IN SEARCH OF THE SOUL
AND THE MECHANISM OF
THOUGHT, EMOTION, AND CONDUCT

A TREATISE IN TWO VOLUMES
CONTAINING
A BRIEF BUT COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY
OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCHES
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY
AS WELL AS
AN ORIGINAL ATTEMPT
TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MIND AND CHARACTER OF MAN
AND ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLES OF A SCIENCE OF ETHOLOGY

VOLUME I
THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY

BY
BERNARD HOLLANDER, M.D.

Author of The Mental Functions of the Brain, Mental Symptoms of Brain Disease, The First Signs of Insanity, Nervous Disorders of Men, Nervous Disorders of Women, Abnormal Children, Hypnotism and Suggestion, etc.

LONDON:
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD.
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO.
inherent in man than have been hitherto admitted. This leads to the consideration of the nature of Life, Mind, Consciousness, and of the problems of the Soul and man’s Religious Faith, in the light of present-day knowledge, and the examination of psychical research into Supernormal and Spirit Phenomena—the same problems which, as stated in Chapter I., engaged the attention of primitive man, and which are now shown, in the concluding chapter, notwithstanding over two thousand years’ investigation and reflection, to be still far from solution.

It will be admitted that the task which the author has set himself to accomplish is a gigantic one, and it is inevitable—however carefully such a comprehensive treatise may have been prepared—that there will be some omissions and a number of mistakes. These, however, should not detract from the value of the work, which is not written dogmatically, but primarily with the object to convey information and subject-matter for thought and inquiry, and by the exposure of the failures of the past to initiate new and more successful methods of investigation. The work should appeal not only to physicians, psychologists, and the clergy, but to every educated man.

Medical Experts will be interested in (1) the history of the slowly accumulating knowledge of the structure and functions of the brain, from the most ancient records to the most recent experimental investigations; (2) the account of the still unknown and highly interesting life and doctrines of that much maligned and misrepresented genius, the great naturalist and philosopher, FRANCIS JOSEPH GALL, and of the vast and extraordinary influence which he exercised on subsequent research and philosophical teaching—with most liberal quotations from his own works, to enable the reader to form his own opinion; (3) the history of psychiatry and the treatment of the insane; (4) the author’s own attempt to add to the knowledge of the motor and sensory functions of the brain (derived from the results of experiments on animals), the knowledge of mental functions which Nature herself furnishes in circumscribed lesions of the brain from injury, the growth of tumours, and other causes. The mass of evidence collected throws new light on the uses of the brain and gives rise to a whole series of theories, which will, no doubt, be subjected to searching criticism; but a proof of their probable correctness is already furnished by the large number of cases quoted in which surgical operation in certain forms of mental derangement led to recovery.

To Psychologists the work should appeal because the history of psychology is brought into relation with the progress of biology and brain research, and because of the elaborate treatment of the emotions and character dispositions of man, and the principles of the new science of Ethology, which gives a deeper insight into the mental constitution of man than has hitherto been obtained, and discloses the primary motives of conduct, a knowledge of which is of the utmost utility to human intercourse.

The Clergy will probably be interested in the historical and other evidence of the failure of science and philosophy to account for the chief problems of life and mind, in the records of their conflict with theology, and the result of the whole inquiry as it affects religious beliefs. Being a scientific treatise, religious doctrines are of course referred to only when necessary, and then with that respect which is due to them.

The work, as a whole, is written as much as possible in popular non-technical language, so that it may be understood and appreciated by the educated Layman, to whom the problems of the soul, mind, and character, and the history of the intellectual progress of mankind are not less fascinating than to the expert.

BERNARD HOLLANDER, M.D.

57, Wimpole Street, London, W.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I

PART I
INTRODUCTORY

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE END OF THE XVIIIth CENTURY

SECTION I
CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE SOUL FROM PREHISTORIC TIMES TO THE BEGINNING OF CHRISTIANITY

CHAPTER I.—PREHISTORIC RELIGIONS

CHAPTER II.—EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY
From Thales to Socrates and Plato.

CHAPTER III.—LATER GREEK PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER IV.—MEDICAL VIEWS OF MIND AND BRAIN IN ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME

SECTION II
VIEWS OF THE SOUL, MIND, AND BRAIN IN THE MIDDLE AGES

CHAPTER V.—CHRISTIANITY AND THE EARLY SCHOLASTICS
Essence of Christianity. Social Conditions and Intellectual Life of the Period. Patristic Philosophers and Early Scholastics: their Views on Soul, Mind, and Brain.
CONTENTS

CHAPTER VI.—ARAB PHILOSOPHY AND LATER SCHOLASTICS

CHAPTER VII.—THE RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION

SECTION III
VIEWS OF THE SOUL, MIND, AND BRAIN IN THE XVIIth AND XVIIIth CENTURIES

CHAPTER VIII.—ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY TO THE END OF THE XVIIIth CENTURY
From Francis Bacon and John Locke to Priestley and Bentham.

CHAPTER IX.—PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE, HOLLAND, GERMANY, ETC.
From Descartes to Rousseau and Cabanis; and from Leibniz to Kant and Herder.

CHAPTER X.—THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE IN THE XVIIth AND XVIIIth CENTURIES

PART II
THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE IN THE XIXth CENTURY

SECTION I
FRANCIS JOSEPH GALL: AN UNACKNOWLEDGED GENIUS

CHAPTER XI.—FRANCIS JOSEPH GALL: A GREAT ANATOMIST AND PHYSIOLOGIST

CHAPTER XII.—FRANCIS JOSEPH GALL: A GREAT PSYCHOLOGIST
CONTENTS

CHAPTER XIII.—GALL'S METHOD

CHAPTER XIV.—GALL'S CLASSIFICATION AND LOCALISATION OF MENTAL FUNCTIONS

CHAPTER XV.—GALL ON INSANITY, IMBECILITY, AND CRIME, AND THEIR TREATMENT. A PICTURE OF THE PERIOD

SECTION II

THE RECEPTION OF GALL'S DOCTRINE

CHAPTER XVI.—GALL'S BIOGRAPHY AND EMINENT FRENCH DISCIPLES

CHAPTER XVII.—THE NEGLECT OF GALL'S ORIGINAL WORK BY ENGLISH DISCIPLES

CHAPTER XVIII.—FLOURENS AND OTHER CRITICS OF GALL

SECTION III

HISTORY OF MODERN BRAIN RESEARCH

CHAPTER XIX.—HISTORY OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE BRAIN CENTRES FOR SPEECH
CHAPTER XX.—HISTORY OF MODERN EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN PHYSIOLOGY. THE DISCOVERY OF BRAIN CENTRES FOR MOTION AND SENSATION

CHAPTER XXI.—HISTORY OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE MINUTE STRUCTURE OF THE BRAIN

SECTION IV

HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE

CHAPTER XXII.—HISTORY OF FRENCH AND ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY IN THE XIXTH CENTURY
From Biran and Comte to Janet and Bergson. From Thomas Brown and Dugald Stewart to William James and M'Dougall.

CHAPTER XXIII.—GERMAN PHILOSOPHY OF THE XIXTH CENTURY
From Fichte and Hegel to Nietzsche, Wundt and Freud. History of Experimental Psychology.

CHAPTER XXIV.—HISTORY OF BIOLOGY AND THE GENERAL PROGRESS OF SCIENCE IN THE XIXTH CENTURY
PART I

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE from Ancient Times to the end of the XVIIth Century
PART I

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE
from ancient times to the end of the XVIIIth century

SECTION I

CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE SOUL
from pre-historic times to the beginning of Christianity

CHAPTER I

PREHISTORIC RELIGIONS

The history of the study of the soul presents three aspects: the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific; but it must not be assumed that they were ever so distinct. Theology was often mixed with metaphysical speculations, metaphysics with either theology or science; and the scientific view was hardly ever altogether free from either theology or metaphysical speculation. Only the most ancient study of the soul was purely theological. With the advent of the Greek philosophers it became metaphysical. With the rise of Christianity theology again predominated, with a large admixture of metaphysical doctrine. It is only with the tremendous strides of science during the past three hundred years that the soul—and more particularly its attributes and activities and the mechanism of their manifestation—was studied more and more from a strictly scientific point of view, leaving theology and metaphysics to follow their own paths. In the course of recent years theological doctrines have been differently interpreted with the increase of knowledge, and metaphysical speculations gradually adapted to the results of scientific research, while it has had to be admitted that science, too, has its limitations.

Pre-historic man imagined that in his dreams something left his body, and that this same something returned to his body before he awoke. He noticed that in his dreams he appeared often to be far away, or other people seemed to come to him, and since he knew by experience that his body never moved, his perfectly natural explanation was that it was something which inhabited his body—a spirit, a natural shadowy image of himself—which could go out and return again. This spirit he at first identified with the breath of the body, since the dead man no longer breathes. It was also natural that he should think that this spirit does not die with the body, but lives on after quitting it; for, although a man may be dead and buried, his phantom-figure may continue to appear to the survivors in dreams and visions. This spiritual entity in time was regarded as the soul, dwelling in the body of...
man and presiding over its functions. It was in no way absolutely attached to the organism, but had a life of its own, independent of its attachments. It had the power of separating itself, if it so willed, from the entire organisation.

In the early days of mankind, it is obvious that death would be, in the great majority of instances, violent and premature. Such death occurring in the vigour of manhood, when its bounding energies are most active, would almost of necessity lead to the conclusion that the unfinished life would be continued elsewhere, and thus probably originated the more or less general expectation and belief in a future life. Just as later, when man lived in civilised communities, he had to suffer so many injustices and unequal hardships, that he found comfort in the belief that a man’s personality does not cease with the grave; and such belief in immortality was probably fostered for the influence it had on the conduct of men.

When a man died, the surviving principle was supposed to remain confined in the grave beside the corpse; hence the custom of elaborate burial ceremonies. Later, the mind of man rose to a conception less purely material, and the souls of the dead were imagined to congregate in places of their own, somewhere whence they can visit the living, especially at night time. Still later, the idea arose that this new existence must be influenced by the deeds of the previous life, for which it is either the reward or the punishment. Two soul places are then distinguishable. Others believed that the soul, for its purification, could enter other organisms not necessarily human. Thus the spiritual part of man was believed to have a life of its own, continuing to exist after the body had returned to its elements, and even affirmed to have previously existed before the period of its organic birth.

From the fact that man in his dream-adventures uses his dress and weapons arose the belief that even these things have their shadowy duplicates or ghost souls, which can be carried away by the departing soul and used by it as the real objects were used by the living man. Moreover, primitive man, having discovered in himself a double being, the one corporeal and the other spiritual, transferred the new notions regarding himself to objects without himself. Whatever seemed to move or act spontaneously, like the winds and streams and echoes, the sun, moon, and planets, were felt as spiritual agencies, especially if a sound were connected with them. The sighing of the breeze, the moan of the wave upon the shore, the babbling of the brook, the roaring of the sea, and the pealing of the thunder were nothing less than sad, joyous, or angry living voices. Being surrounded by elements and forces of nature which he could neither comprehend nor control, primitive man saw spirits everywhere. They constituted his interpretation of nature for the time being. They were symbols of the unknown and mighty powers with which he was surrounded, and before which he stood unprotected, helpless and trembling. As destructive storms and the beneficent rain that makes the grass grow seem to descend from the sky, he pictured a Heaven-Father; and as the earth makes the food grow and has other mysterious powers, he imagined an Earth-Mother. But he also fancied a Sun-God and a Moon-Goddess, and other divine personalities representing other great powers of nature. Similarly he thought the stars, mountains, forests, and rocks animated and haunted by spirits. Indeed, until accidents and experiments led to the discovery of laws of nature, the causes of phenomena in nature were sought in the action of powerful but invisible beings. It is easier for man to think of personal powers at work in the universe than of impersonal ones. Even when man has discovered the laws which govern the universe and creation, he still asks himself who made these laws. The natural was to primitive man the supernatural, as it still is to many of us. He therefore worshipped the sun, the moon, the stars, trees, rivers, springs, fire, winds, and even serpents, dogs, apes, and oxen; and as he came to set up carved sticks and stones to represent these, he passed from nature-worship to fetish-worship.
Uncritical observation of the aspect of nature persuaded primitive man that the earth is an extended level surface which sustains the dome of the sky, a firmament dividing the waters above from the waters beneath; that the heavenly bodies—the sun, the moon, the stars—pursue their way, moving from east to west, their insignificant size and motion round the motionless earth proclaiming their inferiority. Of the various organic forms surrounding man, none rival him in dignity, and he seems justified in concluding that everything has been created for his use—the sun for the purpose of giving him light by day, the moon and stars by night. Comparative theology shows us that this is the conception of nature universally adopted in the early phase of intellectual life. It is the belief of all nations in all parts of the world in the beginning of their civilisation: geocentric, for it makes the earth the centre of the universe; anthropocentric, for it makes man the central object of the earth. And not only is this the conclusion spontaneously come to from inconsiderate glimpses of the world, it is also the philosophical basis of various religious revelations, vouchsafed to man from time to time.

Not being able to see beyond the sky, man assumed a region above it where the gods dwell, and whither those are going who in their earthly life made themselves worthy of such bliss. And thus he pictured to himself a heaven shut off from earth, with all its sins and cares, by the untroubled and impenetrable sky—a place of peace, of light and repose, but also a place of power. On the other hand, there are forces in nature, and there are visions in dreams, which caused him to be terror-stricken, which made him assume malignant spirits, whose habitation he thought was in the dark regions beneath the ground, far away from the realms of light—a region from which, through the volcano, smoke and burning sulphur are cast into this upper world—a place of everlasting fire and darkness, whose portals are in caves and solitudes of unutterable gloom. Placed between the boundaries of such opposing powers, he felt himself the sport of circumstances, sustained by beings who seek his happiness, and tempted by those who desire his destruction. Guided by such obvious thoughts and simple reasonings, he threw a longing look to the good beings who protect him, and sought to invoke their aid by entreaties and to propitiate their help by sacrifices.

It is only natural that primitive man should associate these conclusions with others, expecting that in a future life good men would enjoy the society of good beings like himself, the evil being dismissed to the realm of darkness and despair. And, as human experience teaches us that a final allotment can only be made by some superior power, he expected that He who was his creator would also be his judge, and that there was an appointed time and a bar at which the final destination of all who have lived should be ascertained, and eternal justice measure out its punishments and rewards.

Primitive man considered the gods like himself, only mightier than he, possessing qualities like his own qualities, and motives like his own motives; hence he believed their favour could be courted and their wrath appeased by magic, the singing of praises, gifts and sacrifices. To ensure their presence at such ceremonies, special holy places were selected and temples and altars erected, where he could communicate with them; and gradually a body of men, who study the will of God or the gods and who may mediate for him, were set apart. Some sacrifices were thank-offerings, given as an expression of gratitude for benefits received; other sacrifices were offered to the gods as supplications for help desired.

Each tribe and each nation established its own set of gods, which partook of its own character and were the embodiment of its own peculiar form of life, under whose exclusive protection its members believed themselves to live; and who stood ready to smite its enemies or to deliver its weaker neighbours into their hands. The legends of the gods were handed down from father to son, and became changed in course of time or else new meanings were invented. With advancing civilisation
the real origin of the gods was forgotten, their quality improved, the conceptions became more spiritual and their number diminished, until the monotheistic view became paramount.

Primitive religion had little or no connection with human welfare, apart from the action of supernatural beings. Its chief or only object was to guard the worshipper from injuries which came from the spirit world, or to procure him benefits from the same origin. It sacrificed human life and property on the imaginary propitiation of fictitious deities. Later on, religion was largely the outcome of mythical prophetic revelations. Individuals appeared with the capacity for the highest inspiration, and these become the prophets and inspired leaders of the race. Thus arose the prophetic religions, tending towards monotheism, as those of Zoroaster, Buddha, and Moses. Of another kind were the ethnic religions, arising out of a national tendency, such as those of Egypt, India, Greece, and Rome. All religious truths are largely based on myths. They were originally embodied or taught in poetry, the natural speech of religion, whose literal truth is unutterable, and whose loftiest teachings are as symbolic as the popular legend. There is a similarity in the myths of all nations, yet they possess distinctive features, in harmony with the distinctive character of the nations. It will be seen that in one respect all the sacred books of the East, where most religions sprang from, are alike. They are all full of sublime teaching and of precepts as lofty as any which European nations are in the habit of practising. This is a fact which many Christian missionaries are apt to forget.

Man’s intellect, even in the most remote ages, must have been greatly superior to the understanding of animals; for it led him to the discovery and utilisation of the secrets of nature. Whereas animals that build habitations for themselves or their young continue to do so in the same way for generation after generation, man progressed in knowledge, until at length he reached that stage which we call civilisation. Animals devour the food as they find it; man’s progress led to the management of fire and—the art of cooking his food. Whereas animals are provided with means of attack and defence, human beings are unprotected, but the progressive growth of their intellect led them to fashion weapons of attack and defence. By his intellect, prehistoric man attained command of his environment—that is, the capacity for making out of the inorganic, to some extent even out of the organic, world, instruments for the satisfaction of his wants, fire and clothes to keep him warm, a home to keep him dry, fishing rods and arrows to procure him food.

In his lowest—the savage—state, man probably subsisted on wild plants and animals, neither tilling the soil nor domesticking creatures for his food. He may be considered to have risen into the next, the barbaric state, when he took to agriculture. With the certain supply of food which could be stored till next harvest, settled village and town life was established, with immense results in the improvement of arts, knowledge, manners, and government. Lastly, civilised life may be taken as beginning with the art of writing, which by recording history, law, knowledge, and religion, for the service of ages to come, binds together the past and the future in an unbroken chain of intellectual and moral progress.

Primitive man believing himself surrounded by evil spirits, we need not wonder that he attributed disease to demonic power, which only a magician or witch doctor could expel. At a later stage, when disease was regarded as a punishment by an angry deity, the conceptions of sacrifice, propitiation, purification, fumigation, fasting, etc., made their appearance, and the doctor became identical with the priest. As knowledge advanced, there were joined with these measures others more rational, such as baths, massage, and dieting, besides various hypnotic and suggestive devices. This combination of medical and sacerdotal functions had a wide range and a long vogue.

Diseases of which the cause was not visible being attributed to magic or the operation of evil spirits, there arose from this general concept the notion that there were specific spirits which caused different diseases. Sometimes it was thought that
the disease was caused by possession—that is, by the occupation of the sick man's body by spirits of dead men or of demoniacal animals. This led to surgical practice consistent with such belief, for there is evidence that the skulls of epileptics were trephined to afford incarcerated evil spirits a chance of escape. In other cases treatment would be directed to combating the evil spirits by spells, angry deities by propitiatory rites and sacrifice, and maleficent magic by counter magic. Hence the witch doctors were looked upon not only as healers of disease, but as prophets having power to influence the elements, to ensure success in battle, and to foretell the future. With all this superstition it is not a little remarkable that amongst many races of very low civilisation natural causes of diseases were admitted, such as unhealthy winds, unsuitable food, over-exertion of body, even heredity and infection in some cases. The probability is that only those diseases were ascribed to demons for which no natural causes could be found and no remedies were known.

**Madness,** in early antiquity, was regarded as due to divine influence, but later it was looked upon as due to an evil spirit sent as a divine punishment for neglect of carrying out God's instructions, as is put very clearly in the case of Saul, King of Israel (1097-1058 B.C.). The records of Egypt, Persia, Assyria, and Greece all supply evidence of the same sort. The treatment seems to have consisted of magic, incantations, prayers, sacrifices, and of exorcisms, sometimes of a violent sort. But in the case of Saul the evil spirit was often dislodged by the music of David's harp. He seems to have suffered from what is now called manic-depressive insanity, a form of mental derangement in which mania, melancholia, and lucidity follow one another at periods.

**THE BABYLONIANS**

The most ancient civilisation is believed to be that of the *Sumerian race,* about 4000 B.C., before the advent of the Babylonians and Assyrians, their Semitic conquerors. In any case Mesopotamia was the starting-point of Oriental civilisation, of which the Babylonians and Assyrians were undoubtedly the principal founders. They borrowed from the Sumerians the elements of morals, learning, and the arts, and brought them to perfection.

The Babylonians were skilled in mathematics and astronomy, originated the decimal system of notation, weights and measures, made the divisions of time into twelve months in the year, seven days in the week, sixty minutes and seconds in the hour and minute respectively, and divided the circle, as we do, in 360 degrees. They invented the cuneiform inscriptions, reading from left to right; they knew much about military tactics and the art of war, and were variously skilled in music, architecture, pottery, glass-blowing, weaving, and carpet-making.

**The great gods of Babylonia belonged to the elements and the heavenly bodies.** We find at first different cities and districts worshipping different gods: one, the god of the sea; another, the god of the earth; another, the god of heaven, regarded above heaven, and above all created things. In addition, the sun and the moon are worshipped everywhere, each city having its own sun-god and moon-god; the latter being the older and greater being. The home of the sun-god is Eden. There was also a wind-god. The stars were also worshipped; and the temples were built so that their principal axes should point in a definite direction and form an astronomical guide.

The city of Babylon had its own prevailing god, the great god *Merodach,* the greatest of all, the mediator, who raises the dead to life, and combats the great dragon and the powers of evil. He was first worshipped as the sun-god, and later as BAAL, the Lord, the conception of whom grew more and more spiritual. He was the god of war, he healed the sick, brought relief, gave life, and received the soul in his blessed dwelling above. But the ancient belief in spirits—and their worship—persisted at the same time.
The Babylonian religion presents many similarities with the Jewish account of the creation of the world: the creation out of chaos, the orderly evolution of the cosmos, the creation of man in the image of god or the gods, the temptation and fall, and the flood. The raw material is the same, but the spirit in which the materials are worked up is totally different. The Jewish tradition may be derived from the Babylonian, as many authorities have believed, or both may be derived from the same source. Since the Babylonian is so much older than the Jewish, the first assumption is probably correct. One great distinction is that the Babylonian traditions form a complete mythology; whereas the Jewish Scriptures are more like "primitive philosophies of nature and religion" clothed in spontaneous poetry.

The Babylonians held that the intellect has its seat in the heart, the liver serving as the central organ for the blood, which they considered to be the true life principle. They divided this fluid into two kinds—a blood of the daytime (bright arterial) and that of the night (dark venous). Diseases, usually personified as demons, were looked upon as something that entered the body from without and that consequently had to be expelled.

With the extinction of Babylon as an independent country, the Persian religion predominated.

THE EGYPTIANS

The ancient Egyptians, of whose civilisation there exist records extending back to about 3500 B.C., were a nation skilled in agriculture and in constructive art. Their religion, their reckoning, their measuring, all appear the results of long and gradual growth.

The earliest king of all Egypt must have ascended the throne about 8,500 years ago, when the Egyptians were already skilled in the art of glass-blowing, the smelting and working of metals, weaving, pottery, brick-making, boat-building, rope-making, preparing leather, writing, painting, and sculpture. From Egypt came our recognition of lunar months, our names for the principal stars, the twelve signs of the Zodiac, etc. The Egyptians seem also to have known of the isolation of the earth in space, through which it sailed like the sun and stars.

The ancient Egyptian religion appears to have grown early into pure monotheism. It declared that God is the only One, whose life is Truth, that he has made all things, and that he alone has not been made. There is one Supreme God "who had no beginning and would have no end," a perpetual Creator, pouring life and beauty into all visible things. It was held that not only has God never appeared upon earth in the human form, but that such was altogether an impossibility, since he is the animating principle of the entire universe, visible nature being only a manifestation of him. Adoration of the heavenly bodies—the sun, the moon, the stars—was combined with that of the deified attributes of God. The great and venerable divinities were personifications of such attributes, and were arranged in various trinities. While it was unlawful to represent God except by his attributes, these trinities and their persons offered abundant means of idolatrous worship for the vulgar. It was admitted that there had been terrestrial manifestations of these divine attributes for the salvation of man. The inscriptions on the older monuments emphasise justice, mercy, love of right, hate of wrong, kindness to the poor, reverence for parents. But as in later periods religion degenerated, so did the high moral ideas disappear from the monuments. Only the learned, thoughtful, initiated, the chosen and secret circles of the priests continued to believe in that God whom so many prayers and inscriptions represented as having existed in all past ages and as to exist in all future; the masses of the nation had fallen into the lowest form of idolatry.
When HERODOTUS (484-424 B.C.) visited Egypt in the Vth century B.C., or when DIODORUS (c. 60 B.C.) wrote of it about the time of Christ, or PLUTARCH (40-120 A.D.) gathered the legend of Osiris from Egyptian sources within seventy or eighty years after, the Egyptian religion was a thing of the remote past, at a greater distance from Herodotus or Plutarch than these are from us. The ancient faith had degenerated into extreme polytheism, or idol worship, except among those initiated in its "mysteries," and there was only a tradition or vague impression among other peoples of the purity and grandeur of the belief of the early Egyptians.

The Egyptian mythology reproduces two leading ideas: the belief in the triumph of light—the god RA—over darkness; and of life—the god OSIRIS—over death. Osiris slain by his brother and reigning in the kingdom of the dead, lives again on earth in his son HEROS. Each man, at his death, becomes identified with Osiris. As the soul of the god shines in Orion in the sky, so that of the departed lives likewise among the stars.

Under the first six dynasties, besides OSIRIS and RA (the sun-god who conducts the souls of the dead to the underworld), PTAH of Memphis, the artificer, judge of the upper and underworld, was chiefly worshipped, as the deity who effected the union of the two divisions of the kingdom under one sceptre. Then the three gods were blended together in a higher and invisible god. Under the Middle Empire (XIth to XIVth dynasties) Upper Egypt rose in importance, and its gods were elevated to the highest rank. The future life was regarded only as the continuation of the present, without reference to the doctrine of retribution. AMUN-RA of Thebes became the chief god under the Hyksos rulers, when the doctrine of immortality, now under the control of the dogma of retribution, became the centre of religion. The souls of the wicked are now tortured or become immovable for millions of years. The pictures of heaven, on the other hand, are such as would be most grateful to a dweller in that hot climate—deep shades of over-branching sycamores, cool waters, the fresh north wind, and fruitful fields, forever watered, and rich in never-ceasing harvests. Magic and the power of the priests rose, and the high priest of Thebes seized the sovereign power. The last period is when Lower Egypt threw off the yoke of the priest kings of Thebes. Then followed the Ptolemies.

The ancient Egyptians made most precise assertions with regard to the constitution of the human soul and its future destinies. They imagined that man contained within him a divine ray, constituting the spiritual soul and acting upon the body through the agency of a peculiar fluid-like compound, which they analysed into several different elements—the ego, conscious will-power, unconscious will-power—these elements serving as agents for the various faculties of the soul. These elements, according to the interpretation of other authorities were: the divine spirit, the spiritual soul or intellect, the astral body, the agent of passions and desires, the vitality, the physical body, etc.

The ancient Egyptians, in each one of their acts, seemed to be looking forward toward the final end: so much so, indeed, that the present life was for them scarcely more than a preparation for the existence beyond the grave, when the soul should at last be freed from the yoke of matter. In the life hereafter, all that death takes from a man is restored to him. Soul and genius and shadow reunite with the purified body; the powers of thought and action are restored. A man is made happy by attaining all that he can be expected to want; he has life again, but a better life. The dead man can undergo any transformation that the Ka, the spiritual self, desires. The object of this transformation of the soul after death seems to have been development—not punishment, nor purification as in the transmigration systems, as, for example, in Brahmanism. The soul, it is taught, must complete its education, to be in sympathy with the Divine Mind in his whole work of creation.
The oldest Egyptian book is the Book of the Dead, a collection of texts, prayers, invocations, and protecting spells, intended by their magic power to secure the victory for the soul on its journey through Amenti to the abodes of eternity. The care of the dead is the first duty of the living, and a man must marry in order to have offspring who will pay him the necessary attention after his death. The graves the ancient Egyptians called eternal habitations. They consequently took small pains in building their houses, while they constructed their tombs upon the most lavish scale. The idea that the disembodied soul continues to inhabit the immediate vicinity of the physical body led them to embalm their dead in order to preserve the corpse as far as possible, so that the soul might not be constrained to abandon it entirely, and might, if it were not destroyed, re-animate it upon the judgment-day. Embalming was practised as early as 2000 B.C.

It has also to be mentioned as a characteristic of the ancient Egyptians that they regarded their kings as deities upon earth, and that they paid homage to certain animals, among which the sacred bulls occupied the most prominent place. In early times the deities were represented partly in human and partly in animal form.

The Egyptians seemed to consider every earthly event as providential and therefore sacred, so they recorded everything. They covered the walls of their temples and tombs with pictures and carved inscriptions. They also wrote down the details of their lives on innumerable rolls made of papyrus.

The Egyptian records show the healing art to have been entirely in the hands of the priests, who had a monopoly of learning and taught medicine in the schools existing in connection with the temples, among the most celebrated being those of Memphis and Thebes. Botany and chemistry made considerable progress, but the knowledge of the structure and functions of the different parts of the human body was very imperfect and remained unchanged for many centuries. Egyptian medicine seems to have remained spiritualistic to a late date. The object of diagnosis was to discover the nature and name of the evil spirit causing the disease. Treatment consisted in prayers and incantations, but in part also of rational procedure and the use of drugs. About the X11th century B.C. a State official was appointed who exercised a close supervision of all matters relating to public hygiene. He exercised ethical control over all physicians, who had to bind themselves by oath to observe certain laws in their relations with the public. Herbalists were under police supervision, and the proprietors of public baths were forbidden to admit sick persons into their establishments. Altogether, in matters relating to personal hygiene and sanitation, the ancient Egyptians often displayed a remarkable degree of common sense. They took care, for example, to prevent the entrance of decomposing materials into the soil and the ground water; baths, gymnastic exercises, and diet were studied and prescribed. At a later period they adopted the custom of drinking only water that had been either boiled or filtered. Surgery, too, reached a degree of knowledge and skill well in advance of that reached by any of their contemporaries. Their knowledge exerted a powerful influence upon the beginning of medicine in Greece and upon the social hygiene of the Jewish people. (See also Chapter IV.)

THE JEWISH RELIGION

The ancient Jews were remarkably free from the habit of mind which led almost all other nations to personify the most startling phenomena of nature as living beings. Their fancy was applied almost exclusively to the glorification of their own national history and the one supreme God. They believed themselves to be his exclusively chosen people. It was only with the prophets that Jehovah became God of all the nations, though he revealed himself to them only. It was only in their Babylonian captivity (500 B.C.) that the Jews adopted the Persian doctrine of good and evil spirits.

It is sometimes asserted that Moses (1571-1451 B.C.) borrowed his monotheism
and the Jewish ritual from Egypt, because he was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. The sacred books of Egypt taught the unity and spirituality of God, the immortality of the soul, and a future judgment, besides a morality of justice and mercy. The Jewish priesthood was in some respects like that of Egypt, and the two rituals had some analogy with each other. But the resemblances are on the surface, the differences are radical. The doctrine of the divine unity was a secret doctrine in Egypt, but it was made by Moses the public faith of the nation. The polytheistic idolatry, which constituted the public worship of the Egyptians, Moses made a crime. And the doctrine of a future life, which played so large a part in Egyptian faith, is nowhere distinctly taught in the Books of Moses.

The earlier form of the Jewish religion is an uncompromising monotheism, in which all evil as well as good is ascribed to the agency of one Almighty Being. The physical and moral evil alike come direct from God, the one source of all existence and the one cause of all events. All plague, fire, famine; all passions, sickness, untimely deaths; in short, all calamities are ascribed, not as afterwards to the malignity of evil spirits, but to the direct volition of the Mighty Maker, who has power over the clay to make one vessel to honour and another to dishonour. Everywhere, indeed, in the Old Testament, angels—God's subordinates—are at work fulfilling the behests of Jehovah.

Jehovah is not only the God who has done great things for the children of Israel as a chosen and peculiar people, but he is the God of the whole earth and the whole universe of created things. He is a personal being possessed of that which we know to ourselves as Will—one who works for ever, and works unceasingly in the maintenance and government of the system which we see. He is a living and personal God who is the author of nature as a whole, and of man in particular as the only one of his creatures, so far as known to us, who is capable of having towards him the conscious relations of knowledge and of love. The belief in the omnipotence of God was absolute, but so was the belief that omnipotence itself was not arbitrary in the exercise of its powers, but worked always through intelligible and moral laws, those of truth, justice, and mercy. The true sacrifices to God are those of the heart and conduct. God insists on love and devotion.

The Jews had no sculpture and no painting, and the nature of their thoughts of God, as well as the commands of their religion, forbade their making graven images of Him. They heard rather than saw God.

According to the earlier view in the Old Testament man consists of two elements: soul and body. The soul joins the body only in the fully developed foetus and comes from the heavenly spheres. The Jews held that life, whether of man or animals, was an emission or breath from the spirit of God. But they do not intimate of brutes, as they do of men, that they have surviving shades. Life was regarded as a blessing by them, death as the one evil. "A living dog is better than a dead lion." The soul is the seat of feeling and desire, and, in a secondary degree, of the intelligence, and is identified with the personality.

Under the teachings of the Prophets and the development of monotheism the spirit began to be distinguished from the soul; and while the soul remained as the vital principle of the body and as the seat of all the mental activities, it was not conceived as surviving the death of the body. In death the soul—which is the personal factor in man and is simply the supreme function of the quickened body—is extinguished and only the spirit survives. But since the spirit is only the impersonal force of life common to man and brutes, it returns to God, the Fount of all life, and thus all personal existence ceases after death. In the Jewish religion God rewards the good and punishes the wicked, but this retributive justice is limited to the present life.

The soul leaves the body at death to pass to the dark underworld of the souls of
the dead — Sheol. The state of disembodied souls is deep quietude. Freed from bondage, pain, toil, and care, they repose in silence. Sheol was the abode of all dead persons, without moral distinction. The nation, not the individual, was uppermost. It was only after the Babylonian captivity that personal immortality found expression. Men who held communion with God during life protested against being cut off in the next, and gradually Sheol became the abode of the wicked only, while the abode of the righteous, which was reached by escaping from Sheol, came to be called Paradise. Sheol became thus an intermediate state. Still, all the descriptions of the next world are left vague. Only one thing is certain: there is no ever-lasting damnation. There is only a temporary punishment for the worst sinners. No human being is excluded from the world to come. The general Rabbinic belief was that both Paradise and Hell were in the underworld separated only “by a distance no greater than the width of a thread.” Only later, with the increase of geographical knowledge, which destroyed the old Eden, they changed the location of Paradise to the sky.

There is no utterance of Moses to indicate any sort of future life for man. Even when the Messiah was expected, there was to be no resurrection, in the present sense, but rather a new creation: the righteous shall enjoy a bodily resurrection upon the earth to honour and happiness, but the wicked shall be left below in darkness and death. In the canonic books of the Old Dispensation there is not a single genuine text, claiming to come from God, which teaches explicitly any doctrine whatever of a life beyond the grave. That doctrine as it existed among the Jews was no part of their pure religion, but was a part of their philosophy. It did not, as they held it, imply anything like our present idea of the immortality of the soul reaping in the spiritual world what it has sowed in the physical. It simply declared the existence of human ghosts amidst unbroken gloom and stillness in the cavernous depth of the earth, without reward, without punishment, without employment, scarcely with consciousness. Even when the Jews modified their own belief and accepted the doctrine of the life hereafter, it never became so pronounced among them as among other races and nations.

It is not until the Second Book of the Maccabees, probably 120 B.C., that there is any indication of resurrection. Even at the time of Christ there was the Jewish sect, the Sadducees, who openly denied the existence of any disembodied souls, avowing that men utterly perished in the grave. Another sect, ascetic and philosophical, were the Essenes, who agreed with the speculations of Philo rejecting the notion of the resurrection of the body and maintaining the inherent immortality of the soul. But by far the most numerous sect were the Pharisees, eclectic, traditional, and formalist. They believed that the souls of the faithful would live again by transmigration into new bodies, and many of them held that the sinners were doomed to a place of confinement beneath.

The medical teaching in the Talmud (IVth to Vth century A.D.) is absolutely devoid of anatomical knowledge. Dissection was unknown in those times; even to touch a corpse was thought unclean; consequently the most extraordinary anatomical statements were made.

That the soul was spread throughout the body was the general notion; but Rabbi BEN AKIBA (-135 A.D.) located it in the nose, and Rabbi ELIESER in the abdomen. Based on the biblical pronunciation that God tests heart and kidneys, these organs were held to be the instruments of intelligence. Of the circulation they knew only that the veins contained blood.

The heart plays in biblical, as well as in most heathen psychological systems, the chief part. There is, however, this difference, that in the Old Testament the heart is not merely looked upon as the most important vital organ, but as the organ of thought, volition, and as the seat of all emotions. The head and the brain scarcely find a place in the Old Testament. According to DELITZSCH, the head, as the seat of the intellect, occurs only in Daniel: “The dream and the visions of my head are these”; “Daniel had a dream and vision of his head”; and “the visions of my head troubled me.” In the Talmud, however, according to NEUBURGER,
the seat of reason was assumed to be in the “marrow of the skull.” According to one Jewish physician, ABAGE, the brain contains the centre for the sexual function (Cholin, 45, 2). It was also known that paralysis of the lower extremities was a sequence to the injury of the spinal cord.

The medicine of the Hebrews embraced a sanitary code of the highest sagacity, especially in public hygiene. The Book of Leviticus is largely made up of rules concerning matters of public health. All magic was treated with contempt by the Jews, and there were no occult practices in the healing of the sick. It is God alone who is the healer. But though disease may have been thought to be a direct result of the wrath of God, still it was recognised that unwholesome food and unclean dwellings would surely bring down that wrath upon the transgressors. Many of the prohibitions were followed by the Egyptian priesthood, but in Israel they were enforced on the whole nation. Unclean animals, like the pigs, are shunned as unwholesome in Egypt to this day. The Jews were not permitted to consume as food animals which had died a natural death or were torn by wild beasts. The inspection of all animals used as food was a most important sanitary precaution. Especially sanitary were the rules concerning menstruation in women and all their sexual functions and diseases. Prophylactic and eugenic were also the measures for the prevention of conception in delicate, diseased, and nursing mothers, so as to procure, as far as possible, only healthy offspring. Personal hygiene was practised; for example, gargling after meals with salt water for the disinfection of the mouth, and the drinking of water after every meal.

As regards treatment, suggestion was practised by the laying on of hands and stroking the skin, as well as sympathetic persuasion; and many wonder-cures were thus achieved, presumably on functional cases, such as making blind men see and lame people walk. Gymnastic exercises, massage, purgation, cold-water cure, and other forms of hydrotherapy, and venesection were practised. Special decoctions of the juices of medicinal plants were given for special diseases. Their dietary laws laid down in the Pentateuch, and enforced by specific regulations in the Talmud, are well known; and they had special diets in disorders of digestion, and gave goat’s milk for lung troubles.

THE HINDUS

The Vedas, which are the Hindu Scriptures, are asserted to have been revealed by Brahma. They constitute the basis of an extensive literature. They are based on an acknowledgment of a universal spirit pervading all things: the God above all gods, who created the earth, the heavens, and the waters—the material as well as the cause of the universe, “the clay as well as the potter.” There is but one real Being in the Universe, the Universal Spirit or Brahma, who is outside nature and within nature and one with nature; of whom all our individual souls are parts; from whom they have emerged, and into whom they will return. The world is an emanation of Brahma and a part of him. It is kept in a visible state by his energy, and would instantly disappear if that energy were for a moment withdrawn. Even as it is, it is undergoing unceasing transformations, every thing being in a transitory condition. In these perpetual movements the present can scarcely be said to have any existence, for as the past is ending, the future has begun. Time and the things of earth are of no account—only Eternity is true. Living for eternity, the Hindus cared little for the events of time, and had no historical records.

According to ANDREW LANG, the early Hindus knew the myth of the marriage of heaven and earth, with the consequent birth of the gods; they had the story of the deluge, and various myths of the conflict of the gods. When the hymns of the Rigveda were written (about 1500 B.C.) attention was drawn away from the more superstitious and childish elements of religion. These hymns were polytheistic in appearance, but pantheistic in substance. The great powers of nature were alternately deified and made supreme and worshipped as the heavens, the air, the
fire, or any other manifestation; but it was always the Supreme Being, with the same infinite attributes, who was worshipped. There were no immoral stories of the gods, no idols, no dark descriptions of hell, no demons to be guarded against, no bad deities, and as yet no castes.

The ancient Vedic religion passed on into Brahmanism, which was the worship of a triad: the Creator; Siva, the destroyer; and Vishnu, the restorer—in which the circle of change was completed. Brahma is an intellectual deity, a great spirit, the "Mahan Atma," the innermost essence of all things, unaffected by all changes. Brahmanism was faith in pure spirit. Its worship was contemplation and adoration. Later came more idolatry and polytheism, but they formed no essential part of it, and came by a natural reaction from an extreme spiritualism. It was the worship of spirit, spirit as seen in all nature. The Vedic hymns, prayers, epics, philosophy, were all intensely spiritual. The joy of a Hindu in the beginning was worship; and his joy to-day is worship. The world is really nothing but an apparent or illusory world; and the true wisdom, the only salvation consists in knowing this, and in living a life in accordance with this knowledge. The energy which in other faiths is devoted to a moral struggle is here poured into the ascetic discipline by which the individual looks to escape altogether from the world as it is.

According to the Vedanta view, a human being consists of two parts, the body and the soul. The body is a highly complex material object formed by the combination of a large number of constituents, and is used and controlled by the human soul embodied in it. The spiritual side of the soul is all in all, and the material side with which it is bound, is degraded to a mere illusion or appearance. The soul is a portion or particle of that all-pervading principle, the Universal Intellect or Soul of the World, detached for a while from its primitive source, and placed in connection with the bodily frame, but destined by an inevitable necessity sooner or later to be restored and rejoined.

The human soul has for its self Brahma in unmodified form. There is no other finite being in this world which has the unmodified Brahma for its self, and which, like the human soul, is by nature conscious and self-conscious. But the human soul is also, like Brahma, eternal and all-pervading or infinite. Man, therefore, according to the Vedanta, is Brahma in a sense in which no other thing or being in this world is Brahma. Though, however, the human soul is thus essentially superior to all other things in this world, and is in a special sense Brahma, still it is inferior to Brahma. For it is mostly ignorant, simple, weak, and subject to pain and misery; while Brahma is omniscient, omnipotent, and absolutely free from sin, pain, or misery. And it is to indicate this inferiority of the human soul that the Vedanta calls the former a part or reflection of the latter.

According to the Vedanta, every man is or becomes what he makes himself, i.e., he has complete freedom to determine his destiny. Human beings naturally differ from one another, not only in respect of their bodily attributes, but also in respect of their intellectual, moral, and spiritual capacities—the difference being due to their previous lives. Since a multitude of moral considerations assure us of the existence of evil in the world, and since it is not possible for so holy a thing as the spirit of man to be exposed thereto without undergoing contamination, it comes to pass that an unfitness may be contracted for its rejoining the infinitely pure essence from which it was derived, and thus arises the necessity of its undergoing a course of purification. And as the life of man is often too short to afford the needful opportunity, and indeed, its events, in many instances, tend rather to increase than to diminish the stain, the season of purification is prolonged by perpetuating a connection of the sinful spirit with other forms, and permitting its transmigration to other bodies, in which, by the pance it undergoes, and the trials to which it is exposed, its iniquity may be washed away, and satisfactory preparation be made for its absorption in the ocean of infinite purity. This doctrine of the transmigration

**CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE SOUL**
of the soul led necessarily to a profound respect for life under every form, human and animal, and was an incentive to virtue, a deterrent from vice.

In the Vedanta, the Supreme Soul is the pure essence of immortal existence, without intelligence, self-consciousness, or will. To account, therefore, for the mortality and evanescence of all created things five veils were put before the Supreme Soul, in which were reflected goodness or purity as pure white, passion and activity as red, and ignorance and darkness as black, the fourth veil representing vitality, and the fifth the material body. It is from these different veils that the Vedanta philosophy accounts for nature, and for the great variety of affection, and condition of body and mind.

In the Sankhya system, the material side, instead of being reduced as in the Vedanta to a series of illusory veils, is made up, on the contrary, of a series of real substances corresponding to these veils in number and function. The Supreme Soul, instead of being all in all as in the Vedanta, is reduced in the Sankhya to the position of a mere onlooker, absolutely impassive, unaffected by anything occurring in nature or in the mind or body of man. Whereas the Vedanta system is monistic, the Sankhya philosophy is dualistic, with Nature and Soul as the terms of the antithesis. The Sankhya system holds the conquest of desire to be the way of salvation from bondage to matter. It denies a soul supreme over all, such as the World-Soul of the Upanishads, whose character, as God, is regarded as incomprehensible. The Sankhya philosophy is a regular system of metaphysics, to be studied as one would study algebra. It has been called atheistic; but it is rather agnostic. While it asserts the external existence of souls, it denies that the existence of the Supreme Soul is capable of dialectic proof. One branch of this system—the Yoga—distinctly acknowledges the Supreme Being, and declares that by ascetic exercises and mortification of the flesh one can come into union with God, and be yoked to him.

In the Vaiseshika, the world is made up of an infinite number of atoms of five different kinds: fire, air, earth, water, and—mind. The aggregates of these five different kinds of atoms make up the infinite variety and complexity of the world and of human life. The material side is everything, and the soul, in its turn, is reduced to a mere after-product or effect. There are again the same veils, but they are composed of infinite aggregates of atoms, in different forms and stages of combination and complexity. The Supreme Soul, as in the other Hindu systems, is infinite, eternal; without self-consciousness, intelligence, or will; without pain, or pleasure, or motion, or any other quality whatever except mere extension. And as for the individual souls of men, they are represented as each diffused through the infinite space like ether, taking their colour, complexion, and quality from the particular combination of atoms, bodily and mental, to which at some point of their vast extent they adhere; taking a spiritual impress from its material counterpart—good and evil, pleasure and pain, merit and demerit. In this way the souls of men pass from incarnation to incarnation, gathering merit or demerit as they go along, from the particular combinations of bodily and mental atoms with which during their earthly pilgrimage they are bound up, and transmitting them accumulated and intact to the next; until at last, purified from all grossness, and with colour, quality, and complexion now indistinguishable from that of the Universal Soul in which they all alike float, they become merged and absorbed in it; and so escape at last from that weary round of incarnation to which they appeared to be doomed.

There are three other systems, subsidiary, the Nyaya, the Yoga, and Mimansa, which accept the current beliefs of the orthodox in reference to the Supreme Soul and the knowledge contained in the other, the world-systems. They are more purely ethical systems, and concern themselves rather with the kind of conduct, or attitude of soul, necessary to obtain salvation.

From such theological dogmas a religious system obviously springs having for its object the hastening of the purification of the soul, that it may more quickly enter on absolute happiness, which is only to be found in absolute rest.
CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE SOUL

The Vedanta makes sleep a higher condition than waking. In sleep the self is set free not so much from the body as from the limits of consciousness which constitutes existence. Deep dreamless sleep therefore is an approximation to the best state. In it the soul is set free to rest in itself; the next degree is rest in the eternal consciousness. Later systems recognise a state of self-absorption, which is not identical with deep sleep, but can be attained through meditation in full wakefulness.

All the Brahmanic sects unite in thinking that liberation from the net of births is to be obtained and the goal of their wishes to be reached by one means only, and that is—knowledge, real wisdom, and adequate sight of the truth. Without this knowledge there is no possible emancipation; but there are three ways of seeking the needed knowledge. Some strive by direct intellectual abstraction and effort, by metaphysical speculation, to grasp the true principles of being. Others try, by voluntary penance and self-abnegation to accumulate such a degree of merit. And still others devote themselves to the worship of some chosen deity, by ritual acts and fervid contemplation, to obtain by his favour the needed wisdom.

According to the Vedanta, taking refuge in Brahma is the only efficient means of attaining the goal of man's life, and consists in complete self-surrender to Brahma, without any reserve whatsoever, in respect of the body, intellect, feeling, and will. The self-surrender of will consists in totally abstaining from any act which is positively bad or sinful, which is directly or indirectly selfish; and in almost always willingly doing every act that is in conformity with the will of Brahma simply and solely because it is Brahma's will that we should do it. The surrender to Brahma of feeling consists in making Brahma the highest object of our love and loving other beings as our very self, so that our love of them will contribute to our love of Brahma; and in feeling satisfaction and delight, not as the result of selfishly pursuing any object or doing anything that is not in conformity with Brahma's will, but in the consciousness that we have done or tried our best to do what, according to the will of Brahma, we ought to have done. The surrender to Brahma of intellect consists in pursuing, by every means, whatever knowledge is necessary in order that will and feeling may be surrendered to Brahma in the sense explained. The surrender of the body consists in taking care of it in such a way that it may best contribute to the surrender to Brahma of will, feeling, and intellect, i.e., of the whole soul.

In the early Sanscrit documents medicine is entirely theurgic, and treatment consists in the usual spells and incantations against the demons of disease or their human agents, the witches and wizards.

The pharmacopoeia of the ancient Hindus is very rich in vegetable drugs, but mineral substances were also used both externally and internally. They maintained superiority in (rough) operative surgery above the physicians of neighbouring Oriental countries for a long time.

The practice of medicine at first was in the hands of the priests; then it extended to members of other castes. Thus in time a medical class was organised. The means of acquiring medical knowledge were the study of medical writings, the personal teaching of the instructor, and association with other doctors. Pupils fit for the study of medicine were those who came from a family of doctors or associated with doctors. At the end of the course of studies the candidate had to address a petition to the King asking him to grant authority to practise independently. This seems to be the first trace of anything resembling a legal qualification.

The early medical researches of the Hindus were recorded in the Ayurveda (600 B.C.), much of which survives in the writings of Charaka and Susruta of much later date. The acquirements, medical and surgical, chronicled by these authors were perpetuated, practically unchanged, by oral tradition, until the invasion of India by Western nations introduced the doctrines and methods of rational and

**BUDDHISM**

arose about 500 B.C., its founder being SIDDHARTA, known later as GOTAMA (520-440 B.C.), the word BUDDHA being Sanscrit for "the enlightened."

Tradition declares Mohmaia, an immaculate virgin, to have conceived Gotama through divine influence; thus he was of the nature of God and man conjoined. In the sacred books he is represented as a king, who having laid aside the ensigns of royalty, withdrew himself into a solitary place and gave himself up to the study and practice of virtue. His merits procured for him at the age of thirty the gift of divine wisdom. This consists in seeing into the thoughts of all living beings, in the foreknowledge of all future events, however distant they may be; in the knowledge of the merits and demerits of all men; in the power of working miracles; and in a tender love toward all things living.

Buddhism spread widely in India, Tibet, China, and Japan. Its fundamental principle is that there is a supreme power, a self-existent and plastic principle, in the universe, but no Supreme Being, no self-existent, eternal, personal God. There can have been no Creator, for matter is eternal, and since it possesses a property of inherent organisation, even if the universe should perish, this quality would quickly restore it, and carry it on to new regenerations and new decays without any external agency. It also is endowed with intelligence and consciousness.

Later, Buddhism became monotheistic, recognising one Supreme Being, lord of heaven and earth, above the gods, and men. This doctrine of Adi-Buddha is a belief which began in the tenth century, and does not belong to primitive Buddhism. God is not admitted to be a person, because a person belongs to time and space, has a beginning and an end, and is thus defective. The true God must be absolute, perfect, and eternal. As a matter of fact, Buddha himself, the finite Buddha, is generally worshipped as the Supreme Being, and, in the opinion of some, was so from the beginning, as the shrines from the rock-cut temples testify. He was regarded as the supreme ruler of the universe, though not its creator, since it existed before Buddha himself began to be.

Buddhism rejects inquiry into first causes as being unphilosophical, and considers that phenomena alone can be dealt with by our finite minds. Its trinity is the Past (imagined with the hands folded), the Present, and the Future (the latter two with their right hands extended in token of activity). The Buddhist's conception of God is such that he cannot expect absorption. He has no religion, but only a ceremonial. He necessarily denies the intermediate interposition of any such agency as Providence, maintaining that the system of nature, once arising, must proceed irresistibly according to the laws which brought it into being. He denies the existence of chance, saying that that which we call chance is nothing but the effect of an unknown, unavoidable cause. As to the external world, we cannot tell how far it is a phantasm, how far a reality, for our senses possess no trustworthy criterion of truth. He never prays, he merely contemplates.

The doctrine of Karma denies the existence of any soul whatever, whether human or divine. There is no such thing as individuality or personality. The ego is altogether a nonentity. The vital flame is handed down from one generation to another; it is communicated from one animated form to another. The doctrine of Karma, while denying the existence of the soul, still asserts that the effects on a man's self of his speech and action, or, in other words, his character, are indestructible and cannot die, and are as inevitable and as sure to appear as the effects of violations of, or conformity to, the laws of nature. Karma, or the law of merit and demerit,
governs all existence. It is the reason for the varieties in human fortunes, for
differences of condition and character. As a man sows, so he reaps, or shall reap
hereafter. As he has sowed in former states of existence so he reaps in this world.
**Each individual must work out for himself his own salvation**, remembering that death
is not necessarily a deliverance from worldly ills, but may be only a passage to new
miseries; but some time it must come to an end. That end is **Nirvana**, the end of
successive existences, that state which has no relation to matter, or space, or time.
It is the supreme end: nonentity. The attaining of this is the object to which we
ought to aspire, and for that purpose the character must be purged of self-interest,
cravings and vanities—not by penance and prayers, not by asceticism and self-
mortification—but by turning the mind away from its own self to the happiness and
welfare of others. That is to say, the mind should be so disciplined and trained as
to keep the lower motives overshadowed and subdued by the higher. Buddhism
was to teach men how to escape the miseries of life by the destruction of desire.
Among these desires is the wish for continued existence. This also must be de-
stroyed. The object being to produce perfect peace by the destruction of all
desire, the remedy must be found in knowledge, which is the Buddhist way of
salvation. Buddha tried and found mortification insufficient. His great discovery
was that salvation came through knowledge, knowledge of the laws of being. This
cannot come by reasoning or philosophy, but by an interior insight.

Originally Buddhism was simple, ethical, rational, benevolent and humane in
the highest degree. It did away with priestly tyranny, with the institution of
castes, withpolygamy, condemned slavery, and declared woman man's equal. All
bloodshed, whether with the knife of the priest or the sword of the conqueror, was
rigidly forbidden. For the first time in the history of mankind, the awakening of
the spiritual life of the individual was substituted for religion by body corporate.
It called all men, without any distinction of quality or position, in its fold, opening
to all the way of salvation, which it taught to be obtainable by purity of conduct.
"There is but one law for all: severe punishment for crime, and great reward for
virtue." To love even our enemies; to offer our lives for animals; to abstain even
from defensive warfare; to gain the greatest of victories by conquering oneself;
to avoid all vices; to practise humility and mildness; to be obedient to superiors;
to cherish and respect parents, old age, learning, virtuous and holy men; to provide
food, shelter, and comfort for men and animals—such are some of the moral duties
of Buddhists. No religion is despised by them; hence they never waged war
against dissenters.

Buddhism was a reaction against the sacerdotalism and ritualism of Brahmanism.
It rejected the whole system of caste and salvation by a priesthood. It taught, as
Luther taught, salvation by faith. It made all men equal before God. Its ritual
came later, after its early energy of faith had begun to decay. For as spiritualism
goes out, forms come in.

Some see resemblances between Buddhism and mediaeval Christianity. We
find, in both, monks living in monasteries, mendicant orders taking the three vows
of poverty, chastity, and obedience, going about begging, with bare feet, shaven
crowns, and a rope round the body. We find bells, images, and holy water, a
service in a dead language, choirs, priests, processions and incense, abbots, monks
and nuns, the worship of saints and angels, confession, fasts and purgatory, reverence
for a divine mother and child, relic worship, pilgrimages to the shrines of saints, and
even a pope in each, with his triple tiara.

**PERSIAN RELIGION**

ZOROASTER, or Zarathustra, probably 1200 B.C., was the founder, or at least
the reformer, of the Magian religion, and one of the greatest teachers of the East.
The beliefs recorded in the Zend-Avesta, the sacred books, approximate to the Indian theories. The Zoroastrian system recognises one God, omnipotent, invisible, without form, the Creator, Ruler, and Preserver of the Universe, and the last Judge. The worship of idols is held in abomination; but a reverence for fire and the sun is inculcated, as they are emblems of the glory of the Supreme Deity. This life-giving Sun-god was regarded as the source of all earthly existence. It is he that each morning brings back new life and activity to a world that lay buried in the silence of the night. It is he that every spring calls up the dead vegetation out of its cold grave in the joyful Easter of nature. It is he that bestows on the sons of men the genial warmth and health and food which saves them from perishing. The assertion of one Supreme Being is, however, qualified by the recognition of an opposing principle, this dualism resulting probably from the consciousness of inner conflict in the individual soul. Ahura Mazda, or Ormuzd, the "Lord All-knowing," the spirit of all knowledge, the creator of righteousness, spreads light and is the principle of good; and Ahriman, the demon of darkness, is the principle of evil. The former made a resplendent and happy world; the latter made deformity, discord, impurity and gloom. The Supreme Being was worshipped by one symbol—fire—which is pure and purifies all things. The priest chanted the litany thus: "I invoke and celebrate Ahura Mazda, brilliant, greatest, best. All-perfect, all-powerful, all-wise, all-beautiful, only source of knowledge and happiness; he has granted us, he has formed us, he sustains us."

The fate of the soul depends upon its character. "Heaven was destined for man upon condition that he was humble of heart, obedient to the law, and pure in thought, word and deed." But "by believing the lies of Ahriman they became sinners, and their souls must remain in the nether kingdom until the resurrection of their bodies."

The good soul remains three nights seated by the head of the dead man; on the morning of the fourth day it seems to be in a place of fairest plants and scents, inhaling sweet-scented wind; there comes to it a maiden of exceeding great beauty, which is the man's conscience. Then the soul takes its way, first to the Good-Thought Paradise, then to the Good-Word Paradise, and so finally to endless Light. The fate of the evil soul is the reverse, ending in eternal darkness.

No other faith seems so close to that of the Old and New Testaments as that of Zoroaster in the simplicity of its worship (without temples, without altars) and abhorrence of idolatry, as well as in the purity of its ethical system, with its earnest insistence on "pure thoughts, pure words, pure deeds" as the essentials of religion. Prayer, obedience, industry, honesty, hospitality, alms-deeds, chastity, and truthfulness are enjoined; and envy, hatred, quarrelling, anger, revenge, and polygamy are strictly forbidden.

Herodotus tells us that the Persians regarded lying as the worst possible offence, and next to it falling into debt, since the debtor is tempted to tell lies. The Persian religion was essentially moral, not by a struggle for right against wrong, but by simple obedience to the natural law.

There are some resemblances to the Christian beliefs. Thus: To Zarathustra shall one day be born at the end of time a son supernaturally begotten. A virgin-mother shall give him birth. This Saviour shall come from the distant East, the fountain and abode of light. He shall act as mediator between his Father, the supreme God, and his creatures, whom he compassionates in their miseries and heals of their diseases. One of the sects of the Magi, the priests of Persia, believed in a revelation made by God to the first man, called Gayomart by the Parsees.

The treatment of the sick consisted, from the Zoroastrian standpoint, in the casting out of the demons of disease by prayers and spells, in purification, and
laying on of the hands of the priests. Witchcraft, as practised by the Babylonians, was prohibited.

MITHRAISM

Persia was the original home of the worship of Mithra, who was regarded as an emanation of Ahura Mazda (Ormuzd) 300 B.C. Mithra was held to be the mediator between God and man, who ensured the happiness of mankind by a sacrifice. His worship comprised baptism, communion and fasts. His adherents were called brethren, and among the Mithraic clergy there were men and women vowed to celibacy. The Mithraic moral code was severe. The worship spread to India, and under Pompeius was introduced into Rome and became popular under Trajan and Domitian. This Western Mithraism, with its expiation of sin, its eschatology and sacraments, became the great rival of Christianity and was a complex religion in which the worship of a God of light was united with Chaldean magic, Egyptian rituals, and Greek theories of transmigration.

The fundamental belief of Mithraism was immortality. This implies a severance of soul from body; for the body is mortal. From that follows the idea of spiritual purity. The soul is regarded as one, but yet in life often divided against itself. It requires both a process and an agency to restore the desired unity, and these are found in ritual and in a mediator who can bring about the reconciliation of the imperfect with perfection. The mediator is a spiritual power, Mithra, standing between man and the highest spirit.

The significant feature of this doctrine is the emphasis laid on the idea of spiritual as opposed to material values. There is at last a recognition of the fact that God must be a Spirit and must be worshipped in spirit. The doctrine was not far from the idea of a material union with the Highest Being, expressed in the ritual by admitting the devotee to a sacrament in which the elements, bread with water and wine, were the means by which the nature of God was transferred to the individual. From obscure origins a progressive refinement led to the idea of union with the dead through taking part in a sacrificial feast, and later to a less crude ritual whose object was a sense of unity with the God awakened by symbolic "elements." Finally, Mithraism diverged from the Indian line of development by absorbing an astrological ritual. The soul, instead of merely realising higher degrees of purity, was represented as ascending the path that leads to the sun or descending from the sun to a corporeal life.

CHINESE RELIGION

Authentic records of Chinese history extend back to 2357 B.C., while the Chinese philosophy originated with FUH-HE, who lived about 3327 B.C. He originated the Chinese writing.

In the old Chinese Empire, about the twelfth century B.C., we find a purified and organised worship of spirits, with a predominant fetishist tendency. The sole objects of worship are the spirits, which are divided into heavenly, earthly, and human, and are closely connected with the objects of nature. Heaven is called the supreme emperor, and all spirits are his servants, so that there are no essentially evil spirits, which belief notes a decided advance. There was no priestly caste. Worship was entirely a civil function.

The Chinese believed that the disembodied entity mingled with the souls of his forefathers, and formed with them a collective soul representative of the family. This soul remained in the closest possible union with its offshoots, enjoying terrestrial life, and owed its very existence to their uninterrupted offerings; hence deprivation of burial has always been viewed in China as the height of misfortune, and seeing that all happiness beyond the tomb hinges upon the perpetuation of the family, the
paramount question is to leave sons behind. The father of the family is sovereign lord of man and property; at the same time he is responsible for the acts of all his forefathers. This ancestor worship was the typical characteristic of the Chinese social system.

KUNG-FU-TSZE or Confucius (551-479 B.C.), who is said to have originated this ancestor-worship, was a great philosopher and edited the whole of the ancient literature of China which has come down to posterity. The religious doctrine of Confucius is ethical naturalism, founded on the State religion of the Tshow, and recorded in a Scripture of the twelfth century. He held that the actions of men help to determine their destiny. To prayer he ascribed no great value, and he did not believe in direct revelation. He is still to the Chinese the unquestioned Master. His teaching served chiefly social ends. He refrained from laying down any metaphysical theory as to the nature of the human soul. Indeed, he warns his disciples to avoid philosophical speculations, which vex the spirit and disturb social order.

LAO-TSZE (604-517 B.C.), the founder of Tâo—which has been interpreted as primordial reason, and Teh, as the creative activity—was a contemporary of Confucius. It was he who introduced lofty metaphysical speculations into China analogous to those promulgated about the same time by Pythagoras in Greece and Sakyanum in India. His doctrine led to mystic reflection and contemplative life. To withdraw entirely into himself and free himself from the constraints of sense is the method to exercise a blessed power. To gain long life and immortality by means of self-chastisement and prayer, as well as by the use of certain charms, is the highest endeavour. Lâo-Tsze distinguished opposite elements in the human soul, one spiritual and the other semi-material. The spiritual or intellectual soul, divine in its essence, can move anywhere and does not perish. It is an emanation of Tâo, to which it returns after death. It is united to the semi-material, sentient, or vital soul, and between them they animate the human body. Lâo-Tsze makes no explicit statement as to the survival of consciousness, but he teaches metempsychosis, which implies personal responsibility beyond the grave.

The Chinese religion knows no revelation, no miracles, no divine interferences. The worship of the “spirits” is a primary religious duty for the Chinaman. They form a collective body; they are all good, scarcely any evil spirits. There is no heaven, no hell. Therefore the sacrifices are not of the nature of propitiation, but expressions of gratitude and devotion. There is no self-humiliation and confession; but only thanksgivings and petitions. There is no special class to attend to religion; it is the natural duty of each man. The worship of ancestors is assigned to the private individual. It is the continuance of the family rather than of the person that is thought of.

SHEN NUNG (2733-2697 B.C.) is generally regarded as the founder of medicine in China; but the oldest work on this subject, still preserved and in use, entitled Nei-King, originated with the Emperor HWANG-TI (2698-2599 B.C.). The anatomical knowledge of the Chinese was very limited. Dissections were not allowed, owing to the worship of ancestors and the Buddhistic religious conception that every man should appear in the other world as he was on earth. Therefore no mutilation of the body was permitted. For this reason also, next to nothing was known in China of the brain and nervous system. The brain was supposed to occupy only part of the cranial cavity and to serve as instrument for the five senses. Surgery, too, was very backward. Pharmacology, however, was well advanced, and contained more remedies than that of any other race.

THE ANCIENT MEXICAN (AZTEC) RELIGION

The religious state of ancient Mexico was similar to that of Europe and Asia. The worship was an imposing ceremonial. The common people had a mythology of many gods, but the higher classes were strictly Unitarian, acknowledging one
almighty, invisible Creator. Of the popular deities, the god of war was the chief. He was born of a virgin and conceived by mysterious conception. The priests heard confession and gave absolution. They administered a rite of baptism to infants for the purpose of washing away their sins, and taught that there are rewards and punishments in a life to come—a paradise for the good, a hell of darkness for the wicked. It was the received doctrine that men do not sin of their own free will, but because they are impelled thereto by planetary influences. The Mexicans made awful sacrifices to their gods of their captives. Yet this frightful system was bound up with an ascetic sexual morality and an emphatic humanitarian doctrine. The priests lived in strict celibacy; and they educated children with the greatest vigilance in their temple schools and higher colleges. They taught the people to be peaceful, to bear injuries with meekness, to rely on God's mercy and not on their own merits, and exhorted men to feed the poor. A vast amount of land was annexed to the magnificent temples for the support of the priesthood; so much so as to impoverish the empire.

At the conquest, the Mexican calendar was in a better condition than the Spanish. They had sun-dials for determining the hour, and also instruments to determine the solstices and equinoxes. They had ascertained the globular form of the earth and the obliquity of the ecliptic. Their agriculture was superior to that of Europe. There was nothing in the Old World to compare with their menageries and botanical gardens. Their writing was on cotton or skins, or on papyrus. Immense collections of their literature were burnt by the first Archbishop of Mexico.

ANCIENT PERU

In Peru, where the civilisation was higher and the priesthood less powerful, the sacrificial system was less burdensome and less terrible. The Peruvian religion ostensibly consisted of a worship of the Sun; but the higher classes, when Peru was discovered, had already become emancipated from such material association, and recognised the existence of an almighty, invisible God. The Peruvians expected the resurrection of the body and the continuance of the soul in a future life. It was their belief that in the world to come our occupations will resemble those we have followed here. They taught that the reprobates were sentenced to a hell situated in the centre of the earth, where they would endure centuries of toil and anguish. Their paradise was away in the blue dome of heaven. There the spirits of the worthy would lead a life of tranquil luxury. 'Like the Egyptians, the Peruvians practised embalming.'

THE EARLY GREEKS

In the legendary tales of their early poets—Orpheus (XIVth century B.C.), Homer (962-927 B.C.), Hesiod (850-824 B.C.)—we find the Greeks worshipping the personified powers and objects of nature. The world is peopled by gods, goddesses, and heroes. These divine beings ruled over the earth, the sea, and the underworld; they presided over every aspect, not only of human life, but of all external nature. Hence not only were the dwellings of men under their protection, but mountains, valleys, meadows, groves and springs were animated by their presence: and the storm, the sunshine, shipwreck, plague, blight, sickness, victory, defeat—every phenomenon was due to the direct intervention of supernatural powers. The warrior marching to the field of battle commended himself to the God who would protect his own. The husbandman ploughed his field trusting that the goddess who had taught men how to plough and sow would grant a plenteous harvest. Without the blessing of the gods no seaman could hope for a lucky voyage, the poet's inspiration to song
and solemn ode was a divine gift, and so was the skill of the plastic artist. Apart from the favour of the Immortals the pleasures of the social feast and sport would not exist, therefore a prayer and libation of wine always began the banquet.

The Greeks had no revealer, no sacred book, no theology. The poets were the theologians; they presented a naturalism so gross and crude that it proved an easy prey to the critical shafts of developing reflection. The Greek gods were not only human, but terribly human—capricious—occupied with loves and hatreds, feastings and jests, wars, contrivances, jealousies and deceptions. They were divine men and women, living only a little way off, on the summit of Olympos. They were in no sense supernatural, and interfered but seldom in human affairs.

The gods, as well as men, were developments from chaos. Zeus, who presided over the other gods at Olympos, was not the creator of the world, though he was the supreme ruler, whose power was unlimited. Connected with him was Athena, the personified "wisdom," and Apollo, his son, the revealer of his counsel. The divine will was made known by personal revelation, by miracles and signs, or by inspiration and dreams, but most clearly of all by works. At Delphi was the famous oracle, without whose consultation no important undertaking was commenced. The gods would deliver messages and give oracular answers as to the prospects of undertakings through persons inspired by the divine spirit—persons in a trance, hysterical and epileptic persons; just as in modern times many people believe that a "medium" can tell their future and transmit messages from the dead. About the VIth century B.C., the influence exercised for three hundred years by Delphi began to decline, the oracle failed, and began to be despised. But the national religion still survived.

There was no organised priesthood; consequently there were no hard and fast religious dogmas. There were only rites—external acts—which entered into the life of the citizen. There was an attempt at religious organisation in the mysteries of Orpheus and the Pythagorean brotherhood, which led to nothing.

The idea of the Orphic and similar mysteries, to which admission was granted only after rites of purification, when the truths were revealed by signs and symbols, seems to have been the uniting of men and women for secret worship, and for the hearing of certain great truths symbolically taught, which had been handed down by Egyptian priests and others among the initiated. Thus were carried down the beliefs in the unity of God, the immortality of the soul, and a coming moral judgment, from Egyptian thinkers through these secret associations to the early and later Greeks. In Aeschylus, Zeus is all-causing, all-sufficing, all-mighty, all-seeing, all-accomplishing, Lord of Lords, most holy of holies, the great father of gods and men.

PINDAR (522-443 B.C.), who was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries, made his songs the vehicle of the most elevated religious thought. Comedy and tragedy developed through him, and Aeschylus and Sophocles, and became the means of bringing forth in living forms to general view the kernel of religious truth hidden in the mythologic shell. The spirit promoted by poetry was fostered also by sculpture. Statues were designed to furnish a purer idea of the deities. Ultimately neither poets nor sculptors could arrest the decline of Hellenic religion. The boldness of philosophic speculation questioned the personality of the gods, the mythical element was gradually eliminated, and the high intelligence of the Greeks was free to work out a truly scientific philosophy of nature.

The Greeks of the Homeric age, about 950 B.C., believed in a ghost soul, which enjoyed all the powers, both bodily and mental, of the living man, and differed from the man chiefly in being less substantial and less strictly subject to limitations of time and space; but the ghost soul of the Homeric Greeks was not conceived as the bearer of the mental faculties, or at least as not enjoying the whole of the mental
CONCEPTIONS and BELIEFS of the living man. It was rather a shadowy image, which was exhaled with the dying breath or issued through a warrior’s wound. It was material, but of thin contexture, retaining the shape man had in life, and gliding along like a shadow. And this shadow or shade, descending to Hades, which was supposed to be an immense subterranean cavern, enjoyed but the shadow of its former life and powers. The souls congregated there were disconsolate in their dismal realm, but this banishment was their natural destiny, and not an avenging judgment. The shades, once banished to Hades, were strictly imprisoned there; and thus the Homeric world was freed from the terror of ghosts that has haunted other peoples. And the cult of the dead had no recognised place in that world; for the dead were incapable of influencing the living for good or ill. The strength and will, the intellect and mental powers in general, were supposed to be dissolved or annihilated at the death of the body. Disembodied minds were unknown to the Greeks of this age; even their gods lived upon the earth, and were fully incarnate in bodies which differed from those of men only in this respect, that they were subject to neither disease nor death. The continuance of the ghost-soul in Hades did not constitute a survival of personality, for to the Greeks of this age the body was an essential part of personality. Nevertheless, there appears in Homer the belief in the immortality of a favoured few. This immortality was not an immortality of the soul alone, but rather of the whole person, who was conceived as transported bodily by the favour of some divinity to “the isles of the blest,” or to the “Elysian Fields,” a distant region first located at the margin of the earth, where the sun sets at eve, afterwards in an underworld.

The Homeric beliefs continued to be generally held up to the VIth century B.C. Then a new class of immortals arose, men who, by the power of some god, did not die but were engulfed in some deep chasm or cave, and these heroes became in many cases the centres of local cults. It was probably under the influence of this belief and of these cults that the pre-Homeric belief in the survival of the personality after death was revived. Hesiod’s doctrine of the Golden Age was that, though these men had died, their souls were raised to a life even fuller and richer than they had enjoyed in the body; and these souls, partaking of the immortal nature of the gods, were regarded by him as wandering invisible among men, seeing their good and their evil deeds.

Gradually a doctrine developed that the wicked must be punished. The bad souls were hurled headlong down into Tartarus. In the various myths and legends we see that certain great evil-doers are condemned to an unlimited expiation, and are compelled to renew some useless, fruitless toil; for example, the Danaides filling a leaking cask. The souls which are to return to earth pass the river Lethe, drinking its waters of forgetfulness, and thus becoming oblivious of their former existence. At first a few select ones, the favourites of the gods—and later all the good souls—were rewarded by being sent to the Elysian Fields in the underworld. Thus we find first all the dead fluttering through the neutral melancholy of Hades without discrimination, and finally we discern a sad middle region, with a Paradise on the right and a Tartarus or hell on the left, the whole presided over by three incorruptible judges, who appointed the new-comers their places in accordance with their deserts.

A belief in the immortality of the soul first appeared in Greece with the Dionysian cult, whose central feature was a mystic union of the worshipper with the god. From Thrace this cult spread throughout all Greece, fusing with the cult of Apollo. Under its influence the populace became familiar with the notion that the soul, with all the mental faculties, is separable from the body; and under the same influence there sprang up the belief that the soul is formed for a higher destiny than its life in the body, that it is clogged and held down by its association with the body, and that it must be freed from that degrading influence by purificatory and ascetic
rites. In the Orphic cult these ideas were further developed, until the soul was regarded as having its true life among the gods, its life in the body being a temporary banishment from this true or higher life. The soul at death goes to judgment in the under-world. Thence it returns to be re-incarnated again and again, until it is wholly purified, when it is set free to live for ever with the gods.

In post-Homerid Greece, the soul of the dead hero was believed to hover in the neighbourhood of the tomb, and since it was held that the surviving souls could affect the welfare of men, especially of their own descendants, they became the objects of local and family cults. The notion of survival, limited to a semi-material shade haunting the neighbourhood of the corpse, was bound up in the Greek mind with the hope of a future resurrection of man in his physical entirety. Hence those who descended into Hades had no difficulty in recognising their former friends. Not only had the corporeal aspect been retained, but even the customary raiment.

It appears that the early Greeks believed man to be made up of three parts: a living spirit or soul, a spiritual body or idol, and an earthly body or investing frame, with its organs of mind.

The Iliad opens with the declaration of "the deep resentment of Achilles precipitating the valiant spirits of heroic men down to the place of darkness; but themselves (that is, their mortal frames) it made the dogs' and vultures' booty." And again, in the 23rd Book, Achilles having failed to embrace the ghost of Patroclus, which had just been reasoning with him, says:

"Ye powers! surely then in Pluto's house
There dwell a certain spirit and a shade,
But nought substance." (Phrenos, the substantial organ of mind, on earth.)

THE EARLY ROMANS

The Romans had no mythology of their own, nor were their deities conceived as beings like men. Their conceptions were always subject to foreign influences, originally to those of the Etruscans and Greeks, later to the people they conquered.

Zeus became Jupiter, the best and greatest of beings, the father of gods and men, the all-powerful, the king of all kings, the progenitor and producer of all, the god of gods, the one and all; the Greek goddess Athena became Minerva, Hermes became Mercurius, Poseidon became Neptune, Aphrodite became Venus, and Mars the god of war, etc. Spirits were innumerable; every man and every woman, every object, every action, every moral quality had its own spirit. The Lares, similar to the Greek heroes, were worshipped, at first at least, in private; the Penares, or hearth-spirits, received public adoration; the Manes, the souls of the dead, at first pure, became later evil spirits.

The gods, which the Romans worshipped, had a somewhat nebulous existence, and were not so much persons as abstractions. They had no human heart, with its virtues and vices; they were colourless, cold conceptions, each with its own functional activity, corresponding to the daily work of his worshippers, but without influence upon conduct and morality. What the Roman deities really represented was not the experiences of an inner life, but the experience of the Roman agriculturist, warrior, or citizen in his struggle for existence.

The gods were believed constantly to make signs for the guidance of men, and special knowledge was required for their interpretation. These augurs were consulted on every undertaking. The administration of religion was a part of the civil administration. The priests were no special caste, but ordinary men, without special qualification, chosen by the State. They were not mediators, but saw to the ritual. The fulfilment of the outward signs of religion was considered more important than faith and devotion.
The Romans never claimed that their religion was perfect or the only true one. They were tolerant of other religions, so long as they did not offend against civil order, and—as mentioned—often adopted the new ideas. In course of time, the State religion, undermined by philosophy, fell more and more into decline. First there was incredulity and then superstition.

To the Romans, who may be said to have held that there are three souls, death was produced by their separation from the body. The first, the breath the *spiritus*, mounting towards celestial regions; the second, the *shade*, remaining on the surface of the earth and wandering around the tombs; the third, the *names*, descending to the lower regions. The Romans, though they appear to have believed in immortality, seem never to have set store by the idea of personal survival, and few of them endeavoured to rise above the primitive conception of the collective existence of impersonal souls. The notion of conscious immortality was to Roman philosophers a matter for dubious discussions, and they rigidly held aloof from metaphysical speculations. "The fear of eternal life," says LUCRETIUS (99-55 B.C.), "should be banished from the universe; it troubles the peace of mankind, for it prevents the enjoyment of any security or pleasure." (See also Chapter III.)

**THE GAULS**

The thought of a future existence and of the *transmigration of souls* permeated the life of the Gauls throughout and governed their actions, inspiring them with bravery and contempt for death. They believed that man's immaterial part was a divine emanation, which animated inferior forms of life, first plants and then animals, before being admitted to liberty and transmigration to worlds of trial and atonement peopled by mankind, of which worlds the earth was one. After many transmigrations the soul on its progress towards perfection passed on to higher spheres and ultimately to the circle of the infinite, belonging to God alone. As with the Pythagoreans, the moon was regarded as a sort of half-way Paradise, before the souls reached the sun, which was the real and lasting Paradise. The soul never returns to inferior forms, as is so common in other theories of metempsychosis.

There can be little doubt that the Druids, the priests of Gaul, who had attained to this conception of inhabited worlds, must have possessed profound astronomical knowledge, as indeed Cesar claimed for them. It is said they knew that the world moves in the universe, of which it does not occupy the centre. The Druids became ready converts to Christianity, but in Gaul, as elsewhere where Gauls had settled, some of the old traditions persisted for a considerable time together with the new faith.

**THE WENDS AND LETTO-SLAVS**

The Letto-Slavs, peopling Eastern Europe and especially North-Eastern Europe, had a mythological religion, resting on the *doctrine of spirits*. The spirits were divided into spirits of the house, the water, the forest, and the air. The house-spirit watched over and protected the house and its inhabitants, not excluding the animals, sharing all their fortunes. When angry, he could be appeased; but, when neglected, he could show himself as a spirit of might. Similarly, the other spirits had beneficent and destructive power. It was an animistic doctrine, but clothed in poetical guise. Besides these spirits there were real deities worshipped: the thunder-god, the sun-god, and the god of the underworld. There were also fire-gods and other divine beings, such as the spirit of life, the gods of light and darkness. The Letto-Slavs believed in magic and spells. They had *neither temples nor priests*; nothing but sacred places and wise men and women.
They disposed of their dead in three ways: (1) by burial, which carried the soul to the underworld; (2) by burning, which bore the soul in the smoke to heaven; (3) by burial or burning in a boat, which transported it to the island of the sun. The soul remained for a while after death in the neighbourhood of the body, then set off on a journey to shadowland, which was sought either in the underworld, or on a happy island in the East, the abode of the sun, or in the sky. The journey was thus a long one, and the survivors were careful to provide the dead with what they would require on their expedition. The idea of retribution had not yet arisen; the life after death was simply a continuation of the life on earth. The souls of the deceased continued in relation with the living, and as their return was dreaded, feasts and sacrifices were celebrated to appease them.

**THE TEUTONS**

Our knowledge of the Teuton religion is derived from the Eddas, of which the older contains a collection of mythological songs, and the younger is composed chiefly of prose traditions. According to CÆSAR (100-44 B.C.), the Teutons worshipped the sun, Vulcan, and the moon. TACITUS (55-120 A.D.) mentions also other gods.

Wotan was originally a nature-god, the personification of the violent movements of the air, the storm god, a war-like patron of heroes, whom he gathers after their death into his Walhalla; finally he rose to be the supreme Lord of the world. There was Thor, the thundering god, and as such the summer-god, who protects agriculture and is the god of the people. Another god of the air was Loki, also fire-god. These three gods fought together against the winter-giants. Loki gradually became an evil being, a sort of Lucifer, dangerous and treacherous, and was finally thrust out. The struggle between the gods with Loki and the giants is dramatic.

The Teutons worshipped in sacred groves of their big forests. Their priests were not a caste like the Druids. They belonged to the nobility and acted as judges as well. Magic was general.
CHAPTER II

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

In the early Greek ages the priests were the learned men. The first man to lay aside the priestly character and to make a systematic attempt to account for the universe by philosophy rather than by the conflicting wills of the gods is said to have been

THALES of Miletus (ca. 624-548 B.C.).

He taught that water (moisture or fluidity) was the fundamental element of all things. All life, animal and vegetable, depends upon this element; all nourishment is moist, heat is generated from moisture, and life is sustained by heat. He predicted an eclipse of the sun which actually took place in the year 585 B.C.

"All living beings are aquatic," said CLAUDE BERNARD. "Beings that live in the air are in reality wandering aquariums," said another physiologist. "No moisture, no life," wrote PREYER. The environment must contain water in certain proportions. In the higher animals there is a mechanism which works automatically to keep at a constant level the quantity of water in the blood.

ANAXIMANDER (ca. 611-547 B.C.),

the pupil of Thales, taught that the primary substance whence all things arise is not water, nor, indeed, any form of matter known to us, but an infinite something without limit in space or time. Out of this all the worlds are evolved by a necessary process of succession, and into it they return when their fated term of existence is completed. Thus, not only the great thought of the original unity of the cosmos and the development of all phenomena out of the all-pervading primitive matter found expression in Anaximander, but he even enunciated the bold idea of countless worlds in a periodic alternation of birth and death. He considered animals were originally developed from aquatic or fish-like creatures, and that man was born from animals of a different species. His reason for insisting that man had not originally the form he now has shows some acuteness, for "while other animals quickly find food for themselves, man alone requires a long period for suckling; hence he could never have survived had he been originally as he now is."

Anaximander is the inventor of the sun-dial. We are also told that he made the first map, and that he conceived the earth as hanging unsupported in space. Thales had conceived it as a flat disc floating on the water.

ANAXIMENES (ca. 560-500 B.C.),

the successor of Anaximander, probably recognising that respiration maintains life, taught that air (ether) having the property of infinity was the fundamental principle of existence, the substance out of which all things were made, the animating soul of
man, the support of animal life, and the great conservative force of nature; and in his view, heat and cold, like the solid, liquid, and gaseous states of matter, were all merely so many products of rarefaction and condensation. That water is generated from it we see by the raindrops that come from the clouds and form springs, rivers, and ultimately the sea. Even the soul is but air, since life consists in inhaling and exhaling it, and ceases as soon as that process stops. Anaximenes thus came very near to recognising that oxygen (which was discovered two thousand years later) is needed for life. The earth and the heavenly bodies he considered to be flat and supported by air.

**XENOPHANES**, of Colophon (ca. 575-480 B.C.),

maintained that the primordial element, conceived by Thales as water, and by Anaximenes as air, was earth; and this he described as extending downwards to infinity. He attributed omnipotence and omniscience to the material world. He was the first thinker who raised the conception of God to a philosophic plane. If God is the most powerful of beings, he must be One, eternal, and possess omnipotence of mind. He ridiculed the polytheistic anthropomorphism; he resented the ascription of human passions to the gods. Men, he said, make gods in their own image.

“Negroes imagine them as black and with flattened noses; the Thracians, with blue eyes and red hair; if horses and oxen had hands, and could paint and produce works of art as men do, horses would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen. . . . There is one God, the greatest among gods and men, comparable to mortals neither in form nor thought.”

**PYTHAGORAS** (ca. 582-500 B.C.)

had travelled extensively through the then civilised world and was well acquainted with the philosophy of ancient Egypt and the religion of Babylon. For him nature obeys and reflects the laws of number. The world becomes an ordered cosmos; its unity is seen in its numerical relations. The essence of things consists in the numbers which express them; the numbers, therefore, are themselves essences. Unity is the symbol of perfection, the first cause of all things, God himself. The animal soul is an emanation from an anima mundi, and consists of the intellect, the reason, and the soul proper. God is the soul universal, light of lights, author of Himself. Between the two exists a gradation of higher or lower beings. Man is the lowest of the higher and the highest of the lower beings.

The soul was distinguished from the body as something opposed to nature, rather than a part of it. Even during its sojourn in the body it has no organic relation to it, but maintains uncontaminated its peculiar nature. It does not constitute the personality of man, for any soul may inhabit any body; and after death it taries in Hades, whence it returns again and again to earth, seeking each time a new body for its abode. So it wanders during long ages, inhabiting in turn many human and animal bodies; its fate at each incarnation being determined by its actions during its preceding periods of embodied life, rising or falling in the scale of existence as each earthly life has or has not been spent in accordance with the law of purity. When it has reached perfection, the discarnate soul is replaced in its astral surroundings and permitted to enjoy the view of that luminous world which is hidden from it entirely during the life of the body. It is by this old Oriental doctrine of metempsychosis and re-incarnation that Pythagoras explains the inequality of human conditions with its apparent injustices and the mystery of the existence of good and evil.
CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE SOUL

His doctrine was that animals having been made out of a fermenting mass of matter, by the Soul of the Universe or Supreme Deity, received a vivifying animal principle, or psyche, from the Eternal Soul; that this psyche constituted the souls of all living creatures, which were, consequently, in so far, eternal; that a period of union between an earthly body and this spiritual essence constituted animal life; that when the earthly body died, the soul, incapable of death, and yet destined solely for the sphere of earth, was, of necessity, compelled to take up its abode in some other animal body upon earth, and this fortuitously, brute or man. For as facile wax will yield to various impressions, and yet remain the same wax, so the never-dying soul is accommodated to the impressions or necessities of various bodies, and is yet for ever the same soul.

He believed that mankind had always existed, because there never could have been a beginning of things, relying on the scholastic argument that no bird could be born without an egg, and no egg without a bird.

The soul is the numerical harmony of the body, as the world-soul from which it arises is the harmony of the cosmos. According to some authorities, Pythagoras divided the soul into two portions: the rational and the irrational; the former having its seat in the brain, the latter in the heart. Others say he considered the soul as being triple in its essence; instinctive in so far as it felt the necessities of material life and the physical world; animic, in so far as it was sensitive to the various emotions of affection, hatred, or the passions; and intellectual, in so far as it rose to the comprehension of divine laws. These three elements are united into one whole constituting the human soul, which is itself governed by the personal ego, volition.

The subtle element constituting the spirit-envelope in man is a particle drawn from that imponderable fluid filling the entire universe. This etheric fluid is a kind of living and plastic substance permeating all visible objects, and the generator of form and condition. It is the great intermediary between spirit and matter. It may occasionally, especially during sleep, detach itself from the physical body, and thus enter into communication with the universal ether. Thus it was that Pythagoras explained the phenomena of somnambulism, trance, clairvoyance, and prescience of the future, as manifested by the Pythia at Delphi, when uttering the oracles of Apollo.

Pythagoras taught that human life is in God's hands; consequently he condemned suicide as an act of iniquity. But it was not by describing its delights that he sought to reconcile man to life; on the contrary, he maintained that it would be well for the soul to be delivered from the prison house of the body, but she must respect God's commands, and remain on earth to expiate the sins of a former life. It would seem that for him the renunciation of happiness was the necessary condition of virtue, for there appears in his school for the first time the great conception of asceticism, which, broadly speaking, consists in sacrificing the natural to the moral.

As a corollary to his notion of number, Pythagoras held the theory of the opposites (odd and even, the one and many, right and left, light and darkness, good and evil, health and sickness). Bodily health means harmony, disease means discord. He did a great service to mankind in teaching that disease is of earthly origin and not an affliction brought about by irate gods. He thus made study and rational treatment possible. His principle was, however, less to cure disease than to remain healthy, and to that end was drawn up a careful programme for the daily life. He promoted health mainly by diet and gymnastics, advised music for depression of spirits, and had in use various vegetable drugs. Most noteworthy of all, he included mental affections with the other diseases of mankind, denying their assumed divine significance. Holding such opinions, it is not surprising that he was driven from Athens.
The school of Pythagoras disappeared from history soon after Plato's time, and
was revived two centuries later—Neo-Pythagoreans—and became one of the most
directive agencies by which the doctrine of immortality was diffused throughout the
Roman Empire in association with a severe moral code, thus serving as one of the
channels by which Platonism led into Christianity.

HERACLEITOS, of Ephesos (535-475 B.C.),
held that not rest but motion, not permanence but change, is the key to nature and
to life. The endless flux is a struggle between contrasts. Wisdom is not so much a
knowledge of many things as a perception of the underlying unity of warring
opposites. Even man's nature consists of opposites, and ethical conduct is based
upon it. "Without injustice there could be no justice."

To account for this endless "becoming" and transformation he sought out a
new primary element, which like the previous three—water, air, and earth—is of
vast extent in its diffusion and necessary to the support of life, namely, fire. It was
the world-soul. Through the breath, the soul of man partakes of the eternal living
fire, which is the basis of all things. Vital warmth maintains life. But by fire he
does not mean "flame"; he expressly excludes it, so that we must assume he meant
heat or combustion. Living beings require a certain amount of heat. Life, which
could not have existed on the globe when it was incandescent, will not be able to
exist when it is frozen.

Another idea of his philosophy is the idea of universal law and order. He held
that "all human laws draw their sustenance from the one divine law." God is the
omnipresent wisdom or Reason by which all lives are animated or diverted. "The
one is all and all is one." The human soul, such as is endowed with reason, is an
emanation from the universal mind; but it is united with an animal nature, in
common with the inferior orders of creation. Man breathes the universal soul or
mind, and readily unites with creative intelligence, in a state of waking; sleep being
an immediate and temporary suspension of this communication.

Reason (meaning sentiency or consciousness), according to Heracleitos, has an
independent existence in the universe. It enters into man from without just as
does the air he breathes or the sensation he obtains. Sensation is the passage of
something from the outside to the inside of us. It comes into us when we are
awake, because the channels are then open, and in sleep the sensations cease because
the paths are then closed. Sensation is made to depend on motion, and requires
"opposition," so that like does not perceive like.

PARMENIDES, of Elea (540 -B.C.),
clothed his speculations in verse. To him the whole of being is one uniform, un-
changeable, limited, luminous sphere, without parts, without a beginning, and
without an end. He tells us that only what is can be conceived or even spoken of;
the non-existent is also the unthinkable. Moreover, what is can never not have
been, can never cease to be; in modern language: matter and force are indes-
structible. Mind is the material composition of the body; and the activities of mind,
the thoughts, vary in relation to the different constitutions of men. Death is not
the end of sensibility for matter, but only the cessation of the individual's sensations.

He described the earth as a perfect sphere, extending equally in all directions
from a central point. He is also known for his embryological speculations.

ZENO, of Elea (ca. 490-430 B.C.),
like his master Parmenides, denied the reality of motion. The world principle
being one, the multiplicity of things could be due to appearance only, i.e., due to the deception of the senses.

Empedocles (ca. 495-435 B.C.),

statesman, physician, poet, besides philosopher, was the first to grasp the law that matter persists through all metamorphoses without loss or gain. He explains that what is can neither begin nor cease to be, and what men call birth and death are simply a mixture and separation of pre-existing substances. Fire, air, earth, and water are the ultimate elements whence all things arise and into which they return. Two powers control the universal process: Love (attraction) drawing the elements into one; Strife (repulsion) tearing them apart.

Empedocles assumed a kind of hedonic consciousness, i.e., a consciousness reduced simply to a distinction between comfort and discomfort, a desire for good and repulsion from evil, which he supposed to be the universal principle of all activity. This view was held, after Empedocles, by Diderot, Cabanis, and the modern materialistic school in general. The same principle of appetite, or of love and of repulsion or hate, was, under the names of affinity, selection, and incompatibility, thought to direct the transformations of bodies when chemistry first began; when Boerhaave, for example, compared chemical combinations to voluntary and conscious alliances, in which the respective elements, drawn together by sympathy, contracted appropriate marriages.

The soul was not considered as an entity apart from the body, and he omitted the idea of an intelligent Ruler.

The external world is known to us through the channels of sense, and that literally. He imagined that streams of material particles emanated from the bodies about us, and that these made their way through certain minute passages or pores with which the organs of sense are supplied, thus producing the characteristic sensation by which the element within is enabled to recognise the element from without as akin to itself.

Smell, says Empedocles, is due to the reception of particles from the odorous bodies, and this naturally seems to receive support from the fact that odour is often associated with bodies wasting in decay. The exciting cause in sound is the air, the current of which strikes on the cartilage within the ear, which rings like a gong. The effluxes reaching the eye from without explain our ability to see objects at a distance from us, and reduce this to a form of touch. In the case of sight we have a flashing—a fire—in the eye.

Empedocles laid the foundations for the notion of temperaments or the idea that an individual's characteristics depend upon the mixture of the elements of the body. The decrease of consciousness which occurs in sleep is explained as a reduction of vitality, a symmetrical cooling of the blood.

He divined the truth that light travels with an appreciable velocity; he knew that the revolution of one body round another can only be maintained by the composition of two forces, a centrifugal and a centripetal; and he recognised the sexual reproduction of plants. He even suggested the famous doctrine of the non-survival of the unit.

Leucippus (ca. 480 B.C.),

the founder of the atomic theory, formed the conception of multitudinous, indestructible, invisible and indivisible particles as the basis of all real existence. He credited all his atoms alike with a downward motion through infinite space.
Democritus, of Abdera (ca. 460-360 B.C.),

elaborated this theory, and, with the modifications brought about by the progress of science, it has remained the basis of the scientific conception of life. He declared that the atoms—which he represented as indivisible bodies so small as to escape perception—differ in quantity only (in figure, grouping, and position), and that the qualitative differences are merely apparent and due to our sensations. Moreover, they are all persistent, though undergoing multitudinous transformations. Thus he enunciated the principle of the **persistence of matter** and the **conservation of energy**, which it has taken mankind a long time to acknowledge.

Democritus imagined the world to be the result of the concurrence of an infinite number of material atoms, and considered the soul—being part of the world, though animate—as consisting of the same material: warm, fire-like atoms, which are peculiar only in being finer, smoother, more rounded, and therefore more mobile, than any others; these finest atoms permeate the whole body and produce the phenomena of life. These soul atoms are drawn in with the breath, and, when they are no longer breathed in, death ensues.

Thus Democritus regarded the physical body also as an aggregate of atoms (corpuscles), warmed into life by the soul, which departs at death leaving the body inanimate. He asserted that individual souls were the emanation of individual bodies, varying with their matter, and form of matter, brute with brute, fish with fish, man with man, etc.; that the soul bore the same relation to matter as the perfume of a rose bears to the flower, as light and heat bear to the ignited fuel; and it fades as the material fades.

**Perception** takes place by means of little images which pass to the soul through the senses. Impulse and will, the active life, reveal the reverse process—the pouring out of the images taken in by perception; but perception is imperfect and often deceptive. The configuration of the air may be so changed as not to represent the object faithfully. The senses are, therefore, sometimes inadequate and deceptive.

The objects which produce **taste** and **smell** do so in accordance with their shapes. The source of **sound** throws off particles which, mingling with like elements in the air, stream into the ear and so come to the soul. There is no reason why these particles should strike only on the ear, and they do, in fact, strike upon the whole body; but the ear alone hears, because that organ is best adapted to receive and retain the air. **Sight** is like hearing, in that the original source of the sensation may be at a distance from the person. The primary object, the thing, sends off films or "images," which being infinitely thin cannot be seen individually, and, acting on the air, mould it into the shape of the original object; thus the eye is penetrated, as it were, by an air-figure, which is a copy of the distant object. Thus motions are set up similar to the objects, i.e., pictorial reproductions of them. This so-called copy theory persisted up to the XVIIth century, when it was regarded with new favour on the discovery that an image of the object, although inverted, is indeed thrown upon the retina.

Democritus held the primary colours to be four—white, black, red, and green. A colour is an effect produced by atoms and is expressible in terms of the figure of the atoms in a manner analogous to that in which varieties of taste are explained by differences in the shapes of atoms. All other colours are formed by the mixture of these four.

Democritus distinguished "true" from "obscure" knowledge. These are divisions of knowledge according as it depends on sense or reason; the superiority of reason is consistent with the doctrine that the atom is knowable, but not an object of sense. Thought is superior to sense, for it is, by its nature, conversant with objects not known to the senses.

His theory, while formally acknowledging the possible existence of superhuman
beings, left no place for gods in any true sense of the word. In a world where the atoms alone were eternal, where necessity and mechanical law alone ruled, there could be neither creation, nor providence, nor immortality. The particular combination of atoms which makes the individual is broken up and dispersed at death, and on the same physical analogy we must regard the soul as sharing the dissolution of the body.

Democritus appears to have distinguished various faculties of the soul and to have assigned a seat to each in a different part of the body: thought in the brain, anger in the heart, and desire in the liver.

His moral teaching was very much in the form of proverbial philosophy. For example: Goodness is not abstinence from doing wrong, but from the wish to do wrong. Encouragement and persuasion are a better training to virtue than law and compulsion. From his habit of constantly deriding the follies of men, he acquired the epithet of the laughing philosopher. He was treated as insane by the Abderaites for his attempt to find out the cause of madness by dissection.

**ANAXAGORAS (500-428 B.C.)**

was the teacher of Pericles, the great Athenian statesman. He was the first Greek philosopher who taught that there must be one Great Intelligence ruling over the whole Universe. Observing that men attribute actions to reason, he justified the assertion that reason is the starting-point of the activity which has put in order the chaotic mass of original matter. Reason in this way becomes an immanent force that makes for order, itself pure and unmixed, but the cause of all mixture, a power inherent in some things, and ruler or organiser of all. Hence he suggested an **intelligent First Cause—Nous, Spirit, Reason**—that "knows everything about everything and controls everything," and brought order into the Universe from a primordial chaos. The evolutionary process was therefore not spontaneous, not due to what we call the unaided forces of nature, but due to this guiding and shaping intelligence, the First Cause: Nous. As opposed to the elements of things which are material, he considered the soul as simple, identical, unmixed. It is the principle of reason from which the ends found in nature proceed, acting in opposition to accident and blind necessity. It is also active, not merely intelligent; it is the moving, working principle, seen not in the living person only, but in all nature.

He considered mind to be the same in all living creatures, both in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and the different grades of intelligence depending entirely on the structure of the body. By a confusion of vital function and consciousness he attributed to plants reason and knowledge. It was by the intellect alone men became acquainted with the truth, the senses being altogether untrustworthy.

**He recognised that it is the brain which hears**, not the ear. He said hearing is due to sound which passes through the ear to the brain.

He held that difference in the kind of matter is not due solely to the arrangement of its particles by motion, as Democritus thought; it is due to the special character of the particles themselves. Material things consist of particles (molecules) which are homogeneous in each kind of body, but various in different kinds. This is the Homoiomeria of Anaxagoras. **He, too, recognised the law of the conservation of energy**, which we associate with the name of MAYER, twenty-four centuries later.

Anaxagoras was the first philosopher who chose Athens as his abode, and, unhappily for the fame of that city, was the first also whose free inquiries brought him into collision with the religious superstitions of the age. He was accused by the Athenian populace of atheism, since he asserted that the so-called divine miracles of his time were nothing more than common natural effects, and that the sun and moon consisted of earth and stone. He had convinced himself, partly as would seem, by the study of meteoric bodies, that the sun was a hot mass of stone,
that the stars were not fire, that the moon was an earthy body, shining not by her own but by reflected light, and causing eclipses of the sun by the interposition of her cold dark orb between him and us. In particular, he interpreted the markings of the moon's surface as indications of plains and ravines. Now at Athens the sun and moon passed for being blessed gods, and a pious belief prevailed that they were worshipped as such by the whole human race. To treat them as inanimate matter was blasphemous, and Anaxagoras was accordingly prosecuted for impiety, condemned, and escaped death by the hemlock only by a timely flight. (See also Chapter IV.).

**DIODENES**, of Apollonia (412-323 B.C.)

laid great stress on the evidences of design in nature, the beautiful harmonies of which, according to him, could only be explained as the work of an intelligent cause. He was a physician, and wrote a careful account of the vascular system, which he thought had something to do with the distribution of air—or, as we should say, oxygen—over the body. He regarded air as the most important element in the world. It is the principle of life, pervading the whole body, but there are two special centres, the head and the heart. By means of the air round the brain we become conscious of objects; the more subtle the air the clearer the perceptions.

**PROTAGORAS**, of Abdera (ca. 480-411 B.C.),

was one of the Sophists—itinerant professional teachers who taught oratory and all branches of higher culture to their pupils. The Sophists rejected the current polytheism of their age, and thereby contributed to the great religious revolution that substituted the belief in one God for the belief in many. Protagoras in one of his books said: “About the gods I cannot say whether they exist or not. Life is too short for such difficult investigations.” This modest confession of agnosticism brought down an action for blasphemy, to escape the consequences of which he took flight and perished at sea.

For Protagoras, all external reality or truth is relative to the observer, who apprehends the world through the medium of the senses; there is no reliable general knowledge of nature secured by perception. Justice and morals cannot be founded on a supposed objective order of nature. Reason is no better. There is no way to reach any independent truth, either sensible or rational; all rests upon the experience and nature of man. To say that the senses deceive, is to say that the interpretation put upon sensation is incorrect or false. To say that knowledge is relative is to say that our percepts, images, etc., are capable on occasion of varying interpretations. To say that reason is ineffective, is to say that the beliefs, presuppositions, and processes which are its tools are insufficient. All these misinterpretations turn upon the fact that consciousness possesses data which are taken to be subjective; that “ideas” intervene in some sense between the perceiver and the thing perceived; that ideas are the mediating or instrumental term in knowledge. It is impossible to pass beyond ideas, and, therefore, man, the possessor of ideas, is “the measure of all things, determining what does, and what does not, exist.” To which Plato opposed the principle that God, and not man, is the true measure.

For Protagoras morality is the very foundation of human life, the conditions of every other art, the essential distinction between brute and man, between savages and civilised communities. Some are born with more, and some with less, capacity for acquiring virtue; but that it is an acquisition is proved, among other ways, by the existence of penal law. For punishment can only be justified as a deterrent for wrong-doing—in other words, as a moralising agency. How to be happy is the Vol. i.]
CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE SOUL

important problem. To be happy is to govern one’s self. Hence philosophy is the art of being virtuous.

The Sophists denied that human reason had thus far succeeded in ascertaining anything, and even affirmed that it is incapable, from its very nature, as dependent on human organisation, of determining the truth at all. If truth were actually in our possession, we have no criterion by which to recognise it, and having no standard of the true, we have no standard of the good, and our ideas of what is good or evil are altogether produced by education or by convention. “It is might that makes right.” It is the will of Nature that the strong should rule over the weak. The strong man defying conventional justice instituted by men, confiding in his strength, which would make him feared by others, would give full rein to his passions. From the Sophists’ point of view, purely human justice which forbids violence is a mere convention, a prejudice fostered by the weak, whose interest it serves. A modern philosopher—Nietzsche—has revived this defence of the strong.

Merit and evil depending on the social standard and public opinion, those who depart from the social rule should cultivate rhetoric, that noble art by which the wrong may be made to appear the right, and even worthy of praise, or the blame may be attached to one’s enemy. The sons of noblemen valued such instruction, which the Sophists were offering to give for adequate payment.

The Sophists discerned in the belief in the gods a successful artifice, employed by legislators in order that fear might prevent, or that remorse might disclose, secret crimes which would otherwise go unpunished. And who will venture to say that the support which the modern State gives to the Church has not for one of its objects to encourage submission and prevent dissatisfaction!

Other Sophists of importance, besides Protagoras, were Hippias, Prodicus, and Gorgias, all living about the latter half of the 5th and the commencement of the 4th century B.C.

**Hippias** was a naturalist and taught his pupils to ascertain the will of nature by the sedulous study of geometry, astronomy, and physics.

**Prodicus**, like the others, rejected the gods of popular religion as supernatural personalities, explaining that they arose from the personification of natural elements and powers.

**Gorgias** was a dialectician who argued that there is nothing, and besides, we could not know it if there were, and we could not communicate it if we knew it; thus preaching a philosophy of negation and scepticism.

**Socrates** (470-399 B.C.) was principally an ethical teacher. Self-development, self-consistency, and self-knowledge are the key-words of his teaching. While for the Sophists the teaching of wisdom had been merely an honourable and lucrative profession, for Socrates it was the fulfilment of a duty to his country and of a divine mission. He devoted himself to the moral instruction of the youth of Athens, and, unlike the Sophists, he never thought of procuring for himself a brilliant position.

He opposed the Sophists’ individualistic way of employing subjectivism. The world is something to conquer and enjoy, and something to conform to, rather than something to understand; and the “self” is a body of collective social interests, rather than a personal being of mere desire, individual personal caprice, and private opinion. Man has by nature a tendency to strive after happiness, and this natural conation is the root of all desire. Satisfaction of desire is only found in the good, so that all desire is really the will to be happy, which is the same ultimately as the will to be good. In his view, virtuous conduct depends upon knowledge in the sense that with adequate knowledge, or insight into the results of action—called by him “wisdom”—one could never do wrong. Goodness can be taught, for it is a matter of knowledge. Sin is error; bad action is due to mistaken judgment. Our ideas guide
our actions; ideas are the means of attaining truth and virtue. The will is simply the reason when in action. Freedom is found in intelligent action. Mere external authority, social constraint, religious sanction, cannot replace the inner light of knowledge.

The analysis of human nature gives us only reason and the passions, and the passions cannot overcome reason. The faculties are essentially distinct and therefore do not affect each other. Man cannot have passions in the rational part, nor reason in the emotional part. Motive resolves itself into the question which, among the elements, is the stronger, when there is conflict between the elements.

The mind, by its very supremacy in man, is a proof of God's presence in the Universe. God represents the unchangeably good. There can be no truth in the stories of deceit and lust of Greek mythology. Socrates acknowledges the existence not only of God, but of Providence, and not only of that universal Providence which watches over the whole world, but of a particular Providence, which is interested in the fate of individuals. He recommends men to pray, and to pray only for the good of their souls, and not for temporal goods.

Socrates conceived death as a long sleep, denied that the soul had memory, and professed ignorance as to immortality. All this would not have mattered; but that he had tried to demonstrate the unity of God was too much, and he was accused by the Athenian Dikastery of alleged irreligious teaching and thereby corrupting the youth of Athens, and was condemned to death in the manner of his day, by drinking a cup of the juice of the poisonous hemlock.

PLATO (427-347 B.C.)

rejected the notion of previous philosophers of the soul consisting of a subtle kind of substance permeating every part of the body, which after the death of the body continued to exist, and might appear as a dim vapour-like duplicate of it, or ghost. He believed the soul to have three parts. One, an immortal or rational part, coming from God; another a mortal, animal or sensitive part, the seat of appetite and sensation, belonging to the body; and a third, lying between these and making their interaction possible—will or spirit—by means of which reason conquered desire. Plants have the lowest part; animals the two lower; but the rational part is exclusively human.

This rational soul he regarded as immaterial and metaphysical in nature, incapable of being perceived by the senses, and only to be grasped by the intellect. The union with the mortal, material and physical body was only a minor incident of its long career, a temporary association for the course of the individual life. The rational soul existed as such, as an "eternal idea," before it entered the human body; and when it quitted it, it sought such other form as was most suited to its character for its habitation. Plato thus drew a fundamental distinction between soul and body.

He ascribed personal immortality to the soul. When we recall by an act of mind a former experience with which we are familiar, but which actually has never been experienced in this life, the remembrance must be the revival by the soul of experiences that belong to the soul itself. That which we thus recollect is truth independent of the present time, in its nature eternal; and therefore our own thought, properly understood, proves that the soul has an existence of its own, an activity independent of all sensation, and a life which is at least not limited to the span of bodily existence.

Plato was an adherent of metempsychosis or the transmigration of souls. After death the soul is in some intermediary region, subjected to reward and punishment, and must in most cases undergo a new incarnation, which corresponds to the stage
of purification already attained. Finally the soul is purged and then finds a lasting abode in the ideal world.

To secure the triumph of good over evil, perfect happiness for the good man in this life is not enough; he must also have the prospect of felicity in a life to come, while very much the reverse is in store for the bad. For the immortality of the soul, though not generally accepted, is, according to Plato, quite certain. He argues that if anything could destroy the soul it would perish by moral corruption—which, as we know by experience, does not happen. Therefore souls live for ever, migrating after apparent death into a new body, higher or lower than the last habitation, as their own choice, which God leaves free, may decide. But before resuming their earthly existence all souls have to pass through an intermediate stage of disembodied consciousness, lasting a thousand years, in which they receive tenfold retribution for the good or evil deeds performed in life, the worst offenders being subjected to everlasting torments. Each soul before returning to earth is described as taking a draught of Lethe, whereby all remembrance of the experiences in the intermediate state is blotted out.

The rational soul is capable of three states according to the way in which it is related to objects. With respect to the real, it has knowledge; with respect to the contingent, opinion; and with respect to the non-existent, ignorance. The soul is imprisoned in the body, the body hinders the soul, hence the difference in our forms of knowledge.

A man who knows something feels sure of it; knowledge is therefore psychologically a kind of feeling, and it is true that knowledge is felt certainty. All emotions belong to the soul, for they are conscious states, and therefore in some way connected with knowledge. The body never has knowledge, however indispensable an instrument it may be to the attainment of knowledge in some cases. The soul knows itself and knows also the body. Pains and pleasures arise from both sources, though as known the affections are in the soul. The body may be in pain while the soul has pleasure, e.g., the pain of hunger combined with pleasure of expectation; or body and soul may both be in pain as when pain of the body is joined with despair of relief. The unmixed pleasures belong to the soul. They are the intellectual and aesthetical pleasures, and, in general, pleasures that are not preceded by pain.

The material soul he believed to be endowed with the faculty of receiving impressions and giving rise to imagination. Therefore memory and imagination were regarded by him as material qualities, dependent upon organisation; while reason, on the contrary, was a faculty essentially spiritual and independent of all organisation.

The rational part acts on the brain, being the part nearest the heavens, and man being, as it were, an inverted plant, "for the divine power suspended the head and root of us from that place where the generation of the soul first began." The irrational soul acts on the spinal cord. Both brain and cord are the conductors of vital force. But the seat of the irrational, material, or vegetative soul—which needs food for its preservation—is in the abdomen; and the will, or spirit, the intermediate link between the mortal and immortal soul, has its seat in the heart.

The heart was probably chosen by Plato as the seat of spirit or courage from observation of the feelings attending fear, anger, and the like; while the desires and passions could be relegated to the lowest parts, not only to banish them as far as possible from the head, but also as a result of observing the processes of nature, hunger and reproduction. As the desires arising in the lowest soul are known to and can disturb the highest soul, so the movements of the highest soul can produce effects in the lowest. Thus the power of thought is like the acid element in the liver; it is therefore capable of commanding sympathetic activity in the liver; and
this explains why some people not only know a thing to be bad, but also have a
positive disgust for it, a feeling of its badness.

The liver, in which the thoughts issuing from the brain are, so to speak, reflected
as in a mirror, is the seat of the faculty of prophesying. The spleen, which is
closely connected with the liver, Plato regarded as a sort of reservoir of the
impurities of the blood. The active principle, setting the brain and viscera in motion,
was described as pneuma, or universal soul, "a vital movement animating all
nature." This furnished the brain and senses with a kind of aura, constituting the
element of their activity.

Plato was not the first to regard the passions—pride, ambition, courage, anger,
love, etc.—as innate and placing them in the different viscera. Full six hundred
years before, David showed that the popular, and consequently the ancient, opinion
of his day was, that not only the affections, but even the reasoning power, resided
in the heart and kidneys; the latter being possibly considered from very ancient
time the chief seat of vitality and passion; and the heart as the seat of under-
standing, as may be seen by reference to the oldest of all authorities, the Book of
Job. The liver was also spoken of as the fountain of life, and was considered, up
to the days of Harvey, the laboratory of the blood.

According to Plato, man is not merely a mixture of elements, as the physiologists
hold; he is a mixture of natures, and the science of temperaments requires as its
complement a science of character. Character depends largely on the extent to
which one or other of the natures is developed; a man may be characterised by
excess of passion, or of spirit, or of intellect. The study of man from this point of
view is therefore essentially a study of conduct.

Life is a collection of activities, a perpetual striving after fulfilment of the need,
whether it be for physical or spiritual satisfaction. The will depends upon the
mind's grasp of an end; the creature acts in the way which it thinks best. All
conduct is therefore in the first case merely doing what one thinks best. Right
conduct can only be achieved when that which is thought best is at the same time
truly and really the best. Hence the mind must be trained to think rightly. Men
act for the ends which they approve; they live for that which they like, and their
likings reflect their nature. The common element in all cases is the liking. The
distinction of characters depends upon the tendency of the likings, and this again
depends upon the balance of the elements in the nature of man; evil likings arise
from natures in which the evil elements predominate. Evil is not the possession of
any one part, whether higher or lower; it consists entirely in the breach of proper
relations between the parts.

The highest good is not pleasure, nor knowledge alone, but the greatest possible
likeness to God, as the absolute good. The virtue of the human soul is the fitness
for its proper work. It includes various particular virtues, which form a system
based on the classification of the faculties or parts of the human soul. The virtue
of the cognitive part of the soul is the knowledge of the good, or wisdom; that
of the courageous part is valour, which consists in preserving correct and legitimate
ideas of what is to be feared and what is not to be feared; the virtue of the ap-
petitive part is temperance (moderation or self-control), which consists in the
agreement of the better and worse parts of the soul as to which should rule; justice
finally is the universal virtue, and consists in the fulfilment by each part of its
peculiar function. Piety is justice with reference to the gods. Justice consists,
not as the old maxim said, in doing good to one's friends, and evil to one's enemies,
but in doing good to all men without distinction. Thus Plato enjoins the forgive-
ness of injuries. To do injustice is worse than to suffer injustice.

Temperance is for Plato the renunciation of pleasure and the release of the soul
from the body. Appetite, which is lawless and blind, can be conquered only by
setting against it the spirited passion which, of its own impulse, makes for the good.
Wisdom is not only first among the virtues, it is also the principle of them all. One
of the ramifications of wisdom is philosophical love, or the joint striving of two souls
for the attainment of philosophical knowledge. Virtue should be desired, not from
motives of reward and punishment, but because it is in itself the health and beauty of the soul. The social virtues depend on individual morality. The virtue of rulers is wisdom, of warriors valour, and of the lower orders (labourers and trades-people) self-restraint and willing obedience.

Plato, like Hippocrates, considered the moral character of dreams as the expression of desires which are usually suppressed. He seems to favour the idea that in sleep the rational soul, if it is not troubled by the irrational parts, can attain truths not otherwise revealed.

According to Plato, we can only thoroughly understand the faculties of the mind by carefully studying the effects they produce. We ought then to distinguish as many faculties of the mind as there are different and distinct mental operations.

Plato distinguishes primarily two principal faculties: that of feeling and thinking. To feel is to be affected by an external impression; to think is to operate upon our ideas. The faculty of thinking divides itself again into two others, the understanding and reason. The understanding is that power which combines sensible images; reason is that supreme faculty which regulates all others, directs to an end or object, marks the relation of things, and forms conclusions from the whole. The understanding and reason exercise themselves both under an active and passive form; under the latter form they receive and preserve notions; and under the former they are united, separated, combined, and placed in logical and methodical order. Thought is a species of inward self-instructor; it interrogates itself and furnishes the answers. This self-instructor, through the means of language, forms the judgment, which consists in the uniting of ideas together, in the same manner as discourses are formed through the instrumentality of nouns and verbs. The understanding is closely linked to sensation; for every sensation is but a confused judgment, which the understanding has afterwards to develop. The senses furnish the materials, and the understanding elaborates them. Imagination is a mental activity in a sensuous form. Sensation, memory, and opinion are all accompanied by an imagination. The word phantasy in Plato suggests the unreal as opposed to the real. It produces appearances.

There are in our minds images, notions, and ideas: the first belong to sensation, the second to the understanding, and the third to reason.

Ideas, according to Plato, are original endowments of the mind, but they are at first latent and we are not conscious of them. Education has to draw them out. They are derived from a previous state of the soul and we recover them by an act of memory or recollection. Sensations provoke ideas; they do not create them. Their function is to recall to our minds our latent possessions. The soul longs to see those truths again which it once knew.

Ideas or concepts are not merely subjective states of mind, as with Socrates, but absolute realities existing in themselves. Every actual thing in nature has its absolute prototype or model in "idea." What degree of reality things have comes only from the presence of this prototype, of which the thing is a mere "shadow." The ideas constitute a hierarchy or ascending series, the supreme idea being God or the Good. The idea of the good must be the highest idea, and it must be divine. The divine reason in man responds to the divine good in God. By love and contemplation the soul realises the union of wisdom and goodness in God, and attains its own proper immortality.

To Plato, God was the infinite and purely spiritual embodiment of truth, beauty, and goodness. These three qualities were not ideals but spiritual realities, shining upon the earth like stars on a cloudless night, reminding us of the spirit world in which the soul once lived, and to which it will return when freed from the prison of the flesh. To be like unto God is to escape from the material or sensible world, which is of necessity the abode of evil, and to take flight towards the world of Ideas. No doubt, man, inasmuch as he consists of a body composed of many
Since to Plato the pursuit of wisdom was to be the highest aim of life, the body could only be regarded from the point of view of its utility in helping or hindering this pursuit. Apart from the various diseases of the body, which of necessity must impair the activity of the soul in seeking after truth, the complex and unnecessary desires of the body are always tending to drag the soul down to a lower level, and to prevent it from realising those aims which are its ultimate goal. He believed the good soul could improve the body, but the good body does not improve the soul; indeed, “excessive attention to the training of the body brings with it evils as great as the undue neglect of it.” The body then gradually swallows up the mind; the whole man swells with the pride of conscious strength; by degrees his courage sinks into brutality and his high spirit into insolence; his senses, the windows of his mind, are clogged and darkened; his intelligence, neglected and starved, grows weak, dwarfed, and blind.

Education to Plato is information, not the mere acquisition of knowledge, but the formation of mind. Knowledge cannot be thrust into the soul from without nor attached to it as an ornament may be attached to the body. Knowledge is activity, and the wise man is he who has acquired through training perfection in the exercise of his faculties. The education of youth was regulated by Plato in accordance with the principles of a gradual advance to the cognition of the ideas and to the corresponding practical activity in the State, so that only the best qualified persons could rise to the highest stations, while the rest were destined to exercise inferior practical functions.

To the children of rulers and warriors Plato provided from the first to the second year care of the body; from three to six narration of myths; from seven to ten gymnastics; from ten to thirteen reading and writing; from fourteen to sixteen poetry and music; from sixteen to eighteen mathematical sciences; from eighteen to twenty military exercises. Then follows a first sifting. Persons possessing an inferior capacity for science, but capable of bravery, remain simply warriors; the rest go on, until the age of thirty, learning the sciences in their mutual relations as parts of one whole. Then comes a second sifting. The less promising are assigned to practical public offices, the others assume positions of authority until the fiftieth year. After this they are received into the number of rulers and fill in turn the highest offices of the State.

Of interest also is Plato’s view of the treatment of disease by drugs:

“This method of treatment should be used only in urgent need, and a man of sense will never resort to it except in extremity. Diseases require a certain time to run their course, and if one attempts by violent remedies to combat them before their period, one may produce out of one disorder several, or turn a mild affection into an incurable one.”

After speaking of bodily disease, Plato discourses on insanity:

“In the above manner are diseases of the body produced, but the diseases of the soul, resulting from the habit of the body, are as follows. We must admit that the disease of the soul is folly, or a privation of intellect, and that there are two kinds of folly—the one madness, the other ignorance (imbecility). Whatever passion, therefore, a person experiences that induces either of them, must be called a disease. Excessive pleasures and pains, however, are what we should deem the greatest diseases of the soul, for which a man is over-elevated with joy or unduly depressed with grief, and so hastens immoderately either to retain the one or fly from the
other, he can neither perceive nor hear anything properly, but is agitated with fury, and very little capable of exercising the reasoning powers. . . . And, indeed, it may be almost asserted that all intemperance in any kind of pleasure, and all disgraceful conduct, is not properly blamed as the consequence of voluntary guilt. For no one is voluntarily bad; but who is depraved becomes so through a certain bad habit of body, and an ill-governed education. . . . All the vicious are vicious through two most involuntary causes, which we shall always ascribe rather to the planters, than the things planted, and to the trainers, rather than those trained."

In the laws which he laid down for his "Republic," he provided for the insane, as follows:

"If any one is insane, let him not be seen openly in the city, but let the relations of such person watch over him at home, in the best manner they know of; and if they are negligent, let them pay a fine."

A further proof of his wisdom is shown by his definite views on eugenics.

He praises Aesculapius for his practice of treating only definite curable ailments, and not those persons diseased through and through; so that he did not lengthen out useless lives and prevented weak fathers from begetting weak sons. The true way of improving the human race, he says, is by a scientifically directed system of breeding. "The State alone should regulate marriages, not according to the will of the parties, but solely in view of the general good of the nation." He held that it was the duty of the magistrates to choose the bravest men and the most beautiful women so as to obtain specially good offspring. Aristotle wrote to the same effect.

NOTE

The history given in this chapter shows the Greeks in the VIth, Vth and IVth centuries B.C. to have been intellectually superior to the rest of mankind and to have produced a whole series of pioneers in philosophy, supreme thinkers, men of extraordinary wisdom, in search after truth, and most of them of exemplary character. Ancient Greece was evidently a country in which free discourse was the habit of the people, the discussion being at first confined to the problems of the universe and gradually extending to man's nature, his past and future. The influence of the teaching of these great men has persisted, as we shall see, throughout the ages, and no succeeding discovery in philosophy can be estimated at its true worth unless the history of the progress of human thought from the very beginning is kept in mind. That is the reason why this work contains the whole history of human speculation, though it may be already familiar to the reader and have been described in a better and fuller manner in other works. Such a proceeding was deemed necessary, in order that the general reader may comprehend properly the results of modern research and speculation.

In the succeeding chapter the history of Greek philosophy will be continued to its decay; from Aristotle, the universal genius, philosopher and naturalist, going through the whole history of Greek rationalism and Stoic moral philosophy, to the Alexandrian revival of Platonism, which contributed so much to what is best in the Christian Church.
CHAPTER III

LATER GREEK PHILOSOPHY

ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.)

was one of the greatest scientific men and speculative geniuses that ever lived. He may be considered the father of natural history, the founder of comparative anatomy, anthropology, embryology, besides having produced the best collection of physiological facts known in his time, derived mostly from his own observation.

So far as is known, he was the first to treat systematically of the mental processes and laws, and his influence here, as in other departments of philosophic study, has dominated subsequent inquiry. His method was not to begin with ideas furnished by the mind, but with the facts of sense derived from observation of Nature. A thing with him was not to be regarded as true, because the imagination had suggested it, or because it was amenable to dialectical treatment, but because the reason could verify it inductively by an appeal to experience.

Aristotle approached psychology from the point of view of biology, and by his soul was ascribed to all material things that manifest powers of spontaneous movement and growth, that is to say, to all living organisms. The soul was to him the sum of the vital functions. His psyche would therefore be more correctly translated "vital principle," rather than soul, like the "entelechy" of Driesch in recent years.

Man absorbs nutriment, perceives objects, and transcends the immediate moment of perception in thought. Aristotle accordingly, using Plato's idea, admitted three grades of life, arranged in a progressive series of increasing perfection: the vegetative or nutritive, the sensitive or animal, and the rational or human soul. The plant mind is nutritive only; the animal is nutritive and sensitive; the human mind is nutritive, sensitive, and rational. In man the parts of the soul are hardly more than divisions of psychic activity, but their separate existence in the world of nature is the justification for speaking of them as separate parts or souls.

In the theory of the relation of these parts, Aristotle advances to a genetic point of view. They are not separate parts in the sense of having different local seats in the body, as Plato taught, but functions of the one developing principle. The higher is developed from and includes the lower. Man, who is at the end of nature, exhibits in himself the various steps of development. He is placed among the animals, but distinguished from them by certain features—by the relative size of the brain, by two-leggedness, by mental characters, and, above all, by the fact that in him the thinking or rational soul is present. This is implanted in him before birth from without; and at death it goes back to its source, the divine reason, where it continues in eternal but impersonal form. It is twofold in its nature in man, partaking both of divine reason and of the sensitive soul; it is both active and passive. It is man, in the masculine gender only, that realises the end of nature.

Aristotle thus attempted to trace a series of continuous gradations connecting
the inorganic with the organic world, plants with animals, and the lower animals with man. Yet he was not an evolutionist, as we understand the term now. For he held that all the animal species were immutable; they always had existed, and always would exist; and he was a strong teleologist, believing that the animal organs had been designed and made for the functions that they now perform. Thus, while Anaxagoras had said that man was the most rational being because he had hands, Aristotle reversed this dictum: man has hands because he is the most rational being; for the instrument must be fitted to its work, not the work to its instrument.

For Aristotle, matter is not an independent principle. Matter is pure potentiality. It exists only in connection with form and design. Matter united with form is matter as we find it; it is organised. Matter is the substratum; the form is that which makes of matter a particular, determinate, or real thing; it is the perfection, the activity, the soul of the thing.

The objective world is a world in which reason is immanent. There are two great modes of reason, considered as cause, in the world: a cause is either a potency or an act. Every change from the potential to the actual is brought about by a cause—the moving cause. It may either operate from within, as is the case with the animal germ; or it may operate from without, as is the case with artistic construction, in which the material is given and the work of the artist is added to produce the shape he has in his own mind. In either case there is an operative cause by which the materials are moulded into form. The final cause is that for which everything exists. A final cause always implies intelligence, which an efficient cause does not necessarily imply. The first great final cause of all, that is the intelligence which originally set in motion the whole universe, is pure actuality, self-evident, and unmoved.

Every thing is in a sense a combination of soul and body. They can be separated in thought only. The body is the material cause of the organism; the soul is the efficient cause, for it produces its movements; it is also its formal cause, for it determines the form of the individual organism; and it is its final cause, for it is the end for the sake of which the body exists.

Since everything that becomes has its formal cause, which is the principle and its end, one may say that there is in every being a principle analogous to the soul. The soul is in the proper sense of the word the first entelechy of an organised body potentially possessing life. Thus the entelechy of the eye is the action of looking at something at a given moment. Supposing the eye were by itself a complete living thing, its soul would be the faculty of vision. The soul is to the body what the vision is to the eye, and in this sense it has something of the body; but this something is neither figure nor motion, but the particular activity which gives to the body figure and motion, the cause of the agreement and harmony between all its parts.

A dead body is properly only matter; for the soul is the essence, the true being of that which we call body. It has the functional value of an instrument. The soul is not in the body as in a dwelling, which it may abandon; it cannot travel from body to body, being able to exist only in the body that corresponds to its essence, and which by this very fact it creates.

The soul does not stand in need of purification or of a series of re-incarnations. Its office lies in pure contemplative thought, which is made possible for it by the possession of certain absolute truths in no wise to be acquired from the world of experience. The divine spirit exists only in self-contemplation, apart from the world, beyond the outermost heaven, which is the sphere of the fixed stars, that are made of ether and have spirits which are moved by love, directed towards God. There is no unity in the world except that which results from a universal tendency towards the same perfection, that is, towards God. In his system, therefore, a world-soul is not required.
Aristotle’s belief was that the rational principle implanted in man before birth was in essence akin to ether and returned after the bodily dissolution to the place whence it came—the celestial spheres. To the criticism that this does not explain why the mind took so long to grow up in youth, he replied that the mind had to become gradually accustomed, like the eye, to brilliant light, and that it did not become so accustomed till after childhood had passed. He also held that the mind was always fresh, although the instrument might be impaired by disease and old age. Aristotle believed also that all consciousness ceased with death. The soul has, after death, no personal existence, but exists only as a divine absolute force, which, combining again with an animated human body, renders it a rational man; but she has no recollection of a former existence.

The internal organs were to Aristotle chiefly a machinery designed to balance the extremes of heat and cold. The lungs draw the air not to keep up the animal heat, but to moderate it; therefore the gills of fishes are not respiratory organs, there being no occasion for air to cool the blood where water supplied the need. The brain was to him a gland containing a compound of water and earth, and quite of secondary importance, partly for reason of its locality, partly because it was the coldest part of the body, being devoid of blood, and having for its chief and only function the cooling of the heart. Into this grave error Aristotle was led by his metaphysical notion that the sensitive soul was indissolubly connected with heat, and therefore could not have its seat in the coldest region of the body.

The heart occupies the noblest position and has an a priori claim to be regarded as the seat of the noblest functions. It is the central seat of life, sensation, motion, and heat. The heart is the place from which the tendons move the limbs. He could not prove that the heart is sensitive, but he knew that the brain is insensitive. When the brain becomes too moist or too dry, it does not either refrigerate the heart or congeal the humour; and when the brain becomes too large (hydrocephalic), the temperament becomes too moist; therefore an abnormally large head was a sign of stupidity.

Aristotle affirmed that the brain does not receive blood-vessels, and this opinion is probably owing to his never having opened the human subject. Yet he knew that the membranes of the brain are covered with a multitude of blood vessels. He held that there is no continuity between the brain and the organs of sense, and he therefore derived all the senses from the heart. He maintained that the ear does not communicate by any opening with the brain, but that the brain sends to each ear a vessel (the acoustic nerve). He first gave the name of aorta to the largest artery of the body, but he attributed the same functions to it as to the veins.

The obvious relation of breath to life leads him to the natural primitive view that air and the principle of life are either akin or identical. Life is activity, and this activity is exhibited as intaking and outgiving, notable in inspiration and expiration. He foreshadowed our modern notions of the dependence of life on combustion or oxydation, asserting the dependence of the psychical (vital) functions on fire or heat.

The soul cannot exist without natural heat; death and violent destruction mean respectively the exhaustion and extinction of the vital heat. The body has a natural fire or principle of heat, and this is nourished by the pneuma. The vital heat is found in all things that have life. It is the life principle which resides in the heart. Sensations are conveyed to the central seat of sensation—the heart—by that which fills the veins—and the veins are filled with blood and pneuma. The inner pneuma is distinct from the outer pneuma, i.e., from the air which we breathe. The inner pneuma is a secretion resulting from processes going on in the body; it moves with the blood and is said to depend on the blood for its existence, probably because loss of blood reduces vitality. The active element is of the nature of fire, and this is the principle of fertility in seed; this heat is not distinguished from
pneuma except in so far as the pneuma may lose its principle of heat and so become insufficient. Excess of blood reduces vitality, as in sleep; death may be due to exhaustion of heat, though excess of heat may also destroy the exact balance of elements which make life possible.

The organs of sense are in every case constructed to propagate the outer movements inward to the pneuma which they contain; this movement results in a further movement which the pneuma transmits through the blood to the centre, the heart. The pneuma is thus a sentient organism of a subtle nature spread through the body and acting as the universal medium of sensation. In later psychology, as will be shown, this appears as a doctrine of "animal spirits."

According to Aristotle, there is nothing in the mind that was not previously in the senses; that is to say, ideas are anterior to all knowledge, but are not innate. They are introduced through the medium of the senses, and become graven on the understanding, which he compared to a waxen tablet untouched by the stylus, or to a sheet of blank paper. Perception results from the reaction on external impressions of the organs of sense, which are thus raised from a potential to an energetic condition, the "form" alone without the "matter" of the thing perceived being communicated—a theory still preserved in the word "information." Sensation, to be adequate, must be a mean between two extremes. Thus for distinct seeing, the light must be neither too faint nor too intense; for distinct hearing, the sound must be neither too low nor too loud.

The separate senses are insufficient of themselves to explain the fact of sense-perception. The universal qualities of things are perceived by all the senses, and therefore require a special faculty, a common sense, for the co-ordination of the various sensations and their formation into true perceptions. It is in the common sense that the judgment of things as true or false takes place, and the common "sensible qualities"—notion, number, shape, size—are attributed to things. The common sense gives unity to consciousness itself. Its organ is the heart, the seat of the sentient soul.

The common sense is the basis also for the phenomena of sleep and dreams. Sleep is caused by fatigue, in which the common sense loses vitality. It may also be caused by the rising of gases from the stomach to the brain and descending to the heart.

An image is primarily the effect of the external stimulus. Reproduction of the image in the absence of the original stimulus is imagination (phantasy). Imagination can be clearly distinguished from both sense and thought. It is not sense, for the image of an object is no longer visible; it is not thought, because it involves no belief or reasoning. It is an intermediary faculty between sense and reason.

The possibility of storing up the movement is the condition of memory; it is that retention without which memory is impossible. But memory for him is more than that, it is a condition in which an image present to the mind is known to be the copy of an object which had been present itself on some former occasion. In this way memory is an experience midway between mere passive retention and active recollection. The art of recollection (reminiscence) consists in starting a sequence of ideas, a train of imagination. Recollection is the voluntary effort which by exciting an idea creates a stimulus for the whole chain of ideas. The laws of this process are the laws of association between psychic activities: the laws of similarity, dissimilarity, and contiguity.

Memory is possessed by animals, but only man has active recollection and constructive imagination.

The imaging function is necessary to thought as sensation is to imagination. By the productive imagination the necessary schemata are supplied to the reason. Artistic imagination is imitative, producing a purified or idealised picture of the
real. The drama serves to afford an outlet for the emotions of pity and fear—a function by which the soul is purged and ennobled.

Reason, the power by which we form abstract ideas or concepts, is the highest faculty of the soul, and that by which man is distinguished from all other animals. There are two kinds of reason in man—the actual and the potential, the active and the passive: that which produces everything, and that which becomes everything. The former alone is separate and distinct from the body, eternal, immortal.

Man is so constituted as to stand between the animal and the divine natures; there are in him the desires of the beast united with a reason that is godlike: in the relation of these two are contained the problems of the psychology of conduct.

Conation acting in the irrational part of our nature depends on sensation for its direction. Sensations are always attended by pleasure and pain, and these again by Desire, which has an emotional quality, because it begins in the pain of want and ends in the pleasure of satisfaction. All mental and bodily dispositions are accompanied by feelings: by pleasure when unhindered in activity, by displeasure when inhibited. Those who are fond of music, geometry, etc., make progress in that kind of work, because they delight in it—thus he argues for innate dispositions. Without disposition to it, the exercise is painful. From a mixture of both states—pleasure and displeasure or pain—arise the emotions; sometimes apparently without reason, though in consequence of bodily conditions. Character, emotion, desires are all dependent on feeling. Emotion prompts to action, but along with this impulsive spontaneous action there is deliberate will, which arises in desire. Desire is awakened by ideas or knowledge. Desire which is guided by reason Aristotle, with Plato, calls Will in the narrower sense of the word, appropriating the name Desire to its irrational exercise.

There is a hierarchy of active motives and ends, as of intellectual states. Stages of desire, will, and rational choice depend upon perceptions, empirical knowledge, and rational insight. The rational will is free; but the principle of will in general extends into all organic nature, in the form of impulse or potentiality. The formation of character is a process by which impulsive action is checked and the power of rational choice developed. Control consists in the mastery over tendencies to excess. The ideal character is that of the man who never loses his head, never fails to act from reason or to defend his actions as properly calculated and adapted. In all things there is a mean; even in the emotions there is a mean, and reason dictates it. On the basis of emotional differences, Aristotle founded differences of temperament.

Passion arises without reflection, spontaneously. It is both a lasting tendency towards certain types of action and a passive state. That it is a modification of the body as well as of the soul is sufficiently proved by the organic disturbances which accompany it. Each passion is both a state of the soul and a principle of action; it is an element of the character.

The actions and passions of a living being have two aspects—one which is formal and of the soul, and the other material and of the body. When an animal or a man is angry, his emotion is at once a mental and a bodily fact. Indeed, all our acts are at once physical and psychical; and health of the soul implies health of the body. The superiority of our organism is due to the fact that it is the instrument of a superior kind of soul. Man, as has been mentioned already, does not think because he has hands—he has hands because he thinks. Aristotle, however, makes one exception. The active intellect has no bodily organ; it comes from without, is separable, and alone eternal and immortal.

Aristotle places the passions under two categories: those in which pleasure predominates (love, courage, benevolence); and those in which pain predominates,
and which are by far the most numerous (rage, hatred, fear, pity, just indignation, envy, shame, jealousy). Anger, fear, courage are types of feelings allied to the spirit of resistance. Anger arises from the sense of wrong and seeks after revenge. Fear is consciousness of danger with prospect of ultimate disaster; while courage is the consciousness of danger accompanied by assurance of successful resistance. Each passion should be studied, in the first place, in him who feels it; secondly, in its object; and lastly, in its motives. Aristotle does not regard the suppression of the passions as possible or desirable; but if they are well employed, he thinks that they may be the weapons of virtue.

The end of all action is happiness, but by happiness Aristotle does not mean pleasure and the absence of pain. Perfect happiness, according to him, would be the unhindered exercise of reason. Our passions are an obstacle to perfect happiness, which lies in intelligence alone. The wise man need not go outside himself to seek happiness. He finds it in his own contemplation. The reason does not attain to its full vigour if our moral nature is not in a well-regulated state. On the other hand, moral virtue implies the due regulation of our moral nature, with all its instincts, appetites, and passions; and this state only exists when they are subordinated to the control of the reasoning faculties. Hence the different parts of human nature reciprocally act and react on each other. Every act of self-control and every good resolution carried into effect increase the vigour of the pure reason and render the highest faculty of our being more capable of performing its work. Again, the more powerful the reason becomes, the fewer obstacles the lower part of our nature puts in its way, the more effectually does it influence the moral life and strengthen and confirm our habits of virtue. Not moral teaching is required, but the formation of moral habits. We become just and temperate not by listening to sermons in praise of justice and temperance, but by continually practising forbearance and mutual respect. According to Aristotle, the whole of morality consists in willing to observe in all things the due mean, and in actually observing it. The virtues of which he makes the most exhaustive study are the virtues of social life: justice and friendship.

Morality is concerned with pains and pleasures, and vice is tendency to excess. A man may avoid pain too much or seek pleasure too much, while it is his duty to pursue the mean in each case. Assuming that he knows and, in a sense, wills the good, what conditions cause failure? The answer is that in some cases desire rises into action before the process of deliberation is complete. According to Plato, vice was ignorance. Aristotle saw that it was possible to have a right conception and yet fail in action; for the principle of action is not identical with the principle of reason. Man is not a creature ruled by knowledge, he may have reason and yet not be wholly rational; he may lose his reason and regain it, as he may be drunk and become sober. The power of clear reasoning is not always at the same degree of intensity. The passions can reduce a man's realisation of principle.

Individuals may start life maimed in respect of virtue; there may be some essential flaw in a man's make-up, or disease may cause abnormal states. Moral deformity can be a natural phenomenon. **Wickedness is not always viciousness, it is frequently a congenital defect of will power for the right conduct.** Where there is viciousness pure and simple the condition approximates to that of the animal whose desires have no controlling reason. It is an exaggeration to call a man a beast, but as a descriptive term the word indicates a truth; desire may be so perverse as to be unhuman. Bestiality is a failure of nature to produce the normal type or a decline from the normal state due to such accidental causes as disease.

The faculties are innate, but virtue and vice are acquired. He who would act morally must not only do the right, but he must do it in the right frame of mind. It is this, and not the outward effect, that gives to the action its moral worth. In order to be able to act morally, one must first be a man with a certain psychological and physical constitution and with a natural capacity for virtue; for every virtue presupposes certain natural qualities, definite impulses and inclinations in which the moral qualities already to a certain extent reside. This natural disposition, however, is not yet moral. It is found, not only in children, but even in the lower
animals. Natural disposition and the operation of natural impulses do not depend upon ourselves, whereas virtue is in our own power. He excludes emotions such as fear, anger, pity, etc., from the sphere of praise and blame. Bravery, self-control, generosity, magnanimity, head the list of virtues. Religion is an absolute moral necessity, but the popular beliefs are palpable fables.

The soul and the body appeared to Aristotle to sympathise. When the former in any degree changes in quality, it also changes the form of the body, and, vice versa, when the latter undergoes a change in quality, it affects the condition of the soul. His perception of the fundamental principle of physiognomy is evident when he adds that, since it is one of the functions of the soul to be sorrowful and to rejoice, the face of the sorrowful must look sad, and of those who rejoice, cheerful. He believed vicious instincts to be hereditary, and gives in his book on "Physiognomy" the physical signs of habits, vices, and crimes; some of which are in accordance with modern scientific observation. He describes even a connection between the shape of the head and the mental disposition: "Those who have a large head are sagacious—are like dogs; those who have a small head are stupid—are like asses; those who have no shame—are like birds with curved claws." He even went so far as to contemplate the possibility of the mental and physical correspondence being retained after death. The sympathy between soul and body would remain if the form of the latter were retained. There would, however, be this difference, that the one could not contribute to the other in this life. In proof of this relationship during life he observes that insanity appears to attach itself to the soul, and yet physicians, by purging the body, and by diet, free the soul from insanity. As, therefore, the body is liberated from disease at the same time, it is clear that they contribute to each other. The similitude between physical forms and the mental powers is thus strongly insisted upon.

Aristotle was fully alive to the influence of fever in causing hallucinations or illusions, the instance given being the appearance of animals on the wall. If the patient is not very ill, he recognises the nature of the illusion; otherwise he is deceived. He compares this deception of the senses to what happens when the timid man, under the influence of fear, fancies he sees enemies from the slightest resemblance, or when the lover, under the influence of affection, thinks he sees the object of his love. In short, in proportion to the intensity of the passion by which a man is influenced is the resemblance by which he is deceived.

Charged with atheism, Aristotle left Athens in 322, and died soon after at the age of sixty-three.

THE PERIPATETICS

Aristotle used the open space of the Lyceum as a resort for his philosophical discussions, conversing with his scholars while he walked up and down in that gymnasium between the rows of trees; and from this custom his school derived the name of the Peripatetics.

THEOPHRASTUS, of Eresos (372-288 B.C.),

a physician, was his immediate successor. Of him need only be mentioned that he realised that the passions have their origin in corporeal movements, which, however, are only their occasional cause; the real principle of passion is the soul. Passion, in its turn, reacts on the body, modifies the movements of the latter, and the relations between them. Pleasure increases the powers of the body; pain contracts them.

The greater part of his works have perished. Among those preserved is his
CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE SOUL

History of Plants, in which he enumerates about five hundred different kinds, describes the details of their structure, the uses of their organs, the laws of their reproduction, and their diseases. He explains the fecundation of the female flowers by the pollen of the male; he recognises hermaphrodite and unisexual flowers, and points out how the fecundation of the latter is effected by the wind, insects, and by the water in the case of aquatic plants.

STRATO (-270 B.C.)

followed Theophrastus as philosophic teacher from 288 to 270 B.C., and represents the culmination of the naturalistic development begun by his predecessor. The activities of the soul are motions, and motions are inseparable from matter; for this reason he does not admit the existence of an immaterial soul, separable reason, or pure thought.

The object of science is the corporeal soul, which is a single force diffused through the body; it is distributed in the sense organs as the air in the flute. Reason is the activity of the central soul which is situated in the fore-part of the brain between the eyebrows. The soul is a pneuma controlled by the will and its diffusion through the body is deduced from the doctrine of the nerves. Attention is recognised as the indispensable condition for converting impressions into perceptions. Attention for Strato probably meant a direction of the pneuma or spirits to the organs of sense. Impressions may occur without coming into consciousness if the mind is occupied in some other direction. He did not consider that the actual sensation arose in the organ of the soul. There is no real distinction between reason and sensation; consciousness is a unity and denoted a rationality common to all functions of the soul. In this the animals share; they and we alike have only a reason which has grown up with the body. There is no immortality, no connate endowment of eternal truths, no reminiscence, and no pure activity of reason.

THE SCEPTIC SCHOOL

existed side by side with the Epicurean and Stoic schools.

ARISTIPPUS, of Cyrene (435-350 B.C.), a disciple to some extent of Socrates, had already argued that, as all knowledge consists in the first place of sensations, and that as these are the result of external impacts which they do not necessarily resemble, we have no certain information about the external world.

But PYRRO (375-288 B.C.) was the real founder of the Sceptic school. According to him, we cannot know what things really are. Neither our senses nor our ideas teach us the truth. Complete reserve of opinion is the only satisfactory condition of thought.

He was followed by ARCESILAUS (316-241 B.C.), who said we cannot really know anything. One can say, "So it appears to me," but not, "So it is." Without any definite knowledge we must resign ourselves to our lot.

Another prominent sceptic was CARNEADES (213-129 B.C.), who held that self-preservation proves stronger than altruistic motives, when necessity arises. The moral and intellectual perfections of man are conditioned by his social and material environment. If we had no wants, no companions, no bodily senses, they would not exist.

In conduct the Sceptics were in the habit of following the usages prevalent among them, but their main efforts were directed toward holding their judgments in suspense, welcoming any ideas that seemed useful, and carefully avoiding such zeal for any opinion as seemed hostile to peace of thought.

The ten arguments, given fully by SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, are designed to show that we have no right to be confident in any opinion, because:
(1) The senses often deceive us;
(2) Men differ in their natural needs and tastes;
(3) Our senses often differ from each other in the impressions they give us of the same object;
(4) The same man varies in opinion according as he is well or sick, sane or insane, drunk or sober, hungry, frightened, in joy, or in sorrow;
(5) Different nations differ utterly in morals and theology;
(6) We do not know substances in themselves, but only by their properties;
(7) Objects appear differently on account of their position;
(8) Many things affect us very differently in small and in large quantities;
(9) What is rare is more valued and noticed than what is common;
(10) Nothing can be known by itself, but only in its relations to something else.

Such arguments forced even the Platonists to admit that truth is utterly beyond our reach, and that the Infinite or Absolute is incomprehensible; so that it is useless to inquire after any thing more than mere probability, and even this is unattainable in regard to God or immortality.

**THE EPICUREANS**

Epicurus (342-270 B.C.), who lived at Athens, followed the atomic theory of Democritus and held that sensation is produced by images in the form of volatile atoms passing from the object through the air and striking upon the sense organs. Differences in the quality of the same organs must be explained by differences in the form of movement of the active bodies. All life and thought proceed from the constant motion of the atoms; and these have power to change their direction spontaneously. This variability enables the mind to develop itself independently, and thus each man can become the author of his own destiny, and defy the Fates. Although Epicurus held that whatever takes place is the result of physical causes, operating by innate and natural laws, he was no fatalist. He believed in freedom of the will, or rather freedom of choice. He based a doctrine of freedom upon the postulate of accidental deviations in the course of falling atoms.

The soul was composed of very subtle elements diffused through the body, giving life to every part. He gave two proofs of this subtlety: in the first place, the promptitude with which the will moves the body; in the second place, the fact that a man when dead weighs as much as when alive. The soul consisted of fire, air, pneuma, and of a fourth more mobile, more subtle element, which was the principle of sensation. The irrational soul (anima) extended throughout the body, of which it was the vivifying force. The rational soul (animus) was situated in the breast, and it alone possessed sensation and motion. These two souls, although they constituted one and the same being, were capable of difference in condition; the mind might be serene, whilst the animal soul was in pain. The reciprocal action of the body and the soul was a sufficient proof of the corporeal nature of the latter.

Dreams and visions prove the existence of deities, but there is no proof that they take any notice of our conduct. They must be supposed to be perfectly good, and if so they can have no jealousy or anger. They must also be thought perfectly happy, but this requires that they should not trouble themselves about human actions, or any other natural phenomena. Supernaturalistic beliefs of every sort were the worst enemies of that freedom from anxiety which to him was the principal condition of felicity. There was no more fatal cause of anxiety about our future than the fear of what the gods were going to do to us in this life or in the next; a fear which seems to have tortured many people of his time. According to Epicurus, as already mentioned, the immortals never troubled their heads about mundane affairs; and as the soul did not survive the body, nothing need be apprehended from a future state. With the dissolution of the body there naturally followed the annihilation of the soul, and therefore, that which man regards as the most terrible...
of all evils—death—is nothing to be afraid of. "When we are, death is not; and when death is, we are not." The sage may dismiss the thought of it.

We are to be virtuous from purely prudential considerations; not in order to make other people or the world in general happier, but because by that method we shall best secure our own good, our own pleasure. By pleasure, however, was not meant self-indulgence and sensuality, but happiness, such as is derived, for example, from agreeable social intercourse. Friendship always remained an object of special culture among the Epicureans. Their harmony remained unbroken by any difference of opinion.

The pleasures of the soul are exceedingly more precious than those of the body; for the body is only affected by the present, the past, and the future. The love of pleasure is a primitive instinct which gives the impulse to activity and determines its end. Epicurus distinguished between pleasure in repose, and pleasure in movement. The former is the true pleasure; the latter is only a means employed by nature to reach her end, which is the absence of pain. He did not admit an intermediate state. If only pain be absent, we enjoy all the pleasure that is possible. True happiness consists therefore in freedom from pain and in peace of mind. In order to rise above the present pain, men should enjoy life as a whole, and the pleasures that are past but capable of being recalled. He desired them to drive away the momentary suffering by all the pleasant memories they have stored up, and to free the mind from actual pain by occupying it with former joys and future hopes. It is therefore always open to man to be happy and free.

He classified desires under three descriptions. The first are natural and necessary—hunger, thirst; the second, natural but not necessary—love, family; the third are neither natural nor necessary—wealth, honour—and arise out of false opinion. To be happy it is enough to be able to satisfy the desires that are natural and necessary.

**TITUS CARUS LUcretius (99-55 B.C.),**

the Latin Epicurean, may be quoted here as giving the gist of the Epicurean creed, besides the atomic theory of Democritus. Lucretius wrote a didactic poem, "On the Nature of Things" (55 B.C.), in which he endeavoured to emancipate the human mind from the superstitious fear of the gods. He ridiculed the belief that in the thunder and lightning the Lord of Heaven displays his power and manifests his will. Lucretius asks why, in that case, so many bolts are wasted without effect in the water and in desert regions; why Jupiter does not strike the wicked, but his own temples and statues. This imaginary power of the gods, he says, can avail nothing against fate and the laws of nature; for even their holy temples and images are not exempt from decay. In answer to those who hold that the world was originally formed by gods, he thinks it sufficient to object the evil and irregularities which are discovered in it. To those who fear that a denial of all religion must lead to godless principles and shameful crimes, he objects that religion itself has led to the greatest enormities: human sacrifices, for instance. It is not piety to prostrate one's self before every altar; piety consists rather in the calm and imperturbable feeling of the sage. What return could human gratitude be to perfectly happy beings, that they should be induced to undertake any thing for the sake of man? What could induce them to wake up from their eternal repose to the creation of the world? This false worship he derives from the ignorance of man, who from the manifestations of the divinity, in sleep, and even in his waking senses, had been led to form an idea of immortal beings of human form, but endued with eternal youth and infinite power, in order to be able to refer to the power of these gods, those phenomena of nature of which he could not discover the causes. The gods are not interested in human affairs, and do not exercise any providential control of them, and they have
no direction over the course of physical events. Instead of the gods creating the world—as commonly held—the world creates the gods. He attacks also the belief in the immortality of the soul. Who, he argues, that is acquainted with the nature of the soul, can doubt that this weak, frail body must, as soon as it is deprived of its shell, by being expelled from the body, be destroyed by the slightest shock? Nature is the only deity that he is willing to venerate; he preaches her holy laws and ordinances, and teaches that she produces all things, and suffers them again to decline and perish as soon as they have grown to their measure, as determined by their respective laws of existence. In the fifth Book, Lucretius points out the great fact of the survival of the fittest.

THE STOIC SCHOOL

Contemporaneous with the Sceptics and Epicureans we have the Stoic School.

ZENO, of Kittion (336-264 B.C.)

was the founder and the most representative of the Stoic School. He came from Cyprus to Athens; but his teaching became most popular in Rome. The natural bent of the Roman mind was towards practical affairs, and, therefore, Rome never developed a philosophy of its own, and its men of culture adopted Greek philosophy: its practical teaching more than its abstract speculations. Stoicism, therefore, formed numerous adherents and became the philosophic basis of that system of jurisprudence which is Rome's gift to the world.

Zeno, to begin with, opposed the spiritualism of Plato and Aristotle, if by spiritualism is meant that which falls outside the range of natural laws. Psychic phenomena are reduced to physical facts. All things are real in so far as they are capable of acting or of being acted upon. All things are therefore material. As Zeno defines matter in terms of action there is no dead matter and no opposition between matter and spirit. A pure monism is the result.

The corporeal cannot be affected by anything that is not corporeal; the body is affected by the soul, and soul is therefore corporeal. It is extended throughout the body as pneuma—the breath of life. It comes into being with the body in the physical mode of generation; but the material is a part of the divine fire which descended into the bodies of men when they first arose out of the ether. This fire of the soul is nourished by the blood, and the governing part of the soul has its seat in the heart, the centre of the course of the blood; for does not the air we breathe penetrate into our chest? Does not speech, the first manifestation of thought, proceed from the chest? In generation a part of the soul of the parents is transmitted to the embryo, which, so long as it is in the womb, has only a vegetative soul. It is after birth, and under the action of the external air, that, by a sort of condensation, the animal soul is formed. Mental characteristics are inherited no less than physical qualities, and must therefore be corporeal. Differences of character can be expressed in terms of finer or denser conditions of soul-matter.

There is a cycle of creative periods, and the soul has only the duration of one of them. Zeno admitted a survival of the human soul after death, but no purgatory. We must not expect annihilation, but reunion; and, as the tired man looks forward to the insensibility of sleep, so the philosopher, weary of the world, should look forward to the tranquillity of extinction. Of these things, however, we should think boldly, since the mind can produce no certain knowledge from its internal resources alone. It is unphilosophical to inquire into first causes; we must deal only with phenomena. Above all, we must never forget that man cannot ascertain absolute truth, and that the final result of human inquiry into the matter is that
we are incapable of perfect knowledge; that, even if the truth be in our possession, we cannot be sure of it.

Every appetite, lust, desire, springs from imperfect knowledge. Our nature is imposed upon us by Fate, but we must learn to control our passions, and live free, intelligent, virtuous lives, in all things in accordance with reason. We must bear in mind that the majority of men are imperfectly educated, and hence we must not needlessly offend the religious ideas of our age. It is enough for us ourselves to know that, though there is a Supreme Power, there is no Supreme Being. There is an invisible principle, but not a personal God, to whom it would be not so much blasphemy as absurdity to impute the form, the sentiments, the passions of man. All revelation is, necessarily, a mere fiction. That which men call chance is only the effect of an unknown cause. Even of chances there is a law. There is no such thing as Providence, for Nature proceeds under irresistible laws, and in this respect the universe is only a vast automatic engine. The vital force which pervades the world is what the illiterate call God. The modifications through which all things are passing take place in an irresistible way, and hence it may be said that the progress of the world is, under destiny, like a seed—it can evolve only in a predetermined mode. Therefore, the course of nature cannot be changed by prayer, nor is it desirable that it should be changed.

SENECA (3 B.C.-65 A.D.) says: "No prayer is needed, except to ask for a good state of mind, for health of soul. . . . God is within thee. It is absurd to fear the gods, for they are ever beneficent. The only worthy temple of God is the universe; he is not to be worshipped by temples, but by a pure heart; not by sacrifices, but by a good life."

The mind is devoid of all content, a white sheet on which the senses write their various characters—the elements of knowledge. Only CHRYSIIPPOS (280-207 B.C.), who followed Zeno, held that the result of sensation was not an impression but a modification of the mind. When the mind is subjected to the action of an object, the result is an image of the object, a presentation, which Zeno termed phantasy (image-making, imagination or ideation), and held to be connected with light, showing the object to the mind and illuminating the mind.

Mental activity as it is found in men is a developed and specialised form of the universal reason. The creature who possesses reason is therefore only its vehicle, and is perhaps more correctly described as possessed by reason. Instinct is unconscious reason. The reason has an inner and an outer activity. As inner activity it is the faculty of judgment and choice; as outer reason it is manifested by speech. Reason in itself has no tendency to error; man has by nature the infallible reason. It follows that truth is natural, error unnatural. If men err, it is through some depravity, and the supreme end of all science is the discovery of a cure for this depravity.

The passions are diseases of the reason, which cause assent to be wrongly given; they are not useful and good in some degree as the Peripatetics held. Virtue is knowledge, but vice is not ignorance; it is due to want of restraint. Error and vice are not identical in nature; a wrong opinion may be corrected when a vicious habit cannot be changed. Vice is in our power at first, but may in time pass into a confirmed and unchangeable character. All passions are voluntary; man is not a slave to passions; there is no "lower" self tyrannising over a "higher"; the affective side of our nature is not essentially distinct from the rational. The only valid distinction is between right and wrong activities of the reason: the ideal is right reason.

To understand the passions aright we must distinguish them from natural impulses. Zeno defines impulses as a tendency of the soul to or from something, covering both appetite and aversion. They are natural inclinations in creatures
endowed with sensation, and are really subconscious workings of reason. As the creature attains a higher degree of reason, impulse becomes rational and becomes an element in conduct. In place of mere impulse we now have conscious adoption of ends of action. The will to attain or avoid is now fully conscious assent. Zeno recognises that "the first impulse which an animal has is to protect itself," that is the tendency to self-preservation. When the impulses throw off the yoke of reason, passion is born. Passion is an excessive and irrational desire, a vicious, disordered reason. All passions are bad. Zeno distinguishes four ruling elements: pain, corresponding to present evil; fear, to a future evil; pleasure, corresponding to a present good; desire, to a future good; besides numerous subdivisions. As we pursue the good by a natural instinct, so we avoid the evil by a natural instinct. This instinct, when regulated by reason, becomes a caution, which is quite different from fear.

The Stoics maintained that the only man who can properly be said to be free is the man who leads a virtuous life. The free man is the man who lives as he wishes, but no man wishes to live a life of sin, and, consequently, the vicious man, however rich and powerful he may be, is really a slave; while the man who is virtuous under all circumstances, and he alone, is really free. Error of conduct they referred to errors of judgment; and errors of judgment are due to diseased states of mind, the obliquities of passion, which cause assent to be wrongly given. Accordingly the Stoics took a very broad view of abnormal mental states. They divided men into two classes; the wise and the foolish—just as sticks may be divided into straight and crooked sticks; and they called special attention to the fact, as it was neatly put by them, that very few sticks in this world are absolutely straight.

According to the Stoic teaching, man is a law unto himself. Happiness is not to be sought in outward things, but in indifference to, and superiority over, all desires and passions. Material good or evil, wealth or poverty, can neither add nor detract from the soul, and they are, therefore, to be despised. The world is as good as it can be made.

Virtue, to be truly such, must be accepted by us not as an external command, not as sanctioned by threats or promises, to be fulfilled either here or hereafter, nor yet as something the possession of which will enhance our self-esteem; but as our own free choice, to be preferred before all other gifts, even were its rejection to be condemned by none but the judge within our breast. The organic conception of the world and of society makes the virtue of humanity an imperative duty. Conscientiousness toward man and resignation toward fate became watchwords. In the Roman group they were embodied in lofty maxims of friendship, duty, and humanity. High thinking and plain living were the order. We are all members of one body, and the interest of each is identified with the interest of all. That the mutual slaughter of human beings should be made an entertaining spectacle, as in the gladiatorial games in Rome, was revolting to Seneca. The same feeling of humanity set itself strongly against the abuse of slavery.

The Stoic movement was a return to sober and practical understanding, after the vogue of high theories of the reason. Knowledge is the interest of practical life; prudence guided by information; freedom as expression of personality in a world ruled by law and subject to fate; social obligation and calm enjoyment opposed to capricious pleasure; such were the Stoic counsels of perfection. As a consequence of this Stoic teaching, the cry "Back to Nature," the search for landscape beauty, the enjoyment of country scenes and pleasure, spread widely, and the romantic love of the sexes became a leading motive of idyllic and dramatic poetry.

The Stoics gave currency to a new designation of the animating principle or theory of the vital processes, namely pneuma. Primarily, as has been already explained, the pneuma was regarded as the breath of life; it was warm air closely associated with the blood; it was a vital principle transmitted in generation; it
varied in density and accumulated especially in one region of the body. With the introduction of the pneuma began that trichotomy of human personality into body, soul, and spirit, which has figured prominently in the speculations of the theologians. The conception of the soul or psyche, which through all the Greek philosophy had covered both the animating principle of all living things and the intellectual or mental principle of man, became differentiated into two conceptions, which long continued to figure in the European culture tradition more or less independently of one another: namely, on the one hand the vital force of the physiologists, and on the other hand the spirit or immaterial soul of man.

**POSIDONIUS** *(133–50 B.C.)*

an independent member of the Stoic School—the teacher of Cicero—held that we cannot explain everything by reason, the principle of the passions must be in the two inferior parts of the soul, which are intimately united with the body.

**SENeca** *(3 B.C.–65 A.D.)*

was adviser to Nero, until accused of conspiracy against him. He recognised the influence of temperament on the passions. It is the amount of warmth in the organism that is the cause of anger, which arises out of the heating of the blood in the region of the heart. In old age heat decreases, and anger gives place to persistent ill-temper. This was also the view of Galen. Since animals were not held to have reason, they were supposed to have something resembling passion. Animals, says Seneca, have images from which arise impetuous movements; but these outbursts are violent, obscure, and fleeting. What is anger in man is ferocity in the brute. The animal tends to self-preservation and desires what is proper to its constitution, and by obeying this earliest natural instinct, it discovers pleasure. Pleasure is therefore not a primitive fact, but an accessory, or result.

**EPictetus** *(50–118 A.D.)*

was brought to Rome as a slave in the court of Nero, and sought comfort in philosophy, salvation amid the imperfections of life, rather than an intellectual discipline. He held that true liberty consists in controlling our thoughts and desires, in defending ourselves against external evils, entrenched in the impregnable fortress of the will. Some things depend upon ourselves, others do not. What depends on ourselves is our thought, whereas health, wealth, and all external advantages are things we have no control over. We should cling to what depends on ourselves, and nothing could then affect us. Liberty of mind is our most precious possession, not only because it frees us from all the evils created by opinion, but also because it is one with reason, that divine part of the soul, and therefore our dignity rests on it.

The Emperor **Marcus Aurelius** *(121–180 A.D.)*,

a philosopher on a throne, took up the religious aspects of Stoicism. "To reverence God and help man" was his summary of a good life. But while he was intent upon the salvation of his own soul, he neglected the affairs of State and did not prevent the fiercest persecutions of the Christians.

**THE NEO-PLATONIC SCHOOL**

Neo-Platonism was an attempt to combine the philosophy of Plato with the mysticism of the East.
a great Jewish commentator, a contemporary of Jesus, may be regarded as the precursor of the Neo-Platonic School. He endeavoured to unite Greek thought with Hebrew religion. Owing to his character, fascinating philosophical speculations and literary ability, he exercised a great influence on Christian opinions.

The Egyptian Jews appear to have formed a mixed society mainly Hellenic in manner and language, but still thoroughly Jewish in temper. A note altogether foreign to the Old Testament is struck in the repeated references to individual immortality; but the idea was still in its infancy and the nature of the immortal life was but vaguely outlined. The allegorical method of interpreting the Sacred Scriptures, which had long prevailed among the more cultivated of the Alexandrian Jews, was adopted by Philo without restriction. The prophets were only involuntary instruments of the spirit which spoke through them. Philo criticises the attitude of those who merely hold fast to the literal sense of the Scriptures as law, as unworthy and superstitious. The anthropomorphic representations of Scripture are only permitted as an accommodation to the wants of sensuous man, while for the discerning and spiritual it declares that God is not like a man, nor like the Heavens, nor like the world. God is exalted by Philo as above all human knowledge and virtue and above the idea of the good, as Plato had assumed. He contends that God is to be worshipped as a personal being, yet he conceives him at the same time as the most general of existences. Philo rejects the notion of a resurrection of the body and holds to the natural immortality of the soul.

According to Philo, man’s bodily form is made from the ground, the soul from no created thing, but from the father of all; so that, although man was mortal as to his body, he was immortal as to his mind. The death of man is the separation of soul from the body; the death of the soul is the corruption of virtue and the assumption of vice. A polished, purified soul does not die, but emigrates: it is of an inextinguishable and deathless race, and goes to heaven, escaping the dissolution and corruption which death seems to introduce. Different regions are set apart for different things—heaven for the good, the confines of the earth for the bad.

The Hebrews, like so many other peoples, had conceived the soul as air, wind, breath. But this air was breathed into man by God, and therefore, as the conception of God was dematerialised, so also the pneuma emanating from him to become the soul of man becomes an immaterial substance. But in Philo’s doctrine the process of dematerialisation is not completed. The animal soul of man is generated and destroyed with the body, and the pneuma, which is the rational soul breathed into him by God, is the last sublimation of the physical principle of the Stoics. Furthermore, just as there are two distinct souls in human nature, so life, too, is divided between the life of the flesh and the life of the spirit, or between sense and reason. The explanation of this dual nature is to be found in the story of creation; for there we learn that man was created, as to his body, from the earth, and as to his soul, by God himself.

To the rational soul, Philo attributes three separate faculties: understanding, sensation, and speech; and to the irrational soul, the sensual passions and affections. He affirms that the understanding is not only a divine spirit, but an inseparable portion of the divine essence itself. The soul is possessed of complete liberty of action. God has given to man prudence to govern his reason, courage to restrain his passions, and temperance to repress his sensual desires. Sometimes the soul, invested with the senses, only sees sensible objects; sometimes, by taking a spontaneous flight, it disengages itself from material influences, and elevates itself to the perception of intelligent things. It is this deliverance from the bondage of the body that the truly wise always aspire after; the overcoming of this conflict between the senses and the free exercise of the understanding, constitute wisdom in
its loftiest acceptation. It is from this contemplation of the divine essence that man obtains all his true knowledge, and arrives at virtuous excellency.

PLUTARCH (40-120 A.D.),

the historian, was an eclectic Platonist. He recognised a cosmic dualism, and in accordance with it an essential dualism in man. The soul is a unity of opposing principles, of rational and irrational principles, good and evil. The reason rules over the irrational principles, which include desire and spirit. To this Platonic division of psychic activities are added the nutritive and sensitive functions (of Aristotle), but these are to be recognised as ethically neutral. Thus results a fivefold division of activities: nutritive, sensitive, desire, spirit, and reason.

Influenced by Jewish notions, Plutarch describes God as the origin of all that is good. He is one who sees but is not seen; knows and is not known, though we can attain some knowledge of him through nature and still more in moments of inspiration. He is Providence, superior to intellect, a forethought which is before all thought; and between God and man there are intermediate beings, the lesser gods who reside in heaven and the spirits who watch over men. The universe is governed by Providence and Destiny. Nevertheless the will is free, for Destiny is a hypothetical necessity, which leaves particular actions untouched. Man acts under unchanging laws, but the law does not compel any action.

Man’s thoughts come to him from outside, from something not himself, and his intuitions are really revelations. Dreams are experiences of the soul when it withdraws into itself away from the body. He believes in a second sight, which is an activity of the soul possible under certain conditions. These conditions are realised in sleep, in physical states produced by ascetic practices, and under the influence of certain exhalations, e.g., those at Delphi. The “scientific” explanation of all these cases is that the pneuma becomes more refined and capable of exercising powers which are hindered by the grossness of its usual condition. With this mystic notion is associated Plutarch’s doctrine of a world of spirits, kingdom of purer beings with whom the soul of man has communion when it is purified by the contemplation of eternal truths. The union of soul and body is traced to a “fall”; the soul has consequently a power of self-restoration by which it may ascend from earth to the moon and thence again to the sun. For the sun is the original source of spirit as the earth is of the body.

The proof that the soul is immortal consists in (1) the need of a future life in which goodness may be rewarded; (2) the origin of the soul, which is born of God; (3) the natural feeling of abhorrence from the idea of annihilation.

Plutarch maintained that animals can think, but as a rule it is unreflective thought, i.e., instinct. (His medical views will be dealt with in the next chapter.)

PLOTINUS (205-270 A.D.)

The mystical character of Neo-Platonism found eloquent expression in Plotinus, who came to Rome from Egypt, and is the most representative of this school. He rejected the Stoic doctrine of the pneuma, and also the idea of a central Reason. His own belief was that the soul is a reality belonging to a higher degree of Being than matter.

Our personality, according to Plotinus, cannot be a property of the body, for this is composed of parts, and is in a state of perpetual flux. A man’s self, then, is his soul; and the soul cannot be material, for the ultimate elements of matter are inanimate, and it is inconceivable that animation and reason should result from the aggregation of particles which, taken singly, are destitute of both; while, even where
it is possible, their disposition in a certain order would argue the presence of an intelligence controlling them from without. Again, to suppose that the soul shares in the changes of the body is incompatible with the self-identity that memory reveals. To suppose that it is an extended substance is irreconcilable with its simultaneous presence as an indivisible whole at every point to which its activity reaches, as well as with the fact that all our sensations, though received through different organs, are referred to a common centre of consciousness. If the sensorium is a fluid body, it will have no more power of retaining impressions than water has; if it is a solid, new impressions will not be received at all, or only after the old impressions have been effaced. Passing from sensation to thought, it is admitted that abstract conceptions are incorporeal; how, then, can they be received and entertained by a corporeal substance? Or what connection can there be between different arrangements of material particles and such notions as temperance and justice? So much for the Stoics.

Turning from them to the Epicureans, Plotinus argues that to deduce mind from atoms is even more absurd than to deduce it from the elementary bodies. Granting that the atoms have a natural deflection, and so impinge upon one another, still this could do no more than produce a disturbance in the bodies against which they strike. But to what atomic movement can psychic energies and affections be attributed? What sort of collision in the vertical line of descent, or in the oblique line of deflection, or in any direction you please, will account for the appearance of a particular kind of reasoning or mental impulse or thought? How can it account for the existence of such process at all? 

Plotinus agrees with Epicurus in upholding human free-will as against Stoic fatalism; but, instead of using it as another argument against materialism, he prefers to regard the soul's self-determination as a logical consequence of her spiritual nature.

According to Plotinus, the soul uses the organs of sense as its instruments; it is itself unaffected. External impressions are made upon the sensitive soul by objects and are stored there until the cognitive soul turns toward them and chooses to behold them.

Memory is the soul's power of knowing its own former activities. We have memories of activities which were not sensations, memories of thoughts themselves; and this could not be if memory was only a storehouse of impressions. Memory depends on forms, but forms are not impressions; they are modes of activity directed toward sensation rather than derived from it. Memory of that which did not happen is memory of an activity which failed to reach its object; clearly there could be no memory of an object that failed to reach the soul. Memory is a state which may be described as an affection of the soul apart from the body. The body may assist or hinder the soul in its efforts, but the body does not itself remember in the proper sense of the term. Being a kind of thought and distinctively a mental activity, it belongs to sensation rather than feeling.

Feelings leave traces, and there is a certain cumulative tendency in feelings which amounts to a propensity; this is an obscure form of retention which occurs below the level of conscious unity.

According to Plotinus, thought in its highest form is passionless; the body alone is affected by the emotions. The soul merely perceives what takes place in the body; it has a passionless perception of them. The soul by itself has no sensuous desires. A movement arises in the body, in consequence a desire springs up in the lower part of the soul which belongs to animal life and is connected with the body, and this desire awakens in the superior, the real soul, images by which it is either satisfied or repressed. Passion has sometimes also its starting point in the soul. Anger always implies a disturbance of the blood and of the bile, but this organic disturbance is sometimes a starting point and sometimes a consequence, and is caused in the soul by the idea of injustice. Thus feelings and desires that are purely spiritual may be awakened in the soul, such as joy, the desire for knowledge, and the love of beauty, which prepare us for the pure contemplation of the true.
The soul is that which has life in itself and gives life to the organism; it is immaterial and gives life to the body. It is more correct to say that body is in soul than that soul is in body. Soul does not mix with body, but dwells beside it, and either goes forth to it or withdraws from it. Neither are the sensuous faculties lodged in the body; they are only present with the body, the soul lending to each bodily organ the force necessary for the execution of its functions. Thus the soul is present not only in the individual parts of the body, but in the whole body, and present everywhere in its entirety, not divided among the different parts of the body.

The Soul is distinguished from Spirit chiefly by the presence of unfulfilled desire; Spirit being free from all desires.

There is a World-Soul, which is an object of worship, and scarcely distinguishable from Spirit. It is only by contemplating the World-Soul that the individual soul can understand itself.

The world issues from God—who is impersonal, and above all beings and all thought—by a series of emanations or outpourings; by these He is manifested, without loss of impoverishment to Himself. In concentric circles, the Divine becomes dilute, its perfections are impaired in the world-soul and in angels, demons, and men. This is the "fall," the descent of man.

In consequence of their descent into corporeality, the souls of men have forgotten their divine origin and become unmindful of the Heavenly Father. They wished to be independent and fell constantly farther and farther from God. Hence the need of man’s conversion to that which is the more excellent. Man has not lost his freedom, the absence of constraint. Some men remain buried in the sensuous, holding pleasure to be the only good and pain the only evil; they seek to attain the former and to avoid the latter, and this they regard as their wisdom. Others, who are capable of rising to a certain point, but are yet unable to discern that which is above them, become only virtuous, and devote themselves to practical life, aiming merely to make a right choice among those things which are, after all, only of an inferior nature. But there is a third class of men of divine nature, who, gifted with higher power and keener vision, turn toward the radiance which shines from above and rise into its presence. This is the highest point of contemplation. It is reached when we are completely buried in ourselves and elevated even above thought, in a state of unconscious ecstasy and love, suddenly filled with the divine light. Thus we become so immediately one with the primal being that all distinction between it and us disappears.

There are no words in which to describe ecstasy, because ecstasy transcends reason. It is arrived at by a sort of self-hypnotism, "by a suspension of all the intellectual faculties, by repose and the annihilation of thought." As the soul learns to know sleep when slumbering, so it is in ecstasy or the annihilation of all the faculties of her being, that she knows that she is above existence and above truth.

The greatest men of Rome regarded the teaching of Plotinus as a message from Heaven, and venerated him as a prophet. (One of the latest and best works on "The Philosophy of Plotinus" is by the Dean of St. Paul’s, the Rev. Dr. W. R. Inge.)

Towards the end of the fourth century Neo-Platonism changed its character. The search for truth was gradually subordinated to the promotion of polytheism as opposed to Christianity. PROCLUS (410-485 A.D.) was the last prominent representative. Under the Emperor JUSTINIAN (483-565), by whose edict Pagan philosophies were oppressed and the schools of Greek philosophy at Athens and Alexandria were closed, Neo-Platonism ceased to exist as a school, and priests became the depositories of such knowledge as survived.
CHAPTER IV
MEDICAL VIEWS OF MIND AND BRAIN IN ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME

MEDICINE IN ANCIENT GREECE

In giving a history of the speculations of men on the nature of the soul, it is not sufficient, as psychologists do, to give an account only of the history of philosophic thought, but we must take note of the civilisation in general and the progress or neglect of science in particular; more especially that branch of science which deals with human life, namely medicine, and that particular part of it which deals with the disorders of the human mind, namely insanity.

The earliest records of Hellenic life show that it was universally believed that every sickness was due to the anger of some offended god, and especially was this supposed to be the case in epidemics and plagues. Such a paralysing notion was necessarily inconsistent with any attempt at the relief of communities by the exercise of sanitary measures. There was one god, however, in Greek mythology—Apollo—who was hailed as the god of light and the promoter of health. He was supposed to disperse epidemics, thus showing that the ancient Greeks were informed of the power of the sun’s rays to destroy infection. Apollo was supposed to have taught Centaur, and he, in turn, to have taught Æsculapius, who probably lived in the thirteenth century B.C. and was ultimately deified as the Greek God of Medicine. Splendid temples were built to him in lovely and healthy places on wooded hills and mountain sides, near mineral springs, a sort of popular sanatoria, managed by trained priests and, in intention, not unlike the health resorts of modern times. Patients flocked to the temples of Æsculapius, or were brought there by their friends, to offer up sacrifice and prayer to the gods, as in more modern times these were brought to holy wells and churches. It does not appear that any fee was exacted for the celestial advice; but the gratitude of the patient was frequently displayed by optional gifts.

The practice of Greek medicine became almost entirely restricted to the temples of Æsculapius, the most important of which were situated at Rhodes, Cnidos, and Cos. The priests were known as Asclepiads, but the name was applied in time to the healers of the temple who were not priests. Mental suggestion was extensively applied.

After prayers to the god of healing, ablutions and sacrifices, the patient was put to sleep on the skin of the animal offered at the altar, or at the feet of the statue of the divinity, while the priests performed their sacred rites. In a dream he would have pointed out to him what he ought to do for the recovery of his health. Pure air, cheerful surroundings, proper diet and temperate habits were advocated, and, among other methods of treatment, exercise, massage, sea-bathing, the use of mineral waters, purgatives and emetics, and hemlock as a sedative, were prescribed. When a cure was effected, a record of the case was carved on the temple walls.

These temples were the famous medical schools of ancient Greece; but medicine at
this period was not a science to be taught to all comers, but was a mystery to be orally transmitted. A spirit of emulation prevailed, and a high ethical standard was attained, as is shown by the famous oath—said to have originated in Egypt—prescribed for students when they completed their course of study. The pupil swore to lead a holy life, to follow the profession to the best of his ability and judgment, not to dispense poisons or to aid abortion, if asked to do so, not to take advantage of the opportunity of seduction, and to keep the information supplied by the patient a secret.

The Pythagoreans apparently first introduced the custom of visiting patients in their own homes, and they went from city to city and house to house in performance of this duty. For this reason they were called periodic or ambulant physicians, in opposition to the Asclepiadæ, who prescribed only in the temples.

**ALKMAEON** (550-500 B.C.),

a doctor of Crotona, contemporary and disciple of Pythagoras, was the first to demonstrate the intimate connection of the brain with conscious life. He was especially devoted to the study of anatomy and physiology, and is credited with the distinction of having been the first person to dissect animals for the purpose of learning the formation of the different parts of their bodies. To him we owe the first treatment of the human organism which is in any sense based on direct scientific work, i.e., on physiological and biological facts. He has the credit of being the discoverer of the optic nerve, and he endeavoured to explain the sensation of light as it strikes the eye: reflection gives an image of the object in the watery element of the eye. He attempted also an explanation of hearing, the moving air converging to a chamber filled with air in the ear, otherwise the air and not the sound would be conveyed to the brain. It is interesting to observe that he explained sleep as due to the retirement of the blood into the larger bloodvessels.

**PHILOLAOS** (-480 B.C.),

Alkmæon's pupil, developed his teachings and distinguished between sensory, animal and vegetative functions and their localisations, later more definitely stated by Plato and Aristotle. He localised the "human" element in the brain (the seat of the intellect), the "animal" in the heart, and the "vegetative" (growth) in the navel. The causes of disease, according to him, were bile, blood, and phlegm.

**EMPEDOCLÉS**, of Agrigentum (ca. 495-435 B.C.),

the philosopher, of whom an account was given in Chapter II., was another famous physician. He is remembered as having placed the seat of hearing in the labyrinth of the temporal bone, which he discovered (the ossicles of the ear were not discovered until two thousand years later), and for having anticipated the doctrine of natural selection.

Empedocles asserted that the embryo results from a mixture of male and female semen, and receives the form of either as one or the other predominates, or according as the imagination of the mother may be more or less called into action. He gave the name of amnios to the membrane which encloses the fætus and to the water in which it swims.

**ANAXAGORAS**, of Chazomene (500-428 B.C.),

a contemporary of Empedocles (see Chapter II.), celebrated for his Homoiomerian theory as well as for his assumption of a future spiritual life, belonged to those
philosophers, who, like Herakleitos, practised dissection of animals, following the illuminating example of Alkmaeon. Anaxagoras laid the foundation of dissection of the brain, and is the first to mention the lateral ventricles. The brain he supposed to be the first organ developed in the embryo. Most acute affections, according to him, are caused by bile (of which he distinguished two varieties: black and yellow) which permeates the blood and organs.

Anaxagoras believed that the embryo proceeds solely from the paternal semen, and that the mother provides only a place for its development.

Hippocrates (460-370 B.C.)

Hippocrates lived in the golden age of Greek culture, about the second half of the Vth and the beginning of the IVth centuries B.C. This period corresponds to that wonderful epoch in which human intelligence suddenly attained to heights not since surpassed. The three men most distinguished in science and philosophy at this period were: Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. They were contemporaries of Pericles, the statesman, Herodotus and Thucydides, the historians, and many other remarkable men.

Hippocrates was the first to separate medicine from philosophy, to deliver it from the thraldom of superstition and the sophistries of philosophers; in short, to give it an independent existence. He led his patients out of the temples of Æsculapius and proceeded to treat them by ordinary medical means. He taught that one disease is no more divine or human than another, but that each is due to a natural and intelligible cause, and showed that in the observation of facts lay the only path leading to truth in medicine. When the gods were stripped of the power of producing disease, they likewise ceased to be called upon to cure it.

Hippocrates is rightly called the father of medicine. He lays emphasis on climate—the atmosphere breathed—and all the elements which constitute environment. His views upon the importance of diet, exercise, gymnastics, massage, and hygiene were sound and wise. He was also the father of surgery. True, many of the works attributed to him may have been the production of his pupils. None the less, eight of his seventeen genuine works are strictly surgical. He was a skilful bone operator in dislocations and fractures, and performed operations on the head, thoracic and abdominal cavities, and used as an antiseptic "raw tar water," a crude sort of carbolic acid.

In fracture of the skull with depressed bone the trepan was applied, and in cases where blood and pus had accumulated they were skilfully evacuated. He insisted that no injuries to the head were to be considered trifling; even wounds of the scalp may prove dangerous if neglected. He said that convulsions are the frequent consequence of head injuries, and that they occur on the opposite side of the body to that in which the brain injury is seated. All this is in harmony with modern knowledge.

Among the diseases of antiquity there was one, epilepsy, which by reason of the spectacular manner of its operation was peculiarly, calculated to support the prevalent belief in the supernatural source of disease. Hercules was supposed to suffer from it, hence the disease was known as Morbus Herculeus; but later it came to be known as morbus sacer, or "sacred disease," under which name Hippocrates described it, on account of its assumed divine origin, but he did not consider it "sacred"; for to him all diseases were divine, and all human. He wrote:

"The sacred disease appears to me to be in no wise more divine nor more sacred than other diseases; but has a natural cause, from which it originates like other
affections. Men regard its nature and cause as divine from ignorance and wonder, because it is not at all like other diseases. . . . They who referred this disease to the gods appear to me to have been just such persons as the conjurors, purificators, mountebanks, and charlatans now are. . . . Such persons, then, using the divinity as a pretext and screen for their own inability to afford any assistance, have given out that the disease is sacred, adding suitable reasons for this opinion, and they have instituted a mode of treatment which is safe for themselves—namely, by applying purifications and incantations, and enforcing abstinence from baths and many articles of food, which are unwholesome to men in disease. . . . This disease is formed from those things which enter and go out of the body, and it is not more difficult to understand and cure than the others, neither is it more divine than other diseases."

He goes on to say that epilepsy in "its origin is hereditary," and herein he gave form and currency to a teaching already present in the Pythagorean School. Altogether, he believed in the hereditary transmission of qualities, not only physical but also mental. "Our tendencies toward virtue and vice, as well as toward health and disease, come rather from our parents and from the principles of which we are composed, than from ourselves." Again, in speaking of the qualities necessary for a physician, he speaks of natural and innate dispositions.

According to Hippocrates, man was a miniature embodiment of the universe; the four elements of the latter—earth, water, fire, and air—being represented by the four humours: blood (warm) found in the vessels, yellow bile (dry) in the liver, mucus (cold) in the head, and black bile (moist) in the spleen; these four humours contributing to the body the respective qualities of dryness, moisture, heat, and cold. He explained the differences of organisation, i.e., of the temperaments of men, on the basis of these four humours. In this respect we must remember that the ancients had no scientific instruments aiding them in diagnosis and that they had no physiological and little anatomical knowledge. In consequence they eagerly cultivated a knowledge of external signs, and finding that people differed, often remarkably, in external conformation, as well as in mental and moral character, they attributed those differences to the excess of one or other of the humours of the body—e.g., the blood, bile, lymph, or phlegm, and according to the mixing of these fluids there resulted an excess or deficiency in their constitutions. Therefore persons were described as of a sanguine, bilious, melancholy, or phlegmatic temperament.

Similarly Hippocrates explained all disease by a mixture of these four humours and based his medical treatment upon this theory, prescribing medicine to expel the predominant humour—to expel mucus, or to remove bile, etc. If a disease were progressing favourably these humours became changed and combined, preparatory to the expulsion of the morbid matter, which took place at definite periods known as critical days. This humoral pathology was derived from the fact that digestive disturbances precede or accompany most diseases. It lasted for ten centuries and was abandoned only after the Renaissance. Whatever we may think of it, it must be acknowledged that Hippocrates was the first independent physician, one of the greatest minds of all time, a close observer, an acute clinician, and a practical therapistist. We must acknowledge that amidst much that is crude and empirical in his works, there is genuine recognition that in the field of disease events follow a natural sequence, that effects are proportionate to causes, that order reigns, and that the business of the physician is to investigate that order.

We are indebted to him for the classification of diseases into sporadic, epidemic, and endemic, and he also separated acute from chronic diseases. He divided the causes of disease into two classes: general, such as climate, water, and sanitation; and personal, such as improper food and neglect of exercise.

Public opinion condemned dissection of the human body in ancient Greece, but it is certain that dissections were performed to a limited extent. Hippocrates did not know the difference between arteries and veins, and nerves and ligaments and
various membranes were all thought to have analogous functions, but his writings display a correct knowledge of the anatomy of certain parts of the body such as the joints and the brain.

Within the body the brain occupies the most important place. From it proceed, according to Hippocrates, all the veins of the body. Into the brain lead the various passages of sense—eyes, nose, ears. All diseases begin from the brain because from it flow the humours that are found throughout the body. The brain is the seat of intelligence, but only because it is adapted to retain the air, a medium by which the air communicates to us its nature; the changes in the diaphragm and heart are merely reflex action due to the contraction of air vessels. Thus the heart palpitates in fear; but this is secondary, a reverberation of the original encephalic motion. Thought can only arise in the absence of commotion. Insanity arises from a humid condition of the brain which causes it to move perpetually and produces confusion of the senses.

Of Alkmeneon we have no direct records—his writings have all been lost—but there is plenty of evidence that Hippocrates laid down the principle that the brain is the organ of mind, that consciousness is located in the brain, and that insanity is merely the result of some disturbance in this organ. He said:

"Men ought to know that from nothing else but the brain come joy, despondency, and lamentation. . . and by the same organ we become mad and delirious and fears and terrors assail us, some by night and some by day; and dreams, and untimely wanderings, and cares that are not suitable, and ignorance of present circumstances, desuetude, and unskilfulness. All these things we endure from the brain when it is not healthy, but is more hot, more cold, or more moist, or more dry than natural, or when it suffers any other preternatural and unusual affection. And we become mad through humidity (of the brain). For when it is more moist than natural, it is necessarily put into motion, and, the affected part being moved, neither the sight nor the hearing can be at rest, and the tongue speaks in accordance with the sight and hearing. As long as the brain is at rest man enjoys his reason; but the depravement of the brain arises from phlegm and bile, either of which you may recognise in this manner: Those who are mad from phlegm are quiet and do not cry out or make a noise, but those from bile are vociferous, malignant, and will not be quiet, but are always doing something improper. If the madness be constant, these are the causes thereof; but if terrors and fears assail, they are connected with derangement of the brain, and derangement is owing to its being heated. And it is heated by bile when it is determined to the brain along the blood-vessels running from the trunk, and fear is present until it returns again to the veins and trunk, when it ceases. He is grieved and troubled when the brain is unseasonably cooled and contracted beyond its wont. It suffers this from phlegm, and from the same affection the patient becomes oblivious."

He regarded mental derangement as a disease similar in its nature to bodily disease, and distinguished between mania, melancholia, and dementia, the oldest division of insanity which prevailed till quite recent times.

As to those labouring under melancholia, he spoke of their anxiety, their love of solitary places, their fears, and the frightful dreams by which they are tormented. He mentioned also loss of sleep and aversion to food. Mania he recognises as insanity with violence, and dementia as mental weakness. Insanity was due to the bile mixed with the blood being carried to the brain. The black bile, for instance, was the cause of the dark passions, such as suspicion, jealousy, hatred, and revenge; while the yellow bile produced great irritability, high spirits, and extravagance. Considering our modern theories of the causation of insanity by toxins, we are enabled to take a more lenient view of the Hippocratic pathology than older writers have done.

As regards the causation of insanity, practically all the factors which are discussed
in current text-books were set down. Physical and mental causes were distinguished, and the effects of moral shock and of organic disease of the brain, or of remote organs, were recognised; likewise the modifying influence of climate and season, of age and critical times of life. The results of alcoholic excesses and the prolonged use of other drugs, of excessive indulgence or repression of the appetites, of protracted watching and fatigue, of exposure to extremes of temperature, of injuries to the head, of reverses of fortune, of disappointment in love, of the subjection of the mind to fear and superstition, of the sustained tension of sinew and nerve in the race for fame and fortune—all those things found place in the etiology of insanity as set forth by the Hippocratic school.

Provision for the insane in Greece was made by having dangerous lunatics imprisoned, harmless lunatics cared for by their friends, and prodigals deprived of the control over their property.

That the Greek public took a very broad view of insanity and often regarded very harmless deviation from ordinary conduct as indicating its existence is afforded by an interesting illustration in the commission which Hippocrates received from Abdera to make inquisition into the mental state of the worthy anatomist Demo-critus, who had caused anxiety to the inhabitants by his practice of dissecting the bodies of animals.

Modern psycho-analysts were anticipated by Hippocrates, who thought some dreams belong to a special class that can only be understood by the interpreters who have a science of their own. In the dream state the soul acts freely; it is no longer disturbed by sensations, for the body sleeps. The soul then produces impressions instead of receiving them. Underlying these reflections seems to be the idea that the soul discovers in sleep what in the waking state goes on unnoticed. This amounts almost to the view of the modern Freud school that a latent consciousness comes to the surface in dreams.

Hippocrates approved of prayer as an excellent thing, but he remarks that it does not remove the need for self-help.

THE DOGMATISTS (about 357-264 B.C.)

With the decadence of philosophy in Greece medical knowledge also suffered, but there were some schools which gained considerable renown. First of these in time was the Dogmatic School. The Dogmatists made an attempt to found a scientific system of medicine, and sought for the hidden causes of disease, though their efforts were premature. The Dogmatists had the acumen to perceive that a science of medicine must be based upon physiology; their error consisted in attempting to erect a complete edifice before there were materials suitable or sufficient for the foundation.

The Dogmatists maintained that it was not enough for the physician to know the mere symptoms of his patient's malady; he must acquaint himself with the hidden causes. He must know the principles on which the human machinery is constructed before he can scientifically treat the accidents and disturbances to which it is liable. He must have a theory which he can apply to the treatment of his patients, and the best physician would be the one who best knew how the disease originated. Experiments without theory were valueless; their chief use was the confirmation of his conjectures. Anyone can discover the immediate or evident causes, but the physician must discover the remote or hidden causes, otherwise his practice will be mere guess-work. Another striking factor in the development of the school was the influence of the Sophists. This had the effect of giving an enormous importance to the power of talking, so that to be a skilled rhetorician was a sure passport to success as a physician.

The Dogmatists found a close relation between the two facts of animal heat and
respiration. They attached great importance to the pneuma, coming from the ether. "All space between heaven and earth is filled with a subtle vapour which is for mortals the principle of life and the cause of disease." The chief representatives of the Dogmatic School were DIOXIPPU S (ca. 370 B.C.) and PRAXAGORAS of Cos (ca. 340 B.C.).

Praxagoras distinguished the arteries from the veins. The veins were full of blood, and the arteries, which in the dead body were empty, only serve for the circulation of the air, or of the pneuma; and they play in sensation the part which we attribute to the nerves. He believed that a wounded artery attracted the blood from other parts of the body, thus causing it to flow out. Galen was astonished that Praxagoras should have pretended to judge of the state of the blood by feeling the pulse, as he did not admit the existence of that fluid in the arterial vessels. As numerous anastomoses were found between the veins and the arteries, a whole theory of disease was based by Praxagoras on the invasion of the arteries by the blood. He explained epilepsy as caused by obstruction of the bloodvessels. There is a similar modern theory that the epileptic fits are due to spasmodic contraction of the cerebral arteries.

The later members of the Dogmatic School came under a very different influence, namely, that of the Stoics, and this had the effect of giving a materialistic turn to their doctrines.

THE ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL

began meanwhile to flourish during the reign of the Ptolemies, the enlightened rulers, at Alexandria, some 300 years B.C. PTOLEMY SOTER (367-283 B.C.) originated and PTOLEMY PHILADELPHUS (309-246 B.C.) completed the Alexandrian Museum and Library. It was the greatest attempt at a collection and organisation of human knowledge. The studies were arranged in four comprehensive divisions or faculties, as in a University, namely: Literature, Mathematics, Astronomy, and Medicine, the last including such subjects as Natural History.

Under the munificent patronage of these princes, astronomy began to be cultivated as a science of combined observation and theory. One of the earliest astronomers was ARISTARCHUS (ca. 212-140 B.C.), who came from Samos to Alexandria and was tutor to the sons of one of the Ptolemies. He taught that the sun was immovable like the fixed stars, and that it was the earth which travelled round the ecliptic. He knew also that our earth does not stand quite upright in its journey round the sun, but that a line drawn through the earth from the North to the South Pole would be sloping or oblique to the ecliptic, and that this obliquity is the cause of our four seasons. Aristarchus appears also to have been the first Greek who understood that night and day were caused by the earth turning round its axis every day. If the Greeks had understood his teaching, especially about the earth moving round the sun, they would have made much more progress in astronomy. Some, like Pythagoras, for example, knew that the earth moves, but they would not believe that it went round the sun. This had to be re-discovered 1,700 years later by Copernicus.

The Greeks in spite of all their great intellectual genius failed in physical science. The cause of this failure appears to be that the ancient Greek philosophers eagerly grasped at generalisations, suggested indeed by observation, but unsupported by the slow and laborious process of experimental verification; and they applied these generalities as universal principles, satisfied with any conclusions which might by mental operations alone be clearly deduced. In the Alexandrian School we find observation and experiment in some measure taking the place of speculations as to what would happen according to certain assumed principles. Results of permanent value were thereupon attained.

The famous EUCLID (367-283 B.C.) opened a geometrical school in Alexandria Vol. i]
CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE SOUL

about 300 B.C. His fame was eclipsed by his pupil ARCHIMEDES (287-212 B.C.), the greatest mathematician of antiquity, who in mathematics, geometry, physics, and mechanics, had no equal. A contemporary, famous for his chronological and astronomical works, was ERATOSTHENES (276-194 B.C.), who was Keeper of the Alexandrian Library. He made a map of all the world that was then known, and described the countries of Europe, Asia, and Libya. But his two great works were laying down the first parallel of latitude and trying to measure the circumference of the earth.

It is to HIPPARCHUS of Alexandria (190-120 B.C.), a mathematician as well as an observer, that the origin of astronomy, as a science of mental calculation, is generally attributed. His works perished, along with many other priceless relics of the past, in that great calamity for the human race, the conflagration of the Alexandrian Library. Hipparchus, by enrolling the visible stars to the number of 1,080, by discovering the precession of the equinoxes, by detection of the eccentricities of the solar and lunar orbits, his calculation of the solar year but twelve seconds more than its real length, his tables of the apparent motions of the sun and moon, his directions for the systematic prediction of eclipses and for the study of straight and spherical triangles, and his construction of a map of the starry firmament, as well as of accurate tables of the apparent motions of the sun and moon, made such achievements as place his name above that of any observer in Alexandria. It was on the basis of his observations that JULIUS CÆSAR (100-44 B.C.), with the aid of an astronomer from Egypt, was able to accomplish the famous reform of the calendar, establishing the Roman year, which had varied from 355 to 378 days, according to the caprices of the priests, to three years of 365 days followed by a fourth of 366; and no change has since been found necessary except that adopted in 1581 of not taking the close of a century as a leap year, unless divisible by 400.

Our knowledge of the discoveries of Hipparchus is derived from the work of his celebrated successor, the astronomer and geographer, PTOLEMAEUS, who flourished about the year 140 A.D. He is the author of one of the greatest astronomical books, containing nearly all the knowledge we possess of the astronomy of the ancients. His system of the world, the Ptolemaic system, which maintained its ground for upwards of thirteen centuries, placed the earth immovable in the centre of the universe, the sun, the moon, and the planets being supposed to revolve severally in orbits of different magnitudes; the entire heavens turning round the earth in every twenty-four hours. For the irregular motions of the planets Ptolemaeus had invented an ingenious theory of epicycles and eccentricities, based upon imaginary circular orbits.

The greater part of the Alexandrian Library, which contained the collected literature of Greece, Rome, India, and Egypt, was housed in the famous museum in that part of Alexandria called the Brucheion. This part was destroyed by fire during the siege of the town by Julius Cæsar (100-44 B.C.). Mark Antony (83-30 B.C.), then at the urgent desire of Cleopatra, transferred to Alexandria the books and manuscripts from Pergamos. The other part of the library was kept at Alexandria in the Serapeum, the temple of Jupiter Serapis, and there it remained till the time of Theodosius the Great (346-395 A.D.), until in 391 both temple and library were almost completely destroyed by a fanatical mob of Christians. When Alexandria was taken by the Arabs in 641, under the Caliph Omar, the destruction of the library was completed.

It was in the Alexandrian School that the study of anatomy was carried furthest in antiquity. Among the Greek, dissection of the human body was considered a sacrilege, but at Alexandria not only were dead bodies supplied in abundance but, as we learn from Celsus, vivisection was practised on condemned criminals.

HEROPHILUS (335-280 B.C.),
a pupil of Praxagoras, was one of the first physicians appointed to ascertain the true structure and functions of the human body, and he became most famous for his researches into the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system. He considered the
nerves as organs of sensation, but distinguished that some were subject to the will, and that these arose from the brain and spinal cord. He carefully dissected the human brain—he is reported to have been the first to do so—and he refuted Aristotle’s view of that organ. He was also the first to distinguish the nerves from the tendons, to describe the membranes of the brain, the choroid plexus, the venous sinuses including the torcular Herophili, the cerebral ventricles, and the calamus scriptorius, which he believed to be the special seat of the soul. He traced the course of the nerve trunks for some distance from their origin in the brain and spinal cord. He held that the sensory nerves arose in the membranes and the motor nerves in the substance of the brain. He compared the brain of man with those of animals and came to the conclusion that the richness of the convolutions in the former must have some relation to his superior intelligence. He assumed four fundamental life forces: the nourishing, situated in the liver; the heating, in the heart; the thinking, in the brain; and feeling, in the nerves. In this respect he seems to have followed Aristotle. He observed also the difference of blood pulsations as regards their strength and velocity, and remarked that it was not in the artery itself but in the heart that the origin of the force which induces pulsation should be sought after. So great was his reputation that an anatomist of comparatively modern times considered him infallible.

ERASISTRATOS (330-250 B.C.),

was another physician of eminence at Alexandria, only a few years younger than Herophilus, who carried on the same researches into the structure and functions of the brain and nervous system, so that there is some doubt which of the two made these discoveries. It is certain that Erasistratus made comparisons between the human brain and those of animals, and that he arrived at the same conclusion as Herophilus, that the superiority of the human brain—the richness of the convolutions—pointed to its psychical activities. He, too, at first believed the nerves sprung from the dura mater, the outer covering of the brain, but on closer examination he discovered that they sprung from the substance of the brain. He placed the seat of the soul first in the membranes of the brain, later in the cerebellum.

Erasistratos assumed the body being permeated by a kind of energy or vital force—pneuma—which reached the heart by respiration through the lungs—pneuma zooticon—and through the arteries was delivered to the brain—pneuma psychicon. Some historians say that he had a knowledge of the circulation of the blood and discovered the valves of the heart.

The pupils of Herophilus founded the so-called

EMPIRICAL SCHOOL OF MEDICINE,

which arose in Alexandria about 280 B.C. They took Aristotle as their intellectual leader, but were influenced also by the Eleatic school of thought and the Sceptics. The Eleatic School, as represented by Parmenides, had constantly opposed the knowledge which comes to us by the senses to that which we acquire by the powers of the mind. Hence they believed that one avenue to knowledge was as uncertain as the other. It is impossible to know the true nature of things, for perception only shows us things as they appear, and not as they are. The only correct attitude, therefore, which a man can adopt is that of suspension of judgment.

Whereas the Dogmatic School, as we have already mentioned, induced people to believe that medicine, like modern politics, was a matter of rhetoric, and took
fluence in discourse and subtlety in argument as the standard of medical skill, the Empiricists adopted the unanswerable attitude of the practical man that "diseases are not cured by eloquence, but by remedies," and that "a man does not even become a farmer or a pilot by arguing, but by practice." They defined disease as "a union of symptoms which are observed always in the same way in the human body." The whole art and science of medicine became, therefore, reduced to a system of therapeutics. Their main object being not to understand disease, but to remove it, they made no attempt to discover the causes and regarded the study of anatomy as superfluous. They did not want to know, for example, how we digest, but what is digestible. They taught that experience was the only teacher, and that it was idle to speculate upon remote causes. It has often been said that the besetting sin of men of science is to fancy they have finished off all things in heaven and earth by giving them names; certainly the Empirics, according to Galen, were "terrible men for names."

MEDICINE IN ROME

The study of anatomy declined with the Alexandrian University, which fell on evil days when the Romans conquered Egypt, and ceased to exist when the city was captured by the Arabs. Medical knowledge was now transferred to Rome, the centre of intellectual activity. Indeed, it may be said to have already migrated after the destruction of Corinth (146 B.C.). Before the Greek invasion, the Romans, as the elder Pliny (23-79) tells us, "got on for 600 years without doctors." The oldest and best instructed of the relatives would treat the diseases of the family as he understood them, relying mainly on domestic medicine and religious observances. But there were also a number of itinerant quacks, uneducated foreigners, mostly freedmen and slaves; and for this reason, down to the time of Caesar, physicians formed a class despised by the better order of Romans.

The old Roman medicine consisted of three branches: (1) sacred rites paid to the higher gods of healing; (2) deprecatory rites paid to the malevolent deities who caused special diseases; (3) an empirical popular medicine. Among the ancient gods of healing the chief was Salus, an old Roman or Sabine goddess, whose temple stood on the mons salutaris, one of the summits of the Quirinal. Another was the goddess Carna, invoked to preserve the health of the bodily organs. In the 7th century B.C., on the occasion of a pestilence, a temple was dedicated to Apollo, who was later honoured as Apollo medicus. Greek medicine was introduced with the worship of Asclepius, 293 B.C., but Greek physicians were emancipated only by Julius Caesar in 49 B.C., when the profession of medicine was for the first time considered an honourable calling for a free-born citizen of Rome. But there were plenty of Jewish physicians practising in the Roman provinces and esteemed for their learning.

Though there was little that can be called medical science in the early days of Rome, there was a considerable amount of knowledge of sanitation. The Romans built a drainage system of big sewers at the close of the 7th century B.C., later uniting private drains with the public sewers. Their aqueducts for the supply of water from the hills were also marvellous works, and dated back to the 4th century B.C. They practised cremation, had sensible, well-ventilated houses, magnificent public baths; altogether they were remarkable for their hygienic achievements.

The Romans appear to have been nearly always at war. During the first five hundred years they were at war with the different states of Italy, and for the next two hundred years with other nations. Their special talent for military science and the making and administration of laws was of far greater consequence than their active literary contributions to science, philosophy, and medicine. As regards philosophy, it appears to have attracted the attention of the Romans only as
furnishing precepts for the guidance or consolation of life, and we find them divided between the two rival schools of the Epicureans and the Stoics.

The first Greek medical school of renown in Rome was

THE METHODICAL SCHOOL,

whose followers took as their philosophical guide Epicurus. Its chief representative was ASCLEPIADES (128-56 B.C.). He was a Greek physician, a man of wide culture, a pupil of the Alexandrian School, who in the last days of the Republic came to Rome, where he became the friend of Cicero, Mark Antony, and other leading men. He was the inventor of many new methods in surgery and medicine. He attributed disease to constricted or relaxed conditions of the solid particles of the body. This doctrine of "strictum et laxum" has been revived as "sentic and asthenic" states by JOHN BROWN (see Chapter X.). Asclepiades was no believer in drug medication with the exception of "good wine," and this only in adjusted doses, and relied largely on hygiene, temperance, exercise, open air, and bathing. He had an immense reputation with the public, which then, as in modern times, was enough to incur the enmity of his own profession, who denounced him as a quack.

Asclepiades prescribed for the insane abstinence from food, drink, and sleep in the early part of the day; the patient should drink water in the evening; that then gentle frictions should be employed, while, later on, liquid food should be administered, the frictions being repeated. By such means it was hoped to induce sleep. In fomentations of mandragora, poppy, or hyoscyamus he had no faith. Still worse was venesection. His patients were directed to be placed in the light—a protest against dark cells.

It is said that Asclepiades and his adherents, SORANUS, the great gynaecologist (ca. 110-150), and CAELIUS AURELIANUS (ca. 400 A.D.)—of whom we shall speak presently—were the only physicians throughout ages past and ages to come who deviated from the accepted Hippocratic doctrine that the four humours and their noxious potency in excess determined various mental disorders. They set up in place of the bilious diathesis the theory of vital force, to a surplus or deficiency of which disease was to be ascribed.

More fortunate than many other doctors in all ages, Asclepiades lived to a great age without illness, a circumstance which he attributed to the efficacy of his own hygienic precepts.

His friend, the great orator,

CICERO (106-43 B.C.),
too, held very comprehensive views of insanity. It is also noteworthy that as regards physiology, and the soul’s immortality, Cicero was involved in great doubt.

Man, he says, cannot understand even his own frame, however assiduously he may dissect it in order to examine its internal structure; for who can say that its parts have not undergone a change during the operation? How much less can he hope to determine the nature of the soul, its mortality or immortality? A knowledge of the body is more easily attainable than that of the soul. Man may persuade himself that there are gods, yet even this is a question not without its difficulties. What if nature produced all things out of herself? If we believe in the providence of God, how can the existence of evil be explained?

In his Tusculan Disputations he said:

"All fools are disordered in mind; all fools, therefore, are insane. For it is the opinion of philosophers that sanity or health of mind consists in a certain tranquillity, or equanimity, or, as they term it, constancy. And they consider the
mind, when void of these qualities, as insane; since sanity can no more exist in a disordered mind than in a disordered body. We separate, however, this insanity from fury; being of the nature of folly, that term possesses a wider signification."

The distinction drawn by Cicero between insanity and fury—insania and furor—was an important practical distinction in ancient Rome. Those persons who laboured under the disorder called furor, which is defined by Cicero as consisting in a confusion of mind in regard to everything—mentis ad omnia cacitas—and corresponds probably to our expression "blind fury," were placed under tutelage of persons who were responsible for them and had the power to imprison them. The law also took cognisance of persons suffering from a less violent kind of insanity, under the name of mente capti. These and other defective persons, unable to take charge of their property themselves, were placed under the care of curators. They are defined by ULPIANUS (170-228) as persons "who have neither method nor purpose in their expenditure, but squander their means in havoc and dissipation." The Romans looked on insanity as a disease which was to be cured, if at all, by ordinary medical treatment. Harmless cases were therefore sent to houses of physicians; only the dangerous ones were removed to places of detention.

HORACE (65-8 B.C.),

the Latin poet, also showed great familiarity with the symptoms of insanity. His references to madness are sufficiently numerous to authorise the conclusion that mental disorders were of considerable frequency.

Horace considers that some persons are sane on all subjects but one, the indulgence of which renders them so happy that they would rather not be deprived of it, and that he himself, if he was a dull and foolish poet, had better not be enlightened. As an example, he relates the story of a monomania at Argos, who fancied he was hearing some excellent tragedy when in an empty theatre, and joyfully applauded it; but who, notwithstanding this delusion, could perform the duties of life with propriety, was an honest neighbour, an amiable host, a kind husband, and could forgive his slaves. He would not lose his temper when a bottle seal was broken, and he had sense enough to avoid an open well or precipice. This monomania, when cured by pure hellebore, reprimanded his friends, exclaiming "By Pollux, you have destroyed, not saved me, from whom my pleasure is thus taken away, and a most agreeable delusion of mind forcibly removed."

In describing a man who was mad, he tells us what the Roman law would do with him, namely, the praetor would interdict him, and order the care of him to devolve upon his sane relations.

CORNELIUS CELSUS (25 B.C.-50 A.D.),

the celebrated Roman physician in the time of Tiberius, gives very definite rules for the treatment of insanity. He objected to rough measures in slight cases—patients who are merely a little incoherent and do slight injury with their hands. The audacity of the more violent was to be subdued, and they were to be made to submit to blows, as any one else would be who required restraint. The patient whose mirth was excessive should be scolded. Should conciliation fail, patients should be cured by some sort of torment; thus, should they be detected in falsehood or deceit, they should be hungered, or bound in chains, or flogged. Under this vigorous policy and resolute treatment they would be at last quite disposed to capitulate, to eat anything, and so successful is the practice that even their memory will be refreshed! To startle a patient suddenly, greatly to terrify him—this was
excellent treatment. There was, however, a better side in Celsus. He directed that all that was possible should be done to divert the melancholic from his sadness, and to excite cheerful hopes, pleasure being sought in fables and sports, and whatever else might conduce to health. Of course bleeding and, if not contraindicated, starvation diet, with an emetic and a smart purgative of white hellebore, were enjoined. Sadness, as all the old physicians thought, was the result of black bile. Music was not overlooked, and reading aloud to the patient was recommended. Celsus recommended the rocking motion of a hammock and the sound of a waterfall to induce sleep.

Celsus left an encyclopaedia which is the best account of ancient medicine we have, and the elder PLINY (23-79) left another, containing mostly folklore medicine.

**PLUTARCH (40-120 A.D.),**

supplied one of the best chapters on insanity to be found in the writings of antiquity. In his "Morals," he insisted that every disease or defect is peculiar to a special part or faculty; in the same way, no one can be said to be beside himself or mad to whom Nature never gave the use of thought, reason, and understanding. He thus recognised that the idiot and imbecile are not suffering from madness, for they never possessed understanding. He then met the objection which may be made from the fact that dogs go mad, and that he himself had seen horses in the same condition, while bulls and foxes are said to become mad, by replying that it is evident that even these creatures have a sort of reason which is not to be despised, and can become disordered. Plutarch asserted that, as it would be absurd to say that a melancholic or delirious man is not beside himself, so is there no other explanation to be given of the corresponding state into which the lower animals fall. The man who thought otherwise seemed to Plutarch either to overlook what is just before his eyes, or else to fight against the truth itself.

Plutarch has left us a most accurate description of religious melancholy.

"The melancholic magnifies every little evil by the scaring spectres of his anxiety. He looks on himself as a man whom the gods hate and pursue with anger, and a far worse lot is before him; he dares not employ any means of averting or of remedying the evil, lest he be found fighting against the gods. The physician, the consoling friend, are driven away. 'Leave me,' says the wretched man, 'the impious, the accursed, hated of the gods, to suffer my punishment.' He sits out of doors, wrapped in sackcloth or in filthy rags; ever and anon he rolls himself naked in the dirt, confessing aloud this and that sin; he has eaten or drunk something wrong; he has gone some way or other which the divine being did not approve of. The festivals in honour of the gods give no pleasure to the melancholic, but they fill him rather with fear and affright. He proves in his own case the saying of Pythagoras to be false—that we are happiest when we approach the gods—for it is just then that he is most wretched. Temples and altars are places of refuge for the persecuted; but where all others find deliverance from their fears, there the melancholic man most fears and trembles. Asleep or awake, he is alike haunted by the spectres of his anxiety. Awake, he makes no use of his reason; and asleep, he enjoys no respite from his alarms. His reason always slumbers; his fears are always awake. Nowhere can he find an escape from his imaginary terrors."

**THE PNEUMATIC SCHOOL**

was founded by ATHENÆUS, who practised in Rome in the time of Emperor Claudius, about 50 A.D. It was inspired by the philosophy of Plato, and—in opposition to the humoral theory of the Dogmatists and the solidism of the Methodists—introduced the aeriform, spiritual principle of the pneuma, the world-soul of
the Stoics, which in their opinion was the cause of health and of disease. (The pneuma, as we have already explained, comes by the way of the respiration from the air into the heart, and is driven thence into the vessels and the whole body—dilatation of the arteries driving it onwards, contraction in the contrary direction.) Yet they also gave the elementary qualities—warmth, coldness, moisture and dryness—a place in their system. Antyllos (ca. 140 A.D.), whose works were used by Galen, and Alexander of Aphrodisias (ca. 198 A.D.) were the most distinguished followers of this school. The teaching of the Pneumatists speedily gave way to that of

**THE ECLECTIC SCHOOL,**

which had no definite system, except that it made a selection of the views and methods of Dogmatists, Methodists and Empirics. Its earliest representative was

Areteus, the Cappadocean (30-90 A.D.).

Whereas Erasistratus, Herophilus, and others of the ancient writers believed in the division of the nerves into those of sensation and those of motion, it is in the works of Areteus that we first find mention of the difference of a brain and spinal lesion upon motion. Treating of "Paralysis," he observed that when the trouble originates in the spinal marrow of the right side, the right side of the body will be paralysed; and if the affection is on the right side of the head, the left side of the body will be affected, and vice versa. "The cause of this is the interchange in the origin of the nerves, for they do not pass along the same side until their terminations, but each of them passes over to the other side from that of its origin, discussing each other in the form of the letter 'X.'" He distinguished paralysis of sensation from that of motion, and called the mixed condition paraplegia.

Areteus was also the first to describe manic-depressive insanity, having observed that mania and melancholia frequently change one into the other. "Sometimes mania begins and melancholia succeeds, or melancholia begins and mania follows; and often in the same patient both forms alternate with each other, or are several times interchanged." He maintained that in melancholia the distress is confined to one subject. This view of partial insanity or monomania prevailed till the middle of last century. Melancholia he believed to be due to excessive aridity in the system; and mania he believed to be induced by luxury, lust, glutony, and drunkenness. Living too fast was then, as now, a cause of nervous breakdown. Clearly men can live too fast without telephones and motor-cars.

By far the most celebrated representative of the Eclectic School was the great

*Claudius Galenus* (131-201 A.D.),

Greek philosopher and physician, whose writings were destined to dominate medical thought and practice for over thirteen centuries. He was one of the most conspicuous figures in medical history. But it was by his philosophical writings that he attained to his extraordinary position in the Middle Ages. He enjoyed an immense reputation in Rome, where he practised surgery. He was medical attendant to Emperor Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic philosopher. The reason of his power lay in the fact that his writings supplied an encyclopaedic knowledge of the medical art. He enjoyed the unique advantage of being able to comment on his contemporaries, as he says in his productions, with the assurance and conveying an impression of finality, for he asserted that he had finished what Hippocrates had begun.

Galen, as he is usually called, saw the obvious absurdity of attempting to have
any sound knowledge of disease without knowledge of the structure of the human body. He wrought an enormous reform in medicine by insisting on the importance of anatomy, which he studied practically. He added numerous anatomical descriptions to our knowledge, derived from his own dissections, which, however, he was permitted to make on animals only. The mistake he made was that he imagined that what was true of animals in the matter of anatomical structure would be equally true of man. Galen was also the first experimental physiologist and, among other things, cut the spinal cord to make studies of paralysis. He made some remarkably true observations.

He distinguished between sensory, motor, and mixed nerve trunks. The spinal cord serves as a conductor of sensation and of motor impulses, and it also plays the part of a brain for those structures of the body which lie below the head. It gives off nerves like streamlets. Division of the spinal cord longitudinally in its median axis does not give rise to paralysis. Transverse division, on the other hand, causes symmetrical paralyses. If the cord is divided between the third and fourth cervical vertebrae: respiration is arrested, and if the division is made between the cervical and the thoracic portions of the spinal column, the animal breathes with the aid only of its diaphragm and of the upper muscles of the trunk of the body. Division of the recurrent nerves produces aphonia; if the fifth cervical nerve is divided, the scapular muscles on the corresponding side will be paralysed. The ganglia are organs for reinforcing the energy of the nerves. The fact that both cerebral and spinal cord nerve-filaments enter into the composition of the sympathetic nerves explains the extraordinary sensitiveness of the abdominal organs.

Galen also distinguishes clearly nerve and muscle. The muscle has the power of contraction which is regulated by the nerve; for the nerve supplies the force. The brain is the source of movement, the nerve is the medium, and the muscle the instrument. The brain is the source of the nerves, for anatomy shows the spinal cord starting from the base of the brain and sending out nerves, like branches, to all parts. The brain is not an expansion of the spinal marrow; it is the origin or cause, not the effect. Brain and nerves can be further analysed into (1) the external membranes and (2) the inner substance, related to each other as are the bark and the pith of a reed. Of these the inner part is the true brain, the real seat of sensation. The functions of the membranes are to hold the parts of the brain firmly together and to unite the bloodvessels. The brain is of the same substance as the nerves, but softer, "as it necessarily would be, inasmuch as it receives all the sensations, perceives all the imaginations, and then has to comprehend all the objects of the understanding; for what is soft is more easily changed than what is hard." Since double nerves are necessary, the soft for sensation, the hard for motion, so also is the brain double, the anterior being the softer, the posterior the harder. The brain itself is not sensitive; it expands and contracts synchronously with the respiratory movements, the purpose of which action is to drive the pneuma from the cavities of that organ into the nerves. The nerves are the conductors of the pneuma, and transmit the motor impulses from the centre to the periphery, and sensations from the periphery to the centre. The nerves have three functions: (1) through their connections with the organs of sense they produce sensation; (2) being joined to the muscles they produce voluntary motion; and (3) they develop in other organs consciousness of dangerous modifications.

Galen showed that the brain was well supplied with blood and was warm—and not cold, as Aristotle had assumed. He further maintained that its elaborate structure was against Aristotle's notion of its being a mere refrigerator, since, for this purpose, a "crude and formless sponge" would have sufficed. Against the theory of the seat of the soul in the heart, Galen cited the experiments made on living animals. Vivisection, he says, proves that the principle of sensation, of speech, and of voluntary motion, is not in the heart, but the brain. Pressure upon the brain causes stupor. An injury of the tissues surrounding the fourth ventricle or of those which constitute the beginning of the spinal cord produces death.
He agreed with Erasistratos in the opinion that the plexuses and convolutions are larger in man than in animals; but he did not admit that the intellect of man depended on this, because asses also have a brain much convoluted.

A brain-anatomist of distinction, previous to Galen, was MARIANUS (Marinos), ca. 80 A.D.; he distinguished seven pairs of cranial nerves. Galen, in his works, refers frequently to him.

Galen also taught a fact frequently disputed, even at the present time, that the skull is moulded on the brain, and not the brain on the skull. (De usu partium, lib. VIII.) This subject of the cranio-cerebral relations is of some importance, and is dealt with in Chapters XIII., XVIII., and XXIV.

Galen showed that the arteries contain blood, and not air, as was thought hitherto. He especially emphasised the renewal of the blood in the lungs, and expressed the hope that we shall some day succeed in isolating the permanent element in the atmosphere—the pneuma—which is taken into the blood in respiration. Fifteen centuries later, LAVOISIER discovered this element: oxygen. Galen imagined that the air inhaled passed to the skull through the cribriform plate of the ethmoid bone, and passed out by the same channel, carrying off humours from the brain into the nose. But some of this air remained and was converted, first into vital spirits in the anterior ventricles of the brain, and then by further refinement in the fourth ventricle, into psychic spirits.

The use of the anterior or superior ventricles is, according to Galen:

1. To receive air through the nostrils and mixing this with the vital spirit brought into the ventricles through the arteries from the heart, to prepare the animal spirits transmitted from the brain to the nerves for motion and sensation. The brain has a double movement: a diastolic, by which it receives the air and vital spirit into the ventricles; and a systolic, by which it distributes the animal spirits to the nerves.

2. By the same entrance, sensible objects, and objects of smell, are introduced.

3. The effete matter from the bodies contained in the ventricles collects there, the accumulation of which excites apoplexy and epilepsy, unless a suitable outlet be provided. There is, however, a double outlet, through the nostrils, and through the infundibulum and pituitary gland, by two ducts opening into the palate and cavity of the mouth.

The animal spirits are transmitted from the anterior ventricles to the fourth ventricle through an opening (now known as the "aqueduct of Sylvius"). The anterior ventricles are double, for the purpose that, if one suffers, the other may serve. Of this Galen gave an example.

Galen believed the fourth ventricle to be the residence of the soul. The refined material constituting the psychic spirits was derived in part from the vapours of digested food; so that the production and the nature of the psychic pneuma depend on both air and the food. Climate and diet therefore directly affect the rational powers, whether this pneuma were to be considered the soul itself or the organ of the soul. The pneuma was the necessary condition of life, and the alterations in the vital breath were the cause of the diseases of the body, of disturbances of the soul, of death itself. Therefore, in the treatment of disease, Galen laid great stress on diet, exercise, and especially on reliance upon nature. "Nature is the overseer by whom health is supplied to the sick; no one can be saved unless nature conquers the disease, and no one dies unless nature succumbs."

The doctrine of the pneuma led Galen to adopt Plato's tripartite division of the soul and to reduce all the different functions of the body to three groups, which correspond to the three forms of the pneuma or vital spirit. The pneuma psychicon, the rational aspect of the soul, has its seat in the brain and nerves, and is the cause of thought, sensation, and voluntary movement; the pneuma zooticon, in the
MEDICAL VIEWS OF MIND AND BRAIN IN GREECE AND ROME

heart, is responsible for the heat of the heart, the pulse, and the temperature; the *pneuma physicon*, seated in the liver, is the source of the vegetative functions, digestion and assimilation, growth and reproduction.

The distinction of desire, temper, and intellect correspond to the physiological parts: desire pertains to the liver, being connected with nutrition principally; temper is vitality, and belongs to the spirits of the heart; intellect is connected with the brain. The nature of the individual depends on these three parts; and the character of each part of the soul depends on the temperament of the part.

"The force of the soul is due to the pneuma, which is carried to the brain with the blood after having been prepared by the vital spirits." This, he says, explains why changes in the soul follow on general changes in the body, and why all opinions are the result of our physical condition. Thus he recognised the influence of the body on the mind. The intellect and the passions are seen to be closely connected with bodily states, and as passions are diseases of the soul that begin in physical causes, their cure lies partly in the treatment of bodily states. For Galen the evil soul is a diseased soul, and as a patient requires a doctor, so the vicious man must put himself in the hands of the good man for treatment and restoration to health.

Galen clung to the humoral theory of the Hippocratic school with some modifications. He distinguished eight temperaments, of which the four composite ones were produced of heat and dryness, of heat and moisture, of cold and dryness, and of cold and moisture, with the names of the choleric, the sanguine, the melancholic, and the phlegmatic temperaments. This theory is of special interest because, although the physical and physiological ideas underlying it have long been discarded, the terms still remain in use and are commonly employed when discussing character.

With Galen moisture produces fatuity, and dryness sagacity, and therefore the sagacity of a man will be diminished in proportion to the excess of moisture over dryness. He therefore advises the medical practitioner to endeavour above all things to preserve a happy medium between these opposite qualities. Should he be of the opinion that the whole of the patient’s body may contain melancholy blood, he is to employ venesection. On the other hand, bleeding must be avoided if madness arise from idiopathic disease, "as from it the melancholy humour is made." This humour is a condition of the blood "thickened, and more like black bile, which, exhaling to the brain, causes melancholic symptoms to affect the mind." (De cogiscindis curandisque animi morbis).

He distinguished insanity with and without fever. With fever, he called it *frenzy*; without fever and accompanied by violence, *mania*; and when accompanied by fever and distress, *melancholia*.

During the time of his activity the early Christians were making considerable noise in the Roman world, disputing about the relative prerogatives of soul and body, and above the turmoil we hear the calm voice of Galen describing his experiments and conclusions concerning the nature of the mind and the brain.

"There is much contention," he writes, "as to whether the faculty of thought is merely resident in us as in a temporary domicile, or is to be regarded as a material portion of the body. Whatever be the difficulty of resolving this question, it is at least permissible to state as the result of experience that in using the trephine, if the brain be compressed, all sensation and all movement are instantly abolished. If inflammation develops in this organ, the same accidents are sometimes observed, and there is uniformly a disturbance of the thought processes. Burns on the head may lead to delirium, and blows on this part may be succeeded by a state of somnolence or stupor. An active morbid process in the neighbourhood of the brain may produce a disorder in the function of thought. It would be very desirable to know first of all in what part of this organ is the seat of intelligence. If we were well acquainted with the physiology of the brain, we should assuredly find in the pathological condition both the place and the nature of the malady. As for myself,
I believe that the brain is at once the seat of the voluntary movements, of the intelligence, of feeling, and of memory."

Galen in his philosophic doctrines was thoroughly eclectic. The philosopher who had the greatest influence on his speculations was Aristotle. Of the latter's principles the most important was the doctrine of the final causes. "Nature makes nothing in vain." Galen accepted this law and proceeded to show that every structure and function of the human body subserved some profound end—that, in fact, the aim or object of any structure was the cause of its existence. For instance, Galen agreed with Aristotle that man had hands because he was the wisest of animals; whereas—as has already been mentioned—the earlier philosopher Anaxagoras, more in accordance with the spirit of modern science, had said that man was the wisest of animals because he had hands. In his work De usu partium Galen endeavours to prove that all the parts of the body have been so well constructed, and in such exact relation with the functions they have to perform, that it is impossible to conceive any better arrangement; anatomy and physiology simply appear as two methods which lead to the proof of the wisdom of God. For this reason, Galen never tired of praising the Creator for his profound intelligence in the construction of the universe:

"The Father of all Nature has shown His goodness in providing wisely for the happiness of all His creatures in assigning to each what could be useful to it. Let us then glorify Him by hymns and psalms. He has shown His infinite wisdom in arriving at His beneficent ends. He has given proof of His omnipotence in creating everything in perfect conformity with its destiny. It is thus that His will has been accomplished."

After Galen, medical attainment rapidly declined, and no great man enlightened the darkness of thirteen hundred years which lasted till the coming of Vesalius. During all that time the writings of Galen were almost the only source of knowledge of human anatomy, just as the books of Aristotle were for the whole of natural history. The dogmatic rule of the Church, admirable as it was for its time and its peculiar task, made medical advance impossible.

Yet there are a few physicians, living in the fourth century A.D., who are rarely mentioned in books on medical history, of special importance to us, in view of the subject with which we are dealing, because of their speculations on the mental functions of the brain.

POSEIDONIOS (c. 400 A.D.),

son of the physician PHILOSTORGIOS (358-425), is generally quoted as living about 350 A.D., when mentioned at all, but it is self-evident that this date cannot be correct. He gave a fairly accurate description of various nervous and mental disorders and their treatment, including nightmare and hydrophobia. He combated the theory of the demoniacal origin of insanity. But his fame rests chiefly on the fact that he apparently was the first to attempt to localise mental functions.

His theory was that imagination is related to the anterior part of the brain; reason resides in the lateral ventricles; and memory in the hinder part of the brain.

This theory, as we shall see in the next two chapters, was adopted by the Christian Fathers, and later by the Arab philosophers and physicians, and held its ground practically till the end of the eighteenth century, with very little variation.

My investigation, however, leads me to believe that Poseidonios was not the originator of this theory, that he only gave expression to an opinion current at the time, and that some earlier writer, whose work has been lost, speculated on this subject. Indeed, the writers of the Middle Ages, who have adopted this localisation theory, refer it to Aristotle, as if he originated it; but, except that Aristotle furnished the classification of the faculties for it, I can find no evidence for this view.
MEDICAL VIEWS OF MIND AND BRAIN IN GREECE AND ROME

On the contrary, Aristotle is very definite on the importance of the heart, as compared to the brain: it is a fact, however, that all the localisationists, whether Christian Fathers, Arabians, or later writers, were Aristotelians.

That the theory of Poseidonios was known earlier is also made probable by the fact that the ancient Greek poets, painters, and sculptors had adopted it. Thus when an artist desired to represent poetic genius or a scientific man, he always formed a large projecting forehead; on the contrary, a short but broad head, with powerful muscular forms, represented the idea of muscular force. Hence Jupiter was depicted with a majestic forehead, projecting beyond the face; while the athletes and gladiators were designed with retreating foreheads. Women had also small heads—instance the Venus of Milo.

OREIBASIOS, of Pergamos (325-403 A.D.), Court physician to Emperor Julian, popularised Galen’s doctrines and was a great compiler. He published about seventy books, of which only a third are in existence. In vol. vii. of his Encyclopaedia there is a description of the doctrine of temperaments, wherein he mentions that ANTYLLOS (ca. 140 A.D.), a distinguished surgeon, founded a sort of phrenology, i.e., a doctrine of the localisation of the mental functions of the brain. ADAMANTIUS, of Alexandria (ca. 350 A.D.), a noted Greek physician, is mentioned by Baptista Porta in his “Physiognomy” (1596) as having speculated to a considerable extent on the mental functions of the brain. AEITIUS (502-575) did the same; and so did ALEXANDER OF TRALLES (525-603), a much-travelled physician who finally settled in Rome, and who was the only one of the Byzantine compilers who displayed any special originality, particularly on insanity. He taught the world how to deal with melancholia and mania, and distinguished acute and chronic headache, and hydrophobia.

CÆLIUS AURELIANUS (ca. 400 A.D.),

who, in his work “De Morbis Acutis et Chronicis,” revised the teachings of Soranus, appears to have been the most enlightened physician of that time as regards the treatment of insane, long before Ætius and Alexander of Tralles.

It has to be mentioned that Cælius’s treatment, which has been described in the early part of this chapter, was copied by physicians, in his time and for centuries afterwards, and these adopted, not what was good in it, but his harsh methods, which were even intensified. Now, Cælius criticises these physicians. He says:

“...They themselves seem to rave rather than to be disposed to cure their patients, when they compare them with wild beasts who must be softened by the deprivation of food and the torments of thirst. Misled, doubtless, by the same error, they recommend that patients be cruelly chained, forgetting that their limbs may be bruised or broken, and that it is more expedient to restrain them by the hand of man than by the weight of iron. They go so far as to advise physical violence, the whip, as if by such means to force a return of reason. This deplorable treatment can only aggravate the condition, and supply unwelcome memories to salute the return of their intelligence.”

Cælius’s humane method of treatment was not revived until the nineteenth century. The following extract from his work shows him to have been fourteen hundred years in advance of his time.

“Excited patients should be placed in a somewhat subdued light, in a room with a mild temperature, and where there are no disturbing noises. There should be no pictures on the walls, and the air should enter by elevated openings. The beds should be of solid construction and so placed that the patients cannot see the door, and are not annoyed by what is passing. Frequent visits, particularly on the part of strangers, are to be forbidden, and the attendants should be vigorously enjoined to repress the outbreaks of the patients in such a manner as never to
irritate them by showing too much spirit, and, on the other hand, not, by too much laxness, to allow them to increase their extravagances. Their faults should not, therefore, be allowed to pass unnoticed, and one should use, as occasion requires, a calculating indulgence, or a mild reproof, setting forth the advantages of amendment in conduct. If the patients become violent and are controlled with difficulty . . . several attendants should be at hand to subdue them, as it were, without their knowledge and without provoking them, by approaching as if to give them massage. If they are irritated by the presence of other persons, and then only in very rare instances, may restraint ligatures be used, but with the greatest precautions . . . employing only bands of soft texture; for methods of repression, if injudiciously applied, give rise to or augment excitement instead of relieving it. . . . One should begin by giving nourishment very cautiously, and at first only the lightest and most easily digested food. . . . If the evacuations are not regular, enemata must not be neglected. . . . One should carefully observe the character of the delirium, and have recourse to the salutary influence of moral impressions, diverting thoughts, or welcome news. . . . If there be persistent wakefulness, a swing-bed may be tried, or one may resort to the continued sound of falling water, the monotone of which often produces sleep. . . . When the excitement declines, consciousness becomes clearer and sleep returns, nourishment should be increased and more varied; and as the patients recover their strength they should be taken for walks and given other physical exercise. . . . When the symptoms have subsided and the mind is no longer dangerously impressionable, a change of scene may be counselled. Trips by land and water, varied distractions and mental diversions, agreeable conversations and affection may do excellent service. Ennui and the spirit of gloom are only too ready to fasten upon those who have already been their victims; and if healthy, sane men can fall suddenly into a morbid state under the influence of grief, how much more is this result to be feared in those who are convalescent or just recovered, and who are still living, as it were, in the atmosphere of their disease?"

Minute and praiseworthy were the rules laid down by this enlightened physician as to the duties of attendants. Thus they were to beware of appearing to confirm the patient's delusions, and so deepen his malady; but, on the other hand, they were to take care not to exasperate him by needless opposition, and they were to endeavour to correct his delusion, at one time by indulging condescension, and at another by insinuations.

Fomentations, by means of warm sponges, were to be applied over the eyelids in order to relax them, and at the same time exert a beneficial influence over the membranes of the brain. Restlessness and sleeplessness were to be relieved by carrying the patient about on a litter. During convalescence, theatrical entertainments were to be given, and it was supposed that excitement would be lessened by representing scenes of a solemn or tragic character. Riding, walking, and the exertion of the voice were recommended.

For the poorer patients, farming was to be encouraged if they were agriculturists; while, if sailors, they were to be allowed to go on the water. He denounced the abstinence which Celsus had extolled, and asserted that a low diet was more calculated to cause than to cure madness. He spoke against the practice, pursued by some, of making patients intoxicated, inasmuch as insanity was often caused by drink. He was opposed to venesection (but not to cupping), and to reducing the strength of the patient by the administration of hellebore and aloes; on the contrary, he favoured soothing and invigorating the patient by emollient and astringent applications respectively.

The reader will do well to keep the foregoing account of the enlightened view of Celsus Aurelianus on the treatment of the insane in memory, and compare it with the awful state of the insane fourteen centuries later, at the time of Gall and Pinel, as described in Chapter XV.
SECTION II

VIEWS OF THE SOUL, MIND, AND BRAIN IN THE MIDDLE AGES

CHAPTER V

CHRISTIANITY AND THE EARLY SCHOLASTICS

We have now to deal with the rise of Christianity. With the gradual downfall of the Roman Empire and the general upheaval of nations ancient philosophy and civilisation were buried, and with the general insecurity of life, each individual had to think for himself. In time of trouble man seeks religious comfort, and the Christian religion seemed created for the consolation of the individual man. At its very origin it appealed to the poor and oppressed, the perplexed, the despairing, the sick, and the penitent. Pagan philosophy, with its eye fixed upon the State, took but small account of the individual, whereas for the Christian Fathers the meanest human soul was worthy of all their energies. It was to the individual that the message of the Gospel made its appeal.

Christianity attached value to the individual lives of the most wretched and outcast of mankind. For the slave and his master there was one law, one hope, one Saviour, one Judge. Sympathy was shown to the unfortunate, and forgiveness to the guilty. To the needy the charities of the faithful were freely given. Love, to the Christian, was the supreme principle in practical life which brought with it happiness and virtue, and every other good. The Christian exalted faith above knowledge, and defined it as an act of self-surrender to the word of God; but he taught that the supreme happiness is not of this world; it is in another life to come. The faith in that belief takes the form of another virtue, namely hope. Thus we have faith, hope, and charity as the three great Christian virtues.

New doctrines of justice and love were taught. The personal virtues of humility, charity, resignation received a new interpretation. True happiness was not to be attained by victory over our enemies, but by victory over ourselves; not by success in life, but by a pure and holy life; not by the esteem of men, but by the approval of our conscience. The spirit of compassion, self-sacrifice, devotion, and selfishness was enjoined. The moral virtues were transformed to a loftier character: chastity became purity, patience resignation, benevolence love; in short, virtue became holiness, and vice sin. Altogether, Christianity presented the world with higher and purer notions of the nature and destiny of man than had been held before. The Christian religion gave men something to live for, and something to die for. It supplied mankind not only with an ideal of excellence, but with a powerful motive of conduct, presenting it with an object of both fear and love. It thus gave rise to a far higher discipline of the affections, of the inner life of man. And, by so doing, it produced those saintly types of character which it is impossible not to admire.

It was undoubtedly because these altruistic ideals exerted a dissolving influence
upon existing society, and not because of their theological tenets, that the early Christians suffered martyrdom, for the Romans were proverbially tolerant of the abstract religious opinion of others, owing largely to the agnosticism and indifference of the educated ruling classes. But Imperial Rome had long been in process of disintegration. It survived only a century and a half the establishment of Christianity as the religion of the State. It was in the year 313 that the edict of Milan gave civil rights and toleration to the Christians throughout the Roman Empire, and Christianity became the official religion of the State. Owing to its incomparable organisation the Church soon attained to extraordinary power.

The Christian Deity was very different from the deity of the heathen philosophers. The latter was a Being very far removed from all human sympathy and regard, who ruled and governed the world by general laws, but took no interest in the petty affairs of man; whereas the Christian system brought the Deity, so to speak, nearer to mankind; instituted a close and mutual sympathy between them, and represented both under the familiar and interesting relationship of Father and children.

We have seen that the later Hebrew religion was a veiled dualism. By it, evil is no longer ascribed to God. He no longer tempts man to evil. This world is the devil's world, the next is God's. All men are destined to destruction, unless some mightier and beneficent being can save them. It is this conception of human life as the arena of a struggle between the powers of light and darkness that rendered possible the conception of a Saviour, so different from the Messiah who was to restore the throne of David.

It was expected that the Messiah would make himself known by miracles. They were demanded in those days. God himself revealed himself in miracles. Miracles are happenings, which at the time appear inexplicable by natural causes. And since nothing happens without a cause, they were attributed to Divine agency.

Christ discarded all theology and all dogmas. He was the champion and defender of the simple doctrine of love to God and love to man, apart from the sacrifices and ceremonies of the Jewish ritual. He rejected the Mosaic notion of the character and attributes of God as a God of hatred and anger, or subject to the passions and imperfections of humanity; and proclaimed as a solace to the poor and unhappy that God is a God of love, to be worshipped in spirit and in truth; a God who demands of His creatures no vain observances, no heavy burdens of ceremonialis, but a cheerful, happy enjoyment of life, provided they keep within the limits of the divine laws, which are neither galling nor heavy, but easy, light and good.

The early Christians were persecuted by the Romans. For what reason? In Rome there was toleration for all religions. All the peoples were free to continue in the practice of their own religion, and to worship the gods of their fathers in the ways in which their fathers worshipped. But the early Christians must have appeared to the Romans to be a people without a religion. They had no temple, no priests, no altar, no sacrifices. The sacramentum, originally a military oath of allegiance, took a religious meaning, and soon extended to people who did not serve in the army or hold office. A Cesar worship sprang up and became widespread throughout the Empire. The emperor was Consul, Imperator, and Pontifex Maximus. But Caesar worship was not opposed to the worship of gods; the emperor was simply the symbol of all that was great and good, even if he did not always act up to it. Cesar was the defender, the ruler, the protector. He was idealised, just as the monarchy was up to recent times held in high esteem as a symbol, though the person occupying the throne might not be capable. Now, the early Christians were only a small sect of poor followers, with totally different standards. It had to make up in enthusiasm, zeal, devotion, what it lacked in learning, wealth, and power. In course of time it was an organised body, with a religion,
CHRISTIANITY AND THE EARLY SCHOLASTICS

an ethic, its own mode of life. But the belief in and worship of the One God meant that its members could not take part in the common life of the community. It meant that Christians could not take part in military service, for that meant that they acknowledged the divinity of the emperor. It meant that they could not hold civil office in the national service, for that implied the same thing. They were the "conscientious objectors" in the Roman Empire. They held different ideals. The emperors recognised the antagonism, and even the best of them were most severe persecutors. They demanded faithfulness and obedience to the State.

For three hundred years Christianity was a religion without a ritual, or a priesthood, or temples, or altars, or public worship. Every Christian communicated direct with God from his innermost heart. The first converts being all Jews, Christianity for the first hundred years retained the principal beliefs of Judaism with some exceptions, e.g., those of exclusive nationality and bigoted formalism. Historically regarded, it was simply Judaism, with the addition of the faith that the Messiah had actually come in the person of Jesus Christ, and was to come again. It was ST. PAUL (-65) who broke with Judaizing apostles and who taught that the test of the Christian salvation was the possession of the mind of Christ, that those who are led by the spirit of God are sons of God. If the Jews had their national God, the Christians, on the other hand, had the doctrine of exclusive salvation. With St. Paul descent from Abraham was nothing, observance of the legal code was nothing; for every man was rewarded according to his works. The God of the Jews became the God of the universe and the Father of all. Henceforth the Christian religion spread rapidly, particularly among the peoples that had no divine records, no previous sacred books to preoccupy them.

Man, for the Greeks, began as a race; for St. Paul, history began with the first man, Adam. He regarded Moses in a literal sense. Man was originally made perfect and fell from a state of purity and perfection, dragging with him the whole posterity. The "Fall of Man" was not referred to by Jesus. The conception of the originally perfect man probably arose from the observation that animals are born perfect, that is to say, with instincts corresponding to their structure, and man is the only creature in whom this perfect co-ordination does not exist. The belief is natural that man through some cause, such as sin, i.e., wrong use of his free will, lost his original perfection. That the whole of posterity should suffer ever afterwards is not unreasonable either, in the light of modern science, for have we not discovered the continuity of the germ plasm?

Salvation by faith in the Atonement is the central feature of the scheme of St. Paul. Right conduct is a natural sequel to right belief. Such is the evangelical or spiritual Christianity. Next came the ecclesiastical, or dogmatic Christianity, which was apt to emphasise the efficacy of ceremonies, concentrate attention on ecclesiastical details, and elaborate the material acts of worship. Finally came the governing or hierarchical Christianity, which glorified the priestly office and sought after temporal power.

Christianity regarded man under a twofold aspect: as flesh and spirit; the one a temporal accompaniment and dependent medium, the other an immortal being in itself. The soul of man is conscious, personal, immortal. The body is a temporary resting-place of the soul between two eternities. The resurrection applies to man in his entirety. The souls of the righteous will ascend to heaven, and those who are not rewarded now will be rewarded in the life to come, when amends shall be made. Unrequited virtue will be duly recompensed and triumphant vice will be punished by purgatory, until the souls are sufficiently purified to be deemed worthy of sharing in the celestial felicity. In this they differed from the Jews, who observed the laws of God simply because they were the laws of God, and not because of temporal or future rewards. The Christian truths, like those of the Jews, were claimed to be based on "revelation," but, granted that they were revealed truths, Vol. i.]
they might still be imperfect, for they came through minds possessing imperfect knowledge, and were for a people even more ignorant.

Among the Greek philosophers the dominant conception of the soul was that of a material substance, very thin and mobile, and having the power of spontaneous movement. The early Fathers, who shaped the doctrines of the Christian Church up to the fifth century, continued to hold this view of the soul. It was even held to be heretical to deny the material nature of the soul; for only material substances, it was thought, could be susceptible of physical pains and pleasures; therefore a material soul was required by the doctrine of retribution after death. The spiritualisation of the soul seems to have been achieved by way of the refinement of the conception of God.

The views of the Fathers of the Church will be dealt with presently. For the present it need only be mentioned that Christian religion took its rise at the beginning of the IIIrd century, in the school for Catechists at Alexandria. TERTULLIAN (160-220) is still materialistic. In ORIGEN (185-253) we find the admission of "comparative" immortality of the soul. In NEMESIUS (ca. 340-400) we arrive at a much higher stage of development; and in AUGUSTINE (354-430) we have the doctrine of immateriality completely expressed. No sooner was Aristotle revived by the Arabians, than this tendency to immaterialism was greatly strengthened. Aristotle supposed the capacity for suffering and enjoyment to cease at death; the rational soul, which alone is separable from the body, being destitute of sensation and appetite. The primitive Christian doctrine, on the other hand, maintained the complete persistence of these faculties, independent of a fleshly body. But, in later times, when Aristotle was forced into the service of the Church, the ecclesiastical standpoint had entirely changed, and Aristotle's immaterialism only reinforced opinions which, through the Pauline teaching of Augustine and Athanasius, more especially, had become generally diffused through Christendom.

ATHANASIUS (296-373), Bishop of Alexandria, urged upon the Church the Egyptian idea of a triune deity ruling the world. He fought for fifty years for the orthodoxy of the Catholic faith.

Philosophic heretics appeared early in the history of Christianity. The Gnostics rose already in the first century and gained strength in the second. They were the originators not only of a rational theology, but also of a doctrine of comparative religion, and may be called religious philosophers. Their philosophical explanations of the mysteries of religion were often most fantastic; but we know little of them except from hostile sources. They called themselves Christians, but cared little for the authority of bishops or apostles. The resurrection of the body, as well as the outward second coming and material millennium, they rejected utterly.

Other heretics were the Manicheans. Manichaeism was a universalist religion, offering itself to men of all conditions and all races as the way of salvation, spreading from the confines of Babylonia and Persia to North Africa and Spain about the IVth century. St. Augustine was a follower of it for nine years. MANI (240-276), its founder, was crucified. The dominant idea is the opposition of light and darkness, in other words, of good and evil. The visible world is a result of the mixture of these two eternally hostile elements. In man, the soul is luminous, the body opaque; the luminous elements have to be liberated from the prison of matter. When all the captive light and all the souls of the just shall have mounted to heaven, the end of the world will come after a general conflagration. In practice, men are divided into the perfect or elect, and the simply faithful or auditors. The former constitute a kind of priesthood; they must abstain from marriage, from the flesh of animals (except fish), from wine, from all cupidity and all lying. The Manichean religion was very simple. It enjoined no sacrifices, no images, but frequent fasts, four prayers a day to the sun and the moon, which were not worshipped as gods, but revered as manifestations of light. The Manicheans practised baptism, communism, and a sort of initiation. Like the Persians, they admitted the existence of a whole army of good and evil genii. The Manicheans were gentle and peaceable.
CHRISTIANITY AND THE EARLY SCHOLASTICS

persons, but as they rejected the rites of existing Churches, and claimed to confine themselves to the ministrations of their own priests, those of other religions persecuted them furiously, and excited the mob against them by calumnies. Manicheism was not completely exterminated until the XIth century.

The primitive Christians, like the Jews, were strongly opposed to the worship of images; but Pope GREGORY THE GREAT (544-604) thought it politic to make concessions to the ignorant in that matter. The Barbarians had only been superficially converted; the old traditions and practices had never been forgotten; the tendency to idolatry had never been eradicated and, it is said, the converts insisted on image worship. Hence the introduction of representations of the Saviour, the Virgin, angels and martyrs, and the demonstration of miracles. These images and pictures were of course intended to stimulate appropriate ideas. It is only the ignorant that worship images themselves; it is an advance in civilisation when the thought of a deity is sufficient to arouse profound ideas.

Pope GREGORY THE GREAT (544-604), in a letter which he wrote to Serenus, Bishop of Marseilles, who took strong measures against the use of images, said: "It is one thing to adore a picture, another to learn, through representation in a picture, what is worthy to be adored. For what the faithful who read receive from books is given to the simple in pictures; since by them the ignorant are instructed in their duty, and in them the illiterate can read." For the same reason governments at the present day organise cinematograph exhibitions of what they want to impress upon the public.

When these images had failed to protect the people from disasters, there arose great opposition to them, and Emperor Leo III. published an edict in 726 prohibiting their worship, and ordering their destruction. Again, in 754, a clerical council at Constantinople decreed that all visible symbols of Christ were blasphemous and that image worship was a corruption of Christianity. On both occasions the monks rose in uproar. There were more prohibitions and risings, and ultimately the images were restored in the East. In the West the Pope himself was for the retention of the images; the Emperor was defied, and thus Rome broke away.

In Christ's teaching we find a wise philosophy confirmatory of man's noblest hopes, but the Church gradually added various rigid dogmas, to which adherence was demanded of every Christian. "Submit to the guidance of the Church while you live, or you shall go to Hell when you die." By various devices the conceptions of Heaven and Hell, especially the latter, were rendered very vivid and real, and the common people were led to believe in incessant providential interventions, as if there were no such thing as law in the government of the world.

The sole thought of many of the early Christians being the saving of their souls, they erred in looking down upon their bodies with contempt, as vile and despicable, the home of the fleshly lusts which war against the soul, and as needing to be vigilantly kept in subjection. Among the Greeks, the glory of the human body was the central conception of art, and beauty of every order was the highest object of worship; early Christianity put a low estimate upon physical beauty. The body was regarded as an unmixed evil, its passions and its beauty as the most deadly of temptations. Hygiene was neglected, and, when disease occurred, it was believed that its progress could be stayed by supplication in Prayer.

The Romans, as is well known, spent a considerable part of the day in bathing. The maximum of luxuriousness in the baths of Rome was reached in the later empire. At that time wealthy people had complete bathing establishments attached to their villas, while there are said to have been upwards of 870 public baths in Rome. The bath consisted of several rooms: the undressing room; the cool room, containing also a cold plunge bath; the warm room; hot air room, having a hot water bath at one end of it. To these was added another room, where after a
cold water affusion the visitor was massaged by an attendant and subsequently anointed all over. A long rest was then taken in a lounging place specially constructed. As luxury grew, these baths became to an increasing degree houses of assignation, and the most frightful immorality prevailed, as may be gathered from the Roman satirists. It was for this reason that these Roman baths were denounced by the Christian Fathers.

All the same, it cannot be denied that many of the early Christians carried the principle of bodily mortification for the sake of spiritual purity to revolting excesses. Persons who wished to give proof of sanctity practised mortification by wearing the same clothes winter and summer and often not taking them off. They accepted the inevitable consequences of parasites and eruptions as penitential exercises, whereby merit would be gained in the eye of heaven. Thousands of holy men and women, holding pleasure to be guilt and all contact with the world sinful, withdrew from it, vegetating in deserts and marshes—the more devout in almost inaccessible caves and rocks, the more prudent in spots not too remote from the abodes of charitable adorers. Many of these anchorites never washed; they lived on roots and grass, and grew to resemble beasts rather than human beings; some of them became insane.

But it would be grossly unjust to credit these unclean habits to the Christian Church. Partly they were due to a misapplication of the Christian teaching, and partly these habits were simply the sign of the Barbarian time. For even in the later Middle Ages dirt and squalor were common.

If sickness and poverty were common, the Christian Church also sought to alleviate human suffering, though it did nothing to remove the causes, which was held to be the business of the State. The large-minded charity of the early Christians was a new feature in the pagan world, and must have aided powerfully in the spread of the Gospel. The care of the sick appeared to them as one of the works most pleasing to God; and many religious men and women made it their life's work.

There is no record of any hospital in Pagan Rome, but no doubt some existed, for with the establishment of Christianity by Constantine many were founded both at Constantinople and at Rome, and were on so great a scale that it is certain they were not the first. Many of them were, however, merely leper houses. In the IVth century, under Theodosius the Great, it is said that the number of hospitals was so great that one was attached to almost every church. Justinian established hospitals and almshouses, so that in his time charity was profuse and organised. His wife, the infamous Theodora, founded a penitentiary for fallen women. Many of the religious orders and of the secular priesthood devoted their lives to the relief of suffering, the redress of wrongs, and the care of the sick, including the insane. In the XIIth and XIIIth centuries again numerous hospitals were founded.

However, noble as were the Christian charities, they laboured under an essential defect in having substituted for educated physicians well-meaning but unskilful ecclesiastics. There was no professional education. The sick who were placed in the benevolent institutions were, at the best, rather under the care of kind nurses than under the advice of physicians. There was an almost universal reliance on miraculous interventions. To the shrines of saints crowds repaired as they had at one time to the temples of Æsculapius.

The early Middle Ages were marked by complete intellectual stagnation and lack of all progress. The darkness which hung like a pall over the human mind was due, partly to the indifference to worldly things engendered by Christianity, but in a large measure also to the ruin of intellectual life caused by the fall of the Roman Empire, and the low standard of civilisation of the invaders.

Rome was enfeebled long before the time of Constantine by its excessive materialism, which subordinated moral excellence to external grandeur and military glory. An over-centralised government found it impossible to maintain those
CHRISTIANITY AND THE EARLY SCHOLASTICS

intimate and peaceful relations with distant possessions which were essential to the welfare of an empire so widely extended. The brutal games in the arena and the institution of slavery hastened a demoralisation, the seeds of which existed in the imperial system. Jealousy of the capital was aroused by the provinces being drained of money, which was brought to Rome and squandered by the idle rich. The unbounded luxury of the rich aroused the envy of the poor and fomented a dangerous opposition of classes.

At the end of the IVth century, according to St. Jerome's "Epistles," Rome had frightfully degenerated; effeminacy and indolence had replaced the former Roman virility, gluttony and extravagance knew no bounds; even the Christian clergy were under the corrupting influences of the times, but fortunately not all of them. There were some famous theologians and ministers of honest purpose and superior minds, who not only saw that the social state was rotten, but that the Church and contemporary Christianity itself needed reform. The exaltation of the monastic life was itself in the first instance a species of revolt and protest against the evils of the time; and was promoted by many, sincerely striving for better things; and among such persons we must undoubtedly class St. JEROME (346-420), who was an ecstatic religiousist, a zealot, believing honestly in the return of Christ, and who held strong ascetic views.

The Barbarians who destroyed the Roman Empire cared nothing for literature or science, and the Greek tradition would have been lost had not the records been preserved in monasteries. The whole of Europe was almost without exception sunk in the darkest ignorance and the most wretched barbarism. Constant wars between the different countries and conflicts within these countries of factions and of princes striving for sovereign authority made life insecure, and no questions could be considered that did not relate to the fierce struggle for existence. But even at a later period, when the clouds began to lift and signs of returning light were undoubtedly to be discerned, the culture, such as it was, affected merely a fraction of a special class. The little learning there was, related only to such as were within the pale of the clergy, and even the clergy were for a long period not very materially superior, as a body, to the uninstructed laity.

Another reason for the darkness of the Middle Ages was that the rulers of the Church were under the impression that the religious life of Christendom was bound up, not only with certain spiritual truths, but with definite views as to the course of eternal nature. Their attempt to embrace all knowledge, both human and divine, and to make ex cathedra pronouncements upon subjects which could only be comprehended after long research, had obviously a paralysing effect. Consequently the free investigation of the world was possible only within the limits of fixed theological canons. The sacred writings were asserted to contain whatever was necessary or useful for man to know. Note the famous sentence of St. Augustine: "Nothing is to be accepted save on the authority of the Scripture, since greater is that authority than all the powers of the human mind." A critical, impartial, and enquiring spirit was the worst form of vice. It was a sin to doubt the opinions that had been instilled in childhood before they could be examined. Innovation of every kind was regarded as a crime; superior knowledge excited only terror and suspicion. If it was shown in speculation, it was called heresy. If it was shown in the study of nature, it was called magic. Too much prying into the secrets of nature was held to be dangerous both to body and soul. Science was limited to what was preserved of the knowledge of the ancients, and later to such investigations as: How to turn lead into gold, and how to prolong life indefinitely; and the problem of mind received mostly theological treatment on the authority of the Scriptures. It came to be the accepted idea that, as soon as a man conceived a wish to study the natural sciences, his first step must be a league with the devil. In 1163, Pope Alexander III., in connection with the Council of Tours, forbade "the study of physics or the laws of the world," adding that any person violating this rule "shall be avoided by all and excommunicated." However, this unreason was not all theological, for in later
centuries, when science had become secular, the same short-sightedness and cruelty
were not uncommon in those entrusted with irresponsible power.

Christianity created a mental atmosphere in which the search for scientific truth
was deemed futile. The prevailing state of knowledge, religious belief, the pre-
vailing ideas as to the right conduct of life, the whole spirit of the age was deter-
mined by the idea that earthly life was a very brief and comparatively worthless
part of man’s entire existence; and that his chief care must be for his soul, or that
part of him which would exist eternally in a future world. The other belief was
that the miseries of this life were all parts of a supernaturally ordained system of
government, and were to be met with resignation, or, if relief from them was really
desired, it was to be sought by supplication in prayer. The world was expected to
be destroyed in the year 1000; therefore the last Judgment was at hand, and
nothing mattered but the salvation of souls. Intellectual and social improvements
seemed waste of energy under the circumstances, and the only wise and holy course
for people was to retreat from the world to monasteries and nunneries, there to
await the awful event. Life, in the Middle Ages, was very insecure, and this
increased the religious tendency.

Medieval Europe shows us the subordination of thought, literature, and art to
the service of an all-powerful Church, the replacement of philosophy by scholas-
ticism, and of science by mysticism. There were, however, some noteworthy
philosophers among the ecclesiastics, both among the early Fathers and the
Scholastics, whom it is our duty to mention.

**PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY**

After the Christian religion had attained to recognised independence and
supremacy in the Roman State, and the fundamental dogmas had been ecclesiast-
ically sanctioned at the Council of Nice, in 325, Christian thought directed itself, on
the one hand, to the more special, internal elaboration of the doctrines which had
now been defined and agreed upon in general terms, and, on the other, to the work
of demonstrating them on grounds either of Christian or of philosophical theology.
The psychology found in the writings of the Fathers has its root in the teaching
of the New Testament, principally in that of St. Paul (65). Man is natural and
spiritual. Within the natural man we find all the organs of the sensitive, appetitive,
and rational life. There is no opposition between matter and mind. Man is
simply a psychic creature. To this principle is added an ethical dualism; for it is
not reason that constitutes the immortal soul. Man as a creature is wholly mortal;
reason does not outlive the bodily life. The immortal is spiritual, another and a
different principle wholly distinct from the psychic nature. The spirit is that part
of man which enables him to draw near to God; but this is not to be achieved by
knowledge, and the vision of God is no longer a reward for intellectual perfection,
but a prize of that high calling which is ours by virtue of the moral nature.

Other subjects of speculation of patristic philosophy were the creation of the
world and the dogma of the resurrection of the body. In the dialogue which
METHODIUS had with the physician AGLAOPHON in the latter’s clinic (300 A.D.),
Aglaphon attacked the doctrine of the resurrection of the body on the ground that
the body is in a constant flux through the food it takes in; it is never the same,
though it appears to be the same.

**TERTULLIAN (ca. 160-220)**

was one of the early ecclesiastical writers. In his treatise "De Anima" he explains
that the soul is the breath of God. Man is by nature dual, a being composed of flesh
and soul. The soul is also dual, being at once a vital principle and a rational principle. The soul is superior to the intellect, for the intellect is its servant, the deputy through whom it does the work of feeling and motion. Man is animal in virtue of the soul; and he is spiritual in virtue of his share in the spirit of God. In accordance with the Bible, and in opposition to Plato, Tertullian asserts that the soul has a beginning. It is produced simultaneously with the body. In agreement with the Stoics, he maintains that it is corporeal, for affections of the body are felt by the soul (only a material soul can suffer in hell), and the soul moves the body—because of the interaction of soul and body. The soul has extension, for some persons have seen the soul with the eye of the spirit. The soul is “soft, transparent, and of an ethereal colour.” The mind is a function of the soul; it is like the soul in being capable of suffering, that is of experiencing emotion. The soul is like the wind in an organ, not divided but distributed through all the parts; and it has its seat in the heart. Though actually simple, the soul has a rational and an irrational part, the latter infused by the devil. The soul is never separated from the body; it is always co-existent with the body though different in nature. As a deduction from this, Tertullian says that sleep affects only the body; it is suspension of the senses during which the soul remains active.

LACTANTIUS (ca. 240-330),

in opposition to Tertullian, held the soul to be incorporeal. It is imperceptible by the senses. It is a heavenly thing—a spirit like unto God, and created by God. There is therefore no possibility of pre-existence. The soul is unity, and on it depend all the activities of the living creature. The distinction of soul (anima) and mind (animus) is not an assertion of parts of the soul, but only a distinction between physical and psychical activities. The soul cannot be divided. We cannot speak of “parts” of the soul. While the soul can perform all the functions of life, its essential work is the intellectual activity. In this there are degrees: it increases and decreases as man grows from childhood through his prime to old age; the idiot has no intellect; in sleep the mind rests and in syncope it loses all power.

In man the seat of the soul is in the whole body, though the thinking soul is in the head, because the organs of sense are there, and not in the heart. The sense-organs are instruments which the mind uses. The eyes are windows through which the mind looks. The fact that two eyes give only one object is explained from the fact that the mind is a single thing. “Seeing double” is a result of the cessation of mental activity, e.g., in drunkenness.

Affections belong to the soul as the senses do to the body. He divides them into those which pertain to God’s nature—anger, graciousness, and sympathy—and those which do not. They are movements of the soul, natural tendencies, and not diseases of reason. They are not to be rooted out, for virtue is the right control of impulses. There is no profit in condemning desire and praising the will: it is better to desire the good than to will it without desire. Moderation is not virtue; he who runs in a wrong direction will not get to the right destination by merely running more slowly. The proper use of all emotional forces is the furtherance of the good life; some that have been reckoned vices are in this view to be regarded as virtues, e.g., fear is a virtue when it is fear of God. Sympathy is not weakness but a bond of unity among men. Anger is justified when it is for the protection of what we have.

Animals are distinct from man in degree; man alone rises to the heights of reflective thought and religion. The animals have traces of other activities such as emotions and instincts, but not of the power that attains to a knowledge of God. Animals have only a principle of life, while man has a divine spirit. The animal soul
comes from the universal ether and is dissolved in death. The human soul is made by God and is capable of immortality, but it is not immortal in itself. A life devoted to bodily pleasure ends in death for the body and eternal death for the soul; a righteous life earns eternal life hereafter. The souls of the just are free from all feeling of pain hereafter; their existence is passionless. On the other hand, the eternal death of the unrighteous consists in perpetual endurance of torture. This conditional immortality is represented as a life of the spirit, the body ceases but the soul can still see, hear, and feel, retains the human form, in which it comes up for judgment at the resurrection.

ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA (331-396)

held that this world was created in one act of will, but only as a potential system. The diverse forms of being arise out of this by a process of development analogous to the unfolding of latent powers in the seed. God as pure spirit cannot come into contact with the material world directly. Man was created as mediator between God and matter. There are degrees in the natural world and a scale of perfection. Reason cannot be counted as the highest form of natural powers. It is something distinctly supernatural. Mind is the image of God; not the same, only identical in properties and qualities. The soul is invisible but can be known through its effect. The soul uses the senses to acquire knowledge which transcends the mere activities of sense. Mind is simple and a unity, though its functions are complex. The human mind is so constituted as to have a faculty of receiving divine influence and a tendency to seek after God. Owing to its nature the soul cannot be localised; it is not in one part of the body more than another, but penetrates the whole.

The soul has no parts, yet Gregory distinguished nutritive, sensitive, and rational activities, corresponding to the body, soul, and spirit. The rational nature is not equally present in all parts of the body. The higher nature uses the lower as its vehicle. In matter resides the vital power; in the vital dwells sensitive power, and to the sensitive power is united the rational. The sensitive soul is thus a medium, purer than flesh and grosser than the rational soul. The soul thus united with the body is the real source of all activities. The nutritive soul is a vital power, and not a substance, and is potentially present apart from the rational soul. So, too, is sensation potentially present. Soul is therefore a substance—living, rational, and capable of endowing the organic sensitive body with vital power and apprehension of sensible objects.

The passions are affections of the nature of the soul, but do not reach its substance or essence. Mind is not ruled by flesh, the reason is not the slave of the passions; on the contrary, mind is supreme in its own domain to accept or reject any external solicitation. The passions are given to man for a purpose. Originally the body was an image of the divine; through sin the passions entered into the world, and it is our business to restore the original state of perfection. Gregory definitely makes the mere affections neutral; ethical value attaches only to the use man makes of them. It follows that they are not to be rooted out but transformed.

NEMESIUS (ca. 340-400),

Bishop of Emesa in the reign of Theodosius, published in 381 a work, entitled De Natura Hominis, in which he tried to combine Greek philosophical doctrines with Christian dogmas. He borrowed from the Neo-Platonists their doctrine of the nature of the soul as an independent reality, from Galen his new physiological data, from the Stoics their system of the passions, from the Epicureans their theory of pleasure, from Aristotle his conception of the will, and finally—evidently from Poseidonius—the localisation of mental functions in the brain. It is the last which is of special interest to us. He states:
"The powers of the Soul are divided into these three: Phantasy, Judgment, and Memory. The instruments of the imagination are the front pans of the brain and the vital spirits which are in them. The instruments of cogitation are the middle pan of the brain and the vital spirits which are in it. The instruments used by the memory are the hinder brain-pan and the vital spirits there placed. If the former brain-pan be hurt, the senses are much hindered; but the cogitation remains sound. If only the middle pan be harmed, the cogitation is maimed, but the seat of sense keeps the senses whole. If any hurt befell both the former and middle pan, both sense and cogitation decay. If the hinder pan only be disordered, the memory alone perishes, and neither sense nor cogitation receive harm. But if the former, the middle, and the hinder brain-pan be all together out of order, the party so disturbed is maimed in sense, in cogitation, and memory, all at once; and the whole living creature is in danger of destruction. This is made evident also by many diseases, and accidents which are symptoms of diseases, and especially in frantic men."

Here we have an insistence on pathological observations on man for the discovery of the physiology of the brain by a layman, a recommendation which physicians of 1,550 years later are still somewhat neglecting, in favour of vivisection of animals. Apollinaries of Laodicæa (339-430) adopted the view of brain-functions of Nemesius; but whereas the latter located mental attributes in the substance of the brain, the former localised them in the cerebral ventricles.

Nemesius drew an ascending scale of organic beings and stated that no sharp line can be drawn between the mental capacities of man and animals; the faculties are the same in both, and all men have the same faculties; and he drew a clever distinction between Will and Choice: our will is unlimited, but our choice is limited.

**ST. AUGUSTINE (354-430)**

St. Augustine was the most learned man of the early Christians, the greatest of the Fathers, whose writings dominated thought for many centuries. He gathered into one the scattered results of what was best in Greek psychological thought. His version of Plato dominated thought until the thirteenth century.

The soul was to be approached and known directly through consciousness. It is immaterial in character and immortal. It is a substance or subject, and not a mere attribute of the body. It feels each affection of the body at that point where the affection takes place; it is therefore wholly present both in the entire body and in each part of it, whereas the corporeal is with each of its parts only in one place. The soul has the power of knowing itself; the faculties turn in upon themselves—self-contemplation; we reflect upon our own states of mind. This is the key to divine knowledge; for in reflecting upon ourselves we discover the characters of the spiritual principle and of God. This is the end of all knowledge. In answer to the sceptical questions of cultivated Romans as to the knowledge of God by revelation, St. Augustine replied that there are truths which are not limited by the accidents of space and time—truths which the mind does not create, but perceives as existing. Mathematical and moral truths are of this order. We must find the eternal home or base of these truths, and they point to the existence of an infinite and eternal intelligence.

In hunting out the impulses of his own mind, he discovered what a tremendous significance feeling has for the inner development of man. Resulting from such observation he found that the mental life was one of continual movement in the one spiritual principle, and showed itself in three fundamental functions: intellect, will, and self-conscious memory. The fundamental moving principle of the entire mental life was will. All passions are manifestations of the will. The cause of evil is to be found in the will, which turns aside from the higher to the inferior, or in the pride of those angels and men who turned away from God, who has absolute being, to themselves, whose being was limited. Not that the inferior as such is evil, but to decline to it from the higher is evil. Evil is not a substance or nature, but a marring of nature and of the good, a "defect," a "privation," or "loss of good."
Evil can only exist as an adjunct of good. An absolute good is possible, but absolute evil is impossible.

He held that the soul acts upon the body from its seat, the brain, which has three ventricles: the anterior is the nerve centre; the posterior is the motor or memory centre; and the middle ventricle is the seat of learning. The memory centre is required so that motions may be connected one with another, the past with the present. The memory centre is not itself memory. In addition to the five senses we have the sixth sense, the traditional "common sense," by which we know that we have two or more sensations at a time. The imagination is a faculty mediating between memory and understanding, not between sense and memory. Its material are memory images, just as sensation has the external objects for its material. For their psychic functions all parts are dependent on the soul. If the soul is not intent the effects of external agents are unnoticed.

Although the astronomical knowledge bequeathed to us by antiquity became gradually lost with the downfall of Rome, yet St. Augustine still held the belief that the earth was the centre of the universe and was isolated in space. He remarked that when the sun disappears from our sight, it lights other parts of the earth; but he did not believe the antipodes to be inhabited by human beings, for it was impossible for man to cross the ocean to reach them, and they could not possibly be descendants of Adam, the common progenitor of mankind.

The doctrine of St. Augustine that the fetus developed a soul in the second month, and was sexually differentiated in the fourth, later played an important part in legislation.

**THE EARLY SCHOLASTICS**

**NOMINALISTS AND REALISTS**

The Scholastics were theologians, who prosecuted philosophy wholly in the interests of the Church and whose aim was to reconcile faith and reason, and to give to the dogmas of Christianity a scientific form. Scholasticism was a blend of the old pagan philosophy with the new faith, the logic of Aristotle associated with the teaching of the Church, and by it Reason became subject to Authority, and was made the mere handmaid of Faith. Even when at last a revival of learning took place, empty scholastic subtleties and metaphysical mysticism engaged the whole attention of men, who rivalled one another in verbal disputations, without agreement in the meaning of the terms they used; and, as if knowledge were nothing more than a process of ingenious excogitation, they made no attempt to observe the phenomena of nature and to search out the laws governing them.

Among the problems discussed were: What caused the creation of the stars on the fourth day? Were beasts of prey and venomous animals created before, or after, the fall of Adam? Why were only beasts and birds brought before Adam to be named, and not fishes and marine animals? Why did the Creator not say "Be fruitful and multiply" to plants as well as animals? One of the problems they set for solution was how to reconcile an omnipotent Justice with an unequal distribution of opportunity, and an omnipotent Love with the existence of suffering. Another query to be answered was: Is there a survival of the conscious ego—a perpetuation of the personality? Then there were the controversies concerning the origin of the soul. Was the soul created by a divine act at the moment of conception, or was the soul passed on from parent to child, in a new individual form, all souls having been potentially created in the first man? Another subject of controversy was the doctrine of the Trinity. Another problem was whether our general notions of such things as man, dog, table, have any objective reality. Those who considered that they did possess such objective reality were known as Realists, while their opponents were termed Nominalists.
CHRISTIANITY AND THE EARLY SCHOLASTICS 91

Nominalism, as the conscious and distinct standpoint of the opponents of Realism, first appeared in embryo in the IXth and Xth centuries and more expanded in the second half of the XIth century (with which we shall deal in the next chapter), when a portion of the Scholastics ascribed to Aristotle the doctrine that logic has to do only with the right use of words, and that genera and species are only (subjective) collections of the various individuals designated by the same name, and disputed the interpretation which gave to universals a real existence.

The Nominalists affirmed that there were no general ideas; the Realists maintained that there were universal ideas to correspond with general terms. There was also an intermediate sect of scholastic philosophers, who took the name of Conceptualists.

The Nominalists affirmed that there were two classes of truths, respecting individual things or objects belonging to the same genus or order; namely, one class relating to individual objects, and their particular qualities or properties; the other class to general truths, which arose out of those qualities or circumstances, which all the things or objects possess in common. The words which are used to designate these general qualities or circumstances are called general terms; and the Nominalists declared that when men talk or reason about these general or common attributes of things, this general term alone is the only thing with which the mind is conversant.

The Realists denied this doctrine and maintained that, though these general terms were used in our descriptions of the similar properties or qualities of things, yet there was a general idea always present in the mind, when it thus characterised the common attributes which belonged to a particular genus. This general term was not a mere verbal instrument; but stood for a real permanent intellectual conception, which was always present to the mind, and to which the name of general idea was uniformly given.

The Conceptualists attempted to steer a middle course between these two opposite doctrines. They all, however, agreed with the Nominalists in denouncing general ideas or conceptions, such as the Realists considered them to be; but they still thought the mind had the power, when requisite to exercise it, of creating these general notions. They said there were no essences, or universal ideas, to agree with general terms, and that the mind could reason about classes of individuals without the mediation of language.

The famous Lord BACON (1561-1626) has given us the most scathing criticism of Scholasticism. He says:

"As many natural bodies, whilst they are still entire, are corrupted, and putrefy, so the solid knowledge of things often degenerates into subtle, vain, and silly speculations, which, although they may not seem altogether destitute of ingenuity, are insipid and useless. This kind of unsound learning which preys upon itself has often appeared, particularly among the Scholastics; who, having much leisure, quick parts, and little reading; being in mind as clearly confined to the writings of a few authors, and especially of their dictator Aristotle, as they are in body to the cells of their monasteries; and being, moreover, in a great measure, ignorant of the history both of nature and the world; out of very dimly materials, but with the most rapid and violent motion of the shuttle of thought, they have woven those laborious webs which are preserved in their writings. The truth is, that the human mind, when it is employed upon external objects, is directed in its operations by the nature of the materials upon which its faculties are exercised; but if, like the spider, it draws its materials from within itself, it produces cobwebs of learning, wonderful indeed for the fineness of the threads and the delicacy of the workmanship, but of no real value or use."

Though the Scholastic philosophy presents, in many points of view, a lamentable instance of the weakness of human nature, yet it is not without some redeeming
qualities. It must always be borne in mind that one prime motive which lay beneath the surface of all metaphysical and theological controversy was an ardent desire for intellectual liberty and freedom of discussion. What many of the learned and able doctors of the Schools contended for was a perfect right for human reason to canvass and discuss the general principles of philosophy and religion, no matter to what result that investigation might lead. Scholasticism was essentially a theological controversy. The theories of the Nominalists and Realists would soon have been deprived of all interest, but for the constant supply of controversial matter which theology afforded. The theory of the Nominalists was considered more in unison with certain views of revealed truth; and the ideas of the Realists decidedly in favour of an opposite conclusion. This was the real source of the long and bitter contest. The leading theological doctrines which were discussed through the medium of the Scholastic metaphysics were the Trinity, Predestination, Grace, Justification, and the Sacraments.

Pantheism simply identifies God with nature and natural forces. Now, in mediaeval times the opposition between Theism and Pantheism took the form of a dispute between Realists and Nominalists. To the mediaeval logician, Realism was just the opposite of our modern concept of a knowledge of material things. The Realists assumed, with Plato, that the idea is as actual as the thing itself and creative of it, whence it follows that all things proceed from the will of God. The Nominalists, on the other hand, affirmed that the form or idea is only a name or abstract conception, existing in the mind of the observer alone, and that God, therefore, exists impersonally in each and every object of the material world. To mediaeval theologians, such pantheism as this could be no less than infidelity and unbelief, since it tended to dissolve the dogmas of faith and was subversive of the ideas of divine revelation and of personal immortality, the hope held out to the Christian.

**JOHN SCOTUS**, of Ireland (ca. 800-880),

was the first to raise the questions (1) whether genera and species, or the so-called universals, have a substantial existence or whether they exist solely in our thoughts; (2) whether, supposing them to exist substantially, they are material or immaterial essences; and (3) whether they exist apart from the objects perceptible by the senses or only in and with them. He held that true philosophy and true theology are identical. Faith belongs to the earlier stages of intellectual life and leads up to reason. The universe is the unfolding of God. Natural things have only a semblance of reality. His pantheistic speculations got him into trouble with Rome.

**ROSCELLINUS** (1050-1120),

Canon of Compiègne, applied the nominalistic doctrine to the dogma of the Trinity. He was accordingly required by the Ecclesiastical Council of Soissons (1092) to recant the offensive inference; consequently, in the period immediately following, there were but few adherents to Nominalism who ventured openly to confess it. It was first renewed in the XIVth century, particularly by William of Occam (1280-1347). The most influential opponent of Roscellinus, among his contemporaries, was Archbishop Anselm, while Abélard sought to maintain an intermediate and conciliatory position.

**ANSELM** (1033-1109),

Archbishop of Canterbury, supported the Realistic position. God's existence is bound up with the true nature of the human mind. The idea of God involves the
realms of that idea. The rational and real are one—an idea which has its germ in Plato. Anselm affirmed repeatedly, as his fundamental principle, that knowledge must rest on faith, and not faith on a preceding knowledge developed out of doubt and speculation. Philosophy is strictly subordinated to theology. He required unconditional submission to the authority of the Church.

**PETER ABÉLARD (1079-1142)**

became the great leader in the intellectual movement of the age. He taught the view, intermediate between Nominalism and Realism, which has since been called Conceptualism, admitting that abstract ideas and general terms are not mere words, but are necessary conceptions of the similar qualities and mutual relations of the objects we classify. While he believed in the capacity of reason to compass all mysteries, he did not renounce the principle of the pre-eminence of faith. But he held that faith without knowledge lacks stability. Man believes not because of authority, but because of conviction. It is in the intention, not in the action, that moral good and evil reside. **The propensity to evil,** belonging to us in consequence of original sin, **is a natural disposition of the body and not in itself sin.** It is only the consenting to evil which is sin. The idea of sin, he affirms, implies not only a departure from what is morally good in itself, but at the same time a violence done to the sinner's own moral consciousness; whatever, therefore, is not in conflict with this consciousness is not sin, although that which harmonises with one's own moral consciousness is not for that reason virtue, unless this consciousness is what it ought to be.

His work on the Trinity caused his disgrace. He was described as a rash innovator who explained divine things with the devil's daring, and sought to penetrate into the secrets of religion, setting his own private opinion above the united testimony of the Church.

**BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX (1091-1153),**

the opponent of Abélard, regarded feeling as the pathway to knowledge, and contemplation as the secret of blessedness. There are three ways of grasping divine truths. The first is by the intellect, which is not possible in this life. The second is opinion, which is void of certainty. The third is faith, which proceeds from the heart and will, and anticipates the knowledge which will at last be clearly given to the mind.

**PETER LOMBARD (1100-1164),**

Bishop of Paris, explained the doctrines of the Church in methodical form, placing them on a metaphysical basis, supported by quotations from the Fathers. He did not escape accusation; but his book, nevertheless, continued to be the text-book of theology for university teachers.

**Bishop JOHN OF SALISBURY (1100-1180),**

the celebrated friend of Thomas à Becket, in 1150, worked out a theory of the continuous development of knowledge, pointing out the transitions of function as they actually take place from sense perception to reason. First appears sensation, and in it the germ of judgment; then imaging, with a further development of judgment in the direction of valuation of experience, from which arise pleasure and pain, the basis of desire. Out of imagination springs rational knowledge, and through it comes wisdom, the contemplation of God.
CHAPTER VI

ARAB PHILOSOPHY AND LATER SCHOLASTICS

The Christian religion never established itself firmly among the peoples of Northern Africa, and when it was supplanted by a theology, the mysteries of which were beyond the understanding of ordinary men, and many of its clergy did not practice what they preached, there was a chance for a new prophet, and MOHAMMED (571-632) was the man. He preached a monotheism which wrenched from Christianity more than half of her possessions. Mohammedanism originated in Arabia, and soon spread by military conquest to Egypt and the remainder of Christian Africa, as well as Syria and Persia, and when the Moors conquered Spain, the Arabian crescent extended from the Bosphorus across Northern Africa to the Pyrenees.

Mohammed was eloquent in the pulpit and valiant in the field. He did not engage in vain metaphysics, but applied himself to improving the social conditions respecting personal cleanliness, sobriety, fasting, charity and prayer. To asceticism he opposed polygamy, and promised the most voluptuous means for its enjoyment in Paradise hereafter. The burden of the teaching of the Koran is the unity of God, and the duty of man to man. It contains poor philosophy, but abounds in excellent moral suggestions and precepts. It is full of maxims of which all men must approve. It betrays a human, though not an intellectual, origin. Paradise was declared to be as much for those who rightly use the pen as for those who gained the crown of martyrdom or who had fallen by the sword. "The world is sustained by four things: the learning of the wise, the justice of the great, the prayers of the good, and the valour of the brave." Like the Jewish religion, the Islamist repels all idea of associating another in the worship of God. There is no "Intercessor" between God and man, either to purge him of his sins or to reconcile him to an angry Deity. If they sin, they can obtain forgiveness by appealing direct to him and by "abandoning their evil ways."

At first the Koran was an obstacle to the advancement of learning, but its fatalism was soon mitigated, and it is remarkable how quickly the ferocious fanaticism of the Saracens was transformed into a passion for intellectual pursuits, and philosophy and science were cultivated, when the rest of the world was steeped in ignorance and barbarism. The Khalifs invited philosophers and cultivators of all the sciences, of whatever religion, to the Court of Bagdad; no mosque was to be built unless there was a school attached to it; libraries were established and the copying of manuscripts properly organised. For a trifling payment liberty was guaranteed to the Christian and the Jew and absolute security for their worship.

The Moors had conquered Spain in the VIIIth century, and the rise of the Arabian Empire, associated as it was with the revelation of a new religion which spread over a large surface of the globe, introduced a fresh element into the worn-out civilisation of the old world. An extensive commerce and a general love of industry created a wealth that astonished Europe. Their version of Aristotle, their medicine and...
general culture exercised a widespread influence. As if by magic, a splendid civilisation sprang into being.

The Arabs had a national poesy and music. They were the inventors of the violin. On a Byzantine and Persian foundation they created a new architecture and ornamental art. Philology is a creation of the Arabs, and in lexicography they created a gigantic work which rivals the most modern dictionaries. They were the most wonderful encyclopaedists. The most comprehensive histories emanated from their archives. They were the first to introduce bibliography as a systematic auxiliary science.

Their cultivation of science dates from their capture of Alexandria in 638. This was only six years after the death of the Prophet. They had not only become acquainted with, but correctly appreciated, the Greek scientific writers. The caliphs, in contrast to most of the Byzantine emperors, vied with each other in the promotion of science, and some of them even took part in the course of instruction. The Arabs were extremely well versed in technology. They were acquainted, e.g., with the use of gunpowder and of artillery before the West. They derived from China a knowledge of the manufacture of paper, made woodcuts for the ornamentation of manuscripts; they also received from China the compass, which they improved and employed on journeys across the deserts.

The Arabs did much original work in astronomy. They ascertained the dimensions of the earth; they had registered or catalogued all the stars visible in their heavens, giving to those of the larger magnitudes the names they still bear on our maps and globes; they determined the true length of the year, discovered astronomical refraction, invented the pendulum clock, improved the photometry of the stars, ascertained the curvilinear path of a ray of light through the air, explained the phenomena of the horizontal sun and moon, and why we see these bodies before they have risen and after they have set; they measured the height of the atmosphere, determining it to be fifty-eight miles, gave the true theory of the twilight and of the twinkling of the stars. These astronomical studies were made, although their study of the heavenly bodies was mixed up with astrology, a kind of magic art by which they claimed to foretell what was going to happen by studying the stars.

Of mathematicians, one of the most celebrated was MOHAMMED BEN MUSA, who lived about 900. He is the earliest Arabian writer on algebra, i.e., the working of sums by means of letters. He was the first to use the Indian (Arabic) numerals instead of the Roman.

ALHAZEN (-138), an Arabian astronomer and mathematician living in Spain, made discoveries chiefly in optics, discovering laws of refraction and the magnifying by convex lenses. He recognised the duration in time of psychical processes, had the knowledge that between stimulus and sensation a certain time must elapse, due to the propagation of the excitation along the sensory nerve. He may therefore be regarded as the forerunner of experimental psychology.

The study of chemistry, which in Europe was considered an "occult science" and a "black art," was fostered and various discoveries were made.

From the VIIIth century to the XIIIth chemistry was cultivated with great assiduity by the Arabs in the academies which they established at Cordova and other cities of Spain; and it was from the latter region that the belief in alchemy spread to all the countries of Western Europe, gradually gaining strength up to perhaps the XVth century. It was during the XIIIth century that the doctrine of the single origin of all matter led to the consideration of the "philosopher's stone" and to the belief of the possibility of transmuting the baser metals into silver and gold (which, however, in the light of recent science appears perfectly possible), and there were not a few who even believed that this as yet non-existent stone possessed the power to increase longevity, to confer health, and to give a prosperous issue to one's undertakings. But although the persistent and wonderfully energetic activities of the alchemists failed to find the philosopher's stone, or to transmute the ordinary metals into precious, they placed in the hands of man the
key to a knowledge of chemistry, that branch of science which was destined in later years to play such an important part in pharmacy, in agriculture, and in other industries. Thus we owe to alchemists the discovery of many chemical substances, of many processes, and the invention of many apparatuses—indeed, the groundwork of modern chemistry.

The greatest of these Arabian alchemists was a man named GEBER or DJAFER (699-776) of Mesopotamia, who has been called the founder of chemistry. He discovered nitric acid and aqua regia, and described distillation, filtration, sublimation, water-baths, and other essentials of chemical procedure.

Among the Moors there were some prominent physicians and philosophers. Medicine had been almost entirely neglected in the early Middle Ages. There were few medical men of reputation, and of these a good many were of Jewish faith. The Arabs fostered the study of medicine both in the East and Spain. Especially pharmacy made great progress. They trusted nature and hygiene very little and were all for active treatment by drugs. Caliph EL RASCHID (786-802), who had founded a university at Bagdad, prohibited any person from practising medicine who had not passed a satisfactory examination. At Bagdad, Greek works were translated into Arabic, and in this manner the writings of Plato and Aristotle were secured. Arabian culture reached its zenith at the period of the greatest power and greatest wealth of the Caliphate in the IXth and Xth centuries.

The Arabians derived their knowledge of Greek medicine from the Nestorian monks, many practical details from the Jews, and their astrologic lore from Egypt and the Far East.

The Nestorians were the followers of NESTORIUS, Bishop of Antioch, called to Constantinople in 427 (died 440). He protested against the worship of the Virgin, and declared that Mary should be called not "Mother of God," but "Mother of Christ," and that in Christ the two natures, human and divine, must be carefully distinguished. Nestor rejected the base popular anthropomorphism, picturing God, Christ, the Virgin, and the Holy Ghost in human form and attires, looking upon it as little better than blasphemous, and pictured to himself an awful eternal Divinity, who pervaded the Universe and had none of the aspects or attributes of man. Nestor was exiled, but his overthrow and punishment by no means destroyed his opinions.

His followers emigrated to the Euphrates and established the Chaldean Church, and from their colleges they spread Nestor's tenets through Siberia, Arabia, India, Tartary, China, and Egypt. The Nestorians adopted the philosophy of Aristotle, and translated his works into Syrian and Persian. In connection with the Jews they founded the medical college of Djondesabour. Their missionaries disseminated the Nestorian form of Christianity to such an extent over Asia that its worshippers eventually outnumbered all the European Christians of the Greek and Roman churches combined. The Nestorians were banished in 439, and in 489 their school, at Edessa, where the Arabians also were educated as physicians, was dissolved. In 490 they founded a new school at Nisibis in Mesopotamia, which in the VIIIth century fell into the hands of the Arabians. These Nestorian schools were the first to require an examination before granting a certificate to practice, and also the first to separate pharmaceutics from medicine proper. The Nestorians found no difficulty in affiliating with their Saracen conquerors. Indeed, they became their educators, and it was partly by their influence that the Saracens became refined.

The Arabian physicians and philosophers accepted Aristotle's classification of the faculties and localised them in the brain, very much on the lines of Poseidonios. The importance of this historical attempt at brain localisation will be seen when we tell the history of similar attempts in the XIXth century. This early attempt at localising mental functions in the brain is generally ignored or dismissed in a few lines; but that it must have been originally based on some observed facts is evident from its acceptance by medical men for 1,300 years.
Aristotle, as we have seen, recognised besides the five outer senses three inner powers, namely (1) a *common sense* for the co-ordination of the various perceptions, and evolving from these (2) *phantasy*, the power of reproducing images, and (3) *memory*, the power of mind to store and retain images. He further distinguished (4) *opinion* from imagination, and (3) *reminiscence* from memory. The Arabian philosophers (as also the Patristic philosophers and Scholastics) located these five inner senses with slight variations, and their localisations, as has been already mentioned, continued to be reproduced till well-nigh the end of the XVIIIth century. Some of them (as Albertus Magnus) acknowledged only the first three faculties; others located all the five. Generally, *common sense* was located in the fore-part of the brain; *phantasy*, imagination, or cogitation, in the middle part of the brain; and *memory* in the posterior part of the brain. As BURTON (1576-1640) has put it in his most curious of books, "The Anatomy of Melancholy" (1621):

"Inner senses are three in number, so called because they be within the brain-pan, as common sense, phantasie, and memory. Of common sense the forepart of the brain is his organ or seat; of phantasie or imagination, which some call estimative or cogitative, his organ is the middle cell of the brain; and of memory, his seat and organ, the back part of the brain."

In the "Tesorretto" of BRUNETTO LATINI (1230-1294), the preceptor of Dante, published in the XIIIth century, the doctrine is taught in rhyme:

"Nel cappo son tre celle,  
Ed io dirò di quelle,  
*Davanti* è lo intelletto  
E la forza d'apprendere  
Quello che puote intendere.  
*In mezzo* è la regione  
E la discrezione  
Che scherne buono e male.  
E lo terno e l'iguale  
*Dirietro* sta con gloria  
La valente memoria,  
Che ricordo e retiene  
Quello ch'in essa viene."

The reason why the ancient philosophers, from whom the Arabs adopted this localisation, placed the faculties in certain cells, meaning cavities or ventricles, probably was to give more room for the pneuma, the gaseous substance, to expand. As we ordinarily carry the hand to the forehead when we think, and experience a peculiar sensation in that region, they made it the seat of common sense; they regarded our ideas as submitted to a kind of elaborative process in the middle portion of the brain, and laid them up in store in the posterior region. Some distinguished four regions, as follows: The *first* or anterior ventricle of the brain, which was supposed to look towards the front, was the ventricle of common sense; because from it the nerves of the five outer senses were presumed to branch off, and into it, by the aid of these nerves, all sensations were brought together. The *second* ventricle, connected by a minute opening with the first, was fixed upon as the seat of the imaginative faculty, because the impressions from the five outer senses are transmitted from the first ventricle into it, as a second stage in their progress through the brain. The *third* ventricle was the seat of the understanding; and the *fourth* was sacred to memory, because it was commodiously situated as a storehouse into which the conceptions of the mind, digested in the second ventricle, might be transmitted for retention and accumulation. Memory being located posteriorly.

[Vol. i.]
the occiput used to be called the mnemonical bone; and many learned men thought that a very prominent occiput was a sure sign of an excellent memory.

As a matter of fact, the so-called anterior ventricle consists of two ventricles: the right and left lateral ventricles, which communicate with one another and are continuous with the third ventricle—called in ancient times the middle ventricle—by the Foramen of Monro; and the third ventricle communicates with the fourth ventricle—called by the ancients the posterior ventricle—by the Aqueduct of Sylvius.

The lateral ventricles are roofed over by the corpus callosum; the third is covered by the optic thalamus; and the fourth is situated between cerebellum and pons.

Possibly the idea of memory being related to the posterior part of the brain arose from the observation that a blow on the occiput is frequently followed by loss of memory; but in modern times this fact is explained on the theory of a contre-coup, a blow on the back part of the head causing the brain to impinge violently on the frontal bone, damaging the anterior brain cells, a region considered by a large number of observers to be related to the intellect and memory.

If the sense of sight and sense of hearing are stimulated at the same time, their effects somehow cohere in consciousness, and the knowledge of this fact inspired the hypothesis of a sensory centre to which the term sensorium commune or common sense was applied. By some this was regarded as the seat of the soul. As most parts of the brain are double, the localities to be selected were very limited, and only structures in the middle line could be chosen; as, for example, the pineal gland by Descartes, and, as late as the XIXth century, the optic thalamus by W. B. Carpenter and the pons cerebri by Herbert Spencer. But there is no sensorium commune. The tracts of fibres ascending to the brain from the sense organs pass to widely separated parts. No doubt the various functionally differentiated areas of the brain intercommunicate; when one part is stimulated, other parts, if not the whole brain, vibrate with it through so-called association centres. It is in this sense that the brain may be regarded as a unit.

The Arabian physicians laid stress on the importance of urine tests as an aid to diagnosis. They were the first to employ opium in the treatment of insanity. They were accurate observers of the physiognomy of disease; they discovered, e.g., the peculiar shape of the nails in tuberculosis. They were the first to undertake operations for the removal of stone from the bladder and they introduced new methods in the amputation of limbs. They were the first exactly to observe and describe leprosy and the infectious fevers. Arab women were admitted to the practice of medicine and held appointments to the ladies of the Court. Women dentists were not uncommon, and, it is said, men preferred them for the delicacy of their touch, their toothache disappearing as if by magic. The Moors built many hospitals and asylums, and were the first to give practical instruction at the bedside of the patients. They were the first to employ dressing stations and field ambulances (transported by camels) on the field of battle.

Rhazes (850-932),
called the "Arabian Galen," was one of the most famous Arabian physicians and appears to have carried the localisation of mental functions into practice, for he is reported to have been a phrenologist of some skill. He was the first also to discriminate between measles and smallpox, to distinguish between febrile and non-febrile heat, and between the laryngeal and recurrent laryngeal nerves. It is related of him that, when asked to choose a site for a hospital, he hung up pieces of meat in various parts of the city, declaring that the one in which putrefaction last appeared would mark the most suitable position. Rhazes was a universal genius,
famous not only in medicine, but also in music, astronomy, mathematics, and chemistry. At the age of fifty, he was one of the most distinguished professors in the Academy of Bagdad, where students came from a great distance to listen to him. He directed the great hospital of that city.

AVICENNA (980-1037), another famous physician, was a zealous disciple of Aristotle, and lost no opportunity of inculcating and expounding his doctrines. He qualified them, however, respecting his division of the vegetative, sensible and rational soul. He remarked that those distinctions indicate rather three modes of action than three distinct things.

The vegetative soul has three faculties: nutrition, augmentation, and generation; the sensitive has two faculties: those of apprehension and motives; the latter excites or produces motion and creates appetites. The faculty of apprehension is a compound one. It exercises itself both externally and internally. We commonly attach to it five external senses and five internal ones. The bodily or external senses embrace hearing, seeing, touching, tasting, and smelling; the five internal senses are: (1) imagination (located in the frontal region); (2) vision or fancy (located in the middle region of the brain); (3) cogitativa; (4) aestimativa; and (5) memory (located in the posterior region). The last faculty has the value of warning in the presence of good and ill. Sense knowledge issues in movement, and movement in turn contributes to rational knowledge, which is of the absolute. The rational soul, being a simple substance, is out of space and time, and independent of the body. Avicenna assumed three kinds of spirits in the body: natural, vital, and animal, each of these produced from the vapour of the blood.

Psychic alterations depend upon pathological changes in the proportional admixture of the brain. They may be divided into elementary intellectual disturbances (of imagination and memory) and real psychoses (melancholia, mania, and weak-mindedness). Intellectual disturbances arise from black bile and betray themselves through anxiety and sadness; if yellow bile is the cause, confusion, irritability and violence arise. Abnormalities of the front part of the brain cause disturbance of the perceptive power (incorrect conception of things or hallucinations); weak-mindedness and imbecility depend upon abnormalities of the middle part; failure of memory upon those of the posterior part of the brain.

Roger Bacon was to a great extent a follower of Avicenna.

AVERRHOES, of Cordova (1126-1198), was the most celebrated philosopher and physician, who exercised the greatest influence upon his own time and succeeding ages. He was a religious free-thinker of a pantheistic kind, who, hiding himself behind the precepts of philosophy, awakened doubts as to the creed of the Church, which accordingly hated him bitterly and condemned his doctrine. He also suffered bitter persecution at the hands of his fellow-believers, being accused of cultivating the philosophy and science of antiquity to the prejudice of Mohammedan religion, and was deprived by Almansur of his dignities and banished.

He was the trustiest follower of Aristotle among all the Arabians. He translated his works from the Syrian into the Latin language, adding his own commentaries.

He denied to the human soul the passive reason or intellect as well as the active reason; but memory and the power of sensory representation and a quasi-intelligence, which went by the name of vis cogitativa, in fact all but the capacity to form a pure abstract notion, were allowed it. Reason or intelligence was then a metaphysical entity, whose relation to individual human souls was purely external and accidental and temporary. The doctrine involved the denial to the human
soul of immortality and of any existence apart from the body; and this implication was explicitly taught by Averroes, though it was not accepted by all who professed themselves his disciples.

From the teachings of Averroes and Abelard sprang the materialism—school of Free Thinkers—which was condemned by the bishops of Paris in 1240, 1269, and 1277. This embraced such doctrines as these; what was contrary to the Catholic faith might yet be true in philosophy; that philosophers could not as such believe in the Trinity or the resurrection of the body; that authority is not a sufficient reason; that man may be saved by mere morality; that the world is eternal and creation impossible; and that human souls are united too closely for individual immortality. So bold was the new philosophy that Thomas Aquinas (see p. 104) was obliged to refute the proposition that miracles could not have happened, because any violation of the order of nature would imply that God acts against Himself and that He makes the universal good give way to that of individuals. In 1310, MARGARET PORETTA, one of the leaders of "Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit," was burned at Paris for teaching that the soul which is one with God is free from laws, and may indulge every inclination innocently. Seven years later, men and women were tried at Strassburg for holding that the Church and her sacraments are useless; that prayer and fasting check the progress of the soul; that the good man needs no priest; that it is better to follow the Inner Voice than the written Gospel; that there is no angel but virtue, and no devil but vice; and that there is no resurrection of the body, and no hell or purgatory, so that even Jews and Pagans are to be saved.

**FOUNDATION OF UNIVERSITIES**

Though a university was founded in the IXth century at Salerno, it was not until the Xth or XIth century that the beginnings of European medicine, as evidenced by a flourishing medical school with a recognised course of study and something of the nature of a diploma, became perceptible.

A candidate for graduation was required to present proof of majority, of legitimacy of birth, and of proper duration of preliminary study, including one year's study of anatomy, and was then examined publicly in the Synopsis of Galen, the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, or the Canon of Avicenna. On passing he swore to conform to all the regulations hitherto observed in medicine, to give gratuitous treatment to the poor and to expose all apothecaries detected in adulterating drugs. The degree conferred was that of "magister," the title of "doctor" being at that period employed almost exclusively to designate a public teacher or professor. Even the number of professional visits and the remuneration were fixed by law. Those who taught at Salerno were the first physicians in the Christian part of Western Europe who procured medicine a home in which scientific considerations alone prevailed, where the Church exercised no control whatever, and where all the different branches of the science were favoured to an equal degree.

Up to this time the Christian monasteries were the only schools where literature and science were cultivated; but the science pursued aimed at nothing higher than an acquaintance with the writings of Aristotle. As regards medicine, reliance was placed on faith, prayers, and fasting; and the sick could emulate the saints in their capacity for endurance of suffering. Therefore, before the foundation of the University of Salerno, and for some time afterwards, medicine was largely in the hands of Jewish and Arabian physicians.

Salerno declined in fame through the foundation of universities at Naples, Montpellier, Padua, Paris, and Bologna, which all entered into a contest for pre-eminence. Montpellier, as early as 1153, was famous as a school of medicine. Within the walls
occurring the city sojourned both Christians and Jews, the latter being subject directly to the civil authorities, and particularly esteemed as translators.

One of the most famous pupils of Montpellier was JOHN OF GADDENS (1280-1361), Physician-in-Ordinary to the King of England, professor in the University of Oxford, who wrote the famous treatise known as *Rosa Anglicata* (1305-15). Gaddesden was perhaps the first formally to recommend the "laying-on of hands" by the king for the cure of scrofula, first performed by Edward the Confessor (1004-1066), whence comes the ancient name for this disease, i.e., "King's Evil."

**JEWISH PHYSICIANS**

From the IXth century to the XIIth the Jews shared with the clergy the monopoly of the healing art. Many of these studied under Arabian physicians, and, though the canons of the Church forbade them to minister to the ailments of Christians, they were still called upon in time of need, and even in many instances had access to the palaces of princes, archbishops and cardinals on account of their superior scientific knowledge. The Roman pontiffs themselves were, some of them, liberal-minded men of the world, who did not hesitate to employ talented Jewish physicians at need, and, in later times, did much to foster the arts and sciences, in Italy at least.

In the Xth, XIth and XIIth centuries, the majority of trained physicians in Europe were Jews. They combined with their professional skill a profound knowledge of theology, mathematics, astronomy, philosophy, and law. Famous among these was Rabbi SOLOMON BEN ISAAC (830-932), who was equally at home in writing commentaries on the Talmud as in giving instructions for great surgical operations, for example the Caesarean section. He, it is said, was the greatest French physician of his age. He wrote, among other works, a treatise on dietetics. Spain produced many distinguished Jews; for example, EBUH ZOHR (1113-1162) also called AVENZOAR, physician to the Court of Seville. Besides being a very learned man, master of several languages, he composed treatises on the cure of disease, and held correct views on the origin and nature of certain fevers. Another was BEN EZRA (1093-1167), a Jew of Toledo, who was at once a physician, philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, critic, and poet.

Rabbi MOSES BEN MAIMON, a Jewish physician and philosopher, known all over Europe as MAIMONIDES (1135-1204), after embracing Mohammedanism, emigrated from Cordova to Egypt, and there became physician to the celebrated Sultan SALADIN (1138-1193). He wrote a book on poisons and their antidotes, and one on personal hygiene, and was famous as a philosophic champion of reason. Even miracles, though not always traceable to their immediate causes, he believed, must be based on the physical and everlasting laws of nature. He pronounced for the freedom of the will, and held that Providence reigns in a broad manner over humanity, but he utterly denied the working of Providence in the particular events which befell the individual, who is subject above all to the great physical laws, and must learn to understand and obey them. The soul, and the soul alone, is immortal. The reward of virtue consists in the soul's bliss in a world to come; while the punishment of vice is the loss of the soul.

Fearing that the Jewish physicians gained too powerful an influence, the Councils of Béziers (1246) and Alby (1254) prohibited all Christians from resorting to the services of the Israelite physicians. This not proving effective, the Council of Venice (1267) and the Faculty of Paris (1301) published decrees prohibiting either man or woman of the Jewish religion from practising medicine upon any person of the Catholic religion. After a similar course was also taken in Spain, the School of Salerno utilised them as teachers until it had developed enough home-grown talent
to get along without them. The same thing was true of Montpellier, which was closed to the Jews in 1301. At that time, a great Jew, PROFATIUS (-1308), whose astronomical researches were favourably alluded to by Copernicus, was at the head of the university of Montpellier. It is said that it was the antagonism of the clergy to him that led to the banishment of all the Jews from France in 1306. The historians of this event describe it as a heart-rending spectacle to see so many learned men, professors and doctors of the faculty, who had adorned and benefited France, wander without a country or asylum.

Although the different emperors continued to retain Jews as their body physicians, yet up to the time of the French Revolution they were not allowed to study at the European universities, and being, moreover, excluded from the liberal professions, played little part in medicine during this period. It is not recorded whether they were compelled to wear a yellow mark (Jew stain) upon their clothing, like the other Jews in those ages, but it is quite probable, and would agree with the spirit of mediaeval fanaticism.

In the Middle Ages there was much persecution of the Jews. They were generally accused of having desecrated the holy places of the Christians, of having poisoned the wells, whenever epidemics, which were frequent, took place. But the fact was that the Jews would not drink cistern water, but flowing water only; hence they were less affected by the epidemics. No doubt, when subjected to torture, some made a false confession to be relieved of their agony, and thus confirmed the prevailing suspicion. The Jews, observing more careful sanitary rules and more constant abstinence from dangerous foods, escaped the epidemics with a smaller percentage of disease; but the public, unable to understand so simple a cause, jumped to the conclusion that their immunity resulted from protection by Satan and that the pestilence had been caused by them. Many thousands of Jews, at the time of the Black Death in Germany and France, perished by being burned alive. Sometimes a feeling spread among the people that the Almighty was filled with wrath at the toleration of his enemies, and might be propitiated by their destruction. Then the Jews were plundered, tortured, and murdered by tens of thousands. In the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, after several random massacres and much persecution, the unconverted Jews of Spain were in 1489 penned into Ghettos, and were in 1492 expelled bodily from the country. Portugal and other Christian countries took the same step a few years later. After the expulsion of the Jews came the turn of the Moors, in 1502, whose last hold in Spain—Granada—had been overthrown in 1492. They were deprived of all exterior practice of their religion, harried, persecuted, compulsorily baptised, and at length in the opening years of the XVIIth century, under Philip III., the whole race was expelled—a million of the most industrious inhabitants of Spain.

At the end of the XVIIIth century the Jews were again allowed to enter universities and to practice medicine in France, Germany, and Austria, though the clergy vigorously protested, as they did a century before, when they declared that it was "better to die with Christ than to be cured by Jews, who were aided by the devil." Jews were not admitted to the full right of citizenship till 1858.

LATER SCHOLASTICS

With the introduction into the Christian schools of the writings of Aristotle through the medium of Arabian commentators about the end of the XIIth century commences the later, more psychological, period of Scholasticism. Not that these translations from the Arabic versions of Aristotle met with general acceptance, for their derivation from infidel sources roused a prejudice against them; and also because Aristotle appeared to deny the soul's immortality which Plato had upheld. The adherents of Aristotle were divided into two parties, one of which relied on the naturalistic interpretation of the Greek exegete, ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS (about 200 A.D.), the other on the pantheistic interpretation of the Arabian commentator AVERROES. The conflict over the question of immortality, carried on especially in Padua, was the culmination of the battle. The Alexandrists asserted
that, according to Aristotle, the soul was mortal; the Averrhoists, that the rational part which is common to all men was immortal; while to this were added the further questions, whether and how the Aristotelian view could be reconciled with the Church doctrine, which demanded a continued personal existence. Accordingly for some time the Augustine version of Platonism still dominated religious thought. Nevertheless, a great revolution was already in progress. As a result of the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204 the Greek manuscripts of Aristotle’s writings were brought to Paris, and subsequently translated into Latin under the direction of ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, whose editing made the philosophy acceptable to catholic theologians.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS (1193-1280), Bishop of Ratisbon, was more of a scientist than metaphysician. He was a profound student of Aristotle, definitely enunciated the doctrine of “creation out of nothing” which broke once for all with theories of emanation and of the eternal existence of matter. Matter was the product of a divine “fiat”—whether intellectual or volitional, opinions differed. The human soul was included in the act of creation, but it was made in the likeness of God. That is, it was rational and personal. He held revelation to be above reason, but not contrary to reason. He denied the world-soul, and the emanation of the soul from God. The soul is a simple, indivisible, unchangeable substance, which contains the principle of different faculties. The connecting medium of soul and body was the most imperfect part of the body.

As regards the different faculties of the soul, he looked upon the sensus communis as partly a particular sense which receives the forms of sensual objects, and partly as the common fundamental sense, the point of union of the sensations (consciousness). The mere capacity to receive impressions and forms of sensible objects is passive. The active power is distinguished in memory, imagination, and poetical force, which depend upon an internal spiritual organ. He designed a sort of phrenological head, locating in different parts of the brain the seats of these faculties.

Albertus Magnus is said to have based his localisation on a work by CONSTANTABULUS (COSTA BEN LUCA)—who, however, appears to have lived later—entitled De Differentia Spiritus et Anima. He distinguished three brain cells or cavities (cellulae or concavitates) with subdivisions. The first cellula has three parts: in the most anterior portion, where the senses terminate in a centre and thus form an organ common to them all, is the common sense; in the middle portion is the faculty of imagination or cogitation; and in the most posterior part the faculty of phantasy or vis astimativa—the seat of the poetical faculty, and, when injured, mania and rage are the result. These faculties form the “intellactus” or reason, and Albertus justified this localisation in the front part of the brain because this part feels “soft.” The middle cellula, according to him, was really no ventricle at all, but merely a passage for the “spiritus.” The front part of the third cellula is the seat of memory and reminiscence; and the posterior part, on account of its “dryness,” is designed for “motion.” (For a detailed account of these localisations see A. SCHNEIDER: Psychologie Alberts des Grossen, 2 volumes, 1903-6.)

Albertus was one of the most renowned scholars and scientists of the XIIIth century. He boldly and repeatedly proclaimed and upheld the rights of observation, experience and induction, thus directing the attention of his contemporaries towards the facts of Nature. It was said of him that “he was great in magic, greater in philosophy, greatest in theology.” He interested himself in the functions of plants, was well acquainted with what is called the sleep of flowers, studied their opening and closing, and understood that the sap is diminished in volume by evaporation from the leaves. He was the first to use the word “affinity” in its modern acceptation. He was also great as a chemist and made several lasting
discoveries. He held the view that there was human life at the antipodes; and he noted the influence of mountains, seas, and forests upon races and products, thus furnishing the germs of physical geography.

Though Albertus's main effort was to Christianise science, he was dealt with by the authorities of the Dominican order, subjected to suspicion and indignity; and only escaped persecution for sorcery by suppressing, like many others, the avowal of his convictions and yielding to the ecclesiastical spirit of the time, working finally in theological channels by scholastic methods.

**ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (1226-1274)**

was Albertus's most famous pupil. **He adopted the doctrines of Aristotle, of which he was the translator from the original Greek, and opposing the teaching of Averroes, made them harmonise with Christian dogmas.**

As a philosopher, Aquinas set out from the principle of the demonstration of the infinite by means of the finite. He declared that reason can perceive and prove God through his works, for the existence of God is demonstrated by its effects—the invisible God is seen in his visible effects. And, indeed, Aquinas, after Albertus Magnus, gave final expression to **the distinction between natural and revealed theology;** natural theology simply signifying the doctrine of God, as established without revelation, and to be found in the philosophy of Aristotle. In the case of natural religion, Aquinas took reason to be parallel with revelation in its working; whereas, in revealed religion, reason has merely ancillary functions, and works in subordination to revelation.

He argued that movement involved the existence of a Prime Mover—not in the physical sense of Aristotle, but as the active initiator or cause of all movement, bodily and spiritual. God moves the will of man as universal mover, and without this universal motion man cannot will anything; but at the same time man determines for himself by application of his reason to a particular volition.

In respect of the Divine relation to evil, Aquinas taught that the sinful act is both being and act, and that God is, no doubt, the cause of all action **considered as act.** But then, says he, sin is more than being and act; it is a defect—springing from free-will as its cause, and not to be referred to God. That is to say, he makes God the cause of the act where there is sin, but not the cause of the sin, since he is not the cause of the defect which there is in the act.

The embryo, from the beginning of its life, possesses an individual soul which is, however, only a vegetative soul. This soul disappears to make room for another, which is at once vegetative and sensitive; finally, the latter, in its turn, yields in place to an intellectual soul which comprises within itself the two others, and it is not till then that the animal becomes man. The rational soul is a principle which has its form entirely within itself; it is not, like the sensitive and animal souls, subject to stimulation from the external world to which it reacts. The rational soul, like God and the angels, is pure form, and as such is immortal. The intrinsic independence of the organism which the soul shows, even while united with the body and conditioned by the health or disease of the imagination or memory, by the very fact of its being the exclusive subject of its own higher functions, is the proof of spirituality and the pledge of immortality. Although **Aquinas attributed immortality to the whole of the human soul, including the vegetative and sensitive powers, he maintained that the souls of animals are inseparable from their bodies and that they perish with them.**

The lower soul is a sort of form which inheres in matter and constitutes the principle of vital organisation. The active reason or pure form, however, exists only along with the passive reason, and is always personal. Within the function of knowledge, the rôle of active reason is to reach general or abstract concepts, the logical species or kinds which underlie sense-percepts and images. Sensation itself is not due to the transfer of material images or effluvia, but is in principle a mental
or spiritual impression. Man’s cognitive power—like the soul from which it emanates—partakes of a double character, material and immaterial. All knowledge begins from the data of sensuous perception. Aquinas distinctly says that our knowledge comes first from the senses, but maintains that this does not mean that our sense-cognition is the complete and perfect cause of our knowledge, but rather that it supplies the material of the cause. He discards the notion of innate ideas, and holds to the objective value of our knowledge. The universe was for him mirrored, ideally and materially, in the mind of man, just as the likeness of a person is on a photographic plate.

In his treatise “On the Powers of the Soul” Aquinas locates the intellectual faculties in the brain after the accepted Arabian fashion, of which we have already given examples.

He distinguished the practical from the contemplative life and developed a theory of the mutual relation of reason and will. Each is dependent upon the other: knowledge is instrumental to action, and action contributes to knowledge. He regarded the four principal virtues—temperance, fortitude, wisdom, justice—as acquired virtues, which lead to natural happiness; while the theological virtues—faith, hope, and love—are divinely inspired and lead to supernatural bliss.

He classified the passions as follows: (1) the concupiscient appetites, which are love—hatred, desire—aversion, joy—sadness; (2) the irascible appetites, which are hope—despair, courage—fear, and anger.

In the first place, an object excites in us either love or hatred, according as it is suitable or repugnant to our nature. Love gives birth to desire, hatred to aversion; and we feel joy or sadness according to the success of our efforts. So much for the concupiscient appetites. As for the irascible appetites, if the obstacles which separate us from good can be surmounted, we experience hope; in the contrary case, despair. When threatened by an evil we are able to avert we feel courage. In face of an inevitable evil we feel fear. An evil which has befallen us may excite anger, if vengeance or resistance are still possible; but when the desired good is attained we feel no passion corresponding to this anger.

Aquinas next considers the different forms and degrees of these master passions. He makes a distinction between amor, which is love based on a sensuous desire; diletio, in which reason and will have a part; and finally coritas, which is love in the highest or Christian sense of the word. In connection with hatred, he remarks, like Aristotle, that it owes its existence entirely to love, and if it seems to be more violent it is only by a pure illusion. Again, like his master, he regards activity as the chief source of joy. He distinguishes two kinds of fear: one which arises from a feeling of personal weakness, the other from the idea of an invincible power in the object. To the first class belong the fear of work, the fear of failure, the fear of deserved blame. The second class includes admiration, amazement, and terror.

Roger Bacon, of whom we shall speak directly, had initiated the experimental method, but Aquinas brought science again under the sway of theological methods and ecclesiastical control. He insisted that the forces of the body are independent of its physical organisation, and that therefore these forces are to be studied by the scholastic philosophy and the theological method, instead of by researches into the structure of the body. The ecclesiastical power of the time hailed him as a deliverer for laying the foundations for a “sanctified science”; but the result of this great man’s compromise was to close for ages that path in science which above all others leads to discoveries of value—the experimental method.

DUNS SCOTUS (1265-1308),

a Franciscan friar, reasserted vigorously the subjective point of view and insisted upon the primacy of the will. Creation is an act of the divine will, and the world is
constantly renewed by the continuing will of God. Further, the individual will is behind knowledge, even knowledge of self. The end of existence is the Good, which is reached by will; intelligence is instrumental, the servant of action. Sin is a perversion of will, causing intellectual blindness, and sin is possible because the will is free. A “suggestion” or “first thought” enters consciousness, serving as stimulus to the will; the will responds to it, embracing or rejecting it; it thus becomes a “second thought.” It is this second thought, the object of will, to which the agent’s freedom and responsibility attach. **Good and evil do not belong to things in themselves, but to the use made of them** in the voluntary “second thought” of the agent.

Duns Scotus, following St. Augustine, distinguished the emotions or passions as a fundamental class of phenomena. Before him the Scholastic leaders had looked upon feeling as a modification of impulse and desire, following the Aristotelian division.

Aquinas and Scotus were the heads of two great conflicting schools which discussed the psychological question whether among the powers of the soul the higher dignity belongs to the intellect or to the will. The adherents of Aquinas were for the former, the adherents of Scotus for the latter.

The followers of Aquinas held that the intellect not only apprehends the idea of good, but also in each individual case recognises what is good, and thereby determines the will. The will naturally strives for that which is known to be good, and it is, therefore, dependent upon the intellect. But, said their opponents, this theory of determinism takes from man all moral responsibility and deprives him of freedom of will. Responsibility can only be preserved if it is acknowledged that the intellect exercises no compulsion over the will. The intellect may indeed present various objects to the will, but the possibility of choice and power of action remain with the will. So far, indeed, from the will being determined by the intellect, the followers of Scotus maintained that the will determines the development of the intellectual activities.

Later, the discussion was raised to a theological one, as to will and intellect in God.

Duns Scotus made the categorical statement of the doctrine of the **Immaculate Conception**; Thomas Aquinas denied it. But the doctrine was gaining ground, and in 1387 the University of Paris condemned one of its members because he taught that the Virgin Mary, like other descendants of Adam, was born in original sin; and the university expelled the Dominicans, who were fierce opponents of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. But in 1483, Pope Sixtus IV, published a Bull threatening with excommunication anyone making charges of heresy against either the advocates or the impugners of the doctrine, for the reason that the point had not yet been decided by the Apostolic See. Pope Paul V., in 1617, also forbade all public disputations on the subject, and Gregory XV., in 1622, prohibited also private discussions. Not until Pius IX., in 1854, was the doctrine accepted officially, when it became heresy to deny it.

**WILLIAM OF OCCAM (1280-1347)**

An interesting variation upon the discussion of Realism and Nominalism arose regarding the relation of the faculties to the “inner sense” or consciousness as a whole. Aristotle had asserted the oneness of mental function in the common sense, the Platonic “parts” or divisions of the soul being merely powers or activities of the one conscious principle. This became one of the burning questions of the late Scholasticism. Occam adopted the theory of the Nominalists, and maintained that general ideas could not have an existence independent of external things, and
of the Deity. He denied the plurality of the powers of the soul, holding to the unity of understanding and will, as well as of that of the vegetative and sensitive soul. He maintained that all the "representations"—sense perceptions, memories, concepts, etc.—were merely mental signs or symbols of varying orders, arising at different stages of mental function; they were not pictures of different realities perceived by fundamentally different faculties or powers, but merely different directions in which the soul is active.

His whole system of thought was anti-papal, for he denied the reality of abstractions more boldly than had yet been done, contending that even the existence of God could not be proved by reason, or admitted on any other basis than faith. That there is one First Cause seemed to him no more self-evident than that there is an endless chain of causes. The so-called universals, or general terms, have no reality, he said, either in the mind or out of it; for we know only particulars, and these merely so far as they affect us personally, and thus all inferences, even those leading to belief in God, become too uncertain for philosophy.

So far Scholasticism.

MASTER ECKHART (1260-1327)

When Scholasticism had passed its period of bloom, there grew up on German soil a peculiar branch of mysticism. It was not the Church and its teaching, but Christianity, as they understood it, that the mystics tried to advance by edifying speculation and to render comprehensible by the transcendent use of the reason. The author and perfector of this entire development was Master John Eckhart. The nature of his speculations was essentially influenced by the fact that he regarded himself as a servant rather of Christian truth than of the Church. He addressed himself above all to the Christian people, not to the schools, and viewed scientific knowledge chiefly with an eye to its morally edifying power. Scholasticism had for its object the advancement of the Church and its doctrine; Eckhart tried to promote the spiritual welfare of Christians and to point out the nearest way to union with God.

John Eckhart was enabled by his study of Greek philosophy, the Bible, the Fathers, and the Scholastics to develop about 1300, in Cologne, a system in which he proclaimed the soul's essential goodness and that salvation could come only through the soul's rising independently into oneness with God, and that this could be done by each soul as soon as she pleased. "Fasting and scourging profit nothing; love is the essence of goodness, as selfishness is of sin. . . . God loves every soul and keeps no one from Him; only they who choose it remain in outer darkness. . . . All that comes to pass is according to His will; nothing that is done should be regretted; but even sin must have been a part of His plan; for if there had been no sin, there could be no salvation. . . . The visible world is a copy of the invisible and ideal, which we know through powers transcending those of observation or reasoning."

ROGER BACON (1214-1294),

the Franciscan friar, another pupil of Albertus Magnus, was a forerunner of the great scientific discoverers who were to come, and is not to be confounded with Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam.

In an age when theological subtilising was alone thought to give the title of a scholar, he insisted on real reasoning and the aid of natural science by mathematics; in an age when experimenting was sure to cost a man his reputation, and was likely to cost him his life, he insisted on experimenting. Roger Bacon laid down the principle that only by careful observation and experimental demonstration could
any real knowledge with regard to natural phenomena be obtained. He not only laid down the principle, but, in contrast to his later namesake, he followed the route himself.

There are three methods of acquiring knowledge: *per actortatem et rationem et experientiam*. But authority is unsatisfactory without reasoning; and even reasoning does not secure the tranquil possession of truth unless experience confirms its findings. Experience is thus the sole source of certitude.

He started out with the principle that there are *four grounds of human ignorance.* "These are: (1) trust in adequate authority; (2) that force of custom which leads men to accept too unquestioningly what has been accepted before their time; (3) the placing of confidence in the opinion of the inexperienced; and (4) the hiding of one's own ignorance with the parade of superficial knowledge."

It is said that he was the first man to refer to gunpowder (1267), the manufacture of which was discovered in 1336; but gunpowder was known to the Arabs and by them introduced into Europe. He did, however, study explosives, and besides learning many things about them, realised how much might be accomplished by their use in aftertime. He foresaw the application of such a force for transportation, especially navigation and motor carriages. He knew that air was necessary to support a fire and that there was a gas which would extinguish flame. As a matter of fact, he predicted as early as 1240 that "one day ships will go on the waters without sails, and carriages run on the roads without horses, and people will make machines to fly in the air."

He was not, as is sometimes claimed for him, either the inventor of the telescope or of the theory of the lenses. He did more, however, than perhaps anyone else to make the principles of lenses clear and to establish them on a mathematical basis. He taught, moreover, the principle of the aberration of light, and that light did not travel instantaneously, but had a definite rate of motion, though this was extremely rapid.

Roger Bacon seems to have embraced all the subjects of learning: metaphysics, languages, natural philosophy, and theology. His chief title to fame rests on the efforts he made to free the human mind from entangling error and to set it on the right path for attaining truth, rather than on specific contributions to science as such. His shrewd common sense opposed Scholasticism with all its might. In his opinion, it had falsified philosophy, theology, and natural science by the respect given to worthless authorities, and by clinging to deeply-rooted prejudices. In order to renew the sciences and re-establish them on a sound basis, investigation must everywhere go back to their origins; thus, in language to Greek and Oriental idioms, in theology to Holy Scripture, and in natural science to observation. He maintained that mathematics were the basis of natural science, and that experiment was the only means of discovering the processes of nature. Still, even he could not shake himself free from the beliefs of his time. Although he possessed an extensive knowledge of physics and chemistry, he retained his faith in the "elixir vitae," alchemy, and astrology.

It is interesting also to observe that he rejected, as a principle of explanation, the notion of faculties, supposed to be independent forces, distinct from the soul. As regards brain function he held the popular view.

To the anima sensitiva belong, in addition to the five senses, the sensus communis, by means of which every sensation is first made our own; the vis imaginativa, which fixes the sensations, and the vis æstimativa, which shows itself among brutes as the power of scent, and finally the vis memorativa. The last two faculties reside in the back part, the first two in the front of the brain. In the centre of the brain is
enthroned the vis cogitativa, with which the anima rationalis is joined, but that only in man.

Roger Bacon was attacked as an "infidel" and "atheist" by the Franciscan Order, to which he belonged, and was accused of magical practices and of a commerce with Satan. In his defence he added fuel to the flame by showing that much which is ascribed to demons results from natural means. His writings were condemned as containing dangerous and suspected novelties, and he was committed to prison in 1278, where he remained for fourteen years, until he was liberated by the intercession of his friends because his health gave way.

**PETER OF ABANO (1250-1315)**

was at the head of the medical school of Padua. In physical and chemical knowledge he far surpassed his contemporaries. He knew that the atmosphere had weight and that the equator was inhabited. He recognised the brain as the origin of the nerves and the heart as the starting-point of the blood-vessels. He had audacious theological views; for example, he denied the existence of the devil and of miracles, but he was a believer in astrology and attempted to cast horoscopes. He was suspected as a heretic, and at the age of eighty he was accused of magic; but he died before his trial was concluded, so the inquisitors were obliged to content themselves with having his bones dug up after his death and burnt after a public sentence of condemnation, declaring him eternally infamous, and depriving his heirs of his great wealth, which was confiscated for the benefit of the Church.

**JOANNES ACTUARIUS (1250-1300),**

a physician, made use in the psychiatric portions of his work of the then current doctrine of localisation of mental functions in separate portions of the brain.

The divine in man is the soul. The organ of the soul is the pneuma and is converted in the heart into the vital spirit and distributed by means of the arteries through the entire body. The greatest transformation occurs in the brain, where the soul-spirit takes its origin. Just as in plants the sap undergoes changes in all parts, so does the pneuma undergo transformations in every portion of the body, and its different functions are conditioned by the varying structure of the organs, as light takes the colour of the particular glass it shines through.

Mental activities are distinguished by him as perception, imagination, judgment, understanding, and reason. Reason is assigned the highest place and is least bound up with the pneuma; the power of imagination is subordinated to the other mental faculties.

**BERNARD GORDON (-1310)**

a Scotch physician, professor at Montpellier in 1296, reproduced the greater part of Aristotle's ideas in a work entitled "Affectus Præter Naturam Curandi Methodus." In 1305 he published "Lilium Medicina," in which he showed himself a sort of phrenological spiritualist. He held that the brain had no power to make us acquainted with the external world. Another higher and heavenly power, called intellect, is necessary to the operation of thought; the power which makes use of the organs, but is altogether independent of them. These organs are:

Common sense resides in the anterior part of the anterior ventricle, which takes cognisance of the various forms or images received through the five senses, and passes judgment upon them; the posterior part of the same ventricle is destined
for the phantasy: it preserves the impressions received from the five senses of which phantasy acts as a kind of storehouse. Imagination resides in the anterior part of the second ventricle; this faculty is always active, and produces chimeras during sleep as well as when we are awake. It is distinguished by two species. When the product of imagination is conformable to reason, and agrees with objects which possess a real existence, etc., the faculty is called cogitation; when, on the contrary, it does not coincide with our sensorial perceptions, but is influenced by the faculty called "aestimativa," the denomination "imaginativa" is preserved, because the ideas thus conceived are false and probably impossible. Gordon placed the faculty aestimativa in the posterior part of the middle ventricle, and attributed to it the function of judging impressions which are not received through the medium of the senses, such as friendship, etc. This faculty instructs the lamb that its enemy is the wolf which it never saw before; it is an instinct governing the action of animals, as reason governs those of man. When the latter is guided by instinct, he is a mere animal. Gordon places memory in the third or posterior ventricle, which, he says, performs three functions, viz., imagination, cogitation, and memory. All these are natural, and corruptible, dependent on their several organs. These different faculties may become imperfect when their respective organs are diseased, and, being distinct, one may be weakened or destroyed while the other is preserved. In some persons the imagination alone is modified, while the other faculties remain intact, and vice versa. Above all there is placed a divine faculty, incorruptible, and intellectual, which is not furnished with any organ of communication with the external world.

These primary organs are material and corruptible; for the operations of thought is necessary a higher and heavenly power, called intellect, which makes use of the organs, but is altogether independent of them.
CHAPTER VII

RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION

In the Middle Ages a large part of the lives of the people was occupied by the Church.

The chief industry was agriculture, and not only was one-third, or more, of all the land in the hands of the Church, but at every harvest the husbandman had to set apart one-tenth as tribute to the Church. The priest combined in himself all the learned professions, and no undertaking of importance could be effected without him. At any rate in rural districts, he was not only the priest but the only available physician and lawyer. He heard his parishioner’s confession, drew up his last will, and proved the will in the ecclesiastical court. Slowly and gradually Europe came under the absolute domination of the Church, until in the XIIth century the individual reason was wholly subordinated, independent judgment was extinguished, and almost every form of intellectual activity was crushed. The minds of men were turned from the study and improvement and regard for this world to the contemplation of a future state of existence in another world that is to come.

Various factors helped to break down the barriers hitherto imposed upon the free exercise of reason.

One was the taking of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453. It brought newly-found treasures of Greek learning, which disclosed that there had once been an epoch in which mankind had lived an open, free, and joyous life, untrammelled by the authority of kings and unfettered by the ordinances of priests; when men had used all their faculties without fear or reproof, not restricted to certain paths or bound to set formulas, but freely seeking for knowledge in every field of speculation and for beauty in all the realms of fancy.

The effect was that great men now devoted themselves to linguistic studies, to the best models and examples alike of thought and expression, the noblest and most inspired ideas of the most outstanding men, and they found this perfection in the literatures of Greece and Rome, and directed all their energies to the revival of these, and to living again and thinking again the best ideas of classic antiquity. The ground was already prepared by two masters in literature—DANTE (1265-1321) and PETRARCH (1304-1374)—who stood on the borderland between the scholastic age and the great movement which we call the Renaissance. With the revival of learning came a renewed study of Plato, which constituted a most striking feature of the time. Simultaneously there appeared a galaxy of great painters, who have never been rivalled in the history of the world—Perugino, Leonardo da Vinci, Michel Angelo, Titian, Raphael, Dürer, and Holbein—all contemporaries living in the XVth century. There was a general efflorescence of the beautiful; but most of the painters of the period were still devoting themselves to religious subjects. The treatise by ALBRECHT DÜRER (1471-1528) on human proportion, “De simmetria,” Nuremberg, 1532, deserves special mention, as being the first application of anthropometry to aesthetics.

First there was this aesthetic revival, and then followed an intellectual one. The
latter was aided greatly by the invention of printing (1440), which opened the world of books to non-academic readers, vastly widening the possibilities of independent thought. The printing-press changed the conditions of life, and literature became the common property of all.

What the great men of the Italian Renaissance did not perceive was that classical learning, even if we include in it philosophy as well as literature, and mathematics as well as philosophy, does not by any means exhaust the capacity of human faculty. It would have been indeed marvellous if, in an age when astronomical science, founded in genuine and, on the whole, exact observation of Nature thousands of years ago in Chaldaea, and methodised, though erroneously, by Ptolemy, had degenerated into astrology; when chemistry, whatever there may have been of it, had passed into the visionary search for the philosopher's stone; when biology, pursued at last on a basis of extensive observation by Aristotle, had become absolutely inept, and a mere repetition of verbiage attributed—and often ignorantly attributed—to the ancients; when anatomy, founded at least on something like personal observation in Galen's time, and carefully pursued by Erasistratos and others in the Alexandrian School, had altogether perished, and was, indeed, forbidden by authority; and when the science and art of medicine, so necessary at all times for the preservation of life and health, had become a mere craft, which instead of studying how to improve sanitation, sought for the "elixir of life"—in such an age as this, it would have been more than human if the pioneers of the Renaissance had ever thought of placing the discipline of science, or of any kind of observation of Nature, upon their programme of an all-round education of human faculty.

It was safe enough to denounce, or to ridicule, the pseudo-sciences of the time; and this the humanists did, and did effectually, especially as regards astrology. From Petrarch onwards they made open war on this flourishing imposture. PETRARCH (1304-1374) was the great opponent of Scholasticism and the chief founder of scientific criticism; he attacked logic and dialectics as not being philosophy, but only its instruments. But the discipline of true science, or of natural and physical phenomena, was a very different thing from this negative attitude towards its counterfeits; this may, however, be placed to the credit of the humanists of the Renaissance Period.

A notable exception was LEONARDO DA VINCI (1452-1519). Long before Bacon, he laid down the maxim that experience and observation must be the foundation of all reasoning in science; that experiment is the only interpreter of nature, and is essential to the ascertainment of laws. Unlike Bacon, he points out the supreme advantage of mathematics. He was great in physics, was an engineer, mathematician, and artist. He discovered several laws of force, foreshadowed some of the great conclusions of modern geology, explained the reflection of light by the moon, excelled as a painter, sculptor, architect and engineer, and was thoroughly versed in astronomy, anatomy and chemistry of his time. He recognised that fossils were animals which once lived. With him commenced the movement in Natural Philosophy.

A great factor of enlightenment was the discovery of new regions of the earth. This disturbed the belief of the origin of mankind in Paradise. Other nations came into sight, ignorant of the old traditions, and the common cradle of mankind came to be placed far beyond the extremest limits of historical remembrance. The discovery of America in 1492 by COLUMBUS (1446-1506)—who was excommunicated and branded as a heretic for advancing the theory that the earth is spherical, and not an extended plane—and the subsequent geographical discoveries, gave men for the first time a fairly complete notion of the planet which they inhabit. Circumnavigators—MAGELLAN in 1521—proved that it is really a globe of comparatively small size, and not a flat plane. Maps of the world, wonderfully exact considering the novelty of the information which they embodied, were engraved as early as 1507.

The independent invention of the compass by FLAVIO GIOJA in 1302 (who was
the first to use it in a ship) had rendered long voyages less dangerous and more frequent, and these opened up to trade regions hitherto inaccessible or unknown, and attracted interest toward commerce as a means of pecuniary gain. Material prosperity increased with the increased industrial and commercial activity. The increased wealth permitted of the adornment of life by the arts of peace. There grew up a secular form of culture, as distinguished from the previously prevailing religious type.

Another powerful influence towards intellectual emancipation was the secession of the Protestants from the Roman Church in 1517, which in the sphere of religion established the right of man to private judgment and abrogated the authority of Popes and Councils. The reformers gave up transubstantiation, the worship of the Virgin Mary and the Saints, the veneration of relics, and faith in daily miracles. But they still adhered to the belief in demoniacal possession and the verbal inspiration of the religious writings.

MARTIN LUTHER (1483-1546) did not attack the authority of the Church; he only thought its authority was being abused, particularly by the sale of indulgences for sins of every kind, for the dead as well as the living; a practice which in his opinion was fatal to moral and religious responsibility. When he protested against the authority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Pope and the Councils, he found sympathisers in the whole of Germany. He was declared a heretic and placed under the Imperial Ban (1521); but the Ban proved ineffectual. The Elector of Saxony and a vast number of people supported him. The result was that the supremacy of the Papal and Imperial authority was broken, and Luther was able to build up an Independent Church. The independence, thus begun, spread throughout Northern Europe, and kings and peoples came to recognise no supreme authority but God and their consciences; and the voice of God to which they submitted was found by them in the Bible. Faith, and the authority of the Bible, were the main pillars of the new movement. The narratives and dogmas which the Sacred Book contains became religion in the minds of the Reformers. The issue of the Reformation was the acceptance by all the Protestant Churches of the dogma that the Bible is a sufficient guide for every Christian man. The authority thus imputed to the Scriptures was not restricted to matters of purely religious or moral kind; it extended over philosophical speculation, and to the interpretation of Nature. The Reformers would tolerate no science that was not in accordance with Genesis. The fatal maxim that the Bible contained the sum and substance of all knowledge, useful or possible to man, was strictly insisted upon.

Rome met the Reformation with four new weapons: a counter-reformation, an increased vigour in the Inquisition, the institution of the Jesuits, and a greater embellishment of worship.

To extirpate religious dissent the Papal government established a tribunal for punishment—the Inquisition (founded by Gregory IX. about 1233 and fully established by a Bull of Innocent IV. in 1252), and as a means of detection—the auricular confession, which was established in 1215 and now increased in power. Summoned before the dread Tribunal on the confession of some domestic spy, the suspected person was simply informed that he was accused of heresy. No accuser was named, but torture was resorted to. The thumb-screw, the stretching-rope, the boot and wedge, or other engines of torture soon supplied that defect, and, innocent or guilty, he accused himself. It is said that in 300 years the Inquisition punished 340,000 persons, and of these nearly 32,000 had been burnt alive.

In 1559 Pope Paul IV. instituted the Congregation of the Index Expurgatorius for the examination of books and the decision whether people may be permitted to read them. This index is still in force.

With the Reformation man awakened to a consciousness of himself. He Vol. i.]
realised his individual worth and became aware of his spiritual nature. Man became convinced that within himself the work of salvation must be accomplished. The Bible was translated into the language of the people and by means of the newly-invented printing-press the humblest peasant could read and examine it for himself. After this, knowledge was no longer pursued in the interests of a Church or class, but for its own sake.

It was in England during the lifetime of Queen Elizabeth (1533-1603) that government for the first time in any European country was carried on without the active co-operation of ecclesiastical authority; and it was also during her great reign that there culminated the great growth of that splendid literature which was to stimulate and increase the national spirit of liberty and inquiry. Besides such a genius in literature as Shakespeare, there were illustrious men in statesmanship, in commerce, in philosophy and science. There was Bacon, who threw off the yoke of Aristotle and Plato, which for centuries had weighed on mankind, and who, though not an investigator himself, imbued with the true spirit, was teaching with his pen how men should seek truth for themselves. Then there were Raleigh, Frobisher, and Drake, who in a large and literal sense, unchecked and uninfluenced by the geography of ages, fearlessly put to sea, and rested not until they had made an unknown world their own. There were Harvey, Newton, and a number of other scientific men. Indeed, the whole country in the Elizabethan era was emancipating itself from an intellectual and spiritual thraldom.

Another great factor that contributed to man's enlightenment was that astronomy, by its discoveries, upset men's notions both of the heavens and of the earth. The heavens, which had been regarded as the visible dwelling-place of the gods, were resolved into the immensity of an airy firmament in which imagination could no longer fix the home of supersensuous beings, and the earth, the sole stage of life and history, was transformed into one of the smallest parts of the boundless universe.

To the early Christians heaven and hell appeared very real indeed. The only hell of Jesus was exclusion from heaven; but gradually hell became a place of physical torments, an ocean of incandescent matter buried in the depths of the earth. On the other hand, heaven was also a definite locality, situated above the clouds, above the firmament, that vast, solid vault, set with stars, which forms the throne of the Deity.

In the Middle Ages the imagination of poets and preachers enlarged freely upon the theme of the infinite variety of the material agonies of hell, and they were able to show that the punishments could be graduated to suit various degrees of culpability. It served even as a pretext for traffic in indulgences, which gave rise to innumerable abuses. Even the virtue of charity degenerated, and was in many cases less the fruit of sympathy than the desire of the giver's spiritual benefit.

ASTRONOMICAL DISCOVERIES

The material conception of heaven and hell remained unshaken so long as the earth was regarded as the centre of the universe, and man was imagined to be the sole possible example of intelligent corporeal beings. But time came when the heavenly vault was opened; new worlds appeared to the terrified gaze of the people, and the earth was deposed from its long unquestioned primacy; the queen of the universe became a petty satellite of the sun, lost in the throng of its sister planets. The sun itself was but a puny star flung carelessly among a million others in the same nebula and whirled like them by some superior power towards an unknown goal.

Astronomical science further showed that the world is ruled by natural law, and
not by supernatural will. It proved also that the reign of reason dominates the
dominion of the imagination; for astronomical science, fathoming the abysses of
space, measured magnitudes, computed distances, and calculated results that are
utterly beyond the realisation of the human imagination. Astronomical science, in
showing the stability of our solar system, contributed also to destroying the dis-
astrous influence of the belief that the judgment day was at hand.

Again, astronomical discovery, in encouraging a love of inquiry in the spirit of
truth, has both invigorated culture and reformed education. Previously to the
growth of astronomical science and the subsidiary sciences to which it led, the prin-
cipal branches of the higher academic culture consisted in the study of the mytho-
logy, the history, and the literature of classical antiquity, the verbal logic of Aris-
totle, and the theology and metaphysics of the early Christian ages, usually accom-
pained by a course of mathematics, though, respecting the utility of mathematics
a difference of opinion actually prevailed. That intellectual refinement and
fastidious taste were produced by the discipline of these studies is undoubted. They
were, however, not rarely accompanied by a want of appreciation of the truths of
nature, by a tendency to believe whatever was inculcated by authority, and by an
inordinate reverence for whatever was old. The essence of such a curriculum might
almost be summarised in a single phrase—the cultivation of credulity.

One of the effects of the universal credulity in the Middle Ages was an enormous
increase of the wealth of the clergy by the legacies of the terror-stricken victims. It
must not be assumed, however, that people were more credulous in those times than
at the present day, at least apart from the prevailing ignorance compared to our
modern knowledge of scientific facts; for the difference is not so much in the
amount of the credulity, as in the direction which it takes. Men are always prepared
to accept, on very slight evidence, what they believe exceedingly probable.

**COPERNICUS (1473-1543)**

propounded his geometrical conception, based upon the supposition of the earth’s
double motion, its rotation on its axis, and its translation through space in an orbit
round the sun. He supposed the planets to move in circles round the sun; but
they move in ovals of peculiar mathematical form, as discovered later by Kepler.

The idea that the earth was the centre of the universe was so firmly rooted that
it was blasphemy to deny it. Though Copernicus lectured in Rome (1500) before
Pope Alexander VI., the Borgia, he dared not publish his book on “The Revolution
of the Celestial Bodies,” which was printed only a few days before his death, in
1543. And though it was dedicated to and graciously accepted by Pope Paul III.,
it raised a storm from both Catholics and Protestants. His system was condemned
by a decree of Pope Paul V. in 1616, which was not revoked till 1818 by Pius VII.
The Protestants imitated the Catholic example.

MARTIN LUTHER said: “People gave ear to an upstart astrologer who strove
to show that the earth revolves, not the heavens or the firmament, the sun and the
moon. This fool wishes to reverse the entire science of astronomy; but Sacred
Scripture tells us that Joshua commanded the sun to stand still, and not the earth.”

MELANCHTHON, in his treatise on the *Elements of Physics*, published six years
after Copernicus’ death, says: “The eyes are witnesses that the heavens revolve in
the space of 24 hours. But certain men, either from the love of novelty, or to
make a display of ingenuity, have concluded that the earth moves. Now, it is a
want of honesty and decency to assert such notions publicly, and the example is
pernicious. It is the part of a good mind to accept the truth as revealed by God and
to acquiesce in it.” He suggests the severest measures to restrain such impious
teachings as those of Copernicus.
CALVIN wanted to know who would place the authority of Copernicus above that of the Holy Spirit. Even Lord BACON, the great philosopher, did not acknowledge the Copernican system.

GIORDANO BRUNO (1548-1600),

a Dominican friar, was the first to draw revolutionary inferences from the Copernican theory. He anticipated modern astronomy in conceiving the stars as so many suns dispersed without assignable limits through space, and each surrounded by inhabited planets. The conceptions of an evolutionary process in nature and of the origin of worlds from nebulae were tentatively propounded by him. When people said he should not spread the Copernican system because it was contrary to the Bible, he answered boldly that the Bible was meant to teach man how to love God and live rightly, and not to settle questions of science.

Bruno rehabilitated atomism. A number of monads, or rather a continuous portion of the ether surrounding and interpenetrating a group of atoms, endows them with the forms and qualities of elementary bodies, ascending gradually through vegetable and animal organisations to human beings. But the animating process does not stop with man. The earth, with the other planets, the sun, and all the stars, are also monads on the largest scale, with reasonable souls, just as Aristotle thought. Beyond and above all these partial unities is the Monas Monadum—the Supreme Unity, the Infinite God, who is the soul of the infinite universe.

Bruno, disagreeing with the authorities, left Italy, and when he returned after many wanderings he was betrayed to the Inquisition, imprisoned in 1593, and burnt alive in 1600; a fate shared by VERGILIUS, Bishop of Salzburg, who, having asserted the existence of the antipodes, was declared a heretic by the Archbishop of Metz and burnt in 1555.

TYCHO BRAHE (1546-1601)

added another mass of astronomical observations. He made a new catalogue of the stars and determined that comets are beyond the moon. He was the first to expose the universal superstition that comets were messengers of ill-fortune.

GALILEO (1564-1642)

is another mathematician and astronomer familiar to everybody. He further explained the Copernican System, being helped by his adaptation of the telescope, invented in 1609, with the aid of which he discovered the satellites of Jupiter and the inequalities on the surface of the moon. He also discovered the principle of the pendulum (1583) and of the rate of falling bodies (1589).

Arguing his case on theological as well as on scientific grounds, and declaring that the Scriptures were not intended as a scientific authority, that the Bible was intended to teach men how to go to heaven and not how the heavens go, Galileo was, by order of the Pope, cast into a dungeon and brought before the Inquisition. A Council of seven cardinals pronounced against him, that to maintain the sun to be immovable and without local motion, in the centre of the world, is an absurd proposition, false in philosophy, heretical in religion, and contrary to the testimony of Holy Scripture; and it is equally absurd and false in philosophy to assert that the earth is not immovable in the centre of the world, and considered theologically equally erroneous and heretical. Probably, if Galileo's discoveries could have been disproved and his reasonings refuted, he would have escaped persecution. His
subsequent recantation is too well known to need description. He was an old man, in weak health, and it is not surprising that, with the possibility of the stake before him, he should yield to superior force. He was again received favourably by the Pope Urban VIII. in 1624, but committed another indiscretion by publishing his famous dialogue in defiance of the authorities; and knowing that his judges had themselves doubts as to the geocentric system, but thought it in the interest of the Church to maintain popular belief, he was again venturesome, and published in 1632 "The System of the World," in which he tried to establish the truth of the Copernican doctrine. He was again summoned before the Inquisition, and was made to abjure the heliocentric doctrine before an assembly of cardinals. He was kept for a short time in the prison of the Inquisition and then in his own house, until he became blind in 1637, when the ecclesiastical authorities relaxed the regulations and permitted the visits of his friends. He died in 1642, the prisoner of the Inquisition. He was not allowed to make a will, and he was denied the right of burial in consecrated ground. Only in the XIXth century was a monument erected to his memory.

Hydraulics was created by Benedetto Castelli (1577-1644); hydrostatics by Torricelli (1608-1647), of Florence, who invented the barometer (1643). Both were pupils of Galileo. Otto Guericke (1602-1686), a German physicist, invented the air-pump (1650) and made the first electrical machine.

Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), a pupil of Tycho Brahe, is the father of modern astronomy. He discovered various laws of the movement of the planets, known as Kepler's Laws (1609 and 1617). His first work in 1604 was on Optics. He discovered that the crystalline lens was not the seat of vision, as had been supposed, but that its function, like that of other lenses, is the refraction of light. He observed that the image of objects is depicted upon the retina, and with Christopher Scheiner (1575-1650) demonstrated that the expansion of the optic nerve in the retina is the essential part in the organ of sight.

It is said that while his mind had a strong grasp of positive scientific truth, it also had an irresistible tendency towards mystical speculation. He is reputed to have been an astrologer as well as an astronomer, and to have believed the stars were guided by angels. If so, this detracts as little from his great merit as it does from the work of those modern scientists who are devotees to spiritualism.

Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) published his immortal book "Principia" in the year 1687. His chief discovery was that of the Law or Principle of Universal Gravitation in 1666; and that comets move around the sun in elongated ellipses and their return could be calculated exactly. He also proved that light is made up of differently coloured rays and that these rays are differently refracted in passing through a prism.

Newton's sincere faith did not avert from him the reproach that his theory of gravitation depreciated the divine agency and limited its providential action. He was also most violently opposed for his discovery of the composition of light (1671). His discoveries were long excluded from the University of Cambridge, of which he was a member, and were introduced through stratagem only by Dr. Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) explaining them in notes, without any appearance of argument or controversy, to the book of Descartes, used as a text-book by all the tutors.

The Effect on Philosophy

The first important result in the field of philosophy of the renewed connection of
Western Europe with Greece was the introduction of the Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophies into the West, and the attempt by means of these to supplant the scholastic Aristotelian philosophy. We are still without great productions—the great philosophic age, as we shall see, commenced a century later—but there were several minor philosophers who prepared the ground for the great men who were to follow.

Petrus Pompanatius (1462-1525),

physician, and professor of philosophy at Bologna and Padua, the author of "De Immortalitate Animi" (1516)—as explained by A. H. Douglas, Cambridge, 1910—rejected the doctrine of Averroes that reason is one divine light which shines in upon the souls of men, and rejected just as positively the Thomist conception of the soul as a self-subsistent and separable form or a spiritual substance capable of existing after the death of the body. He explicitly taught the mortality of the human soul, since the human reason depends on sense and imagery for its objects and the intellectual soul is one with the sensitive and vegetative soul, being merely the same soul under a different aspect. He quoted the commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias as the authority for his doctrines; that is to say, he rejected monopsychism, and declared the soul simply to be not immortal "according to Aristotle." He refuted the arguments for immortality by sound common sense and by moral considerations. Pompanatius protested that he had no doubt of the immortality of the soul, since it is plainly taught, not only by the Bible, which is above all human reason, but by the incontrovertible Thomas Aquinas, and that he was only acting as a questioner, seeking to bring truth into full light, when he states such objections as the following: "If the soul's independence of the senses in some respects proves her immortality, so does her dependence in others disprove it. And there are more of her faculties which imply mortality than immortality, as may be seen in the low mental condition of savages, as well as of women generally. Nor can we prove that the soul is able to think without the body, a capacity expressly denied by Aristotle, or understand her connection with the body excepting by assuming her materiality. Finally, since each soul is admitted to have a beginning, she cannot be a partaker of eternity, wherein is neither beginning nor end, but must be finite in her end as well as in her beginning." After giving these and similar objections at some length, Pompanatius set forth his own view, that "the soul may be called immortal in so far as she is a form of pure thought, which latter is independent of sensation, and therefore both immaterial and eternal, but that she is mortal in reality, since she is affected by the mortality of the body, which is necessarily with her, not as the subject, but yet as the object, of her acts."

We must know that according to Plato and Aristotle the legislator is a physician of the soul, and as the legislator is more concerned to make men virtuous than to make them enlightened, he must adapt himself to their different natures. The less noble requires rewards and punishments. But some cannot be kept in check by these, and it is for them that immortality has been invented. As the physician says what is not true, so acts the founder of a religion, and is completely justified in so acting, his final end being regarded as a purely political one.

As Machiavelli said: "The princes of a republic or kingdom must maintain the pillars of the religion they hold. If this is done, it will be an easy thing for them to keep their State religion, and themselves in prosperity and unity. And everything that favours their interest, and even although they hold it to be false, they must favour and assist, and must do so all the more, the more prudent and politic they are."

To the objection that if our souls were mortal there could be no just ruler of the world, Pompanatius replied: "The true reward of virtue is virtue itself, which
makes men happy; for human nature can have nothing higher than virtue, since it alone makes man secure and free from all disturbances. In the virtuous man all is in harmony; he has nothing to fear or hope, and remains unmoved in fortune or misfortune. To the vicious man vice itself is punishment. He trusts nobody; he has no rest, waking or sleeping."

Spiritual apparitions are explained by Pompanatius to be the delusions of the excited fancy or the deceptions of priests. The "possessed" are sick. In conclusion, he protests with great energy against those persons who maintain that vicious and guilty men commonly deny the immortality of the soul, while good and upright men believe it. On the contrary, he says, it is quite obvious that many vicious persons believe in immortality, and at the same time allow themselves to be carried away by their passions, while many righteous and noble men have held the soul to be mortal. In a similar spirit Pompanatius wrote of the freedom of the will, and boldly set forth its inconsistencies.

**LUDOVICO VIVES (1492-1540),**

a Spaniard, proclaimed the independence of mental phenomena, considered as the matter of psychology, and protested against the metaphysical point of view, with its empty discussions of the essence of the soul. In his work, *De anima et vita* (1538), he expressed the futility of inquiring what the soul itself is, but regarded it as important to discover what its activities and properties are. The forms and substances of the older philosophy are not things but merely logical inventions. The task of psychology is to study mental phenomena and their connections; we can dispense with speculations concerning the nature and "essence" of the soul. He regarded the soul as the principle, not only of conscious life, but of life in general; the heart is the centre of its vital or vegetative activity, the brain of its intellectual activity. The souls of plants and animals are generated by the power of matter; human souls only are immediately created by God. He was also an early investigator of the laws of association of ideas. His psychology, especially in the doctrine of the impulses and the emotions, abounds in subtle observations and happy appreciations of character.

Vives must be regarded as the most important philosophical reformer of this period and as a forerunner of Descartes and of Bacon. His whole life was an uninterrupted and successful struggle against Scholasticism. With regard to Aristotle, his view was that the genuine disciples of his spirit should go beyond him, and interrogate nature herself, as the ancients had done. Not by blind traditions, nor subtle hypotheses, is nature to be known, but through direct investigation by the method of experiment.

The great Italian Humanists were for the most part Platonists. It was PHILIP MELANCHTHON who presented the most decided example for the reform of philosophy on the old foundation of Aristotle. He gave out openly that he intended to introduce into philosophy, by going back to the genuine writings of Aristotle, a reform like that intended for theology by Luther in going back to the Bible. On the other hand, LUTHER declared that the study of Aristotle was wholly useless. His vilification of the Greek philosopher knew no bounds. Aristotle was "a devil, a prince of darkness, a beast; a public and professed liar, a most horrid imposter on mankind."

**PIERRE DE LA RAMÉE (1515-1572),**

known as Peter Ramus, a prominent French Humanist, wrote in 1543 a protest against the exaggerated estimation of Aristotle's philosophy. He attacked the Aristotelian logic as unnatural and useless, and attempted a new logic of his own,
which gained considerable acceptance, especially in Germany; whereupon the French Parliament, under Francis I., condemned him for all time as “insolent, impudent, and a liar,” suppressed his books, and prohibited him from copying them, because he had publicly disputed the doctrines of Aristotle; and further to attack these doctrines was rendered by legislative enactment punishable by the galleys. His enemies raised the cry of secretly espousing Protestant doctrines, and, in consequence of this imputation, he was assassinated at the great massacre of St. Bartholomew.

GERONIMO CARDANO (1501-1576)

was an Italian physician who disputed Galen’s localisation of mental functions. In 1545, he became the founder of Algebra, and did much to inaugurate scientific methods of thought by his works De Subtilitate Rerum and De Varietate Rerum, which appeared respectively in 1551 and 1552, and represent the world as the result of natural forces, acting according to fixed laws. Some dim ideas of spontaneous variation and natural selection have been found in these books.

Cardano revived the Epicurean theory of pleasure, which had been forgotten in the Middle Ages. Good things please us the more when they come after the less good; for every sensation implies a change, and every change is from one opposite to another. If it is from good to evil the result is sadness; if it is from evil to good the result is pleasure. Evil must therefore have preceded. Who takes pleasure in eating unless he is hungry, in drinking without being thirsty? Unlike Epicurus, he declared that we must seek as much as possible the causes of suffering, so as to experience in their sensation the largest sum of pleasure. MONTAIGNE (1533-1592), too, seems to have shared the view of Epicurus.

JACOB BOEHME (1575-1624)

was a German mystic. His doctrine is chiefly concerned with the problem of the origin of evil. All light needs darkness and all good evil in order to appear and to become knowable. Everything becomes perceptible through the opposite alone: gentleness through sternness, love through anger, affirmation through negation. Without evil there would be no life, no movement, no distinctions, no revelation; all would be unqualified uniform nothingness. And as in nature nothing exists in which good and evil do not reside, so in God, besides power or the good, a contrary exists, without which he would remain unknown to himself. Heaven and hell are not future conditions but are experienced here on earth; he who instead of subduing animality becomes enamoured of it, stands under the wrath of God; whereas he who abjures self dwells in the joyous kingdom of mercy. He alone truly believes who himself becomes Christ, who repeats in himself what Christ suffered and attained.

MEDIÆVAL MEDICINE

The Lateran Council, about the beginning of the XIIIth century, forbade physicians, under pain of excommunication, to undertake medical treatment without calling in ecclesiastical advice. This order was renewed by Pope Pius V. (1504-1572), who ruled that all doctors before administering treatment are to call in “a physician of the soul,” on the ground, as he declares, that “bodily infirmity frequently arises from sin”; and if at the end of three days the patient had not made confession to a priest, the medical man should cease his treatment, under pain of being deprived of his right to practice, and of expulsion from the faculty if he were a professor.
The prevalent faith in miraculous healing also tended to check progress in medical science. These miracles were not necessarily fraudulent, but were most probably due, as we now know, to the power of "suggestion." There were some distinguished physicians, as we have shown, but there were no qualified surgeons; for, for a thousand years, the practice of surgery was considered dishonourable by the Church. This stigma attaching to the surgical profession was removed only in 1406 by Emperor Wenzel of Germany. The effect of this widespread ecclesiastical opposition was that surgery was given up to the lowest class of nomadic charlatans, and later was taken up by the Barbers.

French surgery advanced with the establishment of the College of St. Côme in the middle of the XIIIth century, which in 1713 became the Académie de Chirurgie. LANFRANCHI (-1300) of Milan, author of the "Grande Chirurgie," was the first to describe concussion of the brain, and his chapter on the symptoms of fracture of the skull is accounted a classic. HENRI DE MONDEVILLE (1260-1320) was another eminent contemporary surgeon, who anticipated the aseptic treatment of wounds.

Owing to the crowded condition and the lack of sanitation in the walled mediaeval towns, within which the dead were buried, and which were without courtyards or gardens, and owing to the squalor, misrule and gross immorality occasioned by the many wars and by the general superstition, ignorance and uncleanliness of the masses, epidemic diseases were common.

JOHN GADDESDEN (1280-1361), about the year 1350, referring to the perils of travel from shipwreck and robbers, warns also against the innumerable dangers of infection at insanitary inns. Besides giving directions as to cosmetics—perfumes being needed to overcome the odours—he urges the need of frequent baths and the importance of cleanly underclothing. ERASMUS, one hundred and fifty years later, gave a picture of the dirt that prevailed in the houses of noblemen. Still later, the famous Dr. JOHNSON said he had no passion for clean linen; and even the fine gentlemen of his day were far from scrupulously clean in their persons. What must have been the condition of the poorer classes, badly fed, ill-clad, and living in hovels? But dirt was not universal. France, Italy, and Germany had public bathing-places. In Paris alone there were at that time twenty-six such establishments.

As a curiosity we may also mention that the fork, though known at the end of the XIVth century, was not in popular use until the beginning of the XVIth century. In ancient times and throughout the Middle Ages people, high and low, ate with their fingers. Considering the other uses to which the fingers are put, it is surprising that eating manners took so long to improve.

A great social change was brought about by the introduction of hot drinks. Towards the middle of the XVIIth century the Spaniards imported chocolate from Mexico; at the beginning of the XVIIth century tea was introduced from China and Japan; and about the middle of the XVIIth century coffee began to pour in from Turkey. The discovery of the circulation of the blood produced an exaggerated estimate of hot drinks, but it had one great effect: it reduced the amount of drunkenness.

Leprosy appeared in Northern Europe in the VIth and VIIth centuries, and its spread in connection with the Crusades was appalling, reaching its full height in the XIIIth century.

The Plague raged violently in the VIth century throughout the reign of the Emperor Justinian (483-565), and extended almost to the whole of the then known world. It devastated Paris in 1553 and 1580, and London in 1665. The Black Death from the year 1348 onwards is reported to have swept off the fourth part of the then existing population. These great epidemics were considered punishments
for the wickedness of man. That sin caused them is certain, but it was sin against sanitation.

**Syphilis**, a contagious disease not yet known by that name, accounts of which were published towards the end of the XVth and during the early part of the XVIth century, was first observed in 1494, soon after the arrival of Charles VIII.'s army at Naples, when an epidemic spread amongst the French soldiers, therefore the name *morbus gallicus* or the "French disease." It spread among all classes with rapidity all over Europe, and is a significant illustration of the fearful immorality of the time. The word "syphilis" is first mentioned by **FRACASTORO** (1484-1553), a physician of Verona, who published in 1530 a Latin poem bearing the title "Syphilis sive morbus gallicus." Doubtless a good deal of what was called "leprosy" in early times was in reality syphilis.

One of the reasons of the enormous spread of venereal disease was probably the vast preponderance of women, as a result of the constant wars. It is said that during the Crusades there were seven women to one man. As in the great European war just concluded, morality sank very low.

It is interesting to note, too, that in the early Christian era woman was regarded as the supreme temptress. In the later Middle Ages, however, marriage assumed a mystical significance, and woman was elevated to the pedestal of a chivalrous ideal. A passion for romance appeared, which no knight was without. As the refrain of a French ballad of the XIVth century puts it: "En ciel un dieu, en terre une déesse." The courtly love had a refining influence on manners, but apparently not upon morals. Another reason for the elevation of women and the exaltation of the sex instinct was the dissemination of Oriental sensual stories, partly *via* Constantinople, partly through the spread of Arab literature from Spain, by travelling singers, the Troubadours, wandering from castle to castle and village to village. These stories and songs resembled the tales of "Thousand and One Nights," only in European garb. The position of women and morals of the time are well illustrated in Boccaccio's "Decameron," which would never have ranked as a "classical" work if judged only by the nature of its contents.

Another interesting observation is that, whereas the Greeks held the drama in highest esteem, the theatre was unequivocally condemned by the Christians of the Middle Ages, and all professional actors were pronounced to be in a condition of mortal sin, and were, therefore, doomed, if they died in their profession, to eternal perdition. The sacraments were denied to actors who refused to repudiate their profession, and, in France at least, their burial was as the burial of a dog. (Bossuet: "Réflexions sur la Comedie."** MOLIÈRE** (1622-1673), whose plays were continually cited as among the most signal instances of the depravity of the theatre, was the object of special denunciation; and when he died, it was only with extreme difficulty that permission could be obtained to bury him in consecrated ground. The religious mind of **RACINE** (1639-1699) recoiled before the Censure. He ceased to write for the stage when in the zenith of his powers, and an extraordinary epitaph, while recording his virtues, acknowledges that there was one stain upon his memory—he had been a dramatic poet. Nevertheless, the theatre steadily advanced, although the law in England pronounced actors vagabonds and the law in France infamous, and consequently excluded them from every form of public honour and employment.

Uneducated people, even at the present day, frequently take religious teaching too literally. What must have been the state of mind in the Middle Ages! **People then not only believed in angels and devils, but they saw them.** Hallucinations were taken for realities. Angelic visions were explained as the result of an intimate communion with the Deity, and the individuals in whom they occurred were correspondingly revered and esteemed. Others whose utterances and deeds were suspicious of evil were thought to be possessed by the agents of the dark world, and were subjected to exorcism and other ceremonials; and, if this treatment failed to procure a cure, they were cast into dungeons, or ostracised from society. The belief in diabolical agency was an ever-present terror during the Middle Ages, and probably
produced more lamentable effects on human happiness than any other theological belief. From this fatal superstition arose the witchcraft delusion, which acquired a fresh intensity from the religious excitements attendant on the Reformation. Even such an able writer as THOMAS AQUINAS (1224-1274) assures us that diseases and tempests are the direct acts of Satan; that he can transport men at his pleasure through the air, and that he can transform them into any shape.

The belief in witchcraft is probably a relic of the past of the ancient inhabitants of Central Europe, for it was known and tolerated during the first eight centuries or punished with a fine only, as in France. Its history is the blackest in the annals of Christendom, unless that of heresy and the Inquisition be blacker.

It was based on Ex. xxii. 18: "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live"; and on Lev. xx. 27: "A man also or a woman that hath a familiar spirit, or that is a wizard, shall surely be put to death: they shall stone them with stones; their blood shall be upon them." Here is the Divine sanction to which appeal has ever been made, especially by priestly fanatics, in justification of their action in compassing the death of multitudes of hapless victims for crimes which they not only did not, but could not, commit.

It was only in the IXth century, when the devil was supposed to appear at the revels of witches, that the Church began to take serious notice of these practices; but the condemnation of witches to the stake in any considerable number followed only after the institution of the Inquisition in 1183 by Pope Innocent III. The number of victims increased in the XIVth century and reached its greatest height in the XVth century after the famous Bull of Pope Innocent VIII. in 1484, when witch-burning became almost an industry for some two hundred years, Catholics and Protestants rivalling one another in murdering old and young women. Both innocent and guilty were condemned to the flames; perfectly sane persons were made to suffer in common with those poor hallucinated insane who were but too ready to confess to diabolical practices. The famous efforts of James I. to carry out the Biblical command, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live," were outdone by the zeal of the Puritans under the Commonwealth to suppress the wicked old women who had commerce with Satan.

LLORENTE, who had free access to the Archives of the Spanish Inquisition, assures us in his "Histoire de l'Inquisition" that by that tribunal alone more than 31,000 persons were burnt, and more than 290,000 persons condemned to punishments less severe than death. Further, the execution for "Anabaptist errors" of 30,000 persons in Holland and Friesland is mentioned in the official report of the Venetian ambassador at the Court of Charles V. For many years Cologne burnt its three hundred witches annually, and other German and French cities a similar number. The number executed in England during the first eighty years of the XVIth century has been estimated at five hundred annually, and altogether some forty thousand. Probably in those days insanity raged terribly, considering the absurd demoniacal beliefs that were then held; and what is also probable, the minds of the insane fastened on the delusions of the time.

We have it on the authority of Sir Walter Scott and Lecky, the historian, that, except for political purposes, no person was put to death for witchcraft in the "dark ages"; it was not until the dark ages had passed away, until the XVth and XVIth centuries, the boasted age of Reformation in religion, in medicine, and in philosophy, that witches, or "persons who had entered into compact with Satan," were put to death, and had tortures worse than death inflicted upon them. With the laws passed against witchcraft in 1736 its punishment by death gradually died out.

One of the methods of ascertaining the guilt of suspected persons was to tie up their bodies and throw them into the river: if they floated, they were guilty; but if they sank, they were innocent.
JULIUS WEYER (1515-1588) in his work "De praestigiis Dæmonum," Bâsle, 1563, showed that the witches were usually women suffering from melancholia and hysteria, having a distorted imagination; while G. CARDANO (1501-1576) denied the assumption, for witches, he held, often act with a good deal of judgment.

LUDOVICO VIVES (1492-1540) protested against the diabolical barbarity, the employment of torture to extract confessions of guilt from the accused. Torture was not entirely suppressed till the time of the French Revolution at the end of the XVIIIth century.

The victims who died for heresy were not, like those who died for witchcraft, solitary and doting women, but were usually men in the midst of active life, and often in the first flush of youthful enthusiasm, and it was believed that this was only the prelude of eternal agonies hereafter. It was the invariable rule to confiscate the entire property of the impenitent, and his children were thus left absolutely destitute, and with a stigma upon them that in the XVth and XVIth centuries was sufficient to shut them out of respectable society.

In the later Middle Ages psychogenic epidemics of a hysteriform character were also common, arising from a fear of witches, ghosts, and spells. The best known is the Dancing Mania of 1021, 1237, 1278, 1375 and 1418, called St. Vitus's Dance, St. Vitus being regarded as the Patron Saint of the unfortunate persons who were afflicted with the plague. PARACELSIUS (1493-1541) was the first who bade people to regard these diseases as inflicted neither by saints nor demons, and explaining that the "dancing possession" is simply a form of disease, of which the cure may be effected by proper remedies and regimen. But the idea was resisted.

An example that may be quoted as evidence of the widespread demoniacal belief is that of no less a man than AMBROISE PARE (1510-1590), the father of French surgery, who wrote: "The demons are able to assume whatever form they choose, and that suddenly. One sees them often transform themselves into serpents, toads, screech-owls, crows, goats, asses, dogs, cats, wolves, bulls; they change themselves into men, and also into angels of light. They howl at night and make noises like the clanking of chains...they move the benches and tables about, lull the children to sleep, turn the pages of books, count money, and throw dishes to the floor."

As we have said already, in the Middle Ages the body was of no account; the soul and its future was all that people cared for. It is extraordinary to what discipline and torture people could subject their bodies, and we can only explain their extraordinary endurance on the principle of auto-suggestion, i.e., having their mind concentrated on a certain notion, the body became anaesthetic. This indifference to physical conditions had, however, a sad consequence. Not only were men able to inflict hardships and cruelties on themselves, but they inflicted them on others, and crowds went to witness with apparent pleasure and relish scenes—tortures, mutilations, executions—of which it is sickening to read.

In accordance with current beliefs abnormal mental symptoms were ascribed to supernatural operations, divine or diabolical, as the case might be—more often the latter.

LUTHER was quite sure that insanity was caused by Satan, and he exorcised sufferers. CALVIN was equally certain of a personal devil. The same servitude to the mere letter of Scripture which led JOHN WESLEY, the famous preacher (whose strength and beauty of character made his influence in this respect all the more unfortunate), to declare that "to give up witchcraft is to give up the Bible," controlled him in regard to insanity. He insisted, on the authority of the Old Testament, that bodily diseases are sometimes caused by devils, and, upon the authority of the New Testament, that the gods of the heathen are demons. He believed that dreams, while in some cases caused by bodily conditions and passions,
are shown by Scripture to be also caused by occult powers of evil. He cites a physician as testimony that "most lunatics are really demoniacs."

It was the natural result of such views of insanity that men should treat those whom they believed to have the devil in them as they would have treated the devil, could they have had the good fortune to lay hold of him. As Maudsley has said: "The tortures which the insane person suffered from the devils that had entered into him were less than those inflicted by the devils who took charge of him."

The treatment of the insane in the Middle Ages, especially in the XIVth and XVth centuries, was chiefly in the hands of monks. The scant references to mental disorders in the writings of the physicians who flourished in these centuries show how little attention they paid to them. For the milder cases the monastic establishments were sanctuaries in which these unfortunate beings could find refuge from the jarring influences of active life, and protection in some degree from the stones, sticks, and death by fire, which was the common mode of treatment resulting from the popular abhorrence and dread the people had of them, holding them to be of a different species to the rest of mankind—"a set of animals, or positive incarnation of devils, who had taken on human guise."

The story of the Belgian village asylum of Gheel, still in existence, shows that as early as the VIIth century the custom had arisen of sending mad persons for cure to the shrines of saints. In the XlIth century we find madmen being taken to St. Bartholomew's in London, and wonderful cures are recorded as having taken place there. The first custodial institution entirely for the cure of the insane was founded in Florence in 1389. Bethlem Hospital in London was founded in 1247 as a monastery in Bishopsgate, and was handed over for the use of insane in 1403. Asylums were also founded at Valencia in 1409, at Saragossa in 1425, at Seville and Valladolid in 1436, and at Toledo in 1483. In 1660 the Hôtel de Dieu in Paris was opened.

To some hospitals, long before they ceased to be altogether ecclesiastical establishments, there were attached chambers, or cells, into which lunatics were received. But unless the provision which was thus made in these earlier times was much better than the condition in which these places were found in the XVIIIth century would seem to indicate, the benefit of the charity was conferred more on the public which was relieved from the presence of the patients than upon the patients themselves. They were usually confined in a dungeon, where they lay chained on straw, naked, tormented and beaten by inhuman gaolers and keepers. Their food was thrown in, and straw raked out through the bars. Sightseers went to see them, as they went to see the wild beasts, for amusement. The patients were cowed by the whip or other instruments of punishment, and were more neglected and worse treated than if they had been wild beasts. In 1547 Bedlam became a lunatic asylum unconnected with ecclesiastical administration. This change to lay management does not seem to have been any advantage to the unfortunate inmates, for we find it reported fifty years after the change that the condition of the hospital was too loathsome for anyone to enter. The place was really a horrible prison, and not a hospital in any sense of the word. (See Chapter VI.)

Though the belief of possession by the devil had long subsided, the practice of ill-treating the insane, as we shall see further on, persisted till the beginning of the XIXth century. Still, there were physicians who held enlightened views on the subject.

F. PLATER (1536-1614),

professor at Basle, made some progress in psychiatry in pointing to the hereditary transmission of mental defects and in insisting on a careful clinical study, besides attempting a classification of mental disorders, though a rather primitive one. How
the religious belief of the time affected even so clever a man is shown by his reference to a female patient, of whom he says she was tempted by the devil to kill her sleeping husband, whom she really loved, and that he, Plater, cured her “with the help of God” by means of bleeding and salutary exhortations. Another case which he interpreted in the same way was that of a mother who, during two pregnancies, struggled against an almost irresistible impulse to kill her child. Whereas the famous JAC. SYLVIUS (1478-1555) remarked of insanity that “in some cases scolding is required, in others blows and Shackles,” Plater insists, in opposition to him, upon psychological treatment.

W. F. HILDANUS (1560-1634), in his book entitled “Observations,” cites cranial injuries as a frequent cause of insanity. GREGOR HORST (1578-1636), professor at Wittenberg, called attention to the frequency of religious melancholia among monks, and ascribed it to their fastings and general manner of living.

DANIEL SENNERT (1572-1637),

another Wittenberg professor, appears to have been a man who, although he could not free himself from the prevalent belief in witches, wrote sensibly on the various forms of insanity (“Practical Medicine,” 1628). He attempted to modernise the ancient humoral theory and appears to have suspected mania to be of toxic origin. The primary seat of mental derangement was regarded by him to be in the heart, i.e., the blood circulation; the brain, in his opinion, was affected secondarily only: Cordis enim temperis corrupta corrumpit temperiem cerebri. For this reason he suggested the employment of such drugs as influence the circulation. He believed hereditary melancholia to be the most unfavourable form of mental derangement.

Sennert distinguished two great divisions of insanity: melancholia and mania. Melancholia he defined as “delirium or deprival of imagination and reason, without fever, with fear and sadness, arising from dark and melancholy animal spirits, and occasioning corresponding phantoms.”

Mania he described as delirium without fever, a deprival of imagination and reason, without fear, but, on the contrary, with audacity, anger, and ferocity, and arising from a fervent and fiery disposition. The maniac, he tells us, imagines things which are not, and knows no distinction between what is honest and shameful, good and bad, friendly and inimical. “This malady,” he says, “must have a specific and obscure cause somewhat resembling poisons, and be of such nature that it may be produced by certain venomous substances. Some of these, in fact, induce delirium, and it is beyond dispute that numbers of persons have become maniacal through drinking certain philters.” Notwithstanding this, he speaks of “demonical mania,” and asserts that patients suffering from this malady evacuate stones, iron, living animals, etc., which could not be produced in a healthy body, but were caused by demons. These demons, however, can be driven out of the system, for he says: “One must not think that demoniacal mania is inaccessible to remedial agents. The treatment should produce such an effect in the patients that the demons finding them no longer suitable for their domination will abandon them of themselves.”

We see here for the first time an attempt to combat supernatural powers by natural means; though apparently these consisted with him chiefly of the customary remedies—bleeding and purging.

ZACCUTUS LUSITANUS (1575-1642), of Lisbon, a Jewish physician who had to flee from Spain and settled in Amsterdam in 1625, applied psychotherapy for obsessions.

LAZARUS RIVERIUS (1580-1655), professor at Montpellier, in his “Praxis Medica,” argued that since hydrophobia resembles mania and comes from the poison of a dog, so mania itself may be due to some poison formed in the body; thus he arrived at a similar conclusion to Sennert.
WOLFGANG HÖFER (1614-1681), in his work "Hercules medicus" (Vienna, 1657), is the first to describe cretinism.

JOHANN JACOB WALDSCHMIDT (1644-1687) thought that mania and melancholia originated in abnormal fermentations in the body.

TH. BONET (1620-1689),

who wrote the first work on pathological anatomy, showed that progress was made a few years later, and that he, in any case, freed himself from the chains of superstition and fear. He was probably the first to make minute observations on the brains of insane "(Sepulchretum, sive anatomia practica ex cadaveribus," Geneva, 1679); only he made the mistake of regarding the pathological conditions as the cause of the mental derangement. He declared:

"I attach no significance, or next to none, to the art of magic, but attribute all rare and unusual occurrences to nature and to the presence of diseases which we do not sufficiently understand. Hypochondriacal patients experience many discomforts which they assign to supernatural causes; herein, therefore, they discover miracles and lay the blame for their ills on the shoulders of demons or magicians. Human credulity yields so readily before those who dread names that their influence in controlling our destiny is acknowledged."

He died of hydrophobia.

THEOPHRASTUS PARACELSIUS (1493-1541)

One great obstacle to progress in the XVIth century was the failure of either the Renaissance or the Reformation to do more than substitute the authority of ancient for mediaeval literature. The Bible was thought infallible in religion, Aristotle in philosophy, Galen in medicine, Ptolemy in astronomy, and Justinian in legislation. Every path to greater knowledge was blocked by some old book. Mysticism was trying to pull down some of these idols, though only to set up others. What the age most needed was to see that facts are more instructive than books.

First to show the advantage of direct observation over mere reading were the physicians. Among the most famous innovators of the century was Paracelsus, a Swiss contemporary of Luther. He did a great deal for chemistry, medicine, and science in general. Chemistry was for long regarded as one of the "seven devilish arts." A Papal Bull of 1317 strongly condemned the practice of alchemy, in which modern chemistry found its origin. During the XIVth and XVth centuries many chemists were punished as sorcerers, while as late as in 1624 Parliament prohibited chemical studies.

Paracelsus was the author of the three principles, salt, sulphur, and mercury, which replaced the ancient doctrine of the four elements and prepared the way for a true science of chemistry. But the salt, sulphur, and mercury, he tells his disciples, were not the visible bodies which we call by these names, but certain invisible, astral, or sidereal elements, and were analogous to the three worlds, the elemental or terrestrial, the astral or celestial, and the spiritual or divine, and these again correspond to the elements of man: Body, Spirit, and Soul. His idea of the existence of an "archaeus," a power which presides over all physiological actions as well as over all the operations of medicinal drugs, resembles very closely the "vital force" or "animism" so strongly championed by STAHL in the XVIIth century. Paracelsus was the originator of specific remedies and the first publicly to announce the "quintessences," i.e., the active principles of drugs. He was also the first to assert the plurality of the races of mankind and explained the Mosaic cosmogeny as having been written "theologically—for the weaker brethren."
All the lectures on medical subjects had hitherto been delivered in the Latin tongue, which hampered the lecturers in the full expression of their thoughts and the students in properly understanding them. Paracelsus tried to break this objectionable custom; his example, however, was not followed, and the practice was continued for at least two centuries longer. The advantage was that Latin was an international language for all learned men, and that it distinguished physicians from the quacks.

The influence of Paracelsus was far-reaching, and his real services were great. Far in advance of his time, he discarded Galenism and taught physicians to accept chemical therapeutics; he attacked witchcraft and the strolling mountebanks who butchered the body in lieu of surgical procedure, and he opposed the silly uromancy and uroscopy. He discovered miners' disease, was the first to establish a correlation between cretinism and endemic goitre, introduced mineral baths, and was one of the first to analyse them. He distinguished functional from organic nervous disorders and treated them by psycho-therapeutic methods. He made uncompromising attacks upon the prejudices of his age, and his strong mixtures, his alchemy and astrology, procured him everlasting notoriety and the vigorous opposition of his scientific contemporaries. Still, the result was that the Hippocratic method of the minute observation and recording of facts, together with experimentation, was revived, and the medical sciences gradually emerged from the débris of fifteen hundred years.

ANATOMY IN THE MIDDLE AGES

The difficulties under which medical science laboured in the Middle Ages may be estimated from the fact that dissection was forbidden by the clergy, because of the sanctity of the human body and its resurrection, though we do not find this pious objection interfering with such mutilation when effected by means of the rack and wheel and other cruel methods of killing supposed malefactors. True, it is said that the Bull of Boniface VIII, in 1300 against the cutting up of dead bodies was not intended against legitimate anatomical studies, but it was universally and constantly construed to prohibit dissection for this purpose. Even when special licences were granted for dissection, the thoracic and abdominal cavities alone were opened, while the cranial cavity was left untouched in obedience to popular prejudice; and the operation was performed, as a rule, by the barbers, while the learned professor of anatomy merely explained the exposed, but not dissected parts. The subjects were executed felons. The first anatomical theatres were opened at Paris and Montpellier in 1551; but some time before that date anatomy had made great strides.

For eight hundred years—that is, from the VIIth to the XIVth century—the centre for the study of medicine was at Salerno. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews did anything for anatomy. In 1231 Frederick II., Emperor of Germany and King of the two Sicilies, encouraged the study of human anatomy by ordering that a body should be anatomised at Salerno at least once in five years. Physicians and surgeons of the kingdom were required to be present. In 1308 the rulers of Venice gave permission to the Medical College for the dissection of a body once a year.

MUNDINUS (1275-1327), whose real name was LUIGI MONDINI DE LUZZI, was famous as an anatomist. In 1315 he publicly dissected two female bodies in the presence of a crowd of students at Bologna. His example, however, does not seem to have been followed. He shortly afterwards (1316) published a treatise on anatomy, which became a text-book
RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION

in the medical schools for nearly three centuries. It appeared in print in 1478. It was compiled largely from the writings of Galen and Avicenna. At the end of the XVIth century it was still the only text-book used in the University of Padua, and it was probably the first anatomical treatise illustrated by woodcuts. It was held in such esteem, that deviations from his descriptions were considered abnormal. As to the work itself, it is full of preconceived opinions and theories. Of course he held the universal belief in animal spirits (which he believed to pass to the middle ventricle by a worm-like passage—vermis), but he was original in one respect, anticipating a modern view, in teaching that cellules exist in the brain, each of which is the seat of a particular intellectual faculty.

After Mundinus, dissecting gained a firmer foothold as a mode of instruction, and public dissections were decreed in the Universities of Montpellier in 1366, at Venice in 1368, at Florence in 1388, at Vienna in 1404, Bologna 1405, Padua 1429, Paris 1478.

JAC. BERENGARIO DA CARPI (1470-1530) is said to have dissected more than one hundred human bodies. He corrected Mondino’s book, and wrote an excellent treatise on head injuries: ‘‘Tractatus de fractura calvariae s. craniis’’ (1518).

MAGNUS HUNDT (1449-1549), Rector of Leipsic University, was one of the last famous scholastics. His text-book on anatomy is considered the first sound one, and one not without interest even at the present day. It was illustrated with woodcuts. Hundt was the first medieval author to make use of the term anthropo-

JACOBINUS SYLVIIUS (1478-1555), whose real name was JACQUES DUBOIS, was the first regular teacher of anatomy from the human body and the first to study the bloodvessels by means of coloured injections. He dissected a great number of animals and as many bodies as he could procure. Unfortunately, he subordinated all his own research to the authority of Galen.

ANDREAS VESALIUS (1514-1564),
a pupil of Jacques Sylvius, born at Louvain, became professor at Padua, the centre of the great European revival of learning and of the greatest intellectual freedom of the time. Venice was then mistress of Padua and in every way fostered its university. It was under the protection of the enlightened Venetian Senate that Vesaliius enjoyed those unique opportunities for the study of anatomy which enabled him, in 1543, to publish his work on the structure of the human body. ‘‘De corporis humani fabrica,’’ Basle, 1543, a work that broke the medical slumber of more than a thousand years. Hitherto Galen, who had never dissected a human body, was regarded as an absolute authority. There were disectors and dissections before Vesaliius, but he alone made anatomy a living, working science.

Vesaliius gave a more perfect description of the heart, but he still believed that blood was formed in the liver; and as regards the brain, he confined himself to representing it as the central organ of sensation and movement. The question of the significance of the same for the activity of the soul he abandoned to the philosophers; but he was the first to draw attention to the difference between the grey and white matter of the brain and to describe the five ventricles.

Vesaliius, while he took a materialistic view of the nature of the soul, distinguished three souls: the vital, the natural, and the chief soul, each of which was but the sum of the spirit of corresponding function, and he assigned to the brain the chief soul, the sum of the animal spirits, whose functions were distinctly mental. The natural spirit was made by the liver, and from the vital spirits, which were made by the heart and utilised in the bodily functions generally, the brain elaborated the animal spirits in its ventricles and influenced the muscles and other organs by sending them out along the nerves. He was clear that the soul was engendered in and by the brain, but beyond that he knew nothing. Vivisection taught him that

Vol. i]

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when the brain is removed, sensation and movement are lost; but it taught him little more than this.

Vesalius insisted upon the essential similarity of the brains of men and animals, and observed that "the mass of the brain attains its highest dimensions in man, whom we know to be the most perfect animal, and that his brain is found to be bigger than that of three oxen; and that in proportion to the size of the body, first the ape, and next the dog exhibit a large brain, suggesting that animals excel in the size of their brain in proportion as they seem the more openly and clearly to be endowed with the faculties of the chief soul, i.e., mental powers."

Vesalius referred to Aristotle's division of the mental powers adopted by the theologians (Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Albertus Magnus, and others), according to which "imagination" and "judgment" were placed in the second ventricle, and "memory" in the third, and confutes the hypothesis by the fact that the parts of the brain to which the rational faculties are given by the theologians are found in the lower animals to correspond very nearly to the same parts in man. (Liber VII. cap. I. and cap. VI. "Ventriculorum usus"). On the other hand, Vesalius still clung to the opinion, universal in his time, that the air we breathe, penetrating through the Eustachian tubes, is, by a rarefying process, rendered fit for the brain, and enters into the first and second ventricles, and forms the animal spirits. These pass into the third ventricle, and into the posterior (cerebellar) ventricle, from which a portion of them is transmitted into the medulla oblongata, and into the nerves springing from it.

Vesalius was a pioneer in ethnocraniology, observing the shape of the heads of the different races and nations, and he taught that the pressure on the pliable head in infancy determined its shape in adult years; an erroneous notion still held by some anatomists, as will be shown later.

"It appears," he remarks, "that most nations have something peculiar in the shape of the head. The crania of the Genoese and, still more remarkable, those of the Greeks and the Turks, are globular in form. This shape, which they esteem elegant and well adapted to their practice of enveloping the head in the folds of their turbans, is often produced by the midwives at the solicitation of the mother." And he further observes, "that the Germans have generally a flattened occiput and a broad head because the children are always laid on their backs in the cradles; and that the Belgians have a more oblong form because the children are allowed to sleep on their sides."

In 1544, a year after the publication of his great work, Vesalius was driven by the hostility of the medical profession to burn his manuscripts and relinquish original work. He then became physician to Charles V. and Philip II. at Madrid, and was condemned by the Inquisition on suspicion; but escaped, only to suffer shipwreck on an island, where he died in misery. According to Sir Michael Foster (Lectures on the History of Physiology, 1901), Vesalius left Madrid in 1564 because he was wearied by the Court and harassed by the Church, and therefore wanted to change his mode of life.

MICHAEL SERVETUS (1509-1553)

was a theologian, philosopher and physician, and a sceptic in all three. The fall and original sin had no part in his theology; and speaking of "touching for the evil," he remarked that in France he saw the King touch many, but "I did not see any cured." In 1536 Servetus was working at anatomy under Vesalius and Sylvius in Paris. Unfortunately he had astrological leanings and got into trouble on account of this heresy. In this respect we must not forget that even up to very recent times
the moon was credited with having influence on insane and epileptics. Servetus started practice as a physician in Vienna, where he published another unorthodox theological work, which turned the friendship of Calvin into enmity against him. It is in this work that Servetus describes the circulation of the blood (at least, of the pulmonary circulation) accurately. He was thus a forerunner of Harvey. He believed the choroid plexus was the organ destined to secrete the animal spirits, that the fourth ventricle was the seat of memory, and that the habitation of the soul was in the aqueduct of Sylvius.

He was seized and tried for heresy, and having escaped, he was burnt in effigy along with his books. He was discovered in Geneva one evening attending Church service, was followed up, and cast into gaol, and sentenced to be put to death without shedding of blood. He suffered the long-drawn agony without recantation, and was burnt at the stake.

Other famous anatomists of the time were EUSTACHIUS (1510-1574), professor of anatomy at Rome, who published a set of superb plates, "Tabulae Anatomicae," in 1552; FALLOPIUS (1523-1562), of Modena, lecturer of anatomy at Padua, a pupil of Vesalius, who, in his work "Observationes Anatomicae" (1561), denied Galen's statement that the brain is moved by a systole and diastole, since he had never witnessed the movement, either in animals or in wounded men; and VAROLIUS (1543-1575), who was professor of anatomy at Bologna and physician to the Pope, and wrote: spiritus animalis residet in substantia cerebri. He described as a deception the doctrine that the spirit could reside in the brain cavities, since they do not contain air but water, and the water has no other purpose than to carry away the effete substances formed in the brain in the act of thinking. Pons Varolii—a well-known structure of the brain—bears his name.

PIETRO DE MONTAGNA,

an Italian surgeon, published in 1491 a work which contains an engraving of the head, in which are represented sensus communis cellula imaginativa, cellula estimativa seu cogitativa, cellula memorativa et cellula rationalis. LELIÈvre, in a surgical work in 1500, and JOHN ROHAN DE ROTHAN reproduced this engraving.

GEORGE REISCH (1470-1525),

Gregorius Rischius Carthusianus, was Prior of the Carthusian convent at Freiburg in Breisgau, and enjoyed great authority under Maximilian I., whose father-foressor he was. The celebrated Johann Eck, the most violent opponent of the Reformation, went to Freiburg to study mathematics under Reisch. His chief work, "Margarita Philosophica," published in 1503, although consisting of only one volume, is a cyclopædia in miniature, and was in fact published later under the title of "Encyclopædia." It is also illustrated with anatomical woodcuts, one of which represents the human head mapped out like a phrenological bust of the present day. (Chapter: De potentiss animæ sensitivæ.) This engraving has been attributed to Baptista Porta, whose work was not published till 1586. It was copied before that (1562) by LUDOVICO DOLCI (1508-1568) of Venice, in a work entitled "Dialogo di M. Lodovico Dolce, nel quale si ragiona del modo di accrescere e conservar la memoria," which revived the doctrines of Gordon on the nature of the brain and the mental faculties, and treats of the methods of increasing and preserving the memory.

Reisch says the number of the internal senses is five: common sense, cogitation, estimation, phantasy or imagination, and memory. The common sense is in the first portion of the anterior ventricle, as is also the power of imagination. In the middle ventricle is the estimativa; and in the posterior, the memorativa.
a Spaniard, contemporary of Henry IV., in a work dated 1575, and entitled "Examination of the Spirits with respect to their aptitudes for the Sciences," wrote: "Every man is born with a kind of particular disposition; each disposition and aptitude corresponds with a particular form of head."

In a memorial to Philip II. of Spain he pleaded for vocational guidance. He wrote:

"As I have frequently remarked, the mind of man is very narrow and circumscribed, and when it attempts to do more than one thing at once, it only embarrasses itself. I have always thought it never could thoroughly know two arts or professions; and when this was attempted, one of the two was sure to be imperfectly understood. Thus it seems to me, that it is requisite to set apart a number of sagacious and learned men, to examine, and investigate into, the mental qualifications and capabilities of young persons; in order to oblige them to make a choice of such sciences and professions, as would be most in accordance with their intellectual constitutions; and not to leave the matter to their own choice or direction. For in general cases, this choice will necessarily be an injudicious one, and will induce them to give a preference to some line of life which will prove less advantageous and useful to them, than if they were under the direction of suitable and qualified counsellors. It would happen from all this, Sire, that you would have better workmen, and more finished workmanship, throughout your dominions, and persons who know better, than those at present, how to unite nature with art. I should also wish the learned academies of your kingdom to be placed under a similar regulation; for, as constituted at present, all students go from one faculty of learning to another without their understanding Latin well; so, in like manner, examinations should be instituted to ascertain that when any one wished to study logic, or philosophy, or medicine, or theology, or law, he had that peculiar constitution or aptitude of mind fitted for that particular profession."

Here we have the first mention of a "vocational guidance," only that Huarte thought it a sufficient guide to examine the minds of candidates as regards the powers of memory, understanding, and imagination.

The doctrine of temperaments is discussed by Huarte. He showed the connection between bodily conformation and intellectual vigour. He promulgated a curious doctrine, that the various degrees of heat, moisture, and dryness fully account for all the intellectual varieties and powers of man.

BERNARDINO TELESIO (1508-1588),

in De Rerum Natura (1586), taught that the soul was the subtest form of matter, a very delicate substance, enclosed within the nervous system, and therefore eluding our senses. Its seat is chiefly the brain, but it extends also to the spinal cord, the nerves, arteries, veins, and the covering membranes of the internal organs, all of which he believed to have cavities or ventricles like the brain, enclosing this fine, very mobile spirit. Recognising that the nervous system is in close connection with soul-life, he acknowledged that the soul in man differs only in degree from the soul in animals. He assumed beside the material soul in man, a divine corporeal soul directly implanted by God, which united with the material soul. This was probably a concession to the orthodox teaching of the Church.

GIOVANNI BAPTISTA PORTA (1536-1615),

of Naples, was, to judge from his numerous works, a most erudite physiognomist, deeply read in the works of his predecessors. His chief book—De Humana Physiognomia—published in 1586, was translated into many languages. He closely
followed Aristotle, and Avicenna, and considered that the human face should be compared with that of animals. No part of the human body was ignored by him. The woodcut representing the human head, with the distribution of the mental faculties, is, as already stated, taken from the *Margarita Philosophica* of Reisch without acknowledgment. Porta is frequently mentioned as if he had been a predecessor of Gall, but there is little resemblance between their teaching.

In his work on Physiognomy he gives a curious catalogue of the instincts common to man and animals. Several human heads are compared with those of animals. A round head indicates a want of memory and wisdom; when the anterior portion is flattened, perception and memory are feeble; on the contrary, if the posterior part is but little developed, the memory and energy suffer; if the middle part, reason and reflection are but slightly marked.

The Marquis MASCORDI, chief justice of the Criminal Court at Naples from 1778-1782, had studied deeply the work of Porta. Whenever a criminal condemned to death on sufficient testimony persisted in protesting his innocence, the Marquis summoned him before him, examined attentively his head, and then passed a final judgment, of which the two following are examples:

1. *Auditis testibus pro et contra, vise facie et examinate capite, ad furcas damnamus.*

2. *Auditus testibus pro et contra, reo ad denegandum obstinatio, visa facie et examinato capite, non ad furcas, sed ad catemas damnamus.* (Lancet, November 10, 1832.)

Porta’s book on meteorology was the first in which sound ideas were broached on this subject; his researches in optics gave the world the camera obscura (1588); in chemistry he seems to have been the first to show how to reduce the metallic oxides, and thus to have laid the foundation of several important industries.

**NIC. TULPIUS,** (1593-1678) made famous by Rembrandt’s picture “The Anatomist,” **JOHN VESLING** (1598-1649), **CHARLES DREILINGOURT** (1633-1679), **THÉOPHILE BONET** (1620-1689), as well as **THOMAS WILLS** (1622-1675) with whom we shall deal in Chap. X., located the soul in the cerebellum, having observed that severe injury of the cerebellum causes the vital functions to cease, while injury of the cerebrum has no such consequences. Not until **ALBRECHT V. HALLER** (1708-1777), **J. G. ZINN** (1727-1759) and **A. C. LORRY** (1725-1783), was it shown that vital functions are not connected with mental processes and that these observers must have injured with the cerebellum the neighbouring medulla oblongata, which contains the centres for respiration and circulation. (The importance of the medulla was finally settled by **LE GALLOIS** in 1812.) Yet **MICH. MALACARNE** (1744-1816) still asserted that the number of mental functions depended on the number of layers of the cerebellum. On the other hand, **ARCHANG. LO PICCOLOMINI** (1526-1605) and **FRIEDRICH HOFFMANN** (1660-1742) confusing, like the others, vital with mental functions, located the soul in the medulla oblongata.
SECTION III.

VIEWS OF THE SOUL, MIND, AND BRAIN,
XVIth to XVIIIth Century

CHAPTER VIII

ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY TO THE END OF THE XVIIIth CENTURY

FRANCIS BACON, Lord Verulam (1561-1626),

LORD CHANCELLOR of England in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, is usually called the father of the empirical scientific method.

The publication of his "Essays" in the year 1597, the work by which he is still most popularly known, brought him into considerable notice both in England and abroad. In 1605 he produced one of his most celebrated works, viz., his two books on the "Proficience and Advancement of Learning," a profound and comprehensive survey of the existing state and deficiencies of all the various branches of human knowledge. In 1620 Bacon surprised and delighted the learned world by the publication of the great work from which his philosophic fame has chiefly descended to our time, the "Novum Organum Scientiarum," i.e., a new instrument or method for interpreting nature.

Bacon discovered, or for the first time logically formulated, the inductive law of scientific discovery, a law withdrawing the mind from seeking theological or metaphysical explanations for the things of this life, and setting the landmarks of science within the limits of experience, as boundaries prescribed by Nature herself to human inquiry. From faith and belief man was to turn to doubt and inquiry; and, by the use of his own senses and reasoning faculties in the observation and interrogation of Nature by experiment, man was to acquire a knowledge of the actual world in which he lived.

Bacon taught that man was no longer to look to a supernatural world, and spend his time in the barren contemplation of it—that is to say, instead of constructing a world from his own conceptions, man was to consult experience and observation, so that he might have facts and not opinions to reason about. He was to concentrate his mind on the natural world as his actual dwelling-place, and whilst here to regard it as his real home. He was to rouse himself from a supine resignation to the evils of this life, and he was energetically to seek the diminution of human sorrows and the increase of human happiness, not in soliciting the supernatural, or appealing to Providence through prayer, but by making free use of his own intelligence; first, in acquiring a knowledge of, and interpreting nature, that is, tracing effects to their natural causes in order to discover their laws of action; and second, in rationally regulating and improving his life in obedience to the laws of nature.
Bacon threw off the yoke of Aristotle and Plato, which for centuries had weighed on mankind. His work consisted in an attempt at restoring knowledge to the path of fact and to the service of utility. He pointed out the various hindrances under which the pursuit of truth is prone to labour. The mind must be purified of all preconceptions, prejudices or “idols,” and it must proceed by a gradual method of observation and induction from particular to more general facts. The causes of error in all human speculations are: (1) the Idols of the Tribe; that disposition in the human mind to generalise too rapidly, and without a due regard to the number and well authenticated nature of particular facts; (2) the Idols of the Den, grounded on the natural and constitutional differences amongst men, joined to particular kinds of education, habits, stations of life, and so forth, which affect the judgment, and lead men to form wrong conclusions on many subjects; (3) the Idols of the Forum, which arise from the imperfections of language, and its wilful perversion for interested purposes; (4) the Idols of the Theatre, arising from attachments to particular systems or schools of philosophy, fettering the human mind from one generation to another.

In his Novum Organum (1620) Bacon declared that the “corruption of philosophy from superstition and theology introduced the greatest amount of evil both into whole systems of philosophy and into their parts.” He denounced those who “have endeavoured to found a natural philosophy on the books of Genesis and Job and other Sacred Scriptures, so seeking the living among the dead.” He speaks of the result as “an unwholesome mixture of things human and divine; not merely phantastic philosophy, but heretical religion.” Religious controversies, says Bacon, are pernicious. Let religion remain untouched, but let it not—after the manner of the Scholastics—be mixed up with science. The mingling of science with religion leads to unbelief; and the mingling of religion with science to extravagance. The mind must be freed from superstition and from prejudice of every kind, in order that, as a perfect mirror, it may so apprehend things as they are. Knowledge must be in harmony with experience. It should set out with observation and experiment, whence through induction it should rise methodically first to propositions of inferior, and to others of higher, generality, in order finally from these to redescend to the particular, and to arrive at discoveries which shall increase the power of man over nature. He attempted to limit and define philosophy, and to formulate a sound experimental method whereby the sum of knowledge might be augmented. This programme was of service, of course, to all sciences alike, mental as well as physical. His great merit was that he “led forth the sciences from their house of bondage”; that he directed the minds of men away from mere verbal disputations to the discovery of truth by observation and experiment; that he incited men to develop the industrial arts and to acquire knowledge and apply it “to the glory of God and the relief of man’s estate.”

In many parts of the writings of Bacon we find striking evidence of the firm persuasion that the mental faculties and powers of man were very different in their nature from those possessed by the brute creation. This difference was not one of degree but of kind.

He died suddenly, at the age of sixty-six, from an attack of bronchitis, consequent upon his having incautiously experimented with snow in the open air, to ascertain whether the effect of intense cold could preserve from putrefaction the flesh of a dead fowl. It was the initial experiment in a process that has resulted in our day in bringing millions of tons of frozen provisions to the market of England from distances of thousands of miles, yet preserved in their purity through lengthened periods of time.

Though great as a philosopher and lawyer, Bacon apparently was a seeker after wealth and power. The contrast between the records of his character and of his writings has never been explained.
shared with Bacon the belief that all knowledge comes from experience, besides making it clearer than his predecessor that experience of the world comes through the external senses alone. He is connected with Gassendi by his mathematical and physical interpretation of nature.

The honour is awarded to Hobbes of having been the first writer on mind who maintained that our sensations do not correspond with the qualities of external objects: for example, "that the said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of the motion, agitation, or alteration which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance in the head." In the "Meditations" of Descartes the same proposition is laid down.

During his residence abroad Hobbes had become acquainted with the physical philosophy of Galileo—the theory that regards every change in the external or phenomenal world as a mere rearrangement of matter and motion, matter being an aggregate of independent molecules held together by mechanical pressure and impact. The component parts of this aggregate become known to us by the impression their movements produce on our senses, traces of which are preserved in memory, and subsequently recalled by association. Language consists of signs conventionally affixed to such images; only the signs, standing as they do for all objects of a certain sort, have a universal value, not possessed by the original sensations, through which reasoning becomes possible.

Hobbes attempted to discover what was the essential nature of man. As a result of his psychological analysis of human nature, he reached the conclusion that all man's desires are essentially directed towards his own preservation and happiness, and what are apparently unselfish emotions are to be analysed and explained in terms of this self-regarding tendency. He found it necessary to deny that man is naturally a social animal, and to assert the primacy of man's egotistic tendencies. He classified human emotions and sentiments on the basis of the wider distinction between appetite and aversion, common also to animals. But "curiosity," Hobbes erroneously assumed, is an emotion "found in no other living creature but man." He distinguished within emotional life three innate conditions of attraction—pleasure, love, and desire—and three of repulsion—pain, aversion, and fear. The play of these, and of the emotions derived from them through association of ideas, is ruled by the striving toward power and honour, or ultimately toward self-preservation, a tendency shared by all men with all other beings. There is no disinterested passion for Hobbes.

He lays down clearly the principle of utilitarianism, and from it deduces his main dogmas. Sensation is the criterion of good; pleasure is a motion "helping vital action," a motion which appears in consciousness under the form of desire. The value of things is measured by the desire they engender, and their comparative excellence by the intensity of this desire. Again, it is in desire, and not in possession, that the good lies. Conduct should be regulated with the view to the useful, for a thing may not in itself be good which yet becomes so because it is conducive to happiness. Thus power may in itself not be delightful, but it has the effect of making others peaceably disposed towards us; it protects us against envy and malice; it compels respect; it wins for us good-will and love, and all these advantages make it desirable and good. The interest by which our actions should be guided is always individual interest. The instinctive hatred which men bear to their fellow-creatures may be veiled by politeness and education, but cannot be obliterated. But our hatred for others flows from self-love. As soon as our fellow-men serve our interest they become lovable. We may act benevolently towards others because it is an egotistical, and therefore a natural, action to feel that we have the power to make not only our own happiness but that of others. Pity for
others in their misfortune is the fear we have that the like calamity may befall ourselves. His doctrine is one of exclusive egoism.

Every man regards his neighbours with fear and suspicion. This condition leads men to enter with one another into a kind of treaty or contract, in which each renounces his freedom and limits his desires, on the understanding that all do the same. This social contract becomes the original foundation of the State's constitution. Right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice, have no meaning in themselves. They are only constitutional ideas which exist by the supreme will of the government. There is only one standard for the worth of actions, and that is public law. Religion is the child of fear, duty the offspring of self-interest, and both are the creatures of law, the artificial appointments of political expediency. Might is right, with Hobbes, and the sovereign is all-powerful.

JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704),

a physician by calling, used the method of observation and induction, and based his hypotheses on the study of children, animals, and primitive man.

He discarded the artificial dualism between the consciousness and the external world in favour of another dualistic conception, which consisted in distinguishing the inner from the outer sense; the former affording us cognition of our inner or psychic actions, the latter of external objects. He begins his "Essay concerning Human Understanding," 1690, with a vigorous polemic against the doctrine of innate ideas. Whatever a man knows, or can in any way conceive, is dependent on experience. All our ideas refer either to external data of sensation or internal operations of reflection.

To Locke, the world of objects revealed through sensation and reflection was no illusion, no creation of our own. We find it there, changing, when it changes, without, or even very much against, our will. Locke's view was that it consists of material bodies, some animated, and some not. And matter, the supposed substance of body, is made known to us by impressions on our organs of sense. But when we try to think of matter apart from these sensible qualities and the relations between them it vanishes into an empty abstraction.

The fundamental process of external perception is sensation, that of the spirit reflection, all perceptions and ideas of the external world being derived from sensation; in other words: no knowledge without experience. Hobbes merely assumed this; Locke supports his case by a formidable array of proofs. According to him, the mind begins with external sensations, and then by means of its faculties of perception, retention or memory, contemplation (comparison and reflection), and imagination, it executes all the particular operations of thinking and volition.

To Locke, reflection was largely a passive power: reflective upon the course or flow of our ideas, not itself determining this flow or course to be what it is. Reflection was an "inner sense." The actual flow of ideas was due to the laws of association.

Locke almost wholly ignored the emotional side of human nature in his psychology as in his educational theory. Even the feelings and moral principles result mediately from the understanding. Intellectual and moral principles are recognised by mankind only by some, and by those only as the result of teaching. Just as there are no innate ideas, so there are no innate moral principles.

According to Locke, "the passions are modes of pleasure and pain, resulting in our minds from various considerations of good and evil." While reflecting on the pleasure which a thing that is present or absent may give us, we have the idea of
what we call love. On the other hand, reflection on the pain which a thing present or absent may cause in us produces the idea of what is called hatred. Joy, sadness, hope, fear, despair, anger, envy, are all, in like manner, modes of pleasure and pain and different forms of the uneasiness which is caused by the absence of a good or the presence of an evil. These divers passions are often mixed in life.

Locke uses the term "faculties," for it would be affectation for the philosopher to wish to deviate in his speech from common usage and to strike the well-known powers from his vocabulary. Still, he should not forget that they are not active persons or agents, but simply attach to active persons. Understanding would indeed be impossible if there were no faculty of understanding; however, it is not this faculty which works upon another faculty, for example, upon that of will. "It is the mind that operates and exerts these powers; it is the man that does the action; it is the agent that has power or is able to do." First comes the thought, then the action.

The will, according to him, is the faculty of choosing from several thoughts or motions, and liberty is the possibility of putting into execution the thoughts or motions chosen by the will. "We are endowed with a power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from determining the will and engaging us in action." We can compare our desires and calculate their consequences. The choice will be determined by our desire to avoid pain and desire for happiness. "In this lies the liberty a man has." Freedom has to do with action, not with will. A man is not free to will and not to will. So far as a man's power of acting in accordance with his own thought extends, so far is he free. It is plain that Locke did not go to the root of the matter; he does not tell us how our desires and impulses arise. We are free to choose between a number of desires—on that point we are all agreed—but these desires arise from and are dependent upon our organisation. The gratification of these pre-organised desires gives us pleasure, and that is why we think we have chosen them of our own accord.

According to Locke, it is "a certain and evident truth that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being, which whether anyone will please to call God it matters not." We have no innate ideas or direct intuition of the Almighty, but our experience proves to demonstration his existence. Locke refused toleration to atheists on the ground that their denial of a divine lawgiver and judge destroys the basis of morality. For him morality is constituted by the will of God. Revealed religion is to him the only sure ground for the belief in the soul.

The consequences of Locke's tabula rasa doctrine that all knowledge is derived from experience was shown by the celebrated Dr. JOHNSON. This shrewd literary and observing man considered the gift of genius as a thing that, when once existing, might be directed any way. Newton, he thought, might have been a Shakespeare. For, said he, a man who can run fifty miles to the south, can run fifty miles to the north.

ANDREW BAXTER (1686-1750)

The freedom and activity consequent upon the political revolution of 1688, and the influence of Locke's Essay, as also of the new physics, were manifest in the variety of directions taken by philosophical investigation. One of the most conspicuous of these directions was towards materialism. Discussions and controversies in respect to the nature and immortality of the soul began in the XVIIth century, and were prosecuted during the greater part of the XVIIIth. Among the many writers who wrote on this subject we may mention, in 1704, WILLIAM COWARD (1656-1725); in 1708, HENRY DODWELL (1641-1711); and in 1737, Andrew Baxter, with his work, "Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul." Baxter ascribed all the imperfections of the human soul to its mechanical connection with the body,
and on this supposition he attempted to show that the mistakes and mental delusions which arise from dreaming, spectral illusions, drunkenness, etc., are derivable from this source. In his "Essay on Dreaming" he affirmed that it is not the soul itself which is the cause, but some "living intelligent cause" which tampers with the brain, and anticipated the modern explanation of the origin of illusions and hallucinations. He said:

"It requires but a greater degree of the same power to make delusory impressions upon the sensorium, while real external objects are making true impressions upon it, than it would require to make the same impressions while no other impression from external objects is made upon it at the same time. If one is made to see in his sleep a man pursuing him with a drawn sword, there are certain proper vibrations excited in the optic nerves, or such impressions made upon that part of the brain upon which the optic nerves act, as if these vibrations were excited in them; and if the same vibrations are more powerfully excited in the optic nerves while the eyes are open, than those excited by external objects then acting, the man pursuing with the drawn sword will still appear, even though the eyes are open. And thus by easy steps we see that dreaming may degenerate into possession; and that the cause and nature of both is the same, differing in degree, for dreaming is but possession in sleep. . . . What is said with respect to the objects of sight is easily applicable to those of hearing. . . . The more pregnant instances, where people are subjected to illusions of the fancy, and such things as disorder their imaginations, generally happen after the brain hath been discomposed with anger, fear, disappointment, or other violent passions."

ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER, EARL OF SHAFTESBURY (1671-1713)

arranged the affections, not according to their different modes, but according to the objects towards which they are directed. He discovered in man self-regarding impulses and their opposites—benevolent or social impulses, which cause us to love the happiness of others for its own sake, and without any regard to our own. To these two classes of impulses he added rational or reflective tendencies, which imply reason; these consist in the sense of esteem or contempt which we feel in the presence of moral beauty or ugliness, and have for their object human actions, or rather, the thoughts or affections which are their source. When we imagine an action we experience a feeling which is either agreeable or painful, as when we hear a harmony or a discord. We distinguish good from evil by a kind of delicate sense, an innate moral sense, whose existence manifests itself in our rational impulses; a sense which finds more sweetness in the subtle joys of self-sacrifice than in the brutal satisfaction of egoism. By trusting to its guidance we shall find happiness without seeking it. These impulses not only give rise to judgments, but also intervene as determining forces, as springs of action. Virtue consists in the harmony between our personal and benevolent impulses, induced by our rational impulses. Virtue and happiness are identical. It does not appear that Shaftesbury recognised that there are men born without this innate moral sense, and those who possess it are not all endowed with it to the same degree. Indeed, in most men, life is a battle between the egoistic tendencies and the moral sense.

GEORGE BERKELEY (1684-1753).

Bishop, born in Ireland, spent some years in London in that brilliant literary circle of Addison, Swift, Steele, Pope, and others. He represented in his writings orthodox Christianity as opposed to the "mathematical atheism" of his age.

According to Berkeley, there are no abstract ideas—i.e., no thoughts unassociated with some mental image besides a mere word; and matter or inanimate substance would be such an idea, therefore it does not exist. There is nothing but mind and its contents—ideas—or what we call states of consciousness. Even the earth, the
sea, the heavens themselves, and all that they contain, are merely impressions on the sensorium. The unriality of material things is stated by him very clearly in the opening words of his “Principles of Human Knowledge” (1710):

“It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge that they are either ideas actually imprinted upon the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or, lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination. . . . But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises diverse operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul, or Myself. . . . That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations, or ideas, imprinted on the senses, however blended or combined together, cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.”

Whence, then, come the objects of our consciousness, and whither do they go when we cease to perceive them? Berkeley replies that all things subsist in the consciousness of God, and by their subsistence his existence is proved. Man knew because God knew. His omniscience was the original of our knowledge, his ideas the archetypes of ours. Our ideas, indeed, were a sort of divine speech, nature a visual language spoken by God and interpreted by man. The direct apprehension of reality that is not ourselves only becomes possible through what would be called in modern language a subjective participation in the divine consciousness, more feebly reflected, it would seem, in the memories, imaginations, and reasonings of our finite minds.

The soul, according to Berkeley, is a simple active being revealed to us through experience, but not perceived in any concrete experience. It is a concept drawn from the mental life. Nothing exists except spirits; the other existences, whose essence is to be perceived, are maintained by the perception of God, who is the true cause of their appearance to us. When perceiving, mind is reason; when acting, it is will.

Berkeley, in his “Theory of Vision” (1709), attempts to prove that extension is not a real attribute of things in themselves, but an intellectual construction, or what Locke would have called an “idea of reflection.” Till then people had thought that its objectivity was firmly established by the concurrent testimony of two senses, sight and touch. Berkeley shows, on the contrary, that visible and tangible extension are not the same thing, that the sensations—or, as he calls them, the ideas—of sight and touch are two different languages whose words we learn by experience to interpret in terms of each other without their being necessarily connected.

 **BISHOP BUTLER (1692-1752)**

The leading principle which pervades all the speculations of J. Butler (1736) is that there is a more exact correspondence between the natural world and the constitution of man than is commonly imagined. We perceive that his inward frame displays a striking agreement with his bodily form; and both harmonise with the physical arrangements of the universe. Our various passions, feelings, and emotions are peculiarly adapted to our condition. When we submit our constitution to examination, and pay attention to what our consciousness indicates, we recognise a remarkable fitness between the external senses and various bodies and elements around us. We see a complicated system of organs and instruments suited to accomplish certain fixed ends or purposes. The eye is made to see, the palate to taste, and the ear to hear; and when we look at the intimations which we have of external things, in and through these varied channels, and compare them with the
hidden and internal faculties of the soul, we perceive a radical conformity to a high principle of order and system. Human nature is not a simple or uniform element, but a combination of many things, which blend and harmonise for a definite end. The body is an aggregate of different senses, organs, and functions; and our intellectual nature is compounded of a number of instincts, judgments, passions, emotions, and propensities. Over all these numerous parts and offices of thought and feeling there presides a ruling power which is uniform in its nature and influence among all classes of men, and whose especial province it is to exercise a controlling authority over all these faculties—and this power is the act of reflection. It goes under various other designations, but of its existence and influence we can entertain no doubt whatever. It is our constant guide, monitor, and judge.

Butler observes: “That which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and action. Brute creatures are impressed and educated by various instincts and propensities; so also are we. But in addition to these, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them objects of our thought.”

Conscience, as understood by Butler, is not the enlightened and educated conscience of the man who has reflected on the origin and consequences of human actions, but the untutored conscience of any ordinary unreflecting person—in fact, of the “plain, honest man.”

That the conscience admits of education, and that the uneducated conscience is a very inadequate guide, are considerations of which Butler takes no heed. He fails to see that, in the case of ordinary men, the conscience is simply the aggregate of those moral ideas and feelings which have been derived partly from personal experience, partly from the accumulated experience of mankind, transmitted from age to age, and impressed on the individual by the various influences which together constitute his education, e.g., parental authority, influence of friends and society, law and religious instruction. The decisions of reason are often out of harmony with those of conscience, as it exists in its unenlightened form.

Butler confined himself to introspection. He made no attempt to compare human nature under a variety of circumstances, in different times and nations, and the like.

FRANCIS HUTCHESON (1694-1746)

made a not quite successful attempt to distinguish between instinct, affection, and passion, and discussed the function of the instincts in determining conduct, and their relation to reason (“Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions,” 1728). Hobbes had maintained that all our actions have their ultimate source in self-love. In opposition to this, it was maintained by Hutcheson that many of our actions spring solely from a regard to others, and that, in fact, this is the case with all those of which, on reflection, we approve. The only quality, either in our own actions or in those of others, which commends itself to our approbation is their benevolence or unselfishness. His general position was that, “Though we have instincts determining us to desire ends, without supposing any previous reasoning, yet it is by the use of our reason that we find out the means of attaining our ends.” Reason itself can never determine any end. “No reason can excite to action previously to some end, and no end can be proposed without some instinct or affection.” He explained the nature of instinct:

“We may further observe something in our nature determining us very frequently to action, distinct from both sensation and desire, if by desire we mean a
distinct inclination to something apprehended as good, either public or private, or as the means of avoiding evil, viz., a certain propensity of instinct to objects and actions, without any conception of them as good, or as the means of preventing evil. . . Thus in anger, beside the intention of removing the uneasy sensation from the injury received; beside the desire of obtaining a reparation of it and security for the future, which are some sort of Goods, intended by men when they are calm, as well as during the passion, there is in the passionate person a propensity to occasion misery to the offended, even when there is no intention of any good to be obtained, or evil avoided, by this violence. And it is principally this propensity which we denote by the name of anger. . . . This part of our constitution is as intelligible as many others universally observed and acknowledged; such as these, that danger of falling makes us stretch out our hands; noise makes us wink; that a child is determined to suck, many other animals to rise up and walk; some to run into water, before they can have any notion of good to be obtained or evil avoided by these means.” (Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, 1728.)

Hutcheson arranged the “natural powers” in six classes: (1) the external senses; (2) the “internal sense,” which determines the pleasures arising from the perception of “regular, harmonious, uniform objects, as also from grandeur and novelty.” (3) The “public sense,” which determines us “to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery.” It gives rise to the “desire for company,” and apparently underlies “benevolence and compassion,” and corresponds to our gregarious instinct. (4) The “moral sense,” which determines the perception of virtue and vice in ourselves or others. (5) The “sense of honour,” which makes us pleased at the approbation of others and ashamed at their condemnation. (6) The sense of the ridiculous.

Desires and aversions fall into similar classes. Desires and aversions are determined by apprehended good and evil. They may be divided as primary or secondary, according as they are directed towards ends determined by “natural propensities” or affections, or towards ends which merely serve as means for the attaining of primary ends. In the latter category he would place such desires as the desire for wealth and power.

Desire is generally accompanied by an uneasy sensation, but the desire is not a desire simply to remove the uneasiness. Further there is a pleasant sensation attending the gratification of desire, in addition to the satisfaction obtained from the object itself of the desire, but “desire doth never arise from a view of obtaining that sensation of joy, connected with the success or gratification of the desire.” In the case of the appetites, these are always characterised by the fact that there is “uneasy sensation” antecedently to “any opinion of good in the object.” They are instincts. The object is esteemed good because it allays the pain or uneasiness, but it is “desired” prior to its being experienced as “good.”

Hutcheson drew a sharp distinction between egoism and benevolence. We desire the happiness of others as directly as our own. Benevolence is an ultimate feeling. Besides these two affections, we find within us the primary idea of the moral good. And this simple quality of moral goodness can only be perceived by a special sense. This is the moral sense, whose perceptions, like all sensible perception, are accompanied by pleasure and pain. Adapted to the perception of a quality which is to be found in our intentions and acts only, our moral sense is not an external but an internal sense. Moreover, Hutcheson saw goodness in those actions only which tend to the happiness of others; universal benevolence constitutes moral excellence.

He placed fear in the same category with anger. He also recognised what we call the gregarious instinct as of the same order, but he enumerated it among the “appetites.”
physician and later Professor of Chemistry, was a follower of Locke. In his work, "On the Derangements of the Intellectual Functions," he dealt with the relation of mind and brain and had some significant observations to make:

"Judgment is determined by sensation, and volition is the effect of judgment. Moreover, the relation which exists between sensation and volition is always effected by means of the brain and an act of judgment, and one can therefore hardly doubt that this act of judgment depends on certain movements which take place in the brain and on various modifications of these movements. As to the nature of these phenomena we are still in ignorance. It has not been possible to demonstrate that any part whatsoever of the brain is more concerned than any other in the act of judgment. We have no idea of the part taken in this operation by the different portions of the brain. Our data being thus limited, it is obviously very difficult to determine the particular cerebral conditions underlying the various states of our intellectual functions. These physiologic considerations should precede, however, the examination of the derangement of the functions of the intelligence. Although each portion of the brain doubtless has a special significance of its own, it is, nevertheless, necessary for the organ to act together as a whole in order that the judgment may remain intact." Cullen, in his "First Lines of the Practice of Physik" (London, 1777), dealt with paranoic forms of insanity, called by him "Vesantia."

DAVID HUME (1711-1776),

philosopher and historian, born at Edinburgh, published two great works, "Treatise of Human Nature," 1739, and "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," 1747. He accepted, like Berkeley, only what is immediately revealed to our senses, but he asks, if we have no experience of an external world and the existence of matter apart from perception, must not the spiritual world be denied as well? If we can know nothing but what the senses reveal, there is no room for a knowledge of mind.

He divided the contents of consciousness into two classes, impressions and ideas—the second being copies of the first, and distinguished from them by their relative faintness. From these perceptions (which he called thoughts), Descartes had passed by an immediate inference to the ego or self, which he affirmed as the primary fact of consciousness, whereas Hume did not grant the existence of the metaphysical self—of a simple and continued substance, as distinguished from particular states of consciousness. We are, he declared, "nothing but a bundle of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." He distinguished among impressions the first data of experience, "inner" and "outer" impressions. Inner impressions were those of the inner sphere itself, such as pleasures, pains, efforts, etc.; and outer impressions were those received by the senses and having the imprint of externality. All possible materials of knowledge, of experience throughout, arise in impressions; and since the term sensation is commonly used for such first data of knowledge, "sensationalism" became the term applied to the resulting theory of knowledge.

The course of ideas—their flow, connection, composition—was ruled by the principle of association.

Three cases of association were recognised: the cases of "resemblance," "contiguity" in space and time, and "cause and effect." Things repeatedly and invariably associated together become parts of one whole over which "habit" overflows, and to which habit gives the sanction of a universal and necessary connection. By "habit," said Hume, the associated impressions and ideas are bound into aggregates and wholes, to which belief and custom attach. All necessity
attaching to the course of events, either internal or external, is due to habit. What we are in the habit of finding we take to be true and necessary. We have no final certainty of anything. Reason furnishes no assured test of thought or action. Custom is our only guarantee, and probability our only guide in life.

If we know only states of consciousness, we know nothing of a mind, soul, or God underlying them. Evidence is reduced to a stream or bundle of disconnected perceptions. We can no more deduce God from them than material objects. The existence of the soul is merely a tradition which has been uncritically accepted, and no demonstration of its existence ever had been, or could be, made.

Hume’s method is wholly inductive, but, instead of appealing solely to self-introspection, it is based on the observation and comparison of various types of character and sentiment, collected from the different ages and countries of the world as well as on the registration of individual experiences. Whereas hitherto there had been a prevailing disposition to study principally, or even exclusively, the understanding, Hume’s works make decisive progress in recognising the importance of the affective qualities.

Hume did not, like nearly all his predecessors and contemporaries, find the determining grounds of volition in ideas, but in the feelings. Impassive reason can never itself become a motive. It is only capable of influencing the will indirectly, through the aid of some affection. Abstract relations of ideas, and facts as well, leave us entirely indifferent so long as they fail to acquire an emotional value through their relation to our state of mind. Reason is not motive for action, but has merely the function of directing the “impulse received from appetite or inclination.” The sole determining motives are the passions. Passions may be calm or violent, and it is when the motive is of the calm kind that we are deceived into thinking that the motive is reason.

When we speak of a victory of reason over passion it is nothing but a conquest of one passion by another, i.e., of a violent passion by a calm one. That which is commonly called reason here is nothing but one of those general calm affections (e.g., the love of life) which direct the will to a distant good, without exciting any sensible emotion in the mind; by passion we commonly understand the violent passions only, which engender a marked disturbance in the soul and the production of which requires a certain propinquity of the object. A man is said to be industrious “from reason,” when a calm desire for money makes him laborious. It is a mistake to consider all violent passions powerful and all calm ones weak. The prevalence of calm affections constitutes the essence of strength of mind. Reason is thus a slave of the passions.

Hume thus distinguished calm passions (including beauty and deformity) and violent passions (love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility). Next he divided them into direct or simple and indirect or complex passions. The direct arise from pleasure and pain, and include desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear; these passions become indirect and complex as the object of the passion is either oneself (pleasure and pain becoming pride and humility) or some other person (pleasure and pain becoming love and hate).

Moral distinctions are determined by our sense of the agreeable and the disagreeable. We approve such traits of character as are immediately agreeable or useful, either to the person himself or to others. If the moral value of actions is thus made to depend on their effects, we cannot dispense with the assistance of reason in judging moral questions, since it alone can inform us concerning these results of action. Reason, however, is not sufficient to determine us to praise or blame. Nothing but a sentiment can induce us to give the preference to beneficial and useful tendencies over pernicious ones. This feeling is evidently no other than satisfaction in the happiness of men and uneasiness in view of their misery—in short, it is sympathy. Hume defined sympathy as that propensity we have “to
receive by communication" the "inclinations and sentiments" of others, i.e., suggestibility; but in the case of opinions, he distinguished between the effects of sympathy and those of "authority." Upon this sympathy he based the various phenomena arising really from the gregarious instinct.

By means of the imagination we enter into the experience of others and participate in their joy and sorrow. Whatever depresses or rejoices them, whatever inspires them with pride, fills us with similar emotions. From the habit of sympathetically passing moral judgment on the actions of others, and of seeing our own judged by them, is developed the further one of keeping a constant watch over ourselves and of considering our dispositions and deeds from the standpoint of the good of others. This custom is called conscience. Allied to this is the love of reputation, which constantly leads us to ask, How will our behaviour appear in the eyes of those with whom we associate?

In order that an action may gain the approval of the spectator two other things are required besides its salutary effects: it must be a mark of character, of a permanent disposition, and it must proceed from disinterested motives. Hume is obliged by this latter position to show that disinterested benevolence actually exists, that the unselfish affections do not secretly spring from self-love. To cite only one of the thousand examples of benevolence in which no discernible interest is concerned, we desire happiness for our friends even when we have no expectation of participating in it. The accounts of human selfishness are greatly overdrawn. Because virtue, in the outcome, produces inner satisfaction and it is praised by others, it does not follow that it is practised merely for the sake of these agreeable consequences.

Only after we have experienced the pleasure which comes from the satisfaction of an original motive (e.g., ambition), can this become the object of a conscious reflective search after pleasure, or of egoism. Power brings no enjoyment to the man by nature devoid of ambition, and he who is naturally ambitious does not desire fame because it affords him pleasure, but conversely, fame affords him pleasure because he desires it. The case is the same with benevolence as with the love of fame. It is implanted in the constitution of our minds as an original impulse immediately directed toward the happiness of other men. After it has been exercised, and its exercise rewarded, it is indeed possible for the expectation of the agreeable consequences to lead us to the repetition of beneficent acts. But the original motive is not an egoistic regard for useful consequences.

The advent of Hume denoted the period which initiated the discussion of the mental powers of animals. Descartes had tried to prove that the bodies of men and animals are machines actuated by springs like watches, but that man possessed in addition a soul, wholly different in its properties from his body, and apparently incapable of being acted upon by it. Man only can think; animals are capable only of physical sensations, and have no consciousness. Animals were supposed to act from "blind instinct," a supposition which was still held in the last century and helped to strengthen the conviction that the mental processes of animals are unsearchable. Hume appealed to the observation of domesticated and other animals of high grade. The facts seemed to him to show that animals as well as men are endowed with reason and able to draw inferences; he did not, however, credit them with the power of framing general statements, holding that experience operates on them, as on children and the generality of mankind, by "custom" alone. He saw no ground for drawing a line between the mental powers of man and those of the higher animals, though he attributed to man a power of demonstrative reasoning to which animals do not attain. In this he substantially agreed with Aristotle.

David Hartley (1705-1757), physician and philosopher, a contemporary of Hume, devoted himself to discovering
the principle of the connection of ideas. This he found to consist in the laws of association, to which feeling and willing, as derivative faculties, were both subject. He explained complex psychic phenomena and even the most elevated thoughts and feelings by means of the association of sensations and simple perceptions. To this psychological association corresponds the physiological phenomenon of brain vibrations, and Hartley realised that these notions, which at first were accompanied by full consciousness, become, through repetition, unconscious or automatic.

In his "Observations on Man" (1749) he developed a moral philosophy, consisting of two parts:

(1) Of an attempt to trace the genesis of the several principles which supply the motives of action. These are, according to the order in which he placed them, imagination, ambition, self-interest, sympathy, theopathy, and the moral sense.

(2) An attempt to regulate and adjust these various principles by a careful estimate of the nature and amount of pleasure which each of them, when made an object of pursuit, is calculated to produce either by itself or in combination with others, and by this method to frame a rule of life. The first part is mainly psychological, the second strictly moral.

All these principles are traced ultimately to sensation. They are all factitious, and are all of them the result of a constant repetition of sensations blended together, and combined, as it were, into a new entity by means of association. Sensation is the common foundation of them all, and each in its turn, when sufficiently generated, contributes to generate and fashion all the rest. Let sensation, e.g., generate imagination; then will sensation and imagination together generate ambition, or love of honour and consideration; sensation, imagination, ambition, and self-interest will generate sympathy; sensation, imagination, ambition, self-interest, and sympathy will generate theopathy; and all these together constitute the moral sense. The pleasures of sensation are alone original, the others are factitious. In this way we advance from the organic and bodily to the imaginative and intellectual, and from the intellectual to the moral and the spiritual pleasures. As we advance we become less and less selfish, more and more spiritual; we forget ourselves more and more, until all regard for self is lost in the love of others, and eminently in the love of God, and in admiration of those moral attributes which he alone exhibits in perfection. In Hartley's language, we begin with self-love and end with self-annihilation. He does not deny the existence of purely disinterested actions or feelings, but he maintains that they have, in the progress of the individual's life, been transmitted, by means of association, out of acts and feelings which were at first purely self-regarding.

THOMAS REID (1710-1796),

the Scotch professor, author of "Inquiry into the Human Mind," 1764, was roused by Hume's philosophy to the philosophy of "Common Sense."

The theory that we do not perceive objects immediately, but only through ideas, Reid held to be a fiction. His own theory is that of immediate perception. We do not start with ideas, but with judgments. There is at first a sensation, and the sensation "suggests" a perception. Every perception is or involves a "judgment." Common sense is the criterion of knowledge or ultimate appeal. The principles of common sense relate to "contingent truths" and "necessary truths." Among the first, he placed the existence of everything of which we are conscious—those things are what we perceive them to be; the freedom of the will; the life and intelligence of our fellow-men; and the uniformity of nature. Among the second he placed all mathematical truths and logical axioms, and all principles of moral and metaphysical truths.

Reid ("Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind," 1788) divided the "active powers" into three groups: mechanical principles of action (habit, instinct); animal principles (appetites, desires, affections); and rational principles. Under
instinct in its mechanical sense Reid included mainly what we prefer to call reflexes; but he included also imitation, and even "instinctive" belief, which plays an important part in the education of the child.

He recognised that there are two elements or constituents of human nature which determine human conduct, and which have been known by mankind in all ages as "passion" and "reason." The meaning of the word passion is so uncertain as to have given rise to endless discussion. "I shall," says Reid, "by the word 'passion' mean not any principle of action distinct from those desires and affections before explained, but such a degree of vehemence in them, as is apt to produce these effects upon the body or upon the mind which have been above described." Passion tends to good, and it is only by accident that it leads us into evil. Reid meant by "passions" impulses of our "animal nature," which are common to man and brute animals, and characteristic of children "before the use of reason." Opposed to passion is reason. This "reason" is the specific difference between the nature of man and the nature of brutes. It is "superior to every passion, and able to give law to it."

Reid pointed out the appetites (hunger, thirst, lust, need of action and rest), which are preceded by disagreeable sensations and are periodic. Desires differ from appetites, firstly, in that they are not accompanied by a disagreeable sensation; secondly, in that they are not periodic. The chief desires are the desire of power, the desire of honour, and the desire of knowledge. The principle of the desires is not, any more than that of the appetites, the pursuit of pleasure: the appetites tend to the preservation of the body, desires have been given to us for the furtherance of social life.

Those principles of action which have persons for their immediate object, and which imply that one is either ill or well disposed towards a man, or at least towards a living being, are the affections. The benevolent affections cannot be reduced to egoism. Naturally pleasant, they are directed towards the happiness of their object (gratitude, compassion, esteem, friendship, love, patriotism). Even the malevolent affections, the chief among which are emulation, anger, and resentment, serve a purpose in the plan of Providence. These principles of action are "such as operate upon the will and intention, but do not suppose any exercise of judgment or reason, and are most of them to be found in some brute animals, as well as in man."

**ADAM SMITH (1723-1790),**

the "father" of political economy, propounded a "Theory of Moral Sentiments" (1759) and rules of conduct on the psychological laws of sympathy, by which he meant the communication to our minds of all the feelings of others. He remarks, for instance, that it is impossible to witness the sufferings of others without being affected by the contagion of this suffering. Nature has joined us in a fellowship with other men, so that their pleasures and their pains become our pleasures and pains. When we approve of our own actions, it is because, when we place ourselves in the position of an impartial spectator, we can, from his point of view, sympathise with the motives which dictated our conduct.

From this modest germ he developed by a progressive growth the wide-spreading tree of morality: moral judgment, the moral imperative with its religious sanction, and ethical character. Accordingly we may distinguish different stages in the development of sympathy: the psychological stage of mere fellow-feeling, the aesthetic stage of moral appreciation, the imperative stage of moral precepts, which further on are construed as commands of God; finally, the concluding stage wherein these laws of duty are taken up into the disposition. The difference of intensity between the original and the sympathetic feelings differs widely with the
various classes of emotions. It is difficult to take part in feelings which arise from bodily conditions, but easy to share those in the production of which the imagination is concerned—it is easier to share in hope and fear than in pleasure and pain. We are also more potently influenced by the causes of suffering than by the signs of it. The wooden leg of the beggar is more effective in exciting our pity than his anxious air.

Nature has so willed it that this feeling of sympathy should not fail to bring pleasure, and it may be sought for its own charm. Evil fails to attract us; the heart, when it follows its natural inclinations, is always drawn to the good. The impulses of sympathy are always towards what we call morality. Consequently, we should have only those sentiments and should perform only those actions which ought to bring the approbation of our fellow-creatures and gain their sympathy. Sometimes, even, we should act in opposition to prejudice and face public censure, in order to obtain from posterity, which is the only equitable judge of conduct, a tardy but universal sympathy, and one that will last for ever. If the actions of others did not sometimes excite in us sympathy and sometimes antipathy, we should have no conception of the moral value of our own actions. A man alone in the world would remain ignorant of good and evil. We should judge our actions as impartial spectators.

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY (1733-1804),

the naturalist, chemist (isolated oxygen, 1774), and theologian, made Hartley's ideas, which at first passed unnoticed, more generally known. He gave them a materialistic colour by affirming the identity of the mental and cerebral processes, and maintaining that the former can be understood solely through the study of the latter. He explicitly taught the identity of mind and brain. This is fully developed in his "Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit," 1777.

Priestley enters on the discussion of his subject with a statement of his views as to the nature of matter, and to the notions hitherto entertained of it. Matter is not inert, but a certain power or force is necessary to its solidity or essence, without which every particle would fall from every other and be dispersed. This opinion formed the groundwork of his subsequent reasonings respecting the homogeneous nature of man. Man is unquestionably endowed with perception and thought, but these depend upon the brain and nervous system. As far as we are able to judge, the faculty of thinking and the state of the brain always bear a certain correspondence or relation to each other. There is no instance of the existence of thought when the brain is destroyed; and whenever that material organ is injured, or impeded in its regular and natural movements there is a corresponding derangement in the mind or thought. Thought depends on the material organisation. If thought were the result of an immaterial substance, we might expect it to display more vigour and activity in proportion as the bodily frame became weakened and diseased; but the very contrary of this is the case. If the mental principle were immaterial, all the faculties of mind would be so too; whereas we see several of these well-defined powers greatly impaired during old age and during the process of bodily distempers and maladies. "Since, therefore, all the faculties of the mind, separately taken, appear to be mortal, the substance or principle in which they exist must be pronounced to be mortal too." The nature of many of our affections militates against the notion of the immateriality of the thinking principle. They can be improved or depraved. For these reasons, mind is merely a property of matter. Priestley attempted to strengthen this conclusion from the consideration of various mental phenomena, where the sympathy between the mind and body is conspicuous; from certain declarations in the Scriptures; and from the history of opinions relative to the origin of the soul, and the nature of matter, entertained by philosophers from the earliest period down to his own time.
who was a disciple of Hobbes and of Helvétius, and a jurist as well as a philosopher, gave by his profound analysis of the different kinds of pleasure a new development to utilitarianism, the principles of which he, moreover, applied to jurisprudence. His morals are based on the principle of utility. To attain pleasure and to avoid pain are the great ends in life and the springs of all our actions. He opposed the earlier writers on morals who laboured to find some principle of approbation or disapprobation in the human mind capable of speaking with authority on matters of right and wrong, and of enforcing obedience to its dictates. It was, according to his judgment, a method which was wholly arbitrary, and based the laws of conduct on no solid foundation. The principle, which according to him should be the starting-point in our moral judgment, is derived from the consideration of the consequences of our actions. Those actions are good, the consequences of which we can foresee will result in pleasure for us, or at least in more pleasure than pain. Even criminal pleasures are bad only because of the painful consequences which they involve.

An act is good not because it is approved by conscience, or because it proceeds from one motive rather than another; but simply because it promotes the happiness of those whom it affects. Moral sanction, strictly so-called, that of self-approbation or self-disapprobation is entirely ignored by him. What he calls moral sanction is in reality social sanction. The instruments by which, according to him, human conduct is regulated are self-love, regard for the opinion of others respecting ourselves, fear of God, and fear of the Law. The effect of an action on the sum total of human happiness gives it its moral character.

Although all pleasures are good, they vary in degree of intensity, duration certainty, purity, etc., and their comparative value is a science of moral arithmetic. The social consequences of our acts must be considered most especially; they outweigh individual interests. Men seldom measure these. In a theft we perceive only the wrong done to the person robbed, and not the greater evil which will result from the bad example. Laws are provisions made in order to ensure to citizens the greatest sum of happiness possible. It is their utility that constitutes their justice. The pain of punishment which is inflicted is not in order to satisfy a desire of vengeance, but to prevent or to make less frequent the recurrence of guilty actions.

The British philosophers mentioned in this chapter, from Hobbes to Reid and Bentham—and especially Hume—may be described as Ethologists, for their speculations were largely concerned with "human motives," which form the basis of character. (See Chapter XXV.)
CHAPTER IX
PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE, HOLLAND, GERMANY, ETC.

XVIIth Century Philosophy

RENÉ DESCARTES (1596-1650)

Was no mere speculative philosopher. He was one of the first to regard the brain as an organ subserving the interaction between mind and body, and the first to state definitely that the brain is the organ of sensation, of thought, and of emotion. But in Descartes' time, and for a hundred and fifty years afterwards, the best physiologists had not reached that point. It remained, down to the time of Bichat and Gall, a question whether the passions were or were not located in the abdominal viscera.

Descartes distinguished sharply between matter and spirit, defining the former as extended substance, the latter as inextended thinking substance. He held that the whole material world and all its processes were to be explained mechanically by means of the conceptions of extension, divisibility, and mobility. He was the first of the moderns to attempt to give a mechanical theory of the evolution of the world, teaching that purely mechanical explanation in terms of matter and motion must apply not only to the planetary movements and to all the realm of inorganic matter, but also to the processes of organic bodies. He wrote:

"All the functions of the body follow naturally from the sole disposition of its organs, just in the same way that the movements of a clock or other self-acting machine or automaton follow from the arrangement of its weights and wheels. So that there is no reason on account of its functions to conceive that there exists in the body any soul, whether vegetative or sensitive, or any principle of movement other than the blood and its animal spirits agitated by the heat of the fire which burns continually in the heart, and which does not differ in nature from any of the other fires which are met with in inanimate bodies."

He distinguished mind and body as two substances separate and incompatible. They have different properties, and each has its own specific characters or marks. The essence of the body, he says, is "extension"; and the essence of mind is "thought." These two substances are known in different ways. They form the subject-matter of different scientific interests. They are investigated by different methods. The method of the physical sciences is mathematics; the method of psychology, the science of mind, on the contrary, is introspection, inner observation of the events of consciousness. This second position is summed up in the famous Cartesian saying: "I think, therefore I am."

"Doubt" is, with Descartes, the starting-point of all thought, the solvent which must be brought to bear on all inherited beliefs and opinions bequeathed by education and authority. He found it possible to doubt the presentation of his senses, the contents of his memory, and even the demonstration of mathematics. He could doubt all things—except his thinking, i.e., self-consciousness.
He argued that the reasoning soul "can by no means be deduced from the power of matter, but must be expressly created; it is of a nature wholly independent of the body, and consequently is not liable to die with the latter; and finally, because no other causes are observed capable of destroying it, we are naturally led to judge that it is immortal."

The soul was conceived by Descartes as the fixed and immutable something, from which all thoughts, feelings, and acts of volition emanate. It is everywhere in the body, but its principal seat, its precise point of conjunction with the body, is the pineal gland. Because of the median position of this structure at the base of the brain, he thought it was the point where the senses, which are all double, form a junction of their impressions. Here the soul, besides its own processes of pure understanding, imagines and perceives; the medium of its sensations being nerves running from its seat in the brain to every part of the body. The movements propagated from the peripheral extremities to the central spot excite different sensations, differing partly as the nerves are different, partly as the motion in the same nerve is of a different kind. The varying state of the blood affects the nerves with different kinds of motion; if it be pure and well-tempered, it quickens their sensibility and gives them an action which excites natural joy in the soul; if it be gross and sluggish, a heavier movement ensues which carries a feeling of depression to the soul. Whenever, from any other cause than the state of the blood, these different movements are imparted, the corresponding feeling will occur.

The molecular changes which take place in the brain and are propagated along the motor nerves to the muscles Descartes described as "animal spirits," and in similar manner "animal spirits" were thought by him to convey sensation along sensory nerves to the brain, where we should now speak of molecular changes conducted along them. For Descartes the animal spirits were purely material, consisting of the finest particles contained in the blood, which are filtered from the arteries through minute pores into the central cavity or ventricle of the brain. From this ventricle they pass into the nerves, and thence into the muscles. He said:

"This small gland (the pineal body), which is the principal seat of the soul, is suspended between the cavities containing these spirits in such a manner that it can be moved by them in as many different ways as there are sensible differences in objects; and at the same time, it can be moved in divers ways by the soul, which is of such a nature that it receives as many different impressions within itself, or in other words, has as many different perceptions as there are different movements of the gland; and conversely, the bodily machine being moved in divers ways by the soul or by any other cause, it impels the surrounding spirits towards the pores of the brain, through which they are conducted by the nerves into the muscles, by means of which the soul causes them to move our limbs."

Descartes starts with the two principles, that the sole function of mind is thought, and that thoughts are of two kinds, "actions of the soul" which are our desires, and "passions," which are "kinds of perception or forms of knowledge which are found in us." The perceptions "found in us" are again of two kinds, the one kind being merely the perception of our desires, the second kind having the body, not the soul, as their cause. Among the latter, three kinds must be distinguished: (1) perceptions which relate to objects without us, i.e., sensations; (2) perceptions which relate to our own body, such as "hunger, thirst, and other natural appetites"; (3) perceptions which relate to our soul itself, such as "the feelings of joy, anger, and other such sensations."

According to Descartes ("Des Passions de l'Âme," 1649), the various faculties of the soul depend on the relation in which the latter stands to the body. The passions are in this way the effect of the influence of the body on the soul, whereas the "internal emotions" are derived directly from the thoughts and judgments of the
soul. He endeavoured further to reduce the various feelings to a few elementary forms. The account given of the passions is in the main physiological, that is, in terms of movements of the animal spirits. He distinguished six primary emotions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness; of which all the other emotions—and he described about forty—are modifications and combinations.

"The ultimate, immediate cause of the passions is merely the disturbance by which the animal spirits set the small gland, which is in the middle of the brain, in motion. It is therefore an error to place the seat of the passions in the heart. No doubt the passions cause some disturbance to be felt in the heart, but this is through the medium of a small nerve which descends from the brain to the heart." Passion depends so much on the machinery of the organism, that a slight modification in the construction of the machine is enough to transform a passion. "The same impression made on the gland by a terrifying object may arouse fear in some men, and excite courage and boldness in others; the reason of which is that all brains are not made alike, and that a movement of the gland which excites fear in some, will in others cause the spirits to penetrate into the pores of the brain, whence they descend, some into the nerves through which move our hands in defence, and some into those which stir the blood and drive it to the heart in the way required for the production of the spirits necessary to the continuance of this defence, and for the sustenance of the will."

Whatever we may think of the explanation of the passions, Descartes certainly had correct notions of the treatment of the passions, which was almost identical with our modern practice of suggestion, auto-suggestion, and mental discipline. To him, the human body is an automatic machine in which everything is explained by extension and the laws of motion. To this machine a soul is joined, and what was mechanical action in the body becomes passion in the soul. The passions are merely the internal movements reflected in the soul. It is within the sphere of medical science, he said, to regulate these movements, to regulate the course of our animal spirits and to change their composition, and thus make us masters of our passions. By means of a system of hygiene and remedies properly proportioned, we should thus be able to pre-arrange and fix accurately the degrees of sadness, of joy or love. But if medical science fails to formulate such therapy, we are not obliged to remain slaves to our bodies; we can still recover possession of ourselves by a sort of moral hygiene, i.e., by calling up such and such a thought and dwelling on it, and thus, firstly, suspend the action which would ensue from the passion; secondly, alter the motion of the small gland which is the seat of the soul and give a new direction to the animal spirits contrary to the passion; and, thirdly, without altering the action of the gland, we may through habit associate with the bodily action thoughts, and dwell on them while the impulse to the action lasts. Through habit, therefore, we are able to bring up certain thoughts and change the natural order of the passions.

For the "image" theory of sense perception, Descartes substituted a mathematical conception finding the sense-stimulus in "vibratory" rays or undulations (light, air, etc.) expressed in mathematical formulas. These produce effects in the organism which are in no sense like the object perceived, but are symbols or signs of external objects. Heat and cold are sensations of the mind, and not the properties of matter.

Except for the term "animal spirits," Descartes described correctly the physical theory of memory: that when a sensation has once passed to the appropriate part of the brain—by a single passage of the animal spirits—the passage is made easier in the same direction for any subsequent flow, and that the repetition of this action makes it easier still, until at length the passage becomes so easy that almost anything, especially an associated flow which may be set going, recalls the impression made by a former sensory act.
Descartes explained that certain sensations can arouse movements which do not depend on the mind at all, which are performed without the mind thinking about them—without the intervention of consciousness—as when in falling from a height we throw forward our hands, or as when a person whose eye is about to be hit starts winking. He thought the animal spirits were thus "reflected," and WILLIS, the famous Oxford professor, quoted Descartes in 1672 in *De Anima Brutorum*, and called this action a reflex action, the significance of which is appreciated only to-day.

Descartes held that consciousness and thought are man's exclusive prerogative, and that he alone is blessed with an immortal soul. The spirit being limited, in his estimation, to the higher mental activities, i.e., the intellect, those psychic manifestations which could not be included therein came to be relegated to the level of matter, so that the lower animals became, for Descartes, mere complex machines or automata. He recognised in the lower animals the existence of all the affections of mind except "thought" or "reason." He ascribed to them the attributes of the corporeal soul—the mental emotions of fear, anger, as well as all the sensations of pleasure and pain; and it is evident, from certain passages in his published correspondence, that what he meant by "thought" was really abstract ideas and the expression and communication of them. This, he said, is never wanting even in the lowest of men, and is never present even in the highest of animals.

Although Descartes had not intended to withhold from animals "feeling," i.e., the power of sensibility, but only that of self-consciousness, his followers took his view of animals as being merely "automata"—in whose nature our own conscious processes operate by a clock-like mechanism—literally, and with logical strictness used it as an excuse for cruelties to dumb animals, because, as they said, they only had sham feelings. Ever since most psychologists have entirely neglected the mental life of animals and restricted psychological research to man.

Man, according to Descartes, is born with ready-formed ideas on God, the world, and other cosmological and ontological concepts which could never be acquired by experience. The idea of God must be true, since no object save God could cause an idea of the infinite and perfect. Further, God is the guarantee of the validity of the clear and distinct ideas generally, since we cannot suppose he would deceive us. Thus the certainty of the object of knowledge rests upon the certainty of the existence of God.

The valuable reasonings of Descartes lost much of their effect because of his fear of the opinion of the Jesuits, then very powerful in France. They had educated him and he was most desirous of keeping on good terms with them, so that he dared not express his real convictions. Indeed, his works were repeatedly condemned by theologians, and though he had argued for the existence of the deity in his works, he was accused in Holland of atheism, and the Synod of Amsterdam upheld the right of the civil power to crush the heretic. His works were placed on the Roman Index. Finally, when he heard of the condemnation of Galileo, he so feared the Inquisition that he stopped writing altogether in 1633.

Descartes occupies, not only as a philosopher, but also as a mathematician and physicist, a place of conspicuous importance. His principal merit in mathematics is that he founded analytical geometry, and as a physicist his merits are based on contributions to the doctrine of the refractions of light, the explanation of the rainbow, and the determination of the weight of the air.

**J. B. LE BOSSUET** (1627-1704),

the theologian and historian, held that passion is a movement of the soul which
being affected by the pleasure or pain which it either experiences or imagines in an object, pursues or avoids that object.

"If we consider the passions as being merely in the body, they would seem to be nothing else than an unusual disturbance of the animal spirits on the occasion of certain objects, which are to be pursued or avoided. Thus it must be that the passions are caused by the impression made and the motion excited in the brain by an object possessing great force. The co-operation of the soul and body in the passions is evident, but it is clear that the good or bad inclination must have its commencement in the body. In the passions the soul is passive, it does not rule over the dispositions of the body, but subserves them."

He placed the principal passions under two categories: those whose object is regarded simply as being present or absent and which, taken together, constitute the concupiscent appetite; and those whose object is considered as being hard to attain or to avoid, and which constitute the insensible appetite. To the first category belong love, hate, desire, aversion, joy, sadness; to the second, courage, fear, hope, despair, anger. There are a great many secondary passions: shame, envy, emulation, admiration, etc., but these are all connected with one or more of the principal passions. One may even say that all the passions depend on love alone, that all are comprised in or excited by love.

"The love we feel for one object comes from our love for another. Desire is nothing else than love extending to an object not possessed, as joy is love of the object possessed. Courage is a kind of love that undertakes the most difficult things in order to possess the loved object, and fear is a kind of love that, in finding itself threatened with the loss of that which it seeks, is disturbed by the danger. Take away love and there will be no passions, and, on the other hand, where love is, there all the passions are found."

Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715),

a devout Catholic, held that the soul cannot know "things themselves"; they are only the "occasion" of the rise of ideas in the mind. The true cause of all ideas is God, in whose presence and action the world is perceived. Even the ideas of the perfect and infinite cannot be innate to the soul, for it is finite and imperfect. These ideas—that of God himself—are divinely aroused in the mind on the occasion of the contemplation of the world with attention. Hence the saying of Malebranche: "We see all things in God." Actions, moreover, acts of will, are volitions of God, since our desire is only their occasional, not their original, cause. The active life, like the intellectual, is lived in God.

In one important point Malebranche was a dualist, not an absolute idealist: he held that the knowledge of the soul through self-consciousness was more superficial than that of the body. We have a profound knowledge, in his view, of space and its properties—the essence of matter; but we know only particular states of mind, not general and universal truths.

Malebranche followed Descartes and Spinoza in making the passions depend on the body, but considered, on the other hand, the existence of pure emotion higher than those bodily passions, an intellectual love, the love of God. Without a disturbance of the animal spirits and of the blood there is no passion, but often the movement is preceded, and the way prepared for it, by purely spiritual phenomena. Intellectual pleasure is stable, free from remorse, as immutable as the truth which causes it; but sensual pleasure is nearly always accompanied by sadness of mind, or remorse of conscience. All the passions have two very remarkable effects: they cause us to apply our mind and they engage our hearts. So far as they cause us
to apply the mind, the passions may be very useful in the acquisition of knowledge; but so far as they engage our hearts, they have always a bad effect, because they only possess the heart by corrupting the reason.

The understanding receives its directions from the will, and the mind must have inclinations, just as bodies have motions. All natural inclinations are directed towards "good in general," and some towards particular goods. "The number of the passions is not to be multiplied according to the number of objects, which are innumerable, but according to the principal relations that can exist between them and us." He classified three principal inclinations or affections. The first group is of the inclinations included in, or derived from, the inclination towards "good in general." In this group is classified curiosity or the inclination towards novelty—that uneasiness of the will which makes us seek all that is new in the hope of finding the desired satisfaction—that vain striving of humanity to satisfy an inclination, which the circumstances in which man is placed make it impossible to satisfy. The second group comprises the inclinations towards particular goods which are related to our own preservation and welfare, i.e., self-love (including the love of greatness and of pleasure, the love of being and well-being) and love of our own preservation: for God has attached pleasure to certain objects, which man ought to seek, and pain to other objects, which he ought to avoid, in the interests of self-preservation. Men desire not only to possess learning or riches, but also to have the reputation of possessing them, which "produce in the imagination of those around us, or those with whom we come into closest contact, a disposition very advantageous to us." Our third natural affection is that which we feel for those with whom we live, and for all the objects surrounding us: social attachment. We rejoice in the joy of others, we suffer by the evils that befall them. "Upon the sense of some surprising evil" a man raises a cry "forced out involuntarily by the disposition of the machine." This cry falls on the ears of others, "it pierces them and makes them understand it," and it stirs with emotion all those who hear it, and makes them involuntarily rush to give help.

The "mother passions" are love and hate. These produce the "general passions"; desire, joy, and sorrow. All the other emotions are made up of these, more or less compounded and modified by circumstances, with the exception of admiration and the secondary emotions developed from it. Admiration is called an "imperfect passion," because it is not excited by either the idea or the sense of good, but only by the novel. The derived emotions are esteem, veneration, contempt, and disdain, according as the admired thing appears great or small; pride, haughtiness, valour, humility, timidity, and so on, when the object is ourselves or our own qualities.

Though natural inclinations and passions are common to all men, yet they vary in strength in different individuals. There is also a variety in the objects to which emotions attach themselves in different individuals. In particular passions there is an infinite variety, according to the relations that different objects may have to different individuals.

All the passions have their own appropriate signs, and this is true also of wonder and admiration. In this manner Malebranche associated with the phenomena of "self-feeling" the phenomena of contagion of the imagination, that is, the phenomena which we classify under the heads of imitation and suggestibility.

The contagion of the imagination is best seen in children with respect to their parents, in servants with respect to their masters and mistresses, or in courtiers with respect to their princes and kings, and it is shown generally in all inferiors with respect to their superiors. Suggestion may also arise from other circumstances, in addition to the prestige of the source, as, for example, in the manner in which, or in the degree with which, any statement is made. Another factor is "public opinion." We esteem and love what is esteemed and loved in the world.

Malebranche investigated vision, sense-illusion, and colour-perception, with notable results.
He showed that the distance of an object is judged according as the intensity of the light and sharpness of the image increases or diminishes; he spoke of the changes in the angle of the visual axes, and mentioned the circumstance that in monocular vision a suspended ring, if approached with a stick from the side, can only with difficulty be found; he took into account the accommodation of the eye, and was concerned to show that the idea of space arises from a co-operation of sight and touch sensation. In a memoir of the year 1669 he discussed the processes of colour perception, and concluded "que les diverses couleurs ne consistent que dans la différente promptitude des vibrations de pressions de la matière subtile."

BARUCH DE SPINOZA (1632-1677)

Spinoza, the Jewish philosopher, was born at Amsterdam. In his chief work, which appeared shortly after his premature death, the world—the universe, the cosmos—is identical with the all-pervading notion of God. God is the only, the one substance; but being infinite, God must have an infinity of attributes. Nothing conceivable can be denied of him. Of this infinity of attributes, we are able to know only two: thought and extension, mind and matter, but the "infinity less two attributes" must have equal reality. Mind and body, therefore, are equally independent of each other and of all the other attributes, but they are also equally dependent upon the one infinite substance: God. Each thing is at once mind and body, representation and that which is represented, idea and object. Body and soul are the same being, only considered under different attributes. The soul cannot be localised (Ethica, p. iv). The human mind is the idea of the human body; it cognises itself in perceiving the affections of its body; it represents all that takes place in the body, though not all adequately. Between the mind and the body there is an exact parallelism, a real pre-established harmony. The decisions of the mind and the impulses of the body are not only simultaneous facts, but are one and the same thing, though they appear to us under different aspects, according as we consider them from the standpoint of the mind or that of extension. As man's body is composed of very many bodies, so his soul is composed of very many ideas. To judge of the relation of the human mind to the mind of lower beings, we must consider the superiority of man's body to other bodies; the more complex a body is, and the greater the variety of the affections of which it is capable, the better and more adapted for adequate cognition is the accompanying mind. The emotions and passions perish with the body, but the human mind (i.e., not including the emotions) cannot be destroyed with the body. There remains something which is eternal.

Although Spinoza held that every passion corresponds to a state of the body, yet, like Descartes, he recognises the existence of a higher emotion, which corresponds to the mind's own special activity. The soul, inasmuch as it possesses adequate ideas, tends to persevere in its own being. In this case, desire is pure action, in which sadness has no place. The adequate idea is the highest degree of our active power; and sadness being that which diminishes or hinders the mind's power of thought, no affection of sadness can reach the mind, in so far as it is active. There remain now only two primitive emotions—desire and joy—and of these there are two forms, strength of mind and generosity. Strength of mind is the desire by which each person endeavours from the dictates of reason alone to preserve his own being. Generosity is a reasoned, virtuous sympathy, which induces us, by means of the dictates of reason alone, to endeavour to assist other men, and bind them to ourselves in friendship.

Desire and joy spring from the activity of the soul. When the soul reaches a greater perfection or reality, it feels joy; when it reaches a lesser perfection, sadness. We can eliminate sadness through the vision of things under the form of eternity, by living in God, and finding in the intellectual love of him happiness and virtue, which are identical. Spinoza proved that from joy, sadness, and desire, all the other passions can be derived by three processes, the effects of the association of
ideas, effects of imagination, and effects of sympathy. In this way he accounted for commiseration, emulation, benevolence, and envy.

Since all that furthers or diminishes the being of the object of our love exercises at the same time a like influence on us, we love that which rejoices the object of our love and hate that which disturbs it; its happiness and suffering become ours also. The converse is true of the object of our hate: its good fortune provokes us and its ill fortune pleases us. If we are filled with no emotion toward things like ourselves, we sympathise in their sad or joyous feelings by involuntary imitation. Pity, from which we strive to free ourselves as from every painful affection, inclines us to benevolence or to assistance in the removal of the cause of the misery of others. Envy of those who are fortunate, and commiseration of those who are in trouble, are alike rooted in emulation. Man is by nature inclined to envy and malevolence. Hate easily leads to under-estimation, love to over-estimation, of the object, and self-love to pride or self-satisfaction, which are much more frequently met with than unfeigned humility. Immoderate desire for honour is termed ambition; if the desire to please others is kept within due bounds it is praised as courtesy, modesty. Hope and fear, inconstant pleasure and pain, arise from the idea of something past or to come, concerning whose coming and whose issue we are still in doubt. There is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear without hope; for he who still doubts imagines something which excludes the existence of that which is expected. If the cause of doubt is removed, hope is transformed into a feeling of confidence and fear into despair. There are as many kinds of emotions as there are classes among their objects or causes.

Besides the emotions to be termed "passions" in the strict sense, states of passivity, Spinoza recognised others as active states. Only those which are of the nature of pleasure or desire belong to the class of active emotions; the painful affections are entirely excluded, since without exception they diminish or arrest the mind's power to think. The totality of these nobler impulses is called fortitude, and a distinction is made among them between animositas (vigour of soul) and generositas (magnanimity, noble-mindedness), according as rational desire is directed to the preservation of our own being or to the aid of our fellowmen. Presence of mind and temperance are examples of the former, modesty and clemency of the latter. Vice is as truly an outcome of nature as virtue. Virtue is power, vice is weakness; the former is knowledge, the latter ignorance.

Spinoza's great contemporary, HOBES, had taught that the fundamental impulse of human nature is the will for power; and Spinoza accepted the idea, but parted company with the English philosopher in his theory of what it meant. In his view it is an utter illusion to suppose that to gratify such passions as pride, avarice, and lust is to acquire or exercise power. For strength means freedom, self-determination; and no man can be free whose happiness depends on fortuitous combination of external circumstances, or on the consent of other persons whose desires are such as to set up a conflict between his gratification and theirs. Real power means self-realisation, the exercise of that faculty which is most purely human—that is to say, of thought under the form of reason.

Spinoza understood by will "the faculty of affirming and denying," not the desire "by which the mind takes a liking or an aversion to anything." "There is in the mind no volition . . . except that which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves." "Will and intellect are one and the same thing." He denied the freedom of the will in the common acceptance of the term. Men think they are free because they are not conscious of determining causes. Man is free when he intelligently strives to fulfil the inner necessity of his being. Here reason is our guide. To know our limits is to transcend them. If we know our passions, they can be transformed into instruments for our self-realisation. That is of real usefulness which first contributes to the highest perfection of the individual, and through him to society. Nothing is useful but that which serves knowledge. Knowledge is our true being, and the highest knowledge is the knowledge of God. We are free as we partake of the nature of God.
Spinoza protested strongly and daringly against philosophy being held in chains by theologians. His celebrated *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (1670) had for its primary purposes *the vindication of the freedom of scientific thought* from ecclesiastical interference. And this he did by drawing a definite line of demarcation between the respective offices of religion and of philosophy. The business of the one is to form the character and to purify the heart; of the other, to guide and inform the intellect. When religion undertakes to teach scientific truths the very ends for which it exists are defeated. When theological dogmatism gains control of the Churches the worst passions are developed under its influence. The claims of theology to dictate our intellectual beliefs are not only mischievous, but totally invalid. They rest on the authority of the Bible as a revelation of God's will. But no such supernatural revelation ever was or could be given. Such violation of the order of nature as the miracles recorded in Scripture history would be impossible.

With such views, it is not surprising that Spinoza was anathematised and excommunicated.

**FRENCH PHILOSOPHY OF THE XVIIIth CENTURY**

**JULES DE LA METTRIE** (1709-1751),

a wit, philosopher, and friend of Frederick the Great, was *the founder of French materialism*, which he traced, however, to Descartes, and maintained that the wily philosopher, purely for the sake of the priests, had patched on to his theory a soul, which was in reality quite superfluous.

He took the step from sensationalism to materialism, for he taught the corporeality of the senses and called thought a necessary consequence of matter. To Descartes man alone was endowed with consciousness, while the lower animals were practically machines or automatons. It was a short step from this to consider mankind itself an automaton, deprived of all spontaneous mental energy, a theory to which Mettrie, in his works *Historie Naturelle de l'Âme*, 1745, and *L'Homme Machine*, 1748, gives expression. The hypothesis of a soul distinct from matter, having its seat either in a particular point or in some particular part of the body, is inadmissible. The errors of the metaphysicians arose out of their *a priori* methods; for the complicated machine, which is man, can only be known *a posteriori* through the senses and by experience.

All ideas come from without, from the senses; without sense impressions, no ideas; without education, few ideas; and since *the soul is entirely dependent on the bodily organs*, along with which it originates, grows, and declines, it is subject to mortality. Not only animals but men, who differ from the brutes only in degree, are mere machines; by the soul we mean that part of the body which thinks, and the brain has fine muscles for thinking, as the leg has coarse ones for walking. If man is nothing but body, there is no other pleasure than that of the body; only that sensuous pleasure is brief, while intellectual pleasure is lasting. Enjoy the moment, till the farce of life is ended! Virtue exists only in society which restrains from evil by its laws, and incites to good by rousing the love of honour. *The good man, who subordinates his own welfare to that of society, acts under the same necessity as the evil-doer*; repentance and pangs of conscience, which increase the amount of pain in the world, but are incapable of effecting amendment, are useless and reprehensible: the criminal is an ill man, and must not be more harshly punished than the safety of society requires.

La Mettrie investigated the effect of environment, of food and education, on the temperament, and the effect of temperament on moral conduct. Man is a material machine, the soul is merely the principle of motion, a spring in the machine.
"Thought is so far from being incompatible with matter, that it would seem to be a property of matter, like electricity, mobility, impenetrability, and extension. In a word, man is a machine, and in the whole of the universe there is only the one substance, which is modified in divers ways."

The theory of psychological automatism had many followers, and has reappeared in Germany and elsewhere in the middle of the XIXth century in a more modern form.

FRANÇOIS VOLTAIRE (1694-1778),
the famous poet, historian, and philosopher, rejected both materialism and spiritualism. The former affirms more than it knows; for how can it say that everything is matter while it does not know what the essence of matter is? On the other hand, spiritualism, in order to explain phenomena that have no parallel in the material world—thoughts, feelings, memory, etc.—imagines a special principle, spiritual, distinct from the body and situated within it, which it calls the soul, thus giving substance to a mere abstraction. "A tulip or a rose is produced by an incomprehensible mechanism, and yet we suppose no soul in them. Nor do we suppose any in insects, which live and die. In animals we admit instinct, but we do not at all know what it is. And when we suppose a soul in man, do we understand ourselves any better?" We cannot account for the functions of the soul till we see their connection with organic functions. Yet Voltaire was no atheist. He was a theist.

The whole of nature bears witness to Him who created it. "When we behold a fine machine, we say that there is a good machinist, and that he has an excellent understanding. The world is assuredly an admirable machine; therefore there is in the world an admirable intelligence, wherever it may be." Philosophy does indeed show us—says Voltaire—that there is a God, but his attributes and his essence we are unfit to understand. Let us, therefore, abstain from attributing our own qualities to God and making him in our own image. Neither human justice, nor human kindness, nor human wisdom can be lis. It is useless to stretch these ad infinitum; they will never be aught but human qualities whose boundaries have been extended. God may have created spirit and matter without himself being either matter or spirit. Voltaire wished for a natural religion free from dogma, which would include not only Christians, but all mankind. Religious dogmas could not exist but for man's foolishness and credulity, and theological quarrels were the most dreadful plague in the world. The universality of natural religion is a token of truth. All dogmas are different from another, while morality is the same among all men. Jesus himself was a theist; but to-day we have not the pure religion of Christ, but Catholicism, with its dogmas, mysteries, symbols, articles of faith, relics of saints, sacred books, writings of Fathers of the Church, decisions of church councils, bulls of the Popes. The only gospel we should read is the great book of nature, written by the hand of God and stamped with his seal. The only religion one should profess consists in worshipping God and being a righteous man. Just as the world is conceived to be an immense machine, built by the Supreme Maker, so Voltaire looked upon the whole body of beliefs as a work made with set purpose by law-givers and priests. A religion is necessary for the people. "Atheism and fanaticism are two monsters which may tear society to pieces." A retributive and avenging God is also a necessity, for in all countries the lower classes—the brutal, the ignorant, and the vulgar—need to be strongly curbed.

Philosophers, though they are called unbelievers, have in all times been the most upright men in the world. Those who must have recourse to religion in order to behave righteously are much to be pitied. The basis of morality cannot lie in philosophical reflection, which is accessible only to a small number of thinkers. Morality
lies in the very essence of human nature. "Do thou unto others as thou wouldst have them do unto thee." This law cannot be wrested from the human heart. It is the foundation of morality and of all society at all times. Altruism is just as innate in human nature as self-love. Moral good and evil in all countries are what is beneficial or hurtful to society; in all places and times he who makes the greatest sacrifices to the public is called the most virtuous. There is no absolute good or evil.

Such moral philosophy could but end in cosmopolitanism, and, indeed, patriotism is described by Voltaire as in most cases an artificial, selfish, and hurtful thing. He left to the heroes of Plutarch their conception of patriotism, and wished that the age of reason would unite all separate countries into one great patrie of humanity.

ÉTIENNE DE CONDILLAC (1715-1780),

French Abbé, author of Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines (1746), transferred the sensationalist theory to France in another work of his, Traité des Sensations (1754).

Condillac studied the human mind not as a metaphysician, but as a psychologist and a logician; not in order to discover the nature of it, but to understand its operations. He denied the existence of Locke's inner sense. Locke had held that all our knowledge springs from experience, but he had assumed two sources of this empirical knowledge—sensation and reflection, or external and internal sense—but Condillac contended for the reduction of the two to one. He abolished reflection and retained only sensation. Sensations alone, accompanied by feeling, reproduced as ideas, and dominated by association, account for the entire mental life. What is called reflection is to him sensation and nothing more. All mental processes, even will and the association of ideas, are in his eyes only modified sensations. Memory, comparison, judgment, abstraction and reflection are nothing but different forms of attention; similarly the emotions, the appetites, and the will, are nothing but modifications of desire; while both alike take their origin in sensation. Sensation is the sole source and the sole content of the life of the mind as a whole. On his theory it is difficult to see how man differs from the lower animals, many of whom have senses quite as acute as his.

Being accustomed to ascribe all the sensations of the sense of touch to external objects, says Condillac, we fall into like habits with our other senses. Thus our sensations become objective; they appear as qualities of bodies around us. They have become ideas. Let us now suppose a sensation more vivid than others to force itself upon our consciousness so powerfully as to throw all others, at least temporarily, into the shade; this exclusive sensation will be what we call attention. But attention may just as well be directed to a past sensation, which recurs again to the mind. Memory is therefore nothing but a transformed sensation. Once given a twofold kind of attention and there results comparison. Now, we cannot compare two sensations without perceiving some difference or resemblance between them. To perceive such relations is to perform an act of judgment. Thus does sensation as it undergoes transformation become successively attention, memory, comparison, and judgment. Condillac lays it down as a principle that there are no neutral sensations, but that each of them gives us either pleasure or pain, and makes us inclined to continue or to escape it. Were it not for this property of our sensations, intellectual activity would not be aroused—attention, memory, and therefore understanding would be left undeveloped. The famous dictum of Condillac—penser est sentir, to think is to feel—was meant to emphasise the idea that it is impossible to say where sensation ends and thought begins; in other words, that feeling and thought are always interdependent.

We can distinguish two "selves" in every man: the self of habit and the self of reflection. If we suppress in a grown-up man the self of reflection, the self of habit
which remains suffices for such needs as are absolutely necessary for the preservation of the animal. **Instinct is nothing but habit minus reflection.** But, Condillac added immediately afterwards, it is by reflecting that beasts acquire instinct. As they have but few wants, a time soon comes when they have done all that reflection can teach them. They daily repeat the same actions, and their habits become automatic. **Instinct is not innate and hereditary, for it is subject to improvement, and whatever is subject to improvement is acquired.**

The evolution of thought is coincident with that of speech, and it is the gift of language, by which man is able to associate and combine ideas, that distinguishes him from the brute.

The sum of our reflections over and above our habits constitutes our reason. But language is necessary for the development of reason. Were our thought limited to the representation of individual and concrete objects, and unable to form abstract and general ideas, it would remain for ever in a rudimentary state. **But for words, there would be no abstract ideas.** Whenever a man thinks, even though he should not express his thought outwardly, he speaks. This has been called "inward language." Consequently, "the art of reasoning is equivalent to the art of speaking."

This theory of the interdependence of thought and language constitutes Condillac's chief merit. We need only mention besides, that he considered all inclinations, good and bad alike, to spring from self-love.

**DENIS DIDEROT (1713-1784)**

was Condillac's most distinguished pupil. He (with D'Alembert) was the author of the famous "Encyclopædia" (1751-1772) in twenty-eight volumes, which formed one of the most important events in the history of human knowledge. All the leading ideas in the revolt against the Church had a place in Diderot's great work, in which a number of leading thinkers collaborated with him. Diderot was deeply impressed with the function of the nervous system in psychology, and dogmatically declared against freedom of the will and immortality. ("Interpretation de la Nature," 1754.)

Diderot suggested in 1749, with Rousseau, raised printing types for the blind; and the idea was carried out in 1785 by VALENTINE HAUY (1745-1822), the founder of the first French institute for the blind. The first school for deaf-mutes was founded in Paris in 1755 by the ABBÉ DE L'EPEÉ (1712-1789).

**BARON D'HOLBACH (1723-1789)**

was a friend of Diderot, and a confessed materialist. His work, *La Système de la Nature*, 1770, was regarded as the atheists' Bible. Religion divides men instead of uniting them. The senseless doctrine of freedom was invented only to solve the senseless problem of the justification of God in view of the existence of evil. **Man is at every moment of his life a passive instrument in the hands of necessity; the universe is an immeasurable and uninterrupted chain of actions and reactions.** The most fatal error is the idea of human and divine spirits, which has been advanced by philosophers and adopted with applause by fools. The word "spirit" has no meaning. The savages admit the existence of "spirits" to explain effects for which they cannot account and which seem to them marvellous. Such an idea of spirit is preserved only by ignorance and sloth. The immortality of the soul is a religious dogma which never was of any use except to priests, and is not even a check upon the passions if they are at all violent, as experience sufficiently proves.
D’Holbach subjected deism and theism to a searching criticism, obviously directed against Voltaire’s natural religion. The deists’ God is useless, the theists’ God is full of contradictions. If we nevertheless accept him, we have no right to reject anything in the name of reason, and we are inconsistent if we refuse to go further and decline to submit to religious dogma. Theism is liable to as many heresies and schisms as religion, and is, from a logical point of view, even more untenable. So there will always be but a step from theism to superstition. The least derangement in the machine, a slight ailment, some unforeseen affliction, is sufficient to disturb the humours, and nothing more is required. Natural religion is only a variety of the other kind of religion, and speedily comes back to the original type. It was fear and ignorance of causes that first suggested to man the idea of his gods. He made them rude and fierce, then civilised like himself; and nothing but science can cause this instinctive theology to disappear.

Nature is an active, self-moving, living whole, an endless chain of causes and effects. As man has doubled himself, so also has he doubled nature. Evil gave the first impulse to the formation of the idea of God; pain and ignorance have been the parents of superstition; our sufferings were ascribed to unknown powers, of which we were in fear, but which, at the same time, we hoped to propitiate by prayer and sacrifice. If we seek to give the word God a tenable meaning, it signifies active nature. Matter and motion are alike eternal.

D’Holbach defined man as a material being, organised so as to feel, think, and be modified in certain ways peculiar to himself—that is, to the particular combinations of substances of which he is composed. The intellectual faculties may be reduced to changes produced in the brain. We directly perceive only external movements, while the inner motions of invisible molecules are known only by their effects and have been wrongly ascribed to the mind. In dividing himself into body and soul, man has in reality only distinguished between his brain and himself. Man is a purely physical being. All so-called spiritual phenomena are functions of the brain. Thought and volition are sensations; sensation is motion. The moving forces in the moral world are the same as those in the physical world; in the latter they are called attraction and repulsion; in the former, love and hate.

All human actions proceed from interest. Good and bad men are distinguished only by their organisations, and by the ideas they form concerning happiness. Repentance is only the regret for evil consequences, but neither responsibility nor punishment is abolished, for we have a right to protect ourselves. Virtue is the art of making ourselves happy through the happiness of others. Nature herself chastises immorality, since she makes the intemperate unhappy. Religion has hindered the recognition of these rules. The true moralist will cure the mind through the body, control the passions and hold them in check by other passions instead of by sermons, and will teach men that the surest road to personal ends is to labour for the public good.

CLAUDE ADRIEN HELVETIUS (1715-1771)

published in 1758 a book entitled De l’Ésprit, which aroused the antagonism of the Catholic clergy and made him lose his position at Court. He declared the satisfaction of self-interest to be the basis of morality. Virtuous is he whose strongest passion agrees with common interest. Thus Helvétius represented us as enslaved by things which surround us.

In a later work De l’Homme, de ses Facultés intellectuelles et de son Éducation, published after his death, in 1772, he gave currency to the notion that men are born not only without character, but also absolutely indifferent to all character, without any tendency or disposition of any kind whatever. We all come into the world formed and disposed alike, and are purely the creatures of the circumstances in
PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE, HOLLAND, GERMANY, ETC. 163

which we are placed; in other words, education can do everything. To ensure the happiness of mankind, it will only be necessary to bring the art of education to perfection. Education will make enlightened men, and even men of genius, as numerous as they have hitherto been scarce. All the powers of mind which have adorned but a few of our species might, in spite of anything contained in the original frame and organisation of the individual, have been the lot of every one of the thousands who daily come into and go out of the world, without leaving any other trace behind them than in their progeny.

It is curious that philosophers, though they correctly assumed the soul as immaterial and indivisible, and matter as compound, were ever ready to admit attributes to this spiritual substance, rather than to assume an original diversity of material organisation, to explain the varieties in the character of man. If the attributes are immaterial, how is it that we feel within us so decided a capacity for certain pursuits, and so utter a disability to follow others? How is it that children manifest so great a variety in their original disposition to the various emotions, such as anger, fear, etc.? How can the early display of talents be accounted for? Helvetius explained it in a very simple manner. He told story after story to prove his argument; as, for example, that of a boy who used to be left alone in a room with a big clock, and afterwards became a distinguished mechanic.

Helvetius ignored the capacity of the brain. CHARLES BONNET (1720-1793), the celebrated physiologist and philosopher, recognised this and criticised him for it. He said:

"Rather a bold genius, and one who knows how to manage his subject with as much art as grace, he has thought that he made a very philosophic step in discovering that the horse differs from man only by his hoof. It appeared to him, that, if the feet of the horse, in place of terminating by an inflexible hoof, had ended in supple fingers, he would soon have attained to a level with man. I doubt whether a philosopher, who shall have deeply studied the nature of animals, will applaud the discovery of this ingenious author, whose merit ought not to be confounded with his opinions. He had not considered, that any animal whatever is a particular system, all of whose parts have a mutual harmony among themselves. The brain of the horse corresponds to his hoof, as the horse himself answers to the place which he holds in the organic system. If the hoof of the animal were converted into flexible fingers, he would not be the more capable of generalising his sensations. The hoof would still exist in the brain, that is, the brain would want that admirable organisation, which enables the soul of man to generalise its ideas; and were it ordained that the brain of the horse should undergo a change corresponding to that of his feet, he would no longer be a horse, but another animal which would require a different name."

Helvetius adopted the premises of Hobbes, and rejected all his conclusions. Self-love was the only rule he recognised. While to Hobbes the cause of division and hatred was the interest of the individual, Helvetius discovered, in the workings of the laws of interest, the principle of tolerance and of sympathy.

"Men are not wicked, but they are the slaves of their own interests. We must take them as they are. All hatred of them is unjust. Fools bring forth folly as a wilding bears bitter fruit. The humane man is he to whom the sight of another's misfortune is unbearable, and who to escape from this sight is compelled, so to speak, to succour the unfortunate."

In other words, he who acts kindly thinks only of his own relief. To expect men to practise altruism through disinterested goodness is only a dream of the mystics, who refuse to see that self-interest is the only force by which the human machine is worked. Nothing less than the threats of the law are needed for the
prevention through fear of every action contrary to the public good, and if it were not for the honour and esteem by which the public repays services rendered to it, heroism would disappear. But if morality cannot do without the support of the law, the law, on the other hand, must turn to morality for instruction.

Helvetius, while he believed individuals to be bound to follow self-interest, required of the State, not the abolition of property, but the provision of opportunity for everyone to acquire it, restriction of the exploitation of labour, reduction of the hours of daily work to seven or eight, and the extension of culture.

GEORGE CABANIS (1757-1808),

in his Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme (1802), insists on the importance of the inner organic sensations, whilst Condillac had confined himself almost exclusively to outward impressions. He was even more materialistic than his contemporaries. According to him, the brain is to thought what the stomach is to digestion. As impressions reach the brain they excite it to activity, just as food, when it enters the stomach, stimulates in it secretion of the gastric juice.

"In order to arrive at a correct idea of these operations from which thought arises, we must consider the brain as a particular organ, destined specially to produce it in the same way as the stomach and the intestines are there to perform digestion, the liver to filter the bile, the parotid, the maxillary, and sublingual glands to prepare the salivary juice."

The proper function of the brain is to perceive each particular impression, to attach signs to it, to combine and compare together the different impressions, and to form therefrom judgments and determinations, just as the function of the stomach is to act upon nutritious substances. From this Cabanis derived the notorious formula: "The brain in some sort digests impressions; it produces an organic secretion of thought."

Being a physician as well as a psychologist, he showed, by the aid of several hundred observations made upon man, both in health and sickness, the reciprocal action of the body upon the mind and of the mind upon the body; as also the influence of age, sex, temperament, diet, climate, on the manifestation of mind and character.

Condillac said everything is acquired, even instinct. Cabanis looked upon instinct as innate, and inferred therefrom that external sensations are not, as Condillac declared, the sole principle of all mental life. Moral ideas and determinations do not depend solely upon sensation, but the impressions resulting from the functions of several internal organs contribute to them more or less, and, in certain cases, appear to be the sole cause of their production. There is within us a whole system of inclinations and determinations formed by impressions almost totally unconnected with those of the external world; and these inclinations necessarily influence our way of considering objects, the direction of our researches concerning them, and our judgment of them. It is not, therefore, the external world alone that shapes the thoughts and desires of the "self"; it is rather the latter, pre-formed by instinct and by specific dispositions, that builds for itself an external world with the elements of reality that interest it. Likewise, spontaneous activity precedes in us reflective activity. We are first determined to act without being aware of the means we employ, and often without even having conceived a precise idea of the end we desire to attain.

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU (1712-1778),

the Swiss philosopher, formed a strong contrast to the materialism we have just mentioned. He was an idealist and champion of individual freedom. Let us do away
with all artificial conventions and unnatural restrictions. Let us get back to primitive life. "Back to Nature" is the great thought in all his books. Civilisation is the great evil, the parent of all vices. Man, as he comes from the hands of Nature, is good; but the artificiality of Society has spoiled him. Society, with its creation of property and division of labour and separation of classes, has awakened selfish passions and created every crime. Let us have individual, isolated education, so that the true nature may unfold. Let man exercise his bodily functions and preserve in their naturalness and innocence all his primitive instincts. All nature, all that is characteristic, all that is good, has disappeared with advancing culture; the only relief from the universal degeneracy is to be hoped for from a return to nature by the individual and society.

Morals, institutions and beliefs all hurt him, and appeared to him false and different from what they should be. Whence comes it that the immense majority of men are sunk in poverty, in order to maintain in luxury the few who in their turn suffer from having no rule of life and nothing more to desire? Man was created good, vice is acquired. Original man was good, for he lived alone, only joining occasionally his fellow-creatures. Man, having once left the state of nature behind him, had constantly new wants. His intelligence and sensibility developed, the family was constituted, and groups of families were formed, and the idea of property appeared. Property implies the organisation of civil society, of penal justice and the legal recognition of inequality. Henceforth there must be rich men and poor men; and by a prodigious piece of dexterity, those who have possessions have managed to get their wealth insured and protected by those who have none. Soon there will be powerful men, and weak men, and in the end masters and slaves. In the state of nature men were all equal, save for a few physical differences, since they all led the same peaceful and solitary life. In the present state some are starving, while others are wallowing in superfluous wealth, and all become crafty, jealous, and wicked. The long toil of civilisation, which gave us arts, sciences, and industry, also brought upon us diseases, misery, sufferings of all kinds, and especially vices. Society is an assemblage of artificial men, preyed upon by factious though only too real passions, which did not exist in the primitive state. Therefore, if man's nature is now corrupted, we must not infer therefrom that it has always been so. This corruption is his own work, and is the ransom paid for his release from savagery.

The remedy, if it exists, can be found only in a system of education that would rehabilitate man depraved by the morals and institutions of to-day. But such a system of education implies a whole system of philosophy, for it pre-supposes a thorough knowledge of man's nature, of the laws of his mental development, of his private and public intercourse with his fellow-creatures, of his place in nature, of his future destiny, and, lastly, of the first cause of all things.

Materialism—the philosophy of the Encyclopaedists—need only to be stated in order to be refuted, said Rousseau. The heart rejects it, conscience condemns it. Matter is inert. To account for the motion of the universe we therefore need an intelligent motive power. How does this force move matter? I do not know, and the probability is that I shall never know. But am I better acquainted with the soul's way of moving the body? Yet I cannot doubt that it does move it.

I believe that the world is presided over by a wise and powerful Will; I see this, or rather, I feel it, and it is the only important thing for me to know. Do not ask me whether the world is eternal or was created, or what are the metaphysical attributes of God. It is sufficient for me to have an unshaken conviction that he exists, that he moves the universe, that he ordains all things, and that he is therefore intelligent, powerful and good. Let philosophers search further; my heart and reason are contented with this. The same inward assent makes us sure that we are free; no other demonstration is needed. Indeed, liberty is the most essential characteristic of mankind. It is not so much man's understanding that specifically
distinguishes him from other animals as his being a free agent. But from his freedom it follows that the soul must be immortal; for if we are free, the soul must be immaterial and essentially independent of the necessary laws which rule over matter.

Moral order requires that everyone be treated according to his deserts. Therefore we shall live after death. The union of the soul and body is a forced condition; when they cease to be united they both resume their natural state. The life of the soul after the decay of the body is assured to me by the fact that in this world the wicked triumph, while the good are oppressed. All passions are good when we control them, all evil when they control us.

God has manifested himself to men both in the universe, and within themselves, in their hearts. Natural revelation is enough to make us religious. The Gospel is the most sublime of all books, but still it is a book unknown to more than three-quarters of the world. Do you believe that the wild African is less dear to our common Father than you or I? The only indisputable revelation is the one that is given universally to all men. And when Rousseau added that all religions are good, so long as God is fairly served, and worship is essentially from the heart, he could not expect both Catholic bishops and Protestant clergymen to excommunicate him.

Every religion claims to be revealed and alone true. All revelation comes down to us by human tradition. To examine it carefully would require an amount of learning which could not possibly be a condition of salvation and acceptance with God. "I neither accept revelation nor reject it, but I reject the obligation to accept it." Rousseau was evidently endowed with the religious sense. "Without faith, no real virtue can exist." Rousseau spoke of it impressively, as a man who practiced it, loved it, and could not live without it.

Like his religion, so his ethics were based on the "inward revelation" which is called conscience, and which dictates to us what we ought to do. If a conflict arises between conscience and our reason, conscience is what we must unhesitatingly follow. Conscience is the most enlightened of all philosophers, and as safe a guide for the soul as instinct for the body. It would be sufficient to guide our steps in innocence were we always willing to listen to it.

All our inclinations are legitimate. "Whatever the cause of our existence may be, it has provided for our preservation by giving us feelings suitable to our nature, and it cannot be denied that these at least are innate. The first of these is the love of self; but we also desire the happiness of others, and when it costs nothing to our own, the latter is increased by it." With these benevolent affections our moral sense is closely connected. "Love of good and hatred of evil are as natural to us as the love of ourselves. The behests of conscience are not judgments but feelings."

His contact with the philosopher HOBSES is interesting. Both agree in the theory of a social contract as the foundation of the State. Both would deduce the civil from the natural condition of man. But while Hobbes conceived of man being at enmity and as making a contract for the sake of mutual safety and preservation, according to Rousseau men are not foes by nature, but are naturally drawn to one another for the sake of mutual advantage and development. With Hobbes the contract is based on fear and selfishness, and on the idea that might is right, and the sovereign alone is all-powerful. With Rousseau the contract unites all in the enjoyment of equal rights and equal duties; it is reciprocal, based on brotherhood and love, and the power is lodged in the people themselves. According to Rousseau, the State is a democracy; according to Hobbes, it is an absolute monarchy.

Rousseau, as we have seen, was, like Voltaire, a deist. Émile, his brilliant contribution to the theory of education, appeared in 1762. The book was publicly
burned in Paris and an order issued for Rousseau's arrest. He fled to Geneva and Berne, but was ordered to quit each place. In Neufchâtel he was prosecuted by the local clergy, but Frederick the Great gave him protection. He left for England, and after a few months returned to France, where he was left unmolested.

**GERMAN PHILOSOPHY**

**G. W. LEIBNIZ (1646-1716)**

took all knowledge for his province. At once a mathematician, a physicist, a historian, a metaphysician, and a diplomatist, he went to the bottom of whatever subject he touched, and enriched all his multifarious studies with new views or with new facts.

He taught that the universe created by God consists of an infinite number of real beings, each different from every other, each containing from the first the potentiality of its whole subsequent history, each indivisible and incapable of being destroyed, save by an act of God. These enduring beings or substances are the monads, the elements of which all things are composed. These monads, which Leibniz regarded as the ultimate basis of all existence, are not, like the atoms of Epicurus, physical and extended particles; but they are rather centres of force and have the powers of self-activity. They are simple substances emanating from God, as from the primordial unity. The soul of each man and of each animal is such a monad; but the soul of man is a monad of a higher order than all others, is not bound to any particular part of the body, and is properly called a mind, because its consciousness is richer and its psychical activities are of a higher order, and it expresses or reflects the world more fully, and knows also God.

The aggregates of monads range from the inorganic, through plants and animals, up to man. The body of man Leibniz regarded as a complex of separate monads, but the soul was a single monad, the substantial centre of man's being. The soul does not receive its impressions immediately from the body; but, from the beginning of its existence, it contains within itself all the ideas which ought to develop in time and in a determined order. The soul is, in fact, a spiritual automaton. Its operations are not mechanical, but it contains within itself all that is beautiful in mechanism. He said: "I consider that the souls which are destined one day to become human exist in the seed, like those of other species; that they have existed in our ancestors as far back as Adam—that is, since the beginning of the world—in the forms of organised bodies."

In opposition to the Empiricists, who gave too much importance to the so-called external sensations, Leibniz maintained that our consciousness is a spontaneous process, which manifests itself at all times independently of any external stimulus, and is therefore always active, even when, as during sleep, the soul "does not think." In his opinion, our psychic life consists in a complexity or a chain of facts, not all of which appear to us in a clear and distinct manner. Those of which we are clearly conscious he called *apperceptions*, whereas those of which we are only more or less dimly conscious he called *perceptions*. He was also of opinion, in opposition to the Spiritualists and Cartesians, that we possess no inborn ideas; but he believed in certain innate dispositions or aptitudes of the soul, which, however, are in need of the help of experience to develop themselves. The mind is not a *tabula rasa*, a blank tablet, receiving impressions from outside itself; it is, on the contrary, the *fons et origo* of all action. The will is the principle by which the flow of presentations in consciousness takes its determined course; it is the dynamic aspect of mind.

The old-standing antagonism between faith and reason was not, according to
Leibniz, founded in the nature of things, the essence of which is harmony and order; thus arose the celebrated doctrine of the "pre-established harmony," the soul and body being compared to two clocks wound up to keep exact time with each other. There is a complete series of psychical processes parallel to a complete series of physical processes, and between the two a pre-established harmony. The laws of the body are those of motion, while the laws of the soul are moral laws. The soul he thought non-material and the prime "entelechy" or realisation of the body; but the body is possessed of a second entelechy, namely, the force of movement.

There is no place for free-will in such a system. Leibniz not only admits the eternal punishment of predestined sinners, but even defends it as morally appropriate. According to him, everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. All is done for the best, but also all is done through an unbroken series of efficient causes. At the same time, these causes are only material in appearance; in reality they are spiritual beings. There is no such thing as dead matter: the universe consists of living forces all through.

Far from the body being the cause of passion, it is passion that is the cause of the body. The soul has within itself the principle of all its actions and even of all its passions. The body only expresses its law of limitation.

The tendency of every monad to advance in being is, in the human soul, the principle of the passions and emotions. But this tendency towards a higher perfection would not in itself suffice to explain the emotional life of mankind. The monad is not an isolated thing, for, owing to the pre-established harmony, it is in agreement with all the other monads; and it is in this interdependence of creatures that the principle of passion is to be found. Passion is a limitation of action. The appetites are like so many little springs which try to release themselves, and which make our machine go. They deliver us from obstacles without our thinking about it. In the lowest stage such instinctive actions are unconscious; in the higher they give rise to the passions which we do not feel, and which are attributed to the body, although there is always something corresponding to them in the mind. Lastly, above the passions proper "there are distinct inclinations which reason gives to us, whose force and formation we feel." These inclinations do not depend on the body, but express the very nature of the soul; they correspond to distinct ideas, and are veritable activities. "All action is a step towards pleasure, and all passion a step towards pain." As there are three kinds of inclinations, so there are also three kinds of pleasures. There are some pleasures which correspond to our unconscious inclinations, others which correspond to the passions, and others, lastly—the purest—which correspond to the activity of the mind.

Leibniz instituted the Academy of Science in Berlin; but for his inability to accept the current doctrine of the immutability of the species, he was prevented by the Church from founding a similar Academy in Vienna.

It is now agreed that Leibniz discovered the differential calculus independently of Newton; and, what is more, that the formulation by which alone it has been made available was his exclusive invention. In physics, he was a pioneer of the conservation of energy. In geology, he started the theory that our planet began as a glowing molten mass derived from the sun, gradually cooling, the theory of the descent of its strata by fracture, and the deposit of sedimentary rocks and their induration. The modern theory of evolution is a special application of his theory of development.

G. E. STAHL (1660-1734).

professor at Halle, physician and chemist, in his work Theoria medica vera (1707), expounded his theory of animism. He rejected the distinction of vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls, and ascribed all vital manifestations, especially growth
and movement, to the rational soul. He put forward and brilliantly maintained the view that all the chemical events of the living body, even though they might superficially resemble, were at the bottom wholly different from the chemical changes taking place in the laboratory: since in the living body all chemical changes were directly governed by the sensitive soul which pervaded all parts and presided over all events. Stahl’s fundamental position was that between living things, so long as they are alive, however simple, and non-living things, however composite, however complex in their phenomena, there is a great gulf fixed. The former, so long as they are alive, are actuated by an immaterial agent, the sensitive soul; the latter are not. Further, the living body is fitted for special ends and purposes; the living body does not exist for itself; it is constituted to be the true and continued minister of the soul. The body is made for the soul; the soul is not made for, and is not the product of, the body.

He wrote: “Vital activities are directly administered and exercised by the soul itself, and are truly organic acts carried out in corporeal instruments of a superior acting cause, in order to bring about certain effects, which are not only in general certain, and in particular necessary, but also in each and every particular adapted, in a special and yet most complete manner, to the needs of the moment and to the various irregularities introduced by accidental external causes. Vital activities, vital movements, cannot, as some recent crude speculations suppose, have any real likeness to such movements as, in an ordinary way, depend on the material condition of the body and take place without any direct use or end or aims.”

Chemistry, and even anatomy, are useless to the healing art. The source of all vital movement is the soul, which builds up the machine of the body, and maintains it for a time against external influences. The substance of the body is continually renewed. The immediate cause of death is not disease, but the direct action of the soul, which leaves the bodily machine either because it has become unworkable through some serious lesion, or because it does not choose to work it any longer. In any case putrefaction increases with age, and may finally become irresistible. The soul tries to preserve the body as long as possible, and most so-called diseases are merely manifestations of its efforts in this direction, e.g., the fevers, which the soul counteracts by a more rapid motion of the circulation and secretion. The soul is liable to error, as when it sends too much blood to a particular part, which then becomes congested... The soul, in spite of its mistakes, knows much more about the body it has built up than does the most skilful physician. The latter’s chief duty, therefore, is to watch and assist its efforts. Stahl’s view of the soul as a sort of sanitary inspector did not please the theologian. His doctrine of animism was a reaction against the chemical and mechanical theories of the XVIIth century.

Stahl’s chief and leading principle, that the rational soul of man governs the whole economy of his body, is based on the fact observed by physicians at all times, from Hippocrates onwards, that the vis conservativa et medicatrix naturae resists injuries which threaten the body and corrects or removes disorders induced or arising in it. A fatal consequence of this view was that too much attention was given to the so-called “expectant” treatment, and the timely interference by active remedies and surgical operation was neglected. However, his doctrine made Stahl realise the importance of psychic treatment of mental disorders.

Stahl increased and spread the knowledge of chemistry. The thing which brought him the greatest renown was the “phlogiston” theory, of which we shall speak in the next chapter. (See also p. 176.)

CHRISTIAN THOMASIIUS (1655-1728),
a celebrated jurist, founder and rector of the University of Halle, who fought for
the abolition of witch trials and instruments of torture, and for the freedom of faith, was an expert in the knowledge of human nature. He claimed to be able to discover the peculiarities of a person's character by determining "by means of a brief conversation and with the help of a few obvious rules concerning human nature, the special passions of the character in question and then the degree in which it shares the other passions common to the human race." Similarly to modern phrenologists, he set his students the problem that, given four traits of character, the intensities of which are expressed in numbers (say, ambition 60, voluptuousness 50, affection 30, and avarice 5), what would the conduct of such a person be likely to be? ("Versuch vom Wesen des Geistes," 1699 and 1711.)

Thomasius was the first instructor who ventured to deliver lectures in the German language instead of Latin. Christian Wolff, of whom we shall speak next, followed his example.

CHRISTIAN WOLFF (1679-1754)

was a disciple of Leibniz, whose doctrines he made known to the world, and was the first to introduce a methodical study of psychology into the universities. He developed the ideas of his master in a classification of the mental faculties, which had a marked influence on German psychology of the XVIIIth and part of the XIXth century. He opposed the theory that the body is a machine merely, and sought to account for its properties and functions by the conception of a non-mechanical principle, the vis essentialis or vital force.

Wolff held introspection to be the only means of obtaining a knowledge of the mental processes. He considered psychology as consisting of two parts: empirical and rational or speculative; the former having for its object the description and explanation of the phenomena of consciousness, and the latter the discussion of questions concerning the essence of the soul, its destiny, its immortality, etc. In his empirical psychology he distinguished inner and outer sense; the former being regarded as the means of obtaining cognition of the phenomena of mind, the latter of those of the external world. All knowledge is to him the outcome of sensation; and thought and intelligence are the result of attention, the former consisting in a retrospective examination of what we have perceived, the latter being the faculty of representing things to ourselves distinctly.

Wolff, like his predecessors, maintained the Platonic division between the faculties of cognition and desire, each of which he subdivided into a higher and lower part. The lower cognitive faculty comprises imagination, the poetic faculty, and memory; the higher faculty comprises attention, reflection, and the reasoning power. The lower faculty of desire embraces pleasure and displeasure, desire and repugnance, and the emotions; the higher part embraces willing and not willing, and liberty. The Wolffian School subsequently modified this division, giving increasing importance to feeling, which was finally separated from desire and recognised as an independent faculty between the other two. This was the origin of the classical triple distinction, subsequently accepted by Kant, of the three faculties: cognition, feeling, and willing.

Wolff not only divided mind into a number of faculties, but he believed each to correspond to a special portion of the brain. Thus he fell into the same error as Comte did a century later, of suiting physiology to the results of his introspection and speculation; but he is less to blame than Comte, for the study of the anatomy and physiology of the brain was in its initial stages at his period, and nearly all the special sciences were dominated by metaphysical ideas.

The suggestion of "faculties" soon crystallised in the extravagant faculty psychology which cut up the mind into watertight compartments, each doing its
peculiar work in independence of the others. In modern times different “faculties” have been spoken of in the same external manner, as acting independently of, and in opposition to, one another. Not only was a division between different parts of faculties thus introduced—a division disproved by the thoroughgoing unity of conscious life, without which even the strongest contrasts could not be felt or apprehended—but moreover, those who took this view entangled themselves in the illusion that by tracing the phenomena back to different “faculties” they had reached an explanation: that, e.g., knowledge and feeling would severally be more easily intelligible if a special faculty of knowledge and a special faculty of feeling were accepted.

In consequence of accusations brought against him by theologians, Wolff had to leave the country in 1723, but was recalled in 1740, and rose to great honour as chancellor of his university.

**G. E. LESSING (1729-1781)**

was, apart from his achievements in German literature, a philosopher of distinction. He combined Leibniz’s doctrines with those of Spinoza, and laid the foundation of a **philosophy of religion**. The idolatrous reverence for the Bible was an abomination to him. The letter is not the spirit, the Bible is not religion, nor yet its foundation, but only its records. Christianity is older than the New Testament.

**JOHANN NICHOLAS TETENS (1736-1807)**

made an unsuccessful attempt at forming an independent psychology which should be solely based on observation and experiment; his attempt being in the direction of the **measurement of the duration of images produced by different sensations**. He denied the materialistic hypothesis that the mental processes are equivalent to cerebral stimuli.

Tetens, in his “Philosophische Versuche” (1777), classified mental states into thought, feeling, and will. He found in his analysis, as did others before him, that in every perception a thought is contained; for only when the mind apprehends an object as a particular object, isolates and distinguishes it from others, does the mind perceive or is it conscious of the object; —and the mind becomes thereby conscious of itself. The act of thinking and the awareness of this act, he discovered, do not occur at the same time, and he conjectured that the change produced in the ideas through thought is perceived as an effect—just as the outer objects are apprehended entirely through their effects; hence the flow of thought must be a mere phenomenon.

**IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)**,

whose life coincided with the period when German literature was at its highest, was born at Königsberg, in Prussia, where he held a chair at the University from 1770-1797.

In the year 1781, when Kant was well over fifty years of age, his world-renowned **Critique of Pure Reason** was published. In this book, to the writing of which, as he himself assures us, he was incited by the scepticism of David Hume, he undertook the examination of the origin, extent, and limit of human knowledge, and unfolded his doctrine of the relativity of all knowledge. He tried to establish the distinction between phenomena—whose substance is given us through impressions on the senses, but whose form is a purely subjective product of the mind itself—and real things or “things-in-themselves,” which exist out of relation to time, space, or causality. He showed us, in this Critique, that what we call **external objects are really only mental**
representations resulting from the nature of our sensibility. To us they are mere appearances, the inner nature of which we can never ascertain. The appearance of the things we know; the things-in-themselves, we do not and cannot know. Nevertheless, in opposition to Berkeley, Kant declared that, although we do not know how, we must assume that transcendental objects or things-in-themselves exist.

Kant distinguished two kinds of knowledge, one experimental and another founded on belief. He maintained that the first kind is only relative, subjective, or phenomenal, or that we know only the relation of the subject to the object; that we do not know either the subject or the object in itself, but both in their mutual relations only, and that this relation constitutes their reality to us. The subject he conceived endowed with particular categories which are applied to the object; whatever is general and necessary in knowledge belonged to the subject, while the particular and variable is the attribute of the object. Hence all experimental knowledge is founded upon dualism; upon the union of the subject and object; for, even the categories, though inherent in the subject, and contrived by the mind from within, acquire objective reality only by their application to the object. Kant, though he considered both subject and object, had, however, the subject more in mind than the object. He reduced all categories or forms, according to which the mind acquires experimental knowledge, to four kinds—to quantity, quality, relation, and modality; of these, the two first concern objects in general, and the two last the relations of objects to each other and to our understanding. Thus Kant admitted notions independent of experience, as conceptions of space, time, cause, and others; and considered these conceptions, not as the result of external impressions, but of the faculties of the subject; they exist from within, and by their means we are acquainted with the objects.

Kant maintained the three faculties of knowing (cognition), feeling (of pleasure and pain), and willing (desire), to be each of independent origin, and impossible of further reduction. Intellect and will refer to objects, feeling to the self. Knowledge is divided by him into intelligence (understanding), judgment, and reason, which constitute together the higher part, the lower part being the sensations. In his opinion there is not only a difference of degree between the two, but the former is the active, the latter the passive, or receptive part, which furnishes the material for the other to work upon. Therefore, the faculty of knowledge, and more especially the reason, in Kant's estimation, is the sovereign faculty, which regulates and selects from the feelings and the desires.

He argued further that our minds also are inaccessible to our direct observation, and that we have direct knowledge only of mental phenomena or appearances. These mental phenomena, owing to their instability and fluctuation, are not as susceptible of direct observation as the phenomena of the external world, and, therefore, psychology could never be a science, though it would always be a useful branch of study.

Mental phenomena do not resemble "objects," do not possess the stability of physical phenomena; they are "processes," and therefore cannot be studied by the same methods. We cannot observe our mental mechanism while under the influence of a strong emotion. If we can stop to reflect, the emotion tends to be weakened, and may even disappear altogether. The introspective method limits psychological observations to a certain period of life, when the mind is matured and accustomed to follow the inner processes, in a mentally normal man, and even within these limits can give, but very uncertain results; whilst it renders any analysis of the mental states in animals quite out of the question. Kant accordingly proposed to found his empirical psychology on the observation, not of self, but of others.

Human actions must, like all other phenomena, form an unbroken chain of antecedents and consequents. With sufficient knowledge and powers of calculation, a man's whole future conduct might be foretold. Nevertheless, under the XVIIIth
century idea of man as naturally the creature of passion or self-interest, he claimed for us, as moral agents, the power of choosing to obey duty in preference to either.

All reason demands uniformity, order, law; only what in theory is recognised as true has in practice to be imposed as right. In this way, Kant arrived at his formula of absolute morality: act so that the principle of thy conduct may be the law for all rational beings. He called this the **Categorical Imperative**, as distinguished from such hypothetical imperatives as: act this way if you wish to be happy either here or hereafter; or, act as public opinion tells you. Moreover, the motive, as distinguished from the end of moral action, should not be calculating self-interest nor uncalculating impulse, but simply desire to fulfil the law as such.

The moral law is so clear and categorical, while the realisation of it in this life is so imperfect, that **there must be a future life** for the soul to work out its task, and **there must be a supreme moral legislator** who has formulated the law, and will provide the opportunity for its triumph.

As regards pleasure and pain, Kant adopted the view of the Italian philosopher [Verri](1741-1816), that pleasure is not a positive state, but merely the cessation of pain. **Man’s sole motive principle is pain.** Pain precedes every pleasure. Pleasure cannot follow another pleasure. Pains that pass slowly are not followed by a lively pleasure, because we are not conscious of the transition.

**Passion** is an inclination which is little or not at all under the control of reason. On the other hand, the vivid consciousness of an actual pleasure or pain, which allows of no reflection in the subject, is **emotion**. Emotion is a seizure of the soul, is violent, fleeting, and may be compared to intoxication. Passion moves slowly, reflects, is like a disease resulting from the absorption of a poison, or from a vitiated constitution. Where there is much emotion, there is usually little passion. Emotion is like water bursting its dykes; passion like a torrent, which cuts an ever deeper bed. As examples of emotion, Kant cited excessive joy, hopeless melancholy, fright, anger, anxiety. Among the passions he made a distinction between those that are natural, innate, ardent, such as love of liberty, sexual love; and the acquired passions which are calmer, such as ambition, desire of ruling, and avarice.

Most of the great philosophers have done first-class work in some special line of investigation, apart from their philosophy, and Kant was no exception. He offered a brilliant solution of the problem of the origin and constitution of the celestial system in his "Natural History of the Heavens," 1755, a work embodying the celebrated nebular hypothesis. Kant’s cosmogony may have been premature and mistaken in its details, but his idea of the heavenly bodies as having originated from the condensation of diffused gaseous matter still holds its ground.

**J. G. v. HERDER (1744-1803)**

was a poet and illustrious writer of philosophical treatises on natural history and theology. His opposition to the subjective philosophy of Kant and Fichte made him unpopular. He rescued Spinoza from an ignominious neglect, and was influenced by naturalists like Haller, Buffon, Sömmering, and Blumenbach, who through physiology, comparative anatomy, and ethnology, attempted to bring the study of the human race and its mental development into connection with that of the brute creation, of the surrounding plant-life, of the characteristics of climate and soil, and of the great natural features of sky and landscape. Herder did not believe that we could study the great forces of nature and mind from the inside or in the abstract. **Irritability**, the highest physical phenomenon of matter, was to be the starting-point of his psychology. He was the first to show clearly that it is not abstract reasoning, but patient inquiry into origin and growth, that is the most
profitable means of approaching the vast problems of civilisation and religion. In his chief work, "Ideas for a Philosophy of Human History" (1784-91), he is mainly concerned with intellectual and moral phenomena. Its leading idea is thus expressed:

"The force which thinks and works in me is in its nature as eternal as that which holds suns and stars together. The instrument may, like the stars, wear out, but the laws by which they all exist and re-appear in other form never change. . . . The history of man is a natural process; in his life we see the same laws of development which we see in nature. Man is not only the crowning work of the universe to whom all lower forms of life point; he is also the first link in a higher order of existence. Hence the life work of man is to cultivate those elements in his humanity which unite him with the highest."

It is interesting to note that he considered man's sociability, his benevolence and —like Cicero, Seneca, Lavater, etc.—his inclination to venerate a Superior Being, his love of religion, as innate. To him, as to Lessing, Christ's religion and not Christianity was what we ought to profess. He has also the great merit of having urged the importance of the study of language and literature in primitive forms as the great gateway into anthropology and the science of humanity (1798). He expressed a hope, in 1775, that at some future time the functions of the different parts of the brain would be discovered.
CHAPTER X

THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE IN THE XVIIth AND XVIIIth CENTURIES

PROGRESS OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES

Scientific knowledge increased rapidly in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, especially in chemistry, natural history, anatomy, physiology, and general medicine. True, this period cannot be compared with that of the century following, for, as we shall see, scientific research was still handicapped by the survival of mystical theories from the earlier Middle Ages; but there can be no doubt that the foundation was then laid for the achievements of the XIXth century. With the rapid increase of cultivators of science came also the foundation of learned societies. Imitating the examples of the Academia Secretorum Naturae, instituted at Naples by Baptista Porta, in 1560, and another Academy for the Promotion of Natural Philosophy at Rome, in 1603, the Academia del Cimento was established in Florence in 1657, the Royal Society in London in 1645, the German Academy of Naturalists (Leopold I.) in 1652, the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris in 1665, the Royal Academy of Science in Berlin in 1700, and the Academia Española in Madrid in 1714. All these societies entered into scientific investigations energetically, with results that enriched the world.

JEAN BAPTISTE VAN HELMONT (1577-1644),

of Louvain, was a great scientist and a devout Catholic, one of the founders of the iatrochemical school, a naturalist and physician, and the leading physiologist of the opening years of the XVIIth century. Though many of his concepts were fantastic, he originated many bright and correct ideas, and made several useful contributions to the medical and chemical sciences. He was the first writer to use the word "gas" (1624) and the first to recognize the physiological importance of ferments and gases, particularly of carbonic acid, and his knowledge of the gastric secretions was considerable. Digestion, he declared, does not, as Galen maintained, depend upon heat, but upon a certain ferment existing in the gastric juice. Heat is not, as has hitherto been taught, the cause of life, but rather one of its products.

Van Helmont took up Vesalius's doctrine of the elaboration of the animal spirits by successive stages, and distinguished six such stages. In addition he mingled with his chemistry the mystical conception of archai, which he derived from Paracelsus. Like the latter, he believed that each material process of the body is presided over by a special dominating vital power, archaius. One of these regulating principles of the body is the archaius influus, which governs all the psychical and physiological processes in the body; another is the archaius insitus, a subsidiary power which resides in each individual part of the body, but is under the influence of the former; and a third principle, the idea morbosa, which causes disease.
Van Helmont recognised a sensory and motor soul, as belonging to man alone. Plants and animals possess only a certain vital power. This sensory-motor soul is the prime agent of all the acts of the body by means of the brain and nerves, but its actual seat is the orifice of the stomach. The sensory-motor soul is mortal, and co-exists in man with the immortal mind, of which it forms the shell, so to say. Before the fall of Adam man possessed the immortal mind, which discharged the functions of life. At the fall, God introduced into man the sensory-motor soul, and with it death, the immortal mind retiring within the soul and becoming, as it were, its kernel. Through the mortal soul gaining dominance over the immortal mind, there arose disease. It is therefore the highest task of man to recognise and identify himself with the divine nature of his spirit. This is to be done by prayer and abstraction of the immortal mind from its natural fettlers and the sensory-motor soul.

Van Helmont manufactured many remarkable remedies, with which he claimed to have succeeded in curing myriads of patients who had failed to receive any benefit whatever from the ordinary resources of medical science. He was strongly against venesection.

PIERRE GASSENDI (1592-1655).

first professor of theology at Aix, then in 1646 Regius professor of mathematics in Paris, revolted against the predominant scholastic philosophy, rehabilitated Epicur, and was among the first to employ the methods of Baconian empiricism in his attempt to formulate a systematic view of the world. He was the founder of the modern atomic theory. He taught that atoms are the primal constituents, the dominant entities of the world. They are the original seeds of all things. They have indeed been created and set in motion by God; but from them, by generation and destruction, everything has been formed and still continues to be. All growth and decay are the results of the combination and separation of atoms. He anticipated many of the ideas of modern science. Like Newton, he explained the fall of bodies by the earth's attraction.

GEORGE E. STAHL (1660-1734),

whose philosophical theories we explained in the last chapter, advanced the knowledge of chemistry and popularised the "phlogiston" theory (1729), propounded before him, in 1670, by JOACHIM BECHER (1635-1682). This theory was to the effect that all combustible materials or substances contain an invisible element to which the name "phlogiston" was given. Stahl was not able to demonstrate the actual existence of this element; he simply assumed its existence. Chemists believed the phlogiston theory for nearly a hundred years, though JOHN MAYOW (1643-1679) had disproved it, when fresh experiments proved Stahl's theory to be false. At the same time, the fact should be stated that the term "oxidation" and "reduction," which came into use during the following century, developed out of this theory of phlogiston.

In 1756 carbonic acid was discovered by JOSEPH BLACK (1728-1799); in 1766 hydrogen by HENRY CAVENDISH (1731-1810); in 1772 nitrogen by RUTHERFORD (1749-1819); and in 1774 oxygen was isolated by JOSEPH PRIESTLEY (see page 148), independently of K. W. SCHEELE (1742-1786), in 1775. A. L. LAVOISIER (1743-1794), another great chemist, overthrew the phlogiston theory by proving the action of oxygen (1778), and discovered the indestructibility of matter (1789). (He fell a victim to the French Revolution and was guillotined.)

Another subject of ardent investigation, besides chemistry, was natural history.
PROGRESS OF SCIENCE IN XVIIth AND XVIIIth CENTURIES

CONRAD v. GESNER (1516-1565),
professor of natural history at Zürich, whom Cuvier called the “German Pliny,” on account of his equal attainment in botany, zoology, bibliography, and general erudition, published his famous “Geschichte des Tierreichts” in five folio volumes between 1553-1559, and with it laid the foundation for modern zoology. In botany he made the first attempt at a true classification of plants. He also wrote a book on mineralogy.

JOHN RAY (1627-1705),
the celebrated naturalist, was the first to make out that fossils are the remains of natural animals and plants, which have passed away in unknown ages, thus telling men of the countless ages of the earth’s existence. Ray also led the way to comparative anatomy in his synopsis of quadrupeds. He was the first to define the use of the term “species,” and to lay emphasis on anatomical characteristics as a basis of classification. He may be called the father of modern zoology.

GEORGES LEROY (1723-1789),
the friend of Hume and Diderot, appears to have been the first to observe the mental characteristics of animals, a subject which was apparently never inquired into throughout the ages. He was a huntsman, and wrote therefore with knowledge, especially about the wolf, fox, deer, rabbit, and dog. He attributed to these animals observation, comparison, and judgment. His book, entitled Letters on Animals, is enlivened by many touches of nature, which make it highly interesting.

CASPAR FRIEDRICH WOLFF (1733-1794)
The antiquated psychology of the Middle Ages considered the mental life of man and that of the brute to be two entirely different classes of phenomena; the one it attributed to “reason,” the other to “instinct.” In harmony with the traditional story of creation, it was assumed that each animal species had received a definite, unconscious psychic force from the Creator at its formation, and that this instinct of each species was just as unchangeable as its bodily structure. All living things were supposed to have been created in their present condition, and one species was believed to be, genetically, quite distinct from every other species, however closely it might resemble it morphologically and in its relationship to its environment. Moreover, the idea was prevalent that animals, whilst still in the gerin, were models in miniature of the adult condition, the various parts only requiring expansion and unfolding. CHARLES BONNET (1720-1793) of whom we shall speak presently, was the chief apostle of this form of unfolding “evolution” as then understood.

Caspar Friedrich Wolff, Professor of Anatomy and Physiology in St. Petersburg University, in his Theoria Generationis, 1759, laid the foundation of modern embryology and was the first to assail this doctrine of “unfolding.” He demonstrated that all the complex organs are formed from simpler structures, and are only developed gradually. He discovered the true character of embryonic development, and proved that there is a series of very remarkable formative processes in the evolution of the fetus from the simple ovum. But the physiologists of the time, with the famous ALBRECHT VON HALLER (1708-1777) at their head, flatly refused to entertain these empirical truths, which may be directly proved by microscopic observation, and clung to the old dogma of “preformation.” This theory assumed that in the human ovum—and in the egg of all other animals—the organism was

Vol. i.]
already present or "preformed," in all its parts; the "evolution" of the embryo consisted literally in an "unfolding" of the folded organs. Haller declared, "No part of the body is made from another; all are created at once." Wolff's doctrine was resuscitated by MENDEL.

COMTE DE BUFFON (1707-1788),

the great French naturalist and anthropologist, was no believer in the permanent stability of the species. He hinted that all the present species have gradually been evolved from ancestral forms of a different type (1749), but as a concession to the Sorbonne, and afraid of spending the remainder of his days in the Bastille, he added: "But no; it is certain from Revelation that every species was directly created by a separate fiat." He was a believer in the view that acquired characters are capable of being transmitted. This is what he says on the subject:

"Upon the whole, every circumstance concurs in proving that mankind are not composed of species essentially different from each other; that, on the contrary, there was originally but one species, which, after multiplying and spreading over the whole surface of the earth, have undergone various changes by the influence of climate, food, mode of living, epidemic diseases, and the admixture of dissimilar individuals; that at first these changes were not so conspicuous, and produced only individual varieties; that these varieties became afterwards specific because they were rendered more general, more strongly marked, and more permanent, by the continual action of the same causes; that they are transmitted from generation to generation, as deformities or diseases pass from parents to children."

Buffon described the "Varieties of the Human Species," and was therefore regarded by FLOURENS as the founder of anthropology. Individual variations, according to him, are due to three causes: climate, food, and habits. These influences, acting over large areas on large groups of people, produce general and constant varieties. To these varieties he gave the name race.

In his Théorie de la Terre (1749), he attempted to state simply geological truths; but the theological faculty of the Sorbonne dragged him at once from his high position, forced him to recant ignominiously, and to print his recantation, which runs as follows:

"I declare that I had no intention of contradicting the text of Scripture; that I believe most firmly all therein related about the creation, both as to order of time and matter of fact. I abandon everything in my book respecting the formation of the earth, and generally all which may be contrary to the narrative of Moses."

JEAN PICARD (1620-1682) had already, in 1682, estimated the size of the earth; BOUGIER, in 1738, made the first attempt to measure its density; LAZZARO MORRO in 1740, JAMES HUTTON (1726-1797) in 1749, and ABRAHAM WERNER of Freiburg (1750-1817) in 1776, studied the formation of the earth's crust, and with these investigations geology became established as a science, having broken loose from the trammels of theology.

The prevailing doctrine of the Church continued to be that "all things were made at the beginning of the world," and that to say that stones and fossils were made before or since the "beginning" is contrary to Scripture. JOHN WESLEY (1703-1791), the famous preacher, basing his theology on the declaration that the Almighty after creation found the earth and all created things "very good," declared, in his sermon on The Cause and Cure of Earthquakes, that no one who believes the Scriptures can deny that "sin is the moral cause of earthquakes, whatever their natural cause may be," and that earthquakes are the "effect of that curse which was brought upon the earth by the original transgression."
CARL v. LINNÉ (1707-1778), the great botanist, a contemporary of Buffon, "found biology a chaos and left it a cosmos." His system was published in 1768. Whereas Buffon described, Linnaeus classified. Order and method were with him a passion.

GEOFFROY ST. HILAIRE (1772-1844),

in 1795, came to the conclusion that all species have descended from a primitive type; and, in 1796, GALL proved the gradual evolution of one of the structures—the brain.

GOETHE (1749-1832), the German poet, who was a scientist as well, about the same time and quite independently, declared that all the more perfect organic natures, such as fishes, amphibians, birds, and mammals, with man at their head, were formed at first on one general type. ("Theory of the Metamorphosis or Transformation of Plants," 1796.)

ERASMUS DARWIN (1731-1802),

the grandfather of Charles Darwin, was a philosopher as well as a naturalist, and said that animals vary from one another chiefly because they are continually altering their habits and changing their environment. He endeavoured to explain the animal instincts by means of experience and association, regulated by the impulse of self-preservation and by the necessity of individual adaptation to external conditions. His principal work was "Zoonomia, or the Laws of Organic Life" (1794).

G. R. TREVIRANUS (1776-1837),

naturalist at Bremen, in his work on Biology, in 1802, expressed the idea that from forms of life originally simple had arisen all higher organisations by gradual development; that every living creature has a capacity for receiving modifications of its structure from external influences; and that no species had become really extinct, but that each had passed into some other species. He wrote in 1821 on the Functions of the Brain. According to his theory, the convolutions of the brain contain the centres for perception, association, and memory; sight is located in the occipital region, hearing in the cerebellum, and smell in the frontal region.

JOHN HUNTER (1728-1793)

rivalled Haller as a collector—his vast scientific collection forming now the College of Surgeons’ Museum in London—and exercised far-reaching and profound influence upon many sciences. His contributions to human and comparative anatomy, the natural history of plants and animals, vegetable and animal physiology, geology and palæontology, were of signal value. Manifold were the results of his studies; but not the least important was the declaration of his belief that in the brain were posited the centres of thought and feeling, and that it consisted of a plurality of mental functions or faculties. His greatest interest was natural science, and he was the first of scientific surgeons. He wrote of himself:

"I am not a reader of books," and "I believe nothing that I have not seen and observed myself." His reply, when taunted with ignorance of the classics, is famous: ‘Jesse Foot accuses me of not understanding the dead languages, but I could teach him that on the dead body which he never knew, in any language, dead or living.”
professor in the Faculty of Medicine at Göttingen, laid the foundation of race classification based on measurement (1776). He classified mankind into five varieties under the one species: Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, American, and Malay; laying particular stress upon the shape of the skull and of the face, and may therefore be regarded as the founder of craniology. He was a great collector of crania, and it became the fashion to visit the Blumenbachian Museum, to have the differences which distinguish the various cranial types pointed out, and to indulge in sentimental rhapsodies upon the beauty and symmetry of the young female Georgian skull, which was considered the highest type of all.

Blumenbach dealt a death-blow to the fabulous tales which had at all ages been recorded of the Natural History of Man and which had been accepted by credulous people: men with eyes situated in their shoulders, or with their feet turned backwards, men with dogs’ heads, or, indeed, with no heads at all; fossil bones of animals as large as the elephant were held to be human and to have belonged to a race which attained a stature of twenty feet. Even Buffon believed this statement.

We can refer only briefly to two pioneers in astronomy of this period, having mentioned NEWTON in Chapter VII, page 117.

PIERRE DE LAPLACE (1749-1827)

re-discovered the nebular hypothesis forty years after Kant. It was published in his magnificent astronomical treatises, Exposition du Système du Monde (1796) and Traité du Mécanique Céleste (1799), in which he showed that the entire mechanism of the celestial bodies is strictly in accordance with the principles and laws of mathematical science.

SIR WILLIAM HERSCHEL (1738-1822)

discovered a new planet—Uranus—and pointed out the probable formation of new suns going on in far-distant regions. He pictured our own sun rushing through space at the rate of 150 million miles a year, carrying with it our earth and all the other planets, and, above all, he traced the law of gravitation into the distant star-world, and showed it there holding suns together and causing them to revolve round each other. In 1793 he explained the cause of sunspots, and in 1822 he discovered the use of the spectroscope for the detection of chemical elements.

PROGRESS OF MEDICAL SCIENCE,
especially of the knowledge of
THE BRAIN AND ITS FUNCTIONS

WILLIAM HARVEY (1578-1657)

was one of the first to demonstrate the value of Bacon’s method. He was a pupil of GIROLAMO FABRICIUS (1537-1619) of Padua (successor of Gallopius), who was the first to give an elaborate description of the valves in the veins (1546). Continuing these researches, Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood (1616, date of Manuscript in British Museum; 1628, date of his treatise), a discovery which rendered him immortal. But he also made other important researches, such as into
the procreation of animals, as a result of which he formulated the well-known law: "Every living thing comes from an egg." The results of Harvey's observations are the more remarkable when we consider the scanty instruments and appliances then available. That he followed Bacon's method is seen from his explanation:

He said of himself that he felt it in some sort criminal to call in question doctrines that had descended through a long succession of ages and carried the authority of the ancients, but he "appealed unto Nature, that bowed to no antiquity, and was still higher authority than the ancients." He also said: "I profess both to learn and to teach anatomy not from books, but from dissections; not from the position of philosopher, but from the fabric of Nature."

His discovery of the circulation of the blood, which ranks second to none in its consequences on physiology and medicine, was, on its announcement, met by a host of clamourers, who denounced its author, and had such power over the public mind that he was deemed a madman, and not safe to be consulted as a physician. The Faculty of Paris interdicted the demonstration in proof of his discovery. He was ridiculed and persecuted by almost all the learned contemporaries, and, by the consequent loss of his practice, was reduced to comparative poverty.

When the reality of the great discovery of Harvey dawned upon the medical world, the first result was a school of medicine, which went to the other extreme and regarded man simply as an hydraulic machine, and found the principle of every malady in imperfections of circulation.

ANDRÉA CESALPINO (1519-1603), Professor of Medicine at Pisa, and physician to Pope Clemens VIII., anticipated the discovery of the blood before Harvey. He had grasped, as pure theory, the truth about the systemic and pulmonary circulations, but his ideas were not supported by any convincing experiments. Cesalpino was an able naturalist, taught botany as well as medicine, was the first true classifier of plants ("De Plantis," Florence, 1583), as was acknowledged by Linnaeus, and the last writer to regard the heart as the sole seat of the soul. JOHN MAYOW (1643-1679), of London (see p. 176), explained the process of respiration, and declared that "the particles of the air absorbed during respiration are designed to convert the black or venous blood into the red or arterial." He also declared the placenta to be the lungs of the foetus, and knew that the third cranial nerve contracted the pupil. Mayow located the soul in the dura mater, for by it, he thought, the animal spirits were drawn from the blood to the brain.

FRANCIS SYLVIUS (1614-1672),

—Jacques Dubois (le Boë)—professor in Leyden, the most ardent defender of the doctrine of animal spirits, is one of the founders of the iatro-chemical school and was the first to apply chemistry to physiology, divesting it of most of the phantastic trappings which van Helmont gave it. He is also famous for his prescriptions, some of which survive to this day. He introduced clinical teaching in the university of Leyden, which he rendered famous. Sylvius was a psycho-therapeutist. "Whoever," said he, "is unable to treat disease of the mind, is no physician. I have had to care for a large number of cases of this kind, and have cured many; but assuredly rather by moral impressions and the effect of reason, than by the use of drugs." He was also famous as an anatomist. The fossa Sylvii and the aqueduct of Sylvius in the brain are named after him. He had many distinguished pupils, notably Willis, Swammerdam, de Graaf, and Stenson.

THOMAS WILLIS (1622-1675),

the most distinguished disciple of Sylvius, a famous anatomist, was professor in the university of Oxford, and one of the founders of the Royal Society (1660).
Willis was fully aware of the importance of the brain for mental processes, the higher modes of which, in the case of man, he attributed to a rational incorporeal soul; nevertheless, he distinguished a corporeal soul consisting of two parts, one of flame residing in the blood; the other an ethereal element—the animal spirits—diffused throughout the nervous system and in a less degree through other tissues. He sought to discover the mental functions of the brain, or the canals through which the "animal spirits" flow when psychical activity is present, and strove to prove that these spirits were secreted in the cortex, and transmitted thence through the white substance in the nerves of the body.

Willis assigned to each particular part of the brain a special influence on the mind (1681). He held that the cerebrum subserves the animal functions and the voluntary motions, the cerebellum the involuntary; that a perception of all the sensations takes place in the fibres of the corpora striata—the seat of the sensus commune—and through these descending voluntary movements are excited; that the understanding is seated in the corpus callosum, and memory in the convolutions, which are its storehouse; that the animal instincts are located in the thalamus opticus and corpora quadrigemina, and that the animal spirits are generated in the cortex of the cerebrum and the cerebellum from the arterial blood; that they collect in the medulla, are variously distributed and arranged to excite the animal actions, and distil through a pedicle; that the animal spirits secreted in the cerebellum are ever flowing, equally and continuously, into the nerves which regulate involuntary movements; but those of the cerebrum tumultuously and irregularly as the animal actions are vehemently performed or quiescent.

Willis believed the vagi nerves to originate in the cerebellum, and it is due to this mistaken notion that he attributed the vital functions of the heart and respiration to that organ.

Willis maintained that serous effete matter in the ventricles trickles partly through the olfactory nerves into the nostrils, partly through the infundibulum to the pituitary gland, and thence by peculiar ducts to the various veins which return the blood to the heart from the brain.

He agreed with Galen in considering the use of the fornix to consist in supporting the hemispheres; and decided that the pineal gland was not the seat of the soul, but a lymphatic gland (the view Galen held), having no relation with the substance of the brain.

Willis considered the brain to consist, like all other organs, of "fibres," which, however, on account of the softness of the tissue, cannot be isolated.

Willis investigated also the blood supply of the brain, and certain vessels at the base bear his name: the "circle of Willis." As to the loops of nerves with which the arteries here and there are encircled, he stated their use to be to reflex or close the arteries, and thus during the various emotions of the mind to admit the blood in greater or less quantity to certain parts. These nerves which control the calibre of the arteries are now known to be the vase-motor nerves.

A contemporary of Sylvius, JOH. JAC. WEPPER (1620-1695), of Schaffhausen, also traced the course of the vessels of the brain, with more accuracy than had previously been done, and is known for his observations on apoplexy. REALDO COLOMBO (1516-1559), successor of Vesalius at Padua and later professor in Rome, made observations of the circulation on the exposed hearts of animals, is the discoverer of the smaller circulation, and noticed the movements of the brain isochronous with the action of the heart (1559). A more careful description of these movements was given in 1618 by JEAN RIOLAN (1580-1657), professor of anatomy in Paris.

THOMAS SYDENHAM (1624-1689),

the great English physician, was a contemporary of Willis. He was a supporter of the doctrine of Hippocrates regarding the vis medicatrix naturae. Sydenham was
against all systems, and broke the power of the iatro-physical and iatro-chemical schools. The philosopher and physician LOCKE was a friend of his.

PIERRE CHANET


He located imagination in the fore-part of the brain and gave a variety of reasons for it, the chief being that, after a strong effort of the imagination, we feel a lassitude, and considerable heat in the forehead. He, however, cautioned his readers not to think that the imagination resides in an indivisible point of the brain, or is attached to a single spot, but its locality is more extended.

With reference to memory, he was afraid that he might be accused of using improper terms in attributing an organ to memory, which has no action, and is, properly speaking, no faculty. Be that as it may, it has a passive instrument, a particular portion of the brain where the spirits are arrested and fixed, namely the cerebellum.

"I hold," he says, "with the common opinion that this part is the cerebellum. The proofs are, certainly, not so strongly in favour of this theory as I should wish. Still, they seem probable and must be accepted. I find them contradicted only by one surgeon, who boasts of having removed the cerebellum without any disorder of the intellect intervening. But this surgeon seems to belong to that class of vain-glorious operators who brag of having removed large organs when they have only removed a few atoms. If he had simply said that memory had not suffered, I might have believed him; but to say that no faculty whatever was damaged is to say that nature made an organ of no use. I hold, on the other hand, an author worthy of belief, who states that he found the cerebellum absent in a man who, during life, had little or no memory. What a marvellous composition must, then, that organ have, which is the direct instrument of our mental operations! What would be our delight if the mechanism of this masterpiece of the Omnipotent were displayed before our eyes! We should behold in this organ a little world; and if it belonged to a Leibniz, this little world would be the abstract of a Universe."

This controversy on the question whether lesions of the brain impair the mental manifestation has been revived two and a half centuries later.

MARCELLO MALPIGHI (1628-1694)

In 1661 began the application of the microscope, which had been invented in 1590, and enabled the study of minute anatomy.

Malpighi, professor of medicine in the university of Bologna, who was in the habit of manufacturing his own microscopes, was able, by aid of one of these instruments, to exhibit the blood, loaded with its corpuscular bodies, passing rapidly from one capillary vessel to another in the frog’s lung (1665). He also discovered the air cells of the lungs (1661), the cells of plants (1674) and the lower layers of the epidermis.

Malpighi (De Cerebro 1686) held that the brain is an appendage, to the spinal cord, in which medullary fibres, collected together, radiate towards the brain, until they end in the cortical portion, just as the fibres in the stem of a cauliflower radiate into the leaves. CARLO FRACASSATUS, his friend, professor of anatomy at Bologna and Pisa, also adopted this opinion, and THOMAS BARTHolin (1616-1680), of Copenhagen, in his "Anatomy," said this opinion was both new and peculiar, and that by it he could understand how fishes, on account of their small brain, are dull as to sensation, but agile as to movement, from their large spinal cord.

Malpighi’s microscopical researches into the anatomy of the brain suffered from
the inadequacy of his instruments and the coarseness of his method (he boiled the brain before examination). This led him to declare that the cortex of the brain consisted of "microscopic globules" and was therefore a glandular organ for the secretion of the animal spirits. Most of the XVIIIth century anatomists appear to have held the opinion of the brain being a gland, and that its white substance consisted of microscopic pipe-like structures and the grey of granular bodies.

A. van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723),
a Dutch naturalist, by the same aid (the microscope), was the first to describe spermatozoa and to give a complete account of the red corpuscles (1674), to discover the striped character of voluntary muscle, and the structure of the crystalline lens. He was the first to see what he called animalculæ, i.e., micro-organisms (1687), and to discover the capillary anastomosis between the arteries and veins. He discovered also that the grey matter of the brain was made up of what he called globules (in reality nerve-cells), thus agreeing with Malpighi, but in opposition to the view of his fellow-countryman Ruyssch (1638-1731), who claimed that it consisted of a congeries of blood-vessels. He also claimed that the nerve-fibrils contained globules floating in a fluid and that their vibration is the cause of sensation. (Thesauri Anatomici decem, Amsterdam, 1701-16.)

Raymond de Vieussens (1641-1716),
professor at Montpellier, in his "Neurologia Universalis" (1685), described the mighty nerve tracts which pass through the corpora striata and capsule interna both up towards the hemispheres of the brain and down towards the spinal cord. When he followed them upwards, he found that they formed three regions in the white medullary portions of the brain (centrum ovale): the regio suprema, highest up near the crown of the head; the regio media, below the latter; and the regio inferna, farthest down, nearest the fissure of Sylvius; and Vieussens thought that it was in these regions of the cerebral medulla (white substance of the cortex) that the seat of the soul and psychical activity lay; more especially in the "centrum semi-ovale Vieusseni," probably because of its lesion in apoplexy, as noticed also by Wepfer, Willis, and Lancisi.

Vieussens considered the ganglia of the nerves, which were known already to Galen, to be receptacles of the animal spirits, for the nourishment and preservation of the nerves.

G. M. Lancisi (1654-1720),
physician to three Popes in succession, described in his work "De subtancis mortibus," Rome, 1707, the minute anatomy of the corpus callosum, and ascribed to the pons, in his work "De sede cogitantis animæ," 1718, the fabulous quality of controlling the functions of the soul, the power of thought being in direct relation to the bulk of this organ. The pineal gland (Descartes) he regarded as a subsidiary centre.

V. Coiter (1534-1600), pupil of Fallopius and Eustachius, a great authority on the comparative anatomy of crania, in 1573, had already described the anterior and posterior spinal nerve roots, and Mistichelli, in 1709, and Francis Petit—Pourfour du Petit—(1664-1741), in 1710, described the decussation of the fibres of the spinal cord below the pons. Petit regarded the cortex of the brain as containing the centres for voluntary movement.
PROGRESS OF SCIENCE IN XVIIth AND XVIIIth CENTURIES 185

ANTONIO PACCHIONI (1665-1726),
a pupil of Malpighi, thought he had discovered in the dura mater of the brain an apparatus for the movement of the animal spirits, similar in importance to the heart in the circulation of the blood. ("De Dura matris fabrica," Rome, 1701.) That no such apparatus existed was shown by GIOV. DOM. SANTORINI (1681-1737), in his work "Observationes Anatomicæ," Venice, 1727, and by the anatomist A. V. HALLER (1708-1777).

HERMANN BOERHAAVE (1668-1738),
the great professor at Leyden in Holland, thought that every sense has its own sense organ, so that there were regions in the brain separated in situation according to the different senses. He attempted to show that the animal spirits consist of a very refined aqueous fluid, which is produced in the brain and moves the muscles, being distributed by means of the nerves, having also a nutrient property—which was disputed afterwards by Haller. He located the soul in the gyrus fornicatus.

Boerhaave, through his great ability, made his university famous and the centre of medical influence in Europe. He laid the foundation of organic chemistry (1701), and is especially remarkable through his eminent pupils: Haller, Cullen, and Van Swieten.

Boerhaave was a representative of the iatro-mechanic school, originating with Descartes. To him the muscles were springs, the heart was a pump, the kidneys a sieve, and secretions of the glandular juices were produced by pressure; the heat of the body was the result of the friction of the globules of blood against the walls of the blood-vessels; it was greater in the lungs because the vessels of the lungs were supposed to be narrower than those of other organs. When iatro-mechanism became insufficient, chemistry came to its aid. Distillations, fermentations, and effervescences played their rôle. As mentioned, FRANCIS SYLVIUS (1614-1672) and THOMAS WILLIS (1622-1675) were its most eminent representatives.

FRIEDRICH HOFFMANN (1660-1742),
Boerhaave's contemporary, professor of medicine in the University of Halle, formulated the theory of the nervous influence in the production of disease. He declared melancholia and mania to be due to the diminished or increased impulse of the blood. If the impulse is deficient and the stoppage is light, resulting only in a difficulty of the return of venous blood, there results melancholia. If the impulse is stronger, the blood thicker, and the congestion greater, there results mania. The treatment was in accordance with this view—venesection, cold applications to the head, etc.

EMANUEL V. SWEDENBORG (1688-1772),
a Swedish mystic seer and founder of the Swedenborgian religious sect, penetrated deeply in many departments of natural sciences. In 1770 he published in Amsterdam his famous "Occonomia Regni Animalis," in which he dealt with the brain, and showed himself not only a learned anatomist and a sharp-sighted observer, but also in many respects an unprejudiced, acute, and deep anatomical thinker. He relied chiefly on clinical results from the study of cases by other authors who were accessible to him, and drew largely from Vieussens, Wepfer, Pacchioni, Ruysch, Lancisi, Malpighi, Leeuwenhoek, and others.
He maintained that the surface of the cerebrum, the grey cortex of the brain, served as the material basis of the psychical phenomena, as well as for the conscious perceptions and voluntary impulses to motion. He knew that the medullary substance of the brain was fibrous, and he claimed that at the end of these fibrils hang small elements, which are the seat of psychical activity, though "the soul pervades the entire brain," both the cortical and medullary parts. In the cortical elements, which Swedenborg called "spherulae" or "cerebellula," the soul receives the sense impressions, transforms them into ideas, judgments, and decisions; but all the regions of the cortex are not of equal value. Some regions governed the higher, others the lower functions; some received the sensory impressions and others sent out the different kinds of motor impulses; that is, the different departments of the psychical activity were localised in different places in the cerebral cortex.

The most important part of the cerebral cortex, where the psychical phenomena actually take place, is the anterior and superior region of the cerebrum. "All the sensations affect chiefly the anterior province of the cerebrum, and the voluntary conatus or efforts proceed thence. . . . And, therefore, if this portion of the cerebrum is wounded, then the internal senses—imagination, memory, thought—suffer; the very will is weakened, and the power of determination blunted. . . . This is not the case if the injury is in the back part of the cerebrum."

Swedenborg divided the anterior superior region of the brain in three lobes: the one situated highest in the crown of the head; the third lowest down, along the fissure of Sylvius; and the second between the two. He says further: "The royal road of the sensations of the body to the soul . . . is through the corpora striata. . . . All determinations of the will also descend by that road. . . . It is the Mercury of Olympus; it announces to the soul what is happening to the body, and it bears the mandates of the soul to the body." And as the corpora striata lie immediately under the anterior and superior region of the brain "all sensations arrive for the most part to the anterior region of the cerebrum, and the voluntary impulses likewise emanate from this." And "the muscles and actions which are in the ultimates of the body, or the soles of the feet, depend more intimately upon the highest parts (of the brain); upon the middle lobe, the muscles which belong to the abdomen and thorax; and upon the third lobe, those which belong to the face and head." This localisation is very similar to the results of modern research.

**Théophile de Bordeu** (1722-1776),

was the founder of the vitalistic school at Montpellier. He brought forward new views which transformed Stahl's animism into vitalism. He noticed that nerves regulate the secretion of the bodily glands, and held the view that the brain had as many parts as the body has organs, so that each organ was represented in the brain. His pupil, P. J. Barthez (1734-1806), regarded the "vital principle" as the cause of vital phenomena.

**Albrecht v. Haller** (1708-1777),

another pupil of the celebrated Boerhaave, was a distinguished anatomist and physiologist, and was a physician, botanist, and poet as well. He was living in the time of Frederick the Great, and wrote a work of great influence on the "Elements of Physiology" (1757), in which he declared that the brain is connected with the mind and the psychical functions only so far as it is the sensorium commune, or the place where all activities of sense are exercised and whence all muscular movements take their origin. He believed the sensorium to extend over the whole substance of cerebrum and cerebellum. He thought that the only prospect of attaining to any knowledge of the use of the various parts of the brain lay in diligently availing
ourselves of every opportunity for dissecting the brains of insane, and in accurately comparing the brains of animals (whose faculties are well known) with the human brain.

Previous to Haller, as we have seen, it was held that the soul must be present at some one spot in the brain, where it would receive or be affected by all the agitations brought from the sense organs by the converging sensory nerves, and where it could control the outflow of nervous impulses along the motor nerves; for the soul was considered as playing upon the central ends of groups of motor nerves and originating in them impulses appropriate to the production of the movements it willed, much as a musician plays upon the keys of a piano, striking them in combinations appropriate to the production of harmonious chords. According to this way of thinking, it was necessary that the seat of the soul should be a central and single organ in the brain, and, since almost all parts of the brain exist in bilateral symmetrical duplication, the choice was strictly limited and fell in turn upon each of the single median structures, e.g., the septum lucidum, the corpus callosum, the central ventricle, the pineal gland; all of which, however, were in turn shown to have no immediate connection with consciousness.

Haller rejected Stahl's view that the soul acts directly in all parts of the body; but he argued that "no narrower seat can be allotted to the soul than the conjoint origin of all the nerves; nor can any structure be proposed as its seat, except that to which we can trace all the nerves. For it will be easily understood that the sensorium commune ought to lack no feeling of any part of the whole animated body, nor any nerve which can convey from any part of the body the impression of external objects. And the same may be said of the nerves of movement. Wherefore, even quite apart from the experimental results described above, we cannot admit as the exclusive seat of the soul, either the corpus callosum, the septum lucidum, the tiny pineal gland, the corpora striata, or any other particular region of the brain." And he concluded that "both sensation and movement have their source in the medulla of the brain. This, therefore, is the seat of the soul." By medulla he denoted the whole of the central mass of both cerebrum and cerebellum. He regarded the white matter of the brain (now known to consist exclusively of nerve-fibres) as the seat of sensation and movement for another reason, because he thought it insensitive to stimuli. Still, he inclined to the view that different parts of the brain are specially concerned in different mental functions; though in summing up he wrote: "Our present knowledge does not permit us to speak with any show of truth about the more complicated functions of the mind, or to assign in the brain to imagination its seat, to common sensation its seat, to memory its seat."

In postulating a special sensitive force or sensibility for neural action and a special "irritability" for muscular movement, Haller gave strong support to the erroneous theory of a specific "vital force," which lasted, with modifications, down to the middle of the XIXth century, by which time physiology had entered upon a new phase.

He was the first to describe the cerebro-spinal fluid (1766), and his fame is due to the fact that he was among the first of physiologists to employ the method of experimentation in his work. He was also one of the founders of Comparative Anatomy.

JOHN BROWN (1735-1788),
in his "Elementæ Medicæ," Edinburgh (1780), built a system of his own on Haller's discovery that irritability and contractibility had some relation to vital phenomena. It was built on the theory that life was a state due to stimuli and maintained by stimuli, and he applied it to the nature and causation of disease, conceiving two states—strength and weakness, sthenia and asthenia. He made some sensible remarks as regards insanity. He admitted that insanity may
originate in the brain, but he attached greater importance to abnormal passions as a factor in the causation of mental derangement, since passions disturb the whole body and not only the brain. Therefore insanity is not a disorder of the brain alone, but an affection of the whole body.

GERHARD VAN SWIETEN (1700-1772),

a pupil of Boerhaave, who became physician to Empress Maria Theresia and professor of medicine at Vienna, whose medical school he made famous, believed in brain localisation, but he considered the organisation of the brain too complicated, too intricate, and too difficult of investigation to permit us to hope that we should ever be able to point out the seat of memory, judgment, or imagination; faculties which, as we shall show in later chapters, it is impossible to localise.

Van Swieten, writing theoretically on surgery, advised us in the case of very bad compound fractures which may most probably require amputation, to defer operation until we have tried the force of antiseptic fomentation, and applications of like kind, for two or three days. (Quoted by Percival Pott, "Chirurgical Works.")

ANTON DE HAEN (1704-1776),

another pupil of Boerhaave, was a distinguished physician, who went with Van Swieten to Vienna, and became professor there in 1754. He was the originator of electro-therapeutics, applied especially to nervous disorders (1755.) Curiously, he was a believer in witchcraft, and wrote a treatise in defence of it.

The science of electricity was founded by WILLIAM GILBERT (1540-1603), an Englishman, in 1600; and BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (1706-1790) investigated its nature (1746) and made experiments with the lightning-rod (1752). H. C. OERSTED (1777-1851) discovered electro-magnetism in 1819; and M. FARADAY (1791-1867) electrical induction (1831), dynamo-electricity, and largely electro-chemistry.

Electro-physiology had its origin in the epoch-making experiments on muscle-nerve preparations, summarised in 1792 by LUIGI GALVANI (1737-1798) of Bologna. It was followed up with rare skill and insight by ALESSANDRO VOLTA (1745-1827) in his "Letters on Animal Electricity" (1792). Its actual founder was EMIL DU BOIS REYMOND (1818-1896). He published observations pointing to an electrical theory of propagation of nerve impulse in 1848, and was followed in 1850 by G. B. DUCHENNE (1806-1875), on "Electro-Diagnosis and Therapeutics."

C. L. HOFFMANN (1721-1807)

conceived (1792) that the principle of life or vitality could not be separated from matter, but was one of its essential properties; that life was a series of mutual actions and reactions between the fluids and solids of the body; and that all the operations of the body and the mind are the result of this regular and harmonious action. He was also the author of the "antiseptic" theory, that in diseases, especially in fevers, septic products of decomposition are carried in the blood and act as irritants to the solid parts. His treatment and remedies, accordingly, were designed to antagonise this influence. He was very famous in his day.

G. B. MORGAGNI (1682-1771),

professor in Padua, was the father of pathological anatomy, the science of the causes of error in the working of the human machine. In his work "De sedibus et causis
morborum per anatomem indagatis," Venice, 1761, he gave the clinical history of cases and their post-mortem appearances.

**J. A. Unzer (1727-1799),**

professor at Halle, after twenty-five years of patient and painstaking research, published in 1771 his "First Elements of Physiology," in which he dealt in a scientific manner with the problem how **instinctive actions** could be distinguished from those prompted by intelligence. He recognised the following "instincts": for food, self-preservation, self-defence, propagation, for the protection of offspring, love of life, self-love, for the performance of voluntary movements, and instinct for repose and enjoyment. Unzer was a metaphysician and defended Stahl. He did not believe the **brain** could be the seat of the soul, as its faculties have been manifested in subjects whose brain had been entirely destroyed, and in children born without a brain!

So firmly was the belief in animal spirits implanted for centuries in the minds of scientific men that even Unzer wrote: "All the phenomena of motion and sensation manifested through the nerves render probable the existence of a remarkable subtle fluid essence which is present invisibly in the medulla of the brain and nerves, and is the means whereby all the functions of both are performed. It is termed the vital spirit or nervous fluid, but it is not known how and when it contributes to the animal actions."

**J. C. A. Mayer (1747-1801),**

professor of anatomy in Berlin University, in his *Anat.-Physiol. Abhandlung vom Gehirne* (1779), asks, "Are all the functions of the rational soul of man localised in those parts where it manifests vivifying power; or are the operations of a single mental power effected in a single and especially appointed part of the brain? And does not the mind perhaps localise its ideas by the operation of single faculties in particular departments, one in one place, and another in another?"

**Charles Bonnet (1720-1793),**

physiologist and philosopher, of Geneva, author of "Essay de Psychologie" (1754), "Essay analytique sur les Facultés de l'Âme" (1759), and other works on psychology and natural history, was a severe critic of Condillac. In his opinion, man is not purely psychical nor purely physical, but is a psycho-physical being. Thought, therefore, cannot be produced without the action of the nervous fibres; but the latter are by no means identical with thought itself, the origin of which is a mystery. He refuses to admit the materialistic theory as generally accepted in his time, but nevertheless maintains that, properly to understand the formation and the connection of ideas, there is no other way but to examine the relation of the nervous fibres. On this assumption he made several important observations upon the physiologica conditions of the mental processes.

He considered the brain to be formed of a plurality of organs, and the various attributes of the intellect and the various kinds of feeling to act on different sets of fibres. In fact he attributed a different function to each nerve fibre for each special sensation, and a different function for each part of the brain, though he confessed his inability to designate these functions. He held that when the fibres are put in motion too violently, or for too long a period, they are fatigued and suffer pain. He also observed that the brain became more complex as we ascend the animal scale, and he thought that all the nerve fibres converged towards one common centre, which must be the seat of the soul. He said:
“The action of sound is not confined to the tympanum, nor that of light to the retina; there are nerves which propagate these different impressions to the brain. . . . Feeling is not in the fingers, neither is sensation in the external senses. . . . We know that we have ideas only by the aid of the senses; this is a truth, which experience attests. Experience also teaches us that our ideas of every kind are chained to one another, and that this connection belongs to the combination, which the fibres of the senses have together. It therefore follows that the different senses with which we are endowed have, somewhere in the brain, secret communications, by means of which they may act on one another. The part where the communications take place is that which must be regarded as the seat of the soul. . . . It is by this part that the soul acts on the body, and by the body on so many different beings. Now the soul acts only by the agency of the nerves; it follows, therefore, that the nerves of all the parts, which the soul governs, must terminate in this organ, which we regard as the intermediate seat of feeling and of action.”

The soul is a unit. The nervous apparatus is complex. If the soul is to act through the nervous apparatus there must be a centre somewhere where all the impressions are received, a centre of all the nerve-fibres which convey the communications, and that centre will be the seat of the soul. That was the reasoning of the most ancient philosophers, and it still prevailed at the end of the XVIIIth century. Bonnet, notwithstanding his advanced notions, fell a victim to it. He was also wrong in assuming that we have ideas only by the aid of the senses. It is not the perfection of the senses which gives intelligence to the brain, but it is the perfection of the brain which determines the employment of the senses, the external instruments.

**XAVIER BICHAT (1771-1802),**

biologist and author of “vitalism,” is the earliest exponent of modern descriptive anatomy and scientific medicine. His “Anatomy and Physiology as applied to Medicine” (1800) established a new science, the science of “histology,” but this term was introduced only a few years later (1819) by AUG. F. J. C. MAYER (1787-1865). It comprehends the study of the minute anatomy of the tissues of the human body, their classification and properties. Life, according to Bichat, is the totality of those functions which resist death.

He held that every kind of sensation has its centre in the brain, but the brain is never affected by the passions; the organs of organic life and the sympathetic ganglia are the exclusive seat of the latter. Lesions of the liver, stomach, spleen, intestines, heart, etc., produce a variety of affections which cease when the cause is removed. Fear, for instance, arises from the stomach, choler from the liver, goodness from the heart, joy from the intestines!

During the XVIIIth century the facts of living bodies were studied by two opposing schools; by the first as a deduction from physical and mechanical discoveries, by the second as the procedure of a metaphysical entity, the vital principle. In contrast with these opposing schools, Bichat endeavoured to present the laws of phenomena characteristic of living things, without attempting to penetrate their primal cause. “We can study the phenomena of light, of heat, of oxygen, without knowledge of what the essential nature of each of these things may be. And so in the study of life we can study the properties of organs animated by life without knowing what may be their vital principle.” Abandoning all attempts to discuss the origin or the essential meaning of life, Bichat surveyed the facts of living bodies, and reached many of the great generalisations on which biological science is founded.

He wrote “Physiological Researches on Life and Death” (1800) and a text-book on “General Anatomy” (1801). He showed in the latter, the most important and influential of his works, by the aid of the microscope, that the body of one of the
higher animals is not only a collection of organs, but also a collection of tissues, and that the same is true of the higher plants.

He died, at the age of thirty-one, through an accident.

**S. T. von Sömmering** (1755-1830),

the physiologist, was a friend of Kant, but still accepted Descartes. He wrote, in 1791 (Hirn und Nervenlehre, Par. 83), that it is not improbable that certain kinds of ideas arise in determinate parts of the brain; that certain mental functions are executed in determinate parts; in short, that these different powers appropriate different provinces in the brain. In 1796 (Über das Organ der Seele, a work dedicated to Kant) he localised the seat of the soul (pneuma psychicon) in the fluid of the cerebral ventricles. During his anatomical studies on the real origin of the cranial nerves he was struck by the fact that nearly all terminated in the walls of the cerebral ventricles, where they are bathed by the serous fluid of these cavities. This led him to conclude that this fluid is the single medium of nervous activity, the sensorium commune, the organ and seat of the soul. Kant replied that the soul cannot be spatially localised; the site of the sensorium commune can be considered, not as the seat, but as the organ of the soul; and that the sensorium cannot be in the ventricular fluid, because water cannot be organised, and without organisation no matter can serve as the immediate organ of the soul.

Sömmering contributed to the advance of ethnology by his classical investigations into the comparative anatomy of the Negro and the European. We shall have occasion to refer to him frequently in the succeeding part of this work.

**George Prochaska** (1749-1820),

pupil of A. de Haen, Professor of Anatomy at Prague (1771-91), afterwards at Vienna, in his work on "The Functions of the Nervous System," 1784, brings us very near to the localisation of mental functions in the brain. He says:

"It is our consciousness and a certain peculiar feeling which convinces everyone that he thinks with his brain. But since the cerebrum as well as the cerebellum is composed of many parts variously figured, it is probable that nature, which never works in vain, has destined those parts to various uses, in that the various faculties of mind seem to require different parts of the cerebrum and cerebellum for their production. . . ." Hitherto it has not been possible to determine what portions of the cerebrum or cerebellum are specially subservient to this or that faculty of the mind." He regretted that the whole subject was still in obscurity, and thought with Haller "that no light can be thrown upon it in any other way than by a careful dissection of the brains of fatuous persons, apoplectics, and such as have other disorders of the understanding."

Prochaska was an adherent of the "faculty psychology," and the faculties he expected to be localised were those of Wolff's description. In his "Physiology of Man," Par. 340, he says that "it is beyond all doubt that the internal senses—the faculties of perception, attention, imagination, memory, and so forth, are the results of the mutual action of the organisation of the brain and the faculties of the soul. For, in proportion as the development and perfection of the brain advance through the influence of time and exercise, the understanding equally increases; and, on the contrary, whatever impedes the development of the brain weakens or mutilates these powers. On this account, also, the faculties of the understanding are not alike in all men; and for the same reason, any disease which operates either directly or indirectly on the brain may produce insanity, the entire loss of consciousness, or only the loss of memory." Hitherto it had not been possible to determine what
portion of the cerebrum or cerebellum is especially subservient to this or that faculty; but "it is by no means improbable that each division of the intellect has its allotted organ in the brain, so that there is one for the perceptions, another for the understanding, probably others also for the will, and imagination, and memory, which act wonderfully in concert and mutually excite each other to action." Again, he says that "the impressions which are excited in the sensorium of the mind through the external senses and their nerves are arranged and prepared by means of numerous faculties and organs, in a wonderful, and to our understanding an incomprehensible, manner, so that from them the most beautiful and interesting functions arise, which are called thought and consciousness; and the parts into which they can be divided are called the internal senses." But he adds: "But we cannot yet tell with certainty what part of the brain is necessary to this or that internal sense." Still, he coincides with BOERHAAVE in the supposition that the seat of the perceptive faculty must be very remote from that of the imagination, because during sleep the imagination may be in a high state of activity, whilst the perceptive faculty is inactive. This is the reason, he says, that in sleep the ideas are so confused, and do not begin to recover their distinctness until the perceptive faculty awakes.

Prochaska—as all other physiologists until GALL—still searched for the sensorium commune. He says: "The sensorium commune reflects the sensorial impressions into motor by definite laws peculiar to itself, and independently of consciousness, and since we laid down that the sensorium commune comprises the medulla oblongata, medulla spinalis, and the origin of all the nerves, it follows that the cerebrum and cerebellum, together with their connections, the sensorium commune excepted, constitute the organs of the faculty of thought; and as in some animals these organs are entirely wanting, it is fair to conjecture that the faculty of thought is also wanting, and that they exist solely in virtue of the vis nervosa of the sensorium commune and of the nerves with which they are endowed."

Prochaska was also one of those physiologists who doubted the hypothesis of the animal spirits. In 1784 he wrote: "The arguments adduced in its favour prove nothing when carefully analysed, and the whole hypothesis is altogether devoid of truth."

J. M. de DÉGÉRANDO (1772-1842),

French physiologist, had as little expectation as Haller, Van Swieten, and Prochaska that we should ever be able to determine with certainty the organs of the different faculties. He admitted, however, an essential difference between the different functions, and explained the association of ideas in his work, "Des signes et de l'art de penser" (1800), in the following manner: "The vibration," he says, "which takes place in one organ is communicated to another or to several, and awakens the impressions deposited there."

THE END OF THE DOCTRINE OF "ANIMAL SPIRITS"

The "animal spirits" were assumed to be a very fine and subtle ethereal fluid elaborated in the brain and used by the soul in the performance of its functions. "Not," observed GALEN (131-201), "that this animal spirit is the substance of the soul, but it is its prime agent while inhabiting the brain." The principal ground for the belief in the existence of the animal spirits seems to have been the idea that the brain is a secretory organ—an idea which was suggested by the great quantity of blood sent to it and by some supposed resemblances in its structure to other secreting glands. Yet as nothing cognisable by the senses was produced by it, it was concluded that it must secrete something of a subtle or ethereal nature peculiarly
suited to the performance of the functions which belong to the brain, and which are unlike those of other material substances.

It was after the "animal spirits" were ejected from the ventricles that—as MALPIGHI, SYLVIUS, and WILLIS attempted to show—they were secreted by the cortical substance, whence they were received by the medullary substance, to be transmitted by it to the nerves of the whole body. If the brain is a gland, as even the great MALPIGHI (1628-1694) believed—it must secrete. What? The answer was immediate—animal spirits—about the existence of which the great majority of men had no doubt, and about whose nature and activity they talked as glibly as though they had been seen and weighed and measured. With this explanation of mental life they were content, and so, wrapped about with mists of their own making, they stood still on the road that leads to knowledge; and they advanced only when the animal spirits had been banished. Among those who had denied the existence of animal spirits were AVICENNA, FELIX PLATER, and VAN HELMONT. Long before Prochaska, WEPFER (1620-1695), the discoverer of the haemorrhagic nature of apoplexy (1658), attempted to overthrow the doctrine, which was defended by Willis.

The REV. STEPHEN HALES (1677-1761), known also for his experiments on the blood pressure of animals and his contributions to plant physiology, studied the form of muscles at rest and in contraction and speculated that what we now call a nervous impulse, but which was then spoken of as the animal spirits, might possibly be of an electric nature.

Opponents of the animal spirits were also found in the Stahlians, who maintained that all the functions of the nerves depended directly on the soul, and rejected the animal spirits as useless. But the Stahlian doctrines being overturned, notably by HALLER (1708-1777), the animal spirits were re-established, or, rather, continued.

After it had been fully decided that the animal spirits were not generated in the ventricles of the brain, nor generated in the brain, to be collected in the ventricles, still all believed in the use of the ventricles as receptacles for the effete matters which flow towards the ventricles after the secretion of the spirits and the nutrition of the brain, escaping partly in the nostrils and partly through the supposed ducts from the pituitary gland to the fauces, forming the mucous matter there, and if in abundance causing coryza and catarrh. This doctrine was opposed by C. V. SCHNEIDER (1614-1680), professor in Wittenberg (who, in his work De morbis capitis seu cephalicis illis, 1669, opposed also the localisation theory of Galen and the Arabs), showing that all the foramina of the cribriform plate were closed by a firmly adherent dura mater, and that there were no ducts passing down to the fauces; that catarrhs never collected in the ventricles of the brain, but had their seat in the pituitary membrane of the nares and fauces, which, from being more exactly described by him, was called the Schneiderian membrane. Still, as we have seen, there were a number of anatomists who adhered to the old doctrine.

When the animal spirits had been banished, their place was taken by the *vis nervosa*—a term used by HALLER, and defined by UNZER and PROCHASKA to designate the agent (as yet unknown) by which the nervous system is rendered fit for the performance of its functions.

**VIEWS ON INSANITY**

The housing of the insane and the manner of their treatment during the XVIth and XVIIth centuries were a disgrace to humanity. No reform took place till the beginning of the XIXth century. Since in Chapter XV, the state of the insane prior to the reform will be fully described, this part of the subject need not be dealt with here. But the history of the speculations and investigations on the functions of the brain would not be complete without mention of some of the physicians who held enlightened views of the nature of mental derangement.
LORENZO BELLINI (1643-1704), in his work "De morbis capitis," Bologna (1683), gave a good description of the symptoms of melancholia, especially as regards aboulia and mental inhibition.

MORITZ HOFFMANN (1622-1698), in 1662, proposed transfusion of blood for the cure of melancholia, and JEAN BAPTISTE DENIS (-1704) in 1687 carried it out on a patient and claimed complete recovery. SIR GEORGE ENT (1604-1689) proposed to introduce the same treatment in England in 1667, but failed to convince the medical faculty. KLEIN, in 1680, and M. ETTMULLER (1644-1683), in 1682, recommended the same treatment in Germany.

ELIAS CAMERARIUS (1673-1734), professor at Tübingen, declared disturbances of the circulation in the brain to be the origin of both melancholia and mania, in opposition to the current belief in the XVIIIth century that mental derangement was due to abnormal conditions of the animal spirits.

WILLIAM BATTIE (1704-1779), in his "Treatise on Madness," London (1758), attached special significance to the growth of spicule in the interior of the skull-cap as an etiological factor.

A. CH. LORRIE (1726-1783) made observations on the pulsations of the brain, and treated in his work "De Melancholia," Paris (1762), of insanity in general. He divided the symptoms according to the various regions which originate them or which they affect. The German alienist, FRIEDRICH NASSE (1778-1851), did the same.

A. LE CAMUS (1722-1772), in his work "Médecine de l'Esprit" (1769), traced the origin of disorders of the "understanding" to the derangement of the mechanism of the body and advised treatment on this basis.

R. A. VOGEL (1724-1774), in his work "Academica praelectiones de cognoscendis et curandis corp. hum. affectibus," Göttingen (1772), distinguished six varieties of mental derangement: mania, melancholia, fatuitas, stupiditas, amentia, and oblivio. A more minute classification was furnished by F. BOISSIER DE SAUVAGES (1760-1767) in his Nosologia Methodica, Leyden (1760).

ZÜCKERT (1737-1778) of Berlin, in his work "Von den Leidenschaften" (1770), attempted to trace mental disorders to the influence of abnormal emotions and passions.

F. C. G. SCHEIDEMANTEL (1735-1799), in his book on "Die Leidenschaften als Heilmittel betrachtet," Hildburghausen (1787), recommended that patients who are not amenable to persuasive treatment should be provoked to fright, anger, or other strong emotions, which tend to produce changes in the functions of the body favouring their recovery. He gives details of what emotions to arouse in the various forms of insanity. Of similar tendency is the work "Traité de nerfs et de leur maladies," (Paris, 1782), by S. A. TISSOT (1728-1797), and the Prize Essay "De l'infuence des passions de l'ame dans les maladies, et des moyens d'en corriger des mauvais effets," Paris (1798), by C. J. TISSOT (1750-1826). The latter recommended amongst other means "music" as a relief for sadness, and was altogether a strong advocate of psychotherapy.

THOMAS ARNOLD (1742-1826), published a thorough treatise on Insanity, Leicester, 1782, in which he classified mental disorders on psychological lines and gave due attention to pathological anatomy.

W. PERFECT (1740-1789) published, among other books, "Select Cases of Insanity," Rochester (1787), in which he expressed the view that in the greater number of cases hereditary predisposition is the cause, and we should find it, if we could only trace the family history back far enough.

A. HARPER, in his "Treatise on Insanity," London (1780), laid stress on treating the body as well as the mind in mental disorders. All excitants should be avoided, therefore "all forcible measures." The strict confinement in cells hinders recovery.

FAulkner's book, "Observations on the general and improper treatment of insanity, with a plan for the more speedy and effectual recovery of insane persons," London (1790), dealt principally with psychotherapy and the early treatment of mental disorders, before the asylum became necessary.

WILLIAM PARGETER'S essay, "Observations on Maniacal Disorders," London (1792), mentioned, besides the recognised causes of insanity, localised cerebral injuries. He did not think pathological observations post-mortem would disclose the nature of
With more fought like devote and the century, melancholia, a partial derangement; (2) Mania; (3) Dementia—the latter two being complete derangements. All three have their subdivisions. He inaugurated in Italy post-mortem examination of the brains of insane.

L. H. C. Niemayer (1775-1800), in a Prize Essay, "Commentar de commercio inter animi pathemata," Göttingen (1795), recommended Scheidemantel's method of influencing the patients by definite emotions on the ground that they affect the "internal secretions," which act on the blood and through it on the nervous system.

J. H. Bolten, in his work "Gedanken von psychologischen Kuren," Halle (1751), advocated psychotherapy on strictly medico-psychological lines.

Benjamin Rush (1745-1813), professor of medicine in the University of Philadelphia, in his "Diseases of the Mind," maintained that insanity is not a disease of the brain, but an affection of the blood and the cerebral arteries. He conceded that the brain is the instrument of the mind, but stated that he could find no evidence of brain disease in cases of insanity. He also insisted that debility is the predisposing cause of all disease. He attended President Washington in his last illness (1797).

Ernst Platner (1744-1818) observed the cranial abnormalities in the insane. He ("Specimen de vi corporis," Leipzig, 1767) and J. F. Meckel (1724-1774), in the "Mémoires de l'Académie Royale à Berlin," vol. xx., 1764) noticed the differences in the specific gravity of the brains of sane and insane (maniacs and melancholics). John Ferriar (1761-1815), in his "Medical Histories and Reflections," Washington (1792), recommended prolonged warm baths for maniacs and cold baths for melancholics.

John Haslam (1764-1844), of Bethlem Hospital, in his "Observations on Insanity," London (1798), held that the intellect is involved in both mania and melancholia; only the emotional state is different. Prevention is better than treatment, consequently education should be directed early towards the discipline of the emotions and passions. He was the first to describe "General Paralysis of the Insane."

Alexander Crichton (1764-1856) wrote a fairly complete treatise on "Mental Derangement," London (1798). He traced the origin of all insanity to changes in the bloodvessels.

NOTE

Here ends PART I. With the ascendancy of the natural sciences in the XIXth century, speculations about the soul, and metaphysics in general, fell into neglect, and philosophy became almost apologetic in her tone. The philosophers began to devote themselves to a more critical study of the particular branches of their field, like logic, psychology, ethics, aestheticism, and the history of philosophy, and fought shy of system-building. Brain physiology became at the same time a more exact science.
PART II

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE IN THE XIXTH CENTURY
PART II
THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE
in the XIXth century

SECTION I
FRANCIS JOSEPH GALL: AN UNACKNOWLEDGED GENIUS

CHAPTER XI
GALL AS ANATOMIST

FRANCIS JOSEPH GALL (1758-1828),
whose biography we shall give in a later chapter, was one of the greatest anatomists that ever lived. He has been so much maligned and misrepresented—mostly on second-hand evidence—that I think it expedient to give most liberal quotations from his own works, to enable the reader to form his own independent judgment. Here is a list of his most important discoveries—announced already in the year 1796, but published in book-form only between 1808 and 1820. Most of these discoveries have been acknowledged at some time or other by independent writers, and it will be seen that any single one of them should have sufficed to bring him fame.

1. Gall demonstrated the evolution of the brain and the successive development of the different parts of the nervous system.

He traced the development of the brain from the smallest ganglia in insects to the first appearance of convolutions in higher animals. He had many arguments with contemporary naturalists and anatomists on this subject, more especially about the resemblances of the brains of the orang-outang and man.

He was the first to describe the formation and development of the brain in the fœtus, and to call attention to the simplicity of the convolutions in new-born infants, and in idiots, as compared with the complexity of the brain of the normal adult. Dr. Paul Topinard (1830-1911) in his "Anthropology," 1890, assigns the credit of this discovery to Ant. Desmoulins (1796-1828), in 1825, when Gall's work had been before the public for some years; but Topinard deems Gall's work an "imaginary fancy."

In the report on Gall's Memoir, the Committee of the Institute of France declared: "In the nervous system all is formed simultaneously," whereas Gall had asserted that in the fœtus of man, as well as of animals, the brain is only gradually formed. He says (in his work on "Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau," six vols., Paris, 1822-26, from which this and all succeeding quotations are taken, when not otherwise stated):

"In the human fœtus of about six months, the nerves of the vertebral column,
of the muscles of the eye and the trifacial nerves are sooner formed than the olfactory nerves, and the latter before the auditory and the optic nerves, the pyramids, and the annular protuberance, in which scarcely any trace of nervous filaments are perceptible. The peduncles of the brain, on the surface of which the bundles of fibres are so distinct afterwards, at this time appear to consist only of a mass of grey substances; the optic thalami, corpora striata, and the hemispheres do not contain any distinct filament (without preparation and to the naked eye); they are discovered sooner in the posterior and middle, than in the anterior lobes.

"But, without intending to undervalue the advantages to be derived from the examination of the foetal brain in its different ages, I have always inclined to the opinion that the study of the brain of the various classes of animals below man is a surer method of attaining knowledge of the general laws of the organisation of the nervous system and the brain. . . . I would wish, then, that the successive development of the brain should be studied mostly in the foetus; but, to know the true structure of this organ, the continuity and connection of its parts, the direction and the varied interlacings of its fibrils, their origin, reinforcements, and expansion, etc., I should always prefer either the adult human brain, or brains less complex, but more or less analogous to it."

2. Gall was the first to unfold the convolutions of the brain by his new method of dissection, descriptions of which appeared later in Cloquet's "Manuel d'Anatomie descriptif" (1816) and Green & South's "Dissector's Manual" (London, 1825).

Gall had a hospital patient in whose case he was much interested—a case of hydrocephalus—which led to the discovery of the unfolding of the brain. She was a small woman, and "in spite of her hydrocephalus, appeared to have intellectual faculties in no respect inferior to those generally possessed by women in her station."

Her head was so large that Gall thought it must contain at least four pounds of water. Her death occurred in her fifty-fifth year, and he found, in fact, more than four pounds of water in the cerebral cavities, which had distended the superior portion of the brain to a smooth and thin surface, instead of a mass of corrugated convolutions. It is from this brain that he learned to unfold the convolutions and other anatomical lessons. Previous to this discovery it was supposed by anatomists that the acridity of the water liquefied the brain.

Gall's method—the dissection of the brain stem from below upwards and tracing the fibres from the spinal cord to the cortex—was a new procedure in the study of the brain, and it was through the skilful use of this method that he disclosed some of the intricacies of the anatomy of the nervous system.

The mode of examining the brain then in use among anatomists was, after removing the membranes which enclose it, to cut through it in different directions, to scrape away a large portion of its substance, till the lower structures became visible.

By his discovery of the unfolding of the convolutions and the fibrous consistence of the white matter of the brain, Gall proved that both together were not the pulp mass that his predecessors and contemporaries believed them to be. He showed that by the dilatation of the lateral ventricles in hydrocephalic heads, the brain may be distended without any destruction of its parts. He gave regular demonstrations before doctors from all parts of Europe, a number of whom published accounts of what they had seen. Moreover, Gall himself went on a tour visiting the various German and other universities, everywhere explaining his methods and discoveries.

Among his audience at Halle in 1805 was J. C. REIL (1759-1813), who became famous as an anatomist, and many have attributed Gall's discoveries and scientific method of dissection to him. But Reil himself made no such claim; in fact, his
researches were published only two years later, in 1807, in the "Archives of Physiology."

Again, S. T. v. SÖMMERING (1755-1830), in a memoir to the Academy of Munich, 1808, claimed that the discovery of the unfolding of the convolutions was a very ancient one, made by BERENGARI (1470-1530) of Bologna in 1521; but, as Gall says: "Berengari merely describes the convolutions of the brain as they appear to the eye; he compares them to folds, and there is not a single word in his work which would lead us to presume that he had any idea of the unfolding of the brain."

Gall was able to unfold the convolutions without tearing of the fibres or breaking of the small blood vessels. Others evidently did not succeed so well.

Thus K. A. RUDOLPH (1771-1832), the teacher of Johannes Müller, in the "Grundriss der Physiologie," 1823, said: "I have tried all the manipulations indicated by Gall, in order to unfold the brain, and I have always found that this cannot be effected without severely lacerating it, and that the convolutions are never unfolded in a regular and natural manner, as he pretends." To which Gall replied: "Those who cannot succeed in this artificial operation, certainly have a right to say, that they have not been able to convince themselves of this by their own dexterity; but to hear them, one would believe that they accused me of imposture and charlatanism. But I repeat what I have said in the discussion of the same subject in the work of TIEDEMANN—I invite Sömmering, Rudolfi, Blainville, etc., to come and see with their own eyes this unfolding, which is so inconceivable, and, in the course of half an hour, they will be enabled to do it with as much promptitude as myself."

Another anatomist who is supposed to have anticipated Gall's method of anatomical dissection and views on hydrocephalus is SIR EVERARD HOME (1756-1832), brother-in-law of the celebrated John Hunter. (Philosophical Transactions, 1814). But Home must have been fully acquainted with Gall's work in this department, considering the number of German books which had already appeared, besides the Memoir to the Institute of France and Gall's reply to it, in 1808, and the accounts which had appeared in English medical journals and books. In 1806 there was published in the "Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal," by T. C. ROSEN-MÜLLER (1771-1820), Professor of Anatomy in Leipsic University, an "Account of Dr. Gall's Discoveries regarding the Structure of the Brain," and an anonymous publication on Gall's Theory with Hufeland's observations thereon, in English, appeared the same year, a copy of which is in my possession. Yet Sir Everard Home seems to have made the claim, and JOHN BOSTOCK (1773-1846), the anatomist, believed him. Hence the indignation of Gall, who replied:

"Does Sir Everard Home mean to appropriate to himself the discovery of the unfolding of the cerebral hemispheres? Several years before I undertook my travels, which were commenced in 1805, in my lectures at Vienna, before numerous auditors of all nations, I demonstrated the unfolding of the brain in the most famous universities of Germany, in Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, etc., and finally, in 1807, in Paris. Would not Sir Everard Home have been informed of it? My discovery created too great a sensation, to admit of the supposition that he was not. The memoir before the Institute, and the report of that society upon it, were made in 1808; the answer to that report appeared in 1809; this answer was sent to the "Royal Society" the same year. In 1810, the first volume of my large work, on the Anatomy of the Brain, was sold even in London; and in that volume it is expressly said, as it is in the memoir presented to the Institute, and in my answer, that it was the observation of hydrocephalic cases which led me to the discovery of this unfolding. Finally, in the presence of the London Medical and Chirurgical Society, Dr. Spurzheim demonstrated the structure and expansion of the brain [he had been Gall's prosector], previous to the time when Sir Everard Home read his
memoir to the Royal Society. Sir Everard Home, then, could not be ignorant of my discovery. What motive has he, then, in claiming it?"

That Sir Everard Home was a dishonest man is shown by another disgraceful incident. Home prepared the catalogue of Hunter's museum and then burned his manuscripts, that he might conceal the plagiarisms of which he had been guilty in writing his book on "Comparative Anatomy."

3. Gall was the first to demonstrate that the white matter of the brain is fibrous in structure.

This was denied by many anatomists of his day; for example, by the Brothers WENZEL (Josef Wenzel (1768-1806) and Karl Wenzel (1769-1827), both anatomists), J. F. ACKERMANN (1765-1815), etc.; and even the Committee of the French Academy spoke of it only as "pulp." JOHN GORDON, Lecturer on Anatomy in Edinburgh University, also denied it. In 1802, John and Charles Bell published The Anatomy of the Human Body, in the third volume of which CHARLES BELL (1774-1842) gave descriptions of the brain and made no mention of its fibrous structure. The state of knowledge of cerebral anatomy in those days may be judged from this fact. By the method then in vogue of making thin sections of the brain, right through the hemispheres, down to the corpus callosum, vertically, horizontally, obliquely, from below upwards, from above downwards, the surface of the brain appeared to the observer merely as a gelatinous substance, more or less coloured; and they failed to discover that the white part of the brain consisted of fibres going in various directions; for these fibres are so delicate and so closely connected, that, when cut, they appear to form only a uniform and pulpy mass. As for the nerves, the general view of them was that they all took their rise in the brain, and the spinal cord was a prolongation of that organ.

In answer to the general belief that the brain consists of a soft and pulpy mass, uniform and homogeneous, solely designed to support the vessels and assist their divisions, Gall explained that if it were pulp, it would be washed or blown away by the impulse of water or air and would not separate into layers as it does; and that the fibres and bundles of fibres are distinctly visible, that they go in different directions, form their own expansions, and that "they are developed at different periods of life," etc.

NICOLAUS STENSON (1638-1686) of Copenhagen, in his "Anatomy of the Brain," 1667, was really the first to surmise (if not to demonstrate) that the white matter of the brain is fibrous; but his suggestion was disregarded. He wrote: "If, indeed, the white substance (of the brain) of which I am speaking be, as in most places it seems to be, wholly fibrous in nature, we must necessarily admit that the arrangement of its fibres is made according to some definite pattern, on which, doubtless, depends the diversity of sensations and movements."

4. Gall was the first to declare that the grey matter of the brain and spinal cord gives origin to the nervous fibres and supplies their nutrient energy.

Even those who acknowledged the white matter to be fibrous in consistency had the curious notion that it was formed before the grey matter; for example, Serres, Rolando, Burdach and Tiedemann.

E. R. A. SERRES (1787-1868), in his "Comparative Anatomy of the Brain," Paris, 1824, said: "One of the physical laws of organic matter is that dissimilar organs may discharge the same function. The non-fibrous grey substance is not first formed, and cannot give origin to the fibrous white substance. The nervous system, as well as the whole organism, is not formed from the centre to the periphery, but from the periphery to the centre." These are the two propositions to which Serres recurred on almost every page of his work. He went on to say: "Gall's hypothesis is founded on the idea of the central development of the nervous system.
It supposes that the spinal marrow and encephalon are formed from the centre to the circumference. The grey matter in the cerebro-spinal axis is considered to exist previous to the white matter at the periphery, to the nerves implanted in it, to the inter-vertebral ganglia still more eccentric, and to the nerves that from these ganglia radiate to every part of the animal. . . . This hypothesis is utterly opposed to facts. We see that the inter-vertebral ganglia do not furnish the substance of the nerves which radiate from them, since these nerves exist before they do. We see that the spinal matter is not, and cannot furnish the substance of the cords that are implanted in it, since these cords do not primarily communicate with it, and frequently even exist without it. We see, finally, that the grey substance of this spinal axis cannot be the organ of the nutrition of the white substance, since the latter is invariably formed first." In conclusion, he reiterates his belief that the nervous system is formed from the circumference to the centre, and not from the centre to the circumference, and invokes the judgment of the Royal Academy of Sciences on this point.

Gall, in his reply to Serres, pointed to the development of the spinal cord in the embryo, that it exists before the development of the nerves; and he also showed by the embryonic development of the cortex of the brain that it arises before the fibrous structure. He pointed out other errors to Serres, and continued:

"I much prefer facts to the judgment of Academies. If the latter had the preference, where should we be, now that so many Academies have come into existence and furnish thousands of reports; more especially, if these reports are received as law by the whole world! According to this hypothesis, the fingers and toes are formed before the trunks of these extremities, and the latter before the central parts of the body. In the same way, the leaves and flowers should be formed before the branches, the branches before the stem, and the stem before the root."

K. F. Burdach (1776-1847) of Königsberg, in his work "Vom Bau und Leben des Gehirns," 1819, expresses the same view as Serres. He said:

"My manner of considering the nervous system of the trunk is founded on the general principle, that unity is the essence of sensibility, and that, to comprehend the origin and genesis of the soul, we must proceed from the circumference, and stop at the centre. . . . The nervous system of the trunk is a network, and in order that intuition should not stop in this network, we must seek for the points, where the commencement is subject to no doubt. But where could this take place, if not in the peripheric extremities? It is only by starting from these, that we uninterruptedly acquire a general knowledge."

In Burdach we see a mistaken philosophy influencing physiology. As Gall said:

"The transcendental philosophy of Germany has taken possession of the heads of our French philosophers. To hear these gentlemen, everything in the nervous system is homogeneous, all is unity; the white fibrous substance gives origin to the non-fibrous substance; the nerves are formed from the circumference to the centre, and not from the centre to the circumference. . . . It is false to say that the nerves proceed to the ganglia, instead of saying that they arise, or depart from them. It is, as if we should say, that the branches crossed to the trunk, instead of growing from it."

F. Tiedemann (1781-1861), Professor of Anatomy in Heidelberg University, wrote in his work on "Anatomie und Bildungsschichte des Gehirns im Foetus des Menschen," 1816:

"Gall is in error in affirming that the grey substance, to which he gives the name
of matrix of the nerves, is the first formed, and is that which produces and nourishes the nerves."

Gall replied: "I ask M. Tiedemann how he can infer from these data that the pulpy, non-fibrous substance develops after the white fibrous substance? If he would examine without prejudice, he would find that the pulpy, gelatinous substance, the cortical substance, exists a long time before any trace of fibrous matter is perceptible and nourishes and multiplies the nervous filaments; no matter, whether this substance, as in the spinal cord, is placed internally to the fibrous, or externally, as in the cerebral hemispheres."

Tiedemann believed besides that the grey matter of the brain is formed in convolutions by the action of the pia mater, the membrane investing them. He said:

"The convolutions are formed in consequence of the increase in the pia mater, which, in enlarging, bends and sinks its folds into the soft layer of cerebral substance, which covers the external portion of the hemispheres."

But Gall explained:

"I appeal to the good sense of my readers and of M. Tiedemann himself. . . . The pia mater is not a membrane, which, in compressing the brain, would make notches on its surface; it is a tissue of sanguineous vessels destined to nourish, penetrate, accompany, and to excite to activity, the cerebral substance. . . . Tiedemann so frequently tells us that the pia mater everywhere secretes a non-fibrous pulpy substance, that, in tearing off the pia mater, this substance remains adherent to it, in the form of flakes. . . . If the skin of an animal, the rind of a fruit, the bark of a tree, are placed on the surface, are they, on that account, applied from without inwards, or from within outwards?

"Let it be borne in mind, that it is not the fibrous, but the gelatinous, non-fibrous substance, that is penetrated by an abundant tissue of blood-vessels; that the whole formation of every organ is necessarily effected by the vascular system. Is it not then conformable to physiological principles to seek the primary origin of the nervous filaments in a substance penetrated by an infinity of blood-vessels? When one is forced to assert, that, wherever ganglia exist, filaments come from them; that, wherever a nerve is united to a ganglion, it goes from it increased in energy . . . it is difficult to understand, how one can fail to distinguish in the non-fibrous substance the primary and sole origin of the nervous filaments."

5. Gall was the first to show the enlargements of the spinal cord in the cervical, dorsal, and the lumbar regions.

RUDOLPHI (1771-1832), the famous German physiologist, professed not to be able to see these enlargements, and expressed doubt as to the origin of the nerves from the grey substance in the interior of the cord, as Gall had asserted to be the case. Serres, Carus, and the Committee of the Institute of France also denied the fact; and Tiedemann wrote:

"As in the embryo the medulla spinalis is found in the lowest state of organisation, these enlargements should be distinctly visible; but, on examining it from its first growth, nothing like enlargements or ganglia can be discovered." To which Gall replied: "It is because, from the commencement, the medulla spinalis is found but little developed, and because the period for the appearance of the nerves has not yet arrived, that these enlargements cannot be distinctly perceived. How can they be seen in the medulla, which as yet has no consistence, which cannot as yet be separated from its sheath? Have not anatomists, and even the Committee of the Institute themselves, denied the existence of these enlargements, so distinct and so evident?"

REIL thought that these ganglionic enlargements have the function of modifying impressions made upon nerves.

6. Gall was the first to "demonstrate" the course of the motor nerves through the
pyramids, cerebral peduncles, corpora striata, thence radiating like a fan, thus spread out towards the periphery of the hemispheres. He demonstrated also the converging and diverging systems of fibres in the brain, and showed the formation of the great commissure of the hemispheres.

VIEUSSENS, in 1684, had already begun to trace the nerve fibres from the pyramids to the corpus striatum and hemispheres in three tracts; but he does not seem to have carried conviction, for anatomists in Gall's time denied the fact.

RUDOLPHI did not admit the diverging of the fibres or that they change their direction at all, and believed "that we shall find therein a very important argument for the unity of the brain."

In answer to TIEDEMANN'S denial Gall said:

"Such is the diverging system of nerve fibres of the cerebrum. All anatomists who follow the progress of the science have adopted this exposition of the structure since our public demonstrations and the publication of our anatomy of the brain. . . . Reil saw our demonstration of the brain and was convinced of this phenomenon (the converging and diverging systems). And I think that, if M. Tiedemann would witness one of our dissections, or rather one of our demonstrations of the developments of the brain, he would soon become a believer in the two systems of the diverging and converging fibres."

SÖMMERING, in opposition to Gall's discovery of the ascending sensory and descending motor nerve fibres from the cortex of the brain—the two sets being always found together—declared that all the motor and sensory nerve-fibres take their origin in the walls of the ventricles, and that they are united by no other material than the cerebro-spinal fluid, which must be regarded as the seat of the soul.

This discovery is sometimes attributed to REIL, but Reil never claimed to be the discoverer of the system of diverging and converging fibres, and his work was not published until some years after the visit of Gall to Halle, when Reil had said, as quoted by Prof. Bischoff (1781-1861) of Bonn, in the preface to his exposition of Gall's doctrine: "I have seen in the anatomical demonstrations of the brain, made by Gall, more than I thought that a man could discover in his whole life."

Let me add the acknowledgment of a modern authority, none less than Prof. PAUL FLECHSIG (1847-). He writes ("Gehirn und Seele," Leipsic, 1896):

"To Gall is due the merit of having proved by careful anatomical investigations that the white brain-substance consists of various systems of conducting fibres and thus to have prepared the way for the views of the present day, especially for Meynet's projection system." Yet THEODOR MEYNERT (1833-1892) declared Gall to have been nothing less than a "swindler."

7. To Gall must be attributed the credit of the first anatomical demonstration of the crossing of the nerve fibres in the pyramids.

It had long been known to physicians as early as ARETÆUS (30-90) that lesions on one side of the brain produced loss of motion upon the opposite side of the body; but contemporary anatomists were divided upon the subject of decussation, while many denied altogether the crossing in the pyramids, as, for example, Gall's own teacher—Prochaska—as well as Barthez, Sabatier, Royer, Dumas, Bichât, Chaussier, Magendie, Desmoulins, Vicq d'Azyr, Haller, and Morgagni. It was through the labours of Gall that the actual decussation was first made a matter of ocular demonstration and the subject thus placed beyond the pale of controversy.

8. Gall was the first to show the true origin of the olfactory, oculo-motorius, and trigeminal nerves (the latter also called the "Nerve of Bell," who discovered its more minute anatomy), as well as of the nervus abducens and the optic nerve.

He traced the optic nerve to the anterior pair of the corpora quadrigemina,
whereas his contemporaries—Rolando, Rudolphi, Tiedemann, etc.—declared the optic thalamus to be its origin.

Before the publication of Gall’s memoir, Cuvier still derived the olfactory nerve from the corpora striata, and the optic from the thalamus.

SERRES said that the auditory and the facial nerves have not the origin which Gall supposes, for “these nerves are formed without the cranium and at first with no communication with the encephalon.”

9. Gall described the structure of the cerebellum in man and animals. He described for the first time the formation and structure of the corpus callosum, the annular protuberance, the pineal gland, cornu ammonis, and other parts of the brain. He described also the “insula,” that portion of brain within the fissure of Sylvius, and resting on the corpus striatum, which has been falsely attributed to Reil and named the “Island of Reil,” though Reil’s first mention of the insula was only in 1809.

10. Gall considered the cortex of the brain to contain—besides the centres for the highest psychical activities—the centres for motion and sensation, centres which have been discovered about seventy years later.

He showed that the cerebral hemispheres have specific local connection with certain muscles, as he believed, with those that are employed by the various mental powers in the manifestation of their functions. In that part of his large work dealing with the “Expression of the Emotions” he shows how certain faculties use definite groups of muscles, and holds that when their brain organs are stimulated so will corresponding movements occur; but these cortical areas being no part of the instruments themselves, they may be removed without injuring the instruments which they only use. He explains: “As the brain alone is the seat of thought, the motions produced by thought must be derived from it. If the cause of voluntary motion existed in the same parts which executed it, each motion would exist after the destruction of the brain, and would not be augmented when this organ is irritated, nor suppressed by its compression.”

Other writers on the Expression of the Emotions after Gall are: Sir Charles Bell (1806), Duchenne (1862), Gratiolet (1865), Charles Darwin (1872), Mantegazza, Piderit, Warner (1885), and H. Krukenberg (1913).

Such are in brief Gall’s anatomical discoveries. They were received with enthusiasm by some, as, for example, by Reil, Loder, Hufeland; others, like Walter Rudolphi, Sömmering, Tiedemann, denied them; and again others, when they were no longer deniable, attributed them to Reil, Sir Everard Home, etc.

Professor J. G. WALTER (1734-1818), of Berlin, declared Gall to be completely ignorant of anatomy (quoted in “Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal,” 1806).

On the other hand, the celebrated C. W. v. HUFELAND (1762-1836), Physicist to the King of Prussia, said:

“...It is only necessary to have eyes, and to open them, to be convinced of what Gall demonstrated concerning the dissection of the nerves, the crossing in the pyramids, etc.”

J. C. v. LODER (1753-1832), of Jena and Halle, one of the great anatomists of Dr. Gall’s time, wrote:

“Now that Gall has been at Halle, and I have had an opportunity, not only of listening to his lectures, but also of dissecting with him, either alone or in the company of Reil, and several others, nine human brains and fourteen of animals, I think I am able and entitled to pronounce my opinion of his doctrines... The discoveries made by Gall are of the highest importance. Many of them possess such a degree of evidence that I cannot conceive how any one with good eyes can mistake them. I refer to the passage of the nerve fibres in the corpora pyramidalis,
and thence into the corpora striata and hemispheres, the bundles of the spinal marrow, the origin of the motor nerves of the eyes, the trigeminal nerves, those of the sixth pair of nerves, etc. These discoveries alone would be sufficient to render the name of Gall immortal. They are the most important that have been made in anatomy since that of an absorbent system. . . . I acknowledge with Reil that I have found in Dr. Gall more than I believed it possible for a man to discover in a lifetime. . . . The unfolding of the convolutions is a capital thing. What have we not the right to expect from further progress in a route thus opened? I am ashamed of myself for having, like others, for thirty years, cut up some hundreds of brains, as we slice up cheese, and not perceived the forest by reason of the great number of trees. The best thing we can do is to listen to the truth and learn what we are ignorant of."

The celebrated J. F. BLUMENTHAL (1752-1840), writing from Göttingen to Dr. J. A. ALBERS (1772-1821), of Bremen, on the 10th September, 1805, said:

"I need not inform you that I congratulate myself uncommonly on having heard Dr. Gall. The views which he maintains about the organisation of the brain, the derivation of some of the supposed cerebral nerves from the spinal cord . . . are to my mind extremely important."

When Gall arrived at Paris, the most brilliant success attended at first his anatomical demonstrations. But when Napoleon returned from his campaign in Germany, he over-awed the members of the Institute (see Chapter XVI.), and Gall was denounced as a charlatan. The adverse report on his memoir, presented to the Institute in 1808, followed almost as a matter of course.

His method of dissection was attributed to the ancients; though how they could have discovered the direction of the nerve fibres was not stated. The Committee of the Institute also pretended that VAROLIUS and VIEUSSENS had, two centuries before, done the same thing; whereas Vieuessens dissected the brain from the centrum ovale, and Varolius began the dissection at the base, not to trace the parts upwards, but simply, he said, because the brain compresses these parts against the skull, especially in the dead body, and renders the ordinary method of dissecting from above inconvenient. Varolius had so false an idea of the anatomy of the brain that he conceived the crura were offshoots of the cerebrum and cerebellum and from the spinal cord, and declared the spinal cord to be formed from the cerebrum. These critics passed silently over a dozen points; as, for example, the formation of the convolutions of the hemispheres, the radiation of the nerve fibres, the progressive development of the brain in the different species of animals. They allowed, however, eighteen discoveries. The Report was signed by JAS. RÉNÉ TENON (1724-1816), ANTON. PORTAL (1742-1832), R. B. SABATIER (1732-1811), PHILIPPE PINEL (1745-1826), and GEORGES CUVIER (1769-1832). A translation of it appeared in the "Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal," 1809.

The opponents of Gall seized upon this report with avidity. Another consequence was that some authors appropriated Gall's ideas without mentioning their source. Others praised him in some respects, but were careful to add sufficient blame; and a few others who became partisans of his openly were expelled from the learned societies.

That the Academy's report was biased is shown by the fact that J. P. FLOURENS (1794-1867), who we shall see when we deal with other achievements of Gall, was Gall's greatest antagonist, yet wrote of him as "the profound observer whose genius has opened for us the study of the anatomy and physiology of the brain. I shall never forget the impression I received the first time I saw Gall dissect a brain. It seemed to me as if I had never seen this organ."

GEOFFROY ST. HILAIRE (1772-1844), in a letter to Dr. Dannecy, said: "I shall
always remember our astonishment, our sensations, our enthusiasm, on seeing Gall for the first time demonstrate his anatomical discoveries in the Jardin du Roi. The word ‘brain’ will always call up to mind the name of Gall. His brain has brought him inextinguishable renown, and is entirely his, as much as the balloon is Montgolfier’s, the moon is La Place’s, and the fossil animals are Cuvier’s.”

DUCROTAY de BLAINVILLE (1777-1830), at the Academy of Natural Sciences on June 23rd, 1828, said that “Gall had given to the researches of the brain and nervous system an impulse and direction altogether new; this new direction had diverted anatomists from the beaten track to which they had attached themselves before his labours; and that if he had done nothing but this, and were all the points of his anatomy to be successfully contested and completely refuted, there would still remain to him the honour of having discovered a new impulse, and consequently to him must be referred as to its source all that may be valuable in future labours on this subject.”

With reference to those discoveries of Gall which have been attributed to other anatomists, we must not forget that, though Gall’s great work, of which the first volume deals exclusively with the anatomy of the brain and nervous system, was not published until 1809, his discoveries were made known to the world several years before that date through the publications of those who had attended his demonstrations and lectures (which he started in 1796), as by Froriep, Bischoff, J. F. Ackermann, Walter of Berlin, Walther of Bonn, Blôde, John Meyer of Naples, Démangeon, etc., and some of these books were translated into foreign languages; and that the memoir on the anatomical discoveries was presented to the Institute of France in 1808, the report on which was sent to all the academies of the world.

LUIGI ROLANDO (1773-1831) was one of those from whom Gall was supposed to have taken some of his discoveries.

But Rolando (Saggio sopra la vera struttura del cervello, 1828) admitted that he had only three brains at his disposal, and in consequence we see a want of exactness in the description of the course of the fibres in the brain, in the description of the corpora striata; and like all anatomists of his time he made the optic nerve arise from the thalamus opticus, the olfactory nerve from the anterior commissure; the entire structure of the cerebellum was a great mystery to him; he denied that any fibres come from the grey substance of the brain, and he declared he had observed that the cerebellum of an idiot was composed of only 324 laminae, whereas that of an intelligent man consists of 700, and so on.

Rolando should be remembered, however, as having been the first to excite the surface of the brains of animals, after trephining the skull, more than forty years before Hitzig, and having observed convulsions being produced. He believed that the white substance, not the grey, produced particular movements, but he did not define them. The great Flourens did not think the cortex to be thus excitable, and held that the current travelled down to the structures at the base of the brain and to the spinal cord. Thus we have a dispute very similar to that of more recent times.

Rolando observed in injury of the cerebellum irregularity of movement but no paralysis. He was puzzled by the phenomenon, since he thought only the corpora striata were the regulators of muscular movements, so he assumed the cerebellum to be an electrical organ, which secreted a fluid analogous to the galvanic fluid, which was transported by the nerves to stimulate the muscles of locomotion. He waxed eloquent on his discovery that “the cerebellum is an organ, whose structure is precisely similar to the apparatus of Volta. What other proof can we desire to demonstrate that the cerebellum prepares a fluid analogous to that which the Voltaic instrument develops? What more direct inference can be made, if we observe that all the influence of the nervous fluid on the muscles of locomotion
ceases if this organ is injured or destroyed? It appears to me that no one has insisted upon the necessity of admitting a particular mechanism, by means of which the fluid prepared in the cerebral electro-motor can be transmitted to the central extremity of the nerve, that may be regarded as a conductor by which this fluid is enabled to pass, in order to irritate the muscles which are to be put in motion."

Gall criticised Rolando and pointed out that "the new discoveries in physics and chemistry always become the warhorse of the physiologists. I have already proved that the cerebellum cannot be compared to the galvanic pile or to a Voltaic apparatus."

**CUVIER** (1769-1832) acknowledged in his Report on Flourens' experiments the achievements of Gall. He said:

"It is now known by the investigations of M. Gall that the spinal marrow is a mass of medullary matter, white externally, grey internally, divided longitudinally, from above downwards, into anterior and posterior columns, the *fasciculi* of which communicate with each other by means of transverse medullary fibres; that it swells out at particular distances; that it gives off at each swelling one pair of nerves; that the *medulla oblongata* is the upper part of the spinal marrow enclosed within the skull, which also gives off several pairs of nerves; that the fibres of communication between the two columns cross at the *medulla oblongata*, so that those of the right side proceed upwards into the left side, and *vice versa*; that these *fasciculi*, after having been enlarged, in the mammiferæ, a first time, by a mixture of grey matter, and having formed the prominence known by the name of *pons Varolii*, separate and take the name of *crura cerebri*, still continuing to give off nerves; that they are again enlarged, by a new mixture of grey matter, in order to form the masses commonly called the *optic thalami*; and a third time, to form those named *corpora striata*;—that from the whole external border of these last enlargements arises a lamina, more or less thick, more or less convoluted externally, according to the species, covered entirely on the outer surface with grey matter, forming what is called the *hemispheres*. This lamina, after having been reflected upon itself, in the middle of the convolutions, is united to that on the opposite side by one or more commissures or fasciculi, of transverse fibres, the largest of which, existing only in the mammiferæ, is named the *corpus callosum*. It is also known that, on the *crura cerebri*, behind the *optic thalami*, there are one or two pairs of smaller swellings; known when there are two pairs, as in the mammiferæ, by the name of *corpora quadrigemina*, and from the first of which the optic nerves appear to arise; that the olfactory nerve is the only one which does not evidently take its rise from the spinal marrow, or from its columns; finally, that the cerebellum, a single mass, white internally and cineritious externally, like the hemispheres, but often more divided by external folds, is placed transversely behind the corpora quadrigemina, and over the *medulla oblongata*, to which it is united by transverse bundles which are called the *crura cerebelli*, and which are inserted into the cerebellum at the sides of the *pons Varolii*.

Gall called attention to this report, because certain points in the anatomy of the brain, which were doubted or denied, in 1808, by the Committee that examined his memoir, were now admitted and adopted. But he corrected, among other statements made by Cuvier, the one where he speaks of the cerebellum as a single mass, and said that "he can refer only to the cerebellum of fishes, reptiles, and birds. The part which, in birds, constitutes the whole cerebellum, forms only the middle or fundamental portion in mammiferous animals. At each side of it, in the latter, there exists a lobe, more or less complicated, but always symmetrical with its counterpart on the opposite side. Consequently, the cerebellum of the mammiferæ belongs, like the brain, to the class of double organs."

It is interesting also to note Gall's anticipation of there being different tracts in the spinal cord for the nerves of motion and for those of sensation.

In 1802 Gall wrote:

Vol. 1.]
"It has long been observed, that in palsy, voluntary motion and the sense of touch were generally destroyed at the same time; but that sometimes the one ceased, while the other remained. From this it has been inferred that there are two sets of nerves. Anatomy has not yet demonstrated them; but I believe that they exist, and for the following reasons. The same nervous fibres do not go to the muscles and to the skin, and each of these parts has a distinct function. The nerves which are necessary for voluntary motion cannot propagate the impressions of the sense of touch, nor the latter impressions of movement."

In vol. i. of his "Anatomy and Physiology of the Brain and Nervous System," Paris, 1810, Gall represented the spinal cord as possessing one tract for motion and another for sensation.

After 1810 Gall did no more original work, but was engaged with the publication of his material. But the various ideas he had thrown out evidently took root in different directions; and so did the above suggestion.

In 1811 CHARLES BELL (1774-1842) published a tiny pamphlet entitled, "Aidea of a new Anatomy of the Brain," issued for private circulation, wherein he put forward the belief that the nervous system was constructed on the principle that "the nerves are not single nerves possessing various powers, but bundles of different nerves, whose filaments are united for the convenience of distribution, but which are distinct in office as they are in origin from the brain."

It was not until twelve years later that he published his discovery in a communication to the Royal Society, that the anterior root of a spinal nerve is motor in function, the posterior root, sensory.

He proved that the nerves of motion and sensation, although running blended together in a common sheath, and in appearance constituting a single nerve, all the fibres of which served for the same purposes, were also, in reality, distinct organs, one serving for sensation and the other for motion, each capable of acting independently of the other, and each separately liable to disease.

F. MAGENDIE (1783-1855) had been working on this problem too, and furnished the experimental proof in 1822. HERBERT MAYO (1796-1852) was also engaged in investigating it.

Magendie said:

"I have proved by direct experiments that these distinct roots (anterior and posterior) have also functions entirely distinct. The anterior are destined for motion, the posterior for sensation. If we cut off the first, the animal loses all motion, but it preserves its sensibility untouched; and, vice versa, if we cut the second, sensibility is lost, but the animal preserves its power of motion."

Gall had previously made the same observation in man. He gave the history of a patient "who had lost the motion of his arms for many years but still preserved a lively sensibility in them. He died, and on examination of the spinal cord, the posterior roots were found in their state of integrity, whilst the anterior ones had lost their medullary substance and were reduced to their membranous envelope."

It would be natural to suppose that a great man like Sir Charles Bell would have the magnanimity to do, at least, justice to a fellow-worker, and to recognise some of Gall's discoveries. But he went out of his way to make the astoundingly untrue statement that Gall knew not the difference between cerebrum and the cerebellum, so ignorant was he. In his treatise "On the Nervous Circle which connects the Voluntary Muscles with the Brain," published in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 1823, Bell said:

"The most extravagant departure from all the legitimate modes of reasoning, although still under the colour of anatomical investigation, is the system of Dr. Gall. It is sufficient to say, that without comprehending the grand divisions of the nervous system, without a notion of the distinct properties of the individual nerves, or having made any distinction of the columns of the spinal marrow, without even
GALL AS ANATOMIST

having ascertained the difference of cerebrum and cerebellum, Gall proceeded to describe the brain as composed of many particular and independent organs, and to assign to each the residence of some special faculty."

This was a deliberate misrepresentation, and one can only wonder what was the motive. It was deliberate, for Bell many years later, in a quarto volume entitled: The Nervous System of the Human Body, 1836, when much more was known in England about Gall’s anatomical researches, and such medical journals as the Lancet and the British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review had become partisans in Gall’s favour, Sir Charles Bell repeated the original statement without modification. But, if the great Sir Charles Bell condemned Gall, what chance had the latter of gaining official recognition—that is to say, recognition in the medical schools? Gall’s work was extinguished so far as the Universities were concerned, and the only reply later anatomists could give was that “Gall had been exposed and buried long ago, and to attempt to re-discuss his merits would not only be useless but frivolous.”

Bell was, however, not the only opponent who suppressed the truth. His criticism was surpassed in virulence by Dr. JOHN GORDON (1786-1818), the Lecturer in Anatomy and Physiology in Edinburgh University, who wrote in the Edinburgh Review, No. 49, 1815:

“The anatomical discoveries of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim [the prospector of whom we shall speak later] remain to be considered; and these are on no account to be passed over in silence. It appears to us that in this department they have displayed more quackery than in any other. . . These gentlemen are too knowing not to have perceived that the science of anatomy is in general cultivated with most zeal by those who have the least leisure to devote to it. . . They calculated, no doubt, that as the number of individuals is inconsiderable, who are not only zealous in anatomical pursuits, but by a fortunate combination of circumstances, are enabled to bestow their whole time upon it, the chance that a few bold affirmations respecting the structure of a delicate and complicated organ (the brain) would be put to the test of experiment is comparatively small. . . Let us now see what Drs. Gall and Spurzheim say upon the subject (the brain). They affirm without scruple that it is possible to demonstrate the white matter to be fibrous in all parts of the brain. . . We not only maintain, however, that this is incorrect, but that they must have known it to be so. . . Such is the grand system of the diverging fibres of the brain of which Drs. Gall and Spurzheim are the sole inventors and proprietors. . . It is our duty to remark that the system is a complete fiction from beginning to end. . . We must ascribe their inaccuracy solely to intention. . . It is a wilful misrepresentation in them, therefore, to affirm that in portions of the brain which are composed purely of white nervous matter, either diverging or converging fibres can be shown by the method they have described.”

This same Prof. Gordon, who described the anatomical discoveries of Gall in the Edinburgh Review as “quackery from beginning to end” and as “amazing absurdity,” two years later—in 1817—endeavoured to prove, in a specially printed pamphlet, that Gall had borrowed his ideas from Reil, quite ignoring the fact that Reil had attended Gall’s demonstrations at Halle in 1805 and had expressed his admiration for them. As Gall said:

“Let any one compare the early works of Reil with those he has published since he has attended my dissections at Halle in 1805, and let them also compare the successive improvements in both the lectures and books of Richerand, Béclard, Blainville, Serres, Georget, Lallemand, Tiedemann, Carus, etc., and they will be astonished at the progress which has been made since the appearance of my positions. . . The enthusiasm with which Reil and Loder have received my discoveries is well known.”

JOHANN CHRISTIAN REIL (1759-1813), professor of medicine at Halle (1787) and Berlin (1810), was the original editor of the “Archiv für Physiologie,” the first
periodical to be devoted to the science of physiology. The "Island of Reil" (though first described by Gall) was named after him. He is also the author of "Rhapsodies," a clever work on the psychic treatment of the insane (1803).

Dr. Gordon relied on the book by Reil published in 1807, two years after Gall's visit, in which Reil makes no mention of Gall, but wherein he makes no claim as to originality either. If Gall's discoveries had not been original, the French Academy would have taken no notice of his work, or would at least have made some mention of the fact in their report. It is worthy of notice, too, that Dr. Gordon, though he possessed Gall's original work, preferred to criticise the anatomy of Gall as described in condensed form in a contribution to the French Dictionary of Medicine, "the large work being too tedious for general perusal."

Anyone looking at the anatomical text-books which appeared after Gall's public demonstrations must see how complete was the change they effected in the knowledge of the brain. Yet it is rare that we find any credit being given to him. One of the few satisfactory acknowledgments of his merit in the medical literature of Great Britain during the last fifty years is by Sir Samuel Wilks (1824-1911), in Guy's Hospital Reports, 1879, which would not be read by many. Men of science who have profited by Gall's labours have refused him the honour which is his due. They have excluded his name from their books, as if it would be a sin to mention it.

GALL AS PHYSIOLOGIST

Gall wrote in 1796, in his letter to Baron Retzer, that the highest development of brain-matter is found in the cerebral hemispheres, and that the grey surface of the brain is the material base of all mental and moral activity, the instrument through which all psychical manifestation takes place; and that therefore a systematic study of the structure and functions of that organ and the nervous system in general would disclose some important facts which might help us to understand man's psychical activities, his mental gifts, variety of sentiments, emotional dispositions, and the choice of motives which give him an impulse to action. Gall declared that we know nothing of the nature of the soul, but we know its attributes, and these attributes would never come into existence were it not for the brain being acted upon by external influences. As regards past methods, he said:

"In place of seeking simply for phenomena, men have hitherto confined themselves, as to some extent is still the custom, to philosophic subtleties; exhausted themselves in speculations on the intimate nature of the soul; and tried to discover how souls and bodies were united, whether immediately, or by means of an intermediate substance. As the soul was thought to be the source of the instincts, propensities, faculties, it was made a great and very serious occupation to find its seat. Sometimes it was spread throughout the body, sometimes lodged in the brain; and, keeping in view the simple essence of the soul, the metaphysicians, and with them the physiologists, have been obliged to compress it to a single point. It was from this point that the soul directed all the remainder of the body, that it made all its moral and intellectual force to radiate, without the intervention of any other cerebral part."

Ascending from the lowest organic beings, which have only a rudimentary nervous system and likewise a rudimentary intelligence, to the highest, Gall says we find as the cortex of the brain becomes more and more developed so does the mental manifestation increase. In man, who occupies the highest stage of the animal creation, with his large and highly finished brain, we have the most exalted intellect. But this dependence of the mind upon the brain does not end here. This is in fact only the beginning of it. The brain in its turn depends upon the other organs of the body for its health and even for its life. If the distribution of blood and nutrition
to the brain be imperfect, it must suffer in health and vigour, and the capacities of the mind will be at once disturbed by the weakness and imperfection of the functions of its physical organs. A sound, well-developed, well-proportioned, well-nourished brain is necessary to a well-balanced intellect and a moral character.

To Gall the cortex of the brain was exclusively the organ of the intellectual faculties, moral sentiments, and animal instincts.

"The instincts, propensities, sentiments, intellectual faculties, and all the distinctive characteristics of humanity, owe their existence and modifications solely to the brain. Without a brain, there could be no perception, sensation, ideas, enjoyment, suffering, or individual consciousness. This study of the brain enables us to trace the gradual development of the sentient beings, from the lower to the higher animals, and to man. The physiology of the brain discloses to us the cause of the diversity and the antagonism of our propensities, the strength and weakness of our understanding, the internal motives of our will and actions. It explains to us the modifications of our propensities and faculties at different ages, their successive and gradual development, and their gradual decline in old age. It explains to us the diversity of the moral and intellectual character of individuals, the diversity of talent, and the variety of motives which determine our tastes and actions; finally, why the animal propensities are opposed to reason and moral sense.

"The external senses are no longer regarded as the origin of our faculties. It is the brain which receives their impressions and operates upon them, according to the nature and degree of its inherent force. Understanding, affection, instinct, volition, etc., will be no longer personified beings; they will be recognised as cerebral functions. The philosophical physician and physiologist, instead of sounding their course amid the straits of speculation, will sail confidently along the sea of observation. The time will soon arrive, when, convinced by evidence, all will agree that the phenomena of nature are based upon the organisation in general, and that all the moral and intellectual phenomena are based upon the brain.

"A few drops of blood extravasated in the brain, a few grains of opium, are enough to demonstrate to us, that in this life, volition and thought are inseparable from cerebral organisation. Affections of the brain interfere with the mental operations. When the brain is incompletely developed, idiocy is the result. Provided the brain is not affected, all the other portions of the corporeal system may be diseased or separately destroyed; even the spinal marrow, at a certain distance from the brain, may be compressed or vitiating, without the functions of the mind being immediately impaired. If, on the contrary, the brain is compressed, irritated, injured, or destroyed, the mental functions are partially or totally deranged, or become altogether extinct. If the compression of the brain is removed, the extravasated blood or the pus evacuated, or the cerebral inflammation allayed, consciousness and the power of thought return, sometimes instantaneously."

Sprengel (1766-1833), Richerand (1779-1840), and others had asserted that the intellectual and moral faculties remained unimpaired even after complete destruction of the brain.

Gall was not the first to note, but he was the first to lay stress on the double nature of the parts of the brain, and that each presumed function was doubly represented. In other words, each hemisphere of the brain was a distinct organ, capable of separate volition, though usually the two hemispheres were working simultaneously; but if one became diseased the other would continue the function. He confessed that he himself had seen one hemisphere of the brain destroyed by suppuration, and yet the intellectual faculties remained intact: and he explained this phenomenon by the fact that the brain consisting of two hemispheres, just as the nerves of sense are double, the remaining hemisphere in these cases carried on the work. If, he said, those authors were correct who state that all parts of the brain can be destroyed and yet its functions remain entire, this would be "not only demolishing, at a single blow, the whole of my physiology of the brain, but also destroying the
possibility of any kind of cerebral physiology." He quoted authorities who assumed that in hydrocephalus there is a distension but not necessarily a destruction of the structure of the brain, and if it could be shown that the mental powers are not retained, then "it must be acknowledged that the brain is not necessary to the exercise of the mental functions."

Not regarding the emotions and propensities as belonging to the brain, the loss of them in injury of the brain, or their change, is disregarded, so long as the intellectual faculties remain entire, and the statement is made that "considerable parts of all the cerebral areas can be destroyed without impairment of any of the essential functions or faculties of the mind." This statement is repeated even at the present day, chiefly by surgeons, who may be excused for their lack of psychological observation, but when an eminent psychologist, like G. J. LADD (1842-) repeats it, from whom these words are quoted, we must ask "what faculties of the mind" are not lost in destruction of considerable parts of the brain?

Gall’s theory of the evolution of the mental powers of man from those of animals running parallel with the evolution of the brain naturally excited violent opposition in many quarters; for it was felt to endanger the privileged position which man had assumed to be his, and to be inconsistent in many ways with the generally accepted doctrines of religion. Hence Emperor Francis I, prohibited Gall’s lectures in Vienna in 1802: "His Majesty entertaining the apprehension, that Gall’s theory appears to lead to materialism, and consequently to militate against the first principle of morality and religion." Gall addressed a protest and remonstrance to the Emperor against the order, from which we quote the following passages as bearing upon the subject under discussion in this chapter:

"The first principle in my doctrine concerning the functions of the brain, which appears liable to the objection of materialism, can be no other than this—that the brain is the organ of the mind."

"We, physicians and surgeons, limit our investigations to facts cognisable by the senses, and leave everything else to the clergy and revelation. It is, however, highly important to know how the soul operates in this life in its alliance with the body, and according to what law it acts. The most decided and undeniable experience teaches us that the brain, of all parts of the body, is the one by means of which the mind manifests its powers; that human beings who are born without brains exhibit no mental functions; that all mental manifestations cease when the brain is destroyed or the head cut off; that effusion into the cavities of the brain, inflammation and injuries of this organ, etc., derange the mental functions and produce insanity, imbecility, or general or partial obstruction of the mental powers; that too small a size of the brain, or a skull fractured or deformed by violence, also water in the head, and cretinism, degrade man almost below the level of the beasts, in regard to manifesting the mind; that our powers of thinking are very different in childhood, in manhood, and in old age; that men think and feel differently from women; that we think and feel differently in the full vigour of life, in drunkenness, and in the heat of fever, from what we do in times of exhaustion, through affliction, hunger, sickness, and so forth.

"These phenomena prove the dependence of the mental manifestations on the bodily organs—or that influence of the physical world on the mental functions which, from time immemorial, no philosopher, moralist, theologian, physician, teacher, judge, or legislator has ever doubted.

"It leads no nearer to materialism when, instead of maintaining the dependence of the mental manifestations on the whole body, we limit the proposition to the brain, as being the special organ of the mental functions; a proposition on which also all physicians and philosophers are long since agreed."

The metaphysicians argued—and so did many scientists, obsessed by metaphysical notions—that the ego remained always the same, whereas the brain and body undergo changes; the ego could, therefore, have no relation with matter.
But Gall showed that it is untrue that the ego always remains the same; even in adult years a personality of to-day is not what it was, say, five years ago. It is only in fundamentals that we remain the same, and these fundamentals depend on the permanency of the main constitution of the brain.

**F. BÉRARD (1789-1828)** was one of the thorough-going spiritualists who opposed Gall. He taught that all material theories are, in themselves, inadequate to account for the intellectual and moral phenomena of human life. There is not the slightest analogy between matter and the human soul. The idea we invariably entertain of the latter, instead of being that of extension, figure, and colour, is that of passion, sympathy, and intelligence. This soul is the active and vivifying principle of existence; and is that of which we speak when we say: *I* or *myself*. It is one, indivisible, but not material. That the soul or thinking principle cannot be the result of any peculiar organisation in the brain or nervous system generally, Bérard argued in many parts of his work. Thus he said:

"The mind is one and indivisible, immaterial, though united to the body; it cannot take part in this union except as mind; and not in accordance with those laws which unite body with body. The thinking principle cannot be separated from the body, or placed in the midst of its organs; but it is present in them; it perceives through them; it communicates activity to them; and receives it from them in return. It is bound in its movements by certain physiological and vital laws, without which it could not manifest its faculties or powers; but it does not owe these faculties to the organs of sense."

**A. B. RICHERAND (1779-1840)**, vitalist, was another opponent, whom we shall quote frequently. He is known to history as having suffered from overweening ambition and vanity.

Other philosophers, as we have seen in Vol. I., alleged the concentration of the mental functions in one definite, circumscribed spot of the brain, the centre of all the nerves, in-coming and out-going, the seat of all sensations, where they were changed to representations, and where all voluntary and involuntary movements originated. In this centre-point, the *sensorium commune*, in this anatomical and physiological unity, they saw a strong point for the unity of mind.

To these metaphysical objections Gall replied:

"The metaphysicians have established that as the mind is simple, its seat in the brain ought to be equally simple, consequently the physiologists who had, as they supposed, discovered that the brain is the organ of the mind and human nature, had the complacency to reduce their organ of the mind to a single point. This single point was claimed by them with being the meeting-place of all the nerves, the common centre, the seat of all the operations of the mind. . . . The mind being simple, they concluded from this that all its acts, thoughts, understanding, will, judgment, reason, imagination, were also necessarily simple, and could not in their exercise be subject to matter. I do not know how they could elude the examples of imbecility, madness, delirium, in short, of derangement of all the functions, in consequence of defective organisation, disease of the brain, intoxication, etc.

Those who took the whole mass of the hemispheres as the result of the concurrence of all the nerves of the body, how could they attribute other functions to the brain than those proper to the nerves? This error is the cause of that axiom, which has paralysed all physiological researches of the brain—that nothing is in the mind which has not previously existed in the senses. The same error caused them to believe, as long as the five senses were intact, the brain could be destroyed and the mind be preserved in a state of integrity.

"Supposing there were a central point from which all nerves radiate, and that it were the only, the exclusive organ of the soul, how shall we explain the successive development, the separate action, and the partial diminution of the different intellectual faculties?"
CUVIER (1769-1832), the great naturalist and authority on comparative anatomy, acknowledged that only since Gall have anatomists ceased to search for a central point in the brain, the point of union of sensory and motor nerves, for the seat of the soul as a unity.

We have seen that Descartes located the soul in the pineal gland; Vieussens in the centrum ovale; Willis in the corpus callosum. Sömmering, in 1796, located the soul in the fluid of the ventricles, believing the ventricular walls to be the centre for all the nerves, their activity beginning and terminating there, their influence on each other being exerted through the medium of the cerebro-spinal fluid.

The Report on Gall's discoveries by the Committee of the Institute of France showed the same metaphysical convictions:

"The functions of the brain," they said, "suppose a mutual influence, incapable of being comprehended, between divisible matter and an indivisible ego, the perpetual stumbling-block of all philosophers. Not only do we not comprehend, but we shall never comprehend, how impressions made upon the brain substance may be perceived by the mind and produce images there. . . . In a word, no one who has laboured upon the brain has been able to establish, rationally, a positive relation between the structure of this viscus and its functions, even those which are the most evidently physical."

Gall further pointed out that XAVIER BICHAT (1771-1802) regarded the cortex of the brain as a simple envelope, destined to protect the parts which are found beneath it from injury; that R. B. SABATIER (1732-1811) and ERASMUS DARWIN (1731-1802) regarded the brain as a purely secretory organ; that some philosophers, with STAHL (1660-1734), thought that the soul is expanded throughout all the nerves, not only in its action, but also in its substance, and that thus the whole body becomes the organ of the soul; and that, in the opinion of many others, the two superior faculties at least—reason and volition—act independently of matter.

In 1837, according to THOMAS LAYCOCK (1812-1876)—" Journal of Mental Science," 1876—many of the old school denied "that the brain had any essential connection with the intellectual powers; sensations might have their seat there, but the reason was independent of brain-function."

W. B. CARPENTER (1813-1885), in his "Principles of General and Comparative Physiology" (1838), wrote:

"The complexity of the operations of the mind, and the impossibility of deriving from the study of the lower animals any assistance which can be relied upon in their analogies, have hitherto been a complete bar to the successful investigation of them as portions of the nervous system. It is, as yet, quite uncertain how far mental acts are dependent on or connected with any changes in its condition."

With such views being held by acknowledged authorities, it is not surprising that Gall's doctrine was condemned as utterly false and without foundation.

Psychologists hitherto had had a sterile and narrow conception of their science as the science of consciousness, dealing only with the intellectual capacities of man and throwing no light on the life of emotion and the play of motives, for which it would have been necessary to observe the mental manifestation of their fellow-men, and not to limit themselves to introspective observation. Gall changed all that; he enlarged psychology to a science of human conduct and behaviour, based on comparative and physiological research, and relying largely on objective methods: the observation of the behaviour of men and animals under all conditions, in health and in disease.

For Gall, the cerebral hemispheres are not alone the centres of ideas, but they are also the centres of the emotions and passions, and volitions; indeed, they are the sources of energy, which set the ends and sustain the course of all human activity
and the intellectual processes are but their servants, instruments, or means. There is the same essential connection between the moral sentiments and the brain that there is between thought and brain; a fact still little appreciated and denied by many. But if so, asked Gall, might not the moral monstrosities, as well as the intellectual giants of our race, be explicable by their cerebral development? Might there not be diseases of one part of the brain causing emotional insanity, while the memory or the imagination, being related to other parts, remain unaffected? He continued:

"Reflect on the tumult which the affections and passions, whose immediate seat and original source is in the brain, excite in the whole man. Do we not behold jealousy, homesickness, misplaced affection, etc., devouring the principle of life? How often has not a too sudden transport of joy, violent fright, or anger, destroyed life as suddenly as a thunderbolt. Who does not know the power of imagination, of attention, and of faith, in the production and cure of disease, especially of nervous disorders? These most grievous afflictions, and all the mental alienations, have their principal and immediate causes in derangement of the brain.

"Volumes have been written on the reciprocal influence of the brain and the viscera of the abdomen and the chest. The instincts, the propensities, the sentiments, the intellectual faculties, the distinctive character of humanity, owe their existence and their modifications solely to the brain. Without a brain, there would be no perception, no sensation, no ideas, no enjoyment, no suffering, no individual consciousness.

"The physiology of the brain makes us acquainted with our entire dependence on the primitive laws of the creation; the source of moral good and evil; the cause of the diversity and of the antagonism of our propensities; of the strength or weakness of our understanding; the internal motives of our will and of our actions. Instructors, moralists, legislators, and judges, cannot, with impunity, neglect the influence of the organisation over our propensities, passions, and talents. It proves to them that there is no certain quantum, either of the power of doing good, or of avoiding evil, or of the degree of moral liberty with which each individual is endowed. It explains to us the modifications of our propensities and faculties at different ages, their successive and gradual development, their decline in old age, and the diversity of the moral and intellectual character in individuals."

Gall defined affection and passion, and explained why—being only the expression of energetic activity of a mental power—they cannot have special seats in the brain:

"Most authors confound the affections with the passions. By passion, I mean the highest degree of voluntary or involuntary activity, of which any fundamental power is susceptible. Every faculty, whether intellectual or affective, as soon as it attains a very energetic and resolute degree of action, must be called passion. In this sense, the philosopher may have the passion for thought, for seeking the relations between cause and effect; the poet may have the passion for poetry, the musician for music. The affective qualities, the instincts, sentiments, and propensities, when they become habitually imperious, are also passions. It is thus that love increases to a passion; excess of the sentiments of benevolence or of devotion is a passion; the love of offspring, propensities for combats, ambition, etc., may become passions.

"But where are the affections situated? They have no seat, neither in the plexuses, nor in the viscera, nor in the brain. They are common to all the faculties. There cannot be a particular organ for joy, or sadness, or despair, or discouragement, or hope, or any affection whatever. To admit one would be equivalent to admitting a particular nerve for pain, and a particular nerve for agreeable sensations. Every nerve may be the seat of pain and of pleasure. If we admit a single organ for all the affections, it would follow that every animal susceptible of one affection would be susceptible of all, and that this organ once set in action, all the affections, however unlike or opposite they may be, would simultaneously affect both men and brutes."
Gall held that *the sympathetic nervous system communicates with the brain*, informs the same of the state of the viscera of the chest and abdomen, and establishes a reciprocal action and re-action of the vegetative and nutritive life with the life of relation to the external world or animal life:

"There is no inward consciousness that the affections and passions are exercised internally. Their action is much more marked in the viscera of the chest and abdomen than in the head. We must seek for the seat of these feelings. The brain and its functions being unknown, they were consequently referred to the spot which was supposed to be most affected, that is, the heart, the stomach, or the diaphragm; such was the most ancient and general opinion. As soon as even a superficial knowledge of the functions of the brain was acquired, several philosophers and physiologists regarded it as the seat, not only of the intellectual faculties, but also of all the affections and passions. Then came speculative philosophers and metaphysicians. They attributed to the soul all the phenomena of moral and intellectual life. They recognised no organ for any one of its functions. Impressions on the external senses gave birth to the instincts, the propensities, and the intellectual faculties; and if the affections and passions were still placed in the viscera, this was rather with reference to their action than to their origin or seat. At a later period, and especially in France, it was judged that there was some internal source for what is called instinct, affection, and passion. As the brain at this time was held in no consideration, it was natural to make a present of them to the heart, etc.; and when the anatomy of the nervous system was brought to some perfection, this was immediately proclaimed as their seat and origin. Hence the ancient reputation of the heart; hence the zealous admirers of the solar plexus, the phrenic centre, and the ganglionic nervous system. But now that we are able to assign, with certainty, to each organ and nervous system its proper function, now that we know the graduated scale of beings and nervous systems, our ideas are altogether freed from these absurdities.

"We know that the ganglionic nervous system is intimately connected with the vascular system; they always co-exist, and frequently where there is no brain or spinal marrow. All the branches of these ganglionic nerves accompany the arterial trunks, branches, and ramifications, and enter with them into the different organs, which evidently proves that this system has no other office than to preside over the functions of the life of nutrition, to establish a reciprocal influence between this animal life, by the branches communicating with the nervous system of the vertebral column.

"We know the functions of the stomach, diaphragm, liver, and heart. We know that the mammiferous animals have these parts in common with man; that in the larger species they are even more voluminous than in man, although the affections and passions are neither so various nor so energetic. We perceive the absurdity of assigning to the same part—the heart for instance—functions directly opposed to each other. It is still more extraordinary to constitute the heart the seat of cruelty in the tiger, of gentleness in the lamb; of fidelity in the dog, of perfidy in the cat; of courage in the bison, and of timidity in the hare. We know, also, that the fact of emotion being felt in certain parts in connection with the affections and passions proves nothing as to their seat. We no longer confound the origin of an affection with the reaction of it on a particular part, since experience has taught us that by doing so the same passion or affection would have a different organ in each individual. In one instance, jealousy shakes, commiseration painfully contracts the jaws and palate; the sentiment of benevolence brings tears to the eyes; anger produces colic; and indignation causes the knees or lips to tremble. Let each individual observe, and he will discover in himself a different seat for jealousy, pity, the sentiment of benevolence, anger, indignation, etc.

"The slightest attention demonstrates to us the falsity of the notion that the brain is never affected by the affections and passions. Moral affections are followed by diseases of the brain, and diseases of the brain are frequently characterised by certain moral affections; an evident proof that both spring from the same source.

"The affections follow only on the perception of an object; no one is frightened
except at the unexpected approach of imminent danger; anger is usually the off-spring of wounded self-love; we are not grieved unless disagreeable sensations or unexpected and unfavourable news has been received by the brain; it is from the brain that flow those sudden and more or less violent movements, which radiate towards the principal organs of the system, and sometimes even towards them all. . . . How can we conceive general effects so varied as those which accompany or follow the manifestation of the affections, and sudden and severe mental shocks, without ascribing them to a common source? . . . If we acknowledge the brain to be the true source of these disturbances, everything is explained: this organ is in relation with the whole system; it is susceptible of receiving impressions, variable in their nature and degree of intensity; its sympathetic reactions may be as various as its particular affections and as the organs over which it exercises its influence."

Gall went on to give the different views of philosophers:

There are those who seek the mainspring of conduct in some vaguely conceived intuitive faculty: "conscience" in man, and "instinct" in animals; or they speak of the "will" as the source of all human action.

There are those who hold to the view that the motives of all human activity are the desire of pleasure and the aversion from pain. One is driven to suppose that the minds of the moral philosophers who maintain this view are either constitutionally devoid of the powerful impulses that so often move ordinary men to actions which they know to be morally wrong and against their true interests and destructive of their happiness; or are so completely moralised by strict self-discipline that these powerful impulses are completely subordinated and hardly make themselves felt.

Then he quoted the contemporary physiologists who tried to locate the passions, and showed how they opposed him.

A. B. RICHERAND (1779-1840) considered courage as the moral function of the heart: "The heart is larger, stronger, and more robust in courageous animals, than in the weak and timid species." He pointed out that he meant the relative size and not the absolute number.

F. J. V. BROUSSAIS (1772-1838), "Examen des Doctrines Médicales," vol. ii., before he became a convert to Gall's doctrine, wrote: "Prof. Richerand agrees with Cabanis in referring the instinctive determinations to the viscera; and the truth of this fact seems to be no longer contested by any one except Dr. Gall. The same professor attributes to the viscera the origin of appetites, whence spring certain passions; but he refers these passions to the intellectual faculties, so that the passions would be composed of determinations issuing from the viscera, and consequently instinctive, and intellectual operations."

J. C. REIL (1759-1813) and others considered the seat of the affections and passions to be in the nervous plexuses and ganglia of the chest and abdomen.

C. L. DUMAS (1765-1813) and KURT SPRENGEL (1766-1833) sought them in the difference of temperaments.

J. J. VIREY (1775-1840), the vitalist, author of "De la Puissance Vitale," Paris (1823), in the "Dictionnaire des Sciences Médicales," vol. xxxix., on "Passions," said: "Passions may exist without the intervention of a brain, and in beings least capable of ideas and reflections; for the passions belong in fact, not to the will, but to instinct, in all the brute creation . . . If the passions existed in the brain, why should terror take away all presence of mind and energy from the brain so as to induce syncope? It is therefore evident that passion is manifested in other parts than the organ of thought."

M. DELPIT ("Dictionnaire des Sciences Médicales, vol. xxxviii., p. 263) said that he could not agree with Gall that the brain is the organ of the affections and passions; on the contrary, "the opinion of the philosophers of antiquity, as well as those of our own time, supported by the testimony of our own consciousness, have placed in the precordial organs, or in those of internal life which are farthest distant and which appear the most independent of the brain, the seat of our most lively emotions and most impetuous passions."
We might add to these opinions another, nearly contemporary, writer, the well-known ethnologist J. C. PRICHARD (1786-1848), also a Lunacy Commissioner, who considered that the emotions were independent of any material apparatus. He said:

"So far from considering the propensities and sentiments as dependent upon or connected with any part of the brain, I am acquainted with no fact, either in physiology or pathology, which furnishes any ground for presuming that these mental phenomena take place through the instrumentality of any corporeal process whatever. I am sanguine enough to hope that the time will arrive when we may be enabled to ascertain the nature of the cerebral functions, and perhaps to understand thoroughly the whole of the process which is carried out in this part of our bodily fabric. At present, however, we must confess that we are not in possession of one fact that belongs to it.

"The higher powers of the mind, as well as the will itself, on which depends our moral responsibility, are entirely exempt from any connection with instrumental processes and any immediate dependence upon the organised structure of the brain. They are modes of operation of the immaterial soul."

According to Prichard, "the mind that reflects, reasons, deliberates, judges, or creates a world of its own in imagination is independent of the material organisation." He quoted a case reported by Gall, in which a "disorder of the propensities" followed an injury to the head caused by a fall from the fourth storey of a house, and calls attention to the absurdity of such a statement, adding that if such reports gained credit, "the College of Surgeons may expect one day to march in triumph and take possession of the vacant seats of the criminal judges; and we shall proceed forthwith to apply the trepan, where now the halter and the gibbet are thought most applicable." (Treatise on Nervous Diseases, 1822; and Treatise on Insanity, 1835.) That such cases are by no means rare will be shown in Chapter XXXII., where there are a number of cases quoted of criminal tendencies subsequent to brain injury, with complete recovery after surgical operation.

Notwithstanding these views, Prichard laid claim to—and DANIEL HACK TUKE ("Prichard and Symonds," 1891) accorded him the merit of—being the first to describe "moral insanity," by which he did not mean derangement of the moral faculties or congenital moral defect, but derangement of the feelings and instinctive impulses without derangement of the intellect; a mental condition which was described in a much more scientific and exhaustive manner by Gall, but was ignored by medical men and psychiatrists. (See Chapter XV. on this subject.)

JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS (1807-1871) read a paper before the British Medical Association, in 1869, on "Criminal Responsibility in Relation to Insanity," in which he discoursed on the subject of "moral insanity" and expressed his astonishment that physicians had not recognised sooner "the large share which the emotions and sentiments and passions bear in the mental constitution of man. . . and that the question should not have presented itself before, as to whether there are not actual cases in which mental derangement is confined to moral feelings and the emotions, just as in other cases the perceptive and reasoning powers are the sole subjects of disorder."

To-day we are agreed that insanity, at its onset at all events, is frequently an emotional disturbance; and that insanity is due to a disorder or disease of the brain. In my opinion, the emotions are always the first deranged, and through them the conduct becomes changed. A man is not declared insane for what he thinks, but for what he does, or omits to do. This problem will be dealt with fully in succeeding chapters. Granted even that it is not always, but only frequently, that the emotions are involved in the onset of insanity, it would be a puzzle to most physiologists and pathologists to explain how the emotions originate, and whether
any particular locality of the brain is concerned with them. It is true that there is some scientific literature on the subject—SIR FREDERICK MOTT (1853-) has made by far the most important contribution to it—but while we have learned a great deal as to the nervous processes and bodily effects of emotions, we are still ignorant of their relation to the cortex of the brain.

**SIZE OF BRAIN AND MENTAL POWER**

Another leading argument which Gall developed and pressed home was the connection of mental power with the size of the brain, meaning by mental power not merely intellectual power, but the power of all the mental qualities, that of the intellect, feelings, and propensities. He laid it down as a fact that where the brain is so small that the horizontal circumference of the head does not exceed thirteen or fourteen inches, idiocy is the necessary consequence. "Complete intelligence," he remarked, "is absolutely impossible with so small a brain; in such cases idiocy, more or less complete, invariably occurs, and to this rule no exception ever has been or ever will be found."

Indeed, FELIX VOISIN (1794-1872), Medical Superintendent of Bicêtre Hospital, verified this assertion of Gall and found it substantiated by every one of his cases. In the lowest class of idiots, where the intellectual manifestations were nil, the horizontal circumference, taken a little higher than the orbit, varied from eleven to thirteen inches; while the distance from the root of the nose backwards over the top of the head to the occipital protuberance was only between eight and nine inches. When the size varied from fourteen to seventeen inches of horizontal measurement, and eleven or twelve in the other direction, glimpses of feelings and random intellectual perceptions were observable, but without any power of attention or fixity of ideas. Lastly, when the first measurement extended to eighteen or nineteen inches, although the head was still small, the intellectual manifestations were regular enough, but deficient in intensity. In a full-sized head, the first measurement is equal to twenty-two inches on an average, and the second to about fourteen inches. Deficiency in the size of the brain is not, however, the only cause of idiocy; mental imbecility may arise from disease of the brain and causes which indirectly influence the brain by affecting its nutrition.

Other things being equal, the greatest amount of mental capacity and vigour is allied with the largest quantum of cerebral substance. According to Gall, all observation of man and animals proves that the energy of any nervous centre always bears a direct proportion to its bulk. Every organ of our body increases in size in proportion as it is exercised within the limit of its physiological capacity, and this rule holds good as to the brain as well. With increased mental work the brain will show an increased growth.

That there are many cases of great men having small heads is not at all a surprising fact, says Gall. Many men regarded as great are not so in every respect, but are great only in a particular department; and as but few of the mental powers serve in such cases, the entire bulk of the brain may be comparatively small. That men of common everyday life are often met with having heads in configuration and quality equal to those of the greatest men that ever lived is no proof against our view; for a man's ability is judged by what is publicly known of him, but often the man who thinks and feels the most expresses the least. Besides, not all the big brains of normal individuals that we see are also stored with facts. Many an uneducated man possesses more wisdom than the learned man who has specialised in one department of knowledge. People with large heads sometimes show small mental capacity, which in many cases is due to unfavourable circumstances, or pathological conditions. Small heads rarely manifest great mental power, though they may show isolated talent.
Size is *ceteris paribus* a measure of power. This is a universal law of nature. The greater the normal bulk, the more power. A man who is noted for physical strength has large, powerful muscles. Yet Gall's opponents thought the brain formed an exception.

F. E. FODÈRE (1764-1835), *Traité du Délire*, vol. ii., p. 82, said:

"What proves more effectually than everything else that the intellectual energy is far from being proportionate to the cerebral mass, is the observation which every one can make, that the volume of the head predominates in the early stages of life, although this is the precise time when our understanding is characterised by the greatest weakness. The researches of anatomy demonstrate that the cerebral mass, which at birth constitutes a sixth part of the body, afterwards relatively decreases, so that in the adult it forms only a thirty-fifth part. It is not, therefore, by its mass that the brain can contribute to intellectual life."

To this Gall replied:

"I shall prove in this volume that the proportion which the brain bears to the whole body is a deceitful means of estimating the degree of intelligence; besides, it is very natural that, with equal volume, a brain which has not yet attained its maturity should not exercise its functions in their full vigour. But, indeed, how can we expect sound views from writers who, like Fodère, have the most erroneous ideas of comparative anatomy? Let any one compare a calf's brain, that of a sheep, that of an orang-outang, that of a lion (see illustrations) with the brain of a man, in order to satisfy himself whether these brains have the same extent, and a structure, in almost all respects, analogous to that of the human brain."

JOHN BOSTOCK (1773-1846), Lecturer on Physiology at Liverpool, a contemporary of Gall, said on this subject in his book, p. 785:

"The position that the size of an organ is an indication of the degree of its power or capacity, a position which may be regarded as almost the fundamental principle on which the whole of Gall's doctrine rests, is in direct contradiction to fact. The perfection of the eye, either when considered with respect to the different species of animals, or to the different individuals of the same species, does not bear the least relation to its size, but depends entirely upon the nature of its organisation, and, except in those cases where the exercise of an organ is connected with mechanical force, as in muscular contraction, bulk has no relation to the perfection of a part."

Gall indignantly asked: "Who has ever said that the power of sight depended on the size of the eye? The power of sight does depend on the optic nerve."

Modern authorities seem to deny that size is *ceteris paribus* a measure of power, when they speak of Gall's doctrine, and to assert it when it suits them in confirmation of their own views of localisation. For example, ALLEN STARR, the eminent American brain surgeon, declared (Popular Science Monthly, 1889) that "size has nothing to do with function," yet he goes on to say, "In the middle line (of the brain) lies the motor area, and it is interesting to know that on the left half of the brain, which guides the right hand, it is larger in extent than on the other side which controls the left hand; because the majority of fine movements are performed by the right hand, and have to be learned by the left brain. The reverse is true of left-handed people."

H. WELCKER (1822-1897), of Halle, held the erroneous view, still common in recent times, that *abnormally small brains were due to arrested skull growth*. He did not know that when the brain wants to grow, the skull, which is a living substance, will grow with it. (See Chapter XIII.) He admitted (Anthropological Review, 1867) that a brain, below the average in size, will "rarely, if ever, be met with, in
conjunction with higher intellectual endowments," but he made the reservation, "unless the smallness of the brain is due to a checked development produced by synostosis of the skull." He believed that men highly endowed intellectually were found to possess a small capacity of skull and consequently a small brain—for example, W. v. Humboldt, Paracelsus, and Dante—because "the skull, in consequence of infantile obliteration of sutures, had become contracted."

**Absolute size** is not a measure of development among the brains of different animals, because the brain must bear a certain relationship to the size of the body in all classes of animals. Consequently a very large animal of a lower class will necessarily have a larger brain than a very small animal of a higher class. For example, the brain of a large shark is very small compared with the size of the animal, but it is much larger absolutely than the brain of a mouse, which, though absolutely small, presents evidences of a higher development than the other. We cannot, then, from the mere size or weight of the brain in any given case, arrive at a just conclusion regarding the state of development of the organ. Among animals of the same kind, after the medium size of their brain is known, the absolute size may lead to conclusions regarding the weakness or strength of their cerebral power, but no conclusion can be drawn from absolute size alone, regarding the mental capacities of the animal. As Gall said:

"If it be admitted that the brain is the organ of the mind, the conclusion that its functions must have a direct relation with this volume is perfectly natural. A much larger cerebral mass has been found in man than in the largest of our domestic animals—for example, in the ox or the horse; and, without more accurate researches into the animal kingdom, the predominant qualities of man were attributed to the greater cerebral mass: the world generally maintained, with Aristotle, Erasistratos, Pliny, and Galen, that of all animals, man had the greatest mass of brain; an opinion which has been embraced by many of the present day.

"At a later period it was found that the cerebral mass of the elephant and several of the cetaceous order was more considerable than that of man. This circumstance would naturally embarrass the partisans of the opinion to which we have just referred. In vain shall we extol the faculties of the elephant, and constitute the whale king over the inhabitants of the deep; we shall scarcely be authorised to attribute to them these qualities, which form the pride of man. It became necessary, therefore, to renounce the opinion that the intellectual faculties were to be estimated by the absolute mass of the brain.

"The dog and the ape have less cerebral mass than the horse, ox, or ass, and yet in regard to intelligence, the former generally surpass the latter. The wolf, sheep, pig, and tiger are nearly in the same position, relative to the cerebral mass; and yet they are endowed with qualities the most different, and even the most opposite. . . . We see, moreover, that nature can produce the most wonderful effects by means of an extremely small nervous mass; the ant and the bee are remarkable instances. Who has not observed the domestic economy, local memory, mechanical activity, anger, the revenge which they inflict in a body, the careful education of the young, the harmony which reigns in a hive or ant-hill? What is better adapted to its purpose than the spider's web? . . . Who will venture to say that nature is deficient in the nervous organisation of the minutest insect, or that she has exhausted her resources in the brain of a whale?"

The **relative size of the brain to that of the whole body** of the animal is no measure of the mental capacity, said Gall. In general, as animals rise in the scale, so their brains become not only more complex, but larger in proportion to the size of the whole body. But although this is a fact applicable to the great majority of animals, still the exceptions are numerous, and the laws of nature have no exceptions. The brain of the canary, and many other birds, constitutes a twenty-fifth part of their whole weight; whereas the brain of the elephant, in every respect more fully developed than that of birds, does not weigh a thousandth part of the huge body of
the animal. The relative size of the brain, then, to the whole body, cannot be viewed as a test or measure of cerebral development.

HALLER (1708-1777) remarked that children had a larger brain than adults in proportion to their body, and consequently that, if the mental powers were measurable by the proportionate size of the brain, they ought to excel grown-up persons in understanding. It may, however, be replied that the brain of children is not yet completely developed and is, therefore, unfit to manifest the intellectual capacities. Gall continued:

"Physiologists have shown some reluctance in abandoning the idea that the volume of the brain furnishes a scale for the measure of instincts, inclinations, and faculties; they could not deny that the elephant and whale have a more considerable mass of brain than man; but, they held, the cerebral mass must be compared with that of the entire body; and it is very evident that the mass of the elephant's or whale's body, divided by that of its brain, gives a greater quotient than the mass of man's body divided by his cerebral mass. Moreover, they added the spinal marrow and the nerves, both of which should be considered as continuations of the brain, and which constitute in these animals a much larger mass than in man; hence, a great part of the cerebral mass of these animals is destined to the use of the organs of sense, and to the voluntary motions; in a word, to the functions appertaining to nervous systems of a secondary order. In man, on the contrary, whose nerves are generally smaller, it is quite the reverse. According to calculation, a much smaller cerebral mass is appropriated in the elephant or whale to the superior functions than in man. It follows that the elephant and whale have, in proportion to the mass of the body, a much smaller brain than man.

"Many phenomena strengthen these opinions, both with respect to the proportion of the cerebral mass to that of the whole body, and with respect to the proportions of the absolute mass of the brain. Reptiles, amphibiaous animals, and fishes have extremely small brains, in regard to absolute mass, and in comparison to the entire mass of the body. The brain of a crocodile twelve feet in length, of a serpent eighteen feet long, or of a turtle weighing from three to eight hundred pounds, weighs, at most, but two or three drachms. The brain of the great vulture is not more voluminous than that of the crow. The turkey-cock has less cerebral mass than the grey marrot; facts which favour the opinion that it is the proportion of the cerebral mass to that of the whole of the body which furnishes a scale, by which the instincts and faculties are to be estimated.

"But the facts above mentioned are subject to many exceptions. Wrisberg, Sömmering, Cuvier, and others found that the sparrow, green canary, robin, wren, and especially several kinds of monkeys, have a much larger brain than man in proportion to the size of the body. These animals, then, ought to surpass man intellectually, and be infinitely superior to the stag, dog, or elephant. Several species of animals, in which nearly the same proportion exists between the mass of the brain and that of the whole body, should likewise have nearly the same instincts and faculties and in equal degrees of perfection; but that it is not so experience proves. Besides, it is almost impossible to determine the proportion between the mass of the brain and that of the body. Cuvier and others attempted it; but without producing satisfactory results. The brain of an adult, according to Cuvier ('Anatomie Comparée,' vol. iii., p. 149), is to the body in the ratio of one to thirty-five. But, in fact, it is much more frequently as one to forty, fifty, and even sixty; for, suppose an adult to weigh from a hundred and twenty to a hundred and fifty pounds, and his brain from two and a half to three pounds, the proportion is that which I have stated above. Cuvier, therefore, in comparing the cerebral masses of man and other animals, sets out from false data. Furthermore, he does not say at what point he separated the brain from the parts adherent to it; whether, when he weighed it, there were larger or smaller portions of nerves and medulla oblongata attached to it; or whether he had stripped off the meninges; or, if they remained, whether they were filled with blood, or free from it; or what was the age of the individuals whose brains he weighed. There is also another source of inaccuracy. Individuals possessed of very superior faculties have, other things being
equal, larger brains than those of ordinary talents. If, then, we compare the weight of a man's brain, endowed with extraordinary qualities and talents, with the weight of his body, we shall find a very different proportion from that which would result from the same experiment made upon a fool.

"Sömmering and Cuvier found another difficulty in determining the ratio between the weight of the brain and that of the body. The weight of the body, they say, may be increased or diminished by one half, by a change in the individual, from a fleshy state to that of leanness or the reverse, but the brain does not participate in this change. It is true that the brain is not susceptible of growing fat, that is, as little adipose matter is deposited in the cerebral as in the pulmonary substance; but it is certain that the contents of the cranium participate, with all the other integrant parts of the body, in the effects which result from very abundant or insufficient nourishment. Both in man and other animals, of a mean age and well fed, the brain is heavy, the convolutions are turgescent and compacted against each other. In decrepit, emaciated subjects, on the contrary, the brain, with equal dimensions of body, is sometimes not more than half as heavy as in the former case. The convolutions are flabby, and in some places even sunk. When persons have died of consumption, sometimes there is found upon the whole of the internal surface of the cranium the impress of the convolutions; because, in consequence of the emaciation of the convolutions, they leave wider intervals between them, and because the meninges become thin. I have made, with regard to this point, most careful observations upon rabbits, cats, monkeys, birds, and human beings."

The relative size of the brain to certain parts of the nervous system, and in particular to the spinal cord, in the opinion of Gall, will lead to no more accurate results regarding cerebral development. He says:

"Sömmering, and some other physiologists, finding the rule mentioned fail, then thought that the volume of the brain, compared with that of the nerves, would give an exact measure of the degree of intelligence. But some animals have large optic nerves, others large olfactory, in others the auditory nerves predominate, without any necessary proportion between them and the brain.

"Cuvier, for a time, regarded the proportion between the size of the brain and that of the spinal cord as the most infallible measure of intelligence, but he soon had to acknowledge exceptions—the dolphin as one.

"In fishes, the spinal cord is absolutely larger than the brain. In reptiles, this is also the fact, but to a less degree. In birds, the spinal cord is smaller than the brain, 100: 30, and in mammiferous animals the spinal cord is relatively so small, 100: 22, that it appears as a mere appendage to the encephalic mass. Again, those animals that are lowest in the scale of each class, have the spinal cord relatively largest; and those highest in the class, relatively smallest. Thus the proportion in the mouse is 100: 22, but mammiferous animals lower in the scale than the mouse have the relative proportion of their spinal cord larger than the above statement indicates, and all animals higher in the scale than the mouse have the cord relatively smaller. Man has the smallest spinal cord compared with the size of the brain, and we know that the brain of man is in a higher state of development than that of any other animal."

The size of the brain bears no relation to the dimensions of the face, says Gall, in opposition to several of his contemporaries.

"Other physiologists, as Richerand, Duméril, and even Cuvier, and Sömmering, too, affirmed that intelligence is in exact proportion to the degree in which the size of the brain preponderates over that of the face. Cuvier, indeed, tells us that ancients had perceived this rule, and, on this account, gave to their heroes, sages, and demi-gods large and prominent foreheads, in combination with moderately-sized faces. The superiority of intellect is, however, due to the large size of the frontal lobes; and it is a matter of perfect indifference to the corresponding mental functions whether the adjoining face be large or small. Leo X., Montaigne, Racine, Vol. i.]

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Mirabeau, had all large brains joined with large faces. Bossuet, Kant, and Voltaire had, on the contrary, the same large size of brain, but with proportionately much smaller faces."

Gall explained that mere size of brain indicates brain power only—as the large boiler will generate more steam than a small one—but does not indicate its direction whether in intellect, emotional feeling, or animal passion. A man, like an animal, may have a large mass of brain, and yet not manifest much intelligence; but both will exhibit power of some sort or other.

The two terms, which most men confound, are "mental" and "intellectual." The former means the whole mind: feeling, thinking, acting; but the latter means or refers to only one of the three divisions of mind—namely, the thinking property. Now, the word mental, as applied to its organ, embraces the entire brain; but the word intellectual, when used to designate its organ, merely refers to or embraces the part of the brain to which the intellect is more especially related, namely, according to Gall's theory, the frontal lobes. Size and weight of the whole brain are, therefore, not measures of the intellectual capacity of a man; but they are measures of his mind, his mental power, without determining whether that power lies in extent of intellect, in strength of moral feeling, or in force of passion or affection. Through ignorance of this fact the objection arose, that while some great men have had large heads, other men of eminence have had small ones.

Speaking roughly and generally, the size of the purely intellectual region of the brain is about one-fourth of the whole, or from that to one-third. Hence a man with great intellect, combined with little sentiment and passion, should have a small-brain and small head, while, on the other hand, a man of strong passions, great impulsive energy, and strong sentiment should have a large head, whether his intellect be strong or feeble. This should suffice once for all to refute the people who dispose of Gall's doctrine by such stories about Leigh Hunt's hat being too large for Shelley's head, and so forth.

A number of writers have repeated this old cavi—that large heads are not peculiar to high intelligences, and small heads to weak intelligences—on the assumption that Gall said they were. A whole set of stories turns on this absolutely false presupposition. It is often mentioned, for instance, that Napoleon, though he had a large head, could get the hats of some of his soldiers right over his ears. As a matter of fact, Gall was at special pains to repudiate the notion, current before his time, that the larger the brain the greater the intellect. He said:

"It has been objected that a bee has no perceptible brain, and that yet it manifests great intelligence. The objector intends that we should infer from this fact, either that man also may manifest the mind without a brain, or at least, that in him, size in the mental organ has no influence on the power of manifestation. But no two creatures can be more unlike than a bee and a man; and it is unsound in philosophy to draw conclusions relative to the one from facts observed in the other; when we can ascertain the truth by a direct investigation of the structure and functions of each by itself. By the same mode of reasoning, we might prove that lungs are not necessary for respiration in man, because some insects, such as the butterfly, the bee, the worm, and the louse, have no lungs, and yet live in air.

"I have heard the objection more than once, especially at Paris, that Voltaire, with all his vast genius, had a small head, and that we frequently see men of limited abilities with large heads. Voltaire's skull, however, especially the anterior part, had pretty large dimensions; but Voltaire had a small face, and this occasions the illusion.

"Let me be permitted to show that in animals also a large cerebral mass is singularly favourable to the manifestation of the instincts and faculties. The mastiff, of a powerful breed, is the largest and least intelligent of all dogs. Although its head appears very voluminous, it does not contain more brain than that of some
GALL AS ANATOMIST

pug-dogs. It is remarkable that many of the smaller species of dogs have generally almost as much brain as the larger, such as the mastiff, the great greyhound and the bulldog; and very frequently the former have a greater quantity than the latter. Among the large species, the spaniel and pointer have the greatest cerebral mass, and their heads are the most prominent and arched in front. On examining different individuals of the same species, we shall always find that the most intelligent, and those distinguished for any particular quality or faculty, have larger heads than the others. It is the same with regard to horses, and to such a degree, that, in Saubia, the peasants know perfectly well the most intelligent horses, by their foreheads being broader and more arched. When they pass over dangerous roads they put a horse or an ox distinguished by this conformation to lead the way. I know a jockey who, from long experience, can distinguish many qualities of horses by the form and dimensions of the forehead. He prefers those in which this part is broad and much arched. For several years I have attended to this sign, and have never found it to fail."

We must attend to the quality of the brain, said Gall, when we estimate capacity.

"Some say that size of brain is not a measure, and bid you to look at the fleetness of a racehorse as compared with the slow and clumsy movement of a cart-horse. But the example referred to is not a fair one; the racehorse is of a different breed from the cart-horse. We ought to compare the effects of size in two individuals of the same kind. If we see two cart-horses of very unequal size, are we not certain that the larger one is more powerful? Among men the same law holds good.

"In calculating the power of an organ, quality and internal activity as well as size must be attended to, and this may depend on a variety of conditions. Activity is as important to the brain as it is to a muscle.

"Size of particular parts of the brain is a measure of the power of the particular function with which it is associated, although not always when individual is compared with individual, because these often differ in temperament or constitutional condition."

Gall's proposition is now almost universally accepted, as the following quotations will show:

QUAIN, "Anatomy," vol. ii.: "All other circumstances alike, the size of brain appears to bear a general relation to the mental powers of the individual."

ALEXANDER BAIN (1818-1903), "Senses and Intellect": "Just as largeness of muscle gives greater strength of body as a general rule, so largeness of brain gives greater strength of mental impulse."

SIR WILLIAM TURNER (1832-1910), Professor of Anatomy in the University of Edinburgh: "One almost insensibly associates the ideas of power and strength with size and weight, and when one sees a large-headed, big-brained man, one is disposed to say that such a person must be endowed with great intellectual capacity. . . But that the size and weight of the brain are accurate measures of the degree of the intelligence is a proposition which must not be accepted too absolutely. . . . The brain of a lion is both bigger and heavier than that of a domestic cat, and yet we cannot say with any certainty that the intelligence of the former animal is higher in degree than that of the latter." This point has already been discussed.

Professor JOHANNES RANKE (1836-), Munich: "Every organ of our body increases in size the more it is exercised within the limits of its physiological capacities—and this refers to the brain as well. With increased mental work, the organ of the mind—that is, the brain—will show an increased growth."

SIR DAVID FERRIER (1843-), "Functions of the Brain": "Other things being equal, there are grounds for believing that a high development of certain regions will be found associated with special faculties of which the regions in question are the essential basis."

D. J. CUNNINGHAM (1850-1909), Lecturer on Anatomy in the University of Belfast and afterwards Edinburgh, at the British Association Meeting, Glasgow, 1901, said: "One of the most striking peculiarities of man when regarded from the
structural point of view is the relatively great size of his brain. Although with one or two exceptions the several parts of the brain are all more or less involved in this special development, it is the cerebral hemispheres which exhibit the preponderance in the highest degree. Insignificant in size and insignificant in functional value in the more lowly forms of vertebrates, a steady increase in their proportions is manifest as we ascend the scale, until the imposing dimensions, the complex structure, and the marvellous functional potentialities of the human cerebral hemispheres are attained."

Gall explained that the brain is not, like the liver, the heart, and other internal organs, capable from the time of birth of all the functions which it ever discharges; for while, in common with them, it has a certain organic function to which it is born equal, its high special character in man as the organ of conscious life, the supreme instrument of his relations with the rest of nature, is developed only by a long and patient education. Though the brain, then, is formed during embryonic life, its highest development only takes place after birth, and the same gradual progress from the general to the special, which is exhibited in the development of the organ, is witnessed in the development of our intelligence.

At what age does the brain attain full development? According to Gall, "The brain of most men hardly acquires its ultimate development till the age of thirty, often even not till forty. After the brain has completed its growth, the cranium thickens by degrees, in the following manner. ..." It is astonishing that on such a simple question—how the brain continues to grow—there should be such a diversity of opinion; some authorities agreeing with Gall; others making the most absurd statements.

S. T. SÖMMERING (1755-1830), supposed the brain finished its growth as early as the third year. C. WENZEL (1769-1827) thought the brain finished growing between six and seven years of age. F. R. TIEDEMANN (1781-1861), famous as an anthropologist, assumed the eighth year as the limit of the brain’s growth. SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON (1788-1856), the Scotch philosopher, wrote: "In man, the encephalon reaches its full size about seven years of age," and he adds, "This was never before proved," as if he regarded his proposition as an incontestable fact. WILLIAM A. HAMMOND (1828-1900), the American neurologist, was still more dogmatic. In the Popular Science Monthly, 1887, he asserted: "A fact which is somewhat astonishing to those not aware of it is, that the head of a boy or girl does not grow in size after the seventh year, so that the hat that is worn at that age can be worn just as well at thirty." (!)

HENRY HERBERT DONALDSON, Professor of Neurology in the University of Chicago, "The Growth of the Brain," 1895: "The brain has pretty well approximated its full size by the end of the seventh year, and but little growth takes place after the fifteenth year."

DAVID F. LINCOLN, "Sanity of Mind," 1900: "The head and brain get almost their entire growth in bulk by the end of the seventh year."

W. W. IRELAND (1832-1909), well-known authority on Feeble-Minded (Journal of Mental Science, 1888): "The brain is fully developed at about ten or twelve years of age."

Other observers have come to the conclusion that the brain not only goes on increasing in size and weight to a much later period of life, but that, under favourable circumstances, it may increase in weight long after the body has attained its maximum; thus agreeing with Gall. For instance:

SIR WILLIAM TURNER (1832-1916), the anatomist, wrote: "The human brain, in all probability, attains its full size and weight at or about the age of thirty," and he added, "whilst the body not only increases greatly in weight after
this period, but in one and the same individual may vary considerably in weight at different stages of adult life, without any corresponding fluctuations taking place in the weight of the brain."

The celebrated Austrian neurologist, Professor MEYNERT (1833-1892), found the brain to reach its greatest weight in the fortieth year.

SIR JAMES CRIGHTON BROWNE, F.R.S. (1840-): "It is certain that the brain may continue to increase in size until upwards of thirty years of age, and that in every nerve centre structural complexity may be augmented long after the limit of bulk has been reached."

Gall's brain physiology is continued in Chapter XIV. (The quotations from Gall in this chapter are all taken—as already mentioned—from his small work: Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau, 1822-6, in six volumes.)
CHAPTER XII

FRANCIS JOSEPH GALL: A GREAT PSYCHOLOGIST

EXCEPT in GEORGE HENRY LEWES'S "History of Philosophy," we shall find no mention of Gall as a psychologist; or, at most, only one or two brief references. Yet, if Gall was not a psychologist, in the strict sense of the word, his influence on psychology was tremendous, as will be shown in Chapter XXII.

Gall did not study mind; he studied mental phenomena. He broke away from all the traditions of the schools, abandoning every theory and preconceived opinion, and started out on an original course of investigation of mental activities, which included amongst other subjects:

1. Animal Psychology, showing the mental development of animals and the concurrent evolution of their nervous structure.

2. Infant Psychology, following the harmonious development of brain and mind in human beings.

3. Social and Race Psychology, being the manifestation of mentality in the progress of mankind from a condition of barbarism to present civilisation.

4. Normal Psychology and ethology, by studying the mind and character of man, especially the character, which had been almost entirely neglected until his time.

5. Abnormal Psychology—mental pathology—by observing mental and moral dispositions in disease, injuries, malformations, and arrested growth of the brain. He showed that the morbid state does not differ radically from the normal, but is only an exaggeration or reduction of some of its elements beyond the limits of variation habitually proper to them. In the insane we can watch the manifestation of a particular faculty or moral tendency, acting in an intensified degree, and controlled by thoughts and feelings by which it is habitually directed or restrained. Indeed, the insane man is in some measure like the animal. His feelings are not under the control of the intellect.

There is no doubt that, by attending to their own consciousness, metaphysicians have ascertained and described the relations of their own thoughts and feelings, and that occasionally these may be found to correspond with the thoughts and feelings of others; but their systems do not exhibit complete and practical views of human nature. They studied the intellect, but not the feelings which give the impulse for the mind to act. Gall's method was not that of self-observation for the delineation of human nature, but observation of his fellow-beings. If we compare the results of metaphysical thinkers with the wonderful insight into mind and character which, for example, a writer like Shakespeare possessed, we cannot be in doubt which is the more practical method. Nearly every metaphysician has been the exponent and founder of a new school, so that we read of a Cartesian, Spinozian, or Kantian philosophy of mind—because metaphysicians did not practise the observation of their fellowmen, but limited themselves to introspection. How strange it would seem if we heard of every eminent chemist having his own system of chemistry!

We cannot study the feelings and emotions by introspection. Whosoever aspires to give an adequate account of the emotions should devote himself to a careful
investigation of their simplest manifestations in the higher members of the animal kingdom; to the study of the different grades of their evolution in the savage and the civilised man, in the child and the adult, the woman and the man, the idiot and he who is not right in his mind. Introspection may disclose our own desires, but cannot disclose those of others; and we may be very much mistaken about our own aims, for the desires naturally attaching to them are often transferred after a time to the means by which that aim is attained, so that there ensue in this way manifold secondary formations. For instance, the end of wealth is to give enjoyment and comfort; but how often does a passion for the means supersede the desire for the end!

The normal mind in its reflection is not conscious of any relation to the brain, or of being hampered in any way. Introspection does not reveal any physical mechanism, the condition of which may either favour or impede its operation. Indeed, the healthy man is not conscious of any apparatus for any of the functions; he is not conscious of the mechanism of digestion, circulation, or of the mechanism of his thought processes. The objects of metaphysical speculation are the immaterial properties of an immaterial being; the brain has no existence for the metaphysician. He studies mind only. Gall proceeded from the brain to discover the processes of the mind. All the metaphysicians naturally ignored him.

He began by following the natural history method and *studying mind in the lower animals*. His work contains a mass of information of the mental dispositions of animals, mostly of his own observation, that is simply wonderful. Hitherto this study had been neglected by most philosophers.

That Gall was a naturalist of the first rank is shown in every chapter of his work. Take his discussion with K. A. RUDOLPHI (1771-1832), for example, that birds lack the sense of taste or have an obtuse taste only; Gall wrote:

"Blumenbach has found the organ of taste in the duck comparatively much larger than in the goose; and so also have I observed that the palate of many birds, such as birds of prey, heath-cock, etc., is garnished with nervous papillae, very numerous and strong. A great number of birds do not swallow their food at once; the tom-tits, for instance, in a manner lick it; most birds, that live on insects and grains, crush and bruise them. What reason should we have in this case to attribute to them a less perfect taste than to other animals? Let anyone give to the canary, bullfinch, nightingale, or cuckoo, many different kinds of food, each will select without fail that which he likes best. The canary prefers doggrass. If we give to nightingales, that are newly caught, the larvae of ants, a great number will die of hunger, because they do not know the kind of food; if we put them in their beak, they usually reject them; but if we crush them, they swallow them with avidity. This evidently proves that they have a very distinct taste. Even birds that swallow their food at once, such as hens, pigeons, etc., distinguish berries and grains by touching them with the end of their beak. Let any one mix the grains of vetch with those of the *robinia caraguna*, the *systisus* of the Alps, etc., the hens and pigeons will take them all without distinction, but they will soon reject the two last. Thus the horny extremity of the tongue does not exclude taste; it seems, on the contrary, to be a prolongation of the lingual nerve, destined to give this part a more delicate taste. If storks have been accustomed to receive in their beak rats and frogs, that are thrown to them, they swallow them with avidity, after having tossed them many times in the air, re-caught and crushed them; but if we throw them a toad, they instantly reject it; they greedily swallow large flies and bees; but, if they catch an insect they do not like, they reject it. Swallows, and all birds that live on insects, do the same. It is an error, then, to suppose that a humid solution is first necessary to cause the sensation of taste. The surface of grains and insects certainly excites on the tongue oleaginous, alkaline impressions, that the taste instantly perceives, by means of instruments organised for this purpose. Add to this, that the dog, when hungry, swallows without chewing, greedily chews filberts, almonds, chestnuts; that he laps milk with great delight; that, like
almost all other animals, he loves sugar; that the hog and duck, who root and dabble in the mud, tear and chew roots, insects, frogs, etc.; roebucks and pigeons, who greedily seek dirty slime; is it possible to deny a distinguishing sense of taste to all these animals? It is then the less conceivable how Rudolphi can maintain that the sense of taste is wanting in most animals."

Some psychologists, like Descartes, denied to animals any conscious mentality at all, or they attributed all their mental phenomena to the operations of that conventional faculty, termed Instinct. The comparison of the mental powers of man and animals offers the same advantages for the investigation of man’s moral and intellectual nature as comparative anatomy furnishes in general biological research. This comparison Gall found especially useful in determining the really innate and universal attributes of men, unmodified by systematic cultivation or social influence. According to Gall, mind cannot be comprehended without a study of its development and a comparison of animal and human dispositions. The gulf between the two, he declares, is not so great as has hitherto been assumed. The bodies of brute and man are fashioned on the same plan; so are their minds.

Gall regarded man as the highest summit of the animal kingdom, not merely in a purely anatomical sense, but also in a physiological sense, and in a further, namely, a psychological sense. He taught that man in his psychological relations does not merely reach this summit in a partial development, but that all the psychological elements of the animal kingdom are present in man, and occupy qualitatively and quantitatively the highest grade of development. The manifold mixtures of character are the result.

He said:

"Those who presume that the moral and intellectual acts of man flow from understanding and will, independent of the body, and those who, ignorant of natural science, believe brutes to be automatons, may consider the comparison of man with animals revolting and absolutely futile. Not so those who are familiar with the works of Bonnet and Condillac, and those who have any knowledge of comparative anatomy and physiology. Brutes are objects of contempt because of the ignorance and pride of man, but they share so many things with him, that the naturalist is frequently embarrassed to determine where animal life terminates and humanity commences. Animals are produced, born, nourished under the same laws as man; their muscles, vessels, viscera, and nerves are similar; they are endowed with the same senses, which they use in the same manner; they are subject to similar affections, such as joy, sadness, fear, alarm, hope, envy, jealousy, and anger; they have the same desires of propagation, and love and foster their young; they have attachment for each other and some for man; they are courageous, and fearlessly defend themselves and their offspring against enemies; they feed like ourselves on vegetables and other animals; they have the sentiment of property; and while some are cruel, sanguinary, and vindictive, others recollect benefits and injuries, are sensible to blame and approbation, mild, docile, compassionate, and mutually assist each other; some are cunning and circumspect, foresee the future by the past, and take necessary precautions against dangers which menace them; they correct their false judgments and their unsuccessful enterprises by experience; they have the idea of time, and foresee its periodical return; they have memory, reflection, and comparison, and even form abstractions; by means of articulate language or gestures, they communicate their ideas, wants, and projects; some have a capacity for construction, some can sing, or are sensible to the harmony of music, some can even count; and to a certain degree they are susceptible to individual perfectibility. There is no moral quality or intellectual faculty of which the germ may not be found in the animal kingdom. If it be thought that this comparison is degrading to man, I, with Pascal, reply that if it be dangerous to show man in how many respects he resembles brutes, without pointing out his superiority, or to show him his greatness without pointing out his inferiority, it is still more dangerous to leave him in ignorance of both. We shall not fail to give due recognition, in this
work, to the distinguished place which the Author of nature has assigned to man. His superiority is so conspicuous that there is no need to have recourse to distinctions which experience and natural history disavow. The real detractors of the human species are those who think they must deny the intelligence of animals in order to maintain the dignity of man. To concede to the brutes what God has given them is surely not to degrade our own species.”

Hitherto all actions of animals had been referred to instinct, and all the thoughts and actions of man to his understanding. This is certainly a very easy manner of explaining facts: instinct is the talisman which produces every variety in the actions of animals. Gall asked: What is instinct? Is it a personified being, an entity, or a principle? or does the word, according to the Latin etymology, signify only an internal impulse to act in a certain way in ignorance of the cause? He took it in the latter signification; thus the word “instinct” denoted to him every inclination to act arising from within. It is merely an effect and does not express the cause that produces the inclination. Thus when we say that one animal sings and that another migrates, we specify some sorts of instincts, but leave their individual causes undetermined. He explained:

“Instinct is an impulse that impels a living being to certain actions, independent of reflection and volition, i.e., without its having a distinct idea of the means or end. . . . If instinct were a single, general power, not only ought the Instincts to be manifested all at once, but also in the same degree. The truth is, however, that while certain instincts act with great force in the young animal, they are completely inactive in others; certain instincts act at one season, others at another season.”

The dividing line between man and the other animals, according to Gall, is not drawn between instinct and reason. Brutes also reason, and man is not without his animal instincts. Instinct belongs to both, and the lower animals have, to a limited extent, knowledge of the relations of cause and effect in the world around them, and have, to a limited extent, the intuitions belonging to the reasoning faculties that nothing happens without a cause, and that like causes will produce like effects. The mind of man differs from that of the lower animals, rather as to the degree in which the reasoning faculties are developed in him than by anything peculiar in their hind. Even moral affections are enjoyed by animals—the horse is docile, the lion courageous—and they are excited by the same emotions as ourselves: terror acts on them in the same manner as on us; suspicion, the offspring of fear, is eminently characteristic of most wild animals. Gall said:

“Hitherto a complete line of demarcation was established between man and animals, and no connection could be tolerated between them. . . . ‘The brute acts from instinct, man from understanding’—such is the language of philosophers. In the former, say they, instinct supplies the place of intelligence, which is peculiar to men. But do they act solely from instinct? Are they destitute of intelligence? Is man exempt from all instinctive impulses, and beyond the influence of instinct? We have only to obtain a precise idea of instinct, and of understanding or intellect, and the truth will spontaneously present itself to our minds. Instinct is independent of reflection and volition—an inward movement, an impulse that impels a living being to certain actions, without its having a distinct idea of the means or ends. Instinct is not a universal power, that explains all the actions of animals, but it varies as much as the fundamental propensities. For example, some animals build themselves a dwelling, others do not; some hoard food, others do not.”

Animals are not mere machines. They do not act solely from instinct, for many animals modify their actions according to external circumstances; they even select one among different motives, and often resist their internal impulses or instincts.
Nor are the instincts of animals rigidly fixed; they are plastic, and their plasticity renders them capable of improvement or of alteration, according as intelligent observation requires. In the words of Gall:

"They are susceptible of much more extended instruction than their immediate wants require. Do we not teach all sorts of tricks to domestic animals? They also modify their own mode of action according to the position in which they find themselves. But this ability of receiving education is always proportionate to their primitive faculties. They cannot, any more than man, learn things of which they have not received the first impress from nature. If the dispositions are not innate, why do animals do things which they have never seen done; and why do they almost always execute them as well the first time as their progenitors have done?"

Instinctive actions are displayed in their purest form by animals not very high in the scale of intelligence. In the higher vertebrate animals, few instinctive modes of behaviour remain purely instinctive—i.e., unmodified by intelligence and by habits acquired under the guidance of intelligence or by imitation. And even the human infant, whose intelligence remains but little developed for so many months after birth, performs few purely instinctive actions, because in the human being the instincts, although innate, are, with few exceptions, undeveloped in the first months of life, and only ripen, or become capable of functioning, at various periods throughout the years from infancy to puberty. If, in later years, man is moved by different principles, and is better able to govern his passions than animals, it does not follow that in him these passions or instincts are more feeble.

While it is doubtful whether the behaviour of any animal is wholly determined by instincts quite unmodified by experience, it is clear that all the higher animals learn in various and often considerable degrees to adapt their instinctive actions to peculiar circumstances. Gall continued:

"Let us now examine whether, in the manifestation of their fundamental powers, animals always obey a blind impulse; whether they act exclusively from impulse, or are conscious of their propensities and faculties; whether they modify their instincts by a clear idea of the means or ends to be used; in other words, can they be considered to possess intelligence, understanding? If animals acted only from a blind instinct, their manner of acting would be always uniform. Experiences and external influences would never be able to make them deviate one hair's breadth from their ordinary routine; their actions, and the order of their occurrence, might be submitted to calculation, like the course of a machine, which, in fact is the common doctrine; but experience teaches a very different lesson. At the very moment that the wolf scents the flock enclosed in the fold, the thought of the shepherd and the dog comes to his recollection, and counterbalances the present impression which he receives from the sheep. He measures the height of the fold, compares it with his strength, judges of the difficulty of leaping over it with his prey, and concludes the attempt would be useless, or dangerous. Yet, from the midst of the flock, when scattered over the field, he will seize a sheep before the eyes of the shepherd, particularly if the nearness of the woods affords a chance of concealment. He undermines the park or sheepfold, when he can find no other means of penetrating it. He needs but little experience to learn that man is his enemy, and that he must fear his snares. Thus he is always on his guard. The older he is, and the more dangers he has encountered, the more distrustful he becomes. Wolves will hunt in packs, and the mutual aid they afford renders the chase easier and surer. If a flock is to be attacked, a female goes and shows herself to the dog, which she leads away in pursuit of her, while the male leaps over the fold and carries off a sheep which the dog is unable to protect.

"We have daily opportunities of seeing the difference between a trained and an untrained horse, and the changes which education effects in the manner of dogs. Whoever has, in the slightest degree, observed animals, must concede to them a certain degree of perfectibility, of which I have mentioned a great number of
examples in this work. It cannot be denied that they remember past facts, and that their conduct is regulated in reference to them; that they compare, reflect, and judge; and that in emergencies they take measures well adapted to the circumstances. All this cannot be the impulse of a blind instinct—it must be admitted, that, to a certain extent, they are endowed with understanding. But as this understanding is only the faculty of modifying the manifestation of their natural instincts, according to accidental circumstances, it follows that there is a portion of understanding peculiar to each species, and in virtue of this law, each species remains confined to the circle in which nature originally enclosed it. Still, it is established that animals exercise their mental powers with more or less intelligence or understanding."

Instincts are a chain of impulsive acts which have become simplified and connected through continual repetition of the same actions following upon the same stimuli, so as to become finally fixed into the physiological organisation. Consciousness has gradually disappeared from them, though not entirely. Taken in this light, all our primary mental powers might be regarded as instincts. The sexual instinct, parental love, social attachment, all actions of self-preservation as fighting and concealment, making provision for the future, etc., are all primitive dispositions and instinctive, the moment they create an impulse impelling to action.

Gall, like G. H. Schneider ("Der thierische Wille," 1880) and William James ("Principles of Psychology," 1891), nearly a century later, maintained that man has at least as many instincts as any of the animals, and assigned them a leading part in the determination of human conduct and mental processes. Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed, or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn.

The affections, the propensities, the passions are the great springs of human life. They do not result from intelligence; on the contrary, their spontaneous and independent impulse is indispensable to the first awakening and continuous development of the various intellectual faculties.

The feelings in animals are generally of a less complicated character than in man, and consequently better adapted in that state for observation. They are also less under the control of the intellect, and therefore are nearer the essential or primitive type.

Even what we consider specifically human in the mind exists in its rudiments in the animal. The super-added powers are largely due to man's erect attitude, the development of speech, manual dexterity, the progress of civilisation, and "individual" education. We must imagine a human being without these influences and then compare him with the brute.

"Now let us inquire," said Gall, "whether man also acts from instinctive impulses, or exclusively obeys the dictates of reason. Is he the author of his propensities, or are they involuntary in him, as in the brute?"

"I do not speak of those reflex movements that some authors confound with instinct, and which both man and brute do unconsciously, and without any possible premeditation. For instance, we recoil suddenly from the sight of danger, and in falling we stretch out our arms, either to come on our hands, or to preserve our equilibrium. I here speak of instinctive propensities—true instincts. I have proved in the section on innate dispositions, and when treating of the fundamental qualities and faculties, that man neither invents nor creates his propensities and faculties. I know not to what degree of ignorance are to be attributed the dogmas of that arrogant philosophy which pretends that man is beyond the reach of those laws which govern the animal kingdom. When man burns with physical love and seeks a companion; when he loves his children, and takes care of them; when he defends himself and family against his enemies; when he is proud, vain, benevolent, cruel,
avaricious, cunning, and circumspect, who does not know that this takes place without his participation or resolutions? Who does not perceive that all these sentiments are movements, dispositions independent of reflection? They are not the result of attention, of deliberate thought, or premeditation, of volitions. They are genuine instincts. The intellectual faculties also are in most cases exercised instinctively. The primitive capacities are inborn, and so little are we conscious of them, that when our attention is called to them subsequently, we are astonished to find such extraordinary qualities or gifts. The more brilliant the genius, the more instinctive the activity of the organ, at least in the early period of its manifestation.

"If men of genius manifest talents at an age when they do not know that such faculties exist; if they calculate, sing or draw, without any previous education, do they not do so by some internal impulse or instinct, as well as the animals which sing, build, migrate, and gather provisions? Instinct, then, is not confined to animals, and understanding is not a prerogative of mankind.

"My admiration was deeply excited by the following lines of Voltaire, who has achieved so much himself by the force of instinct, addressed to Diderot, under date of April 20th, 1773:

"All the philosophers together could not have written the Armide of Quinault, nor Les Animaux Malades de la Peste of La Fontaine, who was unconscious of what he had done. It must be granted that, in the performances of genius, all is the work of instinct. Corneille conceived and wrote the scene between Horace and Cornelius as a bird builds its nest, with the exception that a bird always does its work well, which is not the case with us."

"It is only when man turns his attention to his innate internal powers, compares them with the powers of others, learns their use and how to employ them under change of circumstances, and reflects upon himself, that his instincts gradually acquire the character of intellect or understanding.

"The qualities common to man and animals are ennobled in man: the animal desire for propagating the species is transformed in man to moral love; the love of female animals for their offspring becomes, in women, that amiable virtue which inspires tenderness for their children; the attachment of animals increases in man to friendship; their sensibility to caresses, to ambition and a sentiment of honour; the same faculty which produces the song of the nightingale, produces in man the art of music; and that which produces the nests of birds and the huts of beavers, produces man's temples and palaces. Man with his more complex organisation presents elevated faculties, but the elements are the same, and it is doing violence to reason to place him out of the domain of those natural laws which govern both animals and man.

"Man, knowing that he possesses no member and no part of his body peculiar to his species—that he propagates his kind after the manner of animals, that he nourishes himself on the carcasses of other animals, that he lives, fights, and dies like an animal—has his pride ruffled. Yet the man who is endowed with strong physical powers and mental force has no more right to plume himself on their possession, as if they were acquisitions due to his voluntary energy and perseverance, than need the man to whose lot has fallen physical and mental poverty be ashamed of his misfortune as if he had the option by voluntary effort of becoming a Hercules or a Solomon."

Gall was thus the first to show that there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental powers; a fact confirmed three-quarters of a century later by CHARLES DARWIN (1809-1882), in his "Descent of Man," 1871.

Neither the ego nor consciousness are the sovereign powers to which metaphysicians have raised them, said Gall. Man can receive sensations without consciousness. Moreover, consciousness varies in degree according to the state of the brain and changes entirely in Insanity. The ego is no entity; it varies from time to time, and is sometimes split up. He continued:

"Inanimate bodies are unconscious of their existence. They have no ego; nothing tells them that they are individuals independent of other beings; and
alone, though infinitely multiplied, they would constitute a perfectly dead nature. Life, ego, consciousness of the existence of the world, begins with sensation, with the nervous apparatus. When the individual perceives that it is distinct from surrounding things, it has an ego whose capacity will be in proportion to the variety and intensity of its sensations; and consequently, to the number and energy of the organs of internal sensibility and external relations. The more numerous the organs in contact with external objects, the more extensive will be the world of the animal. To the general, vague, indefinite sensation, add sensations that are determinate and essentially distinct from one another, and you gradually modify and enlarge its world. Each sense, each organ, becomes a new revelation. Taste, smell, hearing, vision, touch, each make known to him existences, and different relations in the world, and whether wholly or partially combined, the aspect of this world must essentially vary. Applying these remarks to the organs of the moral qualities and intellectual faculties, we may consider them also so many points of contact with the external world; so many sources of new kinds of sensations, sentiments, instincts, propensities and faculties; but we have seen that they are unequally shared by the different species of animals. Their internal and external world must therefore vary to infinity, diminishing or increasing in the same proportion as the number of these organs diminishes or increases."

The anatomy and physiology of the brain alone can furnish rational notions of the human understanding. I ask you, psychologists—said Gall—do you really believe that you have explained the nature of man by depicting—and that on a gratuitous supposition—an immaterial "ego," charged with the duty of cognition, feeling, and willing?

"Your answer to all my questions is: My consciousness tells me that it is so. But I tell you your consciousness deceives you. Instead of trusting so fallacious a guide, interrogate your senses; apply yourself to the observation of your fellow-men, and they will instruct you as they instructed me. As a physiologist I will demonstrate to you the organs of the different mental powers not only in man, but in the whole series of animals. I must confess that my investigation is far from complete, but I am at least certain that no other method can lead to a knowledge of the moral and intellectual man."

Gall was opposed to regarding the mind as entity and unity. He knew only a mental organisation. The notion of the soul or mind as an absolute unity long prevented, or, at least, obscured the recognition of the great variety of different powers and more or less discordant tendencies existing in the same individual, and led metaphysical thinkers to reduce all the sentiments and affections as modes of self-love (Hobbes), and all the intellectual phenomena as transformed sensations (Condillac). No one had so far attempted to explain why souls differ. If the soul were an immaterial substance, all souls ought to be alike, only varying during the life of the body according to the influence of circumstances; otherwise they must be originally unlike.

Gall strenuously opposed the "faculty" psychology (Wolff), which was so popular in his day. The faculties are simply different directions of activity of the mind. When he used the term "faculties," the word had not the same meaning with him. He meant not entities, but powers and aptitudes, and then generally with reference to the intellect—intellectual faculties—as distinguished from the sentiments, emotions, and propensities. He told us that while the metaphysicians were engaged in their elaborate propoundings of perception, conception, memory, abstraction, imagination, reason, and so forth, they never suspected that they were dealing but with terms that refer to qualities which merely characterise the various degrees and modes of operation of the fundamental mental powers, and that such terms did not even serve to nominate or define the nature of a single elementary power. "They are not
radical, fundamental, primitive qualities at all; they are only abstractions, general attributes of the true fundamental powers.” For example:

“Take the musician. He would not be a musician if he did not perceive the relation of tones, if he had no memory of music, if he could not judge of melody and harmony; and certainly not a composer, if he had not the imagination to invent new combinations. Thus attention, perception, memory, judgment, and imagination are nothing else than the different modes of action of every one of the fundamental capacities. When the primary mental power is energetic, so will these attributes be; when it is feebly developed, there will be a feeble degree of attention, of perception, of memory, a defective judgment, and no imagination. This explains how it happens that one may have strong attention, easy perception, a tenacious memory, and an extremely correct judgment, an inventive and brilliant imagination in one particular direction, and be almost imbecile in any other.

“We have to discover the fundamental powers of the mind, for it is only these that can have separate organs in the brain. But how are we to derive this knowledge? Whenever we inquire we get this common answer: ‘What need have you of seeking other powers of the mind than the faculties of intelligence and the will? Man is an architect, mathematician, poet, solely because he applied his understanding to architecture, mathematics, and poetry. He gives himself to love; he takes care of his children; he is ambitious; because such is his choice.’ I had in vain to ask why it was that one man applied himself by choice to architecture, rather than to anything else; why another took pleasure in hoarding money, another in seeking honours, etc.

“In order to invalidate this unsatisfactory appeal to the will and the understanding, I referred them to the mole, the rabbit, the ant, who construct their subterranean galleries with astonishing foresight; I referred them to the beaver, the bee, the penduline, who construct their cabins, their hives, and their nests with inimitable art; I referred them to the quail, the cuckoo, the stork, and the swallow, who, after a long absence, return to their old habitation; I referred them to the bloodthirsty weasel, the cunning fox, the bold wild boar, the singing nightingale, and the imitating mocking-bird. But still my ears resounded with the cry of the philosophers: it is ‘instinct’; and one would have believed that all the means for explaining these phenomena had been exhausted.”

Aristotle held that “there is no power of mind which has not been derived from the external senses,” and Locke held a similar view that the whole intellectual content comes through the senses; but how can we believe in the sensation theory, when we see that a word heard by one individual can determine in him an intense psychic reaction, which may lead to a series of actions, whilst in another it may pass almost unheeded? It is evident, said Gall, that in such a case the effect cannot be explained without assuming the intervention of some organic predisposition.

“When by sensation we understand nothing more than impressions produced by the external world on the senses, as most authors do, we wholly neglect the internal feelings of man and animals, and forget that the external world is known only to the extent of our perception of it, which varies according to our own individuality, although all men are surrounded by the same objects. We all have the same senses, but the world we live in appears different to each one of us. What is it that makes the world different to each individual? Psychologically, it is the individual character. The elements of the individual character determine the individual outlook. These elements, though they can be modified, are permanent in man, and we know him by them during life and remember him by them after death.

“The five senses will not help us to explain the great variety in the animal instincts, the nest-building of the bird, the constructive instinct of the beaver, the migratory instinct of the nightingale.

“If animals were so susceptible to impressions from their surroundings, why does not the female nightingale imitate the song of her mate, and why does each
animal, notwithstanding intercourse with other species, preserve its peculiar manners? Why does the cuckoo not imitate the note of the bird which has reared it? Who instructs the spider, hardly escaped from the egg, to weave a web and envelop the captive flies?

"If the propensities of animals are not determined by their organisation, how can you explain the fact that these propensities are always found in harmony with their external organs? Will you maintain that nature acts without object in giving to the beaver strong gnawing teeth and a flat tail; to the intelligent elephant: his trunk; to the sanguinary tiger his terrible claws and teeth? Will you tell me that the bear, the tiger, and the elephant employ their instruments for the sole reason that they find them fitted for certain purposes? That the mole lives under ground because his eyes are too small, or that the swan chooses of necessity his abode in the water because his feet are natural oars? Neither man nor animals have any limb, any instrument, in order to use it, but they use them because they have them! If we give the teeth and claws of the lion to the sheep, we do not change the sheep into a lion.

"Man does not invent because he has hands; but animals and man have these organs, because their internal organisation is endowed with the faculties which are in relation to them."

The foregoing criticism is evidently in reply to the attempt made by BUFFON, VICQ D'AZYR, CUvier, and others, to deduce instinct, or mechanical aptitude, from the tail of the beaver, the trunk of the elephant, the eye, ear, and hand. Gall went on to say:

"The capacity of perceiving impressions, of retaining and comparing ideas, and making application of them, is by no means in proportion to the senses either in man or animals. Could it even be demonstrated, that man, of all animals, has the most perfect senses, we should not obtain the explanation of his surpassing all others in intellect. Experience teaches us that greater or less superiority of mind is not produced by greater or less perfection of the organs of the senses.

"If all our ideas arise from the senses, what becomes of the general and purely intellectual ideas, the signification of which is wholly independent of the material world? For example, 'there is no effect without a cause.' As we generally attribute to savage nations the most delicate senses, it would be from them that we ought to expect the most profound philosophy, and the feeblest instinct.

"Are idiots, who possess their five senses in perfection, more gifted than the men born blind? Is it not apparent that the internal powers alone modify the impressions received by the senses? For this reason external objects act very differently on men and animals, and on different individuals.

"Age and sex produce no essential difference in the number and nature of the senses; why then are the intellectual faculties and the passions so different in the child, the youth, the man, and the woman?

"The great diversity of intellectual functions, feelings, and instincts is not due to the five senses. For example, musical ability does not depend on a fine sense of hearing, and constructive ability on superior sight; there must be a fundamental capacity and disposition for such abilities.

"The senses are not the immediate generators, but merely the mediators of mental qualities. They conduct external impressions to the brain, which receives, digests, and reproduces them, according to its own energy."

The eye does not see, nor the ear hear. Behind ear and eye there is something which changes all that is supplied by the senses into percepts and concepts. There are brain-centres for sight, hearing, etc.; and if these are injured, the eyes, ears, etc., are useless.

"People err when they believe that the eye sees, and the ear hears, and so forth. Every external organ of the senses is, by means of its nerves, in connection with the brain. At the origin of these nerves, a proportionate mass of cerebral matter, the
proper internal organ, completes the function of the senses. Although, therefore, the eyes themselves be ever so sound, and although the optic nerves be perfectly entire, yet if the internal organ be diseased or injured, the eyes and optic nerves are no longer serviceable. Consequently, the external instruments of the senses have also their operating organs in the brain; and these external instruments are only the means by which their internal organs are brought into communication with external objects, or, on the contrary, are excited into activity by them. This is the reason why, without the interposition of external objects, or of the external organs of sense, we can experience in our minds representations of tones, of light, and so forth, as in dreams."

There is no independent faculty of reason, intellect, intelligence. Reason is an abstraction, not a real thing. There are as many possible "reasons" as there are particular minds and particular exercises of mind in the different domains of thought and situations of life. Nor is it from reason that the motive impulse to action comes. Reason only devises the means to it. Animals can reason on the objects which arouse their instincts and on no others.

"Every fundamental disposition accompanied by a clear notion of its existence and by reflection is intellect or intelligence. Each individual intelligence could not constitute reason, which is the complement, the result of the simultaneous action of all the intellectual powers. It is reason that distinguishes man from the brute. There are many intelligent men, but few reasoning ones. Nature produces an intelligent man; a happy organisation cultivated by experience and reflection forms the reasoning man. . . . There are as many different kinds of intellect as there are distinct qualities. . . . One individual may have considerable intellect relative to one fundamental power, but a very narrow one in reference to every other. Man, by reason of his more complex organisation, is much more capable than the brute of acquiring a clear knowledge of his propensities and capacities; and, in consequence of this prerogative, he is endowed with intellect, not exclusively, but in a higher degree than any other animal. . . . From what has been said, we draw the conclusion that a special faculty of intellect or understanding is as entirely inadmissible as a special faculty of instinct."

For these reasons Gall held that the special capacities of the intellect might have circumscribed centres in the brain, but that the intellect, per se, cannot be localised. As MUNK (1830-1912), within recent years, has said: "Intelligence is localised everywhere, and nowhere in particular."

Gall held similarly that each mental quality had its own memory, and that therefore memory could not be localised in the brain. This is in accordance with the most advanced observations of the present day; but many writers erroneously accuse him of having localised it. Each mental power, having a corresponding agent in the mechanism of the brain, is the exclusive agent for the conveyance to the memory of its own impressions. Hence it is that we find that the capacities of memory vary, not only in various persons, but in the same individual. We remember what we are fond of, whether it be art, or poetry, or philosophy. Emotionally we also remember what we hate. This is due to the attention aroused by the emotional interest. But there is also disinterested "retentiveness"; such retentive power is the gift especially of what we call talent, as the reproductive power is the gift especially of genius. Gall showed that memory is not a single, an individual faculty, but the property of each fundamental power, dependent on the physical apparatus with which that power is connected. Accordingly, as this apparatus is physically sound or unsound, each kind of memory is either feeble or active, be the other faculties what they may. He said:

"Perception and memory are only attributes common to the fundamental psychical qualities, but not faculties in themselves; and consequently they can
have no proper centres in the brain. If perception and memory were fundamental forces, there would be no reason why they should be manifested so very differently, accordingly as they are exercised on different objects. There would be no reason why the same, and, in fact, every individual, should not learn geography, music, mechanics, and arithmetic, with equal facility, since their memory would be equally faithful for all these things. But where is the man who, after the greatest possible application, does succeed with equal ease in these different branches of knowledge, and does not evince, however astonishing his capacious memory in certain respects may be, an extremely small endowment in other subjects?

"One man remembers facts, and forgets dates; another recollects faces and not names; some never lose from their minds the places where they have been, yet have no power to recall a tune; therefore, memory is not a simple fundamental faculty."

Gall applied the same reasoning to the supposed faculties of judgment and imagination. They, too, are not fundamental powers, but attributes of all the fundamental qualities.

"A man's judgment may be prompt and correct, relative to certain subjects, while he is almost imbecile in regard to others; a man may manifest the most rich and brilliant imagination, relative to a certain class of subjects, while he is cold and barren upon every other. It is impossible for him to possess judgment and imagination respecting subjects, for which nature has refused the fundamental endowments. For example, whosoever is endowed with a very active sense of tones, perceives concords, readily judges of the correctness, or incorrectness, of the relations of tones. In the same manner, whoever has the artistic sense, has a good judgment of works of art. When, however, the fundamental endowment is weak or absent, the judgment relative to the objects of it must necessarily be weak or absent also.

"Judgment is no fundamental faculty; but every intellectual faculty has its judgment. The most profound thinker will form an imperfect judgment of music, painting, etc., if he is not gifted in that direction, if the brain centres for these capacities are imperfectly developed in him."

"I apply the term 'imagination' to the activity of the primary mental powers independent of the external world; it is the creative power of each fundamental capacity. The imagination of the sense of locality creates landscapes; that of the sense of tones, music; that of the sense of numbers, arithmetical problems; and that of the mechanic, machines. . . . Then there is the imagery of the timid man, of the bold fighting man, and so on."

Some philosophers held that "attention" was the source of all the faculties of man, but, said Gall, attention varies according to the innate disposition. We pay attention to such subjects as we are disposed to study, and no attention to those for which we have no innate disposition. One pays attention to music, the other to mechanics, another to natural history; some to dress, women, money, etc. Attention is not an independent faculty. We are attentive to what pleases us; and what pleases us is what is agreeable to our organisation. Hence intelligence is not the regulator of attention, but the primary powers of our organisation move us to pay attention. Attention depends on the feelings and propensities. The animal crouching for its prey, the child gazing at a commonplace spectacle, the assassin waiting for his victim, the mathematician studying a problem, are attentive, because the prey, the spectacle, the thought of the victim, the problem to be solved, arouse in them an intense and durable emotion. Without emotion there would be no attention; but while emotion lasts, so does attention.

"I cannot conceive," said Gall, "how it ever entered the heads of certain philosophers to maintain that attention is the source of all our faculties and propensities. I admit, for a moment, that attention is exerted in everything done by Vol. 1.]
man or brute; but it must proceed from a fundamental power—it never can be the source of any fundamental power whatever. A partially imbecile person may give the most untiring attention to everything relative to mimicry, to order, and to the sexual functions; but none whatever to the sentiments and thoughts of a different order. The educated and thinking man is very soon fatigued, when fixing his attention on subjects that are out of his sphere, while it is mere sport for him to give unwearied attention to subjects that belong to his province.

"It has long been one of the favourite notions of many philosophers that attention is the source of all the faculties of man; that one may acquire such or such a capacity, according as one directs one's attention to such or such an object in question. Helvetius has gone so far as to say that there is no well-organised man who cannot exercise his attention with all the force and the constancy which would need to be employed in order to elevate him to the rank of the greatest man. Such is the eager zeal of deriving from a single principle all the phenomena of animal life! Condillac made sensation the source of all the faculties. According to him, recollection, memory, comparison, judgment, reflection, imagination, and reasoning, are included in the faculty of perceiving.

"When an animal or a man is excited by the relation which exists between him and his relative object, the man or the animal is found in a state of attention. The hungry fox scents the hare; the falcon, gliding through the air, perceives the lark; they are then attentive. The philosopher is struck with a happy idea: he is then attentive. This will explain why each animal has the habit of fixing his attention on a different determinate object, and why each man fixes his on different objects. The roebuck and the pigeon regard with indifference, without attention, the serpent and the frog, objects of the attention of the hog and the stork. The child fixes his attention on playthings; the woman, on her children and on dress; men, according to their individual dispositions, on women, horses, battles, the phenomena of nature, etc. The difference which travellers manifest in their descriptions of the same country and the same nation, the diversity of the judgments which different men pass on the same objects, arise from the diversity of predispositions. Every instinct, propensity, and talent has therefore its attention. Attention is, therefore, an attribute of a pre-existing innate power, and anything rather than the cause of this power.

"If the special instincts, propensities, and talents are feeble, their relations to their objects are equally so, and neither man nor animal will have a long or a strong attention. It is for this reason that, in infancy, when certain powers are still undeveloped, and again in old age, when the brain organs have lost their energy, that we regard with coldness the same objects, which, at the age of manhood, excited our liveliest interest.

"In other respects, I leave attention and exercise, as well as education, possessed of all their rights. It is not enough for one to be endowed with active faculties; exercise and application are indispensable to acquire facility and skill. To awaken the attention of men of coarse minds, we must either make a strong impression on their senses (propensities), or we must limit ourselves to the ideas and objects with which they are familiar; that is to say, with which they have already points of contact."

All that has been said with reference to attention, memory, judgment, and imagination is also true of the desires, propensities, and passions. They are only different degrees of some fundamental power, whether intellectual or appetitive. We can have no desire, propensity, or passion in regard to objects for which we are not endowed with a primary or fundamental power. With a poor tone-sense, there can be little desire, no propensity, and no passion for music. Gall continued:

"The gradation that takes place in the intellectual capacities is still more sensible in reference to those fundamental powers, that are only sentiments and appetites. While the cerebral organ of the sexual instinct remains undeveloped, as in the child, there is no difference to him between the two sexes. But, according as this centre is developed, the boy and girl begin to fix their attention on whatever relates
to the sexual functions, whether in themselves or others; and, in the same proportion, there arises a sentiment, a propensity, which at last is raised to a passion. The same is true of the love of offspring, of the sentiment of property, etc.

"Desires, propensities, passions, are only different degrees of the activity of some fundamental power. We can have no desire, propensity, or passion, but in regard to objects for which we are endowed with a primitive or fundamental power. "Our desires vary with the organisation, hence desire is not an independent faculty. We can weigh different desires and decide for one or the other, but the strength of any particular desire will depend on the energy of the particular primitive mental power which has awakened the desire."

"In recapitulation, then, we observe, that wherever there exists a fundamental faculty, a particular and definite intellectual power, there also necessarily exists a power of perception relative to this faculty. Whenever this faculty is actively exercised upon its appropriate objects, there is attention. Whenever the ideas, or traces, which the impressions of these objects have left upon the brain, are renewed, either in the presence or absence of these same objects, there is passive memory, reminiscence. If this same renewal of impressions is done by a deliberate, voluntary act of the brain, there is active memory. Whenever a fundamental faculty compasses and judges the relations of analogous and different things, there is judgment. A series of comparisons and judgments constitute reasoning. Whenever a fundamental power creates by its own inherent energy, without the concurrence of the external world, objects relative to its function . . . there is imagination, invention, genius.

"The history of insanity and idiocy proves to us, that when one of the fundamental qualities has been lost or enfeebled, its perception, memory, judgment, imagination, attention, all its attributes, in short, are equally lost or enfeebled.

"The intellect, desires, attention, judgment, etc., do not act capriciously, but always in accordance with the organisation of the innate fundamental qualities."

The "will" is not a fundamental power of the mind, but is a general attribute of it, according to Gall.

"According to the metaphysicians, it is because a man wills, that he defends himself or his property, that he builds, that he sings; and it is from instinct that the animal kills, defends its property, constructs, or sings, etc. There is no abstract will existing; we each will differently, and the same person wills differently at different times; and even with regard to the same object, he does not always will alike."

We have seen that philosophers considered the desire of pleasure and the avoidance of pain to be the only motives of human actions. Gall's study of animal behaviour led him to see that this theory of motives was false. Many an animal mother strives with all the energy of her being against overwhelming odds and, unflinching, meets death in its most cruel form, rather than desert her young to seek an easy safety in flight. Fear is not a pleasurable emotion; we cannot avoid it, if we are strongly organised towards it. There is no pleasure in anger or jealousy either. Besides, even the passions ranked as pleasurable are seldom wholly pure or unmingled with pain, and it is most rare that we find the painful passions wholly unmitigated by those which are pleasurable.

In Gall's opinion, desire and aversion are felt in accordance with the energy of the innate dispositions. One man feels the most vivid pleasure in generously pardoning offences, another rejoices when he succeeds in satisfying his vengeance; some men place their happiness in the possession of riches; others in a philosophy which elevates them above human vanities.

The continued obstruction of instinctive striving is always accompanied by a painful feeling; its successful progress towards its end by a pleasurable sense of satisfaction. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the
complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means
towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their sati-
sfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the
means. Conduct does not proceed primarily from a calculation of satisfactions to
be yielded by this or that course; but every creature, whether animal, child, or
man, behaves in this or that way, because the impulses with which he is intimately
endowed are set towards this or that end.

Sir FREDERICK MOTT (1853-). "Physiology of the Emotions," British Medical
Journal, 1908, agrees with Gall that "neither pain nor pleasure can be said to
constitute an emotion."

We are all a mixture of dispositions, and one or more passions usually pre-
ponderate over the rest—for example, fear, anger, or ambition—rendering us con-
stitutionally timorous, irascible, or aspiring. Education can teach us to control our
disposition, but cannot eradicate it.

Gall also showed that the differences of constitution, i.e., of "temperament," are
insufficient to account for the great diversities of intellectual ability and emotional
disposition, as well as conduct. Cabanis, Richerand, Pinel had sought for the moral
and intellectual character of man in the temperament, by following the doctrines
of the ancients. Gall said:

"Whenever I read expositions of the temperaments, I imagine myself surrounded
by fortune-tellers, such as Porta, Penchel, Pernetti, Huarte, and de la Chambre, who,
if they know whether a person has black, fair, red, stiff, straight or curly hair, hazel
or blue eyes, straight or arched eyebrows, the base of the nose wide or narrow,
small or open nostrils, thick or thin lips, round or pointed chin, can draw his horo-
scope, and determine his qualities, vices, and talents."

This passage shows that Gall was against character-reading by physiognomy, yet
many critics held him liable for the extravagances of his followers in that direction.

There are a number of innate mental powers, or rather dispositions to such powers,
in every individual of the human race and animal species. They are possessed in
very different degrees of endowment in different individuals, and can be improved
but not eradicated. We do not all possess the different intellectual capacities in the
same degree; nor are we alike in our emotional dispositions. Some mental power or
combination of powers generally predominates, and it is this difference of develop-
ment which constitutes the endless varieties in the characters of men.

Our elementary capacities and dispositions, according to Gall, are innate; but
if innate, what becomes of our Free-Will? This is a very important problem, on
which even to-day men are not agreed. Gall has dealt with it ably and fully:

"If the fundamental elements of our capacities and dispositions be innate, it is
urged, then we are the instruments rather than the masters of our actions, we are
slaves to our internal impulses. What then becomes of our moral liberty, and how
can good and evil be ascribed to us? Condescend to hear my explanation.

"You say that it is the brain en masse—as a whole—which is the organ of the
different mental powers, and I explain that I substitute a compound organ for a
simple one. One is as material as the other. You admit an instrument, so to say,
with a single string, to produce the music of mind in all its varieties and at all ages
—infancy, adult years, and old age; and I show you that the instrument has a
number of strings to produce the different tones.

"Has any one drawn the conclusion that the soul is material or mortal, from the
differential differences of the senses? Is the mind which sees, different from the mind
which hears? We do not see with the eye, nor hear with the ear, but with the
material brain-centres for sight and hearing; and the same mind, which sees through
the centre of sight and smells through the olfactory centre, remembers words,
figures, or tunes, by other distinctive brain-centres, and experiences the emotions of fear, anger, etc., through still other definite parts of brain-matter.

"The spiritualist admits that the mind moves the arm by means of the nerves, and sight is owing to the action of light on the eyes and optic nerve; why should not the soul require for its various attributes structurally distinct parts of the brain? The brain centres determine the disposition or tendency but not the actions themselves. The only difference is this, that he who has well-developed centres will have a stronger inclination to exercise the activity united with it, and more difficulty in abstaining from that exercise, than he who has whose organ is feeble. It has long been acknowledged that men are born with different inclinations, some of which manifest themselves very early in life, so that in children of the same parents, and educated together and alike, very different dispositions and inclinations may be observed. What the theologians used to call the temptations of the devil are just those violent inclinations and desires opposing our better knowledge and will. Finding a brain-centre for these inclinations does not alter anything. Only knowing that they are bound to a physical structure, we learn that exercise stimulates a structure to growth, and neglect diminishes its power; and this law we can apply to morals, especially in the training of children.

"It is true that man cannot change his organisation, nor the results which follow directly from it. Moreover, he has no control over accidental impressions produced by external causes. As it is impossible for him not to feel hunger when his stomach acts in a certain manner, so it is impossible for him not to feel the desires of the flesh, or any other propensity, whether for good or evil, when the centres or organs of these propensities are stimulated. But we must not confound propensities and desires with Will. Desire, propensity, passion, are different degrees of the activity of each fundamental power. There is reason to deny freedom with regard to the existence of desires; but it is a false inference to conclude that will and actions are equally devoid of freedom. Desires, propensities, passions, are the result of the activity of certain centres; Will, on the contrary, is a decision, a determination, produced by the examination and comparison of several motives. Oftentimes man is incapable of controlling the violent action of some one of his organs; in which case, the desire, propensity, or passion that results is involuntary; and thus arise temptations, which are the first conditions of vice and virtue; While we only desire, we deserve neither reward nor punishment. Most often, the brutes have only desire without will, and the same is the case with man in a state of idiocy or insanity or when the organs are unusually active. It is only when the will is exercised that our actions become morally free, and subject to merit or blame.

"It is not the impulse that results from the activity of a single organ, or as some term it, the feeling of a desire, that constitutes the will. That man might not be limited merely to desire, but might exercise will also, the concurrent action of many of the higher intellectual faculties is required; motives must be weighed, compared, and judged. The decision resulting from this operation is called the Will. There are as many kinds of desire, propensities, and passions as there are fundamental powers. The will is the result of the simultaneous action of the higher intellectual capacities, and supposes attention, reflection, comparison, and judgment. The will is often in opposition to the desires, propensities and passions.

"With only one propensity, there would be only one motive and no choice of action. If an animal has a variety of brain organs, it will act according to the one which has the greatest energy and thus supplies it with the most powerful motive. The more complex the organisation the greater the choice, the greater the freedom. Man, in addition, has reason and moral sentiments, which act as a check to the propensities; hence he may will quite contrary to his desires and inclinations. All the facts quoted by metaphysicians in favour of a free will are only met with in the conditions where the intellect predominates over the instincts and sentiments.

"It is evident that there must be as many motives to our action as there are primitive qualities and faculties. Here too the comparison of man with the lower animals will be of great utility. The actions of the lower animals are simple, while those of man are almost always more or less complicated, and the individual himself is very often unable to render a reason for them. Their motives are doubtful, and never entirely free from capricious subterfuges. The most powerful springs of the
actions of brutes are the instincts of propagation, of love of offspring, of social attachment, of self-defence, of the sentiment of property, etc. Their actions are very often determined by envy, jealousy, hatred, anger, etc. Man being endowed and governed by the same desires, the same propensities, and the same affections, his actions must be determined by the same motives. Our social, civil, and religious institutions are due, in a great measure, to the instincts of propagation, of love of offspring, of self-defence, of the sentiment of property, of vanity, ambition, the desire of independence and domination.

"The existence of an internal sense of individual freedom is commonly alleged in opposition to those who reject an absolute free-will. It is said that every one has a consciousness, that when no physical or moral constraint forces us to act, we act freely—that is, that we might have acted in a different manner. But it is a fact, that even when acting under the influence of desires more or less imperious, without choice or will, man experiences a sentiment of satisfaction associated with the accomplishment of his desires, and which is more or less vivid in proportion to their intensity. It is this satisfaction which misleads the individual, and induces the belief that in this case he acts with freedom. Thus, he thinks he acts with freedom when he walks erect, although his organisation obliges him to do so; the man agitated by jealousy, or the desire of revenge, and he whom the fire of love is consuming, consider themselves free, so long as they feel satisfaction from the accomplishment of their desires. When the storm is calmed, they change their tone and acknowledge that they were carried away by the impulse of passion. We are often entirely strangers to every idea of a sensual appetite; but scarcely has an object excited our organs than without the least desire to gratify our sensual feelings we experience the desire of possessing what we should have disdained an instant before, and we believe that we have determined with freedom.

"Animals do not enjoy perfect liberty; yet they act without feeling any restraint. Like men, they experience the pleasure which follows the accomplishment of their desires. In certain circumstances, even our judgments are accompanied by a pleasurable sensation, without being, in consequence, the result of our reflection. Hence it is that we judge differently of the same object, according as circumstances alter our internal feelings. On the other hand, animals themselves are not altogether subject to their dispositions and propensities. Strong as may be the instinct of the dog to hunt, repeated punishments will, nevertheless, prevent the action of his instinct.

"But man possesses, besides the animal qualities, the faculty of speech, and unlimited educability—two inexhaustible sources of knowledge and action. He distinguishes truth from error, right from wrong; he has the consciousness of free-will; the past and future are able to influence his actions, etc. Thus armed, man may combat the inclinations that lead him into temptation; his inclinations can be subdued and kept under by opposite or stronger motives. Responsibility ceases, even according to the doctrine of the most rigid theologians, if man is either not tempted at all, or if he is absolutely incapable of resistance when violently excited. There is no merit in the continence of those who are born eunuchs.

"It is this struggle against our propensities which gives rise to virtue, vice, and moral responsibility. What would that self-denial, so much recommended, amount to, if it did not suppose a combat with our internal inclinations? The more we multiply and fortify the counteracting motives, the more we gain in free agency and moral liberty. The stronger the propensities are, the more do controlling principles become necessary. From this fact arises the necessity and utility of education, law, reward and punishment, and religious influences. On it also is founded the utility of the knowledge of mankind, and of the present doctrine concerning the origin and difference of the human faculties and dispositions.

"If man could act without a motive, and solely from caprice, there would be no certainty, nor even probability, that, under given circumstances, he would act in such and such a manner. Why should we expect of our friends fidelity rather than perfidy, virtue rather than vice? Man must have determining motives. If man had an absolutely independent will, he would act according to the caprice of the moment, and we could never rely on him.

"Cæteris paribus, the desires and passions will prevail in a rough uncultivated
man; the Will will triumph in a refined and educated man. The brute, the violently excited man, the idiot, the maniac, have ardent desires and passions, but hardly any will. The actions of those who are solely guided by the desires and passions are easy to foresee and calculate, however little we may know of their organisation. The decisions of the will, however, cannot be foreseen with such certainty, but require a profound examination of the nature of all the motives, which are furnished in part by the organisation, and in part by the external world.

"That we are not entirely masters of our feelings nobody doubts. But let us suppose several human faculties to act together, and let us suppose that they have been enlightened and improved by education, by social converse, by knowledge of the laws, and by the dictates of the sentiments of religion, and the knowledge of right and wrong; and that the powers of judgment and control resulting from all those combined causes are directed against any powerful impulse acting singly—then a contest will arise between it and the controlling influences; the possibility of choice will be enjoyed; and at last, and often in spite of strong and counteracting desire, a resolution will be formed, which is the free act of the soul itself. It follows that if you would always have actions to be the result of deliberate reason, you must cultivate the innate qualities and faculties; and you must multiply, ennoble, and enforce the outward motives. It follows, too, that the virtues and crimes of man may as justly be imputed to those who are charged with education and government, as to the individuals themselves.

"I have shown that an unlimited and absolute liberty is opposed to the nature of a created being, but that man, by virtue of those faculties, the number and dignity of which elevate him above brutes, has the power of fixing his attention on the highest motives of his nature, whether springing from internal or external causes, and will be thus determined either by existing motives or by new motives which a well-organised man can continually call to his aid; that, whenever a sane and well-organised man has willed a thing, he might have willed the contrary, not without a motive, which would be absurd, but by seeking for and adopting other motives than those which have determined him; that this power constitutes true moral liberty, and that on this notion of liberty is based education, morals, legislation, rewards and punishment."

The contemporaries of Gall were under the influence of JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU (1712-1778) and PESTALOZZI (1746-1827) and their followers, who under-estimated the hereditary disposition, on which Gall laid so much stress, and thought education could make anything of man.

Gall showed that education was not the source of our mental powers. If man's mental stock-in-trade were entirely acquired and not instinctive, we ought to be able to train any child into any speciality, make Mozarts, Michael Angelos, and Newtons of them. We are not born with equal mental faculties, nor are the differences observable due only to education and external circumstances. The mind is no mere tabula rasa or magic mirror whose function it is passively to receive impressions from the outer world or to throw imperfect reflection of its objects; the desires, the sentiments, are not generated by the experiences of the individual; there are "innate" aptitudes or fundamental peculiarities of mind, to which, at least as strongly as to education or accident, we must attribute each special bias. Not only bodily peculiarities, but even moral dispositions and tendencies in many instances, descend from parent to children. Not only do children partake of the character, habits, and tendencies of their parents, but we are surprised when they do not.

Gall was a close observer of human character and a serious student of that part of psychology which can be applied to the practical affairs of life. He held that great men were what they were, not by dint of will-power or education, or even to any great extent owing to the influence of their surroundings, but by inherent ability, and that the fact held good whether in the physical field, where it is generally admitted, or in the moral. He tried to get at the secret of greatness, which many
people try to attribute to schoolmasters, and found that it resided invariably, so to speak, within the four corners of one's personality, implanted there by nature in the mysterious distribution of her gifts. The man who has the qualities of a poet or an artist will never make a good horse-dealer or an expert mechanic.

**Education will not create talents.** No amount of taking pains can atone for the lack of aptitude. Education creates nothing; it can only with care and diligence bring out that of which the germs already exist. It can only improve the natural faculty; it can never supply it. There are "innate" aptitudes or fundamental peculiarities of mind, whether generic or individual, to which at least as strongly as to education or accident we must attribute the precocity of genius. Each man becomes what he is quite as much by the individual peculiarities of his mind as by the culture to which he may be submitted. Some men have by nature certain of their faculties in greater degree of energy than others, and would take more naturally to certain pursuits than others. **During life these rudimentary tendencies are modified and developed by experience and environment.** Not only the various abilities, but also the moral qualities necessary for intellectual supremacy, such as ambition and perseverance, are natural endowments depending upon certain formations of our brain, and can be developed: the fighting instinct in the prize-fighter, the hoarding instinct in the financier, the sense of colour in the painter, the sense of tune in the musician, of construction in the inventor, of imagination in the poet, of deduction and induction in the philosopher, etc.

Philosophers, as we have seen, laid great stress on the unity of mind, which, being a purely spiritual entity, was thought to be independent of bodily influences, and in consequence the various mental powers were attributed to accidental circumstances, the necessities of life, the activity of the five senses, and other sources except the true one—the hereditary disposition. Gall taught that the primitive mental powers are not the accidental product of the fancy of the mind, of sensorial impressions, of education, or other external circumstances; but that the disposition to them is innate and determined by Nature herself.

The mind of the human infant is not at birth a mere blank sheet of white paper on which anything, either good or bad, may be inscribed. Each individual is born with a physical and mental constitution which he has inherited from his parents, together with certain feelings and tendencies, certain habits and modes of thought; at first, no doubt, slumbering in embryo, but still none the less certain to show themselves when the opportunity occurs. Gall said:

"If human superiority resulted merely from the environment and the gift of language, it should be possible, by careful training, to raise the mind of an animal much nearer to the human level than it can actually be brought."

**The inequalities of the intellectual and moral development of children placed under similar conditions and influences are much greater than any that could be attributed to favouring or retarding influences.** For we see sometimes a child growing up under the most unfavourable conditions of every kind, and yet rapidly and easily attaining a high level of development; and we see others under the most favourable conditions remaining stupid and of low moral level, or exhibiting special intellectual defects or moral deformities. Again, among those children who develop exceptionally high powers, we commonly find that the development of these powers cannot be accounted for by the influence of their environment. And in many cases it is obvious that their special excellences are innate or have an innate basis; for the same peculiarities can be traced in their ancestry through several generations; they are, therefore, hereditary, and whatever is inherited is innate. The most striking instances are those in which the hereditary peculiarity takes the form of excellence or defect, in highly special forms of mental activity, such as musical or mathematical talent; but similar evidence of highly special innate powers and tendencies
is afforded by the appearance of numberless family traits, idiosyncrasies of thought and feeling, and special mental excellences and defects of many kinds.

"Every part of our nature has its use as well as its abuse. Our propensities and passions not being evil in themselves, but evil only in their excess and misdirection—it is wonderful what effects may be produced by the judicious guidance of their energy towards worthy objects.

"The elementary qualities of the mind are innate, but they have to be drawn out and cultivated. The differences, intellectual and moral, in children are due to material causes, that is, due to differences in brain structure; therefore, there is no human equality, either at birth or in adults; and education must be adapted to the individuality of the child.

"The development of the mind of the child, far from being a mere moulding of it by the impressions made upon it by its environment, is itself a process of evolution in the proper sense of the word, an unfolding of latent potentialities. In other words, though education may do much, heredity is all-important, and education can but refine, perfect, or restrain the native tendencies of the mind.

"There is no fault of character that may not be destroyed, or at least rendered harmless, if right treatment be applied to it in time. Even the most powerful and deep-seated passions may be overcome or indeed rooted out; and that which naturally tended to evil may be made productive only of good.

"The means by which any faculty can be trained and cultivated is exercise. Each faculty has its appropriate exercise. But all exercise is not training. Some seek to cultivate and train certain of the faculties, not by exercising them, but by means of certain others. Thus people fancy that they can make children moral by storing their minds with moral precepts, and lecturing them on the results of this or that course of conduct, without any regard to the practice of what is enjoined. But it is only by the practice of morality, by the exercise of the moral faculties, that men are made moral.

"The greater the strength and activity of any faculty, the greater the pleasure attending its exercise."

The primary mental powers do not develop simultaneously. Some develop early in life and speedily reach maturity, while others are late in coming into activity, and may continue to improve down to old age. The order of development is quite distinct from that of importance, for in general the most important mental powers are the last in making their appearance.

Education cannot create new faculties, but it can arouse faculties that are slumbering uselessly, and whose existence was perhaps unknown and unsuspected; and it can impart right training to, and render useful, those qualities that otherwise might be worse than useless—evil and mischievous. All men are not equally capable of education, nor will it be productive of the same results in everyone; for the original dispositions are not the same. The senses may be so strong as to dwarf the intellect; the memory so powerful as to interfere with reason and judgment; active imagination may take the place of observation, and give all the appearance of reality to the most airy creations of the brain; the reasoning faculty may be so vigorous as seriously to interfere with the activity of the other powers.

Further, none of the mental powers is self-governing: each is dependent upon others, and the efficiency of the highest rests in great measure on those of lesser quality. The mind is dependent upon the body, the intellect upon the senses, the reason upon memory and imagination, and so on.

The human mind has certain innate or inherited tendencies which are the essential springs or motive powers of all thought and action, and are the bases from which the character and will of individuals are gradually developed under the guidance of the intellectual faculties. These primary innate tendencies have different relative strengths in the native constitution of the individuals and are favoured or checked by the social environment. These tendencies, in stronger or weaker degree, are present in the whole of humanity, and we find all of them, or at
least the germs of them, in animals. Education perfects, deteriorates, represses, and directs the innate faculties, but can neither destroy nor produce any. As Gall explains:

"The antagonists of innate dispositions persist in saying that man, being from his birth surrounded by men, appropriates to himself their faculties and their character. Might I not ask whence the first men, who were surrounded only by beasts, obtained their faculties, and how they created or invented them? If children had not the same dispositions as their parents and instructors, how could they be capable of receiving their instruction and profiting by their example. In the first years, when children are almost solely in the hands of their mothers and nurses, boys always distinguish themselves from girls, and one child is perfectly distinct from another. Do we know any art by which an instructor can create in children envy, love, attachment, anger, goodness, or wickedness, ambition, pride, etc.? Do we know how to create any talent? Education cannot take place except by imitation, and the imitator must have the faculty of receiving what is communicated to him and of transforming it into his own nature.

"The influence of education, instruction, example, and of surrounding circumstances acts principally when the innate dispositions are neither too feeble nor too energetic."

"In the midst of the general resemblance of men, each individual is distinguished from another by a peculiar character, just as he differs by the external form of his body. Such a quality is given to one and denied to another. Each has a predilection, or a more decided talent, for a particular pursuit. There is, then, in every man, something which he does not derive from education, and which even resists all education. The individuality of character peculiar to each individual shows itself in a thousand modes at all periods of life, without education having any effect upon it. From his infancy, man shows the character which will distinguish him in adult age.

"How can we attribute to education those most decided dispositions which are sometimes observed even in children and which, consequently, are anterior to all instruction. Most great men have manifested their future greatness in their early years. Experience proves the small power of education, when we have to deal with energetic dispositions. Men, endowed with striking characters and superior intellect, push on and raise themselves, notwithstanding the greatest obstacles. The greatest men, it is true, bear the impress of their age, and cannot entirely defend themselves from the impression of the objects which surround them; still, we constantly see that he who possesses a dominant energetic quality or talent pursues his route, and seizes with force the object which nature has pointed out to him. Thomas, in his oration on Descartes, did well not to dwell much upon his education. 'For,' said he, 'when the question relates to extraordinary men, we have to consider education much less than nature. There is an education for ordinary men; the man of genius has the education which he gives himself, and which consists principally in destroying and effacing that which he has received.' The same holds good of character. Good education does not make a great character, nor does a bad one destroy it. Almost all great men have either been educated by inferior masters, or have received no education whatever.

"But geniuses, say the antagonists of innate propensities, make an exception, and form a separate class; we cannot conclude from them that the qualities and faculties are innate. I answer that genius is only the energetic activity of some quality or some faculty which is inherent in the organisation. If, by a concurrence of circumstances, a man endowed with certain very active faculties has been prevented from following his inclination, this dominant faculty or propensity determines the choice of his hobbies and amusement.

"If precocious geniuses are the result of education and the circumstances of their surroundings, why do they not raise themselves above their companions in their other faculties? Helvetius, himself, is forced to confess that education would never have changed Newton into a poet, or Milton into an astronomer.

"To sum up:
"1. The impressions received through our senses from external sources are not the origin of our aptitudes, talents, sentiments, instincts and propensities."

"2. The propensities and instincts, the aptitudes and talents, the intellectual abilities and moral qualities of men and animals are innate.

"3. Education perfects, or represses, or directs the innate powers, but can neither destroy nor produce them."

Before Gall, the prevailing notion seems to have been that men are not naturally adapted by mental constitution to one pursuit more than to another; but that when any such peculiar aptitude is evinced, it is due to the direction given to the mind by casual events or surrounding circumstances. Gall has greatly assisted in dissipating such erroneous views of human nature, and by the instances which he has industriously brought together, of extraordinary aptitude for music, mechanical invention, calculation, languages, and other activities, as well as of peculiar proneness to certain emotions and sentiments, he has widely spread the conviction that there is an infinite variety in the degree and combination of constitutional qualities by which men are adapted to as great a variety of functions and fortunes. Some philosophers say we might all be great poets, or inventors, or philanthropists, if we chose; but, asked Gall, why do some choose and others do not? Even ambition and perseverance, mental powers that enter largely into many kinds of intellectual supremacy, though not into all, are shown by Gall—as we have already quoted—to be natural endowments depending upon certain developments of our brain. If a boy has natural aptitude for learning, he will acquire it, no matter in what circumstances he may be placed. What is of value to a youth is the mental organisation which enables him to do well in the world; but he does not acquire that at school; it is his from the hour of his birth. The schools cannot fashion a great poet, a great painter, or a great musician out of a lad who had no native capacity for literature or art.

In connection with this problem, it may be of interest to hear what Gall has to say on the origin of the arts and sciences:

"The origin of the arts and sciences is almost universally attributed to chance, necessity, or reflection. Even the earliest and most indispensable of human occupations are supposed to be derived from the same source. Hunting and fishing, it is said, were invented, because the spontaneous fruits of the earth were insufficient for the nourishment of families; and when families became so numerous, as to form tribes and nations, they have been obliged to resort to agriculture; the women and children not finding sufficient food, man is obliged to attach himself to one woman only, and to share with her in the domestic cares. Here is the origin of marriage and of society, which go on increasing in numbers, and giving rise to all the wants. The inclemency of the weather is to be guarded against, and thence spring the arts of making clothes, and building houses and palaces. Thence also arise the factitious wants, all the desires and passions, which are the result of inequalities of condition, vanity, love of distinction, and glory, ambition, avarice, war, luxury, with the excesses it cherishes, laws, police, religion, the thirst for strong emotions, music, eloquence, poetry, and shows.

"If outward accidental causes are the source of all these inventions, why have they not produced the same effects in the lower animals? Why does not the dog build a house to protect him from the inclemencies of the weather? Why do the partridge and raven perish of cold, rather than migrate like the swallow? Why is it that each animal satisfies its wants in a manner peculiar to itself? that each man has different wants, though outward circumstances are very nearly the same in all? Because the true source of the arts and sciences is our innate instincts, propensities, and faculties—our inward wants. Without a brain centre for music, there would be no musicians. The dispositions are innate. Chance may furnish a faculty, the occasion of displaying activity; but when the faculty does not exist, it accomplishes nothing. Pythagoras, passing by a blacksmith's shop, was struck with the
gradations of the different sounds of hammers. He examined them carefully, and
made one of the most brilliant discoveries in acoustics, and one which has most
contributed to the perfection of music. To Newton, the fall of an apple from the
tree was the occasion of discovering the laws of gravitation. How often has the
sound of hammers been heard, and apples been seen falling to the ground, without
giving rise to the slightest presentiment that these phenomena take place by virtue
of certain laws of nature? Often, the first instinctive efforts of genius are master-
pieces. It is not until after he has constructed machines, and built houses, for ages
together, spoken language, whether of words or signs, cultivated painting, sculp-
ture, music, poetry, eloquence, that man thinks of seeking for the rules of these
arts, and of formulating their laws. During the same time, too, he has reasoned
correctly, without inquiring for the rules of logic; he has compared and judged,
without suspecting that the flow of his ideas was confined to any necessary catena-
tion. He was a logician long before he had learned any logic; and in the same
way he decided what was just, and what unjust, long before having any acquaint-
ance with jurisprudence.

"The progressive improvement of inventions and discoveries is not to be
attributed to any particular power, but is the result of application and experience;
the first invention is the work of genius. Neither let it be objected that, upon my
principles, any man, supposing him to have lived under favourable circumstances,
might have invented all the arts and sciences. A man of moderate powers—and of
such is the majority of mankind—tempts nothing and creates nothing of himself.
His faculties only are competent to appropriate what is already invented. It is
only remarkably developed brain organs, whose activity is exercised on things
without, that leave their impressions on the external world—that, in a word, create.
"Banish music, poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, all the arts and
sciences, and let your Homers, Raphaelis, Michael Angelos, Glucks, and Canovas be
forgotten; yet let men of genius of every description spring up, and poetry, music,
painting, architecture, sculpture, and all the arts and crafts will again shine out in
all their glory. Twice within the records of history has the human race traversed
the great circle of its entire destiny, and twice has the ruggedness of barbarism been
followed by a higher degree of refinement. It is a great mistake to suppose one
people to have proceeded from another, on account of their conformity of manners,
customs, and arts. The swallow of Paris builds its nest like the swallow of Vienna.
But does it thence follow that the former sprang from the latter? With the same
causes, we have the same effects; with the same organisation, we have the mani-
festation of the same powers.

"The arts and sciences were not invented because of the necessities arising for
them, but because of our innate dispositions: just as a spider constructs its web,
the bird builds its nest, the bee its cell, the wolf hunts, and the nightingale sings.
The cause of these inventions, therefore, lies in the (brain-)organs; or, in other
words, animals have received from nature, by means of (brain-)organs, certain
definite powers, propensities, talents, and faculties, which produce their habits; that
have so often the appearance of spontaneous and deliberate actions. It is precisely
the same with man. The same organ, which in the nightingale produces singing,
in the beaver the faculty to build, in the hamster the propensity to lay up pro-
visions, produces correspondingly in man music, architecture, love of property, etc."

Gall proceeded to discuss the problem—How far is the Human Species perfectible?
This is what he said:

"The hope of a constantly increasing improvement of our species is a pleasing
and animating sentiment. But alas! the laws of organisation and the records of
history destroy the illusions of metaphysicians. It is idle to object to me the
distance between brutal ignorance and refined learning—between the savage and
the civilised man. Cast a careful look at the various conditions of the human
family, even in the civilised, and you will see depicted with equal fidelity both its
littleness and its grandeur.

"Surrounded as we are by refined and cultivated men, we readily attribute to
mankind in general that progress and perfection for which we are indebted to a few
individuals. As long as we have had any knowledge of our race, the generality of men have been the slaves of ignorance, error, prejudice, and superstition. Slavery, brutality, and sensual gratifications of the grossest description have ever been the main features of its history. Even the hunters, fishermen, and tillers of the earth, have hardly possessed the knowledge necessary to their employments. Everything is done mechanically; to deviate from the old routine, to alter, and improve is to them absurd, ridiculous, and criminal. Mechanics, too, are scarcely any better, the majority resemble automatons more than intelligent beings. Labourers, and, in short, all who are obliged to spend the most of their time in obtaining the necessaries of life, either do not think at all, or have but few ideas relative to the satisfaction of their wants. Though encompassed by the wonders of nature, they scarcely ever arouse their minds from indifference and supineness.

Again, as regards the higher classes, their fortune and influence dispense with the necessity of reflection, and form the propensity to idleness, so natural to the majority of mankind. Hence it is that pomp and ignorance are as inseparable as dissipation and misery; hence the sad truth, that the class, which from their imaginary elevation, looks down on the people with disdain, is moreover, in point of intelligence, on the same level with them. There is the same indifference, the same prejudice, and the same aversion towards new truths; the same tenacious adherence to old errors, the same credulity and the same superstition. The fatidical flight of birds, the fatidical oaks of Dodona, the sorceress of Thessaly, the magic of Egypt, the oracles of Delphos, are replaced by fortune-tellers, prophets, interpreters of dreams, presentiments and inspirations, hobgoblins, ghosts, and unlucky days and numbers. We still live with Romans and Spartans, who seek to know the future, in the motions of the bills of birds, and in the entrails of beasts; we have yet our Mithridates and Alexander, who employ conjurers to interpret their dreams.

Penetration and prudence, and great military and political talents, and the height of civilisation, are as incompetent now, as they ever were, to guard ignorance from the most puerile, absurd, and superstitious practices. Can those even, who are led by the energy of their faculties to reflection and the search for truth, fortify their minds against error? Can they save themselves from the wildest extravagances? The fatalism of Zeno, and the absolute and indefinite liberty of Ancillon; the Iroquois notion of the immortality of brutes, and that of Descartes of their automatic nature; the doctrine of Parmenides, that God includes all ideas, and that of Malebranche who saw all things in God; the belief of Empedocles in the transmigration of souls; the numbers of Pythagoras, which the Supreme Intelligence used for direction in the creation of the world; the tabula rasa of Helvetius; the doctrine of Lucretius, which attributes the creation of the universe to the concourse of atoms; Berkeley’s disbelief in the existence of matter; the molecules of Buffon; the monads of Leibniz; the atoms and the voids of Leucippus and Democritus; the approval of suicide and contempt of all property of Antisthenes and Diogenes; the voluntary sufferings and abstinence of Epictetus; the merry philosophy of Aristippus and Epicurus, etc., are but specimens of the efforts of philosophers, most of whom were the admiration of their age.

We need not speak of the interminable, and often bloody, controversies of theology, the eternal vacillation of the forms of government, of the present infancy of criminal legislation, of the fluctuation of the principles of civil law, supported as they always are by force and violence; let us look where we might have some grounds to expect indefinite perfection. Compare with modern works of art the temple of Dendera in Egypt, the Pantheon in Rome, the temple of Nîmes in France, the vast temple at Heliopolis in Syria, now Baalbeck, the immense colosseum at Rome, the arenas in the city of Nîmes, the theatre of Marcellus at Rome, Trajan’s column, the Antonine column, the vast temple of Pëstum, the temples of Pula in Istria, the ruins of Thebes, of Sienna, of Persepolis, and, most astonishing of all, those of Palmyra, the baths of Titus and Caracalla, and the excavations of Herculanœum and Pompeï. Compare the poets, painters, and orators of our days with Homer, Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Tasso, Cicero, Michael Angelo, and Raphael, and then maintain, if we can, that the productions of the mind are always progressive in improvement.

All that man can immediately attain by the force of his powers; all that is
the result of great genius, he has and will attain, whenever favoured by nature with
a large development of his organs. But, where the progress of the arts and sciences
requires a particular concourse of fortunate circumstances and combinations, it is
impossible to fix a limit to our knowledge. The positive arts and sciences, geometry,
astronomy, experimental physics, navigation, chemistry, anatomy, surgery, medi-
cine, agriculture, natural history, bear no resemblance to their former condition.
Still, since our capacities are always limited, we necessarily lose as many old ideas
as we obtain new ones, and when the mass of society shall be enriched by innumera-
ble discoveries, individuals will no longer be astonished. Every one is obliged to
confine himself to a particular sphere, to make ever so little of his privileges, and
scarcely has he begun to flutter on the height of his domain, when he is precipitated
into the abyss of nothing. We see nations remaining for thousands of years sta-
tionary in mediocrity, and none have gradually risen for any length of time towards
moral and intellectual perfection. Athens and Rome have sunk into barbarism,
and the flux and reflux of the ocean everywhere represent the history of human
affairs.

"Philosophers have always drawn an argument in favour of the indefinite
perfectibility of our species from the uniformity of the actions of brutes. But the
sum of man’s dispositions, and consequently their principal actions, are everywhere
alike. People the most remote in time and place are united together in their
interests and institutions. We deceive ourselves when we consider the maxims of
the present day as the results of modern reflection and experience. The morality
of Pythagoras, of Socrates, and of Christ are all equally founded on the sentiment
of benevolence and the good of society.

"Finally, when I see the greater number of people despising the arts and
sciences, and with all the arrogance of ostentation and power, consuming all their
powers in commercial pursuits, or sensual enjoyments; when I see the proneness of
men to sloth and the commonest ideas, and their invincible aversion from every
mental effort and innovation; when in travelling among people styling themselves
the most cultivated in the world, I find at every step entire provinces still plunged
in barbarism, and see that the same men not only bear with indifference the vilest
condition, but shrink from whatever would point them to a lot worthy of humanity;
when history teaches us that sometimes nations, which have risen to the summit of
distinction, relax their efforts, and that after a few ages of light and knowledge,
either in consequence of their own sloth, or the jealousy of their neighbours, again
find themselves in the depths of ignorance and barbarism—who, after such reflec-
tions, can help maintaining that the moral perfectibility of the human species is
confined within the limits of his organisation?"

Some writers have attributed the origin of the mental dispositions of man to
chance circumstances. To this Gall replied:

"It is, they say, by insignificant impressions that sometimes one mental power
is determined and sometimes another. Demosthenes became eloquent because he
was attracted by the eloquence of Callisthenes. Shakespeare made tragedies in
consequence of being an actor; Corneille became a great poet, because, falling in
love, he wrote verses; and Newton saw an apple fall; what more was wanting to
enable him to divine the laws of gravitation? All that can be concluded from these
facts, that our propensities and talents do not always put themselves in activity;
and that it is often necessary that the impulse be given them by an external im-
pression, or that the material object, on which they are to exercise themselves, be
offered them. The cock will not fight unless he finds a rival; the beaver does not
build if he has no branches of trees; without obstacle there can be no firmness;
without an enemy, no generous pardon. In all ages great events have given rise
to great men; not that the circumstances produce their intellectual capacities, but
because they furnish an ample field for the free exercise of their faculties. Taking
children to art galleries does not make them into artists, unless there is an innate
disposition for the talents which make an artist."

Necessity does not create a disposition, said Gall. Lamarck supposed that the
sense of necessity exists before the internal organs, and that the exercise of the external organs preceded the existence of these organs. The cunning and, in general, the inventions and ingenious actions of animals, arose from a strong sense of want. But, said Gall, the rabbit, which we keep in our stable, though not contented by the cold, still digs its burrows. And why does not the hare, pursued by the hounds, feel the urgent necessity of seeking an asylum under ground? The cuckoo has need of a nest, yet it does not build one; some birds die of hunger and cold in rigorous winters, but they do not migrate as others do.

"Some naturalists would have the necessities of man and of animals regarded as the principal source of their instincts, propensities, faculties. True, discomforts cause animals and men to exercise their faculties in order to rid themselves of them; but it does not follow that these necessities give rise to their faculties, otherwise the same external causes would produce the same qualities; whereas each animal, and each man, reacts in virtue of his organisation on things without, and in the manner peculiar to himself. All that can be attributed to external circumstances is, that they put the various internal dispositions into operation."

A great many animals are susceptible of much more extended instruction than their immediate wants require. They also modify their own mode of action with reference to the position in which they are placed. But the capability of receiving education is always proportionate to their primitive faculties, and they cannot, any more than man, learn things for which nature has not provided them with innate capacity. Gall continues:

"There cannot be any necessity without there existing an active organ, an impulse from within. Without certain vital forces in the interior, there could be neither hunger nor thirst, nor necessity for respiration. Thus the exterior necessities always suppose an interior force.

"The internal organisation gives rise to desires and wants, which impel the animal to action. The weaver-bird forms her tissue even when encaged; and the beaver builds, however well lodged he may be already. They follow the impulse of an internal disposition, without being determined by any external necessity. There are, likewise, men for whom travelling, music, etc., are almost matters of necessity, because these individuals are so organised that these propensities possess a predominant activity. It is, again, by the same principle, that we must explain why men who have several (brain-)organs eminently developed experience a greater number of wants than those whose (brain-)organs are less energetic. The idiot has few desires, consequently few wants; and he has few desires because few of his (brain-)organs arrive at complete development, or any considerable degree of activity. With the advance of old age, our internal wants diminish, because the activity of the organs is impaired."

Gall’s classification of the mental powers, of which we shall speak in a succeeding chapter, was very crude, but it did not deserve the sneers of psychologists, for Gall was the first philosopher to proceed in a classification of the primitive impulses, sentiments, and capacities of man and animals on “natural history” lines. He rejected the summary distinction of “cognition,” “feeling,” “volition” as separate entities. There cannot exist cognition unattended by feeling and will, nor feeling and will without presentation to govern them. He also showed that there is a cognitive, an active, and affective experience in every emotion, and that the emotions are expressed in certain instinctive acts and conduct. On the other hand, the propensities give rise to emotions which influence our conduct.

Gall did not recognise an intellect as an entity; he knew only of intellectual “capacities,” and of these such only as he observed in nature, and which could be lost in lesions of the brain. Thus he distinguished a capacity for language, for
number, for the appreciation of tones, a time sense, a sense of locality, a sense of form, and so on.

As regards the propensities, he originated the inquiry into human behaviour and philosophy of character, which has been taken up within recent years by RIBOT, WILLIAM JAMES, M'DOUGALL, MERCIER, SHAND, PARMELEE, SUTHERLAND, HYSLOP, MOTT, DREVER, CORIAT, BORIS SIDIS, ARM-STRONG-JONES, HARRY CAMPBELL, and others, who apparently were quite unaware of the work accomplished in this direction by Gall.

Gall was the first to treat of the propensities, the appetites of man and animals. (See Chapter XIV.) According to him, the affective impulses, which he calls also propensities and appetites, and which we have in common with the lower animals, are implanted in us for important purposes. He divided them in two: the personal and self-protecting, and the social. The sentiments, both egoistic and ethical, such as self-love, religious feeling, benevolence, etc., modify the propensities. The entire moral life of man consists in a permanent struggle between the two groups of motive activities. The intellect is not a sovereign power, but the servant of the propensities. Surely not much fault can be found with that statement.

Gall was the first to regard fear and anger as primary emotions, though he thought they could not be localised. They are found neither in Descartes, Spinoza, or Hume. Too much influenced by introspection, these philosophers took into account only the ideational fears which spring from desire, and overlooked the primitive forms aroused by sensations.
CHAPTER XIII

GALL'S METHOD

PROOF OF PLURALITY OF CENTRES IN THE BRAIN

GALL was the founder of the modern localisation theory. Since we cannot imagine the manifestation of mind without a material instrument, and the various attributes of mind differ very essentially (intellectual capacities, moral sentiments, feelings, and animal propensities), so there must be different structures for them; that is to say, there must be a plurality of organs in the brain. To be angry is so different from casting up a sum in arithmetic, for example, that we can hardly suppose the two different functions otherwise than acting through different localities in the brain.

Gall pointed to the fact that not only have not all men the same abilities in the same degree, but that they vary also in their emotional dispositions—one is frank, another is reticent or suspicious; one is self-assertive, another is modest; one loves approbation, another does not mind in the least the opinion of his fellow-men, etc., etc. There is no end to the diversity that obtains among men, intellectual and moral.

Having shown that there is a great variety in the mental qualities, Gall drew the inference "that the whole brain cannot be regarded as a single organ, but that its entire mass is composed of so many distinct and independent organs, as there are different, independent, primary mental qualities."

It was this theory which aroused the antagonism of three schools of thought. The theologians called it blasphemy; the introspective philosophers of the time called it materialism, and the current scientific opinion was committed to the belief that the brain acted as a whole and not in parts.

Psychologists opposed Gall with the argument that the brain must be a single organ, since the whole mind acts at a given stimulus, and no attribute of the mind ever acts by itself. Similarly the physiologists interposed that the brain always acted as a whole, and not in parts. And both, psychologists and physiologists, accused Gall of trying to destroy the ego.

Now, the brain is acting as a whole because its various parts are called into play simultaneously, though—as Gall pointed out—the whole brain is not concerned in each of the component sensations and volitions associated with any particular mental state. He admitted, it is true, that several mental powers are generally active at the same time; but their elementary distinctions and independence of each other are shown, not only by their different degrees of strength bearing no constant relation to each other, but by the ever-varying combinations, in number and in kind, in which they manifest themselves. For if they were all general results, of one general power, operating through one organ, there would be in all instances a fixed proportion in the manifestations of feeling and thought, and a definite order in their sequence and arrangement, in harmony with the unity of action of a single organ.

Gall did not destroy the unity of the "ego." It was already destroyed by the Creator, who gave us five different senses instead of only one. How can Gall have

Vol. i.]
destroyed the "ego" by asserting that there must be special centres in the brain that enable one man to become a great orator, another a great mathematician, another a great painter, and still another a poet or a musician. He did not create these. They exist. The only novelty is that he assumed that whatever element there is at the basis of each talent must be dependent on the degree of development, quantitatively and qualitatively, of a definite area of the brain, as it is not probable that the same part should be able to perform such a great variety of functions. The same reasoning was applied by Gall to the elementary feelings and instincts.

The physiologists, P. H. BÉRARD (1797-1858) and A. F. J. DE MONTEGRE (1779-1818), in the "Dictionnaire des Sciences Médicales," vol. vii., objected that: "If the intellectual and moral qualities were merely a result of the relative development of certain brain organs, appropriated to them, the individual would exert them, nearly like an automaton, or a machine, which goes as soon as it is wound up. There would be no relation between the exercise of the moral qualities and external causes; the poet would always compose verses; the musician, music, etc.; but it is known that education has a sovereign influence even on the greatest men; and moral motives are the causes of most actions; it must then be admitted, that the moral self often acts independently and without material instruments; where, then, is the necessity for this apparatus of distinct and separate organs?"

Gall replied that the unity of the mind depended on the unity of its organ; disturbance of the brain causes disturbance of the mental functions; that the mind of the infant develops with the development of its brain; and that the mind in old age decays with the decay of the brain; that if there be any faculty independent of organisation, why are we not all alike in that faculty, when we desire to be so? Why does intoxication, apoplexy, and cerebral inflammation affect the mental manifestation? And why can we not uninterruptedly indulge in the exercise of any faculty, if it be purely spiritual?

Another objection made by the same authors was that the unity of the personal entity requires a unity of brain functions. Though those anatomists and physiologists were wrong who sought in the brain for a common sensorium, still there must be some union.

Gall replied: "I have shown that there cannot exist in the brain either a mathematical point, or even a physical point, wherein all the organs or all the nerves are united, or towards which all the cerebral functions converge; they, therefore, who regard such a centre as indispensably necessary, grasp at a phantom." This is metaphysics, he said, not physiology; and he gave the example of our being simultaneously engaged in a variety of occupations; he pointed to the variety of the five senses; to the struggle within us between intellect, morality, and passion—the flesh and the spirit; and to the disintegration of personality and insanity.

Bébard and de Montegre continued: "If we pursue the reasoning of Gall into all its consequences, the multiplication of organs will be infinite, because the ideas of insane people are so. Did Malebranche, who saw a shoulder of mutton hanging from his nose, and who, in other respects, possessed a superior understanding, have an organ corresponding to this idea? Do those who believe themselves changed into worms, or animals, have special organs for these ideas?"

The answer Gall gave was: "Does not each particular sense—for instance, the sense of sight—give rise to a great variety of hallucinations? So each special organ for each primitive attribute of the mind gives rise to innumerable varieties of delusions in mania. Not each delusion has a special seat in the brain, but the primitive power has, whose derangement gives rise to the delusion."

ERNST PLATNER (1744-1818), of Leipsic, another defender of unity, said:
"With the five fingers or with one hand the most complicated pieces of music are executed; why, then, may not a single organ suffice to execute all the intellectual faculties?"

Gall replied: "We require for the execution of music not only a hand and fingers, but also an instrument, composed of different parts, and above all, a brain; and musicians not only perform music, but other acts essentially different."

C. A. RUDOLPHI (1771-1832) objected that:
"If there were several special organs in the brain, how could the slightest lesion possibly suspend or destroy, at once, all the powers of the sensorium? If these organs be independent of each other, as Gall is compelled to admit, it is difficult to form a conception of complete insanity, or absolute cessation of consciousness."

To which Gall replied: "If Rudolphi cannot form an idea of total alienation, on the supposition of the plurality and duplication of the organs, how can he understand a general disease of the body, with its plurality of viscera, and multitude of constituent parts? If he cannot imagine how a slight lesion can at once suspend or destroy all the powers of the sensorium, he will still be less able to comprehend how an inconsiderable lesion, or compression of a cerebral part, sometimes suspends or annihilates the manifestation of the functions of the five senses, each of which has its distinct and independent instrument."

Because anatomists and physiologists could see no difference of structure of parts, they assumed there were no parts. It was not till the discovery of motor and sensory centres in the brain, seventy years later, that differences in the structure of the cortex of the brain were admitted. The microscope then disposed of the fiction of the homogeneousness of the brain. It proved the brain to be an immense instrument constituted of nervous elements, living cells of varying shapes and sizes, each gifted with its proper individuality, and yet intimately connected with one another. But in Gall's time it seemed sheer nonsense that the brain should have different areas each with its own function.

As JOHN BARCLAY (1758-1826), Lecturer on Anatomy in Edinburgh, said: "The convolutions of the brain exhibit as little difference in their form and structure as the convolutions of the intestine."

GEORGE HENRY LEWES (1817-1878), in his "History of Philosophy," in the chapter on "Gall," made a similar statement.

C. A. RUDOLPHI (1771-1832) said: "The pineal gland and the striated bodies differ very slightly," to which Gall replied: "The functions can very rarely be inferred from the anatomical structure."

BÉRARD and DE MONTEGRE (just quoted) also wrote: "The brain is characterised everywhere by unity; no marked division can be observed; this anatomical disposition proves the impossibility of placing in it distinct organs."

Such were the opinions based upon the apparent similarity of structure of the different parts of the cortex. One would have thought that the simile of the nerves for motion and sensation would have sufficed. The structure of a part must be in accordance with its function; but it does not follow from this that it invariably reveals its function. Not only is there no distinction between motor and sensory nerves, but there is none between optic and acoustic or any other nerves—thus showing, as Gall said, how little weight ought to be attached to our notions of what ought to be, when placed in opposition to what is.

As the nerves of the five senses all terminate in different parts of the brain, and as each of them performs a function entirely different from its neighbour, and as their duties are found never to be interchangeable, it surely must be plain that the centre with which any one of them is connected must have a function peculiar to itself, and consequently that the brain into which they are all inserted must be a compound organ. If one centre in the brain be specially connected with seeing, another with hearing, and a third with smelling, and the centre which is for smelling cannot take the place of that which is for seeing, it surely requires no further proof to establish that there are a multiplicity of centres in the brain. Vision may be in a morbid condition, and hearing be normal. Of the other external senses the same is true. They are so independent of each other, that either of them may be sound or unsound singly. Yet they have their real seat in different portions of the brain. Vision is not seated in the eye, hearing in the ear, taste in the tongue,
smelling in the nostrils, nor touch in the fingers, neither are they seated in the nerves of those organs. The eye, ear, tongue, nose, and fingers are but the externals of the senses, while the nerves are but the intermediates.

"He is mistaken," Gall said, "who thinks that the eye sees, that the ear hears, etc.; each external organ of sense is in communication by nerves with the brain; and at the origin of the nerves is a proportionate mass of brain which constitutes the true internal organ of each sensory function. Consequently, the eye may be ever so sound, the optic nerve may be ever so perfect, and yet, if the internal organ is impaired or destroyed, the eye and the optic nerves are of no avail. The external instruments of sense have, consequently, their organs also in the brain, and these external instruments are only the means by which the internal organs are put in relation with external objects."

The very fact, then, that different areas of the brain are appropriated to the external senses, and that the functions of these brain areas are as different as the function of the nerves they receive—for each area must be in harmony with its own nerves—this fact alone, we say, proves the brain to be a compound viscus. In confirmation of the general view here taken, it is well known that blindness, deafness, and an extinction of the other external senses, often depend not on any diseased condition of the external or intermediate apparatus, but on a morbid affection of the brain.

Gall was thus the first to lay stress on the fact, which had been surmised before him, but not proved; that the various senses have their centres in the brain; though his observation received confirmation only three-quarters of a century later. One of his opponents, LORD JEFFREY (1773-1850), wrote in the *Edinburgh Review* (1826), that if Gall be right as regards his localisation of mental functions, "it would seem to follow that all the five senses must have organs in the brain, as well as a connected apparatus beyond it"; showing that it was not the accepted view then.

Throughout the whole of his writings, Gall was forever insisting upon the absolute necessity of studying the evolution and comparative anatomy of cerebral structure in the different classes of animals; and with this increasing structural complexity, he correlated an ever progressive functional advance. He showed that as the cortex of the brain from the lowest animal up to the highest becomes more and more complex, so there is also a greater diversity and a gradual perfection of the mental functions; and as the cortex of the brain is partially or wholly destroyed, so diminishes the manifestation of the intellectual capacities, sentiments, and emotions, though automatic life is still possible. He said:

"All the species and all the individuals of the same family have essentially the same brain; for the principal convolutions do not differ. The brain of the lion or tiger, in regard to its principal convolutions, is the same as that of the cat; the brain of the wolf is the same as that of the fox, the dog, and all the canine varieties, whatever difference may be found in the external forms of these animals. All human brains, if they are not naturally defective, exhibit the same parts and the same principal convolutions; they are distinguished from each other only by the relative proportions of the convolutions, and by some differences of accessory convolutions. Therefore, the essential qualities of each species are the same, and the differences observable in the faculties of the varieties arise wholly from the various degrees of development in the different cerebral parts."

Gall laid down the principle that the differences of structure in the encephalon of different animals, which are the most striking, correspond to decided differences in its functions. He pointed to the difference between animal and human brains, between carnivorous and frugivorous animals, between the brains of the various types of animals, and concluded that these differences must correspond to a difference in the
mental functions. "I defy any one," he said, "to examine only a dozen brains, of different species of animals, and not be strongly impressed with the fact that different cerebral parts are appropriated to distinct functions, and, consequently, that the brain is compounded of many organs."

"The brain is more complicated, and the convolutions more distinct and numerous, as we ascend the scale of the animal kingdom. The essential differences obtaining in the encephalic structure correspond to decided differences in its functions, and the complexity of the structures is proportionate to the number of aptitudes and propensities displayed. What can be the purpose of the difference in the organisation of the brain in different animals, unless it be the difference prevailing in relation to the variety of their instincts? If it be admitted that their instincts are hereditary, then it must also be admitted that they are due to some peculiarity in the brain structure. One species of animals is endowed with mental powers, in which another is deficient, a fact that would be inexplicable, did not each particular cerebral function reside in a particular portion of the brain. Suppose that I should inquire of my readers how it happens that certain species of animals are devoid of the sense of smell, or some other sense, whilst they are in full enjoyment of the rest. They would find no difficulty in such a phenomenon. The functions of each sense, I should be told, required a particular apparatus, and certain species may not possess one or other of them. But, if they admitted only one organ, through which all the senses executed their functions, the absence of one or more in any animal would be inexplicable. Now let the like reasoning be applied to the primitive mental powers, the manifestation of which depends on the brain. There is scarcely any species of animals which does not enjoy certain aptitudes and propensities not to be found in other species. The unwieldy beaver and the nimble squirrel are both admirable architects; the dog, the docile, intelligent and unwearied companion of man, has no skill in building. The horse and the bull have not the bloodthirsty propensities of the weasel and the falcon. The sparrow and the turtle-dove do not utter the sweet notes of the nightingale. Sheep live in flocks and rooks form communities; the fox, the eagle, and the magpie dislike the confinement imposed on them by the care of their young, to which they impatiently submit some weeks only. The swallow, stork, fox, etc., are faithful in their attachment to a single mate; the dog, so susceptible of affection, the stallion, and the stag, gratify their desires with the first female of their species which they meet. The natural history, from beginning to end, exhibits in each species of animals different propensities and aptitudes. Does not, then, the conclusion necessarily follow that the distinctive propensities and aptitudes of these animals are relative to different cerebral parts. Were the brain the single and universal organ of them all, each animal ought to possess them all indiscriminately. Or, if the brain, as some suppose, subserved the intellect alone, it would be no longer possible to conceive that man is elevated by superior intellectual faculties above all other animals to a far greater extent than the mere size and weight of the entire brain would warrant. But, if it be supposed that each primitive mental power, like each particular sense, depends on a special cerebral part, it is not only conceivable that any one animal may be destitute of a certain cerebral part possessed by another, but likewise that all animals generally may be lacking in certain encephalic parts with which man is solely endowed."

It is beyond one's comprehension how physiologists can have assumed that the brain is a single organ, for that would mean it to have a single function. If this were the case, the only possible difference that could exist between animals with large brains and animals with small brains would be simply a greater or less degree of the same qualities of intellect and of propensity; and that thus a sheep, whose brain is nearly of the same size as that of the tiger, ought necessarily to possess the same ferocity and energy which distinguish the latter. The same is true if the brain is regarded only for movement and sensation, as is the view of some modern physiologists. Gall said:

"According to the physiologists, whom I have cited, and who measure the
cerebral mass, either in reference to itself or to the other parts of the body, if the mass of the brain be the same, we must expect not only the same mental powers, but that they will exhibit nearly the same degree of manifestation. But experience teaches us that the reverse is true. With equal mass of brain, we find the most marked differences in regard to the moral and intellectual character. We do not here refer to those shades of difference which might arise from the constitution of the body, etc. We speak of essential differences, the manifest work of nature, which, in these cases, triumphs over all external influences.

"Consider the great differences in the brains of the various species of animals. Are they an idle freak of nature, or are they material conditions of the diversity of their faculties? But all this language of nature, so clear, so precise, is not understood by the physiologist, infatuated with the idea of centralisation and of the unity of conformation; by those who pride themselves in a high and elevated conception, in regarding the cerebellum as a reversed brain, the brain as a repetition of the spinal marrow, and the most distinct parts of the brain as the simple repetition of the same homogeneous parts; by physiologists who seem to be ignorant that when nature repeats an apparatus, she repeats also the function, and that when she has for an object functions essentially distinct, she creates also essentially distinct apparatus. . . . The idea of the centralisation, unity, homogeneity of the nervous system is, as I have already said, a reverie of the transcendental philosophy of Germany. It has been warmly received, (1) because it was thought proper to combat my theories of the plurality of the cerebral organs, and (2) because it favoured the juggleries of animal magnetism. This was the standpoint of the Committee of the French Academy, who reported on Gall's doctrine. Mesmerism, then in vogue, showed that sensations could be transferred from one organ to another.

"Carus had already said, with a thousand other credulous and metaphysical German physiologists, that the whole cerebral mass is homogeneous: that nothing prevents the functions of one part from being transferred to another, and that it would not be contradictory to anything we already know if, after the entire destruction of the hemispheres, the intellectual faculties, or consciousness, should still remain. On this supposition, the spinal cord and nerves, the nerves of the senses, the plexuses and ganglions of the sympathetic nervous system, may all, indiscriminately and reciprocally, exercise any function whatever of the nervous system. Nothing hinders an ox or a horse from being equal in understanding, at least, at the moment of magnetic influence, to Plato, Locke, or Kant; since the identical and preponderant nervous mass of their senses, spinal cord and sympathetic nerve will amply supply the deficiency occasioned by the much smaller mass of their brains."

EMIL HUSCHKE (1797-1858), of Jena, taught in a dissertation of 1821 that to the three vertebrae of the skull there correspond three main divisions of the brain, and that, therefore, we must also assume three main intellectual faculties. To the medulla oblongata and the cerebellum is assigned willing, to the parietal lobes feeling, and to the frontal lobes thinking. Of course, "polarity" plays a part in all this. The cerebellum is opposed in a polar way to the cerebrum; the former serves for motion, the latter for sensation and thinking; the former has active, the latter receptive activity. In this respect the structures at the base of the brain are completely attached to the cerebrum; but then, again, within this mass there arises polar opposition.

CARL G. CARUS (1789-1869), of Dresden, the discoverer of the central canal in the spinal cord (1814), in his "Neue Cranioscopie" (Stuttgart, 1841), following Gall's lines, formulated a similar theory of the three cranial vertebrae and the tripartite division of the soul, which met with some acceptance. He took the divisions of the brain, as then known—the anterior, middle, and posterior lobes—and declared them to be in relation to the intellectual, personal, or individual, and the social or affectional attributes of the mind.

According to Carus, there are in the three cranial vertebrae positive indications of
GALL'S METHOD

the three faculties of the soul, viz.: will, sentiment, and intelligence. Each of these vertebrae bears a definite relation to a certain portion of the brain: mental tendencies and the will are clearly indicated by the posterior or occipital vertebra; vegetative life and the sentiment by the intermediate vertebra; acuteness of sense and intelligence by the anterior or frontal vertebra. The development of the vertebral bones composing the nose, the orbits, and auricular apparatus, is always remarkably significant, not only of the development and preponderance of the sense of smell, vision, and hearing, but also of the influence of these organs upon the psychical individuality.

Carus thought the seat of the soul to be in the corpora quadrigemina, while Huschke claimed also the optic thalami, the posterior lobes of the cerebrum, and other portions of the brain. For the latter, the corpora quadrigemina were too insignificant for so important a function as that of the life of the soul, especially as they visibly lose in importance in the development of man, as well as in the ascending animal series. This circumstance did not disturb Carus, since he started from the original disposition, and thought it "an absurdity to regard emotion, intelligence, and will, as so localised in the developed mass that they would be, so to speak, imprisoned in one of the three divisions of the brain." But it must be very different "if we speak of the primary disposition of these structures, when as yet the conducting fibres are not developed, or only imperfectly so, and when, therefore, there can as yet be no question of the finer shades of intellectual life." Only, then, in this mere disposition to a later developed intellectual activity are its three main tendencies to be considered as localised. As Carus conceived this whole localisation as at bottom only the symbol of the peculiar development of the mind, his standpoint evades refutation by losing itself in metaphysical vagueness.

Another argument in favour of the localisation theory, mentioned by Gall, is the appearance of dispositions in the child before it has had the slightest experience; and the inequality of the dispositions it manifests. He said:

"If you have ever been a parent or teacher, you cannot have failed to observe that many a child or pupil has certain predominant intellectual or moral dispositions, which cannot rationally be accounted for, either by education or preceding exclusive application; that, in many instances, it is even impossible to divest these children of their natural tastes and inspire them with others; it is even the earliest foundation of a good education, to learn and profitably manage the strongly-marked dispositions of children." The same observation may be made in the animal species. "The most quarrelsome dog, that bites at everyone, has often not the least propensity for the chase; another, on the contrary, is the mildest and most peaceable animal in the world, and yet he is devoured with the desire for hunting and killing; a cowardly bitch, without any instinct for the chase, passionately devotes herself to her young; another abandons them with indifference, and defends the life of her master at the risk of her own."

Another proof of the plurality of organs in the brain Gall found in the successive development of the different powers of the mind in infancy and youth, considered in conjunction with the gradual development of the brain. Gall said, "the nervous fibrils are first visible in the posterior and middle lobes, and only at a later period in the anterior lobes." Now, this development of the nerve-fibrils in the infantile brain was confirmed and worked out eighty years later by Paul Flechsig, of Leipsic, who studied the human brain in both the foetus and the infant, paying special attention to the maturation of the nerve fibres, i.e., the conducting organs. He found that the paths to the centres of sensation and motion matured earlier than those to the centres of perception and association. The process (myelinisation) is hastened sometimes by precocious functional stimuli, and sometimes retarded by causes influencing nutrition. Thus he explained anatomically individual differences in psychical development. The subject will be dealt with more fully in Chapter XX.

Another fact in favour of the localisation theory, according to Gall, is that the
mental powers prevailing in every individual of the same species exist in very different degrees, a circumstance which can be explained by the different development of the several parts through which these powers are manifested. Men possessing first-rate talents of a certain order are sometimes quite insignificant in every other respect. Genius is in well-nigh every instance partial, and limited to the exaltation of a few mental powers, which could not be the case were the organ of mind single. Could this be, if the brain were not multiplex? If the same portion of nervous matter were engaged in all studies equally, then a man with a brain to excel in mathematics must be able equally to excel in drawing or music; but we find great metaphysicians who cannot learn the multiplication table, poets who do not like music, religious people without morality, and moral people without religion; some who can draw well but cannot colour, some colourists who cannot draw, musicians who cannot keep time, and so on. He continued:

"There is a natural inequality in men. No two are alike in character. There prevails among individuals an infinite variety of intellectual endowment, of moral sentiment, affections, and instincts of self-preservation. The force and order of the impulses differ in every one. Some young folks, though lacking in intelligence, possess an astonishing faculty for learning by heart; others, again, remarkable for their intelligence, have great difficulty in committing to memory. So with grown up men. One will remember dates, another localities, a third individuals, and a fourth events. One lacks wit and gets angry at all mirth and fun, another is deficient in dignity, another dislikes children. One expects to find the enjoyment of life in wealth, another in power, a third in rank, a fourth in fame, while not a few are found to seek it in a mere round of excitement. Some folk are noted for their cruelty, others for their courage, others again for their slyness. Then there are persons who never had any friends and do not want any. Again, a little observation shows us that some men, apart from all training, have a decided capacity for certain pursuits. One man excels in history, another in geography, a third in mathematics. Some become great musicians, others eminent painters, others distinguished poets or actors. Most of us are wholly devoid in some mental power: some are baffled by arithmetic, some have no skill for drawing, some are a dead weight at music. Such mental quality is vouchsafed to one and denied to another. Each has a predilection, or a more decided talent, for a particular pursuit. There is, then, in every man something which he does not derive from education, and which even resists all training. We follow the line of least resistance, that is to say, the line along which our most active dispositions and abilities drive us. From his very childhood does a man show the character which will distinguish him in adult years. He is haughty or humble, prudent or careless, affectionate or cold, harsh or kindly, because it is in his nature to be so; in other words, because his brain organisation is so constituted. Admitting a multiplicity of centres in the brain, we can at once understand how it is that one man may excel in one thing and be stupid in another, just the same as a man may have strong eyesight and be very deaf, or a fine sense of touch and no power of smelling.

"Were the brain a single organ, then the innate dispositions of each man would be similar. But if the main and accessory convolutions of the brain be appropriated to different mental powers, then does every modification of character depend on a different degree of development attained by these particular parts of the brain, and their varying degree of activity. There are no two skulls nor two brains alike in their configuration, nor are the characters of any two individuals found to exactly correspond. Moreover, genius not infrequently appears at so early an age as to put study or training, as a producing cause, entirely out of the question. No one will deny that it is a natural gift. Have you not noticed that prodigies are quite as childish as other children in everything but the talent by which they are particularly distinguished?"

Gall argued further, that in insanity frequently only a limited number of faculties is disordered, while the others remain sound; and when due to disease of the brain,
not the whole organ is involved, but very often only certain regions of it. Based on this fact, Gall made a strong point in the treatment of insanity, to give the patient whenever possible occupation, and to divert his attention from his morbid ideas by fixing it upon other subjects, thus bringing into activity the healthy cerebral parts and giving the morbidly irritated a rest.

Gall saw another proof of the plurality of the functions of the brain in his observations on idiocy. When imperfect development of the brain occasions idiocy or imbecility, the individual is deficient in most of the intellectual powers, and frequently in some of the moral sentiments, and yet may possess a few of them in considerable vigour. Thus some idiots commit to memory with great facility, some have a talent for imitation, for drawing, for music, without being capable of comprehending a single abstract idea; or they show a hoarding inclination, a destructive tendency, or the sexual instinct, without manifesting any other power to a perceptible extent. Gall mentioned idiots who, though they had hardly any understanding, yet "learned, by themselves, to play tolerably on the organ or harpsichord; and others who understood, without having been taught, how to repair clocks, and to make some pieces of machinery." "This," he said, "probably depends on the more perfect organisation of the organ or centre with which such an act is connected, and not on the understanding." Anyone with experience of this class of idiots—the idiot-savants—must agree with Gall. But what do most psychologists, and even physiologicalonemeditating in his study, the other examining dead brains in his laboratory, get to know of these peculiar manifestations of the mind? Hence the one-sidedness of so many of them. If the brain acts as a whole, or if it is nothing more than an organ for motion and sensation, as some of our modern laboratory-men would like to make us believe, how shall we explain the extraordinary talents of these imbeciles?

Injury to the brain, too, does not involve the whole mentality, but only that manifestation of which the injured part is the seat. But were the brain single, i.e., did it act as a whole, then disease of any part of the cortex should always affect the whole mind.

Gall's opponents produced as chief evidence against his localisation theory cases of injuries to the brain affecting different parts, while the mental powers supposed to be related to these parts have not been diminished or impaired. Even to this day, numerous cases are quoted of cerebral wounds without any injury to the mental powers, by surgeons in every country. Destruction of part of the brain has been observed after death, while in the living subject no diminution of intellect had been perceived. I shall have to deal with this question fully at a later stage; here I will confine myself to Gall's rejoinder:

"If all these observations were as correct as their authors state them to be, not only would my whole theory be false, but it would be impossible to maintain that the brain performed any intellectual functions, or indeed any functions. But the vague, indefinite manner in which all these examples are produced save the head and its contents from the imputation of being useless appendages. In order to ascertain whether an injury done to any material organ is followed by the disuse of any function, the direct method is to observe whether the function attached to that organ is altered or abolished, or not. If the seat of the organ of music is damaged, we should inquire into the power to appreciate tones after the accident; if the seat of another mental power is destroyed, I should expect that power to suffer in its manifestation. If we confine our inquiry to faculties which do not belong to the part affected, we should obtain as satisfactory answers as we should if we were to conclude that, because smell and taste were not directly impaired when their respective nerves were cut across, the patient suffered no injury. The surgeons who have gone before me and my present-day opponents did not possess the necessary means of observing accurately the facts which they have stated; for, instead of looking for the faculties which I attach to the injured parts, they endeavoured to
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Finally, Gall reminded us of the differences existing in the national character and
the corresponding differences in the brain and skulls of the different nations and races
—the basis of the science of anthropology.

An objection that is often brought against Gall’s doctrine at the present day, and
which is really due to its authors never having looked at Gall’s work to see for
themselves, is: that his doctrine favours the “faculty” psychology.

Now, Gall distinctly said that no one centre of the brain is competent to manifest
itself by itself. The more highly developed the mental powers, the more numerous
will the various centres of the brain become by means of intricate channels of the
freest intercommunication. Though the centres themselves are distinct, all of them
are inter-united, and the activity of each depends on its relation to the others.
Each act as a portion of the brain to modify the general result of cerebral action.
It is through this solidarity and inter-dependence that no portion of it can be
injured or exhausted without its interfering in some way with the functions of the
other portions. There is, however, a great difference between saying that the
various brain parts exert a mutual influence, and saying that each part does not
perform its own particular functions.

ABNORMALLY DEVELOPED BRAIN CENTRES INDICATE ABNORMAL ACTIVITY

Gall, from his earliest infancy, was devoted to the study of natural history, and
even when a boy was noted for quick perception and talent of observation. He
was very early induced to remark the various shapes of the heads of his companions
and fellow-students, and to connect these peculiarities with their moral and in-
tellectual character. Having remarked in some cases a striking conformity between
the form of particular parts of the head of those who resembled each other in certain
mental characteristics, and an absence of these dispositions in those where the
same part of the head appeared deficient, he—after years of observation—formed
the theory that the elementary qualities were located in definite parts of the brain.
At the same time, he called to his aid the observations of comparative anatomy and
professional experience of brain lesions.

It is now generally admitted that the size and shape of the skull give a fair
indication of the size and shape of the brain. But even admitting difficulties in
drawing conclusions of one from the other in the case of average individuals—a
subject with which we shall deal presently—we must remember the fact that Gall
studied the abnormally active and the abnormally deficient to discover the normal.
He did not make his observations on common every-day persons, but limited himself
to the observation of extremes in talent and character, true, mostly on living persons,
but verifying his observations whenever possible on actual brains. Average heads
could have conveyed to him no information, for they belong to average men with
average capacities and average character; Gall confined himself to extremes, to
the extraordinary. For example, he studied the brain-organ for the appreciation of “tones” (music) in the great composers of his time, who were then very numerous
in Vienna—to mention only Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, etc.—and he compared
their heads with tone-deaf persons. His observation was by no means superficial,
for he took casts of their heads, some of which are still in existence, and sometimes
he got permission to dissect the brain after death. That he was not superficial in
his work is proved by the fact that modern observers with their much improved
methods and much ampler facilities have found the tone-sense or music-sense in
approximately the same locality. Such persistent investigation as Gall indulged in costs time and money; and this shows that Gall cannot have been the charlatan that his opponents pretended.

We have mentioned that Gall compared the skulls and brains of composers with tone-deaf persons; similarly he compared these structures in men of genius in other directions with those of idiots in the same field. He did not confine himself to intellectual capacities, but he made the same observations regarding character excesses and deficiencies, as, for instance, comparing the brains of misers and spendthrifts, i.e., excess and deficiency of the hoarding instinct; the eunuch with the Don Juan, to discover the location of the sexual instinct; and so on. This method would be insufficient, and certainly would lead to errors, if we confined ourselves to it. But Gall did not do anything of the kind. He made post-mortem dissections of the brains of men noted for these special capacities and characteristics; and he watched for the effects of brain injuries and circumscribed disease. Altogether, it must be admitted, he proceeded on scientific lines. Most of his critics have merely expressed opinions; they have not repeated his investigations by his methods, and they have given no facts. Let the reader therefore have no preconceived ideas as to the merit of Gall’s investigations, but follow with an unbiased mind the evidence which I am going to submit.

This method of first observing such persons as presented any special mental power in great action, generally in its abuse, led Gall to designate it accordingly—hence the awful terminology, which choked off many a favourably disposed student and did Gall a great deal of harm. He was fairly accurate, as we shall see presently, in naming the primitive intellectual capacities; but as regards the primary instinctive tendencies, he generally used the name of their abuses, under which he had observed them in the first instance. For example, he called the hoarding instinct the thieving instinct, because it was on incorrigible thieves that he made the first observations. He did not attempt to ascertain the original or fundamental power—probably because he recognised how difficult is psychological analysis—and confessed that he left that part of the work to those who came after him.

That Gall did not first find a system—as he is so often accused of—and then look for the localisation of the mental functions, is evident from his terminology. He made no claim either to have enumerated all the fundamental faculties of the mind.

Gall presented us with a simple statement, namely, that when a primary mental power is constantly strong in its manifestation, we shall find a definite part of the brain highly developed, except in cases of disease and old age; and, on the other hand, a deficient development of certain parts of the brain is accompanied, as a rule, by deficient strength of those powers of the mind related to these parts.

We may hold preconceived notions that this statement is not true; we may refuse the inquiry on the ground that this is lowering science to quackery; we may speculate, quibble, abuse—anything you like—but we shall not have disproved Gall in the only way he can be disproved, that is, by repeating his observations. Not that the statement will always hold true; because the development of the brain may arise from other causes than mere functional activity—the quality of the brain, the blood-supply, the effects of toxins, etc., have to be taken into consideration; the function of the particular part may have remained latent—that is to say, the faculty may not have been brought into use for lack of stimulus; but all this does not matter since we are not professing to read character, but are investigating only abnormal phenomena of development and manifestation.

Gall made nothing, but simply recorded what he saw existing in nature. His teachings being simple statements of the results of observation, they can be refuted only by showing that the observations have been made incorrectly or that the results
have been incorrectly stated. Any man who objects to them without attempting to do this is simply finding fault with nature. Gall did not, as so many have imagined, first dissect the brain and pretend by that means to have discovered the seats of the mental powers; neither did he, as others have conceived, first map out the skull into various compartments, and assign a faculty to each, according as his imagination led him to conceive the place appropriate to each power. On the contrary, he first observed a concomitance between particular talents and dispositions, and particular forms of the head; he next ascertained, whenever he could, by removal of the skull, that the shape and size of the brain are indicated by these external forms; and it was only after these facts were determined that the brain was minutely dissected and light thrown upon its structure.

Gall attempted to compare the parts of the brain with the powers of the mind as inculcated in systems of philosophy. But he could arrive at no satisfactory result. He then compared the development of different parts of the brain with the actions of men, and he had some reason to congratulate himself on his success. And is it not an undoubted fact that some men show a disposition to certain actions from their earliest childhood: some to music, some to drawing, some to calculation, and some to construct mechanical instruments? Is it not an undoubted fact that children often show an uncontrollable disposition to anger, fear, jealousy, etc., different from their brothers and sisters, and without previous experience and adequate external cause?

The ancient philosophers maintained that all genius is inherent; nay, they went further, some of them advocated the doctrine that every idea was innate. Gall's doctrine is different. He maintained that the dispositions of mankind are innate, in the same way that the power of locomotion or vision is dependent on organs that are born with us; but as we cannot foretell what kind of muscular movements may take place, or what things may be seen, neither can the ideas which may arise in the mind be foretold, as they depend on circumstances which are contingent.

Gall had no preconceived notions regarding the primitive mental powers. He simply stated what he had observed. It was only after he had made a great number of localisations that he noticed that the situation of the mental powers corresponded with what one would expect psychologically. Contemporary critics reproached him with not first determining what the primitive powers were, and then seeking out their centres in the brain. He replied: "If you can tell me what the primitive faculties are, I will try to find out where they are located." But this they neither did, nor could do; and we are not agreed upon them at the present day.

Gall at first spoke only of elevations and depressions on the cranium, as denoting the presence or absence of determinate dispositions and talents. It was this that gave rise to the "bump" theory, which persists to the present day. Considering that there was no topography of the convolutions in those days, how was he to describe his observations? All his opponents judged him by these "bumps," that is to say, they condemned his whole doctrine. But how unfair! He marked all his localisations on the brain as well. Anyone who will look at his magnificent anatomical plates of the brain can see his markings by numerals on the convolutions, where he assumed the centres of the highest activity of particular mental functions to be; and they must recognise that his diagrams look at least as scientific in their representations of the assumed functions of the brain as do those of our modern physiologists who have mapped out the brain in a sort of mosaic of sensory and motor centres. He did not even circumscribe his centres, for he acknowledged that the function of one merges into the other; so that those who accuse Gall of having created "bumps," speak of a creation of their own imagination.

That there is nothing wrong in the principle of it is shown by recognised authorities;
GALL’S METHOD

ROBERT JAMES GRAVES (1796-1853), of Dublin University (London Medical Journal, vol. ii.), wrote: “Accordingly we find that exactly in proportion as the encephalic portion of the nervous system is developed in the vertebrated animals we can trace the appearance of new faculties, which, few and obscure in the lower species, become, as we ascend, more numerous and more distinct until we arrive at man, in whom the brain attains a degree of pre-eminence sufficient to place him far above all other species of mammalia. . . . Through the various degrees of instinct and intelligence observable in the different classes of the animal kingdom, we perceive an uninterrupted gradation, an unbroken chain, until we arrive at man, when the nervous system and the intellect receive a simultaneous improvement, so great as to place man far above the rest of his fellow-creatures. But man does not only differ from other animals in the configuration of his brain and the capacity of his mind, but also exhibits the singular fact of a great difference, in these respects, between individuals of the same species; it being an obvious fact that different men exhibit as much disparity in their intellectual powers as if they were animals of a different genus. In all such cases (where the difference between the intellectual powers is extreme) there also we invariably find a striking difference between the form and size of their skulls, the most highly gifted always presenting a greater relative proportion of brain.”

WILLIAM B. CARPENTER (1813-1885), the well-known physiologist, who was not a disciple of Gall, said (Medical Gazette, 1841): “When the brain is fully developed it offers innumerable diversities of form and size among various individuals and there are as many diversities of character. It may be doubted if two individuals were ever exactly alike in this respect.”

J. BARNARD DAVIS (1801-1881), author of “Thesaurus Craniorum” (London, 1867), whose craniological researches have rendered such immense service to anthropological science, said that “the cranium is subject to variations of size and form, almost endless in the different races of man, and these diversities are coincident with and allied to disparity of powers, capacities, and character, which may be considered to a certain extent commensurate with the differences of conformation themselves.” (Philosophical Transactions, 1867.)

GEORGES CUVIER (1769-1832), the great naturalist, wrote: “Certain parts of the brain are large or small according to certain qualities of the animals.”

Professor D. J. CUNNINGHAM (1850-1909), at the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Glasgow, 1901, said: “The cranial vault fits like a tight glove on the surface of the enclosed cerebrum. The cortical elevations which rise on the surface are due to exuberant growth in localised areas. There cannot be a doubt that the process is intimately connected with the development of function in the districts concerned. We know that functions of different kinds are localised in different parts of the cortex, and when we see an area on the cerebrum rise up in the form of an eminence we may reasonably conclude that the growth in the area concerned is the structural foundation of what will become later on a centre of functional activity of an acute kind.” He recommended the study of skull peculiarities, brains seldom being available for investigation to any but medical men, and he admitted that his proposition was a return to the old doctrine of Gall.

DANIEL HACK TUKE (1827-1895), the well-known alienist, wrote: “The diversity, as regards the form and size of the human cranium, can only have escaped the notice of the least observant, or failed to excite some interest in the least reflective. This diversity is observable, not only in regard to the whole head, but also its several regions. The head of one is large and massive, of another small and ill-developed; but more than this, the forehead of one may be broad and ample, while that of another is shallow and retreating; these facts are notorious. On the other hand, the mental characteristics of one individual do not contrast less strongly with those of another. Between the two extremes of the highest psychical endowment and the helpless condition of idiocy, every conceivable shade of intellectual character or function is to be met with.”
MORIZ BENEDIKT (1835-), neurologist and anthropologist of Vienna, said:

"That types of skull are generally connected with types of character may be concluded with safety from the results of craniology in the animal world and from the study of the skulls in different races."

E. A. SPITZKA (1851-1914), the American neurologist, who dissected the brains of various celebrities, believed with Gall that some faculties could be definitely localised, and that taking two men, both of great but of different mental capacities, not the same but different areas of their brain would preponderate. He supported his contention by reference to his dissection of brains of eminent Americans. He claimed to have noticed the difference between one who was "more creative, constructive, philosophic, and brilliant in abstract generalisations," and another who was "a far keener observer, quick at seeing analogies, an excellent systematiser, and had a splendid power of memorising and recalling visual impressions." (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 1907.)

It would seem that some of our modern anatomists and physiologists are quite willing to admit protuberances of the skull when it suits their purpose, as the following quotations will show.

Thus we read the statement of one of the motor-centre enthusiasts: "Such an increase of the hinder part of the frontal lobes is usually accompanied by an enlargement of the areas which are connected with skilled movements of the hands and face, and in consequence the portion of the parietal bone along the squamous suture is thrown outwards and the width above the ears is increased."

Sir THOMAS LAUNDER BRUNTON (1844-1916), Journal of the Anthropological Institute, 1887, said: "As regards the possible change in the shape of the skull from development of the different centres, it seems to me that if a cortical centre expands in all directions, the number of cells in a longitudinal direction being much greater than in the transverse direction, the actual longitudinal increase will be much greater than the transverse, the proportional increase to the original size being the same. The development of the visual centre will thus tend to raise the vertex and elongate the head from above downwards, while the development of the auditory centre will tend to push the occiput backwards, and elongate the head in an antero-posterior direction. Whether the development of the tactile centre will render the head broader or not I could not be sure, but it seems to me that this is just possible."

It is stated as a definite fact by some that it has been shown that in animals the occipital part of the cortex remains in a state of very incomplete development, if the animal is in any way deprived of the use of its eyes from birth onwards. (Notwithstanding the fact that the sight centre has been shifted since to the calcarine fissure). The same is said of the other centres, as, for example, the arm centre, that in men who suffered amputation of the arm in early years a deficiency was discovered, and that this deficiency was perceptible in the skull of the living subject.

Thus HERMANN MUNK (1839-1912), the well-known physiologist and experimenter on brains of animals, said: "When a limb has been absent from infancy or a sense has not existed since that time, those brain areas which correspond to them will remain undeveloped. This may be seen in the living person from the part of skull covering it. A skull area well arched, or striking flat, indicates a corresponding convexity or flatness of the corresponding brain area." This is justly ridiculed by KONARD RIEGER.
GALL’S METHOD

More recently Professor G. SCHWALBE (1844-), has shown that the position of the third or inferior frontal convolution was indicated by a prominence on the surface of the cranium in the anterior part of the temple. This human cranial speech bump was much more highly developed in man than in anthropoid apes and it was unusually easily demonstrated.

The dissectors of Gambetta’s brain drew special attention to the fact that the cortical structure in the neighbourhood of Broca’s convolution was markedly augmented, and a writer in the British Medical Journal, July 31st, 1886, said: ‘When we recall the fact that Broca, in his ‘Memoirs,’ attributes to this part of the cerebral cortex the functions of articulate language, the unusual development of this convolution in Gambetta and others confirms, to a certain extent, this opinion now generally accepted. Gambetta was a great orator, his memory for words being most remarkable; he had acquired a rapid and most exact method of expressing his ideas. It is therefore somewhat admissible to associate his great oratorical power with his increased growth of cortical tissue in the neighbourhood of Broca’s convolution.’ This is, as we shall see presently, very much what Gall said, but Broca gets the credit.

MATHIAS DUVAL (1844-1907), in L’Aphasie depuis Broca, Paris, 1888, stated that in the brain of Gambetta the third frontal convolution, in which the speech centre is located, was enormously developed, and he exclaimed: ‘Quelle person alité a jamais représenté à un plus haut degré l’orateur, improvisateur, le moteur verbal?’

HERVÉ (‘La Circonvolution de Broca,’ Paris, 1888) expressed himself similarly.

NIC. RÜDINGER (1832-1896), one of those anatomists who thought the intellect had its seat in the upper part of the parietal lobe (‘Beiträge zur Anatomie,’ 1882), and who had the opportunity of dissecting the brains of a number of distinguished men, asserted that the higher the mental endowment of an individual the greater is the relative extent of that part of the brain. Gall said no more, only that his localisation was different.

GUSTAV RETZIUS (1842-1919), (‘Biologische Untersuchungen,’ 1898), made a similar statement, but he found ‘a marked exuberance of cortical growth in the lower part of the parietal cortex in people of undoubted genius.’

PAUL FLECHSIG (1847-), the famous Leipsic neurologist, though he condemned Gall’s method, claimed the discovery of the ‘bumps’ of music in the skulls of Bach and Beethoven.

It is commonly supposed that Gall neglected the convolutions on the median and under aspects of the brain and arranged the whole of his localisations under the outer vault of the skull. (See C. S. SHERRINGTON in ‘Encyclopædia Britannica,’ article ‘Brain.’) Such a statement can only be made by one who has never opened Gall’s anatomical atlas, where it may be seen that all the gyri on the orbital, inferior temporal, and median surfaces of the hemispheres are marked with his centres. In the text Gall explains that the convolutions on the internal surface of each hemisphere which are divided by the falciform process, ‘are all prolonged more or less vertically to the surface, and are but a continuation of the superior convolutions in the middle line, having the same functions’; he shows how he estimates the orbital and inferior temporal convolutions, and the size of the cerebellum, ‘so that no part of the brain escapes our observation.’ Curiously, modern experimenters have done exactly the same. Their ‘leg’ centre, for example, on the superior surface, extends down the side in the middle line. These locations might present difficulties for the practical ‘reading of heads,’ but Gall indignant rejects such a notion and declares that his business is to discover the physiology of the brain.

Could Gall with the means available in his time have applied any other method than he did? Simple dissection of the brain would not have helped him to determine the functions of the brain. As he said:

‘There are but few cases where the structure of a part has enabled the anatomist
to understand the functions which depend upon them; and when it happened, his ideas were merely conjectures. Thus the bones and ligaments are examples of this kind. Before having seen the motion produced by muscles, their structure does not enable us to divine either their irritability or their contractility. The dissection of the stomach, the liver, the kidneys, has not taught the functions of these viscera. What purpose would it serve to know the structure of the eye and the ear, if experience had not taught us their uses? Would the most profound perspicacity ever have attributed the sense of smell to the pituitary membrane of the nose, and the sense of taste to the nervous papille of the tongue, when even to this day anatomists still dispute which nerve conveys the gustatory sensation? The tendons and ligaments have been confounded with the nerves for ages; and the organisation of the heart has had so little influence in leading anatomists to a knowledge of its functions, that, to the time of Harvey, the arteries were considered as conducting tubes of air. . . . Almost always has the knowledge of their functions preceded that of the parts. It was not necessary to know the structure of the eye, nor the mode of existence of the optic nerve, to know it was the organ of sight. For a long time it was not believed that the nerves were necessary to the functions of the senses, because it was thought that the blood-vessels carried the impressions to the heart, the supposed seat of the soul. . . . Whenever it has been attempted to advance the pretended knowledge of organisation before that of functions, it has been altogether conjectural, and worn the impress of the prejudices of the age. It is in this way that the heart has been constituted the seat of courage, love, sympathy, cruelty; the liver was formerly the seat of anger and physical love; it is thus that, even to this day, the moral and intellectual faculties are made to arise from a mixture of the humours of the temperaments; and the dispositions and passions take their rise in the abdomen or from the solar plexus. If anatomy were a sure guide in establishing the uses of different parts, would Willis have said that the vital spirits, necessary for motion, were secreted in the cerebellum? Would Galen have connected the organ of smell with the anterior cavities of the brain? Would the soul, alternately dislodged from the pineal gland, the corpus callosum, the annular protuberance, etc., have been replaced by Sömmering in the vapour of the cavities of the hemispheres, and by Ackermann in the medullary substance which lines the interior of the same cavities!

"It is rather by observing physiological phenomena that we arrive at a more just idea of the brain. Accordingly, it has been requisite for me to collect a great number of physiological and pathological facts, before I could come to any rational induction respecting the laws of its organisation. I owe almost all my anatomical discoveries to my physiological and pathological observations; and it is only from these that I have been able to convince myself of the perfect accordance of the moral and intellectual phenomena, with the material conditions of their manifestation."

Modern physiologists have tried to discover the mental functions of the brain by experimental excitation and destruction of different parts; but all they have achieved is the production of physical phenomena, connected with either movement or sensation. Many of them were in consequence convinced more than ever that Gall was wrong; but they might as well deny not merely the localisation of mental functions but the existence of mind or spirit itself, as a portion of man, because we cannot separate, with our scalps, that ethereal essence from our grosser parts, and subject it to an examination, by one or all of our external senses. When we examine with the most scrupulous minuteness, the form, colour, and texture of the brain, no sentiment can be perceived slumbering in its fibres, nor half-formed ideas starting from its folds. It appears to the eye only as a mass of curiously convoluted matter; and the understanding declares its incapacity to penetrate the purposes of its parts. In fact, we cannot, by merely dissecting any organ of the body whatever, discover its vital functions. As Gall has said, anatomists for many centuries dissected the nerves of motion and sensation, and saw nothing in their structure that indicated the difference of their functions; and, at this moment, if the nerves of taste and of
hearing were presented together on the table, we might look at them for ages without discovering traces of separate functions in their structure. Simple dissection of the brain, therefore, could not lead to the discovery of the functions of its different parts.

**GALL ON CRANIO-CEREBRAL RELATIONS**

We have already stated that Gall examined brains wherever he could, but he generally started with the examination of the living head for the detection of variation from the normal or average, and verified his conclusions post-mortem when he could get the opportunity. His critics, however, denied that it was possible to learn anything from the living head, because, as they alleged, the skull and brain do not agree in conformation. This untruth has been fostered to the utmost for a whole century, and is still echoed by men unacquainted with the fact that Gall studied only extremes of skull types, and not average heads, and that all the different objections which they raise have been answered by him.

To estimate the size and shape of the brain from the size and shape of the skull has been compared to "telling the contents of a travelling trunk by passing the hands over it"; and by Oliver Wendell Holmes (1809-1894) to "telling the number of a bank-note inside an iron safe by feeling at the knobs outside."

F. Gotch (1853-1913), Professor of Physiology in the University of Liverpool, said: "It would be just as sensible for a safe-maker to examine the knob or handle of a safe, and then to profess to be able to tell what amount of wealth was contained in the safe in its various drawers and compartments."

Another writer said: "It is just as reasonable to determine a person's digestive capacity by looking at his waistcoat as it is to pretend to know the shape of the brain by looking at the skull."

Professor M. Allen Starr (The Popular Science Monthly 1889) said with reference to Gall's doctrine: "It is pretty well agreed among scientists, at present, that it has no actual basis of fact, and that elevations upon the skull do not indicate masses of brain beneath them. . . . It may be stated without hesitation that from the size and shape of the head no conclusion whatever can be made as to the extent of surface of the brain, and consequently no conclusion can be reached regarding the mental capacity." Yet, in the same paper, he stated that "in the middle (of the brain) lies the motor area, and it is interesting to know that on the left half of the brain, which guides the right hand, it is larger in extent than on the other side, which controls the left hand; because the majority of the fine movements are performed by the right hand, and have to be learned by the left brain. The reverse is true of left-handed people."

Professor P. G. H. Klenke (1813-1881), Canstatt's Jahresberichte, 1843, declared, "Gall's brain organs are nothing more than excrescences of the skull bones, caused partly by the insertion of the head muscles, partly by centres of ossification. There is no correspondence between brain and skull surfaces, and in later life the brain recedes altogether from the skull. The furrow we see marked on the inner surface is simply the markings of blood-vessels. Just as all the bones of the skeleton vary in different individuals, so does the cranium. The latter develops in accordance with the growth of the other skeleton bones quite independently of the brain."

Joseph Hyrtl (1811-1894), the celebrated Austrian anatomist ("Lehrbuch der Anatomie des Menschen"), also held that the skull develops independently of the brain, and that "early closure of the sutures, before the brain has reached its full growth, causes microcephaly, i.e., is accompanied by innate idiocy."

Konrad Rieger (1855-), another well-known anatomist, held the same mistaken notion.

Wilhelm Wundt (1832-), the famous physiologist ("Gehirn und Seele," Deutsche Rundschau, 1880), said: "Skull and brain do not agree in conformation. No deduction can be drawn. If Gall's views were right, the gorilla should be distinguished for his enormous venerating capacity."
AN.

The head had with skull. Thus patronising contrary craniology first the whole hungen 274. Medical Physicians round durable removed mine spoken the relation deceit healthy internal means EON FRANCIS AUGUST FROLIEP (1849-1897), Professor of Anatomy, Tübingen ("Lagebeziehungen zwischen Grosshirn und Schäeldach," 1895) held there is no constant relation between the convolutions and the skull-covering.

HENRY CHARLTON BASTIAN (1837-1915), the well-known neurologist, complained that Gall located functions in centres of ossification; ignorant of the fact that Flechsig located the musical sense in the parietal eminence.

LEONARD HILL ("Manual of Physiology," 1890), says: "The bumps on the head are in many places due to interspaces in the bone or thickening of the bone, and by no means represent swellings of the brain substance." He calls it "quackery and deceit" to determine the size of the brain by the size of the head.

Many of these critics produce diseased skulls from their museums to prove that the internal table does not correspond with the external. They might as well say that a healthy nose could not be of Roman shape, because another nose, in a state of disease, had a greater resemblance to a Dutch cauliflower. Gall dealt only with healthy skulls.

Other anatomists have expressed the opinion that it was "impossible to conceive such a tender and delicate substance as the brain forcing out such a hard and durable material as the skull," forgetting the distension of the head in hydrocephalous, and that an aneurism or new growth can wear away a solid bone.

If the brain and skull do not agree in conformation, one may well ask what is the good of anthropometry, craniology, anthropology, and all the other studies based on measurements of the head? Is it an idle freak of nature that the skulls of the various nationalities differ, and that amongst the same race one man has a round head, another a square, another a cylindrical, and still another a sugar-leaf head?

Many well-meaning objectors give elementary information on skull growth in a patronising tone, taking it for granted that Gall knew nothing of the subject. Thus FREDERICK PETERSON, Chief of the Clinic, Nervous Department, College of Physicians and Surgeons, New York ("American Medico-Surgical Bulletin," 1895), tells us plainly that Gall's doctrine "was an entirely empirical study of the exterior of the head, and no careful anatomical investigations were ever made by him of the brain or its convolutions, or of the thickness and structure of the skull and scalp."

Gall himself was the first to point out the formation and the irregularities of the skull. It is presumption, therefore, on the part of his antagonists to write as if he had been ignorant of elementary anatomy. Gall wrote:

"The circumstance that the two tables of the cranium are not parallel in their whole circumference, and at all periods of life, would certainly be of the greatest importance if I had ever pretended to judge of all the minute shades of difference that exist in the convolutions of the brain. On the contrary, I have endeavoured to acquaint my hearers and readers with all the circumstances in question. I have spoken of the frontal sinuses, of the separation of the two tables in the cranium in men and in animals. I wrote upon it in my article 'Cranium' in the Dictionary of Medical Sciences. I was the first to mention that it was impossible for us to determine with exactness the development of certain convolutions by the inspection of the external surface of the cranium. I was the first to treat in detail the variations in the thickness of the cranium which happen in old age, in insanity, etc. I was the first to teach that in certain cases the external table of the cranium is not parallel to the internal one. I have called the attention of anatomists to all these circumstances. Is it fair, then, of these anatomists to turn these facts into weapons against craniology? Why had they not the frankness to state by what means I have removed many of these difficulties, and to confess that I pursued my researches with candour, and considered it, in all its aspects, with impartiality? A critic who, in order to combat his adversary, is obliged to attribute to him opinions contrary to those which he professes, betrays the weakness of his own arguments.

By what right do these anatomists suggest the idea that a man, who for a long
GALL'S METHOD

series of years has devoted himself to the study of the functions of the brain with an indefatigable zeal and a love of truth, overcoming all obstacles, has neglected to observe so necessary a condition?

"It is true that, after the cranium is removed, the prominence of certain cerebral parts do not appear such as they are impressed on the cranium. But does it astonish anyone that the brain should sink and flatten down in some measure when the osseous box, which covers it and sustains and supports it on all sides, is removed?

"In examining the internal surface of the cranium of a subject who has not died of a chronic cerebral disease, we observe that the great blood-vessels of the dura mater are very exactly impressed upon it; we see also there the impressions of the so-called Pacchionian bodies, and the sinuses. The convolutions are found very distinctly impressed, especially on the orbital plate, the inferior anterior part of the frontal bone, and in the temporal bones. When from any cause the membranes of the brain become thinner than natural, we then distinguish the impression of the convolutions on the whole internal surface of the cranium.

"The head of a new-born child is from thirteen to fourteen inches in circumference; those of adults are from twenty to twenty-one inches and a half. (The old French inches.) The cerebral cavity, and consequently the whole contour of the head, enlarges in the same proportion as the brain increases in size; and this simultaneous enlargement continues so long as the head grows. The cranium yields constantly to the brain, as it augments in volume; and, as the bones of the cranium are very thin until the age of puberty, it follows that the external outline of the cranium is precisely similar to the surface of the brain. Some physiologists have thought that the enlargement of the osseous box was caused by the pressure which the brain exercises on the internal surface of the cranium; but there does not exist in living organisation any like mechanical action. There is continual absorption, secretion, nutrition, decomposition, and new formation. The osseous molecules are absorbed, and others are secreted in their place.

"The thickness of the cranium in adult age is from one to two lines. After the brain has completed its growth (at an age of thirty to forty), the cranium thickens by degrees, in the following manner. The bones of the cranium are composed of two solid osseous laminae, one forming the outer, the other the internal surface; the interval between the two laminae is filled with a cellular substance—the diploë; this substance is not of uniform thickness throughout, so that the two tables are more separated from each other at certain places than in others. Thus then, although the internal surface is exactly moulded on the surface of the brain, from the moment when the cranium has acquired a certain thickness, it cannot be asserted without qualification that its external surface exactly represents the convolutions of the brain. For if we take a cast both of the internal surface of the cranium and its external surface, we shall see that the first does not correspond exactly to the second; hence the inference that is drawn from the external surface of the cranium, as determining the form of the brain, must be false, and consequently craniography would be, at least in the mature age, a very precarious means for determining with exactness the degree of development of the cerebral organs.

"When, in consequence of a collection of fluid, which takes place in the ventricles of the hemispheres, the cerebral convolutions are unfolded and distended, the bones of the cranium are distended, whether they are yet united by their sutures or not."

The distance of the brain from the external frontal bone in certain animals is sometimes cited to cast discredit on Gall's claims; but here too, as in so many other departments, he was a most exact and conscientious observer. He described the crania of animals and the relations of their brains to the crania, and showed that in most animals it is only a part of the cranium which has any relation to the brain.

"In some species of animals, we can determine the form of the brain from an examination of the external surface of the cranium; in others, on the contrary, the external table of the cranium, either in its whole contour, or in some regions, is so
far from being parallel with the internal table, that the external form of the head and cranium in no way resembles the form of the brain. . . . Some species are without any frontal sinus; in others, the cells between the osseous tables extend not only to the frontal sinus, but spread all over the skull and into the horns; in others, there are only cells in one considerable part of the skull. . . . In night-birds the two tables of the skull are at a considerable distance apart, the interval being filled with very light cellular material. In certain species the tables are parallel, although at a considerable distance apart; in others, again, their directions are quite different. In dogs we may observe, as regards the muscular masses, the frontal sinuses, and the crests or ridges, a great difference not only between one variety and another, but even between individuals of the same breed. Some dogs have no frontal sinus at all; in others it is as big as in the wolf or in the hyæna. The cat, the marten, the squirrel, the horse, the ape, have no frontal sinuses; the ox, the pig, the bear, the elephant, etc., have them."

Some German anatomists believe that the shape of the head is due to the traction of the masticatory muscles and the insertion of the neck muscles at the back of the head. Both LANGE and J. ENGEL (1816-1899) held that the shape of the cranium depends on the traction which the muscles exert. But RIEGER does not hold that opinion. He says:

"I have seen many skulls cut open, but I have never observed any special connection between a strongly arched temporal bone and powerful masticatory muscles or between a flat occiput and feeble nape-muscles. What is it, then, that shapes the skull? Surely not," says Rieger, "individual parts of the brain?" Why not? "Because that would be acknowledging Gall's doctrine."

Here we have the stumbling-block to all the brain investigations of the last century. Truths cannot be truths if they favour a doctrine which we have dismissed long ago as untrue.

Various modern authors have expressed a similar view to Lange and Engel, quite unaware that Gall had also dealt with this problem. This is what he said:

"Some naturalists believe that the muscles, by the traction and pressure which they exercise upon the cranium, contribute greatly in determining the form of the head, and that consequently we may greatly deceive ourselves in estimating the shape of the brain from the appearance of the cranium. . . . The physiologists and naturalists who attach such significance to the action of the muscles upon the cranium may be divided into two sets, whose opinions contradict one another. Some believe the action of the muscles causes the protuberances on the skull; the others hold that they tend to flatten the skull. Now, which set is right? 'They are both wrong,' he says. 'The form of the head is determined in utero.'"

"If the prominences of the cranium were owing to the action of the muscles, they ought to assume the contours of the attachment of these muscles; but I have always found them to correspond to the underlying part of the brain. . . . If the muscles drew the bones of the cranium outwards, they ought necessarily to act with more force upon the external table, and separate it from the internal. But it is exactly there, where the strongest muscles act—in the temporal region and occiput—that the osseous plates are more closely in contact. . . . Negroes have stronger masticating muscles than Europeans, but have the temporal region flattened. . . . The muscles of the limbs are sometimes attached to prominences and sometimes to grooves, which proves that neither prominences nor depressions are formed by muscles. . . . In certain diseases the action of the muscles curves the spine of the back. In most of these cases the right shoulder rises above the left in consequence of this action; here, say they, is a modification of bones produced by the muscles. The instance cited shows that when the action of certain muscles becomes predominant, their most feeble antagonists yield, but by no means proves that the form of the bone is modified by such action."
GALL'S METHOD

The following quotations from old and modern authors will show that Gall's view that the skull grows with the brain and conforms to its shape is shared by an overwhelming number of eminent observers.

GALEN (131-201), "De usu partium," vol. viii., long since said that the cranium is moulded on the brain, and not the brain on the cranium. A. DE LAURENS (1550-1609), "Hist. Anat.," p. 139, and J. van DIEMERBROEK (1609-1674), "Anat. corp. human.," p. 534, taught the same thing in the XVIIth century.

J. B. FISCHER (1685-1772), anatomist, in 1743 wrote a treatise making the same observation.

J. F. BLUMENBACH (1752-1840) was equally convinced of it.

FRANCOIS MAGENDE (1783-1855) said: "The only way of estimating the volume of the brain in the living person is to measure the dimensions of the skull."

L. P. GRATIOLET (1815-1865), one of the greatest anatomists of the XIXth century, very accurately observed that the cranium surrounding the brain has the shape of that organ truly engraved, otherwise the original form would be lost when the brain is taken out, as it is only a soft mass, and collapses when the blood ceases to circulate in it. Fortunately this form, though lost in the brain, exists in the shape of the cranium.

The celebrated COUVIER (1769-1832) stated that: "The brain moulds itself in the cavity of the skull, which it fills exactly in such a manner that knowledge of the bony part gives us information at least of the form of the exterior of the brain."

The renowned PAUL BROCA (1824-1880) in "Memoires de la Societe d'Anthropologie," ser. ii., vol. i., p. 63, declared: "One can say, that in a general way, the capacity of the cranium increases or decreases with the volume of the brain, and that consequently a comparison of the capacity of crania corresponds pretty well with that of the brains themselves."

L. MANOUVRIER, the celebrated French anatomist, pointed out that the impressions of the convolutions on the inner surface of the skull are unshakable proofs, firstly, that the brain fits close to the skull, and secondly, that its position does not change, but it lies immovable. (Societe d'Anthropologie de Paris, November 4th, 1885.)

G. SCHWALBE ("Ueber die Beziehungen zwischen Innen-Form und Aussen-Form des Schädels," Deutsches Archiv für klinische Medizin, 1902), traced the various convolutions and fissures on the outer surface of the skull, and his observations, as he says, open a large field of new and truly scientific investigation on the lines of Gall.

NIC. RUDINGER (1832-1896) also traced the vaulting of the skull to the growth of certain convolutions.

HERMANN WELKER (1822-1897), who examined Schiller's skull, believed in the localisation of special capacities in the sense of Gall, only that Gall, in his opinion, was too impatient, and came to conclusions on insufficient material. He did not accept the details of Gall's theory.

RUDOLF VIRCHOW (1821-1902), "Ueber die Entwicklung des Schädelgrundes," Berlin, 1857, confirmed the harmony of conformation between brain and skull.

J. RANKE (1836-), in an address "On the Relations of Brain and Skull," stated that the differences in the form of the skull are entirely due to the differences in the development of the brain. (German Anthropological Congress, Danzig, 1891.)

EMIL ZUCKERKANDL (1848-1910), "Medizinische Jahrbücher," 1883, pt. iv., described the influence of the growth of the sutures and of the cranial shape in the direction of the convolutions, and agreed that "brain and skull develop together."

F. OBERNIER (1839-), "Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie," 1865, wrote: "All processes which augment the brain-substance have also an influence on the development of the skull."

R. B. TODD (1809-1860), "Cyclopaedia of Anatomy and Physiology": "A comparison of the external and internal surfaces of the cranium establishes the fact that there is a general correspondence of the two so far as regards those parts which are in contact with the periphery of the brain."

MORIZ BENEDIKT (1835-), the Vienna neurologist: "It has been objected that
there are in the skull very many accidental secondary prominences which have no counterpart in the brain. Fairly considered, however, this objection is not very material, inasmuch as it refers only to unimportant and changeable details and comparatively rare abnormalities. No scientific man, even if he does not altogether agree with Gall, disputes the doctrine that the construction of the skull is remarkably proportionate to the whole anthropological organisation in brutes and in man; and the whole craniology, as it is understood by anatomists and anthropologists, would have no meaning if this idea were not the leading one. . . . That types of skull are generally connected with types of character may be concluded with safety from the results of craniology in the animal classes and from the study of the skulls of different races."

Sir CHARLES BELL (1774-1842), in his "Anatomy" said: "The bones of the head are moulded to the brain, and the peculiar shape of the bones of the head is determined by the original peculiarity in the shape of the brain."

SAMUEL SOLLY (1805-1871), in his work, "The Human Brain," 1836, said: "The skull is moulded in its form and shape by the brain, though it is not uncommon to hear opponents ridicule the idea of a soft brain producing any impression on the hard skull."

Sir WILLIAM LAWRENCE (1783-1867), Professor of Anatomy and Surgery, St. Bartholomew's Hospital, in his "Lectures on Man" said: "The general capacity and particular form of the skull depend entirely on the size and partial development of the brain."

SAMUEL GEORGE MORTON (1790-1831), author of "Types of Mankind" and "Crania Americana" (1839) wrote: "The growth of the brain is consentaneous with that of the skull." According to his biographer, he saw nothing unreasonable in the doctrines of Gall, but much that was reasonable and worthy of being seriously maintained.

FREDERICK PETERSON, American Journal of Insanity, 1895, said: "It may be affirmed that every segment of the skull represents some particular part of the brain lying beneath it. This may be asserted without proclaiming one's self a proselyte of Gall."

Sir WILLIAM FLOWER (1831-1899), in his lectures at the College of Surgeons in 1879, said that "the skull is a fair index of the development of the brain in its different regions, and ought therefore to be studied"; adding that "the longer he lived he saw fresh beauty and meaning in every line and configuration of the cranium, and that the fact that he could recognise particular skulls when presented to him as belonging to certain nations is a proof of there being certain fixed and uniform laws in regard to them."

ALEXANDER ECKER (1816-1887), the great authority on the Topography of the Convolutions, said: "The cranial vault fits like a tight glove on the surface of the enclosed cerebrum."

Sir GEORGE M. HUMPHRY (1820-1896), Professor of Anatomy, Cambridge University, said: "The skull is moulded upon the brain, and grows in accordance with it. The size and general shape of the brain may be estimated with tolerable accuracy by the size and general shape of the skull. The frontal sinuses and the projecting ridges, the inequalities on the surface of the skull, which have no correspondences in the interior, do not amount to much, and do not affect the principle that the skull is moulded upon and fitted to the brain, and that its exterior does, as a general rule, convey pretty accurate information respecting the size and shape of that organ."

Sir WILLIAM TURNER (1832-1916), Professor of Anatomy in Edinburgh University and a pioneer in cranio-cerebral topography, drew attention to the fact that in certain regions the outer surface of the skull possesses elevations and depressions which closely correspond to definite fissures and convolutions of the brain, and he adds (West Riding Lunatic Asylum Medical Reports, vol. iii.) that "single psychical functions, and probably all, are related to circumscribed centres of the cortex of the cerebrum."

Sir DAVID FERRIER (1843-), one of the greatest authorities on the brain, who also studied cranio-cerebral relations, made the following statements (Harveian Oration, 1902):
1. The brain fills the cranial cavity like a hand in a glove and is closely appressed to the interior of the skull-cap.
2. Under normal conditions the amount of cerebro-spinal fluid is so small as to be practically a negligible quantity.
3. As a general rule, it is not till about the fortieth year that the cranial sutures (except at the base) become ankylosed, and the process is not completed till much later in life.
4. So long as the intersutural fibrous tissue is present, the cranium may increase.
5. Increase of the brain pressing from within can delay the closure of the sutures. During the development of the brain, the cranium expands according to the demands made upon it. The initiative lies with the brain.

Sir Frederic Treves (1853-), in his "Surgical Anatomy," says: "The amount of fluid in the subdural space is only enough to prevent friction during the movements of the brain. The fluid which is in the subarachnoid space over the convexity of the brain is insignificant.

Geo. M. Robertson, in the Journal of Mental Science, 1893, says the same as Treves.

Sir Thomas Lauder Brunton (1844-1916), Anthropological Institute, February 22nd, 1887, supported Gall's view.

D. J. Cunningham (1850-1909), Professor of Anatomy, at the British Association Meeting, Glasgow, 1901, said:

"The cranium is the outward expression of the contained brain, and the brain is the most characteristic organ of man; cranial peculiarities therefore must always, and should always, claim a leading place in the mind of the anthropologist. . . . During the development of the brain the cranium expands according to the demands made upon it by the growing brain. The initiative lies with the brain, and in normal conditions it is questionable if the envelope exercises more than a very subsidiary and limited influence upon the form assumed by the contents. The directions of growth are clearly defined by the sutural lines by which the cranial bones are knit together; but these are so arranged that they admit of the expansion of the cranial box in length, in breadth, and in height, and the freedom of growth in each of these different directions has in all probability been originally determined by the requirements of the several parts of the brain."

Alexander Macalister (1844-1910), of Cambridge University, said: "The largest part of the skull is that which is at once the receptacle and the protector of the brain, a part which, when unmodified by external pressure, premature synostosis, or other adventitious conditions, owes its form to that of the cerebral hemispheres which it contains. . . . So far from the shape of the brain being seriously modified by the constraining influence of the surrounding embryonic skull, the form of the soft membranous brain-case is previously moulded upon the brain within it, whose shape it may however be, to some extent, a secondary agent in modifying in later growth. We have also learned that the cerebrum is not a single organ acting as a functional unit, but consists of parts, each of which has its specific province; that the increase in the number of cells in any area is correlated with an increase in the size and the complexity of pattern of the convolutions of that area; and that this in turn influences the shape of the inclosing shell of membrane and subsequently of bone." (British Association Meeting, Edinburgh, 1892.)

Professor Symington, of Belfast University, at the British Association Meeting, 1903, said:

"It is the brain growth that determines the form of the cranium, and not the skull that moulds the brain into shape. There can be no doubt that within certain limits the external form of the cranium serves as a reliable guide to the shape of the brain. Indeed, various observers have drawn attention to the fact that in certain regions the outer surface of the skull possesses elevations and depressions which closely correspond to definite fissures and convolutions of the brain."

It seems strange that such a simple problem should not have been settled long ago. The fact is, few trouble their heads about it, otherwise it could be solved every day in any dissecting-room. I have carefully observed many dissections, seeing the skull sawn through and the brain exposed, and I have never failed to observe
that when the skull-cap was lifted off the brain showed exactly the same elevations and depressions as the skull itself. But even if this were not completely the case, we must always remember that we are looking for extremes of development and deficiencies, and are not trying to prove that every slight elevation or depression has its significance. It might well be that a special extraordinary growth of the brain in a particular area caused the skull-covering to arch conformably, without it necessarily being true that an average brain in average activity has such a power over the cranial roof. Gall himself acknowledged that "every individual cannot become the object of useful craniological observations."

Let us remember also, that the skull cavity is so closely filled by the brain, that any development of it must exert pressure on its own substance—with serious consequences—unless that part of the skull becomes elevated. Does not the shell of the snail and the shield of the tortoise expand with the increase of the animal? Why? Because the hard covering is made for the protection of the animal, and not the animal for the covering. Likewise the cranium is made for the protection of the brain. The brain is more essential to the end of nature than its osseous envelope.

It is sufficient to say that brain shape does in the main undoubtedly determine skull shape in human beings, at least in normal cases. Any deviation between the two skull plates, when it exists, amounts usually only to one-tenth or two-tenths of an inch, except at the frontal sinus and occipital protuberance; whereas the differences in the development of particular regions of the head amount to "entire inches." The general thickening of the skull often seen in the aged is in direct correlation with the shrinkage of the brain's bulk, the internal table gradually following the retreat of the cerebrum, so that, if the outer table does not likewise contract, either the two tables of the skull separate or the interspace is filled by fresh spongy ossification, making the skull as a whole thicker. This is conformable to the general physiological fact that the hard parts of the body are adapted to the size and form of the soft ones they enclose. In consumption, if one side of the lungs alone be affected, the ribs of that side sink down. If the eye be extirpated, the orbit becomes smaller; and if, on the contrary, it grows carcinomatous, the orbit enlarges as the eyeball increases in size. Precisely so does the skull follow the brain in its size and general configuration. It must be remembered that the bones of the head, like all other bones of the body, are alive, and their life is animal life, they are permeated by blood-vessels and absorbents; their materials are continuously in the course of removal and re-disposition.

That the skull-bones have the power to adapt themselves to abnormal conditions has been shown by A. B. Droušik ("On the Causes influencing the Shape of the Skull," St. Petersburg, 1883), who states as the result of his experiments on animals, firstly, that the skull bones increase in thickness in proportion to the diminution of pressure (reduced activity) on the part of the brain from the inner surface; secondly, that an abnormal development of the brain as well as any changes in its form influence the configuration of the skull and indirectly of the face.

With reference to the traction of muscles on the head, let me point out that the muscles are softer than the cranium, that, notwithstanding the muscles, the head increases in size; that the base of the brain is a solid structure which does not change much and is harder for the protection of the more vital organs at the base of the brain—not like the vault of the skull, where the almost immovable occipitofrontalis muscle is attached. If the muscles really did determine the form of the skull, they ought, obviously, to act in the direction of their insertions; and the protuberances of the occiput and sides of the head ought then to be directed downwards, not backwards and to the sides. There ought also to be some proportion between the size of these protuberances and the strength of the muscles inserted between
them; but it often happens that large protuberances correspond to weak muscles, and vice versa.

The brain is frequently described as lying upon a water-bed or as swimming in the cerebro-spinal fluid. The only portions which are really separated from the skull are the medulla oblongata and the pons Varolii, structures containing the centres controlling the action of the circulatory and respiratory organs and other vital functions, and may therefore be regarded as the most vital parts of the central nervous system, which need special protection. Otherwise, the amount of fluid in the subdural space is only enough to prevent friction during the movements of the brain.

Skulls vary in thickness, but since nature, in forming the bony frame of healthy people, has a uniform mode of working, a healthy man may be judged to have a thick skull if the other bones of the body are also strong and thick. On the other hand, we may infer from thin bones of the limbs a comparative thinness of skull under normal conditions.

Even if single convolutions do not impress themselves always perceptibly on the outer surface of the skull, groups of convolutions do modify the shape of the cranium; indeed, there are no two skulls alike, as little as there are two faces alike. My experience of those who deny the fact is that they are mostly men unaccustomed to look at the appearances of skulls and the surface of brains, though they may be expert anatomists and histologists.

The difficulty with reference to the frontal sinus has also been much exaggerated. In children one may ignore it altogether. The sinus does not generally appear before the age of twelve. After puberty it is generally present, and increases with age. In women the frontal sinus is smaller than in men, and only slight allowance need be made. In men the bodily constitution will tell us what sized sinus to expect. Where all the bones are large, the sinus may be expected to be large, though not necessarily so. In old age, in chronic idiocy, and in dementia it may be of abnormal size. Finally, the frontal sinus, even when excessively developed, affects only the centre part of the lowest segment of the frontal lobes of the brain, but does not affect the width of that part of the forehead or its length from the ear forward.

All these difficulties exist only for those who look for protuberances on the head; they do not affect the scientific man who looks first at the general configuration of the head, then at the development of the different bones which make up the skull, to judge of the size of the various lobes of the brain underneath, and who has a scientific system of measurement, not of one direction only, but including the length, breadth, and height of each region.

As has been pointed out already, every child is born with a tendency to that form of head which it afterwards assumes. To allow of this, the brain of the foetus is surrounded not by an osseous substance, but by a transparent cartilaginous membrane, which becomes osseous simply for the protection of the brain. Centres of ossification start about the eighth week. Could any person go to the length of imagining that the size and shape of the body are determined by the state of the skin which surrounds and protects it? Brain growth is the determining factor, and the skull grows upon, and accommodates itself to, the brain, whether the latter be large or small. Surgeons, like O. M. LANNELONGUE (1841-1911), who have removed strips of bone from the skulls of microcephalic idiots with the idea of affording more space and freedom for the growth of the brain, have evidently forgotten the fact; hence their failure.

A microcephalic brain is not a more or less normal brain of very small size, the idiocy resulting from the smallness of the parts present, but is always an abnormal and undeveloped, and in a great many instances a diseased, brain. Large areas of it may never be developed, and the cells that are present are small and comparatively few in number. If a strip of bone be removed from the skull, new normal
cells will not be produced; parts that are entirely absent cannot be created, and powers that do not exist cannot be called into being. The reported improvement after this operation is not due to the surgical procedure. Many cases have been reported at too early a date, and the improvement has not continued. When it has done so, it has been due to proper instruction and care, and not to the operation.

In old men, as a rule, the external appearance of the skull indicates what was formerly the shape of the brain, the internal table having receded to follow the shrinking brain. The skull will be spongy and lighter. In the chronic insane, on the other hand, the bones thicken, become more dense, compact, and heavier, approaching somewhat the texture of ivory. Most idiots also have a very thick cranium, when not suffering from hydrocephalus.
CHAPTER XIV

GALL'S CLASSIFICATION AND LOCALISATION OF MENTAL FUNCTIONS

Gall's localisations of the mental functions of the brain appear fantastic at first sight and give the impression of being the creation of his imagination. But we must remember that he made no attempt at a psychological analysis of mind and character — he simply recorded his observations. Yet the mental powers he located roughly agree with those of the modern psychological school, which has studied human and animal behaviour: Bain and Spencer began, William James, M'Dougall, Sutherland, Shand, Hyslop, Mercier, Coriat, Boris Sidis, Harry Campbell, Drever, Mott, Armstrong-Jones, etc., continued the inquiry. Gall emphasized:

"My views of the qualities and faculties of man are not the fruit of subtle reasonings. They bear not the impress of the age in which they originate, and they will not wear out with it. They are the result of numberless observations and will be immutable and eternal, like the facts that have been observed and the fundamental powers which these facts force us to admit. If the reasonings of metaphysicians are ever discarded, this philosophy of the human qualities and faculties will be the foundation of all philosophy in time to come. . . . Let man confine himself to the phenomena of nature, regardless of any of the dogmas of metaphysical subtlety; let him utterly abandon speculative suppositions for positive facts, and he will then be able to apprehend the mysteries of organisation."

But, it is said, granted even that he hit on the right elements of the intellect and emotion, or on some of them, his brain centres, provided that they can be localised at all, are mere guesses. The answer to this query can be only one: if they have been mere guesses, and not the result of careful observation, based in many cases on clinical and pathological facts, they have been very shrewd guesses, for some of them have been confirmed by more recent research. Other critics say that Gall's localisations have been rejected long ago and will bear no revival:

"It would be flogging a dead horse at the present day to offer arguments against the exploded doctrine of Gall, which has long been discredited by scientific men." So said one; and another: "We had imagined that Gall's doctrine had been judged and condemned long ago, and sank into an enormous grave where lie buried so many other huge and popular delusions. We must beg our friend not to prosecute this subject any further. People have all made up their minds about it."

These were the replies I received when I first attempted to revive Gall's doctrines. But it is not the question whether Gall's centres actually exist in the brain or not. I give them merely as a proof that localisation of "mental" functions is possible, and shall produce such evidence as will convince any one willing to listen that localisation is already a fact, as far as the principle is concerned, and that if we have until now failed in detail, it has been because of the insufficiency of our methods, and because we did not know what to look for. In my opinion, we have
now reached, after being for a century on wrong tracks, the right course, both psychologically and physiologically, for the unravelling of the relations between certain parts of the brain and the elements of mind and character.

**Accept nothing without proof and re-examination!** But clear your mind from preconceived notions, which frequently are based not on personally examined evidence, but on the faith in authorities of long ago who did not know better, considering the state of science at the time!

Gall studied the form of the brain in connection with the capacities and actions of man. When he claims to have observed that musical geniuses have a certain part of the brain and head prominently developed, and that tone-deaf persons have this part deficient, he is making a definite statement of observation, which cannot be contradicted by mere words. The observation itself would have to be repeated. This has not been done, until nearly a century later, when by other methods of inquiry, *i.e.*, by vivisection, clinical and pathological evidence, the possibility of such localisation was established and a centre discovered, which we shall see presently corresponds very nearly with that of Gall. He observed other varieties of genius to have other parts of the brain prominently developed; and men renowned for their crimes, or for their goodness and faith, or for their sensuality, still other parts. **He himself asked us not to accept these observations as established facts,** though he repeated them a thousand times. It is our duty to find out for ourselves.

The explanations may be wrong, the facts of observation will remain. As G. ANDRÁL (1797-1876) said:

"The question is not whether Gall erred in the determination of the cerebral organs. Even if no one of these organs has been found, the basis of the science is still unaffected. The principles of it have been laid down by the aid of induction, in itself most valuable, and sooner or later the facts will be accumulated. Then the science will be definitely formed, and if the great majority of these facts favour the principle laid down, we must not be embarrassed by a few exceptions, for these will be only apparent."

Gall’s psychology was arbitrary; his system, like most other systems, inadequate; but the principle, which he was the first to lay down—the localisation of function in definite parts of the brain—was true; and to-day our cerebral physiology, as far as it exists at all, is but a refined and more cultured expansion of Gall’s doctrine. For this service he should be remembered.

Gall first made his observations; when he was reasonably certain in his own mind that his localisations were founded in nature, he noticed that they followed a certain plan, namely:

1. The most fundamental instincts, common to man and animals, and tending to the preservation of the individual—"self-protecting," as he calls them—were found to have their seats at or near the base of the brain; as the instinct of propagation, love of offspring, instinct of self-defence, that of providing food, instinct of cunning, etc.

2. The social sentiments for the preservation of the species were placed in the posterior lobes.

3. Those intellectual faculties which man enjoy in common with animals were found to be at the base of the frontal lobes; perception of size, form, distance, number, colour, etc.

4. The higher intellectual faculties, the ethical, aesthetical, and religious sentiments, which are peculiar to man, at least as regards their degree of intensity, were found to be in the coronal region, *i.e.*, at the posterior part of the frontal lobes.

5. Analogous qualities were found to be placed near each other; for example, tone-centre and the centre for number.

In one respect Gall’s general exposition of the functions of the brain differs
essentially and totally from the modern view. Gall did not assign to the thin stratum of grey matter of the convolutions and cerebral ganglia the whole of the functional energies of the brain, and to its vastly greater mass of white fibres the mere business of conduction; he considered the grey and white mass together to be involved in the functions of an organ. Modern experimenters have tried to disprove his localisations by destroying certain areas of the cortex and noting the loss of function following. But if he is right, the mental function of any region of the brain can only be destroyed by the extirpation, destruction, or disorganisation of not only the grey matter, but also of the white fibres throughout their whole depth. Such disorganisation may possibly occur as a direct result of injury, or may follow subsequently as a consequence of atrophy where the nutritive function of the grey matter is suspended by the injury.

Gall did not personify the faculties and imprison them in circumscribed portions of the grey substance; but he regarded the grey area as the centre where the stimulus enters the nervous system through the medullary fibres of sensation, rouses a psychical image or feeling, and terminates in other medullary fibres appropriated to movement. In his opinion, the grey matter is destined for deliberation and repression.

Gall did not pretend to have discovered the ultimate nature—the elementary function—of the mental powers:

"I have made it," said he, "an invariable rule to advance nothing which I could not strictly prove, or at least render very probable by very strong arguments; for this reason, in regard to the qualities and faculties, the existence of which I maintain, I have always confined myself to the degree of activity in which I could discover them and observe their manifestation. I know it would have been more philosophical always to refer to their fundamental forces the qualities or faculties which I could detect in only their highest action; but I preferred leaving something for those who came after me to do, rather than give them an opportunity to disprove what I had prematurely advanced."

There was no analysis of mind and character available in his time; only now are we making attempts at it. What his contemporaries and the psychologists before him had described as fundamental powers—attention, memory, judgment, imagination—were in his view merely the general attributes of all the faculties.

"We see the poet, and the external mark of his talent; but this degree of activity is evidently the result of an extraordinary development of one cerebral part. What is the function of this part in its primitive destination? What is its radical fundamental function?"

Gall did not know. He also pointed out to the future inquirer that "a modification of a mental power, and the result of the combined action of several mental powers, must not be mistaken for elementary qualities."

This shows that Gall conducted his inquiry in the right spirit.

Gall did not map out the whole brain or circumscribe the region of each centre; neither did he pretend to have enumerated all the faculties of the mind. "Probably," says he, "those who follow me in the career which I have opened, will discover some fundamental forces and some organs which have escaped my researches." He was quite aware of the incompleteness of his discoveries. All that he claimed was to open the way for further research. As he said:

"I am far from believing that the edifice is finished. Neither the life, nor the fortune of one man, can be sufficient for this vast investigation. I have had to depend on my own resources. It will require many fortunes to bring this study to the perfection, which my unaided efforts could not alone effect." And again:
"I do not as yet know the functions of all the cerebral parts, consequently further discoveries have yet to be made. I have also more than once avowed, that it is impossible for me to circumscribe exactly the extent of each centre, and have urged this consideration with those who believed that in removing such and such parts of the brain they would be enabled to learn its functions."

Had Gall located only intellectual activities, there probably would not have been much difficulty in accepting his theory; but that he should attempt to find the centres from which originate the feelings and propensities of man aroused the opposition of the old psychological school. But then Gall was a naturalist, not a psychologist. He observed and analysed human behaviour, not the entities created by introspective meditation.

"The inquiry into the contents and the operations of the mind must be conducted upon the same principles as a physical investigation—that is, on natural philosophy lines." So said Gall. Now, psychologists are only just starting to make this inquiry, and they have not got very far yet. WILLIAM JAMES in his "Principles of Psychology," 1890, admitted that both psychologists and physiologists very much neglected the emotional nature of man and dealt only with the perceptive and volitional parts of the mind. It is only since James that the subject has received attention. Some of the essays of this school of psychologists (p. 283) are almost identical with those published nearly a century ago by the despised phrenologists in the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal (see Chap. XVII).

Gall, as I have mentioned repeatedly, made no attempt to analyse the mental powers. He contented himself with naming those for which he could find brain centres, in the terms of their highest activity and frequently of their abuse. This terminology of the functions of the organs was atrocious—the hoarding instinct was the organ of "theft"; the instinct for self-defence was the organ of "murder," and so on. True, he made his qualifications and explanations, and, later, modified his terminology altogether, giving his organs more reasonable appellations; but these were disregarded, so great was the merriment and indignation, and sometimes contempt, with which his earlier conceptions were received. A degree of obloquy was brought upon his doctrine, from which it has never recovered. However, if we take his later terminology and read more deeply, and take note of his explanations, we shall find that his mental powers correspond in the main with those of the modern school before mentioned.

This is what Gall said:

"Whatever the fundamental disposition, it would have been impossible for me to discover such a quality or faculty, unless it had been manifested in the highest, or, at least, in a very marked degree of activity; and I was under the necessity of giving it a name, derived from this high degree of activity. For example, the carnivora are forcibly impelled by an innate propensity to kill creatures necessary for their support; but never, as some of my opponents, with equal assurance and folly, have sedulously endeavoured to make people believe, never, in speaking of the instinct of murder, did I mean, therefore, a propensity to homicide. My principle is, and I shall always adhere to it, that to designate a fundamental faculty or quality, common to man and the lower animals, we must choose a name that will be applicable to both. But, certainly, a propensity to murder compelling to homicide, would be totally inapplicable to the natural destiny of the carnivorous animals. Would it be just for nature to withhold from man the means of ridding himself of his enemies? . . ."

"All the faculties are good, and necessary to human nature, as it should be according to the laws of the Creator. But I am convinced that too energetic an activity of certain faculties produces vicious inclinations—causes the primitive destination of propagation to degenerate into libertinism, the sentiment of property into an inclination for theft, circumspection into irresolution and a tendency to suicide, self-love into insolence, disobedience, etc."
GALL'S CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL FUNCTIONS

The analysis of the mental powers presents difficulties. No sharp line can be drawn between intellectual faculties, sentiments, emotions, and propensities, nor between animal and human faculties. *No faculty acts singly.*

"The moral qualities and intellectual faculties may be differently divided, if considered from a different point of view. We may divide them into sentiments, propensities, talents, and intellectual faculties. Pride and vanity, for instance, would be sentiments; the instinct of propagation and the love of offspring, propensities; music and mechanics, talents; and comparative sagacity, an intellectual faculty. It is often perplexing, however, to fix the precise limits of each division. The intellectual faculties and talents, when their organs are very active, are manifested in company with desires, propensities and passions; and the sentiments and propensities have also their judgment, taste, imagination, and memory.

"The more cautious observer would not venture to decide where the faculties of the brute end and those of man begin; hence it must be acknowledged that the division in animal and human would not prove satisfactory.

"The best division appears to me that of fundamental qualities and faculties, and that of the general attributes of these same qualities and faculties."

**A mental quality is considered primitive by Gall:**

1. When it exists in one species of animal and not in another.
2. When it varies, according to sex, in the same species;
3. When disproportioned to the other mental powers of the same individual.
4. When its appearance and disappearance is independent of the other mental powers;
5. When its action or repose is independent of the other mental powers;
6. When it is capable of being transmitted from parent to child;
7. When it is capable of preserving independently a degree of normality or abnormality.

Gall was the first to show us the *evolution of the mind of man*: First impelled by instincts, wants, or tendencies; next directed by sentiments, subordinating the selfish desires; and finally, the intellect springing up and growing in strength, subduing and modifying the impulses arising from the instinctive tendencies and sentiments.

Gall held that there are innate predispositions, but *no innate ideas*; these dispositions remain dormant if not stimulated by the senses; the propensities—to fight, construct, acquire, etc.—could only be developed by objects and would ever remain dormant without them. For example, in order to fight we must have an antagonist.

To most philosophers mind and intellect were synonymous. They viewed man as a rational creature, but Gall laid stress on the instinctive nature of man; *he was the first to treat of the propensities*, the appetites of man and animals. They over-estimated the reason of man. As a matter of fact, as I have already pointed out, the average man accepts the judgment of the herd and the persons whom he respects as authorities, but he does not formulate his own conclusions, in most of the matters concerning which he holds opinions. The intellect acts only in the service of the propensities as a means of attaining the ends to which they are directed. The impulses to action must come from the affective elements of our constitution. The intellect can only appreciate facts, not supply motives. Unless stimulated by the propensities, which present more or less definite aims, the intellectual powers might remain inactive, dormant, latent. As Gall said:

"The intellect is not the sovereign exercising despotic authority as the metaphysicians imagined it. The instincts produce certain wants, desires, propensities to action, and are most active in the ignorant, and therefore also in childhood; but also in later life, when the intellectual faculties are most active and cultivated, our actions are not invariably guided by what is called reason; hence the contradiction
we observe in human actions, the disorders of civilised society, and the obstacles placed to oppose progress.

"Man is said to be a reasonable being, and although the observation is just to a certain extent, yet are all his actions the result of reason? Are not many of his actions such as reason cannot approve? Is he not frequently influenced by feelings alone? And feelings which are purely of an instinctive character? Are there not such feelings as sexual desire and parental attachment? But are they the result of reason? Do we not find them in powerful operation in inferior animals?"

"When the superior qualities and faculties, proper to the human species, pre-dominate greatly over the qualities and faculties of an inferior order, the man, properly so called, will subdue the animal in him. The contrary takes place with those in whom the organs of the animal qualities and faculties have reached a considerable development and activity, while the organs of the superior faculties are but little developed, and have little activity. In these individuals, everything is subject to sensuality and error. In those cases where the qualities and faculties common to animals, and, at the same time, those proper to man, are equally active the character will be alternately influenced by both classes of faculties. They will be stimulated, elevated, or degraded according to circumstances. Such may be great in vice or virtue. These are the individuals who experience, in the most sensible manner, the struggle of two beings at war within them. When one or several qualities or faculties, whether animal or human, possess extraordinary energy, while the others are only moderately developed, there will result a pre-dominance in that direction, producing a particular talent, or a definite peropensity, good or bad, predominating over the rest. Where there is a deficiency in one particular organ, there is apathy or weakness in that direction. Lessing and Tischbein, for example, detested music; Newton and Kant had a horror of women. Finally, there is the crowd of ordinary men; but as in the brain the organs common to animals occupy by far the largest area, this class of men remain much under the influence of their animal qualities, their enjoyments are those of sense, and they never distinguish themselves in any remarkable degree."

**GALL'S MENTAL FUNCTIONS AND THEIR LOCALISATION**

**Combativeness, Courage, Fighting Instinct, Aggressive Instinct, Tendency to Oppose.**
Located in posterior part of inferior temporal convolution.

**Carnivorous Instinct, Destructiveness, Propensity to Annihilate, Impulse of "Anger," Irascibility.**
Located in the middle part of the inferior temporal convolution.

**Hoarding Instinct, Sense of Property, Acquisitiveness, Propensity to make Provision.**
Located at the superior anterior part of the temporal lobe, behind Constructiveness.

**Cautiousness, Foresight, Circumspection, Emotion of Fear, Organ of Melancholy.**
Located in supra-marginal convolution.

**Constructiveness.**
Located at anterior edge of temporal lobe, in front of Acquisitiveness.

**Propensity of Propagation, Sexual Instinct.**
Located in Cerebellum.

**Love of Offspring, Parental Love.**
Located in lower part of occipital lobe, near the middle line.

**Attachment, Social Affection.**
Located in occipital lobe, external to Parental Love.

**Inhabitiveness, Attachment to Home and Country.**
Located in occipital lobe, above Parental Love.

**Pride, Love of Authority, Self-Esteem.**
Located in superior parietal lobule, near the middle line.
Located in superior parietal lobule, external to Self-Esteem.

Firmness, Perseverance, Obstinacy.
Located at the top of the posterior central convolution, behind the Fissure of Rolando.

Verbal Memory.
Located in Island of Reil.

Linguistic Faculty.
Located posterior part of orbital convolutions.

Memory of Objects, Educability.
Located at lower end of first frontal convolution.

Memory for Moving Things, Memory of Events.
Located above the former in first frontal convolution.

Memory of Persons. Perception of Form.
Located in anterior part of orbital convolutions, near middle line.

Memory of Spaces and Places. Relation of Objects in Space.
Located at lower end of second frontal convolution.

Colour Sense.
Located in orbital convolutions, central and anterior. He was the first to show that colour-blindness is an affection of the brain, and not of the eye.

Faculty of the Relation of Numbers, Memory for Numbers.
Located at the anterior outer part of the orbital convolutions.

Tone Sense, Music.
Located within the Fissure of Sylvius at anterior edge of temporal lobe.

Time Sense, recognised by him, but he admitted having failed to discover its centre.

Comparative Sagacity, Deductive Faculty, Perception of Similitude.
Located in the middle of the first frontal convolution, above Memory for Facts and Events.

Metaphysical Sagacity, Causality, Inductive Faculty, Aptitude for Drawing Conclusions.
Located middle part of second frontal convolution, at side of Comparison.

Wit, Humour, Perception of Dissimilitudes.
Located in outer margin of second frontal convolution. In centre, external to Causality.

Poetical Aptitude, Ideality, Creative Fancy.
Located upper part of third frontal convolution.

Sense of Fine Arts; the Perfecting, Æsthetic Faculty; Sense of Beauty.
Not located.

Imitation, Tendency to Copy, Mimicry.
Located in ascending frontal convolution, below Veneration.

Sympathy, Benevolence, Compassion, Good Nature.
Located most posterior part of first frontal convolution.

Religious Sense, Veneration.
Located at upper part of ascending frontal convolution.

Visionary Capacity, Wonder, Inspiration, Prominent in Fanatics.
Not located.

Vol. i.]
To these Spurzheim and Combe added:

Alimentiveness, Desire for Food.
Located at anterior edge of third temporal convolution. In exactly the same situation as Ferrier's gustatory centre.

Conscientiousness, Sense of Justice.
Located by the side of Love of Approbation.

Hope, Tendency to Aspire, Mental Elation.
Located in front of the former.

Perception of Size.
Located in orbital convolution, next to Form.

Perception of Weight.
Located in orbital convolution, next to Size.

Time Sense, Perception of Relation of Objects in Time.
Located external to Eventuality.

Order, Perception of Objects in Relation to Sequence.
Located in orbital convolution internal to Number.

Anyone looking at Gall's classification of mental activities and their localisation will, at first glance, declare it as "absurd" and "without the slightest foundation," and undoubtedly it seems so. But let us remember, Gall had a clumsy way of expressing himself, partly due to writing in a language foreign to him, and partly due to the fact that he was more of a naturalist than a psychologist. Let us therefore have patience in examining his statements, and we may find more treasure in them than is apparent at first sight.

First of all, it will be noticed that all the intellectual powers are located by him in the frontal lobes. He was the first to show that the frontal brain, that area which is largest in man of all animals, and lies in front of an imaginary plane drawn midway between the two ears (and more particularly the pre-frontal brain—that is, the region corresponding to the forehead proper), is the region for the higher intellectual operations: of observation and reasoning capacity. This has been confirmed since his day by various neurologists—such as Meynert, Hitzig, Ferrier, Macdonald, Bolton, Sachs, Mills, Durante, Oppenheim, and many others.

Gall regarded the frontal lobes as an inhibitory apparatus against the lower and more instinctive natural impulses and the purely vegetative functions. If this inhibition becomes weakened or disordered, predominance of the natural instincts or impulses occurs. Th. MEYNERT (1833-1892) "Psychiatrie" (1859) confirmed this view, apparently unaware of what Gall had said before him.

Gall's system explained the causes of individual talent:

"Neither psychology nor physiology has up to the present explained what gives men that special bias towards certain pursuits. There is no uniform type or universal talent—for painting, poetry, mathematics, music, mechanics, philosophy, language, acting, etc., all in one. What makes for greatness is the pronounced talent for one pursuit together with the relative imperfection in others. There is no one model type of man, just as there is no single type of dog. The organisation of the greyhound is different from that of the bulldog. . . . We all admit with Horace, that 'a poet is born, not made'—poeta nascitur, non fit; but if this maxim is just with regard to the poetic talent, it is equally just with regard to talent of every kind."

Gall placed a number of the special perceptive powers—for form, space, colour, number, etc.—in the orbital convolutions resting on the orbital plates at the roof of the eyes. This might be dismissed at once as contrary to anything we know; but I shall produce some evidence for it in that part of this work where I present my own investigations, which will justify us in leaving it an open question.

Gall was the first to show that colour-blindness is not an affection of the eye, but
of the brain, and that it is not "a good ear" that gives capacity for music, but a well-developed brain-centre for the appreciation of tones.

Nearly a century later, in a paper on "Colour-blindness" contributed to vol. v., pt. ii., of the Proceedings of the Bristol Naturalists' Society, the celebrated chemist, Sir W. RAMSAY (1852-1916) suggested, as something quite new, that the particular defect which causes colour-blindness may lie in the brain, not in the eye. Certain persons, he points out, are incapable of judging which of two musical tones is the higher, even when they are more than an octave apart. Yet such persons hear either tone perfectly; the defect is not one of deafness. "It must be concluded," says Prof. Ramsay, "that in such a case the brain is the defaulter, and it may equally well be the case that the incapability to perceive certain colours is not due to a defect in the instrument of sight—the eye—but to the powers of interpreting the impressions conveyed to the brain by the optic nerve. If this is the case, the problem is no longer a physical one; it falls among those with which the mental physiologist has to deal."

Apparently he was wrong with his localisation of his colour centre, but his location of the tone-centre, implying musical ability, coincides nearly with that of modern observers, of which evidence will be given later. He located the tone-centre in the superior lateral part of the head, which gives width and roundness to the forehead towards the temples. His location is based on the examination of the heads of Kreibig, Mozart, Haydn, Beethoven, Rossini, and many other eminent musicians, casts of whose heads were in his collection. He also observed cases of insanity in which there was almost a complete derangement of faculties, yet music remained preserved. He mentioned, too, a number of cases of more or less complete idiocy with a remarkable talent for music, thus showing that there must be an independent brain-part for it, which did not suffer in the general arrest of brain-growth. Considering further a number of cases of musical and arithmetical prodigies, he came to the conclusion that the explanation can only be that there is a separate centre for the appreciation of tones, number, and the other fundamental capacities.

"Such prodigies are, ordinarily, in every other relation except in their peculiar talent, children like others; which proves that the faculty by which they distinguish themselves, as well as its organ, is independent of all the other faculties and all the other organs, and that we must recognise it as a peculiar power."

Gall had to defend himself against the charge of materialism and wrote in the Petition to the Austrian Emperor in 1802:

"I have long ago made the discovery that the tone-centre is quite distinct from the proper organ of hearing. I have established, by evidence, the existence of a brain organ for the faculty of number. Because I have demonstrated the situation of these brain organs, do I say that, therefore, material organs feel and judge of the relations of tones and numbers?"

Gall's location of the "speech-centre" will be dealt with later in a separate chapter (Chapter XIX.).

Gall further showed that "memory" is not a single faculty but that each faculty has its own memory, and he distinguished certain special memories, for words, places, events, etc.

Gall's "metaphysical faculty," located in that portion of brain underlying the frontal eminences, "enables us to form abstract conceptions of a kind the most remote from all practical application; to discuss the ultimate causes of things, the nature and qualities of matter, motion and force, of space and time, of cause and effect, of will and conscience." This localisation is followed from the observation of heads of the philosophers of his day; and how great was the general interest
aroused in his doctrine is shown by the fact that the death-mask of Kant was presented to him.

Another intellectual power distinguished by him was the "discriminating" capacity (located internally to his metaphysical faculty corresponding to the region between the two frontal eminences). Of this he said: "Without discrimination there is no knowledge. Knowing a thing is, in a sense, being able to distinguish it from other things. So, too, in a higher sense, discriminative power is the ability to analyse, to criticise, to classify. There can be no order without it, and therefore no clearness. The power of intellectual discrimination differs in the case of different persons."

Gall showed that the moral feeling is not an omnipresent, infallible guide to conduct, identical in all men, but that it varies in different people, and even fluctuates in the individual himself, according to the state of his mental and emotional poise. **He was the first to hold that the moral sentiments, the highest acquisition of man, are part of our brain organisation.** A defective brain organisation leads to moral imbecility.

HENRY MAUDSLEY (1835-1918) held a similar view: "Moral feeling may be impaired or destroyed by direct injury of the brain, by the disorganising action of disease, and by the chemical action of certain substances which, when taken in excess, are poisons to the nervous system. When we look sincerely at the facts, we cannot help perceiving that it is just as closely dependent upon organisation as is the meanest function of mind."

The moral head, according to Gall, is above an imaginary plane drawn between the frontal and parietal eminences. "The "villainously low forehead," in spite of the affirmation of some theorists, will, to the majority of mankind, point to a villainous disposition; as the lofty forehead will to an elevated disposition—a rational sequence.

**The organs which minister to the necessities of our animal life are according to Gall in the temporal lobes.** If the temporal lobes are well developed, particularly in the lower region, the ears would appear set deep. In the typical murderer, as in carnivorous animals, the lower part of the temporal lobes predominates, when compared to the mild-natured man and frugivorous animal. The ears of the typical murderers are set very low and wide apart, thus giving more space to the inferior part of the temporal lobes. The murderer's head is therefore a wide and deep head; deep below an imaginary horizontal plane drawn between the frontal and parietal eminences. Gall asked us to compare as regards the breadth of head across the temporal lobes "the broad-headed lion with the narrow-headed horse; the ferocious, broad-headed bull-dog with the timid, narrow-headed English terrier."

These observations were confirmed by PAUL BROCA (1824-1880), "Revue d'Anthropologie," 1878, and MORIZ BENEDIKT (1835-1920), "Anatomische Studien an Verbrechergehirnen," Wien, 1879, and again in his article on "Der Raubtier Typus in menschlichen Gehirn," Centralblatt für Medizinische Wissenschaften, 1876.

**RUDOLF WAGNER** (1805-1864) *Untersuchungen über die Funktionen des Gehirns* (1858-60), gave the following figures to show that the uneducated labourer is broad across the temporal bones. Taking the entire cortex as 100, he showed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frontal</th>
<th>Parietal</th>
<th>Temporal</th>
<th>Occipital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gauss</td>
<td>39'4</td>
<td>16'7</td>
<td>26'6</td>
<td>17'5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuchs</td>
<td>39'7</td>
<td>14'6</td>
<td>24'3</td>
<td>21'4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>35'9</td>
<td>16'5</td>
<td>29'6</td>
<td>18'0</td>
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</table>
Not only are the temporal lobes in the uneducated labourer larger absolutely, but still more so relatively, considering the small size of the frontal lobes.

REINHOLD HENSEL ("Kraniologische Studien," Halle, 1881) observed the wide arching of the brains in ferocious animals, as compared with the frugivorous, and the greater width of diameter in males.

Gall's localisation of the "sexual instinct" in the cerebellum, which is the only localisation of his that has ever been tested, and in consequence of the failure of which his whole system was discarded, will be stated, with all the evidence he submitted, in a future chapter (Chapter XXXII.).

The "domestic propensities" are placed by Gall at the back of the head above the occipital protuberance. This region, especially the area for maternal affection, is larger in female than in male animals. Gall gave several sections of male and female skulls and brains, human and animal, which showed this quite clearly. He also stated that the posterior lobes were feebly developed in twenty-five out of twenty-nine women who committed infanticide, and that this region was well marked in negresses, among whom infanticide very rarely occurs.

Many naturalists to this day assume, with SIR RICHARD OWEN (1804-1892), comparative anatomist, a pupil of Abernethy, that the occipital lobes are peculiar to man. Gall denied this. He said:

"It is not true that the posterior lobes are wanting in animals. Many animals, as the elephant, the dolphin, and apes, have the cerebellum as much covered by the posterior lobes as man. The error has arisen because of the difference in position of the head, being more or less horizontal or vertical; the covering of the cerebellum being connected with the upright position of man and monkeys."

We cannot be surprised that Gall’s organology was not accepted, but that it should not have occurred to one scientist, whether physiologist, neurologist, or psychiatrist, to test the principle laid down by Gall and underlying his observations, however imperfect and faulty they may be, that the fundamental qualities of the mind, whether intellectual capacities, emotional dispositions, or propensities, are located in more or less circumscribed parts of the cortex of the brain, is an omission that cannot easily be pardoned. The neglect of Gall’s main principle of localisation has been, in my opinion, disastrous to science, for, as a consequence of this neglect, our knowledge in this respect is to-day not much further advanced than it was a hundred years ago.

We see, then, that according to Gall, the brain is composed of various parts, to each of which a special function belongs, and his system embraces the topographical determination of each of these parts, organs, of centres. It has been objected that Gall thus destroyed the unity of mind; but he replied:

1. That philosophers have always admitted mental activities of a sort.
2. That it is no more unreasonable that the brain, though a unity, should have different subsidiary parts, than that the body, which in one sense is also a unity, should have very distinct and independent organs, which yet fit into the whole.
3. Unity of mind is already destroyed by the existence of the five senses—one for seeing, one for hearing, etc.

"The same soul which sees through the medium of the organ of sight, and smells by means of the organ of smell, learns by heart through the organ of Verbal Memory, and is stimulated to kindness through the organ of Sympathy. It is always one and the same spring; only with you it moves a few wheels, and according to my view, a greater number."

Gall wrote to Baron Retzer:

"Allow me to touch upon two important defects in my work. First, I should
have conformed more to the spirit of the age, and ought to have maintained that we could absolutely ascertain by the shape of the skull and the head all the dispositions without exception, and instead of investigating I ought to have made the whole a speculative study. People are not charmed by, or interested in, a science which is hard to acquire. The premature judgments which have been pronounced, the jokes and squibs which have been let off at my expense, even before my intention or my object became known, go to prove that men do not wait for research in order to draw their conclusions." Other or more centres may be discovered, but "if we reflect on the number of possible combinations which may result from the twenty-seven or thirty faculties or qualities, from the reciprocal action of as many organs, we shall not be surprised at the infinite number of shades of character among mankind. How many different combinations result from the ten cyphers, from the twenty-four letters? How many different countenances result from the different combination of the small number of parts which compose the human face? How many shades of colours and tones result from the small number of primitive colours and fundamental tones?"

It has been objected that Gall's appropriation of particular functions to certain parts of the brain cannot be correct, because insects and reptiles exist which possess similar instincts, without the corresponding cerebral organs; but insects and reptiles have the power of motion, though they lack that area of the brain which is called the motor area; and they breathe and have their blood oxygenated, though they do not possess any lungs. As Gall said: "We might as well argue that the stomach cannot be intended for digestion because there are creatures, very low in the animal kingdom, which digest without stomachs."

Gall made it clear that the various mental activities do not arise through the senses; and that the sense-organs in the brain (the visual, auditory, and other areas) are distinct from the location of the various capacities and talents. This harmonises with Wundt's view, some eighty years later, that the brain areas of "perception" are not the same as those of "apperception."

Gall said:

"We no longer regard the external senses as the origin of our faculties. It is the brain which receives their impressions and operates upon them. The various senses merely modify the impressions created by external bodies, in such a manner as to render them perceptible by the brain, but it is the latter organ alone which perceives. This is proved by the fact that when the brain is diseased, perception ceases, although the organs of sense remain perfectly sound.

"The perceptive centres are perfectly distinct from the regions in which the perceptions themselves are placed; for the various talents for painting (colour centre), music (tone centre), etc., belong to regions of the brain which are quite distinct from those masses at the origin of the nerves which preside over perception properly so called. This is proved by the fact that a man's perceptions may be exceedingly clear and distinct, without his possessing the talents mentioned.

"People err when they believe that the eye sees, and the ear hears, and so forth. Every external organ of the senses is, by means of its nerves, in connection with the brain.

"The perception of bodies acting through the nerves is not the office of the brain taken in mass, but belongs to certain portions of the cortex destined for that purpose. This might be proved by showing that certain partial affections of the brain prevent the production of perceptions which should arrive from certain senses, while the perceptions excited by the other senses are uninterrupted."

Gall pointed to the fact that the intellectual faculties are to a certain degree independent of some of the special senses, inasmuch as persons born blind, deaf and dumb may be very intelligent. Have we not had examples of this since Gall, in Laura Bridgman and Helen Keller?

Gall also held that where the special brain capacity exists, opportunity alone is necessary to develop it.
GALL’S CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL FUNCTIONS

Whatever Gall’s errors may be, it must be admitted that he proceeded scientifically. It is impossible to do him justice in all his reasoning within the compass of a work like this. All I want to do is to initiate an inquiry into his doctrines and discoveries. His works have never been read. If my effort to give the stimulus to the perusal of his writings should succeed, it will be a great accomplishment; for he has remained for a century not only a neglected but a despised philosopher.

Let me give only one example in detail to show that he did not select his fundamental powers, for which he sought localisation, rashly; and that introspection, while seated comfortably in an armchair, or the vivisection of animals in a laboratory, are by themselves methods insufficient to disclose what are the fundamental attributes of mind and what are the centres for their localisation in the brain. Both psychologists and physiologists have dealt unfairly with Gall. He knew a great deal more than most of his critics.

The subject I will choose for quotation is that of “Parental Love.”

“Most insects, fishes, and amphibious animals, seeking to preserve their eggs from accidents, lay them in a place which facilitates the egress of the young, and where they are enabled to find food. Their solicitude for their young extends no further.

“In some of the species of these animals, the care that they take of their offspring even goes beyond this. Certain species of spiders carry their eggs in a little sack on their back, which they never part with except in the most pressing emergency, and which they immediately resume when the danger is passed. All those who have once in their lives destroyed an ant-hill must have seen with what earnestness the ants collect their eggs and larve, to replace them in safety. Wasps and bees, that at all other times permit us to observe them without manifesting anger, become dangerous to those who approach them in the season of their young. Who does not know with what indefatigable activity they nourish them, and with what courage they defend their young bees, with what anxiety they lick and caress them from the moment when they come out of the cells? We find also in birds this tender affection for their young. The more they are taught, by sad experience, the dangers that threaten their young, the greater pains do they take in building secure nests and in concealing and protecting them. After having with perseverance covered the eggs and hatched out the progeny, the parents nourish them with extreme tenderness; their watchful love foresees all the accidents which may happen to them, instantaneously gives them notice, and induces them to remain still and conceal themselves, or conducts them to a safe place. When the parents perceive that their brood is threatened, what anxiety, what alarms do they manifest! what stratagems do they put in operation to deceive the bird of prey, the serpent, the weasel, or man! and when we succeed in robbing them of their offspring, what painful cries, what stubborn resistance! Sometimes uttering plaintive accents, they follow the robber for considerable distances, to the very place where he deposits them, which they do not quit until they have lost all hope of recovering them; even hunger cannot make them quit in the moment of peril; often, even after long continued cold and humid seasons, we find the males and females dead, covering their young, victims also of the cold.

In the mammalia, also, the love of offspring is the most active and imperious of all the instincts. The mother observes with solicitude and anxiety everything which may become dangerous to her offspring. When the fox, the cat, the squirrel have the least indication that their habituation is discovered, they instantly abandon it, and conceal their young in another retreat. Animals of prey, however wild they previously had been, and with whatever caution they had concealed themselves in the vicinity, become rash when they have young to provide for; no danger stops them; they enter the gardens without caution, the poultry yard, the dove-cot, etc. When all the outlets of a burrow are furnished with snares, the foxes, when they have no young, keep shut up for fifteen days, until there only remains the alternative of dying of hunger or falling into the trap. But when they have offspring, the cruel hunter knows too well that the mother will not long resist their groans, and the
father also, after having exhausted all the means of safety, will soon become the victim of his tender love for his progeny. Cats nurse the young of which the mother is sick or dead. With what earnestness does the bitch implore the pity of her master who takes from her one of her young? The hind and the female roebuck forget that they are unarmed, and rashly precipitate themselves on the enemy when they are compelled to save or defend their fawns. With what fury does the wild sow defend her young! How formidable do animals of prey become when they seek food to appease the hunger of their offspring!

"Finally, who is there that forgets this admirable propensity in the human species? From the most tender age, nature begins to teach the woman the part of the mother, and makes her pass through the different degrees of instruction to prepare her for her future destiny. Observe this little girl, so seriously occupied in playing with her doll. She dresses it, undresses it, decks it in fine clothes, feeds it, gives it drink, prepares its night linen, puts it to bed, takes it up often, caresses it, gives it its lessons, scolds it, threatens it, and tells it stories. In this way she spends the whole day, weeks, and even months, with her dear doll. It is with hearty good will also that she assumes the care of her younger brothers and sisters. She feels, more acutely than they, their pleasures and their sorrows. Hardly does a new desire arise in her heart; nothing in the world has greater value or more charms in her eyes than babies. Where is the father, or the mother, who does not call to mind with rapture the time, when, being single, they hoped soon to be married? And when the early indications attest that the union has not been sterile, what joy! what mutual felicitations! what plans for the future! Some young women experience especially an inexpressible delight when they first perceive the movements of the living infant within them. The young wife becomes the object of the busy cares of the whole family; all await the decisive moment with impatience, mingled with anxiety! Is there any happiness purer than that which is depicted in the looks of a mother, watching with tenderness the wants of the infant that she presses to her bosom? What duty is there more to be revered and more sacred than the cares which parents take of the precious pledge of their love? If I had a city, there should arise in its centre an emblem of domestic happiness: a mother nursing her infant. Every time that a grandmother sees her grandchildren, or her great-grandchildren, the sentiment of maternity comes again to her heart, and this benevolent instinct acts still, when all the other propensities are almost entirely extinguished within her.

"Every sacrifice, the least action performed for the safety of a child, or to administer to its happiness, deeply affects us; all which discloses the heart of a barbarous mother fills us with indignation and horror; every injury inflicted on feeble infancy, or on a pregnant woman, or a nursing mother, revolts us. The interest, which infancy commands, influences even the judges in favour of criminals. Reflecting on all the circumstances that characterise the love of offspring, it is impossible to deny that it is an innate instinct, and intimately inherent in the organisation.

"In order to be convinced by the surest evidence that the love of offspring is an innate and particular instinct, let us follow it in its different manifestations in the different species of animals, in the two sexes, and in different individuals.

"In many species, the male have little or no love for the young; such as the bull, horse, stag, wild boar, dog, cock, etc. In these species the love of offspring appears to belong exclusively to the females. It is very rare to see a dog bring food for his female companion with young. In other species, on the contrary, the male and female equally love their young, and take care of them in common. This particularly takes place in those where nature has established union durable as life; for example, in the fox, wolf, marten, pole-cat; in almost all birds, such as the stork, swan, swallow, blackbird, nightingale, sparrow, pigeon, etc. In these species, when the female dies, the male continues to cover the eggs and nourish the young. When both are alive, they generally cover the eggs alternately, and take care of the young in common. Still, even in these species, it is observed that the female is more powerfully influenced by this instinct than the male. In cases of imminent danger the father escapes rather than the mother.

"In each of these two classes again there exist differences between one
individual and another. There are cows, mares, bitches, which submit with indifference to the loss of their young; some females even abandon them entirely as soon as they are born. Generally, pigeons, the male as well as the female, cover their eggs carelessly. They often let them get cold; frequently they crush them; sometimes they abandon their nest for the slightest cause; and when their young are taken from them they do not manifest much sorrow. Le râle des genets, called the king of quails, acts with so much assiduity, that oftentimes the bird is beheaded by the sickle of the reaper. When the building in which there is a stork's nest takes fire, the parents precipitate themselves into the flames, rather than abandon their young. The females of the silver rabbit and hamster neglect their young, and sometimes devour them, even when they do not want food. Other females are inconsiderable for the loss of their young, grow lean with sorrow, and utter lamentable cries. I have seen bitches seek their young for many months, with the most unwearied anxiety, attack with fury all those whom they suspect of having taken them away, and overwhelm with plaintive caresses those whom they believe are able to restore them; when they found all their hopes disappointed, they filled the air with their continued howls. Some mares have such a passion for colts, that they lead away those of other mares, and take care of them with jealous tenderness.

"In the different species, maternal love manifests itself still with different modifications. The female of the silver pheasant singularly loves her young; and on this account the nest and care of the young speckled hens are confided to her, in preference to the old hens. Some females have an affection only for their own young, and hate those of other females of the same species. The female partridge manifests the greatest tenderness for her own young, but destroys those of others. The common hen pheasant, on the contrary, shows much less affection for her own young, and abandons, with apparent indifference, those that have wandered away; but she receives with joy and takes under her protection young pheasants that are strangers to her.

"Some animals live a long time with their young, and constitute a family; others quit them as soon as they can do without assistance. There are numerous families of insects, of amphibious animals, and of fishes, the males and females of which do not trouble themselves about their young. Among birds, the cuckoo is entirely a stranger to the love of offspring. All her care for her posterity is confined to the preservation of her eggs, which she deposits in the nests of other birds, whose eggs she either eats or carries away. The masters of these nests, always smaller than the usurper, not only hatch out the eggs of the cuckoo, but still nourish, with indefatigable complacency, the voracious young cuckoo. When anyone takes him from the nest and places him in an aviary with other birds, or exposes him in a garden, all the birds around seem anxious to adopt him. I have frequently caused them to be raised by a wren; it was a pretty sight to see the adopted father mounting on the shoulders of the young cuckoo to introduce food into his mouth.

"Man constitutes a part of that class in which the male and the female love their young, and take care of them with common accord. Notwithstanding this, the woman very much exceeds the man in this respect. This instinct is manifested in infancy; the little girl reaches out her hand for the doll, as the boy for a drum or sword. When we wish a child taken care of, we call a servant girl and not a valet. Females who do not wish to marry, or those whose marriage is sterile, often adopt the children of others, in order to bestow upon them those cares which nature imposes upon the mother. The whole physical constitution of woman combines with her moral and intellectual character to prove to us that she is destined, more particularly than man, to take care of children.

"These striking differences in the manifestation of the love of offspring strongly prove that it is not a voluntary or factitious propensity, but an instinct resulting from organisation, varying like it, but always natural and innate.

"The manifestation of the love of offspring is a phenomenon of such daily observation that, on this very account, no one takes notice of it. Whenever, in my youth, I inquired the causes of similar manifestations, I was taken for a very singular man. It is natural, they replied to me, and my inquiry was terminated. But why is it natural? How has nature implanted this instinct in animals? Has she not been obliged to appropriate a part in the organisation, by means of which
this instinct not only becomes natural in man and animals, but becomes also in
them a want and a passion, which, at the same time that it procures for them
great pleasures, provides for the preservation and the education of their feeble
offspring?

Others would endeavour to satisfy me by speaking of instinct. In general, it
is by instinct, as we have so often seen, that everything in animals is pretended to
be explained, as, in man, everything has been accounted for by will and intellect.
But again, instincts also ought to derive their source from the organisation. They
are very different among themselves, sometimes even opposed to each other; they
are developed at very different periods of life; one instinct may exist, and not
another, etc. All the instincts cannot, then, be collectively considered under
the same denomination nor be derived from the same source. Naturalists only follow
natural deduction when they endeavour to seek a particular cause for a particular
effect.

"A mother," they say, "does not love her infant because she has a special
brain development; she loves her child because it makes, or has made, her happi-
ness; she loves it because it is a part of herself, because it is a part of the man who
is or has been dear to her; she loves it because it resembles her, or at least she
thinks so; she loves it because it is her work; she loves it from the pride she has
in being a mother; she loves it from the dangers she has been exposed to on its
account, from the pains it has caused her; she loves it because it is feeble and
requires her aid; she loves it because she has felt it within her, and because she has
heard proceed from its lips the sweet sound of mother; she loves it, finally, from
duty, from virtue, from habit if you will, when there have not been other reasons

"It certainly is not to such causes as these that the Creator has confided the
life and the well-being of children and the young of animals. He has provided
better for their safety. Let any one examine the hearts of tender parents, and
let him read there whether their love for their children is determined by such
artificial motives; if they can possibly do otherwise than love them? Do we not
find examples of this tender love in the most degraded individuals, in the most
savage nations—in a word, under circumstances where most of the motives above
mentioned do not exist? Finally, in all these assertions, we entirely forget the
animal creation, which affords thousands of examples of this strong love of offspring.
It is true that we may be sometimes tempted to doubt whether, in the human
race, the love of children is an inherent propensity. With what repugnance do not
certain women observe the first development of the fruit of their womb! With what
indifference do they not place in mercenary hands their new-born infant! There
are instances where, from the want of development of this particular brain organ,
this propensity is hardly manifested, and where this kind of insensibility is a natural
condition.

"The love of offspring, say some, neither merits recompense nor admiration.
Immediately after confinement, the breasts and nipple are distended with milk, so
much so as to give the mother pain; nursing becomes a matter of necessity; the
child or the young animals, by sucking, give ease to the mother; this is sufficient
to cause the mother to love them. It is proved by constant observations that
this immediate affection belongs essentially to the dispositions of the womb, or the
interior of the organ secreting the nourishing fluid; hence arises the necessity for
nursing and the pleasure that attends it. How can we transport to a cerebral
division the seat of such an affection?" (Delpit, "Dictionnaire des Sciences Médica-
les," vol. xxxviii., p. 267.)

"How can any one be so ignorant of natural history, and especially of com-
parative physiology, so fruitful a means of enlightening the philosophical physician
on the functions of our race? Where are those constant observations which
prove that the love of offspring belongs essentially to a disposition of the womb, or
the interior of the secreting organ of the nourishing fluid, etc.? As soon as the
infant or the young animals have quitted their parent's womb, and a long while
before the breasts are distended with milk, the mother warms, dries, andlicks them
with tenderness. If among them she finds one dead, she turns it every way with
the expression of the most melancholy feeling, and often preserves it many days.
What need of nursing have birds, and the males of those mammalia where the two sexes divide the care of the young, as man, the fox, the marten?

"Maternal love," says Richerand ("New Elements of Physiology"), "surely is not the result of any intellectual combination of cerebral action; it is in the bowels that it derives its source; it comes from them, and the greatest efforts of the imagination cannot produce it in those who have not enjoyed the happiness of being mothers." No! It certainly is not the result of any intellectual combination. But Richerand also would deny that the sentiments are an operation of the brain. The whole natural history of woman, from infancy to old age, refutes his gratuitous assertion. How often, I repeat it, do we see women who have never desired or never been able to become mothers adopt the children of others, and bestow upon them the most tender cares? Animals prepare nests or breeding-places before they have brought forth young.

"If the love of offspring, say my adversaries, were the effect of a brain organ, it ought to be evident at all times, but we observe nothing of this in animals when they have no young. But I have shown, when speaking of other instincts and propensities, that the reason why they do not always manifest themselves, proves absolutely nothing against their innateness. The various instincts can be individually active or at rest; that proves that they are independent powers and have separate organs. How happens it, notwithstanding this, that some women do not have equal love for all their children, that sometimes they hate some of them? This is of little importance. Dogs and cats frequently love one of their breed in preference to the rest, and in human beings additional influences, such as the character of the child, its beauty, etc., are at work. All music does not please equally well every musical ear, and every woman does not inspire every man with desire and love."
CHAPTER XV

GALL ON INSANITY, IMBECILITY, AND CRIME, AND THEIR TREATMENT

A PICTURE OF THE PERIOD

GALL ON THE NATURE AND PATHOLOGY OF INSANITY

It is self-evident that the teachings of Gall were bound to have a revolutionary influence on the prevalent conception of insanity and the treatment of the insane.

Gall interpreted all mental disturbance as a pathological manifestation, and welded psychiatry with general clinical medicine. He held that in order that psycho-pathology may acquire real practical value, it is necessary for it to go hand in hand with normal psychology. But we must not look upon normal psychology as a purely introspective analysis, but must examine normal psychical phenomena in relation to their anatomical and physiological conditions, that is to say, study the organic brain processes which are their essential basis. Insanity is not primarily, nor always, a disorder of the intellect; that is to say, it does not always comprise delusion, or faulty observation or judgment; but the mind may be disordered in any of its departments, and frequently the feelings are deranged without disturbance of the intellect. There is also moral disorder, sometimes amounting to insanity, unaccompanied by any delusion. (See Chapter XI. on Prichard and Symonds.)

Insanity is not a mental disease, for the brain only—not the mind—can be diseased. Therefore insanity is only a symptom of a disease or of numerous diseases, and a symptom which can only be removed by taking away the pathological cause inducing it; or, in other words, by changing the state of the brain on which it depends. It is the prolonged departure, without an adequate external cause, from the state of feeling and modes of thinking usual to the individual when in health that is the true factor of a disordered mind. Disturbance of mental function is not a specific disease, but an effect of various and often opposite affections of the organ which performs that function. With these views of insanity, it follows that Gall advocated an enlightened treatment of insanity at a time when the insane were chained in dungeons and kept in order by the lash.

Let us see what Gall has to say on the subject. He wrote:

"The most important of my results is the entirely new doctrine of the different kinds of insanity and their means of cure, all supported by facts.

"Many physicians speak of diseases of the mind. Certainly the manifestations of the mind may be deranged; but I have no idea of any disease or of any derangement of an immaterial being itself, such as the mind or soul is. The soul cannot fall sick, any more than it can die.

"It is but a few years since the directors of insane asylums and all those who wrote on insanity considered mental alienations either as diseases of the mind, with which the body had no part; or they placed their immediate seat in the chest or viscera of the abdomen. This general belief not only diverted the attention from
the true seat of these diseases, but it deprived the physicians of madhouses of one of the most precious and most fruitful means of discovering the true fundamental qualities and faculties, the relation of their alterations with the changes of the brain, etc., and of exposing the erroneous doctrines of philosophy which are still professed in the universities.

"As in the prevailing philosophical opinions of the schools, the activity of the mind was looked for in the intellectual powers; as, according to an axiom, its whole activity began with sensation, so that there was nothing in the mind which did not come into it by the senses; it was very natural to think always of the intellectual powers, when derangements of the mind were spoken of.

"For a long time deranged judgment was considered the basis of insanity. It is true, so long as judgment exists and corrects erroneous perceptions, the morbid affections of the five senses are not considered as insanity. So long as we know the incorrectness of our perceptions, we are not insane; but a patient is styled insane if he believes in such perceptions from external impressions which have no existence. But the power of judging is not always deranged. Many insane persons, if we grant their premises, reason with perfect consistency.

"I soon perceived that my researches would throw great light on more than one point connected with mental disorders. . . . All the mental alienations, with their influences on so many other parts of the body, have their principal and immediate causes in derangement of the brain. What an indication consequently this is to the treatment of these sad maladies. . . . How great must be also the utility of the pathological study of the brain in other affections, besides insanity, such as cerebral fevers, apoplexy, inflammation of the brain, etc., which are frequently so deceptive and which by the tremor, spontaneous vomiting and depression of strength, simulate diseases of a totally opposite nature. . . . 

"How could physicians, who had not the least idea of the functions of the brain in health, have just ideas of mental troubles? I employed myself, therefore, with opening as many crania of insane persons as I could procure.

"I know that anatomists and surgeons of celebrity relate that they could not find any morbid appearance in the brains of insane persons after death. . . . I was able to detect morbid appearances or organic alterations, either in the substance of the brain, or in the blood-vessels, or membranes, or even in the skull. . . . It is impossible to make accurate pathological observations upon an organ while we are ignorant of its structure and do not know its functions. The injury, new growth, etc., may not be in the cortex but in the fibrous part of the brain, or between the two hemispheres of the brain, or one hemisphere may have remained sound and assumed the function of the other,—in all these cases the mental functions might appear normal. The change in the brain is not always perceptible, the brain is not a lifeless machine, the derangement may be purely functional. This explains why, when a mental disorder has been of short duration, it frequently occurs that not the least trace of it can be found by a post-mortem examination; whilst, on the contrary, when the same kind of alienation has been of long continuance, the most marked changes are perceptible in the brain, the meninges, and the cranium. . . . Sometimes, indeed, considerable injuries of the brain do not disturb its functions so much as might have been expected, and at others the slightest injuries are followed by the severest effects. But the same thing occurs in other parts of the body. Moreover, very few philosophers have any correct ideas of the primitive faculties of the mind, and do not know what to inquire for. All the accounts of diseases or injuries of the brain, which do not, as is said, occasion derangement of the mental faculties, may be referred to this: the patient walked, ate, and talked; he did not lose his reason, that is he was not delirious, but retained his memory and judgment, and consequently had lost none of his mental faculties. A man had the anterior part of the os frontis fractured by the kick of a horse; although stunned, he answered slowly, and in an interrupted manner, the inquiries of the surgeons. Several hydatids were found in the brain of a camel, which had never ceased to eat or recognise its conductor. Therefore, in these cases, it is presumed that neither consciousness nor any of the intellectual faculties were affected. . . . The conclusion intended to be deduced from such facts would be true if consciousness, memory, recollection, and judgment constituted the whole of the intellectual and
moral powers of man and animals. Many of the lower animals evidently possess consciousness, memory, and recollection; they often judge very correctly of what is passing around them; but do they therefore enjoy all the moral and intellectual faculties of man? If a man, by a defect or disease of the brain, were degraded to the state of a dog, or an ape, could it be said that he had lost none of his faculties? . . . When a man whose character had been pacific became quarrelsome, after having received a blow on the head from a stone which laid open his skull, and another, whose previous inclinations had been honest, after having been wounded on the head, experienced an irresistible propensity to steal: can we say of these individuals, who certainly retained their consciousness, memory, judgment, etc., that their wounds had exerted no influence upon the manifestation of their moral and intellectual faculties?

“I rejoice in having been the first who attacked these errors of our most respected authorities, and of having effected the most happy revolutions, not only for the study of the nature of mental disorders, but also for their treatment. If all my researches had only this one result, I should deem myself sufficiently rewarded for my labours. If men of sense will not thank me, I ought, at least, to be sure of the thanks of fools.”

In Gall’s time, accidental symptoms of mental disease were taken for clinical entities, hence the frequency of “monomania” at that time. It was assumed that according to his doctrine all these monomanias and systematised delusions can each be localised in the brain. He protested against this, and explained that only the primitive power from which originated the special delusion has its seat in a particular area of the cortex. For example, there are endless delusions based on over-active suspicion. Suspicion is a primitive faculty and originates in some definite part of the brain, but not so the delusion or delusions based upon it.

Gall believed that the brain centre which is the most active in health is likely to influence the particular symptom of insanity; thus over-conscientious and anxious persons are more liable to be melancholic when, from some cause, they become insane.

The importance of Gall’s teaching becomes more apparent when we compare it with that of some of his contemporaries. Here is the most striking example.

J. C. A. Heinroth (1773-1843)—whose text-book, “Lehrbuch der Störungen des Seelenlebens,” Leipsic, 1818, is based on religion and metaphysics, and reads more like a medieval treatise on theology—drew his psychology from the gospels and considered mental hygiene to consist in piety, the etiology of madness in sin, and repentance and a return to faith to be the means of cure.

“Whatever one may say,” explained Heinroth, “there is no mental disease, except where there is complete defection from God. Where God is, there is strength, light, love and life; where Satan is, weakness, darkness, hatred and destruction everywhere. An evil spirit abides, therefore, in the mentally deranged; they are the truly possessed. It is no more absurd to hold that the insane are children of the devil than that the righteous are the children of God. In short, we find the essence of mental disease in the partnership of the human soul with the evil principle—and not merely in partnership, but rather in its entire subjection to the latter. This is the complete explanation of the lack of freedom or unreason in which all the mentally disturbed are involved.”

The greatest change in the general views of insanity was brought about by Gall in Paris. As he himself says: “Let any one compare the articles on Insanity in the Dictionnaire des Sciences Médicales by M. PINEL with the new opinions of M. ESQUIROL and the excellent works of MM. GEORGET and FALRET.” The two latter were disciples of Gall.

From the time of Gall’s arrival in Paris, the brain became an object of particular attention. Post-mortem examinations increased in number and confirmed Gall’s
GALL ON INSANITY, IMBECILITY, AND CRIME

observations. The reason why they did not always produce tangible results is pointed out by J. E. GEORGET (1795-1828), in his work on Physiologie du Systeme Nerveux vol. ii., p. 205:

"On the one side," he said, "the delicate and imperfectly known organisation of the brain hardly allows us to appreciate all the changes that can occur; on the other, in diseases of this organ, which, without being of themselves fatal, may endure for a great number of years, it is impossible, judging merely by an examination after death, to avoid confounding the cause of these diseases with the cause of death, and to avoid taking the latter for the former, the cause of death being generally much more evident than that of the cerebral affection. There is another consideration, which has always struck me, because it appeared to me highly important: it is, that we are seldom enabled to see a brain perfectly sound, since few patients die without being affected by fever and delirium, phenomena which depend upon irritation of this organ."

Gall was not the first to teach that insanity is due to disorder or disease of the brain; but he certainly insisted more on the fact than any physician had ever done. His contemporary, the great French physician and reformer, PHILIPPE PINEL (1745-1826), held the same view, and even went so far as to measure the size of heads to determine whether or not a form of head existed from which a disposition to insanity can be adduced. Gall did not entertain the idea, for, he said:

"Mental disorders are simply a derangement of the functions of the brain, in the same manner as other diseases are merely a derangement of the functions of other parts of the body. An individual may be affected with alienation, whatever be the form of the brain, just as any one, with the best constitution, may become sick. However, in such persons in whom a certain configuration indicates certain very active faculties, it is possible that these form the subject of delusions, should the person have become insane; and that is as far as we can go."

Gall had also much more definite and modern notions of insanity than Pinel. Indeed, much of the glory bestowed by posterity on the latter ought really to be conferred on the former, for Pinel ("Traité médico-philosophique sur l'Aliénation Mentale," Paris, 1801) seems really to have known little of insanity itself, making little distinction between mania, dementia, and imbecility. As Gall said:

"If anything vague is found in the opinions of Pinel, it arises principally from the fact that, in speaking of mental disorders, he does not sufficiently attend to the distinction between mania, dementia, and imbecility. Mania, dementia, and imbecility are mental diseases; but neither dementia, nor imbecility, is mania; nor is mania, dementia. . . . Dementia differs essentially from mania and melancholia. . . . Dementia must not be confounded with imbecility and idiocy. The imbecile has never had the faculties of the understanding sufficiently energetic, or sufficiently developed, to reason correctly. One who has fallen into dementia has lost a great part of those faculties.

"Mania and dementia, as I have already observed, have no connection with any particular conformation of the head, or with its volume. It is very different with congenital imbecility. . . . True, the extreme smallness of the cranium, and the manifest want of cerebral development, are not the only reasons why the intellectual faculties are so circumscribed; for, we meet with those who are born imbecile, the exterior conformation of whose heads by no means indicates their mental condition; yet where this want of development exists, there is always imbecility more or less complete. Pinel asserts, as we have seen above, that there are certain malformations of the cranium, which are connected with a state of alienation, especially dementia, or congenital idiocy'; this is true of idiocy only."

Pinel (ibidem, p. 142) located the seat of mania in the stomach, not in the brain. He said:
“It appears generally, that the primitive seat of this alienation is in the region of the stomach, and that from this, as a centre, the disorder of the understanding propagates itself by a kind of radiation. ... A prejudice most injurious to humanity, and which perhaps is the deplorable cause of the abandoned state in which the insane are almost everywhere left, is that of regarding their malady as incurable, and referring it to an organic injury of the brain. ... I can affirm, that in the great number of cases which I have collected upon delirious mania, which became incurable, or terminated in some other fatal disorder, all the results of autopsy, compared with the previous symptoms, prove that this kind of alienation has generally a purely nervous character, and is not the result of any organic unsoundness in the brain.”

Gall criticised this passage as follows:

“Pinel lays it down as a principle that the character of mania is purely nervous, and therefore concludes that its seat cannot be in the brain; but, when reasoning in this manner, he does not reflect that the brain itself is the most important part of the nervous system. ... I cannot agree with Pinel when he affirms that in most cases he has been unable to find any visible trace of disease in the brain of those affected with incurable mania. ... My own numerous researches contradict Pinel’s assertions. If, in future, this learned man will bestow more attention upon the diminution of the cerebral mass, and the changes produced in the cranium, modifications which I shall point out when I treat of the influence of cerebral diseases upon the brain, he will find much more frequently than he has hitherto done in the encephalon, sensible traces of the effects of mania, at least as secondary consequences of the previous derangements, which the vital functions had experienced. I am persuaded, indeed, that the cause of numerous mental diseases susceptible of cure is found in the abdomen, but so far only as diseases of the abdominal viscera become remote causes of those maladies; the proximate cause of mania exists, and must exist, in the contents of the cranium. ... For this reason, physicians who undertake the treatment of mental disorders ought never to lose sight of the great influence which the brain exercises over the abdominal viscera. Every one knows how much the exertion of the mind too long continued enfeebles the digestive powers; that grief often gives rise to disease of the liver, etc. In like manner, it is frequently very difficult to determine whether disorders existing in the abdomen have re-acted upon the brain and disturbed its functions, or whether the brain was the first cause of the disorder in the abdominal functions. It is certain that the observations of Pinel prove nothing against the doctrine that the brain is the seat of mania.”

GEORGES CABANIS (1757-1808) held the same opinion as Pinel, and said with reference to changes in the brain after dementia:

“Pinel affirms that he has discovered nothing of the kind in the bodies that he has dissected; and we may confidently rely upon the assertions of an observer so sagaciously and scrupulously accurate.”

J. E. D. ESQUIROL (1772-1840), a pupil of Pinel, at first agreed with him, but on becoming acquainted with Gall’s researches, he paid greater attention to the subject, and proved the existence of organic defects in the brains of deranged persons. (Dictionnaire des Sciences Médicales, vol. viii., p. 290.)

Still later, owing to the predominant influence of FLOURENS’ investigations, which—as we shall see presently—seemed to prove that the brain was a single organ, Gall’s doctrine was boycotted by all recognised scientific institutions; and the effect of this boycott is obvious in a discussion which took place in 1845, when M. BELHOMME (1800-1880) stated before the Academy of Medicine in Paris that insanity is connected with disease of the brain, and P. JOLLY (1790-1879) replied that we are not warranted in asserting that material lesions are necessary.

“Children,” he said, “are frequently attacked with inflammatory affections of the
brain, but are not insane. The lesions of the intellect do not require for their manifestation inflammation, softening, hardening, or any other material lesion. Hereditary predisposition, a bad education, moral commotions, alone suffice to give rise to them."

The reason for Jolly's view was that no changes were discovered in the brains of insane. Indeed, no changes were perceived until quite recent years. It was therefore supposed that the alteration in the ideas, emotions, and actions of the insane could not have a material basis. In this discussion, two physicians supported M. Belhomme, and three M. Jolly.

Those who belittle Gall ignore or know nothing of the history of insanity. Compare, for example, Gall's sound views of insanity as a disorder of the brain with the views held by the celebrated Dr. Prichard in England.

J. O. PRICHARD (1786-1848), as has been shown in Chapter XI, had said ("Treatise on Insanity," 1835, p. 30) that he is "acquainted with no fact, either in physiology or pathology, that these mental phenomena (the propensities and sentiments) take place through the instrumentality of any corporeal process whatever." The brain is for intellectual functions alone; the emotions of fear, anger, suspicion, etc., are not dependent on any bodily process. Now, since insanity generally starts with a derangement of the feelings, and the feelings, according to Prichard, are independent of a physical basis, insanity cannot be a bodily disease. Prichard went on to say:

"I believe most of the facts which appear to lead to this inference admit, when strictly examined, of a different explanation. Such apparent examples of disorderly sentiments and affections are often, if not always, dependent on some hallucination. The insane mother, who neglects her offspring, only feels aversion for little imps or demons, which she imagines to have been substituted in the place of her own children, when they were cruelly torn from her."

Prichard did not realise what every modern physician experienced in the treatment of the insane knows, that many insane mothers hate their children, knowing them to be their own; and many irascible madmen furiously attack those who, they are at the time perfectly conscious, are full of kindness and sympathy towards them, and whom they esteem and admire.

Prichard continued: "The irascible madman is a victim of some vexatious disappointment or mortification, which is continually harassing him." Then, referring to Gall's account of a boy who displayed depraved impulses after an injury to the brain, an observation not at all uncommon at the present day, he remarked: "A relation of this kind proves nothing. That an individual at the age of this youth should begin to display the influence of powerful passions on his mind is nothing extraordinary. If stories of this kind gain credit, the College of Surgeons may expect one day to march in triumph and take possession of the vacant seats of the criminal judges, and we shall proceed forthwith to apply the trepan where now the halter and the gibbet are thought most applicable." We shall show in Chapters XXXI. and XXXII. that many such operations have been successfully performed. However, Prichard must have thought of that possibility, for at p. 41 he said: "I am sanguine enough to hope that the time will arrive when we may be enabled to ascertain the nature of the cerebral functions, and, perhaps, to understand thoroughly the whole of the process which is carried on in this part of our bodily fabric. At present, however, we must confess that we are not in possession of one fact that belongs to it."

We have seen that Prichard considered the primary emotions independent of the bodily organisation; but what is still more surprising is that he thought the intellect...
had its seat in the cerebellum, not in the cerebrum. What was to be the use of the brain proper we are not informed by him. He explained this view, p. 474:

“When we consider the great amplitude which the cerebellum attains in man in comparison with its size in the lower animals, we are obliged, if we really attach any importance to such a system of correspondence, to acknowledge some relation between this circumstance and the transcendent superiority of the human intellect, compared with the psychical power of brutes. Other paths of observation lead us to a similar conclusion. Cretins, in whom the cerebellum is very defective, display, in different degrees, idiotism or deficiency of intellect. Again, injuries of the posterior part of the head are observed to be followed by stupor and loss of memory, indicating the function of the cerebellum to be connected with the exercise of the mental faculties.”

Injuries to the back of the head affecting the memory are explained now on the theory of contre-coup, the brain moving violently forward against the frontal bone; and we know now that plenty of cretins have large cerebella and that their condition is due to insufficiency of thyroid secretion. Blows on the back of the head are more likely to affect the occipital lobes of the cerebrum than the cerebellum, which is situated below the level of the occipital protuberance.

With such views, progress in this department of research has necessarily been slow.

Prichard was a distinguished anthropologist. His works on the “Physical History of Man” (1813) and the “Natural History of Man” (1843) remained standard works for a long time.

When Dr. John Epps (1803-1869), one of the earliest advocates of Gall’s doctrine in England, gave an address to the “Westminster Medical Society,” April 5th, 1828, on “Insanity,” Mr. Bennett, the well-known surgeon, replied, “that he could not assent to the proposition of the author of the paper that mind comes from matter. He stated that there is no perceptible difference between the brain of man and of animals.” (Lancet, April 19th, 1828.)

THE TREATMENT OF THE INSANE IN GALL’S TIME AND AFTER

In Gall’s time, although the insane were no longer regarded as the peculiar property of the devil, it was thought that they had no claim upon the consideration of society. So long as the madman was prevented from troubling his fellow-men the community felt that every duty had been discharged. When all knowledge of mental action was gained by observation of self-consciousness, men naturally formed opinions from their own experience which they applied to the mental state of criminals and insane persons; feeling that they themselves had a consciousness of right and wrong, and a power of will to do the right and forbear the wrong, they never doubted that madmen had a like clearness of consciousness and a like power of will; that they could, if they would control their disorderly thoughts and acts. This was the epoch of dungeons and chains in the treatment of the insane, as we shall show presently.

Gall’s doctrine supplied lunacy physicians with a practical doctrine of the mind in place of the visionary theories which had been hitherto maintained. Gall said:

“These metaphysical doctrines are fraught with the most dangerous consequences, as we see in the cruel neglect and imprisonment in infected cells of those unfortunate victims, who should merit our compassion, and often our esteem. We hardly dare to fix our attention on the establishments for the insane; so defective are they in most countries, that they appear the shameful monuments of the most profound ignorance. . . . Villainous criminals who have disturbed the peace of society live in what might be described comparatively as palaces, well-aired, often with a play or exercise ground, and the whole building, even their place of worship,
warmed, hot and cold baths provided, and everything comfortable and clean; while the poor insane, who want and deserve our pity, live on straw and dirt, exposed to all vicissitudes of season and weather, reduced to the mercy of the turnkey, and less attended to than a horse or wild beast."

**Daniel Hack Tuke** (1827-1895), in his Prize Essay on the Management of the Insane, York Retreat, 1854, has described the condition of the insane in France, previous to the Revolution:

"Previous to the Revolution in France, the monk was the madman's physician, and the convent was his asylum. It is not to be doubted that, in some instances, he was humanely treated, but there is abundant evidence to show that the ordinary mode of treatment was to the last degree cruel and inhuman. Whether by these monks the insane were regarded as the subjects of demoniacal possession, and the idea was entertained of beating the evil spirit out of them, we will not determine; but whatever was their theory as to the *modus operandi*, the fact is indubitable that in some establishments at least, the practice consisted in the daily administration of about a dozen lashes to each unfortunate patient!... The practice of flogging has been mentioned; the maniac was almost constantly chained, and frequently was in a state of entire nudity; he was consequently filthy in the extreme. Often placed in a cage of iron, each revolving year still found him, crouching like a wild beast immured within his wire-bound cell, his limbs moulded to one position, and whatever of mind or feeling remained, crushed to its lowest pitch by changeless monotony, or maddened by intolerable despair. But whips and fetters were not deemed sufficiently ingenious. Chairs were employed, so constructed that all movement of the limbs was prevented, and others were devised to whirl round the patient at a furious speed in order to produce extreme vertigo and sickness; 'muffling' was also a frequent practice, by which was meant covering the mouth and nose very closely with a cloth, in order to see if it would quiet them."

**Vincenzo Chiarugi** (1759-1822) was the first medical man called upon to plan and construct an institution especially designed for the insane—St. Boniface in Florence. Here new methods were introduced, between the years 1774 and 1788, chains and fetters were abandoned, and patients were encouraged to work. But the chief impetus in the humanitarian movement is ascribed to his contemporary, Pinel, of whom we have already spoken.

In 1792 Pinel was appointed to the Bicêtre Hospital. The conditions which he had to face were graphically described by M. Pariset Etienne (1770-1847), Secretary of the Academy of Medicine and member of the Phrenological Society of Paris, in the eulogy pronounced in Pinel's honour before the Royal Academy in Paris, in 1828:

"In spite of the reforms attempted under the most humane of all kings, the hospitals of the capital were still in a deplorable state of barbarity. The one which presented the most revolting aspect was the institution of Bicêtre. Vice, crime, misfortune, infirmity, diseases the most disgusting and the most unlike, were there confounded under one common service. The buildings were uninhabitable. Men covered with filth covered in cells of stone, narrow, cold, damp, without air or light, and furnished solely with a straw-bed that was rarely renewed, and which soon became infectious;—frightful dens where we should scruple to lodge the vilest animals. The insane thrown into these receptacles were at the mercy of their attendants, and these attendants were convicts from prison, and used the whip and other instruments of punishment to coerce the unhappy patients, who were loaded with chains and bound like galley-slaves. Thus delivered, defenceless, to the wickedness of their guardians, they served as the butts for insulting raillery, or as the subjects of a brutality so much the more blind as it was the more gratuitous. The injustice of such cruel treatment transported them with indignation; whilst despair and rage, finishing the work with their troubled reason, tore from them by
day and night cries and howlings that rendered yet more frightful the clanking of their irons. Some among them, more patient or more crafty than the rest, showed themselves insensible to so many outrages; but they concealed their resentment, only to gratify it the more fully. They watched narrowly the movements of their tormentors, and surprising them in an embarrassing attitude, they dealt them blows with their chains upon the head or their stomach and felled them dead at their feet. Thus was there ferocity on the one hand, murder on the other."

These were the conditions Pinel had to face. In 1793, he made his appeal for abolishing the chains—at a moment when France, crushed under the Reign of Terror, was left to the mercy of a few men who were more eager to destroy their own species than to aid the diseased, infirm, and insane. "Are you yourself become mad," asked George Couthon (1755-1794), "that you would unchain these animals?" "I am convinced," replied Pinel, "that these patients would be less intractable, were they not deprived of air and liberty." He unchained about fifty of his patients, having prepared previously a strait-jacket, which could be tied behind the back if necessary. The first patient liberated was an English captain who had been in chains for forty years. He was very weak, but succeeded in time in approaching the door of his dark cell, when his first look was at the sky, and he exclaimed, "How beautiful!" This patient remained two years longer at the Bicêtre, and during that time rendered himself useful by exercising supervision over other patients.

While thus liberating the lunatic from his iron fetters, it must not be supposed Pinel instantly realised to the full extent the degree to which the insane may be allowed liberty of action. Mechanical restraint he judged necessary in a considerable number of cases where it would now be considered reprehensible to employ it. Pinel still bound and confined them. Nor could he change the prison-like aspect of their abode.

In two years Bicêtre was transformed, and Pinel was sent to the Salpêtrière, where he found the same abuses and where he undertook the same reforms.

Seventeen years after Pinel had knocked the chains off the lunatics at Bicêtre, the progress of his ideas had not advanced one step. Then J. E. D. ESQUIROL (1772-1840), his pupil, intervened. Having been ordered to make an inquiry into the condition of the insane and their establishments, he wrote these grievous words:

"These unfortunate people are treated worse than criminals, and are reduced to a condition worse than that of animals. I have seen them naked, covered with rags, and having only straw to protect themselves against the cold moisture and the hard stones they lie upon; deprived of air, of water to quench their thirst, and of all the necessities of life; given up to mere gaolers, and left to their brutal surveillance. I have seen them in their narrow and filthy cells, without light and air, fastened with chains in these dens, in which one could not keep wild beasts... This I have seen in France, and the insane are everywhere in Europe treated the same way."

When Esquirol succeeded Pinel at the Salpêtrière (1810), he made great reforms in housing and regimen; but he still used seclusion and the strait-jacket. He was the first to establish a clinic for mental diseases and to lecture on psychiatry, in 1817. He wrote "Des Maladies Mentales," Paris (1838). He professed to be an opponent of Gall, but he was not an active one, and certainly had imbibed his principles. ANDREW COMBE (1797-1847), who was one of his students, put it on record that he "talked Gall" in his lectures, so that many mistook him for a disciple of his. Most of his pupils were active followers of Gall, members of the Phrenological Society of Paris. There were VOISIN, FALRET, FOVILLE, DELAYE, ROSTAN,
the celebrated GEORGET, and many others, who were all placed at the head of asylums (see Chapter XVI.).

**J. E. GEORGET** (1795-1828), who lived for years in the midst of lunacy at the Salpêtrière, became like others an avowed advocate of Gall’s doctrines, and by his writings on insanity did much to diffuse sounder views of its nature and treatment, which effected much good in later years. In his work “De la Folie,” published in 1820, he lay down the following principles of treatment:

1. Never to exercise the mind of the insane on their delusions.
2. Never to attack openly or roughly the affections and the exalted ideas of the deranged.
3. To create by diverse impressions new ideas, affections, moral emotions, and thus to restore the inactive faculties.

Thus we achieve the object:
1. To occupy the mind of the patient in another direction, and to make him forget his insane notions. We shall produce these effects by working upon the intellectual faculties, by manual employment, recreation, etc.
2. To counterbalance and finally to destroy by opposition their dominant ideas.
3. To give some motives in order to combat vicious ideas.
4. To excite the cerebral action of those who are stupid, etc., in order to break the chain of thought.

These are the means, then, which we propose to employ in the treatment of the insane. They consist briefly in conversations, the advice and counsel of the physician, the society of the convalescent, manual employment, agriculture, objects of recreation, etc.”

It was **G. M. A. FERRUS** (1784-1861), another adherent of Gall and member of the Phrenological Society of Paris, who first gave employment to the insane at the Bicêtre asylum and opened air work at St. Anne’s Farm.

Several works on Gall’s lines were now published by members of the Phrenological Society. Among them was “Physiologie de l’Homme,” by N. P. ADELON (1782-1862), who also wrote “Analyse d’un Cours du Dr. Gall”; “Sur la Folie,” by F. J. V. BROUSSAIS (1772-1838); “De l’Hypochondrie et du Suicide” and “Folie Circulaire,” by J. P. FALRET (1794-1870); “Nouveaux Elements d’Hygiène” and “Gymnastique Médicale,” by CHARLES LONDE (1795-1862); and “Des Causes des Maladies Mentales,” by the celebrated FÉLIX VOISIN (1794-1872), the favourite pupil of Esquirol and successor of Georget.

**TREATMENT OF INSANE IN ENGLAND**

Pinel’s remarkable experiment was unknown in England for many years. The state of affairs in England at this period was no better than Pinel had found it in France. The asylum at York and Bethlem Hospital in London, unenviably immortalised by the great pictorial satirist Hogarth, and the records of Evelyn, were the homes of injustice, cruelty, and flagrant abuses, no less revolting than those described at Bicêtre.

The unsuccessful treatment of George III., first by WILLIS, the ecclesiastic, who founded a private asylum at a small village called Greatford, and later by SIR EVERARD HÔME, physician, aroused in England an interest in insanity and a general feeling in regard to the miserable management of the housing of the insane. Burke described the “dreadful mansions where those unfortunate beings were confined”; and Pitt, Fox, and other statesmen sat upon a Committee of the House of Commons, in 1763, to inquire into the state of private madhouses, but no action was taken.
In 1751, St. Luke’s Hospital was founded in London, and several similar institutions in other parts of the kingdom. There seems also to have sprung up about this time a very considerable number of private establishments for the safe custody of lunatics. But these, as well as the public institutions, seem to have been dens of misery and cruelty, where "chains, whips, darkness, and solitude" characterised the treatment. Up to the year 1770 the patients were exhibited to the public like wild beasts in cages, on payment of a penny; and they are said to have afforded much sport to the visitors, who flocked to see them, in numbers estimated at no less than 48,000 annually. Dr. Wm. PARGETER, in his "Observations on Maniacal Disorders," published in 1792, records that beating was a common practice, and that chains and cords were employed, such cords he witnessed to be tied so tightly that they lacerated the tendons and caused gangrene.

The abuses existing in the miserably conducted old York Asylum led to the projection by WILLIAM TUKE (1732-1822), a Quaker, in 1792 of the York Retreat, which was opened in 1796, where neither chains nor any instrument of punishment were allowed. This reform was initiated therefore about the same time in which Pinel’s appointment at Bicêtre took effect.

Elsewhere the treatment of the insane was still by flagellation, torture, confinement in dark rooms, and acute suffering, often until death released them. It was a treatment of the greatest cruelty, inhumanity, and barbarity. The insane were no longer tied to crosses, to pillars in churches, flogged at "trees of truth," or burnt as sorcerers at the stake, but they were still chained in dungeons, and the milder cases sent to common prisons.

The scandal was such that a Committee on Madhouses was appointed in 1815. The York Asylum, which was the worst, was burned down a few days later, and with reference to Bethlehem the Report says:

"In the men’s wing six patients in the side-room were chained close to the wall, five were handcuffed, and one was locked to the wall by the right arm as well as by the right leg. Except the blanket-gown these men had no clothing; the room had the appearance of a dog-kennel. Chains were universally substituted for the strait-waistcoat. Those who were not cleanly, and all who were disinclined to get up, were allowed to lie in bed; in what state may be imagined. One man had a stout iron ring riveted round his neck, from which a stout chain passed to a ring made to slide upwards or downwards on an upright massive bar, more than six feet high, inserted into the wall. Round his body a strong iron bar about two inches wide was riveted; on each side of the bar was a circular projection which, being fastened to and enclosing each of his arms, pinioned them close to his sides. The effect of this apparatus was, that the patient could indeed raise himself up so as to stand against the wall, but could not stir one foot from it, could not walk one step, and could not even lie down except on his back; and in this thraldom he had lived for twelve years. During much of that time he is reported to have been rational in his conversation. It is painful to have to add that this long-continued cruelty had the recorded approbation of the committee of management, the medical officers, and of all the authorities of the hospital."

The condition of the female patients is described as follows: "One of the side-rooms contained about ten patients, each chained by one arm or leg to the wall, the chain allowing them merely to stand up by the bench or form fixed to the wall or to sit down upon it. The nakedness of each patient was covered by a blanket-gown only, with nothing to fasten it in front; this constituted the whole covering."

The Report goes on to say that the overcrowding was terrible; the stench was intolerable; the cold, too, in the winter months must have caused severe hardship; there were no facilities for heating; yet many of the poor creatures were more or less naked; no glass in the small windows of the damp and dark cells, and the unglazed windows placed so high that no one could see out of them. Another of the horrors of those days brought out in this Report was the vice or immorality
which was rendered possible, and often actual, by the fact that the sexes were by no means rigidly separated, and specific instances are given of male keepers being in charge of female lunatics, and abusing that charge.

At this time, insanity, if no longer considered due to demoniacal possession, had chiefly a psychological interest, 

*suí generis*, and was certainly not considered to be a manifestation of a diseased nervous system. It is true that **SPURZHEIM** (see Chapter XVII.), the pupil of Gall, had published his "Observations on Insanity" in English, in 1816; and **ANDREW COMBE**, another able disciple of Gall, his "Observations on Mental Derangement" in 1831, when things were still not much better; but the official boycott of Gall’s doctrine by the medical profession, of which the next chapter will give information, prevented progress from being made. Indeed, we shall see that even eminent men of that day denied any relation between mind and brain.

In 1839, the new resident physician of the Hanwell Asylum (opened in 1831), Dr. **JOHN CONOLLY** (1794-1866), a follower of Gall’s doctrine (see Chapter XVII.), reported the entire abolition of mechanical restraint: "No form of strait-waistcoat, no hand-straips, no leg-locks, nor any contrivances confining the trunk or limbs or any of the muscles are now in use."

But previously, in the year 1836, the first experiment was made in not restraining the insane at the Lincoln Asylum by Dr. **GARDINER HILL** (1811-1878), and to the great surprise of the medical and general public he was able to say:

"Three successive months have now elapsed without the occurrence of a single instance of restraint in my establishment."

In 1838, the new treatment being still successful, he expressed the hope that his asylum might be an example to others, and that "undivided personal attention towards the patients shall be altogether substituted for the use of instruments of restraint." Dr. Hill further stated:

"Within the walls of the asylum I had the whole staff of attendants against me, for restraining a patient was a pretext for them to be idle and nothing more. . . . Outside the asylum I had the whole medical world against me. The superintendents of several of our largest asylums opened a regular battery against me. I was assailed right and left. The system was denounced as ‘utopian,’ ‘a gross absurdity’; some fulminated against it as ‘the wild scheme of a philanthropic visionary, unscientific and impossible,’ it was ‘an unnecessary exposure of the lives of the attendants—in fact, a practical breaking of the sixth commandment.’ Dr. James Johnstone said, ‘it indicated insanity on the part of its supporters, it was a mania which, like others, would have its day.’"

It was this experiment, described subsequently in 1838 by Dr. Hill at a lecture, that induced Conolly to embrace the new doctrine, and it was he who was successful in getting rid of all material impediments, hobbles and chains, handcuffs and muffins, when he became installed as superintendent of Hanwell Asylum. Both Pinel and Conolly possessed the rare gift of moral courage. They were reformers. But even after the system of non-restraint was proved to be successful, the superintendents of other asylums were still unbelievers. Thus Conolly, recording his success, said:

"Our asylum is now almost daily visited by the officers of other institutions, who are curious to know what method of restraint we do resort to, for they can scarcely believe that we rely wholly on constant superintendence, constant kindness, and firmness when required."

In 1844, he wrote: "After five years’ experience I have no hesitation in recording my opinion that, with a well-constituted governing body, animated by philanthropy,
directed by intelligence, and acting by means of proper officers entrusted with a due degree of authority over attendants properly selected and capable of exercising an efficient superintendence over the patients, there is no asylum in the world in which mechanical restraint may not be abolished, not only with safety, but with incalculable advantages."

Thenceforward progress was made. In 1840 the British "Medico-Psychological Association" of Asylum Medical Officers was founded. After 1864 began in place of the old prison-like institutions the building of asylums which attained more and more perfection. Instead of the dark cells of half a century ago, asylums were then built in England of almost palatial luxury, at least in outward appearance, eclipsing other institutions, such as prisons, workhouses, hospitals, and even the great public schools.

Previously to 1870 no real progress was made in the study of psychiatry because of the common belief that no pathological changes could be discovered in the brains of men who had died insane. Since 1890, the asylum staff, both doctors and attendants, have had to be specially trained, pathological laboratories have been established, and, of late, even psychiatric clinics in the centre of great cities, which—it is hoped—will assist materially the prevention of insanity.

**THE STATE OF THE INSANE IN OTHER COUNTRIES**

In Germany the great cities at the end of the XVIIIth century had hospitals for the insane; but **JOHANN CHRISTIAN REIL** (1759-1813), a defender of "vital force" who applied psycho-therapeutics in the treatment of the insane (see Chapter XI.), wrote of them in his "Rhapsodich über die Anwendung der psychischen Kur-methode auf Geisteszerrüttung," Halle (1803).

"These unfortunate creatures, like State criminals, are thrown into low dens which the eye of humanity never pierces. We leave them there to waste away in their own excrements, under the weight of the chains which bruise their limbs. . . . They are exposed as a sight for public curiosity, and greedy keepers make a show of them like wild beasts. . . . Whips, chains, and dungeons are the only means of persuasion employed by their masters, who are as barbarous as they are ignorant. . . . The bellowing of the maniacs and the rattling of the chains resound day and night in the streets; cage strikes against cage in these dens, and deprives each newcomer speedily of what little reason may have been left him."

Reil proposed that all asylums should become public hospitals, with a psychologist as well as a physician at the head. He started a journal for psychotherapy, "Magazin für die psychische Heilkunde." German psychiatric literature of that period was based largely on metaphysics and consequently laid stress on psychotherapy in its widest sense. When the influence of Gall began to be felt, the *somatic* school arose, which took the view of insanity being a purely bodily disorder. **C. F. NASSE** (1778-1851), **J. B. FRIEDREICH** (1796-1862), an avowed follower of Gall, and **MAXIMILIAN JACOBI** (1775-1858), were the chief representatives of that school.

**JOHANN GOTTFRIED LANGERMANN** (1768-1832), a reformer of psychiatry in Germany, was the first, in 1810, to place the curable and incurable in different institutions, and he divided disorders of the mind into idiopathic and symptomatia. His reform seems not to have had many followers, if any, for **J. J. S. SCHNEIDER** (1777-1855), in his book on the Treatment of Mental Disorders ("Heilmittellehre gegen psychische Krankheiten," Tübingen, 1824) contains still illustrations of instruments of torture being employed and such severe measures as "cold douches on a shaved head," "violent emetics and purgatives," etc.

It was a nephew and namesake of Spurzheim, the pupil of Gall, Dr. **KARL S.**
SPURZHEIM (1809-1872), who introduced the non-restraint system in the treatment of the insane in Vienna. Both in Germany and Austria the old accommodation for the insane was only gradually improved about the middle of the last century.

WILHELM GRIESINGER (1817-1868) was a pioneer in the development of medical psychology. The appearance of his work, "Die Pathologie und Therapie der Psychischen Krankheiten," 1845, made a startling contrast to the work of Heinroth. Griesinger, basing his science upon the psychology of Herbart, brought together, as had never been done before, careful clinical observation, psychological analysis, and the study of physiological and pathological changes. This was the first book on mental disorders on modern lines. Many writers on derangements of the mind, before him, insisted that insanity was not due to brain disease at all, since they could find in their post-mortem investigations of insane cases no brain lesions. Griesinger replied—almost in the words of Gall:

"Pathology proves as clearly as physiology that the brain alone can be the seat of normal and abnormal action; that the normal state of mental processes depends upon the integrity of this organ; and that both together are influenced by the state of the other organs in disease." The physiological and pathological facts of deranged mental functions prove unmistakably that the brain is the organ involved; "we, therefore, primarily and in every case of mental disease, recognise a morbid action of that organ. . . . Insanity being a disease, and that disease being an affection of the brain, it can therefore only be studied in a proper manner, from the medical point of view. The anatomy, physiology and pathology of the nervous system, and the whole range of special pathology and therapeutics, constitute preliminary knowledge most essential to the medical psychologist." And again he declared with italicised emphasis, "that the most important and most constant changes in the brains of the insane consist in diffuse diseases of the external layers of the cortical substance—that is, of the surface of the brain—and of the membranes enclosing them."

During the last year of his life, Griesinger outlined the idea of psychiatric clinics in connection with general hospitals, and such were established at all the German and Austrian universities soon afterwards.

F. A. H. VOPPEL (1813-1885) founded, 1867, the first agricultural insane colony.

In Holland, J. L. C. SCHRÖDER VAN DER KOLK (1797-1862), who in his work, "The Pathology and Therapy of Mental Disorders" (1852), confirmed some of Gall's localisations, caused, in 1837, a model asylum to be built by the Dutch authorities, near Haarlem.

Miss DOROTHEA DIX (1802-1887) helped to ameliorate the condition of the insane in America about eighty years ago, and was instrumental in founding no less than thirty-two asylums; and since the sweeping attacks by DANIEL HACK TUKE (1885), and WEIR MITCHELL (1894), facilities for the scientific study of insanity have greatly increased.

No name in connection with reforms in the condition of the insane in the United States is worthy of more honour and veneration than that of Dorothea Dix. Early in the field, never disheartened by the difficulties which beset her path, this resolute woman succeeded not only in exposing the once revoltmg condition and shameful neglect of the insane, but in inducing the State Legislatures to erect suitable retreats for them. More than this, she encouraged efficient medical men to come forward to superintend these institutions, and exercised her influence in obtaining their appointment. Furthermore, she watched over the hospitals for the insane after their establishment, and promoted their successful working by all the means within her power.

PLINY EARLE (1809-1892), a celebrated American alienist, in 1867, emphasised the importance of suitable employment of the insane, of the inclusion of psychiatry in the medical curriculum, and the establishment of psychopathic "hospitals."
Reviewing the history we have given, and after reading the reference to insanity in Chapter XVII, who can deny that it was due to Gall and his medical followers that a broader conception of mental disorders arose? Treatment was bound to improve with the recognition of insanity as a brain disease. In this respect Christian countries were behind the Mohammedan, for, as JOHN HOWARD (1726-1790) found in the XVIIIth century, the Arabs and Turks made a large and merciful provision for lunatics "as was not to be seen in Christian lands."

GALL ON IDIOCY

Gall made also some original observations on idiocy, more especially on microcephalic idiocy. He said:

"Their heads, measured immediately above the superior arch of the orbit and the most prominent part of the occiput, were from eleven to thirteen inches in circumference; and from the origin of the nose to the posterior part of the occiput from eight to nine inches. They consequently contained as much brain as the head of a new-born child, that is, a fourth, fifth, or sixth of the cerebral mass of an adult in the full enjoyment of his faculties. The perfect exercise of the mental powers is absolutely incompatible with so small a brain, and there always exists in such cases idiocy more or less complete; to this rule no exception has been or ever will be found. . . . When the circumference of the head varies from fourteen to seventeen inches, and the arc between the origin of the nose and the occipital foramen nearly twelve, these dimensions are accompanied with a greater or less degree of stupidity or fatuity—more or less complete inability of fixing the attention on a determinate object; vague sentiments, indeterminate and transitory affections and passions, an irregular train of ideas, speech consisting of broken phrases, or merely of substantives or verbs, blind and irregular instincts, or an almost entire absence of them.

"The orang-outang has not quite the same quantity of brain as the imbeciles of whom we have been speaking; and this refutes Buffon, who maintains that the orang-outang has as great a cerebral mass as man; from which this author thinks the conclusion legitimate, that the brain is not essential to the exercise of the moral qualities and intellectual faculties.

"Children from two to twelve years old generally have the periphery of their heads from eighteen to nineteen inches in circumference, and the arc, from the origin of the nose to the occipital foramen, twelve or thirteen inches.

"Heads eighteen, or eighteen and a half inches in circumference, are small, though not incompatible with the regular exercise of the intellectual faculties; they indicate a pitiful mediocrity, a slavish spirit of imitation, credulity, that species of sensibility which is easily raised to joy or tears, a very fallible judgment, an extreme difficulty in discerning the relation of cause and effect, a want of self-control, and frequently, which is a happy circumstance, but few desires. With this degree of development, however, there may exist one faculty or other highly developed.

"Still imbecility is not always the result of a defective brain organisation; the functions of the cerebrum may be impeded by other causes; for frequently we see idiocy with an apparently perfect organisation from birth."

Gall found in the brain of idiots the convolutions fewer in number, individually less complex, broader and smoother than in the apes; this condition resulting neither from atrophy nor mere arrest of growth, but consisting essentially in an imperfect evolution of the cerebral hemispheres or their parts, dependent on an arrest of development. With the animal type of brain in idiocy sometimes appear animal traits and instincts.

G. L. BUFFON (1707-1788) maintained that no difference could be found between the brain of an imbecile and that of one in the enjoyment of all his intellectual faculties, and, consequently, that it is impossible to admit the dependence of intellectual excellence on the perfection of the brain. This was because the cortex
of the brain, considered of much importance by Gall, was still neglected, and all
the structures in the middle and lower parts of the brain could be seen in both.
For the same reason, many anatomists denied any difference existing between
the brains of the higher apes and man.

The criticism of Buffon by Gall was mild compared to the bitter fight some fifty
years later, between OWEN (1804-1892) and HUXLEY (1825-1895), the two great
anatomists and naturalists, at the British Association Meeting in 1860, continued
in the columns of the *Athenaeum* in 1861, Owen declaring that there was a marked
difference in the brains of man and the monkey, and that the higher and the lower
monkeys stood in that respect nearer to each other than the highest monkeys to
man. Huxley declared the opposite.

To JEAN ITARD (1775-1838), of the Bicêtre, belongs the honour of having been
the first to recognise the condition of the imbecile and to take steps for its ameliora-
tion. The first idiot to be scientifically treated was the so-called "Savage of
Aveyron," in 1801. But it was not until 1839 that the first "special school" for
idiots was opened by E. S. SEGUIN (1812-1880), who in 1841 published "The Theory
and Practice of the Education of Idiots."

The first school for cretins was founded by GUGGENMOOS, in Salzburg, 1816, and
in 1839 J. GUGGENBÜHL (1816-1863), in Switzerland, began to study cretinism, and
opened a school on the Abendberg in 1842. In the same year, SAEGERT opened the
first hospital and educational establishment for idiots in Berlin. In 1846 HERMANN
KERN (1823-1891) established a similar school at Leipsic.

The Earlswood Asylum for the care and training of the feeble-minded, a model
private philanthropic institution in England, was founded in 1847, partly through
the efforts of Sir JOHN FORBES (1787-1861), afterwards a member of the Board, an
active advocate of Gall’s doctrines.

And yet another active follower of Gall founded the first school for teaching and
training idiotic and feeble-minded youths, namely Dr. SAMUEL HOWE (1801-1876),
of Massachusetts, in 1848.

We shall have occasion to refer to some of these disciples of Gall in a succeeding
chapter.

**GALL ON CRIME AND CRIMINALS**

Gall regarded the moral sense as innate, and if innate, he argued, it can be lost
the same as any other sense, and from a variety of causes.

He was the first to point out that moral defects are frequently caused by affections
of the brain, and was the first to describe moral idiocy, imbecility, and moral insanity.
By moral idiocy and imbecility, he meant the congenital absence or deficiency of
the moral faculties. Moral insanity assumes the loss of pre-existing moral qualities.
In all these cases there is a lack of moral judgment and ethical ideas—a moral
insensibility. Such persons may mechanically know the laws of morality, but if
such laws enter their consciousness, such persons do not experience any real
appreciation or regard for them.

Gall gave an enlightened account of moral responsibility, which might have been
written by any modern authority. He said:

"Legislators and moralists feeling that they themselves had a consciousness of
right and wrong, and a power of will to do the right and forbear the wrong, they
never doubted that all men had a like clearness of consciousness and a like power of
will. If an individual showed bad dispositions, it was because he willed them.
Offences and crimes have been considered without regard to the mental organisation
of the man who committed them. In the prisons, of which we have visited a very
large number, we have satisfied ourselves that the greatest number of the criminals
were born in districts and in conditions of life in which instruction and education,
moral as well as civil, are the most neglected. To alter the will of malefactors, it
has been thought sufficient to inflict penalties. Hence, criminal laws have been made, which have only determined what acts are to be considered culpable, and fixed for each a proportionate punishment without considering the different circumstances of the individuals offending.

"It has been argued that if man's evil propensities are innate, there is no longer any culpability in vice and crime; no one can avoid doing evil, and a criminal need only say that he has such or such a propensity to excuse all his actions and secure himself from punishment.

"But man possesses motives which urge him to do good and to avoid evil, and if through neglect the higher faculties are not sufficiently developed to restrain the lower ones, this only shows that not all men are equally morally free, are not equally guilty, although the positive acts they committed may be the same.

"There can be no question of culpability or justice in the severe sense; the question is of the necessity of society preventing crime. The measure of culpability and the measure of punishment cannot be determined by a study of the illegal act, but only by a study of the individual committing it.

"It is the nature of the act which determines the nature of the punishment without regard to the person committing it; undoubtedly we shall find too many difficulties in proceeding otherwise, and this is believed to be the only means of obtaining perfect equality and impartiality in the administration of justice. But it is evident that it is exactly in this manner that we render ourselves guilty of the most crying injustice, and, while we almost always fail in obtaining a just estimate of the crime, we fail equally in the proportionate application of punishment.

"Crimes and misdemeanours are not to be considered as abstract existences, but the result of the actions of individuals; they can only be estimated according to the nature and situation of the individual.

"Men have always regarded violent affections and passions as extenuating motives, such as anger, jealousy, etc., when, under the influence of these feelings, they were hurried into a criminal action. But are promptitude and impetuosity the only characteristics of violent affections and passions? It often happens that, although the storm rages in the mind, external circumstances may retard the explosion; it is not always the strongest sensations that burst out the most suddenly. He who is moved by fierce anger, often succeeds in restraining it, but the mind and body are more strongly agitated than if it were allowed its free course. The deeper a painful sentiment, and the longer it gnaws upon the mind, the more it weakens the powers and violently agitates the soul. An atrocious resolution adopted in this state should be regarded, under many circumstances, as the effect of the strongest emotion and perverted judgment."

How to deal with criminals is a problem which we have not yet solved satisfactorily, and it was a much more serious problem a century ago. Here, too, Gall showed himself to be an advanced humanitarian reformer, and no magistrate, judge, or legislator should fail to read his suggestions.

"We have seen that the want of instruction, the ignorance of moral and religious precepts, the laws and duties toward men and God, are the principal sources of the criminal aberrations of men. We must then endeavour to supply the deficiencies resulting from the organisation and education of these individuals. In the first place, prisons must become houses of correction. Criminals should not be herded together but scattered to one another their adventures and boast of their deeds, and thus to lose all shame and horror of crime; they should not be branded (as they were in Gall's day) so as to be an object of public disgrace, and they should be provided with the necessary means to earn an honest livelihood, as otherwise they are forced to devote themselves to crime to avoid starvation. Imprisonment is not always the kind of punishment best adapted to the character of criminals and their peculiar propensities. The society they enjoy renders their lives less miserable. If they are ill-fed, they are at least secured from all the wants common to this class of men; they are clothed and preserved from the inclemencies of the weather. On the other hand, the punishments are often severer than the law prescribes, especially when the buildings are insanitary, or placed in a damp soil, or when the walls are
GALL ON INSANITY, IMBECILITY, AND CRIME

317

damp—when glandular affections, pneumonia, dysentery, etc., are common. When the punishment of a criminal is limited to a detention for a stated period, it would be in accordance with the spirit of the sentence to inflict the punishment in a manner not destructive of the individual’s health.

"Prisoners who are accustomed by the regulations to inaction or are made to do useless work, when restored to liberty often are deprived of the means of earning their living for a long time. It is not surprising, therefore, that we find prisons filled with persons who have returned over and over again.

"Prisoners should be instructed in reading, writing, arithmetic, morals, and religion; and should be taught some occupation which would be of use to them when restored to liberty, instead of being made to pass their time in idleness or being forced to a labour which is no good to them."

In connection therewith, we must not forget that, in England at all events, JOHN HOWARD (1726-1790) began to direct public attention to the abuses in the administration of prisons some little time before Gall, in 1774.

The prisons of that period were vile beyond belief. Men were confined in dungeons rarely, if ever, disinfected after the death of previous occupants, and with their corridors connecting directly with the foulest sewers. There was no proper disinfection, ventilation, or drainage; and in most of the large prisons for criminals or debtors the jail fever was supreme, and from these centres it frequently spread through the adjacent towns. About 1750 began the work of John Howard, who visited the prisons in England, made known their condition to the world, and never rested until they were greatly improved. Though not a physician, he was the first to take notes on sanitary questions. His essays presented to Parliament demonstrated the awful neglect which obtained in lazarettos and prisons both at home and abroad. He showed that typhus arose from lack of hygiene, and in the course of his post-chaise travels and investigations in the South of Russia, he at length contracted this disease and fell a victim to it. As Sir SAMUEL ROMILLY (1757-1818) said of his travels: "What a singular journey! Not to admire the wonders of art and nature, not to visit courts and ape their manners, but to dive into dungeons, to compare the misery of man in different climates, to study the arts of mitigating the torments of mankind. What a contrast might be drawn between the painful labour of this man, and the ostentations sensibility which turns aside from scenes of misery, and, with the mockery of a few barren tears, leaves it to seek comfort in its own distress."

It was Sir SAMUEL ROMILLY who, in 1808, brought in his Bill to abolish the death penalty in cases of small gravity.

Prisons improved after the great work at Newgate of Mrs. ELIZABETH FRY (1780-1845). Transportation was abolished in 1847, and public executions in 1868.

Within recent years we have come to recognise that offenders must be taken in hand when found. One method of dealing with them is the "Borstal System," started by Sir EVELYN RUGGLES-BRISE.

Do criminals repent? Gall's answer to this question is:

"It is commonly imagined that malefactors, who are condemned only to imprisonment of greater or less duration, repent, and ultimately resolve to renounce their evil habits and return to good behaviour. Nay, more; the hope is cherished that those condemned to perpetual imprisonment, to hard labour for life, to the punishment of death, will make a sincere confession of all their crimes and all their accomplices; and in their effort to obtain pardon, at least in the other world, will be tormented by the stings of conscience, and will feel sincere repentance. But experience in this respect shows a very different result. I do not deny that some criminals do sincerely repent; those who have been drawn into crime by imprudence, an unfortunate fit of passion, poverty, seduction, or other very pressing external circumstances. When the fatal concurrence of circumstances has passed, the milder internal feelings will become active. A total contradiction is manifested
between the natural sentiments and the act committed; and this contradiction is what constitutes repentance, or the natural conscience.

"But he who is drawn into crime by an innate propensity will rarely experience natural repentance. In such a man the natural inclinations which lead to evil are predominant; if the expression may be used, they compose his proper character. Consequently, all his acts are in harmony with his whole being, and his tranquillity is rarely disturbed by them.

"This view of man's depravity may naturally displease those persons who dream only of the dignity of the human species. But observe closely the usurer, the libertine, the villain, and you will see that each of them is happy only in proportion as his desires are satisfied. Go into prisons; place yourself in the midst of the prisoners, avoiding the appearance of a public functionary, which would incite deception, and inspire these men with frankness and confidence: with what internal satisfaction, with what joy and vanity they will recount to you their crimes, without forgetting the most insignificant details! Calculate how many of them have been re-committed, and you will be easily convinced how few have repented. An abandoned criminal is rarely accessible to remorse and repentance, but I have seen many who, being convinced of the abominable character of their habits, have begged that they should be restrained from having it in their power to indulge in them. We should do the utmost to strengthen and multiply contrary motives, and where this fails, and we cannot reform the criminal, to proportion the punishment to protect society from the attempts of those who are more or less incorrigible."

This was written a hundred years ago. Now let me quote the most recent utterance of an expert of the present day—Sir BRYAN DONKIN, Medical Adviser to the Prison Commission, Director of Convict Prisons, who in the Journal of Mental Science, 1917, says practically the same thing:

"Here it may be said that most practical observers and students in the field of mental pathology, however they may differ on this matter, do undoubtedly recognise the frequent occurrence, in many kinds of convicted prisoners, of this defect (feeblemindedness or moral imbecility). It is marked by aberrant conduct which points to plainly inferior function, not only in the intellectual sphere, but also in the other so-called 'faculties' of the mind; and the defects indicated may be manifested in different proportions. These cases are certainly more common among convicts than in the general population; and whatever their nature be deemed to be, there is a general concensus of opinion that the characters manifested point to imperfect cerebral development as the predominant element in their causation. It is this prominent manifestation of defect which demands notice as carrying with it a claim for its subject to be credited with at least attenuated responsibility, or a modified liability to punishment, and, therefore, to be specially treated. . . . This mentally defective class which I have described includes criminals of many kinds. Their defect is manifest apart from their criminal acts. They are apparently unable to acquire the complex characters that are essential to social life, and are actually possessed by the large majority of men. These, according to their individual surroundings and the multiform influence acting on them, as on all men, tend to follow the path of least resistance, which is, more often than not, the path of anti-social action."

Classic moralists asked themselves whether a man with a brain organisation for murder is responsible for his crime, whether he is a free agent, whether he is so guilty as he is held to be when he yields to the cruel instincts with which nature, in his case a wicked mother, has endowed him. Is it just to be pitiless towards a man who has only obeyed his physical conformation, almost as a madman obeys the impulse of his diseased mind? But the same reasoning could be applied to virtuous deeds. Is much commendation due to the man who fulfils his duties, if his wise and respectable conduct be simply obedience to the good impulses communicated to him by his physical organisation? If there is barbarity on the part of society which
punishes the guilty, there is absence of merit in the well-behaved man. These results of Gall's doctrine were very embarrassing and almost immoral. They were difficult and painful to admit, so the world got out of the difficulty by rejecting Gall and his teaching.

**Gall is the pioneer of modern criminology,** a science which, while it was overdone by some of its followers, nevertheless contains many truths that are of practical value to humanity.

HAVELOCK ELLIS (The Criminal, London, 1890) said:

"Gall thrust aside for ever the credulous fancies of the physiognomists; and he has been described, not altogether without reason, as the founder of the modern science of criminal anthropology. He was certainly its most brilliant pioneer. . . Gall studied the brain, sought to differentiate the functions of its various parts, and the effects of its varying development on the skull.

"For Gall the varying development of the brain was the cause of the divergent mental and moral qualities of the individual; he was firmly convinced that all the facts of psychical life are rooted in the physical organisation; he wished to write the natural history of every primitive moral and intellectual force, in health as well as in disease. To the best of his ability he carried out his programme in detail, by an unceasing study of all the varieties of the brain and of the living head that he could find; he pursued his studies throughout Europe, in lunatic asylums and in prisons, as well as among the ordinary population, and he foresaw the extent of the applications of the science he was opening up to medicine and to law, to morality and to education. While his work extended far beyond the borders of what we should now call criminal anthropology, he devoted much attention to the problem of the criminal organisation, and even to its varieties, many of his observations according well with the results of recent investigations. More than this, he clearly advocated a method of dealing with the criminal which is now widely regarded as the only right and reasonable method."

**Gall regarded all men as potential law-breakers.** Few men are so fortified that they are not liable to make a slip from rectitude, more or less unconsciously, when placed in trying circumstances and seduced by temptation. Excluding such accidental offences, Gall recognised two factors which lead to crime, namely, ignorance and lack of moral sensibility. Both these factors diminish the human check on the instinctive tendencies, so that the propensities, i.e., the animal qualities, govern the whole being.

Now, an animal type of character will be shown by an animal type of brain, which according to Gall is indicated by prominent temporal lobes, giving breadth of the head between the temples; and deficient frontal lobes, giving a narrow low forehead; and frequently by deficiency in the occipital lobes, giving a short head from front to back.

Gall's criminal type is the same as described in later years by MORIZ BENE-DIKT (1835-1920), who like Gall called it a reversion to the carnivorous type, by HANOT and C. BOUCHARD, CORRE and ROUSSEL, TAMURINI (1848-1919), PAUL NÄCKE (1851-1913), and HENRY MAUDSLEY (1835-1918), late Professor of Medical Jurisprudence in University College, whom we propose to quote herewith:

"All broad-headed people," he wrote, "are very selfish; that is to say, all who have the head broad in proportion to its length. An undue preponderance of the breadth of the head indicates with certainty an animal self-love, which can scarcely be trusted at all times to adopt only fair means for its gratification. Undue preponderance, be it observed, for it is justifiable to expect a favourable result, even with a rather broad head which has a proportionately good length, and which has, so to speak, the power of its length placed in the anterior half thereof. And why? Simply because there is in the front the greatest natural power, the force of intellect, which, by exercise and development, is able to control the objectionable propensities
indicated in the animal broadness of skull.” He described a brutal head as follows: “The bad features of a badly formed head would include a narrowness and lowness of the forehead, a flatness of the upper part of the head, a bulging of the sides towards the base, and a great development of the lower and posterior part; with these grievous characters might be associated a wideness of the zygomatic arch, as in the carnivorous animal, and massive jaws. A man so formed might be expected, with some confidence, to be given over hopelessly to his brutal instincts.”

Gall considered it a mistake to think that every criminal bears these marks; not even the head of the worst kind of criminal need necessarily have that conformation. There are various causes that lead to crime, and criminals vary in character and therefore also in brain organisation. But given an individual at the meridian of life with this type of head, a bad inheritance, and a bad education, there is little or no chance of his reformation.

A murderer need not necessarily have a low head. For example, it was objected that John Thurtell, who was executed for murder, had actually a high head in the frontal region, as we find in benefactors. As a matter of fact, Thurtell, like many other notorious criminals, was noted for his benevolence. If applied to in behalf of a friend in distress, he drew out of his pocket his last remaining half-sovereign, with the remark, “He wants it more than I do.” He would shed tears over a quarrel he caused innocently. His kindness to friends and his affection toward all his family were extreme. When naval lieutenant, he was a dashing, thoughtless, good-hearted officer. Yet, from his early youth, he was irascible, and what was called a murderous shot; a very dare-devil, a kind of prize-fighter, a notorious liar, a dupe of all his gambling associates, and he became a premeditating, cold-blooded murderer.

That types of skull and brain-conformation are generally connected with types of character (due to habitual states of mind) may be concluded from the results of craniology of animals. A criminal type of head may be found in men outside prisons, but is far more common inside these institutions. All Gall wanted to convey was that, given the psychological characteristics of a typical criminal, there will be a particular cranial conformation. Of course, not all men in prisons have the same mental dispositions. All are there because of their anti-social tendencies; but while some are anti-social from mental weakness, others possess considerable intellectual capacity which they employed for criminal ends. The swindler, forger, pickpocket, require special skill; the burglar audacity, and so forth. Gall also admitted the modifying effect of the environment on the inborn characteristics, especially in childhood; but it may also render the inherited tendencies over-active.

Critics of Gall are fond of quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES' (1809-1894) sarcastic remarks in “The Autocrat at the Breakfast Table,” but they omit to mention that Holmes has said (“Elsie Venner,” p. 174):

“The limitations of human responsibility have never been properly studied,” except by Gall. Though Gall’s system is not a branch of positive knowledge, but only a pseudo-science, “for all that, we owe it an immense debt. It has melted the world’s conscience in its crucible and has cast it in a new mould, with features less like those of Moloch, and more like those of humanity. If it has failed to demonstrate its system of special correspondence, it has proved that there are fixed relations between organisation and mind and character. It has brought out that great doctrine of moral insanity, which has done more to make men charitable, and soften legal and theological barbarism, than any one doctrine I can think of since the message of ‘peace and good-will toward men.’”

HISTORY OF CRIMINAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Altogether, that department of anthropology which concerns itself with the study
of the physical and mental constitution of typical criminals—so-called criminal anthropologist—has contributed many facts of interest and value to the psychologist and criminologist. H. L. AUVERGNE (1797-1859) in France, in 1841, and ATTOMYR (1842) in Germany, had applied the theories of Gall to the examination of convicts; and their works, in spite of certain exaggerations of phrenology, are still a valuable treasury of observations in anthropology. Later PAUL BROCA (1824-1880) gave attention to this science by noting the peculiarities of skulls of habitual criminals. Then followed A. B. MOREL (1809-1872), Director of the Asylum at Rouen, with his doctrine of degeneration (1857). According to this doctrine the somatic factor in mental disorders assumes a high importance, whereas hitherto psychic causes were made to account for it. Organic causes, above all of an infective or toxic nature, lower the tone of the organism, injure its most vital organs, and disturb the most delicate mechanism of procreation. The offspring degenerates; the individuals carry in their person the stigmata of degeneration from birth, and evidence of this degeneration is seen in external morphological aberrations, lesions of internal organs, and, above all, in departures from the normal in the nervous system.

This doctrine was modified later by J. J. MOREAU DE TOURS (1804-1884) and attained a high development with the work of CESARE LOMBROSO (1835-1909), and grew under the influence of the study of biological heredity. It received an absurd extension by some, who explained all extraordinary gifts of men of genius as the outcome of degeneration, and proceeded to describe the stigmata, real or imaginary, of all the great men who have contributed to the happiness of the world by their productions in literature, music, and fine arts.

PROSPER DESPINE (1812-1892), in "Psychologie Naturelle," 1868, leaving aside the physical nature of criminals, made an exhaustive study of the capacities and character of "instinctive" criminals, in whom he found absence of human checks on the lower propensities. He pointed out the unforeseeing imprudence, the entire lack of moral sensibility and of remorse, which characterises this class of criminals, whom he considered "morally" insane, and therefore irresponsible.

He was followed by RICHARD v. KRAFFT-EBING (1840-1902), whose work on the "Grundzüge der Verbrecher Psychologie," 1872, made criminal anthropology popular in Germany.

But the real home of criminal anthropology was in Italy, where CESARE LOMBROSO, Professor of Psychiatry in Turin, made a close study of the physical and mental organisation of criminals. His work, L'uomo delinquente, 1876, has been translated into most languages. Lombroso founded the anthropological school which held that criminals are racial degenerates, or biological reversions to the savage state, that criminality is hereditary, innate, or constitutional, and that criminals must, as a class, be regarded as generally irresponsible and incapable of reform. Lombroso assigned to atavism a position of prominence in the etiology of crime; crime is a return to primitive and barbarous ancestral conditions, the criminal being practically a savage, born out of due time. This refers, of course, only to the habitual criminal. Prominent among the stigmata, pointed out by Lombroso, are: want of symmetry of the cranium, receding forehead, deformities of the jaw-bones, and abnormal shape of the ears. On the mental side he found the prime deficiency in criminals to be a want of mental power and an inability to resist temptation, which renders them unfit to earn their livelihood in the competition of honest industry.

The interest aroused by this now somewhat discredited teaching inspired many different attempts to establish the study of crime and punishment so far as possible on a foundation of observed and accredited fact. Lombroso was followed by PAOLO MANTEGAZZA (1831-1910), ENRICO FERRI (Sociologia Criminale, 1891), ANTONIO MARRO, GAROFALO, etc.

Vol. i.]
CHARLES FÉRÉ (Dégenerance et Criminalité) thought that the type reversion would have to be complete for the establishment of atavism. Anything short of this he classed as degeneracy. Atavism must not be distorted to mean degeneracy, simply because of its frequent association with that condition in the human subject.

We have already quoted Gall’s views on crime and punishment. MORIZ BENEDIKT, who examined Gall’s collection of criminal skulls at Baden, found that they showed a reversion to the carnivorous type, as evidenced by great temporal breadth and a defective development of the frontal and occipital regions. CORRE and ROUSSEL (“Revue d’Anthropologie,” Paris, 1883) found flattening of the frontal and the posterior part of the head.

J. WILSON read a paper before the British Association (Exeter) on “The Moral Imbecility of Habitual Criminals as exemplified by Cranial Measurements.” He had measured 464 heads of criminals and found that habitual thieves presented well-marked signs of insufficient cranial development, specially anteriorly.

LOMBROSO, too, had noticed brachycephaly and confirmed Gall’s observation that female criminals, even where sexual passion is exaggerated, have no love for their offspring.

TAMBURINI (“Archivio di Psichiatria e Scienze Penali,” 1889) described the case of a man who killed his parents and brother, in whom the temporal arches were prominently developed and close to the sagittal line, thus giving excessive width to the head.

F. PACINI (Ibidem, 1882) had found 14 skulls out of 25 of female murderers mesocephalic.

BORDIER, of Paris, published a study of a series of criminals, and drew the following conclusion (Anthropological Review): “The murderer’s skull is developed at the sides mainly, or in the lower part of the parietal and in the temporal lobes.” According to Gall, the sides of the head are the seat of the impulses, and the murderer is a creature of impulse. His lack of frontal development shows lack of reflective power. He takes no thought of to-morrow.

Of course, if the distorted skulls observed by criminal anthropologists mean anything in criminology, they imply correspondingly aberrant development of the brain beneath, with resultant perversions of the intellectual and moral faculties. Such persons cannot be held entirely responsible. A good argument to this effect was introduced by HENRY MAUDSLEY (1835-1918). He said:

“Take a quite young child, which is causing its parents alarm and distress by the precocious display of vicious desires and tendencies of all sorts, that are quite out of keeping with its tender years, and by the utter failure of either precept, or example, or punishment, to imbue it with good feeling and with the desire to do right. It may not be notably deficient in intelligence; on the contrary, it may be capable of learning quickly when it likes, and extremely cunning in lying, in stealing, in gratifying other perverse inclinations; and it cannot be said not to know right from wrong, since it invariably eschews the right and chooses the wrong, showing an amazing acuteness in escaping detection and the punishment which follows detection. It is, in truth, congenitally conscienceless, by nature destitute of moral sense and actively imbued with an immoral sense. Everybody who has to do with this unfortunate creature feels that it is not responsible for its vicious conduct, perceives that punishment does not and cannot in the least reform it, and is persuaded that there is some native defect of mind which renders it a proper case for medical advice. If bad organisation be admitted in such a child, why not in the adult?"

The latest work on the subject is “The English Convict—a Statistical Study,” by Prof. KARL PEARSON and Dr. CHARLES GORING (1870-1919), which appeared as an official publication in 1913, and has already been referred to. The authors hold that criminality is to be explained by the facts of its heredity alone. “The criminal
diathesis is inherited and crime is only to a trifling extent, if to any, the product of the environment or the force of circumstances."

They conclude that there is no such thing as a physical or "anthropological" type of criminal man. Yet they admit mental deficiency. Those convicted of crime are differentiated by inferior stature and defective intelligence from the non-criminal population. The most defective convicts as regards intelligence are those who commit murder, arson, theft, or burglary, and these form the large majority of offenders (if they had the brains they would more carefully plan their crime so as not to be caught; moreover, they would be able to earn their living in an honest way); less defective are those who commit crimes of violence other than murder; receivers of stolen goods and coiners are more intelligent than thieves; and forgers, embezzlers, and fraudulent persons generally are practically absent from the records of "mental defect."

The mental defects of a certain class of criminals is not the causation of crime, for non-criminals have these defects, but they contribute to the detection and conviction of crime. "The thief, speaking of course generally, who is caught thiefing has a smaller head and narrower forehead than the man who arrests him." According to these authors, the criminal possesses "anti-social proclivities," which amounts to the same thing as the inborn criminal propensities of other authors.

Sir BRYAN DONKIN says:

"Most of the human concrete characters that we choose to study, or that can be studied, are referable for their origin both to an inborn capacity for developing them, and to some external stimulus appropriate for their development, and that many inborn capacities may never be developed for want of such stimulus."

Criminal anthropology has described certain data which of course do not apply to all criminals, but are confined only to a certain number of congenital, incorrigible, and habitual criminals. In regard to two types—murderers and thieves—an incontestable inferiority has been noted in the shape of the head, by comparison with normal men, together with a frequency of hereditary and pathological departures from the normal type. Similarly an examination of the brains of criminals, whilst it reveals in them an inferiority of form and histological type, reveals also, in a great number of cases, indications of arrested development and disease, undetected frequently during life.

The size of the criminal head is about the same as that of ordinary people. Thieves more frequently have small heads; the large broad heads are usually found among murderers. In the worst kind of criminals the recognised tendency is towards the pointed or sugar-loaf skull. The low, flat crown and receding brow are also quite common, and have always been looked upon as evidence of low mental and moral organisation. Prognathism is another mark of degeneration. It is most frequently met with in those who are guilty of crimes of violence. It denotes a strong animal nature.

It cannot be denied that there are creatures with crime written on their faces. If so many malefactors were mixed up with a large number of honest men, a detective would pick out most of them at once merely by scrutinising their bearing and physiognomy; but then he would lay more stress upon certain traits acquired by vicious life than on the anatomical peculiarities described by anthropologists. Moreover, all the children of criminals have not these fixed peculiarities, and not infrequently the children of criminals turn out well in after-life.
SECTION II
THE RECEPTION OF GALL'S DOCTRINE

CHAPTER XVI
GALL'S BIOGRAPHY AND EMINENT FRENCH DISCIPLES

FRANCIS JOSEPH GALL was born on March 7th, 1758, in the village of Triefenbrunn, in the Duchy of Baden, in Germany. It is said that his family came from Italy and the name was originally Gallo. Gall's parents were Roman Catholics and had intended him for the Church, but as his natural tendency was to study plant and animal life in the fields and woods, he chose the healing art as his profession. Vienna being at that time more noted for its medical school than any other of the German-speaking cities, he decided to pursue his medical studies there, and in 1781 went to that city from the University of Strassburg, completing his studies in 1785, and afterwards settling there. He carried on investigations into the structure and functions of the nervous system for a long series of years, dissecting brains both at the hospital and at the asylum for the insane, and examining, at the same time, all the brains and skulls of celebrities he could obtain, and studying the same organ in the different species of animals in connection with their mental characteristics. He had a wonderful collection of considerable value, of which a fragment only is preserved. In 1796 he made his first announcement of his discoveries in a letter to his friend, Baron RETZER, Imperial Censor of Vienna, which was published in Der Deutsche Merkur, in December, 1798. In this letter he gave an outline of that big work which he started to publish only twelve years later.

The discovery of the law of gravitation is attributed to Newton seeing an apple fall from a tree to the ground; so Gall's doctrine is supposed to have originated in his observation when a lad that those fellow-pupils who were cleverest in committing recitations to memory had prominent eyes; this peculiarity of appearance, as he discovered in later life, being due to a prominent development of a certain part of the brain—the centre for verbal memory—pushing the eye downwards and outwards.

Gall, in Vienna, was the friend of two eminent clinical teachers: of ANTON VON STÖRCK (1731-1803), successor to Van Swieten and physician to Maria Theresa, the Emperor Joseph II., and also to Francis I., at the commencement of his reign; and of MAXIMILIAN STOLL (1742-1787), the successor of De Haën. When Störck died, Gall was to have been appointed his successor as body-physician to the Emperor, but disliking the restraints of Court life, he declined the honour and recommended another man, ADOLF VON STIFFT (1760-1836), who in course of time became so powerful that he was styled "His Medical Majesty." Gall's fame soon spread. His lectures became the talk of Vienna. Hearers came from all parts of the Continent. This notoriety made the authorities suspicious, and his former protégé, Dr. Stift, not being too honourable and rather jealous, had no
difficulty in getting the Austrian clergy to use their influence with the Government and the Emperor to prohibit Gall’s lectures on account of their materialistic tendency. Consequently, the Austrian Government, on January 9th, 1802, issued an edict, in the form of a general regulation, prohibiting all private lectures unless a special permission was obtained from the public authorities. Gall knew that this edict was pointed at him, and wrote a Petition and Remonstrance to the Emperor (reproduced in Dr. Walther’s “Gall’sche Gehirn und Schädellehre,” Munich, 1804), a lengthy but highly interesting document, wherein it is stated, among other things, that he had already spent 32,000 florins of his own on investigations, made in hospitals, asylums, and prisons, and had brought together a magnificent collection of material. His petition not being granted, Gall struggled on more or less privately for another three years, encouraged by numerous friends; but finally, having received invitations from a number of German universities for lectures and demonstrations, he left Vienna on March 6th, 1805.

Gall’s first scientific visit was to Berlin, which he entered on April 3rd, 1805. There he pursued his investigations in the prisons and hospitals, and repeated his anatomical demonstrations before the medical professors, the King and Queen, and other distinguished auditors. Outlines of his lectures were published by Professor ERNST BISCHOFF (1781-1861): “Darstellung der Gall’schen Gehirn und Schädellehre, nebst Bemerkungen über diese Lehre von C. W. v. HUFE LAND,” Berlin, 1805. A translation of this book appeared in London in 1807. The royal favour bestowed upon Gall excited the envy of some of his colleagues, who began to attack him. On the other hand, the King’s physician, the famous Dr. Hufeland, became his friend, and had a medal struck in honour of his visit and discoveries.

The Medical and Surgical Journal, Edinburgh, vol. xv., March, 1806, contains an account of Gall’s visit to Berlin, as follows:

“The craniology of Dr. Gall was the favourite topic of the German literati during the summer of 1805 at almost every university and capital of the Northern Provinces of Germany. . . . In the beginning of last spring the doctor set out for Berlin, and lodged in the house of his intimate friend, Mr. Kotzebue. He there met with universal acceptance. The King, the Queen, princes and princesses, interested themselves so much in his discoveries that he obtained an invitation to go through a course of lectures in presence of the Royal Family, during which the Queen inspected the dissection of a human brain, while the doctor demonstrated the whole series of his astonishing discoveries. . . . A rancorous attack was now commenced against his theory by Dr. WALTER, leading anatomist in Berlin, but it failed of the intended effect, every person being convinced that it was dictated by envy. On the opposite side, the justly renowned Dr. HUFE LAND, first physician to the King, almost all the faculty, as well as others professed their full assent, and several interesting tracts were published, in which ample justice was done to the theory. . . . Dr. Gall visited the houses of correction and prisons in Berlin and Spandau, and gave the most convincing proofs of his ability to discover, at first sight, such malefactors, thieves, and men of particular talents as were amongst the convicts and prisoners. At Torgau, where he also visited a house of correction, Professor BOTTIGER accompanied him, who afterwards published Gall’s observations, an abstract of which is given in this article.”

The visit referred to by the above correspondent was that to the prisons of Berlin and Spandau. The former was visited by Gall on April 17th, 1805, in the presence of the chief of the establishment, of the heads of the criminal department, and various counsellors selected by the Prussian Government. It was the first official test of the truth of his doctrines and their application to the detection of criminal and other dispositions. Gall saw two hundred prisoners, and described not only the nature of the crime, whether murder, theft, fraud, etc., for which each one was detained, but in many of them the special natural characteristics for which they were known to the authorities and their companions. On April 20th he went to Spandau, accompanied by C. W. v. HUFE LAND (1762-1836), one of the most
celebrated philosopher-physicians of his time, like Abernethy in England. Four hundred and seventy heads were submitted to inspection. These visits by Gall to the prisons of Berlin and Spandau attracted much notice throughout Germany.

In a brochure entitled "Etwas über Herrn Dr. Gall's Hirnschädellehre," Berlin, 1805, Geheimrat Professor Johann Gottlieb Walter (1734-1818), Lecturer on Anatomy in the University, referred to the visit by Gall to the Berlin prison, where 600 inmates were brought before him, mostly thieves, and said:

"With great ease Gall differentiated the more distinguished thieves from those less dangerous, and in every case gave a description which tallied with the record of the trial of the prisoner. The disposition to thieving was most marked in the prisoner Columbus, and amongst the youths in the head of little H——, with reference to whom Gall advised that he should be kept in prison for life, as he will never be anything else than a 'good-for-nothing.' In both cases the acts of the trial showed an abnormally active disposition to thieving."

Now, Prof. Walter does not question the validity of the test to which Gall was submitted; he does not question the accuracy of the diagnosis, and that Gall had really proved that it was possible to recognise an incorrigible thief by the shape of the head. It is not the truth of the doctrine he challenges, but its tendency. He says:

"What man of feeling for morality and religion will be able to read this without amazement? A fanatic advises the perpetual interment of a child, which has stolen once and is supposed to have an imaginary organ of thieving. Mankind must revolt when it hears that a preacher of fatalistic theories promulgates teaching which would be abhorred even by the most savage people without morals and religion. And shall nations accept them who believe in Christ and revere His preaching of charity? And we fill the pockets of such a man and engrave medals in his honour! It is lucky for Berlin that Dr. Gall held his Fatalism Sermon in the presence of intelligent and just judges; in any other place it might have had dangerous consequences."

Gall, as will be seen from other quotations, pointed out the difficulties and errors to which those are liable who judge even abnormal heads; but with reference to criminal types of heads, he points out that:

"In a prison, on the contrary, errors are less likely to occur. I can, from seeing a greatly developed organ, the abuse of which might lead to crime, pronounce with sufficient confidence on the nature of an offence. First, it is on account of crime that the individual is imprisoned; next, we know that man, excited by energetic propensities, if not restrained by powerful motives, ordinarily abandons himself to his natural inclination. There is, then, good reason to suppose that the offence for which he is punished is that for which we find in him a marked disposition. We may, indeed, be mistaken; fortuitous circumstances may sometimes, for the time, urge a man to acts for which he feels in himself no very strong propensity. We often meet robbers and assassins in whom the organs for theft and murder have not acquired an extraordinary development. But, in these cases, the malefactor has been drawn in by seduction, misery, or unruly passions, such as jealousy, resentment, quarrelling, or some other unfortunate circumstance. We are rarely deceived when the question relates to incorrigible malefactors, or persons who from their childhood have manifested evil dispositions or criminal propensities; in these, the development of the organ is evident. If the features, gestures, mien, or language betray want of education, or of exercise of the intellectual faculties; if the organisation of the brain is not favourable, it will almost always happen that the actions will accord with the unfortunate organisation."

In this connection, I should also like to mention that I have visited many prisons
in England and other countries, and have frequently been told by the governors of these establishments that they can tell which prisoner is likely to return.

In reply to Walter the reader is referred to Gall's defence of free-will and his views on crime (Chapter XV.). What mental specialist and criminologist has not come across hopeless cases of evil-doers, and has had to advise permanent control? Has not the infliction of increased sentences the same effect, and are we not already trying to segregate the feeble-minded criminal? Walter was simply giving way to his wrath, for he was incensed at Gall's grand reception in Berlin. His anger is shown by his statement that "Dr. Gall is completely ignorant of anatomy; that much was promised and very little performed; that he saw no such parts as were pretended to be shown," and so on. (Report in Medical and Surgical Journal, July, 1806.)

The remarks by C. W. von Hufeland (1762-1836), Physicin to the King of Prussia, are very different in their tone and temper from those of his colleague, Professor Walter. He says no one could have been more prepossessed against Gall's doctrine than he was himself, before he became acquainted with the author; and only by attending the lectures and demonstrations, and being convinced from what he saw, did he become a partisan. He goes on:

"It is only necessary to have eyes, and to open them, to be convinced of what Gall demonstrated concerning the dissection of the nerves, the crossing of the pyramids, etc. In order to see the structure, the brain must be dissected after Gall's method, following the parts from below upwards through all their ramifications." Curiously, with regard to the very quickly acknowledged discovery of there being two distinct sorts of nerves, one going to the circumference of the brain, and the other returning, and these two sets being always found together (nerves of sensation and motion), Hufeland expresses his want of faith. He continues: "It is with great pleasure and much interest that I have heard this estimable man himself expound his new doctrine. I am fully convinced that he ought to be regarded as one of the most remarkable phenomena of the eighteenth century, and that his doctrine should be considered as forming one of the boldest and most important steps in the study of the kingdom of nature. One must see and hear him to learn to appreciate a man completely exempt from prejudice, from charlatanism, from deception, and from metaphysical reveries. Gifted with a rare spirit of observation, with great penetration, and a sound judgment—identified, as it were, with nature—becoming her confidant from a constant intercourse with her—he has collected, in the kingdom of organised beings, a multitude of signs and phenomena which nobody had remarked till now, or which had been only superficially observed. He has combined them in an ingenious manner, has discovered the relations which establish analogy between them, has learned their signification, has drawn consequences and established truths, which are so much the more valuable that, being based on experience, they emanate from nature herself. He ascribes his discoveries solely to the circumstance of his having given himself up ingenuously and without reserve to the study of nature—following her in all the gradations, from the simplest result of her productive power to the most perfect. It is an error, therefore, to give this doctrine the name of a system, and to judge of it as such. True naturalists are not men to form systems. Their observations would not be sufficiently accurate if they were prompted by a systematic theory, and realities would not square with the various limits of their notions. Hence, the doctrine of Gall is not, and cannot be, anything except a combination of instructive natural phenomena, of which a part consists at present only of fragments, and of which he makes known the immediate consequences."

From Berlin Gall went to Leipsic, Dresden, and Halle. At Halle, his lectures and demonstrations were attended by the very REIL (1759-1813) by whom he was afterwards charged with pillaging the self-same discoveries in the structure of the brain, which, on that occasion, Gall taught him; which Reil acknowledged: "I
have seen more in the anatomical demonstrations of the brain by Gall than I conceived a man could discover in the course of a long life."

In the same year Gall went to Weimar, where he met GOETHE (1749-1832) at the Ducal Court. The great poet, who, as is well known, was a scientist as well, was already acquainted with his teachings, and showed his appreciation, of which various records have been left. He took a very profound view of the doctrine of Gall. Some years after the meeting he wrote:

"The brain remains the foundation and chief object, since it is not required to adapt itself to the skull, but the skull must conform to it. ... In every way Gall's demonstration of the brain was superior to that of the schools, where the organ was cut into horizontal and vertical sections and a view given of certain parts following one after another, to which names were assigned, as if this were all that was necessary. Even the base of the brain, the origin of the nerves, remained known as mere localities, from which I, interested as I was, could gain nothing further."

From Weimar, Gall went to Jena, Göttingen, Brunswick, Hamburg, Kiel, and Copenhagen. In 1806, he visited Bremen, Amsterdam, Leyden, Frankfort, Heidelberg, Stuttgart, and Freiburg. In 1807, he visited Marburg, Würzburg, Munich, Augsburg, Zürich, and Bâle; everywhere giving demonstrations of brain dissections. Outlines of his lectures were published by Dr. KNOBLAUCH (1781-1819), of Leipsic, Dr. C. A. BLOÈDE (1820), of Dresden, Prof. BISCHOFF (1781-1861), of Berlin, and H. G. C. SELPERT. The earliest accounts had been by Dr. F. H. MAR- TEN (1778-1805), of Jena, published at Leipsic in 1801; Prof. F. L. v. FROIREP (1779-1847), of Weimar, in 1802; Dr. P. F. v. WALTHER (1781-1849), of Munich, in 1804; and by Prof. J. ARNOLD, the anatomist, at Erfurt in 1805. Dr. JOHN MEYER, of Naples, published an "Exposition of Gall's Doctrine of the Brain and Skull" in 1808.

While Gall was lecturing at Heidelberg (where he was opposed by Prof. ACKERMANN), a French physician, Dr. DÉMANGEON (1764-), attended his courses, and on his return to Paris published, in 1806, La Physiologie Intellectuelle, ou Dévelop- ment de la Doctrine du Docteur Gall, a work which enjoyed great popularity and went through a great many editions.

In the course of 1807, Gall arrived in Paris, where he repeated his demonstrations before various learned societies. He made converts of the great CUVIDER, the celebrated FLOURENS, and GEOFFROY ST. HILAIRE, whose testimonies we have already quoted (Chapter XI.). The following year he presented a Memoir to the Institute of France, which was referred for report to a committee of five, Cuvier presiding. At first the committee appeared favourably disposed towards the claims of the German doctor; but when the matter came to the ears of BUONA- PARTE, he reprimanded the Institute severely for submitting to be taught chemistry by an Englishman (Sir Humphry Davy) and anatomy by a German quack. On Napoleon's displeasure becoming known, the natural characteristic to pander to Royalty, combined with the anti-foreign feeling so prevalent in France at that time, caused the committee of the Institute to change their attitude and to issue an unfavourable report. (Quoted Chapter XI.)

J. P. FLOURENS (1794-1867), professor of physiology, who had expressed himself previously so favourably, was commissioned to make an experimental investigation into the functions of the brain. Flourens took a live pigeon, and sliced its brain in successive stages, and as the poor animal seemed to suffer little or no effect by the destruction of its brain, it gave him the opportunity of denying the alleged discoveries made by Gall. (We shall deal with Flourens in detail in Chapter XVIII.) For the moment we need only mention that the law which was laid down by Flourens in consequence of the result of this experiment was accepted by scientific men for fifty years; it was that "the brain is a single organ, that no individual part acts
by itself, and that by slicing off the brain its functions are preserved." His report was gladly accepted by the Academy and was used to strike a fatal blow at Gall's position, and thenceforward Gall's doctrines were declared "absurdities" and "charlatanism" and the newspapers were used as instruments to ridicule them, so that some physicians would not go in consultation with him.

Cuvier, who had previously upheld Gall, now abstained from doing so, in public at least, though he remained on friendly terms with him, as is shown by the fact that he sent a skull to Gall in confirmation of his doctrine, but Gall, who then was already on his death-bed, returned the same with a message of thanks, and explained that "my collection wants only one more proof, and that is my own cranium, which will soon be placed there." It can still be seen preserved in a glass case in the Natural History Museum of Paris in the midst of what remains of his own collection.

GEORGES CUVIER (1769-1832) is the real founder of comparative anatomy through his profound work, "Leçons sur l'Anatomie Comparée" (1803), wherein he formulated for the first time definite laws as to the whole of the animal creation. In vol. ii. of that work he states that he found, in the different magnitude of the corpora quadrigemina of the frugivorous and carnivorous tribes, an explanation of the two instincts, by which the former are led to feed upon plants and the latter upon animals. But he changed his opinion upon becoming acquainted with Gall's work. ("Rapport historique sur les progrès des sciences naturelles depuis 1789 et sur leur état actuel," p. 193.) In this "Historical Report" he wrote: "It appears even that certain parts of the brain contain in all classes of animals a development proportioned to the peculiar properties of these animals, and we may hope that in following up these researches we may at length acquire some notions respecting the peculiar uses of each part of the brain."

Baron Cuvier undoubtedly was favourably disposed towards Gall's doctrine, but he was docile to Napoleon, if not expecting favours from him; and Napoleon being hostile, Cuvier, like a skilful courtier, "dodged the question."

The renowned F. J. V. BROUSSAIS (1772-1838), who became an ardent disciple of Gall, wrote of the effect of Napoleon's pronouncement against Gall (Lancet, July 23rd, 1836):

"Before that event Gall's lectures were attended by generals, senators, privy counsellors, and all the learned frequenters of the Court. As soon as the Emperor's opinion was declared, the persons who had received the doctrine of Gall with favour changed their tone, and either became his open enemies or sought excuses for their desertion of a cause which they had so recently espoused. But this was not all. Ridicule was employed, the journalists were let loose, and for several years Gall and his opinions were attacked in the most virulent and embittered manner."

The no less renowned JEAN B. BOUILLAUD (1796-1881), says of the treatment of Gall by Napoleon and Cuvier:

"The opposition of these two great men, backed as it was by the power of ridicule so terrible in all countries, but particularly in France, arrested, so to speak, the course of the new star which had just appeared above the scientific horizon. Forthwith the journals, schools, and academies formed a sort of holy alliance against the system of Gall; and all would have been over with that system long ere now, were it possible for the triumph of any holy alliance over truth to continue for ever."

Napoleon, while in Germany, had become acquainted with Gall's doctrine through a metaphysician who had told him that the workings of the soul were too mysterious to leave any external mark. Gall knew this, and had this fact in view when he wrote to the Institute of France in his reply to their Report on his doctrines:
"And, the metaphysician can no longer say, in order to preserve his right of losing himself in a sea of speculation, that the operations of the mind are too carefully concealed to admit of any possibility of discovering their material conditions or organs."

Napoleon's first body-physician was J. N. CORVISART (1755-1821), a great authority on heart disease, who popularised the method of percussion, first introduced by J. L. AUENBRUGGER (1722-1809), of Vienna. Corvisart, like Baron LARREY (1766-1842), Napoleon's great army surgeon, was a great friend and supporter of Gall and defended him against his Imperial master; but when FRANCESCO ANTONMARCHI (1780-1838) became body-physician, he, like Dr. Stift of Vienna, did his best to ruin Gall. (Antommarchi published a text-book on Anatomy, merely writing a text to Mascagni's drawings, which he used without acknowledgment or permission, thereby causing considerable scandal.) In his Memoirs "On the Last Moments of Napoleon," vol. ii., p. 29, Napoleon is reported to have said:

"Corvisart was a great partisan of Gall; he praised him, protected him, and left no stone unturned to push him on to me, but there was no sympathy between us. Lavater, Cagliostro, Mesmer have never been to my mind; I felt, I cannot tell how much aversion for them, and I took care not to admit any one who kept them among us. All these gentlemen are adroit, speak well, excite that fondness for the marvellous which the vulgar experience, and give an appearance of truth to theories the most false and unfounded. Nature does not reveal herself by external forms. She hides and does not expose her secrets. To pretend to seize and to penetrate human character by so slight an index is the part of a dupe or an impostor; and what else is that crowd with marvellous inspirations which pullulates in the bosom of all great capitals? The only way of knowing our fellow-creatures is to see them, to associate with them frequently, and to submit them to proof. We must study them long, if we wish not to be mistaken; we must judge them by their actions; and even this rule is not infallible, and must be restricted to the moment when they act; for we almost never obey our own character; we yield to transports, we are carried away by passion; such are our vices and virtues, our perversity and our heroism. This is my opinion, and this has long been my guide. It is not that I pretend to exclude the influence of natural dispositions and education; I think, on the contrary, that it is immense; but, beyond that, all is nonsense."

From the above quotation it is evident that Napoleon saw no more in Gall's doctrine than a system of character-reading from the protuberances of the head; just as nearly all the other opponents have done since. Of Gall's real work he and the others were ignorant.

Antommarchi, successor to Corvisart as Napoleon's body-physician, seems also to have known no more of Gall's doctrine than can be learnt from a phrenological plaster bust, with which Gall had nothing whatever to do, as will be proved in the next chapter.

In the Mémorial de Saint Hélène, by COUNT E. A. D. DE LAS CASES (1766-1842), Napoleon is reported to have said:

"I have greatly contributed to put down Gall; Corvisart was his great follower; he and his fellows had a strong leaning to materialism; it would increase their science and their domain. But nature is not so poor; if she was rude enough to announce her meaning by external forms, we should soon attain our ends, and we should be more learned. Her secrets are finer, more delicate, and more fugitive; hitherto they have escaped every one. A little hunchback is a great genius; a tall and handsome man is often a great ninny; a large head with a big brain sometimes has not an idea, while a little brain is often in possession of vast intelligence. And yet, think of the imbecility of Gall; he attributes to certain bumps dispositions and crimes which are not in nature, and which take their rise from the conventional
arrangements of society. What would become of thieving if there was no property? of the bump of drunkenness, if no fermented liquors existed? of that of ambition, if man did not live in society?

Gall has very correctly replied to this:

"In regard to my doctrines, the ideas and prejudices of Napoleon differ in no respects from those of the vulgar. 'What would become of the bump of thieving, if there was no property? of that of ambition, if there was no society?' What would become of the eye, if there was no light?—but light exists. What would become of taste and smell, if there were no odorous particles, and no savoury qualities?—but these particles and qualities exist. What would become of the propensity of propagation, if there were not two sexes?—but two sexes exist. . . . If Napoleon wished to destroy the tendency to materialism in the way he understood it, he ought to have begun by prohibiting the study, not only of the anatomy and physiology of the brain, but also that of natural history."

In 1809, Gall commenced publishing his great work, entitled "The Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System in General, and of the Brain in Particular. Four vols., folio, with an Atlas of 100 Plates." The work was not finished until 1819. The first two volumes bear the name of his prossector Spurzheim as well. The price of the work was 1,000 francs per copy, so that only libraries could afford to buy it. This is one of the reasons why it remained unread and unknown.

Gall concluded his folio work with the following reflections:

"Here terminates this big work, which for fifteen years the public has been impatiently expecting. I should have wished to defer it still longer to bring the fruits of my researches to greater maturity; but the final hour draws near, and I must be content with leaving this first effort on the physiology of the brain far less perfect than it will be fifty years hence. Neither the life nor the fortune of one man can be sufficient for this vast investigation. I have had to depend on my own resources. It will require many fortunes to bring this study to perfection, which my unaided efforts could not alone effect. If I had been a man to be gratified with a little temporary éclat, I should have yielded more than twenty years ago to the desire of publishing the first views of a physiology of the brain; but I am prouder of the discovery of the slightest truth than of the invention of the most brilliant system.

"If any one will convince me of the falsity of my discoveries, I shall be the first to announce it to the public. Truth is my object. I place it above all personal considerations. May all my adversaries follow my example!

"Conforming to the spirit of the age, I ought to have maintained that one could absolutely ascertain by my method all the mental powers, without exception. I ought to have given single instances, instead of experiments a hundred times repeated; I ought to have made of the whole one speculative study, and not have submitted my doctrine, as I have done, to so many investigations and comparisons; I ought not to have expected of the world so much preparatory knowledge and perseverance; I ought to have mounted Parnassus upon Pegasus, and not upon a tortoise. For where is the charm and interest of a science, so hard to acquire? The premature judgments which have been pronounced, the jokes and squibs which have been let off at my expense, even before my intention or my object was known, prove that men do not wait for the results of research in order to draw their conclusions.

"I dare not flatter myself that my undertaking will ever be continued in its details, or that my exertions will be appreciated. Whoever is not impelled by an innate instinct of observation; whoever finds it hard to sacrifice opinions and views which he has derived from his earlier studies; whoever thinks more of making his fortune than of exploring the treasures of nature; whoever is not fortified by inexhaustible patience against the interpretation of envy, jealousy, hypocrisy, ignorance, apathy, and indifference; whoever thinks too highly of the force and correctness of his reasoning to submit it to the test of experience, a thousand times repeated, will never do much towards perfecting the physiology of the brain. Yet
these are the only means by which my discoveries can be verified, corrected, or refuted."

Gall is still denounced by some writers as a quack and charlatan; but let me ask: Is that the strain in which a quack would write?

Gall, in Paris, was physician to ten ambassadors and had a large practice; but he kept himself poor by spending upon his scientific pursuits all he gained.

His skill as a physician may be inferred from the fact that in 1810 a medal was presented to him, executed by BARRE, an eminent artist of Paris, by order of Count Potosky, a rich Polish nobleman, who took this method of expressing his deep gratitude to Dr. Gall, who had cured him of an old and dangerous malady, for which he had in vain consulted the best medical men in Paris.

The famous PRINCE METTERNICH (1773-1859) was a pupil of Gall. He was then Count Clement, and not yet powerful. The Prince renewed his acquaintance with Gall in Paris, and when he resided there as ambassador to Napoleon, he did friendly services for him, such as guaranteeing the expenses of the publication of his big work.

Prince Metternich, in one of the numerous conversations he had with R. R. NOEL in the winter of 1835 on Gall and his doctrines, made the following remark: "Gall was the greatest observer and thinker that I have ever known, a most indefatigable investigator, and possessed a truly philosophic mind." On another occasion he styled him: "A man of facts and a lover of truth—a hater of all theories."

Metternich induced EMPEROR FRANCIS (1768-1835), in 1814, to invite Gall to return to Vienna; but Gall declined to do so, assigning as his reason that he was now established in Paris, and would be forced to begin the world anew if he removed to Vienna.

In 1823, Gall was invited to LONDON, where much was promised, but he returned two months later disappointed.

In March, 1828, at the conclusion of one of his lectures, Gall was seized with an attack of apoplexy, from which he never fully recovered, and of which he ultimately died on August 22nd, 1828, at his country house at Montrouge, near Paris, in the seventy-first year of his age. A public monument was erected to his memory over his grave in the cemetery at Père la Chaise in 1836.

Gall was excommunicated by Pius VII. in 1817. No wonder he refused spiritual aid on his deathbed; but, he declared, he had no objection to a religious service over his coffin. He was religious by nature (according to the statement of his widow he had faith in God), but objected to ignorant credulity. He defended himself against the attacks of the Church by saying: "In studying the works of God, I do not think that I have done any wrong."

JOSEPH VIMONT (1795-1857), one of his disciples, performed the post-mortem examination and prepared his skull for the Natural History Museum, where it was placed in the midst of his own collection. His brain weighed 2 lb. 11 oz. The circumference of his skull was 22" 2"" over the widest area, and it measured from glabella to occiput 14° 9"".

Gall was very independent, indifferent to praise and blame. Few men were ever more ridiculed; few men pursued their aims more determinedly, despite its effects. He—as we shall show presently—effected more change in mental and moral philosophy and cerebral physiology than any predecessor, except Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Galen, and it is with these men that he should be classed. ELLIOTSON (see Chapter XVII.) wanted him to write a "popular"
work on his theories, but he declined on the ground that his work was for scientists and not for the multitude, and if unappreciated in his time, it might yet appeal to posterity. Gall did not believe in hypnotism or homeopathy; he took no part in politics, and was unmusical. He took neither tea, coffee, nor spirits. He gave his friendship to few men, was circumspect and somewhat suspicious. He was hardly ever punctual, lacked order and system in his personal habits, and was negligent in his style of writing. This may be the reason why he left the arrangement and details of his great work to his prosector SPURZHEIM (see Chapter XVII.), and out of kindness and honourable feeling permitted his name to be printed as joint-author.

Gall was naturalised in France in 1819. He was married twice and had no children. He married his first wife, CATHERINE LEISSLER (daughter of a surgeon-major in the French army), after having nursed him during a serious attack of typhus while a student at Strassburg; but she rendered his life unhappy by jealousy and an ungovernable temper, for which reason he separated from her in Vienna, making her an adequate allowance. She died in 1825, when he married again—MARIE ANNE BARBE, of Nancy (born 1795). This lady re-married, in 1831, Dr. Imbert, of Lyons, a lawyer, who died in 1852. All the belongings, including the manuscripts of the two husbands, were sold by her to the new tenant; and Gall’s most valuable papers have not been seen or heard of since.

In Gall we have a man who devoted all his energies and means to his scientific investigations for the benefit of humanity, refusing even the honours which might have brought him glory, so as to remain undisturbed in his pursuits; publishing nothing until he was sure of his facts, which were accumulating to such an extent that his work came before the world, unfortunately, too late, when he was already a judged man; judged not by his own writings, but by the résumés of others, and by those who had never heard him speak at all. He was a century in advance of his time. Probably also the constant wars, invasions, and occupations of Germany, and the political events in France, helped in diminishing the interest in Gall and his works.

In some of the obituary notices Gall was charged with a lack of generosity; but the writer has found that their wording is identical, so that we may presume they were copied one from the other. A man who devotes himself to scientific research and spends what money he makes on the pursuit of it, who holds no official position and no endowed lectureship, cannot rightly be accused of lack of generosity, even though he charges duly for his services and exacts payment for what is due to him. Gall must have had cause for complaint, for he said, one day, to his friend FOSSATTI: “Do you see how these wealthy people treat us and other physicians? They spend a hundred times more for their pleasures than the health we give them, and expend enormous sums on balls and dinners, while they leave their physicians unpaid. Indeed, while they largely remunerate the lawyer who gains their cause, they give nothing to the physician who saves their lives.”

Gall published as a young man in Vienna one volume of a work he never completed, entitled, “Philosophisch-medizinische Untersuchungen über Natur und Kunst im gesunden und kranken Zustande des Menschen,” 1791. His other, the physiological works, were published in French. There is the folio work already mentioned, and a smaller edition of the same—in six octavo volumes, which appeared between 1822-1826, the sixth volume consisting entirely of replies to his critics. The extracts I have quoted in this book are taken from the smaller work, where not otherwise stated, as already mentioned. He is also the author of various articles, including one on “Cerveau” and another on “Crâne” in the Dictionnaire des Sciences Médicales (1812-1822), a stupendous illustrated encyclopaedia of sixty volumes, which was to carry the evidence of the greatness of French medicine to the most remote corners of Europe.
In 1824 or 1825 Gall presented to Dr. ANTON ROLLETT (1778-1842), of Baden, near Vienna, that part of his collection of skulls and casts which he had left in Vienna. This collection was treasured highly by the son, HERMANN ROLLETT, the Austrian poet, and is still in existence in the Rollett Museum at Baden; some objects, however, the writer was told, went into possession of another son, ALEXANDER ROLLETT (1834-1903), Professor of Physiology in the University of Graz.

Gall's Paris collection was handed over to the Government on the death of Gall by his widow, who received in return a life annuity of Frs. 1200.—It contained 354 brains, skulls, and casts of heads of men distinguished in some particular direction, besides 250 other anatomical preparations, and is preserved in the Natural History Museum of that city. Some of the most interesting specimens—for example, the casts of the heads of Goethe, Emperor Joseph II., Mozart, Liszt, Burdach, etc., from nature, and the original skull of Blumauer, the German satirical poet—seem to have disappeared.

Besides the famous Prince Metternich, Gall had another warm partisan in Prince LOUIS of Bavaria. Another fact that deserves mention is that Gall made converts of the two greatest sculptors of his day, who appreciated the value of his doctrine in the application to the modelling of the head. One was the great Italian sculptor CANOVA (1757-1822), and the other the great Danish sculptor THORWALDSEN (1770-1844).

The attention of German scientists has been drawn to Gall by P. J. MÖBIUS (1853-1907), a Leipsic physician, through a work on "Franz Joseph Gall," 1905, and other books and papers, and it has been assumed that he was the first in the field. A personal explanation here may therefore be not out of place.

My first publication on Gall's doctrine dates from the year 1886. In 1889 and 1890 I lectured before the British Association, the Anthropological Institute and other societies, when I had such distinguished men as Sir WILLIAM TURNER, F.R.S., and Dr. JOHN BEDDOES, F.R.S. (1826-1911), as chairmen, and practically all the leaders of brain research, as FERRIER, HORSLEY, and others, among my audience. I sent my papers to Dr. Möbius at the time, he being editor of an international medical journal. In 1899 I published a small brochure in German, entitled "Die psychischen Thätigkeiten des Gehirns" (Berlin, Hirschwald), which created a sensation, and was reviewed in "Pflüger's Archiv," besides other medical journals; but Möbius took no notice of it. A year later he commenced writing articles on Gall in his journal, the same which were afterwards published in book-form. In 1901 I published my big work on "The Mental Functions of the Brain" in London, a copy of which I sent to Möbius, who replied by letter expressing his indignation that I had omitted to mention his work, as bearing upon Gall. Subsequently, when his articles came out in book-form, I found that he had added a notice mentioning our "simultaneous" work on this subject, and dismissing my big book on "The Mental Functions of the Brain" with a few words as of no importance.

Möbius made no acknowledgment of my priority, but, all the same, I will give him credit that he wrote well and fought hard to convince his unwilling colleagues in Germany of the genius of Gall.

That my book on "The Mental Functions of the Brain" was of more importance than Möbius pretended is shown by its having been reviewed in the "Encyclopædia Britannica" by ALEXANDER MacALISTER (1844-1910), M.A., D.D., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S., Member of Senate of Royal University of Ireland, Lecturer on Anatomy in Cambridge University, and has thus been put on permanent record. Prof. MacAlister, in an article of over two columns in length, says:

"Gall's great work contains a very considerable number of clinical and pathological observations, and an attempt has lately been made to show that his doctrines are confirmed by modern physiological and pathological facts concerning cerebral
localisation. This attempt to advance Gall's doctrine to the level of the natural sciences may be studied in the volume published in 1901, by Dr. Bernard Hollander, entitled 'The Mental Functions of the Brain.'... Dr. Hollander's purpose is to bring Gall's clinical and pathological instances into line with modern observations. He honours Gall, with justice, as an admirable and dexterous anatomist; he calls attention to many carefully recorded clinical and pathological facts in Gall's writings... and endeavours by this method to establish an unbroken connection between his doctrine and our present knowledge of cerebral localisation.... These collections of recorded cases, taken from a vast mass of clinical and pathological literature, accumulated during the past century, have been arranged by Dr. Hollander with great industry; and they clearly express his purpose to extend the limits of the study of cerebral localisation, and to advance it from the observation of the motor areas and the special sense-centres to the observation of the higher acts and states of consciousness. This, we may be sure, is the tendency of all modern researches into the working of the central nervous system: to seek a higher level of interpretation, and a statement of the departmental life of the brain in terms of ever-increasing complexity.... Physiology is beginning to feel its way forward from the localisation of muscular movements and special sense-centres to the localisation of the simpler faculties and instincts."

Professor G. v. BUNGE (1844-), Lecturer on Physiology in the University of Bâsle, wrote about my efforts to restore Gall:

"I am gratified to see the attempts that are being made to overcome the prejudice which keeps physiologists and psychiatrists from taking up the investigations of Gall, whose immortal work is a mine of valuable information even for our own generation."

Professor R. v. KRAFFT-EBING (1840-1904), Director of the Clinic for Mental and Nervous Disorders in the University of Vienna, wrote, a few days before his death, a review of my work, in which he said:

"Hollander's sound scientific treatise in defence of Gall should be read by all who love truth and justice."

The late Professor LEONARD LANDOIS (1837-1902), whose text-book on Physiology is so well known, wrote to the same effect.

That Möbius ignored my work may be regarded of little consequence; but that he ignored Prof. MAX NEUBURGER'S work on the History and Development of Experimental Physiology of the Brain and Spinal Cord ("Entwicklung der exper. Gehirn u. Rückenmarks Physiologie," Stuttgart, 1897) is deplorable. Neuburger, the celebrated historian of medicine in Vienna University, in that work pleads eloquently for Gall and his scientific achievements.

THE HISTORY OF GALL'S DOCTRINE IN FRANCE

In France Gall's doctrine never died out. In January, 1831, three years after the death of Gall, a society was formed, unfortunately under the title of "Phrenological Society," which kept much more strictly to Gall's teachings than his followers and similar societies in England have done, as we shall see presently. The Paris society was a scientific society in the strict sense of the word, not a phrenological society for character-reading by the protuberances on the head; and that is probably the reason why it counted among its members men of the highest renown in medicine, philosophy, and the law. At the time of its formation it consisted of 110 members, of whom 61 were physicians, most of them of distinction and still remembered for their work in other departments.

We mention:
THE RECEPTION OF GALL'S DOCTRINE

N. P. ADELON (1782-1862), Professor of Physiology (Text-book, 1823), who published "Analyse d'un Cours du Gall" (1818).

GABRIEL ANDRAL (1797-1876), Professor of Medicine, Paris; President of the Medical Academy and the Phrenological Society (1833); the most distinguished pathologist of his time; wrote a work showing the application of Gall's doctrine to insanity (reviewed in Lancet, 1833).

B. N. M. APPERT (1797-1847), criminologist, Editor of the Journal des Prisons.

PIERRE H. AZAIS, M.D. (1766-1845), author of "De la Phrénologie" (Paris, 1839), "Cours de "Philosophie Générale," and other works.

P. H. BÉRARD (1797-1858), Professor of Physiology, College of Medicine.

CLAUDE BERNARD (1813-1878), the celebrated physiologist.

H. M. DUGROTAY de BLAINVILLE (1777-1850), zoologist, Professor of Comparative Anatomy.

J. B. BLONDEAU (1784-1854), Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Paris.

JEAN B. BOUILLAUD (1796-1831), Professor of Clinical Medicine; Chief Physician La Charité; Author of "Traité de l'Énêphale" (1824); President of the Phrenological Society and Editor of the Phrenological Journal.

ALEXANDER BRIERRE DE BOISMONTE (1798-1881), the well-known alienist.

CASIMIR BROUSSAIS (1803-1847), Professor at Val-de-Grace; wrote a reply to the objections against Gall's doctrine by Flourens and Leuret (Transactions of Phrenological Society, 1841-2).

F. J. V. BROUSSAIS (1772-1838), the former's father, Professor in the Faculty of Medicine, Paris, and Chief Physician of Val-de-Grace.

JULES CLOQUET (1796-1883), the distinguished Anatomist and Professor of Surgery, Paris, who, in his folio work "Anatomie de l'Homme," copied every one of the plates of the human brain from Gall's great work.

AUGUSTE COMTE (1798-1857), the celebrated philosopher, Professor at the Athenæum. See Chapter XXII.

J. P. FALRET (1794-1870), the celebrated alienist, Physician to the Salpêtrière, who described "Circular Insanity" (1853).

G. M. A. FERRUS (1784-1861), Professor of Diseases of the Nervous System; Physician to the Asylum of Bicêtre.

P. FOISSAC (1801-1886) the pathologist, who read a paper to the Phrenological Society on the post mortem examination of the brain Cuvier of (1832).

J. A. L. FOSSATI (1786-1874), Professor of Clinical Medicine; personal friend of Gall.

ACHILLE FOVILLE (1799-1798), Physician to the Mental Hospital at Rouen and later at Toulouse, who, in his "Traité du Système Nerveux" (1840), adopted Gall's doctrines.

IMBARD, Surgeon-in-Chief, Charité Hospital, Lyons.

PAUL JOLLY (1790-1879), the well-known hygienist.

C. J. J. LE GALLOIS (1770-1814), Professor of Physiology; located the respiratory centre in a circumscribed portion of the medulla oblongata.

P. M. LENOBLE (1772-1824), Head of the Department of Public Instruction.

M. A. LENOIR (1762-1839), archæologist, Director of the Athénéum.

CHARLES LONDE (1795-1862), author of "Gymnastique Médicale," Paris (1820), and "Nouveaux Éléments d'Hygiène."

LUCAS, Inspector-General of the Houses of Detention in France.

C. C. H. MARG (1771-1841), renowned alienist; wrote "Insanity Forensically Considered," Paris (1840).
Duke of MONTEBELLO (1769-1809).
MOREAU, Inspector of Prisons.
ETIENNE PARISET (1770-1847), alienist; Secretary to the Academy of Medicine, Paris.
PINEIL GRANDCHAMP, Surgeon at the Salpêtrière.
PONCELET, Professor in the Faculty of Law, Paris.
LÉON ROSTAN (1790-1866), Physician to the Salpêtrière; Professor of Clinical Medicine in the University of Paris; author of "Ramonissement du Cerveau" (1820); great authority on localisation of brain functions.
GEOFFREY ST. HILAIRE (1772-1844), Professor of Natural History; Member of the Institute.
L. J. SANSON (1790-1841), Professor of Clinical Surgery; successor to Baron Dupuytren at Hôtel-Dieu.
J. B. SARLANDIÈRE (1787-1838), collaborator and friend of Magendie; wrote "Examen critique de la Classification des facultés cérébrales, adoptés par Gall," Paris (1833), and many articles in Phrenological Journal; he practised electrical treatment of nervous diseases.
FÉLIX VOISIN (1794-1872), Chief Physician, Mental Hospital of Bicêtre.

At one of the meetings of the society, Dr. VOISIN gave an account of a visit which he made to the Prison Galleries of Toulon, under the authority of the Minister of the Marine. The number of prisoners confined amounted to 372, and he had to find amongst them the 22 individuals who had been condemned for the crime of rape. He selected 22 persons, and among them were 13 who had been condemned for rape, and the other nine were marked on their information sheet as requiring surveillance in regard to their morals.
At the same meeting there was a discussion on the characteristics of Dr. Antommarchi's MASK OF NAPOLEON, which had been taken immediately after his death. This mask gives only the fore part of the head, so that at best it is only an indication of the intellectual abilities, but not of the character of the man; and not even that accurately, for Antommarchi marked the position of the ear by guess, so that we do not know the length of the base of the frontal lobes.
In 1836, there was a discussion on Gall's doctrine by the "Royal Academy of Medicine of Paris," which occupied four sittings. The Academy decided that the subject could not at present be adopted, and deferred its decision "till the system was established upon more solid bases."

F. J. V. BROUSSAIS (1772-1838)

It was in the same year (1836) that one of the highest medical authorities of his day in France delivered a course of lectures on Gall's doctrine at the University of Paris, which were attended by nearly 2,000 persons. They were reported fully in the Lancet (London) of that year. He commenced by saying:

"I assure you that it has not been from rashness, nor without reflection and numerous observations, that I have ventured to take up this subject. I have multiplied observations, so far as it has been possible for me to do, ere entering the list of its defenders."

Previously, in 1828, Broussais had published a work, "Sur l'Irritation et la Folie," in which he applied Gall's doctrines to mental diseases.

Broussais was a pupil of Bichat and the founder of a theory of physiological medicine. Life, according to him, depends upon external irritation, especially that of heat. The latter excites in the body peculiar chemical processes, which in turn
maintain regeneration and assimilation as well as contractility and sensibility. When these functions supported by heat cease, death at once ensues. Health depends upon the moderate action of the external irritants; disease upon their weakness, or more frequently upon their extraordinary strength. Disease is in no degree or respect ontological. He thought gastro-enteritis the "basis of all pathology." Nature had no healing power and it was necessary to abort disease by active measures. To this end, he adopted a powerful antiphlogistic or weakening régime, the main features of which were to deprive the patient of his proper food and to leech him all over his body.

Broussais and his pupil and successor, BOUILLAUD (1796-1881), were furious blood-letters. Broussais' professional rivals asserted that he was responsible for as much bloodshed as Napoleon I.

In the XVIIth century bleeding was the universal remedy. No matter what the disease, bleeding was resorted to. Dr. PATIN, a contemporary of Molière, mentions that he himself bled seven times for a common cold, and he cites with approval the practice of a colleague who bled a patient sixty-four times for rheumatism. Of a physician who died without allowing himself to be bled, he says that "the devil will bleed him in the other world, as a scoundrel, an atheist, deserves." This bloodshed continued far into the XIXth century. Often patients were actually bled to death, yet those who did it were so blinded that they ascribed the death to the illness and not to the bleeding. If he had done nothing else, MARSHALL HALL (1790-1857) would have proved his genius by pointing this out, as he did in his "Researches Principally Relative to the Morbid and Curative Effects of Loss of Blood" (see Chapter XXIV).

JOSEPH VIMONT (1795-1857)

In 1818, the Royal Institute of France offered a prize to the author of the best memoir on the anatomy of the brain in the four classes of the vertebrate animals. Attracted by this, Dr. Vimont, of Caen, commenced researches, without reference to Gall's doctrines; indeed, he had not read Gall, and had heard of him only as a charlatan. However, as Gall had written upon the subject of his researches, he thought it incumbent upon him to read his work among others.

"Hardly," says he, "had I begun to read it, when I found that I had to do with one of those extraordinary men whom dark envy endeavours to exclude from the rank to which their genius calls them, and against whom it employs the arms of the coward and the hypocrite. High cerebral capacity, profound penetration, good sense, varied information, were the qualities which struck me as distinguishing Gall. The indifference which I first felt for his writings soon gave way to the most profound veneration."

Vimont commenced investigations into the brain structure of animals, and continued them with extraordinary perseverance. In 1827 he presented to the Institute a memoir containing a fragment of the researches on which he had spent so many years, together with 2,500 skulls of animals of various classes, order, genera, and species. Among these, 1,500 had belonged to beasts with whose habits he had been well acquainted before they died or were killed. He presented to the Institute also 400 wax preparations of the brain, modelled after nature. He spent more than 12,000 francs in procuring specimens. His work was entitled Traité de Phrénologie humaine et comparée (1836), but was opposed to Spurzheim's phrenology. It contained 120 plates and 600 figures.

Of AUGUSTE COMTE, the greatest of Gall's philosophical followers, we shall speak later. (See Chapter XXII.)
In Italy, Gall had several distinguished disciples, and all the early ones fared badly.

**PHILIPPO UCELLI** (-1832), Professor of Medicine in the University of Pisa and Lecturer in the Academy of Fine Arts, wrote an important work on the doctrine of Gall, a perfectly mild and philosophical treatise, entitled, *Compendio di Anatomia-Fisiologico Comparata ad uso della scuola di medicina* (Florence, 1825-6), supported by observations of his own. How innocent the work was may be seen from his statement:

"I am no convert to the doctrine of the twenty-seven compartments or boxes of organs, each separate and distinct; but I honour the man who carries on the duty of investigation in a frank and fearless temper, and am sure mankind will be greatly served by the result, be it what it may."

However, the work was regarded by the authorities as dangerous to the popular religious views and it was suppressed. Its author, in 1826, was deprived of his chair in the University by the reigning Grand Duke, and persecuted in every possible way. At his death, in 1832, the censor prohibited the publication of biographical accounts of him, and suppressed even the notice that his former students had accompanied his body to the grave. The young men intended to have a funeral service, but even this was not granted.

The Professors **ORICELLI** and **GIACOMO TOMMASINI** (1768-1846), of Bologna, having adopted Gall’s doctrine, and being consequently suspected like Ucelli of heresy, received a message from Cardinal Opizoni in the following terms: “I beg to apologise for the trouble I am giving, but as all mankind are not so enlightened as you, you will be so good as not to scandalise them by preaching the dangerous and immoral doctrines of Gall.” But they persisted in their offence, and having continued to teach what seemed to them the truth, measures were taken to depose them also.

Dr. **LUIGI FERRARESE**, alienist, of Naples, who wrote a work on Gall’s doctrine (1838), in 1840 was called before the Holy Tribunal and was imprisoned for twenty-eight days. It is on record that “he was suspended from the office of physician to the Royal Lunatic Asylum at Aversa, and crushed to the earth by every engine of persecution which bigotry and tyranny combined could employ against him.”

Other eminent Italian followers of Gall were Dr. **PIETRO MOLOSSI**, of Milan ("Studii Phrenologici," 1840), **RIGONI**, Professor of Physiology in Pavia, and **ZARLENGA**, alienist, of Naples.

Other followers of Gall, in Italy and other countries, will be dealt with in the course of this volume.

**GALL’S FOLLOWERS IN DENMARK**

were numerous. His doctrine had many adherents among physicians and surgeons. J. J. v. **BERZELIUS** (1779-1848), one of the greatest chemists of his time, was a follower of Gall.

Prof. **MAX NEUBURGER**, the celebrated historian of medicine of the University of Vienna, has gone very closely into the history of Gall and published many important biographical details in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin.*
CHAPTER XVII

THE NEGLECT OF GALL'S ORIGINAL WORK BY ENGLISH DISCIPLES

JOHN CASPAR SPURZHEIM (1776-1832)

JOHN CASPAR SPURZHEIM was born on December 31st, 1776, at Longwicb, near Treves, on the Moselle. He studied divinity and philosophy, and when the French armies seized upon Treves he went to Vienna, where he became tutor to the sons of Count Splangen. He appears to have commenced his medical studies in 1800, at the same time as he became acquainted with Gall's doctrine; and when Gall was in need of a student to do the dissections for him at his public and private demonstrations, Spurzheim joined him for that purpose in 1804, and went with him on his tour round the German universities—as prosector, secretary, and general assistant. In all the reports of that journey the name of Spurzheim is not mentioned, and, with the exception of Great Britain and the United States, it has remained practically unknown. Gall, in his letters to Dr. R. Meier, of Bremen, in 1805, speaks of "my attendant and assistant Spurzheim," who addressed a letter wrongly. (Mentioned by Blumenbach, Edinburgh Phrenological Journal, 1846.)

During the first five years in Paris, however, Gall seems to have relied so much on Spurzheim as regards the arrangement of his discoveries for publication, that he allowed Spurzheim's name to be associated with his in the memoir presented to the Institute and as joint author in the first two volumes of his big work, though Spurzheim at that time had not yet qualified as a physician.

It was in 1814 that Spurzheim took his degree of doctor in Vienna, after which he came back to Paris and tried unsuccessfully some lectures of his own. He then decided to go to England, the previously subordinate Spurzheim then feeling sufficiently qualified and confident to pursue his own path towards the temple of fame. He therefore took "French leave" of his master. English medical men have always been rigid disciplinarians of their own fellows, but encouraging to "outsiders." Spurzheim hoped, therefore, to reap a harvest for himself by an unprincipled misapplication of his master's researches and discoveries, and a diplomatic utilisation of name and fame attaching to them. When Gall offered to go too, Spurzheim insisted on going alone, and admitted having learned English for six months in secret for that purpose. This led to a break of the relations between them.

The procedure and practice of his quondam pupil and associate were vigorously protested against and unsparingly denounced by Gall; and it is to the renegade Spurzheim and his disciple George Combe that humanity at large became indebted for the illiterate reader of character from the "bumps" of the head, who has flourished ever since.

Spurzheim in England claimed a share in Gall's discoveries of the structure and functions of the brain, and to have rendered "systematic and philosophical what had been in Gall's hands merely rude and detached facts." According to FOSSATI, Spurzheim was with Gall from 1805 to 1813, and before he joined Gall, Gall had
already discovered the decussation of the pyramidal bodies, their passage through the pons, the different layers in the pons, the continuation of the optic nerve to the anterior pair of the quadrigeminal bodies, the divergence of the pyramidal fibres from the crura through the corpora striata to the cortex of the brain, etc. Spurzheim’s claims to the anatomical discoveries of Gall were therefore unwarranted, and he admits in his work on the “Anatomy of the Brain,” London, 1826, p. xli., that Gall had already made and promulgated his discoveries before he became Gall’s prospector. Yet on the same page he says: “Modern anatomists before Gall and myself were divided in opinion on the subject of the decussation of the fibres in the pyramids.” Again: “Before Gall and I began our researches, all other anatomists were in the habit of cutting down the brain by slices.” As regards the physiological and philosophical theories of Gall, it must be admitted that he did remodel them and form them into a system under the name of “phrenology”—a name suggested in 1815 by Dr. THOMAS FORSTER (1789-1860), a naturalist, in a “Sketch of the New Anatomy of the Brain, with its Relation to Insanity” (1813)—but this systematisation, before the scientific foundation was laid, only inflicted fatal injury on Gall’s doctrine.

Spurzheim undoubtedly succeeded in one respect, namely, in popularising Gall’s doctrine; but the popularisation of science has its great dangers. No ideas lend themselves to such easy, and likewise to such shallow, generalisations as those of science. Once let out of the hand which uses them, in the strict and cautious manner by which alone they lead to valuable results, they are apt to work mischief.

Gall absolutely refused to have any more to do with him and declined even to look at his books, so disgusted was he. In vol. iii. of his big work, he warned his readers of the hasty conclusions and premature systematisation, and the introduction of “phrenology” by his pupil. Gall never undertook the construction of a system—in fact, he expressly disclaimed the pretension of doing so. He discovered one brain organ after another, just as it might happen. It was Spurzheim who had a more metaphysical mind, who divided the faculties, tried to improve upon their terminology, and added eight new organs. Gall disliked artificial systematic division and subdivision. He saw nothing satisfactory in Spurzheim’s classification:

“The most natural and philosophic order,” says Gall, “must be that which nature has observed in the successive arrangement of the faculties of the mind. But M. Spurzheim begins by establishing new divisions of the mind. . . . The philosophical spirit of M. Spurzheim shines in divisions, sub-divisions, sub-sub-divisions, etc.; and this is what he calls infusing more philosophy into the physiology of the brain than I had the ambition of introducing. He is forced to jump from one region to another . . . a perfect monstrosity, which one would believe to be invented with the design of rendering the study impossible. The propensities and sentiments, and often the intellectual faculties, are so confounded together, that it is hardly possible to discover the characteristic signs which distinguish one from the other. . . . With what propriety does he exclude imitation, circumspection, secretiveness, constructiveness, from the intellectual faculties? . . . The division into qualities and faculties common to man and brutes, and qualities and faculties peculiar to man, is, I confess, of great value from a philosophic point of view; but, when the most careful observer dares not decide where the faculties of the brute cease and those of man begin, the division cannot be considered satisfactory. He has changed the names, but treated the organs according to my principles; yet in so hasty and feeble a manner, that this part of my doctrine would be deplorable, if it were not established on a better foundation.”

There is also independent evidence of the relations between Gall and Spurzheim. The MARQUIS MOSQUATI wrote:
“From 1804-1807 Spurzheim was nothing else but the secretary and assistant to Gall. In 1806 I attended at Heidelberg the lectures of Gall, and I was witness as Spurzheim handed to him the casts and objects on which Gall was to make his remarks, in the same manner as when Dr. Faraday lectures at the Royal Institution there is always somebody to perform the mechanical part of the lecture. It must be allowed, however, that for the subsequent five years Spurzheim assisted his master so well in arranging his discoveries for publication that he was mentioned as joint author in the work on the ‘Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System.’ In 1824 I saw Gall again in Paris. At this epoch Spurzheim had remodelled the system of Gall, and had called it phrenology. I must say that Gall was not pleased with his innovations, and more than once in my presence spoke violently against him, calling him a plagiarist and a quack.”

Again, Dr. Fossati wrote to Dr. Andrew Combe, July 2nd, 1828, reproaching him “for not giving Gall the glory which is due to him, and for ascribing too much to Dr. Spurzheim by always connecting his name with that of the founder.”

John Elliotson, F.R.S. (1791-1868), Professor of Medicine in University College, London, showed the injustice of Dr. Spurzheim towards Gall, his vile attempts to share with Gall discoveries in which he had taken no part. He said:

“After reading some of Dr. Spurzheim’s first English work, published on his arrival in England, Gall gave the book with disgust, only half cut, to Dr. Fossati, and knew nothing more of Dr. Spurzheim’s sayings and writings afterwards than what was pointed out to him, and it was with the greatest difficulty that he could be prevailed upon to take any notice, even for a moment, of what was pointed out to him. I know none of the advocates of Dr. Spurzheim who is not miserably ignorant of the writings of Gall and of the history of Phrenology, and has not derived his knowledge second-hand from Dr. Spurzheim, or from one taught by him, and few who are not most unjust to Gall.

“Gall’s works are clear, flowing, full, at once rigidly philosophical and rich with profound thoughts and glowing illustrations. I never take them up without finding something fresh, and feeling that I am with one of that band of mighty minds to which Bacon, Shakespeare, Milton, etc., belonged. They speak for themselves, and are totally different from the writings of Dr. Spurzheim; and yet Gall’s writings are unknown to the greater part of the physiologists of the present day. It was Gall’s facts that made Dr. Spurzheim a phrenologist.” (Lancet, November 25th, 1837.)

Spurzheim’s campaign in London, in 1814, was opened by a dissection of the brain at the Medico-Chirurgical Society in Lincoln’s Inn Fields, and he set to work at once on the writing of a volume in English entitled “The Physiognomical System of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, founded on Anatomical and Physiological Examination of the Nervous System in general and of the Brain in particular, and indicating the Dispositions and Manifestations of the Mind.” This work appeared in 1815. It gained some adherents, but the University and other official authorities ridiculed and condemned it. Gall and Spurzheim were described as itinerant philosophers, quacks, and mountebanks, and this criticism was made in ignorance of Gall’s real work, but on Spurzheim’s presentation of it, his vainglorious disciple.

Particularly vehement were the criticisms by the Edinburgh Review. On reading these articles, Spurzheim went to Edinburgh, giving lectures and demonstrations there, but they were of no avail. Spurzheim thereupon published an “Examination of the Objections made in Britain against the Doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim,” which was reviewed by the Editor, Lord Jeffreys (1773-1850), himself, who wrote that their ideas of the anatomy of the brain had no claim to originality, that they were known a hundred and fifty years before. Spurzheim had also an introduction to Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), the philosopher. He waited on him, but Stewart refused to receive him. This discourtesy was consistent, for did he not write in the Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica: “Is there no Arbuthnot now to chastise the follies of our craniologists?”
Edinburgh, at the beginning of the XIXth century, had a medical school of great importance, rivalling London in its foreign reputation. It was important that Spurzheim should succeed there, but the only convert he made—though he grew into an eminent disciple—was a Writer to the Signet, GEORGE COMBE (1788-1858). Spurzheim had the good fortune to meet him, to convince him of the truth of his doctrine, and to leave him not only an enthusiastic disciple, but a practical and skilful master and teacher of it. After seven months, Spurzheim returned to London.

In 1817 he published his work entitled "Observations on Deranged Manifestations of the Mind."

In 1818 he went to Paris to marry Mademoiselle Perier, an accomplished woman, who made the drawings for his lectures.

In 1824 the French Government prohibited all lectures without its special permission, thus stopping Dr. Spurzheim. He did not visit England again until 1825. Meanwhile, in 1820, the Edinburgh Phrenological Society had been formed, with George Combe as its President. In 1823 they started their Phrenological Transactions. Subsequently, all over England societies were formed, aided by George Combe.

It was the practical philosophy of phrenology which made so many converts in England. It dealt with the emotions and passions of man, with the springs of human conduct, and not merely with the intellect. It must not be taken, either, that all the adherents accepted the localisations of phrenology; they may have thought them possible; but it was the analysis of character and the practical philosophy of life which attracted them.

In 1827 Spurzheim lectured at Cambridge University by permission of the Vice-Chancellor. In 1829 he visited Dublin, and was elected an Honorary Member of the Royal Irish Academy. In 1832 he went to America and lectured in Boston and at Harvard University. He died there on November 10th.

Spurzheim's error consisted in attempting to erect a complete edifice before there were materials suitable or sufficient for the foundation. The attempt to form a complete organology was premature so long as the knowledge of the parts was so meagre and imperfect. He did not follow Gall's plan of detailing the origin and progress of each of his discoveries of organs and of stating a number of individual instances in proof to his readers. He merely made assertions, so that one was inclined to think that he had reasoned himself into the belief in faculties, and then considered where their organs were most likely to lie. He presented his system to the British public as a perfect doctrine of the mind and the joint work of master and assistant; so that Gall had to suffer for Spurzheim's errors. Spurzheim and his successor, George Combe, instead of recognising the importance of Gall's anatomical and physiological labours, and drawing attention to them, as scientists would have done, looked more at the deductions which could be drawn from them. Principles which were yet in question they extended. Not only was Gall's work not continued, but no steps were taken either by Spurzheim, or by George and Andrew Combe who had forty years' time, to make it better known and to get his books translated. When £6,000 was left by Mr. Henderson for the promulgation of Gall's doctrines, George Combe, as trustee, published his own works with that money. When Gall died, no obituary notice was published in the Phrenological Journal; only the bare announcement of his death appeared.

Spurzheim and Combe held, and the philosophers BAILEY (1791-1870) and BAIN (1818-1903) refuted, the idea that phrenology was in itself a system, or the whole, of mental and moral philosophy; and the latter exposed also the insufficiency of the psychological analysis implied in the former's terminology. Spurzheim and Combe also disregarded Gall's warning that there are many large and well-formed brains which yield no intellectual fruits proportionate to their apparent capacity
and that correspondence between brain development and mental development is a very complex thing.

George Combe, in his reply to Dr. P. M. ROGET (1779-1869), who criticised the subject, said: "The title which Gall and Spurzheim give to their science is Phrenology." Now Gall nowhere called it that or by any other name. He invariably contented himself with the expression, "Functions of the Brain."

So firm was the belief of Spurzheim and his followers in the accuracy of their localisations, and that the size of each organ was a measure of its capacity, that JAMES STRATON (-1856), Secretary of the Phrenological Society of Aberdeen, invented a system of measurement of the different parts of the cranium which he claimed gave the size of the organs with mathematical accuracy. (Contributions to the Mathematics of Phrenology, Aberdeen, 1845.)

With Spurzheim and his followers the brain was soon neglected and the cranium became the principal object of their science. With them the question was whether or not we can tell people's characters by examining the size and shape of their heads; whereas with Gall it was always whether abnormal formation of the brain and circumscribed lesions would give any clue to its physiology. He wrote as early as 1796, that is long before the publication of his big work:

"They call me a craniologist, and the science which I have discovered, craniology. I rather think that the wise men have baptised the child before it was born. The object of my researches is the brain. The cranium is only a faithful cast of the external surface of the brain, and is consequently but a minor part of the principal object."

Gall would have nothing to do with indiscriminate character-reading from the head. His object was to elucidate the structure and functions of the brain as the organ of the mind; and in Gall's hands, at least, that object was pursued by the most strictly orthodox scientific methods, by the observation of facts, the induction of general laws from them, and the correction and control of such generalisation by experiment and further observation. The anatomy of the brain in man and the lower animals, its form and structure, were the groundwork of his labours; and in this dry region of pure science he proved himself a sound and original investigator of the first order. Infinite pains were taken in the collection of facts, and no theory was advanced without a mass of evidence to support it.

Gall's teaching was never made known in England. Many people thought, and many still think, that its essence is contained in what can be learned from looking at one of the phrenological busts, where it is made to appear as if the human mind could be parcelled out in a number of bumps, each one a chamber for some busy occupant. The remark made by SIR JOHN FORBES (1787-1861), in the British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review, is as true to-day as it was in 1840: "We have heard and read much in opposition to phrenology, and we can affirm that the phrenology opposed was scarcely ever that of Gall, but usually its miserable caricature as exhibited by half-informed enthusiasts."

One of the earliest converts to Phrenology was none less than the celebrated Dr. JOHN ABERNETHY (1764-1831). He started as an opponent:

"I anticipate nothing but mischief from Gall and Spurzheim's Physiognomy or Cranioscopy becoming generally known and accredited. Suppose a man to have large protuberances on that part of the head where they are said to indicate excess of cautionous; suppose him apprised that such excess tends to produce melancholy musings and irrational apprehensions, which may hold the mind spellbound and appalled, till suicide is welcomed as the only means of escape from seemingly insupportable gloom and horrors. Suppose him with this information seized with a fit of temporary despondency; will he now strive to rouse his mind to active exertion and employ it on other subjects? Will he not rather think the effort
NEGLECT OF GALL’S WORK BY ENGLISH DISCIPLES

useless and be inclined to submit to his doom from the belief that it is the result of unalterable organisation?”

After a closer study of the subject he lectured upon it at the Royal College of Surgeons in 1821, when he said:

“In looking over the list of faculties, in order to see if I could reconcile them to analogy and reason, I could discern no order nor connection between them. The whole presented to me a rude appearance quite different, as I then thought, from what is found in nature. But after a more attentive consideration, light began to dawn upon me; and, beginning to consider the faculties in a certain way, and to group them after a certain order, the whole gradually formed themselves before me into a system of surprising symmetry; and—like the disjointed parts of an anamorphosis, when seen from the proper point of view, collecting themselves under one elegant design—delighted me with the appearance of that very order and beauty that I would beforehand have expected to find in the mental faculties. The harmonious junction of the organs, the beautiful adaptation of the faculties to each other, and to the phenomena of mind, as observable in every state in which it exists, are far too remarkable, and the coincidences far too numerous and exact, to have occurred by chance. As soon would a number of letters shaken out of Swift’s Laputan machine fall of themselves into a scientific treatise, as would the names of thirty-five or thirty-six faculties, put down at random, compose a complete and well-combined scheme of the human mind, such as this appears actually to be. The inference is, I think, irresistible, either that the scheme, which appears so well arranged, has been invented by Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, or (if they actually proceeded, as they tell us, and founded it piecemeal by a gradual and patient examination of facts) that the harmony and systematic junction of these scattered members forms a very strong presumption—to say no more—in favour of the accuracy of their separate observations, and of the system being truly founded in nature. Had Drs. Gall and Spurzheim sat down with the purpose of constructing a system from their own imagination, it is next to morally impossible that they could have contrived one which harmonises so completely with itself, and with the actual state of the mental faculties, and the uses to which these faculties are subservient. This is a problem which has puzzled the most eminent philosophers of ancient and modern times; and all attempts to solve it have hitherto been fruitless, so as almost to conclude that its solution was beyond the reach of human ingenuity. If, then, these gentlemen have actually succeeded in inventing a system like this, which affords a key to the mental constitution of man, and a facility of accounting for the diversities of human character and intellect, far surpassing any other system that has ever yet appeared—supposing it to be, as all other systems have been, purely hypothetical—it would entitle its authors to rank as philosophers with the highest names that ever adorned the annals of the world.”

Dr. Abernethy confessed his “inability to offer any rational objection to the new doctrine, as affording a satisfactory explanation of the motives of human conduct,” and quieted his Scotch countrymen, who had religious objections against it. He even invited Spurzheim to give a series of demonstrations on the brain to his pupils at St. Bartholomew’s Hospital, and resigned his chair to him on these occasions.

It was Abernethy, who, by his College of Surgeons’ lecture, caused the spread of phrenology; not any effort of Spurzheim.

Guided by so competent an authority as Abernethy, every medical man set up a phrenological bust in his surgery, in recognition of the respect which he entertained for the phrenological doctrine. This became so general that a surgery was considered to be but incompletely furnished without such a bust; and a phrenological head was a regular item in the order for an outfit such as was supplied to medical men in those days by the firm of Maw, Son, and Thompson, surgical instrument makers, of London. The example thus set by the surgeons was followed by the chemists, who, from the erudite appearance which it gave, placed a phrenological
head in their windows. Thus exposed, these busts often found a sale among the
general public. To keep up appearances with their betters, the quack doctors
exhibited them in recommendation of their profession. This so disgusted the
chemists that many of them discontinued the exhibition of them.

Another convert of Spurzheim was Sir WILLIAM LAWRENCE (1783-1867), a
pupil of Abernethy, Professor of Anatomy and Surgery, at the early age of thirty-
two, at St. Bartholomew's Hospital, and President of the Royal College of Surgeons.
In his lectures on "Comparative Anatomy, Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural
History of Man," he speaks highly of the new doctrine.

In these lectures, delivered between 1816 and 1819, Lawrence advanced the
doctrine of the evolution of the brain and mental powers, for which he was de-
nounced as a materialist. They raised an immediate outcry, and the author was
charged with "the unworthy design of propagating opinions detrimental to society,
and of endeavouring to enforce them for the purpose of loosening those restraints in
which the welfare of mankind exists." Lawrence was forced to bow before the
storm of abuse, and announce publicly that the volumes had been suppressed as he
was refused copyright. As a result he forsook anthropology altogether, and
henceforward devoted himself entirely to anatomy and surgery.

Spurzheim had associated himself early during his stay in London with one
JAMES DEVILLE (1777-1846), a dealer in the Strand who was clever in making
casts of living heads and who soon became famous for his vast collection, containing
many hundreds of casts of clergymen, artists, painters, sculptors, navigators,
travellers, poets, authors, musicians, composers, legislators, judges, lawyers,
astronomers, engineers, actors, many of them men of celebrity; and even of
pugilists and criminals, idiots and imbeciles, and men of different nationalities. Of
George Bidder, the celebrated engineer famous for his arithmetical gifts, he made a
cast of the head at the age of eight, thirteen, sixteen, nineteen, twenty-two and
twenty-eight. His collection of skulls of animals numbered about 3,000. Cuvier
gave him permission to make casts from all the well-authenticated skulls in his
splendid museum. He also made a large collection of copies of the busts of ancient
philosophers and great men in the Louvre, Florentine and Prussian Galleries and
private collections.

Deville was discovered by BRYAN DONKIN, F.R.S., in 1817, and employed
by him to make casts of heads for the Phrenological Society in London.

Deville was the first "professional" phrenologist. He gained his reputation as
such by examining the heads of 148 convicts on board the convict ship England,
when about to sail for New South Wales, in the spring of 1826. He classified them
according to their likely degree of violence and mischief-making and handed the
memoranda to Dr. Thomson, the surgeon in charge, who had no knowledge of the
subject. The authorities allowed the publication of the Log and Proceedings of the
convict ship during that voyage (Edinburgh Phrenological Journal, vol. iv., 1827),
and they bore out the accuracy of Deville's delineations in all cases, excepting only
one.

GEORGE COMBE (1788-1858)

was born at Edinburgh, studied law, and became acquainted with Spurzheim in
1816, and was for many years the chief advocate of Phrenology. He contributed
nothing to brain physiology and took no steps whatever to get Gall known in
England; but Combe nevertheless was an able and excellent man, and contributed
much to the moral bearings of Gall's doctrine and to its philosophy.
In 1817, in the April number of the Scots Magazine, Combe published his first article on the subject. In 1820 he, with his brother, ANDREW COMBE, and others, founded the Phrenological Society, and, in 1823, the Phrenological Journal, which was full of information, some of it interesting at the present day. It ceased publication in 1847.

In the Glasgow Medical Society, Combe's Essays were excluded from the library. Ministers preached against phrenology, claiming that it tended to materialism, and of course to infidelity; in reply to these attacks Combe wrote a book to show that it was in harmony with the Scriptures.

His chief work was 'The Constitution of Man,' published in 1828, a work of which an enormous number of editions were sold, and which became a household work on account of its sound philosophy and practical teaching of the hygiene of mind, in regard to which it is on an equality with the best works of modern writers.

HORACE MANN (1796-1859), U.S. Senator, famous educationist and great reformer, said:

"Combe's 'Constitution of Man' is the greatest book that has been written for centuries. It shows us those conditions of our being without whose observance we cannot be wise, useful, or happy. It demonstrates from our very organisation, and from our relation to the universe in which we are placed, that we cannot be prospered (in any true sense of the word) unless we are intelligent, and cannot be happy unless we are good. It 'vindicates the ways of God to man' better than any polemical treatise, and I declare myself a hundred times more indebted to it than to all the metaphysical works I ever read."

LORD MORLEY, in his "Life of Cobden," says:

"Few men have done better than the author of 'The Constitution of Man.' That memorable book, whose principles have now in some shape or other become the accepted commonplace of all rational persons, was a startling revelation when it was first published. . . . We cannot wonder that zealous men were found to bequeath fortunes for the dissemination of that wholesome gospel, that it was circulated by scores of thousand of copies, and that it was seen on shelves where there was nothing else save the Bible and 'Pilgrim's Progress.'"

However, Combe sinned in always using phrenological terms, where others would have done just as well. He wrote as if there were no psychology and ethics outside phrenology; but often he did no more than to graft the more or less crude terms invented by Spurzheim on well-known and ancient truths. Here is a specimen, of interest in view of recent history:

"The national debt of Britain has been contracted chiefly in war, originating in commercial jealousy and thirst for conquest; in short, under the suggestions of combativeness, destructiveness, acquisitiveness, and self-esteem. . . . Would a statesman, who believed in the doctrines maintained in this work, have recommended these wars as essential to national prosperity? If the twentieth part of the sum had been spent in effecting objects recognised by the moral sentiments—in instituting, for example, seminaries of education and penitentiaries, and in making roads, canals, and public granaries—how different would have been the present condition of the country! . . . All these calamities happened because Mr. Pitt and Buonaparte were not acquainted with phrenology and the natural laws. They acted, it appears, in pure ignorance of the supremacy of the moral and intellectual faculties. Buonaparte, in particular, did not believe in the existence of justice as an innate sentiment."

In 1836, Combe was candidate for the chair of Logic in the Edinburgh University, but it was SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON (1788-1856) who was successful. From
1838-1840 he was lecturing in America. In 1833 his book on "Phrenology" was translated into German, and in 1844 he gave some lectures at Heidelberg, there being a short-lived interest in Phrenology in Germany.

The chief German representatives were:

Geheimrat Prof. BERNHARD v. COTTA (1808-1879), geologist;

J. B. FRIEDREICH (1796-1862), Editor of the well-known "Friedreich's Jahrbücher," who took up Gall's doctrine on Criminology.

Prof. J. C. A. GROHMANN (1769-1847), the Kant philosopher, who wrote "Untersuchungen uber Gall's Schadellehre" (1842).

Dr. ED. HIRSCHFELD (-1845), who, for a year or two before his death, published a small phrenological journal.

Prof. KARL W. IDELER (1795-1860), the famous alienist.

JUSTUS v. LIEBIG (1803-1873), the famous chemist, who analysed organic substances (1830).

Geheimrat E. J. A. MITTERMAIER (1787-1867), Professor of Criminal Law, Munich.

R. R. NOEL, relation of Lord Byron, who wrote a number of phrenological works.

G. v. SCHEVE (1815-1880), who also wrote several phrenological works.

LUDWIG SCHLAGER (1828-1885), of Vienna.

JOH. v. SPIX (1781-1826), anatomist.

G. v. STRUVE (1805-1870), Editor of the German Phrenological Journal.

Wm. WAGNER, Professor of Medical Jurisprudence, Berlin University.

George Combe, like Gall, Voisin, Deville, and others, visited prisons and diagnosed the nature of the crime of convicts from the shape of their heads. In April, 1829, he visited the Penitentiary of Dublin, accompanied by a number of men of standing eager to see a trial of the phrenological doctrine. He had a dozen convicts, selected by the Governor, brought before him and wrote out their characteristics, which were afterwards compared and found in harmony with the entries made in the Governor’s case-book. (For details, see my treatise on "Scientific Phrenology," London, 1902.)

Combe’s advice was much sought by the nobility in the education of children, and in 1846 Queen Victoria consulted him about the training of her own sons and daughters.

He died in 1858, living long enough to see the decline of the subject to which he had devoted his life’s energies. He was married to Miss CECILIA SIDDONS (in 1833), a daughter of the famous "Queen of the Stage.”

Dr. ANDREW COMBE (1797-1847),

the brother of George Combe, was a far different man, and would have achieved much had he not suffered from chronic ill-health (tuberculosis). He was the most sagacious and far-seeing of all British writers on Gall’s doctrine. He believed that a position of importance awaited it in the future. "If true," he said, "it furnishes a key, not only to the physiology of the brain and nervous system, but to the philosophy of the mind.”

After taking his doctor degree in 1817, he went to Paris to study under ESQUIROL for two years. Tuberculosis drove him to Italy, but he returned in 1821 and commenced medical practice in 1823. In 1831 he went again to Italy for two years. In 1834 he published “Principles of Physiology, applied to the Preservation of Health, and to the Improvement of Physical and Mental Education,” of which 28,000 copies were sold. In 1836 he was honoured with the appointment
NEGLECT OF GALL'S WORK BY ENGLISH DISCIPLES

of Physician-in-Ordinary to the King and Queen of the Belgians. SIR JAMES CLARK (1788-1870), Physician to Queen Victoria, recommended him. For several months he resided at Brussels, but his pulmonary trouble caused him to resign and return to Scotland. In 1838 he was appointed one of the Physicians Extraordinary to Queen Victoria, in Scotland, and in 1844 one of H.M.'s Physicians in Ordinary. He was also F.R.C.P., Ed., and Corresp. Member of the I. and R. Society of Physicians in Vienna.

During a stay in Madeira, in 1843, he wrote "The Physiology of Digestion," which went through nine editions. In 1846 he wrote "The Physiological and Moral Management of Children," which went through ten editions. He died in 1847. He was joint-editor of the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal, which ceased publication directly after his death.

The humane and moral treatment of the insane, and the abolition of restraint, were advocated by Andrew Combe in an article contributed to the Scotsman, February 6th, 1830, and in his work entitled "Observations on Mental Arrangement," Edinburgh, 1831. He therefore preceded CONOLLY in the advocacy of these reforms. This work continued to sell until a few years ago. In the article referred to, he protested strongly against appointing—to the duty of ministering to the mentally deranged with a view to restoring sanity—men who possess no particle of acquaintance, either professed or implied, with the philosophy of mind, and without the sympathy or kindness of disposition necessary to effect that change. He says:

"Connected with this, I may remark that a hurtful error is prevalent in supposing that all lunatics are inaccessible to reason, and insensible to the ordinary feelings of humanity, and that, therefore, it is lost time to attempt to influence them by rational and consistent kindness and friendly intercourse, and quite unnecessary to be scrupulous or otherwise considerate in what we say to them, as they can neither remember nor judge with accuracy. This, however, is a most pernicious error, favourable only to unworthy deceit, ignorance, and indolence. In the majority of cases, some, however few, of the faculties remain unaltered, and even in those which apparently involve every feeling and faculty there are glimpses of reason, and tendencies to right and sound action, which, as in all other diseases ought to be fostered and strengthened into vigour. It is for this reason that it is injurious to recovery to limit the intercourse of the insane to those who are themselves insane, as is done in our public establishments, where the only rational creatures with whom the patient can associate are his keepers and superintendent, men generally of little intellectual superiority, knowledge, or learning, and of little refinement of manner or feeling. Not only is the intellect thus deprived of the ameliorating influence of sound exercise in others, but the feelings, already separated from every object to which formerly value was attached and affection engaged, are thus left ungratified, and perhaps disgusted, and delicacy hurt by the scenes to which they are inevitably exposed; and in proportion as reason and health return, the evil becomes more afflicting, and its effects more injurious in retarding complete restoration. . . .

"Moral regimen can scarcely, indeed, be too highly estimated in the cure of insanity, and it requires only to be conducted with discrimination to render it a very effective remedy. Unfortunately the use of the term 'moral' has from its connection with mind withdrawn the notice of the practitioner too much from the bodily conditions under which the intellectual powers and moral feelings act, and thus deprived him of the opportunity of adapting different kinds of moral treatment to different forms of insanity; and accordingly we find all the inmates of an asylum subjected to the same discipline, and their employments and amusements regulated after one general plan. . . . Powerful in modifying the action of the brain, as moral arrangements are thus shown to be, the practice of subjecting all lunatics to the same regimen appears not less preposterous than would be that of subjecting all who are affected with stomachic disease to one sort of diet, food being pretty nearly to the stomach what mental stimulus is to the brain. In society we know how
variously we must address ourselves to different individuals to produce any impression upon them; and the effect of disease disturbing the mind is not to smooth down inequalities already existing, but to make natural features stand out in harsher contrast, and therefore the necessity for discriminative occupation and appeals to sentiment becomes only the greater by the addition of disease. The neglect of this circumstance is the chief cause of the discrepant testimonies we possess as to the effects of music, of religious exercises, and of various other moral remedies, which, if they act at all, must do mischief when ill applied, as certainly as they do good when used judiciously. And hence the unavoidable evils arising from lunatics associating with none but lunatics, or with keepers of no education or refinement. In such society, there cannot be the slightest regulation of moral stimuli so as to adapt them to the exigencies of the moment, and of the individual case, and a powerful means of beneficial influence to the patient is thus sacrificed.

To be able to grapple with mind, and to influence it beneficially, we must not only have mind ourselves, but we must be intimately acquainted with human nature, with its various feelings and springs of action, and with the relations of these to each other, to the external world, and to the physical system; and we must know the individual qualities of the patient, and live and associate with him to put all these in proper operation. The mind and the body act and react on each other without ceasing, and therefore a knowledge of the organs and functions composing the body, and of the effects of these upon the mental states, is also indispensable. But such a combination of requisites is not to be looked for in the half-educated, although, it may be, good-hearted, keeper or superintendent of an asylum.

"The second great principle in conducting the moral treatment of the insane is to give due exercise and occupation to the mental faculties and cerebral organs which are unaffected." Then he goes on to show that idleness increases the morbid tendency and that more opportunities for occupation should be provided in asylums.

The Combes made many important converts to the doctrine of phrenology, at least to those scientific principles and practical philosophy which underlie it. We must bear in mind that the connection between mind and brain was not then an acknowledged fact, and that most men had a very vague view what the word "mind" conveyed. To most men it was an entity without attributes.

Moreover, Gall's doctrine dealt not merely with the intellect of man, like psychology, but also with the sentiments and propensities, i.e., with the motives of human conduct. As Professor ALEXANDER BAIN (1818-1903), in his work on the "Study of Character," 1861, said: "Phrenology is the only scheme of human character that has hitherto been elaborated in a manner proportioned to the subject."

Gall's doctrine was also a useful aid to the study of the functions of the brain and assisted in the understanding of mental deficiency and mental disorders, and their treatment. If Spurzheim and the Combes had only translated Gall's works or given sufficient extracts from them, the doctrine would have found many more adherents and might even have received official recognition. As it was, the official leaders of medical opinion remained hostile, and the private believers in the truth and value of the subject soon turned from it with the advent of the "professional" character-reader.

It has been shown that Dr. Andrew Combe was a pioneer in the "moral" treatment of the insane long before any actual reform took place. The following testimonials will show that practically all the better known English alienists of that period subscribed to Gall's doctrine, and were avowed phrenologists, before that term acquired its present meaning.

Sir WILLIAM C. ELLIS (1839), Medical Superintendent of Hanwell Asylum, wrote:

"I candidly confess that until I became acquainted with phrenology I had no solid foundation upon which I could base my treatment for the cure of insanity.
NEGLECT OF GALL'S WORK BY ENGLISH DISCIPLES

... I am fully convinced the dispositions of man are indicated by the form and size of the brain. ... I could mention a great variety of cases in the treatment of which I have found the little knowledge I possess of this interesting science of the greatest utility. ... Residing amidst 600 lunatics, no day passes ever in which the truth of phrenology is not exemplified."

JOHN CONOLLY (1794-1866), who succeeded Sir William Ellis at the Hanwell Asylum in 1839, was a member of the Warwick and Leamington Phrenological Society and the Phrenological Association, and in 1835 read a phrenological paper on "The History and Cerebral Development of King Robert Bruce." In his work on "The Indications of Insanity" (1830), he wrote:

"Many of the phenomena of disease and the observation of all mankind, seem to me to prove that the first principles of phrenology are founded in nature, and I can see nothing which merits the praise of being philosophical in the real or affected contempt, professed by so many anatomists and physiologists for a science which, however imperfect, has for its object the demonstration that for other functions, the existence of which none can deny, there are further separations and distinctions of hitherto unexplained portions of nervous matter. ... Phrenology may save us from the present barbarous system of education of overloading those who are not naturally fitted for the burden. ... If a man with a unique head has a unique mental power, are we to be told that there is no connection whatever between them?"

And in a letter to George Combe (quoted in the Journal of Mental Science, 1879, p. 238):

Conolly expressed his "conviction of the great usefulness of habitual regard to the principles of phrenology especially in my department of practice, and of the confusion and imperfection of the views which seem to me to be taken both of the sound and unsound mind by those who reject the aid of observations confirmed now by vast experience, and most of which may be daily verified in asylums for the insane. I am also convinced that attention to the form of the head, conjoined with that cautious consideration of all other physical circumstances, which no prudent physiologist disregards, will often enable the practitioner to form an accurate prognosis in cases of mental disorder, and to foretell the chances of recovery or amelioration, or hopeless and gradual deterioration."

Again, in a letter to Sir James Clark, December 8th, 1862 (quoted in Journal of Mental Science, 1869), Conolly said:

"It is rather curious that the subject of the delusions of old age, concerning which you inquire if I have written anything, has been lately and often the particular subject of my thoughts. For many years past I have kept rather full records of cases occurring in my practice. ... Forgetfulness of words, of dates, of people, of things read and things once carefully done and written, dread of poverty, visions of wealth, foolish attachments and dislikes, strange delusions founded on dreams, and sometimes the oddest singularities. These things are very curious, and phrenology, which seems forgotten, appears the only doctrine which tends to explain them."

Sir JAMES CLARK (1788-1870), Physician to Queen Victoria, in his Memoir of Conolly, himself observed, after citing certain passages from modern physiologists favouring the localisation of cerebral organs:

"These observations, which are founded on inquiries into the anatomy and physiology of the brain, strengthened by recent discoveries in pathology, all point in one direction, and tend to suggest the opinion of the phrenologists that the brain is an aggregate of many different parts, each appropriate to the manifestation of a
particular mental faculty. The prediction of the late Dr. Andrew Combe, the most
sagacious and far-seeing of all British writers on phrenology, that a possible position
of importance awaited it in the future, appears to rest on a surer foundation than
has sometimes been imagined."

Dr. JAMES SCOTT, Medical Superintendent of the Royal Naval Lunatic Asylum
at Haslar, writes:

"As I have been for nearly ten years medical Superintendent of this asylum,
my opportunities, at least of observing, have been great indeed; and a daily
intercourse with the unfortunate individuals entrusted to my care and management
has firmly, because experimentally, convinced me that mental disorder and moral
delinquency can be rationally combated only by the application of phrenology;
and that the man who treats them on any other system will much oftener be
disappointed than he who studies the manifestations of mind and traces effects to
their secondary causes by the almost infallible beacon of phrenology. . . . I
unhesitatingly give it as my conviction that no man, whatever may be the qualifi-
cation in other respects, will be very successful in the treatment of insanity, in its
various forms, if he be not well acquainted with Gall's doctrine; and I will add
that, whatever success may have attended my own practice in the lunatic asylum
of this great national establishment, over which I have presided as chief medical
officer for many years, I owe it almost exclusively to that knowledge."

Sir JAMES COXE (1811-1878), Commissioner in Lunacy for Scotland, had the
following eulogy passed on him by Sir James Crichton Browne in his Presidential
Address, Royal College of Physicians, 1878:

"From the commencement of his career Sir James Coxe interested himself in
insanity. During the earlier stages of his professional training he enjoyed no op-
portunities of coming into contact with the cloistered insane, nor of observing the
modes of treatment then resorted to, as lunatic asylums were not in those days open
to students, and were unprovided with medical assistants; but this disadvantage
was, to a great extent, compensated by his having acquired from his relatives George
and Andrew Combe a thorough knowledge of phrenology, which—not then fallen
on evil days of charlatanism and into the evil companionship of mesmerism—
encouraged the accurate observation of mental states, accentuated the relations
subsisting between these and states of the nervous system, and had even some
curious glimpses of foresight into the revelations of modern physiology. He saw
the phrenological method of inquiry applied in cases of insanity and of peculiar
turpitude in the communities of lunatics and criminals that he visited during a
long sojourn on the Continent, and the influence of the information thus obtained,
co-operating with the natural bent of a comprehensive but unimaginative mind,
may be discerned in all his subsequent public and official acts."

W. A. F. BROWNE (1805-1885) had studied phrenology under George Combe, and
afterwards the subject of insanity under Esquirol in Paris; and he wrote to Dr.
Combe and his brother, soliciting their influence in procuring the appointment as
Resident Superintendent of the Montrose Asylum, and their influence got him the
post. He was subsequently chosen to fill the corresponding office in the Crichton
Royal Institution near Dumfries, and later became Commissioner in Lunacy for
Scotland, having risen to the first rank in his profession. He wrote in his book on
"What Asylums Were and Ought to be," 1837, which was dedicated to Dr. Andrew
Combe, "as an acknowledgment of the benefits which he has conferred on society by
his application of phrenology in the treatment of insanity and nervous disease":

"To those who are acquainted with the doctrines of phrenology the extent of
my obligations will be readily recognised; and to those who are still ignorant of
these doctrines I have to offer the assurance that insanity can neither be understood,
NEGLECT OF GALL'S WORK BY ENGLISH DISCIPLES

nor described, nor treated by the aid of any other philosophy. I have long entertained this opinion. I have for many years put it to the test of experiment, and I now wish to record it as my deliberate conviction."

In a letter to the Hon. A. Boardman, 1850, he said:

"I hereby certify that I have been acquainted with the principles of phrenology for upwards of ten years; that from proofs based upon physiology and observation I believe these to be a true exposition of the laws and phenomena of the human mind; that during the whole of the period mentioned I have acted on these principles, applied them practically in the ordinary concerns of life, in determining and analysing the characters of all individuals with whom I became acquainted or connected, and that I have derived the greatest benefit from the assistance thus obtained. But although the utility of the science be most apparent in the discrimination of the good from the bad, those of virtuous and intellectual capabilities from the brutal and the imbecile, it is not confined to this. In the exercise of my profession I have been enabled, by the aid of phrenology, to be of essential service in directing the education of the young as a protection against nervous disease, and in removing or alleviating the various forms assumed by insanity in the mature. For several years I have devoted myself to the study of mental diseases and the care of the insane. During my studies at the Salpêtrière, Charenton, etc., in Paris, I was able to derive great additional information from my previous knowledge of phrenology, and now that I have been entrusted with a large asylum, I am inclined to attribute any little success that may have attended my efforts to ameliorate the condition of those confined to my charge to the same cause."

Sir ARTHUR MITCHELL (1826-1909), Commissioner in Lunacy for Scotland, was also friendly to the doctrine. He republished Andrew Combe's "Mental Derangement," stating that "the soundness of the fundamental principles of phrenology may be considered as no longer in dispute."

Dr. LITTLETON FORBES WINSLow (1810-1874), in a work entitled "The Principles of Phrenology as Applied to the Elucidation and Cure of Insanity," London, 1852, said:

"A knowledge of the principles of this science will be found highly serviceable to the physician in enabling him to prevent the development of insanity in those who are hereditarily or otherwise predisposed to this distressing malady. ... The correctness of their localisation of the functions of the brain becomes at once so plainly demonstrated, that the non-acceptance of phrenology is next to impossible."

Dr. JOHN GLENDINNING, of Manchester (Clinical Lectures, 1842), said:

"The business of reform in mental science has been resumed on other and sounder principles by Dr. Gall; and phrenology will, I doubt not, generally be regarded as the only system before the public that makes any tolerable approach to what the enlightened common sense of mankind can recognise as science, and useful for practical purposes. It was the study of insanity that gave Gall the clue; and people are unconscious witnesses against, and telling illustrations of, the unsoundness of the earlier systems."

DANIEL HACK TUKE (1827-1895), the well-known alienist, son-in-law of Conolly, in the Asylum Journal of Mental Science, 1856, wrote:

"The diversity, as regards the form and size of the human cranium, can only have escaped the notice of the least observant, or failed to excite some interest in the least reflective. This diversity is observable not only in regard to the whole head but also its several regions; the head of one is large and massive, of another small and ill-developed; but more than this, the forehead of one may be broad and ample, while that of another is shallow and retreating; these facts are notorious. Vol. i."
On the other hand the mental characteristics of one individual do not contrast less strongly with those of another. Between the two extremes of the highest psychical endowments and the helpless condition of idiocy every conceivable shade of intellectual character and functions is to be met with. . . . We owe something to the phrenological school for their analysis of the mind, which (whatever may be the fate of Gall’s cerebral physiology) is more practical than any which preceded it, and probably many are not aware how considerable an extent they assume the truth of the divisions of the phrenologists.”

JOHN ELLIOTSON, F.R.S. (1791-1868), Dean of the Medical Faculty in the University of London, President of the Royal Medical and Chirurgical Society, wrote in Human Physiology, in 1836:

“I always taught phrenology in my lectures upon insanity, when I had the chair of the Practice of Medicine in St. Thomas’s Hospital; and notwithstanding this was stated to the University of London when I offered myself for the chair of the Practice of Medicine in that institution, I was unanimously elected, and have not only discussed the subject of insanity there ever since upon phrenological principles, as the only ones by which a person can have any knowledge of insanity, but have promised a statement and defence of phrenology on arriving at that part of my course. . . . Those who have studied it know that phrenology unfolds the only satisfactory account of the mind—human and brute; that it contributes to establish the surest foundation for legislation, education, and morals, and presents a large department of nature in the noblest, grandest, and the only satisfactory point of view; and that those who reject or neglect phrenology are lamentably ignorant of much which they fancy they know, and deprive themselves not only of much intellectual delight, but of much practical utility.”

Dr. SAMUEL G. HOWE (1801-1876), the founder of the Perkins Institution for the Blind, Massachusetts, U.S.A., wrote: “Before I knew Phrenology, I was groping in the dark as blind as my pupils; I derived very little satisfaction from my labours, and fear that I gave but little to others.” He educated Laura Bridgman (1829-1889), the blind deaf-and-dumb woman who entered the Institution in 1837, on phrenological principles, and with what success all the world knows. Another inmate of that Institution, of remarkable intellect and similarly afflicted—blind, deaf, and dumb—is Miss HELEN KELLER, born 1880, who entered in 1886. Both cases are incontrovertible proofs of the mental powers being innate. They had latent gifts which only wanted drawing out. The Reports of the Perkins Institution contain a complete history.

Among well-known members of Phrenological Societies and active supporters of phrenology, besides those mentioned, who left written records of their views, were:

DISNEY ALEXANDER, Medical Superintendent of Wakefield Asylum.
JOHN ASHBURNER, M.D. (1816-1878).
EDWARD BARLOW, M.D., University of Edinburgh.
Sir WILLIAM BAYNES (-1866).
RICHARD BEAMISH, F.R.S. (-1873), member of Phrenological Association.
T. E. BEATTY, M.D., Professor of Medical Jurisprudence, Royal College of Surgeons, Ireland.
BINDON BLOOD, F.R.S.E.
CHARLES BRAY (1811-1884), author of numerous philosophical and phrenological works. (See Chapter XXII.)
Sir CHARLES BULLEN (1769-1853), admiral.
JOHN BUTTER, F.R.S. (1791-1877), surgeon.
NEGLIGENCE OF GALL'S WORK BY ENGLISH DISCIPLES

CHARLES CALDWELL (1772-1853), Professor of Medicine in Lexington University; the chief advocate of the doctrine in the United States.

W. W. CAMPBELL (-1840), Lecturer on Anatomy, Royal College of Surgeons, Ireland.

RICHARD CARMICHAEL (1779-1849), of Dublin, surgeon.

ROBERT CHAMBERS (1802-1871), one of the Editors of Chambers' Journal, a forerunner of Darwin, with his book entitled "Vestiges of Natural History of Creation" (1844). See Chapter XXIV.

RICHARD CHENEVIX, F.R.S. (1774-1830), chemist.

JOHN CHEYNE, F.R.S.E. (1777-1836), Physician General to H.M.'s Forces in Ireland.

RICHARD COBDEN (1804-1865), the famous economist.

JOHN C. COLOQUHOUN, M.D. (1785-1854).

Sir ASTLEY COOPER (1768-1841), the famous surgeon.

J. J. COWAN (1812-), Lecturer on Anatomy.

Judge P. C. CRAMPTON (1782-1862), Professor of Law in Trinity College, Dublin.

JAS. GEO. DAVEY, Lecturer on Insanity, Bristol Medical School.

CHARLES DICKENS (1812-1870), the celebrated author.

BRYAN DONKIN, F.R.S. (1768-1855), engineer and inventor, formerly an auditor of Gall in Vienna, who, together with Dr. Elliotson, discovered Deville, the phrenological bust maker, and formed the London Phrenological Society and later the Phrenological Association, which met concurrently with the British Association in different towns in Great Britain.

BRYAN DONKIN, C.E. (1835-1902), the former's son.

JAMES L. DRUMMOND (1783-1853), Professor of Anatomy, Belfast.

ROBERT DUNN, F.R.C.S.

W. F. EDWARDS, F.R.S. (1777-1842), naturalist.

J. ESDAILE (1808-1859), surgeon. (See Chap. XXXVII).

RICHARD S. EVANSON, Professor in the Practice of Physic in the Royal College of Surgeons, and Secretary of the Phrenological Society, Dublin; one of the founders of the Phrenological Association.

FRANCIS FARQUHARSON, M.D., F.R.C.S., surgeon; Vice-President of Phrenological Society.

ROBERT FERGUSON, M.P. (1767-1840).

Sir WILLIAM FERGUSSON (1808-1877), surgeon.

Sir JOHN FIFE (1795-1871), Lecturer on Surgery.

Sir JOHN FORBES, F.R.S. (1787-1861), Editor of the British and Foreign Medical and Chirurgical Review; member of Phrenological Association.

H. S. GALBRAITH, Medical Superintendent Glasgow Royal Asylum.

WILLIAM GREGORY, F.R.S. (1803-1858), Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh and President of the Royal Medical Society.

W. A. GUY (1810-1883), Professor of Forensic Medicine, King's College, London.

Sir HENRY HALFORD (1766-1844), Physician to George III., George IV., William IV., and Queen Victoria.

Hon. DOUGLAS HALLYBURTON (1799-1852), M.P., member of the Phrenological Association.

ROBERT HAMILTON, F.R.S.E. (1749-1830) surgeon; member of the London Phrenological Society.

S. HARE, Medical Superintendent of Leeds Asylum.

ROBERT HARRISON, M.D., Professor of Anatomy and Physiology, Royal College of Surgeons, Ireland.

JOHN HASLAM (1764-1844), Medical Superintendent of Bethlem Asylum.
S r HENRY HOLLAND, Bt. (1788-1873), the famous physician, was a member of the Manchester Phrenological Society.

JOHN HOUSTON, M.D. (1802-1845), Lecturer on Surgery, Dublin.

W. HOWITT (1792-1879), well-known author.

ROBERT HUNTER (1805-1865), Professor of Anatomy and Physiology in the University of Glasgow.

WILLIAM HUNTER (1805-1867), Professor of Logic in the Andersonian University of Glasgow.

JACOB (1790-), Professor of Anatomy, Dublin.

JAMES JOHNSON (1777-1845), Physician Extraordinary to King William IV.

THOMAS LAYCOCK, F.R.S.E. (1812-1876), Professor of Medicine and Medical Psychology, Edinburgh; author of “Mind and Brain” (1860). See Chapter XX.

WILLIAM LAUDER LINDSAY, M.D. (1829-1880), author of “Mind in Animals.”

HUMPHRY LLOYD (1800-1881), Professor of Natural History, Trinity College, Dublin.

LONGFIELD, Professor of Political Economy, Dublin.

FILIPPO LUSSANA, M.D. (1820-1898), author of “Lezione di Frenologia,” Parma, 1864. (See Chapter XXXII.)

JAMES MACARTNEY (1770-1843), Professor of Anatomy and Surgery, Trinity College, Dublin.

Sir JOHN MACINTOSH (1765-1832), Lecturer on Medicine and Pathology, Edinburgh.

W. C. MACINTOSH, Medical Superintendent, Perth Asylum.

Sir FRANCIS MACKENZIE, Bt.

Sir GEORGE MACKENZIE, Bt., F.R.S. (1780-1848), geologist; member of the Aberdeen Phrenological Society and Phrenological Association; author of “Illustrations of Phrenology.”

Sir JOHN MACKENZIE (1765-1832), member of the Edinburgh Phrenological Society.

ALEXANDER MACKINTOSH, Medical Superintendent Dundee Royal Lunatic Asylum.

D. MACKINTOSH, Medical Superintendent Newcastle Asylum.

CHARLES MACLAREN (1782-1866), Editor of the Scotsman.

ROBERT MACNISH, M.D. (1801-1837), medico-psychological writer, author of “An Introduction to Phrenology.”

Sir HENRY MARSH, Bt. (1790-1860), Consulting Physician, Dublin General Hospital, President Dublin Phrenological Association.

G. MARTELL, Surgeon to Portsmouth Prison.

HARRIET MARTINEAU (1802-1876), the novelist.

H. MAUNSELL, M.D., Professor Royal College of Surgeons, Ireland.

THOMAS MAYO, M.D. (1790-1871), author of Pathology of the Human Mind (1838).

J. AITKEN MEIGS (1829-1879), Professor of Medicine, Pennsylvania College; known for his “Catalogue of Human Crania,” Philadelphia, 1857.

W. F. MONTGOMERY, M.D., Professor Queen’s College of Physicians, Ireland.

Sir ALEXANDER MORISON (1779-1866), author of “Lectures on Insanity” (1848). Dr. MORRISON, Lecturer on Anatomy, Newcastle School of Medicine.

PATRICK NEILL, F.R.S.E. (1776-1851), naturalist.

J. P. NICHOL (1804-1859), Professor of Astronomy, University of Glasgow; member of the Phrenological Society.

NEGLECT OF GALL'S WORK BY ENGLISH DISCIPLES

CARL OTTO (1795-1879), Professor of Forensic Medicine and Pharmacology, University of Copenhagen; published "Phrenologien," 1825. (See Chapter XX.)

ROBERT OWEN (1771-1858), the philanthropist and social reformer, member of the Phrenological Association.


Sir BENJAMIN WARD RICHARDSON, M.D. (1828-1896).

BENJAMIN SILLMAN (1779-1864), Professor of Chemistry, Yale College, U.S.A

SAMUEL SULLY, F.R.S. (1805-1871), Lecturer on Anatomy and Physiology, St. Thomas's Hospital; author of "The Human Brain" (1836); member of the Phrenological Association.

JAMES STEWART, M.D., physician to H.R.H. the Duke of Sussex.

WM. STOKES, F.R.S. (1804-1878), physician.

JOS. STRATON, F.R.S.E. (-1856).

EDMUND S. SYMES (1805-1871), surgeon; member of the Phrenological Association.

ROBERT B. TODD (1809-1860), author of "Anatomy of the Brain" (London, 1845), and Joint Editor of the "Cyclopædia of Anatomy and Physiology."

Sir WALTER C. TREVELYAN, F.R.S.E. (1797-1879), member of the Phrenological Association.

ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE (1823-1913), the great naturalist, colleague of Darwin. (See Chapter XXIV.)

H. C. WATSON (1804-1881), President of the Royal Medical Society, Edinburgh.

WILLIAM WEIR, M.D., Lecturer on the Practice of Medicine, and afterwards Lecturer on Phrenology, Andersonian University, Glasgow, a chair being endowed in 1845; Editor of the Glasgow Medical Journal.

Rev. Dr. DAVID WELSH (1793-1845), Professor of Church History, Edinburgh; member of the Edinburgh Phrenological Society.

RICHARD WHATELY (1787-1863), Archbishop of Dublin.

Sir C. WHEATSTONE, F.R.S. (1802-1875), inventor of electric telegraph; member of the Phrenological Society, Edinburgh.

FRANCIS WHITE, President Royal College of Surgeons, Ireland.

H. T. M. WITHAM, F.R.S.E.

In 1836 the Edinburgh Phrenological Society numbered 630 members, 105 of whom were doctors. Their museum contained 463 skulls, 280 busts, and 100 masks of eminent or notorious individuals. The collection is now in the Museum of the new University Buildings.

The London Phrenological Society, founded by Dr. Elliotson in 1824, consisted of 300 members, 100 of whom were medical men. It owned 300 to 400 specimens. Dr. Spurzheim owned 800 to 900, Mr. Holm 300 to 400, etc.

There were Phrenological Societies in every big town in Great Britain, and lectures on Phrenology were given at the London and St. Thomas's Hospitals, and at the London Institution.

Now, the question may well be asked: Were all these men mistaken? Were Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe deceivers, and the large number of eminent men we mentioned the deceived? Some people evidently think so. Thus one of our leading medical journals, in a review of one of my early lectures, said:

"We are not inclined to subscribe anything to the credit of Gall and Spurzheim. They kept up a noisy and futile controversy for half a century, and caused a great deal of mind force to be wasted in wrong directions. The only lesson worth speaking of which the phrenologists left behind is a telling illustration of the enormous misleading force of mental predisposition. In fact, the rise and diffusion of phrenology forms a very curious and instructive chapter in the history of human error."
THE RECEPTION OF GALL'S DOCTRINE

I have already shown—as I believe, to the satisfaction of every unprejudiced reader—that Gall was one of the great investigators well deserving of a monument in medical history. Nor was the controversy which he raised "noisy and futile." The noise was all on the side of his adversaries, and those who have the patience to follow me in the further history of medical research and philosophy will come to see that the controversy was not futile; on the contrary, the shadow of Gall has pursued our modern investigators so persistently that they "swore at him" in their works to hide the fact that they were preaching his doctrines. And the moral is:

Truth cannot be suppressed; it must be revealed some day!

Let us compare the opinion just quoted with that of another authority.

Sir SAMUEL WILKS (1824-1911), late President of the Royal College of Physicians, London, wrote in "Guy's Hospital Reports," 1879:

"It seems astonishing at the present time, when phrenological societies have ceased to exist, and we look calmly back on the achievements of their members, to contemplate the bitter animosity which was exhibited towards them by their opponents in all classes of society. Physiologists simply ignored them, and looked upon the attempts to apportion out the brain into organs corresponding to the functions of the mind as gratuitous and fanciful; whilst the literary and religious public became their bitterest antagonists because they made mental processes depend upon organisation. The virulence and abuse poured upon phrenologists by reviewers and magazine writers would seem almost incredible were not the evidence before us to attest it. . . . It was true, of course, that the phrenologists were materialists, in the sense that they endeavoured to associate all mental phenomena with the brain. They did not hesitate for a moment to state the principle on which their new science was founded, and one of their leaders, Dr. Engledue, was the first who used the term cerebration to designate the operation of the brain. They discarded the psychical notion of the human individuality, as expressed by Addison in the Spectator, where he says: 'What we call the faculties of the soul are only the different ways or modes in which the soul can exert itself'; but they announced their doctrine as expressed by one of the earliest teachers of the system in such words as these: 'The right method is at last attained. Mind is studied as it is constituted by the Creator in its natural relation to the body, not in a state of fanciful existence. The facts of the physiologists are substituted for the phantasies of the metaphysicians. Locke talked of an algebra of morals. Phrenology almost holds out the prospect of realising such an idea. It unites into one the philosophy and physiology of man.' And Spurzheim, in speaking of the older methods of mental philosophy, says: 'One fact is to me more positive and decisive than a thousand metaphysical opinions.'

"In myself considering phrenological works in an unprejudiced spirit, I cannot but be struck with the great object which the writers presented to themselves, and the mode in which they proposed to prove the truth of their doctrine. Their object was the same as that which is now considered most rational. They discarded the notion that the brain was to be regarded simply as associated with the mind and there left, but they looked upon it as a compound and complex organ. They were the first who replaced the old method of anatomists, of slicing up the brain, by unfolding and dissecting it. They showed that it was made up of parts, each having its own function. They erred no doubt in hastily framing a system whose correctness did not admit of proof [the system was Spurzheim's, not Gall's]; but out of it arose discussions on the different faculties of the body and mind, which must have made the phrenological societies in London overflow with interesting debates. They discussed the subject of language in a manner which had never before been attempted, as well as co-ordination, time, the muscular sense, the feeling of resistance, and kindred subjects. Aphasia, indeed, seemed clearly understood, and language was located by them in the region where the physiologists are now agreed to place it. If phrenologists had not stated so strongly their belief in the existence of separate organs in the brain, but had used their system merely as an hypothesis, no objection could have been urged against it, for it developed for the first time a number of theories as to the nature of the different faculties of the
NEGLECT OF GALL'S WORK BY ENGLISH DISCIPLES

mind. The transactions and reports of the old phrenological societies give accounts of debates on subjects of the deepest interest, such as can nowhere be found in the records of other learned societies, for, on the one hand, there was merely the metaphysical system to explain mental phenomena, and, on the other, the simple physiological one which gave little more account of the brain or its functions than could be discovered in the laboratory by experiments on animals.

"The opposition they raised was due to their assumption of the functions of the surface of the brain, whereas it was clear to physiologists that it had other properties than those assigned to it by phrenologists. The latter were, however, able to answer the objection 'that injuries of the brain were not attended by loss of that mental quality which the new system would demand' by declaring that the brain was double, and they did not even deny that the brain had other functions than those of mental action. . . . That they also associated the will and movements with the anterior portion of the brain may be seen in the writings of Dr. Combe, the great apostle of phrenology. He maintained that the anterior lobes were connected with the will, and that their convolutions bore an analogy to the peripheral expansion of a simple nerve of motion. The fibres which ultimately constitute the convolutions, although proceeding from the motor and sensory tracts, may reasonably be presumed to perform functions distinct from motion and sensation. One view is that the organ of mental faculties which use muscular motion and sensation as their instruments of manifestation, and the relations of the convolutions to the two tracts in question, accord with this view," etc.

Seeing how the phrenological doctrine flourished about the year 1840, what was it that caused its downfall? Certainly not any opposition, for a fair number of the medical profession, if not officially, at least unofficially, gave it its support. No, the disintegration came from within.

There were three events which ruined the doctrine. The first was the adoption of a purely materialistic tendency, at a time when most people, and consequently a large number of its followers, were devoutly religious.

It was a retired medical practitioner, Dr. L. E. G. ENGLÈDE, of Southsea, formerly President of the Royal Medical Society of Edinburgh, who, on June 20th, 1842, in an address at the Annual Meeting of the London Phrenological Association, by expounding extreme materialistic views which acted like explosives on the Association, broke it up. He affirmed that phrenologists were in error in propounding that the brain is the organ of the mind, inasmuch as there is no such thing as mind. He knew only of the brain; and the brain was simply a viscus with its own proper functions, like the liver and kidneys. Here are some of his own words:

"We contend that mind has no existence—that we have to consider matter only. What is organised matter? Merely a collection of atoms, possessing certain properties and assuming different and determinate forms. What is brain? Merely one kind of organised matter. What do we mean by cerebration? The functions of the brain—one of the manifestations of animal life resulting from a peculiar combination of matter. The varied changes of form which this matter assumes gives rise to the various manifestations of cerebration in the different tribes of beings, and the varied changes of cerebration in the same being originate in molecular alterations—merely other expressions of a new condition.

"The belief in the existence of 'mind' is an exemplification of the tendency in uncultivated man to personify all the actions of nature—is a barbarous recognition of the manifestation of a property resulting from a peculiar molecular arrangement of matter, and which arrangement necessitates the exhibition of the property. The philosopher witnesses the phenomena of thought and acknowledges that the brain is essential to its production—but he is not satisfied with this knowledge, and because he cannot understand and see distinctly how these functions are produced, he, like the savage, has recourse to an external, unknown, invisible agent—to a spirit. Can greater ignorance be manifested? The philosopher feels the difficulty, but instead of using his best endeavours to unravel the mystery, he cuts the knot,
and enlists a power which he has not seen and cannot appreciate, for the purpose of explaining phenomena for which, as cerebral physiologists, we contend there is already a sufficient cause."

At the conclusion of Engledue's address, some members, after protesting against the views expressed, quit the hall, and the same week sixty-five members withdrew from the Association. The Zöist, Dr. Elliotson's paper, defended Engledue, but the Phrenological Almanac, No. ii., wrote:

"Our science has received a blow, from the effects of which it will take at least one generation, if not much longer, to recover. Well may we exclaim: 'Save us from our friends!' for our enemies, open and concealed, have not injured the science so much during the last twenty years as has been done by the author of the ill-timed and ill-judged essay delivered as an introductory address at the opening of the Phrenological Association. It appears that a very general dissent from his opinions was expressed by the audience; but those only who were present can know the degree of dissatisfaction, not to use a stronger term, with which his opinions were received by very nearly the whole of the persons present. With one or two exceptions, all who spoke used the very strongest language in combating and reprobing his erroneous views, and all remarked upon the gross impropriety of introducing such discussions to a general audience."

H. G. ATKINSON, the co-worker with Miss Harriet Martineau (1802-1876), the novelist, in their "Letters on the Law of Man's Nature and Development," (1851), expounded similar views to those of his friend Engledue.

"I feel," said he, "that I am as completely the result of my nature, and impelled to do what I do, as the needle to point to the north, or the puppet to move according as the string is pulled. I cannot alter my will, or be other than what I am; and cannot deserve either reward or punishment."

Atkinson's comparison between a puppet and man has often been made, but is absurd, for the puppet is made by man and does not move unless man pulls the strings which he has attached to it. The "motives" which move man cannot be compared with the strings of a merely mechanical automaton.

Engledue, Atkinson, and other phrenologists were simply the forerunners of a materialistic wave which swept over Europe in the middle of the last century. We shall refer to it in a succeeding chapter.

The second cause of the downfall of phrenology was its association with mesmerism, which in those days was violently opposed, though now acknowledged under a new name—hypnotism.

When, in 1842, Dr. Elliotson brought before the Royal Medical and Chirurgical Society the "account of a case of successful amputation of a thigh, during the mesmeric state," Dr. James Copland (1791-1870), the chairman, contended that "if the account of the man experiencing no agony during the operation were true, the fact was unworthy of their consideration, because pain is a wise provision of nature, and patients ought to suffer pain while their surgeon is operating; they are all the better for it, and recover better!" It was only three years later that chloroform was discovered.

Mesmerism was declared as disproved long ago—like Gall's doctrine, by the same French Academy; the witnesses of Elliotson's experiments were declared as credulous, the operators as fraudulent, and the patients as impostors. JOHN ELLIOTSON (1791-1868), a great physician, who was the first to use the stethoscope and to adopt the practice of auscultation in England, introduced in 1819 by Laennec (1781-1826), had to resign his professorship in the University. (See Chapter XXXVII.) It must be remembered that there are fashions in medicine as there
NEGLECT OF GALL'S WORK BY ENGLISH DISCIPLES

are in wearing apparel. A doctor in practice must feel the breeze of popular sentiment with as much attention and accuracy as he does his patient's pulse. What we have not learned is, that even when a subject is practised exclusively by quacks, there may still be some truth in it. What is science to-day was mysticism or quackery in the past. Medicine itself is the outcome of practices which we should not recognise to-day. The "exclusiveness" can be carried too far. Even if mesmerism or animal magnetism, as it was also called, was pure charlatanry in the early part of last century, that was no reason to reject the paper on the strictly scientific investigation of these phenomena, under the term of "hypnotism," which JAMES BRAINT (1795-1860), the Manchester surgeon, offered to the Medical Section of the British Association in 1842. Thirty-eight years later, in 1880, the British Medical Association invited a German professor, Dr. W. T. PREYER (1841-1897), to deliver an address at their annual meeting and explain to an English medical audience what Mr. Braid, their distinguished countryman, whom the Germans had learned to honour, had done.

Elliottson claimed to have succeeded also in stimulating the various brain centres in hypnotised subjects, giving rise to a manifestation of those dispositions and capacities located in these regions. This so-called Phreno-Mesmerism was declared, like all the mesmeric phenomena in those days, a pure fraud; later, when hypnotism was accepted, it was explained on the theory of silent "suggestion." But my own experiments in that direction, which have been made under every possible test, excluded any chance of suggestion. The phenomena are so extraordinary that they are bound to arouse scepticism; but as I said, I have found them true (see the author's "Hypnotism and Suggestion," London, 1910), and the fact may encourage some future investigator—in a generation to come—to examine this subject further and develop its possibilities. (See Chapter XXXVIII.)

The third cause of the downfall of phrenology was the advent of the professional character-reader. The professors of phrenology were, most of them, literally nothing more than "professors"; that is to say, they knew no more of phrenology, not to mention Gall's works, than can be learned from the markings on a phrenological bust. They learned to tell the time by the face of the clock, but did not trouble to understand, and frequently were too uneducated to understand, its works.

This soon caused all Gall's brain physiology and moral philosophy to be forgotten; the phrenological doctrine lost its meaning, and came to be looked upon as a system by which one could tell character or fortune from the protuberances on the head. Just as one looks down upon telling fortune by cards or by the lines of the hand, so was phrenology condemned. This is how men who look only on the surface of things came to group astrology—phrenology—palmistry together; but we should have expected less superficiality from a psychologist like Professor JASTROW ("Fact and Fable in Psychology," 1901).

Already, in 1835, professional phrenology had grown to such an extent, at least in America, that a protest was raised in the American Annals of Phrenology of that year:

"There are many abroad teaching the public phrenology who stand in eminent need of instruction themselves. They read a few pages of a work on the subject, and suddenly appear as men full of wisdom and experience. The most prevailing evil is the practice of examining heads; not of well-chosen cases, where examinations may be of use to the science, but indiscriminately. Every head, whether common or uncommon, receives a formal judgment. Not content with satisfying a few inquirers, who may have had their curiosity excited, there are individuals who make it their business, have their shops, and receive pay for their manipulations, at so much per head! This practice only degrades the science. It turns a dignified science into a system of legerdemain, and those who are really able to promote the
true philosophy of man will be prevented from investigating the subject, on account of the repulsive appearance of its exterior. ... In making these remarks, we allude to no particular individual, but to many of whom we have heard. We respect their motives but we protest against their practices. We entreat them to desist, and to aid in promoting phrenology in a way more in accordance with scientific taste.”

GEORGE COMBE wrote (Lancet, July 4th, 1840):

"In America I find phrenology flourishing in astonishing vigour as a practical art. Wherever I have gone I have found men who call themselves practical phrenologists exciting a vulgar curiosity concerning the science; examining heads, predicating character, using it, in short, as a species of palmistry, and extracting, as I have been told, large sums of money from the people by their skill."

In 1843, we find the following observations in the Phrenological Almanac:

"It becomes us as zealous advocates of phrenology to become also guardians to the public for the purity of the science, by the bold exposure of quackery in all its forms. Much as this science has suffered from those misled philosophical opponents, it seems now likely to be travestied by a set of impudent and illiterate quack manipulators. Manipulations, properly conducted by professional phrenologists, are philosophic experiments, and cannot be too highly recommended; but this important practical department of the science we leave to be followed up by those whose professional engagements admit of it. Manipulations for the gratification of personal vanity are practised by peripatetical quacks, who are apt to be confounded by the ignorant with the members of the phrenological school. Their sole aim is to fill their own pockets, by playing upon the weakness and vanity of those who are so foolish as to pay them for being bamboozled."

FLOURENS must have had the professional phrenologists in his mind when he wrote: "Les hommes qui la pratiquent sont des charlatans, et les hommes qui la croient sont des imbéciles." (Quoted by Dr. George Harley, Medical Times and Gazette, 1873.)

Learned professors have judged the subject by the popular exhibitions they saw of it, and unfortunately Gall had to suffer in consequence. This explains such statements as that made in D. J. HILL’S "Elements of Physiology," 1900: "Phrenology is a pseudo-science which professes to localise mental faculties by excrescences on the cranium."

But what are we to say to such a mistake as the following, by JAMES DREVER, in "Instinct of Man," Cambridge, 1917: "Gall was certainly more than half charlatan... but Spurzheim and Combe were not charlatans, and phrenology as such was not only very significant historically, but it exercised an important influence on the development of psychology, of educational theory, and to an even greater extent of physiology."? Who originated the doctrine—Spurzheim or Gall? Dr. Drever has now become "Combe Lecturer" on Psychology in Edinburgh University, a chair I presume to be endowed by the same "Combe Trust" that employed Dr. Andrew Wilson a few years ago, another opponent of Gall’s doctrine, who seized every opportunity to belittle it. Surely the funds which George Combe left were for the propagation of his teachings, and not for their misrepresentation.

And why should not a man’s character betray itself in the shape of his head, as well as his face, general appearance and bearing? It must not be forgotten also that some men have a natural bias for physiognomical observation, as every experienced doctor ought to have.
NEGLECT OF GALL’S WORK BY ENGLISH DISCIPLES

A man who thus could read character magnificently, to the astonishment of any unprejudiced mind, was L. N. FOWLER (1811-1896), who came to England from the United States in 1860. He was the best known professional phrenologist, and his character readings, as I have often witnessed, were wonderfully accurate, and helped more than anything else at that time to keep up public interest in the subject.

If professional phrenologists had been contented with delineating character, no great harm would have been done; but they insisted on giving addresses on brain physiology as a preliminary to their demonstrations, in order to explain the principles of the science, of which they were really ignorant. It is on their explanations of the doctrine that such statements are based as the following:

"As a matter of fact, knowing how little relation there is between the bumps on the skull and the brain lying underneath, I would as soon think of attempting to read a person’s character and ability by his bumps as I would of scrutinising the ridges on the dome of St. Paul’s in order to discover the sort of theology taught by the Dean and Chapter.”

The learned professor who made that statement did not know that the size and shape of the brain can be judged by the size and shape of the skull, and cannot have heard of that new science “anthropometry,” which promises to run dangerously close to the practices of the despised phrenologists. A representative writer on the subject says:

"Anthropometry promises to be of great value. Measurements of the heads of the most eminent men in the same profession have shown that they are very nearly of the same size and shape. Take, for example, electricians: the heads of Lord Kelvin, Sir William Preece, Professor Perry, and Mr. Crompton are almost exactly the same in size and shape. This no doubt holds for other professions, but extensive measurements of the heads of men eminent in the various professions have yet to be made. When such data have been obtained the parent may acquire valuable information about the best career for his boy by measurements of his head. Though measurements with the callipers are valuable, and are very easily made, much more information can be obtained by taking the horizontal contour of the head by a machine somewhat similar to those used by hatters.”

The writer of the above would find much valuable information and hosts of measurements in the Transactions of the various phrenological societies. Thus modern anthropology has come back to the old phrenology.
CHAPTER XVIII

FLOURENS AND OTHER CRITICS OF GALL

GALL’S biography would not be complete without giving the opinions of his critics—his contemporaries and posterity. Some have already been quoted, others will be mentioned when we deal with the enormous influence he exercised on subsequent philosophy and scientific research. This chapter will be restricted to those criticisms which brought about the neglect of Gall’s doctrines and their condemnation; those, in fact, on which modern opinion of Gall is based. Of course, as we have already seen, there were some men of distinction who wrote in his favour, or, at least, passed an unprejudiced judgment; but they were few and far between, and failed to stop the attacks on Gall, many of which were expressive of as much rancour and animosity as if Gall had been a criminal. Such language is used sometimes in the writings of political opponents, but rarely in scientific disputes; and the fact that Gall was denounced in such terms should satisfy us that his opponents were not arguing as scientific men. Considering that practically all his discoveries have been re-discovered in recent times, as will be shown in succeeding chapters, some valuable lessons may be drawn from the opinions quoted.

GERMAN CRITICS

We have already mentioned J. G. WALTER (1734-1818), Professor of Anatomy in Berlin, as the first formidable opponent Gall had the pleasure of meeting.

Another was KARL A. RUDOLPHI (1771-1832), Professor of Physiology of the Royal Academy of Science, a Swede, first established at Greifswald, then at Berlin. Rudolphi did not approve of Gall bringing in the evidence of comparative anatomy in support of his theory, for “beasts,” he thought, “should not be compared with man.” According to him, it is only the minds of animals that require different cerebral parts for the manifestation of different aptitudes and instincts. For man, the Creator would have been able to constitute, perhaps ought to have constituted, mind entirely independent of this vile inert matter. With this view, it is not surprising that Rudolph, in his “Treatise on Insanity,” wrote: “I have had occasion to examine many hundreds of brains, but I have never found anything which was in accordance with the theory of Gall.” He states that he has not seen the enlargements of the spinal cord, the decussation of the pyramids, the structure of the cerebellum, of the annular protuberance, the formation of the corpus callosum, the origin of the optic nerve, etc. “The cerebral parts are all formed of the same substance; they are not sufficiently dissimilar to allow them to be considered as distinct organs.”

Professor J. F. ACKERMANN, of Heidelberg (1765-1815), successor to Sömmering in the chair of Anatomy, in a brochure against Gall’s doctrine (1806), declared that Gall’s discoveries amounted to nothing, since he had not been able to demonstrate the vital principle, or life itself, and to explain the functions of the soul. He argued against centres in the cortex, but believed there must exist certain regions in the
brain, in which impressions are treasured up, and he thought that these parts were the optic thalami. In addition to this inferior organ of the soul, he admitted with ERNST PLATNER (1744-1818), another of a more elevated order, in which thought and the comparison of impressions are carried out: this last organ, according to him, was the medullary part of the hemispheres. He considered that there was "an extremely subtle, nervous medulla, soft and almost fluid, which converts itself by degrees in the cavities of the brain into animal vapour, and which becomes a medium between the soul and the nerves of sense."

On the other hand, FRIEDRICH ARNOLD (1803-1890), pupil of Tiedemann, in his "Lehrbuch der Physiologie des Menschen" (1838), praised Gall; and KARL FRIEDRICH BURDACH (1776-1847), Professor of Physiology in the University of Königsberg, in his compendious work on the brain, "Vom Baue und Leben des Gehirns," Leipsic, 1819-26, acknowledged the greatness of Gall, spoke of him as the most renowned natural philosopher, and put him foremost as a brain anatomist.

A most virulent opponent of Gall was the well-known Vienna anatomist, JOHANNES HYRTL (1811-1894), author of the "Lehrbuch der Topographischen Anatomie." He certainly cannot have read Gall's works. To him Gall's craniology was "charlatanry." Science, he said, ignored Gall's doctrines completely, just as it has to ignore other erroneous theories which are advanced from time to time "which do not deserve the honour of being refuted"; it would be futile to discuss them. One of his objections was that Gall regarded only the surface parts of the brain. Then he repeated the tittle-tattle of supposed mistaken diagnoses made by Gall. Brain and skull do not agree in conformation was another objection.

Hyrtl relied on and quoted the criticisms of ANDREAS RETZIUS (1796-1860); but Retzius had relied on the evidence of Flourens. Nevertheless, he admitted "there is nothing absurd in the localisation of psychical activities in special parts of the brain."

Hyrtl, like others, did not criticise Gall, but the vague conception of what he thinks was his theory. But imagine what harm these professors did in instilling these false ideas in a number of students every year, for most of whom it was enough for the rest of their lives "that their great teacher thought and said so."

The celebrated German physiologist, JOHANNES MÜLLER (1801-1858), pupil of Rudolphi, founder of the physico-chemical school of physiology, in his "Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen" (1837), wrote identically with Gall:

"In no part of physiology can we derive greater aid from comparative anatomy than in the physiology of the brain. Corresponding with the development of the intellectual faculties in the different classes, we meet with very great differences in the form of the brain, which are highly important in aiding us to determine the functions of the different parts of the organ. . . . The brain undergoes a gradual increase of size from fishes up to man, in accordance with the development of the intellectual (?) faculties. All parts of the encephalon, however, do not keep pace equally with the development of the intellectual powers. It is in the cerebral hemispheres that the increase of size in the higher animals chiefly takes place."

Compare Müller's statement with the passage in the Edinburgh Review: "We deny that there is any connection or proportion whatever to be observed, on a comparison of animals with each other, between their intellect or inclinations and the number of parts in their brains."

Müller, however, had evidently not read Gall's work, for he had the impression that Gall located the Wolffian faculties of memory, imagination, etc., and says, what Gall himself said: "There is no circumscribed area in the brain, in which memory, imagination, etc., can have their seat." And he was against the localisation theory in toto because injuries to the head, in his experience, do not affect the mental powers; an erroneous view, which Gall had exposed.
A very popular work is the "History of Materialism" (1875), by F. A. LANGE (1828-1875). This is a fairly modern book, and therefore we should expect some newer criticisms of Gall. But what do we find? Lange still relied on antiquated authorities. He said:

"It still holds good, as Johannes Müller said in his 'Physiology': 'With regard to the principle, its possibility cannot a priori be denied; but experience shows that the system of organs proposed by Gall has absolutely no foundation in facts, for the history of injuries to the head is directly opposed to the existence of special regions of the brain destined for particular mental activities." The frontal lobes of the cerebrum have to carry a mass of such important organs, that the destruction of a part of them in serious injuries of this region must always become noticeable, especially as intelligence, talent, etc., are here concerned, the disappearance of which is easier to establish than the change of a moral quality. Yet in the large number of brain injuries in the frontal part of the head, which have been under exact observation, nothing has ever yet been found that can be made without extreme violence to point in this direction. There are even cases in which quite unequivocally both frontal lobes of the cerebrum have been seriously affected and destroyed, and in which not the least disturbance of intelligence was observed. (!) If any one shows me that a slight injury to some portion of the brain makes an otherwise healthy cat give up mousing, I will believe that we are on the right path of physiological discoveries. But even then I will not assume that the point has been found in which the ideas of mouse-hunting have their exclusive seat. If a clock strikes the hours wrongly because a wheel is injured, it does not follow from this that it was this wheel that struck the hours... It is with them (the cerebral functions) much as if one tries to find the various activities of a locomotive, so far as they can be externally observed, localised in the individual steam-pipes or in particular parts of the machine. Here the faculty of expelling smoke, there a similar faculty of running quickly or slowly, and elsewhere again the capacity for drawing burdens. In our whole traditional psychology the actions of men are classified, without any regard to the elements of their origin."

In answer to Lange's objection, taken from Müller, it has to be pointed out that the latter was a physiologist by profession, and Lange was a journalist by profession, and that therefore neither was in a position to make clinical observations as to whether injuries of the head ever lead to the loss of any of the primitive mental powers. But the reader will find in this work over 1,000 cases cited, showing that injuries to circumscribed portions of the brain do affect particular mental qualities. I have never observed localised injuries in cats—my investigations deal only with human beings—but it will be shown by overwhelming evidence that instincts similar to the mouse-hunting instinct in cats may be lost in man. The comparison of a wheel of a clock and a circumscribed area of the cortex is not a good one; for we know that from the brain centre goes forth the energy for the manifestation of a certain tendency, but nothing goes forth from the wheel, which is merely a passive agent. Neither is Lange's comparison of the cortex of the brain to a locomotive a good one. If psychology is ignorant of the elements of mind and character, of the springs which move to action, it is psychology that is at fault. It is too late in the day to argue whether there are specific centres in the brain. Why should the locomotive objection be brought against Gall's theory, and not equally against the theory of the motor and sensory centres, and the various speech centres of modern physiologists, to which it is much more applicable?

ANDREAS RETZIUS (1796-1860), of Stockholm, the originator of the classification of skulls into brachycephalic and dolichocephalic, orthogonathic and prognathic, in an examination of Gall's doctrine ("Die Phrenologie vom wissenschaftlichen Standpunkte aus beleuchtet," Tübingen, 1844), was adverse to it, because of the unity of the "ego." Moreover, Gall's anatomy must be bad because his physiology was unsound. Gall knew nothing of the convolutions of the brain. Many mammals
have no occipital lobes. There have been great minds with extraordinary small heads. He made no reference to the fact that Gall explained all these points, so we must assume that he never read his works. Retzius concluded that he did not dismiss the doctrine entirely; his objection was that, in his philosophy, Gall had destroyed the unity of the mind and that he based his conclusions on an anatomy which had no existence. Retzius recognised, however, that his own skull classification and scheme of measurement would be of no value if the brain and skull did not agree in conformation; he therefore conceded that point.

K. RIEGER ("Über die Beziehungen der Schädellehre zur Physiologie, Psychiatrie und Ethnologie," Würzburg, 1882) declares Gall a "swindler." Gall's doctrine is dead. Any child to-day can see its errors. Gall's psychology consists of impossibilities. "For genuine scientists, Gall's errors were so crude, that they could be treated only with pitiful contempt. . . . But genuine scientists are so few, that false doctrines, however grave their errors may be, do infinite mischief."

A. BÄR (1834), in his work, "Der Verbrecher in anthropologischer Beziehung," Leipsic, 1803, commenced with the false statement that Gall designated his system "phrenology." Nowhere in Gall's works can that term be found. Then he asserted: "The formation of the skull is in no wise dependent on that of the brain."(!) He relied still, and that in the year 1803, on Flourens' argument that the brain acts as a whole, and localisation of functions is impossible. He admitted that Gall is the founder of what is now called "criminal anthropology"; LOMBROSO (1835-1909) did not acknowledge the fact.

ENGLISH CRITICS

Gall's doctrine met in England and Scotland with a very hostile reception, which took the form of ridicule and abuse of every imaginable description.

The QUARTERLY REVIEW, in its notice of Madame de Stael's L'Allemagne, censured her for being "by far too indulgent to such an ignorant and interested quack as the craniologist Dr. Gall." BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE was more expressive still. It called Gall an "infernal idiot."

Sir JOSEPH BANKS (1743-1820) proclaimed it "damned nonsense"; while Sir ASTLEY COOPER (1768-1841) pronounced it to be "calculated to bring immortality to its author." (London Medical Journal, 1832.) Sir SAMUEL WILKS (1824-1911), in an admirable review in "Guy's Hospital Reports," 1879, also expressed his admiration for Gall's doctrine. (See previous chapter.)

Dr. JOHN GORDON (1786-1818), of Edinburgh, an esteemed lecturer on anatomy and physiology, wrote in the Edinburgh Review, 1815, No. 49 and succeeding numbers:

"The writings of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim have not added one fact to the stock of our anatomical knowledge, respecting either the structure or functions of man; but consist of such a mixture of gross errors, extravagant absurdities, downright mis-statements, and unmeaning quotations from Scripture (!), as can leave no doubt, we apprehend, in the minds of honest and intelligent men as to the real ignorance, the real hypocrisy, and the real empiricism of the authors. . . . We look on the whole doctrines taught by these two peripatetics, anatomical, physiological, and physiognomical, as a piece of thorough quackery from beginning to end. . . . To enter on a particular refutation of them would be to insult the understandings of our readers. Indeed, we will flatter the authors so far as to say that their observations are of a nature to set criticism at defiance. They are a collection of mere absurdities, without truth, connection, or consistency, and incoherent rhapsody, which nothing could have induced any man to have presented to the public, under the pretence of instructing them, but absolute insanity, gross ignorance, or the most matchless arrogance. . . . Such is the trash, the despicable trumpery, which two men, calling themselves
scientific inquirers, have the impudence gravely to present to the physiologists of the XIXth century as specimens of reasoning and induction. ... Well has the learned and witty historian of John Bull's indisposition remarked, there is nothing so impossible in nature but mountebanks will undertake; nothing so incredible but they will affirm. ... There are a certain number of individuals, however, in every community, who are destined to be the dupes of empirics. So it would be a matter of surprise if these itinerant philosophers did not make some proselytes wherever they came."

Anatomy had passed its verdict—in the person of Dr. Gordon; physiology demolished Gall—in the person of Dr. P. M. ROGET (1779-1869). In his text-book on that subject, he argued first of all that the brain is uniform—acts as a whole, for all the diversity of mental functions, for: "Does not the same stomach digest very different and even opposite kind of aliment? Yet we do not find one portion of that organ is destined for the digestion of meat, and another for the digestion of vegetable matter." This from a teacher of physiology, apparently not aware that digesting is no more than digesting, whether it be performed on turtle or roast beef, animal food or vegetable! Again, this same author said: "Nerves perform the double office of volition and sensation; but the different bundles of fibres which convey such impression, the one to the muscles, the other to the sensorium, are wrapped up in the same sheath, and are so intimately intermixed during their course as to constitute a single cord." According to Roget, if a nervous cord, which is in reality single in its nature, can perform a double function, there could be no reason why the brain may not do the same. He had looked at a nervous cord which performed two very distinct functions; and because, to his eye, it looked single, he drew the conclusion that the same part can perform two duties which are entirely different in their nature. But PROCHASKA (see Chapter X.) did the same, and could not avoid the conclusion "that the nervous fibres conducting the impressions to the central organs, and transmitting motor impulses from them, were distinct." Finally, Roget asserted that "there is not a single part of the encephalon which has not, in one case or other, been impaired, destroyed, or found defective, without any apparent change in the sensitive, intellectual, or moral faculties." I wonder if persons who make such a statement, and believe it, have ever asked themselves the question: "Of what use, then, is the brain?"

In 1826, Lord JEFFREY (1773-1850), the Editor of the Edinburgh Review, designated the doctrine of Gall as "crude," "shallow," "puerile," "fantastic," "dull," "dogmatic," "incredibly absurd," "foolish," "extravagant," and "trash." In his opinion, "there is no connection between body and mind." If so, then insanity is not a bodily disease.

Lord BROUGHAM (1778-1868), too, asserted that "the ordinary course of life presents the mind and the body running courses widely different, and in great part of the time in opposite directions, and this affords strong proof that the mind is independent of the body."

On the other hand, W. B. CARPENTER (1813-1885), the celebrated physiologist of the middle of the XIXth century, wrote in the British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review, 1846: "There is a very general correspondence between certain forms of the cerebrum, arising from the cerebral development of its different portions and certain leading diversities of character, which might not unfairly be regarded as indicating that these several divisions are the special instruments of particular groups of intellectual or moral faculties."

Yet later, in the fifth edition of his "Human Physiology," he changed his mind on this subject, and, like LANGE ("History of Materialism," 1875), compared the brain to a steam-engine "which may be employed in carrying it forwards and backwards, according to the direction given to its action," and judged from this steam-engine argument that "it must be fundamentally erroneous to attempt to
parcell out the cerebrum into distinct 'organs' for these respective faculties; the whole of it, so far as we can judge, being called into operation in every kind of mental activity." Yet, when speaking of animals, Carpenter said: "When the cerebrum (cerebral hemispheres) is fully developed, it offers innumerable diversities of form and size among various individuals; and there are many diversities of character." He evidently meant to say that the hemispheres of the brain of man and the higher vertebrates present as many diversities in form and size as there are diversities of individual character. Gall said no more; but Gall proceeded to observe carefully the two series of facts, to compare them, and to draw deductions as to how far the form and size of certain parts corresponded with certain mental characteristics.

However, Carpenter did not keep to this view, for he later asserted that "comparative anatomy and experiment alike sanction the conclusion that the purely instinctive propensities have not their seat in the cerebrum." Of what use, then, is the animal brain? That question does not seem to have occurred to Carpenter.

Up to 1873, this celebrated physiologist held the view that "the cerebral hemispheres, as the organ of thought, do not act in isolated portions, but as a whole"; but he again abandoned this view when he became acquainted with the results of experiments made by Ferrier (see Chapter XX.). When the Times newspaper, not being acquainted with the change of opinion, credited him with the old view, Carpenter contradicted the statement in a letter to the Times, September 27th, 1873. Then once more he reverted to his old view:

"The cerebrum," he wrote, "is the material organ through whose instrumentality all the processes of thought and feeling are carried on. Take, moreover, the existence of facts, such as that injuries to the head affect, not unfrequently, one or more of the mental powers, while others remain perfectly sound, has appeared to not a few physicians to make the supposition far from unreasonable that different portions of the cerebral hemispheres have different functions allotted to them."

Carpenter said that head injury not infrequently affected one or more mental powers; yet Müller, Lange—and, as we shall see further on, Schopenhauer—asked: "Whoever heard of such a thing?" and on that ground condemned Gall's doctrine. Carpenter not only accepted this view, but proceeded to locate the intellect in the posterior lobes, on the ground that only the quadruped and man possess them.

Sir BENJAMIN BRODIE (1783-1862), a pupil of Abernethy, in his examination of Gall's doctrine ("Psychological Inquiries," 1855), was of the same view as Carpenter that the posterior lobes are lacking in the lower animals. He said:

"The fact is that the posterior lobes exist only in the human brain, and in that of some of the tribe of monkeys, and are absolutely wanting in quadrupeds." And he was of opinion that, "in the bird's brain, what appears to a superficial observer to correspond to the hemispheres is found, on a more minute examination, to be apparently the corpora striata developed to an enormous size."

We have already quoted Gall on this subject. The fact is that in many animals, such as the elephant, the dolphin, the ape, etc., the cerebellum is as much covered by the posterior lobes as it is in man. The error has its source in the position of the head, more or less horizontal or vertical in animals. Comparing the male and female brains in the same species, it will be observed that in all females the posterior lobes are more developed, more completely covering the cerebellum than in males. If these lobes were connected with the higher intellectual faculties, it should follow that women excel men as to the noblest faculties of the mind.

Sir THOMAS SPENCER WELLS (1818-1897), Medical Times and Gazette, 1860, said: "This bubble has been so often and so demonstratively exploded, that we scarcely Vol. 1."

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think men of science are bound any more to trouble their heads about it. That such a fanciful idea as that of reading a man's soul by the language of bumps on his head should be taught and believed in is nothing wonderful. What outrages on common-sense, on natural laws, on scientific facts, will men not teach and men believe?"

In a letter to Dr. F. James C. D. Carson (1772-1843), he replied: "Our mind is made up about it, just as it is made up about mesmerism, homeo-quackery, or perpetual motion." Our minds are made up on a good many subjects, but did we give the other side a patient hearing?

"Our mind is made up about it as it is made up about mesmerism," wrote Spencer Wells. But mesmerism has since been adopted by the medical profession, owing to Heidenhain and Charcot. True, we modified the method of its induction, made a change in the theory, called it by a different name and proved the originator to have been only a quack whose work one could not seriously consider—and mesmerism in its new garb under the title of hypnotism or "suggestion" flourishes; indeed, in the treatment of functional disorders of the nervous system, it is frequently a valuable aid. Yet Dr. Elliotson, when he tried to induce the profession to take up the practice, was kicked out of the University College Hospital, deprived of his official position, and practically of his livelihood. Should not that be a lesson to us?

No comparison of scientific merit is possible between Gall and Mesmer.

Sir FREDERIC BATEMAN, in his work on "Aphasia or Loss of Speech," 1890, wrote:

"In spite of all that has been said against Gall, and all that has been written in depreciation of his labours, beyond all doubt his researches gave an impulse to the cerebral localisation of our faculties, the effect of which is especially visible in our own days, and I look upon his work as a vast storehouse of knowledge, and as an imperishable monument to the genius and industry of one of the greatest philosophers of the present age."

Before that, in 1869 (Journal of Mental Science), Bateman wrote:

"Gall's labours would undoubtedly have met with more hearty reception from his contemporaries had not the Austrian priesthood raised the cry of 'materialism' as applied to his doctrines. The great German psychologist had no such heterodox notions as his adversaries maliciously attributed to him, for as Hufeland philosophically observes, 'he was employed in analysing the dust of the earth which man is formed, not the breath of life which was breathed into his nostrils.' As in Gall's days so in ours, this very indefinite and unmeaning word 'materialism' is used as a kind of psychological scarecrow to frighten all those who are endeavouring to trace the connection between matter and mind. Surely there is nothing contrary to sound theology in assigning certain attributes or functions of an intellectual order to certain parts of our nervous centre? The cerebral localisation of our diverse faculties, and the plurality of our cerebral organs, strikes no blow at the great principle of the moral unity of man. The same power that caused the earth, like a spark from the incandescent mass of unformed matter, hammered from the anvil of omnipotence, to be smitten off into space, this same power, surely, could just as well ordain that a multiplicity of organs should be necessary to the full development of man's mental faculties as that the manifestation of them should depend on the integrity of one single organ."

Dr. CHARLTON BASTIAN (1837-1915), F.R.S., friend and trustee of Herbert Spencer, in "The Brain as Organ of Mind," claimed to have examined Gall's doctrine and found it "fallacious in almost every respect." He continued: "Though it would have been almost needless but for the fact that amongst the general public
there are probably very many who may be glad to know upon what precise grounds the system should be rejected." Gall's doctrine is fallacious because:

Reason one: Gall considered "the grey matter of the convolutions—the matter which we now believe to be so largely concerned with the most delicate and subtle of brain functions—to have no proper nerve function at all." (!) We have seen that the opposite was the case. Gall was the first to point out the importance of the grey matter of the convolutions.

Reason two: That "his analysis of the human mind was supposed to have been complete." Gall emphatically said it was not complete.

Reason three: That Gall located his faculties in bony prominences: for example, "philoprogenitiveness in the occipital protuberance." The falsity of this accusation has already been proved.

If there are many Bastians in our Royal Societies, it is not at all surprising that they refuse to discuss Gall. The discussion would damage the reputation of some of the members, and, in consequence, we might question their reliability in other departments of knowledge.

Scientific men complain of the spirit of orthodoxy of theology, but they can be no less intolerant. Bastian, who did not hesitate to misrepresent Gall's teaching, had to experience the orthodoxy of the Royal Society later in life, when they would not allow a report of his experiments on the "origin of life." Bastian then wrote a letter to the Times, February 28th, 1912, in which he complained that Star Chamber jurisdiction still remains in the headquarters of Science itself—the Royal Society. He complained that a paper by a Fellow like himself, of forty years' standing, had to be submitted to a committee to decide whether such paper should be accepted or not. "Unfortunately," he says, "scientific intolerance as well as Papal intolerance still exists."

Sir WILLIAM OSLER (1849-1919), writing on Servetus, admits that "next to theology itself the study of medicine has been a great heresy breeder." Dogmas of science and doctrines in medicine are as tenaciously held as they are in the case of the theologian. There has scarcely ever been a really important advance made in science and philosophy which has not met with much bitter opposition on the part of the men who were most prominent at the time in that science; at least, they made things very uncomfortable for the discoverer, and, on many occasions, this opposition has taken on the character of real persecution. The history of science is full of examples of this orthodoxy, showing that formal scientific bodies refused to consider seriously what were really great discoveries, or that scientific editors not only rejected papers representing valuable original research, but even did not hesitate to discredit their authors in such a way as to make it extremely difficult for them to pursue their studies in science successfully, and still more to prevent them from pursuing their scientific investigations under favourable circumstances. Science claims to hold her lofty head far above the disturbing influence of sentiment or passion. Yet there are no controversies more bitter than those between rival scientific workers, and the temper shown in such disputes affords ground for thankfulness that there is no likelihood that a scientific Inquisition will ever be established. If such a thing were to come to pass, scientific heretics would fare very ill. New truth, even of direct practical importance, so far from being welcomed, is too often treated as an undesirable alien or even as a criminal anarchist. The only justification for such conduct is that medical men, and scientists in general, have to protect their beloved science from foolish innovators. They are conservative because, for one great discovery that proves its actual right to the title, there are at least a hundred that are proclaimed with loud blare of trumpet, yet prove to be valueless. On the other hand, it is a lasting disgrace that it should have been the lot of so many men who have loved knowledge for its own sake, and who have given themselves without stint and without hope of material reward to labour for the
lightening of the darkness in which we exist, to die in neglect and privation for the opinion they held; while those who apparently rejected their views have republished them in a new garb without acknowledgment, and have reaped fame where they have not sown. The fact is that great men are apt to become fossilised. In their young days, shortly after becoming qualified, they may have done some research work which gained them reputation and position as lecturers and examiners at universities, and official positions in learned societies, and ever afterwards they rest on their past glory. Year after year they repeat the same doctrines to their students, deriding any innovation. Their convictions have become so ingrained that they cannot revise them.

Great injustice has been done to Gall, especially by those in secure official positions, the professors in universities, for he was not one of them. And who does not know the despotic decisions of learned societies on novel doctrines introduced by "outsiders"! In former days, learned bodies could evoke the help of the State to save them from preachers of unorthodox doctrines; when that power was gone, they boycotted the works and ostracised the author of doctrines which threatened to upset their orthodox teaching. True, the sanctity of science and the dignity of the profession, the welfare of the public must be safeguarded; but this should not be done at the cost of fair hearing and degrading methods of misrepresentation.

It is perfectly clear and palpable that those who rejected Gall's doctrine did not do so on account of insufficient evidence, because they had not examined the evidence already in existence. No! The real cause was the intellectual indolence and apathy which prevented their taking this step, and induced them to content themselves with assuming its falsehood. The author can remember the annual tilts that used to be made against Gall's doctrine by physiological and anatomical teachers for the edification of their students. Usually, the mastoid process of the skull, which forms so remarkable a bump behind the ear, was selected; and it was pointed out that this was described by Gall as the organ of "combativeness"; others selected the occipital protuberance and described it as the seat of the sexual instinct by Gall. As these bony prominences are not set up by the cerebral contents of the skull, the students were much entertained. If a professor of physiology (D. J. HILL: "Elements of Physiology, 1900," ) sees no more in Gall's doctrine than "a pseudo-science which professes to localise mental faculties by excrescences on the cranium," we are not surprised when an official medical journal declares that Gall's doctrine "is unworthy to be countenanced by a scientific profession." This is an easy way of preventing a discussion which might disclose that not all official lecturers are authorities on the subject which they are paid to teach.

This contempt for Gall and his doctrine had the effect, as will become evident in later chapters, that men convinced of the truth of the principles of Gall's doctrine have earned fame by giving them to the world as their own, not necessarily from any dishonest motive, but because they were afraid to confess their derivation. Whenever I come across a book which starts by abusing Gall, I suspect the author of having borrowed largely from him, and I am rarely disappointed.

It is easy to sneer at Gall's localisations. Any tyro can do that! We must take his whole work, and keep in mind that it was published at a time when the anatomy of the brain was still imperfectly known, and its physiology was not yet in existence. Gall struck out an entirely new line. He failed in getting his theories accepted, because—in his own words: "To oppose received habits, to brave the decisions of learned societies, to expose conceit, to overturn the pretended knowledge of the anatomy and physiology of 3,000 years, etc., how can it be expected that one should succeed with such elements?" Had Gall discovered only a new foramen in the skull, or a new fissure in the brain, every medical student would know his name and revere him. But because he revolutionised the whole knowledge of the structure and functions of the nervous system by his numerous discoveries, he was not understood, and in the end was disregarded. No one can dispute the title which his most formidable opponent, Flourens, gave him: "The Founder of Cerebral Physiology."
We have already in a previous chapter shown that what contributed largely to the destruction of Gall’s doctrine was its popularisation—minus its scientific basis—by his successors, its hasty completion into a system under the title of “phrenology,” and the advent of professional “character-readers,” who, ignorant of Gall and his work, made a travesty of the whole subject. Nearly all the criticisms of Gall during the past century are worthless, for they were hardly ever based on a knowledge of Gall’s works, but only on the miserable misrepresentations of itinerant “professors” of phrenology. I have already shown how opposed Gall was to “character-reading.” Here are some further remarks of his in proof of this:

“Birth, social position, education, laws, usages, and religion exert the greatest influence on the occupations, on the mode of action of the organs, and the moral character of man. It would therefore be rash to conclude that the actions of an individual respond simply to the predominant features of the cerebral organisation. . . . Whoever would wish to foresee or judge a man’s actions must not only know his natural disposition, but also all the external elements that concur in producing his determinations; for the acts of reason and will are often diametrically opposed to the instigations of the desires, wants, and passions. . . . Let us not forget that many occupations, apparently very unlike, require the employment of nearly the same moral and intellectual powers. The faculty of observation, the force and promptitude of the judgment, prudence and circumspection, the exact knowledge of external data, constitute equally the genius of the physician, the general, and the diplomatist, etc. . . . There are too many average people; and birth, social position, education, customs, etc., exercise an influence sometimes stronger than that of the hereditary organisation. . . . I do not examine heads, unless some scientific information is to be gained thereby.”

Gall examined heads when there was some peculiarity in the mental condition of the individual or some abnormality in the size or shape of the cranium; and he did this not to read character, but to determine whether he could get any aid thereby in discovering the seat of the elemental qualities of the mind. For this reason he was pleased with his tour through Germany, for:

“This journey afforded me the opportunity of studying the organisation of a great number of men of eminent talents, and of others of very limited capacity, and I had the advantage of observing the difference between them. I gathered innumerable facts in the schools, and in institutions for orphans and foundlings, in asylums for the insane, in reformatories and prisons, in law-courts, and even in places of execution; the multiplied researches on suicides, idiots, and madmen have contributed greatly to correct and confirm my opinions. I have had the assistance of several dissecting rooms and physiological laboratories; I have compared antique statues and busts with the records of history, etc.”

Finally—what all critics forget—Gall sought to confirm his localisations by clinical and pathological evidence, that is, by a recognised scientific method. This evidence I have reserved for separate chapters (XXIX.-XXXII.), when we shall deal with each localisation individually.

The following arguments are directed also against popular character-reading:

“I teach further, that it is only an extraordinary degree of development of an organ which becomes discernible on the surface of the brain and skull; and that although we can thus judge, in many cases, of the leading dispositions of an individual, we cannot estimate the use which he has made of them through education, principle, and exercise. . . . Thus the charge is unfounded when I am accused of distinguishing the worthless and useless from the virtuous by the shape of their skulls. All this is impossible, because moral, social, civil, and religious conduct is
the result of many and different concomitant causes, and especially of many powerful external influences; for instance, education, example, habits, laws, religion, age, society, climate, food, health, and so forth. Thus instead of my doctrine being injurious to any human being, it leads us to forbearance with our mutual weaknesses, and teaches us, when we know their sources, to avoid their detrimental consequences.

"If, in social life, I perceive the external sign of a well-developed brain organ, I can say with confidence that, in this man, the disposition of the faculty which is connected with this organ is stronger than the dispositions of his other qualities. But I am ignorant whether circumstances have permitted this individual to devote himself to the pursuit to which this principal disposition would direct him."

Any attempt to explain the real doctrine of Gall is met with the dogmatic reply: "Our mind is made up, Gall was buried over a century ago." Yes, the mind is made up, but it is made up on falsehoods, or at least based on a superficial knowledge derived not from Gall's works, but from popular phrenology. Supposing anyone wished for information on the subject, he naturally would turn to the "Encyclopædia Britannica," where in the latest (11th) edition, he would find, under "Brain," an article written by one of our greatest physiologists and neurologists, CHARLES SCOTT SHERRINGTON, F.R.S., Professor of Physiology in the University of Liverpool. Such a high authority, one would assume, would make no statement negligently, but there it is:

"Flourens and others of his contemporaries had already shown not only that intelligence was resident exclusively in the brain, but that it was resident exclusively in that part of the brain which is the forebrain. Now Gall placed certain of his twenty-seven intellectual faculties in the cerebellum, which is part of the hindbrain...

... All these 'faculty organs' were placed by Gall at the surface of the brain."

Prof. Sherrington must know that Flourens came after Gall, and, in any case, could not have been the first to show that "intelligence is resident exclusively in the brain"; for that knowledge is as ancient as the Greeks; and so is the conjecture of its relation to the forepart of the brain, which Flourens did not admit till forty years after Gall's death, in 1863. Secondly, Gall did not place certain faculties in the cerebellum, but only one, and that one was not intellectual. Thirdly, Gall did not place all his faculties at the surface of the brain, but Providence put the most highly organised structure, the cortex, i.e., the cell area, at the surface of the brain, and Gall included in each of his centres the white fibrous matter as well; and if Prof. Sherrington means that Gall did not place any centres within the middle fold of the brain, he might have convinced himself of the contrary by opening Gall's "Atlas of the Brain," or my own book on "The Mental Functions of the Brain" (1901), which contains reproductions of Gall's brain illustrations; and he would have seen that Gall extended the functions of the convolutions in the middle line downwards in exactly the same manner as he and his co-workers have done in the case of their motor and sensory centres (e.g., leg centre).

It is disastrous to science that the minds of many thousands of students and future medical practitioners are thus biased against the subject, and hold it in contempt for ever afterwards. To most of them it is not worth consideration, because their tutors, whom they revere, have pronounced against it.

Part of the opposition to Gall probably arose from the fact that men are filled with fear or repugnance at the thought of confining the mind in space, and, still worse, of depositing it in cortical pigeon-holes according to its various forms of activity. But, as we shall have occasion presently to show, we do not mind nowadays locating muscular and sensory centres and even mental centres of a kind.

FREDERICK PETERSON, Chief of the Nervous Clinic, New York, in the American Medico-Surgical Journal, 1905, wrote of Gall's doctrine as the "Science of Bumps," "which," he says, "is as dignified a title as it deserves," that "Prochaska began to
expound it in Vienna in 1796. Gall followed in 1798." (!) "It was founded upon the observation of the heads of men and lower animals, and of busts and pictures. . . . It was an entirely empirical study of the exterior of the head, and no careful anatomical investigations were made by these men [Prochaska (!) and Gall] of the brain or its convolutions, or of the thickness and structure of the skull and scalp. . . . It was the attempt to establish a rather startling new science in a short period of time, and the ardour of its exponents was greatly stimulated by the pecuniary reward to which it almost immediately led." Then followed a glowing description of the substitute, "the new phrenology."

Such inconsidered statements as the above explain why books and lectures on Gall are boycotted by the medical profession. It is because these critics cannot afford to have their stupidities exposed.

JACQUES LOEB (1859-), Professor of Physiology in the University of Chicago (now Chief of the Department of Experimental Biology in the Rockefeller Institute), in his work, "Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psychology," London, 1901, 8835:

"Gall was an industrious worker in the anatomy of the brain and at the same time a huge fraud. The anatomy of the brain was not sufficiently sensational for him, so he enlivened things somewhat by grafting upon his anatomy the worst metaphysics he could get hold of. The various nooks and corners of the brain became the seat of soul-powers of his invention. This artificial connection between metaphysics and brain-anatomy or histology has since become traditional." Yet Loeb himself introduces metaphysics. "It is obvious," he insists, "that the assumption of a localisation of psychical functions in the cortex is opposed to the elementary facts of associative memory of consciousness." He believes in anatomical separation of fibres but not in localisation of psychic elements.

On the other hand, his colleague, CHARLES K. MILLS (1845-), Professor of Neurology in the University of Pennsylvania, was of other opinion. He said:

"In some quarters a tendency to rebel against the extreme differentiation of the brain into areas and sub-areas and centres is exhibited, but close attention to the facts, particularly those which are being obtained through clinico-pathological observation, would seem to show that this differentiation is even much greater than has been supposed by the most ardent believer in localisation. . . . If the insanities are essentially disorders of the brain, as all must admit in a final analysis of the subject, and if the brain is recognised not as an organ all parts of which are necessary to every function, or an organ, one part of which is sufficient for all functions, but as an assemblage or confederation of separate organs, or centres, each of which is independent, or at least autonomous, it follows that the facts and principles of cerebral localisation must play an important rôle in the solution of psychiatric problems, and especially in the elucidation of psychic symptoms, and the causation, duration, and the prognosis of the different types of insanity."

FRENCH CRITICS

One of the most brilliant and thorough-going opponents of Gall was undoubtedly A. F. LÉLUT (1804-1877), alienist. Though a Frenchman and able to read Gall's work, he preferred to attack the latter through his disciple Spurzheim; hence the titles of his books, "Qu'est ce que la Phrénologie?" (Paris, 1836); "De l'origine phrénologique de la destruction chez les animaux" (1838); and "La phrénologie, son histoire, ses systèmes et sa condamnation" (1853). Lézet was quite willing to accept mental faculties minus brain matter, but on no account would he accept mental faculties with brain matter, his main objection being that Gall's organology was materialistic. He admitted that Gall denied this, but he quoted various state-
ments of Gall that certain areas are invariably associated with motor manifestations to substantiate his assertion. Thus he pointed out that Gall found a certain region of the brain from which the head and body are energetically raised, and other groups of muscles elsewhere; and he contended that "to assert that certain parts of the brain exercised such an influence over particular parts of the muscular and osseous system was nothing short of lowering man to the level of a mechanical toy." What do the discoverers of the motor centres in the brain say to this? How would Hitzig, Ferrier, Horsley, Munk, and all the others have fared in the time of Léut? And yet some of them go on repeating what Léut, Rudolphi, Ackermann, etc., thought of Gall.

Then Léut proceeded to show that Gall's doctrine, or phrenology, as he called it, is not original. But his proof is purely metaphysical. He next pointed out that the convolutions are not distinct enough to admit of centres. He then declared that if there is any truth in Gall's doctrine, it must be shown by the application of the cephalic index.

He measured various animals from ear to ear and from front backwards: carnivorous (dog, cat, and fox) on the one hand; frugivorous (horse, sheep, ox, and rat) on the other, and he arrives at the following conclusions:

1. Frugivorous and insect-eating birds have brain and cranium of the same width in proportion to their length;
2. Carnivorous animals have not wider heads than frugivorous in proportion to their length; the contrary is the case.

Léut's measurements are absurd. In measuring from ear to ear he was not measuring the temporal lobes only, but also part of the frontal and parietal lobes; a narrow but high head may equal a wide but low head. The same objection must be brought to the measurement from the nose to the occipital protuberance, in which case we go over three lobes. When we attempt to compare the brain capacity of one animal with that of another, with the view of ascertaining the quality of their respective mental manifestations, we must first determine what are the exact homologous parts that are comparable. To draw any such inference as Léut has done, from a comparison of two brains, by simply weighing or measuring the whole mass of each, would be manifestly of no scientific value. Equalised brains do not display equivalent, nor indeed analogous, results. To postulate such a doctrine would be as irrational as to maintain that the walking capacities of different persons are directly proportionate to the weight of their bodies.

We need hardly mention that Léut was against all cerebral localisation, even that of the speech centre.

JEAN PIERRE FLOURENS AND GALL

JEAN PIERRE FLOURENS (1794-1867) was commissioned by the Academy of France to test Gall's doctrines in 1822. He had been an admirer of Gall, but now became his most formidable opponent. He had written of him as being:

"the profound observer whose genius has opened for us the study of the anatomy and physiology of the brain. One can estimate his work only at its true value if one is acquainted with the depth of ignorance which prevailed when he appeared. I shall never forget the impression I received the first time I saw Gall dissect a brain. It seemed to me as if I had never seen that organ."

Flourens was a follower of Descartes, and dedicated his report, when it was published in book-form, to him. He was an out-and-out believer in one indivisible intelligence. The unity of the "ego" united him with the great philosopher. Descartes had emphasised the indivisibility of the psychical functions and had
demanded a unitary "seat of mind." As his choice of the pineal gland could not be sustained, in the face of more recent experience, Flourens substituted for it the total mass of the cerebral hemispheres.

Similarly, Flourens believed in a centre of "life," and in 1827 defined in detail the vital knot (noeud vital), previously made out by A. C. Lorry (1725-1783) in 1748, and C. J. J. Le Gallois (1770-1814) in 1812, at the junction of neck and head, or, more precisely, on the floor of the fourth ventricle, and this was regarded as the seat of the vital principle. It is really the respiratory brain centre. This centre, according to more recent investigations, is so extremely sensitive to any increase or diminution of the partial pressure of carbon dioxide in the blood that a diminution of 0.2 per cent. of an atmosphere, or 1.5 mm. of mercury, will cause apnoea, while a corresponding increase will double the breathing.

Flourens started his investigation with a preconceived notion, the notion of the unity of mind, and therefore expected to find the brain a unity. We shall see in the course of our history that the preconceived opinions of investigators have vitiated many of the experiments which have been conducted since that time. According to the psychological view of the observer, so have been the results.

Flourens' indivisibility of the "ego" appealed to the philosophers of his time, especially in metaphysical Germany, where the opinion about Gall changed on the appearance of Flourens' report. The notion that the brain might by any possibility be ever parcelled out into distinct areas of differentiated activities was thenceforth habitually stigmatised as contemptibly ridiculous and unworthy of scientific consideration. Flourens' opinions dominated the medical world for fifty years to the exclusion of all progress in our knowledge of brain functions. It was he who by his experiments, which were wrongly conducted, brought about the neglect from which Gall's works have suffered ever since. It will be of interest, therefore, to go more fully into the matter and give Gall's criticism of his method; the more so, as many of the remarks apply equally well to experiments made since and even at the present day. Indeed, every physiologist should read the history of this controversy.

Not Flourens, but Luigi Rolando (1773-1831), began those vivisection experiments on the brain which to this day hold undisputed sway. Rolando ("La vera struttura del Cervello," 1809) had removed in successive layers the brain of a hen, and had found that when the entire hemispheres were destroyed the hen could still "eat, drink, and walk," which according to Flourens meant that its "intelligence" was preserved, which he thought impossible; therefore Rolando's experiments must have been wrongly conducted; indeed, he "mutilated," but did not destroy the parts on which he operated, in the opinion of Flourens.

Flourens took a live pigeon for his experiment, and removed its brain in successive stages. As a result of his observations, he came to the conclusion, contrary to Rolando and Gall, that the whole of the cerebral mass is homogeneous, that nothing prevents the functions of one part being transferred to another, and that so long as one little part is left, the intellectual faculties and consciousness will still remain. He wrote:

"Thus one may remove, anteriorly, or posteriorly, from above, or from the side, a considerable portion of the cerebral lobes without destroying their functions. Even a small portion of these lobes, therefore, suffices for the exercise of their functions. In proportion to the extent of the removal, all the functions become impaired, and gradually fail; and beyond certain limits they are altogether annihilated. The cerebral lobes, therefore, co-operate as a whole in the full and complete exercise of their functions. Finally, when one form of perception is lost, all are lost; when one faculty disappears, all disappear. There are, therefore, no
special seats either of special faculties or special perceptions. The faculty of perceiving, judging, and willing one thing resides in the same region as that of perceiving, judging, and willing another; consequently, this faculty, essentially one, resides essentially in one organ."

Flourens' report, was accepted by the Academy and by all the world, and it was regarded as a fatal blow to Gall's position; but his experiments were in turn set aside fifty years later, having been wrongly conducted, and only on animals too low in the scale of organisation to show the highly complex functions with which the human brain is endowed. It was Flourens who had given the death-blow to Gall's doctrine, and yet there is not a man to-day who accepts his deductions.

"As all who, like the writer, ever listened to the earnest pleadings of that enthusiastic dogmatist can testify, it was difficult to resist conviction while under the spell of his eloquent expositions. Now, Flourens, removing the brain in different directions by successive slices, announced as proven propositions: A small portion of the cerebral lobes suffices for all their function; there are no separate seats for various functions or various perceptions; when one perception is lost, all are lost; when one mental faculty goes, all others follow in its immediate train. The metaphysical conception of the unity of mind seemed once more to have regained ascendancy." (W. H. Walshe, "The Colloquial Linguistic Faculty," London, 1885.)

Flourens' report which had obtained the prize of the Academy—though Cuvier did not agree with it—was entitled, "Experimental Researches into the Properties and Functions of the Nervous System in Vertebrate Animals." It was two years later, in 1824, published in book-form, was reprinted in an enlarged edition in 1845, and still further enlarged in 1863. The cause of this further augmentation of his original work was that he had renewed his experiments, forty years after his first investigation, and had applied a new and ingenious method. He applied small metal balls to the surface of the brain of animals and let them slowly sink through. The balls in every case forced their way in course of time right through to the base of the brain, without any disturbance of function whatever resulting. Only where the balls stood directly over the vital centre (in the medulla), death followed when they had sunk completely through. This experiment excited the admiration of the scientific world, though how it could prove or disprove any psychical quality whatever, one fails to see. This was the scientific way of going "in search of the soul." Physicians and surgeons have every day thousands of cases of brain injuries, derangements and diseases before them, changing and destroying the mind and character of man in every possible way; yet we shall show that such material, for want of systematic observation, is almost neglected to this very day. No! we must sink metal balls into the brain of a pigeon to gain the gold medal of a learned society!

Gall protested that brain mutilation does not disclose mental function:

"It is a notorious fact, in order to discover the functions of different parts of the body, our anatomists and physiologists prefer the employment of mechanical methods to the accumulation of a great number of physiological and pathological facts; to collecting these facts, repeating them or waiting for their repetition, in case of need; to drawing from them slowly and successively the consequences, and to publishing their discoveries with philosophic reserve. The method, at present so much in favour with our physiological investigators, is more sensational and gains the approbation of the majority of ordinary men by its promptitude and visible results."

After referring to the contradictory results of these mutilation experiments, Gall adds:
"It is but too notorious that these violent experiments have become the scandal of the academicians who, seduced by the glamour of ingenious operations, have applauded with as much enthusiasm as superficiality the pretensions to glorious discovery made by these mutilators."

Even Sir CHARLES BELL, though such a violent opponent of Gall, acknowledged that:

"It is doubtful whether the contradictory practice of cultivating physiology by the cutting up of living bodies, and thus throwing them into a pathological state, has not propagated more error than truth. As evidence in favour of this view of the subject, it is well known that it is a rare occurrence for any two of those experimenters to agree in their results."

BUCHNER'S phrase, written some thirty years later, is well known. It is that Flourens had cut away "the soul" from his fowl bit by bit. "Even conceding that the higher mental functions of the fowl—functions so difficult to define—had really fallen away in these vivisections, even then the supposition does not follow, since the cerebrum need still be only a necessary factor in the production of these activities, but by no means their seat."

It is undoubtedly a fact, again brought home to us by more recent experiments, that the scalpel cannot disclose the thoughts or feelings of an animal, and that we cannot by destruction of portions of the brain discover the loss of particular functions, when we have wrong notions, or no notions at all, of what these functions are. We can ascertain but little when we unseal in the dissecting-room the door of the mind. Well might the satirist say, in his exaggerated language:

"Was ever such an ass as that
Who hoped by slicing mutton fat
And pulling candlewicks to pieces,
To tell why light should spring from greases?
Yes, one:—that still more precious fool
Who, in the anatomic school,
Expected with dissecting knife,
To learn from death the laws of life."

—Béranger.

Besides Flourens, there were also Rolando (1773-1831), F. Magendie (1783-1855), and others, conducting experiments on the brain. Gall himself repeated them, to be in a better position to criticise them. He was thus able to explain why these experiments by mutilation of the brain have such contradictory results when made by different investigators, and why they are all to some extent vague and uncertain, and in some cases entirely barren.

He said:

"When we read of the experiments of our physiologists on the brain, we are almost induced to believe that the whole nervous system, especially the cerebrum, cerebellum, etc., is only composed of pieces of wax applied one over the other. One is removed, and another is removed, and the loss of one or another function instantly takes place. No one thinks of the state of suffering, trouble, and uneasiness of the animal, of the blood that inundates the injured parts, and which it is necessary to staunch at every instant, which very often immediately coagulates, and requires such compression, friction, and searing, that the part operated on rarely presents a smooth and clean surface to enable us to ascertain with exactness how deep and to what extent the lesion or extirpation has been practised. The experimenters always assure us that the experiments have been a thousand times repeated; but, with a few exceptions, it is hardly possible to perform twice absolutely the same operation; which explains why every time, unless the experimenter wishes to impose
upon us, the accidents attending the operations vary, which also brings about a variation in the results. This single circumstance is generally sufficient to make this sort of experiment disgusting to all those who seek new truths with candour without self-love, without the incitements of a fugitive vanity. M. Flourens assures me that, in order not to confound the parts on which he has operated, and not to attribute a result to another organ than that to which it belonged, he has by turns experimented separately on the nerves, spinal cord, brain, the different parts of the brain, and that, in the exploration of each of these parts, he has taken the most scrupulous pains to involve that part only on which he was experimenting, and by this means to avoid all foreign complication. He adds that it is always necessary to be as careful as possible of those parts which furnish blood: 1. Because the loss of blood greatly abridges the life of the animal, and it is quite necessary that the animal should live to furnish the results of the experiments; 2. Because the blood being effused in the cerebral mass, produces those compressions, the results of which, being confounded with those of the experiments, complicate and often destroy them. I conclude from this that M. Flourens knew perhaps better than his predecessors with what precautions similar experiments ought to be performed. But is it not to be feared that by this he has in a great measure pronounced his own condemnation? Is this localisation of the cerebral parts and their results possible? Where is the anatomist or physiologist who knows with precision all the origin, the extent, the ramifications, and connections of a particular brain part? You remove the cerebellum, at the same instant you wound very seriously the medulla oblongata and spinal cord, the annular protuberance, the tubercula quadrigemina; consequently your results belong not only to these parts, but also to all those that communicate with these mediatly and immediately. You believe that you have isolated the tubercula, but those tubercula have connections with the corpus olivare, the medulla oblongata, the cerebellum, with the optic nerve, and with many convolutions. The optic thalami and the corpora striata are connected below with the crura of the hemispheres to the annular protuberance, the medulla oblongata, the pyramids and spinal cord; above, with all the cerebral convolutions; by their surface to the different commissures, such as the anterior commissure, the great commissure, or corpus callosum; to the fornix or septum lucidum. Thus there does not exist a cerebral part of which we do not know that it has very multiplied relations with other parts. I do not even except the corpora mamillaria, the pineal gland, infundibulum, etc., etc. And surely the connections that are unknown to us are still more numerous. This being established, how can we prevent the reciprocal influence of all these parts, especially when they are irritated, injured, acerated, or removed? And how can we isolate their results? This beautiful idea of localisation is then only a fine and presumptuous chimera. To arrive at a cerebral part, we must perforate, break or cut the bony parts; we must wound or tear violently the membranes which envelop the nervous system and which establish, among all its parts, an intimate connection by means of the vascular and arachnoid membranes. And as these membranes penetrate not only the ventricles and convolutions, but also the whole cerebral mass, the loss of blood, their irritation, inflammation, etc., must inevitably complicate the experiment and its results.

"M. Flourens frequently makes horizontal sections of the cerebral parts; this procedure would imply that the centres in the different parts of the brain are composed of horizontal layers placed upon one another. This disposition does nowhere occur, not even in the annular protuberances. Upon the anterior pair of the tubercles, on the surface of the brain, etc., you can remove a very delicate layer of non-fibrous substance; but this substance only contains the early rudiments of an infinite number of nervous filaments, which are continued into the interior of the cerebral masses. Throughout, the white filaments of the cerebellum, cerebrum, corpora striata, optic thalami, crura of the brain, annular protuberance, and tubercula, course and diverge from below upwards; throughout, they plunge either diagonally, perpendicularly, or obliquely towards their apparatus of supply; and from thence to their ramifications. The converging fibrils in inverse order arrive from the surface of the brain and cerebellum to form the different commissures. Thus this art, so much recommended and extolled, of removing the organ by layers, is in opposition to the structure of the cerebral parts. They talk to us of the
medulla oblongata, the annular protuberance, as cerebral parts, that it would be easy to isolate; but they are not more difficult to isolate than the tubercula quadrigemina. These are still a part, the continuation of the medulla oblongata and medulla spinalis. They are at the same time formed by ganglia, one part of which gives origin to the fibrillae of the optic nerve. So in a great degree is the medulla oblongata a continuation of the medulla spinalis; besides that, it contains many masses of non-fibrous substances, which, like so many ganglia, are the origin of many nerves of the greatest importance, having very different functions. The annular protuberance is not alone composed of the nervous bundles of the two hemispheres of the cerebellum, or the commissure of the cerebellum; it is also the continuation of many bundles of the medulla oblongata and spinal cord, the anterior and posterior, or inferior and superior, pyramids, and it contains a considerable quantity of non-fibrous substance, placed between the transverse and longitudinal bundles, and which create new filaments for the crura of the brain, the tubercles, etc. We see, then, throughout the brain, the parts very materially complicated, which renders any localisation absolutely impossible. This localisation only becomes practicable where the particular nerves are already disengaged from the common masses, in order to join the apparatus where the special function takes place. This is applicable to all the nerves which take their origin from the medulla oblongata, etc. More than this, you cannot isolate or localise the nerves of the senses before they are complete and joined to the apparatus of the sense. The origin of the nerves of taste is confounded with the masses of origin of many other nerves; the auditory nerve is confounded with the nervous and non-fibrous masses of the fourth ventricle; the optic nerves, at first, with all the mass of the tubercles, with the corpora gniculata and their contiguous parts, with the crura of the brain, and with the greyish layer situated immediately behind their junction. The olfactory nerves are at first intimately united with the grey substance placed on the interior and inferior convolutions of the middle lobes, with the anterior cerebral cavities, etc.

"Either those who experiment on the brain, and the cerebral parts, have never had a clear and just idea of the organisation of the nervous system, or they imprudently calculate to make dupes; and they succeed marvellously, since, in spite of the refined precision of their precepts, they find their readers and judges in a greater ignorance than that in which they themselves are of the most essential facts of the cerebral organisation."

"The corpora striata are wanting in reptiles, and the optic thalami in fishes; but they all possess the tubercula quadrigemina, and consequently vision. (Flourens, p. 20.) Thus whenever animals have a common organ, they have also the common function. If certain apparatuses are wanting in reptiles and fishes, it follows that certain functions are also wanting. It is then not true that animals have all the same cerebral parts, and that they all have the same parts as man. The different parts then are destined to different functions. As this difference of composition does not only exist in different species of animals, so far as the cerebellum, cerebrum, medulla oblongata and spinalis, corpora quadrigemina are concerned, but also for the greater or less complicated composition of the cerebral lobes, it necessarily results that the different parts of these lobes are destined for different functions. A singular thing this! They prove the existence of one organ for muscular contrac-
tility; another for excitation; another for the connection of particular contractions into uniform motions, and another for volition and sensation. They wish even by carefully slicing the cerebellum to be able to destroy the power of flying, or flying and walking, or at the same time, flying, walking, and standing (Flourens, p. 40). And yet they manifest a hypocritical aversion for the plurality of the centres for the qualities and faculties of the mind, so essentially different!"

"I can point out to M. Flourens that the corpora striata are never wanting in reptiles, and that it is not true, as he says, that the volume of the tubercula quadrigemina is, in all species of animals, in direct proportion with the volume of the optic nerves and the eyes.

"Our celebrated experimenter maintains, that all the parts capable of exciting contraction have the grey substance within and the white substance without; that an inverse disposition of these two substances constitutes the character of the
non-exciting parts, that is to say, of the cerebral lobes and the cerebellum; and that we can then judge a priori of the properties of these parts by their structure, and reciprocally of their structure by their properties. All this proves that M. Flourens does not yet understand the true use of the two cerebral substances. 

**There is throughout, where the nervous filaments take their rise,** without regard to its locality, internally or externally, a non-fibrous grey substance. . . .

"I have proved in the fourth volume of my large work, and I have made it sufficiently clear in this edition, that each fundamental power, essentially distinct, includes sensation, perception, memory and recollection, judgment and imagination; since these common attributes are nothing else than modifications, different degrees of each faculty. Even each propensity, each instinct, includes volition, in the acceptance that M. Flourens himself gives it in hens, pigeons, rabbits, etc. Thus, so long as a single fundamental propensity or talent exists, all the general attributes also exist; so long as there exists a single atom of matter, a single plant, all the general attributes of matter and plants exist. Therefore, so long as we shall not have destroyed all the seats of the fundamental powers, sensation, memory, judgment, volition remain.

"Let us now see the experiments of M. Flourens:

1. I removed from a pigeon, by careful and successive slices, all the anterior portion of the right cerebral lobe, and all the superior and middle portion of the left.

"This way of experimenting supposes an organisation of the brain absolutely contrary to that which really exists. Where has M. Flourens ever seen that the brain of any animal whatever is formed by layers? If he wishes to have us believe that, in his experiments, he tries to remove one faculty after another, he must attack each cerebral part, each division of fibres into bundles, at their origin . . . and follow it to its ramifications upwards; and then follow it again from the surface down. . . . But M. Flourens has no idea of it, consequently all his experiments, even should he give us millions, never can have the least demonstrative value as regards the seat of any mental power. He mutilates all the organs at once, weakens them all, extirpates them all at the same time.

"Vision became more and more enfeebled, and by little and little, as I advanced (while he removed the layers), and was not totally lost until the layers in the neighbourhood of the central nucleus of the two lobes were suppressed.'

"M. Flourens has not told us what is the central nucleus, and this central nucleus, precisely because it is the central nucleus, the origin and receptacle of all the rest, might it not be that very limited small portion, but sufficient to permit of the continuance of all the faculties?"

"But from the moment vision was lost, hearing was also, and with this and sight, all the intellectual and sensitive faculties.'

"Why does M. Flourens always insist on vision? The destruction of the brain, since, according to him, it is the seat of all sensation, and every intellectual faculty, should necessarily bring about the loss of all the senses, and all the sensitive faculties. Why, then, so many evasions?"

"2. From another pigeon I removed by successive cuts, also very carefully made, the whole anterior and posterior portion of the two cerebral lobes, to within a few lines of the central nucleus. As this ablation proceeded, the sight gradually and sensibly became enfeebled; hearing the same; all the other faculties like hearing and seeing; and when one was entirely destroyed, they all were.'

"Granted that M. Flourens has found the measure of the successive diminution of sight and hearing; how in making his successive ablations has he also made observations on the relative diminution of the intellectual faculties of the pigeon?"

"3. Finally, on a third pigeon, I uncovered, thus to speak, and exposed the central nucleus of the two lobes, by the successive and gradual ablation of all the superior, posterior, and anterior layers. At each new cut, vision lost its energy; and when the animal no longer saw, it no longer heard, willed, remembered, judged, and was absolutely in the condition of an animal entirely deprived of his lobes.

"4. Thus, first, we can remove either from before, behind, above, or from the side, a certain extent of the cerebral lobes without destroying their functions. A limited portion of these lobes is then sufficient for the exercise of their functions.
Secondly, as this slicing goes on, all the functions become weak and gradually diminish in energy, and beyond certain limits they are entirely destroyed. The cerebral lobes then concur in their totality in the full and entire exercise of their functions. Thirdly, finally, when one sensation is lost, all are lost; when one faculty disappears, all disappear. There are not then different seats, neither for different faculties nor different sensations. The faculty of perceiving, judging, or willing one thing resides in the same place as that of perceiving, willing, judging another; and consequently this faculty, essentially one, resides in a single organ.

"Let us reason like M. Flourens: We exhaust a man by bleeding; All the functions of the cerebrum, cerebellum, medulla oblongata, spinal cord, heart, lungs, stomach, etc., become enfeebled. We cut off his head, we kill at a single blow: the functions of these same organs cease. Hence the faculties of sensation, thought, sight, hearing, taste, smell, motion, respiration, digestion, circulation of the blood, secretion of bile, etc., reside in one and the same organ."

"5. Each of the different organs of the senses have no less a distinct origin in the cerebral mass. We have already seen that the primordial principle of the action of the retina, and the play of the iris, is derived from the tubercula quadrigemina. In like manner, the sense of taste, smell, hearing, as well as vision, derive their particular origin from the particular eminence which gives rise to their nerves.

"6. We can then, by destroying separately each of these particular organs, destroy separately each of the four senses which are derived from them; and we may, on the contrary, destroy, if not all these senses, all their result by a single blow, by the simple destruction of the central organ, where their sensations are effected and completed.'

But where is this central organ? As a very limited portion of the brain suffices for all the functions, and as all the parts concur in all the functions, this central organ is then each part, each little portion of the brain; thus this central point is either found throughout the brain, or is nowhere found.'

"P. 122: 'In the last analysis, the cerebral lobes, cerebellum, tubercula quadrigemina, medulla oblongata, medulla spinalis, the nerves, all the essentially different parts of the nervous system, have all specific properties, peculiar functions, distinct effects; and, notwithstanding this wonderful diversity of properties, functions, effects, they do not the less constitute a single system. One point of the nervous system being excited excites all the others; a point weakened enervates all; there is a community of reaction, alteration, energy. Unity is the grand principle which reigns throughout; it governs all. The nervous system forms then but a single system.'

Unity is the constant dream, the ne plus ultra of declaring metaphysicians. The universe is but one; millions of suns, planets, comets are but one; the human race is but unity; different nations, the Chinese, French, Japanese, Africans, Germans, Turks, Greeks, are but one; the head, chest, abdomen, extremities, superior and inferior, the nervous, lymphatic, sanguinous systems, the liver, heart, intestines, etc., are but one. The senses, cerebrum, cerebellum, tubercula quadrigemina, medulla oblongata and spinalis, are essentially different; they have each different and specific properties, particular functions, distinct effects. They are, according to Flourens, in a complete and fundamental independence of each other (p. 27). Each of them can be separately preserved, destroyed, restored, as the organ of each is preserved, destroyed, or restored (p. 102); and they are one!!!

'The cerebral lobes,' says Flourens, 'can lose, either from before, behind, above, or from the side, a certain portion of their substance, without losing their functions.' Yes; without losing the common attribute of every propensity or determinate faculty.

'This reasoning is contradicted by a great number of pathological facts. I repeat: the appreciation of cerebral lesions and their consequences requires:

'1. An exact knowledge of the organisation of the brain and the reciprocal vital influence of the different parts;

'2. A detailed knowledge of the functions of the brain, of the different fundamental qualities and intellectual faculties, the instincts, propensities, and talents, etc.
"So long as the experimenter is not acquainted with these two indispensable conditions, all his experiments to ascertain the animal functions of the brain and the different cerebral parts are but the groping of a blind man. In all my researches the question was to discover not the vital functions or the reciprocal vital influences of the different parts of the nervous system, but the animal functions, moral qualities, and intellectual faculties, and the seats of their organs.

" 'The cerebral lobes,' continues M. Flourens, 'effectively concur, altogether, in the exercise of their functions; it is very natural that one of their parts can supply another; that intelligence can consequently subsist or be lost by each of them.'

"In consequence of this supposition, the different species of animals should not differ among themselves, but by different degrees of the totality of the moral qualities and intellectual faculties; very nearly in the same way that a piece of lead of six pounds differs from another piece weighing an ounce. But as certain species are deprived of certain faculties with which other species are endowed, it follows that some must be deprived of certain cerebral parts, with which others are possessed. How can we explain, on this hypothesis, the development and non-simultaneous destruction of the animal functions of the brain? How can you conceive of partial geniuses, partial idiots, partial mental alienation, precocious geniuses in one single faculty, the different degrees of our different qualities and faculties, the antagonism of our qualities—the double man within us? Truly, if we consult ever so little the most ordinary facts, the pretensions of our experimenter appear more and more absurd."

P. 236, Flourens explains: "But, independently of this peculiar and exclusive action of each part, there is common action for each part, that is to say of each upon all, and of all upon each."

This latter sentence agrees with what Gall has said, and said better:

"Each nervous part has its peculiar functions, although they all exercise a reciprocal influence, and are all more or less subordinate to each other. The plurality of the organs does not exclude the unity of their action. Life takes place with many organs, and a single volition, with many instruments of voluntary motion. But if it were the reciprocal influence, which could impress on a system the character of the unity of an organ, all the parts of the animal would be a unity, since all the parts influence each other."

Gall continued:

"Flourens confines himself, so far as function is concerned, like the philosophers, to generalities, which are really very nearly the same in all animals. All are excitable, all have sensibility, all have also volition; and if to eat, drink, walk, fly, crawl, swim can be included under the empire of the intellectual faculties, they all possess intelligence."

Gall said he had made out the parts of the brain which have to do with intellect, feelings, and animal propensities, and determined their localisation.

"Now the materials are in your hands. Cut, pinch, prick, remove, cause your martyred animal to live as long as you will, and show us which of these faculties continues or ceases to manifest itself! You cannot deny the existence of these qualities and faculties, since all the actions of man and animals attest them! Or prove to us that it belongs only to their volition, to the direction of what you call intelligence, that the tiger has the propensities of the tiger, the sheep those of the sheep; that one bird sings and another does not; that one man excels in poetry, another in observation, another in music, etc.; where will you show us the material conditions of these phenomenon at the point of your scalpel! None of you thus far have had either the philosophy or the courage to meet these questions; otherwise you would have soon been convinced of the insufficiency and nullity of your cruel experiments."

Flourens, early in the sixties, also published a little book, De la vie et de l'intelligence, wherein he admitted that Gall rendered physiology a great service in proving
that the brain is exclusively the organ of the intellectual faculties and the moral qualities; but he strongly objected to his cutting up, not only the intelligence into so many little intelligences, but also to the cutting up of the brain into so many little brains, organs, or centres. He also considered the associating of these organs with supposed distinct mental faculties an extremely fallacious performance on the part of Gall. But Gall's greatest crime, according to Flourens, was that he denied the freedom of the will (?), and without free-will there can be no morality. Gall had not proved his organs anatomically. He could not circumscribe them, could not distinguish them in the brain; hence they must have arisen in his imagination. Seeing them on the skull is not the same thing, for skull and brain do not agree in conformation. (1) Descartes, he says, meditated for days in a corner of his room (s'enfermait dans un poêle), frivolous Gall went into company to see slyly what he could discover. Flourens was not aware that he gave Gall with this statement the greatest testimonial; for the two methods of study mentioned distinguished the naturalist from the metaphysician.

Though the doctrines of Flourens met with general acceptance, they were contested on experimental grounds by some physiologists, particularly by J. B. Bouillaud (1796-1881), in "Journal de Physiologie Experimentale" (1830). The experiments of Bouillaud on pigeons, rabbits, and dogs led him to conclude that destruction of the anterior lobes alone caused symptoms of profound dementia. Though the animals were able to feel, see, hear, smell, and to execute a number of spontaneous and instinctive movements, they were unable to recognise their relations to the objects by which they were surrounded. They were unable to feed themselves, and had, in general, lost all reasoning powers. An animal, said he, in whom the anterior lobes have been destroyed, "though deprived of the exercise of a more or less considerable number of intellectual acts, continues to enjoy its sensory faculties; a proof that 'sensation' and 'intellection' are not one and the same function, and that they have separate localities."

But Bouillaud was ignored, like Gall. In consequence of the results of the experiments by Flourens, Longet, Budge, and Schiff, special localisation of function in the cortex was discarded; and orthodox physiology taught, even against the strongest evidence to the contrary, the equivalence of mental function; that is, the brain, as a whole, not any definite portion, was considered to be the physical substratum of mental activity.

Even the localisation of motor centres, vaguely indicated by Gall and proved in the seventies, was denied in those days. In 1842 F. A. Longet (1811-1871), in his Anatomie et Physiologie du Système Nerveux, Paris, 1842, affirmed that he had experimented upon the cortical substance of dogs, rabbits, and kids, had irritated it mechanically, cauterised it with potash, nitric acid, etc., and had passed galvanic currents through it in different directions, without obtaining any sign whatever of resulting muscular contraction.

We now know that an animal deprived of its hemispheres is still capable of movements towards a definite purpose; only it is no longer a conscious participant or agent in the purpose to be subserved. The animal is no longer an active agent, impelled to these movements by desires which are mental affections, and experiences no longer the pleasure which the consciousness of the sensation gave it.

If the cerebral hemispheres are removed in a teleostean or crayfish, in whom there is only a rudimentary cortex, the animal is to all intents and purposes unaffected. It can distinguish between a worm and a piece of string, and will rise to red wafers in preference to those of another colour. The operation does not damage the primary centres of vision—the optic lobes—and in these fishes the eye is the most important sense organ.

A shark, however, subjected to the same operation, is reduced to a condition of complete quiescence. This is due to the circumstance that in this fish the principal Vol. i.]
sense organ is that of smell, and severance of both olfactory tracts produces the same result as removal of the entire cerebrum. In either case the path between the olfactory bulbs and the centres that control the cord are interrupted.

A frog from which the cerebral lobes have been removed will respond to appropriate stimuli with all the movements of which a perfect frog is capable. It will swim, leap, and crawl. When placed on its back, it will easily and at once regain its normal position. When placed on a tilting-board, it will constantly adjust the position of its body so as to maintain an equilibrium. It will crawl with the regularity of a music-box when its flanks are gently stroked. Thrown into the water it will swim with great regularity of motion until it is exhausted or finds something—as a small piece of wood placed in contact with it—upon which it can crawl. When submerged in the water, it will rise to the surface for air; it will not, if as it possessed only a spinal cord, remain quietly in water the temperature of which is gradually raised, but will make violent efforts to escape. It is guided by the light, for it avoids objects that cast a strong shadow. On the other hand, it appears stupid; it pays no attention to the flies that are placed near it; by careful occlusion of all stimuli it may be kept motionless for hours. We cannot argue from this, however, that it is without sensations, for it may be hungry; and HEUBEL ("Pflüger's Archiv," vol. xiv., p 162) asserts that a sound frog may, with careful manipulation, be made to lie still on its back for a long time. Removal of its hemispheres does not entirely abolish its apparent spontaneity; it still continues to feed itself, for instance, by catching passing insects. It is not until the optic thalami are removed also that it becomes a purely reflex animal. If the brain and the anterior end of the bulb are removed the lower centres of the cord are set free, and the result is incessant movement provoked by slight stimuli. R. L. WILBUR, of Cornell University, U.S.A., tried to prove that in animals the cerebrum was the seat of consciousness and volition. He decerebrised a frog and put it in a large open jar, where it remained for five years, i.e., until its death. During all that period the animal never showed signs of any initiative, its only movements being very slight and attributed to muscular weariness, like that of persons asleep. The eyes, optic nerves, and optic lobes of the brain were uninjured, and the animal could evidently see, but without understanding. The most attractive frog food put before it was absolutely unnoticed, and it was fed every day of its brainless life by an attendant, who would open its mouth and with forceps push a bit of fresh meat or fish far enough back into the throat to arouse the reflex mechanism of swallowing. If touched, the body would move or leap; if placed in water, it would swim until some support was reached; if turned upon its back, it would promptly and vigorously right itself—but it would never move of its own accord.

A bird thus operated upon remains perfectly motionless, sleepy, and unconscious, unless it is disturbed. When disturbed in any way, it will move; for instance, when thrown into the air it will fly; but these movements are, as in the frog, purely reflex in character; when the animal is made to fly its movements are directed by the sense of sight, the optic lobes being still intact, and it will select a perch to settle on in preference to the floor. It will start at a noise; it will not eat voluntarily; it exhibits no emotions such as fear, sexual feeling, or maternal instincts. When laid on its back it will easily regain its feet, and will stand in a natural and easy posture. It will tuck its head under its wings, clean its feathers, pick up corn, and drink water presented to its beak. It will start at sharp sounds or flashes of light.

In mammals the operation of extirpation of the brain is attended with such severe hemorrhage that they die very rapidly, but in some few cases where the animals have been kept alive the phenomena they exhibit are similar to those shown by a frog or pigeon. The difficulty of the operation was overcome by GOLTZ, of Strassburg, in dogs, by removing the cerebrum piecemeal. One dog treated in this way lived in good health for eighteen months, when it was killed in order that a thorough examination of the brain might be made. It was then found that not only the hemispheres but the main parts of the optic thalami and corpus striatum had been removed also. Though it still could carry out co-ordinated movements, its reactions were entirely reflex, and memory, emotions, feelings, and the capacity to learn were absent.

The rabbit or rat thus operated upon will stand and run and leap. Placed on
its back, it will regain its feet. It will follow with its head a bright light held in front of it; it will start and tremble, or run, at a shrill or loud noise. It will utter a prolonged cry when pinched. Its muscular motions are obviously co-ordinated in response to sensory impulses from the organs of touch, hearing, and sight.

The higher animal loses just those characters which distinguish it from the lower ones. The higher it is, the more fatal the effects, the immediate disturbance is more severe, the return of function slower, and the permanent loss is greater.
SECTION III
HISTORY OF MODERN BRAIN RESEARCH
CHAPTER XIX
HISTORY OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE BRAIN CENTRES FOR SPEECH

During the whole course of his evolution, no possession which man has acquired has exercised a stronger influence on his higher development than the power of articulate speech. Some philosophers even thought that our faculties were due to the possession of speech. That was not the opinion of Gall. He said:

"Since Condillac, philosophers have exhausted themselves in reasonings on the influence which signs in general, and spoken language in particular, exercises on our ideas and our knowledge. They maintain that without signs we should hardly think; that it is only articulate words which can lead us to abstract ideas; that signs and language develop our faculties, give birth to our inclinations, our sentiments, affections, passions; that, without signs, we could not compare our simple ideas, nor analyse our compound ones; that in this way languages are necessary to thought as to speech, to the possession of ideas as to their expression; that without language we should have only few ideas, and these very few confused and incomplete.

"The doctrine so pompously announced is false; namely that language, that signs in general, have called forth, directed, and fixed the progress of the human mind in its combinations and researches. I admit that the history of signs is, at the same time, the history of the successive advancement of human knowledge. But it is knowledge, inclinations, sentiments, talents which have produced the signs; never could any sign give rise to any inclination, sentiment, or talent. It is necessary first to have experienced these, and then to have found the acceptance of the word or sign invented by others. Speak of metaphysics in the most distinct terms to an animal, idiot, or a man of very limited powers; and it is like talking of colours to a blind man. Boast to a miser of the pleasures of beneficence; to a cruel man of the charms of compassion; you will never, with all your signs, awaken benevolence in the miser, or humanity in the cruel man."

Speech, according to Gall, is indissolubly bound up with the intellect and the state of the feelings:

"The language of gesture and verbal language are the product of the activity of the faculties, inclinations, affections, and passions of men and animals. It is in the nature of man and animals to produce certain sounds as soon as they are affected; as soon as they experience the necessity of communicating with their fellows. It is an effect so necessary to their organisation, that it even takes place in spite of them; and these seem almost always to depict the various affections so well, that they become the most certain and the most distinct natural signs. Before all language, the organs of our qualities and faculties are active, and however little
this action may be felt, it manifests itself either by gestures, or by sounds, or words, or by both in combination. It follows that those external signs, for the most part, are proportioned to the action of the internal faculties; it is by means of language that man and animals communicate their feelings and their ideas; and consequently the language of each species of animal, of each people, of each individual must be more or less rich and just, according as the sentiments and the thoughts are more or less numerous, clear, lively, and determinate. No language whatever can have more signs than those who form it have ideas or feelings. Language and knowledge always are in concert; and in their progress, the equilibrium always establishes itself between the interior faculties and the signs. In order to transmit to my hearers or my readers in a clear manner my ideas and my feelings, I try to impress myself with them, to personify them, if I may be permitted to use the expression, and the proper language spontaneously presents itself. This is the reason why the most perfect language is always employed by the most profound and enlightened men; and whenever language is poor, vague, imperfect, vacillating, the sentiments and the course of the ideas are open to the same charge. The language of brutes is, for the same reason, very limited; and thus it may be conceived why that of certain savages is composed of only three hundred words. The words are created only in proportion to the need we have of them."

Gall recognised a special brain centre for speech, through which by association the faculties can manifest themselves; and he was the first to recognise the lesion of aphasia or loss of articulate speech.

"The cases of disease, which I have quoted, in which the patients had full knowledge of things, without being able to find or pronounce their names, prove that the action of the internal forces precedes signs; that it is, in some measure, independent of these, and, finally, that arbitrary signs, like spoken language, can give rise to ideas and sentiments only so far as they have become by use means of association. If it were true that, without signs, we should hardly think, and that nothing but articulate words can lead us to abstract ideas, then children would scarcely think before knowing how to speak. Now, experience shows that, before speaking, children acquire an infinity of notions, which, without thinking, would be impossible. Children even commence the operations of their intelligence by making abstract ideas for themselves."

In support of his argument, Gall also quotes the case of a blind deaf-and-dumb person, blind and deaf from birth, who showed a keen desire to know objects and indicated reflection in all his actions. The senses of smell and touch were very keen, the countenance was very expressive, and, in general, his natural language was not that of an idiot, but of an intelligent being. He was not taught, but himself invented numerous signs to convey his thoughts and desires.

Dr. Howe, as we have already mentioned, founded his education of Laura Bridgman, a similarly afflicted woman, on Gall's principles.

Gall was the first to locate the centre for articulate speech and verbal memory at the basal extremity of the third frontal convolution and the island of Reil—marked in his Anatomical Plates between the Figures xv. (anterior border of third frontal convolution) and 39 (at posterior border thereof, abutting on the fissure of Sylvius); this part of the brain, when well developed, pressing on the posterior part of the superior orbital plate.

This important discovery was achieved by Gall:

Firstly, by the observation of injuries to the orbital region of the brain, which, he found, were not infrequently followed by loss of memory for words.

Secondly, by the observation of cases of apoplexy, which, when the hemorrhage is on the left side, are often accompanied by loss of articulate speech, not through any impairment of the vocal organs, but by lesion of the cerebral centres for speech. There is retention of the faculty of intelligent comprehension of what is said, and the person appreciates the meaning of words uttered in his hearing, but loses the power
of voluntary using words to express ideas. The ideas are present in consciousness, and in their logical order, but he is not able to reproduce them as an articulate phonetic combination. He cannot repeat what is said to him; sometimes, however, he can express his own thoughts in writing.

AUSTIN FLINT (1836-1915), in his "Physiology of Man" (1873), vol. iv., p. 351, asserts that the first accurate record of loss of speech was furnished by FOUR-FOUR PETIT, in his Nouveau Système du Cerveau, in 1766. (If François Pourfour du Petit is meant, he lived 1664-1741.)

The case referred to is as follows: A cavalry man, age 35 years, had hemiplegia of the entire right side. "He could move the tongue only with a great deal of difficulty, and could not protrude it from the mouth, nor pronounce any word." Post-mortem: "I found on the left side, the entire anterior protuberance which contains the internal and superior corpora striata, the middle and the external or inferior, dissolved and converted into a substance resembling the lea of wine."

It will be seen that this is not a case of true aphasia, but one of paresis of the tongue. Moreover, that the lesion of apoplexy of one side may destroy the power of speech appears to have been known to physicians of almost all ages. What we claim for Gall is that he was the first systematic observer and the first to define the region anatomically. Subsequent experience has shown that he was right.

Here is the first case of aphasia, or loss of speech, which came to the notice of Gall over a century ago:

"Edouard de Rampeau, aged twenty-six, received from a foil, the point of which had been broken on the cushion, a blow on the middle part of the left canine region, near the nostril, in a direction oblique from below upward, and slightly so from without inwards. The instrument penetrated to the depth of about three and a half inches, across the left nasal fossa, crossed the cribriform plate of the ethmoid near the insertion of the falx cerebri, and appears to have penetrated in a vertical direction and somewhat obliquely from before backward, to the depth of five or six lines in the internal posterior part of the anterior left lobe of the brain, in such a manner as to approach the anterior part of the temporal lobe.

"The patient experienced a very considerable hemorrhage at the instant of being wounded, and a large quantity of splinters escaped through the nose and mouth. Patient lost the sight of the left eye for a month, and subsequently saw all objects double. The sense of smell was temporarily extinguished. The taste was equally destroyed. It returned by degrees on the right side of the tongue, but not on the left. The whole of the tongue was drawn to the right in opposition to the hemiplegia, which existed on the right side, the mouth being drawn to the left. The sensibility remained unaffected.

"The memory of names was wholly extinguished, while the memory of objects which could be demonstrated to him was perfectly sound. Patient, though knowing the physician well and recognising him, could not recall his name, and always designated him as Mr. 'Such-a-one.'"

May I call the attention of the reader to the minute and careful description given by Gall, and also to the fact that, whereas almost all cases of loss of speech recorded after Gall, and especially after Broca, were observations made on apoplectics—in whom the hemorrhage frequently destroys larger areas of the brain, so that deductions for localisation are difficult—Gall observed also cases of circumscribed injury, especially through the damage done by a foil, which at that time, when duelling was common, were not infrequent. It is evident that this latter circumscribed injury of the brain of a healthy young patient is of far greater scientific value than the damage done to the brain of an old man owing to the bursting of one of his diseased blood-vessels. This we have to keep in mind in the discussion that follows.

Gall and his followers recorded a number of cases of aphasia, for over sixty years,
DISCOVERY OF THE BRAIN CENTRES FOR SPEECH

before the medical profession officially condescended to take any notice of the existence of such a lesion.

That the much despised phrenologists, before the time when "character-reading" became almost their exclusive occupation, were scientific observers is shown by the following case, recorded by ALEXANDER HOOD, a surgeon of Kilmarnock, in the "Transactions of the Edinburgh Phrenological Society," 1823, p. 235:

"The patient, a sober and regular man of sixty-five years of age, possessed of the ordinary knowledge of written and spoken language, on the evening of September 2nd, 1822, suddenly began to speak incoherently, and became quite unintelligible to all those who were about him. 'It was discovered that he had forgotten the name of every object in nature. His recollection of things seemed to be unimpaired, but the names by which men and things are known were entirely obliterated from his mind, or rather he had lost the faculty by which they are called up at the control of the will. He was by no means inattentive, however, to what was going on; and he recognised friends and acquaintances perhaps as quickly as on any former occasion; but their names, or even his own or his wife's name, or the names of any of his domestics, appeared to have no place in his recollection. By way of experiment, I would sometimes mention to him the name of a person or thing—his own name, for example, or the name of some one of his domestics, when he would repeat it after me distinctly, once or twice; but generally, before he could do so a third time, the word was gone from him as completely as if he had never heard it pronounced. When any person read to him from a book, he had no difficulty in perceiving the meaning of a passage, but he could not himself then read; and the reason seemed to be that he had forgotten the elements of written language, viz., the names of the letters of the alphabet. In the course of a short time he became very expert in the use of signs; and his convalescence was marked by his imperceptibly acquiring some general terms, which were with him at first of very extensive and varied application. In the process of his recovery time and space came both under the general application of time; all future events and objects before him were, as he expressed it, next time; but past events and objects behind him were designated last time.'

"In the month of December, 1822, his convalescence was so complete, that he could support conversation without much difficulty."

In the Phrenological Journal of August, 1825, p. 28, Mr. Hood reports the death of the patient, having occurred on August 17th, after an attack of apoplexy. The post-mortem examination revealed a lesion in the left hemisphere "half an inch from the surface of the brain, where it rests over the middle of the supra-orbital plate," and a cystic cavity was found extending from the anterior part of the brain opening into the ventricle. The right hemisphere was normal.

Now, Mr. Hood's case could not be stated more clearly for a modern clinical lecture; yet it was ignored.

Here is another case from the same "Journal," No. 39: "Affection of the Faculty of Language from injury of the brain":

In this case, subsequent to a fall, there was a loss of the power of moving the left side of the body, and of articulating words, with the exception of one or two of the simplest monosyllables. The patient was quite aware of his situation, and understood all that was said within his hearing, while at the same time he could not apprehend the meaning of written or printed language. About seven months from the time of the accident he died. On dissection, there was found, among some other morbid appearances, a very distinct softening, to the extent of about a shilling, but of little depth, on the inferior surface of the anterior lobes.

The Lancet in those days supported phrenology, and it is now quite interesting to read in its pages the report of a case of aphasia (February 1st, 1824), where the author had to argue with all his powers of intelligence that the loss of speech in the
case quoted was not due to any injury of the vocal organs or tongue, but was a lesion of the brain. By way of contrast he cited cases of injury to the vocal organs in which the patient was still able to speak, though imperfectly.

Here is another case, by Dr. S. JACKSON (Lancet, June 13th, 1829):

Rev. M. R., aged forty-eight, enjoying excellent health and whose intellect was of a high order, awoke one morning with loss of speech. He could neither speak nor write, being unable to recall words. After forty ounces of blood were drawn from the arm, speech returned, though a difficulty continued to recall the names of things. Dr. Jackson drew the inference, that as the loss of language was the only derangement of the intellectual faculties, it must have a separate seat in the brain, and he recorded the case as a strong confirmation to the general truth of the doctrines of phrenology.

And yet another case of aphasia, recorded by W. A. F. BROWNE (1805-1885), with critical remarks in the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal, 1834:

"Many years ago there was brought into the Infirmary of Edinburgh a man who was suffering from some febrile affection. He was under the able and excellent Dr. Wm. Pulteney Alison. The patient seemed to understand what was said to him, but his replies were quite unintelligible, because he made use of words which had a meaning quite different from what he was apparently anxious to convey. The words denoted something which had no connection with what he intended to say. This he sometimes made known by gestures; and then his wants would be guessed at. This would imply that he could understand the proper meaning of words when used by another, though he could not recall them himself. This poor man died. His body was opened and closely examined, and its condition commented on with his accustomed care and ability by Dr. Alison at the next clinical lecture. But what he particularly called our attention to was the want of power in the patient to use the proper words to express his thoughts, as well as the fact that there appeared not the slightest lesion or injury of the eye, where Dr. Gall placed the organ of language. [Marked on phrenological busts on the eye, and most critics of phrenology draw their information from them, thinking it waste of time to read Gall's works.-And he therefore concluded that the case was unfavourable to the doctrine main]" and Gall. Now here is a great physician and physiologist, and a most candid and estimable man, making an important assertion—important because it was certain to create in the minds of scientific and accomplished young men a prejudice which any careful student of Gall's doctrine could in a moment contravene. And when he declared as a proof that there was purulent matter found at the side of the sella turcica which extended transversely at the posterior inferior part of the anterior lobe of the brain, he was not in the least aware that he was giving an accurate description of the organ of language in a state of incurable disorganisation, while all the other convolutions of the frontal lobe were in a healthy state. But as the size of the organ can be measured by the position of the eye in the bony orbit, the good doctor was under an erroneous impression as to its true position in the brain."

The next is a case of aphasia through injury, recorded by Dr. JAMES INGLIS, of Halifax, in the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal, 1836, p. 68.

"Mary Wilson, age thirty-three, was shot by a sheriff's officer named Blair on Thursday, December 24th, 1835, in the village of Sprigholm, near Castle Douglas. The ball entered the cranium at the external orbital angle of the frontal bone. It appeared that, on the night of the injury, she had had an epileptic fit, and did not gain complete consciousness till Saturday morning. She then had the use of all her faculties, the memory was unimpaired, and she answered questions correctly. She complained of a dull, heavy, constant pain in the region of the wound. A probe was introduced into the wound, and, after penetrating about an inch and a quarter, was stopped by a splinter of bone pressing on the anterior lobe of the
DISCOVERY OF THE BRAIN CENTRES FOR SPEECH

brain. On passing the probe a little to the right towards the middle line the bullet was distinctly felt, having penetrated both tables of the bone and got imbedded in the internal one. The bullet and several splinters were removed, including one of the orbital plate, which was pressing down upon the eye, causing the woman to complain of something 'pricking' the eyeball.

"Two days later the mental condition attracted attention. She observed and knew every one, and understood whatever was said to her. 'She appears to have lost the memory for words. She cannot express her wants.' The nurse in attendance said to the physician: 'I wonder many times that she does not speak, for her tongue is well enough, and when she wants anything she cannot name it, so that we have to bring a number of things to her, and when it is what she wants she gives a kind of smile.' Two days later she began to improve; she spoke, but in monosyllables only. A fortnight later further improvement. 'Still, however, she forgets some words several times before she can recollect others to express her ideas in succession, and often stops short in the middle of a sentence, telling her nurse to finish it for her.' Two months later the memory for words was quite restored."

A similar case was recorded by the celebrated physician, J. L. C. SCHROEDER VAN DER KOLK (1797-1862), who supported Gall's views (Gazette Médicale, September 5th, 1857):

A bony splinter pressed on the brain above the left eye and caused loss of speech, which faculty was completely restored after the removal of the fragment by trephine.

SIR FREDERIC BATEMAN mentioned a curious case of circumscribed injury in the Journal of Mental Science, vol. xiv.:

Sarah Hase, age twenty-nine, ruptured a vein within the orbit and lost the faculty of speech. The protruding eye receded under appropriate treatment and her power of speech returned.

SIR BENJAMIN BRODIE, M.D. (1783-1862), an avowed opponent of Gall, in his "Psychological Enquiries," announced his grave suspicion that there is in the brain a special organ of speech. In support of his view, he quoted two cases of young children who were unable to speak, although the intellectual faculties were seemingly perfect.

Meanwhile the phrenologists of France were also not idle.

J. B. BOUILLAUD (1796-1881), editor of the "Journal of the Paris Phrenological Society," placed the faculty of articulation of speech in the frontal lobes of the brain, based on his observation of 116 cases of loss of speech. (Archives Gén. de Médecine, 1825: Recherches cliniques propres à demontrer que la perte de la parole correspond à la lesion des lobules antérieures et à confirmer l'opinion de M. Gall, etc.) He offered a prize of 500 francs for any well-authenticated case disproving his observation.

He was followed by G. ANDRAL (1797-1876), with 37 cases.

Then MARC DAX, in a paper read before the Medical Congress at Montpellier in 1836, reported impairment or loss of speech in 140 cases of right hemiplegia, from which he concluded that the faculty of articulate language was situated in the left anterior lobe, or, as he put it, that "lesions of the left half of the encephalon are coincident with forgetfulness of the symbols of thought."

His son, G. DAX, published further cases, and limited the seat of the faculty of speech to that portion of the left hemisphere which borders on the fissure of Sylvius. He sent a treatise embodying his own and his father's cases to the Imperial Academy of Medicine of France for consideration (1863). Bouillaud, Jules Béclard (1818-1887), and Léut (1804-1877), that fierce opponent of Gall's theories, were to report on
Dax's paper, which bore the title: "Observations tending to prove the constant coincidence of Speech Disorders with lesions of the left hemisphere."

At the meeting of the Academy, December 6th, 1864, Lélu said he regretted that the Academy had imposed upon him this task, which he ought to have declined. There were many points in physio-psychological science on which his opinions never could be changed or modified. Among these were the relations which it is attempted to establish between certain mental faculties and certain parts of the nervous system, and amongst these the attribution of the faculty of language to a particular part of the brain. This was neither more nor less than phrenology, and he had paid too much attention to this pseudo-science to have recourse to it. Such being the case, he would only speak in his own name, leaving it to his colleagues to express their opinions separately. Dr. Dax, it appeared, had collected about 140 cases, in which speech disorders were always found connected with some lesion of the left hemisphere, the lesion of the right hemisphere producing no disorders of this kind. If such a fact were true, then the brain—that mysterious organ—would be still more mysterious. Lélu concluded by citing what he called a truly startling fact, that of an epileptic in whom the left hemisphere was reduced to a pulpy mass, yet whose speech was perfect to the moment of death.

We have quoted Sir SAMUEL WILKS'S examination of Gall's doctrine in the last chapter, and will now continue the quotation, giving his remarks "On Gall's Discovery of Aphasias and the Seat of Language":

"In whatever way we may regard the first inquiries of Gall, it is interesting to see with what enthusiasm the phrenologists set about proving their doctrine as to the seat of language. The earlier volumes of their 'Transactions' contain numerous cases of aphasia connected with disease of the brain, which no doubt involved the third anterior convolution. The description of these cases is most excellent, and the aphasic condition seems so perfectly understood, that it is really surprising why all that is known about it nowadays should not have been taught equally well fifty years ago. Our works on physiology, strangely enough, were silent on the subject of speech in connection with any localised seat in the brain, while a heterodox literature contained the whole of the facts which have only just now been taught in the schools.

"One can only account for the ignorance of physiologists and the medical profession of well-established doctrines by their antipathy towards the phrenological school, which prevented any of its literature entering the portals of our college libraries.

"As most modern writings on aphasia entirely exclude the work performed by phrenologists, although done anterior to that usually quoted, I will offer the notes of some cases taken from their 'Reports and Transactions.'" Here follow the notes. ("Guy's Hospital Reports," 1879.)

It will be seen presently that the French method of issuing an adverse report on a subject which is not acceptable to orthodox science is preferable to the British method of boycotting it altogether, for the former method keeps the members acquainted with what is being done in the way of research by outsiders, and they can profit by it, for rarely is an investigation so bad that there is not some kernel of truth in it; whereas the latter method is an absolute bar to progress.

We have shown that it was Flourens who, by his experiments which seemed to prove the brain a unity, brought about the neglect and discredit of Gall's doctrine. The faith in the dogmatic assertion of Flourens of the unity of the brain was first shaken when the localisation of the speech centre was accepted by scientists.

PIERRE PAUL BROGA, of Paris (1824-1880), was the man who brought this about. He had been an opponent of cerebral localisation, but was converted after a meeting of the Anthropological Society, when AUBURTIN asserted that—at least—Bouillaud's localisation was proved. He thereupon started to give attention to the
subject at his hospital, where he soon met with a case confirming his localisation. A second case afterwards confirmed Broca that the lesion was "on the upper edge of the Sylvian fissure, opposite the island of Reil, and occupying the third left frontal convolution." (Broca: "Sur le Siège de la Faculté du Language Articulé, avec deux observations d'Aphémie (perte de la parole)," Paris, 1861; and "Remarques sur le Siège, le Diagnostic et la Nature de l'Aphémie, Bulletin de la Société d'Anatomie," July, 1863.)

Broca's discovery was suppressed for a time owing to the action of ARMAND TROUSSEAU (1801-1867), who, however, later became a convert and termed Broca's aphémie—aphasie, i.e., aphasia.

Broca merely confirmed the theory which was already current, by adding two more cases; and having had the advantage of the new topography of the brain, he was able to name the seat of the lesion, namely the posterior part of the third left frontal convolution. Broca was acclaimed as a great discoverer, but he had discovered nothing new, and had added only two cases, that of Laborgne and Lelong. Still, it was well that he received so much acclamation, for it had the effect of counteracting Flourens' influence and establishing the possibility of a localisation theory. Text-books spoke of the great Broca; none of the great Gall. But even the writer of the hostile article on Phrenology in the Dictionnaire Encyclopédique des Sciences Méthodiques had to admit that "but for Gall, we should not have discovered aphasia, the keystone of all modern brain physiology." ADOLF KUSSMAUL (1822-1902), "Die Störungen der Sprache," Leipsic, 1877, and SIR FREDERIC BATeman, in his work on "Aphasia," have also done justice to Gall. And SIR JAMES CRICHTON BROWNE (1840-) is reported to have said at the Bradford Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of science, in 1873: "Ferrier locates the 'memory for words' in the very part indicated by the phrenologists as the 'organ of language.'"

It is astonishing that Broca's localisation of the speech centre should have met with such ready acceptance, for the first case submitted by him presented a lesion extending over a large area, and involving not only the third frontal convolution, but the lower portion of the ascending frontal and parietal convolutions, together with a large part of the first temporal, nearly the whole of the supramarginal, and part of the angular gyrus. The second case was that of an old man, eighty-four years of age, who was said to have suffered from senile decay; and in this case there is some doubt whether the third frontal convolution was involved at all. The acceptance of the localisation was almost entirely due to the popularity among a large section of medical men in France of Gall's doctrine, and the confirmatory observations by Bouillaud and the Dax's. It is surprising with what slender evidence inquirers are sometimes satisfied, so long as the meagre testimony harmonises with their beliefs. It is only when theories are propounded which go contrary to opinions already expressed that the critical faculty comes into use. The brains on which Broca's observations were made have been preserved in the Museum of Pathological Anatomy in Paris, where they still may be seen.

Broca's discovery did not annihilate all opposition to the localisation theory. A host of men did not accept his localisation of the speech centre, and published cases disproving it. BATeman and MOUTIER quoted cases in which a tumour destroyed both frontal lobes, and the patients, instead of being speechless, were remarkably loquacious. My own observation of similar cases leads me to the conclusion that while the inflammatory process of the brain cells persists, the functions of the area involved are exalted; when inflammation proceeds to destruction, then the function is extinguished. In the above cases, destruction and death may have been simultaneous.

HENRY MAUDSLEY (1835-1918), in a lecture before the Medical Society of London, November 9th, 1868 (reported in the Lancel), argued against Broca's
localisation of the speech centre, having been promulgated too hastily and received too rashly. He went on to say:

"To my mind there has been nothing like it in psychology since Descartes located the soul in the pineal gland. It appears to me that these atrophied brains—the brains of persons who died inmates of a lunatic asylum—afford very indifferent support to the theory which was extracted from them; indeed, it is not easy to see why M. Broca might not, with equal justice, have maintained that a faculty of sanity was located in the third left frontal convolution. . . . Where would the advocates of Broca's theory suppose that the faculty of non-articulate language of an intelligent deaf and dumb person was located? To what particular convolution would they assume that the ideas must travel in order to get themselves expressed in gesture language? Would they locate all the bodily movements in the convolutions? . . . Broca and his followers seem to have deceived themselves by the creation of a wonderful metaphysical entity distinct from the phenomena, which they call a 'speech faculty,' and locate in a portion of the third left frontal convolution. Every idea of the mind is then supposed to be obliged to travel there from the most distant convolutions of both hemispheres, from the north and the south and the east and the west of the brain, to get itself spoken—translated into a muscular act of speech. In no other way can it get outward articulate expression. But if this be so, it will be necessary to suppose that nerve fibres from all the ideational centres of all the convolutions converge to this particular convolution. We know that communicating fibres, the radiating fibres of the cerebrum, do converge from all parts of the convolutions to the motor centres below; but of any similar fibres converging to a particular convolution we have not the shadow of any evidence. Now the truth is that there is no more a special faculty of speech in the mind than there is a special faculty of dancing, or of writing, or of gesticulating."

Though in the case of Gall, medical men reject with indignation the suggestion of prominences in the brain or skull having any functional significance, they are nevertheless willing to admit them when it suits their purpose. Thus when the brain of Gambetta, the great orator and statesman, was examined by DUVAL (1844-1907) and CHUDINSKI (Report of the Anthropological Society of Paris, and "L'Aphasie depuis Broca," Paris, 1888), Mathias Duval said:

"What person has ever been a greater orator and improviser of speeches? In him the third left frontal convolution was enormously developed. It actually exhibited a double folding or reduplication in this area, indicating an exceptionally active disposition as far as eloquence and command of language were concerned—qualities for which Gambetta, of all men, was markedly distinguished."

Broca proved in 1861 that the seat of the important centres of speech is in the posterior part of the third frontal convolution of the left hemisphere, where it abuts on the fissure of Sylvius and overlaps the island of Reil. Later he enlarged the speech area, and we now understand by Broca's area that cortico-subcortical area which surrounds the ascending branch of the Sylvian fissure, including its bifurcations. This makes Broca's convolution include what DEJÉRINE calls the orbital portion, the cap and foot of the convolution. By the foot, we mean the part situated between the pre-central convolution and the horizontal and ascending branch of the Sylvian fissure. NAUNYN (1839-), at the Medical Congress at Wiesbaden, 1897, also declared the speech centre to reach to the base of the third frontal convolution, and FLECHSIG (1847-) regarded the island of Reil as the association centre of speech. In a large percentage of cases of disturbance of speech due to cerebral lesions, the adjacent parts of the parietal and temporal lobes are also involved.

The Island of Reil, or insula, is deeply placed below the surface and hidden from view. It is seen on lifting up the overhanging parts of the brain, namely the two
opercula, lying between the two branches of the Sylvian fissure. The brain of the
ape and also of the microcephalic idiot with defective speech goes no further in its
development; the front part of the insula district remains uncovered and exposed
when to view on the surface of the cerebrum. In man, however, two additional opercula
grow out and ultimately cover over the fore part of the insula. These opercula
belong to the lower and back part of the frontal lobe, and are supposed to be more
or less called into evidence in connection with the acquisition of articulate speech.

The insula itself is regarded by FLECHSIG as an association centre. WALDSCHMIDT
found it under-developed in deaf-mutes, and the same has been pointed out by DONALDSON. MEYNERT, CORNILLON, LEPINE, SPITZKA,
and others have regarded the insula as the cortical centre for speech; CHARCOT
maintained that it might, though exceptionally, preside over the speech function to
the exclusion of Broca’s convolution. Besides those already mentioned, WYLIE
and MILLS have also contributed to the literature on the insula.

In all true aphasics, the connection between ideas and articulate language is
interrupted within the cerebral cortex.

ADOLF KUSSMAUL (1822-1902) in “Die Störungen der Sprache,” Leipsic,
1877, said: “All disturbances of speech can be brought under two great classes,
according as the connection between the conception and the word is impeded in the
direction from the former to the latter, or vice versa, from the latter to the former.
When the first happens, the expression suffers; when the second, the under-
standing.” He means, however, the “understanding” as applied especially to
articulate language.

According to JULES DÉJÉRINE, the damage in pure motor aphasia is not
cortical, but subcortical, i.e., the grey matter of Broca’s area is intact, but its
efferent fibres contained in the subcortical white substance are destroyed. Thus
the grey matter of this centre is isolated from the motor centres necessary for
speaking aloud, but, being itself intact, “internal” language remains possible.

Broca’s aphasia, or motor aphasia, is characterised by inability to speak,
although the patient understands what is said to him—he has internal language—
and was until recently supposed to retain complete intellectual capacity; that is to
say, he is speechless, yet understands what is said to him, as shown by his being able
to write his wishes down on paper. Some thus afflicted retain the power to pro-
nounce words of one syllable, but are obliged to resort to writing in order to com-
municate anything further. Others possess a small stock of words, which they make
more serviceable with expressive gestures. Others, still, are simply able to speak a
few senseless, and often very extraordinary, syllables and words.

Some aphasics, however, lose also the capacity for writing. This agraphia, or
inability to express thought in written language, which not infrequently accompanies
aphasia, may be incomplete or absolute. Some patients, who have formerly been
highly cultivated, become unable to produce a single letter with the pen. Others
can write long rows of letters, but arrange them for the most part in meaningless
fashion, with an intelligible word occurring here and there.

We shall see in a succeeding chapter that in the seventies and eighties of last
century there was a wave of enthusiasm for localisation. Among the areas then
mapped out for special function was also the angular gyrus, the destruction of
which was discovered in 1877 by ADOLF KUSSMAUL to cause so-called word-
blindness, that is, inability to recognise the latest learned objects, letters, and words,
whilst the recognition of objects, properly so-called, is unimpaired or comparatively
so. The inability to recognise letters and words leads to inability to read, therefore
this condition is also called “alexia.” Words can be spoken, and can also be heard,
understood, and remembered; but their written or printed symbols are not under-
stood; they appear meaningless pictures, although in other respects the visual
functions remain unimpaired.
Sometimes patients cannot read written or printed characters, but the power of reading figures is preserved intact. The memory for words and letters is completely independent of that for figures, and such functional independence leads us to presume anatomical independence.

Cases are also on record in which the patients, though word-blind, still retained the power of reading musical notes. We shall deal with this peculiarity in a later part of this work.

KARL WERNICKE (1848-1905) first described, in 1874, what he termed sensory aphasia, a disorder due to a lesion in the superior temporal convolution and characterised by the fact that the patients, while perfectly aware of the least sound or noise, are incapable of understanding the significance of the words they hear. KUSSMAUL (1876) regarded it as an incomplete form of psychical deafness, and called it word deafness. MUNK confirmed the observation. Word-blindness and word-deafness were now combined by Wernicke under the one term—sensory aphasia—meaning a condition in which the patient speaks but does not understand, his speech being more or less incoherent, and due to a lesion of the posterior part of the superior temporal, angular and supramarginal areas which obliterates the images of spoken and written language.

The inability of some patients to write or read led WUNDT ("Principles of Physiological Psychology," 1902, fifth edition) to assume a "writing" and a "reading" centre in the brain. Their localisation is "somewhat less assured," says he, but he makes no objection to them.

Indeed, the seats of the various elements of which "speech" consists are so widely spread over the brain, that pathologists like WERNICKE and LICHTHEIM have drawn up a geometrical scheme of their connections, to explain their working. Looking at such a map, one can not help wondering how little of the brain is left for all the other mental processes; and the question occurs to one's mind: Of what use is the brain to animals, if the identical parts in man are necessary for the complicated apparatus of speech?

In reading aloud, the impressions of the words enter by the eyes, reach that portion of the visual sphere known as the visual word centre, travel across to the auditory word centre by association fibres, where the memory of their sounds is revived; another tract of association fibres connects this to the sensory motor area in Broca's convolution, called by Bastian the glosso-kinæsthetic area, whence motor impulses originate which finally reach the muscles concerned in pronouncing the words originally seen.

Writing from dictation is just as complex. The course of the impulses is by the auditory channels to the auditory word centre, then by association tracts to the visual word centre, where the shapes of the letters composing the words are revived; another association tract carries the impulse thence to the sensory-motor area connected with the movements of the hand (Bastian's cheiro-kinæsthetic area) near the middle region of the Rolandic cortex, and finally the movement of writing is accomplished.

If the diagrams explaining all the divers elements of speech and the various forms of aphasia are correct, then the brain must be primarily a wonderfully constructed speech machine, and the thoughts themselves, for which this mechanism serves, come from nowhere.

Notice also the large number of cases of lesion of the parietal and temporal lobes (Chapters XXX. and XXXI.) in which no word-blindness and no word-deafness took place.

In 1906 the whole scheme of speech centres received a rude shock. PIERRE MARIE (1853-), in "La Semaine Médicale," 1906, declared Wernicke's localisation to be founded rather upon theory than fact, and denied the assertion,
DISCOVERY OF THE BRAIN CENTRES FOR SPEECH

often made, that in Broca's aphasia there is no intellectual disorder; on the contrary, he asserts that in every case there is more or less pronounced difficulty in understanding spoken language. Looked at superficially, he says, such patients may appear of normal intelligence, but closer attention, and the performance of more complicated acts, discloses their incapacity. He is unable to admit the existence of pure word-deafness, as he has never observed a single instance of it, and the few cases which have been published have been vitiated by some error. If a patient cannot understand the significance of words, Marie does not attribute this to word-deafness but to defective comprehension, his opinion being that Wernicke's area is an intellectual (?) and not simply a sensory centre. Word-blindness, according to him, exists clinically, but the lesion which causes it is one of the posterior cerebral artery and not of the middle cerebral artery.

Marie asserts that in every aphasic there is trouble to comprehend spoken language, but that the tests ordinarily used are not adapted to bring the defect out. It is not enough to ask the patient to “put out your tongue” or “hold up your hand.” He also claims to have observed that these patients no longer possess the power of intelligent mimicry so as to supplement their defects of speech. He affirms there have been cases, though limited in number, in right-handed persons, in whom the isolated destruction of the posterior part of the left frontal part of the left frontal convolution was not followed by aphasia, and gives as the reason why such cases are exceptional that it is rare to find this region alone destroyed. Aphasia being generally due to obliteration of the middle cerebral artery at a point above the origin of the branch to this convolution, so that its destruction is associated with that of parts which are the true seats of the function in question. Secondly, he states, that in fifty per cent. of the typical cases of Broca's aphasia, the third left frontal convolution was absolutely normal.

According to Marie, the aphasia of Broca is the aphasia of Wernicke minus speech. The essential difference between them is that in the latter the patient can speak, and in the former he cannot; otherwise they resemble one another in many respects; in both there is incapacity to read and write, and inability to understand what is said when the question is complicated.

The third term which Marie desires to define clearly is anarthria, or pure motor aphasia, the inability to articulate words, the consequence of a lesion of the brain. It is marked by a loss of speech, or, at least, of comprehensible speech, to such an extent that it may be possible to confound it with Broca's aphasia, but the distinctions are numerous and decisive. The sufferers from anarthria understand perfectly what is said to them when the phrases are not complicated; they can read and write and are capable of indicating by signs the numbers of letters or syllables of which are composed the words they are unable to articulate. Marie's anarthria corresponds to Déjérine's "subcortical motor aphasia"; but Marie prefers the term anarthria to avoid confusion with true aphasia, which includes, in the first place, inability to understand language, dependent upon intellectual decay, and, in the second place, loss of the power of reading and writing, neither of which is found in anarthria.

The lesion of anarthria, according to Marie, is at the base of the brain, not confined to either hemisphere, in the white matter between the insula and the lenticular nucleus, or in the anterior part of the "knee" of the internal capsule. It is an ataxia of phonation. Broca's aphasia is often merely aphasia complicated by anarthria, or anarthria complicated by aphasia. The only part of the brain, lesion of which gives rise to aphasia is the area of Wernicke, that is, the gyrus supra-marginalis, the angular gyrus, and the posterior portions of the first two temporophasenoidal convolutions. Broca's aphasia occurs in those cases where, in addition to a lesion of Wernicke's area or of the white fibres thence derived, there is also anarthria due to a lesion in the lenticular nucleus or its neighbourhood. Most commonly this is due to softening, the result of obliteration of the middle cerebral artery which causes destruction of the entire brain area mentioned.

According to LICHTTHEIM and DéJÉRINE, subcortical aphasias are characterised by pure word-deafness or pure word-blindness or pure motor aphasia; but
Marie believes this classification to be absolutely artificial, neither Broca's nor Wernicke's aphasia being purely cortical, the lesion being always found to extend into the subjacent white matter.

Marie finds the association theory of language inadequate to explain the phenomena noted clinically in sensory aphasia. This condition varies much in intensity, but in all cases what is noted is not a loss of certain words, but a general enfeeblement of understanding of words. According to the severity of the case, words of one or more kinds disappear, and the order of their disappearance is constant; thus proper nouns disappear first, verbs last. Marie's view is that true aphasia is one and indivisible; motor and sensory forms cannot be distinguished. It consists, not in a defect of perception, but in a general intellectual enfeeblement, "characterised especially by a loss in the stock of things learned by didactic processes." Though isolated words are perfectly understood, the patient fails to carry out a complex act, and this failure indicates a general intellectual impairment, not a mere loss of understanding of words.

Marie admits that the emotional life is usually well preserved in aphasics.

Marie claims that, in many cases of aphasia, Broca's area is uninjured; and that in cases where Broca's area is injured, aphasia is not always present. If Marie is right, what an indictment of brain investigators! How careless they must have been in their examinations, when they confirmed Broca's observation for forty years! What guarantee have we that other modern localisations are correct! It means that pathologists saw what they "expected" to see.

Now, Gall laid more stress on cases of aphasia due to circumscribed lesion of the brain through injury than he did to the cases of aphasia in apopletics; for, in the latter, as we have pointed out already, all the blood-vessels of the brain are in a state of degeneration, softening takes place in more than one region, and thus the whole problem becomes complicated. Moreover, Gall's speech centre, as all his so-called organs, include not merely a certain area of grey matter, but the subjacent fibres as well, and he frequently points out that the lesion may be in one as in the other. In my opinion, the whole subject wants further systematic inquiry—and that by men who have no preconceived notions of what they may expect to find.

Marie claims that Wernicke's zone—the temporo-parietal area—is not the area for the auditory and visual centres of speech but is an intellectual area; and that the aphasia of Wernicke is due, not to disturbance of auditory and visual processes, but to intellectual disintegration. If Marie is right on this point, what a maze we are in! According to him, the posterior temporal area is connected with intellectual processes; we shall see later that other observers say the central parietal area alone is connected with the highest intellectual powers; others say the same of the occipital lobes; others of the frontal lobes; and finally there are some who declare the entire brain to serve for intellectual processes! We shall see presently that the confusion in which the localisation theory is now involved is largely due to the hasty deductions drawn by observers, otherwise eminent, from isolated cases. Let us have the material first! The theorising can be left to the next generation.

With reference to this discussion of aphasia and its connection with the intellect, we must remember that the speech centre is in the midst of the intellectual zone (if we accept the frontal lobes as the seat of the intellect), so that by the mere cutting off of some association fibres the intellect may suffer; and we must also not lose sight of the fact that the patients on whom the observations are made are hospital patients, and therefore as a rule with little or no education. Lesions which interfere with the cerebral zone of speech, either on its sensory or motor side, will cause in such persons an impairment of ability to carry out mental processes to a greater degree than in those of a higher order of intelligence. The mere fact of the speech defect
DISCOVERY OF THE BRAIN CENTRES FOR SPEECH

increases the difficulty of determining the integrity of the mental processes. The question is: Can the aphasic do any abstract thinking?

Déjèrine, in his replies to Marie, maintained the classical, or at least the usually accepted views, regarding aphasia, holding with reference to sensory aphasia that the long accepted theory of centres for sensorial images cannot be successfully attacked, and that the diminution of intelligence sometimes exhibited by aphasics is dependent upon disruption or disturbance of the cerebral mechanism of speech rather than the aphasia upon the intellectual loss or deficit.

He stoutly maintained that Broca's convolution plays an important part as a speech centre, explaining the cases in which it is involved and aphasia does not result by the compensation action of the opposite hemisphere; and cases of Broca's aphasia without lesion of Broca's convolution by the fact that the motor speech zone includes other parts, as the anterior insula and the foot of the second frontal gyrus. He adhered to his theory of subcortical motor aphasia due to lesion of the fibres entering and leaving Broca's convolution. He held that the existence of the real or the apparent sensory aphasia in motor aphasics is usually only temporary, and in any case is not to be explained in the way that Marie suggests. Anarthria or disarthritis, according to Déjèrine, is due to lesion of the motor projection fibres, and is different from cortical or subcortical motor aphasia. He contended also that the cases with numerous or extensive lesions described by Marie are cases of total aphasia, the lesions involving all or a large part of the speech zone; also that Marie failed to recognise cases in which Wernicke's zone and the lenticula are not involved and yet Broca's syndrome is present. Déjèrine believed that a purely unilateral lesion of the lenticula does not produce anarthria.

The following case of Déjèrine confirms the classical Broca centre:

At a meeting of the Société Clinique de Médecine Mentale of Paris held on July 19th, 1909, M. Marcel Briand and M. Brisson exhibited the brain of a case of motor aphasia of considerable interest, as the patient had been under observation for a number of years, and her clinical history had been published by Déjèrine in 1898. A report of the communication will be found in the Revue de Psychiatrie for August, 1909. In 1896, at the age of twenty-seven years, an apparently healthy young woman suddenly was seized with a stroke of paralysis and fell to the ground, remaining unconscious for ten hours. On recovering consciousness, she was found hemiplegic on the right side and to have lost all power of speech. Before the stroke she had been able to speak four languages, French, German, Italian, and Spanish, but from that moment and afterwards she was unable to pronounce anything more than the two simple words, "Oh non." A slight degree of word-blindness, which was remarked, disappeared after a few months. The patient came under the observation of Professor Déjèrine at the Salpêtrière, who considered the case very striking, the intelligence being of a very high order and other cerebral functions being to all appearance intact. Her condition remained practically unchanged for ten years. Re-examination by M. Briand, in May, 1908, showed the existence of a spastic right hemiplegia—with exaggerated reflexes on that side. Spontaneous speech was nil, except for "Oh non," used correctly and in its proper sense. The patient was unable to repeat words on request. With the letters of the alphabet before her, she was able to spell out any word in any of her four languages, either spontaneously or by dictation. There was not the slightest trace of word-deafness in any of these languages. Writing was perfectly performed with the left hand, spontaneously and to dictation, and copying was accurate. There was neither mind-blindness nor mind-deafness; no astereognosis or apraxia. There was no indication whatever of intellectual defect; the patient was well aware of her surroundings, of events in her life; memory, attention, and judgment were unimpaired. The case appeared to be one of pure motor aphasia. On May 15th, 1909, death occurred from renal causes and a necropsy was secured. The whole of the posterior end of the third left frontal convolution was completely destroyed by an old area of softening. In addition, on the right side, another area of softening involved the inferior parietal convolution and the anterior and superior part of the
angular gyrus. This cavity was roughly two centimetres in diameter and two and a half centimetres in depth, yet it had given rise to no symptoms of sensory aphasia. In view of the contention of some members of the Parisian school that Broca's convolution has nothing to do with the production of motor aphasia, the above case is interesting.

MOUTIER declares that neither Broca nor anyone else has produced a single case of aphasia dependent upon the isolated destruction of the third left frontal convolution, while, on the other hand, there are many cases on record in which the destruction of this convolution was not accompanied by aphasia, and he quotes the remarkable cases of BURCKHARDT ("Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie," 1891), who extirpated three convolutions in demented persons without the operation being followed by any affection of speech. He states that at Bicêtre there have been three cases of destruction of Broca's convolution without aphasia. Moutier regards the whole conception of cerebral localisation as having collapsed with the theory of Broca.

DUPUY (Lancet, 1914) does not believe that the quadrilateral space Marie mapped out contains the centre of the speech faculty, for he also found it destroyed when no aphasia existed. He believes these centres are centres of inhibition.

Just as others find a difficulty in accepting Broca's centre, so S. IVORY (Science, March 1st, 1912) declares it unfortunate "that we cannot say that word-deafness is invariably due to a lesion of the left superior temporal gyrus. Authentic cases have been recorded in which there has been no affection of this convolution." And he confesses that the localisation of this condition, even as a clinical phenomenon, rests upon only two cases which have been checked by careful post-mortem examination. Ivory, however, believes only in a motor, sensory, and associational localisation, but not in a psychic localisation.

MORTON PRINCE (Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, June, 1910) sums up the present position of aphasia by saying: "Whatever the outcome of the re-investigation of this question shall prove to be, it is evident that the beautifully diagrammatic concepts of the function of language with which our text-books were illustrated, and of the aphasic disturbances of this function in one or other of its many forms as produced by some particularly localised lesion, have been relegated to the scrap-heap of the phantasies of science."

Further particulars of the speech centre and aphasia will be found in succeeding chapters.
CHAPTER XX

HISTORY OF MODERN EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN PHYSIOLOGY

The Discovery of Brain Centres for Motion and Sensation

JOHN HULHINGS JACKSON (1834-1911)

In 1861 Broca had tried to localise a mental power—that of speech. In the same year, Hughlings Jackson advanced the theory of localisation of "physical movements" ("Clinical and Pathological Researches," 1861). From a study of the form of epilepsy (1864), now known as *Jacksonian epilepsy* in distinction from the ordinary epilepsy, he furnished cogent reasons for believing that certain convolutions near, and functionally related to, the corpus striatum had a direct motor significance. By irritation or "discharging lesions" of these convolutions, localised or general unilateral convulsions of the opposite side of the body were induced, beginning generally in the thumb or index finger, or in both.

Jackson had, however, been anticipated in a measure more than a century before by A. v. HALLER (1708-1777) and his pupil, J. G. ZINN (1717-1759), who stated that on removing parts of the cortical substance of an animal's brain, convulsive movements occur in its extremities. C. E. ECKHARD (1822-1903), in 1867, made independently a similar observation.

Jackson believed that the whole of the frontal lobes are chiefly motor in their functions, a view held by THEODOR MEYNERT (1833-1892) and others, who regarded the anterior part of the brain to be destined for motor and the posterior for sensory functions.

**Jackson did not believe in localisation of "mental" functions.** "For my part," he said, "I think there are not in the cortex cerebri any abruptly demarcated centres for any kind of representation"; and he took consciousness and mind to be synonymous, for "if all consciousness is lost, all mind is lost." (Journal of Mental Science, 1887.)

Jackson's view that local convulsions are produced by local lesions was passed over in silence until DAVID FERRIER (1843-) called attention to them in support of his own views.

**EDUARD HITZIG (1838-1907), of Halle.**

We have seen that the doctrine of Gall, that each part of the brain presided over some mental faculty, stimulated Flourens to a series of experiments which appeared to disprove the localisation theory. These experiments in turn were disputed when, in 1870, facts were discovered in Germany which form the basis of our present knowledge of brain action.

In 1870, Hitzig, together with his colleague G. T. FRITSCH (1838-91), of Berlin University, undertook some experiments on the brains of dogs to determine whether localisation of function was possible. These epoch-making experiments (Archiv
for Anatomie, Physiologie, etc., 1870, and Hitzig's work, "Untersuchungen über das Gehirn," 1874), began the modern era of investigation into this subject.

Hitzig and Fritsch discovered that the stimulation of circumscribed portions of the brain-surface of a living dog produced movements of definite groups of muscles. To cause these movements certain parts of the brain had to be irritated by electricity, other parts being irreponsive.

Hitzig and Fritsch found that a portion of the convexity of the cerebral hemispheres of the dog is motor, that is, it reacts by muscular movements to the direct application of a galvanic current, while the other portion is inexecutable to this stimulus. On exciting with weak currents the resulting contractions are limited to certain groups of muscles on the opposite side of the body; with stronger currents the reaction spreads to more muscles, not only on the opposite, but also on the same side of the body. They gave the name of centres to those areas of the cerebral cortex which, when excited with a weak current, induce reaction in a limited group of muscles on the opposite side. They found they could distinguish in this manner five "motor centres": one for the muscles of the neck, another for the extension and abduction of the fore-limb, another for the bending and rotation of the same limb, another for the hind-limb, and lastly one for the face; the irritation of the one side of the brain always causing movements in the other side of the body. All these centres in the dog are situated round the crucial sulcus.

The Viennese anatomist, LUDWIG TÜRCK (1810-1868), had already noted that the motor nerve-fibres terminate in that part of the brain which is called the region of the central convolutions.

Hitzig and Fritsch then proceeded, for confirmation, to the destruction of these same areas, when these same groups of muscles became impaired.

In the opinion of Hitzig, these disturbances of motion were due to destruction of the physical basis of the animal's control over its limbs; but, in the opinion of another investigator—MORIZ SCHIFF (1823-1896)—they were rather due to tactile anaesthesia.

Hitzig ("Centralblatt für die medizinischen Wissenschaften," 1874) also found that the removal of certain convolutions in the posterior lobes of the dog produced blindness of the opposite eye, combined with a paralytic dilation of the pupil; stimulation of the same area producing contraction of the pupil.

B. PANIZZA (1785-1867), in 1855, ascertained that the lesions of one posterior portion of the dog's hemispheres produced blindness on the opposite eye; thus anticipating Hitzig's observation by twenty years.

FERRIER localised the centre for vision, in 1875, in the angular gyrus; where MUNK, in 1877, located "psychical blindness," when the animal can see, but no longer recognises the object which it sees. If the occipital lobe is destroyed as well, the blindness is not only psychical, but absolute and permanent, i.e., there is cortical blindness.

These experiments, since that time repeated in almost every physiological laboratory in Europe and tried upon various animals, established the fact that there is in the brain a certain part which directs voluntary movements. Before Hitzig began his work, the corpus striatum was regarded as the great motor centre, and the optic thalamus as the chief centre for sensation. From his time onward, these basal structures were regarded as subsidiary centres.

Hitzig and Fritsch, from the facts they had observed, drew the conclusion that the principle announced by Flourens of the unity of the brain was demonstrably false. "We must rather admit," they said, "that certainly several psychical functions, and probably all, are shown to have their point of entrance into matter or of origin from it at circumscribed centres of the cerebral cortex." These centres are therefore not purely "motor," as many physiologists believed, and still believe, but "psycho-motor." But if they are psycho-motor, they establish one of the first principles of Gall's doctrine, the plurality of the functions of the brain, and we should have expected some acknowledgment from Hitzig. But what does he say?
"I know nothing of Gall's doctrine from my own experience. It is enough for me that Leuret is said to have demonstrated as a consequence of Gall's own statements that the rabbit would have to be a more destructive animal than the wolf, and the donkey immensely more musical than the nightingale" ("Zeitschrift für Ethnologie," 1873).

Thus once more has Gall's doctrine been demolished, not on direct evidence, but on a ludicrous second-hand statement.

Hitzig was opposed by HERMANN NOTHNAGEL (1841-1905), who did not believe in the localisation of mental functions.

**THOMAS LAYCOCK (1812-1876),**

Physician in Ordinary to Queen Victoria for Scotland, Professor of Medicine and Lecturer on Medical Psychology and Mental Diseases in the University of Edinburgh, must be mentioned here, because of the many distinguished students of his that afterwards rose to fame, some of whom took up this special department of experimental physiology. Among his students were James Crichton Browne, Hughlings Jackson, David Ferrier, Lauder Brunton, MacKendrick, William Rutherford, Stirling, and Thomas Clouston. Laycock extended the doctrine of reflex action to the brain, and claimed priority in the use of the phrase "unconscious cerebration" (originated in 1838). Edinburgh University is indebted to him for introducing the teaching of Medical Psychology and Mental Diseases in 1857. In his work on "Mind and Brain" (1860), he accorded merit to the phrenological system as "founded on natural principle," and taking cognisance of the relations of consciousness to the nervous system, while its classification is more complete than that of any previous metaphysical one. "I am inclined," he said, "to adopt that classification [psychological classification by Gall and Spurzheim] as the best arrangement that could be adopted until our physiological analysis of mental phenomena has had a more scientific development. Great skill may be attained by persons specially endowed (as the majority of practical phrenologists are) with the faculty of physiological diagnosis. . . . The results of observation are sometimes so striking as to present all the apparent certitude of a science. . . . That a minute cranioscopy founded on the European type is applicable to all races of men may well be doubted; but all agree in admitting the great divisional regions of phrenology." This unusually favourable view of phrenology by a physician of his standing need not surprise us, because of his intimate friendship with SIR JOHN FORBES (1787-1861), another great physician who tried his best to get his profession to take up a reasonable attitude towards the subject.

In view of the succeeding history, the reader should also take note of Laycock's observation with reference to the discovery of motor centres (Journal of Mental Science, 1876) that "the localisations of Gall, to which Dr. Carpenter still strongly objects, as well as those of Hitzig, Ferrier, and others—all which tend to confirm Gall's view—constitute the most available anatomy of the Reason and Will, considered as the intellect and power."

**Sir JAMES CRICHTON BROWNE (1840-),**

one of the pupils of Laycock, is the man whose intervention was the source of much of the progress which has been made in this department of research. We have cited among the early phrenologists Dr. W. A. F. Browne (1805-1883), Commissioner in Lunacy for Scotland. Now, his son, Sir James Crichton Browne, F.R.S., before he became Lord Chancellor's Visitor in Lunacy, but was still Dr. Crichton Browne, Medical Superintendent of the West Riding Lunatic Asylum in Yorkshire, was as
ardent a phrenologist as his father. He has since changed his views, but that does not alter history.

He wrote in the *Journal of Mental Science*, 1861:

"To the illustrious founders of phrenological science psychology owes much; for those who have had the greatest opportunities of observation have almost invariably come to the conclusion that, without an acceptance of the general principles of phrenology, mental disease can neither be understood, nor described, nor treated.

"Phrenology has been despised by many and opposed by the learned in the most illogical and dishonest manner, and yet it still exists, and now begins to take up its proper position among the sciences. Its great doctrines are now openly or tacitly acknowledged by the great majority of medical and by several metaphysical writers, and many have earned fame by giving them to the world without confessing their derivation."

He also wrote to the Editor of the *British Medical Journal*, November 16th, 1861, in reply to a paragraph welcoming the decision of the Newgate authorities not to allow a cast of the convict Cogan’s head to be made after execution:

"Now, sir, it has been observed that the human mind has usually opposed a passive and instinctive resistance or vis inertia to the progress of new ideas, even when of the most simple and palpable description; and it has also been remarked that where the new doctrine treats of matters not lying on the surface, and when it appears to clash with established views on points in which the feelings are apt to be interested, an active, passionate and vehement opposition may be looked for. But it had been hoped that the diffusion of knowledge at the present day, and liberal and enlightened opinions on scientific subjects, and also the length of time during which phrenology has been before the public, would have secured for it a more calm and fair examination than it at first received or even now receives.

"The paragraph quoted above was, therefore, read with considerable surprise and much regret, for it unmistakably shows that the Newgate authorities are animated by feelings tyrannical and unfair towards phrenology, and that the Newgate surgeon is actuated in the present instance by sentiments anything but enlarged and philosophical. It is surely unjust that a whole doctrine should be rejected, and its patient students stigmatised as quacks and promulgators of ‘vagaries,’ by men who have never looked at a brain or skull with a view to discovering the relation they might bear to mental manifestations. It is not at all material to the question before us whether phrenology be true or false. Whether true or false, it appeals to facts and to nature, and no logical opponent would attempt to prevent its disciples from accumulating observations, which will militate against themselves if phrenology be false, and which will go further to refute it in such a case than the a priori arguments with which it is frequently met. The interference of the Newgate authorities must be regarded with apprehension, for why should not pathological ‘vagaries’ be extinguished by putting a stop to ‘post-mortem examinations’?

"I know not by whom the application for Cogan’s head was made. Very probably by some of those charlatans and quacks who prostitute science, but who, at the same time, often collect valuable materials to be used by its legitimate followers. I cannot help thinking that a cast of the convict’s head might have been interesting and useful, even apart from its phrenological significance, and I regret that it was not procured."

Sir James Crichton Browne is a very learned man who was then, as he is now, doing his utmost to promote the progress of medical science. Seeing that Hitzig had proved the most fundamental principle of Gall’s doctrine—the multiplicity of centres in the brain—the denial of which had for fifty years obstructed the advance of our knowledge of brain functions, he invited a young friend and former fellow-student (of Dr. Laycock, Professor of Medicine of Edinburgh University)—DAVID
FERRIER (1843—), who then was engaged in quite a different department, being Lecturer on Toxicology (1872-1889) in succession to Dr. Guy in King’s College, London—to come to Wakefield and repeat Hitzig’s experiments on the brains of animals and to confirm—or possibly to contradict—phrenology.

Sir DAVID FERRIER (1843—)

Crichton Browne placed at the disposal of Ferrier the resources of the Pathological Laboratory of the West Riding Asylum, with a liberal supply of pigeons, fowls, guinea-pigs, rabbits, cats, and dogs for experimental purposes. The West Riding Lunatic Asylum Reports, vol. iii., 1873, contain the first result of Ferrier’s researches, embodied afterwards in “The Functions of the Brain,” London, 1876. He used the faradic current in his experiments, finding the galvanic (used by Hitzig) not the most appropriate stimulus for the purpose.

Whereas succeeding experimenters saw only motor centres in the brain, Ferrier is keen to point out their phrenological significance. Thus he said:

“It will be seen that the movements recorded in the above experiments as resulting from excitation of the individual centres are purposive or expressional in character, and such as we should, from psychological analysis, attribute to ideation and volition if we saw them performed by others. The clutching or striking movement of a cat’s paw is not a simple muscular contraction, but is a complex and combined action of numerous muscles all directed to one end. Of course, we have no other guide than our own consciousness to the interpretation of the actions of the lower animals, but as in ourselves or others we attribute such apparently purposive complex movements to ideation and volitional impulse, we may conclude that the cortical centres are not merely motor but voluntary motor, and concerned with the outward manifestation of intelligence.” He then asks the question: “Are the ideational centres situated in the same regions as the corresponding motor centres; or does a high development of certain motor centres indicate only, but without localisation, a corresponding development of the ideational centres which manifest themselves outwardly through these? Would, for instance, a high differentiation for the centres of the hand indicate a high degree of manual dexterity [the phrenological organ], or at least the capacity of acquiring such, and the possession of those mental powers more immediately associated with such dexterity?

“These speculations are suggested by the now tolerably well established fact of loss of speech following destructive lesions of the lower frontal convolutions in the neighbourhood of the island of Reil. . . . It is a significant fact that the centres for the mouth and tongue in cats and dogs are localised in regions corresponding in geographical position, and which, both anatomically and physiologically, I should be inclined to regard as the homologues of the lower frontal convolution and island of Reil in man. The question, then, is, do lesions in this neighbourhood destroy the organic centres of the memory of words, or do they only interrupt the channels whereby these are manifested outwardly as articulate speech? The fact that the speechless patient is likewise unable to write, i.e., in the sense of expressing himself by written symbols, even though the hand may retain the power of tracing these, would seem to indicate that it is not the mere channel for the articulate expression of ideas that is interrupted, but that the very centres of word-memory are destroyed. . . . The speechless man is not wordless; his defect is that he cannot revive words voluntarily. . . . Hence I should incline to the opinion that the organic centres of word memory [the name Gall gave it] are situated in the same convolutions as the centres which preside over the muscles concerned in articulation.”

Ferrier did not mention Gall or his doctrine, except once, when he said: “To Dr. Gall let us pay the tribute that in his analysis he followed strictly inductive methods, and made many observations of enduring value.” Nor do I think he has much knowledge of Gall’s teaching.

But Sir James Crichton Browne evidently reminded him of his indebtedness to
the earlier investigator at the British Association Meeting in 1873, when he said: "I think that the labours of Gall and Spurzheim ought not to be overlooked in a discussion on the localisation of functions of the brain—a principle which they distinctly enunciated. It was a curious fact that Dr. Ferrier located the memory of words in the very part indicated by the phrenologists as the organ of language."

Whatever Sir James Crichton Browne had in his mind when he suggested to Ferrier to undertake the investigation, considering Ferrier was then not a neurologist, but Lecturer on Forensic Medicine, Ferrier himself had no other desire but to record what he had observed. Indeed, his own version of what gave him the impetus to undertake the inquiry is that he wished to put to experimental proof the views entertained by Hughlings Jackson. Certainly in his later utterances Ferrier lays greater stress on the motor and sensory localisation than on the psychical; but no one acquainted with Gall's work can read Ferrier's without recognising that, at all events at first, the mental functions were to him more important than the physical. Take only the title of his lecture at the Anthropological Institute in 1887: "How far recent investigations on the functional topography of the brain could be brought into relation with craniological and anthropological researches with a view to establish the foundation of a scientific phrenology"; a lecture to which I had the honour of replying two years later, when Ferrier, Horsley and a number of other experimenters were present.

I showed then that Ferrier acknowledged Gall's fundamental principles, almost verbally:

1. "That the brain is the organ of the mind is a universally admitted axiom."
2. "Other things being equal, there are grounds for believing that a high development of certain regions will be found associated with special faculties of which the regions in question are the essential basis."
3. "Intelligence and mental power, as a whole, will largely depend on the relative balance or development of one part as compared with another."
4. "The brain fills the cranial cavity like a hand in a glove, and is closely appressed to the interior of the skull cap."
5. I showed that Ferrier confirmed Gall's theory of the pre-frontal lobes being the centres of the higher intellectual operations;—other parts of the brain being for the appetites and instincts:

After destruction of the frontal lobes, Ferrier says, "there is the aspect of uninterest and stupidity, the absence of that active curiosity which is normally manifested by monkeys, and the mental degradation which seems to depend on the loss of the faculty of attention and all that it implies in the sphere of intellectual operations.

"After removal or destruction by the cautery of the antero-frontal lobes, the animals retain their appetites and instincts, and are capable of exhibiting emotional feeling. They have lost, however, the faculty of attentive and intelligent observation."

6. Stimulation of Gall's brain area which is supposed to dispose to anger, fighting, and destruction causes, according to Ferrier: "Opening of the mouth ... associated with vocalisation and other signs of emotional expression, such as spitting and lashing the tail as if in rage."

7. Stimulation of Gall's brain area of the emotion of fear, disposing to caution, causes the animal, according to Ferrier, to give "a quick start or bound, as if to escape from danger"; and after destruction of this area, the animal "paid no attention to threats or grimaces."

8. With reference to the posterior area, which Gall identified with the social affections, and which in a morbid state gives rise to grief and depression, Ferrier says:
"In regard to the occipital lobes much has yet to be learned as to their specific function. Irritation of these lobes by the induced current gives rise to no outward manifestations, and the only effect I observed after extensive destruction of these lobes on both sides in a monkey was a remarkable state of depression with refusal of food such as one sees in cases of melancholia, sensation and voluntary motion being unaffected. The facts are such as to indicate a relation to the systemic sensations and the emotions founded upon them. This would agree with the results obtained by Schröder van der Kolk, who states that in melancholia with depression he has found the posterior part of the brain diseased. In the case before us melancholia was a prominent symptom, and considerable softening of the occipital lobe on the right side was found post-mortem." (Why Schröder van der Kolk, who only followed Gall ?)

(9) Of the phrenological organ of "alimentiveness" or "gustativeness," discovered by Dr. OTTO, of Copenhagen, and rediscovered by Ferrier, he says:

"The substrata of the feeling of hunger and appetite for food are the stomachic branches of the vagus and their cerebral centres." Stimulation of the area in question "caused movements of the tongue . . . characteristic of tasting."

(10) Even of Gall's sexual centre in the cerebellum, which has been denied by every other experimenter, Ferrier shows toleration, for he says:

"The sexual appetite may be morbidly excited by pathological irritation of the cerebral centres," as instanced "by the satyriasis and nymphomania occasionally observed in connection with disease of the middle lobe of the cerebellum."

These and other facts were pointed out by me in 1889. Whether as an effect of the discussion that took place, and the subsequent correspondence, or in consequence of the articles which appeared in scientific journals, I cannot say, but the fact remains that since that time "mental" centres have been taboed, and we have heard only of centres for motion and sensation. Ferrier did not set out to prove phrenology, that is evident; he merely undertook an investigation which seemed to him might produce some valuable results, but he undoubtedly regarded the movements he elicited as expressions of the mental state of the animal. He honestly believed that his centres were psycho-motor and psycho-sensory, and he described them accordingly; but his description fell on deaf ears. To have admitted in those days "psychical" areas would have been equivalent to admitting a status for phrenology, for that doctrine was not yet quite dead; indeed, several of the old scientific advocates of phrenology were still alive, though they kept silent. A revival of that doctrine could on no account be tolerated, however modified in substance and form, not only because the subject had fallen into the hands of quacks, but because so many scientific authorities had committed themselves definitely against the theory of localisation of mental function, and could not go back on their word. Unfortunately this "new" phrenology, as it was called by the opponents of the old, did not achieve much more permanent results than its predecessors, as will be seen in the course of our history.

Ferrier was not accepted on the Continent either as a new or a true light. Hitzig, Munk, and Benedikt criticised him severely. LARGE spoke of "his crude and unmethodical repetitions of Hitzig's experiments." And they all accused him of mapping out the whole brain, except a small area, the pre-frontal lobes, which are hardly noticeable in animals, so that no room was left for purely mental operations. As Hitzig said: "According to Ferrier, almost the whole hemispheres must be motor, and no room is left for sensory, perceptive, or reasoning functions."

In Britain, however, his researches were greeted with enthusiasm, and leading articles in medical journals were written prophesying wonderful developments for
these discoveries. It was confidently anticipated that they would solve man's moral and spiritual mysteries, and that the nature and causes of insanity would speedily be laid bare. These hopes have not been realised.

Only SIR MICHAEL FOSTER (1836-1907), Professor of Physiology in Cambridge University, ventured to criticise the results of these investigations by Ferrier, Fritsch and Hitzig. At a meeting of the British Association in 1897, he said:

"That progress has left much to be desired. On the one hand the experimental inquiries, even when they were carried out with the safeguard of adequate psychical analysis of the phenomena which presented themselves, and this was not always the case, sounded a very uncertain note, at least when they dealt with other than simple motor effects. They were, moreover, not infrequently in discord with clinical experience. It is risking too much to trust too implicitly to the apparent teaching of the results arrived at; something appears wanting to give these their full validity, to explain their full and certain meaning by showing their connection with what is known in other ways and by other methods."

Ferrier mapped out the hemispheres of the brain into no fewer than fifteen kinds of centres. He was not long in bringing the evidence of human pathology to bear upon them ("Localisation of Cerebral Disease," London, 1878). It is this that must redound to his greatest credit. In France, it was JEAN MARIE CHARCOT (1825-1893) and PITRES who confirmed by clinical evidence the accuracy of the localisation of the motor area (1877).

Ferrier's standpoint was well expressed in his address to the "Congress of American Physicians and Surgeons" in 1888 ("Transactions," vol. i.):

"Though our knowledge of the functions of the brain and of the principles of diagnosis of cerebral disease has made enormous strides of late years, and has rendered possible the brilliant surgical achievements of which we have heard this evening, we must not imagine that we really know much about the brain after all. Though we can point to the portion of the brain concerned with the movements of the foot, the head, the mouth, etc., to that portion of the brain with which we see, or hear, or feel, and determine with a fair degree of accuracy the seat and kind of disease which invades the cerebral cortex, yet there are portions of the cortex which are to us still practically a terra incognita—and even with respect to the regions which I have alluded to, there are still considerable differences of opinion, which though not materially affecting the diagnosis of cerebral disease, are yet of no little importance in relation to a true conception of the mechanism of brain function. For behind those sensory and motor centres there lie also all those functions which constitute mental phenomena, a true correlation of which, with their material substrata, is even of greater importance, both theoretically and practically, than the mere determination of their physiological significance, and the effects of irritative or destructive lesions. The sympathies between the different parts of the nervous system are so numerous, and so intricate, that it is often impossible to determine between the effects which are the necessary consequences of a particular injury and those which result from sympathy. If we add to these the difficulties arising from the impossibility of deciding how much of the effect is attributable to the shock given to the whole animal system by the very severe wounds of other parts, and how much is due to the mutilation of the brain itself, our hopes of success will be very moderate. And while we know so little of the functions of the primitive mental faculties, as still to be disputing their number and nature, it seems to us little short of absurd to expect to discover which of them has disappeared."

As to Ferrier's statement of the sympathies existing between the different parts of the nervous system, which render it difficult to determine the effects of irritation or destructive lesions, it is identical with that made by Gall exactly eighty years earlier:

"In order that experiments of this kind should be able to throw light on the
functions of each of the cerebral parts, it would require a concurrence of many conditions, impossible to be fulfilled. It would first require that we should be enabled to restrain all the effect of the lesion to that portion only on which the experiment is performed; for what can we conclude if the irritability or inflammation affects other parts? . . . Where is the anatomist or physiologist who knows with precision all the origin, the extent, the ramifications, and connections of a particular brain part? . . . This being established, how can we prevent the reciprocal influence of all these parts, especially when they are irritated, injured, lacerated or destroyed?"

Ferrier's other statement that we do not know what are the primitive mental powers, their number and nature, is also identical with Gall, who said:

"It would also have been necessary that the mutilators should be divested of every metaphysical prejudice; that they should have a detailed knowledge of the fundamental powers. . . . They are unquestionably ignorant of the character of each primitive power which may be manifested by the mind. On seeing a certain number of manifestations, they cannot tell to what primitive powers they belong, nor how many are still wanting to complete the manifestations of the full catalogue of primitive faculties."

Gall concluded:

"The physiologists do not pretend that they can cut out particular organs from the brain without impairing the functions of other organs. It is impossible therefore to compare particular manifestations lost with particular parts cut out. . . . I consider, therefore, that this method is fundamentally defective, unphilosophical, and unproductive, when relied on for discovering the primitive faculties connected with particular parts of the brain."

Ferrier's experiments were followed by LUIGI LUCIANI (1842-1919) and AUGUST TAMBEURINI (1848-1919) in 1878.

HERMANN MUNK (1839-)

The work of Munk ("Über die Funktionen der Grosshirnrinde," Berlin, 1881) added to the discoveries of Ferrier by establishing that sensations as well as motion can be localized. He located the sense of sight in the occipital lobes and enlarged Ferrier's area for hearing in the temporal lobes. He discovered also the area for "psychical blindness" in the gyrus angularis, i.e., the inability of the animal after destruction of this area to form those visual images or ideas which give it the meaning, or interpretation, as it were, of the visual impressions.

If the gyrus angularis be removed from both hemispheres of the brain, when the animal has recovered from the inflammatory reaction, it will still move about freely, guiding itself by sight even under difficult circumstances. But it does not recognise by sight the dish from which it has been accustomed to take food or water, the companions with whom it has formerly played, the man who has been its keeper, the threatening hand or whip, the burning coal held before its face. (This is Gall's area of "fear" and "caution"). It still retains its general intelligence and makes constant and diligent investigation into the objects by which it is surrounded. As time passes, it gradually learns to recognise again all those visual objects, the period required being from three to five weeks. This recovery consists in learning anew the meaning of visual impressions.

ALBERT ADAMKIEWICZ (1850-), "Die Pathologie der Hirncompression," 1883, showed that these sensory spheres are not only for sight and hearing, but also for the movements necessary for these senses: the sight area moving the eye, and the area for hearing moving the ear.
began his experiments, together with Dr. BEEVOR, in 1885. **He restricted Ferrier's motor area to the two central convolutions.**

The cerebral region especially concerned in the motor functions of the leg, trunk, arm and head is the one lying about the great central fissure—the fissure of Rolando; more precisely still, it embraces the gyrus centralis anterior, the gyrus centralis posterior, and the prolongation of the two on the median surface of the brain in the lobulus paracentralis.

Horsley has shown that the motor and sensory localisations established in monkeys are applicable to man, and he achieved renown by his surgical operations on the brain for circumscribed lesions.

**Sir EDWARD SCHÄFER (1850-)**

then Professor of Physiology in University College, London, now University of Edinburgh, as a result of experiments conducted in conjunction with SÄNGER-BROWN, opposed the observations of Ferrier, Munk, and others.

Ferrier had located the auditory centre in the superior temporal convolution. Munk had stated that when a certain part (area B) of the temporal lobe was destroyed on both sides in dogs, it produced a disturbance of hearing which he termed *psychical deafness*, its characteristic being that, although the animal hears, *i.e.*, has auditory sensations, it has lost the perception and memory of the auditory images perceived in its previous life. LUCIANI and TAMBUINI (1879) and with SEPPILLI (1885) found the auditory centre to extend beyond the confines of the temporal lobe, towards the parietal and occipital regions, and towards the Hippocampus and Cornu Ammonis.

Now, Schäfer and Sänger-Brown were unable to produce deafness by destruction of the temporal lobes in either dogs or monkeys.

Schäfer disagreed also with Ferrier as to the pre-frontal lobes being the intellectual area.

In order to avoid the shock, consequent upon a bilateral removal of an extensive part of the hemispheres, which is apt to be temporarily followed by a condition of apathy and apparent idiocy, whether the operations be in the frontal or other regions, Schäfer adopted a modification of the mode of operating, whereby he did not actually remove the portions of the brain, but severed their connections with the rest of the mantle and the brain-stem. In several instances in which he thus severed the pre-frontal lobes in monkeys there were no appreciable symptoms. From these experiments he could not support the view that the pre-frontal lobes were especially the seat of intelligent action.

At the International Congress of Experimental Psychology, held in London, 1892, Schäfer challenged the results of the earlier experiments made upon monkeys by Ferrier. In conjunction with Horsley, Schäfer found, after bilateral removal of the pre-frontal lobes, that at first the animals appeared apathetic, but that this condition passed off after two or three days. He also regarded the experiments of Hitzig and Goltz upon dogs as doubtful, inasmuch as antiseptics were not used, and from the small size of the pre-frontal lobes in these animals and their juxtaposition to the psycho-motor and kinaesthetic area the symptoms might possibly have been due to an extension of the injury to that region.

**He regarded the occipital lobes as the brain-area for intellectual operations, because the sight-centre is the chief avenue of sensation.**
HISTORY OF MODERN EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN PHYSIOLOGY 413

C. S. SHERRINGTON and OTTO GRÜNBAUM (LAYTON)

(British Medical Journal, 1901) restricted still further the motor area and admitted only the ascending frontal (anterior central) convolution as such. No movement whatever was obtained from excitation of the ascending parietal convolution (posterior central), the convolution which Horsley still included. They said:

“We have examined nineteen hemispheres, but have never found the motor area extend to the free surface of the post-central convolution.”

Thus Sherrington and Grünbaum limited to a relatively narrow strip what had previously been considered a widespread motor territory, a strip which approximately corresponds with Gall’s area of “mimicry” (imitation), which he found large in actors.

The order in which the motor areas were arranged from below upwards are (1) face and head; (2) neck; (3) shoulder; (4) arm; (5) upper part of trunk; (6) lower part of trunk; and (7) lower limb.

These localisations were found to agree with those made by C. and O. Vogt (Journal für Psychiatrie, 1897), who experimented on apes, and by F. Krause, who is reported to have experimented on man. It was subsequently found that the two convolutions—the anterior and posterior central—are also histologically distinct; the former being agranular, and the latter granular in the brains of mammals.

Now, it is interesting to observe that although the posterior central convolution was thus proved to have nothing to do with the motor area, yet H. C. Bastian (1837-1915) and Victor Horsley (“Brain,” vol. iii.) had previously declared that they had seen it atrophied in “congenital absence of one hand”; so had Joseph Wiglesworth (Journal of Mental Science, 1886) in case of an “Old Amputation of the left Upper Arm”; and A. W. Campbell (“Histological Studies on the Localisation of Cerebral Functions,” Cambridge, 1905) also claimed to have observed histological changes in the posterior central convolution in three cases of amputation of a leg and in three cases of amputation of an arm.

Other cases are: Gowers (“Brain,” 1878, p. 381) in congenital defect of left arm; Chiquet (“Bull, de la Soc, Anat.,” 1876, p. 618) in amputation of left arm six years before death; Boyer saw both anterior and posterior central convolutions on the left side atrophied in amputation of left arm thirty-one years before death; Landouzy (“Bull, de la Soc, Anat.,” 1877, p. 330) found the left post-central convolution atrophied in injury to right leg which rendered it useless; Oudin (“Revue Mens,” 1878, p. 190) found the left anterior and posterior central convolutions atrophied on both sides in infantile paralysis (!) of right leg.

On the other hand, Charcot (Soc, de Biol., 1878) denied the possibility of these observations.

Finally Horsley himself cast doubt on the remaining motor area (British Medical Journal, 1909), when he stated that:

“The movements return after complete destruction of the motor area. . . . It is now perfectly clear that so-called volitional movements are not alone generated from the brain through the motor area or precentral gyrus, but must also be subserved by other parts.”

Munk claimed (1890) to have found on excision of the anterior central convolution in twelve monkeys that only the posterior central convolution was excitable. Rothmann (“Archiv f. Anatomie,” 1907) found the same. If this result is correct, it would contradict Sherrington’s observation.
of Strassburg University ("Pflüger's Archiv," 1876-1881, and "Verrichtungen des Grosshirns," 1881), extirpated parts of the brain of 51 dogs by washing away the substance of the cerebrum by streams of water sent through orifices broken at selected places in the skull, and observed that, when the injury of the brain is not of too great an extent, the animal recovers perfectly without the formation of new centres. He thereupon disputed the localisation theory, the supporters of which he called the "new phrenologists." He rejected the doctrine that each part of the brain can do the work of the other parts, but otherwise he reverted to the theory of Flourens. His conclusions may be summarised as follows:

No impairment of intelligence follows the loss of a large amount of cortical substance from one side of the brain; but loss of any considerable amount of substance from both sides—whether in the frontal, posterior, or temporal lobes—produces a permanent impairment of all the functions, which corresponds in a general way to the amount of the loss. For example, a dog which has been trained to give his paw on command loses the power to do so in consequence of such loss of brain substance, and never regains it. It is not possible, by extirpating any amount of the substance of the cortex on either side or on both sides, to produce a permanent laming of any muscle of the body, or a total loss of sensibility in any of its parts. It is, however, possible, according to Goltz, by repeated removal of the cerebral substance on both sides, gradually to reduce an animal to a condition of almost complete idiocy—to an elaborate eating, drinking, and walking "reflex machine." No part of the cortex of the brain, then, can be called the "exclusive" organ or centre of intelligence or feeling; but the psychical functions of sensation, volition, ideation, and thought are connected with all its parts. The quantity of the cerebral substance removed determines the amount of the general impairment of the mental powers, instead of the locality from which the removal is made defining the quality of mental impairment.

In 1884 Goltz, with the authority due to extensive personal observations, criticised the too narrow and literal prevailing conception of the sensory and motor centres, and announced that injury of both frontal and occipital regions in dogs produced changes of character. This was confirmed by H. DE BOYER ("Études Cliniques sur les Lesions Corticales," Paris, 1879) and GROSGLÜK ("Archiv für Anatomie und Physiologie," 1895), and in the human subject by LEONORE WELT by means of a series of cases of cerebral tumour. BECHTEREVI further showed that lesions of the parietal and temporal lobes have an influence on character; so that now the whole brain appeared to be, in addition to its other functions, an instrument for the manifestation of character dispositions.

Goltz observed that dogs, after great lesions to the fore brain, show an increased impulse to move about, and assume an excited, angry, and aggressive character; and dogs which have received great injury to the hind brain become quiet, soft, and harmless, even when they have previously been vicious. He held that the destruction of the anterior part of the brain destroys the inhibiting power over the outflow of energy into the muscles. On the other hand, the posterior portion being more connected with the organs of the senses, when destroyed the excitations pass into the motor apparatus and inhibit it in its activity. Destruction of the occipital lobes, in his view, produces poverty of feelings, which roughly confirms Gall's view of these lobes containing the centres for the tender feelings of attachment (to parent, child, and friend, etc.).

Both Goltz and Munk unite with Flourens in thinking that the higher mental manifestations are not limited to definite cerebral tracts, i.e., that the most important cerebral functions, the actions from which we conclude intelligence, feeling,
passion, and natural impulse, cannot depend on definite sections of the cerebrum. Both Goltz and Munk, however, are vague in their psychological terms. There is a difference between intelligence and intellect; intelligence is not localisable, intellect is.

Munk said: "Intelligence has its seat in all the cerebral convolutions, and not in any special one, because it is the result of all the presentations derived from sensible perceptions." Exactly what Gall said. (See p. 240.)

Goltz wrote in 1879: "From my experiments I have arrived at the conclusion that every section of the cortex of the brain shares the function from which come willing, perception, representation, and thought. Every section, independently of the others, is connected with all the voluntary muscles, and stands also in connection with all the sensory nerves of the body." This is also exactly as Gall explained. Willing, perception, etc., cannot be localised, because they are abstract terms belonging to every faculty of the mind. (See pp. 240-3 and 382.)

Goltz's observations were not left unchallenged, and he did not shrink from the demand to make good his assertions.

He took up basket and dog, and journeyed from Strassburg to London. Here, in 1881, he came before the Physiological Section of the International Medical Congress, opened his basket, and, taking out the dog, placed him over against the almost equally celebrated monkey of Ferrier. The dog walked, ran, saw, heard, tasted, and smelt; this was as his master desired, yet he should not have behaved so, for he had lost almost all the centres for these respective functions. Large territories in both hemispheres were gone. He was clearly weak-minded, but, on the whole, he was not the kind of dog believed in by the advocates of motor and sensory localisation. Professor Yeo even went so far as to say before the Section: "I candidly admit that, should the entire area of the so-called motor centres prove to be destroyed in this case, Professor Goltz has succeeded in completely changing my views on cerebral localisation."

After the dog there was a monkey. Ferrier introduced him. He had lost the motor zone in the left hemisphere seven months previously. Of him Ferrier said: "As to any independent volitional action of the right arm and leg we have not seen a single indication since the operation was made. The animal is, in every other respect, perfectly well, and as to its tactile sensibility there is not the slightest sign of impairment." It is pleasing to know that, as the dog had been faithful to his master, so the monkey was true to his friend: he displayed the proper amount of paralysis on the opposite side of the body.

We know now that destruction of a particular part of the motor area does not produce "paralysis" of the limb involved, but only paresis or a certain awkwardness, and that after some time this paresis or awkwardness disappears. It was said that the corresponding or homologous area in the other hemisphere has taken up the lost function, but CARVILLE, DURET, EUGÈNE DUPUY ("Examen de quelques points de la physiologie du cerveau," Paris, 1873), and HERMANN ("Pfüger's Archiv," 1875), have found that destruction of that homologous centre causes paresis or awkwardness in the opposite limb, while the limb on the same side regains its power. Dr. OTTO SOLTNER has also come to the conclusion ("Centralblatt," 1875) that "the extirpation of the grey matter causes loss of motor power neither at the time nor after."

**LOWER CENTRES** versus **CORTICAL CENTRES**

Another explanation of the phenomenon is that these movements have their seat in other and lower centres than the cortex, but that in lesions willed and newly-acquired movements would always be lost.
E. F. A. VULPIAN (1826-1881) maintained that it is not the brain-cells which are stimulated by electricity, but the fibres which spring from the cells. The cells are stimulated by the "will," and the area is therefore not "motor" but "psycho-motor" in character. On the other hand, EUGÈNE DUPUY said that this could not be true, for he was able to teach dogs, in whom the centres for the movements of the foreleg and paw had been removed, the performance of tricks involving the use of these limbs.

HITZIG ("Untersuchungen über das Gehirn," Berlin, 1874) failed to see how we can settle the question whether the motions are produced by stimulation of the cells of the grey matter, or by stimulation of the conducting fibres. In no part of the brain can the cells be isolated from the fibres; even in the cortical surface of the hemispheres there are still numerous fibres amongst the cells.

FERRIER ("Functions of the Brain," 1876) said: "It would be a matter of indifference as regards the great question of differentiation of function in the cerebral cortex if it should appear that it is not the grey matter of the cortical regions which is really excitable, but the cone of subjacent medullary fibres distributed to them."

FRANÇOIS-FRANCE and PITRES (1878-9) established the fact that, generally speaking, the white matter is less excitable than the grey.

CARVILLE and DURET, ONIMUS, DUPUY, and others showed experimentally that the electric currents applied to the cortex spread, more or less in proportion to their intensity, both superficially and deeply, beyond the area between the electrodes. They concluded that the motor reactions aroused by electrical excitation of the cortex are not sufficient proof either of its excitability or of functional localisation, since they may be interpreted as the effect of the spread of current toward the basal ganglia, pons and bulb, where there are nerve elements that are readily excitable.

MORIZ BENEDIKT also held that only the lower centres are affected, and that the cortex of the brain contains no motor centres at all.

ALBERTONI and MICHIELI of Padua ("Archivio," 1876 and 1878) repeated Hitzig's and Ferrier's experiments on the grey matter of the brain, and came to the conclusion that these certainly contain centres of voluntary motion, which, however, only act medially through the nervous ganglia at the base of the brain, which are the true motor centres. They were able to collect pathological evidence pointing to the same inference, and from which it appeared that disease of the cortical grey matter produces imperfect and transitory paralyses, accompanied by spasms and twitching of the muscles whose motor centres are affected, while disease of the basal ganglia results in complete paralysis.

MUNK ("Über die Funktionen der Grosshirrinde," 1881) considered the motor area to be sensory (Fühlspäre), and regarded this region as the mechanism for storing up the memories for movements. In his opinion, no part of the cortex should be termed the motor area, since by implication the representation therein of those sensations and sensory disturbances which of necessity precede every muscular action is left out of sight.

HUGHINGS JACKSON regarded the motor area as sensory-motor, or a combined mechanism for the record and execution of afferent and efferent nerve impulses.

BASTIAN described it as the "kinaesthetic" area ("Brain," 1887), and as "a purely sensory area" (British Medical Journal, 1909); in other words, as an area for the sensory appreciation of muscular movements.

HORSLEY (British Medical Journal, 1909), as we have already seen, came to the conclusion that "so-called volitional movements are not alone generated from the brain through the 'motor' area, but must also be subserved by other parts, for the movements return after complete destruction of the motor area."

From this evidence it does appear that the so-called motor centres are not necessary for the functional activity of the parts which they are said to govern. This view was plainly expressed at the Washington Session of the United States Academy of Science, 1874, by BROWN-SEQUARD (1817-1894), who there said:
"It is perfectly well known that cutting away a large portion of the brain does not produce the least alteration of voluntary movement anywhere. Suppose the part of the brain, say the anterior lobe, being excited by galvanism, produces a movement in the anterior limb; now suppose that part is cut away, then the anterior limb should be paralysed, for its voluntary movement is gone. Admitting that the other half of the brain should supply the place of the missing part, let us take away that also; then certainly there should be a paralysis of the anterior limbs. But there is not. This should be sufficient to invalidate the conclusions of Dr. Ferrier. But there are abundant pathological facts of this nature proving the fact beyond question. And there are the cases of recovery from paralysis. There is no such localisation of power as Dr. Ferrier has assumed. If galvanism be applied to the severed leg of the frog, the leg will jump, although there is no brain power in question."

To this I might add the observation that in asylums for the insane, where men die after the cortex of their brain has become completely disorganised, paralyses are rare; and that in hospitals, where neurologists observe cases of paralysis, mental symptoms are the exception.

**EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND MENTAL FUNCTIONS**

Surely the reasoning is bad which argues that, because a given movement is excited by stimulation of a particular brain area in an animal, anesthetised or at least strapped down, this movement is of the same character as when the animal is free to exercise its mentality and controlling apparatus. At best the experimenter can discover only the mechanical machinery, of which the mind of the animal makes use. The mind remains still undiscovered.

Then, as regards the brain centres for sensation, the new phrenology does not tell us why it is, for example, when two men go through an art gallery, one may hurry through it, while the other looks carefully at the paintings. They both receive the same impressions, but in one there is some mental effect which enhances his enjoyment, which in the other is lacking.

Because the localisation of motor centres has proved to some extent a failure psychologists have at once jumped to the conclusion that localisation of mental function is also not possible. Thus G. J. LADD (1842), Professor at Yale University, in his famous text-book on "Physiological Psychology" (1890), has said:

"A large number of so-called centres, covering an increased amount of the cortical surface, have been pointed out by Ferrier and others on the cerebral hemispheres of the monkey. Fully half of this number, however, cannot be regarded as having anything like a demonstrable character, and much fault has justly been found with many operators upon the brains both of monkeys and of dogs for their lack of precision in experiment and haste in drawing conclusions.

"Experiments in extirpation also show that considerable areas of the cortical substance may be removed without perceptibly impairing any of the motor or sensory functions of the animal. Indeed, even when the loss of the cortical substance, thus artificially produced, extends over almost an entire hemisphere, or over a large portion of both hemispheres, the operation may not result in the permanent and complete loss of any specific function, motor or sensory. So true is this that one eminent observer, Goltz, has maintained, on the basis of many experiments in extirpation, that it is chiefly the quantity of the cerebral substance destroyed, in large measure, irrespective of the locality, which determines the nature and extent of the resulting psychical disturbances.

"This fact is in itself undeniably unfavourable to any theory which would map out the entire cortical surface into so-called centres or areas, to be considered as separate organs of particular psychical processes."

Ladd proceeded to give examples of injuries and destruction of the brain which Vol. i]
had been recorded to produce no physical or mental effect; but the question does not occur to him, What is the use of the brain?

So-called "physiological psychology" had a temporary success, when it was thought that the brain had practically no other than the motor and sensory functions, and that psychical phenomena could be interpreted in terms of these functions. Faculties, capacities, and dispositions were contemptuously denied. Mind, to physiological psychologists, was not an organisation, but a series of modes of motion, of which no two observers gave a like report.

Physiological psychology endeavoured to determine the varying importance of the different parts of the brain so far as they receive centripetal projection paths coming from the different sense organs, centrifugal projection paths along which the different voluntary impulses are transmitted to the muscles, and commissural and association paths which bring the separate fields of action into close connection. The highest and most complex psychical functions are not localised in these cortical fields, but are conditioned by the associative elements, so far as these co-operate in making the brain into a single organ. The individual acts of the mind result from the different combinations of the intellectual functions of the separate cortical areas.

We shall show in a succeeding chapter that brain tumours produce mental symptoms which vary according to the locality; for example, frontal tumours are followed by disturbances of the intellect. But so infatuated are some of the neurologists by the results of vivisection experiments, that they can see motor changes but no mental changes. Thus L. G. PFEIFFER (1805-1877), Archiv für Psychiatrie, vol. xlvii, denied "mental changes in cases of brain tumours" from his observation of eighty-six cases. His conclusions were as follows:

1. There is not the slightest reason to believe that the frontal lobes are especially concerned with intellectual functions.
2. The only localisation that could be made out was that of neurological symptoms.
3. Lesions of Flechsig's association centres produce no specific psychical disturbances.
4. Altogether, localisation of psychical functions and attributes is impossible.

The conclusions drawn from the results of experiments on animals have proved unsatisfactory. This is admitted by Ferrier himself, who said:

"There is, perhaps, no subject in physiology of greater importance and more general interest than the functions of the brain, and there are few which present to experimental investigation conditions of greater intricacy and complexity. No one who has attentively studied the results of the labours of the numerous investigators in this field of research can help being struck by the want of harmony, and even positive contradictions, among the conclusions which apparently the same experiments and the same facts have led to in different hands. And when the seemingly well-established facts of experimentation on the brains of the lower animals are compared with those of clinical observations and morbid anatomy in man, the discord between them is frequently so great as to lead many to the opinion that physiological investigation on the lower animals is little calculated to throw light on the functions of the human brain."

Exactly so! But did not the much-abused Gall say the same thing? How many animals have been experimented on since his time, and still we are unable to throw light on the mental functions of the brain! Compare Ferrier's statement with that of Gall! He said:

"It is a subject of constant observation that, in order to discover the functions of the different parts of the body, anatomists and physiologists have always been
rather disposed to employ manual means than to accumulate a large number of physiological and pathological facts... to draw slowly and successively the proper deductions from them, and not to announce their discoveries but with a wise reserve. This method, at present the favourite one with our physiological investigators, gains the approbation of most men by its promptitude and its apparent results. But it has also been constantly observed that what has appeared to have been proved by one mutilator either did not succeed with another, or that the second found in the same experiments all the evidence necessary to refute the conclusions of the former."

The reader is also referred to Gall’s remarks on the experiments of Flourens (Chapter XVIII.).

How contradictory the results of experimental observations sometimes are may be seen from the following.

Take the visual centre. FERRIER originally located it in the angular gyrus. MUNK proved it to be in the occipital lobe, which Ferrier subsequently acknowledged as correct. Yet LOEB ("Pfüger’s Archiv," vol. xxxiv.), who had destroyed the entire visual sphere, found, contrary to Munk, that no marked disturbances of sight were produced even by the most extensive lesion of this area, and that disturbances of sight may follow lesions in other than the occipital lobes, especially in the frontal lobes; a conclusion with which LUCIANI, TAMBURINI, and GOLTZ agreed. BERNHARD GUDDEN (1824-1886), at a meeting of the German Medico-Psychological Society ("Neurologisches Centralblatt," 1885), said that he had extirpated the whole occipital lobe in young rabbits and found that they could still see very well. He had also removed the so-called motor spheres in cats, and after a few hours they showed no motor disturbance. He referred to the great differences of opinion about the results of experiments on the grey matter of the brain, and said that he had little faith in the charts in which different centres were put down as on a map.

Yet brain surgeons will tell us of their wonderful results in localising lesions with the help of these charts. There I can speak from personal experience. Where both mental symptoms as well as motor or sensory symptoms have guided me, the operation advised was a success. Where motor or sensory symptoms were the only guide, I have seen the most eminent brain surgeons in consultation disagree as to the locality of the lesion; and I have witnessed several cases of trephining which left the lesion still undiscovered.

Again, SCHAFER disputed the centre of hearing, for the reason that the monkey whose temporal lobes were destroyed must have been deaf before the operation, as all his and Prof. BROWN’s experiments on a large number of monkeys left their hearing unimpaired. (Royal Society’s “Proceedings,” December 22nd, 1887.)

EUGÈNE DUPUY read a paper before the Neurological Society of London ("Brain," 1892), in which he said:

"Already great differences exist between those who teach the doctrine of ‘localisation of functions’ on the interpretation of the nature of the very function of the cortex. It is not necessary to mention before this Association the hypothesis of Hitzig and of Nothnagel, who consider the Rolandic region as the centre of muscular sense or muscular consciousness; of Bastian, who separates muscular sense from the other compounds which go to form his ‘kinæsthesia’; of Schiff, who believes that it is some kind of sensitive region in connection with tactile sensation, said by him to travel through the posterior spinal columns; nor the doctrines of Ferrier, who considers the Rolandic region as entirely motor—a doctrine which is identical with the one taught by Hughlings Jackson (the original founder of the doctrine); nor of Charcot, who holds that the ‘motor centres’ are the substrata of motor action as distinguished from sensation and sensory centres; nor Munk’s psychic theory of sensory spheres representing images of the different
species of sensations, common and special, and which react in a psychic manner 'metaphysically,' if I may so express it. There are also a number of theories, chiefly evolved by the Italians, which are modifications of those given above."

MORTON PRINCE, in the *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, June, 1910, maintained both theoretically and practically, that for an intellectual function there can be no cortical localisation:

"The present doctrine of cerebral localisation regarded as a mapping of the brain into areas within which lesions give rise to particular groups of symptoms is one of the triumphs of neurology which cannot be valued too highly. Regarded as a localisation of the psycho-physiological functions represented by these symptoms within narrowly circumscribed areas, it is in large part naive to a degree which will excite the smiles of future neurologists. A rising change of mental attitude shows that in some of its assumed narrow localisations or functions it bids fair to be classed with the phrenology of Gall... While incontestable evidence proves that hemianopsia results from lesion of the apex of the occipital lobe, there is still wanting the evidence that shows that we are justified in localising a psychical function—that of the formation of visual images—in this area, much less that of localising here the more complex function of visual perception and memories. ... What I have said of the localisation of the visual functions applies, I believe, with still more force to the localisation of language."

Against Morton Prince, who fears the phrenology of Gall, we can quote Prof. ALBERT ADAMKIEWICZ (1850-), of Vienna, who does not admit motor or sensory centres in the cortex but believes in "psychic areas" (Seelenfelder), and is thus upholding the theory of the localisation of mental functions.

PAUL FLECHSIG (1847-), of Leipsic, regarded the motor centres as purely motor, and not "psycho-motor," as Hitzig and Ferrier do. In his opinion, "the height of the forehead is no measure of the intellectual disposition in a man, for the height depends partly on the development of the motor area and the latter on the size of the body." Every line of this sentence is wrong. The motor area does not depend on the size of the body, and the height of the forehead is no measure of the extent of the frontal lobes. We must measure the length, width, and take into account the vaulting as well. The like mistake was made some years ago by the *Athenaeum* in an article on "Retreating Foreheads and their Relation to the Intellect." Thirdly, the motor area has no connection with the height of the forehead: the fissure of Rolando, around which the motor centres are grouped, is much further to the back.

Many physiologists still cling to antiquated metaphysical ideas. They still hold the long-explored view that all knowledge is derived from sensation and that therefore the sensory centres, especially those of sight in the occipital lobes, are the centres for the intellectual operations—this, for example, is Schäfer's view; quite ignoring the fact that the occipital region preponderates in the lower races and the monkey species, almost in the same proportion as the frontal region preponderates in civilised man (see Elliot Smith and Brodmann), and that the latter is structurally the most perfect; and ignoring also that animals and savages have keener and in many respects more perfect senses than civilised man, and should therefore, if this view were correct, be his superior in knowledge and understanding.

Thus in one of our modern text-books by a well-known Scotch neurologist we find it stated:

"All knowledge is derived through the exercise of the senses. The man who can see best is the man who understands most, and who therefore knows what to look for.

"Now it has been calculated that of all the stimuli from the outside world which
reach the brain, nine-tenths come from the organs of sight, so that the blind are
dependent on the remaining one-tenth for the scenery of their mental world."

According to this view, all knowledge would be a knowledge of sensations.
The different talents for music, poetry, mathematics, etc., should all be simple
modifications of one or more of the five senses. It would lead us to assume that
men are born with equal original mental capacity; opportunities and education
determining the difference of subsequent development. If all our ideas come from
the senses, how can we explain Milton, who was blind at an early age, yet what
imagination can be stronger and more brilliant? Laura Bridgman, the blind deaf-
and-dumb woman, was remarkably intelligent, and her sister in that misfortune,
Helen Keller, has become an accomplished authoress. It is not the perfection of
the senses which gives intelligence to the brain, but it is the perfection of the brain which
determines the employment of the senses. External objects act very differently on
different men according to their innate mental powers.

Why should the sensory region be just the intellectual region? The feelings
and passions can be aroused just the same, and much quicker, as the result of the
objective perception gained through the medium of the eye. Not only does the
sensation of sight arouse emotion, but it differs according to the emotion we are
already in. If all knowledge is derived from sensation and movement only, why
does the receipt of a telegram strike one person differently from another? All these
motor and sensory functions are alike in human beings, but we differ psychically.
The physiologicalists ignore psychology, yet psychologists base their speculations on the
results of physiology.

It is not true that all knowledge comes through the senses. Does not the
recollection of an insult make us tremble with anger?—the recollection of a loved
one bring a glow of affection? These are stimuli from within. Moreover, the
philosophical theory that there is nothing in the human consciousness beside
transformed sensations is obliged to deny to man a religious nature.

The experiments which have been made upon the brains of living animals by means
of electricity are not of a nature to reveal anything concerning the mental functions of
the brain.

The manner in which such experiments are conducted renders success in this
direction altogether impossible. A monkey, dog, cat, or other dumb animal is by
the application of chloroform reduced to a state of apparent insensibility, and
thereby rendered incapable of manifesting any kind of emotion. After a part of
the skull has been cut away, electricity is applied to a definite region of the brain
thus laid bare, and a particular limb or a group of muscles is seen to contract or
move; a certain other part of the brain is irritated and other muscles are seen to
contract; the phenomena being of a purely physical character without a single
vestige of thought or feeling; just as seen in a puppet, where "you pull the string
and the figure moves."

The electric current cannot reveal a centre of ideation; and in the opinion of
many experts, as we have shown, it is bound to travel beyond the cortical to the
subcortical region, and possibly to the ganglia at the base of the brain.

"The various cortical centres are so interwoven that no stimulus which the
physiological experimenters can use will be sufficiently fine in its nature and exact
in its application to be limited to the excitation only of the function of the particular
region. The most nicely applied and carefully guarded electric stimulus in such case
must inevitably work beyond its desired limits and affect neighbouring structures,
and it is natural then to suppose that the structure most sure to be affected by the
diffused stimulus will be the structure most intimately connected with it physiologically, that is to say, the subordinate, if not subcortical, actual motor area.
That may well be a sufficient reason why the physiological experimenter cannot
stimulate a thought or volition only, and why the attempt to do so must almost
certainly be the excitation of a crude movement.” (Henry Maudsley, “The Cerebral Cortex and its Work,” “Mind,” 1890.)

When these discoveries were first announced, they were proclaimed as of such importance and received with such acclamation as if the whole mystery of the mind had been unfolded. Not that I wish to minimise the value of the results achieved, regarded as motor and sensory centres pure and simple. Indeed, all honour is due to these physiologists as to every scientific investigator, whatever his achievements! I am only raising a protest against extravagant claims, in order to arrive at the truth. Every impartial observer must agree with me that it is fantastic to expect a solution of the working of the human brain—even of the ordinary man, not to speak of great philosophers, scientists, poets, and artists—from the electrical stimulation or destruction of bits of cerebral tissue of a monkey, dog, or cat. We have seen that not even as regards the motor and sensory centres is there that uniformity of opinion which one might expect from strictly scientific experiments. When we read the explanations of the mental mechanism of man, and the localisation of mental functions in the brain, physiologists contradict one another in a still more amazing manner.

Even approximately they do not know yet where the intellect is located in the brain. FERRIER, in harmony with a host of observers from Gall onwards, declared the frontal lobes to be the centres for the highest intellectual processes; but MUNK (“Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie,” 1884) asserted that dogs, whose frontal lobes had been extirpated and were observed “for years,” showed not the slightest disturbance of intelligence, and, at the Meeting of Neurologists and Alienists held at Baden in 1883, he declared that he found that the removal of one frontal lobe rendered the animal unable to bend the back sideways, and that the removal of both lobes made it incapable of arching the back upwards. He therefore concluded that the function of the frontal lobes, which are the highest in structural organisation of all parts of the cortex, was nothing more important than the innervation of the muscles of the back.

We have read a great deal of abuse of the old phrenologists, and quoted abundantly from it. But if Munk is to be taken literally, are we not entitled to reply in the same strain? Are the only uses of the cerebrum to make the miserable race of man walk forward or backward or turn the head from side to side, and are these shoulder-shrugging, tail-wagging, toe-twitching, tongue-darting, eye-winking, ear-flapping, and leg-swinging centres all that is needed for the manifestation of that wonderful gift of creation—mind? According to the new phrenology based on vivisection, it does seem so. What has the new phrenology done to aid us in the analysis of human thought and emotion?

Stimulation of a centre by electricity, even if the animal were not anaesthetised, would not reveal a thought or feeling. As somebody once put it: “Supposing my brain organ for sympathy, if such exists, were electrically excited, I should not display benevolent feeling but would have fits like a brute.” We cannot even prove that the centre is psycho-motor, for it has not been made out what is the particular emotion that would move, for example, the leg centre only. Many varying emotions might move that centre, and we have no evidence that it is connected with other centres.

The motor centres will not explain the diversity of mental powers, but the mental powers will explain the use of the motor centres.

The lion is not courageous and audacious because he has strong claws and teeth, the boar because he has tusks, and the bull because he has horns; these tools are there because, for the execution of certain innate dispositions, they are indispensable. A young bullock will often run his head against objects before his horns have grown.
Man, on the other hand, uses his intelligence as his chief weapon, but has lost most instruments of brute force.

Granted that each structurally differentiated part has a special function, no part can be destroyed without affecting to some extent the functions of the entire brain. This was admitted by Gall, the foremost advocate of the localisation theory. Moreover, it is not in all cases clear precisely what convolutions or parts of convolutions of the brain of man correspond to those in animals; nor is the psychical life of man and animal the same.

The experimenter does not know beforehand what mental power the part destroyed manifested, and he cannot therefore judge its suppression.

The animals in whom certain parts of the convolutions are destroyed are not placed in circumstances calculated to show whether they are or are not capable of manifesting any propensity which might be connected with the injured part; and, even if they are kept alive afterwards, no physiologist has yet attempted to observe whether the animal is still able to manifest all its propensities, sentiments, and intellectual powers. And if he wanted to observe them, we are not yet in agreement as to what are the elementary dispositions to look for.

The experimenters still cling to such general properties of the mind as memory, volition, judgment, which are properties of the entire brain and impossible to localise.

I maintain, therefore, that the experimenters have failed to discover the location of a single fundamental faculty owing to the insufficiency of their methods. Because of this failure, they have inconsiderately committed themselves against the localisation of mental functions, disregarding entirely the overwhelming number of facts which can be gathered from clinical observation. (See Vol. II. of this work.)

Also, those who admit localisation to be possible have confined their observation to the intellectual functions alone, forgetting that the animal brain must have other functions as well. Motor and sensory centres have been admitted, intellectual as well, but there is no room left for those primary affections and propensities—the instincts of animals. There is no reference in any text-book on the brain to the fact that they exist at all. Physiologists would be rather puzzled if they were asked to locate them.

Nay, more! We have not got much further, notwithstanding a hundred years of experiments on animals, than that we think with the brain. That we also "feel" with our brains has not yet been realised. That is to say, that besides observing, remembering, and reasoning, we also manifest love and hate, fear and courage, pride and modesty, cheerfulness and anger, through our brains. The experimenters on animals have failed to raise any such feelings at the point of their scalpel, and therefore they deny any relation between them and the brain. But physicians who attend to living humanity have observed that a slight injury to one part of the brain can affect a man's character and conduct in one particular manner, and leave him in all other respects a normal man. It will be shown in Vol. II. of this work that a blow to one particular region of the head may change the cheerful, optimistic man to a depressed and melancholic one, while injury of another part may cause a hitherto peaceful man to become quarrelsome and violent, and a wound to another spot may cause a highly religious man to become a totally opposite character; and yet in all these cases the intellect, that is to say memory and reason, may remain quite unaffected. The evidence that will be submitted to the unprejudiced student of psychology and brain functions is not that of isolated cases, but that of hundreds and hundreds of cases, incontrovertible in fact. Also with regard to the intellect, the metaphysical divisions will be ignored, and it will be demonstrated by observation alone that the general faculty of memory cannot be lost by destruction of parts.
of the brain, but that circumscribed lesions can and do cause loss of memory for "numbers," "dates," "localities," etc.; that the powers of observation in certain particulars may be lost, and the power of judgment in certain directions may become faulty, while in all other respects the man remains as before, or suffers only a slight weakening in consequence of the disruption which has taken place.

Man has a much larger and much more complicated brain than the lower animals, although he has not anything like the same amount of muscular energy and power which many of them possess.

A glance at the facts of comparative anatomy should suffice to make it evident that the cerebral cortex attains an enormous extent in man as compared with other vertebrates, including the apes. It is in the highest degree improbable that all this increased development of the cortex corresponds simply to a greater refinement of human sensibility or movement, and therefore to a multiplication of sensory and motor centres. Indeed, as regards the senses and agility of movement, man is the inferior of animals. On the other hand, it is legitimate and almost necessary to attribute the absolute and relative vastness of the human cortex to the intellectual superiority of man, which is beyond all dispute immense. The complexity of the nervous elements and anatomical connections in the cerebral cortex of man is to be interpreted, not as the cause of slight physiological differences, but as the reason for the perfection to which the human species has brought abstract thought, memory, imagination, and other mental powers are not manifested by other mammals in the same degree, and the refinement, the emotions and instincts of animals. All this was pointed out by Gall, but ignored by the established teachers, who mould the opinions of future generations. It is, however, repeated with eloquence and assurance gained from experience by EUGENIO TANZI, Professor of Psychiatry in Florence, in his "Text-book of Mental Diseases," 1909.

All the motor and sensory centres will not explain the variety of mental powers and the different degrees in which men are endowed with the same powers.

Motor and sensory centres will not explain why one man is more ambitious, or more proud, selfish, or more sympathetic than another; or, again, why some men place their happiness in the possession of riches, and others in a philosophy which elevates them above the human kind. Nor will they explain why a son, who has inherited somewhat exclusively the qualities of his father, should be found so frequently to fail with his failures, sin with his sins, excel with his virtues, and, speaking generally, to go through life in much the same kind of fashion.

All the motor and sensory centres will not explain why one vast intellect, like Newton's, fathoms the profundities of science, while the mind of another man scarcely gropes its way through the daily occurrences of life; why one individual spends his life in an ardent chase of wealth, which he stops not to enjoy, while another scatters in wasteful prodigality the legacy of his sires, and perishes in want from a mere incapacity to retain. All the motor and sensory centres will not explain the difference of the constitution of the brain of a poetical genius, as compared, say, with a mathematical genius; or why a youth who in all respects is an idiot should yet possess a remarkable memory for dates, or numbers, or localities, and be capable of practically all the emotions. Finally, all the motor and sensory centres do not help, even in the remotest way, to explain the facts of insanity.

As that influential Edinburgh journal, the Scotsman, said when Ferrier first announced his researches: "How shall we by such means fathom the intellectual and moral life of man? How shall we by such crude experiments make manifest the existence of an intellect that is capable of tracing the action of gravitation throughout the boundless regions of space; or trace the cause or origin of those moral feelings which make up so much of the sweet and bitter of human life?"

Some savage nations have as much motor power and often more delicate senses than Europeans. It would be from them that we ought to expect the most profound
philosophy and the feeblest instincts if this new phrenology were true. Those who have observed the defective brains of idiots must be aware that they are often without any corresponding motor or sensory defect. And in lunatic asylums we see destruction of the brain leading to various forms of insanity, but very rarely, unless there be spinal disease as well, to loss of motion and sensation.

The fact is too much has been made of the experimental investigation into the functions of the brain. I am not against it—laboratory work is often indispensable. I repeat that all I want is to protest against its exaggerated estimation, by which all those who are engaged in it and who explain the mysteries of life and disease by physical, mechanical, and chemical laws are hailed as scientists, and none other are considered to deserve that name. Sober-minded men have come to see that this method of investigation has reached its limit, and that even its supposed assistance in operations for certain forms of epilepsy has not met with that success which had been anticipated.

That celebrated surgeon M. ALLEN STARR ("Journal of the American Medical Association," 1907), considered that sufficient time has now elapsed to enable us to estimate the value of brain surgery for the relief of tumours, epilepsy, and abscess with considerable accuracy. It is only in localised Jacksonian epilepsy (about two per cent. of all cases) that operation is indicated, and in only about twenty per cent. of these is it successful. He published a table of 1,100 cases of cerebral tumours which showed that only seven per cent. were "probably removable."

Yet previously Allen Starr was as enthusiastic as all the others. He said:

"The old phrenology was wrong in its theory, wrong in its facts, wrong in its interpretations of mental processes, and never led to the slightest practical result. The new phrenology is scientific in its methods, in its observations, and in its analysis, and is convincing in its conclusions. And who can now set a limit to the benefit it has brought to mankind by its practical application to the saving of human lives? Our knowledge of the brain is by no means complete, for there are large regions, on this African map, of undiscovered country. Fortunately several Stanleys are on the way."

SIR CHARLES BELL (1774-1842), a century ago, in his essay on the "Circulation of the Blood," 1819, p. 25, pointed out that experiments on animals should be conducted without any preconceived notions:

"I have endeavoured to discover the truth by the examination of the structure, and the observation of the phenomena of life, without torturing living animals. It is too common a belief that, in physiology, experiments on living animals is the best and surest way of pursuing an inquiry, although it be certain that the supposed issue of experiments is as much affected by the preconception as the process of reasoning can be. . . . It is but a poor manner of acquiring fame, to multiply experiments on brutes, and take the chance of discovery. . . . At all events, it is our duty to prepare for experiments upon living animals by the closest previous application of our reason, so that we may narrow the question, and make it certain that advantage shall be gained by the experiment."

We try to learn the mind and character of man and the structure and functions of the brain from the results of irritation and mutilation of animals; but the vast material always at our disposal in the large number of asylums all over the world is barred even to expert physicians. "No admission except to residents" is the rule. If they were thrown open to a visiting staff, as hospitals are, we should be enabled to examine the mentality of these patients in a systematic manner, and, after death, view their brains macroscopically and microscopically. Physiologists should take a more comprehensive view, and, in particular, not neglect the facts of clinical medicine and human pathology. I hold with TANZI (op. cit.):
"As the study of experimental localisations would appear to have reached its limit, physiologists, in common with clinicians and those who investigate the question from other standpoints, have now no reason to refuse space for a psychical zone, the existence of which forces itself upon us, even apart from the testimony of experimental researches."

Let me also quote from Professor CHARLES RICHET'S speech at the Congress of Psychology, 1889:

"Of course, we may disguise our ignorance under the imposing weight of fact, of autopsy, of experiment. But, vulgarly speaking, this is merely throwing dust in our eyes; for the professor who cites the works of Charcot, of Flechsig, of Goltz, of Ferrier, of Luciani, of Fritsch, of Hitzig, and of many other savants, must admit that, in spite of all these authorities, he has not made much advance. . . . And thus our rich bibliography is but a delusive treasure; this abundance conceals profound poverty. The physiology of the brain is still enshrouded in mystery, is still as completely concealed from us as was the function of respiration before Lavoisier. Cerebral physiology awaits some discovery of genius which will throw light on this problem, as mysterious to-day as it was two thousand years ago, viz., the relation between the structure of the brain and thought, which is the functioning of the brain."

INTELLECTUAL PROCESSES AS LOCATED BY EXPERIMENTAL PHYSIOLOGISTS

The diversity of views of physiologists becomes at once apparent when they have to deal with a practical problem. Now nothing can be more important or more fundamental than the knowledge of the localisation of the intellectual processes in the brain.

I. We have seen already that some physiologists are against all localisation. They consider the entire brain to be involved in all intellectual processes.

Thus H. MUNK said: "Intelligence has its seat everywhere in the cerebrum, and nowhere in particular; for it is the abstraction and the resultant of all ideas springing out of sensuous perceptions." ("Functionen der Grosshirnrinde," Berlin, 1881, p. 73.)

Dr. YELLOWLEES (Journal of Mental Science, 1898) said they all believed that the brain acted as a whole, and that it was very difficult to differentiate one part from another in regard to mental and intellectual processes.

Professor STIEDA is convinced that there is absolutely no correlation between the surface form of the brain and the mental life of the individual, and that all attempts to solve the functions of the brain in this direction are futile.

MEYNERT followed Munk and said, "Intelligence is localised everywhere in the cerebral cortex, and nowhere in particular." Again, as Gall has pointed out, no distinction is drawn between intellect and intelligence.

II. On the other hand, a large number of investigators consider the frontal lobes, or, more exactly speaking, the pre-frontal region, the seat of the higher intellectual operations.

The best defence of this view, after Gall, was made by Sir DAVID FERRIER:

"We have, however, other evidences which go to show that the frontal regions of the brain (which are much larger in man than in other animals) are associated with higher intellectual functions. What is the physiological explanation of this function we are at present unable to say. So far the facts of experiment and of disease favour the views of phrenologists, namely, that with the development of the anterior part of the brain there is a corresponding development of the higher intellectual powers; but investigation is still needed in order to thoroughly explain this fact in physiological terms." (Manchester Science Lectures, 1875.)

"When the animals have their pre-frontal lobes diseased or largely removed,
they are capable of exhibiting emotional feeling. The sensory faculties, sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell remain unimpaired. The powers of voluntary motion are retained in their integrity, and there is little to indicate the presence of such an extensive lesion; and yet, notwithstanding this apparent absence of physiological symptoms, I could perceive a very decided alteration in the animal's character and behaviour, though it is difficult to state in precise terms the nature of the change. The animals operated on were selected on account of their intelligent character. After the operation, though they might seem, to one who had not compared their present with their past, fairly up to the average of monkey intelligence, they had undergone a considerable psychological alteration. Instead of, as before, being actively interested in their surroundings, and curiously prying into all that came within the field of their observation, they remained apathetic or dull, or dozed off to sleep, responding only to the sensations or impressions of the moment, or varying their listlessness with restless or purposeless wanderings to and fro. While not actually deprived of intelligence, they had lost to all appearance the faculty of attention and intelligent observation." ("Cerebral Diseases," p. 37)

"Lesion of the frontal convolutions is of itself sufficient to account for a state of dementia. Experimentally I have found that destruction of the frontal regions of the brain of the monkey induces a condition resembling dementia." (West Riding Lunatic Asylum Medical Reports, 1874.)

In 1874, HITZIG assigned abstract thought to the frontal lobes. He pointed, very rightly, to their increasing development in the mammalian scale, the abundance of medullated fibres at the anterior poles of the brain, and the ruin which progressive paralysis—that implacable destroyer of the intellect—produces pre-eminently in the cortex of this region.

According to BIANCHI, 1894, the animals lose much more—notably, the power of inhibiting movements initiated by other regions of the nervous axis, that of recalling the images of previous sensations in commemorative form, and, lastly, the power of associating these images in abstract synthesis. He observed the same symptomatology in the human subject in cases of tumour affecting the anterior portion of the brain.

C. v. MONAKOW ("Gehirn Pathologie," p. 492) said: "Lesions of any extent at all are never observed to occur in this region without causing the most serious intellectual defects."

This does not exhaust the evidence in favour of the frontal lobes; but as we have to deal with their function more minutely in Vol. II., the above quotations will suffice for the present.

A very decided statement against this supposed function of the frontal lobes was made by SCHÄFER, who claimed that after destruction of the pre-frontal area "the animals have in no instance shown the dullness and apathy previously noticed, but have appeared as bright and intelligent after recovering from anaesthesia as before the operation. These experiments do not therefore support the view that the pre-frontal lobes are especially the seat of intelligent attention."

SCIAMANNA, in 1905, showed two monkeys from whom he had removed the pre-frontal lobes the year before. The animals showed no appreciable change in their behaviour. They showed a lively interest in a mirror placed before them; they were greedy for fruit and sugar (hunger and taste centres are not in the frontal but in the temporal lobes); were on good terms with their attendant and people they knew (affection centre, according to Gall, is in the occipital lobe); were disturbed by threats and noises and tried to escape (fear centre in parietal lobe). After killing both monkeys it was found that the frontal lobes had been incompletely destroyed.

LEONORA WELT (1888) found in only twelve out of fifty-nine lesions of the frontal lobes any mental disturbance or change of character. Has it not been said that the whole brain can be destroyed without any mental change?
MUNK, as we have already mentioned, found after destruction of the frontal area in dogs paralysis of the trunk muscles, and he termed the frontal region the sensory sphere of the trunk.

WUNDT opposed Hitzig’s localisation of the intellect in the frontal lobes; yet he himself ascribed to the pre-frontal region the faculty of *apperception*, that is, the power of selection of the ideas or mental images to be the subject of thought or attention at a given moment.

LADD (“Physiological Psychology,” 1890) said:

“It is enough at present to say that the experimental and pathological evidence does not warrant us in assigning such pre-eminence to the frontal lobes. Extensive lesions may occur in these lobes with little or no diminution of so-called general intelligence.”

Quite correct! “General intelligence” may remain unaffected, since it is the property of the entire brain, but not so the intellect proper. Destruction of the brain without mental symptoms is simply due to negligent and ignorant observation. (See Chapter XXVIII.)

III. Other investigators found in the great size of the parietal lobes of the brain a reason for locating in them the intellectual functions.

NIC. RÜDINGER (1832-1896) “Beiträge zur Anatomie und Embryologie” (1882), who had the opportunity of studying the brains of quite a number of distinguished men (amongst whom were Bischoff of Bonn, Döllinger of Munich, Tiedemann of Heidelberg, and Liebig of Munich), asserted that the higher the mental endowment of an individual the greater is the relative extent of the upper part of the parietal lobe. Opposed to him is E. A. SPITZKA (1851-1914), who dissected the brains of several eminent Americans, and noticed the frontal, not the parietal, lobes to be the most highly developed. (“Transactions of the American Philosophical Society,” 1907.)

Prof. D. J. CUNNINGHAM (1850-1909), “British Association Proceedings” (1901), said in answer to Rüdinger:

“There was absolutely no foundation for this sweeping assertion. When the evolutionary development of the parietal part of the cerebral cortex was studied, exactly the reverse condition became manifest. It was the lower part of the parietal lobe which in man, both in its early development and in its after-growth, exhibited the greatest relative increase. Additional interest was attached to this observation by the fact that recently several independent observers had fixed upon this region as one in which they believed that a marked exuberance of cortical growth might be noted in people of undoubted genius.”

GUSTAV RETZIUS (1842-1919) found considerable development of the parietal lobe in the brains of the astronomer Hugo Gyldens (“Biologische Untersuchungen,” 1898) and the mathematician Sophie Kovalevsky (1900).

D. P. v. HANSEMANN (“Zeitschrift f. Psych. u. Phys. der Sinnesorgane,” 1899) described a similar condition in the brain of Helmholtz; GUSZMAN (“Anatomischer Anzeiger,” 1901) in the brain of Rudolf Lenz, the musician; and G. MINGAZZINI in the skull of Raphael.

FLECHSIG (“Neurologisches Centralblatt,” 1898) also looks on the lower parietal region as the most important.

V. M. BECHTEREVR (1857-) and R. WEINBERG have published an anatomical study of the brain of the celebrated Russian chemist Mendeleeff (Leipsic, 1909). They found evidence of his creative imagination in an extensive and highly convoluted left parietal region, and accounted for the absence of musical faculty by the entire temporal lobes being small and simple. Flechsig found in Beethoven and Sebastian Bach, not the temporal, but the parietal, region most highly developed.

MOTT’S observations of brains of insane show (see “Handbook of Physiology,” by W. D. Halliburton, 1915) that the frontal region is important for intellectual operations, though not so important as the parietal association area behind the
Rolandic area; the greater the intellectual development, the larger and more convoluted does the parietal region become.

IV. HORSLEY stated that a condition of idiocy was more readily produced in the ape by removing extensive regions of the temporal lobes on both sides than by cutting off the pre-frontal region completely by an incision; and Schäfer at the time agreed with him. Horsley’s experiment suggests a wrong interpretation of the phenomena observed. For GOLTZ, who removed the whole posterior half of the hemispheres of dogs who were lively and active before the operation, found, as we have already mentioned, that these animals became quiet and apathetic, and that their intellect was inhibited; that is to say, he produced a mental condition akin to melancholia in man. But that is no proof of the intellect being related to the posterior half of the brain; for, as will be shown, excitation of the posterior area seems to have an inhibiting influence on the anterior, probably through the vasomotor nerves.

V. Another series of investigators located the intellect in the occipital lobes of the brain. Wm. B. CARPENTER (1813-1885) was the first to express this view. Later, in 1874, BASTIAN (1837-1915) strongly insisted “that the posterior lobes of the brain have more to do with the intellect than the anterior.” HUGHLINGS JACKSON (1834-1911), in 1892, not only concurred with Bastian “that the posterior lobes are the most important parts of the brain for intellectual purposes,” but, agreeing in this, he went a step further and declared that “disease of the right posterior lobe produces greater mental defect than disease of the left does.”

BASTIAN must have changed his views in later years, for in his work on “Paralyses,” p. 250, referring to lesions of the frontal lobes, he said: “It has often been difficult precisely to define the nature of the change which has been brought about; but a dull apathetic condition seems to have been most frequently noticed, together with irritability, vacillation, a diminished power of attention, and a lowering of the moral nature.”

W. CROCHLEY CLAPHAM (Journal of Mental Science, 1898) was also in favour of the occipital lobes for intellectual operations.

He said: “It would be ‘flogging a dead horse’ at the present day to offer arguments against the exploded phrenology of Gall and Spurzheim, which has long been discredited by scientific men. They were in favour of the frontal lobes, but all the evidence—biological, ethnological, developmental, clinical, and pathological—is in favour of the occipital lobes.”

Most curious are the later views of Sir VICTOR HORSLEY, who said: “Dog, monkey, and man have large occipital lobes. Emotional disturbance commences in the frontal lobes of the brain; intellectual disturbance commences in the occipital lobes. In a complete intellectual operation the whole brain energises.”

S. SERGI, Jr. (1909) brought out the fact that the development of the frontal lobe is not in ratio with the degree of intellectual development, and that the highest races are characterised by predominating development of the parietal and occipital lobes.

SCHÄFER, as has been shown, also favoured the occipital lobes, on the ground that they are the “sensory” region and all knowledge is derived from sensation. (!) Indeed, a physiological text-book, used in a great number of medical schools, repeats the words of Hughlings Jackson (British Medical Journal, 1894), that experimental physiology lends no support to the view that the frontal brain is the organ of the intellectual faculties, as the sensory centres (and sensations are the materials for intellect) are situated behind or within and not in front of the Rolandic area.
According to this view, as we have already explained, all the different talents are simple modifications of one or more of the five senses. But this view is wrong, not only psychologically, but also physiologically; for the different senses are located in different regions of the brain, and not all in one area. Only the sense of sight is supposed to be located in the occipital lobes. Besides, we must distinguish in the act of vision between the mere perception of an object and an intelligent knowledge thereof as to its nature and qualities. The centre of visual sensation is not necessarily the centre of perception. Perception is a complex act and consists not only of the visual impression, but of the impression of solidity, form, size, and position, which vision alone would never give without the aid of the other senses. Perception, then, cannot take place in the occipital lobes. It must take place in higher centres, which WUNDT, in agreement with Gall, locates in the frontal lobes, and calls the centres of "apperception."

Some physiologists have declared—for instance, Sir BENJAMIN BRODIE (1783-1862)—that the posterior lobes are wanting in animals, which as regards intelligence are placed below man, but this is not the case. We have already mentioned that most animals—the elephant, the seal, the dolphin, the ape, etc.—have the cerebellum as much covered by the posterior lobes as man. The error has its source in the position of the head, which is more or less horizontal in most animals and vertical in quadrupna and man. The error is due also to the relation of the constituent parts of the brain being determined by anatomists after its removal from the cranial cavity, and with its base resting on a flat surface, such as a plate. By a procedure of this kind a very incorrect estimate is formed, for great displacements of parts ensue, especially in the lower mammals. As Sir WILLIAM TURNER pointed out (Royal Society, Edinburgh, Proceedings, 1865-1866): The medulla, instead of being more or less oblique, is placed horizontally, and causes the cerebellum to be tilted upwards. The arched form of the base is almost entirely destroyed. The displacement is still greater if, at the same time, the membranes are removed. The observations should be made without removing the brain from the cavity of the skull. By removing carefully with the bone forceps the posterior part of the skull a view may be obtained of the cerebellum and cerebrum as they lie in situ. Owing to the transparency of the dura mater in many of the lower mammals, the relation of the structures to each other may be studied, either with or without removal of the membranes.

In man, the olfactory nerves are covered by the anterior lobes of the brain; in quadrupeds, they lie in front of them entirely. The olfactory nerves of man are separated from his brain; in the greatest number of quadrupeds they are united to the anterior convolutions. But are the anterior lobes therefore wanting in quadrupeds? Then why should the occipital lobes be wanting because they do not cover the cerebellum?

If the theory of the posterior lobes were correct, we should find a large posterior region in the more intellectual races, but this is not the case. We shall show further on that the reverse is the case, the anterior lobes being well developed where intellectual ability is marked.

Now, the reader has his choice of the organ of the intellect: in the frontal, upper parietal, lower parietal, temporal, or occipital lobes, or the entire brain. So exact is modern "science"! It would seem as if each experimenter set out with a preconceived notion, and discovered what he expected to find. Leading articles in the medical and lay journals of the seventies were hailing victorious vivisection which would ultimately win anatomical solutions of man's moral and spiritual mysteries; but it is ridiculous to go to the scalpel for an adequate account of a mother's love. She loves, not her brain. Her love is not a function or secretion, although it requires a brain, and, in my opinion, a special part of the brain, to manifest itself. Because these experimenters failed with their electrical stimulations, their ablutions and cauterisations of brains of rabbits, dogs, monkeys, and other animals to discover a centre for affection, veneration, or fear, or anger, their verdict is: they are non-existent; Gall was a mere quack, unworthy of serious
consideration. Gall's name is rarely mentioned in a text-book, unless it be to show his ignorance. He did the easiest and simplest thing possible: he looked at the heads of his fellow-men to see what part of the head is prominently developed in men of undoubted intellect, and what part is defective in the mentally deficient. Had he confined himself to this method, criticism would be justified; but he sought for proof of his observations in clinical cases whenever he had the opportunity. No "scientist" would lower himself to observe what is so commonplace, so we go on dissecting and vivisecting, and get no further. It is by clinical observation alone that we shall get any results; experiments may afterwards confirm or disprove our observations, but they should not precede the investigation. That is my conviction after a thorough study of the subject.

This chapter, more than any other, shows the limitations of science. Specialists and experimenters, self-imprisoned within the walls of their laboratory, in their eager desire for exact knowledge and plain demonstrable facts, are apt to lose the outlook over the whole field of life from its windows, and do not get an adequate breadth of view including all spheres of thought. It is for this reason that I have embodied in this treatise all the work done in science and philosophy from the earliest records to the present day.
CHAPTER XXI

HISTORY OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE MINUTE STRUCTURE OF THE BRAIN

The surface of the human cerebrum is thrown into a series of tortuous folds or convolutions separated by slits or fissures, and both combine to give it an appearance of great complexity. These convolutions were long considered to present no definite arrangement, but to be thrown together in meaningless disorder. During the latter half, or rather more, of the last century it has, however, been shown by the many eminent men who have given their attention to this subject that the pattern which is assumed by the convolutions, while showing many subsidiary differences, not only in different races and different individuals, but also in the two hemispheres of the same person, is yet arranged on a consistent and uniform plan in every human brain, and that any decided deviation from the plan results in an imperfect performance of the cerebral function.

The physicians in Gall's time were surprisingly ignorant of the anatomy of the hemispheres. Gall was the first to show their convolutional arrangement, in place of the brain pulp of PROCHASKA; even his successors could see no order, and confined themselves to describing the seat of a lesion roughly as being in the anterior, middle, or posterior lobes. It remained for LEURET and GRATIOLET to demonstrate clearly that there was an orderly plan in the convolutions of the brain which could be traced from the inferior mammals, through the ape up to man. Both these anatomists were opponents of Gall's doctrine.

FRANÇOIS LEURET (1797-1851), of the Asylum of Bicêtre, in his "Anatomie Comparée du Système Nerveux," 1839, demolished Gall's doctrine (said Maudsley); but the chief argument, I can find, is that according to Leuret, "the sheep has the most perfect brain in the animal kingdom, excepting the elephant and the ape." Leuret protested also against the propaganda in favour of Gall's doctrine by his colleague G. M. A. FERRUS (1784-1861) and his publication of clinical cases in its confirmation. He was also against J. B. M. PARCHARPE (1800-1866), who claimed to have observed wasting of the grey matter of the brain in chronic dementia, on the ground that Parchappe had omitted to measure the amount of substance wasted, and had omitted to make comparison with a normal brain.

PIERRE GRATIOLET (1815-1885), French naturalist and anthropologist, appointed Professor of Anatomy in Paris (1863), wrote in 1854 his "Mémoire sur les Plis Cérébraux de l'Homme et des Primates." He held that "size of brain has scarcely any direct significance in individuals or races," and that "the doctrine of specialisation of function is false in application and principle." Broca combated this opinion. But Gratiolet admitted that the different senses must have their organs in the brain, and, like his predecessors of the Middle Ages, sought for a central point where the impressions conveyed by the senses are united, and for this sensorium commune he suggested the centrum ovale. He said:

"It is legitimate to assume that there are as many distinct regions in the cerebral hemispheres as there are different organs of sensation at the periphery of the body. Thus we have the brain of the eye, the ear, and so on; and in each of these brains it would be easy to locate a memory and an imagination. But where are we to
DISCOVERY OF THE MINUTE STRUCTURE OF THE BRAIN

locate general intelligence? If there were several organs, several brains, of what use would they be to one another? How, for instance, could the brain of the ear assist the brain of the eye? The anatomical conditions of these associations and of this synergy lies perhaps in the numerous commissures which, since they unite all the convolutions of a hemisphere in the most perfect manner, determine the fundamental unity of the brain. Is the intellect simultaneously in the centrum ovale and the layers of the cortex, or is it seated in the latter exclusively? I doubt whether in the physiology of the intellect it is possible to neglect the centrum ovale with safety. Admitting, however, that the intellect has the whole brain for its organ, is it not activated at all points of the brain in the same way?"

The researches of these great observers, and especially of their successors, ECKER, BROCA, and GROMIER, by mapping out for us the morphology of the external surface of the brain, removed the chief anatomical obstacle, and made it possible for us to describe accurately the precise location of any lesion. The scholarly work of ALEXANDER ECKER (1816-1887), Professor of Anatomy in the University of Freiburg in Switzerland, on "The Convolutions of the Human Brain," 1869, and that of GROMIER, entitled "A Study upon Cerebral Convolutions in Man and Monkey," did much to lead men out of the labyrinth, which draughtsmen represented very much as they would a dishful of macaroni. But if there is an orderly arrangement of the convolutions, the fact points to an orderly arrangement in the psychical functions. This is the view taken by Ecker in the work mentioned. He gave due credit to Gall’s doctrine and committed himself to it without reserve. He wrote:

"That the cortex of the cerebrum, the undoubted material substratum of our mental operations, is not a single organ, which is brought into play as a whole in the exercise of each and every psychical function, but consists rather of a multitude of organs, each of which is subservient to definite mental processes, is a conviction which forces itself upon us almost with the necessity of a claim of reason. The hypothesis set up in opposition to it, of a single organ for carrying out the multiplicity of psychical functions, would present about an equivalent point of view to that of 'vital force,' which has received its coup de grâce. If, however, as we conceive to be an undoubted fact, certain portions of the cortex of the cerebrum subserve definite mental processes, the possibility is at once conceded that we shall some day arrive at a complete organography of the surface of the brain—a science of the localisation of the psychical functions. Such a science, that is, a knowledge of the psychological organs of the brain, in all their relations, is certainly one of the most important problems for the anatomy and physiology of the next century, the solution of which will work no small transformation in psychology."

Previously to Ecker, in 1866, Sir WILLIAM TURNER (1832-1916), F.R.S., observed in "The Convolutions of the Human Cerebrum Topographically Considered," that:

"The precise morphological investigations of the last few years into the cerebral convolutions have led to the revival in Paris of discussions in which the doctrine of Gall and his disciples—that the brain is not one, but consists of many organs—has been supported by many new arguments, and the opinion has been expressed that the primary convolutions, at least, are, both morphologically and physiologically, distinct organs."

Later, in the "West Riding Lunatic Asylum Medical Reports," Sir William Turner acknowledged that "the primary psychical functions, and probably all of them, are related to circumscribed centres of the cortex of the cerebrum."

So long as Flourens' theory of the unity of the brain prevailed, the microscopical structure of the different convolutions was regarded as uniform; but with the discovery of the speech centre, and still more so after the discovery of the motor Vol. 1.]
centres, in the early seventies, interest in the minute anatomy of the brain was aroused, and this led to a new science—brain histology—with a host of eminent investigators: Lockhart Clarke, Bevan-Lewis, Meynert, Betz, Ramon y Cajal, Nissl, Golgi, Deiters, Donders, Weigert, Kölliker, Edinger, Waldeyer, Campbell, Bolton, Elliot Smith, Mott, Oskar Vogt and his pupils Déjérine and Brodmann. Their researches have demonstrated that the cortex, far from being of a velvety, equal structure throughout, as GEORGE HENRY LEWES (1817-1878), in his criticism of Gall’s doctrine, still described it, shows the most distinct differences in all its parts, either in the number of strata, or in the quality and number of the cellular elements of which these strata are formed. Not only so, but the boundary line between one cortical type and another is very often abrupt and distinct.

By the employment of refined histological methods it has been shown that the grey matter in the cortex of the hemispheres and in other parts of the brain is the seat of an enormous number of nerve cells, and that those in the cortex present many variations in form and size. Further, that these nerve cells give origin to nerve axial fibres, through which areas in the cortex become connected, directly or indirectly, either with other areas in the same hemisphere or with parts at the base of the brain, and the spinal cord.

With the microscope, C. G. EHRENBerg (1795-1876) made in 1833 the first discovery of a nerve cell in a spinal ganglion. Four years later, J. E. PURKINJE (1787-1869), of Breslau and Prague, the discoverer of the germinal vesicle in the egg of higher animals, demonstrated that the grey matter of the cerebrum and cerebellum is made up of nerve cells and their fibres, and discovered among other things the pear-shaped ganglionic cells in the cerebellum, named after him. In 1846, the “neuroglia,” the network in which the cells are embedded, was discovered by RUDOLPH VIRCHOW (1821-1902), of Berlin, pupil of Johannes Müller. In 1850, A. V. WALLER (1816-1870) discovered the “Law of Wallerian Degeneration,” which showed that the nerve fibres are simply prolongations of the cells from which they receive their nourishment. In 1856, HERMANN WELCKER (1822-1897), of Halle, introduced the microtome for brain sections. In 1863 followed the classical researches of OTTO DEITERS (1834-1863), published in his “Untersuchungen über Gehirn und Rückenmark” (Brunswick), distinguishing between the nerve processes. In 1864, J. A. LOCKHART CLARKE (1817-1880) showed that there is in each part of the grey cortex a specific architectonic plan, according to which the brain cells are placed. In 1874, P. F. BETZ (1819-1894), was the first to show that the motor area of the brain contained a limited number of cells larger and more voluminous than any other part of the cortex. This was confirmed by Wm. BEVAN-LEWIS (“Proceedings of the Royal Society,” 1878), who showed that the anterior central convolution contained giant pyramidal cells in groups.

JOS. GERLACH (1820-1896), of Erlangen, in 1848, maintained that the cells and fibres constituted a continuous tissue, in which each part is uninterruptedly connected with every other. This was disproved by CAMILLO GOLGI (1844-1914), professor at Pavia, who made also improvements in technical methods and research and proved the nerve cell to be a comparatively independent unit (“Sulla fina anatomia degli organi centrali del sistema nervosa,” 1883). W. WALDEYER (1836-) professor in Berlin University, in 1891, was the first to use the term “neurone” for the brain cell. He, as well as ALBERT v. KÖLLIKER (1817-1905) and RAMON y CAJAL, the eminent Spanish histologist, of Madrid, “Les nouvelles idées sur la structure du Système Nerveux,” Paris (1895), and others greatly extended the knowledge of the minute anatomy of the brain.

The neurone, the elementary unit of the nervous system, is formed of a nucleus and prolongations which sometimes are of considerable length and differ morphologically and functionally. Some of these prolongations, possessing a structure
DISCOVERY OF THE MINUTE STRUCTURE OF THE BRAIN

closely resembling that of cellular protoplasm—the protoplasmic processes—are, generally speaking, numerous, relatively short, and ramify in the ganglionic mass in which the cell body lies. They subdivide repeatedly like the branches of a tree and from this feature—forming arborisations—they are called dendrites. Another and thinner process, almost if not always single, is clearly seen to spring from the cell body, and splits up sooner or later into fine fibres, which in their turn may undergo further subdivision. This is the nerve process, neurite, axon, or axis-cylinder process. Although the neurones have one structural plan and are all provided with a cell body, dendrites, and an axon, nevertheless these organs differ immensely one from another in length, richness of ramifications, and in a thousand other morphological particulars.

The neurone—with its differentiated processes, its definitely organised reticulum and definitely arranged granules of various nature, its nucleus and nuclear network and chromatic filaments—is the most complex unit of the human body, and each neurone is more intricate in structure than the whole cerebrum was supposed to be in Gall’s time. There are millions of these neurones in the cerebral grey matter, and these are not planted fortuitously, but they are definitely arranged, and, according to the current hypothesis, each neurone is a separate organisation. Altogether, the histological study of the brain is now absorbing more attention than the naked eye anatomy. Microscopy has replaced macroscopy.

J. SHAW BOLTON distinguished five primary laminae or layers in the cortex of the brain, as follows:

1. The outer fibre lamina or superficial layer;
2. The outer cell lamina or pyramidal layer;
3. The middle cell lamina or granule layer, which is almost wanting in the cortex of the ascending frontal convolution, whereas in the occipital region it is of great depth and is even duplicated;
4. The inner fibre lamina, which in certain regions contains such bodies as the Betz cells and the solitary cells of Meynert;
5. The inner cell lamina or polymorphic layer.

Bolton’s contributions to the pathology of insanity are of inestimable value; and so also are those of Sir FREDERICK MOTT, who is also distinguished as a psychologist. Already, in 1883, BEVAN-LEWIS (British Medical Journal, 1883) had pointed out the directions in which studies in cerebral localisation might advance our knowledge of insanity. He held that the localisation of cerebral function was the outcome of the great principle of evolution carried to its logical issue; that the alienist should rivet his attention upon the changes undergone by the material substrata of the mind; that he should strictly and closely study the objective manifestation of mental activity; that he should learn to examine the various limited lesions of the cortex as to area, depth, localised atrophy, relative bulk of convolutions, and tracts of ascending and descending degeneration.

But if the various cortical regions are characterised by an individuality of structure, by which it is easy to identify them, it is an additional proof of the plurality of mental functions, first formulated by Gall. Histology has also confirmed his view of the structure of the grey matter of the brain, the fibrous processes of the cells, and the fibrous structure of the white matter; and confirmed his view of the grey matter being, amongst other things, nutritive in function, and the nerve fibres conductors. We should therefore have expected a revival of Gall’s doctrine adapted to our modern knowledge, but once condemned, always condemned; and histologists preferred, like the vivisectors, to construct their own, a "new" phrenology, forgetting that just as thought cannot be lifted from the brain with a dissecting-knife, so the mysteries of psychic phenomena cannot be resolved by examinations of brain sections under the microscope. When we examine with the
most scrupulous minuteness all the properties of the "neurone," no sentiment can be perceived slumbering in its meshes, no half-formed ideas starting from its processes.

Histologists have tried to discover the uses of the different parts of the brain; but unaided examination of structure has never yet been sufficient to reveal the functions of an organ. We might dissect the optic nerve till the crack of doom, without being enabled, by that means alone, to demonstrate that its use is to convey visual impressions from the eye to the mind. It is by observing the concomitance of the faculty of vision with the existence and development of the nerve, and the effect of its diseases in destroying sight, that we arrive at the discovery of its function. Having once made the discovery, anatomy steps in to confirm its truth, by showing its consistency with the relations of the nerve to the eye on the one side and the brain on the other. It is the same with the nerve of hearing, with the nerves of sensation and motion, and, indeed, with every part of our bodily structure. We might dissect them all for centuries, apart from observation of living phenomena, without being thereby enabled to discover their uses. Even the structure of a muscle, plainly as it speaks after we perceive its function, does not, of itself, suffice to teach us that its office is to contract. It is by observation of the actual concomitance of contraction and structure that we first ascertain the fact. Dissection may prove the compatibility of function and structure, after the function is revealed by observation, or disprove an alleged function, by showing its incompatibility with well ascertained structure.

The greatest physiologists, on various occasions, have laid stress on the inadequacy of anatomy, even the most delicate microscopic anatomy, to elucidate the modality of the functions. This was one of the ideas dear to FRANÇOIS MAGENDIE (1783-1855), and especially to his pupil CLAude BERNARD (1813-1878), who never tired of repeating that histology can do nothing, or next to nothing, for physiology, and that the knowledge of a form in no wise implies the knowledge of a function. Even if we are able to describe minutely the form of a cell and the complicated network of the different granules which constitute it, we shall not have got much further towards knowing its proper function. It was limited in its usefulness, yet medical men believed that microscopic anatomy, normal or pathological, would make everything plain.

It was natural that histological examination should be applied to the brains of the insane, but without any theory to guide us we cannot learn much from it for the present. Its only use has been in amentia and dementia, which are conditions which may affect the whole brain; and in the latter the brains are so disorganised that one cannot seize upon any one circumscribed lesion. It is only in cases when an intercurrent disease carries off the patient prematurely that one can expect post-mortem evidence that will be of demonstrative value.

It was CARL WERNICKE (1848-1905) who first invented a microscopic phrenology. In his opinion the various layers of cells have different functions. On the top floor, i.e., in the most external layer, he located "bodily consciousness"; on a lower floor, i.e., in a deeper layer, that of the "external world," and in the basement, i.e., quite down, that of "personality." EMIL KRAEPELIN was of the same opinion. The psychological error of Wernicke and Kraepelin in assuming a general abstraction of higher and lower psychical activity was well criticised by L. EDINGER (1855-1918), who, in his "Vorlesungen über den Bau der Nervösen Central-Organe," Leipsic, expressed Gall's view that in place of these general abstractions:

"We are accustomed to distinguish the mental capacities of a man, not as a whole, which would not be possible to estimate as a total, but we generally estimate him by some distinguishing characteristic, which procured for him renown, position,
DISCOVERY OF THE MINUTE STRUCTURE OF THE BRAIN

etc.; such qualities may well depend on the development of single cortex areas, without being noticeable in the total general structure of the convolutions or the weight of the entire brain."

More curious still is EVANS ("Brain," vol. xvi.), who localised different functions in the granular, infra-granular, and supra-granular strata of brain cells, and saw in each of these layers of the occipital cortex the seat of the perceptions of one of the fundamental colours.

J. SHAW BOLTON held that the outer cell laminae of the cortex subserve the associative, psychic, or educative functions of the cerebrum, in contradistinction to the inner layers, in which are localised the organic and instinctive functions. By years of patient micrometric measurements of the depth of the several cell layers in the cortex, he has arrived at the conclusion that the physical explanation of mental defects and disease is to be found in imperfection of neuronic development on the one hand and in neuronic degeneration on the other. He finds that a definite relationship exists between the depth of the pre-frontal cortex and the degree of amentia and dementia. He considered it proved (Journal of Mental Science, April, 1905) that:

"The great anterior centre of association of Flechsig in the pre-frontal region is under-developed on the one hand in all grades of primary mental deficiency, and on the other hand undergoes primary atrophy pari passu with the development of dementia. This region of the cerebrum is therefore concerned with the performance of the highest co-ordinating and associational processes of the mind. . . . The pre-frontal cortex is the last region of the cortex cerebri to develop; it possesses the highest associational functions, and is the first to undergo retrogression. The pyramidal layer in this region is under-developed in the various grades of amentia; it varies somewhat in depth in normal individuals, and it undergoes retrogression in the various grades of dementia."

Again, different observers cannot agree. A. W. CAMPBELL opposed Bolton. In Campbell's opinion (Journal of Mental Science, October, 1904): "The pre-frontal area is not of much importance. . . . Its destruction gives rise to no effect at all." In his investigations on the localisation of cerebral function, he came to the conclusion that the importance of the pre-frontal region was exaggerated; that on histological grounds—inferiority of nerve cell and fibre supply—it could not be held to share the functional importance of the better developed frontal cortex placed further back; and he expressly declared that "although it may have a future in front of it, at present its evolution, both structural and functional, is incomplete."

BOLTON, however, has combated these views, basing his reason also on the results of minute histological investigation. He has shown, as has been mentioned above, that the pre-frontal is the last region of the cerebrum to be evolved, and the first to undergo dissolution in mental decadence. He has apparently demonstrated that it is the chief focus of sub-evolution and dissolution of the cerebrum occurring in amentia and dementia; conditions, the characteristics of which are decrease, instability, and loss of voluntary control over the processes of cerebral association. That there is no uniformity among histologists, even with reference to fundamental questions, is shown by K. BRODMANN, in his work on "Vergleichende Lokalisationslehre der Gehirnrinde," Leipsic, 1909. It may be sufficient to point out that each observer has given his own nomenclature and interpretation, and that the number of layers of cells described varies from five to nine. According to Brodmann, six is the correct number of cell-strata in the cortex of men and mammals.

BRODMANN made the magnificent discovery that throughout the mammalian
series there occurs **in definite localities of the cortex the same characteristic structural formation**, so that we can define homologous areas in the different animals, varying only in extent. From the primitive unstriated cortex a morphologically differentiated striated cortex is developed, which on transverse section shows a number of distinct regions of peculiar structure varying *firstly* as regards thickness, *secondly* as to the appearance of the cells in the various layers, and *thirdly* in quality. The cortex contains, therefore, a multiplicity of organs, of differentiated structural complexes, which we are led to assume from the analogy of other organs to have separate functions, so that the work hitherto performed by the whole brain is now split up and localised, the more precisely the higher the animal in creation. This process of division of labour is still going on.

Although these structurally differentiated areas are common to man and animals, there is yet an insurmountable bridge between man and even the highest apes, and HUXLEY’S statement that the orang-outang is nearer man than the lower ape in brain formation is not correct. For man, unlike any mammal, is a "brain animal," that is to say, he is distinguished by the mass of brain above all other distinctions. According to HENNEBERG and WAGNER, the area of a hemisphere of the brain measures 110,000 mm., whereas a hemisphere of the orang-outang measures only 50,000 mm., and that of a lower ape like the macacus measures 30,000 mm. But it is not only as regards the quantity of brain that man differs enormously from the nearest mammal, the higher ape, but also as regards the thickness of the grey matter, its inner structure and its topographical differentiation. In these respects, too, the orang-outang is nearer the lower ape than he is to man. O. VOGT distinguished 100 myelo-architectonic areas in the whole cortex, of which 50 are in the frontal lobes alone, whereas TH. MAUSS (*"Journal of Psychology and Neurology," 1908), distinguished thirty-two corresponding areas in the lower monkeys and forty in the orang.

**G. ELLIOT SMITH**, Professor of Anatomy in the University of Manchester, and K. BRODMANN discovered twenty-four distinct areas on the surface of each hemisphere of the brain, having identical anatomical structure in man and mammals. These areas are:

**Frontal Region.**
1. Area præ-frontalis ;
2. " fronto-polaris ;
3. " frontalis granularis ;
4. " frontalis intermedia ;
5. " orbitalis ;
6. " triangularis ;
7. " opercularis ;
8. " frontalis media.

**Temporal Region.**
1. Area ecto-rhinalis ;
2. " occipito-temporalis ;
3. " tempororo-polaris ;
4. " temporalis inferior ;
5. " temporalis media ;
6. " temporalis superior ;
7. " para-insularis ;
8. " temporalis transversa interna ;

**Parietal Region.**
1. Area præ-parietalis ;
2. " parietalis superior ;
3. " supra-marginalis ;
4. " angularis.

**Occipital Region.**
1. Area striata ;
2. " occipitalis ;

This topographical differentiation of areas is the first and most important step towards localisation. We have seen that earlier histologists made localisations too, not according to areas, but according to the various layers of the cortex, and the appearance of their cells; thus attributing specific motor function to the giant pyramidal cells, which Brodmann shows is not correct, and by designating the different strata of cells with terms describing physiological or psychical functions,
such as "sensory," "perceptive," "association," "projection," "commemorative," and "psychical" strata. "Such and similar terms," says Brodmann, "which one meets on every step, especially in modern psychiatrical-neurological literature, have no foundation; they are pure fiction, and serve no other purpose than to create confusion."

After this statement, and considering the valuable work done by Brodmann, it surprises one to find that he is absolutely against the theory of localisation of mental function; indeed, that he sides with FLOURENS, that "for every psychical action the whole brain is at work, and that whatever psychical process is lost is made up again by the remainder of the brain." However, he gives himself a loophole of escape from an otherwise untenable position by admitting the possibility that complex psychical states may be connected as a "resultant" with certain definite areas, having, so to say, a "predilection" for them, but they are never the product of a morphological or physiological centre.

I fail to see that it matters whether certain complex psychical functions have a "predilection" for a "circumscribed and histologically distinct" part of the cortex, or whether they are the "resultant" of numerous minor processes all over the brain, or whether all the elements of a complex psychical function are to be found associated with that particular centre or organ. Certainly, they are not the "product" of that organ, as Gall has made perfectly clear; that would be reverting to the purest materialism. The "mind" is not a product of the brain; but it is in some way associated with it, and the same can be said of its elements. What that relation really is no one is yet in a position to say; but that need not hinder us from recording our observations of certain functions being abnormally performed or inhibited in certain definite lesions of the brain. If we assume mind to be some sort of force, we can understand it producing different results according to the structure of a particular brain area. (See Chapter XXXIX.)

It is sufficient for our purpose that Elliot Smith and Brodmann have made out just such structurally differentiated areas in the brain as must exist if localisation of mental function is to be possible, that they admit that cells and cell groups are localised, and that certain symptoms are produced by definite lesions. This is something definite and undeniable.

**FLECHSIG'S ASSOCIATION CENTRES**

**THEODOR MEYNERT** (1833-1892) is claimed as the discoverer of what is called the projection systems of the brain (1886), and not J. B. LUYS (1828-1897), whose book he translated into German, but as we have already explained (Chapter XI.), Gall was the originator of them. This is admitted by FLECHSIG.

Meynert has described three such systems:

The first projection system consists of fibres which lead to and from the cortex cerebri; they pass in a radiate direction through the corona radiata, some traversing the basal ganglia, others forming connections with the cells of the central grey matter. In addition, there are commissural fibres of the corpus callosum and the anterior commissure, which are supposed to connect the two hemispheres; and connecting or associating fibres, which connect different areas of the same side with one another.

The second projection system consists of fibres of great variation in length, which run in a longitudinal direction downwards to the central grey matter. Some of these fibres end in this central grey matter, while others pass to the level of the lowest spinal nerves.

The third projection system consists of the sensory and motor peripheral nerves. In the medullary centre we have, therefore, three systems of nerve fibres: Projection fibre, Commissural fibre, and Association fibre systems.
Like Gall, Meynert ("Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie," vol. lx.) declared: "The paths of the sensory nerves run more towards the occipital, and those of motor nerves toward the frontal region of the cerebrum." Like Gall, he traced the motor nerve fibres from the anterior lobes of the brain to the anterior roots of the spinal cord. Like Gall, he claimed the intellect as related to the entire fore-brain, the seat of the mechanism for association and induction.

PAUL FLECHSIG (1847-) in "Gehirn und Seele," Leipzig, 1896, contends that Meynert ought to be grateful because Gall's careful anatomical investigations had prepared the way for his work:

"To Gall is due the merit to have proved by careful anatomical investigations that the white brain substance consists of various systems of conducting fibres and thus to have prepared the way for the views of the present day, especially for Meynert's projection systems."

This is how Meynert acknowledges his indebtedness to Gall ("Vierteljahrschrift für Psychiatrie," 1867, p. 77):

"Much more hopeful can we be some day to understand the functions of the brain, which must of necessity lead to the creation of an organology of the brain surface. We need not be afraid of it, because of Gall's swindle, for if two engage upon the same thing, it need not turn out the same, especially when we recognise the frivolous ambition of the man, who, according to Burdach's striking characterisation, 'did not want to be within the bond of science, or a link in its chain, but wanted solely to float on the surface,' as compared with our own exact, careful, scientific, psychological method."

Again, we find an eminent scientific authority relying on a second-hand judgment of Gall, and not taking the trouble to formulate his own opinion by direct investigation. And, again, the second-hand libellous criticism comes from a man who had good cause to be grateful to Gall, whose work he appropriated. This is what Gall, the man with the "frivolous ambition," who "wanted to float on the surface," wrote:

"I have never wished to be talked about. Whenever any one will convince me of the falsity of my discoveries, I shall be the first to announce it to the public. Truth is my object. I place it above all personal considerations. May all my adversaries follow my example... I regret, and always have regretted, that I dare not flatter myself that my undertaking will ever be continued in all its details, or that my exertions will be appreciated. Whoever is not impelled by an innate instinct of observation; whoever finds it hard to sacrifice his opinions, and the views he has derived from his earlier studies; whoever thinks more of making his fortune than of exploring the treasures of nature; whoever is not fortified by inexhaustible patience against the interpretations of envy, jealousy, hypocrisy, ignorance, apathy, and indifference; whoever thinks too highly of the force and correctness of his reasoning to submit it to the test of experience, a thousand times repeated, will never do much towards perfecting the physiology of the brain. Yet these are the only means by which my discoveries can be verified, corrected, or refuted."

Meynert was also opposed to Gall's localisation theory because memory is the common property of all cortical cells and fibres; which is exactly what Gall said.

Meynert based his doctrine on C. F. BURDACH, who, in "The Structure and Life of the Brain," 1826, tried to demonstrate the unity of brain and mind.

Gall had shown that the convolutions of the brain do not develop all at the same time, but gradually from infancy to adolescence. FLECHSIG was credited with this discovery, because he was able to confirm Gall's discovery by demonstrating
the process of myelination of the nerve fibres. Human embryology as regards the development of the brain was first studied by Gall, but in his time he could study it only macroscopically and without the aid of chemicals and staining agents. It was Meynert who suggested a re-investigation with the help of a new method, that of observing the order of myelination of the various tracts of nerve fibres and the precise time at which each reaches maturity. This was done by Flechsig.

Flechsig studied the human brain in both the foetus and the infant, paying special attention to the maturation of the conducting organs—the nerve fibres. On completion of their development the nerve fibres are clothed with a special substance, myelin, which on account of its special chemical constitution is easily demonstrated by specific reactions and elective staining. Now, the principal paths of sensation and motion, that is to say, the nerve paths which, proceeding from the periphery, reach the cortex, or leave this and extend to the motor organs—the so-called projection paths of sensation and motion—attain their maturity much sooner than those which unite different parts of the cortex with each other—the association paths. The fibres lying in the depth of the cortex likewise follow this law; so that in certain periods of development there are cortical areas containing mature fibres in relation with subcortical fasciculi of mature fibres, and other areas in which they are still entirely absent.

While the lower level of the brain appeared to be completely developed at birth, Flechsig found that the child, more especially when prematurely born, enters the world with altogether immature hemispheres, the fibres of which are almost entirely devoid of myeline sheaths, and therefore essentially different from those of the adult. While the lowest level of the brain is fully matured at the time of birth, only few nerve paths are found to exist in the hemispheres of the infant; and such as are there are exclusively intended for connecting sentient parts of the interior of the body and some external organs with the cortex. One sensory path after another advances from the surface of the body towards the cortex; the first in order being the olfactory sense, which is of so much importance for the proper selection of food; and the last being the sense of hearing.

It is only after these sensorial paths have been completely built up that a new development is seen to commence in an inverse direction. Some of them begin to advance towards the lowest level of the brain, the spinal cord, and the origin of the motor nerves; and thus one internal sensorial plane after another becomes supplied with conducting paths carrying volitional impulses to the muscles of the peripheral sense organs. First of all in this respect comes the sense of touch, the area of which is in the upper frontal and anterior parietal region.

The first zones to mature, then, are the centres of sensation and motion, the projection centres; the others, of late development, are centres of association, the seats of mnemonic images and of their combinations. In these centres it is also possible to recognize special periods at which maturation occurs.

Flechsig named the great sensory centre which receives the impulses associated with touch, pain, temperature, muscular sense, etc., the region of general body sensation or the somatic area (Körperfühlsphäre).

He distinguished four association centres:
1. The frontal brain proper;
2. A large portion of the temporal lobes;
3. A considerable area in the posterior parietal region;
4. The island of Reil.

We have thus four large and well-defined areas in the human brain which are not directly concerned with sensorial impressions from without or within, nor with motor impulses, but the activity of which is entirely directed inwards. Anatomically these areas have been found to possess a definite peculiarity, which clearly points to their mental nature, inasmuch as they remain immature and completely
devour of myeline for several months after birth, in opposition to the sensorial centres which have then already arrived at maturity.

It is only after the internal architecture of these latter has been completely finished that a new movement is seen to spring up in the mental centres; for new innumerable fibres begin to advance from the sensorial into the mental areas, and conducting paths proceeding from the former enter into communication with each other, and terminate close together in the cortex. These mental centres are, therefore, mechanisms, which co-ordinate the action of the different internal and external senses, so as to become higher units, and associate sensorial impressions of different kinds, so as to become carriers of the act of thinking.

The existence of "association centres," as defined by Flechsig, has been the subject of animated discussion, Ramon y Cajal, Edinger, and Hitzig declared themselves in favour of the hypothesis; while Déjérine, von Monakow, Siemerling, O. Vogt, and others pronounced the distinction altogether impracticable. There are no cortical areas, say these authorities, to which projection fibres cannot be traced; just as there are, by general admission, none which are not supplied with association fibres.

Flechsig ("Gehirn und Seele," Leipsic, 1896) practically adopts Gall's doctrine. All the fault he can find is in the terminology of the organs, such as "friendship," "benevolence," "wit," "firmness," etc. Yet, on p. 29, he speaks of the "amative propensity," of the "feeling of hunger and thirst," the "emotion of fear," which give impulses awakening memories connected with them as if by the touch of a magic rod.

On p. 31 he says: "Besides these propensities giving impulses, there are inhibitive feelings (the moral sentiments), so that these animal impulses may be eminently moral. When alcohol or disease affects the inhibitory centre of the intellect or the moral sentiments, then the low propensities, such as 'anger,' 'rage,' and 'fear' manifest themselves prominently. A healthy frontal association centre is necessary for the control of the sensal impulses."

Another sentence from Flechsig, in agreement with Gall, is: "The result of the action of physical impulses upon the cortex is a struggle between sensory impulses, and reason. As soon as the power of the mental centres is paralysed, the impulses are deprived of the mental control, and passion reigns unbridled."

Just as Gall posited different centres but claimed that they work together in complicated mental operations, so Flechsig says his centres for such purposes act together:

"In the most complicated mental operations all mental centres are likely to be acting together; they are connected with one another by an untold number of conducting nerve fibres. By far the largest portion of the medullary matter of the brain consists of millions of conducting paths, extending, it is estimated, over many thousands of miles, and connecting, first, the different sensorial centres amongst each other; secondly, the sensorial with the mental centres; and, thirdly, the mental centres amongst each other. It is only by the aid of such mechanism that unity of cerebral operations can be brought about."

Speaking of "moral insanity" (p. 32), he says a special characteristic of it is, besides the total absence of the social instincts, of "attachment" and "sympathy," an increased activity of the propensities. Just as in lesion of the intellectual association centre, such persons react easily and immoderately to slight stimulation of the propensities.

On p. 92 he says: "The 'inanition' psychoses are due partly to transitory inhibition and excitation of larger or smaller areas of the cortex."

He claims, like Gall, for each centre the general attributes of memory, judgment, etc.
DISCOVERY OF THE MINUTE STRUCTURE OF THE BRAIN

On p. 102 there occurs yet another paragraph which might have been written by Gall: "Genius depends not on degeneration but on a progression, that is, an abnormally large development of a circumscribed brain area as compared with the rest." Thus he even adopts the "bump" theory, and gives a practical example of it in locating the organ of "music" in the parietal ossification centres from study of the skulls of Beethoven and Sebastian Bach. Needless to say, the localisation is wrong. There is not the slightest evidence for it.

WILHELM HIS (1831-1904), professor of anatomy in the University of Leipsic, distinguished as an embryologist and anthropologist, called the attention of Flechsig to his observation that both Beethoven and Bach had highly developed parietal protuberances. These enormous "bumps"—to use the term employed by the opponents of Gall—in two such eminent composers, FLECHSIG suggests, would justify us in looking in the subjacent gyrus supra-marginalis for one of the essential factors of musical ability. Critics found fault with Gall's procedure, but here we have an exact repetition of it. Moreover, notwithstanding his hundreds of observations, and the thousands of repetitions by his followers, he was charged with arriving too hastily at conclusions. But Flechsig made a deduction based on two examples only. Again, what is Flechsig's observation, but that of a development of a "centre of ossification." And was it not said that the shape of the skull depended more on the strength of the muscles attached to it by reason of the traction and pressure they exercised upon the cranium, than on the development of the brain? Was it not contended that the inequalities of the skull bar us from judging of the development of the brain? Yet if these statements be correct they must hold equally good in this case. Is this the "new phrenology" which Flechsig would substitute for the old? Gall verified his observations made on the skull by post-mortem examinations of brains. Where are Flechsig's cases in support of this localisation? Cases do exist which prove the localisation of musical ability, but the loss of it—so-called amusia—was observed by Kast, Oppenheim, Hochwart and others, not in the supra-marginal gyrus, but in destruction of the anterior extremity of the superior temporal convolution.

If we look at Bach's skull, of which I have a photograph, we shall find that the parietal bone is only of normal or average development, and this corresponds with his character, according to Gall's theory, which was that of a prudent, circumspect man, who bore with any amount of injury and insult rather than give up his position, which might have plunged him into poverty. He acted through the emotion of fear modified by his highly developed intellect. (See Spitta's "Biography of Bach."

Beethoven apparently did have large parietal eminences, and assuming Gall's theory to be correct, he should have been a melancholic, and this he was. Already as a youth he was often morose and given to preferring solitude, being distrustful of man. As he grew older, this became more emphasised, and one can quote no better testimony in support of the theory that an excessively developed parietal area bears some connection with the melancholic state than Beethoven's own words, as conveyed in his last will. He there says: "For me there cannot be any recreation in the company of men. I must live an exile. If I get near company a burning anxiety overtakes me. Moral power alone has uplifted me in my misery. To it do I owe, in addition to my art, the fact that I have not ended my life by committing suicide." (See Schindler's "Biography of Beethoven.") For further evidence see Chapter XXX.
SECTION IV

HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE

CHAPTER XXII

HISTORY OF FRENCH AND ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY IN THE XIXth CENTURY

French Philosophy

M. F. MAINE DE BIRAN (1766-1824),

author of the Prize Essays "On the Influence of Habit upon the Faculties of Thinking" (1800) and "The Mutual Relation of Man's Moral and Physical Constitution" (1807), maintained that the affective life is independent of our will, though our will depends upon it. Many things take place in the soul which never come within the range of consciousness. Our humour changes, our attention flags, our self-confidence disappears or returns without our knowing how. This continual change of the states of consciousness—"the ever-revolving wheel of existence"—is the principal obstacle to the introspective method.

THÉODORE JOUFFROY (1796-1842),

the translator of the works of Reid and author of "Mélanges Philosophiques" (1833), may be called the last, and perhaps the most ardent, follower of the doctrine of the inner sense and of the introspective method, a doctrine and a method which were natural to a mind like Jouffroy's, entirely closed to external objects, and absorbed in its own "ego."

Man must be viewed and studied as a compound of two elements: a bodily whole and a person. The former is a natural production, under the influence of necessary laws and material impulses; the personality of human nature possesses that power by which all our internal faculties and energies are called into full activity and vigour, for the fulfilment of certain ends and purposes of our existence. This division necessarily makes human life appear under two distinct aspects: as an impersonal and a personal existence; each displaying a separate class of faculties and powers. These Jouffroy arranged thus: The personal faculty is that which directs the eye of the mind inwardly, takes cognisance of its ideas, classifies and divides them, and then brings them out in open day by an exercise of that which we denominate liberty or will. Then we have primitive inclinations, which are a collection of instincts, and constitutional tendencies and sympathies, which irresistibly impel us in certain directions. The locomotive power embraces the energetic movements of the body, through the influence of certain nerves and muscular actions. The expressive faculty is that of depicting our thoughts, ideas, sentiments...
and feelings to others, through means of signs and representations. Sensibility is a kind of passive power, indicative of our susceptibility of being agreeably or disagreeably affected by internal passions of desire, love, hatred, revenge, and the like. The intellectual faculties comprise all the more lofty principles and powers of thought, such as are connected with abstract reasoning on all branches of human speculation and knowledge.

AUGUSTE COMTE (1798-1857),

the celebrated French philosopher, was one of the distinguished members of the Paris Phrenological Society. He is known to us as the founder of "Positive Philosophy" (1830-42) and for having formulated the "law of the three stages" in the evolution of thought. He is also one of the founders of "sociology," which was to comprise all the sciences of the intercourse and interaction of men. Comte was convinced that religion is a social necessity, and, to apply the place of the theological religions which he pronounced to be doomed, he invented a new religion—the religion of Humanity.

For Comte metaphysics must be entirely eliminated; observation and experiment must be the basis of all knowledge. Wishing to reduce all science to objective knowledge founded on facts, he repudiated the introspective method in favour of external observation. The day of intuitions, a priori conceptions, entities, innate ideas is past. If a problem cannot be solved, it is to be let alone. Psychology is only a branch of physiology, and the latter a division of biology. In his opinion, mental processes can only be explained by means of the biological phenomena which attend them, and the best way to the solution of the problem lay in the doctrine of Gall.

Human knowledge has passed through three stages: one of faith or theology, the supernatural; one of conceptions or metaphysics, the abstract; and one of observation or positive science. The theological stage ascribes phenomena to supposed personal power, the metaphysical stage to abstract natural forces, and the positive stage of a science explains phenomena by their laws.

"From the study of the development of human intelligence, and through all times, the discovery arises of a great fundamental law, to which it is necessarily subject, and which has a solid foundation of proof, both in the facts of our organisation and in our historical experience. The law is this: that each of our leading conceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes successively through three different theoretical conditions—the theological or fictitious, the metaphysical or abstract, and the scientific or positive. In other words, the human mind, by its nature, employs in its progress three methods of philosophising, the character of which is essentially different, or even radically opposed, viz., the theological method, the metaphysical, and the positive. Hence arise three philosophies, or general systems of conceptions on the aggregate of phenomena, each of which excludes the others. The first is the necessary point of departure of the human understanding, and the third is its fixed and definite state; the second is merely a state of transition."

The supernatural is the first development. Man views the operations of nature through a religious medium; he "sees God in clouds, and hears Him in the wind." He peoples the hills and the valleys, the woods and the rippling streams, with genii and spiritual beings; and everything he cannot really comprehend he endeavours to account for by the agencies of supernatural powers. The history of astronomy affords many striking illustrations of this tendency of the mind. This infantile age of our race passes away, and ushers in another—the metaphysical—which deals in abstract conceptions and real mental entities. Here we meet with the numerous theories of the origin of the world, broached by the Pythagoreans and all the Eastern nations; in which light, numbers, harmonies, unities, and similar general conceptions of abstract powers or agencies, play a distinguished part. These, though but the feeble gropings of mental weakness and imbecility, gradually lay the
foundation for more solid acquirements. A scientific method emerges out of this pristine haziness; and this method is the positive, which embraces nothing but facts, which are traced to certain general principles, called laws of nature.

What science has to do is to obtain facts, and classify them according to certain rules or principles arising from the succession and similitude of things around us. There are five fundamental branches of knowledge in the positive sciences. First, astronomy, which displays the highest generalisation of the laws of matter and motion. Everything here is on a gigantic scale; and the movements of the heavenly bodies exercise a visible influence over terrestrial phenomena. Secondly, in mechanical combinations, and when we descend to material objects and agencies in our own globe, we perceive less order and regularity in their action than in the first science. Their results are more complex and diversified. Thirdly, the science of chemistry is replete with physical movements and powers of an extraordinary kind; and it terminates where life, in its simplest form, commences. The fourth science is biology, which comprehends all above unorganised matter; from the lowest vegetable production to man, the highest and most perfect of organised beings. The fifth and last science is sociology, or the philosophy of human nature. Here we find numerous questions of great complexity and uncertainty; chiefly arising from physiological and mental laws but very imperfectly understood.

Sociology originated with G. B. VICO (1668-1774), of Naples, and his work "New Science" (1725). The Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794), half a century later, independently applied the same general ideas, and inspired Comte. Sociology was finally established through the "Principles of Sociology" (1876) by Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), a century after Condorcet.

Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862), an English contemporary of Comte, also planned to evolve a social science inductively through a study of history, but with the help of economics and statistics. In his "History of Civilisation" (1857-61), he emphasised the influence of environment on mankind, and attempted to show how climate, food, soil, and the general aspects of nature were the dominant influences in early societies.

Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874), Director of the Royal Observatory at Brussels, a voluminous writer on many topics of physical science and principles of morals, to ascertain their bearing upon questions of social philosophy, also exercised a decisive influence upon our modern science of statistics by his calculation of probabilities, through which he was led to the conclusion that medical art exercised very little influence upon mortality. His principal treatises were: "Sur l'Homme et le développement de ses Facultés" (1835) and "Du Système Social et des Lois qui le régissent" (Paris, 1848).

Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911) introduced the statistical study of biological variation and inheritance in his work on "Natural Inheritance" (1889); now carried on so successfully by Karl Pearson (see "Biometrika").

Comte's large work, "Positive Philosophy," was translated in a condensed form by Harriet Martineau (1802-1876), herself a close student of Gall's doctrine (see her "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature" to George Atkinson, London, 1851). Comte, from the outset, acknowledged Gall as his authority and expressed his appreciation of Gall and his philosophy—the only philosophy that was worthy of Comte's admiration—and gave him credit for his efforts to make psychology a cerebral science. These are his words:

"In entering on this great subject, I find it specially incumbent to render due justice to my principal guide. From the first origin of true biological science Gall attempted to bring the higher and more difficult problems within its range, and thus effectually to shatter the last link which chained natural philosophy to metaphysical and theological systems. And this bold project he realised to a degree beyond all
that the most competent thinkers of his time had imagined possible. In a time when
the attributes of human nature were narrowed down by all existing schools to mere
intelligence, Gall boldly upheld in his own way the positive doctrine of the pre-
ponderance of the heart over the intellect, a truth indicated by the common instinct of
mankind, but unknown as yet to science. He dissipated, on the one hand, the
nebulous mental unity of psychologists and ideologists, by demonstrating the
plurality of intellectual and moral organs. And, on the other hand, he removed the
old biological error of attributing the higher functions to any but the cerebral
apparatus. To appreciate the importance and the difficulty of this latter service
we must remember that the passions were still referred to the vegetal viscera, not
merely by Bichâ't, who never had the time to examine the subject with sufficient
care, but even by Cabanis, who devoted much attention to it. At a time when
naturalists by common consent were devoting their whole attention to dead animals,
Gall took living actions, which he observed so admirably, as the foundation of his
principal analysis of propensities and faculties."

Comte pointed out as the two fundamental bases of Gall's doctrine "the innate-
ness of the fundamental dispositions" and "the plurality of the distinct and funda-
mental faculties," having previously stated that "no function can be studied but
with relation to the organ which fulfils it." He acknowledged that Gall endeavoured
to prove by "all the methods that physiology admits—from direct observation,
experiment, pathological analysis, the comparative method, and popular good
sense"—the stability of this much of his doctrine that "the brain is no longer an
organ but an apparatus of organs," and that "the proper object of physiological
psychology then consists in determining the cerebral organ appropriate to each
clearly-marked simple disposition, affective or intellectual; or reciprocally, which
is more difficult, what function is fulfilled by any portion of the mass of the brain
which exhibits the anatomical conditions of a distinct organ." He then explained
that Gall did not distribute the passions in the organs of vegetative life, the heart,
liver, etc., but to the brain, the seat also of the intellectual faculties. Comte then
dealt with the objection to Gall's doctrine, of the necessity of human actions, and
said: "It is only in mania, when disease interferes with the natural action of the
faculties, that fatality, or what is popularly called irresponsibility, exists," and that
"it is therefore a great mistake to accuse cerebral physiology of disowning the
influence of education or legislation, because it fixes the limits of their power."

But while Comte rendered due justice to the philosophical and biological parts of
Gall's work, he confused his physiological discoveries by making it appear that Gall
had first analysed the human faculties and then tried to discover their connection
with the brain; whereas Gall had first collected his facts regarding the connection
between the organic state of parts of the brain and certain fundamental attributes
of the mind, and then drew his deductions from them.

Moreover, Comte made it appear that Gall's collection of physiological and
pathological facts was merely a didactic artifice to justify his analysis of the human
faculties; whereas, in fact, Gall did not pretend to have discovered or enumerated
all the mental powers, and avowed furthermore his inability to indicate in all cases
the fundamental forces; even those which he deemed fundamental he admitted
might be found to be complex.

Comte strove to discover the fundamental faculties by a study of the human
progress as a whole, that is, by a study of sociology. This is done also at the present
day by numerous writers on "social psychology." Comte then proceeded to
localise the various fundamental qualities in different parts of the brain, in a totally
unscientific manner, namely, by a process of speculative reasoning and without
producing a single fact in support of such localisation. In his opinion, physiology
and pathology are incompetent to solve the problem of localisation of function. He
represented ("Positivist Catechism," 1852) the brain as appropriated to three orders
of functions: the preponderating portion of it, and more especially the posterior region, being given to feeling; the anterior portion to intellect; the central portion to activity. The feelings, again, he divided into two classes: the personal and the social. So far there is no serious difference between Gall and Comte. Even the arrangement of the faculties Comte made after what he calls the "idea" of Gall, forgetting that it was his "observation," not his idea. They are so arranged that their succession presents a developed series, being higher in quality and inferior in force according as we proceed from back to front. Comte thus appropriated the anterior extremity of the affective region to the social feelings, reserving the larger portion to the personal instincts; the hinder portion always belonging to the less noble propensity. The benevolent inclinations he placed in proximity to the intellectual organs.

Comte's classification is as follows:

1. Personal instincts (forming together the "heart."
2. Social instincts
3. The intellect (counsel).
4. The character (execution).

The personal instincts are divided into:

1. The instinct of preservation (a) of the individual; (b) of the race.
2. The instinct of improvement.

The nutritive instinct leads to the preservation of the individual; it is a strictly universal instinct, no animal supporting life without it. "There can be little doubt," says Comte, "as to where this instinct should be placed. The nutritive instinct should occupy the lowest position in the brain, as near as possible to the motor apparatus, and to the vegetal viscera. I would place it, therefore, in the median portion of the cerebellum, leaving the remainder of this large region to the reproductive instinct." By such a process of reasoning, as Comte here applies, the most difficult problems that science has to deal with could be disposed of within a short space of time.

There are two instincts for the preservation of the race: the sexual and the maternal.

The instincts of improvement are also two: the military and the industrial instincts; the one for the destruction of obstacles, the other for the construction of instruments.

Comte places the military behind the industrial instinct in the posterior cerebral region.

We have now to consider two intermediary affections:

1. Pride, or the love of power; and
2. Vanity, or the love of approbation,

the one aiming at personal ascendancy by force, the other by opinion. As regards the localisation: "The more personal of the two should be placed below the other; that is to say, by the side of the industrial organ; the other and more social being situated above that organ." Comte evidently had a high idea of the artistic designs, for he arranges his localisations to please both the eye and the understanding.

The higher propensities are three in number:

1. Attachment;
2. Veneration; and

The localisation of these three affections is just as arbitrary as the others. The highest median portion of the frontal division he assigns to Humanity; Veneration he places immediately behind it, and Attachment occupies a lateral position.

We have now to deal with the "speculative region." Comte says that with regard to the intellectual functions he differs from Gall almost as widely as Gall differed from his metaphysical predecessors. Here Gall was not helped by the study of the lower animals; hence he has gone astray. Here, again, Comte assumes that
Gall first constructed a system of faculties and then tried to localise them. Whereas Gall really made a number of observations respecting the brain, without any pretension as to an accurate analysis of the mental powers.

The first distinction in intellectual functions which Comte draws is that between the faculties of conception and the faculties of expression. The latter presupposes the first and is subordinate to it. In diseased states they are often separated, the one being exalted, the other lowered.

We have two sorts of conception, adjusted to each other, but still fundamentally distinct: one passive—contemplation: the other active—meditation. They both exist in a lesser degree in the animal kingdom.

Contemplation may be "synthetic," referring to objects; dealing with the concrete aspect of things. Or it may be "analytic," taking cognisance of events, and therefore abstract in nature.

The meditative function is decomposed into "induction" and "deduction"; two distinctions universally accepted.

The contemplative function he places in the lower portion of the frontal region, leaving the higher portion to meditation. Abstract observation he places in the median line, and concrete contemplation laterally to it; similarly deductive reasoning has a median location, and inductive logic a lateral position.

The fifth intellectual organ is language, under which Comte does not understand merely articulation of speech, but also cries and gestures. He places it in the middle of the anterior lateral margin of the frontal region, extending in the direction of the temple, midway between the eye and ear, its principal auxiliaries.

The faculties which constitute "character" proper are courage, prudence, and perseverance. Courage in undertaking, prudence in execution, firmness in accomplishment. No practical success can be attained without the union of these three qualities. He places these three faculties between his organ of veneration and his industrial instinct, "there being no other places available."

This completes the analysis of "The Human Soul" into eighteen faculties as follows:

1. Nutritive instinct
2. Sexual
3. Maternal
4. Military
5. Industrial
6. Pride
7. Vanity
8. Attachment
9. Veneration
10. Benevolence
11. Concrete Contemplation
12. Abstract
13. Inductive Meditation
14. Deductive
15. Language Expression
16. Courage
17. Prudence
18. Perseverance

It is a pity that Comte attempted to localise the faculties. In every other respect we ought to admire him for his courage in undertaking the solution of a problem which every other philosopher shrank from. It shows courage, too, to acknowledge his indebtedness to Gall in face of almost unanimous opposition.

In consequence of Comte's advocacy, French investigators are more favourably disposed towards Gall than those of any other nationality; at all events, Gall is rarely abused by them. Comte's school had many followers, and this has helped to sustain Gall's reputation. Indeed, a German alienist, Dr. P. NÄCKE, of Hubertusberg—a supporter of the tabula rasa theory—expressed his regret at the phrenological tendencies of French writers, giving quotations from Charcot, Magnan, Gilles de la Vol. 1].
Tourette, Féré, Lacassagne, Laurent, Bordier, Manouvrier, Corre, Richet, De Mayer, Duret, and Grasset in support of his statement.

Comte substituted for the metaphysical idea of the immortality of the soul the positive idea of incorporation into the "Great Being." Men whose behaviour has been deserving do not wholly die; they continue their existence in others by virtue of the continuity of society. Man has, therefore, two kinds of existence. During the first he participates in social life as an individual. If he undergoes this trial honourably, that is, if he subordinates in himself egotism to altruism, he enters after his death into a second existence, the better part of him is incorporated into the spiritual life of Humanity. This form of immortality is free even from the laws of space and number. This leads naturally to the commemoration of the dead, of those benefactors who have made humanity what it now is. Thus is established the religion of humanity.

VICTOR COUSIN (1792-1867),

author of "Histoire de la Philosophie" (1841), is known as the principal representative of the Eclectic School. He originated no new system, but took from all the schools what he thought best.

H. A. Taine (1828-1893),

philosopher and historian, wrote especially on art ("Les Philosophes Classiques du XIXme siècle," 1856). His chief merit in psychology is having turned to account the abnormal mental phenomena ("De l'Intelligence," 1870). The theory of the relation of genius and insanity, and that of the double ego or multiple personality, refer back to Taine. He accepted Flouron's doctrine of the unity of the brain.

TH. RIBOT (1839-1916),

is principally noteworthy for his analysis of mental phenomena, and for his ability in applying pathological data. His principal works are: "Les Maladies de la Mémôrre" (1881); "Les Maladies de la Volonté" (1883); "Les Maladies de la Personnalité" (1885); "La Psychologie de l'Attention" (1889); "La Psychologie des Sentiments" (1896); "Essay sur les Passions," etc. He established the "autonomous" theory of feeling in contrast with "intellectual" and "organic" theories. Feeling, emotion, sentiment, etc., is an original state, not dependent on presentation. It has its own independent revival, association, generalisation, and logic. It is not merely revived by an idea. "Like all general terms," Ribot says, "consciousness must be resolved into concrete data. Will, in general, does not exist, but volitions; and, in a like manner, there is no consciousness in general, but only states of consciousness. The latter are the reality." Values of all kinds are only constituents of states of consciousness, and have no reality apart from these states.

Ribot divides human sentiments into three principal groups:

1. The affective states, properly speaking, that express our appetites, inclinations, and desires that are inherent to the psycho-physiological organism of man. These states characterise normal life, preoccupying consciousness feebly or to a medium intensity.

2. Emotions characterised by abrupt and violent disturbance of the psychic equilibrium (fear, anger, amorous outbursts, etc.). These are reactions of the innate mechanism or manifestations of nature.

3. Passions are creations of man. Animals, children and primitive men have impulses, outbursts, but not passions. The first characteristic trait of passion is the idée fixe that constitutes their nucleus. An idée fixe becomes a passion when it
excites sentiments and tendencies to act. The second characteristic of passions is their intensity (love, gambling, etc.), in which wishes manifest themselves as acts and show no tendency to satiation. In static passions (hatred, cupidty, cold ambition, etc.) the intensity exists in a state of tension, often under the form of arrest of motion. The third characteristic is their duration. Even the shortest passions are of far longer duration than are pure and simple emotions. The difference between passion and emotion is like the difference between the acute and chronic. As Kant said: "Emotion is like water that breaks through its dyke, while passion is like a torrent that eats into its bed more and more profoundly."

ALFRED BINET (1857-1911),

like Ribot, wrote on abnormal psychology: hypnotism, double consciousness ("Les altérations de la Personalité," 1891), etc. The most important work of his colleague, CHARLES FÉRÉ (1852-), is "Pathologie des Émotions," 1892.

PIERRE JANET (1859-)

—not to be mistaken for PAUL JANET (1823-1899), an authority on the history of philosophy—is another distinguished writer on morbid mental phenomena. His chief works are: "L'Automatisme Psychologique" (1889); "L'État Mentale des Hystériques" (1892); and "Passions et Caractères" (1898).

HENRI BERGSON (1859-)

is the latest and greatest of modern French philosophers. The central idea of his philosophy is that of the eternal flux, of the incessant becoming. Living things, conscious or unconscious, with souls or without souls, are in endless, irreversible movement, in which no repetition is possible. The universe is not a completed system of reality, of which it is only our knowledge that is imperfect, for the universe is itself becoming. Everything is movement, is change, is becoming. Inert matter filling space, space that underlies matter as a pure immobility, do not exist. Movement exists, immobility does not.

Conscious life is a continuous growth. It is not a succession of states but an unceasing becoming. A thing that lives is a thing that endures, not by remaining the same, but by changing unceasingly. The intellect may look backward and perceive a succession of "moments," but life looks forward. Life is action, adaptation, utilisation. The intellect has been formed to serve the purposes of the activity which we call life. Knowledge is for life, and not life for knowledge.

Just as the events which the historian chronicles are marked out by the guiding influence of some special interest, so the intellect follows the lines of interest of the activity it serves. It marks in the flow the lines along which our activity moves. It selects. The intellect views the reality as solid things because that view serves our ends. It is a real world that the intellect reveals to us, a reality that is not relative to our understanding; it is reality itself, but it is limited.

Like the cinematograph, the intellect takes views across a moving scene, and these views are the things that present themselves to us as solid objects spread out in space, space that is unmovable, the reality in which things move. To grasp the reality it is necessary to restore the movement as the cinematograph does. The movement is life. The intellect is what gives to the world the aspect it bears to us. It gives us views of reality, views that are limitations of our apprehension, and that we mistake for limitations of reality.

We have the power of apprehending reality without the limitations that the intellect imposes; in the intuition of life we see reality as it is. Intuition is not a
special endowment of certain highly gifted minds, enabling them to see what is hidden from ordinary intelligence. It is a power of knowledge that we may imagine to exist in everything that lives, even in plants, for it is simply consciousness of life. It exists for us because consciousness is wider than intellect, because consciousness is identical with life. The intellect is formed out of the consciousness that is identical with life.

Bergson holds evolution to have taken place on three different lines: the line of automatism, exhibited in plants; the line of instinct, exhibited pre-eminently in the hymenoptera; the line of intelligence, exhibited in the vertebrates, and carried to its highest in man. At the basis of these modes of evolution, as at the basis of each particular living individual, is a general life force or impulse, urging the organisation to deal more effectively with the brute matter of environment. He holds ("Évolution Créatrice," 1907) that instinct is a sort of direct or "sympathetic" knowledge on the part of the animal, being in contrast with the "logical" form of knowledge seen in the intelligence. The view still commonly held that intelligence develops from instinct, or at least that there is some community between the last two, he regards as radically false and disproved by the facts of evolution. Instinct and intelligence, although sharply distinguished from one another, yet exist together in our consciousness in a very close and intimate union. For instinct is akin to that power of direct insight that we have called intuition. It is this power which philosophy must make use of for the solution of the intellectual puzzle. By so doing, and only by so doing, can we have a real metaphysic, a knowledge of things in themselves, a science that is beyond and before the sciences.

In man, where intelligence is supreme, instinct is practically lost as a guiding and directing activity. We find traces of it in the behaviour of infants and children and in natural dispositions, but the very word instinctive has come to denote the opposite of rational action and not the basis of it. The actions that we call instinctive in man are those that we seem to carry out without any interval of hesitation by a natural disposition without reflection or questioning, without interposing the perception of the relations or of the meaning of the actions, without the presentation to the mind of an end to be attained. They are not simple reactions to a stimulus, such as the vital functions of respiration, circulation, and the like; they are actions that imply awareness and conscious purpose, but they are direct spontaneous actions evoked by the presence of physical objects or of emotions. Many actions that are in their origin intelligent we call instinctive by analogy when they have become habitual and are unconsciously performed. Consciousness means an active attention to the work that is being performed, and this active attention seems to be a necessary condition of intelligence. Instinct is unconscious, is intelligence become automatic, and intelligence is always tending to become instinct. We may know a thing by instinct more perfectly than we can ever know it by intelligence, but it is intelligence alone that gives us the knowledge of relations, and it is this knowledge that gives us command over the wide field of activity that we possess.

The intelligence of man is not merely a vague power of adaptation; it is the capacity for fabrication, for making out of the inorganic, to some extent even out of the organic world, instruments for the satisfaction of his wants. The psychical capacity on which this power rests is man's power of detaching fixed things from the eternal flux. The tool that an insect uses is part of its bodily structure; it is far more perfect for its purpose than any human tool, and with it is always the special instinct that prompts the animal to use it. It has perfect skill, but is restricted to a very narrow range.

The function of the brain is to transmit movement, and its great complexity is to give us choice of movement. In order to choose, consciousness must perceive, but perceptions to be of use must come from the objects round us, among which our action is to take place. We perceive in the world around us not the whole of reality, but only that part which interests us on account of the action our body,
having received the stimulus, is likely to perform. Perceptions are movements from objects outside the body, which the body selects. Those movements that do not interest us with regard to possible action are reflected back; those that concern us pass in and are consciously perceived. If the nerves that transmit the movements to the brain are divided, the movements cannot reach the brain, there will be no perception and no motion of the body.

Bergson is a frank opponent of the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism, which he regards as in reality a metaphysical contention having no adequate experimental basis, however justifiable as a convenient working hypothesis. He ascribes to our inner life (mind or soul) an independent reality, and attributes the contradictory results of previous investigations to the misuse of such inadmissible categories as "unity," "multiplicity," etc., which have meaning only in regard to material things. Our intuitions regarding the soul cannot enter into the framework of everyday conceptions, classifications evolved for utilitarian and practical ends. The soul, he says, is not a thing but a movement, continuous, indivisible, neither one nor many. He regards positive thought as a faculty evoked by material necessities and, for speculative uses, initiated by a habit of breaking the free movement of life into a series of immobilised "states." Bergson does not believe that the cerebral functions are the equivalent of the mental life. He cites cases in support of his contention that the whole of our past is present en bloc in the mind of each of us. In conscious experience there is no perception without memory. As pure perception is wholly in the present, so pure memory is wholly in the past. The past is that which has ceased to act, it has not ceased to exist. It can be brought into consciousness from the unconscious.

The brain, as related to mind, he regards as a screen permitting to pass just those recollections which occasion requires. As related to the outer world it is, he says, the organ of sense, movement, and habit formation. He compares the brain, or, more generally, the body, to the point of a knife of which the soul or mind is the blade, or to the prow by means of which the vessel of life penetrates the billows of reality. In order to render conceivable the interaction of mind and body it is obviously necessary to conceive their natures as having something in common; the action of bare consciousness on bare matter seems quite out of the question. To meet this difficulty he suggests that mind may be conceived as in some sort extended, and even that matter may possess memory of a rudimentary kind. He regards life as a product of the entrance of soul or will into matter. The former, by attuning itself to the rhythm of material things, is, he believes, enabled to dominate them to a certain extent, and meanwhile to achieve for itself the definite individualism which it could not otherwise attain.

Free-will is not the liberty of choice that indeterminists have asserted and determinists have denied. Free-will is the very nature of our lives as individual wholes, the expression of the individuality of life. Our actions, even our free actions, follow from and depend upon our character, and our character is formed by circumstances, but is not external to us; it is ourself. But it is only at times that free action is called for. Our ordinary life is made up of actions that are largely automatic, of habits and conventions that form a crust around our free expression; it is only at moments of crisis or when we are touched with deep emotion that we seem to burst through this crust and our whole self decides our action.

ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY

DUGALD STEWART (1753-1828)

wrote a work on the "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of the Mind" (1828). He employed the word Reason "to denote mainly the power by which we
distinguish truth from falsehood, and combine means for the attainment of our end." He classified the "active powers" into "instinctive or implanted propensities" and "rational and governing principles." The instinctive propensities he further classified into appetites, desires, and affections; the rational principles into self-love, and the "moral faculty." As regards the relation of these to understanding or reason, he said: "Our active propensities are the motives which induce us to exert our intellectual powers; and our intellectual powers are the instruments by which we attain the ends recommended to us by our active propensities." The activity of reason "presupposes some determination of our nature," which will make the attainment of the ends, towards which our activity of reason is directed, desirable. Not only so, but these active propensities also largely determine the direction and extent of the development of our intellectual powers; and therefore, "in accounting for the diversities of genius and of intellectual character among men, important lights may be derived from an examination of their active propensities."

Most people regard musical ability and a genius for poetry or painting, and even for mathematics, as gifts of nature, bestowed only on a few. Though they require application and experience, yet these talents are innate. Stewart, however, argued, like Johnson, that these powers "are gradually formed by particular habits of study or of business." Similarly he maintained attention to be a primitive faculty, but not so imagination; for, he informed us, "what we call the power of imagination is not the gift of nature, but the result of acquired habits aided by favourable circumstances."

The appetites are distinguished by three characteristics: their originating from states of the body, their periodical and occasional, rather than constant, occurrence, and their feeling accompaniment of "uneasiness," which is "strong or weak in proportion to the strength or weakness of the appetite." The main natural appetites are three: hunger, thirst, and sex. The corresponding impulses—and the same is true as regards the "desires"—are "directed towards their respective objects," not to any pleasure that arises from their gratification. "The object of hunger is not happiness, but food; the object of curiosity not happiness, but knowledge." Nevertheless, as a result of the experience of pleasure, the mere gratification of an appetite may become the end, and thus we may have the development of many acquired appetites.

The desires differ from the appetites in that they do not take their rise from states of the body, nor do they possess the characteristic of periodicity or occasional occurrences—that is, they are more or less permanent. Of "natural" desires, five can be clearly distinguished: curiosity, the desire of society (gregarious instinct), the desire of esteem, ambition, and emulation. The gregarious instinct is natural, not derived from any perceived advantage to ourselves; children show the instinct "long before the dawn of reason." Similarly the "desire of esteem" is an original principle of our nature, showing itself too early to allow us to resolve it into a sense of the advantages which arise from the good opinion of others. Ambition or the "desire of power" covers several original tendencies of our nature, with the pleasure of activity (constructiveness) and with the desire of property (acquisitiveness), which last, according to his view, is a derived, not an original, principle.

The affections are divided into benevolent and malevolent. Of the former, parental feeling is a typical example; of the latter, anger or resentment. Four of the benevolent affections are discussed in some detail: natural affection, friendship, patriotism, and pity. They are not all original and unanalysable principles of action, but they are all founded upon original and primary instinctive tendencies. According to Stewart, imagination is not involved at all in sympathy.
THOMAS BROWN (1778-1820),

successor to Dugald Stewart in the chair of Philosophy in Edinburgh University, in his "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind," published in 1822 after the author's death, renounced the doctrine of association of ideas, and instituted suggestion in its stead, which is made to account for all mental phenomena; that is, that certain things have the power of "suggesting" or "creating" certain states or conditions of mind.

One of the chief principles laid down by Brown was that there are no independent or distinct powers of the mind, apart from the mind itself. These faculties or powers are only certain indications of states of mind, and cannot be said to be conversant about the objects of our mental perceptions, but are really in themselves all that we do know or ever can know of the mind itself. Having renounced the classification of mental phenomena of his predecessors, he framed one for himself, which embraced only two grand divisions: external affections and internal affections. The external states of mind comprehend all our sensations of whatever kind; and the internal states are divided into two branches, the one intellectual and the other emotional. Under the intellectual affections or states we have simple and relative suggestions; and under emotional states we have all the passions and desires. He considered the functions of the external senses dependent on the nervous system, but the other mental operations were, in his opinion, independent of organisation.

Brown followed to some extent Gall's lines, as, for example, in denying that perception, conception, attention and memory were fundamental powers of the mind. This was the opinion of his biographer and commentator, the Rev. Dr. WELSH, who wrote: "His greatest merit will be seen to consist in the near approach that he has made to many doctrines of phrenology, without the aid of the instrument that phrenology presents."

Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON (1786-1856),

a disciple of the philosopher Reid, was appointed to the chair of Metaphysics and Logic in the University of Edinburgh in 1837, a post for which George Combe was the rival candidate. His "Lectures on Metaphysics" were published in 1858, and his "Lectures on Logic" in 1860.

Hamilton divided the phenomena of mind into cognitions, feelings, and conative phenomena—which include volitions and desires. We know only the relations of things. Revelation, he held, supplements the knowledge which our faculties are too weak wholly to apprehend. Inevitably, he thought Gall's doctrine "implicit atheism—physical necessity—materialism." He asserted that Gall's localisations "were not discovered but invented"; that "in ignorance Gall was totally eclipsed by Spurzheim"; that the skull and brain do not agree in conformation; that "the whole of their very smallest organs were over the region of the frontal sinus"; and so on. Of more general interest are the following astounding statements: "In man, the encephalon reaches its full size about the age of seven" and "the cerebellum, in relation to the brain proper, comes to its full proportion about three years of age." According to him, "the African brain, and in particular that of the Negro, was found not inferior to the average size of the European; and consequently the former is equally capable of civilisation as the latter."

There was a long acrimonious correspondence, starting in the year 1826, between him and George Combe.
is the author of "Elements of Political Economy" (1821) and "Analysis of the Human Mind" (1826), which latter work is of interest to us here.

The power of association of ideas, and the art of giving things certain names, which constitutes the mechanism of speech, are two instruments which James Mill employed to account for almost every mental phenomenon. Association clusters and binds certain kinds of sensations and ideas into parcels of various dimensions, called complex notions; and these again, in a greater or lesser number, are made to run into tracts or paths, called trains of thought. Language enables us to communicate these complex notions and trains of thought to others of our kind; and here we have the whole framework of the "Analysis of the Human Mind." Sensations are ideas, which are copies or images of them; the power of sensations and ideas to cluster or run together; and the faculty of giving names to them; these are the elementary processes of the intellectual structure of man.

With these instruments the author entered into an analysis of various powers and faculties of the mind, such as conception, which is simply a general or abstract term for all mental phenomena whatever. Imagination is likewise a generic term for all trains of thought. All abstractions are purely concrete terms. Memory is not an original power or faculty: it is made up of two ingredients, the thing remembered and the idea of having seen it. The last ingredient is, however, analysed into three other component parts: my present remembering self; my past remembering self; and these being united by a certain train of consciousness, unite the two selves, which form a compound we call personal identity. Belief or conviction is of three kinds: a belief in real existence, a belief in the testimony of others, and a belief in certain axioms or propositions of science.

The active, in contradistinction to the intellectual, powers of man, are accounted for in this manner. We have sensations of a pleasurable and sensations of a painful cast; these produce their images or copies, called ideas; and thus we have ideas of an agreeable or disagreeable kind. Desires and aversions arise in consequence of these; and these give rise in their turn to all the various passions, emotions, and feelings in the human breast. The will is only another term for desire.

The power of reflection, maintained by Locke and many other metaphysicians of distinction, Mill considers as identical with simple consciousness. "Reflection is nothing but consciousness; and consciousness is having the sensations and ideas."

JOHN STUART MILL (1806-1873)

son of James Mill, besides being a political economist like his father, was a philosopher of the Positivist School. He was a critic rather than a constructive thinker, and was one of the most powerful advocates in modern times of what is known as utilitarianism, the greatest happiness theory.

According to Mill, mind and matter belong to two distinct realms, and are incapable of being compared, and "mental phenomena do not admit of being deduced from the physiological laws of our nervous organisation." We are not surprised that he wrote (in 1841) to Comte, who had called his attention to Gall's doctrine: "I avow that I have for a long time regarded this doctrine in its present condition as unworthy of occupying the attention of a genuine thinker, an idea in which I persisted until I learnt by your third volume that you adhere to phrenology at least in the main principles."

This correspondence on Gall with Comte had, however, one practical effect, in that it led to Mill's proposition of a general science of human nature under the title of "Ethology."
FRENCH AND ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY IN THE XIXth CENTURY

His "Logic" (1843) is regarded as the most important contribution to philosophy since Hume.

By Mill the relations of sense and thought were conceived much as Hume and Locke conceived them. There was the outside thing or object which we only know as "the permanent possibility of sensation"; there was the sense impression, which was lively, immediate, bearing in itself the evidence of its clearness and truth; then there came the idea, or thought, or conception abstracted from sense-impressions, the result of associations set up among the intimations of sense. Thus, thought was a transformed sensation; and sense-impressions, as acted upon by laws of association, explained all the furniture of the mind.

SAMUEL BAILY (1791-1870),
in his "Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind," London, 1855, had a fair criticism of the phrenological doctrine, of which, however, he adopted the main principles. He was more logician than psychologist.

GEORGE HENRY LEWES (1817-1878),
author of "History of Philosophy" (1845), and "Problems of Life and Mind" (1874-9), "The Physical Basis of Mind" (1877), etc., was the first in England to give special importance to the physiological problems connected with psychology. He was influenced in this direction largely by the popularity of phrenology in his day and by his companion MARY ANN EVANS (1810-1880), better known as "George Eliot," the celebrated novelist, who had been brought up in a phrenological atmosphere at Coventry by the Brays. Mr. CHARLES BRAY (1811-1884) was an ardent phrenologist, who had published several books on the subject, and Mrs. Bray (Caroline Hennell) wrote on hygiene.

From early womanhood, George Eliot was personally acquainted with George Combe. In October, 1852, she stayed with Mr. and Mrs. Combe in Edinburgh, and on other occasions both were guests in the house of a mutual friend. For her profound penetration and insight into the most intrinsic workings of human character, George Eliot was undoubtedly largely indebted to the phrenological philosophy of George Combe. In her letters there are numerous references to him and phrenology.

George Eliot induced Lewes to include "Gall" in his "History of Philosophy," and to deal with him fairly, which Lewes did; but he rejected Gall's doctrine, principally on the ground, now proved to be untrue, that the grey matter of the brain is of uniform structure, and can therefore have only one function. Lewes said:

"The convolutions of the brain, which Gall has mapped out into several distinct compartments, each compartment being the organ of a distinct faculty, are in reality not more distinct than several folds of a piece of velvet; and a little more reflection discloses the absurdity of supposing that one portion of this velvet should be endowed with different properties from every other portion, simply in virtue of its superficial position. The tissue of which the convolutions consist is the same throughout its folds."

Lewes objected also to Gall's ready acceptance of "the rude indications of observation," and gives as an example his location of the complex faculty of veneration in a particular convolution in man, which "by an unfortunate coincidence was found conspicuously prominent in sheep"—which was explained by Broussais—but still more unfortunately was discovered later by LEURET ("Anatomie Comparée,"
1839) to exist also in the brains of lions and tigers. More second-hand superficial criticism!

Lewes (influenced by Flourens) was against all localisation, not merely the phrenological one:

"I can never read without a smile the confident statements which credit certain nerve-cells with the power of transforming impressions into sensations, and other cells with the power of transforming these sensations into ideas, which assign volition to one centre, sensation to another, perception to a third, and emotion to a fourth."

What a contrast between Mill and Lewes! Whereas Mill treats throughout of experience as though it meant the proceeds and results of individual acquaintance with cosmical facts, Lewes explains it in a larger sense as the inheritance of the whole human race. To the former, "mental phenomena do not admit of being deduced from the physiological laws of our nervous organisation," to the latter, "a neural process or an organic state is the physical correlate of a mental state." Mill never seemed entirely to understand the immense importance of evolution and development in mental science; Lewes was never weary of impressing upon his readers the progressive influence exercised upon the human mind by such facts as the social medium in which men live, and the laws of heredity as explaining so-called mental forms and innate ideas.

Lewes laid stress on the collective experience of the individual and the collective experience of the race. "The biological conception," he said, "is defective in so far as it treats only of the individual organism, and only of the organism in its relation to the external medium. For animal psychology this would suffice; for human psychology it is manifestly insufficient. Man is a social animal—the unit of a collective life—and to isolate him from society is almost as great a limitation of the scope of psychology as to isolate him from nature. To seek the whole data of our science in neural processes on the one hand, and revelations of introspection on the other, is to leave inexplicable the many and profound differences which distinguish man from the animals, and these differences can be shown to depend on the operation of the social factor, which transforms perceptions into conceptions, and sensations into sentiments."

ALEXANDER BAIN (1818-1903),

Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen, author of "Senses and Intellect" (1855), "Emotions and Will" (1859), "On the Study of Character" (1861), "Moral and Mental Science" (1868), and "Mind and Body" (1873), is another philosopher who had a leaning towards phrenology, of the bearing of which on human character he made a thorough examination. He is credited with having been the first to classify the feelings; but, as his "Study of Character" shows, he based them on the phrenological analysis. He recognised that the earlier philosophers (Descartes, Spinoza, etc.) had always placed the manifestations of the feelings and of the will in a subordinate position to the intellectual processes, whereas the phrenologists laid stress on the importance of the feelings, accordingly as they are the outcome of anger, of sympathy, of fear, or may be defined as aesthetic, ethical, intellectual, ideal, etc. He said:

"Phrenology is the only science of human character that has hitherto been elaborated in a manner proportioned to the subject." And again:

"All theorists previous to phrenology could not prove their principles by appeals to observed facts; they could not show a relationship existing between cerebral organs and the functions of the elementary powers they had analysed in their own
consciousness. Phrenology not only showed herself capable of doing this, but she became the first and only science of character."

Bain proved the complexity of some of the phrenological faculties, and criticised the terminology; but his criticism does not tell against either the localisation of function or the resort to study of the living head for evidence, but merely against the claim of some phrenologists that phrenology is the science of mind, and against the classification of the organs by Spurzheim and his school.

**HERBERT SPENCER** (1820-1903),

by profession an engineer, was an ardent phrenologist in his young days, not merely a theoretical one, but a practical delineator. Documents in my possession show him to have been a clever character-reader from the living head, and in my correspondence with him and our mutual friend, Dr. JOHN CHAPMAN (1822-1894), editor of the Westminster Review, the fact was not denied. I also published an article in that Review in 1895, at the suggestion of Dr. Chapman, entitled "Herbert Spencer as a Phrenologist." Spencer was also the inventor of an instrument—the cephalograph—for the measurement of living heads, a description and illustration of which he published in his "Autobiography," vol. i., Appendix H (London, 1904). Spencer wrote various essays on phrenology as a young man and offered them to the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal, but GEORGE COMBE, unsuspicious of the greatness to which this young writer would rise, rejected the contributions. They were subsequently published in Dr. ELLIOTSON'S paper, the Zöist, vol. i. and ii.; but Spencer was indignant at Combe's refusal, and was for ever afterwards hostile to phrenology and the phrenologists, though he embodied all that he thought good in it in his own philosophical system. Spencer's essays in the main dealt with suggested improvements in the terminology of certain phrenological localisations based on his own observations of heads. In one respect Spencer was right. Neither George Combe nor any of his school took any notice of the progress of science and the bearing it had on their doctrine, and they admitted no correction. Hence phrenology stood still. I have already shown that they were equally unfair to Gall and left the world in ignorance of his writings. It need therefore occasion no wonder that this attitude and this want of adaptability to the results of new research and new ideas caused the more scientific and philosophical of their followers to turn from the subject and seek independent fields. Herbert Spencer was one of them.

Spencer took his revenge in "The Principles of Psychology" (1855), where he said "the crudity of their philosophy is such as may well make men, who to some extent agree with them, refrain from avowal of their agreement, more especially when they are met by so great an unwillingness to listen to any criticisms on the detailed scheme rashly promulgated as finally settled."

The harmony between Spencer's psychology and Combe's phrenology was noted by more than one observer. Thus Dr. JAMES HUNT (1833-1869) wrote in the Anthropological Review, 1867:

"Mr. Spencer speaks of 'the unscientific reasonings of the phrenologists,' and yet there is, perhaps, no modern writer on psychology who has so blindly accepted the fundamental principles of phrenology as he has done. In one place he speaks of 'the discovery of the relation subsisting between the development of the nervous system and the degree of intelligence. Originally no such relation was known to exist.' . . . Mr. Spencer accepts all the chief principles of the phrenologists, often, however, without due acknowledgment, and at the same time sneers at the conduct of physiologists for not accepting the same as 'being in harmony with the controversies in general.' The only difference between the utterances of Dr. Gall and Mr. Spencer is that the one gives his opinion on the special localisation of the
faculties, as a man of science and observation, and the other as a dogmatic philosopher. Mr. Spencer says: 'Localisation of function is the law of all organisation whatever; separateness of duty is universally accompanied with separateness of structure, and it would be marvellous were an exception to exist in the cerebral hemispheres.' Mr. Spencer, indeed, goes still further than Gall, or I believe any of his followers, in his application of the doctrines of phrenology to comparative anthropology. Thus Mr. Spencer writes: 'The corollary from the general argument that has been elaborated is, that the brain represents an infinitude of experiences received during the evolution of life in general, the most uniform and frequent of which have been successively bequeathed, principal and interest; and have thus slowly amounted to that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain of the infant—which the infant in the course of its after-life exercises and usually strengthens or further applies, and which, with minute additions, it again bequeaths to future generations. And thus it happens that the European comes to have from twenty to thirty cubic inches more brain than the Papuan. Thus it happens that faculties, as that of music, which scarcely exist in the inferior human races, become congenital in superior ones. Thus it happens that out of savages unable to count up to the number of their fingers, and speaking a language containing only nouns and verbs, come at length our Newtons and Shakespeares, etc.'

In an article on "First Principles," M. AUGUSTE LAUGEL, editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, described Herbert Spencer as a follower of Comte, and said that Comte's influence is easily recognisable. Spencer protested against this statement in a pamphlet, "Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of Comte." Seeing that both took Gall and his school as their authority (Auguste Comte acknowledging the fact, but Mr. Spencer ignoring it), M. Laugel's error is easily explained.

Spencer claimed in his "Autobiography" to have been unacquainted with Comte's work. He asserted that he knew nothing more of him than that he was a French philosopher. Yet he was indebted to Comte—among other things—for the conception of sociology as a distinct science, founded on the basis of other sciences, and used the same title "Social Statics," and made the same endeavour to give a scientific basis to politics, as Comte had done twenty years before him.

We must not forget that at the time of the publication of "The Principles of Psychology," there was not a single philosopher or physiologist in favour of the plurality of functions of the brain except Gall's own followers. The two authorities whom Spencer mentions in his defence against the supposed similarities between his writings and those of Comte—Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON and FLOURENS—wrote the reverse of what he advocated. The former in his lectures on *Metaphysics* (p. 264) said: "No assistance is afforded to mental philosophy by the examination of the nervous system; and doctrine or doctrines founded on the supposed parallelism of brain and mind are, as far as observation extends, wholly groundless." And Flourens, as we have seen, thought he had proved the *unity* of the brain by his experiments.

Another well-known authority, whom we have already quoted extensively as having a strong, though unacknowledged leaning towards Gall's doctrine, who also complained of Spencer's borrowing from the same sources, is Dr. HENRY MAUDSLEY. In his "Physiology of Mind," p. 133, he said:

"As Mr. Spencer does not on any occasion give references to or make quotations from authors who have preceded him, but works up their results systematically into his lucid exposition, those who gain all their knowledge of philosophy from the most recent and popular expositions of it, and ascribe to their authors all they find there, are prone to think original that which is often a legacy from the past. This practice of ignoring authorities, though it no doubt has its conveniences, bears hardly and disagreeably sometimes on those who may have occasion to write upon the same
subjects, inasmuch as they are liable to be charged by ignorant persons with borrowing from an eminent contemporary what the contemporary has really derived from the same well-known source, and would not claim as his own. This is trying; the most serenely pankletic appropriator of the fruits of past thoughts will become recalcitrant when he is charged with specific appropriation of material, not from the real proprietor of the property, who may perhaps not be known by name, but from one who, indebted for it to the same sources in the stores of the past as himself, does not make specific acknowledgments."

The following is the criticism of the phrenological doctrine by Spencer. It will be seen that many of his remarks apply to details of it and not the main principles, and that the things he objects to were most of them not created by Gall, but by his phrenological followers. In "The Principles of Psychology," par. 248 onwards, Herbert Spencer says:

"A few remarks are here called for respecting the tenets of phrenologists. It scarcely needs saying that the conception above elaborated, implying the constant co-operation of all the leading nervous centres in every thought and emotion, is quite at variance with their theory, as presented by themselves. But it may be necessary to point out that I do not hence infer the absolute untruth of their theory.

"That the contemptuous antagonism they have met with from both psychologists and physiologists is in great measure deserved must be admitted. They have put forth their body of doctrines as in itself a complete system of psychology—naturally repelling by this absurdity all students of mental science. At best, phrenology can be but an appendix to psychology proper; and one of comparative unimportance, scientifically considered. [That can refer only to Combe's phrenology, not to Gall.] That those who have carefully investigated the structure and functions of the nervous system, should have long ago turned their backs on phrenology is also not to be wondered at, seeing how extremely loose the phrenologists are in their methods of observation and reasoning, and how obstinately they ignore the adverse evidence furnished by experiment. [Experiment at the time proved the unity of the brain.]

"Nevertheless, it seems to me that most physiologists have not sufficiently recognised the general truth of which phrenology is an adumbration. Whoever calmly considers the question cannot long resist the conviction that different parts of the cerebrum must, in some way or other, subserve different kinds of mental action. Localisation of function is the law of all organisation whatever; and it would be marvellous were there here an exception. If it be admitted that the cerebral hemispheres are the seats of the higher psychical activities; if it be admitted that among these higher psychical activities there are distinctions of kind, which, though not definite, are yet practically recognisable; it cannot be denied, without going in direct opposition to established psychological principles, that these more or less distinct kinds of psychical activity must be carried on in more or less distinct parts of the cerebral hemispheres. To question this is to ignore the truths of nerve-physiology, as well as those of physiology in general. It is proved, experimentally, that every bundle of nerve-fibres and every ganglion have special duty; and that each part of every such bundle and every such ganglion has a duty still more special. Can it be, then, that in the great hemispherical ganglia alone, this specialisation of duty does not hold? That there are no conspicuous divisions here is true; but it is also true in other cases where there are undeniable differences of function—instance the spinal cord, or one of the great nerve-bundles. Just as there are aggregated together in a sciatic nerve an immense number of fibres, each of which has a particular office referring to some one part of the leg, but all of which have for their joint duty the management of the leg as a whole; so, in any one region of the cerebrum, each fibre may be concluded to have some particular office which, in common with the particular offices of many neighbouring fibres, is merged in some general office fulfilled by that region of the cerebrum. Any other hypothesis seems to me, on the face of it, untenable. Either there is some arrangement, some organisation, in the cerebrum, or there is none. If there is no organisation, the
cerebrum is a chaotic mass of fibres, incapable of performing any orderly action. If there is some organisation, it must consist in that same 'physiological division of labour' in which all organisation consists; and there is no division of labour, physiological or other, but what involves the concentration of special kinds of activity in special places.

"But to coincide with the doctrine of the phrenologists in its most abstract shape is by no means to coincide with their concrete embodiments of it. Indeed, the crudity of their philosophy is such as may well make men who to some extent agree with them, refrain from avowal of their agreement, more especially when they are met by so great an unwillingness to listen to any criticisms on the detailed scheme rashly promulgated as finally settled.

"Among fundamental objections to their views, the first to be set down is that they are unwarranted in assuming precise demarcations of the faculties. [Not to be found in Gall, and such demarcations, made by Spurzheim and Combe, have only to do with physiology, not with psychology.] The only localisation which the necessities of the case imply is one of a comparatively vague kind—one which does not suppose specific limits, but an insensible shading-off. And this is just the conclusion to which all the preceding investigations point. For as we have seen that every mental faculty, rightly understood, is an internal plexus of nervous connections corresponding to some plexus of relations among external phenomena that are habitually experienced; and as the different plexuses of external relations, in proportion as they become complicated, become less definite in their distinctions, so that when we reach these extremely involved ones to which the higher faculties respond there arises a great overlapping and entanglement of different plexuses; it follows that the answering internal plexuses must be fused together—it must be as impossible to demarcate the internal nervous aggregations as it is to demarcate the aggregations of external things and actions.

"Moreover, I believe the phrenologists to be wrong in assuming that there is something specific and unalterable in the nature of the various faculties. Responding, as faculties do, to particular assemblages of phenomena habitually surrounding any race or organisms, they are only so far fixed as they are fixed and specific. A permanent alteration in one of these assemblages would in time establish a modified feeling adapted to the modified assemblage. A habit—say of sitting in a particular place in a particular room, ending in being uncomfortable elsewhere—is nothing but an incipient emotion answering to that group of outer relations; and if all the successors of the person having this habit were constantly placed in the same relations, the incipient emotion would become an established emotion. So little specific are the faculties that no one of them is quite of the same quality in different persons. Each mental power is variable to as great an extent as each feature is variable. Yet further, the current impression of phrenologists seems to be that the different parts of the cerebrum in which they locate different faculties are of themselves competent to produce the manifestations implied by the names they bear. The portion of brain marked 'acquisitiveness' is supposed to be alone concerned in producing the desire of possession. But it is a corollary from foregoing arguments that this desire includes a number of minor desires elsewhere located. As every more complex aggregation of psychical states is evolved by the union of simpler aggregations previously established—results from the co-ordination and consolidation of these—it follows that that which becomes more especially the seat of this more complex aggregation, or higher feeling, is simply the centre of co-ordination by which all the simpler aggregations are brought into relation. Hence, that particular portion of the cerebrum in which a particular faculty is said to be located must be regarded as an agent by which the various actions going on in many other parts of the cerebrum are combined in a particular way. [Association-centre.] The brain, active throughout, evolves under the co-ordinating plexus that is for the time dominant an aggregate of feelings that is various in quality according to the proportions and arrangements of its components; just as out of the same orchestra, with its many instruments going from moment to moment, are drawn combinations of sounds now grave, now gay, now martial, now pathetic, according to the way in which the actions of its parts are co-ordinated by the composer's score.

"That in their antagonism to the unscientific reasonings of the phrenologists
the physiologists should have gone to the extent of denying or ignoring any localisation of function in the cerebrum is, perhaps, not to be wondered at: it is in harmony with the course of controversies in general. But no physiologist who calmly considers the question in connection with the general truths of his science can long resist the conviction that different parts of the cerebrum subserves different kinds of mental action. Localisation of function is the law of all organisation whatever; separateness of duty is universally accompanied with separateness of structure; and it would be marvellous were an exception to exist in the cerebral hemispheres. Let it be granted that the cerebral hemispheres are the seat of the higher psychical activities; let it be granted that among these higher psychical activities there are distinctions of kind, which, though not definite, are yet practically recognisable; and it cannot be denied, without going in direct opposition to established physiological principles, that these more or less distinct kinds of psychical activity must be carried on in more or less distinct parts of the cerebral hemispheres. To question this is not only to ignore the truths of physiology as a whole; but especially those of the physiology of the nervous system.

"Again, they [the phrenologists] are unwarranted in their idea of a precise demarcation of the faculties. Were there anything like that definite distinction in the functions of the different parts of the cerebrum, which is indicated by the lines on their basis (!), and apparently supposed by them really to exist, there would be some signs of it in the cerebrum itself. In other parts of the nervous system, where there is decisive difference of function, there is decisively marked separation of structure.

"Saying nothing of the many minor objections that may be made to the phrenological doctrine, in respect of its localisations, and more especially in respect of its very faulty, unanalytical nomenclature of the faculties, it is thus sufficiently clear that, defensible as it is in its fundamental proposition, it is in many other points quite indefensible."

What Spencer tells us in the above quotation simply amounts to this, that phrenology is not perfect, but I am not aware that even Combe considered it to be so; and if he had done so, the fact would have nothing to do with the original doctrine as set forth by Gall. In all the history of philosophy, is there one doctrine that can claim perfection? Besides, Spencer was only criticising so that he might have greater freedom to use what was really good in the original doctrine. Thus he adopted Gall's teaching that the mind is largely made up of feelings; that the emotions have definite localisations in the brain as have the intellectual capacities (he is the only philosopher who admits that); that the exercise of the mental powers gives pleasure, and their inaction and inhibition causes pain; that with the complexity of the brain instinctive action becomes rational action; that hereditary transmission applies to psychical peculiarities as well as to physical peculiarities; etc., etc. He accepted many of the phrenological faculties, and, like Gall, traced their origin and development. His defence of free-will was exactly on the lines of Gall; so was his distinction between instinct and reason, and his statement that animals have intellect and moral feeling; and so on. Spencer has earned renown for some of these views, while Gall and his doctrines continue to be despised. Herbert Spencer said of Free-will:

"That every one is at liberty to do what he desires to do (supposing there are no external hindrances), all admit; though people of confused ideas commonly suppose this to be the thing denied. But that every one is at liberty to desire, or not to desire, which is the real proposition involved in the dogma of free-will, is negatived as much by the analysis of consciousness as by the contents of the preceding chapters. From the universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion of psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed one another in experience, it is an inevitable corollary that all actions whatever must be determined by those psychical connections which experience has generated either in the
life of the individual or in that general antecedent life of which the accumulated results are organised in his constitution.

"When, after a certain composite mass of emotion and thought has arisen in him, a man performs an action, he commonly asserts that he determined to perform the action; and by speaking as though they were a mental self, present to his consciousness, yet not included in this composite mass of emotion and thought, he is led into the error of supposing that it was not this composite mass of emotion and thought which determined the action. But while it is true that he determined the action, it is also true that the aggregate of his feelings and ideas determined it; since, during its existence, this aggregate constituted his entire consciousness—that is, his mental self.

"Naturally enough, then, the subject of such psychical changes says that he wills the action, since, psychically considered, he is at the moment nothing more than the composite mass of consciousness by which the action is excited. But to say that the performance of the action is, therefore, the result of his free-will is to say that he determines the cohesions of the psychical states which arouse the action; and as these psychical states constitute himself at that moment, this is to say that these psychical states determine their own cohesions, which is absurd. Their cohesions have been determined by experiences—the greater part of them constituting what we call his natural character, by the experience of antecedent organisms; and the rest by his own experiences. The changes which at each moment take place in his consciousness, and among others those which he is said to will, are produced by this infinitude of previous experiences registered in his nervous structure, co-operating with the immediate impressions on his senses; the effort of these combined factors being in every case qualified by the physical state, general or local, of his organism.

"The irregularity and apparent freedom are inevitable results of the complexity, the same holds good in the organic world. A body attracted by a single other body, its course in space can be accurately predicted. A body attracted by two other bodies, its course can be less accurately predicted. A body attracted by three other bodies, still less accurately. A body attracted by multitudinous bodies of all sizes and distances, as in a star-cluster, its motion will appear free. Similarly in proportion as the cohesions of each psychical state to others become great in number and various in degree, the psychical changes will become incalculable and apparently subject to no law.

"We speak of will as something apart from the feeling or feelings which for the moment prevail over others; whereas it is nothing but the general name given to the special feeling that gains supremacy and determines action. Take away all sensations and emotions, and there remains no will. Excite some of these, and will, becoming possible, becomes actual only, when one of them gains predominance. Until there is a motive (mark the word) there is no will."

Now, let us compare this explanation of the will with that by Comte, who gives Gall the credit, where Spencer does not.

"Among the innumerable objections which have been aimed at this fine doctrine—considered always as a whole—the only one which merits discussion here is the supposed necessity of human actions. This objection is not only of high importance in itself, but it casts new light back upon the spirit of the theory, and we must briefly examine it from the point of view of positive philosophy.

"When objectors confound the subjection of events to invariable laws with their necessary exemption from modification, they lose sight of the fact that phenomena become susceptible of modification in proportion to their complexity. The only irresistible action that we know is that of weight, which takes place under the most general and simple of all natural laws. But the phenomena of life and acts of the mind are so highly complex as to admit of modification beyond all estimate; and in the intermediate regions phenomena are under control precisely in the order of their complexity.

"Gall has shown how human action depends on the combined operation of several faculties; how exercise develops them; how inactivity wastes them; and
how the intellectual faculties, adapted to modify the general conduct of the animal according to the variable exigencies of his situation, may over-rule the practical influence of all his other faculties. It is only in mania, when disease interferes with the natural action of the faculties, that fatality, or what is popularly called irresponsibility, exists. It is therefore a great mistake to accuse cerebral physiology of disowning the influence of education or legislation, because it fixes the limit of their power. It denies the possibility, asserted by the ideology of the French school, of converting by suitable arrangements all men into so many Socrates, Homers, or Archimedes, and it denies the ungovernable energy of the ego, asserted by the German school, but it does not therefore affect man's reasonable liberty, or interfere with his improvement by the aid of a wise education. It is evident indeed that improvement by education supposes the existence of requisite predispositions, and that each of them is subject to determinate laws, without which they could not be systematically influenced; so that it is, after all, cerebral physiology that is in possession of the philosophical problem of education."

In my opinion, it was the study of phrenology that led Spencer to the wider application of his philosophic abilities and the production of "The Principles of Psychology," a work which gained him world-wide renown. In this work he proved himself an evolutionist several years before Darwin, but very much on the lines of Gall. It was the first "psychology without a soul," for in it he studied the individual as a psycho-physical being, who has to adapt himself to his surroundings—not as an abstract psychic entity; and in it he traced the progressive development of consciousness. He applied the physiological principles of association psychology to explain not only the development of the human mind, but also the evolution of the mental powers of the race; claiming to show how all the powers of the human mind have been built up by the transmission and accumulation from generation to generation of the experience of each, embodied in the form of associated groups of nervous elements. And these speculations met with very general approval and exerted a wide spread influence.

He was the first philosopher to develop the theory of a progressive evolution of consciousness parallel to that of living organisms. He examined first of all the nervous system which is the sine qua non of consciousness, and was of opinion that the object of psychology consists in determining the connection between the series of physical phenomena and the corresponding series of mental phenomena. The individual cannot be considered as an abstract psychic entity, but as what he really is, viz., a psycho-physical being, who has to adapt himself to his surroundings. Therefore there can be no sharp distinction between biology and psychology, for there can be no interruption in evolution, which is a universal and continuous process observable in every form of existence. Life consists in a perfect harmony between the outer and the inner worlds. Thus consciousness, like the bodily organism from which it is inseparable, is subject to a progressive evolution from simpler to more complicated forms, or, as we may say, from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous form.

Just as biology was beginning to consider all organic beings, including man, as connected with one another by a continuous chain of evolution, so psychology ceased to consider man as an isolated being in order to explain the origin of conscious phenomena by means of the evolution of the species. Thus Spencer maintained the necessity of supplementing the individual method in psychology with the social and psychological methods, and divided the first into two special sciences, the subjective and objective, the latter being properly a biological science.

JOHN TYNDALL (1820-1893)

In England the materialistic wave, if we exclude the phrenologists, came much later, i.e., after Darwin, with Huxley and Tyndall. The latter said: "Given the Vol. i.]
shape of the brain, the corresponding thought might be inferred." This sounds quite phrenological, but is absolutely wrong. All that we can say is: Given the shape of the brain, the mental dispositions might be inferred. Given a sound eye, we know that the man will see, but we cannot tell what he will see. Similarly, given sound and prominent frontal lobes, we know that the man possessing them will tend to intellectual activity, but we do not know what the thoughts will be; or, again, given a sound and prominent centre for the appreciation of tones, and the other powers necessary for the practice of music, we know that the man, under the proper stimulus, will take an interest in the subject, but we cannot tell whether he will compose or what he will compose. In other words, a centre or instrument is necessary for the manifestation of mental and moral activity, as an ear is necessary for hearing; but the instruments and the psychological activity are not one.

In 1874 Tyndall gave his famous address at the British Association Meeting at Belfast, when he declared against free-will; or, rather, seemed to do so, for so it was interpreted at the time. T. H. HUXLEY (1825-1895) followed with a discourse on "animal automatism."

HUXLEY invented the term "agnostic" to express the attitude of mind which, where knowledge obviously cannot be had, is content not to know, and declines to speculate further,

Tyndall explained his views on free-will in the Fortnightly Review, 1877, as follows:

"What is meant by free-will? Does it imply the power of producing events without antecedents? Of starting, as it were, upon a creative tour of concurrences without any impulse from within or without? Let us consider the point. If there be absolutely or relatively no reason why a tree should fall, it will not fall; and if there be absolutely or relatively no reason why a man should act, he will not act. It is true that the united voice of the assembly could not persuade me that I have not, at this moment, the power to lift my arm if I wish to do so. Within this range the conscious freedom of my will cannot be questioned. But what about the origin of the wish? Are we, or are we not, complete masters of the circumstances which create our wishes, motives and tendencies, and action? Adequate reflection will, I think, prove that we are not. What, for example, have I had to do with the generation and development of that which some will consider my total being, the living and speaking organism which now addresses you? As stated at the beginning of this discourse, my physical and intellectual textures are woven for me, not by me. Processes in the conduct or regulation of which I had no share have made me what I am. There, surely, if anywhere, we are as clay in the hands of the potter. It is the greatest of delusions to suppose that we come into this world as sheets of white paper on which the age can write anything it likes, making us good or bad, noble or mean, as the age pleases. The age can stunt, promote, or pervert pre-existing capacities, but it cannot create them."

HENRY MAUDSLEY (1835-1918),

the distinguished alienist and author of numerous works on the physiology and pathology of mind, was an important representative of the materialistic school, at least in his younger days.

In Maudsley's opinion, "the unity of mind is merely the organic unity of the brain." Consciousness is not the most important factor in man, but is, on the contrary, an epiphenomenon—that is to say, an addition to what constitutes the essence of an organised being—viz., its impulses and instincts. It is merely a by-product, a spark thrown off by the engine, the brain. He relied on the fact that men's characters are fixed, and their actions thereby, to a certain extent, predictable, and that sane society, in fact, is based on the assumption of such fixity; and from
this he proceeded to draw the conclusion that any sort of self-determination, anything, in fact, but the inevitable fatalism of natural causation, is a delusion and a snare. Character to him was another name for organisation. We are saints or sinners according to the configuration of the nerve tracks concerned. Ethics is as much a matter of machinery as the basest mechanical process; only the machine is cunningly made, and improvements are made by generations. Brethren could not dwell together in unity; human society, in fact, would be impossible, unless men could rely on each other's conduct as a physical necessity as perfect as, and in fact the same as, the absolute bondage of physical causation. "The final reaction after deliberation, which we call Will, is a resultant of a certain molecular change in a definitely constituted nervous centre," or in other words, "I am a reproductive steam-engine."

Maudsley has written more than any other modern British alienist on the lines of Gall. Here are a few specimens (Journal of Mental Science, Vol. VII., p. 191):

"No more useful work could be undertaken in psychology than a patient and systematic study of individuals, the scientific and accurate dissection and classification of the minds and characters of men, in connection with their features and habits of body. How vast a service it would be to have set forth in formal expression the steps of the quick process by which the shrewd and experienced man of the world intuitively judges the character of those he has to do with, and refers them in a moment instinctively to their proper classes in his mind.

"All broad-headed people," he wrote, "are very selfish; that is to say, all who have the head broad in proportion to its length"; and he accepts the observation of the phrenologists, "that an undue preponderance of the breadth of head throughout the region in which they place the propensities indicates with certainty an animal self-love, which can scarcely be trusted at all times to adopt only fair means for its gratification. Undue preponderance, be it observed, for it is justifiable to expect a favourable result, even with a rather broad head which has a proportionately good length, and which has, so to say, the power of its length placed in the anterior half thereof. And why? Simply because there is in the front the greatest natural power, the force of intellect, which by exercise and development is able to control the objectionable propensities indicated in the animal broadness of skull."

To the question, What constitutes a noble head? Maudsley replied: "From the forehead the passage backwards above should be through a lofty vault, a genuine dome, with no disturbing depressions or vile irregularities to mar its beauty; there should be no marked projections on the human skull, formed after the noblest type, but rather a general evenness of contour."

On the question, What is a brutal head? Maudsley remarked: "The bad features of a badly-formed head would include a narrowness and lowness of the forehead, a flatness of the upper part of the head, a bulging of the sides towards the base, and a greater development of the lower and posterior part; with those grievous characters might be associated a wideness of the zygomatic arch, as in the carnivorous animal, and massive jaws. A man so formed might be expected, with some confidence, to be given over hopelessly to his brutal instincts."

"Is a man, then, hopelessly chained down by the weight of his inheritance?" "By no means," was the answer of Dr. Maudsley, "for there is something besides inheritance which makes fate, and that is education. It is a physiological law that the brain, throughout infancy, childhood, and youth, grows to the circumstances which it is placed among; and therefore the actual development of a brain may be much influenced by the sort of nutriment supplied to it as long as it grows. It would be rash, indeed, to venture to limit the effect which a right, reasonable, moral, physical, and intellectual education may have on the worst inheritance. But given an individual at the meridian of life, with a bad inheritance and a bad education, the benevolent enthusiast may hope for his reformation, and, all honour to him, labour for it; but the careful observer will be prone to smile at his expectations, and regarding them as a devout imagination, to compare them to those made to wash a blackamoor white."
These remarks should be read together with the reply of Gall to the criticism of Walter, who disapproved of his diagnosis of criminals (p. 327). Again Maudsley said:

"It is extremely probable that different convolutions of the brain do discharge different functions in our mental life. . . . That the broad, high, and prominent forehead indicates great intellectual power was believed in Greece, and is commonly accepted as true now; the examination of the brains of animals and idiots, and the comparison of the brain of the lowest savage with the brain of the civilised European, certainly tend to strengthen the belief. Narrow and pointed hemispheres assuredly do mark an approach to the character of the monkey's brain. There is some reason to believe also that the upper part of the brain and the posterior lobes have more to do with feeling than with the understanding. Huschke has found these parts to be proportionately more developed in women than in men; and Schröder van der Kolk said that his pathological researches had afforded him the most convincing proofs that the anterior lobes of the brain were the seat of the higher intellectual faculties, while the upper and posterior lobes ministered rather to the emotional life."

The above quotations contain practically the whole of practical phrenology in a nutshell, and if anybody were entitled to be called phrenologist, Maudsley would be. Yet Maudsley, though accepting what I should call the questionable part of phrenology, that part—the physiognomy of the head—which scientists have persistently refused to examine, was absolutely against "the precise mapping out of the cerebral surface, and the classification of the mental faculties, which the phrenologists have rashly made and which will not bear scientific examination." He had himself examined it. He tested the organ of "Love of Life" (an organ unknown to Gall and Spurzheim) in patients who were either very desirous of preserving their existence or were tired of it. Maudsley said that phrenologists locate this faculty in front of the ear, and that he found the location correct only in one out of many cases. It is unfortunate for Maudsley that phrenologists did not locate this faculty (about which, by-the-by, they were uncertain) in front, but behind the ear, in the posterior part of the temporal convolutions. Furthermore, to ascertain the truth of phrenology by actual measurement, Maudsley compared the size of the patients' heads with that of a model bust. Is it a scientific test to compare the dimensions of a living head with that of a plaster model?

We have too much reverence for Maudsley's profound knowledge to think that he meant his criticism seriously. As a follower of Comte, he must have been acquainted with the doctrine of Gall, and have intended this as a joke.

However, Maudsley condemned not only the phrenologists, but rejected also Broca's speech centre. He said:

"Recently some observations have been made with the view of establishing a theory that a portion of the anterior lobe, the third frontal convolution of the left hemisphere, was the seat of language; but the observations reported are unsatisfactory; directly contradictory observations are overlooked or ignored, and it is contrary to the first principles of psychology to suppose that language, complex and organic as it is in its intellectual character as the sign or symbol of the idea, can have so limited and defined a seat in the brain."

WILLIAM JAMES (1842-1910),

the American psychologist, Professor at Harvard University, in his "Principles of Psychology," 1891, said that psychology is the "science of mental life" with regard to its phenomena and its conditions. He rejected the English theory of "associationism," and maintained that in psychology a large place must be given to cerebral
physiology. Mental phenomena, however, extend far beyond the limits of nervous physiology, and James succinctly defined their distinctive character as consisting in the fact of striving after future aims and choosing the means to reach them, this being, as he rightly observed, what distinguishes an intelligent from a mechanical act. Like Herbert Spencer, he recognised the fact that man is not merely an intellectual machine, but that he also leads a life of emotion; and he recognised further that the emotions have their roots in the instincts, appetites, and desires.

James pointed out that emotion and instinct are really the same thing, the only difference being that instinct brings the organism into more practical relationship with the external world than emotion. He deprecated the method of classifying "definite tendencies by naming abstractly the purpose they subserve, such as self-preservation, defence," and the like, and insisted further that the strict psychological way of regarding instincts is to regard them as actions, which "all conform to the general reflex type," that is, the type of a definite response to a definite situation. But it seems as objectionable to speak of an instinct of imitation, or play, or curiosity, as it is to speak of an instinct of self-preservation, if we apply to human instincts the criteria which James wished to apply. As it turns out, he himself found it convenient to ignore his own criteria so soon as he came to discuss the more important human instincts and instinctive tendencies.

According to James, "every instinct is an impulse." But every instinct is not an impulse, although every impulse involves the existence of an instinct. Every instinct implies the possibility of the appearance of an impulse. We act instinctively in a thousand different ways during all our life without paying any attention to our acts; but some day, when something inhibits our instinctive actions, we have a disturbance of our mental life, which in complex cases produces what we designate as an impulse, which we feel tends to compel us to act in accord with our instinct. With choice of instincts comes hesitation, and then reason. Instinctive actions, so far as they affect our mental life, are represented in consciousness by "instinctive feelings," and, whenever the instinctive actions are inhibited, impulses present themselves in consciousness.

James, in his article on "Emotion" in the psychological journal Mind, 1884, said: "Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions shade imperceptibly into each other. Every object that excites our instinct excites an emotion as well. . . . The bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion."

CHARLES LANGE (1834-1900), of Copenhagen, almost simultaneously with James (in his "Emotions," 1883), taught that the psychic emotion is only the state of consciousness brought about by organic disturbances which themselves are only reflexes of the circulating apparatus governed by the vaso-motor centres. For instance, there is paleness of the skin in fear due to vaso-motor spasm; whereas in anger there is dilatation of the vessels and flushing of the skin. This is termed the vaso-motor theory. It amounts to this, that the perception or idea produces the feeling of the emotion, which is followed by the organic changes. It comprises two propositions: (1) The psychic emotion does not exist, but is only the state of consciousness brought about by organic disturbances; (2) The reflex organic disturbances which are the factors of emotion are themselves only reflexes of the circulating apparatus governed by the vaso-motor centres. In joy, gaiety, and kindred states there is a vaso-dilatation of the small arteries; and in sadness, grief, and kindred states there is a vaso-constriction of the small arteries. Now, contrary to this theory, it is held by some that these vaso-motor modifications are the true causes of joy and sadness, not the result of them.

G. SERGI ("Physiological Psychology," 1888) opposed Lange's vaso-motor theory and asserted that it is too restricted. He would include not only the vaso-motor centres, but also the bulbar centres, including the respiratory, and the centres of vegetative life. This is the so-called bulbar theory.
James stated that an emotion is the reaction of the brain consequent upon the excitation of afferent nerves. A number of bodily changes are set up by some exciting factor, and as a consequence of the perception of this factor and of its mental representation an emotion is the result. The emotion, in other words, is the expression of the stimulus, and the order of events is (1) the perception of some "exciting" fact; which (2) sets up reflexly some bodily disturbance; and (3) this commotion is apprehended or realised. It is this "apprehension" that constitutes the emotion. The emotion felt is either strong or weak, according to the amount of bodily disturbances set up by the exciting stimulus. This is the physical reflex theory. The feelings are thus solely the expression of the organic functions of the individual. The emotion does not cause the expression (as DARWIN held), but the expression, the instinctive action, causes the emotion. This omits the ethical and aesthetical feelings.

According to James and Lange, feeling mixed with an idea is called an emotion. There are ideas without any feeling, but the same idea may come to have a feeling tone. The emotion of fear, for example, is an intellectual anticipation of danger. The feeling may die out and the idea may persist. But may it not be the reverse way—that the idea is lost, and the feeling persists? We often feel fear without being able to account for it, but a psychological analysis reveals some event in personal or ancestral experience which brought danger.

Opposed to the theory of James and Lange that the emotions follow upon and are the result of the organic changes, we have the theory of GALL, BAIN, and SPENCER, that all affective states are connected with biological conditions and are the direct and immediate expression of the vegetative life; in other words, the emotions have their roots in the instincts, appetites and desires, as James admitted, but they do not follow but are concomitant with instinctive actions.

WILLIAM M'DOUGALL (1871-), Lecturer on Philosophy in the University of Oxford, author of a standard work on "Social Psychology" (1908) and "Body and Mind" (1911), accepts the view of James with modifications, for he declares the emotions to be the mental representation of instinctive bodily tendencies, i.e., the emotions are the mental side of the bodily tendencies, innate in the individual, the result of a long evolution, yet modified by development and social customs.
CHAPTER XXIII
GERMAN PHILOSOPHY OF THE XIXth CENTURY.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (1762-1814)

The philosophy of Fichte is a system of pure and subjective idealism. It emphasises the unity and self-renewing activity of the soul. The ego is the supreme principle of philosophy. First is sensation, which is unconsciously generated and comes from the outer world; then intuition; then the understanding, which originates from intuition and creates the form of objective being; finally reflective judgment and rational knowledge, by means of which the ego comprehends itself or comes to pure self-consciousness. Corresponding thereto is a series of practical activities; on the basis of longing and desire a system of impulses is built, and above this rises the moral will. The body is the ego in perception; therefore philosophy requires no special concept of the soul, there is no distinction of body and soul, and therefore no personal immortality. He rejected the faculty conception of the mental powers.

F. W. J. v. SCHELING (1775-1854)

Schelling, successor of Fichte in the chair of philosophy at Jena, said that if matter, seemingly so unspiritual, were not in the last analysis spirit, there would be no connection between nature and the intelligence which knows it; for intelligence is not able to apprehend something totally different from itself. So-called inorganic nature is also animated, is the lowest stage of a series of productions, which terminates in reason, in which nature reveals its true essence, its spirituality. The psychological evolution is from sensation to intuition, reflection, judgment, and absolute will-activity, and the goal of the whole process lies not in knowledge or conduct but in artistic creation and aesthetic contemplation, for in art the soul becomes one with nature.

Schelling, who was well versed in natural science, endeavoured to escape from Fichte's subjectivity, and to restore reality to the world without separating it from the mind. The real and the ideal, the objective and the subjective, are, as it were, the two poles of the Absolute. The task of philosophy is to evolve alternately nature from intelligence, and intelligence from nature, and thus to establish the identity of the two terms; philosophy is completed by the science of the Beautiful, which is created by the simultaneous operation of the conscious and the unconscious, blended in the inspiration of genius. The unity and progress of the world can only be explained by a World-Soul, a plastic principle, which organises the universe. This world-soul with its indifference embraces and reconciles the subject and the object, is apprehended by us in an intellectual intuition of our deepest being. That which in our minds arrives at self-consciousness is the very activity which in nature created the universe. Matter is spirit with its fire extinguished. Reality is the evolution of the Absolute, the life of the universal soul; and philosophy is the history of God. Mind can only be understood by a construction of the universe;
the plurality of souls is only a means employed by the Absolute to develop itself by becoming more and more conscious of itself and of its freedom.

G. W. F. HEGEL (1770-1831)

Notwithstanding Kant, pure metaphysics triumphed again, in Hegel, the founder of the historic method of research, who claimed the unity of mind in human society, according to which history appears as the development of one single all-embracing spirit. For the interpretation of human history and natural history alike, a dialectical process of thought replaces the empirical laws of nature and mind.

In his "Anthropology," he dealt with subjective spirit in its immediate entanglement with the body. So far as it is under the sway of the body, it shows certain determinations which are given to man from birth and from which he cannot free himself. Here belong the racial differences, temperaments, relation of sleep and waking, etc.

In his "Phenomenology of Mind" (1807), he worked out a genetic psychology, superseding the theory of faculties. Mind interpreted as thought objectifies itself in the world, and shows itself subjective in the individual mind. Consciousness is the act by which spirit is distinguished from everything that is not ego; at first it apprehends objects in their isolation, then the universal, then laws and forces, and finally develops the insight that sees, in its presentation of objects, its presentation of itself.

According to Hegel, it has been a gross misunderstanding to regard the soul as a quiescent substance, and he rejects with equal vigour the customary separation of will and idea, since they are both fundamentally the same and in freedom are united.

Hegel held with Schelling that all things come from the Absolute, but he reproached him with having posited the Absolute without defining it. For Hegel the Absolute is the Idea, reality is the Truth. Consciousness is only a moment in the evolution of Being. To absolute knowledge, being and thought are identical; the rational is the real, the real is the rational. Metaphysics is a system of Logic. The Logic, in an unbroken dialectic chain, leads to the Philosophy of Nature, that is the Idea estranged, as it were, from itself; and this again leads to the Philosophy of Spirit, or to the Idea which has returned from nature to itself, and has assumed, along with possession of itself, an existence that is independent.

The subject matter of psychology in the narrower sense is spirit, so far as it exists theoretically as intelligence, and practically as will and as morality. Through conduct intelligence reaches the knowledge that a rational purpose realises itself in the world, and morality, i.e., will, is formed, which has as its end the universal content of reason.

FRIEDRICH HERBART (1776-1841)

Herbart’s books appeared between 1816 and 1824, when psychological studies were under the dominion of the "faculty" theory. Herbart was praised for having resisted this tendency towards a species of mechanical science of the mind, for not having gone into the question of the connection between mind and organism, and for having limited his method solely to inner tuition and to the subjective analysis of the mental elements. He was strenuously opposed to an artificial division and subdivision of consciousness into faculties, but his criticism applied much less to Gail than to the disciples of Wolff and Kant, who believed these faculties to be innate forces or energies, which necessarily produce corresponding mental acts, in the same way that physical forces produce certain given effects. In Herbart’s opinion, these mental forces or faculties are in reality no more than "possibilities," which add nothing to the facts of the inner experience, and their effects are by no means
so certain as the effects due to physical forces. He condemned Gall for having had no notion of the complexity of the mental processes and no comprehension of the extraordinary complexity of the cerebral processes. (1) He argued that if we once admit different faculties, there is no stopping anywhere; every distinguishable mode of mental process may be ascribed to a separate faculty: colour-perception and piano-playing no less than feeling and will. The theory of faculties is a fiction as void of sense as the horror vacui of the old physicists. There exists neither feeling nor knowledge nor willing; but only feelings, facts of knowledge, and acts of willing—a statement with which Gall would have quite agreed. Herbart had no objection to raising against the use of the concept of force; but he made a distinction between force and faculty. We assume the action of a force in all cases where we have learned to look upon a result as inevitable under given conditions. We speak of a faculty, when the result may just as well not occur as occur.

Herbart's criticism of Gall is based on a misconception of his terms. Gall endeavoured to analyse mental capacities and human conduct. He did not pretend to have succeeded—his elements, he says, may be found to be complexes—but he calls these presumable elements "soul-activities," and that they are. The terms "powers," "faculties," etc., are used only (as by myself) to avoid repetition, but not in the sense that Kant and Wolff used them.

In Herbart's opinion the basis of psychology is to be found in metaphysics. The soul, like the whole universe, is a compound of units; and the mental life consists in the conflict and also in the harmony of these units. Mental processes must be considered as unitary processes, and to satisfy this unity Herbart raised one of the products of current psychological abstraction above all the rest. He regarded the idea as the real and only content of the mind. Nay, he went so far as to declare that the idea, when once it has arisen, is imperishable, while all the other elements of mind—feelings, emotions, desires and impulses—are merely the resultants of the momentary interactions of ideas. All ideas possess an inherent activity, in virtue of which they further and check one another. Ideas are real forces, no particle of whose energy is ever lost. If ideas happen to be opposed, they are said to suffer arrest, i.e., they severally lose a portion of their original intensity, one or all ideas being driven below the threshold of consciousness.

Will is the consciousness of the dynamic side of the play of ideas—the tension of the idea towards clear presentation, its reaction against inhibition. When such tension exists below the "threshold" of consciousness, there is "impulse"; when the idea is consciously inhibited, there is "desire"; when it is released by the idea of the end of satisfaction, desire passes into "volition." Feeling is the consciousness of the resulting conditions—of success, failure, equilibrium, compromise or balance—in this continuous rivalry of ideas. Consciousness is the mere theatre of the mechanical play of presentations.

The influence of Herbart's psychology was very great indeed, especially in educational applications. He was opposed to the doctrine of the "drawing out" and cultivating of innate "faculties" of observation, memory, reasoning, and imagination, apart from the presentations which alone give significance to them, and held that by means of ideas every normal child can be educated into a moral and capable citizen. Now, such "faculties," as has been shown by Gall, do not exist—they are general properties—but the importance of "guiding ideas" must be admitted (see Chapters on "Education" and "Suggestion"). Herbart dealt with the intellect alone and left the elements of inherited instinct—the propensities—out of consideration. It will be shown in the chapters mentioned that the fundamental intellectual powers (the different elementary capacities) do require drawing out, otherwise they remain latent; but the emotions and propensities require proper direction only, for they are active before experience has been gained.

Herbart is esteemed, too, for his "Folk Psychology" ("Völker Psychologie"),
which owes its origin in a great measure to his followers: THEODOR WAITZ (1821-1864), of Marburg, who wrote "Anthropologie der Naturvölker" (1860), and MORIZ LAZARUS (1824-1903), who published "Das Leben der Seele" (1856), and, with H. STEINTHAL, the "Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie."

F. E. BENEKE (1798-1854),

author of "Psychologische Skizzen" (1825-7) and "Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft" (1833), although working in opposition to Hegel, helped, too, to overthrow the common faculty psychology. He continued to hold the conception of the soul as the ground of mental life; but he, too, contributed to bring about the predominance of the "psychology without a soul," by affirming the validity of purely physiological and anatomical explanations of mental disorders, and by his sympathetic presentation of Spinoza's doctrine of the relation of mind to matter. He conceived of psychology as a natural science and introduced into the study of the inner life the physical method. **He was the purest representative of the psychology of the "inner sense."** He maintained that an idea is accompanied by a feeling-tone and contains a striving; and, furthermore, that uninterrupted relations, in the way of laws, exist between conscious processes of all kinds. Feeling, will, and ideation are going on together at every moment. Mind is essentially a flux and transformation.

Beneke designated as the principal step in the progress of scientific psychology the banishment of "innate ideas" and of innate, abstract" faculties of the soul." Yet he admitted fundamental processes as primary faculties (Urvermögen), which are set in play by outer stimuli. A special "aptitude" (virtually faculty) is required for every sensation and its persistence; new faculties must therefore, by means of the innermost life of the soul, be continually formed and adapted to the processes already present. But just as, on the one hand, they emerge as strivings from the depth of the soul, on the other hand they are dependent on nourishment and stimulus from without. It is characteristic of the faculties that they persist outside consciousness as "traces or dispositions." Instead of the hitherto acknowledged faculties (such as understanding, judgment, etc., which have been falsely assumed as primitive, but which are in reality only hypostatised class-conceptions of very complicated phenomena), we must seek to determine which are the truly elementary faculties. This, as we have seen, was exactly the view of Gall, and the task he set himself. According to Beneke, power or faculty is the operative factor in any process. The faculties are not mere possibilities, but possess within the soul the same degree of reality which the developments, rendered possible by them, have as conscious phenomena. The faculties are the elements of the substance of the soul itself; they are not inherent in a substratum distinct from themselves. A thing is only the sum of its own combined forces. The immediate scientific problem is to analyse the results of direct consciousness into their simple elements, i.e., to reduce them to a number of fundamental processes or laws. When these are known, we can proceed from them to the powers or faculties in question.

Beneke recognised four fundamental processes, and in view of their nature defined the soul as "a perfectly immaterial being, consisting of certain fundamental systems of forces, which not only in themselves, but also in combination with each other, are most intimately one, or constitute one being." The human soul differs from the soul of the brute by its spiritual character, which is founded in the higher energy of its elementary faculties.

Beneke's psychology was spiritualistic. Introspection, in his opinion, is the only possible method, because of the inner sense being so much sharper and more exact than the external sense. Idealistic philosophy and metaphysics ceased to be of influence in Germany after 1840.
GERMAN MATERIALISM

After Gall, speculative philosophy receded into the background. Science and invention, and their results, occupied mankind. The application of steam and electricity, and consequently technology and industry, made rapid progress and wealth increased. These factors also helped to make men more practical in their views, if not actually materialistic. Metaphysics ceased to interest men outside the circle of University professors, whose business it is to lecture on the subject. Introspection was no longer sufficient; the philosopher must have studied the sciences, or, at all events, be an observer of men. Philosophy must take the whole of experience for its contents. It must not isolate itself from practical life, nor refuse the findings of scientific discovery. Again, it was recognised that psychology was incomplete without a study of the functions of the brain and nervous system. All these changes proceeded gradually.

The impetus that was given through Gall to brain research caused a strong materialistic tendency. We have seen how Englelue broke up the Phrenological Society of London by his extreme views, in 1842; but it was in Germany that materialism took the deepest root. To a large extent, this was merely a revival of the materialism which prevailed in France at the end of the XVIIth century, when GEORGE CABANIS (1757-1808) taught that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." Exactly the same was said by CARL VOGT (1817-1869), professor in Jena, when he had his dispute with RUDOLF WAGNER (1805-1864), of Göttingen, in "Menschenschöpfung und Seelensubstanz" (1854), and in his famous work, "Köhlergläube und Wissenschaft" (1854). He wrote: "Physiology is categorically opposed to an individual immortality, and, in general, to all the hypotheses referring to the existence of a distinct soul. Spiritual activities are merely the functions of the brain, that is, of a material substance." Vogt's book had an enormous circulation. Another work on these lines was by LUDWIG FEUEBACH (1804-1872), a positivist.

ROBERT MAYER (1814-1878), having expounded the famous theory of the conservation of matter and energy, in 1845—a theory confirmed in 1847 by J. P. JOULE (1818-1889) and HERMANN V. HELMHOLTZ (1821-1894)—gave a further stimulus to the materialistic hypothesis. A work that went through innumerable editions was "Kraft und Stoff" (1855), by LUDWIG BÜCHNER (1824-1899), professor at Darmstadt. Another materialist of fame of that period was JAC. MOLESCHOTT (1822-1893), a Dutchman, professor at Turin and afterwards at Rome, who, in his "Kreislauf des Lebens" (1852), set out from sensationalism, whence he deduced a materialistic theory. Matter, according to him, is inseparably united to force. Both are eternal, and there is a perpetual exchange or circulation of force and matter. "Thought is to the brain what bile is to the liver, or urine to the kidneys." Moleschott, as a proof that consciousness is only in the brain, alleged the well-known observation of A. J. JOBERT DE LAMBALE (1799-1867), according to which a girl injured at the top of the spinal cord remained conscious for half an hour, although the whole body, with the exception of the head, was completely paralysed. "Thus the whole spine may become inactive without the consciousness being affected." RUDOLF VIRCHOW (1821-1902), and ERNST HEINRICH HÄCKEL (1834-1919), the celebrated naturalist, might be included in that circle.

The materialists considered the mental phenomena as one of the aspects, or functions, of matter, which alone is real. To this they added the notion of the continuity and continual transformation of matter and energy, with which they thought to explain the production of mental phenomena. Owing to the enthusiasm which recent scientific discoveries had awakened, the natural sciences were looked
to for the solution of every problem, physical or moral; and for some time moral and philosophical science did little more than strive to appreciate and adapt to their own uses the laws of the natural sciences. In affirming, as they did, that thought is merely a product of the brain, they practically denied the existence of psychology. They exercised, however, an indirect influence through their demoli-
tion of obsolete spiritualistic ideas and their demonstration of a connection between cerebral and mental processes. As investigation proceeded, so more and more phenomena, which had formerly been ascribed to spiritual action, were explained in mechanical terms; but the materialists ousted the spiritual agency altogether, and accounted for everything, even for human conduct—nay, even for the totality of the human mind—as matter or as mechanism. The moment this conclusion is reached, the majority of mankind rightly revolts against it.

This was the period of the godless and the pessimists. Listen to SCHOPEN-
HAUER (1788-1860) in his discourse upon the vanity and sufferings of life. We shall deal with him presently. Faith in God was greatly diminished. True, He was still upheld and believed in; He was admitted as the Creator of the world, and the laws which govern the world were still regarded as divine laws; but it was assumed that, having created these laws, He ceased to control its destinies by the exercise of autocratic power. This belief allowed scientists to prosecute their researches undisturbed by fears of incurring odium, and it enabled those among the educated classes, who were inclined to lend a friendly ear to science, to read learned works with a clear conscience. It will be noticed also in English scientific text-
books that God was frequently referred to at the beginning of the XIXth century, but gradually less and less, until about 1850 He ceased to be mentioned.

For example, Sir CHARLES LYELL (1797-1875), in the early editions of his "E-
lements of Geology " (1830), praised the glory of the Creator, words which he expunged in the later editions. It was no longer the fashion to speak of God, such mention was deemed unscientific. Science became indifferent to problems that cannot be solved by the aid of instruments and calculations, and ignored religion. More and more distinctly did she consider herself as resting on objective experiment entirely, and as having no other object than the discovery of the immanent connections of phenomena. As Prof. ÉMILE BOUTROUX put it: "In entering his labora-
tory, the scientist left his convictions at the door, though he might take them up again on leaving."

But the world without faith in God seemed strange and cold. Men were unused to such conditions. They had become adapted to another environment, where prayers, hopes of after-life, and fear of punishment after death had reigned almost as fixed ideas. Responsibility had been laid on the shoulders of a divinity for centuries; it now seemed to lie very heavily upon the shoulders of men. And, having relinquished all past interpretations of what people call "The First Cause," they began to ask themselves: What is the world? What is its object? What are we all driving at? If there be no God, no Heaven to go to, no Hell to which we may relegate our enemies—what, indeed, is the purpose of existence? The thinking world, the world that looks for an object in existence, and will have an ideal after which it may strive—this world was in despair. The rise of pessimism was in-
evitable.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (1788-1860)

Greatly admiring Kant, and adopting many of his first principles, Arthur Schopenhauer, as a young man of twenty-six years of age, deeply versed in the lore of Hindu antiquity, took up Kant's doctrine of the relativity of our knowledge. He developed it in his principal work, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung " (1819), by
GERMAN PHILOSOPHY OF THE XIXth CENTURY

477

attempting to show that—although the world is only our notion, our idea—if we regard another aspect of it we can actually arrive at a knowledge of things in themselves, we can learn the inner nature of external objects.

In what concerns our perception of the outside world, he adopted Kant's view, that we are totally unable to derive from our mental representation of it any knowledge whatever as it really is. The inner nature of external objects, in the process of imaging them in our minds, completely eludes our perceptive powers. It must be clear to every one, said Schopenhauer, "that what he knows is not a sun or an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, and a hand that feels an earth; and that the world which surrounds him is there only as idea, i.e., only in relation to something else, the consciousness which is himself. . . . The consciousness of everyone is in general opposed to the explanation of objects as mere ideas. The objective world, the world as idea, is not the only side of the world, but merely its outward side; and it has an entirely different side—the side of its inmost nature—its kernel—the thing-in-itself."

How can we discover what this kernel, this thing-in-itself is? We have seen that we cannot arrive at this real nature of things from without. But, said Schopenhauer, we are objects in nature, we are things among things, and of ourselves we have a special, second view which we cannot have of other things. Besides being an object of perception, the body of each individual is known to him in its inner nature; he knows its kernel immediately; and what is this kernel, which each can immediately perceive in himself? Is it not that which we call mind or spirit—that embodiment of feeling, volition, and intellect, which some call soul?

This soul, ego, or first principle, Schopenhauer resolved into two factors—will and intellect; but of the latter he made small account, regarding it merely as a cerebral phenomenon, dependent upon the organism, a function of the body. What is most essential in man is not the intellect, but the will, by which he means that mass of impulses which have their origin in our moral and physiological nature and over which reason exercises no power. The intellect has no other function than that of illuminating the will, so that man may know his own self, though without any possibility of modifying his inner essence. Though not a materialist, he placed the seat of human will in physiological temperament and considered presentation a product of the brain.

If we wish to find out what is in ourselves which best expresses our inmost being, and which differentiates us from other human beings, we are obliged to recognise that it is not our intellect; because not only is this common in different degrees to all men, but it is without power to regulate our moral conduct. For it is a fact that we never really conform our actions to our ideas. We may have the noblest moral principles regarding truth, justice, and humanity, and yet act entirely at variance with them. That which determines our actions, rules our whole life, and represents consequently better than any other mental activity our personality, is what we call our "character." When the latter coincides with our ideas, the mental life is harmonious, and we have the illusion that it is they which regulate our actions, whereas we are really only obeying our own nature. And of this we have an evident proof when there arises a discrepancy between our ideas and our character, for in that case it is always the character which conquers. The intelligence is consequently a superadded element, an "epiphenomenon," and the real basis of our nature is the "will," which has its root in our innate instincts and organic tendencies.

According to Schopenhauer, man's innermost nature, constituted by innate, deeply-rooted instincts, is not susceptible of change, in spite of the continual progress of his intelligence; for the latter has a purely cognitive mission, and does not influence the original character of the individual. The mind may consequently
be endowed with acumen and culture, it may perceive what is wrong and disapprove of it; but if the character of the individual is inclined to wrong-doing, the intelligence cannot prevent or even correct his reprehensible inclinations. Well-doing and wrong-doing do not therefore depend upon the intellect, but on the character, on the "will."

This is not the case. Character, though possessing a substratum of hereditary instincts and aptitudes, which we shall show in due course are merely "possibilities," is nevertheless in a state of continual formation, and therefore susceptible to the influences and circumstances of the external world and of intellectual culture. In order to have a real, conscious morality, the mind must be free and aspire towards high ideals, and nothing favours such a state so much as intellectual culture. Of course, learning alone does not improve morality, and it is possible to have high ideals without culture.

It used to be customary to allot intellect the first place in a classification of our mental phenomena; but Schopenhauer denied its primitive importance.

Again and again he told us, "the intellect, like the claws and teeth, is nothing else than a weapon in the service of the will," it is the lantern of the will," or "an assistant organ of the will." In every blind force of nature Schopenhauer saw a factor that cannot be accounted for by an appeal to intellect; in the early actions of animals, as also in all functions of our body which are not guided by knowledge, a power is at work which has nothing in common with the understanding or with reason. Every feeling we have involves an action of our will; for, if it be agreeable, we will have that which awakens it in us; whereas, if it be disagreeable, we will not have it active under any circumstances. Willing and feeling—how can they be thought of apart? From the very dawn of our lives, they, as one phenomenon, infallibly guide us to perform life-preserving actions without the very slightest assistance from the intellect, which can only act upon acquired knowledge. We may take it, therefore, that our inner life consists of these two sharply defined mental attributes: the intellect with its derivatives—understanding, reasoning, and thought—and the will, which, as we have seen, covers feeling.

The will is more important than the intellect, for the intellect is an instrument, a mere means in the service of the will. We desire, we want, we will have something, and our intellect is employed, that this desiring, this wanting, this willing, may be stilled. Our passions, our love, hate, and physical appetites, are matters of feeling and will; and we certainly do make our intellect work, in order to find the means of administering to them. But they are the primitive force; intellect is but their intermediary. It is a common illusion to believe that our actions follow as consequences of our ideas; on the contrary, they cannot be guided by any law, but solely by the will, which resides in our inmost nature and eludes all determination.

The will, which is "the innermost kernel of our nature," is not in truth individual: it is merely a manifestation of the one universal will. Hence the study of psychology is vain, because there is no "psyche"; there is nothing but will and phenomena. Not less vain, according to Schopenhauer, is any notion of free-will in man. He was a strict necessarian. Our character—our "intelligible" character, as he termed it to distinguish it from our "empirical" character—is born with us and is absolutely subject to the law of cause and effect which reigns in the phenomenal world. As logical necessity presides over the sequence of ideas, and physical necessity over the succession of phenomena, and geometrical necessity over the relations of space, so moral necessity rules in the actions and motives of men. This theory makes an end of conscience, which he thought might be resolved into five elements: fear of man, superstition, prejudice, vanity, and custom; also, of course, it overthrows the old bases of moral obligation. Virtue, he taught, consists in universal sympathy, grounded on the fact that the whole universe, sentient and non-sentient, is simply a manifestation of the one will, and therefore is identical with ourselves.
It is therefore merely a form of self-love, and to show kindness to any man or thing is to show kindness to that which we ourselves are. "Tears," he said in one place, "spring from self-pity." Theism, he held, is a tradition of the nursery; pantheism is an invention of the professors and fatal to the personality of man.

The one reality is will, manifesting itself in the phenomenal world as the will-to-live (self-preservation). This is not a rational desire, but a blind instinct, altogether foolish and irrational. We are the sport of that dark and mysterious power—will, which is perpetually rushing into life, whether conscious or unconscious. Everywhere among creatures that are driven by this blind will there is warfare, oppression, suffocation, maiming, torture, misery.

"Everywhere in nature we see strife, conflict, and alternation of victory. This universal conflict becomes most distinctly visible in the animal kingdom, for each animal can only maintain its existence by the constant destruction of some other. Thus the will to live everywhere preys upon itself, and in different forms is its own nourishment; till, finally, the human race, because it subdues all the others, regards Nature as a manufactory for its use. . . . But an optimist bids me open my eyes and look at the world, how beautiful it is in the sunshine, with its mountains and valleys, streams, plants, animals, etc., etc. . . . Is the world then a raree show? These things are certainly beautiful to look at, but to be them is something quite different. . . . Whatever one may say, the happiest moment of the happy man is the moment of his falling asleep, and the unhappiest moment of the unhappy is that of his waking. . . . And to this world, to this scene of tormented and agonised beings, who can only continue to exist by devouring each other; in which, therefore, every ravenous beast is the living grave of thousands of others, and its self-maintenance is a chain of painful deaths; and in which the capacity for feeling pain increases with knowledge, and therefore reaches its highest degree in man, a degree which is the higher the more intelligent the man is; to this world it has been sought to apply the system of optimism, and demonstrate to us that it is the best of all possible worlds! The absurdity is glaring!"

Schopenhauer turned in horror from the world he thus depicted. The sufferings of existence choked him; in the voice of Nature he heard but an exasperated groan, in her smiles he read deception.

He maintained that existence is in itself, and essentially, an evil; because for every sentient being to live is to will, and to will is to strive, and to strive is to suffer.

"Man's capacity for pain increases far more with the passage of time than does his capacity for enjoyment, and is especially increased by his foreknowledge of death. Animals only fear death from instinct, without having any real knowledge of it, and without having the prospect of it always before their eyes, as is the case with human beings. . . . Life, so far from being a state of enjoyment, is always and necessarily one of suffering, and the deepest cause of this suffering lies in the will itself. . . . Our nature is a perpetual striving, and may be compared in every respect with an insatiable thirst. . . . It is a struggle for existence, with the certainty of being vanquished."

Nor is there any exception to this rule. It presses upon animals as upon men, and upon wise men as upon the ignorant and foolish, but ever with the more terrible severity the higher we ascend in the scale of being. For increased intelligence merely means increased capacity for pain—the man of genius being more miserable than the fool, and the fool more miserable than the animal—while the only moments of life which deserve to be called happy, save those passed in the absolute unconsciousness of sleep, are such as are spent in the disinterested contemplation of works of art. Æsthetic enjoyment is the temporary deliverance from all which makes up the fatigue of life, its chain of vulgar realities and petty egotism. The
modern philosophy and the progress of science

notion of what is called progress, the dream that man will become in some vague future wiser, gentler, better, is the master delusion of the age, for "the advance of civilisation means but the enhanced capacity of the human race for suffering."

We have seen that, to Schopenhauer, Will is the master and intellect its servant, and the elementary dispositions give the motives to action. By Will, he meant the sum of the innate dispositions, which is physiologically fixed, yet not in the brain, for "injuries to the head with loss of brain substance," he said, "are as a rule very detrimental to the intellect—they are followed by total or partial idiocy, loss of speech, temporarily or permanently, and so on; whereas we never read that after an accident of this nature the character has undergone a change, that the man has become morally better or worse, that he had lost particular propensities or passions, or gained any; no, never!" This, of course, is quite wrong. Schopenhauer simply placed reliance on the statement by JOHANNES MÜLLER (see p. 365), a great authority on physiology, but in this instance absolutely in error. Schopenhauer pronounced therefore against Gall's doctrine, though much that he wrote on the relative value of the intellect and the character dispositions was very much on the lines of Gall.

Neither Herbart nor Schopenhauer met with much success in their day, owing to the predominance of the absolute idealism of Hegel; but, although their efforts at founding a metaphysical science based on psychological observation were doomed to failure, they exercised no little influence on the philosophers and psychologists who came after them.

C. R. E. v. HARTMANN (1842-1906),

in his chief work, "Philosophy of the Unconscious" (1869), followed Schopenhauer's pessimistic views. In his extravagant estimate of the misery of the world, Hartmann came very near to the standard set by his predecessor. He affirmed that in all relations the sum of pain greatly exceeds that of pleasure.

Hartmann held with Schopenhauer that pleasure in the main is but the absence of suffering. As proof of the negativity of pleasure, he bid us take any acute pain—neuritis, headache, hunger, thirst; when relieved from these we at first feel pleasure. As soon as the pain is forgotten the pleasure passes into indifference. We have no positive pleasure in the air we breathe any more than from habitual health. Deprived of either we suffer. In all cases the suffering incomparably outweighs the enjoyment. A healthy child is overflowing with boisterous activity and apparent happiness, yet the child is never conscious of that state as happiness. Take away its toy and it screams.

The advance of civilisation tends to increase the amount of pain, and improvement in material conditions is no source of happiness. Civilised people are more wretched than those in a state of nature; the poor, the low, and the rude are happier than the rich, the aristocratic, and the cultivated. Stupidity is a much better title to happiness than cleverness. The design of the increasing sum of misery is to educate the intelligence of men and to discipline their feeling up to the point of choosing in common the one means of escape, the cessation of conscious individual existence. It is futile to pursue happiness. When men fail in life in obtaining happiness, they base their faith on, and console themselves with, the happiness in life after death. Immortality is a delusion. The most primitive and the uneducated people are the happiest. Education increases discontent. The progress of science contributes little or nothing to the absolute happiness of the world.

Being and being conscious are not the same, according to Hartmann. There is an unconscious being, which—an explanatory science must take into account. The
causes of the appearance of consciousness and the laws of the change of its contents rest in the unconscious, especially in the physiological unconscious—which is located in the nervous system in the form of irritability or purposive reflex action and in the absolute unconscious. The latter is at once vital principle and soul, and, as immaterial activity, lies at the basis of both corporeal and mental phenomena.

Instinct is "purposive action without consciousness of the purpose," and it is "conscious willing of the means to an unconsciously willed end." We may explain it "as a mere consequence of corporeal organisation," or as "a cerebral or mental mechanism," or as "a result of unconscious mental activity." The first two views are inadequate, and incapable of accounting for the facts. Instinct must be regarded as conscious willing, as volition, not as unconscious willing, conditioned by an unconscious purpose, and not as a mere unconscious mechanism. But conscious will cannot itself explain instinct. Instinct must also involve "unconscious ideation and volition," an unconscious purpose, because nothing else will explain the connection between the sensuous presentation as motive and the "conscious will to some particular action." Putting it briefly, instinct is not the result of conscious reflection, nor of corporeal, cerebral, or mental mechanisms, but of the conscious activity of the individual, "springing from his inmost nature and character." The end, towards which the activity is directed, is not conceived by an external mind, a Providence, but "unconsciously willed and imagined" by the individual, and the suitable means unconsciously chosen. The knowledge involved in this unconscious cognition, which is frequently such as could not be obtained from sense perception, is of the nature of "clairvoyance," and manifests itself as "clairvoyant intuition." Clairvoyance may occur apart from instinct. They are two distinct facts. But clairvoyance alone will explain the nature of instinct-knowledge. This clairvoyant intuition is "the characteristic attribute of the unconscious."

It is necessary that the instinctive action itself should be vividly realised in consciousness, in order that the necessary accuracy of execution should be secured, but it is the execution only that is conscious.

There are two main ends which instincts subserve: preservation of the self and preservation of the race. But there is a third end: "the perfection and the ennoblement of the species." The progress of the human race, individual, social, and national, the appreciation of the beautiful, the development of science and philosophy, the satisfaction of the deeper spiritual needs of the heart, all derive their driving force, their interest and will, from the Will and Idea of the Unconscious.

Hartmann, unlike Schopenhauer, acknowledged Gall's doctrine, from which he borrowed some notions of instinct and such distinctions as "potentia" and "libido" sexualis, and analysed the mental powers, like Gall, on Natural History lines. His work is a valuable contribution to the Science of Character.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (1844-1900)

For Nietzsche, as for Schopenhauer, "God is dead," but Nietzsche was no pessimist. Happiness, roughly speaking, means that state to which we have attained when we perform those actions which we are best apt to perform. It means that state to which an organism arrives when it is in complete harmony with its environment. But an environment may be unworthy of adapting one's self to it. Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche regarded blind Will as the motive force of the universe; but he did not think this will is a will to live, but a will to power. The struggle for existence is changed to the struggle for power. It is our needs that interpret the world, our instincts and their impulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for power; each has its point of view, which it would fain impose upon all the other instincts as their norm. Even in our very bodies there is a fight for power between the cells and the tissues.

Vol. i.]
Nietzsche, like Lamarck, believed in adaptation to the environment and the inheritance of acquired characters. Like Spencer, he based his sociology and ethics on biology, insisted upon the elimination of the weak and degenerate. Gradually the idea of environmental influence weakened, and the "Will to Power" was then considered by him to be the chief evolutionary factor. He distinguished between "masters and slaves" according to the different quanta of energy in different men. Not the competitive fight, the struggle for existence, but the struggle for might. He considered war and struggle as a biological and social necessity.

Man is not only striving to survive but he strives for power, for supremacy—one individual over another, one tribe over another, one nation over another—hence there is no peace either between individuals or nations. (Nietzsche inveighed against nationalism and was in favour of a United States of Europe.) The two forces to that end are aggression and dissimulation. Those animals are doomed to become extinct that cannot select the order of conduct which is best calculated to make them overcome, either numerically, strategically, or by sheer physical strength, the will to power of other species. The animal world, therefore, is the scene of an uninterrupted war.

A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength. It is a natural function of the strong to discharge their energy. They thirst for enemies, resistance, triumphs. The superfluity of their energy is the pressure in them which accounts for their acts of destruction for destruction sake; it is the motive force which explains their will to overpower, to create or destroy above their immediate needs, to fight, kill, and altogether to seek danger. This natural function of the strong was perforce regarded as "good" by those possessed of such energy. The wolf says, "Eating lamb is good"; the lamb says, "Eating lamb is evil."

As Plato has pointed out in the "Republic," so Nietzsche explained how morality is imposed on the weak by the strong in the interest of the rulers. The conqueror forces the conquered to serve him; that is considered by the latter as "oppression" or "atrocity." Accordingly there is a master morality and a slave morality. The man with power calls it wicked to deprive him of it. He teaches goodness; he moralises. The slave holds that to be good which alleviates the state of suffering. Pity, patience, humility, industry, benevolence, excite his approval and admiration. Of course, the two classes are not always so distinct; they shade imperceptibly one into the other.

Not only the actually powerful, but also the impotent, the oppressed, the ill-constituted, the defeated, will struggle for power. Life means struggle, battle, war. Those who do not want to fight will shout for peace, love of one's neighbour, love of one's enemy.

Christianity is the religion of pity. "The most general effect, the most complete transformation that Christianity has produced in Europe, is perhaps the fact that the man who performs social, sympathetic, disinterested, and benevolent actions is now considered as the moral man. Christianity itself, when flourishing, was thoroughly selfish, for the Christian cared really but for the one thing needful, the absolute importance of eternal and personal salvation. Now, when Christian dogmas are slowly receding, when people become gradually separated from these dogmas, they seek the more some justification for this separation in a cult of the love of humanity. In the hands of the strong 'religion is an additional means of overcoming resistance in the exercise of authority.'"

"There are no moral phenomena, there is merely a moral interpretation of phenomena." Morals depend on the geographical and historical conditions of the people. Every conception changes with time. Much that passed for good with one people was regarded with scorn and contempt by another. To be moral means to be obedient to an old-established law and custom. The motives of this morality are fear of loss and injury, and hope of usefulness and advantage.
"Man does not seek **happiness** and does not avoid unhappiness. Pleasure and pain are mere results, mere accompanying phenomena; that which every man, which every tiny particle of living organism, will have, is an increase in power. In striving after this, pleasure and pain are encountered." Evolution does not make happiness its goal; it aims merely at evolution and nothing else. "Good" is all that enhances the feeling of power, the will to power, and power itself in man. Evil is all that proceeds from weakness, envy, and revenge. **Self-discipline** is the thing on which Nietzsche insisted most, and obedience and fidelity next. Morality is self-control and self-conquest.

Morality is the herd instinct in the individual. Fear is the mother of morals. Everything that elevates the individual above the herd, and is a source of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth called evil; the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalising disposition, the mediocrity of desires attains the moral distinction and honour. The masses are to be harmless, good-natured, and easily gulled. The **most virtuous man is the tamest man**, because he would be the least likely person to ruffle other people's feelings; or to make ripples upon the calm waters of peace and comfort. Conformity with a given harmless, domesticated type, uniformity of manners, views and few desires, these are the qualities most appreciated in men.

Compulsion precedes morality; indeed, morality itself is compulsion for a time, to which one submits for the avoidance of pain. Later on it becomes custom, later still free obedience, and finally almost instinct; then, like everything long-acustomed and natural, it is connected with pleasure—and is henceforth called **virtue**. Since, however, no one is really responsible for his action, the concept of free-will being a happy delusion, remorse is cowardice. Formerly people argued: conscience condemns this action, therefore this action is reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience condemns an action because that action has been condemned by custom for a long period of time. All conscience does is to imitate; it does not create values. That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions was not conscience, but the knowledge of or the prejudice against their consequences.

Our actions follow in a continuous stream, there is no intervening vacuum. Their sources are hidden away in the dim past (heredity) and the mystery of the present (environment). Now, the belief in **free-will** is "incompatible with the idea of a continuous, uniform, undivided, indivisible flow." This belief presupposes that every single action is isolated and indivisible. "It is the extravagant pride of man, this desire for freedom of the will, this desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom. . . . No one is responsible for the fact that he exists at all, that he is constituted as he is, and that he happens to be in certain circumstances and in a particular environment."

**Nobody is responsible for his actions,** nobody for his nature. To judge is identical with being unjust. This also applies when an individual judges himself. "We do not complain of nature as immoral because it sends a thunderstorm and makes us wet—why do we call those who injure us immoral? Because in the latter case we take for granted a free-will functioning voluntarily; in the former we see necessity. But this distinction is an error." All systems of morals allow intentional injury in the case of necessity—that is, when it is a matter of self-preservation. Yet the insect and criminal do that which seems to them good (useful) according to the degree of their intellect.

**Nietzsche was the first modern philosopher to advocate eugenics.** The law that the fittest survive in a given environment does not by any means imply that the stronger or the better will survive. It is the survival of those who are constitutionally fittest to thrive under the conditions in which they are placed; and very often that which, humanly speaking, is inferiority, causes the survival.
Nietzsche advocated the elimination of the unfit and prohibition of offspring to certain people. He believed the worst impediment to elimination was and still is the Christian Church, because the latter protects and preserves the unfit and weak. What the species requires is the suppression of the physiologically botched, the weak, and the degenerate; they ought to be helped to perish, but it was precisely to these people that Christianity appealed as a preservative force. A man should not marry unless he is sound, of good ancestry, and entitled to desire a child. Nietzsche would improve the race by a eugenics marriage system, so that gradually an aristocracy, strong in body and mind, and from it a new race of "higher men," and from these higher men a new species of "supermen," would evolve.

HERMANN LOTZE (1817-1881),

successor to Herbert in the University of Göttingen, a disciple of E. H. Weber (1795-1878), was a thoroughgoing modern defender of animism.

When Lotze published his principal psychological work, "Medizinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele," 1852, a great change had taken place in scientific ideas, owing to the progress of the physical, chemical, and biological sciences, culminating in the discovery of the conservation of matter and energy. This progress affected physiology. The metaphysical explanation, according to which organic phenomena were supposed to be derived from an imaginary vital principle, was not discarded in favour of the explanation common to all physical phenomena, viz., that organic and vital phenomena, like all other phenomena of the external world, are the result of physical causes. This principle was, however, much disputed, and is still rejected by some.

Trained in the medical sciences, and a master of the physiology of his time, one of the first efforts of Lotze was an attack on vitalism. He exhibited the futility of the formless notion of the vital force, and conceiving the mechanical principles in a very broad spirit, he attempted to show the adequacy of these principles to the explanation of all the facts of biology. But in his chief works he defended in the most thorough and searching manner the notion of psycho-physical interaction and the conception of the soul as being distinct from the body. Lotze was a dualist: the mental and the somatic (physiological) processes were two different events, but running concurrently.

Lotze represented the unusual spectacle of a thinker who is at once thoroughly imbued with the spirit of empirical science, and yet in earnest with metaphysics or ontology. He had no doubt about the existence of the soul-entity, and, while prepared to welcome all the results of physiological research and pathological evidence, was firmly convinced that no extension of natural knowledge can dispense with the admission of spiritual activity over and above all mechanical and biological forces. The difficulty which seems to have impelled him to, and maintained him in, this position would appear to be the unity of self-consciousness. Among other things this ultimate unity renders, in his view, all attempts to derive extension, or the most general property of the object-world, from experimental data, futile. In experience representations possess only intensiveness—space is a mental construction, occasioned by, but not generated from, phenomena of sense, whether motor or sensory.

Lotze, in his capacity of psychologist, philosopher, and physiologist, first reopened the question of the relations of mind and body, placing himself at the modern standpoint in accordance with recent scientific discoveries. His philosophic principles were, however, entirely spiritualistic. In his opinion, we can only obtain an exact knowledge of internal phenomena because we have a direct perception of them; whereas of external phenomena, which are apprehended indirectly, we can but have an imperfect notion. He thus rejected Descartes' dualism, which gives to spirit and matter an equal value. On the other hand, he stoutly maintained the
principle of the mechanical causality of biological phenomena, although he refused to admit that the physical energy which is spent in physiological processes is preserved as such. In his opinion, this energy, although remaining intact as to quantity, can be transformed into a force of a different kind—namely, psychical energy. The point at which this transformation takes place he held to be the seat of the soul, herein approaching very near to Cartesian theories of the reciprocal influence of mind and body.

Lotze designated the fibreless parenchyma of the brain as the probable seat of the soul, since the existence of a common point for all nerve fibres cannot be demonstrated, nor is it likely, indeed, that the separate excitations of the soul are conveyed to it in a condition of entire isolation.

His opinion of the old faculty psychology was that it was inadequate; but he thought that we were compelled, without detriment to the supposition of the soul's inexplicable unity, to assume as many separate faculties as there are irreducible groups left by our study. Such ultimate groups of inner life are presentation, feeling, and will.

FRANZ BRENTANO (1838-1902)

held that the only means of arriving at an exact knowledge of psychological phenomena consists in introspection, coupled with the observation of other individuals. Psychology is the science of the soul, used in the old metaphysical sense, but meaning that it is the science of everything connected with feeling, thinking, and willing. In other words, modern psychologists are no longer concerned with an inquiry as to the substance of the soul.

GUSTAV THEODOR FECHNER (1801-1887).

Professor in Leipsic University, was the author of "Psycho-Physics" (1860) and the founder of modern scientific psychology. HERMANN V. HELMHOLTZ (1821-1894), in his great works on vision and hearing, had already shown how physics mount into physiology and psychology; and after him Weber, Fechner, Lotze, and Wundt had, step by step, pushed forward the parallels of the material accompaniments of thoughts and feelings.

Whereas Lotze was practically a follower of the Cartesian dualistic principle, Fechner, on the contrary, believed in a universal animism, by which matter and spirit are indissolubly connected, not only in man and animals, but also in plants and the celestial bodies. The difference between the external and internal worlds, he taught, depended rather on a different point of view than on substantial difference between the two.

Fechner received from his master, E. H. WEBER (1795-1878)—"Der Tastsinn und das Gemeingefühl" (1849)—the idea of a constant relation existing between the external stimulus and the sensation. This led to his formulating the psycho-physical law, which he called by Weber's name, i.e., the variation in the intensity of the mental state is not proportionate to the actual force of the stimulus, but to the difference between the amount of energy manifested by the corresponding material state and that existing previous to the action of the new stimulus; in fact, sensation increases as the logarithm of the stimulus. Psycho-physics is therefore the exact science of the connections between the functions of the body and of the soul, or, more generally, between the physical and mental worlds.

Fechner preserved the old distinction of inner and outer perception. The connection between body and mind may be direct or indirect. Sensations are in direct dependence on certain activities of the brain, of which they are the immediate
consequences; but they depend also indirectly on the external stimuli whose action is conveyed through the nerves. The mental process being viewed as a direct emanation of the physical process, the latter may be considered the substratum or vehicle of the former; and those physical activities which are in more direct connection with the mental activities are called psycho-physical. Psycho-physics may therefore be divided into two branches, according as it studies the indirect or the direct relations intervening between consciousness and the external world. The former, the psycho-physics of the external world, borrows its method from the science of physics; while the latter, or psycho-physics of the inner world, presupposes a knowledge of physiology and anatomy, especially those of the nervous system, and constitutes, in other words, so-called physiological psychology.

WILHELM MAX WUNDT (1832-) AND EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

Fechner's work was carried on by Wilhelm Wundt, a pupil of Helmholtz. In 1878 he founded in Leipzig the first laboratory of physiological psychology, or experimental psychology, and since then, not only in Germany, but in all European and American countries, this one has served as model for numerous laboratories which have been established for the same purpose.

Not satisfied with the definition of psychology—and of psychological phenomena as compared with physical—given by his predecessors, Wundt re-examined the whole question from the beginning. He arrived at the conclusion that there is no substantial difference between psychology and the natural sciences, the external world existing only inasmuch as it is perceived by our consciousness, and consciousness existing only inasmuch as there is an object to be perceived—i.e., the external world. The only difference between the physical and psychical sciences lies in the point of view from which they consider their object. Psychology studies it in connection with the direct impression it creates on our consciousness, whereas the physical sciences make abstraction of the effects produced on our consciousness and are concerned with general laws. That which appears directly to our consciousness is constituted by qualities, or values, which manifest themselves either as sensations or as feeling and will. The two latter are what lend an eminently qualitative character to the mental processes, the will being that which represents the spontaneous character of the mental life, and distinguishes it from a merely physical mechanism.

As a consequence of his principle that the phenomena of consciousness and those of nature are the same thing differently considered, follows the application of physiological methods to psychology. The experimental method completes what introspection can only partly achieve, and gives a more exact basis to psychological research; but it is by no means sufficient in itself, and can only be applied to the simpler mental processes. As regards the more complex ones, social psychology, or, as it is also called, the psychology of peoples or Folk-Psychology (Völker-psychologie), studies the great mental phenomena which are the outcome of man's life as a member of society. Additional help is derived from a study of child-life and animal life, and abnormal mental phenomena.

Wundt started his philosophic career as a monist, but later became a defender of the dualism of body and soul. He says: "Every psychic event has a corresponding physical change; but the two are completely independent, and are not in any natural causal connection."

The application of experiment to psychology, now so general, was largely due to Wundt. These experiments may be divided into two classes: those which refer to the measurement of the sensations and to the study of perceptions, and those which aim at determining the duration of certain mental processes; the law of the relation between sensation and stimulus. Let us see what they teach us.

There are various states of consciousness which can have an influence on the
attention and, indirectly, on the sensibility. Thus depression or agitation or physical discomfort is apt to diminish the intensity of the attention; whilst, on the contrary, a strong interest in the work on hand and a great faith in its results render the attention keener. Expectation and habit may also modify the subjective conditions of the individual under observation. Expectation renders the sensibility more acute, for it resolves itself into a preparatory attention, which serves to strengthen the attention itself. Habit also may be a cause of error, in that the individual, after a certain number of experiments, is apt to acquire a disposition of the mind or nerves towards the reception of a determinate stimulus. In a series of sensations this disposition may easily lead to an erroneous appreciation, as some sensations may appear more and others less intense than they are in reality. Naturally this factor should be taken into account by observer and experimenter alike, and it should be reduced as much as possible to a constant value. Further disturbing causes are practice and fatigue. Practice tends to sharpen and facilitate perception; fatigue, on the contrary, renders it slow and obtuse.

One of the most important methods of this school has been the investigation of the time relations of mental phenomena. A sensation of standard quality and intensity is selected, the moment of its appearance is expected, and its recognition is indicated by a simple muscular action to which the experimentee is well accustomed. This gives what is called the reaction time, which is found to vary a fraction of a second in different individuals, and in the same individual under different conditions. Since only so many separate excitations can be recognised by the experimentee in a given unit of time, the smallest interval in which he can discriminate between two successive stimuli is called the period of latency. Simple reaction time minus the period of latency is known as perception time.

Simple reaction time is found to be shortened by the intensity of the stimulus, by use and expectancy. It is delayed by fatigue, brain and mental disorders. It is markedly shortened by coffee, and would appear to be considerably delayed by alcohol, though the subject of the experiment always believes it to be hastened. But alcohol, taken slowly in small sips, appears, like coffee, to diminish reaction time.

KRÄPELIN's association experiments consist in presenting, orally or visually, words—as a rule substantives—to the test person, who must respond as quickly as possible with the first word which occurs to him.

Experiments have also been made to investigate the time taken up by the higher mental operations; for instance, the time taken up in clear and discriminating perception, so-called discernment time. The method is to submit to the subject of the experiment opportunities for the discernment of varying sensations more or less complex and of different intensities, and to subtract from the results thus obtained the simple reaction time which is peculiar to him. Then the will time, or the time occupied in choice can be measured, if the same series of experiments be repeated, but a choice of ways of reacting be permitted, when the differences in time resulting between the two series of experiments will show the difference due to the operation of the will in choice.

Other subjects of experimental psychology are: testing tactile, visual, muscular, acoustic sensations and presentations; tests of memory and verbal association, observations on physical and mental reactions; the response of individuals to definite prescribed conditions; effects of drugs; testing of sensibility, susceptibility, and effects of fatigue and abnormal influences on the mind.

Another subject is the measurement of emotions by the galvanometer. Every stimulus accompanied by an emotion causes in normal people a deviation in the galvanometer, recorded upon a kymograph as a curve, the amount of such deviation—or the height of the curve—being in direct proportion to the liveliness and actuality of the emotion aroused.

In this country, Dr. CHAS. S. MYERS, Director of the Experimental Psychological Laboratories at Cambridge, is the most distinguished representative of experimental psychology in England. In a recent lecture on "Industrial Efficiency" he claimed that laboratory researches on mental and muscular work had shown the relation existing between rest and length of task, the importance of determining and employing the optimal load, and the various psychological factors which affect the
work curve. A study of these factors brought out the economic value of introducing scientific management and systematic rest pauses in the workshops and of selecting by appropriate tests employees fitted for tasks demanding special ability. There was, in Dr. Myers' opinion, a wide difference between the increased production due to scientific shorthand methods in industrial efficiency and that due merely to the dangerous process of speeding up. Real industrial efficiency would result from the establishment of vocational bureaux, where lads and girls on leaving school were psychologically examined, and advised on the basis of this examination, supplemented by a dossier of opinion collected during their school career, as to the occupation for which each was best fitted. The early and skilful treatment of nervous breakdown was most important to industrial life. Psychologists are now alive, he said, to the preponderating influence of the feelings, in the light of which current conceptions of memory, of personality, and of consciousness required to be revised. A case in point was the danger attending the apparent cure of contractures, paralyses, tremors, and other functional bodily disorders, when practised without reference to the psychic disturbance from which they arose.

The latest American studies on "Fatigue" (such as that by Prof. A. H. Ryan, "The Human Machine") disclose the different types of fatigue found in different types of work and tend towards a solution of the problem of what are the physiological requirements of each specific job. The occupations are being classified into types on the basis of the parts of the worker's body brought into play, and the degree of participation by machinery. It is found that rough, bodily labour requiring muscular strain occupied thirty-five per cent. of the factory manufacturing force; purely hand work, thirty-eight per cent., of which half is repetition "bench" work and half "crafts" and repairs requiring dexterity. Machine operating occupied twenty-three per cent., and inspection, watchmen, etc., the remaining four per cent. of the manufacturing force. Women are occupied almost exclusively in two types of work—benchwork and machine operating—where they form sixty-four per cent. and forty-seven per cent. respectively of the total so occupied. Fatigue studies in the form of hourly output records have been made mainly on benchwork and machine operating types—forty-two per cent. of all factory operations. The fatiguing effect on operators of operations representative of each type of occupation is being studied along three lines: (1) By showing the hourly output distribution over the working day; (2) by the use of Prof. Martin's muscular strength test, at the beginning and the end of the day's work; (3) by the use of Prof. A. H. Ryan's skin reaction test, four times a day, at the beginning and end of each spell. The hourly output distribution has shown so far that there is a distinct fall in output during the working day in all operations requiring muscular strength, dexterity, or any degree of attention, however slight; but that there is no fall in the work of operating machines in the strict sense. In interpreting this difference in the curve of output the investigators consider "rhythm" the main factor, i.e., the regular and frequent repetition of a group of differentiated motions and pauses. To measure the exact rhythm, the investigators employ an instrument which automatically records the worker's motions on a kymograph through electrical contacts.

Experimental psychology in Italy owes much to Giuseppe Sergi, Professor in the University of Rome, author of "Principii di Psicologia" (1874), "Elementi di Psicologia" (1879), and a work on the "Emotions" (1901); and to Angelo Mosso (1846-1910), Professor in the University of Turin, who contributed largely to the study of psychology with his works on "Fear," "Fatigue," and "The Temperature of the Head."

Altogether, experimental psychology may determine:

The degree of attention with its resistance against distracting stimuli;
The power of memory under various conditions and various material;
The mental excitability and power of discrimination;
The quickness and correctness of perception;
The chains of association and the rapidity of the associative process for various groups;
The types of reaction;
The forming of habits and their persistence;
The conditions of fatigue and of exhaustion;
The emotional expressions and the emotional stability;
The time needed for recreation, and the resistance against drugs;
The degree of suggestibility and the power of inhibition.

The chronoscope measures the reaction times and association times in thousandths of a second; the kymograph, by the help of the sphygmograph, writes the record of the pulse and its changes in emotional states; while the pneumograph records the variations of breathing, and the plethysmograph shows the changes in the filling of blood-vessels in the limbs which is immediately related to the blood supply of the brain. The ergograph gives the exact record of muscular work with all the influences of will and attention and fatigue; the automatograph writes the involuntary movements, the galvanoscope registers the influence of ideas and emotions on the glands of the skin, and hundreds of other instruments are used in the psychological laboratory.

Experimental psychology, like everything new, promised much at the outset. Thus Prof. Cattell, of the Psychological Laboratory in the University of Pennsylvania, wrote:

"The high a priori way having led philosophers into hopeless quagmires, science has stepped in to rescue them, and the bold step has been taken of subjecting the intangible and imponderable phenomena of mind to the experimental tests of the laboratory. Whenever experiment has been introduced into science a rapid and most sudden advance has followed, and there are good grounds for hoping that methods which have been so fruitful in physics will not prove barren in the study of mind."

It was claimed that psychology had made progress because it had taken on a new phase; it had become experimental and had laboratories equipped with delicate and elaborate apparatus. But though registration of the action of nerve force, in normal conditions or under the influence of internal or external stimuli, is interesting, it adds little to the science of mind, nor would it do so even if it could give the length of an idea in millimetres and the weight of an emotion in milligrammes. Trying to get results as to memory from tests with letters, unconnected words, long rows of figures, has little bearing on the true memory of man, on the memory by which he recalls the experiences of his life. Man has an individuality and is not a mere registering apparatus. Experimental psychology cannot explain the social, ethical, and religious side of man, cannot tell us what makes a man a miser and another a spendthrift, a drunkard, or a wife-beater. These are practical problems for the solution of which we must look to comparative, developmental, pathological, and to the new social psychology on natural history lines. It is not to be denied that these experiments give precision and exactitude to some minor facts of our knowledge, but they have the same relation to psychology proper as the taking of temperature, blood-pressure, and pulse-rate has to general medicine. They are aids to the science but not the science itself. As Wundt himself acknowledged: "We can apply the experimental method only to the simpler mental processes. No doubt they have their value. The measurement of the intensity and duration of sensation, of the extent of consciousness, and so forth, would be nothing but a useless pastime if it did not find some practical application. It would be better in that case to apply oneself to the improvement of sewing-machines." But if experimental psychology is applied to minor points, it certainly is a valuable aid, and when extended to include the larger, as it will do in course of time, it may fulfil all its expectations.

Wundt, though so thorough as a philosopher, was yet extremely superficial in his
examination of Gall’s doctrine. ("Principles of Physiological Psychology," 1902, and "Essays," 1906.) He rejected it on the ground that its localisation theory is mere charlatanism. The brain and skull do not agree in conformation (!) and "if Gall were right, the gorilla should have an enormous organ of divine veneration where there is actually only a bony excrescence over the longitudinal suture at the junction of the parietal bones."

He went on:

"Gall regarded the mental functions as the business of a number of internal senses, to each of which, on the analogy of the external senses, he attributed a special organ. Nearly all of these internal sense organs he localised on the outer surface of the brain, assuming a parallelism of skull-form and brain-form which, as can be easily demonstrated, does not obtain, at any rate to the extent required. "Gall distinguished twenty-seven 'internal senses,' in naming which he makes use at need of the expressions: sense, instinct, talent, and even memory (!). . . . It is useless to repeat the statements of the phrenologists regarding these localisations. It may, however, be mentioned that in one case—and the fact shows that he possessed some gift of observation—Gall made a lucky hit: he localised his "sense of language" in a region of the cerebral cortex approximately corresponding to the area whose lesions, as we shall see later on, have been proved in modern times to constitute the most frequent cause of the syndrome of 'aphasia.' Indeed, the discovery of the seat of aphasia is directly traceable to Gall's suggestion, as has been expressly acknowledged by Bouillaud, to whom it is due. (!) At the same time, we must not forget that even in this instance, where a pronouncement of Gall's has received a certain measure of confirmation from the facts, there is really an essential difference between what was actually discovered, viz., the anatomical seat of central derangements of speech, and the phrenological 'organ of language.'

"Granted that Gall was, in his day and generation, one of the highest authorities on brain morphology: the honour is his, and is not to be taken from him. The phrenological system, nevertheless, is and remains a scientific aberration, the joint-produce—like its predecessor, the physiognomies of Lavater—of charlatanism and unreasoning caprice."

Wundt asked: Supposing a particular convolution was found highly developed in mathematicians and deficient in men who lack the mathematical ability—what would follow? And he replied to his own question: "Certainly not that there was a mathematical organ, in the sense of the phrenologists, but at best this: that we were in presence of a fact, which for the time being we could not explain, and which had about as much value for science as the law that most great men possess unusually large skulls."

Wundt criticised as a psychologist. Were he a brain surgeon, he would know that such localisations as Gall made, if proved correct, would be of the utmost value for the saving of human lives, for they would enable us to put the finger on the exact spot of the brain where is the lesion; and that such localisation would also be of the utmost value to the psychiatric physician for the understanding, diagnosis, and treatment of insanity. Proof of this will be furnished in later chapters.

Psychologists have done with Gall. Unacquainted with his works, they labour under the mistaken notion that "the faculty psychology was completed, and rendered ridiculous at the same time, by Gall's doctrine, which was its physiological counterpart." Thus said GUIDO VILLA, of the University of Rome, in his "Contemporary Psychology" (1899). Villa relies on Lange's description (Chapter XVIII.), and said Gall had "no notion of the complexity of the mental processes" and "no comprehension of the extraordinary complexity of the cerebral processes." It has been shown repeatedly in the course of this work that Gall was against the faculty psychology, and the assertion that he did not comprehend the complexity of the nervous system can only be made by one totally unacquainted with his works. Villa relied on Lange's criticism, Lange on Müller, Müller on his teacher Rudolphi,
and so on; and so an unanimous opinion has been formed, without anyone ever inquiring whether the original critic was not mistaken.

SIGMUND FREUD (1856-),

Professor of Neurology in Vienna, is celebrated for his contributions to abnormal psychology. At the basis of his theory (which originated with Dr. J. BREUER, in 1861, with whom Freud was associated as student and assistant) are certain well-known facts, namely, that no experience is ever wholly lost; that our present acts are the outcome of all our antecedent acts; that our perceptions, even when apparently new, are in reality nine parts memory; and that disclosing of and talking over old troubles clears the mind and relieves the feelings of distress. We can substitute or we can neutralise the effects of our experience, but we cannot kill them. A large number of even ordinary mental processes come from hidden sources, unknown or unsuspected by the individual.

The larger and the most important part of each person’s character is made up of habits, tendencies, preferences, aversions, moods, and principles, of which for the most part the individual has little distinct consciousness, and these at critical moments have often a decisive effect on his destiny. Chains of unconscious associations, relations, unknown to the ordinary consciousness, exist between events and recollections of most different epochs, and apparently altogether distinct in origin; autonomous groups of mental images and memories at high emotional co-efficiency, a vast intricate web, which, from the depths of the unconscious, constellate our thoughts and acts in a particular fashion and without our being aware of it.

We all have instincts and passions which press for gratification, and ungratified or imperfectly gratified desires remain as unconscious comrades to our thoughts. We have ostensible personalities and concealed personalities, and though the two may harmonise fairly well, they are never fully in accord. Constant adaptation to our surroundings necessitates the repression of some of our most urgent desires. Our organised conative tendencies are apt to come in conflict with one another, producing moral struggles. Every case of what is commonly called temptation involves such a conflict of conative tendencies, the more moral with the less moral or disapproved tendency. When the less moral is defeated, when the temptation is conquered, it is not always destroyed or wholly abolished by such a victory; it is apt to be only repressed and to work in the mind in a subterranean fashion. The conscious mind will have none of it, so there still goes on an unconscious conflict.

From an early period of life the child finds gratification of its instinctive impulses checked or even prevented by the presence of its environment. Conflict is thus set up between the two forces of instinctive pressure within and social pressure from without. Instinctive impulses which thus come into conflict with the repressing force are not destroyed, but are deflected from their natural outlet, are repressed within the mind and ultimately prevented from rising into the conscious field at all, except in disguised and symbolic forms. The emotions and temptations, in spite of being discarded and repressed, continue to be important portions of ourselves. The repression of a desire gives rise to a vague sense of disquiet; and this feeling may attach itself to a definite object and be felt as a morbid impulse or a defined fear.

There exists quite a cluster of phenomena occurring in ordinary daily life which have not been registered by official psychology, and to which Freud has drawn very special attention. I refer to the slips of pen and tongue, a kind of forgetfulness, incongruous or at least unexpected gestures, apparent blunders, etc., which reveal, under psycho-analysis, the hidden thoughts, the least marked but most profound
tendencies of the individual; the tendencies of his unconsciousness. These troubles of conscious activity are betrayals which it is possible to interpret; that is to say, to cause to pass from the unconscious to the conscious. These "accidents" which interrupt the normal course of thought or action are due to the intervention of repressed ideas possessing a high emotional co-efficient, and which make their irruption into the field of the ordinary consciousness at a moment when its sway is weakened, on the occasion of some lively emotion which partially dissociates the normal consciousness.

Freud applied the same experience to the Interpretation of dreams. Fantasy, in dreams and in the waking state, borrows its elements from experience; it creates nothing, it only combines. During sleep, when the control of consciousness is withdrawn, thoughts and feelings, desires and fears, more especially such as have been repressed, may emerge from subconsciousness to occupy the theatre of the mind with dreams in fantastic and extravagant disguises, symbolic of their real meaning. In analysing a dream, the first step consists in seeking for the materials which have contributed to its elaboration, the source of every detail; this leads to the discovery of a world of memories of very different origins and epochs, the latent contents of the dream. Dream is therefore a means of expression of the unconscious. It becomes more complicated with the widening of the intellectual operations and the refinement of the affectional life, with the increase of the moral conflicts to which modern man is exposed in social life. The community binds him to a host of concessions, of submissions; that is to say, of victories over himself, over the most marked tendencies of his nature. These restrained desires seek for an outlet, an escape towards another issue, under the form of dream fantasies or fantasies in the waking state: castles in the air. Freud distinguished between the "manifest" and the "latent content" in dreams, and stated that the latter was always the imagined fulfilment of an unconscious wish. Dreaming gratified unconscious desires which could obtain gratification in no other way; it is, however, not merely a veiled gratification of repressed desires, but a continuation through the hours of sleep of the struggle for adaptation.

In this way Freud interpreted the significance of dreams, witticisms, infantile amnesia and auto-erotism, unconscious memories, absent-minded actions, anxiety-neuroses, and other aspects of psycho-pathology of every-day life. He believed that there is a rigid determinism of psychic effects, and that many complex mental processes never attain to consciousness and can only be elicited by a long process of psycho-analysis, the technique of which was largely developed by his pupils C. G. JUNG and SANDOR FERENZI.

By means of psycho-analysis, it is possible to discover a certain unity of action in the individual throughout the whole of his life by tracing out the ensemble of the motives of his acts, the super-determination of the intellectual processes, the motives of which he is, to a large extent, quite unconscious. One may thus quickly understand how an individual's past acts upon his present activity, as each impression—where an affective value is engaged—registered at any period of his life, even in the earliest years of his childhood, leaves its durable traces: a most precious dowry for the doctrine of psychical determinism.

The correctness of Freud's reasoning seems to be borne out by the successful treatment of hysteria through the disburdening of the mind, or by other appropriate psycho-therapy. He traced hysteria to some mental shock or trauma, very frequently to one experienced in childhood, and most frequently of a sexual nature. The painful event becomes buried but its effect is not lost; the stream of emotion, the effect to which it gave rise, not being normally and fully discharged at the time, undergoes conversion into some physical phenomenon.

Freud had the correct view, but at first exaggerated the importance of the sex instinct, as if it was the only human instinct, the suppression of which can cause
abnormal phenomena. Though it is the strongest instinct, all the primary propensities of human nature influence man unconsciously and any one may be abnormally strong.

C. J. Jung differs somewhat from Freud. According to Jung, when a patient falls ill of a psycho-neurosis, it is because he is not adequately adapted to his present social and physical environment. Life is too great a task for him; he has not sufficient energy to face facts, with the result that, if of a neurotic disposition, his mind turns back to childhood’s memories, activities, and early fancies, and his mental energy or “libido” becomes linked up to them, and what Jung calls “regression” takes place. The libido being no longer of use to the individual in his present mental situation, he becomes still less competent to deal with his environment. The treatment must, therefore, be directed to the disclosing of these earlier memories, and this is done by a process of psycho-analysis, which is simply a method of free association, allowing the unconscious mental activity to come to the surface.

Abnormal psychology has many distinguished investigators in the United States. The most prominent are: Boris Sidis, Morton Prince, Isador H. Coriat, James J. Putnam, A. A. Brill, Smith Ely Jelliffe, and Ernest Jones (formerly of Toronto, Canada, now in London).
CHAPTER XXIV

HISTORY OF BIOLOGY

And the General Progress of Science in the XIXth Century

PHYSIOLOGY

In addition to the Physiologists already mentioned, three great authorities stand out in the first half of the XIXth century: a Frenchman, an Englishman, and a German.

CLAUSE BERNARD (1813-1878),
a pupil of Magendie and the successor of Flourens in the "Academy," was the first Professor of General Physiology in Paris (1854), and the year later (1855) became Professor of Experimental Physiology. He is memorable for his experimental investigation of physiology and the application of chemical and physical knowledge to the solution of biological problems. He showed the vaso-motor mechanism (1851-3), and the internal secretion of ductless glands into the blood was first investigated by him in 1855.

The secretion of the thyroid, pituitary, suprarenal, and genital glands acting on other tissues at a distance by means of substances, for which the Scotch professor STIRLING has suggested the name hormones, has given rise to the therapeutics by "organic extracts," which, together with the preventive treatment by "vaccines," to which we shall refer later, has set the present fashion in the direction of chemical regulation of function.

MARTIN HALL (1790-1857)
an opponent of Gall and of any attempt at brain localisation, is recognised as the discoverer of the reflex action of the spinal cord (1832), foreshadowed by Descartes.

The Royal Society would not permit the publication in the Transactions of Marshall Hall's early papers on his extremely important discovery. This refusal is paralleled by that of the Faculty of Medicine of Paris, which carried its blind opposition to practical knowledge so far as to refuse permission to Ambroise Paré (1510-1590), the great surgeon, for the printing of his invaluable discovery of the application of ligatures to arteries—a discovery which enabled the surgeon, in the amputation of a limb, to arrest the flow of blood by the application of a thread to the artery, in place of searing the stump over with a red-hot iron.

JOHANNES MULLER (1801-1858),
of Coblenz, a pupil of Rudolphi, whom he succeeded in Berlin, was one of the greatest German physiologists and a great all-round medical naturalist. Originally,
like all the physiologists of his time, a vitalist, he admitted the existence of a unique vital force as the supreme cause and regulator of all phenomena. JUSTUS v. LIEBIG (1803-1873), one of the founders of biological chemistry, shared these ideas. Later Müller, in his "Manual of Physiology" (1833), attempted to explain the phenomena of life by chemical and mechanical processes. He is also considered the greatest comparative physiologist after Cuvier, though he wrote very much as Gall did, whom he opposed. He said:

"In no part of physiology can we derive greater aid from comparative anatomy than in the physiology of the brain. Corresponding with the development of the intellectual faculties in the different classes, we meet with very great differences in the form of the brain, which are highly important in aiding us to determine the functions of the different parts of the organ. . . . The brain undergoes a gradual increase of size from fishes up to man, in accordance with the development of the intellectual faculties. All parts of the encephalon, however, do not keep pace equally with the development of the intellectual powers. It is in the cerebral hemispheres that the increase of size in the higher animals chiefly takes place."

Johannes Müller conceived the motor nerves to be all spread out at their central extremity to receive the influence of the Will, and compared them, as they lie side by side, to the keys of a piano on which our thoughts play or strike. He had many distinguished pupils. Besides those already mentioned incidentally in previous chapters, there was HERMANN v. HELMHOLTZ (1821-1895) equally celebrated as physiologist and mathematical philosopher. In 1847 he established the doctrine of the conservation of energy, conceived by Mayer in 1842. He invented the ophthalmoscope (1850).

EMBRYOLOGY

The classical works of ARISTOTLE are also the oldest known scientific sources of embryology. The great philosopher gave many interesting facts, which were not fully appreciated for two thousand years—until FABRICIUS (1537-1619) in 1600, and MALPIGHI (1628-1694) in 1687, CASPAR FRIEDRICH WOLFF (1733-1794) in 1759, BICHÂT (1771-1802) in 1801, and KARL ERNST v. BAER (1792-1876) in 1828, renewed the investigation.

E. H. HACKEL (1834-1919) condensed the main conclusions of embryological research in the following theses:

1. Each human individual, like every other higher animal, is a single simple cell at the commencement of his existence.
2. This "stem-cell" is formed in the same manner in all cases—that is, by the blending or copulation of two separate cells of diverse origin, the female ovum and the male spermatozoon.
3. Each of these sexual cells has its own "cell-soul," i.e., each is distinguished by a peculiar form of sensation and movement.
4. At the moment of conception or impregnation, not only the protoplasm and the nuclei of the two sexual cells coalesce, but also their cell-souls; in other words, the potential energies which are latent in both, and inseparable from the matter of the protoplasm, unite for the formation of a new potential energy, the "germ-soul" of the newly constructed stem-cell.
The nucleus of the spermatozoon contributes the qualities of the male parent, and the nucleus of the ovum gives the qualities of the mother, to the newly-born stem-cell. The blending of the two nuclei is the "physiological moment" of heredity; by it the personal features of both body and soul are transmitted to the new individual.
A new individual comes into existence at the moment of conception; yet it is not an independent entity, either in respect of its mental or its bodily features, but
merely the product of the blending of the two parental factors, the maternal egg-cell and the paternal stem-cell. The cell-souls of these two sexual cells combine in the act of conception for the formation of a new cell-soul, just as truly as the two cell-nuclei, which are the material vehicles of this psychic potential energy, unite to form a new nucleus. As we now see that the individuals of one and the same species—even sisters born of the same parents—always show certain differences, however slight, we must assume that these variations were already present in the constitution of the generative cells themselves.

Such is the provision made by nature for the continuity of the psyche of each parent.

MATHIAS SCHLEIDEN (1804-1881) discovered in 1838 that the common element of all tissues in the plant world was the cell—[the plant cell was discovered by Sir ROBERT HOOKE (1635-1703) in 1677]—and immediately afterwards THEODOR SCHWANN (1810-1882), assistant to Johannes Müller, proved the same for the animal world. The individual cells of a complex organism are usually themselves alive; sometimes, as in ciliated epithelium, they give indications of life long after they have been separated from the body.

The cellular theory of Schleiden and Schwann—the cell being "a small vesicle with a fine membrane enclosing fluid content" [the cell nucleus was discovered in 1831 by ROBERT BROWN (1773-1858)]—was gradually replaced by the protoplasmic theory [the term "protoplasrn" was introduced by HUGO V. MOHL (1805-1872) in 1846]—the distinct membrane was found to be frequently absent, and there only remained "a small mass of protoplasm endowed with the attributes of life."

It was shown by two other pupils of Johannes Müller—the able physiologist ERNST W. v. BRÜCKE (1819-1892), of Vienna, and the distinguished histologist ALBERT v. KOLLIKER (1817-1905), of Würzburg—that the activity of all organisms is, in the ultimate analysis, the activity of the components of their tissues, the microscopic cells. These elementary organisms in the body of man and of all other animals are the only actual, independent factors of the life-process.

RUDOLF VIRCHOW (1821-1902),

another pupil of Johannes Müller, stated formally that the cell was to be regarded as the proper, ultimate, vital element. He conceived the happy idea of transferring the cellular theory from the healthy to the diseased organism. He sought in the more minute metamorphoses of the diseased cells and the tissues they composed the true sources of those larger changes which, in the form of disease, threaten the living organism with peril and death. He is the founder of "cellular pathology" (1858) as distinguished from cellular physiology, and proved by his researches in that field that the body is an aggregate of cells, each of which leads its own life, and leads it sometimes in dangerous independence of the rest.

Virchow was considered one of the foremost exponents of the new materialistic theory of the vital processes in man, which he took to be purely mechanical natural phenomena. He emphasised the inseparable connection of spirit and body, of force and matter. He wrote:

"Every animal appears as a sum of vital unities, each of which bears all the characteristics of life. The characteristics and unity of life cannot be found in any determinate point of a higher organisation, e.g., in the brain of man, but only in the definite, ever-recurring arrangement which each element presents. Hence it results that the composition of a large body amounts to a kind of social arrangement—an arrangement of a social kind in which each of a mass of individual existences is dependent upon the others, but in such a way that each element has a special
activity of its own, and that each, although it receives the impulse to its own activity from other parts, still itself performs its own function."

**THE VITALISTIC THEORY**

Since the middle of the XVIIth century two distinct theories have been applied to the interpretation of the phenomena of life: the mechanistic and the vitalistic.

The **mechanistic** theory holds that life—a part from that mysterious accompaniment of vital activity: consciousness—is nothing but a physical and chemical process, and can be explained in terms of matter and motion, in accordance with the chemical, physical, or mathematical laws known to us. It is represented in the writings of DESCARTES (see Chapter IX.), who compared living bodies to automata animated by non-luminous heat such as is produced during the fermentation of grape-juice. The comparison of life to a fermentation was seen to be tautologous, however, when it was shown that fermentation itself is dependent on the growth and multiplication of living organisms. The attraction of the mechanistic theory of explaining physiological processes as resultants of mechanical, physical, and chemical laws is that it offers something which can be tried out experimentally; whereas vitalism is not a thing of the laboratory.

The **vitalistic** theory holds that some obscure vital principle or force is at work in the living body to regulate the chemical, physical and other processes, that result in what we all recognise as life, and that this vital principle is an influence that resists the tendencies of physical and chemical agencies to produce disintegration of the structure of the living body, which is perceived by us and maintains itself as a whole. The vitalists hold that it is only isolated fragments of physiological facts that we can explain by the mechanistic theory. The life processes—respiration, absorption, secretion, etc., are not so simple; they are of great complexity. Life represents much more than any known physico-chemical activities. The body effects its own repairs without help from without. In the vitalists' opinion, the chemical physiologist, with his gloomy creed that life is fermentation, and love, hope, memory, and artistic creation but phosphorescence on the surface of the brain, forgets the power of mind, which no mere philosophy and test-tube can comprehend.

We have mentioned already J. C. REIL (1759-1813), the eminent anatomist and physiologist, in connection with Gall. Reil, while admitting that a certain number of the vital processes may be traced to physical and chemical causes, held that others are the outcome of a special "vital force," which is independent of physical agencies. This divergence of the vital phenomena from the mechanical processes of life became, naturally, more conspicuous as science advanced in the chemical and physical explanation of the latter. Hence there arose a complete physiological dualism—an essential distinction was drawn between inorganic and organic nature, between mechanical and vital processes, between material force and life-force, between the body and the soul.

CLAUDE BERNARD (1813-1878), whom we cited at the beginning of this chapter, held that mechanical, physical, and chemical forces are the only effective agents in the living body, and that they are the only agencies of which the physiologist has to take account. The substances of which the living body is made up are, no doubt, extremely complex, yet none the less physiology is in the last resort the chemistry of the proteids.

J. R. v. MAYER (1814-1878) established in 1842 the "conservation of energy" and showed in 1845 that vital energy is accounted for by the oxidations that go on in the living body. This was the beginning of the end of the view that there is a distinct "vital force" in organisms, a special source of energy apart from what we can account for by the chemical and physical circumstances of the case. Mayer's principle remained unknown until HELMHOLTZ (1821-1894), in his celebrated memoir on the conservation of energy (1847), brought it to light and gave it the importance it deserved.

Vol. i.]

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The inevitable reaction followed. It was found that only isolated fragments of physiological facts can be explained by the mechanistic theory [for example, JUSTUS v. LIEBIG (1803-1873) regarded respiration and heat production as relatively single processes of oxidation; CARL LUDWIG (1816-1895) and others regarded secretion and absorption as processes of filtration and diffusion]; the manner in which the various processes are determined as a whole finds no explanation in physics and chemistry. ERNST PFLÜGER (1829-1910) and others showed that oxidation does not, like ordinary chemical oxidation, increase or diminish in proportion to the varying supply of oxygen brought to the seat of oxidation, but is controlled by living cells.

The vitalistic argument from the facts of development has found its finest expression in the work of Hans Driesch (1867-), who was led to his theoretical position by a series of steps well marked in his successive papers, and corresponding definitely to a series of brilliant embryological experiments. He endeavoured to get nearer to the secret of development by altering the normal environment of the egg and observing the results, or by tampering with portions of the developing egg itself. He gave two proofs of the autonomy of life. The first is based on a study of morphogenesis, i.e., of the way in which an organism realises its specific form and structure. The second is based on a study of inheritance. Driesch restated the evidence for the view that we must assume the existence of some guiding influence or vital force—entelechy—in living matter which directs development into the right way. According to him, "there is something in the organism's behaviour—in the widest sense of the word—which is opposed to an inorganic resolution of the same, and which shows that the living organism is more than a sum or an aggregate of its parts. . . . This something we call 'entelechy.'" This entelechy he conceived as an agent at work in nature, non-spatial, without a seat or localisation; it is immaterial and it is not energy, and its function is to suspend and to set free, in a regular manner, pre-existing potentials, i.e., pre-existing faculties of inorganic interaction.

THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN EVOLUTION THEORY

(See also Chapter X.)

JEAN BAPTISTE de LAMARCK (1744-1829)

published his first views in his "Observations on Living Organisms," in 1802, and extended them in his profound work "Philosophie Zoölogique," in 1809. He was the founder of invertebrate zoology; at least, he reconstructed it.

In opposition to the prevalent dogma of fixed species, he declared that the organic "species" is an artificial abstraction, a concept of only relative value, like the wider-ranging concepts of genus, family, order, and class. All species are changeable, and have arisen from older species in the course of very long periods of time. The common parent-forms from which they have descended were originally very simple and lowly organisms. While the type is preserved by heredity in the succession of generations, adaptation, on the other hand, effects a constant modification of the species by change of habits and the exercise of the various organs. Even our human organism has arisen in the same natural manner, by gradual transformation, from a group of pithecoid mammals.

He attributed the change of species mainly to physical conditions of life, to crossing, and especially the use or disuse of organs, which not only resulted in the modification, growth, or atrophy of some, but, under the stress of necessity, led to the formation of new ones. He also held that changes produced in the individual as the result of habit and environment accumulated in the germ and were transmitted to the offspring. Organic life was traced back and back to a small number of primordial germs or monads, the offspring of spontaneous generation.
Owing to changes, climatic and otherwise, affecting their needs, animals, in order to sustain life, are forced to adopt new habits, to adopt new methods of satisfying their wants of food, etc. These new habits being forced on all the animals alike, and the new habits being voluntary in those with a nervous system, the results are registered on the germ plasm and its developed stages, germ, sperm, zygote, and embryo. The gradually acquired new habits, being permanent, and being forced on all, young and old, male and female, the organism is also gradually modified to suit the new conditions of life until full or relatively full adaptation is reached. Acquired habits, with their passing from generation to generation, become fixed in the nervous structure; that is, they become instinctive. The bird builds its nest as it does because its ancestors learned consciously how to do so in the first instance. This function, acquired by experience, has been inherited and improved upon by countless generations, and has thus become native or innate. Finally, it has become a purely nervous function, requiring no antecedent experience on the part of the individual bird. In this way all sorts of ancestral experiences were made available to later generations by the simple bridge of heredity, thrown across the chasm between parent and child. Reflex acts, the adaptations due to the "efforts" pointed out by Lamarck, the actual accommodations acquired by the intelligence and preserved by the experience of the forebears—all these are preserved in solid nervous connections, in the organisms of the individuals of the species. In this way the individuals are endowed with instincts. The instincts seem so intelligent because they once were intelligent; they were acquired by the aid of intelligence. It is only their nervous apparatus that has been conserved in the form of instinct; the intelligence, at first required, has lapsed, disappeared.

Lamarck said: "All that nature has caused individuals to acquire or lose through the circumstances to which their race has found itself for a time exposed, and consequently, through the predominant exercise of certain organs, or through a failure to exercise certain parts, it preserves through heredity to the new individuals that are produced by them, provided the changes acquired are common to the two sexes, or to those that have produced these new individuals."

Lamarck would have accounted for the long neck of the giraffe by supposing that in remote ages its ancestors were short-necked like other animals, but that they exercised their necks in browsing off high trees, that the necks were elongated in consequence of this stretching, and that this elongation was transmitted by heredity, although even by imperceptibly slight degrees, from one generation to another, until the part gradually grew to the present length.

The Darwinian hypothesis, as we shall see presently, was that, somehow or other, among giraffes a variety occurred with longer necks and forelimbs, and that this variety, being better adapted to the surroundings, survived.

Lamarck was little known during the half century that preceded the publication of Darwin's "Origin of Species." Darwin himself, as his correspondence shows, had a very imperfect apprehension of his speculations.

In this Lamarckian view of heredity we have two ideas: first, that fresh characters may be acquired during an individual's lifetime, due to the action of his surroundings or environment; and secondly, that these fresh characters are transmitted to the offspring and may produce in time marked racial change. The first idea is undoubtedly and admittedly true. It is the second idea, the supposed transmission of these acquired characters, which is called in question.

GEORGES CUvier (1769-1832),

Professor of Natural History and Comparative Anatomy in Paris, whom we have already mentioned in connection with Gall, was Lamarck's chief opponent. Cuvier, who distrusted new hypotheses, maintained the fixity of the species, and opposed the theories of Lamarck and St. Hilaire, in which a later generation recognised, the beginnings of the Darwinian doctrine of the transmutation of the species. GEORGE-FROY ST. HILAIRE (1772-1844) pointed out (1818) that the parts or organs are
the same in all animals, only modified to suit their wants; that is to say, that there is a common plan of structure pervading the whole animal kingdom—a unity of type and progressive development. Cuvier proved that the parts of an animal agree so exactly, that from seeing one fragment the whole can be known. In 1840 Cuvier's doctrine of the fixity of the species seemed to be victorious, and closed discussion until the advent of Darwin.

Cuvier, besides being the recognised authority on zoology, was even more renowned as an anatomist. He was celebrated, too, for his study of fossils, and was the founder of the new science of palaeontology (1822). He restored the remains of fossil animals in 1812, and published in 1821 elaborate and well illustrated descriptions of nearly a hundred extinct animals, an extraordinary output for one investigator. In 1847 BOUCHER DE PERTHES furnished geological proofs that man lived upon earth in ages long gone by, with animals which are now extinct. The theologians believed that the fossils were caused by the deluge of Noah, and no supposition was too violent to support this theory, which was considered vital to the Bible.

Cuvier upheld the theory of the catastrophe, of alternate destructions and regenerations, against the new theories of transformation and evolution (1812). According to this widely accepted belief, the universe was subject to violent terrestrial revolutions, involving the destruction of all existing things and the total annihilation of all living beings belonging to the past epoch.

Sir CHARLES LYELL (1797-1875), in his "Principles of Geology" (1830) discredited Cuvier's "Theory of the Earth," traced the evolution of the earth to natural causes, and secured the recognition of the theory of continuity in the formation of the earth's crust, as opposed to the catastrophic theory of Cuvier.

In 1844, ROBERT CHAMBERS (1802-1871) published his "Vestiges of Creation." In his view the several series of animated beings, from the simplest and oldest to the highest and most recent, were the result of two distinct impulses: the first imparted to forms of life, lifting them gradually through higher grades; the second tending to modify organic substances in accordance with external circumstances. Eight years later, HERBERT SPENCER (1820-1903) published an essay contrasting the theories of creation and evolution—reasoning with great force in favour of the latter, showing that species had undoubtedly been modified by circumstances.

On July 1st, 1858, there were read before the Linnean Society in London two papers—one presented by CHARLES DARWIN (1809-1882), the other by ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE (1823-1913)—and with the reading of these papers the doctrine of evolution by natural selection was born.

CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN (1809-1882)

In 1859 Charles Darwin published his epoch-making work, the "Origin of Species." He laid great stress upon the facts (1) that organisms vary, no two animals or plants being precisely alike, and (2) that they tend to increase to the utmost limits of subsistence. More are born than can come to maturity, and there is a "struggle for existence" which resulted in the preservation of those most fitted to the environment, or what Herbert Spencer called the "survival of the fittest," the fittest being those with some variation which gave them an advantage in the struggle for life. The inheritance of these beneficial variations, with still further modification in the same direction in the offspring, will account for the origin of species from ancestral forms of a simpler type. And the process may, in imagination, be carried backward until we come to a single speck of living matter. This is the theory of "natural selection."

The key to the puzzle of affinity, a property by which organisms were associated
in natural groups, which had so long baffled thinking naturalists, was at last supplied by Darwin, who explained in his "Origin of Species" that

"the natural system is founded on descent with modification; that the characters which naturalists consider as showing true affinity between any two or more species are those which have been inherited from a common parent, all true classification being genealogical; that community of descent is the hidden bond which naturalists have been unconsciously seeking, and not some unknown plan of creation, or the enunciation of general propositions, and the mere putting together and separating objects more or less alike."

Darwin not only showed that the development of the species proceeds by a regular and natural evolution from the lowest forms of life to the highest, but that also by the law of survival of the fittest under the conditions in which they live, through struggle for existence and natural selection, new types have been evolved with organs, faculties, and habits tending to the preservation of the individual or of the species under the conditions of life in which it is placed. As far more individual animals of all kinds come into the world than can be supported in it, those that have some slight advantage—who are most fitted to their surroundings—have the best chance of surviving and of producing their kind, while injurious or weaker variations, those unadapted to their environment, are destroyed. This law of natural selection, or "survival of the fittest"—brought forward by Darwin and simultaneously by Walace (1858)—naturally leads through the ages to the improvement of each type, and consequently to an advance in organisation.

Taking the case of the giraffe, Darwin and Wallace would have explained the length of the neck somewhat as follows: They would agree with Lamarck that the ancestor was short-necked, but the subsequent elongation they would explain in quite another way. They would take for granted that there are times when grass and foliage are scarce, that short-necked animals would soon exhaust the herbage and shrubbage, but that the taller shrubs and trees would afford subsistence to animals with a higher reach. Amongst the ancestral giraffes those born with the longest necks would at such times have an advantage over the rest, who in large numbers would die out. The longer-necked ones, more suited to their environment, would perpetuate their inborn quality of long-neckedness; of the next generation those again with the longest necks would survive, and so on.

There are three ideas in this law of natural selection: (1) that there are inborn variations among the offspring even of the same family; (2) that these various individuals living in surrounding conditions on the whole uniform and common to all of them, will start in life, some with an advantage and others with a relative disadvantage, and that those possessing an advantage will, more of them, tend to produce offspring; (3) that the variations, inborn in this case and not acquired, will probably be transmitted.

The conception that the organic world is the scene of an incessant struggle, of a keen, vital competition, in which the fittest survive—that is, the fittest for their environment in the capacity to obtain food, to resist their enemies, and propagate their kind—while the unfit perish, has been recognised as the fundamental law of life. The operation of natural selection is, however, negative rather than positive. It does not actively assist the superior individuals; it merely cuts off the individuals who are less beneficially endowed. The "struggle for existence" and "natural selection" do not account for the creation of—for example—the philanthropist or the poet.

According to Lamarck, "instinct" is originally a character, consciously acquired, and established as a habit, in successful adaptation to environment, and then transmitted to descendants and unconsciously performed; the inherited
character being subsequently modified by new successful adaptations, which are in turn transmitted. A complex instinct is thus due to a number of successful adaptations, made at different times in the history of the race, and transmitted as gradually changing "race habits." In other words, instinct is largely "lapsed intelligence."

According to the Darwinian view, instinct is due mainly to the operation of natural selection upon accidental or spontaneous variations. It is at no period consciously purposive and implies the transmission of acquired characters.

Instinct is an actual performance or act, not a mere innate impulse or disposition. Impulses or dispositions may be "instinctive," in the broad sense of inborn; but an instinct, properly speaking, is an action, congenital, i.e., not the result of a process of education or self-education; adaptive, i.e., conducive to the welfare of the organism; co-ordinated by nerve-centres, thus excluding the superficially similar behaviour of the lowest animals and all plants; actuating the whole organism, thus excluding most, if not all, reflex acts in the higher animals, as well as the wonderful adjustments affected by bone-corpuscles and other parts of organisms; and common to all the members of a species or other group, thus excluding individual aptitudes.

Darwin threw a new light upon instinct by showing that natural selection can operate on the subtlest modifications. It can discriminate shades of hardiness to climate, shades of intellectual acuteness, or shades of courage. It can intensify qualities which appear only in adults past bearing or in individuals congenitally incapable of propagation. Human selection, though a blunt tool in comparison with natural selection, can originate a bold and hardy race of dogs, or showy double flowers incapable of producing seed.

Darwin brought the valuable proof that the instincts of animals are subject, like all other vital processes, to the general laws of historic development. The special instincts of particular species were formed by adaptation, and the modifications thus acquired were handed on to posterity by heredity; in their formation and preservation natural selection played the same part as in the transformation of every other physiological function. Darwin afterwards developed this fundamental thought in "The Descent of Man," 1871, and other works, showing that the same laws of "mental evolution" hold good throughout the entire organic world, not less in man than in the brute, and even in the plant. Hence the unity of the organic world, which is revealed by the common origin of its members, applies also to the entire province of psychic life, from the simplest unicellular organism up to man.

In connection with man, it has, however, to be remarked, in opposition to Darwin's theory, that the struggle between members of the human community is not so much a struggle for existence as a struggle for a superfluity of the good things obtainable. It is a struggle for property, and not therefore necessarily a struggle in which the most successful will be the largest race-producers. Property is not always acquired by the most capable. The property-holders are frequently less capable than the property acquirers. The poor child may have a vigorous personality, but may not get the training essential for success. Push counts for more than capacity. The capable are frequently sterile, marrying late in life.

The evolution theory presented difficulties for the problem of the soul, for at what stage of the evolution did the human soul replace the animal soul?

Bishop WILBERFORCE, in the Quarterly Review, declared that Darwin was guilty of "a tendency to limit God's glory in creation"; that "the principle of natural selection is absolutely incompatible with the word of God"; and that there is "a simpler explanation of the presence of these strange forms among the works of God," that explanation being "the fall of Adam."
Cardinal MANNING also declared his abhorrence of the new view of nature, and described it as "a brutal philosophy—to wit, there is no God, and the ape is our Adam."

In an address at Liverpool, Mr. GLADSTONE, the great statesman, remarked: "Upon the grounds of what is termed evolution God is relieved of the labour of creation; in the name of unchangeable laws he is discharged from governing the world." Herbert Spencer called his attention to the fact that Newton with the doctrine of gravitation and with the science of physical astronomy is open to the same charge.

The Dublin University Magazine charged Darwin with being "resolved to hunt God out of the world."

The Times, that important London daily paper, published a review stigmatising Darwin's "Descent of Man" as an "utterly unsupported hypothesis," full of "unsubstantiated premises, cursory investigations, and disintegrating speculations," and Darwin himself as "reckless and unscientific."

CARLYLE, too, refused to accept Darwin's theories, and even Sir RICHARD OWEN (1804-1892), the celebrated naturalist, was an opponent of Darwinism until converted by HUXLEY.

LAMARCK had already shown, in 1809, that the theory of descent was of universal application; that even man himself, the most highly developed of the mammals, is derived from the same stem as all the other mammals; and that this in its turn belonged to the same older branch of the ancestral tree as the rest of the vertebrates. He had even indicated the agencies by which it might be possible to explain man's descent from the apes as the nearest related mammals.

Darwin put forward a similar theory that man is descended from some lower form; a view which T. H. HUXLEY (1825-1895) had already discussed in 1863 in his famous "Man's Place in Nature."

E. H. HäCKEL (1834-1919), the zoologist, professor at Jena, in his "Anthropogeny," 1874, presented in historical connection the entire series of ancestors through which the human race has slowly evolved in the course of millions of years. He popularised Darwin's teaching in Germany before it gained recognition in England. Indeed, he may be called the prophet of evolution. His "Creation of Man," 1868, covered the same ground as Darwin's "Descent." It had an enormous circulation and was translated into fourteen languages. His "Riddle of the Universe," 1899, enjoys the same popularity. He has taught, like Spencer, that the principle of evolution applies not only to the history of nature, but also to human civilisation and human thought. Häckel was a monist.

He showed the unity of the universe, the merging of energy and matter into one, the underlying unity in inorganic and organic nature. He emphasised the common origin of all organisms. There is no absolute difference between plant and animal, animal and man. There is no schism between body and soul: the psychic development is dependent on the physical and the human consciousness differs from the animal only in degree. The individual soul disappears with the individual body. There is no personal God interfering in human affairs. Nature is the sole ruler.

GEORGE ROMANES (1848-1894),

Professor of Biology in Cambridge, developed further Darwin's views of the mental faculties and their evolution in the animal world and in man. He presented, in natural connection, the entire length of the chain of psychic evolution, from the simplest sensations and instincts of the lowest animal to the elaborate phenomena of consciousness and reason in man. He gave convincing proof "that the psychological barrier between man and the brute has been overcome." Man's power of conceptual thought and of abstraction has been gradually evolved from the non-conceptual stages of thought and ideation in the nearest related mammals. Man's
highest mental powers—reason, speech, and conscience—have arisen from the lower stages of the same faculties in our primate ancestors. Man has no single mental faculty which is his exclusive prerogative. His whole psychic life differs from that of the nearest related mammals only in degree, and not in kind; quantitatively, not qualitatively.

All this, as we have shown, has been said by Gall (1796), but nowhere is any mention made of him. He is remembered only as a phrenologist, whose system has been discarded long ago.

MODERN THEORIES OF HEREDITY

Buffon, Lamarck, Charles Darwin, Romanes, Brown-Séquard, and Francis Darwin expressed themselves in favour of the inheritance of acquired characters—characters which are acquired during the lifetime of the individual. The leader and founder of the opposite school—the non-inheritance of acquired characters—was AUGUST WEISMAN (1834-1914), of Freiburg (1882), and he was supported by Sir FRANCIS GALTON (1822-1911), who said: "Acquired modifications are barely, if at all, inherited" (Journal of the Anthropological Institute, 1876), and by DE VRIES, MORGAN, BATESON, and others. All these latter authorities maintain that only those mutations are heritable which arise as a result of some modification of the germ cell.

Darwin and other biologists accepted the Lamarckian principle of the inheritance of characters acquired by use during the life of individuals. The efforts of the animal to satisfy its instinctive needs, to avoid the painful and secure the pleasurable influences of its environment, result in the formation of habits and in other modifications of structure and function; and these modifications, according to the Lamarckians, are in some degree inherited by the offspring, or at least determine in the offspring variations in the direction of similar modifications. Now we have three forms of the theory of evolution: (1) The theory of the Neo-Darwinians, who deny that any such inheritance takes place, that any determinate variations are provided in this way for the operation of natural selection. According to them, the essential causes of variation are the differences inherent in the germ borne by the individual, and not the experience or behaviour of the individual in the course of his career; and in denying this, they deny that mind has played any such part in organic evolution; (2) the theory known as orthogenesis, according to which there is a continual changing in a definite direction from generation to generation; and (3) the Neo-Lamarckian theory, according to which the cause of variation is the conscious effort of the individual, an effort passed on to descendants. Each of these theories may be true to the extent that it explains certain facts.

According to Darwin's selection theory, only useful characters can survive. According to a more recent theory, the mutation theory of HUGO DE VRIES (1901), variation has not been continuous, but discontinuous, not along an inclined plane, but by steps or sudden leaps; and new forms, completely and sharply separated from the parent species, have frequently, if not generally, come into existence. According to this theory, useless characters may also survive, and even those that may be hurtful in a small degree. According to De Vries, "Natural selection may explain the survival of the fittest, but it cannot explain the arrival of the fittest."

Inherited variations are called by De Vries "mutations," whereas non-inherited variations are known as "fluctuations." The former are caused by changes in germinal constitution, the latter by alterations in environmental conditions; the former represent changes in heredity, the latter changes in development. Fluctuations are continually occurring generation after generation; mutations are rare and occur intermittently. Fluctuations imply a little more or a little less of characters already present; mutations are novelties, they imply some new pattern.
The appearance of mutations is explained by Mendelians as being due to the presence of some definite factor in the fertilised ovum from which the organism sprang. On the other hand, the Adaptationists hold that variations which may become transmissible arise as a direct response of the organism to the external forces of its environment; a response which is made possible by the inherent variability or modifiability of the organism itself.

As a result of the permutations of ancestral characters, the appearance of mutations, and the fluctuations of organisms due to environmental changes, it happens that in all cases offspring differ more or less from their parents and from one another. Every offspring is a unique being that is, on the average, more like its kind than like anything else.

**AUGUST WEISMANN** (1834-1914),

following the suggestion of Nussbaum, laid the foundation of his fame by demonstrating the **continuity of the germ plasm** (1885). His theory is to this effect:

The ovum splits up into two portions: (1) a modifiable somaplasm which develops into the organs and tissues of the body generally, and (2) a persistent germplasm which is not used up in the formation of the offspring, but is reserved unchanged for the formation of the germinal cells of the following generation. This germ plasm is situated in the chromosomes of the nucleus. Weismann thought the chromosomes are constituted of an immense number of small parts, which he called "determinants"; hence the character of the offspring depends on the adjustment made by the determinants of maternal and paternal origin. He proved how, after division and subdivision of the zygote or fertilised egg, a colony of cells is formed out of which one only of the colony ultimately develops into a new organism. Hence the new organism becomes, as it were, a brother or sister of the previous organism, and not a son or daughter.

Each one of us, male and female, is developed from a simple undifferentiated cell, the direct descendant of the undifferentiated germ-cells of the parents and grandparents. The germ plasm is potentially eternal and always remains undifferentiated, the cells composing it always remain simple. This is what is meant by the continuity of the germ plasm. The undifferentiated germ-cells, or blastogenic cells, give origin to the soma, and at the same time to the next generation of germ cells, being thus hereditary cells; while the soma gives rise to nothing but itself, and ultimately perishes. The "soma" is the actual body of the adult and exists only for the life-time of the individual. These germ-cells divide and divide, giving origin to similar simple cells until such time as one of them, being discharged, encounters a germ-cell of the other sex—and the result of the combination of the two is that marvellous complex of cells of all orders, the animal body, enclosed in which is a group of unaltered cells, the germ-cells—the future heredity cells (ultimate ova and spermatozoa)—which, in their turn, undergoing discharge, are capable, upon fertilisation, of giving origin to another complex individual. The adult does not transmit certain of his "somatic" qualities by his "soma" but by his heredity cells. The determinants of heredity lie in the germ plasm in the form of "chromosomes" in the heredity cell nucleus. They are protoplasmic, and contain the immediate family qualities and those of recent and long past ancestors. Each species of animal has its special number. In maturation, half of the chromosomes are lost by the male and by the female, but in fertilisation the normal number is made up. This, then, means a reduction of hereditary determinants on each side by one half, and thus we may have here a striking variation brought about for the future organism. It seems certain that the great majority of inborn differences between parent and offspring are due simply to new combinations of previously existing characters. It is easy to see that with sexual reproduction, where two parents are involved in the production of the offspring, there is a continual mixing of different germ plasmas, and thus almost infinite changes of new combinations. The
changes or mutations may be either progressive or retrogressive. Any variation in
which a characteristic of a remote ancestor recurs is termed a reversion.

This is the theory of the continuity of the germ-plasm on which the fame of
Weismann rests; but he, not content with demonstrating the continuity of the
germ-plasm, went further and maintained that the germ-plasm was inviolable, i.e.,
that it was impossible for it to be influenced or affected by any means. To justify
his position, he was forced to postulate the theory that variations arose, not alone
through a mixing of the germ-plasms of germ and sperm, but also that the inviolable
germ-plasm was imbued with an intrinsic power of throwing out indefinite varia-
tions of varying qualities. On that assumption, he postulated the theory of the
all-sufficiency of natural selection. Subsequently, however, he was forced to admit,
through the results of experiments by others, that the germ-plasm was not in-
viable, but that it could be influenced by various conditions in the environment.

Variations are produced in an individual organism either (1) by external, or (2)
by internal influences. External influences comprise climate, food, accidents, and
all the effects produced upon the individual by the general surroundings, or his own
habits and activities (use or disuse of particular organs). Internal influences com-
prise those arising out of the qualities inherited from parents and remote ancestor,
qualities which have not been acquired by parent and ancestor, but belong to the
parental or ancestral germ-plasm, which has come down to the individual through
his parent and ancestors. The germ-plasm, according to this view, though in the
body, is not strictly of it. It has been transmitted from the past through the bodies
of successive individuals, each of which has played the part of host to it.

Lamarck and Spencer and other evolutionists held that both kinds of variations
(due to external and internal influences) could be transmitted hereditarily; in
other words, they considered that acquired variations could be so transmitted.
Weismann and his followers contend, on the other hand, that there is no proof, and
little, if any, possibility of the transmission of acquired variations, and that only
those due to internal influences, i.e., germinal variations, can be hereditarily trans-
mitted. Putting it in another way, the Weismannites consider that evolution is
worked by means of "natural selection alone." Internal influences, they say, will
supply variations in sufficient numbers and diversity for natural selection to operate
upon, and thus promote evolution by (indirectly) preserving such of these chance
variations as are useful, and (directly) weeding out those which are detrimental.

The other schools (the Transmissionists), while recognising that acquired varia-
tions are much less heritable than germinal variations, consider that the former may
be, and are, hereditarily transmitted in some cases, and to a certain extent, and
thereby supply natural selection with an additional class of variations to work
upon.

According to Weismann, a father and mother can endow their posterity with the
germ-plasms which they have respectively received from their own parents, but
they can do nothing to improve upon them. All the improvement comes from the
stimulus of the transmitted culture of past ages—the mental acquirements of the
past. These stimuli bring out the possibilities inherited from the progenitors.
Weismann addressed himself to the transmission of bodily acquirements chiefly,
but we are concerned with the transmission of cerebral acquirements. He cut off
the tails of twenty-two generations of mice without producing any transmitted
reduction of the tail. But we know from surgical experience that bodily mutila-
tions of adults are not transmitted. Weismann then points to the fact that speech is not
inherited; neither is any other human capacity, except elementary instincts; but
we inherit a certain nervous mechanism to enable us to speak, and other cerebral
endowments for other capacities. As that eminent writer on heredity, Sir ARCH-
DALL REID, has pointed out: What is transmitted is not the acquirement, but the
power of making it. It is educability that can be transmitted, but not the results
of education. So much may be admitted. But there comes another problem. Mental activity causes cerebral modifications. Can these produce any effect on the germcells? Can brain modifications be transmitted? We shall deal with this problem in Vol. II.

Another problem is whether the germ plasm and its developments can be directly acted on by adverse conditions in the environment. Now, Professor ADAMI has brought together overwhelming evidence that alcohol and other poisons do adversely influence the germ-plasm and its developments. Yet, although the direct injurious influences are transmitted through individuals, there is no doubt that the direct inimical influences are, in the long run, as seen in racial survival, counter-acted by an indirect reaction of a beneficial nature. This is seen as regards infectious diseases, adverse conditions of life, as in city life. This racial survival through adaptation is attributed to natural selection by Sir Archdall Reid. But its explanation is far easier to the physician by recognising the fact that all living bodies in the presence of continuous inimical influences tend to protect themselves by elaborating an antidotal principle which, ultimately by the educability of the cells, serves to prevent extinction, and thus to lead to survival of a race.

Sir FRANCIS DARWIN (British Association Meeting, 1908), and other modern investigators, have given a fresh stimulus to the whole problem of heredity by their view that, in certain cases at any rate, the germ plasm is not confined to the germ-cells, but is diffused more or less through the entire organism.

GREGOR MENDEL (1822-1884),

Abbot of Brünn, in Moravia, in 1865 published the results of his now famous experiments in the crossing of common peas. His paper appeared in the Proceedings of the Natural History Society of Brünn, and it lay buried and forgotten in this publication for thirty-five years. Mendel lived before his time, for apparently no one who knew of his paper was capable of realising its importance. In 1900, after the law which Mendel discovered had been simultaneously re-discovered by three separate investigators, the original paper was brought to light.

The essence of the Mendelian principle is, first, that in great measure the properties of organisms are due to the presence of distinct, detachable elements, separately transmitted in heredity; and secondly, that the parent cannot pass on to offspring an element—and consequently the corresponding property—which it does not itself possess. In sexual reproduction the characters inherited are not an evenly blended mixture of those of the parents; but some, at least, are exclusively derived from one parent, or may even be missing; and that the proportion in which these elements are distributed among the progeny can often be calculated on the abstract theory of probabilities—that is to say, as a mere matter of chance.

No man is pure-bred in respect to all the factors, physical and mental. He may be pure-bred in respect to his musical ability and cross-bred in respect of the colour of his eyes. There may be some inhibiting factor to a character. It may remain latent in the person, and some factors may be broken up in the process of heredity. Factors may also influence one another in different ways, and may thus be either more or less capable of combination in one individual. In these ways there is great scope for variation in progeny, apart altogether from immediate influence on the developed organism or varying environment. On the theory that the germ-cells are physiologically isolated from the parent organism and its environment, we can thus account for variation, provided we assume that variation is due to a mere re-shuffling, or dropping-out, of original factors. (See Prof. Bateson’s Presidential Address, British Association Meeting, 1914.)

Mendel formulated certain laws that underlie variation. Thus regression means
the tendency of offspring of exceptional parents to "regress" towards the racial average. Reversion means the appearance in a child of traits not apparent in the parents, but possessed by some other members of the stock—a grandparent, for example. Atavism means the appearance in a child of some trait supposed to be remotely ancestral.

Each germ, cell, ovum, or sperm may contain or be devoid of some element or elements; and since all ordinary animals and plants arise by the union of two germ-cells in fertilisation, each resulting individual may obviously receive in fertilisation similar elements from both parents or from neither. In these cases the offspring is pure-bred for the purpose of the character in question, or for its absence. But it may be found by the union of dissimilar germs, one containing the element, the other devoid of it, and in this case we call the individual cross-bred in that respect.

A population thus consists of three classes of individuals, those pure for the presence, having received two doses of an element; those pure for the absence of an element, having received none of it; and the cross-breeds, which have received one dose only. A plant, for example, though cross-bred for tallness, may be as tall as one pure-bred for tallness. Each dwarf plant, whatever be its parentage, can only produce dwarf offspring; not having tallness it cannot transmit that property. A cross-bred tall plant can, by self-fertilisation, produce both tall and dwarf offspring.

Mendel called the tall quality dominant and the dwarf recessive, the latter term having been chosen because the characters thereby designated withdraw or entirely disappear in the hybrids, but nevertheless reappear unchanged in their progeny. The recessive quality "withstands." According to this doctrine of dominance and recession, the corresponding character of the second parent always exists in the offspring side by side with the character which finds expression; but the former, termed recessive, is obscured by the latter, the dominant. This is the explanation of a characteristic feature of a particular grandparent which was not visible in the parent reappearing in the child. It also accounts for those heritable diseases and abnormalities which are transmitted by the females in ancestry and appear in the males. As it passes through a daughter to a grandson, and so on, it must be latent in the germ cells, though, for some obscure reason, it has not found expression. In fact, non-expression of a disease does not imply non-inheritance of a disease, but rather a predisposition to disease.

Applying Mendel's theory to the inheritance of congenital abnormalities we distinguish four classes:

1. Those in which the defect behaves as a Mendelian dominant. A dominant character is transmitted only from an affected parent, and when the other parent is normal the expectation is that it will appear on the average in half the children. The unaffected member of an affected family never transmits the defect. Example: brachydactyly.

2. Those congenital abnormalities which are recessive. Recessive characters only appear if the factor for the defect is received by the child from both parents, as is frequently the case in the marriage of first cousins. Each parent may unwittingly bear the factor without showing any trace of it, but if the germ-cells which unite in fertilisation both possess it, the child will show the defect. Examples of this kind are albinism, some forms of deaf-mutism, hereditary epilepsy and insanity.

3. Those congenital abnormalities which are "sex-limited" in transmission. Sex-limited transmission occurs chiefly in males, rarely in females, and is transmitted from an affected man through his daughters to half their sons. The sons of the affected man are normal, but on the average half their sons are affected and half their daughters are again transmitters. Only if an affected man married a transmitting woman can the affection appear in a female. Examples: colour-blindness and hemophilia.

4. Those congenital abnormalities which are undoubtedly hereditary, but which are irregular in their appearance, being sometimes transmitted direct from parent
to child, and sometimes appearing in the children of normal persons who belong to affected families. For example, hare-lip and cleft palate. This class is probably dependent on more than one hereditary factor, one alone being insufficient to produce it.

One conclusion from these theories of heredity is both safe and important: the germ is the undeveloped organism which forms the bond between successive generations; the person is the developed organism under the influence of environmental conditions; "the person is merely the carrier of the germ plasm, the mortal trustee of an immortal substance."

**BACTERIOLOGY**

Another of the new sciences which sprang up during the last fifty years, after much tedious, self-sacrificing labour, is bacteriology. It revealed a new world, that of the micro-organisms, and contributed more than any other to a huge saving of human lives. In the hands of a number of brilliant and distinguished workers, most elaborate and beautiful methods of cultivating, identifying, and differentiating micro-organisms, which are the cause of a large number of infective, contagious and septic diseases, have been worked out and perfected, and, what is of still greater importance, methods have been discovered by which these injurious effects may be prevented or counteracted.

The germ theory has helped us to manage disease, but the task was laborious. In the first place, it was not easy to destroy the germs without injury to their host, and in the case of some bacilli, though they could be easily killed, their spores had wonderful vitality. Then further research showed that ill effects mainly depended upon what we call toxins, substances formed by the bacilli in the blood, or locally, and afterwards absorbed into the blood. This led to the discovery of anti-toxins, and their injection for the prevention of disease.

The origin of this new preventive medicine must be traced back to Edward Jenner (1749-1823), a pupil of John Hunter, who received £30,000 from the British nation for his discovery of vaccination against small-pox. The first trial of cow-pox vaccination was made May 14th, 1796. An older process of inoculation had been introduced into England from Mahommedan countries by Lady Mary Montagu (1659-1762) in 1721.

Before Jenner was rewarded so handsomely by a grateful nation he had met with vehement opposition. He was refused a licence to practise by the College of Physicians, treated with ridicule and contempt, and the theologians hurled their anathemas against him. J. C. Ehrmann (1749-1827), a physician of Frankfort, alleged that vaccination was a real anti-Christ. "Are not these scars the mark of the Beast?—they were taken from the cow." Jenner was threatened with expulsion from his club, and was actually prevented from publishing the results of his experiments in the *Transactions of the Royal Society.*

Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), in 1683, made mention for the first time of bacteria. One hundred and fifty years later, in 1836, Latour discovered the living character of yeast cells by which fermentation was produced, a discovery denied by Liebig and Helmholtz. Schwann (1810-1882) shortly afterwards proved experimentally that putrefaction is just as much the work of living organisms as alcoholic fermentation.

In 1856 Louis Pasteur (1822-1895), the pioneer of preventive inoculation against disease, confirmed and extended this knowledge, and showed that putrefaction and fermentation were the result of living particles, and that for each type of fermentation a specific particle was necessary; in other words, that putrefaction is due to living ferments and not due to the oxygen of the air, as had hitherto been supposed; indeed, some causes of decomposition could thrive only in the absence of oxygen.
This suggested to Lord Lister (1827-1912) the thought that the putrefaction changes in wound discharges might be due to living organisms, and that the exclusion of these by aseptic dressings would enable wounds to heal more readily. Lister made it possible to operate with safety upon conditions and diseases which formerly proved fatal. Lister published his theory of asepsis in 1867. Before that time the mortality in operative surgical cases (amputations) was about forty per cent.; it is now under three per cent., notwithstanding that operations which no surgeon would have dared to attempt before 1860 are now performed. Lister's teaching encountered no more bigoted opposition anywhere than in his own country, and bacteriology was a laughing-stock to most men over middle age up to a comparatively recent time.

Some time before Lister, in 1844, a Budapest obstetrician, Ignaz Semmelweiss (1818-1865) investigated the problem of that fatal fever which levied so heavy a toll on the lying-in women of the hospital at Vienna (ten per cent.), of which he was then a physician. C. E. v. Baer (1792-1876) and Oliver Wendell Holmes (1809-1894) had already hinted at contagion as a factor in these cases (1842), but in vain. Semmelweiss noticed that the deaths among patients were greater in those clinics whose chief attended to post-mortem examinations as well, and he advocated surgical cleaning of the hands before attendance in the maternity wards. This practice was followed by a considerable reduction in puerperal mortality. Henceforth he assailed all uncleanliness in medical practice and aroused the enmity of the orthodox school. He had to leave Vienna and return to his native city, where he became Professor of Midwifery in 1850. In 1860 he published his defence of the employment of antisepsis in midwifery, gynaecology, and surgery, which later made Lister so famous. In 1863 he performed the first ovariotomy operation. He was persecuted in every way, and was urged by his friends to prove his position by experiments on animals, but his energy had already given way and he did not proceed far in the investigation. His sensitive nature was not equal to the strain of violent controversy, and, brooding over the wrongs he suffered, he became insane. Semmelweiss, at a time when bacteriology was still unknown, laid down the doctrine that puerperal fever and other hospital poison diseases are caused by infected material due to decomposed organic matter, and that, by disinfection of the hands with chlorinated lime, the mortality could be reduced by at least sixty per cent.

In 1886 Ernst v. Bergmann (1836-1907), of Berlin, introduced sterilisation in surgery. [Bergmann greatly advanced cranial surgery in his “Memoirs on Head Injuries” (1873) and “Surgical Treatment of Cerebral Diseases” (1888).]

In 1867 Julius Cohnheim (1839-1884), pupil of Virchow, demonstrated the migration of leucocytes and their part in the process of inflammation, a theory which received additional significance by the discoveries of Elie Metchnikoff (1845-1916), the eminent Russian biologist, who developed the subject of immunity on the cellular side by his studies of inflammation, 1884. His theory of phagocytosis, in the hands of Sir Edward Almroth Wright (1861-) and others, led to vaccine-therapy (1902-7), rendering the blood immune to the virus.

In 1880, Eberth and Gaffky discovered the typhoid bacillus; in 1882, Baumgarten (1848-) and Robert Koch (1843-1910) discovered the tubercle bacillus, and the latter, in 1883, discovered the cholera bacillus. In the same year Edwin Klebs (1834-1913) and Friedrich Löffler (1852-1915) isolated the diphtheria bacillus; and in 1885 Albert Frankel and Anton Weichselbaum the micro-organism of pneumonia. These are only some of the bacteriologists. From their discoveries grew an enormous body of knowledge.

HISTORY OF DISCOVERY OF ANÆSTHETICS

The aseptic method of performing operations has enabled surgery to make wonderful strides, but another factor in its success was the discovery of anaesthetics in the early part of the century.

What must have been the agonies of patients in pre-anaesthetic days, considering that at the present time we shudder at the thought of having the slightest incision
made without being first rendered unconscious, either entirely or at least locally! Just at the time when successful attempts were made to hypnotise patients for surgical operations, the simpler methods of anaesthesia by ether and chloroform came into vogue. In 1841 JAS. BRAID, of Manchester (1795-1860), made his hypnotic trials, and JAS. ESDAILE (1808-1859), in Calcutta, successfully operated upon mesmerised patients (1840). JOHN ELLIOTSON (1791-1868), who had migrated from St. Thomas's to University College Hospital, was then giving the full weight of his great mental power to mesmerism, although his book on "Surgical Operations Performed in the Mesmeric State without Pain" was not published until 1843. There is no doubt that at the time mesmerism, or the hypnotic trance, was regarded as the accomplished fact of anaesthesia, and that many of the leading men in medicine and surgery accepted it as the long-hoped-for panacea whereby suffering humanity could pass unflinchingly through the ordeal of the surgeon's knife. In France, A. B. RICHERAND (1779-1840) had tried it and pronounced in favour of its value, and other surgeons scarcely less eminent were willing to swallow the doubtful reputation of Anton Mesmer so long as they could benefit their patients by employing methods which had been exploited by him. (See Chapter XXXVII.)

Internal medication by narcotic substances to prevent pain in surgical operations was known in ancient times. In the days of Hippocrates the root of the Atropa Mandragora was used for that purpose. It is mentioned also by Albertus Magnus. The vapours given off by these medicaments were noticed to have a stupefying effect on those who prepared them, and in this way came to be applied for surgical purposes in the XIIth century, and were in general use in the XVth century.

Even local anaesthesia for surgical operations was known in antiquity. Pliny mentions Lapis Memphiticus, which was applied in the form of an ointment over parts which were to be cut or cauterised, to render them insensitive.

SIR HUMPHRY DAVY (1778-1829), the great chemist, had suggested nitrous oxide as an anaesthetic in 1799, but the suggestion was ignored. In 1818 FARADAY (1791-1867), another great chemist, called attention to the stupefying effects of ether. In 1820 HENRY HILL HICKMAN (1800-1829) experimented with carbonic dioxide and later nitrous oxide gas on dogs, rabbits and kittens. In 1825 he placed the results before his professional brethren, but everywhere he was met with the greatest scepticism, and his system was generally derided and condemned as dangerous and useless. Disheartened by his failure to secure a hearing from the profession in his own country, Hickman laid the matter before the Royal Academy of Medicine in Paris (1828), but although BARON LARREY, the Surgeon-General of the Grande Armée—a friend of Gall—offered himself to be experimented upon, Hickman's discovery was received by the majority of the members with derision and contempt, and the demonstration was allowed to drop. Discouraged and broken-hearted, he returned to England, to die a few months afterwards at the early age of twenty-nine.

ALF. VELPEAU (1795-1867), in his day the leading surgeon of France, declared that the abolition of pain in surgery was a chimera which it was no longer permissible to pursue. MAGENDIE (1783-1855) said he believed that pain was useful, and expressed doubt whether there was any real advantage in suppressing it by making patients insensible during an operation. He added that it was a trivial matter to suffer, and that a discovery the object of which was to prevent pain was of little interest. In England prevailed very much the same opinion, that pain was desirable and salutary.

In 1842 Dr. CRAWFORD and C. WILLIAMSON LONG (1815-1878), two Americans, made the first trial of ether inhalation, but they did not exploit it.

On October 16th, 1846, the first operation under ether anaesthesia was successfully performed in the Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, by Dr. J. COLLIE WARREN (1778-1856), the administrator being WILLIAM T. G. MORTON (1819-1868), C. T. JACKSON (1805-1880) and HORACE WELLS (1815-1848) of Hartford, Connecticut, also claimed to have used anaesthesia (nitrous oxide) in dentistry in 1844, but Long proved his priority. A fatal case caused Wells to end his life.

Sir JAMES Y. SIMPSON (1811-1870) of Edinburgh introduced chloroform anaesthesia for surgery and midwifery at the end of 1847; and the ether was neglected in favour of the new element. It was suggested to him by DAVID WALDIE (1812-
It had its commencement at Kaiserswörth, in Germany, where the first institute for training deaconesses was founded; and it was at this institute that FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE (1820-1910), an English lady, acquired the practical knowledge which enabled her afterwards to turn her remarkable gift of organisation to such brilliant account. She went out to the Crimea in 1854 with a body of nurses to take charge of the barrack hospital at Scutari, where she achieved unexampled success. Until then there was no proper nursing by competent attendants outside Catholic orders.

Altogether, hospital architecture and administration have made wonderful strides in the XIXth century. The wards are the very acme of cleanliness, not ordinary cleanliness, but surgical cleanliness, with which no private home, however scrupulous its owner and whatever the number of servants, can compare. The attention a poor patient gets often surpasses what the wealthy can pay for. To enable the reader to appreciate the progress made, I will quote a description of hospitals in the XVIIth century.

Most of the hospitals were still in a lamentable, indeed, a dreadful condition, rather nests of disease than institutions for the cure of the sick; for hospital hygiene, with which even Paracelsus was acquainted, was utterly lost sight of or neglected. In the Hôtel-Dieu at Paris single large halls contained more than 800 patients. The entire institution contained 1,220 beds, of which 734 were large, (i.e., five feet wide), occupied by four to six patients, and 486 small (three feet wide) for single patients. The mortality amounted to twenty per cent. Almost all those who underwent operations, particularly amputations, died. The following is MAX NORDAU'S description of this hospital at that period:

"In the lower halls, which lacked light and air, there were no beds. On the tiled floor lay heaps of straw, and upon these pallets the sick crowded each other, packed together like herrings in a cage. On one occasion, when Louis the Saint visited the hospital, the straw upon which the miserable creatures were rolling was so frightfully filthy, stinking and rotten, that the king in an fright ordered fresh straw to be brought at once from the Louvre and spread out in the halls. About the middle of the last century (XVIIIth) beds were furnished, but the situation of the sick was in no way improved thereby. In one bed of moderate width lay four, five or six persons beside each other, the feet of one to the head of another, children beside grey-headed old men, indeed, incredible but true, men and women intermingled together. In the same bed lay individuals affected with infectious diseases beside others only slightly unwell; on the same couch, body against body, a woman groaned in the pangs of labour, a nursing infant writhed in convulsions, a typhus patient burned in the delirium of fever, a consumptive coughed his hollow cough, and a victim of some disease of the skin tore with furious nails his infernally itching integument. Medical service was deficient, the medical directions scarcely followed, and the choice of remedies very limited. The patients often lacked the greatest necessaries. The most miserable food was doled out to them in insufficient quantity and at irregular intervals. The nuns were in the habit of feeding with confectionery those patients who seemed to them pious enough, or at least those who reeled off their rosaries with sufficient zeal; but the body, exhausted by disease, required not sweets, but cried out for meat and wine. Such food, however, the sick never received in profusion, save when it was brought to them by the wealthy citizens from the city. For this purpose the doors of the hospital stood open day and night. Any one could enter; any one bring whatever he wished; and while the sick on one day might be half-starved, on another day they might very likely get..."
immoderately drunk and kill themselves by overloading their stomachs. The whole building fairly swarmed with the most horrible vermin, and the air, of a morning, was so pestiferous in the sick-wards, that nurses and inspectors did not venture to enter them without a sponge saturated with vinegar before their mouths. The bodies of the dead ordinarily lay twenty-four hours, and often longer, upon the death bed before they were removed, and the other sick during this time were compelled to share the bed with the rigid corpse, which in this infernal atmosphere soon began to stink.

Whoever has not had enough of these revolting details will find them still more highly coloured in the monograph regarding the Hôtel-Dieu published in 1867 by Dr. Pietra-Santa.”

Under Louis XVI. each patient was first furnished with his own bed, the sexes were separated, children placed by themselves, attention given to better nourishment, and the feeding of the sick by the charitable abolished.

Such was the condition almost everywhere, so that in many places physicians declined hospital service as equivalent to sentence of death, and it was not until the introduction of clinical instruction that the situation was somewhat improved.

ANTHROPOLOGY

Another science of special importance to the subject-matter of this work, that sprang up in the XIXth century, is anthropology—meaning “the science of man,” though as a matter of fact it confined itself largely to the study of racial characteristics (ethnology), the study of skulls (craniology), and the measurements of the dimensions of the head and body (anthropometry).

One of the fore-runners of anthropology was PIETER CAMPER (1722-1789), a pupil of John Hunter and friend of Buffon, Haller, and Blumenbach. He was interested in a variety of subjects: philosophy, anatomy, botany, surgery, and medicine; and had already been studying head-forms before Gall, though from a totally different standpoint. At different times he lectured at the Academy of Fine Arts in Amsterdam, and in one of these expositions, delivered in 1770, he enumerated the principles of the facial angle, which from that time has borne his name. These lectures were not published until after his death, in 1791. The method by which he examined the formation of heads was as follows:

If a line be drawn from the upper jaw by the side of the nose over the most prominent part of the forehead, it will form an angle with another line drawn horizontally from the nostril to the opening of the ear. This is the celebrated facial angle of Camper. The angle varies with the form of the head. It is more obtuse or open as the forehead advances, and with the retreating of the forehead it is more acute. The facial angle of the horse, in this way, measures twenty-three degrees, of the ram thirty, the dog thirty-five, orang-outang fifty-six, and the European adult eighty-five degrees.

Camper’s facial angle entirely neglects the breadth of the head. It gives no information concerning the form and capacity of the head proper, and no index to intellectual power. It measures only the prominence, without the breadth, of the anterior parts, and takes no cognisance whatever of any of the dimensions of the upper and back parts of the brain. Moreover, the facial angle changes at different periods of life. Also, prominent jaw-bones, which increase this angle, have no relation to the intellect of man. There have been great men with large faces and very prominent jaw-bones. All this was pointed out by Gall, who added that three-fourths of all known animals have nearly the same facial angle, and that the cerebral mass is by no means placed in all animals immediately behind or beneath what is called the forehead. In a great many species of animals, on the contrary, the external table of the frontal bone is at a considerable distance from the internal, and this distance increases with the age of the animal. The brain of the pig is placed an inch lower than the frontal bones seem to indicate; that of the ox, in some parts three inches; and that of the elephant from six to thirteen inches.

PAUL BROCA (1824-1880), who established the localisation of the speech centre in the brain, originated craniometry and founded the Anthropological Society of Paris in 1859. In those days anthropologists were looked upon with some
suspicion. They were regarded as men with advanced ideas—ideas which might possibly prove dangerous to Church and State. It had been attempted in 1846 to found such a society, but the attempt was rendered futile by the intervention of the Government; and when permission was granted, in 1859, Broca was bound over to keep the discussions within legitimate and orthodox limits, and a police agent attended its sittings for two years to enforce the stipulation. A similar Society in Madrid was suppressed. The Anthropological Society of London was founded in 1863.

Crania vary much in size and shape, and are only of value because they represent the outline of the brain that was once within. In order to gauge the size of the brain that formerly filled the cranial cavity various methods have been in use.

The internal capacity of the skull first received attention from TIEDEMANN (1836), who determined it by filling the skull with millet seed and then ascertaining the weight of the seed. SAMUEL GEORGE MORTON (1799-1851), of Philadelphia, author of "Crania Americana" (1839), first used white poppy seed, which he discarded later for No. 8 shot, while VOLKOFF employed water. Modifications in the use of these three media—seeds, shot, and water—are still employed by craniologists.

A method of determining the probable weight of the brain from external measurements of the living head is obtained by adding together (1) the head circumference (above supra-orbital ridges and over occipital protuberance; (2) antero-posterior arch (from occipital protuberance to root of nose); (3) transverse arch (from auditory meatus to auditory meatus over vault). The sum of these three measurements taken in inches equals very nearly the weight in ounces of the brain contained in the head measured.

**There is a greater variety in the shape of the cranium than in that of its size.** If a number of skulls be taken and placed on the floor so that one can look down upon them, we can at once realise that they display a great variety of form.

The variety in the shape of heads has never yet received its due appreciation. Craniologists have been satisfied with taking what they call the cephalic index, which conveys very little information. It was invented in 1846 by ANDREAS RETZIUS (1796-1860), of Stockholm. It is obtained by the following formula:

\[
\frac{\text{Breadth} \times 100}{\text{Length}} = \text{cephalic index.}
\]

The results were grouped by Retzius as follows: Skulls with a proportionate width of eighty or over are termed brachycephalic; skulls of which the index lies between seventy-five and eighty are mesocephalic; whilst skulls with a proportionate width below seventy-five are dolichocephalic. Retzius also recorded the projection of the jaws, demonstrated by Camper.

The cephalic index gives, however, a very poor indication of the size and shape of the brain, for it is a measurement in two directions only. **No conclusions of any value can be drawn from it.** It can tell us nothing of the size of the different lobes of the brain, which presumably have distinctive functions. Even were the brain for intellectual function only, and acted always as a whole—as so many investigators still wrongly believe—the cephalic index would not suffice; for a skull which, according to the measurement of the index, ought to be dolichocephalic might be brachycephalic, and vice versa; a skull which is short might make up for the deficiency in breadth; and it gives absolutely no idea of the height and vaulting of the skull. The conclusions drawn from it are, in my opinion, valueless.

Retzius started the anthropological, or, rather, craniological measurements—Kraniometrie. Libraries are now filled with records of these measurements, taken with an exactitude truly admirable. None but anthropologists seem to be interested in them, and we need not marvel at this apathy. For what is the significance of these measurements? They might serve a useful purpose if anthropologists had some theory to guide them, but they have none.
First of all, the measurement of the skull can only have a value if it represents the brain, and on this point, we have seen, we are not agreed. The followers of Gall say yes! Others say no!

Granted that, as Gall proved, skull and brain do correspond in outline, we must next know the value of the brain. Are anthropometrists measuring skulls only to discover the strength of the motor and sensory centres? Or are they assuming that the brain has mental functions? If the latter, whose theory do they accept? I have already shown that there are some physiologists who declare the entire brain has intellectual functions; that some say with Gall only the frontal lobes; some only the parietal lobes, and others only the occipital lobes! Any absurdity is good enough, so long as it apparently disproves Gall. To examine whether there is anything in his view has so far been considered equivalent to a crime.

In the latter part of the last century a rage for skull measurements arose. Most elaborate instruments were invented for the purpose. Measurements of the body as well as of the skull were made systematically. This so-called anthropometry was first introduced in 1880 by A. BERTILLON (1853-1914), and at that time solely for police work for the identification of criminals. In 1901 the system of taking finger-prints was added.

One of the greatest experts now existing on the morphology of skulls and skull measurement, an authority to be respected, is Prof. ARTHUR KEITH, F.R.S., the Conservator of the College of Surgeons, of London. Other authorities are Prof. ELLIOT SMITH and Dr. SMITH WOODWARD.

Anthropology has not fulfilled its anticipations. It has contributed a great deal to the knowledge of the lower races, which is really ethnology, but nothing to what its title conveys, i.e., to the knowledge of civilised man.

The misuse of craniometry is described by Professor ALEXANDER MACALISTER (1844-1910), in his Presidential Address, Section H., British Association (1892):

"Despite all the labour that has been bestowed on the subject, craniometric literature is at present as unsatisfactory as it is dull. Hitherto observations have been concentrated on cranial measurements as methods for the discrimination of the skulls of different races. Scores of lines, arcs, chords, and indexes have been devised for this purpose, and the diagnosis of skulls has been attempted by a process as mechanical as that whereby we identify certain issues of postage-stamps, by counting the nicks in the margin. But there is underlying all these no unifying hypothesis; so that when we, in our sesquipedalian jargon, describe an Australian skull as microcephalic, phaeozygous, tapeino-dolichocephalic, prognathic, platurnine, hypselopalatine, leptostaphyline, dolichuranic, chamaperspotic, and microsem, we are no nearer to the formulation of any philosophic concept of the general principles which have led to the assumption of these characters by the cranium in question, and we are forced to echo the apostrophe of Von Töröck: 'Vanity, thy name is craniology.'"

OTHER DISCOVERIES

The XIXth century saw also rapid progress in chemistry, starting at the beginning of the century with JOHN DALTON (1766-1844), who in his "New System of Chemical Philosophy" (1810) founded, with the assistance of Lavoisier's law, the "atomic theory," showing chemical substances composed of minute elements or "atoms," which combine together according to certain simple principles. This theory enabled him not only to explain all the facts of chemical combination and decomposition which had already been ascertained by experiment, but also that it was possible by their aid to predict what would happen in any further experiments of a similar kind; and thus he opened the way for modern chemistry.
Dalton was colour-blind, and on his post-mortem examination the phrenologists were able to confirm their theory that this defect is due to a deficiency of a certain part of the brain (one of the supra-orbital convolutions). See Mr. Stanley’s paper to the Royal Medical and Chirurgical Society, March 1st, 1845; Manchester Courier, August 17th, 1844; and Journal of Psychological Medicine, 1856, p. 106.

Transformation in astronomy resulted from the discovery of spectrum analysis, thanks to which we know the chemical constitution of the most remote stars more correctly than that of our own planet. [It was in 1822 that Sir WILLIAM HERSCHEL (1738-1822), and in 1859 that G. R. KIRCHOFF (1824-1887) and W. v. BUNSEN (1811-1899) discovered the meaning of the spectral lines.] The RÖNTGEN rays, which have the property of traversing all opaque bodies with the exception of metals, were discovered in 1895; and in 1898 Mr. and Mrs. CURIE isolated radium chloride. The electric telegraph was invented by WHEATSTONE (1802-1875) and COOKE in 1837; later came telephonic communication (BELL’S Telephone, 1872), and the realisation of wireless telegraphy by HERTZ (1887) and MARCONI (1895). JAMES WATT (1736-1819) made the first steam engine (1765), locomotive engines were made in 1824, and the first railway by GEORGE STEPHENSON (1781-1848) in 1825; and now we have aerial navigation, both by dirigible balloons and by aeroplanes. Finally, as the result of the recent world war, destructive engineering has made such progress that more human lives can be destroyed in an hour than could be massacred formerly in a number of years. This is progress in the wrong direction. Altogether the external achievements of humanity have outrun the moral achievements.

We have shown that novel philosophic theories met with opposition; but in the enlightened XIXth century practical inventions sometimes fared not much better. Thus, when gas was first introduced, such a sagacious and practical mind as that of Sir Walter Scott recoiled from this great practical improvement, apparently for no other reason but that the idea was new to him, and he wrote of the idea as that of a visionary; and yet, before thirty years had passed, he had a gas factory at Abbotsford, and was chairman of the Edinburgh Oil-Gas Company. Similarly Stephenson, who invented the locomotive steam engine (1812), a safety lamp (1815) before Sir Humphry Davy, and built the first railway (1825), was ridiculed and violently opposed by all the great men, with a few exceptions. Still, he ultimately conquered all opposition. It seems that it is a primary impulse of man to reject the new. This is more likely to be the case where the new doctrine treats of matters not lying on the surface, and where a personal knowledge and conviction of the truth can hardly be obtained without laborious study and observation. If, in addition, the new doctrine should clash, or should appear to clash, with established views on points on which the feelings are apt to be excited and interested, we may reckon, with absolute certainty, even at the present time, on opposition to it.

The XIXth century saw also the extension of compulsory elementary education, and the propaganda for popular education, beginning in Switzerland with PESTALOZZI (1746-1827) and his follower, the celebrated FRÖBEL (1782-1852), the founder of the Kindergarten. Pedagogics and juvenile psychology have been treated by BINET, SEGUN, STANLEY HALL, MARIA MONTESSORI, and others. DIETRICH TIEDEMANN (1748-1803), with his “Observations on the Development of the Mental Capacities in Children” (1787), was followed nearly a century later with an essay by CHARLES DARWIN, “Observations on the Development of the Mind of the Child” (1881); by J. MARK BALDWIN, “Mental Development in the Child and the Race” (1895); and a host of others too numerous to mention. Finally came the enormous spread of knowledge by periodical literature and the enormous power of the Press, which is not always exercised for the good of the public.
IN SEARCH OF THE SOUL
AND THE MECHANISM OF
THOUGHT, EMOTION, AND CONDUCT

A TREATISE IN TWO VOLUMES
CONTAINING
A BRIEF BUT COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY
OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCHES
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY
AS WELL AS
AN ORIGINAL ATTEMPT
TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MIND AND CHARACTER OF MAN
AND ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLES OF A SCIENCE OF ETHOLOGY

VOLUME II
The Origin of the MENTAL CAPACITIES
and DISPOSITIONS of Man and their Normal,
Abnormal and Supernormal Manifestations

By
BERNARD HOLLANDER, M.D.

Author of The Mental Functions of the Brain, Mental Symptoms of Brain Disease, The First Signs of
Insanity, Nervous Disorders of Men, Nervous Disorders of Women, Abnormal Children, Hypnotism and
Suggestion, etc.

LONDON:
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD.
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

SECTION I

ANALYSIS OF MAN'S PSYCHICAL NATURE

CHAPTER XXV.—ETHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF CHARACTER


CHAPTER XXVI.—EVOLUTION OF THE EMOTIONS AND INSTINCTIVE IMPULSES

-love of life and the propensity of self-protection. the alimentary propensity. the combative propensity and the propensity of resentment. the emotion of anger. the propensity to take flight and the emotion of fear. the propensity to conceal and the feeling of suspicion. the propensity to acquire and hoard. the sexual propensity. parental and filial love. love of home and country. the social feelings. the self-regarding sentiments. love of praise and self-esteem.

CHAPTER XXVII.—EVOLUTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL CAPACITIES AND THE ETHICAL, AESTHETICAL, AND RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS


SECTION II

THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN

CHAPTER XXVIII.—THE BRAIN: THE ORGAN OF THE PSYCHIC ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER XXIX.—INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS AND THEIR CEREBRAL ORIGIN


CHAPTER XXX.—THE EMOTION OF FEAR AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN

Fear and Melancholia. Anatomical and Physiological Considerations. Clinical Cases of Melancholia from Head Injury, Tumours, and Other Circumscribed Lesions; with Cases of Recovery after Surgical Operation. Cases of Melancholia with Psychical Blindness.

CHAPTER XXXI.—THE EMOTION OF ANGER AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN

Irascibility and Acute Mania. Clinical Cases of Acute Mania after Head Injury, Tumours, and Other Circumscribed Lesions; with Cases of Recovery after Surgical Operation. Cases of Acute Mania with Sensory Aphasia. Mental Disturbances in Ear Disease.

CHAPTER XXXII—OTHER PRIMARY MENTAL DISPOSITIONS AND THEIR CEREBRAL ORIGINS


SECTION III

GENIUS, INSANITY, AND CRIME

CHAPTER XXXIII.—HEREDITY, EDUCATION, AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF GENIUS


CHAPTER XXXIV.—THE APPLICATION OF ETHOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF INSANITY

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXXV.—THE ETHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL  246


SECTION IV

UNEXPLORED POWERS OF THE MIND

CHAPTER XXXVI.—THE POWER OF SUGGESTION  264


CHAPTER XXXVII.—HISTORY AND RESULTS OF HYPNOTISM  281


CHAPTER XXXVIII.—EXTRAORDINARY PHENOMENA. EVIDENCE OF UNEXPLORED FORCES AND CAPACITIES  297


CHAPTER XXXIX.—THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF MAN  317


LIST OF NAMES  339

SUBJECT INDEX  351
SECTION I
ANALYSIS OF MAN'S PSYCHICAL NATURE

CHAPTER XXV

ETHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF CHARACTER

Having concluded the history of philosophy and science in Vol. I., the reader will now be prepared for the consideration of those problems which form the real subject-matter of this work. We propose to deal with them, in succession, as follows:

(1) The mental organisation of man;
(2) The physical structure which serves for the manifestation of his intellectual capacities, emotional tendencies, and instinctive impulses; and
(3) The evidence for the existence of higher capacities in man which apparently are spiritual; that is to say, for which, up to the present, no explanation has been found.

THE SCIENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT

We have seen that, notwithstanding some twenty-five centuries of philosophic speculation and more than two centuries of scientific research, we are still in ignorance of the nature of mind, of the varieties of mental activities, and the laws which govern them. One of the reasons for this lack of progress is that most psychologists until quite recently concerned themselves almost exclusively with consciousness, and the ideas and understanding of man, studying "thought" for its own sake, whereas the science of mind also embraces strivings and desires, feelings and action, i.e., character and conduct. The great problem of psychology throughout the ages has been: "Have we ideas independent of experience?" But far more important is the question, so long ignored: "Have we desires independent of experience?" The psychologist studied himself, by a method of introspection and self-analysis; whereas the true mental philosopher studies his fellow-men and uses his powers of observation. The psychologist looked around his own mind-chamber, whereas the practical philosopher looks out upon the theatre of human life wherein all human beings are the actors.

Each psychologist wrote long and most abstruse disquisitions upon the patent and latent errors of his eminent predecessors, besides giving the world speculations of his own; but it is a lamentable testimony to the insufficiency of the method of psychology that, notwithstanding the number of its distinguished followers, the greatest thinkers that the world ever possessed, they had to hand over to poets, dramatists, and romance-writers the description of the fundamental facts of human nature and motives of conduct, and the problems that arise from them. Success in life depends largely on knowledge of the character of one's fellow-men; but character cannot be studied by introspection. A successful business man knows...
more about it than is disclosed in our psychological text-books. No matter how much we may study ourselves, the knowledge of our own individuality will be of little use unless combined with the knowledge of the individuality of others. Mental phenomena do not lend themselves to self-observation like physical phenomena; they are in a state of continual change. When in a passion, we cannot stop and observe it; for by reflection the emotion tends to be weakened, and may even disappear altogether. Moreover, the highly instructive study of mental disorders—the pathology of mind, to which we are about to contribute considerable material in this work—is altogether impossible by the method of self-introspection.

To know one’s self is a task attended with no small difficulty; and to suppose that we can attain self-knowledge by mere consciousness is an error as great as it is fatal. The difficulty of this study was acknowledged by the ancients; in fact, the attainment of self-knowledge was regarded by them as worthy the attention of the gods, requiring the highest exertion of the soul. “Know thyself,” was a precept of THALES, the Milesian, who said: “That for a man to know himself is the hardest thing in the world.” It acquired the authority of a divine oracle, and was written in gold letters over the door of the temple of Apollo, at Delphos. Indeed, Apollo was supposed to be its author; because, as Cicero said, “it has such a weight of sense and wisdom in it as appears too great to be attributed to any man.”

A complete science of mind must include a science of character. Possibly one of the reasons why this subject has been neglected so long is that—as with religion and politics, so with human character—everyone claims to have a knowledge of it, and to be able to discourse upon it if called to do so. Yet just because everybody appears to know all that can be said about it, the subject has been treated only in a popular manner and has so far not been subjected to a scientific analysis.

Human character from all time has been popularly studied, and all men may lay claim to a certain knowledge thereof; but hitherto we have rested content with studying the actions of human beings, without searching for the hidden springs governing them. What is it that makes one man place his happiness in the possession of riches, someone else in the gratification of his thirst for glory, or yet another in his desire to do good to his fellow-men? What is it that renders one man distinguished for his success in poetry, or music, or, mathematics or, say, statesmanship? Why is it that in all ages and throughout all countries robberies and murders have been committed, and neither education, legislation, religion, the prison, nor the gallows, have yet been able to extirpate these crimes? Look at the large amount of domestic unhappiness from lack of a proper understanding of the character and motives of husband and wife! Glance at the miseries of men whose career was determined by their parents against their natural inclinations and the consequent loss of brain capacity to the State! Look at the crimes committed by persons in those early stages of mental derangement which none but an expert knows to be indicative of insanity! Think over all these problems, and you will arrive at the conclusion that there is one subject of study which has hitherto been neglected, namely, the study of human character.

There is no science which has up to now essayed to reveal, with anything like completeness, the primary mental powers, or to demonstrate their modes of operation, to account for the peculiar mental build of each individual or for the wide contrasts perceptible in the characteristics of nations. We have had abundance of fruitless speculations, but no scientific data; and amid such lamentable deficiency how greatly have the interests of education, legislation, and morals suffered! The diversity of opinions has in every age increased with the diversity of writers. Libraries are teeming with philosophical treatises, yet we are poor in the midst of such abounding riches, and have had no work on the science of character. It would appear that the ancient Greeks were closer students of what they called ETHOS,
the heart or soul of man, which they held to be the seat of his intellect, feelings, desires and passions, than were the philosophers who succeeded them, not excluding even the great thinkers of the present day. Thousands of years have gone by and we have still no standard whereby to measure man.

We have seen that GALL’s doctrine furnished the first rudiments of a science of character, but that doctrine was ignored, or condemned, by psychologists under the mistaken notion that it was akin to the faculty psychology. After him, JOHN STUART MILL, stimulated by Comte, a supporter of Gall (see Correspondence between Comte and Mill), drew attention to the necessity of a science of character. Later BAIN and SPENCER, as we have seen, worked more or less on Gall’s lines; but even Spencer paid more attention to perceptions and ideas than to feelings and action. It is only within quite recent years that a number of writers on so-called Social Psychology, without being aware of what had been done already in that direction by Gall’s followers, have contributed a variety of books and papers on the subject of character and conduct; to mention only Ribot, William James, Alexander Sutherland, McDougall, A. F. Shand, Charles Mercier, Harry Campbell, Drever, Mott, Hyslop, Armstrong-Jones, Parmelee, Coriat, Boris Sidis, Tanner, W. Trotter, J. B. Watson, etc. It was JOHN STUART MILL ("Logic," bk. vi., chap. v.) who first suggested the name ETHOLOGY for the scientific study of character.

"A science is thus formed to which I would propose to give the name of Ethology, or the Science of Character, from ethos, a word more nearly corresponding to the term ‘character,’ as I use it here, than any other word in the same language. The name is perhaps etymologically applicable to the entire science of our mental and moral nature; but if, as is usual and convenient, we employ the name Psychology for the science of the elementary laws of mind, Ethology will serve for the ulterior science which determines the kind of character produced in conformity to those general laws by any set of circumstances, physical and moral. According to this definition, Ethology is the science which corresponds to the act of education, in the widest sense of the term, including the formation of national or collective character as well as individual."

Etymologically, the word ethos is applicable to the entire science of our mental and moral nature, and the scientific views of character should embrace the totality of all the mental and moral peculiarities: the intellectual abilities, judgment, imagination, the emotions, passions, animal propensities, moral virtues, the aesthetic, worldly, and religious life and aspirations.

Ethology is the science of Human Character and deals with human action or conduct. Of course, the basis of conduct is the reaction to environment. But all action or conduct is dictated by certain motives and springs from certain habits or dispositions. A science of character, therefore, must be essentially a science of the motives of conduct—motive being that characteristic tendency or disposition of man in virtue of which a given act possesses an attraction for him.

The character of every man depends partly on innate potential dispositions and partly upon external circumstances. It is expressed, in the first place, by his mode of reaction to his environment according to his choice among his own innate or acquired tendencies—that is to say, the usual manner of his behaviour; secondly, by the emotional energy of his actions, which may decline as habits are formed; and, thirdly, by the intelligence with which ends are comprehended and means adjusted to them.

The older psychologists did not admit the innateness of the primary motives of human conduct, but held that the sensation of pleasure or pain determines our actions.

For example, according to BENTHAM, a motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain operating in a certain manner. And according to LOCKE,
the feeling of pleasure or pain is the motive to action or inaction. We strive for riches because we recollect the pleasures which they can yield to us; we are deterred by punishment because we recollect its pain. These are the motives which Utilitarian philosophy regards as the mainsprings of our conduct. They influence us very greatly; but there are stronger forces, some of which lie beyond the apprehension of our consciousness.

Happiness, like health, is one of the things of which men rarely think except when it is lost. Most men are unconscious of their faculties until they become obstructed or impaired.

The pleasure and pain theory does not account for actions of self-denial, nor for the actions arising from anger and fear. Furthermore, every emotion has a potential disinterestedness, so far as among the stimuli are some which excite it on behalf of another individual instead of on behalf of one's self. There are selfish emotions which are disinterested, as when an animal experiences the emotion of fear and sacrifices its own life to save that of its offspring.

What is the fixed emotion of avarice? Is it the joy of the avaricious man in the possession of his wealth, present in the thought of it, expressed in the handling of it? This at least seems to be the centre of his passion in favourable circumstances, to which his activities converge. But suppose that he loses his wealth or a part of it; or even that he fears to lose it. What becomes of his joy? Is it replaced by sorrow or fear? But if his passion is identical with joy, then it ceases to exist, because the joy felt in the possession of its object is replaced by sorrow at its loss or fear at its apprehended loss. On the contrary, the sorrow and the fear are both evidence of its continued existence. If the avaricious man did not feel them in the appropriate circumstances, he would not love his wealth.

The same law is exemplified in the case of love of approbation. The enjoyment which it affords depends on its active state; and the necessity for more incense, and for mounting higher in the scale of ambition, is constantly felt by its victims.

The passions cannot be classified as merely pleasurable and painful; for the passions ranked as pleasurable are seldom pure or unmingled with pain.

Thus the happiest love is rarely clear from all pangs of jealousy, or the brightest hope from all sufferings of apprehension. And as though it were preordained that no human enjoyment should be complete, even when at the summit of our wishes, and under the full gratification of our most ardent passions, fears and forebodings of change will almost always sully the purity of our happiness. The same is also true of our painful passions. Most rare is it that we find them wholly unmitigated by those which are pleasurable. Some faint beam of hope will penetrate even the deepest moral gloom. It is questionable, then, whether any of the passions, could they be perfectly analysed, would be absolutely free from any mixture of their opposite. A large proportion of the painful passions in society are the offspring of such as are pleasurable. We suffer because we have enjoyed. Our present state is darkened by contrasting it with the brighter past. The reverse also holds true: as we suffer because we have enjoyed, so do we enjoy because we have suffered. Knowledge, too, or the enlargement of our ideas, in opening to us new fields of desire, and causing new comparisons with our present condition, becomes a frequent source of discontent and the various painful passions of which it is the parent. Thus does our happiness too frequently depend much less on what we are, than on what we have been.

We have seen that some philosophers based human conduct on the pleasure of sympathy, but moral conduct which is founded only on the pleasure of gratified sympathy stands on a somewhat insecure basis. Much of the sympathy which impels us to moral action is most unpleasant.
A man sees a woman cast herself from a bridge into a cold and turbulent stream; while he runs round to plunge in from the bank he may have time to think of the chill he is sure to get, of his ruined clothes, of the considerable chance his wife has of becoming a widow and his children of becoming orphans. He feels no pleasure in the prospect, nothing but anger that the woman should have been so wilful, and yet it is impossible for him to stand callously by and see her drown. If he tried to do so, something would boil in his blood, and as the time for useful action grew near an end, in spite of himself he would take the plunge and face all the inconveniences. Possibly enough, after he has got the woman out, he may feel no particular glow of pleasure, but only the chill of streaming underclothes. Thus sympathy is an emotion which, though in the main it gives pleasure, is by no means essentially pleasurable; and we act upon sympathy not to please ourselves, but in obedience to certain primitive instincts—very often without thinking—which have been bequeathed to us by our ancestors, because without these instincts our ancestors would have failed to survive and we should never have existed.

We have propensities, i.e., organic impulses, to make us follow certain paths of life; but we are not following them because these propensities serve a definite and ordained end in nature, but because the satisfaction of the impulse is accompanied by a pleasurable feeling.

The animal is aware of the sensation of hunger and experiences appropriate pleasure from the food its taste approves of; but it has no knowledge that the assimilation of new material is an indispensable necessity in the maintenance of animal life. Like the animals, so do we do innumerable things to which we are led by purely organic impulse; things which indeed have a reason and a use, but a reason which we never know, and a use which we never discern, till we come to think. Such thinking, which we apparently do in obedience to a higher voice, is peculiarly human, and never wanting even in the most degraded of human beings. This impulse, disposition, and ability to reason, is as intuitive and congenital in man as the disposition to eat.

None of our faculties seek pleasure for its own sake, although pleasure results from their attaining their ends. A woman loves and tends her children, and it makes her happy to do so; but she does not love and tend them that she may feel happy. And so of all our desires and motives to action; they none of them have happiness directly for their object, but if pleasure did not follow from the pursuit, or unhappiness and pain from the neglect, they would cease to be motives.

The greater the strength and activity of a mental quality, the greater the pleasure attending its exercise. To a person with a highly developed aesthetic sense to behold a beautiful picture will be pleasurable; to an unmusical person, music may create a painful feeling. Happiness signifies a gratified state of our faculties. The gratification is achieved by exercise. To be agreeable, that exercise or pursuit must be proportionate to the energy of the aptitude or disposition; if it be insufficient, discontent arises, and its excess produces weariness. To achieve complete felicity is to have all the mental powers exercised in the ratio of their respective development.

A man is tender, hard, credulous, cynical or benevolent as a result of the predominance of one or more innate qualities which turn the scale in that direction, and, whatever his disposition, he desires gratification from following it; he acts in certain ways because it suits him to do so. In one order of mind there is happiness in relieving the suffering or misery of others; in another order of mind there is happiness in adding pound to pound. Everyone acts according to his own disposition, but those deeds are most praiseworthy which are for the good of the largest number.

The propensities are simply rudimentary impulses whose expression is wholly determined by the social environment. Mental life is rooted in the propensities. It
is not true, as JAMES has said, that man has more "instincts" than animals; but it is true that he has more propensities than any single species of animal.

In all the higher animals there is a highly developed nervous system, with multitudes of connections between its elements. These connections are pathways of nervous currents. Many of these connections are inborn and seem to be as much a part of the heredity of the individual and the race as physical characteristics. The nervous system is thus characterised by a multitude of more or less perfectly developed pre-organised reactions which are a part of the individual's heredity. **Propensities are then inborn pathways of nervous currents**, which have as their functional correlate inborn motor tendencies, and as their psychical correlate inborn psycho-physical dispositions. They are evidently the psychological aspect of racial heredity, and it is as inconceivable that the organic individual should exist without them as without the equipment or general bodily structure itself. As propensities are not acquired by the individual, but are given in the germ, they are transmitted from generation to generation, varying only as other biological characteristics of the stock also vary. Inasmuch as they are characteristics of the highest and the most unstable portion of the organism, the nervous system, they probably vary more widely than the grosser physical traits. They are more modifiable and alterable, owing to the fact that only about one-third of the connections of the nervous system are made at birth, the other two-thirds being acquired by the individual during his lifetime. These acquired connections must, of course, very greatly modify the character of the original connections. There are in man, therefore, no definite, hard and fast instincts such as characterise the lower types of animals, but rather a complex series of propensities to action. Repeated resistance to impulses builds up a habit of self-control; repeated yielding a habit of self-indulgence. The crimes and follies of mankind are mainly due to the uncontrolled operation of the propensities (the "flesh" of theology).

**EVOLUTION OF THE MENTAL POWERS**

The first step to be taken towards the formation of a science of character is to analyse human behaviour and endeavour to ascertain what are the primary mental powers. Without such classification one cannot proceed in any methodical way to describe individual character. But it must be understood at the outset that **these mental powers are potential only**; that they are only presumably primary, but on further investigation may be found rather complex; that we still lack suitable terms for many of the fundamental capacities, instincts, and propensities; and that, though we shall describe them singly, they do not act singly, but that intellectual, emotional and volitional activities are inextricably intermingled. The method we shall follow is what we have already described as the "natural history" method. As we have seen, the defect of the earlier attempts at a classification of the impulses which are the mainsprings of behaviour has been that their authors treated man too much as though he stood alone in the animal creation, as if his propensities and capacities could be studied without reference to the connections which may be established between them and like endowments of the lower animals. But there are a number of elementary powers which we possess in common with animals, which are aroused spontaneously, and are implanted by nature for the preservation of the individual and the race.

Man and animals being in a world, the inhabitants of which devour one another, the most important safeguard with which they are endowed is the **propensity of self-preservation.** This consists of several dispositions. First of all there is the **love of life**, giving a disposition to guard themselves against mechanical injury and destruction. In order to maintain existence, the animal must have a **propensity to seek food.** Since many animals and man live on other animals a **propensity for**
aggression is necessary, and in order that they themselves may not be devoured they must possess a disposition for self-defence; these tendencies giving rise to the emotion of irascibility, which increases the natural strength of the animal. But not all animals are endowed with weapons for self-defence; nature has provided them, therefore, with a disposition to take flight and a disposition to conceal themselves and their intentions in case of danger; and, in order not to be taken unawares, nature has endowed them with the emotion of fear and the feeling of suspicion. Food not being always available, some animals developed a propensity to hoard nutrient materials, and some developed for their protection a propensity to construct a habitation for themselves and their offspring.

The continuance of the species was assured by the provision of a sexual propensity, and when young were born there developed an attachment between parents and offspring. The young growing up together formed an attachment to one another, giving rise to a feeling of affection, and frequently they became attached to the place in which they grew up, and thus developed a love of home. Family life taught them that there was greater security in numbers, and thus developed the gregarious propensity and the foundation of social life. For the individual to live in a group a certain conduct favourable to the preservation of the herd was necessary, and those who conformed would meet with the approval of their fellow-members. Thus arose the love of praise and dread of blame. Some members of a group, being more gifted than the rest, would take the lead and thus acquire self-reliance and tenacity of purpose. The self-preservative propensities brought man into collision with his fellow-men until he was schooled into respect for each other's interests. From this moment was established the principle of altruism, which is at the root of all moral progress.

For the acquisition of food and the maintenance of self and the species powers of observation are necessary. These impart retentiveness and supply the essential material for practical knowledge. By the comparison of past experiences with the present, and tracing causes and effects, the reasoning powers arose. Man, being endowed with speech in addition to the language by gesture which animals possess, could think in the abstract as well as develop powers of imagination, with which he could endow certain objects with greater excellence than others; thus developed the aesthetic sense. Imagination renders persons susceptible also to impressions of happiness and distress in others; and where there are no strong antagonising motives in the mental organisation, feelings of justice, kindness, charity, and generosity, i.e., ethical and altruistic sentiments, may arise. Moreover, the grandeur of natural phenomena impressed him and aroused in him feelings of awe and wonder and reverence. Believing these phenomena to be caused by supreme powers, and in time by an Almighty Power, the religious feeling was aroused. These are, briefly sketched, the primary mental powers, with which we shall deal in detail in succeeding chapters.

EMOTIONS AND PROPENSITIES versus INTELLECT

Psychologists have concerned themselves greatly with the reason of man, as though the human mind comprised within its domain nothing further than mere intellect, but we all have propensities which give rise to desires, and we all feel and strive as well as think. Indeed, the feelings and propensities are the prime-movers of the intellect and of the greatest biological significance. (Even WILLIAM JAMES, who furnished us with a new theory of Emotions, devoted nine-tenths of his "Treatise on Psychology" to the consideration of the Intellect, and only one-tenth to Feeling and Will.) Our judgment is oftentimes influenced by our desires and feelings; in too many instances, indeed, the intellect is made the servant of the feelings and propensities. Rouse the emotions and men cease to reason, for the emotions focus
the ideas and actions of a man into one channel, cutting off all other thoughts, impulses and incipient actions.

Men are animals first and reasonable beings afterwards. Notwithstanding all that has been said of the "nobility" of the intellect, men's lives are not determined by it, but by their propensities and emotions. We experience satisfaction, discontent, anger, fear, jealousy, hatred, or grief spontaneously, and these conditions influence our mode of thinking. These feelings are part of our organisation because there are objects and events which from their nature must be detested or loved, desired or feared, for the preservation of the individual or the species.

According to BERGSON, the intellect has been formed to serve the purpose of activity which we call life. "Knowledge is for life, and not life for knowledge." If Bergson means by life the manifestation of the natural propensities, he is quite right; for the intellect serves for their gratification, and not the propensities for the service of the intellect.

Man may exist without reflection, but scarcely without action. The emotions and propensities supply the dynamic energy to human conduct. Without them there would be no stimulus to the exercise of the intellect; for the intellect can appreciate facts but cannot supply motives. In judging a man, we have to ask what are the motives that habitually determine his conduct, whatever be the means his intellect may devise for the attainment of his ends. But all propensities have a good purpose; only when wrongly directed do they become vicious. On their activity depends all the good and evil in life.

The cat may see the mouse, but that has no effect upon her if no emotions are thereby aroused. The mouse may see the cat, but its subsequent activity is due to the emotions thus induced. Why should a man pick up a lump of gold at his feet, even though his intellect should inform him first that it is truly gold and that certain things might be procured in exchange, unless he has some desires, some hopes, which gold may satisfy, or some fears which gold can alleviate? Even the study of science is maintained only by emotion. It may be the emotion of ambition, or some other stimulus, as a feeling of curiosity. It is plain at least that without emotional stimulus we obtain no sort of return for our labour, and only through our emotions can we find any motive for it. Fame and wealth are the two most powerful incentives to human enterprise. One man may have a magnificent intellect, but no emotional stimulus to exert it; another may have poor talents, but, with the capacity for taking pains, may know how to turn his abilities to good account.

The influence of certain politicians and sections of the Press is so great because of the appeal they make artfully and successfully to the people's emotions. Indeed, many of the "intellectuals" are moved by it against their previous convictions, and those who hold fast are in a minority and muzzled for the safety of the herd.

The affective tendencies—that is, the feelings, emotions and passions, differently named according to the degree of their intensity—preponderate over the intellect and determine the nature and life of the individual. Man only thinks as he feels. The feelings promote thought, unless they become too strong, when they inhibit intellectual activity. Were we deprived of our feelings, the remainder of our consciousness would amount to nothing; our sensations would lose their pleasure and pain; our thoughts would be bereft of all interest and vitality; our convictions and ideals would lack the quickening touch of the spirit, and fall as empty sounds on deaf ears.

Education, law, public opinion, tend to repress impulses and to produce uniform conduct; but nature will out. One man is still more affectionate, less ambitious, more amorous than others; and that these peculiarities are innate, and not the result of education or training, is evident from the contrasts which we observe between members of the same family.
ETHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF CHARACTER

If the propensities for self-preservation were untutored, every man would have impulses for killing, stealing, lying, etc.—though we do not always call them by these names. Their existence is shown in certain states of clouded consciousness and in brain disease, when these propensities manifest themselves in their full vigour and in the coarsest manner. Because of this untutored manifestation, these propensities have been called evil or immoral; but they are simply non-moral. For only out of action can morality be evolved, and only by desire can primitive man be spurred into action.

The feelings are not only far more extensive in their action than the intellect, but are more important for health and sanity. In mental derangement, the primary disorder usually consists in a tendency to disordered emotion, which affects the course of thought, and consequently of action, without disordering the reasoning processes in any other way than by supplying them with wrong materials.

The greater the intellect of a man, the greater the check upon his emotions and passions. The lower the power of the intellect, the more freely do the feelings influence the actions of the individual. Hence a child, a savage, and persons of no culture are little able to restrain their inclinations. Hence also in injuries to the intellectual region of the brain, the loss of control over the propensities. But reason seems to have that power only by exciting a higher feeling to suppress the lower, so that the struggle is, as a rule, between feelings, and not between reason and feeling. The feeling is first aroused, and the intellect steps in afterwards.

Consequently the ready response of the primary emotion when a man is offended—to fight someone—the first animal propensity. An irascible combative person knocks a man down, and thinks and reasons about it afterwards; there is a blow and a word, not a word and a blow. And so, of all the feelings, we often act upon the mere impulse; self-consciousness, or reflection, comes afterwards.

In any given individual the intellect may be highly developed, and the passions and emotions very ill developed, or the reverse.

The fool may have a kind and affectionate heart, and the criminal a quick wit. Of course, intellectual and moral defects may also co-exist. Were intellect not entirely distinct from emotion (a view not shared by the great majority of psychologists), the complete idiot would be also incapable of manifesting any emotion; whereas, on the contrary, his emotions are manifested the more strongly for lack of the inhibitory control of reason.

The propensities are the basis of the higher powers; and whilst the emotions and propensities can exist without intellect, intellect cannot exist without them. Indeed, without the promptings of the propensities, men would die. We do not live for the purpose of gratifying our propensities, but we exercise our propensities in order to live.

In some persons the animal, the baser nature, would appear constitutionally to predominate, the passions readily breaking from the control of reason, and bringing too often sorrow, shame and disease upon the unhappy individual. In others the reverse of this is true; the intellectual nature holding the supremacy, ever keeping the feelings under a just restraint; and fortunate indeed are they "whose blood and judgment are so well commingled."

As the good tendencies greatly preponderate in some natures, so do the bad in others; and we meet those who scarce ever from their childhood manifest an amiable or generous feeling. Such extreme cases, however, are fortunately but rare. Generally there exists in our composition a due mixture of the good and evil dispositions: "Our virtues would be proud if our faults whipped them not; and our crimes would despair if they were not cherished by our virtues." Virtue depends on the successful struggle with our evil dispositions. Chastity would be no virtue in one without carnal desires, nor clemency in him who was incapable of
hatred or anger. The poets glorify their gods by making them war with demons. As the artist heightens and sets off the bright and beautiful colours of his canvas by the dark shades with which he intermingles and contrasts them, and exaggerates the beauty of his angels through the ugliness of his devils, so does Nature on her moral canvas enhance the lustre and comeliness of virtue by the very shadows and deformities which she throws into the picture.

Finally, there are those who from very early existence are distinguished by the predominance of some particular passion as fear, anger, or ambition; that is, they are constitutionally timorous, irascible, or aspiring in their tempers. Education, however, may do much in repressing passions originally in excess, and developing such as are deficient; and herein consists moral culture, so vitally essential to our health and happiness.

The emotions predominate over the intellect by their stability and relative duration. Perception, thought, contraction of the voluntary muscles are instantaneous functions. They are scarcely begun before they are ended. The emotions and their muscular and organic effects are slow and more lasting. Only by their abuse can they be more quickly aroused. To become angry takes an appreciable length of time—minutes, or even hours, according to the organisation of the individual and the exciting cause; and when the passion is fully aroused it continues for some time and passes off. Some of the emotions occur at such an early period that there is no possibility of their expression being in any way due to imitation. They are forms of instinctive reaction to the objects that excite them.

Some children from their earliest years are more timid or more courageous, more secretive or emulative than others; some are naturally inclined to jealousy and others to affection. Violence of temper is often associated with exceedingly good health. We must note that one may be of a timid disposition and yet be not inclined to anger or jealousy, and be affectionate and be still lacking in courage. We must also note that the infant feels anger, fear, attachment, before it is alive to the sublime or beautiful; and it observes occurrences long before it reasons.

The intellectual capacities and the emotions are two distinct sets of mental powers; but, in their manifestation, are commonly blended together. A feeling of some kind arises at or about the same time as the idea and is associated with it. On the other hand, just as the intellect may work independently, so the emotions may manifest themselves primarily without any ideas.

For example, there is often anxious feeling without any idea. The individual experiencing that feeling may seek for a cause and may fasten upon some idea; but the feeling comes first. A man may be in a state of irritability amounting to anger, before he has been opposed or had occasion to find fault. It relieves him when he can discharge his anger on some individual or object, though he or it may be innocent of any offence. In the various disorders of the bodily organs, glandular secretions, arterial changes, there are often remarkable emotional states, for which the patient may account in a legitimate way by events in his mental life, not suspecting their physical origin, until the bodily disorder is so marked that he feels compelled to consult a physician.

THE NATURE OF INSTINCT

Much confusion has been caused by the actions of animals being referred to instinct; whereas the thoughts and actions of men have been referred to intellect.

One bird as soon as it is hatched runs into the water, and it is said it does so by instinct. Another sings by instinct. Others migrate by instinct. Some animals make provision for the winter by instinct. Now, though we cannot call in question the propriety of such a term, can we suppose that the one entity—instant—will explain all these various phenomena? On the other hand, all the actions of men
ETHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF CHARACTER

have been referred to intellect; but though intellect is necessary for the successful prosecution of human affairs, yet does it explain how one man may possess a taste for music and exhibit no talent for mathematics or poetry; or how a man may be a natural orator and excel neither in poetry nor mathematics? This diversity of talent, I am aware, has been attributed to the peculiarities in the mental constitution, and the opinion is so far just; but it is not sufficiently explicit. We shall account for it in succeeding chapters.

Man is born with certain innate capacities, and he is born with desires to exercise these capacities. The same is the case in animals. These capacities are at birth mere potential tendencies, and even an instinct is only a tendency. For example, nest-building is an instinct in the bird; but which particular tree, and which branch of the tree, shall bear the nest, these are not predetermined. There is no internal compulsion in the bird to select one tree rather than another. There is freedom of choice in that respect. That is to say, while the act of nest-building is determined, in its main features, by internal organisation, and is in this respect instinctive, it is subject in its details to the operation of choice in adaptation to circumstances, and is, in this respect, reasoned. Moreover, the animal can take up its instinctive work at any time, at any stage, and pass from one business to another.

Instincts may appear mechanically performed, but they are not; for instincts may be altered. All living organisms have the power of improving their position by adapting themselves to external conditions. Such adaptations imply intelligence. There is no instinctive behaviour without an intelligent factor; and there is no intelligent behaviour without an instinctive factor.

Instinct in man is a term generally used in describing that part of human character and conduct which is not the outcome of a consciously rational process; but there is no "pure" instinct in man, such as exists, for example, in insects. It is always associated with ideas in the adult human being. For this reason I propose to reserve the word "instinct" for such innate capacities as are followed by behaviour more or less automatic, and to which the whole species reacts in exactly the same manner; and I call "propensity" an innate impulse to action, which is neither automatic nor uniform, but is controlled largely by the animals' intelligence. Adopting this view, animals have both instincts and propensities; but man has only propensities. They impel him to certain actions, but there is no innate guidance how that action is to be performed. The elements of knowledge and skill are lacking, and the impulse to act is not necessarily followed by its execution. ("Sucking" in the human infant is regarded as instinctive, but resembles rather reflex action.)

A person may have, for example, the propensity to hoard very marked, and manifest it in a desire and conduct "to get rich." The acquisitive propensity being so strong in him, he will seek ways and means to gratify it. Therein he has choice in accordance with his innate abilities and the circumstances in which he is placed. He can exercise his reason to discover how to gratify the tendency, the active exercise of which gives him pleasure.

Instincts, in the lower animals, dictate the end, and not only the end, but to a considerable extent the means by which the end is achieved, and leave but a margin, larger or smaller, to the guidance of reason. Propensities, whether in man or animals, give rise to desires for a particular end, but leave it almost entirely to reason to discover the means of attaining that end. If man were provided with instincts, and not merely propensities, he would not require such a long period of protection and instruction. What we call moral education is really largely the proper direction of the propensities.

Take the nutritive instinct, i.e., the instinct of the animal to obtain food for its
sustenance. The chick, immediately on leaving its shell, has not only the impulse to seek food, but knows how to obtain it; and all chicks act alike in their manner of procuring food without previous teaching. The human being, on the other hand, has merely a propensity to acquire food. He requires to be taught how to obtain it (even in "sucking"). Such desire for nutrition arises out of, or is excited by, physical conditions of the stomach, or system at large, which demands the supply of food and drink; and thus serves as monitor to solicit the co-operating acts necessary to furnish such supply. Consequently, animals, as soon as born, and independent, of course, of education or imitation, go through, and as perfectly as ever afterwards, all those complicated muscular movements requisite to meet the demands of nutrition. The human being, however, hungry and with food placed in front of him, if untrained and left to himself, would starve.

Instinctive action resembles reflex action, but is not carried out with the same fatal promptitude immediately upon the stimulus; being more complex—consisting of acts, rather than mere movements, and being accompanied by feelings. Consequently it includes a sort of consciousness, though not consciousness of the actual end of the action. In the reflex movement, on the contrary, every form of consciousness has entirely disappeared.

The more instincts an animal has, the more it leads a life of hesitation and choice—an intellectual life. Apparently, because it has no instincts; really, because it has so many that they conflict with each other. Thus man is more uncertain in his reactions than the lower creatures, because he possesses all the primary propensities that they have, and a great many more besides; but they become greatly modified; firstly, owing to the greatly prolonged period of immaturity and consequent parental protection; secondly, owing to the possibilities of profiting by tradition—the store of acquired knowledge—being immensely increased; and thirdly, owing to the great development of his intellect and moral sense.

What constitutes the superiority of man over animals? Does he excel them by the possession of more exquisitely constructed senses? No! In this respect he is inferior. The eagle has a keener eye and the dog an olfactory apparatus of much finer susceptibility. Do we find man's superiority in the instincts? No! The instincts of animals are more powerful than ours, for the wants by which they are expressed manifest themselves more clearly, and are satisfied by actions of much greater energy. Nor is the difference between human and animal types due to the monopoly of mind by man, but solely in a greater development of the intellect and moral sentiments.

The fundamental character dispositions are common to both man and animals. Affection, love, hate, discontent, satisfaction, envy, jealousy, revenge, magnanimity, courage, fear, anger, joy, love of approbation and pride, are not human attributes alone—all of the higher animals possess them. Only the perception of the sublime and the religious emotion are absent in animals, because they depend upon ideas of too abstract a nature to be reached by the mind when unaided by the logic of signs, that is, without language. All the other capacities animals seem to possess too, but most of them are very slightly developed.

It is impossible to deny that animals possess intellectual capacities to a certain degree. Some possess even better powers of observation than man; and they possess understanding, though not in the same degree as man. They evidently retain the images of bodies, and are perfectly able to recognise objects which they have once seen. We cannot be convinced of this by any oral testimony on their part, but it is proved by induction.

Though a dog cannot speak and communicate his feelings, it is evident that he recognises his master, or any other individual with whose person he is familiar: that he becomes attached to his benefactor, and avoids those who treat him ill; that he has perfect remembrance of the shed which covers him, etc. A thousand facts prove
that he thinks of these objects when far removed from them, regrets their absence, and views with pleasure preparations for a journey which he imagines will bring him nearer to his home. The dog, therefore, like ourselves, possesses sensation, perception, comparison and memory, and in many cases he seems only to want language to become an intelligent being. We might even accord him a sentiment of personality, but this he is unable to express.

**Animals are quite as able to form abstract Ideas as we are,** if under abstract ideas we include general ideas of qualities which are so far simple as not to require to be fixed in our thoughts by names. **Animal intelligence is unable to elaborate that class of abstract Ideas the formation of which depends on the faculty of speech.** It is wholly impossible to over-estimate the value of language as thus the handmaid of thought. For, in the absence of language, it would be impossible for thought to rise above the very simplest of abstract ideas, while, in the presence of language, it becomes possible for us consciously to predicate qualities, and so at last to feel that we are conscious of our own consciousness.

Were not the various qualities of the understanding manifested by animals identical with those possessed by man, there could be no intercommunication between man and animals; for without this mutual intelligence the rider could not manage his horse, nor the sportsman direct his spaniel, nor the pig-boy drive his pigs, nor the blind man be led and guided by his dog. Animals and man must understand each other, otherwise animated nature would be a confusion. Even sounds of the voice and the meaning of words are frequently understood by animals as distinctly and fully as they are by ourselves; and the intent and object of our actions are perceived by them in the same sense as we intend them to be perceived. Thus the horse knows the sound of the trumpet, the sound of the whip, and the driver's bidding; the hound responds to the huntsman’s horn; the cat minds the maid-servant’s call, and the cow obeys the cry that hails her home to be milked. The mechanism of the beaver is like our own, and the fox pilfers our poultry-yards with the same adroitness as the thief pilfers our coffers. Thus the intelligence of animals is the comparative anatomy of the understanding of man; what is one in us is several in them. They are the analysis of the mind of which we are the standard and type. By pursuing this train of reasoning we might show that the less perfect understandings in man approximate to the lower understandings of animals. Thus we say as stupid as an ass, as filthy as a pig, as timid as a lamb, as cruel as a tiger. The higher human understandings admit of no such debasing comparison, since they cannot be likened to anything else than themselves.

**The primitive propensities which prompt man do not manifest themselves in the same rude and open manner as they do in animals.** Nor are animals hindered in the manifestation of their innate qualities by restraints. On the other hand, man receives a long process of education, and is surrounded by restraining forces, such as family ties, public opinion, communal interests, besides the activity of his understanding, which all help to control the impulses which urge him in certain directions.

Man, like the animal, has to kill that he may eat, has to oppose aggression and to shun danger; he has pleasure in eating, drinking, sleeping, and exercising his limbs; and one of the greatest obstacles to improvement is that so many of the race are contented with this enjoyment, and consider it painful to seek higher sources of gratification. Man has added to his animal nature moral sentiments and reflecting faculties. But this peculiarity attends them: that while the animal propensities act powerfully of themselves, his rational faculties require to be cultivated, exercised, and instructed before they will yield their harvest of enjoyment. Therefore, the necessity of moral education of his young: to develop the higher human sentiments in the child and to leave the lower instincts inactive, or, at least, to put them under control. Evil thoughts and deeds were at one time ascribed to the instigation of
the devil—no doubt their manifestation is due to some form of temptation; but it is we alone who are responsible for making wrong use of the powers which are given to us. Of course, it is not always wickedness, but sometimes also ignorance, that leads to their unwarranted manifestation.

**Man has an insatiable appetite for knowledge, for the discovery of new truths**, which is the stimulus ever urging him forward in the path of intellectual endowment. The relations of an animal to the objects among which it is placed have reference chiefly, if not solely, to the gratification of its appetites, or the satisfaction of its bodily wants, and its preservation from injury or destruction.

Its sensual desires gratified and unthreatened by danger, it commonly falls asleep, or at least remains at rest. But such is not the case with man, certainly not with civilised man. With his appetites satisfied, with ample provision for every physical necessity, and exempt from even the remotest apprehension of harm, still, actuated by a class of wants above those of his mere animal nature, does he remain awake—observing the objects and phenomena about him, reflecting, perchance, on his own mysterious constitution and its intricate relations, observing what passes within himself; or, unsatisfied with the present, stretching his view far into the dim, uncertain future, and judging, or trying to judge, of its fast-coming events. Nor is his expanding mind bounded by the world in which he dwells; he grasps at the universe and eternity, and space and time are too limited to contain it.

**Man has the advantage above animals of being able to profit more largely by experience, the results of which he can communicate to others, in like manner as he can avail himself of their experience**; and this is communicated by one generation to another—each adding, as it were, fresh layers to the sum of human knowledge. The instincts of animals lead to no progress.

The beaver constructs his habitation, the sparrow his nest, the bee its comb, as did their ancestors thousands of years ago; while man, owing to the records of past experience, has been gradually advancing to a higher and more perfect state of development—each generation profiting by the learning and experience of those that preceded it, and in like manner transmitting its knowledge and attainments to those that come after.

Very young children present in their mental constitution, in common with animals, chiefly those mental powers which we call propensities. With advancing age, the first indication of true intelligence seems to consist in the power of forming special associations. Memory thus appears early in life, and long before a child is able to speak it links together in thought ideas of objects which it finds to be associated in fact. Again, the emotions begin to assert their presence at a very early period, and attain a high degree of development before any of the characteristically human faculties can be said to have appeared. Moreover, in young children we meet with nearly all the emotions occurring in animals, and their general character is much of the same kind. In more advanced childhood, the emotions of children resemble more those of savages. With regard to the more purely intellectual faculties, language is largely intelligible to a child long before it is able to articulate; but soon after it is able to articulate the power of abstracting qualities and classifying objects by the aid of signs begins its course of development.

But, in comparing the intelligence of a young child with that of an adult animal, we are met with this difficulty—that as the bodily powers of children at so immature an age are so insufficiently developed, the mind is not able, as in the case of animals, to accumulate experiences of life. In order, therefore, to obtain a fair parallel, we should require a human being whose mental powers have been arrested in their development at an early age, so serving to supply the aborted human intelligence with full experiences of life. Now, the nearest approach we have to these conditions
ETHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF CHARACTER

is to be found in the case of idiots. There are, of course, all degrees of idiocy. As we descend in the scale from the higher to the lower grades, so we find the characteristically human faculties are the first to disappear, while those faculties which man shares with the lower animals persist. Or, reversely, as we ascend in the scale, so we find first the animal faculties only, and higher in the scale, some of the more characteristically human.

THE WILL AND THE POWER OF CHOICE

We have eyes to see, legs to walk, and a nervous organisation with which to think and feel. The legs are instruments to give us the freedom to walk where our desires direct us; the eyes are instruments to give us the freedom to look at what appeals to us, and the brain-cells serve as instruments for certain elementary capacities and dispositions, which give us the freedom of the loftiest thoughts and most supreme feelings. We cannot walk without legs, nor see without eyes, nor think or feel without a brain. Any defect in these instruments restricts our liberty. We must grant the existence of the instruments, but no one can tell what use the individual will make of them.

We can make a teleological teddy-bear that will walk across a thoroughfare, but not a teddy-bear that will choose the route and will avoid the traffic. The man who thinks grand thoughts, feels beauty, aspires and loves, is the citizen of an ideal world; no theory of philosophy can make an automaton of him. Fatalism is wrong. There is no predestination, though there is a plan in the universe. There is a desired goal, but not a destined goal. For example, every healthy child is planned to live to eighty or a hundred years; but that is not its destiny.

Usually three meanings are distinguished, in which freedom is attributed to the Will or "Inner Self" of a human being:

1. The general power of choosing among different alternatives of action apparently without a motive, or against the resultant force of conflicting motives;

2. The power of choice between the promptings of reason and those of appetites (or other non-rational impulses) when the latter conflict with reason;

3. Merely the quality of acting rationally in spite of conflicting impulses, however strong.

It is obvious that freedom in this third sense is something quite distinct from freedom in the first or second sense; and, indeed, is rather an ideal state after which the moral agent ought to aspire than a property which the human will can be said to possess.

It very frequently happens that a desire passes at once into action, so that we are not conscious of an interval between the two, as in the satisfaction of the propensities. But it also frequently happens that there is a conflict of desires, causing us to reflect and compare the consequences which would result from the gratification of the several desires. It also occasionally happens that, even when only a single desire is operating, something occurs to suspend its passing into action. In both these cases we are conscious of an interval between the desires, or the conflict of desires, and the action which is the result. The interval may be so brief that we can hardly detect it, or of a considerable duration. To this act of determination we give the name of volition. The Will, by those who regard it as an independent part of our nature, is supposed to be the source of these volitions, or, in more precise language, a power or aptitude enabling us to form them and to retain them until the moment of action arrives.

Volition is determined by two factors: the external circumstances by which a man is at any moment surrounded, and the various desires and thoughts excited by them in the man himself. The former are external to the man altogether,
whilst the latter are determined by his actual character at the moment; and his actual character, through an unbroken series of experiences and developments, has been determined by the potential character which was his when his life began.

In our full consciousness we act as we choose, but our choice is usually determined by our character, i.e., by those dispositions which we inherited and followed habitually. We can control our innate desires and innate dispositions, but we cannot eradicate them. The man with the character of a lamb, or the character of a fox, the Frenchman with his French inclinations, and the Englishman with his English inclinations, are described as such because of their habitual conduct; though, as we have repeatedly explained, they can change to a considerable extent by making a conscious effort to do so; only under certain circumstances will the original dispositions reveal themselves.

Unconsciously we act according to the strongest motive; but consciously we can choose—not the motives, but among the motives. And although the strongest motive will have the greatest attraction for us, we can act contrary to it. We are not compelled to do anything. From this it follows that, the more conscious and the greater the knowledge of self (our dispositions) and the world, the freer we are.

The mere fact of a person having a character means that tendencies are so uniformly the same that he can be trusted under similar conditions to act always in the same way. Our character is our limitation, and if we had no limitation we should be unreliable. We have all our natural dispositions, and cannot change in one day. If we do, our friends will watch us with anxiety. Of course, the man of reason and in full consciousness can, if he chooses, go contrary to his natural dispositions; he can do so; though, as a rule, he is a creature of habit and indulges his strongest impulses, i.e., he follows the path of least resistance. For this reason, freedom so often leads to vice, instead of being a blessing. Our friends may be able to tell us what we would do under certain circumstances, but they cannot tell us what we must do under certain circumstances.

External factors also mould the will. Man, considered as a moral agent, is dependent on the civilisation which surrounds him, on the force exerted upon him by the accumulated actions of the generations which have gone before him. The land he lives in, the nation into which he is born, its laws, its habits, its religion, fix certain limits to his action which he cannot pass any more than he can jump off his own shade. He is born a member of a special society and grows up with the beliefs, customs, and traditions with which that society endows him. He finds himself under the dominion of a moral code, of a moral standard of duty, of inrooted prejudices and practices, accepted by current opinion, to which he must give assent if he wants to remain a member. Within these limits he may act well or ill on the impulse of noble ideals or enslaving passions. He is a free agent within the limits which these surroundings determine; he is not a slave to them, for he has the power of modifying them.

Man is subject also to the influences exerted upon him in his infancy and childhood. Education and experience tend to modify the inherited dispositions; but none of us have been free to choose our parents, or our ancestors, or our early surroundings. Therefore, by the time we are free to determine our actions for ourselves, our habits and our character are to a large extent already formed. Now, any act which we consciously will to perform and do not perform automatically, or under pressure of physical coercion, we perform and will to perform because our nature is such that we look on the results of such an act as desirable. Every creature likes its own ways and takes to following them as a natural thing to do. Thus neither animals nor man are conscious of any restraint.

For example, the man, generous by nature, gives freely at the sight of suffering; whereas the miser, even if he can realise the sufferings of others, gratifies his tendency of saving and adding pound to pound. Both act in accordance with their own
ETHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF CHARACTER

organization. Both follow the line along which their most active powers urge them, which is the line of least resistance.

If the passion of love is strong in us, we think we have decided to love; whereas our organisation has rendered us more liable to be stimulated by such external impressions as would arouse love. Emotions of fear, anger, pity—in fact, all the primary emotions—may be so strong as to render any balancing of the ends in view out of the question. The man agitated by jealousy and the desire for revenge considers himself free so long as he feels satisfaction from the achievement of his desires. When the storm calms down he changes his tone, and acknowledges that he was carried away by the impulse of the passion. The drunken man and the mad man, the angry man and the man in love, all think themselves free; yet when they recover they cannot always account for their actions.

Daily experience teaches us that some men are inclined to be virtuous, while others are inclined to be vicious. We do not change anything by saying that such tendencies are the result of their innate dispositions. Daily experience teaches us that one man wills to devote himself to art—sees, talks, and loves in art—while another wills to make money—sees, talks, and loves for business only. One man is unhappy if he cannot court women to the exclusion of all proper occupations; another sits over his books and loves learning for its own sake. These are acknowledged facts, and in stating them we are not altering nature, we are not taking away the liberty of the person; we are only explaining his disposition. Every one of these men may act differently if he chooses; but he does not choose, unless he is endowed with other strong dispositions as well, because he derives no pleasure from following other pursuits.

An act of willing is always determined by some motive. The will itself has no decision; but the motives decide the will. This does not mean, however, that the motives fight it out among themselves. We select among them, choosing to identify ourselves with one and not with another. The choice made depends upon the person choosing as well as upon the motives prompting. Of course, we do not select our own motives; they are partially determined in our characters. When there is only a single and immediate motive, we term it an impulse. The greater the variety of motives, the more hesitancy in action.

When there are two or more desires present, we usually choose to identify ourselves with the strongest. Thus the benevolent man may be very strongly moved to part with some money to a person who has the appearance of being in distress. Perhaps he himself at some period of his life went through some such experience. This would still further increase the impulse to relieve the suffering of his fellow-being. However, the memory of his own past sufferings may awaken simultaneously the fear of his again falling into trouble through the parting with his hard-earned money; he may also recollect that at the time he did not always receive the ready help which he now wants to extend to the suffering stranger, and that only through his saving instinct he became what he is now. After such deliberation, the saving instinct stimulated by the emotion of fear, predominates, and the silver coin is returned to the man's pocket.

The more numerous the impelling motives, the freer the individual. It is the man with the greatest choice of motives, the man whose mind is cultivated and in whom the social and ethical sentiments—sympathy, benevolence, love of justice, etc.—predominate over all selfish desires, who enjoys the greatest freedom, and whose conduct can be least determined. The less a man is educated and the lower his organisation, the fewer motives will he have, and the more easily can his actions be predicted. In most men the propensities, i.e., the natural appetites and cravings, predominate over the reason. When the senses are excited, the individual feels an inclination to yield to impulse, but so long as his reason continues normal he weighs consequences, and thus may will precisely the reverse of what his desires
would have led him to effect. Many men, however, lack that power of inhibition: they readily consent to their desires.

The thoughts are often merely the expression of the propensities. For example, thoughts of love in a youth on the approach of an attractive maiden, thoughts of profit in the greedy business man on a favourable opportunity of sale or purchase, thoughts of infidelity in a jealous person on the slightest suspicious circumstance, and so forth. We imagine that we ordain the direction of these thoughts, whereas very often we are only following them. That is why so many men are mere automata and their actions can be predicted.

The will which is swayed entirely by low motives is less free than that swayed by higher motives. Consequently, when a person is blamed for having done ill, he is not blamed for not having acted without motives, but for not having been actuated by the highest motives. Moral reprobation attaches, not to the bare act, but to the balance of motives to which the act is an index. When persons pray for power to resist inferior temptations, and to follow the inspirations of the spirit—that their will may be directed towards certain actions and turned away from others—they acknowledge thereby that the will is susceptible of being influenced, and not free to act without a cause. If there existed unrestricted liberty, there would be no need for the moral education of children in restraining over-active propensities and developing weaker sentiments. It is only persons of arrested mental growth, in whom the moral sentiments never are developed, who lack sufficient choice of motives. Without such freedom of choice there can be neither vice nor virtue.

The will can be improved by education, because education improves the intellect, and intellect guides the will. Socrates said: "Man acts wickedly only from ignorance, even the villain who appears to act with consciousness. To choose between money, power, knowledge, or virtue depends partly on the power of the propensities, partly on education; both, however, depend on the intelligence." Socrates shows us that he knew the intellectual powers ought to be stronger than the propensities, because the will follows the strongest inclination; and although we may believe, before deciding, that we are quite free to choose, yet when we have chosen we often repent.

In the animal world, desire is usually followed without any other restraint than fear; while in man it is largely, though no doubt very imperfectly, limited by self-control. Most crimes spring not from anything wrong in the original and primal desire, but from the imperfection of this higher, distinct or superadded element in our nature. Immoderate and uncontrolled desires are the root of most human crimes. Punishment aims at repressing undesirable conduct by supplying deterrent motives against it, holding that conduct is determined by the influence of motives on character. If the will were beyond the control of motives, punishment would be absolutely purposeless or simply vindictive.

The will, then, is not the determining agent, but is the result determined by the impulses and reason. The will can have no content other than that supplied by the involuntary flow of ideas and feelings, and can only have unrestricted freedom of choice between the objects thus put within its reach and desire. Thus viewed, both free will and determinism are true. We are free and we are controlled. As Lavater said: "Man is as free as a bird in a cage; he can live within certain limits." What some philosophers and theologians mean by free will is will without a cause. That is impossible. The only freedom of which we are conscious is freedom from compulsion in choosing among things which are presented to our choice. For choice, there is always an efficient reason, or there would be an effect without a cause; and our freedom is the power which we have to act in accordance with the choice.
Ordinary unphilosophical persons may profess some vague belief that the will is absolutely free; but for all practical purposes they believe that conduct springs from character, and habitually act upon that belief. Our dealings with individuals are regulated by our estimate of their characters. Business would be impossible if conduct were at the mercy of an incalculable will. We address ourselves to each individual differently according to his known disposition. When we wish the covetous man to act we speak to him of his personal interest; we appeal to the benevolent man on grounds of pity and the pleasure it must give him to do good; we supply the vain and ambitious man with a motive to action by promising him great praise for the performance which we recommend to him. Indeed, the best reader of human character, in this way, is often the most successful man.

There are men who are strong-willed in some directions and weak-willed in others—weak-willed in their business or professional capacity, and tyrants in their domestic affairs; and there are strong-willed rulers in public life who have no will-power in their family circle.

**Will is not only a power to act but also a power to restrain.** Freedom is the power of inhibition of instinctive and non-rational acts. Man can fashion his outer and inner conscious purpose, according to the ideal set up for his guidance; he can discipline and inhibit his propensities and natural impulses, so that they shall no longer move him. It is to be understood, however, that the determining principle itself must be native to man; this he cannot give himself by his will, for it is the innermost will itself. Now, there are men who lack this innermost will-power—it is frequently lost in nervous exhaustion—and who in consequence become easily addicted to grooves of thought (obsessions), morbid habits, undue emotionality, etc. In these we have to re-educate the character, to supply fresh ideals according to their individuality; we have to teach them how to suppress undesirable thoughts and feelings, or how to direct them in other channels. This is the so-called “suggestion” treatment, which will be dealt with fully in a later chapter.

**The older psychologists spoke of the will as if it were a separate entity, presiding over the mental powers and originating courses of action to the exclusion of all motives.** If will were an entity, it is notably infantile in the child, imbecile in the idiot, grows in power, range and quality as the mental powers grow by education, is mature in the adult, falls sick with the body’s sickness, and becomes decrepit in old age. It is not the will that directs; it is the thought that directs. Will is the concentration of the thoughts towards the desired end, the focusing of the thought-forces.

**We are conscious of free will, but not of absolute free will, for we are conscious also of our limitations.** No man can will to be a poet, an artist, an athlete, a Socrates or Archimedes if he does not possess the necessary capacities. Men speak of absolute free will when they cannot even command their own ideas. We are all haunted at times by certain ideas or memories of past experience. Had we a perfectly free will we should not allow ourselves to be troubled by our imagination day and night. We may by change of topic, association, fresh impressions, get rid of some troublesome idea; but to dismiss it at once by an effort of will is often beyond our power.

How can there be an absolute free will, when the will is limited by other wills? Man, as has been already pointed out, exists as a member of a community and has to adapt his will to it. We talk about liberty, but we are really slaves to our environment. Most men are satisfied in being no more than one of a herd, without independent personality.

The persons who defend loudest the illusion of an absolute free-will are often those who never strike out a line for themselves, but simply follow convention. It would seem sometimes as if not only good breeding but the highest morality consisted in following the rules of respectable society, and therefore it is that in every place the
best, most lamented, and virtuous man is he who has strictly obeyed the laws of his country and regarded the land of his birth as the best in the world. Thus it is that persons who have never had an idea beyond what their immediate surroundings have brought forth are said to have led a blameless life, and have had every virtue inscribed in gold on their pretentious tombstones. On the other hand, the exceptional men of genius, those of literary and scientific aims, who have had more brain than was ready to act in a simple reflex manner, but have not conformed to all the customs of society, have been mourned over as reprobates. This fact is often overlooked by moralists and preachers. Habit it is which compels us to the performance of a large number of our daily acts; conventionality is what we worship in society; we give it our highest praise, and call those virtuous who walk in its paths, so that even a commonplace man who could not get out of the routine of the manners of his little town has a monument raised to his honour.

Convention rules social life. Every one of the many professions has a peculiar character of its own, which, with rare exception, it inflicts on those who follow it. There is the shopkeeper type, the manufacturer type, the lawyer type, the medical type, the clerical type, the soldier and the sailor type. And we distinguish with ease, on the slightest intercourse, to what class a grown person belongs. It is to be seen in his look, in his tone of thought, his voice, gesture, even in his handwriting, and in everything he does.

Another class of limitations to freedom includes those which spring from our own conduct. Action creates habit, and habit influences future action. Character grows with every exercise of the mental powers, and, if it does not altogether control, it certainly affects conduct. Thus we seem to be continually setting self-created limits to our own liberty.

That there is no absolute free will is also shown by the effect which circumscribed injuries and disease of the brain have on the manifestation of character. We shall show by numerous examples in later chapters of this work that the brain, when thus abnormally affected, may change the moral qualities formerly possessed, may make the religious man profane, the honest man a thief, and the chaste a profligate—and may abolish the will-power altogether.
CHAPTER XXVI

EVOLUTION OF THE EMOTIONS AND INSTINCTIVE IMPULSES

We shall now proceed to analyse the psychical capacities of man in detail, describe their individual action, and the effects of their combined action on human conduct (as well as their morbid activity as observed in the insane). This is a rather novel attempt and may be very imperfect; but there can be no doubt of the value of laying the foundation for such a study, not merely to the student of philosophy, but to every man whatever his vocation in life. We are generally acquainted with the leading characteristics of our friends and acquaintances, or at least have no difficulty in ascertaining them; but few people trouble to draw the necessary deductions as to the elementary motives of human behaviour. Knowing the primary dispositions and the degrees of their development in a particular individual we should be enabled to predict his conduct, a knowledge which, especially in the case of youths, must be of paramount importance for the gauging of their capacities for a particular career, for their moral education, and to ensure their future happiness.

LOVE OF LIFE

The most primary and universal desire of all organisms is the desire to live—the love of life—and to guard it. Nature has protected it not only by the pain which is always inflicted whenever it is endangered, but has endowed all beings with an instinct of self-protection; i.e., an instinct to guard the body against mechanical damage or destruction, giving a tendency to avoid obstacles and dangerous objects, and an instinctive wish to preserve it even in the midst of acutest suffering.

But for this instinct we should never move out of the way of danger, never raise a hand to avert a blow, never resent an injury, never provide ourselves with the means of subsistence. If the self-preservative instinct were absent, and we were guided entirely by the preponderance of pleasure and pain, suicide would inevitably be resorted to whenever pain predominated over pleasure. If the individual had to wait till experience taught him the necessity of self-subsistence and of self-protection, experience would arrive too late to be of any use.

In insanity, especially in melancholia, the “love of life” is often lacking and its loss leads to attempts at suicide. Deeply demented persons, no more than young children, can safely be trusted to be alone; they are unable to exercise the simplest care and forethought. Idiots, too, rarely attain to the degree of intelligence that enables them to guard themselves against even obvious dangers.

THE ALIMENTARY PROPENSITY

Another primordial propensity for the preservation of the individual is the alimentary propensity, making the animal search for food in order to maintain life. It is this appetite for food which directs man, even when new-born, to remove the
pains of hunger and thirst, the only pain then removable by an act of his own. In man, when the nutritive materials are defective in the blood, or it is imperfectly oxygenated, the man becomes irritable or quarrelsome, showing the intimate connection between the aggressive propensity and the desire for food.

In satisfying hunger and thirst there is a great sensory enjoyment, quite apart from the relief it gives; indeed, if the impulse to eat was not made known to us by the cravings of hunger we should be unaware of it, and should believe that we ate simply because we were attracted by the taste of food. For man's tastes are not limited, like those of brutes, to foods and drinks which provide nourishment. By usage, or adoption, he has added to his dietary a vast number of substances the sole use of which is to give pleasure. The abuse of this instinct leads to gluttony and drunkenness. Often a brilliant appetite is associated with an atrocious digestion.

The insatiable craving of hunger, even when the stomach is full, is a common lunatic symptom. Some, having devoured their own ample allowance, seize all they can lay hands on, prowling about the entire day in search of food. We also find sometimes morbid desires, longings, or impulses for various substances generally regarded with loathing and disgust. Similarly the desire to drink may become a mania.

Sometimes the insane refuse to take nourishment from a great variety of motives, according to the form of insanity. A patient may be immersed in his thoughts so that the sensation of hunger is deadened; he may refuse it because he fears it is poisoned; another, because a voice told him that he must not touch it; another, because he is too great a sinner to receive God's gift. In all we have the same symptom of suppression, or perversion of the instinct, associated with very different motives.

THE COMBATIVE PROPENSITY AND THE EMOTION OF ANGER

Another universal propensity is the combative propensity, which is really a complex tendency, being required for aggression as well as for self-defence; and may be said to involve aggressiveness as well as resentment.

Since most animals live on other animals, i.e., on moving things, every creature must be able to stop, fight, destroy, and kill in order to obtain food; that is the necessary condition of their existence, which can only be satisfied by an adequate expression of aggressiveness. And since every animal is thus liable to be killed and devoured by others, it must be alive to, and able to remove, the dangers by which it is surrounded, and must be capable of inflicting injury on its foes in self-defence, i.e., it must possess a propensitv to resent. This fundamental propensity is absolutely needful for the preservation of the individual. Of course, not all animals have weapons for self-defence—many of the herbivorous type, animals who live on stationary things, have not; and not being equipped for the fight, they "fear" the enemy and fly from him. Fear is another instinct, with which we shall deal presently. The aggressive instinct probably arose through the sensation of hunger, which necessitated killing for food. Never is a beast so savage as when hungry, and in a measure this is true of man. Gradually, animals also killed for the mere sake of killing. In the latter case, it is not the capture but the pursuit which is the joy; just as in our love of hunting, which is a relic of ancestral life.

Man not only must defend himself, but must resist all kinds of aggression. He must defend not only himself, but his family and property. He must possess the power to repel aggression; hence the instinct of resentment. In order to defend himself he must be also in a position to assail; he must have the power of aggressive action. He cannot always wait till he is attacked; sometimes it will be more prudent for him to go boldly at the enemy. Savage man surrounded by ferocious
animals could not wait till attacked; he found that it was best to set out and destroy these beasts.

All living nature is in deadly conflict. Eat, or be eaten, is the law. Every-where it is one bloody fight for existence. Man has so much modified his animal instincts that it comes to him as a shock to be told that he has a propensity to fight and kill. We must go to primitive man, when nature was still "red in tooth and claw" and the law of life was to kill or be killed. If man now fights with machine guns and tanks, instead of his nails and teeth, those enemies that would deprive him of his means of existence, it is the same primitive instinct which still actuates his mind. Human nature has not changed. The animal fights from impulse without any thought of the pain it inflicts. Man is often mindful of the pain he can cause; he is artfully cruel, and "brutal" is not the word for it. The mere spectacle of a battlefield with the appalling mass of hideous suffering deliberately and ingeniously inflicted by man upon man should be sufficient to shatter all idyllic pictures of human nature.

Man lives in a beautiful world and has a mind capable of solving the profoundest mysteries of nature and assuming god-like virtues; but the foxes and wolves of humanity manage somehow to mislead the good men and to use them for cutting each other's throats. "Peace on earth" is much spoken of, but the true spirit is shown not by what is said, but by what is done. To-day every civilised country trains its citizens in the art of killing—and in nearly all countries an apprenticeship to this art is compulsory. History is in the main a monotonously hideous record of successive wars and slaughters and the glorification of those who have success-fully made war. The recent world-war has cost millions of lives to give some nations supremacy over others and to drive them, at least commercially, out of existence. It is the colossal concentration of wealth anxious for its safety, or seeking further expansion, that moves governments into conditions which bring about war, and leads to terms of peace that lay the foundation for future wars. At the outbreak of war the enemy is depicted as so vile that men believe they are fighting and sacrificing their lives for the realisation of high ideals. But, when peace is declared, are the conditions better for themselves and for the coming generation? Has mankind become better spiritually, or richer in hate, in revengefulness, in in-tolerance?

A testimony of the brute nature of man may be found in HUXLEY’S "Agnosticism": "I know of no study," says he, "which is so unutterably saddening as that of the evolution of humanity, as it is set forth in the annals of history. Out of the darkness of pre-historic ages, man emerges with the marks of his lowly origin upon him. He is a brute, only more intelligent than other brutes. ... He attains a certain degree of comfort, and develops a more or less workable theory of life in such favourable situations as the plains of Mesopotamia or of Egypt, and then for thousands and years of struggles with varying fortunes, attended by infinite wickedness, bloodshed, and misery, to maintain himself at this point against the greed and the ambition of his fellowmen. He makes a point of killing and otherwise prosecuting all those who first try to get him to move on, and, when he has moved a step further, foolishly confers post-mortem deification on his victims. He exactly repeats the process with all who want to move a step farther."

In individual civilised human beings this propensity manifests itself in a refined manner. Whereas primitive man resembled the animal in having to enter into combat and destroy to obtain the food necessary for life, in our own day this pro-pensity is greatly modified and altered, because our great civil organisation has made money, by reason of its purchasing power, the chief protector of life. In course of time, civilisation has diminished the necessity of physical aggression and defence, and it has become no longer necessary for man to kill his personal enemies by way of punishment. He devised means of getting redress through the administration of
ANALYSIS OF MAN'S PSYCHICAL NATURE

justice. Only nations envious of each other's possessions behave still like highway robbers and have not yet risen to that lofty standard. The codes of war, however, show the effort rational man makes to clothe with decency the shame of his own primitive instinct.

The public attitude towards malefactors has undergone, during the last few generations, a great alteration. Until a hundred years ago they were treated by punishments of the most savage and even barbarous character. The gallow's, the axe, the stake, the wheel, the quartering-block, the rack, the thumbscrew, and the boot were employed with horrible frequency; and such retaliations of society on its depredators are now regarded with horror. Nowadays the malefactor is handed over to the courts of justice and is treated with consideration, if not with tenderness. By some he is regarded as the victim of heredity; by others as the victim of circumstances; and yet others blame the victim—society—for the depredations of those that prey upon it.

In our time this propensity is greatly modified and altered also, because of the growth of the understanding and of the social and moral tendencies amongst civilised races. Were there only propensities and intellect, many men would use their intellect for the gratification of their propensities, as animals do, but the evolution of the moral sense in human beings opposed such tendency. But if man is better able to govern his instincts or passions than are animals, it does not at all follow that these passions or instincts are more feeble. They are simply more under the control of the understanding.

The aggressive instinct and combative tendency is of use not only in the contests of the battlefield, but in the collisions of civil life, whenever our views happen to clash with, or to be opposed to, those of others; and it may display itself in the bloodless contests of the Bar and council chamber. It enables us to resent and resist, to overcome difficulties, and to find pleasure in encountering opposition. There is no quality in which men differ more than in the combative instinct. While some individuals are so devoid of it as to shrink from the most trifling opposition, there are others who are never so happy as when engaged in a vigorous contest, such as to employ to the utmost their whole powers and means, both offensive and defensive. Education and habit cannot account for it, though they may modify its activity.

The propensity of resentment is accompanied and aroused by a special emotion—that of irascibility or anger. This emotion is necessary in order to stimulate the physical energy and give the animal strength for the fight. The sight of its foes arouses an animal's energies to furious rage, whereby spontaneous muscular changes are developed all over the entire body and the strength of every muscle is exalted. This is a reflex mechanism of immense preservative value in the struggle for existence. Similarly, when a man is angry, the spontaneous impulse is to inflict injury on the originating cause of the emotion awakened. Sometimes he destroys innocent objects to give vent to his anger.

Anger not only increases the physical energy but gives fire and force to some of the other powers of the mind. The energy of its impulse adds itself to and reinforces that of other impulses and so helps us to overcome our difficulties. The raising of the voice in anger is an automatic manifestation akin to the roaring of the lion and intended to strike terror in the opponent. A man devoid of the pugnacious instinct would not only be incapable of anger, but would lack the push and spirit and the reserve energy which is called into play in most of us by any difficulty in our path. Anger has its justification, therefore, in the roused energies of the organism reacting against an impression hostile to its self-preservation and self-expansion. Its discharge is natural and useful when wisely guided.

The aggressive instinct can be active without anger. It gives to the character its executive energy and power, without which no undertaking can be successful.
The self-preservation of man and kindred animals is effected through mechanisms which transform latent energy into kinetic energy to accomplish adaptive ends. Probably it is the consciousness of strength which imparts boldness, courage, aggression; just as a sense of weakness begets timidity.

Indulgence in feelings of anger and vindictiveness tend to make those subject thereto more and more habitually prone to outbreaks of these vices. Frequent anger, commonly called temper, is unfavourable to sound judgment and unbiased opinion. Anger may be rational, but its highest pitch—rage—is brief madness; for the main characteristic of madness is loss of self-control, and this is exactly what happens to people in a passion. The instinctive fury, the violent and destructive mania of some madmen, is no different, is only the same mental power acting in excess.

Different individuals, owing to their native temperament, bodily health, and moral education, vary remarkably in their propensity to anger, as also in the pertinacity with which they cherish this passion. In some it is sudden and transient, while in others, though perhaps less hasty, it assumes a more deep and lasting character, settling into that malignant feeling called revenge. Anger is sudden and impulsive resentment, in which the hostile reaction against the cause of pain is unrestrained by deliberation; while revenge is deliberate and controlled resentment, retrospective, inflicting punishment for past injury. It was most marked in the savage, who had to avenge all wrongs offered to himself, his relations, his tribe. Revenge was a duty and a right.

Hate often precedes and succeeds anger. The object of anger is particularly apt to be the object of hate. What anger accomplishes by a volcanic outburst, hate accomplishes in a slower, but surer and subtler way.

Envy is hate combined with a certain very compound concept. It is aroused by the superiority of some individual to ourselves, which we regard as a sort of a hindrance or injury, against which consequently we feel resentment. If we make attempts to bring down its object to a lower level, to compass the ill of its victim, this is malice.

Jealousy, too, is a very complex compound of love, fear, suspicion, and often hate. Like hate, it depresses vitality and keeps the body in a peculiar explosive condition, so that violent paroxysms of anger suddenly burst forth at a touch. Jealousy is a species of envy, but the latter invariably is attached to real or supposed superiority, while jealousy attaches to equality, or even lower, and has therefore a wider signification.

Those in whom the instinct of resentment is very active generally manifest also great force of character, executiveness, tenacity of purpose, and energy of mind, which enables them to overcome whatever obstacles oppose their progress. If they have large self-esteem as well, they may show sternness and severity of character, great indignation when displeased, and give their commands in an impressive and fear-inspiring manner. Such a resentful disposition in a person of nervous temperament leads to peevishness, fretfulness, and irritability. The combative instinct in a person of small intellect leads to easy provocation, ready quarrelling, and the kindling of strife. When combined with a dominant acquiring instinct, the person may "quarrel for a penny." Combativeness with little caution leads to foolhardiness, and when combined with large intellect and the gift of language, such a person will be fond of debate, and will prefer to argue on the opposite side of the question.

People in whom the combative instinct is defective dislike quarrelling and will avoid it, surrendering much for the sake of peace; they have no liking for severity of any kind, and would use physical force only as a matter of necessity; they threaten more than they execute, and show anger to little effect. If they are persons with large sympathy, they secure their wishes more by persuasion than by threats, and cannot bear to see suffering. If they are very cautious and of a
nervous temperament, they are likely to be timid, irresolute, and may see lions where there are none and make mountains out of molehills.

In this manner the effects of combinations of the combative instinct with other dispositions might be described, but these examples will suffice to demonstrate the importance of ascertaining the primary dispositions of a person, and to show that one can predict from their combination the "likely" conduct under given circumstances. The systematic study of ethology would thus prove eminently practical and beneficial to humanity, a goal that pure psychology could never reach.

Irritability of temper from slight causes, a tendency to take offence easily, noisy arguing, unpremeditated violence and, to a lesser extent, designed violence, are common symptoms in several forms of insanity. Often there is violent anger against everybody and everything. Or its subject will exhibit a general moroseness of character, or a malignant hatred toward, and a disposition to inflict cruelty, and even death, upon, particular persons, especially such as are most near and dear to him when in a rational state of mind. Some insane patients are impulsively destructive to material objects only, such as glass or furniture, and are quite harmless in other ways; while others will make assaults on persons as well, with or without intent to kill. These are the really dangerous lunatics; they form only a small minority, and even in them such outbursts of passion can be avoided by proper care and treatment.

Slight irritability from exaggerated sensibility may occur in neurasthenia. One of the characteristics of hysteria is instability of temper. Mere argumentativeness, rarely anger, is one of the symptoms of dementia praecox. In the early stage of mania patients become irritated on the slightest provocation, but their irascibility does not last. The general paralytic, too, may be easily roused to anger, and is also more or less easily calmed, at least at the onset of his disease. Noisy, abusive, violent temper is seen in acute alcoholism; unreasonable irritability, unprovoked anger rising to blind impulsive passion is seen in chronic alcoholism. Peevish disposition, bad temper, impulsiveness giving rise to dangerous acts, occur in epileptic insanity. The highest degree of irascibility is seen in acute mania, where we get excessive anger, violent language and conduct, sometimes lasting for days without any interval. Explosions of violence occur when least expected, and may lead to attacks on any person who happens to be present. In certain delirious states and melancholia agitata the patient raves and destroys, but his activity is conditioned by painful states of feeling and frightful hallucinations, and is analogous to the acts of a sane person enduring torture.

PROPENSITY TO TAKE FLIGHT AND THE EMOTION OF FEAR

Defenceless animals and animals recognising the superiority of the enemy instinctively take to flight. The struggle for existence of the different species of animals has exposed them, especially the weak, to continual risk. The consciousness of past dangers has caused them to fear the enemy and, when possible, to run away from him. The emotion of fear has its object in nature to make the animal shrink from danger. This must often happen automatically, otherwise it proves useless. There is often no time for reflection. Were there no emotion of fear experienced, there would be no apprehension of danger. Fear is perhaps more essential to the human species than to the brute creatures, for we do not possess the same facility of avoiding danger by rapid flight, or of concealing ourselves by what may be called instinctive strategems.

Certain things arouse fear in young animals before they have learned by experience what things are signs of danger—as loud noises, rapid approach, strange or large things. Generally speaking, the unfamiliar arouses the fear instinct, for what is unfamiliar may be a menace to life. This is especially important in weak and defenceless animals, such as hares and rabbits, whose only refuge and safety is
in running. Animals which must receive actual injury before experiencing pain are clearly inferior to those which experience emotion-pain before the injury is actually received.

The effect of fear upon the system proves its uncontrollable influence. The sudden stopping of the heart-beat and respiration, and the paralysis of movement in which it sometimes finds expression, are due to the impulse to concealment; the hurried respiration and pulse, and the frantic bodily efforts, by which it is more commonly expressed, are due to the impulse of flight.

P. CHALMERS MITCHELL, Secretary to the Zoological Society of London, in his work on “The Childhood of Animals” says that he tried animals with snakes; and all the animals on which a snake would feed showed no signs of fear. There was no trace of any transmission from ancestors of inborn fear or recognition of such a universal natural enemy as the snake. But this is no proof that fear is not innate. A child will approach a fire and walk across a street without compunction. Fear is innate, but not fear of fire, or fear of street traffic. A child may play with a lion; that does not say that fear may not be very active in it.

BENJAMIN KIDD (“The Science of Power,” London, 1918) similarly holds that fear arises entirely as the result of social heredity imposed on the young of each generation by training and example and nearly always under conditions of a strong emotion. Yes! but the element is there in different degree. Some animals of the same species and brood are more afraid than others. A solitary cow having her first calf may attack a passing stranger, surely not from social heredity.

Kidd says when once the emotion of fear has been set into activity the animal could not be tamed. That shows the apparatus is there, only not manifested until aroused by experience. So human emotions may remain more or less latent, just like the primary intellectual capacities remain latent until stimulated by training. If Kidd were right, the taming of animals would be an easy task. We need only take the young as soon as they leave the nest or their mother’s breast, and since they will be free from fear, we can breed from them when they grow up, and thus create a species—say of rabbits or of hares—free from fear.

Fear sounds the trumpet-note of danger. With little fear, there is frequently little caution, and the danger is not seen until escape is impossible. The objects of fear vary according to the individual constitution. Each man has his special fears, as his fear is combined with other sentiments; thus there is fear of loss of money, power, reputation, and many other things besides life. The tendency to fear and to employ the intellect to take precaution has been very unequally developed in the different individuals of our species. We find a more profuse manifestation of the feeling of fear in natures more intensely and variously sensitive than the average. Those who feel strongly the ill consequences of a false step are moved to avoid it; they may be afraid or they may not; fear is not necessary to active precaution. Normally it produces prudence and circumspection; when deficient it causes recklessness and carelessness; in excess it causes indecision, cowardice, and, in some, such a depression of spirits, that with the slightest misfortune they fall into despair and think life no longer worth living.

Fear incites us to avoid, or flee from, dangers. When escape, however, is impracticable, the emotion may change and the individual will often be driven to the most fierce and desperate resistance; thus even the greatest cowards have sometimes acquired the fame of heroes. We cannot feel fear and anger at the same time; but anger may follow fear.

Courage frequently means blindness to danger, a lack of imagination to realise the horrors of a distant catastrophe. A man who is mentally alert and well-informed, and therefore able to gauge pretty accurately dangers he is called upon to face, is not likely to distinguish himself for physical courage. On the other hand, the naturally timid, if they possess the higher faculties, may be stimulated by duty,
honour, pride, so that in many instances they become bold and successful warriors. The most delicate and effeminate in body, through the ascendant influence of their moral nature, have faced dangers and borne sufferings under which naturally stouter hearts and firmer nerves quailed. Fear will oftentimes spring rather from mistaken judgment than from any absolute deficiency of courage. Familiarity with any particular danger, according to a law of the animal constitution, serves to diminish our dread of it, although it may not necessarily embolden us in respect to others of a different character.

Fear is not only an essential instinctive feeling for the protection of the individual, but it is also a powerful agent in the preservation of social order. For there is no doubt that the apprehension of punishment materially influences man's conduct.

A child with little moral sense but large fear may, from dread of punishment, avoid telling falsehoods, until with years the habit of speaking the truth has become a second nature. Fear is also the basis of morality among many uncultured people. They do not steal because they fear the gaol, and they do not murder because they are afraid of the gallows. It is already a moral advance when a man has large domestic affections and will not steal, not because he fears gaol, but because it would give pain to his mother, wife, or sisters. We all behave ourselves, in a measure, for "fear" of public opinion.

Circumspection and foresight depend on the emotion of fear, but are essentially intellectual manifestations, compound and not fundamental therefore. Circumspection is calm, sustained, intelligent effort to accomplish a purpose. Foresight is an intelligent perception of the probable effects of present circumstances, and a conception of coming causes and their resultant consequences. Circumspection is one of the most comprehensive powers of the mind, and its co-operation is needful in all states and conditions of life. Instead of being a simple, unresolvable power, it is very complex, and springs from several intellectual faculties and emotions, of which the emotion of fear is but one. Every circumspect act is the result of the judgment, or the judgment is the approximate cause, though fear may be the remote or inciting cause, which is the only part it can play in circumspection, and it is not in all cases the principal cause. Circumspect animals keep a sharp look-out for danger, and therein we have the origin of foresight. The cautious and prudent are those whose fears are far-sighted. Instinctive prudence is very different from simple reflective prudence. Dread is fear of a future event.

Fear, in its most aggravated degree, acquires the name of terror. That particular condition which it has been imagined certain animals have the power to produce in certain others, termed fascination, is not unusually ascribed to the agency of terror, which paralysing, as is thought, all voluntary muscular action in the victim, renders him an easy prey to his destroyer. Terror is paralysing; the individual is "rooted to the spot," and has the appearance of death, an effect which in some animals is protective.

Horror is a painful detestation, more or less mingled with fear, of particular objects, which usually neither threaten nor, in fact, cause the slightest apprehension of bodily injury.

Grief is a complex emotional state, consisting of love and fear, with an idea. A mother sees her child dying, and her grief is intense; but if we could destroy her love for the child her grief would cease at once, though she might feel sympathy. Grief, then, in this case, is love combined with the fear of death. Grief, like fear and all depressing emotions, causes a rise of blood-pressure. A profuse shedding of tears relieves the blood-pressure and frequently also the mental state; that a good fit of crying eases the grief is a common observation.
Despair is the name by which we express the most aggravated degree of mental depression. Under this dreadful feeling, no ray of hope, no sunbeam of joy, breaks in upon the gloom. Fear normally stimulates effort, in normal despair there is absolute inertness. One may fear or be frightened a little, but there is no littleness in despair. Desperation is the feeling of the inevitable.

It is not misfortune that drives people to suicide, but a constitutional disposition to look at the dark side of things and to be apprehensive, often without cause or with insufficient cause; for there are millions of people who bear with cheerfulness disappointment, loss of wealth, loss of husband, wife, children, friends, of health, character, or social position; they do not dream of suicide.

Fear is accompanied by a more or less sudden closing down of the blood-vessels of the body. We soon recover from the effect when the cause is gone. But in grief a steady constriction is placed on the vessels, and the vital tone, though less sharply, is more permanently lowered. Dislike, jealousy, and hate are in their physiology closely analogous to fear and grief. The bodily powers which they restrain are still present, though kept in repression, and therefore liable to explosive manifestation.

A man cannot be angry without having the object of his anger—whether real or imaginary—in his mind and wishing to oppose or destroy it; he cannot be afraid without thinking of the object of his fear and wishing to escape it. But in joy and anxiety he experiences only a passive consciousness of his vascular condition.

As regards the combination of other faculties with the emotion of fear, we may note that the disposition to fear in an intellectual person gives rise to forethought, carefulness, and prudence. When combined with an active combative instinct such persons may be slow in commencing, yet, once interested, they push on with spirit, and will combine discretion with valour, prudence with determination. The fear instinct in a person of nervous temperament makes them easily anxious and discouraged. The fear instinct with little combative self-esteem, and hope, renders persons timid, destitute of energy; they rarely venture and are likely to worry over misfortunes.

Persons with little fear may lack care and prudence, and if combative they may drive forward in a furious, reckless manner. When fear is combined with the acquiring instinct a person may take care of property, but is likely to be imprudent in other respects. And if his acquiring instinct is small, he may keep money loosely.

As regards fear and insanity, morbid fears of a special kind are common in neurasthenia and hysteria. Fear as to health and apprehension of disease is the main condition of hypochondriasis. Terrifying hallucinations occur in alcoholic insanity. Unreasonable excessive apprehension and vague feelings of anxiety are common in melancholics; their whole life is tinctured with sadness, anxiety casts a gloom over all their thoughts and actions. They can find no pleasure in anything, and feel as if their body were fixed to the place where they are; or else they may be so agitated as to run about in violent despair. Their delusions, if any, are not the cause of their disorder, but are mere efforts on their part to explain their misery. On the other hand, fear and anxiety, caution and prudence, are often diminished or lost in insanity and lead to actions resulting in the ruin of the patient and his family.

Propensity to Concealment and Feeling of Suspicion

Animals had to protect themselves against their numerous enemies to avoid destruction, and developed a tendency to concealment, which was also found useful in approaching their own prey, and a feeling of suspicion. Suspicion is a protective propensity and hence a necessary quality. To hide is as instinctive as to run away. Hiding is protective because it falsely suggests to the adversary that there is nothing
ANALYSIS OF MAN'S PSYCHICAL NATURE

for him to attack. It is, then, the beginning of deceit. An animal cannot always protect itself by open force, and it must make up in cunning what it lacks in strength and courage. Hence it conceals itself or its intentions. Thus wild animals make use of innumerable arts for procuring food and escaping from their enemies. The hunter studies the habits of the animals he pursues, that he may lay his snares and shape his proceedings accordingly; so it is in human life. Those who are secretive and close in what regards themselves are vigilant in watching others with intent to discover, if they can, their sentiments and purposes. Cunning can outwit muscular strength and tends to develop the intellect in one particular direction.

A person under the dominion of this propensity can conceal his own thoughts successfully and take a great interest in the concealed thoughts of others. This is the Sherlock Holmes type. Even small things, slight omissions, and the smallest peculiarities of man have their lessons for him, raise a suspicion, and are traced to their true source. To the guileless man such things generally go unnoticed. The mind of the secretive man has a familiarity with all underground channels of thought. He knows by instinct what the next move of the rogue is likely to be and can trip him up. Hence the saying, "Set a thief to catch a thief." The criminal who is deceitful prefers forgery and fraud to theft, and will use poison rather than direct assault to kill a person.

Some men are by nature secretive, prone to duplicity, hypocrisy, and cunning, while others are frank and open. A certain endowment of this power is essential. People who give utterance to every thought and feeling which arises in their minds, and confide their private affairs in a reckless fashion, appear to be both foolish and a nuisance. A man but moderately endowed with this power may nevertheless keep his own counsel, if he is possessed of caution and good judgment. Such a man may be frank and overflowing with his friends, but he will save himself with strangers by his caution. The man who has a fair share of this power trusts little without good cause, takes little for granted, and consequently is seldom hoodwinked; whereas the frank man is liable to think others equally frank and truthful and is easily deceived.

A suspicious person, as, for instance, a jealous man, may reason quite correctly, but he will misinterpret actual occurrences in accordance with the state of his feeling. Ill-founded suspicion is common in insanity. In such cases it is not the reasoning that is wrong, but the premises that are ill-founded, actual occurrences being misinterpreted owing to the perverted emotional state. If the premises are conceded, then is the conclusion perfectly correct. When the disorder has lasted some time, and the false ideas are habitually dwelt upon, they become realities to the consciousness of the individual. Such suspicious patients think that the people in the street look at them strangely; they may fancy that the newspapers write about them, that policemen or supposed enemies are following them; that there is a plot or conspiracy to rob, ruin, and destroy them.

Suspicion renders people secretive; they penetrate the thoughts of others and try to conceal their own. They are rarely indiscreet, and are generally able to restrain the outward manifestation of their feelings. Secretiveness with little conscientiousness gives a cunning, deceitful disposition. A secretive, but social, person may sometimes communicate his feelings freely to his nearest friends, yet will seldom do so and will exercise more attachment than he expresses. Secretiveness in a person very acquisitive and not conscientious leads to the practice of tricks of trade.

With little suspicion, a person is generally frank, candid, cordial in disposition and intercourse with men, has few secrets of his own which he wishes to keep, and cares little about learning the secrets of others. He may disclose his faults as freely
as his virtues. Combined with large caution, he may manifest great care and deliberation in laying plans, but be imprudent in the manner of execution. A person with large social feeling and little disposition to suspicion will enter readily into conversation with strangers.

Ill-founded suspicion of being despised or distrusted, or a marked person, is peculiar to paranoia; innocent looks or remarks are interpreted as having some deep meaning and may lead to attacks on strangers. Melancholics sometimes have delusions of persecution, attributing their misery to the influence of others; but they never react against their persecutors, but accept their supposed injuries as rightly deserved. Persecutory delusions, referring chiefly to mysterious objects and arising from hallucinations, are common to acute alcoholism. Chronic alcoholics are very distrustful, especially of the fidelity of the wife or husband. In senile dementia the delusions of suspicion and persecution are usually directed against the patient’s own family, resulting sometimes in strange wills being made to the disadvantage of the wife, son, or daughter.

On the other hand, there is sometimes too much frankness in persons of disordered mind. In the early stage of mania, patients unbear their innermost thoughts to chance acquaintances, and so do the general paralytics to undesirable companions. This association and intimacy with persons of inferior station in life may be the first symptom which draws the attention of their friends to their mental state.

THE PROPENSITY TO ACQUIRE AND HOARD

The propensity to acquire and hoard is another primary propensity. Some animals found it useful not to have to hunt continuously for food, which may prove scarce at certain periods, and began to store up things for future use. Thus developed the hoarding propensity and love of possession, a tendency to lay up provisions for the future. Man not only stores up provisions for winter, but he acquires property of every sort and kind for all his life and for his posterity. The tendency to acquire varies in different people; the ability to do so depends on the intellect and other requisite qualities. The hoarding instinct is one of the strongest and most general impulses of our nature, and, in fact, is the origin of wealth, by the tendency which it produces to acquire for the mere pleasure of possessing. For the sake of gratifying his desire to acquire, one saves where others spend; one man is diligent, and another speculates, to get rich quickly.

In the child this propensity shows itself most naturally. The child will seize everything and appropriate what does not belong to it. Idiots and imbeciles will steal, the intellect being too deficient to check the animal instinct. Love of possession is a natural disposition implanted in the human organisation, and dishonesty is only the result of the absence of controlling motives.

The hoarding propensity originated in the practice of accumulating, in times of plenty, a store of food that should serve for sustenance in time of scarcity; and its obvious advantages soon caused the transfer of the desire and the practice to other things than food; until, in the course of ages, it culminated in the practice of accumulating money, the symbol and potentiality of acquiring most things that are regarded as desirable. Having started as a means to the further end of security against future want, it has now, by the process of anticipation of future motive, become an end in itself; and we have the familiar spectacle of men who have already accumulated money in excess of any possible need, still continuing the accumulation for the mere sake of accumulating. From food and money the practice has overflowed, by an easy process of transference, to other things, some useful, many useless, and we now see people accumulating postage stamps and all kinds of queer things, merely to satisfy the instinct of accumulation.

The love of wealth, as distinct from the desire for objects of immediate gratification,
ANALYSIS OF MAN'S PSYCHICAL NATURE

in which it undoubtedly takes its rise, is an object of future gratification, and therefore requires foresight. First we provide for our own wants, next for those connected with us, and ultimately wealth is amassed without any regard whatever for its future use. The amassing itself becomes a pleasure for its own sake. Its ill effects are a grasping and covetous disposition; its good effects, the stimulation of frugality and industry. When the desire for the accumulation of money has become a man's ruling principle, and he exhibits it on all occasions, he is called covetous or avaricious.

For the crowd, the idea of happiness never extends beyond a limited circle of immediate and tangible satisfactions which can be bought with money. In order to succeed, all means are justified, and success is the sole measure of the value of actions. Success under its most brutal form, which is monetary success, has almost become the exclusive object of universal endeavour. The collective ideal is the same as the individual ideal—to get rich as soon as possible, and by every available means. As in private life, admiration and respect are accorded to those who have succeeded financially. The desire to become rich destroys the capacity for happiness when the riches are obtained; but there continues a ceaseless activity. The governing classes are no longer the higher classes, and what remains of the old aristocracy has but little concern in maintaining its intellectual supremacy, or in constituting itself as a social force and setting an effective example. The only effective aristocracy that survives is that of money, and it cares for nothing save augmenting its wealth or spending it without intelligence. The highest class to-day is a mere plutocracy.

A man may be a thief without love of property, and he may be moral and yet grasping. There are many rogues who are not very acquisitive and who readily part with what they have stolen; that is to say, they are dishonest but not selfish; and there are many avaricious men who are sternly honest. In moderation, not out of proportion to the other impulses, we see persons not grasping, but with a conservative and economical tendency towards property, and a disposition to take good care of everything they possess. They waste nothing, but they are not necessarily selfish or very eager in the pursuit of wealth.

Cupidity and greed are caused by general selfishness combined with this propensity. Penuriousness is caused by this tendency being active in a timid or weak man. The pleasure of avarice consists in accumulating and hoarding up treasures; in computing and gloating over them; in a feeling of the power which they bestow; and likewise in the consciousness of the possession of the means, though there be no disposition to employ them for the purpose of enjoyment. Envy is directed toward those who already, or at least as we conceive, enjoy something more and better, either internal and external gifts, than belongs to ourselves.

When the acquiring propensity dominates, there is a disposition to turn everything to good account, which stimulates to the acquisition of wealth. When combined with cautiousness, such a person cannot endure to see waste; he will sometimes deliberate so long as to miss good opportunities; he will save rather than speculate. The acquisitive person with a hopeful disposition and small caution is likely to enter into speculative enterprises. The acquiring propensity combined with good observing faculties makes a man a good judge of the value of property; and, in a man of large intellectual powers, makes him prefer a livelihood by intellectual pursuits rather than business.

A person with only poor acquisitive propensity desires money more as a means than as an end. He may be industrious but lack economy, and is likely to show disinterestedness in pecuniary matters. The person with little acquisitiveness and aesthetic sensibility and desirous of approbation likes to buy beautiful things and to show them. The person with little acquisitiveness and a hopeful disposition may spend money in anticipation of future events and is apt to run into debt. A person
EVOLUTION OF THE EMOTIONS AND INSTINCTIVE IMPULSES

not acquisitive and very cautious may still acquire property; but it is as a safeguard against future needs, and he cares little for it as property.

Genuine kleptomania is probably due to an excess or perversion of this propensity, where an individual, apparently sane in other respects, will steal anything he can lay hands on. It occurs in persons in whom there is a strong desire to take possession of things quite irrespective of their value, disregarding risks of detection and the consequences of exposure; and it is accompanied by a feeling of restlessness and anxiety when the impulse arises and a pleasurable feeling of relief and satisfaction on the execution of it. As in the child, it is the appropriation which gives the satisfaction, and not the enjoyment of the article taken; so that the objects appropriated are usually insignificant, considering the position and wealth of the patient. In consequence the stolen goods are not parted with for gain, are not valued or desired, but are quite thrown away, or accumulated uselessly, or they are forgotten.

Kleptomania occurs in the mental disorder which sometimes accompanies pregnancy, in the clouded consciousness of hysteria, and sometimes in the semi-conscious state following an epileptic fit. Weak-minded persons are prone to commit petty acts of larceny, and head-injury may also be a cause.

In the early stage of mania the patient sometimes steals whatever he can lay hands on, but the articles stolen are often thrown away as soon as they are in his possession, and he steals almost openly. General paralytics, in the early stage of their disease, not infrequently steal without reflection, though sometimes with ingenuity, as a rule any article that takes their fancy. They also commit frauds of every kind, generally neglecting ordinary precautions. In the latter stages of the disease these patients again steal, but this time under the delusion that everything they see belongs to them. They then appropriate all sorts of articles, hoard and conceal them, and immediately afterwards lose all recollection of them. In senile dementia, the hoarding propensity appears pure and simple, such patients filling their pockets or any available receptacle with anything they can lay their hands on, regardless of value, even with mere dirt.

Among other perverted manifestations of the hoarding propensity in insanity we have, on the one hand, the patient who fears loss of property and destitution, or thinks he is already ruined; on the other, the parsimonious man who suddenly launches out into endless extravagance, giving orders for motor-cars, jewellery, and other luxuries, which he has often not the means to pay for, or else makes imprudent investments, or is given to impracticable business ventures.

THE SEXUAL PROPENSITY

We have dealt so far with the dispositions implanted by nature for the preservation of the individual. We have now to deal with the propensities intended for the preservation of the species. The most primitive of these is the sexual propensity, or the tendency to propagation.

To each individual, life is not a gift but a trust, to be employed in transmitting life to a new generation; and, this purpose effected, the raison d'être of the individual is at an end. This is very clearly indicated in the lives of many of the lower animals, in which reproduction is followed at once by death. In man this propensity has reached great refinement, and given rise to the tender emotion of love, besides inspiring men to immortal productions in painting, sculpture, poetry, music, literature, and the drama.

In insanity it is often exalted to an extraordinary degree, leading to the most lascivious conduct—nymphomania in women and satyrasis in men. Indecent manifestations occur in general paralysis; regard for decorum and the amenities of society is often lost in the mental disorder of the climacterium. Over-excitation is also common in the early stage of mania. The erotic tendencies are often revived...
in senile dementia, which makes the patients easy victims to designing women and often causes them to be so misguided as to fall in love with very young girls.

**PARENTAL LOVE**

The love of offspring—parental love—is an instinct inherent alike in animal and in human nature, and is one of the instincts necessary for the protection of the race.

It is necessary that the young animal shall not, during the first period of its active life, be dependent altogether upon its own efforts, for its highly generalised instincts would hardly suffice to maintain it alive unaided. Rather it must enjoy a period of sheltered life, during which it may acquire, through experience, such specialisations of its innate mental structure as are necessary for independent existence. This period of protected immaturity Nature provides by developing in the species the parental instinct, which leads the adults of each generation to feed, protect, and shelter their young, while these add to their highly general innate knowledge a sufficient store of acquired knowledge.

Among ourselves the credit of right conduct is freely and warmly allowed to the mother who works for her children, who denies herself many an innocent pleasure in order that she may feed and clothe and properly train her little family. But in almost all animals that attend to their young the self-same devotion may be found; and it will be observed that, even in those who in all other situations are very timid, any attempt to remove the young from the protecting parent, or in any way to hurt them, provokes a fierce and desperate display of all their combative resources. Take, for example, BREHM'S observation of the monkey-mother.

"When the monkey suckling is unable to do anything for itself, the mother is all the more gentle and tender with it. She occupies herself with it unceasingly, sometimes licking it, sometimes running after it or embracing it, looking at it as though reveling in the sight of it; then she lays it against her breast and rocks it to sleep. When the little monkey grows bigger the mother grants a little freedom, but she never loses sight of him; she follows his every step and does not permit him to do everything he likes. She washes him in the brooks and smooths his fur with loving care. At the least danger she rushes to him with a cry, warning him to take refuge in her arms. Any disobedience is punished with pinches or cuffs, but this seldom happens, for the monkey does not do what its mother objects to. The death of the young one is, in many cases, followed by that of the mother from grief. After a fight, monkeys generally leave their wounded on the field; the mothers only defend their young against every enemy, however formidable. At first the mother tries to escape with the young ones, but, if she fails, she emits a loud cry of pain and remains still, in a threatening attitude, with wide-open eyes, gnashing her teeth and menacing the enemy with outstretched arms."

Whether we call this instinct or affection, it is necessary for the maintenance of the species that things should be so. Still, desertion of infants and young children is not uncommon in human beings. In insanity the love for the child often turns to hate.

**LOVE OF HOME**

The reminiscences of infancy and early youth are the source of an attachment to the place and surroundings in which we live, giving rise to a love of home, which further extended gives a love of country—a patriotic attachment.

Patriotism is one of the most lauded virtues, but it is often wilfully perverted by rulers by inculcating in the thoughtless masses an irrational dislike to foreigners, and an idea that their own countrymen are necessarily the most superior in the
world. Patriotism is not fostered by them solely as a feeling which leads to self-denial and disinterested effort for the whole nation, but as a curious mixture of a desire to overcome other nations, an irrational contempt for their customs, and a swaggering self-complacent idea of superiority. Sound patriotism—that is, love of the beauty of one's native country and its achievements in science, literature and the arts—is to be recommended and does not exclude the higher ideal—a love of humanity. The spurious patriotism promulgated by ambitious rulers and interested self-seeking classes seeks to foster dissension with other nations, and has only one purpose: to make obedient soldiers when the government of the country chooses to make war. If the well-being of one's country is threatened from without, it is an absolute duty to sacrifice oneself, but too often the interests of the rulers or ruling class are confounded with the State.

Some persons have this feeling of attachment to home so well developed that they do not like leaving their native place and suffer from "home-sickness" when they do go away. The opposite are those persons who have no interest in home, take little pains with it, and easily change to where their interest or business leads them.

**SOCIAL ATTACHMENT**

Animals having to fight to obtain food, and others having to defend themselves against attack, must have found it of advantage to keep together in groups, for aggression in a herd was surer of success than singly, and so was protection. Other animals found that by keeping in flocks mutual alarm could be given more easily; also that enterprises, such as migration in the case of birds, afforded greater protection when undertaken in a greater number. Similarly primitive man, unprotected against the forces of nature and at the mercy of every foe, his instinct directed him to cultivate the society of his fellows. He found that living in numbers and forming societies rendered him more powerful and enabled him to give effect to the advantage of his superior intelligence. Every conquest over animals and over natural conditions has been due to specialisation of employment; and specialisation is not possible except in social life. When life is in solitude, or in pairs, everything that is necessary for preservation and survival must be done by each individual or each pair. If every man had to collect his own food, protect his own family, build his own house, make his own clothes, and make his own furniture and utensils, innumerable works of utility would remain undone, and art, science, law, medicine, etc., would never have come into existence.

Grouping among men was all the more necessary because of the long protection needed by their offspring. The long association before children became independent gave rise to an attachment between child and child, and child and parent, between brother and sister, friend and friend, and so on, thus forming the foundation of social life. Again, family life awakened in primitive man feelings of love and tenderness for those who excited in him no fear or rivalry. Gradually these sympathies widened till they embraced the tribe and ultimately the whole human race.

Social attachment necessitates renunciation. To share the advantages, the protection, of the community, we must abandon the freedom allowable to a solitary man and restrain ourselves in every direction. Those who lack this sentiment are likely to sacrifice friends if their interests should suffer.

There is a great difference among individuals in regard to the strength of the social feeling. Some men have many acquaintances, but no friends; while others remain attached to certain individuals during every change of circumstance, and do not readily enlarge the circle of their intimates. When this feeling is strong in a person, delight is felt in friendship and attachment. Those in whom the feeling is
weak care little for friends; out of sight, out of mind, is their practice. The possession of this instinct, even in great strength, does not necessarily imply sociability of temperament. Many a man in London leads a most solitary, unsociable life, who yet would find it hard to live far away from the thronged city. Such men are unsociable but gregarious; and they illustrate the fact that sociability, although it has the gregarious instinct as its foundation, is a more complex, more highly developed tendency. However safe they may know themselves to be, most men find it difficult to sleep in an empty house, and would be distressed by prolonged absolute solitude. Even habit cannot do much in this respect. We like privacy, we do not like chatting all the time; but we feel more comfortable in the knowledge there is another person somewhere on the premises.

To a certain extent the foundation of all morality is domestic; for even now, parental and conjugal sympathies, as they were the first to appear, are they still the most fundamental. When a man has run his mortal race, if for his epitaph we may truly write that he was an affectionate son, a kind husband, and a tender father, we imply a character of fundamental goodness from which other moral qualities may be inferred. If we can add that he was a true friend and a devoted citizen, in that collection of parental, conjugal, and social sympathies we describe the full measure of ordinary practical morality.

Living in crowds diminished the personal responsibility and increased the suggestibility. Doing less for themselves, the keenness of the senses and the excellence of the reason in certain directions diminished, and belief in the collective observation and judgment was substituted. The masses cannot all take part in affairs of the State and diplomacy, and must accept what the rulers choose to tell them through the Press. The information can be so restricted and so arranged as to create certain beliefs and prejudices among the masses, and thus moulding public opinion at the expense of independent judgment.

In certain forms of insanity the social feelings become perverted, persons forming attachments to undesirables and outcasts, as in the early stage of mania and general paralysis; or they become almost extinguished, solitude being preferred to company, as in melancholia, when even the death of a dear one may leave the patient indifferent. The melancholic shuns society because social intercourse gives him pain, while the paranoiac shuns it from mere distrust. The patient suffering from dementia praecox avoids relatives and associates, being engrossed with himself. Often the commencement of insanity is marked by the lapse of natural affection, the dislike of friends and relations becoming pronounced and increased to actual hostility. Sometimes the mental disorder shows itself in patients loving without measure those whom they soon hate without reason. Long continued mental disorder is especially distinguished by an unsociableness, which often prevents patients from speaking to their companions. It is no pleasure to them to be associated with their fellow-creatures. Many of them do not play games, and they cannot combine for any purpose.

**SELF-REGARDING SENTIMENTS**

From the social attachment there arose the desire to please, to earn the approval of those who are dear to us and with whom we live in companionship. A man must order his conduct as to gain the approval and good opinion of those with whom he consorts, and the desire of gaining and retaining this good opinion is one of the strongest of the motives by which his conduct is prompted and regulated. Such is the origin of love of praise and dread of blame, which are necessary elements in social life and give rise to the desire to excel—that is, to ambition. Duties are enjoined on the young by parents and elders; and certain acts are forbidden or punished, others are applauded or rewarded. The public opinion of society carries on the process.
The desire to obtain the approval of others for our conduct, and to avoid their disapproval, is a very powerful and pervading motive to conduct. What will people think? is a question constantly on the tongues of some, and constantly in the minds of all.

In every community, conformity, not only of conduct, but of opinion, of each, with the conduct and opinion of the rest, is regarded with approval; and conduct and opinion that do not conform to the common standard meet with strong reprobation, and sometimes with vigorous suppression. Hence we find strongly implanted among the instincts of every member of the community the desire to conform, to do as others do, to fall in with the prevailing mode of action. The good citizen is he who is satisfied with existing conditions and is obedient to authority.

Conformity is the imitation of the example of others; but there is a clear distinction between conformity and imitation. The child’s action in learning to write is imitative, but it is not conforming. Conforming action is necessarily imitative, but imitative action is not necessarily conforming. Fashion is that conduct, whether changeable or continuous, to which all conform at the same time. Thus, a fashion, if it endures, becomes a custom; and a custom, so long as it endures, is a fashion; but, while continuity is the essence of custom, fashion is independent of continuity or change.

Conformity to the customs of the community is usually regarded as morality; but true morality is to do what we believe to be right, merely because it is right. We should disapprove of ourselves if we acted otherwise, and our own disapproval is more than we can bear; so we do what we believe to be right, even though, in so doing, we incur the disapproval of others. Many people do not act on the motive of securing their own approval, but accept the conventional morality they find prevalent.

Love of approbation causes men in their social intercourse to be courteous, conciliatory and polite. Life is thus made more pleasant, and the general sum of happiness is increased. If all men spoke exactly what they thought, without being restrained by the fear to offend, or the desire to please, what a world we would have!

Love of approbation gives rise to display; thus refinement is promoted, and the dulness and ugliness of our surroundings are largely reduced. If it were not for the desire of approbation, how many books that interest and delight us would never have been written! How many noble deeds would have remained undone!

Love of approbation renders people mindful of appearances, and often fishing for popularity though destitute of talents; but when there is little love of approbation the person is indifferent whether he pleases or displeases, and, even possessed of talents, may have too little ambition to exert his powers.

The reward of applause and the punishment of reprobation are a guide to conduct, and with many constitute a sense of duty. But this often leads to imitations of the general example and therefore does not deserve our approval, as when a person who has really little or no religious feeling is a regular church-goer, simply because he is afraid of his neighbours, or, for example, the man who is a Tory or Liberal in politics, because the one or the other party-view happens to be held by the majority, or, again, the person who subscribes to a charity not from a benevolent disposition, but because his neighbour has done the same. Such actions are not dictated by a desire to do good to humanity but are stimulated merely by a desire to obtain the applause of mankind. In obedience to the promptings of this faculty men will erect hospitals, endow universities, provide homes for the destitute. Many of our most noble institutions would fall into insolvency if all the contributions to their funds which did not arise from a pure motive of benevolence were withdrawn. Benevolence alone would never do the noble deeds that the desire to please, to gain esteem, and to become notorious does.
From the desire to earn the admiration of one's fellow-men arose ambition, which we may define as that anxious aspiration, so characteristic of the human species, to rise above our respective station, or to attain to something loftier and, as fancy pictures, better than what we now enjoy. It implies, therefore, dissatisfaction with the present, mingled, generally, with more or less elating visions for the future.

There are persons with inordinate ambition, and appetite for honours which can never be satisfied; feeding only serves to aggravate its hunger. No sooner has the ambitious man gained one eminence than another and yet loftier aim becomes visible, and with fresh and more eager efforts and desires he strains forward to reach the summit. It is a continual restlessness, and each successful step increases the passion and renders its victim even less content and less happy than he was at the beginning.

Ambition has two sources: the love of reputation and the love of power. Love of approbation confines itself to a narrow circle; love of reputation to a wider one, and is held to imply the possession of high intellectual aptitudes. Love of reputation in a high degree, over a wide area, and for a long period of time, is love of fame; if the desire is merely to be talked about, it is love of notoriety. Men may commit all sorts of actions to achieve that end. People with a disposition to plume themselves on any petty, accidental, or temporary cause of superiority to their fellow-men are called vain.

If the fear of disapprobation leads to confusion, we call it shame. It occurs on being discovered, but may be prospective and prevent us from doing things which are condemned by our friends or by public opinion.

The social life led some men to comport themselves according to the ideas of others, but some became distinguished by preferring to act in accordance with their own views. They were men who set more value on their own opinions than on those of others. This gave them self-reliance and independence of character, self-confidence and self-satisfaction, which enabled their mental powers to act to the best advantage. These were the born commanders.

The man who desires to rule is necessary to all organisation, political, military, or industrial. Just as the man who loves approbation is desirous of fame, so the man with large self-esteem loves power. The direction the love of fame or power will take is determined by the strength of the other faculties. Thus wealth, political or military fame, or even mere brute strength—in short, almost anything that can distinguish us from the crowd—may under different influences become the object of our aspirations.

The civilisation of every country depends upon a small number of eminent men; therefore the rest of us must have instincts and dispositions impelling us to follow leaders: such as suggestibility, imitation, admiration, etc.; and will be progressive only when the rulers foster progress.

The self-reliant man is well satisfied with himself no matter what his intellect, personal talents, birth or fortune; he does not envy a king. On the other hand, those deficient in this respect will be remarkable for their humility. It is a wise provision of nature that persons in the meanest situations and with the humblest acquirements have a sense of self-importance. It renders its possessor happy and contented with that "modicum of sense" which has been conferred upon him, who otherwise would be miserable if aware of his deficiencies. It is sad to think that much talent has been lost to the world through self-confidence being too weak to enable the talented one to rise to the occasion and to fill a responsible office. We talk a great deal of liberty, forgetting the fact that obedience is an impulse which gives restful happiness to millions of mankind. Many a slave has been freed that would have preferred to remain with his old master.

Love of liberty may be regarded as the counterpart of the love of power. As the
superior desires power, so the inferior desires liberty—that is to say, emancipation from the power of his superior. Where the power of which the exertion is resented is moral and not physical, the appropriate phrase is not love of liberty, but love of independence.

Self-esteem in excess leads to conceit and arrogance. Self-esteem is often exaggerated to the ridiculous, sometimes with reference to personal attractiveness, sometimes in regard to intellectual ability. The "bore" has plenty of it. Some men are successful in life through sheer "cheek."

Where our regard for self keeps us from performing certain actions deemed unworthy of ourselves, we call the attitude self-respect. But what we consider unworthy is, for most of us, determined by what our social environment considers to be unworthy. What is ordinarily called self-respect really is dependent, in the great majority of cases, on what people generally think regarding such matters.

Self-esteem and love of approbation are often confounded. By the one sentiment a man esteems himself; by the other he courts the esteem of others. They are best distinguished in their abuse. The one is pride, the other vanity; the one assumes, the other begs; hence it is truly remarked that an individual is too proud to be vain. Pride is more connected with command, and vanity with taking counsel. The vain man attaches the utmost importance to the opinions entertained of him by others, and seeks with eagerness to gain their approbation; the proud man expects that mankind will come to him and acknowledge his merit. The vain man knocks at every door to draw attention towards himself, and supplicates the smallest position of honour; the proud man despises these marks of distinction, which on the vain confer the most perfect delight. The proud man is disgusted by indiscreet eulogisms; the vain man inhales with ecstasy the incense of flattery, although profusely offered and by no very skilful hand.

Some people have so little self-esteem and are so sensitive to criticism that they anticipate it keenly; they become morbidly shy and shun society. They are too self-conscious. Of course, the emotion of fear is mixed up with it; but it is not merely fear of adverse criticism; they are also shy of praise, and begin to blush all over. It is not always a sense of their own inferiority, for people who are convinced of their own capacities and have confidence in themselves in other ways, as in their writings, yet evince that shyness before strangers.

Shyness is natural at puberty, and is then the outcome of the growth of the sex instinct. In women, one takes it perhaps as more or less natural. Men afflicted with this complaint feel it more keenly. They feel it when in company as if they were always observed and are doubtful that the observation may not always be sympathetic, or else they are eager to make a good impression and consequently become nervous. A shy person may blush, get confused, have tremors, show restless movements, have a nervous laugh and a foolish expression, with the eyes glancing restlessly in all directions. He sometimes tries to hide his discomfort. In consequence of these feelings, he isolates himself from society and even ordinary companions sometimes, and becomes a lonely man, with all the evils of self-contemplation, self-introspection, eccentricity, etc., that are apt to develop in the recluse.

Self-conscious people find it difficult to walk across a stage when hundreds of people are looking, or to address an audience of strangers eagerly listening to them. They become awkward and embarrassed under the circumstances.

Self-reliance imparts a resolute character, not easily influenced by others; the helpless man lacks constancy, for his actions depend on the influence of others, his conduct is therefore not uniform. Belief in one's own powers gives tenacity of purpose and firmness; if in excess, stubbornness and obstinacy.

Some persons yield readily; it may be said of some they scarcely have a will of
their own; they follow the last impulse they receive, and, without strength to resist, they are easy instruments of all whom they meet. They give up persevering under difficulties; they decline to follow the estimable motto, "Try again." Others are of an immovable character, firm in their resolutions and constant in their principles; they do not attend to exhortations or to examples; their conduct is uniform, and their exertions may be calculated on in various situations of life. Some persons are steady, determined, persevering in character, others vacillating, lacking fortitude and patient endurance. The greatest work demands the greatest effort; and not only so, but this effort must be perseveringly applied, and for this firmness is necessary. When firmness is deficient, the individual is the victim of those external circumstances that may address his strong faculties, and no confidence can be placed in him, for what he says or does to-day is no guide as to what he will do to-morrow.

Stability of character is often called strength of will. A man who adheres tenaciously to his resolutions is called a strong-willed man, and, if this tendency exists in excess, an obstinate man. On the other hand, a man who vacillates, or frequently changes his resolutions, is called a man of weak will. Some men are by nature resolute and consistent, and are therefore credited with great will power. They refuse to be the sport of circumstances, to drift with the current, but strike boldly out for some definite point on life's shore. How came they by that tenaciousness? What were the exterior circumstances that gave to it its tone and direction? Such will power and tenaciousness will be found in most cases to be hereditary, and as regards its scope and direction only shall we find it the sport of circumstances. Small minds often exhibit a tenaciousness that leads them to success, for they are capable of being entirely possessed by the one unchanging motive. Larger minds often fail of success by reason of a want of consistency in pursuit due to the varied play of many motives, each capable of a strong attraction, on a richly endowed nature. It is the person who has definite aims in life who will appear to possess the strongest will.

The habit of perseverance or of continuous effort is that which, added to energy, constitutes industry.

Patience is passive endurance of labour, but also endurance under fatigue and suffering in general.

Persons with large self-esteem have confidence in their own powers, value their own judgment, and are willing to assume responsibility. If intellectually gifted they may undervalue the talents of others; and with small intellect there may be a conceit of abilities not possessed.

When there is little self-esteem, a person gives in to the judgment of others easily, lacks independence, self-confidence, natural dignity, self-reliance. And if given to respect authority as well, he is liable to underrate his own abilities, and more apt to follow than to lead. Little self-esteem in a cautious person is likely to make him afraid to exert himself; but, gifted intellectually, he may lead off well when once placed in a responsible position, though at first he distrusts his own capabilities.

Self-esteem and self-satisfaction are prominent in the early stage of mania. Such patients admit only their own point of view and their own plans. A silly self-satisfaction is noticeable in the alcoholic. On the other hand, self-esteem is diminished and there is a feeling of unworthiness in melancholia. In general paralysis the patient believes himself to be an exalted personage, but he changes his character almost daily, if not hourly, being one moment a great general, another a king or statesman, a third a millionaire or a strong man, giving ample evidence of the weakening of his intellect. In the later stages of paranoia the patient also believes himself an exalted personage, often an under-rated genius, but the character he fancies himself to be is fixed. He knows he is an important person; he can tell you
good reasons why. His intellect is perfectly retained, although he reasons from false premisses.

Generally speaking, amongst the insane we meet with men immensely over-estimating their own importance and the significance of all their actions, engrossed only with themselves, and but little, or not at all, with external things.
CHAPTER XXVII

EVOLUTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL CAPACITIES AND THE ETHICAL, AESTHETICAL, AND RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS

Man possesses, in addition to the feelings and propensities he has in common with animals, intellectual powers of superior order and higher sentiments which are peculiar to the human race. Man possesses various elementary capacities which constitute his observation, memory, reason, and imagination. According to the degree of their development, so is the intellect of the individual petty or great.

Among the ignorant we find defective and inexact observation, influenced generally by the emotional prejudices of the observer; weak, or what is even worse, misleading memory; feble reason, dependent on faith in authority; and limited imagination. Much has been written concerning the extent of human ignorance; but we ought to discriminate between absolute incapacity to know, and mere want of information, arising from the fact of not having employed this capacity to its full extent.

Man is endowed with intellectual faculties, and these may be divided into the knowing and reflecting. It is undeniable that intellectually we know and we reflect. It is a common observation that knowledge is not wisdom till it is compared and reasoned on by reflection. It is its combination with reflection which constitutes that knowledge which is power. The weakest reflecting powers often co-exist in the same individual with a store of knowledge which excites our wonder. Few men are equally good in reasoning and observation. There are men of observation and men whose knowledge rests chiefly on reason; the former are more practical, the latter more theoretical.

Our ability to perceive, to reason, to learn certain subjects would not be exerted without the instinctive impulses, the needs of the organisation, which are driving forces to the employment of the intellect and give rise to curiosity. At first the intellect is confined in its range by the fears and wants which an object and necessitous condition prescribe to it; but as curiosity is enlarged, it devises means to ends, rising continually higher and higher, and developing the several arts and industries necessary to the convenience and adornment of life.

POWERS OF OBSERVATION AND REMEMBRANCE

Animals possess curiosity and powers of observation often to an extraordinary degree. The desire to obtain food induced them to examine everything of novel appearance which came within their range of observation, irrespective of its utility. Curiosity to observe, especially anything unfamiliar, is common to all animals, and their educability probably depends on the strength of it.

The connection between memory and sensory impressions is of the very closest. Indeed, our faculty of perceptive sight results from an intimate combination of sensory recollections with sensory impressions. Memory apart, sensation would
mean nothing to us. Men with sight only could see, but would not perceive. Men with hearing only would hear, but would not understand. There is no sensation that can be appreciated without recollection. There is no sensation which does not call up recollections. It is beyond dispute that the powers of observation are the primary faculties of intelligence, and supply the raw material, as it were, for all intellectual exertion. They include retentiveness as well, and supply the material for practical knowledge. Memory, like perception, is not a single faculty, but there exist perceptions and memories for words, sounds, numbers, lapse of time, order of sequence, space, form, distance, colour, weight, objects, places, of different strength in each individual. Each of them may be lost in circumscribed injury or disease of the brain (see Chapter XXIX.). On these conceptions, in part, the talents of drawing, painting, sculpture, mechanics, music, etc., depend; and from the desire to know objects as mere existences our inclinations for the study of science arose. Our perceptions and memories may be divided into those of mere existences—stationary objects—and those for moving objects or objects in time, i.e., for facts and events.

The knowing powers cognise two classes of objects, existences and events—in other words, things that are, and things that happen. Let anyone reflect for a moment and he will find that whatever he knows must either have an existence or be an event. The paper on which we write is an existence—a thing that is; if we drop it on the carpet, it is an event, a thing that has happened; a change has taken place. Soldiers are existences, their battle is an event. The acids and alkalis are existences; their effervescence or mixture is an event. Natural history concerns existences; civil history records events. Now, from observing that the power of perceiving and remembering these two classes of objects, respectively, varies in a marked degree in different individuals, and that they may be lost independently of one another in lesions of the brain, we may consider them as distinct.

Speaking generally, a man with good perceptive powers is likely to be an observer of men and things, a practical man given to minute inspection and adapted to study physical phenomena. Combined with the acquiring instinct, he is likely to interest himself in the value of property and goods; and combined with constructive ability, he will be given to mechanical operations and interest himself in machinery. A man with good perceptive powers but small reflective capacity will be a man of facts rather than ideas, better adapted for carrying out plans than for originating them. He will be a man who looks more than he thinks, of quick perception but possibly little wisdom, a man who thinks nothing is certain and worthy of attention except facts. Good perceptive powers combined with good reflective powers make a man not only a close observer of things, but also strongly inclined to trace their relations of cause and effect.

A man with small perceptive powers will be deficient in the capacity of observation and take little interest in the mere examination of objects; and with superior reflective power, he will be more of a philosopher than a scientist, a bookworm rather than an experimenter in the laboratory. That is to say, he is most likely to be these things; his tendencies will run in these directions.

Each of the perceptive powers and memories will now be dealt with in detail; and we shall show in a later chapter that each of them depends on a definite centre in the brain and may be lost when that limited brain area is injured or diseased.

The perception and memory of form is commonly accepted as an elementary power. We all vary in it, as, for example, in its application to the remembering of faces.

It is said of Cuvier that he was able to recognise a similarity in form in the most extraordinary manner, never forgetting the shape of an object he had once seen. The special memory developed by this faculty is also well illustrated by those artists
who are able to draw accurately from memory; thus it is said of Turner that, having carefully looked at a ship, he was able to go home and draw from memory the details of the ship as accurately as if he had been standing in front of it.

The power to observe the size of objects is another elementary capacity. Its function is manifestly different from that of the faculty of form; thus a sixpence and a half-crown are of the same form, but differ in size. Another is the power of resistance or sense of weight.

The perception of position, giving the memory for places, or the sense of locality, varies greatly in people. It is not dependent on any sense in particular.

Locality is a faculty (probably complex) which appears to be more developed in savages and animals than it is in persons belonging to civilised communities. It is also larger in a provincial dweller than in a citizen of a large town, as we should naturally expect. An animal or savage would soon get lost in the forest if it were not for this faculty to guide them back to their starting-point.

The ability to deal with numbers, being a natural power, can, of course, like any other, be improved by exercise and practice, but no amount of practice will produce it where nature has not bestowed it. It, too, depends on no sense in particular. It is with this faculty as with all others: great ability in regard to numbers and calculation gives a great love for them.

Another elementary power is that of perceiving periods of time, forming a sort of natural chronometer in the individual. It likewise depends on no sense in particular. The special memory is well seen in those persons who are able to remember the chronological order of events easily, because they are associated with ideas of periods of time.

It is surprising how accurately some men are able to tell the exact time of day without referring to a watch. Time in music also comes under the same faculty, because here a correct estimation of time has to be formed, so that the notes may be played in correct relation to the time as shown by the metronome.

Though the perception of time is essential to a musician, it does not make a musician; several other qualities are required, which vary according to the type selected. A person with a small development of tone-perception thinks music a "noise," and takes no pleasure in it, not being able to distinguish one tune from another.

To the unmusical person a Mozart or Beethoven concerto is only horsehair scraping on catgut; whereas Heine rapturously declared that Paganini's violin expressed "sounds from whose bottomless depths gleamed no ray of hope or comfort . . . melting sensuously languishing notes of bliss! Tones that kissed one another, then poutingly fled from one another, and again languishingly embraced and became one and died away in the ecstasy of the union."

The memory for words is probably very complex. A man may have an excellent memory for languages and yet a poor memory for proper names; he may be fluent in speech and yet have a very small vocabulary. His visual memory, i.e., memory for things read, may be excellent; and his auditory memory, i.e., his memory for words heard, may be very poor, and the reverse.

It is doubtful to what extent ideas are formulated and exist in the mind in the shape of words—to what extent, that is, men think in words. There can be no doubt of the existence of thought in the lower animals, and that they can express their emotions and communicate them, and it is equally certain that all normal children have a copious supply of thought before they have any knowledge of
language at all adequate for thinking in words. The difficulty many people have in expressing their thoughts, and which even the most fluent speakers sometimes feel in putting into words certain ideas, is a further proof of at least a very considerable independence between ideas and their verbal formulae.

Gambetta, as we have shown (Vol. I., p. 396), had a wonderfully developed speech centre, a better machinery for remembering and speaking words than the average man. The rest of his brain was comparatively small. He was a great speaker, because he was born with the tools to speak with, but he was not brilliant in other respects; just like some members of our own Parliament. The speech centre by itself is usually not of much use, unless a man has the intellect correspondingly developed. Just as a great painter, who was asked what he mixed his paints with, was correct in replying "brains"; for without brains the sense of colour alone is useless, so it is useless to have the speech centre by itself.

We see, then, that neither perception, memory, nor judgment are elementary powers of the mind. When one is said to be a man of quick perception, or of good memory, or sound judgment, we must ask—of what?

It is a metaphysical error to distinguish memory as a primitive faculty. If memory were a distinctive power, it would in each individual be alike strong, and regard all subjects of recollection alike. But as this is not consistent with fact, as one individual remembers existences and another forgets existences and remembers events, while a third recalls with ease a train of reasoning, another musical airs, and another faces he has seen, or scenes he has surveyed, each perhaps weakly remembering something else of the matters enumerated, we are forced to the conclusion that there is no general faculty called memory, but that each faculty has its own power of recalling its impressions. The instructor of youths should ponder this truth well, and he will save himself and his pupil much time and labour in indefinite and desultory exercise of a supposed general faculty of memory, when in truth he will actually improve the memory of each mental power in the proper direct cultivation of the power itself.

We have not only "intellectual" memories, but also memories of our emotional experiences and the actions of our propensities. Of course, the latter are never pure memories, but are connected with the ideas we had at the time when we had the emotions and exercised the volition. That the emotions and propensities influence our memory is shown by the fact that the timid man will remember the objects and events which inspired him with fear better than other facts; the acquisitive man will remember all that concerns money and business; the secretive man all that aroused his suspicion, and so on.

Nothing is ever absolutely forgotten, once it has been impressed upon the mind. No impression, once recorded, ever ceases to exist. It is not lost, but merely becomes obscure and exists outside of the field of consciousness, to which, however, it may be recalled long afterwards by some act of the will, or some association, according to the circumstances of the case. It is true that many impressions are never revived, either by volitional effort or involuntarily through association, but the impression is there still and its influence is manifest in our acts and thoughts.

Attention is necessary to memory. The remembrance of anything depends upon the clearness and vividness of the impression originally made by it upon the mind, and this on the degree of attention with which it was regarded. The defects of memory, of which most persons complain, are owing more to want of attention than to any other cause. We remember what we attend to, but what we do not attend to we readily forget. Attention is the fixing of the mind intently upon one particular object, to the exclusion for the time of all other objects that solicit its notice. It is not, strictly speaking, a special faculty of the mind, but is a mode of activity equally applicable to all its states. We pay attention to what interests us—one to business,
ANALYSIS OF MAN'S PSYCHICAL NATURE

another to music, another to science, etc., and therefore according to the natural dispositions for these subjects, so will be our attention and memory for them. We cannot separate our world from our interest in it. What we see in it is determined by our attention, and our attention is determined by our organic needs and interests. Indeed, one individual differs from another not so much in power of memory, reasoning, attention, or will, as in the sort of material to which he successfully applies these processes.

It is commonly said that in the decay of our powers through age the memory is the first faculty that fails; but this is not strictly correct, for it is the power of attention, on which memory depends, that is the first to deteriorate. Hence it is the most recent subjects—the things of yesterday or last week—those that have not been sufficiently attended to, that are the first to disappear. The things of years ago, and of early life, those that were attended to and are established, are the last to be forgotten. Another factor is that in old age our interests diminish, the elementary passions fade, and so we regard with less attention the objects and events before us, and remember them afterwards imperfectly, if at all.

Attention undergoes pathological alterations in insanity, varying from the painful monoidoism of the melancholic to the maniac's rush of ideas.

Memory must be clearly distinguished from remembrance, recollection, and recognition. Memory is the innate power to have an impression recalled if a proper stimulus be applied. Recollection is the power of voluntarily recalling impressions, using an effort of the will, to revive some impression previously stored away. Remembrance is the term applied when the process is involuntary, when the previously stored impression comes again into the field of consciousness without an effort of the will, as by association, resemblance, etc. Recognition is the word applied to that process of the memory whereby, when we see or hear a thing, we know that we have seen or heard it before; it is a conscious association of the present impression with previous ones. Recognition is therefore the essential element of memory.

REASONING POWERS

The power of reasoning upon the knowledge gained, of tracing the relations of cause and effect, and of determining the analogies which obtain among other things dissimilar, comprises the next development in the intellectual capacity.

The process of reasoning, of drawing conclusions, is sometimes performed by a simple act of comparison, or perception of analogy. A vast majority of mankind reason in this way. The whole of the brilliant field of what in reasoning is called illustration is nothing more than this process of comparison. Another set of reasoners are more severe and are contented with no conclusions which do not stand in the relation of necessary consequences to their premises. This is truth, they reason, because it is deducible necessarily from the consideration of these other known truths brought together. These are the logicians, who distrust analogy and comparison. The faculty they use is the highest intellectual power, the percipient of the relation of cause and effect. It is clear, then, that the act of meditating can be performed in two distinct ways, by induction and deduction. Inductive meditation is to institute comparisons and to generalise. It is found in persons highly critical, in those fond of metaphors. An intellect given rather to deductive meditation is an intellect which co-ordinates, systematises, and draws consequences. Both forms of meditation may be equally active, but there are exceptions—to wit, the born critic on the one hand, and the philosopher whose mind is in quest mainly for cause and effect.

A person with dominant reflective faculties is generally gifted with depth of reasoning and strength of understanding; and if he is poor in powers of observation,
he will be more deep than clear, more theoretical than practical, better in philosophy and speculation of human affairs than in the details of science, likely to make good plans though he may be less good in putting them into practice. He will possess an inquiring and investigating turn of mind, good judgment, originality, able to clear up abstruse points and to carry conviction by irresistible arguments presented in a very intelligible manner, especially if he have the gift of language as well. With the combative instinct, he will be able to advocate and defend his opinions vigorously.

A person with little reflective power will think little in the abstract, will not be clear or correct in apprehending the principles of causation, will be deficient in discernment and understanding and injudicious in planning. Persons with small reflective power frequently have great faith in authority, and reason thus: A = B, because C said so. Such people, for example, judge the merits of a book by its circulation, just as they do the wisdom of a man by the income he earns. Small reflective powers combined with a tendency to imitation renders a person apt to do what he sees others do; he may gain something from experience, yet will be unwilling to apply his mind to any subject requiring close investigation and research. Little reflective power combined with selfish propensities and some secretiveness render a man shrewd; he may manifest considerable tact and ingenuity in laying plans, yet he has too little intellect to realise them.

A person possessing good inductive capacity will be keen in discrimination, and will rarely fail to catch points of difference. Good at analogies, he will readily discover resemblances and differences and will possess a criticising turn of mind. If he have good perceptive powers as well, he will be good in comparing natural phenomena and in illustrating his ideas. With aesthetic sensibility, he will make many elegant and elevated comparisons; and with small aesthetic sensibility, he will be more argumentative than ornamental in illustration.

Altogether there are three degrees in the reasoning capacities of mankind. One man understands things by means of his own natural endowments; another understands things when they are explained to him; and a third can neither understand himself, nor when they are explained by others.

It is commonly assumed that ignorance keeps people poor, but this is not the case. We are all ignorant in certain things. Only one thing is true, that ignorance leads to the exploitation by the unscrupulous. Persons of little education, but knowing how to make the most of that little knowledge they possess, often succeed wonderfully.

Insanity is primarily a disturbance of the feelings and consequently of the conduct of man. The brain disturbance must be serious before the intellect shows permanent signs of weakening. But there is often a want of power of fixing the attention and loss of memory, the most common affairs of life being forgotten, names, dates, figures, passing out of recollection. When perception is disturbed there may be hallucinations and illusions; when the reasoning powers are weakened there may be disturbances in the formation of ideas, of the train of thought, or its rapidity.

When the accuracy of memory is disturbed, we see the patient unconsciously distorting facts when telling them, or he may mix real experiences and imagined experiences together without knowing it, or he may deal in fabrications which are really hallucinations of memory, the patient weaving an account of things often improbable and contradictory, that never existed, yet doing this all unconscious of the untruth. Normal and abnormal defects of memory are, of course, a matter of degree. No one remembers all his experiences, and to forget is as natural and as normal as to remember. In practice, however, little difficulty is experienced in deciding that a defect of memory is morbid in degree, since by common consent no defect is considered morbid if not extreme.
Loss of memory is often very marked in insanity. The power of recollection—especially of recent events—disappears or is considerably diminished in general paralysis and in senile dementia. At the commencement of the former disease there is forgetfulness of ordinary duties and of details of business. Sometimes the recollection of former years is present, but no recollection of what has happened half an hour before. Sometimes also there are delusions of recollection on account of the memory picture being insufficiently fixed. Or events that never happened are remembered as realities. On the other hand, a very profound degree of apparent dementia is not inconsistent with an almost perfect recollection of events. The memory is impaired in chronic opium poisoning, and more so in chronic alcoholism, where there is instantaneous forgetfulness of events which have only just transpired. On the other hand, in the early stage of mania the memory is stimulated, so that the patient may be able to recall whole pages of poetry or to quote extensively from standard works.

The commonest forms of sense delusions are hallucinations and illusions. The essential difference between the two is that the hallucination is solely a brain creation without any external stimulus to produce it, whereas an illusion is aroused by some real object outside the brain, and is, in fact, a misinterpreted sensation. Sense deceptions may occur in the same. Their importance as a disease symptom in insanity rests on the fact that they exert a powerful and irresistible influence over the entire thought and activity of the patient.

Hallucinations depend upon disturbances of the centres of sensation, so that the person may hear, see, taste, and feel things which have no external objects to evoke them; and yet so vivid is the impression made upon him, because of some abnormal excitation in his brain-cells that are ordinarily excited by real objects, that he feels certain that the things heard, seen, etc., really exist in the world outside, though in truth they originate in his own brain.

Suspicion of insanity is always excited if hallucinations are present. Hallucinations, which occur also in fevers and intoxications, are not in themselves decisive as to the existence of insanity. The most that they prove is the existence of an abnormal cerebral condition. Hallucinations appear in their true light only when they stand in relation to other elementary disturbances, such as attacks of anxiety, and in the disturbed state of consciousness are no longer corrected and exercise influence on action.

Hallucinations of all the senses may occur at the same time, or there may be disturbances in only one or two fields. They may be agreeable, but more often they are disagreeable. Unpleasant hallucinations often give rise to dangerous conduct on the part of their victim.

Hallucinations of taste are frequently found with delusions of poisoning. When the sense of smell is affected patients frequently complain of foul odours, of gases being forced into their sleeping apartments, and such complaints are not uncommon with certain forms of persecutory delusions, which are largely based upon them.

Hallucinations of sight are particularly characteristic of toxic interference with cerebral action. They are common in all forms of alcoholism, in poisoning by various mineral and vegetable drugs, in exhaustion, starvation, and long-continued thirst. Hallucinations of sight occur in acute mania; horrible scenes are witnessed in the hallucinations of melancholia; repugnant objects in motion in acute alcoholism; fear-inspiring visions occur in mania delirium, and frightful hallucinations in puerperal mania. Insane epileptics, too, are sometimes subject to terrifying hallucinations, and ecstatic visions are sometimes seen by hysterical women.

The most common hallucinations are those of hearing. The patient hears voices, and generally words expressing definite ideas, though he is often unable properly to refer them to any speaking person. Sometimes, instead of external sounds or voices, the patient has a consciousness of an internal voice that may be as real to him as any external auditory perception. Their utterances may be
agreeable, but it is more often the case that they are abusive, threatening, or commanding, and annoying or absolutely distressing to the patient. The belief in their reality is so general that they are a positive source of danger, for one day the subjects may be able to control themselves and disregard the "voice"; the next, they may feel bound to obey the voice and do what it commands, whether it be homicide or suicide.

Hearing voices is often the first sign of brain disturbance and can remain stationary for years; but for these voices such people may be in all respects sane, and conduct themselves as ordinary members of society, yet they are always to be looked upon with suspicion. Abusive and threatening voices are commonest in paranoia; they are constant and follow the patient wherever he goes.

Besides the deception of the special senses, there are also found in the insane hallucinations of general sensation and visceral feeling, as well as of the cutaneous surfaces.

**Illusions** are also deceptions of the senses, but they have an outside object as a starting-point. An illusion is a false perception. The object is not recognised in its real character, but is perceived as something else. The patient really hears, sees, tastes something, but thinks it is other than it is. He misinterprets it. His sense impressions are as correct as ever, but the judging power is at fault. Some persons may experience illusions, but by bringing closer investigation and judgment to bear on them they are able to correct the false impressions; the same man compares the visual object of delusion with the impression of other senses and the perceptions of other persons; this is exactly what the madman cannot do. He concludes that what is only an illusion is a reality. But the illusion is not the madness. The madness lies in the want of power or resolution to examine. He is insane because he meditates and indulges in the morbid sensation, which thus acquires fresh force.

The illusion, like the hallucination, may be of a pleasant or unpleasant character. Illusions of sight are the most common in the insane. Next to illusions of sight come probably those of hearing, and all the senses may be thus subject to misinterpretation in states of mental disorder. A very striking class of illusions is that of the internal or visceral sensations: a vague bodily sensation is attributed to some special cause—such as having a snake in the abdomen—altogether different from the reality.

When insanity affects the intellectual sphere, ideation suffers. There may be abnormally slow thought, or absurdly rapid thought, or such a flight of ideas that the association between them can no longer be traced by the bystander—the stream of thought has become incoherent.

The insane do not differ from the sane by the apparent loss of the faculty of reasoning; but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths and they err as men do who argue right from wrong principles. Of course, there are insane who both reason illogically and incoherently, and establish wrong premises from which their reasoning proceeds. A marked feature of impending mental disorder is seen in the tendency to allow the mind to wander away from the proper duties of life, and luxuriate among scenes of the imagination, or of ill-regulated fancy, becoming dreamy and abstracted.

Abnormally slow thought, giving rise to dearth of ideas and expression, occurs with a depressed emotional state, as in melancholia. Abnormally rapid thought, a rapid flow of ideas, occurs in mania, and becomes more and more jumbled in expression as the disorder progresses; this latter condition is accompanied by an exalted emotional state. The rapidity of thought may increase to such an extent that the patient loses the thread of conversation, he is no longer able to arrange logically the abundance of material that comes to him, but he expresses senseless ideas, disconnected sentences, words, and syllables. Since the flash-like ideas can
no longer be co-ordinated or placed in logical sequence, the result is incoherence. Incoherence of thought and speech is, however, not exclusively the result of increase of thought or a symptom only of maniacal states. It occurs also in various other abnormal conditions.

Whilst rapidity of ideation leads to verbosity, slowness of ideation induces taciturnity. The person speaks only after long pauses and much hesitation, in a subdued voice, and only in response to very strong stimulation, or to categorical and persistent questions.

In the early stage of mania the acceleration of ideas is, at all events at first, so slight that the patient may give the impression of being an entertaining conversationalist, full of spirit, wit, and humour. It is in acute mania and in acute alcoholism that the ideas are confused, and often there is a repetition of ideas. The intellect is restricted in epileptic insanity; there is mental enfeeblement in chronic alcoholism and progressive mental weakness in a formerly clever youth occurs in dementia praecox. In melancholia the intellect also remains clear, its processes are only retarded, because thinking becomes painful, so that the ideas do not flow, the response to questions is slow, and patients are incapable of long sustained mental effort. Abnormal slowness of ideation occurs also in states of mental weakness. The most marked derangement of ideas is of course in dementia.

A lack of ideas is characteristic of idiocy and imbecility from arrested brain development, and since the intellect acts as an inhibitory force and checks the animal passions, there is lack of self-restraint in the weak-minded. As regards his stock of ideas, the imbecile has been described as a pauper, the dement as a bankrupt. Their intellectual level is the same, but the one does not rise because he is unable to learn, the other fails because he has unlearned what he knew. The imbecile is and remains mentally a child, but the dement retains from his bankrupt stock remnants of developed intelligence.

Day-dreaming is done by the sane and overdone by the insane. It is fraught with serious mischief to the mind. There is pleasure attached to its illusions, which renders it seductive and dangerous. Great activity of the imagination regularly accompanies an increased susceptibility of thought to external causes and susceptibility to auto-suggestion. Mental abstraction occurs in hysterical insanity, and day-dreaming and immature philosophising in dementia praecox.

**MANUAL DEXTERITY AND CONSTRUCTIVE CAPACITY**

Man and some other animals have the ability and desire to build both a home and a place for their store of savings. With the advantage of manipulative organs and a progressive brain, man gradually developed a capacity to understand and to utilise the forces of nature. As a handicraftsman he fashioned tools and weapons, with the skilful use of which he got the mastery over all other animals. With a knowledge of the uses of fire, the art of cooking his food, and the power of fabricating materials for clothing his body, he accommodated himself to the vicissitudes of climate, and so greatly extended his habitable area on the globe. The element of conscious constructiveness appears to be manual dexterity, and it reaches its zenith in the inventions of art and industry.

Children frequently excel in fashioning a variety of figures of animals and things long before their understanding is matured. Idiots have been known to excel in mechanics; while some men of great talents have been unable to fabricate or construct. In short, the fact is undeniable that genius for works of art is not possessed in proportion to the strength of the understanding.

Constructive ability with large perceptive powers gives talent for drawing, modelling, planning, and inventing. With aesthetic sensibility as well, there is passion and ability for the fine arts. With the constructive tendency, but small powers of observation, the person may understand machinery but will be awkward
E V O L U T I O N  O F  T H E  I N T E L L E C T U A L  C A P A C I T I E S

in the use of tools. The study of machinery has no interest for the man who has little constructive ability, but if he has good powers of observation and imitation he will be able to learn to do what he is shown. If of good intellect, but without any mechanical talent, he may still be able to direct others.

IMITATION

Imitation is another natural capacity, by which a large portion of the experience of infancy is acquired. Children imitate their elders, and thus is preserved the continuity of manners and tastes from one generation to another. To this propensity the family and the nation owe most of their external uniformity in dress, manners, and culture. Paradoxical as it may appear, it is only the imitative mind which can attain originality; the artist must learn to copy before he can create. The tendency to reproduce with the hand whatever pleases and astonishes the mind undoubtedly began at an early period in the history of man.

The faculty of imitation is often defective, and is sometimes in excess. There are many occasions on which imitation cannot be achieved, either at all, or without much labour, and many unsuccessful attempts, as every teacher of handicraft and bodily exercise knows. The power of accurate imitation diminishes with advancing years and differs much in different people. While a strong tendency to instinctive imitation is a sign of a mind of low calibre, some forms of imitation, as, for instance, the subtle imitation in high-class parody, of the spirit as well as of the form of the original, demand faculties of a high order. Mere instinctive imitation is seen at its height in monkeys. The power of imitation is essential also to the mimic. Persons without intellect, children, and idiots are sometimes very clever in imitating the facial expression and manners of people with whom they come in contact, which shows that it must be a natural gift independent of the understanding.

When there is little gift for imitation and considerable self-esteem, a person will not try to imitate other people, but will have little inclination to adopt other people's ways and opinions, and will prefer to go his own way.

ÆSTHETIC SENSE

Another power of the intellect is that of synthetising and creating. From the moment of the creation of language, the intellect is able to pass from the useful material creation to a disinterested creation; from the day on which it perceives it can work in the abstract it gives itself up to the creation of ideas. The synthetic creation of ideas is a characteristic of mankind, and especially useful to the poet and artist, but the scientist also cannot do without it. Many people possess the power but cannot give expression to it. This power of inventing scenes or objects invested with the qualities most pleasing to ourselves is called the æsthetic sense, or faculty.

The æsthetic faculty is manifested in aptitudes which range from supreme talent in artistic expression to an absolute insensitivity to beauty. It is, of course, independent of the power of production. It may manifest itself in mere appreciation. For one creative artist there are thousands of admirers of art.

Man, unlike animals, can enjoy things apart from their utility, merely for their beauty. This is not the effect of intellect, for highly intellectual persons are often very poorly endowed with it. Two men with equally good eyes may perceive an object, but only the one with the æsthetic sense will seek for grace, elegance and beauty and enjoy them when observed. Poets and artists possess this æsthetic sensibility, and also many other persons who lack the other powers by which they might give expression thereto. Such persons long for something more perfect than the scenes of mere reality; a plain, unadorned description of things would not
satisfy them. They love the ideal and are enthusiastic in their appreciation of whatever manifestation of it may appeal to their natural aptitudes and dispositions.

A certain proportion of the spare energy, left over after vital requirements are satisfied, is expended on the contemplation of beauty and the making of beautiful things. The contemplation of beauty, and the measures taken to go where beautiful things are to be found, constitute one phase of aesthetic conduct; the making and acquisition of beautiful things constitute another.

Some hold that the aesthetic sentiment is akin to play. They see a play at human passions in poetry and the drama. But there is more truth in saying that imitation is akin to play, as we see it illustrated in the conduct of children. The play instinct is possessed by both animals and man, but is not an instinct in the proper sense of the word. It arises from the pleasure that exists in activity, provided the activity be spontaneous and consist in the normal exercise of the faculties. That it is not only imitative is shown by boys and girls not imitating the same thing. The feeble-minded are usually entirely without aesthetic sensibility, yet the tendency to imitation and play is rarely absent. All young animals are given to play. Indeed, some authors think the play instinct an independent disposition.

The feeling of the sublime is a form of the aesthetic sentiment, but is a complex mental power.

There is the poesy of painting, of music, and even of religion. Fantasy sees things beautiful or embellishes to make things beautiful, but the reality, the truth, is at its basis. If we could entirely abolish poesy, it is a question whether anything would be left to make life worth living.

Persons with strong aesthetic sensibility positively abhor the coarse, low, sensual; they are fond of refinement and style, and enjoy the ideal. If they have small reflective power, they will manifest more refinement than solidity, more rhetoric than logic, more delicacy than vigorous intellect. Persons with little aesthetic sensibility are contented with few elegances in life, look at poetry and fine arts with little enthusiasm, and prefer plainness to ornament.

**ALTRUISTIC SENTIMENT**

Persons with a lively imagination are generally very susceptible to impressions, some only to the impressions of objects, others to living things; hence are they easily affected by the happiness and distress observed in others, and if their mental organisation supplies them with no counteracting motives, they may act up to the feelings produced in them, and exhibit kindness, charity, and generosity, thus leading to the diffusion of happiness. They manifest the altruistic sentiment. One of its elements, sympathy, is that susceptibility which renders one individual ready to catch the contagion of the emotion of another individual, leading men to grieve at the sorrows and rejoice in the pleasures of their fellow-men.

Sympathy is the power of realising to ourselves the pains, pleasures, and emotions that do not concern ourselves at the moment, but are manifested in our presence by some other person. Some men have a remarkable aptitude and disposition to enter into the situation and states of mind of those about them, while others are engrossed exclusively with what concerns only themselves. Sympathy is confounded in all languages with tender feeling, but is nevertheless a distinct phenomenon. Love undoubtedly inclines us to sympathise with one another; but we may have sympathy for many persons whom we do not love, as may be seen in the lifelong endeavours of Howard to ameliorate the fate of the jail population.

**Benevolence** is a pure-hearted sympathy, without any thought of return or reward. Benevolence consists not only in giving. It is pure benevolence to suppress one's own humour and desires when these would be lacking in kindness or sympathy. The softness and consideration, which are the charm of politeness, are
the result of it. Deficiency in it, on the other hand, produces callousness to the misery and suffering of others. Even robbers can be benevolent; many a man steals in order to give away. On the other hand, there are people who are benevolent, but only at the expense of others.

None are so benevolent as the moderately poor, because they are not too far removed from utter destitution to recollect and realise the misery of want. The rich might have abolished poverty by now. The thousands of millions spent on war would have gone a long way towards it. But the rich man is unable to realise to the full extent what poverty means. The only thing he can and often does realise is the meaning of sickness and death; and that is why his benevolence is exercised for the benefit of hospitals. The greatest benefactor in this direction is often one who would not help a poor man with a sovereign.

Benevolence, when active, gives a warm and glowing feeling of kindness and good-will, a tendency to "rejoice with those that do rejoice, and weep with those that weep." Such a person's sympathies will be prompt and sincere. With absence of selfish disposition, he will be charitable and forgiving, have ready sympathies and an open purse. Active benevolence with large social feeling adds liberality to friendship, but with large acquiring instinct, he will be more kind than liberal and give his services rather than money. A benevolent person with considerable combativeness will be more severe in word than in deed, except when in passion; and with little religious sense will regard charitable work more highly than religious faith.

Philanthropy is sympathy with mankind as men and is both a positive and a negative virtue; it attempts to promote happiness as well as to alleviate misery.

**MORAL SENSE**

The peculiar feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction which accompanies the reflection on our own conduct or which the conduct of others generates in us, in combination with reason, constitutes the moral sense, and this faculty, including both a rational and an emotional element, not only passes judgment on our past actions, but contributes in no small degree to shape our future behaviour.

The moral sense took its origin from the desire of mankind to live together. The wish to live in families imposed upon man certain obligations and duties which varied according to the wants and habits of each community. Man had to act not solely for his own benefit, but had to take the welfare of his family or community into consideration. The great principle has always been: Do unto others as you would be done by; or the negative: Do not to others what you would not wish that they should do to you. Moral conduct is essentially social conduct, at all events the higher forms of it, which involve the voluntary control and regulation of the instinctive impulses.

The moral sentiment is complex, consisting of sympathy (a community of nature and disposition), the altruistic or benevolent tendency, the sense of justice, the desire of approbation and the fear of disapprobation (fear of public opinion, of law, of God), and contains also some intellectual elements.

Take the moral sense, and examine the actions which it sanctions and those which it forbids, and thus analyse, or, as it were, decompose, its nature, and it will be found that the actions which it sanctions are those which may be proved by sober reason to be conducive to the well-being and the progress of the race, and that its prohibitions fall upon the actions which, if freely indulged in, would lead to the degeneration if not extinction of mankind. Thus morality simply includes the rules and regulations by which we may all live together in the most happy manner
possible. Murder and theft and lying can never be to the interest of society; although in war, political economy, and diplomacy they are still thought to be so.

The selfish tendencies manifest themselves without training and spontaneously, and are therefore more active in the child, even though it have marked latent altruistic sentiments. It has yet to learn self-control before the moral sentiments can manifest themselves. All the moral dispositions require education: a love of justice does not tell us what is just.

The practice of morality usually extends only as far as persons think they can perceive some personal advantage or immunity from punishment to be gained by it; hence it is that those who can extensively foresee future consequences of their acts are more moral than those who are ignorant, not so much because they have better intentions as because they can perceive the future effects more clearly than those whose minds are more occupied by immediate pleasure and personal desires.

Ordinary persons are practically compelled to "swim with the stream," because the sanction of their fellow-men is the chief regulator of their conduct. To gain the approbation of one’s fellow-men is a factor in morality, for the man possessing love of approbation takes prudent care in avoiding the resentment of his fellows. To secure the general praise, avoid the general blame, and escape the general ridicule, a man imitates the general example, and the pressure of this external force upon his actions will be felt by him as a sense of duty. The exercise of self-restraint to prevent injuring others in person, or property, or feeling, constitutes morality; and the doing of such injurious acts is immorality, and may or may not be crime, according as it is or is not punishable by law. Immorality and crime, then, are disorders of conduct in the sense that they are departures from what the universal consent of mankind admits that conduct ought to be.

The mistake is often made of attributing moral transgression entirely to impairment of Will, as if man were instinctively moral in tendency and, when he does not follow his moral impulses, simply lacks the will to follow them. This is a serious mistake. There is in all of us a constant conflict between the moral, i.e., the altruistic, sentiments and the self-preserving tendencies. Some are by nature endowed more with the one than the other. The man with the selfish instincts in predominance will exercise his will in that direction; thus moral obliquity may be the result of powerful volition. Children are relatively strong-willed, yet defective in moral sense and conscience. The will to commit breaches of social ethics may be as strong in one individual as the will not to commit them is in another. Right acting, indeed, may require no effort of self-control whatever.

When we say that persons with a relatively weak will are more liable to transgressions, we really want to indicate that there is such a lack of balance in the arrangement and degree of the various mental powers that the individual is the play of circumstances and can be easily influenced in one or other direction.

The man in whom the altruistic sentiments are stronger than the egoistic propensities will be good by nature; the man likely to sin is the man in whom the altruistic and selfish tendencies are equally balanced and who is therefore more at the mercy of external circumstances. Then there are men who simply follow their animal inclinations, lacking in their organisations any checking power of social or altruistic feeling. These are the morally weak-minded. Nearly all moral disease arises from unregulated desire; every desire exposes a man to the temptation of gratifying it, and animal desires are usually the most imperative.

Goodness has to be its own reward and badness its own punishment. The good man is not necessarily happy, nor the bad man miserable. But the good man has inner compensations in the known quality of the life he lives; he finds salvation in the freedom from worry, pessimism, fear, and unfaith. The only temptation is from within. When there is no evil within, the evil may come from without, but will
provoke no response from us and will be to us non-existent. The spiritually-minded is not preserved from shipwreck while the ungodly is drowned, but through his calmness of mind he may see his chances of escape.

The sentiments of common interests in the primitive family and tribe, and the habitual reprobation of certain acts by individuals as injurious to the family or tribe, in course of time generated a sentiment of right and wrong in regard to such acts; but the approbation or disapprobation, which may turn our choice, may not be of our fellows, but of ourselves. In fact, man, in the solitude of his own thoughts, is still a social animal, and creates a companion out of himself—a critic to whose praise and blame he is keenly sensitive. When a man does, or refrains from doing, an action which he thinks is right or wrong, he is guided in his conduct by the application of certain rules or principles implanted in his mind, either naturally or by the influence of external circumstances. When this moral judgment becomes so active in its operation as to be instinctive it is called conscience.

Whenever a man does anything which he knows would meet with the disapprobation of his friends he experiences a feeling of uneasiness, a feeling of guilt; and when he does something which would be applauded by his fellows he has a sense of happiness. This is the basis of the moral sentiment with which the voice of conscience is indissolubly associated. A non-gregarious animal can do what it likes; it has only itself to consider.

We follow the traditions of the herd, but these traditions vary, hence the variety of conscience. The fashions of the herd at the time cause opinions to be held which may be false, but if we depart from the customs and fashions of the herd we are likely to feel uncomfortable and to be regarded as eccentric and to be ostracised. The new generally encounters the opposition of the herd.

All men's desires, lusts, and passions, if uncontrolled, lead to evil, and against these conscience bars the way. Conscience is a simple desire to do the right thing without hope of reward, sometimes not even caring for the esteem of others or self-esteem, but acting merely from a natural tendency for righteousness. It is the instinctive application to the actions of social life of certain moral ideas found in the mind, and it therefore depends on experience and education for its peculiar phase of activity.

Conscience alone is a deceitful guide. Like justice, it is blind. What passes for conscience and moral sense in some individuals is merely "dog conscience," i.e., fear of consequences. Many men act rightly only from fear of punishment; and no distinction in this respect need be made between the man who fears the punishment of his fellow-men and he who fears the punishment which he thinks will be meted out to him in another sphere. The fear of sharp punishment may deter a man from evil-doing; but it does not make him moral.

Scratch ever so lightly the back of civilised man—remove his inhibitions, as by a blow on the head which obliterates all his higher attributes—and we find the animal nature, i.e., the primary instincts. Most of us are a mixture of good and bad qualities. No man ever merited heaven, no man ever deserved hell. Many men appear virtuous because they lead a life so monotonous that they are outside of temptation and their passions are bound to remain dormant. Many men are wicked because their mental powers stopped short at the development of the moral sentiments. There exist moral imbeciles with the animal instincts and the intellect unimpaired. Such persons are deficient of moral guilt. Only those men and women whose active animal propensities are governed by sound moral sense will, when having committed wrong for once, feel the torture of conscience in the loneliness and darkness of the night, and be afflicted with those terrible dreams which are alleged to shake nightly the guilty soul. Not so the moral imbecile. His conscience is not strong enough to torture him.

I repeat, let the admirers of the excellence of the human species reflect why, in all
ANALYSIS OF MAN'S PSYCHICAL NATURE

ages and in all countries, robberies and murders have been committed; and why
neither education, legislation, nor religion, the prison, hard labour, nor the wheel, has
yet been able to extirpate these crimes. In Queen Elizabeth's time, out of every
thousand persons born, five were actually hanged, as a matter of recorded statistics,
yet it did not eliminate crime. Do criminals rob and murder for the sole pleasure of
exposing themselves to punishment, and without any temptation? Suppose we
allow it to be education, and not nature, that produces vicious tendencies, the
difficulty still remains the same, because education does not depend upon him who
receives it; and education never would develop either good or evil inclinations
were not their germs previously existent in human nature.

A conscientious tendency in a combative character gives great moral courage.
If combined with self-esteem, the person is inclined to be censorious; and if in
addition there is lack of benevolent feeling, the individual is likely to set up himself
and his doctrines as the only correct standard of truth. Conscientiousness and
cautiousness combined render a man uncertain what his duty is; he will be fearful
of doing wrong, and prefer not to act at all than fail to do right.

Then there are persons with few and feeble compunctions of conscience. They
will consult expediency rather than duty. If they have love of approbation, they
will do right when to do wrong would injure their reputation. If their intellect is
good, their conduct will be governed by the dictates of reason.

As a rule, the higher mental powers, those which are added latest in the scale
of evolution, are the first to deteriorate in anything that affects the brain, whether
by poisons, injury, or disease; hence a change in the moral nature of man is often
the first symptom of unsoundness of mind. The patients become abnormally
egotistic, or else there is apathy and indifference, or complete ethical insensibility.

Only in melancholia ethical sensibility becomes exaggerated, conscientiousness
hyperactive. Such patients accuse themselves of having neglected their duty, or
they worry about supposed sins committed in their early youth, of which they had
not thought until the commencement of their illness. When delusions are added
to this state of mind, such persons make all sorts of self-accusations.

The moral character also undergoes remarkable transformations in the involution
process of old age. There are men who, as they grow old, lose all feelings of affection,
take a dislike to their own children, and exercise a headstrong tyranny over those
who are dependent upon them; or they become erotic, vain, ambitious; or utterly
selfish. Others become more indulgent, amiable, generous, and more serene than
they used to be, owing to the disappearance of disturbing passions and preoccupations.
There are some who lose in virtue and there are others who only lose some
faults.

RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS

Closely allied to the aesthetic and ethical feelings are the feelings of wonder and
awe, aroused by the sublime and vast in nature, the feeling of veneration and
reverence awakened by the recognition of an exalted influence and authority, faith
and belief aroused by appearances for which the intellect can find no natural causes,
and the spiritual feeling arising from appearances which suggest a heavenly power.

Faith is a fundamental principle of the mind and is first instilled by parenta
authority. Without faith no obedience. Men are not moved by knowledge, but
by feeling. It is not knowledge which brings happiness; it is faith. Hence we cling
to the latter, though our reason tells us that we have no evidence for our belief.
Faith will make martyrs of those who would be terrorised out of convictions that
were voluntarily chosen.

Faith is to a great extent involuntary, operating silently and intuitively to
supply the imperfections of knowledge. Habitually, but unconsciously, we depend
EVOLUTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL CAPACITIES

on faith in every perception and every act, in every inquiry after truth, and every expectation of a practical result. It is the admission of certain inferences beyond knowledge; whereas knowledge is inference from experience. Faith by verification is often transformed into knowledge. Every increase of knowledge supplies a wider and firmer basis of belief. If faith be possessed in very large degree, and not checked by reason, it is apt to produce credulity. True faith must be in alliance with the intellect—that is, it must be a belief in things probable. A morbid eagerness for a cheap and easy solution of the mysteries of existence is not sound faith, but a hindrance to philosophy and true religion.

The abuse of faith leads to prejudice, the prejudgment of a problem, arriving at a conclusion without having it submitted to the intellect for examination. Many subjects are decided in this lamentable manner. True, we do not always act upon our prejudgment, but few people can say that they are entirely unaffected by it. We see this principle of faith most strikingly illustrated in that most extraordinary process called hypnotism. It is not merely due to a suspension of reasoning power, but the process seems to establish a proclivity to believe what is stated by another. The creation of prejudice in the minds of the people by unscrupulous persons has blasted the character of many a man—a whisper believed in is often sufficient for this. It will damn the measures of some particular statesman, however wise and necessary they may be. It will confirm without examination, or condemn unheard, any stated policy. In fact, political partisanship rests upon it.

The man who has formed an erroneous opinion has himself formed it and knows the grounds on which it rests. If he can be made to see that his reasons are ill-founded, his opinion goes at once. The man with a prejudice, however, has no proper foundation for it. He does not himself quite know why he thinks so, and therefore he sweeps arguments aside, and is of the same opinion still.

Midway between deference of love and the deference of fear is the deference of awe. It springs from the consciousness of that which is greater than ourselves, even though there be no tincture of fear. We stand in awe of persons who are totally beyond us in their superiority, who exist in a sphere of power and glory, which transcends even our understanding, and thus awe has a religious as well as an aesthetic side.

Wonder is generally our first impression, when we come across anything that we do not understand. It aids faith in believing things without examination. Those in whom the feeling of wonder is small cannot believe things without satisfactory evidence, especially if their intellect is developed. The less man's reasoning faculties are active, the greater is the attraction which the marvellous and the miraculous have for him; and the reader is the credence he gives to them. Man has by nature a disposition to credulity. He loves the marvellous and mysterious.

Reverence or veneration appears to be a combination of love and awe; or love, admiration, and fear. Veneration, in its connection with earthly objects, gratifies itself by deference for superior worth or talent, for ancestry, for titles of honour, and even for inanimate objects which have become associated with these or other great qualities. It is a tendency to look up to and admire superiors in rank and power. Without veneration for authority the world would be uninhabitable to the lovers of order and justice. Veneration is eminently a conservative force. It constitutes the chief ingredient in the adoration of religious worship. There is no worship without veneration.

Religious belief consists of an intellectual element and an emotional feeling. It bears at the lowest stage the character of fear. That fear first created gods is borne out by the fact that evil beings were worshipped before good ones. Belief in gods and belief in immortality are at the lowest stage one, for the gods believed in are the spirits of the dead, and those spirits only the object of worship which are thought capable of doing harm. Religious veneration is here simply a recognition
of power. A higher stage is reached when the extraordinary, inconceivable and
wonderful awakens religious feeling; this acquires then the character of admiration
and of reverence, and begins to be of a disinterested nature. Man's reasoned beliefs
are not the whole of his spiritual nature, hence he is still a prey to religious emotions.

Religion is as old as the human soul, and is the expression of its fundamental
needs. Dissatisfied with the world as it is, man seeks to flee from it and attempts
to discover another, to construct "a new heaven and a new earth."

Whether primitive man was born with a religious sense, or whether he acquired
it at the stage when he became capable of abstract ideas, is an open problem. Certain
it is that this sense has become innate in the course of thousands of generations,
though like other senses it is weaker in some and stronger in others, and some seem
to be born without it.

The tendency to worship is found in different degrees of strength and forms of
manifestation in different individual organisations. Just as not all who can handle
a pencil are artists, not all who can appreciate the practical results of logic are
philosophers, or who can make rhymes are poets, so the spiritual capacity is naturally
of varied grades. The religious sentiment may predominate just as an inordinate
tendency towards music, poetry, mathematics, or any other engrossing pursuit may
predominate, and make the character one-sided.

Religion is a revelation of man—an historic and progressive revelation of man's
hopes and fears, man's knowledge and character. It is an additional powerful
motive to correct living. The religious spirit within fortifies the soul, clears the
mind, invigorates the nature, and strengthens the heart. Religion keeps people
moral, but it is not the religious creed which is the basis of morality.

It by no means follows that because a man has strong affinities naturally for
worship that he should therefore necessarily have a vigorous moral faculty, or a
fuller and clearer sense of right and duty than other men have. He in whom the
tendency to worship is strongest has not necessarily the noblest type of mind. It
is an absurd supposition to think that because a man has not a natural capacity for
intense religious impulse, but only possesses a cool reasoning mind, artistic skill, or
fine moral intuitions, he is therefore inferior to the person who is susceptible of
rhapsodical fervours, or to the person who is chiefly instrumental in unlocking the
wonders of science, and setting forth the multiplying harmonies of the universe,
and whose lips only utter the varied wisdom pertaining to visible things and every-
day life.

Morality has suffered many times not a little from its connection with religious
creed. Morality survives when creeds die, having its more secure foundation in the
hard-won experience of mankind. Theological doctrines vary amongst man-
kind, but the religious sense is in all alike and leads everywhere to moral rules of
conduct. Some religion is necessary for moral conduct, but not theological dogma.
It is not the fault of religion that many people are nowadays more influenced by the
fear of their neighbour's censure than the fear of God, but the lack of faith in theo-
logical teaching.

Religion and theology, as I have pointed out in a previous chapter, are not
synonymous. Religion is the affair of the affections, theology of the intellect.
Religion was active long before theology was, and will not cease with the decline of
theology. A person may hold definite theological doctrines and yet have no
spiritual feeling; on the other hand, a scientifically enlightened person may yet be
deeply religious; for science is not antagonistic to religion, only to theological
dogmas. Science tells us only how things happen, not why things happen.

Often we judge men not by their religion, but by their religious observance. Men
have been denounced as infidels and atheists, because they did not subscribe to all
the dogmas of a particular creed; but a man may be highly religious without
belonging to any particular Church. Religion is based on feeling, not on reason. Priests have laid down dogmas according to their reason, but the state of knowledge was not then what it is to-day. Feelings are pretty well alike in all of us, but reason requires a stock of information; hence we vary in our interpretation of religious doctrines, unless we accept them simply on the faith of authority.

Science can offer no substitute for the religious emotion; for religion is made up of belief alone, not of knowledge. However much the modern intellect trained in strictly scientific pursuits may try to curb the spiritual inclinations, there can be no doubt that the religious sentiment has become an element of our nature. Even the atheist experiences its emotions when circumstances arise which appeal to his feelings rather than to his intellect—that is, when he allows his nature full play. The atheist, as a rule, argues against theological dogmas but not against religion. The two are not synonymous; just as a man's vision does not depend on his theory of light. Dogmas signify the profession of certain fixed beliefs, but the measure of one's belief in the doctrines of one's creed or Church is not the measure of one's religion. The individual is subordinate to the Church in his religious beliefs. The Church stands between him and his God.

The influence of religion, which formerly detached so many minds from their immediate cares, is gradually diminishing. The unseen has receded; the eternal has diminished; the infinite has dwindled; the reality of the divine has become less credible; there is an all-round depreciation of religious values. Our generation is not opposed to religion, it is only too busy looking after its material welfare to concern itself much with it. The average man is apt to conceive of religion and spiritual culture as things which it may be quite landable to cultivate, if one can spare the time and has the inclination, but which have no vital connection with the real business of life. He neglects his inner life in the pursuit of material things and the over-valuation of all the external improvements which technical science has made possible. Religion for a good many people seems no longer to exist save as an honoured name, which once had a good deal behind, but which to them is a mere remembrance which their piety and imagination strives to embellish still with the colours of reality. For a considerable number of other persons, religion is simply imitation; it is not inwardly experienced in their feelings or in their beliefs. Such people simply reflect the sphere in which they live. The decay of faith is not due to some deadening of the religious emotion, but to a decay of the beliefs which allow the emotion to assert itself. When people were still ignorant religion gave them a theory of life. To-day the theological dogmas are considered antiquated, people have grown indifferent to them, and, unfortunately, many are indifferent to any religious impulse whatsoever. There are still many people who profess some religion, but few men and few nations act up to what they profess. In spite of a very great number of religious systems, there is comparatively little religion upon the earth. There are several reasons for this, among the chief being that thousands of the clergy are teaching dogmas which they themselves do not believe, in a manner that does not carry conviction to others. What is really needed is a teaching that will satisfy the modern trained intellect at the same time that it inspires the spiritual graces; such a teaching must be authoritative if it is to be effective, and it can only be delivered by those who are cognizant of the difficulties with which they have to deal, and are genuinely possessed of the beliefs that they propagate.

By miracles of invention we have secured control over steam and electricity, but we are not yet masters of our souls. The ethical function of religion is to strengthen the power of self-control, to afford a sufficient motive to self-denial and self-restraint, and to inspire self-sacrifice for the sake of others. Most people pray to God to give them what they do not deserve; but prayers for such subjective qualities as for patience under affliction, for charity, for courage, may indeed be said to assure themselves of being granted, for by placing the mind in an attitude of
patience, or charity, as the case may be, they fit it for the habitual exercise of these functions. It is in this expectation of elevating our character that we should be altruistic, not in the expectation that the accumulation of good marks will open the doors of heaven to us. A critical analysis of our conduct as in meditation elevates the intellectual and moral faculties above the animal propensities and thus further strengthens the mind in the right direction. Even a prayer for health in a truly devout person may have a beneficial effect through the increase of nervous energy applied to the ailing part, in the same manner as suggestion acts therapeutically on many functional disorders and occasionally improves the condition of diseased organic parts. Where faith and spirituality predominate over the animal tendencies—the spirit over the flesh—there is less possibility of succumbing to the temptations of sin, and certainly little chance of sinning becoming habitual. Many men would never acquire those morbid habits, for which they seek the aid of the physician and hope to be relieved by “hypnotism” or “suggestion,” had they more spiritual faith. They are unable to control these habits, the indulgence of which was once a pleasure and is now a curse to them, for lack of just that balancing power which the higher sentiments would give them, and we physicians have to instil into them and render permanent just those uplifting ideas which guide the conduct of all good and honourable men. “Suggestion” treatment produces wonderful results, but were the moral and spiritual faculties more active, there would be less need for it.

When the religious sentiments are developed in excess the person is inclined to mysticism; and when perverted or not guided by the intellect there may be superstition, bigotry, fanaticism, delusions, and a ready belief in supernatural phenomena and mysterious occurrences. The intellect being less highly developed, it is guided by the stronger impulse, and may even be employed to search for arguments to support the credulity.

Defect of religious conduct is common enough without carrying with it any implication of insanity; but excess and disorder are occasionally seen, and are more decidedly abnormal. In insanity we often find a devout person beginning to exhibit indifference to things sacred, becoming irreverent, profane, flippant. Others are possessed by religious doubts; while still others develop excessive religious devotion, as in epileptic insanity, or absurd ideas of a religious and occult nature, as in dementia praecox, or delusions of a religious character, as in paranoia. Delusions of a religious nature also occur in hysteria and melancholia.
SECTION II

THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE BRAIN: THE ORGAN OF THE PSYCHIC ACTIVITIES

It is generally acknowledged that the brain is the structure through whose medium all mental operations take place. We know that organic life, nutrition, circulation, excretion, secretion, motion, in fact all vital functions, can be carried on without the cortex—the outer rind of the hemispheres—of the brain; but that the manifestation of the intellectual and moral powers, the affections and propensities of self-preservation, cannot take place without it. Provided that the cortex of the brain be not affected, all the other portions of the system may be diseased, or separately destroyed—even the spinal cord may become affected—without the mental functions being impaired. Of course, if the heart, the medulla oblongata, or some other vital part be injured, death will precede any such experiment. If, on the other hand, the superficial grey matter of the brain becomes depressed, irratated, injured, or destroyed, the mental functions are partially or totally deranged or become wholly extinct. When the compression of the brain is removed, as in the case of an indented skull, or a tumour, or the extravasated blood or accumulated pus is evacuated, or the cerebral inflammation allayed, consciousness and the power of thought and feeling return.

We not only think but feel, rejoice and weep, love and hate, hope and fear, plan and destroy, trust and suspect, all through the agency of the brain cortex. Its cells record all the events, of whatever nature, which transpire within the sphere of existence of the individual, not merely the intellectual knowledge acquired, but likewise the emotions passed through and the passions indulged in. It is therefore wrong to employ the word "mental" as meaning "intellect" only; it should refer to all the powers and attributes of the mind—intellect, feelings, and primitive desires—character as well as intelligence.

We can only manifest our intellectual aptitudes, moral dispositions, and tendencies to self-preservation through the mechanism of the brain with which we happen to be endowed, and according to the sort of experience we have accumulated. Hence, though the primitive mental powers and fundamental anatomical parts of the brain of all men are the same, we all vary according to the mental predispositions and brain types we have inherited and the early education we received.

Of all the organs in the human body, the brain ranks highest in importance; yet, as we have seen, until about a century ago it received hardly any attention, and even at the present day the knowledge of its mental functions is still very obscure. It seems that the influence of antiquated metaphysics based on the results of self-introspection has not yet worn off entirely. For mind is still regarded by some as it consisted of intellect alone, whereas we all feel and strive, as well as think, with our
brains. If it were not so, of what use would be the animal brain, as, for instance, that of the mouse, which has in proportion to the size of its body more brain than man (according to Wagner), and should therefore be more intellectual than any human being?

Another remnant of metaphysical days is the view held by certain physiologists that all knowledge is derived from sensation. Whereas it is not the perfection of the senses which gives intelligence to the brain, but it is the perfection of the brain which determines the employment of the senses. The senses are perfected in childhood long before the structure of the brain is completed. The gradually increasing intelligence displayed throughout infancy and youth is due to a large extent to the completion of the cerebral organisation; and talents are sometimes displayed in later years of which there was no suspicion during the process of education. Where the whole or parts of the brain remain arrested in their growth, education and experience are of no avail.

The cortex of the brain is the exclusive organ of the primordial psychic activities. I say "psychic activity" and not "mind," for I think it is a mistake to regard mind as an entity. It is too often described as if it laid a clutch, as it were, upon the brain, when it thinks, desires, or wills; or to use it as a complex tool or mechanism in thought and feeling, somewhat as senses and fingers avail themselves of a calculating machine or of a musical instrument. An entity remains always the same; but if we regard mind as a "force" (see Chapter XXXIX.), we can understand that it varies in strength, that it can give energy to a weak part—by the concentration of suggestion or auto-suggestion—and we can understand that it is present in the whole and in every part of the body, owing to the close relation between brain and nervous system, and the latter being ramified throughout the body. We can understand how somatic conditions can influence psychic activity by influencing mind-force, but cannot create or destroy any of the primordial psychic activities, as influences acting directly on the brain cortex can. We can then understand that insanity may be due to toxic conditions in the bodily organs producing a degradation of function, without as yet producing a degradation of structure; and why functional disturbances may be corrected while structural changes are hopeless.

The primary seat of mental disturbance is not always in the brain itself. The brain, by means of its nerves, is in direct or indirect connection with all the bodily organs. We know that bodily conditions will affect the nutrition of the brain and modify its functions. At one time all looks bright, cheerful, and encouraging; at another time, not far distant, the same identical prospect looks cheerless, gloomy, and tinted with despair. This change depends upon physical conditions. When there exists a condition of good nutrition of the brain centres we experience a pleasant, agreeable sense of well-being. When the nutrition is imperfect the consequences are a mixture of irritability and bad temper, blended with depression. Hence it is possible that a brain intrinsically sound may show some morbid mental manifestations for the sole reason that the stimulations reaching it from other parts of the body are not normal. If the brain is really normal, such disturbances only arise with difficulty, or at any rate they pass away on cessation of the cause. Where the disturbances persist, there is always some weakness in the central organs.

One of the most necessary conditions for the proper manifestation of mental functions is that the brain should have a regular supply of arterial blood. The stoppage of one of the great arteries leading to this organ, either by compression in the neck, or by embolism at some point along its course, at once produces profound disturbances and even complete cessation of consciousness. It has been calculated that, while the weight of the entire encephalon is only about one forty-fifth of that of the body, the supply of blood used up there is not less than about one eighth of the whole supply. This expenditure is indicative of the large amount of work done
by the intra-cranial organ. It has also been shown that the temperature rises and falls in the whole cerebral area, or at particular circumscribed regions of the cortex, in close connection with the psychical activities.

To the man with depressed circulation the world seems sad, thinking requires an effort, movement is painful. To the man with an accelerated circulation the world and his own fate appear in rosy colours, and his capacities and possibilities seem to him infinite. His memory is active, he is continually planning and creating, and constantly on the move. In anaemia of the brain, as every attendant on the insane can observe, it is not only the thoughts that are slow, but there is less response to the affections, and the propensities are inactive. In engorgement of the brain we get hyper-activity, not only of all the intellectual powers, but also the sentiments and emotions, and the passions may be so active that restraint may become necessary. The individual manifestation will of course vary according to the natural character of the patient, but in all cases the natural characteristics will be more accentuated. This is another proof that the emotions and propensities, as well as the intellect, are dependent for their manifestation on the brain.

We know as yet so little of the mental functions of the brain that it is still a problem whether optimism and pessimism are due to peculiarities of the brain or due to bodily conditions. No doubt there are men who by nature are cheerful, hopeful, and enjoy being alive, however squalid their circumstances and mean their occupations; and there are others who, whatever may be their good fortune, are gloomy, depressed, seeing clouds in the brightest sunshine of life. These dispositions are said to be due to superabundance or deficiency of vital energy—but that this is not so, or, at least, not entirely so, is shown by those people who in sickness are still optimists, and, even when told of their approaching death, either refuse to believe it or hope for some miraculous help, or accept their fate stoically.

Optimism stimulates the activity of the vital organs; the pessimistic disposition slows the vital processes, slows the response to impressions from the external world, and disinclines the individual to make new adaptations to its environment. The bodily organs become sluggish and inert, except when temporarily animated by some physical agent or the stimulus of lively social intercourse.

Mental disturbances may also arise from excess or deficiency of the secretions of certain glands—for example, of the thyroid. Atrophy of the thyroid gland changes a normal child into a stunted and frightful cretinous idiot; on the other hand, hypertrophy and hyper-secretion of the same gland produces an over-emotional, restless, and unstable nature.

The influence of the constitution on the mental activity varies largely according as (1) the vital bodily organs, or (2) the bones and muscles, or (3) the brain and nervous system predominate. The first we can call the nutritive or vital; the second, the mechanical or motive; the third, the mental or nervous constitution. The man with the first says I live and I enjoy; the second says I work and I execute; and the third I think and I plan. The first manifests geniality, love of ease and domesticity; the second, industry, energy, self-reliance, force of character and endurance; the third originates, reflects, and refines, is sensitive and emotional, and attracted by intellectual pursuits. Few people are of such pronounced types; most men and women are more or less balanced. Still, there are a good many for whom this division holds good.

The brain is incontestably the dominant organ of the body, affecting all its tissues, controlling all its functions, and regulating all its energies. When any other organ is affected by disease it is, after all, merely a part of the man that suffers; when the cortex of the brain goes wrong in its mechanism it is the man himself that is affected. No instance has been found where an individual has manifested mental power without a brain. A diseased brain produces diseased manifestation. It appears that in some of the lower animals the psychical life is not inseparably
bound to the cerebral hemispheres; still, in the case of the higher mammals, and especially in the case of man, the connection undoubtedly exists.

Other things being equal, the greatest amount of mental capacity and vigour (functional power) is allied with the largest quantum of cerebral substance. All observation as regards men and animals proves that the energy of any nervous centre always bears a direct proportion to its bulk, whether absolute or relative. Every organ of our body increases in size in proportion as it is exercised within the limits of its physiological capacity, and this holds good as to the brain as well. With increased mental work—emotional as well as intellectual—the brain will show an increased growth. That is why in the insane the cranial capacity is greater than in the sane. (Measurements made by Amadei, Meynert, Obernier, Sommer, and Feli.)

The entire brain may be too small. Heads measuring eleven to thirteen inches in circumference and with a longitudinal diameter—from glabella (root of the nose) to occipital spine—of eight to nine inches, belong to the lowest class of idiots, where the intellectual manifestations are nil.

Heads with a circumference from fourteen to seventeen inches and a longitudinal measurement from eleven to twelve inches show glimpses of feeling and random intellectual perceptions, but without any power of attention or fixity of ideas. Heads of so small a size are accompanied by a greater or less degree of stupidity or fatuity, vague sentiments, indeterminate and transitory affections and passions, an irregular train of ideas, speech consisting of broken phrases, and blind and irregular instincts.

Heads of eighteen to nineteen inches in circumference are small, yet if well-balanced are not incompatible with the regular exercise of the intellect, which, however, is deficient in intensity. They indicate a pitiful mediocrity, a slavish spirit of imitation, credulity, superstition, that species of sensibility which by a trifle is raised to the height of joy, or plunged in an abyss of tears, a very fallible judgment, an extreme difficulty in discerning the relation of cause and effect, a want of self-control, and frequently, which is a happy circumstance, but few desires. With this degree of development, however, there may exist some marked mental aptitudes—such as a remarkable memory for figures, dates, music, etc., because some cerebral parts may be more fully developed.

As a rule, when the brain is too small, it is not dwarfed equally in all its parts, but is specially so in the pre-frontal regions—in those parts which manifest the peculiar human faculties and sentiments—while the hinder and lower parts of the brain—those which are the seats of the appetites and propensities—are far less affected; hence also the peculiarly animal look.

The average circumference of the head should be twenty-two inches. The measurement from the root of the nose to the occipital protuberance should be on the average fourteen inches. The brains of men who have distinguished themselves by their great talents are often larger, and those of feeble intellectual power smaller.

JOHN VENN and FRANCIS GALTON read a paper to the Anthropological Society, April 24th, 1888, on Head Growth in Students at the University of Cambridge, containing the following conclusions:

1. Although it is pretty well ascertained that in the masses of the population the brain ceases to grow after the age of nineteen, or even earlier, it is by no means so with University students.

2. That men who obtain high honours have considerably larger brains than others at the age of nineteen.

3. That they have larger brains than others, but not to the same extent, at the age of twenty-five; in fact, their predominance is by that time diminished to one-half of what it was.

4. Consequently "high honour" men are presumably, as a class, both more
precocious and more gifted throughout than others. We must therefore look upon eminent University success as a fortunate combination of these two helpful conditions.

The following figures of **HERMANN WELCKER** (1822-1897), of Halle, exhibit the cranial capacity in man at different ages, and consequently the progressive volume of his brain:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male, Cubic centimetres</th>
<th>Female, Cubic centimetres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New-born infant</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At two months</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At one year</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At three years</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At ten years</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From twenty to sixty years</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WEIBACH** obtained the following weights of the brains of males between the ages of ten to ninety years, showing the *increase in the weight of the brain* up to middle age, and the decline of its mass in senility:

- 10-19 years of age, 1270 grammes
- 20-29          "      1355  "
- 30-59          "      1375  "
- 60-90          "      1349  "

The *average cubic capacity of the skull*, according to **MANOUVRIER**, is 1560 cubic centimetres in ordinary men and 1665 c.c. in eminent men; and, according to **BORDIER**, 1540 c.c. in murderers.

The following are the *skull capacities of some well-known men*:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Skobeleff, general</td>
<td>1457 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Gambetta, statesman</td>
<td>1294 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Donizetti, musician</td>
<td>1391 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Thackeray, author</td>
<td>1644 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Descartes, philosopher</td>
<td>1700 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Broca, anthropologist</td>
<td>1485 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Dante, poet</td>
<td>1493 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Spurzheim, phrenologist</td>
<td>1559 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Dupuytren, surgeon</td>
<td>1436 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Bertillon, anthropologist</td>
<td>1398 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Cuvier, naturalist</td>
<td>1830 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Abercrombie, physician</td>
<td>1785 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Agassiz, naturalist</td>
<td>1512 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Liebig, chemist</td>
<td>1352 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Gall, anatomist</td>
<td>1692 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Petrarch, poet</td>
<td>1602 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>La Fontaine, author</td>
<td>1650 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Grote, historian</td>
<td>1410 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Gauss, mathematician</td>
<td>1492 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Tiedemann, anatomist</td>
<td>1254 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Scarpa, surgeon</td>
<td>1455 c.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Volta, physicist</td>
<td>1745 c.c.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The orang and chimpanzee have cranial capacities of 26 and 27½ cubic inches respectively; while for normal man, the lowest cranial capacity is 55 cubic inches. As to the weight, the gorilla’s brain weighs 20 ounces, and those of the other anthropoids range from 12 to 16 ounces. But the *average weight of the civilised male*
THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN

Brain is 49 ounces, of the female 44 ounces, while a weight of from 32 to 37 ounces is the minimum compatible with ordinary human intelligence, though idiot brains may sink as low as 10 ounces. The factor must not be overlooked that man's body-weight is about half the weight of the gorilla's body; which makes the difference in brain-weights more striking.

The following are the brain-weights of some well-known men:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Skobeleff</td>
<td>51.5 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Gambetta</td>
<td>39 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Schiller</td>
<td>63 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Thackeray</td>
<td>58.5 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Spurzheim</td>
<td>55 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Dante</td>
<td>51.3 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Dupuytren</td>
<td>50.7 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Napoleon</td>
<td>57 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Cuvier</td>
<td>64.5 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Abercrombie</td>
<td>62.9 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Chalmers</td>
<td>53 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Daniel Webster</td>
<td>53.5 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Gall</td>
<td>42.25 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Grote</td>
<td>49.75 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Gauss</td>
<td>52.6 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Tiedemann</td>
<td>44.2 oz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>45.5 oz.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of more recent brain-weights taken, the lowest recorded was that of Ignaz von Döllinger, the celebrated Catholic theologian, which weighed 1207 grammes, and the heaviest was that of Turgenieff, the Russian novelist, which was 2012 grammes.

How unreliable—without the fullest details—these brain-weights are, is shown by the careful weight taken of the brain of Helmholz, distinguished for his wonderful researches in optics. ("Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie," 1899). The weight of his brain, including the blood coagulum, was 1700 grammes. This being removed, the brain weighed 1540; but so much blood remained that it was estimated that 100-120 grammes should be deducted. This would reduce the brain-weight to 1420-1440 grammes. Helmhotz had therefore a brain not much above the average weight; but how do we know that in the cases of those very heavy brain-weights recorded allowance was made for the quantity of blood, as was made in the case of Helmoltz?

The brain of Cuvier remained for a long time the heaviest brain recorded of distinguished men. The weight was stated by Wagner as 1861 grammes, but this Broca corrected to 1829.96 grammes. Even thus reduced it exceeds the limits of the normal human brain by nearly one-third. The frontal lobes were abnormally large. He was an all-round genius. To Sptizka, an eminent American neurologist, the explanation of Cuvier's heavy brain was very simple: it represented not intellect, but healed-up hydrocephalus. Celebrities with large heads will not feel flattered by this explanation. Science is rarely complimentary, but this is well-nigh libellous.

Lord Byron died in Greece in 1824, and English papers reported his brain-weight as six medicinal pounds, a round figure which renders it suspect of being inaccurate. In any case it was probably a Neapolitan or Venetian weight, the former 1924 gr., the latter 1807 gr.; and it was stated that Byron's brain was in a hyperæmic condition, so that probably no allowance was made for the blood which the brain contained.

The use of different standards of weights and measures, and of diverse materials for determining the capacity of the skull in different countries, greatly complicates the researches of the craniologist.

Cromwell's brain is estimated at 78.8 oz., but must also be exaggerated, considering the size of the head in his portraits.

Sir Walter Scott's portraits show an astoundingly large head, especially in
height. The cranial arch from ear to ear measured from the mastoid process was 19 inches, whereas the average is only 14.6. The circumference of his head was 23.1 inches, the longitudinal diameter 9 inches, and the parietal 6.4 inches. Yet in
the report of the post-mortem examination of Scott, the physicians stated that “the brain was not large.” The peculiar shape of his skull was attributed to his lameness dating from his infancy—another healed-up hydrocephalus. But if, as his physician
supposed, “the sagittal suture closed prematurely,” his skull could never have
achieved the enormous height.

On the discovery of DANTE’S remains at Ravenna in 1865, the skull was pro-
nounced to be ample, and exquisite in form. But its actual cubical capacity and
estimated brain-weight falls considerably below those of the heaviest brain-weights of
distinguished men.

Size of brain is of course only a measure, and not the measure; for a small brain
but of superiority in texture, complexity of convolutions, and depth of sulci may
equal a large one; still, too much importance need not be attached to the frequent
statement that the brain was rich in convolutions, for we know of no average in this
respect. It is also a sad fact that many men, for lack of opportunity, are not in a
position to use all the brain material at their disposal.

I have all my life observed living heads of all sorts and collected portraits of
distinguished men of the past; and I can confidently assert that no man with a
small head is really great; none such ever originated or led revolutions in science,
letters, religion, or government; or in any way stamped an image of himself on his
country or age. Such an event would be as extraordinary and unnatural as the
existence of gigantic muscular strength in the person of a dwarf. All history
testifies to this. From Pericles, Aristotle, and Alexander, passing through the
Caesars, Ciceros, and Bacons, down to Napoleon, Fox, Bismarck, and Richard
Wagner, every great conqueror, statesman, writer, or pioneer in any department
has had a large head, with predominating frontal region.

Too much reliance is still placed on the now very old researches on the weights of
brains made by RUDOLPH WAGNER (1805-1864), of Göttingen. He furnished by
far the largest number known, and not many have been added since. He measured
and weighed so many brains of renowned men, that a weight below the normal, i.e.,
average, gave rise to the suspicion that the man was after all not so clever as was
thought during his lifetime. This alarmed some of his renowned contemporaries so
much, that they thereupon had a clause inserted in their wills, forbidding a post-
mortem examination of their brains.

Few brain-weights are taken nowadays, and the old results are almost worthless;
for the number of weights taken were far too small and greatly wanting in details.
Moreover, there is great variation in the size of the inch. For example, Gall means
French inches, which are about one-sixteenth longer than the English. What we
require is the weight of thousands of brains—of healthy, not of insane and diseased
brains—each brain being weighed as a whole, and each part—frontal, parietal,
temporal and occipital—according to an agreed anatomical division separately.
It is of little value to know the weight of the brain of an eminent man without knowing
the weights of the different parts. For, as is well known, the frontal lobes may be
highly developed and the occipital lobes may be deficient; in another brain of
exactly the same weight the parietal lobes may be massive and the temporal lobes
very small.

That the entire weight is misleading is shown in the case of the late Professor
L. BISCHOFF (1807-1882), of Munich, who was one of the anatomists of Europe to
defend the hypothesis of the mental inferiority of women against men, chiefly on
the ground of the fact that he claimed to have observed that the average weight of a
man’s brain is 1350 grammes, but of a woman’s only 1250. After his death the
post-mortem examination elicited the interesting fact that his own brain weighed only 1243 grammes.

The average weight of the brain of a European male, as has been already mentioned, is forty-nine ounces, and of the female forty-four ounces. This difference between the sexes is less marked in savage than in civilised races, and may be explained on the ground that in the lower races there is less difference in the education of the two sexes and the work done by them. We want new measurements of female brains. It would be interesting to observe, for example, what is the difference, if any, between the brain of a distinguished male and a distinguished female doctor of medicine. It must also be pointed out that the ordinary European averages of brain-weight are founded on the working classes, and generally not on the most successful members even of those classes. It is therefore not surprising that notable men should exceed the general average in brain-weight.

That the whole brain does not subserve only the intellectual functions is shown by the occurrence of emotional insanity and of certain systematised insanities and monomanias, in which the perception, memory and judgment remain unaffected. These affections can only be explained by disease of one part of the brain causing derangement of some of the intellectual capacities, while disease in another part may not disturb the intellect, but derange the moral powers or propensities. If the whole brain did subserve the intellectual functions, we should be unable to explain the idiot, whose brain is arrested in growth. He should be incapable of manifesting any emotion; whereas, on the contrary, his emotions are manifested all the more strongly for lack of the inhibitory control of reason. The intellect can only appreciate facts; it does not supply motives. We act from affection, and think in order to act. The world is governed not by thought but by emotion, and in judging a man we have to ask what are the motives that habitually determine his conduct whatever may be the means his intellect devises for the attainment of his ends.

Size of head indicates mental power but does not tell us whether that power lies in extent of intellect, in strength of moral feeling, or in power of passion or affection. We repeat again that the cortex of the brain records all the events, of whatever nature, which transpire within the sphere of existence of the individual, not merely as concerns the intellectual knowledge acquired, but likewise the emotions passed through and the passions indulged in. Most men utterly disregard this distinction. They confound intellectual power, moral feeling, and brute propensity, and treat the brain as if it consisted only of one lobe with only one function, namely, the manifestation of intellect. Thus TIEDEMANN inferred, and Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON concurred with him, that because the negro brain is equal in weight to the European, therefore the negro is also his equal in intellectual power.

Comparisons are frequently made between European and savage brains, but such comparisons to be of value should be made between savage brains and those of unskilled workmen or vagrants; for the educated man has the advantage of the accumulated knowledge and civilisation in general.

After all, it is very doubtful whether the great mass of men in our day exercise so much more complicated mental functions than the savages. Those who invent nothing, improve nothing, and, confined to their trade, swim with the great stream of imitators, understand only a small part of the manifold machinery of modern civilisation. The locomotive and the telegraph, the prediction of eclipses in the almanac, and the existence of great libraries with hundreds of thousands of books are taken for granted by them, and do not trouble them any farther. Whether now, with the rigid division of labour running ever into higher social positions, the functions of such a passive member of modern society are much higher than those of the native of Africa or Australia may be very much doubted, especially as the latter are undervalued.
On the other hand, there is a probability that many of the present tribes of savages are, in point of civilisation, in a more degenerate condition than their forefathers, who acquired originally higher mental qualities under natural selection. And, if such be the case, we naturally expect to find some stray races with inherited brains of greater capacity than their needs, in more degenerate circumstances, may require. An exact equivalent to this may be seen in the feeble intellectuality of many of the peasants and lower classes among the civilised nations of modern times. The capacity is there, but latent. Hence it happens not unfrequently that a youth born of such parents, if educated, becomes a distinguished citizen.

Similar remarks are applicable to the skulls of prehistoric races, as it would appear that evolution had done the major part of its work in brain development long before the days of neolithic civilisation. Some of the skulls of fossil men are of large size, but chiefly in the posterior region. It would seem that the growth of the frontal region of the brain diminished the posterior development. Until localisation of brain functions makes greater progress it is futile to speculate, to any great extent, on the relative sizes of skulls of different races, either in present or prehistoric times.

Owing to the ignorance of the fact that the primary emotions and propensities are as much related to the brain as the intellect, weights and measurements are taken to this day—as we have seen—of the entire brain and deductions drawn as to the intellectual capacity of the individual. The evidence of comparative anatomy is entirely overlooked, that we have some parts of the brain in common with animals, to administer to our animal wants, and that only those parts which are characteristically human can have any relation to the higher intellectual processes and moral powers for which man is distinguished.

Prof. KARL PEARSON, in a paper read before the Royal Society on January 23rd, 1902, endeavoured to show that there is no correlation of intellectual ability with the size of the entire head. This is obvious, for the purely intellectual functions, as we shall produce evidence presently, are confined to the frontal, or rather the pre-frontal, region of the cortex, which is at best one-third of the entire mass of the brain.

Prof. C. S. SHERRINGTON (Lecture on Physiology for Teachers, London, 1901) is therefore also quite correct in his observation that the brain may be wide or narrow, deep or flattened, the shape of the entire mass will not give any clue to the intellectual endowment of its former possessor.

No matter whether the head be large or small, and the brain heavy or light, the entire mass will give no clue to the intellectual ability or moral character of the individual. We must compare the relative development of different regions in the same brain to come to a conclusion.

Circumference alone, as a measure of the skull and its contents, is inadequate; for the brain may grow in certain regions without affecting the circumferential measurement. Thus I have three female adult skulls in my collection, each one has the circumference of 524 millimetres, i.e., 20.6 inches, but the cubic capacity of

No. 1 is 1390 cubic centimetres
No. 2 is 1550 cubic centimetres
No. 3 is 1420 cubic centimetres

which shows a difference between skull No. 1 and skull No. 2 of 160 cubic centimetres, or 11.5 per cent. This shows that we want to weigh each lobe separately, and even definite segments of each lobe.

A high development of a particular region as compared to the rest of the brain is generally associated with special mental powers of which the region in question is the essential basis; just as in animals that possess an extraordinary sense of smell there is a relatively large development of the olfactory bulbs.

Men are born with intellects or understandings which differ materially from each
The mental functions of the brain

other, so that there are particular kinds of understandings as there are of instincts among the animals, and we must conclude that each kind of understanding has a particular instrument for its manifestation.

The difference in the mental powers of members of the same family arises wholly from the various degrees of development in the different cerebral parts. All normal human brains exhibit the same parts and have the same primary mental powers, but vary in the relative development of the different convolutions, principal and accessory. This relation is infinitely varied, hence the great variety in the character of men and the different degrees of development of the primitive mental powers in the same individual.

Each individual comes into the world with a varying potentiality of development, and with an innate tendency for that development to take place more readily along certain lines than along others. There is not the slightest doubt that the innate developmental capacity of the brain cells varies greatly in different individuals. In some the potentiality is very great, in others it is comparatively small. This seems to be particularly the case with certain regions of the brain, and in consequence we have striking differences in family aptitudes.

There are some families the members of which evince a marked predilection for intellectual pursuits; there are others of which the members are born soldiers or travellers, and there are others with a special head for mechanical work of some kind or other, and with but little proclivity for book study. These differences are clearly inherited.

Of course, environment exerts a considerable influence, but environment cannot supply faculty of which the rudiment is non-existent, nor can it modify to any great extent the course of inherited tendencies. These things it cannot do, but it can certainly afford or withhold the opportunity for the development of those tendencies. The environment can, in short, encourage or discourage mental evolution.

Quality of brain does not account for these differences; for, as a rule, all the parts of the same brain have the same quality. But if we compare two brains, we must recollect that their size may be equal, and that nevertheless the one, from possessing the finer texture and its owner having a more vigorous bodily constitution, may be active and energetic, while the other, from being inferior in quality, or its owner having a different kind of temperament or feeble constitution, is naturally inert.

Another explanation put forward is that the differences obtaining in the weight of brains are due wholly to differences in the bulk of the body. This argument has been disposed of by Sir William Turner (1832-1916), who said:

"The human brain, in all probability, attains its full size and weight at or about the age of thirty, whilst the body not only increases in weight after this period, but in one and the same individual may vary considerably in weight at different stages of adult life, without any corresponding fluctuations taking place in the weight of the brain."

Small heads are rare with tall men, while large heads are very common with little men. When large heads show small intellectual capacity, we must look for power in the emotions and propensities. Some big-headed men are little more than big animals; they may manifest considerable mental power, particularly in the directions of the feelings and passions, though little intellectual. On the other hand, there are multitudes of comparatively small-headed men who display an almost unquenchable thirst for knowledge, an aptitude to acquire it, and a disposition to make right use of it; such small heads consist almost entirely of frontal brain—the region which we shall prove to be connected with intellectual functions.

Many men possess not general intelligence, but a special intelligence, which
makes them successful; accordingly they may have small brains, well developed only in one or a group of centres, and not heads large all round. Specialists' brains are often small—too small for their possessors' judgments to be trustworthy except in their narrow speciality, and often not even in that. EDINGER, in his "Anatomy of the Nervous System," showed that special ability, as in certain great men, commanders, business men, etc., is not due so much to big brains as to the development of special parts.

Again, the logical faculty of reasoning may be highly developed in a small brain and its possessor be a very great man. This type of man is often unable to take any special part in the orchestration of civilisation, but as leaders to direct and harmonise the efforts of other specialists they may be superb. We all know plodding successful specialists of extremely limited mental horizon, scientific investigators too narrow to interpret their own results and discoveries, philosophers who have no idea of number, mathematicians who are unable to talk, statesmen without business sense, men ignorant of the existence of Shakespeare yet possessed of executive ability enabling them to manage vast affairs, while men noted in other respects may be so devoid of executive ability as to bungle everything they attempt to manage. Practically we have every possible grade between degenerate imbeciles like "Blind Tom," with but one developed faculty, and those having many faculties developed, the equally impracticable "Admirable Crichtons."

Mind and consciousness are bound up with a brain in us; but just as in the lower creatures there is digestion without a stomach, so there is consciousness without a brain. Only, in proportion as the organism becomes more perfect, a division of labour is brought about: special organs are destined to diverse functions instead of the whole mass doing all. But the function was previously performed in the undifferentiated organism; it was performed all over it, though with less precision.

It is astonishing that there should still be men existing who pin their faith to the belief that the brain acts always as a whole whatever the mental function—that the same structure acts in anger, fear, aesthetic emotion, love, scientific observation and metaphysical thought. Those who hold that belief might as well say that the same aggregate of brain-cells is engaged in the function of seeing, hearing, and smelling; but they do not go so far because they know it is not true. The olfactory lobes, for one, are so distinct that they must be acknowledged. But why, if we admit different regions for the various senses, should we not admit that the primordial activities of the soul should have separate instruments in the brain, though so closely interwoven by a network of fibres that the action of one will set the others into vibration? The discovery of anatomically distinct areas in the brain by BRODMANN and ELLIOT SMITH would point to such an interpretation.

There is nothing unreasonable in the supposition that an indivisible soul may have the power of seeing, hearing, reflecting, and manifesting various primitive feelings through the medium of a complex brain. Those who do not admit the plurality of centres are thrown back on assuming a compound soul or mind acting through a simple brain; or on assuming that the soul, with its emotions, passions, judgment, and the senses, acts independently of the brain, and is divisible though immaterial.

Some metaphysicians get out of their difficulty by explaining that the various mental powers are only particular modes of action: "The mind itself existing in certain states" (Dr. Thomas Brown). That is, a constantly changing mind—the mind in a state of anger, love, fear, observation, reflection, imagination, etc., dancing out of one state into another. Is such an idea consistent with our experience? Others make a great deal of the consciousness of personal identity, but ignore the cases of dissociation of personality. In a state of health man is conscious of his own identity; but when labouring under disease, consciousness is frequently disturbed or even lost. If the psychical activities are independent of definite and separate
Instruments we cannot understand insanity. We cannot admit a mind disease, and still less that portions of our psyche should be diseased while the remainder remains healthy. But insanity can be readily understood if we admit that certain areas of the brain, through which mind acts, are in a disordered or diseased condition, while the remainder is still normal.

There is no mental unity even in the ordinary healthy conditions. There is not a man in the world whose memory is equally good on every subject and the same at all times. How can a spiritual unity be strong on one point and weak on another? Just imagine a spirit becoming imbecile, weak, tired, and exhausted! May we not conclude, then, that each mental manifestation takes place through a special and appropriate organ, and that the brain consequently consists of a congeries of centres for the manifestation of the various psychical activities, or rudiments of those activities?

By assuming that the mental powers of perception, deduction and induction require separate mechanisms of brain-cells, I do not destroy the psychical nature of the soul; on the contrary, I prove that the products of perception and thought are unlimited and purely spiritual. No one will assert that if I recall in my mind a mountain scene, or create a vision of a machine, that these things are physical. They have no actual existence; but as I have an eye for seeing and an ear for hearing, so I must have some mechanism for the elementary psychical processes, without which the perception and creation of these things is impossible. Even to conceive the Power of an Almighty and to be able to render devotion to Him I must have some brain elements to get into that condition; for where these elements are lacking, as in arrested brain growth of idiocy, or where they are destroyed through brain injury, that power may never exist or be lost, and the individual be reduced to an animal state.

Long-continued mental application does not fatigue all the mental powers in an equal degree. Rest can be obtained by a change of object. This would be an impossibility if the whole brain were engaged in each mental exertion.

Take, furthermore, the phenomena of dreaming. During that state several of the mental faculties, moral, affective, as well as intellectual, are evidently active, while the remainder continue dormant. The natural result of such an arrangement is that we sometimes imagine ourselves engaged in actions which, in our waking moments, we should never have undertaken, because in the latter state our decision would have been influenced by feelings and faculties that in our dream-moments were asleep.

It has already been pointed out that in partial idiocy the individual is exceedingly deficient in most of the intellectual powers, and yet may possess a few of them in considerable vigour. Thus an idiot may have a talent for imitation, for drawing, or for music, and be incapable of comprehending a single abstract idea; or he may show a hoarding inclination, a destructive tendency, or some special instinct in high activity, and yet manifest no other power to any perceptible extent. Were the brain a single organ, then the innate dispositions of each man would be similar. But if there be special aggregates of brain-cells appropriated to different mental powers, then does every modification of intellect and character depend in its elements on a different degree of development attained by these particular parts of the brain, and their varying degree of activity. There are no two brains alike in their configuration, nor are the mental dispositions of any two individuals found exactly to correspond.

Moreover, the existence of such evidence as that of injuries of the head affecting, not unfrequently, one or more of the mental powers, while others remain perfectly sound, has appeared to not a few physiologists to render the supposition far from unreasonable that the different portions of the cerebral hemispheres have different functions allotted to them. A large number of cases have been placed on record.
by independent observers, in which some special mental quality or primary feeling, deranged owing to circumscribed lesion of the brain, has returned to normal activity when the source of irritation has been removed (see Chapters XXIX.-XXXII.). True, now and then we hear that destruction of the grey matter of the brain may occur without any mental change in the patient. But such statements are made by men who have no method in their observation of intellectual changes, and who disregard entirely the alterations in the feelings and emotions of the patient, believing them to be independent of the activities of the brain.

Just as the brains of animals differ in accordance with the strength of a particular sense which is peculiar to them—one with a superior smell having large olfactory lobes—so it is not unreasonable to assume that animal brains differ in accordance with the special instincts which they manifest; and, indeed, if we compare the brains of the different species we see essential differences in the form, size, and shape of their brains, and the form and number of their convolutions. Even the individuals of each species, notably of domestic animals, show often essential differences in abilities and dispositions; for instance, not every breed of dogs could be made into sporting dogs, consequently some essential element in their brain must also vary. We make distinctions also between the skulls of different races, and of different nationalities, and the brains differ also. But, if that is the case, the different regions of the brain must vary in their function.

Vision may be in a morbid condition and hearing sound; or hearing may be disordered and vision sound. Of the other external senses the same is true. They are so independent of each other that either of them may be sound or unsound singly. They have their real seat in different portions of the brain. Vision is not seated in the eye, hearing in the ear, taste in the tongue, smelling in the nostrils, nor touch in the fingers, neither are they seated in the nerves of those organs. The eye, ear, tongue, nose, and fingers are but the externals of the senses, and the functions of these organs are as different as the functions of the nerves they receive, for each organ must be in harmony with its own nerves. This fact alone proves the brain to be a compound viscera. In confirmation of the view here taken, it is well known that blindness, deafness, and an extinction of the other external senses, often depend not on any diseased condition of the external or intermediate apparatus, but on a morbid affection of the brain.

When we direct our attention to the lower order of animals, we perceive an accurate correspondence between their brains and mentality. When we find the brain with few convolutions, the animal has few faculties. As we ascend through the higher grades of animals, brain matter and mentality increase in complexity alike, until we rise to man, who has the most complex brain, as well as the most complete mental manifestation. This is well known to comparative anatomists and to all naturalists. The human brain contains many convolutions not found in the brain of any other animal; and human mentality consists of several powers exclusively its own, the supernumerary convolutions and the supernumerary faculties corresponding.

Moreover, different parts of the brain are not developed simultaneously; but those whose functions are earlier called into action have their fibres earlier developed. Similarly, the various mental powers appear, some at an earlier, some at a later, period. Further, in the same individual, certain propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties are manifested with great energy, while others scarcely appear. One may excel in verbal memory, and be incapable of combining two philosophical ideas; another may be a great painter, and a bad musician, or a miserable poet; and a third a great poet, but a bad general. Everyone has peculiar gifts. Hence the same mass of brain cannot preside over dissimilar functions. It is evident, therefore, that the brain must have different centres to account for the great variety in the natural capacities and emotional dispositions.
How can a capacity, say, for music, or a disposition to excessive irascibility, be inherited if these are purely psychical tendencies independent of any material organisation for their elements? But we can explain hereditary mental dispositions by assuming the inherited instrument to be perfect or imperfect.

If there were no special centres, how could the transmission of peculiarities of character from parent to child be explained? Peculiarities of character are no more than modes of faculties, and they could not be transmitted unless we had also a peculiarity of structure in the organ. The mental qualities of the parent may be transmitted to the offspring, either immediate or remote, in an identical or an allied form. Every fundamental attribute of the parent tends to be inherited by the offspring. This is the first and most fundamental law of heredity. How can mental characteristics be inherited unless there is some physical characteristic corresponding with it? Those who deny the possibility of different nerve-cells having different functions must, therefore, first explain the heredity of mental characteristics.

It has been said that the exceptional talents and characteristics of some men are due to accidental causes; as, for instance, Demosthenes is said to have become eloquent because he was attracted by the eloquence of Callisthenes. But many heard Callisthenes who did not become eloquent; and Demosthenes differed from them by a predisposition to oratory sufficiently strong to make him take the trouble to acquire the necessary skill. All that external impressions can do is to give an impulse to talents which have not been exercised before; the disposition for such activity must already exist. We must bear in mind that the same opportunity is offered to a great many men, whilst only one is inspired. As FRANCIS GALTON has pointed out, education and surrounding circumstances are only powerful on those men whose innate dispositions are neither too feeble nor too energetic. Even the men of mediocrity have their individual character. There is something in every man which resists all educational efforts, as every teacher will know.

Last, but not least, we have the observations of numerous investigators showing that certain regions of the cerebrum are distinguished from other regions by broad differences in structure. Not only does the structure in different convolutions assume to a greater or less extent a variety of modifications, but even different parts of the same convolution may vary with regard either to the arrangement or the relative size of their cells. These structural differences must be correlated with some difference of function. The group of cells whose function is purely intellectual cannot possibly have the same construction as a group of cells whose function is purely emotional. The two may be united by association fibres, so that one may rouse the other, but the function of each group of cells must be distinct.

This conception of centres would alter none of our known psychological facts. For, as we have already explained, that although we may for the present, not knowing better, localise complex mental functions, it is really only the element of each function that can have a separate centre or instrument—only every primary process of intellect, feeling, or impulse. Let me repeat, that just as we require an eye to see, but cannot tell what the eye will see, so we cannot tell what use the person endowed with the colour sense, or a sense of tone, or his apparatus for anger, love, or fear, will make. Just as sight and hearing are roused spontaneously on stimulation of the eyes or ears and their brain centres, so are the brain centres for the primary emotions roused on the requisite stimulus, to a different degree according to the force of the stimulus and the perfection of the particular centre. Science can only say: You cannot have a primary capacity, emotion, or propensity without the agency of certain brain-cells—which are live cells, and not a material apparatus, it is to be remembered—just as little as you can have music without musical instruments. The fact that instruments are necessary for music does not alter anything in the psychology of music; nor is anything altered by the assertion that you
cannot feel angry without a certain group of cells in the cortex being set into activity. Admitting this theory, we can understand why a nervous discharge—as takes place, for instance, when the emotion of fear is aroused—being connected always with a given group of brain-cells, subsequent discharges take place along the same routes and become easier the oftener they are repeated. The more frequently a person allows himself to be frightened, the more timid he will become, for the nervous action becomes facilitated, and it will be more difficult for him to resist it. We may commence by stealing a pin, we may learn to steal a sovereign, and end by being unable altogether to resist thieving.

The brain centres do not contain ideas, but they possess the mechanism to compose ideas. Therefore we cannot say that a person with a certain brain formation is, for example, musical, but only that he has certain brain areas for the appreciation of tone, time, and harmony so perfectly developed that the instruments are there which, given favourable circumstances, would make him easily develop musical ability.

The sensory centres are not the centres for intellectual activity, for knowledge does not depend on sensation alone. What sensation does is to rouse the mechanism of the brain centres for the primordial dispositions to activity, according to their relative development and associative arrangement. That is how the sight of, for example, a wood strikes the poet and timber merchant differently, and the hearing of the same sentence evokes different response in different individuals. These primary centres are for unconscious mental dispositions of ancestral inheritance (as we have already pointed out in Chapter XXV.), and their conscious control is a matter of education.

The more primitive the brain organisation, as in the lower animals, the more is the response to sensations like reflex action; and the more organised the brain, the greater the control over the response.

Another fact is that the primary propensities for self-preservation respond more impulsively than the higher powers by the rousing of the primitive emotions (fear, anger, etc.).

Again, the response by a centre to sensation is the quicker the more developed the particular centre, and the higher the quality. Furthermore, congestion produces greater activity than anemia. Maniacal patients, therefore, react quickly to impressions; whereas melancholics respond slowly, if at all.

The emotions and propensities depend upon the brain organisation as much as do the intellectual capacities. Common sense tells us that the intellect and feelings are so essentially different that there must be separate centres for them. No one can suppose that the same bundle of nerve-cells and nerve-fibres which is employed in intellectual effort is that through which the emotions are manifested. The feelings of anger, fear, love, and grief arise spontaneously in us, and are as vivid the first time we feel them as they are after being often repeated.

We find children show different dispositions to fear, anger, love, etc., in different degrees long before they had any experience and quite independent of intellectual influences, and we find sometimes that all the training fails in curbing the natural inclinations. If we do not admit that they are due to peculiarities of brain organisation, it will be difficult to explain them. We shall have to assume that all character is due to education and experience, in which case no reliance could be placed on the actions of men. Education, experience, and external influences in general, may draw out the inherited dispositions and may alter them, refine them, but they cannot create them. Education can act only in proportion to the degree of development of the innate mental powers. It can sharpen existing aptitudes and dispositions, but cannot supply new ones. The character tendencies, like the intellectual capacities, are predetermined, and this is the reason why so frequently—to use the words of Sir FRANCIS GALTON—"a son, happening to inherit somewhat
exclusively the qualities of his father, will fail with his failures, sin with his sins, surmount with his virtues, and generally get through life in much the same way."

But **tendencies are of course not “actualities,”** and the growth of character is subjected to such a variety of influences that the ultimate constitution may differ considerably from the original disposition.

We do not feel sorry because we cry, as JAMES contended, but we cry because, when we are sorry, or overjoyed, or violently angry, or full of tender affection—when any one of these diverse emotional states is present—there are nervous discharges by sympathetic channels to various viscera, including the lachrymal glands.

This view that **emotions are not of visceral origin** is in accord with the experimental results of SHERRINGTON, who has demonstrated that emotional responses occur in dogs in which practically all the main viscera and the great bulk of skeletal muscle have been removed from subjection to and from influence upon the brain by severance of the vagus nerves and the spinal cord. In these animals no alteration whatever was noticed in the occurrence, under appropriate circumstances, of expressions of voice and features, indicating anger, delight, or fear. The argument that these expressions may have been previously established by afferent impulses from excited viscera was met by noting that a puppy only nine weeks old also continued to exhibit the signs of affective states after the brain was disconnected from all the body except head and shoulders. Evidence from uniformity of visceral response—and evidence from exclusion of the viscera—are harmonious, therefore, in pointing towards central rather than peripheral changes as the source of differences in emotional states.

The intellect and the emotions must be related to different parts of the brain, otherwise it would be difficult to account for the fact why there so often exists a **wide difference in the same individual between the moral character and the intellectual capacity,** and why in lesions of the brain the conduct may become altered while the **intellect remains unaffected.** If the feelings and propensities are not related to the brain, we should fail to account for the fact that in brain lesions they become changed—the religious man becomes irreligious, the benevolent man hard and cruel, the affectionate man neglectful of his family ties and obligations, the amiable and even-tempered man irascible without provocation, and so on. When a man goes mad, the primary disorder usually consists of a lack of control over his feelings, which affect the course of his thought and consequentially of action, without disordering the reasoning processes in any other way than by supplying him with wrong materials.

"It will not be denied," says RAY ("Jurisprudence of Insanity," p. 163), "that the propensities and sentiments are also integral portions of our mental constitution, and no enlightened physiologist can doubt their manifestations are also liable with the organism to derangement and disease. That a man may be morally insane with intellect unimpaired is a position that may now fairly be assumed without question."

Yet according to HÖFFDING ("Outlines of Psychology," 1891, p. 349), "both talent and character are determined by the temperament." (!)

That the primary emotions must have their separate centres in the brain is shown by their **effects.** Fear, sorrow, and depressor emotions in general lower the muscular innervation, constrict the arteries, slow speech, slacken the association of ideas, and lower the vital functions; whereas joy and anger increase the muscular innervation, dilate the arteries, and increase the volubility of speech and the general energy. Further and more convincing proofs will be found in the succeeding chapters, where we deal with each emotion separately. The number of cases we shall cite there, accurately observed and recorded, in which injury of the brain affected one particular emotion or propensity, according to the locality on which it
THE BRAIN: THE ORGAN OF THE PSYCHIC ACTIVITIES

was inflicted, while in other respects the individual remained perfectly sound, can only be explained on the principle that the several portions of the several hemispheres have different functions allotted to them.

Meanwhile attention must be drawn to the fact that it is through the sympathetic nervous system that every bodily function can be affected by an emotion, and vice versa.

The brain, besides being the organ of mind, is also the great regulator of all the functions of the body, the ever-active controller of every organ. For this purpose it has a double set of nerves; firstly, the cerebro-spinal nerves, which in the normal state are more or less under voluntary control, enabling us to move our muscles and limbs; and, secondly, the so-called sympathetic nerves, which are not under our voluntary dominion. The latter go to our internal organs and to the arteries, controlling the local blood-supply and thus nutrition, and also to the spinal nerves, thus exerting a brain control over our intentional movements. In this manner—and this is only a rough outline—all organs and all functions are represented in the brain, and are so represented that all may be brought into the right relationship and harmony with each other and converted into a vital unity. Thus mind, motion, sensibility, nutrition, repair and drainage have their governing centres in the brain.

Thus certain states of mind are apt to be accompanied by various derangements of the functions of the body. Everyone knows how the receipt of an unpleasant letter may make us lose all appetite for food, and even cause us indigestion or headache; how fear may actually paralyse the muscles and keep us "rooted to the spot"; how sudden shock will sometimes result in instant death; how long-continued grief or mental strain will sap the strength of the body. And it is no less a fact of observation that when healthy mental states are substituted for unhealthy ones, the functional derangements of the body tend to disappear again.

On the other hand, it is owing to the same organisation that our mental disposition can be influenced by the bodily functions. Nobody is constantly the same self. Not only is he a different self at different periods of his life and in different circumstances, but also on different days, according to his different bodily states: sanguine and optimistic, gloomy and pessimistic, frank and genial, reserved and suspicious, apathetic or energetic. Although his intellectual powers remain the same, his judgment of the objective world and his relations to it are quite changed, because of the change in his moods and in the bodily states which they imply.

The subtle working of the sympathetic nerves may be witnessed by anyone in the habit of making physiognomical observations. He will see the flush of sudden anger, the pallor of sudden fear, the damask hue of overtaxed modesty, and the deeper tint of actual shame, the quasi-electric glow (in both cheek and eye) of radiant hope, the jaundiced hue of malignant jealousy, and the ashen bloom of suppressed (and postponed) vengeance. Each of these circulatory changes is a visible sign of the working of the mind through the sympathetic system; but the internal and invisible effects are much more powerful and quicken or retard practically every bodily process.

Without giving any further illustrations, it will be admitted that there is ample evidence of the interaction between mind and body, i.e., of the physical effects of mental causes and the mental effects of physical causes. We need not go into details, so long as it is admitted that not only can the body be weakened through the agency of the mind, but it can be strengthened also by that same agency.

If the emotions and propensities arise previous to experience and vary in degree according to the inherited predisposition, they must have their brain centres from which they originate, the same as the intellectual capacities have. But this is an assumption which is still most emphatically denied. The statement will be supported presently with abundant evidence; but first let us examine the reasons for its non-acceptance.

First of all, to make trustworthy observations on this subject we must be both
physicians and psychologists; but seldom indeed are the two combined. The mind is regarded as the province of the psychologist, who as a graduate in philosophy knows nothing of the brain, or has only second-hand knowledge which renders him apt to accept whatever brain theory happens to be in fashion at the moment, and to speculate on the same, while the brain is turned over to the anatomist, physiologist, or pathologist, i.e., to the doctors of medicine, who not infrequently know little of the mind and its elements.

The view that the emotions and propensities have their centres in the brain independent of the intellectual centres is opposed by modern brain physiologists principally on the ground that the emotions are all-pervading, affecting the whole body and exercising their influence over the entire brain—over every idea. This statement is quite correct, only it does not disprove our theory. Each emotion gives an impulse to the brain different in kind, and, if there be anything like order, must travel along different nerve paths, and though the effect of such an impulse may be an all-pervading one, there must be a centre from which the impulse starts. We might as well say that Bright's disease is a disease of the whole body, and not of the kidneys, because a great many parts of the organism may be affected by it.

Thus, GEO. W. ORILE, Professor of Surgery, in an admirable study of "The Origin and Nature of the Emotions" (Philadelphia and London, 1915), starts from the point of view that the emotions affect the whole brain, whatever their kind. He gives a mechanistic explanation and holds nurture, not nature, to be the originator, maintaining "not that man is in large measure the product of his environment, but that environment has been the actual creator of man."

Another objection is that each idea appears to have its own emotion. This objection arises from ignorance of what are the primary emotions. Sensations and ideas arouse feelings, which may occur simultaneously with them, but they are not the feelings. On the contrary, it would be truer to say that every emotion is accompanied by an idea, for the feeling arises first and we seek for a cause.

The sight of cruelty arouses a feeling in us just as surely as does the sensation of pain inflicted upon our bodies. We cannot infer that the feeling aroused by seeing another suffer comes to our mind through the channels of visual sensation or even visceral sensation, else why should not the same sight always produce the same effect upon us? Instead of the same feeling, we find a bewildering variety, ranging from fear and horror to compassion and resentment.

Any idea may exist associated with almost any emotional state; it may also exist without the co-existence of any emotional state. Any simple emotional state, as fear or anger, may exist without being associated with any idea, without the simultaneous existence of any thought. A man may not be afraid; the individual simply suffers from fear, not from fear of something. Moreover, there is no relation between the intensity of emotional and intellectual action going on at the same time, as we should think must necessarily be the case if these two were functions of one and the same part of the brain. In any given individual the intellect may be highly developed and the emotions very ill developed, or the reverse.

True, we cannot recall feelings as we can intellectual experiences. For example, feeling happy is not the same as having the idea of happiness. Still, if it can be shown that injury of one part of the brain is followed by undue manifestation of anger, and that of another part by excessive fear without adequate cause or without any cause (see cases in succeeding chapters), the connection between certain fundamental feelings and definite portions of the brain must be admitted.

Another objection is that the emotional parts of the mind cannot be so divorced in operation from the intellectual that the one can become insane, the other remaining perfectly sane. But that is exactly what is the case.

For example, in the early stage of melancholia there is a vague anxiety that
THE BRAIN: THE ORGAN OF THE PSYCHIC ACTIVITIES

cannot be accounted for by the patient, who is quite free from delusions, and observes and reasons quite clearly. His mental machine—his thoughts and actions—will work more slowly in this condition, but quite correctly. In the next stage he will try to find some reason for his indefinite fears that make him feel so miserable, and he then may exaggerate some mistakes he made in his earlier life, of which in his health he has taken little or no notice, and may put down the cause of his depression to them; but he is still inventing nothing. He did make the mistakes, though they are not of such importance as to cause so much and so persistent an anxiety.

In paranoia also we get in the early stages a purely emotional change consisting of an exaggerated feeling of suspicion. In trying to seek evidence for it, the patient will misinterpret the looks and actions of people whom he meets, but he does not reason incorrectly, only his suspicion supplies him with wrong facts, just as it does in the case of a jealous person. He will do his work, at this stage at all events, as well as ever, and it is only when we touch upon the subject or object of his suspicion that we can notice something wrong with him.

Another argument against our view—rather old, but again revived—is that the source of our feelings is to be sought in the activity of the visceral functions. With this objection we have dealt already, and need only mention here that the viscera may cause slight alterations, or, rather, accentuations, in our feelings, but they do not create them; for perfectly healthy persons may all their life be possessed by undue fear, making them cautious and prudent in all their actions, and others may experience the emotion of anger more frequently or more strongly, giving them force in opposition, indignation at affronts, and energy in execution of their plans. We all differ in our primary emotions quite independently of the state of the viscera.

The question, however, is not so much whether specific emotions originate in a limited brain area, but whether the fundamental propensities—the original instincts of animals and man—are connected with the brain or not. This question seems never to occur to physiologists and brain surgeons. It is always the intellect and its metaphysical elements that are inquired into; but, surely, if any mental qualities are related to the brain, it is those elementary instincts which are common to all animal creation for the preservation of their existence. Otherwise of what use is their brain? It is positively wearisome to go through thousands of reports of cases of head injuries, brain tumours, and other lesions affecting the cerebrum and read invariably that the symptoms observed were "mental depression," "restlessness," "diminished attention," or "loss of concentration" or of "memory." Such vague statements can be made of any person, whether suffering from a cold in the head or pain in the big toe, and need no cerebral lesion. The vast number of cases which I shall quote in the next three chapters may not all be suitable cases to prove my arguments, but they are the average that can be found in medical literature for the present, and all that is intended with them is to give an impetus to an inquiry into the whole problem on new lines.

Then there are those who oppose not only the view that the primary emotions and propensities have their origin in special centres of the brain, but oppose all localisation whatsoever. Most of them are still imbued with the metaphysical notion of the unity of the ego. But do not the bodily organs—the heart, the lungs, the stomach, and the kidneys—work simultaneously? Why should not the different brain centres, which are also organs for specific functions, work simultaneously in their respective departments? Consciousness is only a phase of that nervous work.

We read a book which excites our imagination. The printed words and sentences are observed. Their memory images are associated with the speech centre; the words read may be heard. From the speech centre are called up the images of visual centres. While this goes on our imagination gives us illustrations of what we
have just read, and our eyes perceive in advance another line of words. At the same time, we observe what goes on outside our book in the field of vision with a little less attention, and the ear takes in sounds, say of a band that passes our windows. We notice the melody and at the same time we notice a printer's error or criticise a badly constructed sentence. The melody may remind us of something that happened in our life. All this may go on without our being really distracted. This shows that our ego is formed of parts grouped together like a mosaic.

Such objectors labour under the mistaken view that each centre could or would act independently; but though the centres themselves are distinct, all of them are inter-organized, and the activity of each depends on its relation to the others. No one centre is competent to manifest itself by itself. Each acts as a certain portion of the brain to modify the general result of cerebral action. The different centres are only points of highest activity of a special function, but none of the functions can be completely disjointed, for each specialised group of cells is connected by nerve fibres with a number of other groups, so that when one centre is roused into activity the greater part, if not the whole, of the brain may tingle in unison. All centres may therefore be regarded as association centres. It is through this solidarity and interdependence that no portion of the brain can be injured or exhausted without its interfering in some way with the functions of the other portions. There is, however, a great difference between saying that the various brain parts exert a mutual influence, and saying that each part does not perform its own particular function. Were the cortex of the brain a single organ, then the innate dispositions of each man would be similar. But if the various convolutions of the brain be appropriated to different mental powers, then does every modification of character depend on a different degree of development attained by these particular parts of the brain and their varying degree of activity, one man reacting to certain stimuli with anger, another with fear, another with sympathy, and so on.

Every group of cells has multiple connections with other groups and may therefore be affected by a series of impressions different in origin and, to a certain extent, also in nature. Their function is therefore very far from being limited to a single form of stereotyped activity; but at the same time it does not consist in an indefinite capacity to receive any kind of stimulus. It is simply impressionability by a certain number of minimal stimuli, subconscious and different from each other, but probably little dissimilar, which come from various parts by pre-established anatomical paths, sometimes along with others, sometimes in little processions, according to circumstances. Every group of cells acts both as an organ for reception and an organ for discharge, inasmuch as it can pass on to other groups of cells the stimulus it has received. As an organ of reception it can be impressed with various stimuli, and it has the same versatility also as an organ of distribution, passing on to near or distant cellular groups, with which it is anatomically connected, one or other impression, according to the circumstances of the moment. The course of thought is, therefore, very precarious. Its variations depend not only upon external events, but also upon the intimate changes in innumerable cells, which form part of the system accessible to a given nervous current, and which are each independently able to attract or repel this current. Theoretically the psychical process should be able to reach without limitation to any point with which there is anatomical continuity; but practically it encounters resistances and attractions, sometimes of a transitory nature, which do not allow it to go beyond or to stop short of a given course. On account of this dynamic variability, the nervous currents, proceeding from the same point of origin, can assume an almost infinite number of material figures in the cortical space and of subjective figures in consciousness. This conception of psychical centres does away with the objection that the number, extent, and topographical arrangement of the cortical centres, being determined by the fixed order of embryological development, cannot present great differences in one individual as compared with another, and still less from time to
time in the same individual, and that this renders inexplicable the infinite variety of ways in which images, ideas, and emotions follow one upon another, even under the same external conditions.—(Tanzi)

The position of the centres is not accidental, but is governed by fixed principles. One centre fuses with another, hence neighbouring centres are related in their mental manifestation. Centres are of a higher character, and of later acquisition, in proportion as they occupy a higher locality in the brain. Thus the highest mental powers will be found farthest from the base of the brain, for the rigid base of the skull does not admit of much expansion. On the other hand, the vault of the skull remains open in two places at least for some time after birth, and even in later life is still capable of an increased arched to make room for increased brain mass. The lowest and most indispensable mental powers—for instance, the instincts of self-preservation common to men and animals—will be found at the base of the brain.

The greater the moral and spiritual energy of a man, the higher seems to be his head; the more animal energy a man possesses the broader his brain at the base. We need only compare the heads of the really great men of the Church with, say, those of prize-fighters, and the fact will be apparent even to an unskilled observer.

It is a mistake to draw conclusions from animal physiology to human physiology as to the mental functions of the brain, as has been the fashion for the last fifty years. To mention only one fact: a slight blow to the human head may render a person insane, whereas, if we are to believe the physiologists, large portions of the brain of an animal may be extirpated without affecting its mental condition. These traumatic lesions are often highly instructive for cerebral localisation, for they are not only limited in the area they involve, at all events at the time of the accident, but they are limited in the damage they do to the mentality of the victim, usually one or more mental powers becoming deranged, while in other respects the individual remains perfectly sound; and whenever the injury affects the same locality, the same mental power suffers. Similarly circumscribed lesions due to the growth of tumours, the effects of haemorrhage, etc., give rise frequently to definite mental changes by pressure on a limited brain area producing degeneration of the surrounding brain-cells. Such lesions may be described as Nature's own experiments, and, being made on man himself, are much more trustworthy and instructive than the experiments on pigeons, guinea-pigs, rabbits, cats, dogs, and monkeys conducted by physiologists.

As long ago as 1814 Sir EVERARD HOME, a famous surgeon (see Chapter XI.), in a paper in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, proposed keeping accurate records of brain injuries and the mental powers which become subsequently affected. "The various attempts," said he, "which have been made to procure accurate information respecting the functions that belong to individual portions of the human brain having been attended with very little success, it has occurred to me that, were anatomical surgeons to collect, in one view, all the appearances they had met with in cases of injury of that organ, and of the effect that such injuries produced upon its functions, a body of evidence might be formed that would materially advance this highly important investigation."

Some fifty years later Sir FREDERIC BATEMAN (Journal of Mental Science, 1869) wrote: "Traumatic cases may be regarded as veritable vivisections, and their study is invaluable in an etiological point of view, as contributing perhaps more than any other class of cases to sound ideas as to the question of the cerebral localisation of our divers faculties."

Still later, WILLIAM JULIUS MICKLE, in a paper on "Cerebral Localisation," wrote: "In the human subject, strictly limited traumatic brain lesions are among the pathological conditions which bear most clearly upon the problem of cerebral localisation. Necessarily these accidental experiments upon the human brain are sometimes as sharply localised as are the experiments of the physiologist upon the
brains of lower animals. For the purpose of the physician, indeed, they are more instructive than the latter."

Experiments on animals can produce only motor and sensory phenomena, therefore physiologists lay stress on them, and, clinical observation not coming within their range, they are apt to undervalue it in comparison with their own more exact research. But now that laboratory physiology has evidently done all it ever will do in elucidating the functions of the brain, any further advance must be made by observing the effects of injury and disease on man, since man is the only animal that can communicate his feelings, sensations, and thoughts by means of speech.

These clinical observations have never been made systematically. The neurologists—one section of the medical profession with special opportunities for them—specialise in motor and sensory phenomena and therefore place their faith in the information physiologists put before them. Mental changes, if they are observed by them, refer principally to visual, auditory and speech phenomena; but with reference to mind proper as including intellectual capacities, sentiments, emotions, and propensities—these are rarely noted by them. Most of them do not admit any relation of emotions to brain centres, and changes so severe as to amount to insanity do not come within their sphere.

As a proof of my statement I need only refer to the French report on head injuries in the recent war, based on 5,000 cases ("Wounds of the Skull and Brain," by CH. CHATELIN and J. de MARTEL, London, 1918). Mental symptoms (except affections of sight, hearing, and the other senses) are denied by the authors—and after reading their book one really wonders whether insanity can be a brain disease.

The alienists, whose proper department is mind and its disorders, have no opportunity of collecting such material, for there are no real "hospitals" for the insane, and the asylums, though now called "mental hospitals," admit only advanced and more or less chronic cases.

Our asylums are like monasteries on beautiful heights in the country, surrounded by big walls, which not only prevent the escape of patients, but, by the rules with which these institutions are governed, prevent anyone but its salaried officers making clinical studies in them, and burden these officers with so many administrative duties, that only those who really love their work and are born with a gift for it ever make any contributions to our knowledge of the subject.

No wonder that until a few years back it was frequently denied that there is any difference between the brains of sane and insane; and now, when we have a fair number of pathological laboratories connected with asylums, the only definite facts we possess are the appearances of brains in amnesia and dementia (progressive, alcoholic, and senile). It is to be borne in mind that the insane upon whom we make autopsies in asylums almost always die in states of advanced dementia, or in consequence of intercurrent diseases, which, both of them, produce alterations in the brain, often entirely different from those connected with the psychosis and, wholly or in part, obscure the original characteristic changes. Moreover, localisation of mental function in the sense here described not being admitted, the pathologist takes at random slices from any part of the brain and examines the microscopical appearance of the brain-cells, usually most carefully and minutely; but his descriptions, however valuable from other points of view, do not help us in the solution of this most important problem. All honour to the men who make these researches, they have immensely advanced our knowledge of the structure of the brain and its morbid changes; but their views on localisation, for or against, are still based only on surmise, since the theory has never been tested systematically, as we propose to do in succeeding chapters.
THE BRAIN: THE ORGAN OF THE PSYCHIC ACTIVITIES

It is rare that we get clinical cases with post-mortem observations reported from asylums. Most mental cases recorded in medical periodicals are by neurologists! A sound localisation theory would enable us to point to the seat of the disease and to treat it as may be required; but to those who oppose the theory, it matters nothing whether a person be melancholic, violently maniacal, homicidal, or suffer from delusions of persecution, whether he be a kleptomaniac, a religious maniac, or fancy himself a millionaire; in every case they assume that the whole brain is affected. Unfortunately, those who do not expect to find localised areas of disease are not looking for them, and have no inclination to examine the evidence others put before them; hence our knowledge of this subject has made little progress. But if we are disputing one of the most elementary problems of the functions of the brain, what advance can be made in the treatment of the insane and feeble-minded? The unfit are ever increasing, and Royal Commissions are appointed to investigate the causes of this increase, but what is the good of all these inquiries when we are not yet agreed on the fundamental question of the functions of the brain: Is localisation of mental function possible?

But what about the surgeons? Have they not operated in thousands of cases in this war alone for localised head injuries, and are they not the best judges of the problem before us? They might be, but, so far, they are not. First of all, the surgeons are generally in a hurry, necessarily so, and have no time, even if they have the opportunity, to make detailed examination of the patient's mentality or to follow up the case.

Thousands of operations have been performed in the recent war for injuries to the skull and brain (notice the French report just referred to), and as in olden times, so now, the statement is made in the medical reports that the patient suffered neither loss of intellect nor change of character, though he lost an appreciable quantity of brain-matter. The surgeon may be right, but he should state what sort of examination he made into the mental condition of the patient and how long after the operation he had him under observation.

It has been my experience that, whenever a patient is able to return a rational answer to any simple question about his health, the surgeon and attendants invariably speak of him as in full possession of all his faculties. So long as the patient can answer ordinary questions about his food, number of his family, his location at the time, and attend to his bodily wants with some care, he is considered not to have shown any mental symptoms. But I have had the opportunity of following up several of these cases, and discovered not only some with loss of definite intellectual capacities, and certainly diminished vigour of these powers, but in a great many instances marked emotional changes—from previous cheerfulness to melancholy, from gentle pleasantness to irascibility, from affection to hatred, from honesty and truthfulness to deceitfulness and criminal tendencies. Are these changes of character and conduct also due to the brain lesions? I am in a position to affirm that, if such changes were taken notice of at the time, or the possibility of their later development were recognised, measures might be taken which in many cases would save a man from the workhouse, prison, or asylum. The man with a serious brain injury has few needs, few thoughts, few feelings, and is only semi-conscious; the questions usually put to him convey no information about his real state. Let us follow up the history of such a case after the patient has returned to ordinary life, and a different picture will be presented. He is not the man he was before.

A man may give rational answers to questions put to him at the bedside of a general hospital, and yet be totally changed in character since his illness commenced. How is the surgeon to know unless he has some knowledge of the state of the man's intellect and dispositions during health? He may have suffered a great diminution of energy, so that he is altogether incapable of following a chain of reasoning, or comprehending a line of detail, to which, when in health, he would
have been much more than adequate. Nothing is more usual, in ordinary life, than to see a person a little unwell cease work from a consciousness of incapacity; even a common cold can cause diminution of mental vigour, and yet a severe gunshot injury is sometimes stated to have made no difference to the patient's mental capacity. This is generally due to the superficial examination resulting in such vague statements: "The senses were retained to the last"; "All the faculties remained entire"; "He had his consciousness entire, viz., he knew all around him." Sometimes we find it stated, "Memory was impaired." Which memory? Even in health not all our memories are the same. The memory for facts, events, tones, dates, numbers may be excellent, and the memory for proper names atrocious. Where is the clinical assistant who inquires into these details and tries to discover what they were in health and what they are now in disease?

"If the patient is free from delirium and can say 'Good morning,' and put out his tongue when told to do so, it is recorded that 'his mental faculties remained entire,' that 'there was no deficiency of intellect,' or that 'he was clear and collected to the last.' This testimony, of course, to be of any value, necessarily supposes a skilful and exhaustive exploration of the mind in all its departments, and a scrupulous attention to minute and intricate details in each particular case. Being founded, however, only upon the most superficial examination, it is not merely valueless but mischievous and misleading. To evidence of this kind must, I believe, be traced many fallacies which have impeded scientific progress, such as the statement that a whole hemisphere of the brain may be destroyed without the mind suffering in any way, or that every part of the brain has been found disorganised in one case or another, without any derangement of the mind having existed."—(Sir James Crichton-Browne.)

"That mental symptoms or mental deficiencies have not been recorded in cases of bilateral cerebral lesions is a negative statement of very little value. Unless a man becomes so demented as to neglect the ordinary wants of nature, or so furious, maniacal, or irrational as to require restraint, there are few engaged in the practice of medicine who think of inquiring narrowly into a patient's mental state, and, even if more attention were directed towards this subject, are we in possession of any means of accurately gauging the mental condition of an individual so as to be certain that it has altogether escaped damage, notwithstanding the presence of a cerebral lesion? I see little to justify, and much to contradict, such an assumption. A man may not be incapacitated for the ordinary duties of life, but that his mental powers are altogether unscathed, even by a unilateral lesion, I venture to question."—(Sir David Ferrier.)

"Every structure in the nervous system has a specific function, and if a portion is destroyed it cannot be replaced anatomically, and, from the point of view of function, the compensations which are provided indirectly are always far from being complete. If in such cases no defect is recognised, it must undoubtedly be due to insufficient methods, to which may be added perhaps a want of patience on the part of the observer."—(Ernesto Lugaro.)

It is not uncommon to find patients years after a head-injury, when it has been forgotten because it left no outward sign, present symptoms of mental deterioration due to degenerative changes set up in the cortical layers of the hemispheres. The mischief produced may be out of all proportion to the apparent severity of the lesion, and therefore such injury should never be lightly regarded. Often it is only some local irritant to the membranes of the brain—such as a splinter of bone, accumulation of fluid, etc.—while the brain itself remains perfectly sound. In such cases cranial operation is all that is needed for the relief of the patient and the more alarming brain surgery need not be undertaken. From the cases quoted in the succeeding chapters it will also be apparent that there is no limit to the time that may elapse when surgical treatment may still be successful, some of the cases having
THE BRAIN: THE ORGAN OF THE PSYCHIC ACTIVITIES

been treated three, four, eight, and eleven years after the accident, one case after twenty-five years, and one even after thirty-one years.

The instructive matter in these cases is that the moral character is usually impaired first, and sometimes is completely perverted without a corresponding deterioration of the understanding. And still we find physicians and surgeons who neglect to inquire into the condition of the emotions and propensities in brain lesions, and proceed as if the human mind consisted of intellect only. Do we not find in ordinary ailments an increase of irritability or emotionality? Why, then, should the state of the feelings be overlooked in brain affections? The feelings may be changed without any affection of the intellect. MAUDSLEY, for example, held that "injury to the head will tend to produce intellectual disorder rather than emotional depression, while abdominal diseases will favour the production of emotional depression."

This lack of appreciation of the character-changes in brain lesions need not surprise us, however, for insanity has not long been recognised as a morbid condition of the brain, and it is only a little over fifty years ago that the Royal College of Physicians of London published a Nomenclature of Diseases, in which work insanity was dissociated from all other affections which beset humanity, and its varieties were comprised under the heading "Disorders of the Intellect," all connection with the emotions being disregarded.

It is due to lack of proper psychological training and knowledge of the elements of human character that the statement is so frequently made that all the faculties have been found entire after a brain lesion. But if a person of a mild and peaceable character, after a wound on the head, becomes quarrelsome and morose; and if another, whose life had always been irreproachable, after a similar accident should feel an irresistible inclination to steal, it is evident that, though these persons preserve consciousness, memory, judgment, and imagination, we cannot thence infer that the injuries inflicted have produced no derangement of the mental functions. Do animals not possess consciousness, memory, and judgment; but are they therefore on a level with men? If a man were by disease reduced, in point of faculties, to the level of a dog, but still enjoyed the five external senses, as well as some portion of memory and judgment, would he, therefore, have lost no characteristic faculty of humanity? If partial idiots have perception, memory, and judgment, are all the faculties of the mind manifested? It is evident, therefore, that the mental examination of patients with brain lesions will have to be conducted on very different lines in the future if we wish to discover the mental functions of the brain.

As has been shown in a previous chapter, the views on localisation are so conflicting, that the wisest plan for physicians and surgeons to follow would be to content themselves with placing on record the facts they observe and to let them, as it were, speak for themselves. If, as hitherto, every observer has his own preconceived notions, and draws conclusions from one or two cases that have come under his care, his report is useless; just as much as is the report of that other man whose mind is "made up" that localisation of any sort is impossible.

Another necessary criticism of medical and surgical reports is the vague description of the locality of the lesion. It is not enough to say "patient received a blow on the head," or "there was a scar on the side of the head," without telling us what bone had been injured and what part of it.

RATHMANN ("Vierteljahrschrift f. Gerichtl. Medizin," 1901) gives fifty-one cases of head injuries followed by mental derangement, most of them without indication of locality.

As we have already said, the more highly developed the mental powers, the more connected will the various channels of the brain become by means of intercommunication. Though the centres themselves are distinct, all of them are
inter-united, and the activity of each depends on its relation to the others. It is therefore a mistake to look for a protuberance of brain-matter, or a bump on its outer covering, the skull. Let me repeat again that no one centre is competent to manifest itself by itself. Each acts as a portion of the brain to modify the general result of cerebral action. It is through this solidarity and interdependence that no portion of it can be injured or exhausted without it interfering in some way with the functions of the other portions. There is, however, a great difference between saying that the various brain parts exert a mutual influence, and saying that each part does not perform its own particular function.

Destruction of a particular area, even if we know its exact boundaries, need not necessarily cause loss of a definite mental function, for no organ ever works alone; it sets into vibration other brain organs; just as we can rarely think of one subject or event without being reminded of a number of others associated with it, and having various feelings aroused at the same time. There must be division of labour in the cortex as elsewhere, and certain groups of cells will be occupied with preference with one fundamental psychic quality rather than with any other. We may in certain clinical cases of circumscribed lesions discover an increase or diminution of activity of a special mental faculty, but I can see no other way of discovering its seat.

Owing to these inexactitudes, the number of observations really available for scientific purposes is comparatively small. If the records of these cases were more carefully taken, both as regards the extent and location of the injury as well as to the mental changes following it, we should obtain most valuable information, whereas now this vast material is almost lost to us.

Owing to these inexactitudes we read such statements as: "Abscess of the brain may exist, or portions of it may be carried away by gunshot or other injuries, and yet no perceptible difference be observed in the mentality of the individual." After reading this one wonders what really is the use of the brain. It is only the vague, indefinite manner in which all these examples are produced that save the head and its contents from the imputation of being useless appendages. The brain is the instrument of all the mental powers, and it betrays great indifference to assert that it matters not whether the instrument be a whole or a broken one.

It must, however, be distinctly admitted that instances of extensive cerebral disorganisation occur in which neither mental, nor motor, nor sensory disturbances appeared during life of so marked a character as to excite a suspicion that such things existed; but this kind of anomaly is by no means limited to the brain. Numerous cases are recorded in which a whole lung has been destroyed, or the greater part of the liver disorganised, or a kidney has disappeared, without any suspicion having been entertained during life of the real state of matters; and it would obviously be as reasonable to infer from them that the lungs were not the organs of respiration, or the liver the organ of biliary secretion.

The fact that is frequently overlooked is that the brain is composed of two similar halves or hemispheres, and that, consequently, all the centres must be double. The wonder is that one-sided injury so often causes an accentuation or loss of a particular mental power; for, as a matter of fact, both centres should be destroyed to cause complete loss of the function with which it is concerned.

Though we may speak of a centre, it is understood that as there are two hemispheres of the brain, every centre is two-fold, and to this fact may be due those few instances in which a particular centre has been injured or destroyed without a loss of any mental power being discoverable. This is especially the case in accidents to the right half of the brain, which seems to be less active than the left. When the two halves are unequal, I have frequently observed that the right represents what the individual is by nature, i.e., his inherited organisation, and the left what he has made of it.
It has also to be noted that diagnosis in cases of blows to the head is often rendered difficult because of the effects of *contre-coup*. The head may be struck on the occiput, but the concussion causes the brain to shoot forward and impinge upon the frontal bone, where the effects may be produced. Were the mental functions of the brain better known, we should be more certain when a contre-coup has taken place, and would not have to wait for the post-mortem examination.

Another difficulty is that the emotions and propensities may become accentuated by a lesion of those parts of the brain with which these are connected; but they may also become accentuated when the lesion is in that part of the brain which has to do with the intellectual functions; because, the intellect being impaired, there is little or no control over the emotions and propensities. For example, it will be shown that a lesion of the lower part of the temporal lobes is almost invariably followed by symptoms of irascibility; but a lesion of the frontal lobes by destroying the control over the emotions may accentuate an irascible disposition. For this reason we should always know the state of the mind when the patient was in health.

Another puzzling difficulty to some observers is that in lesions of the brain the particular mental function is sometimes manifested more intensely; at other times it is diminished or lost. This is explained by the inflammation preceding the destruction of the nerve-cell. During the process of inflammation the activity of the function connected with the area involved will be stimulated to hyperactivity, and when degeneration commences and destruction takes place the function connected with the circumscribed area will diminish or vanish. This is in agreement with the law of the "temporary excess of function in atrophy," by *Claude Bernard*, which is: "When a histological element dies, or tends to die, its irritability, before diminishing, begins to augment, and it is only after this exaltation that it decreases again, and gradually becomes extinct." It has also to be noted that when the region of the intellectual functions is damaged, these get lost; but when the region of the emotions and propensities is injured, these are augmented. As a rule, the emotions become accentuated in inflammatory lesions of the parts of the brain concerned with them; while intellectual powers appear to be lost. (For proof of this statement see succeeding chapters.)

For clinical cases to be of use for localisation, both the history of the disease and the description of the post-mortem condition must be trustworthy, full, and unambiguous; and there should be no other lesion than the one in the cerebral cortex to complicate the legitimate inferences. These conditions are rarely fulfilled, and it is therefore a mistake to collect all cases indiscriminately to prove or disprove a particular theory. Thus Dr. *Paul Schuster* (of Prof. Mendel's Polyclinic), in his work on "Psychische Störungen bei Hirntumoren," Stuttgart, 1902, examined the localisation theory (as advanced by me in outline in a pamphlet published some twenty years ago) by collecting all cases of brain tumours recorded in history and noting the mental changes produced by them, if any. He found, of course, that only rarely did the records harmonise with my theory. In the succeeding chapters I shall produce the history of some hundreds of cases of brain tumours, omitting all those too vaguely described, and it will be seen as definitely as to amount almost to a law that the mental manifestations in cases of brain tumours involving the cortex vary according to the locality in which the growth is located, and that tumours in the same region produce the same manifestations.

Still, I do not claim that all the cases quoted by me are perfect; possibly some may be objected to on closer inquiry. But whatever the defect of individual cases, I shall produce such a volume of evidence, accurately recorded beyond all question, as shall induce, not necessarily the acceptance of my theories, but a fresh investigation into the whole subject of mental functions, on the lines suggested by me; not on the basis of former cases, but on new ones as they happen to occur.
THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN

It may be objected that many of the cases cited by me are not recent ones; some might even be described as ancient. But is this really a vital objection to the theories advanced? Such facts as I have just quoted—as that our modern students are trained to devote all their attention to the microscopical appearances of the brain in the different psychoses to the neglect of naked-eye appearances; the prevalence of the toxin theories to account for most forms of insanity; moreover, the lack of opportunity to study the early stages of mental disorders; as also the fact that intellectual changes are not inquired into with sufficient minuteness; and character changes are often disregarded altogether as not dependent on brain conditions; and last, but not least, the contempt with which the localisation theory of mental functions has hitherto been regarded—all these facts explain sufficiently the lack of adequate material.

Pathologists will now know what to look for to discover local lesions; and surgeons will learn when and where to operate, the more frequently the more definite our knowledge of the mental functions of the brain becomes. Already there is a fair number quoted in which surgical operation has been performed successfully, not only in cases of injury to the head, but also in inflammatory lesions, haemorrhages, and new growths.

If my theory of the physiological basis of human character—of the localisation of the fundamental qualities and dispositions in the brain—be right, it can hardly fail to lead to a more perfect understanding of human character, and, indirectly, to the elucidation of some of the most difficult and interesting psychological, educational, and social problems. So much is certainly evident, that not only as regards the intellectual qualities, but as regards the strength of the primary feelings, we do not start life equally, but with advantages and disadvantages according to our inherited organisation. The highly organised brain is bound to lead, to dictate, to govern, while the more weakly endowed is born to a life of servitude and submission. From this it follows that no uniform system of education is in conformity with nature; moreover, it becomes evident that parents and teachers must train the feelings and propensities as well as the intellectual capacities of children, since the former as well as the latter depend on the inherited brain organisation, and the feelings supply the motives to the exercise of the intellect, and on their proper development and restraint depends the whole character and thus the future of the man.

This question of localisation of function is of the highest importance both to the psychologist and the physician. Those who admit that the primary mental powers have separate centres in the brain will condemn uniform methods of education and lay stress on individual training according to the organisation. The localisation theory will enable us to explain abnormalities of character and to trace them to their cause; and, speaking as a brain-specialist, the localisation theory is of the greatest importance in the diagnosis and treatment of those early stages of mental derangement when the pathological changes have not yet advanced too far and the patient is not mad enough to be certified as insane.

In conclusion, let me repeat that I do not wish anything contained in these pages to be taken for granted. I shall be satisfied if I can claim to have indicated the lines on which future research might be undertaken with better results than have been hitherto achieved.
CHAPTER XXIX

INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS AND THEIR CEREBRAL ORIGIN

We have seen that there are elementary feelings and propensities which man and animals have in common, and which exist for the preservation of the animal and man without consciousness, reflection, or active participation on the part of the individual being necessary. But if it be admitted that we have elementary feelings in common with animals and are distinguished from them by our greater intellect and higher sentiments, and if it be admitted that all mental operations take place in and through the brain, then we must presume that we have some parts of the brain in common with animals and some which are distinctly human. This is proved by comparative anatomy. If we take the lowest animal which has a rudimentary brain, and observe the gradual development throughout the whole species of animals till we reach the highest apes, whose brain most closely resembles that of human beings, we shall see that, in accordance with the gradual development of the reasoning capacity of animals, there is a part of brain, corresponding to the frontal lobes in man, which correspondingly increases in size and is relatively largest in the gorilla, chimpanzee and orang-outang, though their frontal lobes are still smaller in size than those of the lowest human idiot. As the other lobes in man and animals show no such disproportion, we may draw the inference that the frontal lobes are related to functions which are distinctly human, that they are the instruments for abstract thought and the higher intellectual operations, and possibly for the higher human sentiments.

Again, if we study embryology and observe the growth of the human brain, we shall find that those parts which are the latest and highest acquisitions grow last, and that as the reflective and reasoning faculties are latest in arriving at perfection, the frontal lobes are the last to develop.

If we now examine the brains of microcephalic idiots, we find that the arrested development is chiefly in the frontal lobes. Indeed, if we compare the frontal lobes of imbeciles with those of men distinguished for their intellectual qualities, we find a great contrast in their size, though the remainder of the hemispheres has attained to normal growth. The contrast is more eloquent than any language can express. On the other hand, it is not to be overlooked that examples of idiocy and imbecility are not rare where the head is of average size and shape, and where the mental deficiency is congenital through an insufficiency of neuronic elements.

As the deficiency of the frontal lobes is not accompanied by a corresponding deficiency of the rest of the brain, the emotional life of all the higher idiots, as of all the higher animals, is remarkably vivid as compared with their intellectual life. All the propensities and emotions are present, except the higher emotions—the ethical, aesthetical, and spiritual—which belong to the frontal lobes, as we shall show. True, their emotions are not profound. A trivial event will make them laugh or cry, and it is easy to hurt their feelings with a slight offence; on the other hand, the death of a dear relative is very soon forgotten, while the stronger passions do not
occur with that force and persistency common to normal man. The higher faculties, that belong to the frontal lobes, as I said, are absent. There is, for example, no idea of right and wrong. The higher idiots do experience a feeling of remorse on offending the sympathies of those whom they love; but, it seems, some dogs know when they have done wrong and hide themselves from their master.

There are a number of anthropological facts in favour of the view that the frontal lobes are related to the intellect. The expansion of the frontal lobes in men engaged in intellectual pursuits has been repeatedly demonstrated by actual measurements. It has been shown that the frontal lobes vary in size and weight in different races according to their intellectual capacity. Anthropologists have demonstrated from examination of European skulls that the progress of civilisation has resulted in raising the anterior and flattening the posterior part of the head.

HERMANN WAGNER (1840-), inspired by his father, RUDOLF WAGNER (1805-1864), in 1864 compared the mean proportions of the cortex in man and the orang. The occipital lobes proved larger in the orang than in man, while the frontal lobes were considerably smaller. He also weighed each lobe of the brain of Gauss, the mathematician, and of other eminent men, and compared it with the weight obtained from the brains of working-class men. The workmen had the smallest frontal lobes, but larger occipital lobes than the celebrated mathematician.

GRATIOLET (1815-1865) distinguished the principal divisions of our species by that bone of the skull which is relatively the largest. Thus (1) Frontal or Caucasian; (2) Parietal or Mongolian; (3) Occipital or Ethiopic. He has shown that in the Caucasian, the anterior fontanelle is the last to ossify, and thus permits of the greatest possible development to the frontal lobes; and that in the Ethiopic race the reverse condition obtains, the posterior fontanelle being the last to ossify. According to this arrangement, in the superior races the frontal lobes of the hemispheres continue to develop for a long time after the occlusion of the posterior sutures has put an end to the growth of the rest of the brain; in the inferior races, on the contrary, the ossification of the sutures proceeds from before backwards, and, thus the anterior parts of the brain are first arrested in their growth.

The important researches made in reference to ancient skulls by the ABBÉ FRÈRE, whose rich collection is in the Anthropological Museum at Paris, led him to the conclusion that the skulls of Europeans have increased in size since historic times; and that the progress of civilisation seems to have resulted in raising the anterior and flattening the occipital part of the skull.

PAUL BROCA (1824-1880) examined the heads of thirty-two house surgeons who had successively resided at the Bicêtre during the years 1861-1862, and compared their dimensions with those of the heads of twenty-four porters attached to the various wards of the same hospital. This comparison resulted in the confirmation of the generally received opinion, that the anterior lobes are the instruments for the higher intellectual operations; and Broca considered that he had demonstrated that the cultivation of the mind and intellectual work augment the size of the brain, and that such increase affects chiefly the anterior lobes. ("Revue Scientifique," 1861-2.)

J. B. M. PARCHEPPE (1800-1866) also made measurements and found that the frontal lobes in men of learning have much larger proportions than in common working men.

LAGASSAINE and CLIQUET have examined, by aid of the conformateur, the heads of 190 doctors of medicine, 133 rudimentarily educated persons, 90 illiterate persons, and 91 prisoners (soldiers), with the following results. There was a considerable difference in size of head in favour of the doctors, and this was especially marked in the frontal measurement. In the educated, the frontal region was more developed to the left, and was altogether proportionately more developed than the occipital region, which was the larger in the case of the illiterate.

ALEXANDER MacALISTER (1844-1910), Professor of Anatomy, at the British
Association Meeting, Edinburgh, 1892, declared that "increased growth of the frontal lobes is the physical accompaniment of intellectual activity."

Theodore Meynert (1833-1892) found that in normal brains the ratio between the weight of frontal plus temporal lobes and the weight of parietal plus occipital lobes is as 6:3. In dementia paralytica and dementia senilis this quotient is 5:4, showing that the frontal lobes and temporal lobes have lost the most.

Schröder van der Kolk (1797-1862) wrote: "That to all parts of the cerebral convolutions are not assigned exactly similar functions was long ago suspected. Further, that a finely arched forehead indicates, as a rule, high intellectual endowment was already not unknown to the Greeks, as we may conclude from their delineations of Jupiter, Apollo, and so forth. The strongly prominent forehead as the prerogative of man came yet more definitely into view when Camper proposed the facial angle named after him, and pointed out its difference in Aztecs, Negroes, and Europeans, in children likewise and in grown-up persons."

Whenever decided talent is found conjoined with a small frontal region—small in all its dimensions and relatively to the other regions of the brain and to the body generally—there will also invariably be found a vivid and energetic temperament and such propensities and emotions which act as a stimulus to the intellect; or else however little there is of the intellect has been concentrated upon that particular field of study for which there is some natural gift. Energy of character, industry, application, often make up for natural talent.

On the other hand, one can see everywhere plenty of big foreheads, high, broad, and with a large base from the opening of the ear to the outer corner of the eye—so that we may presume large frontal lobes, without their possessors being remarkable for intellectual ability either general or in one particular. There are various reasons to account for this, the most common being that the brain has never been stocked with knowledge, or only with trivial information such as a cheap Press supplies; the person may be easygoing, lack nervous energy, application, or, what is not uncommon, he may be a mere dreamer.

Remarkable foreheads may be seen amongst working-class men. Some do not show any special knowledge, but sound, practical views on the problems of life, while a great many others have studied for themselves politics, political economy, and even special sciences, in which they excel. But we must look for something more than an apparently large forehead for a sign of intelligence, ability, etc. The head must be well proportioned all round; otherwise, if the sides or the back of the head predominate over the front, the intellect will be merely in the service of the functions of these parts.

I shall show—on the strength of a large number of clinical cases by independent observers—that over-stimulation of the frontal lobes by hyperæmia, congestion, etc., leads to:

1. A joyful disposition, and in its trend extreme hopefulness, feeling of well-being, mental exaltation, delusions of grandeur and ambitious delirium (a false belief of possession of honours, fabulous property, and extraordinary mental capacities);

2. A state of mania, namely hypomania.

3. When the stimulation amounts to congestion, paralysing the frontal brain-cells, or destroying them, there will be loss of self-control, i.e., loss of inhibition over emotions and propensities; consequently loss of ethical, aesthetic, and religious sentiments (and through the loss of inhibition, the patient seeks immediate gratification of his desires).

Further, it will be shown that destruction of portions of the frontal area leads to:

1. Loss of active apperception;

2. Defects of memory;
(3) Defect or loss of logical reasoning; and when involving the greater part of the substance, there will be

(4) Dementia.

The larger the frontal lobes, the greater the power of inhibition, suspending and postponing the immediate and direct pursuit of an end, a step which lies at the root of all progress, civilisation and morality. The larger and more perfect the frontal lobes, the more reasoned adaptation enters into the action of instinctive tendencies, and the greater the self-control.

Experiments on animals confirm the view that the frontal lobes are the centres of perception and reflection, and the centres of inhibition against the instinctive impulses, so that they form the basis of the moral sentiments as far as their rudimentary existence can be demonstrated in the lower creatures.

Hitzig (1838-1907) said: "It is true that the intelligence exists in all parts of the cortex, or, rather, in all parts of the brain, but I hold that abstract thought needs a separate organ, and seek for it in the frontal lobes." He claims to have observed that dogs whom he deprived of the frontal area forgot all they had learned and could not learn anything new.

Ferrier observed that "after removal or destruction by the cautery of the antero-frontal lobes, the animals retain their appetites and instincts, and are capable of exhibiting emotional feeling. They have lost, however, the faculty of attentive and intelligent observation." He locates the centres of reflection and attention in the frontal lobes.

Bianchi found after destruction of the frontal lobes in dogs and monkeys that the curiosity to observe, which is so marked in monkeys, is lost; that they are not able to receive new impressions, or to remember or reflect on the old; and that since they can no longer criticise they become timid and easily excited. The frontal lobes appeared to him not only centres of perception and reflection, but also co-ordination centres of the rest of the brain. He said: "The animals remain friendly, they still caress or show affection. They can get into wild excitement. They show fear more readily. They become cautious, but cannot avoid accidents; these strike terror into them. They eat with reckless avidity. They are duller and sleepy. The physiognomy is stupid; the expression cruel. They show no gratefulness. They cannot adapt themselves to new surroundings, neither learn anything new, nor regain what they have forgotten." His hypothesis is that the frontal lobes are the seat of co-ordination and fusion of the incoming and outgoing products of the several sensory and motor areas of the cortex. The frontal lobes sum up into series the products of the sensory-motor regions, as well as the emotive states which accompany all the perceptions, the fusion whereof constitutes what has been termed the psychical tone of the individual. Removal of the frontal lobes does not so much interfere with the perceptions taken singly as it does disaggregate the personality, and incapacitate for synthetising groups of representations. The actual impressions which serve to revive those groups thus succeed one another disconnectedly under the influence of fortuitous external stimuli, and disappear without giving rise to associational processes in varied and recurrent succession. With the organ for the physiological fusion which forms the basis of association disappear also the physical conditions underlying reminiscence, judgment, and discrimination, as is well shown in mutilated animals." The destruction of the frontal lobes, according to Bianchi, entails the loss of the anatomical and physiological basis upon which judgment and the reasoning faculties are reared. The monkeys operated upon by Ferrier lost the power of psychical concentration and attention. According to Bianchi, the animals lost much more, namely, the power of recalling the images of previous sensations in commemorative form, and the power of associating these images in abstract synthesis. He observed the same symptoms in the human subject in cases of tumour affecting the anterior portion of the brain.

Hitzig's, Ferrier's, and Bianchi's localisation of the intellect possesses a special interest owing to the fact that it contains a negation, implied if not expressed, which
is more important than the affirmation: Whilst they assign an intellectual function to the pre-frontal lobes, they deny it to the other regions of the cortex.

ANTON agrees with Bianchi; and COLELLA, too, considers, as a result of his experiments, that the pre-frontal lobes are the seat of the highest psychical functions.

S. J. FRANZ ("Archives of Psychology," 1907), after training monkeys and cats, destroyed their frontal lobes, when he found that all freshly acquired habits and knowledge were lost; but if any other part of the brain was destroyed they were not lost. This loss cannot be ascribed to shock, loss of blood, or the anesthetic, for in the destruction of the other parts they are just the same. If one lobe was destroyed, the intellectual associations and actions were not lost but retarded. The emotions and passions were manifested the same as before.

LUSSANA (1820-1898) extirpated the first and second frontal convolutions and the orbital lobes of dogs and observed that such animals no longer recognised their master, nor the street or house they lived in. Destruction of any other area of the brain still preserved these memories. This observation will be confirmed by me by a large number of cases of lesions of these parts in man.

Pathological observations also confirm this localisation. It is universally known that in senile dementia and dementia of any kind, including dementia paralytica or general paralysis of the insane, the greatest atrophy occurs in the frontal lobes. Physiologists not being pathologists, many of them have taken no note of this. Moreover, the convolutions of the frontal lobes in idiots and imbeciles are deficient and there is a want of development of the nerve-cells—as we should expect if our theory is true.

MEYNERT ("Wiener Medizinische Presso," 1886) observed that "all forms of dementia, including senile dementia and dementia paralytica, are due to brain atrophy affecting the frontal lobes, whose weight is much reduced, whereas the other lobes are hardly at all involved."

HITZIG pointed out already, in 1874, that the ruin which progressive paralysis—that implacable destroyer of the intellect—produces, is pre-eminently in the cortex of the frontal lobes.

FERRIER observed in lesions of the frontal lobes "inability to fix the attention," and he says: "The frequent association of idiocy with defect of the frontal lobes is a generally recognised fact."

CARL VOGT (1817-1895) found: "The brain formation of microcephalous idiots does not depend on an arrest of development of the brain equally all over, but chiefly of the frontal lobes."

B. SACHS found: "Large porencephalic defects in the parietal areas are compatible with a tolerable high mental development, whereas a defective development of the frontal lobes leads to complete idiocy even though the remainder of the hemispheres has attained to normal growth."

JOSEPH SHAW BOLTON has shown that in dementia the frontal cortex, especially the pre-frontal area, is greatly degenerated, and that in idiots the degrees of mental deficiency correspond with the lack of development of the same region, while the remainder of the brain may be normal. "The pre-frontal region is the region of the cerebrum which is concerned with the performance of the highest co-ordinating and associational processes of mind." Bolton—in opposition to A. W. Campbell—has found that the pre-frontal area of the brain is of extremely complex structure and of finer architecture than any other part of the brain. "It is the last region of the cortex cerebri to develop; it possesses the highest associational functions, and is the first to undergo retrogression. The greatest amount of wasting in dementia occurs in the pre-frontal region. In cases of amnesia there is under-development of the pre-frontal region and a more or less marked simplicity of the convolutional pattern. The high-grade amnesia is a man who is required to do a man's work with a child's brain." (Journal of Mental Science, 1906.)

CHARLES K. MILLS, late Professor of Neurology in the University of Pennsylvania, said: "The region of the brain in which focal lesions have produced persistent psychic symptoms has been the pre-frontal lobe. If these lesions are
both extensive and deep-seated, disorders of memory, will, attention, comparison, and judgment may be present.'" And again: "Lesions of the pre-frontal lobe, although this is one of the so-called latent districts of the brain, have in a large percentage of the carefully studied cases shown distinctive manifestations. The symptoms are largely psychical, and unfortunately the physician is not usually well trained to study such phenomena. Mental disturbances of a peculiar character occur, such as mental slowness and uncertainty, want of attention and control, and impairment of judgment and reason; closely studied, the inhibitory influence of the brain both upon psychical and physical action is found to be diminished."

G. Anton ("Neurologisches Centralblatt," 1900) gave the following description of lesions of the frontal lobes: "Injury to one frontal lobe has as a consequence that the intellectual functions can be carried on only with greater exertion. The memory and judgment are weakened, and continued attention is rendered difficult. If the disease extends to the other frontal lobe as well, then we have sudden and hopeless dementia."

F. Durante said that lesions of the frontal lobes are always followed by intellectual changes, and that the frontal, especially the pre-frontal, region is the seat of the highest mental powers.

P. Schuster ("Mental Changes Accompanying Brain Tumours," 1902) stated that melancholia and paranoia are hardly ever observed in lesions of the frontal lobes, but mania and dementia are.

P. Flechsig ("Gehirn und Seele," 1896) located in the frontal lobes the anterior association centre of attention, reflection, inhibition. It is concerned with abstract concepts and other complex intellectual processes. He observed the following changes taking place in lesions of the frontal lobes: (1) active apperception ceases; (2) logical reasoning becomes defective; (3) loss of ethical and aesthetical judgment; (4) exaltation; (5) loss of self-control.

Richter, De Bayer, Duret, Grasset, P. W. MacDonald, and many others expressed similar opinions as to the functions of the pre-frontal lobes.

The majority of physiologists have ignored Wundt's distinction between perception and apperception—the centres for which he located in the frontal lobes—and persist in placing these centres in the sensory regions, visual, auditory, etc. We shall deal with these centres in this chapter, and will mention for the present only that from the evidence which we are about to submit it does appear that they are related to the lowest parts of the frontal lobes, viz., the inferior parts of the three frontal convolutions, the orbital convolutions, and perhaps the small convolutions within the fissure of Sylvius. We shall quote cases which demonstrate that destruction of these parts causes loss of definite perceptive powers and memories.

We also find that when the frontal lobes are destroyed by injury or disease the processes of judgment and reason are diminished, there is an inability to fix the attention, to follow a continuous train of thought, or to conduct intellectual processes, ultimately ending in complete dementia. We find, moreover, that in such men the struggle between the lower instincts and ethical feelings is diminished or does not exist any longer, and instead of a rational man, we see a creature given over to the satisfaction of his lower desires. Such is the case in all forms of lesions of the frontal lobes, and it does not occur in lesions of other parts of the brain.

Hyperaemia of the frontal lobes of the brain, or any other irritating pathological condition, causes an increased activity of the mental processes of perception, association, and reproduction. The patient forms numerous plans and projects, has a rapid flow of ideas, and through stimulation of the speech centre is loquacious, but his stream of talk and ideas is perfectly coherent; it is only in the advanced stage that he may become incoherent. The other lobes of the brain being unaffected and deprived of the control of the intellect, manifestations of the natural feelings and animal spirits occur. There is a peculiar hilarity and tendency to jest, and there may be actual exaltation. The patient is free from hallucinations and delusions, knows his surroundings, and many men fail to recognise in him anything
abnormal. This state of mind is called manie by the Germans and French, and is not the same as the English "mania," by which usually a furious state is meant, described by the Germans as Tobsucht.

In the hypomanie, as the patient suffering from manie is sometimes called, all the psychical processes take place with unwonted alacrity and exuberance, creating in the mind of the patient joy, satisfaction, and self-confidence. There is euphoria, a happy state, and moria, a jocular state of mind. The good spirits of the hypomanie seem, excepting for occasional slight abatement, to be inexhaustible; they almost never leave him; they make dangers invisible, misfortune light, life easy, and its struggles pleasant. If some incident in a patient whose frontal lobes are excited (as in manie) arouses ill-humour, it is not for long, and certainly does not increase to blind fury (as in Tobsucht); but the two forms of mania can occur together, and usually the former lapse into the latter.

Temporary depression may precede the maniacal attack from a vague consciousness of an approaching mental disturbance. A temporary state of depression may also follow the attack in consequence of the exhaustion after the excessive mental and motor activity, and partly from the recollection of the mental illness and a reflection on the consequences of the many foolish things said and done. Such depression is under the circumstances perfectly natural, and should not be mistaken for "melancholia."

EUPHORIA

Both in functional and organic lesions of the frontal lobes there is one characteristic that is missing in lesions of any other part of the brain, and therefore diagnostic, that is, the patient has no anxiety as to his condition; on the contrary, frequently there is a sense of well-being and general optimism—a mental condition called euphoria is present, while depression is most common in lesions of the parietal and occipital lobes.

While the parietal lobes, as will be shown in the next chapter, seem to be in special relation to the sympathetic nervous system, the frontal lobes appear to be specially connected with the cerebro-spinal nerves, and consequently their stimulation gives rise to unrestrained, spontaneous muscular activity, with a feeling of joy, as seen in laughter and play. Certain it is that lesions of the frontal lobes are more often accompanied by euphoria, and lesions of the parietal lobes by melancholia, and that in the one there is an excess, and in the other a diminution of mental and muscular activity. For exceptions, see next chapter.

The mental processes of perception, association, and reproduction are stimulated, and there is emotional exaltation; hence the patient exhibits a rapid flow of ideas, coupled with an unmeaning gaiety and increased motor activity. The perfect health and general well-being of these patients renders them joyous, talkative, satisfied with themselves and content with others. Natural dispositions such as hope, pride, and ambition, in addition to the imagination, are stimulated to excess as the disease progresses; delusions of grandeur and of vanity, of increased wealth, power, and importance may develop, followed by confusion and disorientation, until all the ideas are affected and chronic dementia is the result.

The patient, as has been mentioned, may get angry when offended, or on receiving ill-treatment, but his irascibility does not last. It is over when the cause is withdrawn. Similarly his motor excitement is of the joyful type and not of the destructive furious rage order. If damage is done it is good-humouredly. This distinguishes the hypomanic from the "acute" furious maniac.

The patient's stream of talk in the early stage is perfectly coherent, as we have already pointed out, but it is not always refined owing to the loss of inhibitory power over the propensities; hence the patient may show erotic passion or he may steal
THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN

if there is an inclination to it normally, but even then it is not done from a blind impulse but from a desire to do mischief for the fun of the thing. This desire to do mischief for his or his companions' amusement may prove troublesome, but is easily controlled by judicious management, and need not be regarded as dangerous.

**The euphoria of frontal lesions is not based on delusions but is absolutely free from any motive.** It is also in sad contrast to the seriousness of the patient's condition. Frequently there is to be observed an inclination to witticism, joking, punning—a state called moria—which also does not occur in lesions of other parts of the brain.

**P. Schuster** ("Psychische Störungen bei Hirn-tumoren") found irascibility a symptom in frontal tumours; but he included any and every case he could find in medical literature, and thus included also epileptics who developed frontal tumours. But irascibility is a common symptom accompanying epilepsy and not diagnostic of frontal tumours. Schuster included even alcoholics suffering from frontal tumours as showing irascibility.

**M. Jastrowitz** ("Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift," 1888) noticed in tumours of the frontal lobes a peculiarly cheerful excitement—hilarity and witticism—which is retained sometimes even on the operating table until the application of the anaesthetic. He observed also that the patient is given to grimaces.

**H. Oppenheim** ("Charité Annalen," vol. x., and "Archiv für Psychiatrie," 1890) gave quite a number of cases of frontal tumour with abnormal witticism and humorous remarks.

**L. Bruns** ("Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift," 1892) observed play with words—punning—and witticism.

**A. Richter** ("Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie," 1883) and **Knörlein** observed grimaces.

Sir **Wm. Gowers** ("Textbook on Nervous Diseases") and **M. Bernhardt** ("On Brain Tumours") noticed childishness and childish actions.

**J. B. F. Baillarger** (1809-1890), "Annales Médico-Psychologiques," 1881, published six cases of "ambitious delirium," i.e., mental exaltation, with focal lesions in the frontal lobes. The delirium may continue for six months or longer, he said, without lesions of chronic perencephalitis.

Prof. **Colin**, of Val-de-Grâce, published in 1878 a paper on "General Paralysis, in which he declared that a lesion of the frontal lobes of the brain may become the starting-point of general paralysis, by extension of what is at first a focal area.

**Meynert** held that in mental derangements in which exaltation forms a prominent symptom the frontal lobe is the affected part, not so in derangements in which depression is the leading characteristic. ("Erkrankungen des Vorderhirns," 1884.)

**F. Obernier** considered exaltation to be one of the symptoms of tumours of the frontal lobes.


**EXAMPLES OF EUPHORIA AND EXALTATION**

**CASES OF FRONTAL TUMOURS**

**Case of Frontal Tumour with Euphoria.**

**Thomas Lytle** ("Journal of Mental Science," 1880):

T. H., a boatman, "keeps in the very best of spirits. When asked how he is, says he feels 'very well,' repeating the words 'very well.' He sings occasionally, and talks a good deal of the fine boats he possesses, and addresses strangers by some familiar name, such as 'Joe': labours under the delusion of mistaken identity, and holds out his hand to shake hands with strangers, believing he has known them all his life. Takes his food well and enjoys it. Generally very happy and contented. No history or symptoms of syphilis." Post mortem, a tumour was found occupying the greater part of the right frontal lobe.
Case of Frontal Tumour with Euphoria.

F. X. Dercum ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases," 1910):

M. S., age thirty-two, merchant. "The patient's answers to questions are somewhat variable and he is at times distinctly confused. He smiles readily and seems quietly pleased. He manifests no anxiety as to his condition. He asks no questions." A huge tumour was removed from the frontal lobe. Patient died shortly afterwards.

Case of Frontal Tumour—Euphoria—Moria—Disturbances of Memory.

D. Campbell (Altona), "Monatsschrift für Psychiatrie u. Neurologie," 1910:

Patient, thirty-seven years old, conscious of his surroundings, gives a correct account of his past history, but confabulates when interrogated about recent events, has no sense of time, does not know recent dates, is indifferent as to his condition, cheerful, witty, easily irritated but quiet when left alone. Post mortem, tumour was found involving both frontal lobes.

Case of Frontal Tumour—Euphoria and Loss of Memory.

CASTAN and LEJONNE ("Revue Neurologique," 1901):

A woman, age thirty-three, was admitted into the Salpêtrière with optic neuritis, Jacksonian epilepsy, and a peculiar psychical disturbance. Suffering at the commencement of her illness from apathy and torpor, probably due to cerebral compression, she now passed into a state of high spirits, looking happy and smiling when spoken to, complaining no longer, and showing signs of good humour and good appetite. Her intelligence seemed a little blunted, and she laughed at almost everything which was said to her, and exhibited little initiative or volition of her own. Her recollection of things said to her was poor. Her habits remained neat and clean, and she was free from dementia. A somnolent state succeeded the euphoria, lasting three months. The necropsy revealed a large cystic tumour involving the posterior two-thirds of the ascending frontal convolution.

Case of Frontal Tumour with Euphoria, Moria, Loss of Appreciation of Time and Loss of Moral Sense.

F. X. Dercum ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases," 1908):

D. P., age fifty, clergyman; family history and previous history good. Only signs he noticed was failing sight and headache. His friends, however, observed the following changes: "He appears to be easily pleased and is of an easy disposition. He was at one time exceedingly active and interested in his clerical duties, but now is indifferent to his duties. He never worries about anything. He used to be very conscientious, but now is apt to take everything as a joke. He is never serious. Formerly he was very punctilious, but now he is careless in regard to keeping his appointments and indifferent as to beginning his services at the right time. He has done various erratic things, such as visiting his friends and forgetting altogether the proprieties as regards the length of his stay. He would remain all day and once stayed even for weeks. This conduct contrasted strongly with his former habits." Later on he deteriorated morally. When asked to undress, it was found he had not a single undergarment upon his person, and when asked to explain why he had dressed himself this way, he did not seem to realise that he had done anything unusual. Post mortem, an enormous tumour was found involving both frontal lobes to about an equal extent. These lobes had suffered extensively from compression and loss of the white substance; while the convolutions, especially the anterior and orbital portions of the first and second frontals on either side, had been much thinned. The tumour upon microscopical examination proved to be a sarcoma.

Case of Frontal Tumour with Euphoria and Moria.


Man, age thirty-seven, suffering from tumour involving both frontal lobes, the Vol. ii.]
right almost completely destroyed. The symptoms were: bad memory for recent events, confabulation, moria, indolence, sleepiness, and violent headache. He had no hallucinations and was not demented. He went blind.

Case of Frontal Tumour with Exaltation.

V. MAGNAN ("Revue Mensuelle de Médecine et de Chirurgie," 1879): reports a case of exaltation in which post mortem a tumour was found in the ascending frontal convolution about its middle third.

Case of Frontal Tumour with Exaltation and Excessive Hopefulness.

F. LALLEMAND ("Recherches Anat.-pathologiques sur l'Encéphale"): Jean Bailly, age sixty, after some ill-treatment by soldiers, had several paralytic seizures which passed off. Coincidently his character changed. He developed an excessive "hopefulness," a blind belief in obtaining a considerable fortune, and planned great enterprises. One characteristic deformity was observed: his mouth was drawn up on the right side. Post mortem, a tumour was found, the size of a large egg, on the posterior surface of the right frontal lobe.

Tumour of Frontal Convolution with Exaltation.

SIEMENS, "Berliner Klinische Wochenschrift," 1888.

Frontal Tumour with Exaltation, Optimism, Dementia.


THOMAS LYLE, ibidem, 1883.

TARGOULA, ibidem, 1890.

OTHER LESIONS

Cases of Frontal Lesion with Euphoria.

ALFRED GORDON ("Journal of American Medical Association," 1907):

J. M. H., age thirty-four, "when asked where he was, replied 'in Paradise.' Every act and word expressed enchantment. He would joke with strangers. He expressed pleasure at anything offered him. Any article of food tasted delicious." Post mortem was found haemorrhage in left frontal lobe.

L. PIQUÉ ("Soc. de Chirurgie," 1910):

H., age fifteen, fell from a train, sustaining a comminuted fracture of right frontal bone. Three months later developed excessive gaiety, laughing incessantly.

Case of Exaltation with Loss of Moral Sense.


A woodworker, age thirty-five, had his left frontal bone fractured in a railway accident. In a few weeks he became grandiose, careless as to money, and obscene. Burr mentions several other cases of apparently focal lesions, but gives no details as to their locality.

Cases of Frontal Lesion with Exaltation.

MARANDON DE MONTYEL ("Annales Médico-psychologiques," 1877):

In a patient suffering from délie des grandes there was found post mortem inflammatory adhesions of the meninges to the left ascending frontal convolution.

KRAFFT-EBING ("Traumatic Insanity," Erlangen, 1868):

G. B., age twenty-nine, farmer, fell from his carriage on the left side of the vault of the skull. He developed mania of exaltation. Death six years after the accident, when two sequestra were found in left ascending frontal convolution.

L. MARCHAND ("Soc. Anat.," 1905):

Patient hit by a stone on the head when four years old. Exaltation delirium set in at fifteenth year and continued till death at age of sixty-three. P. M. softening of left ascending frontal convolution.
INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS AND THEIR CEREBRAL ORIGIN

MENDEL (quoted by Paul Guder, "Geistesstörungen nach Kopfverletzungen," 1886):

Man, thirty-six years old, good history, was hit with a pistol on top of head. Scar two and a half inches long at sagittal suture parallel with coronal suture. Paresis of arm, aphasia, exaltation. Post mortem, the cranium was found thickened in the region mentioned with exostoses; blood-extravasation with pseudo-membrane internally.

Case of Frontal Lesion with Exaltation and Euphoria.

V. MAGNAN ("Revue Mensuelle de Médecine et de Chirurgie," 1878):

The patient, a butcher, age fifty, showed, a few days before admission, excessive activity in making exalted plans, and was possessed by an abnormal cheerfulness and optimism. Post mortem was found a symmetrical lesion in the middle 3-5th of each ascending frontal convolution, the active congestion extending to half the middle and lower frontal convolutions.

EXAMPLES OF SURGICAL TREATMENT

Case of Frontal Tumour with Loss of Induction and Deduction, and Recovery after Surgical Operation.

This case should be compared with those of lesions in other parts of the frontal lobes, especially with that of Abel and Colman (p. 108), which, it will be seen, produce no loss of judgment and reason, but intellectual deficiencies of another kind.

WILLIAM ELDER and ALEXANDER MILES ("Lancet," 1902):

Patient, a man, age forty-seven, had a tumour of the left pre-frontal lobe exactly under the frontal eminence, which was swollen. As regards the affection of his memory, it appeared to be not so much a blotting-out of his past impressions as a want of power of associating memories, of comparing and contrasting them. Loss of power of forming a judgment about anything and loss of attention were prominent symptoms of his mental condition. He could not compare or contrast two things or ideas. His individual memories seemed all right. He recognised objects and friends. His emotional condition was another prominent symptom in his case. He lost the sense of modesty and shame. There was evidently loss of inhibition. The skull was trephined, the tumour was removed, and the patient's symptoms rapidly disappeared.

Case of Frontal Injury with Symptoms of Exaltation, and Recovery after Surgical Operation.

BARTON and GAYTON ("British Medical Journal," 1891):

A woman, age thirty-nine, married, no family. There was a history of a blow on the head received whilst running upstairs, when she knocked her head against the top of the doorway. This spot, which was the seat of very great pain and headache, was selected for the operation, namely, one inch to the right of the middle line and one inch behind the coronal suture. Patient had exalted ideas of wealth, delusions as to possessing carriages and horses, etc. There were no convulsions previous to the operation, but there were two afterwards. A fortnight later she began to improve, and from that time made a steady recovery. The delusions and headache were both cured. Before the operation she wrote badly and incoherently; after the operation her handwriting improved, and she wrote a reasonable letter. She was discharged.

Case of Surgical Treatment of General Paralysis of the Insane.

T. CLAYE SHAW ("British Medical Journal," 1891):

A man, age thirty-six, a packer at the Army and Navy Stores, had, when admitted, grandiose delusions, and was impaired in both gait and speech. He was
trephined by Mr. Harrison Cripps. The operation was carried out on the right side of the head about the middle of the post-central convolution, and consisted of making two one-inch trephine holes, about two inches apart, and removing the intermediate bone. There was considerable bulging of the tissues beneath the opening, indicating pressure. The underlying dura mater was removed, and the pia excised. A considerable quantity of fluid drained away, and the opening was then closed by replacement of the skin. Mental improvement followed, the intellect was clearer, patient became coherent, and had no delusions. He died suddenly in convulsions. At the post-mortem examination it was found that the trephine hole was completely filled up by a tough fibrous membrane. On the under-surface this membrane was adherent to about the size of a shilling to the cortex of the middle of the ascending frontal convolution.

Another similar case by the same author (ibidem, 1891).

THE FRONTAL LOBES AS CENTRES OF INHIBITION.

THE MORAL SENSE

Let me lay stress on the fact that the frontal lobes act as centres for inhibition—that is to say, they enable us to exercise control over our feelings and impulses. In injury or disease of the frontal lobes, therefore, will the intellect be affected, or some elements of it; but more manifest still will be the loss of inhibition over the natural dispositions of the man, in consequence of which they will be manifested in a much exaggerated manner. This accounts for the inaccurate statement so often made that frontal lesions may be accompanied by almost any symptom—irascibility, depression, suspicion, etc. These manifestations are not the symptoms; the only diagnostic symptom is the loss of control over the natural tendencies.

The frontal lobes, containing the centres for the reasoning processes, act as an inhibitory apparatus against the lower and more instinctive innate impulses. The more developed the frontal lobes are, the more they overbalance the rest of the brain—the greater the tendency to subordinate the instincts of self-preservation and the egotistic feelings to the intellect, and to act as check on the animal propensities—the more moral the man. If this inhibition becomes weakened or totally lost, then we see the disordered predominance of the instincts and impulses. These being out of control may lead the passionate man to immoral actions, and the man with strong anti-social impulses to criminal deeds.

It is the highly developed intellect of man which changes the innate animal propensities into glorious faculties. Thus the animal desire of propagating the species is transformed in man to moral love; the love of female animals for their offspring, provided by Nature to preserve their young, becomes in women the amiable virtue which inspires their tenderness for their children; the attachment of animals changes in man to friendship; their sensibility to caresses changes into ambition and a sentiment of honour; the instinctive building of nests by birds and of huts by beavers is at the root of man's nobler dwellings, of his temples and palaces. It is the frontal brain with its connecting fibres to all the remainder of the cortex to which this difference is due. The larger the anterior lobes in proportion to the rest of the brain, the more refined will be the expression of the emotions, and even of the passions, of man, and the greater control will he be able to exert over them. Let the frontal lobes be arrested in development, or affected by disease, and man descends to the animal stage.

From this one might wrongly conclude that the development of the moral sense is in proportion to the development of the intellect. But this is not so, for as everyone knows, there are moral idiots as well as intellectual idiots—men born with fair intellect but with an entire absence of the higher moral sentiments, entirely destitute of moral feeling. They are as insensible to the moral relations of life, as deficient in this regard as a person colour-blind is to certain colours, or as one without
ear for music is to the finest harmonies of sound. If caught in an immoral or criminal act, they show no repentance. They may perhaps feel and dread the material consequences of crime, but they are deficient in the feeling of moral guilt. **They are not lacking in intelligence; but their intellect is put to bad use.** This view may go against the convictions of some people; there are magistrates and judges who deny such an assumption. But it is not alone on the basis of the evidence I am about to quote that I assert that moral idiocy is due to a deficiency of a particular portion of brain, but my assertion is based also on evidence, which I am not at liberty to publish—namely, that contained in my case-books, of persons, descendants of well-known families, whose respectability is of repute, whose careers I have been able to watch from infancy and of whose convictions for various crimes I have kept records.

Still, I agree with those who hold that **there are no definite centres in the brain for the manifestation of the moral sentiments.** But there are centres for adaptation and self-control, and that is what morality amounts to. These centres appear to be in the posterior part of the frontal lobes, which seem to act as a check to all the other centres. The actual locality is of no consequence at present, so long as it is recognised that the moral sentiments may be lost in lesions of some portion of the brain. If a blow on the head can cause such circumscribed mental changes that only the morality of the man deteriorates, while he remains in all other respects as before, it shows that morality or immorality—that is, the tendency to one or the other—depends on brain conditions. And if this be admitted, then we are also justified in assuming that the moral tendencies are subject to the laws of heredity, though environmental influences and education will always discount to a large extent the forces of heredity.

The so-called moral sense is of course highly complex; originating in the social sentiments, largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by reason, self-interest, religious feeling, and experience of the more remote consequences of our actions. But in the course of evolution it has become part of the mental organisation, varying in degree in different people and dependent no longer so much on the approbation of others as on the approbation of self; in other words, it has become—conscience. That it is not the product of a purely reflective faculty we see in children from the earliest age. Some have it strongly without teaching or example; others have it sparingly, and need the most assiduous care to develop it.

**F. L. GOLTZ** (1834-1902), although an opponent of the localisation theory, was a very accurate observer. He admitted that when the frontal lobes are destroyed the inhibitory power over the emotions and propensities is lost and such an animal changes its character for worse. His dogs that were very docile and good-tempered became, after removal of the frontal part of their brain, easily excited, irascible, made much noise, and were constantly disposed to fighting. In fact, it seems Goltz produced in his dogs symptoms similar to mania in man. ("Die Verrichtungen des Grosshirns," Bonn, 1881.)

**J. LOEB** found the same as Goltz.

**PAUL FLECHSIG** (1847-1904) said: "The result of the action of physical impulses upon the cortex is a struggle between sensory impulses and reason. As soon as the power of the mental centres is paralysed, the impulses are deprived of mental control, and passion reigns unbridled." He found in lesions of the frontal association centres that patients "could not distinguish truth from untruth, imagined events from experienced events, possible things from impossible. Ethical and aesthetic judgement diminishes, prudence in the manifestation of the propensities is lost, self-control is lost. Finally idiocy results with loss of personal identity."

**CAMPBELL** ("Journal of Mental Science," 1904) declared—on histological evidence supplied by LEONORE WELT, and emphasised by v. MONAKOW—that "destruction of what one may call the middle part of the frontal lobe gives rise to various disturbances of the moral faculty."

**L. F. BARKER,** Professor of Anatomy and Pathology in John Hopkins University, said: "When the intellectual centres are paralysed, there often results
most marked disorganisation of the mental processes, and most serious alterations in the character of the individual. The struggle between the lower instincts and the ethical feelings may cease, and instead of a rational man we see a creature given over entirely to the satisfaction of his lower desires."

W. C. SULLIVAN, late Medical Officer H.M. Prison, Holloway ("Lancet," 1911), records two cases of frontal tumour in prisoners and accounted for their crime by the loss of control over the propensities. He ascertained the cause of death in prisoners to be brain tumour in four per cent. of the total mortality, a rather high proportion when it is borne in mind that cases of this disease with distinct physical or mental impairment would not be likely to be sent to prison, or, if sent, would not be detained.

ALLEN STARR, who has studied the mental disturbances following disease of the frontal lobes, gave the summary of twenty-three cases in the American Journal of Medical Sciences, 1894. He laid great stress on the frontal brain as an inhibitory organ. He regarded it therefore as the seat of judgment and reason, the highest psychical manifestations. Through the loss of self-control, he said, the attention can no longer be fixed, and the patient can no longer follow the sequence of his ideas. He regarded the loss of attention as important. He said: "The form of mental disturbance in lesions of the frontal region does not conform to any type of insanity. It is rather to be described as a loss of self-control and a subsequent change of character. This action of control implies a recognition of the importance of an act in connection with other acts—in a word, it involves judgment and reason, the highest mental qualities. It seems probable that the processes involved in judgment and reason have for their physical basis the frontal lobes; if so, the total destruction of these lobes would reduce man to the state of an idiot, while their partial destruction would be manifested by errors of judgment and reason of a striking character. One of the first manifestations would be a lack of that self-control which is the constant accompaniment of mental action, and which would be shown by an inability to fix the attention, to follow a continuous train of thought, or to conduct intellectual processes. It is this very symptom that was present in one half of the cases collected. It occurred in all forms of lesions—from injury by foreign bodies, from destruction by abscess, from compression by softening due to the pressure of tumours—and therefore cannot be ascribed to any one form of disease. It did not occur in lesions of other parts of the brain."

EXAMPLES OF THE LOSS OF MORAL SENSE

That the frontal lobes represent the higher nature of man is shown in cases of their destruction—or rather destruction of certain parts of the frontal lobes—when all the stock of inherited and acquired sentiments—in fact, man's moral nature—seems to disappear on account of the loss of the power of inhibition.

Everyone knows of the classical "Crowbar Case," recorded by Dr. HARLOW. It is so typical that it cannot be too often quoted. But it has been misrepresented in many of our text-books as being typical evidence that loss of brain substance may occur without any mental change, simply because moral sentiments are not supposed to be dependent on brain matter. In his work on "The Functions of the Brain," 1876, Sir DAVID FERRIER referred to the case as illustrating the fact that disease or injury to the frontal region in one hemisphere is not followed by any appreciable mental symptoms. However, in his later work, "The Localisation of Cerebral Disease," 1878, he furnished a detailed account of it, proving the contrary. Nevertheless, in Kirkes's "Handbook of Physiology," sixteenth edition, 1900, the crowbar case is still misrepresented, it being said that "no noteworthy symptoms were observed" in the patient "during the rest of his life," indeed, he "returned to his work as overseer to the mine." This is not true, and I am glad to see that in more recent editions the case has been left out altogether.

Another author quotes the case as showing that the patient "lost nothing of mental power or sagacity and was entirely clear in all his mental processes."

The following is the actual history:
"While Phineas P. Gage, age twenty-five, was engaged tamping a blasting charge in a rock with a pointed iron bar, three feet seven inches in length, one inch and a quarter in diameter, and weighing thirteen and a quarter pounds, the charge suddenly exploded. The iron bar, propelled with its pointed end first, entered at the left angle of the patient's jaw, and passed clean through the top of his head, near the sagittal suture in the frontal region, and was picked up at some distance covered with blood and brains. The patient was for the moment stunned, but within an hour after the accident he was able to walk up a long flight of stairs and give the surgeon an intelligible account of the injury he had sustained. His life was naturally for a long time despaired of, but he ultimately recovered, and lived twelve years and a half afterwards." This is what Dr. Harlow says of his mental condition during that period: "His contractors, who regarded him as the most efficient and capable foreman in their employ previous to his injury, considered the change in his mind so marked that they would not give him his place again. The equilibrium or balance, so to speak, between the intellectual faculties and animal propensities seems to have been destroyed. He is fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which was previously not his custom), manifesting but little deference for his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating; devising many plans of future operation, which are no sooner arranged than they are abandoned in turn for others appearing more feasible. A child in his intellectual capacity and manifestations, he has the criminal passions of a strong man. Previous to his injury, though untrained in the schools, he possessed a well-balanced mind, and was looked upon by those who knew him as a shrewd, smart business man, very energetic and persistent in executing all his plans of operation. In this regard, his mind was radically changed, so decidedly, that his friends and acquaintances said he was 'no longer Gage.'"

Gage became "very childish." He died twelve and a half years after the accident in epileptic convulsions. The base of the frontal bone was found fractured.

Case of Frontal Injury followed by Moral Insanity.

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG-JONES ("Archives of Neurology," 1907):

X. Y., age twenty-six, was admitted to Claybury Asylum from prison. The family history was singularly free from insanity and drink. The patient was in good health and condition, and the organ apparently normal. Traumatism was the assigned cause of insanity, patient having fallen forty feet from a lift and fractured his skull in the pre-frontal region. The forehead showed a linear scar 6 centimetres long, with obvious depression of the right frontal bone. Patient was unconscious for several days after the accident, and there was some loss of brain substance. Six months later some portions of dead bone were removed at St. Bartholomew's Hospital, and after two or three years of medical treatment he was pensioned as unfit for further work in Woolwich Arsenal. Before the accident, patient was bright, energetic, honest and trustworthy, a life-abstainer, and much respected. After the accident there was complete metamorphosis; his career became a record of moral obliquity and mental perversion. He was idle, irritable, threatening and violent; he was three times convicted of indecent behaviour, the last time being detained during His Majesty's pleasure, and after being in prison a month was removed to Claybury.

Case of Frontal Tumour with Moral Degradation, and Recovery after Surgical Operation.

FRANCESCO DURANTE (Rome), "British Medical Journal," 1902:

G. B., age forty-six, a housemaid, was admitted in March, 1896. She had been operated on in May, 1884, for fibrosarcoma of the dura mater compressing the left frontal lobe. "The patient on both the first and second occasion had contracted the habit of excessive license of language, to such an extent as to make highly improper remarks, and when reproved she not rarely broke into oaths. When she presented herself to me for the second operation, her relatives informed me that for several months she had manifested a peculiar perversion of the moral sense, shown
not merely by the use of improper expressions, but by actions void of all decency and absolutely unbecoming in an honest woman." Durante diagnosed a recurrent fibrosarcoma of the left frontal lobe, and an operation found the same adherent to the falx cerebri and extending downwards to the crista galli. He removed the tumour, and the result was a complete cure of all the symptoms.

Case of Brain Lesion at posterior end of superior frontal convolution followed by Moral Insanity.

FRONTAL LESIONS WITH RELIGIOUS MANIA

The frontal lobes containing the centres which enable us to exercise control over our natural dispositions, it follows that men by nature religious, when they suffer from frontal lesions, become more intensely religious in their thoughts and conduct. The following are examples of religious mania from lesions of the frontal lobes.

Case of Frontal Lesion with Religious Mania.

JAMES GEORGE DAVEY ("Zoist," vol. i.):
E. M., a woman, age sixty-four, suffered from religious insanity, the first sign of which was evinced by a love for theological disputes, which eventually became so excessive that she disturbed religious services by calling the minister to order for the opinions he expressed. She subsequently regarded herself as an apostle, and declared she was an instrument in the hands of the Almighty, with which it was His intention to effect extraordinary and great good. Sacred music sent her into ecstasy, and she sometimes fell into a paroxysm during the service at the asylum chapel. Post mortem the brain and its membranes were found healthy, with the exception of a circumscribed part in the superior frontal convolution corresponding to the anterior fontanelle, where the tissues were so firmly adherent to one another that the membranes were torn in liberating the brain.

Case of Head Injury with Religious Mania.

H. SCHÜLE ("Sectionsergebnisse bei Geisteskranken," Leipsic, 1874):
A labourer, age forty-one, received some twenty years prior to admission an injury on the top of his head which never caused him any inconvenience, though there was a bony deficiency, the size of a florin, one-third of an inch behind the coronal suture in the middle line, where post mortem a piece of iron was found embedded, causing degeneration of the brain substance around. Patient was admitted for mania. Fourteen days after his admission he began the solemn recitation of biblical sentences with increased excitement, so that he had to be isolated. He continued to preach fervently in his cell, and gave Bible quotations with a declamatory voice. His temperature rose. A cold bath reduced it again, and he then began the preaching anew, with a further rise of temperature and quickened pulse. He got generally exhausted by the morning. The fever and the maniacal excitement of a religious character always went together, and no treatment seemed to prove of avail. He died of pneumonia about three months after admission.

Lesion of Upper Frontal Region followed by Religious Mania.

A. P. MILLER ("Medical and Surgical Journal," vol. iv.):
A clergyman who had neglected his health had a sudden outbreak of insanity. He had called on a notorious drunkard to convert him to better ways, and was turned out of the house by him. This conduct had such an effect on his already excited feelings that he rushed into the public square, holding the Bible in the air, and knelt down praying to God to subdue the obduracy of the sinner's heart, and rising up began most vociferously to exhort people to repentance, for sin had darkened the land, and the judgment of God was coming upon earth. After much difficulty he was compelled to go home, where he ran up to his bedroom, stripping,
and washing himself by dashing basins of cold water over his body, and praying most earnestly "that the waters of life he was now washing in would cleanse his soul from all sin." This process he repeated thrice, and such was the intensity of his conviction respecting his own impurity that each time he determinedly refused to be dressed in the same clothes, because they were unclean. He died twelve days after the event. Post mortem was found haemorrhage limited to the upper end of the superior and middle frontal convolutions.

Case of Brain Tumour with Religious Mania.

JOHN B. CHAPIN ("American Journal of Insanity," 1862):

E., male, age twenty-three, single, farmer, no hereditary tendency to disease. Hitherto healthy and industrious. Came voluntarily to the asylum. Suffering from religious mania. Devoted to religious subjects and a religious life. Occasionally a reaction of profanity. Post mortem, a tubercular tumour was found, the size of a walnut, at the vertex of the brain.

Case of Head Injury with Religious Delusions.

E. BROWN ("Alienist and Neurologist," 1883):

J. K., age thirty-nine, was a quiet and orderly youth before the injury. He entered the army early in the American Civil War, and was struck on the head, where the wound left a cicatrix over the junction of the coronal and sagittal sutures. He remained unconscious for twenty-seven hours. On his return home he was found to have undergone a complete change of character. There was loss of control over his temper, together with religious delusions.

Cases of Frontal Tumours with Religious Mania.


GIANELLI, "Policlinico," 1897; two cases of loss of moral and religious sentiments.

THE CENTRES OF APPERCEPTION

The frontal lobes contain the centres necessary for the various elementary apperceptions. As has been explained in Chapter XXVII., we must distinguish in the act of vision between the mere perception of an object and an intelligent knowledge thereof as to its nature and qualities. We must distinguish between acts of pure sensation and the mental acts of symbolic representation. Perception is a complex process, and consists not only of the visual impression, but the impression of solidity, form, size and position, which vision alone would never give without the aid of the other senses. Our various representations, the different impressions made by the senses, would not exist for us without an element which gives them unity and makes them an object of understanding. Perception is, then, sensation plus intellect. The sensory ideas, whether visual, auditory, tactile, or other, on entering the domain of consciousness, are studied in all their relations to self and the external world. The visual centre may see an object, but the perceptive centre looks at an object and ascertains its significance and attributes—their form, size, weight, colour, order, number, etc. It is not enough, therefore, to ascertain that a patient after injury to his brain can see an object; we must also ascertain whether he can see all its attributes.

The part of the brain that sees the object is a different part from the one that recognises it. The centre of sensation is not the centre of perception. In cortical blindness, NOTHNAGEL (1841-1905), as long ago as 1882, observed that the power of calling up visual images remained unaffected. Sense-deceptions, according to this theory, may be regarded as a disruption in the connecting link between the actual sensory and the co-ordinating centres.

The powers of perception give retentiveness as well, and thus supply the raw material for our practical knowledge.
To understand how important a factor memory is in mental operations, we have only to conceive what the mind would be without it. Without memory there would be no past, only a perpetual present, therefore no possibility of comparing past states with present ones. The mind would be the subject of a series of sensations and of nothing more. But with memory, perception is possible; we recognise the relations between one sensation and another; we can form ideas; we can think and feel. Memory is a necessary condition of personal identity; it is, in fact, as HUME puts it, only another name for consciousness.

It is usual to employ the word "memory" in a general sense to express the property, common to all thinking beings, of preserving and reproducing the impressions they have received; but psychological analysis and a large number of facts in mental pathology have demonstrated that memory should not be regarded as a single faculty, having a distinct seat. Every cell of the brain and of the body has its own memory. If memory were a distinctive power, it would be alike strong for all subjects. But as this is not consistent with fact, we are forced to the conclusion that there is no general faculty called memory, but that each faculty has its own power of recalling its impressions. One individual remembers existences, another events, a third recalls with ease a train of reasoning, another musical airs, another the faces he has seen or the scenes he has surveyed; each perhaps weakly remembering something else of the matters now enumerated. Each of these memories may become lost in injury or disease of the frontal lobes, while the others remain intact and unaffected in the slightest degree. From this we are led to infer that they must possess anatomical independence.

BIANCHI, of Naples, found that after destruction of the cortex of the pre-frontal lobes in dogs and monkeys not only were memory, attention, and the judgment impaired, but the animals did not recognise either the places or persons with whom they had been previously familiar.

GOLTZ found that dogs in whom he had removed the pre-frontal region of the brain acted differently from normal animals. Very remarkable is the following experiment which he made. "If a bone is thrown to the animal at some distance it runs to it with great alacrity, but does not have the sense to stop at the right moment and sink its head, so that it runs beyond the mark, as if it had lost the sense of distance. Instead, however, of turning round and looking for the bone in a methodical way, the animal appears to forget what it was after, and runs on regardlessly until the bone is lifted and the animal's attention again attracted to it."

WUNDT, admittedly an authority on physiological and experimental psychology, held that perception must take place in a higher centre where all the sensory impressions are co-ordinated—that is, in a perceptive centre, which he locates in the frontal lobes.

There exist partial, special, or local memories, each of which has its special domain, and which are so independent that one of them may get enfeebled or disappear, or may develop to excess without the others necessarily presenting any corresponding change.

We have already dealt with the speech centre. Here we need refer only to the fact that the memory for words may be lost and the memory for tones, number, etc. —and their expression—may be preserved intact.

The ability to recognise the form of an object, as well as its nature—the stereognostic sense—may be lost independently. This is recognised by MILLS, HOPPE, and WEISENBURG, but they locate it in the superior part of the parietal lobe; whereas the cases quoted in the succeeding pages show it to be in the orbital convolutions. The independence of the stereognostic sense—without giving any locality—is also recognised by ROBERT SOMMER ("Zeitschrift f. Physiologie der Sinnesorgane," vol. ii.), BERGMANN ("Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie," vol. vi.), and HEBOLD ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1885) on the basis of definite cases.
WILLBRAND observed the loss of appreciation of time. FÖRSTER ("Archiv f. Ophthalmologie," vol. xxvi.) observed the loss of the memory for places. GROEBUNOW ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," vol. xxiii.) did the same. Similar observations by Bjernum, Brill, Cohen, Schnelle, etc.

SAMUELSOHN had a case under his charge where, after an apoplectic seizure, the sense of space and light was intact, but the colour sense was utterly extinguished ("Centralblatt f. die mediz. Wissenschaften," 1882). STEFFEN ("Graefe's Archiv," vol. xxvii.) had a similar case, and concluded from it that in the main central organ, the brain, the centre for the sense of 'space' and for the sense of 'colour' are divided, no matter how near to each other they may be estimated, but there is a special centre for each of these senses.

The well-known effects of intoxication by hashish also point to the existence of special centres for the appreciation of time and space. The notion of time is completely overthrown, the moments are years, and the minutes centuries. Short distances seem immense. In this illusion a bridge or an avenue appears to have no end, and to be prolonged to unheard-of and impossible distances. In ascending a staircase the steps seem to rise to heaven; a river, whose opposite bank can be seen, appears as large as an arm of the sea. These two delusions last more than twenty-four hours after the injection of the poison.

Idiot children have sometimes talents in special directions, which are all the more remarkable because of their lack of sense in every other direction. We can only explain such natural gifts by assuming that they are dependent on special centres in the brain, which are rich in neurones as compared with the remainder of the cortex. It is not uncommon to find in idiot institutions children with an extraordinary talent for remembering dates and past events. Several children under Dr. LANGDON DOWN's care have possessed this faculty to an exceptional degree. One idiot boy never failed to be able to tell the name and address of every confectioner's shop that he had visited in London—and they had been numerous—and could as readily tell the date of each visit. Another could tell the time of arrival of all the children at the institution, and could supply accurate records in relation to it when needed. One boy under Dr. Down's care had a very unusual faculty, namely, the perfect appreciation of past or passing time. He was seventeen years of age, and although not understanding, so far as he could gather, the use of a clock-face, could tell the time to a minute at any part of the day, and under any circumstances. Dr. Down tried him on numberless occasions, and he always answered with an amount of precision truly remarkable.

Dr. E. T. BOLAND brought before the New England Psychological Society, October 11th, 1887, an idiot-savant, a boy named George, sixteen years old, whose strong point was that he could answer questions as to calendar dates in his past life and for a year or two in the future. He had never learned to read, sight being too defective even had his capacity permitted. He was an imbecile in every respect.

Dr. SHUTTLEWORTH had in his institution a remarkable case of a young man with a history of congenital imbecility who was able, without much mental effort, to give the day of the week corresponding to the day of the month for several years past and for several years to come. His ready answers were very surprising to strangers.

**EXAMPLES OF LOSS OF SPECIAL PERCEPTIONS AND MEMORIES**

*The author's observation of a case of Loss of Form, Size and Weight, and Memory of Dates and Names.*

E. M. J., a farmer, age sixty, received a kick from a horse on his forehead, crushing in the skull at the root of the nose along the level of the eyebrows, the fracture extending upwards to the middle of the forehead, showing afterwards an
unsightly depression at the seat of injury. The patient, who remained in a semi-conscious condition for several weeks after the occurrence, made a gradual recovery, but the following symptoms remained. He was able to walk about and look after his farm affairs, but he found that he had lost interest. It was noticed that he could not learn and observe things as before; that he could not remember dates, names, or even recognise faces and forms as readily as before. He who could formerly guess at distances correctly could no longer measure them with the eye. Form, size, width, and height seemed changed to him. Formerly a good shot, he could not aim at any object now, a bird in the air appearing a long way off, when in fact it would be near or almost directly over him. Nor could he estimate the weight of cattle, dogs, and horses, at which he was naturally clever before the accident. He spoke rationally and was perfectly normal in every other capacity and disposition, except that he had an inclination to frequent anger without apparent cause. This was the only loss of control that could be ascertained.

Another case of my own observation of Loss of Sense of Size and Weight.

H. B., age fifty-five, a tailor, was hit in a quarrel by a billiard ball over the left eye, fracturing the skull over the supra-orbital foramen. After recovering consciousness, he suffered from agonising attacks of supra-orbital neuralgia, for which he was treated. As regards the mental condition, it has to be noted that the patient lost control over his feelings, and for a time was considered insane. He recovered, however, completely and became a normal man but for the loss of appreciation of size and weight, so that he could no longer cut clothes or fit coats.

Case of Frontal Injury with Loss of Memory of Previous Events, of Forms, Objects, and Places.


G. T., a sober, well-conducted railway fireman, age thirty-six, was brought to the Peterborough Infirmary with the broken ends of an oil-feeder protruding from his right cheek, a little behind the angle of the mouth. It was stated that in stepping from the tender on to the footplate of his engine, with the oil-feeder in his hand, he slipped and fell forwards, the spout of the oil-can being driven forcibly into his face. He was then quite senseless, but partially recovered consciousness in a few minutes. When he was being placed on the stretcher, someone suggested a coat for his head, and he was sensible enough at that time to say that his own coat was on the engine; so that the loss of memory, afterwards so conspicuous, was not then present. He reached the hospital quite conscious. The metal spout of the oil-can was firmly fixed in the base of his skull, and required firm traction with forceps to relieve it from the grasp of the bone. It passed upwards and towards the middle line, and the concavity of the spout was directed from the middle line, the end of the oil-can entering the skull at the inner corner of the right eye, reaching up to the middle of the forehead. There was now paralysis of the left side of the face and left arm, while the left leg was little affected. Mental condition: He could not recognise his wife or his old comrades, and he had also difficulty in recognising common objects and their uses. He did not recognise a fellow-workman who met with an accident and was in a bed next to him for weeks. But what was most remarkable was that the whole of his life for twenty years before the accident was wiped out from his memory. He asserted he was a farm labourer, which he was before he worked on the railway. All the memory of the accident was gone, and has never returned. After he left the hospital some previous events did return, but after the lapse of a year there were still five years of which he could not remember anything. The paralysis had nearly disappeared, only the arm was left weak. There was very little control over his emotions. He laughed or cried at the slightest provocation. His irritability of temper was said to have increased, and he was often hasty in his language, although not violent. The partial return of his memory seems to have been in part due to the habit of his "mates" coming in and talking to him of the past, and continually reminding him of occurrences which were likely to have made an impression on him. There was still extreme difficulty in retaining in his memory any passing events. If he went out for a walk by himself he was unable to find his
way back, and often failed to recognise his own house when he was outside; and there was also frequent failure to recognise common objects and their uses. There was present therefore a condition of imperception. There was no aphasia at any time, and no difficulty in expressing himself. His reasoning processes were fairly orderly, but as, owing to the blanks in his memory, he often argued from false premises, he arrived at ludicrously incorrect conclusions. For example, he occupied one of the houses built by the railway company for their servants, and as he had no recollection of having worked for them for five or six years, he argued that he had no right to be there, and insisted with unnecessary warmth that his wife should pack up and leave the house before they got into trouble for being there.

Case of Frontal Tumour with Disorientation and Loss of Memory and Sense of Time.

F. X. DERCUM ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1910):
I. G. C. L., age fifty-nine, book-keeper. "His wife reported that he had been in a 'dreamy' state of mind for some time and that he seemed to have no idea of time. He often forgets what he is doing. At times he does not seem to know just where he is; sometimes loses himself in his own house. His wife states further that he does not seem to notice the change in his condition; that he does not manifest any anxiety about himself. He does not worry and assumes no responsibility regarding his affairs." Post mortem, a sarcomatous tumour was found in the right frontonal lobe.

Case of Frontal Tumour with Loss of Memory for Facts and Events.

LEONIDA CANALI ("Rivista Sperimentali de Froniatria," 1881):
Antoine Ruggeri, age forty-four, a priest, struck his forehead against a wooden post in his house. Remained unconscious for about an hour. The injury and subsequent headache was in the region of the right frontonal eminence. A year later mental changes followed. He became loquacious, his memory for facts and events got markedly enfeebled, and his ideas disordered. Gradually he also lost control over his character tendencies, became haughty, irascible, and intolerant. Eighteen months later died in a fit. The autopsy revealed a glio-sarcoma involving the middle of the first and second frontonal convolutions on each side.

Case of Frontal Tumour—Euphoria, Loss of Sense of Time, Place and Number.

GABRIEL CHEZE ("Écho Médical du Nord," 1910):
Marie V., age forty-two, found wandering in a state of nudity, smiled happily, had optimistic notions, no knowledge of time and place, no idea of simple calculation. Died five days later. A large sarcomatous tumour was lying across the orbital plates of the frontonal bone, compressing the orbital convolutions, which were partially destroyed.

Case of Frontal Injury—Loss of Sense of Weight and Sense of Resistance.

THOS. LAYCOCK ("Australian Medical Journal," 1893):
A case of fracture of the base of the skull just behind the orbits, there being a fissure about a quarter of an inch in width. The patient, a man, age twenty-nine, was treated surgically. Much lacerated and contused brain substance was removed. On recovery, patient had lost the conception of the quality and position of foreign bodies, their weight and resistance, through the sense of touch.

Case of Frontal Injury—Loss of Sense of Time, of Locality, and of Objects.

Patient, age thirty-three, fell off a scaffolding seven feet high, when the right side of his forehead struck an iron screw and he sustained a wound about four centimetres in length. He was rendered senseless, but soon recovered consciousness. Subsequently he frequently lost control over his temper, and there was absolute loss of the sense of time, complete failure of self-orientation, and inability to notice things.
THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN

Case of Frontal Lesion—Loss of Sense of Time, Memory of Places and of Objects.

M. JASTROWITZ ("Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift," 1887):

Patient, wife of a major in the army, age forty-two, had a syphilitic scar of three centimetres in length over the glabella above the root of the nose. Though intellectually quite normal, she could not distinguish either time or locality, and mistook objects. The post-mortem examination revealed intermeningeal haemorrhage at the anterior root of the superior and middle frontal convolutions.

EXAMPLES OF RECOVERY OF MEMORY AFTER SURGICAL OPERATION

Case of Frontal Tumour with Enfeeblement of Perception and Memory—Surgical Operation—Recovery.

GIANELLI ("Policlinico," 1897):

Patient manifested slowness of perception and confusion of memory. On removal of the tumour complete recovery.

Case of Frontal Tumour with Loss of Memory—Operation—Recovery.

SEYDEL ("Neurologisches Centralblatt," 1896):

Case of loss of memory, loss of all interest, apathy. Removal of tumour led to complete recovery.

Case of Frontal Tumour with Loss of Memory for Facts and Events—Surgical Operation—Recovery.

FRANCESCO DURANTE, Rome ("British Medical Journal," 1902):

S. D., age thirty-nine, suffered from "slow perception, mnemonic confusion for remote facts, and abolition of memory for recent facts." On operation, large subcortical gumma involving nearly the whole of the left frontal lobe was removed. Result: "Complete cure of all the symptoms."

arithmetical ability

There are two things necessary for an ability to reckon rapidly: a powerful memory for figures and a real ability for calculating. The carrying out of long calculations in the mind depends, above all, on the accuracy of the memory for a sufficient length of time. The power to commit a group of objects or a line of a dozen figures rapidly to memory and to call it up again instantly depends on the ease and rapidity with which one can impress it on the mind, on the accuracy with which it is reckoned, and the ease and rapidity with which it can be reproduced. The ease and rapidity with which a number of objects can be impressed on the memory seem limited in ordinary persons to about five at a glance. In regard to a special inclination for mathematics and its relation to ability for calculation, and to other abilities likewise, great diversity is exhibited.

There are those having pronounced arithmetical bent combined with great powers of mental calculation, though not necessarily rapid. Mathematicians are not necessarily distinguished rapid arithmeticians. In fact, they rarely have a liking for mere reckoning.

There are those with inclination and ability for mathematics, including arithmetic.

Those with special inclination and arithmetic solely: (a) such as have had no opportunities afforded for cultivating other branches of mathematics; (b) in spite of opportunities afforded; (c) where the talent disappears ere an opportunity for development is rendered possible.

There are children whose apathy nothing would seem capable of arousing, and others, again, who take keen interest in everything, and amuse themselves with even mathematical calculations without any end in view. Still others there are more
rarely than either of the aforesaid groups, who limit their interest to mathematical
calculations merely. Strange as the fascination for arithmetic seems, it becomes
still more so when it is manifested at an age at which it is normally absent; strangest
of all is the union of ability with the inclination. The great calculators showed
precocity for figures at three years of age, some at six, and most of them before ten
years of age.

One peculiarity in the imaginative powers of arithmetical prodigies is worthy of
notice, namely their visual imagery, their capacity of carrying a vivid mental
picture—a photograph—of the numbers, with which they are at the time occupied;
and this without a corresponding visual memory for words.

Among the great arithmetical prodigies are:

NICKOMACHOS, of Gerasa (ca. 30 A.D.), mentioned by Lucianus.
THOMAS FULLER (1710-1790), the Virginian calculator.
JEDEDIAH BUXTON (1707-1778), of Derbyshire, England.
ANDRÉ MARIE AMPÈRE (1775-1830), of Marseilles.
CARL FRIEDRICH GAUSS (1777-1855), of Brunswick.
RICHARD WHATELY (1787-1863), Archbishop of Dublin.
ZERAH COLBURN (1804-1840).
VITO MANGIAMELE (ca. 1837), of Sicily.
ZACHARIAS DAHSE (1824-1861), of Hamburg.
C. GRANDMANGE (ca. 1852), of Paris, born without legs or arms.
HENRI MONDEAUX (1826-1862).
GEORGE BIDDER (1806-1876), engineer.
TRUMAN HENRY SAFFORD (1836-), of the United States.
JACQUES INAUDI (1867-).

Gall observed several calculating boys of his time and located the centre of the
sense of "number" (Zahlensinn) at the inferior and external root of the frontal
convolutions, a point which from his brain plates I make out to be the supra-orbital
end of the third frontal convolution, corresponding to the external angle of the eye.

He exhibited a boy from St. Poelten, near Vienna, son of a blacksmith, who had
received no teaching, but was quicker in calculating rows of figures by head than
others were on paper.

A barrister consulted Gall about his son, age five, who busied himself extensively
with numbers and calculations, so that it was impossible to fix his attention on
anything else.

Gall knew also a boy, age seven, named Devaux, whose greatest pleasure it was
to go to all the fairs and check off the traders' calculations when they were making
up their accounts.

His works contain numerous other examples, including cases of calculating
idiots.

The appreciation of number is a primitive sense, but not the capacity for mathe-
matics, which is a complex ability. Yet P. J. MöBIUS (1853-1907), who attempted
to revive Gall's doctrines in Germany (see Chapter XVI.), fell into this error. In a
lecture delivered at the fifth meeting of Alienists and Neurologists of Central
Germany at Leipsic, 1899, he declared: "I have not closed the investigation as
yet, but I have got far enough to enable me to say with full conviction, in this
localisation Gall was completely right. I have found all his statements correct, and
only one thing Gall left unmentioned, that the development of the mathematical
organ is more often to be observed on the left side." Möbius, in his work, "Über
die Anlage zur Mathematik," Leipsic (1809), gave a collection of mathematicians
(male and female) from ancient to recent times, with their biographies, psycholog-
ical analyses, and cranial formations.

PAUL FLECHSIG (1847-1904), at the meeting just mentioned, declared that
probably the faculty of "number" was located in the lowest part of the third frontal convolution; exactly where Gall believed it to be.

A. Binet (1857-1911) had studied Inaudi and Diamandi, who were examined by the Academy of Sciences in Paris. I saw Inaudi in London. A line of figures, casually suggested by members of the audience, was multiplied by another line, and the product given with astonishing rapidity. The cyphers were written on a blackboard behind the performer, so that they could be read by the spectators, but not by Inaudi. Nevertheless he was able to hold in his memory and repeat all the figures. In adding he used to begin at the left side with the higher numbers. He dealt with the numbers as sounds—that is, they had to be repeated to him orally—whereas Diamandi regarded them as seen figures. Binet observed that, besides the capacity of keeping the figures in memory and rapidly calculating, it is of importance that the reckoners should keep up the use of their talent; for without practice they seem to lose much of their facility. The possessors of this wonderful faculty generally come of obscure families who never showed particular skill in arithmetic.

Arithmetical ability is not confined to Europeans. In the Korea Magazine, May, 1917, is an account by W. Carl Rufus, Ph.D., of An Myengwhan, a Korean lad, sixteen years of age, in the employ of the Land Investigation Bureau. He is described as a perfect human adding machine. He can add up twenty-five items of four figures each in seven seconds by mental calculation, and when using an abacus the time required by him in making the same addition is eight seconds. Frequently at night he sees columns of figures before his closed eyes.

On the other hand, there are men with a congenital deficiency in the faculty of number, for example, George Combe. He said:

"Arithmetic has always been a profound mystery to me, and to master the multiplication table an insurmountable task. I could not tell how much eight times nine are without going to work circuitously and reaching it by means of the tens, yet for seven years I studied arithmetic. The faculty in me is, in fact, idiotic. Were any other powers in like condition, I should be totally unfit for the ordinary business of life."

Arithmetical ability is one of the capacities that cannot be explained by any process of development through the struggle for existence or sexual selection. Yet the arithmetical talent seems to be a special faculty of the human mind. Though all normal children can be taught to count, some learn quickly, others slowly. Some men take a delight in working at arithmetical problems, others have a distaste for them. It often happens that those who are very skilful in solving arithmetical problems have no unusual ability for anything else.

It is curious that in the mental manifestations in idiocy and imbecility we find that of all human faculties that of music is the best preserved, whereas that of number is the most deficient, yet music seems to have a certain connection with number. A tune depends upon the numerical relation of certain notes to one another, and upon their succession in time. Even idiots who cannot speak catch up tunes and hum or grunt them. To be able to learn to speak is a measure in the capacity of imbeciles, but speech may be freely exercised without there being ability to count. This deficiency is universal, comprising all classes of imbeciles. The old legal definition of an idiot is "one who cannot count twenty pence." The greater number of idiots cannot count three, but among imbeciles are sometimes found children wonderfully skilled in calculations of various sorts, though with no other ability.

Dr. Desruelles, of the Asylum of Armentières, published in "L'Encéphale," 1912, a very interesting and valuable description of a new case where phenomenal ability in arithmetical calculation is associated with general mental inferiority, if
not actual insanity, and where, further, there is a curious complication in the fact that the patient has been blind from birth, and therefore can have no visual memory. Fleury is a young man of eighteen, who suffered from ophthalmia neonatorum and is completely blind. He has never been teachable in any way, has always proved refractory and difficult to manage, and has passed from an institution for the blind to an asylum. The only thing successfully taught him has been the Braille system, but his capacity for reading thereby is by no means well developed. On the other hand, he has from an early age shown himself exceedingly apt in figures, and partly by persevering with the Braille method, partly by devising certain mental methods for himself, he has reached a stage of extraordinary facility in performing elaborate calculations, the extent of which is limited only by his difficulty in remembering any set of figures beyond six. Psychologically the case is of great value, for it must be remembered that Fleury has no visual memories at all, and on questioning him he denies that he uses his auditory memory to any extent. It is clear that his tactile memories are so remarkably developed that by them alone, coupled with certain other processes, he is able to perform mental feats of an astonishing kind. When he calculates he uses his fingers constantly, as though he were feeling the familiar raised Braille figures with them, and while he mutters to himself as he does this, it is not figures that he is repeating, but such fragments as "that makes . . . ." "then . . . .", "added to . . . .", etc. All of Fleury's calculations are mental; he does not repeat figures with his lips. Here are some examples: He multiplied 825 by 825 in four seconds; given a day of the week in 1912, he calculated May 22nd, 1908, as a Friday, in five seconds; asked how many seconds in 39 years, 3 months, and 12 hours, he gave the correct answer, 1,238,587,200, in 1 minute 15 seconds.

A. WIZEL ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1904) described a phenomenal talent of counting in an imbecile:

Sabina W., age twenty-two, inmate of a hospital at Warsaw. The family had a special gift for music, but none for arithmetic. Patient normal till seven, when she had severe epileptic fits, followed by unconsciousness lasting for several days, leaving her an absolute imbecile. When she was eleven she was mentally the equal of a child of three. The epileptic seizures continued, though in a milder form, but they were followed by fits of violence. At the age of twenty-two she was still weak-minded. She could not tell how old she was, or how many brothers and sisters she had; she could not read or write, could not read figures, and could only talk on childish subjects. She had no affection for anybody and could not keep herself clean. But she had remarkable faculty for arithmetic, being especially good at multiplication and division. She divided 576, 560, and 336 by 16, and 225 and 270 by 15, with astonishing quickness; yet she failed in simple addition and subtraction, giving often the right answers, but much more slowly. Sabina possessed another power which is rarely met with in ordinary people. Once Dr. Wizel asked her: "What is the product of 23 x 23?" She quickly gave 529, and added, "That comes to as much as 33 x 16 and 1." Dr. Wizel gives numerous other examples. It was difficult to get Sabina to explain by what processes she so rapidly got her answers; but one example may explain. Asked 45 x 18, she answered 810; Dr. Wizel thinks she multiplied 90 by 9.

Case of Head Injury with Loss of the Faculty of Number.

K. RIEGER ("Centralblatt f. Nervenheilkunde," 1887) showed at a meeting of the Medical Association at Wurzburg a patient, Mr. Seybold, a sculptor of Carlstadt, who received a fracture of the base of the skull in a railway accident. Patient spoke a bit slowly, and was weaker in his memory than before the accident, but the chief symptom was, that he had forgotten all ideas of figures beyond 1, 2, and 3.

Case of Aphasia with Retention of Expression of Figures.

VOLLAND ("Münchener Medizinische Wochenschrift," 1886):

A farmer's son, age fifteen, had a fall which injured the scalp but not the bone. When he recovered consciousness, after several days, he understood everything that was said to him, but could only reply one word, "Anna," by speech or in writing.
THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN

Yet he was able to count up to 100, to recite the multiplication table, and to add or subtract figures. He could write all figures and calculate correctly on paper. Gradually he acquired the power to speak whole sentences, but did not get on well at school, except in arithmetic, in which he was equal to the best. Six years after the accident he was still somewhat aphasic, had attacks of giddiness and slight ptosis. This case shows that the formation and expression of words must be anatomically separate from the formation and expression of figures.

Another Case of Aphasia with Retention of Expression of Figures.

SCHRÖDER VAN DER KOLK ("Pathology and Therapeutics of Mental Disease," p. 14):

A tradesman came, conducted by his son, to obtain the doctor's advice. About half a year back the father had an apoplectic attack of only short duration and which left no paralysis; yet the memory for names or words had in a great measure vanished, so that he called objects by wrong names, and, for example, used the word "chair" when he meant a table. Yet he well knew the word "chair" was not the usual one, and he brought forward other words until at last he came to "table," which word he then pronounced with great satisfaction. But there was yet another remarkable suppression, such as the doctor had not before observed. The patient was no longer able to read, although the sight was not impaired. On a large printed book being placed before the man, he distinguished the letters in it quite well, and spelt, for example, the word "towards," but he was not able to combine these letters into a word. The man had also lost the capacity of writing, so that he could no longer sign his name. But the most remarkable circumstance with this patient was, that he could still, according to the assurance of his son, keep his ledger and reckon now as ever before.

Other Cases of Aphasia with Retention of Expression of Figures.

MARCÉ ("Gazette Médicale de Paris," 1856):

Case 11. Patient distinguished single letters quite well, but was no longer able to combine them into a word. He transcribed a word quite correctly, but could not write it when it was dictated to him. Yet he could write figures very well.

Case 7. The patient could not write his name from memory, but wrote figures and solved complicated arithmetical exercises, always setting the figures in their proper places.


H. G., had loss of speech but could calculate correctly.

PRINGLE MORGAN ("British Medical Journal," 1896):

Recorded a case in which the memory for words and letters was lost, but not for figures; from which he infers that there is not only a complete functional independence of these two faculties, but also an anatomical independence.

HEILLY and CHANTEMESSE ("Progrès Médical," vol. xi.):

A case of sensory aphasia with the power of calculation preserved. Authors mention that patient could play écarté correctly.

A. CHAUFFARD ("Revue de Médecine," 1881):

Case of sensory aphasia. Had a tendency to substitute numerals for words. His appreciation for music was well preserved, though he complained that he could not hear words.

DÉJÉRINE ("Comptes rendus des séances de la Société de Biologie," 1892):

Patient, although word-blind, could write as fluently as ever. He could copy correctly pages of manuscript, although he could not read a word he had written. He had also lost the power of reading musical notes, but he could still sing well. He could read figures and do mental calculations just as well as ever.

BRANDENBURG (Graefe's "Archiv f. Ophthalmologie," 1888):

A hitherto healthy man had an apoplectic stroke, which made him temporarily aphasic. There was alexia but no agraphia. The patient could write anything but could not read, with the exception of figures, so that the reading of numbers was preserved.

M. LANNOIS ("Lyon Médical," 1898):
INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS AND THEIR CEREBRAL ORIGIN

Patient, age thirty-two, had been for three years in a condition of complete amnesia, with the exception of the memory for figures. He could not write spontaneously anything except figures, and calculating remained his only occupation.

JAMES HINSHELWOOD ("Lancet," 1895):

A teacher of languages, age fifty-eight, who had of recent years a large amount of mental work and, before his present visual difficulties appeared, considerable mental worry and anxiety, found suddenly one morning that he could not read the exercises as usual. Greatly puzzled, he took up a printed book, and found that he could not read a single word. On examining his visual acuity, Dr. Hinshelwood found that he was unable to read even the largest letters of the test types. Patient informed him that he could see all the letters plainly and distinctly, but could not say what they were. What attracted special attention was the fact that the patient read at once the number standing at the top of each paragraph of the test types. On examining him further, it was found that he did not experience the slightest difficulty in reading any number of figures quite fluently and without making any mistakes whatever. He could read figures printed on the same scale as Jaeger No. 1, the smallest of the test types, and from other tests it was evident that there was no lowering of his visual acuity. The inability to read was thus manifestly not due to any failure of visual power, but to a loss of the visual memory for letters. The page of a printed book appeared to him exactly as it appears to a person who has never learned to read. He saw each individual character distinctly enough, but the character was no longer a visual symbol, as he no longer remembered the special significance attached to it. His difficulty with written characters was equally well marked. He could write with perfect fluency and ease to dictation, although afterwards he could not read what he himself had written. He spoke as fluently as ever. Patient was tested further with large combinations of figures, and all these were read with the greatest fluency, and without any hesitation whatever.

Cases of arithmomania—patients dominated by an irresistible impulse to count everything and to make useless calculations—while otherwise of normal intellect and conduct, have been reported by TRÉLAT ("La Folie Lucide"), A. CULLÈRE ("Annales Médico-Psychologiques," 1890), and LUDWIG BRUNS ("Neurologisches Centralblatt," 1891).

MUSICAL ABILITY

It would be difficult to settle what are distinct talents or innate gifts, but it will scarcely be denied that the musical talent is one of them. Nevertheless, it is made up of a number of elements, of which the principal one is the sense of appreciation of tones. The appreciation of sounds alone is not music. Music is a harmonious arrangement of sounds. The "time" sense among other factors is required to appreciate it. The lowest species of musical gift is the simple pleasure derived from hearing music, then that of remembering tunes, and of singing and performing. The title of musical genius is often reserved for great composers, but many great performers who cannot compose are spoken of as possessing musical genius. Between the highest and the lowest it is but a question of degree.

In persons who, in common language, have no ear for music, there is not deafness properly so-called, but an inability of the nervous structure to appreciate the minute vibrations which are caused by the more subtle differences in or among musical sounds.

Sir ASTLEY COOPER mentioned the case of a man who was very deaf from childhood, and who, notwithstanding, appreciated harmony; this person played well on the flute, and performed with great success in concerts. DARWIN knew a child who loved music extremely, who easily retained an air after hearing it sung distinctly, and whose organ of hearing was yet so imperfect that it was necessary to speak very loudly in addressing him.
Memory of tune is a very common faculty among the feeble-minded. They readily acquire simple airs and rarely forget them. The turn for music is quite disproportionate to their other mental faculties, and not unfrequently those who cannot speak at all can hum tunes correctly. This remarkable relative development of the musical sense in the feeble-minded is the more striking on account of the utter absence of any other evidence of artistic taste. A beautiful landscape or a lovely picture is powerless to move them.

The following casts, taken from living heads—all contemporaries—were in Gall's collection: Beethoven, Mozart, Haydn, Glück, Liszt, Kreibig (the accompanist of Emperor Joseph II.), Marchesi, Catalani, Rossini, and numerous others whose names would not be known at the present day except by persons intimately acquainted with the history of music. In his "Atlas of Brain Plates" he places the centre for the appreciation of the relation of tones over the fissure of Sylvius, in the upper and lateral part of the brain, corresponding in the skull to the temporal region bordering on the supra-orbital ridge, which part, when prominent, as in musicians, appears broader than the inferior part of the forehead between the external angles of the eyes. Gall analysed the history of Handel, Mozart, and other musical prodigies; described the musical disposition as it exists sometimes in idiots and the insane, and examined the differences in brain structure of singing and ordinary birds.

How correct Gall was in recognising singing-birds by the shape of the head is related by PRINCE METTERNICH (1773-1859), the famous Chancellor and lifelong patron of Gall, who used to accompany him to the Central Market in Vienna for the selection of singing-birds. To illustrate Gall's capacity we might mention also a mask in his Paris collection, labelled "Liszt: A mask taken from the living head. A young Hungarian, who very early displayed a great talent for music, and cultivated it with enthusiasm. The formation of the tone-centre is very striking in the mask." Gall's successor, FOSSATI, who had also examined Liszt's head, reported ("Lancet," 1834) "although the shape of the forehead of Liszt has some analogy with that of Weber, yet he feared this young artist, with all his talent, was not capable of producing anything to be compared with works of a higher worth." Those who have known Liszt in his later days can certify that this prognosis, founded entirely on the shape of the head when Liszt was still a youth, was quite correct. Liszt remained one of the best performers, but his compositions were of minor value.

BLIND TOM, as Thomas Wiggins was known throughout two continents for his wonderful musical genius, was little more than a child of feeble mind in all relations of life except that of music. He reproduced with an exactness little short of the marvellous what he heard immediately before the reproduction. But the wonder was that, once having reproduced the execution of a musical composition, he never afterwards lost memory of it. He also composed some pieces of his own. He never, outside of music, rose above the intelligence of a child of six. His passion for music began when two years old, and he never lost it until a few days before he died, when he was stricken with apoplexy. In his retirement he spent eight hours of each day at the piano. The rest of his life was a blank. He made fortunes for his owners and guardians. He died in 1908, in his sixtieth year. He was of the pure negro race, born in Georgia, a slave. His mother was bought by Col. James N. Bethune in 1850. She carried in her arms at the time a babe blind and so feeble that, in the sale, the babe was thrown in with the mother. He was the wonder of America and Europe, and although he was almost an imbecile in everything but music, in this he showed extraordinary talent.

Dr. LANGDON DOWN had an idiot boy under his care who could tell the time, besides the words and number of nearly every hymn in Hymns Ancient and Modern. Another boy in his care, if he went to an opera, would carry away a recollection of all the airs, and would hum and sing them correctly.

ESQUIROL (1772-1840) already had called attention to the fact that even idiots without the power of speech can sing.
WILDERMUTH ("Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie," 1889) estimated that the musical capabilities are well developed in one-third of even badly speaking idiots, and though first-class musicians predominate amongst normal children, second, third, and fourth-class musical capacity existed more frequently amongst idiots.

In insanity the musical faculty is often the last one to go.

For example, Sir JOHN BATTY TUKE (1835-1913), "Journal of Mental Science" (1891), had two lady patients who, though quite incoherent in speech, played with great accuracy on the piano, the one by ear, the other by reading music, although the latter was quite unable to read a book, and had not dressed herself for twenty years.

Music thus appears to be a rudimentary endowment which demands a much lower capacity than that of speech, and is less liable to be destroyed in mental decay.

The appreciation of musical sounds appears much earlier in life than the appreciation of words. Children may sing, perceive and enjoy music before they speak. Dvořák's son manifested great delight at the sound of music when three months old, and retained the memory of melodies when one year old. That speech is unnecessary for the learning of melodies is also evidenced by birds—for instance, the bullfinches. Moreover, that the musical capacity is independent of the speech centre is shown by the loss of musical perception and of the ability to sing without the simultaneous loss of speech and the power of understanding spoken words. It is only within the last few decades that attention has been drawn to the fact that the musical capacity may be lost from various pathological causes, and, further, that musical aphasia may occur either in conjunction with ordinary aphasia or be independent of it.

Cases are on record in which the patients, though "word-blind," still retained the power of reading musical notes. In other cases there is loss of the visual memory for musical notes, though they can read words. The patients can see the notes as usual, but they have no longer the faintest idea of their significance. They may be able to read the words of a song, but can no longer read the accompanying music.

Similarly there may be deafness for spoken words without deafness for musical tones, or the reverse; or there may be complete deafness for both. The notes are heard, but simply as sounds, without the patients being able to assign to them their position in the musical scale.

H. OPPENHEIM ("Charité Annalen," 1888) found that many aphasics retain their musical faculty and are able to recognize and appreciate melodies and music when they have lost the power to understand language, and were able to sing sometimes even with words they could not speak; others could read or write notes when they could not read or write words. He published clinical notes of seventeen cases of aphasia in which the musical faculty had been the subject of careful inquiry. The general result of these observations was that the musical faculty survived the loss of speech in aphasia, though in some patients the other mental powers were evidently injured. After the memory for melodies, the memory for numbers was found to be the best preserved. One patient, though he could not read ordinary letters, and could not write to dictation, nor copy writing properly, could quite well read and copy musical notes or write them to dictation.

A. KNOBLAUCH ("Deutsches Archiv f. Klinische Medizin," 1888), who introduced the term "amusia" for the loss of the musical sense, cites the case of a little girl, Lizette S., age six, who had right hemiplegia with aphasia. The child could not speak at all at first. Later on she said "mamma," and apparently repeated a few words. She could sing the song "Weisst Dy wie viel Sternlein stehen," etc., but she could not recite the text of the song, or speak voluntarily single words of the same.
L. v. FRANKL-HOCHWART ("Deutsche Zeitschrift f. Nervenheilkunde," 1891) studied the injury to the capacity for musical expression in five cases of aphasia. In all of these the musical power was less injured than that of speech. Some of them could sing words which they could not speak. Two could play from the music-book, one the violin, the other the piano, but they could not sing from it.

J. B. BOUILLAUD (1796-1881), "Bulletins de l'Academie de Médecine," vol. xxx., almost a century ago, made the observation on a patient, age fifty, who had lost the memory for words almost entirely and could speak and write but little, that he could compose an original tune, watch carefully when it was played to him, and sing the words correctly to the accompaniment.

J. P. FALRET (1794-1870), in 1867, called attention to the fact that many aphasics who are unable to speak are still able to sing; some without words, but others with the words that they are unable to speak.

E. C. LASÈGUE (1816-1883) had an aphasic and agraphic patient who could write down a composition with ease after hearing it played to him.

BALLET, in 1856, described musical aphasia, agraphia, and musical deafness.

BRAZIER cites some cases in which there was no aphasia, but the patients could not distinguish musical airs with which they were usually familiar.

EDGREN, of Stockholm, published in the "Deutsche Zeitschrift f. Nervenheilkunde," 1894, a collection of fifty-two cases of aphasia without amusia, and pure amusia without aphasia, showing the anatomical independence of the centres for speech and appreciation of tones.

Other observers of the independence of the tone sense are Stumpf, Stricker, Wallaschek, Blocq, Brissaud, Donath, Würtzen, Marinesco, Lichtheim, Kahler, Pick, Wernicke, Anton, Larionow, Hughlings Jackson, Gowers, Grasset, and Hallopeau.

Some observers assume that amusia may be situated in the anterior part of the first tempo-sphenoidal convolution, in front of Wernicke's area for word-deafness, but I am inclined from a study of the evidence to seek the centre for the appreciation of the relation of tones in the small anterior convolutions within the folds of the fissure of Sylvius that lie between the inferior frontal and superior temporal convolutions. Its definite localisation, however, must be the subject of future investigation. Here we must content ourselves in bringing the literature concerning this problem and records of cases together.

PAUL FLECHSIG (1847-1904) discovered the end stations of the cochlea nerves in this region, and this localisation would also harmonise with Ferrier's observations.

PROBST ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1899) locates the tone-centre in the most anterior parts of the left temporal lobe.

URQUHART ("Journal of Mental Science," 1904) found the lesion in a case of loss of musical capacity at the tip of the temporal lobe.

BRONISLAWKI ("Contribution a l'étude de l'amusie et de la localisation des centres musicaux. Thése de Bordeaux," 1900) locates the sensory centre for music in the anterior two-thirds of the first temporal convolution and the anterior half of the second; and the motor centre for singing in the second left frontal convolution. He maps out several other centres for the different varieties of musical capacity, very much as others have located the various forms of aphasia all over the brain. He has even a special centre for wind instruments! It is this sort of localisation that makes the whole problem appear ridiculous.

MERCIER and NEWINGTON ("Journal of Mental Science," 1907) argued that the tone-sense cannot be localised.

Case of Frontal Injury with Loss of Tone Sense.

J. G. EDGREN ("Hygeia," 1894):

The patient, thirty-four years of age, on August 31st, 1890, knocked the side of his forehead against a lamp-post so that he fell to the ground. He complained of headache afterwards, of imperfect sight, of vomiting, of difficulty of speech, and
INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS AND THEIR CEREBRAL ORIGIN

abnormality in the sense of taste. At first he could not eat at all. The next few days he took some water only, because he felt as if all food were remarkably hot; even the water he drank appeared hot. After a week he began to eat, but he now complained that all the food was too much salted. On September 17th patient came home after a visit to several concert halls and declared he could not make out the music. He had tried several places intentionally, but though he could hear the music, it did not sound as usual, but more like an indefinite noise, so that he could not make out the melody. The reply his wife gave him he could not understand, and he himself spoke no more for two days. On September 20th he began to speak again, but in so confused and disconnected a manner that it was almost impossible to understand him. Admitted to hospital on September 23rd. He was word-deaf. He could hear when someone was speaking to him, but without understanding the words spoken. Written communications he apprehended immediately, and he could still calculate. He heard equally well on both sides; he could hear the ticking of a watch at seven centimetres distance. His sense of smell was reduced; he could not smell spirits or vinegar. On October 5th his sense of smell and taste were perfectly normal. His defects were therefore only temporary, with the exception of his tone-deafness. He left the hospital on November 3rd. Before the accident he had a good musical ear, which had now vanished, so that orchestral music was to him mere noise, and he could not distinguish a waltz from a polka or march. He used to sing to his children, but now when attempting to do so he failed, and lost the melody. On March 17th, 1893, he was readmitted for bronchitis and an eruption of petrupsa. Intellect quite normal; no traces of aphasia, no word-deafness, only tone-deafness. The post-mortem examination revealed destruction of the anterior two-thirds of the first temporal convolution, and the anterior half of the second temporal convolution of the left hemisphere.

Case of Frontal Injury with Loss of Musical Capacity.


J. Trump, a singer, age eighteen, received a kick from a horse, resulting in a fissured fracture of the frontal bone, the fissure running from the outer corner of the left eyebrow upwards along the borderline of forehead and temple. The particles of bone were pressing on the brain, and the brain itself was confused. The wound suppurred, but got well after surgical treatment, a broad, deep scar being left. The patient had not suffered in intellect after his recovery, but had lost the memory of all the tunes he formerly knew.

Case of Head Injury with Loss of Musical Capacity.


A youth, age fifteen, fell from a cart and struck his head against the wheel. The accident was followed by loss of consciousness, which lasted several hours, and on restoration to consciousness it was found that the right side of the body was paralysed, and that, though he seemed to comprehend what was said to him, he could not utter a word. The paralysis slowly disappeared. At the end of two months the aphasia had altered its character. The boy was no longer unable to speak, but he had completely lost the artistic use of his vocal cords, though prior to his accident he was a distinguished member of a choral society. He sang discordantly and quite out of tune, and could not correctly follow the lead of another singer.

Case of Head Injury with Temporary Loss of Musical Capacity.

THOMAS D. SAVILL ("Clinical Lectures on Neurasthenia," 1908):

Mrs. Z., age forty-one, a professional singer and pianist, was struck severely on the left temple by falling glass from a seventh-floor window. She complained of loss of memory, confusion of thought, and complete inability to sing or play the piano. She could remember ordinary matters well enough, but found herself utterly unable to read a single note of music or to recognise delicate shades of
intonation. At the time of the injury there had been a good deal of swelling and bruising over the left temple, but no fracture anywhere. Extreme tenderness continued. The loss of memory for musical signs persisted for over a year.

Case of Frontal Lesion—Aphasia—Musical Sense Preserved.

BERNARD ("De l'Aphasie," Paris, 1889):
Lady music-teacher, age forty-five, had an apoplectic stroke, became hemiplegic on the right side and aphasic, but recovered the power of speech gradually, though she now expressed herself with difficulty. Yet she sang the tune "La dame blanche vous regarde" with the correct melody, pronouncing every word distinctly, and other tunes besides. She was not word-deaf. She could read a few sentences from a newspaper. She could read the title of music-scores, yet not the score itself; she could not read a single note. Of all pieces of music put before her she could read the title, but failed with the notes. Post mortem, a long strip of the convolutions within the Fossa Sylvii was found destroyed.

Case of Frontal Lesion—Aphasia—Musical Sense Preserved.

FINKELNBUG ("Berliner Klinische Wochenschrift," 1870):
A professional violin player, after an apoplectic stroke, lost considerably the memory of names of objects, and more so of abstract ideas. He could still play the violin by ear as ably as before, but not from notes, which he constantly mistook; nor could he write notes any longer without making mistakes. Another stroke deprived him of speech altogether, of the power of writing, and of the ability to read notes. Post mortem, the cortical layer of the island of Reil and the neighbouring parts were found softened.

Case of Frontal Lesion with Loss of Musical Faculty.

FRANK HAY ("Journal of Mental Science," vol. xii.):
Patient, a musician, suffering from epilepsy, became aphasic, and lost the musical faculty as well. He could not be induced to sing, though formerly a member of a church choir. His humming and whistling were only in a monotone, and never in the nature of a tune. The autopsy revealed the tip of the temporo-sphenoidal lobe disorganised, and exposed a cavity which entered the fissure of Sylvius, and laid bare the insula and anterior extremity of the operculum.

Case of Temporal Lesion with Sensory Aphasia and Tone Sense Preserved.

LUDWIG BRUNS ("Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie," 1892) showed at the meeting of the German Alienists at Hanover on May 1st, 1891, the brain of a musician with sensory aphasia who had not lost the tone sense. There was softening of the first temporal convolution with the exception of the anterior part.

CONCLUSION

This concludes the evidence in favour of the view of the frontal lobes being the material instruments for the manifestation of the intellectual capacities. In succeeding chapters will be shown the functions of the other lobes of the brain, concerned with the emotions and propensities. Therefore the inference may be drawn that no other part of the brain is involved in the intellectual functions, which we have enumerated. Nothing more is claimed for the view here expressed than that of an hypothesis. That it is one deserving the closest investigation there can be no doubt.

The reader will remember the orthodox view of physiologists, which has been examined minutely in Chapter XX., and will consequently not be surprised to be informed that CH. CHATELIN and T. de MARTEL (op. cit.), in their report on 5,000 wounds of the skull and brain in the recent war, have come to the conclusion that "there are no symptoms special to wounds of the frontal lobes." (p. 51). They
declare that the theory, so long maintained, "that the frontal lobes are a very important centre of association and the seat of the highest psychic functions" is "a purely theoretical assumption" and "has never received the slightest experimental confirmation." In other words, because experimenters have failed to dig out any thought or sentiment in vivisected monkeys or dogs, therefore the frontal part of the brain can have no such function. The authors mentioned quote Munk's localisation of "movement of the trunk muscles" and Sherrington's "lateral movement of the eyeballs" as experimental evidence of the functions of this part of the brain, neglecting the fact that the extraordinary size of the frontal lobes in man is a characteristic which distinguishes his brain from that of animals, and the relation of "mind" to brain.

Since localisation of special perceptions, individual memories, and other intellectual functions—as the evidence contained in this chapter tends to prove—is not admitted by present-day scientists, it is not surprising that no inquiries are made regarding the loss of them in lesions of the brain. Owing to this neglect, our knowledge of the mental functions of the brain—and the prevention and treatment of mental disorders—is still very primitive, as compared with the knowledge gained in other departments of science; and no progress can be made so long as physicians and surgeons rely too exclusively on knowledge based on the results of experiments on animals.

Dr. RICHARD EAGER, of Lord Derby War Hospital ("Journal of Mental Science" April 1920), states that of the 5,000 cases of head injury passed through his hands only 0.375% became insane. In his opinion most of the cases were purely "functional." Notwithstanding the large material at his disposal, he could quote only 28 cases of frontal injury, and he concludes from these that "there seems to be no uniformity in the psychic symptoms that may follow frontal injuries, and the tendency that there has been in the past to consider as a special characteristic of injuries in this region the likelihood of the moral character of the individual to suffer most is not supported." He found, however, "the number exhibiting states of complete dissociation, such as amnesias, to be comparatively high." Though Dr. Eager mentions my researches, he gives no evidence that he examined the patients psychologically on the lines indicated by me, and, so long as this is not done, reports will continue to be published making it appear that, no matter how serious the injury to the brain may be and whatever the locality that may be affected, no mental change will follow. I repeat the question, What, then, are the mental functions of that organ in the opinion of these observers?
CHAPTER XXX

THE EMOTION OF FEAR AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN

Intellectual functions have from time immemorial been associated with the brain; not so the feelings. Yet whether we assume that they arise through external stimuli, through bodily sensations, or through ideas of our own communicated to us, each rudimentary feeling—if there is anything like order in the nervous system—must have a centre in some group of nerve-cells from which it can set the rest of the brain into activity and produce its bodily manifestation. This has been recognised from time to time by individual observers, who located a general region for feelings in the lower ganglia of the brain; but the idea of cortical centres is still thought absurd. Now, I propose to take in this chapter the feeling of fear and to demonstrate its centre of origin in the cortex. I choose fear, first of all, because it is a rudimentary feeling; and, secondly, because it is easily demonstrated by the mass of evidence we possess of its morbid manifestation in circumscribed injury and disease of the brain, giving rise to that state of insanity called melancholia, which will be shown in Chapter XXXIV, to have at its base undue anxiety and fear, apparently without cause, or at least with insufficient cause.

It has been shown in the previous chapter that the intellect is related to the front part of the brain, and that over-stimulation of the frontal cells produces a state of mania and exaltation, and that softening of the same part leads to dementia. The conclusion is perfectly natural that the other lobes of the brain must have functions different from those mentioned; and since we must exclude the intellect, we must assume that they are related to the primary emotions and propensities. That the functions of the anterior and posterior parts of the brain are different in nature is partly confirmed by the peculiarity of the blood supply to the brain.

As regards the blood supply, the brain is divided into two areas: (1) the anterior, fed by the internal carotids, and (2) the posterior, fed by the basilar artery, the union of the two vertebral arteries. The existence of the circle of Willis has done much to give us false impressions as to the amount of inosculcation in the intracranial circulation. The existence of necrosis after embolism tells us very clearly of the slight character of the inosculations of the terminal vessels in the substance of the brain; while the occurrence of hemiplegia after ligation of one carotid artery reveals the inadequacy of the circulation through the circle of Willis to maintain the functional activity of the half-hemisphere whose direct blood supply has been interfered with. These two vascular areas contain brain-cells with different properties and functions.

The anterior and posterior parts of the brain appear also to differ in their influence on the nervous system. The former is connected chiefly with the voluntary or cerebro-spinal system, the latter with the sympathetic system. In other words, the anterior part of the brain seems to be exercised chiefly in connection with peripheral and muscular sensations and volition—with the relation of the organism to its surroundings; the posterior seems to receive mostly internal, organic sensations, i.e., to be connected with the vegetative life.

The distance between the brain and the viscera, between mind and appetite, is
THE EMOTION OF FEAR AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN 123

bridged by the sympathetic nervous system (also called "ganglionic"), which plays such a large part in all the great vital processes as well as in the creation and modifications of the emotions. It is only slightly under the control of the will, mostly acting reflexly to prepare the body for spontaneous protective action. That is how the actual origin of the passions has been placed in the viscera. As a matter of fact, the viscera stimulate the brain to emotional acts, by means of the sympathetic nerves; and emotions can stimulate the viscera through these same nerves.

It has been shown in the previous chapter that the pleasurable passions are connected with the front part of the brain. In this chapter it will be shown that the depressing emotions are connected with the posterior part of the brain.

When, owing to some stimulus, the bloodvessels of the brain are dilated, a state of hyperaemia supervenes, producing a state of exaltation, so long as mild; and, if severe, anger may follow. Just as a little alcohol quickens the circulation and makes us joyous and light of spirits; a little more, and the temper quickens, and argumentativeness and quarrelsomeness may follow.

Ordinary voluntary activity (of the cerebro-spinal system) causes a general expansion of vital action. The blood, under the animating influence, flows more liberally to the surface, and, playing freely through its capillary vessels, the countenance becomes expanded, its expression brightens, and the whole surface acquires the ruddy tint and genial warmth of health. The body also feels buoyant and lively, and there is a consequent disposition to quick and cheerful muscular action: to run, to jump, to dance, to laugh, to sing; in short, every function would seem to be gladdened by the happy moral condition; the common expression, therefore—the heart is light, or leaps with joy—is not altogether figurative.

A stimulus which dilates the visceral vessels, through the sympathetic nerves, causes paleness of the brain by emptying it of blood, and consequent depression, mental and physical languor, and, if severe, gloomy thoughts and fear.

Under the active influence of the depressing emotions the whole body appears, as it were, to shrink or contract. The blood abandons the surface, and being thus thrown in undue quantity upon the internal organs, there follows that inward oppression, that painful sense of stricture and suffocation, and the consequent desire for fresh air which ever mark the intensity of this class of passions. Hence the frequent sighing under severe grief, which act consists in a deep inspiration, succeeded by a corresponding expiration, and so, by expanding freely the chest and affording a larger supply of air, relieves, in some measure, the heart and lungs of their suffocative load. The painful passions also act immediately on all the vital functions, directly depressing all their energies. Although, however, the general effect of the painful emotions is to induce a contraction and a depression of the actions of life, yet, in their exaggerated forms, they are sometimes followed by a transient excitement, reaction, or vital expansion. This has probably some connection with a change in the emotions, as when the animal that took to flight from fear, when driven into a corner, gets into a rage and fights with all its might.

The vaso-motor nerves of these two areas of the brain—the anterior and posterior—are also differently derived.

The vaso-motor nerves of the vertebral arteries spring from the inferior cervical ganglion, into which run the fibres ascending from the abdomen by the greater splanchnic nerve. Indeed, ELIAS CYON (1843-), pupil of Claude Bernard, and ALADOFF, have traced nerve-fibres from the liver up the vertebral arteries. On the other hand, the carotid arteries derive their vaso-motor supply from the middle and superior cervical ganglion. Thus we can see how the emotions sympathise with the organic processes, especially those located in the abdomen, and can comprehend how mental depression may accompany, or wait upon, and depart with abdominal disturbance, which does not extend to the intellectual processes, but involves the emotions alone.
The emotions are the mental interpretation of physiological adaptations for survival, for they are capable of calling up certain powers of the body into action which help to preserve the individual. One may tutor one’s face and tongue to assume a condition consonant with one’s surroundings, but the gloom or gaiety— the feeling or tendency to feeling— persist, in spite of everything.

Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition of it in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clinching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in their state limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face? What kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if there were not present the feelings of quickened heart-beats, shallow breathing, trembling lips, weakened limbs, sensations of goose-flesh or of visceral stirrings?

But the bodily state may be both cause and effect of the emotion. For example, the sight of danger causes us to fear, and an anaemic condition of the brain may also cause a vague fear.

It has been supposed that each emotion has some special organ or organs on which its power is more particularly expended; that some act most obviously on the heart, as fear and joy; others on the respiration, as surprise; and again others, as grief, on the digestive organs. We shall find a clear indication of this connection in our common forms of speech, which must have been derived from observation and generally recognised before they could have been incorporated with our language. The paleness of fear, the breathlessness of surprise, and the bowels of compassion, are phrases sanctioned by the custom of different ages and nations. The effects of a passion, however, are rarely limited to a particular one, but a number of the organic viscera are almost always included within their influence.

The viscera do not distinguish between different kinds of emotion, but the different emotions have their own bed or track deeply laid already and ingrained in the central nervous system, and each has in connection with this track a separate group of co-ordinating neurones. This is the view expressed by Prof. SHERINGTON, the distinguished physiologist, with which I not only agree, but which I shall attempt to prove in this and succeeding chapters.

Those who hold that the origin of the specific emotions cannot be localised in the brain advance as a reason that each emotion tends to involve nearly the whole brain and bodily organisation; but, as I have already explained, this is judging by the effects of the emotion.

By observing the effects of circumscribed injury and disease of the posterior parts of the brain—and comparing them with the effects of circumscribed injury or disease of the anterior—it will be seen that the two have different functions. In this chapter I propose to limit the inquiry to the functions of the central parietal area, which will be shown to be affected in states of depression and melancholia, which have fear, either vaguely or definitely, as their basis. True, fear can stimulate as well as inhibit the entire organism, according to its degree; but so can anger, a totally different emotion. Common sense will tell us that they must have different centres of origin, from which their influence is directed. But it is not by arguments that I intend to prove my statement, but by evidence.

The view that the central parietal area is concerned with the highest intellectual operations, and Flechsig’s view that it is the centre for musical ability, have been disposed of in previous chapters. On the other hand, the current theory (of cerebral physiologists and pathologists) that lesion of this area gives rise to “psychical blindness” (see Chapter XX.) is not opposed to the localisation about to be proved; on the contrary, a number of examples will be cited of concurrent symptoms of fear and psychical blindness.

We have seen that in lesions of the frontal lobes there is usually a feeling of
physical well-being and mental exaltation. The evidence that follows will show that in lesions of the posterior part of the brain (the area behind the central fissure)—or, more clearly defined, the central parietal area—there is generally a feeling of being physically unwell and mental depression.

At the basis of simple melancholia is the emotion of fear—an unreasonable apprehensive depression, which retards thoughts and movement, and interferes greatly with self-control, without impairing the reasoning power. Whereas joyful emotions accelerate the course of ideas, anxiety, fear, grief, and all depressing emotions inhibit intellectual processes. The intellect remains intact, but as every exertion augments the distress, such patients avoid all occupation, become inert, indecisive, and brood over their own sadness. The intellect is not equal to the task of controlling these gloomy thoughts. Melancholia is a morbid condition of the emotional life affecting a brain area which is not concerned in intellectual processes. These only get slower, painful, and restricted to the patient’s own woes. (See Chapter XXXIV.) Were melancholia an affection of the entire brain, the intellect would always be involved; whereas one may meet every day with melancholiacs who do not exhibit any disorder in their ideas or judgment.

Simple melancholia is essentially a state of mental pain, a vague feeling of anxiety, gloom, depression, indifference to the ordinary interests of life, and lack of all hope in the future, or positive fear and trepidation. Those who suffer from it labour under an indefinite despondency, which they can neither shake off nor explain. They find no pleasure in anything, nor can they be touched by the misfortunes of others, their own distress being much more intense than all besides. Thus they live in constant solitude and apprehension. Fear and apprehension shade and modify the reminiscences of the past, exaggerate dangers, and distort reality. Thus a just and rational view of life is no longer taken. The subject is generally acutely conscientious and distresses himself needlessly with worries, of which the unreasonable is appreciated by him but cannot be got rid of. Other feelings are paralysed, consequently the patient becomes indifferent towards those persons and things which he used to hold in affection. The feeling of fear is so accentuated that any trifling mistake ever made is exaggerated and self-accusations follow, which, however, are not delusions, but simply reasons to account for the depressed feeling and state of anxiety. The patient, as the disease progresses, anticipates dreadful consequences of his past errors; he is therefore unhappy, sleeps badly, weeps, sobs, sighs, groans, laments his cruel fate, and wishes to be dead. Suicide is common.

The physical manifestations of uncomplicated melancholia are identical with the manifestations of fear. They both produce a state of anaemia through vaso-motor spasm, which causes pallor of the face, cold extremities, and precordial distress. The contraction of the coats of the arteries causes a rise of blood pressure.

In mania the blood-pressure is lowered; in melancholia it is increased. Whereas the average blood-pressure in a normal man is 152 mm. Hg., and in cheerful people it falls to 145 or 140 mm. Hg., in anxious patients it rises according to the degree of fear to as much as 180 mm. Hg. The tension of the walls of blood-vessels is increased so that they admit only of a small quantity of blood from the heart, which has therefore difficult work to perform, and thus gives rise to painful sensations. A profuse shedding of tears relieves the blood-pressure and relieves also the mental state. This is the reason why grief and anxiety can be worked off sometimes by a good fit of crying.

JOHN TURNER ("Journal of Mental Science," 1909), however, says there is no relation between blood-pressure and mental disorders.

Fear and the anxious emotion, if prolonged as in the state of melancholia, cause defective nutrition, and this defect is particularly manifest in those parts of the human frame supplied by the sympathetic nervous system. The skin becomes dry and muddy in appearance, the hair is also dry and harsh, fades in colour, turns grey,
and may fall out altogether; the nails grow slowly; digestion proceeds slowly, leading to discomforts and disturbances which later may give rise to various delusions; the bowels are constipated; the bodily temperature is lowered, the pulse is slowed, and so is practically every bodily process. Owing to the deficient breathing, lung disease is the most common termination of melancholia.

**Fear and melancholia render the cerebro-spinal nervous system inactive**, hence the muscular languor, lassitude, and loss of all sense of energy. There is frequently a condition resembling what is called "apraxia," namely, an inability to execute the movements required to carry out a definite action, although there is no paralysis. This muscular inability is acknowledged to take place in lesions of the parietal lobe. An erect figure is never seen in this malady. As in an acute state of fear, so in acute melancholia, the subject may remain fixed in one attitude; in another degree he may be restless, but this restlessness is brought about by the involuntary nervous system, and is quite different from the maniacal restlessness which originates in the voluntary or cerebro-spinal nervous system. The trembling of fear is probably due to the rhythmic action of the sympathetic nervous system on the cerebro-spinal nerves. In melancholics, not only is what little movement that takes place done rhythmically, but the words uttered—the expression of their misery—is repeated in a rhythmical manner.

Whereas insanities in which the cerebro-spinal system is involved—such as acute mania and epileptic insanity—can occur suddenly, melancholia involving the sympathetic system is slow in its onset. The beginnings are usually so slight that they attract no notice, and it is not until the disorder has become fully established that it is remembered for how long the symptoms have been gradually increasing.

Pure melancholia being an emotional and not an intellectual disease, it is not surprising to discover that **Julius Jensen** (1841-1891) "Archiv für Psychiatrie," vol. xx., who examined 453 brains of insane patients, found that in melancholia the frontal lobes are not involved, and that **W. J. Tigges** (1830-) "Allg. Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie," 1888, made the same observation. The latter said: "In melancholia there is no wasting of the frontal lobes—they retain their weight; in mania, there is some loss of weight; in general paralysis the loss is the greatest."

This view was also expressed long ago by the celebrated **J. L. C. Schröder van der Kolk** (1797-1862), in his text-book on "Mental Disorders" (1852): "In insanity proper, in cases of confusion of ideas, and of insanity of exaltation, I have always found the anterior lobes of the brain suffering; but, on the contrary, in the melancholic, and in those who condemned themselves with or without religious delusions, I have found the upper and posterior parts of the hemispheres diseased, and that in the latter cases the understanding often showed no trace of disturbance, insomuch as the individuals judged correctly and disputed acutely. In those who at last perished with dementia, I never found the anterior parts of the lobes intact; they were always adherent to the pia mater, and this could not be removed without injuring the grey cortex."

**J. A. Lockhart Clarke** (1817-1880) has said: "That the anterior and posterior lobes have different functions is certain, as the convolutions of the cerebral regions have different structure."

**Aug. Voisin** read a paper on "The Suicidal Tendency" to the Academy of Medicine on August 8th, 1882, in which he declared that his observations led him to the conclusion that the particular part of the brain which gave the tendency and impulse to suicide is in the parietal lobes.

**Chas. K. Mills** ("Philadelphia Medical Journal," 1901) held that cerebral tumors in parietal region render patients abnormally emotional.

**Bernhard Gudden** (1824-1886) declared the anterior half of the brain to be concerned with motion, and the posterior half with sensation.

**Luigi Luciani** (1842-1919) and **Giuseppe Seppilli** were of opinion that the fusion of sensory centres takes place in the parietal lobes.
FRANCESCO DURANTE saw in the posterior lobes the centre for general sensibility, and believed them to be involved in melancholia.

ALBERT E. EULENBURG found by experiments on dogs that stimulation of the parietal region produced irritation of the vaso-motor nerves, together with such symptoms as sudden emptying of the bowels, which we frequently observe in mania.

F. L. GOLTZ (1834-1902) and BEATSON found that destruction of the posterior lobes in dogs and sheep causes these animals no longer to be frightened by objects that had caused them terror previous to the operation. Dogs which were lively and active before the operation became quiet and apathetic, and their intellect was inhibited.

JAC. MOLESCHOTT (1822-1893) noticed that immediately after destroying in pigeons that portion of the brain corresponding to the parietal lobes in man, they showed a total imperception of danger.

Sir DAVID FERRIER observed that: "The animal whose left angular gyrus was destroyed moved only unwillingly, and when it was obliged to; it ran its head full tilt against everything that came in its way. When both angular gyri were destroyed there was still greater reluctance to move from its position, arising evidently from a sense of insecurity, for the animal paid no attention to threats and grimaces.

HERMANN MUNK also observed "non-perception of threatened danger—the animal made no sign of fear at threatening gestures."

HEINRICH KISCH stated as most characteristic symptom of mental depression a sensation of heat about the parietal bone.

R. v. KRAFFT-EBING (1840-1902) considered melancholia a form of neurosis or psychic neuralgia of the sensory centres of the brain. Undoubtedly, melancholia gives rise to a psychical hyperaesthesia.

THOMSEN and OPPENHEIM ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1884) stated that the sensory anaesthesia form a typical group of symptoms, the most constant being the bilateral concentric limitation of the visual field. It is important to observe that in almost every case psychical symptoms are present; most often depression of spirits, feelings of apprehension, and easy excitement to terror.

GALL described the physical movements appropriate to this area as that of circumspension, taken literally: "Turning the head sometimes to the right, sometimes to the left, holding it slightly inclined backwards, while the eyes, wide open, follow the movements of the head." The locality and description have been unconsciously confirmed by FERRIER, who, in stimulation of his Centre 13, observed: "The eyeballs move to the opposite side, and frequently also the head moves in the same direction."

It is also well known that in melancholia there is anaemia of the brain, and in mania hyperemia; and that hallucinations of sight are common in anaemia, whereas hallucinations of hearing occur in hyperæmia.

There is ample material to prove to us the relation of melancholic states of mind to pathological conditions of the parietal lobes, more particularly of the angular and supra-marginal convolutions. Numerous examples will be given, but to remove any doubt which may obscure the judgment in the testing of these cases it is advisable to explain at once those exceptions in which lesions have been found in other regions than the parietal.

Everyone may call to mind cases of melancholia which were found with lesions of the frontal lobes. How are these to be explained? In the previous chapters it has been shown that the frontal lobes are the centres of the intellect, and as such they are the centres of inhibition of the emotions. In a lesion of the frontal lobes, therefore, the control or inhibitory influence exercisable over the emotions would be lost, and thus naturally active dispositions become morbid. Of course, if the patient is demented as well as melancholic, both parietal and frontal convolutions will be found affected.

Sometimes no lesion may be discoverable, and sometimes the whole brain may
apparently be affected. Thus we may find a general anaemia of the brain in melancholic cases owing to inanition. In such inanition-melancholias there prevails an intensification of the natural characteristics of the patient; there is manifested a hereditary or acquired disposition to a depressed condition. The same would be true where the blood is the carrier of toxins.

In all these conditions, only dispositions which are already leading and highly active in the normal state will become morbid. Thus the modest, humble, apprehensive, and conscientious man becomes the melancholic and self-accuser. Persons who are of selfish and criminal cast of mind do not in their delirious utterances reproach themselves, nor express ideas and sentiments which imply that they are especially troubled about their past conduct. The delusion that they have committed the unpardonable sin afflicts only the meek, humble Christians who cherish ideas of exalted purity, and who long to attain a holiness of life, yet distrust their capacity, wisdom, and self-control; and are thus led to safeguard anxiously their motives, search their hearts for lurking inclinations to sin, and so drift on into the unfathomable abyss of morbid introspection, which naturally ends in insanity. The ungodly, who pursue deliberately lawless, wicked ways, without a pang of regret, do not become self-incriminating the moment thought and reason are unrestrained. It is not the dishonest man, the gambler, or the thief who will, while delirious, confess himself guilty of cheating, embezzlement, and financial frauds; but rather the kind-hearted "Golden Rule" man, who has endeavoured to practise just and upright dealings with all men, and whose generous promptings often have exceeded his means of benevolence.

The clinical material which we are about to produce shows that the supramarginal and angular gyri are concerned in the production of those morbid psychical and physical states which we collectively term "melancholia," of whatever nature the lesion may be. Frequently the functions which have been assigned to this area by various physiologists and neurologists, such as "psychical blindness," exist with melancholia, particularly in its earlier stages. Such earlier stages, however, do not often come under the observation of alienists; and the neurologist, generally speaking, is not wont to notice the mental changes in the patient; or, if he does observe them, he is likely to regard the patient’s depression, anxiousness, and morbid fears as the outcome of existing physical trouble and not of the particular lesion of the brain.

I am aware, of course, that by a great many alienists melancholia is no longer regarded as an independent psychosis; that it has been shown by GEORGE DREYFUS that all of the cases described by KRAEPELIN and his school as "melancholia simplex," "melancholia agitata," and "depressive insanity," are in reality cases of manic-depressive insanity. Dreyfus found in a large number of the cases he examined typical circular symptoms. But this only shows that in manic-depressive insanity we have a general affection of the brain, probably of its circulation; and with cases involving the whole brain, or the greater part of it, we are not concerned in this book.

Sir GEORGE SAVAGE had already pointed out in 1887 that melancholia might usher in mania or general paralysis, or be present after an attack of mania as a phase of reaction, but that it is also true—as may be seen by the examination of the cases I am about to quote—that melancholia may be a complete psychosis in itself. That, after the disorder has lasted some time, the melancholic state may change into something else is no proof against my view, since the cause may be in a circulatory disturbance which cannot be strictly limited; and, even when it is the brain itself, it may be of such a character that the mischief cannot remain limited to a particular region for any length of time.

Besides cases of tumours, inflammatory lesions, haemorrhages, etc., I shall cite cases of injuries to the brain which have been followed by the manifestation of melancholia. These cases of injury to the parietal region, when compared with the cases of injury to other regions of the brain which I quote, will make it evident
that there is no ground for a "traumatic insanity," as various authors have assumed. **A single form of traumatic insanity is simply non-existent.** SKAIE, MAUDSLEY, and others have declared that melancholia is rarely present in traumatic insanity, but the cases I shall quote show that injuries to the middle parietal region are always likely to be followed by mental depression, morbid fear, anxiety, and actual melancholia.

In order to demonstrate the practical value of this localisation, I shall begin with cases of melancholia which have been cured by surgical operation.

**SURGICAL TREATMENT OF MELANCOLIA**

One of the author's own cases of Parietal Injury followed by Symptoms of Melancholia—Surgical Operation—Recovery. *(Published in "Lancet," 1907.)*

Patient, age thirty-nine, a doctor of medicine, previously quite healthy, fell from his cycle on his head. He did not think that he had received any marked injury, and did not believe there was any connection between his subsequent illness and the accident. There certainly were no external signs, but soon after the accident he began to suffer from hemicrania so severely that he could not go on with his work. He got depressed, anxious without sufficient cause, accused himself of all sorts of evil deeds without foundation, and made some attempts on his life, so that he had to have a companion to watch him. He consulted various specialists, who advised change of scene; but travelling did him no good. The depression and headache increased. He consulted the author six years after the accident, and was then melancholic, emotional, readily weeping, and very suicidal. The right side of the head pained him much, and there was a burning sensation just behind the right parietal eminence. Operation was proposed, which Mr. William Turner carried out. Only when the head was shaved did a scar become visible, which extended from the situation of the angular convolution just behind the parietal eminence vertically downwards for about two inches. A semi-circular flap was made extending from the ear to the occipital protuberance, and the scar, which was adherent to the bone, was detached. Two trephine openings, one one inch and the other eleven-sixteenths of an inch in diameter, were made and connected with one another. The bone over the angular convolution was thickened and ivory-like, without any evidence of diploe, and the dura was attached to the bone. The brain bulged into the wound and did not pulsate, notwithstanding a strong pulse at the time. On incision of the dura a stream of clear fluid escaped. The dura was found thickened, but the brain appeared quite normal. Dura, periosteum, and flap were each closed with stitches, only a small opening being left for drainage for some days. Patient was at once free from pain and of cheerful, normal disposition, and after two years of perfect health gave permission for the publication of his case.

Other cases of Parietal Injury—Melancholia—Surgical Operation—Recovery.

G. MACKENZIE BACON ("Journal of Mental Science," 1881):

Samuel S., age thirty-eight, joiner by trade, always in good health. Whilst at work a hammer fell from a height of about six feet on his head. He was not unconscious, nor were any serious symptoms exhibited at the time of the accident; but six months afterwards he found himself unable to attend to his work through giddiness and inability to fix his mind on anything. A year after the accident he complained of severe pain over the stellate and adherent cicatrix on the left parietal bone. He grew morose and talked of suicide. In the following month he made a most determined attempt at suicide by throwing himself from the staircase at the top of the hospital where he was then an inmate. His life was saved, and he was sent to Fulbourne Lunatic Asylum. An operation was arranged, and Mr. Wherry removed with the trephine from the seat of the injury a piece of the parietal bone, and found the dura mater beneath of a deep purple colour, and apparently healthy; it bulged with pulsations into the wound. The portion of the skull removed was three quarters of an inch in diameter, but had not been fractured. The wound healed rapidly and well, and a month later the patient was lively and cheerful and
went to work in the carpenter's shop. Three months after the operation he went back to his old employers. He continued in good health.

GEORGE E. WHERRY ("British Medical Journal," 1883):

N., an attendant of the Three Counties Asylum, a strong man, age 25, was sitting in an arm-chair, when a powerful lunatic came up from behind and struck him on the head with a heavy carpenter's mallet. He remained master of his senses, but fainting from loss of blood. There was a compound comminuted fracture of the right parietal bone, from the parietal eminence to the sagittal suture. He was trephined. The inner table was found more extensively fractured than the outer, the fragments of skull being deeply depressed and the brain bruised. The exfoliated bone was removed. Next day the wound unfortunately suppurated. The patient, who, previous to the operation, was merely anxious about himself, otherwise calm and intelligent, got more depressed and sullen, and in another month was insane. He had a vacant and absent look. More pieces of bone which had been exfoliated were removed, after which operation he spoke rationally, and by December recovered sufficiently to engage in farming pursuits.

WILLIAM MACEWEN ("Lancet," 1888):

A man who had received an injury to his head a year previously suffered from deep melancholy and paroxysms of pain in the head. Though the pain was excruciating he welcomed it, as it temporarily dispelled the almost irresistible impulse to kill his wife and children. Prior to receiving this injury he was perfectly free from impulses of this kind and had led a happy life with his family. Immediately after the accident, and for about two weeks subsequently, he had suffered from psychical blindness. Physically he could see, but what he saw conveyed no impression to his mind. This gave the key to the operation. The angular gyrus was exposed, and it was found that a portion of the internal table of the skull had been detached from the outer, and had exercised pressure on the posterior portion of the supra-marginal convolution, while a corner of it had penetrated and lay embedded in the anterior portion of the angular gyrus. The bone was removed from the brain and re-implanted in proper position, after which he became relieved in his mental state and made no further allusion to his murderous impulses.

The SAME AUTHOR ("Pyogenic Infective Diseases of the Brain," 1893):

J. W., age twenty-five. Seven weeks prior to admission he fell down the slope of a quarry, his head coming in contact with a projecting stone. In this way he received a small wound at the posterior extremity of the left parietal bone, about one inch from the middle line, which gave him little trouble and was soon healed. About three weeks after the accident he began to experience a dull aching pain, and began to suffer from great mental depression. These symptoms continued until his admission into the hospital, four weeks from the attack. At the operation the periosteum was found to be thick and somewhat inflamed. A stellate fracture of the skull was discovered, with a much depressed and comminuted internal table, and about four drachms of pus escaped. At the centre of the affected area the dura mater was covered by a thick layer of granulation tissue, while at its circumference this membrane was flocculent. A fortnight after the operation the wound healed. The patient's former mental depression and painful sensations had entirely disappeared. A month later he was dismissed well, and twelve months after he reported that he was in excellent health and attended to his work regularly.

W. B. FLETCHER ("American Journal of Insanity," 1886-1887):

W. P. H., age thirty-five, fell from a scaffolding six years prior to admission, and exhibited since then strong suicidal tendencies. There was a depression of bone in the left parietal region, near the osculation of the right parietal and occipital. The depression was quite perceptible to both sight and touch. The depressed piece was elevated and, according to Dr. Fletcher, the patient "found to his delight that he was free from pain and from the abnormal mental condition, which had been his constant companion for years, since the moment of his fall from the housetop."

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):

J. G., age forty-seven, machinist, was struck on the head by a stove-lid lifter three years before admission. He was taken home in an unconscious condition, and so remained for six hours, and confined to his bed for several days. He was soon able to resume work, which he continued to do, after a fashion, for six months.
From this time on he became negligent, careless about his clothing, with lack of interest in anything; finally melancholy and suicidal. Careful examination under chloroform revealed a scar on the parietal bone one and a half inches from the coronal suture. The scalp was adherent. On dislodging the surrounding bone, a spicule of the internal table was found, puncturing the dura like a carpet-tack. By the seventh day after the operation the patient was a "new man," as he expressed it. He has been able to continue his work as a stove-moulder from that time, and was reported two years after his discharge as being still perfectly well and working at his trade constantly.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):

Henry Stevens, age twenty-three, was admitted to hospital from prison for melancholia. He never talked nor moved, and sat constantly with eyes turned downwards and lids nearly closed, as if to avoid the light. A scar ran from the coronal suture backwards over the left parietal bone, two inches long and one inch wide. The bone was depressed to a corresponding extent, and was removed. The melancholia disappeared. He talked, walked, and cared for himself. But another injury—possibly by contre-coup—was supposed, as patient became later morose and profane.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):

M. C., age forty-four, was injured by a fragment of bursting shell, and suffered from melancholy ever since. There was a deep scar, one and a half inches long, vertically over the centre of the left parietal bone, forming a groove in the bone. Though there was no depression of bone, the patient's pain and nervousness disappeared after the operation, and he became cheerful and went to work as a gardener.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):

J. N., age fifty, fairly educated, and, for a farmer, had accumulated a good fortune. Eight years prior to admission he was standing in a saw-mill, when the boiler exploded, a fragment of iron striking him on the upper and anterior third of the right parietal bone. Through this he was unconscious for several days, but gradually recovered, and for seven years pursued his occupation on the farm. Then he got muscular convulsions of face and arm, and at the same time became melancholic, listless, and sometimes suicidal. His friends wanted him committed to an asylum, but an operation was decided upon instead. There was no fracture at the seat of injury, but the dura was firmly adherent to the bone; it was tough and did not pulsate. On incision two drachms of fluid escaped, and during the next forty-eight hours a large quantity of yellowish fluid. All symptoms disappeared and patient has been well ever since.

The SAME AUTHOR mentions other successful cases and two unsuccessful ones. These two had suicidal tendencies after injury to the frontal bone, and trephining the depressed portion of bone, over seat of injury, did not improve the patients. I have already pointed out that the frontal region is the inhibitory region, so that lesions thereof are liable to accentuate natural tendencies: a naturally gloomy man becoming melancholic, an irritable man bad-tempered and violent, and so on. Hence the importance of the mental symptoms for localisation. There is also the possibility of contre-coup.

P. STETTER ("Centralblatt für Chirurgie," 1892):

Patient, age twenty-eight, received an injury some eleven years before in consequence of a cart-horse, on which he rode, shying at a railway train and throwing him to the ground. The pole of the cart was driven into the lower part of his right parietal bone, and the depression extended to the parietal eminence. He was carried home unconscious. The wound healed rapidly, but the depression remained. No physical symptoms, but striking psychical changes. Patient shunned all association with men, sat for hours brooding in a corner, had daily paroxysms of weeping, and in the end preferred his bed to getting about. He was trephined and the depressed bone was removed. After the operation patient resumed social life again and became quite normal.

BRIGGS ("Philadelphia Medical News," vol. xiv.):

A similar case of a patient who was successfully operated upon five years after injury.
THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN

Christian Lieze, when forty-two years of age, received a blow on the left parietal bone. Three years afterwards he betrayed much abnormal anxiety, developed symptoms of melancholia, and the following year he made two attempts at suicide, one by hanging, and one by cutting his throat. He was sent to the asylum. At the seat of the injury a scar was visible, and a small tumour could be felt. On excision it was found to be a neuroma dolorosum. Patient became bright and cheerful, declaring himself free from pain, and was discharged. He reported himself some time afterwards as continuing well.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):
C. D., age eighteen, received a blow from a stick on the left parietal bone, which caused him great pain. Fourteen days afterwards, when the wound was healed, he became excited with fear, saw danger everywhere, looked anxiously about, sat or lay motionless. He was admitted to the asylum with symptoms of melancholia, and had to be forced to take his food. When moved to speak at all he burst out crying. On the left parietal bone there was a highly tender scar, one inch long, adherent to the bone. The excision of the scar cured the patient, and he was discharged.

DANIEL MOLLIERE (Report of the French Surgical Congress, 1885):
M. A., age forty-nine, received an injury in the parietal region close to the temporal bone, which left a scar of fifteen centimetres length. Patient became melancholic, with paroxysms of agitation at night. The operation revealed an abscess in the brain beneath the seat of injury. On letting out the pus, his recovery was rapid. He soon returned to his occupation, which he followed with his former gaiety of spirits, and he reported himself to the physician to have kept well and in possession of all his faculties.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):
H. X., age thirty-one, received an injury to his head which left a scar in the right parietal region. He became melancholic. After trephining the skull at the seat of injury he gradually improved, and was discharged two months after the operation, and reported himself well and working at his trade two years later.

H. A. POWELL ("Surgical Aspect of Traumatic Insanity," 1893):
Depressed fracture of the right parietal bone in a girl age eight. Depression and apathy. Trephined seven years after injury, when fifteen. Became at once bright and cheerful. Under observation two and a half years.

A carpenter, age twenty-six, always healthy until receiving a blow on the parietal bone to the left of the median line, about midway between the fissure of Rolando and the external occipital protuberance. Four years after, he complained of pain at the spot, and became melancholic, sullen and morose. The depressed bone was elevated. On recovery from the operation he was at once cheerful, and undertook again a responsible position.

BOUBILA and PANTALONI ("Gazette des Hôpitaux," 1892):
Case of a patient suffering from hallucinations of sight and tendency to suicide, which was cured after lifting up a piece of depressed bone in the posterior parietal region, evidently the result of an injury.

FENOGLIO ("Bologna Rivista Clinica," 1887):
Similar case. Operation. Complete mental recovery. An interesting observation was made in this case, namely, that the symptoms were reproducible by pressure over the trephine hole.

The SAME AUTHOR ("Archiv. di Psichiatria," 1884):
A young farmer, age nineteen, suffered a depressed fracture of the right parietal bone situated between the parietal eminence and the highest middle point of the temporal crest. The previously merry, cheerful patient fell into a sad and depressed mental condition, which brought him to the asylum five years afterwards, in his twenty-fifth year. He was trephined, and a splinter of bone, which had indented the brain, was removed. After the operation the patient recovered his former bright nature.

Patient, age forty, was admitted to the St. Pierre Asylum for symptoms of melancholia, distressing delusions, and terrifying hallucinations. There was a
depression in the left parietal bone, size five centimetres, about which no history could be obtained. The depressed bone was elevated, the dura mater excised. The meninges presented a gelatinous appearance with milky spots. After the operation the patient lost his depressing delusions and hallucinations.

J. E. CHAMBERS (Report of Cosmopolitan Sanatorium, St. Louis, 1906):

Patient, age thirty-seven, sustained a fracture of right parietal protuberance two inches long. Part painful on pressure and caused fainting. Three weeks later he had "melancholiaagitata," lasting for three and a half years. At the end of that time he was operated upon with such success that he was able to resume his occupation after ten weeks.

T. RIBOLI ("Phil. Seb.," vol. i.):

Female patient, suffering for four years from melancholia, complained of pains on the right side of the head. There appeared a swelling the size of a nut on the parietal bone. When it was cut open, pus escaped. But it re-formed, and the second time it was cut open by an accidental knock on the head. Then a necrosed particle of bone was discovered underneath. After its removal the melancholia disappeared, and patient having no relapse within a year of the operation, she was discharged.

G. H. HUME ("Lancet," 1908):

The patient, a man between fifty and sixty years of age, fell from his bicycle and received a cut on the back of the head on the left side. He lay unconscious for a few minutes and came to himself standing in the midst of a group of workmen who had come to his assistance. The wound was dressed by a surgeon late in the day. It healed readily, and the ordinary habits of life and business were not interrupted. But from the date of the accident he felt vaguely ill and suffered from a constant feeling of anxiety and depression. He went on a voyage and wrote: "I must confess to a constant urging towards suicide; it seems so easy to drop overboard in the dark and end all my troubles." He suffered from pains on the left side of the head. Three months after the accident he was trephined. The posterior parietal region was laid bare by a large flap reflected downwards. The cicatrix of the wound was included in the upper and posterior angle of the flap and the underlying bone showed no trace of injury. Three trephine discs were then removed and the intervening piece of bone was cut out. The exposed dura mater bulged and looked bluish, and when it was incised a quantity of porter-like fluid gushed out to the estimated amount of five or six ounces. Adherent portions of the clot were scraped away, and while this was being done it was noticed that the surface of the depressed parietal lobe was slowly rising to the normal level. The dura mater was readjusted, and the scalp flap closed. The bone was not replaced. He recovered completely.

H. HANDFORD ("British Medical Journal," 1899):

A girl, age thirteen, had atrophy of both optic nerves. She suffered from headache and melancholia, and had visual hallucinations. There was an ostephite in the right parietal region, which on trephining was seen to have pressed internally. Patient after her operation lost her headache and hallucinations and became cheerful, and even her sight improved.

**MELANCHOLIA FROM PARIETAL INJURY**

**Other Examples of Injuries of Parietal Lobes followed by Abnormal Fear, Anxiety, and Melancholia. Case of Recovery.**

CHARLES PHELPS ("Traumatic Injuries to the Brain," 1898):

Patient, age thirty, fell twenty-five feet from a ship's deck on to a raft alongside. Consciousness was lost for a few moments only. Hæmatoma over right parietal region. After three weeks painful delusions developed. He suffered acute mental anguish, which could have been scarce exceeded had these pure fancies been actual facts. An inclination to weep was manifested both with and without cause. His speech was always coherent. Gradual recovery. Discharged seven months after admission.
Another Case of Recovery.


Patient, a little boy age ten, was shown at the Fifty-fifth Meeting of the German Alienists at Breslau. He had received from his teacher a blow with a cane over the left parietal region. Five days after the receipt of the injury patient had a paroxysm of fear accompanied by trembling of all the muscles, painful sensations over the heart, and hallucinations inspiring great fear. He made self-accusations. Two days later came delusions as to his going to be hanged. He regained his perfect mental stability after treatment.

One More Example of Recovery.

M. GAMBERINI ("Bulletine delle scienze mediche di Torino," vol. i.):

A banker, age thirty-four, with a history of syphilis, fell from a height on to the left parietal bone. He had severe headache subsequently, and epileptiform attacks, first slight, then growing in severity, and his mental state became that of melancholia. His expression was that of sadness and anxiety, and he had a fixed stare. The bone was swollen at the seat of injury. Anti-syphilitic treatment not only made the swelling disappear, but cured the melancholia and epileptiform attacks.


T. S., age fifty-six, single, Catholic, always healthy, fell downstairs in 1891, and injured the right parietal bone. Since that accident he suffered from insomnia, aversion to food, deemed herself unworthy to receive the Sacraments, believed she was going to be executed, her head chopped off, etc. She spoke only in a whisper. Sighed constantly. She made a recovery and was discharged.

Examples of Parietal Injuries followed by Symptoms of Melancholia:

JOHN GAY (Medico-Chirurgical Society Meeting, November 25th, 1879; "Lancet," 1879):

Patient received an injury to the parietal bone, followed by necrosis. He was for the following five years despondent and suicidally inclined. He was brought into the hospital after an attempt to drown himself. He was to have been trephined, but cut his throat the day before the operation. At the necropsy the inner table was found driven in and adherent to the cicatrix through a fissure in the bone. The brain was normal, only slightly depressed under the indented bone. During life pressure over the cicatrix always caused hallucinations of the same type.

JOHN F. GRAY ("American Journal of Insanity," 1876):

A soldier, age forty-one, was wounded in the head, the ball striking the posterior part of the right parietal bone, crushing it in, leaving an opening in the skull one and a half inches in antero-posterior diameter, and three inches in the vertical line. The ball was embedded in the substance of the brain, and was removed with forty-eight pieces of bone ten days after the injury. He remained in good health for five years, when he became depressed and finally developed profound melancholia. Post mortem, an elliptical opening of the right parietal bone was found, corresponding to the wound described; the dura mater extended over the opening and was firmly adherent to the scalp. It appeared inflamed and thickened. Brain apparently healthy.


Patient, age fifty-four, became melancholic after some heavy blows on the head. Post mortem, haemorrhage was found over the parietal region, compressing the convolutions.


Katharine Laier, when two and a quarter years old, fell down ten metres over two flights of stairs, and hit the left side of her head on the stone floor. She was rendered unconscious. Since then mentally depressed, hyper-sensitive, suffering from night-terrors and polyuria. Two and a half years after the accident great terror one night, with trembling, agitation, turning of eyes, severe headache and
vomiting. Collapse and death. The left parietal eminence showed a scar 6.5 centimetres long. The brain underneath was hyperæmic.


L. LÖWENFELD ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1898):
J.L., age thirty, male, single, was hit by a stone on the right parietal bone when thirteen years of age. Since then the injured part was painful and patient became low-spirited and subject to paroxysms of fear.

Two cases, both with falls on the parietal bone, followed by headache, ambyopia, depression of spirits, feeling of anxiety, and tachysmia.

PAUL SCHÜLLER ("Psychosen nach Kopfverletzungen," Leipsic, 1882):
A. Sch., a servant, age twenty-six and a half years, fell on her head into the room below, through a floor which had given way. She injured her parietal bone, was unconscious, and had to keep in bed for five weeks. Low spirits, paroxysms of fear and abnormal sensibility were her symptoms thereafter.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):
H. S., miner, twenty-nine years of age, had both parietal bones injured in a fight, leaving scars, and on one side an indentation five millimetres deep. He became melancholic, wept readily and a good deal, and deemed himself badly used.

DEROUBAIX ("Belgique Médicale," 1906, and "L'Encéphale," 1907):
Man, 32 years of age, received a blow with a hammer on the parietal bone, after which he developed stuporous melancholia and had to be put in an asylum.

HERMANN DEMME ("Militär-Chirurgische Studien," Wurzburg, 1864):
A sergeant-major received a wound in the parietal region. He became a melancholic of a very bad type.

AZAM ("Archives Générales de Médecine," 1881):
Patient, age thirty-three, suffered a contusion of the parietal bone, after which he grew emotional, wept without cause, and became very timid.

LUDWIG BRUNS ("Neurologisches Centralblatt," 1889):
A non-commissioned officer received in a quarrel with a soldier several blows with a sword on the left parietal region. He suffered since then from severe headache, giddiness, insomnia, and attacks of utmost anxiety without cause. These symptoms increased and developed into genuine melancholia. He attempted suicide by hanging, but was cut down in time. He was brought to the asylum.

A railway-guard, age forty-two, injured his right parietal bone in a train collision. The symptoms were giddiness, defects of memory and paroxysms of anxiety, in which he wept and cried for hours. He attempted suicide on several occasions. He died eighteen months later.

S. V. CLEVENGER ("Alienist and Neurologist," St. Louis, 1888):
L., age forty-eight, mechanic, vigorous, cheerful, and industrious, was struck by a flying stone in the left parietal region, and within a year became melancholic. He lost all interest in his former amusements, became helpless and sleepless, and presented the appearance of advanced age.

G. ALDER BLUMER ("American Journal of Insanity," 1892):
M.D., age 38, was struck on the right parietal bone, where there remained a slight depression. Suicidal tendencies ever since. Operation was decided upon, but curiously not over the scar, but over the motor area. No wonder it did not improve the patient's condition!

ERNEST TREDINNICK ("British Medical Journal," 1900):
Case of fracture of parietal bone, followed by depression and attempts at suicide.

R. THOMSEN ("Charité Annalen," vol. xii.):
Pieper, watchman, forty-three years of age, previously healthy, fell from a cart on his head and received a wound on the left parietal bone, which left an adherent scar twenty centimetres long. He went on his way, but on reaching home he suffered from nervous symptoms which caused him to remain in bed for eight weeks. He then tried to resume work, but had to give it up from a feeling of fear and
anxiety, palpitation of the heart, and giddiness. There was pain at the seat of the scar. His depression increased considerably and he heard voices, with the left ear only, assailing his character, but was unable to distinguish them as unreal and as due to his illness. He saw faces, too, which inspired him with terror. Sent to the asylum a year after the injury, he was noticed to be quietly behaved, to have an expression of sadness, and there was concentric limitation of the field of vision, with tremor of the hand. He was very anxious, especially at night, and his sleep was disturbed by dreams which increased his terror. The excision of the scar was decided upon, but consent to the operation could not be obtained.

The SAME AUTHOR ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1884):

W. Schäfer, age forty-nine, healthy until two years ago, when he was hit on the head with a hammer, rendering him unconscious. On the posterior half of the right parietal bone there was a scar, four centimetres long, with a marked bony depression, sensitive to pressure. The wound healed in about six weeks. Patient suffered since from anxiety, giddiness, terror at the slightest noise. If addressed suddenly he gave a sudden start and was unable to speak a word. He was a strong muscular man. His facial expression betrayed anxiety, and his eyes stared. Continuous melancholic depression. Limitation of visual field.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):

K. Poehl, age forty-nine, was hit by a locomotive severely on the head, but did not lose consciousness. Scar seven centimetres long, with depression of bone. Admitted to hospital, patient complained of continuous mental depression and suicidal thoughts. Very nervous and easily terrified. Constant feeling of anxiety, which increased in paroxysms.

Other Examples of Injury to Parietal Region with Melancholia.


The SAME, Prager Medizinische Wochenschrift, 1879.

LANDERER and LUTZ, Christophshod Asylum Report, 1878.

E. SOMMER, Zur Casuistik der Gehirnverletzungen, 1874.

T. S. CLOUSTON, Journal of Mental Science, 1872. Two cases.

W. J. MICKLE, ibidem, 1883.

STOLPER, Vierteljahrschrift f. gerichtl. Medizin, 1897.

E. MENDEL, Progressive Paralyse, 1880.

T. C. ENGLISH, Lancet, 1904. Two cases.

C. W. BURR, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1898.

MARCHAND, Nouvelle Iconographie de la Salpêtrière, 1910.

PARIETAL BRAIN TUMOURS AND MELANCHOLIA

Examples of Tumours of Parietal Lobe, especially in Angular and supra-marginal Gyri, with Depression, Morbid Fear, and Melancholy.

Sir WILLIAM BROADBENT ("Lancet," 1874):

Clara C., age thirty-six, a widow, earning her bread as a needlewoman, well nourished, but rather pale and having a sad expression. She was particularly intelligent, but greatly distressed, highly nervous, apprehensive, low-spirited, and often gave way and wept. The emotional depression continued till her death, when two small gummata were found under the parietal eminence, depressing the right supra-marginal lobule.


The patient was a woman, age sixty-three, who for years had made suicidal attempts. She had delusions of having animals in her body and lead in her head, of having no abdomen. The left side of her body she thought was drying up, because she cut her left wrist in one of her suicidal attempts. Post mortem, the greater part of the left parietal lobe was found depressed for about two centimetres.
THE EMOTION OF FEAR AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN 137

below its level. The depression was caused by a cyst, filled with serum, beneath the dura and adherent to it.


Patient, age thirty-one, father of five children, complained of a sensation of pressure in the parietal region, of sleeplessness, restlessness, and fear; he easily wept, was afraid of becoming mentally deranged, and had the delusion of suffering from lues, for which he subjected himself on his own account to an inunction cure. His anxiety and fear continued to increase in intensity, and one day he made an attempt at suicide. Patient wept a good deal, searched his whole life for possible causes of his misery, and had to be admitted to the asylum, now suffering for five years, for melancholia agitans. The post-mortem examination revealed a sarcomatous tumour of the parietal lobe.

L. MANOUVRIER ("Bulletins de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris," 1885):
The brain of a woman was shown, having a depression, size of a walnut, in the parietal lobe, caused by a fibrous tumour implanted in the bone. The patient, age fifty-one, was an inmate of Orleans Asylum, suffering from melancholia and tendency to suicide. Intellectually she was normal.

Sir JAMES CRIGHTON BROWNE ("British Medical Journal," 1873):
M. B., age sixty-six, admitted into West Riding Asylum. Family and personal history good. After a transient stroke his mental condition changed completely. He was at first listless, later agitated, and greatly and unceasingly disturbed as to the safety of his soul. Moved by his fears on this account, he would wander about the house during the night, wringing his hands, and would talk about his desire to put an end to his earthly misery. On admission to the asylum he was depressed in spirits, and felt, he said, as if he were being perpetually Upbraided by his conscience for having neglected to seek salvation. His memory was found vigorous, his face expressed pain; he was restless, sighing and weeping, and, again, he was quiet and stolid, taking little or no interest in what was going on around him. All his muscles were tremulous. His melancholia increased. When spoken to, he would, in attempting to reply, dribble into an incontinent emotional overflow of tears. He gradually became paralysed on the right side. He died two months after admission. Post mortem, a cancerous tumour was found involving the whole of the convolutions of the left parietal lobe.

L. PIERCE CLARK ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1895):
J. B., age thirty-four, married, family history good. His illness began seven months prior to admission with intense depression from being out of employment. He attempted suicide with a razor. When questioned he replied in monosyllables. His articulation was slow and hesitating, and at times he broke down entirely, becoming emotional and unable to answer questions. Muscular tremor in tongue, facial muscles and hands. Kneejerked increased equally on both sides. Depression increased. He failed rapidly in health, and died in a seizure eight months after admission. The autopsy revealed four sarcomata, all over the right parietal region, none bulging beyond the cranial surface.

Sir WILLIAM BROADBENT ("Lancet," 1874):
Woman, age thirty-six, suffering from usual signs of brain tumour and manifesting melancholic depression. A tumour was found post mortem in the right supramarginal convolution.

ANDERSON ("British Medical Journal," 1889):
Man, age forty-one, suffering from great mental depression and anxiety. The autopsy revealed a cyst in the gyrus angularis.

R., a well-to-do farmer's wife, age fifty-three, had no illness until her fortieth year, when she became melancholic, with intense depression and self-accusations. Six years in the asylum. Seven years later relapse with morbid fears and suicidal tendency. Re-admitted. Her anxiety much worse, hardly any sound sleep, wept and wailed for days together, accused herself of impiety, and deemed this the cause of her illness. Intellect unclouded, no hallucinations. She died after five years. The autopsy revealed two sarcomatous tumours in the left parietal lobe which had grown together and had perforated the bone. They involved the gyri supramarginalis and angularis and surrounding brain substance.
HERMANN OPPENHEIM ('Charité Annalen,' vol. x.):

Man, fifty-seven years of age, suffering from intense depression and anxiety. Post mortem, a cyst, size of an egg, in left parietal lobe.

LUDWIG BRUNS ('Jahresberichte f. Neurologie u. Psychiatrie,' 1868):

Man, fifty-five years of age, suffering from agitated melancholia, was found post mortem to have a tumour of the left parietal lobe.

GLYNN ('British Medical Journal,' 1878):

Man, age thirty, suffering from agitated melancholia, was found post mortem to have a tumour of dura mater over gyrus angularis and supra-marginalis.

PETRINA ('Prager Vierteljahresschrift,' 1874):

Man, age sixty-six, suffering from acute melancholia, sighing continuously and walking up and down all night, moaning and wringing his hands in despair. Post mortem, a huge tumour of left parietal lobe.

H. D. DAGONET and P. REY, Asile St. Anne ('Annales Médico-Psychologiques,' 1882), found a tumour weighing over 350 grammes over posterior parietal area of both hemispheres in a patient whose condition was that of melancholia and stupor. Patient, age twenty-three, fell on his head when seventeen years old; he died a year after admission.

Other Examples of Tumours with Morbid Fears, Unreasonable Anxiety, and Symptoms of Melancholia, are given by:

H. OPPENHEIM, ibidem, 1890.
MAROT, Bulletins de la Soc. Anatom., 1875.
E. MENDEL, Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1882.
STEIN, ibidem, 1897.
G. ANTON, ibidem, 1900.
TOUCHE, ibidem, 1900.
T. S. CLOUDSON, Journal of Mental Science, 1879.
WM. BOYD, ibidem, 1873.
R. VIRCHOW, Onkologie, vol. ii.
P. NICOL, West Riding Lunatic Asylum Medical Reports, 1872.
GIANELLI, Policlinico, 1897. Two cases.

PAUL SCHUSTER, who (op. cit.), like the author, has examined the history of cases of parietal tumours, states "that neither progressive paralysis, nor paranoia, nor mania, ever occur in such cases; but that they are mostly accompanied by states of depression." He sees nothing improbable in the localisation of melancholia in this region.

GHAS. K. MILLS ('Philadelphia Medical Journal,' 1901) declared that tumours of the parietal lobes are accompanied by emotional depression.

W. C. SULLIVAN ('Lancet,' 1911), on the other hand, states:

"Actual suicide appears to be a very rare occurrence in cerebral tumour; I have found only one case mentioned in the literature of the disease (a case reported by Rey, quoted by Bernhardt, 'Beiträge zur Symptomologie und Diagnostik der Gehirngeschwülste,' Berlin, 1881): and in a series of 1,700 post-mortem examinations of suicides reported by Pils ('Ann. Méd.-Psych.,' 1908) new growths were found in the brain in only three cases."

In my opinion, the localisation theory cannot be proved by statistics. Suicide is committed for a great variety of reasons, and I am quite sure, if we take all the reports of inquests held in England in a year, we shall find very few evidences of brain disease, not to speak of tumours. We are dealing with mental depressions amounting to melancholia, and all melancholies have a tendency to suicide. If statistics are admitted at all, the only ones of value would be those of asylums for the insane. One might as well disprove my statement that lesions in certain parts of the brain lead to kleptomania, and of others to homicide, by taking the statistics...
of all criminals, and showing that only an infinitesimal percentage had any brain trouble whatsoever.

**EXAMPLES OF MELANCHOLIC DEPRESSION IN SOFTENING OF THE PARIETAL LOBES**

E. KUNDT ("Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie," 1894) cites several cases, of which the following is an example:

H. Michael, age thirty-three, married, always of good humour, changed half a year ago after a sleepless night. He made an attempt to hang himself, but was rescued in time. He afterwards gave utterance to delusions of melancholia. He believed himself a thief, a bad and a lost man. He was starving because, as he thought, his stomach would not hold food, it being so constructed that it let everything fall through. He died of phthisis. Post mortem, it was found that the pia over the parietal lobe was thick, milky, and the brain substance beneath was atrophic.

Sir DAVID FERRIER (West Riding Lunatic Asylum Medical Reports, 1874):

A. B., housewife, age forty-four, suffering from melancholia. Nine weeks before admission the illness began with restlessness and refusal of food. She became very low-spirited, and was influenced by the idea that her soul was lost, because she had been wicked to everybody. She attempted suicide on three occasions, twice by strangulation, and the other time by concealing a razor with intent, etc. The patient had had two strokes, one ten years previously, and the other three years before admission. On admission she was extremely dejected and miserable, her mind dwelling incessantly on her supposed sins and misfortunes. She constantly exclaimed that she had no home, no clothes, and that she would never be able to pay the debts incurred for her food and clothing there. For this reason she refused food. She died six months after admission. The post-mortem examination revealed wasting and softening of the angular gyrus, and both postero-parietal lobes, with the adjacent area.

W. GRANT COOPER ("State Hospitals Bulletin," 1897):

Widow, age sixty, suffered from acute melancholia. Post mortem was found cystic softening of the left parietal lobe extending to the occipital lobe.

J. LOCKHART CLARKE ("British Medical Journal," 1874):

G., a woman, age seventy-six, one day suddenly became extremely excited, sitting up in bed and throwing about her arms and wringing her hands in apparent mental distress and despair. On being questioned, she replied that she wished to die because she had been wicked. On every other subject she was perfectly rational. This state of excitement lasted for about two months, and recommenced six months later. Night and day she would wander about the house throwing about her arms and turning up her eyes as if in despair, and crying frequently aloud, "Oh dear, what shall I do?" She was wholly unable, however, to give any definite or intelligible account of her mental suffering. This state continued for about a month, during which time she frequently refused to take food, declaring that she was unable to swallow; so that she was reduced to a state of great emaciation. Then she became quiet, but still distressed in mind. After remaining for about a week in this condition, she gradually and quietly sank. Post mortem, the convolutions of the upper part of the parietal lobes were so atrophied that the spaces between them were in some instances three-quarters of an inch in breadth. It was over this space that the membranes were adherent to each other, as well as to the falx and skull.

Other cases of Softening of Parietal Lobes with Melancholia.

VOISIN and BURLUREAUX, De la Mélancolie, Paris, 1880. Numerous cases.

J. LUYS, L'Encéphale, 1881. Two cases.

JAMES SHAW, Brain, 1882; and another, ibidem, 1895.


A. ROSENTHAL, Centralblatt f. Nervenheilkunde, 1889.
EXAMPLES OF HÆMATOMA OF THE DURA MATER (PACHYМENINGITIS IN-TERNA) IN THE PARIELT AREA IN FEAR, FRIGHT, AND MELANCHOLIA

H. AUBANEL ("Annales Médico-Psychologiques," vol. ii.) mentions several cases of sudden shock followed by raptus sanguinis, where post-mortem hæmorrhage in the parietal area and false membrane were found.

J. B. BOUILLAUD and J. L. CRUVELHIER made similar observations.

L. F. CALMEIL ("Traité des Maladies Inflammatoires du Cerveau") gives numerous cases.

AUGUSTE VOISIN and CHARLES BURLUREAUX ("De la Mélancolie," Paris, 1880) also cite numerous examples of localised hæmorrhage in the parietal area, but we will quote only one case as a specimen:

Gr., a woman, age thirty-four, hitherto without any serious illness, during the days of the siege of Paris and the Commune became impressed with fear. For two months she could express only one phrase, indicative of her anxiety. She lost all interest in her work and domestic affairs. One evening, when she heard shooting, she grew excited, tore her clothes, and attempted suicide by jumping out of the window. After her rescue she refused all nourishment, and, being unmanageable, her husband placed her in the hospital. On admission she seemed terribly emaciated. Her face bore the aspect of terror. Her excitement abated and she lapsed into a state bordering on catalepsy, had to be fed with the tube, and uttered only a few words of terror. Post mortem was found a small subarachnoid blood cyst over the left parietal lobe, and the arachnoid in this region was studded with numerous yellow spots, size of pins' heads, which, on microscopical examination, turned out to be dilated capillaries, filled with haematosine granulations, hæmatine crystals, mostly discoloured, and blood globules.


H. B., age twenty-five, watchmaker, mentally always very bright and lively, was noticed by his parent about six years before admission to change in mood and become melancholy. Mentally and physically he became very inactive; nothing interested him any more. He sat still the greater part of the day, rarely uttering a word, betrayed an anxious uneasiness, and was ultimately removed to the asylum. On admission his face was found pallid and expressionless and his emotional state apathetic. He died of phthisis five years later. In this case a pseudo-membrane was found extending over both parietal lobes, and on the left side the convolutions were flattened by fluid accumulated under the false membrane.


C. U., age forty-six, wife of a manufacturer, suffered from melancholy. Her fear and anxiety were intense. She refused all food, considered herself a great sinner, wished herself dead, and made an attempt at suicide. On admission she was found to have delusions of having to die a frightful death, fears of being put in a boiler with seething oil, and of being swallowed by serpents. Pretending to get a breath of fresh air at the window, she, in an unobserved moment, committed suicide by hanging. The autopsy revealed hæmorrhage under both parietal tuberosities.

W. J. MICKLE ("Journal of Mental Science," 1880):

A soldier, age thirty-five, was depressed and apathetic, sat by himself, never spoke unless addressed, sighed, and took no apparent interest in his surroundings. He was suicidal. The expression was one of sadness and misery. The obstinacy of the patient as to the taking of medicine and food was a source of much difficulty. The post-mortem examination revealed a false membrane (the organised remains of hæmorrhage), size of a five-shilling piece, symmetrically placed in both parietal lobes just opposite the parietal eminence, which was eroded.

BRIE ("Neurologisches Centralblatt," 1897):

Catherina D., single, age thirty-six. Five years before her admission she showed the first signs of melancholy. As cause was given rejected love. Her condition gradually got worse, she took no interest in anything, remained silent,
THE EMOTION OF FEAR AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN

preferably in bed, and when disturbed she was unfriendly. Post mortem was found in each angular gyrus, right and left, a hemorrhagic focus, with softening of the neighbouring parts.

H. D. MACPHERSON ("Journal of Mental Science," 1915):
D. S. B., age twenty-five, well nourished and of good physique, suffering from a first attack of acute melancholia. Previous to admission had made two definite attempts at suicide. His mental state was one of intense depression with delusions of unworthiness and marked suicidal tendencies. Post mortem: Pachymeningitis Interna Hemorrhagica.

Other Examples of False Membrane and Pachymeningitis Interna Haemorrhagica with Symptoms of Melancholia.

PLINY EARLE, American Journal of Insanity, vol. ii.
S. G. WEBBER, Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, 1883.
F. A. AMELUNCK, Bericht Uber das Hofheimmer Spital, 1830.
F. C. HOYT, Medical Record, New York, 1892.
JOFFÉ, Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie, 1867.
SEIDLITZ, Zeitschrift für Psychiatrische Medizin, 1809.
J. WIGGLESWORTH, Journal of Mental Science, 1888.
L. MEYER, Archiv f. Psychiatrie, 1872.
S. POZZI, L'Enéphale, 1883.
GORDNER, ROBERTSON, and COATS, British Medical Journal, 1875.

In support of this clinical observation may be quoted the experiment of KRE-MANSKY, of St. Petersburg, who produced artificially a pachymeningitis hemorrhagica circumspecta in the parietal region of dogs, and observed their mental changes. The animals exhibited morbid fear, and refused to take any food.

CASES OF MELANCHOLIA WITH WORD AND PSYCHICAL BLINDNESS

The next cases are such as have shown symptoms not only of different degrees of melancholia, but in addition the symptoms attributed to the angular and supramarginal gyri by Munk and other observers, namely, word-blindness and psychical blindness, i.e., being able to see words and objects, but failing to recognise them. This defect is apparently due to a disruption of the connecting link with the perceptive centres; and not only of the perceptive centres, but of all the stored-up memories; in consequence of which such patients lose all interest in life. The melancholy need not persist; there may be only a sudden, strong depressing emotion at the outset, followed by "word" or "psychical" blindness.

J. M. CHARCOT ("Progrès Médical," 1883) described the first case:
X., a Viennese merchant, who spoke German, Spanish, and French, and was well acquainted with Latin and Greek, who had a splendid visual memory for words, inherited from his father, a professor of Oriental languages, also a visual memory which enabled him to recall all persons and objects once seen, and a splendid memory for figures; he could furthermore draw, well remembering every detail of landscape. On the other hand, his auditory memory was defective, and he had no ear for music. About a year and a half before consulting Dr. Charcot, patient had great anxieties about some debts, which he thought he might not be able to pay. He lost his appetite and could not sleep. When, after all, his financial worry proved groundless, his worry and anxiety did not cease, but went on for a whole year, during which he continued apprehensive without any reason, until one day he perceived a great change in himself, which made him think he was going mad. He was already very nervous and irritable. Although he could see everything as before, he had lost the optic memory for forms and colours. This only increased his anxiety.
Whenever his business called him to a town which he had been in the habit of visiting, he now felt as though he were in a new town, not recognising the streets, buildings, or monuments. Only after staying some time could he recollect them anew. He could not figure to himself objects mentally. He could not draw from memory any longer. He could not remember the form and features of his wife and children. In addition he had a certain degree of word-blindness. The examination of his eyes revealed no change. He trained his memory afterwards by his auditory impressions, repeating words aloud.

COTARD ("Archives de Neurologie," Paris, 1884):
M. P., age sixty-eight, diabetic, came first to the asylum in 1872, when suffering from melancholia. He was in a continuous state of fear and apprehension, and refused food. He believed himself ruined, incapable, and wished to end his life. Sometimes he sat quite motionless. At other times he would walk up and down the room repeating that he was the most unfortunate man in the universe, that he was lost, and that he would never recover. It was extremely difficult to get him to dress himself or to perform the most necessary acts of life. Yet a year later he had so far improved that he was permitted to join his family at home. He returned in 1881, with the like symptoms of anxious melancholia, with similar delusions, only more intensified. He thought himself totally incapable, devoid of energy or intelligence, and possessed of all possible miseries. His hypochondriacal ideas increased. He now asserted that he had no blood, that his whole body was rotten, that he was going to die, that he was already dead. For several months he had complained that he could not represent mentally the objects with which he was formerly quite familiar. Thus, he could not remember a single picture of the town in which he had been living for a long time, and every shop and house which he knew formerly and could picture to himself with closed eyes. Even the face of his wife he could not call to mind, and sometimes it seemed to have quite vanished from recollection.

The AUTHOR himself has seen two extraordinary cases of mental depression with loss of memory:

Both received blows on the parietal region, but without leaving scars. The one in a railway accident, the other, a naval officer, in a submarine explosion. Both had recently married, and exhibited, besides mental depression, loss of visual memory. Both after recovery from unconsciousness failed to recognise their wives, and persisted in denying they were married to them. As one of them put it when consulting me, "This lady claims to be my wife. . . . I know nothing about her." The second case led to a separation, as a child was born five months after the accident, the parentage of which the officer denied, notwithstanding the assurances of the entire family.

Case of Parietal Tumour—Melancholia—Psychical Blindness.

Patient, age fifty-seven, suffering from word-blindness and psychical blindness. The mental state is described as follows: "However the moods of the patient may vary, one expression predominates over all others and is perceptible, whether the features are at rest or in motion. It is the expression of anxiety. The patient looks helpless and in fear. He was very emotional, crying easily without sufficient cause. Even to his own physicians he speaks but little, and that guardedly. Only when completely assured of the friendly feeling which the visitor entertains towards him does his reserve give way, and then talks as freely as his defect will allow him." Post mortem, a sarcoma involving the medullary portion of both parietal lobes was found.

Case of Parietal Atrophy—Melancholia—Psychical Blindness.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):
C. K., age sixty-eight, gave constant sighs, groans, and lamentations, without any reason, certainly not from pain. His face and whole demeanour expressed helplessness and perplexity. His surroundings seemed strange to him. He
seemed psychically blind, and he did not know where he was. He did not understand that he was being medically examined, but looked on the physicians as his enemies, against whom he must defend himself. He was in fear to leave his bed, and when he did get out he moved about with the utmost caution. No paresis, however. He sat brooding, a picture of absence of all will-power. After three weeks his weeping, sighing, and moaning still continued.

_Case of Tactile Amnesia—Psychical Blindness and Melancholia._

CHARLES W. BURR ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1897): Patient suffered from inability to recognise objects by the sense of touch, and had mind-blindness, _i.e._, inability to recognise objects by the sense of sight. She remained in bed, dull, apathetic, talked little, and showed no interest in anything.

_Other Examples of Melancholia with Psychical Blindness._

A. CHAUFFARD, _Revue de Médecine_, 1881.
KUCZINSKI, _Neurologisches Centralblatt_, 1910.

_CASES OF SYMMETRICAL ATROPHY OF THE PARIETAL BONES IN MELANCHOLIC STATES OF MIND_

Numerous observers—Larrey, Broca, Virchow, Rokitanski, Maier, Chiarì, Lerè, George M. Humphry, and others—have been in possession of skulls with symmetrical depressions on both parietal bones. There is also one in the College of Surgeons' Museum in Lincoln's Inn Fields. The observers have described the "naked eye" and "minute" anatomy of these deformities, but were unable to discover the cause. These parietal depressions commonly exist on the two sides, and are symmetrical in position and more or less alike in size. They are situated at some distance on each side of the sagittal suture, if not on the parietal tuberosity itself. The thinning is sometimes so considerable as to produce a hole or perforation in the centre. These depressions do not present any indication of being the result of disease, such as syphilis, as ROKITANSKY has assumed. They are certainly not the result of external influences or accident. Changes in the circulation alone would not cause in the part such a circumscribed symmetrical wasting. These depressions are not congenital, as HUMPHRY thought, nor is MAIER correct in attributing the circumscribed thinning of the skull to senile atrophy. The author finds that in those authenticated cases in which a clinical history was obtainable, such history was invariably one of psychical pain and melancholia, and that it is therefore probable that these localised changes in the skull may be due to trophic influences.

R. VIRCHOW ("Verhandlungen der Phys. Med. Gesellschaft zu Würzburg," 1854) showed the skull of a man whose chief symptoms besides pain and giddiness were _intense melancholy_, and whose facial expression had been observed to be always one of extreme sadness. On both parietal bones, exactly corresponding to the eminences, the bones were so thin as to be perfectly transparent when held against the light. Virchow described the morbid histology of this affection minutely.

RUDOLF BLOCH ("Prager Medizinische Wochenschrift," 1897): Patient, age eighty-six, had a round depression of four and a half centimetres diameter on each parietal bone. Patient was in a condition of _mental depression_ and bore the indicia of anxiety. She was tremulous, slow of speech, and hesitating in her answers, and wrung her hands despairingly. Her intellect was quite normal. History of suicide in her family. Two weeks before admission she had made two attempts to kill herself, trying to knock her skull in with a hammer, showing still an open wound, and a day later she used a knife, but was stopped just in time. Later on it was ascertained that she had been in the same institution some thirty
years before, and on looking up the case-book it was discovered that she was then treated for symptoms of fear and depression and for boring pains in her head, and that then shortly before her admission she had made four attempts at suicide—two by drowning, one with a pocket-knife, and one with a razor. Post mortem, the examination of her skull showed that in the thinned cranial parts the lamina externa and diploe were completely absent. The lamina vitrea appeared unchanged, and at the borders of the depression the diploe was heaped up and there was hyperostosis of the lamina externa.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem) gives a second example.
LUDWIG MEYER ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1872):
C. Th., age forty-four, single, became melancholic in his forty-first year; it is said through disappointment in love. Hypochondriacal delusions of changes in his own body, effected by women. Repeated paroxysms of fear, with a tendency to self-mutilation—one attempt, cutting his veins in neck and at wrist, nearly caused his death. On admission he wailed and moaned over his supposed misery. Had attacks of acute fear. The autopsy revealed atrophy of both parietal eminences.
ROSSBACH ("Deutsches Archiv f. Klinische Medizin," 1890):
Patient, age forty-nine, had suffered from melancholia for twenty-five years, had symmetrical atrophy of both parietal bones. The skull and two others, of identical cases, were shown at the German Psychiatric Congress in 1899.

Other Cases of Symmetrical Atrophy of both Parietal Bones with Symptoms of Melancholia.

H. SCHÜLE, Sektionsergebnisse bei Geisteskranken, 1874.
W. B. PRITCHARD, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1890.
W. FRÄNKEL, ibidem, 1877.
KIRCHHOFF, ibidem, 1883.

CASES OF ABNORMAL EXPANSION OF PARIETAL BONES IN MELANCHOLIA

The author has seen several such cases, but they are rarely mentioned in medical literature.

J. E. D. ESQUIROL ("Mental Diseases") mentioned some.
M. RIVET ("Bulletins de la Société Anatomique de Paris," 1887) mentioned the case of a melancholic with suicidal tendency whose parietal bones were of extraordinary expansion and thickness, and whose brain was flattened in this region.
A. CAMPBELL CLARK ("Journal of Mental Science," 1879):
John R., age thirty-eight, showed post mortem a uniform increase of the natural convexity of the left parietal bone, and the left parietal eminence jutted out abruptly about one inch below the sagittal suture, and therefrom downwards showed a well-marked convexity. The pia mater adherent to the marginal convolutions on both sides. Clark says: "The emotion of fear, as already observed, was very strongly marked. This emotion, believed to be the lowest of its class, was, when excited in him, quite beyond the control of his will, and no amount of experience could rid him of it, or lessen its intensity. Thunder was a great terror to him, and its first peal was the signal for covering himself over with the bedclothes. When placed in an armchair, though protected all around, he was in a state of deplorable misery, until he was brought back to bed, so great was his fear of falling." Altogether, "the most exaggerated faculty in him was the emotion of fear."

CONCLUSION

Sufficient evidence has been given, I hope, to prove that the supra-marginal and angular gyri are in some way connected with the emotion of fear and the mental
disorder known as melancholia. Lesions of the frontal lobes may cause similar symptoms, but only when the emotion of fear and the complex characteristics which underlie melancholia have been previously active, and through the frontal lesion complete control over these mental powers is lost. I admit no other exception. Certainly, simple melancholia does not occur in lesions of the temporal lobe; but only when complicated with delusions of suspicion. (See Chapter XXXII.)

According to CHATELIN and de MARTEL (op. cit.), there are in a certain number of cases no symptoms in lesions of the parietal lobes, and in the remainder only disorders of sensibility, and aphasia and apraxia. Although I published the greater part of my evidence in my works on "The Mental Functions of the Brain" (1901) and "Mental Symptoms of Brain Disease" (1910), and originally in the "Journal of Mental Science" (1900), and have been quoted in several text-books, as by BIANCHI and by SCHUSTER, the authors appear not to be acquainted with it, or think it insufficient to deserve notice. But, if Chatelin and de Martel have observed no symptoms in lesions of the parietal lobes, then the results of experimental physiology are also discredited, and we are back again where we were fifty years ago, and the laborious and extensive experiments on animals have been in vain.

Dr. RICHARD EAGER ("Journal of Mental Science," April 1920) in his Report (see prev. chap., p. 121) claims to have had only three cases of parietal injury. The first case mentioned is that of a man who had been wounded by a shell splinter "just above the right ear," and therefore not in the parietal, but in the temporal region; and the mental change exhibited corresponded to those described in lesions of that area (see next chapter): "Formerly a steady quiet man, he was now noted as showing a marked insubordination . . . laughing in his officers' faces," having "lost all sense of discipline." "Formerly a staunch teetotaller, he now took to drink." The second case was that of a boy, age nineteen, wounded by a bullet over the upper part of the parietal region, which, in my opinion, corresponds to the posterior end of the frontal lobes, and so did the symptoms exhibited. He had a record of good conduct all his life, and now became "a notorious liar and full of deceit in every way." The third case was that of a man below average intelligence, and should not have been included. One case was returned as "psychasthenia," but seems to have been really one of "morbid fears." This patient suffered from "syphilophobia," which developed some months after a bullet wound in the posterior part of the left parietal region.
CHAPTER XXXI

THE EMOTION OF ANGER AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN

Irascibility is a primitive emotion and has for its object the overcoming of obstacles and foes for our own preservation. Anger increases the bodily energy, enabling us to remove things that threaten us, and is thus a reflex mechanism of immense value in the struggle for existence. It is an innate mechanism manifested long before the living creature has had any experience. The disposition to it varies in degree in different individuals. In its healthy state it gives executive power; in its unhealthy state it is manifested in chronic bad temper and quarrelsomeness. Its extreme can be observed in "irascible insanity" (acute mania), in which there are ungovernable spontaneous motor impulses and violent anger, generally without loss of knowledge of the surroundings. The person may be so furious as to exhaust himself in shouts, threats, and actions; or the passion may be less vehement, but in all cases it is "anger." When it is fully established, it is an ungovernable intense excitement, a wild paroxysm with a blind desire of destruction, and must not be confounded with the harmless restlessness of the anxious melancholiac.

It will be seen from several hundred examples cited in the following pages that when the temporal lobe, more particularly at its base, is stimulated, states of excitement (irascibility) are produced. When FERRIER excited this region in cats and jackals, "the application of the electrodes in this region caused the animal to make a sudden spring or bound forward, pricking up both ears, as if preparing to fight, and opening of the mouth, associated with vocalisation and other signs of emotional expression, such as spitting and lashing the tail as if in rage."

Excitation of this area in man produces irascibility, from the simple form of anger to furious and even homicidal mania. When the tendency to irascibility is innate, there need be no temporal lesion, but injury or disease of the frontal lobes may, owing to the loss of control, give it exaggerated activity. But I have not come across a single case of irascibility with disease limited to the parietal lobe, except that form of melancholia called "agitated" melancholia, just as I have found not a single case of melancholia in which the disease was limited to the temporal lobes. With the agitation caused by delusions of persecution I shall deal later. The evidence for the temporal lobe being in some way the centre of a reflex mechanism for the protection of self by states of excitement which give additional energy to the entire body is overwhelming.

The temporal lobes are separated only by a very thin partition of bone from the internal ear and can therefore be irritated by extension of ear disease, leading to various degrees of excitement and mania, which disappear with the treatment of the ear trouble. Affections of hearing differ in this respect from affections of sight, which, when due to central lesion, lead to mental depression, paroxysms of fear, and melancholia, with attempts at self-destruction. I shall also show that while discharge from the ear continues the patient may be quiet, but on cessation of the escape of pus a violent attack of mania may ensue. These facts are not all proved yet, but observations in confirmation of some of the statements have been made by
a number of authors—Griesinger, Jacobi, Körner, Huguenin, Morel, Paul Robin, Bennett, and MacEwen, besides those whose cases will be quoted.

Further, I pointed out nearly twenty years ago, in the "Mental Functions of the Brain," that lesions of the temporal lobe may lead to epilepsy as well as violent mania. No other part is so vulnerable in this respect as the temporal lobe. Recently several observers have admitted that "tumour" situated in this region may give rise to convulsive fits, and THEODORE MEYNERT (1833-1892) long ago found that in epilepsy the greatest atrophy and loss of weight is in the temporal lobes; but that is all that has been acknowledged so far. For a time it has been thought that excitation of the motor area gave rise to epilepsy, but it does so only in what is called Jacksonian epilepsy, not in ordinary epilepsy. ALDER BLUMER trespanned over the motor regions in ten epileptics, but neither the number nor the severity of the fits improved; whereas I shall quote several cases in which the fits disappeared on treating the lesion of the temporal lobes; and not only the fits, but the mania as well.

Sometimes the temporal lobes are sound, but distension of the lateral ventricles causes pressure on them. Sometimes also mania and epilepsy are caused by fractures of the base of the skull through extravasation of blood into the brain tissue and tearing of the structure of this region.

Sometimes an epileptic fit may be replaced by a paroxysm of acute mania, which fact shows the intimate relation between the two, the convulsive and the maniacal attack. Both are paroxysmal and explosive, violent and sudden. The change of disposition in the epileptic is remarkably characteristic. From this change alone an experienced observer will frequently be led to infer the presence of epilepsy. There are present extreme irritability, a combative tendency, undue suspicion, violent outbreaks of temper, and frequently strong homicidal tendencies. Post-epileptic violence is impulsive; it precludes the existence of animosity or premeditation; there is generally an entire absence of motive or cause of quarrel. That this mental state is due to the disease and not to any predisposition to violence is shown by the fact that so many epileptics, in the intervals between their fits, find genuine consolation in religious devotion, that they are ever hopeful, and fully appreciative when sympathy is shown them in their suffering.

J. A. ORMEROD ("Brain," 1884) gives one hundred cases of epilepsy, among which forty-six suffered from ear disease.

It is a well-known fact that there are some insane patients whose mental disturbance dates from the time of an apoplectic stroke. Considering the proximity of the tempo-sphenoidal lobe to the corpus striatum, in which most of the hemorrhages take place, it is not surprising that such patients, even when not insane, become excited, irascible, and quarrelsome. They are rarely seen in asylums, for they hardly ever become so excited as to be dangerous, and, secondly, because the accompanying hemiplegia prevents them from becoming violent. Neurologists, on the other hand, study more the derangements of the motor and sensory functions, and would take but little, if any, notice of the mental changes.

J. LUYS ("L'Encéphale," 1881) found that in hemiplegics, whose temper is easily irritated, the temporal lobe was involved.

ALBERT ROSENTHAL has described cases of patients with hemiplegia who manifested agitation and bad temper, and in whom the temporal convulsions showed lesions post mortem. ("Centralblatt f. Nervenheilkunde," 1884 and 1889.)

If further proof were needed of the fact that congestion of the temporal lobes leads to irascibility, violent and destructive tendencies, we have it in the frequency of hematomata auris, which seem to be due to a sanguinous perichondrial effusion of the auricle, and appear to withdraw the blood from the adjacent brain substance;
hence, on the appearance of the haematoma, it is not uncommon that the mania ceases.

If this theory be correct, one would expect also in chronic mania an increase in the size of the temporal lobes, and I shall publish some cases in confirmation thereof. Neurologists and alienists should also be interested in the fact that in the congestion of the temporal lobes caused by various lesions, patients otherwise aphasic can still utter "oaths" when they can articulate nothing else. Sir W. T. GAIRDNER (1824-1907) and HUGHLINGS JACKSON (1834-1911) called attention to this peculiar affection, and I shall also cite some such cases.

Another observation of interest and confirmatory of this localisation is that word-deafness and acute mania can and do sometimes occur together, while word-blindness is never found associated with it, but always with melancholia.

In the "Gazette Médicale de Bordeaux," July 16th, 1911, is an article entitled "La Jargonaphasie Logorrhéique," in which volubility without word-deafness in lesions of Wernicke's area is described. When the lesion bordered on the parietal the patients were sad, otherwise all the cases were gay and inscrutable.

Altogether there will be placed in this chapter at the disposal of the physician and physiologist an overwhelming mass of clinical material and pathological observations which cannot be passed over lightly.

RECOVERY AFTER SURGICAL OPERATION

HERBERT A. POWELL ("The Surgical Aspect of Traumatic Insanity," 1893) quotes the following case from the "Pacific Medical and Surgical Journal," 1884:

A Swede, age thirty-five, in the Arizona Penitentiary for manslaughter, was found by the medical officer in a state of wild mania. On examining him, he found a depression covered by a cicatrix above and rather behind the ear. No history of the cause of this depression was forthcoming from the man. He grew much worse, and, as a last resource, was trephined, and depressed bone, two and one-eighth inches by seven-eighths of an inch in area, was removed. Shortly after his recovery from the anaesthetic, he said in English, "I am hungry—I want something to eat." It was not before known that he could speak English. He talked quite rationally with his attendants and seemed cheerful. Twelve days after the operation he gave his own history.

DANIEL MOLLÈRE ("Lyon Médicale," 1881):

Patient, age forty-one, was admitted on account of maniacal furor. His roaring terrified his companions. On examining the head, a slight wound was found in the left temporal region, just above the external auditory meatus. On probing it, a fracture of bone beneath was detected. Patient was trepanned, and pus was found beneath the dura mater. Two days later he recognised his friends, made sensible inquiries, and after a month left the hospital a normal man. He reported himself three months later perfectly well.

E. HOFFMANN ("Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift," 1881):

A man, age fifty, was struck by a heavy board falling from a great height on to his head. He lost consciousness and became delirious. Afterwards he had attacks of furious mania, in which he caused tremendous destruction in his household, so that he had to be removed to the asylum. He complained of pain in the head. He had no convulsions or any motor or sensory symptoms. On the right side of the head, a little above and behind the external opening of the ear, was found a small but tender depression of bone, about the size of a shilling, which was resected, when on incision of the dura four spoonfuls of cerebro-spinal fluid streamed out. The pia was turbid and oedematous, and more fluid escaped therefrom. The wound healed well. No further attacks of destructive mania—in fact, no psychical symptoms of any kind. Discharged cured, and reported himself six months afterwards as perfectly well.

E. v. BERGMANN ("Volkmann's Hefte," No. 190):

A. H., age thirty-nine, fell from a seafolding about six yards high. The only
marks of injury were on the right side of the head just above the ear. Patient was so excitable and restless that he had to be restrained. He recovered after surgical treatment.

JAMES HOWDEN ("Journal of Mental Science," 1875):
J. S., age fifty-one, received an injury to his head, and became insane. He was restless, raging, and dangerous to others, and so remained until the forming of a large abscess in the left temporal fossa, which was opened, when he became sane again.

ERNST SOMMER ("Zur Casuistik der Gehirnverletzungen," 1874):
A coachman, age twenty-five, fell from a ladder and fractured his right temporal bone; hemorrhage from right ear. The temporal arch was much swollen. Patient became acutely maniacal and had to be isolated. An abscess formed over the left ear. After surgical intervention and removal of necrosed piece of bone he recovered.

J. A. E. ESTLANDER ("Finiska Läk Handlingar," 1897):
Boy, age thirteen, with violent mania after injury to temporal bone. Operation. Recovery.

P. GUDER ("Die Geistesstörungen nach Kopfverletzungen," 1886):


SAVORY ("British Medical Journal," 1869):
J. B., age twenty-two, a brakeman on the underground railway, was found lying across the line by the guard of another train. When admitted he was quite unconscious. There was a slight wound behind the left ear. There was grinding of the teeth. The right temple was swollen. He became so violent that he had to be strapped down. He was noisy and used obscene language. He recovered after surgical treatment and was discharged six weeks after the accident. He had no recollection of it.

A Boy with Uncontrollable Propensities Improved by Craniectomy.

A. SPANBOCK ("Neurologisches Centralblatt," 1895):
Lipe Spielmann, a boy of fourteen, had been physically and mentally slow in development. He teethed only at the end of the second year, learned to walk only when three, and began to speak when four years old. He was sent to school in his ninth year, but made absolutely no progress; took three days to learn one letter and then forgot it. All efforts to teach him anything were fruitless; he did not learn to read, write, or to count. Morally, also, he remained undeveloped. He thrashed his fellow-pupils when he could. The older he grew the more dangerous he became to the family. He had to be constantly watched to keep him from destroying things, or beating or throwing stones at someone. His deeds brought him frequently before the police courts, to the great annoyance of his family. The boy getting worse, a medical consultation was sought. The boy was well built. On admission it was observed that his frame, with the exception of the skull, was regular. The latter showed signs of degeneration; low forehead, big ears, abnormally high palate, teeth widely apart. He also had "tic convulsif" of the right M. orbicularis palpebrarum. The patient could not remain still in any one place, he shouted abusive words at everybody, did not reply to questions, or repeated in a senseless manner the questions put, or, if he did reply, it was with foul words. He could not fix his mind for one second, there was a constant flight of thoughts. He told falsehoods and had a tendency to steal. He had no sense of decency or feeling for others. Craniectomy was proposed and carried out. An incision was made in the sagittal line, another vertically down to each ear. The latter incision revealed the site of a former injury. The tissues above the right ear were adherent to the temporal bone. After several trepannings had been made the bone was cut away, when on the right side the cortex was found ödematos, and looked as if covered with gelatine. There was no improvement, mentally or morally, immediately after the operation; on the contrary, the strait-jacket had once to be
used. Yet in the course of a year there was a gradual change. He now behaved properly, did not disturb anybody, showed no inclination for destruction, but on the contrary tried to make himself useful to his family. He spoke politely, and showed gratitude. "He was even able to blush." Intellectually, improvement could only take place with education.

**Homicidal Tendencies Apparently Relieved by Surgical Operation.**


B. R., widow, age thirty-seven, had hallucinations of hearing with impulses to kill her sister and child. A portion of the brain weighing three grammes was removed from the posterior part of the first and the middle of the second temporo-sphenoidal convolutions on the left side. The substance of the brain was found unusually soft. Sensory aphasia after the operation, but fewer hallucinations. Her quarrelsome tendencies and impulses to kill seemed to have disappeared, and she was delighted to be with her child again. She was discharged. She was unexpectedly found drowned one day, and it was possible she committed suicide, though she was then quite free from mental disturbance.

**Operative Cure of Homicidal Mania and Epilepsy of Twenty-five Years' Duration.**

BOUBILA and PANTALONI, of Marseilles ("Gazette des Hopitaux," 1892):

Woman, thirty-one years of age, received at the public insane asylum at Bouche-du-Rhône for imbecility with uncontrollable impulses of violence. The only noticeable incident in her history was that she had a fall at the age of six, which still left a scar with depression in the bone in the left temporal region. Before that accident she was a normal child. After it she became queer, insubordinate, irritable, and quarrelsome, and could not be kept in any school. At the asylum she was the terror of her companions, and even attacked the physicians. Epileptic fits developed. She was trephined, and a portion of bone which pressed on the brain removed. A month after the operation it was noticed that she had changed in her conduct; there was no more disgraceful language, insolent behaviour, acts of violence, but modesty, deference, and grateful emotions. She was anxious to work. Her fits ceased. She was released a year after the operation.

**Cases of Homicidal Mania, with Recovery after being Trephined.**

LAMPHPEAR ("University Medical Magazine," 1893):

COHUIRSCO and MILHAERCO ("Spitalerd," Aug. 1907):

Patient struck in right temporal region by a horse's hoof developed acute mania. Recovery after trepanation.

**Case of Violent Delirium, with Recovery after Surgical Operation.**

ERNEST LAPLACE ("Medical and Surgical Reporter," 1896):

Mrs. D., age fifty-four, was struck by her husband with his fist on the left side of her head. She became insane with violent mania a short time afterwards. She was taken to the asylum, where she was in a violent delirium, "causing so much disturbance as to be handcuffed and isolated." She was trephined in the left temporal region, where the bone was found very much thickened and the dura congested. "Three weeks after the operation she returned to her home absolutely well, and is so still, at this moment, six months after the operation."

**Example of Epilepsy and Homicidal Mania of Seven Years' Duration cured by Operation.**

W. B. FLETCHER ("American Journal of Insanity," 1887):

C. E., age thirty-seven, was struck on the head when thirteen years old with a small wagon wheel; had epilepsy when twenty years old, and married at twenty-two. In a fit of frenzy he killed his two-year-old child by catching hold of its feet
and beating its brains out. Admitted to the hospital at the age of thirty, he continued violent and homicidal. Trephined. The convulsive fits and mania ceased. Six months after discharge still well.

Examples of Bullet Wounds, causing Mania; Operation; Recovery.

AZAM ("Archives Générales de Médecine," 1881):
X., age thirty-eight, was shot in 1870, the ball penetrating his skull at the upper end of the fissure of Rolando, and coming out about nine centimetres above the external auditory meatus. A peaceful, agreeable man previous to the injury, he had changed to a bad-tempered fellow who became violent without provocation. He was trepanned and the ball extracted. After the operation the patient regained his former character.

A soldier, age twenty-five, received a shot along the whole of the temporal region at the battle of Hallue. A year and a half later he had hallucinations of hearing and became violently maniacal, the attack setting in with a piercing pain in the left temple, and lasting five to eight days. Patient when well was a quiet and modest man. In his attacks he was noisy, quarrelsome, abusive, and violent. Two pieces of lead were extracted. Six months later he reported himself well and free from attacks.

Sir THOMAS SMITH ("Lancet," 1879):
Similar case of bullet wound in temporal lobe, with recovery.

MANIA SUBSEQUENT TO EAR DISEASE SUCCESSFULLY TREATED

Case of my own:
Young girl, age fifteen, had regular fits of maniacal excitement, in which she destroyed whatever she could lay her hands on, threw the furniture about, tore her younger sister's hair out, and tried to stab her eyes when unobserved. When free from attacks she was a modest, quiet girl. She suffered from middle ear trouble, for which she was surgically treated. On evacuation of the pus, she became perfectly well.

LUDWIG MEYER ("Deutsche Klinik," vol. vii.):
T., age forty-five, changed in character about two years previous to his admission. Always of cheerful temper, amiable towards his family, peace-loving and sociable, he grew irascible, kept in ill-humour for days together, and was often violent and dangerous to those about him, and the strait-jacket had to be applied to him frequently. A few days after admission a putrid discharge from the ear was noticed, and simultaneously his mania ceased. Two months later the discharge stopped, and then his fury recommenced, so that he had to be isolated. In three days' time the discharge reappeared, and the mental excitement diminished and ultimately gave way. This repeated itself so often that the attendants began to regard the otorrhoea as a barometer of the mental state of the patient. One day, however, the discharge ceased without any signs of mental excitement, but it was observed that the pus had made its way to the mastoid cells, where a tumour could now be seen. On incision and subsequent proper treatment, patient was cured of his ear trouble and with it of his mental derangement.

J. KÖPPE ("Archiv f. Ohrenheilkunde," 1875):
Hoffmann, bricklayer, sustained in his forty-ninth year several injuries to his left ear. Gradually he became irascible, quarrelsome, and dangerous to his wife and children, with whom he had lived on happy terms previously. On treatment of the ear disease he recovered his sanity.

B. BALL ("L'Encéphale," 1881):
Patient, age twenty-two, received a blow on left ear when thirteen years of age, which was followed by perforation of the tympanic membrane with putrid discharge, also noises in the ear. He sought treatment on account of his uncontrollable paroxysms of anger. Later he also heard voices of an insulting character. The otitis media was treated, and with it the mental symptoms gradually disappeared.
E. BOUCHUT ("Gazette des Hôpitaux," 1877):
A child, six years old, alarmed its parents considerably by its frequent attacks of delirium, presenting all the characters of madness. Not recognising its parents, it would endeavour to strike and beat them; it would break up all the furniture in the place and run its head against the walls, thinking them living beings, all the time shouting noisily. The attack would last several hours, and occurred at night as well as during the day. The attack being over, the child would grow calm, recognised those around him, and be none the worse but for a slight headache. There was no sign of epilepsy or meningitis, or any other nervous symptom other than those mentioned. On questioning the parents, it was ascertained that the child had had a discharge from the right ear. On examination, the parts around the ear, particularly along the sensory nerves, were very tender. After treatment the attacks ceased and did not again recur.

Another Similar Case.

W. S. BRYANT ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1906):
A girl, age five, had chronic ear trouble of a purulent nature. Whenever there was retention of pus the child had maniacal attacks, during which she broke everything within reach and fought desperately with all the members of the family, including those she was most fond of at other times. Drainage of the pus cured the patient.

Case of Irascible Mania with Improvement after Treatment.

J. S., age twenty-five, innkeeper, no hereditary predisposition, previously healthy and of peaceful character, married to an evil-tempered woman, who one day threw a porcelain jug at him which struck him on the left temple. Two deep wounds in front and above the ear were the result, one having cut the temporal artery across. The wounds healed normally, but already after three weeks there was pain radiating from the scars and evoking great irascibility. The patient became violent, attacked those who approached him, complained of sleeplessness, buzzing in the left ear, from which pus oozed. His violence and destructiveness increased, necessitating his admission. There was oedema around the scar, and at the posterior part one could feel a distinct depression of the bone with projecting edges. The part on pressure proved very painful. Tormenting tinnitus aurium. On the ear trouble being attended to, the excitability of the patient diminished, and he was able to be discharged four months after admission. On later inquiry it was found that he still suffered from pain over the area of the depressed bone, was still easily roused to anger and rage, but they passed quickly away.

Other Examples of Maniacal Excitement cured by Treatment of Ear Disease.

H. SCHULE, Handbuch der Geisteskrankheiten, 1878. Three cases.
W. RHYS WILLIAMS, Lancet, 1877.
G. C. BABLETT, American Journal of Insanity, 1877. Two cases.
J. O. GREEN, Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, 1905.
SIR WATSON CHEYNE, British Medical Journal, 1890.

Violent Mania after Injury to Inferior Temporal Convolutions

A Medico-legal Case.

R. v. KRAFFT-EBING ("Uber die durch Gehirnerschütterung und Kopfverletzung hervorgerufenen psychischen Krankheiten," 1868):
J. L., healthy up to his twenty-first year, a quiet, peaceful man; family history
good; was attacked one day and struck on the left side of the head above the ear, causing haemorrhage from the ear. He was unconscious for nine days and subsequently deaf in left ear. From that time he became avaricious, greedy for money, irascible to an ever-increasing degree, so that he could bear no contradiction and at once took to personal violence. Four years after the accident he married, but he ill-treated his wife and children for no or but very trifling cause, and beat them until they bled and were half-dead. Punishment had no effect on him. One day a neighbour teased him and challenged him to shoot if he dared. L. did so and killed him. He immediately gave himself up with the pistol still in his hand. His state of mind was inquired into. He was transferred to an asylum. His irascibility and violence continued there, also his covetousness. He threatened to shoot all the doctors. He suffered from headache, giddiness, and tinnitus aurium, but there were neither motor disturbances nor hallucinations.

The SAME AUTHOR (*ibidem*):

G. G., age fifty-eight, a farmer, untainted and hitherto healthy, was run over at the age of twenty-three by a cart in such wise that the wheels passed over his head, producing a dent in the bone over the left ear three inches long, one inch broad, and half an inch deep. Patient was unconscious for a long time, recovering, however, completely, there remaining only some deafness in the left ear with an occasional paroxysm of rage. These affections did not, however, interfere with his vocation for twenty-three years. Two years prior to admission, subsequent to some financial losses, his excitability increased, and he had an attack of acute mania, lasting several weeks, which was repeated again and again after lucid intervals of eight weeks. In these intervals he was mentally torpid, and had to keep a good deal in bed suffering from headache. After admission to the asylum the paroxysms of acute mania continued with shorter intervals, varying from three weeks to ten days, and lasting, as a rule, from six to ten days. Besides the mania, he showed a morbid impulse for hoarding. The ebullitions of rage, his great destructive propensity, and his active kleptomania necessitated his isolation. He died of bronchitis after ten years' residence. The autopsy revealed a deep scar on the left temporal bone half an inch deep, pieces of bone having pressed on the brain substance and caused softening there.

The SAME AUTHOR (*ibidem*):

A. W., age twenty-eight, fell when twenty years old from a height on to his head, from which injury a still visible scar and fissure on the left temporal bone resulted. He showed mental confusion at first, then broke out into violent mania.

GUSTAV SPIES ("Zur Casuistik der traumatischen Manie," Würzburg, 1869):

Margarete L., age thirty-six, married, mother of three children, was most irascible, though an affectionate mother and industrious housewife. After knocking her head one night in the darkness against a stone, her husband was alarmed at her irascibility, which seemed to increase every day after the slight accident. She became furious, raging, aggressive and voracious. A slight contradiction would result in personal violence. In the intervals she was good-humoured and loquacious. A week after the accident she became so violent that she had to be brought to the asylum. Her destructive, aggressive, and noisy mania soon necessitated the application of the strait-jacket. Her muscular power during these attacks was astounding. In another week she had sitophobia, and great difficulty was experienced in feeding her by reason of her violent resistance. The lucid intervals grew briefer with each attack. After one of these outbreaks of fury she collapsed and died. The post-mortem examination revealed haemorrhage in both middle fossae, more so in the right, and adhesion of the dura mater to the base of the skull.

REGINALD HARRISON ("British Medical Journal," 1869):

A dock labourer, age forty-three, had fallen head foremost down a ship's hold, a distance of about thirty feet. On admission he was insensible, cold, and almost pulseless. In the course of the afternoon he partially recovered sensibility, but on being aroused he became exceedingly riotous. On the day following his admission he was in a semi-conscious state. On speaking to him he endeavoured to answer but became exceedingly noisy and riotous. On the third day he became so excited and violent that at times he required two attendants to restrain him. There was
THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN

no fever. On the fifth day he gradually became completely insensible, and died on the tenth day. Post mortem it was seen that the temporal lobes at the base were of a dark olive colour, gradually fading into the normal appearance as traced upwards; they were also much softer than natural, in some parts almost diffusent. Rest of the brain free.

A Medico-Legal Case, with post mortem-evidence.


Patient, a man in the fifties, always shy and of a retiring disposition, abstainer, slipped on the ice in the street, blood oozing from nose and ears. Subsequently he suffered from headache and insomnia. The accident was discussed in a Court of Law, his own doctor declaring him incapable of ever resuming work, the insurance experts arguing to prove only temporary disabement. Patient sought further independent advice and, his case being thought serious, he went for a few weeks to Dr. Serger's asylum for observation. It was found that he suffered from constant restlessness, excessive irritability, and an unwarrantable dislike of his family. The Court declared the case to be one of hysteria; but as he made a murderous attack on his family, the police sent him back to the asylum, where he showed a still greater increase of irrationality than on his first stay. Nearly two years after the accident patient handed himself with a kitchen-cloth in the lavatory. The post-mortem examination revealed a double fracture in the temporal fossa in the middle line, the membranes being adherent to the bone.

Another Medico-Legal Case.

Reported in the "Daily Telegraph," London, January 24th, 1902:

This was an action brought by a Lambeth tailor, on behalf of his seven-year-old son, to recover damages from Messrs. J. T. & S., Ltd., for injuries sustained by the boy through the negligence of the defendants' servant. It appeared that a truss of hay fell from the defendants' van on the boy's head and knocked him to the ground. He was picked up and carried home, where he was found to be suffering somewhat severe injury. A lad who worked in the shop after school hours described the child as a lively little boy before the accident; now he was dull and miserable; formerly he was well-behaved, now he hit his mother frequently. The father supported this statement, adding that the boy would now take anything and break it, and once he deliberately set fire to a pair of trousers to see them burn. Formerly quiet, well-behaved, he now rushed out into the street, frightening passers-by, picking up stones and throwing them at their heads. He was also given to swearing. The medical superintendent of the Tower Hamlets Dispensary, who attended the boy, expressed his opinion that there had been slight fracture of the base of the skull. During the first week or two there were signs of paralysis, but these symptoms passed away. There was no defence, and the jury assessed the damage at £50.

Other Cases of Fracture of Base of Skull with Serious Symptoms.

ERNEST TREDINNICK ("British Medical Journal," 1900):

Patient, who sustained fracture of base of skull, killed his wife and then shot himself.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):

Patient received a kick from a horse, fracturing skull at left mastoid process. He became maniacal.

CHARLES L. DANA ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1889):

Kate C., age thirty-two, domestic. Always healthy. No epileptic history. Two years prior to admission patient fell down an air-shaft, distance of thirty-five feet, striking her head. She was unconscious for several days; was in bed for several weeks. Her friends say she grew different in disposition afterwards, and became "queer" in her mind. At times she was very destructive. Eighteen months later supervened chill, three days fever, temporary rigidity of left arm, continuous headache with vomiting. Four months later vertigo, forced movements, sudden falling, always backwards and to the right. When the headache
was less severe and she grew more conscious she proved very restless and would throw herself out of bed continually, always on the right side of the bed. At last she was tied in. At the autopsy, on removal of the brain, a good deal of blood was seen in the right middle fossa. On the under surface of the right temporal lobe was a focal lesion consisting of softened brain tissue mixed with blood. The lesion involved the third and fourth temporal convolutions in their middle three-fourths.

Examples of Injuries to Temporal Lobes leading to Violent Mania and Epilepsy.

FRANCIS SKAE ("Edinburgh Medical Journal," 1866):

J. E., age fifteen, son of a farmer. His father's statement was as follows: He was a very intelligent boy until he was five years of age, and at that time he was struck immediately behind the ear by his schoolmaster with a ruler. The blow caused swelling and ecchymosis—no fracture. The same night he screamed out in his sleep; in the morning a change in his manner and appearance was noticed; he seemed stupid and silent; he ceased to speak entirely for six weeks. When he began to speak again he talked nonsense. It is now ten years since he received the blow; he is often very noisy at night, and he swears a great deal. His father managed him at home until he brought him to the asylum on account of his violence and his dirty habits. He never had any fits or any symptoms of paralysis. On admission he seemed perfectly imbecile, and his bodily condition was weak. He was very noisy at night, swearing profusely, and he was very dirty in his habits. He was put among the noisy patients, and continued unchanged for a year and three months. Then followed a succession of very severe epileptic fits for three days, in one of which he died. The post-mortem examination revealed four drachms of serum in the lateral ventricles, so that it could have been pressure only that caused the symptoms.

LAWSON and MAJOR ("Lancet," 1876):

B. W., when six years old, was knocked down and run over by a carriage wheel, injuring the whole of the right temple and leaving a depression. Some portion of the bone had necrosed and came away. From that time he had fits. Previous to the accident he was a bright and intelligent boy; he now became more and more demented. He was given to paroxysms of noisy excitement, in which he fought fiercely and attacked his companions. On his admission he continued aggressive and quarrelsome. He had an offensive discharge from the left ear, and gradually a small abscess formed behind the ear. Two years after admission he had severe hemorrhages from mouth, nose, and left ear, up to a quart of pure blood at a time. He continued querulous and stupid. He died after a frightful outburst of bleeding. Post mortem, there was an old clot in the right temporal lobe, and both grey and white substance were degenerated. There were depressions and rough projections on the petrous portions of both temporal bones and brown staining of both bone and dura mater. The hemorrhage was caused by friction of the larger vessels against the corroded osseous prominences.

Case of Slate-pencil in the Head causing Violent Irascibility and Epilepsy.

MAX HUPPERT ("Archiv der Heilkunde," Leipsig, 1875):

Carl T., age forty-two, well educated, industrious, and always of a cheerful temperament, received an injury to his head about a year before admission and was thereafter irascible, ill-treating his wife, and in the institution his fury continued. Hämatoma auris appeared spontaneously in both ears. A year after he had epileptic fits. He died of edema of the lungs. On post-mortem examination there was found stretching from the inner wall of the squamous portion of the right temporal bone, along the middle fossa to the cornu ammonis, a slate-pencil seventy-three by five millimetres, i.e., three inches long and one-fifth of an inch broad. How the pencil got there could not be ascertained. The appearance was much as if the pencil had been in this situation all the patient's life, and had caused no symptoms until the accident, a year before the patient's death.

Case of Temporal Injury with Irascibility and Aphasia, yet Swearing Fluently.

(See remarks on p. 148)
A fireman, age thirty-five, was hit in an explosion by the point of a wooden rod so violently in the left temporal region, about two to three millimetres above the external opening of the ear, that the bone was indented to the extent of admitting the point of a finger. Fourteen days' stupor followed this accident, after which he was unable to speak, though he understood everything that was said to him, and easily got into a temper, in which he could use abusive words quite fluently, which he could not articulate when quiet again. He could reproduce melodies without a mistake.

Another Similar Case.
M. JOWETT ("Western Journal of Medicine," 1868):
Patient received injury to temporal lobe, became aphasic, but could swear when in rage.

Example of Temporal Injury followed by Character Changes, apparently only temporary.
CHARLES GIBBS ("International Clinics," 1902):
G., a young officer, received an extensive wound at the base of the skull and in the neck, which had been sown up. In spite of the severity of the wound, he fought on. He reached the Langman Hospital forty-eight hours after. Blood was oozing from the wound. The stitches were removed and the whole extent of the wound was explored. There was considerable injury to the structures of the neck, the main mass of the mastoid process and the adjacent petrous bone had been blown away. The upper part of the wound was full of brain matter reduced to a sanguinary pulp. At least one ounce was removed at the first dressing. This was the wound of exit; the wound of entrance was about four inches above this and a little behind it. It was an ordinary Mauser puncture of three-eighths of an inch in diameter. There was complete facial paralysis on this side and complete deafness. The general condition of the patient was extremely good; he was perfectly conscious, understood what was said to him, answered properly, and took his food well. The only mental change was in his temper. This could hardly have been worse. He grumbled at everything and everybody. This irascibility was quite abnormal, for he was well known as a man of great amiability and very popular with his regiment. Since his recovery of health the irascibility has completely gone, and he is once more of charming amiability. The wound was surgically attended to and in a few weeks healed up. The author concludes: "This case is interesting as showing what a grave amount of destruction the brain is able to sustain without losing any of its functions." But both the examination and the history given are incomplete. On inquiry, it appears the man has not done so well.
Three other cases are given by the author where nothing mentally has been observed.

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O. HERPIN, several cases. Bulletins de la Société Anat. and Progrès Médical, 1876.
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BERNARD BECK, several cases. Die Schädelverletzungen, 1865.
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HARTMANN, several cases. Archiv f. Psychiatrie, 1884.
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THE EMOTION OF ANGER AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN 157

J. CHRISTIAN, bullet wound. *Archives de Neurologie*, 1889.
SHAW and CRIFFS, *ibidem*, 1890.
W. H. BATTLE, *ibidem*, 1890.
W. J. MICKLE, two homicidal cases. *Journal of Mental Science*, 1881 and 1885.
W. B. FOX, *ibidem*, 1891.
THOS. CLAYE SHAW, *Archives of Medicine*, 1882.
G. THOMSON, *Brain*, 1884.
JULIEN TELLIER, *Traumatismes du Crâne*, 1890.

**VIOLENT MANIA FOLLOWING TUMOURS OF TEMPORAL LOBES**

A nursemaid, age thirty-two, suffered for about four years from great irritability and sudden attacks of anger, after which she sometimes became aphasic. She suffered from loss of consciousness and attacks of giddiness for twelve months. During the two years she was at the asylum she proved very excitable without cause, exaggerated little matters, and was continuously quarrelling with the other patients. She had outbursts of fury and made obscene remarks. During the last weeks of her life she suffered from headache, giddiness, and vomiting. The necropsy revealed a tumour occupying nearly the whole base of the left temporal lobe.

E. KLEBS ("Präge Vierteljahrschrift," 1877):
A man, age thirty-three, whose mental symptoms were violent anger with paroxysms of fury, had a neuroglioma in left temporal cortex.

LINDSTRÖM ("Hygieia," vol. xviii.):
Male, age fifty-five, had fracture of temporal bone when twenty years old, which healed completely. Paroxysms of fury every three or four weeks. Headache in right temporal area. Vomiting. Post mortem, a tumour was found in right temporal lobe adherent to dura mater.

H. SCHÜLE ("Sectionsergebnisse bei Geisteskranken," Leipzig, 1874):
Jacob Hock, age fifty-six, admitted for furious mania with impulses to violence and destruction, tearing whatever was within reach. Patient developed enormous gluttony. His speech was most obscene. Post mortem, two gummata were found at the tip of the left sphenoidal lobe in the thickened dura mater, adhering to the brain substance.

WILLIAM BOYD and STANLEY HOPWOOD ("Lancet," 1913):
A man, age forty-seven, by trade a moulder, suffering from chronic mania, a useful and capable worker in the asylum, though weak-minded and having auditory hallucinations. He had periodic attacks of noisy excitement and at times became very abusive. He died after ten years' residence. Post mortem, the greater part of the left temporal lobe was replaced by a large cyst. Remainder of brain normal.
Case of Tumour of Temporal Lobe mistaken for "Hysteria."

A. HUGHES BENNET ("Brain," 1878):

Miss A., a young lady, age sixteen, at the first consultation complained chiefly of blindness and loss of power in her lower extremities. Father had suffered from acute mania. Patient in her extreme youth exhibited unusual sharpness and intelligence, generally exercised for mischievousness or destructive purposes. She was always a "very naughty child," who took a special delight in annoying and playing mischievous tricks on her companions and relatives. She was unusually developed for her age, physically and mentally, and she still retained her reputation for wilfulness, cunning, and bad temper, although she could make herself amiable and agreeable if she liked. She had been expelled from school for misconduct. Six months prior to the consultation, being apparently in robust health, while in an angry fit and sulking after correction for misdemeanour, she became suddenly blind. It was thought she was malingering, and, indeed, a few days afterwards, she recovered her sight. She had a second attack of blindness, and in addition deafness, which lasted some weeks, when she regained her hearing, but not her sight. Several physicians diagnosed "hysteria." Four months later she also lost power over her lower limbs. Every now and then she had attacks lasting from one to three hours, which had all the appearance of hysterical fits, involving shouting, laughing, crying, throwing herself about, striking the nurse, etc. Later on she became restless and greatly excited, chiefly at night, and frequently alarmed the household by crying aloud and getting out of bed. The excitement continued to increase, until on the third day there supervened mind-wandering and delusions. She was now totally blind, deaf, and could not stand on or move her limbs. She did not know anyone. She complained of violent headache. On the fifteenth day she became unconscious and wildly delirious, until she died on the twenty-fourth day. At the autopsy all the organs were found healthy, except the brain. A tumour, the size of a hen's egg, was discovered in the medullary substance of the temporo-sphenoidal lobe, highly vascular, with extravasation of blood on its surface.

Another Case of Tumour of Temporal Lobe mistaken for "Hysteria."

ALEXANDER BRUCE ("Brain," 1883):

L. M., age forty-five, single, previously a nurse, until two years prior to consultation had been remarkably healthy, of a cheerful and kindly disposition. Then it was first noticed that she had become nervous and excitable. Six months later patient began to grow very selfish, irritable, and jealous of her sisters, and had grown so passionate as to be almost unbearable at home. Then for nine months she seemed to be in perfect health, and held a situation as nurse. Then, however, she began to get excitable, and to quarrel without cause with her fellow-servants. Finally her excitement became so great that she alarmed everyone by rushing about the house at night screaming. Two physicians diagnosed "hysteria," and a surgeon thought her simply excitable and recommended her to go to the country for a time. There she had her usual fit of laughing and crying, especially the latter, for no apparent reason, and the medical man who had been summoned, again assuming hysteria, recommended treatment by "firmness with kindness." Two months later she had what appeared to be an attack of paralysis, but what was thought by the physicians to be either functional or "shamming." She was removed, however, to the infirmary, where she died the following month. The autopsy revealed a tumour extending from the tip of the left temporo-sphenoidal lobe to the junction of the anterior with the middle third of the pons, pushing the convolutions of the temporo-sphenoidal lobe outwards and pressing on pons and medulla.

More Cases of Temporal Tumours mistaken for "Hysteria."


Woman, age thirty, diagnosis hysteria, tumour left inferior temporal convolution.

BRAULT and LOEFE" ("Arch. Gén. de Médecine," 1900):

Case of mistaken hysteria. Tumour right inferior temporal convolution.
THE EMOTION OF ANGER AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN

BALL, "Buffalo Medical Journal," 1898:
Girl, age sixteen, supposed hysteria; tumour right temporal lobe.

Temporal Tumour with Mania and Convulsions.

JACOB WEISS ("Wiener Medizinische Wochenschrift," 1877):
H. D. F., a potter's assistant, age fifty-one, was on admission in a state of acute maniacal fury. He tore the clothes off his body, jumped and rolled about on the floor, shouting, kicking, biting, and rendered a medical examination impossible. It was ascertained that patient had clonic convulsions of his right extremities for a year, and that the fits during the last few weeks had continued daily. The maniacal excitement went on day and night, patient striking the door so violently with his hands and feet as to produce numerous excoriations. In the end he got exhausted, fever set in, strabismus divergents, and facial paralysis on left side. He died of pneumonia a month after admission. The post-mortem examination revealed a tumour, size of a walnut, embedded in the left temporal lobe, and extending along the base to anterior part of the pons and left crus.

Tumour of Temporal Lobe with Violent Mania and Epilepsy.

T. S. CLOUSTON ("Journal of Mental Science," 1872):
J. R., male, age thirty-eight, married, butcher. No hereditary predisposition. Had shown symptoms of insanity for four years. His first mental symptoms seem to have consisted of a change in temper, great irritability, and an altered affection for his wife and family. His first bodily symptoms were intense headache, slight deafness and gradually increasing blindness. He had been getting mentally much worse, being excessively irritable, violent towards his wife and daughters, very abusive and foul in his language, and then accusing his wife of all such violence. During twelve months before admission he had had several epileptic attacks. On admission he proved sharp and intelligent, and had no delusions; the gait was that of a tipsy man. He was quite blind, and deaf in his right ear. In nine months his legs were paralysed. It was noticed during the first fortnight that on the very slightest provocation he became wild with passion, completely losing control over himself and capable of doing any violence to those about him. The excessive irritability with violent paroxysms of passion, often coming on without cause, were his chief mental characteristics during the remainder of his life. He died ten months after admission. Post mortem, a tumour was found attached to the right temporal bone, having disorganised the internal ear of that side, and having caused complete softening of the temporosphenoidal lobe by pressure.

More Tumours of Temporal Lobes with Violent Mania and Epilepsy.

J. B. TROWBRIDGE ("Neurologisches Centralblatt," 1881):
Acute mania and epilepsy. Cyst in right temporal lobe.
B. M. McDOWALL ("Rivista di Freniatria," 1889):
Epileptic mania, very dangerous, homicidal. Tumour of left temporal lobe and hippocampus.
RUSSELL. ("Medical Times and Gazette," 1873):
Maniacal excitement, threatening, epilepsy. Post mortem, cyst middle of base of left temporal lobe.
Spinster, age thirty-two, bad-tempered, abusive, quarrelsome, later epileptic. Sarcoma of left inferior temporal convolution.

Other Examples of Temporal Tumours with Violent Mania, and most of them with Homicidal Tendencies.

MILLS and McCONNEL, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1895.
F. X. DERCUUM, ibidem, 1912.
S. J. SHARKEY, ibidem, 1889.
J. B. TROWBRIDGE, ibidem, 1891.
J. Rokie, Journal of Mental Science, 1890.
THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN

B. M. McDOWALL, ibidem, 1881.
W. H. PACKER, ibidem, 1882.
CONOLLY NORMAN, two cases. Ibidem, 1890 and 1893.
J. RUSSEL, Medical Times, 1875.
Sir JAS. CRITCHTON-BROWNE, British Medical Journal, 1873.
Sir W. T. GAI RDNER, 2 cases. Ibidem, 1873 and 1877.
J. A. ARBUCKLE, Glasgow Medical Journal, 1876.
Sir SAMUEL WILKS, Guy's Hospital Reports, 1866.
H. M. HURD, American Journal of Insanity, 1896.
A. RICHTER, ibidem, 1883.
J. JENSEN, ibidem, 1889.
W. FRANKEL, ibidem, 1896.
K. OPPENHEIM, Archiv f. Psychiatrie, 1877.
M. HUPPERT, Archiv der Heilkunde, 1875.
ROUSSEAU, 2 cases. L'Encéphale, 1888.
E. CHAMBARD, ibidem, 1881.
GEOFFREY, Annales Médico-Psychologiques, 1865.
BALL, ibidem, 1876.
C. BOUCHET, ibidem, 1853.
C. BAUZE, Jahrbuch f. Kinderheilkunde, 1876.

 Cases of Tumours in Lateral Ventricles, etc., with Oedema of Temporal Lobes.

ALFRED H. MARTIN, British Medical Journal, 1875.
W. B. RANSOME, Brain, 1895.
N. FRIEDREICH, Intracranial Tumours, Würzburg, 1853.
A. HOLLANDER, Jahrbücher der Psychiatrie, vol. iii.
C. FÜRSTNER, Archiv f. Psychiatrie, 1875.
GOTTFRIED JEHN, 3 cases. Ibidem, 1878.

EXAMPLES OF INFLAMMATION AND SOFTENING OF THE TEMPORAL LOBES WITH VIOLENT AND HOMICIDAL MANIA

H. SCHÜLE ("Sectionsergebnisse bei Geisteskranken," Leipsic, 1874). Three cases, of which one is quoted herewith:

M. M., age thirty, was admitted on account of an increasing mental excitability and intense headache. He soon became violently maniacal, with a stormy motor restlessness, shouting, and destroying everything in the room, and threatening those approaching him. Opium relieved him only temporarily, then the scenes of violence and destruction began anew. Pulse and temperature arose proportionately with the degree of excitement. Much grinding of teeth. No paresis. Two months after admission he died from convulsions. Post mortem, the anterior part of the temporal lobe and the whole of its base was found softened. Basal ganglia not involved.


A man, age forty-five, was admitted on account of violent mania. The post-mortem examination revealed softening of both temporal lobes, more marked in the left than in the right.

J. MacKENZIE BACON ("Journal of Mental Science," 1869):

William G., age fifty-seven, kept well till within a few days of his admission into the Cambridge Castle Asylum, when he became noisy and excited. When admitted he was in a state of restless delirium. He was fed with the greatest trouble, resisting all efforts in a blind fury, without any particular object. He died after eleven days. On removing the dura mater there was thick greenish lymph, limited to the left middle fossa of the base of the skull.
FURSTNER and STÜHLINGER ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1886):
Reibold, a married woman, age forty-seven, irascible from childhood, in continuous conflict with her husband. On admission noisy, abusive, aggressive. Died after eight months. Post mortem, the left temporal lobe was bulging, and both temporal lobes were tougher than usual. They had a yellowish discoloration and numerous granules on their surface, the size of pins' heads.

CLOVIS GALLOPIN ("Annales Médico-Psych.," 1879):
Louis Cheval, age sixty-one, admitted for violent mania, cried and shouted all night long. Six days after found dead in bed. Post mortem, softening of left temporal lobe was found.

WM. JULIUS MICKLE ("Journal of Mental Science," 1880). Four cases, of which one is quoted herewith:
J. M., soldier, age thirty-three, developed suddenly homicidal impulses. On admission restless, meddlesome, irritable, quarrelsome, foul and obscene in his language, and dirty in his habits. Post mortem, marked changes in the middle fossae, where there was a false membrane and the temporo-sphenoidal lobes were eroded. There had been tenderness over the temples during his illness.

T. DUNCAN GREENLEES ("American Journal of Insanity," 1887). Two cases, of which this is one:
Hannah Eliza F., age fifty-six, single, was suffering from acute mania, but remained coherent. Died in an apoplectic seizure after five years' residence. Post mortem, softening of the left temporo-sphenoidal lobe was found, and blocking of left meningeal artery.

Case of Destruction of Left Temporal Lobe without Sensory Aphasia.

ADOLF KUSSMAUL ("Berliner Klinische Wochenschrift," 1885):
Woman, age sixty-three, could hear quite well, read letters and newspapers, and spoke German and French fluently. Nothing was remarked of her mental condition, save that for the last two years her character had changed. She was selfish and quarrelsome. She died of abdominal trouble. On examination there was found wanting the greater part of the left temporo-sphenoidal lobe, including the half of the Wernicke's sensory speech centre (she was right-handed), without either the comprehension or the utterance of words or the power of hearing in either ear being injured.

Lesion of Temporal Lobe with Irascibility.

ALBERT M. BARRETT ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1910) describes the case of a man, named Taft, a good business man, who enjoyed perfect health till he was about forty-five. Then he became weak in his legs. He gave up business at fifty-two. "For some years previous there had been developing an increasing crankiness in his disposition and he showed a number of eccentricities of conduct, such as doing little things to annoy his family—as shouting, whistling, and slamming doors. In more recent years these peculiarities became more pronounced." Otherwise he retained his mental capacity up to the age of sixty-seven, when he became word-deaf and lost the use of his legs. "Throughout his illness he was irritable and fault-finding." Post mortem, the posterior portions of the right and left first temporal convolutions showed signs of softening and were sunken inwards.

Other Cases of Softening of Temporal Area with Violent and Homicidal Mania.

BYROM BRAMWELL, Edinburgh Medical Journal, 1879.
R. E. MITCHELL, ibidem, 1883.
RASORI, Centralblatt, vol. xiv.
C. FROHLICH, two cases. Ibidem, 1875.
L. WILLE, ibidem, 1875.
Vol. ii.]
G. H. BERGMANN, *ibidem*, vol. iii.


A. ALZHEIMER, *ibidem*, 1897.

M. KOPPEN, two cases. *Ibidem*, 1896.

J. B. TROWBRIDGE, *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 1891.


ANGLADE, *Gazette Médicale de Bordeaux*, 1911.


KENNETH McLEOD, *Journal of Mental Science*, 1861.


BLENYIE, *Dissertation sur l'Inflammation du Cerveau*.


ADOLPH MEYER, *ibidem*, 1895.


**Examples of Hemorrhage into Temporal Fossa.**


A. EICHHOLT, *ibidem*, 1885.

E. KUNDT, three cases. *Ibidem*, 1894.

T. KREBS, *ibidem*, 1895.


**A Medico-Legal Case of Homicidal Mania and Epilepsy with Post Mortem.**


J. D., an epileptic, married, father of three children, was much ill-treated in his youth by his father, who was of violent temper. He often lost consciousness after severe chastisement. Patient studied well, was good-natured, sociable, industrious, and economical. Epileptiform convulsions commenced in his twentieth year, and simultaneously with them his character changed. He became less sociable, irascible, and inasmuch as his business brought him into public-houses, his irascibility was thought to be due to drink. When twenty-six years old he had an attack of mania furiosa, lasting several days, during which he was restrained. The attacks recurred every three or four weeks. A private physician who took charge of him seemed to have cured him for a time. He married shortly after this cure. The year after the attacks of rage recurred and grew more frequent. They were accompanied by oaths and threats against his nearest relatives. He was frequently restrained. In his lucid intervals he was very religious. Two years after marriage, now in his twenty-ninth year, he locked a woman, whom he employed in business, in his room, where a prayer-book and some butcher's knives were lying on the table, and told her that she would have to suffer with her life for her want of piety, and that he was destined to kill her. Her cries for help saved her life, but she lost an eye in the adventure. The raging maniac was handcuffed and locked up. The following year he was again sent to a private asylum for his repeated attacks of mania, and was once more discharged as normal. Immediately on his arrival home he
threatened his brother-in-law, was again arrested and again sent to a private asylum, and then to another, and finally died in the State asylum in his thirty-sixth year. Post mortem, osteophites were found in the middle fossa of the skull, and the lateral ventricles were very much dilated.

A Case of Pyromania and Homicidal Mania and Epilepsy with Post Mortem.


Natalie X., an epileptic girl, age seventeen. She showed a tendency to mischief a year before her admission. She stuck a knife into the lungs of her father's horse; another time she cut up a perfectly new dress, and another time unchained a dog known for his viciousness. She frequently laid fire, and on each occasion said she could not resist the impulse; she felt she had to do it. She learnt well at school, but had to be removed because of her interrupting the lessons. Her father thought her a wicked child and punished her, but she did not appear to feel the chastisement.

An aunt of hers in another town took charge of her, until she was caught one night attempting to pierce the eyes of the children with a hairpin. After the injury was done she confessed that an inner voice prompted her to do so. She made several more attempts to set on fire. Several experts had examined her, and advised her being consigned to an asylum. At the institution she had a mania for taking hold of burning objects, and collected all the matches. During the Christmas festivities, when supervision was somewhat relaxed, for precaution sake her bed was examined, and a collection of matches was found in it. Even when she was free from fits she was very noisy and aggressive, beating, kicking and scratching other patients. She kicked a can of oil over, tore numerous dresses, and notwithstanding the supervision, succeeded in hiding objects with which she could lay fire. She had otorrhœa dextra, which increased latterly very much. She died of miliary tuberculosis. Altogether she succeeded in causing fires six times. The autopsy revealed a prominent osteophile in the form of a crest in the middle fossa. The arachnoid membrane was turbid and remarkably thick at the temporal lobes, which were firm and hard.

Another Case of Epilepsy with Homicidal Impulses.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):

Martin Kluszikowski, an epileptic, age eighteen, with perfect calm, without motive or cause, loved to injure people. He had the mien of a cat; the noiseless, elastic tread and treacherous glance, but otherwise he seemed harmless. His derangement showed itself mainly in impulses of harmful mischief and in attempts to cause personal injury. They were not accompanied or preceded by feelings of rage or anger; not done blindly nor noisily—as is common with epileptics; they were committed slyly, as if in gratification of some morbid impulse or desire. He appeared conscious that he was doing wrong. The cat-like seizure of opportunities to do wrong made him highly dangerous. Thus, a workman was putting down a file for a moment, which the patient promptly seized, and stabbed another patient with it in the back. The autopsy revealed basal meningitis, limited to the middle fossa. All the membranes were adherent in this region, both to the skull and brain, and the cornu ammonis was sclerotic.

Other Cases of Osteophites in Temporal Region with Epilepsy and Violent Mania.

LUDWIG MEYER ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1872):

Heinrich S., joiner, age thirty-six, married, fell into the street from a window he was repairing. He seemed uninjured except for a superficial contusion, but from the right ear flowed fluid, and on recovery from the shock there was impairment of hearing. Later on he had difficulty of hearing also on the left side. Some weeks later he had general convulsions. His character changed and he was easily roused to violence, attacking his wife and friends, and destroying the contents of a room. At the institution he so often attacked his fellow-patients that he had to be isolated. He had an apoplectic stroke and died four years after the accident. Post mortem there were several large and sharp exostoses in the right middle fossa with localised pachymeningitis.
T. S. CLOUSTON ("Journal of Mental Science," 1875):

T. M., thirty-eight years old, admitted six months after severe epileptic fits, coherent, but intensely irritable, would strike out at anyone on the slightest provocation or contradiction. Irritability greatest after the fits. Used foul abuse and most vituperative language, if he did not strike, at the refusal of a request. Post mortem, osteophites in temporal bone, dura thickened, and lower parts of temporosphenoidal lobes atrophied.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):

D. G., engineer, age thirty, five years an epileptic, after a fall on the left side of the head in a ship. He had been very dangerous and violent to those near him. He was admitted to the asylum very irritable and violent in an impulsive way. Post mortem, irregular excrescences in squamous portion of left temporal bone, membranes and brain matted together in this region by fibrous tissue. Temporal convolutions atrophied.

Sir FREDERIC BATEMAN (on "Aphasia," London, 1890):

C. G., a gentleman, age thirty-six, subject for many years to great mental excitement, had to be placed in asylum. There he had convulsions, followed by right hemiplegia and aphasia. Post mortem, exostosis found in middle fossa, with membranes adherent.

Other Examples of Temporal Lesions with Violent Mania and Epilepsy.

FEITH, ibidem, 1867.
OTTO SNELL, ibidem, 1875.
F. LÜHRMANN, ibidem, 1896.
Sir SAMUEL WILKS, Guy's Hospital Reports, 1866.
A. CULLÉRE, Annales Médico-Psychologiques, 1890.
M. FOVILLE, ibidem, 1882.
W. J. MICKLE, Journal of Mental Science, 1881.
S. W. D. WILLIAMS, ibidem, 1869.
T. B. WORTHINGTON, ibidem, 1880.
W. R. WOOD, ibidem, 1884.
FRANK HAY, ibidem, 1895.
A. TAMBURINI, Rivista Sper. di Freniatria, vol. V.
C. BOUCHET, several cases. De l'Épilepsie.
T. CRISP ENGLISH, Lancet, 1904.
J. S. BOLTON, several cases. Journal of Mental Science, 1905.

EXAMPLES OF CHRONIC MIDDLE EAR DISEASE WITH VIOLENT AND HOMICIDAL MANIA

Observation by the Author. Medico-Legal Case.

A highly esteemed and widely-known professional man, a devoted husband and father, killed one day his wife and both his daughters, ten and thirteen years respectively, by cutting their throats. He then took his own life. There were signs of a struggle with the victims, but no evidence that there had been a quarrel beforehand. Indeed, his brother had spoken to him a few hours before, and at the inquest declared that he found him in full possession of his reason and with his usual amiable character. Nor had he any cares or sorrows. Patient suffered from a chronic abscess in the ear, for which he had already once been operated upon, and for which he was still under treatment. The inflammation had extended to the adjacent brain.

Another Medico-Legal Case.

K. CRAMER ("Gerichtliche Psychiatrie"): 


The wife of a working man, age thirty-two, family history normal, suffering from disturbance of the inner ear, after a confinement in which she lost a great deal of blood, heard voices: "You must cut the throats of your children." The voices became more powerful, until they took entire possession of her, so that she could no longer resist, and, with a large kitchen knife, she cut the throats of her children, of whom she had so far been the loving mother.

**Still Another Medico-Legal Case.**

"American Journal of Insanity," vol. v., p. 34:

William Freeman, a servant. Several members of his family were insane. At the age of sixteen he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for stealing a horse. It was the general opinion that he was innocent of the charge. Whilst in prison, Freeman was struck a severe blow over the side of the head, which caused a chronic purulent discharge from the ear and deafness. The unjust imprisonment seemed constantly to prey on his mind, and when he left the prison at the expiration of his sentence he sought compensation, but in vain. Remuneration with him was the one idea. He enjoyed three years' liberty. During this time he is reported never to have spoken much and to have spoken only when addressed; never to have asked any questions, and to have answered very briefly those put to him. He was now twenty-two years of age. One evening he armed himself with a common butcher's knife and left his lodging, no one knowing for what purpose. After examining two or three premises he finally selected those of Mr. Van Nest as the proper place to begin "his work," as he termed it, and there massacred Mr. Van Nest, his wife, one child age two years, and Mrs. Wyckoff, age seventy. He stabbed another man, Mr. Van Arsdale, in the chest, who subsequently recovered. In the affray he entered every room in the house, both above and below, but took nothing away. He went to the stable, unfastened and mounted a horse, and was some rods from the scene of devastation in the incredibly short period of not more than five minutes from the time of entering the house, as was proved in evidence. Three days afterwards he was committed to jail to await his trial. The excitement caused by the killing of a well-known family, the character of the act, the plea of insanity which was made in defence, the protracted trial, the reputation of the distinguished counsel (Van Buren), and the number and standing of the medical witnesses called all conspired to give the case an unusual interest. Freeman died of phthisis while under trial. The post-mortem examination revealed caries of the inner part of the petrous portion of the left temporal bone. The dura mater covering this portion of the skull was red and congested, and the internal structure of the ear was mostly obliterated. There was also a collection of fetid pus in the cavity of the bone having no connection with the external ear. These changes, it was proved, were consequent upon the injury Freeman received when an inmate of the State prison; he was struck on the head with a board, the blow splitting the weapon into fragments. The medical opinion was that this injury was the cause of the diseased condition of the brain and of the violent and sudden derangement for which the defendant was on trial.

**Case of Middle Ear Disease in a Boy leading to Violence and Destructive Tendencies.**

E. BOUCHUT ("Gazette des Hôpitaux," 1877):

The wife of an English naval officer brought to him her boy, age six. When three years old the boy had measles and chronic bronchitis. Two years later he was sent to Nice for cure. He there had scarlet fever, and after recovery otorrhoea of the left side, which had lasted for three months. Since this otorrhoea he heard indistinctly with that ear, suffered with his head, and had nervous crises, several in a day and even during the night. No vertigo nor loss of consciousness, no vomiting. He became wild, yelled furiously, and threw himself on his mother, kicking her and striking her with his fists. His attacks were made as if he meant to kill her. He smashed everything he could lay his hands on. After that he became calm again, began to cry, embraced his mother, until the next storm broke out shortly afterwards with exactly the same symptoms. The noise he made was so great that the hotel people would not allow his mother to stay any longer, and she had to seek apartments elsewhere. She was recommended to reside with a medical man, and during
residence there the same violent scenes occurred as before. Before the treatment was concluded the mother returned to England with her son.

Other Examples of Violent Mania due to Ear Disease.

E. GRISsom, American Journal of Insanity, 1877.
G. C. BABLETT, two cases. Ibidem, 1877.
JANSEN, Berliner Klinische Wochenschrift, 1891.
HOMER, Monatsschrift f. Ohrenheilkunde, 1863.
WM. MacCORMAC, Lancet, 1886.
G. FABRI, Italia Medica, 1883.
H. SCHULE, three cases. Handbuch d. Geisteskrankheiten, 1878.
H. KUKARZEWSKI, Progrès Médical, 1894.
W. H. BENNETT, Dublin Quarterly Journal of Medical Science, 1871.
A. BABINSKY, Languedoc Médical, 1891.
EDWIN W. DAY, two cases. Annals of Otology, 1911.

In view of the above cases, the frequency of homicide in ear disease is not surprising. Recently I have collected a number of cases committed by deaf-mutes. They have certain features in common. As in most of the cases quoted, the murder is committed with unwonted brutality, more than one person may be attacked, sometimes perfect strangers, and not infrequently the guilty person attempts suicide after the deed. Still, in strict accordance with the law, these afflicted persons are sentenced to death or varying terms of hard labour.

A FEw EXAMPLES OF SENSORY APHASIA WITH VIOLENT MANIA

GIUSEPPI SEPPILLI ("Rivista Sperimentali di Freniatria," 1884):
A widow, age fifty-one, entered the hospital in a state of violent mania. She suffered from word-deafness, though her hearing was perfect. Her mental faculties after the subsidence of the attack seemed unimpaired. Post mortem, the membranes were adherent over the first and part of the second convolutions of the left temporal lobe.

ALBERT ROSENTHAL ("Centralblatt f. Nervenheilkunde," 1886):
Engineer, age forty-three, suffered from sensory aphasia. Two years later violent maniacal excitement. He was easily aroused to anger, became dangerous and destructive. Post mortem, the left tempo-ro-sphenoidal lobe, particularly the inferior convolution, was so softened that it was washed away by a jet of water.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem, 1889):
F. K., age thirty-nine, had an apoplectic stroke, followed by hemiplegia on right side, sensory aphasia, inability to count ten, though formerly a good arithmetician. Agitated mental condition. Left temporal lobe, especially superior and middle temporal convolutions, atrophic.

L. BIANCHI ("La Emioplegia," Naples):
Cerbone J., age sixty-one, a working man of low type, always fighting, violent, quarrelsome, woke one morning with sensory aphasia. Though hearing well, he could not understand a single word spoken. The upper half of the left temporal lobe was found softened.

Other Examples of Sensory Aphasia with Violent Mania.

H. LIEPMANN, homicidal. Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1900.
LEOP. LACQUER, Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1888.
BANCROFT, American Journal of Insanity, 1879.
W. L. WORCESTER, ibidem, 1896.
SCHAFER, Centralblatt f. Nervenheilkunde, 1881.
M. BERNHARDT, ibidem, 1882.
THE EMOTION OF ANGER AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN

A. PICK, Archiv f. Psychiatrie, 1892.
E. BISCHOFF, three cases, Ibidem, 1889.
G. HEBOLD, ibidem, 1894.
F. BAIZER, Gazette Médicale de Paris, 1884.
MILLS and McCONNELL, homicidal. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1895.
A. M. BARRETT, ibidem, 1910.

CASE OF ABNORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEMPORAL LOBES

F. C., female, age thirty-one, single, habits good, tendencies destructive and criminal in character. During childhood she was eccentric and unruly, markedly disobedient, perverse in her tastes, irritable on slight provocation, and when angered would fly into a passion, become destructive and greatly overwrought. This would soon pass away, but it was noticed as the child grew older she became worse, less susceptible to control, and developed sundry degenerate traits of character. From the father's statement, it seems that the girl reached the age of eighteen without very serious trouble, maintaining fair self-control with only an occasional manifestation of viciousness. At the latter age, however, she had a serious outbreak and for several weeks lost entire control of her mischievous and perverse tendencies. This was followed by a somewhat tumultuous interval of four years, at the end of which she again had an outbreak extending over a like period of time. She threatened her parents with a knife, broke dishes and furniture, and was a menace to the family safety except when in the presence of her father. Through the earlier months of her residence in the hospital she was subject to paroxysms of fury and destructiveness, during which she was mischievous, vicious, and subject to great mental restlessness. During one of these she seized a bottle of camphor and chloral liniment from a nurse and drank a portion without subsequent injury. She repeated this rash act immediately afterwards, and regretted that she was unable to control her impulses. She remained excited and disturbed for four months, and then began to improve rapidly, becoming quiet, orderly, and finally manifesting few perverse tendencies. Second admission, constituting her fourth outbreak, was after an interval of three years. During this period she was turbulent and mischievous, but maintained fair control. Her second residence in the hospital was marked by a repetition of her former excesses. If anything, this last attack was marked by an increase in vicious and destructive tendencies, sometimes premeditated, while others had the appearance of being entirely impulsive. She would emphatically deny all of her behaviour which was unobserved but readily traceable to her as the offender. When discovered in any of her depredations, she acknowledged her guilt with profuse regrets, and promised to restrain herself in future, but, nevertheless, would take the first opportunity and from time to time attack slyly fellow-patients when nurses were not looking. One minute she would talk sociably and kindly with an associate, while the next, if unobserved, or if the converser's attention was distraught, she would strike a violent blow with anything which might be ready at hand to inflict injury. She seemed to appreciate the enormity of her offences, and regretted her lack of self-control. She was a confirmed kleptomaniac, and exhibited a high degree of secretiveness following upon her lapses. She was also a pyromaniac, having on one occasion set fire to her father's residence. It was observed that she had excessive bulging of the temporal bone on the right side, making the head prominently asymmetrical.

Other Cases of Abnormal Development of Temporal Lobe.

ARNOLD PICK ("Frager Mediz. Wochenschrift," 1879):
Patient was brought to the asylum strapped down on an ambulance by the police, he having become suddenly acutely maniacal, threatening to kill someone,
and could only be overcome by the combined strength of several men. On the following day patient was calm and perfectly normal. He gave his history correctly, and stated that he always got easily excited to acute anger, but that the anger as rapidly disappeared. The cause in this case arose within himself; some reflections about past events made him angry, and his fury increased at the attempts of wife and friends to pacify him. On examination an asymmetry of the head was noticed. The left temporal bone bulged so much that it formed a perfect groove at its junction with the frontal and parietal bones. No other evidence of disease or other abnormality could be found.


**Cases of Hæmatoma Auris in Violent Mania.**


A young farmer of good constitution, age twenty-one, was seized with acute mania, persistent destructiveness of everything within reach and incessant motion. Five weeks after admission well-marked hæmatomata occurred in both ears, passing through the usual stages and terminating in the characteristic disfigurement. It was followed by an abatement of the excitement, convalescence was established, and he was discharged recovered. He continued in good health.

MacDONALD (*ibidem*, 1887):

Patient, age eighteen, maniacal and violent. This was his second admission, when he developed double hæmatomata, which increased rapidly and were apparently painless. In each case the swelling was confined to the concha, giving a very peculiar appearance. Absorption was rapid and at the end of a month the tumours had nearly disappeared, leaving the usual thickening. At the same time the mental disturbance had gradually subsided and convalescence was established. The patient was observed for the three years following his illness, he being a prisoner, and he kept perfectly well during that time.

*Other Cases of Hæmatoma Auris in Violent Mania with Recovery recorded by:*


FRED. NEEDHAM, *ibidem, 1890.*

TISHKOFF, *Lancet, 1892.*

**CHATELIN and de MARTEL (op. cit.) have made no such observations** as are cited in this chapter. As disciples of PIERRE MARIE, they deny even the existence of word-deafness in lesions of the temporal area; "not a single case has been observed" by them, whereas about twenty cases have been quoted by me. They acknowledge, however, that the patient "often speaks too much" and that "he presents jargonaphasia," symptoms that are familiar to psychiatrists, being common in acute mania.

The evidence I have quoted in this chapter is also of importance in showing the frequency of epilepsy in lesions of the temporal lobes. It should receive more than cursory attention by neurologists.

Dr. RICHARD EAGER (see p. 121 and 145) had only three cases of serious injury in the temporal region. *One of these suffered from "maniacal excitement," as we should expect; another is claimed by him as melancholic, but in reality complained only of pain in the head, and got well on "persuasion." The third seemed confused and wandered about aimlessly. There were three other cases of temporal injury, in the posterior region (described in next chapter under "Delusions of Persecution"), and one of these is mentioned as suffering from "an acute hallucinatory state and was for weeks in a state of acute maniacal excitement."
CHAPTER XXXII
OTHER PRIMARY MENTAL DISPOSITIONS AND THEIR CEREBRAL ORIGINS
SUSPICION AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN

In Chapter XXVII, it has been shown that a feeling of suspicion is a necessary element of self-preservation. It varies in degree in different individuals. From the examples of brain lesions which will be quoted it would appear that the upper posterior part of the temporal lobes has some connection with it, i.e., a part of brain midway between the supra-marginal and angular convolutions of the parietal lobes—the centres of the emotion of fear—and the lower part of the temporal lobes—the centres of the irascible emotion; consequently both these psychical tendencies may be involved.

Morbid suspiciousness and delusions of persecution can arise, particularly in young people, from other causes than a limited brain lesion, as an exaggeration of a natural disposition to taciturnity and distrustfulness, to seek solitude, to sensitiveness of character, and a hypochondriacal condition. Such people begin to interpret everything that happens in a bad sense and as intended to do them harm. They suspect everybody and everything, and see hostility everywhere and are constantly on their guard, and the most trifling incidents acquire in their eyes an extraordinary importance. Sometimes they begin to imagine that everybody is looking at them or talks about them. All the words they hear they refer to themselves. Gradually they suspect people of spying and listening at the door, and following them when going out. Their mistrust makes them exceedingly reserved. For a time they struggle against their delusions, recognising the possibility that they are such, but gradually their delusions assume a more systematised form; then they accuse a certain person or persons, authorities or societies of conspiring against them, and for definite reasons, which they can make very plausible. They now think themselves important personages to be the object of so much hate, conspiracy, or other unpleasant attention on the part of their fellow-creatures.

At this stage, or even before, actual hallucinations may set in, the principal one being that of hearing. Hallucinations of sight are extremely rare in these cases—the sight centre not being in the temporal lobe—but hallucinations of smell and taste are not uncommon, hence the idea of being poisoned. These hallucinations, it will be seen, can be explained on anatomical grounds; for it will be shown that the lesion found in delusions of persecution is in the temporal lobe, so that the propinquity of the ear will account for the hallucinations of hearing, and, as will also be demonstrated, the gustatory centres are in the same vicinity, and are subject to the same liability of morbid excitement.

W. T. TIGGES ("Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie," 1888) has shown that in this form of insanity the weight of the frontal lobes is least diminished, next come the parietal lobes, and the temporal lobes suffer the greatest diminution.
Delusions of persecution may occur without any other signs of disease, and they may occur as complications in melancholia as well as in mania furiosa. The latter two are merely extensions of disease already existing, from the central parietal area in melancholia and from the inferior temporal area in mania furiosa to the posterior superior temporal region.

It has been shown in the last chapter that epilepsy frequently involves the temporal lobes. Hence on the one hand the violence and homicidal tendency of many epileptics, and on the other the hallucinations of hearing and delusions of persecution. This observation was also made by PARANT ("Archives Cliniques de Bordeaux," 1895).

The proximity of the internal ear to this brain area accounts for hallucinations of hearing being so frequent in the delusions and mania of suspicion and persecution—they are generally of a threatening nature—and also explains why this same morbid mental state may arise when ear disease spreads to the temporal lobe. It is also a well-known fact that deaf people are particularly subject to ideas of suspicion and persecution.

It has been observed by several authorities that chronic middle ear disease may produce a psychosis. Whether this connection is dependent on increased intracranial pressure, direct meningeal irritation, reflex nervous conditions, or disturbed cerebral circulation is not determined. But the fact remains that, in these cases, cure of the ear disease cures the psychosis, and if pus is formed and retained the mental defect is aggravated. Hence, whenever we get unreasonable suspicion or delusions of persecution, we should examine for ear disease and inquire for hallucinations of hearing. FISHER ("American Journal of Insanity," 1888) found only two exceptions in forty-seven cases of mania of persecution that came under his notice. BOUCHERON ("Gazette des Hôpitaux," 1887) observed mental troubles of suspicion and persecution to accompany ear disease. PIERRE MARIE did the same, and so did E. C. LASÉGUE and C. FÜRSTNER. Increased pressure alone seems to suffice to set up delusions; and the moment pus escapes from the ear the mental trouble disappears. This is an observation made by SCHÜLE, KÖPPE, GRIESINGER, JACOBI, KÖRNER, HUGUENIN, MOREL, ROBIN, BENNETT, and MacEWEN who have all reported similar cases. REDLICH and KAUFFMANN found ninety per cent. of paranoia cases among patients suffering from ear trouble. W. S. BRYANT claims fifty per cent., but puts nearly the whole of the remaining cases under "dementia."

Dean Swift suffered from middle ear disease, which gave rise to insane suspicion and irritability, and to this may be ascribed his cruelty to Stella.

Case of Injury to Posterior Temporal Region with Delusions of Suspicion and Persecution

By THE AUTHOR:

A young South American had been sent to London for a change of scene, after he had fractured the mastoid process in a fall from his horse, and had become mentally unsound. At first he seemed able to exercise some control, but later, at the time of the consultation, he had secluded himself from all society, and complained, amongst other suspicious ideas, chiefly of threatening persecutors. An operation was arranged, but before the day fixed upon he threw himself from a third-floor window and was killed.

RECOVERY AFTER SURGICAL OPERATION

By THE AUTHOR:

Patient had chronic ear disease from his childhood. He was mentally quite normal and an active business man until two years before, when in consequence of ideas of persecution he changed his occupation rather frequently and succeeded in
none. Getting worse, he refused to eat any food that had not been first tasted by others, and refused to speak with anyone except his nearest relatives, to whom he spoke quite rationally, thus showing that he was suffering from a disordered state of feeling, and not of the intellect. An examination was made of his ears. The disease in the right ear was healed, but there was necrosis of the left ear. When he was operated upon, the left temporal bone was found of ivory-like hardness, there was not a trace of mastoid cells, and the bone had to be chiselled through to get at the brain. The dura was thickened and was cut cross-like in two. The wound healed readily, and patient spoke to his attendants directly after the operation. He got perfectly well, and remained so.

W. RHYS WILLIAMS ("Journal of Mental Science," 1879):

D. C., age twenty-six, had enjoyed good health, was industrious and sober until some days before admission, when he became excited, noisy and violent. He was continually swearing and screaming, said he saw devils, and was violent. Six months later it was noticed that he had a profuse purulent discharge from the left ear. He said he had this for months past. Slowly a large puffy swelling formed over the left mastoid process and spread up over squamous portion of temporal bone. On pressing this the discharge ran freely from the meatus. As a rule the patient was sullen and dangerous, and would not allow anyone to examine him. He fancied the doctors wanted to injure him. The following month, the abscess having got still bigger, it was opened, and he became sane at once. No further discharge took place from the ear.


Richter, a miner, sustained, when thirty-one years of age, a fracture of the base of the cranium, was eight days unconscious, and ill for three months. He became somewhat deaf, and there continued buzzing in the right ear. Two years after the accident he became mentally changed. He suffered from delusions of persecution: people robbed him of everything, intended to poison him, spoke badly of him. He threatened to kill his wife and children and to commit suicide afterwards. The otorrhoea got worse, and with it his delusions. On treating the ear-disease his mental derangement disappeared completely.

E. REGIS ("Annales Médico-Psychologiques," 1882):

A young man, age twenty-two, received, when thirteen years old, such a severe box on the left ear that purulent middle ear disease resulted from it, which became chronic. Typhoid fever in his sixteenth year made the ear disease worse, and he became quite deaf in the left ear. Since then he had hallucinations of hearing of an insulting character; yet the patient was conscious of their origin, and had no delusions about them. Local treatment of the disease made the hallucinations disappear.

B. BALL ("L’Encéphale," 1882):

Similar case with cure.

CHARLES PHELPS ("Traumatic Injuries of the Brain," 1898):

Male, age forty-five, thrown from a truck in a collision, unconscious. Third day ecchymosis over right mastoid process and extending upon the back of the ear. Irrational and required restraint, had delusions, saw imaginary persons, and heard scolding voices, was easily annoyed when spoken to, considered it an outrage to find himself subjected to having his temperature taken. His mental faculties were completely restored after operation.


The same author ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1906) has an article on "The Great Psychical Importance of Ear Disease." He again gives numerous examples of purulent inflammation of the middle ear followed by psychoses, which disappeared on treatment of the ear trouble. The following is an example:

"The author has a case of a child, five years old, who has recurrent purulent inflammation of both tympani. If there is any retention of pus, maniacal attacks come on, during which the child makes inarticulate cries, breaks everything within reach and fights desperately with all the members of the family, including those it is most fond of at other times. These seizures are constant during the attack.
Attention to the middle ear conditions and drainage of the pus relieves the cerebral irritation at once."

EDWIN GOODALL ("Lancet," 1898):

Male patient, age twenty-nine, previously healthy, always temperate. No hereditary tendency. Six weeks before admission he received a kick from a horse on the left mastoid process, which rendered him unconscious. He bled from left ear. After coming round he developed marked delusions of suspicion, and exhibited violence, so that he had to be transferred to Hanwell Asylum. Considerable scar over left mastoid process. Complete left facial paralysis. After surgical treatment he became perfectly rational. Discharged three months later, and a month after discharge patient reported himself well and at work.

DAMER HARRISON ("Journal of Mental Science," 1902):

A gentleman, age forty-six, who held an important Government appointment, and was admitted into Haydock Lodge Asylum in 1906. He had suffered for the past year from delusions of persecution of disparaging and threatening character. An operation was decided on in the region of the temporal lobe—auditory centre—on the left side. The brain bulged into the opening of the wound, and on incision into the dura mater a considerable quantity of serum escaped. On the day after the operation the voices appeared to the patient more like a jumble of noises. On the fourth day he could still hear the voices at times, but he was peaceful and comfortable. Instead of being wrapped up in his own misery, he watched what was going on in the room, was inclined to talk, and his manner was bright. On the fifth day the sounds became indistinct and were no longer heard as voices. On the twelfth day the noises too had disappeared, and on the twenty-fourth day he was discharged cured. He reported himself three months later free from relapse.

E. AMBERG ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1906):

Auditory hallucinations and persecutory mania. Recovery after treatment of ear affection.


Mrs. B., married, healthy up to thirty-fourth year, then became melancholic, suicidal, developed delusions of persecution, and became dangerous to those around her. For sixteen years she remained in this condition in the asylum. Dr. Burckhardt removed a strip of the parietal lobe (gyrus angularis and supra-marginalis—seat of melancholia, see preceding chapter) and a strip of the posterior part of first and second right temporal convolutions (also part of Broca's convolution without influencing her speech). He claims that patient lost her desire for attacks and abuse and her delusions, and instead of the depressed condition she became lively and communicative.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):

This subject was a man, age thirty-five, who had been four years in the asylums. He was suspicious, had fear of being poisoned, became threatening, heard voices, and was violent and destructive. Dr. Burckhardt trephined for the auditory centres above left ear, and removed about 2.8 grammes of brain substance. The brain was found of a slate colour. *The patient did not become word-deaf* after this operation, but the hallucinations became less intense and the mental condition improved. He was now perfectly quiet, and took an interest in things.

The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem):

M. M., artist, delusions of persecution with hallucinations of hearing which caused irascibility. Auditory area excited, weight of brain removed 4.6 grammes. Patient lost his irascibility. Dr. Burckhardt in a second operation removed another strip, when the patient's mind cleared up. He began to draw again, could play a game of cards and billiards correctly, became polite and obedient.

HENRY MAUDSLEY ("Lessons of Materialism," 1879):

"Some years ago a miner was sent to the Ayrshire District Asylum who, four years before, had been struck to the ground insensible by a mass of falling coal which fractured his skull. He lay unconscious for four days after the accident, then came gradually to himself, and was able in four weeks to resume his work in the pit. But his wife noticed a steadily increasing change for the worse in his character and habits; whereas he had formerly been cheerful, sociable and good-natured, always kind and affectionate to her and his children, he now became irritable, moody, surly,
suspicious, shunning the company of his fellow-workmen, and impatient with her and the children. This bad state increased; he was often excited, used threats of violence to his wife and others, finally became quite maniacal, attempted to kill them, had a succession of epileptic fits, and was sent to the asylum as a dangerous lunatic. There he showed himself extremely suspicious and surly, entertained a fixed delusion that he was the victim of a conspiracy on the part of his wife and others, and displayed bitter and resentful feelings. At the place where the skull had been fractured there was a well-marked depression of bone, and the depressed portion was eventually removed by the trephine. From that time an improvement took place in his disposition, his old self coming gradually back; he became cheerful again, active and obliging, regained and displayed all his former affection for his wife and children, and was at last discharged recovered."

**TEMPORAL INJURY WITH DELUSIONS OF PERSECUTION**

*Case of Recovery.*

**THOMAS DRAPES ("Journal of Mental Science," 1904):**

Patient, age thirty-six, employed at office work, most temperate all his life, always healthy and athletic, an enthusiast about games. Many years ago, when playing football, he got a kick on the left side of his head, just over his ear, and some six months after he began to suffer from deafness, which he attributed to the injury. An eminent London aurist, however, did not attach much importance to this, and seemed to regard the deafness as due to Eustachian obstruction. For a number of years he had some discharge from the ears. He had a slight blow again on the top of the head by a hockey stick, and from that day he was very fidgety and restless, except when under the influence of sleeping draughts. One night, the month following, he sprang over the foot of the bed, imagining he saw men coming in at the door. Another day he saw two men, one in the wardrobe, the other standing opposite the side window, of which the shutters were shut. He seized his hot water jar and flung it with all his force at the latter, as he thought, and it went within a few inches of his sister's head, who was sitting at the fire with her back to him. Had he aimed at the man in the wardrobe, he must have hit her and might have killed her. All this time his hearing was much more acute than normal. He made slow recovery, and as he got better the deafness gradually returned. He wrote afterwards a long account of his delusions, which were connected with a conspiracy.

**Medico-Legal Case of Temporal Injury followed by Homicidal Tendencies.**

**JULIUS KRATTER ("Friedrich's Blätter f. Ger. Medizin," 1889):**

Josef H., while walking with some companions, had, as afterwards was shown, a momentary delusion of persecution, and this delusion incited him to knock one of his friends down, and, when attacked by the other, he stabbed him several times, apparently in self-defence. On arrival home he boasted of his intention to murder thirty persons, and became very noisy and threatening. Numerous witnesses declared H. to be a violent, threatening and dangerous man, and that the change of his character dated from the receipt of an injury to his head. One medical witness declared him to be simulating; another described him as intellectually very clear-headed, definite in his statements, adhering to them under cross-examination, having a good memory of facts and events, and never contradicting himself. He stated that twenty years before he was run over, and received a severe wound which caused him to be paralysed and speechless for a few weeks, and altogether indisposed for a whole month. A brother of his stated that since that time defendant had been intolerant of alcohol. Defendant remembered every detail of the act he was accused of, but stated definitely that his two companions intended to kill him. Questioned further, he said he was not mad; 'he heard them distinctly arranging the plot; he knew what he was doing, and was not going to let himself be murdered without some self-defence. It was then ascertained that defendant construed some remarks made by his companions in this sense, and when he walked faster to escape them they also followed him more quickly, whereupon he turned
round and fought, with the result given above. In reply to inquiries by the medical experts, he admitted having other enemies in the village, and gave their names and their intentions. Asked why he did not prosecute his enemies, he admitted that he applied for a summons against one of them, but the magistrate would not grant the summons. He believed the magistrate had been bribed. The physical examination revealed the following anomalies: facial paralysis and paresis of sympathetic on right side; over the ear at the junction of the right temporal with the parietal bone there was a depression, the size of a five-shilling piece, holding three fingers easily. Superficial tissues were adherent. Scar not tender but sometimes painful. Right pupil larger than left. Opinion of experts that defendant had suffered for many years from delusions of persecution; that these delusions dated from the injury, and had increased when hallucinations of hearing appeared. Moreover, he construed everything that might be said or done in the sense of his delusion. Since the injury he had grown very irascible. In his anger he often spoke nonsense, and the laughter and remarks caused thereby by those around him only increased his irascibility and delusion. Simulation was declared to be out of the question. In a postscript Dr. Kratter stated that the Court handed the prisoner to the mayor of the district to deal with him as he thought proper. The mayor intended to send him to a lunatic asylum at once, but a superior authority intervened, so that H. was left at large. He immediately resumed his threats and violent behaviour, and to such an extent that the local people had to petition the Government to place H. in an asylum, since he was a public danger. Dr. Kratter added a special certificate. Only then was H. secured.

Another Medico-Legal Case.


S. A., a very conscientious woman, age twenty-nine and a half, whose house was burnt, including all her property, which was not insured, interpreted some remarks by the neighbours as meaning that her husband had caused the fire. Fearing his arrest, she got into a state of terror, and left quietly, with her two children, the scene of her misfortune. An hour afterwards her cries were heard from a pond in the neighbourhood, where she had drowned her children and made an unsuccessful attempt to take her own life in the same way. She was arrested. At the trial she remained reticent, but betrayed in every feature and look her extreme anxiety, and gave the judge the impression that she felt her guilt so much that she was afraid to betray herself if she spoke. Expert evidence showed that her silence, refusal of food, sleeplessness, fever, etc., indicated some mental derangement. She was sent to the psychiatrical clinic for further observation. She was found much depressed, but this condition had begun long before the fire. She was hereditarily tainted. On her head in the region of the left parietal bone some ulceration was observed. Her fever increased, and with it her fear of death. She asked for a priest, and confessed to him that she herself laid the fire to get away from the town, which she abhorred, and gave details of the preparations she had made to fix the suspicion on others, which confession left the impression on the judge, to whom she repeated it, that she had told the truth and was not under a delusion. She died of pyaemia. Post mortem, there was a necrosis of the left parietal bone with loose pieces, the parietal lobe being covered with pus, which had made its way to the temporal area and middle fossa. Dr. Fränkel thought the necrosis was the result of an injury.

Another Medico-Legal Case.


A woman, age forty-seven, a habitual thief with long records of imprisonment, whose trials were always interesting by reason of the craftiness with which she planted her guilt on others, became quarrelsome and violent in manner. Four weeks after being discharged she committed another theft, and received one year of hard labour for it. But this time her mental state received notice, and she was sent to an asylum. Her violence was accounted for by horrible delusions of persecution with hallucinations of the same kind; she saw only enemies, detected poison everywhere; but, unlike a melancholic, who would simply refuse to eat, she destroyed the plates
and dishes, and behaved altogether outrageously. She remained in this condition for years. Gradually paralysis set in. She died of phthisis. Post mortem, there was softening of the temporal lobe.

Other Cases of Temporal Lesions with Delusions of Suspicion and Persecution

CONOLLY NORMAN ("Journal of Mental Science," 1894):

Patient, age forty-two, entertained fixed persecutory delusions, chiefly to the effect that people in the jail had put beasts in his inside to torture him; that his chest was full of gnawing beasts, and so forth. He complained bitterly of his treatment, and said that the asylum authorities were conspiring with the prison warders to persecute him. No hallucinations. Post mortem, porencephaly was found involving the greater part of the left temporo-sphenoidal lobe and supramarginal gyrus, holding sixteen ounces of perfectly clear fluid. The left parietal eminence and left parietal cortex were distinctly more prominent than the right.

ALBERT ROSENTHAL ("Centralblatt f. Nervenheilkunde," 1884):

Patient, age twenty-five, with ear disease, which in three months' time left him deaf. Simultaneously therewith mental derangement took place, the patient having delusions of persecution and attacks of maniacal fury. To escape from his persecutors he made an attempt to jump down from a fourth-floor window. The excitement never abated. Epileptic convulsions followed in such rapid succession that he was dead in a few hours. Post mortem, there was a focus of yellow softening in the right temporal lobe extending to the external capsule.

PAUL SCHÜLLER ("Psychosen nach Kopferletzungen," Leipsic, 1882):

F. B., age sixteen and a half, an apprentice, with ear disease from his earliest youth, received in a fight a blow with a piece of wood which broke into pieces. It hit him at the posterior junction of the right temporal and parietal bones, leaving a scar. He became insane, suffering from delusions of persecution. He was in fear of being hacked to pieces and of being poisoned; he was suspicious of everybody and everything, and to defend himself became extremely noisy, violent, and made attempts at homicide.

J. T. ESKRIDGE ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1889):

J. P., male, age thirty, Colorado ranchman, was left after typhoid fever with a purulent discharge from the right ear. During the following fortnight he was observed to be getting irritable, and one day was found in bed delirious, and with the delusion that his attendants were trying to kill him. His eyes followed the physicians and people in the room, as if suspicious of the actions of those by whom he was surrounded. He accused his attendants and Dr. Eskridge of seeking an opportunity to kill him, and cursed them accordingly in the unpolished language of a Western ranchman. The doctor received profane abuse for every question that he put to him. There was a saucious or semi-purulent discharge from the right ear, slight in amount but offensive in character. His appearance was depressed and anxious. His left arm and muscles of left angle of mouth were paretic. He was terephined and a large abscess cavity emptied; but the patient's improvement was only of short duration, and he died on the fifth day. Post mortem, there was found, besides this cavity, pus on the petrous portion of the right temporal bone with meningeal inflammation around.

JOHN KEAY ("Journal of Mental Science," 1894):

Patient, age fifty, was suffering from monomania of suspicion of about a year's duration. He had auditory hallucinations. Mentally he was an excited, irritable monomaniac, full of delusions of suspicion. He charged people with hatching plots to do him injury, was extremely hot-tempered, and answered the most civil remark with a torrent of abuse and threats of civil action or physical violence. Thus he continued for four months, when his hitherto robust health declined, his appetite failed, and his weight diminished. It was then observed that he frequently placed his hand on the right temporal region, and at the same time it was noticed that there was a slight purulent discharge from the right ear, in which he seemed deaf. Patient resisted all personal examination. A month later he had fever and became semi-comatose. There was a swelling with tenderness on pressure over the mastoid
bone. It was agreed that the case was one of basal meningitis, arising from the purulent otitis media. The skull was trephined half an inch posterior to the external auditory meatus, and the pus allowed to discharge. Improvement seemed to follow the operation, but the patient died the following day. Post mortem, the convolutions of the temporo-sphenoidal lobe on the right side were softened. The walls of the ventricles were also soft, and they contained a quantity of semi-purulent fluid.


Case 15: A negro, age thirty, sustained a depressed fracture behind the left ear from a blow from a baseball bat, for which he was trephined on account of pressure symptoms. After the operation he became partially word-deaf and at the same time had auditory and visual hallucinations. He soon became unmanageable, and was violent and abusive. He had delusions of persecution. The brain showed distinct injury to the auditory speech centre.

TEMPORAL TUMOURS WITH DELUSIONS OF PERSECUTION

Tumour of Temporal Lobe found in a Murderer.

W. C. SULLIVAN, then Medical Officer, Holloway Prison, now one of H.M. Prison Commissioners ("Lancet," 1911):

Case of Dr. R. Cunyngham Brown, of H.M. Convict Prison, Parkhurst: "The patient, who was stated by the police to be a heavy drinker, murdered his wife; while awaiting trial he complained of visual and auditory hallucinations, and developed a persecutory delirium; after a period of remission the persecutory symptoms recurred with increasing mental confusion and apathy, and the patient died some seventeen months after the crime. At the post-mortem examination a large tumour was found infiltrating the right temporo-sphenoidal lobe." Dr. Sullivan continued: "So far as I am aware, this is the only case on record of actual homicide in this disease."

Numerous cases of temporal tumours with homicidal tendencies have been given in this and the previous chapter, and here are some more.

Other Cases of Temporal Tumours with Delusions of Persecution and Homicidal Tendencies.

HARTMANN, Archiv f. Psychiatrie, 1884.
H. SCHULE, Sectionsergebnisse bei Geisteskranken, Leipzig, 1874.

INFLAMMATION OF TEMPORAL LOBE WITH DELUSIONS OF PERSECUTION

Examples of other Temporal Lesions with Delusions of Suspicion and Persecution.

TOMASCHEWSKY and SIMONOWITSCH ("Wjestnik Psychiatrii i Neuroradiologii," 1888):

Patient, age thirty-three, always of good health, was frequently struck on the head by a drunken husband. She had subsequently several attacks of general convulsions which continued till her death. On admission, the principal symptoms were excitement, sleeplessness, delusions of persecution, and hallucinations of hearing. She heard with both ears the voices of her tormentors. There was chronic catarrh of the left Eustachian tube. Post mortem, there was thickening, adhesion, and injection of the dura over the gyri supra-marginalis and angularis and posterior half of first temporal convolution, and the brain substance of these parts appeared injected and wasted.

CH. VALLON ("L'Encéphale," 1881):

Patient, age thirty-five, had delusions of persecution. Four months later he had hematoma of right ear. He died a fortnight later of pneumonia. Post mortem, there were sanguinary effusions of both right and left temporal lobes in the posterior parts.
T. DUNCAN GREENLEES ("American Journal of Insanity," 1887):

James K., age fifty-three, had been insane for eighteen months previous to admission, consequent upon a paralytic seizure, the effects of which had partly disappeared. On admission he had a suspicious look, was very restless, and had the fixed delusion that persons wished to poison him. During his residence he was passionate, and became easily excited. If left to himself he was dull, and would speak to no one, preferring the solitude of his own company. Eighteen months after admission he had another paralytic seizure, accompanied by aphasia. Death nine days later. Post mortem, the whole of the left temporo-sphenoidal lobe was in a state of red softening, and broken down into a cavity. Part of the adjacent
Post mortem, it was found that the right temporal lobe was flat and bulging, and on incision an ounce of thick pus escaped, disclosing a thick-walled abscess occupying the whole of this part of the brain. Rest of the brain apparently normal.

T. C. SHAW ("Archives of Medicine," New York, 1882):

M. R., age thirty-four, married, four children, had a sudden attack of loss of consciousness, lasting two weeks, since when she was insane. The certificate committing her stated that she said some men were trying to kill her, and she screamed without cause, and was at times violent. A month after admission she had a severe epileptiform fit, after which she continued noisy, screaming unintelligibly night and day. Post mortem was found atrophy of superior temporal sphenoidal convolution extending to parietal lobe in both hemispheres.

CHARLES K. MILLS and WILLIAM G. SPILLER ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1907):

Case of delusions of persecution, after fracture of the base of the skull—in which was found post mortem contusion of the posterior part of the first and second temporal convolutions.

Other Examples:

LANDERER and LUTZ, two cases. Christophbad Asylum Report, 1878.
P. DEECKE, American Journal of Insanity, 1883.
G. C. GABLETT, ibidem, 1877.
J. B. M. PARCHARPE, Traité de la Folie.
D. M. B. BOURNEVILLE, Archives de Neurologie, 1880.
F. BAIZER, Gazette Médicale de Paris, 1884.
G. HEBOLD, ibidem, 1894.

HUNGER AND THIRST AND THEIR CEREBRAL ORIGIN

The most elementary instinctive impulse of animal nature is the impulse to satisfy hunger and thirst. The substrata of the appetite for food and drink are the stomachic branches of the vagus nerves and their cerebral centres; and as local conditions of the stomach may destroy or increase the feeling of hunger and thirst, so central disease may give rise to ravenous appetite, sitophobia, conditions exemplified in certain forms of insanity.

It is objected that hunger, or the desire for food, is referable exclusively to the state of the stomach. Facts, however, are against the objection. A certain condition of the stomach gives rise, no doubt, to the sensation of hunger, just as a certain condition of the eye does to that of light; but the sensation itself takes place in both instances in the brain. If we never experienced a desire to eat or drink except when the stomach required food or liquid, intemperance and disease would play a much smaller part in the drama of life than they actually do. If the stomach were the sole seat of appetite we should never witness the apparent anomaly of excellent digestion existing without any desire for food, or great craving without the power of digestion.

Hunger and thirst are commonly given in physiological text-books as marked and typical examples of "general sensibility." On the other hand, impulses to satisfy hunger and thirst have always been set down as instinctive. Now, the feelings of hunger and thirst themselves prompt to the same sort of conduct as these so-called instinctive impulses. Indeed, it seems possible that the same inner core of
the psychic happenings, which in the one case is regarded as a visceral feeling, may be identical with that which, in the other, is named an instinct. What, then, should result if, instead of conceiving the inner core of the feelings of hunger and thirst to be the counterparts of certain visceral currents running to the brain, we were to turn squarely about and regard them as motor ideas seated congenitally in the brain, and let loose from it to prompt the creature to specific action for procuring sustenance? Unquestionably our attitude of investigation of such matters would be revolutionised, and a wider horizon would be given to the problem. We should now expect these instincts to be aroused in more than one way—by smell, by sight, and even by sound, as well as by a condition of the stomach. Moreover, since in cases of instinctive impulses aroused through vision, for example, of an animal at sight of its prey, we should think it ridiculous to seek an explanation of these instincts wholly in the eye, so we should now be led, maybe, to recognise how faulty it has been for physiologists to seek an explanation of hunger and thirst wholly within the viscera. Of course, the mere taking of this wider view would not, of itself, solve all the mysteries of hunger, nor illumine beyond shadow all the realms of physiology, of insanity, and of emotion. But it would bring light into all these regions. It would enable us to understand how herbivora and other animals, whose stomachs are commonly more or less full, should yet feel hungry at the sight of food. It would enable us to imagine at least how hunger, proceeding from an empty stomach, may be explained in different ways, and yet in conformity with the conclusion that the viscera afford no direct sensory currents save of pain from pain-nerves and of muscle sense from muscular contractions. It may be that the mere emptiness of the stomach, or, again, the undue presence of its juices, incite muscular and peristaltic disturbances of such persistency or strength that they force their way to the cerebral centre, and thence arouse by association the proper instinctive feelings of hunger. Or in place of muscle sense, it may be that obscure and feeble pains are commonly the only direct visceral sensations, and these rising by pain-nerves (sympathetic) to the cortical centre. Again, all these things may be brought into line with the fact that long-continued hunger may be lessened and apparently satisfied by the injection of food into the bowels. It is a small matter how hunger be explained—whether as visceral sensation or as instinctive motive—but the collateral issues are momentous.

In the instincts of hunger and thirst animals eat and drink before they can know that food and drink induce that pleasant external sensation which constitutes the satisfaction of the instinct. But if the animals become conscious of the objects of the instinct the volitional element is added, and the blind impulse of nature cooperates with the inclination of the animal to obtain it. The blind instinct is become the volitional instinct for food and drink.

In the pregnant, chlorotic, and hysterical female there is a desire for strange substances, and amongst the ordinary occupants of lunatic asylums we find sometimes morbid desires, longings, or impulses for various substances generally regarded with loathing and disgust. In the condition called bulimia, the patient has an irresistible longing for food of a normal kind, so that an exaggerated form of gluttony results. This may occur first when the stomach is enlarged, and, secondly, when it is of a normal size. Under either condition the person devours an enormous quantity at each meal—as much, indeed, as would suffice for three or four ordinary men, and yet he may be haggard and gaunt in the extreme. Amongst the insane bulimia is common—some, having devoured their own ample allowance, seize all they can lay hands on, prowling about the entire day in search of food. Another condition, called dipsomania, signifies a disordered cerebral condition, in which the individual madly drinks to excess, yet may loathe the degrading stimulant. On the other hand, the desire for food may be distinctly lowered in intensity or even lost. This is called anorexia.
Dr. HOPPE, of Copenhagen, was the first to observe a gustatory centre and centre for the alimentive instinct in the brain. In 1823 (“Edinburgh Phrenological Journal,” vol. x.) he expressed the opinion that, besides the nerves of the stomach and palate, of which alone he conceived the sensations of hunger and thirst to be affections, there must be also a centre in the brain of animals for the instinct of nutrition for the preservation of life, which incites to the sensual enjoyments of the palate, and the activity of which is independent of hunger and thirst. In a second communication, in 1824, he gave the results of numerous observations, locating the centre of taste at the anterior extremity of the temporal lobe.

Dr. CROOK, of London, claimed that several years before the publication of Dr. Hoppe’s papers, he himself had arrived at similar conclusions with regard to this propensity and the position of its centre.

FERRIER has located the gustatory centre at the anterior tip of the temporal lobe, in close relation to the olfactory centre. He says:

“...It was noted in connection with electrical irritation of the lower extremity of the temporo-sphenoidal convolution in the monkey, and of the same region in the brain of the cat, that movements of the lips, tongue, cheek-pouches, and jaws were occasionally induced—phenomena which might be regarded as indications of the excitation of gustatory sensation. This interpretation receives support from the results of destructive lesions, and we have therefore reasonable ground for concluding that the gustatory centres are situated at the lower extremity of the temporo-sphenoidal lobes, in close relation with those of smell.” (“The Functions of the Brain,” London, 1876.)

Mr. STEPHEN PAGET read a paper some twenty years ago “On Cases of Voracious Hunger and Thirst from Injury or Disease of the Brain,” published in the “Transactions of the Clinical Society” of London, 1897, in which he quoted some ten cases, the lesion being in all at the anterior extremity of the temporo-sphenoidal lobe.

Voracious appetite or bulimia, according to this theory, should be due to irritation of a certain part—the anterior tip—of the temporal lobe. If so, we should expect to see a manifestation of it in the two derangements we have already described as being due to lesions of the temporal lobe, namely (1) in acute mania, and (2) in epilepsy. This is actually the case. Of the former, several cases have already been quoted, and some more will be given; and with reference to the latter, we may refer to Féré’s paper on “La Faim-Valle Epileptique” (“Revue de Médecine,” 1899).

Extraordinary Case of Voracious Appetite.

PERCY and LAURENT (“Dictionnaire des Sciences Médicales,” article “Homophaqe”) cite the case of a Frenchman, named Tarrare, who when a lad would eat all sorts of odd substances to satisfy his ravenous hunger, with the result that he was frequently seized with colic. No sooner relieved than he resumed his previous practice. At the age of seventeen, when he weighed one hundred pounds, he would consume twenty-five pounds of beef daily. When in the army he would often devour his comrades’ rations besides his own. When they guarded themselves, Tarrare was nearly famished, and had to go to the hospital. There they had to grant him a quadruple allowance, and yet he ate the refuse of the kitchen as well, and sometimes would swallow the poultices and anything else that came in his way. He was reported to have eaten dogs and cats, and once to have eaten the dinner of fifteen labourers. He was utilised by the officers of his regiment for comical adventures, but gradually the novelty wore off. He lived a little while on what food he could steal from poultry-yards and elsewhere, but in the end returned to the hospital. There he was discovered to have eaten the flesh of dead bodies, and when once the dead body of a little girl had mysteriously disappeared he was
suggested of it and dismissed from the hospital. He turned up again at the hospital of Versailles, where he died shortly afterwards of purulent diarrhoea, at the age of twenty-six.

Another Case of Voracious Appetite. ("Annales de la Médecine Physiologique," 1832):
A woman of the name of Denise furnished a curious example of insatiable appetite for food. In infancy she exhausted the milk of all her nurses, and ate four times more than other children of the same age. At school she devoured the bread of all the other scholars. And in the Salpêtrière Hospital it was found impossible to satisfy her habitual appetite with less than eight or ten pounds of bread daily. Nevertheless, she there experienced, two or three times a month, violent attacks of hunger, during which she devoured twenty-four pounds of bread. If, during her fits, any obstacle was opposed to the gratification of her imperious desire, she became so furious that she used to bite her clothes, and even her hands, and did not recover her reason till hunger was completely satisfied. On one occasion she drank the soup prepared for twenty persons and ate twelve pounds of bread. On another occasion she drank all the coffee prepared for seventy-five of her companions in the Salpêtrière. Post mortem, the anterior part of both temporal lobes were found abnormally developed.

Yet Another Case of Voracious Appetite.
J. B. F. DESCURET ("Lancet," 1836):
Patient, a woman, when at the Salpêtrière, ate the allowance of from fifteen to eighteen persons a day. When turned out of the hospital she seized every possible occasion for stealing bread and other food. At last she was compelled to retire into the country without resource, and there devoured every species of vegetable food which presented itself within her reach. But deprived of the faculty which herbivorous animals possess of distinguishing wholesome plants, she gorged injurious vegetable substances, and at last died from the effects of violent gastritis. The anterior tips of the temporo-sphenoidal lobes were found remarkably developed.

Voracious Appetite following Injury to Temporal Lobes ("Archives Générales de Médecine," 1860):
A man fell from a high scaffold, and was removed to hospital. He had a confused wound of the temple and hemorrhage from the left ear. When he recovered consciousness after five days he was agitated, and constantly asked for food and drink. He drank daily from seven to twelve pints. He would call at the top of his voice for food and drink, and on one occasion he drank twenty-four and a half pints in one day. After some weeks his thirst slowly abated, and he left the hospital, in good health, eight weeks after admission.

Another Case of Injury with Intense Thirst.
BAUDIN ("Revue Générales de Médecine," 1860):
A young man, age eighteen, working in a saw-mill, was struck with a piece of wood on the right temple, and was unconscious for some hours; then came violent headache, fever, shivering, and intense thirst. Two days later he was well enough to go back to work, but his thirst persisted, and three weeks later he came to the hospital, begging to get relief from it. He was in good general health, his appetite for solid food was not excessive, he complained of nothing but extreme thirst, drinking all day, and waking at night again and again to drink. On one occasion in twenty-four hours he drank no less than fifty-two and a half pints. His urine was almost pure water, and did not contain any trace of sugar. He was treated with large doses of valerian, and in three weeks his thirst had much abated, and was daily getting less.

Other Cases of Injury.
PUTAWSKI ("Lancet," 1890):
A young man fell out of a waggon and struck his head against a stone. He was
admitted to hospital, unconscious, and bleeding from left ear. The diagnosis was fracture of petrous portion of temporal bone. On the fifth day he regained consciousness, and at the same time became inordinately hungry. The usual diet wholly failed to satisfy him. He constantly complained of hunger, and even cried for food. Six pounds of bread daily, besides other articles of diet, were not enough for him. The bowels acted regularly. There was no excessive thirst. After ten weeks his appetite fell to normal.

HERMANN NOTHNAGEL ("Virchow's Archiv," 1887):

A man, age thirty-three, in consequence of a kick by a horse, fell and came down with his right ear against a piece of wood. He was stunned, and unable to rise. Half an hour later he felt great thirst, and drank more than five pints in the next three hours, before admission to hospital. He was still suffering from thirst a fortnight after the accident, when he left the hospital at his own request. Within three hours of the accident he drank five pints of fluid, next day twenty-one and a half pints, the day after thirty-two and a half pints, the seventh day twenty-eight pints, on the eleventh day thirty and a half pints. A few days later, when he left hospital, his average had fallen to nine pints. There was no dryness of the mouth or throat, and the skin acted freely. The urine was clear, acid, free from sugar and albumen.


A man, twenty-two years old, was struck with a hockey stick on the left temple, and was unconscious for about a quarter of an hour. About a month after the injury he began to have a voracious appetite for solid food. He would eat a whole chicken at one meal, and on one occasion ate twelve large slices of meat for lunch, besides vegetables, sweets, etc. He had no excess of thirst. This abnormal hunger lasted over a year, and the appetite had not yet quite become normal at the date of report.

Case of Temporal Abscess with Voracious Appetite.


Case of a boy, twelve years old, with an abscess in the left temporo-sphenoidal region. The patient was twice trephined. Three days after the first operation the notes say: "His appetite is remarkable; he begs for solid food, and says, 'I want to go home; they don't give me enough to eat here.'" Two days later the notes say, "Restless and noisy, appetite ravenous." At this time he had partial aphasia. He slowly recovered. Even when he was at his worst—delirious, lying in a state of stupor, or screaming wildly—he would eat and drink greedily, taking more food than any man in the ward, asking for more, and saying, "What's the good of that to me?"

Case of Temporal Softening with Insatiable Thirst.

WERNICKE and FRIEDLANDER ("Fortschritte der Medizin," 1883):

Patient was deaf, had epileptic convulsions, and suffered with thirst so excessively that she drank water by the bucket. Post mortem, there was gummatous softening of both temporo-sphenoidal lobes.

Other Cases of Temporal Tumours with Voracious Appetite.

N. FRIEDREICH, On Intra-Cranial Tumours, 1853.
CRICHTON-BROWNE, British Medical Journal, 1873.
S. W. D. WILLIAMS, Journal of Mental Science, 1869.

Other Examples of Temporal Lesions with Voracious Appetite.

H. SCHÜLE, Sectionsergebnisse bei Geisteskranken, 1874.
LANDERER and LUTZ, Christophsbad Asylum Report, 1878.
G. SPIES, Zur Casuistik der Traumatischen Manie, 1869.
OTHER PRIMARY MENTAL DISPOSITIONS

ROSENTHAL, Uber Magen Neurosen, 1886.
MONRO, Morbid Anatomy of the Stomach, etc.
BLENNIE, Dissertation sur l'Inflammation du Cerveau.
C. P. JOHNSON, American Journal of Insanity, 1858.
MORTIMER, Philosophical Transactions, vol. xiii.
KENNETH M'LEOD, Journal of Mental Science, 1861.
W. J. MICKLE, ibidem, 1885.
B. B. FOX, ibidem, 1891.
F. LALLEMAND, Récérecherches anat-path. sur l'Encéphale, 1830.
Sir THOMAS SMITH, Lancet, 1879; and another case, Clinical Society's
Transactions, 1897.
E. V. LEVINGE, British Medical Journal, 1878.
F. C. WALLIS, ibidem, 1897.
W. H. BENNETT, Clinical Society's Transactions, 1897.
W. S. COLEMAN, ibidem, 1897.
KINGSTON FOWLER, ibidem, 1897.

HOARDING PROPENSITY AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN

Love of possession is a natural disposition implanted in the human organisation. In order to preserve existence certain animals and man store up things for future use. The desire to acquire property varies in strength in different people; and, like other propensities, it is liable to become morbidly exaggerated to cupidity, greed, miserliness, and kleptomania. The hoarding instinct in man has become greatly changed through the substitution of money, and can be seen only, in its primitive form, in those in whom the intellect is undeveloped—i.e., in infants, idiots, and imbeciles, or where the intellect and the moral sense are in temporary abeyance, as in insanity.

The impulse to acquire and hoard—kleptomania—is of most frequent occurrence in the weak-minded, who steal without reflection and merely to satisfy their animal instinct. They will purloin whatever takes their fancy. Sometimes they display a considerable amount of ingenuity and low cunning in their methods of procedure. Acts of stealing occur also in the initiatory stages of general paralysis and sometimes in the later stages as well. The patients steal under the delusion that everything they see belongs to them. They appropriate all sorts of articles, hoard and conceal them, and immediately afterwards lose all recollection of them. Theft may also be the unconscious act of an epileptic. Cases of pure kleptomania, not complicated with any other disorder, occur more in private than in asylum practice, hence there are few cases officially recorded where a post-mortem examination has been undertaken to determine the seat of the lesion. According to the evidence about to be cited, the probable seat of the lesion seems to be the upper anterior part of the temporal lobe. But it has to be admitted that the evidence is so meagre, that the localisation must be considered highly problematical.

Morbid Love of Hoarding arising from an Injury to the Head.

CESARE LOMBROSO ("Archivio di Psichiatria," 1882):
The patient, age sixty-four, a rich citizen, was renowned for his sordid avarice. He was found to have an immense inclination to theft. He kept a set of burglary instruments, by means of which he robbed not only his servants, whom he frequently changed, but the guest whom he invited to his house and entertained there. The proceeds of his robberies he sold. This man fell, when a boy eight years of age, from a height on to a stove, and injured his left temple. He lost his left eye through the accident, and the temple bulged for ever afterwards. Lombroso held that this injury had caused changes in the brain which produced the morbid inclination. Here would have been a case for the surgeon.
THE MENTAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN

A Medico-Legal Case.

L., age thirty-four, was wounded in the left temple in the war of 1870. The wound healed only after a year. There was a depression in the bone to which the superficial tissues were adherent, which became tender on pressure and in changes of weather. Patient, who was previously mentally sound and honest, had a delusion that everything he saw belonged to him. He had been sentenced eleven times before for appropriating other people's goods. On the twelfth occasion he was sent to the asylum for observation, where paroxysms of irascibility were noticed, which were accompanied by the delusion that everything he saw belonged to him. Acting on this delusion, he kept other people's property, and hence the numerous committals for embezzlement. He was declared not guilty, as suffering from kleptomania.

A Case with a Post Mortem.

LUDWIG MEYER ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1872):
Wilhelm H., a stonemason, age thirty-three, overworked himself, being anxious, as he said, to save some money for his children. One day, after a prolonged exposure to the sun's heat, he fainted and afterwards became irascible. Simultaneously he developed a delusion that he might starve, and to save himself he often asked excessive wages for his work, but inasmuch as the results of his work only deteriorated, he was discharged. He then went out thieving. For some days he stole loads of fish, at other times cartloads of wood. At the institution he loved playing at cards, but was only pleased when he could win. He died of an apoplectic stroke. Post mortem, a cyst was found in the anterior part of the left temporal lobe.

Head Injury leading to Kleptomania.

R. v. KRAFFT-EBING ("Über die durch Gehirnerschütterung und Kopfverletzung hervorgerufenen psychischen Krankheiten," 1868) gives a number of such cases, of which the following is an example:
C. D., age thirty-nine, labourer, single, hitherto healthy, who had fallen over a staircase and had knocked his head on the right temple so hard that he remained unconscious for some time. Apart from the local swelling, there were no signs or symptoms, and patient quickly recovered. Soon, however, he developed two morbid tendencies, for which he was sent to the asylum two years after—kleptomania and voraciousness. He could not distinguish what was his own and what was other people's property. He showed some maniacal excitement occasionally only; as a rule he was quiet. The kleptomania continued up to his death, four years after the accident.

WM. JULIUS MICKLE ("Journal of Mental Science," 1885):
J. W. T., age forty-seven, married, had sustained a very severe blow on the head from a stone nearly two years previous to admission. The place struck was in front and slightly above the left ear. Patient became subject to delusions about money, and would secretly rifling objects about the house and fill his pockets with coke. Post mortem was found decortication and adhesion of the left temporal lobe.

Other Examples:

KENNETH M'LEOD, two cases. Journal of Mental Science, 1861.
J. CHRISTIAN, Archives de Neurologie, 1880.
Sir THOMAS SMITH, Lancet, 1879.
E. KLEBS, Vierteljahrschrift f. prakt. Heilkunde, 1887.
A. SPANBOCK, Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1895.
PAUL GUDER, Geistessäkuren nach Kopfverletz., 1896.
CLOVIS GALLOPIN, Annales Médico-Psychologiques, 1879.
OTHER PRIMARY MENTAL DISPOSITIONS

H. KURELLA, ibidem, 1895.

THE AFFECTIONS AND THEIR CEREBRAL ORIGIN

The mental functions of the occipital lobes are still unknown; nor can we throw much light on them. But from anthropological and clinical observations it would seem that they are related to the gregarious instinct, i.e., with the affections. A psychical symptom of the softening of the occipital convolutions that follows haemorrhage is emotionalism, or loss of inhibitory power over muscles that express the aff ective states. Women, speaking generally, are (or used to be) more emotional and less intellectual than men. In harmony with this statement is the observation that women have more brain than men posterior to the great central fissure, and less anterior to it.

HERMANN WELCKER (1822-1897) found seventy-three per cent. of female skulls dolichocephalic (long-headed).

RICHTER ("Virchow's Archiv," vol. cxxviii.) and BROCA confirmed the results of Welcker. According to them, it would appear that the greater length of the female head, as compared with that of the male, is due to the additional occipital length.

D. J. CUNNINGHAM (1850-1909), according to Havelock Ellis, assigns to women a longer occipital lobe. Husckhe found the same. Dr. A. WEISBACH, in his book "Der deutsche Weberschädel," also certifies to the larger occiput of women as compared with men.

CESARE LOMBROSO (1835-1909) found in female criminals a short occiput, hence brachycephalic heads, and a complete absence of affection, though their libido sexualis is increased.

PAUL NATCHE ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1893), too, examined the brains of female criminals, and found that those committed for murder had a deficient occipital lobe. In the others—thieves, etc.—the occipital lobes were of normal size.

MORITZ BENEDICT (1835-1920) has described the brains of three murderers in whom the occipital lobes were short and did not cover the cerebellum.

DAVID FERRIER observed "that the only effect after extensive destruction of these lobes on both sides in a monkey was a remarkable state of depression with refusal of food." Sensation and voluntary motion were unaffected.

HERMANN MUNK says of a dog whose posterior lobes he destroyed: "The sight of men whom he used to greet joyfully now leaves him cold, and even the company of dogs with whom he used to play leaves him unmoved." Thus showing destruction of the gregarious instinct which gives social affection.

JACQUES LOEB found that after destruction of the most posterior part of the brain (occipital region) of a bitch, it lost its parental attachment and neglected its puppies directly after delivery.

Monkeys, of all animals, are the first to possess distinct occipital convolutions; and they are considerably larger in the female than in the male, so that it is easy to distinguish the sexes by the appearance of their brains. The female monkey, too, shows as great, if not greater, attachment to its offspring than most animals, and orphan monkeys, according to Brehm, are always adopted and carefully guarded.

All that is positively known about the functions of the occipital lobes is that the calcarine region is related to the sense of sight. This relationship was known to EMIL HUSCHKE (1797-1858), who wrote:

"The posterior lobes are no doubt in ultimate relation with the emotional life and the sense of sight. No other sense organ has such an intimate connection with the tender feelings and grief as that of the nerve of sight, the fibres of which can be traced to the convolutions of the posterior lobes. Apart from the mimicry of
the eye, in which all affections are most vividly reflected, weeping is the best of all
proofs."

With reference to clinical histories, there is this difficulty, that occipital lesions
are very difficult to isolate. They involve nearly always the parietal or parieto-
temporal convolutions. Nor has any attempt ever been made to differentiate the
mental characteristics of occipital lesions. Therefore the cases about to be quoted
are nothing more than very vague indications of possible functions of this part of
the brain. Any serious inquiry would have to start without any preconception
whatsoever.

EXAMPLES OF LESIONS OF OCCIPITAL LOBES

T. M. T. MacKENNA (Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1908) :
Tumour—Jealousy, delusions of unfaithfulness.
WILLIAM BOYD (Journal of Mental Science, 1873) :
Tumour—Insane with jealousy.
T. S. CLOUSTON (ibidem, 1872) :
Tumour—Loss of affection for wife and family.
JANY (Centralblatt f. Augenheilkunde, 1882) :
Tumour—Excess of grief, weeping.
Sir DAVID FERRIER (West Riding Lunatic Asylum Medical Reports, 1874) :
Softening—Excessive cruelty to children.
W. CHARLES HOOD (Journal of Physiol. Medicine, vol. xi.) :
Serous infiltration—Infanticide.
ERNEST BISCHOFF (Archiv f. Psychiatrie, Berlin, 1899) :
Atrophy—Loss of recognition of children.
H. SCHÜLE (Sectionserhebungen bei Geisteskrankheiten, 1874) :
Yellow infiltration—Insane grief at loss of child.
O. HOTZEN (Vierteljahrschrift f. Ger. Medizin) :
Arrested development, cerebellum uncovered—Matricide.
G. H. BERGMANN (Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie, vol. iii.) :
Prominent occipital lobes, fully one inch projecting beyond cerebellum—Insane
with thoughts of love.
The SAME AUTHOR (ibidem), a second identical case.
CESARE LOMBROSO (The Criminal) :
Osteophites in middle fossae, arrested development of occipital lobes—Strocco,
age sixteen, killed father, brother, and made an attempt to poison mother.
CHARLES PHELPS (Traumatic Injuries, 1898) :
Injury to occiput—Delusions of death of wife and child.
S. V. CLEVENGER (Alienist and Neurologist, 1888) :
Injury to occiput—Hallucinations of being with friends.

CHATELIN and de MARTEL (op. cit.) observe that "nothing is known of the
functions of the external convolutions" of the occipital lobe; only the visual area
in the region of the calcarine fissure is admitted.

THE SEXUAL PROPENSITY AND ITS CEREBRAL ORIGIN

The sexual propensity has a spinal centre and a cerebral centre. As regards the
situation of the former in the lumbar enlargement of the spinal cord all physiologists
are agreed. As regards the latter, modern opinion is divided, some favouring the
pineal gland, others the hypophysis cerebri. But according to the very latest
observations, such bodily glands as the thyroid, thymus, and suprarenal appear to
be involved.

The pineal gland (a structure at the base of the brain) seems to undergo some
involution in adult life, the process apparently starting at about the seventh year;
but even in the aged it appears to perform some function, and not to be merely a
surviving remnant like the remains of the thymus. Clinical research has been devoted chiefly to tumours of this structure. Of these, approximately ten per cent. have exhibited symptoms of nutritional change, the most typical being precocity of the genital apparatus (but only in boys, not in girls) and also to some extent of the mental powers, and marked adiposity (RAYMOND and CLAUDE, "Bulletin de l'Académie de Médecine," 1910). The former is held to be associated with defect of the pineal secretion, the latter with excess of it, while total absence may give rise to a peculiar form of cachexia.

The pituitary body, or hypophysis cerebri, is considered the cerebral sexual centre by others. (See ARTHUR MUNZER, "Berliner Klinische Wochenschrift," 1911.) According to AXENFELD ("Neurologisches Centralblatt," 1903), tumours of the base of the brain, especially those which involve this structure, are most commonly productive of cessation of menstruation. Persons suffering from acromegaly, due to tumours of the hypophysis, are said to have complete amenorrhoea as one of its first symptoms. HARVEY CUSHING, of John Hopkins University ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1906), called attention to cases in which tumours affecting the hypophysis were complicated not only by optic atrophy, but also by sexual infantilism, this latter condition involving complete absence of menstruation.

There seems to be some antagonism between the pineal and the pituitary bodies, as removal of the testicles is said to lead to atrophy of the pineal and to hypertrophy of the pituitary.

In the opinion of others, not only pituitary insufficiency, but also insufficiency of the thyroid secretion may cause the genital organs to remain infantile, and disease of these structures may cause retrogression in the genitalia even after they have functioned normally. Removal of the thyroid is said to produce an intense degree of atrophy in the uterus. The ovaries, however, do not retrogress; on the contrary, there appears to be increased activity.

The thymus gland is also mentioned in connection with this function, removal of the ovaries leading to its hypertrophy.

According to the most recent investigation, yet another bodily structure appears to be involved. It is claimed that suprarenal tumours in male children are practically always associated with precocity of the sexual organs and secondary sexual characteristics; whereas the sequence in female children is not precocity of the sexual organs, but a tendency to produce the characteristics of the male in the sexual organs, together with a deep voice.

The evidence in favour of these structures, cerebral and bodily, is, however, poor compared with the evidence which Gall produced for his cerebellum theory, and which has greatly increased in the course of a century. But, it will be said at once, "Surely you do not intend to revive that long-discredited theory of Gall? Scientific opinion is absolutely agreed that it is utter nonsense." I am fully aware that the mind of physiologists and neurologists is made up on this question. They have given their verdict. But I am also aware, by the abuse that is heaped upon Gall, that his evidence has never been read, and that no attention has been paid to the extraordinary number of clinical cases which favour his theory, and these I propose to quote for whatever they are worth. For the present I would ask the scientific expert to be indulgent, and let me restate the whole problem, not with a view to prove Gall's conception of it, but to enable future investigators to discover what is the cerebral seat of this fundamental propensity.

Before doing so, let me remind the expert that the thyroid secretion has a marked influence on the intellectual and emotional manifestations; yet he would not dream of locating these in the thyroid gland. Similarly the structures mentioned may influence the sexual organs, and yet not be the seat of the sexual propensity.
At the outset, it has to be remembered that Gall was the first to describe the structure of the cerebellum, so that there can be no question of his qualification as an anatomist.

Next, it has to be pointed out that all investigators have proceeded on the false assumption that Gall located in the cerebellum the sexual potency; but he did nothing of the kind. Gall did not say that every vital function concerned in propagation depends immediately upon the cerebellum, but that the idea or feeling which prompts to the generative act is organically dependent upon it. He located only the sentiment which involves consciousness in the cerebellum. The second factor in the process, the reflex action, must take place through the agency of the appropriate segment of the spinal cord, namely the lumbar enlargement. And the last factor in the process—the secretion—may occur through the sexual organs. Therefore, to do Gall justice, we must observe whether changes in the thymus, thyroid, pineal, pituitary, or suprarenal glands affect the libido, i.e., the psychical sexual condition.

Gall located only the libido sexualis in the cerebellum, not the potentia coeundi; and he did not locate the libido in the central portion of the cerebellum, but in the lateral lobes, of the functions of which—to this day—we know nothing. The lateral lobes of the cerebellum are situated in the occipital fossæ, externally visible in an arch between the occipital protuberance and the mastoid processes behind the ears. The greater the size of the cerebellum, the deeper the fossæ, and the more prominent these arches, the larger the surface for attachment of the muscles, making the nape of the neck rounded, large and thick. When the lateral lobes are small, the distance between the two mastoid processes is narrow; the ears lie close together, and the nape of the neck is flat and depressed.

But, of course, the size of the cerebellum must be calculated in relation to the size of the entire brain. Taken in such relation, the cerebellum in infants up to the age of puberty is small. In the human race the cerebellum is a sixteenth to a twenty-fifth part of the whole brain at birth; but after puberty the ratio between cerebellum and cerebrum is as 1:6 or 1:7. Gall thought this was due to the development of the sexual passion, and I am not aware that any other explanation has ever been offered.

Both Meynert and Notthnagel ("Centralblatt f. Nervenheilkunde," 1878) have observed that the cerebellum increases in size accordingly as one ascends the scale of life; and even when the cerebrum has reached its absolutely highest weight, the cerebellum continues to grow, and represents most definitely the scale of rising and declining manhood. Why is this?

According to Gall, the cerebellum is relatively largest in man, whose sexual activity is not, as in the case of animals, confined to the heat periods. He claimed to have observed that castration in early infancy prevents its full development; and that frequently the cerebellum is of excessive size in offenders against morality, and there is turgescence or disease in persons suffering from satyriasis or nymphomania. He even went so far as to assert that removal of one testicle not infrequently diminishes the size of the cerebellar lobe on the opposite side.

Reichhardt ("Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie," 1906) declares this latter statement as "undeniable nonsense." He bases this very strong opinion on three cases he had observed. The first was that of a general paralytic, seventy years old, who had one testicle crushed by a waggon that went over it; the second, a man, fifty-seven years of age, also lost a testicle through an accident; and the third was a cretin, thirty years of age. Surely, these are not suitable cases for an investigation, neglecting the most primary precaution that the subject should not suffer from any other disease.
Gall further showed that when the cerebellum is inordinately developed at an early period there is precocious manifestation. He gave other cases to show the effect of emasculation on male children. If mutilated in infancy, there is no desire; if mutilated after puberty, or at that period, the desire remains, but is feeble.

Gall performed numerous dissections and experiments on animals, the results of which supported his theory. I must leave it to the expert to examine this mass of evidence. Here I can mention only a few facts. He observed an increased turgescence of the cerebellum in animals killed at the moment of heat as compared to the cerebellum of animals destroyed in another season. The emasculation of the males of our domestic quadrupeds at an early period of life is stated to prevent the development of the cerebellum. Hence the smallness of the neck of the castrated horse, ox, sheep, and hog compared to that of the uncastrated one. And those that are castrated soon after birth have no sexual propensity. But in those castrated after maturity some share of the propensity remains, although the power of performance is taken away. And in these the cerebellum is diminished in size after castration, but never becomes so small as it would have been had they been castrated at an early period. Emasculature affects materially no other portion of the brain but the cerebellum.

The effects of early and late castration on the potency of men were known to the ancients. For this reason Roman women deferred the period of castration until their slaves had passed the age of puberty, and were thus able to satisfy their passions without danger. "Sunt quas eunuchi imbelles, ac mollia semper oscula delectant, et desperatio barbas, et quod abortivo non opus est," etc.—Juvenal, Sat. vi.

Gall and his followers furnished a number of pathological observations of lesions of the cerebellum, especially of injuries, and showed that when the cerebellum is concussed or atrophies, the libido is extinguished; when the injury inflames the cerebellum, the libido is rendered more intense. Still, it must be admitted that Gall made most of his observations on the living subject, judging the size of the cerebellum by the size of the nape of the neck. Therefore, even if Gall was correct in his observation, he may have been wrong in his inference. A large nape of the neck may mean a large occiput, but it does not necessarily mean a large cerebellum. The nape of the neck may be large in consequence of the development of the undersurface of the occipital lobes, and only in a minor degree, if at all, indicate the size of the cerebellum.

That a large nape of the neck indicates an active sexual propensity can be verified by observations both on men and animals. I believe agriculturists are well aware of it. In this connection I may relate the visit of the celebrated Dr. FÉLIX VOISIN to Toulon Prison to study the heads of men confined for crimes on women. He was expected to select them out of 372 prisoners of all sorts. He chose 22 individuals, and did not look at the rest. Thirteen of these had actually been condemned for rape; the other nine were committed for other crimes, but were under special surveillance for sexual proclivities. ("De l'Homme Animal," Paris, 1839.)

In the course of my medical practice, a number of children have been brought before me, both boys and girls, some as young as four years of age, manifesting sexual precocity. In all of them I have found a very large occiput, ordinary in length, i.e., not elongated, but extraordinary in width at the nape of the neck from ear to ear. I have observed the same formation in adults for whom the opposite sex had an excessive attraction, amounting in some to a mental obsession. This peculiarity is particularly noticeable in old men who have not given up courting. Maybe that this particular observation, which can be easily verified, is of no more than physiognomical significance; but I mention it as confirming Gall's view.
HENRY HEAD ("Brain," 1894) finds that the pain and tenderness in diseases of the ovaries or testes is referred to the occiput.

The nape of the neck covers the cervical vertebrae, and it is a common observation that injury to these may cause priapism. MARSHALL HALL ("Lancet," 1838) wrote: "I have never met with any case in which priapism took place, except when the cervical spine was the seat of injury. Whenever the cervical vertebrae have been injured priapism has almost invariably occurred immediately after the injury." This is known to those who have observed "hanging by the neck."

T. SYMES PRIDEAUX wrote: "The convexity of the lower fossæ of the occipital bone and their protrusion backwards and downwards really have a connection with the strength of the sexual feeling; but then these conditions are principally due to the development of the under surface of the posterior lobe of the cerebrum, and but in a minor degree to the size of the cerebellum."

That the ancients observed the size of the nape of the neck appears from their nuptial ceremonial. It was customary to measure the neck of the virgin previous to the wedding, and again on the following day, and if it had increased it was a sign that marital relations had taken place. This curious test, which has also been utilised to establish the fact of adultery, has been transmitted to us in the Epithalamium of CATULLUS:

"Non illam nutrix orienti, lux revisens,  
Hesterno collum potuit circumdare filo."

Apollonius of Rhodes, speaking of the passionate love of Medea, says: "The fire which devours her attacks all her nerves and makes itself felt behind the head in that spot where pain is most poignant when an extreme fervour seizes all the senses." Of olden time, artists depicted broad necks for sensual people.

Since Gall's time numerous experiments have been performed on animals, all apparently disproving his theory, and their authors vie with each other in heaping contumely on poor Gall, that "idiot," in the opinion of KONRAD RIEGER. Still I ask the expert to read these pages patiently to the finish. If his mind is not already made up, he may learn something that may prove of advantage to him in attempting to solve the problem. Remembering Flourens' experiments, which delayed the recognition of the localisation theory for half a century, would it not be wise to reserve judgment until we have a larger store of facts from which to draw our deductions?

From the history of the numerous investigations into the functions of the cerebellum which are about to be given, it will be seen that most authors are agreed that this structure is the centre of co-ordination and preservation of the equilibrium of the body. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility of its being the centre of the libido as well. But regarded purely as a regulator for movement, why does it develop so late in children? Co-ordination and equilibrium are established before puberty. Why does the cerebellum bear no relation to the locomotor capacities of animals? Why is manual dexterity not affected by a lesion of the cerebellum?

It will be seen that some physiologists are against Gall's theory, because faradisation of the cerebellum failed to excite the sexual organs. But Gall did not locate the potentia there, but merely the desire. We might as well expect that faradisation of the left third frontal convolution—the speech centre—should make a man talk. We do not excite the stomach by exciting the gustatory centre.

The great majority of the physiologists are sure of the utter worthlessness of Gall's view because destruction of the cerebellum not only keeps the sexual instinct intact, but seems to excite it. Now, destruction, especially by slow ablation, is bound to act as an irritant, and, secondly, the destruction is probably hardly ever
complete, for as RISIEN RUSSELL ("Philosophical Transactions," 1894) has pointed out, as the result of his experimental researches into the functions of the cerebellum, the destruction of the entire organ is a surgical interference of such magnitude that nearly all the animals experimented on succumb to the immediate consequences of the operation. Even were sexual potency—and not the libido—located in the cerebellum, it would be no more surprising that destruction of this organ shows no loss of the particular function, than that movements are preserved after the entire cerebral motor area has been removed.

Gall’s follower, BOUILLAUD (1796-1881), "Archives Générales de Médecine" (1827), did not accept the localisation. He thought the sexual instinct was located in the medulla.

THOMAS WILLIS (1622-1675) held the cerebellum to be the source of all involuntary movements, especially of respiration, heart, and bowels.

LUIGI ROLANDO (1773-1831), as a result of his experiments, regarded the cerebellum as the central source of all voluntary movements.

F. MAGENDIE (1783-1855), "Lectures on the Physiology of the Nervous System," noticed the extreme difficulty of making a conclusive experiment on the cerebellum, and thought it the seat of a propensity to move "forwards," opposed by a propensity to move "backwards," with its seat in the corpora striata. Still, he acknowledged that he was struck to find so many cases of high irritation of the genital apparatus coinciding with atrophy or more or less destruction of the cerebellum.

JULIUS BUDGE ("Researches of the Nervous System," Frankfort, 1841), VALENTIN, HAMMOND, and SPIEGELBERG saw in the cerebellum an apparatus for the inhibition of motion, and observed after stimulation movements of the uterus and testicles.

J. P. FLOARENS (1794-1867) stated that on removing the first layers of the cerebellum in the pigeon or guinea-pig, for instance, weakness and hesitation in walking were produced. When the middle layers were cut out, the animal staggered much, but heard and saw perfectly, and did not express pain. When the whole cerebellum was removed, an inability to fly, walk, or run took place, and the animal lay down; whence he inferred that the cerebellum is the organ by which all the locomotive actions are regulated.

F. LEURET (1797-1851), "Anatomie Comparée du Système Nerveux," 1839, made many investigations to disprove Gall’s theory, that castration before puberty causes arrest of development of the cerebellum. He weighed the organ, whereas Gall measured its size. Now, it is quite possible that the size of a cerebral organ may diminish without its weight diminishing; the size may even diminish and the weight increase, as in sclerosis. Leuret thus found the cerebellum in castrated horses rather heavier in weight than normal ones. On the other hand, HUSCHKE ("Schädel, Hirn u. Seele," Jena, 1854) contradicts Leuret, and says that castration in animals has very detrimental effects on the occipital brain (cerebellum,pons, and medulla), which assumes infantile appearance.

Sir DAVID FERRIER ("The Functions of the Brain," London, 1876) considers the cerebellum an organ of "equilibration." He thinks that after destruction of the cerebellum the animal has still sexual desires, but fails to execute them on account of its defective control over its limbs, so that it must be put in the necessary position. Nor will the animal seek gratification voluntarily. Still, Ferrier does not seem opposed to Gall’s view, for he says ("Functions of the Brain," p. 432): "As morbid irritation of the sexual organs may excite a morbid sexual appetite, so, conversely, the sexual appetite may be morbidly excited by pathological irritation of the cerebral paths and the cerebral centres of the sensations connected with the exercise of the generative functions. To the former belong the satyriasis or nymphomania occasionally observed in connection with disease of the middle lobe of the cerebellum; to the latter the various morbid exhibitions of the sexual appetite in insanity where the centres are functionally or organically diseased." On p. 123 he explains, however, that "disease of the median lobe of the cerebellum has been found to co-exist with priapism, or excitement of the generative organs," but that
such a condition of things is eminently calculated to cause irritation of the subjacent posterior surface of the medulla oblongata and pons."

Sir VICTOR HORSLEY (1857-1916) has shown by his experiments that, unless the cerebellum is intact, running, walking, and even standing, are impossible. The automatic function of standing involves extension, of which the newly-born of most mammals are incapable. But standing does not depend entirely on the cerebellum. There are other centres concerned in this. The cerebellum is not even the centre for equilibration. This is in the labyrinth and semi-circular canals of the ear. The tendency in cerebellar disease to incline the head to the side of the lesion is, I believe, due to lesions of the labyrinth. It is the middle portion of the cerebellum—the vermis—only which is connected with disturbances of movement; the functions of the lateral lobes are still unknown.

According to W. WUNDT (1832-1920), "the cerebellum appears to be intended for the direct regulation of voluntary movements by sense impressions. . . . If this hypothesis be correct, it will, accordingly, be the central organ in which the bodily movements incited from the cerebrum are brought into harmony with the position of the animal body in space."

F. L. GOLTZ (1834-1902) destroyed the middle lobe of the cerebellum, and found the sexual functions still intact. This is quite natural, for lesions of the middle lobe were known to Gall to cause inco-ordination of movement. Goltz did not destroy the lateral lobes, and his experiment diminishes in value in the face of another which he performed, dividing the spinal cord in the lumbar region opposite the first lumbar vertebra, when the function, as he says, was also still preserved. This agrees with the observation of W. B. CARPENTER (1813-1885), who performed the same experiment of section of the lumbar cord. Clinical observation, however, has shown opposite results. In transverse lesions of the lumbar region of the cord, impotency is common.

LUIGI LUCIANI (1842-1919), "Il Cerveletto," extirpated one half of the cerebellum in bitches. The animals manifested "heat" at the usual period, though the act could not be effected owing to motor instability. Why should they not manifest heat if the lumbar centres were intact? He also deprived a dog of the entire cerebellum, and the mutilated male and female animals exhibited such sexual eagerness "that my laboratory seemed to be transformed into a lying-in hospital." The possibility that the mutilation set up inflammation, which acted as an irritant, occurred to Luciani, only that he thinks that owing to destruction of the cerebellum "some inhibitory factor had dropped out, causing an abandonment to fleshly lusts." This agrees with CARL OTTO (1795-1879), who regarded the cerebellum as an inhibitory apparatus for the sexual instinct. ("Centralblatt f. Nervenheilkunde," 1877.)

According to Luciani, after cerebellar lesions, the movements lack their normal energy, the tonus of the muscles is lowered, and the movements are uncertain and incoherent. He is inclined to regard the cerebellum as primarily an apparatus for the production of nervous force, an "auxiliary" or "intensificatory system" for the whole cerebral-spinal organ, which is not the seat of any specific or peculiar functions, but reinforces the functional activity of the entire nervous system. In support of this view, he addsuces the trophic disturbances that appear, in course of time, more especially after complete extirpation of the cerebellum.

PH. LUSSANA (1820-1898), "Fisiologia a Patologia del Cerveletto," Verona-Padua, 1885, thought the observations of cerebellar lesions have not been conducted with sufficient care, and cited thirty-five cases with affection of sexual "sensation" (senso specifico venereo). The sexual propensity (instincto venereo) which gives the impulse to seek connection he located in the cerebrum. The abuse of the sexual instinct he believed to produce a particular form of vertig. ataxy. It has an effect on the co-ordination of movement. The effect of over-indulgence must be studied pathologically and cannot be determined by experiment.

As is well known, in the initial stages of locomotor ataxia there is frequently a hyperactivity of the sexual instinct, which afterwards becomes extinguished. We might therefore expect, in addition to the spinal lesion, changes in the cerebellum. These morbid changes in the cerebellum of ataxic patients have been described by ERNST JENDRASSIK ("Deutsches Archiv f. Klinische Medizin," 1888). He
gives illustrations of the atrophy of the cells. Anæsthesia and analgesia of the genitals was found by Fournier, G. E. Rivière (Bordeaux), Émile Biot and Jean Sarrazaës ("Revue de Médecine," 1891), and Marinesco ("La Semaine Médicale," 1897).

It is also known that sexual excess is a common symptom in the early stages of general paralysis (Voisin drew attention to the fact), and J. Luys ("Récherches sur le Système Nerveux Cérébro-Spinal") states that in all the autopsies of cases of general paralysis which he had made he had found the grey substance of the cerebellum to be diseased in a more advanced degree than the cerebral convolutions. Adolf Meyer ("Archiv f. Psychiatrie," 1889) showed atrophy of the cerebellum in general paralysis, in the form of a sclerosis.

Jellinek described the microscopical appearances of atrophy of the cerebellum in Tabes Dorsalis.

William P. Krohn ("Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease," 1892) observed sexual incompetency and ataxy in a cat whose cerebellum was subsequently found uniformly atrophied. A minute histological description was given.


F. Courmoul ("Le Cervelet et ses Fonctions," Paris, 1891) regarded the cerebellum as a psychic and sensitive organ.

André Thomas ("Le Cervelet," Paris, 1897) regarded it as an organ of sensation. The sensation of the generative organs is lost in lesions of the cerebellum.

Sir James Brighton-Browne ("West Riding Lunatic Asylum Medical Reports," vol. ii.) said:

"The exact functions of so large and important an organ as the cerebellum are still undecided, but most authorities incline to the belief that it is in some way connected with the genital system, and is the seat either as a whole or in part of the sexual instinct or of the sexual sensation. When so accomplished a physiologist as Dr. Carpenter, who will certainly not be suspected of any phrenological bias, is found supporting the latter view, and when Brown-Séquard is found corroborating it, and attributing to irritation of the cerebellum an exaggeration of the sexual desires, there can be little hesitation in accepting it as true in the main, but as subject to qualification hereafter in accordance with the increased accuracy of our knowledge of the nervous centres. The effects of injuries in the region of the cerebellum are strongly confirmatory of the opinion that it is in intimate relation with the sexual appetite and apparatus."

Gesare Lombroso (1835-1909), in his work, "The Female Offender," said that "female criminals who have a large cerebellar development have no chastity."

Enrico Rossi ("Il Manicomio Moderno," 1891) opposed Longet's and Luciani's views and regarded the cerebellum as the organ of the sexual instinct.

Henry Power ("Human Physiology," London, 1881) and Austin Flint ("The Physiology of Man," New York, 1873), also support the cerebellar theory. The former quotes Brown-Séquard and also Carpenter, who published seven clinical cases of cerebellar lesions in sexual cases.

R. Jameson ("Journal of Mental Science," vol. xxii.) located the amative propensity in the cerebellum and considered deficiency in its size a cause of anaphrodisia.

Chatein and de Marotel (op. cit.) say with reference to the cerebellum that "it would be of little use to recount in detail the complicated history of the almost useless experiments on animals carried out in former days." They rely on Barany's clinical researches, which appear to prove in the cerebellar cortex (four) centres of muscular tonicity, which furnish the groups of muscles of the various joints and maintain their attitude in repose by balancing the antagonistic muscles.

I shall now produce an extraordinary number of clinical cases—extraordinary in view of the fact that the sexual function is so seldom inquired into in cases of cerebral lesions, and that the cerebellum is so seldom examined at autopsies. All, we know of the functions of the cerebellum is that the central portion has to do with inco-ordination (cerebellar ataxy), and that extensive and even gross destruction of the lateral lobes may take place without producing any obvious symptom. We have
shown that physiologists ascribe to the cerebellum no mental function whatsoever, and that they consider as exploded the antiquated theory of its relation to libido sexualis.

But that there is, in addition to the subsidiary lumbar centre, such a centre somewhere in the brain—and probably adjoined to the cerebellum, if not in the cerebellum itself—can no longer be doubted. For this reason I have reproduced the clinical histories which favour this theory, and we may hope that some investigator may sooner or later discover the actual localisation of this—one of the most primary propensities. I need only add that, with the exception of Gall's contemporaries, the authors mentioned in the succeeding pages had no theory to sustain. They faithfully reported the cases they had witnessed.

The cerebellum receives little or no attention in normal people. Almost all the cases of arrested development which have been recorded have been observed in idiots and imbeciles. Not only is there arrested development of the cerebellum, but the genital organs are also frequently undeveloped. Félix Voisin (1794-1872) noticed this in 150 idiots and imbecile girls at the Salpêtrière; and Bourneville and Sollier ("Le Progrès Médicale," 1888) found 55.4 per cent. of idiots under thirteen years of age with anomalies of the sexual organs.

Gall, as already mentioned, cited numerous clinical examples.

Baron Larrey (1766-1842), Napoleon's military surgeon-in-chief, in his book on "Observations on Wounds," quoted quite a number of cases of his own experience. E. R. A. Serres (1787-1868), "Journal de Physiologie," Paris, 1822, who was physician to the Hôpital de la Pitié at Paris, and whose hostility to Gall is scarcely less known than his anatomical researches, claimed to have found undeniable evidence of the sexual functions of the cerebellum. He published a number of cases of cerebellar apoplexy which had come under his notice, and which all occurred in persons while they had abandoned themselves to venereal excesses, and in all of them he found an inflamed state of the cerebellum. Why is there no surgeon at the present day who will test the validity of this evidence? We read now and then of such cases, but never that the cerebellum has been examined. The fact is, men only look where they expect to see something; and since "their mind is made up" that there can be no cerebellar lesion, they do not look for it. But, even if they merely disproved Gall's theory, their evidence would be of value.

G. Andral (1797-1876) and P. S. Ségalas (1792-1875) cited a number of examples.

Combette ("Revue Médicale," 1834) also quoted in Lquete's "Anatomie et Physiologie du Système Nerveux," 1842) published the well-known case of the girl Alexadrine Labrosse, addicted to perversion from infancy, who was found, on post-mortem examination, to have no cerebellum, owing to atrophy. She could coordinate all the limbs voluntarily, and had the full use of all the senses. She was, however, subject to falling, and spoke imperfectly.

Sir Alexander Morison (1779-1866), in his "Lectures on Insanity" (1848), published several cases, of which the following is an example:

Robert S., imprisoned in Horsemonger Lane Gaol for attempting to gratify his unnatural propensities, which he indulged in from his early youth and for which he had been sentenced on three previous occasions, was found, post mortem, to have a large ulcer in the cerebellum.

C. F. Burdach (1776-1847), the celebrated physiologist, produced also in his book, "Vom Bau und Leben des Gehirns," quite a number of such cases.

John Epps (1805-1869), "Lancet," 1828, brought before the Westminster Medical Society two cases, one of nymphomania, one of satyriasis, both suffering from extensive disease of the cerebellum.


W. B. Carpenter (1831-1885), in his "Human Physiology" (1881), as already mentioned, published seven cases.


Ph. Lussana (1820-1898), in his "Fisiologia e Patologia del Cerveletto" (1885), published not less than thirty-five cases.
MORIZ BENEDIKT ("Archives de l'Anthropologie Criminelle," 1891) performed the post mortem on Hugo Schenk, whose trial at the time caused a great sensation in Vienna. He formed an extraordinary number of liaisons with servant-girls, and when he grew tired of them, which was usually very soon, he murdered them. He was handsome, very intelligent, and an excellent talker. His sexual vigour was extraordinary, and, being of a lazy disposition, he exercised it for a living. He was executed at the age of thirty-six. Post mortem it was found that his cerebellum was of extraordinary weight, namely 194 grammes, i.e., over twenty-five per cent. above the normal.

GIUSEPPE MAINARDI ("Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie," 1873) observed a similar case of a satyriacal maniac and wholesale murderer—Giovanni Grassi—in whom he found, post mortem, inflammatory lesion of the cerebellum.

I could go on giving a hundred more such cases with their unwholesome details, but this being a general and not exclusively a medical work, I shall give merely a classification and the necessary references, for the investigation by experts who wish to take up this problem.

The following is the report of a case of cerebellar tumour which was sent to me from a North Country institution, with the request that, "if the notes forwarded to you are published, would you be good enough to suppress any reference to this asylum?"

T. N., age forty-seven, married, was admitted to the asylum, with all the physical signs of general paralysis except the speech, which was clear, with delusions of great wealth, but otherwise clear intellect until his death six months later. The following history was supplied by the wife to the medical superintendent: "She had been married to the patient nineteen years. She had one child; no miscarriages. He had connection two or three times a week throughout their married life, yet he went with other women, and used to masturbate, having previously made 'soap women,' which he put on the bed. He had a good tenor voice, drank freely, was not specially extravagant, and when sober was a hard-working man. Three weeks before admission the first signs of illness developed." The following notes were made at the autopsy. "The cerebrum was normal. The membranes stripped readily, and the arachnoid showed no opacity. Weight of encephalon 1345 grammes; of Pons Varoli, 20 grammes, medulla 9 grammes, and cerebellum 150 grammes. In connection with the cerebellum, there was a small growth of about the size of a filbert; it was of a whitish colour and consisted of numerous small nodules, somewhat resembling small sago grains; it sprang from the membranes, and was removed easily and without in any way damaging the cerebellar cortex. It was situated on the under surface of the cerebellum, and could not be well seen until the medulla was removed. It arose from the membranes in the slight recess situated between the uvula and amygdala of the right side, pressed on and slightly indented the right lobe of the cerebellum, and the uvula was pushed slightly to the left. There was no sign of any vascular disturbance around, and beyond the fact that some portion of the cerebellum was apparently pushed slightly out of position, there was no other change visible. The post mortem otherwise showed only some slight renal cirrhosis." The writer adds: "We have no pathological laboratory at the asylum, that is why the growth was not examined microscopically."

Examples of PRIAPISM in Cerebellar TUMOURS, producing congestion:

N. FRIEDREICH, Intracranial Tumours, 1853.
PERSILLE, Oppenheim's Zeitschrift, 1849.
JOHN ELLIOTSON, two cases. Lancet, 1837.
K. F. H. IMMERMANN, Berliner Klinische Wochenschrift, 1865.
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G. ANDRAL, ibidem.
MIGNOT, Gazette Hebdomadaire, 1875.
Examples of PRIAPISM with other Cerebellar LESIONS:

C. GUIOT, hemorrhage. Clinique des Hôpitaux, vol. i.
R. DUNGLISON, inflammation. London Medical Repository, vol. i.

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MARTINEAU, Bulletins de la Soc. Anat., 1859.
BORDIER, ibidem, 1865.
JOHN ELLIOTSON, Lancet, 1837.

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CAFFORT, inflammation. Archives Gén. de Médecine, 1830.
ROBERT BIANCHI, inflammation. Lancet, 1855.
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E. ROSSI, Il Manicomio, 1891.
A. OTTO, Archiv f. Psychiatrie, 1874.

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BENNETT, girl, age eleven. Gazette Médicale, 1834.
SCZYSKROVSKI, Thèse de Paris, 1890.
M. JASTROWITZ, Deutsche Mediz. Wochenschrift, 1888.
STEINER, Wiener Medizin. Wochenschrift, 1870.

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M. JASTROWITZ, inflammation. Lokalisation im Gehirn, 1888.
PAYEN, inflammation. Essais sur L'Encéphalite, 1826.
S. W. B. WILLIAMS, prostitute, softening. Journal of Mental Science, 1869.
GUSTAV SPIES, hyperæmia. Traumatische Manie, 1869.
F. MAGENDIE, Lancet, 1837.

Examples of SEXUAL EXCITEMENT, Obscene Acts, Disgusting Language, etc.:

P. W. MACDONALD, woman, eighty-nine, Brain, 1890.
CLOVIS GALLOPIN, inflammation. Annales Médico-Psychologiques, 1879.
Examples of **SEXUAL PERVERSION in Cerebellar LESIONS**:

J. W. PLAXTON, carnal assaults, inflammation. *Journal of Mental Science*, 1890.


Examples of **ATROPHY of Cerebellum in CASTRATION** before Puberty:


**DEGENERATION** and **ATROPHY after Destructive Disease** of Genital Organs:

T. B. CURLING, *Diseases of the Testis*.


**Examples of IMPOTENCY after Cerebellar LESIONS**:

MOULARD MATIN, tumour causing atrophy of cerebellum. *L'Union Médicale*, 1868.

F. OBERNIER, tumour causing atrophy of cerebellum. *Tumours of the Brain*.

MILLENBERGER and ROBIN, tumour causing atrophy of cerebellum. *Gazette Médic. de Paris*, 1855.

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THISU, suppuration. *Arch. Géner. de Médecine*, vol. xii.


**RETURN OF MENSES in Women over Seventy after Cerebellar Hæmorrhage**:


Examples of **ARRESTED GROWTH OF SEXUAL ORGANS** with arrested development of Cerebellum:


JOHN D. FISHER, man of forty-five like boy of ten. *American Journal of Medical Sciences*, vol. xxiii.


ANGELO VERDELLI, boy of nine like age three; cerebellum size of walnut, *Rivista Clinica*, 1874.

J. WIGLESWORTH, two cases. *Journal of Mental Science*, 1893.

D. J. LARREY, two cases. *Observation on Wounds*, 1832.
Examples of PREMATURE DEVELOPMENT of Sexual Organs:

JOHN ELLIOTSON, cerebellar tumour; girl fully developed at five. *Lancet*, 1837.

EISENSCHÜTZ, cerebellar tumour; boy fully developed at eight. *Jahrbuch f. Kinderheilkunde*, vol. ii.

C. G. CARUS, abnormal size of cerebellum; girl fully developed at four; menstruated at two. Examined by Prof. Beck and Seiler, of Dresden. *Canstatt’s Jahreberichte*, 1842.
SECTION III

GENIUS, INSANITY, AND CRIME

CHAPTER XXXIII

HEREDITY, EDUCATION, AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF GENIUS

NATURE AND NURTURE

No two persons think, feel, or act in the same way; no two take the same view of any question; no two can be said to observe the same object in an identical manner or from the same standpoint. The intellect of each works on different lines according to inherited proclivities, individual experience, and education. It is this diversity which forms the basis of distinct individual personality.

If we regard the intellectual powers and moral sentiments, we cannot fail to observe how differently they are manifested by different individuals. The beauties of nature inspire in some men the most exalted sentiments, while the great majority of mankind remains unaware of natural beauty, or values it by some economic standard. A poetic mind will find joy in the ripple of a stream which the farmer values only as a cattle-trough. The stately oak of the forest is valued by the timber merchant according to the number of planks it contains, while to the moral philosopher it is a synopsis and a symbol of history, of the growth and decadence of all sublunary things, of the mystery of life and death.

Though there are no two human beings alike in their mental constitution, in their abilities and character, yet the primary mental powers are alike in all. Individual differences, therefore, arise from the varying strength of each of the powers, and the variety of their combination. All the differences of individual minds resolve themselves into differences of degree among the same identical qualities.

Assuming each individual to possess all the faculties which constitute the human mind, in what a variety of degree of relative strength do they appear in different persons! In one, the love of glory is the feeling which surpasses all; another is deaf to the voice of censure and callous to the accents of applause. The soul of one melts with softest pity at a tale of woe; while the eye of another never sheds a sympathetic tear. One individual spends his life in an ardent chase of wealth, which he stops not to enjoy; another scatters in wasteful prodigality the substance of his sires, and perishes in want from a mere incapacity to retain. One vast intellect, like Newton's, fathoms the profundities of nature; while the mind of another can scarcely grope its way through the daily occurrences of life. The towering imagination of a Shakespeare or a Milton soars beyond the boundaries of sublunary space; while the sterile fancy of another sees no glory in the heavens and no loveliness on earth.
The human mind has certain innate or inherited tendencies which are the essential springs or motive powers of all thought and action, whether individual or collective, and are the bases from which the character and will of individuals are gradually developed under the guidance of the intellectual faculties. These primary innate tendencies have different relative strengths, and they are favoured or checked in very different degree by the social circumstances of men in different stages of culture. These tendencies, in stronger or weaker degree, are not only present in men of all races and all nations, but we find all of them, or at least the germs of them, in most of the higher animals. It is the environment which awakens our dormant powers; and through speech—enabling intercourse with our fellows—and by reading, we become acquainted with the personal and accumulated knowledge of the race. In estimating the mental capacity of an individual, or of a race, distinction must be drawn between these latent tendencies and their actual development.

Men do not start with a fair field, because they are affected by their hereditary proclivities; and they do not start on equal terms, because some are more favoured than others by their surrounding circumstances. Our life is to a large extent predetermined by the innate dispositions and their relative strength. Fortunately not entirely predetermined, because human nature can be modified, principally by three factors: (1) by external circumstances, i.e., the society in which we live; (2) by education, i.e., the training of the mind; and (3) by experience. The intellectual capacities need education; the instinctive tendencies need no training for their manifestation; on the contrary, civilisation demands their inhibition.

It is doubtful whether the civilised mind differs from the savage mind even in respect of a higher intellectual development; certainly the instincts and passions are the same. It is doubtful whether the great mass of men in our day exercise so much more complicated mental functions than the savages. Those who invent nothing, improve nothing, and, confined to their trade, swim with the great stream of imitators, understand only a small part of the manifold machinery of modern civilisation. Even our experts, owing to the rigid division of labour, have to take a great deal for granted outside their own subjects. Man is a reasoning animal; but how much does he reason for himself? He owes most of his opinions to inherited proclivities, tradition, custom, convention, creed, law, education, and the daily newspaper; and all the reason he practices is to make deductions more or less correctly from these fixed premises. For the great majority of modern men the daily paper is the only reading and the guide of opinion. But newspapers are merely commercial enterprises, journalism an industry for the creation and manipulation of average public opinion. They represent the crowd, and maintain their popularity by their persistent appeal to average intelligence and feeling.

Mankind has not improved within historic times; only civilisation has advanced, enabling the modern child to profit by the accumulated knowledge and experiences of the race.

The qualities which form our character are not inherited, only the potential dispositions to them. For example, a child may inherit a group of brain-cells adapted for the appreciation of music; the mind structure for it, it must form for itself. The developed faculty cannot be transmitted, that would mean that the entire experience on which the faculty grew could be transmitted. Only the element can be inherited, and that must be in the germ-cell. What that element, what that physiological unit, is, remains still a mystery.

The elements which go to make up an inheritance need not all be expressed in development, and they will not be expressed if they do not receive proper nurture and stimulus. The potentialities, however, whether physical or mental, whether in the field of intellectual aptitudes or that of the instincts and emotions, are determined from the moment of fertilisation. By changes in the outward conditions of life the
expression of these powers and features may be excited or restrained. If the external opportunity be withheld, the particular disposition may never be manifested. But the environment has no creative capacity; that must be inborn.

The father may have a latent predisposition to a certain characteristic, which may never have manifested itself, at least not in recognisable form; but the son, owing to stimulating factors coming into play, may manifest the father's latent characteristic. This is much more so the case with reference to the mother. Not all the emotional dispositions, and still less the intellectual abilities, which lie dormant are brought out in women, owing to the restrictions of domestic life and their being sheltered in the struggle for existence. But they may come out in the son. The talent or other disposition which characterises the son may be inherited from the mother, but on inquiry it will frequently be found that her latent capacity came from her father.

A characteristic may be kept neutralised by other characteristics; and it may happen also, as we have just seen, that it may never meet with the stimulus necessary for its expression in development, especially when the girl takes after her father and the boy after his mother.

Just as heredity provides us with the intellect common to all of us, so does it provide each of us with those minute differences of character in virtue of which no one of us is precisely like another. It gives us our various characters, as it gives us our various faces. It gives us, in addition to our common power of thinking, infinitely varied assortments of thoughts, feelings, and propensities, written before our birth in a species of invisible ink, which the light or heat of life gradually renders visible.

Some people credit education and surroundings with all these varieties; ascribing to them all the qualities, whether good or bad, possessed by the adult, and deny heredity to be the most potent factor. They still hold that the human infant is born with a brain which might be compared with a neutral clean sheet waiting for writing to be impressed upon it by the influences of the environment. They fail to see that the human infant is endowed with a brain—a living substance—with limitless reserves of potentiality, which are ready to be realised, not by passive impressions of the environment, but by active reaction to its stimuli. Nurture cannot give a child sight if born blind, music if born tone-deaf, or even a passion for the acquisition of wealth without the underlying native propensity. Nurture may modify or develop existing tendencies; it cannot create them. On the other hand, given a mental disposition, its scope is indefinite and the combinations of the various dispositions (of which we have given examples in previous chapters) are also indefinite. There are therefore two chief factors in growth: heredity, which gives us realisable potentiality, and environment, which makes the realisation of potentiality possible.

If nurture were all-powerful, an English infant transferred to France and brought up by French parents should be as French as a genuine French child; but this is not the case. The predominance of heredity is shown by the persistence of national characteristics. The Germans of to-day have still many of the dispositions which distinguished the Teutons at the downfall of the Roman Empire. The French race has still some of the characteristics of the Gauls described by Cesar; their love of display and effect, their sudden enthusiasm and an easy discouragement, their fondness of ornament and talent for art, their gaiety, fickleness, and amorousness.

On the other hand, while it is true that our main potentialities—mental, moral, and physical—are fixed by heredity, it does not follow that all the possibilities of good or evil that may be latent in a given personality are bound to develop, or that education and other environmental influences are of no avail. It is our possible, not
necessarily our actual, personalitites that are predetermined in the germ-cells; as to which of these possibilities shall and which shall not be realised, much must depend on the circumstances under which growth and development proceed. Growth being a function of the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic activities, there can be no predetermination of the organism unless that of the environment is also assumed. Faculties of a desirable kind may be strengthened by use until their due response to the familiar stimulus has become a habit; conversely, by denial of the opportunity of response, undesirable tendencies may be starved and eradicated.

No one will deny that nurture can do much. Many a puny child of the slums can, by means of judicious feeding, attain the stature and the build of the country child. The mind may be directed so that he who in the environment in which he was born would have developed into an uneducated member of the proletariat may become a man of letters or of science. He who would have rapidly developed into a criminal, a danger and an expense to the community, may by due training develop into the benefactor of his race. But all these things can only be done if the child possesses the natural tendencies to develop in these directions. What man can by mere willing add one cubit either to his mental or to his bodily stature? What teaching could ever raise the congenital idiot to the common level of human intelligence? Man has to win wisdom and goodness for himself under the schooling of experience, and it will be easier for him if his ancestors (on both sides) have been wise and good.

The most urgent problem is not so much the improvement of human inheritance as the fuller utilisation of existing talents. The potentiality of greatness is far commoner than is generally supposed, but in the majority of cases is not fully evoked. Education should be directed to realise our potentialities; in reality it often cramps them. Still, so-called higher education often brings out potentialities which would remain dormant in the lower spheres of life. A man may have artistic, musical, literary, scientific, social, or other tendencies within him; but if the son of an agricultural labourer he may grow up an uncouth bear. Yet he may have in him capacities for refinement or culture which would have been developed in a different environment.

Each seed is fraught with its own destiny. It will grow, if it is allowed to grow, to what is in large measure a predetermined form. The elements of mind are of racial inheritance—common to the whole race; but their arrangement and quality are lineal. We all inherit the same bodily structure in its main elements, but each one of us differs in the size, form, colour, and proportions of that structure, which we inherit from our lineal ancestors and which distinguish us individually. Racial heredity gives us a face; but lineal heredity gives us a particular face. Neither of them gives us expression, which is the spiritual feature of the outer man, within his control. A man cannot alter the form of his face, but he can alter its expression.

In the new-born infant the character of the stock lies latent, and the ego is little more than a bundle of potentialities inherited from both parents. The range, the reach, the latent possibilities of our potentialities are unknown to us, and they require stimulus for growth. Since the child gets its first stimulus from its parents, those qualities resembling the parental qualities are encouraged; those differing are discouraged.

A child's soul is a complex of potentialities—intellectual, emotional, aesthetic, moral and spiritual—an indefinable, illimitable, inextricable tangle of latent tendencies, capacities, instincts, passions, desires. Some of these will soon press for realisation. Others will wait their time in the background. Others, in the absence of a favourable environment, will remain unrealised. That the baby will in due season think, reason, plan, love, sympathise, imagine, and so forth, may safely be predicted. But the range, the reach, the latent possibilities of these great tendencies are wholly unknown to us. The embryo of every man—whether the descendant of
serf, emperor, fool or philosopher, felon or saint—is a complex of limitless possibilities, mental, moral and spiritual, as well as physical; which will affirm that the possibilities outweigh the inherited elements, and that each human being is free to draw upon the reserves of potentiality out of the inexhaustible fountain of his "soul," to the extent that his inherited instrument permits, and to the extent of the stimulation of the environment, which draws out the capacity.

It seems certain that the great majority of inborn differences between parent and offspring are due simply to new combinations of previously existing capacities and dispositions. It is easy to see that with sexual reproduction, where two parents are involved in the production of the offspring, there is a continual mixing of different germ plasms, and thus almost infinite chances of new combinations. Considering the long line of ancestors, and that half the cells come from the male, and the other half from the female side, there is room for innumerable variations, and the wonder is that there is any resemblance at all.

Much has been said about the differences observed between the various offspring of the same parents, particularly if there is one child with habits not to be found in either mother or father. But we must not forget, just as two elements in chemistry, each of them harmless, can combine to form a virulent poison, so two harmless elements, one derived from one parent and one from the other, can be inherited by the child and form a combination which, if not checked early, may be detrimental to its future. The child may inherit the characteristics of one parent only, or partly those of one and partly those of the other; or it may exhibit the father's characteristics at one time of life and at another time these may be replaced by those of the mother. It very often happens that certain individuals inherit a prepotency for the transmission of their own special characters, which always predominate in the offspring to the exclusion of those of the other.

It has been said that the exceptional talents and characteristics of some men are due to accidental causes, but the same opportunity is offered to a great many men, while only one is inspired. The fact is that education and surrounding circumstances are only powerful on those men whose innate dispositions are neither too feeble nor too energetic. A man of talent may have an imbecile for his child, but no man of talent ever had an idiot or imbecile for his father or mother.

An acquired character is a structural change in the body directly induced during the lifetime by a change in environment or in function, and persisting after the factors inducing it have ceased to operate. Physiologically stated, the question is whether we can conceive that structural changes in the body of a parent, induced by changes in functional or environmental influence, can so specifically affect the reproductive cells that these will, if they develop, reproduce in any degree the modification acquired by the parent or parents. May the result of peculiarities in parental "nurture" be as such transmitted, or is it the germinal "nature" alone that constitutes the inheritance? Will the offspring exhibit the modification which the parent acquired? That depends what the modification is; and, at best, only the tendency to the modification can be inherited.

It is still held by biologists as a sort of dogma of faith that acquired characters are not transmitted; but one of the latest experiments appears to prove the influence of environmental conditions.

For some years the Austrian zoologist Kammerer has been carrying out a series of experiments with toads. Alytes differ from the frogs and toads, generally, in breeding on land; and the male is without the horny patch on the hand, possessed by all water-breeding forms to enable them to retain their hold on the females under water. The young are hatched out in water as advanced tadpoles with the external gills already covered over. Kammerer's experiment was to keep Alytes in a warmer temperature than usual, with a tank for bathing when disposed. The toads under these circumstances began to mate in the water; and, with appropriate
safeguards, some of the eggs came to maturity, and the young of this generation were hatched out less mature, with one external gill on each side of the head. These tadpoles, when mature, pair in the water and produce tadpoles with three external gills (like the ordinary water-breeding forms), and the male, when mature, has a horny patch on the under surface of the hand. Five generations have now been bred; and the males in all have the horny patch on the hand, all breed in the water, and hatch out with three gills showing. Kammerer has, to all intents and purposes, changed a species by changing the environment, and the acquired character is breeding true.

The ordinary biological teaching to the effect that the inheritance of the child is not affected by the education of the parent is largely based on a deduction from observations on the colours of animals and some experiments of amputating the tails of mice, or, as in the example just quoted, the horny patch of tadpoles. On the other hand, we note that men have been educated more or less regularly in our schools for several generations; horses have been educated on the race-track; and hunting-dogs have been educated in the field. We are led by these observations to the conviction that educability can be inherited, that improvement in mental and physical powers from generation to generation comes directly as the result of educating each generation in succession. The biologists tell us in reply that the predisposition to educability is already in the germ, and is not an acquired character. They say that there may be in the organisation the rudimental possibilities for an acquired character, so that it is really congenital; just as every congenital quality is also acquired, i.e., requires to be nurtured by appropriate conditions if it is to develop. It is not the character, but the tendency to the character, which is transmitted, but the tendency is already inherent in the germ. Acquired characters, i.e., the abiding effects of external conditions, can be expressed only when the organism possesses inborn tendencies to respond to outside conditions; and inborn variations, i.e., modifications due to changes in the germ plasm, can be expressed only under certain conditions of environment; so that the distinction between acquired characters and inborn variations is not easy, and can be distinguished only by experts. According to G. Archdall Reid, "no single transmission of an acquired character has ever yet been proved."

The biologists tell us that "if acquired characters were passed on we should expect to find small waists resulting from tight lacing, and children able to read and write without having to learn." The reply to this argument is that the lacing of women's waists is rarely so tight that it affects the shape of the body and the position of the internal organs permanently, and that it is by no means proved that women who have laced tightly for generations have not smaller waists. We need only compare the figure of the average Parisian woman with that of the average German woman. And as regards the second example, no child is born that can read or write, but every normal child inherits the apparatus and capacity for such acquirements. Children that cannot be taught to read and write are classified as feeble-minded. It is the disposition that is inherited, not the acquirement itself.

The ordinary man, who is not a biologist, puts forward some very strong reasons for the transmission of acquired characters. He says that if they are not transmissible, then the finest mental and moral traits in the parent will not benefit the offspring, cannot be transmitted to them, but have to be acquired in each case by intensive early training, giving them the right start in life. He says that if properties acquired by the parent or parents are not inherited by the children, then the sins of the fathers do not tell upon the children; no matter how the parent ill-treats his body prior to conception, his progeny is unaffected. The man may have tuberculosis or syphilis, but provided he has not infected the mother and, through her, the foetus, he is likely to have as strong and healthy a child as that of a perfectly sound parent.
In the opinion of the biologists, the tendency to the finer mental and moral traits is due to some original modification in the germ plasm and is not acquired. They point to the children of the slums and of degraded parentage, and claim that when these are given a healthy life in healthy surroundings they do develop into citizens of as good quality as those of good parentage. To them, nurture is everything, and nature negligible. If the observed facts do not tally with this view, then we are told that the incidence of particular conditions in the offspring is due to diathesis; that the child possesses a stigma of degeneration which originated in the family history of generations ago, and has arisen by chance—mutation; or that the observed weakness of the child of diseased parentage is not inherent, but due to environment—poor food and wretched surroundings which prevented a healthy bringing up.

Professor Binswanger, of Jena, a famous psychiatrist, expressed his inability to find evidence that a mental or nervous disease was acquired during the individual life. If this were so, the tendency certainly would have to be in the germ plasm. It has to be remembered, however, that diseases are not inheritable in the identical manner, but what is inherited is—a vitiated constitution. The parental disease need not produce the same disease in the offspring, but may produce some other. According to my own experience, there is one mental disorder which certainly seems to run in families, that is—melancholia. I refer to such cases only in which no insanity was manifested until middle age; yet in most of these cases I have been able to trace the characteristics which are common to melancholics as having existed from infancy, namely, a reserved character, lack of sociability, small self-esteem, over-conscientiousness, hypersensitiveness, etc.

Again, as regards the statement of some biologists that, with reference to the morals of children, nurture is everything and nature negligible, my experience does not support this view. In consequence of my theories regarding the significance of the shape of the head, I have had more opportunities than physicians generally have of watching the careers of boys and girls of tainted origin. I have seen not only numerous idiots, imbeciles, weak-minded and backward children, but children addicted to romancing, lying, thieving, premature and perverse sexual habits, and other immoral addictions. Some of these were incurable, and I have been enabled to follow their careers—of some for thirty years—my case-books containing the records of repeated convictions, until owing to the numerous aliases I failed to trace them any longer. Detention in reformatories did no good in these cases, nor the prison in later life, probably because they were mentally abnormal, though not insane. Incidentally I may mention that when the shape of the head of the child is normal I give hope to the parents; when it is badly formed, my prognosis as to the future of the child is unfavourable. But how many physicians ever look at a head, and, if they do, how many have any theory what the shape ought to be?

We know that the brain controls the whole of the life processes of an organism. Therefore, those acquired characters which do not affect the brain directly are not transmitted; on the other hand, those which modify the brain and nervous system, either through voluntary or involuntary action, are transmitted; but as tendencies only.

Modifications acquired as the result of use and disuse are not transmitted. That which is transmitted to the infant is not the modification, but only the power of acquiring the modification under similar circumstances.

It is a matter of common observation that mutilations are not inherited. Wooden legs do not run in families, although wooden heads do. We may cut off the mouse's tail for generations, and yet they will still be born with their tails. Such mutilations have no modifying influence on the nervous system and brain in particular, and therefore cannot be inherited. Loss of a limb or any other portion of the body does not affect the brain, at least not to any appreciable extent. But if,
through change of circumstances, new efforts for the preservation of existence are called forth, such efforts must originate from the brain, and hence the brain is directly modified, and this change of structure may be transmitted. We thus learn that not all kinds of acquired characters are inherited, but only those which produce a modifying effect on the governing portion of the nervous system, that is, the brain.

If an animal, through a change of circumstances, has to make certain new efforts to obtain food, etc., these efforts must originate from the brain, since they are voluntary; hence the brain is directly modified, and the parts in connection therewith are also modified. And if the change in circumstances is permanent, inducing similar efforts on the part of the offspring, gradually the modifications thus produced are inherited, and in time, if the changes in structure are typical, change of species occurs. Again, if through a change of climate an organism is affected through the whole of its surface nerves, a direct impression is made on the brain, which impression leads in time to a permanent modification of character. Such a change of character and its inheritance is seen in a change of complexion, as, for instance, where Europeans gradually acquire a darker skin; and also where wool gives place to hair, as in sheep introduced from a cold or temperate climate to a tropical one.

We need no man of science to tell us that the Ethiopians cannot change their skin, or that one drop of negro blood in an otherwise white family betrays itself for generations in the finger-nails, in the complexion, and in the hair. Mental characters reappear in precisely the same way. That such, indeed, is the case frequently, has been matter of common observation ever since man first began to observe. From which of his parents or grandparents does the child get this or that quality—his taste for music, or drawing, or his good or his bad temper? These are questions which people have been always asking.

As man descends into the grave, so pass with him for ever all the endowments and wisdom which his genius and labour have accumulated during his lifetime. Were it otherwise, the toil of education would have been mitigated, and there would have been no bounds to the mental acquirements of the race. Knowledge certainly perishes, but not the ability to acquire knowledge. This is increased with the growing complexity of the brain. It is not the knowledge that is hereditary, but the disposition to the acquisition of some particular branch, whether of music, poetry, or money-making.

Everyone knows that the children of musicians may so vary as to be more or less musical than their parents, and yet all be more musical than the average man. Suppose the most musical men marry musical women, we thus have generations following, some of whose members are increasingly musical by normal variation. This happened in the Bach family and by the same process as the development of the racehorse—a selecting of the best developed, and the intensification of the variation and not transmission of the acquired modifications. Only a small proportion of them vary so as to be more specialised than their parents, so that they are not all great musicians, nor are all the racehorses great racers. Each child has to acquire its musical knowledge just as painfully as its parents; the only thing that it inherits is the ability to do this.

If we do not accept the Darwinian doctrine, and deny all evolution of mental and physical power, then each kind of animal must have been originally created equal to anything which has since existed. Otherwise a parent must transmit more than he inherited. That "more" must be something inherited, or it must be some special creation associated with reproduction. We cannot get something out of nothing. If there has been an evolution of mental and physical powers at any time in the past, that evolution was necessarily the product of work performed. But has man evolved?
HEREDITY, EDUCATION, AND CHARACTERISTICS OF GENIUS

Enough has been said to show the necessity of ascertaining the laws of heredity, or the transmission of acquired abilities, the transmission of disease, etc. When we have ascertained these laws, we shall be in a position to apply them practically to the improvement of the race. With our present knowledge, the practical application of eugenics presents too many difficulties.

To some men, however, nothing seems easier. They point to the artificial breeding of domestic animals. In reality the two things are altogether different. In breeding animals a higher race of beings manipulates a lower race with the object of securing definite points that are of no use whatever to the animals themselves, but of considerable value to the breeders. Even if we had the ability and the power, we should hesitate before we bred men and women as we breed dogs or fowls. We can breed for "points" and add to the swiftness of the horse, the strength of the ox, the sagacity of the dog; but should we breed men for points as with animals? Would the State have a breed of human mastiffs for its policemen, of human greyhounds for its postmen, and so on?

One cannot improve the efficiency of animals in any one point to any high degree without upsetting the general balance of their constitution. The racehorse can run a mile on a particular day at a particular place with wonderful speed; but that is about all he is good for. His health as a whole is so surprisingly feeble that he has to be treated with as much care as a delicate exotic. We can foster particular points in animals and plants, but it would seem we can only do so by lowering their general vitality. And when we come to deal with the infinitely more complex individuality of man, what hope would there be of our improving the breed by deliberate selection? If we developed the intellect we would probably stunt the physique or the moral nature; if we aimed at a general culture of all faculties alike we would probably end by a uniformity of a level mediocrity. Besides, the most intellectual men and women are not the most fertile.

It is a mistake to expect that human beings can be mates the same as animals for the improvement of the breed, for marriage is not a question of the head only, but also of the heart. We must not forget the love element. It must be remembered that people do not marry merely for the "procreation of children," but also for the mutual society, help and comfort that the one ought to have of the other. Most men and women marry, not thinking of their offspring at all, but because they are congenial and helpful to one another. We cannot know our wives or husbands until we have lived with them, and genuine love produces that adaptability which makes life afterwards comfortable and happy and its burdens bearable. One has also to remember that, having got the perfect couple, they may refuse for financial or other reasons to have more than one or two children.

Human personality is such a complex organisation that it is extremely difficult even for the man himself, not to speak of any stranger, to pick out a suitable helpmeet. And if we succeeded in all cases in finding the right partners, we should only crush out originality in the offspring and produce a tame, stereotyped pattern of amiable mediocrity. Undoubtedly many marriages are arranged on grounds of convenience, cupidity, or snobbishness. Let an heiress be ever so ugly, unhealthy, hysterical, or mad, somebody or other will be ready and eager to marry her on any terms. Considerations of this sort have helped to stock the world with many feeble and unhealthy persons. Among the middle and upper classes it may safely be said only a very small percentage of marriages is due to love alone; in other words, to instinctive feeling. The remainder have been influenced by various side advantages, and nature has taken vengeance accordingly on the unhappy offspring.

The love instinct is an essentially beneficent instinct, developed and maintained in us for the very purpose of insuring just those advantages which some eugenists want to effect by a conscious and deliberate process of selection. The mutual
attractiveness and mutual adaptability are bound to have a beneficial effect on the offspring. We fall in love with the young, the beautiful, the strong, the healthy. We do not fall in love with the aged, the ugly, the feeble, and the sickly. No law is needed to prevent a man from marrying his grandmother; and cripples, physical or mental, do not usually have the same chances in the marriage market as healthy men and women. Marriages between seriously afflicted people are rare, but there are many people with neurotic tendencies who marry, which tendencies before marriage, in consequence of the easier life, may have remained latent, but break out in women with the strain of child-bearing, and in men when the struggle for existence becomes too acute.

Beauty is one of the best guides, so far as race-preservation is concerned. As GRANT ALLEN pointed out many years ago, a fine form, a good figure, a round arm and neck, a fresh complexion, a lovely face, are all outward and visible signs of the physical qualities that tend to make up a healthy and vigorous wife and mother; they imply soundness, fertility, a good circulation, a good digestion. Conversely, sallowness and paleness are roughly indicative of dyspepsia and anæmia; and what we call a bad figure is really in one way or another an unhealthy departure from the normal standard of the race. Nor are indications of mental efficiency wanting. A good-humoured person shows the indications in the expression of his face. Idiotic countenances can never be beautiful; narrow, low, receding foreheads strike us unfavourably; so does, in fact, any departure from the average type of head.

Sometimes neither man nor woman is to blame for an ill-adapted marriage, for each marries, even in favourable circumstances, not the abstractly best adapted woman in the world to supplement or counteract his individual peculiarities, but, as he thinks, the best woman there and then obtainable for him. The result is frequently far from perfect, but it is no worse than if made by strangers, if the choice were similarly restricted. If only we had our liberty in choosing, less mistakes would be made. But, after all, the choice is limited to one's circle, and, even in that circle, restricted by many conventions. Widen the possibility of selection and remove the restrictions of income, and love will manage things better than any committee of anthropologists for the choice of partners can ever do it.

So far positive eugenics, which deals with the measures to be adopted to ensure the continuance in sufficient numbers of the normal members of the race and those superior in mind and physique. Negative eugenics deals with the prevention of the increase of the unfit, the prevention of breeding from lunatics, epileptics, consumptives, drunkards, habitual criminals, imbeciles, and other mental defectives. The object of negative eugenics is the elimination of the bad stock of the population. The State is to interfere with stringent regulations of marriage, prohibiting union of the whole class of degenerates. It is rightly argued that persons tainted with any incurable physical or mental infirmity have no more right to carry suffering and contamination amongst the people than has the person suffering from smallpox to do so by travelling in a public conveyance.

The elimination of the unfit does not, of course, imply an increase of the fit. It must be remembered also that, besides the extreme cases in which the hereditary taint, the predisposition to disease, is so decided that marriage should not be thought of, there is the still larger class of those in whom the taint is so mitigated that, with a properly selected partner, a fairly healthy family might be reared. Should we prohibit those as well? Can we forbid marriages of a healthy man or woman whose father or mother has been seriously afflicted? Can we speak with certainty? And thus we are confronted with the question as to how far the State has a right to employ coercion or restraint. There is a strong repugnance against all coercive or repressive legislation affecting the social customs and habits of society, which is shown by the constant desire to evade it. If there is to be restriction in marriage in the case of persons who are unfit to marry, one has to face the
alternative, which is so often forgotten, that marriage is not an essential preliminary to procreation. It must be borne in mind that there is such a thing as illegitimacy. The people to whom it is essential that this gospel of deliverance should be preached are precisely the people who pay no heed to it. For this reason, sterilisation of the unfit has been proposed; but, before such a drastic remedy is entertained, society would first require to know the effect upon those on whom such mutilation is proposed of better housing, better sanitary conditions, compulsory seclusion in retreats, reformatories, and labour colonies.

There is one precaution, however, at the disposal of all, and which everyone should take before taking a partner for life, and that is, they should demand a medical certificate of fitness for marriage. No healthy person of sound ancestry would refuse to submit to an examination, and, if there is some defect, the union is at all events entered into not blindly, but with full knowledge of the facts.

EDUCATION

Cultivation strengthens powers in themselves vigorous; but education cannot render energetic dispositions or capacities which nature has created feeble. We cannot convert an idiot into a profound philosopher; and there are idiots in art, mathematics, etc. Accordingly, every system of education must be defective which has no reference to the characteristic talents of the scholar, who, for example, though he may be a dunce in classics and slow of recollection, may possess a turn of mind which will some day lead him to great discoveries and rank its possessor amongst the eminent of mankind. If education, properly understood and practised, is what the word implies, a drawing out of the native powers of the mind, a wise direction and control of the process of spontaneous development of innate tendencies, it must be worth while to find out what are those innate tendencies and what is their normal course of development. We want a psychological delineation of individual dispositions, temperament, and character. Children should be tested in the capacity for the different subjects before actual training is commenced.

As regards elementary education, the best known of the methods for testing the mental ability of school children is that devised by Binet, the purpose of which is to rank them according to mental age. For example, a certain child is chronologically, let us say, fifteen years old, yet physiologically he may be only eleven, intellectually ten, and pedagogically twelve. The last number indicates his past achievements at school. The child’s grade in the school does not always correspond with his mental age, and it becomes highly important to ascertain what his mental age is—that is the purpose of Binet’s tests. For instance, the eight tasks that any child should creditably perform, who has a mental age of seven years, are:

1. To indicate the omissions in a figure drawn in outline;
2. To give the number of one’s ten fingers;
3. To copy a written phrase;
4. To copy a triangle and a diamond-shaped figure;
5. To repeat three numbers;
6. To describe an engraving;
7. To count thirteen separate pennies;
8. To name four pieces of money.

A normal child of twelve should be able to repeat seven figures, at ten six, below eight he breaks down at five, at four he handles three, at three two. The length of a series of figures, letters, or names is a test of a child’s control over his attention and the inherent grip of his memory, and this ability is quite independent of any practice in learning by heart. So it is with other tests of the Binet scale. At five years a child should be able to copy a figure of a square, that of a diamond only two years later. Below seven, as mentioned above, he will not notice an omission in an outline drawing, say the omission of arms in the sketch of a “lady.” Up to
eleven, one can tell him that one has locked himself in a room and is unable to get out because the key was left on the outside, and he will believe one. At fourteen, given any time by the clock, he should be able to say what time it would be if the hands were interchanged.

A good deal of discussion is waging round these tests. It is easy to doubt the value of some of them; but on the whole they give a fair estimate of mental development, not merely a measure of the intelligence generally, but of specific memories, attention, muscular control, and of the various powers of observation and of linguistic expression. They do not tell one very much about the real mental idiosyncrasies of the child, but they enable the qualified psychologist to use his skill and natural gift to better effect.

Parents and teachers should ascertain what a boy is really capable of or may be brought to by means of education, as well as what he is not capable of and cannot be brought to by any possible means. A man finds happiness in any work in proportion as it calls into exercise those faculties of his nature that are most vigorous or most highly developed, and in proportion as he has acquired skill and excellence in it. Therefore we must select the calling of a youth in accordance with his natural qualifications and aptitudes, and make him proficient in those studies or pursuits to which his natural talents and character—as well as opportunities—most incline him. In this way the world would be most benefited and the man himself rendered most happy. Vocational guidance would increase national efficiency and should be introduced as an integral part of school administration.

A man who is colour-blind is, from necessity, debarred from taking charge of railway-signals; yet, over and over again, does one see boys whose brain organisation fitted them for some other calling forced into an occupation for which they are not suited, with not a chance for distinction. Each one’s calling and business in life should be selected in accordance with his natural qualifications and aptitudes for it. The blunders that mar our youth make our manhood a struggle and our old age a regret. If the parent, the schoolmaster, and the medical psychologist were to consult together as to the plan of education and the future pursuits of the child, much suffering would be avoided and good accomplished. The State and the country at large would benefit to a now unimaginable extent by its number of great men in every field of art and learning, industry and enterprise, through all the individual powers of each member of the community being directed into their proper and natural channels, according to the diversities of capacity and temperament, instead of being comparatively unproductively employed, as at present, through being misdirected.

The selection will require experts; for though we can observe the various human activities, we cannot judge always whether the men following them have the abilities. One human ability—take the capacity for construction—may give rise to a variety of fundamental activities: architect, engineer, inventor, etc. Some activities, again, necessitate a variety of abilities; for example, the painter—sense of colour, sense of form, etc. Again, a person may have a taste for a particular occupation, but not the necessary ability. Thus a person may think himself musical because he enjoys and appreciates music; yet he may be an indifferent executant and be entirely without the talent of a composer.

Education begins on the day we are born and should end on the day we die. The business of parents, teachers, and schools is not to complete our education, but to fit us to become our own schoolmasters, to continue our own education, so that we may learn through life. A child should be taught enough to awaken an interest in all the sciences and arts, and to perfect itself in those for which it has an innate disposition.

Having ascertained the capacities of the child, the next essential is to teach the child "how to learn." As a preliminary, I would suggest that no teacher be
appointed who cannot teach. I have attended numerous colleges and heard a host
of lecturers in England as well as on the Continent, but I have come across very few
"teachers." The first qualification of a teacher should be to know "how to
teach." Therefore none should be appointed without some test. On the other
hand, the pupils, before taking up a particular subject (at least in the higher schools),
should be instructed "how to learn." A few lessons by an experienced psycho-
ologist would, in my opinion, greatly improve the results. Moreover, much time and
energy are lost over the learning of unessential subjects and the unessential details
of an essential subject; loading the pupil's brain with knowledge for which only
experts find practical use. Of some subjects a rudimentary knowledge would
suffice, and a more intense study should be demanded only of those who have
special gifts in that direction or qualify for some post where such knowledge is a
necessity.

Next, the subject should be made interesting and brought nearer to human life.
A subject is learned more easily if it is presented to us with ideas with which we are
already familiar and which appeal to our innate dispositions. For example, a new
language will be acquired more readily if we start with those words which have a
similarity to our native tongue, and with sentences which we are in the habit of
using daily. Grammar and high-class literature can come later, when we have
acquired a sufficient stock of words and can express our daily wants.

Students should be made to learn in the class-room; mere lectures are a waste of
time. In consequence of this defect, students everywhere have to "cram" from
text-books, and many of these are written as if the student were already an expert
and not a beginner. I have been consulted, in the course of my practice, by clever
students who have failed repeatedly at examinations and feared some brain defect,
when all that was at fault was a lack of method in learning, a proper presentation of
the subject, a knowledge of which had to be acquired, and want of a system to
impress the various memories, especially the visual, which is strongest in most men.
Most students, teachers, and writers on learned subjects place too much reliance on
the "verbal" memory to the exclusion of all others; but the verbal memory is
the most unreliable, except in a few specially gifted men, as is seen by the rapidity
with which subjects learned for an examination are again forgotten. Altogether,
we are trained too much to believe and remember, and too little to think and judge.

In former days it was claimed that observation, memory, judgment, reason, imagina-
tion, were primary faculties; and that in exercising any one of them, by any process,
we were increasing its power to deal with whatever matter might be presented to it. As
if a boy who was exercised in learning poetry by rote would have his memory for
dates and figures thereby improved. He may cultivate observation at school in the
chemistry class, and yet he may go home and fail to see the most striking objects
in the street. In truth, no man learns to do one thing by doing another. If we
wish a boy to observe Stock Exchange prices, we must train him to observe Stock
Exchange prices, not teach him to be an observant half-back at football; and if we
wish to make him a loyal and intelligent citizen, we must teach him citizenship, and
not merely demand that he be loyal and intelligent at cricket. The man who, to
improve his memory for trigonometrical formulæ, tries to train it by memorising
poetry, is simply wasting his time. Another fact that is too frequently neglected is
that our memory is of what we have experienced, not of what we have learned.
Of all that was acquired for examination purposes, only so much will be retained
as was in harmony with the natural talent of the pupil.

If a man be a good observer, he can, in most cases, take time for reflection;
observations he must make himself, and make them rapidly, or lose the opportunity
for ever. For this reason a man can afford to be a slow reflector, whilst he cannot
afford to be a slow observer, if he wishes to be a practical man; and hence it is that
it is better, in nearly all cases, to have good perceptive faculties, and moderate
reflectives, than to have ever so large reflectives with but moderate perceptive powers.

The popular systems of education are by no means calculated to remedy any inherent defect in the perceptive faculties, but they are eminently adapted to increase such organic defects, by directing the mind to the study of dead languages, and to the studying of the abstract laws of observation. In the physical sciences alone can the perceptive faculties find fitting exercise when fully developed; in these alone can they find remedial exercise when naturally weak, and it is in the early years that they must be trained.

It is not uncommon to see children brought up to be very critical as regards the external world, but exercising no criticism as regards their own habits and dispositions. The parents having no fixed principles as to the great questions of life cannot impart to their children what they do not possess themselves. Such omission of moral guidance is as bad as being dogmatic. It is held by many parents and educators that it is best to let the young develop along "their own lines." To a limited extent this should be done; but if the child is allowed to grow up in absolute freedom, it is liable to follow its strongest inclinations—the lines of least resistance—and since in the majority of human beings the propensities are more powerful than the higher sentiments, the child will develop its animal nature and not its spiritual nature. Much of the restlessness, discontent, and spiritual uncertainty of the age is traceable to the failure of an educational system divorced from any truly authoritative, positive philosophy to furnish those who have been brought up within it with a valid view of life as a whole, and to ensure that inward spiritual training which is the absolutely indispensable complement of rational development.

An excellent method for the right training of the emotions and propensities is that adopted by some English schools of letting the boys form a sort of "Junior Republic" among themselves and governing one another. The idea originated in the United States, where it has been in operation for some years, taking the place of reformatories in the training of juvenile offenders.

Experiences make the strongest impressions on the brain. Golden rules do not make a child moral. Yet ideas and ideals must be given for the child's guidance. Habits must be formed, and ideas and ideals round these habits. A child may know a certain act to be wrong, but without a sufficient stock of ideas and experiences it will be unable to withstand temptations.

If we instruct by ideas alone, these will be selected by the child in accordance with his native dispositions. For this reason, among others, children of the same parents and brought up in the same surroundings and by the same teachers do not turn out the same. It is important, too, what ideas we instil into a child's mind, for they are not easily got rid of in adult years. Frequently a man holds particular views, simply because of certain complex ideas received in youth; and contrary ideas, however convincing to the impartial mind, have no chance with him.

Hitherto our schools trained the intellect, and neglected the training of the motives which in later life give the impulse to the exercise of what has been learned in youth. If children were educated so that they could regulate the propelling element, on which depends all their success in life, it would be of more value to them than a thorough knowledge of Latin and Greek without such instruction. Not so-called moral education, i.e., the teaching of moral precepts, is needed, but the education of the emotions and propensities. Education to be complete should include the training of motives for the exercise of the intellectual capacities. Many a boy does well at school because he has natural capacity and is made to learn; but when his
college education is finished, and the stimulus is withdrawn, he ceases to learn any more. The college education trained the intellect but neglected the formation of character, which would provide the youth with aims in life. True, there is moral education of a sort, but that is directed chiefly towards rendering a youth virtuous; it is a training of the moral faculties, not of the elementary instincts (propensities), directing them to useful activity; it is that which is required. What is of value to a youth is the character organisation, which enables him to do well in the world, after he has left school. This organisation he is born with, his teachers may modify it, but they cannot supply it. The greatest men the world ever possessed either received a little or no higher education, or, if so, few of them distinguished themselves in their schooldays; on the contrary, they were considered dunces, and no one ever suspected their talents and force of character. Even when a boy does well at examinations, he may not have the appearance, the neatness, the presence, the speech, and the social qualities which mean success much more often than does actual ability. Our Civil Service Commissioners have discovered that fact, and I understand that in future they are going to interview their candidates for Colonial administration before they are admitted to the competitive examinations.

Our examination systems to prove qualification for the higher walks of life are so arranged that all those young people fail who do not exhibit a certain decidedly mechanical type of intellectual ability, no matter how rich they may be in other mental, moral and practical qualities, some of them of the utmost value to the community. These systems have the deplorable effect of causing both teachers and parents to concentrate upon one narrow form of intellectual development rather than upon the harmonious development of those moral qualities which make or mar a man's future and happiness. Experience has conclusively proved that the pupil who takes first prize at school is not necessarily the best fitted of all candidates for a post of honour and difficulty in the outer world; and naturally so, since the requirements in each case are totally different. One boy may be found in a class learning diligently, and another unable to assimilate anything at all from his books. That is a question of active endowment. In due time both boys leave school—the one still with a taste for reading, the other with latent forces of an unknown character. The reading boy settles down into a bookworm and is happy in obtaining a post as librarian or private secretary; or, if of a scientific turn, he may devote himself to some special study and read papers at meetings of learned societies. The dull boy may turn out to be possessed of courage and daring, combined with ascendency over his fellow-men, and become a famous administrator, helping to maintain the greatness of his native country.

No doubt book-learning is a valuable asset under present-day conditions, but it is not essential, and there are very many individuals, although scholastically dunces, who have yet sufficient aptitudes of other kinds, and, in particular, sufficient common sense, not only to take care of their interests, but to achieve a considerable degree of success in another walk of life. It is therefore wrong to stigmatise children whose minds do not run to intellectual pursuits as backward, or feeble-minded, or mentally deficient. The term "mental defect" should be restricted to those persons who are lacking in general mental capacity, in common sense—that is, to such persons who are incapable of subsisting by their own unaided efforts. We must remember that the human mind is compounded of many faculties, and none of us are equally efficient in all of them; one lacks verbal memory and another arithmetical talent, one has no taste for music and another none for the fine arts, one cannot draw and another cannot sing, and so on.

Accepting the analysis of mental dispositions in this work, or some improved form of it, each child should have a chart made of his main characteristics, of his intellectual capacities, sentiments, emotions, and propensities which from time to time, as they are moulded by training and experience, can be corrected.
charts would also be useful for people about to marry, who would thus get to know each other's dispositions beforehand and be saved from disappointments thereafter.

We have to find out whether a boy is backward from lack of industry, energy, perseverance, self-reliance, or other force of character on which success depends, or whether he is lacking in understanding. The boy may lack ambition to exert himself. He may lack concentration, flitting from subject to subject and taking hold of none. Then there are boys who grow tired easily and cannot fix their attention on one subject for any length of time. Others work by fits and starts. They are capable of great momentary efforts, but these are divided by long intervals of cerebral inactivity. Other boys are wanting in self-esteem, in self-reliance. Others are nervous boys who are easily confused, and whose memory deserts them at the critical moment. Some boys want encouragement. There is no one to tell them "well done" when the work is well done. Some parents criticise but do not bestow praise. Some boys are lacking in will-power, and this may be due to a variety of causes, as from defective nutrition of the nervous elements in delicate children; as, for instance, when a child is growing very fast. The boy may have no method, or no enthusiasm, or no liking for his work.

Boys can be brought up on a uniform plan of education till they are ten or twelve. But even then they should be already sorted according to ability and character, the quickly-learning being put in a separate class to those who are slow. The really able ones should be passed for higher education to the secondary schools, without fees if poor. Greater trust should be placed in the teacher's judgment than in examinations for the sorting-out. The higher education should be arranged according to ability in special subjects, which fit some for technical schools, others for classical training, others for commercial colleges, and others for trade schools. The actually backward would of course require special training and be taught some handicap requiring not much intelligence. Arrangements should be made that students leaving these various schools find at once employment suitable to their individual abilities. This plan would give to the children of the poorer classes greatly improved chances in life, and the State would profit greatly by having the right men in the right places.

**THE CHARACTERISTICS OF GENIUS**

The various talents—and the brain centres for these talents—are unequally developed in individuals; hence the diversity of faculty that we see. Special gifts are not uncommon; indeed, they are very ordinary; but not every man had the opportunity or the character to manifest his abilities to the greatest advantage of himself and the world.

Greatness resides invariably, so to speak, within the four corners of one's personality, implanted there by nature in the mysterious distribution of her gifts. Genius most frequently appears at such an early age as to put study or cultivation as a producing cause, out of the question. Musicians and artists are the most precocious, philosophers the least, the order being very much in accordance with the degree of abstractness of the subject to which their faculties are devoted. The mechanical and mathematical "bent" is as absolutely irresistible towards its own line of achievement as is that of the poets or painters towards theirs.

**Genius is nearly always limited to the predominance of one or more brain powers.** If the entire brain were engaged in all studies equally, as some of our physiologists believe, a man who excels, for example, in mathematics would have to excel equally in drawing or music; but we find great philosophers who cannot learn the multiplication table, men who can draw well but cannot paint, and colourists who cannot draw. Admitting a multiplicity of centres in the brain, one can at once understand how it is that one man may excel in one thing and be stupid in another;
as a man may have strong eyesight and be very deaf, or a fine sense of touch and no power of smelling.

Every elementary faculty which has its seat in the brain can be developed; the fighting instinct in the prize-fighter, the hoarding instinct in the financier, the sense of colour in the painter, the sense of tune in the musician, of construction in the inventor, of imagination in the poet, of induction and deduction in the philosopher, etc.

True, a single faculty alone, except perhaps in the arithmetical prodigies, does not produce genius. For instance, imagination is necessary both to the artist and the scientist, in addition to their special gifts. Commonly it is believed that these two are opposites: the one compact of imagination, emotion, synthetic and creative power; the other tending rather to doubt, to analysis, and to rejection of all that cannot be verified by the testimony of the senses. It is undeniable that the scientific mind is pre-eminently critical in its outlook, yet it is not by observation and experiment alone that the greatest advances in knowledge have been made. For the co-ordination of scattered observations, for the recognition of the laws of their appearance, we have need of that faculty of imagination which is typical of the practical temperament. Great are as the merits of the patient worker who accumulates the facts, the stones of the future building, far greater is the achievement of the thinker who by a flash of intuition binds them into a compact theory and thus completes the edifice with the materials provided by research.

Carlyle said: "Genius is an infinite capacity for taking pains," and others repeated the saying without further reflection. No amount of taking pains can alone for the absence of aptitude. Given the aptitude, then by taking pains we may achieve superiority. But why does the genius take pains with his aptitude? The gratification of that power is a pleasure to him. The term "pains" is therefore a misnomer. Industry alone is not enough to enable the aspirant in any walk of life to become distinguished. Some men toil hard to learn what others acquire by the slightest application. Nay, more, the act of taking pains is, itself, a natural endowment, like a good or bad memory. No amount of taking pains can fashion a great poet, a great painter, or a great musician out of a lad who has no capacity for literature or art. The schools cannot make a mathematician, philosopher, or naturalist of a boy who does not possess the native qualities.

The man of genius is generally a man of passion. We may just as well attempt to run a steam-engine without fuel or water as to make a genius out of a being without strong emotions. A person without any emotions is without energy. Better to have passions—guided in the right direction—than to have nothing to guide and nothing to conquer. The activity of the mind depends to a great extent on the activity of the passions. Great men frequently have great passions. The average man is indolent, does not move from the habitual groove of thought. He has nothing of that activity of soul by which a man in power forms new springs for moving the world or sows the seeds of future events. It is due to their intense passions that men can execute the greatest actions, defy dangers, pain, and death. The passions being strongly fixed on the object of desire, prompts heroes to plan and execute those hardy enterprises which, till success has proved the propriety of them, appear ridiculous to the multitude. It is therefore during the age of passion that man is capable of the greatest efforts, both of virtue and genius, provided he has acquired a proper compass of learning. When the passions decline, often the power of mental acquisition diminishes also, and whatever superiority may afterwards appear in their works, it is no more than the application and display of the ideas acquired in the time of the effervescence of the passions, but which hitherto had not been reduced to practice.

The passions rouse the man of genius to energy, industry, and perseverance, to make effective use of the natural aptitude which he possesses. Although genius is not
merely a capacity for taking pains, yet it is necessary to take pains to develop its capacity. It is in the use of the innate gifts, and not the mere possession of them, that real greatness lies. Many men possess the necessary faculties, but they have not the impulses to use them industriously. Industry, when well directed, would make many men successful, but gifts, so-called, rarely have conferred greatness upon any. Of course, without the special gift, no labour or training will avail to produce the fine flower of genius, hence a person of genius in one line only of mental activity may notably not rise above—may, indeed, fall below—the average level of general intelligence.

The man of talent does what he has conscientiously learnt to do and others can be taught to do; although, having superior mental powers, he does easily and well that which they only do less easily and well. The man of genius does that which nobody but himself can do. His work is the essential and unique expression of himself, and he does it without being aware how he does it. He must be original; that is to say, he must have a constitutional dissatisfaction with things as they are, and an urgent impulse to get off the beaten tracks of thought and feeling in which ninety-nine persons out of a hundred go contentedly all their lives.

One of the differences between the man of genius and the average man lies in their totally different manner of receiving sense-impressions. Among the large number of sense-impressions that continually stream in upon us, our mind, influenced by our interest, makes a selection: the average man according to their practical importance, from a personal point of view; the genius looks at objects which interest him objectively, from a disinterested point of view, taking pleasure in the work for itself, not for its practical purpose.

The man of genius has a definite object in view. To achieve that object he must have exceptional natural ability coupled with such an environment as will give him the opportunity of expression. No matter what his talents, he cannot force his way, if he lives at the wrong time and in the wrong place. Genius must free itself of environmental restrictions. The very central idea of success is separation from the multitude of plain men, differentiation from the crowd. The average man flourishes and finds his ease in an atmosphere of peaceful routine. Men destined for success flourish and find their ease in an atmosphere of collision and disturbance. All great things have been won and given by those who would not conform; and in science, literature, and the arts it is not different. Where would astronomy be now if the great ones had not risked excommunication? Where would the Darwinian theory have been if its author had conformed to the views of the majority? Where would modern surgery now have stood but for Semmelweis; and Lister's disregard of the attitude of their opponents? The genius escapes from the routine in which his fellows live; his work is an innovation. But he often pays dearly for his boldness. As the history of philosophy and science shows, men are not grateful to the discoverer of such truths as tend to disturb existing notions. He is fortunate, indeed, if he escapes persecution, and he must be of a sound organisation if he is not to break down under the abuse and obloquy which are the portion of the preacher of a new gospel. The instinctive tendency of mankind is to resent any disturbance of its placid hold of traditional beliefs, and to muzzle or suppress the disturber. The pioneer is generally in a thankless position; often he is sowing the ground for others to reap.

Great men must make their opportunity. The greatest work in the world has been accomplished by men who have had to fight for opportunity in the face of opposition.

The most distinguished names in every age and country have been self-made. Some of the most illustrious men have sprung from a most obscure origin and often from stocks which the eugenists would eliminate as unfit and unsound. Of course, genius cannot prosper in the extremes of abject poverty, as little as it prospers in
the enervating environment of luxury. In the one his enthusiasm freezes, in the other it evaporates.

Progress everywhere depends on the few who are capable of creating novelties and getting them accepted. There are plenty of geniuses, but their work has not been "taken up," hence there is no reward for them. A poem may be full of the noblest inspiration, the most graceful diction; but it cannot shake the world without a publisher. A comedy may be equally witty and adroit; but it is "dead weed" until it is made convincing to a manager. An architect may design the most "lordly pleasure house," and an engineer the most serviceable bridge, but neither can fulfil its intention until the prosaic builder has been instructed to take the matter in hand. The musician sighs over his uninterpreted "score," his ambition is high, but the "production" of his opera involves a certain risk, a considerable expenditure. He must wait. The realisation of all these ideas depends, and must depend, on powers and opportunities outside their originators, and, as a rule, altogether beyond their control. Consequently other qualities are necessary, besides the inborn gift, namely, character qualities, to make the genius recognised. It is only in the works of genius pure and simple, as in art and poetry, and in literature generally, that recognition follows more easily. It is in these that we find a larger percentage of eminent men arising from humble rank than in any other path of achievement, for they do not require University training. The child of wealthy parents or of high social rank is frequently too far removed from nature. But poverty means enforced labour. Poverty tends to weaken that self-reliance which the consciousness of possessing property tends to strengthen.

There are people with whom the initial difficulty is the great one—people who cannot start themselves, but who, once started, run along merrily. I do not, however, believe that great talents have often been kept down for want of this early help. Provided a man possesses the necessary character qualities, he may be trusted to force his way against almost any obstacle. History shows that the majority of men who have achieved success of the first order in life have had no such good fortune at their birth.

The extraordinary industry of men of genius and their self-imposed hardships render their organisation highly vulnerable. Yet geniuses as a class are long-lived, as might be expected, for, to become eminent, people must generally live long. I refer, of course, to geniuses in the field of philosophy and science, and not in the arts. The latter come early to their season of mellow fruitfulness and often die young, like those whom the gods love.

Men of superior brain power—provided they can keep their emotions steady—are as a rule longer lived than ordinary men, notwithstanding the strain of intellectual life, to which is often added the unhygienic condition of a sedentary existence. Only such men of genius as poets, artists, and inventors are often short-lived; though even among them, Goethe, Michael Angelo, Titian, and others reached a good old age. It is the poverty in early youth, the early disappointment, lack of appreciation, irregular meals and insufficient diet, lack of sleep, and other hygienic errors which tend to shorten life in these cases. Statesmen, judges, clergymen, are generally long lived; but we must not overlook the fact that long life in itself adds to fame, the person so fortunate outliving his competitors and adversaries.

The prolonged application and energy of men of genius are signs of their sanity. The insane often have lucky inspirations, but not the perseverance to carry a work to its completion. If they do finish their task, they are certain to spoil their work before the end by the introduction of some insane idea. I have seen paintings spoiled by the finishing touches of an insane artist, and I have read poems of magnificence and essays of splendid composition but for their last sentences.
The genius is usually consistent in the one thing which makes him original, whether it be in the work which he does or which he proposes to do. A real genius does not produce his work because it brings wealth, fame, or happiness, but because he has the impulse to produce it whatever its consequences. Sometimes he has been stoned for it. Frequently it is adversity that spurs him on. If he is successful, it is not by "good luck," it is not by any occult occurrences, but by opportunities promptly utilised, a characteristic which shows his sanity.

Every illustrious man is the direct result of his ancestry, but we do not know the laws governing inheritance. Natural ability consists of almost infinite complexities of brain power, and it is these complexities, not natural ability itself, which are the subject of inheritance. Men of genius often make ill-advised marriages, and the offspring do not come up to their standard.

We have in genius—indeed, in exceptional ability of any kind—one or more areas of the brain developed at the expense of other areas, and this undue bestowal of brain power in one direction is commonly attended by some deficiency in another. More highly gifted than the majority of men in one respect, he is less well equipped than they in other functions and aptitudes, and not infrequently he suffers from some distressing physical affliction. We are all alike in this respect. None of us have all the capacities in equal strength; indeed, the character by which we are known to our friends is due to this predominance of certain qualities and deficiency of others.

The psychic centres of the brain are multiple and complex. They do not form in any person a homogeneous whole of which the parts are all uniformly developed. It is owing to this exaltation of the functions of one or more groups of brain-cells that genius is, as a rule, partial. Well balanced faculties do not generally lead to anything more than mediocrity.

Genius has the vision of new ideas which outstrip the mental capacities of their contemporaries, and possesses the power of realising these ideas; in other words, genius is an inborn tendency to see and do certain things better than the rest of mankind. The genius is considered such when he develops ideas that are really of value. But there are many persons who have all his qualifications, except the one of being able to materialise their ideas. They lack the ability to do, as well as to contemplate. Such persons are prone to dream of revolutionising the race with their ideas, but they lack the power of practical execution, and their visions come to naught. In the pursuit of their extravagant plans they completely lose sight of the realities of life, keeping their gaze fixed only upon the results, while they never take into serious consideration the difficulties and insufficiencies of their methods. Yet they hold to their ideas, however unusual and absurd, till everything is coloured and distorted by them.

Genius represents to himself things as they ought to be, not as they are. Things as they are would not make him sacrifice himself. Genius proclaims a truth where others keep silent. He proclaims it because he has a high ideal of spiritual vision and is not like the average man, a mere gramophone record of existing dogmas and mass credulity. Viewed in this manner, genius may be considered abnormal; but not all abnormality is pathological, nor is every individual insane who differs from the mass of mankind in his way of thinking and conduct. We know from experience that genius and insanity often go together; but all men of genius are not insane. It is the frequency of eccentricity which has served in the minds of some writers as a reason for regarding genius as a morbid manifestation. We must not forget that trivial details in the lives of great men are recorded and made much of, and that the same symptoms in ordinary men would not be regarded as insanity. To a certain extent, of course, all men of genius are singular, and frequently they are given to unconventionalities of conduct. Circumstances in their lives may have tended to weaken their confidence in human nature, and they accordingly shun mankind and become peculiar in their ways. Their peculiarities and eccentricities
do not justify us in regarding them as mentally morbid. The same peculiarities and defects occur in the general population; but the ordinary man, if he has the least breeding, has been accustomed from his youth to control his expressions and conduct, while the man of genius is often too preoccupied to pay attention to the impression he is likely to convey to others by his manners. He appears what he really is, while the average man often resembles.

The great majority of the human race is average. It is upon the medium type that nature relies upon the continuance of the species. Persons whose minds deviate in some one or more notable respects from the ordinary standard, but yet whose mental processes are not directly at variance with that standard, are said to be eccentric. Eccentricity is generally inherent in the individual or is gradually developed in him from the operation of unrecognised causes as he advances in years. If an original condition, it is often the result of early training emphasised by a special environment. These individuals are often mentally brilliant in some directions, but are handicapped by deficiency in those qualities which would aid them in the competition and struggle for existence.

It is not the exceptional capacity and its exceptional activity which causes insanity or any other breakdown in men of genius, but the deficiency and weakness of the other capacities and activities. Heredity is as much a factor with them as with ordinary people. Personal ease, health, comfort, or welfare do not enter into their calculation. If they fall in gaining recognition and go mad, it is their worry which has broken them, as it does daily other men. Some do lower their vitality by excessive work in unhygienic surroundings, others by the indulgence in drink and a dissipated life; others are by nature hyper-sensitive, and feel pleasures and sadness more keenly than ordinary men.

The genius is in the van of his age, but for this reason he need not be held mistaken, unpractical, or mad. If he agreed with his age, he would not be original. Indeed, the higher the level of the general average of ability, the higher the ability of the distinguished few. A Bacon is not honoured so much by his own age as by a posterity which has developed up to his level. Certain periods in history are more favourable to the rising of genius, for "the great man assimilates and recasts the material supplied him by his epoch"; but the same forces act upon the mass of his totally undistinguished countrymen.

There are literary, artistic, scientific, administrative, military, commercial, religious, philanthropic, and even criminal geniuses; but if they do not belong to a tainted family, and do not indulge in excesses, they do not become insane any more than ordinary men who are not defective from birth nor have led irregular lives. The fault is that most writers on the subject draw up an incomplete list of men of genius, and confine themselves chiefly to artists and poets, who form almost a class to themselves. They leave out of consideration a vast number of persons equally qualified to be considered. Artists and poets, oftener than others, lack balance and are subject to oddities, fixed ideas, prejudices, fancies, and sometimes moral perversions. But the disorderly life which was formerly indulged in by them in the fond belief that it was a help to their inspiration, is very rare now; hence they are saner. Genius is more common amongst artists and poets, because artistic and literary pursuits are open to men from humble rank, which is not the case to the same extent in other paths of achievement. Other pursuits require longer training, ampler means, and greater social influence. But just because these men are of humbler origin, it is questionable whether they are physically as sound as those of better birth. Another point deserving consideration is that artists and poets depend greatly for their originality on their power of imagination, and a vivid imagination is easily disturbed by ill-health and leads readily to deception of the senses; hence they are easily subject to hallucinations.

There is nothing extraordinary in the fact that the nervous organisation of men
of genius is very liable to break down. For theirs is a highly refined and complex organisation, and the price of refinement and complexity is instability. A fine and complex machine is more apt to go out of order than a crude and simple one; but that does not prove that complexity and disorder are the same thing. Similarly, the more complex minds may be more liable to derangement than the simpler ones, but that does not prove that mental complexity and derangement are identical. It only proves what hardly stands in need of proof, that instability and heterogeneity tend to go hand in hand.

Neurosis develops in the man of genius as a consequence of his exceptional labour, much more than as the source of his genius. The brain of the thinker, working harder than all the other organs, appropriates a larger amount of nutriment, thereby impoverishing the rest of the organism and placing it in a condition of inferiority for contending against disease, particularly against those maladies which attack the nervous system.

Another reason for the liability of men of genius to insanity is their great sensibility, which implies a finer and more subtle delicacy of thought and feeling, which permits of a keener sympathy and a deeper, clearer insight into men and things than are granted to ordinary beings. That this constitutes a defect of often great consequences to the individual, as well as a quality of still greater import to the race, is sufficiently clear. Sensations and observations, which the ordinary man hardly notices, are transformed by them to great creations; at the same time disappointed hopes, failures, and adversity are felt more keenly by them. Men of genius are, even with apparent outward good fortune, men who most deeply and irremediably feel the wretchedness of existence. Their ideals urge them to constant, painful, and often unsuccessful effort. The world will jarr on them, their efforts will provoke much friction and opposition, and they will be pained by many things in which a lower nature would placidly acquiesce.

Genius feels the lack of appreciation more deeply than do men of common clay. This feeling is too often justified by the knowledge of the neglect which has been the lot of so many men who have given themselves without stint and without hope of material reward to labour for the lightening of darkness in which we live. Many have been allowed to starve or spend their lives in hidden grooves, their poverty and obscurity being sometimes in strong contrast with the fame and wealth of others who have reaped where they have sown. The hardest thing for a scientific man to bear is the attribution of discoveries of his own to men who have come into the vineyard at the eleventh hour and received the reward of his labours. The history of science is full of examples of such injustice; and it is not surprising that melancholy is a most frequent accompaniment of genius.

Insanity consists in a loss of control over thoughts and feelings. The difference between sanity and insanity is thus the degree of self-control exercised. Of course, none of us reach the ideal in mind and conduct. Nearly all the world is cracked, but some succeed in concealing the crack better than others. In insanity the personality of the afflicted person is altered, sometimes by an alteration of character contrasting with the ordinary healthy condition, sometimes by an exaggeration of the natural dispositions and predilections which have marked the individual when in health. Persistent retrospection or gloomy introspection, extreme sensitiveness, marked egotism, a feeling of unsettledness, a want of power of continuous application to the usual occupations, are symptoms which mark the oncoming of mental derangement.

As regards actually insane persons, they may produce works of great eminence, if their insanity affects their feelings but not their intellect, as, for example, in paranoia. Patients afflicted with this form of mental disease believe themselves persecuted. The geniuses one meets at lunatic asylums are generally of this kind.

Clever work may also be done, and has often been done, at the beginning of mania, during the stage of so-called hypomania, which is characterised by an
increased sense of well-being and an exaltation of all the faculties, so that the natural talents are stimulated and the ideas flow more freely than in the normal state. Some men suffer from a recurrent mania, and if the attacks be mild in their nature neither they nor their friends may suspect anything abnormal.

Whatever the explanation, it is certainly the case that the art of the lunatic asylum is practically confined to pictorial and literary expressions, and it is rare for the insane to seek in music an outlet. Insane literature consists generally of poetry. Relatively few lunatics, and as a rule those only whose mental integrity is but slightly impaired, make any attempt to produce work of literary pretensions in prose. Alike in literature and in painting, conventionality and traditionalism are the distinguishing features of the work of the insane. Originality is rare. This observation may bring some consolation to the Post-Impressionist and Futurist school of painters. Only in cases of delusional insanity is there ability, originality, or constructive power.

Speaking in general, the insane person almost invariably shows signs of mental derangement in more than one direction, and is unable to give long-sustained attention to any one subject. One faculty there is that plays an important part in the mental operations of both the genius and the lunatic, namely imagination. But the one makes use of this faculty for the accomplishment of the objects he has in view, while the other becomes its slave and is led hither and thither by its vagaries.

In taking other defects, such as gout, consumption, etc., it must not be forgotten that these diseases afflict all classes of men, not merely men in the highest ranks of intellect. If the brain be sound, contrary to the accepted notion, the body may be weak. Frail men and women have performed some of the greatest deeds enrolled in the history of the race. They have done so on the stimulus of a great idea. Fired by some great passion or some suddenly roused interest, a comparatively weak individual can carry out an immensity of work impossible to physically stronger persons who are untouched by the spiritual forces which sway him.

If all the genius is tainted, then from the point of view of eugenics they ought never to have been born. Certainly they ought never to marry. But is there anyone who could positively assert that all his ancestors, aunts, uncles, great-uncles, etc., on the maternal and paternal side, were absolutely sound?

The existence of mental defects, obliquity of mental vision, imperfect cerebral development, and marked defection of character, is scarcely compatible with the breadth of view, powerful imagination, and great intellectual strength of men in the very first rank of human genius.
CHAPTER XXXIV

THE APPLICATION OF ETHOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF INSANITY

The study of the signs of mental derangement is of immense importance to mankind, inasmuch as it leads to the prevention of a disease which robs man of all his highest attainments. Insanity seldom comes like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. The study of insanity clearly shows that it practically never develops in a day; but that, on the contrary, often weeks and months elapse until the deviation from normal mental health is noticed. Often some accidental circumstance, some apparently trivial event, may be the determining cause of the outbreak—the immediate precursor of the declared symptoms; but the conditions have been there before, and, as in the old adage, the new event was but as "the last straw" that made the burden intolerable. If the early history of the patient be only carefully investigated, it will be found that eccentric acts were performed long before the actual outbreak of the disease. Opinions may differ as to how wide may be the departure from normal to justify us in diagnosing insanity, but yet this is the beginning of the malady; the difference between this state and certifiable insanity—that is, insanity in the legal sense—is a quantitative difference, a difference of degree only.

Insanity exists long before the certifiable stage, but usually no notice is taken of it so long as the insane person does not seriously interfere with the social current. But when, for various reasons, he becomes troublesome, or commits an indiscretion which affects his own existence or which brings discredit on his family and friends, he may be declared "legally" insane and deprived of his liberty. What the law takes cognisance of is not whether the person is unsound in mind—in the medical sense—but whether the person is insane in conduct or likely to become so. About his thoughts and feelings it is not concerned in the least, so long as no harmful conduct is likely to arise from them. Whatever a person believes, thinks, or feels matters only in the medical estimation of insanity. In the legal sense it is of no consequence, so long as his conduct is not affected thereby. It is for what he says and the way he behaves that a person is certified as insane. It is the patient's lack of self-control and inability to adapt himself to his environment which is the criterion of admission to the asylum. Thus in such institutions we get those types of cases together which appear forbidding to the ignorant and to whom the antiquated term of "lunatic" is applied. It is no exaggeration to say that in a large number of cases the curable stages of insanity are passed by the time asylum physicians see the patient, and treatment before certification has hitherto been rendered difficult in England because of legal restrictions in the case of well-to-do patients and the absence of genuine mental "hospitals" for the poor. These defects are now to be remedied.

A patient may be certified whenever his conduct becomes unsafe to himself or to others. When the realm of conduct is invaded, then the disease becomes of social importance and can be certified as insanity. Thus, what was before medically
THE APPLICATION OF ETHOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF INSANITY

true, though legally denied, is admitted only when the preliminary and most carable stage has passed. It is the badly damaged brain that is sent to the asylum for safe keeping, but there are, in every stratum of society, large numbers of blemished brains that perform their functions irregularly and require repair.

There is no sharp demarcation between the medically and legally insane. There are no hard-and-fast lines separating sanity and insanity, soundness and unsoundness of the mind; indeed, there is no sharp division between health and disease in general, disease being nothing more than an exaggeration, or disproportion, or inharmony of normal phenomena.

Whereas the general diagnosis of insanity, when once so pronounced as to necessitate certification, is in many cases so easy that it can be made by any layman, the early stages of mental unsoundness often demand all the science and skill of the most experienced observers. Even in the domain of physical disease, where exact physical means for diagnosis are at hand, it is often difficult to decide where health changes to disease. It is still much more difficult in the psychic domain, where a standard of mental health can only be thought of as ideal, where no individual is exactly like another, and variations of thought and feeling from the majority of mankind, and even errors of the understanding and illusions of the senses, are possible within the limits of physiological life.

In reference to the body, "feeling well" is the chief mark of health; most people who are sick know it. With the mind it is otherwise; here there is no connection between health and feeling well, and the patient is not in a condition to say whether he is well or not. Consciousness of derangement occurs, as a rule, only at the very beginning of insanity, and that only in some patients; and it occurs again just before recovery, when the knowledge of being mentally ill is one of the most marked symptoms of convalescence.

At the approach of insanity the unfortunate sufferer is often conscious of a gradual loss of control over his thoughts, feelings, and fears, but he conceals with the utmost jealousy from his relatives and friends the agony that is eating into his very soul. No doubt innumerable acts which puzzle and appear totally unaccountable to friends and strangers are the result of mental conflict hidden in the depths of the patient's mind. Persistent introspection or gloomy retrospection, excessive sensitiveness, marked egotism, a feeling of unsettledness, a want of power of continuous application to the usual occupations, are all characteristics not to be lightly regarded. A prolonged condition of want of conscious energy, when work ceases to be a pleasure, when there is "no go" in the man, is a symptom to be taken notice of. The opposite condition of ceaseless impulsive action and continuous output of energy without sufficient cause is also sometimes suspicious. In persons who have had normal or extra good manners when in health, it is a bad sign if the usual social observances and conventions become markedly irksome—and are departed from. Of course, none of us reach the ideal in mind and conduct, and some have marked peculiarities.

In the incipient stage of insanity the patient is sometimes fully sensible of entertaining exaggerated and unnatural impressions; he is acutely conscious of the mind dwelling morbidly and sometimes irresistibly upon certain trains of absurd, unhealthy, and it may be very impure thoughts; he painfully recognises the fact that insane conceptions are struggling to master his reason, obtain an ascendancy over his judgment, an abnormal influence and control over his passions, and the subjugation of his instincts.

The difference between sanity and insanity consists in the degree of self-control exercised. We all have, at some time or other, thoughts passing through our minds and feelings agitating us which, if they were expressed and indulged in, would be as wild and perhaps as frightful in their consequences as those of any madman. But the man of strong mind represses them and seeks fresh impressions from without,
GENIUS, INSANITY, AND CRIME,

if he finds that aid needful. The man of weak mind yields to them, meditates on them, indulges in them, and thus they acquire fresh force, until he is totally unable to free himself from the thought or subject that haunts him, and he is then insane.

The standard of sanity depends partly on the environment, which varies not only with every stage of civilisation and barbarism, but also with each social station and each grade or phase of education. What would be natural and commonplace in one state of society or in one community would be altogether aberrant and unusual in another, and this difference exists even in the same persons under various circumstances.

The standard of sanity depends also on the standard of the individual. Everyone thinks and acts in his own way, and thus there is formed a special standard of normality, which is made up of habits, social instincts, education, training, and more especially of those moral traits that constitute what we call character. In these respects the individual must be measured by the standard of his own personality—he must be tested by what he ought to be and by what he was in his normal condition—before an accurate decision can be arrived at in any case of suspected mental disorder.

Insanity may therefore be described as a state of derangement, disease, or defect of the brain, causing a disordered action of the mind and putting the subject into a condition varying from his normal self and frequently out of relation to his environment.

It is the brain which is at fault, that part of the nervous system upon the unimpaired condition of which the exercise of the understanding and the proper manifestation of the feelings and instinctive propensities depend. The brain itself may be diseased, or it may be affected indirectly; the blood with which it is supplied may be defective, or, since the brain is intimately connected with all the bodily organs, their disturbed condition may cause a reflex-irritation of the brain. In many cases the symptoms of insanity appear due merely to a functional disorder of the brain. Those insanities which are organic, like progressive paralysis, senile dementia, etc., are incurable, at all events at present.

Whether the brain is affected directly or indirectly, something has happened to hinder its normal function. The personality of the affected person is altered, sometimes by an allevation of character contrasting with the ordinary healthy condition, sometimes by an exaggeration of the natural dispositions and predilections which had marked the individual when in health.

When there is an alteration in the character, the change is generally in the direction of degradation. The kindly and forbearing man becomes irritable and quarrelsome; the refined and gentlemanly man consorts with people very much beneath him, regardless of their character; the prudent man launches out in wild speculations; the previously orderly and economical man becomes confused and prodigal; the precise man exhibits carelessness and negligence; the gay man is sullen and morose; and the modest, retiring man thrusts himself forward into all kinds of society, writes long and familiar letters to persons with whom he has only a bowing acquaintance, asking favours, offering benefits, and making appointments; the parsimonious man becomes lavish, and the generous man parsimonious. Often there are also aversion and antipathy towards persons who previously were regarded with respect and affection—a change so painful to those towards whom it is manifested that it is usually the earliest to be noticed.

When there is an exaggeration of the natural disposition, previous faults of character and of temper manifest themselves in greater intensity, over-sensitiveness passing into melancholia, suspicion into delusion, irritable temper into uncontrollable violence, weak volition into obsession, the talkative man monopolising the conversation more completely than usual, the uxorious man becoming even more demonstrative, the egotist bragging more audaciously, the querulous man complaining more bitterly, the naturally timid and reserved man shunning society and
isolating himself altogether from the companionship of his family and friends, the bold man becoming noisy and assuming, the courageous man becoming officious and talkative, and the strictly upright person exhibiting an unhealthy exaltation of conscience respecting his moral and social duties. Any peculiarity of conduct which is natural and not assumed becomes exaggerated.

There are thus two classes of insane—those whose character has undergone a change and those whose natural characteristic has become accentuated or exaggerated beyond control. Of course, it is not the temporary change, the temporary mood or exhibition of eccentricity, which constitutes insanity; for then those only would be considered to be sane who possess ordinary level minds. There are few among us who have not moments of depression or of abnormal excitements, fits of anger or fits of extravagance. It is the prolonged departure, without any adequate external cause, from the state of feeling and mode of thinking usual to the individual when in health that is the true feature of disorder of the mind.

In mental derangement the primary disorder usually consists in a tendency to disordered emotional excitement, which affects the course of thought and, consequently, of action without disordering the reasoning processes in any other way than by supplying them with wrong materials. Men seldom, if ever, go mad from intellectual activity, if it be unaccompanied by emotional agitation. We confine people as lunatics, not because their reasoning is unsound, but because the play of motive in their minds is too abnormal for us to rely on it. Thousands of people believe absurdly enough that they have been wrongly treated. That does not make us interfere with them, but when extravagant vindictiveness appears, when the individual goes about to shoot imaginary persecutors, he is classed among the insane, though his intellect may still be capable of profound or brilliant work.

In the earliest stage of insanity no intellectual defect may be apparent. The reasoning power may remain clear, the intellect as bright as ever, and in the course of a long conversation friends may not perceive the slightest cloud on the understanding. Or if there be any intellectual defect, it is displayed in the inability to recognise and realise the impropriety of the conduct. If one remonstrates or reasons with such a patient, one is astonished at the astuteness with which he justifies and accounts for his conduct. It is in actual brain degeneration, and not in any of the lighter forms of insanity, that the intellect shows permanent signs of weakening.

Through habit a faculty may become so powerful that we lack strength to control it; it controls us. All habits and powers, all passions and propensities, are liable to grow by exercise; every one of these irregularities may, by cultivation and indulgence, become strong enough to overcome the reason and cut off the means of correcting mistakes in judgment, and thereby establish insanity, at least in persons with an insane diathesis or temperament.

All the evil passions—anger, violent temper, hatred, malice, envy, and jealousy—are even more injurious to the balance of the mind than any of the intellectual disproportions. A man in a passion sees in the object of his anger those qualities, and only those, which he wants to see, and his imagination fills up the rest with such as correspond to his own state of feeling. He clothes his antagonist in a garb of his own creation, and then finds undoubted proof that he is wronged.

Some knowledge of the mind and character of man, of psychology and ethology, is absolutely necessary in order to describe accurately the phenomena of morbid mental states. Mental disorders, although they may be associated with the most serious complications affecting the intelligence, do not create new and special desires, but merely rekindle in an extraordinary way and inflame to pathological intensity the common passions of mankind, such as anger, fear, lust, etc.

The various primary mental powers have already been described in order of their evolution and examples have been given of their morbid activity in a state of disease. The disturbances of the primary instincts and emotions, and of perception, Vol. ii.]
memory, and the reasoning powers, have been shown. Illusions and hallucinations have also been dealt with, and it is only necessary to add a few remarks about delusions.

Delusions are frequent, but by no means absolute, signs of insanity. It would be a great mistake to recognise insanity only when delusions can be demonstrated. In the early stage of insanity the delusion may not yet have developed, or the patient may suffer from a form of mental disorder in which no delusions occur; or he may suppress his delusions, or, even though present, they may not reach his consciousness. The sane may entertain the most outlandish false ideas, and even in this respect surpass the insane. On the other hand, the delusion of an insane person need not necessarily contain an objective impossibility; indeed, the delusion itself may be objectively correct and at the same time have the value of a delusion. A delusion in an insane person is a symptom of a general abnormal condition and is related to other symptoms. The error of a sane person depends upon a defect of logical judgment or upon a false premise that has arisen out of uncertainty, carelessness, or embarrassment in the act of perception, such as superstition. A delusion of the insane is a symptom of brain disease, and therefore logic and reasoning are powerless against it. The sane person will see his error and correct it as soon as it is shown to him to be absurd.

The delusion of an insane person always has a subjective significance and an inner relation to his interests; that of a sane person appears only as an objective error. Thus, both may believe in witches: the sane person, however, as a result of superstition and ignorance; the insane person believes in them because he sees, feels, and believes himself threatened by them.

Whereas the well-balanced person would check an erroneous flow of thought by sound mental orientation, the insane—instead of trying to check the mental error by seeking for the proper explanation of perplexing facts as soon as the delusional construction is under way—reaches out for every fact, new or old, that falls within his knowledge, and contaminates it with a delusional and special significance to suit his primary conception.

The cause that gives rise to delusions is an imperfect adaptation of the individual to his surroundings. All delusions consist of fixed ideas, and vary only according to the individual culture of the patient; otherwise they are always alike, or, at least, they follow their course of development in exactly the same manner in the same individual.

Of course, delusions are also caused artificially by means of various drugs, intoxicants, or toxins of organic or infectious nature.

In infectious diseases or diseases due to auto-intoxication, the impure blood which circulates in the brain gives rise to a number of mental images and ideas which, while spurring on one another, are unsystematised. In the brain disease of the insane, on the contrary, although there, too, there may be infected blood circulating, the effect produced is totally different; in this case the ideas are in unison with the fundamental tendencies of the individual, and they dominate him as long as they exist. In brain disorder or disease the ideas always have an intimate bearing on the personality itself. The personality may be depressed, exalted or tortured by them, but they always bear the imprint of the personality, and this is explained by the fact that the cause which brings about the morbid changes does not come from outside, as is the case in fevers, intoxications, etc., but is the product of the brain itself.

A brain centre may be stimulated from within as well as from without; hence the sensation of voices in the insane, in others deceptions of sight, hallucinations of smell or taste, morbid fears or abnormal anger without adequate cause. These are sensations commonly complained of by the insane, and sometimes also by persons in sound mind; the only difference being that the former believe in the existence
of an external cause to excite their sensations, and that the latter perceive their morbid origin, and refuse to obey their impulses.

Both hallucinations and illusions, when believed in as real, give rise to false beliefs and delusions. The patient hears voices, yet he often fails to see anyone to whom he can refer them. Accordingly he assumes in his mad way that the walls are hollow, that the voice came through a telephone, or the like. Many patients hear voices insulting them, and are thereby led to form ideas of persecution. Or, again, they have visual hallucinations. Forms appear and disappear in a very different way from the forms of external objects really present to their senses. Yet they cannot help regarding them as dependent on real external events. So they hit on a way out of the difficulty by, for example, supposing that someone is working mirrors and so conjuring forms up before them.

Some delusions are simply the result of suggestion acting on exalted emotional conditions when judgment is in abeyance; many originate in dreams or are conceived in the half-sleep or the dreamy states of consciousness of many forms of insanity, and afterwards, by reason of constant brooding, become fixed and enduring; or they may be developed as a result of external impressions, as when a paragraph in a book or newspaper is misconstrued, and by a process of false reasoning twisted to suit the insane purpose of the individual.

In other cases they are simply the result of day-dreams of an ill-organised intellect. In still other cases they arise from excessive dwelling of the mind on single ideas and suspicions; they take their start from an egotistic misinterpretation of facts, a sort of mental illusion. Whatever their origin, they are symptoms of defect of intellectual discrimination or judgment—that is, of a disordered intellect.

The most frequent delusional ideas of the insane are personal humiliation and degradation, remorse, physical alteration of the personality, ideas of grandeur, mystic ideas and ideas of suspicion. These delusions are generally fixed, and they invariably refer to the emotional side of the individual's personality, because they are entirely of subjective origin, and because their component ideas are not correctly regulated by conscious ideation of external origin.

Sometimes the conduct of others, wrongly interpreted, is the starting-point of the wrong belief. Sometimes bodily sensations cause the patient to build false beliefs upon them. Sometimes the whole personality is in some way altered, but the patient is unable to describe the alteration which he feels; sometimes the altered personality co-exists with the original personality, and the patient believes, in a confused way, that there are two beings within his body, or that he has another self somewhere outside of himself. Sometimes the personality is actually changed, and the patient has forgotten his past life and has changed to a man of totally different character. Another variety is the patient who believes that he is possessed by a stranger or intruder, who thinks his thoughts, speaks and acts for him, or that he is possessed by an inanimate object.

The delusions which refer to self are either depressive—accompanied by a feeling of misery—or exalted—accompanied by a feeling of happiness.

Patients may suffer from delusions of unworthiness and incompetence, self-accusatory delusions, delusions of sin and crime and vice on the one hand, and of impotence and inability and incapacity on the other. Persons affected with delusions of this class abandon themselves to despair as sinners of the unpardonable sin, or give themselves up to the police for crimes that they have not committed, or confess to faults and vices of which they are wholly innocent or which they greatly exaggerate. They have brought themselves to ruin; they have brought poverty and disgrace upon their families; they have in some inexplicable way involved the whole village, the whole country, the whole human race, in ruin and disaster. There is no solace for them in this world and no hope in the next. These are the delusions occurring in that variety of insanity known as melancholia.
GENIUS, INSANITY, AND CRIME

Or the patient may suffer from delusions of suspicion, persecution, and conspiracy. As he goes about the streets he thinks the people talk to each other about him, or look at him in a significant way; their attitude, their gestures, their very dress even, contain some occult quality which is intended to—and does—annoy and injure him. Sometimes it is a mysterious malignant influence which is exercised over him. It may be by means of hypnotism, electricity, wireless telegraphy, or chemical vapours. This variety of delusions occurs in that form of insanity known as paranoia.

On the other hand, the false beliefs may take on an expansive character. The patient has delusions of exaggerated worthiness, competence or power, or the esteem in which he is held. The patient believes himself to be some exalted personage, or may think himself capable of great feats of bodily strength, of unprecedented mental vigour, of untold wealth, or marvellous inventive, artistic, or executive ability. Such delusions occur in mania, general paralysis, later stages of paranoia, and in dementia praecox.

As before stated, in the early stages a patient may suffer from insanity and yet have no delusions. He may be depressed, out of spirits—he cannot tell why. His business or even his amusements may be a nuisance to him. He may dislike seeing his friends, find even writing a letter a bore, and be irritable to those about him in a way he never was before. But as yet there are no distinct delusions. Conversely, a patient may display a state of exaltation and of change in this direction without delusion, as in hypomania. He may talk in an excited and rapid way, much more than is his wont. He may be inclined to speculations, may build new houses or buy things he does not want, be disposed to quarrel, and by no means willing to take advice. He may sleep but a short time, rising very early and expecting others to do the same, and his whole conduct may be foolish, often causing his friends a fear that he has been giving way to drink. But all the time there may be no delusion. The fact that a patient has delusions is, as a rule, an indication that his mental disturbance has existed for a certain time and proceeded to a considerable depth.

The faculty of speech frequently becomes affected in insanity. There may be increase in the rapidity of speech, from merely a rapid flow to actual incoherence, or the speech may be slow or stammering; or there may be mutism, there may be inability to say certain words, or to put the right word in the right place; there may be silly, affected speech, baby talk, senseless jargon, and gibberish, or wearisome repetition of a word or a phrase, or difficulty in pronouncing words; or there may be scanning speech. The unusual association of words, rhyming and punning, are also among the symptoms often noted. As a rule, the insidious approaches of mischief are foreshadowed by symptoms so trivial that they pass unobserved by patients and their friends.

There may be a slowness and difficulty in expression and answering, and a low-pitched, almost inaudible voice, as in melancholia, in consequence of the painful effect any mental operation causes to the patient. The tendency to silence is often very strongly marked in the acute stage of this disorder, and may be interrupted only by cries and ejaculations of a painful nature. Disconnected sentences and meaningless phrases are repeated in inanition insanities. Speech in monosyllables occurs sometimes in dementia praecox. The speech may be slow in consequence of the feebleness of the mental processes, as in dementia. It may be voluntarily restrained in order to conceal secrets, as in paranoia, or retarded in consequence of hypochondriacal ideas. There may be incessant talking in a high-pitched voice, as in hypomania, the patient allowing nobody else to speak. The speech may be flowing rapidly owing to the wealth of ideas, coming so quickly that the sentences remain unfinished; but speech can be also flowing with a scarcity of ideas, as is common in many sane people.
THE APPLICATION OF ETHOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF INSANITY 229

In connection with speech, it will be appropriate to mention the handwriting of the insane.

In general, it may be said that every one of the principal forms of mental disorder has certain peculiarities of writing and expression, and that the patient in his writings, when he feels less under observation, gives freer expression to himself, and thus betrays more than in conversation. This is especially true of patients who obstinately refuse to talk because of delusions and imperative voices which command them to be silent. It is also often astonishing that patients, who are quite rational in conversation, in their writings express the most irrational ideas. Writing that is rational does not exclude insanity any more than does rational speech. The writing of insane patients may reveal delusions otherwise concealed; the style may enable a judgment of mental capabilities, and in its outward form permit a conclusion concerning the state of consciousness; and the writing itself may be of importance in determining the existence of the slighter disturbance of co-ordination.

In many cases the writing of insane patients is decidedly incomprehensible, as the result of employing words in a new sense, transposition of syllables, the addition of senseless syllables, or substitution of hieroglyphic and symbolic signs for letters. Words improperly written or the absence of words, the repetition of words or complete phrases several times, show disturbances of consciousness. In addition, while writing, the patient often forgets his real object, so that in the same letter he addresses himself indifferently in several languages, delivers the letter unfinished, and forgets to put the address, the date, or the signature. Further, the outer appearances of a letter, the paper, perhaps found in the sweepings and covered with blots, indicate clearly the great disturbance of consciousness. Since writing gives greater clearness of thought than does speech, it is a very fine test of mental weakness.

Imbeciles write the least. The childish formation of sentences, awkwardness and lack of clearness in diction indicate a high degree of mental weakness. Melancholic patients also write little. Here mental pain and inhibition are a hindrance. The monotony of thought reveals itself in the continuous repetition of the same complaints, fears and self-accusations. The writing does not flow in a stream; it can be seen that the patient overcame his inhibition only spasmodically, and was able to express his thoughts only in fragments. Not infrequently the letters themselves are written with a trembling hand.

The maniac writes much and rapidly, with a firm, steady hand, in large letters. It is thus a true picture of his accelerated thought, which oftentimes the hand is unable to keep up with, so that words are left out and sentences remain incomplete. If the flight of ideas becomes greatly intensified, then the handwriting degenerates into an undecipherable chaos of words and sentences that run into each other. In his impulse to write, the patient writes in all directions on the paper, and does not trouble himself about the material which he may have at hand.

Paranoiacs, especially the querulous and erotic, are voluminous writers. Changes in their handwriting, consisting of curious eccentricities, curves, and the underlining of words and syllables, are noticeable. The diction may be faultless, bombastic, or curious, in accordance with the nature of the delusions and the state of consciousness. The content of the writings of paranoiacs is of great value, since it often reveals delusions which are carefully concealed in conversation.

The writing of patients of the paralytic group presents special peculiarities. The disturbance of co-ordination finds its graphic expression in handwriting that is indistinct or childish, zigzag or tremulous, and without distinction in shading.

In Chapters XXVI. and XXVII. the various mental powers as they are affected in the different forms of insanity have been described. The process will now be reversed and the various brain disorders described as they affect the mental powers.

PSYCHASTHENIA

Before dealing with insanity proper, the effects of brain exhaustion should be mentioned, as shown in indecision and morbid fears. In this state the patient is
painfully sensible of feeling mentally below par, and recognises his inability to use efficiently his mental powers. The power of attention is weakened, and the memory either wanders or is incoherent in its associations. The thoughts attach themselves to secondary points, and there is an inability to come to a conclusion. Hence the patient hesitates a long time over trifling details, and this irresolution renders him irritable to the slightest annoyance. His failures discourage him and present to his mind ideas of danger or of evil or fear. He feels powerless to resist the invasion of certain ideas that obtrude themselves upon his mind. Some of these ideas are harmless and meaningless, others are fretful to the individual and dangerous to other people; they are recognised by the subject as unreasonable and morbid, yet he is unable to get rid of them. Particularly painful are the ideas of fear. The patient suffers from an uncontrollable dread, usually confined to a single object or class of objects: the fear of open places, of enclosed places, of crowded and solitary places, fear of lightning, of precipices, of the use of knives, of blood, of special diseases, of contact with certain animals, and so on. They cause the patient to live in a state of mental torture, for his will-power is not great enough to overcome them. These peculiar dreads and oppressions do not tincture the whole being, as the fixed ideas of the insane do. They are more or less arguable, more or less kept in their place by the judgment of the sufferer, who does not lose all sense of relative values. The will being not merely the power to do something, but also to leave something undone, lack of will-power, as in these sufferers, means loss of control over impulses. These impulses are frequently of an absurd character, such as particular movements, or impulses to touch things, but they may also be impulses to take things, when the patient will endeavour to check them, but is so full of "fear" of giving way, that he may suffer intolerable agony.

**Hysteria**

In the mental symptoms of **hysteria**, which affects women more than men, there is also defective will-power, morbid fears, want of self-control, and a tendency to impulsive actions, besides instability of the emotions and an irritability of temper.

Such patients crave for excitement, novelty, and the sensational, and their desire to attract attention and sympathy is so great that they exaggerate and even invent symptoms. Instability is the fundamental feature of the hysterical character. Inclinations, temper, and general feelings all change with incredible rapidity. Self-absorbed and selfish, everything must bend to their feelings and their views. They are untruthful and unreliable, unduly excitable, and far too easily influenced by their environment, yet their obstinacy in having their own way is extreme. Another characteristic is their constant tendency to mental abstraction, to absent-mindedness, which renders them very susceptible to suggestion and auto-suggestion. Sometimes they seem possessed of two or more personalities, being in one state conscious of certain experiences and living up to a certain character, while in another state they seem entirely different beings. A modern hypothesis of hysteria is that the disease is a mental disorder, the symptoms of which indicate what is going on in the subconscious mental life of the individual. Disagreeable events, feelings, emotions, and temptations of early childhood, which may have been discarded or repressed, nevertheless continue to influence unconsciously the mental life of the individual, until traced by a process of psychoanalysis, and frankly confessed.

Hysteria is regarded as due to dissociation; the patient suffers from weakness of mental synthesis, the effect of painful emotional experiences. Certain parts of the mind, certain sensations, certain powers of movement, certain memories, are lost to the main consciousness, but still exist somewhere, in some form, and can be restored under appropriate conditions.
HYPOMANIA

A common, but unfortunately seldom recognised, form of insanity, the precursor of actual mania, is hypomania. In this condition there is a stimulation of all the faculties without confusion and a pleasurable feeling. The ideas are still sound but they flow rapidly, there is constant planning, ceaseless activity, extreme verbosity, increased emotionality, causing the patients to treat as friends mere chance and possibly undesirable acquaintances. The rapidity of their thoughts and actions does not allow them to finish the various subjects that they start, besides which they are constantly attracted by new ones. Self-esteem is prominent in these patients, and their own point of view, their own desires and projects, are the only ones they tolerate. They are the prey to their impulses, and, while the mood is commonly cheerful, and even exuberant, they become irritated on the slightest provocation, but their irascibility does not last. Frequently the memory is extraordinarily stimulated. They are often able to recall at will whole pages of poetry, to quote extensively from standard prose works, and to give dates and details of events, all of which would be impossible in the sane state. In their power of expressing ideas they manifest a wonderful facility, and their command of language seems inexhaustible. Not only so, but the choice of phrases and words, the flow of conversation adorned by jests, anecdotes, and pleasantries, varied according to their audience, shows a mental brilliancy which is more often than not quite unexpected and unlooked-for in the individual. The good spirits of the hypomaniac seem to be inexhaustible; they make dangers invisible, life easy, and its struggle pleasant, with nothing but a certain triumph at its end. It was to such individuals perhaps that Dryden referred when he wrote:

"There is a pleasure in being mad,  
Which none but madmen know."

In a little more advanced stage the patient manifests marked mental exaltation, which reveals itself in an increased tone of self-satisfaction and an exaggerated idea of self-importance. He propounds schemes and projects of an impracticable kind, abandons them quickly for other enterprises, unknown and foreign to his experience. Sometimes, however, patients in this condition have been usefully productive, have solved problems, and written even brilliant works. Usually their projects are not realisable and, if they have control over business affairs, financial losses or other catastrophes are brought about before insanity is recognised by their friends. On account of the loss of control over their baser instincts, the moral nature of this class of patients becomes perverted. They plunge into excesses, and squander money over drink and vice to the great distress of their families. Their natural affection for relatives is, except for selfish reasons, usually in abeyance, and their animosity towards them and others leads them often to foolish controversies, litigations, or criminal proceedings. Sometimes their insanity is ushered in by an attack of melancholic depression, and depression may follow the maniacal excitement.

MANIA

Mania proper is a more advanced state of mental excitement. The patient becomes more difficult to control, his conduct is boisterous, he sings, dances, shouts; the flow of words, while facile, often amounts to mere repetition of one idea or of a single train of thought; the attention wanders rapidly, ideas and speech become more and more incoherent. He is full of mischief, destroys things for destruction's sake, gets disorderly in his appearance, and frequently indecent in talk
and behaviour. Exaltation becomes very marked; he imagines that he has become possessed of great mental ability, of extraordinary physical power, or of unusual riches. He is easily roused to anger and acts of violence, acts upon every idea and impulse that comes to him, and has to be restrained to prevent him from hurting himself and others. His activity, day and night, is inexhaustible. There is constant movement and loquacity, the patient is in a state of frenzy, which may last for days, weeks, or months. He may recover, or the state may become chronic and his brain powers get gradually exhausted, leaving him in a condition known as secondary dementia, reduced to a level beneath that of the beasts of the field.

In acute mania, the expression of the face is one of rage, the eyebrows corrugated, the eyeballs staring and protruding, and the face flushed. The whole body is in a state of intense excitement, and the patient gesticulates wildly in a threatening and aggressive manner. He tears his clothes to tatters and smashes in pieces whatever comes in his way. Whoever touches the patient is abused or struck by him. Irascible insanity is marked by excessive destructive violence and utter disregard of personal danger. The anger and violence are manifested in their greatest intensity by shrieking, roaring, raging, and abusive utterances.

A man in a state of acute mania may commit murder. There is no motive for the act, nor is it the effect of hallucination; the explosion of mania manifesting itself in one act of violence, and the immediate return of reason after the act is accomplished; he may be perfectly calm after the act, and feel no regret for it. There is either no consciousness during the act, so that there is no recollection afterwards; or, certainly, it is not the same consciousness. There is no preparation before the act, or only rarely so; but snatching whatever comes to hand, or happens to be within easy reach at that time and place, the deed is done with it. Moreover, the ordinary sane criminal, having a definite purpose, accomplishes that and is then satisfied; but the homicidal maniac has only one purpose—to destroy; he is not satisfied with merely killing; he goes beyond: though the victim whose throat is cut may be dead already, the maniac will give him another stab in the heart or a blow on the head, or sever the head and fling it out of the window.

**MELANCHOLIA**

In melanchoilia there is excessive and unreasonable apprehensive depression, vague feelings of anxiety, mental pain, with complete insight into the condition. The patient seeks for a reason, and generally fastens upon some misfortune or some omission, or some wickedness of his, as the originating cause, but his depression is quite disproportionate in its degree and duration to the apparent cause with which it is connected. He is totally unable to divert his thought, his will gets paralysed, and he may become so inactive that he will not move unless obliged to do so. Nothing interests him, amusements are a nuisance to him, he wants to be left alone and brood over his misery, but his thoughts run slowly. Later, as his apathy grows, the patient becomes untidy in his habits and completely inert. The intellect remains intact, only inhibited. He may not speak, unless in answer to questions, when he will reply slowly, but sometimes he turns mute. His feelings are paralysed as well. He is indifferent to everybody and everything, finally even the bodily processes become delayed. Such is the uncomplicated condition of melancholia, the exact counterpart of mania. There is no delusion as yet, but the patient, who has always been conscientious, is given to self-accusations, exaggerating the nature and consequences of errors he has committed, but which in his normal state he rarely, if ever, thought of. He weeps, sobs, wrings his hands, groans, sighs, and laments in most sorrowful accents the cruel fate which has come upon him. He wishes he were dead, and has to be constantly guarded to prevent him from committing suicide.
Later delusions will develop; they are always of a painful nature, generally of culpability. Everything is wrong with him, he has wronged everybody, his soul is lost, his punishment has already begun upon earth. Sometimes there are also fears of impending evil, causing him great agitation. Illusions and hallucinations make their appearance, fear-inspiring objects and characters pass before him, or voices command him to kill himself or others, or he imagines his food is poisoned and refuses to eat. He may now become agitated with fear, tearing his clothes or his hair, striking his head, shouting. "I am damned!" "I am lost!" His movements are monotonous and restricted, often rhythmical, quite unlike those of the maniac. Owing to the delay and irregularity of the functions of the body, delusions about them are not uncommon. The patient thinks himself afflicted with some serious disease, or to be dying up or mortifying, hollow, or obstructed. In contrast to the agitated melancholic, some patients become inmobile from fear, fixed in a state of stupor, like a wax figure, neither speaking nor moving a single muscle of the body.

PARANOIA

Paranoia is a chronic mental affection, characterised by delusions of mistrust, working on a tainted constitution, which tend to become fixed and systematised, and in which various hallucinations are common. As a rule the disease is seen in persons who are bright and clever, and suspiciousness is its characteristic. The patient may have always been moody and introspective and begin his complaint by believing himself of interest to other people. He thus misinterprets their looks and actions as having reference to himself. Outside this belief, the patient may be clear mentally and even brilliant. In consequence of his cleverness, he is often, in his own estimation, an under-rated genius. Frequently he is an innovator or inventor, philosopher or reformer, but without the capacity of carrying his creations to a practical conclusion. His want of success may increase his suspicion. He becomes extremely sensitive regarding the motives of other people, even their kindness is misinterpreted, and silence is an offence. In reviewing his past life, he gives a false interpretation to many events. Gradually his delusion becomes more definite, and he accuses certain persons of ill-will against him. Hallucinations of hearing may now commence, voices abuse and insult him, constantly disturb him. Gradually he comes to believe that he is the victim of a conspiracy on the part of some public bodies, or secret societies, or even of supernatural agencies. Sometimes his suspicions are directed against a particular person, who does not perceive that he is in danger of being a victim of revenge. Later, hallucinations of taste and smell may cause the patient to think that attempts are being made to poison his food; or that noxious vapours are injected into his bedroom, so that he carefully stuffs all the keyholes of the doors and any other opening. There may be also hallucinations of general sensibility, which he attributes to electricity, magnetism, wireless telegraphy, hypnotism, or other physical or spiritualistic agency. It is exceedingly rare for the patient to see his persecutors, and for his hallucinations or delusions to take an agreeable form, even temporarily. The irritation may give rise to attacks of excitement, he may attack some innocent person, or else fly for protection to the police, when his insanity is likely to be recognised. Sometimes he tries to get right away from the taunts of his imaginary persecutors and will be free for a time, but soon his suspicions are again aroused; his enemies have followed him. To be the victim of so much persecution, the patient reasons, he must be some important person; he feels happier now in a delirium of an ambitious nature. Perhaps he is exceptionally gifted, of an exalted position, of great wealth, or a world-saviour, or a prophet, or Providence has some special mission for him. He may now have magnificent visions, and, whatever his false beliefs, they are woven into a plausible system. Occasionally he is in love with
a lady far above him in social position; sometimes it is only an imaginary person; at other times he pursues some exalted woman with his attention until she seeks the protection of the law from the stranger. Although his grandiose ideas are absurd, he has always good reasons for them. Gradually his mind weakens, but he still retains the power of conversing in a rational manner on various subjects outside his delusions.

Many people who go through life as eccentric—especially reformers, political enthusiasts, and revolutionaries of society—are possibly only aborted cases of paranoia in whom the progress was checked in the early stage, and modified into a sort of crankiness and eccentricity, not pronounced enough for them to become commonly reckoned insane, but sufficient to make them noticeable as odd in behaviour and generally peculiar. They learn, however, to control their conduct and conceal their feelings to a very large extent, so that their real mental condition is not betrayed, except by some habit of writing or speech when they are off their guard.

There are many people in the world who have grievances real and imaginary, and strong over-self-appreciation, yet who are not insane. Many genuine inventors, philosophers, artists, poets, and others, placed in unfavourable circumstances, may have been robbed of the fruits of their works by some unscrupulous person, or else may have failed to attract attention, and, in consequence, formed an unfavourable or delusionary view of the world, against which they take an antagonistic standpoint in consequence of their misfortune. Even the idea of conspiracy may not be totally unfounded, or at least an unreasonable suspicion. How often is an inventor or discoverer, who is more outspoken than is agreeable to established cliques, boycotted by the official authorities and journals? His opponents might say that he overestimates his own importance, or deny that there is any such organised obstruction to the recognition of his work, and so the man might be held to be labouring under a delusion, whereas, on the contrary, he may have a sounder and clearer brain than his critics, to hold his own in the face of adverse circumstances, as is often shown when success ultimately comes to him. But if he should be unable to hold out, and should find death preferable to the prolonged battle against organised deceit and hypocrisy, the verdict would be that he was insane. On the other hand, since only the highest quality of nervous structure is capable of the finest work, a man who has suffered in the manner described may really break down and then exaggerate his own worth and his grievances to such an extent that he becomes mentally deranged. It is only when the delusions are so extravagant that their absurdity would at once be gauged by persons of ordinary intelligence that we are justified in presuming insanity.

The predominant feature in mania of persecution and that systematised form of it called "paranoia" is the lack of equilibrium between the intellectual operations on the one hand, and the emotions and propensities on the other. A paranoiac is often remarkable for his shrewdness and argumentative power; he may be a scientist, a notable lawyer, a great artist, a mathematician, politician, or skilled administrator. His defects are of a moral nature, inasmuch as his emotion and propensities furnish a false basis for his reasoning, and thus cause his brilliant faculties to be at the service of a bad cause—of the instincts and appetites, which, owing to the disharmony, lead to very extravagant and dangerous acts. That the systematised delusion of persecution is not due to an intellectual enfeeblement is shown by the fact that it rarely leads to dementia.

Persecutory ideas are numerous and varied. Electrical influences, telephonic communications, invisible agencies of all kinds abound; annoyance and tormenting by spirits, magnetising dust, vile odours, poison in the food are constantly met. The paranoiac is often regarded as a mere crank; but from a medico-legal point of view paranoia is of great importance, because those suffering from it commit a large proportion of the acts of violence and homicide committed by the insane at large.
THE APPLICATION OF ETHOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF INSANITY

and in hospitals. A number of cases have already been quoted (Chapters XXXI. and XXXII.) which ended in homicidal attacks from definite motives, in which the patient acted with reflection and determination, such cases being important in medico-legal inquiries.

Although the patient suffering from delusions of suspicion and persecution may become violent, he can be distinguished from the patient suffering from acute mania by the state of his reasoning faculties. The former preserves his shrewdness and argumentative power for an extraordinary time, retains his memory, and it is possible to converse with him for a long time without suspecting that there is anything wrong with him. This is in strong contrast to the disorder of thought presented to us even in the mildest cases of mania.

Hallucinations of hearing giving rise to delusions of persecution often lead to apparent suicide; but this is not the same as suicide arising from melancholia. In the latter the patient thinks life no longer worth living; he contemplates death and may prepare for it. In the former, the patient need not reflect on death at all; he simply tries to escape from his persecutors. If he happens to be on level ground, no harm need follow; if he is on a fifth-floor corridor and he can get out at the window, he may make an attempt to do so, with the inevitable consequences; but it cannot be said that he is conscious of the fatal result, nor that he seeks it.

The illness may commence with the hearing of noises. These noises give rise to impressions varying from mere conscious illusions to hallucinations under the patient's control, and from hallucinations to dominant delusions, which finally become organised. These noises produce at first a disquieting effect, then they may give rise to ideas in the patient that his friends or neighbours have some ill-feeling against him; then the patient may hear decided voices different from tinnitus aurium, inasmuch as definite words, sentences, or phrases are heard, until the patient believes himself persecuted, and even holds conversation with imaginary persons, whose abusive talk molests him. Sometimes the voices heard are of an imperative nature, which the patient, when exhausted from the long-standing worry and anxiety, cannot resist.

The delusions are not attributable to perversions of the reasoning process, but arise out of the perverted emotional state. This gives rise to misinterpretations of actual occurrences in accordance with the prevalent state of the feelings. When the disorder has lasted some time, and the false ideas are habitually dwelt upon, they become realities to the consciousness of the individual.

Mania of persecution can be distinguished from melancholia by the following characteristics:

(1) The persecuted are proud or vain; the melancholic are humble.
(2) The persecuted are active; the melancholic is passive, except in "agitated melancholia." The melancholic still preserves the general characteristics of melancholia, though he may think that someone is trying to poison him, and that his misfortunes are due to the evil work of others; whereas the paranoid is quite a normal man except for the delusion of persecution.
(3) The persecuted have the feeling of health and suffer only because they are made to suffer; the melancholics, on the contrary, have a profound feeling of uneasiness, of physical and moral suffering, and are even so miserable as to be tired of life.
(4) The persecuted become persecutors, threatening and homicidal; whereas the melancholic tend to suicide.
(5) The persecuted accuse others of making them suffer, defend themselves, and think only of strife and revenge; whereas the melancholic accuse themselves of imaginary crimes, or believe themselves falsely accused of crimes which they have not committed.
(6) The persecuted are continually occupied with the past or present, and in most cases go back very far into the past to find evils which others have inflicted.
upon them. The melancholic, on the contrary, occupy themselves but little with the past or present, but they have a constant dread of the future, and of all kinds of misfortunes which are going to happen either to themselves or to their families.

(7) The persecuted often tend to delusions of grandeur, and the melancholic to delusions of negation.

**GENERAL PARALYSIS**

*General Paralysis* (Dementia Paralytica) is a very common disease of the brain and nervous system, occurring during the active periods of life, characterised on its psychic side by a usually marked and generally progressive dementia, ordinarily attended with an expansive emotional condition. Unlike most mental disorders, it is accompanied by gross changes in the brain, chiefly in the frontal region, producing mental and physical degeneration, and ultimately death. At its onset it is marked by a general state of exhilaration. No one, in his own opinion, was ever in a better state of health than he; no one more successful in business, no one happier than he. He contracts friendships with persons whom he would have avoided before his illness; he makes investments such as no prudent man would make, or throws away his money on useless objects. At home he is irritable and whimsical; his likes and dislikes are changed without adequate reason, and he either eats and drinks voraciously or declares that nothing is cooked to suit him and rises from the table in a rage. At times he sheds tears over the veriest trifles, and often for no reason that he can allege. Sometimes a sudden outbreak of violence may be the first definite indication of aberration, but the budding paralytic is rarely vindictive. Although easily roused to anger, he is easily calmed. Being in his own estimation superior to everyone, he can afford to pity and forgive. But of all the prodromata, failure and decay of the moral sense are the most important, and are exemplified by acts of omission and commission against law, order, and propriety. He may perpetrate frauds of various kinds or pilfer whatever he can lay hands on, and without adopting the means of precaution which the common thief would use to prevent discovery. Moreover, the articles he steals are not in general of any use to him, and are thrown aside as soon as he has them in his possession. The idea of propriety in the everyday affairs of life seems to be lost, and the patient will commit all kinds of indecent and obscene acts under circumstances which are almost certain to result in detection and without appearing to be aware that he is doing anything unusual. He becomes regardless of his personal appearance, and may appear in public half-dressed. His sexual excitement may result in rape and acts of indecency. He refers to all his past doings and future achievements in exaggerated language, devoid of all truth, and forgets from one day to another his ordinary duties and appointments, which leads to inconsistent acts and neglect of family affairs. With the increase of physical weakness, the mental weakness also becomes more pronounced. The patient will make astounding claims of being a king, a famous general, or person of renown. He is stronger than Hercules, literally able to move mountains; he can build bridges to the moon; he has a million horses; can make diamonds by the bucketful. These exaggerations sometimes continue until speech becomes unintelligible and the patient is too weak to feed himself. His emotions are equally unstable, and he can be easily made to laugh or cry. Attacks of violent mania may set in, ending in complete dementia and death.

**DEMENTIA PRÆCOX**

*Dementia Præcox* is a premature mental weakness, in which the early life of the patient presents nothing abnormal, some individuals, indeed, showing promise of quite exceptional mental ability, yet who, as they approach adolescence, manifest
THE APPLICATION OF ETHOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF INSANITY

intellectual arrest, with insane and sometimes alarming conduct, followed by permanent mental arrest. Most of them have a defective heredity and manifest a tendency to keep by themselves, or to be over-religious, or to indulge in day-dreaming and immature philosophising. It is a disorder which affects better educated and highly-strung youths between sixteen and twenty-two years of age chiefly. The first chief sign in such cases is an inability to perform the usual work or mental tasks with the same correctness or facility as formerly. There is a lack of application and a general inefficiency. Although there may be no apparent lack of endeavour or industry, there is a defect in attention and concentration, with mental powerlessness. All volition is interrupted, remittent, or spasmodic; yet their comprehension is preserved. Another characteristic is an unimpaired memory. The memory of past events, especially of school knowledge, may be surprisingly good, even when the patient is very much deteriorated. But while there is the recollection of knowledge previously acquired, there is a curious weakness of judgment and loss of interest. The patients are silly, often constrained and affected in manner. They express many absurd ideas, chiefly of a sexual and a religious nature. Their beliefs are likely to be mystical; they are inclined to attribute their morbid sensations and experiences to the influences of others who affect them in some occult way. There is also from time to time a tendency to fits of depression and despondency, or to uncontrollable excitement, or to argumentativeness or irritability. There may be delusions of persecution, but they do not excite them as in the case of the paranoiac. It is the mental weakness that is the characteristic symptom, and the delusions, if any, are secondary only. The patients often get self-absorbed, unconcerned; apparently feeling neither joy nor sorrow, they often stare for hours into vacancy, wholly occupied with the hallucinations that are so prominent an accompaniment of this disease. Silly laughter without any appreciable cause is frequent. Periods of unprovoked anger and destructiveness are common. The patients appear to be aware of their mental disturbance and incapacity, but no regret, no care or fear for the future, for a moment disturbs their serenity. They become indifferent, stupid, foolish, and improvident. The course of this affection may be arrested, but it always leaves behind it a permanent degree of mental incapacity. Many blasted careers, blighted prospects, and inexplicable life failures result from this disease. Large numbers of beggars and tramps, drunkards, prostitutes, and criminals in one stratum of society, and of eccentrics and borderland cases in other social strata, are the victims of dementia praecox.

DEMENTIA

Dementia is a permanent state of mental enfeeblement—that final wreckage of mind which permits no opportunity of salvage. When it occurs in an individual previously sane, it is called primary; when it is the result of preceding insanity, it is called secondary.

In primary dementia, the higher mental faculties, those which are added latest in the scale of civilisation as the result of refinement and education, are the first to deteriorate. Soon all the intellectual powers are degraded. Attention is enfeebled, memory is impaired or even destroyed, and in consequence judgment is incompetent and the controlling power over the emotions is weakened. Dates, places, words, events, are forgotten. Even in the simplest matters the patient cannot arrive at a determination. Indeed, he does not make the attempt. Once the disease is well established, the patient becomes incoherent. Laughter may be indulged in at things sorrowful, and profuse tears shed on some ridiculous occurrence. Mental ruin and often moral degradation are very marked; the proprieties and decencies of life are neglected. Frequently there is a persistent attitude or habit of posture.
SENIOR DEMENTIA

*Senile Dementia* occurs in those hereditarily predisposed or the subjects of arterial disease. Of course, a certain degree of decay of the mental powers is a natural consequence of advanced age, and, within certain limits, is a normal change. With the majority this amounts only to the loss of a certain power of mental assimilation for the events of the day, with a constant reversion to those of youth and early middle life, which stand out in very clear perspective. To these infirmities are added a certain degree of forgetfulness and a loss of the power of logical constructiveness. The character becomes simplified; there are some who lose in virtue, and there are others who only lose some faults. Those, however, who are to become subjects of dementia, show a much greater degree of loss of memory, to an extent to cause confusion about time and surroundings. There is a want of understanding of the general situation, a vacuous cheerfulness, delusions associated with a certain sense of illness, and, above all, a profound failure of attention to present impressions. Often, there is a complete change of character and a lack of carefulness and tidiness in regard to personal appearance and habits, with finally a complete disregard of propriety and decency, the same as in other forms of advanced dementia. The patient’s mind becomes centred upon himself alone, his comforts and his ailments, and events that do not directly concern himself, in his eyes, are of no consequence. Silly mirth and tearful depression, mingled with increasing complaints of the lack of attention received, are also symptoms. Frequently there is excitement or perversion of the sexual impulse. Most often the patient becomes deeply melancholic; mania is rarer, and seldom severe. If there are any delusions, they are generally those of persecution, the outcome of mistrust and suspicion, frequently concerning the patient’s own family, leading sometimes to disinheritance of children. Often designing people gain undue influence over them.

ALCOHOLIC INSANITY

In quite small quantities alcohol acts first of all as a temporary stimulant, putting the person in an agreeable frame of mind, firing his imagination, and giving vivacity to his conversation. In a slightly larger quantity, it quiets the mind and conscience, and acts as a sedative to the feelings. In still larger quantities it produces loss of sensibility, making the person insensible to blows or injuries. The general expression becomes one of silly self-satisfaction, the ideas become crowded and confused, opinions are expressed freely and, from lack of inhibition, the emotions also are given vent to, and become unstable. Joy, anger, silly sentimentalism and melancholy may follow each other; finally there is complete lethargy. Excess may produce acute alcoholism (delirium tremens), when visual hallucinations of moving terror-inspiring creatures and objects occur; sometimes also hallucinations of hearing, and frequently perversions of nervous sensation of the skin and muscles, which are attributed to mysterious agencies, and are mostly of a persecutory type. Similarly there may be disagreeable hallucinations of smell and taste. Consciousness and memory remain intact. In chronic alcoholic insanity there is gradual and progressive mental deterioration with marked enfeeblement of memory and will; and the moral character undergoes serious changes, bringing ruin on himself and his family. Outbreaks of passionate violence are common, and most characteristic of all, a mania of persecution and delusions referring to sexual relations and poisoning. Some preserve their manner with strangers, but in their family life manifest irritability, suspicion, and jealousy, misinterpreting the simplest facts. Finally alcoholic mania with motiveless violence may result.
DRUG INTOXICATION

In Opium Intoxication there is also at first a pleasurable excitation, a condition of beatitude in a semi-somnolent state. On larger doses hallucinations of sight, mental distress and a mild form of delirium occur, followed by peculiar sensations in different parts of the body and great prostration. Since ever-increasing doses are necessary to produce exhilaration, the intellect and emotions become impaired. The moral nature undergoes grave changes, and ethical obliquity, irritability, peevishness, anxiety, and moroseness follow. If insanity does occur, it is characterised by delusions of persecution or grandeur.

In Cocaine Intoxication there is a deplorably weakened will, a steadily failing memory, loquaciousness, and a tendency to write long letters or articles, and a proneness to advance impracticable schemes. Elation and depression frequently alternate, suspicion develops, and the patients grow callous to all obligations and ties. In chronic cases, hallucinations become distressing, giving rise to increased suspicion and suffering, and delusions of being murdered or otherwise foully dealt with. Insane jealousy is another prominent symptom.

MENTAL DISORDERS IN PREGNANCY

occur commonly only in those with some very distinct neurosis, and are as a rule of a more or less melancholic type, with loss of mental power, of will and energy. There may be dislike or distrust of the husband and aversion to the other children. There may be complete apathy and loss of interest in family and surroundings, weariness of life, delusions of having committed unpardonable sins. Mania is rarer, and generally the patient recovers after delivery.

INSANITY FOLLOWING CHILDBIRTH

(puerperal insanity) is due to septic intoxication and the symptoms are of the hallucinatory-confusional types. Suicide may occur as a direct consequence of frightful hallucinations and infanticide is not uncommon. The excitement is often intense, the speech is reduced to disjointed, unconnected words, and, when spoken to, the woman either pays no attention or stares at the person addressing her in a blind, uncomprehending way.

INSANITY OF THE LACTATIONAL PERIOD

begins after the second month after parturition. It also belongs to the type of inanition insanity, only that the hallucinatory maniacal form is the more frequent. There is loss of memory, morbid fancies, and a change of disposition toward the infant and the household. Under the influence of terrifying hallucinations the patient may do harm to herself or her child. A period of quiet or stupor, or delusions of a persecutory type, may follow.

MENTAL DISORDERS OF THE CLIMACTERIUM,

or "change of life," are not uncommon, when the erotic passion may flare up before its total extinction and silly love-delusions may make the patient the laughing-stock of her friends. Others think themselves neglected by their husbands, or a feeling of antipathy may arise. The woman becomes suspicious and sees evidence of unfaithfulness in the merest trifles. During this stage of insane jealousy, acts of
violence and destruction are common, and frequently libellous letters are written, causing public scandal.

**EPILEPTIC INSANITY**

may occur in patients suffering from that disease. Weak-mindedness is commoner than mental aberrations. But often these patients have unfounded aversions, think themselves ill-treated, and are excessively religious, fanatics in political opinions, though their intellectual stock-in-trade is very limited. The two most prominent features are irritability and impulsiveness. Real epileptic insanity shows itself in exalted or manic conditions, or else in depression and fault-finding. There may be hallucinations, agreeable or disagreeable, ecstatic visions, and explosive violence. In the psychic type of epilepsy there is clouded consciousness, when various acts may be committed automatically, with complete forgetfulness after the attack. When a real mental disorder develops, there is marked impairment of intelligence, emotional instability, hallucinations of sight and hearing are frequent, also religious ecstasy, and delusions of persecutions. The epileptic furor is the most marked characteristic, with fierce vindictiveness, caused sometimes by terrifying delusion or hallucination. If a man has been subject to regular epileptic fits, and commits a homicidal act in an impulsive or motiveless manner, the presumption is very strong that the murder is a symptom of his disease, and that he is not fully responsible for his actions. (For cases of operative cure, see Chapter XXVII.)

**TREATMENT OF MENTAL DISORDERS**

The achievements of the last half-century have been the recognition of the pathological nature of insanity and the charitable purpose to separate the insane from other defectives and place them in sanitary dwellings under medical care. Of recent years it has become more and more acknowledged that the majority of the patients in asylums—though we call these institutions now "mental hospitals"—are chronic cases, and that their dominating purpose is that of custodial care rather than treatment, which, for the purpose of cure, would have to start in the pre-certifiable stage; for which purpose it is proposed to establish clinics and reception-houses, where the earliest changes in mind and character can be diagnosed and treated by properly qualified psychologists, and scientific investigation undertaken into the nature of mental disorders and their pathology. On the Continent such clinics and reception-houses have existed for some time.

In one fundamental fact no progress has been made. It is still held, as in Gall's time, that all kinds of mental functions involve the whole brain, and therefore, no matter of what nature the mental disorder, it is the entire brain, and not any one part of it, that is affected. No matter whether a person be melancholic, violently maniacal, homicidal, or suffer from delusions of persecution, whether he be a kleptomaniac, a religious maniac, or fancy himself a millionaire—in every case it is assumed that the whole brain is affected; whereas the evidence produced in this work supports the view that the fundamental dispositions originate in particular localities, and their disorders, at all events in the early stages, are amenable to treatment. It is only when left to pursue their course that they affect other parts and ultimately the entire brain. It is therefore not surprising that post-mortem examination of asylum cases does not favour the localisation theory. But, excluding mental disorders caused by toxins and derangements in the blood circulation, it must be admitted that the disease must have started somewhere. There is not a patient who has not some portion of his mental constitution still sound when certified, and often there is a change only in one or other of the primary emotions, and only one or no delusion.
We never see a complete lunatic, and however old-standing the disease, a careful investigation of the history of the case may lead to the discovery of the focus of the primary lesion. The cases cited in Chapters XXIX-XXXII. show depressed bone, splinters from the inner table, osteophites, weakened bone from circumscribed inflammation, haemorrhage, cysts of hemorrhagic origin, foreign bodies within the cranium (bullets, shell-splinters, etc.), tumours, adhesions from circumscribed meningitis, etc. All these are conditions which would warrant surgical interference.

Certainly in every case of insanity in which there is a history of head injury and the locality injured corresponds with the locality indicated by the symptoms, as described in this work, operation should positively be undertaken, even if there be no external sign of trauma, such as a scar, or depression of bone, and although there is no local tenderness or fixed headache. The length of time that elapsed between the accident and the onset of the symptoms apparently need not be considered.

J. CHRISTIAN ("Archives de Neurologie," vol. xviii.), analysing 100 cases of traumatic insanity, found that:

In 54 cases the interval was from 1-5 years.
   " 21 " " " " 5-10 "
   " 11 " " " " 10-20 "
   " 7 " " " " 20-30 "
   " 7 " " " " more than 30 "

H. A. POWELL found that in 47 of the cases in which the interval is stated, the symptoms appeared:

In 8 cases immediately.
   " 13 " in the first 12 months.
   " 11 " between 1 and 5 years.
   " 8 " " 5 " 10 "
   " 4 " " 10 " 15 "
   " 2 " " 15 " 20 "
   " 1 " " 20 " 30 "

That there is no limit to the time that may elapse when surgical treatment may still be successful is also shown by the cases of insanity mentioned in this work as treated by operation.

2 cases were cured 3 years after injury.
   5 " " " 4 " " "
   3 " " " 8 " " "
   2 " " " 11 " " "
   2 " " " 15 " " "
   1 " " " 25 " " "
   1 " " " 31 " " "

Other cases, too, not due to injury, but due to tumours, haemorrhage, etc., will be accessible to operative treatment, if the localisation theories advanced in this work are confirmed by longer experience.

Lunacy is one of the most dreaded diseases which afflict mankind, and therefore any theory which gives hope of some success in the treatment of the insane is deserving of careful consideration and examination, even when not supported by such a mass of clinical material as is contained in this work. Of course, the majority of cases of mental derangement are not amenable to surgical treatment, but must be treated on medical and psycho-therapeutic lines.

The great fault of the lunacy system is that our asylums are not hospitals, and that their physicians are not allowed to fulfil the proper duties of their office. A man merged in a crowd of irresponsible beings, all under the influence of a common discipline, and under the control of common keepers, must lose his individuality, and cannot possibly receive that anxious care and attention at the hands of one [Vol. ii.]
physician which is necessary from the nature of his case. What every mental patient needs, as the primary condition for recovery, is separate and individual treatment and consideration. What every asylum requires in order to become a truly curative institution is a hospital for the treatment of recent and acute cases, separate and distinct from the main establishment, to which each patient should be assigned on admission. Its medical staff should be ample, and their duties should be entirely restricted to the observation and treatment of their patients. The ideal would be, of course, to see the asylums thrown open like hospitals for visiting physicians and surgeons, and I would admit even students of psychology. Then would each case be studied individually, and if post-mortem examination took place in every case that died at the institution, psychiatry, in my opinion, would make rapid progress. Reception hospitals and greater facilities for private treatment of mental disorders are also needed for the very early and still uncertifiable cases.

The best thing to do with disease is to prevent it; the next best thing is to cure it when it first appears; the last, and least important of all, is to attempt to cure its later stages, and it is with this last and least important duty that the asylums of the world are mainly occupied. Mental disorders should be treated before they amount to insanity.

I propose to add a few words about the characteristics of the feeble-minded.

MENTAL DEFICIENCY

The brain develops up to a certain grade, and then, for some reason, the process ceases before the normal standard is attained. When the development is permanently arrested in early infancy or in fetus, the result is idiocy. When development proceeds to the stage of later childhood and then comes to an end, the result is imbecility; and arrest at a still later stage results in feebleness of mind.

The most extreme form of mental deficiency is that of idiocy. It is a congenital condition in which the intellectual faculties have never developed, or at least not sufficiently. Some idiots have abnormally large heads—hydrocephalic—while others have abnormally small ones—microcephalic. The former is a condition in which the brain is distended by an excessive accumulation of the cerebro-spinal fluid, and the skull in consequence becomes huge and of a globular form. In the latter case the brain is too small, and the excision of pieces of bone from the skull to give the brain more room was tried, at one time, as a remedial measure. But the operation yielded no permanent results, for, if the brain wanted to grow, the skull would grow with it. Another class of idiots are the cretins, a condition due to absence or atrophy of the thyroid gland, and sometimes to its hypertrophy. By feeding these patients with the thyroid gland of sheep remarkable cures have been achieved. Another type is the epileptic type, in which constant fits have retarded the growth of the mental processes. Others are the Mongolian, the paralytic, porencephalic, and lastly the traumatic variety, due to head injury.

The lowest type of idiot is one devoid of all understanding, in whom is found an entire absence of intelligence. Being incapable of any reasoning power, he has no appreciation of the commonest physical dangers. His faculty of attention is also wanting, except a momentary attraction by loud noises, bright lights, and similar exciting objects. Of most of them it may be said that they do not appear to be conscious of their own existence, much less of ordinary feelings of pleasure, pain, fear, and love, except in the most rudimentary way. The sight of food alone has the power to draw them from their indifference, and they may show attachment to whichever person takes care of them. There is no will power and no trace of the faculty of initiation. They have no power of expressing themselves by means of articulate language, but some of them succeed in making known their desires by certain signs, cries, or sounds, understood only by those in immediate attendance upon them. Their temper is easily excited. It is only in idiots of higher degree
that we are able to determine voluntary attention, and by that to develop their
general intelligence. As a rule they do not learn to read, but some of the more
educable ones may learn the alphabet and make out some detached syllables; but
they rarely get to the point of understanding the printed words. Their writing, if
at all possible, is still worse than their reading, for they lack the co-ordination of
movement. Calculation is impossible for the lower grade idiot, and even the higher
grade learns only the elementary figures, and those with difficulty. Not having any
understanding, or but little, idiots rarely laugh; except when they laugh con-
tinually, as is the case with certain incurable idiots who giggle constantly while
making their balancing movements. They are extremely timid; everything
frightens them, because they cannot explain anything. Love of property exists
sometimes to a considerable degree in higher class idiots. They do not hesitate to
appropriate anything they want, especially if it be food. They are not naturally
lazy; they are only inactive from want of attention and slowness of conception
and movement. The musical sense is often preserved in them, quite dispro-
portionately to the other mental faculties; and not infrequently those who cannot
speak at all can hum tunes correctly.

The imbecile is one whose mental defect exists from infancy, and is so
great as to render him incapable of earning his own living, although he has in-
telligence enough to guard himself against the common physical dangers. Im-
becility is a mental deficiency, either inherited or recognisable in the first few years
of life, or occasioned by cerebral injury at or immediately after birth, or consequent
on brain disease acquired in infancy or early childhood. In imbeciles we find de-
fective mental powers of various degrees, from pronounced enfeeblement to grades
of intellectual development, capable of fair education, but retaining a defect in
some mental faculties. As a rule, imbeciles are fairly conversant with their im-
mediate surroundings; they know their own names and are able to respond to them
when addressed. In lower grade imbeciles the command of language is extremely
limited; they are only able to pronounce a few words, or at any rate a few phrases,
the correct significance of which they know. They can make themselves under-
stood, but they fail to learn how to communicate their thoughts in spontaneous
writing or to understand what they read. Voluntary attention exists within
certain limits, but it is intermittent, and they pass from one subject to another
without there being any relation between the two. Their memories are defective,
and they do not retain from one day to another what they have learned with care
and trouble. In some, the memory is apparently greatly developed; but close
observation reveals the facts that they recite a piece always in the order in which
they have learned it, and that the slightest interruption in the recital cuts it short;
for they rarely understand what they are saying. It is difficult to educate them
to read; and although some learn to write, they never form their letters well.
They are unable to count beyond a certain number, and arithmetic is usually beyond
their power. If they can add, they rarely can subtract, multiply, or divide. Yet
imbeciles have been known in whom the memory for figures was not only well
preserved, but developed to an extraordinary degree. Some have a special memory
for dates and a perfect appreciation of past or passing time.

Imbeciles are very much influenced by rhythm, hence they like music, and some
even the recital of poetry, though they may not understand a word of it. They
have often a good memory for tunes. They readily acquire simple airs, and rarely
forget them. This is the more striking because of the utter absence of any other
evidence of artistic taste.

Some imbeciles reach a higher degree of mental development and are capable of
conversing correctly, but their knowledge, as well as their vocabulary, is limited.
Some of them exhibit a wonderful power of imitation and of repartee. Their
credulity, as might be expected from their want of understanding, is very great.
Imbeciles are very egotistic, and occupy themselves above all with their physical well-being. Joy and pain are expressed vividly, and they often laugh without motive, even under sad circumstances. Imbeciles are fundamentally lazy, unless some special inducement to action is offered; they have no endurance. They are often vain, quarrelsome, easily irritated, and frequently a source of annoyance to the household from their propensities to lying, thieving, and their general shamelessness and uncontrollable character. They are capable of manifesting a certain kind of affection to those who treat them kindly and with whom they live; but the feeling is never profound. They are capable of a certain amount of training and discipline in the direction of their external behaviour, and to control their animal propensities.

We describe children as Feeble-Minded when they are superior to idiots and imbeciles, but still suffer from so incomplete a cerebral development that they are behind other children, of the same age and station in life, in mind and conduct, and do not profit by their environment and by education to the same extent as average children. The majority are defective from birth, or at least from infancy, having been normal until a fever, convulsions, or other disturbance damaged their brain and left a permanent defect. Attention in them is neither active nor lasting. The majority have no power of concentration, hence they are unable to learn things, or at least not so quickly as other children. Moreover, being inattentive and having little understanding, they cannot retain things they have observed or learned, and are slow in acquiring even elementary knowledge, such subjects as history or geography being quite beyond their powers. Their permanent stock of ideas is small, and they have little capacity for using it. Whilst the musical faculty is often preserved, the faculty of number is deficient. Even if they learn a little arithmetic, they rarely acquire sufficient knowledge to give change for a shilling. But still, as among the imbeciles, arithmetical prodigies have been known amongst them, without any other ability, evidently a certain part of the brain having remained uninjured and receiving more than its usual blood supply. Others have the memory for names, dates, or localities well preserved. With suitable training, the feeble-minded can acquire simple knowledge and can be trusted to carry out simple commissions and may be taught handicrafts, but they rarely know money values. In a certain sense it may be said of them that they do not grow old with their years. They remain childish, easily satisfied with trifles, and display interest in things which have long ceased to interest normal people of the same age.

That those who are mentally feeble should sometimes show moral deficiencies is only natural, considering that the lower the intellect, the feebler the control over the instincts and passions. They are easily influenced by others, have little self-control and power to resist temptation when it comes in their way. True, some are well-behaved, affectionate, and obedient; but many others are mischievous and cunning enough to invent lies to escape the consequence of their misdeeds. Even the feeble-minded of a milder degree lack imagination in their outlook upon the affairs of everyday life and their own future. Their horizon is bounded by yesterday and to-morrow. They must be guarded from becoming a prey to temptations and being victimised by the unscrupulous. Among the well-to-do it is not the inability to earn a livelihood which attracts attention, but the lack of capacity to keep whatever they possess. Another defect not infrequent is their inability to say "no," so that they are easily "sponged" upon. These are the people who are ruined by becoming security for their friends, buy worthless shares, and whose wills are disputed on the ground of undue influence.

There is still another class, whose mental defect is not, like the one just mentioned primarily of the intellectual variety but is a moral one. The Morally Deficient child is a child who, by reason of arrested development of some parts of his brain, displays at an early age a morbid defect of the moral disposition
and higher altruistic qualities of the human race, associated frequently with 
vicious propensities on which punishment has no effect. There is sometimes, 
but not always, some slight limitation of intellect. Their most marked 
characteristic is a lack of power to recognise ethical distinctions, a lack of conscience, 
of the sense of right and of duty; and through this moral depravation there is a 
serious lack of balance between the thinking and acting capacities. Without this 
power there is no check to the lower passions except by the intellectual consideration 
of utility and expediency, and unbridled egoism has full play. In the milder cases 
the individual may merely be exceptionally self-centred, incapable of appreciating 
the rights and feelings of others, and governing his conduct entirely by his own 
likes and dislikes, to which everything has to give way. And in the more marked 
cases, and in cases where there is also a transient intellectual defect, the latter 
prevents him from seeing beyond the moment's gratification to the unpleasant 
consequences which will follow. Sometimes they behave tolerably as children, but 
more often they lack natural affection, are especially rebellious to authority, are 
unkind to their brothers and sisters and to animals, irritable and hasty in temper, 
sulky when corrected, and sullen and morose. They tend to associate with those 
beneath them in the social scale, tell lies, and do not fully grasp the difference 
between right and wrong. As they get older they may be addicted to petty thefts, 
which are often concealed with an amount of cunning that would hardly be credited 
by those who have no experience of these cases. They do not appreciate the 
enormity of their offence, and when found out they exhibit no sense of shame. 
When they are punished and express regret, it is forgotten when the next temptation 
comes. They are unmanageable at schools and are a danger to other children. 
Next to their lack of industry, their most conspicuous quality is their incurable 
mendacity. The readiness, the resource, the promptitude, the elaborate circum-
stantiality of their lies are astonishing. Many of them are quite unfit, if left to 
themselves, to lead decent, inoffensive lives. Some of them are wicked enough 
either to plan or to permit suspicion or blame to fall upon others. Some cases are 
less extreme, and do fairly well until old enough to assume responsibilities. Some of 
them become inebriates. All act on impulse from lack of self-restraint. Some do 
well always for a period, and then they fall again. Whereas a criminal does often 
escape detection, the morally weak-minded hardly ever. Punishment is of no 
account to them, for they forget it precisely when they have the greatest need of 
remembering it. Education alone cannot eradicate what is bred in the organisation; 
but where there is some rudiment of affection, or conscience, or honest 
ambition, there is hope under appropriate treatment.

Of late, considerable attention has been given to the study of the microscopical 
appearance of the brain of feeble-minded; but, of course, that does not help us in 
the diagnosis or treatment of living imbeciles. The hopeless should be kept in 
special asylums, and those with some intelligence should be sent to training in-
stitutions, which, unfortunately, do not yet exist in sufficient number. By far the 
largest number of the mentally deficient that come to the notice of the mental 
specialist are of the milder sort; those to whom the term "mental deficiency" 
truly applies. Here, again, a proper ethological analysis will enable us to discover 
active or latent capacities and character-dispositions that may be utilised for the 
education of the child or youth; and a cranioscopical examination will assist us in 
determining the prognosis.
CHAPTER XXXV

THE ETHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL

As a result of scientific research during the XIXth century the conviction has gradually gained ground that human beings are to a large extent the victims of their organisations, partly inherited from their ancestry, over which they had no choice, and partly the result of their early education and environment, which also was not of their own selection. It is argued that no child calls himself into life, nor chooses the period, climate, or nation in which he shall be born; that no child determines the manners, customs, laws, forms of government, religion, prejudices or superstitions with which he shall be surrounded from the moment of his birth; that no child can determine to have good or delicate health, to be a male or female, to have a certain temperament, or definite inclinations or talents; that no child can determine the prudence or folly of his instructors, the baneful or useful examples set before him, the influence which external circumstances shall have over him, his condition or that of his parents, or the source of stimulation which his passions and desires shall experience.

Thus it has come to be recognised that our physical, mental, and moral strength or weakness is determined for us and not by us through our inherited organisation and our surroundings in early youth, which are not of our choosing. This knowledge, which has spread throughout all civilised countries during the past century, has given rise to a humanitarian feeling towards all those who are found to be defective in body or mind and even towards those who are anti-social in their tendencies. Many delicate and afflicted individuals, who in former times would undoubtedly have perished, are enabled to reach maturity now, owing to the progress in the treatment of deformities and disease, and millions of money are spent in keeping alight the feeble flame of life in degenerate offspring, and the whole country is flooded with institutions to make things easier for the unfit.

Society enacts more or less uniformity of conduct. Anyone not conforming to its habit is liable to meet with the disapprobation of his fellow-men; an act contrary to the interests of the herd is an offence, and since society for its protection has made laws, every offence which is punishable by law becomes a crime.

No matter what the laws may be, there will always be some people who will break them. Some men are more covetous than others by nature, and if they are not in the midst of plenty, and their ethical instincts have not been trained in their infancy and youth, they may take what is not theirs. Culture means the acquisition of self-control; to manifest one's passions is considered bad taste in good society. In lower grade surroundings exhibitions of low passions are often applauded, language is coarser and more inciting, hence the frequency of transgression, deadly fights, sexual assaults, etc. There is too much of the presumption that all men have an equal chance in the battle against temptations, and too little acknowledgment of the part played by heredity and environment. True, we can overcome these by the exercise of our will, but such strong will, such tenaciousness to keep to one's resolution, is also due to our hereditary organisation and the stimulus of the environment.

The prevalent belief of people is that, in regard to the power of obeying laws,
there is among men no difference of mental constitution; that a good man wills to be virtuous, and a bad man wills to be vicious, and that either might will equally easily the opposite character. Hence the indignation and resentment felt against the criminal. Through the will being regarded as a separate faculty directing the moral destinies of the individual, the ignorant man, as well as the intelligent man, was held accountable for his actions, not only to God, but to the secular authorities, with little regard for the influence of education and environment in affecting his moral responsibility. Many of the cruelties of our penal methods are based upon this erroneous conception of the nature of the will and of human responsibility. Thus we often deal harshly with people who possess by their organisation strong impulses and are surrounded by temptation. It is easy to be virtuous when one happens to be so organised that one has no inclination, and when one has never been tempted, but a born eunuch deserves no credit for being a celibate.

Responsibility is the power on the part of the individual of responding to rational, social, and ethical stimuli or impulses, and of inhibiting stimuli of an opposite nature; and the corresponding expectation on the part of others that the individual will so respond. This implies on the part of society a duty of safeguarding those who, from immaturity or other causes, may be incapable of choosing their own environment against extrinsic stimuli of a dangerous or otherwise unfavourable kind. It implies, further, the positive obligation of providing such environmental influences as are calculated to develop the best possibilities of a given inheritance.

A good many people still hold the notion that all persons are equally good by nature, and might be equally good actually, had they but the will to be so. They fail to see that men are born with all degrees of moral capacities and incapacities, and some of them wholly lacking in that regard, just as they are born with all degrees of intellectual endowment, and some of them with none whatever. A man may be an idiot morally, as well as intellectually. Robberies and murders, as I have said before, have been committed in all ages and all countries, and neither education, legislation, nor religion, the prison, hard labour, nor the wheel have yet been able to extirpate these crimes. It is recorded that in Queen Elizabeth's time, out of every thousand persons born, five were actually hanged, yet it did not eliminate crime. Punishment cannot prevent the wish to commit a criminal offence, though it may prevent in some the actual committal of it. With many, it is temptation which excites the crime. Supposing we allow it to be education, and not nature, that produces vicious tendencies, the difficulty still remains the same, because education never would develop either good or evil inclinations, were not their germs previously existent in human nature.

Character-tendencies, that is, the tendencies to particular forms of virtue and vice, are hereditary, but not the acts themselves. Some authorities teach us that a tendency to drunkenness may be transmitted from parent to child, not by force of example and education merely, but by direct constitutional inheritance; but there are still very few men who will admit that a child may similarly inherit a tendency to bad temper and all its consequences, as well as many other evil inclinations, the same as a tendency to consumption or other disease. They recognise bodily defects, and also all the intellectual ones that limit the range of thought, but they continue to talk of the moral powers as if all men were born perfect.

The mental constitution of man consists—as we have seen—of animal propensities, social feelings, egoistic sentiments, intellectual capacities, ethical and religious sentiments. All these vary in degree of strength in each individual. We are endowed with weaker or stronger tendencies to them from our parents and ancestors, but early education and experience modify our original tendencies to a great extent, and every individual is partly taught, partly acquires for himself, the power of self-control.
Human beings may be divided in three classes with reference to the strength of their animal propensities:

First, those whose animal appetites or propensities are so powerful as to overbalance the restraining force of their moral and intellectual faculties. Beings of this constitution of mind are under the dominion of strong passions, and their impressions of moral duty are so weak as to offer no restraint to the gratification of their selfishness, while in most of them a limited intellect has obscure views of the real nature of things, confused perceptions of consequences, overweening confidence in their own power of concealment, evasion and escape. Any better endowment of intellect in this class is perverted to the purposes of crime; hence expert planning thieves, swindlers, and forgers.

The second class of mankind is very numerous, consisting of those whose animal tendencies are nearly as strong as in the first class, but whose moral and intellectual powers of restraint are so much greater as to bring the tendencies to indulgence and forbearance almost to a balance. External circumstances in such persons turn the scale. In low life, uneducated, neglected, and destitute, they often become criminals; in a more favourable condition of education and society, they continue respectable; but, under the influence of a bad example, they will be found sensual, and often profligate, and they are always selfish and self-indulging.

The third class are the good ground. They are those who are "a law unto themselves." In them the animal propensities are sufficient for their legitimate ends, but the decided predominance of intellect and moral feeling renders it nearly a moral impossibility that the inferior tendencies should ever master them so far as to impel them to commit crime.

Crime is often nothing more than the unguided manifestation of the animal propensities.

There are few persons who are not subject to evil thoughts, but they do not take form because they do not dwell on them. Moreover, there are few people who would not commit crimes if they could profit by them, especially when in need, were it not for the consequences if found out.

In speaking of criminals, we exclude, of course, that large class of petty offenders, whom accident and not taint has brought within the grasp of the law, many of them having been committed for mere breaches of bye-laws and committed to prison for having been unable to pay the fine imposed. Many such crimes are really misdemeanours, i.e., the deeds are not wrong in themselves but made so by law.

Taking the above as our standard, the ordinary sane criminals may be divided into three classes: the accidental, the ordinary, and the professional criminal.

1.—THE ACCIDENTAL OR OCCASIONAL CRIMINALS,

i.e., those who, not being really criminally disposed, have fallen at some moment of temptation in consequence of the extraordinary pressure of exceptionally adverse circumstances. They have committed a single crime, which they are not likely to repeat, but the law punishes them by way of warning and as an example to others. Their crime is a chance crime, and the main effort ought to be to save the offender. These are the accidental or occasional criminals, deterred by the prospect of punishment and amenable to reform.

A subdivision of this class is the criminal by passion. Men have always regarded violent affections and passions as extenuating motives when their impetuosity, excluding premeditation and sometimes even consciousness, has led on to criminal action. But it often happens that, although the storm is raging in the mind, external circumstances may retard the outburst, when the mind and body may be more strongly agitated than if it were allowed to take its own free course. An atrocious resolve adopted during such a state should be regarded, under many circumstances, as the consequence of impaired health and perverted judgment.
And, indeed, if it be suicide, we condone the offence as committed "during temporary insanity," but if it be murder, the man is hanged. Those who commit murder in a fit of passion generally feel remorse immediately after, frequently so keen that they instantly commit or attempt to commit suicide. When convicted, they are always repentant prisoners, and amend their lives, or do not become degraded, so that in this way they encourage superficial observers to affirm as a general fact that ameliorative effect of imprisonment which is really a mere illusion in the case of the far more numerous classes of born and habitual criminals.

2.—THE ORDINARY CRIMINALS,

_i.e._, those who, having some degree of criminal disposition, might still be saved from crime had they had the advantage of a fair education and of propitious conditions of life, instead of the disadvantages of an evil education and of criminal surroundings. These are the men who drift into crime and whom every effort should be made to reform. Many of them have committed their first crime most commonly in youth, or even in childhood—almost invariably a crime against property, and far more through moral weakness, induced by circumstances and a corrupting environment, than through inborn and active tendencies. After this, either they are led on by the impunity of their first offences, or, more decisively, prison associations debilitate and corrupt them, morally and physically, the cell degrades them, alcoholism renders them stupid and subject to impulse, and they continually fall back into crime and become chronically prone to it. And society, which thus abandons them, before and after they leave their prison, to wretchedness, idleness, and temptation, gives them no assistance in their struggle to gain an honest livelihood, even when it does not thrust them back into crime by harassing police regulations, which prevent them from finding or keeping honest employment.

But there is no possibility of forming anything like a reliable estimate of their conduct outside from their behaviour in prison, the conditions being so widely different. Just as among the insane it is difficult to form an estimate of their complete recovery while in the asylum, because they are not yet subject to the forces of the environment outside and have not yet to take part in the struggle for existence, so it is with the criminals while in prison. To teach them to conform to the rules that exist in prison is not to educate them to live outside. It has also to be remembered that the poorer a man is the more difficult it is for him to avoid transgressing the laws of his country, even though he anxiously tries to do so; and imprisonment frequently destroys the initiative for the exercise of the natural talent and earning capacity.

3.—THE PROFESSIONAL CRIMINALS,

_i.e._, the born criminals, whose instincts urge them blindly into criminal activity, whatever their circumstances of life, and whom neither kindness, instruction, or punishment will reform. This class furnishes the professional criminal, who deliberately seeks crime, whatever his opportunities for earning an honest living, and the one main thought must be to protect the community against them.

That there are born criminals we cannot have any doubt. I have seen in my professional capacity (see Chapter XXXIII.) so many sons and daughters of well-to-do, highly respectable parents, who, though perfectly intelligent and some even abnormally clever, manifested an incapacity to lead a moral life, and on whom all possible measures, punitive and therapeutic, had been tried without result; and could not but feel the least doubt that these self-same young people, if not well-provided, well-clothed, and well-mannered, would make incorrigible criminals, as some, indeed, have become, notwithstanding these advantages. My case-books
contain newspaper cuttings of accounts of trials and convictions against them, repeated until I lost trace of them, owing to the frequent change of name. The medical psychologist is consulted as a rule when the boy or girl has reached adolescence, but the remedy must be started in infancy by special education.

A man is not necessarily a professional criminal because he lives habitually by illicit means. It may well happen that his first fall from honesty has left him no choice, and that he must either starve or steal. The true professional is the man who has gone into the business of depredation as a means of livelihood.

The professional criminal is the typical criminal born in crime, and whose vocation is crime, by a physical and psychical proclivity; a man in whom the selfish tendencies predominate over the moral and religious sentiments and altruistic motives, and whose intellectual powers, instead of inhibiting such tendencies, are employed to further them and to supply means for their gratification; moreover, such men are usually not influenced by domestic affections, and are much too insensitive to the esteem of others to be prevented from committing crimes. The professional criminal plans crimes as the merchant plans business. He thinks dishonesty a paying game. He never has worked, and he does not want work. He prefers living by his wits. The regularity of life which work entails is more than he can bear. But his ranks are thinning because the odds against success are yearly growing heavier. Punishment is no deterrent to him, for he looks to the chances of escape.

Investigations have been made which show that in this type of man, not only the moral, but also the physical sensibility is much diminished, that he is less susceptible to pain than normal men. Callousness is more necessary to him than a loaded revolver. That he is not amenable to moral treatment is shown by the frequent recommittals and by the apparent absence of all remorse. He may feel and dread the material consequences of crime, but his conscience is not strong enough to torture him for his guilt. According to the evidence of night-watchers of prisons, he sleeps as soundly as the rural cottager, the simple peasant, or the most innocent in the quiet homes of social men. Repentance is rare. All the organisation of chaplains and teachers, with all the discipline of prison legislation, fail to turn him from the error of his ways. One cannot make an old fox into a house-dog, and one cannot make an honest working-man out of an old thief. The criminals who do sincerely repent are those who have been drawn into crime through imprudence, or an unfortunate fit of passion, poverty, and sore need, or from other very pressing external circumstances. When the fatal occurrence of circumstances has passed, the milder inner feelings become active. This is what usually occurs in the case of crimes committed in a fit of passion. After the event, total contradiction is manifested between the natural sentiments and the act committed, and this contradiction is what constitutes repentance, or the natural conscience.

Crime is so manifold and diversified, there is so much in it of a sporting nature, it opens such wide fields of originality that it is no wonder that the professional criminal, in whom the animal nature predominates over the ethical, seems attracted to it and prefers it to the more monotonous, tame, and toned-down humdrum life of good citizenship.

The professional criminal is frequently a man of superior strength, addicted from childhood to arrogance, bullying, and cruelty.

In the professional criminal the passions predominate not merely from an excess of animal propensities, but partly also from a defective condition of the inhibiting centres, the higher intellectual and moral qualities. Hence the frequent outbursts of fury and destruction in prisoners.

DAVID NICOLSON (late Medical Superintendent Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum) writes: "A current of irascible emotion with its destructive tendency
would in ordinary individuals be resisted, or at least moderated, by their sympathies and conscientious feeling; but such moderating influences occupy but a small space in the criminal nature, and consequently they afford a proportionately slight aid in resisting tides of passion."

P. Näcke ("Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie," 1893) states that, amongst 53 women prisoners, 41 suffered from increased irascibility, 33 were simply abusive, 24 were destructive, 23 violent and dangerous, and 12 given to impulsive fury. All of them were egotistical; the altruistic sentiment seemed totally absent.

Given the criminal bent, instruction appears to do little or nothing to nullify it. In the born criminal's hands, it is only one weapon the more. Instruction is to the mind what athletics are to the body, neither less nor more; it may sharpen an existing faculty, but it cannot create a new one. Nobody supposes that athletics could make all men of the same height, weight, or vigour. Yet something of this sort is expected of education within its sphere. On the other hand, it is not immaterial whether a brain be empty of things or well furnished. An impulsive force traverses the desert brain of an ignorant person without obstacle. After the necessity of education, the utility of instruction becomes plainly apparent. It has been said that instruction can only render man more crafty, more skilful in evil, and consequently more dangerous. But everything which checks impulse must be regarded as moralising, and to furnish a brain with facts or ideas is inevitably to make it wiser. Consider also the highly important fact that, although the total amount of criminality does not seem to have been lessened by the spread of instruction, sanguinary crime is decreasing, while theft and crimes of cunning are on the increase. Violence has diminished and knavery grown. Hence, also, the less civilised men and countries tend toward having a higher percentage of violent crimes than those more civilised; and the cities being more cultured tend to furnish a lower percentage of crimes of violence than do the villages, but they furnish a higher proportion of fraudulent crimes.

The educated classes judge the uneducated classes with severity for their murders and violence, but there is plenty of vice and infraction of the law in the higher classes, but of a different type. Unscrupulous men, who have no conscience, are able to amass wealth by grinding down the poor, bycornering the necessities of life, by manipulating the stock market, or issuing well-prepared balance-sheets, and they count among the "Napoleons of Finance" and are respected citizens. The violence of crime among the lower classes may be due in part to excess in drinking, especially of bad liquor, in part to the lower state in evolution, and to the degenerative surroundings under which they live, circumstances which naturally reinforce any trend or tendency to the uncontrolled instincts with which their early life seems inseparably bound up. The dull, dreary, monotonous environment offered by the dismal streets in the poorer quarters of our English cities has a very depressing effect, and, considering the crowded rooms in which they live, we must not wonder that the public-house is an allurement, and that the voice of the tempter and agitator awakens an echo in dull ears. We must remember the difference in rank in criticising defects of moral character. The children of the rich have plentiful and healthful food, and under ordinary circumstances they have a well-regulated physical and mental education, as well as other advantages which those in lower life have not. The practice of their parents is not constantly enforced both by example and a sort of necessity, and the tendencies which they have inherited are not generally fostered by an entirely depraved moral medium. Far different is the lot of the children of the poor. Born in the midst of abject poverty, misery and privation are their lot from their earliest infancy; and their want of the common necessaries of life, with complete ignorance of its comforts, prompts them to the commission of crimes, and to the indulgence of their hereditary tastes, to relieve their immediate wants and sufferings. And thus their impulsive nature, so far from being checked by any moral considerations, is placed in a very hot-bed for its evil development.
GENIUS, INSANITY, AND CRIME

We are all of us a compound of our inborn qualities and those that have been stamped, as it were, upon us by contact with the external world; and we have no right to judge in an offhand manner of the innate qualities of a criminal without a very extensive knowledge of his upbringing and of the temptations and influences which have surrounded him. Theft by a person in necessity need by no means imply so vicious a temperament as that of a man who spends his life in getting the better of his less clever neighbours, and who enriches himself by the loss of others, as is done in many so-called legitimate ways; and the killing of a man in passion may be done by one who would be incapable of settling an old grudge by taking a mean advantage of an enemy.

The man who amasses great wealth by grinding down the poor, by cornering the necessities of life, or by sucking the life-blood out of the toiler; the unscrupulous financier who robs his credulous dupes—these because of their money are eligible for peerages; the less refined criminal goes to goal. The former hide their guilt and save their conscience by giving millions—though still only a fraction of their wealth—to charity. Society is indulgent to the fraudulent financier, who lives to rob, and hard on the larceny fellow, who robs to live. Criminal law, paradoxically enough, often catches the little fish and lets the larger ones escape through its elastic meshes.

H. J. BUCKLE (1821-1862), "History of Civilisation" (1859), and A. QUETELET (1796-1874), "Sur l’Homme" (Paris, 1883), found that in everything which concerns crime the same numbers recur with a constancy which cannot be mistaken. Every year there takes place nearly the same number of murders, and even suicides. The number may go up some years, and may be below the average in other years, because a number of factors are at work; but, roughly speaking, statistics continue to tell the same tale, in spite of improved civilisation and remedial measures. It is only the method which differs. If we have very few highway robberies at the present day, it is because people travel no longer in coaches but in railways, because they carry fewer valuables on their person, and the police protection is better. Altogether, attacks on the person and burglary have diminished, but less easily detected crimes, as those of fraud, take their place. The wickedness and the all-devouring selfishness of man has not lessened; it is only artificially dammed in by the dykes of the law and of civil society. The degree of immoral disposition has remained the same, but it has discarded the clodden feet and walks about in conventional costume and has become more elegant. Theft and illegal fraud are vulgar and clumsy selfish methods despised by the more clever rogues, who know how to keep their attacks on their neighbour’s property within the letter of the law.

If the strictly criminal type of mind is held to be due to bad organisation, as I certainly believe it is, it is for society to say whether it will isolate those who possess it and protect itself. It prefers, as a rule, to do the first, and to protect itself by penalties of different grades following the detection of wrongs attempted upon itself. The man of innate criminal type knows this ruling of the social law, and he accepts the challenge with the full power of his reasoning faculties. Crime is, therefore, the result of bad judgment, when it is not the result of necessary wants or due to passionate impulses. The criminal plays for wholly insufficient stakes, and appears incapable of estimating the chances against him at their proper value. Apart from moral considerations, could anyone assert with a full appreciation of the risks involved, such as a well-balanced and fairly well-informed mind would take account of, that it was “good business” to rob a till, to forge a cheque, to strangle a farmed-out baby, or to break into a suburban villa and murder its occupants for the sake of such small booty as was there to be had? No, under present conditions it is not good business, and no normally constituted person would attempt it. There must be a warp in the mental mechanism before the first suggestion of the crime is entertained. There is, of course, genius for crime as for any other calling. The criminal section of society is very like other sections. It contains its master-
THE ETHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL

minds, its average practitioners, and its bunglers, the last-named of whom fortunately are in the great majority.

It is claimed that the fear of punishment, on the one hand, and the psychic shock of it, on the other, have a powerful reformative and repressive effect on criminals and would-be criminals. Fear is a deterrent, but not a reformatory emotion; and is not always deterrent, because the criminal does not reckon with the possibility of being found out, but with the possibility of escape. The typical criminal has no shame and, if repressed by fear alone, relapses into crime whenever there is any assurance of safety to himself. First there is the chance of not being detected, which is the most powerful spring of all contemplated crime; then the chance, in case of detection, that the evidence will not be strong enough, that the judges will be merciful or will be deceived, that judgment may be averted amidst the intricacies of the trial, that clemency may either reverse or mitigate the sentence. These are so many psychological causes which, conflicting with the natural fear of unpleasant consequences, weaken the deterrent force of legal punishment. Even when prisons were a great deal worse than they are nowadays, imprisonment did not keep those who had been in them from repeating their misconduct. The severity of punishment does not prevent the wish to commit crime, though it does to some extent prevent the actual committal of it. When people with a criminal tendency are brought daily face to face with the punishment awarded to criminal acts, and yet will persist in these acts, we must suspect something wrong in their mental organisation, something which they either cannot resist or can resist only with difficulty. That, as a rule, they can resist, is shown by their power to retard, precipitate, or cancel their acts altogether if the conditions are not favourable to success. They take their chance, and if they fail they blame themselves only for carelessness in neglecting some point essential to their success in accomplishment or concealment. Punishment serves a useful purpose as the expression of resentment of society which is to enter into the sum total of actuating motives.

Another factor in the inhibition of crime is the feeling of self-esteem and love of approbation of our fellow-men. The shame of exposure, trial, and punishment has reformed many a man. Fear and shame, in general, may stand in place of conscience. Therefore, in order to prevent crime, we should see that we bring up self-respecting citizens. The wider the contact of a man with his fellow-men, as in social intercourse, the more he cultivates these feelings. Even if he does not mind being condemned to gaol, his wife and children will be ashamed of meeting their friends and acquaintances, and for this reason will exercise a deterrent influence on the offender.

The proper housing of the poorer classes in England is a reform which is receiving recognition. Another needful step is the training of children to some trade or money-earning occupation, so as to prevent the creation of loafers, unskilled labour, cul-de-sac occupations. Thirdly, in this still very Puritarchical country, the provision of plentiful wholesome amusement, as, for example, poor men's restaurants, where plentiful music is provided, and cafés with a liberal supply of newspapers, where the labourer can take his wife and child to meet other families, is needed in place of the common public-house.

In addition to the three classes mentioned we have

4.—THE WEAK-MINDED CRIMINALS,

individuals physically and mentally weak, miserable, submissive to circumstances, given to trivial crimes often repeated, as, for example, to theft of certain articles only, marked by temporary exemplary conduct followed by relapses, something
like the chronic inebriate. The weak-minded criminals are habitual criminals, men who live by dishonest means owing to defective mental constitution. Punishment has little effect on them, and they do not fear going to prison. They are mental defectives, not genuine criminals. They cannot "will" an honest life.

To this class belong the foolish odds and ends of humanity, the people of no foresight. No doubt there are among them some who are gifted with exceptional capacity, but, even with these there is a weak joint in the moral harness. A great character sets his face like a flint against the seductions which, if yielded to, would prove his undoing, but, where the character is weak, temptation is succumbed to with fatal facility, and in due course the weakling swells the ranks of the criminal classes.

That a large number of criminals have not the same vitality and intelligence as law-abiding citizens is shown conclusively by the following observations.

The mortality among juveniles in reformatory and industrial schools is higher than the mortality among the general population of a similar age. It has also been pointed out that the juvenile prison population, as a whole, are under the average weight of the general community at the same period of life. Further, it has been shown that a high percentage of these juveniles are descended from such a feeble stock, that over thirty per cent. of the industrial school, reformatory school, and prison population have lost one or both parents in early life. In other words, the physical basis of mental life is in a worse condition amongst juvenile offenders as a body than amongst the ordinary population at the same stage of existence. In addition, it has been shown that nearly one-third of the inmates of reformatories descended on one or both sides from parents who neglected to control them, or deserted them, or were in prison for crime. The majority are either unable to read and write, or can read and write only imperfectly, many because of defective mental capacity.

Reading the police reports one is struck by the number of apparently purposeless crimes that are committed. It is not to be wondered at when we realise how large is the proportion of the weak-minded. As the lame man wants his physical crutch, so these poor creatures need their mental crutch, and when that is withdrawn many of them inevitably fail. The more amenable they have been to good influence, the more readily may they succumb to bad ones. They lack will-power, and this must be super-imposed from without. If it be a power for good, all is well; if for evil, as it generally is, the result is disastrous. Criminals, paupers, drunkards, prostitutes are frequently descended to these conditions because they are feeble-minded, and our charitable and State institutions, homes, industrial schools, reformatories and prisons fail to stem the evils with which they contend, because the public acts on the assumption that temporary care and training are all that are needed.

Sir Bryan Donkin, one of H.M. Commissioners of Prisons, at a conference at Birmingham, made the statement that "the weak-minded amount to between ten and fifteen per cent. of the total number of persons committed to prison; the true maximum is probably even higher than this. Owing to their inherent incapacities and to certain surroundings, a large number of mental defectives tend to become criminals, and a considerable proportion, even twenty per cent., of so-called criminals or law-breakers are demonstrably mentally defective."

It is sad to remember how many charitable agencies are wasting their powers, because they do not understand that it is impossible to rescue the weak-minded unless it is done once for all. People who deal with these degenerates and see them under control, behaving in decent and orderly fashion and generally maintaining good habits, are apt to forget that the control, and that alone, is the cause of the good behaviour, that as soon as this control is removed these weak-minded men and
women are likely to succumb to any other influence which may be brought to bear. Cleverness in planning crimes does not exclude weak-mindedness. It is simply the employment of what intellect there is available for the purpose of gratifying a passion. Even idiots confined in institutions sometimes show cleverness in the mischief they do. Strong propensities, in man the same as in animals, gives inventiveness and craftiness in the employment of means to gratify a desire. This would explain the apparent contradiction in the intellectual manifestations of a criminal who from one point of view appears almost a genius and from another a mental deficient.

So far the intellectually deficient have been dealt with; but there are persons intellectually quite normal, who are merely morally deficient. It is this class of

5.—MORALLY WEAK-MINDED CRIMINALS

which we shall now have to consider more fully.

If the mental defect is of the intellectual variety there is usually no difficulty in recognising it. But if the effect is a moral one, it is difficult for anyone but the expert to distinguish iniquity and folly, wickedness and crime. There are persons born with a marked deficiency of the moral sentiments, wholly insensible to the moral relations of life, as deficient in this regard as a person colour-blind is to certain colours, or as one who is without ear for music is to the initial harmonies of sound. Those who study reports of criminal trials must be struck with the constant recurrence, among those who have committed great crimes in cold blood, of a mental condition marked by the absence of all moral remonstrance before the act premeditated, and the absence, not less complete, of all remorse after the accomplishment thereof.

For the offspring of poor parents who suffer from moral weak-mindedness there is nothing but the prison; but even the offspring of wealthy parents often have to go to gaol.

One of the first signs of such moral weak-mindedness in early youth is an incapacity to tell the truth. These children lie to themselves and to others continually, until they are no longer capable of distinguishing clearly between that which has been experienced and that which has been invented. This habit, unless treated early, becomes rooted and remains through life. In adult years such persons cheat and make up things, either half consciously or quite unconsciously. They are instinctive liars, and are incapable of speaking the truth, even if they are put on their oath. Such a pathological liar confuses the products of his fancy with realities. False memories constantly disturb his reproductive faculty. Since he plunges with his whole attention into the deceptive creations of his fancy, in such a way that they become realities to him, he has an assured appearance, and he presents his humbugs and swindles so ingeniously and naturally, with such an innocent expression or with such unfeigned enthusiasm, that he succeeds again and again in convincing his fellow-men, where a conscious liar, who coolly and clearly measures his words in constant fear of contradicting himself or being trapped, meets with instinctive mistrust. In the consciousness of the common or normal liar two trains of thought flow beside each other—the thought of the truth and the thought of the lie—and they trip each other up. In the brain of the pathological liar all is unified, and so he can carry through the most magnificent swindles artistically and with inner conviction. Thus he drag a multitude of credulous souls with him to ruin. The public believe blindly in his alluring portrayals, his poetic effusions, his fairy tales, until at last some chance, or the reflection of a thoughtful man, brings the end with panic, and usually a sensation in the courts. Then, as though waking from a dream, the pathological liar collapses, for the moment almost as astonished and dismayed as his victim—only to begin soon again, for he cannot help himself.
In the moral imbecile, the stock of showy and superficial knowledge, the con-

dfident and boastful manner, the glibness of tongue, the spurious brightness, the
cunning and carefully-planned schemes—all these mask the significance of the
supreme selfishness, the lack of shame and remorse, the unbounded egotism, the
cruelty, the lack of fear of consequences, the love of notoriety, the failure to respect
the feelings of others, the idleness and tendency to early vice which are apt to
characterise this type of defective.

6.—THE INSANE CRIMINAL

This class forms quite a small number, not so numerous as the pleadings of
insanity in courts of law would make it appear.

Weak-mindedness is common among habitual frequenters of prisons, not so
insanity. Weak-mindedness means arrest of brain-growth or congenital defect;
insanity is an acquired disease, though the tendency to it may be inherited. The
weak-minded show symptoms of their defect from childhood; not so the insane.
The weak-minded commit the lesser crimes, the insane the greater. One half of
the population of Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum are there for murder,
attempted or actually committed. The rest are chiefly for violence or sexual
offences, where the manner and the grossness of the outrage would draw attention
to the prisoner's mental state.

The ordinary criminal will not, and the insane criminal cannot, exercise self-
control; that is the difference. The one is to be blamed, the other to be pitied.

It is commonly taken for granted by lawyers that if a rational motive can be
found for the criminal offence, such as lust, rage, greed, or any other passion, there
is no ground to allege insanity, or, at any rate, no ground to allege exemption from
responsibility, by reason of insanity. In the eyes of the law, the ideal madman acts
without motives or acts from insane motives. But insane persons have the same
feelings and passions as those who are not insane, but they do not exercise restraint
to the same extent as normal persons.

To establish a defence on the ground of insanity it must be proved, according
to English law, that at the time of committing the act the accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know that he was doing what was
wrong. The criminal is supposed to be conscious of the nature and quality of his
acts; to know that they are injurious or noxious, and worthy of punishment; and
to be able to control them. An insane person may cause the same injury to society
as a criminal, but, seeing that he is not able to control his acts, or is impelled by some
false idea for which he is not responsible, or is ignorant of the nature and quality of
his act, and its consequences to himself and others, he is not punished. In the one
case the person is supposed to be able to recognise right and wrong, and to act
accordingly; in the other case he is not able to distinguish and to decide.

We are not all alike in our organisation or our education; the problem of life
is easier for one than for another; some of us have more temptations than others;
but this does not compel us to yield to them. So long as a man is himself—so long
as he is not a madman—he has at every point the power to say "yes" or "no."
He can, in other words, exercise self-control and self-denial if he will. It is an
unstable condition of the brain centres which allows action to take place upon
impulse, which a healthy state of the brain would have enabled us to resist. The
desire to do the right thing and avoid the wrong may be as keen in the one state as
in the other, but the power to resist is absent in the one and present in the other.

Very few people would resist temptation if the temptation were sufficiently strong.
In that want of power lies the true evidence and fact of the disordered brain, and
not, as legal psychology assumes, in the knowledge which may be present. True,
some lunatics acting upon impulse show no regret, no sense of the nature of their conduct, but there are others who may weep with bitter regret over that which they have done, and who can give no explanation of the motive. The knowledge of the difference between right and wrong is therefore no test of insanity.

There are comparatively few madmen of whom it can be truthfully said that they have no proper knowledge of right and wrong. They often do wrong by reason of their mental disease, but most of them know at the time that the act is wrong and against the law of the land. They may have the power of distinguishing right from wrong, but they have not the power of choosing right from wrong. They are often conscious of doing wrong, but have not the power to stop the brain machinery; they lack the self-control. They are often the slaves of a conception which they not only cannot check, but they may even devise means of carrying the conception into action.

Taking even sane persons, it must be apparent to the most ordinary observer that the majority of authors of violent and reckless crimes, especially homicide, manslaughter, and serious assaults, are under such influence of passion as to obscure reason and reflection for the time being, and that they are not thinking at all at that moment of the consequences of their acts, or that they are doing wrong. Whether a jealous husband shoots his wife's lover to vindicate his own honour, as sometimes happens in France; or a burglar stabs a policeman in order to prevent himself being arrested, as sometimes happens in England; each may be, at the time of the act, incapable of distinguishing right from wrong. In the first case, the thirst for revenge, in the second, the desire for liberty, completely obscures the moral sense.

There is perhaps no class of persons so much to be pitied as those who act on impulse, especially when what they do has the aspect of premeditation. Such impulsive actions are particularly common amongst the uneducated. Irresistible impulse is, unfortunately, no mere fancy, invented for the special benefit of accused persons. It has a real existence. All children act on impulse; education is supposed to give us deliberation and hesitancy. There are few persons in ordinary life, even amongst the most sane, who are quite free from occasional impulses to commit acts which are inconsistent with strictly moral rectitude. The particular nature of the desire differs with the individual and with the same person under different circumstances. Some feel an impulse to throw themselves down from a height or over the side of a vessel into the water. One person has a desire to scream in a crowded church or theatre, another to smash something valuable on the table. All these impulses are, by the healthy mind, resisted and controlled, but when the mind is not healthy, when by disease the controlling power of the higher centres is inhibited, then an insane impulse may be let loose in any direction—homicide, suicide, mere wanton smashing, or causeless violence.

By an impulsive act is to be understood an act which is unpromeditated, which is undertaken on the spur of the moment, and without any, or with the minimum of, balancing of advantages and disadvantages to be obtained from the act. Impulsive acts are commonly the acts of those who have little power of self-restraint, and for this reason, as well as for their usually unprofitable character, they are regarded with reprobation. An insane person will suddenly start up from a state of quiescence, and even of lethargy, and commit a violent or unprompted assault or act of destructiveness without warning, and apparently without premeditation.

The reader is reminded here of the large number of recorded cases of criminals which have been treated surgically (see Chapters XXXI. and XXXII.).

7.—THE SEMI-INSANE OR BORDERLAND CRIMINALS

Between those persons who are certainly insane and those who are undoubtedly sane, there are a great many on or near the borderland, and it is in these cases that
difficulty arises when a definite judgment has to be pronounced one way or the other. The requirements of the law demand that a definite boundary shall be drawn, where science tells us that no natural frontier-line exists. Perfect mental health is probably as rare as perfect bodily health; and it is most difficult to decide what amount of departure therefrom should be held to constitute insanity, or to confer irresponsibility. It may fairly be argued that the commission of a brutal crime is in itself proof of the existence of an unhealthy state of mind; but it is certainly no proof of such a degree of insanity as would justify its perpetrator being held irresponsible for his act. Crime is punished by law, not from any desire for vengeance upon the criminal, but in order that he and others may be deterred from its commission in the future.

The legal view of insanity is that it is a disorder of the intellect. It ignores the emotions and propensities. But no one can be said to be of sound mind unless all the mental functions—intellectual, emotional, and instinctive—are healthily performed. The legal test of insanity is simply a test of knowledge, whereas anyone acquainted with diseases of the brain must be aware that the disorder expresses itself not only in perverted ideas, but in all sorts of perverted feelings, appetites, and instincts. The law does not embody that, but fortunately in practice it is often allowed. It is by no means unusual to find the disorders of the emotions and propensities out of all proportion greater than the disorder of the intellect, and this is especially the case in regard to those victims of insanity who are most likely to bring themselves within reach of the criminal law. It is a common experience in lunatic asylums to find that the very persons who are most dangerous to themselves and those about them are the most intelligent inmates in the institution.

It is very difficult to perceive the motives of human action and to prove they are morbid if behind the emotional stimulus there is no delusion or intellectual deficiency. Not only is there such a state as constitutional immorality in another wise sound person, but in the early stages of insanity the psychosis may be slight, having only just begun, and a certain lucidity preserved, yet the patient may display a shocking degree of immorality in his feelings and conduct. In such instances the faults of character are out of proportion to the intellectual defects. The public are very ready to cast the stigma of insanity upon anyone who talks foolishly, but hesitate to confer it upon the person who commits foolish acts.

Amongst persons of undoubtedly unsound mind we have the hypomaniac, who may reason so ably that he gives the impression of being saner than in his normal state. The melancholic also reasons clearly, and his depressed condition may be mistaken for the outcome of remorse for the crime. The paranoid will defend his misconduct by able arguments; his state of mind will have to be examined very closely to discover that he reasons from false premises.

The question of sanity has to be decided chiefly in cases of sexual crime, larceny, manslaughter and murder.

With reference to sexual crime, the chief offender is the man suffering from General Paralysis of the Insane. His sexual excitement, which at the commencement of his disease is often in excess, may result in rape, exposure of the person, and other acts of indecency. Such patients have lost the sense of propriety and are apparently unconscious of doing wrong; at least, they seem to take no precaution to prevent detection. In Senile Dementia, too, there is often erotic excitement, leading to assaults on children, pederasty, and other perverted manifestations. On the other hand, false accusations are often brought by young women suffering from hysteria and elderly spinsters in the climacterium, such as that liberties have been taken with them.

Kleptomania occurs in the mental disorder which sometimes accompanies pregnancy. Weak-minded persons are prone to commit petty acts of larceny. The hypomaniac sometimes steals whatever he can lay his hands on, but the articles
stolen are often thrown away as soon as they are in his possession, and he steals almost openly. General Paralytics in the early stage of the disease not infrequently steal without reflection, though sometimes with ingenuity, as a rule any article that takes their fancy. They also commit frauds of every kind, generally neglecting ordinary precautions. In the latter stages of General Paralysis they again steal, but this time under the delusion that everything belongs to them. They then appropriate all sorts of articles, hoard and conceal them, and immediately afterwards lose all recollection of them. Then theft may occur in persons who from childhood have been "morally weak-minded" and easily yielding to temptation. Their insanity can be proved only by investigating their entire history, from infancy onwards, and by showing the coexistence of other defects of morality. Another important class of Kleptomaniacs are those who are perfectly sane in every other respect, but have morbid impulses whenever there is any temptation to pilfer. Such impulsive stealing has certain points which are of importance to know. The person may be rich and by no means ungenerous with his money, and may yet appropriate articles which are worthless in themselves and of no practical use to himself, the articles stolen being generally of the same kind—handkerchiefs, ties, watch-chains, scarf-pins, books; moreover, the stolen goods are not parted with for personal gain, but are accumulated uselessly. These are the points of difference between kleptomania and theft.

As regards manslaughter and murder, assaults on a person, with or without intent to kill, are made in acute mania. There need be no delusion whatever; the crime is simply the outcome of ungovernable passion. A person suffering from melancholia may kill his wife and children, hearing the voice of God within him commanding him to do so. Persecutory hallucinations and delusions may cause the acute alcoholic to turn upon his enemies and attempt to kill them. Wife-beating, inhuman treatment of children, attacks upon associates as the effect of blind passion, are common to chronic alcoholism. Assaults may also occur as the result of delusions, as in paranoia, and may be unpremeditated or designed. The paranoiac kills a stranger, mistaking him for his long-sought enemy. The murder is done openly and he justifies it. These patients often object to the defence of insanity in their behalf. They do not like to be called insane, even if they risk their lives when on trial for murder. As the law stands, an insane delusion is a defence to a criminal charge only when the imaginary facts would, if really existent, be a legal justification. If A kills B under the delusion that B has slandered him, he is guilty of murder, but if A kills B under the delusion that B is trying to kill him, he is not guilty of murder.

Political paranoiae are common. They are men with tainted brains who speculate on political affairs and get fixed ideas that the State is mismanaged, that the people are wronged, or else they have imaginary grievances, or real but exaggerated, against certain officials. Paranoiae dwell on these ideas so persistently, although in every other respect reasonable beings, that the brain, so to say, becomes soaked in them and the conduct becomes affected. If a murder of some exalted personage is the result, popular indignation rises so high that even when the insanity is pronounced, feeble or no attempts are made to prove it. Many anarchists are men suffering from a form of paranoia, and, misguided by political obsessions, they think themselves persecuted and called on to act as martyrs and to kill some great person in the name of Liberty.

Auditory hallucinations are often the precursor of insanity, and the voices heard may incite to murder. False accusations may be brought by insane persons owing to insulting voices they hear; such a condition may lead to a carefully planned action against particular individuals, or may result in a sudden violent attack on a chance passer-by who happened to look at the person or made some innocent remark. Voices may also be heard in apparently sane persons suffering from internal ear trouble, and this latter complaint, even without auditory hallucinations, may lead to irresponsible actions by direct or reflex irritation of the brain (see Chapter XXXII.).
Injuries to the head sometimes cause a deterioration in brain energy and consequent weakening of the character with criminal dispositions. In others, injuries of the head give rise to morbid impulses of a criminal nature which the person is conscious of, but cannot control (see Chapter XXXI).

Epileptics are particularly liable to criminal acts. All is well if the epileptic have genuine convulsions, which any layman can recognize. Sometimes, however, there are no convulsions, but the fit is replaced by a paroxysm of mania, in which the epileptic may perform actions as automatically as his convulsive movements are performed at other times. In other words, the nerve storm may discharge itself in a physical manner, or by psychical action alone, or sometimes in both ways, one following closely upon the other.

I have seen a number of cases of young men guilty of theft and other offences at absolutely regular intervals, their conduct in the periods between being exemplary. The regularity of their offences at definite times suggested psychic epilepsy, and that the diagnosis was right was proved by the fact that they did well under treatment and became honourable citizens. But it is only the well-to-do classes that can afford the services of an expert and who will be believed by a magistrate; the poor have to go to gaol, and since there crime is recurrent, they are regarded as habitual criminals and punished with ever-increasing sentences.

Epileptics, after a fit, frequently have a brief attack of furious mania before they recover consciousness. They are violent and destructive, being evidently excited by frightful hallucinations. After the attack has subsided, the individual returns to his normal condition, giving no indication of what he has gone through. In the less serious forms there may be no excitement, but the patient may act like a somnambulist, and do various things, normal, foolish or criminal, of which he has no recollection or awakening. The person on whom the attack is made has, as a rule, no difficulty in restraining the patient, but a misfortune is almost sure to occur when the person attacked is asleep or is too feeble, as in the case of a child, to resist. Sometimes the dreamy state alone will take the place of a fit, and if the patient is suffering from minor epilepsy, which resembles simple fainting fits, i.e., without convulsions, it may be very difficult to convince a jury that a crime committed during this state is due to a disease and should exempt the patient from responsibility.

In the course of thirty years there were at Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum, amongst the total number of patients admitted, twelve per cent. who were described as epileptic. A tabulation of the crimes and offences of these epileptic patients showed that 66 were guilty of homicide, 41 of attempts at homicide, 28 of larceny, 7 of arson, 6 of burglary, 3 of manslaughter, and the rest of other offences. That epilepsy is not more frequent among criminal lunatics than might be expected may be explained by the fact that persons suffering from epilepsy are, when at large, kept under observation and thereby prevented from committing harmful acts.

We must distinguish psychologically (and in the matter of treatment) between an individual who, while insane, commits a crime; and a criminal—and more especially a habitual criminal—who becomes insane while undergoing imprisonment; in short, between a criminal lunatic proper, and an insane criminal. Technically, and in practice, the term "criminal lunatic" is not applied except to a person who has committed a crime, and who is for that reason under special detention as a lunatic; and it matters not whether the priority of occurrence was with the insanity or with the criminal act, that is, whether the individual in question was insane when he committed the crime (King's Pleasure Lunatic), or was a criminal when he became insane (Secretary of State's Lunatic).

A considerable number of murders are committed with such an excess of brutal and revolting violence as seems to establish a prima facie case of insanity in the murderer, and some of these are committed by persons known to be epileptic. In such cases the victim is not only killed, but mutilated or battered almost out of semblance of humanity.
Here is one of the numerous examples one may read in the daily papers. It is copied from the newspapers of July 19th, 1908:

ROADSIDE MURDER

DEATH SENTENCE FOR TERRIBLE CRIME

JURY DISAGREE WITH DOCTORS' EVIDENCE

Yesterday the Yorkshire roadside murder was the subject of investigation at Leeds Assizes, where James Jefferson, twenty-one, labourer, of North Shields, was condemned to death for the murder of Mrs. Elizabeth Todd, thirty-one, on the roadside at Otley Chevin, in May last. Mr. Bruce Williamson, for the Crown, said there arose the question as to prisoner's mental condition, and as to whether he was fit to plead. He proposed to submit evidence as to his mental condition. Medical evidence was then called. First, Dr. Edgerley, of Menston Asylum, gave evidence, and then Dr. Exley, of Armley Gaol. They both considered him unfit to plead, but the witnesses having been questioned by the judge at considerable length, the jury found that prisoner was fit to plead, and the trial proceeded. The murdered woman, wife of a shoemaker living near Otley, had been on a visit to her mother's house some little distance from her own home, and on her way back she was overtaken, or was met, by the prisoner. It is alleged that without any reason he assailed her with a knife. Ferocious and unexpected as was the onslaught, she made a valiant but unsuccessful fight for life. Repeated stabs killed her, and it was stated that accused was still wrestling with her dead body, endeavouring to cut off the head, when Mr. Hellwell, a provision dealer, driving along the road, was the horrified spectator of the terrible crime. Whipping up his horse, Mr. Hellwell dashed off at full speed for assistance. A quarter of a mile up the road he found some men, and drove back to the scene of the affair. By that time the man had disappeared and so had the body, but after looking round, the searchers espied over a wall the prisoner, who was hacking at the body, then headless and stripped of its clothing. Mr. Hellwell called out, but the prisoner made no reply, and continued to cut away at the victim's arm. Prisoner was seized, and he said: "I do not know what made me do it." At that time the woman's head was lying some distance away in the field. The crime created a great sensation by reason of the fiendish brutality and amazing callousness shown by the prisoner. Yesterday the chief interest in the case centred in the defence. Drs. Edgerley and Exley, recalled as witnesses for the defence, gave evidence. The former expressed the opinion that prisoner was mad, while the latter said he believed prisoner knew he was killing the woman, but witness did not think he appreciated what he was doing. The evidence of Dr. Ellison, deputy medical officer of Armley Gaol, fully confirmed that of Dr. Exley. Mr. Lawrie, for the defence, ridiculed the idea of robbery, and, apart from that, urged that no sane man could have been guilty of the crime alleged against prisoner, who could not have had the smallest knowledge of the offence he had committed. The judge, in summing up, said there was no doubt prisoner had committed a murder of a ferocious and fearful character, and the only question was whether, when he committed the deed, he knew what he was doing. Prisoner, a feature of whose trial was that he had at first pleaded guilty, and then, at the instance of the judge, pleaded not guilty, was found by the jury to be guilty, and was sentenced to death. Prisoner, after jury's verdict, persisted that he was not in his right mind at the time the crime was committed.

I may add that the Court of Appeal quashed the sentence.

In Chapters XXX.-XXXII. a number of cases have been quoted showing that injury to the side of the head (temporal lobes) frequently leads to epilepsy, violence, and homicide, and that surgical operation is indicated in these cases. That this knowledge has as yet penetrated very little into scientific and legal minds is shown by the following case taken from the daily papers at the time of writing this chapter.

Henry Perry murdered a family at Forest Gate with comprehensive and aimless
brutality, which would lead one to suspect mental disorder. Sir Robert Armstrong Jones, Dr. W. H. Y. Stoddart, and Dr. H. J. Norman gave evidence at the trial in defence of insanity; and Dr. W. D. Higson, medical officer at Brixton Gaol, was called by the Treasury in support of the case for the prosecution. The evidence showed that the prisoner came from an insane stock, that his sister was an epileptic, that he himself suffered from fits at times, and had aural hallucinations. The jury found the prisoner guilty and he was sentenced to death.

The "Times" of June 24th, 1919, reports the proceedings at the Court of Criminal Appeal. The ground of appeal was that Perry was insane. The counsel for the prisoner said that the defence had been hampered at the trial as they had no information about the prisoner's antecedents, except that obtained from the prisoner himself. Perry's half-sister said that he had a fit at her house seven years ago. He had always suffered from headaches, and he used not to be able to lie with his head on the pillow in the usual way. A medical witness, Major Stewart, said that he thought from an interview with the appellant, when he sought assistance shortly before the murders, that he was quite wrong in his head. Dr. Hyslop, the mental specialist, expressed the opinion that the appellant was insane, that he was suffering from a form of insanity and homicidal mania at the time of the murders, and that he did not know the difference between right and wrong. If he had been consulted on the matter before it came into the hands of the police it would have been a case in which he would have recommended an operation on the injured area of the man's skull. The appellant was insane now; he had organised delusions, and had had hallucinations and visions. His state of epilepsy would lead to his alternately forgeting and remembering what he had done. Perry said to him that he did not know anything about the murders and did not believe he had done them. Another witness showed that the prisoner's previous prison records mention his having epileptic fits and delusions; but the Chief Medical Inspector of Prisons gave evidence that no one had ever actually seen the appellant in a fit. Dr. Higson, medical officer of Brixton Prison, said that Perry gave him minute details of his crime, and he never professed that he remembered nothing about the murder. He gave the reason for the murder, and he satisfied himself that it was not due to hallucinations. The Lord Chief Justice pointed out that the crux of the case was whether there was evidence that at the time the murders were committed the man was suffering from an epileptic attack, otherwise it would be dangerous if a man were able to say: "I once had an epileptic fit, and everything that happens hereafter must be put down to that." The appeal was dismissed and Perry was executed. It was stated at the inquest that he had been for a great part of his life in prison. He had been convicted nineteen times; three of the sentences were of penal servitude.

This case shows clearly the necessity for an institution for the observation and treatment of persons accused of crimes and suspected of being insane. An operation for the removal of the affected brain area might have altered this man's career and added to our knowledge of brain functions.

As a rule it should not be difficult to decide between a case of murder and one of insane homicide.

The manner in which the murderer sets himself to the commission of his crime as well as his subsequent conduct is very different from the proceedings of the madman. The former often has accomplices, he commences with premeditation, lays a plan beforehand, chooses time, place and circumstances adapted to the perpetration of the deed, and generally has contrived some method of escape after the catastrophe. He always studies concealment and personal safety, and when there is danger of detection uses all possible despatch to escape the punishment due to his crime. Moreover, the murderer seldom sheds more blood than is necessary for the attainment of his object.

All these particulars are reversed in the madman. He has either no motive or he acts under a motive which, to a sane mind, would be quite inadequate. He has no accomplices, he rarely communicates his purpose to others, he rushes on his victim as if driven by a sudden impulse, seizes whatever weapon chance throws in his
way, and sometimes seems to be excited powerfully to the attempt by the sight of implements fitted to his purpose. He lays no plan for escape, and seldom attempts it after perpetrating the act. Often he has been known to sit down quietly when he could easily escape and wait till he is seized by the officers of justice. In many instances the insane homicide has avowed his act with perfect indifference, and without exhibiting any sign of regret or remorse, or apprehension of censure, or dread of punishment; sometimes he has surrendered himself to officers of justice and expressed a wish to suffer the penalty of the law. He often kills a number of victims at a time, and frequently they are persons to whom he had been attached, often his relatives, his wife and children; sometimes they are persons whom he has never seen, entire strangers against whom it is inconceivable that he could have any motive of malevolence.

One remark in conclusion: **not all criminals are insane.** There are many, no doubt, who are either weak-minded or of unsound mind, but they form a small percentage of the entire number of criminals, and we must remember that society is bound to protect itself, whether the criminal be of sound or unsound mind. It has also not to be forgotten that punishment sometimes stops even a lunatic from a criminal action. The conduct of most lunatics is in part sane and in part insane. While they may not properly be punished for the insane part of their conduct, they may properly be punished—though with mitigated severity—for wrong-doing, which belongs to the same part of their conduct. Hence some authorities hold that, so long as the mind of the lunatic is clear enough to be capable of forming a true and intimate connection between the wrong-doing and the punishment which follows it, so long are we justified in inflicting upon him some punishment. But if the insane person must be punished, he should be punished as an insane and not as an ordinary criminal.

Enough has been said to show that **crime is not always the outcome of wickedness, but often due to disorder or disease of the brain**, and that therefore the medical and psychological expert should be called upon in all doubtful cases for a diagnosis.

When we reflect how irritation, injury, or disease of the frontal brain can cause loss of control over the passions, and thus create an impulsive nature; when we reflect how a slight ear affection, irritation, injury or disease of the temporal lobes can cause offences against property and crimes of violence and homicidal mania; when we reflect how irritation, injury, or disease of another part of the brain can cause all sorts of sexual excitement and give rise to offences against public decency, to bestial assaults, and various perversities; when we read the large number of medico-legal cases in this work, in which men have committed crimes owing to defective working of the brain, and reflect that the symptoms often lie latent for years—accidents in childhood giving rise to mental disorders and criminal impulses in manhood—we are bound to admit that, in certain cases at least, it is the expert physician who should determine the cause of the crime, the responsibility of the criminal, and his treatment, and not the judge and jury.

From the cases quoted in Chapters XXXI. and XXXII. it is also evident that the cure of criminal impulses when due to focal brain irritation or disease can be promised with full certainty; and if this be so, it is not a wild speculation to assert that even the ordinary habitual criminal, who defies all moral treatment and the severest punishments, may one day be treated successfully—by surgical operation.

But if this procedure is considered to belong to the realms of imagination, it cannot be denied that the evidence collected in this book, should it receive confirmation, will help us to take a great step towards the prevention of crime, not only because it will enable us to determine with increased certainty the diseases which give rise to criminal impulses, but because it will enable us—most important of all—to recognise "criminals who have committed no crime as yet"—at an early age, before they have acquired facility in crime.
SECTION IV
UNEXPLORED POWERS OF THE MIND

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE POWER OF SUGGESTION

In the preceding chapters an attempt has been made to explain the nervous mechanism of mind and character, and such an inquiry is apt to lead to the false belief that all our thoughts, emotions, and actions originate in and are dependent upon the machinery of the brain and nervous system. This is true to some extent; but only to some extent, namely, as regards the primary elements of mind and character. Let me repeat again: We cannot see without eyes, hear without ears, nor think or feel or act without a brain. But what that sight, hearing, thought, feeling, or action is to be is not predetermined. Moreover, it will be shown presently that there are mental capacities which seem to be beyond physiological explanation. Meanwhile, let us consider one source of thought, feeling, and action, which is not the result of automatic brain activity, but which is "suggested" to us.

Suggestibility is a characteristic of human beings. In the ordinary acceptance of the word, there is suggestion each time that a person evokes, most frequently by speech, in the mind of another person an idea to which the latter has not been led by the natural course of his thought, an idea susceptible of exercising some influence on his feelings or conduct. Nothing happens to us amiss. There is no such thing as non-significant experience. Every bit of experience, the seemingly most insignificant quite as much as the tragically significant, has a suggestive force for us; whether for good or ill must depend upon its nature and our personal handling of it. We are surrounded by a suggestive atmosphere which we breathe constantly, and which impregnates unconsciously our whole being. Suggestion emanates from our environment, from our associates, from all the persons with whom we come in contact. Without suggestibility social life would be impossible. It enters into every act of life, colours all our sensations with the most varied tints, leads our judgment astray, and creates those continual illusions against which we have so much trouble to defend ourselves, even when we exert all the strength of our reason. Men who pride themselves on their power of resisting external influences are often the most suggestible in every other department of life, except that in which they resolutely determine to be unlike other people. For example, it is not uncommon to find amongst genuine scientific men the most credulous spiritualists.

We pretend to be intelligent beings; nevertheless, if we want frankly to examine our conscience, we shall find that it is difficult always to see clearly, and that daily we are the victims of unreasonable suggestion. As soon as we leave the firm ground of mathematics we experience an incredible difficulty in resisting suggestion. When we formulate an opinion, or when we allow ourselves to be persuaded, it is very rare
that logic is the only cause. Our feelings, affection, esteem, the awe and fear which
those who are talking inspire in us, surreptitiously prepare the paths of our under-
standing, and our reason is often taken in a trap. Our sensibility intervenes, our
feelings and our secret desires mingle with the cold conception of reason, and,
without being conscious of it, we are led into error. We let ourselves be captivated
by a superficial eloquence, by the charm of language, and we yield at the first beck
of attraction. Somebody’s optimistic reflection can give us strength, and, on the
other hand, his ill-humour can take away all our enthusiasm and energy. To the
vast majority of mankind thinking is an extremely difficult and unpleasant process,
consequently the ready acceptance of the opinions of others—especially those
expressed in print. Thus the newspaper, with its leading articles and garbled news,
provides an easy escape from this painful duty.

We are all open to suggestion, but some persons are disposed to allow themselves
very easily to be influenced by others. On the other hand, we meet with people
who know how to subject others irresistibly to their influence. Only two sorts of
people are less receptive; on the one side, those with stubborn limitations, and, on
the other hand, personalities of the commanding type. All those who stand in
between these two extremes, that is, the overwhelming majority, are malleable in
a high degree. But even the most resolute characters are influenced by suggestion,
when the suggestion is made artfully. The idea need only be introduced discreetly
and gradually in order to succeed. By indirect suggestion the subject has no
consciousness that his views are being modified.

A message conveying a sudden joy or a great misfortune often produces extra-
ordinary effects beyond all bounds of reason, and the measure of pleasure we get
from life—altogether—depends more on our suggestibility than on any other
factor. Some people can be happy even in misery, and millionaires have been
known to commit suicide because of the loss of a comparatively small fortune,
often only from fear of loss and not actual loss. Books are often bought because of
their suggestive titles; fashionable clothes are worn because of the suggestion of
wealth and respectability. Certain foods, the habit of open or closed windows, and
other idiosyncrasies and hobbies often create pleasure and comfort, or displeasure
and discomfort, not because of their actual effects, but by suggestion. The mere
suspicion suffices to set up the greatest agony.

Moreover, suggestion lies at the bottom of all forms of moral and religious
Teaching. It is, in fact, the basis of education. It has been practised on all of us,
sometimes reinforced by the application of more or less violent bodily stimuli, which
help to impress the suggestion more deeply on our minds. The training of children
is almost wholly by suggestion. Next to the parental influence, the suggestions
received during school-life have the greatest influence on the formation of the future
character.

There are certain classes of persons whose intellectual labours are characterised by
suggestibility in a very marked degree. An artist’s greatness depends to some extent
on his power to create particular feelings in those who contemplate his work. What
can flatter an author more than to hear that his novel made men and women laugh
or cry, or was effective in creating good morals or wicked conduct? After the
publication of Goethe’s “Sorrows of Werther” there was an epidemic of suicides in
Germany. And what is the object of the dramatist and actor but to suggest certain
thoughts and feelings to the audience, and to make them think, laugh, or cry? And
although the transferred emotion may be suppressed, and is usually not lasting,
with a few it is sometimes strong enough to prevent their enjoying their supper and
sleep that night.

Even in business suggestion plays an important rôle. The best salesman is he who
can dispose of goods that the purchaser has no intention of buying—at any rate,
not at the price asked. The best buyer is he who can make a man part with his
goods at a figure which he regrets as soon as he leaves his presence. A successful salesman must first gain the customer's attention, then arouse interest, and then awaken desire, after which the sale may be concluded. Again, the art of advertising depends almost entirely on its power of suggestion.

In politics, as in daily life, people follow a leader, sometimes against their real interests and convictions. Think of the extraordinary influence of a strong personality like Napoleon, Bismarck, or, say, Gladstone. A few cleverly-chosen words may suggest to a whole mass of people a political truth or untruth—people not stopping to inquire the reason, but following the suggestion like a flock of sheep. The voter as he reads his newspaper may adopt by suggestion the words which are made habitual by repetition every morning, conveying not only political opinions, but whole trains of political argument. At political meetings the emotions of the voters are skillfully played upon by the leaders and speakers, and the current of personal magnetism and suggestion spreads over the body of the party until they become a mob possessed of certain fixed ideas. Just as in the Middle Ages there arose epidemics of hysteria, so it sometimes happens that a whole country has lost its political judgment by some powerful suggestion that blows like a wind of folly over the land. Note the power such words as liberty, country, empire, justice have when flung at a political audience! They are mere words; but they are vast in their suggestion, and will inspire multitudes to tremendous actions.

History, and more particularly the history of civilisation, affords striking instances of the mighty effects of suggestion. Whether we are dealing with social, religious, or political events, or with artistic tendencies and scientific currents of thought, the suggestibility of crowds throws light on many phenomena. It is feeling that sways a gathering of people, not reason. Mobs will commit acts that no one man of them would think of perpetrating. These whirlpools of emotional excitement, of whatever kind, are strengthened by the constantly repeated suggestions of those participating in it, which, with the constantly growing volume of mental energy being thrown forth, serves to add fuel to the fire. That is why a theatrical performance is enjoyed more when the house is filled than when only half its seating capacity is used.

Suggestion is the cause of the movements and actions of crowds. A word or a cry may seize a whole mass of people in its suggestive grasp, so that it is carried away to acts of destruction like a wild and will-less herd. It will be shown presently that for a suggestion to be successful, the receiver must be in a passive, relaxed state. If the receiver is active, a suggestion gets no hold of him, his brain is too much occupied with its own ideas. So also a voice in a dense moving crowd will not attract attention—the person is carried away by the throng against his will; but let the crowd stand still and be quiet, that same voice may carry the people. It has also to be noted that just as hypnotic suggestion is especially effective if it accords with the character of the subject, so suggestions given to a community, nation, or race are fatally effective if they harmonise with their own bent of mind.

Our character acts on us as a constant suggestion. Every man, of necessity, sees other men and nature itself through the prism of his own individuality. Thus the pessimist is convinced deeply that evil is everywhere, when it is, above all, in himself. Consequently the value of having an ideal, some aspiration, whereby to oppose the suggestiveness of inherent characteristics and attractive temptations, and shape our conduct with the voluntarily chosen goal.

Tennyson's poem of the "Two Voices" is no poetic exaggeration of the duality (dual personality) of which we are conscious when we attend to the mental operations of our own most complex nature. It is as if there were within us one Being always receptive of suggestions, and always responding in the form of impulse—and another Being capable of passing these suggestions in review before it, and of allowing or disallowing the impulses to which they give rise. This dual personality
is never wholly wanting even in the most degraded of human beings—their thoughts everywhere "accusing or else excusing one another."

It is a peculiarity of the subconscious mind that it is highly amenable to suggestion. It receives suggestions not only from external sources, but from the conscious mind itself; and it gives suggestions not only from our past experiences, but from the experiences transmitted from our forefathers. Looked at in this light, heredity may be regarded as a mass of potent suggestions transmitted from our ancestors. We do not inherit ready-made qualities, such as virtues and vices; we only get from our parents more or less well-constituted brains, capable of reacting more or less promptly and accurately to the various stimuli which cause its activity. Suppose, for instance, an infant to be born with a predominant tendency to the feeling of fear; that feeling, as reason develops, will become intellectualised; and, if no counteracting tendency is present, it will form the ruling idea for his guidance, it will act as a potent suggestion, and his characteristic will be circumspection. And so all our deep-seated feelings and instincts can become intellectual qualities, which we think we make for ourselves, whereas in reality they are hereditary suggestions to determine our conduct.

Children are almost purely subjective; and no one needs to be told how completely a suggestion, true or false, will take control of their minds. Their good manners are easily destroyed by bad company, and their minds can be corrupted by what they see, hear, and read. Often a child is frightened at dusk by someone pretending to be a ghost or the devil. The fright and the image of the ghost remain in the memory, appear in dreams, and terrify the child afterwards on every occasion; for now the slightest hint or the most insignificant incident gives new life to the memory. The child does not fear to go into a room because it is dark, but because he has a mental representation of danger. In consequence phobias and hallucinations may arise.

Looked at in this manner, we are a mass of suggestions—suggestions from within (the subconsciousness) and suggestions from without. One can overcome the other, but it may be laid down at once that external suggestions act on us more readily when they are in harmony with our internal ones, that is, when they are in harmony with those auto-suggestions which conform with our natural character. When the subconscious mind is confronted by two opposing suggestions, the hereditary auto-suggestion and a suggestion from another person, the stronger one necessarily prevails. Thus a man with settled moral principles will successfully resist the suggestions of crime and immorality; for moral principles constitute auto-suggestions, the strength of which is proportionate to that of his moral character.

Suggestion in the widest sense can be direct or indirect, but direct persuasion is not usually regarded as suggestion. As Prof. BECHTEREV has clearly said: "Suggestion enters into the understanding by the back stairs, while logical persuasion knocks at the front door." Suggestion, in this more restricted sense, is a process of communication of an idea to the subconscious mind in an unobtrusive manner, carrying conviction, when consciously there is no inclination to accept it, and logically there are no adequate grounds for its acceptance.

There are people who scarcely ever act from motives originating within themselves, but whose entire lives are lived out in obedience to the suggested ideas and feelings of others. All persons are more or less amenable to suggestion, not merely in hypnosis but in the ordinary waking condition. Examples have been given of this universal suggestion. Other illustrations of it are: gaping involuntarily, even against one's strenuous attempts to avoid it, on seeing another yawn; beating time unconsciously on hearing the measured throb of martial music; becoming wildly excited for no other reason than that one's companions are panic-stricken; and, contrariwise, having one's fears allayed by the tranquil appearance of his associates.
in a terrible emergency. With many people the mere statement that they are blushing is enough to produce a flow of blood to the face; the repeated assurance that they are warm or cold will tend to make them feel warmer or colder; the mention or the sight of certain little insects which inhabit the bodies of uncleanly persons seldom fails to make the skin itch uncomfortably.

Suggestions almost invariably appeal to the feelings, and we are always more willingly and readily influenced by our feelings than by our reason. A suggestion causes a feeling to spring up from the subconscious state of the mind, in response to the exciting cause coming from without. Words in themselves are not really suggestive; they possess no magic power. All their force and effect depends upon the associated feeling. The more feeling we throw into our words, actions and manner, the better they will suggest. When suggestion acts through the association of ideas, it is based upon the acquired impressions of the race, by which certain words, actions, manners, tones and appearances are associated with certain previously experienced feelings.

Suggestions convey ideas, and ideas are symbols of something thought or felt. The majority of ideas held in the mind of the race arise from feeling. People may not understand things, but they have experienced feelings or emotions regarding them, and have consequently formed many ideas therefrom. They do not always know the reason why an idea is held by them; they know only that they feel it that way. And the majority of people are moved, swayed, and act by reason of induced feelings, rather than by results of reasoning. It is true that suggestions may accompany an appeal to the reason or judgment of the person influenced, and, indeed, are generally so used; but, strictly speaking, they constitute an appeal to a part of the mind entirely removed from reasoning and judgment. They are emotional first, last, and all the time.

Suggestion may act through obedience to a person in authority, whether real, assumed, or self-constituted. Reason is quiescent because of our faith in his authority. The authority induces the mental states for such people by "boldly asserting" and "plausibly maintaining." Some people will obey any authoritative tone and manner. They are most effective on those who have never used their own wits and resources in life, but have depended upon others for orders and instructions. The degree of suggestibility along these lines decreases among people who have had to "do things" for themselves, and who have not depended on others so much.

A suggestion is more likely to be successful if made by a person who is trusted, loved, or feared, or under circumstances that inspire these sentiments, or in a tone of voice or with a manner that the subject has always associated with ideas that are to be acted on or believed. One or other of these qualities, or more often a combination of them, is an invariable characteristic of the person who is suggestive. All have noticed that some individuals seem to have a "winning way" about them, and are able to induce others to fall into their way of thinking or desires, and to do what they wished done. Not only on the stage, but in the pulpit, on the platform, and in the councils of the nation is quality of voice all-important. Few men are convinced at once by logical argument, but their feelings are turned in favour of a speaker who with his own varying tone of voice can appeal to the emotions of his audience. Thus quality of voice counts for more than we suspect in the relations of daily life. The speaker's power to move us depends upon his being able to create in us the feeling by which he is or pretends to be moved, and thus to cause similar vibrations in our own nervous system. In this respect we are like so many musical glasses. We ring when we are in unison with the exciting object, but not otherwise. Only words that come from the heart can reach the heart. For this reason a speaker who speaks out of the fulness of his heart will be more suggestive, will create more nerve vibrations amongst his hearers, than another man who has the same amount of feeling but cannot convey what he feels in the same manner.
Domestic and other quarrels often arise not because of the words spoken, but because of the voice in which they are conveyed.

**Suggestion may act through imitation.** Man is an imitative animal. Many of us imitate without reflection. It is only when our attention is roused to the habit by a third person that we become really conscious of it and reason upon it, with the result that we correct it. Few of us can for long be with people who have peculiar habits of movement without feeling a tendency to imitate them. As is well known, stammering is frequently communicated from one child to another. In matters that are not of vital importance to the conduct of life, such as fashions in clothes and in food, we slavishly imitate our neighbours; and even in weightier matters, such as systems of belief or moral standards, we tend to adopt without question those that we find around us.

**Suggestion may act through repetition.** Repeated shrugs, sneers, and insinuations of gossips have destroyed many a reputation. Constant dropping of water will wear away the hardest stone. There is weakened resistance through repetition of the attack, the force of habit. We have heard certain things affirmed over and over again, until we have come to accept them as veritable facts, notwithstanding that we possess not the slightest personal knowledge of, or any logical proof concerning, them. Thus public opinion is moulded.

Reason and judgment must be in abeyance in order that a suggestion should act; hence **suggestion may act by the suddenness with which it is made**, which gives no time for observation and deduction, and causes a suggestion to be accepted and immediately acted upon.

Tell a lady comfortably seated in an armchair that there is a mouse crawling up her dress, and her mind will be immediately filled with the idea to the exclusion of everything else, and she will instantly jump up. The idea through its very suddenness overflows into action at once before critical ideas are able to arise. In addition, the idea, a repellent one, by its suddenness gives a shock to the mental system, and tends to render dissociation easy. In this case, therefore, the conditions are (1) rapidity of presentation, which does not give the contrary ideas time to arise; combined with (2) the shock of presentation, which helps to hinder them from making a protest.

The ability to maintain a passive state has a predisposing effect. There are many persons who are by nature given to passive submission to external influences, and therefore are in a highly susceptible condition to every form of influence from without. But it would be a mistake to consider the disposition to suggestion a sign of weakness of will. The cleverest men, because of their capacity to forced concentration of attention, excluding all other external impressions, are often the most susceptible. This ability to give the thoughts a certain prescribed condition is partly natural, and partly a matter of training and habit. Of course, there are men who possess a natural credulity, and are not disposed to make conscious logical deductions, and many men will believe what they want to hear, or what they have expected to happen.

**Auto-suggestion,** which, strictly speaking, is not a good term, although in general use, means a suggestion originating within the individual. It may be either a suggestion from the conscious self to the subconscious self—a self-imposed narrowing of the field of consciousness to one idea, by holding a given thought in the mental focus to the exclusion of all other thoughts, as, for instance, when I concentrate before going to sleep on the one thought that I shall rise the next morning punctually at seven o'clock; or it may be a suggestion arising from the subconsciousness, owing to hereditary ancestral tendencies or acquired experiences, and dictating to the consciousness, such as the fear suggested to most of us when we sleep in a remotely situated empty house. All suggestions are in reality auto-suggestions, for without
the acceptance by the subject they produce no effect; only that the idea comes from outside, and not from the mind of the subject.

Every man can develop the power of determining and controlling his thoughts, the power of determining what types of thought he shall and what types he shall not entertain. For let us never fail to remember this fact, that every earnest effort along any line makes the end aimed at just a little easier for each succeeding effort. Owing to our wonderful reflex nervous system, whenever we do a certain thing in a certain way it is easier to do the same thing the next time, and the next, and the next; until, finally, it is done with scarcely any effort on our part at all, and thus we establish a habit. Life is, after all, merely a series of habits, and it lies entirely within one's own power to determine just what that series shall be. It is true that everybody is born with certain predispositions, and that these predispositions influence very strongly the early formation of habits and of thought; but the fact remains that the character is built up by long-continued habits of thought.

Our dominating thoughts determine our dominating actions. These actions repeated crystallise themselves into our habits. The aggregate of our habits is our character. Whatever, then, we would have our acts, we must look well to the character of the thought we entertain. Whatever act we would not do—whatever habit we would not acquire—we must look well to it that we do not entertain the type of thought that will give birth to this act. Our character is thus dependent on the thoughts we entertain. By the thoughts we think, we create an atmosphere around us by which other people are influenced. If we continually think thoughts that are good, our life will suggest goodness; if we continually think evil thoughts, our life will suggest evil. If we are sad, it is a sad world; if we are happy, it is a happy world. A great deal depends upon the individual himself for weal or woe; to a large extent we create our own condition—the heaven or hell we have to live in.

All this sounds easy enough, but the question is sure to be asked: If so much depends on our own thoughts and auto-suggestions, why is there not more happiness around us? The answer is: Because most people have not their own thoughts under control. They lack mental discipline and concentration. In order to concentrate we must be masters of our brain, and not allow the brain to master us. The brains of most men are undisciplined and unreliable.

One of the most potent factors in man's existence is auto-suggestion. Thoughts that are dwelt upon strongly soon recede from consciousness to subconsciousness; from whence, without any effort from our conscious self, they nevertheless influence our actions and determine our progress or retrogression, our success or failure. Of the great good that may come from conscious self-suggestion, the examples of those great men who have, through the self-suggested ideal that moved them, extracted a gigantic life-work from a grudging brain, speak to us with lofty eloquence.

On the other hand, there are people who allow the mind to be controlled by one dominant impression of past experience, which subordinates all others. They bring about their own misery and waste their existence by dwelling upon, lamenting and brooding over past misfortunes and past mistakes. Hopelessness, fear and depression are not merely moods and sensations of no consequence, but are terrible realities, and the more we indulge in them, the more they become impressed upon our surroundings as well as our subconsciousness, and the more permanent is the deadly mark they make upon our lives.

There are people who magnify the obstacles which rise before them, who are discouraged by the smallest failures, to whom the slightest happenings are catastrophes. They are overcome by a telegram before having learned its contents; they read between the lines of a letter, and ascribe to any occurrence whatever the least probable and the most terrible causes. Others are given to anxious, uneasy observations of the body, producing a crowd of auto-suggestions of symptoms of diseases, of pains and sensations of all sorts, exactly as though a real organic trouble
THE POWER OF SUGGESTION 271

were present. The human suggestibility reinforces and even creates our sensations. Conscious effort and a fixed determination are necessary to overcome such a wretched and mistaken existence.

I regard the hypochondriacal patient, the patient with obsessions, morbid fears, psychic inhibitions, as suffering from excessive self-suggestibility. The neurasthenic suffers perhaps not so much from lack of energy as from misdirected energy. Drink or drugs, if they monopolise the man, are also a form of mono-idea dominating too much of consciousness, and have therefore the power of auto-suggestion. These people take time before they are amenable to suggestion treatment, because their self-suggested ideas are stronger from long indulgence than those conveyed by the operator. It is only after careful analysis of the mental processes and habits and character of the patient that we are able to exert any influence and bring about a normal attitude towards the thoughts which continue involuntarily to occupy the patient's attention, when they cease to lose their emotional value, and gradually disappear.

The auto-suggestion arising from our subconsciousness accounts for much self-deception. For instance, the wine which we pour out of a dusty bottle bearing the label of a celebrated vineyard always seems better than it really is; a connoisseur among smokers will let his judgment be influenced if he recognizes the make of the cigar that he is smoking. Some people feel already sick when the ship is still lying motionless in the harbour. It is also well known that the auto-suggestion of fear in the case of epidemics renders one more liable to contagion.

If we see in a place where we might naturally suppose a cat to be a grey mass about the size of that animal, we do not often take the trouble to test this perception, and we affirm the existence of the cat with a conviction which would draw other persons into error. Question eye-witnesses concerning the details of some event at which they were present, and you will find that they have all seen differently; because they have all looked through the spectacles of their understanding, distorted by preconceived opinions and auto-suggestions. Judges and lawyers know how little credence they can often give to the declaration of even disinterested witnesses.

Enough has been said to prove that suggestion, from both within and without, is a process constantly at work amongst us. The next step is to examine the methods of employing it for practical purposes.

Suggestibility is the characteristic of all human beings, but there are methods which increase that suggestibility. The best known is that of hypnotism. There are two aspects of hypnotism, which must be kept distinct: one, the value of the study of its psychological phenomena; the other, the value of hypnotism as a therapeutic agent for the amelioration and cure of certain nervous and mental disorders of a functional kind. Hypnotism being practised almost exclusively by medical men nowadays, greater stress has been laid on its therapeutic value than on the value of the psychological phenomena. For the former purpose it is not always necessary to put the patient actually to sleep, but often a somnolent state suffices, a condition of objective passiveness consistent with consciousness, a mental state of calm and physical and mental relaxation, which causes the patient to become receptive to the impressions that we wish to make upon his or her mind. This passive state simply means the suspension of the functions of the conscious state of mind for the time being, for the purpose of allowing the subconscious mind to receive impressions and to act upon them. Sleep need not be induced. This method has the advantage that nearly everybody can be subjected to it. I have described this method and its effects fully in my book on "Hypnotism and Suggestion" (Pitman, London, 1910). But it is not my intention to deal here with the therapeutic application of hypnotism and waking suggestion, but to record the psychological effects which we are enabled to produce, and for this purpose real hypnosis is necessary.
Modern hypnotisers bring about this state by suggesting sleep to the subject, having previously made him comfortable in a quiet room, with his body relaxed and his mind freed from disturbing thoughts. The old mesmerists, of whom we shall speak presently, made the patients gaze at some object, and by means of slow passes, stroking the skin, or gentle pressure, produced the desired effect. The methods are numerous, but they all agree in certain points, namely:

1. The fixation of attention;
2. An environment to produce monotony of impressions and intellectual drowsiness;
3. Limitation of voluntary movements by relaxation of the muscles;
4. Limitation of the field of consciousness by allowing no new incoming impressions; and
5. Inhibition of ideas by making the mind as nearly as possible a perfect blank.

Owing to the fact that hypnotism is nowadays practised chiefly by physicians and for medical purposes, the notion is common that only sick people, or people suffering from nervous or other disorders, can be hypnotised. This is a mistake, however; perfectly healthy people make equally excellent subjects, but healthy people have no reason to consult a doctor and therefore do not come under the observation of physicians. Nor has weakness of "will" anything to do with the susceptibility of a subject. Neither is it lack of muscular strength that predisposes to hypnosis. Strong muscular persons are equally easily hypnotised if the conditions enumerated are fulfilled. If they are not, even the feeblest person will make a bad subject. Nor are "credulous" persons necessarily good subjects. There are plenty of people who believe all that they are told, yet they often offer a lively resistance when an effort is made to hypnotise them.

EXPLANATION OF HYPNOTISM

Considering that we possess little or no knowledge of what mind itself is, it can cause no wonder that all the explanations offered hitherto for the phenomena of hypnotism are still unsatisfactory. Considering, also, the varieties of theories of natural sleep, we cannot be surprised at our ignorance of hypnotic sleep.

The power of suggestion does explain, of course, a large number of the hypnotic phenomena, and we know that suggestibility, which is so common in waking life, is very much increased in the trance. But hypnosis is not necessarily conditioned by "suggestion." I have frequently left boys alone in a room gazing at a glass crystal, making no other remarks but that I would come back in ten or twenty minutes—would they meanwhile keep their eyes fixed on the crystal?—and when I returned I found them in the cataleptic state. It is possible, of course, that these boys may have had the knowledge that crystal-gazing may induce sleep; but so far as I could ascertain they had no such knowledge or expectation. Indeed, I have found that those who are acquainted with the procedure and its effects are more difficult to hypnotise, and some resist entirely. Moreover, I shall quote a series of most extraordinary results obtained in specially gifted subjects, which were obtained free from any possibility of suggestion, every precaution having been taken by myself and the witnesses present to exclude such possibility.

My own experience strengthens my belief that the phenomena of hypnosis are due to some inherent capacity which varies with different subjects. A hypnotic effect is not something forced upon the subject by the will of the operator, but something evoked by the mind of the subject exercising its own powers at the suggestion of the operator. And this suggestion is addressed to the person's consciousness—mind speaks to mind. The operator only suggests the result to be accomplished; he does not suggest the method whereby it is to be achieved.
That there is some inherent capacity for increased output of nervous energy in all of us may be shown by a simple example. For instance, I may be able to lift a certain weight; but if I will for some reason to lift a heavier weight, or not to get fatigued by lifting the same weight repeatedly, I can do so. Now, what is the power that gives me the additional strength? It is also well known that under some powerful emotion we possess increased strength and endurance. How is that achieved? Herein lies the value of enthusiasm for one's work, and of high aims and ideals. People who work only because they must, in order to live, can never do as much, either as regards quantity or quality.

In hypnosis suggestions are accepted uncritically, unless they offend against deeply-rooted convictions; other ideas are suppressed or inhibited, and, once accepted, the suggestion takes possession of the mind, and allows association to go on only within the limits that suit the controlling idea. You assure a subject that he cannot move his arm, for instance; he feels that he can, and yet he cannot. The volitional current from his higher brain centres is neutralised, as it were, by the current from other centres in which the suggestion has created a fixed idea of his own incapacity. As hypnosis becomes deeper, every trace of resistance disappears. provided the idea is not repugnant to the subject, and the fixed idea reigns supreme.

This state of credulity is an element in hypnotism which we find also in dreams. It is characteristic of dreams that the most improbable things are accepted by us without resistance. We have become so credulous that all the images which present themselves to our minds, however absurd they may be, are received as real without difficulty. In normal waking life a man can convince himself of the inaccuracy of a statement by means of his senses; and, apart from this, an idea in itself has not the same tendency that it has in hypnosis, to develop into a hallucination which dims the judgment.

In hypnosis the resisting consciousness is absent. True, a subject may resist the suggestion of an operator, and frequently does so, but it is a subconscious resistance through the habits which have been formed by him which the suggestion has, so to say, offended. The resisting consciousness being absent, the suggestion is at once transformed into action.

A subject in hypnosis will accept any suggestion, and whatever there is within range of his own knowledge or experience, whatever he has seen, heard, or read which confirms or illustrates that idea he has at his command and effectively uses, but he is apparently totally oblivious to all facts or ideas which do not confirm, and are not in accord with, the one central idea. It is obvious that a hypnotised person never uses inductive reasoning, but that his reasoning is always deductive.

In order to make a suggestion effective, and to develop, for instance, hallucinations in a hypnotised subject, a state akin to dreaming, a dream-consciousness, must be produced. In dream-consciousness we are subject, firstly, to hallucinations, that is, we believe that what we see or feel are real objects; secondly, our sense impressions do not produce normal perceptions but illusions, and thirdly, the power of judging the experiences of which we are conscious is essentially altered. These peculiarities are also common to consciousness in hypnosis.

Normal sleep is often induced in the same manner as hypnotic sleep. Children, when their sleep does not come naturally, are often talked or sung or rocked to sleep. Grown-up people, too, produce the hypnotic sleep in themselves by concentrating their minds upon the thought and expectation of sleep, or at least by excluding all disturbing and exciting thoughts.

There are other analogies between the phenomena of normal sleep and the phenomena of hypnotism. For instance, it is well known that the recollection of what occurred during hypnotic sleep is in exact inverse proportion to the depth of the sleep. If the sleep is light, the remembrance of the subject is perfect. If the sleep is profound he remembers nothing, no matter what the character of the scenes.
he may have passed through. The same is true of dreams. We remember only those dreams which occur during the period when we are just going to sleep or are just awakening. Profound sleep is dreamless, so far as the recollection of the sleeper informs him.

Having mentioned the analogies between ordinary and hypnotic sleep, let us now consider their **points of difference.**

It is not true that the mind of the hypnotised person is asleep and that perhaps only one or the other idea can be pushed into his mind. On the contrary, his mind is open to an abundance of ideas, just as in the normal state. His whole mind is awake; the feelings and emotions and volitions, the memories and judgments and thoughts are rushing on, and only that is excluded which demands a contrary attitude. Therefore it is not quite fair to compare hypnosis and sleep. Though we bring it about by suggesting the idea of sleep, *i.e.*, the idea that sleep will set in, for this idea removes all opposing ideas. But the fact that belief in sleep and expectation of sleep bring with them the hypnotic state is not a proof that the hypnotic state itself is sleep. The hypnotic state may be brought about by fascination, as staring at a glaring light, *i.e.*, by an abnormally increased suggestibility without sleep.

As far as we know, in natural sleep consciousness is lost completely, in hypnotic sleep it is not, for though the subject may not remember on waking what has occurred, he recollects everything when he is again hypnotised; so that the recollection of one hypnotic sleep to another is continuous. One might compare the consciousness of a hypnotised person with that, say, of a business man who does not think all day of his home; and when home may give not a single thought to his business; but he is conscious all the time. Only that in the hypnotised person (and in the somnambulist) there is a more definite division between his state and the waking state. The hypnotised person may also be compared to a man engrossed in a play; he is perfectly conscious, and yet in a sense he is hypnotised.

Another difference consists in that the intellectual activity of our dream-consciousness is marked by the absence of logical consistency; whereas in hypnosis the capacity for logical thought is preserved, and moral consciousness is not only retained but may be heightened. In all probability hypnosis is purely a psychical state, whereas natural sleep is dependent on changes in the circulation and chemistry of the brain, or at least on physiological processes.

During sleep, the pulse, respiration, and other bodily functions are changed, but they are not in hypnosis, save in exceptional circumstances. In hypnotism the sleeper remains *en rapport* with the operator or some other person who may make suggestions, whereas in ordinary sleep, as soon as consciousness is lost, the subject is only in relationship with himself, though sometimes he can be put *en rapport* with someone. Ordinary sleep is too deep to make the influence of suggestion possible, but cases are on record in which dreams have been suggested to persons in light sleep, and also of persons who have actually been hypnotised in their sleep, so that their natural sleep was converted into hypnotic sleep. When falling into ordinary sleep the mind passes from one idea to another indifferently, and the subject is unable to fix his attention on any regular train of thought, or to perform any act requiring much voluntary effort. On the other hand, the concentration of attention, which is the result of the means employed for inducing hypnosis, is continued into the state itself, and verbal suggestions or sensory impressions excite definite trains of thought or physical movements, instead of dreams.

Under hypnotic suggestion people fall asleep without fatigue to help them, and sleep so that *even surgical operations on them do not wake them*, while ordinary sleep needs to be helped by fatigue and other physiological changes, and is often hindered by pain and pathological checks.

Besides the astounding effects of anaesthesia produced by suggestion in the
hypnotic sleep, we have an entirely new condition of the intellectual faculties. They may be much better than in the normal state (see Chapter XXXVIII). On the other hand, there are plenty of cases on record of men who have solved most difficult problems in their sleep, which puzzled them much when awake. There are sleep-walkers who even do heavy housework in their sleep. To be sure, when they wake up they have the feeling that they have slept soundly, and yet they are very tired, exhausted, broken up. Both sleep-walker and the hypnotised somnambulist have no recollection on waking; but while the memories of such somnambulistic states are not retained under normal conditions, the hypnotic subject can remind himself of what has taken place in the condition of natural somnambulism.

In dreams we often assume quite a different personality; so in hypnotism a subject can be made to change his identity; that is to say, he can be made to forget who he is, and whatever name or character is suggested to him is at once assumed. The suggestion may be oral, and proceed from another; or it may be an auto-suggestion, arising from something suggested in a previous hypnotisation, or from some forgotten circumstance. Be that as it may, the suggested character is assumed and carried out with all the deductive logical exactitude characteristic of subjective reasoning. This is a well-known result of a common hypnotic experiment. It is also well known that the subject can be made to assume any number of characters by the same process.

The lack of sense, of logical connection, which strikes us in dreams, is only apparent. We have to distinguish between manifest and latent contents of a dream, and the latter, represented by the so-called dream thoughts, are far from being nonsensical, but give us important clues to the nature and workings of our subconscious processes of thought.

In our dreams, as in our illnesses, our unconscious and repressed thoughts and emotions find expression. But, as in our illnesses again, the revelations are not straightforward, the instinct for compromise and concealment makes itself everywhere apparent. In the night dream as in the day dream, wishes are fulfilled, but they are often partial wishes, and such as in our waking moment we do not admit even to ourselves. Symbolisms and innuendoes take the place of direct statement, and the possession of a treasury of dramatic power is revealed by the sleeper, of which his waking moments may indicate no trace, so deadening, even though useful, is the repression of education and convention.

Sleep is a biological reaction of defence of the organism against fatigue. In deep sleep there is an absolute repose of the brain; while, on the contrary, in deep hypnosis the brain may be exceedingly active.

MOSSO ("Sulla Circulazione del Sangue nel Cervello delle Uomo," Rome, 1880) showed that sleep was due to changes in the cerebral circulation. In passing from the waking state into sleep there occurs a dilatation and a relaxation of the vessels of the skin, and the brain contains less blood than in the waking condition.

W. H. HOWELL ("A Contribution to the Physiology of Sleep," Journal of Exp. Medicine, 1897) declared sleep to be caused by a diminished blood-supply to the brain, due to a relaxation of tone in the vaso-motor centre, thereby producing a general fall of arterial pressure.

TARCHANOFF ("Observations sur le Sommeil Normal," Arch. Ital. de Biologie, 1894) showed that in puppies the brain grows pale when the animals are asleep, and that at the same time the cortex reacts less readily to electric stimulation.

G. PUPIN ("Théorie Histologique du Sommeil," 1896) gave us a histological theory of sleep, according to which sleep consists of a repose of the nervous centres due to a difficulty in the passage of external stimuli or impressions, owing to an interruption in the continuity of the neurones by the retraction of the dendrites.

The chemical theories of sleep ascribe sleep either to impoverishment of oxygen, an accumulation of fatigue products in the blood, increase of carbonic acid gas, and
the formation of toxins by the tissues, which, acting on the brain, have a narcotic effect. When these products are eliminated, awakening results.

The psychological theory explains sleep as due to the absence of external stimuli. Only constant impressions from without keep us awake. Without them we fall asleep.

E. CLARAPÈDE ("Enquisse d'une Théorie Biologique du Sommeil," Archives de Psychologie, vol. iv.) advanced a psycho-biological theory of sleep, according to which sleep is a negative state, a cessation of all activity, and is reaction of defence to protect the organism against fatigue, rather than a physiological process the result of fatigue. Against this theory must be pointed out the fact that infants sleep nearly all the time and their length and depth of sleep do not depend upon fatigue. Moreover, sleep is periodic in character and may be postponed by excitement, interest, and even volition.

BORIS SIDIS ("An Experimental Study of Sleep," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1908) interprets sleep from the standpoint of the threshold of cell energy. According to him, monotony of sensory impressions and limitations of voluntary movement are the most important factors in the production of sleep, in that they tend to raise the threshold of stimuli. When the threshold falls, awakening follows.

ISADOR H. CORIAT ("The Nature of Sleep," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1912) performed some experiments which tend to show that muscular relaxation is the chief element in bringing about sleep, and next, that external stimulation must have reached just below the threshold of perception, so as to cease to exist for the subject. It is not the monotone of a sermon or lecture which makes us fall asleep, but we sleep under these conditions because we become inattentive. This inattention causes the muscles to relax, and this relaxation of muscles produces sleep.

Finally, we have the secretory theory of sleep. Our daily sleep is a biochemical phenomenon, whose function is the nutrition of the central nerve elements, and consequently those tissues which depend upon the activity of the nervous system rest likewise during sleep. Sleep is therefore really a biological reaction of defence against starvation. The primary psychic condition for sleep is disinterestedness and inattention. Sleep is a negative state, a cessation of brain activity, an instinct. This instinct consists of a periodic relaxation of muscular tonus, which becomes automatic by habit. When we sleep we take the position in which there is the least muscular tension.

All secretions are regulated by psychic stimuli. The desire to sleep is brought on by a gland or secretory apparatus, which has a periodic activity. The principal factor in sleep as in secretions is the periodicity. Disorders of sleep are very frequent in those diseases which interfere with the internal secretions. According to the secretory theory, sleep is essentially a mechanism for the repair of the neural elements, which cease their activity during sleep—"sleep is a vegetative function, a function of secretion, intimately related to the functional activity of certain special organs of internal secretion. Deep sleep is an absolute repose of the brain, in which there follows a slowing of the metabolic processes of the entire body."

Dissociated Personality and Treatment by Psycho-Analysis

We come across in actual life cases of dual or multiple personality, and they are regarded as very wonderful, but there is more than one personality in each of us, as we happen to find out when great trials in life have brought out a particular side of our character of which we were not conscious, and which was unknown to our friends.

The person assumes a new name and a new character, the last being often in marked contrast to the normal one in every essential particular. The old personality is sometimes completely forgotten, and sometimes it is remembered only as a person whom the patient has once known. In some instances the two personalities alternate at somewhat irregular intervals, and persons have lived for years in an alternation of two characters, in one of which they forgot all they had ever learned.
in the other, and they have had, therefore, to be educated like children in the
former. In others, the phenomenon occurs only once in a lifetime. In others,
several different personalities will be assumed at different times.

The subconscious, or secondary consciousness, is impersonal, but may be
crystallised into a personality, usually only evanescent; but if more stable and
growing in strength it forms a dissociated personality, which may obtrude itself on
the primary consciousness, producing two personalities of equal rank. Two, three,
or even more personalities may be formed and be co-existent within the sub-
consciousness. We have then not only a secondary, but a tertiary consciousness.
There are no sharp divisions between consciousness and unconsciousness; but, as
a rule, one shades imperceptibly into the other. It is only when a part becomes
dissociated that it appears quite distinct, and even then it has been proved that
memories of the other personality are not quite extinguished.

We have pointed out already that impressions, thoughts, and actions, of which
we have no conscious memory, may, nevertheless, exert a strong influence on present
ideas and conduct. Many persons are moody, morose, melancholic, excitable,
irritable, solely because of the overpowering influence of some picture of past ex-
erience, which remains unconsciously in operation after conscious thought on the
occurrence has ceased and the person has apparently forgotten the incident.

In normal everyday life disagreeable or painful thoughts are generally for-
gotten; we intentionally or even unconsciously push them out of consciousness,
so as to free ourselves from disagreeable feelings or pain. Sometimes, however, a
disagreeable incident remains in our unconscious memory. Then, because we have
no control over it, it cannot run its normal course, and therefore becomes converted
or changed into a pathological condition. Sometimes it is a desire arising from a
highly active instinct which for conventional or other reasons had to be suppressed,
which remains in subconscious regions and disturbs the nervous functions. Thus a
conflict or disharmony is set up between the main stream of conscious personal life
and the submerged or subconscious mental state. There is a lack of unity in the
inner life, because this suppressed thought or emotion is not at one with the per-
sonality as a whole. If these repressed emotions are given an opportunity to
complete themselves, if by a particular process of examination they are brought
before consciousness, they cease from doing mischief. The method of digging out
this buried complex and bringing it to light or consciousness, and therefore to
conscious control, is called psycho-analysis. This process throws light upon the
origin of habits and idiosyncrasies of all kinds and upon many obscure problems of
everyday life. The instinctive dislikes, which so frequently influence conduct for
no obvious cause, mannerisms and odd gestures, uncalled-for explosions of temper,
inexplicable waves of sadness, sudden untimely merriment, blind unreasoning pre-
judices, are to be attributed to past experiences and old conflicts, which, though
quite forgotten, may be discovered by psycho-analysis, and over which, when
understood and frankly faced, healthy influences have a chance of prevailing.

Desire, craving, conflicting emotions, maladaptation to instinctive reactions,
play an immensely important part in functional disorders. The activity of the
repressed complex is often manifested in some distorted form that is hard to
recognise. The psycho-analyst has to study the various mannerisms, symptomatic
movements and tricks of behaviour, and slips of the tongue or pen, which reveal the
automatic functioning of the repressed train of thought. He has to unravel the
confused end-product and to bring about an intelligent synthesis of the disturbed
personality; for which purpose he needs essentially a sympathetic insight into the
patient’s character. But psycho-analysis, in my opinion, has been pursued hitherto
in a one-sided manner. It is not the disclosure of the repressed psychical event that
is important, but the discovery of the underlying motive. All the active propensities
and sentiments may be repressed. Repressed “greed,” “love of approbation,”
"envy," etc., are just as common as repressed "libido sexualis," to which the Freudian school has attached exclusive significance. We must therefore ascertain first of all the natural character of the patient by an ethological examination. Without a knowledge of the congenital dispositions, psycho-analysis means groping in the dark, and at best such a lengthy proceeding that little good can come from it.

In real life there are in all of us three personalities: one known to ourselves, one to our neighbour, one to God. Our personality undergoes every instant modification, which we scarcely perceive, but which is none the less real. We are ourselves only because we remember our past. Our whole past lives in us, reacts upon us, gives us the notion of ourselves, constitutes us a special being, distinct from all others and connects by a long chain, which has no break in any of its links, the whole of our long past to the short present moment.

When we have arrived at old age we are no longer identical with the person we were at the time of infancy, youth, or mature age. However, since at no moment of that long period there has been a psychological interruption between the preceding and the present states, we say that we have always remained the same person. This is not altogether correct; for if, looking back on ourselves, we try to imagine what we were ten, or twenty, or forty years ago, we perceive such differences in ourselves that we sometimes have difficulty, when we find writings or memorials of our past, in saying that they belong to the same person.

**SUGGESTION IN THE WAKING STATE AND ITS RESULTS**

There are different degrees of hypnosis. We are not here concerned with the lighter hypnotic state—the somnolent state—which is the stage usually employed in treatment. Nor are we here concerned with that deeper stage in which catalepsy, constrained rigidity of the muscles and general loss of sensibility take place. What interests us is that state of hypnosis in which the subject ceases to be in relation with the outer world, hears principally, if not only, what is said to him by the operator, believes all his statements and carries out his wishes promptly—in short, the state of somnambulism.

By means of hypnotism we can influence the somatic activities: the action of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the secretion of the glands, the working of the internal organs in general. I have succeeded in affecting intestinal stasis, amenorrhoea, chronic neuralgia, chronic muscular spasms; even the pain and sleeplessness of persons dying of cancer, when morphia injections would no longer act. Yet of late I have been able to achieve the same results without any conscious attempt at inducing hypnotic sleep, but solely by verbal suggestion. Certainly for purely psychical disorders—mental obsessions, morbid fears, uncontrollable impulsive actions, stammering, morbid blushing, drink and drug habits, abnormal sexual inclinations, lying, thieving, and other perversities—hypnotism is not always necessary, and I rarely induce it. The suggestion-treatment is directed to remedy the lack of moral strength that underlies the patient's sufferings, want of discipline and self-control. It is also directed to increase his self-confidence, improve his memory and concentration of attention, and give him application and perseverance. Medical and hygienic remedies are of course applied whenever necessary.

The will, far from being weakened, is strengthened by this method. Many patients have a clear conception of what they ought to do, but have not the power to do it. Suggestion increases the power of transforming the idea into action; teaches them again to "will." But the desire must be there. A criminal cannot be changed into an honest man if he does not want to reform; we can only effect that change if he wishes to become a normal man, but has hitherto found temptation too strong for him. The same condition applies to the drunkard and all the others who give
THE POWER OF SUGGESTION

way too readily to their inclinations. Suggestion-treatment does not act on the
degenerate, because he lacks the desire to reform.

Suggestion in the waking state is all that is required, if by suggestion we include
re-education of the character, the teaching of mental discipline, the getting rid of
all mental and moral hindrances, and the insertion of powerful ideas and motives
for hesitancy. We rouse the spirit within; we make the subject aspire to something
higher. We evoke ideals and the impulses to pursue them, and make them so at-
ttractive to the patient that they become embodied in the processes of conduct. Of
course, the ideas must be practical, not utopian. By the implanting of new ideals
we tap the potential subconscious reserve-energy of the patient, bring about a re-
association and synthesis of the dissociated mental systems underlying the symp-
toms of the disease, and guide the mind of the patient to self-realisation and self-
perfection.

Physicians do not trouble enough, as a rule, about the patient's attitude of mind.
Most people have fallen into a mechanical habit of thought, just as they fall into a
mechanical habit of body. They must regain conscious control of their mental and
physical powers. We have all our habitual conceptions and are unwilling to receive
ideas opposed to them. The physician must clear away the impeding habit of
thought which stands between the patient and conscious control. He must clear
away the preconceptions. For example, certain work may be hard for some,
because of a preconception that it will be hard. For this purpose, no strenuous
effort is needed on the part of the patient; only the conscious wish, the conscious
desire is needed to bring about its adequate performance. Singleness of purpose is
necessary, more than concentration.

The strength of the theory of development depends on the principle that all that
is "purposeless" in nature suffers elimination and destruction; whereas all that is
fitted and built to attain its ends survives. Similarly living without aim leads to
destruction, and a fixed aim leads to development. As nature works skillfully
towards her ends, so must man. When we consider that the brain contains numer-
ous independent centres, we begin to perceive that human consciousness may be
only like a great amorphous deep through which contradictory currents are for ever
flowing. Therefore the need of steadfast aims. Some men live continually for the
gratification of their senses. But the more intermittent a pleasure is, the more
vivid will it be. Unless it has ideal elements, it will have no persistence. The
enjoyments connected with our sensuous life perish with the fatigue of sense, and
must be for ever renewed; but if an ideal impulse and some intellectual elements
are mixed with a pleasure, it has a chance of survival. For example, the gratifica-
tion of the sex instinct is a mere temporary pleasure; love is lasting.

We must take note of the patient's intelligence and character, prejudice and
beliefs, preferences and dislikes, family life and social surroundings, ambitions and
prospects, sincerity and energy, memories and fancies, experiences and habits.

All non-medical suggestive cures rely mainly on the emotional power of the act of
believing. They are pure faith-cures. The psychotherapist who has no training
and experience in nervous disorders and psychiatry, normal and abnormal psy-
chology, may fail to distinguish the depression of the neurasthenic from the de-
pression of the melancholic, and the obsession of the psychasthenic from the fixed
idea of the paranoid, the lameness of the hysteric from that of the malingering
and from organic lameness, the indigestion of the hypochondriac from nervous dys-
pepsia and the various organic disturbances of the digestive tract. Yet there are
medical authorities who, both in the professional and lay press, throw suspicion and
ridicule on psychotherapy, with the result that they drive patients from the qualified
physician to the advertising quack who never received any medical training.

For actual hypnotism, which is rarely ever needed, a certain gift is necessary,
without which one cannot succeed. It is dependent not on suggestion merely, but on the manner of making the suggestions. It is those who fail who are adverse to its use, even by practised medical men, and they exaggerate its dangers, which exist only in the case of unscrupulous persons.

Cures by suggestion are all the more remarkable because the physicians who specialise in that treatment obtain their patients frequently only after a number of other medical men have tried their orthodox remedies and failed. I have seen inebriates who have been treated in various institutions, hysterics who have undergone Weir-Mitchell and other treatments, neurasthenics who have tried tonics, massage, electricity, and every other possible method, and I have even taken suitable insane patients out of asylums and succeeded with them. Of course, neither I nor anyone else succeeds in every case; but this much I can prove, that the percentage of recoveries is astonishingly great, and the recovery is, in most cases, permanent; as one can expect, considering that we aim not only at treating the constitutional defects, but at a thorough change of the character of the patient.

Such a method implies an accurate insight into the mentality of the patient as can only be acquired by a knowledge of psychology, ethology, and long experience. It requires also sympathy, patience, faith, and hope—and last, but not least, more time than the average consultant and physician is able to give. Without these qualities a physician had better not attempt psychotherapy.

Unfortunately a large proportion of the medical profession still looks askance at psychotherapy. To many it is identified with hypnotism and its popular performances of the past; to others it suggests Freudian psycho-analysis, with its stress on sex confidences; to some it is a mere verbal suggestion too trifling to require study. The prejudice and misconception is greatly due to the fact that we have still no schools for rational psychotherapy for students of medicine, undergraduate or post-graduate. But psychotherapy cannot be taught successfully without a preliminary-training in practical psychology and an intimate knowledge of human nature and human affairs.
CHAPTER XXXVII

HISTORY AND RESULTS OF HYPNOTISM

HISTORY OF HYPNOTISM

Hypnotism and suggestion are as ancient as mankind. They are at the root of all "mental healing." Under this generic title may be grouped the invocations of the gods by the Egyptian priests; the magic formule of the disciples of Æsculapins (XIIIth century B.C.); the sympathetic power of Paracelsus (1493-1541); the King's touch for the cure of scrofula; the wonderful cures of Lourdes; the miraculous power supposed to reside in the relics of Saints; the equally miraculous cures of such men as Valentine Greatrakes (1628-1700), of J. J. Gassner (1727-1779), and of the Abbot Prince of Hohenlohe; and the no less wonderful healing power displayed by the modern systems known as mind cure and faith cure. One fact, pregnant with importance, pertains to all these systems: and that is that marvellous cures are constantly effected through their agencies. Underlying all, it would seem, there is some mysterious power or principle which, once understood, would show them to be identical as to cause and mode of operation.

Going back to the earliest practice of medicine, which was solely by priests, we find the performance of faith cures by prayers and exorcisms. In course of time medicines were employed by them; but since, according to our present-day knowledge, they cannot have had any curative properties, we must assume that they were efficacious only through the medium of suggestion.

Ancient medicine, which was in the hands of the priests, and in which many more or less impressive ceremonies and paraphernalia were used, is full of this mental influence. On the red granite obelisk of the Thames Embankment, known as Cleopatra's Needle, will be found indications of psycho-pathic healing being practised 2,500 years ago. In Egypt at that time the sick were laid in the temples of Isis to await the voice of the oracle which should reveal to them the means of cure. Charlatans, according to Celsus, performed extraordinary cures by the mere application of the hands, and cured patients by blowing.

In the Greek temple of Æsculapins marvellous cures were effected by psycho-therapeutic measures. The imagination was strongly stimulated and processions to the accompaniment of music, prayers to the god, the sanctity of the surroundings, and, perhaps above all, the personal influence of the priests, contributed to the happy results. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, cured persons suffering from the spleen by touching them slowly, and for a long time, on the painful side.

The temple sleep of the sick, which practice is still in vogue amongst Hindus in India, is a means to facilitate the effect of suggestion. The sick lie down to sleep in the temple, and are told by the god in dreams of something that will cure them.

Ancient history speaks of the mysterious doings, oracular sayings, prophetic forebodings, and apparently miraculous performances of the Egyptian priests; of the Delphian oracle among the Greeks, and of the Sybils among the Romans. From what is known of the practices, the long vigils and fastings, and the peculiar attitudes and manners of the Sybils, there can be little doubt that, by various means
kept secret from the multitude, a condition similar to, if not identical with, the hypnotic state was induced; and that the Sybils and utterers of oracles were at times really clairvoyant, and in a state of trance. Saint Justin says, "that the Sybils spoke many great things with justice and with truth, and that when the instinct which animated them ceased to exist, they lost the recollection of all they had declared."

People were brought to the temples to be healed, and after the customary incantations and ceremonies, designed to affect the imagination and respect of the primitive people, they were found to be benefited, and actually cured in time. But under and at the back of all these ceremonies and rites, the principle effecting the cure was the same principle that is being used to-day by all forms of mental healing, under whatever names it may be disguised and masked.

The secret lies in the fact that the relief comes from within the mind of the person affected, and not from the supposed source. Back of all the ceremonies and incantations, amulets and charms, relics and images, is the mighty force of the human mind employed under the mask of fancy trappings and sacred mysteries. The different forms and practices have no other effect than increasing the faith of the patient and insinuating a suggestion into his mind.

A new order of things was established with the advent of the Greek school of medicine. The priest was left in large part his authority in matters pertaining to the soul, but the domain of physical disease was snatched from his hands, never to be returned. It follows, as a matter of course, that the therapeutic methods used by the earliest physicians would be in some measure similar to those of their priestly predecessors. Thus we find in those times, both in Greece and Rome, a profession of medical men independent of the priests, who employed, in addition to unconscious suggestion, actual therapeutics directed to the mind or soul of man to get him into that mental condition which favours recovery. Thus we find ASCLEPIADES (128-56 B.C.) ordering merry Phrygian melodies for melancholic conditions of mind, serious Doric and Lydian tunes for maniacal patients, and ARETAUS (30-90 A.D.) advising patients suffering from religious depression to listen to the playing of the flute and to have other diversions and encouragements.

The soothing application of what are called passes was evidently known at a very remote period; for there is a curious passage in the works of CELSUS (25 B.C.-50 A.D.), the Roman physician, in which he states that the old Greek father of physic, ASCLEPIADES, practised light friction, as a means of inducing sleep, in phrensy and insanity; and, what is more remarkable, he says that by too much friction there was danger of inducing lethargy.

With the decay of the Roman Empire and the growth of Christianity, religious psycho-therapeutics obtained favour again. Prayers, exorcisms, anointment, consecrated herbs and holy water, the laying-on of hands, pilgrimage to the graves of saints, etc., were all measures of faith-healing. They were greatly favoured by the belief in witches and obsession by the evil spirit, which prevailed in the XVth, XVIth and XVIIth centuries. If the world is a stage upon which the powers of light and darkness contend for the mastery of mankind, and punish and injure him by sickness and death, the most potent remedies must be those means by which such supernatural powers are invoked or controlled. Prayers and holy water, amulets and charms, magic and spells, therefore superseded drugs in the treatment of disease.

Independently of this production of particular psychic states, there existed at all times in many quarters the belief that particular individuals could influence their fellows by the exercise of certain powers. This influence could be used as well for good as for evil. Of the first use we are reminded by the laying-on of hands in benediction; also by the healing by touch which was obtained by the old Egyptian and other Oriental nations. Numerous old monuments testify to this.
The Ebers Papyrus, also, which represents the state of Egyptian medicine before the year 1552 B.C., contains a statement according to which the laying-on of hands on the head of a patient plays a part in treatment. We see the same thing later in the cures which King Pyrrhus and the Emperor Vespasian are said to have effected. It is known that Francis I. of France, and other French kings up to Charles X., healed by the imposition of hands. The kings of England performed similar acts and thereby aroused a feeling of jealousy between the two nations. The Anglo-Saxon King Edward the Confessor was known to practise it as a royal function, inherent with the rank of kings and priests. The custom of touching for the King's Evil (especially for enlarged glands of the bubonic plague) in the Middle Ages was observed by almost every king of England for six hundred years up to George I. It was a sign of a legitimate claim to the throne. Even when kings were exiled, patients were sent after them by doctors, when medicine and the knife proved futile. Reflections have been made upon the Church of England for giving countenance to popular faith in the royal touch. Yet that sturdy man of ponderous common sense, Dr. Samuel Johnson (1709-1784), was touched by the royal hand for scrofula. Belief in the efficacy of this also prevailed among Dissenters and Puritans during the reigns of Queen Elizabeth, King James I., and Charles I., as well as among Nonconformists of a later period. Even Oliver Cromwell is said to have seen if he had the gift; while Presbyterians in Scotland (see Buckle's "History") were especially given to regard psychic power in ecclesiastic use most potent for moral and physical good.

In the reign of Charles II., a gentleman of the name of Valentine Greatarick, or GREATRAKES (1628-1700), acquired considerable notoriety from curing diseases by stroking with his hands. These cures were authenticated by the Bishop of Derry and many other respectable individuals. The Royal Society is said to have accounted for them by the supposition that there existed "a sanative influence in Mr. Greatrakes' body, which had an antipathy to some particular diseases, and not to others."

In the reign of Henry VII. there was a form of service to be used at the ceremony of healing. There were also various forms used in the Church of Rome, all sickness being thought due to sin and obsession.

About 1530, THEOPHRASTUS PARACELSUS (1493-1541) came forward with the theory of the effect of the heavenly bodies on mankind, more especially on their diseases. Out of this the theory gradually developed that not only did the stars influence men, but that men mutually influenced each other. Paracelsus distinguished functional from organic nervous disorders and gave an excellent description of the former. He used the magnet therapeutically and thus anticipated Mesmer.

VAN HELMONT (1577-1644) taught with more precision that man possessed a power by means of which he could magnetically affect others, especially the sick. ATHANASIUS KIRCHER (1602-1680), of Fulda, in his "Magnes sive de Arte Magnetica" (1643) treated of the curative powers of magnetism, and in his "Physiologia Kircheriana" (1680) was the first to record an experiment in hypnotism. About 1665, a Scotsman of the name of MAXWELL advanced a theory of magneto-therapeutics of his own. According to this theory, everybody is supposed to emit rays evincing the presence of the soul, and these rays are endowed with a vital spirit by means of which the soul performs its actions.

In the XVIIIth century, psycho-therapeutics was the recognised method of medical men, who directed their measures towards the whole body, being still ignorant of pathological anatomy and the changes produced by disease in individual organs. F. C. G. SCHEIDEMANTEL (1735-1796) wrote on the "Emotions as Healing Agents" (1787); J. C. REIL (1759-1813) ranked psycho-therapeutical cures equal to the medical and surgical ones, and advocated the granting of a third degree by the Faculties of Medicine and Surgery, namely, the degree of Doctor of Psycho-Therapeutics.
The phenomena of hypnotism and magnetism, as practised at the present day, became popularly known only at the end of the XVIIIth century, when a Viennese physician of the name of Frederic Antoine Mesmer (1734-1815), settled in Paris from the year 1768, used them for the purpose of medical treatment and advanced a theory of magnetic emanations. He was evidently gifted in that direction from his youth, for he chose as his Inaugural Thesis for the Doctor degree "The Influence of the Planets on the Human Body" (1766). He thought this planetary influence operated by electricity; but finding that element inadequate to the solution, he subsequently abandoned it for magnetism (1774). To this he was led in the following manner. Mesmer had obtained from a Jesuit named Maximilian Hehl the secret of magnetic steel plates, which had been applied to the cure of disease with much success. Hehl thought their efficiency was in the metal itself, but Mesmer claimed that the cures he achieved were due to his method of applying them by particular manipulations, so-called "passes," which he learned from another priest named J. J. Gassner (1727-1779), in 1766. A controversy arose, which resulted in Mesmer being opposed by the scientific authorities and obliged to quit Vienna. Soon after his arrival in Paris he published his "Mémoire sur la déconverte du Magnétisme Animal" (1779).

Albert Moll has pointed out that an influence may be exercised on nerves at a certain, though perhaps very limited, distance, which was admitted also by Alexander v. Humboldt, and his opinion was concurred in by Reil. More than once the hypothesis has been put forward of electric activities being called up by mesmeric passes, instance Rostan and J. Wagner. Tarchanoff has demonstrated that the application of gentle stimuli to the skin will excite in it slight electric currents, and that, moreover, a strong effort of concentration of the will, with the muscular contraction by which it is invariably attended, will suffice to produce the same.

According to Mesmer himself, whose theory has been made the subject of much misrepresentation, the whole universe is filled with a fluid, more subtle than ether, just as this is more subtle than air, and air more so than water. Vibrations, he maintained, take place throughout this fluid, just as they do throughout the ether, air, and water. And just as light is transmitted by the vibrations of the ether, so, he concluded, are phenomena of another nature constantly produced by the vibrations of this all-pervading fluid. On these vibrations, he believed, the mutual attraction and repulsion of the heavenly bodies depend, and that they also determine the interchange of attraction and repulsion between bodies endowed with animal life. In the vibrations of this fluid Mesmer considered animal magnetism to reside, and he believed this universal magnetic fluid to possess great healing properties, which could be actually passed from the magnetiser to the patient. But in order to "pass" it he held what might be fairly termed curative organs, in which science and quackery, mystery and melodrama, hysteria and somnambulism, all played their part. Princes and nobles thronged to consult the "great magician," and to treat the crowds of patients which flocked to him Mesmer gave up individual treatment and invented methods of mass treatment, like his famous "tub," and the honest practitioner was changed into a charlatan. Though good work was undoubtedly accomplished, it was discredited by the atmosphere of buffoonery in which the séances were carried on. Public sentiment turned against him and his opinions; the medical faculty condemned him as an impostor; the brand of charlatanism was imprinted upon psychic healing, which became a fruitful field for quacks and adventurers of all sorts. In 1785 Mesmer was driven from Paris. He died in Switzerland at the age of eighty-one.

Whatever they think of the views or doctrines of Mesmer, present-day critics should remember that they were the views of his time. Mesmer thought that every motion of the body, external and internal, whether in health or disease, took place
by the agency of the nerves, and the nerve action itself depended on the action of a very subtle fluid. So thought all other physicians. Mesmer believed this fluid to be itself subject to various agents, some of which are external and others internal; all other physicians thought the same. Mesmer thought that the normal state of our functions, on which health depends, is maintained by the regular action of the nerves; other physicians thought so too. Mesmer believed that the cure of diseases is effected by crises; other physicians also considered this to be the case.

In what, then, did Mesmer differ from the physicians of his age? In this: Mesmer thought that he had discovered the secret of directing at will the fluid which sets our nerves in action, and thereby of imparting to them such action as might be requisite either for the preservation of health or for the cure of disease. Mesmer, in fact, laid claim to having arrived at a better knowledge of the laws of life than the physicians who had preceded him. It was this which the Viennese physicians disputed and for which he was repulsed. Mesmer's theory may have been a mistake, but there can be no doubt that the great end of all his proceedings was the application of a remedy for human suffering. Whatever may be said against his theory, and the methods he employed, there can be no question that there was produced such a profound impression upon the system of the patient as oftentimes to effect the relief or cure of a certain order of malady. Experience has augmented our knowledge; and we now know that the same curative effects may be produced without all those pretensions, which so greatly lead to the ideas of jugglery and imposture. He was evidently convinced of the truth of his theory, for he offered it to the faculty of Vienna, but was met with disdain. Later, in 1784, in Paris, he offered it to the Royal Academy of Medicine. His pretensions were examined and again reported on unfavourably. Mesmer, in reply, wrote to the Academicians these prophetic words: "You say that Mesmer will never hold up his head again. If such is the destiny of the man it is not the destiny of the truth, which is in its nature imperishable, and will shine forth sooner or later in the same or some other country with more brilliancy than ever, and its triumph will annihilate its miserable detractors." Indeed, in 1831, after Mesmer's death, the Royal Academy of Medicine again examined his system and reported upon it. This time it summed up its conclusions in the significant statement: "Regarded as a therapeutic agent, magnetism ought to take rank as one of the resources of medicine." So great, however, was the shock of this report to the conservatism of the Academy, that they declined to print it. "We are convinced," the Commissioners announced, "that the phenomena are mainly produced by the imagination of the patients," failing to see that in that fact lay the germ of a great truth. Had they referred them to the influence of suggestion instead of the imagination, they would have been nearer the truth. The opponents of magnetism had found out a word—imagination—which explained every phenomenon, and consequently saved them the trouble of investigating the subject minutely. If imagination could produce the extraordinary, not to say wonderful, results attributed to magnetism, surely they should have studied its powers carefully. As a member of the Academy pointed out, the only one who spoke in favour of mesmerism: "If Mesmer possessed no other secret but that of being able to benefit health through the imagination, would this not always be a sufficient wonder? For if the medicine of the imagination is the best, why should we not make use of it?" The effect of this fairly favourable report caused such a deluge of occult practitioners, that soon after, in 1837, a third Commission was appointed, which pronounced definitely against Mesmer's system and impugned the intelligence of the former committee. This report killed mesmerism in France for a great number of years. Its followers were persecuted, and those of them who held a medical diploma were made to sign a declaration against magnetism under a penalty of being struck off the register of practising physicians. A number of them would not tamper with their conviction, and were struck off.
In 1812, Dr. C. C. Wolfart (1778-1832), at the request of the Prussian Government, examined animal magnetism, and being converted by Mesmer, introduced its treatment in Prussian hospitals.

Previously, in 1784, the Marquis de Puysegur (1751-1825), a pupil of Mesmer, who practised mesmerism gratuitously for the benefit of suffering humanity, discovered the phenomena of somnambulism and developed in his subjects the power of clairvoyance.

In 1787, Pététin, of Lyons, studied and discovered artificial catalepsy.

In 1814, the Abbé de Faria (1755-1819)—who denied the existence of any magnetic fluid—opened a public institution for magnetism, and a few years later magnetism was practised in different Paris hospitals, including La Salpêtrière, with the sanction of Esquirol, and a number of University professors acknowledged its value in their treatises. Faria is the author of "De la Cause du Sommeil Lucide," Paris, 1819.

Mesmerism had many sincere and learned advocates in England, such as W. Gregory (1803-1858), John Ashburner (1816-1878), John Colquhoun (1785-1854), and Spencer T. Hall (1812-1885) and others, including Herbert Mayo (1796-1852), the eminent physiologist and surgeon of Middlesex Hospital, who wrote on "magnetic sleep" in 1837, and advocated mesmerism with an enthusiasm which cost him his position and finally drove him from London. But of all mesmerists the one who interests us most is John Elliotson (1791-1869), one of the most distinguished physicians of the period, Lecturer on Medicine at University College, President of the Royal Medical and Chirurgical Society, the first physician to practice auscultation in England and to use the now so familiar stethoscope, who employed animal magnetism in the treatment of diseases, and invited the medical profession to witness the amputation of the leg of a patient while in the mesmeric state, chloroform not having been yet discovered. He became acquainted with the subject by attending the lectures on mesmerism by Richard Chenevix, F.R.S. (1774-1839), the famous chemist and mineralogist, in 1829; and receiving practical instruction from Baron J. du Potet (1796-1881), in 1837. Elliotson was abused in unmeasured terms by his own colleagues, and even those who had been convinced of the truth of these phenomena had not the pluck to stand up for him.

Elliotson made the unfortunate selection of two hysterical patients, the sisters O'Key, for a test examination; and like Charcot's and Luys's hysterical women, some sixty years later, they failed. Mr. T. Wakley (1795-1862), the editor of the "Lancet," exposed and denounced him (Sept. 1838), just as Mr. Ernest Hart, the editor of the "British Medical Journal," exposed and condemned Luys. One of the O'Key sisters was said to fall into convulsions on being touched by a piece of nickel, no effect being produced by lead. Discs of the two metals "charged with magnetism" were given by Elliotson to Wakley. Wakley gave the nickel, unperceived by Elliotson, to Clarke, another visitor, who put it in his pocket and walked to the other end of the room, where he remained during the experiment. Wakley, now having nothing but the lead in his possession, bent forward and touched the girl's right hand. As he did so, a bystander, by arrangement, whispered audibly: "Take care that you do not apply the nickel too strongly." Immediately Miss O'Key fell into strong convulsions; it is said, much to the gratification of Elliotson, who remarked that "no metal but nickel had ever produced these effects." Wakley replied that no nickel had been used, and upon Dr. Elliotson's indignant protest Clarke came forward and explained the trick that had been played, producing the nickel from his pocket. Wakley denounced the whole thing as a pitiable delusion. Now, I know from my own experience that verbal suggestion is stronger than any other. In all my experiments to test hypersensitiveness I have had to prohibit suggestions, whether friendly or antagonistic, as they inevitably spoil the result. In Wakley's case this was neglected. But Elliotson also made a mistake. He ought never to
have acquainted his subject with her susceptibility to certain metals; then the word "nickel" would not have produced any effect. I have found it fatal to inform subjects of their doings in the hypnotic state.

Everything which-ingenuity could suggest was adopted to induce Elliotson to abandon the subject, and to throw ridicule upon it, but without having any effect on Elliotson's mind. The attacks on him were carried on with so much invective and vituperation, that as a result a resolution was passed by the Council of University College to the effect "that the Hospital Committee be instructed to take steps as they shall deem most advisable to prevent the practice of mesmerism or animal magnetism in future within the hospital," in consequence of which Elliotson resigned his position as physician to the hospital (1838). As a result of his efforts, "Mesmeric Infirmaries" were established in London, Edinburgh, and Dublin, and many surgical operations painlessly performed upon mesmerised patients ("Numerous Cases of Surgical Operations without Pain in the Mesmeric State." By John Elliotson, M.D., F.R.S., London, 1843). When, in 1842, Mr. Ward, a surgeon, amputated a thigh during mesmeric trance, the celebrated physiologist, MARSHALL HALL (1790-1857), suggested that the patient was an impostor, because he had been absolutely quiet during the operation; if he had not been simulating insensibility, he would have had reflex movements in the other leg. Elliotson's work was taken up in 1843 by JAMES ESDAILE (1808-1859), a Medical Officer of the East India Company, who used mesmerism for the production of anaesthesia in surgical operations and was so successful that a small hospital was granted him in Calcutta in 1846, where he performed many major and a multitude of minor surgical operations on mesmerised patients ("Mesmerism in India," 1846, and "The Introduction of Mesmerism as an Anaesthetic and Curative Agent," 1852). Before Elliotson and Esdaile, magnetism for the production of anaesthesia in surgical operations was employed by J. C. A. RÉCAMIER (1774-1852) in 1821 and JULES CLOQUET (1790-1883) in 1829. The latter removed a cancerous breast from a mesmerised patient. Mesmerism as an anaesthetic might certainly have come into general use had it not happened that just as its merits were becoming known Sir JAMES SIMPSON (1811-1870) made his great discovery of chloroform. Orthodox medicine, committed to a denial of the efficacy of psychic healing, welcomed the new anaesthetic with acclamation. The claims of the mesmerists were forgotten or dismissed as ridiculous, Esdaile was described as an honest fool, who was deceived by his patients—a set of hardened and determined impostors—and the physical method of producing insensibility—dear to the scientific mind because it was physical—achieved absolute dominion.

While Elliotson and Esdaile are forgotten to-day, there was yet another medical man, JAMES BRAID (1795-1860), who interested himself in the subject through seeing the demonstrations of La Fontaine. His work was revived some forty years later. He gave the name nervous sleep—neuro-hypnotism—or, for short, hypnotism, to the mesmeric phenomena, and attributed them to suggestion ("Neurypnology," 1843). In 1842, when Braid offered a paper on the subject of his study to the Medical Section of the British Association held that year in Manchester, it was refused; but in 1880 the British Medical Association invited Professor W. T. PREYER (1841-1897), of the University of Jena in Germany, the translator of Braid's "Neurypnology" (1881), who had become converted to "Braidism," as he called hypnotism, to come over and explain to an English medical audience what Braid, their distinguished countryman, whom the Germans had learned to honour, had achieved. From this time the practice of hypnotism as a means of therapeutic suggestion was tolerated. It was RUDOLF HEIDENHAIN (1834-1897), Professor of Physiology in Breslau University, who popularised hypnotism in Germany ("Der sogenannte thierische Magnetismus," Leipsic, 1880).
The last abusive article in England—of importance—appeared in 1883, when EDMUND GURNEY (1847-1888) and F. W. H. MYERS (1843-1901) published their investigations into hypnotism, when a renowned medical journal wrote: "The medical profession has made up its mind about these hypnotic manifestations long ago, and satisfied itself that they consist of a small nucleus of genuine phenomena, and a huge mass of wilful deception and vulgar buffoonery. Medical men have enough to do in dealing with the sad realities of life, and in the pursuit of legitimate science, and have no time to waste on the curious conundrums that may be prepared for them by idlers, poets, and philosophers, or in the detection of fraud."

In 1860, AZAM, of Bordeaux, aided by Velpau, Broca, Verneuil, Cloquin and Follin investigated the facts given by Braid in 1858, and published a work thereon. In 1875, RICHET studied artificial somnambulism.

JEAN MARIE CHARGOT (1825-1893), who had been applying hypnotism to hysterical patients at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris, commenced classes for instruction in 1878; but it was not till after HIPPOLYTE BERNHEIM (1840-1919), who had studied with LIÉBEAULT at Nancy since 1880 and accepted his views, published his treatise on "Suggestive Therapeutics" (1886), that hypnotism came to be seriously regarded. Liébeault founded the Nancy school of hypnotists in 1860. After 1886, medical men from all quarters went to study under Liébeault and Bernheim at Nancy, and to investigate Charcot's experiments in Paris. The former school held hypnotism to be entirely due to suggestion; while the latter declared it to be an artificial neurosis akin to hysteria. But the theory of suggestion is contradicted by the hypnotisation of animals; and hypnotism is not like hysteria either, for it can be broken off at any time. The suggestion theory was in the end successful and is the one now held. But in my opinion, as I have already said, hypnotic phenomena are not all due to suggestion. Many results cannot be explained by it: for example, that persons can be hypnotised without their knowledge. Nor is the suggestion theory compatible with the definite physiological effects upon the muscles, the circulation, the secretions; and that children, too young to understand what is expected of them, and animals of various kinds, can be mesmerised. When we ask the question: "What is the cause of the extraordinary effects of experimental hypnotism?" the answer invariably is: "It is all caused by suggestion." "But how is suggestion to be explained?" "That is also very simple; it is the consequence of 'suggestibility', which is a natural property of human beings." So the schoolmen believed that they had explained the reason why opium caused sleep by saying that opium had a sleep-producing virtue.

Hypnotism was looked upon with suspicion by medical men and they instructed the laity to look upon its phenomena as fraudulent and dangerous. When later the medical profession took the subject up, the public, previously warned, would have none of it, and only a few outsiders dared to practise it. Most of these have now ceased to produce genuine hypnosis and content themselves with inducing the somnolent state.

ACCREDITED PHENOMENA OF EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOTISM

I shall now describe the phenomena of experimental hypnotism. These are highly interesting to the psychologist, and must be studied carefully. Unfortunately the layman, and a good many physicians, are under the false impression that these curious phenomena—seen frequently in stage performances—are produced also in psychotherapy, i.e., in the treatment of patients by suggestion. I must repeat again that psychotherapy and suggestion treatment consist principally of the application of methods for the re-education of the character of the patient, and no physician of reputation would attempt to produce other phenomena than those essential to the recovery of health and the mental equilibrium.
HISTORY AND RESULTS OF HYPNOTISM

It is especially in the somnambulistic state that the astonishing phenomena of suggestion are observed, when suggestibility is heightened to the greatest degree. The subject believes everything that his hypnotiser tells him, and does everything not repugnant to him which the latter commands. Even results over which the will has normally no control, such as sneezing, secretion, reddening and growing pale, alterations of temperature and heart-beat, menstruation, action of the bowels, etc., may take place in consequence of the operator's firm assertions during the hypnotic trance, and the resulting conviction on the part of the subject, that the effects will occur.

The subject, though not asleep, yet does not move or think, and can be so impressed through the sensory channels as to enter upon some definite train of ideas or movements. He lacks spontaneity, like a machine that cannot start itself but can be set going by the operator.

Verbal suggestion is not always necessary. One need say nothing, but, for example, by someone playing some tune, the hypnotised subject will be influenced by it, and music will act by way of suggestion. Thus a reel will set him dancing with grace or little elegance, according to his natural capacity. He will assume the attitudes and gestures corresponding to the character of the music. A solemn strain will readily cause him to kneel and pray, or to join in the devotional music; and a war-like march will cause him to march about in a soldierlike manner.

Whatever suggestions may be imparted to his subconscious mind; the subject accepts them as facts, from which he reasons. His subconscious mind is incapable of inductive reasoning, therefore he does not trouble himself whether the premiss is true or false; that is to say, he proceeds at once to deductive reasoning, and this as a rule perfectly, as his deductions are logically correct from a false premiss as they are from a true one.

The subconscious mind accepts, without hesitation or doubt, every statement that is made to it, no matter how absurd, incongruous or contrary to the objective experience of the individual. The subconscious mind does not classify a series of known facts and then reason from them up to general principles; but, given a general principle to start with, it will reason deductively from that down to all legitimate inferences, with marvellous cogency and power. The subject takes the text from his operator; but he may amplify and develop it enormously as he acts it out.

Place a man of intelligence and cultivation in the somnambulistic state, and give him a premiss, say in the form of a statement of a general principle of philosophy, and no matter what may have been his opinions in his normal condition, he will unhesitatingly, in obedience to the power of suggestion, assume the correctness of the proposition.

False and true suggestions alike are carried into active effect. Thus, for instance, any character suggested to a hypnotised subject in this state will be instantaneously assumed, so far as it is physically possible to do so, and will be personated with marvellous fidelity to the original, just as far as the subject's knowledge of the original extends. If it is suggested to a subject that he is another person, a peasant, a general, or an archbishop, he will readily take up the suggestion, and will speak and act the part with great accuracy. His own personality is for the moment completely obscured, while the suggestion of a fresh personality is readily taken up. If he is told the next second that he is the President of the United States, he will act the part with wonderful fidelity to life. If he is told that he is in the presence of angels, he will be profoundly moved to acts of devotion. If the presence of devils is suggested his terror will be instant, and painful to behold. If a subject is told that he is a dog, he will instantly accept the suggestion and, to the limit of physical possibility, act the part suggested, and for each of these states his
imagination, aided by memory which is continuous for the character, will suggest
a suitable system of ideas and of actions.

An experiment frequently performed is to cause a grown-up woman to believe
that she is still a child, when it is found that she speaks in a childish voice and
even writes like a child, asks for her doll, and cries when she thinks someone is
taking her doll away.

It is evident that in hypnotisation the ideo-reflex excitability is increased in the
brain, so that any idea received is immediately transformed into an act, without the
controlling portion of the brain, the higher centres, being able to prevent the
transformation.

The subject may be rendered happy and gay, or sad and dejected, angry or
pleased, liberal or stingy, proud or vain, pugnacious or pacific, bold or timid, hopeful
or despondent, insolent or respectful. He may be made to sing, shout, laugh, weep,
act, dance, shoot, fish, preach, pray, deliver an eloquent oration, or excogitate a
profound argument.

The expression during these delusions is also important. In all such experi-
ments one will observe that the gestures and voice, the manner and expression, the
whole physiognomical and natural language, are extremely perfect. The attitudes
of pride, humility, anger, fear, kindness, pugnacity, devotion or meditation, and all
others are, with peculiarities in each case, depending on the idiosyncrasy of the
individual, beautiful studies for the artist.

The attitudes and gestures are equal to or surpass the best efforts of the most
accomplished actor, although the hypnotised subject may be a person of limited
intellectual cultivation, and show no peculiar talent for mimicry in the waking state.
Everyone knows how difficult it is to place oneself in a particular position so that
the expression, the attitude and the actions should correspond to the idea. To
represent such a situation as naturally as possible is the greatest art of the actor,
but is very seldom altogether realised on the stage; but it is still more difficult to
change the mood in a moment, and pass from one situation to another in a few
seconds. The hypnotised subject, however, does so easily. In personating
suggested characters, he is really not "acting a part" in the ordinary sense of the
word. It is much more than acting, for the subject believes himself to be the
actual personality suggested; just as the excellence of the real actor is proportionate
in each case to his ability to forget his own personality and to identify himself with
that of the character which he seeks to portray. The essential conditions of good
acting are therefore present in perfection. It follows that the rendition will
approach perfection in proportion to the subject's knowledge and intelligent
appreciation of the salient characteristics of the suggested personality. Oc-
casionally a suggested character may appear unreal to the subject, and in such a
case he may be conscious of "playing a comedy," and have enough recollection
when awakened to imagine that he has been shamming all the while. Yet if we
hypnotise him again, he is again unable to resist the suggestions made, and performs
them so faithfully, that if he were shamming he must long since have found his true
function in life upon the stage.

One of the remarkable effects of hypnotism is the recollection of circumstances
and the revival of impressions long since past, the images of which had been com-
pletely lost to ordinary memory, and which are not recoverable in the ordinary state
of the brain. All the sensations which we have ever experienced have left behind
them traces so slight as to be intangible and imperceptible under ordinary circum-
stances; but hypnotic suggestion, addressing itself to the subconscious mind, and
the subconscious mind being the storehouse of memories, they can be recalled at the
command of the operator. The subject can be made to remember in hypnosis every-
thing learned in normal life, even when it has apparently been forgotten. On the other
hand, the subject can be made to believe that he has experienced something that
never really occurred. This happens also in the waking state in some people, especially children with a lively imagination. The police-court reports frequently contain cases of false accusations against people, told with such perfection and with such plausible accuracy of detail, that only a very clever cross-examination can detect any flaws in the evidence.

Many persons not hypnotised yet perform actions, innocent and sometimes criminal, as if in a dream, of which they have no recollection afterwards. This is the case in epilepsy sometimes, and in hystero-epilepsy. By hypnotising such patients we can get at their subconscious state of mind in which they performed these actions, and can induce them to tell us all about the occurrence.

Hypnotised subjects are said to be capable of repeating everything like phono-graphs. BRAID had an experience which attracted considerable attention at the time. One of his subjects, a young workgirl, who did not know the grammar of her own language and who had never been taught music, though she must have possessed the gift subconsciously, correctly accompanied Jenny Lind in several songs in different languages, and also in a long and difficult chromatic exercise which was specially improvised in order to test her.

The memory may be obliterated. Nothing is easier than to make subjects forget their own name and condition in life. It is one of the suggestions which most promptly succeed, even with quite fresh subjects.

A subject may forget whole periods of his life at the suggestion of the hypnotiser.

Sense delusions are common in hypnotism, either as hallucinations or illusions. An illusion is the false interpretation of an existing external object, as, for instance, when a chair is taken for a lion, a broomstick for a beautiful woman, a noise in the street for orchestral music, or when I ask a subject whether he would like to smoke and he accepts a lead-pencil in place of a cigarette and attempts to light it. That the illusion is real is evident by the fact that the subject will imagine he is drawing smoke from the pencil, which, of course, is not even alight, and will even cough, if smoking is usually irritating to his throat.

A hallucination is the perception of an object where there is really nothing; as, for instance, when I say to a subject, "Sit down in this armchair," where there is really no chair at all, yet the hallucination is so perfect that he does put himself in exactly the same attitude as if he were sitting in a real chair. It seems incredible that a hallucination should be so real that a person can assume an attitude so strained, but it is so.

Suggest to a person that a swarm of bees is buzzing about him; he will not only see and hear the bees, but he will go through violent antics to beat them off.

Or tell a person that there are "rats" in the room, and the word will awaken a train of imagery in the patient, which is immediately projected outward in an expressive display of appropriate gestures of aversion and corresponding movements of avoidance.

The fear depicted on the face of a subject when he believes he is about to be attacked by a tiger is most impressive.

Hallucinations of all the senses and delusions of every conceivable kind can be easily suggested to good subjects. The emotional effects are then often so lively, and the pantomimic display so expressive, that it is hard not to believe in a certain "psychic hyper-excitability" as one of the concomitants of the hypnotic condition. Hallucinations have been shown by ALFRED BINET (1857-1911) and CHARLES FÉRÉ (1852-) to be doubled by a prism or mirror, magnified by a lens, and in many other ways to behave optically like real objects.

In suggesting a hallucination, say that of a bird, the suggested approach of the object causes contraction of the pupil, and vice versa. At the same time there is often convergence of the axis of the eyes, as if a real object were present.

Those who have witnessed public exhibitions of hypnotic performances will
remember that hypnotised subjects will drink water or even ink for wine, and will eat onions for pears. The showman will make them eat a potato for a peach, or drink a cup of vinegar for a glass of champagne. A subject will drink several glasses of wine by suggestion, will become red in the face and then complain of his head. He may be thrown into a state of intoxication by being caused to drink a glass of water under the impression that it is brandy; or he may be restored to sobriety by the administration of brandy, under the guise of an antidote for drunkenness. In these cases the expression of the face induced by the suggested perception corresponds so perfectly to it that a better effect would scarcely be produced if the real article were used. The operator may give his subject simple water to taste, telling him that it is some nauseating and bitter mixture, and he spits it out with grimaces of disgust. If he says that what he is offering is sweet and pleasant, though it is as bitter as wormwood, the subject smacks his lips as if he had tasted something remarkably good. The senses are dominated by the idea suggested, and such a person is very much in the position of an insane person who believes that he tastes poison in his food when he imagines that someone wishes to poison him. Ammonia will smell like eau-de-Cologne and a piece of cork may be taken by the subject for an onion, and his eyes will fill with tears if he smells it.

Naturally, several organs can be influenced by suggestion at the same time. I tell someone, "Here is a rose"; at once he not only sees, but feels and smells the rose. I pretend to give another subject a dozen oysters; he eats them without it being necessary for me to say a word. The suggestion here affects sight, feeling and taste at the same time. In many cases the muscular sense is influenced in a striking manner by such suggestions. I suggest to a subject that he is to drink an imaginary glass of wine; he lifts the pretended glass to his lips, and leaves a space between hand and mouth as he would if he held a real glass. I am not obliged to define the delusion for each separate sense, the subject does that spontaneously to himself. The deception, if it is thorough, is clearly reflected in the subject's expression and gestures. No gourmand could wear a more delighted expression over some favourite dish than does a subject over a suggested delicacy.

When the delusion is positive the subject believes he sees what does not exist; when it is negative he fails to recognise the presence of an object really placed before him. I have often made the post-hypnotic suggestion to a subject that on waking he will not see me, although I shall remain in the room, and although he will see everybody else. The subject then can hear and feel me, but fails to see me. When speaking to him I observe his head and eyes turn in my direction, but it is as if I had on a fairy helmet which hides me, he cannot see me. This is a negative hallucination of sight. Similarly, it may be suggested that the subject is deaf to certain words, and not to others.

Negative hallucinations depend upon the co-operation of various factors; firstly, dream-consciousness which creates the tendency to negative sense-delusions; secondly, the subject's belief in everything the experimenter says, which favours those delusions; thirdly, the mental state which results from this, and which may be regarded as analogous to diversion of the attention.

An entire cessation of the functions of any sense organ can be induced in the same way as a negative hallucination. "You can no longer hear, you are deaf!" or "You are blind!"; these words suffice to deprive the subject of the corresponding sense-perceptions. Not only does he cease to recognise any particular object, but the sense organ affected is insusceptible to anything. A command suffices to restore the functions.

It is certain that the blindness and deafness induced in this way are of a mental nature, for the corresponding organ of sense performs its functions, though the impressions do not reach the consciousness. In the same way the sight of one eye can be prevented, though the other can see as usual.
Various **physiological effects** can be produced in the state of hypnosis. Thus *lachrymal* secretion can be excited either by suggesting emotional states or by a sense delusion such as a pungent smell.

I have even seen a subject weep and shed tears on one side of the face, and laugh with the other. I do not think any conscious person has separate control over each side of the face, or at least not perfect control.

The *pulse* can be quickened or retarded, *respiration* slowed or accelerated, or temporarily arrested, and *perspiration* can be produced—all by suggestion. Even the *temperature* can be affected. Thus it has been observed that if a subject is told he is in high fever his pulse will become rapid, his face flushed, and his temperature increased. Or a person is told that he is standing on ice. He feels cold at once. He trembles, his teeth chatter, he wraps himself in his coat. "Goose-skin" can be produced by the suggestion of a cold bath. *Hunger and thirst* can be created, or the *action of the bowels* stimulated or arrested, and other functions increased or retarded.

The mind can be so concentrated upon a physiological process as to stimulate that process to unusual activity, so as to produce curative effects; and even to superabundant activity, so as to produce pathological effects, or disease. For instance, a blister can be caused on a sound and healthy skin by applying a postage stamp and suggesting that it is a fly-plaster; or as ERNST JENDRASSIK (1838) and R. v. KRAFFT-EBING (1840-1902) have done to subjects in the hypnotic state, by placing upon the healthy skin a key or a coin with the suggestion that at a given time, say two hours after waking, a blister will appear at the spot where the key or coin had been placed, and of corresponding size and shape. The key or coin is then removed and the patient awakens having no conscious knowledge of the suggestion given; but at the appointed time the blister appears.

On the other hand, blisters and burns have been annulled by suggestion by DELBOEUF and others.

Mere local redness of the skin is easily produced by suggestion, and can be seen to appear in a few minutes.

The production of reddening and bleeding of the skin in hypnotised subjects, suggested by tracing lines or pressing objects thereupon, throws a new light on the accounts of the stigmata of the cross appearing on the hands, feet, sides and forehead of certain mystics.

**Post-hypnotic suggestions** are deferred suggestions given to the subjects during hypnosis, to take effect after waking. The patient is hypnotised, and then impressions are made upon him which reappear when he is awake. The deeper the hypnosis the greater the success of post-hypnotic suggestion. When he is recalled to consciousness he has no recollection of having received any instruction, but at the time stated, or when the circumstances arise, he will proceed to do what has been suggested to him.

When subjects are questioned as to their motive for acting on a post-hypnotic suggestion they give different answers; they either believe that they have so acted of their own accord, and invent plausible and ingenious reasons for their proceedings, or they say they felt impelled to act so. "It came into my head to do it," is a common reply. We can use suggestion here also. When the original suggestion is being made, it may at the same time be suggested to the subject to believe that he has acted of his own free-will.

Something also depends upon the frequency with which the experiment is made, and particularly on the greater or lesser absurdity of the suggested act. If a suggestion is absurd, the subject may struggle against the impulse which he feels rising in him—he knows not why. The event will take place at whatever time we may have suggested to the subject while in the trance, whether in 1, 2, or 24 hours, or 1,000 or 2,000 minutes, or in a month or more remote periods from the day on which a subject has been hypnotised.
There are numerous cases on record in which a subject has been ordered to go to a certain person's house at a certain hour and deliver some message. As the time approaches he is seen to be restless, till he sets out for his destination. He pays no attention to the people he may meet, and, if they purposefully arrest him, he forces his way onwards, delivers his message, and can only say that he felt that he had to do so.

The sense of time appears to be an innate mental power, for there have been cases of idiot boys who were able to guess the time correctly, no matter how suddenly the question was put to them.

It would appear that our subconscientness is marking time very accurately, without our being aware of it, and at the suggested moment an impulse arises which arouses our consciousness. Even when we are not hypnotised, but suggest to ourselves certain acts to take place at a particular time, the event will happen at the time indicated. Many people on going to bed can "will" to awake at a certain hour.

When the mind is made up to perform a certain action at a certain time, the idea is then dismissed from the mind; but if the subconscientness has been properly trained, at the time, or reasonably near it, the action will be performed, although neither the thought of the time nor the idea of performing the action may have been in the mind from the moment that the resolution was taken.

Sometimes no definite time is given, but we suggest that at a time marked by a signal a certain event is to take place. The moment the signal occurs the subject, who until then seems in a perfectly normal waking condition, will experience the suggested effect.

In the same manner, one can determine by the signal the hour and minute at which the patient will of his own accord lapse into trance again.

But what is more important still, one can prevent by post-hypnotic suggestion any other person being able to hypnotise the patient, and one can even suggest a resisting power against one's own influence. Often when I have cured a person and there has been no likelihood of their requiring my services again I have suggested to them in the last trance, that no one, not even myself, should ever be able to hypnotise them again. In such cases I have tried during the same week whether I could hypnotise them once more, but failed. Whether I should have failed equally after a year or so I am not in a position to say, not having had the opportunity.

Anyhow, this de-hypnotisation of a patient is an excellent precaution for susceptible people against unexpected hypnosis by designing persons who know their weakness, and that is what most people are afraid of.

The most important of all post-hypnotic suggestions are, of course, those relative to the patient's health. In this way one can make the patient who is melancholic feel happy, the patient who has no appetite feel hungry, or the man who has morbid habits have hallucinations which will deter him from indulging in them after emerging from his trance, without the patient being conscious that any suggestion has been made.

A person suffering from insomnia may be told in the hypnotic state that he will get drowsy at eleven o'clock at night and sleep soundly until eight in the morning, waking up quite fresh in body and mind. Another person addicted to the drink or drug habit may be told that when the temptation arises again, it will be successfully conquered, he fearing the consequences of yielding to it and being convinced he can struggle against the habit, or for other reasons which will arise in his mind and which he will believe are entirely his own without remembering or suspecting their having been suggested to him.

Even dreams can be influenced by post-hypnotic suggestion. I have told patients of a melancholic state of mind the loveliest dreams in the trance suited to their character and ambitions in life, to be dreamed on the succeeding night, and told them
that they would remember them on the following day and feel happy in the enjoyment of the recollection. Thus I could influence their state of mind when no other remedy was successful. The drunkard can be made to dream of his cure and subsequent success in life; the man with fixed ideas and phobias of the absurdity of his obsessions. Lost memories can be restored by dreams suggested in hypnosis. Such dreams frequently give the patient a firmer conviction than the suggestions alone would make while in hypnosis. Indeed, let me remark here, that success in curing patients by means of hypnosis depends not merely on knowing how to hypnotise, as some people and even professional men seem to believe, but still more on knowing how to make the right suggestions individually, according to the mind and character, desires and habits of the patient. A knowledge of human nature is therefore essential.

Sometimes hysteria as well as melancholy is caused by some event of the past life, which the patient cannot forget, or which, even if the remembrance no longer exists in his active consciousness, persists in subconsciousness. Is it not a blessing that in the trance the memory also can be influenced by post-hypnotic suggestion and that a person can be made to forget on waking the painful events of his past life, which have had such a baneful influence on his mind?

The physiological effects produced in the hypnotic state can also be produced in the post-hypnotic state.

Hunger and thirst can be excited by post-hypnotic suggestion, which is useful in patients suffering from morbid loss of appetite. Healthy subjects who have just eaten a hearty meal can be made to feel fresh hunger and go through another meal. DELBOEUF, on the other hand, has induced loss of appetite by suggestion to such an extent and for so long a period that the person concerned took no solid food for fourteen days. Further, it is possible, up to a certain point, to satisfy the hunger and thirst of subjects in deep hypnosis by merely suggested food and drink.

One of the most certain effects is the regulation of bowels. In chronically constipated subjects I have sometimes suggested that at a fixed time the bowels shall be relieved and such action has occurred invariably. Similarly their action has been arrested by post-hypnotic suggestion.

The occurrence of the menstrual period can also be retarded and accelerated by post-hypnotic suggestion. I caused the menses to appear in an anæmic woman on a certain day—though not exactly to the hour suggested. My case may have been coincidence, but FOREL experimented on a number of his female asylum attendants, and most successfully.

The secretion of milk, also, has been increased as well as arrested by suggestion. The old mesmerists reported many such cases. J. Grossmann reports a recent case; also Hassenstein. The latter caused a copious flow of milk in a wet nurse in whom the secretion had ceased to flow. It had ceased, however, owing to the excitement over the child's condition, and was renewed by suggesting away the excitement.

Post-hypnotic suggestion may also be applied for purposes of education. Boys can be made to apply themselves to their studies, to invent, compose, etc., provided the suggestion is in harmony with their innate capacities. I have produced wonderful results in that way.

The personal character may also be influenced for the good by post-hypnotic suggestion. People are often so astonished at the effects of hypnotism when they watch the treatment that they request one sometimes to suggest various improvements in the personal character of the subject, or in his manners to particular relatives or acquaintances. Quarrelsome men and women have been thus rendered amiable in disposition, for their attention being drawn in the hypnotic state to their natural characteristics, they acted up to the suggestion, and exercised greater control afterwards over their tendencies. In others, over-sensitiveness has been reduced to a
normal degree, and obstinacy and other undesirable characteristics have been rectified.

Strong protests have been raised against this method of rendering a person healthy or moral; but if to heal the sick, to give sleep to the weary and heavy-laden, to suggest to the vicious to be "virtuous," to the thief to "steal no more," to the victim of abnormal and fearful perversions to "be free," and to the drunkard to be "sober"; if to suggest this and far more—and with the certainty of its being fulfilled—is opposed to ethics, then we ought also to abolish opium, belladonna, strychnine, and other poisonous drugs from our pharmacopoeia. One has to distinguish between (1) therapeutic application of hypnotism, (2) experimental investigations, and (3) the show-effects of popular performances to carry conviction to sceptics. Physicians of repute may be trusted to limit their influence to the production of phenomena which tend towards the recovery of their patients. To perform experiments on them would be as reprehensible as taking advantage of persons while under anaesthesia. Besides, as I have already explained, all suggestion is now done in the somnolent state, when the consciousness of the patient is still entire; and I personally have found that even when a person falls asleep he can be roused immediately, and the injunction given then, when awake, will still be effective. The old methods of hypnotism are now rarely applied by physicians; the entire treatment is based on known psychological principles, and has much more to do with the laws of concentration and mental control than with so-called "suggestion."
CHAPTER XXXVIII

EXTRAORDINARY PHENOMENA

EVIDENCE OF UNEXPLORED FORCES AND CAPACITIES

In 1779, a few years previous to Galvani's experiments, WALSH and INGELHAUS made a series of important investigations regarding the electrical phenomena present in certain fishes, namely the torpedo fish and electric eel, which have the power of producing shocks in animals similar to those produced by an electric current. These fishes possess complicated electric organs developed out of muscular tissue, which have the power of accumulating electric force in large quantities and communicating it to other animals. When, however, we come to ask the question: What is this nervous energy which travels along the nerves to cause a muscle to contract or an electric organ to discharge itself? science as yet can give no definite answer. Physiologists hold that though it bears definite relations to electricity, it is not electricity itself, since the rate at which its impulse travels is too slow to be thus explained, but that it is a form of ether vibration there can be little doubt. This nerve force was in early days believed to be analogous to magnetism, and people were credited by the old magnetisers with the possession of an aura or atmosphere which emanated from their bodies, and which, like magnetism, possessed polarity, and had the power of attraction and repulsion, and was capable of acting even over space. Hence the force was named by them—animal magnetism. This doctrine, however, was more or less confined to them, and obtained little credence amongst scientific men generally, although there were a few men of scientific eminence who held these views.

In 1820 H. C. OERSTED (1777-1851), of Copenhagen, discovered electromagnetism. He found that when a galvanic current was passed along a wire near a magnetic needle, the needle was deflected one way or the other in accordance with the direction of the current. The astatic needle and galvanometer owe their invention to this discovery; and later on the evolution of the dynamo, with the production of electro-motive force and electric light, was a further result.

In 1845, twenty-five years after Oersted's great discovery, KARL von REICHENBACH (1788-1869), of Vienna, naturalist and technical expert, discoverer of paraffin and creosote, made a series of experiments as to the influence of magnets, etc., on "sensitives," that is, people whose powers of perception are exalted above the normal standard by virtue of a highly-strung and sensitive nervous system, or those in an abnormal state of consciousness through hypnosis; and the results he obtained, although treated with indifference, or even contempt, by his scientific contemporaries, are so striking in the light of recent research and knowledge that I feel tempted to refer to them briefly. Reichenbach found that when strong magnets were presented to those subjects they saw flamelike appearances proceeding from the poles and sides of the magnets; the same phenomenon was observed in the case of crystals, and, moreover, they claimed to see "fiery bundles or light flow from the finger-tips of healthy men," in the same way as from the poles of magnets and crystals.
He found also that the force present in magnets and crystals and human beings could be transferred to other bodies—for instance, water—and could be transmitted even along a wire, so as to be recognised in each case by the sensitive. To this force he gave the name Od or Odyle, and he concluded that the human manifestation of it, namely animal magnetism, was but a new manifestation of the form of energy present in magnets and crystals, and he believed, moreover, that although it is present in magnets it had an existence independent of them. He found, moreover, that his Odic force exhibited polarity, that it was capable of conduction to distances, but that its conduction was much slower than electricity; it was also present in solar radiation, and appeared to exist also in artificial light; bodies could be charged with it either by close proximity or contact, but to a less degree than the one that generated it, and the force, while it lasted, in like manner, exhibited polarity, but was quickly dissipated.

The weak point in the observations of Reichenbach was held to be that they so largely depended on the good faith of his sensitives, a class of people whose testimony is often unreliable, owing to the possibility of hypnotic suggestion causing them to see things subjectively which do not exist in fact, and also because no one in an ordinary state of consciousness has been able to verify the truth of these phenomena at first hand by the use of his senses. On the other hand, the argument for their plausibility gains considerable strength when it is seen how prophetic some of Reichenbach's experiments and conclusions were of what is now being re-affirmed by modern science. A volume of these researches was published by Reichenbach in 1845, and was translated into English by Dr. Gregory in 1850.

It is in recent years that the interest in nerve energy has received a fresh impulse owing to the great and momentous revolution which has taken place in physical science in regard to the new views on the nature of energy and matter. This is in great measure due to the researches of Sir William Crookes (1833-1919) on the properties of radiant energy which were commenced by him in 1872, and also as a result of the brilliant mathematical deductions made by J. Clerk-Maxwell (1831-1879), who in the sixties gave the first hint of the existence of electro-magnetic waves, and who, working on the same lines, formulated in later years his great electro-magnetic theory of light. The experimental proof of the former was demonstrated in 1888 by his disciple Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894), through whose epoch-making experiments the means of communicating over space by means of electric waves has been discovered; and the latter is now generally accepted by men of science. Following on Crookes' researches, we find Linard in 1894 adding important information to our knowledge of radiant energy, and two years later, in consequence of these observations, Professor Röntgen discovered that the cathode or X-rays given out by a Crooke's tube could, by the aid of photography, produce skiagraphs of the bones of the human body and other substances. Shortly after, about the year 1898, Professor and Madame Curie, following up the work of the great French physicist, Henri Becquerel (1852-1908), on radio-activity, discovered radium and polonium respectively.

It would be out of place, besides taking up too much space, even to outline what has been done in the study of radio-activity, and the tremendous results which have arisen therefrom, or to mention the long list of great names which have been associated in this grand work. The great point which bears on our subject of nervous energy is that out of this mass of accumulated knowledge, a great scientific generalisation has arisen which stands hardly second to evolution itself in importance, and this is the theory of a universal all-pervading ether, which permeates all space, whether terrestrial or celestial, interstellar or intermolecular. This ether is regarded as an attenuated form of matter, which is neither solid, liquid, nor gaseous, but which Sir William Crookes regards as a fourth condition of it, the ultimate particles of which are called ions or electrons; and it is considered that all
energy, such as light, heat, electricity, magnetism, etc., is due to the vibrations of these particles: even the molecules of matter itself are now believed to be built up primarily of these etheric units.

Considering these discoveries—X-rays, wireless telegraphy, radio-activity, etc.—it is not to be wondered at that when Prof. BLONDLOT, of Nancy, announced in 1903 the discovery of certain new radiations, called by him N-rays (in honour of Nancy), which were given out by certain substances, and when Prof. CHARPENTIER proved that these were given out in large quantities during nervous activity, that the results of their researches were received with respect and interest.

N-rays are emitted by many different substances, for instance, wood, glass, wool and caoutchouc, when forcibly compressed or twisted. Tempered steel and hammerd metals are permanent and spontaneous storers of these rays, but non-tempered steel is inactive. Solar radiations contain N-rays, and stones, quartz, Iceland spar, and fluor spar, when exposed to sunlight, become charged with them. These radiations are capable of reflection, refraction and polarisation. These N-radiations are ether vibrations of long wave-length and are near to electro-magnetic vibrations in point of frequency. They are given off by an incandescent gas flame, and can be separated from heat and light rays by filtration through aluminium-foil, which allows their passage through it whilst intercepting the rays of light and heat. Their presence can be demonstrated because they have the power of increasing the phosphorescence of a platino-cyanide of barium screen, and by causing a small, faintly luminous bluish gas-flame to be rendered white in colour and more luminous when these rays are focussed on it by means of a quartz lens.

The supreme interest of N-rays, however, is that they are given off largely by nerves and nerve-centres, and Prof. CHARPENTIER demonstrated that their emission was greatly increased during functional activity, such as speaking or putting a muscle into action. Even the act of attention and mental effort was found to increase their activity, the evidence of which was shown by the increased phosphorescence of the platino-cyanide of barium screen.

Blondlot has observed that these rays will act on a photographic plate. He found that if a platino-cyanide of barium screen, which has been exposed to the influence of N-rays, and one that had not been so exposed, were photographed, the former produced the darker print of the two. This, taken with the facts that N-rays increase the luminosity of a feeble gas-flame, and increase the phosphorescence of phosphorescent bodies such as platino-cyanide of barium, etc., suggests that these radiations must possess some intrinsic luminosity, although too faint to be seen by ordinary vision.

Another interesting observation was made in 1905 by Prof. BECQUEREL regarding these rays, namely, that animals put under the influence of chloroform cease to emit N-rays, but as soon as the influence of the anaesthetic passes off the emission of the radiations recurs. Moreover, metals, crystals, and other substances which emit N-rays behave in like manner under certain influences.

More recently Dr. PAUL JOIRE ("The Annals of Psychical Science," 1906) has shown that this nervous force is capable of not only being detected, but even measured. He has proved, moreover, that it can be exteriorised in various other bodies. This he demonstrated by an instrument of his own invention—the sthenometer.

The sthenometer consists essentially of a horizontal circular dial, marked out in 360 degrees, in the centre of which, balanced by a pivot on a glass support, is a light needle or pointer, most frequently made of straw. One arm of this pointer is much shorter than the other, and is weighted by a counterpoise to keep it in a horizontal position. The whole is covered with a glass shade. All possible sources of error having been eliminated, such as the action of heat, light, electricity, and sound, by
special tests, it was found that, when the extended fingers of one's hand are brought near the side of the shade without touching it, at right angles to the pointer, after a few seconds, in the majority of cases, a decided movement of the pointer takes place, it being attracted towards the hand. This movement extends over fifteen, twenty, and sometimes up to forty and fifty degrees.

Dr. Joire observed also that not only do the extended fingers produce movements of the stethometer needle, but also that certain substances which have been held in the hand produce movements, which, previous to being handled, caused no movement at all, thus proving the exteriorisation of this nerve energy. The amount of movement varies with the nature of the substance; some materials produce no movement at all. In all cases it was found that the movement was not so powerful as with the hand which previously handled them. The objects which have been found incapable of storing this force are tinfoil, iron, cotton, and those capable of storing it in different proportions are wood, water, linen, cardboard.

By this brief summary of Blondlot's, Charpentier's and Joire's researches it will be seen how remarkably they are in accordance with many of Reichenbach's observations. Whether the N radiations of Blondlot and the nerve force of Joire coincide with Reichenbach's odic force, or are only part of the radiations studied under that name, is not yet ascertained. At first sight the alleged observation, if it is a fact, that Od presents luminosity would appear to contradict its being simply N radiation, but, as before suggested, it would appear that these radiations may be faintly luminous, but too slightly so for ordinary perception. If, however, we go down the scale of animal life we shall find examples of luminous phenomena apparently of nervous origin. For instance, amongst the beetles, we find two sub-orders containing insects which have the power of emitting light—the glow-worm and the fire-fly. Other examples of luminous phenomena in connection with nervous tissues are to be observed in the light which proceeds from the eyes of some animals and insects, especially when seen in the darkness. In the case of some moths, the light emitted is distinctly violet, cats and dogs give out green, whereas the light from the human eye is orange or red. Certain magnetic phenomena are also attended with luminosity, such as the glow in Crookes's tube in the production of X-rays, and the Aurora Borealis.

Dr. HENRY A. FOTHERBY recently called attention to the analogy of nerve force to magnetic force. He points out, among other facts, that the energy of sound and light is seen to be capable of conversion into nerve energy through the mechanism of special receiving organs, the ear and the eye respectively; just as the energy of sound and light has physically been converted through the mechanism of the telephone and teleroscope into electricity and back again into sound and light. He refers to Joire's stethometer as proof of the nervous energy having the power of attraction, as in the case of magnetism; and to Blondlot's experiment with N-rays having demonstrated radiations from nervous tissues.

Reichenbach encountered scepticism and even open hostility from the greater number of the representatives of official science when he published the results of his experiments. He had already acquired a certain notoriety by his works on chemistry and especially by his discovery of paraffin and creosote, but he did not belong to the staff of any University.

E. DUBOIS-REYMONT (1818-1896) refused to examine Reichenbach's experiments in detail "because it would at least be impossible for him not to be guilty of using unparliamentary language in doing so." This fear did not prevent him from adding that Reichenbach's work "is one of the most deplorable aberrations that has for a long time affected a human brain; they are fables which should be thrown into the fire."

I, personally, can certainly confirm Reichenbach's observation that normal,
healthy persons, in the hypnotic state, are sensitive to the influence of a magnet, and
that the ends of the magnet appear to them luminous in a perfectly dark room. The
light is described by them as very faint and easily overpowered by the faintest
glimmer of ordinary light; and I can also confirm the statement that the human
body possesses the same influence, and produces the same effects on sensitive sub-
jects as magnets do, faint rays appearing to issue from the tips of the operator's
fingers. Absolute darkness is essential, and some persons require to remain for
some time in the darkness before the experiment is commenced. Light from a
candle or entering from a chink or cranny may spoil the experiment. I may
mention also that I have performed the experiments, which are of a rather unusual
kind, repeatedly before small and large audiences of learned and scientifically
trained men, and that every possible precaution has been taken to exclude "sug-
gestion." The persons chosen were normal persons who volunteered for the ex-
periment, and not nervous or weak-minded subjects.

Taking a normal subject in the hypnotic state and blindfolding him, one of the
first observations that can be made refers to the probable existence of a human
aura, for by holding one or more fingers near any part of the subject's body or head,
without coming in actual contact, that part will be moved in the direction in which
the finger is slowly drawn. An ordinary horse-shoe magnet, held similarly, pro-
duces a like result, and I have found persons who, unaware of such an instrument
being in the room, complained of unpleasant sensations when the magnet was held
near the back of their head, questioning me what I was doing and imploring me to
desist.

CHARCOT believed in the power of the magnet, BERNHEIM did not. BINET
and FÉRÉ claimed that a magnet can effect a transfer of anaesthesia from one side
of the body to the other. BORIS SIDIS ("Psychology of Suggestion," 1910) also
tried the effects of magnets. Again he made previously the verbal suggestion: "I
shall change the direction of the magnet, and the transfer will take place from the
arm to the leg." Accordingly, "at the end of a minute the arm fell and the leg
was raised." I have already explained that verbal suggestion is stronger than any
physical agent. Therefore, by telling the patient what is going to happen, the
whole experiment becomes worthless. The subject should never be allowed to
know, in the hypnotic state or after, what is expected of him. When he is told in
the hypnotic state, the suggested result takes place immediately; when he is told
subsequently in the normal waking state, and we repeat the experiment, the subject
is likely to remember the information, and he no longer acts automatically or by
inspiration, but starts guessing what is required of him, to please the operator or
the audience.

MILNE BRAMWELL says on this point: "The enigmatic reports of the
effects of magnets and metals, even if they be due, as many contend, to unintentional
suggestion on the operator's part, certainly involve hyperaesthetic perception, for
the operator seeks as well as possible to conceal the moment when the magnet is
brought into play, and yet the subject not only finds it out at once in a way difficult
to understand, but may develop effects which (in the first instance certainly) the
operator did not expect to find."

We know our friends not only by their visible forms and features; we know
them also by the magic atmosphere which surrounds them. At least, some of us
do; perhaps they are gifted with a special sensibility of that kind. We have also a
feeling that a friendly person is in the house or room, though we cannot see him.
Again, two perfect strangers meet and they are drawn to one another before they
speak, as if there was an affinity between them; two others meet, and they repel
each other.

The experiments of A. BUÈ and LIÈBEAULT have shown that a living being
can, merely by his presence, exercise a salutary influence on another living being,
quite independently of suggestion. And is not that the experience of everyone who has ever felt sorrow or been ill? The child who has just fallen down and is weeping and screaming stops suddenly if his mother, softly rubbing the bruised spot, tells him that it is nothing. Who will deny that, when he has been suffering or troubled, the soft pressure of a beloved hand upon his forehead has suddenly comforted him? Bé restored the vitality of diseased organs by placing his hands on them or making pressure over them. If the "King's touch" had not had a salutary influence it would not have persisted for so long. How could the thought of healing heal, if the brain, under the influence of this idea, did not constantly send into the diseased organs some currents which restore or regularise the functions?

Magnets do act on the human body. When passes are made with them the same sensations are experienced as when the operator uses his hands. Here it may be said the influence of the hand is combined with that of the magnet; but by using the magnet without the hand of the operator, or in the hand of a person whose hand, by itself, has no perceptible effect, it is ascertained that the magnet does exert an influence identical with that exerted by the human hand.

I have seen experiments made in a physiological laboratory to disprove the supposed influence of magnets. A subject was told that a powerful magnet was at work behind his head and tracings were recorded by the proper instruments of his pulse and respiration. Then the subject was told that the magnet had been removed, when actually one was put on, and again tracings were recorded of the pulse and respiration. These tracings were thought to be a proof that the magnet had no power whatsoever, but from what I witnessed I was not convinced, except of one thing, that "suggestion" is stronger than any magnetic force.

I cannot agree with Tamburini's view, that magnetic force has no influence, that "it is only the temperature of the metal which has effect." A. TAMURINI (1848-1919) found that when a magnet is brought close to the pit of the stomach it influences respiratory movements in hypnosis. Later on, he found that other metallic bodies produced the same effect; the strength of the effect, however, depended on the size of the piece of metal.

ELLIOTSON, too, believed in the mesmeric powers of certain metals, but Wakley, the editor of the Lancet, performed test-experiments (see previous chapter), and, operating with a non-mesmerising metal, made the subject believe he was using a mesmerising one, whereupon she fell asleep; from this he concluded that all the subjects were impostors; whereas all Wakley proved was that "suggestion" is able to overcome any of these mysterious forces, which are admitted, by those who believe in their existence, to be very feeble in power.

There is no doubt in my mind that a magnet gives off some force which can be felt by a hypnotised subject, and that our own body, particularly at the fingers' ends, exerts some similar influence. I became convinced of this by placing a hypnotised subject in a completely darkened room, then letting him open his eyes and describe what he saw. I held a magnet suspended in my hand at the poles of which he perceived a luminous appearance, and when holding out my fingers he described similar luminous emanations proceeding from my finger-tips.

I have found that ordinary magnetic discs, which are used for hypnotising people, can be made luminous in the dark, by rubbing them between the fingers. The ordinary bronze coin has a similar though not quite such a strong effect.

The light which the subject declares to emanate from them is sometimes sufficiently strong to illuminate surrounding objects, which the subject will describe.

The one essential condition is that there must be absolute darkness.

The human aura appears to extend from the body for a distance, some say a yard, and gradually fades away. And the aura of each person is seen to be coloured according to the vibrations belonging to his prevailing mental states or character.
EXTRAORDINARY PHENOMENA

It is not unlikely that the human organism is a radio-active body, for if our experiments do not deceive us, the body emits rays which can be seen and felt by sensitive persons. That they can be seen I have already shown. The following is an experiment which I have often repeated which would prove that they can also be felt. A person previously hypnotised and now awake and blindfolded is made to distinguish my hand from a dozen others, when held above his or hers at a distance of six inches or less for a few seconds. This is done with great success, and if you give the different persons numbers, the subject will after a time even recognise when the hand of No. 5 or 7 or any other comes round again. This experiment would point to different emanations from different people and a discriminative sensibility for them in certain subjects in the hypnotic state. Possibly the sensations may be due entirely to hypersensitiveness to the temperature of the different hands, and this is one of the explanations offered by some of the critics; even so the performance would be remarkable; but I cannot think that there is sufficient difference in the temperature of the various hands to be perceived even by the most sensitive subject. There is something to be said for those who assume a magnetic or an electrical force or some still unknown nerve force or vital energy to be at the root of these phenomena.

Electricity is known as a great force in physical nature; and it is harnessed and made to perform many services to mankind. Like all the great forces of nature, it is invisible, except through its effects, and it defies analysis. It will never be known to man except as one of the great correlated forces. Why should it be thought impossible that a nerve force can emanate under certain conditions from the operator and can control his subject?

BRAID observed that hypnotised subjects recognise things at a certain distance from the skin, and this simply by the increase and decrease of temperature. They walk about the room with bandaged eyes or in absolute darkness without striking against anything, because they recognise objects by the resistance of the air and by the alteration of temperature. POIRAULT and also DRZEWIECKI found the same.

EDMUND GURNEY (1847-1888) maintained that there must be a special effluence or emanation to account for the fact that a peculiarly susceptible subject could discriminate the passes made by his magnetiser over an arm or finger, though carefully blindfolded and screened off. The effect produced sometimes amounted to complete local anaesthesis, whilst passes of other hypnotists produced no effect.

Prof. OBERSTEINER, of Vienna, supposes that there may possibly be a special magnetic sense, which may come into activity with many people during hypnosis, and which is, perhaps, localised in some terminal organs whose functions are still unknown.

Moll mentions BABINSKI'S and LUY'S experiments. "If a hypnotised subject and a sick person are set back to back, a magnet put between them will cause the sick person's symptoms to pass over to the hypnotised subject. Hysterical contractures and numbness have been thus transferred, as also the symptoms of organic disease—e.g., multiple sclerosis. The transference is said to take place even when the hypnotic has no notion what the sick person's symptoms are—i.e., when suggestion is excluded. Luys went even farther. When he placed a magnet first on a sick person's head and then on a hypnotic's, the morbid symptoms of the first person were supposed to appear in the hypnotised person." Moll's explanation is:

"In these experiments of Babinski and Luys we have an obvious combination of the phenomena of mineral and animal magnetism. It is a significant fact that such assumptions as these have hardly ever been made in recent times by men who must be taken seriously. We are, therefore, justified in now assuming that the results obtained by Babinski and Luys in those experiments were due to suggestion—i.e.,
that there was self-deception on the part of the experimenters, who at the time were not so well acquainted with suggestion as a source of error as we are to-day. Of course, all this does not prove that it is impossible for the magnet to influence human beings."

FÉRÉ ('"Mémoires de la Société de Biologie,"' 1888) was the first to discover the effect of the emotions on the galvanometer. TARCHANOFF, VERAGUTH, C. J. JUNG, of Zürich, and F. PETERSON, of Columbia University, made further observations and claimed to be able to measure the emotions. They showed that if the body of an individual is introduced into the circuit of a mirror-galvanometer through which a weak current is passing, and the resistance being so arranged by means of a rheostat as to enable them to bring the needle to zero on the scale, psychical conditions will lead to a deflection of the needle of the galvanometer. The inference is that the psychical change produces some physical change by which the current passes less readily or more readily through the body. If the individual is spoken to or read to, indifferent words have no effect on the galvanometer, but as soon as words are uttered that evoke an emotional tone, an effect is produced on the galvanometer. Every stimulus accompanied by an emotion caused in normal people a deviation in the galvanometer, recorded upon a kymograph as a curve, the amount of such deviation—or the height of the curve—being in direct proportion to the liveliness and actuality of the emotion aroused. The stimuli were of the most varied kind—for example, the threat of a needle, the sudden fall of a weight with a loud noise or the threat of it, arithmetical calculation, sudden call by name, and so on—and the resulting curves were found in normal people to vary directly in amplitude according to their unemotional and phlegmatic or excitable temperament. Successive stimuli delayed and diminished the response.

Before passing on to the next phenomenon, I would here refer to another of Reichenbach's observations. It is this: Since all chemical action is attended with the emission of odyllic light as well as odyllic influence, the changes which take place in dead bodies by decay, which are chemical, are sources of odyllic light, just as are the changes in the living body, respiration, digestion, etc. Hence sensitive persons see luminous appearances over churchyard graves, especially recent graves, in the dark of the night. There will be found in the work of Reichenbach several most interesting and instructive cases of this fact, and thus we find that science, with her torch, dissipates the shades of superstition. Corpse-lights exist, but they are not supernatural; neither are those who habitually see them "uncanny." The lights are perfectly natural and harmless; and the seers are only sensitive persons.

Another experiment is for a member of the audience to take a packet of blank ivory cards or note-paper, or envelopes, fresh from the stationer's, to select one of these and show it to the hypnotised subject. The card or paper or envelope is then secretly marked and shuffled amongst the others, or else without any mark the relative position is remembered by the person in charge of the pack, which is returned to the subject, who as a rule without hesitation picks out the right card or other object from the number handed to him, although no difference is perceptible to the most skilful observer watching the performance. This experiment shows the quickening of the sense of sight in the subconscious state.

Others have made similar experiments, usually by suggesting photographs to appear on the back of the cards, by which illusion the subject invariably recognises the card. This is no less wonderful, but Moll has an adverse explanation for it, which I cannot pass over. He says: "I will take this opportunity of quoting an experiment which is often repeated and is wrongly considered as a proof of increased keenness of the senses. Let us take a pack of cards, which naturally must have backs of the same pattern, so that to all appearance one cannot be distinguished from the other. Let us choose a card—the ace of hearts, for example—hold it with its back to the subject and arouse by suggestion the idea of a particular photograph
E X T R A O R D I N A R Y  P H E N O M E N A

on it—his own, let us say. Let us shuffle the cards, including, of course, that with
the supposed photograph on it, and request the hypnotic to find the photograph,
without having allowed him to see the face of the cards. He will often find the
right one, although the backs are all alike. The experiment can be repeated with
visiting-cards, or with sheets of paper, if the selected one is marked, unknown to
the hypnotic. This experiment makes a greater impression on the inexperienced
than it is entitled to, for most people are able to repeat the experiment without
hypnosis, and hyperaesthesia is not generally a condition for its success. If the
back of these cards and papers are carefully examined, differences which may easily
be discerned will be discovered. The experiment has no bearing on the question of
simulation. Naturally, I do not contend that a hypnotic cannot find a paper in
such a case better than a waking man. I only wish to point out that although this
experiment is often used to demonstrate the presence of hyperaesthesia, the latter is
not generally necessary for its success. I have seen men of science show astonish-
ment when a hypnotic distinguished apparently identical sheets of paper. They did
not understand that there were essential differences in the sheets, which suffice for
distinguishing them even without hypnosis. The experiment is to be explained
thus: The minute but recognisable difference (points de repère) presented to the
hypnotic at the moment when the idea of the photograph was suggested to him
recall the suggested image directly he sees them again. The points are so closely
associated with the image that they readily call it up. Binet and Féré have rightly
pointed out that the image only occurs when the points de repère are recalled to the
memory; they must first be seen. Consequently, if the paper is held at a distance
from the subject’s eyes, the image will not be recognised, for the points de repère are
not visible.”

I absolutely deny that a normal person can distinguish a blank card out of a
pack of identical cards owing to any defect or any peculiarity in the manufacture, if
the same conditions are followed that I have made obligatory in my experiments.
Only one card out of a pack is shown to the subject, which is shuffled by some
stranger, who must remember whether it is the fifth or fifteenth or any other card,
but who need not remain in the room, so as to avoid any suspicion of thought-
transference. Nor, of course, should anyone else know, least of all the operator.
The subject on receiving the pack will take up one card after another, and as soon
as arriving at the right one will stop without looking at the rest of the pack, and
hand that particular card over. The subject can often tell when he has received
the card upside down.

BRÉMAUD thinks that the increased power of vision in hypnosis is to be
ascribed to an increase of attention. Attention is certainly increased, but that is
not the entire explanation.

D’ABUNDO produced enlargement of the field of vision by suggestion.
I have frequently demonstrated visual accentuation in another manner. A
subject in the hypnotic state after a time may get fatigued and express a wish for a
glass of water. On a table close by there are a dozen empty glasses, all exactly
alike. I hand to the subject one of these empty glasses and he drinks from it as if
it really contained water. When he puts it down all the glasses are changed in
position by some member of the audience, so that no person by the mere look of the
glasses could tell which is the one that has been used. After some little time the
subject himself may want to drink again, or else it may be suggested to him to
have another drink. He will glance over the glasses and, to the great astonishment
of the audience, take up the right one and empty it of its supposed contents.

BERGSON has described one of the most remarkable cases of increased power of
vision. This particular case has been cited as a proof of supersensual thought-
transference, but Bergson ascribes the result to hyperaesthesia of the eye. In this
case a subject who seemed to be reading through the back of a book held and looked
Vol. ii.]
at by the operator was really proved to be reading the image of the page reflected on the latter's cornea. The same subject was able to discriminate with the naked eye details in a microscopic preparation, to see and draw the cells in a microscopical section, which were only 0-06 millimetres in diameter. SAUVaire, after some not quite irreproachable experiments, supposed the existence of such a hyperaesthesia of sight, that a hypnotic subject recognised non-transparent playing-cards by the rays of light passing through them. A case of TAGMENT'S, in which an ordinary piece of cardboard was used as a mirror, is said to have shown quite as strong a hyperaesthesia. All objects which were held so that the reflected rays from the card fell on the subject's eye were clearly recognised.

If my subjects could experience sensations beyond the normal, we cannot refuse to believe the abnormal vision of somnambulists and clairvoyants.

The subject can be made to hear with increased acuteness, and that to an extent apparently marvellous. The ticking of a watch heard at three feet distance in the waking state becomes audible at thirty-five feet in some hypnotics.

That the sense of smell in the hypnotic state is also more acute is equally easy of proof. A card, paper, envelope, or handkerchief is selected from a number, all alike, and the subject is requested to smell it. The object chosen is then put among the rest and the whole packet handed back, when the subject will smell each of them until he gets to the right one, which he gives up, frequently without testing the remainder, so sure is he of his selection.

An experiment in this connection, which I have arranged on several occasions, is the following. The subject is requested to smell a handkerchief, which, of course, must have no scent whatever, and to hand it to some member of the audience. To avoid any possibility of mind-reading the operator takes the subject out of the room while someone hides the handkerchief in some easily accessible place. The subject is led back and told to find the handkerchief. He walks round the room and will soon stop at a place where he makes a search and discovers the article in question.

I have never tested the increased sense of smell beyond the distance of an ordinary room, but BRAID recorded a case in which the scent of a rose was traced through the air at a distance of forty-five feet.

MOLL relates similar experiments. A visiting-card was torn into pieces, which pieces were professedly found purely by the sense of smell; pieces belonging to another card were rejected. The subject gave gloves, keys, and pieces of money to the persons to whom they belonged, guided only by smell. Hyperaesthesia of smell has often been noted in other cases. CARPENTER states that a hypnotic found the owner of a particular glove among sixty other persons. SAUVaire relates another such case, in which a hypnotic, after smelling the hands of eight persons, gave to each his own handkerchief, although every effort was made to lead him astray. BRAID and the older mesmerists relate many such phenomena. Braid, like Moll, describes a case in which the subject on each occasion found the owner of some gloves among a number of other people; when his nose was stopped up the experiment failed. This delicacy of the different organs of sense, particularly of the sense of smell, is well known to be normal in many animals; in dogs, for example, who recognise their masters by scent. Hypnotic experiments teach us that this keenness of scent can be attained by human beings in some circumstances.

On the skin two points can be discriminated at less than the normal distance. The sense of touch is so delicate that, according to DELBOEUF, a subject after simply poising on her finger-tips a blank card drawn from a pack of similar ones can pick it out from the pack again by its "weight."

That the sense of touch is also quickened in the subconscious state can be tested in the following manner. Six objects—I generally choose glasses—are put on a table. The subject looks away or may be blindfolded. Someone selects one of
the glasses which the operator is to touch. The subject is then requested to find
the "magnetised" glass, which he does without hesitation.

Frequently I do not even touch the glass, but hold two extended fingers over it.
It would appear that in doing this the temperature of the air contained in the glass
is slightly raised, sufficiently to be recognised by the subject.

I have made movements with a finger at a distance of three to six feet, as if
tickling the nose of the subject—who is blindfolded—and produced sneezing; and
similar movements elsewhere to the bare skin excited irritation and consequent
scratching by the subject. If this hypersensibility does exist, we cannot deny it to
other persons—for example, the water-diviners. Because a process or event is in-
explicable in the light of our present knowledge, this is no reason to deny its
existence.

Both the sense of temperature and the sense of taste can be tested by pouring
water into all the glasses and holding two fingers over one. The subject will taste
each till he gets to the "magnetised" one, which he hands to the operator. MES-
MER spoke of mesmerised water, but this idea was scouted and rejected as absurd.
But everyone who has studied mesmerism, and tried the experiments, knows that
water may be so charged with some force that a person in the mesmeric sleep,
without the slightest knowledge that the experiment is made or intended, instantly
and infallibly distinguishes such water from that not mesmerised. It is generally
described as having a peculiar taste, not easily defined, but different from ordinary
water.

MOLL says: "That a magnetised person may at times discern 'magnetised'
water is correct. It has, however, nothing on earth to do with magnetism. In the
first place, it is often impossible to prevent a slight rise in the temperature of water
that has just been magnetised. Secondly, it is highly probable that in the act of
magnetising, which is generally accompanied with the gesture of flourishing some-
thing in the direction of the water, chemical substances may be introduced into the
latter, and may bring about an alteration in its taste. But chemical dissociations
have nothing in common with magnetism, which is supposed to represent a physical
force. This intentional confusion between chemical agencies and the magnetic
force is a good proof of the want of clearness prevailing on the subject amongst
most mesmerists."

Why should Moll assume there is a "gesture of flourishing something in the
direction of the water" or the still more abominable insinuation that "chemical
substances may be introduced " surreptitiously into the water? These are genuine
scientific experiments, not done for profit, but from the mere desire for knowledge,
and surely no scientific man is either such a "fool" as to make flourish or signs
to spoil his own experiment nor such an impostor as to wilfully deceive his audience.
Scientific men may differ as to their explanation of such phenomena, but they
should not bring accusations against one another without some shade of
evidence.

The experiments upon hysterical patients with different medicines in sealed
tubes performed by BOURRU, BUROT and LUYS, producing the effects of the
drugs they contained—sleepiness in the case of opium, drunkenness in the case of
alcohol—are said to be due probably to suggestion. Not having tried the experi-
ment, I can offer no opinion.

Not merely the senses, but all the mental qualities of a person in the subconscious
state, are highly accentuated in the state of hypnosis. In some manner, which we
are still unable to explain, we can, by touching different regions of the head, standing
behind a subject (previously hypnotised, but now awake), and without any "will-
ing" or suggestion, excite expression of different thoughts and emotions, and
various dispositions.

By touching symmetrical points on the subject's cranium, various manifestations
are elicited, both in word and gesture, such as devotion, anger, benevolence, meanness, kleptomania, repentance, conceit, vanity, anxiety, hunger, etc., as well as combinations of these states when two or more centres are touched at the same time.

Such an experiment naturally suggests collusion. To prove that there is no previous arrangement between the operator and subject, the latter should be perfectly ignorant of what is expected, or a new subject should be chosen. A subject who has been operated on before is occasionally too anxious to excel and guesses at what he is to say or do. Moreover, it is not at all necessary that the operator should touch the particular centres; he may let any stranger do so. When the expression is not spontaneous the subject should be asked: "What are you thinking of? What do you see? What do you feel?"

I should also state that I have never produced any effect by mere "willing," or even thinking of the expected manifestation. Frequently it has happened that I have been on a different centre than I intended to touch, and thus got another manifestation than I had promised to produce.

I have excited the same centres by applying a feeble galvanic current and found that the right side alone will not correspond; the left will do so, but the best results are produced by acting symmetrically on both hemispheres of the brain.

It is argued that mere pressure cannot possibly produce such results even on a highly sensitive brain, for the skull is intervening. Quite so, but it must not be forgotten that the skull is not inanimate matter, but a living substance permeated by nerves and blood vessels. Mere argument will not upset the fact. Let physicians who practise hypnotism experiment as I have done, without preconceived notions as to what is or is not possible. Thus by touching one particular region of the head the patient will be found to assume the attitude of devotion and to say his prayers. The moment the finger is removed, he will leave off abruptly, sometimes at a syllable, breaking the word. When the finger is put down again the prayer will be continued at the same syllable where he left off. Touching another region, the patient can be made to steal, but the moment the finger is removed to a region which I might describe as the moral region of the brain, the stolen object is returned with expressions of remorse.

The expression of the emotions thus produced is simply magnificent, and I have a collection of photographs reproducing them. Thus by touching one part of the head the subject will exhibit a beautiful picture of devotion. He kneels and prays, with a fervour and intensity of expression which it would be difficult to surpass. Humility is intensely predominant in his gesture. When another part is touched, he exhibits pride and hauteur to a most ludicrous degree. In another part the expression changes to compassion, while in yet another the most appalling mimicry of fear and misery is produced.

Many of the old mesmers and hypnotists, such as GREGORY, ELLIOTSON, BRAID, etc., about whose honesty there can be no question, have obtained the same results, but the experiment is criticised severely by modern investigators who have never attempted to repeat it. There is only one hypnotist, Dr. PITRES, who has made a similar investigation and recorded certain zones télégènes. Braid's acknowledgment should certainly be accepted, since he was not a supporter of that school which believed in a multiplicity of centres in the brain.

SILVA, BINET, FÉRÈ, and HEIDENHAIN claimed that they can move single limbs of the hypnotised person by stimulating the parts of the head which correspond to the motor centres of the limbs concerned. CHALLENGER even proposed to study the physiology of the brain in this way. On the other hand, BORIS SIDIS, the well-known American psychologist, denies the possibility of exciting mental zones. He tells the patient: "Now I am going to touch that part of the cranium which corresponds to the movement of the left arm, and this arm will go into convulsions." He then touches the part, and immediately the left arm
is convulsed (op. cit., p. 83). I can only repeat that verbal suggestion is stronger than any physical influence.

No one who has ever seen these beautiful manifestations can suppose that the state of the subject is a mere reflection of the operator's mind. For while the latter is tranquil, the former may be heaving with emotion; on the other hand, accidental emotions in the operator are not communicated to the subject, who may be acting some passion or feeling to the life, while the operator is convulsed with laughter, and yet he is not thereby affected at all.

I have never seen reason to believe that I have heightened the effect of my processes by exerting the strongest will, or lessened them by thinking intentionally of other things. So far from willing, I had at first no idea of what would be the effect of my processes.

Again I would remark that I have taken all precautions to avoid the possibility of deception.

Firstly, the subject is absolutely unacquainted with what is expected of him, and ignorant of any brain-theory. Yet he will, if a good medium, respond to the touch instantly wherever it may be made.

Secondly, the same results are produced, and have been produced, by a stranger equally ignorant as the subject, being put "en rapport" with him while I was talking to somebody in the room. Yet here also the manifestation has often happened as well as before.

Again, it often happens that when an operator knows what to expect and intends to touch a particular part of the head, but, turning to speak to someone, touches a wrong centre, with the idea of the first in his mind, or when his hand accidentally slips, a wrong result is produced.

I know that I shall be abused and ridiculed in placing this last experiment before serious investigators, notwithstanding all the precautions I have used. It will be quoted to show my "credulity." All I can say is that I have proceeded honestly and stated honestly what I have observed. Who does not want to accept my word need not do so, but I am bound to record here this observation, as well as the others, in the full belief that it will be proved and acknowledged some time or other.

Prof. BERNHEIM, the originator of the "suggestion" theory, too, never succeeded in thought-transmission. He says: "I have tried to produce phenomena of thought-transmission in hundreds of cases, but without success. I have found nothing definite. If thought-transmission exists, it is a phenomenon of another order, which has still to be studied. It has nothing in common with the phenomenon of suggestion."

MOLL, another great expert, accepts the possibility of thought-transmission, but attributes it to deception. He thinks that the "hypnotic has a much greater tendency to pay attention to the smallest sign made by the experimenter than a person has who is awake," and that "it is just in this that one of the chief sources of error lies, because what in reality depends on the influence produced by such insignificant signs is very often taken to be the result of telepathic influence." To Moll, what cannot be explained by the theory of suggestion must be the result of deception or fraud. He concludes with the assurance: "I have never observed anything of an occult nature occur during my own experiments, provided the necessary precautions were taken." Quite so, but thought-transmission is not an occult phenomenon, and we are not dealing with professional thought-readers, but with experiments conducted by scientific men with the strictest precautions. Thought-reading is possible under certain conditions, as will be shown presently.

When did the higher phenomena show the first signs of decadence? A moment's reflection will fix it at about the date of the promulgation of the theory of suggestion. As soon as it was found that the hypnotic sleep could be induced by suggestion all other methods were practically abandoned. It was a much easier operation than
to make passes over a subject for an indefinite length of time, accompanying the
passes by fixity of gaze and intense concentration of mind. The law of suggestion
is undoubtedly of the highest significance, only let us remember that it is not the
whole of psychic science. It seems clear, then, that it is to this change of methods
that we must look for an explanation of the change in results.

One of these phenomena—familiar to the old mesmerists and vouched for by men
of learning and standing—is "Clairvoyance," the subject seeing objects with closed
eyes, and things that are invisible to the ordinary sight. Anyone examining the
voluminous literature on the subject must admit that at all events some of the
experimenters took every possible precaution to prevent self-deception or fraud.
"Clairvoyant power" may or may not exist; only those can express an opinion
who have undertaken the investigation. Why should it be thought impossible that
there is a peculiar emanation in certain forms of matter, the action of which is
perceived by certain "sensitive" people, especially when in the hypnotic state?

Hypnotists, who practise "suggestion" only, are bound to frustrate their own
experiments in this direction and fail to produce any of the extraordinary phenomena
mentioned, because of the fact repeatedly stated, that suggestion, whether consciously
or unconsciously exercised, is the most potent force, and therefore does not give the
innate powers of the subject a chance to manifest themselves. Conscientious
investigators should remember this. Only those of our modern hypnotists who do not
limit themselves to the suggestion method have succeeded in reproducing the higher
phenomena. In the subject put to sleep by the mesmeric method, that is by passes
without contact, and with no verbal suggestion of any kind, and who has never been
hypnotised by any other person (for the memory of past hypnoses by the subject is
a great factor in determining the condition of the present state), we have, and there
we must agree with the mesmerists, instead of an interesting automaton, an
individual with a personality of his own, one whose mental faculties have become
clearer and more powerful, and who often exhibits an intelligence and capacities
superior to those of his normal condition.

Clairvoyance, psychometry, and all the higher at present unaccountable phe-
nomena, which the old mesmerists produced, may be true or not true, but of one
thing I am convinced: They cannot be ascribed to thought-transmission or thought-
reading, by which modern critics explain them, when the facts are forced on their
attention so that they can no longer deny them. As if thought-reading—the
power of seeing into another man's soul—were at all less wonderful than the power
of seeing through a stone wall or a floor! To my apprehension, thought-reading
is still more wonderful and incomprehensible than that kind of clairvoyance which
takes note of material things at a distance. In the latter case we can imagine some
subtle, rare medium by which impressions may be conveyed to us, as light or sound
are. But how do we perceive thoughts, not yet expressed, in the mind of another?
We account in this way for an apparently unaccountable phenomenon by one still
more incomprehensible.

Sometimes the phenomena I have described cannot be produced at the first
attempt. The subject has to practise the performance, otherwise he or she is liable
to guess, instead of waiting for what I may call for want of a better term—intuition.

I may mention also that I have given several public demonstrations of the
phenomena I have cited—the biggest one before an audience of five hundred people at
the opening meeting of the Ethological Society at the Suffolk Galleries in 1904—and
several private séances at the houses of learned friends. Unlike those of most
other experimenters, my subjects have been new ones; they had not been hypno-
tised before. And I have always experimented in the waking state, that is to say,
on subjects awakened from hypnosis, so that there was no outward sign of any
difference from their normal condition.

In the physical sciences, it is easy to demonstrate discoveries and to have them
repeated under exactly the same conditions. When we come to the science of mind, however, all the circumstances are changed. True, we have our anatomists and physiologists working with the scalpel and microscope, but even as regards the most elementary phenomenon, say man's reasoning capacity, how much have we learned from them? No one will deny that man does reason, and that, compared to animal intelligence, human reason must seem something supernatural. Is it a wonder that to everyday men the abnormal capacities of the hypnotised sensitive persons should seem incredible? Why should man in the progress of his evolution not have developed powers—and may we say brain-functions?—of which we have still only meagre knowledge? Hypnotised subjects must practise the higher powers just as every man must practise his reasoning capacity, not to arrive at wrong conclusions. Man's reasoning capacity has been trained for thousands of years; what has humanity done to draw out the psychical sense? Therefore let us assume a different attitude towards such abnormal phenomena, when they are manifested spontaneously and not with the object of a pecuniary gain. We have given up the explanation of their being supernatural. Let us also give up the idea that they belong to fraud and imposition, and that only highly credulous persons believe them.

Is it possible for one mind to act on another where the two minds do not communicate by the spoken word or by signs or symbols of any visible kind? This is a question which has set a great many people thinking, and not a few to make observations of their own and investigations of the experiences of others. As a result, those who have studied the subject have no longer any doubt that communication is possible between mind and mind otherwise than through the known channels of the senses; but that such communication is rare, because its manifestation requires exceptional conditions. Before all, there must be a mind willing strongly to impress a thought; and a mind in that state of subjectiveness or passivity which alone makes it possible to receive the impression.

The phenomena which we are about to consider must not be confused with those, improperly termed thought-reading, which are produced in persons who, by virtue of the extreme sensitiveness with which they are endowed, are able by the mere contact of their hand with that of a person formulating a certain thought to perceive the unconscious muscular movements, and, in consequence, to execute correctly the thing thought of.

That form of pastime used to be played in drawing-rooms, and usually as follows. One of the party, generally a lady, leaves the room, and the rest determine on something which she is to do on her return—for example, to take a flower from some specified vase, or to strike some specified note on the piano. She is then recalled, and one or more of the "willers" place their hands lightly on her shoulders. Sometimes nothing happens; sometimes she strays vaguely about; sometimes she moves to the right part of the room and does the thing, or something like the thing, which she has been willed to do.

This looked at first like a promising starting-point for a new branch of scientific inquiry, but it is pretty obvious that the will of the player generally expressed itself in a gentle push. Even when the utmost care is used to maintain the light contact without giving any impulse whatever, it is impossible to lay down the limits of any given subject's sensibility to slight muscular impressions. The difference between one person and another in this respect is very great; on the other hand, the "willer" may be quite unaware of the pressure he applies according as the movements are on the right track or not, and which afford a kind of "Yes" or "No" indication quite sufficient for a clue.

An experiment that is frequently performed is that of thought-transmission without contact. A number of people, seated in a circle, are requested to think of a particular number or article. The subject, who has previously been blindfolded
outside the room, is brought in and led to a seat in the centre of the circle by someone unacquainted with the arranged idea. Certain individuals are so gifted that after a few minutes they will have a vision of the number or the article on which the minds of those present are concentrated.

Such thought-communication between individuals, especially between close relations and persons in sympathy with each other, is indeed nothing uncommon. But to produce such a phenomenon at will is an activity of a kind different from its accidental occurrence.

Undoubtedly communication is possible both in the waking state and the hypnotic state between mind and mind otherwise than through the known channels of the senses. Telepathy is, in effect, a convenient phrase under which we group all those unaccountable phenomena which we attribute, some rightly, some perhaps wrongly, to the action of mind on mind where the two minds do not communicate by the spoken word or by signs or symbols of any visible kind.

It is, of course, impossible for us to know the process employed in the ordinary communication of subjective minds. The communications that telepathy conveys appear to be feelings or impressions which in some cases raise ideas and in some cases do not raise ideas. The degree of clearness of the mental image is largely determined by the intensity of the thought compressed in the act of its transference, whether intentional or not. The state of clearness and the activity displayed by the operative functions of the mind that receives the message will also affect the result. This clearness will chiefly be determined by the state or degree of quietude indulged in during the thinking. The impression made upon the recipient brain is transferred outwards. In other words, there is a hallucination produced, and that hallucination will vary according to the general experiences and knowledge of the recipient. That is why the same message or impression reaching different persons may produce different hallucinations and be interpreted differently.

If we assume that a nerve-force or some other still unknown energy can radiate from the brain, and that such force may travel and strike a brain, which is in tune with it, that is to say, is in a passive state, we have bridged the difficulty of "telepathy."

That an impression striking a passive brain should produce an image which is transferred outward is nothing uncommon, and is often caused by other stimuli—electrical, chemical and mechanical—as evidenced in experiments upon animals. Various forms of auto-intoxication may supply the stimulus in certain diseases, as, for instance, in migraine, epilepsy and hysteria, in which subjective visual phenomena are of frequent occurrence, ranging from flashes of light, plays of colours, to actual hallucinations. The same may also be produced by the alkaloids present in certain poisonous drugs introduced into the system, such as opium, etc. Again, it may be due to some subtle stimulus acting from one part of the brain on another during certain states of consciousness, as in dreams; why not, then, from one brain to another?

Let it be granted that whenever any action takes place in the brain, a chemical change of its substance takes place also, or, in other words, an atomic movement occurs; and let it be granted that no brain action can take place without creating a wave of undulation in the all-embracing ether; why might not such undulations, when meeting with and falling upon duly sensitive substances, produce impressions? And such impressions are "felt," not thought of.

Such oblique methods of communicating between brain and brain would probably but rarely take effect. (I have already mentioned that I have never succeeded in thought-transmission.) The influence would be too minute and subtle to tell upon any brain already preoccupied by action of its own, or on any but brains of extreme, perhaps morbid, susceptibility. But if, indeed, there be radiating from living brains any such streams of vibratory movements, these may well have an
effect even without speech, and be perhaps the *modus operandi* of "the little flash, the mystic hint," of the poet—of that dark and strange sphere of half-experiences which the world has never been without. It is quite open to surmise some sort of analogy to the familiar phenomena of the transmission and reception of vibratory energy.

A swinging pendulum suspended from a solid support will throw into synchronous vibration another pendulum attached to the same support if the period of oscillation of the two be the same; the medium of transmission here being the solid material of the support. One tuning-fork or string in unison with another will communicate its impulse through the medium of the air. Glowing particles of a gas, acting through the medium of the luminiferous ether, can throw into sympathetic vibration cool molecules of the same substance at a distance. It is also said that a permanent magnet brought into a room will throw any surrounding iron into a condition similar to its own, though by what means of communication is not known. Similarly, we may conceive, if we please, that the vibration of molecules of brain-stuff may be communicated to an intervening medium, and so pass under certain circumstances from one brain to another, with a corresponding simultaneity of impressions.

However, when we admit that all thought is connected with cellular vibrations, we comprehend easily by analogy what happens in mental suggestion at a distance; the communicating cerebral zones may be compared with two pianos or two harps which vibrate in unison, or to two tuning-forks which give the same note, and of which the one repeats spontaneously the vibrations given by the other; they may be again compared with the wireless telegraphy stations more or less perfectly attuned. If we suppose two men in whom the cerebral cells vibrate harmoniously, whether in consequence of a bond of kinship or friendship, or because one of them, the magnetiser, has imposed his rhythm on the other, the magnetised, their brains may perhaps be in the same relation to each other as two tuning-forks; all live thought which causes vibration of the one is able to make the other vibrate without impressing the various brains which are on the line of the vibrating wave. The brain of the subject impressed plays the rôle of the resonator; the impression produced will arrive much more easily at the consciousness of the subject as the latter is less disturbed by other impressions. That is why it is important to choose for experiments of this character a time when we believe the subject to be disengaged or half asleep.

In many cases of telepathy, such a long interval has often elapsed between their occurrence and recital that the imagination has had leisure to fill up the gaps of the memory. Others are second or third-hand recitals. Still, there remain a large number of authentic cases worthy of credence to allow us to *keep an open mind on the problem*. Because telepathy is not open to experiment, it is not considered scientific.

In his Presidential Address on Medicine, delivered at the Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association, 1905, Dr. MAUDSLEY expressed himself as follows:

"Without subscribing to the strange stories of telepathy, of the solemn apparition of a person somewhere at the moment of his death a thousand miles away, of the unquiet ghost haunting the scenes of its bygone hopes and endeavours, one may ask whether two brains cannot be so tuned in sympathy as to transmit and receive a subtle transfusion of mind without the mediation of sense. Considering what is implied by the human brain with its countless millions of cells, the complexities of minute structure, its innumerable chemical compositions, and the condensed forces in its microscopic and ultra-microscopic elements, the whole a sort of microcosm of cosmic forces to which no conceivable compound of electric batteries is comparable; considering, again, that from an electric station waves of energy radiate through viewless air to be caught up by a fit receiver a thousand
miles distant, it is not inconceivable that the human brain may send off still more subtle waves to be accepted and interpreted by the fitly tuned receiving brain. Is it, after all, mere fancy that a mental atmosphere of effluence emanates from one person to affect another, either soothing sympathetically or irritating anti-pathetically?"

The brain, from which the thought is sent out or liberated—whether voluntarily or subconsciously—must act with intense force, such as we can imagine is the case when a healthy strong man suffers death by violence on the battlefield, when his entire life-force is sent vibrating through the air, and his thoughts are concentrated with all the power possible upon his sorrowing wife or his child, whom he may never see again, or his father or mother who are anxiously waiting for news from him. On the other hand, the clearness of the impression will depend on the state and degree of quietude of the person receiving it. If the recipient is actively engaged in some occupation so that his or her own brain is "energising," no impression can be made. The passive condition is essential for the successful transmission of telepathic communications. The more perfectly that condition is attained, the better will be the impression. Hence most messages are received in light sleep, or on just going off to sleep, or while resting in a chair in that relaxed state that is very much akin and often leads to sleep. That is why such visions occur most often at night. The brain is then resting, or at least not consciously functioning. During the day we are too busy, or rather our brains are too busy, besides receiving a multitude of subconscious impressions from our active and noisy surroundings, so that such a subtle impression coming from a distance is likely to pass unnoticed.

The impression may be so slight that it is merely "felt" by the person and its effect is merely that of "uneasiness." It need not raise any ideas at the moment. Or the impression may be so intense that a vision of the sender and the scene from which the message was sent may be projected from the brain and appear as real. A mother experiences a sudden anguish and sees her husband or child in peril in clearly defined conditions. She is able to bear witness that this presentiment or vision occurred exactly at the time when the person, being in peril or in danger of death, thought strongly of her and transmitted to her by unconscious mental suggestion the image or the picture of the perilous circumstances in which he was placed. The vision need not be at all accurate. Friends see, as a rule, the person in the clothes that they are familiar with, owing to his having worn them in their company, or they see him dressed in some other more or less undefined garment. The reason for this is that it is some form of brain-energy which strikes the passive recipient, who then interprets the message in accordance with his own recollections. It is the person's spiritual image which is transmitted, and not the image of his clothes, or his beard—which he may have allowed to grow since they saw him last—nor anything material whatever. Only his spiritual image, and possibly an image of the form of danger that threatened him and caused his life-energy to vibrate. An apparition, therefore, is nothing more or less than an intensified telepathic vision. In all cases, the interpretation of the feeling experienced or the vision seen will be in accordance to the experiences and knowledge of the recipient.

Such messages and visions are rare because we are so rarely in a "receptive" state. The noises of civilisation, not ceasing even at night; the fatigue caused by the strenuous work of the day blunting the sensibility of the nerve-cells and causing sleep to be either too deep or to be disturbed by dreams; the attitude of indifference of most people to matters spiritual—all these are factors that make it difficult, if not impossible, for such communications to reach our brain, or to make an impression upon it. Moreover, we are so accustomed to see things that are not, and hear sounds and even voices that have no foundation—in our healthy, active, waking state, as well as in our dreams—that we dismiss them instantaneously as an
error of our senses, whenever they occur, and think no more about them. A telepathic communication has therefore very little chance of being accepted. Some people, again, suffer such fear and anxiety regarding the welfare of those whom they love and know to be exposed to injury that they dismiss the impression as the result of their fancy, and frequently it is proved that their fears were quite groundless. Another objection is the adaptability of the memory in the case of a premonition having been dismissed and again recollected when news came confirming it. These are some of the reasons why, of the thousands of deaths and times of danger to those whom we love and hold most dear, so few authenticated cases of telepathic vision are recorded. Many people will reply: "What a good thing these ethereal communications are rare, for who wants to be disturbed by uncanny visions?" I agree, but this objection is beside the question, which is not whether such experiences are desirable or not, but whether they are possible.

One of the differences between matter and spirit is said to be that the former is perceived through the sense of touch, while the latter is intangible; but this explanation is insufficient when we have persons so sensitive as to have the knowledge of a stranger intuitively, and telepathic apparitions of persons dying are accepted as actual occurrences. One condition for telepathic phenomena is that the recipient should be at the time of the communication in a passive state; hence they are most frequent at night when in a semi-state of slumber. This would also point to mind being a force, the energy sent out by the dying person being all the greater the younger he is and the more violent and unexpected his death. There must be a bond of union and sympathy between the sender and the recipient, that is to say, they must be tuned alike to cause the brain-cells of the recipient to vibrate alike and produce the vision, or feeling that something unpleasant has happened.

The emotions attending a death by violence are necessarily of the most intense character. The desire to acquaint the world with the circumstances attending the tragedy is overwhelming. The message is not for a single individual, but to all whom it may concern. A ghost does not travel from place to place, and show itself promiscuously, but confines its operations to the locality, and generally to the room, in which the death-scene occurred. In the castles of bygone times the walls were thicker, there were fewer and smaller windows, and hardly any ventilation, hence the energy that was created by such a circumstance would cling to the room. Moreover, the room in which a murder occurred would most likely be shut up and never be used again. If, years after, some new tenant inhabits the death-chamber, he may when in a passive state receive an impression, which he translates into the vision of a ghost. Then it becomes known that the room is "haunted." One man is pluckier than the rest, says he will sleep in that room and slay the ghost should he meet him. He waits and waits, sword in hand, but no ghost appears. Then he tires, and just as he is on the point of falling asleep his brain, too, receives an impression—and the ghost stands before him, frightening him out of his wits, like the rest. This is an explanation which has the charm of reasonableness, and I know of no better to account for the occurrences which are authenticated. This theory would also explain another peculiarity of ghosts, that they invariably disappear, never to return, when the building which was the scene of their visitation has been destroyed. Another building may be erected on the same spot, but the ghost never reappears. The powerful emanations at the time of danger may account for the fact that the ghosts which are best authenticated, and which seem to possess the greatest longevity, so to speak—are of those who have died under circumstances of great mental stress or emotion. Another salient characteristic, which seems to be universal, and which possesses the utmost interest and importance in determining the true source of the phantasm, is that it possesses no general intelligence. That is to say, a ghost was never known to have more than one idea or purpose. That one idea or purpose it will follow with the greatest pertinacity, but it utterly ignores
everything else. A ghost is, therefore, nothing more or less than an intensified telepathic vision; its objectivity, power, persistence and permanence being in exact proportion to the intensity of the emotion and desire which called it into being.

From what has been said, it must be evident to the reader that there are forces in human beings, spiritual and other, the presence of which with our present knowledge we can only surmise; and that there are faculties and capacities in the subconscious sphere higher in their nature than those which belong to the conscious life. Some people seem to possess more of them, others less, and some apparently none. Naturally, those who are not gifted with them are the most sceptical. No wonder either that scientists are indifferent to problems that cannot be solved by the aid of instruments and calculations. But by reason of this abstention on the part of scientists, whether through timidity or indifference, these great problems remain unsolved. But the time has come when these questions which exercise the human mind have to be answered. The methods of the physical laboratory are of no avail in such an investigation; but that does not prove their non-existence. Some people will object to the term "forces." Call them what you please, explain the phenomena as you like; but do not ridicule the subject: Go and investigate it!

The subject is of great importance, for if—as shown in this chapter—the mental powers by the process of hypnosis can be accentuated in their activity and new unsuspected capacities manifest themselves in that state, it is possible that certain persons can put themselves in that state by a habit of profound abstraction and may be capable of higher things than in the ordinary conscious state. The Mystics, mentioned in the first part of this work, may have been such men, the inspirations of genius may be due to that habit, and the disclosures of supernormal phenomena of media in spiritualistic séances may be explained on that basis.
CHAPTER XXXIX

THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF MAN

Surveying the contents of this work, the reader will find that, while it contains considerable material concerning the mechanism of human thought, emotion, and conduct, the great problem of the soul is still as mysterious as it was in the early history of man, and all the knowledge we possess regarding it consists of the speculations of metaphysicians and the revelations of religious prophets of ancient times. Science, and even psychology—since it has become experimental—have ceased to concern themselves with the soul of man. In giving some of my reflections on this subject in the succeeding pages, it must be understood that they are purely personal opinions. Having so far kept to strict observations and deductions from fact, I want to avoid making sweeping conclusions in the final chapter of this work.

Before giving my views let me point out:

(1) Although the evidence for brain localisation produced in this work refers largely to very complex states of mind, it is only the elements of our mental qualities which have definite areas of the brain as their physical basis.

(2) These elements comprise not merely intellectual powers, but also the emotions and propensities. In fact, the latter have a directing and preponderating influence over the intellect, and constitute the "character" of man.

(3) These elements of intellect and character are inborn. They are alike in all men, and differ only in inherent capacity of development.

(4) On the basis of several hundred cases it has been shown that it is highly probable that the elements of the intellectual capacities belong to one region of the brain, the elements of the sentiments and affections to another, and the primitive propensities to a third; and that circumscribed lesions of the brain, whether due to injury or disease, affect the mental quality connected with that limited area.

(5) It has also been shown that man can under certain conditions manifest capacities above the normal, that by taking thought or following definite aspirations he can control his inherited tendencies and acquired mental habits, and that he even has the power to initiate, arrest, and change physiological functions. From this fact the conclusion may be drawn that the physical mechanism of the brain and body can be subjected to spiritual influences under certain conditions and by appropriate training.

The wonder of man's spiritual nature has not grown less with the years which have brought increasing knowledge. Modern science has swept away many superstitions, but it has brought the infinite mystery of things still more clearly home to our human hearts.

By the term "spiritual" is usually meant the opposite to physical, but it has to be remembered that man has always attributed to spirit that which he could not explain on a physical basis, and that under spiritual may be included, not supernatural or supernormal, but merely "unknown energies." Of course, science can take account only of such phenomena as can be reduced to laws. But laws mean nothing but regularity of action; they are not creative forces, but only the rules by which such forces act. For example, when we speak of the law of heredity, we have
explained nothing. We have only given a name to the marvellous fact that some potency lies in each seed or egg which causes it to produce a plant or an animal from which the seed or egg came. No explanation is given of this power. Some undiscovered force or energy is there, and since forces are not visible except in their results, man regards those forces which apply to his own nature as spiritual. Supposing, even, we could explain the process of heredity, the natural laws which govern plant and animal life, and the complex machinery of the body governed by the brain and the nervous system, these processes and laws would be no less marvellous.

THE PROBLEM OF "LIFE"

Life manifests itself in two ways—as structure and as activity; but it is a living structure and a living activity. Organic matter is life matter. The whole body—all the organs, the bones and muscles, and even the skin, the different parts of the eye and of the brain, are made up of live cells. The whole body is a vast and harmoniously co-operating aggregation of cells, each of which is in a sense a vital unit, with a life of its own, relatively independent of the rest of the body. The whole body consists of living structures with individual energies; but it nevertheless preserves its own personality. It does not become real matter, as the word is generally understood, until the cessation of life.

We cannot speak of real matter when we are dealing with organic substances. Is the liver matter? Is the body as a whole matter? In sound health we have no consciousness of either. Except for the weight of the clothes, we should not know we have a body. We have to touch it with the hands to become aware of it. Therefore, so long as there is unhindered vital activity in an organic body, it is a live thing, not matter. And even if it were real matter, we now know that matter is not the inert helpess clay in the hands of the potter that our ancestors believed it to be, but that tremendous energies are locked away in the minutest atom. It is no longer possible to talk about solid matter acted upon by mysterious forces; the mysterious forces may almost be said to constitute matter. Matter is alive. Matter, as we now know, consists of innumerable "electrons" and "ions" in constant motion. Do not the X-rays show matter to be almost ethereal? On the other hand, so-called spirit cannot be contemplated with our senses except as having form—except as "materialised."

Science does not deal with life, but with biological facts. The two essentially distinctive properties of living matter are the power of growth and the power of reproduction. All living things grow by intussusception and multiply by division, whereas these properties are not found in any non-living thing. Life propagates life; life is eternal. We all develop from one single cell. The elementary living organism, when it divides by fission, gives rise ultimately to an infinitely larger mass of living matter composed of units retaining the character of the ancestors. The original cell contains in itself a mechanism capable of reproducing countless millions of complex cell mechanisms in their proper spatial and other relations to one another. Now, the question is, what is the power which enables this germ-cell to build up the body and give us all our physical and mental attributes, our personal characteristics and distinct individuality? What is the force that gives this bit of protoplasm the capability of becoming a living, thinking, and loving being? We do not know.

Anything that is physical can be made from other material things by man. Nothing approaching to the cell of a living creature has ever yet been made.

The first condition of the power of growth is a power of assimilation—a power whereby a living thing is enabled to appropriate from its surroundings materials which can subsequently be converted into the protoplasm of its own body. This accounts for the great characteristic of protoplasm, namely, its instability. It is
THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF MAN

constantly in motion; it is continually undergoing decomposition and reconstruction. It assimilates food from its surroundings, takes up matter and energy constantly, and gives them off by an automatic process. Nutrition is a primal necessity. A life-cell must get material to live, or else must die. Living matter has another peculiarity: it is composed of the same elements as dead matter, but though these elements constantly enter and leave it, the living organism, nevertheless, retains its individuality and activities. The response to any stimulus is determined in relation to the life of the organism as a whole.

The living body consists of many organs—brain, heart, lungs, stomach, kidneys, etc.—all separate yet all one. All separate, so that each has its own method of work and times of rest. Even the design of one’s finger-creases, one’s voice, and one’s handwriting are individual. There are probably in the whole universe no two living beings exact in counterpart. Yet all our parts are one. Through it all runs a living energy which keeps us alive, and death comes to it as a catastrophe by the fault or decay of its subordinate ministers—the brain, heart, lungs, or other structure. Life seems a continuous adjustment of relations in an organism in relation to its environment. To maintain that adjustment it requires individual exertion. Disturb that adjustment, and we get disorder or disease; destroy it, and we have death.

The human body has been represented as a machine, but it is a machine only in a certain sense. It is a living, automatic, self-reproducing, self-regulating, self-repairing machine, unlike any other. Behind every other machine there is a living being who has made it and started it, without whom it would not exist or go. Nature repairs; man can only guide the repair and hasten it. As vitality decreases, so the tendency to repair diminishes. One other distinction: the human body profits by experience; no machine does so.

The human body has also been represented as one great laboratory, in which the most varied processes—assimilation, respiration, secretion, excretion, generation, sensation—go on harmoniously to maintain a unity of being, though each is liable to incalculable disorders. Man’s life undoubtedly consists of vast chemical and physical processes, but not entirely so. Death does not stop these processes, for they go on more briskly than ever in the corpse after the withdrawal of that something that held together and harmonised them and kept them in check. When this process, which we call life, ceases to act, the body or bodily organ resolves itself into its natural, inorganic elements, and the tendency to individualisation is destroyed. We can buy pepsin at the chemist’s and digest beef with it in an egg-cup; but the human mind can retard or accelerate the same bodily process, and this is an element which eludes chemical and physical investigation. The physico-chemical formula do not suffice for a complete description of the vital function. They have explained, no doubt, separate processes, but they have not explained the way in which they work into one another’s hands, so that a unified effective life results.

Just as the soul has been lowered from its spiritual conception to something that can be pulled to pieces in a dissecting-room, so chemists have tried to produce life and have failed. If life is solely a chemical process, how is it that we can by mere thought retard its physical and chemical actions or accelerate them, by cheerfulness raise and prolong its activity, and by gloominess depress and shorten it? A thought, an emotion, may prostrate a man as effectually as a blow on his head from a hammer.

If life is solely a chemical process, how do mental states affect nutrition, digestion, respiration, circulation, secretion, reproduction, etc.? The biologist can explain the necessity for breathing and the regulation of breathing, for example; but not what produced an emotion which heightens or diminishes that activity. The effect of depressing emotions (anxiety, fear, melancholy) appears to arrest the nutritive energy of the brain and nerve centres, so that the trophic supply to the bodily organs and muscular structures is diminished, the body gets thinner and
thinner, and the man may die, even when feeding normally. The opposite example is that of people suffering from a serious disease struggling successfully to get well, or to keep alive, for a certain period until they have accomplished a task which seems to them necessary before giving up life.

The explanation of life, as far as science is concerned, is bound to be a physico-chemical one. A vital force cannot be discovered anywhere. Yet, to explain the action of the bodily organs, some form of energy must be assumed. Life consists primarily in an impulse to capture energy, to store energy, and to release energy. The germ itself, which is perpetual, is a highly complex centre of potential energy; and the organism it gives rise to, which is perishable, is another complex of energy. The question can only be whether life is an energy different from any other known energy. Does not the physician take for granted that there is some energy at work—an energy which he cannot define—which quickens or diminishes the activity of the bodily organs, when he tries to raise the constitutional force of the patient, his "vital energy," his power to overcome, or resist, or prevent disease, by various measures? Does not the success of a surgical operation to some extent depend on the vital energy of the patient? Regarded in this light, death is the loss of vital energy, the inability to resist antagonistic elements.

The biologist may reply that the maintenance of life consumes no energy, that life borrows from the external world all the energy which it expends, and that the functions of the body merely transform that energy. For example, the muscle is not destroyed in its functional activity, but it grows. The same is true of the brain. The biologist can measure the shortening of a muscle, the pull it produces, the oxygen it absorbs, the electrical changes which accompany its excitation. Yet those who regard life as some form of energy will point to the fact that, having done so, we are no nearer to understanding a mental act, or a variety of mental acts totally opposed to one another, which can set the same muscle into activity. The biologist describes the structure and activities of parts of the body, but not of the organic whole, just as the experimental physiologist and the experimental psychologist describe parts of the organs and mental functions, but not body or mind as a whole.

**Biology does not explain either the cause or purpose of life.** The biologist describes physical and chemical action, but that is not the life itself. The physicist may make the dead man kick, as he may make little fragments of iron dance—in both cases by the excitation of electricity—but the action is not life in either case. He can increase or he may stop life's actions; but he, so far, has failed to manufacture life.

When life becomes purely chemical it is no longer life, for life is not merely a growing and decaying; it is a struggle against adverse forces—degradation from within and destruction from without. Altogether, **there is more in life and mind than can be discovered in the laboratory.**

For example, Professor ARTHUR THOMSON, writing from the biological standpoint in one of the quarterly journals in 1911, instanced the remarkable story of the eels in Northern Europe, which, beginning life in the silent depths of the mid-ocean, migrate as little three-inch larvae to the rivers of the Eastern Baltic, three thousand miles from their birthplace. Several years later these eels, now full-grown, set out on an exciting journey to the far-away spawning-grounds, never to return. Can the physiology which is only applied physics and chemistry explain all this? asks Professor Thomson. Does it even help to make the biological fact of migration more intelligible?

**CONSCIOUSNESS**

The new-born babe is a kind of vegetative animal, whose existence alternates between drinking and sleeping, and whose consciousness, if any, is very vague and
develops gradually—from subconsciousness to consciousness, and from consciousness to self-consciousness. There is a brief period at the beginning of its life when the infant is unconscious of anything but a few sensations, and a longer period elapses before it is conscious of the outer world as distinct from itself.

**Consciousness is not a faculty or substance, but a quality or attribute incidental to mental processes.** Psychic states, being always changing, we ought really not to speak of consciousness, but only of states of consciousness. Yet self-consciousness has the character of continuity, being connected with the past through the memory; otherwise there would be no personality. Self-consciousness is the feeling we have that the mental processes belong to our personality. It arises from the reflections which go on between the individual creature and its environment as it adapts itself to it and adapts it to itself, waxing with the progressive increase of reflection in the ascending scale of animal life to its highest expressions in man. The ego by itself means self-consciousness, i.e., consciousness of consciousness. As BORIS SIDIS, the well-known American psychologist, says: "The central point of the ego or of personality lies in the fact of the thought knowing and critically controlling itself in the very process of thinking, in the very moment of that thought's existence."

The common notion of consciousness is taken entirely from this self-consciousness or reflective consciousness. That is how the older psychologists limited mind to conscious states; but we can have thoughts and not be conscious of them, so that any theory of mind is bound to involve unconscious states. **Consciousness is only a phase of our psychical life, but not the psychical life itself.** So far as there is consciousness, there is certainly mental activity; but it is not true that so far as there is mental activity, there is consciousness. Consciousness may exist in different degrees of intensity or it may be absent altogether. There is a thousand times more below the surface of consciousness than there is above. We flatter ourselves that it is we who are thinking; whereas the thinking is within us, goes on all the time. *We do the thinking only when absolutely conscious.*

**Mind and consciousness are not synonymous or co-extensive,** for during a particular conscious state all the rest of the mind is dormant. Consciousness knows only the *result* of the work done in the unknown laboratory beneath it.

There is no conscious activity without a much greater unconscious activity. When I sit down to write this essay, it is only the result of my thinking that I put down on paper. The right experiences and ideas come before my mind—become conscious from unconscious regions—from former conscious events and thoughts since relegated to the depths of unconsciousness. All our latent memories are stored in our subconscious mind. Not a millionth part of the mental possessions of an educated man exists in his consciousness at any one time. We may forget objects and events—that is to say, we may dismiss them from our consciousness—but they are stored up in our subconsciousness to the end of our days. We may be able to call them into consciousness by some association when we wish to do so, or they may flash into consciousness for some reason, without any effort of ours; but at other times the mind is unconscious of their existence.

I need only call attention to the well-known phenomenon of "trying to recollect" some name or event. Sometimes no effort of the will can do it, but we wait, and by and by, when we are engaged in something else, the desired idea springs up out of the unconscious. Our decisions in great matters as well as in small show how we trust our unconscious processes. Life would be too short for the humblest activities if we must bring into consciousness all the arguments, *pro* and *con,* for an act, and consider its bearings and results. A large part of our daily activities is governed by motives and processes that never rise into clear consciousness. Consciousness not only blunders, but it is too slow. The man who has to think of his manners is not always polite, for he does not think quickly enough.
The man whose morality has not become automatic will sometimes be surprised in a fault. Even in the most important matters of life we distrust consciousness. We wish to sleep over a matter, not only that our conscious processes may be clearer, but that we may have the help of that unformulated knowledge which, at most, can be said to be only in the background of consciousness. In important matters we often feel confident that a certain course is the right one—as we know an absent road or a face without being able to describe it—but cannot formulate the ground for decision in words. What is termed "common sense" is nothing but a substratum of experiences out of which our judgments flow, while the experiences themselves are hidden away in unconscious regions.

If everything that exists in the mind existed there consciously, or if every time that an idea occurred to the mind all the other ideas that had at any time been associated with it came along with it, and a selection had to be consciously made of the right one, inconvenience and loss of time could not fail to result. In some persons, from habit or lack of proper training, an idea in the mind immediately recalls a number of other ideas, having more or less, and sometimes very little, connection with it, thus distracting the mind with a multitude of thoughts, making the selection of the best a conscious act, producing hesitation and indecision, and causing loss of time. The selection of the right thoughts should take place unconsciously.

The rapidity with which subconscious ideas can pass through the mind is truly marvellous and is shown by the inconceivably quick succession of transactions in our dreams. For example, when we are awakened by the jarring of a door which is opened into our room, we sometimes dream a whole history of burglary or fire in the very instant of awakening. We can dream more in a minute than we can act in a day, and the great rapidity of the train of thought in sleep is one of the principal reasons why we do not always recollect what we dream.

There are many events which are so completely forgotten that no effort of the will can revive them, and the statement of them calls up no reminiscences, which may nevertheless be reproduced with intense vividness under certain physical conditions. Thus persons in the delirium of fever have been known to speak in a language which they had learned in their childhood, but which for many years had passed from their memory; or to repeat with apparent accuracy discourses to which they had listened a long time previously, but of which before the fever they had no recollection. They have even been known to repeat accurately long passages from books in foreign tongues, of which they never had any understanding and had no recollection in health, but which they had casually heard recited many years before.

In the course of my hypnotic practice I have several times revived the memory of a long-forgotten event in a hypnotised subject, and sometimes of a piece of poetry of which the subject had no recollection in the normal state and which I had not heard or read before, thus excluding the possibility of transference of thought. The most remarkable cases, however, are those of persons who have been resuscitated from drowning and who have reported that they had a sudden revelation of all the events of their past life presented to them with the utmost minuteness and distinctness just before consciousness left them.

Some psychologists argue that there is no subconsciousness; but we have no other expression for those experiences, thoughts, and emotions which are not in consciousness at any given moment. Whether we admit an absolute unconsciousness or a relative unconsciousness or subconsciousness, a subliminal consciousness, or a secondary consciousness, or a fringe of consciousness, does not matter much at the present stage, so long as we are agreed that conscious experiences are relegated to another unknown region, or, at least, do not remain in consciousness, but are capable of being revived in consciousness. We know that the man of genius
derives his brilliant thoughts from that mysterious source, the inventor and discoverer his guidance, the poet his inspiration, the religious man his beliefs.

We are in a flux. Attention is centred only on an immediate object, on one object at the time; all the rest is in subconsciousness. Consciousness is therefore awareness. Things we are not aware of, we are not conscious of.

Acts which are at first executed slowly, and with full consciousness and attention, become gradually less and less perceptible as they gain in ease and rapidity by repetition, till they fall below the minimum necessary for consciousness, and become unconscious. The more often we repeat a thought or act, the less vivid—the less conscious—it becomes, until an unconscious habit is formed, which tends to reproduce itself spontaneously, so that as much conscious effort is needed to prevent its recurrence as formerly was necessary to produce it. I repeat, that if all our mental and physical operations were performed as painfully and as consciously as at first—walking, writing, etc.—life could scarcely fail to be a burden. Our mental progress, then, is in the direction of our becoming unconscious, or largely unconscious, of many of our activities.

An expert accountant, for example, can sum up almost with a single glance of his eye a long column of figures. He can tell the sum with unerring certainty, while at the same time he is unable to recollect any one of the figures of which that sum is composed; and yet nobody doubts that each of these figures has passed through his mind. It is on account of the rapidity of the progress that he is unable to recollect the various steps of it, and only the result appears by a sort of inspiration before consciousness.

On the other hand, it seems to me a question whether we are ever completely unconscious (notwithstanding RIBOT'S reasoning on this point, "Diseases of Personality," p. 10). As regards sleep, for example, all we can say is that we have no memory of what has passed in that state when awake again. Even under an anaesthetic thinking can go on, as in nitrous oxide anaesthesia; and even in chloroform narcosis, unless very deep, dreaming appears to take place, for patients sometimes utter sounds or talk, though they are unable to feel and have no recollection on regaining consciousness.

Sometimes persons anaesthetised preliminary to a surgical operation have no recollection afterwards of what occurred between the time when they entered the operating theatre and took the anaesthetic, although they may have carried on a conversation with the doctors for some minutes before lying down on the operating table. This is called retro-active amnesia. But if they have no recollection of conscious speech and doings before the anaesthesia, what proof is there that there was not some brain activity during the anaesthesia?

My observation of epileptics leads me to believe that there is some mental activity during the attack, and not merely in their post-epileptic condition, before they regain consciousness.

The fundamental character of consciousness is distinction. We are conscious inasmuch as we distinguish, and our consciousness becomes more vivid the more clearly we distinguish. In order to be distinguished—to be conscious—a sensation, thought, or motion requires to be of a certain magnitude or intensity, and to persist for a certain time.

We are constantly receiving impressions, thoughts are incessantly passing unperceived, because they are not of sufficient magnitude or intensity to make themselves felt. If a book is read very quickly, so that time is not allowed for the sight stimuli to influence the brain, there is no memory of what is read, because there is no consciousness of it; and when speech is too rapid and blurred, there is a similar absence of consciousness and memory, because of the want of time and intensity.
Yet, though we are not conscious of what we glanced over hurriedly, some passage or other may have registered itself on our brain, and spring up one day like an inspiration, only to disappoint us when we come to know that it is not original.

We have already mentioned that, as a rule, it is only the result of a mental event that we are conscious of, the actual origin and working remain obscure. Even in the conscious act of perception through our senses there is an unconscious process of reproduction exercising an influence. Indeed, even in the cleverest of us, in the ordinary mental operations of our daily life, there is not so much consciousness as is commonly assumed. All things are known to us only as they appear in our consciousness; which appearance, so far as we know, tells us nothing of the reality. All that we know of what is outside of ourselves is only more or less probable inference. That is why we cannot trust our consciousness and the liability of all of us at one time or another to be subjects of hallucinations.

Take an extreme case, that of a man suffering from delusions of persecution. He is positively certain that he sees an enemy where no enemy is; he may hear a voice threatening him when there is no voice. He cannot be brought by the concurrent testimony of everybody about him to recognise his error. It is a physical impossibility for him to doubt the evidence of his own consciousness, because his consciousness shares in the derangement of the mental state which it mirrors when that state is active. When it is not active, he is not conscious of his enemy's presence or plots, but thinks and acts like any other sane person.

An act of attention—that is, an act of concentration—is necessary for every exertion of consciousness. The more we concentrate our attention on any particular subject the less we notice other concurrent impressions, and the less we notice also our internal sensations. For example, in times of real danger the body may feel no pain, no matter how severe the injury. When the excitement is gone, then the sensations are felt.

Consciousness runs in personal streams, so long as the brain is stable. As the brain grows, decays, or is influenced by various agents, so will consciousness vary; but the main character, the main self, always remains behind these variations—even in cases of multiple personality. Dissociations of consciousness occur in hysteria, epilepsy, and artificially in hypnotism; but all these conditions are only superficial and temporary, the real personality is not destroyed so long as the brain does not suffer permanent injury.

Consciousness depends on brain activity for its very existence; but the fact that a whiff of chloroform deprives us of consciousness proves only that consciousness is dependent on our breathing air, but it does not prove that consciousness is dependent on brain processes. Still, it is a fact of comparative anatomy that consciousness increases with the complexity of the nervous system. With increased size of brain we have varied functions, with strength of feeling in proportion to size and quality; until in man we have all the variety of sense, thought, intellect, emotion, and propensity, all of which are modes of sentence or feeling, and increase our consciousness.

One man has a perfect consciousness of the pleasure derived from the beauty of colours; while another is totally unconscious of any such pleasure. One is conscious of the delight which the reading of poetry and works of highly-wrought fiction affords, while another is not only insensible to the flights of the imagination, but, from a sense of imperative duty, condemns the indulgence in them. Some are conscious of a spirit of benevolence in them, a disposition to do acts of kindness to their fellow-men; others are bound up in self, and have no consciousness of the existence of any power to perform an act that has no reference to their own good. They despise men who cannot live by their own exertions, and they are above giving to others what they do not ask for themselves. Some are conscious of strong
THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF MAN

passions and are strangers to the mild and amiable virtues of our nature; while others, those who reason without feeling, and feel without passion, are conscious only of those sources of action which originate in the perfect quietude of the soul. Their consciousness affords no evidence that the passions necessarily exist, or that others are naturally subjected to them.

Consciousness leads the musical person to regard music as an art highly calculated to promote the happiness and refinement of society. The unmusical man, with equal claims to good sense, is conscious of no delight or gratification in hearing it; it is even disagreeable to him, and the other man's estimation of its value not only surprises him, but even begets a sort of contempt for his opinion. The same is true of all the various capacities. An individual with great intellectual endowments by nature is conscious of a greater variety of thought, reasoning, and relation than one whose natural talents are more circumscribed. The former comprehends all propositions with ease, and is conscious of the existence of a power to show their truth or fallacy; but the latter is only conscious of his inability to solve a difficult problem, or of a doubt as to its really meaning anything, because of his want of the necessary power of discernment. Consciousness varies, then, according to our mental capacities. The consciousness of a saint is bound to be different in quality and dignity from that of the sinner or the savage, because the mental contents of the one are very different from those of the other.

Our inherited dispositions—our primary innate capacities, rudimentary emotions, and instinctive tendencies—are all unconscious. Only after their manifestation, by reflection on our impulses and conduct, do we become aware of them, and can determine to control them in future. For example, I cannot say, "I am going to 'fear' now." The youth attracted by the maiden does not know why he follows her; he is unconscious of the primary racial instinct which urges him.

Those impressions strike us most strongly which appeal to our characteristic dispositions; the others remain on the fringe of consciousness. Consciousness does not tell us why some motives have greater attraction for us than others; we can only say because we are thus constituted, because such is our character. It is only on reflection after the act that most men realise the motive which prompted them to certain conduct. Many men are misers, ambitious, suspicious, conceited, and so forth, without being conscious of the fact; but their fellow-men know it.

The conscious content is of a complex nature and rests upon conscious and unconscious elements. The unconscious differs from the conscious in that it is uncensored; consciousness is the censor of the unconscious. It is by directing our consciousness to the unconscious dispositions, which supply our motives and give rise to habits, that we learn to control them. When we say, for example, that a man is conceited, we do not mean thereby that he could not appear otherwise. We mean only that in his automatic behaviour he manifests the signs of conceit. If he were to direct his attention to the defect in his character, and had the desire to change his manner, he could succeed in altering his conduct; first consciously, and, after a time, he would acquire an unconscious habit of a different kind. Only when taken by surprise, in exhaustion or illness, might the original tendency assert itself again.

We all see the same world objectively, but according to our unconscious minds we look through different spectacles, and the scenery suggests to us different ideas. The unconscious elements are the basis of character, and condition conduct to a far greater extent than the view of life that we express, and by which we believe that we are actuated. Education of the conscious self tends to uniformity in all civilised people. The unconscious self, however, which is built up out of that countless multitude of unconscious impressions and their recurrence coming from their surroundings, customs, languages, national types, physical effects of climate, and many other sources, is widely different. They create an unconscious self in every person, and make him not merely a representative of his times, but produce in him the qualities peculiar to his country, to his race, and to the class in society to which
he belongs, thus stamping him at once with their limitations and idiosyncrasies.

For example, an "educated" Frenchman's opinions—whether he be a merchant, a professional man, or an artisan—may be in no wise different from those of an educated Englishman or of an educated American in the same position of life; he is, as we properly say, "a man of the world." But when, for any reason—emotional, for instance, or through depression or illness, or from a sudden surprise—his conscious self is weakened or fails him, his unconscious self asserts itself, and the national characteristics appear in spite of "intellectual" culture.

We have, then, two states of mind: the conscious or objective, and the subconscious or subjective. As a rule, the conscious state of mind and the subconscious state of mind work together, and there is no dividing line between them; so that we feel we are only one personality. Both depend on the organisation of the brain with which we happen to be endowed.

THE NATURE OF MIND

Just as life is some form of energy, so mind is some form of energy; but the two are not identical. Mind can only be where there is life; but life is not mind. We must have life before we have mind. There are many things alive that have no mind, but there is no mind without life. When mind is apparently in abeyance, as in anaesthesia, there is still life.

The soul and mind being regarded as identical, mind was held to be an entity. But how can a spiritual entity undergo so many variations? How can mind be at one time anger, then suspicion, then acquisitiveness, then veneration, filial affection, musical capacity, arithmetical ability, or perception of locality? If these various psychic activities are merely so many particular states of mind, how do they unite in one personality? And are we not producing in effect the old "faculty psychology"? Mind cannot be a faculty—a little mind in itself—and a binding essence at the same time so as to produce the oneness of personality. For the manifestation of mind nervous centres are necessary, and the force playing on these centres can produce diverse and opposing mental manifestations (see Chapters XXIX.-XXXI.); but these mental manifestations cannot be diverse and opposed to one another, and a unity at the same time. As mentioned already, consciousness runs in personal streams. Whether we think, love, or are angry, we have always the feeling of individuality. It is we who think, love, and exercise all the other psychic activities; just as it is we who breathe, not the lungs; we who run, not our legs. The brain may reproduce impressions, but we recognise them. A man can judge himself, his thoughts, capacities, feelings, and actions; it is he who judges, not his brain. If he were purely a piece of mechanism, he could not be at the same time a spectator.

Supposing a person shed a tear on seeing so much deceit and cruelty, so much loss of valuable lives, so much intolerance and hate, as a result of the recent war, which was to end war, which was to be a war for freedom, it would be found on analysis to be only a drop of water containing a little saline matter. That is all that the chemist and microscopist can find in the tear. They cannot discover the emotion that caused the tear, the affection of mind in virtue of which the tear was shed, and, therefore, the physico-chemical explanation of mental manifestations must be inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading.

The products of thought are unlimited and therefore purely spiritual. If mind were limited, if it were an entity, it would have dimensions; but however much is put into the mind, there is always room for more. Inventions originate in ideas, so do artistic creations. They have at first no external existence. Physical and chemical
activity may have a part in it, but do not explain it. The brain elements for such conceptions must be in existence, but the result is a spiritual conception. Just as natural substances become by synthesis transformed into other substances, so the mental elements, which depend on the functional activity of groups of brain-cells, are actually transformed by combination into mental complexes different from those elements from which they started. The synthetic product of our thoughts is not the same as the elements; as little as water is identical with two elements of hydrogen and one element of oxygen. It is neither the one nor the other, but a new product. The mechanistic conception of life and mind is like regarding a symphony as vibrations of atmospheric waves. So it is, but that is not all. The mechanistic conception of life and mind does not explain the spirit which animated the heroes of science, who refused to submit their reason to authority, the political leaders who contended for the rights of man, the philosophers who championed liberty, the religious enthusiasts who fought for the right of private judgment and the freedom of the individual conscience. If such a wonderful synthesis as Shakespeare's literary creation is simply the result of physico-chemical mechanism, then we ought to have many Shakespeares, but there has only been one such genius.

No physical or chemical fact can explain man's conception of an Almighty Father. True, human beings with arrested brain growth may be incapable of such a conception; a blow on the head may destroy the capacity in another; still, the conception is spiritual. The brain element has the same relation to it as the eye has to sight. The eye is an essential organ to seeing, but there is no limit to what we may see with our eyes or may conceive with our brains. Moreover, man has the power to change purely animal instincts into refined and lofty qualities; for example, the sexual propensity into the spiritual affection of love. Man is therefore a spiritual as well as a material being. By the power of his spirit he can, to some extent at least, elevate, control, and direct the mental, physical, and chemical elements of his being, can modify heredity, influence his environment, and shape his course towards a definite goal of existence.

If mind were an entity, it should be the same in the infant as in the adult and in old age, but nobody is constantly the same self. Mind is a flux just as life is a flux. The only wonderful thing is that we preserve our "identity" in these constant changes. We vary not only at different periods of life and in different circumstances, but also on different days according to the state of the brain and bodily condition—sanguine or gloomy, frank or reserved, apathetic or energetic. We feel, indeed, that there is a continuity through all these changes, but this is because we can recognise by means of our memory connecting links between our successive activities.

Psychologists took some time in discovering that there is a relation between psychical activity and the brain; for consciousness does not reveal to us the existence of a brain, gives no information regarding the operations of the brain, or of the functions of any other internal organ. Man, in general, in the state of health, has no consciousness of the existence or uses of the brain; and in consequence of this want of consciousness, psychologists have for so long ascribed the phenomena of sensation, emotion, and thought exclusively to a spiritual entity which they have named—the mind. But we are not conscious even of having a mind; we are conscious only of mental states and acts.

Let anyone reflect on the vast number of sensations which strike our brain, and the innumerable reproductions and associations that go on all the time, often even while we are sleeping. Let him reflect on the number of his impulses to do certain things, mental and physical, and the elaborate apparatuses with which he is endowed for that purpose—it must appear wonderful to him that he feels nothing of the existence of all these various departments of nervous energy, and remains even
unconscious that he has a brain. We know that we breathe and digest, but we are left to find out, by observation, both the manner and the mechanism; and it is the same with the brain. That we are not conscious of the various functions of the organic life of the body which go on in quiet harmony with the nicest adaptations of means to ends throughout its complex mechanism is presumably because they have no direct relations to the external world, but are practically self-contained within their own domain, their rhythmical action being mainly with one another. We know nothing of the existence of the machinery, unless it becomes disturbed in one or other of its functions, and the message it then sends to the brain is felt by us as "pain."

Mind being regarded as an entity, this view has given rise to various theories of the relation between mind and brain.

(1) We have seen that it has been held by materialists that thoughts were secretions of the brain. If this were so, thoughts would be lost as soon as expressed. The brain does not secrete thought, for no secreting organ in our system creates that which it secretes; it only separates and forms into new combinations the substances which have entered it, and there is nothing in the constitution of either the blood or the neurones that can be converted into thought, unless it be the nervous energy transmitted to the central organs. If thought were matter, matter would supply it. But thought can only be fed by thought. No mechanical or chemical theory can explain the creation of an original thought—say the creation of a poem, or of a beautiful piece of music before it is written down. True, a brain is the necessary instrument, and in some way retains the production of thought, poem, or melody.

(2) A more moderate view is that psychical activities are mere functions of the brain. This view, like the purely materialistic view, does not explain how it is that notwithstanding our brain organisation, which should determine certain acts, we are able consciously to control mental manifestations, and even to manifest tendencies opposite to our natural inclinations. Indeed, all education depends upon this fact, whether education of children or the education of the adult, in the reform of morbid habits and tendencies, by what is commonly called "suggestion."

(3) Then there is the purely spiritualistic view, which rejects the necessity of material instruments and presumes mind to be an entity alike in all men. But it is through our mind that we know of the existence of matter. Whether a man is a materialist or a spiritualist frequently depends on the circumstance that the one is observing himself and the other his fellows.

(4) Another view is that of monism, i.e., that mental activities and brain activities are one and the same thing, or as different states of one thing. According to this view, nothing is psychical without being at the same time physical; and nothing is physical without being psychical, just as there is no matter without energy, and no energy without matter.

(5) Another view is that of interaction. This assumes that the mind and the nervous system are found in juxtaposition, that the nervous system can influence mind, and that mind in turn can influence the nervous system. Interacting dualism postulates a mind acting on the body, just as the body has certain inherent activities independent of the mind.

(6) Others regard psychical activities as running parallel with brain activities, with no connection of cause and effect between them, never interfering with each other, yet invariably occurring in correlation, thus supposing an irresponsibility on the part of both. According to this view, which is Leibniz's "pre-established harmony" pure and simple, the physical and psychical processes are equally real, but there is no causal relation between them; the two series of events, the psychical processes of any mind and the physical processes of the brain with which they are associated, merely accompany one another in time; their relation is one of simple concomitance only; the two series of events run parallel to one another in time, as
two railway trains running side by side on a double track, or two rays of light projected towards the same infinitely distant point, run parallel with one another in time and space. But in the case of brain and mind, this fails to explain the connecting link, how this parallelism is brought about.

(7) Another view is that mind activities occur simply during the functioning of the brain. This is the most reserved statement and leaves the nature of mind outside discussion.

All these views regarding mind as an entity fail to explain what starts the impulse in the brain-cell. Some will answer a chemical process occurs in the brain-cell. But what made it occur just then and in that way? What is the peculiarity of a brain-cell that transforms a sensation into an idea? What enables it to receive the sound of words and respond with feelings of love or anger? Is it the brain-cell that remembers or do I remember? I can recall at will at this moment not only different items in my present history, but every variety of knowledge I have ever acquired— it is I who do that, who set this mechanism going, not a mind entity, nor a particular brain-cell, which sets it going. To speak of memory as a mere matter of successive nervous events is something like saying that in a phonograph the record on the second half of the cylinder was able to recognise its own likeness to, or difference from, the record on the first part of the cylinder.

We have got no nearer to the solution of these problems since man first began to philosophise and notwithstanding a great deal of scientific research. What is there to show the anatomist dissecting the brain or holding a section under the microscope that a particular convolution of brain-cells is agitated in love, fear, or anger, or involved in the production of a sentiment or in the exercise of logic? On the other hand, the physiologist deals only with stimuli, excitability, and response. Physical stimuli result in physical responses; all experimental brain physiology has utterly failed to disclose even the crudest element of mental phenomena.

We must think of mind, not as a self-existing, self-acting entity, but as an energy, working on the brain-cells.

But if we regard mind as analogous to a force or energy, it will enable us to surmount the difficulties we have just discussed, and to explain why we have failed so far in locating mental functions; for we cannot discover a force by dissection.

If mind be a force or energy, we can observe its actions on the brain in health and disease, just as we observe the manifestations of other forces of nature without knowing what these forces or energies are. Take, for example, electricity—it is invisible, intangible, immaterial, and in its essence unknowable, thus corresponding with the nature of mind. Just as electricity is an unknown force, so the nature of mind-force is not known and only its manifestation can be observed.

If we regard mind as an entity, we are obliged to make an immaterial agency produce physical effects—the mind using the brain as a man plays the piano, and causing all the mental operations—and we still have to invent a force by which the mind is able to do so. But mind being regarded as analogous to a force or energy, it is no more wonderful that it should produce physical, i.e., organic effects, than that physical agencies should produce changed manifestations of the psychical activities. Regarded in this light, the effects of thoughts and emotions on the body are more easily comprehensible.

Mind is related to organic matter as force is related to inorganic matter. Force moves inert matter, and mind moves a living substance. The brain is not a mere machine, but a composite living instrument, the most wonderful structure in the universe. A machine wears out by constant use; but the nervous system under normal activity tends to grow.

Mind as an entity fails to explain the manifestation of dissociated, double or multiple personality. But we can imagine mind as a force unable to act on parts of
UNEXPLORED POWERS OF THE MIND

the brain owing to some localised physical change, thus annulling parts of memory, certain feelings and dispositions, while the remainder of the brain is free to act. Whole areas of memory and characteristic qualities of the person may remain latent for a time, while other elementary qualities, which had never been exercised, are stimulated to activity, producing an entire change of the personality. If we assume mind to be a force or energy, we can understand how multiple consciousness can be produced at one time, as, for example, in playing music.

"Two different sets of hieroglyphics have to be read at once, and the right hand has to be guided to attend to one of them, the left to another. All the ten fingers have their work assigned as quickly as they can move. The mind—or something which does duty as mind—interprets scores of A sharps and B flats and C naturals into black ivory keys and white ones; crotchets and quavers and demisemiquavers, rests, and all the mysteries of music. The feet are not idle, but have something to do with the pedals; and if the instrument be a double action harp (or an organ) a task of pushings and pullings more difficult than that of the hands has to be performed. And all this time the performer—the conscious performer—is in the eleventh heaven of artistic rapture at the results of all this tremendous business, or perchance lost in a flirtation with the individual who turns the leaves of the music-book, and is justly persuaded she is giving him the whole of her soul." (Miss Cobbe, "Macmillan's Magazine," 1870.)

Our potential tendencies are not limited to the bare receiving of impressions; when they are more pronounced, they seek satisfaction. But narrow reality seldom offers this satisfaction and they must resort to disporting themselves in the kingdom of phantasy. It is surprising how many people lead a double existence, an external and an imagined one; the one narrow, the other full of fancied situations, of which they dream they are the heroes and where there is room for their unsatisfied longings and unused powers. This may also explain why poor and uneducated people love the melodrama and penny novelette, in which the good man and woman get their reward and the wicked man and woman their punishment.

Mind being regarded as an energy, it is easier to understand the changes in our moods: why we never feel exactly the same one day as compared to another, such feeling depending on the condition of the physical elements, on which the mind force acts; and why, for example, when the feeling is one of lassitude, a piece of good news, i.e., a mental stimulus, rouses the whole organisation. Mind being regarded as a force or energy, we can understand its action on the body; that, for example, when directed to any portion of the body it can change the circulation and nutrition, or molecular constitution of that part. We can understand also the influence some people exert over things by mere mental force, and the power of our own individuality over our brain activities, stimulating some and inhibiting others.

Experimental physiology, seeing only elementary movements and sensations, reduces mind to a mechanical apparatus. Minor data and observations are accumulated, but the greater problems of life and mind are ignored, perhaps justly so, for whenever experimenters venture on generalisations, they are contradicted by subsequent observers. But just as much as I hold that it is absurd to argue that, because the elementary mental dispositions cannot be dug out with the scalpel from the brain, therefore they have no connection with it; just as much as is it, in my opinion, absurd to argue that, because the soul cannot be found with the knife, electric current, weighed in the balance, or detected chemically, therefore it is non-existent—a mere hypothetical construction of the metaphysicians.

The philosophical theory that there is nothing in the human consciousness beside transformed sensations has guided the physiologist in his investigations. Owing to this preconceived notion, he could see nothing in the brain but a physical mechanism for movement and sensation. He failed to discover any apparatus for
the elements of our various mental gifts, because he did not look for any; indeed, he denied there are special instruments for the elements which compose the mind and character of man. All man's characteristics, animal and specifically human, were supposed to be the result of sensation. But man has in him the germ of a rational, social, moral, and religious nature, of poetical, artistic, inventive, and other gifts. External sensations help to unfold them; but the seeds must be there. If we depended on sensation alone, why should a particular impression leave one man unconcerned, inspire another to an artistic creation, rouse in a third the deepest religious emotion, and cause a fourth to exert all his mental powers to follow what he knows or considers to be the right path? Not all truth comes from without; some of the greatest truths have come from within. Is it the external impression that makes the poet, musician, artist, philosopher, inventor? It is something within—and that something within has so far escaped the instruments of the physiologist; nay, even his contemplation.

In all cases where emotions are started by non-mechanical causes—let us say the receipt of a telegram announcing ruin, death, or the realisation of extravagant hopes—the initial movements in the brain are indubitably set up by the mind. How can the light-waves which strike the retina on the reading of the written words account for the exhibition of forces which follow astounding news, different persons being differently affected by the same cause? No hypothesis of sensory brain centres will explain the fact; but, if it be admitted, as I have shown, that the principal emotions—fear, love, resentment—have centres in the brain, then it can be easily understood that, according to the individual development of these centres, so will different people respond differently to the same stimulus.

Chemico-physical changes in the nerve-cells are supposed to be the cause of consciousness and of everything which goes to make up what is called "mind" or "soul." Thus that eminent American scientist, JACQUES LOEB ("The Mechanistic Conception of Life," Chicago, 1912) believes that life's wishes and hopes, efforts and struggles, disappointments and sufferings are amenable to a physico-chemical analysis, because he can explain animal tropism, i.e., the tendency of certain animals to fly or creep to the light, on such a basis. He considers this tendency to be instinctive, and, being able to explain the one instinct, he can see no reason why the whole of man's inner life should not receive a physico-chemical explanation. But, in my opinion, the tendency of certain animals to go instinctively to a source of light is not a universal or primitive instinct.

Loeb has undoubtedly made some valuable contributions to our knowledge of the behaviour of animals, and made an original study of the conduct of winged plant-llice—but surely it is a long way from plant-llice to the complex behaviour of man! For all I know, the plant-louse may have some noble inspirations, and as regards food, reproduction, etc., may have instincts identical with man; still, man is so far removed from the insect, that no correct deductions can be drawn from one to the other.

That, however, is not the opinion of Loeb and the school he represents. On the contrary, all that is noble in man is considered by Loeb purely mechanical. "Our instincts," he says, "are hereditary, as is the form of the body, and we obey them 'machine-like'—for we are compelled to do so.... We struggle for justice and truth since we are instinctively compelled to see our fellow-beings happy." How many men does Loeb believe do struggle for justice and truth? And what is the physico-chemical explanation of this struggle? "Not only," says he, "is the mechanistic conception of life compatible with ethics: it seems the only conception of life which can lead to an understanding of the source of ethics." May I ask what ethics can there be in compulsion? On a physico-chemical basis practically all men should be virtuous, for they are so organised, and their actions could be foretold.
Loeb goes still farther. Physical chemistry, according to him, will make the facts of psychology accessible to analysis. He believes that the investigation may be of importance even to psychiatry. He goes on: "The experiments may also attain a similar value for ethics. The highest manifestation of ethics, namely, the condition that human beings are willing to sacrifice their lives for an idea, is comprehensible neither from the utilitarian standpoint nor from that of the categorical imperative. It might be possible that under the influence of certain ideas chemical changes—for instance, internal secretions within the body—are produced which increase the sensitiveness to certain stimuli to such an unusual degree that such people become slaves to certain stimuli just as the copepods become slaves to the light when carbon dioxide is added to the water."

Loeb's view is strictly materialistic. So is the view of modern physiology and medicine. Yet as regards the latter, I shall show that, if we accept their facts as proved, just the opposite deductions may be drawn—namely, that mental activity is purely spiritual. In support of this statement, let me quote again the excellent summary of physiological research by CH. CHATELIN and DE MARTEL ("Wounds of the Skull and Brain," London, 1918), and their practical observations, "most carefully made," on more than 5,000 cases in the recent war, of wounds of the skull and brain, during 1915 and 1916. Prof. PIERRE MARIE, the great French neurologist, in his preface to the work, says that it "is not merely a treatise of traumatic affections, but will remain as a guide to the study of local affections of the skull and brain. The book is really a great achievement."

Relying entirely on the results of animal experiments, which they quote, no attempt has been made to inquire into possible changes or loss of definite mental powers, such as I have furnished in this work. The possibility of the intellect becoming affected in lesions of the brain is recognised by them in a vague way; but other changes in mental dispositions, and the loss of definite capacities, are not mentioned; indeed, one might well assume, after reading the work, that insanity may be anything but a brain disease.

Whereas according to the evidence produced in this work it would appear that the elements of the various mental powers—intellectual, emotional, and instinctive—are connected with definite parts of the cortex of the brain, the authors found, referring to the four chief lobes of the cerebrum:

1. "There are no symptoms special to wounds of the frontal lobes."
2. "It is impossible to state definitely the reasons why a lesion of the parietal lobes does not show any symptoms."
3. "Most of the symptoms described by the classic writers as arising from lesion of the temporal convolutions have no clinical existence."
4. Referring to the occipital lobe: "Nothing is known of the functions of its external convolutions and the symptomatology of this lobe is confined entirely to the disorders arising from lesion of the visual centre in the cortex or of the central occipital tracts."

The authors did notice that "important lesions of the frontal lobes are frequently accompanied by profound disorders of intelligence" and observed the various forms of aphasia in lesions of the brain; but they produce no evidence that inquiries have been made into the mental state of the patients who came under their observation, such as would be made by men who admit the hypothesis of the localisation of mental functions. Accordingly there is also no evidence that the authors allowed for possible mental changes some time after the operations, as has been shown by me to occur frequently. The whole work is indicative of the universally accepted view that no connection can be proved between the brain and distinct mental phenomena—a result that must be most encouraging to spiritualists. It is the latest and most scientific evidence in support of their beliefs. If the various mental manifestations cannot be proved to have any connection with the brain—they must be
THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF MAN

spiritual, and thus it might be claimed that we get at least negative evidence for the existence of the soul.

THE PROBLEM OF THE SOUL AND IMMORTALITY

The older psychologists, as has been shown, limited the soul to consciousness and intellect, omitting the emotions and propensities. Modern psychology, on the other hand, since it is getting more and more experimental, like physiology, places reliance on physical methods for the explanation of mental phenomena. But because psychology has ceased to search for the soul, this is not sufficient reason for assuming that there is no soul. Notwithstanding all the progress in science and philosophy, we still know no more of the spiritual nature of man than our great ancestors, and the problem must still be left to theologians and metaphysicists. But there are some reflections on which I may be permitted to venture.

Generally speaking, the soul is assumed to be identical with mind—the sum total of our psychic activities; but if this description be correct, then the soul appears sometimes in degraded forms, as in the idiot, the drunkard, the sensualist, the habitual criminal. Moreover, such a conception deprives the soul of its unity and freedom. The soul, assuming its existence, must be something higher, for the elementary psychic activities are also possessed by animals; indeed, they seem to be derived from them. In that case animals also have souls. Quite right! it will be said. But there is this objection, that whereas man in consequence of his noblest faculties is capable of refinement of his lowest instincts and of apparently indefinite advancement, there is a limit to the progress of animals.

If the soul were identical with mind, then it would be affected by physical agencies. We know that if the circulation of a man be checked, he thinks wildly or not at all; if his secretions become impaired, his moral sense may be dulled, his aspirations may flag, his hope, love, and faith may reel. Impair them still more and he becomes a brute. Indulgence in wine or spirits may degrade his moral nature below that of a pig. A blow on the head may abolish memory, or consciousness, or result in an entire change of character. If the soul be identical with mind, then it must be assumed to undergo all these variations from virtue to vice, from sanity to insanity.

In all religions the soul is conceived as an entity, and the Christian explanation of its origin is that it is directly created by the voluntary power of God; some holding that all souls were created by the Divine fiat at the beginning of the world, and laid up in a secret repository, whence they are drawn as occasion requires; while St. JEROME (346-420) and other Fathers of the Christian Church maintained that the production of souls was not confined to any past period, but is continued still, a new soul being freshly created for every new birth. This has become the prevailing view. On the other hand, TERTULLIAN (c. 160-220) taught that all human souls had their beginning in the soul of the first man, and have been transmitted ever since in accordance with the Divine plan. The soul of the first man was the fountain-head of all human souls; all the varieties of human nature are but modifications of that one spiritual substance. The first parent bore within him the undeveloped germ of all mankind, so that sinfulness and souls were propagated together. He held that souls of children are generated from the souls of parents as bodies are from bodies; but this doctrine is based upon the erroneous belief that the bodies of the parents generate the body of the child, and that correspondingly the souls of the parents generate the soul of the child. Now, we know that the child comes from germ-cells which are not made by the bodies of the parents but have arisen by the division of antecedent germ-cells. On the other hand, it might be claimed that Tertullian's teaching received support from the modern doctrine of the
continuity of the germ plasm. Tertullian's view has been formally condemned by the Roman Catholic Church.

The prevailing conception of immortality is that of a conscious survival after death, preserving a future recollection of our past existence and also our bodies through all eternity. Whether the soul continues hereafter or not is to many of little consequence. They are not anxious about their soul, but about their consciousness. A mere surviving principle would not satisfy them. But our personality is not a static ego looking on, an indestructible monad gathering experience in the world, to be sealed and signed, and then stored up in some unknown region till the day of resurrection. Our personality changes from day to day, and there is but one link which binds the changing states from infancy to old age into one continuous identity, and that is memory. If memory there is to be, then we must carry all our omissions, sins, and pains into another existence. Again, the higher the existence, the greater the freedom from competition, and therefore the less use for the animal part of our nature. But if the animal appetites are left behind us in the grave, our personality is no longer the same. It follows that the obliteration of our personal outlines must keep exact step with our advance towards the divine state, if the soul is to survive.

The continuity of the germ-cell proves humanity to be immortal, but not the individual man; just as the river may be regarded as immortal, but not the drops of water composing it at any particular time. Now, some men are so organised that they believe in a future life and hope for it; others doubt or deny it, or, if they grant the possibility, do not live in expectation of it. Whatever the belief, few people are nowadays influenced in their conduct by it. The good man is given to good conduct; the bad man to bad conduct, either because he is born defective, or because he has not the knowledge that bad conduct is not to his advantage, and does not further his happiness in the long run. Animals, children, and primitive people we must influence by holding out to them rewards and punishments; civilised man wishes to live in harmony with his surroundings, and he is conscious that he can do best by exemplary conduct.

I have shown in an earlier chapter of this work that there are men who lack the necessary organisation for the spiritual qualities; just as men are born who lack the elements for the moral sense, or are so organised that they cannot appreciate music, understand algebra, or take any interest in the fine arts, in high-class literature, or abstract philosophy. There are men who lack the sublime devotional feelings inspired by the grandeur of Nature, who cannot contemplate an Almighty Power, who lack all spiritual emotion. They are religiously ungifted. They are not fitted to reach these conceptions and emotions. It is as useless to argue with them as it is for a musician to explain the laws of harmony to a tone-deaf person. But just as much as it would be an impertinent assumption for a tone-deaf person to deny the existence of beauty of music, so it is an assumption for a person devoid of the spiritual sense to deny the conceptions of religious men. It is from the spiritually gifted men that we must draw our enlightenment on spiritual problems, and not from the men who lack the necessary organic elements for such investigation, or who, by their devotion to material affairs, have deadened their higher senses. By "spiritually" gifted men I do not mean "mystics" who neglect every law of science and logic, nor necessarily ministers of the Church who, to whatever creed they may belong, are restricted to the interpretation of their sacred books; but simply men who, in addition to sound, practical common sense, possess the elements of religious feeling and inspiration.

Religious feeling is as much a gift as is artistic feeling. The world could exist without either, but it would be deprived of some sources of joy. Religion from the sceptic's point of view is an illusion; so is art to the inartistic. The soul, the Creator, immortality, are beyond scientific proof; so is the soul which the artist
THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF MAN

infuses into the human form, the sky, the sea, and his own creations. Doubtless man could live by the gratification of his instincts alone, but he is not so disposed. He loves the ideals which he pictures to himself. A life without ideals would be dreary indeed. The pursuit of the ideal is common to the moralist, the artist, the religious man and woman. Just as the artist has the idea of perfection at which he aims, so the religious man, seeing the imperfections of individual human nature, creates an ideal of perfection, at which he aims and with which, like the artist, he holds communion. He clings to religion for the gratification of his spiritual ideals; but he no longer expects religion to furnish him with an explanation of phenomena—that is the province of science.

Science has made wonderful progress, but, as I have already said, the problems of the First Cause, of the nature of the soul, of the possibility of life after death, the nature of the forces which are beyond our control, are still where they were in pre-historic times. Science has never touched the psychical; it is bound to be material—to be limited to phenomena which can be verified by the senses. That is why theological dogmas have such a strong hold on man, for they set at rest those questions which his reasons cannot solve. True, science has destroyed the meaning of many of the assertions of theologians, so that the intellect of the religious man is no longer satisfied; but it has not destroyed the foundation of religion. Religion is not an invention of the theologians. It arises from certain primary needs of man and provides for his aspirations. Man’s heart wants to be satisfied as well as his intellect.

The world will have religion of some kind, even though it should fly for it to the spirit manifestations of professional mediums. It wants the lifting power of an ideal element in human life; something to warm and colour it; something to distinguish human from mere animal existence. There will always be religion; the only alternative is superstition. So long as men wonder whence they came, and what is the meaning of life, and what the purpose of the universe; so long as there are struggles and inequalities of existence, the mystery and sorrow of death; so long as there is tragedy, and mourning, and hope, so long will there be feelings and yearnings and ideas that generate religion. Religion in some form, adaptable to our needs and harmonious with advanced thought, is for most people a necessity and will always be with us. It is the outgrowth of the feeling which animates a large proportion of humanity, that there is something beyond the compass of human knowledge.

It was an instinctive spiritual feeling, and not reason, which gave our ancestors the faith in a great Unknown Power, and made their terrestrial misery tolerable. The more primitive and the less educated the people the more completely their religious conceptions filled such psychical life as they had. As man’s intellectual and spiritual development advanced, so his religious conceptions grew broader.

Independent of the various creeds, all men must grant that there must be a Power in the universe from which all life and energy proceed or originally have proceeded, a Power which cannot be comprehended or controlled by human thought and will; a Power—not as in past ages identified with the idea of abnormal and capricious action—but, in the present scientific age, with that of regular and unbroken law. It is also natural that mankind in their adoration of God, the “Architect of the Universe,” the great “Unknown and Unknowable,” and with the desire to revere and worship him, should have represented an ideal personal deity, a “Loving Father,” a limited but the only tangible conception that would appeal to their understanding. We cannot conceive even a Spirit without form. Others—particularly many scientists and philosophers—regard God and the World as one.

Seeing the hardships and injustices of this life, the affectionate bond between members of the same family and community, and the frequent premature death, it is not surprising that the idea arose in the earliest times of an existence and union
hereafter. This problem science has not solved; life in spirit is beyond scientific proof. All that science can say, for the present, is that we live in our offspring and the influence we have exercised on our surroundings. Every life more or less forms another life, and lives in another life. None so humble that he does not exercise some influence which keeps his spirit alive, at least for a time, after the dissolution of the body. Activity on earth in the real and known work of life, in the welfare of those whom we have loved, and in the happiness of those who come after us—therein lies the only immortality science can answer for. As we live for others in life, so we live in others after death. Religion is a necessity, but the belief in a life hereafter is not.

On the other hand, the inference that there is no other life, because the human mind—or, more correctly speaking, some human minds—cannot conceive it, is not inevitable. As matter is constant but undergoes changes, so it may be with man's spirit, in terrestrial life and hereafter. Most people who deny such survival, consciously or unconsciously, regard all man's mental manifestations as the result of his brain activities; but that this is a misconception, in my opinion, I have already explained. Those who assume a spirit to exist during life are justified in assuming its existence after death; but as the body perished, it can no longer manifest itself through it, and therefore can no longer have individuality, so far as our limited intelligence can conceive. Such purely spiritual survival, however, is unsatisfying to most men, as is evident from the fact that, quite apart from the various religious beliefs, there are a number of men, some of them very learned, who accept the evidence of so-called "materialisation" of spirits, who believe in survival of both body and mind, and in a life hereafter corresponding very nearly to life upon earth, as if the conditions and environment on which mental life depends were identical with those of ordinary physical existence. Assuming communication between the spirit world and the living to be possible, it is surprising that in all the records collected by societies which investigate these phenomena there is not one message of importance, or one which would throw light on any of the great problems which affect humanity so deeply, not one message that is lofty or holy, or would betray any greater nearness to God. If spirits have nothing to tell us that is of comfort or enlightenment to us, except that they are perfectly happy in the other world, suspicion is justified that these messages arise in the brains of those who attend these meetings. If spirits there are, if they love those whom they left behind them, if there is any love for humanity in heaven, if God could reveal himself to our ancestors, heavenly manifestations are still possible and do not require the intervention of unholy media and their commonplace interpretations. Such is my personal opinion.

All the same, let us keep an open mind on the subject! It has been shown in the previous chapter that in hypnosis—whether self-induced or induced by others—persons manifest mental powers of which they are incapable in the normal conscious state. A medium may be able by profound abstraction or self-hypnosis to get his own brain impressed by the subliminal mental activity of those who watch his performance. He may not be able to read all that is going on in the subconsciousness of those who wish to communicate with their departed friends, he may become impressed by isolated fragments only; but since these correspond with the actual memories, the result seems to the persons present so marvellous as to increase their belief in spirit communications. Many of them were probably at the outset favourable to the spiritistic hypothesis, subconsciously if not consciously. This is the most likely explanation, and so long as we can find a "natural" explanation, it would be folly to seek a supernatural one. The phenomena are none the less marvellous, for such unconscious thought-transference is not yet an accepted fact of science, and on that hypothesis investigations should be undertaken.

So little is known of the mental constitution of man, and its relation with his
physical being, that it would be audacity on my part to affirm or deny, or even to argue, on the existence of the soul and a life hereafter. Not until investigations are made on the lines described in this work, not until ethology is recognised as well as psychology, not until brain research is extended from motor and sensory to mental manifestations, and the elementary powers can be defined and their physical bases are discovered, will it be safe to speculate on the soul and spiritual nature of man. Only one suggestion I would venture in conclusion: Every particle of man is alive and adjusted in its function to the whole being, the self, and by his thought and emotion he can control not only his brain activity, but every function of the body, accelerating or inhibiting it. From this it appears to me that instead of saying "man has a soul," it would be more correct to say that "man himself is a soul." He is not a conscious machine, but a spiritual being.

THE END
LIST OF NAMES

Welbach, A., II, 65, 185
Weisnburg, II, 106
Weismann, Aug. (1834-1914), I, 304, 505
Weiss, Jacob (1849-), II, 159
Welcker, Hermann (1860-1897), I, 322, 377, 434; II, 67, 185
Wells, Horace (1832-1888), I, 511
Wells, Sir Thos. Spencer (1878-1897), I, 369
Welch, David (1792-1845), I, 357, 435
Wel, Leopold, I, 414, 427; II, 102
Wende, J., II, 109
Wendt, H. F. W. (1858-1875), II, 158
Wenzel, Carl (1789-1887), I, 202, 228
Wenzel, Joseph (1768-1806), I, 202
Wenzel, Emperor (1560-1571), I, 120
Wepfer, Joh. Jac. (1760-1803), I, 182, 184, 185, 193
Werner, Abraham (1730-1817), I, 178
Wernicke, Carl (1856-1925), I, 396, 399, 400, 401, 436; II, 118, 182
Westley, John (1703-1791), I, 274, 178
Weyr, Julius (1314-1358), I, 124
Whately, Richard, Archbishop (1787-1863), I, 357; II, 322
Whestone, Sir C. (1862-1875), II, 357, 516
Wherry, Geo. E. (1852-), II, 130
White, Francis, I, 357
Whitelaw, J. R., II, 157
Wiglesworth, Joseph (1617), I, 413; II, 144, 197
Wilbur, R. L. (1879-), I, 225
Wilberforce, Bishop Samuel (2895-1875), I, 502
Wildermuth, Hermann (2892-), II, 217
Wilks, Sir Samuel (1824-1911), I, 212, 358, 367, 394
II, 150, 164
Willibrord, II, 107
Wille, Ludwig (1834-), II, 185
William of Occam (2890-1842), I, 92, 106
William IV., King (1765-1837), II, 355
Williams, S. W. E., II, 160, 182, 196
Williams, W. Rhyas, II, 152, 171
Willie (c. 1800), I, 309
Wills, Thomas (1622-1675), I, 133, 153, 181, 182, 184, 193, 212, 222; II, 191
Wilson, Andrew, I, 365
Wilson, J., II, 322
Winslow, Littleton Forbes (1810-1874), I, 333
Witham, H. T. M., I, 357
Wied, A., II, 113
Wollart, G. C. (1778-1852), II, 286
Wolff, Christian v. (1679-1754), I, 170, 197, 237, 472, 473
Wolff, Caspar Friedrich (1733-1794), I, 177, 495
Woodward Smith, I, 355
Worchester, W. L., II, 166
Worthington, T. B., II, 164
Wright, Sir Almroth (1861-), I, 520
Wright, I. II, 166
Wurtem, II, 113
Wyllys, I, 397
XENOPHANES (570-480 B.C.), I, 27
YELLLOWLES, I, 428
Yeo, G. F. (1845-1909), I, 415
ZACCOURS, Lusitanus (575-1642), I, 126
Zacher, Th., II, 138, 162
Zarlngas, I, 339
Zeno of Elea (c. 490-430 B.C.), I, 29
Zeno of Knttian (336-264 B.C.), I, 51, 233
Ziedl, II, 157, 182
Zingerle, Hermann, II, 162
Zinz, J. G. (1727-1799), I, 533, 403
Zoheib, II, 164
Zoccooaster (prob. 1200 B.C.), I, 4, 16
Zuckertanld, Emil (1826-1910), I, 277
Zuckert (1727-1795), I, 194
Brain functions, history of discovery of (continued):

Buffon, I, 374
Burckhardt, I, 303, 340
Cabans, I, 176
Campbell, I, 437
Cardano, I, 120
Carpenter, I, 68, 215, 269, 368, 429
Carus, I, 262
Carville, 275, 416
Chanut, I, 283
Charcot, I, 420, 437, 419, 426
Chiquet, I, 411
Claparède, I, 249
Comte, I, 448
Costalbaut, I, 103
Crichton-Browne, I, 405
Cullen, I, 443
Cunningham, I, 427, 428
Cuvier, I, 269, 392
Darwin, E., I, 216
Dax, I, 932
Degrande, I, 192
Déjérine, I, 397, 399, 401, 434, 442
Descartes, I, 390
Dol, I, 131
Duppy, I, 402, 415, 416, 419
Duret, I, 475, 416
Ecker, I, 433
Eckhard, I, 493
Edinger, I, 436, 442
Eglofédé, I, 329
Erasistratus, I, 57
Esquirol, I, 594
Evans, I, 427
Ferrier, I, 407, 412, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 422, 424, 446
Flechsig, I, 440
Florentii, I, 378
Footc, I, 222
Foville, I, 336
Foster, Sir Michael, I, 470
Francois-France, I, 435
Friths, I, 493
Galen, I, 73, 75
Gall, I, 518, 263
George, I, 903
Goitz, I, 414, 417, 419, 426, 429
Gordon, I, 109
Gowers, I, 415
Gratiolet, I, 432
Graves, I, 269
Grégoire, I, 414
Guilien, I, 419
Hallier, I, 156, 403
Hansemann, I, 428
Hartley, I, 416
Helmont, I, 176
Helvetius, I, 163
Herder, I, 174
Hermann, I, 425
Herophilus, I, 57
Hervé, I, 271
Hippocrates, I, 63
Hitite, I, 403, 405, 406, 409, 410, 412, 416, 419, 420, 426, 427, 428, 444
Hobbes, I, 136
Holbach, I, 176
Horsley, I, 412, 413, 416, 429
Hurtot, I, 130
Hughlings Jackson, I, 403, 405, 416, 419, 426
Hunter, I, 179
Huschke, I, 262
Hwang-Ti, I, 29
Ivey, I, 408
Jolly, I, 304
Kant, I, 191
Kraepelin, I, 436
Krause, i, 413
Ladd, I, 477, 428
Landouzy, I, 412
Lange, I, 565, 394
La Roque, I, 405
Le Febvre, I, 312
Lètost, I, 375
Leures, I, 432
Lewes, I, 435
Lob, I, 375, 419
Luciani, I, 411, 414, 419, 426
Malacarne, I, 183
Malpighi, I, 183, 193

SUBJECT INDEX

Brain functions, history of discovery of (continued):

Marie, I, 498
Marshall Hall, I, 404
Maudsley, I, 302, 466
Mayer, J. C. A., I, 199
Meech, I, 446, 455
Michael, I, 446
Mill, J. S., I, 456
Milles, I, 275
Moleschott, I, 475
Munkow, I, 427
Montagut, I, 173
Montègre, I, 258
Mott, I, 428, 434, 445
Monteuix, I, 402
Müller, Johannes, I, 365, 366, 494
Mundinus, I, 179
Munk, I, 404, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 426, 419
423, 426, 428
Nemesius, I, 88
Noumaged, I, 405
Onimus, I, 416
Otte, I, 409
Pacchioni, I, 189
Panizza, I, 404
Parchapage, I, 435
Piatistic Philosophers, I, 97
Peter of Abano, I, 109
Petit, I, 164
Pfeffer, I, 418
Philolaos, I, 50
Pinal, I, 304
Pitres, I, 410, 416
Platner, I, 239, 365
Plato, I, 36
Porta, I, 133
Possidonio, I, 76
Prichard, I, 395
Priestley, I, 148
Prince, Morton, I, 402, 420
Proschaska, I, 191
Reisch, I, 131
Reutz, I, 271, 365, 428
Rhees, I, 56
Richter, I, 413
Richet, I, 426
Roget, I, 368
Rohm de Rothen, I, 131
Roloando, I, 377
Rothman, I, 413
Rüdiger, I, 271, 426
Rudolphii, I, 364
Ruska, I, 195
Sabatier, I, 216
St. Augustine, I, 90
Sauer-Brown, I, 412, 419
Schefer, I, 418, 419, 420, 427, 429
Schiff, I, 404, 419
Schopenhauer, I, 480
Schwalbe, I, 277
Schwann, I, 427
Schiapparelli, I, 412
Seligii, I, 412
Servetus, I, 137
Sherington, I, 413
Sols, I, 415
Sommering, I, 191
Speners, I, 459
Sprengel, I, 170
Sprengel, I, 213
Spurzheim, I, 449
Sarr, Alenm, I, 222
Stieda, I, 426
Strack, I, 48
Swedishborg, I, 186
Talmud, I, 10
Temebra, I, 411, 412, 419
Tanz, I, 454, 452
Telesio, I, 172
Tentius, I, 377
Trevirarum, I, 179
Trouseau, I, 395
Turner, Sir William, I, 433
Uozer, I, 159
Van Siven, I, 188
Venditius, I, 135
Vieussens, I, 188
Vimont, I, 338
Vive, I, 133
Vogt, I, 413, 475
Gall's doctrines, opinions on, by (continued):
Spurzheim, I., 340
Starr, Allen, I., 273, 423
Stuart, I., 349
Stiff, I., 344
Tiedemann, I., 309
Tophanavry, I., 169
Tuke, D. H., I., 333, 338
Turner, Sir William, I., 433
Villa, I., 490
Vimarcot, I., 339, 338
Walker, I., 406, 353, 316
Walther, I., 336
Wecker, I., 277
Wickes, I., 367, 394
Wissow, Forbes, I., 353
Wundt, I., 273, 489
Gall's method, I., 387
** terminology, I., 367, 341
Gaul, the ancient, I., 24
Gaus, I., 163, 247, 248, 250, 253, 264, 266, 267, 272
278, 443, 450, 454; II., 50, 214, 234, 274, 271, 216
Geographical discoveries and geology, history of, I., 24, 46, 66, 178, 190, 190
German philosophical, history of, I., 187, 471
God, history of conceptions of, I., 5, 6, 8, 11, 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 45, 47, 59, 58, 55, 68, 70, 74, 88, 97, 94, 104, 106, 107, 109, 130, 134, 144, 153, 154, 156, 159, 161, 162, 168, 165, 169, 173, 176, 253, 350, 456, 476, 481, 502, 505 I., 327, 335
Greek medicine, history of, I., 28, 48; II., 28;
philosophy, history of, I., 28, 46
religion, I., 20
Gustatory brain centre, I., 290, 499; II., 130
HALLUCINATIONS, I., 48, 139; II., 45, 169, 233, 235, 253, 262, 291, 292
Healing by touch (laying-on of hands), I., 11, 18, 201, 130; II., 241, 282, 302
Heaven and hell, conceptions of, I., 3, 7, 10, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 57, 114, 120
Heredity, doctrines of, I., 33, 51, 62, 125, 161, 252, 254, 294, 247, 248, 250, 251, 254, 343, 426, 495, 499, 502, 504; II., 5, 70, 74, 88, 199, 246, 247, 317, 316, 334, 357
Heredity of acquired characters, I., 178, 482, 499, 507, 502, 504, 506; II., 203
Hindus, the ancient, I., 11
Histology of brain, I., 121, 186, 432, 457; II., 71, 74
History of anatomy, I., 6, 10, 15, 32, 65, 66, 73, 109, 112, 128, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 196, 199, 201
History of anthropology and cannibalism, I., 41, 139, 130, 174, 178, 180, 184, 193, 268, 269, 274, 395, 396, 397, 366, 476, 474, 513; II., 90, 203
History of anastomosis and craniometry, I., 117, 274, 363, 513, 574, 515
History of bacteriology, hygiene and sanitation, I., 8, 11, 68, 88, 98, 101, 123, 124, 500
History of biology, I., 26, 29, 30, 33, 41, 43, 112, 179, 190, 440, 458, 465, 484, 488; II., 203, 318
History of botany, I., 8, 20, 28, 103, 177, 179, 181
History of brain anatomy and histology, I., 10, 19, 61, 65, 71, 74, 112, 114, 152, 158, 184, 186, 189, 200, 250, 268, 305, 404, 435, 459, 487; II., 71, 74
SUBJECT INDEX
355
Soul, history of conception of, by:

Actuarius, I, 109
Albertus Magnus, I, 103
Aoaagaeus, 3
Aoziformes, I, 27
Aquinas, I, 104
Aristotle, I, 42
Averrhoas, I, 99
Avicenna, I, 99
Bacon, Roger, I, 108
Baxter, I, 138
Becker, I, 474
Berard, I, 215
Berqou, I, 453
Berkeley, I, 240
Beneke, I, 189
Brechtian, I, 485
Democritus, I, 31, 32
Descartes, I, 25
Eckhart, I, 107
Empedocles, I, 30, 253
Epicurus, I, 49
Fichte, I, 471
Galen, I, 74
Gall, I, 322, 300
Haeckel, I, 495, 503
Haller, I, 187
Malthus, I, 182
Hegel, I, 472
Helmout, I, 276
Helvetius, I, 263
Heraclitou, I, 29
Herbart, I, 472
Hercules, I, 66
Holbach, I, 163
Hume, I, 144
Lactantius, I, 87
La Mettric, I, 328
Leibnitz, I, 167
Lotze, I, 494
Lucretus, I, 52
Maimonides, I, 101
Malbranche, I, 154
Pico, I, 55
Plato, I, 59, 65
Plotinus, I, 57
Pomponatius, I, 118
Posterior, I, 54
Pythagoras, I, 27, 28
Reussan, I, 165, 166
St. Augustine, I, 69
St. Gregory, I, 88
St. Jerome, II, 533
St. Paul, I, 86
Schelling, I, 471
Schopenhauer, I, 472, 478
Secrator, I, 55
Spencer, Herbert, I, 465
Spinoza, I, 205
Stahl, I, 169
Stoics, I, 53
Strato, I, 48
Swinburne, I, 185
Telesto, I, 132
Tertullian, I, 55, 553
Theophrastous, I, 47
Vesalius, I, 129
Vives, I, 119
Vogt, C., I, 475
Voltaire, I, 259
Willis, I, 182

Soul, religious conceptions of:

Buddhists, I, 25
Chinese, I, 16
Christian, I, 81; II, 233
Egyptians, I, 7
Greeks, I, 27, 28
Hindo, I, 22
Jewish, I, 55
Manicheetics, I, 16, 82
Mithraists, I, 18
Persians, I, 17
Roman, I, 34

Soul, seat of, located by:

Ackermann, I, 272, 284
Auchier, I, 190
Borchave, I, 185
Bonet, I, 233
Bonnet, I, 189

Soul, seat of, located by (continued):

Carpenter, I, 98
Cours, I, 263
Cousin, I, 181, 226
Chaucer, I, 283
Descartes, I, 95, 121, 216, 356
Descantour, I, 133
Epicurus, I, 49
Ernstine, I, 87
Galen, I, 74
Haller, I, 187
Helmont, I, 176
Herophilus, I, 267
Hoffmann, F., I, 133
Huschke, I, 203
Lactantius, I, 87
La Mettrie, I, 158
Lacessi, I, 184
Leibnitz, I, 167, 168
Lotze, I, 185
Mayer, J. A., I, 189
Mayow, I, 181
Pico Colonini, I, 133
Platner, I, 365
Plutus, I, 58
Pritchard, I, 220
St. Augustine, I, 90
St. Gregory, I, 88
Servetus, I, 131
Sommer, I, 191, 205, 216, 272
Spencer, Herbert, I, 90
Spinoza, I, 156
Stahl, I, 216
Strato, I, 48
Swedenborg, I, 186
Teileo, I, 132
Tertullian, I, 87
T Tuneo, I, 133
Unaeus, I, 189
Vesalius, I, 143
Vissi, I, 343, 216
Wille, I, 133, 182
Zeno, I, 57

Speech, faculty of, I, 161; II, 7

Speech, history of discovery of brain centres for, I, 277
Speech, association in insanity, II, 228
Speech, sensory in insanity, II, 228
Spiral lesions, I, 11, 72, 75, 209, 210, 225
Spiritits, I, 24, 6, 14, 109, 113, 119, 122, 126, 102, 367, 371, 375, 350
Spiritual nature of mind, II, 56, 58, 317, 324
Spiritualism, I, 119; II, 316, 322
State school, I, 81, 65, 69, 72, 88
Subconscious mind, II, 287, 289, 286
Suggestability, II, 36, 38
Suggestion, I, 59, 145, 152, 155, 455; II, 60, 286
Suggestion, methods of, I, 277

Suggestion, post-hypnotic, II, 293

Surgical treatment by, I, 19, 60, 297, 281, 294
Suicide, I, 29, 239, 235

Sumerians, I, 5

Supernatural, II, 187

Surgery, history of, I, 5, 8, 14, 19, 62, 69, 75, 98, 101, 121, 124, 125, 179, 183, 188, 220, 510
Surgery, cranial, I, 5, 18, 75, 220, 221, 228, 229, 230
Surgical treatment of hypnotics, I, 217; II, 274, 286, 287

Surgical treatment of delusions, I, II, 129

Suspicions, I, 29, 228, 233, 235

Surgical treatment of delusions, II, 170

Symphatic nervous system, I, 218; II, 77, 122, 123

Taste, sense of, I, 231

Taste, sense of, I, 409; II, 180


Temporality, I, 311, 312

Temperaments, doctrine of, I, 30, 37, 54, 77, 132, 158, 184, 219, 244, 272; II, 63

Temporal lobes, mental functions of, I, 292, 398, 400, 405; II, 146, 147

Teutonic religion, I, 5

Theism, I, 96, 159, 165, 179
| Theology and science, history of conflict between, I, 37, 39, 55, 85, 109, 104, 109, 124, 145, 160, 137, 135, 153, 158, 162, 167, 188, 171, 178, 339, 360; II, 38 |
| Thought-reading, II, 370, 372 |
| Thyroid gland, I, 306; II, 83, 187 |
| Thyroid gland, I, 306; II, 83, 187 |
| Time sense, I, 299, 300; II, 44 |
| Tone, sense of, I, 289, 300; II, 44 |
| Tone-sense, cerebral origin of, I, 289; II, 116 |
| Traumatic insanity, II, 129 |
| Unconscious, study of the, I, 480 |
| Understanding, I, 97, 133, 192 |
| Utilitarianism, I, 136, 459, 459 |
| Universities, foundation of, I, 104; 169 |

**Remarks:**
- The list includes various scientific and philosophical topics, with page numbers indicating references to specific articles or sections within volumes 1 and 2.
- The entries are aligned in a table format, with each topic and its associated page numbers clearly listed.

**Notable Sections:**
- **Vedanta, I, 11**
- **Vis Medicatrix Naturae, I, 169, 182**
- **Vitalism, history of doctrine of, I, 60, 109, 127, 170, 175, 180, 187, 190, 219, 219, 384, 376, 478, 485, 495, 483, 498**
- **Vocational guidance, I, 39, 132, 363, 488; II, 21, 210**

**Additional Entries:**
- **WATER DIVIDERS, II, 297**
- **Wax, religion of, I, 24**
- **Will, II, 15, 19, 40, 54, 278**
- **Witchcraft, I, 393, 399, 402; II, 114, 117, 141, 177**

**Miscellaneous:**
- **X-Rays, I, 516; II, 298, 299, 300**