NO WAR

THE EUROPEAN CRISES
(Prophetic Scripts)

written by
GERALDINE CUMMINS

compiled by
E. B. GIBBES

PAST
PRESENT
FUTURE

Price 6d.

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THE EUROPEAN CRISES

An index to photographs
purposely drawn

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given through
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Introductory Note.

Geraldine Cummins is a well-known trance-writer, that is, her pen occasionally writes matter on which she has formed no opinion or is directly contrary to her stated opinion and therefore to her conscious mind. She has written several books which record information beyond her normal knowledge but which contain facts verified by University scholars. These are: The Scripts of Cleophas, Paul in Athens, The Great Days of Ephesus, The Childhood of Jesus, When Nero was Dictator. They are primarily concerned with early Christian history. In addition to these, two books called The Road to Immortality and Beyond Human Personality have been published, which deal with conditions in the After-Life. They purport to be dictated by the late F. W. H. Myers (one of the founders of the Society for Psychical Research) who used Miss Cummins as his amanuensis or "interpreter."

Miss Cummins sits at a table, covers her eyes with her left hand, leaving her right hand resting on a block of foolscap paper. After a few moments she falls into a light trance or dream state and her hand begins to write. In order to remove the paper when filled with writing, I sit beside her, asking questions very softly when required or replying to those written down on paper by her. In this manner "communication" is maintained between the living and the so-called dead. The automatist (Miss Cummins) is the placid and silent instrument or intermediary necessary to obtain this contact. On the lines of wireless waves, she is "tuned in" to certain vibrations, which so far no mechanical instrument has registered. In the manner described she will write for periods of from one to two hours—sometimes without a break. Part of this book is reproduced by courtesy of PREDICTION, while a considerable portion appeared recently in LIGHT. By request it is now put into book form, together with some additional matter. It is hoped that the predictions with their numerous verifications, as recorded here-with, will reach a larger public than hitherto and so give reassurance as regards the possibility of war in Europe. This is the sole reason for their reproduction in its present form. The compilation of this little book has necessitated considerable labour. Some of the verifications may prove to be wrongly interpreted, therefore I ask the indulgence of readers.

E. B. GIBBES.
Introduction

Note
The European Crises Foreseen and Recorded

In view of the state of "chronic crisis" in which Europe seems to be plunged, it may be of interest to record the following series of automatic scripts connected with the international situation which have been written by Miss Geraldine Cummins from time to time since March, 1938. They lead up to the present moment.

As a rule, Miss Cummins is engaged on psychic writings of a very different character, but occasionally F. W. H. Myers, a certain well-known Politician, and others purport to write through her.

To go back to the autumn of 1937—Miss Cummins had returned from her home in Ireland (where she had passed the summer) in a very depleted state of health. She spent two months in bed and another two months in being "built up" enough to resist the vagaries of the English climate. Gradually becoming strong enough to do psychic work, we started with a few short sittings early in March, 1938. At these, friends and relatives communicated.

Then came the annexation of Austria by Germany.

Sunday morning, March 13th, 1938, was one of agitation and excitement. The Sunday papers printed huge headlines describing the march into Austria. We had arranged to have a sitting in any case, but in view of this development I decided to ask for the Politician or for Myers—their comments on the situation might be of interest. Miss Cummins too was anxious to obtain some information concerning world affairs at this critical juncture.

It should be noted that the theory of "wish-fulfilment" failed in this instance, as in others.

The name of Silenio (Miss Cummins's Christian "Control" or "Guide") was written. He appeared to be oblivious to the disturbing thoughts which must have been vibrating on the ether, for he quietly wrote: "I draw together to-day the old threads... Behold the Messenger."* And without a pause the latter wrote for a time.

Later, I asked for Myers. When his name appeared on the paper, I enquired if he were conscious of the present European situation. He wrote:

"Yes, I have been talking with X (naming the Politician) about it. He says that there will be no European war, but bloodshed in Austria. Already those in the know are aware that it has to become a province of Germany. Mussolini gave it some months..."
ago to Hitler. Now Mussolini will be faced with the secret disapproval of a section of his people. He will try, therefore, to make terms with England and there is going to be a change of attitude throughout the world. Victory has sometimes greater losses than defeat. Hitler will be able to keep this territory he has acquired, but it will lead to a ring of alliances against him and the expressed determination of small and great nations that he shall not encroach in Hungary or elsewhere. He will find that trade suffers, and it seems that he will be kept in check by England, France, Russia, Rumania and other Balkan States, who will all be prepared to fight him if he goes further. I see no European war this year, but crises at intervals and civil war or shootings in towns on the Continent. This move of Germany's will bring sorely-needed internal unity to France, and it seems that England's next trouble will be Palestine. England is refusing to come to a solution there, and it will make things more difficult for her. I see that Spain again starts up with fresh severe fighting, but Mussolini seems to withdraw more or less, eventually."

After some further comments, Myers ended with: "Do not be afraid. There will not be war for England in Europe this year (1938). I see no farther. There will be further panics, but do not be alarmed for England."

At that time I did not check up the events predicted in the script-writing as they occurred and were reported in the newspapers, for Miss Cummins and I were engaged on another psychically written book. But the above seems to be a fairly accurate forecast of some of the events which subsequently took place.

It will be noted that, speaking of the annexation of Austria, Myers says: "Mussolini gave it some months ago to Hitler." It is of interest here to quote, perhaps, a previous remark of the Politician's in this connection. As long ago as November 6th, 1936, he wrote (referring to Mussolini): "... meanwhile, he aims at alliances with Germany and a settlement in which Austria is also friendly, and he will not object to Austria being federated with Germany, so long as he can secure a strong position with the backing of Germany ... I see, however," he continued, "no signs of a great European war. The strength of the opposing alliances is such that neither side will dare to take the offensive—for some time to come anyhow."

This is the earliest reference that I can trace at the moment to the fact that there would be no European war in which we were involved. And it should be observed that the Politician apparently foresaw in November, 1936, the annexation of Austria by Germany,
which occurred in March, 1938.

Referring to the remark made by F. W. H. Myers that "Mussolini will be faced with the serious disapproval of a section of his people," The Times correspondent, writing from Rome one year later (March 17th, 1939), makes the following statement: "The annexation of Bohemia has merely served to convince Italians of Germany's callousness and untrustworthiness. In the north of Italy, it has made them dislike the Axis policy more than ever" (italics mine).

The Anglo-Italian Agreement was signed in February, 1938.

Myers states that Hitler's action "will lead to a ring of alliances against him . . ." and that he "will be kept in check by England, France, Russia, Rumania and other Balkan States, etc."

This forecast would seem to point to events further ahead and which may be the outcome of the crisis of March, 1939, when Hitler seized Czecho-Slovakia. The Sunday Times (March 19th, 1939) reported the following: "Ministers also discussed . . . a proposal by Lord Halifax for consultations between Britain, France, U.S.A., and Russia, to consider a common policy in the event of further German aggression. To this policy Rumania, Greece, Turkey, Poland and Jugoslavia would be invited to subscribe." The invasion of Albania by Italy on Good Friday, April 7th, 1939, brought about renewed efforts in this direction. At the moment of writing, the forecast, made in March, 1938, has in part been fulfilled.

Germany has certainly found her trade suffer since the writing of the above script. There was no European war in 1938, and there have been a series of crises and panics ever since this prediction was made. The civil war went on in Spain; France became more united and England had serious trouble with Palestine. (On October 18th, 1938, it became necessary for British troops to take charge of Jerusalem. About the same time 10,000 Italian troops were withdrawn from Spain, though a large number remained).

* As in the case of William Blake, certain entities describing themselves as "messengers," communicated the contents of first five books mentioned in introductory note. E.B.G.
Alignment of Poland and Balkan States Predicted

European events were again referred to on May 1st, 1938. The communicator claimed to be the Politician, and his presence was quite unexpected. The same entity had written in December, 1936, that "world war would be avoided although the Powers come pretty near to it . . . I fancy that Germany will, later on, help herself to some slices of country on her Eastern frontier. But it does not necessarily lead to European conflict."

The script of May 1st, 1938, runs as follows (the writing changed to a small hand-writing and the name was given):

"I fear that this is an intrusion. I want to talk about Europe. The game on the political chess-board seems more than usually complicated. You may not know that Chamberlain has risked his popularity and is, in fact, being seriously censured through the country because of his efforts to maintain peace."

I replied that I had not heard it.

"No, not in Kensington or Chelsea would you hear it; but it is said quite freely that Chamberlain has sold the country to the money-lenders and sold the freedom of the seas and the Mediterranean to Italy." (This refers presumably to the Agreement of February, 1938.)

"He has done nothing of the sort. It is quite true that he has greatly benefited the City through this loan to Italy and the trade arrangement. But, actually, it is our coal industry that will feel the benefit most. In return, he receives the friendship of Italy and Mussolini is now anxious to keep his distance in regard to Germany. Hence Hitler's arrangement to visit Mussolini, in order to pacify him. But, in effect, Chamberlain has followed the only road that leads to peace. Though Italy can, through Abyssinia, threaten our trade route to India in a future war, there need be no war if England remains on good terms with Italy. What Chamberlain has prevented is the seizure of the Balearic Islands and a portion of North Spain by Italy, and these are vital regions which concern us."

"North Spain?" I queried.

"Yes," he wrote, "a kind of protectorate on the part of Italy was the idea. But Chamberlain has made it clear that he will not tolerate this. Germany has been allowed to conquer Austria, but again this permission on the part of the Great Powers to such free-booting will lead to serious consequences. There are at present
going on secret political visits, made by highly-placed officials in the Balkan States, and there will be an alignment of these States, an alliance between them, which will check Germany's progress in South-Eastern Europe. Poland, also, is stiffening against Germany, and 'Mein Selbst und Gott'—the old German definition of the Teuton Empire—will lose all round in the long run. I may be sorely mistaken, but some years hence it is likely that Austria may break away from German control.'

A short discussion concerning the Budget then took place, after which I asked this communicator his opinion concerning Ireland and the Treaty just concluded. He wrote:

"Yes, Chamberlain has had a diplomatic triumph in connection with Ireland. Everything will go more than smoothly now between the two Islands. Chamberlain has apprehended the Irish mentality. Lloyd George and those who came after him, including Baldwin, always failed in that respect. In effect, Chamberlain has acted like a statesman, and in the same manner, towards Ireland and Italy. He has made, therefore, a considerable improvement in our position. He has established a friendly Ireland on our Atlantic route, and he has established a friendly Italy on our eastern route. Germany is trying, through the Hitler visit, to upset this amicable relationship with Italy, but he will fail.

"Now, through recent diplomacy, Germany has become isolated and in consequence there will be no war. Chamberlain has, I think, saved Europe. But none of the intellectuals will thank him for that in his life time.

"I see no big European war within the next year. Germany and Italy, for all their window-dressing, are not strong enough to take on England and France; and Germany, though apparently clever, has been very stupid again—without allies, her credit down—because of her assimilation of Austria."

After some criticisms of the Government's management of Palestine and other remarks concerning the future of the Throne of England, our unexpected visitor withdrew.

The same communicator was responsible for the accurate forecast of the abdication of King Edward VIII, given about the time that event took place, and published in Light on November 24th, 1938.

As I have said, I did not then check off these predictions as I noticed any corroborations in the newspapers. Being much occupied in other matters, I put the scripts away and did not again refer to them. About this time, however, it appeared that Mr. Chamberlain had, because of his appeasement policy, become unpopular in
certain parts of the country. The making of the agreement with Italy was severely criticised in some quarters. Hitler also paid a triumphant visit to Rome.

Whether or no Mussolini was aiming at a protectorate in Northern Spain, and whether alliances to check the march of Germany in South-Eastern Europe were then being considered, I do not know. Perhaps again these were glimpses into the more distant future. But the Balearic Islands are still, I think, officially in the hands of Spain and not of Italy—a very important fact. This early reference to Poland is also of interest.

We have certainly now a friendly Ireland on our Atlantic route, but at the moment of writing the idea of a "friendly Italy" seems somewhat mistaken. However, in support of this statement I quote the following remarks taken from The Sunday Times (April 23rd, 1939): "... although the Axis is solid, the aims of the two partners are not the same. It is worth recalling the friendly words towards Britain spoken this week by the Vice-President of the Italian Chamber, Signor Gray. 'With Great Britain,' he said, '... an understanding has been possible ... and to-day cordial accord can be foreseen between the two nations which, if maintained and strengthened, may settle all misunderstandings between the two countries.'" (Reports received in 1939 indicate that the Italian people are friendly to Britain in spite of the policy of their Government).

It will be noticed that the Politician, as early as May 1st, 1938, claims that the Prime Minister, by his determination to make friends with Italy, has "saved Europe."

It must not be forgotten that Signor Mussolini's assistance at the Munich conference helped to secure peace. (See Prime Minister's speech, January 30th, 1939, quoted on page 24.) The assurance is again given that there would be no war.

Now a curious statement occurs in the foregoing script. On May 1st, 1938, the Politician refers to a loan to Italy as an accomplished fact. Yet, on March 4th, 1938, Sir John Simon had stated that no loan to Italy was in contemplation. In his speech, as reported in The Times on March 27th, 1939, Signor Mussolini said: "Time and again the 'pluto-democratic lie-shop' had triumphantly announced the imminent collapse of Fascist Italy — she had worn herself out in Africa, or, later still, in Spain, and was in urgent need of a loan 'which naturally could only be a British one.'"

Writing to The Times on March 29th, 1939, Mr. H. S. Abrahamson says that "Signor Mussolini is quite justified in protesting against the suggestions which have appeared in certain newspapers
representing Italy as in need of a British loan. This ill-founded statement," he writes, "was first launched a year ago . . . and an ill-advised financial writer . . . got hold of the wrong end of the stick." The writer of the letter further remarks that, so far as he is aware, "there has never been any question of Italy asking Great Britain for a loan."

So what are we to conclude? In the face of these denials, one must presume that the Politician was wrong in this instance. Doubtless even the so-called dead are not infallible in their prognostications; moreover, this communicator remarked on December 4th, 1936—referring to another matter—that he was "not a fortune-teller, but that is as I see it from a diagnosis of the situation, and I was successful in that respect in my life." In fact, it seems that he arrives at his views by a process of deduction on certain occasions, intermixed with his ability to foresee events.

From the point of view of a student of Psychical Research, of course, it may be claimed that the automatist read the report of a possible loan to Italy in the paper and that her subconscious mind served it up on this occasion under the guise of the communicator. Alternatively, she may have received the wrong (assuming that this is so) information telepathically from some outside source, for the matter must have been very much "on the air" at that time. Again, the Politician may have noticed the idea of this loan floating around in the mind of the Sensitive and made use of it, thinking it an accomplished fact.

In reviewing this statement in the script it should be remembered that these forecasts, as will be seen, have so far been remarkable in their accuracy. If one or two misfire, this can in no way invalidate the value of the entire series. It would have been very easy, in the circumstances, to have deleted the Politician's remark; but, since it happened, I leave it, and readers can form their own conclusions.

And I would like to take this opportunity to say that of all the many forecasts given, those which have not been verified are relatively few, and generally refer to minor details—remarks made in the course of conversation as it were, when one merely expresses one's opinion but does not make a definite statement.

Miss Cummins went to Ireland at the end of June, 1938. We had been engaged on many matters, some of a particularly worrying and anxious character intermixed with scripts from a "Messenger." So, save for a communication at the end of May from a certain deceased Army officer assuring his wife that there would be no war and that he and his group were working for peace, there
were no further references to the international situation until the middle of the September (1938) crisis. This took the form of a letter written early one morning by the same Army officer, who occasionally communicated through Geraldine Cummins. He was insistent that a message should be sent to his wife in England assuring her that we should not be involved in war. At that moment, Miss Cummins had become convinced that war was inevitable. Full details of this incident were published in *Light* (October 13th, 1938).
The Violation of the Munich Pact Foretold

Now, to come to the time when Miss Cummins returned to London after the crisis of September 1938. Our first sitting for automatic writing took place on October 12th, 1938. It was natural perhaps, that, after such an anxious time, there should be some communications of a personal kind. Therefore, friends of mine were the first to ask if they could speak to us. Among these was an elderly man whom Astor (another of Miss C's controls), introduced as "the Financier." He had occasionally communicated before, giving information of an interesting character.

On March 17th, 1938, after the annexation of Austria, he had written about family matters. Asked if he thought there would be war, he replied: "Not for England. I see no war in the coming months for us, but panics at intervals and the Stock Exchange in the dumps! . . ."

In his life, his was a far-seeing and brilliant mind. Anxious about those he loved on earth and knowing that I was in touch with them, he was waiting to speak to us on October 12th, the first opportunity in my presence since the previous June. I referred to the crisis just passed and asked him to describe some aspect of it from his viewpoint.

"Yes, we were kept busy over here," he replied. "However, as we had previously assured you there would be no war, I did not attempt to write to you."

"How was Peace fixed up with Hitler by Chamberlain at the last moment?" I enquired.

"All the most able minds that belonged to Britain and France," he wrote, "were united in one white electric force. They sent out a beam of thought to Chamberlain, and in a lesser sense to Daladier and Mussolini—three beams. They then encircled Hitler with a red sign, which was the only one that might keep out the continuous demands of his advisers that he should go to war. You are probably not aware that Germany was, in essentials, the stronger. Her air fleets would have smashed up many towns in England and paralysed communications to a certain degree. First, her army would have possessed Czechoslovakia, then she would merely have defended herself in regard to France, and struck at England swiftly with all her air forces. The Allies might have brought things to a stale-mate in time, but at the cost
of a ruined England.

"I want you to understand that, in order to obtain glimpses of the earth's future we, here, have to place ourselves in a special state. This state of acute mental and spiritual observation transports us into Recorded Time—or what some may call 'God's Time.' Then we obtain glimpses of things to come. But we may not remain long in that higher zone—the atmosphere is too rarified, to put it crudely. I knew there would be no war; but, all the same, I worked with all the inadequate power I have to avert it. For I was responding to the law of my being. And in this Recorded Time, one perceives usually two events."

(Here a little picture of scales was drawn and the words "The Scales" appeared beside it.)

"I saw the picture of war and its results in the left one (scale), and I saw war averted and its results in the right. They were evenly balanced. The Omnipotent Mind does not judge. It conceives the two pictures as a painter perceives his unpainted picture. It leaves to man to choose which he will have. The choice is made according to the average of spirituality in the few rulers concerned; according, also, to the average of emotion and intelligence. We, on this side, could do much in such a crisis to tip the scales in the right direction.

"The many thousands slaughtered in the last war, dying with thoughts of revenge and agony, produced a fog of evil, gaseous memory, which the lower influences over here strove to cast about the principal figures in Europe. So, apart from our own special section, there was great conflict raging here—working for revenge, hate and destruction, or for peace, common-sense and construction. You are not by any means out of the wood. Hitler is already thinking of his next move. There will be another war crisis next year (1939). It will be even more dangerous because conducted with greater secrecy than the last one. It will come out of apparent calm. I think that, for the moment, he is content to stir up trouble for England through his agents in Palestine. He hopes to rouse the whole Moslem world against England, and so embarrass her in India and in the East generally. Hitler worships only one thing—power and domination. He wants to go from victory to victory. But it will be some months before he has finished consolidating his new territories in the Reich."

"You said it was the men behind him, not Hitler, who were pushing him into war?" I said:

"I spoke of the crisis in the autumn (1938). Hitler saw further than they did and argued that it was better peacefully to
acquire the valuable forts, mines and timber of Czecho-Slovakia. These then, as an increased source of strength, would enable him to fight and dominate more easily at a later time.'

"The German nation don't want war it seems?"

"You have hit on the weak spot, the Achilles heel of Hitler, in that remark. He and his advisers do not yet realise the growth of internal discontent in Germany. It is extremely secret, but it is there and spreading among the workers. England's best hope of peace lies in time. By delaying and delaying the apparently inevitable war, she gives the revolting party in Germany a chance to become strong—so strong that, eventually, they turn on the present régime and attack it openly. I think, therefore, that a great war can, and will be, averted. But you will go dangerously near it, and only the strength of your armaments will prevent its outbreak.

"Well, we continue to re-arm and prepare for war in spite of our pact with Germany never to go to war with each other again," I remarked.

"That pact is not worth the paper it is written on. Hitler is essentially an opportunist and whatever is favourable at the moment he snatches at. He holds that the truth of yesterday is not the truth of to-day. Do not worry about the future of Europe. He who takes up the sword perishes by the sword. Germany is the advocate diablo of violence to-day. Such violence will re-act on it to-morrow internally. Peace of a kind continues for some time. But clouds gather in the East in connection with Palestine."

It will be observed that the Financier says that we are "probably not aware that Germany was, in essentials, the stronger. Her air fleets would have smashed up towns," etc.

In the Prime Minister's speech delivered at Birmingham on March 17th, 1939, and reported in The Times the next day, we may note that he admits that "after Munich our defence programme was actually accelerated and it was expanded so as to remedy certain weaknesses which had become apparent during the crisis."

("Certain weaknesses" is good!)

It was not clear which crisis was to come "out of apparent calm." Calmness, to some extent, prevailed until a day or two before the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia, and trade was more stabilised. On the other hand, another crisis in May is mentioned later as being dangerous for this reason, and the writing subsequently indicated that this was the crisis referred to.

Regarding the statement that Hitler is "content to stir up trouble through his agents in Palestine," the following is of interest.
Writing from Jerusalem on November 28th, 1938, The Times correspondent says "that German moneys are passing through a certain Arab in Damascus, and thence filtering through to Palestine is certain... propagandist literature is being printed in Arabic in Germany and distributed in Palestine and Egypt. It is known that Germans of all ranks and occupations in Palestine and Egypt are playing their allotted parts in the service of Nazism and that the centre of this organisation is in Cairo."

Certainly, Hitler has moved from one triumphant victory to another since this script was written, and he does not yet appear to have finished consolidating his new territories in the Reich! Frankly, Miss Cummins and I rather doubted the Financier's statement as to the growth of internal discontent in Germany.

However, on January 2nd, 1939, The Times printed a long article entitled "Germany in 1938." Space permits only some brief extracts from it. "... The nerves of the German people had been subjected to a strain such as they can seldom have known save in time of war... the opposition of both Catholics and Protestants to Nazi Church policy... the resentment felt by 'intellectuals' at the subordination of art and science to political cant... the dissatisfaction of the peasants with an agricultural policy whereby... Among employers of labour there is opposition... among the working-class there has been resentment at the destruction of trade unions, and at a system which, amid all the symptoms of a boom, has prevented working-class standards of living from rising... growing dissatisfaction at the periodically recurring shortages of certain foodstuffs and the deterioration in the quality of many products, particularly clothing... the workmen had been led to believe that conditions would be improved as soon as the initial problem of giving full employment had been solved. This hope has been sadly disappointed... conscript labour. This measure was very unpopular... bitter resentment caused by the compulsory dispatch of workmen to places far from their homes and families... this cavalier treatment was extremely unpopular..."

The "strength of our armaments" must certainly play a considerable part in averting a general war. Though "peace of a kind" then continued, we seemed to be "dangerously near" war at intervals.

Subsequent actions of the German Dictator have proved the truth of this communicator's statements made in October 1938, concerning the worthlessness of the pact signed between him and Mr. Chamberlain at Munich. In view of Herr Hitler's repeated assurances that he had no further territorial claims in Europe, I
viewed the Financier's summing up of that individual as being personal prejudice and dislike in some way. But I need only quote Mr. Duff Cooper's remark in the House of Commons on March 16th, 1939, after the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia, for corroboration of the actual words of the script written in October, 1938. He said: "I consider that no agreement he (Hitler) signs is worth the paper it is written on."

In corroboration of the Financier's statement that German violence will react on Germany, attention is drawn to the Prime Minister's words in his Birmingham speech (March 17th, 1939). He is reported to have said: "This is a great and powerful nation—far more powerful than we were even six months ago, and acts of violence and injustice bring with them sooner or later their own reward. Everyone of these incursions raises up fresh dangers for Germany in the future, and I venture to prophesy that in the end she will bitterly regret what her Government has done."

On the following day (October 13th, 1938) the Politician again wrote through Miss Cummins. Being a Politician, there is a certain amount of justified criticism in his writing, part of which was subsequently corroborated by the Prime Minister in the speech to which I have just alluded. Referring to the September crisis and the Munich agreement, the Politician said:

"I feel that Chamberlain, in view of the circumstances, had no other choice. I, of course, commend him for his great courage, his devotion and his sincerity. But it appears to me that wise statesmen should have foreseen this crisis a year at least previous to the occasion of its appearance. Baldwin and the then acting French Premier should have foreseen the danger to Austria and to Czecho-Slovakia. If they could not have saved Austria, they should at least have urged the Czechs to make peace within their borders, to unite Bohemia to them by giving the Sudeten Germans all the privileges that would win them. Where Chamberlain was caught—apart from military strength—was in the weakness of the cause he was expected to fight for, expected by Labour, at least. The Sudeten Germans asked for the Reich; and, though their demand was artificially stimulated, it remained the request of the majority, and in refusing it the Allies would have been violating League principles . . ."

In his speech (March, 1939), Mr. Chamberlain, (referring to the Munich agreement) says: "I had to deal with no new problem. This was something that had existed ever since the Treaty of Versailles—a problem that ought to have been solved long ago, if only the statesmen of the last twenty years had taken broader and more enlightened views of their duty . . ."

To revert to the Script of October 13th, 1938. The Politician
wrote as follows:

"... They will accuse Chamberlain shortly of being pro-Fascist, of endeavouring to run England on Fascist lines. As I see the future there will be a condition of unrest for some time to come. Chamberlain fails, at present, to get any definite assurances from the Dictator Hitler. He is unable to nail him down. Sentimental diatribes about the desire of Germany for peace may well be uttered by him, but they mean nothing. Hitler and Mussolini are now waiting for the last act of the Spanish tragedy. When that comes, when there is an attempt at a settlement in Spain, it seems that another war crisis occurs. The Dictators want their money's worth, and England and France will again be threatened with war. It seems that only Chamberlain's extreme caution saves the situation in this instance. The public will know much less about it on this occasion. That is why the position will be more dangerous than the position last September. Manœuvres and negotiations are mostly carried on behind the scenes. But it seems to me that a European war is put off at any rate ... Where Hitler and Mussolini are at a disadvantage is in economic matters. Those two countries are nearer bankruptcy than we are. It is finance that saves us from war in the next crisis. Czecho-Slovakia becomes an unacknowledged German colony. It is almost wholly dependent on the Sudeten German area, and in future the Czechs will have to obey Hitler for the sake of their trade and for the sake of their very existence. Take a longer view. Time is on our side. Germany has now within its borders very different types of people. Numbers of them do not enjoy the Prussian drill-sergeant's manner of government; for it is only through Prussianism that Germany is held together and made one unit. In a few years time there will be discontent and the dividing again of the people into factions—a decadence, a breaking-up. Then Germany becomes less formidable. Time is on our side. But, as usual, England has to pay heavily to keep out of war. In other words, England buys her peace. But it is worth while. Our financial strength at present is our strongest weapon of defence."

Though written in October, 1938, the view expressed by the Politician that Mr. Chamberlain would be accused of being a Fascist was given expression to by Mr. Atlee, the Opposition Leader, in the House of Commons on February 28th, 1939. He said: "The Prime Minister might have been a dictator addressing a Fascist Grand Council ..."

That the Dictators are waiting for "the last act of the Spanish tragedy" remains to be seen. German and Italian troops are still in Spain, though the majority are now reputed to be withdrawn. The truth of the Politician's statement that "only Chamberlain's
extreme caution saves the situation in this instance” may be inferred by his determination not to break the Italian Agreement. In his speech on April 13th, 1939, after the annexation of Albania by Italy, Mr. Chamberlain said: “No doubt some will say that we should now declare that the Anglo-Italian Agreement must be considered to be at an end. I do not take that view myself. Nobody with any sense of responsibility can in these days lightly do anything that would lead to increase in international tension, and everybody would deplore the loss of the advantages that follow from international agreements arrived at after mutual discussion.”

Commenting on the Prime Minister's speech, The Evening Standard applauds his declaration "which combines firmness with a determined refusal to take any action which might in any way bring war nearer... such as has been urged upon him from some quarters. He has refused to denounce the Anglo-Italian treaty... his desire to leave the door open to the establishment of genuine friendship between this country and Italy.”

The fact that Germany was near bankruptcy is confirmed by Herr Brinkmann of the Nazi Ministry of Economics in a long statement which was reported in The Sunday Referee (March 19th, 1939). This statement showed that "economically, industrial Germany is within sight of breaking-point."

Czecho-Slovakia became an unacknowledged colony of Germany after the crisis of September, 1938, and Time has certainly "been on our side."

Readers will observe that the prognostications of both the Financier and the Politician, made directly after the crisis of September, 1938, anticipated another crisis for May of this year.

It is true that Herr Hitler's speech (April 28th, 1939) somewhat eased the international tension. But the correct interpretation of these phrases concerning the crisis in May, is given at the end of this pamphlet.
After Munich

On Sunday, October 16th, 1938, the Financier again communicated by automatic writing through Miss Cummins. This was, as in other instances, quite unexpected. The matter seemed urgent, so I told "Astor" to let him come. There followed a script written without a break, needed no editing (beyond punctuation, etc.) and which seemed to have been carefully thought out beforehand. It covered nine pages of foolscap and was inscribed in forty minutes or less. The handwriting changed as usual.

"You have been a troubler of my peace," the Financier wrote.
"Oh! I am so sorry," I remarked.
"I deserted my garden and made the grand tour of the Teutonic mind and searched everywhere for information that is not known to journalists or perhaps even to the British Cabinet. Shall I briefly summarise my conclusions?" (Yes, please.)

"Firstly, let us go back a little way into the past. At the time of the Anschluss, if Austria had been prepared to defend itself and fight to the last against aggression, half the German army would have mutinied. They certainly would have refused to fight those they regarded as their kinsfolk.

"Half the army is discontented, Germany is seething with discontent. It is cleverly concealed. When Hitler threatened to march into Czechoslovakia, he placed himself in a very dangerous position. Chamberlain actually pulled him back from a precipice. It seems that Hitler made this threat in the belief that when he had taken possession of the whole of Czechoslovakia, France and England would only protest, but would do nothing. Chamberlain, when he paid his first visit (to Germany) made it clear that they would go to war. The Chancellor, after Chamberlain had left, had practically what amounted to a nervous breakdown. Only Göring and Goebbels were aware of the extent of their Emperor's hysteria.

"Goebbels counselled then a bold policy—rejection in totem of Chamberlain and his proposals on his second visit, the gambler's desperate last throw. Goebbels pointed out that Hitler could not go back on his demands; if he did, he would lose his prestige with the German people, the agitators would seize the opportunity, and there might, indeed, arise a revolt that could not be crushed.

"Chamberlain has extraordinary intuition. He sensed the whole situation, though he did not realise all the weakness of Hitler's position. So he did the only wise thing possible. When
he returned from Godesberg, he made England prepare for war with such vigour that at last Hitler and his advisers could doubt no longer.

"Do you realise that the trench-digging, the distribution of gas-masks, evacuation of children, were all superb play-acting—I mean from the point of view of the inner circle of politicians. They knew perfectly well it was enough to bring Hitler to book. Mussolini then made a dramatic entry according to plan at the end of the second act. So it was that we had what I believe some called a miracle as a dénouement. It was nothing of the sort. No miracle occurred whatever. Each step was calculated and its results foreseen.

"There was only one serious danger—Hitler going mad and infecting his military advisers with his madness. But England’s military parade brought them to their senses. Chamberlain saw all along that, in common fairness, if the Germans in Czecho-Slovakia wished to return to Germany, they should be allowed to do so. The difficulty was to get the Czechs to see this. They wouldn’t until the last moment. They, too, had to be made to realise that they, in hundreds, would be slaughtered if they did not give in. Chamberlain did not perform a miracle, but he achieved a diplomatic triumph and saved many Czech lives.

"Now, as to the future. At the present time, if Germany fought the Allies she would not be able to maintain a war for more than a month. The reason for this is that she is nearly bankrupt. It is essential in a great war of that character, which employs all the energies of the population, to be able to buy supplies from neutral countries, of the necessaries of life and munitions. Germany could do neither. She couldn’t buy. In 1914 she was much stronger financially; and, in any case, a 1938 or 1939 war would make a far greater demand on the energies of the whole German population.

"No, during the next eighteen months Germany is in no position to go to war—only the madness of a greater fear, fear of a revolution within, would goad her rulers into starting a European war: a last attempt to save themselves; for war would mean unity against the common enemy within Germany at once.

"Wise statesmanship—that is to say, moderation in the councils of France and Britain—will prevent any such war during the next eighteen months. So long as they do not goad the Germans into fighting by any humiliating demands, all will be well.

"You see, Hitler has created a new idol—a proud, free, triumphant Germany. He daren’t, for the sake of his own posi-
tion, allow this idol to be tarnished or desecrated through any suggestion that Germany is not the equal of the Great Powers.

"What I prophesied long ago, I think, is now coming to pass—an economic alliance (partly secret) between Britain and U.S.A. This, in the long run, will be extraordinarily favourable as regards putting an end to unrest and war alarms. Britain, with the U.S.A.'s power for production and vast capacity for supply behind her in the case of war, will be in a much stronger position to act as mediator in Europe and, perhaps, in time secure a reduction in armaments output.

"I think there will be bargaining and panic at the termination of the Spanish war, but no real danger of war in Europe over it. So keep your head and remain calm when such a situation arises.

"Peace for the next eighteen months. Let that be your motto. I cannot see further than that period. Germany will go down hill slowly. Even now a great number of her people are hungry—terribly hungry. There is want in her cities you do not know of here. In such a situation lies the seeds of decay. Napoleon lost through exhausting France. Germany is likely to lose, I think, in the same way, without striking a blow over a period of time.

"Forgive this long dissertation. It is written out of intimate knowledge. I have drifted over and through the great German cities—an extraordinarily interesting experience—I do not regret it."

Now, let us record a few corroborations in the above script. The information that Germany was "seething with discontent" is supported by an article in The Times previously quoted by me (p. 18). The Financier says: "Mussolini then made a dramatic entry according to plan." In his speech at Birmingham on January 30th, 1939, the Prime Minister is reported to have said: "I go further and say that peace could not have been preserved if it had not been for the events which had preceded it—by the exchange of letters between myself and Signor Mussolini in the summer of 1937, and by the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian Agreement in February of last year, because without the improvement in the relations between this country and Italy, I could never have obtained Signor Mussolini's co-operation in September, and without his co-operation I do not believe peace could have been saved." (The Times, Jan. 30th, 1939.)

This passage from the Prime Minister's speech confirms the Politician's forecast of May 1st, 1938 (see p. 11), when he declared that Chamberlain's diplomacy had "saved Europe."

The Financier writes: "If it had not been for the visit to Munich, the Czechs would have been slaughtered in hundreds if
they had not given in. Chamberlain did not perform a miracle, but he achieved a diplomatic triumph and saved many Czech lives."

Speaking at Birmingham, March 17th, 1939, Mr. Chamberlain said (referring to the Munich visit): "The peace of England was saved; and, if it had not been for those visits, hundreds of thousands of families would have been mourning for the flower of Europe's manhood."

The Financier remarked that "Germany could not maintain a war for more than a month... she couldn't buy..." In this connection the following observations from an "eminent economist" published two months later in The Daily Sketch (December 16th, 1938) are of interest. "Our financial resources are far greater than those of Germany, and a rich country must always prove victorious in a prolonged struggle with a poor one. Germany has a very small secret gold reserve and practically no foreign investments. It is doubtful whether she could borrow abroad on any terms. She could not last a month of war (italics mine). So poor is her purchasing power abroad that the next war would differ from the last in that there would be no necessity for us to blockade Germany. Germany could not pay for anything purchased overseas and, therefore, foreign powers would not sell to her. Great Britain is strong because we have a gold reserve of...",(giving the vast sums).

The bankruptcy of Germany has been referred to by Herr Brinkmann (see p. 21).

The Financier writes of having already predicted "an economic alliance" between U.S.A. and Great Britain. This is correct. On March 4th, 1938, before the annexation by Germany of Austria, he wrote: "I have every reason to believe that within two years, understandings are come to by the Great European nations and trade becomes freer then. England and U.S.A. are coming together secretly much more. Their economic arrangements as regards trade lead to a financial alliance which will do more than anything to keep the peace of the world." The Anglo-American and Canadian-American Trade Agreements were signed at Washington on November 17th, 1938.—(The Times, Nov. 18th, 1938.) From the Financier's forecast given in above paragraph, it appears that he anticipates more peaceful conditions in 1940. Recent developments in U.S.A. tend to confirm his views. In referring again to the end of the Spanish War, it will be noted that he uses the word "bargaining."
On November 19th, 1938, the Financier came again. I asked if he had anything to tell us of the persecution of the Jews by Germany. He wrote:

"Alas, yes. I have been greatly saddened and moved by all I have seen. Hunger, death and sorrow already are the rule among the poorer classes over there. The older generation (of Germans) are repelled by the persecution, the youths are enjoying it, it satisfies their desire temporarily for military glory. That, and the plunder, are the reasons Hitler caused the Jews to be attacked at this time. As he did not go to war he had, he felt, to blood his hounds—that is to say, the youth of the country. This diversion takes the people's minds off the tyranny under which they labour, or with the thoughtful causes them to despair—to be afraid to conspire. Many Jews will die while nations confer and talk. But it seems as if Roosevelt is seriously considering refusing to sell any further materials for the manufacture of munitions to Germany. The only fear is lest the financiers who benefit from the sale will object. But I think Roosevelt will put it through. Otherwise is seems that all that is done is the taking by the various countries of a quota of Jews from Germany . . . I think that, from the point of view of England, this Jew persecution is, politically speaking, all to her advantage—America is, as it were, thrown into her arms. It will help to strengthen our secret alliance with U.S.A. Other countries in Europe are afraid now of Germany, and therefore tend to stand together against her.

"By the way, there will be another crisis when Germany appears to want like a dog to take a bite of territory on the North-East—the objective may be the port of Memel. Lithuania is likely to be threatened. There will be vehement protests. I think it likely they will be disregarded and there seems a real danger of war. But it appears that Germany gets her way and she gets some scraps of territory in that direction . . . Hitler seems to carry on for eighteen months or two years. Then he is removed and it seems as if there is a coup d'état and a new régime. The old bullies go . . . But the new rulers, though not as bad as their predecessors, will still be rather hostile to world progress. The coup d'état appears to bring splits in the country . . ."
various countries conferred, all that they were able to do was to take a quota of Jews into their different countries.

February 2nd, 1939, brought the announcement that America’s frontier was "in France." This led to considerable fury in Germany and to controversy in the U.S.A.

In view of the statement concerning a secret alliance with America recorded in above script, the following extract from The Times (Feb. 3rd, 1939) is of interest: "There thus remains the accusation that the President has so enlarged the road of French and British access to American industrial facilities as either to have made this country the virtual 'ally' of two European powers, or at least to have gone through the preliminary motions of an 'alliance'. . . A number of Republicans and some Democrats . . . now insist that the President is conducting a secret foreign policy . . ."

Now, as regards the Financier's forecast concerning Memel. December 12th, 13th, 1938, etc., showed results of the elections in Memel-land to be a foregone conclusion, the campaign having, apparently, been conducted on the same lines as those adopted "by Herr Heinlein in the penultimate stages of his struggle with the Prague Government."

Memel passed into the Greater German Reich on March 23rd, 1939. The Financier's prediction of November 19th, 1938, was thus fulfilled.

It will be observed that, referring to Memel, this communicator stated that he anticipated another crisis and "a real danger of war." From this remark we may assume he saw the cloud of war which was precipitated by the threat of Germany to Danzig and the subsequent menace to peace over Poland at the end of March, 1939. This culminated in the British Government giving an assurance of support to Poland if her independence were threatened. "Real danger of war" over this situation has been evident ever since.

As regards the forecast that Hitler carries on for eighteen months or two years and there is then a new régime, I quote again from the article describing conditions in Germany and published in The Times (Jan. 2nd, 1939). "There is a widespread feeling of resentment against the Party . . . proved wholly unsuited for the posts to which they were appointed. Many genuine enthusiasts have been disillusioned by the spectacle of these men using their positions for personal gain. Ex-service men, in particular, have had the feeling that their very real services to Germany have been forgotten . . . thus a background of discontent has always been present . . . Possibly, there is a greater opposition to Hitler to-day
than for some time past. It is, however, an unorganised opposition and a divided opposition. For, though united in dislike of the present régime, it has no agreed alternative to offer."

NOTE.—Because the Financier appears to be very much in touch with present world conditions, it must not be inferred that he spends his new life only in studying market prices and Foreign affairs. As indicated (p. 16) he has other work; for rest and recreation he has his garden (p. 22). It is obvious that, granting survival of human personality and of memory, he would be anxious to reassure those he has left on earth on the matter of war. (p.33). For totem read toto, (p. 22). E.B.G.
The Crises of March and May 1939

On Christmas Day, 1938, Miss Cummins and I were prepared for one of the group of Messengers to continue his writing, but once again "wish-fulfilment" played no part in the proceedings. M., a young daughter of the Financier's who had died some years ago, asked to be permitted to speak. The matter seemed urgent, so I let her do so. Towards the end of the sitting, she said she had a message from her father. She was asked to say that there would be no war, but "a great panic later in the year—probably May." I asked if this would be in connection with Spain? She replied: "Yes, Italy, backed by Germany, tries to be greedy."

This was the first indication that the month of May would bring trouble, as I then concluded, in connection with the Mediterranean. It will be recalled that the script of October 13th, 1938, predicted a crisis at the termination of the Spanish War. Later, this is referred to more definitely by the Financier himself.

On January 25th, 1939, we were rung up by the Editor of Prediction, who asked if we had received any indications that there would be no war? If so, could we let him have an article by first post the next morning on this matter. We were occupied with other affairs until 4.30 p.m. At this hour I obtained fuller details from the Editor. Miss Cummins and I decided to have a special sitting in order to augment (or otherwise) the existing information we had on the subject. This automatic script published in Prediction (March), was issued on February 10th, 1939. It was written by the Financier and runs as follows:

"I have told you before, and I repeat it again, there is to be no war during the next few years. I cannot see farther. There is to be no European war in which many countries are involved. You will hear of riots and you will hear of horrible deeds committed in Spain, and in March nations will be faced with a serious crisis. The majority of people will believe that war is inevitable. This belief is entirely mistaken.

"In May also I anticipate a period of great anxiety. Indeed, throughout the summer there will be much uncertainty. Public opinion will go up down, be swayed this way and that by the collective fears of a great number of men and women.

"During the times of anxiety and especially during the period of panic I advise every sensible man and woman to go about their work calmly and fearlessly, holding in their minds the idea of peace. This in itself will be beneficial and help to produce a stability of outlook which must in time re-establish confidence. In that at-
mosphere, nations should eventually come to a point in which they distrust each other less and can begin to confer at last with a genuine determination to settle their differences.

"It must be borne in mind that both Hitler and Mussolini are in a difficult position and it should be realised that, though they are going to attempt a big bluff fairly soon and through threats endeavour to bully the other Great Powers into yielding up territory, they will not, on this occasion, obtain what they are aiming for. In other words, though there is a measure of compromise, they will fail to pull off their bluff. They do not, in other words, become masters of the Mediterranean."

"The internal situation of the larger but not greater Germany is very serious, economically speaking. There is grave discontent, because of the rationing system, because of the long hours and the regimenting of the people. Italy also is in a serious financial position, more serious than is realised. So the two autocrats at the head of these countries, though they go very far in their threats of war, do not, when the moment comes for the final decision, make war.

"Of course, ordinary people will only hear a certain amount of what is going on in regard to the discussions between the representatives of these European powers. But though we go very near to war during the coming year, I assure you that there will be none as anticipated. Actually, Italy is in a worse position than Germany—or I should say, the Fascists and their Dictator are less welded together than the Nazis and theirs.

"Mussolini’s grip is slackening. He is already a defeated man and I see that his time is not long. There is going to be disturbance and trouble in Italy, but not quite yet. That seems to come next year, though it is difficult to gauge the time in that connection. Eventually, but not for some time yet, this clumsy, larger Germany becomes disunited and the seeds of decay are already taking root in it.

"All I would ask of you in England in the coming time is to be cheerful, to work and trade as if peace lay before you. For though there is economic war (in other words, fierce trade competition), you are not going to have a war of arms. Put the idea of bombs dropping on London and the big cities of England out of your head. It is not going to happen."

He ended with the following paragraph: "Rely on Germany’s and Italy’s economic weakness when it comes to the point. They are afraid to make war because they know they can’t last the course. Rely also on the backing of the United States in regard to materials, etc., and supplies. The fear of the backing of the United States
in this respect in the event of war will have a strong influence on the Dictators in the hours of crisis—France and Britain stand together but they have others behind them also.’’

In this script of January 25th, 1939, the Financier refers to “riots” and “horrible deeds committed in Spain.” For days after the fall of Barcelona at the end of March newspapers reported the horrors which were being perpetrated in that country. As for the riots, it may be taken that the Financier indicated the outbreaks in India and Burma which occurred about 11th of February. The Times reported (February 13th and 14th) that numbers had been killed in the rioting, and that the situation was “still grave.” British troops patrolled the streets of Cawnpore and extra police were drafted in. “All normal life in the city is paralysed.”

The forecast given on January 25th that “in March, nations would be faced with a serious crisis” was entirely justified. In spite of his assertion that Germany would make no more territorial claims in Europe, Hitler re-started his campaign of appropriation, and on March 15th, 1939, German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia. British and French Ambassadors were recalled from Berlin. It will be observed that the communicator refers to “Nations” and not “the Nation,” as being faced with a crisis.

Readers may notice that, on Christmas Day, 1938, the Financier’s daughter, M., stated that there would be “a great panic later in the year, probably May.” In reply to a suggestion from me, referring to Spain, she said: “Yes, Italy, backed by Germany, tries to be greedy.”

Up to the time of putting these writings into book form, the anticipated claims by Italy have not been seriously put forward. In his speech on March 26th last Signor Mussolini stated that “the Mediterranean was a vital area for Italy” and referred to the questions “which Italy had to settle with France, problems of a colonial character—Tunis, Jibuti and the Suez Canal.” The Daily Telegraph as recently as July 3rd, 1939, reports the following: The Relazioni Internazionali, the well-informed weekly review, says: ‘‘If in defending the status quo of Danzig, Paris and London think they defend Tunis, Jibuti and Suez, the mistake could not be greater. By defending Danzig the gun will speak and with the gun the Italian claims will be solved simultaneously.’’ This statement is in strange contrast to the attitude of Italy in general towards being mixed up with Danzig, as has been published in various journals on the matter. However, it indicates the attitude of the two dictators to which the Financier refers in his writing of Jan. 25th, 1939, where he says: “They will fail to pull off their bluff. They do
not, in other words, become masters of the Mediterranean.'’

But I wish to introduce some possible explanation for the apparent confusion as regards date in the above statement made by the Financier’s daughter. First, it was I who suggested Spain, and thereby the Mediterranean, to the sub-conscious mind of the automatist (or her mind may itself have taken this course, touching on previous remarks and conscious conclusions).

But there is another explanation which, from experience, seems to me a more likely one. The Financier’s daughter is not particularly interested in the affairs of this world. She is absorbed in her present life and only occasionally communicates when some serious matter of a family kind may have presented itself on earth. She has stated that she finds difficulty in reading the future and does not appear very interested in doing so. In other words, I have found her forecasts in various ways occasionally somewhat inaccurate. I am thinking of an instance when this young communicator assured me through Miss Cummins that a certain anticipated family happening would not take place. At the same sitting, the Financier wrote that it would. He was entirely correct. He stated that he recollected the character of one of the parties concerned and had read the mind of the other. Putting the two together, he deduced that this event would take place. I cannot enter into further details but give the above facts as an illustration that predictions, purporting to come from unseen entities, would seem to be made in part by deduction, assisted, as has been indicated, by certain glimpses into the future.

In passing on this message from her father, I would draw attention to the wording of the remarks in question: they denote a certain happy carelessness in contrast to the Financier’s own very firm statements. They should not therefore be taken too seriously. It will be noted that the Financier did not specify the form the panic would take.

To continue the chain of predictions given by the Financier, it is necessary to explain that his family has no direct contact with him through psychic means. However, he occasionally gives me messages to certain members of it. These I pass on.
The Fall of Madrid

On January 27th, 1939, "Astor" again wrote that the Financier wished to speak. He referred to his previous communication and said that he was thinking of his daughter and grandsons when he wrote it. "As the latter are on the Stock Exchange," he said, "I want them to bear in mind that, this year, however near we seem to be to war, there is no war. Let them buy and sell accordingly . . . it is merely the advice of an old financier."

He continued spontaneously: "I am inclined to believe that May sees the fall of Madrid. It won't be before then, I fancy."

"Oh! But Barcelona has just fallen," I remarked. "So it seems probable that the rest of Spain will fall."

"Not yet. But there will be some gross demand from Mussolini shortly—March most likely, and then there comes a crisis. But somehow it misfires. Chamberlain is going to be firm then. That will steady things. But all through the summer, Europe will be in a most disturbed state—according to experts on your side 'anything may happen.' But that anything won't happen—a polite disguise for the word "war."

It will be noted that the Financier mentions that May would see the fall of Madrid. This was inaccurate, inasmuch as the city surrendered to the Nationalist troops at the end of March. When this error later on became apparent, I did not draw Miss Cummins's attention to it. She was quite unaware that the fall of Madrid had been mentioned in any communication. But at a sitting on April 16th, 1939, when the Financier was again writing, I commented on this error of his. Instantly he made the following reply. The explanation had not occurred to me. He wrote (underlining the first words):

"Yes, but it does not fall to Franco until May. So far, Franco has been afraid to enter Madrid for fear of assassination, for fear that he and his advisers may be blown up or shot. So I was right as regards it not being conquered until May, for Franco cannot enter it as a conqueror till then. They are, meantime, busy combing out the Republican ringleaders in it so as to make it really a conquered city."

With reference to the "gross demand from Mussolini" (January 27th), I am inclined to think that Hitler's name should have been substituted for that of Mussolini. This may have been a slip on the part of the communicator, i.e., the wrong name may have first been caught by the automatist's brain and left unobserved.
on paper by the communicator. (I have evidence that this does occasionally occur). It will be seen by what follows that Hitler's annexation of Czechoslovakia was the incident indicated.

It is curious to note that, in his speech on April 4th, Lord Stanhope (who may be considered "an expert"), is reported to have used the words "... the fleet to be ready for anything that might happen"—the Financier's exact words.

Confirmation of the Financier's statement concerning conditions in Madrid appears in The Sunday Referee (May 14th). Referring to the cancellation of General Goering's visit to that city, their diplomatic correspondent wrote: "Gestapo agents in Spain reported to Berlin that Madrid is full of Republicans ready to take the chance of a long shot at a distinguished Nazi or Fascist."

Had The Times correspondent known of the Financier's prognostications concerning the fall of Madrid and the termination of the Spanish War, given on January 27th, 1939, he could hardly have chosen more apt words with which to confirm it than those which follow.

Writing from Madrid on May 18th, 1939, he says: "General Franco entered Madrid to-day, thus ringing down the curtain on the Spanish War. This, according to a statement made by the Minister of the Interior, is the symbolic termination of the war and victory's most perfect crown." (The Times, May 19th, 1939).

It may now be of interest to introduce a few personal details. The information contained in the writing of January 27th, 1939, displayed considerable accuracy as regards the exact date of the crisis precipitated by Hitler's annexation of Czechoslovakia in mid-March. The Financier's daughter H. was going to the South of France for purposes of health early in February. During the sitting of January 27th I remarked that, if we were to expect a crisis in March as suggested, she might have to hurry home on account of it. He replied:

"Your time is difficult. But they seem to return just before the crisis or when it is upon Europe. But it does not spoil the holiday; I don't see that. All signs point to mid-March for the new political excitement—growing to fever-heat near the end of the month. But it seems that Chamberlain's Government hardens and so steadies things. He has been a little flabby before. Hitler thinks him a weak man. He is not. But Hitler has to learn that yet."

The daughter in question had arranged to go to France on February 7th. On the 5th of that month the Financier begged again that his daughter H. should not worry about the European
situation. He wrote:

"... The leaders—Mussolini, Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier—are determined not to make war. The Dictators will present another front when it suits their purpose and utter warlike sentiments. They will secretly intrigue and pay agents in England to destroy buildings and human beings, and agents in Palestine for the same purpose. But H. must not be alarmed about the world or any such things."

Again I referred to the possibility of a crisis occurring before the return of his daughter from the Riviera.

"It won't be till late in March, as I see it," he wrote, "and in any case, it does not mean war. So their movements should not be influenced by any political excitements. I see no panic-stricken crowds in the trains rushing home. Nothing of that kind occurs."

I remarked that really Hitler and Mussolini seemed to be rather quiet since the U.S.A. implied that their intention was to back us up in the event of a war of aggression. But he replied:

"Oh, there will be crises, but May, as I told you, is the time of serious uncertainty, and much of what goes on will be kept back from the public, as I said before. So, though things become serious at times, a great effort will be made to hide them from the public in order to restore confidence and trade. What is quite certain—Hitler and Mussolini know that war means revolution in their own countries. So they will not go to war." (The communicator's italics).

After some conversation on family affairs, the Financier wrote:

"I am not, in the personal sense, a good prophet. My mind is trained to see the future in a general sense for the world rather than for the individual... for all my life trained me to tune into the mind of the world and foresee the changes in it."

Referring once more to the then approaching crisis, the Financier said: "It is more a number of confusing issues than anything else, and Hitler becoming rather desperate about the economic situation and trying by threats and pleadings to extract money."

Now, the Financier remarked (February 5th) that his daughter seemed to return "just before the crisis or when it is upon Europe." She returned on March 10th. The first hint of any disturbance in connection with Czecho-Slovakia was reported in The Times on Saturday, March 11th. Unknown to the public, the crisis was already upon Europe. (See also further on). At that time, there were certainly no "panic-stricken crowds rushing home." The train on which she returned happened to be particularly empty.

It will be observed that the Financier remarks (January 27th) that Chamberlain's Government is going to be firm, "it hardens
and so steadies things." And he further says that Hitler has to realise that the Prime Minister "is not a weak man." This again is an accurate forecast, for, six weeks later, Mr. Chamberlain’s attitude changed and, after his speech on March 17th, 1939, all newspapers reported the shock that this stiffening had given to the Nazis.

It will be noted that the Financier wrote on February 5th, 1939, that Mussolini, Hitler, Chamberlain and Daladier were determined not to make war. So far as the last two leaders mentioned are concerned this statement is correct. However, a special correspondent to The Evening Standard (April 5th, 1939) writes: "The indications are that Germany and Italy have no intention of going to war. They hope rather to extract benefits for themselves by maintaining Europe in a state of nervousness."

Also, I believe, there is corroboration of the remark that German agents were concerned with the recent bombing outrages in England.

In the script of February 5th the Financier also refers to the crisis as occurring "late in March." Writing nine days after the previous forecasts, it may well be that he visualised the events subsequent to those of mid-March. That crisis culminated in the Memel incident and the Polish complications at the end of that month (see p. 26).

The Financier refers to "a number of confusing issues and Hitler becoming desperate about the economic situation." This would seem to indicate, as I surmised, that the name of Hitler should have been substituted for that of Mussolini in the earlier script-writing. There were certainly very conflicting issues resulting from Hitler’s approach to the Rumanian frontier and his anxiety concerning the economic conditions in Germany were very evident. It was just at this time that Herr Brinkmann made the long statement on this matter to which I referred (p. 21). Subsequently, we hear of the Trade Agreement signed between Germany and Rumania on March 23rd, 1939.
Annexation of Czecho-Slovakia

Once again we have an illustration of how the theory of "wish-fulfilment" failed. On Sunday, March 12th, 1939 (a day or two before Miss Cummins went to Ireland for a short holiday, and two days after the return of the Financier's daughter), we prepared for a sitting with a Messenger for an express purpose. However, "Silenio" intimated that the Financier was near. I was anxious for a special sitting—knowing that it would be some time before we had another, so I explained matters to "Silenio" through Miss Cummins. He then gave the following message:

"The Financier has said that the country of the Czechs and Hitler's demands on it will lead to trouble at the end of the month or some time soon. Without the knowledge of any people, even now, there is crisis between the Allies and Hitler on this issue. But, for fear of interference and of making difficulties in the trade of the countries, it is all being kept very secret."

So far as the public knew at the time, there was no question of the immediate annexation of Czecho-Slovakia. The Times of March 11th announced the beginning of the Slovak demand for independence. The Sunday Referee (March 12th), published the following statement from Madame Tabouis: "The strength of the Democracies and the firm speeches of British Ministers has led to a change of plans by the Dictators. It is expected now that they will postpone any further action until the autumn . . . At the French Foreign Office no one believes in the imminence of war."

When reading this aloud to Miss Cummins before the sitting that morning, I remarked that after all, it seemed that the Financier's prognostications regarding the March crisis were not going to be fulfilled. As a result of Madame Tabouis's comments and by reason of the fact that things seemed more settled on the Hitler front she fully endorsed my views. In spite of this, however, Silenio gave the above message at a very critical moment.

It is of interest to note that this communicator refers to Hitler's demands then being made. The Times reports the following from the Prime Minister's speech (March 18th): "Before even the Czech President was received by Hitler and confronted with demands which he had no power to resist, the German troops were on the move and within a few hours they were in the Czech capital . . . Last Wednesday . . . was the day on which the German troops entered Czecho-Slovakia, and all of us, but particularly the Government, were at a disadvantage because the information that we had
was only very partial; much of it was unofficial . . . "

An interesting paragraph which bears on the above incident appeared in an article by Madame Tabouis in *The Sunday Referee* (May 7th, 1939). It runs: "It is now known that the German Army entered Prague on March 12th." If this statement is correct, readers will observe the accuracy of the Financier's information given above and on the very day. That the Prime Minister denies knowledge of the German activities at that period, may be explained by the Financier's words "very secret."

Now to revert to the script of *January 25th, 1939*. At the end of the Financier's statements, I asked Miss Cummins's control to call a certain entity or guide who refers to himself as "The Watcher of the Company of Cleophas." He seems to be a messenger like the other unseen intelligences who purport to dictate the books on early Christianity to which reference is made elsewhere. From time to time he has given us some interesting examples of prevision. When he had written his name, I enquired if he could give us further information on the international situation. He then wrote this final message, which ran in strong contradiction to the prevailing fears of the moment:

"I see in Europe dark clouds of fear and I see prisons filled with men and women and suffering for them. There is much civil strife; but I perceive no great war. I see poverty for some dispossessed people; but the fears of men are not fulfilled. Be of good cheer! In this year ye pass through the Valley of the Shadow of Death but come through unscathed. Peace, hardly retained, will be retained in the coming year and the year after this one. Then slowly the world comes out of these dark times when death and slaughter seem certain, into a time of peace and security.

"For a while there will be in certain countries a continuance of oppression and tyranny. But the King-Emperor and his Empress lead their people into a new time, when fear of war vanishes and peace is secured to your generation.

"There will be difficult times for some, and the people must be prepared to face a certain economic stress. But they will come through it well and, once the fear of war has gone, England will prosper and take a leading position among the nations. Be without fear! Do your work and keep faith in peace in your mind. By so doing you help to bring nearer the time when uncertainty goes and good days come again."

"The Watcher's" script was written through Miss Cummins about 6 p.m. on January 25th, 1939. And it will be noted that
he says he sees "dark clouds of fear and I see prisons filled with men and women and suffering for them."

Writing from Hendaye, Jan. 25th, *The Times* correspondent says: "Although they are at the gates of Barcelona, General Franco's troops have not yet entered the city... Its fate was practically sealed yesterday... When dawn broke today the Nationalist columns... were in sight of the fortress of Monjuich..." (*The Times, January 26th.*)

On January 26th, the same correspondent, writing from Barcelona, describes the scenes of enthusiasm when Franco's troops entered the city on that date. The article ends with the following remark: "Most of the important prisoners who had been confined in the seminary of Monjuich and elsewhere had been taken with the Republican Army to Northern Catalonia..."—(*The Times, January 27th.*)

Writing again from Barcelona on Jan. 29th, *The Times* correspondent says: "Nationalist Barcelona is now four days old... Monjuich prison was abandoned by its guards the night before the Nationalists entered the city. Before they left they dealt out summary justice to a number of prisoners, including women, whose bodies are still lying on the western slopes of the hill..."—(*The Times, Jan. 30th.*)

In a further article (*The Times, Feb. 15th*) he says: "The maelstrom of passion let loose has horrified the world," and he describes appalling crimes. "As General Franco's troops advanced," he writes, "they found a devastated countryside and mutilated and tortured men, women and children. Tragedies of the prison and of the cemetery, as well as of the home, assumed terrifying proportions..."

From the above dates and approximate times given, it would seem that the Watcher, at the time of writing, was literally seeing the tragedy being enacted around "the terrible prison fortress of Monjuich, which frowns over Barcelona." Enough horrors have been enumerated above to prove the truth of the words of these two communicators.
The "Error" of Albania

Hoping to elucidate some explanation of the reference to seeing the prisons filled, etc., on March 5th, 1939, I asked for "The Watcher" once more. When he wrote his name, I said that, when he wrote previously, he had spoken as though he actually saw these tragedies being enacted at the moment of writing. He replied:

"It was not only at the time. I saw the prisons filled with men and women. In the coming months many will be taken up and put in prison. In Italy more men, who are said to have offended against the State, will be thrown into prison. Also in Germany men will be secretly snatched from their homes and flung into prison camps."

I again referred to the fact that at the moment of writing he seemed to have seen the incident of which he wrote for it was reported in the papers a few days later. I also referred to Spain. He wrote:

"That was what I saw. But I saw that later on numbers of people were taken up in Italy and Germany and imprisoned. There will be more fighting in Spain. But the war is near its end. There will be a crisis, that is quite certain. Not at once, but it seems that Mussolini will commit some error shortly and he will lose through it. His flag is slowly falling."

Referring to the last sentence, The Daily Telegraph's correspondent, writing from Warsaw (July 7th) says: "It is felt here that for the first time the initiative may gradually be passing from the dictators to the Powers allied in the peace front."

Miss Cummins returned from her short stay in Ireland at the end of the month. No sittings took place until April 7th and 8th, as she was engaged in giving some lectures and attending to other matters. Albania was invaded by Italy on Good Friday, April 7th. The Saturday papers were of course full of it. On that morning (8th) Astor wrote:

"So the world is turning, turning on its axis. The Financier says, though, that Hitler's axis will be caught, the wheel will be stuck in a rut—that this move of Hitler's in conquering Albania will help the Allies' cause more than anything that has so far occurred. The two dictators have acted thus in the hope that the Balkan States will be terrorised into an alliance with them. But actually, the contrary will be the effect. I see that this conquest consolidates the South-Eastern States of Europe. They stand
together against the Dictators as a result of it. This sudden catastrophe is only catastrophic for Albania; in the long run it helps the world generally. It will bring all the countries in line in their determination to resist further aggression. It helps to minimise the danger of a great European war. The wires are buzzing, or rather, the ether is being kept busy with assurances from various countries to each other, that they will not be put down and trampled upon by the Huns. But of course this is framed in polite diplomatic language . . . !"

The Evening Star, April 8th, wrote: "Diplomats in many capitals were engaged to-day in anxious activities arising out of Mussolini's stroke in Albania. President Roosevelt has been using the Atlantic telephone to consult key diplomats of U.S.A. in Europe . . . Signor Mussolini's Albanian adventure is regarded in Washington as a diversion possibly intended to frighten Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Roumania, and stop them from joining the democratic Western Powers in the protection of peace."

"The Watcher's" prediction of March 5th concerning Mussolini's "error" thus became apparent on Good Friday, April 7th. There was no hint in any newspaper concerning movements of Italian troops in that direction until The Times referred to the fact on April 4th and 6th. That this was the "error" to which the Watcher referred is obvious from the following extracts:

"The British Cabinet meets this morning to consider the effects of the latest blow delivered to the battered fabric of international relations . . . Yet the Duce must have felt something more than the temptation to add one more easily won medal to his collection before he took a step that has so disastrously undermined his good repute in quarters to which he is certainly not indifferent . . . "—(The Times, April 10th, 1939.)

"Public opinion throughout the world has once again been profoundly shocked by this fresh exhibition of the use of force . . . To everyone, whatever his faith, whether Christian or Moslem, it must be apparent that a powerful nation has imposed its will on a small and relatively defenceless country, and has done so by an imposing show of armed force . . . " The Prime Minister. — (The Times, April 14th, 1939.)

"The manner of the Albanian rape and the execution of it on Good Friday have profoundly shocked all classes of Italians. The offer of the Albanian crown to the King of Italy is greeted with a shrug of the shoulders."—(The Evening Standard, April 13th.)

Visiting India early in May, Dr. Schacht, formerly chief of the
Reichsbank, found to his cost that the invasion of Moslem Albania was bitterly resented there.

As a result of the Albanian conquest, the Prime Minister announced on April 13th that the Government would lend all support in their power in the event of aggressive action being taken against Greece and Roumania. On April 15th, President Roosevelt issued his appeal to Hitler and Mussolini, urging them to give assurance that they would attack no more independent nations. On May 12th, Mr. Chamberlain spoke of the decision to conclude a defensive agreement with Turkey. And the Turkish Foreign Minister announced that "the invasion of Albania . . . had decided Turkey to abandon her policy of neutrality and join the peace front." (The Times, July 10th, 1939.)

Thus, as the Financier said, "all countries are being brought into line" in order to resist further aggression.

NOTE.—In view of the announcement in The Daily Telegraph on July 22nd and 24th that plans for a "peace loan" to Germany had been discussed, it is of interest to recall a statement made by the Politican on October 13th, 1938 (p. 20). He wrote: "Time is on our side. But, as usual, England has to pay heavily to keep out of war. In other words, England buys her peace. But it is worth while. Our financial strength at present is our strongest weapon of defence."

The Daily Telegraph reports (July 24th, 1939) that Mr. H. S. Hudson, Secretary for Overseas Trade, had made suggestions to Herr Wohltat, Goering's right-hand man, "which might lead to the avoidance of an European war." Amongst these suggestions was the statement that Germany should "receive financial assistance for the necessary adaptation of her industrial life from war to peace production. An international loan as large as £1,000,000,000 had been spoken of in this context . . ."
The Hidden Crisis

Readers will have observed that the Financier and the Politician anticipated another serious crisis in May. Miss Cummins and I had certainly expected some dramatic movement on the part of Germany and Italy "at the termination of the Spanish war." Nothing of the kind seemed to develop and we were faced with the apparent fact that these communicators had somehow miscalculated or misinterpreted forthcoming events.

On May 28th, 1939, Miss Cummins and I were again prepared for a "Messenger" to write. The Financier, however, gave a long account of the very serious crisis that had occurred. He wrote: "I see you are disappointed because you have not, during May, been provided with flaring headlines in the papers and a first-class sensation. Actually, there has been a most dangerous crisis. It has been going on behind closed doors, and we were, at one moment, very near disaster. It is possible that the public will not learn of this crisis until, years hence, the history of your times is written."

The Financier then proceeded to give an account of the obvious difficulties which have confronted the British Government in coming to terms in regard to the alliance with Russia. "I think the crisis is over now and Russia is our ally," he wrote. Though he anticipated further scares and threats, he added: "There is no war coming, be assured of that."

As I was in the habit of considering the possibility of the intervention of the subconscious mind and of telepathy in all mediumistic communications, I thought the Financier and Miss Cummins's inventive mind had got over the difficulty rather well! But if readers will recollect the various references made in connection with the anticipated crisis (given in October, 1938) they will recognise that, if England and France failed to come to an agreement with Russia, a somewhat serious situation might arise.

It will be noted that the Financier said that there would be "another war-crisis next year (1939). It will be even more dangerous because conducted with greater secrecy than the last one" (September, 1938). The Politician wrote: "When there is an attempt at a settlement in Spain, it seems that another war-crisis occurs. The public will know much less about it on this occasion. That is why the position will be more dangerous than the position last September. Manœuvreurs and negotiations are mostly carried on behind the scenes" (italics mine). (pp. 16, 20, 24, 29, 35.)

I must confess that these sentences had always puzzled me. They did not appear to fit into the nature of the crisis which I, and
doubtless others, had anticipated—i.e., demands by Hitler for the return of the colonies, rewards from Spain for services rendered by Germany and Italy, Italian claims in the Mediterranean, etc.

Readers will recollect a remark written on 25th January, 1939, by the Financier, stating that "in May" he anticipated "a period of great anxiety." Writing in October, 1938, the same communicator referred to "bargaining" at the end of the Spanish war, "but no real danger of war over it" (pp. 24, 29).

Reviewing the above extracts in connection with recent events, we may take it, I think, that the Financier and the Politician foresaw, in October, 1938, the serious crisis in May, 1939, during which month the British and French Governments have been negotiating "behind the scenes" and "bargaining" with Russia over the terms of the proposed alliance.

With reference to the above, the following is not without interest. Writing from Moscow on May 31st The Daily Telegraph correspondent says: "In my opinion, however, M. Molotoff... did show that the Kremlin is now committed to the anti-aggression pact, once the final bargaining concerning details has been completed..."

When and if this pact is signed between these three Great Powers, it seems that the "ring of alliances," foreseen and described in March, 1938, will be accomplished. And it is noteworthy to remark that, when this prediction was made there was no question of Russia being included in any pact with England and France, nor was there, then, any reason to anticipate the necessity for one—so far as our knowledge here went. Hitler had then only gone so far as to annex Austria.

That the Financier's forecast concerning the alliance with Russia may be fulfilled, is indicated by the following quotation from The Times, July 13th, 1939. It runs as follows:

"After three months of unremitting effort involving many hours of exhaustive discussions between the representatives of the three Powers, the triple pact of mutual assistance seems to be gradually nearing completion. Many of the disputed points have been agreed, and those gaps which remain are perceptibly narrowing. Hopes have previously turned out to be premature, but with every exchange of views the structure of the alliance becomes better defined and the points of difference more isolated..."

In conclusion I would like to record a few extracts from more recent scripts written by the Financier.

On April 7th, he wrote: "There is a hope of the turning of
the tide in the late autumn in money matters. At the approach of Christmas or early in the New Year, there is some disaster to Germany that upsets her internal affairs, the iron grip slackens and there comes hope for the enslaved States in the Reich . . . Watch the Mediterranean . . . ”

On April 18th, he said: “There are many months of argument and uncertainty but no war though again it seems inevitable. It is Italy that cracks first.” On May 17th, he depicted trouble over Danzig and Spain, and finally on May 28th, 1939, he wrote: “Italy will renew her demands in regard to French territory. That will be part of the game of course, and she will again, I think, ask for a share in the Suez Canal . . . In the autumn there will be definite movements of great importance which will lead the way to a better and more stable state of affairs for us.”

It seems of interest to record this series of predictions (of which there are still more) for they are reassuring in character and remarkable for the accuracy of their prevision. Moreover, they cover a considerable period. It would seem difficult, therefore, to attribute them to telepathy from the living or to the subconscious mind of the automatist (Miss Cummins). It will be noted that two quotations given (pp. 8, 10) date from December, 1936.

Finally, I may add that the chief factor which has contributed to the accurate reception of the statements concerning future events given by these communicators lies, I think, in the remarkably clear channel which, in Miss Cummins, they had at their disposal.

August 2nd, 1939.

Note.—The following few lines were written by the Financier through Miss Cummins on Sunday, July 23rd, 1939: “Hitler and Mussolini have been making very complete preparations for war in connection with the Mediterranean and Danzig. But it is the greatest bluff of all. They won’t fight, but most people will believe they are going to fight in September—possibly. Remember, no war!” (Communicator’s italics.)

E.B.G.
Note: On Tuesday, August 22nd, 1939, Miss Cummins came unexpectedly from Ireland to London. The surprise announcement that the German Foreign Minister was flying next day to Moscow to conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia was described as a "world shock" by the Press. That afternoon the Financier wrote:

"Ah, you are beginning to worry over the chessboard of Europe again! (Some remarks on above lines were made by me). You must in these days expect the unexpected and look always for the unforeseen. But the final aggregate of all these manoeuvres comes again to the same sum—a negative one. No great European war! England and France and Poland do not fight the Axis Powers. This other Russian Dictator has not thrown over the Allies and gone into opposition to them. But he does not trust either side so he thinks it well to play with both and appear to make agreements with both sides."

"Does Germany take Danzig and the Polish Corridor?" I asked.

"I cannot tell you the exact details but I do see gains for Germany and also much discussion and beating of the big drum. But neither side fights, and Hitler does not become master of the Mediterranean."

"Hungary is already becoming active and Turkey also."

"Yes, but I stand by what I said—'No War.' I told you this was the greatest bluff of all. You should not have been surprised."

"I don't doubt what you say," I remarked, "But how is war going to be avoided?"

"Hitler, for economic reasons and other reasons, does not want to fight. But he must pretend he is going to fight in an attempt to secure Danzig and conquer the Balkans through terrorism, but, no war."

"Do you see this as a form of vision?"

"Yes, I get a general view of the future and the turn it takes. I do not see the minor details. I simply get the impression of a crisis and the usual panic but no war ensuing. I assure you that nothing that has happened in the last 48 hours has led me to alter my previous statements in regard to ultimate results.

"I can come again but she is slow to-day."

(This remark refers to Miss C., who was tired after her long night journey. E.B.G.).
The following message was written on the morning of the day the Pact between Germany and Russia was signed. (Wednesday, August 23rd, 1939.)

"I found it difficult to write yesterday. I take a very reassuring view of the present European situation now I have been able to study it. The following are my conclusions:

"Hitler feels that he is being cornered; he is growing desperate. To save his face and his prestige he has climbed down and made an appeal to Russia. The Pact between these two countries does not bind Russia to any serious extent because she has inserted the clause about aggression in it. It encourages the German people at a difficult moment and it upsets the equanimity of the Allies. Hitler will go on bluffing and will probably make more favourable terms thereby than he deserves to obtain. But he has passed the peak of his power so there is nothing to fear.

"Russia has made no concessions to Hitler. Remember No War, and I do not see humiliation for the British Empire. Assure H. that there is nothing in the present situation to give cause for worry. On the contrary, I think the tide is turning."

(Reprinted August 29th, 1939, when war seems inevitable—E.B.G.)
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