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MY MESSAGE
and How I Got to It

From

KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE

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The Prophet.

...Issued for the...

Brotherhood of the Eternal Covenant.

"Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is unquiet, until it find satisfaction in lying upon Thy breast."

"And now abideth health, science, and holiness, these three; but the greatest of these is holiness."

By

Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie,

A. M., Harvard, Ph. D., Cutane.

Vol. I, No. 4.

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May, 1899

MY MESSAGE

Some Principles to Live By

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Teachings of Jesus of Nazara probably were.*

*My Way out to Freedom: or, Reasons why I Left the Protestant
Episcopal Church, and Essays on the Creeds & Lambeth Articles.*

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ME PRINCIPLES TO LIVE BY

For Brain-persons

Apply thy mind with infinite small pains;
Desert is more than title, *work* than brains.

For Neck-persons

What is the use of *Heaven-shaking will*,
If what it seeks be chosen without *skill*?

For Shoulder-persons

Though Martha *labour* till she shed hot tears,
She will not gain what Mary simply *bears*.

For Chest-persons

Careful in *details*, ah, be careful too
In keeping thy weak *soul* to Heaven true.

For Heart-persons

O Love, that passest even *righteousness*,
Be true to *God* with fervour pitiless.

For Plexus-persons

Do not reject *before* thou know'st what's meant:
When thou hast learnt, *then* show thy argument.

For Reins-persons

O thou who canst discern the *smallest* thing,
How failest thou thy *wavering* to see?

For Begettings-persons

Cunning, at best, will go but little ways;
Unselfishness, at last, far better *pays*.

For Thigh-persons

Rashness the best-intentioned souls offends
Whom no small services will turn to *friends*.

For Knee-persons

As *thou thyself* would'st have, to others do:
Who gladly serves, is greater e'en than *you*.

For Ankle-persons

Guide not thy path by *What will people say*?
Just you and *God* form a majority.

For Feet-persons

If still a *fable* Heaven seems to thee
Blame thou thine eyes that have not *learnt to see*.

DEVOTIONAL MEDITATIONS

I love Thee, Father, not because this is Thy sovereign will,
Because Thy hand created me with true and loving skill.

I love Thee, not because with Thee abideth strength and health,
Because Thy favor makes men great and blesses them with
• wealth.

I love Thee for Thy purity,—Thy purity of fire,
Whose flames ascend forevermore in infinite desire.

I love Thee for Thy face serene, whose beauty glows with light,
Reflecting all the fragrant prayers that rise from out our night

I love Thee, Father, for Thy love, I know not how or why;
I only know I yield to Thee a love that cannot die.

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I believe in physical health, cleanliness, temperance; and utter purity in thought, word and deed.

And in truth, honesty, accuracy and scholarship which demands reason for all things, and without prejudice yields its own opinion if shown to be false; which tolerates in each man his own opinions; which leads to art, literature and science; which in earnestness, sincerity and candor perfects all human powers.

I believe in Love, the Father and Destiny of all things, Light of light, Fragrance of fragrance, Beauty of beauty; who, working both here and beyond, is inexorably just, and therefore is the Comforter of the Afflicted and the Avenger of the Evil to the thousandth generation; who leads, by conscience, within myself to the Kingdom of Heaven, which only the humble can inherit, and which shall have no end, forever and ever. Amen.

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DEVOTIONAL MEDITATIONS.

MEDITATION FIRST.

IMMORTALITY.

Under the Providence of God it is the privilege of the writer to set forth in a few simple words sufficient instructions to lead to all truth, to all perfection those who will give themselves the trouble of complying with them in their daily lives.

He speaks positively. He does not seek to dispute, to convert. Gladly and freely he offers that which he has to give. It is for the reader to take or leave. He would oppose none, except as the assertion of truth implies the negation of falsehood.

These instructions will be divided into six meditations. The First will deal with Immortality. The Second, with Mental Development. The Third, with Regeneration. The Fourth with the Everlasting Covenant. The Fifth, with the Intelligible Light. The Sixth, with Practical Methods.

The first Meditation deals with Immortality. This topic may be best considered under six headings. First, Immortality. Second, the Bourne of Death. Third, the Certain Present. Fourth, the Two Ways. Fifth, Transitoriness. Last, the Mental Principle of Utility.

1. *Immortality Proper.*—This is, after all, the chief aim of human endeavor. Consider any actions that are called good, such

as feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, refreshing the weary. What is the essence of these all, if not to prolong the stay of the human spirit in the world? The main endeavor of goodness is then to prolong life, physical, mental, and spiritual.

Physically much has been done to prolong life. Sanitation and proper medical attendance, and still more hygiene, have perceptibly lowered the death-rate, and increased the average age at death. So far, so good.

But this is only, so to speak, a drop in the bucket. The ideal is to prolong life for ever; and the universal desire for some such state is revealed in the persistent belief in a physical resurrection to life eternal. Persistence of existence, immortality, life eternal, or whatever it be called, is the shibboleth of all religions, creeds, and doctrines. This is the promise which all religious prophets have given, this is the cry which has arisen to God from every portion of the globe. The problem is, how to attain eternal life; and whosoever succeeds in doing this, in however small a degree, is hailed as a benefactor of mankind.

2. *The Bourne of Death.*—Whatever be our desires for eternal life, one fact is certain today: Death. We shall all pass away from this earthly tabernacle. The day must come when this garment, the flesh and bones of the body, must be laid aside.

Let us not hesitate to look this fact in the face. Let us not do as the ostrich, and hide our heads in the sand, at the approach of danger, or of unpleasant thoughts. Rather, let us face the evil boldly, and see if there be no remedy. Let us at least recognize all its conditions, understand its laws, and be prepared for its catastrophe.

One of the most certain facts about the change of death is that we know little that is certain of the state after death. The visions of spiritualists are not so certain as they might be. And even if they be true, we desire guidance not from man, but God. We seek also an immortality more glorious, more free, more divine than that which spiritualism offers. We seek conscious beatific vision and divine guidance and help. And these are indeed mysteries, not lawful nor possible to utter.

Yet, whatever the state after death may import, we are certain of one thing. It is not magical. It is natural. It is only a change, a passing beyond. If the spirit survive, it will remain the same it was here. The unclean will be unclean still. The wise will remain wise. The murderer will not be suddenly

transformed into an angel of light. The murderer will remain a murderer, the angel will remain an angel. There will be no such thing as drifting into perfection; no such thing as gravitating into heaven. People fall downward, not upward. No man drifts up stream. Effort, conscious, determined effort; this is the only imaginable means of moral progression and sanctification.

And it is the sad thing about death and the state after death, that we know not if there be there possibilities of moral progression. We may gladly, with Tennyson, hope the larger hope; but, as far as we know, all moralization is connected with a body, as instrument of sanctification and self-control; and we have no shred of evidence pointing to a moralization without a body. We know not; we cannot tell.

This brings us to *the Certain Present*, the third topic. There is perhaps no law of human life which applies with more certainty to the spiritual life than that one vulgarly expressed in the maxim, "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." Of this life, its opportunities, its powers, its functions: of all this we are certain. Of the state after death, on the contrary, we know little or nothing; and the little we guess is contradictory. As God is just, He will not expect us to stake our salvation on something concerning which we know little or nothing. We may therefore consider God's confining our knowledge to this life as a sufficient indication that He permits us, nay, advises us, to omit consideration of it, and to centre our attention wholly, and to stake our salvation wholly, on this present life. Re-incarnation is a beautiful dream; it is a beautiful vindication of God's ways with man; but it is beyond our knowledge. We dare not risk our salvation on such an uncertainty. Nay; we dare not. God knows all things; and though He may hear the full harmony of the partial tones, we hear none but the latter, and must do the best we can. I will have none of a salvation that depends upon conditions that may or may not arise after death. I only know for certain the present. Let me find the best salvation I can here and the rest I am willing to leave to God. So Angelus Silesius says: "Who gains not his kingdom here, will never be a king beyond."

As has been suggested, present salvation means a solution of the problem how to resist, delay and minimize death. This is the fourth topic: *the Two Ways*.

There are two ways of meeting death, a passive and an active way. The passive way is that of animals, who, drifting on the tides of brute instinct, blindly suffer death whenever the time comes. The active way is that of intellect, possessing the power of recognizing facts, laws, opportunities, problems, and solutions, and directing the life purposively. These are the two ways; which will you take? In those men in whom the animal nature is dominant, the passive way is chosen; but in those with whom the mind has gained a sufficient power of independence, fitful gleams and efforts to embrace the latter often occur. This implies sufficient mental lucidity to clear the mental vision.

5. *Transitoriness.*—Stated in its lowest terms, the problem is as follows: Given an individual life, at birth, with a certain endowment of vitality, of brains, of spiritual development, and opportunities, this may be regarded as a certain amount of capital. The problem is, how can this be laid out or employed to best advantage?

There would be no such problem, if there was only one way of employing the capital. But it may be put to various uses, like any other capital. A young man, for instance, may spend a fortune on the pleasures of the senses, or he may employ it to refine and educate himself. So with his endowment of vitality, mind and opportunities. He may develop his spirit, or develop his mind, or develop his body. Which will he do? It is a question of business sagacity, demanding like any other serious worldly decision, much careful deliberation, much wisdom, and far-sightedness.

Concerning this problem, one thing is certain: The capital with which he starts will never increase. It can only diminish. The question is not, how much he will make, but, how much will he save out of it? How much of his capital will he put to eternal uses, and how much in transitory uses? For a short time the spirit is in contact with the body, thereby having certain opportunities given to it of spiritual development. How many of these opportunities will the soul embrace? How much intensity of external consciousness will it gather from the physical life? How much will he during the sea-voyage transform into such a form as will survive the certain shipwreck of death? How much treasure will he have laid away in heaven, where moth and rust do not corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal?

At death, the violinist must leave behind his violin; the pianist, his piano; the painter, his brush; the weaver, his loom; the printer, his press. If, then, he has devoted his whole energy, his whole life, to this, must his life not be also left behind? But if his life have consisted in that which makes character, in strength and clearness of mind, this he will retain to all eternity. Happy he who knows how to discern the things that are seen and transitory, from the things that are not seen and eternal.

The problem must be left, in a certain measure, to each individual. But it may be stated distinctly, and driven home; a man may be implored, for his own sake, to consider it; to be pleaded with in the causes of his own soul, to be beseeched, if he have any pity or compassion, to pity and have compassion upon himself; to listen to the voice of God that speaks in the heart of each; to regard the promptings of the Divine Spirit, to listen to the Wind of Destiny calling our souls into the Great Deep of the Will of God.

6. *Pleasure versus Utility*.—Utility, the mental element, the Secret of Divine Guidance! Ah, to be true utilitarians! To cut off every useless physical impulse and passion! Ah, to judge of everything according to its divinest uses, in spite of custom, society, prejudice, and lust! Ah, to shake off the fetters that chain our souls! Ah, to seek the purer air of light and strength! Ah, to awake to the infinite dignity of being Gods. Ah, to let each action contribute to eternal accomplishment.....

Foiled by our fellowmen, oppressed, outworn,
 We leave the cruel world to take its way,
 And, Patience, in another life, we say,
 The world shall be thrust down and we upborne.
 And will not then the immortal armies scorn
 The world's poor routed leavings, and will they
 Who failed under the heat of this life's day
 Support the fervour of the heavenly morn?
 Nay: the energy of life may be
 Kept on beyond the grave, but not begun;
 And he who flags not in the earthly strife,
 From strength to strength advancing, only he,
 His soul well-knit, and all his battles done,
 Mounts, and that hardly, to eternity.

MEDITATION SECOND.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.

The subject of mental development may be best discussed under seven heads. First, Psychology. Second, Inter-relation of Mental Freedom and Control over the Body. Third, Freedom of Thought. Fourth, Control of Body. Fifth, Control of Intellect. Sixth, Independence of Soul. Seventh, Present Immortality.

1. *Psychology*.—It is plain that, before using terms, we must define them; and a definition of psychological terms implies a provisional psychology. The sevenfold division of the Nature of Man may be simplified into a threefold division: (1) The Body, or that which is assumed at birth and dropped at death. (2) The Intellect, a growth of the former, around (3) The Spirit, the Eternal Part. In short, we may oppose the Passions, Senses and Affections on one part, and the Mind or Reason on the other.

In all persons, more or less, both of these elements are present. Yet the Body is generally predominant, and especially in early childhood, the mind is almost wholly quiescent. The body grows of itself. The Mind needs conscious development. In short, the mind grows by struggle; the body, by drifting. The

problem of life is to evolve the mind so that it will first be distinct from it, and second, will control it, finally becoming wholly independent and self-depending.

This distinction between the Passions and Reason may be made more plain by contrasting the two poets, Walt Whitman, the poet of the Flesh, and Matthew Arnold, the poet of the Spirit. Walt Whitman preaches the doctrine of Bestiality, not negatively, but positively, consciously, ferociously. Remove it, and you bereave him of his whole message, so he distinctly says. The passions are beautiful, but blindly drifting down circumstance to certain death of the personality. Arnold, the poet of the Spirit, exhorting man to rally the good in himself, warning him that eternal life can only be deserved by conscious struggle, self-control, and dogged persistence. Verily, this life of his father at Rugby showed this forth, developing a character which cannot end at death, as described in "Rugby Chapel."

If this distinction between Flesh and Spirit, Passion and Reason be fully grasped by the mind, we are ready for our second topic, the Inter-relation of Mental Freedom and Control of the Body. We now understand the difference between the carnal, and the spiritual life.

The carnal life is any life, howsoever refined or beautiful, in which in eating, in sleeping, in loving persons and animals, in dealing with persons, in dressing, in working, in amusement, the promptings of the passions are followed, reason being only the helper of the passions, but never daring to guide them, or question them. He eats according to the flavor and delicacy of the food, not his physical requirements. He will commit a crime or tell a lie for the sake of his friends or relations. He sleeps unconsciously, already half-dead, as long as he is sleepy, whether eight hours or ten. He receives the sacraments of the Church because either he was brought up as a child among them, or because when he was in trouble the minister was humane to him, or because he likes aesthetic ritual. He believes firmly what he cannot understand nor investigate; and that which remits his sins, either by magic or upon payment of money. He studies and reads when he is in the mood; he laughs and jokes away his most precious hours and years.

The spiritual life is any life, howsoever hard or lonely, in

which, in eating, sleeping, dealing with persons and animals, the reason, and reason alone, guides, controls, and transfigures each affection, each passion, each instinct. He eats food according to the exact need of his body. He rests his body exactly as much as necessary, no more. He loves Morality, God, and Truth more than all men, all institutions, and all ideals. He mounts to eternity by paying his moral debts, and attaining as much physical, mental, and spiritual cultivation as he can possibly lay hold of. He loves no Church more than truth, morality, and God.

In short, the carnal life, or, Passions ruling Reason, is, by this very fact, immoral, unreasonable, irrational, dogmatic, and insane. In short, the spiritual life is alone moral, rational, reasonably passionate, since all passions are controlled by reason, agnostic, yet eternally searching after further truth. Thus, the spiritual life is both Control of the Body, and Freedom of Mind; either implies the other.

From this insight follow five consequences.

3. *Freedom of Thought.*—From the explanation of what the spiritual life is, it follows that spiritual life can only be fully and successfully led by him who is willing to waive all doctrines, and follow no guidance but his own inner light, or, in other words, the Guidance of the Spirit. Most people say, Dear God, lead me, guide, and teach me; but remember, if you lead or guide me to anything else than what my prejudice or passion holds, or if you teach me any opinion which conflicts with my prejudice, I will have nothing to do with thee. We only want God's guidance to confirm, not alter our opinions. And when I said that a spiritual man must waive all doctrines, I meant not only the doctrines of others, but, primarily, his own.

4. *Control of Body.*—Every portion of the body, every affection, every passion, is good, since God made it. But it is only good in its place; only reasonable, when controlled by reason. The method for controlling the body is the only natural one. Sit still, send the thought into that part of the body, until it obeys. And we want to have the obedience, not only of the nose, until we squint one way, or the centre of the stomach, till we squint another, but the obedience of every portion, not by turning the eyes on it, but by going to it with the mind, which has an interior eye. Persistent practice will accomplish all results, drive away all diseases, and transfigure with light divine.

5. *Control of the Intellect.*—If we are monists,—and many see reason to be monists,—we understand that thought is motion, and motion thought. You cannot quiet the body, without first quieting the mind. You must so discipline your intellect until you can pick up and lay down any thought you please, as your hand would pick up or lay down a book. Memorize facts and sentiments, and drill your mind to follow long series of thoughts. Let your mind be your tool; be not the sport of your thoughts. Be not a bundle of random ideas, as so many men are. You are an eternal spirit, judging of the issues of life and death, and if you are faithful, you shall sit down as one of the Assistant Judges at the Great Day; you shall be your own Judge.

6. *Independence of Consciousness.*—By thus drilling the intellect, and controlling the body, reason will gradually assert itself over the body or passions. The spirit's consciousness will begin to be assimilated to the consciousness of the intellect. A new consciousness will be experienced, which will persist while the body is sleeping, while the body is eating or exercising. Bodily sleep, while the mind is active, sleeplessly meditating on God, day and night, will rest a hundred times more than the old mental death during sleep. And it is not until this eternity of consciousness is attained that sleep will be reasonable, and the body controlled. What, do you expect the body to remain controlled, while the controller is absent, or to all intents and purposes, dead? Need you be surprised if the enemy spoils the tower when the strong man is drunk with physical sleep at his post? Absolute bodily control can never be gained until immortal consciousness is attained, for since we will not permit the body or any passion to go wrong while we are awake or conscious, there is only one way to insure its absolute rightness; eternal consciousness. Liberty is to be bought only at the price of eternal vigilance.

7. *Present Immortality.*—This eternal consciousness is immortality; as much immortality as we will ever get, or can get, or want to get. What is immortality, if not consciousness independent of and surviving the body? Unless immortality or continued consciousness be attained before death, our souls will relapse into unconsciousness after death, just as during sleep. Whether we shall have beyond another chance of developing immortality by association with another body,—I cannot tell,

as I do not know; and I dare not risk my eternal welfare on such a chance. Here, to-day, now, we can be immortal, by the least bit of mental effort, well planned, and carefully and inexorably executed. And he who attains this mental power will immediately come face to face with the facts of the spiritual world, and he will be led into all perfection. Immortality, at the price of so little, just a little mental effort, some little dexterity of the intellect. Ah,

While the hair is black on thy head,
While thy soul still looks through thine eyes,
While the heart still pours
The mantling blood to the cheek,
Sink to thyself, O Youth,
Yearn to the greatness of Nature,
Rally the good in thyself!

MEDITATION THIRD.

REGENERATION.

I come to-day to the central points of Religion. What is this, but a new, a higher life? If it be this, it must be a con-version, a changing of the heart, a new life, a closer walk with God. How shall this be expressed better than by the beautiful metaphor of the "second birth"? A terser word is Regeneration; and as none can see the Lord without this second birth, it is not too much to say none shall see the Lord without Regeneration. True, there is no need of Regeneration for talk about the Lord; and the answer to those who insist that Regeneration is not necessary is as follows: Have you seen face to face God's Holy Ones? Have you heard ear to ear, the very voice of God? Your answer will show whether you have, or not, entered within. Is it not wiser to postpone your doctrine that you can enter Heaven without Regeneration until you have without it attained the same or better results?

Regeneration is then the absolute prerequisite of all actual touch with God. Let us consider it seriously, under eight headings: (1) Difficulty of Subject. (2) Assumptions. (3) Mental Control. (4) Exception. (5) The Four Great Proofs. (6) Weariness and Sleepiness. (7) The Paradisaical Tree. (8) Purity of Heart.

(1) *Difficulties of the Subject.*—There are several difficulties connected with the subject. First, that of the apparently incredible claims which are made for Regeneration by those who have made the experiments for themselves. Absurd as it may seem to develop the power to actually see the Holy Ones, and to hear the very voice of God, it is so. Be not so dogmatic as to call anything impossible, except what you have found to be so by experience. If you are agnostic, be truly agnostic, and refuse to judge till you have experienced for yourself. Tennyson has well answered this difficulty. Gawain ridicules the visions of those who followed the Holy Grail. Arthur answered:—

“Deafer.....and blinder unto holy things,
 Hope not to make thyself by idle vows,
 Being too blind to have desire to see.
 But if indeed there came a sign from heaven,
 Blessed are Bors, Lancelot, and Percivale,
 For these have seen according to their sight.”

Second, that of the nature of the subject. It is difficult to touch, because of social conventions. Remember, however, that the New Testament is full of the matter; and that there is nothing for which a man need be ashamed except sin. To the pure all things are pure—and we may appeal to God if any man blame us in the matter. Our bodies are temples of the Holy Ghost; let us cleanse them boldly, and keep them sweet and clean for him.

2. *Assumptions.*—For the present we must assume the following premises: (1) Regeneration is the secret of successful conduct, and (2) is of the very essence of biology. (3) Physiology shows that it is not only a possible but a normal process of human life. (4) The New Testament teaches it explicitly, and (5) It is the method by which the early church produced the illumination of her converts. (6) History shows it underlies all greatness, and (7) Poetry confirms it. All these statements must be here assumed; further consideration of them can be met in a book called “Regeneration.”*

3. *Mental Control.*—The secret of it is this: We all grant that mental control over every physical function is imperative. But when we come to the most important of all, we hesitate. And yet it is this creative function which, as the most important of

*Published by the Barta Press, 144 High street, Boston, Mass.

all, should be most under control. On account of this pre-eminence of importance, the word Regeneration may be restricted to absolute mental control of our creative powers. Mental control means intelligent use, as the mental element is that of utility. Hence intelligent use means absolute cessation of its exercise for pleasure; and devotion to the creation of unborn generations, or to the re-creation of self. This is regeneration, the second birth, or, re-creation of self.

4. *Exception.*—In the Lord there is neither bond nor free, male nor female, Jew or Gentile, married or unmarried. To all the message comes, without exception. We must harness the Niagara of our energies. Suppose we had a splendid young unbroken colt. Which would be best, to wait until he grew gentle by the normal loss of energy that comes by age, or to break him immediately, to use him, before he grew feeble and old? Let us break our colts young, that they may carry us to the Promised Land.

5. *The Four Great Proofs.*—The four great proofs of Regeneration—that from Senility, from Virility, from Disease, and from Vitality—can only be mentioned, and the reader be invited to study. They will show this: That every physical and mental welfare is bound up with purity. None but the 144,000 white-robed virgins shall be the first-fruits of the earth. None but the maiden Galahad shall behold the Holy Grail, and pass away, crowned in the far spiritual city.

6. *Weariness and Sleepiness.*—To prove the point, shall we even mention the gradual dementia of the libertine, the solitary criminal? Surely, how could a man hesitate? There all evil, here all good. Whether in married or unmarried life, continence will, by increasing vitality, destroy all diseases. No evil consequences can possibly follow—except weariness and sleepiness, at the crucial times of transmutation, when, if a man will but remain active and awake, he shall immediately taste of the fountain of eternal life ascending within him; but if he succumb to the enemy, he shall be spoiled and shamed,—and awake once more to this world, while the dawning consciousness of the other has once more grown uncertain or a fable. None but the pure can be conscious of heaven.

7. *The Paradisical Tree.*—Hard by the river of the Waters of Life grows the Tree of Life, yielding twelve manner of fruits, once a month. Those who shall conquer shall every month

have an increase of power; a new divine germ shall fructify, and a new glory be revealed. So life is no more without a purpose, but crammed full of joy and of opportunity of self-conquest, as each moon waxes and wanes; each day its own opportunities, each hour its conquests over self. Oh, the joy of the battle that shall never be over till victory be ours! Thank God for it, and thank God for a knowledge of its existence, instead of regularly, blindly, falling down before it like a calf or a sheep. Up, know your enemy, and the times of his approach, and slay him.

8. *Purity of Heart.*—Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. Yea, blessed are they. For if a man shall only for a few months remain undefiled, he shall behold the Holy Ones, and he shall himself know that God is in the world.

Let us not deceive ourselves. None shall see God but those who are pure in heart. Over the Gate of Heaven, as over the entrance to the temple at Eleusis, stands written: "Let none but he whose heart is pure enter within the incense-perfumed fane."

MEDITATION FOURTH.

THE EVERLASTING COVENANT.

Although it is true that Regeneration of itself is sufficient to produce all spiritual illumination, yet it will do so only under the condition of the Everlasting Covenant. For Regeneration will of itself sooner or later entail the latter, if the highest life be led. Yet the Everlasting Covenant had best be understood thoroughly to produce the best results. It may then be viewed from the following standpoints: First, the Persistence of Law; second, The Father Present Everywhere; third, Two Ways, Alone and With God; fourth, Form of Covenant; fifth Hearing the Guidance; sixth, The Presence of God; seventh, Conformity; eighth, Few Able to Hear.

1. *The Persistence of Law.*—It would be useless for us to consider the metaphysical problems connected with laws of all kinds. Our only interest here is to notice how the persistence of natural law opens the spiritual path to all, in every age, in every race, in every religion. Hence it is useless to make any claim to special revelation, or to claim exclusive wisdom. For every age Nature, Man and God have been the same; and wherever Man, consciously or unconsciously, has obeyed natural and spiritual law, he has come to a full knowledge of the

Divine. This knowledge is not one which can be sold, or conveyed by one more favorite individual to others. Knowledge of it, without money and without price, has come to all who are ready for it. It is therefore something open and natural to all, and its only condition is obedience of the human will to law.

2. *The Father Present Everywhere.*—The first condition of this universal law is the recognition of the Fatherhood of God. Everywhere the Father is present to all who recognize him, and care to enter into personal relations with Him. The mere doctrine of the Fatherhood of God is but a useless intellectual toy. Yet, if this doctrine be considered from all sides, and practical deductions be made from it, it may be possible to deduce from it eternal salvation. In other words, we can have either first or second-hand religion. Second-hand religion is comparatively useless, except as a party cry, or as food for conceit. First-hand religion, on the contrary, is that which a practical realization of the Fatherhood of God entails, and which by virtue of the persistence of law, has always, and will always be possible to man, and is possible to us here today.

3. *Two Ways; Alone or With God.*—Re-stating the problem in slightly different terms, second-hand religion appears as walking in this world alone, on one's own responsibility, and first-hand religion as communing with the Divine. Second-hand religion is almost as useless as no religion at all; and is not as safe, as it tempts man to self-satisfaction and pride. First-hand religion, the religion that makes us talk of God in our daily lives as well as in our formal devotions, that makes us grasp His hand by day and by night, in joy and in sorrow, this is the only religion worth speaking of.

There are two ways, then, of going through the world. Either "going it alone," or, secondly, proceeding under the guidance of the Divine. If we are "going it alone," we should not be surprised if Providence does not work together with us, if we run the risk of being disappointed, of having sorrow and distress. Why blame God for not providing for us when we do what we want as we want? If we choose our path on our own responsibility, why blame God, and question Him? Ah, He is so good, He knows our needs before we ask Him, and is more ready to hear than we to pray. But if we are "going it alone," what can He do but watch us with sorrow?

If we intend, however, to go through life hand in hand with

Him, he shall guide, support, strengthen and purify with a perfectly powerful hand. "I hold myself so still within Thy loving hand." But if we would walk hand in hand with God, we must remember that we cannot deceive Him. If we want His help, His guidance, His support, we can have it only on condition we accept it. That is, we can only receive it if we agree to the terms of the Everlasting Covenant.

4. *Form of the Covenant.*—The Covenant is called everlasting because it expresses those conditions of natural law which are as everlasting as nature, man and God. While nature, while man, while God, remain as they are, the Covenant between them must necessarily remain the same. The form of the Covenant is as follows. Sit down in silence and solitude, and say:

"I hereby dedicate, and consecrate to Thee, O Eternal Father, myself, and all I hope to have and to be, to Thee, and Thy purposes. I reserve nothing. I am weary of myself and my human purposes. I would do Thy will, and accomplish Thy purposes. But I am blind and weak. Support and guide me, and I promise to obey Thee in everything. Use me as a hand to do Thy will; I only ask to remain Thine forever."

This must be repeated continually, until the soul receives within an assurance that its self-dedication has been accepted; after that nothing remains but obedience. This assurance will come to all whose heart is right, and who persist long enough. But as long as some cherished hope is retained, as long as some sin is retained, so long will the prayer be vain! But whoever knocks sincerely and persistently, to him shall it be opened. It is not too much to say that to get this personal relation to the Father is worth the struggle not only of a week, a month, a year, but of a lifetime. Think of it, to be a child of the Universal King! What a privilege! To know we are in harmony with everything, to know we are right, without peradventure, no more to be groping in the dark, no more to be seeking the truth from one man or another man,—but to have hold of the absolute religion, the absolute truth! Oh, joy; oh, glory. Ah, what a priceless treasure the Everlasting Covenant is!

5. *Hearing the Guidance.*—The value of the Everlasting Covenant is, then, to be able to hear the Divine Guidance. To some it comes easier than to others; but to all it is possible, to all who take it by violence—as the Kingdom of Heaven must ever be. Practice of psychometrising is useful; daily and hourly

watching for intuitions, and telling them apart from impressions—all this is useful and necessary. But above all, to seek the Universal Father with childlike devotion, with burning love, with divine passion. Childlike devotion—here is the great secret for which ages have longed in vain. What is meant here is given at length in the little book called “Of Communion with God.”*

6. *The Presence of God.*—This continual guidance of God becomes little by little the Presence of God, brooding over the whole life, till we, too, become divine. Any one who has once gained access to God need never remain lonely, or wander in darkness. It can be gotten in a day, perhaps; but most human beings die without it—and alas! can the holiest of us say he has gotten as near the Divine as he might? This practice of the Presence of God is of inestimable value to all. It will preserve us pure, and restrain hand and tongue from word and deed we would afterwards prefer not to have said and done. Oh, to live in the presence-chamber of the King, and to be constantly encouraged by the light of His eyes!

7. *Conformity of Will to Law.*—But this state of at-one-ment, of Divine union, can only be gotten by conformity of Will to Law. The secret of life is this, Conformity to the Will of the Blessed Father. If we are in harmony with it, all fights for us; if not, all opposes and retards us. Yea, the stars in their courses fight against us. Disobey God’s will of Gravitation, and you are crushed to powder. Disobey God’s will of Purity, and you shall die a thousand deaths. Learn wisdom; seek and find all laws, physical, mental and spiritual. And behold, in using them and conforming yourself to them, you shall attain all truth.

8. *Few Able to Hear.*—But, say you, if this glorious state of salvation is so easy, so near us, why are more not on it? Why, when deification is in our hands, without money or price, do men persist in paying fees to teachers of spiritual methods, as if they had a monopoly of God? Why persist in wandering through the dark?

Because the price of the Pearl of great value is so high. Which soul is ready to pray, Dear God, take from me all that keeps me from Thee! Are we willing to give up all for God?

*Published by G. W. Jacobs & Co., 113 S. Fifteenth St., Phila.
35c.

Do we not think it worth while? Oh, yes, we say; wait a little, dear Lord; after a while—when it will be too late.

A householder invited guests to a supper. When the supper was ready he sent servants to fetch them. And with one consent they all began to make excuse. One had bought land, another oxen; another had married a wife. And the Lord of the feast said, Go out into the by-ways and hedges and compel them to come in—and I say unto you none of those who were asked shall taste of my feast.

There was once a rich young man, who came to Jesus to learn from him what was necessary for perfection. The answer was, "Sell all that thou hast, give it to the poor, and follow me." The rich young man in sorrow turned away, for he was very rich. And Jesus wept, for he loved him.

Dear Lord, make us ready to come; not to love anything or anybody else less, but Thee more than all else; may I lose all things that I may find all things in Thee, my only joy, my only light, my only desire, my only gladness, my crown, and my peace!

MEDITATION FIFTH

INTELLIGIBLE LIGHT.

Wordsworth in one of his minor poems has used an expression which is often quoted. It is this: "The light that never shone on land or sea." Clement of Alexandria used a like expression—the "intellectual" or "intelligible" light. Shelley speaks of

"That light whose smile kindles the universe,
That beauty in which all things work and move,
That benediction which the eclipsing curse
Of birth can quench not, that sustaining Love,
Which, through the web of being blindly wove,
By man and beast and earth and air and sea,
Burns bright or dim, as each are mirrors of
The fire for which all thirst."

We must speak about a cosmological fact of experience, to which these names, especially the latter, may well be applied. We need not mention the name "astral light," for it has been used in so many senses we may well fear to make confusion worse confounded by applying it to denote something which all may personally have experienced. Let us discuss the question from eight standpoints: First, Cosmology; second, God's Om-

nipresence; third, Spirit with Spirit; fourth, Transfigured Body; fifth, Its Value for Control of the Body; sixth, Its Value for Mental Struggle; seventh, Access to God's Strength; eighth, Practical Methods.

1. *Cosmology*.—In order to understand what the Intelligible Light is, we must consider it from the cosmological stand-point. I cannot repeat the proofs which show that we can only know phenomena or effects with our senses. The cause behind all these varying effects is one, and this is the vitality of creative strength of God. Like a finer atmosphere, it interpenetrates this atmosphere of ours, as Stewart and Tait in their work, the Unseen Universe, explain to be quite possible. In Tennyson's words: "The world is the garment, the vision of Him that Reigns"—the Intelligible Light. This Intelligible Light is the Light which God created before sun, moon and stars, which were formed by the maker's hand from the plastic material, the intelligible Light. It interpenetrates all things, and is the basis of the living process—is the breath which drives consciousness and life to ever increasing organization through evolution. It is strongest when the physical light is weakest, and bursts in on the soul when earthly help is beyond reach. The sun's light buoys up the physical body, when physical darkness quiets the body the Intelligible Light remains clear and undimmed.

2. *God's Omnipresence*.—God is omnipresent—there is no such thing as physical space to spirit, which alone dwells in the time form. The space of God is intelligibility. Think clearly and you are where the thought is. Let this suffice. This Light is intelligible. It is the very union of physical and mental existence; it is monism in its highest sense. Hence this Light, like God, exists everywhere, and can be reached from everywhere by the mind.

3. *Spirit with Spirit*.—The question is: How can a man lay hold on it? Not with his hands, since it interpenetrates the tiniest atom, and he could not grasp it. But he can seize it by its intelligible side, by the forceps of his mind, as it were. Tennyson sets this forth:

"Speak to him, for he hears, and spirit with spirit can meet;
Closer is he than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."

4. *Transfigured Body*.—This explains why prayer is so valuable. Those who with childlike devotion fasten their minds on

God without being conscious of what they are doing, fasten their minds' tentacles on the sphere of Intelligible Light and in their breath draw it in a ray of pure white light into their body until it becomes transfigured, glistening white so as no fuller on earth can whiten. So the mediaeval saints attained illumination almost in spite of themselves. What they did in faith, we can do in knowledge. We can formulate its law and use it for our purposes.

5. *Its Value for Control of Body.*—This leads us immediately to the question, What is the use of it? First, its use for the body. It is impossible to get control of the body until the Divine white light has cleansed every muscle, every nerve, and has driven away all the spirits of darkness that fatten off a man. Ah, how a man is humiliated, when his spiritual sight is opened and he beholds himself oppressed by Legion—obsessed, intoxicated, producing energy only to fatten the spiritual vampires. The temple of the Holy Ghost must be cleansed; the money changers and merchants driven out that a man may own and control his own body.

As soon as man attains this power of going with his mind through his body with the light he is able to create himself anew—that is, to heal himself. It is a mistake—healing cannot occur by dumb luck, by blind trust. It comes, like all good things, by mental discipline; by labour, by the mind's not denying the existence of imperfection, but by purposively and inexorably taking control and cleaning each fibre—the divine white light being healing, restorative, as it is the essence of life. Those whose spiritual eyes are open can see that all the healing that does occur takes place because people stumble on this law by chance. Thus the Intelligible Light means perfect physical health to every man—not to heal another, but each to heal himself, and claim his own divine sonship.

6. *Its Value for Mental Struggle.*—Not only is the Intelligible Light necessary for the body, but also for the mind, which in a certain sense is the bloom, the outgrowth of the body. It assists mental work, strengthens the memory, drives away sleepiness when not wanted, enables the mind to think clearly, and cures all headaches that proceed from imperfect nutrition of the brain tissues.

7. *Access to God's Strength.*—I fear to tell you more of the value of the Intelligible Light lest its marvelous power seem to

you absurd. But I may sum all up by saying that it constitutes God's infinite power, love and knowledge. Whosoever has learned how to gain access to this infinite ocean can at any moment of night or day draw thence all strength, courage and wisdom he needs. As God is omnipotent, so nothing hinders man from being omnipotent but his own reluctance to seek it. Ask and it shall be given to you; seek and you shall find; knock and it shall be opened to you. Open thy mouth wide, says the Psalmist, that I may fill it. God blesses man not according to His omnipotence, but can only bless him according to his receptivity. He who knows how to get this strength need never be in anything but perfect health. You will ask for practical directions how to gain access to it. Here are a few suggestions.

It is not to be had for money; it is to be had by intensity of thought.

Most people can learn to gain access to it in from one to two weeks; all depends upon the person's earnestness. Once access is gained you can never be deprived of it except by your own laziness.

Imagine a dazzling white light—those who have once seen it in vision or reality describe it as golden.

Then concentrate the mind on the white light, and imagine you draw a ray of it from the central sphere of it by your breath, through the nostrils, into the lungs.

As the breath leaves your mind will carry it down into any portion you carry it into, by your mind, but the minute your mind lets go, the light disappears.

If you happen to be blind spiritually you will know you have it by a strong glow, even in the midst of winter. You can thus permanently cure cold feet and hands.

If you persist, draw it through every part of the body, beginning at the feet, and going upwards. But do not do so until you are fairly advanced in Regeneration. If you do this part of it too early, either the light will stick in some one part and you will not be able to go on, or if you succeed it will so inflame the lower nature as to work great harm.

You are absolutely safe, however, in drawing it into the lungs and brain. As soon as you get it here the clearness of mind and thought that results will almost intoxicate you with a delicate fragrant happiness.

And if you continue to succeed the palms of the feet and

hands will, at times of prayer, burn like fire and you will later behold the light in full noon-day. When you do so, you will not need my guidance, your teachers will never more be removed out of your sight, and you will be one of those who shall live forever. God speed that day.

MEDITATION SIXTH.

PRACTICAL METHODS.

What has been said in the former meditations may have sounded to some as vague, intangible ideals; to others, to speak politely, nonsense; to others, absurdity. To others, merely so many words. Yet, realizing the tremendousness of the claim, nevertheless, "I have given you the end of a golden string which, if you will but wind into a ball, within a short while, yea, a very short while, you shall know all truth for yourself, and you shall attain the good of all human desire and attainment."

Notice. The writer has not preached obedience to himself, or belief in what he said. As Whitman does, he bids you stand alone. Make the experiment—none can do that for you. If you succeed in the path he has marked out, you will abandon him immediately, for you shall be immediately, by God Himself, put under the guardianship of one of the Holy Ones of God whose whole duty it shall be to guide, guard and protect you. The writer says this advisedly. No person thinks a pure thought, or restrains himself from an impure deed but that automatically the Divine Spirit assumes guidance over him. Try it, and if you are sincere you shall experience this within.

The truth is free to all—who will conquer it by clear thought and humility. The truth must remain the same as long as man, as nature, and as God remain as they are. In all nations, ages, and races, those who have consciously or unconsciously obeyed these laws have had the natural result, and so it will be to the end of time.

The writer in presenting practical methods deems it wise to refrain from much necessary detail here. If any soul is earnest, God will see to it that the guiders are not wanting. He will confine himself to some generalities which are sufficient to guide unto all truth those who are sincere and determined in their aspirations.

1. *Regular Hours for Devotions.*—Regular hours for devotions are more necessary than a regular hour for eating or sleeping. By the amount of time you consecrate to devotions you will show God how high a valuation you set on Him and eternity.

2. *Mental Gymnastics.*—Do not be afraid of injuring yourself by studying too hard. No man's judgment is safe under the fearful trials of the spiritual life, but he whose mind is balanced by all knowledge. The Bible is sacred; but so also are the Dictionary, the Table of Logarithms, and the Anatomy. Unless your facts are studied you run the danger of being either a crank, a fanatic, or a blind, helpless, superstitious devotee.

3. *Planning.*—Planning is a remarkable help in attaining mental control of the body. Plan every detail beforehand. You thus accustom it to follow the mind, not lead it. Let the body only obey. Plan how much to eat, and let not gluttony or weakness mislead—even harmlessly.

4. *The Divine Light.*—Remember what a marvelous resource you have at hand in the Divine Light. Do not forget to make use of it by day and by night.

5. *The Midnight Hours.*—The midnight hours are the most dangerous in many ways. Forewarned is forearmed. Watch and pray lest ye enter into temptation. Let the hours of danger be hours of spiritual struggle and activity.

6. *Stillness.*—Learn to seek God in the stillness within. All good things proceed from physical stillness and spiritual activity. Calm your body.

7. *The Divine Communion.*—The Divine communion has already been described, incidentally. Sit still, back not leaning against anything, hands on knees, facing the East. Think "will" as the breath enters; "still" as it goes. Draw the White Light. But before starting renew your self-consecration. Do this daily, no matter how little or when; if possible, much and regularly. Fight wandering thoughts and sleepiness. One falling asleep does as much harm as five hours of success. If

you have succeeded you will be told of it by a peace, a calmness, a still joy, that is Heaven.

8. *Bodily Healing.*—Do not deceive yourself about your sickness; but resolutely heal yourself. Insist on perfect health—and it will come; it must come, or you will be barred from many attainments. “*Mens sana in corpore sano.*” It is best not to meddle with others; rather let them be helped to heal themselves.

9. *Value of our Small Possibilities.*—We are but poor and helpless? True; but our slight opportunities are the best we have. Let us not throw away the meat for the shadow. Oh, the infinite value of today! Oh, it will never return. Let us labor today, for the night is coming when no man can work. Let us make the best of the little we have, and let us seek to make the best of the little we are.

10. *Conscious Sleep.*—Conscious sleep is the outcome of mental control. If the master of the house had known at what hour the thief should come he would have prepared his weapons and stood on guard.

11. *Inventiveness.*—Inventiveness is a quality of the spiritual man. No man who is not inventive will ever succeed in conquering himself. Let the rule be to consider success as the judge of method; and a man will need much inventiveness to circumvent the enemy.

12. *Walk with God.*—What is walk with God but childlike devotion? Ah, let us be humble, like little children, cause our prayers to grapple at the throne of God, our Father. Let us with strong crying and tears call aloud to Him Who is Light and Love. Let us walk daily with our Father in simple devotion. Believe me, this will stand you in good stead in the day of temptation. Like little children, may we today and for ever stand in the presence of our Father and our God.

Thy Glory alone, O God,
 Be the end of all that I say;
 Let it shine in every deed,
 Let it kindle the prayers that I pray;
 Let it burn in my inmost soul
 Till the shadow of self pass away,
 And the Light of Thy Glory, O God,
 Be unveiled in the dawning of day.

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SUPPLEMENT.

ON HOW TO CONSERVE THE VITAL ENERGIES.

REGENERATION, THE GATE OF HEAVEN, is a book which seeks to explain the scientific proof for the physical possibility of a life of continence, and showing its beneficent results. The practical aspects and methods of this conservation of Vital Energy will be set forth in a Second Part, the chapters of which will be issued serially in this magazine as supplements to each number, or as parts of it, until the book is finished. If these sheets are preserved they can be bound together, forming a volume, the second part of Regeneration. All those who have the First Part will want to have the Second also. Preserve your sheets. The price of the Second Part, when complete, will be \$1.25.

CHAPTER XI.

REGENERATION IN CONSERVATION.

1. *Natural Limitations of Energy.*—In considering the methods of making the most of our energies of life, it is well to realize their natural limitations.

In the first place, it is evident that it is impossible to increase the capital of energies which by his time of birth and surrounding circumstances may have fallen to the lot of any one individual. Vital energy is too subtle an element to be tampered with, manufactured, or multiplied. It is part of the inherent property of protoplasm, and depends on the life-processes of the organized being, being the nascent psychic element. The racial element will inevitable set limits of growth and decay. Plants grow to a certain size, and then cease growing in that way, but begin to develop in another. These bounds are yet inscrutable. Direct increase or manufacture of energy is therefore still impossible, and must be left out of account.

In the second place, none will deny that the average individual of to-day does not possess as much brute physical energy as the average human being of earlier stages. Howmuchsoever better organized a Caucasian may be, an African possesses a far greater and more powerful animal nature. His sexual nature has more energy at its command, and forms perhaps a greater part of the life than with the more refined, chastened Aryans. This is shown by Africans' frequent crimes against chastity, and by their magnificent singing voices which, as in birds at pairing time, betray the impulses and desires of the body.

It would seem, therefore, that whatever methods of increase of power should be adopted, direct increase was impossible. If this be true, then the only hope for increased life can be

the preservation and exploitation of the energy that is present, actual or potential.

2. *The Exploitation of Energy.*—The problem of life may, therefore, be said, not to increase our energies, but to make the best use possible of them. This implies first the preservation of them from all waste, the stopping of all leaks. This done, it may be feasible to begin to think of making the best use possible of them. To this first question this Chapter is devoted: how to stop all leaks of Vital Energy.

This really, in more senses than one, is the great question of questions, how to preserve, not only Vital Energy, the quintessence of what makes life worth living, but all other things and processes helpful to life. The goodness of God consists in his preserving the world, avoiding all waste of life, as well as creating the Universe. "A bruised reed will he not break, and the smoking flax will he not quench." The Conservation of Energy therefore makes a threatened cataclysm, such as many religious fanatics expect, improbable. God never destroys; he builds up, he preserves, and makes the best possible use of everything, suggesting to those who listen to His word methods how to save themselves and the world.

Returning to Vital energy, we see that this thought solves the temptation which meets almost every earnest beginner in the higher life. If vital energy is good, why not increase it by drugs, such as will stimulate the sexual organs? The fact is that for one who really needs to increase his vital energy by sun-baths, or the like, there are ninety and nine who need to know how to preserve that which they have already. And what is the use of increasing the vitality before all leaks have been stopped? Is it not likely that it would be only, the more energy produced, the more wasted? Therefore, before even thinking of producing more energy, the first thing to do would be to exclude all possibility of wasting any of it, and then if any new energy was to be gotten, it would not be lost. A purse should have no holes; how foolish would he be thought who did not stop its holes, rather than endeavor to keep money in it by replacing in it continually new money.

3. *Nature of the Leak.*—In speaking thus generally of vital energy it has not been made plain just what is meant by this term. In a certain sense it might be said to cover that feeling of well-being which is destroyed by physical exhaustion consequent upon physical labor. But this would not be so much vital energy as good nourishment of the muscles. Vital energy is, so to speak, a qualitative feeling which persists even when the body may be very tired from physical exhaustion. It is something more lasting than the immediate accident of physical exhaustion; it comes more slowly, but persists longer than the momentary states of feeling. It is, as it were, the color in

which the world appears to the individuality, and hence has a far more direct effect on mental states than physical momentary weariness.

The leak to be sought is then not a leak of physical weariness merely. Of course, even this should be carefully attended to. There is much useless labor which many perform. Much excitement, much confusion, might well be dispensed with. But, after all, as long as the vital energy remains intact, physical expenditures of the kind are soon recovered from, and are of little if any permanent significance.

The leaks to be stopped are those by which the concentrated nerve-energy, the mood-coloring dependent on the feeling of sexual continence and potential life-energy may be retained within the body.

The possibilities of loss of energy are then two-fold. First, the direct physical loss of the sexual secretions. The effects of this is not felt for at least eight hours, in its most far-reaching consequences. There is a certain amount of humiliation and weakness which accompanies the act; the sense of pressure in the vas deferens is gone, and consequently there is weaker innervation there. But it is after eight or more hours that the lassitude, and mental discouragement affect the individual; the "acute" occurrence of what is chronic in continued dissipation and consequent incipient dementia, such as physicians are acquainted with in extreme cases of gonorrhoea, or the like.

The second kind of loss that may occur is not marked by any physical sign, such as presence of the "Gone" outside the penis, or within the urethra. It is a direct loss of the energy in its highest vitalized state, such as occurs only eight hours or so after physical loss. It is accompanied by the same absence of sense of pressure, apparently, that is, by some feeling very much like it. It occurs after sleep, usually the "dead" sleep which many experience at times. That such a psycho-physical loss occurs is the only solution of the fact that often the dead sleep, even if prolonged, and even sometimes the more prolonged it is, leaves a sense of exhaustion, whereas often short sleeps of a much less dead description are possessed of great recuperative powers. These experiences are so common and universal that they need only be mentioned. And their only explanation can be that during heavy sleep such a psycho-physical loss takes place.

The fact of such losses is certain, whatever the explanation of them be. Those who have any vision into the spiritual realm will not need to be told; whereas those who do not possess such vision would not believe if told of the cause of it. Suffice it, however, that these losses do occur in sleep, whereas they do not occur in the waking state.

How far can either of these two sources of loss be avoided? If the physical loss occur during the waking state, none but

the individual himself is responsible. It may occur in sleep. The psycho-physical loss can alone occur in sleep. It would then seem necessary, in order to stop these two leaks to control the sleeping state. The question then is, how to keep control during sleep?

4. *Vampirism*.—It is not strictly accurate to say that this psycho-physical loss occurs in sleep only. It does occur sometimes in the waking state, but this occurs rarely, and can be avoided easily. This psycho-physical energy is the magnetic element about a personality, and can be communicated by touch of the hand, or any angular or pointed part of the body. This is the reason why we shake hands, the union of our vital energies. So the touch of some hands are healing, and in fact massage is dependent on this to a great extent. The ancient King David's method of keeping young by merely having a young woman to "comfort" him, without any sexual intercourse, by mere physical touch, by day or night, was dependent on this. So lovers "pet" each other, which would be a useless operation if there were no vital energy transfused in this physical contact. This is the reason of the "affection" of pets, dogs, for instance. In fact, a person who is at all sensitive can with the hand or any part of the body "feel" the snout of a dog even when physical contact has not yet occurred. So it seems "cold" to sit far apart, whereas, even without physical contact, to sit close together gives a sense of intimacy which can only be explained by some such hypothesis. Vital energy is however transfused or lost in kisses to a far greater extent than by mere touch of the hand, and on this account lovers "enjoy" each others' kisses, which would be either a delusion or a lie if it were the mere contact of muscle with muscle. The older and more decrepit a dog becomes, the more "affectionate" he becomes; that is, the more he presses up against one, and prolongs the contact. It is mere vampirism.

That this vampirism is a fact is proved by the medically-recognized injury which is inflicted on children who sleep together with older people. Their vitality is absorbed, sucked in, by the stronger. This is the secret of the instinctive turning away of children from some people, and their attraction to others.

In order to avoid this psycho-physical loss during waking hours, it is only necessary to preserve oneself from the touch of human beings, yea, even to insulate properly one's bed, so that the electrical currents of the earth may not disturb one when lying passively. But this is for the most part in the power of anybody; so that there is no need of discussing this at length.

If then Vampirism explains waking losses of psycho-physical energy, what shall explain the losses during sleep? It has already been said that in a work like this there is no need to

MY WAY OUT TO FREEDOM

Being Critical Studies on the Creed and the Resurrection and Reasons Why I Left
the P. E. Church Organization.

By *Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, A.M., Harvard, Ph.D., Tulane.*
Author of *The Message of the Master, The Philosophy of Plotinos*
Regeneration, Of Communion with God, etc.

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WHY I MUST LEAVE ❁ ❁ ❁

THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL ❁ ❁

ECCLESIASTICAL ORGANIZATION. ❁



KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE,
A. M. Harvard, M. A. Sewanee, Ph. D. Tulane.

Why I Must Leave The Protestant Episcopal Organization.

On taking the serious step of forsaking the sheltering arms of that Protestant Episcopal Mother which we all love, I owe it to my friends to make a concise but accurate statement of those principles that have animated me. The past confidence, affection, and loyalty of these friends deserves a reciprocal openness and confidence.

This statement is not headed, Why I must leave the Church, because I neither am leaving nor could leave the Church. Out of the pure and spotless Church of the Living God, of the God of all the prophets, all the saints, all the saviours, of all the ages and races, and Who still speaks through His prophets today, no man can drive me. God alone can, and to Him am I ready to answer on the Day of Judgment.

But I desire to state here at length those reasons that have moved me to sever my connection with that civil institution recognized by law in the United States as the Protestant Episcopal ecclesiastical organization. Why should I leave it? Do I not owe it some loyalty?

Loyalty, properly speaking, can only be reckoned as existing toward some one ideal to which a man has devoted himself; as, for instance, to a nationality, or to an organization, or to an individual. My loyalty must be judged wholly according to the standard I have set for myself.

If a man identifies himself with an organization, it is proper he should conform to its rules and regulations. If certain problems connected with its principles are full of difficulty, let him "stop thinking," till his mind is diverted from them, or some probable theory has suggested itself. And thus irrespective of the actual validity of the grounds of argument, a man can, with tolerable mental integrity, belong to the most different organizations; as, indeed, is the case, in the several Christian denominations.

But if a man identifies himself with a principle, he will connect himself with an organization only as a means. He will abide in the one so long as it forwards that principle, no more and no less. His loyalty to truth, to intellectual light, suffers no rival's

existence. All organizations are only means through which he works; he owes no loyalty to them, any more than a workman owes loyalty to the tool he employs in laboring. He will pick it up, use it, reject it, and select another in the degree that utility dictates. The work, the purpose is the only object of his loyalty.

The aim to which I have consecrated my life is Truth. If I remain loyal to that, I have fulfilled my destiny. I know of no loyalty to any organization. I have no more compunction in stepping from one organization to another than the laborer would have to change pick for shovel. As long as I remain loyal to the truth, I am well pleased.

If the clergy generally should spend less of their time and energy in seeking preferment, and more in analysing what they preached, it were better for all concerned. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that a clergyman who consciously or unconsciously has made worldly success his object, or the success of the Church—should with blind obedience, accept and preach any doctrine set forth by the religious body to which he has subordinated himself, and through which he seeks preferment. Only he who insists on absolute, literal, and unevasive truth, success or no success, will either have the strength of mind or the courage of heart to forsake the land of his fathers, and to seek the land only promised by faith in the guidance of the Supreme.

What is Truth? Investigation. The only crime against truth is to stop investigation. How easy, after a man has attained a settled and comfortable position, to stop thinking! How easy, amidst the pleasures of the home, the smile of the bride, and the kiss of the babe, to be lulled by mental laziness! How easy to rest content on the oars of a course of study, basking amidst the smiles of approval of the brethren, and of an affectionate congregation! But he who would be loyal to truth must overcome all these temptations, and must think continually. However correct his opinions, if a man has ceased thinking, investigating, he may be sure he is on the wrong road. Self-gratification is the grave of investigation. And self-gratification is death. Life is thought; thought is life.

The very fact that is the Church's formularies and symbols are fixed unalterably, and present a "dead line" beyond which all thought is contraband, deadens, partially at least, thought. To be loyal to investigation, to thinking, to truth—this loyalty conflicts with adherence to any standard.

Let us paraphrase this into the religious dialect. Is it not a farce to pray to God after this fashion: "Dear God, I pray thee to inspire me, and to reveal me thy truth. But remember, if thy revelation is not orthodox, I will have none of it." And yet this is in substance the meaning of those who, while bound

to a certain symbol, pray for the inspiration and revelation of God. It is an insult to God. But, "God is not mocked;" for after Death is the Judgment.

But, all things considered, what is the use of the inspiration or revelation of God, if orthodoxy is once for all revealed? Once the orthodox creed is made, there is no more need, according to this position, for the Holy Spirit. But for each man to cease desiring the inspiration and revelation of God is to resign himself to mental and spiritual death. "Lead, Kindly Light, o'er moor and fen," until the night be done.

Restless Investigation, is truth, as far as man can attain it. How many books there are which those who are weak in the faith are advised not to read! Miserable condition, is that not, to be right in belief only because some book has not been read! The truth can take care of itself; read not only one book, but all books. Why taboo the works and hesitate to mention some of the world's greatest writers, because they held different opinions? Investigate every shade of belief, every scientific statement; if a thing be true, it will stand every scrutiny, and the more it is investigated, the more will it be vindicated. If it be false, the sooner it is known to be so, and is rejected, the better for all concerned, even if it be dearly loved. Let us have the truth, before all things!

Moreover, if Christianity be truth, can any truth be foreign to Christianity? What is to be feared from science, and from the results of science, if, indeed, truth be the business and end of Christianity? If all truth be all Christianity, then must all Christianity be all truth? Study anatomy, physiology, geology, chemistry; work them out to the fullest extent; for God is the God of Truth, not the God of Prejudice, or Tradition, as said the early Fathers. Tradition is well enough for a working hypothesis till the scientist is the instrument of the Holy Spirit in revealing new truth; but as soon as the truth is found, let it be accepted joyfully, and not, if at all, sordidly and unwillingly. The scientist is an apostle of the Divine Revelation in the world.

Investigate. Investigate even the facts of tradition. Nay; the more sacred a fact is, the more important is it, the more serious the scrutiny to which it should be subjected. Humanity can afford mistakes in minor matters; but in the momentous, the crucial, the fateful interests of religion, no man can afford to risk his salvation on an error, on a misstatement, purposive or otherwise; or on a pious forgery.

The facts of traditions are subjects for historical inquiry, not for symbolic statement. Only history can decide whether Jonah was swallowed by the whale, or Balaam's ass spake. A rational being cannot "believe," on the pain of heresy, or damnation, in such matters, any more than in a problem of quadratic equations. Working hypotheses have to be made, but these are not matters of "faith;" they are subject to revision at the hands of historical science alone. Did such a

thing take place, or did it not take place? That is a question of investigation, of the photograph, of the phonograph, not of "orthodoxy" or "heresy." What, salvation dependent on a result of historical inquiry? On adherence to Philonic metaphysics? On Ptolemaic astronomy? On Pauline exegesis? On Aramaic hermeneutics? Truth is something higher and broader in scope and possibility than all that. True Faith rests on no historical fact that may or may not be discovered; it rests on the soul's acceptance of a higher moral vision, of a diviner standard of action, as the law of its being; faith is the recognition by a soul of its own divinity; divinity as its destiny.

The greater number of the facts of tradition are so remote in time and place that any convincing and satisfactory scientific investigation is out of the question. No physician would risk a patient's life with a potion which had not undergone the most serious scientific scrutiny. But the soul is risked on traditions which can never be proved or disproved, for lack of scientific evidence. Penny-wise, and pound-foolish! The eternal interests are staked on something that cannot be investigated, and of which any investigation is resented; while the body is trusted in the hand of only the most skilled physicians!

If every one of the facts of tradition could have been recorded with a photograph and phonograph, under proper scientific restrictions, it were possible and justifiable to stake eternity on them, as it were possible to do on the statement that twice two is four. Ah! to know what actually did take place in the past, and especially in the case of occurrences of which seriously conflicting traditions are the only reports! But at best, that is the business of scientific historical investigations, not of heretical prosecutions and damnations of the soul.

Salvation must be something broader than that. It must be possible for every human being, whether he have studied history or not; whether we have come in contact with emissaries of some particular school, or not. It must be possible and rational to all generations, whether they lived before or after any particular event. It must be just as true if all the past were wiped out. "The aids to nobler life are all within." Sublime, austere morality; the inspiration of the Divine Spirit; the grace given to earnest prayer; these are the same in all times and ages; these alone are eternal.

Because of the facts of the spiritual life, the wildest superstitions have been revered; so religious is the soul of man, that even the merest element of truth attracts him, though surrounded and vitiated by senseless tradition. Superstitions have risen and fallen, and will rise and fall; but these facts alone live forever, in spite of the most absurd formulations which weigh them down. For this reason men defend their superstition: for to their minds these eternal elements are bound up with their traditions, and they fear that destruction of their tra-

ditions means destruction of the spiritual light. But they need not fear; nothing that is true, that is essential can be lost; ten thousand years hence, though a hundred superstitions rise and fall, school-children will know that twice two is four. So will they know that the Inner Light is the only hope of man; so will they en throne inexorable righteousness above "the howling senses' ebb and flow." Whatever is temporal, must pass away; no event in time can persist; only laws of nature survive; and laws of nature are only expressions of the Divine will: Salvation is too vital to depend on any historical event. It depends on the recognition, knowledge, and adaptation of the laws of the Divine Will. Any doctrine which must be defended passionately; which leads to uncharitableness; nay, to persecution, torture, the devastation of continents and the consignment to hell-fire of infants and millions of millions of souls; is adventitious. The scientist is calm. He knows that the truth will tell itself. His only business is to recognize and publish it. It will live in spite of every opposition. He has no need to use the thumbscrew and the rack, and to preach tolerance only when powerless. In spite of the numberless superstitions which have claimed the devotion of man, man has remained the same. Humanity mocks superstitions. The Pyramids have looked down on a hundred generations. The very fact that man is the same in every country, every period, that he has ever striven upwards, according to his lights; that to-day he passionately defends, with equal sincerity, the most contradictory views, proves that the only permanent element is man himself. Whatever the opinions, the soul is within; inexorable righteousness points Godward from every soul. Each man holds a different opinion of what is righteous; but righteousness, guilt, duty, inspiration, and beatific vision; these are universal. Is it denied that man has remained the same, even in historic times? That he grows, develops? Then the final end and perfection of man cannot occur in the middle of the process. Either in the beginning or at the infinitely distant and glorious fruition of the process of evolution. His salvation cannot depend on a historical occurrence that has been left behind by century after century. In every stage of growth the element of development remains the same; and to partial stages, partial light is sufficient. But when that which is perfect is come, then shall we also know as we are known. Salvation is the same in all ages, in all places: Upward! Higher! Better! Truer! Stronger! Wiser! More beautiful! More fragrant! Gentler! Tenderer! Humbler! Diviner!

Morality, first. But, do you object that morality is not sufficient? True; but see to it that you have morality, at least. Surely "ethical" culture is not sufficient any more than physical or intellectual culture. It is "spiritual" culture that is wanted. But there is no foundation for it other than morality. "In the sublimest flights of the soul rectitude is never surmounted, love is never outgrown." Be not only moral; but be sure you are

fully moral. See that your life is put in order, see that your ways are amended, see that your character be firm, see that your moral ideal be at least sensibly approached to, before you object to the preaching of morality. There is something wrong in any doctrine that makes morality secondary or uncomfortable, or whose prime requisite and practical insistence is not morality; that lays the primary stress on anything else than morality. Theories? No; they are useless. The only proof of the fruit of the tree is the fruit itself. The only proof of morality is the fact that to all around him the soul of man's light shines. The congregation that is moral should be such that it were possible for a stranger to say: "That man belongs to that parish because of the character of his actions." And so long as there are people of blameless walk outside, so long as some of the most conscientious unbelievers are more moral, by general consent, than some of the professors, so long is that profession partial hypocrisy. "Let your light so shine that men may see your good works" (not only in the alms-bason) "and glorify your Father which is in heaven."

The only Gate of Heaven is morality; nothing less, though indeed, much more, perhaps. Inexorable righteousness; that is the price of admission to the Beatific Vision.

But, say you, inexorable righteousness is "too hard?" Do you want a "comfortable" doctrine for those whose lives are not in order, and have not the slightest intention of conforming them to the Divine Pattern shown in the Mount? To those who flatter their sins by strenuously insisting that it is impossible to become perfect? Who shift their responsibility to "original sin" and that innocent soul accused of successfully bargaining in morality with the source of all morality? What, can righteousness ever coexist with "comfortableness?" The truth is that those who plead for a comfortable doctrine are practically, whether consciously or not, seeking to give eternal salvation to persons, without asking them to give themselves the trouble of leaving their sins. It is the most fiendish immorality, inasmuch as it endeavors to destroy the belief in morality itself. But God is not mocked. What a man sows, that also shall he reap. And those who preach that "comfortable" doctrine will by the very fact of doing so be blinded to the truth for a long period. The divine retribution will visit them inexorably.

Can righteousness coexist with any sort of vicariousness? Is it not as immoral to free the sinner as to punish the innocent? Can any man enter heaven on the shoulders of any other man? Can true love ever conflict with or soften justice? No. True love will insist on inexorable justice, tooth for tooth, eye for eye; since only through such means can souls be trained in prevision, to become as fixed in character and as inflexible as God Himself. This is the highest love of God, and is inexorably just, giving to each according to his works. His dealing may be a source of terror to the evildoer.

comfort to the righteous. Love that in any way antagonizes the fullest measure of justice is only immorality, covered with sheep's clothing. Divine love is inexorable justice; and inexorable justice is Divine love. Justice is love in this, that man is by grace assisted to choose freely, whether he will do what will bring punishment, or what will bring reward. And as he is punished and rewarded his character develops, and he becomes able to be himself. The only thing one man can do for another, or that God can do for man is to help the latter to help himself. Thus, as man pays his debts, and pays the full price for every sin he has committed, are his sins remitted, and his offences forgiven. And as one man furnishes the sinner with the opportunity of paying his debts, and incites him to do so by teaching, by comfort, and by example, does and can he alone remit or forgive the sinner's sins. But this fearful responsibility for sin is only the reverse of the possibility of merit, of spiritual attainment. Unless the sinner were punished, he could not be rewarded. Hence a vicarious forgiveness of sin, and a complementary reward to admission to heaven, is an absurdity of the wildest kind. It is in this matter that any religious system which preaches remission of sins in any sense other than here suggested is actually preaching naked immorality. And though some of the theological systems of the world have for generations been in practice, at least, doing their utmost to uproot morality, yet the latter is so innate in man that it has survived all thumbscrews, racks, and fat benefices.

Is it impossible to become perfect? Then see to it that you become better than you are to-day; that you become "more perfect." Keep a record, and demonstrate your improvement scientifically. "Poor Richard" was not far wrong. It is not that you immediately become "perfect," but that you strive, struggle, laboriously "cultivate" yourself. That is the meaning of spiritual "culture." As long as a soul struggles, strives, seeks to realize its own ideals, and consciously seeks to broaden them, by study, reflection and inspiration, so long is that soul on the straight and narrow way. Do the best you can; angels can do no more. But see to it that what you do is your best; you may deceive others and yourself, but the Awful Eyes are watching you day and night, and cannot be deceived. The musician practices till tears come in the eyes; till the muscles be wholly altered, and complains not. The laborer in some factories for a little wage will work with poisons that are sure to kill him in a few years; and yet, is it too much to ask, that the sincere spiritual self-cultivator shall even endanger his temporary comfort? Work while it is day; for the night is coming, wherein no man can work.

The night is coming. All run in the race, but not all are crowned. How many die, evidently unfit to stand in the presence of God. Many will fail in the examinations of life. Whether another trial will be given them, and whether those who have

succeeded here will be promoted to a still higher examination, we know not; we can only hope. But we do know that many will fail in this examination. "Straight is the gate, and narrow is the way * * * and few there be that find it." "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; not every one." There is no greater mistake than to suppose that every professor of the doctrine will be saved by accepting it. That, eventually, all will be saved, even if so as by fire, is a pious hope which we need not scruple to profess openly. But, so far as we know here, so far as we are certain beyond peradventure, here and to-day is the opportunity for improvement, for perfection. Here it is that each man's ideal must be striven towards, and measurably approached. This opportunity gone, we know not what shall happen. But we are certain that those whose lives are not conformed to the Divine standard before death must certainly "suffer loss." Let each work out his salvation "in fear and trembling."

And let that salvation be worked out here. If there is opportunity for future sanctification, your present sanctification will be only so much gained. If there is not, you are safe. So, in any case do your duty by yourself here. It is the only business-like course.

Does this deny immortality of the soul? Nay! Immortality of the spiritual self is so sure, to those who have any spiritual knowledge, that it is no more a matter of discussion. Immortality of the conscious soul is something to be attained; something very real, something within our grasp. But beyond and above this, the spiritual germ or vortex of divine life, can never be destroyed by merely dropping the garment of the flesh. Immortality does not depend on any doctrine. It anticipated and will survive all forms of doctrines; all absurd, if authoritative, formulations. The most narrow are the first to squirm when the traditional standards are pressed home in their historical significance, not their present day interpretation.

But why, it is urged, should a man forsake the Church when he is in a position in which he can do much good? In which he can preach and teach the truth—granting it to be such—to advantage from within, while from without he could never reach the same people? For the sake then of those who need the truth, who are entitled to it, stay within, and teach and preach. In fact, a man who insists on morality and spirituality has a much truer right to be within the Church than many who profess to be the most stanch supporters of it. He is much more in accord with the early methods and practice of the Church, than they. Supposing the man in question is forced to keep still about certain things; to interpret some details. What then? For the sake of those whom he can help, let him deny himself.

But the answer to all this is that one of Mrs. Browning:
 "Leave results to God; but you be clean."

Again, Matthew Arnold's words are brought up:

"And when my ill-schooled spirit is aflame,
 Some nobler, wider stage of life to win,
 I'll stop and say: There were no succor here;
 The aids to noble life are all within."

Why then move? Truly, this may be applied to laymen, who may take or leave as much as they please, and can remain silent. But for the clergyman, who must continually teach and preach; who must continually commit himself, it is impossible.

Another objection to a man's forsaking the Church with which he is connected is the harm which he might inflict on it, and on those persons who have honored him with their confidence, and on those principles he has most at heart. First, he will inflict but little, if any, harm on the Church by leaving it. Granted that the man in question is not conceited enough to suppose that he is some great one, history shows that however intelligent or moral the man who has left a Church, the effect has at best been temporary, local, and personal. The great majority of church-goers, at least in the Catholic churches, though they may join a Church through personal confidence in the man who represents it to them, nevertheless make it a social, a practical part of their lives, and though congregations may temporarily be injured, in the long run those who belong to a congregation will remain with it whether the head of it is disgraced, or not. The man who leaves the Church must also remember that a great number, if not the greatest number of his supposed admirers, will never take the trouble of investigating the full merits of the case for themselves. The fact that he is disgraced will be sufficient to deprive him of the practical support of the greater number of the parishioners. Moreover, if the man happen to be only an assistant minister, his departure will hardly be noticed by those members of the congregation who are accustomed to judge a man, not according to his merits, but according to his position. Second, he will inflict little, if any harm on those who have honored him with their confidence. If they are relying for their salvation, and for their knowledge of the truth on a man, whosoever he be, the sooner they are taught to put their reliance on none but God, so much the better for them. Indeed, there are always some members of a congregation who seek to enter heaven on the shoulders of the minister; and the sooner these are dropped on the hard ground, so that they may learn to walk on their own feet, the better for them. And surely, if any man places his confidence in any other for any reason other than that they believe the man is looking for the truth—if, for instance, they trust in him as a business and social success, the sooner such kind of "confidence" is destroyed, the better for all. Put not your trust in princes, but in God alone. Third, he will inflict little damage on the principles he really has at heart.

Doubtless, this is the most serious of the dangers of the course of a man who is willing to sacrifice his all for the truth. It has been already noticed that the great majority of religious people accept a given theology merely because they suppose that morality is bound up with it. And when they find a man opposing their theology, they consequently suppose that he is also opposing, consciously or unconsciously, the morality they suppose is bound up with their form of belief. Consequently the man who leaves a Church because he sees that its formularies not only do not produce morality, but contain morality only in spite of themselves, and sometimes explicitly preach immorality, will be in danger of being misunderstood by those who are sufficiently innocent of learning to identify their theology with the purest form of morality. Doubtless, to them, the man who separates himself for the sake of morality, will seem to be immoral, and to antagonize morality. But this evil effect is not the fault of the more enlightened man, but of the less enlightened people; and if any harm is done to them, it is their own fault. Doubtless there are many sincere and devout souls, who have not the ability, even if they have the will to learn better; but, after all, a man may be required to produce arguments, but not to furnish brains, too, for his hearers. If it is not their fault, then, that a bad impression is produced, it is their own misfortune.

Many of the clergy—at any rate as many as have sufficiently limited acquaintance with the technical history of the Church and its formularies—and the greater part of the laity, would agree with the crucial importance of morality, and other principles enunciated in this paper. But they will say, why leave the Church on the account of morality? Is not this morality what the Church is driving at? Cannot the standards of the Church be interpreted with sufficient laxity to permit the fullest preaching of such principles? Is it not, in fact, the case that most modern preachers who gain popularity or reputation are the very ones who so interpret the formularies? For my own part I should say that it may be possible for a man to do so. I would be the last man to endeavor to fasten on the Church the unfair methods of Athanasius and the ecclesiastical councils, the immoral doctrines of Augustine and Thomas of Aquino, the immoral stories and lax business principles, and the imprecatory psalms of the Hebrews, the unequalled tortures, persecutions and wars of religions, or the immorality of the historic sense of the Thirteenth Article of Religion. I should be perfectly willing to maintain that the Church “at heart,” or the “true” Church is consistent with, and helpful to the most enlightened morality. I would be perfectly willing simply to avoid certain errors, absurdities and impossibilities as to matters of fact in standards and formularies. The only trouble, but the sufficient one, is, that those men who represented the Church to me when I was admitted understood it not so, being satisfied with dubbing their opinions “facts,” and refusing to entertain any “theories” or *et*

planations, or authentications of these so-called "facts." This is a cheap but effective means of deceiving one's own mind, and disguising bold refusal to think. Doubtless, it would be possible for me to merge their personalities into official representatives of the Church, so that although they themselves were innocent of learning or mistaken, nevertheless they acted only as agents for the supposititious "true" Church, or "heart" of the Church. But it remains that my admission was in the light of a personal contract between them and me, and I would never have been admitted except on this basis; so that, although I might now interpret my admission in some other way, yet at the time of the occurrence, that was the interpretation they held. Hence I must be bound by it. If any other agent of the Church is willing to readmit me on the wholly liberal interpretation, I for my part would be willing to sacrifice much mental comfort, by using language that needed interperation, so as to retain fellowship with the Church I love so well. But though the bishops in the Lambeth Conference promulgated a Quadrilateral, and many bishops would be willing to retain men within the Church on that basis, yet none would be willing or able, perhaps, to abide by it in admitting a man to the Presbyter-ship. This double standard was well exemplified by the proposal for reunion with other larger Christian bodies on the basis of the Quadrilateral, although no motion was made—at least no successful motion—for union with the small Reformed Episcopal Church, which was perfectly willing to accept it. The fact is that there is a great difference between the Quadrilateral as a succinct epitome of the Thirty-nine Articles, and the Quadrilateral as interpreted by the best scholarship. It was this difference which frustrated all attempts at Church unity.

It is in respect to the clause, "interpreted according to best scholarship," that the shoe pinches. All clergy in the Episcopal Church are willing to accept the Bible as the sole and sufficient standard of faith. But at any rate those who admitted me to the Presbytership qualified this "sufficiency" by a certain "interpretation" of the Bible. One of them, a very saint of God, distinctly stated that only the Church's interpretation of the Bible was meant by that Article of Religion, since, said he, "men of all shades of belief have justified themselves by appeal to the Bible." But was not this begging the question? The faith is to be proved by the Bible; but the Bible is only to be used as interpreted by the faith! Imagine a cashier gravely pretending to straighten out his cash in accordance with the written record of transactions, after he had "interpreted" the record, so as to agree, even in its greatest divergencies, with the actual cash in hand! Consider the well-known fact that the Muhammadan proves that Muhammed was inspired in writing the Q'uran, by showing that there is not a single error in grammar in that whole series of incoherent and harmless vaticinations; whereas it is a well-known fact that the Arabic grammar was formed

by minute and slavish deductions from the language of the Q'uran! This inconsistency is as old as Athanasius and the Arians, the latter insisting just as strenuously as the former on the Bible as the only rule, and sufficient standard of faith; but each insisted on his or their own interpretation as the only one. Yet this interpretation is legitimately a matter of scholarship only, of scientific investigation only, just as the cashier's written record must be considered in its historical sense. Such is the heliocentric theory, formerly condemned by the Church. And the Roman Catholic Church has the merit of frankness in its insistence on its own interpretation of the Bible, and consequent discouragement of reading the Bible in any other version, and apart from its own interpretations. Other churches insist just as strenuously as the Roman Catholic Church on their own interpretations of the Bible; but they dare not acknowledge this to others, or even to ourselves. I personally am willing to accept the Bible as the sole rule and sufficient standard of Faith, if I am permitted to take it for just what scholarship shall show it is worth. Let each man have his own interpretation, according to his best light, but let no man impose his own interpretation on any other man. The fault with the religious bodies mentioned above is not that they have an interpretation of the Bible, but that they force it on human beings. Each should decide as to what best scholarship is according to his own reason, and highest light. And if the faith is to be deduced from the Bible, the Bible must not be taken exclusively in the sense of the faith, but in that of the best historical scholarship obtainable.

The question which drives me out of the Church is in last resort one of the right of reasonable interpretation, of the use of my best light, my reason—understanding the words I use. To insist for proof of doctrine, on the Bible interpreted according to it, is sham; and in the last resort it amounts to insisting on the doctrine without any reason beyond the fact that it is held by some particular person. The controversy is therefore not between those persons I mentioned above and me, but between them and scholarship.

Cardinal Newman had seen all this. The "Via Media" is humbug; it is unsatisfactory, both in point of doctrine, and in point of rationality. He who has the courage to sweep the whole house systematically, till he finds the lost piece of silver comes to the following dilemma: (1) Either the Truth, the unshackled exercise of common-sense and reason, with consequent abandonment of mediaeval formulations—while no element of spiritual truth can be lost, since it is "truth"—or, (2) the Church and Mediaeval Formulations—with mental suicide and childish recreation with dolls and relics, and millinery, and even, on Newman's own confession, public immorality, coupled with and flowing from the death of individual responsibility through the doctrines of vicariousness. Cardinal Newman stood at the parting of the ways, and chose deliberately the

Church, in preference to truth and thought and morality. Will God blame me if I, also standing at the parting of the ways, choose otherwise, and prefer Truth, Thought and Morality to the Church?

But why make the change at this particular time? Have doubts never presented themselves before? Have these facts, which now move me, been unknown to me till the present time? Such questions would not be asked by men who have either been accustomed to think, or who desire to think. They will know that doubts must be carefully considered before they can be asserted as convictions. Rash steps are always unfortunate, both for the man and the Church; and often, when a rash step has been taken, it is wiser to go back until full time has been given to mature and reflect. It demands much patience and sacrifice of life, but it is only justice to all concerned. And so the period of conviction should be reckoned as that one when the thinker is willing to stake his external career on those principles, when he announces publicly that such are his convictions. Then the change will be safe for all. Doubtless there are men in the Church who insist that it is dishonest merely to entertain a doubt; but this very opinion deprives their judgment of any value. It is proof positive that they neither have studied or thought, nor are willing to study and think. They are rather to be pitied.

The writer of these lines is anxious not to be misunderstood by any fault of his. He does not deny that many of the most dogmatic of the clergy are educated, refined, cultured, nay, even "learned" men. But the very fact that they hold certain opinions about facts which would be corrected by mere careful acquaintance with historical data shows that their learning is either unorganized, or extends only to some one department of human life. A man may be learned in vestments and ecclesiastical millinery, in "canon law," in the mere writings of certain men, without either carefully organizing his learning, or without removing from his mind principles which are clearly inconsistent with themselves and other facts. This careful revision and organization of knowledge is what has here been called the function of the "thinker"—which is a better word than "philosopher," since many of those who lay claim to the title limit themselves to interpretative, rather than constructive, work. The thinker is he who threshes out every grain of his knowledge, and digests it thoroughly. The thinker is the least dogmatic of men; and therefore these "theologians" who are most positive, and who probably persecute me and my convictions most bitterly, and in their own eyes most triumphantly—for the wolf can always refute the sheep—are those who can least lay claim to the title of "thinkers." As for me, I care not for my own opinions, but for truth; and he who will point out to me, by arguments, not by invectives or persecution, where I am mistaken, and will take the trouble

of convincing me of error, will have my most heartfelt gratitude. Such a man would be my most veritable benefactor.

This train of thought leads naturally to an objection which may possibly be suggested by readers of these reflections. Are not all these considerations merely vague generalities, which, if irrefutable, are irrefutable only on account of their "vagueness"? On the contrary, although the most ardent traditionalists are such only because they insist most strongly on details, this apparent definiteness is the result of the most deplorable mental incoherence. They never inquire whether these details be self-consistent. More mental grasp, more power of generalizing, more ability to appreciate a mental difficulty, would incontinently stagger them by a revelation of their inconsistencies. The careful thinker seeks the principle, the law, behind all details and applying everywhere the law of casualty, of continuity, finds that the truth consists of those eternal principles of morality which have in different ages been applied and interpreted in so many different ways. It is the very richness of details which has led to their exclusion here. Even only a partial consideration of these details would have demanded a volume for each of the many departments of intelligent theological education, evidences, criticism, history, ethics, and so forth. As a matter of fact, I have, from time to time, endeavored to state my views on these subjects elsewhere as systematically as circumstances permitted. But a public demonstration of them would not have accomplished my present purpose. My mission is not that of a destroyer. I have no desire to inflict on the world a recital of the superstitions and mistakes I cannot away with. Probably such a recital would contain little that was new; if any would feel the difficulties I have felt, let him study, extensively and impartially, and let him reflect; if he does so, he will soon be freed from error. My purpose here is merely to state those things which I am believe most certainly, and for the sake of which I am willing to risk my career—a great risk, since I must leave all those who so far have assisted my onward course. And in taking this serious step I desire merely to assert the principles which in my sight must underlie all spiritual truth and progress; relentless discovery of every phase of the truth, as the supreme motive of life. "If I am right, Thy grace impart, still in the right to stay; if I am wrong, oh teach my heart to find that better way."

But there remains one reason for my forsaking the Church which is more weighty than any or all of the foregoing. None will question that a spiritual man, let alone a preacher, a prophet, should be utterly consecrated to God. And yet how can a man be consecrated to God while he is bound by a promise, or affirmation, to any sect, organization, or doctrine? While he has any promise outstanding, how can he be wholly free, wholly responsive to the least motion of the Divine Spirit? The Church of the future will be one in which free men will freely

work for their Father above; not that they would deny any doctrine, or disapprove of any particular canonical requirements. It is the conception of freedom which characterizes the ideal Church. And the day will come when it will be so; may God speed that day. Then will it be possible for men to listen to and follow the voice within, and to be led by God himself, and his teachers shall no more be removed from his sight.

It is for reasons such as these that I must sever myself from the Church to which I have freely given, and gladly given the best years of my life. This decision is not hasty; for several years the cogency of them has more and more penetrated my mind until to-day, with such calmness of heart and judgment of mind as I can command, I must take the irrevocable step, lest my whole life be a truce, not a challenge. Separated from the few friends of my youth, from every means of support, from familiar scenes, I must go out in faith trusting in the Lord; if it be His will that I shall find souls to whom I may preach the truth as He has revealed it to me, well; if, on the contrary, it be His will that my usefulness and life be cut off, it is well, too; for He knows best. It is with great sadness that I go from those abodes of fragrant devotion; but I can be devout wherever I am, God giving me the strength to keep my heart fixed on Him.

"Thy glory alone, O God, be the end of all that I say;
Let it shine in every deed, let it kindle the prayers that I pray;
Let it burn in my innermost soul, till the shadow of self pass
away,

And the light of Thy glory, O God, be unveiled in the dawning
of day."

I believe in physical health, cleanliness, temperance; and utter purity in thought, word and deed.

And in truth, honesty, accuracy and scholarship which demands reason for all things, and without prejudice yields its own opinion if shown to be false; which tolerates in each man his own opinions; which leads to art, literature and science; which in earnestness, sincerity and candor perfects all human powers.

I believe in Love, the Father and Destiny of all things, Light of light, Fragrance of fragrance, Beauty of beauty; Who, working both here and beyond, is inexorably just, and therefore is the Comforter of the Afflicted and the Avenger of the Evil to the thousandth generation; Who leads by conscience within myself to the Beatific Vision, and all the mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven, which only the humble can inherit, and which shall have no end forever and ever. Amen.

FAITH AND REASON.

1. *The Stand-point of Superstition and Science.*—Shall Reason serve Faith, or shall Faith serve Reason ?

In accordance with these alternatives, men have ranged themselves in two great parties : the one relying on external intellectual authority, the other on individual reason. There have always been men who are satisfied to have their thinking done for them, and there have ever been men who insisted on understanding why they should assent to any belief. The former stand-point may be called that of superstition, the latter that of science.

It would be a great mistake, however, to identify these two stand-points with those of religion and atheism. There are superstitious atheists and there are religious scientists. The stand-point of superstition applies equally to all who owe their intellectual position to anything except personal research and conviction. There are many Christians who belong to a particular Church only because they have never severely questioned its doctrine ; and there are many nominal non-Christians who are such only because they were born or educated in a circle where there was much prejudice against Christianity. There is as much superstition in flippant unbelief, as in unquestioning assent. The stand-point of science applies, on the contrary, to all who owe their intellectual position to personal research and conviction alone. Research may, and often does, justify one's original position, because there is always an immense presumption in favour of the position already held. Yet, research, more or less thorough, may lead the inquiring mind far from its original position. The fact of changing or retaining one's former position, or the fact of occupying either position would not of itself decide whether superstition or science had guided the enquirer.

It is however true that, in respect to religion, the union of Church and State, in pre-Christian as well as Christian times, has always made for the acceptance of the stand-point of superstition, consciously or unconsciously ; for it has identified to a certain extent, in its moral sanctions, the concept of unbelief and criminality. Both offences were avenged the same punishment, and consequently the same obligation fell to their lot.

The conception of the separation of Church and State, with the French Revolution, and adopted in the Constit

of the United States, has gained many adherents to the standpoint of science and has destroyed its former moral obloquy. Whereas in former ages the heretic was always accused openly or implicitly of moral offences, the popular mind has come to recognize the perfect compatibility of agnosticism with pure morals. Every chemical experiment made by a school-boy is a reassertion of this standpoint of the sovereignty of individual reason over its beliefs. There is no doubt that the welfare of humanity is inseparably bound up with the universal recognition of freedom of conscience, and the obsolescence of the standpoint of superstition until it be for ever buried in the silent archives of the past.

2. *The Stand-point of Science Advanced to those Outside the Church.*— If it should be asked which of these intellectual stand-points had been occupied by the Christian Church, the answer would be that it has usually employed both, impossible as this would seem at first sight. It has been the custom of the Church to advance the scientific standpoint to those outside her, in order to make converts of them, but to insist rigidly on that of superstition to all who are within her pale.

Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Arnobius, Lactantius, and Augustine of Hippo, not to mention numberless other less representative apologists, urge strenuously that if the heathen will but let their reason sway their belief, they must necessarily abandon the old faiths, and embrace Christianity. Justin Martyr says: "Reason directs that all who are truly pious and truly philosophers, should love alone that which is true, and refuse to follow the opinions of the ancients, should they prove to be worthless; for sound reason requires that we should not only reject those who act or teach anything contrary to that which is right; but that by every means, and before his own life, the lover of truth ought, even if threatened with death, to choose to speak and to do what is right (1)." Again, "Those who lived according to Reason (Logos) are Christians, even though accounted Atheists. Such among the Greeks were Sokrates and Herakleitos, and those who resembled them; of the Barbarians, Abraham, and Azarias, and Misael and Elias, and many others (2)." Arnobius says, "'But ours (the pagan religion) is more ancient,' say you, 'therefore most credible and trustworthy;' as if indeed antiquity were not the most fertile source of errors (3)." Lactantius, with characteristic vehemence, demands, "Will you prefer to follow antiquity or reason (4)?" The patristic evidence is so copious we can but mention it (5), closing with notice of the fact that Gratian's Decretum asserts that the Canonical authority of the Holy Scriptures stands or falls with its inerrancy, so that if the least mistake could be found in it, it would possess no canonical authority whatsoever.

Nevertheless, Christianity advanced this rationalistic standpoint only where it lacked the power to enforce its claims. The earliest apologists asked only for toleration; but as soon

as Christianity possessed the power to do so, it demanded the destruction of its religious opponents. Even so clear-headed a man as Ambrose did not think justice need be observed when dealing with Jews and heretics. When the emperor Theodosius had commanded the Christian bishop of Calliadinum in Mesopotamia to restore the Jewish synagogue and Valentinian Church, which monks had without any reason destroyed, Ambrose forced him to rescind his edict on the ground that it was not fitting that money in the hands of Christians should be used for such a purpose. Charlemagne received praise for giving the conquered Saxons the choice of immediate death or baptism. Torquemada was acting with ecclesiastical authority when he forced the heretics to be saved in spite of themselves. Finally, a Pope himself approved of the Massacre of S. Bartholomew, Aug. 24, 1572, at Paris, and caused a medal to be issued in commemoration of the event. Even the Reformers approved of such means of conversions, as the persecutions of Quakers and Episcopalianism in New England testify.

3. *The Stand-point of Superstition Advanced to those Within the Church.*—To those who are within her own pale, however, the Christian Church has always advanced the intellectual stand-point of superstition. We are told that at the Council of Nicaea the debate was not on the question which contention—of the Catholics or the Arians—was the true one, the guiding maxim was: “let the ancient customs prevail.” We now begin to hear of the traditions of the “Fathers” handed down from the Apostles, which are to be considered the norms of truth (6). This plea is very deceptive. Historical psychology shows that every man considers his own opinion to agree with that of the wise men of ancient times. Hence the bare fact of being in a majority carries with it the sanction of agreeing with the “Fathers.” Reason is permitted to do its utmost to defend any dogma, but it must never presume to question it. This is the position of Clement of Alexandria, the first Christian since the days of Paul who countenanced philosophy at all. It may be succinctly stated in the following words of Anselm of Canterbury: “As the right order of things requires that we believe the deep things of the Christian faith before we presume to discuss them by reason, so it seems to me to be a sign of negligence if after we have been confirmed in the faith we are not eager to understand what we believe. Wherefore since, by the preventient grace of God, I think that I hold the faith respecting our redemption so firmly that even if I could not comprehend what I believe by any process of reasoning, there is nothing which could tear me away from its firm basis, I beg you to explain to me, etc.” The “preventient grace of God” is merely a metaphor for the fact of having been born and educated amongst orthodox Christians, a ground of belief which the most abased fetish-worshipper, and the Muhammadan could claim with full as much reason

as Anselm ; and in consideration of which his orthodox firmness becomes sheer unreasoning obstinacy. Yet, not all Christians were as moderate as Anselm. The Church does not lack her Tertullian who cried out : " It is credible, just because it is foolish ; it is certain because it is impossible (*) ." In view of such opinions, we see the cogency of the emperor Julian's declaration against the Christians that " The highest point of your wisdom is to believe (*) ."

4. *Defence of the Stand-point of Superstition.*—It is but natural, however, that Christians would have been, from time to time, forced to defend this stand-point. Cyril of Jerusalem (**) returned an answer which agrees almost word for word with that of Origen to this objection : " Why should it not be more reasonable, since all human affairs are dependent on faith, to believe God rather than men ? For who takes a voyage or marries or begets children or casts seeds into the ground without believing that better things will result, although the contrary might and does happen (") ? " Cyril adds the example of the mariner who trusts himself on the ocean with but barely two inches of plank between himself and destruction ; Arnobius (") adds many other like circumstances.

But these arguments do not prove what they were intended to show. Every one of these instances is a case in which reasonable experience has demonstrated that such a course, in the great majority of cases, yields satisfactory results. Doubtless, they are instances of the use of faith ; but it is not faith dominating and contradicting the experience of reason, but in every case being limited and dominated by it. No sailor trusts himself to the ocean till he has examined his craft, to assure himself she is seaworthy. The sower does not sow his seed in the desert or on stone pavement ; he carefully prepares the ground that is to receive it. Each of these instances is a capital proof of the rationalistic stand-point, and different in kind from faith in God, which, in its dogmatic statements, confessedly opposes or neglects reason.

5. *Modern Defence.*—Christian writers have in modern times pointed out that every advance of science is dependent on an exercise of faith. The doctrine of Conservation of Energy, which has been satisfactorily proved only in very isolated cases, has become a doctrine of faith, and as such has been the means of every achievement in physics, biology and psychology. By faith in the analogy of the families of chemical elements several elements were announced a few years before their actual discovery,—not only their mere existence affirmed, but their weight, nature, and properties predicted. If then, it is said, scientists must use faith in order to prophesy accurately, why should it not be equally right for souls to attain their salvation by faith ?

It may be shown, however, that in this argument there is the same undistributed middle we found in the last section. Religious and scientific faith are wholly different in their relation to reason.

Religious faith demands unquestioning assent, while refusing to permit any rational investigation of its mysteries : and everything which reason cannot understand is called a mystery.

Scientific faith, on the contrary, is founded on an induction of facts. Universal and exhaustive research of phenomena being out of the question, we can only say : as far as we have heard from investigators, we have always found that water is composed of two particles of hydrogen, to one of oxygen. Consequently, until we find a drop of water whose composition is different, we have the right to use our faith in declaring that all water is so composed. Hypotheses, on the strength of which experiments are made, are only partial inductions and are only valid as long as no undoubted fact incompatible with them is discovered. In such scientific research we have an admirable example of the use of human faith assisting, but in every case relying for its warrant on reason.

The earliest apostle of scientific faith was Abailard, whose efforts were futile only because scientific investigation was in those days impossible. Neander (²³) says of him : "He assumed as his own position that faith proceeds first from enquiry, that it works itself out of doubt by means of rational investigation. In this respect, then, he makes faith develop itself out of intellection, because one must first know why and what he believes before one can believe ; though in another respect he acknowledged that this intellection has its root in faith."

6. *Scientific Faith not Necessarily Irreligious.*—Yet it may be asked, is scientific faith necessarily irreligious ? This question may be emphatically answered in the negative. It is possible to investigate the field of religious facts with scientific methods, using only scientific faith, and there is no reason why such investigations should not be as satisfactory as investigations in the field of physics or chemistry. In fact, the field of morals and of psychical phenomena has already been cleared for the scientific plow. Results have so far proved that nothing need be feared for any legitimate facts of human nature. Whereas it has been customary in former times to consider all apparitions of the dead as being imagination or deceit, a committee appointed by the Society for Psychical Research, the chairman of which was Dr. Sidgwick of Cambridge (²⁴), has acknowledged that they must be granted credence, if properly authenticated. The veracity and standing of the investigators assure us that justice will be done to the subject, so that we have nothing to lose, but all to gain, by continued researches. Besides, if Christianity is co-extensive with truth, then truth must be co-extensive with Christianity ; and investigation can only vindicate it. The more ardent our religious faith in Christianity the more ardent should be our desire for its scientific investigation and vindication.

The opposition of Christianity to science, before and since

the condemnation of Galileo's heliocentric theory as scientifically absurd, and opposed to religious truth (") might be interpreted as consciousness on its part of its own falsity, if we did not know it proceeded from nothing worse than ignorance of scientific methods and results, and from blind party prejudice, which would not in itself be criminal, if it did not oppose itself to the march of enlightenment.

7. *Mystery*.—Nor let this question of "mystery" be misunderstood. Nobody would object to a *bona-fide* mystery, which was immediately, on revelation from a satisfactory source to a reliable recipient, understood to be a mystery. But when hundreds of years elapse before it is discovered that a certain doctrine is a mystery; when every element of this supposititious mystery can be traced ultimately to pagan philosophy, or to religious utterances published first centuries before the revelation of the supposed mystery, then it is a question whether the particular "mystery" is not merely the formulation of undigested heterogeneous elements in the mind of a man who was not strong enough to fuse them, and who preferred to excuse the illogical by calling it a mystery. Moreover, even if a mystery was to be revealed, it could only be revealed to the mind of a man, which could only apprehend it by its reason. Hence, in the last resort, it is the reason of a man which must exist as the condition of any mystery. Besides, supposing that a revelation should have been granted which had no practical bearing on the moral life, and was incomprehensible, what use could it subserve? It could only be of value as a cabalistic magical incantation, like Solomon's 'Schemahamphorash!' Again reason would have to judge of its value, whether its effects were of any use or not. Hence, ultimately reason would be the arbiter.

8. *The Necessity of Thought*.—There is a final consideration which would seem to decide the question whether it is advisable to trust in reason or in superstition as criterions of truth. The fact is that whatever theories be held, reason is relied on, even to discredit itself. When, for instance, the argument against reason is put in this form, that it is untrustworthy as a guide, on account of such and such imperfections, it is evident that this very fallibility of reason is proved by absolute reliance on reason itself, by which any ratiocination must be conducted. Hence, in endeavouring to prove the fallibility of reason, we have actually given reason an infallible authority, and on account of its infallibility concluded to its fallibility. Do what we will, therefore, it is evident it is impossible for the human mind to transcend itself, and that even in suiciding, it vindicates itself.

This impossibility for rational beings of escaping from this kind of rationality need not be thought anything strange. It is only one phase of the universally recognized metaphysical impossibility of transcending thought. This is called the

“necessity of thought,” the impossibility of doubting one’s own doubt.

Do what man will, he cannot flee away from himself ; he only knows himself in his consciousness, and outside of his consciousness, of course, he cannot be conscious of himself. Hence, reason is actually his guide and criterion of reality, even when he discredits it. Hence to exalt faith as against reason is self-contradictory, and a consideration of the facts forces man, in spite of himself, if he would use faith at all, to be rationally, and not irrationally a truster in faith.

9. *Throwing away the Handle after the Axe.*—It is objected to a reliance on reason that it is unsatisfactory. It is but an unsafe, and an untrustworthy guide.

This must be granted, for ignorant of himself must that man be who does not recognize how often his reason is a halting guide. Yet, it may be asked, supposing that this is so, what difference does it make ? Grant that reason, as a guide of life, is not infallible, and yet, it is the best that we have, it is the best that we can have. Shall we throw away the only thing we have or can have because it is not better ? Shall we not rather preserve it carefully, educate it as far as possible, and make it go as far as possible ? Is it not better to do this than to suicide intellectually, and to be the plaything of a superstition which originally was founded on a pitiful attempt at rationality ?

The light of reason is poor, perhaps, but it is better than darkness. Protect the flame from the rude blasts of the wind ; trim the candle, and make the best of what you have. And perhaps, by careful education, reason may grow more able to be trusted, more continuous, more impartial, more likened unto the Divine Reason of which it is a faint, but yet genuine image.

NOTES.

(1) Justin Martyr, *Apol. I.* (2) *Ib.* (3) Arnobius, *Adv. Gent.* 57. (4) Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* ii : 7; see ii : 8.

(5) "But our Lord Christ surnamed himself Truth, not Custom. . . . It is not so much novelty as truth which convicts the heresies. Whatsoever savours of opposition to truth, this will be heresy, even if it be an ancient custom. . . . They who received Christ set truth before custom." Tertull. *De Virg. Vel.* 1. Also, Gratian's *Decretum*, Pars. I. Dist. 8, c. 4, and c. 5, Gregorius Winimundo Aversano, Augustine, *de Bapt. c. Donat.* iii : 5. On the general question, see Clem. Al. *c. Gent.* 10, 11; *Paed.* i : 7. Just. Mart. *Apol.* i : 12: "But if you also, like the foolish, prefer custom to truth. . . ." Greg. Nyss. *Gt. Cat.* 18. August. *c. Donat.* iii : 3, 5; iv : 5. Cyprian, in *Ep. 74 ad Pomp.* "For custom without truth is only the antiquity of error." Lact. *Div. Inst.* says: "Yet no one departs from us, since the truth itself detains him." *Ib.*, ii : 8: "It is therefore right, especially in a matter on which the whole plan of life turns, that every one should place confidence in himself, and use his own judgment and individual capacity for the investigation and weighing of the truth, rather than through confidence in others to be deceived by their errors, as though he himself were without understanding. God has given wisdom to all alike, that they might be able both to investigate things which they have not heard, and to weigh things which they have heard. Nor, because they preceded us in time, did they also outstrip us also in wisdom; for if this is given equally to all, we cannot be anticipated in it by those who precede us."

(6) Irenaeus, *Ref. Haer.* iii : iv : 1; iv : xxvi : 2; iv : xxxii : 1; iv : xxxiii : 8; v : xx : 1. Tertull. *De Praescr. Haer.*, cc. 13, 19, 20, 22, 37, 38, 40, 42. *Adv. Marc.* iii : 6; v : 5. Clem. Al., *Strom.*, vii : 16. Athanas. *Or. in Ar.*, i : 8; ii : 39, 40; *ad Serap.*, ii : 8; iv : 5. Origen said: "So, seeing there are many who think they hold the opinions of Christ, and yet some of these think differently from their predecessors, yet as the teaching of the Church, transmitted in orderly succession from the Apostles, and remaining in the Church till the present day, is still preserved, that alone is to be accepted as truth which differs in no respect from ecclesiastical and apostolical tradition." *De Princ. Proem.* 2. But Origen did not realize that this tradition might change. He could not have written the above words unless he considered himself to be in harmony with this tradition; and yet the time came when he was adjudged an heretic by this very tradition, which, of course, had changed in the meanwhile. This argumentum "a traditione" resolves itself ultimately into agreement with any doctrine which a majority of persons may at any time hold. Still further, it resolves itself into the doctrine that orthodoxy is my "doxy," and heterodoxy your "doxy," as in the classical instance of Athanasius.

(7) In Neander, *Ch. Hist.* viii : 104; *Cur Deus Homo.* (8) Tert. *Apol.* (9) In Hooker's *Eccles. Polity*, v : 63 : 1. (10) Cyril, *Catech.* v : 3. (11) Origen, *C. Cels.* i : 11. (12) Arnobius, *Adv. Gent.* ii : 8. See Theoph. *ad Autol.*, i : 8. "If then the husbandman trusts the earth, and the sick man the physician, will you not place confidence in God?" (13) Neander, *Church Hist. in re.* (14) *Proceedings*, 1895. (15) See *Encycl. Brit.* sub. Galileo. Even that sympathetic account acknowledges that.

CRITICAL ESSAYS

ON

THE TWO CREEDS

AND

THE LAMBETH ARTICLES.



THE APOSTLES' CREED.

Church History has perhaps no greater surprise, or changes the conception of the lay mind in nothing more than that the Apostles' Creed, in the form in which it is used to-day, is not older than Pirminius, A. D. 758, or 433 years after the formulation of the Nicene Creed. It is customary to consider the former the more original Creed, and the latter the younger ; but, in point of fact, the relation is reversed.

Symbololatry is but a thing of to-day. Creeds until the time of Pirminius were effects, not causes. They were the natural outgrowth of the living faith of the Churches, and varied with the life of the Church. In other words, the Church was the measure, the cause of the Creed. To-day, the case is reversed. The life of the Church is the outgrowth of the Creed, and the Church is unprogressive, having crystallized around one single form of the Creed. In other words, the Creed is the measure, the cause of the Church.

I. Within a few years Professor Harnack has written a pamphlet bearing on the history of the Creed commonly referred to as the Apostles' Creed. Mrs. Humphrey Ward translated it into English, but in its new dress it has not become so popular as it deserved to be. A short outline of its main arguments will therefore not be out of place.

The basis of the present Apostles' Creed, is the Roman Creed, although more directly the formulary of to-day descends from the Gallican form, which seems to have been based on the former.

The Roman Creed is as follows :

"I believe in God the Father Almighty. And in Jesus Christ, his only Son, our Lord ; Who was born by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, and buried. The third day he rose again from the dead, ascended into heaven, sitteth at the right hand of the Father, whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead.

And in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Church, the remission of sins, the resurrection of the flesh."

The Gallican Creed reads as follows :

"I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth :

And in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord : Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Born of the Virgin Mary, Suffered under Pontius Pilate, Was crucified, dead and buried : He descended into hell ; The third day he rose again from the

dead : He ascended into heaven, And sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty :

From thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead.

I believe in the Holy Ghost : The holy Catholic Church, The Communion of Saints : The Forgiveness of sins, The resurrection of the Flesh : And the Life everlasting."

The African Creed had, in the latter clauses, the following alteration : " The Life everlasting through through the holy Church."

The reason that these Creeds were called Apostolic, is well rendered by Pirminius, who recounts at leisure the myth that at Pentecost each of the disciples spontaneously uttered as exclamations one or several of the clauses. This Apostolic origin must have been a Roman innovation, Rufinus, and Ambrose setting it forth at length. But nevertheless the idea cannot have been old, because many provincial Churches recited creeds derived from the form given above, but differing from it. The omission of clauses cannot be traced with certainty.

The Roman formulary appears to have been in use from A. D. 250-460 ; the Gallican form can be traced to Southern Gaul, in the year A. D. 450. The probabilities are that it was descended from the Roman formulary, with the evident additions. Yet the Roman form was probably originated at least by 150 A. D., for it had spread all over the West a short while after. While it lived in the provincial Churches, it died out in Rome itself after A. D. 460. The reason of this was that the Nicene formulation, or rather the Epiphanian Creed, was used in opposition to the Arian barbarians. Then, in Rome itself the French form was introduced, because the Pope was later under the domination of the French. Then the doctrine of Apostolic origin was revived, and applied to the new developed Gallico-Roman formulary. From Gaul came also the so-called " Athanasian Creed," so that France is really responsible for both formularies.

Nevertheless, the Gallico-roman form remained elastic till A. D. 750, under the hands of Pirminius, and showed how great an enlargement the Baptismal formula was susceptible of.

Dr. Harnack contends that even the earliest form of the Roman Creed to which we have access contained articles of belief in excess of the Apostolic teaching. Such are the miraculous conception, the ascension, and the resurrection of the flesh. Again, the reader must be careful not to import into the simple language of the Creed Nicene and Post-Nicene conceptions, in respect to the Fatherhood of God, the Sonship of Jesus, and the Personality of the Holy Ghost. The descent into hell, and the communion of saints does not even appear in the earliest Roman form.

The arguments of Dr. Harnack in respect to the miraculous conception are as follows :

(1). Notice of it is wanting in all the Epistles of the New Testament.

(2). Certainly not to be found in Mark and John.

(3). Not in original Matthew and Luke.

(4). Genealogies are inconsistent, but agree in leading back to Joseph, not Mary.

(5). Jesus proclaimed himself Messiah only at the time of his baptism by John. The ascension does not belong to primitive tradition because not to be found in the three-fold Synoptic record.

The resurrection of the flesh, it is true, is found in respect of Jesus ; but otherwise the passages I Cor. xv : 50, and John vi : 63, are decisive against it for general resurrection.

In respect to the Fatherhood of God, Dr. Harnack contends the Creed referred to nothing more than to a general Fatherhood, of the Universe, such as belongs to a Creator. All that the Gospels say of the nature of the Son is Matth. xi : 27 and Luke x : 22. The "Lord" means Redeemer, and "only Son" refers to eternal Sonship only after Council of Nicaea. The "Son" is the Jesus of history. Since the clause in respect to the Holy Ghost is not defined, the Holy Ghost should not be looked upon so much as a Person, as a Power and Gift. The "Spirit of God" is God himself.

As to the Descent into hell, this clause is first found in the creed of Aquileia and Sirmium, A. D. 359. It is otherwise found only rarely, and with many differing interpretations. The Communion of Saints is never found in Greek. First, in Faustus of Reii, who believed in a worship of saints ; and in Augustine of Hippo, "with the perfected saints."

II. Such are the negative facts to which Professor Harnack draws attention. Dr. Swete in his "The Apostles' Creed : its relation to Primitive Christianity" explicitly sets himself to refute Dr. Harnack's claims. It is interesting to notice what his plea will be.

First in order, it may be worth while to give a passing glance at the general aspect of the book, as affording an insight into the habits of Dr. Swete. Of course, its scholarliness, and style is irreproachable ; but it is noticeable that in the Creeds Dr. Swete gives at the end of his book not one is provided with a date. Since the main object of the book is to show the early period of certain doctrines, it might be expected that his chronology would be explicit ; but perhaps he did not add them because the dates of all of them would be very late. Besides, just as if nothing had been done on the subject for the last twenty years, he prints at length the Epiphonian Creed under the caption of "Creed of Constantinople," as if the Council of Constantinople had adopted any Creed at all, let alone the Epiphonian.

Dr. Swete does not grasp the historical method which Dr. Harnack employs. The historian is not concerned to prove that there is no testimony to deny that a certain doctrine

was held at an early date, although possessing no objective proof. The historian's business is to gather objective facts, and to make deductions from them, without any regard to consequences arising therefrom. Theology may then accommodate itself to history, not history to theology. Dr. Swete seems to be at pains to show that it is with him a question of doctrine that historical facts are such or such. His persistent method is to hold as much as the facts of history can be tortured into bearing, besides, at times, taking facts for granted, which make for him, without examining them: as, for instance, in respect to the "Creed of Constantinople," mentioned above. Instead of acknowledging the full significance of negative facts which make against him, and which he cannot deny, he ignores them.

Dr. Swete answers the *ex silentio* arguments in respect to the Miraculous Conception in the following words: "Much has been made of the silence of St. Mark, but the argument *ex silentio* was never more conspicuously misplaced; it is puerile to demand of a record which professes to begin with the Ministry of the Baptist that it shall mention an event which preceded the Baptist's birth. The plan of the Fourth Gospel equally excludes a reference to the manner of our Lord's entrance into this world. It would have been a departure from St. Paul's plan, if he had directly referred to the fact of the Conception." But Dr. Swete does not seem to realize that the writers of the Gospels and the Epistles did not write with any other "plan" or "purpose" than to give an account, full, and convincing of the life and teaching of the Master. Consequently, so great a miracle could not have been omitted, unless it was not known. Neither the Second nor the Fourth Gospel could have begun only with his baptism, if the Miraculous conception was known to the writers. The fact is that a Miraculous conception is a Miracle so astounding, so absolutely unique, so absolutely contradictory to all other experience of all races in all times, that if it occurred it would have been the one most noticeable thing of the life of Jesus, overshadowing everything of his healing or teaching except his own resurrection. Dr. Swete refers to a Miraculous Conception as if it were an every day affair of which nobody would take much notice, and which might possibly be recounted as a minor detail of the life of Jesus by fond disciples years after the life and death of Jesus. If the Miraculous conception is true at all, it is the one great miracle of the life of Jesus and no complete account of his life and teaching could be given without a reference to it.

But Dr. Swete has no fear of logical self-contradiction. "On the other hand, no adverse conclusion can fairly be drawn from Rom. I: 3, 'made of the seed of David according to the flesh,' as if the words asserted the paternity of Joseph. Ignatius more than once combines in the same sentence the Davidic descent with the Virgin birth." Dr Swete

seems to think that if Ignatius' mind was illogical enough to combine two contradictory things in one sentence, all other minds should be so too. The case is plain : both genealogies of Davidic descent lead to Joseph, not Mary. If then there was Davidic descent, Joseph was father of the Child ; if the Child was virginborn, it was not the child of Joseph, and through him of David. The words of Paul seem to be decisive against Dr. Swete.

Dr. Swete may well say that "the narrative of the Conception in the first Gospel is absolutely independent of the narrative in the third." He does not mention that the two genealogies contradict each other, both however professing to lead to Joseph, not Mary. "Even if it should appear that in the original Matthew the Genealogy ended with the Formula 'Joseph begat Jesus,' the words would no more be a denial of the miracle than S. Luke's references to Joseph as the 'Father' and to Joseph and Mary as the 'parents' of the Lord." It would only remove the last shred of objective evidence of the miracle, and leave all objective denials of it in plain sight.

On one page Dr. Swete says that the Protevangelium of Luke "betrays unmistakably—an independent origin ;" on another he says : "one an integral part of the Third Gospel."

Which of these two statements does Dr. Swete intend to abide by ? Hypotheses are cheap : the differing Protevangelium may have been written before, but it may also have been written after ; no argument should therefore be drawn from this source. The only question that presents itself is the following : if the writer of the third Gospel was not able, when introducing into his Gospel the Protevangelium, to re-write it, and eliminate all the bad Greek, why could he so successfully manipulate all the rest of his material, which makes a perfect unity in the Gospel ? In the Introduction the writer professes nothing more than to compile from earlier Gospels ; and his handling of the material of the First Gospel's "Sermon on the Mount" showed what a masterly compiler he was. Why did he become suddenly unable to correct grammar, and style, when he met the Protevangelium ? The only inference can be that some other hand than his inserted the section under discussion. This is so much the more likely as the Synoptic tradition seems to begin with the Baptism, in all three Gospels ; the First Gospel begins with the Baptism as if it began a separate writing.

Dr. Swete concedes Dr. Harnack's contention, that the Conception does not belong to the earliest Gospel preaching, if the words are restricted to their narrowest sense. But if the Miraculous Conception was a fact, it is impossible that the Twelve could hope to give any kind of an account of the life and mission of Jesus without mentioning such an unique, unheard of, marvellous fact. In the Acts of the Apostles, when the Apostles speak of Jesus in their preaching, they

never mention it, as they must have done, had they known of so great a marvel.

Concerning the Ascension, Harnack claims that it is not mentioned by the Synoptists, or by St. Paul in his Creed-like summary of the Faith (I Cor. XV : 3 ff.), or by the chief sub-apostolic writers. Dr. Swete answers this *ex silentio* argument in the same manner as above. Putting aside acknowledged interpolations, Dr. Swete claims the Ascension did not fall within the proper scope of the Gospels. Strange, that so marvelous an occurrence, that a body which could be felt and could eat should fly up into space in the very teeth of the law of gravitation, should be held so little miraculous by the Synoptists, that they should omit to mention the occurrence, especially if the places in their Gospels were so well fitted to tell the story that interpolators should add it! Why should not the crowning event of a man's life fall within the scope of an account of his life? As to S. Paul, Swete thinks that if he had added a notice of the Ascension it would have been superfluous and misleading—and this to a "creed-like summary of the Faith!" The omission is so unaccountable, because the place is so easily amplified by the addition of a single word. Dr. Swete does not understand that if the Ascension is true at all, it is a miracle of so astounding a nature as to make any account of the life work of Jesus which did not mention it hopelessly incomplete. As to the chief sub-apostolic writers, "what reason is there to expect them to touch upon the subject of the Ascension?" The fact that it is the greatest miracle of the life of Jesus, and if it had been known and believed, so many Christian apologists and writers could not have omitted it any more than the Resurrection of Jesus, which, on the whole, is not so great a miracle as the Ascension.

Dr. Swete scores one point against Dr. Harnack. "In some of the oldest accounts the Resurrection and the sitting at the right hand of God are taken as parts of the same act, without the mention of any Ascension." Texts from the New Testament disprove this assertion.

In respect to the last argument, that "in the Epistle of Barnabas both Resurrection and Ascension happen in one day," both Dr. Harnack and Dr. Swete are at fault. Dr. Swete shows that Barnabas' words may be interpreted so as to allow of an interval; which, however, he confesses does contradict the Acts. He refuses to accept the witness of some Valentinians which Dr. Harnack adduces, without sufficient grounds. Besides he is forced to acknowledge that the statement of the Acts must be taken with great latitude.

In respect to the Resurrection of the flesh Dr. Swete is forced to concede that there is no biblical authority for it, except a Septuagint version of Job, a passage applied in the New Testament only to the resurrection of Jesus. Paul continually speaks of a resurrection of the dead, or of the body; not of the flesh.

The historical method, which Harnack represents, denies everything which facts do not affirm; Dr. Swete, on the contrary, affirms everything which he is not forced to deny. The contrast is interesting. "But if the phrase does not appear within the limits of the Canon, 'we can hardly doubt that from the very earliest times the resurrection of the flesh as preached by a few Christians, but it was not a universal doctrine.' It would have been more exact to say that while the doctrine was in substance universally taught, the phrase seems to have been unknown in the earliest times." Dr. Swete may be asked, what proof have you of this? Especially in view of the fact Paul distinctly avoids the expression? Harnack's position is the most exact. Barnabas and Clement of Rome hold to a resurrection of the body; Ignatius asserts only a resurrection of the flesh of Jesus. Justin knows not of it. Tertullian, Methodius and Jerome are the first to preach it. Origen opposes it. Rufinus improved on Jerome by adding "this" to "flesh," to be quite definite on the subject. The Epiphonian Creed does not contain "of the flesh," nor, according to Dr. Hort, do any "revised Eastern creeds" contain it.

Dr. Swete, does not care to concede Dr. Harnack is right, although the evidence he adduces proves it. He contents himself with showing that the Anglican Church professes all three forms together—certainly a logical way out of the difficulty!

III. A Creed is a statement of necessary doctrine, gleaned out from the great body beliefs which a man may hold. What is not contained in a Creed is then matter of opinion, which a man may hold or not, according to his pleasure and insight. It is interesting to notice therefore what doctrines were in earlier times considered matters of opinion, although in latter days they came to be considered necessary doctrine.

Comparing the Roman Creed with its Gallican development, it appears that the following doctrines were in Rome at least considered matters of opinion. This will appear more plainly from a consideration of later additions.

- (1). Creator of heaven and earth.
- (2). "Conceived of Holy Ghost."
- (3). "suffered,"
- (4). "dead,"
- (5). "descended into hell."
- (6). "Father Almighty."
- (7). Catholic Church, Communion of Saints, eternal life.

The increase of doctrine may appear still more patent if, following the footsteps of J. Rawson Lumby in his *History of the Creeds*, we compare the Creeds of Cyprian, A. D. 250, and Novatian, A. D. 260, with that of Marcellus, A. D. 341, which is the next creed in chronological order, and just after the Nicene Crede.

The creed of Cyprian runs as follows.

"I believe in God the Father ; In Christ his Son ; In the Holy Ghost within the Holy Church, the Remission of sins, and eternal Life."

The creed of Novatian is the following.

"I believe in God the Father ; In Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Lord of God ; and in the Holy Spirit."

Next in order is the nearest post-Nicene formulation, that of Marcellus.

"I believe in God Almighty ; in Jesus Christ his only-begotten Son our Lord ; being born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, and buried ; he rose on the third day from the dead : ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of the Father, whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead. And in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Church, the Remission of sins, the Resurrection of the flesh, and the Life eternal."

This creed has the following additions to the Nicene Creed, and consequently to that of Cyprian and Novatian :

- (1). Being born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary.
- (2). Crucified under Pontius Pilate, and was buried.
- (3). And sitteth on the right hand of the Father.
- (4). The Holy Church, the Remission of sins, the Resurrection of the Flesh, and the Life eternal.

Looking back to the additions to the Nicene Creed, found in the Epiphanian Creed, called by the Fathers of Chalcedon the "Creed of the 150," the strange fact appears that almost the same additions to the creeds of Cyprian and Marcellus are found in that of Marcellus, which are added to the Nicene symbol by the Epiphanian. There can only be one conclusion : that shortly after the Council of Nicaea, perhaps sixteen years after it, there arose a popular craze for symbolic definitions ; and that as a consequence of this the opinions concerning the Virgin Birth, the Crucifixion, the Death, the Session, and of the additions to the last clause were incorporated into the Creed, and considered dogmatic definitions.

This does not mean that these doctrines had never been held before ; or that before this time they had not been found in the Gospels. But it seems that only at this time were they added to the Christian statement of faith as necessary articles of belief.

If, however, the Nicene Creed is a sufficient statement of the Christian faith, as the Lambeth Articles declare, then it is evident that these later additions to both the Nicene and the Apostolic formulations must be omitted from what should be considered necessary parts of the Christian's faith. This does not deny that these facts may be found in the Gospels. It only points out the fact that they are not essentials of faith. They are non-essentials, beautiful, and blessed ; but not to be demanded of any.

THE NICENE CREED.

1.—*The Nicene Creeds.*—The presence of Athanasius at the Council of Nicaea, and the condemnation of Arianism, were of such moment to the doctrinal history of the Church, that ever since then it has been considered a universal test of orthodoxy to abide by the decision and Creed of that Council. The Church asserts this, but gives another Creed in place of the Creed of Nicaea in the Prayer Book. The rubrics concerning it shed light on the question.

The first two Rubrics, p. 12, and 25, are completely non-committal, and merely order "this" to be recited. The Church has full right to order any formulary it may set forth to be recited, only referring to it as "this." Such is the case, for instance, with the General Confession.

But when we consider the Rubric on p. 224, the circumstances are different. It is here distinctly set forth that the formulary which follows is a Creed, and to be recited, and believed as a Creed. It becomes therefore important to know what Creed it is which is to be recited. As long as the worshipper does not know that the formulary which follows is not the Creed of Nicaea, no difficulty occurs. But as soon as this fact is known, it is necessary to ask, What Creed, then, is this? The answer is, Not the Nicene Creed, but, "the Creed commonly called the Nicene." Yet the rubric proceeds, "Provided that the Nicene Creed"—therefore not the "Creed commonly called the Nicene"—"shall be said—" The Rubric therefore speaks of two distinct Creeds: "the Creed commonly called the Nicene," and "the Nicene Creed." It is desirable that in pursuance of this Rubric the actual "Nicene Creed" should be printed at length for the benefit of the clergy and people on Christmas-day, Easter-day, Ascension-day, Whit-Sunday, and Trinity-Sunday. This is the meaning of the actual words of Rubric.

Either the Rubric refers to two distinct formularies, or only to one.

If it refers to two separate formularies, the actual Nicene Creed should be printed below, for use on the Holy Days mentioned.

If it refers to one single formulary, then there is a historical blunder in the Rubric, for the Nicene Creed is not "the Creed commonly called the Nicene."

The only way to avoid the dilemma is to deny history, for which proceeding, however, it is too late in the course of civilization.

The Nicene Creed, as given by Sokratês, is as follows :

“ We believe in one God, Father Almighty, the Maker of all things visible and invisible ;

And in one Lord Christ, the Son of the God ; born only-begotten of the Father, that is, from the being of the Father ; God of God, light of light, very God of very God ; born, not made, consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things in heaven and earth arose ; for us men and for our salvation he descended, and was incarnated and became man ; he suffered and rose on the third day, he ascended into heaven, and will come to judge the quick and the dead.

And I believe in the Holy Ghost.”

2. *Traditionalistic Plea.*—This historical fact of the difference between these two formularies has been known more or less clearly for some time past. It was smoothed over by assuming as a fact that the later formulary was the same as the earlier, only expanded, and amplified. The consequence was that it is not wrong to substitute the later, fuller, form for the earlier, tentative expression of it.

Bishop Wordsworth refers to the matter in the following words, *Hist. of the Church*, Vol. II, p. 332 : “ The Council ” (Constantinople, A. D. 381) “ agreed, without a dissentient voice, as far as we know, in the following determinations :—

1. To confirm the faith of Nicaea in precisely the same words as those in which it was originally put forth in A. D. 325.

2. To add to that Creed some words declaratory of the doctrine of the Holy Scripture, and the Church, in opposition to the Apollinarian heresy.

3.—(To add some declaration concerning the) “ Godhead of the Holy Ghost in opposition to the Macedonian heresy.”

Besides Bishop Wordsworth, two well-known writers have touched the question, Dr. Bright, and Dr. Fulton. Their words are given below.

(Bright, William D. *Notes on the Canons of the First Four General Councils.* Oxford, Clarendon Press. p. 80.)

But here a question arises. The Council of Chalcedon ascribes to this Council of Constantinople and under the name of ‘ the 150 fathers,’ (Mansi vii. 109), that Recension of the Nicene Creed which has practically superseded the original form, with the restoration of the Nicene phrase ‘ God from God ’ in East and West alike, and with the additional of the ‘ Filioque ’ and the change of ‘ and ’ into ‘ of ’ before the name of Mary, in the West only. But is this statement compatible with the formal ratification of the Nicene Creed in the Canon now before us ? It may be answered that the members of the Council of A. D. 381 would not consider themselves to be in any sense invalidating, but rather confirming and per-

petuating, the formulary of A. D. 325, when they adopted, with hardly any change, a development of it which had been embodied just eight years previously in the *Ancoratus* of Epiphanius, and therein described as the Creed of the Church, set forth by 'bishops more than 310 in number' (Ancor. 120, 121). This creed was in effect the Nicene confession expanded, in view of present doctrinal requirements, by means of material borrowed from what might be called the Creed of Jerusalem, as it may be collected from the Catechetical Lectures of Cyril delivered in 347 or 348. It may seem strange that Epiphanius should use such language respecting a formulary which was not *verbatim* identical with the Nicene:—but he is not to be judged by our notions of accuracy, and it is, on the other hand, practically incredible, that he should not have known the wording of the Nicene Symbol itself, which had been solemnly exhibited, as accepted by 3 Semi-Arian deputies, before an orthodox Council at Tyania, in Cappadocia, 6 years before he wrote his *Ancoratus* in Cyprus for a Church in Pamphilia. C. Cp. Basil Epist. 226, 3 : 244, 7. Sok. vi. 12. It is true that these deputies, in their letter to Liberius, alter the Nicene wording in one clause of the creed, so as to read, 'And in one Only-begotten God, the Lord Jesus Christ' Sok. iv. 12 : but for the rest they commit their 64 brethren to that wording. And if any of the prelates at Constantinople could have taken this 'Epiphanian' Symbol for the Nicene in a literal sense, Gregory of Nyssa, whose brother, S. Basil, had embodied the Creed of 35 (omitting Theon ek theou) in a letter to the Antiochene Church, written on 373 (Epist. 142. 2), or Pelagius of Laodicea or Zeno of Tyre (cf. Mansi, iii, 568), who had sat in the Synod of Tyania, could have at once corrected the mistake, and shown in what sense the Symbol could be called the Nicene—a sense sufficient for that purpose, although it might fail to satisfy a modern standard of precision. It is remarkable that Basil, 377, had written to Epiphanius, to the effect that 'not the smallest addition' could be made to the Nicene Creed, except on the divinity of the Holy Spirit ; some proposed additions on the Incarnation he had declined even to consider (Epist. 288. 2). On both these points the 'Epiphanian' creed contained additions which the Council, according to the received opinion, saw reason to adopt : What again been objected that between the years 381 and 451 this recension of the Creed which we call the Constantinopolitan, is never alluded to, in other words, no 'Creed of the Second Council' appears to have been known ; Sokratês says merely that the Nicene Creed was 'confirmed' (v. 8). The Western churches, the Alexandrian church, the Council of Ephesus, the Antiochene party opposed to that Council (comp. Mansi, iv. 1341, 1375,) recognize the original Nicene Creed and no other (cp. Lumby Hist of Creeds, p. 72). But the authority of the Council of Constantinople itself was ignored by the West and by Egypt (see Neale, Hist. Alex. i. 209, Le Quien, Or. Chr. ii.

405): the Council of Ephesus was largely under the influence of the great prelate whom his enemies called the 'Egyptian : ' and the Syrian Churches, however keenly opposed to 'Apolinarianising' tendencies, might not have had occasion to consider or adopt the recension before us, which in one passage, relating to the Nativity, bears tokens of hostility to Apollinarian mysticism. At any rate, none of the bishops at Chalcedon appear to have challenged the assertion of the imperial commissioners that 'the 150' made an 'ekthesis' of the faith (Mansi, vi, 937); and when in the next Session the same commissioners caused the present Creed to be read as what 'the 150' had thus put forth, 'all the bishops exclaimed, This is the faith of all' (Mansi, vi, 957): and the whole Council, in its Fifth Session, solemnly adopted it as forming, with the original Nicene Creed, a 'wise and salutary Symbol' (Mansi vii. 112). It was quite possible in ancient times for persons to be religiously attached to the Nicene formulary, and yet to use, side by side with it, some other formulary agreeing with it in doctrine, but not altogether in language,—as was probably the case with Charisius (see below on Eph. 7), and certainly with Gregory of Tours, who prefixes to his 'Historia Ecclesiastica Francorum,' a 'creed' of his own as 'quod in Ecclesia credi praedicatur.'

(John Fulton, *The Chalcedonian decree*, p.97.) "The Seventh Canon of Ephesus is generally but erroneously supposed to have set forth the Nicene Declaration as a creed in the strict sense of the word, but, as a creed, we have clearly seen that the Nicene Declaration would have been defective in several important particulars; and if the Fathers of Ephesus had intended to establish a creed for universal use, they would hardly have forgotten the Declaration of Constantinople, which would have perfectly answered that end. In what they did they followed the invariable example of their predecessors. They went no further than the matters before them required that they should go. In those matters they had found the Nicene Declaration to be sufficient and satisfactory, and they therefore enacted, first, that it should thenceforward be an ecclesiastical offence to compile or compose any doctrinal statement which should be inconsistent with that Declaration; and Second, that to offer or propound any such statement to any person desiring to enter the Christian Church should be punishable with the penalty of deposition. It must be admitted, I think, that the language of the canon is obscure. Closely examined it seems to have been made up of two originally independent propositions, one of which was probably engrafted on the other as a rider or amendment; and in a council so stormy, it would be nothing wonderful if such an amendment were to be clumsily joined to the original proposition. This at all events is clear, that if the Council intended the very language of the Nicene Declaration to be universally obligatory, it does not say so; and it is equally

clear that if it intended to make the Nicene Declaration a test of all heresies, it adopted a formula which the Fathers of Constantinople had found to be insufficient to answer that purpose.

Twenty years later the work which was imperfectly done by the Council of Ephesus was unequivocally completed. In 451 the greatest of all the Councils, numbering 630 bishops, assembled at Chalcedon for the correction of recently invented forms of heresy; and as the Council of Ephesus had found the Definition of Nicaea, fairly and grammatically construed in its obvious sense, was a sufficient protection against Nestorianism, so the Fathers of Chalcedon found that, in the definitions of Nicaea and Constantinople united, the Church had a sufficient protection against all heresies whatsoever. It was now 126 years since the Council of Nicaea had assembled and nearly 420 years since the Apostles had received their commission to go and teach all nations. In all that time the Catholic Church had never but twice, and then with great reluctance, exercised its supreme function of exact doctrinal definition. Heretics, on the contrary, had been ever ready with irreverent self-conceit to affirm or deny, as the whim took them; and the absence of a fixed formula or symbol of faith had been severely felt. For want of it, faithful members of the Church had been liable to be led away by heretics who professed the greatest devotion to Orthodoxy and the utmost reverence for the Councils of the Church, but who availed themselves of the unrestrained liberty of exposition to set forth new formulas which were inconsistent with the faith of the Catholic Church.—The Declarations of Nicaea and Constantinople, were theologically exact in their terms; they had been unequivocally approved by the Christian Churches throughout the whole world; and they had been found to be amply sufficient in their scope to express the Catholic Faith. Therefore the Fathers of Chalcedon, in dealing with the new heresies of their day, imitated the example of the Fathers of Ephesus. They did not adopt or impose new definitions. They tested disputed doctrines by simply comparing them with the definitions of Nicaea and Constantinople. For the protection of the Church in the future they renewed the prohibition of Ephesus, which forbade the setting forth of any doctrinal statement which should be inconsistent with the definitions of Nicaea; they extended that prohibition to statements inconsistent with the definitions of Constantinople; and lastly they declared that not only the doctrines expressed in those definitions, but the very *ipsissima verba*, the identical words in which they were defined should be and remain unalterable. The distinction is very clearly brought out in the two words *pistis* and *symbolon*; *pistis* referring to the doctrine, and *symbolon* to the formula of the Creed. Repeating the prohibition of Ephesus, the Father of Chalcedon declared “that it is not lawful for any man to

produce, or compile, or compose, or hold, or teach to others any different faith (*heteran pistin*),” a prohibition which manifestly applied to the substance of the faith, and to all modes of teaching; and then they proceeded furthermore to enact that “those who shall presume *either* to compose a different faith, *pistin*, or to publish or teach or deliver a different formula, *symbolon*,” to persons desirous of turning to the truth from paganism, or Judaism, or any heresy whatsoever, shall be deposed, if they be bishops from the Episcopate, and clergymen from the Clergy; and if they be monks or laymen, they shall be anathematised.”—

3. *The Traditionalistic Plea Examined.*—The above arguments have been set forth to show that the later formula was the same as the earlier, only amplified.

It will be worth noting that in spite of all the arguments adduced, the historical fact that the two formularies are not the same, has not been touched. These arguments endeavour merely to show how possibly the development of Christian formularies from the first form to the second may have taken place.

Bishop Wordsworth's remarks may be criticised for two points:

(1). It is misleading to say that the Council of Constantinople agreed “without a dissentient voice, as far as we know”—to any determinations. The fact is that historians know absolutely nothing about the amount of unanimity of that Council in this or any other determinations. And unless Bishop Wordsworth has access to some source of evidence unknown to historians generally, it were wiser to state explicitly that nothing is known, for or against the unanimity of the council from first-hand sources.

(2). The Bishop is mistaken in stating that the Council reaffirmed the Nicene Creed in precisely the same words as those in which it was originally put forth. It can be shown that the changes amounted to more than 50 per cent. of the words, and that not only additions were made, but that important test-expressions were deliberately omitted, if it be true at all that the Nicene Creed was the base of the deliberations of the Constantinopolitan Fathers. The deliberate omissions, and changes of phraseology—apart from additions—prove that the assertion of Bishop Wordsworth that the Council confirmed “the faith of Nicaea in precisely the same words as those in which it was originally put forth in A. D. 325” is contrary to fact, and in matters so elementary that the simple reading of the two documents would have shielded him from committing so patent an error.

Dr. Bright is more careful than Bishop Wordsworth. He, at least, has read the authorities, even though his conclusions may be questioned.

If we arrange chronologically the facts he adduces it will be possible to gain a tolerably clear insight into their significance.

A. D. 325. Council at Nicaea adopts Nicene Creed as given by Sokratês.

347-348. Cyril, at Jerusalem, delivers lectures which contain expressions similar to the Epiphonian formulation.

367. Nicene Creed adopted by Council at Tyana in Cappadocia. Alteration: "And in one only-begotten God, the Lord Jesus Christ."

373. Epiphanius, in Cyprus, writes to a Church in Pamphilia his *Ancoratus*. It contains his Creed (Prayer-Book Nicene). He refers to it as "set forth by bishops more than 310 in number."

373. Basil writes to the Antiochene Church the Nicene Creed, omitting several words of it.

377. Basil writes to Epiphanius that "not the smallest addition" could be made to the Nicene Creed except on the subject of the Godhead of the Spirit. Declines to consider additions in respect to Incarnation.

381. Authority of Council of Constantinople (of "the 150") questioned in West, and in Egypt.

381-451. No mention anywhere of a creed of the Second Council.

431. Council of Ephesus. The Antiochene Party opposed to it recognize no creed other than the Nicene, although keenly opposed to "Apollinarizing" while the new Epiphonian, suppositiously of 381, Constantinople, directly opposes Apollinarism in terms.

451. Council at Chalcedon. The Fathers do not question that the Epiphonian Creed was adopted by "the 150" in "the holy city." They adopt and recite two Creeds, of "the 318" and of "the 150." The latter with the original Nicene Creed forms a "wise and salutary symbol."

451. Sokratês says that the Council of Constantinople confirmed the Nicene Creed.

These are Dr. Bright's facts. Let us see what they omit. They omit any reference to contemporary witness that the Constantinopolitan Fathers either confirmed the Nicene Creed, or adopted the Epiphonian formulary as the Nicene Creed. The first notice of this is years later at Chalcedon. By that time a mistake may easily have become current.

Dr. Bright holds that it was "practically incredible that he (Eusebius) should not have known the wording of the Nicene Symbol." The best proof is that Eusebius did mis-state the wording of the Creed adopted by more than 310 Bishops. Eusebius may however have only meant that his formulation contained the doctrine of the Nicene Creed, without at the time vouching for the verbal accuracy.

It is impossible to understand what Dr. Bright means. Either Eusebius did set forth his formulation with belief it was the Nicene Creed, or he did not. If he did, he needs not that Dr. Bright should excuse his inaccuracy as failing to satisfy "modern" standards of "precision." In this case,

Eusebius is right, and his Creed is the actual Creed of Nicaea, and Sokratês, and Sozomen are fools or liars.

But if he did not set forth his formulation as the actual Creed of Nicaea, in all sincerity, then in saying it was, he knew he was deceiving. Then he needs Dr. Bright's excuses for lack of "modern" standards of precision. It may be remarked that this is not a matter of "precision," but a matter of morals, of righteousness, of honesty; and these standards remain the same in all ages. In this case, since it is "practically incredible that he should not have known the wording of the Nicene Symbol," and since he distinctly claims that his formulation was the Nicene Symbol, and since he must have known the truth, as Sokratês and Sozomen give it, then Epiphanius was consciously deceiving.

That is all; for facts are stronger than theories. Either Sokratês and Sozomen, or Eusebius are right. If Eusebius is right, his formulation is the Nicene Symbol, and it is exact; if he is wrong, his claim is false and it is not a question of precision, but of veracity or ignorance.

In another matter does Dr. Bright contradict himself grievously, in his own words.

(1). He says that the Creed of the "150 Fathers" was a recension of the Nicene Creed which practically superseded "the original form—a development of it—expanded in view of present doctrinal requirements, by means of material borrowed from the Creed of Jerusalem."

(2). He admits that the Council of Chalcedon adopted and recited two creeds, that of the "318" and of the "150." "It was quite possible in ancient times for persons to be zealously attached to the Nicene formulary, and yet to use side by side with it some other formulary agreeing with it in doctrine, but not altogether in language."

The consequence of these two statements is a dilemma.

Either the Creed of "the 150" is a development of, but the same as the creed of the "318," the Nicene Symbol, or it is a different creed.

It seems unnatural that in a Council two separate creeds should be recited, together with anathemas for any one who should alter even a letter of the first if the second is a development of the first, and has superseded it already, and is so much the same as the first as to permit the Church of to-day to call it the first.

If the second is a different creed from the first, then everything in the procedure of the Council is natural, and easily explained. But in that case Dr. Bright is mistaken when he urges that the second is a development of the first, and has superseded it. It is then an "other" formulary, not the same.

So Dr. Bright fails to show the continuity between the Epiphanian and the Nicene Creed.

Dr. Fulton is not happier than Dr. Bright.

In the first place, with the inimitable naïveté of apparent

ignorance that it had ever been doubted that the Council of Constantinople had adopted a recension of the Nicene Creed, he states that fact dogmatically over and over. "If the Fathers at Ephesus had intended to establish a Creed for universal use, they would hardly have forgotten the Declaration of Constantinople, which would have perfectly answered that end.—It adopted a formula which the Fathers of Constantinople had been found to be insufficient to answer that purpose. In the definitions of Nicaea and Constantinople united the Church had a sufficient protection against all heresies soever. They tested disputed doctrines by simply comparing them with the definitions of Nicaea and Constantinople. They extended that prohibition to statements inconsistent with the definitions of Constantinople."

But Dr. Fulton's naïveté extends still further. He never mentions, as Dr. Bright does, that the authority of the Council of Constantinople was immediately and persistently questioned in the West and in Egypt. "The Declarations of Nicaea and Constantinople were theologically exact in their terms; they had been unequivocally approved by the Christian Churches throughout the whole world." This is pretty severe on the whole West!

Besides his naïveté in respect to these important matters, Dr. Fulton is a greater theologian than Athanasius. "The Nicene Declaration would have been defective in several important particulars." And yet he himself insists strenuously that the Nicene Creed is a sufficient "eirenicon" for all Christians, and with approval quotes the words of the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon which anathematize anybody who should demand any more than the Nicene Creed of any new convert. Probably Dr. Fulton overlooked the fact that in making this statement he was anathematizing himself.

The oversight that the Council of Constantinople "brought down the Nicene Creed to its present form," with the exception of the Filioque, is asserted, among others, also by so scholarly a man as Robertson, in his *History of The Christian Church*, Vol. 1, p. 377.

4. *The Plea of Modern Research.*—The writer of these lines was first interested in the question under discussion by a note in Harnack's *Dogmengeschichte*, in which he considered Hort's work decisive in the matter. This led him directly to the words of Dr. Hort, and Dr. Gwatkin, on the subject.

(Henry Melvill Gwatkin, M. A. *Studies of Arianism*, Cambridge, Deighton Bell & Co, 1882, p 262). We surely need not condescend to discuss the story that the Council of Constantinople solemnly revised the Nicene Creed. Dr. Hort, *Two Dissertations*, has conclusively shown that the document in question is not a revision of the Nicene Creed at all, but of Cyril's Jerusalem formula, and that it cannot have had any sanction from the Council beyond an incidental approval when Cyril's case came before them. Bishop Wordsworth *Ch. Hist.* II, 332-

5, tells the old story all the better for his ignorance that it ever been disputed. He only alludes to recent doubts in a postscript. Recently it has found a more serious defender in Bright, *Canons of the First Four General Councils*, 80-82. But he lays unaccountable stress on the assertion of Aëtius at Chalcedon, makes no new point whatever, and seems not to have met with Dr. Hort's decisive work. At any rate he absolutely fails to touch its arguments. Nor is his own account of the matter free from serious objection. When he tells us that "this creed was in effect the Nicene confession expanded" he forgets that there is something more than expansion in it. Surely Athanasius would have had an anathema for the men who left out the all-important *ek tês ousias*.

(Hort, *Two Dissertations*, p. 114.)

No unquestionable trace of the 'Constantinopolitan Creed' has yet, as far as I am aware, been found in the writings of theologians throughout this period. It is certainly unnoticed and unused in numerous places where the results of an ecumenical revision of the work of the 325 were not likely to be ignored. The contrast in the writings of John of Damascus is significant, p. 74. It is now certain that we have no evidence of any public recognition of the 'Constantinopolitan' Creed before the Council of Chalcedon in 457, when it was read by Aëtius a Deacon of Constantinople, as the 'Creed of the 150'—and accepted as orthodox, but not in any way placed on a level with the Nicene Creed, the Creed of the 318, which was likewise read, much less accepted, as taking its place.

p. 115. It was to all appearance reserved to a later time than the age of Chalcedon to confuse the Creed of the 150 with the enlarged Nicene Creed, and thus to complete the fictitious history which was begun when the 150 Fathers of Constantinople were first reputed to be the authors of the Creed of which we may well believe that they had expressed approval.

The short records of the Council of Constantinople illustrate indeed the watchfulness with which the sufficiency of the Nicene Creed was maintained; but threw no direct light on the foundation of the tradition which 70 years later associated the new form of Creed in some way with the 150 Bishops then assembled, and which does not seem likely to have been a mere invention. It is not however an unreasonable conjecture that the Creed was submitted to the Council by some one of its members and accepted as legitimate, without any idea of its becoming in any sense an ecumenical symbol, regulating the faith of many lands. However this may be, it was certainly in existence some years before the Council met, and already included those clauses which in a later age were specially said to have been introduced by the Council. (E. g. Note: 'Not only the additional clauses on the Holy Spirit, but *hou tês basileias ouk estai telos*, which stands in the Creed of the Apostolic Constitutions as well as in that of Jerusalem.)

The responsibility for the 'Constantinopolitan Creed' is thus shifted from the Council of 381, in which various distinguished men took part, to an unknown, person, synod or church at an earlier date, possibly a much earlier date.

The 'Epiphonian' or 'Constantinopolitan Creed' is not a revised form of the Nicene at all, but of the Creed of Jerusalem.

Written by Cyril 362, on return to his diocese, now as orthodox, inserting Conciliar (p. 96.) language into his own Semiarian symbol (p. 99. Note 1). The ratification of the Nicene Creed was thus the act which defined the doctrinal position of the Council both positively and negatively. It is difficult to see how on such an occasion an enlargement of the Creed as a standard of conversion could have been carried out without suicidal inconsistency.

p. 107. The Epiphonian Creed has 33 out of 178 words of the true creed of Nicaea : Note : that is, less than a fifth of the whole. This reckoning of course excludes words found in both the Nicene and the Jerusalem Creeds, but proved by the preceding comparison not to have been in fact derived from the Nicene Creed.

p. 111. Subsequent to its early transcription by Epiphanius the creed . . . that becomes visible 70 years after the Council of Constantinople. Apparently it then relapses into total obscurity for 85 years more : and 172 years have passed since the Council so far as can be gathered from my clear evidence yet advanced before it is found identified with the Nicene Creed, that is, treated as an improved revision of it.

p. 115. It was to all appearance reserved for a later time than the age of Chalcedon to confuse the "Creed of the 150" with the enlarged Nicene Creed, and thus to complete the fictitious history which was begun when 150 Fathers of Constantinople were first reputed to be authors of the Creed of which we may well believe that they had expressed approval.

5. *The Conciliar Documents.*—In order to judge of the question independently, it may be interesting to notice the actual words of the Council decrees, as Mansi has given them.

The following are extracts from the report of the Council of Constantinople, 318 A. D.

Letter of the Synod to the Emperor Theodosius the Great.

Then we pronounced some concise definitions ratifying the Faith of the Nicene Fathers, and anathematising the heresies which have sprung up contrary thereto.

Cannon I. The Faith of the 318 Fathers assembled at Nicaea in Bythynia shall not be set aside, but shall stand fast.

The reader will of course ask, Do the records of Council contain the Epiphonian Creed ? Yes : Mansi gives it : but in a small parenthesis adds : "As contained in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon." So it becomes plain that some one, out of the officiousness of a compiler, gave ground for the universal misconception on the subject. Yet Mansi had the honesty

to add the source from which he derived it ; and it is in the last resort the opinion of the Chalcedonian Fathers which is responsible for the trouble.

The Fathers of Constantinople confine themselves to re-affirming the Nicene Council which they could hardly do honestly if they were just about to supersede it by a later recension, or development of it. In another version of the same canons, Mansi, Hist. Council. Vol. III, p. 577, it is said : "Change not the faith, nor transgress its statutes : namely the statutes of the Holy Fathers who congregated at Nicaea ; but let them remain whole, just as they were given forth."

The following are Canons of the Council of Ephesus, A. D. 431.

Canon VII.—These things having been read, the Holy Synod decrees that it is unlawful for any man to bring forward or to write or to compose any other Creed than that established by the holy and blessed Fathers assembled, with the Holy Ghost in Nicaea.

But those who shall dare to compose another Creed, or to Heathenism or Judaism, or from any heresy whatsoever, shall be deposed of they be Bishops or Clergymen ; Bishops from the Episcopate and Clergymen from the Clergy ; and if they be laymen they should be anathematised.

And in like manner, if any, whether Bishops, Clergymen or laymen, should be discovered to hold or teach the doctrines contained in the exposition produced by the Presbyter Charius concerning the Incarnation of the only-begotten Son of God, on the abominable and profane doctrines of Nestorius which have been condemned ; they shall be subjected to the sentence of this Holy and Ecumenical Council.—

Preface to Canon VII.—

'The Decree of the same Holy Synod, pronounced after hearing the exposition (of the Faith) by the 318 holy and blessed Fathers in the City of Nicaea, and the impious Creed composed by Theodore of Mopsuestia and given to the same Holy Synod at Ephesus by the Presbyter Charisius of Philadelphia.'

Here follow Canons of the Council of Chalcedon, A. D. 451.

The Definition of Faith agreed upon at the Council of Chalcedon.—

And this we have done with one unanimous consent, driving away envious doctrines and renewing the missing faith of the Fathers, publishing to all men the creed of the 318, and to their numbers adding as their peers, the Fathers who have received the same summary of religion. Such are the 150 Fathers who afterwards assembled in the great City of Constantinople and ratified the same Faith. Moreover observing the order and every form relating to the Faith which was observed by the Holy Synod formerly held in Ephesus, of which Celestine of Rome and Cyril of Alexandria, of holy memory, were the leaders, we do declare that the exposition of the

right and blessed Faith made by the 318 holy and blessed Fathers assembled at Nicaea in the reign of Constantine of pious memory shall be preëminent: and that those things shall be of force also, which were decreed by the 150 holy Fathers at Constantinople, for the uprooting of the heresies which had then sprung up, and for the confirmation of the same one Catholic and Apostolic Faith.

"This wise and saving Creed of the divine grace sufficed. This present holy and great oecumenical Council . . . has at the very outset decreed that the Creed of the 318 Fathers shall not be tampered with. And on account of them that contend against the Holy Ghost, it confirms the doctrine afterwards delivered concerning the substance of the Spirit by the 150 holy Fathers who assembled in the holy City."

From consideration of the above it will appear that all three Councils agree on insisting on the Nicene Creed as an unchangeable witness of faith, than which no more shall be demanded from converts, on pain of deposition, and anathematization.

It is equally clear that the Council of Chalcedon recited along with the Nicene Creed, another Creed, the Epiphianian. Nowhere is it stated to be the Nicene Creed; if it were, it would not be referred to and recited beside the other. On the contrary, it is only said it was originated by the holy 150 Fathers at Constantinople, an excusable anachronism. There is in this no excuse to call it a "Creed commonly called the Nicene," or "The Nicene Creed."

6. *Hort's Proof*.—It is not sufficient to prove merely that the Epiphianian Creed is not the Nicene Creed. It is desirable to know actually whence it came.

Dr. Hort's work, which Harnack and Gwatkin think decisive, leads the enquirer to the Creed of Jerusalem, which Cyril amplified with orthodox phrases, when he returned from exile to his home. Before he went into exile, although he had been considered one of the orthodox party, his Creed was Semi-arian, and when he returned he felt it incumbent upon him to correct this defect.

Dr. Hort proves his point by giving all the Creeds in full, and by showing that if the Epiphianian Creed was derived from the Nicene, the additions would be many, the changes of many expressions still more, and several expressions would be omitted. On the contrary, if the Epiphianian Creed was an amplification of the Jerusalem Creed, the only changes would be the consistent addition of whole clauses, not separate unimportant words, here and there.

The omissions would be the important Athanasian (1) "that is, from the being of the Father;" (2) God of God, (3) only-begotten. Besides, the "Epiphianian Creed has only 33 out of 178 words of the true Creed of Nicaea, note, that is, less than a fifth of the whole. This reckoning of course excludes words found in both the Nicene and Jerusalem Creeds, but proved

by the preceding comparison not to have been in fact derived from the Nicene Creed."

I. Cesarean Creed.

We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, he who is the Maker of all things visible and invisible.

And in one Lord Jesus Christ,—the Logos of THE God,—God, of God,—Light of Light,—Life of Life,—the only-begotten Son,—the First-born of every Creature,—Being born of the Father before all ages—through whom all things arose.—Who being incarnate for our salvation,—and dwelling among men—and suffering,—and rising on the third day,—and ascending to the Father,—and sitting again in glory to judge the living and the dead.

(And we believe) And in the Holy Ghost.

II. The Nicene Creed, exhibited with the Creed of Caesarea as its base.

(The original words of the Cesarean Creed are in capitals; words which, in Greek, are in the Cesarean, but not the Nicene Creed, are omitted. These can be seen by comparison with the Creed above.)

WE BELIEVE IN ONE GOD, THE FATHER ALMIGHTY, THE MAKER OF ALL THINGS VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE.

AND IN ONE LORD JESUS CHRIST,—THE SON OF THE GOD,—begotten only-begotten of the Father,—that is, from the Being of the Father,—GOD OF GOD,—LIGHT OF LIGHT,—Very God of very God,—Begotten, not Made;—Consubstantial with the Father,—THROUGH WHOM ALL THINGS AROSE, both those in heaven and in the earth (on the earth),—Who for the sake of us who are men, AND FOR OUR SALVATION came down and WAS INCARNATE,—BECOMING MAN, SUFFERING, AND RISING ON THE THIRD DAY,—ASCENDING into heaven, (the Heavens),—Who shall come TO JUDGE THE QUICK AND THE DEAD.

AND IN THE HOLY GHOST.

But those who say of the Son of THE God, There was not a time when he was not, or, He was not before he was begotten, and that He was made out of things not existing, or, who say that He is of an other Substance and Being, (or created), or Variable, or changeable, (these) the catholic (and apostolic) Church anathematizes.

III. The "Constantinopolitan" Creed, or Revised Creed of Jerusalem, with the Nicene Creed as its assumed base.

(Nicene Creed in capitals.)

WE BELIEVE IN ONE GOD THE FATHER ALMIGHTY,—Maker of heaven and earth,—AND OF all THINGS VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE :—

AND IN ONE LORD JESUS CHRIST,—THE only-begotten SON OF THE GOD;—He who is begotten of his Father before all worlds,—LIGHT OF LIGHT,—VERY GOD OF VERY GOD,—CONSUBSTANTIAL WITH THE FATHER; BY WHOM ALL THINGS AROSE. WHO FOR US WHO ARE

MEN AND FOR OUR SALVATION DESCENDED from the heavens,—AND WAS INCARNATE of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary,—AND WAS MADE MAN :—And was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate ;—He suffered and was buried :—AND THE THIRD DAY HE ROSE AGAIN according to the Scriptures :—And ASCENDED INTO THE HEAVENS,—And sitteth on the right hand of the Father,—And he SHALL COME AGAIN with glory TO JUDGE BOTH THE QUICK AND THE DEAD ;—Whose kingdom shall have no end.

AND IN THE HOLY GHOST, The Lord, and Giver of Life,—Who proceedeth from the Father,—Who with the Father and Son together is worshipped and glorified ;—Who spake by the Prophets.

In one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church :—We acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins,—And we look for the Resurrection of the Dead :—And the life of the coming Age. Amen.

IV. The Earlier Creed of Jerusalem.

We believe in one God, the Father Almighty,—Maker of heaven and earth,—and of all things visible, and invisible.

AND in one Lord Jesus Christ,—the only-begotten Son of THE God,—being born very God from the Father before all the Ages, Through whom all things arose.—He was incarnate and made Man,—crucified and buried,—He arose on the third day,—and ascended into the heavens,—and sat down at the right hand of the Father,—He shall come again in glory to judge the quick and the dead, of whose kingdom there shall be no end.

And in one Holy Ghost,—The Comforter,—Who spoke by the Prophets.

And in one Baptism of repentance for the remission of sins,—And in one Holy Catholic Church,—And in the resurrection of the Flesh,—and in the Life everlasting.

V. The Constantinopolitan Creed or Revised Creed of Jerusalem, Exhibited with the Earlier Creed of Jerusalem as its base.

(Capitals, Earlier Creed of Jerusalem ; Italics, Nicene Insertions.)

WE BELIEVE IN ONE GOD THE FATHER ALMIGHTY,—MAKER OF HEAVEN AND EARTH,—AND OF THINGS VISIBLE AND *invisible* :—

AND IN ONE LORD JESUS CHRIST,—THE ONLY-BEGOTTEN SON OF *the* GOD ;—HE WHO WAS BEGOTTEN OF HIS FATHER BEFORE ALL AGES,—*Light of Light,—Very God of very God,—Begotten, not made,—Consubstantial with the Father ;* BY WHOM ALL THINGS AROSE. *Who for us who are men and for our salvation descended from the heavens,—*and WAS INCARNATE of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary,—AND WAS MADE MAN ;—And WAS CRUCIFIED also for us under Pontius Pilate :—He suffered AND WAS BURIED ;—And THE THIRD DAY HE ROSE AGAIN, ac-

CORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES ;—AND ASCENDED INTO THE HEAVENS,— AND sitteth ON THE RIGHT HAND OF THE FATHER,—AND HE SHALL COME again WITH GLORY TO JUDGE BOTH THE QUICK AND THE DEAD;—WHOSE KINGDOM SHALL HAVE NO END.

AND IN the holy GHOST, The Lord, and Giver of Life, —Who proceedeth from the Father,—Who with the Father and Son together is worshipped and glorified ;—WHO SPAKE by the PROPHETS.

IN ONE HOLY CATHOLIC and Apostolic CHURCH;—We acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins,—And we look for the RESURRECTION of the Dead ;—AND THE LIFE of the coming age. Amen.

VI. The Interpolated Nicene Creed as recited in the definition of Chalcedon, Exhibited with the Interpotations distinguished from the Original Creed.

(Interpolations in Capitals.)

We believe in one God the Father Almighty,—the Maker of all things visible and invisible.

And in One Lord JESUS CHRIST,—the Son of THE God,—HE WHO was born only-begotten of the Father,—God of God,—Light of Light,—Very God of very God,—Begotten, not made,—Consubstantial with the Father,—Through whom all things arose. Who for us men and for our salvation came down FROM THE HEAVENS, and was incarnate OF THE HOLY GHOST AND THE VIRGIN MARY,—And was made man ;—HE WAS CRUCIFIED FOR US UNDER PONTIUS PILATE, AND suffered, AND WAS BURIED ;—And he rose again on the third day ACCORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES,—And ascended into the heavens,—AND SITTETH AT THE RIGHT HAND OF THE FATHER,—And shall come again WITH GLORY to judge both the quick and the dead,—WHOSE KINGDOM SHALL HAVE NO END.

And in THE HOLY Ghost, THE LORD AND GIVER OF LIFE.

But those who say, of the Son of THE God, There was a time when he was not, or, He was not before he was begotten, and that He was made out of things not existing, or, who say that He is of an other Substance and Being, or Variable, or Changeable, these the Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes.

7. *Theological Significance of the Changes.*—The difference between the Nicene and the Epiphonian Creeds has been pointed out above ; it remains to consider its theological significance. The difference is as follows.

(1). "And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God," for : "And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of the God, born only-begotten of the Father, that is, from the being of the Father."

The important additions are as follows.

(2). "Begotten of his Father before all worlds."

- (3). "By the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary."
- (4). "And was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate."
- (5). "And was buried."
- (6). "According to the Scriptures."
- (7). "And sitteth on the right hand of God."
- (8). "With glory."
- (9). "Whose kingdom shall have no end."
- (10). "The Lord, and Giver of Life, Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son ; Who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified ; Who spake by the Prophets : And I believe one Catholic and Apostolic Church ; I acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins : and I look for the Resurrection of the Dead, and the Life of the world to come. Amen."

A sharp distinction should be drawn between the essentials, and the non-essentials of the Faith. It matters but little in how many non-essentials two men may differ; as long as they agree in respect to the essentials, they are both entitled to orthodoxy as designation of their ecclesiastical status. Now a Creed is a statement of the essentials of Faith ; what it omits is one of the non-essentials, on the subject of which two orthodox Christians have full liberty to differ.

When it is pointed out, therefore, what a Creed does not contain, it is not meant to assert that such doctrine was not believed or preached by orthodox Christians ; far from that. But it does mean that such a doctrine was by the framers of that Creed considered a non-essential, which men might hold or not as they pleased. The very fact that the framers of a Creed held some doctrine which they did not insert into it is sufficient proof that they considered that it belonged to the non-essentials of Christianity, that it was possible that a man should be a Christian while withholding his assent from them.

The Bible, without a doubt, contains many facts and doctrines which the Creed does not mention ; they are none the less true, and worthy of belief for that. But the Creed chooses from among them those vital facts which constitute the Christian interpretation of all that the Bible teaches. And therefore, nothing more than the Creed should be demanded of any Christian.

Not only is this reason, but it is Canon Law. The Ephesine and Chalcedonian Councils go as far as to decree anathematization and deposition from the ministry not only against those who should presume to alter even a letter of the Nicene Creed, but who should, in receiving a convert or member of the Church of some other Diocese, demand even a word more of doctrine than the Creed itself sets forth. This could hardly have been the case if they, the framers of these canons, had not considered that anything outside of the Creed of Nicaea was more than a non-essential of theology.

With these principles in mind, and remembering that to

prove a thing a non-essential has not the slightest reference to the question whether or not earlier Fathers held some particular belief, it will be worth while to make the logical deduction from the differences between the Nicene and the Epiphonian Symbols.

Any man has the canonical right to be called an orthodox Christian, without a belief

(1). That Jesus was only-begotten, except inasmuch as it means that he was born of the very being and nature of the Father ;

(2). That Jesus was begotten before all worlds ;

(3). That Jesus was born "by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary ;"

(4). That he sat down at the right hand of God ;

(5). That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Fathers and the Son, that with the Father and the Son he is worshipped and glorified ; that he spake by the Prophets ;

(6). In one Catholic and Apostolic Church ; in Baptism for the remission of sins, in the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come.

On the contrary : the essentials of Chalcedonian orthodoxy are :

"We believe in one God, the Father almighty, the Maker of all things visible and invisible ;

And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of the God ; born only-begotten of the Father, that is, from the being of the Father ; God of God, very God of very God ; born, not made, consubstantial with the Fathers, through whom all things in heaven and earth arose ; for us men and for our salvation he descended, and was incarnated, and became man ; he suffered and rose on the third day, he ascended into heaven, and will come to judge the quick and the dead.

And I believe in the Holy Ghost."

Agreeing on these broad lines of the only Nicene Creed in existence, and permitting full latitude on all points not covered by this Creed, the scattered flock of God may reunite some day, if only none will arise who will seek to increase the differences between different men in regard to all non-essentials. May this long-prayed for event come soon !

THE LAMBETH ARTICLES.

1. *Position of the Laity.*—There are, within the pale of Christianity, many conscientious laymen who, more or less, have become aware of the difficulties of dogmas. To each of them the question presents itself whether they can conscientiously remain where they are. The decision must be determined mainly by the particular circumstances of the case.

If they happen to be in Churches where the crude and repulsive notions of extreme dogmatism are preached, as required by Methodist vicarious salvation, or Presbyterian infant damnation, prudence would dictate putting an end to continual unpleasant thoughts, as suggested by preacher or service.

As a rule, however, even among the bodies mentioned above, there would be no necessity of severing connection with those organizations. The clergy as a rule have been led to insist less and less on the distinctive features of the doctrines they are commissioned to preach; and that for the very practical reason that they do not care to preach to empty benches. All the Churches have become more or less liberalized, and without realizing it, and most of the clergy are as unorthodox as their congregations or more so.

It is always the part of wisdom to remain in the place in which the Providence of God has placed us, until circumstances show duty to go elsewhere. Besides, it is not the highest form of work for the truth to destroy, and deny. Negative work is, at best, incomplete, and fraught with danger to weak consciences. Much more divine is the constructive work which proceeds regularly and perfectly, feeding the souls of the weak, until they become strong enough to seek the light for themselves. Besides, there is no divine command to judge of others. If we do set forth the truth, we do all that is required of us.

In any case, however, change of association with religious bodies is easy enough for laymen, and can take place without unpleasant stirring up of animosity, and uncharitableness. And perhaps the wisest position for the layman is the scientific attitude of doubt, which is, seeking the truth everywhere, and ready to receive it from any source, without, in the meanwhile, attaching themselves formally to any body.

2. *Position of the Clergy.*—The position of the clergy, however, is much more difficult than that of the laity. The layman is not expected or forced to believe anything but a minimum of doctrine. The clergyman, however, before he can enter his life-work, must solemnly declare his unfeigned assent to the whole of the doctrine of the body with which he is connected.

Whether it would be possible for a Christian determined to assert freedom of thought to remain in the Christian body in which he is at home, depends entirely on the conditions of subscription which prevail in that body. In some the conditions are stricter, in some laxer.

3. *The Lambeth Articles as test of Orthodoxy.*—Before it is possible to acknowledge assent or dissent from the doctrines of the Church, it is necessary to define these. In July, 1888, a "Conference of Bishops of the Anglican Communion," holden at Lambeth Palace, in England, proposed the following articles as a basis of Church union with other bodies.

(a). The Holy Scriptures, of the Old and New Testaments, as "containing all things necessary to salvation," and as being the rule and ultimate standard of faith.

(b). The Apostles' Creed, as the Baptismal Symbol; and the Nicene Creed as the sufficient statement of the Christian faith.

(c). The two Sacraments ordained by Christ himself—baptism and the supper of the Lord—ministered with un-failing use of Christ's words of institution, and of the elements ordained by him.

(d). The Historic Episcopate, locally adapted in the methods of its administration to the varying needs of the nations and peoples called of God into the Unity of his Church.

It is evident that if the Anglican Church defined these four articles as a sufficient statement of doctrine, that we may consider her doctrine to be these four articles. Besides, these four articles should be interpreted not in a preconceived traditional sense, but on its merits. What is the use of a definition if this formulation stands in need of a further definition? That is, if it is to be interpreted in one sense alone? When learned men deliberately set forth a definition in the sight of the whole world, it must be supposed that they mean just what they say, neither more nor less.

In view of these facts, it is worth while to examine these four articles narrowly, in order to ascertain whether the conscientious Christian can accept them, and therefore retain his place within the body in which he may chance to be.

4. *The Holy Scriptures.*—The first article reads as follows: "The Holy Scriptures, of the Old and New Testaments, as containing all things necessary to salvations, and as being the rule and ultimate standard of faith."

This proposition contains the following assertions.

(1). The Holy Scriptures mean the books of the Bible held to be of canonical authority within the Anglican communion. This excludes the books commonly called Apocryphal.

(2). These books contain all things necessary to salvation.

(3). They are the rule, and ultimate standard of faith.

More interesting than what this proposition contains, is that which it omits.

(1). It omits all mention of the doctrine of inspiration, or of any particular theory of inspiration.

(2). It omits a proviso such as we find in the Profession of faith of Pius IV, in which the Scriptures must be interpreted only in the sense which the Church directs.

(3). It omits all condemnation of critical and rational study of the origin, growth, and nature of the books of the Bible.

Few if any will object to the assertions implied in this article.

No one who has read the Apocrypha of the Old Testament with any impartiality will hesitate to pronounce them hardly equal to the canonical books in point of depth, morality, style, and probability.

No one will object to the statement that they contain all things necessary to salvation. Their choice of subjects is so varied, their spiritual insights so deep, their lovely simplicity so affecting, that in comparison with the other Bibles of the world, the Jewish Scriptures by universal consent are ranked first ; and to be the first of the best and wisest books of the world insures the fact that it contains the most of what is known to be necessary to salvation, and therefore to contain all things necessary to a salvation according to their standard ; which is by common consent the highest standard yet known.

The next assertion of this article is the truth complementary to this. They are the rule and ultimate standard of faith. The best book of the world should certainly be yielded the preëminence in the matter of authority, and of furnishing a standard of belief. No man has the right to deny such authority to the wisest and most lovely thoughts the world has known. No other standard than this should be permitted ; not a General Council, run by the majority or an unbaptised Constantine ; not the pope or the bishop ; not the writings of well-meaning men who were looked up to in the ages of ignorance that succeeded the sub-apostolic Church. If we are to seek anywhere for an authority, here it will be found, and we will have no rest in our search for one until we accept it, the best book of the world.

We must now turn to some points which it omits.

That the Bible is inspired, no one will doubt. There is no good in us which is not of the influence of God. Should not then the best that we have be of him ? All good books are inspired, inasmuch as they are good ; the best that we have must be most inspired.

Yet, although we may yield unfeigned assent to this opinion, is important to remark that it says nothing of the manner in which it is inspired, of the psychological theory of the influence of the divine spirit on the human spirit by which the inspired record is produced.

It says nothing of inerrancy, in word and letter, nor does it make claims exclusively for itself. It tells its story simply, naïvely, plainly. It is not hard to find contradictions, inconsistencies, improbabilities ; but the very fact that these exist shows the entire good faith of the writers, whoever they were. They spoke to the best of their ability, nor did they endeavor to arrange their statements so that they might attain some ulterior purpose. This very sincerity is proof of its inspiration.

In the second place, the first Lambeth article lays down no rule of interpretation. Reason and common-sense, with

scientific determination of what a writer living in those days would be likely to mean must be the guide. This excludes the straining of texts to favour some theory, orthodox or heretical.

In the third place, it is important to remember that the articles do not exclude rational, scientific criticism such as would be applied to any other book. In calling the Bible the rule and ultimate standard of faith, the enquirer does not accept any theory as to who wrote the Pentateuch or the Gospels. He accepts the Bible for exactly what it is worth ; and scientific criticism will tell him just what is its real value. Calm critical reflection will judge of the date of a book, and thereby decide of the meaning and importance of its expressions. There is therefore no reason why any should be afraid to accept the Scriptures as the rule and ultimate standard of faith ; for reason will decide first what this rule and standard of faith actually is.

5. *The Creeds.*—The second Lambeth article reads as follows : “ The Apostles’ creed, as the baptismal symbol ; and the Nicene creed as the sufficient statement of the Christian faith.”

The first question occurs immediately, what are these creeds ?

The Apostles’ Creed in the form we have it is found for the first time in the works of Pirminianus in 750 A. D. The Nicene Creed was adopted by the Council of Nicaea, in the year 325 A. D. On account of its priority, it is wise to begin with a consideration of the Nicene Symbol.

The Nicene definition reads as follows :

“ We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, the Maker of all things visible and invisible ;

“ And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of the God ; born only-begotten of the Father, that is, from the being of the Father ; God of God, light of light, very God of very God ; born not made, consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things in Heaven and earth arose ; for us men and for our salvation he descended, and was incarnated, and became man ; he suffered and rose on the third day, he ascended into Heaven, and will come to judge the quick and the dead.

“ And I believe in the Holy Ghost.”

But the Nicene Creed as given by the Church has the following important alteration, besides some additions :

(1). “ And in our Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God,” for : “ And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the son of the God, born only-begotten of the Father, that is, from the being of the Father.”

This change is significant. It omits the important definition of what is meant by being only-begotten, and also the Philonic distinction of “ THE ” God, as applied to the Father.

The omission of the definition of what is meant by “ only-begotten ” is so much the more important, as without it the famous expression is misleading. Standing by itself it seems

to infer that there can be only one only-begotten Son, whereas when the explanation is given, it is plain that there can be an infinity of Sons begotten from the being of the Father. Theologically the omission amounts almost to a misstatement.

The additions are as follows :

(2). "Begotten of his Father before all worlds." This addition makes a great distinction between the Son of God and the rest of creation, inasmuch as he preceded everything else. The Nicene Creed does not so much as hint this radical distinction.

(3). "By the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary." These are the words which are the only foundation of the doctrine of the Virgin birth ; and it is significant that they do not appear until the Council of Chalcedon, A. D. 451, 126 years after the Council of Nicaea. The Virgin Birth may have been held by the Bishops of Nicaea, but it does not appear in the Creed, so that the burden of proof lies on those who assert that they held it and believed it.

(4). "And was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate."

(5). "And was buried."

(6). "According to the Scriptures."

(7). "And sitteth on the right hand of God." Thus the doctrines of the divine Session is also a novelty of the Council of Chalcedon.

(8). "With glory."

(9). "Whose kingdom shall have no end."

(10). "The Lord, and Giver of Life, Who proceeded from the Father and Son ; Who with the Father and Son together is worshipped and glorified ; Who spake by the Prophets : And I believe one Catholic and Apostolic Church ; I acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins : and I look for the Resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come. Amen." This is a very material and bulky addition to the Nicene Creed, full of weighty doctrines, and a startling innovation.

These ten changes and additions evidently alter the very marrow of the faith. Yet the Lambeth article declares that the Nicene Creed is a sufficient statement of the Christian Faith. Consequently these additions are not necessary beliefs of the Christian. A man may therefore be a Christian without declaring in his statement of belief that he holds.

(1). that Jesus was only-begotten, except inasmuch as it means that he was born of the very being and nature of the Father.

(2). that Jesus was begotten before all worlds.

(3). that Jesus was born "by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary." This includes the doctrine of the Virgin birth.

(4). that he sat down at the right hand of God.

(5). that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, that with the Father and the Son he is worshipped and glorified ; that he spake by the prophets ;

(6). in one Catholic and Apostolic Church ; in Baptism

for the remission of sins, in the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come.

Those who believe in the Scriptures will believe exactly what is written there, since they are the rule and ultimate standard of faith ; but, since the Nicene Creed is a sufficient statement of the Christian faith, no more than this should be demanded from a man when he gives a statement of his belief. Doubtless many will find these omitted doctrines in the Bible, so that they are not lost beliefs to him who accepts the Scriptures as the rule and ultimate standard of faith. Yet, according to the Lambeth articles, they must not be required in a confession of belief, or in a definition of what forms Christian belief.

It is time to turn to the Apostles' Creed, as the Baptismal Symbol. This infers that before a neophyte can be baptized he must profess to believe this Creed. The question occurs immediately, What is it ?

The form in which the Church uses it is first found in the writings of Pirminianus, A. D. 750. This is 375 years after the Council of Nicaea, whose Creed was by the Lambeth Article declared to be a sufficient statement of the Christian faith. If it be really a sufficient statement, we are not bound to accept any formulation later than that ; and if we are to believe the Apostles' Creed, we must by that mean a form of it prior to 325 A. D., not one found for the first time 375 years after that event. It will be necessary therefore to consider that form which was found last before the Council of Nicaea ; and it will be instructive to see the one next after the Council. J. Rawson Lumby, in his History of the Creed, gives the former form as that of Novatian, 260 A. D., and the latter as that of Marcellus, 341 A. D.

The Creed of Novatian runs as follows :

"I believe in God the Father ; In Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Lord our God ; and in the Holy Spirit."

The Creed of Cyprian, 250 A. D., ten years older than this one, reads as follows :

"I believe in God the Father ; In Christ his Son ; In the Holy Ghost within the Holy Church, the Remission of sins, and eternal Life."

These creeds are of startling simplicity when compared with any Post-Nicene formulation, as, for instance, that of Marcellus, 341 A. D. :

"I believe in God Almighty ; in Jesus Christ his only-begotten Son, our Lord ; being born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, and buried ; he rose on the third day from the dead : ascended into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of the Father, whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead. And in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Church, the Remission of Sins, the Resurrection of the flesh, and the Life eternal."

This form has the following additions to the Nicene Creed, and to that of Cyprian and Marcellus :

(1). Being born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary.

(2). Crucified under Pontius Pilate, and was buried.

(3). And sitteth at the right hand of the Father.

(4). The Holy Church, the Remission of Sins, the Resurrection of the Flesh, and the Life Eternal.

Looking back to the additions to the Nicene Creed found in the Creed "of the 150," the strange fact appears, that almost the same additions to the creed of Cyprian are found in that of Marcellus, which are found added to the Nicene Symbol by the "Creed of the 150." There can only be one conclusion: that shortly after the Council of Nicaea, perhaps sixteen years after it, the doctrines of the Virgin Birth, of the Crucifixion, of the Session, and of the addition to the last clause, were deliberately added to the Creed. This does not mean that these doctrines had not been held before, or that they had not been found in the Gospels before; but only now were they added to the Christian statement of faith. If however, the Nicene Creed is a sufficient statement of the Christian faith, then it becomes evident that these later additions to both the Nicene and Apostolic formulations must be omitted from what we consider necessary parts of the Christian statement of faith, not denying that they may be found in the Gospels. They are not then essentials; on the contrary they are superfluous additions, immaterial to a statement of Christian belief.

When, however, the Lambeth Article declares the Nicene Creed a sufficient statement of the Christian faith, and then adds that the Apostles' Creed is sufficient as a baptismal symbol, then we must suppose the baptismal symbol is simpler than a "sufficient statement of the Christian faith;" and that it must mean some form of the Apostles' Creed anterior to the Nicene formulation, and free from the additions which were made to both in later times.

The Baptismal symbol must therefore be a form of the Apostles' Creed anterior to 325, that is, Cyprian's, in the year 250 A. D. But in this Jesus of Nazara is not even identified by explicit mention with the Messiah of God. The Remission of sins is not explicitly limited to a vicarious sacrifice; and the Life eternal is the common hope of mankind.

The Lambeth article is therefore sufficiently liberal to permit a Christian, without straining of his conscience, to claim and assert his right to a position within the Church which adopted the Lambeth Articles.

6. *The Sacraments.*—The third Lambeth article reads as follows: "The two Sacraments ordained by Christ himself—Baptism and Supper of the Lord—ministered with unfeeling use of Christ's words of institution, and of the elements ordained by him."

The Sacrament of Baptism is a rite so beautifully appropriate to that which it signifies, the dedication of the life to the service of God, that that it is inconceivable how any should object to it. It was in use long before the time of Jesus, and deserves to remain in use as long as men dedicate their being to the service of God. The formula, In the name

of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is a most poetic formulation of dedication of the organism to all the laws of the Universe in its great realms of transcending divinity, common humanity, and the divine influences which are always seeking to guide and elevate seekers after God.

The Supper of the Lord is a like beautiful rite. Who would not commemorate the saintly life and unique example of the Master of Nazara, by eating bread and drinking wine, "in remembrance" of him? Humbler and more reverent must he grow who assembles together with his brethren to commemorate the divine mission of the great Christ, Jesus of Nazara. Word for word may be the formula of institution be used; and he who does so with childlike simplicity will receive the fulness of the blessing that always blesses him who seeks the heights of his life on the heights of the life of the world.

7. *The Ministry.*—The fourth and last Lambeth article declares belief in "the Historic Episcopate, locally adapted in the methods of its administration to the varying needs of the nations and peoples called of God into the unity of his Church."

The "Historic Episcopate," as the name implies, is a matter of history. It is therefore not a matter of discussion, and speculation. Whatever history, unbiassed, and sincere, will declare, that must the world accept. There is no use, therefore, of declaring as the Anglican Ordinal does that "it is evident unto all men, diligently reading holy Scriptures and ancient authors, that from the Apostles' time there have been these orders of ministers in Christ's Church,—Bishops, Priests and Deacons." A matter of history cannot be the subject of dogmatic assent and belief.

Apart then from the witness of history, which must be left to future generations to work out, it is very evident that if there is any organized body there must be some authority at the head to direct and guide. There is an absolute need of overseers, "bishops," of some kind or another. If the Church insists on such a matter as ordination by tactual succession through a definite line of bishops, well and good. It can do no harm, and if it is any comfort to the Church to feel that the overseers are chosen and ordained in this manner, surely no one would have the bad taste to object. Wisely, however, does the Lambeth article direct that it shall be locally adapted to the varying needs of the nations and peoples called by God into the unity of his Church. To the Church that desires it, let ordination be granted; to other bodies who seek God as Christians, let the succession of overseers, theoretical or practical be permitted in the natural course of events. There will always, by virtue of the law of the survival of the fittest, remain a leader of some kind in an organized body; so the historic episcopate—for every event is historic, and every overseer is episcopal—will never fail to the end of the world. With this hope in their hearts the Christians need not fear for the future, but may with full confidence leave it in the hands of God.

THE FACTS

CONCERNING

The Doctrine of the Resurrection.



CHAPTER I.

THE RESURRECTION IN THE FIRST GOSPEL.

The passages of the First Gospel bearing on the Resurrection are as follows : (A) xvi : 21-23 ; (B) xviii : 3, 4 ; (C) xxii : 23-33 ; (D) xxii : 59-64 ; (E) xxvii : 52, 53 ; (F) xxvii : 62-66 ; xxviii : 11-15 ; (G) xxvii : 1-8, 16-18.

(A) XVI : 21-23. From this it would seem hardly probable that Peter would have been disinclined to the belief of the rising again of Jesus ; hence he must have misunderstood Jesus, or Jesus must have spoken very indefinitely as to the meaning of rising again.

That Jesus looked forward to being killed by the Jews need not imply any but common powers of observation of their temper. Whether being raised the third day referred to a resurrection of the physical body, or only a survival of the soul, is not mentioned.

Again, it may be asked whether the "third" day is meant as a denotation of an exact period of time, or only a proverbial expression for any short period, such as "ten days," or "forty days," among the Jews.

(B) XVII : 3, 4. The Transfiguration seems to imply certain facts.

The suggestion of building tabernacles for the three implies a certain equality in the physical appearance of the three. Moses had certainly died, physically, whether Elias had or not. The interesting question remains, what was the status of Moses ? It is not elsewhere in the New Testament claimed that he was physically resurrected.

The suggestion of building a booth for him implies that he had a physical body, for it would be an absurd thought if he was only a spirit. If he was physically resurrected, then it implies the physical resurrection of an Old Testament character, before the death and resurrection of Jesus ; and consequently, independently of its virtue.

Nevertheless, in verse 9, the whole occurrence is spoken of as a "vision." It remains therefore that the apostles were men liable to see "visions" in which the appearances were identical with those of living men, or at least like enough to suggest the thought of building tabernacles as much for the one as the other.

(C) XXII : 23-33. The conclusions which this passage leads to are as follows :

The Sadducees were opposed to the Pharisees, of whom the former considered Jesus a follower in this respect, at least, on the subject of the resurrection. It seems then that the Pharisees

who formed one of the most religious, popular, and influential political parties of the nation believed openly in a resurrection. So did Josephus, too, among others. The doctrine of the resurrection was then well known, and a familiar religious topic.

The answer of Jesus tells of the resurrected only that they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels in heaven.

Angels of heaven have no physical bodies resurrected for them.

The answer of Jesus seems to infer that Abraham, Jacob, and Isaac, whose bodies nobody claimed to have been resurrected, and had become earth, were already "living" or resurrected long ago. It seems then that resurrection had no connection whatever with the physical body, and that it took place commonly during Old Testament times, without reference to the resurrection of Jesus himself.

(D) XXVI : 59-64. It seems that those who said that Jesus had taught that he would destroy the temple, and rebuild it in three days, were false witnesses.

The utterance of Jesus, beginning with "nevertheless" seems to imply that it was not true.

What, in opposition to this that was not true, he "nevertheless" was willing to assent to, was a Jewish final restoration of all things at the end of the world, at which the "Scribes and Pharisees" could take no umbrage, since they themselves held a like doctrine. The offensive portion seemed to be that Jesus declared that he himself should be the protagonist of this restoration or resurrection.

(E) XXVII : 52, 53. It is extremely strange, if the occurrence narrated in these verses actually took place, that so little attention has ever been devoted to an analysis of it.

It would seem that the saints were vivified immediately at the time of Jesus's giving up of the ghost. They did not go into the city till three days after. It is to be surmised then that being perhaps dazed they preferred to stay near the graves in which they had lain a long while. They must have been almost starved, by this waiting of three days, after a period of death. If people had given them food, the miracle would have become sufficiently well known to preclude their waiting so long before taking a walk. And when they did go to Jerusalem, why did they appear only to a few, and not to all? Either they had to die again, or live eternally. Now they did not live eternally, because they are not to be found at the present day. Consequently, they must have died again. It would seem then that the resurrection of Christians is only a temporary revivification, to die again.

It may be asked again, what kind of saints were they? Not Christians; for no followers of Jesus were martyred till long after his death. They cannot then have had any faith in him, nor can their resurrection be due to any interest in his death. The fact that they were buried near Golgotha suggest that they were criminals, and no saints; for the "place of skulls" was the official place of execution of criminals.

It is to be noticed that their resurrection seems to have been dependent on the death, not the resurrection of Jesus. They celebrated the latter event only by taking exercise and walking over to Jerusalem. The former circumstance brought them back to life. Their own resurrection can then not be dependent on their faith in him, nor on the power of his resurrection. It seems to have been due to his death.

(F) XXVII : 62-66 ; xxviii : 11-15. One thing is made perfectly clear by this event of watching the sepulchre that the two portions of it which are inserted, in several pieces, in a narrative that forms a unity without it. The lesson is that the grave was empty after the resurrection. The resurrection of Jesus was a resurrection of the body. The actual physical skeleton, that was not "broken" like that of the two thieves, was reanimated. The skeleton of the resurrected body was the same as that of the crucified body. It was a physical resurrection in his case.

(G) XVIII : 1-8, 16-18. It appears that the resurrection of Jesus was a resurrection of the same body that hung on the cross : for the grave was empty when the women came. Whether those who came doubted his identity, or if not his identity his death, is not stated.

The results of all these circumstances is :

The resurrection of Jesus was one which left the grave empty, taking the old bones, muscles, nerves and bloodvessels that hung on the cross.

The resurrection of other persons does not seem to depend on knowledge of him, faith in him, or faith in his resurrection. His death alone seems to have been an occasion of resurrection for a few.

There are no promises to his disciples that they shall also be resurrected, or that such resurrection would occur by the power of his.

CHAPTER II.

THE RESURRECTION IN THE SECOND GOSPEL.

The account of the Resurrection as given in the Second Gospel does not add any new points to that of the First Gospel. In viii : 31, ix : 31, x : 34, xiv : 28, are prophecies of the event ; in xii : 18-27 is a repetition of the episode with the Sadducees ; in xiv : 58 a repetition of the "false accusation" that he had said he would destroy the temple in three days ; and in xvi : 1-18, is an account of the event itself.

CHAPTER III.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE THIRD GOSPEL.

The account of the Resurrection as given by the Third Gospel is fuller than that of the First and Second. The passages referring to it are, (A) ix : 22, xviii : 33 ; his own prophecy of his death and "rising again." (B) ix : 7, 8 ; (C) xi : 32 ; (D)

xvi : 30, 31 ; (E) xxiv : 1-47. It appears that a belief in the resurrection of dead persons, recently or long dead, was current among the Jews, and even credible with so skeptical a person as Herod.

(C) XI : 32. Jesus speaks of the resurrection of the whole people or race contemporaneous with Jonas, and of the generation of Jews that lived contemporaneously with him. Knowledge of or faith in him, the effect of his own resurrection seem here to be precluded by priority of time.

(D) XVI : 30, 31. The returning of a man from the dead seems to be spoken of in a most commonplace manner, as if such a thing was at all possible. Abraham's refusal to send some one is not based on the impossibility of such a thing, but upon the fact that even such an event would not command the obedience of his brothers. It would seem, however, that so great a miracle would persuade anybody, unless it were a matter of common and general experience and belief. This is postulated by the matter-of-fact way in which so astounding a thing is spoken of.

(E) XXIV : 1-47. It seems from this account that the resurrection-body is physical. The grave is empty, vv. 3, 12 ; he went with the disciples, v. 15 ; spoke with them so that they did not know that their interlocutor was not an ordinary man, v. 17 ; went in to tarry with them, v. 29 ; took up physical bread, broke it, and handed it about, and thus must have been subject to the law of gravitation and conservation of energy, v. 30 ; declares expressly he is not a spirit, v. 39 ; invites the disciples to handle his hands and feet, v. 40 ; takes and eats fish and honey-comb, and thus must have digestive and assimilative tracts, v. 43 ; spoke to them as a usual man, v. 44. In all this he did nothing impossible to the physical body of any living man, or his own before death. Against this it might be adduced that he "drew near," v. 15 ; "vanished out of their sight," v. 31 ; "stood in the midst of them," v. 36 ; was "parted from them, and carried up into heaven," v. 51. These expressions do not necessitate a spirit-like quality, which would be inconsistent with the above. Sudden appearance among persons who did not look for him, and equally sudden departures, are not proofs of spirit-power. It does not say that his body was taken up into clouds. He was parted from them, and carried up into heaven. This phraseology could be explained on the hypothesis of departure, and ultimate destination. It would seem quite natural to appoint all his disciples to meet him in a mountain at the final leave-taking.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RESURRECTION IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

Whereas in the first three Gospels the subject of the Resurrection is referred to explicitly only in the case of Jesus, beyond a popular belief in the actuality of such occurrences, in the fourth there seem to be three main topics ; first, the case of

Jesus himself ; secondly, the literal resurrection of the faithful, and thirdly, their figurative resurrection during life.

1. *The Resurrection of Jesus.*—The passages referring to the Resurrection of Jesus are the following : (A) II : 18-22. (B) x : 17, 18 ; (C) xx ; (D) xxi : 1-15.

(A) II : 19-22. In the first three Gospels the utterance concerning the destruction of the temple was brought forward by false witnesses. In the Fourth Gospel it is advanced by Jesus himself, as a figurative expression which would have been very hard to understand.

Moreover, like the driving of the money-changers out of the temple, it has been taken from the very end of the career of Jesus to its very beginning. This is a significant and important alteration of order. By this process it becomes a distinct prediction of his resurrection. How far this is then a *prima facie* prophetic evidence remains a matter of discussion.

(B) X : 17, 18. This statement is difficult to reconcile with the numerous passages in which it is distinctly stated that it is the Father who "raised up" Jesus. The latter are however to be found mostly in the Pauline Epistles.

(C) XX. A few facts concerning the body of Jesus may be gathered from the above passage. The grave was empty, v. 8 ; the place where the body itself was laid, was unoccupied, v. 12. Consequently the resurrected body contained all the osseous and muscular skeleton of the dead body. It was so different in appearance that the experienced eyes of Mary did not at first recognize him, v. 14. The sufferings through which the body had been put through would have probably satisfactorily accounted for this change. He asked not to be touched, because he had not yet ascended to the Father, v. 17. The reason given for the request not to touch him is obscure ; the natural inference would be that it would be proper to touch him after he had ascended to the Father ; but this is an impossibility. Jesus goes out of his way to speak of "my Father and your Father, and my God and your God," v. 17. This seems expressive of possessing a nature common to himself and other men. He shewed his hands and his side, v. 20, and encouraged Thomas to handle his hands and his side. The only thing that qualifies these distinctly physical signs is that twice, while the disciples were assembled, and the doors being shut, he stood in their midst, vv. 19, 26. But in no other document would that appear strange, or mean any more than that he entered unnoticed, or entered before the doors were shut, and when they were closed, stood in their midst.

(D) XXI : 1-15. In this passage it is related that Jesus prepared a fire, and fish and bread, and gave to them to eat. This could not have occurred unless his body had been physical and able to hold in his physical hand physical bread and physical fishes.

II. *The Resurrection of the Dead.*—Besides referring to the resurrection of Jesus himself, it refers to the resurrection of other dead persons, as is recorded also in the Third Gospel, in

the case of the son of the widow of Nain. The passages which relate to this topic are (A) v : 25-30 ; (B) xi : 21-27, 40-46.

(A) V : 25-30. If there be any real distinction between verses 25, and 28, it would seem that when the above was written was the time when the dead should hear the voice of the Son of God, with a choice of "hearing" and "not hearing." Then, when "the hour" should come, those who had decided to "hear" should enter the resurrection of life, and the others, the resurrection under the name of "damnation." It is evident that a person must be as alive to go into the resurrection of damnation, as into the resurrection of life. The latter word is then a figurative expression, that does not mean life as distinguished from death, but which seems to denote a pleasant state of life. This will henceforth be referred to as "life (II)."

It is evident from the above that conscious existence after death, that is, life (I), of the same kind of life as is enjoyed before death here on earth, is the lot both of good and bad, either in damnation or life (II). Actual existence after death is then the lot of all men, before the advent of Jesus, as well as after. This life (I) after death is moreover a state in which a man may choose whether he will or will not "hear" the Son of God. This state is not dependent on Jesus in any way, and would have existed even if the latter had never been born on earth. The resurrection spoken of, besides, is not said to have any relation to the resurrection of Jesus. That there will be a resurrection for all men, naturally, is plainly stated. Of course, the resurrected state may be one of pain or pleasure, but still it is a state of life (I), or conscious existence ; for it is absurd to speak of the damnation of a person who does not exist.

The only influence which the "Son of God" seems to have is to preach to the dead, and, inferentially only, to preach judgment to the dead ; to decide whether they shall be in pain or pleasure.

(B) XI : 21-27 ; 40-46. It may be convenient to consider the case of the son of the widow of Nain together with the case of Lazarus.

It seems that this "resurrection," of which Jesus says, v. 26, that those who believe in him shall "never die," and is therefore of the same category as the other cases of promised resurrection, reanimated the same body that had "died." The same osseous muscular, nervous, and blood-vessel skeleton that was laid in the grave was revived to former life. Lazarus and the young man of Nain must have died again later on, or they would be living to-day. A resurrection meant nothing more, then, than a temporary prolongation of life, in cases where the body was still intact in its main outline and parts.

The strange part of this is that Lazarus, who must have believed, during his life-time, on Jesus as much as his sisters, did die. And when he was dead, his resurrection did not take place because, like other normal dead, he "heard" the voice of the Son of God, but only because his sister believed, v. 40. It is not then those who believe who shall be resurrected, and shall never

die, but those "for whom" other people believe. They themselves, apparently, have nothing to do with the matter, and might be as unbelieving, or as evil-mannered as any of those who are not as fortunate in having other people believe for them.

If however it be contended that Lazarus rose, not because his sister who, according to strict justice should have been the one to "never die," but believed for him—but because he heard the "voice of the Son of God," then it remains that the dead who who decided to "hear" the voice of the Son of God should have been resurrected during the lifetime of Jesus; and as very few were then resurrected, it would then appear that no other resurrections should ever take place.

It is to be noticed that Martha believed as a common-place matter in a resurrection "at the last day." Such a resurrection "at the last day" had then no connection with Jesus, his life, death or resurrection. The point made in the passage above quoted is that the resurrection shall not only take place at the last day, as all the Pharisees believed, but immediately, and in connection with this immediate resurrection Jesus uses the full language that is anywhere applied to any normal, and not only extraordinary, resurrection. It would seem then that Lazarus, the young man of Nain, and the "saints" of Golgotha, were persons in whose case the real resurrection occurred; but this would leave the rest of the world without hope. If, again, it be held that the resurrection preached by Jesus was the resurrection "at the last day," it is evident that this was nothing new to the main body of Jewish people, as Paul proved when he freed himself by appealing to the belief of the Pharisees on the subject, as against the Sadducees.

III. *The Resurrection of the Living.*—Besides a resurrection promised to the dead, a Resurrection was generally promised to the living while alive. This is referred to in (A) IV : 10-14, 36; (B) v : 24, 39, 40; (C) vi : 27-38, 47-53, 56-58; (D) vii : 38; (E) viii : 12, 24; (F) xii : 24, 25, 50; (G) xvii : 2, 3.

In all these passages it is asserted that immediately on knowledge of God or faith in Jesus Christ the person is passed from death unto life eternal. It is plain that this word "life" is not life (I), the natural, physical life of mind soul and body. It may mean life (II), an undefined addition of some sort which is called "life eternal," but which does not hinder the person from dying, in the primary and usual sense. This is a resurrection from the dead (not dead) (I), but dead (II), meaning something as far from death (I), as life (II) is from life (I), but which does not hinder full health of life (I), the only actual life known or spoken of usually. This is the resurrection of the living, resurrection (II), a theoretic state whose use and purport and nature is apparently still unknown. For if it were of any use, if it were an actuality, if it is an immediate change into eternal life, it should at least prolong life on earth, or in some way effectuate an actuality which could be in some manner seen, felt, observed, or understood.

IV. *Special Resurrection of the Dead.*—When it is asked what use this theoretic resurrection (II) is, it is pointed out that it actually constitutes being raised at the last day.

Such passages are, vi : 39, 40, 54.

But it may be asked, what is the use of this “resurrection at the last day” ? It has been already seen that a resurrection will take place in any case, for good and bad.

Again, the former passages represent the believer as immediately receiving eternal life, and therefore, it would seem, in no need of being raised once more at the last day.

As it has been seen, the dead possess the power of “hearing” or “not hearing” at will. If then the resurrection unto “life (II)” can take place, what is the use of additional faith in this life ?

For the sake of greater clearness, it will be well to distinguish two senses of life (II). It is used to denote the theoretic “life” added to the natural “life” immediately on having faith in the Son of God, here on earth. Above it was used to denote the opposite of damnation, or an added somewhat to the life (I) of the soul after death in the resurrection of just and unjust. Perhaps it may be wise to denote the former by “life (III),” and the latter by “life (IV).” The senses of “death” will be analogous to these distinctions.

CHAPTER V.

THE RESURRECTION IN THE BOOK OF ACTS.

The utterances of the Book of Acts on the subject of the Resurrection fall naturally into four main topics : first, that the Pharisees held the doctrine ; secondly, that the apostles considered themselves witnesses of the event, God being the power that raised Jesus. Thirdly, explanations of the fact are attempted ; and lastly, the accounts of the occasions on which Paul stood face to face with Jesus.

I. *The Resurrection Taught by Pharisees.*—The passages of the Book of Acts which bear on the belief of the Jews on the subject of the Resurrection are (A) iv : 12 ; (B) xxiii : 6-9 ; xxiv : 15, 20, 21.

(A) IV : 13. In this passage the gist of the opposition of the Pharisees to the Christians is set forth. They did not find fault with the latter for preaching the resurrection of the dead, as will appear in the following passages, in which, on this subject, the Pharisees undertook to support Paul against the Sadducees. The trouble was that the Christians restricted this universal resurrection to believers in Jesus, and “through” him preached the doctrines of a judgment to come, in which he was to play the most prominent part. It is evident, therefore, how far the Christians were from being the discoverers of the doctrine of the Resurrection. They were accused by the Pharisees of perverting it by limiting it to the followers of Jesus. In modern times the impression prevails that it was the Resurrection of Jesus

which originated and substantiated the idea of a Resurrection. This opinion could hardly be more erroneous, especially as Jesus preached, as recorded in the Fourth Gospel, a resurrection of the just and unjust, the distinctive tenet of the Pharisees.

(B) XXXIII : 6-9 ; xxiv : 15, 20, 21. It is plain from these lines, which show that the Pharisees were more opposed to the Sadducees than to Paul, that they believed in a resurrection. In xxiv : 15 Paul distinctly acknowledges this ; and later brings to bear the fact that by that appeal to prejudice of party he saved himself. His conscience did not seem to be quite at ease about his appeal to the prejudices of his accusers. This very fact shows how thoroughly he realized the deep-rooted faith of the Pharisees on the subject.

II. *Witness of the Resurrection of Jesus.*—The passages that affirm the resurrection of Jesus, and assert that God raised him, are very numerous, and mostly alike. They may follow here. (A) I : 21, 22 ; (B) ii : 32, 33 ; iv : 10, 33 ; v : 29-32 ; (C) x : 40-42 ; xiii : 30, 31.

The texts adduced need no comment. In x : 41 it is expressly stated that the apostles eat and drank with Jesus after his Resurrection. This of course implies a physical digestive tract, and complementary organs of assimilation and rejection of elements containing no nourishment.

III. *Explanations of the Resurrection.*—The only attempted explanation of the Resurrection are quotations from the Psalms, and two further statements. (A) II : 31 ; xiii : 32-37 ; (B) ii : 24 ; (C) xvii : 31, 32.

It is hard to make the portions of this text illustrate each other. Either God, who is stronger than death, raised up Jesus, or Jesus resurrected himself ; in which case alone the statement that "it was not possible that he should be holden of it," would have any significance. For if it was God that raised him, it is quite comprehensible that death could have held him ; at least, this is the logical inference, whether the writer of these words was aware of it, or not.

The objections of the Athenians seem to have been directed against the Pharisaic doctrine of the Resurrection. The words of Paul are directed at another subject, that of the Judgeship of Jesus at the Last Day. The raising from the dead of Jesus seems to have been considered by Paul an assurance that he would return at the latter day as Judge of all. There does not seem to exist between the two ideas, however, any necessary philosophical connection. The one event could exist perfectly without the other, and conversely.

IV. *Paul's Personal Experience.*—Although Paul was as "one born out of due time," yet he considered himself not one whit behind the chiefest of the Apostles. His call had not been from man but from Jesus himself. This personal experience of Paul's is the basis of his "gospel." References are : (A) XXV : 19 ; (B) xxii : 17-21 ; (C) ix : 3-9 ; xxii : 6-11 ; xxvi : 12-18 ; (D) xxvi : 19.

(A) XXV : 19. What this "alive" means when Paul affirmed

Jesus to be such, is not clear. It might signify the opposite of "dead," and thus apply to a physical resurrection. Yet, the word "alive" might merely apply to spiritual existence outside of the body.

(B) XXII : 17-21. This conversation with the Lord in the temple evidently took place "in a trance." There was no need of a resurrection of the physical body for such a spiritual appearance in a trance.

(C) IX : 3-9 ; xxii : 6-11 ; xxvi : 12-16. Paul's conversion seems to have formed the turning-point of his career. If ever he saw the Lord Jesus it was now. And yet, serious inconsistencies arise in his repetition of the story. In the first version, his companions hear a voice, but see no light ; in the second, they hear no voice, but see a light. In the third, the glory covers them too and throws them to the ground. These inconsistencies cause opportunities for grave reflection as to the objectivity of the vision. Certainly, at any rate, Jesus did not have a physical body that could be handled, and seen, and which could eat. If this was Jesus himself, it remains to be asked, why was his body here of different consistency than it was when Thomas, and the other Apostles saw it ?

(D) XXVI : 19. The objectivity of the above visions, or rather the actual presence of the physical body of the resurrected Jesus is set at rest by the following lines, which impress on the reader clearly the fact that it was a vision, and not the appearance of the resurrected Jesus in his resurrected physical body : "I was not disobedient unto the heavenly vision." It would seem then that Paul himself saw Jesus, but only in trances and visions. He never saw the resurrected Jesus himself in his physical resurrection-body. Whether therefore he saw a different Jesus or whether he and the other Apostles differed as to his nature and body, is not clear. It should be remembered that under ordinary circumstances an event of so marvelous a nature, and so great a significance would have been unlikely to remain so much in doubt through so serious inconsistencies in the stories of those who were witnesses of the events.

CHAPTER VI.

THE RESURRECTION IN THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

As is to be expected from the nature of an Epistle, that to the Romans contains few assertions of the fact of the Resurrection, or explanations of it. On the contrary, it sets forth at length the practical application of the resurrection of Jesus.

I. *Assertions of the Resurrection of Jesus.*—There are two verses, i : 4, and x : 9, which set forth the actuality of the Resurrection of Jesus.

II. *Explanations of the Resurrection.*—There are two short passages which may explain in which manner immortality can be attained, (A) II : 7, and iv : 22-25. "To them who by patient

continuance in well doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life." This has reference evidently to life (III), or that immortality which can be attained during the present life, or life (I). The means is said to be, well-doing. This is righteousness, and may be distinguished by the sign righteousness (I).

The writer of the Epistle to the Romans knows of a different kind of righteousness, which is theoretical, being imputed to those who by faith believe in Jesus.

This is set forth in the following lines. It may be incidentally remarked that by this means, of the similarity of sound between righteousness (I) and righteousnes (II) the whole difficulty of reconciling justification by faith and personal morality is apparently solved, verses 22-25.

This seems to be a step in advance of the Fourth Gospel in which eternal life by faith in Jesus is the only thing promised. The writer of it does not define eternal life, nor its use. The writer of the Epistle to the Romans connects that theory with the practical life, and likens the death of Jesus to the atonement or reconciliation, and his resurrection to every man's personal sanctification, or righteousness (II) by the assistance of the Spirit of the Resurrected Jesus. Voluminous reassertions of this stand-point are given below.

(B) XI : 15. Such a life from the dead, depending on the Jews being received back to glory, or, in other words, by their conversion to Christianity, is not here applied to any particular being ; and as immortality is inseparable from a person who shall be immortal, it is only a figure of speech.

III. *Practical Aspect of the Resurrection.*—The stand-point of the writer of the Epistle to the Romans seems to be contained mainly in v : 6-21 ; vi : 4-11, 22, 23 ; viii : 11-13. The theory seems to be as follows :

By his death on Golgotha, Jesus effected the atonement, or reconciliation, good for all men at all times. By his resurrection into a spiritual state, he has become able to assist each person in gaining their salvation, or sanctification. This is called resurrection (II), or eternal life (III). This "eternal life" is given to men's "mortal bodies" while still in the flesh. The promise of life does not touch life (I), but probably refers to some post-mortem state.

CHAPTER VII.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE EPISTLES TO THE CORINTHIANS.

The First Epistle to the Corinthians contains special treatment of the topic under discussion. It contains more variety of argument and illustration than other writings of the New Testament. It treats not only of the fact of the Resurrection of Jesus, but also of the necessity of the connection between the Resurrection of Jesus and the resurrection of all other people.

It asserts that a resurrection in life, would not be worth while without the one after death, discusses the circumstances and facts of the post-mortem resurrection, the kind of change that will take place at death, and during life.

Before beginning these involved considerations it may be helpful to define the terms to be used.

(1) Life (I) is the natural physiological and historical human life, death (I) being its ending.

(2) Life (V) is the natural continuation of this beyond the grave, both for just and unjust. There is no kind of death to correspond to this.

(3) Life (II) refers to figurative life, or theoretical life, its opposite being death (II). It refers collectively to the two following kinds of life and death.

(4) Life (III) and death (III) refer to a theoretical state of life (I) and death (I). It arises from faith in Jesus, or denotes its opposite. This life in no wise interferes with the normal historical and physiological life (I) and death (I). It is called immortality, but does not seem to affect death (I) in the least degree. There is no experimental sign by which its presence can be ascertained.

(5) Life (IV) is not opposed often to death (IV), or "second death"; more often to "damnation." It is a state of life (V), a superadded somewhat, possibly being pleasurable of life (V). Death (IV) is likewise only the painfulness of life (V).

(6) Resurrection (I) refers to the change between death (I) and life (V). This occurs naturally for all men, just as well as unjust.

(7) Resurrection (II) refers to the addition of life (III) to life (I), the inference being that all men while in life (I) are naturally in death (III).

(8) Resurrection (III) may refer to the change from or rather addition to life (V) of the theoretical conditions referred to as life (IV) and death (IV). This is presumably to occur at "the last day."

(9) Resurrection (IV) may be the label of the temporary re-animation (a short while after death) (I) which occurred in the cases of Jesus, the young man of Nain, and Lazarus. The same physical body constitutes the resurrection-body; so that the grave or bier are empty. This may be called resurrection-body (I).

(10) Resurrection-body (II) may denote the "spiritual body" of i: Cor. xv, which is different from the "natural body," or resurrection-body (I), and which arises from the total disintegration of the "natural body," or potential resurrection-body (I), as a seed. It is "changed" from body (I), and differing from it in the matter of corruption, dishonour, weakness.

I. *Facts of the Resurrection of Jesus.*—The writer of the Epistles under consideration claims to have seen the resurrected Jesus, xv: 4-8, and vi: 14.

It is however to be noticed, that although the writer claims to have seen Jesus in the same way and with the same veridicity as

the other Apostles, the accounts of these appearances differ. When Jesus came to the Apostles he had a physical resurrection-body (I), which could eat and drink, be handled, and walk around to Emmaus, in full sight of all men. When the writer saw Jesus it was only in a "heavenly vision," by-standers not seeing the form, and, according to conflicting accounts, either hearing the voice, or seeing a light. This seems to be closer to resurrection-body (II). It may be questioned, therefore, whether the writer was under the impression that the resurrection of Jesus did not imply a resurrection-body (I) such as the other writers describe. There seems to be here a hopeless difference of opinion.

The greatest significance of this conflict of opinions is that it should occur in a matter of so vital an importance ; for the sake of witness to which, in fact, the Apostles considered themselves bound to perpetuate their body from among men who had been witnesses along with them. But it seems clear that if the early witnesses disagreed, it is hopeless to attain any certainty on the subject at this late date.

Besides, it is the investigator's duty to ask himself what the actual circumstances could have been which by any means could have led to so serious a divergence of opinions. That the witnesses did their work independently is the best proof of the difference of their teachings. The whole matter, however, can never lead to any conclusions more certain than conjectures, without power to enforce the assent of any other man.

II. Necessity of Connection.

In the opinion of the writer, the connection between any resurrection of other persons depended directly upon the validity or power of the resurrection of Jesus himself, xv : 12-15.

If the dead rise not, then Christ is not raised ; and if Christ is not raised, the dead rise not.

This position is hardly scientific. The fact of the resurrection of Jesus, and the fact of the resurrection of other people, should be historically verifiable on their own merits ; and should not depend for veridicity on the supposed consequences of such a fact. If it is a historical fact that Jesus rose, it matters not whether others rise or do not rise, as far as its veridicity goes, it matters not what happened to Jesus. Such verification is only of use if the facts are not historically verified.

It is capable of proof, however, that many resurrections (II) took place which did not depend on the resurrection of Jesus. So with the young man of Nain, Lazarus, and the "saints" of Golgotha.

Moreover, if it be true that there be a resurrection of the just and of the unjust, as Paul in the Book of Acts teaches, then this resurrection (I) has no connection whatsoever with the resurrection of Jesus.

This is not all. Even if it be true that all resurrections depend on that of Jesus, how does the connection take place ? What is the agency by which the influence of the one event affects the other ? If appeal is taken to the infinite and inscrut-

able wisdom and power of God, the question may be asked, if everything is explained by omnipotence, then what was the need of the resurrection of Jesus himself? Omnipotency could as well resurrect persons because it desired to do so, as resurrect them by the resurrection of some other person.

III. *Deadness in Sins.*—Abandonment of sins depends on the resurrection of Jesus, xv : 16, 17, 31.

It is evident that if the question of being in sin or not, even for the past, is dependent on the question whether, at some particular time in the past a faith in the resurrection of Jesus was entertained or not, the state of being in sin or out of it is purely an intellectual abstraction. For if it be more than an intellectual abstraction, if it have ever so little an actuality corresponding to it, this is a fact of experience, which no kind of intellectual belief or assent would alter, especially in a retroactive sense. The mere possibility of a retroactive application of the dependence of sin or freedom of sin on faith in the resurrection of Jesus Christ shows that that actual sins and the sins Paul speaks about are distinctly different things; the first, facts of experience, the second, theoretic abstractions. It becomes clear that in reality Paul considered that as soon as a man believed in Jesus's resurrection, he was saved by that opinion, wholly irrespective of the sins he had or still should commit in the future.

To die daily infers that organic life (I) persists continually; life (III), the theoretic abstraction, and death (III), having not the slightest influence on it.

It is plain that Augustin and Calvin were only logical in concluding from such premisses that all who did not believe in the resurrection, and sealed that by baptism, were eternally damned; for then all men, bad or good, were in sin, irrespective of the actual sins. So then a person who theoretically was out of sin could be saved even if he were worse than the heathen who was damned. But this separates religion wholly from morality; makes it immoral; in other words, relegates it to the limbo of theoretic abstractions.

IV. *Belief and Destruction.*—If Jesus is not risen, then are the dead perished. XV : 18. Besides, even if life (III) was possessed, it was useless if it did not lead to life beyond the grave, xv : 19, 29, 30, 32.

Evidently these passages show two things.

Firstly, Paul has changed his mind about a "resurrection of the just and unjust," among whom those "which are fallen asleep in Christ" would be in any case resurrected, good or bad, and hence, would not be "perished."

Secondly, it shows that, after all, the immortality attained during life, or life (III), is a completely theoretic affair, of no value in itself; except as a means to a wholly different kind of "immortality" after death. Paul would not avoid sin merely because of a desire after a purer life. He only struggles to become free from it, he only spreads the Gospel, in order to capture an existence of some kind after death. He goes as far as to say that if it were not for the opportunity of this life (V) he would

recommend eating, and drinking, and comfort in sinning, implicitly. "For to-morrow we die."

Belief in this magical connection between faith in the resurrection of Jesus and life (V) is then the logical reason and justification of "baptism for the dead," and this "baptism for the dead" becomes a necessary consequence of this belief. A disuse of this rite would indicate necessarily an abandonment of this belief; or at any rate, a traditionalistic habit of mind which sees sin in thinking clearly.

V. *History of Resurrection.*—The writer now uses the word "resurrection" in a different sense; resurrection (III), or the resurrection at the last day. This is found in xv : 20-26.

The whole argument advanced is a vague analogy of death coming by one man, and life by another. Then, another analogy of both these circumstances to each life. This disagrees with former descriptions of the life (III) -process taking place in causal connection with the death and resurrection of Jesus, and not with the death of Adam, and the resurrection of Jesus. Again, both resurrections are different.

Firstly, comes the question of the analogy of death coming by one man, and life through another. The nerve of this analogy is then that "manhood" existed in both cases, the latter "man" rectifying the mistake of the other "man."

It is capable of proof that this analogy does not hold. The death which Adam brought in was death (I), and this persists in all human beings, since Jesus, and in the case of Jesus himself. What Jesus brought in then was not a correction of the mistake or fault of Adam, but the addition of a totally new order of things, which left the old untouched. Firstly, life (III), which Paul himself acknowledges is worthless in itself. Secondly, life (V) or life (IV), whichever Paul may refer to here, if, indeed, he here still holds his own former distinction.

But Paul himself acknowledges that the resurrection of Jesus did not originate the opinion of the Pharisees, and the resurrections (IV) of the young man of Nain and Lazarus—not speaking of Old Testament resurrections. Hence it may be doubted if he himself is sincere when he says that the resurrection of the dead came by faith in the resurrection of Jesus, as expressed above.

Secondly, it can be shown that the analogy of both events does not hold. It was seen above that what Jesus brought man was an immortality or life (III) which existed during life (I), and on which any future existence depended. Now, the work of Jesus is merely this future existence. The work of Adam is not undone. It is only added to.

Finally, it may be interesting to notice that the resurrection of Jesus, resurrection (IV), and the resurrection of all other persons, resurrection (III).

In the case of Jesus the resurrection took place about thirty hours after death, while the organic body remained intact, and the grave was emptied of the physical body put in it at the burial. In case of resurrection (III) it only takes place "at the

last day," which is an indefinite period, and when by physical experiment it is possible to show that all the physical bodies are absolutely dissolved, and often form part of some new organism. The difference is then exceeding great.

VI. *Submission of the Son.*—It seems to be a part of the writer's conception of the resurrection at the last day, that the Son shall be made wholly subject to "The God," the Father, xv : 27-28. This implies that the Son is not The God, and is subordinated to The God.

VII. *Modus Operandi of Resurrection.*—The manner in which the resurrection takes place is described in xv : 35-38.

The resurrection-body (II) is connected with the natural body by the intermediation of a seed. It is distinctly stated that the natural body must disintegrate wholly, and in some unexplained manner leave behind it the seed of a new one, which indeed is different from the old, being spiritual, whereas the former was "natural." This is the exact doctrine of Tertullian. The latter supposed that the teeth, as the most indestructible parts of man, were the seeds of the spiritual body. But this theory falls to the ground before the fact that even teeth decay and that those of former generations have already long ago disappeared for ever. If this theory were true, the dentist would be a very important personage indeed.

Two remarks may be made concerning this theory.

If it be true that the physical body leaves behind a seed which forms the spiritual body, the strange spectacle would be presented of the seed of one thing giving birth to another. This is equal to gathering grapes of thorns, and figs of thistles.

If, in the second place, it is true that the spiritual body cannot be born until the physical one be dead and decayed, how was it that Jesus rose before the physical organism was thoroughly decayed, as a seed would be, and that he took with him everything that had been laid in the grave, with the exception of the napkins and other external things ?

The seed-theory of the resurrection, which is taught by the writer of this Epistle, has some serious difficulties to meet.

VIII. *The Change of the Resurrection.*—How does the actual Resurrection (III) occur ? This is told in xv : 39-52.

The main lesson of these lines is that the "physical" flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God. Hence a change is necessary ; the seed must die before the plant can live. The whole explanation volunteered by the writer is a description of the fact that a change will suddenly take place. But it does not explain how such a change is possible, under the operation of what laws it takes place, and the like. Simply to affirm that there are many kinds of things, —and among these many things alike, like the flesh of men and beasts—and that there will be a change is not to demonstrate how, when, and why it takes place, and from what to what the change is.

The passage is eloquent, but inconclusive.

IX. *Confusion Between Resurrections.*—After describing the Resurrection "at the last day," without apparent change of ar-

gument of subject, the writer suddenly leaves resurrection (III) and speaks of resurrection (II), in xv : 53-57.

Evidently it does not agree with the foregoing, that the seed must die, and that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, to speak of the mortal part not being done away, but merely putting on a garment, or avoiding sin, and contemplating the law. There is some transition here. The jump is from the "last day" when the "trump" shall sound, to the present day, when only dinner-gongs ring. How then can the former argument apply to so different a thing?

It has been the endeavour of the present writer to distinguish these numerous *quaterniones terminorum* by setting apart separate labels for different connotations. Had Paul done that, his ideas would have flowed methodically, one subject at a time, without repetitions, and he would have probably checked himself in many illicit processes. But he did not; and when it is done, it becomes evident how unclear, unmethodical, chaotic,—though extremely picturesque—all that he says is.

This continual confusion of thought is the reason that this writer's statements are so conflicting, and inconsistent. The only hope is to analyze clearly just what he did mean, and what he was referring to.

X. *Living Resurrection*.—The Second Epistle to the Corinthians refers only to immortality during life (I), or, life (III). The quotations refer too plainly to this present order of things, implying in some cases future effort, to permit any mistake as to the period of their application. Such references are i : 9 ; ii : 14-17 ; iv : 10-12, 14 ; v : 1-4, 15, 16.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE RESURRECTION IN THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

The reference to the Resurrection in the Epistle to the Galatians is contained in i : 1, 12, 16 ; ii : 20 ; 21 ; vi : 8, 9.

In the first passage, the writer reaffirms that he has seen the resurrected Jesus. The circumstances of the occurrence have already been detailed above.

In the second, the writer takes the extreme position that if morality were possible without "faith" in the resurrection of Jesus, there would have been no use for this. Again in this place the scientific position would have been to investigate whether morality were possible or not by persistent self-direction. Then he would have been in a position to establish accurately the real value of the influence of the resurrection of Jesus.

In the third he distinctly speaks of everlasting life as in connection with life (I)..His extreme confusion of thought is shown here by his insisting on well-doing as the essence of righteousness (I), when in the excerpt above salvation was limited to righteousness (II) by imputation, or justification by faith.

CHAPTER IX.

THE RESURRECTION IN THE DEUTERO-PAULINE EPISTLES.

The Soteriology of the Deutero-Pauline Epistles is slightly different from that of the main Pauline Epistles, in insisting a little more strongly on the influence of the Holy Ghost. Not being directly interested in Soteriology, it will be the reader's task to ask himself concerning the assertions of the resurrection of Christ, the nature of the living resurrection, the manner in which this saves man, and the nature of the resurrection at the last day.

I. *Assertions of the Resurrection of Jesus.*—The resurrection of Jesus is insisted on in the Deutero-Pauline Epistles in Eph. i : 20, and i Thess. i : 10.

II. *Nature of Living Resurrection.*—The living resurrection, or immortality, *hie* (III), is the theme of continual discussion, in Eph. ii : 5, 6 ; iv : 16 ; Phil. ii : 16 ; ii : 3 ; III : 10-13 ; Col. ii : 12 ; iii : 3, 4 ; i Tim. vi : 19.

In the above lines it is evident that this immortality is something already attainable before the grave. In fact, in Phil. iii : 10-13 it is implied that it is possible to attain unto the resurrection of the dead in this life, since the writer is fearful lest his readers will think he has already attained, which they would not do if it were impossible, and out of the question. Those who share this life have their names inscribed in "the book of life." Even in i Tim. vi : 19 it appears possible before the grave to lay a good foundation of eternal life, although this eternal life does not seem to interfere with death (I).

III. *Soteriology.*—The greatest part of the Soteriology that is relevant to these discussions concerning the Resurrection is contained in ii Tim. i : 10 ; ii : 10-13 ; Titus i : 2, 3 ; iii : 6, 7. Also Col. ii : 11.

What death has Jesus abolished? Certainly not death (I), which is the death that has been known throughout all historic time, and of which men have been afraid. If Jesus abolished death (I) by taking up again the same physical body, it is quite certain that so much cannot be said for any of his disciples whose bodies are not raised as his was.

The fourth passage seems to call life (III) not immortality itself, but only a hope of immortality. Such a meaning would indeed be admissible, and it is possible to explain life (III) under this conception ; but it must be said that the greatest part of the statements quoted elsewhere on the subject do not limit themselves to so moderate a view.

IV. *Resurrection at the Last Day.*—The Deutero-Pauline Epistles contain a description of the expected resurrection at the last day, i Thess. iv : 13-17 ; Thess. ii : 1-3.

It is very evident that the writer of the first passage looked forward to the last day during his own life-time. This belief,

however, was only introduced unintentionally, to all appearances. The resurrection of Jesus seems to be looked upon as a guarantee of the resurrection of persons. The difference in the conditions has been pointed out above. The resurrection of Jesus being physical, however, the bodies of the dead were also to rise physically. Besides, it seems that the living were to be caught up together with Jesus and the resurrected dead ; and as the former were physical, so must also the latter be.

The writer seems to have been betrayed in stating that he expected the last day during his own lifetime, in the heat of his enthusiasm of prophetic description. The converts to whom the letter was addressed seem to have noticed that fact, and made much of it. Then the same writer realized his mistake in speaking about the matter, and wrote the second excerpt to endeavour to turn the attention of the Christians from an expectation to the last day to an observance of all the necessary duties of the present. The signs he mentions are to-day, of course, unintelligible ; yet it suffices that the writer expected the last day in a measurably short time. History has shown that that was a mistaken opinion, at best.

CHAPTER X.

THE RESURRECTION IN THE CATHOLIC EPISTLES.

Two main lessons are illustrated in the General or Catholic Epistles. First, the living resurrection, and secondly, its soteriological aspect.

I. The living resurrection is openly treated of, i Jno. iii : 15 ; Jude 21.

II. The soteriological aspect of this living resurrection is touched upon in i : Pet. i : 3-5, 21 ; iii : 16-21.

CHAPTER XI.

THE RESURRECTION ACCORDING TO THE ANTE-NICENE FATHERS.

The Ante-Nicene Fathers touch upon the subject of the Resurrection from time to time. The following lines give a short outline of their doctrine on the subject.

Clement of Rome, Ep. i : 24, seeks to explain the possibility of a return of the body by the analogy of the return of day and night in regular succession ; also the resurrection of the plant from the sowed seed. In i : 25 the example of the phoenix is adduced. Hence, i : 26, the resurrection is not extraordinary "when even by a bird" God "shows us the mightiness of his power." God, i : 27, cannot lie ; hence if he has promised a resurrection, he will fulfill it.

Polycarp, Phil. ii : 5, trusts that God will raise us up as Jesus was raised, if we keep his commandments.

Ignatius, Trall. 9, writes concerning the resurrection, and takes pains to insist on the bodily resurrection when writing to the Smyrnians, 3. Jesus after the resurrection eat and drank with his disciples for forty days, invited handling, and certainly was not incorporeal.

Justin Martyr, in his First Apology, mentions the fact that God raised Jesus, i : 45. He devotes, however, to the subject a separate treatise—if indeed it be his. The objections, de Res. 2, usually advanced against the resurrection, are three : (1) that it is impossible ; (2) that it would entail a return of all weakness and deformities, and (3) if it is a perfect resurrection will entail a resurrection of the sexual organs, which, according to Mark xii : 25, would be useless in an angelic state. To this the answer is, 3, that Jesus did not use the sexual function during his life ; and therefore the righteous may put these organs to better uses than they are naturally put. All the deformed, 4, will rise healed. That it is possible, 5, is proved from the fact that it would seem far more impossible to create the body from a formless drop of sexual secretion, which however is confessedly the case, than to re-form it from pre-existent materials. Besides, man was created from the earth, in the first instance ; this need not make any difficulty, then, in the second. Finally, God is omnipotent.

The doctrine of a resurrection cannot be attacked by the heathen, for Plato, Epicurus, and the Stoics held opinions consistent with it. The flesh is valuable, 6,7, in the sight of God, hence, it is worthy of a resurrection. The body is a sinner, as well as the soul, 8 ; hence both must be resurrected together. Christ, 9, raised the dead in the flesh, and he himself rose in it, eating, and drinking, and being handled. The resurrection, 10, is of the flesh that died ; hence it is guarded by divine guidance from sins, as it is to be resurrected.

Irenaeus, in the course of his Treatise against all Heresies, touches upon the Resurrection. Christ, iv : v : 2, taught a resurrection. He was incarnated, v : i, and resurrected in order to gain human experience, and become one with man. It is much more difficult, v : iii : 2, to create bones, veins, and nerves, in the first instance, than to reintegrate them when decomposed. So some of the earth will become an eye, an ear, and so forth. The flesh, v : iii : 3, can be a partaker of the power of God as well afterward as to-day. For the earth partakes of life now, in the human body. The lit torch, and the wet sponge, can respectively be lit and wetted again. The prolonged life of the ancient Israelites, v : v, the translation of Elijah and Enoch, the preservation of Jonah, and of the Three Children, proves that God can if he wants raise up physical bodies. So, v : vi, God will raise up both body and soul. As Christ, v : vii, rode in the substance of the flesh, so shall we in our mortal bodies do the same. The impossibility, v : ix, of flesh and blood inheriting the kingdom signifies that not only a part, but the whole of man will be resurrected. The graft, v : x, of the wild olive tree improves it ; so shall the resurrection alter our natures. Sick bodies, v : xii, will be healed in the course of the resurrection.

The highest proof, v : xiii, of the resurrection is the resurrection of Jairus's daughter, the widow of Nain's son and Lazarus. Finally, v : xiii : 5, either Paul contradicted himself, or did not mean the impossibility of the admittance of the flesh into the kingdom to refer to the resurrection of the body. Unless, v : xiv, the flesh was to be saved, the Logos would not have assumed it, and unless he had done this the salvation of man by the atonement could not have taken place. The same God, v : xv, who created, will resurrect. As bodies, v : 16, return to earth, they will have their substance from it. If, v : xviii, the flesh had been imperfect, the Logos would not have assumed it. The preservation, v : xxxi, of bodies is confirmed by the resurrection and ascension of Christ. In the flesh, v : xxxii, in which men have suffered and sinned, shall they be rewarded and punished. Real men, v : xxxvi, must be re-established really.

Hermas has nothing to say concerning the resurrection, as also Cyprian, Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Methodius.

Tatian, ad Graec. 6, states that the resurrection will take place after the restoration of all things, once for all, the disintegrated body, in the meanwhile, being in the storehouse of the Lord, as elements.

Theophilus answers the objection that if, ad Aut. i : 3, even only one case of resurrection should be authenticated, belief might be placed in it, by referring the objector to heathen mythology, in which such strange occurrences are of frequent occurrence. This vital change finds natural analogies in the dying of seasons, days, and nights ; by the natural fructification of a plant from a seed. Besides, in many lives, such a resurrection actually takes place, as when a sick, lean man grows stout by health. The objection that this is due to the kind of food and drink absorbed is met that by the contention that it is just by such means that God works.

Athenagoras devotes a whole treatise to this subject. A resurrection is not impossible unless it be impossible to or against the will of God, 2. He who can create, 3, can also re-construct. It is possible to suppose that that an element would go through several bodies in rotation and yet return to its original source at last. The objection, 4, of the transference of a particle from being an organic part of one body to that of another, is, 5, shown to be worthless, as it is against " nature " for one human body to assimilate the part of another one, and any such particle must therefore, if it form part of nutrition, be, 6, immediately voided. The new bodies, 7, will be constituted from the same elements as the old, but be incorruptible. Because, 8, anthropophagy is the most hateful deed, human flesh is not a proper food for man. It is absurd, 9, to argue from the impotence of man to that of God, and, 10, it is impossible to show that God does not will a resurrection. As, 11, defence of truth is secondary to proof of it, the end, 12, of man's action is both the use of God, and of the life itself. Hence it is impossible to suppose that man should have been created in vain, namely, to pass away wholly after having been created. The

resurrection, 14, must take place for the sake of just retribution ; but the argument of judgment is not of itself sufficient, as sinless children, who cannot need to undergo it, will rise again. Man, 15, being both body and soul, if he is to be eternal must as much have an eternal body as an eternal soul. The space, 15, of death and dissolution is a period of time intermediary between the two lives, is considered an analogy between two waking states—and therefore is as temporary and as harmless as the other. The drop, 17, of sexual secretion, which develops into a man, has no likeness to him. Hence a resurrection may be possible even from things unlike the body that is to be. Reward, 18, 20-23, and punishment demand both body and soul to be rewarded and punished for their own individual deeds. Unless, 19, some resurrection occurred, with a judgment of reward or punishment, man would be treated by God, in comparison with lower animals, unjustly. For in view of the hope of the resurrection they do not eat, and drink, and enjoy themselves like the animals do. If the former state of life did not exist really, all these self-sacrifices were in vain. Since, 24, everything exists for the sake of some end, 25, the only proper end of body and soul, is a conjoint eternal life of both body and soul.

Tertullian thinks that if, *Apol.* 48, it is commonly granted by the heathen that a transference of souls from one body into another is not impossible, there is not a much greater presumption in favour of a return of the soul to the very substance restored. For the purposes of judgment, every man must come forth the same that he was while meriting that judgment ; namely, body and soul. It is easier to reconstruct each suffering for itself, than to create it in the first instance. Light and darkness, stars, seasons return ; fruits are reproduced. Shall the lord of these, man, not return also ? After the millenium, the servants of God will be clothed upon with eternity. Their bodies will be indestructible, although sensitive. Mountains, for instance, burn, and last. So shall it be with the wicked. The resurrection will affect the nature of man much more comprehensibly than the best scheme of metempsychosis, *ad Nationes* i : 19. It is the actual body, *c. Marc.* 9, which will be resurrected.

What the ceremony of "baptisms" for the dead was, as mentioned in *i Cor.* xv : Tertullian says he "does not know," but, with a "never mind that," he proceeds to show how it could apply very well to the body, which of itself without the soul is dead, *c. Marc.* 10. The body that is to be eternal rises from the old as a seed, and is "spiritual." The body must not escape punishment ; shall the cup be punished and the poisoner escape ? Judgment of works done in the body, 12, requires a body.

Tertullian has, himself, written a Treatise on the subject under consideration. With much suggestiveness, he calls it an *Essay concerning the Resurrection of the Flesh*. He fears that the heathen, 4, vilify the body. Nevertheless, 5, it was created by God before the soul was. The flesh, 6, however, is only worthy because of God's skill that was employed in fashioning it. It, in 7, becomes the chief work of creation. Christianity, 8,

puts the highest honour on it. The flesh, 9, is the best means possible of exhibiting the bounty of God. God is fully powerful enough, 11, to effect its resurrection. The body will return, because, 12, the light, the sun, the moon, the stars, the seasons, and fruits return. Tertullian sees in the Greek word meaning a "palm-tree," Ps. xcii, 12, a reference to the fabulous bird called a Phoenix, which of course is a proof of human resurrection, 15. Judgment, 14, 15, 56, demands the presence of both soul and body. The Body, 16, is responsible for its own deeds, and, 17, as well as the soul, will be punished and rewarded. Tertullian goes out of his way to question Paul's doctrine on the subject, affirming it to be an error to believe that the "resurrection of the dead," 19, means the moral change of a new life. He does not believe, 20, that all of the Scriptures is written in a figurative style, so the resurrection, 22, only takes place at the last day. Paul's "spiritual resurrection" is, 23, combatible with, and, in fact implied in the physical resurrection. Paul, elsewhere, 24, and John, 25, distinctly assert the resurrection of the flesh. A bodily resurrection, 26, alone furnishes significance to the so-called spiritual resurrection, 29, Ezekiel's vision of the reanimation of dry bones supports a resurrection of the flesh itself, 30. Even unburied bodies, 32, will be restored. Christ, 33-38, teaches such a physical resurrection, and, 38, gives practical evidence of it in the cases of the persons he raised from the dead. Teeth, 42, and bones, especially the former are "the lasting germs of that body which is to sprout into life again at the Resurrection." Paul's apparent disagreement, 43-49, with a doctrine so physical, can be explained. Works of the flesh, 50, and not the flesh itself, are excluded from the kingdom. The session of Jesus, 51, at the right hand of God assures the believer of the entrance of actual flesh into heaven. The new body, 52, rises from the old as from a seed. Not the soul, 53, but the natural body which died is to rise again. The bodies, 57, which die mutilated will rise again healed. The manumitted slave is no more liable to the sufferings of the whip. Hence, 58, comes comfort and peace in contemplation of the resurrection. Man, 59, being made for the dispensation of man, the flesh will remain the same, but be capable of bearing the changed conditions of eternal life. As, 60, the repaired ship remains the same, so the characteristics, sex, and organs of the body will remain the same, although the function of the latter may possibly be altered. 61. Sexual functions in themselves are honourable enough. The resurrection will induce in the body a likeness to the angels, as men are destined to be equal to the latter. "The" 63, "flesh shall rise again in its own identity, in its absolute integrity." The soul shall never be permitted to remain naked and homeless. Apparent extinction is only temporary retirement. The Holy Ghost teaches this doctrine in order to comfort the afflicted saint.

Minucius Felix, Oct. 34, holds that as God can form, so can he reconstruct. What is withdrawn from human sight is not necessarily perished to God. Everything that has been dis-

solved is in the elements in a state of solution. Natural analogies of the resurrection, and proofs of the above, are the rising and sinking of the sun, the passing and returning of the stars, the flowers dying and reviving, the seeds rotting before sprouting. As the leaves on a tree show forth the springtime of a tree, so must the Christian await the spring-time of the body. Punishments and rewards, 35, will demand the presence of the body.

Origen, de Princ. i : 2 : 4, notes the fact that Jesus is given the title, "the Resurrection," as a mark of perfection. This resurrection, ii : 11, 4, gives knowledge of divine truth. Bodies, ii : 10 : 1, are necessary for a covering of the soul, and therefore when bodies are given to souls after death, it is advisable that the former should be their own, and not coverings belonging to other souls. The spirituality of the resurrection-body consists of being incorruptible, so as not to have to die a second time. The shape, ii : 10 : 2, of the spiritual body is that of the natural body. The earthly body, ii : 10 : 5, falls into the earth like a seed of grain, "that germ being implanted in them" (the bodies) "which contains the bodily substance." The degree of the glory of the resurrection-body will depend directly on that of the soul. The eternal spiritual body, iii : 6 : 4, will probably be invisible, as it is only the invisible things which are eternal. Although the resurrection-body will be refined to a high degree of splendour, yet it will be the identical body.

The flesh, c. Cels. i : 14, is to exist forever. The body, i : 19, will rise from the old as from a seed. The dead, vi : 29, will not be raised with the same flesh and blood; the new "matter" belonging to the "natural" body, will be spiritual. A seminal principle, vii : 32, is implanted in the soul. No soul exists without a body; hence it receives a better vesture after losing the grosser.

Lactantius, Div. Inst. iv : 19, asserts that Jesus was resurrected in the identical body that was laid in the grave. The soul, vii : 23, will rise again and be clothed upon with a spiritual body. As Pythagoras, Chryssippos, and Cicero believe in a kind of resurrection in the nature of a transmigration of souls, there is no need, for the Christian apologist, to explain how a resurrection can take place. At the judgment of God, vii : 26, the righteous who will then be on the earth will be hid in caves until the time of distress is overpast. Then they will be transformed into the similitude of angels, white as snow; then a second public resurrection of the wicked, in order to hand them over to punishment, will take place.

The Apostolic Constitutions, v : i : 7, aver that after the Resurrection men will be in their present form, only without defect or corruption, shining like stars. Both righteous and unrighteous will have a share in the Judgment. The Sybils predicted this long since, and the Phoenix proved it. God is omniscient and omnipotent; and it is easier to reconstruct than to create. He is faithful to his promises, and Jesus, who per-

formed the many miracles reported in the Gospels will assuredly raise us up.

Hippolytos—or some pseudo-Hippolytos—mentions a resurrection of the body, by adducing texts in point, de Christ. et Antich. 65. The kind of body, c. Plat. 2, will depend on the merits of the soul, and it will arise out of the old body as a seed. The unrighteous shall receive their old bodies unchanged, and the righteous will receive their bodies healed. 3, Fire unquenchable, with unimaginable torments, awaits the wicked.

Arnobius, c. Gent. 14, refuses to consider any objections to the Resurrection on the ground that Plato's scheme of transmigration, which is generally accepted without question, contains as many, if not more incongruities. Eternal punishment is annihilation.

So much for the arguments of the Ante-Nicene Fathers for the Resurrection.

When they are scrutinized, it appears that in the whole mass of considerations, there are only two arguments, added to Biblical quotations. The first is the natural analogy of the setting and rising of the heavenly bodies, the return of the seasons, and the like. The second is the necessity for judgment.

The analogy of the rising and setting of the stars, heavenly bodies; the return of the seasons, fruits, and the like, is of course invalid. All these are facts of experience; and from this experience have been formulated. The resurrection, however, has no single case of experience, in present times, to vouch for it. Besides, such an event would flatly contradict all the natural laws which have been discovered by experience.

This is the place to examine the fatal objection which seems to have been thrown into the face of every apologist. If every particle of mater of the old body returns to compose the new, what will occur if a particle belongs to two bodies, by accidental eating of the one by the other? Augustine decided it would belong to the original body; but the result to the second would be disastrous. The earlier Fathers, however, had not achieved this degree of mental subtlety. They contented themselves with asserting that anthropophagy, chronic or acute, was "against nature," and that therefore any particle which would enter a body would not be assimilated, but immediately voided. Of course this argument is useless; savages fatten off their victims; so it is good proof that such particles are assimilated by human organisms. In any case such an argument is a circle. The very fact of such a proceeding being "against nature"—as much as it comes natural to certain bushmen—depends on the particles not being assimilated.

Yet an argument which was not brought against the apologist of physical resurrection of those days is very plain to-day. It has been ascertained that the natural metabolism of the body changes every single particle of matter in a human body once every seven years, at least. Consequently, the question arises, Which body will be resurrected, for in reality at every moment some change forms a new body? Who shall decide which body

shall be resurrected? If the body that died is to be resurrected, it would on the whole be an advantage to suicide while still young, in order to remain young all eternity.

It remains to be asked, also, in how far is a body, which is so different from the old one, as to be incorruptible, immortal, the same body with one that is corruptible, and mortal? The very essence of life is instability; and to eliminate this element is to eliminate all that constitutes a human body. The resurrection-body can then not be the same body, except in shape, possibly. It is not the same body; it is a different body with the same shape.

The characteristic Patristic argument, however, is a new one, and deserving of attention. The premisses are, that a body or soul can only be adequately recompensed for good or evil until they be in the same condition in which they originally were. Hence, the soul must again be in the body. But if this premiss be followed out to its full conclusion, a different result will be obtained. Adequate retribution can only exist under the same circumstances in which the good or evil was committed. The body, of course, is not responsible, being un-moral, physical. But the soul must be in the same position it was, not only in respect to the body, but also in respect to the world. The identity of the particles matters but little; but the identity of the conditions under which punishment or reward are to be attained must be the same and those under which the merit or guilt was earned, is extremely significant. Hence, this argument, does not lead to an eternity of misery, or an irreversible idle happiness, but a re-incarnation in the same world the merit or guilt was won, under such conditions as by God are considered suitable to reward, or punish, or teach deeper sanctification. The result is not then what is understood usually by resurrection of the body, but a re-incarnation in the world.

And indeed, when the doctrine of Metempsychosis is framed judiciously, leaving in God's hands the adjustment of circumstances exactly just, is furnishes the only valid or convincing argument against suicide. For then the period of incarnation is a great benefit, and not to be escaped from; hence it teaches resignation to present circumstances, by pointing out the hope of justice, both as a doctrine, and as an intuition in the human breast.

Beyond these two arguments, the Ante-Nicene Fathers content themselves to repeat the Biblical statements on the questions involved; not scrupling to use many Old Testament utterances, even when, as with Tertullian, the illustration is in the nature of a pun.

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Satis me vixisse arbitrabor, et officium hominis implese, si labor meus aliquos homines ab erroribus liberatos, ad iter caeleste direxerit.

—Lactantius.

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THE MESSAGE OF THE MASTER.

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PREFACE.

The name of the writer of the following pages does not appear on the title page. Why ?

Because the aim of the present Essay is not to ventilate the knowledge, or exhibit the reasoning powers of the writer, but simply to set forth certain undeniable facts, and to place them in the coherent order in which alone their significance can be seen by all. This purpose is one which may be attained, whether the writer be a Caucasian, a Mongolian, or an African. The personality of the writer has no connection with a scientific search after Truth.

It is well to emphasise this distinction. So often in past history has it occurred that when a man discovered certain facts which told against accepted theories the ruling party ended the matter, not by meeting the argument, but by hushing the man, that it is too much to expect that in the future the same methods will not be pursued by those whose ignorance alone enables them to be sincere in unquestioning belief.

The writer is willing enough to suffer the martyrdom his predecessors have suffered ; but his name does not appear on the title page because he desires to emphasise the fact that, in the mind of the reader, the question should not be, *who wrote it ?* but, *Is it true ? And if not true, Why not ?*

If any of the following considerations should happen to be distasteful to any reader, and if he should desire to question any of them, let him remember that there is only one way : argumentation, and the evidence of acquaintance of other recognized facts. Abuse is only potent in the eyes of those who have not sufficient intellectual powers to grasp anything higher.

The writer is not fearful lest his considerations be questioned or disproved. As a matter of fact, the conclusions set forth below were in the nature of a surprise to him. Later he saw that they were the only possible interpretations of the facts which he had originally begun to gather for the purpose of opposing the very opinions to which he was led. He was conquered by truth ; and he was proud of his defeat. He is ready to be conquered once more ; nay, he desires eagerly to be conquered once more ; for the nature of his conclusions have sundered him from all the friends he had, and all the associations of youth. A true friend—known or unknown personally—will show his best friendship by showing the conclusions of the Essay are not well founded in fact or thought. But though eager to be conquered, the writer's views can only be conquered by truth, not by abuse or personal disgrace.

PREFACE.

It follows from the above that none of the conclusions of the *Essay* are more than provisional, tentative hypotheses, put forth as the best intellectual guides available until superseded, and destroyed. If any statement seems to have been made as if indicating a personal conviction, or a positive view, the reader will understand that this assertiveness is merely the rhetorical framework which was absolutely necessary for the construction of the outline. The writer here makes the positive statement that no word is to be taken in any other than a provisional sense, a tentative significance.

Of mistakes there are doubtless many. The conditions under which alone the work could be carried on made greater accuracy impossible. Readers will confer a favour on the writer by pointing out any and all inaccuracies.

Of the general drift of the work, the writer would state so much : the reader should be careful not to import into it any opinions or conclusions of his own. The aim is not to upset any recognized forms of theological belief, but to point out,—in the spirit of Baring-Gould,—that if they are held, they must be held on other grounds than those which it is the object of the *Essay* to show are insufficient to satisfy the demands made on scholarly accuracy and precision by men who will be satisfied with nothing less than the whole truth.

The truth can never be supported by a lie. If a thing be truth, its groundwork must at every step be true, that is, satisfactory to scientific enquiry. We cannot afford to gulp down blindly false arguments in order to support a truth. If it be truth, and the known groundwork be false, let the proper and true grounds be discovered ; and if it is impossible to show them, it is no dishonour to consider the suppositious truth "not proven." Better an accurate doubt, than an inaccurate certainty.

If it be conceived of the Catholic Church of the Living God that she is an institution composed of peripatetic phonographs, whose only aim in life it is to discover or produce other peripatetic phonographs to supply their own place when destroyed by age, then, and then only is the honest search for truth out of place. But then let the Church cease her claim to be, have, and preach the Truth, and the only Truth, lest her portion be appointed with the hypocrites.

If, on the contrary, the Catholic Church of the Living God be an institution whose aim, purpose and nature it is to be, have, and spread the Truth, and nothing but the Truth, then the more discussion of it, the better. If a statement be true, it has nothing to fear from investigation, and will only be vindicated by it ; if it be false, the sooner it is known to be such, the better for all concerned. **THERE IS NO RELIGION HIGHER THAN TRUTH.**

*In Thee, O God of Truth, have we trusted ;
Let us never be confounded.*

BOOK I.

THE ELEMENTS OF CHRISTOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

THE JEWISH SCRIPTURES.

1. *The Scriptures Authoritative.*—When considered as elements of the philosophy of Christianity, the Jewish Scriptures are of equal importance, whether the traditional view of their date and origin be accepted, or whether the critical contentions anent their authenticity and antiquity be recognized. For whether Moses, Samuel, and Isaiah actually wrote the books called by their names, or whether the “Law,” or Pentateuch, was not written before the time of Josiah, the “Prophets” before the return from the Captivity, and the “Writings” written much before the time of the Maccabees, it is quite certain that in the days of Jesus of Nazara the Scriptures were, for all practical purposes, in the form in which we now possess them. Besides, they were then by the Jews of all parties considered sacred and authoritative, even in the most minute details. The Gospels, Epistles, and early patristic writings without exception accepted them in full, as authentic and sacred, being inspired by God himself. We may therefore wholly neglect questions as to their origin and authenticity, when we consider them in the light of their immediate influence on the philosophical justification which the early Christians advanced for their faith.

2. *Jewish Self-Satisfaction.*—In the days of the theocracy, and even in the time of Moses and Joshua, the Jewish religion was so closely connected with the state, that citizenship meant orthodoxy. For instance, intermarriage with the surrounding nations was forbidden, lest the people be drawn to the worship of Gods other than Jahweh. This religious exclusion led to intolerable conceit. Although Jahweh was the God of the Universe, he fought only for Israel, and for Israel against all other nations. Therefore the Jews considered themselves a chosen people, the best of all. In the fourth book of Esdras (1) the

Jew thus addressed God : " On our account thou hast created the world. Other nations, sprung from Adam, thou hast said are nothing, and are like spittle, and thou hast likened their multitude to the droppings of a cask. But we are thy people, whom thou hast called thy first-born, thine only begotten, thy well-beloved." In the book of Siphri (?) it is said : " A single Israelite is of more worth in the sight of God than all the nations of the world ; every Israelite is of more value before him than all the nations who have been or will be."

Captivity and servitude were powerless against this fanaticism ; even when the Rabbis acknowledged Caesar as their king, they held that repentance was almost impossible for the Roman collector of taxes. The Pharisees were members of clubs whose purpose was the strict observance of all legal ceremonies, and the payment of the tithes to the religious authorities. It almost seemed as if political reverses only served to increase this bigotry.

It is self-evident that under such conditions philosophy was impossible, even for the more rationalistic Sadducee. The appeal was ever to the letter of the Scripture, and ingenious as their exegesis was, it could not be called philosophy, whose essence is a free discussion of any topic before the forum of reason, irrespective of all traditional authority.

3. *Post-Exilic Beliefs.*—Nothing short of deportation could break up this narrow intolerance. Those who returned from the Captivity in Babylon, returned much altered. They now believed in the existence of angels, as integral parts of the dispensation of Nature, borrowed from Persian sources, and set forth at length in such books as the Targums and that attributed to Enoch. They now had a belief in a resurrection ; and how wide was this belief may be seen from the fact that Herod the king, and the sisters of Lazarus equally acknowledged it, long before the resurrection of Jesus himself (?). The Talmud, besides, shows how the simple Scriptures were overlaid with wild speculations, drawn from heathen sources, consciously or unconsciously.

In spite of their conservativeness, therefore, the Jews were forced by circumstances to recognize the opinions of foreign philosophy, and consequently, to form a development in their own opinions. In respect to the " Word of Jahweh," therefore we may trace a gradual process of personification in each later book of the Old Testament Scriptures.

4. *" The Word of Jahweh," First Stage.*—In the first place, the Word of Jahweh was nothing more than a locution describing the power of God. " By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made ; and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth. For he spake and it was done ; he commanded, and it stood fast (?)." " And God said, Let there be light ; and there was light (?)." It is very evident that here the Word of the Lord is only a locution for the fiat, or will of God. For, if it should be demanded

that we should make a literal application of these verses, in respect to the Word, so that we may read into these expressions the doctrine of a Word separate from God the Father, as a personal being, then common honesty demands that we apply the verses literally in respect to God himself, which would be a decidedly anthropomorphic conception, having a mouth, lungs to generate breath, teeth in order to secure perfect elocution, etc. Moreover there occur passages in which the Word is unequivocally nothing more than the communication of God's Revelations to his prophets, as, for instance : "The word that Isaiah the son of Amoz saw concerning Judah and Jerusalem (6)."

5. The "*Word of Jahweh*," *Second Stage*. Yet, there occur passages in which the Word of the Lord, as well as the Wisdom of the Lord, are distinctly personified.

The Word is said to be right (7), enduring (8), and powerful (9).

Wisdom is the great secret of life (10), the costliest jewels cannot equal it in value (11). She is the virtue which stands on the street corners and at the city gates, and invites men to walk in her ways (12); God created or prepared her, before the world was made (13), she stood by his side at the Creation as sharing its plans, and was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him (14).

Stevens, among other commentators on the subject, sees in this is a distinction between the Word and Wisdom. The Word, he says, refers more directly to divine activity, Wisdom, to the divine attributes in both cases being no more than impersonifications of phases of God's nature.

Such a distinction, however, cannot be sustained by impartial investigators.

In the first place, this distinction cannot be justified by the passages adduced in this connection, for the fact of being "right," "powerful," and "enduring," does not refer more to divine activities than does the fact of sharing in the plans of Creation, calling men to their salvation, and being sought by all. As a matter of fact, if this distinction is at all to be made, it should be reversed; for the qualities of the Word refer plainly to divine attributes of being right, powerful and enduring, and the qualities of Wisdom, as enumerated above, seem to refer exclusively to the divine activities of creation and salvation.

In the second place, he must be little acquainted with the tautological method of Hebrew poetry who would declare that any such fine distinction could be carried out by a poet or prophet in speaking of the divine nature. It would suffice to refer to the 119th psalm, and its interchangeable use of the Hebrew words represented in English by law, commandment, etc., to prove this point. But, as a matter of fact, it is noticeable that the illustrations adduced by Stevens in respect to the Word, are all from the Psalms and Jeremiah, while those in respect to Wisdom, are from Job and Proverbs. If the distinction had been found in the same book, some plausibility might have attached to it; as

it is, it seems to be no more than the idiomatic difference between the authors of the respective books in reference to much the same subject. And we shall see later that Athanasius relies on the identity of the two conceptions as the proof of the pre-existence of Christ.

In the third place, it would be a dangerous thing to dissociate the Word of God from his Wisdom; for the consequence would be that God would have spoken his Word without Wisdom; an absurd idea.

We must therefore conclude that in some places we find the Word or Wisdom of God, represented as a personified manifestation of God, being called indifferently by either name; but being in no case a separate personality.

6. *The "Word of Jahweh," Third Stage.*—The apocryphal books of Ecclesiasticus and the Wisdom of Solomon seem to carry the personification of the Word to the point of separation from the personality of the God. Yet, Plummer considers (¹⁵) that even here the conception is no more than an elaborately poetical one.

The book of Ecclesiasticus opens as follows: "All wisdom cometh from the Lord and is with him forever. Wisdom was created before all things, and prudent understanding from everlasting. He created her and saw her, and made her known, and poured her out upon all his works. The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, and the branches thereof are long life (¹⁶)."

7. *The "Word of Jahweh," Fourth Stage.*—When the Scriptures were in Aramaic, for the sake of the common Jewish people in the days of Jesus of Nazara, the Hebrew "Word," Dabbar, became the Aramaic Memra, of the Targums. It was still more personified, and became a sort of mediator between the world and God, who were felt to be of so different a nature that there was need of some intermediate beings, angels or otherwise. The consequence was that the "voice of the Lord (¹⁷)" which Adam and Eve heard in the garden, became the "voice of the Word of the Lord." The like occurrence may be found in many other passages, showing a doctrine differing but little from Philo's, except in point of form of expression. It will be necessary therefore to consider more minutely in the next Chapter the whole scope of the philosophy of Philo.

CHAPTER II.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

1. *The Doctrine of Herakleitos.*—For Justin Martyr the doctrine of the Logos was exceedingly important. So much so was this the case that whether a man were accounted an atheist or not, as long as he held the doctrine of the existence of any such thing as a Logos, he was considered a Christian—which was surely as broad a definition of Christianity as that of Theophilus who demands only a belief in an anointing of the Spirit. Justin says, "Those who lived according to the Logos, are Christians, even if they be considered atheists, such as Sokratês and Herakleitos, and the like, among the Greeks."

Evidently Herakleitos must have held a philosophic doctrine of a Logos. Heinze, *Logoslehre*, whom we shall here follow, declares (¹) that Herakleitos both held that everything happened in the Universe "according to the Logos," and that this Logos was identical with his metaphysical doctrine of Strife or War. It was also identified with Fate (²). It is evident that it is necessary not to import into this materialistic conception of the Logos any later Alexandrian spiritual views. Herakleitos is a materialist, and does not hesitate to speak of the Logos as of a "stuff," which he describes as Fire (³). Clement of Alexandria (⁴) sets this forth. Herakleitos is merely a Hylozoist, a Pantheist, whose God is Fire. So Plato and Aristotle, who know of no conscious intelligence and purposive conduct of this Fire (⁵). Herakleitos in the hands of Plutarch believes in a Reason governing the Universe, but this is Plutarch, not Herakleitos. Yet his Physics contain the Logos, and a "gnomê" guiding all things. Heinze summarizes thus (⁶): "We believe to have set forth Herakleitos's conception of the Logos in its widest bearings. It is the all-powerful law of Nature, which becomes revealed in the development of the World, or is the World-process itself, and reaches in a sovereign manner over the realm of theories of cognition and ethics, so that, in the last resort, it is impossible even to speak of these two fields as individual in any way." In several places Herakleitos's Logos in even its cosmic bearings, might be rendered "Reason," "yet it must be remembered, that this 'reason' must always be considered in an objective sense, not in a subjective one, and thus it will be possible, in view of the wide scope of the word 'reason' to translate it as 'law of reason' or 'reasonable relation' or even 'reasonable world-process.'"

2. *The Doctrine of Leukippos.*—With Leukippos (¹) the Logos is only a Cause without which nothing happens, in contradistinction to Chance, which was denied by Demokritos. Empedoklês (²) knows of a World-Strife, but nothing of an all-ruling Logos. It is true he may have used the expression “right reason,” but it need not have meant more than the agreement of Thought and Reality. Zeller (I : 652), agrees with Heinze. This expression became an ethical common-place in the time of Aristotle, Herodotos (³) means by it true speech, or truth. Plato uses it, as a faculty of the soul, but not even in Aristotle (⁴) can it be looked upon as an universally valid principle.

3. *The Doctrine of the Stoa.*—This brings us to the philosophy of the Stoa. Strato neglected (⁵) the transcendence of Aristotle’s highest principle, and considered the divinity nothing more than Nature. Yet the Stoicism of Cicero’s *De Natura Deorum* sees in the harmony of the Universe purpose (⁶), and is physically optimistic (⁷). This view of Nature could not be held without a Logos. Nothing which has neither Soul or Reason can produce what is reasonable. But the world produces beings which have souls and reason ; consequently the World has both Soul and Reason (⁸). The School of Kleanthês, Chrusippos, Archedemos and Poseidonos (⁹) believed in two principles, the active, and the passive. The passive, was matter, the active, the rational element in it, the divinity. This is eternal and creates all things within the other (¹⁰). Thus the Logos permeates (¹¹) matter, as God (¹²) permeates the world, as honey permeates the comb (¹³). The Stoics speak of God or the Logos as of a body (¹⁴). So Origen also (¹⁵) : “and the Logos of the God is nothing else than a bodily spirit.” As the breath and the soul (¹⁶) permeate and rule the body, so God or the Logos permeates and rules the world. God is both breath and Fire, that is, Heat, which however is not the fire and heat of domestic use (¹⁷). It must be remembered (¹⁸) that the Logos in matter is purely materialistic, though often “Logos” is exchanged for “Mind” (¹⁹). This proves that there was no doctrine of a “Logos” in the mind of the Stoics, as a transcendent personal principle. Any word that represented the materialistic, fire-like plastic principle, was admissible. The whole material universe, the matter, the stuff, was the First and Only God, though matter appeared in a secondary position (²⁰).

The manner in which (²¹) the active Reason works in the passive stuff, is the “Logos” called “spermatic.”

The difference between “ratio” and “oratio” goes as far back as Aristotle (²²). He speaks of an external Logos, and a Logos in the soul. The Stoics gave the famous name to this distinction (prophoric, and endiathetic) ascribing it to the ancients, as Jamblichus did to Pythagoras. The Christian apologetics mistook the distinction, and applied both terms to the Common Logos, viewed in two different relations. The Stoics, of course, know of no such perversion of the Aristotelian distinction (²³).

4. *Heinze's Contrast of Herakleitos and the Stoa.*—Heinze's comparison of the Herakleitian and Stoic conceptions of the Logos is as follows ⁽³⁰⁾: "There is no need of a particular course of reasoning to prove that the conception of the Logos of Herakleitos was taken over directly into the Stoic philosophy. Before the Stoics nobody except Herakleitos had treated this conception independently in the field of Physics. Its Stoic scope is the same as the Herakleitian, although it is changed. It is easy to understand that the manner in which both philosophies reach the Logos is very different. Herakleitos laid hold on the Logos intuitively,—although unconsciously proceeding on a process of analogy—and enunciated the Dogma of its omnipotence. The Stoics in Sokratic manner found something similar to human reason in the course of World-events, and endeavored to prove intellectually the existence of the Logos, and its scope in the Universe. With Herakleitos the Logos is the self-changing Fire, is the whole world-process, which proceeds according to immanent laws. The Stoics think of the Logos materialistically, but, placed in opposition to the more gross elements, is likened to the two finer ones that permeate and form the above two grosser ones. It is the rational or mental principle, so that a distinction of Stuff and Form is reached, which proves the influence of Plato and Aristotle."

5. *The Alexandrian Doctrine.*—Of the Alexandrian thinkers Heinze says ⁽³¹⁾: "In the Alexandrian school we find the attempt made to unite the theology of the Old Testament with the propositions of Greek thinkers, or even with popular philosophy, as it appeared in the more cultured portion of the people. Often little remains of the original contents of the Old Testament. The method to arrive at this, without apparently giving up anything, and thus to deceive oneself as agreeably as possible, was a very curious method, which, however, had been borrowed from Greek philosophy." The first great Alexandrian philosopher was Aristoboulos, a genuine Peripatetic, who borrowed from the Stoics the allegorical method, and applied it to the Old Testament.

"Through this ⁽³²⁾ it was naturally possible, to find everything in the ancient sources of the Hebrew people which was sought, because it was held to be truth. Finally even the well-known priority of all the sought and found philosophical doctrines was claimed for the Jewish legislators, so that it appeared that the Sages of Greece had borrowed from these. To make this plainer, Aristoboulos did not despise to interpolate into the works of the old Greek poets verses of Jewish contents, and besides to undertake changes in his favour in the received Text."

Aristoboulos does not know of the Logos in the Greek sense ⁽³³⁾. He only knows of the allegorical Old Testament "Word."

6. *The Philonic Doctrine.*—Of Philo, Heinze ⁽³⁴⁾ says: "Through what means Philo was persuaded to adopt into his philosophy the conception and name of the Logos, does not appear clearly

in his writings. He uses the conception as one already at hand, without particularly justifying his use of it; consequently it appears he must have found it already used in Alexandrian thought." "With the exception⁽⁸⁵⁾ of the difference of the two supreme propositions, of the transcendence of God, and the pre-existence of matter, the Stoic Logos is here in its entirety. True, with the Stoics he is organically one with God, and material, and with the Alexandrian the Logos is separate from God and Matter, not only in conception, but in organical relation. Otherwise it has the scope of the usual Stoic Logos, although the resistance of matter is not so strong as to hinder materially its activity." "In order to declare⁽⁸⁶⁾ the Logos's relation of subordination, he is called the second God⁽⁸⁷⁾, and is distinctly opposed to the highest or first God. Nothing mortal may be fashioned after the latter, but after the former only⁽⁸⁸⁾." Also, "Mortale enim nihil formari ad similitudinem supremi Patris universorum poterat, sed ad normam secundi dei, qui est eiusdem verbi, etc. For us who are imperfect, the Logos may be accounted God, but for the wise and perfect only the first God⁽⁸⁹⁾." "The God is the source of the eldest Logos⁽⁹⁰⁾."

Just like Philo, Plutarch⁽⁴¹⁾, holds that for the origination of the World there is need of a mediation between Matter and highest Reason, and this is effected by the second God, or Demiurg.

CHAPTER III.

PHILO.

1. *Philo Judaeus.*—The narrow fanaticism of the Jews was only temporarily abated by temporary deportation and political subjection. To put an end to fanaticism, there was needed the final dispersion of the Jews after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus. But this involuntary departure had been preceded by a voluntary emigration. There had been, ever since the time of the Babylonish captivity, a strong colony of Hebrews in Egypt, which had gone so far as to establish a temple-worship at Hierapolis. This had assured the independence of the Colony from any of the political vicissitudes which befel Judaea. After Alexandria was founded, its intellectual, commercial and political advantages increased the colony yet more. Here it was that Judaism met the intellect of the world on equal terms, and was forced to justify its contentions by intellectual proof. It was this very necessity of meeting the objections and sneers of heathen philosophers which forced Philo to construct his system of philosophy.

Philo was a Jew who believed in the verbal inspiration not only of the Hebrew Scriptures, but also of their translation into Greek. When he met with carping objections to minor portions of the Scriptures, he endeavored to show that under these apparently meaningless words there rested sublime truths, which, in many cases, were partially recognized in Platonic philosophy or were directly borrowed from it. Thus arose the first explicit philosophy of Judaism as a religion. In Philo's system there was nothing strictly original; it was merely an effort to justify and vindicate Judaism by constructing out of Greek elements a philosophy which allegorical interpretation might read into the text of Scripture. Nor was Philo original in this attempt; for many Jews before him had pointed the way, and had obtained partial results. Yet to Philo must be granted the merit of systematizing all the work he found done before his time, and of moulding it into a philosophical system of at least apparent self-consistency.

2. *The First God.*—God, and the fact that He exists, can only be known from His works; he stands so far above all creation that we cannot understand, express or describe him, beyond stating that he is the highest form of being. He possesses in himself the ground and reason of his excellence and existence,

and is alone unbegotten. He created the world out of non-existence (1) because of his goodness, the revelation of which was its purpose. He created the world alone (2) and needed no assistance in doing so (3). Yet, again, the Logos directs the world (4).

3. *The Divine Logos.*—The Greek language applied the word Logos indifferently to the psychological faculty of reason, and to the sensible expression of thought. In order to distinguish these two concepts, the former is called the indwelling Logos (5), the latter, the externalized Logos (6). If we should apply this Platonic distinction to the divine nature we shall find that

1. The Divine Logos is indwelling inasmuch as it is the comprehensive unity of the archetypal divine "ideas" of the intelligible world, being the "idea of ideas (7)." These were the ideal prototypes which God found in the divine Logos before creation, and which he used as patterns in creating the world. They might be called the prototypes of which the world is the ectype; the seal which leaves its impression in the wax.

2. The Divine Logos is externalized inasmuch as it brings created things to full revelation, as rays of light which stream from the sun, and by which the sun enlightens the world; as the image of the seal which is impressed on the wax.

3. But besides these two functions of the Divine Logos, which two functions Philo has borrowed from Plato, there is a third, the spermatic Logos (8) which Philo borrowed from the Stoics. The spermatic Logos is the indwelling rational soul of the world of Nature, the universal world-reason, or Providence, which interpenetrates and orders all things, and rules and guides the cause of events in the world.

4. *The Logos is God.*—The externalized Logos is not only a divine power, but is also a personal being which stands mid-way between God and the world (9). He is the Mediator between them, teaching man the laws and commandments of God, and presenting to God a plea for man. He is the high-priest (10). Thus the Logos is different from both, being neither unbegotten, nor brought forth like other creatures, in degree (11). He is the older, first-born Son (12); all else is the younger son of God. Of this offspring God is the Father, and Wisdom the Mother. Referring to Gen. xxxi: 12, 13, LXX, Philo says: "Let us examine carefully as to whether there are really two Gods, for it is said 'I am the God who appeared to thee' not in my place, but 'in the place of God' (Bethel), as if another deity were referred to. How are we to treat this statement? The explanation is that the true God is one, but those improperly so called are many. The Sacred Scripture, therefore, denotes the true God by the article, saying, 'I am The God' (Ho Theos), and in the other case omits it: 'Who appeared to thee in the place,' not of 'The God,' but merely 'of God.' Here he calls his eldest Logos God, having no superstitious feeling about the application of names (13)."

Inasmuch as the Logos appears as the representant of God,

he may also be called God ; but with this distinction : The unbegotten God is called "The God," the Logos is called "God," without the article. The Logos is the "second God," (¹⁴) and "the highest angel (¹⁵);" as the Platonic archetypal idea of man, he may be called the divine man.

The Logos is not the only divine power, there are other Logi who are distinct from him, and subordinated to him (¹⁶). They are not distinctly conceived by Philo, who at one time looks upon them as mere ideal revelations of God's power, and at another, as personal beings, who are the servants of God in the creation and guidance of the world. Their number is also indefinite : at one time they are only two, the creative and ruling powers ; at another five : the creative, ruling, commanding, forbidding and forgiving powers. Here we have a clear representation of the Persian angelology.

5. *Soteriology*.—Man was originally perfect, but fell when tempted by the lust of flesh. The end of man is to become divine. This he can do by stilling his sensual consciousness (¹⁷), his reason (¹⁸) and his self-consciousness (¹⁹). Then he can unite himself with the divine. Yet, it is only the good pleasure of God that rests the power of granting the beatific vision ; and he grants it only after prayer, and through the Logos, who thus becomes the distributor of Wisdom, the Mother of the soul, the food of the soul, and the heavenly manna.

6. *Philonic Eclecticism*.—Platonic philosophy, Stoic cosmology and ethics, Persian angelology, and Jewish dogmatism, all jostle each other without much pretense at self-consistency. And this is just the very strangest fact of it all : that though we can account for almost every element of his philosophy, yet Philo claims to have received it from secret tradition. Perhaps this fact may be accepted without inconsistency, if we point out that this esoteric doctrine cannot have been more than just such an eclectic confusion of discordant elements of philosophy, hallowed by secret means of communication, as handed down by some original genius who chose to immortalize his opinions by this effective method.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

1. *The Prologue.*—In reading the New Testament, there is one short passage, the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, which attracts attention by its peculiarity, and difference from all other books. In it we meet the Philonic conception of the Logos, applied to Jesus of Nazara. Nowhere else in the New Testament do we meet with it. The word “Logos” occurs in the Synoptics, but only in the sense of human reason or discourse. We meet the term suddenly without any explanation of it, as if it must be familiar to everybody.

How shall we account for this fact ?

That it is a Philonic term, no one can doubt. The only question can be, was it taken from Philo’s writings at first hand, or only indirectly ? Meyer, Lücke, Reuss, Beyschlag, Weizsäcker, Harnack, plead for the first alternative ; Luthardt, Weiss, Liddon, Godet and Plummer plead for the second.

The earliest date for the Fourth Gospel is usually accepted to be 70-100 A. D. ; many religious authorities accepting 99 A. D. Philo flourished 40-50 A. D. ; so that there would have been plenty of time for popular acquaintance with his doctrine. To this must be added the fact that the Targums had circulated among the Palestinian Jews and the Apocryphal literature among the Greek-speaking Jews for several centuries, so that in any case Philo’s use of the term Logos cannot have been strange or unfamiliar in the conception it represented. Such conditions would greatly favour rapid spread of his doctrine, especially if we remember that we must consider Philo as summing up the partial labours of many Jews before him, and not as a philosopher who had introduced in the world of thought a new idea or occupied a new mental stand-point.

Yet these explanations do not give us a satisfactory answer to the question, how shall we account for the appearance of the Logos in this Prologue ?

Many commentators have held that in this Prologue the author of the Fourth Gospel purposely gives us a definite, distinct outline of the philosophy of Christianity, or a divinely revealed account of cosmology as the knowledge of it is in God, and as it is revealed by the Spirit.

Such a claim is however seen to be doubtful when we can trace every element of this divine revelation in the works of pa-

gans or Jews, whom nobody has ever held to be divinely inspired, and none of whom claimed it themselves. Such a claim must then be considered unfounded or at least unproven.

How then shall we account for it ?

2. *Only Mention of the Logos.*—We may point out again, in the first place, how familiar the conception of the Logos seems to be to the writer, and how familiar he assumes it to be to those to whom or for whom he is writing. Some commentators have then supposed that the writer used these familiar terms to explain what he meant, just as Paul, in his Epistles of the imprisonment used the Gnostic term “fulness” and modern theologians use the concept of evolution in their sermons. Stevens says : “It is as if John had said to his readers : ‘You are familiar with the speculations which have been long rife respecting the means whereby God reveals himself,—the doctrine of an intermediate agent through whom he communicates his life and light to men. The true answer to the question regarding this mediator is, that it is our Lord Jesus Christ. He is God’s agent in revelation ; he is the bond which unites heaven and earth.’”

We have seen that except in this Prologue, the Logos is not mentioned anywhere in the New Testament. Harnack sees in this fact the following significance (1) :

“The Prologue of the Gospel is not the key to the understanding of the Gospel, but it prepares the Hellenistic readers therefor. The writer seizes upon a known quantity, the Logos, works it over and transforms it—implicitly combating false christologies—in order to substitute for it Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son, that is, in order to disclose it as being this same Jesus Christ. From the moment when this is done, the Logos-idea is allowed to fall away. The author continues his narrative now fully concerning Jesus, in order to establish the Faith that he is the Messiah the Son of God. This belief has for its principal element the recognition that Jesus originates from God and from heaven ; but the author is far removed from the purpose of securing this recognition from cosmological and philosophical considerations. Upon the basis of his testimony, and because he has taught the full knowledge of God and life—absolutely heavenly and divine benefits—he leaves Jesus prove himself, according to the Evangelist, to be the Messiah, the Son of God.”

3. *Was the Conception of the Logos the Traditional One ?*—It may be asked, if the writer of the Fourth Gospel took the conception of Logos to illustrate what he believed of the person of Jesus of Nazara, did he do so unreservedly, or did he alter the conception of the Logos ?

To answer this question it will be necessary to turn to the Prologue itself. A literal translation of the first few verses is as follows :

“In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with ‘The God,’ and the Logos was ‘God.’”

“He (the Logos) was in the beginning with ‘The God,’ etc.”

Now, a glance at the doctrine of Philo will show us that the writer of the Prologue has reproduced the very technical terms of Philo, distinguishing between "The God," and "God."

If the writer had intended to depart consciously from Philo's doctrine, he would have written: "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with "The God," and the Logos was "The God." He was in the beginning with "The God," etc.

Besides, knowing that Philo's doctrine, distinguishing between "The God," and "God," was widely known, if he intended to depart from it, he would not only have made that alteration suggested, but would have distinctly said: "This doctrine of the Logos with which you are acquainted represents our conception of the person of Jesus of Nazara admirably, with this exception: that while with Philo the Logos is only "God," and not "The God," our conception of Jesus distinctly requires that he should be called "The God," as well as the Father who is "The God."

This would be especially the case, since this would be the very crucial point of dispute.

If, however, we suppose that the writer of the Fourth Gospel believed the Logos to be fully as divine as the Father, and wrote as he did we must assume the following facts:

I. While knowing that the Philonic conception assigned a dependent and inferior rank to the Logos, and that this very terminology indicated that fact, he used it, without the slightest alteration.

II. He made the distinction indicated ("God" without the article) between two occurrences of the words "The God" consciously knowing that this was a very conspicuous place, and by making it here he would acknowledge he was cognisant of the Philonic distinction.

III. Although his conception of the Logos had changed, yet he used the old terminology unchanged, in the very crucial point, and in a place where it would have been singularly easy to change it, and to make the change very prominent.

Such assumptions are, however, absurd on their face, and can only be held if we have a case to make out.

Perhaps the best way in which we will be able to reach some knowledge of what he meant exactly will be to inquire how the contemporary and later writers interpreted this his statement, or conception of the cosmical Logos. To the answer of this question we will devote the Second Book of this Essay.

4. *Pearson's Explanation.*—In a future Chapter we shall see that Paul makes the same distinction between "God" and "The God" which we find in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel. It cannot be chance, or individual characteristics which dictated such a distinction; there must have been a settled purpose.

Pearson, being ignorant of the Philonic origin of the distinction, considers it a mere captious objection, founded on a passage of Epiphanius, where "God" is the god or gods of the Gentiles, but "The God" the divinity of Jews and Hebrews (?).

Such ignorance would be its own refutation in the eyes of all fair-minded persons, if observed in any author other than Pearson. He endeavours to break down the distinction by noting that in many places in which God the Father is referred to (in his own opinion) the word "God" is used; as in: "There was a man sent from God whose name was John (⁸)," and "no man hath ever seen God at any time (⁹)."

Yet Pearson does not endeavour to show any passage in which Christ is spoken of as "The God." If he had, the distinction would break down. But he cannot, for there is no such passage in the New Testament.

We may easily explain the fact that in very many places God the Father is referred to as simply "God." Before the Philonic conception was made, God was always referred to as "God," as for instance by Plato. Long habit then had made it usual to refer the highest divinity the name "God," and so except where the metaphysical distinction was consciously made, it was usual to use the traditional name. Satisfactory as this explanation is, and impossible as it is to quote an instance in which "the God" is referred to Christ (which should be possible if, as Pearson claims, the terms are synonymous as to meaning, without any particular distinction), it is capable of proof that wherever the Father and Christ are mentioned together, and the Father is called "God," there Christ has no divinity at all ascribed to him, the natural inference being to the contrary. "But to us there is but one 'God,' the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him (¹⁰)."

Here it is asserted that there is but one God, and that this one only God is the Father. Next is mentioned "our Lord Jesus Christ." He cannot then be God, inasmuch as there is but one God, and that one God is the Father.

Besides this explanation, we have still one more to offer; it would be possible to call the Father God as well as "The God," because "God" is in "The God." But "The God" is not in "God." All roses are flowers; but not all flowers roses. Thus, all "God" is "The God," but not all "The God" is "God." Thus we might with perfect propriety speak of the Father as "God," even while recognizing Philo's metaphysical distinction.

5. *The Meaning of the Doctrine.*—Merely to prove that the Logos-idea of the Fourth Gospel is Philonic is not sufficient; we must show what the Philonic conception of the Logos is.

The Logos is the highest manifestation of the power of God; "all things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made." He mediates between "The God" and man, so that he represents "The God" to man. "The God" himself is far above all description or comprehension; so that we only know him through the Logos. Consequently, "The God" is God, wisdom, knowledge, power and love in a superlative sense; whereas the Logos is God, wisdom, knowledge, power and love in a proper and actual sense.

It is this fact which is lost sight of by many theologians. They forget that if we follow Philo, we may call the Logos very God, and Divine Knowledge Will and Power, without in the least impugning his subordination to "The first God." Philo considers the Logos only a "God" in a secondary sense, in a secondary degree of existence, depending for its cause and ground absolutely on the first. Whereas "The first God" is above all definition, the "second God" may be both defined, and his qualities may be spoken of. It is evident that the comprehensible is less than the incomprehensible, the undefinable more than the definable and describable. And whereas the "second God" absolutely depends on "The God," "The God" does not depend on the "second God."

We repeat that this fact is usually lost sight of by theologians. They think as Bishop Bull, in his *Defense of the Nicene Creed*, does, that if they can prove that a Church Father called the Logos God, then they have disproved that he is a subordinationist, even if he speaks of a "second God." Then they consider him orthodox in the Athanasian sense, which involves the additional difficulty: that the Son is both begotten of the Father and equal to him. On the contrary, the Church Father in question affirms that the Logos is God, but holds his absolute subordination to "The God" in a deeper sense, so that the Son's Divinity is based on his dependence on the Father; not that the Son is equal to the Father by virtue of his Divinity.

Wherever then, in later history, we hear of a "second God" or of a secondary grade of Being, we must recognize Philo's strictly subordinational view, even if the Logos is called very God; the inconsistency thus being only apparent, which would be an actual contradiction in terms with the Athanasian conception.

6. *Is Johannine Philonism Ultimate?*—In interpreting the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, we have gone upon the supposition that the Logos-conception was only brought in to explain what the author thought of the person of Jesus, and not as an actual historical or scientific description of objective cosmology, revealed by God.

We have done this because of the difficulties which present themselves to a thoughtful mind, if the latter hypothesis is accepted.

For, if the account is a strictly historical one, than which none other account is more accurate, and since the terms of this description are Philonic, to the very technicalities of his philosophic dialect, then it follows necessarily that Philonism, or a particular form of Platonism, is the only true philosophy. Exclusive assent to the theological implications of the Prologue would imply exclusive assent to the philosophy of Plato, that is, of Philo. All other philosophies, that of Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Herbert Spencer, are necessarily heterodox.

• To a logical believer of the historical hypothesis regarding the Prologue, there would only be two alternatives, mutually exclusive. Either he would have to accept the philosophy of Philo, and refuse his assent to any later or future philosophy, since that has received the "imprimatur" of revelation, or if he refused to fetter his mind in this ignoble fashion, then Christianity, which is indissolubly bound up with Philonism, must go by the board with the latter. The horns of the dilemma would then be "Philonism" in philosophy, or "non-Christianity" in religion.

What would add to the seriousness of the circumstance would be that even if for the sake of orthodoxy we would *a priori* hold that all pre- and post-Philonic philosophy is and must be false, yet, as we have shown, this Christianity would not be orthodox in the Athanasian sense of non-subordination. Thus the prize of this voluntary mental suicide, required in any case, would be a system of religion branded by the Nicene Fathers as unorthodox, not false.

To escape these unavoidable difficulties of the historical view, we have been forced to embrace the other hypothesis, that the Logos-conception was only mentioned by the author of the Fourth Gospel as an illustration or example of what he meant. Yet, even in this, we have convicted him of subordinationism.

7. *The Fourth Gospel an Era in Thought.*—Yet we cannot hide from ourselves the fact, that even if the hypothesis of explanation in respect to the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel be accepted, it marks an era in Christian thought; for it identifies Jesus of Nazara with the cosmical Logos. We may seek the reasons of the process of thought which ended in this result in the following circumstances:

I. The Fourth Gospel is on all hands admitted to be the latest of the Gospels. Nobody claims it to have been written much before the year 99 A. D.; and, unless we accept the Johannine authorship, there is no reason why the date should be any year before 125 A. D., at the very least. The earliest of these dates, which is almost undisputed, 99 A. D., would be 66 years after the death of Christ, certainly long enough for a development in thought, especially for the yielding of exclusive divine honours to an individual.

II. We must consider the natural tendency of the human mind, especially in times in which unscientific methods and descriptions were the rule, to yield exclusive divine honours to a person of great merit, long since dead. Not to mention heathen ancestor-worship, we may mention the Christian practice of the canonization of saints, and especially the divinization of the mother of Jesus, Mary, as expressed in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. A phenomenon of the same tendency of the human mind is to speak of the "good old times" which, as far as accurate history can make out, were not better, if not worse, than the present day.

III. Jesus strongly emphasised the brotherhood of all men, including himself (*), and the Fatherhood of God (†) who was greater than himself. Thus in the same sense that he was divine, all other men were also divine, potentially, if not actually. It can be easily understood how when contrasting the realization of the divinity of Jesus, and the mere potentiality of divinity in others, the latter should have been lost sight of, in comparison with the former, leaving Jesus alone divine. Yet the early Church continually speaks of that which in modern times we would hesitate to express, that the end of man is to be God, which end is ever said to be that of the process of knowing one's self, the Sokratic maxim. Thus while a consciousness of this early belief remained in the Church, it had ceased to be applied to man when he was compared with Jesus.

IV. The cause, to a great extent, was that the Christians identified Jesus of Nazara with the Jewish Messiah, in their disputes with the Jews. Consequently, the Messiah must be preëminent, the Only-begotten Son of God, although the Jewish Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of the many brethren of Jesus (*). And as the Targums and the Apocryphal literature had identified the Messiah with the Wisdom of God, and this with the Logos (though with Philo himself Wisdom was not the Logos himself, but the mother of the Logos), what was more natural than that

V. The Logos should have been the illustration used by the author of the Fourth Gospel to show what he meant by the Messiah, the Only-begotten Wisdom of God? He did not feel the metaphysical impossibility of identifying the cosmical Logos with a single one of its ideas to the exclusion of all its other ideas, without destroying these, simply because he did not assert the identification of Jesus with the Logos dogmatically, and did not endeavour to think out the consequences that would arise if his illustration should become dogma. This will be very patent if it shall happen that we will be able to show that in the times of Irenaeus, while Jesus was unhesitatingly believed to be the Logos, yet we have the proof of the original creeds to the fact that the creative activity was universally ascribed to the Father, although philosophically, it was the exclusive duty and function of the Logos.

VI. Besides these points in the development of the conception of the exclusive divinity of Jesus of Nazara, we may mention another: the close analogy between the Fatherhood of "The God" which Jesus ever claimed for himself (though not more than for other men) (‡) and that which might be aptly applied to the relation between the first and second Gods, especially if it had become desirable to represent the relation between Jesus and his Father as unique.

It is quite possible then that by some such process as this there should have arisen the identification of Jesus with the cosmical Logos which we find in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel.

BOOK II.

THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROLOGUE.

CHAPTER I.

PAUL OF TARSUS.

1. *Paul of Tarsus.*—When Matthias was chosen to the Apostolate, the condition imposed on candidates for that office was that they should have been eye-witnesses to the life of Jesus. Paul however was “born out of due time ;” he was the first of the Apostles and teachers who had only heard of Jesus. Paul was an educated Jew, a Pharisee, having sat at the feet of Gamaliel. He must have been familiar with the “Memra Jahweh” of the Targums, and the “Wisdom” of the Alexandrian Apocrypha. He must have looked forward to a Messiah, whom he could identify with the two conceptions given above, as soon as the person of the Messiah who had claimed to be the Son of God was recognized.

Beyond all this, he must have been familiar with Greek and Greek literature, which is plain from the fact that he quotes Aratus in his Epistles. Besides, some of the lines of the Epistles are in correct hexameter form, following the oratorical custom of mingling lines of verse with prose. He must have been unquestionably familiar with the speculations of Philo, or the fore-runners of Philo ; and although the word “Logos” is nowhere found in his Epistles, yet his conception of the person of Christ is almost identical with that of the Philonic Logos.

The influence of this his wide education may be seen in several circumstances.

In the first place, he could not accept the Judaizing tendency of Peter, who said that if Jesus was the Messiah of the Jews, then those who would take advantage of the benefits of the life of the Messiah should become Jews. This arose in part from Peter’s ignorance of the world outside of Judaea and the immediate Jewish colonies of the towns of Syria. Paul, when brought into opposition to Peter, minimized the importance of

the fact that Jesus was identified with the Messiah. He identified Jahweh with the God of the Universe, so that his Son was the cosmical Logos, having a message of salvation to all nations ; hence it was Paul felt himself to be called to the Apostolate of the Gentiles. Perhaps Paul did not think the name of Jahweh in Hebrew a necessary part of the faith ; so that he preached to the Athenians " the unknown God."

In the second place, Paul was much more able than any other of the Apostles to feel the cogency of an argument or objection. He must have felt the fact that his intellectual plea for Christianity and salvation through Jesus of Nazara did not reach the cultured heathen ; for it is almost pathetic to see with how much courage he acknowledges the charge of foolishness brought against his philosophy ; glorying in its foolishness, when nothing else was left for him to do (1). The educated people were Pagan ; consequently the early Christians identified philosophy with Paganism, and eschewed both. The Christians were of the poorer and less educated classes, who could not hold their own in an intellectual dispute ; therefore Paul advised them to avoid " foolish questions (2)."

Yet, if Paul was educated, and could feel the point of an objection, so much the less would he have remained a Christian, if he had no great and sufficient proof for that religion. That proof lay for him, as it did for all the Church after him (3) as long as the miracles lasted, in the power in performing miracles of healing, and impartation of the gifts of the Holy Ghost (4).

He considered the nature of miracles evidential of certain doctrines handed down to him by those who had conferred on him the power to work them.

Here is touched the second proof of Christianity, the inner meaning of the external miracles. The proof of the value of Christianity lay in its power to confirm men in a better and purer life, by the imparting of the Holy Ghost, which was thus not a mere theoretical forgiveness of sins, which leaves a man no better in his outward walk than he was before, but an actual changing of the currents of the life. This fact was brought forward with continual insistence by the apologists of all ages, and by Paul himself, who begins his Epistle to the Romans with a description of the moral state of the old world (5), and exhorts his disciples that by their works they must redeem the time (6).

Thus appears but one proof for Christianity, with an outer and inner application : the outer of miracles, the inner of forgiveness of sins, that is, strengthening of the inner moral life.

These two were conjoined in the baptism, which was in apostolic times immediately followed by the laying on of hands, conferred only, as far as the records explicitly go, on adults. When however the gifts of the Spirit died out of the Church, then baptism retained only a theoretic forgiveness of sins, or enlightening, as it was universally called in the East. Why then should not babes as well as adults be baptized, and be strengthened ?

And as this was the universal custom at the time of Augustine, and he knew baptism was administered for the remission of sins, he asked, for what sins are infants baptized, if not for "original sin"? With the doctrine of original sin and the consequent damnation of infants the whole Augustinian system was complete.

2. *Paul a Philonist.*—It may perhaps be shown that Paul's conception of Christ was thoroughly Philonic.

I. Christ is the "image of The God (¹)."
He is "the brightness of his (God's) glory, and the express image of his person." This is also a characteristically Philonic conception. God is the glory, and the person; Christ is only its brightness, and the image. Likeness, is not identity. It infers dependence on the pattern, after which the image is modelled. Moreover, Christ is the image of "The God" who is unseen (²), whereas man is the image and glory of "God" (³). This is a remarkable duplication of the Philonic conception of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. Christ is to God what man is to Christ. We must remark that in the Philonic conception this word "image" was regularly applied to the Logos of God, so that we have here only a distinct and emphatic repetition of Philonism, not a new conception.

In connection with this point, it may be interesting to notice that Athanasius could only sustain his interpretation of the Gospels and Epistles by making the word "image" a convenient term with which to confuse the two concepts of likeness and identity, which are in Paul's writings distinctly separate; for if "image" means identity, in the first case adduced above, that of Christ and God, then it must mean the same identity when used between man and Christ, whereby it would appear that man was identified with the Logos's Father.

II. Christ is the first-born of every creature (⁴). Now this word "first-begotten" in its natural sense implies distinctly that whereas the process of begetting is the same for all who are begotten, "the first-begotten" happens to be begotten first in point of order. Athanasius endeavoured to evade the force of this term by making a distinction between begetting and creating, which exists in the verse: "The first-born of every creature (⁵)."
Yet, we can annul this attempted distinction by quoting the parallel verse: "that he might be the first-born among many brethren (⁶)."
That this is a parallel passage may be proved from the fact that in the first one, the assertion that Christ is the image of "The God" precedes the quoted words; whereas the second is preceded by the words "conformed to the image of his Son," which quotation supports the distinction above noticed that man is in the image of "God," whereas Christ is in the image of "The God." Here is proof that Paul considered "his Son" an equivalent term for "God," as distinguished from "The God."

III. Christ existed before all things (⁷). The preëxistence of the Logos before all was never doubted by Philo.

IV. Christ is the preserver of all creation (¹⁴). "And by Him all things consist." This conception of being the Preserver is a characteristically Philonic one, especially since Philo expressly mentioned that as one of the attributes of the first Logos, or of a subordinate Logos whose particular duty it was to preserve creation.

V. In Christ "dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily (¹⁵)." This is perfectly in agreement with Philo's conception, and is explained in a subordinational manner in the following section, which see.

VI. Christ is the Mediator between God and Man (¹⁶). This is the very essence of Philo's conception of the Logos, so we need not discuss it further, remembering that Philo interpreted it consistently with absolute subordination.

3. *Paul a Subordinationist.*—Such are the arguments which are usually advanced in order to prove the divinity of Christ. This is generally agreed to; but it is usually understood to mean co-ëquality with the divinity of the Father. The reason is, that the Philonic distinction being usually overlooked, it is thought sufficient for a proof of Christ's co-ëquality with the Father to adduce a passage ascribing to him divinity.

Paul seems to consider Christ as absolutely subordinate to the Father.

I. When it was said that "in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead (a gnostic term) bodily," it was remarked that it was proper to remember the parallel passage, in the same Epistle which reads: "For it pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell (¹⁷)." This cannot be explained any other way than that he derived all that he has from the Father; that he derived all his divinity, all his "fulness of the Godhead" from the good pleasure of the Father; and "good pleasure" means that the Father had it in his power to give or to withhold, and that the Father's decision was actuated by as rounded a physical life as that of a man "disposing" of things at "his good pleasure." Athanasius makes a point of denying that Christ was begotten at the pleasure and will of the Father.

II. Creation is ascribed to Christ; but only as to a tool (¹⁸). "God, who created all things, by Jesus Christ (¹⁹)." Here the creation is ascribed to God, "who" created all things, by what tool or means? By Jesus Christ, the tool or means. "By whom also he made the world (²⁰)." Who made the world? God. Therefore he is the creator. By whom, or by what tools or means did he make it? By Christ. "But to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him" (notice, "we" are in the Father); "and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him" (notice, "we" who are "in the Father" are "by the Son," not "in" or "of" the Son, which would be necessary if he was the creator) (²¹). Thus it made clear what is meant by the words: "for by him were all things created (²²)." There is only need to supply: "for by him were all things created of God the Father."

It is doubtful whether any of these passages can possibly mean more than that the Christ or Logos was the means or tool by which the Father created.

III. Many passages, distinctly subordinationist, but whose force was evaded by Athanasius as only referring to Christ's human nature might be adduced here. Such an one is "whom he hath appointed heir of all things (²²)," etc., which though it refers distinctly to Christ as a preëxistent Being will here be omitted as doubtful, so as to make our proof only on texts whose import cannot be mistaken.

IV. The crowning passage of Paul's epistles, where he describes subordinationism in unequivocal terms, and which Athanasius could only pass over in silence, is the following: "The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. For he hath put all things under his feet. But when he saith all things are put under him, it is manifest that he is excepted which did put all things under him. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all (²⁴)." The Greek reads: "that THE God may be all in all." So the Son is distinctly to be lost in "The God," who is to be "all in all."

CHAPTER II.

JUSTIN MARTYR AND IRENAEUS OF LYONS.

1. *The Apostolic Authority of Justin and Irenaeus.*—Justin Martyr died 166 A. D., belonging to the generation born at the time of the death of John. Irenaeus lived about 177-202 A. D. He remembered the disciples of John (1) and was persuaded that his doctrine agreed with that of John and Polycarp. He says: "I can even tell the place where the blessed Polycarp used to sit and converse, and his goings forth and comings in, and the manner of his life, and the form of his body and discourses that he used to make to the people, and his intercourse with John how he used to tell of it. And I can protest before God that if the blessed and Apostolic Elder had heard any such thing he would have cried out and stopped his ears, as he was wont, saying 'O Good God, unto what times hast thou reserved me that I should endure these things.' And from his Epistles too, which he used to write either to the neighboring churches confirming them, or to any of the brethren admonishing them and urging them, can this be shewn (2)."

Again he says: "The tradition therefore of the Apostles, made manifest in all the world, all may look back upon, who wish to see things truly: and we are able to recount those whom the Apostles appointed to be Bishops in the Churches, and their successors, quite down to our time. In the time then of this Clement, no small tumult having occurred among the brethren which were in Corinth, the Church in Rome wrote a most effective letter to the Corinthians, urging them to be at peace together, and renewing their faith, and setting forth the Tradition which it had recently received from the Apostles; which tradition proclaims One God, etc., etc. (3)."

From these and like passages it is plain that Irenaeus held the same doctrine the Apostles held, or that at least he thought he did. Much authority therefore attaches to his statements.

2. *Relation of Christianity to Judaism and Paganism.*—Justin Martyr, like Athenagoras and Theophilus, assumed that the Pentateuch was older than the most ancient Egyptian or Greek philosophy, and that Plato, for instance, had read the books of Moses and the prophets, and had copied his doctrines from that source. Justin says: "The doctrine of moral freedom Plato copied from Moses, as he was familiar with the whole Old Testament; besides, all that the philosophers and poets said about the immortality of the soul, about the contemplation of divine things comes originally from the Jewish prophets; from these men

seeds of truth spread everywhere, although incorrect application of them led to divisions and disagreement (4)."

Besides this external relation of Paganism to Judaism, there was an internal one. "One article of our faith is that Christ is the first-begotten of God, and we have already proved him to be the very Logos, or Universal Reason, of which mankind are all partakers, and therefore those who live according to the Logos are Christians, notwithstanding they may pass with you as Atheists. Such among the Greeks were Sokratès and Herakleitos, and among the Barbarians Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, Elias, etc., etc., (5)." But while the "prophoric" Logos, which afterwards became incarnate, instructed the Jews, it was the "spermatic" Logos that instructed the Greeks (6). Thus all who lived before the time of Christianity were partially Christians, and their writings belonged to the Christians, in as much as they agreed with the Christian revelation (7).

It is needless to say that biblical higher criticism and modern research in the field of history have thoroughly discredited Justin's supposition that Plato copied from Moses, or from any Jewish prophet. The above extracts have only been given to show Justin's familiarity with Philo's compilation of Greek philosophy. The Prologue to the Fourth Gospel must have been known by Justin, if it was written before his time, as is probable. For Justin became a Christian by studying the Old Testament writings, and whatever of the New he can have laid his hands on. Consequently we may place implicit confidence in the fact that his doctrine represents the early interpretation of the famous Prologue.

3. *The Philonic Distinction.*—We meet in Justin Philo's contention that the Father is above all description and name, while the Logos can be described and named. He says: "But proper name for the Father of all things, 'who is unbegotten,' there is none. For whoever is called by a name has the person older than himself who gives him that name. But the terms Father, and God, and Creator, and Lord, and Master, are not names, but terms of address derived from his benefits and works (8)." Thus we see that the Father is more than "God," the very point of the Philonic distinction.

This Father is the Creator. The first paragraphs of the Apostles' and the Nicene Creed preserve in incontestable form the original doctrine. Justin says: "Besides him whom we confess to be the Creator of the Universe another is called Lord (Jesus) by the Holy Ghost, Ps. cx: 1 (9)." Irenaeus is equally clear and emphatic on this point. The two following creeds he represents as being the verbatim report of the traditions handed down by the Apostles to their successors in the sees of Rome and elsewhere. "One God, Maker of heaven and earth, announced by the Law and the prophets; and one Christ the Son of God (10)." "One God Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, framer of man; who brought on the flood, and called Abraham, who led the people out of the land of Egypt, who conversed with Moses,

who ordained the Law and sent the Prophets, who prepared fire for the devil and his angels. That he is set forth by the Churches as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, those who will may learn from the letter itself, and discern the Apostolical tradition of the Church, the Epistle (of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians) being more ancient than our present false teachers and devisers of another God, above the artificer and creator of all things that exist (¹¹)." It may be noticed in this primary Creed that the article in respect to the Father is very much elaborated; that the article in respect to Jesus Christ merely mentions Jesus Christ as God's Son, not as God, or Creator; and that any mention of the Holy Ghost is wholly wanting. The full significance of this observation will be grasped when we remember that Irenaeus repeats this Creed with slight alterations, more than forty times, the relation between the three articles being always the same (¹²).

Irenaeus speaks on the point at issue still more distinctly: "And that neither by angels, nor by any other virtue, but by God the Father alone, were made things both visible and invisible, and all things whatsoever (¹³)." On this point Irenaeus quotes Justin, as agreeing with him: "I could not have believed the Lord himself if he announced another God beside the Creator, because from the one God who both created the world and formed us, and contains and governs all things, the Only-begotten Son came unto us gathering together into himself the work of his own hands, my faith in him is firm, and my love to the Father immovable; both being God's gift unto us (¹⁴)." Irenaeus thus speaks of Christ: the Son of the Creator of the world (¹⁵)." In view of all these passages it would seem that in the opinion of Irenaeus the Father, not the Son, was the Creator.

4. *Justin's View of the Logos.*—Justin's opinion of the relation of the Logos to God is exactly that of Philo, with the exception that he identifies the Logos of the world with Jesus of Nazara. Consequently the position of the Logos, in respect of the Father, is one of subordination, Irenaeus alone noticing the distinction of Theophilus (¹⁷) and of Philo between the "endiathetic" or implicit, and the "prophoric" or explicit Logos (¹⁸).

Justin's definition of the relation is as follows: "And they call him the 'Word'. So the Father when he wills, they (the prophets) say, makes his power to go forth, and when he wills he draws it back again into himself. In like manner they teach that he makes the angels also. But it has been proved that the angels exist and always remain and are not dissolved again into that from which they were created. And that this power which the power of prophecy calls God, as has been likewise been fully proved, and angel, is not numbered as another in name only, like the light of the Son, but is numerically another thing, I have already briefly explained, when I saw that this power has been generated from the Father by His power and will; but not by abscission, as if the Father's essence were divided off, as all other things which are parted and severed are not the same as before the division took place for an example of which I took

the fires kindled as from a fire, which we see in other "hetera," that from which many be kindled, being in no degree diminished, but remaining the same (19)." Other utterances of Justin are as follows: "That Word, no other than whom, after God the Father, we know to be the most noble and Lost prince (20)." "Whom having learned him to be the Son of the very God, and holding him to be in the second place (21)." "For the first power after God the Father and Lord of all things, even his Son, is the Word (22)." The first begetting of God produces the Son (23) so that he is the first born (24). He received from the Father the power to be King, priest and angel as well as all he possessed (25). According to the Father's will is he God (26). He is the servant and tool (organon) (27) of God through whom the Creator creates (28); for the Father remains is himself beyond the world (29). Yet in Justin's opinion, when the Word was united to Jesus of Nazara, it ceased to be the Word: "Jesus, the Christ, is the Son and Apostle of God, being formerly the Word (30)." Before the Incarnation, the Word appeared as angel to the Jehovah angel, for the Creator-God cannot have abandoned the regions of heaven to appear in one visible place in the earth. "I shall attempt to persuade you, since you have understood the Scriptures, of the truth of what I say, that there is, and that there is said to be, another God and Lord subject to the Maker of all things; who is also called an angel, because he announces to Men whatsoever of all things—above whom there is no other God—wishes to announce to them. So that you may now proceed to explain to us how this God who appeared to Abraham, and is minister to God the Maker of things, being born of the virgin, became man, of like passions with us all, as you said previously (31)." Evidently the Word was not the Creator of the Universe, for it ceased to be the cosmical Logos during the life of Jesus of Nazara. It was then only "the first power," "created" similarly as the angels, as we saw above.

5. *Irenaeus's View of the Logos.*—Irenaeus holds the same doctrine. The Father, as distinguished from the Son, is the Creator. Yet, the Father creates "by" the Son (32), "through" the Son (33), so that the Son is said to "form" us, but only according to the foreknowledge of the Father (34). Thus the Son is even called once or twice the "Maker of the World (35)" and the "Creator (36)." The Son "sums up all things" in himself (37), receives all things already created from the Father (38), and "gathers all things into himself (39)." The Son, as to his eternal Sonship, is "anointed" by the Father (40), so that his subordination is incontestable. If more proof is desired, the passages (41) where the Son, like the Holy Ghost, is called a "hand" of the Father, may be consulted.

There is yet stronger evidence than this that Irenaeus held the distinction between "God" and "The God." He says: "This therefore being plainly shewn (and it will be shewn yet more plainly), that neither the Prophets nor the Apostles, nor the Lord Christ in his own person, confessed any other Lord God,

but him who in the primary sense is God and Lord ; the prophets first and the Apostles after them confessing the Father and the Son, but naming no other as God, nor confessing him as Lord ; and the Lord himself afterwards delivering to the Disciples the Father only as God and Lord, him who alone is God and Sovereign of all : we, if at least we are his disciples, must follow their statements, the tenor of which is as follows, etc. (42).” Then, the Word is spoken of as “The God of those things which are created (43),” “obeying the Father’s will” in creating, therefore before his Incarnation (44). Besides : “For the Father underlying both the creation and the Word, and the Word upholden of the Father, impart the Spirit unto all, at the Father’s good pleasure : to some in the way of creation, (which sort of thing is made) etc., (45).” Directly opposing Athanasius in the interpretation of S. Mk. xiii: 32, in that the very Son of God himself ignores, and the Father alone knew the hour. Irenaeus calls the manner of the generation of the Son unspeakable, and “no man knows” anything about it (46). This was one of the Arian proof-texts, interpreted by Irenaeus in the Arian sense, and directly contradicting Athanasius’s interpretation.

Moreover, it is very doubtful whether Irenaeus distinguished very clearly between the Father and the Son. It is quite possible that Irenaeus considered the Son as merely a manifestation of the Father. He says : “All saw the Father in the Son : for that which is invisible of the Son is the Father, and that which is visible of the Father is the Son (47).” “For the knowledge of the Father is the Son, but the knowledge of the Son is in the Father, and is revealed by the Son (48).”

6. *Justin’s View of the Holy Ghost.*—The Holy Spirit, according to Justin is the Spirit of prophecy (49), although no mention is made of its influence on the believer. Justin is not certain whether to assign it to the third or fourth rank. “Jesus Christ whom, having learned him to be the Son of the very God, and holding him to be in the second place, and the Spirit of prophecy in the third (50).” “But both Him and His Son who came from Him, and taught us these truths, and the host of the other good angels who follow and imitate him, and the Spirit of prophecy (51).” Further, Justin identifies the Spirit with the Son : “It is right then to conceive the Spirit, and the power which is from God, to be nothing other than the Word, who is the first-born of God, etc. (52).” That Justin knows anything of a Trinity is evidenced only by the baptismal formula (53) and the ascription of prayer (54), the particle “through” being used both of the Son and the Spirit, betraying an inability to distinguish between them. In the numberless accounts of creation we meet with in Justin’s works, the names of the Father and the Logos alone appear.

7. *Irenaeus’s View of the Holy Ghost.*—In respect to Irenaeus’s conception of the Holy Ghost, the first fact of importance is that, just as the last clause of the creed of the Council of Nicaea was only “And in the Holy Ghost,” without any further ad-

ditions, so in the short Creeds of Apostolic authority quoted above in connection with the creatorship of the Father, the second clause reads "And in Jesus Christ," while the third, in respect to the Holy Ghost, is not found. This fact is of immense importance in making an estimate of what Irenaeus and the Church before his days thought of the Holy Ghost.

Secondly, there are a number of passages, of which some have already been quoted, distinctly affirming that besides the Father, (God in the primary sense) and the Son (upholden of the Father) there was no other God ⁽⁸⁴⁾. The whole divine economy is set forth without mention of any third principle ⁽⁸⁵⁾. When the Holy Ghost is spoken of, it is only as a means of reaching Father and Son ⁽⁸⁶⁾: "Who then are clean? Those who by faith take their way steadily towards the Father and the Son: for this is the steadiness of those who are of the double hoof ⁽⁸⁷⁾." In this simile there is no place left for the Holy Ghost; nor is there any in the following: "that we receiving by the Spirit the image and inscription of the Father and the Son, might cause the penny entrusted to us to bear fruit ⁽⁸⁸⁾." Nor in the last paragraph of his *Refutation of All Heresies* does Irenaeus at all mention either a third principle or the Holy Ghost ⁽⁸⁹⁾, when describing in elaborate terms the attributes, powers, and functions of God and the Logos.

Thirdly, the Holy Ghost is spoken of as one of the "hands" of God, the Logos being the other "hand" ⁽⁹⁰⁾. Here there is a confusion between the nature of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, both doing the same thing, and being coördinate, and subordinated to the Father.

Fourthly, the Holy Spirit is identified with the Wisdom that was with God before all creation ⁽⁹¹⁾. Philo had made the Logos the Son of "The God" as Father, and Wisdom as Mother. Paul, John, and Athanasius identified the Wisdom of the Old Testament with the Logos of the New, and thus proved the preëxistence and creative power of the Son. Irenaeus identifies Christ with the Logos, and the Spirit with the Wisdom of God. The theological consequences of such a doctrine would be disastrous, as it would make Wisdom inferior to and proceeding from the Word; so that the Word would be without Wisdom until it proceeded to beget it. Irenaeus does not countenance this absurdity; he has committed the mistake simply because he has identified the Holy Ghost with the Logos, as before, where each was one "hand" of God. This is also plain from the fact that Irenaeus ascribes the dispensing of the prophetic gifts to the Son, and immediately again to the Holy Ghost, identifying them completely ⁽⁹²⁾. Yet, again, Irenaeus identifies the Father with his Wisdom, which would then identify the Father with the Holy Ghost ⁽⁹³⁾.

Fifthly, The Holy Spirit descended on Jesus at his baptism ⁽⁹⁴⁾ and was the "gift" of the Father to the Son, and of the Son to men ⁽⁹⁵⁾. It is called the "ladder whereby we ascend to God ⁽⁹⁶⁾." So far the Holy Ghost need not have been more than a

phase of divine activity, having done nothing demanding personal existence or action.

Sixthly, Yet, where the baptismal formula suggests a Trinity, the Spirit is coördinated with the Father and Son, though the coördination seems to be nothing more than a formal one, equality never being asserted. There seems to be a hierarchy: "First above all is the Father; and he is the head of the Church: in us all again is the Spirit, and he is the living water which the Lord imparts to all that rightly believe in him, and love him and know that there is one Father who is above all and through all and in you all (⁶⁴)."

Here is a subordinating hierarchy, in which the Holy Ghost occupies the fourth place: The Father, who is the head of Christ; Christ, who is the head of the Church; the Church on earth or in heaven; lastly, the Holy Ghost. Thus the Father is both above, through and in all, as the Christ and the Church are within him; the Holy Ghost seems to be "in" the Church, as the fourth order of existence. Again: "The Spirit, first preparing man in the Son of God, then the Son leading him to the Father, the Father lastly bestowing incorruption (⁶⁵)."

Also: "The Father approving and commanding, the Son performing and creating, the Spirit giving nourishment and growth (⁶⁶)."

There is one more like subordinational passage (⁶⁷), and one which is too short to be decisive either way, the three men hid by Rahab prefiguring the Trinity (⁷⁰). On the whole, then, it may seem, that where the Holy Ghost is not wholly identified with the Son, the former is supposed to be subordinate to the latter.

8. *The Opinions of Justin and Irenaeus.*—Summing up it may appear that both Justin and Irenaeus recognized the Philonic distinction in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, being thorough subordinationalists.

Concerning the Holy Ghost, they are in confusion, being at a loss for a principle in nature with which to identify him, when they recognize him at all. This is only the case where the baptismal formula forces them to do so.

From these premises it may seem that the theology of Justin and Irenaeus was a crude aggregation of two different elements: the baptismal formula, and the philosophy of Philo.

As to the Son, there was no hesitation in identifying him with the Logos, and at times with the apocryphal "Wisdom" and Targumic "Memra Jahweh."

As to the Holy Ghost, they were at a loss what to attribute him to, since the Philonic philosophy furnished only two divine principles, and these two were already identified with the first two terms of the baptismal formula. At times then they identified the Holy Ghost with the Logos, at times, they ignored him utterly, and when forced by the baptismal formula to account for him, they were willing to dissociate the Logos from the Wisdom of God, never reflecting on the philosophic absurdity of the procedure. But, as a rule, they ignored him, as Irenaeus does in the last paragraph of his *Refutation of All Heresies*.

CHAPTER III.

THEOPHILOS OF ANTIOCH.

1. *Theophilus of Antioch.*—Theophilus of Antioch was almost a contemporary of Irenaeus, dying five or six years after him. His extant works consist of an Apology for Christianity, addressed to Autolukos.

His authority has always been held high in the Church, because it is in his writings that we meet for the first time the word "Triad," applied to God. And yet, his Apology to Autolukos contains no single mention of Jesus. He says that Christians are called such because they are anointed by God, evidently with the Holy Ghost (¹). His Christianity is nothing more than a Jewish morality couched in Christian phrases.

2. *The Logos.*—Theophilus speaks of a Logos, but it is very doubtful if he meant by this term anything more than an attribute of God. "For if I say he is light, I name but his own work; if I call him Word, I name but his sovereignty; if I call him Mind, I speak but of his Wisdom; if I say he is Spirit, I speak of his breath; if I call him Wisdom, I speak of his offspring; if I call him Strength, I speak of his sway, etc. (²)."
Here the Word and Spirit are both separate from Wisdom, and all three of these are coördinate with Light, Mind, Strength, Power, Providence, Kingdom, Lord, Judge, Father, and Fire. It is impossible then to think that Theophilus meant any more by these names than attributes of God, not separate personalities.

The God, the Father, is everywhere spoken of as the Creator, who made the world (³). Without doubt, he says: "For God having made all things by his Word (⁴)."
Doubtless, God implied the existence of the Word by saying "Us" in the account of creation (⁵). Yet Theophilus distinctly states: "The command, then of God, that is, his Word (⁶)."
Evidently, the Word of God is merely the Command of God, and not a separate personal existence. Besides, there are several passages which speak distinctly of a time when the Logos was not (⁷).

Nowhere does Theophilus mention even the name of Jesus, which would seem to be indispensable to any statement of Christian doctrine.

3. *The Holy Ghost.*—What Theophilus means by the "Holy Ghost" is not clear. He was no more than an attribute of God; and nothing more than the fact of being an attribute is demanded

by what other things Theophilus says of him. The Holy Ghost is always the inspirer of the Prophets (⁷). Yet in other places the Holy Spirit seems to be nothing more than the Stoic Spermatic Logos: "And by the Spirit which is borne above the waters, he means that which God gave for animating the Creation, as he gave life to man, mixing what is fine with what is fine. For the Spirit is fine, and the water is fine, that the Spirit may nourish the water, and the water penetrating everywhere along with the Spirit, may nourish creation. For the Spirit being one, and holding the place of light, was between the water and the heaven, in order that the darkness might not in any way communicate with the heaven, which was nearer God, before God said, 'Let there be light' (⁸)." Again the Logos is identified with the Spirit (⁹).

The prophets were inspired by the Holy Spirit. Yet it is doubtful if Theophilus contemplated a separate Divine Person: "But men of God carrying in them a holy spirit and becoming prophets, being inspired and made wise by God, became God-taught, and holy, and righteous (¹⁰)." Theophilus may have referred to the fact that God inspired men, and in that capacity of being an attribute of God was called Spirit.

CHAPTER IV.

HIPPOLUTOS.

1. *The Works of Hippolutos.*—Hippolutos deserves separate consideration, because his doctrine is so very different from any that have already been considered, or are to be considered, until the time of Augustine of Hippo.

Who Hippolutos was seems yet an undecided question. Whether he was Bishop of Ostia, on the mouth of the Tiber, near Rome, or was the Bishop of some town on the southern coast of Arabia, will perhaps never be known. It is certain, however, that the logical and sternly precise cast of doctrine favours the former hypothesis. He was the author of a large work against the Heretics, usually referred to as the *Philosophoumena*, which has been recovered only during the last century, and which was carefully analysed by Bunsen, in his interesting work on the subject.

Hippolutos opposed the heresy of Noëtus, and wrote his best treatise as an attack on Noëtianism.

2. *The First Formulation of the Trinity.*—Hippolutos is the first Father in which an orthodox formulation of the Trinity is met with. Guided by the baptismal formula, he formed a Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity. When the difference between the Father and the Son is said to be one of distinct personality, it is not meant that there are two Gods, but two persons in one God. The third person is the Holy Ghost, which unites with the other two to form the Godhead. The Father commands, the Son obeys, and the Holy Ghost illuminates. The Father is over all, the Son through all, the Spirit in all. It is impossible to believe in one God without a belief in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost (*).

It is a question if this formulation of the Trinity is not still subordinationist. For the Father commands, the Son obeys, and the Holy Ghost seems to obey both in illuminating.

3. *The Process of the Trinity.*—Justin and Irenaeus were Trinitarians when forced to be such by the baptismal formula; but when they came to a philosophic explanation of it, they were hopelessly at sea. The like is the case with Hippolutos.

There are three moments, it seems, in the development of the Divine Logos.

Firstly, the Logos is still impersonal, yet in undifferentiated unity with God the Father as the Divine Reason, the potential personal Logos, in whom are all the archetypal Ideas of Creation (*). The Neo-Platonist "Mind" (*) and Justin's "endiathetic" Logos may here be recognized. Evidently this is a time when the Logos as a personal being is not yet.

Secondly, God becomes Father by an act of his will directed on his own being, by which in the fulness of time, he calls out into fulness the world of Ideas, in a separate hypostasis, as the ray from the sun, in which it stands over against him as an "other" God, beneath him. This is the created world (*). Here we find verbal identity with Justin's formulation.

In the Incarnation the Logos undergoes the third and last stage of development, in which he becomes for the first time the real and perfect Son of God (†). Thus Hippolotos endeavoured to correct Justin's philosophy.

This was an ingenious attempt to reconcile the Philonic philosophy with the triplicity of the baptismal formula, especially in regard to the Son. Yet, there is no distinct expression of coequality with the Father, while the process indicated seems to be a philosophic impossibility.

Firstly, The Logos is the Divine Reason. If then it becomes dissociated from the Divine Being, then this latter must remain without Reason, and be irrational, an absurdity when applied to any one person of the Divinity.

Secondly, The Divine Reason becomes dissociated from the Divine Being, and is an "other" to it, and is subordinate to it. How then can it ever become possible for this dissociated and subordinate Reason to become by some inner development greater than it is already, so as to become a perfect "Son," as divine as the Father (‡) ?

4. *The Holy Ghost.*—In all this, there is not yet a philosophic explanation of the cosmical reality which underlies the third divine principle. The Holy Ghost was yet unaccounted for in philosophy ; a proof that the baptismal formula and the philosophy of Christianity were elements foreign to each other, never thoroughly united, and that the latter, far from being an essential part of the faith, was really inconsistent with it. Like Irenaeus, when the baptismal formula did not absolutely require a mention of it, Hippolotos found it wise to ignore its existence. Irenaeus ignored the Holy Ghost in the last paragraph of his *Refutation of All Heresies*, although he expatiates at length upon the names and attributes of God, not neglecting the Logos. Hippolotos did the same in the closing sketch of necessary doctrine, at the end of his *Philosophoumena*.

But beyond this negative proof, there is positive proof that Hippolotos did not ascribe personality to the Holy Ghost. "I do not say that there are two Gods ; but only one. But there are two personalities, and in the Divine Economy the third grace of the Holy Ghost ; for the Father and Son are one, although two persons ; but in the third place the Holy Ghost (‡)." The reason of this insistence on the personality of Father and Son is that Hippolotos was opposing the Noëtians, who held that Father and Son cannot be distinguished numerically. Consequently, he neglected the Holy Ghost, who was first called "Deus" by Tertullian (¶).

CHAPTER V.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.

1. *Clement's Life.*—Clement of Alexandria was almost a contemporary of Irenaeus, being born like him about the time of the martyrdom of Justin, and dying a decade after him, perhaps in 213 A. D. Titus Flavius Clemens was probably an Athenian by birth, and born in a Pagan household. His search for truth led him to Alexandria where Pantaenos was the means of his conversion. He took presbyter's orders, and was appointed to succeed Pantaenos in the mastership of the Catechetical School. He fled from Egypt at the time of the persecution of Severus, in 203, and died in exile a decade later.

2. *Relation to Paganism.*—Clement agrees with Justin in holding that Greek philosophers and poets owed their noblest thoughts to imitation of the Jewish prophets. Therefore, he sees in Homer a prophet (¹) when a few Homeric words bear a faint resemblance to a locution in the Septuagint; and on like grounds he speaks of Orpheus as of the "theologian (²)."

Yet, to Justin's work (³) he makes the notable addition that he considers Plato and the other Greek philosophers dishonest, for not having acknowledged the source of their inspiration; they are "thieves and robbers" of which our Lord spoke as entering the fold not by the door (⁴). The instances of mutual plagiarism which Clement discovers among the Greeks themselves are hardly more than such verbal coincidences as may be found in any literature, and notably in the Bible itself. Besides, he was indebted for most of his quotations to popular, and not always over-accurate anthologies. As to the plagiarism of the Greeks from the Hebrew Scriptures, the coincidences are very slight, and historically impossible; and there is a bit of humor in the fact that Clement accuses the Greeks of having stolen the maxim "know thyself" from a supposititious quotation from the Bible: "thou hast seen thy brother, thou hast seen thy God" which cannot be found anywhere in canonical or deuterocanonical Scripture (⁵). This is almost as amusing, if it were not so sad, as Justin Martyr's charge against the Jews that they had destroyed several verses of the Bible which made for Christianity. Needless to say they had been interpolated by some Christian, whether honestly or not, is another question.

Yet, Clement was seriously impressed by the need of knowing all manner of facts, and of philosophizing. He contends that, do

what he will, a man must philosophize if he would think rightly. "But if we are not to philosophize what then? (For no one can condemn a thing without first knowing it.) The consequence, even in that case is that we must philosophize" about the question whether we shall philosophize or not (⁶). Clement here advances one step beyond Justin; and for the matter of that, beyond Paul himself. He asserts that Paul did not mean to condemn philosophy as such, but only because in his day all philosophy was heathen, pagan speculations (⁷). Whatever the Pagans may have said that was true may with fearlessness be appropriated by the Christian, as already belonging to him, and from the most erroneous writers some glimpses of truth may be gathered; as one gathers roses and plucks off the thorns so should all error be sifted out from beautiful thoughts of the philosophers (⁸). Divine revelation is the truth, and the norm of all truth (⁹). If philosophy serves revelation, as Hagar served Sarah, we will have true "gnosis" or knowledge (¹⁰); if however philosophy dares to judge of revelation, we have false "gnosis" or knowledge (¹¹). This Philonic metaphor is the first plain assertion on the part of a Christian writer of the standpoint of superstition. Clement, however, acted in his life exactly in contradiction to his rule; for when he was converted by Pantaenos, his reason judged of Christian revelation that it was the truth; or, otherwise, he would have remained a Pagan to the end of his days.

3. *The Father*.—All things exist in God: but God's being is above theirs; that is, God is incomprehensible, but we may know that there is a God (¹²). God is or possesses all being in himself (¹³); but he is "beyond Being" and "beyond Unity" (¹⁴). Of God we can only know what he is not (¹⁵). "He is formless and nameless, though we sometime give him titles which are not to be taken in their proper sense, the One, the Good, Intelligence, Existence, Father, God, Creator, or Lord (¹⁶)." Here we have a distinct reassertion of the Philonic distinction of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. The Father is above "God," and is called "The God" in a subsequent quotation. If however, God is a Father, "he is at the same time Father of a Son (¹⁷)." Here again we have the Philonic definition of the Son.

4. *The Son*.—If the Father is Unity, so the Son is Unity comprehending manifoldness, the source and end of all things whatsoever (¹⁸). His nature is the next to the Father. As the Father is incomprehensible, so the Son is comprehensible; "the God" then being indemonstrable is not the object of knowledge, but the Son's Wisdom and Knowledge and Truth and whatever else is akin to these, and so is capable of demonstration and definition (¹⁹). So the Son is the consciousness of God, in which the Father sees all things mirrored (²⁰). The Son is the name (²¹), face (²²), and house of God (²³). He is the Idea or Sum of Ideas of God (²⁴), the Sum of the Powers of God (²⁵), He is the

Divine Image, the "apathetic man," the Heavenly man ⁽²⁶⁾. He is our high-priest ⁽²⁷⁾. These terms are all borrowed from Philo in this particular form, so that it may be understood why all the rest of Clement's theology is Philonic.

The Philonic conception of the Logos attributes to him all divine titles and prerogatives—even that of prayer ⁽²⁸⁾—without in the least conflicting with his absolute subordination. So, firstly, Clement asserts that the Son is called Lord ⁽²⁹⁾ and Almighty ⁽³⁰⁾ and "beyond knowledge, as being infinite, though cognizable ⁽³¹⁾."

On the other hand, the Father is called "he who alone is Almighty ⁽³²⁾," while the Son is only the "eldest as to birth ⁽³³⁾," a potentiality ⁽³⁴⁾, or energy ⁽³⁵⁾, or a servant ⁽³⁶⁾, of the Father. The Father "creates" the Logos ⁽³⁷⁾, and is said to be he "who made the beginning of all things (the Logos) ⁽³⁸⁾." Plainly and distinctly does Clement assert that the Son is the nature "next" below the Father: "Most perfect, indeed, and most holy, and most lordly, and most commanding, and most royal and most beneficent is the nature of the Son, which is the most closely conjoined with him who is alone Almighty ⁽³⁹⁾."

Man may attain to the image of the Son, but not to the image of God himself ⁽⁴⁰⁾. This was Paul's opinion; and yet some Christians maintained the opposite ⁽⁴¹⁾. As for Clement himself, however, he believes that the Son "is the true Only-begotten, the express image of the glory of the eternal King and Almighty Father, who impresses on the Gnostic the seal of the perfect contemplation according to his own image; so that there is now a third Divine Image, made as far as possible like the second cause, the essential life through which we live the true life ⁽⁴²⁾."

5. *The Holy Spirit*.—Concerning the Holy Spirit, Clement is very doubtful.

The Spirit is the "intelligible light," the light of truth, the true light without shadow or darkness, the Spirit of the Lord which is given to all who are sanctified by faith ⁽⁴³⁾. So the Spirit dwells in man as in a temple ⁽⁴⁴⁾, is the agent of salvation in being the "dew" which washes out human sins ⁽⁴⁵⁾ and binds together the Visible and Invisible Church ⁽⁴⁶⁾.

But, like Justin and Irenaeus, Clement confuses the Holy Ghost with the Son, when attempting to assign to each a cosmical principle underlying his divine claims; for the Son equally with the Spirit grants the spirit of prophecy ⁽⁴⁷⁾.

Again, like Justin, Irenaeus and Hippolytus, Clement ignores the Holy Ghost when the memory of the baptismal formula does not force him to account for it.

Firstly, The Logos is the image of the Father, and man the image of the Logos, thus being a "third image." Where is a place left for the Holy Ghost in this cosmology?

Secondly, Like Irenaeus, Clement ⁽⁴⁸⁾ interprets the double hoof of the clean animals as the security of resting on the Father

and the Son, the Holy Ghost not being mentioned at all in this fundamental statement of doctrine, where orthodox doctrine is distinctly differentiated from heretical opinions.

In the closing chapter of his *Exhortation to the Heathen*, Clement, like Irenaeus and Hippolytus, mentions the Father and Son, but not the Holy Ghost; and in the "Prayer to the Teacher," at the end of the *Paedagogos*, the Holy Ghost is only mentioned in connection with the final ascription, the final Chapter again expatiating on the Father and Son, without reference to the Holy Ghost.

Fourthly, The Holy Ghost is not mentioned at all in Clement's account of the hierarchy of God, the Word, the angels, the gods or inferior angels, and men, in the following passage: "So the best thing on earth is the most pious man; and the best thing in heaven the nearer in place and purer, is an angel, the partaker of the eternal and blessed life. But the nature of the Son, which is nearest to him who is alone the Almighty One is the most perfect. To him is placed in subjection all the hosts of angels and Gods; he, the paternal Word, exhibiting the holy administration for him who put all in subjection to him (⁶⁰)."

Fifthly, The task of inspiring men to good deeds, granting the spirit of prophecy, and guiding human affairs is entrusted to angels, guardian to individuals and to states (⁶⁰). Angels are the human comforters and encouragers, instead of the Holy Ghost (⁶¹), the "Comforter" of the Scriptures.

6. *The Trinity*.—Yet, where the baptismal formula forces him to recognize a Trinity, Clement speaks of one. "Oh mystic wonder, One is the Father of all, One also the Word of all, and the Holy Ghost is one and the same everywhere (⁶²)."

Whether this "holy Trinity" is a theological definition, there is much room for doubt. He says: "And for those who are aiming at perfection there is proposed the rational gnosis, the foundation of which is the Holy Trinity, Faith, Hope, and Love: but of these the greatest is Love (⁶³)." It almost seems as if this was the only explanation he could give of the Trinity: calling it the "rational Trinity."

At any rate, the formulation of the Trinity given above in no way conflicts with the subordinationism detailed at length; if Clement holds a Trinity at all, it is not composed of equal members; there is a distinction of rank in the ethical Trinity of Faith, Hope, and Love.

7. *The Ethics*.—This ethical Trinity introduces the subject of Ethics.

The development of the Christian goes from faith to knowledge, and from knowledge, which includes good works and virtue, to love; and from love to perfection, the inheritance of the Saints (⁶⁴). The ideal man is called the "Christian Gnostic," as the Stoics called theirs the "Wise Man," from which Wise Man Clement's Christian Gnostic is palpably borrowed. The Christian Gnostic loves knowledge more than salvation, and

loves it for its own sake ⁽⁸⁵⁾ ; he performs good actions for their own sake, even if God permitted him to commit evil deeds ⁽⁸⁶⁾ ; and loses all passions, and by becoming apathetic becomes like God, and becomes God himself ⁽⁸⁷⁾.

All souls are in themselves equal. There is neither male nor female "when they no longer marry or are given in marriage ⁽⁸⁸⁾."

Evidently then, there can be no mediating office of priest-hood between man and God ; all souls that are pure are priests. From this fact Clement makes a startling deduction. "Those then also now who have exercised themselves in the Lord's commandments, and lived perfectly and gnostically according to the Gospel, may be enrolled in the chosen body of the Apostles. Such an one is in reality a presbyter of the Church, and a true minister (deacon) of the will of God, if he do and teach what is the Lord's ; not as being ordained by men, nor regarded righteous because a presbyter, but enrolled in the presbyterate because righteous. And although here upon earth he be not honoured with the chief seat, he will sit down on the twenty-four thrones, judging the people as John says in the Apocalypse ⁽⁸⁹⁾." The consequence of this is that the external Church is only an "imitation" of the angelic glory and economy ; only existing for the successful management of the assembling of Christians. It is not a mediator between man and God outside of which none can reach the Father. The officers of the Church can only be "elders" in age or honour ; not "priests" in the sense of the Old Testament, who alone could sanctify and purify the suffering soul.

Consequently, election comes by merit, and if we "know ourselves" we know God, since the light of God illumines all who permit their eyes to be opened. This sanctification comes from abandoning lust. The end of man is to become a God going about in the flesh. Thus Jesus was no more than a Teacher and Pattern who by the gift of the Holy Ghost in Baptism forgave sins.

8. *Philonism.*—Clement was deeply read in Philo, so that it is no wonder that the Philonic distinction in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel is by him sustained. His conception of the Logos need not be described further than by the name, "Philonic," with all its subordinational implications.

As to the Holy Ghost, Clement is not clearer or more certain than Justin or Irenaeus. In fact, there is a remarkable similarity between the two conceptions of the Spirit. The fact that all mention of the Holy Ghost is so often omitted in crucial places reminds us forcibly of its omission in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, which seems to propose to give a philosophical account of the Divine Nature and which would as such contain a reference to him, if the orthodox dogma had been recognized fully in those days.

CHAPTER VI.

ORIGEN.

1. *The Life of Origen.*—Clement had only been separated from the time of the death of John by the life-time of Justin Martyr. And Clement was the teacher of Origen, at the Catechetical School. When the persecution of Severus drove Clement from his position, Origen succeeded to him by virtue of his fitness for the post, at the early age of eighteen, at the appointment of the Bishop Demetrius. He never forgot that his father Leonides had been a martyr in the beginning of the persecution which raised him to his post of honour ; and he was ever a devoted Christian, pious, and learned.

As many young women attended his lectures, he resolved to avoid scandal, and in order to do so, willingly mutilated himself (*). The Bishop heard about it, although he had endeavoured to keep the act secret ; and the Bishop approved of his action. While teaching, he felt the need of knowing something of the heathen systems of belief which he was to oppose, and took lectures from Ammonius Sakkas, the Neo-Platonist, who probably exerted such an influence over him that he changed his style of interpretation from literalism to the allegorical style used in his later works (*). It was probably at this period that he wrote his philosophical work *Concerning Basic Principles*, stimulated by the Neo-Platonist cosmology.

His teaching was interrupted by two journeys : one in 211 A. D., to Rome, when Zephyrinus was Bishop of Rome, and one in 215 A. D., to the Holy Land, being forced to leave Alexandria on account of a massacre which had occurred. On this journey, the first unpleasantness with Demetrius occurred, when he was invited to preach in the presence of Alexander of Jerusalem, and Theoktistos of Caesarea. This was the period of his greatest literary activity, beginning his work on the "Hexapla," a critical comparison of the various texts of the Old Testament Scriptures.

On his way to Achaia (228-230 A. D.) he was ordained presbyter by his friends in Palestine ; and as Demetrius of Alexandria would not recognize his orders, and excommunicated him, he retired to Palestine, where he engaged in literary labours, finishing his work on the "Hexapla," and replying to the attacks on Christianity of Celsus, a heathen philosopher. His work was interrupted by a persecution at Tyre, under Decius, in 249 A. D., from the injuries received in which he soon died.

The circumstances of his life account for the two great streams of thought which pervade his writings, and which he was never able to harmonize : the teaching of Clement, which has already been analyzed, and the teaching of Ammonius Sakkas. The former underlies all of Origen's theology and cosmology ; the latter, Origen's anthropology. For the present we shall neglect his anthropology, which is considered elsewhere. Origen differs therefore but little from Clement, except in a more thorough reading of Philo, and a more far-reaching application of his principles.

From Philo he took the doctrines of preëxistence and of the souls of the stars ; metempsychosis into animals and plants he distinctly rejects ⁽⁸⁾. It is very strange, however, that his name alone of all other Church Fathers should be associated with these doctrines ; for both were held quite generally before and after his time. The doctrine of the souls of the stars was nothing but a transliteration of the "spermatic" Logos of the Stoics, Philo, Justin Martyr, and Irenaeus. There were Scripture texts which could be used ⁽⁴⁾ and neither Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose, or Thomas of Aquino considered the question otherwise than an open one ⁽⁵⁾. The Platonic doctrine of preëxistence, with its Scripture proof ⁽⁶⁾, was at one time held by Jerome, not denied by Augustine, and not settled till the time of Gregory the Great ⁽⁷⁾. Surely such names should free Origen from blame for holding to these two doctrines which when condemned by a Council were pronounced false and absurd, but not heretical. Many eminent men, both in Origen's lifetime, and later, upheld his orthodoxy and shared his opinions ⁽⁸⁾.

That Origen considered himself orthodox, and considered all his doctrines as capable of being harmonized with Christianity is certain, from the very fact that he is as emphatic in respect to external tradition as Irenaeus himself. Besides Origen in his highest flights is ever interpreting the Scriptures, whose sense he seeks with prayerful devotion. That he considered himself thoroughly orthodox, and that Athanasius, and the three Gregories thought him so, must give his writings the highest evidential value in respect to the state of Christian philosophy in his day.

The rule of faith which he considers as having descended from the very Apostles, and which as a Preface to his great philosophic work, *Concerning Basic Principles*, is as follows, in respect to the Father : "That there is one God, who created and arranged all things, and who, when nothing existed, called all things into being—God from the first Creation and foundation of the world, etc., etc. ⁽⁹⁾." Mr. Bigg ⁽¹⁰⁾ rightly remarks that whereas Clement considered God primarily from the metaphysical stand-point as unconditioned (a view which Herbert Spencer has seen fit to adopt), Origen looked on him from the moral stand-point, as the Perfect Being. Every attribute of his is in a perfect condition, and therefore limited by this perfection ⁽¹¹⁾.

2. *The Eternal Generation.*—To Origen, the world owes the theological term “eternal generation.” He explains this in the following way. The Divine Father is the absolute Unity of the all-embracing fulness of the Divinity. He posits his Son as the image of his Being⁽¹²⁾, in which Image the Unity of himself with his Son consists⁽¹³⁾. Since it is foolish or godless to think that God would not or could not generate his Son before any given time, it is plain that he always was the Father of his Son, who was born of him, and received all he possessed from the Father⁽¹⁴⁾, but without any temporal or intelligible beginning⁽¹⁵⁾. His generation is as eternal as the procession of the ray from the light⁽¹⁶⁾.

The same argument makes the world eternal. If God was always a Creator, how could he have been Creator without something created? Consequently, the world was eternal.

Strange to say, the same argument is used to prove the eternity of the Logos, and that of the world. And yet, theologians hailed the first result with delight and the second with horror.

Philo's distinction, between “God” and “The God,” is found in the writings of Origen. “For, as he is the image of ‘The God’ who is unseen, and therefore is ‘God,’ therefore Christ says, in order that they may know thee ‘The’ only true ‘God’ likewise he is the Image of goodness, but not absolute goodness as the Father⁽¹⁷⁾.” Origen distinctly recognizes this distinction as having been made by John, and affirms expressly that the true absolute God is by John called “The God” whereas what is called “God” “has been made divine by participation in his divinity⁽¹⁸⁾.”

Thus there are reserved to the absolute God the titles of “very God”⁽¹⁹⁾, and as appeared above, that of “very goodness,” although of course the Son may represent it to man⁽²⁰⁾. “The God” is above all “Being.”

3. *The Second Clause of His Creed.*—The second clause of Origen's Creed begins thus: “That Jesus Christ himself, who came (into the world), was born of the Father before all creatures; that, after he had been the servant of the Father in the creation of all things—for by him were all things made,—etc., etc.⁽²¹⁾. Origen recognizes that if God makes all things by the Son, then the Son is his servant. Thus the Logos, who is the first-born of creation, is the first in rank after the absolute God before all other Gods, whose God the absolute God is. The latter gods are only images of the first image or archetype; the Logos⁽²²⁾. Therefore the Logos may be called “the second God⁽²³⁾,” occupying the second place of honour after the highest God⁽²⁴⁾ as being by nature Son⁽²⁵⁾. He is the demiurge of the world⁽²⁶⁾ but is not equal to the Father: “Although the Son of God excels all natures in being, dignity, might, and divinity, since he is the living word and Wisdom, yet in nothing is he equal to the Father. For he is only the image of his goodness, the reflexion of glory and eternal light of God, not of God himself; he is the

prime outflow of his glory, and the spotless mirror of his activity (27)." This is the case, for Jesus himself says, "the Father who has sent me is greater than I." Just before this Origen says: "Grant that there be some individuals who are not in entire agreement with us, and who incautiously assert that the Saviour is the Most High God; however, we do not hold with them, but believe him when he says" the text given above (28). The Father alone is "The God over all (29)."

The Son is the Wisdom of the Father (30) and the source of life and reason to all creatures (31). He is the system of divine world-Ideas, the Idea of Ideas (32), and the bearer of a system of Ideas (33). He is the cosmical mediator between the Godhead and the Creature (34) and thus only can it be said that "all things that are of the Father are in the Son (35); and both are 'one God' (36)." Thus he is over and before everything (37).

4. *Bull's Apology for Origen.*—In the face of these distinct assertions of subordinationism, Bishop Bull proposes to prove that Origen held the consubstantiality of the Son and the Father.

His first point is that Origen calls the Logos "very truth," "very wisdom," "very justice," etc. (38). Bull distinctly asserts (39) that by these expressions Origen intended to correct the Neo-Platonic subordination of the Divine Mind to the Father. Yet when he proposes to prove that the Son is subordinated to the Father, he uses the same passages to prove the opposite of what they proved before, calling that objection one "of no weight whatever (40)," holding that the prefix "very" means only "truly," as in the case of "very Son" which does not mean "Son of himself" but "truly Son." Since Bull thus contradicts himself his contention may be neglected.

He quotes a number of passages as proving his assertion. These do no more than ascribe divinity to the Logos, which was perfectly admissible in the Philonic conception; none of these passages claim necessarily more than secondary divinity. Bull here makes the common mistake of thinking he has disproved subordinationism, when he has proved divinity (41).

5. *The Third Clause of His Creed.*—The third Clause of Origen's Creed begins thus: "The Apostles related that the Holy Ghost was associated in honour and dignity with the Father and the Son. But in his case it is not clearly distinguished whether he is to be regarded as made or unmade, or also as a Son of God, or not (42)." Origen here acknowledges that it was yet an open question whether the Holy Spirit was made or not, and that he was often confounded with the Son of God. Besides, Origen distinctly acknowledges the personality of the Holy Spirit, but subordinates him to both the Father and the Son, by the latter of whom he is created, like all other beings, though distinguished from them by his divine nature (43). Whatever the Holy Ghost is, he is only through the Logos (44). The Holy Ghost reveals the Father and the Son; but he recognizes the Father not through the mediation of the Son but by his own

innate power ⁽⁴⁶⁾. He is the fulness of all divine gifts of grace ⁽⁴⁶⁾. Thus he sanctifies the spirits that turn towards God, and though he excels all other spirits, he is not equal to the Logos ⁽⁴⁷⁾. He does not dwell in those who walk after the flesh ⁽⁴⁸⁾; for in every man Being is from the Father, Reason from the Son, and Sanctification from the Holy Ghost ⁽⁴⁹⁾. But this sanctification cannot take place without the voluntary coöperation of man; either factor, human or divine, being necessary to the process ⁽⁵⁰⁾. The rain can be of no advantage to the land that is not cultivated ⁽⁵¹⁾; the sun may soften the wax, but even when under solar influence dirt remains hard ⁽⁵²⁾.

If sanctification is the specific function of the Holy Ghost, it might be supposed that prayer might be addressed to the Holy Ghost. Such however is not the case. Origen even rejects the practice of prayer to the Son, Christ; as the Son is only a particular "hupostasis" it is evident that man must pray to the Father alone, or to the Son alone, or to both. As the latter two possibilities cannot be admitted on grounds of opposition to Scripture and to monotheism, consequently, prayer to the Father is alone possible. Yet it is permissible to pray an "improper" prayer (invocation) to the Father through the Son ⁽⁵³⁾.

6. *The Triad*.—"To associate in honour and dignity" is a phrase which is capable of many constructions, being evidently dictated by the baptismal formula. There is one passage in Origen's works which unhesitatingly sets forth the coëquality of the three members of the Trinity, and is usually brought forward to support the doctrine of Athanasius. In commenting on the Proverbs, v: 15, LXX, "drink water from the spring of three cisterns," he says: "When we investigate the meaning of what the one spring of these three cisterns be, so do I think that the knowledge of the ungenerate Father is one of the cisterns: the knowledge of the Son the other, and the knowledge of the Spirit finally the third. For the Son is an 'other' to the Father, and the Holy Ghost is an 'other' to both the Father and the Son. Hence the plurality of the cisterns denotes the personal difference of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. But these several cisterns have but one spring, i. e., the divine Trinity has only one substance, one nature." "We must therefore confess one God—and on the same confession recognize the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. This is the original Trinity, the worshipful Trinity, to which everything is subject ⁽⁵⁴⁾."

At first sight, this "three in one" and "one in three" seems to admit of no subordinational explanation. Yet if his conception of the manner in which a man was saved be remembered, it can be seen that the subordinational view can be vindicated. Besides, the passage is only to be found in the Septuagint, it is unimportant, and very allegorically explained. Finally, it demands nothing more than had been given before, when Origen acknowledged that while the Father and Son were in all things, the Holy Ghost was only in the hearts of repentant sinners ⁽⁵⁵⁾.

It must be acknowledged that Origen has taken a long step in advance of Clement. The latter had not been able to assign any definite function to the Holy Ghost ; Origen assigns to him the hearts of the repentant sinners, subordinate as such a position is.

7. *Summary.*—It may seem that if the writer of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel was not aware of the Philonic and subordinational nature of the terms he was using, all the men of importance after him interpreted his Prologue in the Philonic way. Justin, Irenaeus, Theophilus, Hippolytus, Clement and Origen distinctly held a subordinational theory of the Logos, counting it divine, but only the second rank or order of Being and worship.

CHAPTER VII

TERTULLIAN.

1. *Tertullian's Position.*—Tertullian represents the African Christianity of the time of Clement of Alexandria, whose contemporary he was. Late in life he became a heretic and schismatic, but only in respect to his views concerning the Holy Ghost. Strange to say, it is on the very subject of the Holy Ghost that he is in closer touch with Athanasius and Augustine than on the subject of the relation of the Father to the Son, his views and discussions on that subject having always been considered orthodox. This proves that the Church of his day agreed with him on the subject of the relation of the Son to the Father, but disagreed with his disquisitions about the Holy Ghost in its practical relations to the life, as to prophecy and the gifts of the Spirit.

2. *Subordinationism.*—Tertullian was a thorough subordinationist, as will be seen by the following quotations.

"The Name of God was always with and in himself ; but he was not always Lord. 'God' is the name of his substance, or divinity ; 'Lord' is the name, not of his substance, but of his power. God is Father and Judge ; but he is not eternally Father and Judge because he is eternally God. For he could not be Father before the existence of his Son, or Judge, before the fall. There was therefore a time when both the Son and the Fall, which constitute him Father and Judge, were not (')."
It is startling to find here the very words of Arius, which were to become so famous a century later. Surely, if Athanasius had read Tertullian's works, he would not have said that the Arian heresy was a new thing founded by Arius.

"Let Hermogenês here confess that the Wisdom of God is here said to be born and founded, lest we should think that anything besides the Only God be not born and not founded (')."
Once more we have a distinct assertion of the Arian explanation of Proverbs viii: 22-27.

Yet Tertullian does not seem to be quite certain as to the Wisdom here spoken of. He says explicitly that it is the Holy Spirit ('), and later (') that it was Wisdom that created the World, which of course is the Word. "Thus therefore is manifested the Creator God ; the creation, all things ; and the means by which the creation took place, the Word." We may explain this apparent discrepancy by remembering that the Spirit is in the

Word, Wisdom proceeding from the Father through the Son. Thus it may be present at the Creation.

The Divine Economy (°) is of the "only God, and his Son, the Word (°)." There seems to be here an implication that the Son is not God in the same sense in which the Father is. It may be seen later on that Tertullian held exactly such a Philonic distinction, although the fact that the Latin language has no article hampered him in its expression.

Before leaving the thought of the "Economy," the word "Trinity," (°) which occurs in Tertullian for the first time in Latin theology, just as it appeared first in Greek theology in the works of Theophilus, must be noticed. It is worth remembering too that Tertullian uses the word "Trinity" although he subordinates the persons of the Godhead hierarchically, one to the other. Therefore it is not necessary to be anything but a subordinationist, even though that word be used; it need not necessarily be a sign of Athanasianism.

In speaking of the angels he explains "how it is that God seems to suffer division and dispersion in Son and Holy Ghost, to whom the second and third places are allotted, should have so many fellows (the angels) in the substance of the Father,—which division and dispersion it does not suffer in the number of so many angels (°)."

"Do you ask how I, who deduce the Son from nowhere else than from the substance of the Father (the Son doing nothing without the Will of the Father, and receiving all his power from the Father), can preserve the 'monarchy' in the Faith, otherwise than by representing it to be descended from the Father to the Son as to a servant? This I assert, that the Holy Ghost has a third grade of being, because the Spirit proceeds from nowhere else than from the Father through the Son. It is you who had better see to it that you do not destroy the 'monarchy,' you who break up God's nature and dispensation into as many names as God may have willed to apply to it. Rather, everything remains in its proper dignity, that is, of the Trinity, so that it is necessary that all things should be given back by the Son to the Father, as it is written by the Apostle concerning the end of all things, when he will have handed over the Kingdom to God the Father. For he must reign until he have put all enemies under his feet. When all things will be subject unto him, except he who did put all things under him, then he himself shall be subject unto him that subjected all things to him, that God may be all in all (°)."

Before all things existed, God was alone, he with himself, and the world and space and all things. He was alone because there was nothing outside of him. On the other hand, he was not alone, for he had with himself in himself Reason, that is, his own reason. For God is rational, and he is such primarily, while all other things are so only secondarily. This Reason of God is his Sense. The Greeks call it Logos, which vocable we also translate as Word. For although God had not yet sent his Word, he had with and in himself his reason, and silently thought

out and disposed those things which he was soon to express by a Word (¹⁰)." In these words Tertullian differs with Athanasius in two important particulars : the Word did not exist from all eternity, and its generation was preceded, on the part of God, by reflection and will.

"This power and this disposition of the Divine Sense is set forth in the Scriptures by the name of Wisdom. For what is wiser than the Reason or Word of God? Thus also we hear of Wisdom that it was the second person founded. At first the Lord created me the beginning of his ways with his works (¹¹)." Here Tertullian once more opposes Athanasius in the interpretation of this verse, Proverbs viii: 22, and denies his own former interpretation, by making Wisdom identical with the Word, not as before with the Spirit. This shows that like Justin and Irenaeus, Tertullian had a trinity of names to explain by a *Philonic duality of principles, God and the Logos*. Therefore, when it was convenient, the second principle, Wisdom, applied to the Son, and, when convenient, to the Spirit. He confesses this confusion : "By his Word the heavens are founded, and by his Spirit comes their strength, that is, by the Spirit which inherited in the Word ; so that the same power is now called Wisdom and now Word (¹²)."

The Word of God did not exist until the Creation : "Then indeed does the Word assume its appearance and form, its sound and voice, when God says, Let there be light. This is the perfect birth of the Word, when it proceeds from God, being founded in the beginning by God under the name of Wisdom for the purpose of thinking : 'The Lord founded me in the beginning of his ways' ; then generated for an effect : 'When he prepared the heavens I was with him' (¹³)."

It is impossible to ask for a subordination more explicit than this : "Whatever then was the substance of the Word, call it a person and claim for it the name of Son ; and while I recognize the Son, I defend his claim to the second rank after God (¹⁴)."

And the reason for this subordination is plain. "It is necessary that anything which proceeds should be secondary to that from which he proceeds ; but it is not on this account necessarily separated from it. Where the second is, there are the two ; and where the third is, there are the three. The Spirit is third from God through the Son, just as the fruit is third from the root through the stem, and the rivulet is third from the fountain through the river, and the point of light is third from the sun through the ray. Nevertheless, nothing is separated from the womb from which it derives its properties. Thus the Trinity by conjoined and related degrees descending from the Father both protects the state of the economy, and does not oppose the 'monarchy' (¹⁵)."

"The Father is the whole substance, the Son is a derivation from the whole, and a portion, as he himself confesses : The Father is greater than I. And that he is less than the Father is said in the Psalm that he is a little better than the angels. Thus the Father is both an 'other' to the Son,

while being greater than the Son. The third degree being shown forth in the Paraclete, as the second is in the Son, according to the arrangement of the Economy (¹⁶)."

Concerning the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, Tertullian says: "One who was, and another next to him who was. We have never acknowledged two Gods and two Lords, not as if the Father was not God, and the Son not God, and the Holy Spirit not God, and each of them God—so that when Christ should come he should be acknowledged both God and Lord because the Son of God and the Lord—made second after the Father, and with the Spirit third. Thus I will not call them all Lords and Gods, but I shall follow the Apostle, so that if both Father and Son must be spoken of in the same sense, I will call the Father God and Jesus Christ Lord. Speaking of Jesus alone, however, like the Apostle, I will call him God (¹⁷)."

For "God is the head of Christ (¹⁸)."

"They should not be called two Gods and Lords, but two, as Father and Son, and this not in separation of substance, but of disposition when we speak of the individual and unseparated Son as apart from the Son, not in being, but in degree, so that although he is called God when spoken of separately, yet this does not make two Gods, but One, because God is called One from the Unity of the Fatherhood (¹⁹)."

"And therefore is the Spirit God, and the Word God, because they are of God, not because they are God in themselves. The Son is God of Gods, as substantial being, not as God in himself; but God only so far as he is of the substance of God himself, both because he is substantial being, and a part of the Whole (²⁰)."

These passages could be multiplied indefinitely, all showing a thorough Origenistic hierarchy, grounded in the fulness of the Being of the Father, the ground of all existence.

BOOK III.

ATHANASIUS AND AUGUSTINE.

CHAPTER I.

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ATHANASIUS.

1. *The Life of Athanasius.*—Athanasius was born in the year 296 A. D., of rich parents, in Alexandria. His precocity revealed early the powers he was to develop. Alexander, the Bishop of Alexandria, took upon himself the supervision over his education, and made him his private secretary, ordaining him deacon in 319 A. D. The persecutions under Diocletian and Galienus strengthened him in his Christian faith. Thus he had every possible advantage in his youth.

When, in 320, Arianism arose, Athanasius took sides with the Bishop, who condemned it at the Synod of Alexandria. Alexander took him with himself to the Council of Nicaea, in 325, where his learning and ability told with great effect on the orthodox side. Bishop Alexander died in 328, and, in opposition to the Arian party, Athanasius was unanimously elected by the orthodox.

From this moment to his death, which occurred in 373, he fought a desparate fight against Arianism, being banished over and over again, being continually employed in polemics against adversaries. His fifth banishment occurred in 365, but it lasted only four months, and on his recall by Valens, he spent the end of his days in honour and never-ending labour.

2. *The Works of Athanasius.*—Just after being ordained deacon, and soon after meeting for the first time the objections of the Pagans against Christianity, he wrote his great work: *The Oration Against the Heathen Nations*, in which he attacked idolatry on the ground that a man could rise to the knowledge of God without revelation, merely from the contemplation of nature, so that idol-worship was inexcusable creature-worship. His cosmology is purely Philonic, with the single exception of the identification of the Logos with Christ. He is at great pains

to prove on philosophic grounds that there is such a thing as a Logos, against those who would take the ground away from under his feet by denying its existence.

But the internal confusion created in Christianity by the Arian disputes, changed the direction of his literary efforts. He wrote almost innumerable treatises and letters on the subject, his masterwork being, after the colourless *Of the Incarnation of the Word of God*, his *Four Orations Against the Arians*.

Athanasius can be best understood if the fact that his endeavour is not to bring forth the truth, but to confute the Arians, whatever the means be, be thoroughly grasped by the mind. It is on this extenuating circumstance of blinding passion that it is possible to acquit him of what would in any other man be called dishonesty and unfairness in argument. These charges will be substantiated further on. Athanasius seems to labour under the disability of not seeing the cogency of an argument which makes against him, or seeing the unfairness of using arguments when they make for him, which he had objected to on account of their nature, when they made against him. If such methods of argument be admitted, then of course anything can be proved.

3. *Athanasius's Inconsistencies*.—It is also patent that Athanasius contradicts himself again and again.

In the account of the Council of Nicaea which is to be found in his works, it is distinctly stated that the only reason why the Fathers did not admit the Arian catchwords into their Creed was that they were unscriptural (¹). Yet, Athanasius is forced to recognize that his own terms are unscriptural (²), and feels called upon to apologize for the use of the word "consubstantial" in the Nicene Creed, which certainly is not to be found in either Testament, on the ground that the term was "inoffensive" and "innocent" (³).

The burden of the discussion at Nicaea was the question whether the Son was "consubstantial with" or only "like unto" (⁴) the Father. Although the latter statement was anathematized, Athanasius himself had used it in his works (⁵) and never tried to have his works corrected in that particular.

He refuses to receive Scripture proof from the Arians, on the ground that Scripture is not to be received if in the mouth of a bad man (⁶), and acknowledges that if the language of the Apostles be taken without qualification, they would be Arians (⁷); and in the face of all this, he taunts the Arians with the fact that they cannot bring forward any Scriptural proof for their dogmatical position (⁸).

Further, he says that the Son is not dependent on the Father as by participation (⁹), although in another place he directly affirms this (¹⁰).

He says that the Son is not absolutely eternal (¹¹), and yet holds that in the Trinity there is no difference even of degree (¹²), and that the Son is absolutely coeternal with the Father (¹³).

It is evident then that for him words have no meaning except

as they make for the particular arguments which he is at the moment engaged with.

4. *The Blasphemous Language of Athanasius.*—Another proof that the purpose of Athanasius is not the discovery of truth by argument but the silencing of his opponents, is the fact of the disgraceful language he never hesitates to apply to them.

The Arians are "insane (14)," "frantic with rage (15)," "apostate infidels (16)," "blasphemers (17)," "ignorant (18)," and "gulfs of impiety (19)." They are "shamelessly obstinate (20)," their arguments are called "the disgraceful sophistries of these vile heretics (21)," they are "wicked guides basely leading astray (22)," they have "disordered imaginations (23)," they are "apostate infidels and traitors (24)," they are "disciples of Caiaphas and Herod (25)," they are "depraved (26)."

But this is not enough. The Arians are "indecent" and "immoral (27)." He accuses them of not stating their doctrine clearly because they are seeking ecclesiastical preferment, and are loth to draw upon them the disfavour of the emperor (28).

Athanasius goes further: The Arians are "children of the Devil (29);" "even the Devil himself who is their father, I venture to think would have been abashed at last, and would have yielded to the invincible arguments which have been employed in this conflict (30)."

Nor is this all of the theological billingsgate of Athanasius, as anybody may see who cares to consult his *Four Orations Against the Arians*, and his other polemical works.

Such language would be disgraceful in a baptized person, let alone an Archbishop. To say that it was the manner of the times is no excuse; for wrong is wrong and right is right according to the Gospel, which commands us to "bless those that curse you, and do good to them that despitefully use you," at any time of the world's history.

And if it be said again that this was the custom of theologians of that day, and not the fault of Athanasius, then the guilt falls not only on Athanasius but the whole Christian Church of the day, the fact of disobedience to the Gospel being no less criminal because many are engaged in its commission than because only one single man transgresses the law.

Besides, this very excuse would prove that in morals, at any rate, if not in theology, the Church of those days had departed far from the truth as it was revealed in Jesus of Nazara, while holding an external continuity with the Church of the Apostles, and while thinking itself to be like to it in point of morals. The significance of this fact will be seen later, when it is enquired who was the innovator, Athanasius, or Arius.

That it is impossible to acquit Athanasius of the charge of hate is evident from the words: "what punishment is bad enough for them (31)?" "They should be stoned (32)."

CHAPTER II.

USE OF SCRIPTURE.

1. *Scripture the Authority of All Parties.*—The Scriptures were the authority both of Athanasius (1) and the Arians (2).

Athanasius says that when "our minds are wearied with such problems as these, we must at last come to Holy Scripture. Here we must rest, and believe things exactly according to the obvious sense revealed there (3)."

That the Arians relied on Holy Scripture to prove their opinions is plain from the numerous texts which Athanasius examines in his Orations against them.

Now if the Holy Scripture contain all doctrine required as necessary for eternal salvation, then should both Athanasius and the Arians have been recognized as Catholic. The dispute between them lay not in the authority of Scripture, but in the interpretation of Scripture. In endeavouring to limit the interpretation of Scripture, both parties were wrong. It is a psychological impossibility for any two men to understand any one given word in exactly the same meaning it bears to other men. If a man shall teach nothing as necessary to eternal salvation, but that which he shall be persuaded may be concluded and proved by the Scripture, he has a right to demand agreement; but in the interpretation of that letter it is no less clear that every man must be permitted liberty of thought.

If, however, not only agreement to the letter of Scripture, but also assent to our own interpretation of it be demanded, then we are dishonest in stating that the Scripture alone contains all doctrine required as necessary for eternal salvation. In referring to the question of the unscripturalness of the Homoöusion, Gwatkin (4) says: "If Scripture was to be limited to any particular meaning, they must go outside Scripture for technical terms to define that meaning." "Both sides indeed accepted Scripture as the paramount authority; but when the interpretation of Scripture was disputed, it became a question whether a word not sanctioned by tradition could be made the test of orthodoxy." Vincent of Lerins (5) says: "Since the canon of Scripture is perfect, and more than sufficient for itself in all respects, what need of joining to it the Ecclesiastical sense? because from the very depth of Holy Scripture all men will not take it in one and the same sense." But what need is there of this, if it be sufficient in all respects? This is a contradiction in terms. But then it is

evident that the test of Orthodoxy is no more the Scripture, but the Athanasian interpretation of Scripture—two very different things.

And it is difficult to know just what the Athanasian interpretation of Scripture is. At times, Athanasius pleads for the literal, plain, sense of Scripture. He says: "as often as they find him plainly declared to be the Son, they avoid and reject the plain sense of those words (*)"

2. *Figurative Interpretation.*—Yet, when he is pressed with difficult passages, he deemed it no less necessary to use in Scripture a figurative interpretation in order to avoid the plain and direct implication of the words. He asserts that the language of the Apostles must be understood with qualification. "Why, it is high time for them to brazen it out (for there is nothing too daring for them) and claim that the very Apostles held with Arius: for they declare Christ to have been 'a man from Nazareth, and passible' and said: 'He was faithful to him who created him, (*)'" Such passages as must be understood with qualification are Acts ii: 22, iv: 10, xiii: 22; xvii: 30. Speaking of "the Lord created me," Athanasius says: "It is certain that the literal sense in this passage is not the true one, and that we must draw aside the metaphor before we shall discover the true meaning (*)"

Thus the Scriptures must be explained literally if they agree with right doctrine, and figuratively if they oppose it. The test of the veridicity of Scripture is doctrine. When in consulting the Scriptures "any doubts arise, the safe course to take is not to question or reject the general truth of the doctrine according to what seems the exact meaning of the words before us. But when any one is led by his difficulties to form for himself doctrines which God disapproves of and when he makes the most of them in defiance of him, and when he misrepresents the Deity out of his own oracles, this is an unpardonable abuse of God's loving kindness (*)" It is plain that such a canon of interpretation makes all appeal to the Scriptures a hollow farce and mockery.

3. *Evasiveness of the Double Standard.*—With such principles to guide him in his interpretation of Scriptures, it is no wonder that he can taunt the Arians with having no Scripture proof for their tenets (†). But if the same principles were to be applied from the stand-point of the Arians, a like taunt could be made out against Athanasius.

If an appeal to Scripture is to be made, then doctrine should be judged by Scripture and not Scripture by doctrine. When a cashier appeals to the record of the ledger to correct any mistake he may have made in the handling of the cash, he must not alter the record so as to make it agree with his balance of cash in hand, when the literal sense of the record is against him, as Athanasius confesses above. To do so is nothing less than dishonesty.

Yet Athanasius was not alone in this shuffling evasion in respect of the use of the Scriptures. The Fathers at Nicaea were fully as reprehensible. In Eusebius's report of the proceedings of the Council he says that "Since then no divinely inspired Scripture has used the phrases, 'out of nothing,' and 'once he was not,' there appeared no ground for using them or teaching them." Yet these same Fathers who decreed the above adopted in their Creed as the crucial test-word the unscriptural "consubstantial." The Arians were not slow to point out the inconsistency. "Why did the Fathers at Nicaea use terms not in Scripture, 'of the essence,' and 'consubstantial' (*)?" Why did not Jesus who must have known truth, and who preached it, used it (*)? Athanasius had nothing to answer. His only plea is a "tu quoque," which certainly came ill from the tongue of one who based his opposition to the Arians on the broad principle of unscripturalness. "How clamorously they have accused the Nicene Bishops for assuming unscriptural terms, although they are very innocent and inoffensive ones, but suitable enough for subverting their heresy, and yet they themselves have done the very same thing, and have invented unscriptural terms on purpose to dishonour our blessed Lord (10)." Sometimes he goes as far as to claim that the unscriptural words really represented the unexpressed sense of Scripture (11); but his most characteristic Athanasian argument is as follows: "they should be cast out, as talking idly and disordered in mind (12)." The long and short of it was that Athanasius had no excuse.

But his "tu quoque" argument is not even fair. The Arians had not put their unscriptural words in their Creed, as the Nicene Bishops did. They only used these unscriptural words to explain the Creed. Gwatkin says (13): "It was a mere 'argumentum ad hominem' to answer that the Arians had set the example. At any rate they had not attempted to put their 'out of nothing' into the Creed. The use of 'agrapta' in the Creed was a positive revolution in the Church." Moreover the Nicene unscriptural term was a very dangerous one. Gwatkin declares that (14): "The word 'consubstantial' is Sabellian. It implies the common possession of the divine essence, and fairly admits the doctrine of Marcellus that the unity of person is like that between man and his reason. If we consider its derivation and follow its usage in the earlier part of the controversy, there is no escape from the conclusion that the word was Sabellian, and that the sense ultimately given to it was a result of the semi-Arian movement."

How thoroughly worsted Athanasius was in the case of the argument concerning unscripturalness appears from the fact that at last he despairingly gives up Scripture itself. He will not receive it in the mouth of a bad man. "Religiousness is confessed by all to be lawful, even though presented in strange phrases, provided only they are used in a religious view, and a wish to make them the expression of religious thoughts (15)."

But who is to judge of this "religious intention"? Athanasius himself. Thus he excuses the heretical utterances of Dionysius of Alexandria, and will not receive Scriptures from the Arians when they have successfully proved a point against him (16).

4. *The Standard of Tradition.*—When Athanasius pleads for a figurative sense of Scripture, it was usually that they might yield a sense in harmony with the "Regula Fidei," the unwritten faith of the Churches. In his usual complimentary way, he remarks that it is from want of understanding (17) that the Arians interpret the Scriptures in a "private" sense (18). He knows of an "ecclesiastical" sense (19) which is the general drift of Scripture doctrine, and which he generally calls "religious." This "ecclesiastical" sense seems to have been the prevailing ideas of the Church in the time of Athanasius. He was too uncritical to ask whether it might not have changed since the time of the Apostles; he accepts it as a final authority. It is therefore left to us, in a later Chapter, to investigate whether any change had taken place, and whether this unwritten, indefinite, and therefore irresponsible ecclesiastical sense is really the doctrine of the Fathers anterior to Athanasius.

Before leaving this subject, it is worth while to compare the evidential value of the written words of the Apostles, and the Ante-Nicene Fathers with the traditional, unwritten, floating, irresponsible, and intangible Aberglaube, to which, by the bye, Arius appealed quite as strongly as Athanasius. It is evident that we should not dare to tamper with the plain sense of the written word in favour of this uncertain Regula Fidei, which could not even boast of sufficient definiteness to have ever been formulated into so many words. Rather than correct the Scripture by the Regula Fidei, a man should correct the Regula Fidei by the written Scripture. In any case it is wise to hold to the only tangible and responsible witness, the written word.

In this connection, it is worth while to notice that the relations obtaining between Scripture and belief, both in the case of the Catholics and the Arians. It is a common accusation against the Arians, taken up by Gwatkin (20), that the Arians scarcely referred to Scripture except in quest of isolated texts to confirm conclusions reached without its help. Voigt (21) and Atzberger (22), and Newman (23), say the same. But to any one who knows of the fragments of Arius's writings with their constant appeal to the tradition of the elders and Holy Scripture, this accusation falls harmlessly to the ground. It is easy to accuse a man of sins when he is only known through his adversaries, and most of his writings are destroyed; but the few letters left by Arius show that this charge at least is undeserved. On the contrary, this accusation might be well retorted on Athanasius. Newman says (24) that the "Catholics pursued the intellectual investigation of the doctrine, under the guidance of Scripture and tradition merely as far as some immediate necessity called for it; and cared little though one mode of expression seemed incon-

sistent with another." Does it seem possible to believe that the Catholics in their doctrine began from the Scriptures, when Athanasius declares positively in one passage that it is certain the literal sense is false, and that the figurative sense which contradicts the literal one, is the true one? The fact that Athanasius used Scripture only as a means of justifying his opinion, whether we dignify it by the appellation of "Regula Fidei" or not, is betrayed by such words as the following: "This then suffices to prove that the Word of God is not a creature, but that the doctrine of the passage is concordant with orthodoxy. But since that passage when scrutinized has an orthodox sense in every point of view, it may be well to state what it is (²⁵)."²⁵ If the sense of the words was clear and the ultimate standard of orthodoxy, there would be no need for the statement that the words of Scripture are "capable" of an orthodox interpretation.

CHAPTER III.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM.

1. *The Principle of Anthropomorphism.*—Man can have an idea of the nature of God which does not, more or less, imply an application of the nature of man to that of God. It was thus that Philo had spoken of the Logos as the “heavenly man.” The sect called Anthropomorphites had in a crude way recognized this truth, and had not scrupled to apply to God the most minute traits of human character. The Church felt this to be unworthy of God, and thus dissented from them.

But if man does not apply to God some similarity of nature with man, it is absolutely impossible for him to have the slightest thought of or about God.

Hence it resulted from this need that it was observed that man was made in God’s image, and that therefore it was possible to rise to a conception of the nature of God by contemplating the nature of man who is the image of God.

It is plain that there is here the same truth as above, stated in different words, considered from the opposite standpoint. The difference is one of phraseology : for in both there is observed a similarity between the natures of God and of man, without the assumption of which it would be impossible to speak of God at all.

2. *Athanasius for Anthropomorphism.*—Athanasius himself relies on this similarity of nature between that of God and that of man, in order to have a foundation for his dogma. He says expressly: “For such illustrations and such images has Scripture proposed, that, considering the inability of human nature to comprehend God, we might be able to form ideas even from these, however poorly and dimly, and as far as is attainable (¹).” “And he who names God maker and framer and unoriginate, regards and apprehends things created and made ; and he who calls God Father thereby conceives and contemplates the Son (²).” “Therefore it is more pious and more accurate to signify God from the Son, and call him Father, than to name him from his works only and call him originate (³).” “But the word Father is very simple and scriptural ; it explains itself at once, and informs us that God the Father has a Son.” But the proof of the nature of God from that of man is still stronger. “If, as they hold, he is Son, not because he is begotten of the Father and proper to his essence, but that he is called Word only because of things

rational, and Wisdom because of things gifted with power, surely he must be named a Son because of those who are made Sons : and perhaps because there are things existing, he has even his existence, in our notions only. And then, after all, what is he ? for he is none of these himself, if they are but his names : and he has but a semblance of being, and is decorated with these names from us. Rather this is some recklessness of the Devil, or worse, if they are not unwilling that they should truly subsist themselves, but think that God's Word exists but in name (4)."

Besides, he uses this similarity of natures to prove his point in a similarity of the architect (5), of mother and son (6). Thus he proves that children are not from without the substance of their parents (7), that Solomon was called both son and servant of his father (8), and that the Son of God is begotten of his Father without anterior Will and Pleasure (9). This latter fact is a very important one, and this similarity of human and divine nature is the only argument advanced in the matter.

3. *Athanasius Against Anthropomorphism*.—When, however, this principle of anthropomorphism was used against him by his opponents, Athanasius did not hesitate to deny it utterly.

"Cease this confusion of things unassociable, or rather of things which are not with him who is (10)." "Not as man is God (11)." "For God does not make man his pattern, but rather we men, because God is properly and alone truly, Father of His Son, are also called fathers of our own children (12)." This last assertion he contradicted above, in which we called God Father from the fact he had a son, not contrarily. He repeats over and over the statement that God is not like man (13), and that therefore any arguments based on the supposed similarity are null and void. "There is no affinity between the Divine Nature and ours (14)." God and man are so unlike it is even wrong to inquire why this similarity does not exist : "Nor must we ask why the Word of God is not such, as our word, considering God is not such as we, as has been before said (15)."

4. *The Real Standard is Athanasius's Fancy*.—It is plain that by holding both of these contradictory principles, and applying them according to our fancy, it is possible to construct any idea of God for which we may happen to have a predilection. For it is after all we who decide where the one principle shall apply, and where the other. Used in such a manner, neither of these principles are of the slightest value. If any objective proof is to be derived from their application, we must use only one or the other, not both at once. Either then God is in all things like man, or he is in none like man. Between these two alternatives lies our choice. If, however, a man has a preconceived idea of God, it is quite possible to justify it in every particular by a judicious application of both principles. But then it is plain that the conception of God arrived at is a subjective one, and not one to which he has been led by logical premisses, or for which he can demand the assent of anybody who is willing to think logically.

The fact that Athanasius used both principles indiscriminately proves that his conception of God was a subjective one, which he was endeavouring to justify ; it was not a conception of God to which the use of reason would infallibly lead any consistent thinker. And as a matter of fact he thought that he had derived it from tradition, from religion, from ecclesiastical authority. His arguments, as arguments, are valueless, beyond showing what an ingenious man could say for that conception ; for that which guides his arguments is not reason, but authority, "religiosity." The purpose of his arguments is not then the establishing of any truth, but the confutation of his opponent, whatever their opinions may have been. These arguments are a splendid example of *argumenta ad hominem*. Beyond this, they are valueless.

Before leaving this subject, it may be well to point out once more the utter unreasonableness of his position : using contradictory principles whenever they happen to be convenient to prove his point. This glaring injustice and unfairness vitiates all the objective value his arguments might otherwise possess.

That this opinion of the character of Athanasius is not mistaken has been shown in the last Chapter. He uses contradictory canons of interpretation in respect to Scripture, and so glaring are their discrepancy that it seems difficult to acquit Athanasius of the charge of conscious dishonesty.

5. *Newman's Defence of Athanasius.*—Newman is the only student of the Arian controversy who has noticed this deep question of anthropomorphism. Like Athanasius, he is ready to throw all anthropomorphism by the board except where it serves his purpose. He has even the courage to say that "by the divine begetting is meant not an act, but an eternal and unchangeable fact in the Divine Essence (¹⁶)."¹⁶ But why then is it at all called a "begetting," if it means something totally different in nature from the connotation of the word ? Because a Son can only proceed from his mother by "begetting." But if "begetting" is not begetting, but an unchangeable fact then is no more the "Son" a son, but also a simple eternal and unchangeable fact of the Divine Essence. If anthropomorphism be refused in one place, it should also be discredited in the other.

Several samples of Newman's critique of the Arians, in respect to these principles, may be given here.

"In the first proposition Arius assumes that he is really a Son, and argues as if he were ; in the third he has arrived at the conclusion that he was created, that is, no Son at all, except in a secondary sense, as having received from the Father a sort of adoption. An attempt was made by the Arians to smooth over their inconsistency, by adducing passages of Scripture, in which the works of God are spoken of as births, as in the instance from Job, 'He giveth birth to the drops of dew.' But this is obviously an entirely new mode of defending their theory of a divine adoption, and does not relieve their original fault ; which consisted in their arguing from an assumed analogy, which the

result of that argument destroyed. For, if he be the Son of God, no otherwise than man is, that is, by adoption, what becomes of the argument from the anterior and posterior in existence?—that is, an adopted son is not necessarily younger, but might be older than the person adopting him—as if the notion of adoption contained in it any necessary reference to the nature and circumstances of the two parties between whom it takes place (17).”

This difficulty which Newman finds in the Arian contention proceeds solely from the fact that, like Athanasius, Newman resolutely refuses to recognise the Arian contention that there is no difference between begetting and creating. Begetting is as much a synonym of creating as creating is a synonym of begetting.

The example adduced from Job above was used by the Arians to prove this absolute identity of creating and begetting, not to smooth over any inconsistency in arguing that the Son was really a Son, and then that he received from the Father only a sort of adoption. To the Arians both these conceptions were identical; and Newman only finds an inconsistency because he insists on holding that the Arians allowed man to be created by adoption in the technical Athanasian sense. To the Arians this distinction, and consequently the inconsistency, did not exist at all.

“They might safely confess him to be perfect God, one with God, the object of worship, the author of good; still with the reserve, that sacred appellations belonged to him only in the same general sense in which they are sometimes accidentally bestowed on the faithful servants of God, and without interfering with the prerogatives of the One, Eternal, Self-existing cause of all things (18).”

It may be asked, why should the instance in the Bible where divinity is ascribed to the faithful servants of God, be called “accidental”? This would indeed be destroying the Inspiration of the Scriptures.

Besides, Newman here overlooks the important Philonic, Origenistic, and Asterian distinction between “God” and “The God,” and “powers” and “The powers” of God. This would solve the difficulty immediately.

“They argued against the catholic sense of the word Son, from what they conceived to be its materiality, and unwarrantably contrasting its primary with its figurative signification, as if both could not be preserved, they contended that, since the word must be figurative, therefore it could not retain its primary sense, but must be taken in the secondary sense of adoption (19).”

It is sufficient to remark that this objection of Newman’s rests again on the refusal to recognise that to the Arians begetting and creating were identical processes, so that there was no need of a primary or secondary meaning.

Newman says (II: 5: 2: 1): “That a Father is prior to his son, is not suggested, though it is implied, by the force of the terms,

as ordinarily used ; and it is an inference altogether irrelevant, when the inquiry has reference to that being, from our notion of whom time as well as space is necessarily excluded. It is fair indeed to object at the outset to the word Father being applied at all in its primary sense to the Supreme Being : but this was not the Arian ground, which was to argue from, not against, the metaphor employed."

Of course this was not the Arian ground, inasmuch as it is the only possible excuse by which the Athanasians, not the Arians, can escape from the consequences of the premisses. If some of the most elementary and in fact the most fundamental implication of the word "Father" is inapplicable to God, as being out of time, then we have no right to call God, Father ; we must honestly confess we know nothing whatever about him. But this will not satisfy the Athanasians who insisted on the fact that God has a Son, and refused to apply the same principle of anthropomorphism when the natural deduction is made that the Father as father must be prior to the Son.

Besides, the conception of generation, even if we exclude the conception of time, must include that of succession, which again implies at the very least that the Father is prior to the Son.

CHAPTER IV.

BEGOTTEN, NOT MADE.

1. *The Nicene Distinction.*—In their formulary, the Bishops at Nicaea had introduced the words, "Begotten, not made." Athanasius therefore felt called upon to defend this distinction as to the uniqueness in kind, not of degree necessarily, of the origination of the Son of God. Begetting was the manner of origination of the Son of God; all other things whatsoever were "made" or "created," as to origination. The Arians, on the contrary, attributed both "begetting" and "creating" indifferently to both the Word and to creation, "for, ye say that an offspring is the same as a work, writing 'generated or made' (')." This distinction between generation and creation is then a vital distinction for Athanasius, and with it will stand or fall his argument against the Arians.

It was in this matter that Athanasius made the greatest capital out of his opponents. That the creation was begotten, Athanasius contented himself with denying (*), as the creation came into being at a definite time. This objection assumes that we accept the principle that begetting does not take place at a definite time, a principle Athanasius has not proved. Therefore Athanasius persistently refused to recognise that the Arians made no difference between begetting and creating, and merely accused them of holding that the Son was a creature, in disrespect of the Divinity. Thus he accused the Arians of making the Son share the dishonor of creation as if the process of begetting was still recognised as existing.

All the objections of Athanasius against the Arians in this matter go upon this supposition, and fall to the ground as soon as this flaw is pointed out, since the Arians would simply have refused to accept his supposititious premisses.

It is remarkable that all later writers on the subject have followed in his footsteps. This is not astonishing in Voigt (*), the admirer of Athanasius; but it is worthy of remark in Harnack (*), who is usually so clear-minded. He says in a tone apologetic for the Arians that with them: "Begetting is merely a synonym for creating."

Athanasius alone gave to these two words their technical meaning: to Arius, "begetting," "creating," "purposing," and "establishing" were all synonyms. Besides, all that Arius said, was that before he was begotten, or created, or purposed, or established, he was not. Thus Arius did not give to "begetting"

the connotation of being a synonym of "creating," "Ex ouk ontōn" out of non-existence in the technical sense.

But, singularly, although Athanasius champions the Nicæan distinction, he does not always himself set it forth. Newman (⁵) says: "The Platonists certainly spoke of the Almighty as 'agenētos' and the world as 'gennētos,' and the Arians took advantage of this phraseology. If then Athanasius did not admit it, he would naturally have said so; whereas his argument is, True, the world or creation is 'gennētos,' but only by 'metousia' as partaking of him is the one and only real 'gennētos,' or Son. That is, he does not discriminate between two distinct ideas, 'Son' and 'creature,' confused by a common name, but he admits their connection, only explains it; or, to speak logically, instead of considering 'gennēton' and 'genēton' as equivocal words, he uses them as synonymous and one, with a primary and secondary meaning. In like manner our Lord is called 'monogenēs,' Athanasius speaks of the 'genesis' of human sons, and of the Divine (⁶) and (⁷) he observes that Ignatius calls the Son 'genētos kai agenētos,' without a hint about the distinction of roots."

All this only goes to show that when distinctly engaged in polemic with the Arians, Athanasius recognised the distinction, which otherwise he neglected. This would have been impossible if it had been a distinction inherited from the Fathers, but easily possible if it was merely a distinction employed in polemic by himself first of all.

But, strangest of all, even the Nicene Fathers did not in their formulation adhere to the distinction. Their second anathema is launched forth against those who say "he was not before he was begotten." This certainly infers that "he was" before he was "begotten." If this be true, then it is very plain that the eternal generation is thrown by the board, since he was before he was eternally generated. Besides, this denies that he was "begotten" at all, for it is impossible for anything to be begotten in the Athanasian sense which exists already. If this be true, then the whole Athanasian cosmology must be revised, and the result is polytheism, as there are two unbegotten ones who are not the same.

2. *Creation.*—For Athanasius, creation was a sudden, synchronous, arbitrary act, while begetting was a process (⁸).

It is uncertain how Athanasius reconciled the six days of creation (⁹) with his philosophical conception: "For individual stars and the great lights were not called into being one after another, but they were all created in one day, and they all started into existence at one command. All the individuals of the same kind or species, beasts, birds, fishes, and plants had as it were but one birth (¹⁰)." "For God is not wearied by commanding, nor is his strength unequal to the making of all things—for he lets nothing stand over which he wills to be done; but he willed only, and all things subsisted (¹¹)." If then the Logos did not originate at the same time the world did, it was plain he was not created; therefore, he must have been "begotten" (¹²).

Other differences between creating and begetting are as follows: Creation is out of nothing, out of no preëxisting materials, not from without (¹³). Begetting is from within. God was never without Wisdom or Ray (¹⁴). Created things will perish; begotten things will not (¹⁵). Creation is origination with no ulterior purpose, except the existence of the thing created; that which is begotten is originated for some particular purpose. For instance, Adam was created for no ulterior end than to be a man, and afterwards was commanded to work; the Word, however was begotten "for his works (¹⁶)."

In his zeal to make the distinction Athanasius forgot, however, that he had before (¹⁷) stated the opposite, that it was blasphemy to think that the Logos was begotten for our sakes, and that men were not created for his sake. It is not for us to pretend to solve this absolute self-contradiction.

Creation is "out of nothing," begetting is a participation of nature which is from everlasting to everlasting (¹⁸). No creature can create another; only a begotten offspring can create (¹⁹).

Athanasius concludes: "This distinction then, Holy Scripture very plainly makes between 'begotten' and 'made' or 'created' (²⁰)."

3. *Athanasius Denies the Distinction.*—Yet, when Athanasius is pressed with texts such as, for instance, "whom he hath appointed heir of all things" and "being made so much better than the angels," (²¹) which cannot be tortured into applying only to the human nature of the Logos, he is fain to find instances in the Scriptures where "begetting" and "creating" are used synonymously, so that in these passages he may substitute "begotten" for "made" or "created" or "appointed" (²²).

His argument here is but lame. He points out that in the text above the word "made" is followed by the word "better" to distinguish him from all other things which were created; but it is evident that even in this case the difference is one of degree, and not of kind (²³) as the former distinction demanded (²⁴). He is driven to acknowledge that "thus we see that the sacred writers put the words 'made' and 'become' very often in the place of 'begotten' (²⁵)." Finally in despair he says: "If the sacred writers have used the words 'he who made him' instead of saying 'he who begat him,' in speaking of him, who is so expressly declared to be the Son and Word of God, what advantage will this afford to our enemies? When there is an agreement as to what his nature is, what expressions are used are by no means material. Words will never alter or destroy the nature of things; on the contrary they ought to be adjusted to it (²⁶)."
Thus Athanasius tries to distract the student from the fact, which he is forced to confess, that the distinction between "begotten" and "made," in the Scriptures, breaks down.

Of course, what words are used about things concerning which everybody agrees, is utterly immaterial; but when there is so

much difference of opinion as existed between Athanasius and Arius, then the question of words is all-important, and the whole argument of Athanasius rested on the fact that the Scriptures made a distinction between "begotten" and "made." And now, when he confesses that this distinction breaks down, he thereby surrenders the argument against the Arians.

It is impossible to emphasise too much the above quotations, in which Athanasius explicitly surrenders the distinction on which the Nicæan Symbol is founded.

But it is feasible to prove more than this ; namely, that Athanasius was consciously dishonest. If he had found out that the distinction could not be supported after he had made it, his action would be that of an honest man who confesses that he has made a mistake. But if, as the case actually is, he first finds that the distinction cannot be supported ⁽⁷⁷⁾, and then, subsequent to this ⁽⁷⁸⁾, insists on the distinction, and seeks to prove from it the difference of nature of the Logos and the creation, then it seems that there is the action of a man who already knows that his argument is false, but who is reckoning on the fact that his opponent has forgotten that his arguments had already been proved fallacious.

Besides, if Athanasius had dealt with the Old Testament in Hebrew, and not with the translations, his whole argument would have broken down at the start, or would have had to be changed from beginning to end. Therefore the arguments of Athanasius, even if they were successful, would be useless, since the Prophets did not write in Greek, in which language alone the famous distinction existed in its historic form. They wrote in Hebrew ; and if it be desired to prove anything from the nature of the words employed concerning Wisdom, then it is necessary to deal with the Hebrew words. But, of course, Athanasius knew no better, because he nowhere shows acquaintance with the Hebrew language, and everywhere considers the translations inspired and final. Gwatkin ⁽⁷⁹⁾ says : " The whole discussion on Prov. viii : 22, LXX, ' Kurios ektise me,' etc., might have been avoided by a glance at the original ' yiya qanai.' Even Aquila, Theodotion and Symmachus all have ' ektêsato.' Eusebius ⁽⁸⁰⁾ mentions the fact, refers to the Hebrew and compares Genesis iv : 1, lxix : 30 ; so also Dionusios of Rome ⁽⁸¹⁾ and Basil ⁽⁸²⁾."

Hence appears how uncritical Athanasius was ; Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus had a Greek reading which would have freed him from trouble, and betrayed the insecurity of his distinction: Eusebius, Dionusios and Basil were thus better critics than Athanasius. This proof of Athanasius's uncriticalness shows how little we dare build on his distinction in Greek as well as Hebrew.

4. *Proverbs VIII : 22.*—There was one text which the Arians were never weary of bringing up against Athanasius. " The Lord created me a beginning of his ways for his works ⁽⁸³⁾." Con-

sequently, Athanasius is forced to devote the whole of his second Oration against the Arians to a discussion of this text. In the Septuagint, which Athanasius evidently had before his eyes, it reads : " The Lord created me in the beginning of his ways with his creation ; he founded me before the age in the beginning, before he created the earth ; he begat me before he made the depths, before the breaking forth of the springs of water, before the mountains were settled, before the hills."

Athanasius contends :

I. As we have seen above, " begotten " and " created " are used interchangeably ⁽⁸⁴⁾.

II. As we have seen above, these words must be taken in a proverbial sense, even if that contradicts the literal sense ⁽⁸⁵⁾.

III. " He has not said ' I am a creature ' or ' I became a creature, ' but only ' He created ' ⁽⁸⁶⁾." " But this mere term ' He created ' does not necessarily signify the essence or generation, but indicates something else as coming to pass in Him of whom it speaks." The creatures in Him are said to be created.

IV. " He created " need not necessarily refer to created nature, for " creation " may be used of merely a newly created condition ⁽⁸⁷⁾.

V. The text means only : " My Father has prepared for me a body, and has created me for men in behalf of their salvation " on the grounds of Wisdom building her an house ⁽⁸⁸⁾.

VI. The " beginning of the ways " does not refer to the creation of the World, but of the ways for the salvation of men, for these ways must have existed in the Word before he became their beginning. Adam was the first way ; but that failed ; therefore, for the salvation of man, new ways must be constructed. Thus ⁽⁸⁹⁾ arises a new creation. Thus we must contrast " the Beginning of ways to his being the Only-Begotten Word ⁽⁹⁰⁾." On account of the resurrection was he a Beginning of ways ⁽⁹¹⁾.

VII. " Therefore if he is before all things, yet says, ' He created me ' (not ' that I might make the works, ' but) ' for the works, ' unless ' He created ' relates to something later than himself, He will seem later than the works, finding them in his creation already in existence before him, for the sake of which he is also brought into being ⁽⁹²⁾." Since therefore he was created after creation, this only refers to his body. As he took the servants' form, so he calls his Father Lord, as any other servant would.

VIII. " If he says that he was created ' for the works, he shows his intention of signifying, not his essence, but the Economy which took place for his works, which comes second into being ⁽⁹³⁾."

IX. " For as, if he had said the reverse, ' The Lord begat me, ' and went on, ' But before the hills he created me ' ' created ' would certainly precede ' begat, ' so having first said ' created, ' and then added, but before all the hills he ' begat ' me, he neces-

sarily shews that begat preceded 'created.' For in saying, 'Before all He begat me,' He intimates that he is other than all things ; it having been shewn to be true in an earlier part of this book, that no one creature was made before another, but all things originate subsisted at once together upon one and the same command ("). Thus the Word was first begotten, and then created, while men were first created and then begotten by adoption (").

X. The Arians objected to the need of this Incarnation, since a single word of God would have undone the curse. Athanasius answers here : " We must consider what was expedient for mankind, and not what simply is possible with God ("). " If God had but spoken, because it was in his power, and so the curse had been undone, the power had been shewn of him who gave the word, but man had become such as Adam was before the transgression, having received grace from without, and not having it united to the body ; (for he was such when he was placed in Paradise) nay, perhaps, had become worse, because he had learned to transgress." Inconsistently enough with the point at issue Athanasius goes on to say that if the Son had been only a creature he could not have saved man(") and could not have overcome the devil who was also a creature (").

XI. In respect to the 23d verse, Athanasius says that " He says not ' Before the world he founded me as Word or Son,' but simply ' (before the world) he founded me,' to shew again, as I have said, that not for his own sake but for those who are built upon him does he here also speak, after the way of Proverbs. " And it must be that the foundation should be such as the things built on it, that they may well admit of being compacted together. Therefore according to his manhood is he founded, that we, as precious stones may admit of building upon him. The branches must be like the vine ("). Of course in this connection we remember that work, creation, and things made or founded are all synonyms ("). The fact that this foundation occurs before the creation of the world is evident. " For though the grace which came to us from the Saviour appeared—just now, and has come when he sojourned among us ; yet this grace had been prepared even before we came into being, nay, before the foundation of the world, and the reason why is kindly and wonderful. It beseemed not that God should counsel concerning us afterwards, lest he should appear ignorant of our fate (")."

XII. " And as some son of a king, when the Father wished to build a city, might cause his own name to be printed upon each of the works that were rising, both to give security to them of the works remaining, by reason of the show of his name on everything, and also to make them remember him and his Father from the name, and having finished the city might be asked concerning it, how it was made, and then would answer, ' It is made securely, for according to the will of my Father I am

imaged in each work, for my name was made in the works, (that is, the reason visible in human and subhuman creatures) 'but saying this, he does not signify that his own essence is created, but the impress of himself by means of his name; in the same manner, to apply the illustration, to those who admire the wisdom of the creatures, the true Wisdom makes answer, 'The Lord created me for his works,' for my impress is in them; and I have thus condescended for the framing of all things (⁸²).' "All things took place in me and through me, and when there was need that Wisdom should be created in the works, in my essence indeed I was with the Father, but by a condescension to things originate, I was disposing over the works my own impress, so that the whole world as being in one body, might not be in variance but in concord with itself (⁸³)."

It will be seen in the course of these comments on the above arguments that they contradict each other, and are therefore inconsistent. What this fact proves must be that Athanasius had no consistent interpretation of the text; and that he was merely playing at logic-fencing with his opponents.

If the first argument be true, that there is no distinction between the two words "begotten" and "made" in Scripture, or that the distinction cannot everywhere be supported, then all the other arguments are false, for they all presuppose the distinction with all its implications.

The second argument has already been met elsewhere, and the injustice of accepting a sense contrary to the literal sense has been pointed out. Besides, all the following arguments prove all that they can prove, from peculiarities of the literal sense; so that if this interpretation of the Scriptures is to be accepted, all the following arguments should be dismissed.

The distinction of the third argument is logically indefensible. The plain literal sense demands that "he created me" be equivalent to "I was created by him;" and this is equivalent to "I was his creature." How is it possible to be created without being a creature?

Besides, the third argument agrees with the twelfth in this, that it applies the created part of the Son of God to all creation, not the human body of Jesus of Nazara, as the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh arguments demand. These two sets of arguments are contradictory, and only one of them can be true. Which shall we choose?

The reason that only one of these two sets of arguments can be true is that if the student identify the created part of the Son of God with the human body of Jesus of Nazara, then it cannot also at the same time apply to all other things, which were "other" to the human body of Jesus.

Again, if the third argument be true, then it is the Father who created the world in the Son, and it was not the Logos of God that created them. This would be a serious difficulty in view of Athanasius's continually repeated assertion that the Word which

was begotten created the world and that the reason why the Word was not created was that no created thing can create anything else, and the Logos did create.

The fourth argument sets forth that the created Word here means only a created condition, or, in other words, a change of preëxistent materials. It is then only a metaphorical use of the word.

If this be true, then Athanasius must give up the third, twelfth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, eleventh arguments, which all use the word "created" in the primary sense of creation out of nothing. Which of these two sets of arguments will he give up? For they are utterly inconsistent, forming the fallacy of a double middle, giving a double sense to the crucial word.

The fifth argument implies an illustration so far-fetched, and so far removed from the literal sense that the critic must question it. Even if he accepted it, there would be no analogy. A house is built out of preëxistent materials; creation, on the contrary, as in this case also in which it applies to a created body which is created out of nothing, always means creation out of nothing.

As to the sixth argument, any unprejudiced reader will say that the verse applies to the beginning of all creation. But, even if he accept Athanasius's premisses, he can disprove his conclusion. He confesses that Adam was the first way of God with man. If then the Son is the "beginning" of God's ways with man, then he is identified with Adam, not with the human body of Jesus of Nazara who was confessedly only the second way of God with man, the first way having failed. Besides, if we were to confess that the human body of Jesus of Nazara was the first of God's ways with man, this means that before Jesus God had no dealings or ways with his works. Not only would Adam, the Patriarchs, and the Mosaic Dispensation be ruled out of the category of God's dealings with men, but it would appear that not even the creation of man or of the world was a "way" of God with man. Here we see how the arguments which apply the created part of the Son to the human body of Jesus of Nazara necessarily deny and contradict, and are inconsistent with the arguments which apply it to the creation of the world as the third and twelfth do. For if the human body of Jesus was the "first" of God's ways with man, the whole creation of the world, and the whole history of the world until the birth of Jesus had no connection at all with God and could not possibly be the created part of the Son.

The seventh argument makes a supposition which is inconsistent with the unquoted words of the text. It runs thus: "The Lord created me in the beginnings of his ways with or for his works." If then it should refer to the body of Jesus, this body of Jesus would be the first of his ways with his works. The Old Testament covenants with Abraham and Moses deny this, however. Rather it supposes that the Wisdom was created as the first step which God took in the creation of his works.

The words of the text need not be interpreted as implying the pre-existence of the works, as may be easily seen by consulting the Greek (⁶⁴).

The eighth argument assumes that "the works" refer to his dealings with men in the Incarnation. If the author of the Proverbs had meant this, he must indeed have been a wonderful prophet; and few authorities to-day would say more than Plummer that in the Old Testament Wisdom was conceived of as nothing more than a poetic impersonation of an attribute of God. It is probable that the literal sense is simply that he was created for the works inasmuch as he would be a useful means for creation. Besides, as Athanasius holds that Wisdom created the world, he must hold this literal interpretation, which thus need by no means refer to the Economy of redemption.

The ninth argument introduces some very interesting considerations.

It is once more repeated that all creation is one synchronous act; and we saw before that this was one of the most important characteristics of creation as distinguished from begetting. If this be true, then this absolutely contradicts arguments five, six, seven, eight, on the one hand, and eleven on the other. The point of the first set of these arguments is that his body was created, or founded, before the creation of the world. If then the ninth argument be true, these other five arguments are false, and impossible.

This ninth argument would imply that the body of Jesus was created out of nothing, at the time of the creation of the world, and arguments five, six, seven, and eight, which makes it to be created out of nothing after the creation of the world. Of these three sets of arguments only one can be true; the other two sets must be false.

But this ninth argument still further conflicts with another. According to the ninth, the Son was first begotten and then created; whereas men were first created and then begotten. Argument six, however, says that men were first created, and then were re-created in a second creation. It is impossible to say that this begetting of man is the same thing which is meant by his second creation; for then we would consciously violate Athanasius's distinction of begetting and creating, which the Nicene Creed also recognizes. Here then is a gruesome contradiction in terms. How it shall be solved, on Athanasius's principles, there seems to be no indication.

Besides, the ninth argument says that all creation was simultaneous. How then would it be possible to have a second creation thousands of years after the first?

The ninth argument then labours under these four grave difficulties.

The tenth argument endeavours to answer the Arian objection. Why did God go to so much trouble in the Economy of the Redemption, when a single word of his would have done just

as well? Athanasius does not deny that God could have this; but the arguments he adduces below, that it was expedient for mankind, and that they could not have been as good as before, and so forth, all implicitly deny that God could by a word have released man from all his obligations and sins.

Moreover, in these arguments of his, that Adam alone, and not we, received grace from without, Athanasius differs from all Patristic authority, notably Cyril and Augustine (⁶⁶). Besides, his statement that the Incarnation was not a necessity differs from the orthodox doctrine of Anselm (⁶⁷).

If therefore Athanasius does not say that the Incarnation was a necessity, he does not answer the objection of the Arians: and it remains that if God could have released man by a single word the manner he chose to do it was unnecessarily troublesome.

All the arguments used, in the eleventh answer to the Arians, to prove the fact that Christ must necessarily have been of one and the same nature with man, in order to be the stem of the vine of which men are branches, militate against his original distinction of begetting and creating on the plea of the difference obtaining between God and man.

The eleventh argument, however, is for Athanasius the worst blow his enemies could possibly have inflicted. It is here that Athanasius acknowledges that the Son was "founded," *i. e.*, "created," before the creation of the world. Here he distinctly contradicts his own argument given above which proved that the Son was not created, and therefore begotten.

The argument was this. All creation was a synchronous act. Now, the Son was not created at the same time as the world. Therefore the creation of the world as adverted to in the eleventh argument is false. There is no way of escaping either horn of the dilemma.

If we accept the twelfth argument, we must then contradict all the former arguments which referred the created part of the Son to the human body of Jesus of Nazara, for it is here only the Reason immanent in living beings, and as such is "created"; and this immanent reason is a different thing from the human body of Jesus of Nazara. If the "creation" of the Son was to apply to both the human body of Jesus and the immanent reason, then it would be necessary to have a double creation of the Son, of which we nowhere find a trace.

5. *Usual Interpretation.*—As a usual matter, however, Athanasius did not make so elaborate an interpretation of this passage. In another work he simply denies the application, because elsewhere the distinction exists (⁶⁸), and applies the creation to the human body (⁶⁹). Yet in this case he does not attempt an interpretation of the difficult verse, "he founded me before the creation of the world."

We have now examined the twelve interpretations of Proverbs viii: 22, which Athanasius advances. We have found them

to be mutually inconsistent, and self-contradictory. This fact proves that Athanasius had no settled and clear interpretation himself, and was only doing his best to escape the plain sense of the words. We have said nothing as to the intrinsic value of any of his interpretations. It seems useless to do so, since we find that they are mutually inconsistent.

We have already seen that if Athanasius had glanced at the Hebrew "qanah" or the Greek "ktaomai" (Revised Version, possess, or form) he would have had no need of long arguments, to explain away the "ktizein," which for him was a word with technical meaning. And yet, even then it would not have been the technical "gennêsis" or begetting, which his theory required. The meaning of "qanah" may be seen by the following translations of it in the A. V. : Attain, bought, buy, buyer, get, jealousy, keep, owner, possess, possessed, possessor, purchase, recover, redeem, verily. The Greek "ktaomai" is translated : Obtain, possess, provide, purchase. Both of these words thus seem to refer primarily to things, and only by a very extended metaphor to the "getting" of sons. Even this does not look on children from the stand-point of sonship, but from that of additions to the household of the father, since in the early days of Genesis children were considered chattels, as well as in the later days of Paul. Surely this will not yield what Athanasius demands of "begetting" as a technical word, although in truth it frees him the disagreeable necessity of explaining away the technical term "creating."

CHAPTER V.

OTHER TEXTS.

1. *Philippians II* : 9.—“Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name : That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth.”

The Arians contended that the word “wherefore” indicated that what God had given him was a reward of a successfully carried out purpose ; which can only exist in a nature which is capable either of success or failure (1).

Athanasius rejoins that the Arian belief in a preëxistent Logos as well as the Catholic position is undermined by this interpretation ; for it would imply that he had not been preëxistent Logos and Son before (2). “Therefore he was not man and then became God ; but he was God and then became man, and that to deify us.” The word “Gods” had been applied to Moses and the Jewish congregation before the Incarnation ; this would make him God later than they (3). As there is no deifying apart from the Word, “If he called them Gods unto whom the Word came,” if Moses and the Jewish congregation were called Gods, this implies the Word existed before as God (4). Since the Father is unalterable, his Son Word and Image must be unalterable too, *Phil. ii* : 5-11 ; *Ps. lxxii* : 17, 5, *LXX* (5). The Son must have been God before the Incarnation, for he was worshipped before the Incarnation, in the Old Testament, *Ps. liv* : 1 ; *xx* : 7 ; *Heb. i* : 6 (6). The text applies to the Son only as man, *Heb. vi* : 20 ; *ix* : 24 (7). The words “gave him” refers only to his manhood ; before the Incarnation, the Word was worshipped by the angels ; after, Jesus (8). “Wherefore” does not mean a reward of merit, but a cause of exaltation (9). The words “given him” also refer to the resurrection given him by the Father (10). “Exalted” means that his body was exalted from the lower parts of the earth (11). In this interpretation, Athanasius was right in holding that the literal sense is humanitarian, and destroys even the Arian position.

2. *Psalms XLV* : 7, 8.—“Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever ; a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of thy kingdom. Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity, therefore God, even thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.”

The word "fellows" distinctly refers to all men as fellows of Christ, as man. But he is said to be God, in his eternal nature, in the first part of the quoted verse. He was anointed with the Holy Ghost, as Jewish kings were, and all other men after him. "I, being the Father's Word, I gave to myself, when becoming man, the Spirit; and myself, become man, do I sanctify in him, that henceforth in me, who am the Truth, all may be sanctified (¹³)."

"The Spirit's descent on him in Jordan was a descent upon us, because of his bearing our body (¹⁴)."

This headship of the body of Jesus is as shadowy as that of Adam. As a matter of fact, the bodies of men born a thousand years after his have no contact of any kind with his body; and the only union that can possibly be claimed is a spiritual union, which has nothing to do with the body. The Word was not exalted or lowered; it is man who was promoted (¹⁵). The word "wherefore" means only a cause why, not a reward of merit. The cause was that "those who had become under a curse" might be set free (¹⁶). "But if I through the Spirit of God can cast out demons," Matthew xii : 28. "The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me, because he hath anointed Me," Is. lxi : 1. These verses were spoken of him as a man. John xx : 22 ; xvi : 13, 15, on the contrary, of him as God (¹⁷).

The words "Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity" do not necessarily imply free will of choice between them, that is, alterableness. They were given to alterable men as an example of unalterableness (¹⁷). This is a very strained interpretation: for if they mean alterableness at all, they mean it in whosoever mouth they are. When "loving" and "hating" is spoken of in regard to the Father, as in Is. lxxxvii : 2, Mal. i : 2, 3, the Arians do not interpret such expressions as denoting alterableness; why then in the case above (¹⁸)? This argument of Athanasius is telling; yet it is probable that its application would be denied, in the case above, because it would depend on the nature of the person of which it is said whether alterableness is predicable of it or not. In the case of God, all agree it is not; but just in the case of Christ all disagree. Yet, such alterable interpretation would end in humanitarism, not Arian preëxistence of the Logos.

3. *Hebrews* i : 4.—"Being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they."

I. Athanasius contends that we cannot understand Scripture unless we know the occasion and nature of the persons referred to, so as to be certain of the sense in which it is spoken (¹⁹). This is reading into Scripture, not out of Scripture; it is proving dogma by Scripture which is interpreted according to the dogma. If any objective results are to follow from consideration of Scripture, it must be taken in its literal sense.

II. All that the texts mean is to say that the ministry of the Son is so much better than the ministry of servants. The word

"better" denotes difference of kind, not of degree: as heavenly courts are better than earthly houses because of different kind ⁽²⁰⁾.

III. The word "become" is not used absolutely, but modified by "better," to denote a difference of nature so well that he thought it immaterial which expression was used, deeming no mistake possible. The word otherwise is often used of sons ⁽²¹⁾.

IV. The word "better" indicates a difference of kind; "rather" or "more" or "greater" a difference of degree. There would only have been a difference of degree if the text had run "being made so much greater" than the angels ⁽²²⁾. Usage will not support this distinction. Especially is this the case when the word "become" is the same of angels and the Word. To be made better than another thing is a comparison of degree only, the kind, represented by the word "made" or "become" remaining the same.

V. Elsewhere, the Son is said to be eternal and unoriginate; so it must mean the same thing here. The Father is not said to be "better" than the Son, but only "greater" than him. John xiv : 28 ⁽²³⁾.

VI. Since the word "better" denotes a difference of kind, the Son was not of originate things, if he was better than the angels. Consequently, disobedience to him would not have been more guilty than disobedience to angels, which however is asserted in Heb. vii : 22, 19; viii : 6; ix : 23. The word "better" is used in respect to the dispensation ⁽²⁴⁾.

VII. Becoming a surety for us, means that he became a pledge in our behalf. Therefore, "expounding it according to a second sense" it only means he became man ⁽²⁵⁾. Now, we must notice that an interpreter has a right, if he pleases, to interpret Scripture in a "second sense," even if that contradicts the literal sense. But he should use both at once. Arguments four to six have insisted that the word "better" made a difference in kind, in spite of the word "made," or "become," so that the passage still refers to the eternal Sonship. Now, however, we are told that there is no difference in kind, but that it applies merely to the Son as man, in which capacity he was "made" or "became" in the same manner or kind as all other men and angels. This is sheer contradiction in terms.

VIII. Returning to "better" as a difference in kind, we see that if the Son was "better" than the angels, he must have been God, as which he has been worshipped. Heb. i : 6. Thus only the Divine Son could have brought about something better ⁽²⁶⁾.

IX. If the word "become" applies equally to him and the angels then either he is an angel, or they sons. But in Heb. i : 6, a difference is made between them and him; therefore, whatever in him is equal to them is only his new dispensation as Incarnate God ⁽²⁷⁾. This proof is not from the passage itself; it simply contents itself with denying the words of the passage in consideration of other words which have only a doubtful connection with the sense.

X. In Psalm ix : 9 ; xxx : 3, the word "become" is used of the Father, that He became a defence to those who trusted in him. Now, sound interpretation will apply this to God the Word; and thus the Word would in his created manhood "become" a defence unto them. If, however, it applies to the Father, then the Father himself would be called originate. But, a reading of the text will show that it applies not to the Origin of the Father, but to his merely changing his relation to man, as Abraham long after he had been created, became a defence to Lot. If it was thus that the Father became a defence, then this was the case through the Incarnation of the Son, whereby he became a defence to man (²⁰).

XI. Athanasius thinks that it is only fair that the word "become" should apply to the Son in the same sense that it has been proven that it applies to the Father. He became a defence not as to essence, but as regards to his Economy (²⁰). This deduction is incorrect. The text does not say that the Son merely became a defence to man, as we saw it said of the Father, which indeed, means only a change of relation towards man. But the text distinctly refers to the origination of the Essence of the Son : "Being made so much better than the angels." That is, having been created so much better than the angels. From this it is clear that the conception of creation, the "kind," is the same in both instances ; and therefore the word "better" can only refer to the "degree" in which the kind existed in both angels and the Son. Besides, the word "better" is itself the comparative of the word good : and all comparatives are differences of degree. The argument which interprets the word "became" as applicable to the human becoming of the Son, thereby ignores all the arguments which found in better a difference of kind. For this would mean, that as a created man, the Son was of a higher kind than angels, who are by Athanasius always looked upon as a higher race of created beings than men.

The arguments therefore contradict each other, and show that Athanasius himself had no consistent interpretation of the text.

4. *Hebrews III : 10, 2.*—"Consider the Apostle and High Priest of our profession, Christ Jesus ; Who was faithful to him that made him, as also Moses was faithful in all his house."

I. Athanasius does not deny that the word "made" here applies to the Word before the Incarnation. He denies, on philosophic grounds, that such can be the case. If the Son is a creature, God has no Word. Therefore God cannot create, as light cannot shine without the ray, or a fountain irrigate without a stream of water. Thus, as Creation is an exercise of Will, and the begetting of the Word is Nature, if there was no Word, Will would be above Nature ; while it is self-evident that Nature is above Will ; for the Natural Word is the Living Will of the Father (²⁰).

II. If we understand this, it does not matter what the words used are ; for words should conform to meaning, and not mean-

ing to words. Therefore, when the word "made" is used in respect to a creature, it means "made" in its proper sense; whereas, when it is used in respect to something which is not a creature, it is used interchangeably with "begotten" (²¹). It is plain that here Athanasius acknowledges that the sacred writers do use the word "made" of the Son; also that here Athanasius begs the question. He decides of the sense of Scripture according to the dogma, whereas he is appealing to Scripture to support the dogma. This is an inexcusable proceeding. It is plain that here is the only instance of Athanasius's believing that the words "begotten" and "made" are synonymous, or used for each other, whereas elsewhere he always insists on the Nicæan distinction, "begotten, not made." Besides, if such a distinction occurs in Scripture, it is impossible to believe that a sacred writer, knowing it, and all its bearing on the Divinity of Jesus of Nazara, would deliberately put the one for the other in a crucial place, "in a secondary sense," which, in view of the distinction, happens to be exactly contradictory to the primary sense. Such suppositions are unthinkable.

III. Athanasius endeavours to prove this fact of the interchangeableness of the terms in question by instances from the Old Testament, where Sara calls her husband Lord, although she was his wife. Nathan and Bathsheba speak to David of his son Solomon as his servant (²²). On this account however then did not deny Solomon's sonship (²³). This argument means little, because in the East, as even till to-day, women and children are considered the slaves of their husbands and fathers. Thus it is perfectly consistent to call a son or wife servant. See Gal. 4 : 1. Now, if this argument is to apply at all to Christ, then it will be evident that although he is the Son of God he is the Servant of God just as much as any created thing which was not born or begotten of him. Thus, as to servant-hood, the Son and all created things would be equal, and we would have the Arian coequality of the meaning of begotten and made.

IV. Athanasius notices that the Arians emphasized the words "Who made." Athanasius gives the instance of Eve and of Joseph who called their children Cain and Ephraim and Manasseh, "made" and "gotten," without forgetting their birth (²⁴). Both of these instances are in the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew, and therefore not final, as to the Greek distinction. But if they are final, as to the Greek distinction, as Athanasius thinks, then this is positive proof that the Nicene distinction cannot be supported by the Scriptures.

V. Athanasius repeats that as it is plain the Son is not a work, it does not matter what words are used about him (²⁵). We repeat that this whole appeal to Scripture depends on the words used in Scripture, since this is the very point on which both parties disagree. This is the one proof, that if the Nicene distinction can be found in the Scriptures it amounts to nothing, as all words amount to nothing, according to Athanasius.

VI. Athanasius proves that the Son cannot be a work, because all works shall be brought to judgment, whereas the Word is himself the Judge. He cannot be both Judge and judged (⁷⁶).

Here Athanasius forgets that he had acknowledged that the human body of Jesus of Nazara was made, or created, and therefore a work. As a work, it will have to come to judgment before itself in any case, so that this absurdity is not removed by affirming that the Son in his eternal nature is not a work, and therefore need not be judged. But if an exception should be made in favour of the human body of Jesus of Nazara, it is sufficient to state that the text reads "all works" and does not read "all works except the created body of the Word." This argument may seem trifling: but it is no more trifling than the argument of Athanasius here adduced.

VII. Aaron became highpriest when he put on the priestly robe: so Christ was made Apostle and High Priest when he put on the robe of the flesh. Aaron was made High Priest long after he was made man: Christ was "made" High Priest long after his existence as Word. Who, seeing Christ manifest his Godhead by his works would not have naturally asked, Who made him Man (⁷⁷)? Here is a subtle equivocation in the meaning of the word "made." In the case of Aaron's priesthood, it only means that Aaron assumed the title of High Priest. Whereas, in the case of Christ, it meant the technical "creation" "out of nothing." On account of this difference of meaning, there is no parallelism. The question, Who made him Man? would only be asked by somebody who had supposed that he thereby had ceased to be God. This of course is not Athanasius's desire.

VIII. The word "Faithful" means only eternal, not dying or perishing as the Greek gods. I Thess. v: 24 (⁷⁸). But in these cases the word "faithful" is used of superiors towards inferiors, whereas in the present case it is of inferior to superior: "who was faithful to him that made him." Here, therefore, it can mean nothing more than obedient, and honest in the discharge of his vows or obligations.

IX. Thus Athanasius asserts he has proved that the Word "made," (not this time in its "secondary" meaning!) applies to the body of Jesus. If, however, it is used of the preëxistent Word, then it is interchangeable with "begat" (⁷⁹). Here Athanasius thinks the word applies to the body of Jesus, after having at first admitted it referred to the preëxistent Word. But if in the first instance, we are to use a secondary meaning, why not in the second case also? Why does he say that in the first case a secondary meaning must be used? Because it is certain that the Word was not made, but begotten. But this is the very point at issue, it is not a postulate in which both parties agree, in which case a secondary meaning might be admissible. For instance, when we speak of sunrise and sunset, we all agree to use a secondary sense because it has been scientifically proved that the earth and not the sun moves. But if the question were still open,

we would be forced by honesty to use the first meaning, if we use the word at all. Athanasius concedes to the Arians their exegesis of the verse, that "made" applies to the preëxistent Word. His strictures about a "secondary sense" appear to be mere "begging the question."

5. *Acts II : 36.*—"He hath made both Lord and Christ that same Jesus whom ye have crucified."

I. Athanasius asks, Where is it written, He made for himself a Son, or a Word ; or, the Son is a work ? Here is only written, He hath made Lord, and Christ (⁴⁹).

II. Athanasius reminds the Arians of the last passage interpreted, and that it had been shewn that "made" should only apply to the human Economy, and not to the eternal being of the Word. This is shewn further by the fact that it was only the body which was crucified, so that according to his manhood he was made (⁴⁹). On what grounds, in the last passage interpreted, was this application made ? On grounds of textual interpretation ? No, on grounds of philosophy which expressly contradicted the words of the text. Thus Scripture is violently contradicted by philosophy, or dogma, so that the dogma shall be proved by it. If this was true, that it was the body that was made, then it would be the body which was made Lord and King, and not the eternal Logos. Besides, the sense created would no more mean physical creation out of nothing, as the creation of the body, but the already created body would again be created out of nothing Lord and King !

III. The Scriptures say, "He made him Lord," not, "Word." This means that "He manifested Him as God, by his signs and wonders." *Acts ii : 22 ; John v : 16, 18* (⁴⁹). But here Athanasius overlooks the fact that the text says that the body of Jesus was made Lord and King, after, and not before, the crucifixion. This fact makes the above interpretation impossible.

IV. Athanasius with justice says : If we interpret this passage literally, then the meaning is not Arian, of a preëxistent Logos, but humanitarian, that Jesus did not exist before he lived a man (⁴⁹). Athanasius is right. This is the logical outcome of the argument.

V. The Jews thought Jesus to be merely a man. Therefore it was necessary to speak in this wise (⁴⁹). Therefore the word "made" here means only "change of relations," as we saw before, when applied to God the Father (⁴⁹). Jacob "became" lord over his brother when more than thirty years old ; thus Christ became King and Lord relatively to us (⁴⁹). But Athanasius here makes a strange implication : Was not Christ, as the Word, Lord and King of man, as well before as after his Incarnation ? For if we accept this argument that after the Crucifixion Christ for the first time "became" Lord and King relatively to us, then it seems he was not Lord and King before that, although preëxistent Logos. What shall we say to this ? This would imply a change in the Divine Nature of the Logos

as consequent on the Incarnation, which would not be then only an assumption of humanity. Surely this is unorthodox.

6. *John XVI : 10.*—"I in the Father and the Father in me."

I. The Arians said, What wonder? All men can say, "In him we live and move, and have our being (⁴⁶)." Asterius said: "It is very plain that he has said, that he is in the Father, the Father again in him, for this reason, that neither the word on which he was discoursing is as he says, his own, but the Father's nor the works belong to him, but to the Father who gave him the power." Thus the Word is only one out of many (⁴⁷). Athanasius answers, that if the Lord had meant this, his words would not rightly have been, "I in the Father, and the Father in me," but rather, "I too am in the Father, and the Father is in me too," "that he may have nothing of his own, and by prerogative, relatively to the Father, as a Son, but the same grace in common with all (⁴⁸)." It is plain that this answer is not sufficient. For what Athanasius puts in the mouth of Christ on the Arian supposition, would only have been said if he had been speaking of his own claims as consciously contrasted with those of other men; whereas it was perfectly natural that, thinking of himself only in contrast with his Father, he should only have said what he did. Is it wrong to say that God is my Father, because it is also true that God is also the Father of all? Must I say then My Father, who art also the Father of all men?

This is the only argument Athanasius advances against Asterius. He confines himself, otherwise, to a restatement of the Catholic doctrine, and showing that it agrees with the words of the text, and others, as, "I and the Father are one" and "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father (⁴⁹)."

II. The most interesting part of the discussion is the simile of the emperor's image. He says that a statue of the emperor might with truth say: "I and the emperor are one; for I am in him, and he in Me; and what thou seest in me, that thou beholdest in him, and what thou hast seen in him, that thou beholdest in me." "Since then the Son too is the Father's image, it must necessarily be understood, that the Godhead and propriety of the Father is the Being of the Son (⁵⁰)." The interesting part of this simile is that it implies all that the Arians ask. The emperor is begotten; the image is created. There is not only one statue of the emperor, but innumerable statues in every city of the empire. Each statue has as much right to say the above as any other statue. This was the very contention of Asterius; this was the very interpretation which Athanasius condemned. There could hardly have been a better vindication of Asterius than this.

7. *John XVII : 3.*—"And Jesus Christ whom Thou didst send." Also, *Deut. xxxii : 39 ; vi : 4 ; Mark xii : 29 ; Luke xviii : 19 ; John v : 23, vi : 38 ; xiii : 20 ; xiv : 28.* Also, *John xiv : 6.*

I. The second series of passages mentioned, such as "My Father is greater than I," all speak of the One God. This does

not deny the existence of his Word (⁶¹). Yet such passages as "Why callest thou me Good? none is good, save One, that is, God," distinctly distinguish himself from God; and if he was the Word, as part of God, and being in the Unity of God, then he should not say, "Why callest thou me good? none is good, save One, that is God." For in this he implies he is not Good, and therefore not in God.

II. The second answer is that God spoke of himself as only one in order to distract idolaters from their idolatry. But in doing so he did not deny his Word, as the Sun would not deny its radiance, because it recalled the attention of men to itself from painted images of the Sun (⁶²). Yet this does not explain the strict language, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is One God." While God was thus revealing himself not to idolaters, but to His own people, who already knew his unity, this was the time of all others to reveal the Trinity.

III. "And Jesus Christ whom thou didst send." Athanasius says that if the Son had been a Creature he would not have dared to rank himself with the Creator. Where only one God is spoken of, there the Word is implied (⁶³). The question arises, Did Jesus here rank himself with the Creator? He says distinctly, and Jesus Christ "whom thou didst send." To say that he ranked himself, as being sent, with the Creator, who sent him, is nonsense. Such a passage makes no claim for Jesus which the Muhammadan does not make for Muhammad in saying, We believe in one God, and Muhammad his prophet.

8. *John X : 30 ; XIV : 10.*—"I and my Father are one." "I am in the Father, and the Father in me."

I. The unity of the Son with the Father is not merely one depending on agreement of will, for if such were the case, all human beings and angels could attain to a like union (⁶⁴). Many texts show the difference between God and Man. *Ps. lxxxvi : 8 ; lxxxix : 6.* It is plain that Athanasius does not get this interpretation out of the text; there is in it nothing of "unity of will." It is an Arian objection which Athanasius takes the occasion of refuting.

II. If the Son is an exact image of the Father, then he will in all things be like the Father, except that fact that he is Son (⁶⁵). We pray to the Father and the Son, not to the Father and an angel (⁶⁶). In the Old Testament, the Son revealed the Father to those who saw God and did not die, whereas no man could see the Father and not die (⁶⁷). Not on seeing an angel could a man say he had seen the Father, which he could say, if he had seen the Son (⁶⁸). The Arians, from *John xvii : 20-25 ; viii : 44,* contended that men were as much of the proper essence of the Father as the Son, because all could say, I am in the Father, and the Father in me (⁶⁹). Athanasius answers that this being made one with God in the case of men was only a hyperbole, such as made Jesus refer to Herod as a fox (⁷⁰). Thus also are men likened to the Father but can never attain to his nature (⁷¹). Men

are as little to become equal to the Father, which is impossible for creatures made out of nothing, because it is said, "Be ye perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect" as we are to become horses, because it is written, be ye not like to horse and mule (⁶³). "For like things are naturally one with like; thus all flesh is ranked together in kind; but the Word is unlike us, and like the Father (⁶⁴)." "The words 'In us,' then, are not 'In the Father' as the Son is in him, but simply an example and image, instead of saying, 'Let them learn of us' (⁶⁵)." "The Word then has the real and true identity of nature with the Father; but to us it is given to imitate it (⁶⁶)."

III. Besides, the word "as" in the passage saying that we shall be one as he and the Father are one, shows that only a simile is implied, not an identity. It is said, "As Jonah was three days and nights in the whale's belly, so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth." Jonah did not go into Hades, nor our Lord into the whale's belly. Therefore, it is but a simile, not an identity (⁶⁶). Then Athanasius revels in the passages having a low estimate of human nature. Ez. xxviii : 2; Prov. xxiii : 4, lxx; I John iv : 13 (⁶⁷). Thus man's unity with God is the presence of the Word and Holy Spirit in the believer, which is withdrawn when he sins, though restored when he repents (⁶⁸).

9. *Matthew XI : 27.*—"All things are delivered me of my Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." Also, John iii : 35, v : 50; 35-41.

I. This was not said to denote that once the Son had not all things, but to show that he had them from the Father (⁶⁹). These words "are delivered me" were said to oppose Sabellianism. They show the true Godhead of the Son: for first, it shows that he is "other" than all things; and secondly, it proves him the heir of all things, the very Son of God. "As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given also to the Son, to have life in himself." John v : 26. This proves that if the Son once had them not, then the Father once had them not; for "so" shows an identity between them (⁷⁰).

Athanasius lays much stress on this "so," as denoting identity of nature. And yet, in the third argument on John x : 30, he had laid just as much stress on the particle of comparison, to show there was not a likeness, or identity, but a faint parallelism. Which of these two principles of interpretation shall we adopt?

II. In his tract called *In Illud Omnia*, Athanasius takes a different view of the case. The "all things" are no more all created things, as differentiated from him who is begotten, but all things pertaining to the Economy of the Incarnation. If they meant all things created, ridiculous positions would follow, "For if, when he was speaking, they were delivered to him, clearly before he received them, creation was void of the Word.

What then becomes of the text, In him all things consist ? But if simultaneously with the origin of creation it was all delivered to him, such delivery was superfluous, for all things were made by him. For if they were delivered and upon his receiving them the Father retired, then we are in peril of falling into the fabulous tales which some tell that he gave over his works to his Son, and Himself departed (⁷¹).” Clearly, these two positions of Athanasius are inconsistent. Either “all things” are all creation, or they are the things of the Incarnation ; for he himself proves the other view ridiculous, which he himself had also advanced.

III. How did God deliver to the Son the things of the Economy ? God said, “ Whom shall I send, and who will go ? Here am I, send me. And then it was that, saying, Go thou, he delivered to him man—straightway all things were set right and perfected (⁷²).” This relation of the Son to the Father is evidently subordinational, or at least implying a separation which is not orthodox.

IV. “ All things whatsoever that Father hath are mine.” Athanasius remarks that it is not written, “ he hath given to me,” but, “ are mine.” This distinction denotes that the things of the Son are not separated from the Father, but all that the Father hath is his (⁷³), for he is ever with the Father (⁷⁴). He is an exact seal showing in himself the Father (⁷⁵). It is not plain how the Father can deliver all things to the Son, unless he has them no more, although the Son ever remains with the Father, and the Father ever works through the Son. But this implies a new stage in the mutual relations of the Father and the Son, which takes place at the Incarnation, before which all things were not delivered to him, although the Word had created them all at the start. This then is in direct conflict with the assertion of Argument First, where it was said, that if there was a time when the Son had them not, there was a time when the Father had them not. It is useless to endeavour to smooth over this glaring contradiction.

V. When Jesus asked, “ Whom do men say that I am,” he did not ask this out of real ignorance, but only so as to make his disciples answer the questions. The Divinity was never ignorant of anything (⁷⁶).

VI. The Arians were not satisfied with this answer ; so Athanasius says, the Divinity always knew it, but the humanity our Lord assumed included human ignorance (⁷⁷) which is proper to human flesh. Thus he carried our human ignorance, to be one with us (⁷⁸), but it is only the flesh that is ignorant.

VII. The power which Christ claimed after the resurrection, he had had before it. Before it he only manifested the power he had received humanly. “ Nothing which he says that he received, did he receive as not possessing before.” It was the flesh that received it, that it might surely abide among men (⁷⁹). If we should interpret in the same way Athanasius does we would

say, In that case it was not correct for the Lord to say, "All things are delivered me of my Father." He should have said, "All things that I possessed before as Word, these same things God, or I myself as Word, have given to myself as flesh."

10. *Mark XIII : 32.*—"But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the Angels which are Heaven."

I. Athanasius asserts that the Word must have known the day, especially as he tells what will come to pass before it ⁽⁸⁰⁾.

It is not at all necessary that he should have known the day because he told what would come to pass before it. It is perfectly possible that a man who knew the road leading to a city should prove that knowledge by accurately describing what a man going to the city will pass by. But it is equally possible not to know the day that is set for the destruction of a city but to know what things must necessarily take place before that process will be completed. Besides, Athanasius is not deducing the fact that the Word knew it, from the text; he deduces it from philosophy. When however we are deciding what a text means we must consider the text, and the text alone, and not read anything in it, especially when this is in contradiction to what the text says.

II. Jesus confessed his ignorance, as man, by reason of the flesh. "And it must be remarked that he does not say that the Son of God does not know, lest any should think that the Godhead was ignorant: but he simply says, "not the Son," which implies that the Son of man did not know, and that the ignorance only concerned his humanity ⁽⁸¹⁾." "And if this were not the meaning of the word 'Son,' in this place, after he had confessed himself jointly ignorant with the angels, no doubt he would have likewise added the Holy Spirit. From his not doing this two conclusions naturally arise, first, that the Holy Spirit knew this day and hour, and consequently that the Word, as such, from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds, could not but know it ⁽⁸²⁾."

In the enumeration of persons in the text, is read, first, men, second, the angels; third, the Son. Now, the Son, as man, was a man, and as such, was lower than the angels. Therefore, if the evident increase of rank is to be preserved it would be necessary to say, if the "Son" meant the human Jesus, first, men, either including Son, or followed by the Son, and thirdly, the angels. After he had said that the angels did not know the hour, it is self-evident that a man, who is lower than they, as was the Son in his capacity of being man, should also not know it. It is therefore very unlikely that the above distinction is extremely important. As to the omission of the Holy Spirit in the text, as implying that the Holy Spirit knew it, it would seem that if Jesus had here spoken of the Trinity, enumerated in the three Persons, he would have done a very unusual thing. For there is in the New Testament only one unequivocal mention of the three Persons of the Trinity, at the end of the Gospel of S. Matthew. It is

therefore not at all likely that a mention of the three Persons of the Trinity would have been made here. Besides, if Athanasius here comments on the omission of the mention of the Holy Ghost, what shall be said to his persistent ignoring of the Holy Spirit in his light-and-ray simile ?

III. The Son knows the Father ; therefore he must know all that is in the Father, that is, all creation, and included in that the date of its end ⁽⁸⁵⁾. But this is again speculation, eisigesis, not exegesis ; and is therefore valueless.

IV. In other places, he shows that he knows the time : " In such an hour as ye think not, the Son of Man cometh." This shows that as flesh, as man, he was ignorant ; for he knew as Logos, when he should return, announcing here the fact that he knew it ⁽⁸⁴⁾. Besides, he said, " Watch, for ye know not the day or hour," distinctly emphasizing the " ye," not saying that he himself did not know it ⁽⁸⁶⁾. Neither of these passages demand what Athanasius claims. It is quite possible that Jesus might have known that whenever he would come people would not be ready for him, or expect him ; but this is not saying he knew the exact hour, especially when elsewhere he had distinctly disclaimed it. The second passage means nothing, as nothing can be inferred from the fact that he simply said they did not know it. Rather, if he did not know the hour, was he not telling a falsehood if he said, no, not the Son, when he knew that all around him looked on him as the Son of God ?

V. The Arians believe that when Paul said, " I knew a man in Christ, etc., etc.," he knew through Christ that which he was speaking of ; are they not unjust to the Lord in maintaining that he did not know in his divine nature, that which he said he did not know ⁽⁸⁶⁾.

VI. Why did the Lord say he did not know, when he knew it? First, to tell us what things should happen beforehand ; second, because if he had said he knew he might have been forced to say to his disciples things disagreeable to them ⁽⁸⁷⁾. It is best men should not know the exact fact of their future life, lest they should be puffed up, and their moral responsibility should be injured ⁽⁸⁸⁾. Athanasius then brings them an *argumentum ad hominem*. The Father, says he, asked some questions of Adam, when he was not in Paradise. Did he ask knowing, or not knowing? If you say he asked not knowing, then you are a Manichee. If again he asked them knowing, why then do object that the Son should ask such questions, knowing, too ⁽⁸⁹⁾ ?

Liddon ⁽⁹⁰⁾ feels called upon to consider this text. He thinks that it is perfectly possible to suppose the simultaneity of the concurrent knowledge of the Divine soul, and ignorance of the human, just as we accept the contradiction of his being omnipresent as God, and confined to one locality as man. But in order to explain certain apparent acts of superhuman knowledge in his human nature, Liddon supposes that the human was limited in knowledge only in this direction ; for what reason, however, does not appear.

In this argument Athanasius concedes that the ignorance affected the Son of Man, the human nature. Now it is passably amusing to notice that while here Athanasius is confuting the heretics, his own opinion should in later times be called a heresy. Petavius says ⁽⁹²⁾: "In consequence, the former opinion though formerly it received the countenance of some men of high eminence, was afterwards marked as a heresy." Augustine ⁽⁹³⁾ especially considered this opinion a heretical and mistaken one. Nevertheless it must be granted that Athanasius has on his side Irenaeus ⁽⁹⁴⁾, Gregory Nazianzen ⁽⁹⁵⁾, and Cyril of Alexandria ⁽⁹⁶⁾.

11. *Luke II : 52.*—"And Jesus advanced in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God, and man."

I. If Jesus was no more than a man, then there is no objection to his advancing in wisdom. But this is a humanitarian supposition. The Word, as God, cannot however be supposed to advance ⁽⁹⁷⁾. But, being both God and man, "humanly is he here also said to advance, since advance belongs to man." The mention of "stature" proves that this advancement referred only to the human Nature ⁽⁹⁷⁾.

Liddon objects strongly to this view ⁽⁹⁸⁾. He shows that Jesus had already been spoken of previously as "being filled with wisdom ⁽⁹⁹⁾ and as Word incarnate, he was 'full of truth' ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾." To reconcile these contradictions he thinks that he then can "conceive that the reality of our Lord's intellectual development would not necessarily be inconsistent with the simultaneous perfection of His knowledge." Those who can imagine such a process will thank Liddon for his ingenious solution.

12. *Matthew XXVI : 39 ; Mark XV : 34 ; John XI : 35 ; XII : 27.*—"Jesus wept," etc., etc.

The Divine nature could not suffer or be passible to human emotions. Therefore all such expressions, including the "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me," only refer to the feelings and passions of the human nature ⁽¹⁰¹⁾. If the Arians consider Christ man because of these human emotions, why do they not consider him God, when they consider all his miracles and wonderful works ⁽¹⁰²⁾? The one class of human emotions are all written in reference to his manhood, while the others are written in reference to his divinity ⁽¹⁰³⁾. Athanasius did not consider the fact that while from the human emotions of weeping men are certain of his manhood, they are not from his miracles necessarily certain of his exclusive divinity. For miracles of healing and of resuscitation were performed by him before, and apostles after, Jesus, for which prophets and certainly no one has claimed Divinity, as one of the titles of the Godhead.

13. *Colossians I : 15.*—"Who is the First-born of the Father."

This text is not one of those considered by it mentioned only in connection with Proverbs viii

where. Yet this text is of the greatest importance, so that we must give Athanasius's discussion of it. He firstly explains Romans viii : 29, and Colossians i : 18. "For though it was after us that he was made man for us, and our brother by similitude of body, still he is therefore called and is the First-born of us, because all men being lost according to the transgression of Adam, his flesh before all others was saved and liberated. Whence also he is said to be the First-born from the dead, not that he died before us, for we had died first ; but because having undergone death for us and abolished it, he was the first to rise ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾."

I. But if he is also called First-born of the Creation, still this is not as if he were levelled to the creatures, and only first of them in point of time (for how should that be, since he is only begotten ?) but it is of the Word's condescension to the creatures, according to which he has become the brother of many. For the term Only-begotten is used where there are no brethren, but First-born because of brethren. If then he is Only-begotten, as indeed he is, First-born needs some explanation ; but if he is really First-born, then he is not Only-begotten. Certainly, these two terms being inconsistent with each other, one should say that the attribute of being Only-begotten has justly the preference in the instance of the Word, in that there is no other Word, or Wisdom, but he alone is very Son of the Father. But if all the creatures were created in him, he is other than the creatures, and is not a creature, but the Creator of the creatures ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾." Athanasius here distinctly denies the words of the text. The text runs, the First-born of all creation. This shows that in the mind of the writer, beginning and creating were synonymous. Athanasius simply says that the "First-born" of creation means only "brother of many," and these only men.

Newman ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ recognizes this misinterpretation, and contents himself with remarking on it, without seeming to see its gross unfairness. He says: "As far as Athanasius's discussion proceeds in this section, it only relates to the First-born of man, (*i. e.*, of the dead), and is equivalent to the 'beginning of ways.'" He says it is necessary to choose between the two attributes, "first-born" of every creature, and Only-begotten. He simply violently takes one and dismisses the other. This is not interpretation, this is wilful misinterpretation. They must mean the same thing, if they are applied to the same person. Only-begotten is then only a figurative word of affection or honour, as the First-begotten of every Creature well deserves. And the word First-born is evidently a synonym of creature, so that here at any rate the Arian position is vindicated, and the Nicene distinction destroyed. This is perhaps the most remarkable sample of violent misinterpretation that exists in the realm of exegesis.

II. First-born of the whole creation means that he is other than creation ; yet he is said to be the First-born among many brethren, implying that he is one of them. Thus if Scripture had

said, that he was the first-born of other creatures, then he would be a creature too. "For if he is a creature, he will be First-born of himself." How then is it possible for him to be before and after himself? How the creation and be one of the things which consist in him ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾? The distinction of Athanasius here is not recognized in common use. It is usual to speak of the First-born of a family, without saying he is the First-born of other brothers. This would be tautology. It is vain to seek by such inadequate means to evade the force of the common-sense meaning of the words. As to the absurdities which would follow from his being both a Creature and the First-born of all creatures, there is none which does not apply equally to the Athanasian hypothesis by which he creates his own body, and thus creates himself, and exists both before and after himself. And as this verse distinctly breaks down the distinction between creating and begetting, the suppositions would be in either case the same, that he was before and after himself.

III. Athanasius says, If the Arian contention be true, then the Logos would be the First-born of inanimate creation, which is absurd⁽¹⁰⁸⁾. But why is this absurd? If the Logos is a cosmic principle, and the Creation, although itself created, then the inanimate world is also part of it.

IV. Christ is First-born only because of his coming into the world, because of this adoption of all men as sons ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾. Surely the common use of the word first-born demands something more than this; and if it were the Word who adopted men into sonship, then he would be their Father, not their first-born. Nor, if the men are called sons by adoption, can the Word itself be First-born itself except by adoption; and so the meaning is in every way taken from the word. It seems that impartial reading will not sustain this misinterpretation. The word First-born demands the coequality with the later-born.

It is on this argument that Newman remarks ⁽¹¹⁰⁾ that Athanasius's idea seems to require, First-born to the creature, rather than, First-born of the creature. But this is altering the text interpreted. This is eisegesis, not exegesis.

So far the texts which Athanasius endeavours to interpret in a Catholic sense, having been driven to do this because he says that the Arians had misinterpreted these, have alone been noticed. Unfortunately, however, there are no copies remaining of the works of the Arians, so that it is impossible to know how many texts Athanasius left unanswered. That he left some unanswered seems to be indicated by the fact that, for instance, the very important text Colossians i : 15, is not treated exhaustively, and is touched only for a moment in dealing with Prov. viii : 22.

For instance, the text which Origen used with so much effect, I Cor. xv : 22-28, is omitted by Athanasius. Surely this text above all others needed explanation. It cannot be supposed for a moment that the quick-witted Arians would have overlooked the one text which above all others was responsible for the Sub-

ordinationism of so famed a Church teacher as Origen. From the evasive manner in which Col. i: 15, is touched, it would seem that Athanasius mentioned only those texts to which he could reply successfully, and that even these were only taken up because of the continual demands of the Arians for Athanasian exegesis of them.

It may therefore be supposed that Athanasius was a great deal more hard pressed for rational justification of his position than is usually supposed ; and the texts he omits to mention are almost more significant than the texts he feels himself forced to discuss.

CHAPTER VI.

BROTHER AND MOTHER-AND-CHILD OBJECTIONS.

1. *The Objection of Brother-hood.*—There was an objection which the Arians often brought up against Athanasius (*), which may be called the “Brother” objection.

“‘If there never was a time, when the Son was not,’ say they, ‘but he is eternal and co-exists with the Father, you call him no more the Father’s Son, but Brother’ (*).”

The point of this objection was as follows : it does not matter what you call the second principle : if both principles are co-*eternal*, and you will have a similitude to human relations, then the mutual relation of these two principles is that of brother to brother, not of father to son.

Athanasius misses this point completely. He contents himself with reasserting at the same time the co-*eternity* of the two principles, and the fact that the Son is begotten of the Father. He does not endeavour to explain how it is possible that the co-*eternity* and the begetting should co-exist, as the Arians asked of him. The mere reassertion of an inconsistent position is easy enough. He affirms that the Father and Son were not generated from some common pre-existing origin. He affirms that the Son is begotten and originated by the Father. But he does not explain. “For whereas it is proper to men to beget in time, from the imperfection of their nature, God’s offspring is eternal, for his nature is ever perfect.” We have seen this convenient manner of playing fast and loose with anthropomorphism before ; it explains nothing, for it is on the opinion of Athanasius, and on nothing more objective, that his supposition is founded. He asks, Who ever saw a ray-less Light, or a barren Fountain ? We shall have to examine this convenient analogy later on. Yet it proves nothing in respect to the nature of God ; for we may retort on Athanasius that God is more perfect than nature, and cannot be compared with it.

2. *The Two Unoriginates.*—The Arians often asked Athanasius, Are there one or two Unoriginate beings ? “And if anyone was aware of their subtlety replies : ‘the Unoriginated is one,’ immediately they dart out such poison as this : ‘Therefore the Son is among things originated,’ and well have we said, ‘He was not before his generation’ (*).”

The answer of Athanasius is confused. He says that the Arians should define the sense in which they use the Unoriginate, as there are three senses : (I) possible, but yet uncreated ; (II) uncreatable, as a squared circle ; and (III) original self-existence (*). Athanasius does not make any use of this distinction, but goes on to say that (†) (I) If unoriginate means that which is not a work, but existed always, then both Father and Son are unoriginate. (II) If unoriginate means that which is not generated, nor having a Father, then the Father alone is unoriginate, and the Son is originate. Yet as the Son is the image of the Father, and the Father is unoriginate, he is not originated, but an Offspring. These two senses of unoriginate are then “ unbegotten,” and “ unmade,” and became historical as “ agennêton ” and “ agenêton ” (*).

Yet it may be seen that this is but a quibble on the distinction between begotten and created. Athanasius seems to be determined to ignore that to Arians there was no distinction between begetting and creating, and that to them therefore this double meaning of unoriginate was meaningless. Nevertheless, they made him acknowledge that in one sense at least the Son was originate.

But the real difficulty remains : How can one of two eternal things have been begotten of the other, without a qualification of the eternity of the one begotten ? Athanasius had, himself, once touched the nerve of the difficulty, when he approved of the following words of Dionusios of Alexandria (†) : “ God was always Father, and the Son is not absolutely eternal, but his eternity flows from the eternity of the Father, and he coexists with him as brightness with the light.” To say that an eternity is “ not absolutely ” eternal, is to say it is not an eternity ; an infinity that is not absolutely infinite is a finite quantity. The Father then is eternal ; the Son is not eternal. If he is not eternal, we must ask when he originated, and if there was not a time before that, which is the full Arian position. Instead of frankly answering the objection, Athanasius had recourse to his usual method of reviling his opponents (†) : “ The heathen worship one unoriginate and many originate ; and the Arians worship one unoriginate and but one originate.” Therefore there is no difference between heathens and Arians. Yet, in view of the fact that the Arians considered their originate God either begotten or created, and that Athanasius confesses that in the sense in which there is but one unoriginate, Jesus Christ is originate, not being unbegotten, it may be asked, if Athanasius is not reviling himself along with the Arians ? Of course, if it is possible, with Newman (†), to see no inconsistency in saying the Father is first, and the Son also is first and that the Son is not the Father, then indeed must the Arian contention be condemned.

3. *The Objection from Mother-hood.*—The Mother-and-Child objection runs as follows : An Arian would ask a mother : “ Did you ever have a son before you beget one ? (†)” If you have

not, then just so the Son of God did not exist before he was begotten ⁽¹⁰⁾." The crux of the question is the same as before : the priority of time of the begetter over the begotten. Athanasius dismisses it contemptuously, "let them say what is to hinder God almighty ⁽¹¹⁾." This relation of begetter to begotten he acknowledges to be what we call cause and effect ⁽¹²⁾. But Athanasius conceives of cause and effect as synchronous. "They will find that these though an offspring, always exist with those things from which they are." If however there was no priority in the cause over the effect, the cause would no longer be cause, and the effect no longer effect. Here is the foundation of the system of Athanasius. Athanasius thinks he can silence the objections of the Arians by pressing the analogy of anthropomorphism further, asking if the Father himself then was begotten ⁽¹³⁾ ? For the sake of argument ⁽¹⁴⁾ Athanasius is willing to accept the temporal implications of the Mother-and-Child simile. But, says he, this simile of yours proves too much in another direction : for, on your own supposition, the child is consubstantial with its mother. If this is what Athanasius means by consubstantial, then three men, or three gold pieces, are as consubstantial as the three persons of the Divine Nature. But why, then, should there be only three persons in the Divinity, since there are millions of consubstantial gold pieces, or men ? If this is Athanasius's conception of consubstantiality, then it is capable of proof that the divine Persons are not consubstantial. For the three persons in the Deity, are each God, and yet all three are but one God. Three men are not one man, and three gold dollars not one dollar. If the simile is worth anything (and Athanasius distinctly accepts it in its bearing of consubstantiality) then the Divine Persons are separate beings, having only in common the fact that they are of divine nature, and equal to and separate from each other. They are then Three Gods. Lest there should be any danger of misrepresenting Athanasius, his own words assenting to the simile of mother and child, in respect to consubstantiality may be quoted : "So that if our opponents will make the Divine Generation parallel to the human as regards time, it is but reasonable that they should allow them to answer one another in that identity and propriety of substance which exists between parents and children, or a grandparent with child and grand-child are not one man, but three men, although of different age." So that any three men of different or equal age are consubstantial.

The obsequious Newman himself is forced to acknowledge this ⁽¹⁵⁾ : "It is from expressions such as this the Greek Fathers have been accused of Tritheism." And rightly have they been accused of it, for that is the only logical statement of the doctrines Athanasius here advances.

CHAPTER VII.

BEGOTTEN.

1. *Begotten at Will and Pleasure.*—When all the arguments of the Arians had been refuted, they advanced, according to Athanasius, the following one as their last resort : “ You will not pretend to deny that the Son has been begotten by his Father at his will and pleasure (1) ? ” The first objection of Athanasius to this is that it is unscriptural (2). In the second place Athanasius remarks that in respect to things which once were not, God uses his will, and pleasure, as in the spiritual adoption of men as sons of God, and as the calling of Paul to be an apostle. The principle of anthropomorphism is once more denied in this respect. If the Son had been preceded by the Will of the Father, this Will would have been a Logos, through which the Son would have come into existence. Besides, this would imply a time when the Son was not, which is absurd, since the Son is eternal (3). In the third place, Athanasius replies, You must not confuse God’s physical with his arbitrary acts. “ A man builds a house by exercising counsel and deliberation, but he begets a son by nature (4). ” “ Whatever was created we hold was created by the Divine counsel and will and power ; but the Son of God is no such mere voluntary effort of God’s power, but he is by nature the proper offspring of God’s substance (5). ” “ A work is external to the nature, but a Son is the proper offspring of the essence ; it follows that a work need not have been always, for the workman frames it when he will, but an offspring is not subject to will, but is proper to the essence (6). ” Athanasius proves this “ begetting ” by nature by an analogy to the human process of generation (7). Here he calls in to his rescue the often despised principle of anthropomorphism, which he had even rejected in the preceding paragraph. This is an unexcusable procedure : proving what he desires from it, and rejecting it whenever it would be inconvenient.

And yet this his unfair procedure helps him but little. For, it can be demonstrated, if human generation is a good analogy to the Divine generation, that the Father does generate his Son at his Will and Pleasure. For unless a man uses his will and pleasure in selecting a suitable wife, and circumstances, he will die, as many do, without offspring. If, on the contrary, Athanasius was right in contending that human parturition is a “ physical ” or “ natural ” necessity, no man or woman could die without having had children. The consequences of the disastrous argument of Athanasius are the following : (1) A “ physical ” unconscious act is higher than a voluntary and conscious action.

(2) Over God, as well as over man, reigns a physical and unconscious necessity, which dictates to him the production of offspring. (3) God is not the highest Being : for he is subject to a still higher power, a blind and unconscious necessity, which is not, like in man, preceded, guided, and restrained by conscious reflection. (4) If God is the cause of the Logos, as we saw above, then there is still a blind cause above the Father, of which he too is only the effect. We are now in full pessimism ; consciousness is only the effect of an unconscious blind cause.

2. *The "Reductio ad Absurdum."*—Athanasius endeavours to cast ridicule upon his opponents by drawing what he thinks is the logical outcome of their opinions. If the Father counsels and wills before begetting his Son, does he also exist before he thus counsels and wills ? Thus the Father would have pleasure and will before having his own Logos and Wisdom (9). Rather, the Son is the Living Counsel of the Father, the Wisdom by which he deliberates before the creation of the world (9). Athanasius considers Will and Understanding to be the same thing. Thus if the Father willed to bring forth the Son, he had Understanding and Wisdom, *i. e.*, a Logos, before begetting his own proper Wisdom and Understanding (10). Thus there would be a Wisdom begotten of a Wisdom, and other unthinkable relations. The Son, however, may and should be termed the object of the Will and Pleasure of God, for God loves the Son and shews him all things (11). As a crowning refutation, Athanasius returns to the anthropomorphic simile of human birth. "What we beget, is like, not our good pleasure, but like ourselves ; nor become we parents by previous counsel, but to beget is proper to our nature ; since we too are images of our fathers (12)." It has already been shewn that men and women must exert will and pleasure before producing offspring, by proper marriage and preparations. The pessimism in which Athanasius here lands has already been pointed out.

Newman (13) says : "They maintained that the relation of Father and Son, as such, in whatever sense considered, could not but imply the notion of voluntary originator, and, on the other hand, of a free gift conferred. Athanasius gives substantially the same answer, solving, however, rather than confuting the objection." "The Arians," he says, "direct their view to the contradictory of willing, instead of considering the more important and the previous question ; for, as unwillingness is opposed to willing, so is nature prior to willing, and leads the way to it. Gregory of Nazianzus asked them, 'Whether the Father is God, *volens* or *volens* ?'" Newman here confesses that the Arian contention is not answered. Gregory Nazianzus answered them by asking, is not nature before willing in the case of the existence of God ? Is it not also likewise in the begetting of a Son ? This is a *non-sequitur*. A man cannot help being born, nature thus preceding his will. But many men die bachelors, because in this case marriage depends absolutely on his fancy and will, not nature. Here nature follows will.

CHAPTER VIII.

IMAGE.

1. *The Scriptural "Image."*—Athanasius found the word "image" in the Scriptures. Consequently, he could not deny it ; but he escaped its meaning by changing its acknowledged connotation of likeness to an absolutely perfect reproduction. The Lexicographers all ignore the latter meaning. Liddell and Scott give the following as the connotation of the word : 1. A likeness, image, portrait, whether picture or statue ; and an image in a mirror. 2. A similitude, semblance, phantom. 3. A rhetorical similitude. Sophôklês gives only 1. Image. 2. Picture. Common usage supports these authorities. Of a child which resembles its father, we say that it is his "living" image, recognizing that without the adjective "living" the word "image" would not connote absolute reproduction. What Athanasius understands by the word is not always clear. At times he only speaks of a similarity, and again, of an identity. "And we may perceive this at once from the illustration of the emperor's image. For in the image is the shape and form of the emperor, and in the emperor is that shape which is in the image. For the likeness of the emperor in the image is exact ; so that a man who looks at the image, sees in it the emperor ; and he again who sees the emperor, recognizes that it is he who is in the image. And from the likeness not differing, to one who after the image wished to view the emperor, the image might say : 'I and the emperor are one ; for I am in him, and he in me ; and what thou seest in me, that thou beholdest in him, and what thou hast seen in him, that thou beholdest in me.' Accordingly, he who worships the image, in it worships the emperor also ; for the image is his form and appearance. Since then the Son too is the Father's image, it must necessarily be understood that the godhead and propriety of the Father is the being of the Son (¹)." There are other like illustrations of the meaning of the word "image." The heathens worship their gods as painted pictures of the sun, which is the true God (²) ; and God's Word is to him, as a spoken word is to us (³).

Let us now return to the illustration of the emperor's statue. All lexicographers acknowledge that the illustration is a perfect one, being in common and correct usage in the Greek of the day of Athanasius. Let us see the differences which obtain between the statue and the emperor, admitting all the claims of likeness.

The emperor and the statue are not consubstantial, and not even of like substance. The emperor is flesh and blood, and the statue of iron, brass, or stone. The emperor is begotten, the statue is created (*). During the lifetime of the emperor, there was a time when the statue was not, and the statue will some day be destroyed, although the emperor is supposed to be immortal. Compatible with the unity of likeness between the emperor and the statue which constitutes according to Athanasius as much likeness as the Son bears to the Father (since the same words are used) there is an absolute unconsubstantiality and utter unlikeness of origin.

The excuse made is the following : "The passage (according to Mr. Archibald Robertson) affords a good instance of the imperfect and partial character of all illustrations of the Divine Mystery (*)." Such an excuse would be worth something if it could be shewn that there was some proof for the existence of the Divine Mystery apart from these statements which are said to be so inadequate. And yet, apart from these illustrations, as for instance, also, that of the sun and the ray, there is absolutely no proof for even the existence of any such thing as a Divine Mystery. Therefore, all explanations of this Divine Mystery must of necessity depend absolutely on these images, and stand or fall with them. All the philosophy of Ante-Athanasian Christianity is nothing but a restatement of Philonism ; and from this source all its "Divine Mysteries" have originated. Why then should these "Divine Mysteries" suddenly have become so sacred as not to be interpreted by the words by which they were created, or by the illustrations, by which they were originally constructed ?

The words "Image," "Father," "Son," when applied to God are so applied only from analogy to their human meanings. Beyond this analogy, which depended on the human meaning, we know and can know nothing of the Divine Nature. Therefore, if we are to speak at all of the Divine Nature, we must use such human analogies, according to their human meanings, and not construct dogmas on fanciful enlargements of these analogies, as we shall see Athanasius does.

If, on the other hand, it is desired to emphasize the fact that the Nature of God is mysterious because above and beyond our comprehension, then it is only honest to refuse all human analogies whatsoever, Father, Son, and Image, and to say frankly we know nothing at all concerning God.

2. *Anthropomorphic Explanations.*—Athanasius, however, uses these human analogies, and enlarges their meaning according to his fancy. If the Father is unchanging, the Image must be unchanging too (*). Because the Father is Unoriginate, the Image must be unoriginate too, although an offspring (*). Athanasius does not apparently see the seriousness of speaking of an "unoriginate" image, which is an "offspring." Because there is one God, there can only be one image (*) although we could not

say, because there is only one emperor, therefore there can only be one statue of the emperor ! All of the Father is in the Son, because the Son is his Image (*) although we would not say that all the emperor's power is in his statue because it is his image. Because the Father is First, the Image is First too (°). This is absolutely serious. If words mean anything, there can only be one first of anything ; especially since the Image is originate, not unbegotten, of the First. The Image must then at least be second. Athanasius says that the Son is the First as Image of the First. This however, implies that the Son is not even in the category of powers ; just as the statue of the emperor is first, because the image of the first, and the statue of a consul would be second because image of the second. In this case "image" means nothing more than a likeness which has nothing to do with the actual power of the Imaged. Athanasius says : " If he be not Son, then neither is he image (°)." And yet, must every statue of the emperor be the emperor's son in order to be his image ? Here we see that Athanasius has left the conception of likeness, which is the only connotation of the word Image, and has adopted that of absolute reproduction ; although, when speaking of a child as the image of his father (11) he must remember that many children do not resemble their parents.

3. *Arian Objections.*—As might be expected, the Arians had several objections to make in the matter. If, they said, you make "image" more than the likeness of a statue, but absolute reproduction, then we may press the resemblance still further. If the Father is called Father because he is Father of a Son, why should he not have several sons ? Athanasius answers, Then the Son would not be in all things the Image of the Father. This answer is valueless, for reason shows that because a father has several sons he is no less the father of his eldest son, and his eldest son is no less his son and image. Again, if the Father begets a Son, and the Son is to be like the Father in all things, then the Son should also himself beget a Son. Besides, if the Father did not have a Father of his own, the Son who had a Father could never hope to become in all things his likeness.

Athanasius answers : " Either of these questions is as impious and absurd as the other. For as the Father was always a Father and can never be a Son, so the Son was always a Son, and can never be a Father (12)." It is evident that this answer denies the similarity of the Son and the Father, who are supposed to be like in all particulars : the one ever remains a Father, the other ever remains a Son, and thus ever remain unlike. But Athanasius has another answer to offer. " Nor can it be imagined that the nature of the Son should vary in the least from the Nature of the Father, unless it could be proved that he is not of the substance of the Father (13)." But does a Son ever cease to be the Son of his Father because he himself brings forth children ?

4. *The Necessity of an Image.*—So far it has been taken for granted that there should be an image. But now it must be

asked, Why should there be an image at all ? There is many an emperor who had no statue or image of his made ; at any rate, it was by no means a necessary procedure. Athanasius says : "And the substance existing, of course there was forthwith its expression and image ; for God's image is not delineated from without, but God himself hath begotten (¹⁴)."

But why should he beget it ? Many men have no children, and many women, likewise ; and many emperors have no images or statues. Athanasius says, Of course. But that is an assertion, not a reason. The reference is immediately made to the simile of the Sun and its Ray, which will be considered later on.

CHAPTER IX.

“ALTERABLE,” AND “SEVERAL LOGOI.”

1. *Alterability*.—One of the minor objections which the Arians were accustomed to bring up against Athanasius concerned the variableness of the Son. “Has he free will, or has he not? is he good from choice according to free will, or can he, if he will, alter, being of an alterable nature? or, as wood or stone, has he not his free choice to be moved and incline hither and thither? (1)” This is a very deep question. All the moral worth that man knows of depends on responsible, therefore free action. If God is good, his goodness, if it be moral, must be responsible, and therefore free. Origen had recognized this difficulty, and had felt himself forced to explain the impeccability of Jesus as acquired from successful resistance to temptation; for we cannot regard him morally good who, from the constitution of his nature, cannot help being good.

2. *Athanasius's Answer*.—Athanasius as usual breaks out into vociferous objurgations, and thinks that it is superfluous to examine it, for “it is enough simply to write down what they say, and so to shew its daring irreligion (2).” His arguments are very incoherent: “If the Word be alterable, and changing, where will he stay, and what will be the end of his development? How shall the alterable possibly be like the unalterable? Nay, perhaps, as being alterable, and advancing daily, he is not perfect yet.” If the Son is the Image of the Father he must also be unalterable. Wisdom cannot be changeable. He has not touched the argument at all; he has merely proved unchangeableness from other considerations; he has not explained how the Son can have free Will and still be the Image of the unchangeable.

3. *Plurality of “Logoi”*.—The conception of alterability leads us to a consideration of the claims of the Arians that there was not only one but many Logoi. Asterius says: “Blessed Paul said not that he preached Christ, the Power of The God, or the Wisdom of The God, but without the addition of the article, ‘God's power’ and ‘God's Wisdom,’ thus preaching that the proper Power of God himself which is natural to him, and coëxistent with him ingenerately, is something besides, generative indeed of Christ, and creative of the whole world, concerning which he teaches in his Epistle to the Romans thus,—‘The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead.’ His eternal Power and Godhead also is not the Only-begotten

Son, but the Father who begat him. However, his eternal power and wisdom, which truth argues to be without beginning and ingenerate, the same must surely be one. For there are many wisdoms which are one by one created by him, of whom Christ is the first-born and only-begotten; all however equally depend on their possessor. And all the powers are rightly called his who created and uses them:—as the Prophet says that the Locust which came to be a divine punishment of human sins, was called by God himself not only a power, but a great power; and blessed David, in most of the Psalms invites not the angels alone, but the Powers to praise God (*).” Athanasius thinks that with the above the following conflicts: “God the Word is one, but many are the things rational; and one is the essence and nature of wisdom, but many are the things wise and beautiful. Who are they whom they honour with the title of God’s children? for they will not say that they too are words, nor maintain that there are many wisdoms. For it is not possible, whereas the Word is one, and Wisdom has been set forth as one, to dispense to the multitude of children the Essence of the Word, and to bestow on them the appellation of Wisdom (*).” It is plain that in the first extract referred to the many “wisdoms” are what in the second he speaks of as “many things wise and beautiful.” In the second extract, Asterius is endeavouring, more than in the first, to show the difference between the Wisdom of God and all other things begotten or created, and so denies them the name of Wisdom which in its proper sense is only applicable to God. Besides, if this exegesis should happen to not suffice for Athanasius, it is possible to quote his own words as to the difference of interpretations necessary in regard to the object and person to which it is spoken, as the first is written to Christians, and quoting the words of the New Testament, whereas the other is a philosophic discussion with the heathen, who would not understand the secondary sense in which all things wise were called “wisdoms” without the article, in contradistinction to The Wisdom of God.

4. *Athanasius’s Arguments.*—Against these considerations Athanasius urges:

I. “If, as they hold, he is the Son, not because he is begotten of the Father and proper to his essence, but that he is called Word only because of things rational, and Wisdom because of things gifted with wisdom, and Power because of things gifted with power, surely he must be named Son because of those who are made sons; and perhaps because there are things existing, he has even his existence in our notions only. And then, after all, what is he? for he is none of these himself, if they are but his names: and he has but a semblance of being, and is decorated with these names from us. Rather this is some recklessness of the Devil, or worse, if they are not unwilling that they should truly subsist themselves, but think that God’s Word is but in name (*).” Athanasius evidently did not reflect that the only

way that we come to know of God is by an application of anthropomorphism ; and that we have no right to suppose that anything we predicate of God is anything more than a name. But here is Athanasius, usually the enemy of anthropomorphism, insisting so strongly upon it that he finds fault with those who point out that it is a mere analogical method of proof, therefore subjective, and valid in name only. It is therefore not objective; and while we can predicate dualities of God, we can never predicate anything of him that is not "in our notions" only.

II. "Are they not profligate, who when they hear us say that the Word coexists with the Father, forthwith murmur out, 'Are you not speaking of two Unoriginate?' yet in themselves speaking of 'his unoriginate Wisdom' do not see that they have themselves already incurred the charge which they so rashly urge against us? Moreover, what folly is there in that thought of theirs that the Unoriginate Wisdom coexisting with God is God himself (*)!"

The above words are quoted to show how passionately blind Athanasius was. In one sentence he accuses the Arians of holding two Unoriginate, and in the next he accuses them of holding that God and his Wisdom are one and the same thing. It is plain that if two things are one and the same thing, then they are not two different or separate Unoriginate beings. The insult which Athanasius heaps on the Arians in connection with the matter is worth noting, as indicating the temper and blind rage that made him misunderstand his opponents, on his own assertion.

III. "Is not this portentous, to say that the Wisdom coexists with the Father, yet not to say that this is the Christ, but that there are many created powers and wisdoms, of which one is the Lord whom they go on to compare with the caterpillar and the locust (!)?" The reason of the existence of the Arian movement is very plain. On the one hand, it can be demonstrated that all Ante-Nicene Fathers considered that the Logos was God only in a secondary sense. When the party of Athanasius asserted that the Wisdom was coequal with God, it was natural to accept this, but to say, then Jesus Christ was not The Wisdom, but only a secondary Wisdom. Though, therefore, in terms, the Arian doctrine seemed new to Athanasius, it was perhaps only the holding fast to the doctrine received from the Fathers. Besides, unless a distinction between begetting and making be made, as the Arians did not, then naturally Jesus, the Logos, differed only in degree, not kind, from all other beings.

IV. In Scripture, the Arians found many instances in which "words" of God were spoken of, as "I will make my words known unto you (*)." Athanasius contends that these "words" are nothing more than "precepts or commands (*)." Yet, is not Creation attributed to the Logos because it was the Word of command in creation? Thus Athanasius's objection falls harmlessly aside.

V. The Arians urged that then, if God only uttered one word, there was no likeness between his Word and our words, because human words were many. Athanasius answers that “this happens because their authors are men, and have seasons which pass away, and ideas which are successive; and what strikes them first and second, that they utter—for the speaker ceases, and his word is forthwith spent. For it was fitting, whereas God is one, that his image should be one also, and his Word one (10).” This argument seems unsatisfactory. For every man is one, just as God is one, and on that ground should have but one word, as God has but one. And if God has but one, how is it that the Scriptures give his many words of “precept and command”? Every man is one, but has many words; so God, though One, need not have only one word. He is surely entitled to as many words as a man?

5. *The Philonic Distinction.*—But, has Athanasius answered all the arguments of Asterius? No; the most important one, from a historical stand-point, he utterly ignores. It is the distinction of the article between “Wisdom” and “The Wisdom.” In itself, this distinction was perhaps one which Asterius may have invented; but it was identical with the famous Philonic distinction, recognized by the Author of the Fourth Gospel, by Paul, and in later times expressly by Origen, whom Athanasius professes to admire so much. This distinction is so crucial, that Athanasius cannot have ignored it, especially if he had read the works of Origen, whom he quotes as an orthodox authority. And if Athanasius cannot have ignored it, and is silent on the subject, especially when it is brought up against him by his opponents, what must we think? Must we not suppose that Athanasius had no answer to make to it, no argument to oppose it with?

CHAPTER X.

THE LIGHT-AND-RAY SIMILE.

1. *The Light-and-Ray Simile.*—At the end of the discussion of the word “Image,” it was asked, Why should there be any such thing as an image? The Aristotelian idea of development, and the Eastern conception of Emanationism, had mingled, in the works of Philo, into a conception of “begetting” which Christianity inherited. If, however, the question was asked, How can it take place, the only answer was a reference to the natural phenomenon of the light and its ray. God is impartitive: he is perfect, and can never be lessened or increased (¹). Yet, although he can become no less, he begets “out of himself” his Logos, which act of begetting is as eternal as he is himself, since he is eternally Father (²). This is the eternal generation of the Son, according to Origen. When Christians were asked how this could take place, they pointed to the Sun. The Sun never grows less or diminishes. And yet as eternally as the light exists it begets from itself a ray of light. The radiance is not external to the light (³); an eternal light must have an eternal radiance (⁴) for it is absurd to think that the light was at any time ray-less (⁵). “We see that the radiance from the sun is proper to it, and the sun’s essence is not divided or impaired, but its essence is whole, and its radiance perfect and whole, yet without impairing the essence of light, but as a true offspring of it (⁶).” “As radiance of light, so is he perfect offspring from perfect (⁷).” “For the light must be with the ray, and the radiance must be contemplated together with its own light (⁸).” “As the light of the sun and of the radiance is one, and as the sun’s illumination is effected through the radiance (⁹).” “And this one may see in the instance of light and radiance; for the light enlightens, that the radiance irradiates, from the light is its enlightenment (¹⁰).” “In the case of the radiance and light one might say, that there is no will preceding radiance in the light, but it is its natural offspring, at the pleasure of the light which begat it, not by will and consideration, but in nature and truth (¹¹).” The Arians agreed to this: but they asked, does not the effect always follow the cause, and is there not always a precedence of the cause? Athanasius answered, no. They are simultaneous. Speaking of the radiance of the light and the water of the fountain, he says: “they will find that these, though an offspring” (that is, effect) “always exist simultaneously with those things from which they are (¹²).”

The whole controversy has now been brought down into a nutshell : is an effect always simultaneous with the cause ? If the cause is first, and before the effect, then the Arian contention is supported ; if it be decided that the cause and effect are always absolutely simultaneous, then the contention of Athanasius is vindicated.

Besides the Light-and-ray simile, Athanasius used also the fountain-and-water simile, very often together with the former one. "Is it not then irreligious to say, 'Once the Son was not?' for it is all one with saying, 'Once the fountain was dry, destitute of Life and Wisdom.' But a fountain it would then cease to be ; for what begetteth not from itself, is not a fountain (¹³)."

2. *The Holy Spirit Ignored.*—It is very strange how in both these similes no place is left for the Holy Ghost. That Athanasius did not simply ignore it, we may prove from the following passage, where a Trinity is first spoken of, and then the simile is given without any place for the Holy Ghost, as Ephrem, who speaks of the light, radiance, and heat.

3. *The Value of Similes.*—It must now be asked, What value have these illustrations for us ? On them hangs the fate of Philonic Christian philosophy, as well as the Augustinian Neoplatonist cosmology. By this example, and by this class of similes alone was the truth of begetting vindicated ; and if this falls, the whole conception of begetting falls with its foundation. It must be confessed that the Law of Conservation of Energy forbids the thought that the sun loses no heat and light by the radiance it gives off. In fact, astronomers look forward to the time when all the heat of the sun will be spent, and it will be dark. As to the fountain, nobody at the present time believes that the fountain begets itself. Everybody knows that a fountain is only the opening by which the accumulated rain-water seeks an exit ; and when there is no rain for a long while, all fountains run dry. Therefore, there is no such thing as a fountain which begets its own water without diminishing its own store. It is therefore necessary to dismiss these two similes as unthinkable illustrations. And with them Athanasius's conception of begetting comes to be in need of further vindication and rationalization. Besides, modern science cannot recognize the distinction between "begetting" and "creating." The Law of Conservation of Energy, and of chemical atomic weights reduces all such conceptions to absurdities. We only know that there exists in the world a certain quantity of energy, however large that be, and that all apparent changes are no more than transformation of this energy. More than this, no man knows or can know, until further sources of scientific knowledge are made practicable and available.

Newman is the only student of the subject who has dared to touch this fatal point. He endeavours to avoid its implications in the following manner (¹⁴) : "The question is not, whether in matter of fact, in the particular case, the rays would issue after, and not with the first existence of the luminous body ; for the

illustration is not used to shew how such a thing may be, or to give an instance of it, but to convey to the mind a correct idea of what it is proposed to teach in the Catholic doctrine." We may well be asked, how is it possible to convey to the mind a correct idea of what it is proposed to teach without giving an instance or example of the doctrine? The words of Athanasius distinctly assert the fact that on experiment it will be found that the rays issue simultaneously with the existence of the heavenly body, and pointing to the existence of that process to show the possibility of his "eternal generation." The excuse of Newman is but a transparent sophism to extricate Athanasius from a very unenviable position; for modern science has proceeded too far to permit anybody to doubt that the effect always follows the cause, and is not simultaneous with it. Consequently we are absolutely forced to give up all the theories that are built on the assumption that effects are always absolutely simultaneous with their causes, whether in respect to light and its beams, or to the begetting of a Son by a Father. Newman endeavours to evade this conclusion by saying that as time cannot be predicated of God who inhabits eternity, the illustration will not apply. But in this matter Newman contradicts Athanasius who expressly uses that illustration as an explanation of the process, which of course, involves time.

CHAPTER XI.

DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS.

It was the great misfortune of Greek philosophy that the word Logos had two widely accepted connotations : it meant both reason, *logos endiathetos*, and a spoken word of language, *logos prophorikos*. It is from a confusion of these two different connotations that the whole doctrine of the Logos arose.

1. *The Cosmological Logos.*—In his treatise *Against the Heathen* Athanasius begins his polemic against the heathen religions by the usual Christian statement of the absurdities and immoralities of the Pagan religions. Having thus cleared the ground, he asks, If we have proved that all other Gods are false, and ours alone is left, must not then our God be the only true God (1)? This question could be valid only if the claims of all possible, not only actual Gods had been investigated ; whereas Athanasius has not investigated any but the Gods of Greek and Roman mythology. Besides, he has presented none of the true claims of the Greek Gods, but has only considered their faults ; again he presents only the claims of his own God, and does not notice any of the current objections to the Christian religion. It will be seen therefore that his question has no demonstrative value. If, however, there is a Maker of the world, as all acknowledge, then, evidently, this Maker can only be one, since the Universe which is created is also only one (2). Yet, this does not tell us how the World was created, or whether there is any God at all. These questions we must now investigate. "If the movement of creation were irrational, and the Universe were borne along without a plan, a man might fairly disbelieve what we say. But if it subsist in reason and wisdom and skill, and is perfectly ordered throughout, it follows that he that is over it is none other than the Logos-Reason of God (3)." It is plain that this teleological argument leads to a World-Logos-Reason, which is visible in the disposition of Nature. But Athanasius here makes the assumption that it leads to a "God" whose Logos-Reason appears in the world. This then is an unjustifiable conclusion from the premisses given above, however true it may be in itself. Here is the first leap in the theistic argument of Athanasius. It is worth noticing that this argument leads to a World-Reason, or as the Greek language expressed it, a World-Logos. It must be remembered that the Logos to which the argument has led us is a Logos-Reason, and not a Logos-Word. It would be per-

fectly possible for the argument to call this Logos-Reason God, without assuming a God on whom this Logos-Reason depends. And, if we notice, we will see that this is after all the primary conception of Logos. This argument leads us to a Only Maker of the world who is, not has, Logos-Reason. Reason is an inseparable element of consciousness, and if we reason to a World-Reason, we thereby imply a World-Consciousness, of which Reason is a necessary attribute, as not being unreasonable. Next, Athanasius distinctly declares that by Logos-Reason he does not mean the Stoic "spermatic Logos-Reason," "which is without soul and has no power of reason or thought, but only works by eternal act, according to the skill of him who applies it (4)." Nor does he mean a "Logos-word" such as "belongs to rational beings and consists of syllables, and has the air as its vehicle of expression (5)."

Here Athanasius makes his second leap in argument. His argument had led him to a "logos-reason ;" and because the word "logos" in Greek meant both reason and word, he already feels it necessary to show that he does not mean a "human" "logos-word," although the Divine "logos-word" is already in his mind. This confusion would not be so important if it did not have serious consequences on the nature of the Deity. Reason is a psychological element of a consciousness, and can never be separated from consciousness, or become an "other" to it. A Word, however, may become separated from the psychical consciousness as an audible physical entity, without depriving the consciousness of its reason. Thus, when the conceptions of reason and word are confused, we begin to have the possibility of the Divine Reason becoming separated from the Divine consciousness, and becoming an "other" to it, without subtracting from the rationality of the Divine consciousness. Psychologically this is indefensible, for it would leave the Divine consciousness irrational, as having lost its Reason. But, if we speak of the Divine Logos both as reason and word, then the Divine Logos means Divine Reason as divine and part of the divinity; and of the Divine Word, as sent of the Father, who is not then left irrational, to create the world. This relation of the Logos-Reason to the Logos-Word will appear more clearly when it is proved that on the strength of the teleological argument just adduced Athanasius says that God is he who "like an excellent pilot, by his own Wisdom and his own Logos, our Lord and Saviour Christ steers and preserves and orders all things, and does as seems to him best (6)." Now it is evident that the pilot has as an element of his own consciousness reason, which we may call wisdom. But, strange to say, we find that this Wisdom or Logos-Reason, is identified with a separate personality, "our Lord and Saviour Christ," that is, Jesus, by means of which God steers and preserves and orders all things. Evidently, the leap has been made, and the Logos-Reason, an inalienable property of the consciousness of God, without which he would be irra-

trinal, is an external Logos-Word, a separate personality, which if identified with the personality of Jesus, should not only be a dissected reason-faculty, but a perfect consciousness of thought, feeling, and will. This will be clearer still from the following quotation: "But though he is Logos-Word, he is not, as we said, after the likeness of human words, composed of syllables; but he is the unchanging image of his own Father. For men composed of parts and made out of nothing, have their discourse composite and divisible. But God possesses true existence and is not composite but is the one and only-begotten God, who proceeds in his goodness from the Father as a good fountain, and orders all things and holds them together (")." Here it is evident that the Logos is used in the sense of Logos-Word, although the proofs for his existence all led to the Logos-Reason. This is a distinct fallacy of double middle. For, how could a person's own psychological faculty of reason, be firstly, in the likeness of human vocables, and secondly, be the external image of the person itself? For by the substraction of the faculty of reason, that person would be left as irrational as a pigeon whose brain has been cut out. How can a person's Reason be his external image, or image external to him? How can a person's reason be said to be "begotten" of him? How can a person's reason be identified with the personality of another individual consciousness? If, however, after we have reached by the teleological argument the Logos-Reason of God, we then abandon it for the Logos-Word, then we can understand how a person's word may be said to be an image of the person speaking, how the image may be external to them without leaving them irrational, how the word may be said to be "begotten" of the person, and how by this "word" the pilot may command how the ship shall be steered. But all this can only take place by confusing the two distinct meanings of the word Logos, which we have endeavoured to render in English by the words "Logos-Reason" and "Logos-Word."

But this confusion of meanings has another bearing. The Logos-Reason being part of the personality, is coequal and coeternal with it. The Logos-Word is subordinate to the personality, existing only at the good-will and pleasure of the personality, existing not before the Personality chooses to speak it, and although consubstantial with it in the sense the word bore before Nicaea, yet not as divine, perfect, spiritual, and intelligible as the consciousness itself. The Philonic and Arian conception of the Logos was the latter, the Logos-Word, although they had also arrived to a conception of it by the illogical teleological argument shown above. Athanasius was the first who confused both Logos-Reason and Logos-Word as the Jesus or the Second Person of the Divinity. He never realized the terrible consequence, that if God's psychological faculty or function of reason be subtracted from him he must be left reasonless, or irrational.

2. *The Existence of a Logos.*—But, suppose we do not believe in the existence of such a thing as a Logos? “And if a man were incredulously to ask, if there be a Logos of God at all, such an one would indeed be mad to doubt concerning the Logos-Reason of God, but yet demonstration is possible from what is seen, because all things subsist by the Logos-Reason and Wisdom of God, nor would any created thing have had a fixed existence had it not been made by reason, and that reason the Logos-Reason of God, as we have said (1).” Thus Athanasius assumes the existence of such a thing as a Logos as a universally recognized fact, as it was in the philosophy of the times of Athanasius. He has no new argument to prove it, except the fact that all who do not believe it are “mad.” The function of the cosmic Logos is to unite itself to creation. It is ungrudging, and therefore does not grudge stable existence to created things, which, because they are created out of nothing, would otherwise perish as they were created. They can only have stable existence when the Logos unites its own existence to them (2). “For just as though some musician, having tuned a lyre, and by his art adjusted the high notes to the low, and the intermediate notes to the rest, were to produce a single tune as the result, so also the Wisdom of God, handling the Universe as a lyre, and adjusting things in the air to things on the earth, and things in heaven to things in the air, and combining parts into wholes and moving them all by his beck and will, produces well and fittingly as the result, the unity of the Universe and its order, himself remaining unmoved with the Father while he moves all things by his organizing action, as seems good for each to his own Father (3).” Thus the function of the Logos is to keep harmony in the world: like a harmonious chorus composed of the voices of old and young (4), like the harmonious and simultaneous action of the human senses (5), and the different occupations of the men who compose a city (6). The Logos must keep in harmony the visible and invisible worlds, just as the human body and soul are kept in harmony (7). Thus the Father reveals his Logos through creation, being “begotten” of the Father (8). It would be as foolish to admire the world and despise the Logos its Maker, as to admire a beautiful musical instrument and despise its designer and maker (9).

3. *The “Hand” of God.*—Among the titles of the Logos, there is one which Athanasius uses sparingly, but which had much patristic authority. It is that of being the “Hand” of God (10). Irenaeus (11) and Hilary (12) had used it. Thus God “uses his proper Logos as a hand, and in him does all things (13).” Athanasius used this to denote the consubstantiality of God with the Logos, whereas the Arians are said by Sokratès (14) to have preferred to use the word “tool” or “instrument” (15). It may however be asked whether this conception of “hand” agrees with the conception of Logos-Reason. Can a man use his psychological faculty of reason as he uses his hand, and by it, as

a hand, create? Common experience shows that when a man does something with his hand, his psychological faculty of reason is still intact in his consciousness and is an "other" to the hand. As Logos-Word, however, we can understand how God may be said to create by the Logos-Word, the command, Let there be Light, for instance. Thus God uses his Logos-Word as a hand in creating. But has this no subordinational implications? If the Trinity has no difference of rank or degree, can the second person be called the hand of the rest? Is not the hand used as an instrument, a means, not a separate personality in itself? Is not the hand utterly subordinate to the consciousness? Would we worship a hand in the same sense that we would worship the consciousness that directs it? Is the hand any more than an instrument? As to the consubstantiality of the hand with the consciousness, it must be remembered again that to the Arian there was no difference between "begetting" and "creating." To Athanasius there would have been a vast difference between a "hand" and an external "instrument." To the Arian there was none, for he considered that all things outside of God himself were originated in the same manner, albeit the difference of degree may have existed. Therefore this distinction is only vital to Athanasius or to somebody who can in the Scriptures find a consistent distinction between "making" and "begetting." If the hand is an instrument through which the personality creates, then the hand must exist for the sake of creation, and not creation for the sake of the hand. Athanasius considers the first opinion blasphemous however, and considers that we exist for the sake of the Logos (²²). How inconsistent this position is with the conception of a hand, needs no additional comment. This difficulty shows how little Athanasius realized the meaning of the terms he used.

Besides, how could the "hand" of God be his Image? How could the "hand" of God be his Only-begotten Son? Does a man beget his own hand? We asked, how could the "hand" of God be his image? This could take place easily if the image be conceived of as a mere resemblance; but the Athanasian conception of Image is an absolute reproduction, in every sense equal to its Archetype. This could clearly not be the case with a hand.

4. *The Light-and-Ray Simile.*—The relation of Father to Son, Athanasius always explains by a reference to the simile of the light and its ray, and the fountain and the stream. We discuss this question elsewhere. To beget is not to give out by emanation part of one's own nature. It is participation of the whole nature. Of the Son, all things partake. But begetting itself takes place without affection or division; and therefore it must be that the Son is the Logos-Reason and Wisdom of God (²³). For, "Has not a man himself lost his mind, who even entertains the thought that God was ever without Logos-Reason and without Wisdom (²⁴)?" Doubtless, nobody doubts that there is

reason in God's consciousness ; but this does not mean that everybody believes that there is in God a Logos-Word from all eternity. "To dwell upon our own logos-word as an illustration . . . as it is proper to us and not a work external to us, so also God's Logos-Word is proper to him, and from him, and is not a work (²⁵)." A work is external to the nature, but a Son is a proper offspring of the essence, and a man may be and be called a Maker though the works are not yet, but Father he cannot be called, nor can he be unless the Son exists (²⁶). It is doubtful whether reflection will support this distinction. Origen's argument when applied to the Son, is hailed with delight by the orthodox Athanasius ; but when applied to the world, the same argument is scouted. The reason is that Athanasius held the distinction between begetting and making of which Origen was innocent. The Father and Son are not related as two parts are to a whole ; the Father is the whole, in all of which the Son participates (²⁷). They are not like vessels emptying into each other, but either is necessary to the other's perfection (²⁸). The Father is not in the Son in the same way that he is in the saints ; the Son is one with him not by participation but by offspring, by begetting (²⁹). The Father is in the Son, and one with him, as the emperor's likeness is in the statue (³⁰).

That the Logos-Word of God is substantially eternal with him, Athanasius proves from the fact that the Logos-Reason of God is substantially eternal with him whose unoriginateness is substantial (³¹). Is God wise, and not Logos-Reason-less, or is he Wisdom-less, and Logos-Reason-less ? If the Logos-Word-Reason is from without, somebody must have given him his Logos-Reason, which is absurd ; for before he received it, he must have been Logos-Reason-less, and Wisdom-less. If he has his Logos-Reason from himself, it is plain that the Logos-Word is then not from nothing, or from without (³²). The fallacy of the argument will be apparent on reading this attentively, the English translation of each occurrence of the word Logos pointing out the sense in which it is taken in that particular place. Unless then the Father and Son are two in name only, or are related mutually as parts of a whole, which would make them both imperfect, then unless they be two Gods, they must be consubstantial, one in Godhead, and the Son must be free from the Father (³³). How this can take place, however, without the subordination of one of the two is a mystery.

Such in outline is Athanasius's conception of the Logos-Doc-trine. As we said at the beginning, it turned for the most part on an equivocation between the two meanings of the Word Logos. That such a thing as a Logos exists, Athanasius considers so certain, that he conceives it to be "madness" to doubt it. But since in modern times all doubt it, and thus are "mad," how shall they be enabled to hold the Christian faith whose philosophy is irrevocably bound up with that conception ?

5. *The Arian Philonic Argument.*—Arius, Eusebius, and Asterius, had repeated the Philonic argument for the necessity of the existence of such a thing as the Logos. "God being willing to create and originate Nature, when he saw that it could not endure the untempered hand of the Father, and to be created by him, makes and creates first and alone one only, and calls him Son and Logos, that through him as a medium, all things might thereupon be brought to be." This had been the philosophical argument for the need of the Logos. When, however, it was used by his opponents, Athanasius opposed it on two grounds; If the things that are originate cannot bear the hand of God, and the Son is a thing originate, then neither he will be able to bear the untempered hand of God, and it will be necessary to find a mediator between God and him; and the same argument will apply to him, and so on *ad infinitum*. If however the Son as originate could bear the hand of God, then all things could also bear the hand of God, as being also originate⁽⁸⁴⁾. Again, there was no need of a mediator, since God never grows weary of commanding, nor is he not strong enough to accomplish all he desires⁽⁸⁵⁾. The crowning argument of such a mission of the Logos would be that it would appear that he would have come into existence for our sake, whereas, since woman was made for the man, we were created for his sake⁽⁸⁶⁾. The Son is therefore in the estimation of Athanasius the end of creation, instead of being the means by which the creation takes place. Yet, if we remember that Athanasius calls the Son Hand and Right Arm of the Father, we would have the self-contradictory notion that the creation of the hand was made for the sake of the hand, not the hand for the sake of what it could do. Thus we see that originally this term must have been used by men who differed radically from Athanasius on the point at issue. Asterius was more of a philosopher than a Christian. And it was on this account that Athanasius opposed the philosophical Philonic conception, because it was advocated by Asterius.

6. *Plurality of Logoi.*—Having thus given Athanasius's doctrine of the Logos, and pointed out the confusion of the two distinct thoughts, the Logos-Reason, and the Logos-Word, which correspond respectively to the endiathetic and prophetic Logoi of Justin Martyr, the student is now ready to understand why the Arians spoke of several Logoi. Clearer in thought than Athanasius, they had detected this confusion, without the assistance of the above traditional names. Athanasius's method was simply to assert the identity of these two different thoughts without further ado. He could easily do so, because if he came to any contradiction, it was only necessary to call it a mystery in order to sanctify it.

This is the very subject of Atzberger's essay, so that we must quote from him here⁽⁸⁷⁾.

Atzberger's first point is that the Arians separated these two conceptions, for which distinction they had the authority of Jus-

tin and Clement. "It is doubtless true that the Arians distinguished in the simple essence of God a Logos and a Wisdom; but they distinguished from this inner Logos the Hellenic idea of the Logos. In this distinction lies the deepest root of the Arian Deism, and also the only possible avoidance of it. This very distinction demands a division of the Trinity." But if this Arian Deism was founded on this distinction, Justin and Clement of Alexandria may be called Arian Deists; and if this be the case, the Nicene conception, and not Arianism was the innovation. And Athanasius does make an innovation on Justin, Hippolutos, and Clement of Alexandria. He positively and explicitly refuses to recognize the distinction⁽³⁸⁾. "We believe in one Logos, neither implicit nor explicit."

Atzberger proceeds to give Athanasius's position. "Athanasius started from the position that the Creating and Incarnate Logos must be very God, and that this Logos can be no other than the Logos which it is necessary to suppose is indwelling in God. In doing this, Athanasius has severed the vital root of Arian Deism. Without spending much time in investigating if it be at all possible to unite both conceptions, or how this could be accomplished, he unites them at the very start; he explains the teachings of positive Revelation through the results of speculation and the latter he completes and perfects by the assistance of the former" (*i. e.*, a logical vicious circle).

Atzberger however recognizes that it is doubtful how far Athanasius was right in so doing and excuses him from this most crucial task on the most childish pleas. "It is true that after doing this it should have been for Athanasius his main duty to demonstrate, and prove the identity of the inner and spoken Logos. But Athanasius was not at liberty to remove hither the field of discussion, since his first duty was to save the dogma of the Trinity, which was endangered by the distinction." But if it can be demonstrated that this distinction existed in the days of Justin Martyr and Hippolutos, then it is proved that in those days the dogma of the Trinity did not exist. After saying that Athanasius's right to unite both conceptions was at the very least totally unproved, Atzberger says: "At the time of Athanasius everybody endeavoured to make the Christian Idea the content of general speculation, and therefore it was the custom to apply to it all the categories of Hellenic philosophy. That is, it was customary to identify the heathen idea of the Logos with the historical Christ. In the false union of these two elements centered at the time all heresies." But it can be proved that this union had taken place as early as Justin and therefore according to Atzberger Justin would have to be called a heretic, and perhaps even the author of the Fourth Gospel who introduced into the New Testament the technical term of Greek philosophy, the Logos.

The whole discussion can be summarised in a few words. The Arians upheld Justin's distinction between the two Logoi, as

rational philosophy did universally in their day. Athanasius simply denied that venerable distinction without assigning any reason for this procedure. Except where he needed philosophy to establish the fact that such a thing as a Logos existed at all, he dismissed philosophy once for all. Harnack (³⁹) well says : " In the last resort, Athanasius nowhere considers the Logos in itself ; he see only the Divine which appeared in Jesus Christ. He has no longer any independent philosophic doctrine of the Logos ; he has become a student of Christology." He does not pretend to justify his premisses intellectually ; his religion he justifies by his speculations ; his speculations he supports by premisses drawn from religion. Atzberger calls this the specific Christian method of speculation ; but that not shelter it from the charge of being, in the light of logic, indefensible. It is in a reverend garb the old familiar process of begging the question.

CHAPTER XII.

THE TRINITARIANISM OF AUGUSTINE.

1. *The Source of Augustine's Philosophy.*—The most casual reader of Augustine's theology feels that he has entered into a new realm when it is contrasted with the theology of Athanasius. New words and new conceptions meet his glance everywhere. The reason is that the philosophy of the two theologians is different. Athanasius is the disciple of Plato, interpreted by Philo. Augustine is the disciple of Ammonius Sakkas, the combiner of Plato with Aristotle. Neither realized their real source of inspiration. They accepted naturally the current philosophy of the day, without appearing to realize that there was any other philosophy. So each interprets Christianity according to his philosophy; and the result is a change of theology, amounting almost to a change of religion. But of this more later.

For the convenience of the student, it may be well to state that the gist of Neo-Platonism, the philosophy of Augustine, is a combination, more or less skilful, of the God and Psychology of Aristotle, with the Divine Mind (idea-system) of Plato, and the World-Soul of the Stoics.

Like Plotinos, Augustine holds the essential unity of God and Man (¹). With Plotinos, man was an essential part of the Universe, so that it was possible to conclude to the nature of God from that of man as to a whole from a part. But Augustine makes man only the creature of God, like him, indeed, but essentially separate. Hence either reveals the nature of the other only by "traces" of similarity. Yet these are sufficiently strong to permit Augustine to describe the nature of God from a consideration of human psychology, man being created in the image of God (²) (³). It is necessary, therefore, to begin our discussion of God, by an account of psychology.

2. *The Theoretical Psychology.*—When Augustine reasons concerning the Trinity, his psychology is that of Plato, more or less. The human soul is composed of existence or memory, thought and will (⁴). These are the faculties of consciousness (⁵). Each of these faculties can be used in three ways: towards external things (⁶), self (⁷), and God (⁸). The soul's thought of God proceeds from her memory, to which it is united by the love of God, which proceeds from the faculty of will.

3. *The Practical Psychology.*—When Augustine is off his guard, that is, not trying to prove the Trinity, his psychology is that of

Aristotle, more or less. The human soul is not three-fold, as above, but seven-fold, as follows : Man is divided into body (corpus) and soul, (anima) (9). The body will be vivified by the Spiritus (the spiritus creatus, inbreathed by the Holy Ghost,) at the day of resurrection, just as the anima is alive in the present dispensation (10). The anima is divided into (11) rational and irrational powers (12). The irrational anima is composed of memory, sense, and desire, (adpetitum). The rational anima, also called animus, is distinct from the whole anima (13). The animus is again divided into the rational and irrational parts. The lower or irrational part is divided into four parts : the animus irrationalis proper, the animus passivus, the animus spiritalis, and the perturbationes animi (14). All these powers of the animus irrationalis together form the virtutes and the will (15). The rational or intellectual animus is divided into the two highest faculties of the human mind : mind, and last and greatest, reason. Above this there was no higher faculty, and consequently there was no means of actual union with God, as in the psychology of Plotinos. Man shared his essentia, that is, his body, with the stones and earth ; the seminal life (the anima irrationalis ?) with the trees ; his sensual life (the anima irrationalis ?) with the animals, and his rational life (the animus rationalis ?) with the angels alone (16). Thus both men and angels are separate from the higher realms of divinity.

4. *Conflict of the Psychologies.*—How shall these two systems of Psychology be harmonized ? Consistency is the least of Augustine's cares. Yet, if both are true they must both harmonize. Perhaps the essence or memory is the anima irrationalis ; the will, the animus irrationalis, and thought, the rational or intellectual animus. But if this be the case, the equality of the Trinity is lost. The Father would be the lowest of the three Persons, and subject to both ; the Holy Ghost would control the Father, and be ruled by the Son ; and the Son would dispose of both the other members of the Trinity. This subordination would follow from the fact that each lower function or part of consciousness is ruled by each higher one (17), as is shown by his identification of the anima irrationalis with the life of trees, the animus irrationalis with the life of animals, and the animus rationalis with the life of angels.

Of course the result is absurd, and it is better to consider both schemes inconsistent. It would be useless to ask which was the most correct, as both disagree with an actual psychology.

5. *Existence of God.*—Experience affords knowledge of truth. But all experiences are true inasmuch as they partake of the quality of truth, through which they are true. There exists then a highest truth on account of which all other things are true. The highest truth is the highest, for if there were a higher one, it would not be the highest. That truth beyond which the imagination cannot proceed is God. This is the proof of the existence of God.

6. *The Divine Psychology.*—Applying the theoretical psychology to the Divine Nature, God is triune, being absolute Intelligence, Will, and Spirit. Being or memory is also conceived of as self-consciousness (¹⁸), but not even then would man's trinity, self-consciousness, thought and will, agree with God's Intelligence, Will, and Spirit. With man, love proceeds from will; with God, from Spirit. Here is another inconsistency.

But this is not all of Augustine's self-contradiction. The following statements must be left as hopeless. When God reflects himself, he generates from himself the eternal Word, in which he adequately expresses himself. Thus the Word is the Son of God, the personal likeness of the Father. Beholding each other, they both generate as out of one source the personal Love, the Holy Spirit (¹⁹). The Father is Intelligence, the Son Will, and the Spirit Love. The Persons of the Trinity are one in essence, distinct in personality. All perfections of the essence of God, apply to each separately, and to all together. Only the qualities which constitute the individuality of each belong to one particular person. As they are one as to essence, they are coëqual.

Lack of space will prevent us from proceeding to a consideration of how God created the world. Augustine in this follows Plato.

7. *Destiny of Augustine's System.*—The personality of Augustine of Hippo was so masterful that his system became that of the Christian Church for all time, being finally reformulated by Thomas of Aquino in almost the same words. It is at the present day the standard of orthodoxy, and from this fact derives all its practical interest.

The immense prestige of Augustine may be gauged by the fact that he fixed for all time the Doctrine of the Trinity in the year 400, while the equally important doctrine of Salvation had to wait till the year 1200 to be finally formulated by Anselm of Canterbury. Surely Augustine was a giant among men !

BOOK IV.

THE SUCCESSIVE INNOVATIONS.

CHAPTER I.

THE INNOVATIONS OF AUGUSTINE.

1. *The Innovations of Augustine.*—It has been our task so far merely to set forth certain facts of the history of Christianity which any student can verify for himself. Truth belongs to no school of dogma, and the student will be free to search for it, without any imputation of heresy. Having ascertained these facts, it is now necessary to draw their natural inferences. This is a task of logic, and should not be disturbed by doctrinal prejudice. The seeker after truth follows her dispassionately, careless where she may lead him. The method which we shall employ will be to notice the changes which the doctrine of the Trinity underwent at the hands of each later theologian, beginning with Augustine, and working back to Jesus of Nazara himself. In this manner it will be possible to distinguish sharply the geological strata of doctrine, and finally arrive at some fair notion of what the original message of Christianity must have been.

Since this deduction is a purely scientific enquiry, it depends wholly on the accuracy of the facts mentioned above. As soon as new facts will be discovered, the conclusions will have to be if necessary changed to that extent. As all scientific conclusions, the results below are merely tentative, awaiting future recension, and broadened statement. To brand the conclusions as orthodox or heretical will not change them; only the fact that they are mistaken, or untrue to the facts mentioned, will alter them in the estimation of the man of science. And as no human production can ever hope to claim inerrancy, it is probable they are in some degree open to revision. In this tentative spirit they are put forth.

In considering the Trinitarianism of Augustine after that of Athanasius, the reader is forcibly impressed with the novelty of the former. It is true that both rest on the validity of the principle of anthropomorphism, or if the more orthodox name be

preferred, theomorphism. It is immaterial whether a man concludes to the nature of God from that of man, which alone is known, or, whether he asserts that man is in the image of God, and that there is a likeness between the image and its pattern. In either case the known factor is human psychology. But Athanasius and Augustine differ in this psychology. Athanasius never defined it clearly. He contented himself with asserting the fact that man had such a faculty as Logos-Reason. Then, by the convenient equivocation between Logos-Word and Logos-Reason, it appeared natural that man should "beget" a Logos-Word, which is consubstantial with, but distinct from the human personality uttering it. Augustine, on the other hand, was deprived of this convenient equivocation by the fact that he wrote in Latin, where it does not exist. He was forced to find a new psychological scheme which would account for a Trinity. He found this in the trine faculties of being, thought, and will. Before his time, however, the student of philosophy does not hear of such a psychology being applied either to God or Man by a Church Father. Hence we are forced to conclude that it was an innovation in the realm of theology.

But this psychology contains another innovation. The Athanasian psychology, as also the light-and-ray simile, accounted only for two principles in a psychological being. Now the Augustinian psychology accounted for three principles or faculties. Hence comes this innovation in cosmology, too. That this need was a real one may be seen from the fact that Ephrem the Syrian enlarged the light-and-ray simile to the one of light-ray-and-heat, to account for the Holy Ghost. But this enlargement is not found in Athanasius.

A moment's reflection will show that unless a man holds three principles of psychology and cosmology, he can be called a Trinitarian by courtesy only. Athanasius was vociferous in enumeration of the three Names of the Baptismal Formula; but when he came to explain it by psychology or cosmology, he could never account for more than two. This proves that the traditional dogma and the traditional cosmology were heterogeneous elements, having no inner connection. Augustine was alone orthodox in philosophy as well as in dogma; but it is no less evident that this orthodoxness of philosophy was an unequivocal innovation.

Although Athanasius's psychology accounted for only two principles, when driven to the wall he discovered three in cosmology, the third one being the Origenistic indwelling of the Spirit in the hearts of believers as the Spirit's essential function. But even in this matter Augustine was an innovator. Here the Holy Ghost has nothing to do with the creation of the world, re-creating the hearts of believers only, not being present in those of unbelievers. With Augustine the Spirit is an integral part of the nature of God, and as such took part in any action of God, as, for instance, in the creation of the world. This is a radical

difference, demanded by the Trinitarian dogma, but no less on that account a distinct innovation.

2. *The Mistakes of Augustine.*—In the system of Augustine there are two fatal logical errors which can only be referred to briefly.

I. Human psychology revealed, according to him, in one human personality three faculties or functions; that of being, thought, and will. These are not separate personalities, or three separate consciousnesses. They are only three different aspects under which one and the same consciousness may be regarded. There are only three manners in which one indivisible consciousness operates. But when this human psychology is applied to God, we are startled to find that each separate faculty or function has suddenly somehow acquired an individual or separate consciousness or personality; so that we have a consciousness which consists exclusively of being, one which consists exclusively of thought, and one which consists exclusively of will. And besides, these three separate individual consciousnesses are inexplicably part of the same identical nature, which is also presumably self-conscious. What relation shall these four separate and different consciousnesses bear to each other? If the analogy between man and God had been carried out consistently, we would have in God also only one indivisible consciousness or personality, operating in three different manners. It is needless to say that a conception of a consciousness composed exclusively only of being, or of thought, or of will, is an absurdity of the Muenchausen type, never heard of before Augustine, and one of which no one will grudge him the honor of being the inventor, nay, originator.

II. The whole argument of Augustine is an application to the nature of God of the psychology of man. But in this process the human faculties of being, thought, and will, by a magical change become in God intelligence, will, and spirit; Being becoming intelligence, thought will, and will spirit. Besides, in the human mind the three faculties of being, knowledge and will are coördinate, or simultaneous, neither arising out of the other, being a threefold form of self-expression. In the Divine Nature the first begets the second, and both beget a third.

But what is the use of insisting on Augustine's inconsistencies? The reader will long ago have concluded that his arguments are fallacious, and do not represent reality.

CHAPTER II.

THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NICENE CONTROVERSY.

1. *Athanasius's Appeal to Antiquity.*—Athanasius believed that his opinions agreed with those of antiquity. It has already been shewn that he considered his opinions founded on Scripture. But, besides this, he believed that the Church had always held his opinions. He makes great capital (1) out of the fact that the Arians are called after Arius, and are not called Christians or Catholics. Then he says : “ But if they confess that such a commandment was never heard of before, will they not also allow that this heresy of theirs is a modern invention, and that it has no support or favour from antiquity or tradition ? But what a wretched thing must that be which the Fathers knew nothing of, but which has newly been thought of (2).” “ For if the doctrine of God is now in a perfect triad, and this is the only and true religion, and this the good and the truth, it must have been always so, unless the good and the truth be something that came after, and the doctrine of God is completed by additions. I say, it must have been essentially so (3).” “ Who, on the rise of this odious heresy, of the Arians, was not at once startled at what he heard, as strange, and a second sowing, besides that word which had been sown from the beginning (4).” “ Nor from the Fathers have we heard any such (Wisdom) (5).”

2. *Athanasius's Appeal Examined.*—Although Athanasius claimed that all the Fathers were on his side, when he wrote a treatise in defence of the Fathers at Nicaea, he only quoted four Fathers : Theognostos of Alexandria, Dionusios of Alexandria, Dionysius of Rome, and Origen (6). This was the place of all others to display the array of Patristic Authority to defend the action of the Bishops at Nicaea. And yet, Athanasius can only muster four. Let us examine these four. Dionusios of Alexandria was so doubtful himself on the question debated by Arius, that Athanasius was forced to write a treatise called *De Sententia Dionysii*, in order to defend his orthodoxy. Dionysius of Rome, lived but a few years before Athanasius, and in the times of the Sabellian controversy. Theognostos was a disciple of Origen, and Origen himself is the oldest of the authorities quoted. Of Origen, Athanasius says : “ the labour-loving Origen.” Athanasius, in view of his own opinions, felt the need of apologizing for Origen's opinions and says ingeniously : “ For what he has written as if inquiring and by way of exercise, that let no one

take as expressive of his own sentiments, but of parties who are contending in investigation, but what he definitely declares, that is the sentiment of the labour-loving man (').” As uncertain witnesses, therefore, Origen and Dionysius of Alexandria must be omitted ; as definitely orthodox then remain only Theognostos and Dionysius of Rome. Only two Fathers, therefore, and these so late as to live in the generation before Athanasius, can he quote on his side. Where are Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Theophilus, Hippolotos, Irenaeus, Justin ? Are they not worth quoting ? With this small authority of two late Fathers to support him Athanasius has the sublime courage to say : “ See, we are proving that this view had been transmitted from Father to Father ; but ye, O modern Jews and disciples of Caiaphas, how many Fathers can ye assign to your phrases ? Not one of the understanding and wise ” (this is rather hard on Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Theophilus, Hippolotos, Irenaeus, and Justin) “ for all abhor you but the devil alone ; none but he is your Father in this apostasy (8).”

3. *The Arian Appeal to Antiquity.*—The Arians looked upon themselves as orthodox, and called the followers of Athanasius “ Athanasians.” The whole polemic of Athanasius in the interpretation of Scriptural authority shows that the Arians also considered their views scriptural. Besides, as much as Athanasius did they consider their opinions those of the Catholic Church as handed down from the Fathers. A reference to the Arian documents will substantiate this claim.

So strongly did Arius look back on an authority of Bishops in the Church that Harnack is forced to say (9) : “ Arius points to a whole succession of Eastern Bishops, and above all to Eusebius of Cesarea, as authority ; he even asserted that all Eastern Bishops agreed with him, and therefore were excommunicated by Alexander.” “ And the Arian reaction after the Council of Nicaea that lasted for several centuries shows how much the unanimity of Nicaea was due to the pressure of the unbaptized Constantine.”

4. *The Appeals Contrasted.*—Where both parties contradict each other, it is necessary to decide, and to make the appeal to documentary evidence for them. It will be useless in this instance to quote title and page of the separate works ; the facts are so well known to scholars that they would be useless to them ; for those who are not scholars, easily accessible works will supply the evidence in detail.

In the first place, Athanasius does not only ignore, but actually contradicts the Philonic distinction between “ God ” and “ The God,” which Justin, Irenaeus, Clement, Origen, and Tertullian recognize and confess. That he voluntarily ignores it is plain from the fact that it was in a secondary form brought to his notice by Asterius, and not refuted.

Secondly, the distinction between “ begetting ” and “ creating ” is not supported by Justin, Origen, and Tertullian, who applied

the word "creation" to the origin of the Word. Besides, while Paul, Justin, Irenaeus, Clement and Origen only say that the Father created by the instrumentality of the Son, the dogmatic utterances of Athanasius limit creation to the Son.

Moreover, Paul, Irenaeus, and Origen both clearly speak of the subordination of the Son as to his eternal nature, which Athanasius does not recognize.

Thirdly, as to the identification of the Son with Wisdom, Justin, Irenaeus, Clement, and Tertullian had identified it with the Holy Ghost.

Fourthly, as to the canons of interpretation of the Scriptures, Origen had frankly avowed many Arian positions because led to do so by the plain sense of Scripture. Thus both Irenaeus, Origen, and Tertullian interpreted the text Mark xiii : 32 and Prov. viii : 22, distinctly in the Arian sense.

Fifthly, as to the connotation of the word "image," Athanasius takes the view opposed by Paul.

Sixthly, as to the implication of being the "first-born among many brethren," Athanasius departed from the evident meaning of Paul, Clement and Origen.

Seventhly, Athanasius denies that the Son was born of the good pleasure and Will of the Father. In doing so he expressly contradicts Irenaeus, Origen, Tertullian, and Hippolytus ; besides departing from the universal language of the early Church.

Further, Athanasius claims that "the Fathers of the Church have, all of them, confessed by word of mouth, and written down as well, that the Wisdom of the Father is an uncreated being, consubstantial and coëxistent with him, and the Creator of the World (¹⁰)."

On the contrary, Tertullian without being considered heretic on this subject, had distinctly averred that there was a time when he was not. Origen was the first theologian to speak of our eternal generation.

If it should now be asked, Who was the innovator, Athanasius or Arius ? the answer would be, Both.

The school of Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia held to the Philonic doctrine of the Logos till that time universally accepted in the Church. When however the force of circumstances, the adoption by the Church of the new conception, drove its adherents into the ranks of the opposition, their catch-words became new, as there had never been a necessity in the Church before this time of asserting the negative complement of their positive assertions. So far, the school of Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia were innovators.

The followers of Asterius were bald humanitarians, as all their characteristic interpretations of texts show. Asterius was the author of the conception of several Powers of God, which necessitate the conception of Jesus as a man differing from all others only in degree. The whole of the school of Asterius were therefore innovators, unless it be granted that the Christianity of Jesus was of this type.

Athanasius was an innovator in doctrine, abandoning the universally held Philonic subordination of the Logos, but carrying the organization of the Church with him. And it was by this organization that he was declared orthodox, aided by the powerful civil influence of Constantine, the unbaptized.

Athanasius never complained of the fact that the Arians were persecuted by Constantine ; but he had no words too expressive to denote his feelings at the persecution of the orthodox by Constantius. Perhaps in this minor trait of character may be seen plainly how Athanasius was by disposition the innovator or partisan, and not the consistent philosopher; he could justify means when used for him which he deprecated, as to principle, when used against him.

Summing up then all that has been said, it seems clear that the significance of the step which the Council of Nicaea took was the abandonment of philosophy as philosophy, and the adoption of an authoritative standard of orthodoxy or religiousness. Henceforth it is vain to appeal to reason ; the authority of the Council directed by the stern secular power of the unbaptized Constantine is the only rule of faith, the only measure of truth. This was the essence of the innovation of the Fathers at Nicaea.

5. *History of the Term "Consubstantial."*—Before proceeding with the argument it is worth while to digress, in order to consider the history of the word "consubstantial," which became so famous as the test of orthodoxy at Nicaea.

Aristotle had used the word when speaking of the stars, as being of one same nature with each other ; Porphyry had spoken of the souls of brute animals as being consubstantial with human souls (¹¹). The author of the Hermetic writings had used the term of the Philonic Logos in respect to the First Cause (¹²), in which Philonic conception the Logos was subordinate to the Father. Origen (¹³) who is a distinct subordinationist, also uses the word in the same meaning. The Gnostic Valentinus considered that every emanational aeon, or effluence of God, whether a superior aeon, or a human soul, was consubstantial with God, the Clementine Homilies (¹⁴) agreeing with him. The Manichees considered also the two superior beings below God as well as the human souls consubstantial with God. Both in the case of the Gnostics and Manichees this term is used consistently with subordinationism. The pupils of Origen, in the Council of Antioch 264 A. D., against Paul of Samosata, gave up the use of that word, on being met with the objection that if the Father and Son (notice no mention is made of the Holy Spirit) partook in one essence, this essence was distinct from and logically prior to the two persons. We have seen that Athanasius met this same difficulty, although he stated it in different words.

From all this it results that until the day of Athanasius the word consubstantial had been regularly used to denote likeness of nature between God and a subordinated Logos, or even hu-

man souls. The use of the term in a sense which would preclude subordinationism as was the case with Athanasius, was therefore distinct innovation ; a use of a recognized philosophical term in a special and different theological sense. Even in this use of this word Athanasius, and not the Arians, was an innovator.

6. *Value of Appeals to Antiquity.*—Great prominence is usually given to the fact that the Nicene Bishops claimed to be guided by the maxim, "Let the ancient customs prevail."

It is however worth asking, in how far such a maxim is worth anything, unless the enquirer is guided as to what the ancient customs were, by documentary evidence, and not by opinions of those who are concerned in the matter ; for it is well known that it is a failing of human nature to consider oneself, in the absence of proof to the contrary, as right in everything.

An illustration of what is meant is the ritualistic revival in the Episcopal Church in the United States, which began about the year 1880, and within a decade, has almost succeeded in capturing all of the important parishes of that church. The "low Church" party which opposed it was universally considered the conservative party ; and the ritualists the innovators. The cry of the low Church party was "Let the ancient customs prevail." Yet, as a matter of fact, it can be proved on satisfactory evidence that the ritual being now introduced was the universal custom of the Church in England, not more than 200 years ago, and this in an age of enlightenment, of the press, and of societies. As a matter of fact, therefore, the ritualists are not the innovators ; for they are only reviving what not long ago belonged to the Church. The low Church party, posing at present as the "conservatives," are the innovators. If such a tremendous mistake can be made in an age of enlightenment like the present, how much easier would it be in an age when education was very much neglected, when the Church was continually disturbed by persecution and by the destruction of its manuscripts. Consequently, the maxim of the Nicene Bishops can only be accepted in the case that it is proved on documentary evidence that their opinions were those of the ancient time.

7. *Mistaken Conservatism.*—The Council of Nicaea relied on the maxim of conservatism. It has already been shown, that in the realm of morals, the Church in the days of Athanasius had departed from early standards, although it was in external harmony with them and in the succession of the Apostles. It has also been seen that in point of doctrine the earlier Fathers agreed with the Arians rather than with the Athanasians. It has also been seen that, as in the case of the Episcopal Church in recent years, it is quite possible that the innovators should pose as conservatives, and the conservatives be regarded as innovators. It seems quite possible therefore that the Fathers of Nicaea should have honestly regarded themselves conservatives, although representing the doctrine of that day as the traditional faith of their forefathers.

8. *Athanasius's Dogmatical Evolution.*—So far we have only advanced negative proof that Athanasius was as much of an innovator as Arius. Positive proof of this fact can now be shown.

In his earlier writings Athanasius used the word "of like nature" in respect of the Son. This was the very catch-word of the Arians, and he ceased to use it accordingly. In his earlier writings Athanasius did not scruple to assent to the doctrine of Dionusios of Alexandria, that the eternity of the Son was not absolutely eternal. In his later works, however, he distinctly contradicted this statement, which had granted all the Arians had ever demanded. And Athanasius himself changed in his doctrine in the space between his earlier and his later years; being led to oppose those who held his own early opinions because of that personal animosity which made him use such opprobrious epithets in regard to them.

It is easy to understand why the Arians experienced difficulty in framing a satisfactory creed. Their party was that of free thought as opposed to that of unquestioning assent. This inability to make any formulation of their position was both the weakness and strength of their position; only those who have given up the exercise of their mental faculties can unquestioningly agree to a cast-iron creed. Besides, the Arians represented earlier speculation; and what liberty was allowed to it we have seen in examining the systems of the Ante-Athanasian Fathers.

At the Council of Nicaea the Christian Church took one definite step, cutting itself off from all earlier speculation. Next she laid the foundations which made the next step in the time of Augustine possible.

9. *Modern Criticism of the Question.*—It will be instructive to examine the grounds on which Dorner and Harnack pronounce Arianism an innovation.

Harnack's grounds are as follows ("):

"(1) Not only is the outspoken definition of the fact that the Logos was a creature and alterable, new in its intensity, in spite of Origen, Dionusios of Alexandria, Pierius, etc.

"(2) But before all other things the explicit rejection of any essential union of the Logos with God.

"(3) The illustrations of the fountain and the stream, the sun and the light, which are as almost as old in the Church as the doctrine of the Logos, are here done away with.

"(4) Further, the combination of Adoptionism with the Logos-cosmology, is new, and

"(5) Even if not new, yet before never permitted, the distinction of two Logoi, and two Wisdoms."

Let these charges be examined one by one.

The first charge is false, inasmuch as Arius did not recognize any such technical term as "creature." He only said that the externalized or prophoric Logos was begotten in the same way as all other creatures, although not as other creatures (in degree) ("). Secondly, Arius did not reject any "essential" union with

God, for through him God created all things ; and this could not take place without essential union (¹⁷). Thirdly, Harnack accuses Arius of doing away with the old illustrations of the sun and light. Evidently Harnack had not read Arius's fragments of the *Thalia* in Athanasius's *Orations* where Arius distinctly affirms the illustration (¹⁸). The only difference between Athanasius and Arius in the matter is that Athanasius believes effects to be simultaneous with their causes ; Arius believes that effects follow the causes. And the scientific world has agreed all along with Arius as against Athanasius. The fourth point is the only one which is probably correct. It is certain that in one of the fragments of the *Thalia* Arius does speak of an adoption (¹⁹) ; but it is equally certain that the whole system of Arius precluded such a conception, if it were logically and consistently carried out ; for then Sonship is only a synonym together with creature ; and therefore adoption to Sonship is a mere empty phrase. Lastly, it is interesting to remember that the fifth point we have already discussed, showing conclusively that if this is an innovation, then Justin Martyr must also be considered as having held those misstatements.

Let Dorner's charges now be investigated (²⁰).

(1) Never had the Church defined the Son to be a being created out of nothing ;

(2) Never had it separated him from God or attributed to him a different nature from that of the Father.

(3) As little had any teacher of the Church ever dreamed of dwelling with satisfaction, as Arius did, on expressions which lower the Son, still less of basing his system on them.

(4) Furthermore, seeing that, as a system, Arianism has little or nothing to recommend it in itself, and that the human mind would never by itself have arrived at such a monstrous mixture of rational and supernatural elements, it testifies involuntarily to the prior existence of an entirely different faith, which on the one hand it has essentially altered, though on the other hand it bears clear traces of its influence and impress (²⁰).

The reason that the Church had never defined the Son to be created out of nothing was that until the Council of Nicaea, the Church had never defined anything at all in a general Council. This is certainly a good reason. To say that the Church had never "separated" the Son from God is senseless, since Arius himself never did that ; but if it be held that the Church had never believed subordinationism, then we may point to Justin, Irenaeus, and Origen, Clement and Tertullian, in their day all accepted as orthodox, which fact proves that their opinions did not differ materially from those of the Church. Arius did not dwell with satisfaction on expressions which lower the Son. On the contrary, a perusal of the fragments of Arius will show how reverently and advisedly he spoke, albeit a subordinationist. The fourth charge of Dorner is hardly worth mentioning since it does not deal with facts so much as it does with invectives. It

may however be sufficient to say that the elements of the system of Arius may be satisfactorily traced to Philonism, and to other sources accounting for them in every particular. That it points to a faith different from it as existing before it rests totally on the assumption it is so senseless ; which it certainly is not to the student of Greek philosophy.

The charges have thus been considered in detail, and it has been found that only one of them is grounded in fact : the combination of adoptionism with the Logos-cosmology. Nevertheless, above reasons have been given for holding that even this charge is of little real moment. Thus this negative investigation has yielded the same result as the former positive one.

10. *Liddon's Argument.*—If any revolution occurred in ecclesiastical circles at the time of Athanasius, the innovation was certainly not as much on the side of the Arians, as on that of the unbaptized Constantine. This has been proved by a comparison of the actual beliefs of the Ante-Athanasian Fathers with Athanasius. Even so orthodox a man as Liddon is forced to recognize this difference of expression. It cannot be amiss to quote his words :

“ Is it not notorious, men ask, that some Ante-Nicene writers at times use language which falls short of, if it does not contradict, the doctrine of the Nicene Council? Does not S. Justin Martyr, for instance ⁽²¹⁾, speak of the Son as subserving his Father's Will? nay, of being begotten of him at his Will ⁽²²⁾? Does not Justin even speak of Christ as another God under the Creator ⁽²³⁾? Do not Athenagoras, Tatian, Theophilus, and S. Hippolytus apply the language of Scripture respecting the generation of the Word to his manifestation at the creation of the World, as a distinct being from God? Do they not so distinguish between the endiathetic and the prophetic Logos as to imply that the Word was hypostatized only at the creation ⁽²⁴⁾? Does not Clement of Alexandria implicitly style the Word the Second Principle of Things ⁽²⁵⁾? Does he not permit himself to say that the Nature of the Son is most close to the Sole Almighty One ⁽²⁶⁾? Although Origen first spoke of the Saviour as being ‘ever-begotten ⁽²⁷⁾,’ has he not contrasted the Son as the immediate Creator of the World with the Father as the original Creator ⁽²⁸⁾? Is not Tertullian said to be open to the charge that he combated Praxeas with arguments which did the work of Arius ⁽²⁹⁾? Does any Catholic writer undertake to apologize for the language of Lactantius? Has not recent criticism tended somewhat to enhance the reputation of Petavius at the expense of Bishop Bull ⁽³⁰⁾? ⁽³¹⁾”

What excuses has Liddon to bring forward? Three ⁽³²⁾. They are as follows :

(1) The faith, delivered once for all, had been given to the Church in its completeness by the Apostles. But the finished intellectual survey and treatment of the faith is a superadded requirement ; it is the result of conflict with a hostile criticism and

of devout reflections matured under the guidance of the Spirit of Truth. The Alexandrian teachers of the second or third centuries were, relatively to their successors of the age of the Councils, in the position of young or half-educated persons, who know at bottom what they mean, who know yet more distinctly what they do not mean, but who as yet have not so measured or sounded their thoughts, or so tested the instrument by which thought finds expression, as to avoid misrepresenting their meaning more or less considerably, before they succeed in conveying it with accuracy.

(2) A doctrine may be held in its integrity and yet be presented to men of two different periods under aspects in many ways different.

(3) The Church's real mind was not doubtful. Any recognized assault upon it stirred the heart of the Church to energetic protest.

Let these reasons be examined one by one.

(1) In the first place it is necessary to deny the illustration's implication, that the Ante-Nicene teachers were like young and half-educated persons. They were men as old as the Nicene Fathers. They were men every bit as well educated, and knew their own mind as well as the later Fathers. Now, Athanasius appealed to the *Regula Fidei*, as the standard of orthodoxy; and when the literal sense of the Scriptures contradicts this, then the literal sense is false. The consequence of this is that the orthodoxy of Athanasius did not depend on the Scriptures but on the *Regula Fidei*, handed down from mouth to mouth from these very Fathers who were mistaken. It is plain that if these earlier Fathers had not as yet so measured or sounded their thoughts, or so tested the instrument by which thought finds expression, as to avoid misrepresenting their meaning more or less considerably, before they succeeded in conveying it with accuracy, they certainly could not hand down anything but a misrepresentation of the faith. But this very inaccurate and misrepresenting account of Christianity was the *Regula Fidei* by which Athanasius guided the Nicene definition and condemned the early Fathers. Therefore, how could the truth have been handed down by word of mouth by those who were not able to explain to others the truth they held "at bottom." Of course, it is said, that the Scriptures guarded and guided them; but Athanasius claims that the standard of the Scriptures is the *Regula Fidei*; so that the authority of the Scriptures is only valid when it agrees with the *Regula Fidei*. Therefore, the Scriptures alone could not have guided the later Fathers. The only possible way in which we may vindicate the *Regula Fidei* as the original truth then is that the earlier Fathers, being unable accurately to hand it to their successors by word of mouth, invented a means by which they could place their "bottom" in some communication with the catechumen's "bottom" whereby the catechumen came to hold the faith in his "bottom," being, like the venerable Father, unable to express it in words. But if this be true, to what sudden

change shall the fact be attributed that about the time of Athanasius suddenly the Christians achieved the power of communicating by word of mouth that which they bore with them in their "bottom"? History records no such change in human nature at this particular time.

Another question must be considered. "But the finished intellectual survey and treatment of the faith is a superadded requirement." Dorner repeats this (³³): "They were not able, it is true, to set forth the entire fullness of that image in a scientific form; a substance which science could only slowly, and perhaps by long round-about methods reproduce." What is a "scientific" form? A scientific statement takes time only where experiments are conducted, or where instruments before unknown facilitate research, and lead to mathematical conceptions not known before. There was nothing scientific about the age of Athanasius. No new experiments had been conducted, no new facts had been discovered, no new methods or vocabularies had been employed, no language was changed, no word was used which had not been known hundreds of years before, although perhaps not in a "technical" sense. It does not take much "scientific" research or labour to say that the Logos is not subordinate to God, but coëqual with him. In fact, this must have been a thought present to Origen, as the contradictory of his opinion. The only "scientific" advance of the age of Athanasius over that of Origen was simply to contradict his statement, although no new facts had been discovered since the time of Origen, and it has been proved, in fact, that Athanasius knew less of the Versions of the Scriptures than Origen did. There needs not the "scientific" labour of a century to attain this ridiculously small result, of simply contradicting an opinion held before. Surely the necessity of such scientific advance cannot excuse the fact that leaders of recognized orthodoxy in the past contradicted in terms the Nicene formulation. But the strangest bearing of this claim of "intellectual" and "scientific" formulation has not yet been touched. This claim is made by that very party which discredits the use of reason except as a handmaid of faith, and which insists on calling all the dogmas "mysteries." What place can there be for "scientific" formulation in a "mystery" that must be accepted without examination?

There is still a third subject of interest in this connection. If the faith was "delivered once for all," and had been given to the Church "in its completeness" by the Apostles, how then was it possible that it should still be susceptible of a "scientific" development which should need the labour of centuries to perfect it? Here is a contradiction. Either the faith was delivered once for all in its completeness, or it was not delivered once for all, and was not delivered in its completeness. If the faith was delivered complete once for all, then it is an absurdity and a self-contradiction to say it lacked anything, or was susceptible of any necessary process of development. If a "scientific" process was needed to bring it to a conclusion contradicting in terms to

the premisses then it was not complete, and was not delivered once for all.

If it was delivered once for all, and complete, then the writers of the subapostolic age received it once for all in its completeness. If, as Liddon recognizes, there are such conflicts between their statements and those of the Nicene Fathers that we must choose between them, then either the Ante-Athanasian, or the Nicene Fathers are orthodox; and these are the horns of a dilemma. If the Nicene Fathers are orthodox, then the Fathers who received the faith once for all in its completeness are unorthodox: and this finally leads us to the proposition that the Apostles, and consequently Jesus himself was unorthodox; which is absurd. The only escape from this dilemma is to acknowledge that the Nicene Fathers were unorthodox.

When the argument is brought to this point it is usual to slight the differences existing between the Ante-Athanasian and the Nicene Fathers. But the argument of "rhetoric" has been once for all disposed of by Liddon⁽³⁴⁾. "It really amounts to saying that a succession of men who were at least intelligent and earnest, were nevertheless, when writing upon the subject which lay nearest to their hearts, wholly unable to command that amount of jealous self-control, and cautious accuracy in the use of language which might save them from misrepresenting their most fundamental convictions."

There remains nothing therefore but to say that the differences are slight, that the former statements are "unsatisfactory."

But it must be noticed that their divagations are not upon the minor points of doctrine but on the very most crucial points at issue. Every single one of the instances of mistakes of the earlier Fathers quoted above from Liddon actually relates to the main point of Christian doctrine, the Divinity of Christ. And every single one contradicts in terms the Nicene definition on the point. Surely such contradictions are sufficient to make their statements and the orthodox statements be considered as horns of an unquestionable dilemma. If the differences were in minor matters, on subjects about which all agree that freedom of opinion exists, then we might grant a "scientific" development; but when they actually contradict in terms the Nicene formulation, then we are driven to the choice of one of the alternatives.

We now necessarily come face to face with the question of "development." If the faith was delivered once for all in its completeness, what room is there for development? Dorner⁽³⁵⁾ speaks of a "further development of the doctrine of the Church." "That a very decided step was thus taken in advance of the Ante-Nicene conception of God" (that had lasted till the council of Nicaea) "needs no further elucidation." Liddon acknowledges that in the primary sense of the word "development" he denies that any took place; but he is willing to admit one in the sense of an explanation of an already existing idea or belief, presumably giving to that belief greater precision and exactness, in our own or other minds, but adding nothing what-

ever to its real area (⁸⁶). What is the use of this increased precision and exactness when we are told at the end it is a mystery and must not be investigated? Precision and exactness come from the exercise of the faculty of reason, but are useless in a hopeless mystery.

(2) The second excuse of Liddon is unsatisfactory. He claims that when the Church was disputing with polytheism the Unity was brought forward, but when the danger was passed, then it was necessary to accentuate the Trinity.

If this argument proves anything, it proves that the Fathers had no accurate knowledge of the Christian faith. It is impossible, unless one is a conscious exaggerator, to overestimate or underestimate a truth which is known definitely. If I know that two and two make four, then I am just as guilty if I say it is three, as if I say it is five. Because my enemy says it is three, it is not therefore right for me to say it is five, exaggerating on the other side. If I know the true result is four, I would be as bitterly opposed to one result as to the other. Of course, if I do not know the true result is four, and I have no means except guesswork of reaching the true result, then if an enemy says it makes three, it is perfectly possible for me to say it makes five. But if I said so, knowing the true result was four, I would be either a fool or a knave.

Now if Origen knew in his heart of hearts that the Son was absolutely coëqual with the Father, he was a miserable scoundrel to announce over and over that the Father was the God who is the first God, and God over all. If Justin Martyr knew it, he was a criminal to speak of Christ as another God under the Creator. No more scientific terminology is needed to make the latter statement, than to make the first. The only difference is a difference of meaning.

(3) To support his third assertion that the Church at heart always knew the truth, he quotes instances in which the Church resented false teaching. For instance, Victor's Quartodeciman fulmination was disregarded elsewhere, and his excommunication of Theodotus was everywhere received. Paulus of Samosate and Noëtus were condemned as heretics.

But why were Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Theophilus, Lactantius, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian never until the day of Athanasius censured, on account of their views on the question of the Incarnation, whereas their statements, as Liddon acknowledges, contradict the Nicene formulation in terms? Surely this is proof positive that the Church agreed with them in their day.

The Humanitarian Artemon claimed that the Divinity of Christ was imported into the Church during the episcopate of Zephyrinus, who succeeded Victor in the Roman chair. The writer of "the little Labyrinth (⁸⁷)" answers him thus: "Perchance what they say might be credible, were it not that the Holy Scriptures contradict them; and then also there are works of certain brethren, older than the days of Victor, works written

in defence of the truth, and against the heresies then prevailing. I speak of Justin and Miltiades, and Tatian and Clement, and many others, by all of whom the Divinity of Christ is asserted. For who knows not the works of Irenaeus and Melito, and the rest, in which Christ is announced as God and Man?"

Liddon adds: "This was the argument upon which the Church of those ages instinctively fell back when she was accused of adding to her creed." But to-day, we have accepted the witness of these men, and have from these very witnesses appealed to by herself demonstrated that she has added to her creed.

II. *The Fable of the Wolf and the Sheep.*—The fable of the wolf and the sheep is well known. Where a fault is to be found, it is easy enough to discover one or several. Such has been the case of Christian critics. Arius was wrong. Why? Reasons were not lacking, especially as Arius was dead and could not defend himself. Some critics accuse Arius of creating a separation between God and man; some of annihilating all distinction between God and man; some of making the Son a being of intermediate order between God and man. Between all these accusations (which contradict one another), it is evident that there is no room for the unfortunate Arius to escape; but if he had been living he might have retorted these accusations against his opponents; for the scholarly Gwatkin recognises that the *Homoöusion* was a distinctively Sabellian term.

The first charge against Arius is that he separates God from his world. Voigt ⁽³⁸⁾ agrees with Möhler ⁽³⁹⁾ that the "characteristic of Arianism is the separation of God from the world." Dorner also sneers at the Arian conception of God ⁽⁴⁰⁾: "Through sheer sublimity the God of Arius is unable to create." "Yet ⁽⁴¹⁾, Arianism, strictly speaking, gave up the hope of union with God, and consequently did not consider the realization of that union to be the task imposed upon the Logos and the God-Man." "Nay, more, Arianism deopotentiates man altogether; for it denies that union with God is his destiny ⁽⁴²⁾." It "separates the two so essentially and completely, that not even love is able to reduce the distinction to unity ⁽⁴³⁾."

Voigt is so thoroughly bent on making good this charge that he finds fault with Baur when the latter says that Arius considers the only possible union of man with God to be a moral one. In fine scorn ⁽⁴⁴⁾ Voigt remarks that such thoughts belong to the nineteenth century, not to the fourth. But how can you be certain of this fact, if you deny the evidence which shows that the thoughts did belong to the fourth century?

Having been convicted of separating God from the world, Arius is now convicted of commingling God and the world. Dorner declares ⁽⁴⁵⁾ that Arianism "establishes no distinction between God and the world that can hold its ground." Unhappy indeed is Arius who cannot please Dorner whether he separate or unite God and his world. "It commingles God and the world, by setting up a creature as mediator between God and man ⁽⁴⁶⁾."

There is only one more charge possible against Arius, and that is that the Son is a being intermediate between God and man. This is the work of Newman, Baur, and Gwatkin. Newman says (47) that Arianism was a "compromise that strictly speaking he was neither God nor man." Gwatkin holds that (48) "Thus the Arian Trinity of Divine Persons forms a descending series separated by infinite degrees of honour and glory, not altogether unlike the Neoplatonic Triad of orders of spiritual existence extending outward in concentric circles. The Lord is neither truly God nor truly man, but a heathen demi-god. He is the minister of the first creation and the prophet of the second, but the Lord of life in neither. A true creator must be divine, but a created being cannot be divine. Far from spanning the infinite abyss which philosophy, not revelation, had placed between God and sinless man, the Arian Christ is nothing but an isolated pillar in its midst. His witness is not to the love of God, but to a gulf beyond the power of almighty love to close."

It is hardly necessary to remark that Gwatkin has touched the difficulty, although not explained it. As a matter of fact, revelation had had no means of spanning this gulf until the author of the Fourth Gospel adopted the Philonic Logos, which, in truth, was an intermediate being. Later, however, the Church abandoned the Philonic doctrine, by altering the position of the Logos. Consequently, those who held fast to the Johannine Logos, among them Arius, were out of harmony with the teaching of the Church in the days of Athanasius. Baur is less luminous than usual in his presentation of the matter (49).

12. *The Real Point at Issue.*—The whole discussion between Athanasius and Arius reduces itself in the last resort to the question of the recognition of reason or blind faith as the standard of authority.

Liddon has a very poor opinion of Arianism. "Reason and faith are equally disappointed: the largest demands are made on faith, and reason is encouraged to assail the mysteries of the Catholic Creed in behalf of a theory which admits of being reduced to an irrational absurdity (50)." Liddon is right in saying that Arianism has but little substantiality. It could never be revived in earnest, since its foundation, the Philonic doctrine of the Logos is ignored in modern philosophy. But it is not so clear that both reason and faith were disappointed. We must make allowances for the contemporary position of philosophy, which then made the Philonic Logos a very widely accepted theory.

Atzberger seems to see the true position of Christianity as interpreted by Athanasius more clearly (51). "In Athanasius's doctrine of the Trinity, the only task he imposes on reason is to harmonize in clear conceptions the demands of Scripture and Christian feeling" (an euphemism for the *Regula Fidei*, of course). "And this is really the only possible office of reason in the matter. Any system which desires to go beyond these limits must necessarily end in some form of Sabellianism or Arianism. As Möhler

well says, the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be understood by any speculation," but ⁽⁸²⁾ he adds immediately, "never will human endeavours to understand it rest. But this desire to understand leads immediately into transcendental mistakes, the moment the limits are transgressed."

The result of this paragraph is that reason should be the hand-maid of faith, whereas in all scientific work faith is the hand-maid of reason. This then is the only price at which orthodoxy can be bought; but the strange fact is that this method will apply as well to fetish-worship as to Christianity. As long as reason is only to defend, not to examine, any belief can be justified in this manner.

But the moment that reason is permitted to examine these truths, then immediately they are called in question. Baur ⁽⁸³⁾ thus presents the matter: "How contradictory is it to consider the begetting of the Son as something completely transcendental and unimaginable, and at the same time to declare that the most adequate illustration of this unique relation is the relation of the light and the ray! If the latter be true, then God is conceived of as a natural being, and the often repeated warning not to think of anything physical or natural is meaningless. This nature process belongs so essentially to the matter itself that as soon as one abstracts the meaning, he has a perfectly empty conception. But if we retain this consideration of nature, we fall into new contradictions. If the Son, in his relation to the Father is a mere Light-reflection, then he has no personal subsistence, and he is a mere accident of the substance of the Father. But if this personal subsistence be declared to be the very point in which the nature of God differs from that of the illustration, then we lose the foundation of the natural illustration from which we started, and we have no settled point of departure."

Harnack ⁽⁸⁴⁾ reviews the Athanasian dogma in the following words:

"Unquestionably, even the old doctrine of the Logos, and even Arianism appears to us to-day to be full of contradictions; but the *contradictio in adjecto* in every point was first reached by Athanasius. He believes that the Godhead is a numerical unity, but that in this unity the Father and Son are to be distinguished as two. He teaches that there is only one unbegotten principle; but that the Son is not originated by becoming. He asserts that the Divine in Jesus is the eternal Son, but that the Son is as old as the Father. The Son is supposed to be neither created, nor a quality of God, nor an effusion or part of God, therefore something quite undefinable. The conception of a Theogony is as much denied as that of a Creation. We may not even think of a potential quality. The Father is, by himself, perfect and self-sufficient; yea, though in the sense of the single nature he have but one being, yet the Father alone is 'THE GOD,' and the principle and root of the Son. *Quot verba, tot scaudala!*"

"Whatever contains a complete contradiction, cannot be cor-

rect, and it is the right of everyone to brand the contradiction to be such a logical mistake without mercy. The Arians did that, and as far as they assumed that no sane person can seriously think a contradiction, and that consequently Athanasius was at heart after all said and done a Sabellian, they were in the right. It took two and more generations before the Church accustomed herself to recognise in the complete contradiction the sacred privilege of Revelation. In fact, there was no system of philosophy in existence according to which the propositions of Athanasius could be made comprehensible."

"This absurdity Athanasius accepted. The Nicene declaration he sanctioned. One of the most fatal consequences of this fact was that henceforth the science of Dogmatics was for evermore separated from clear thinking and defensible positions, and accustomed itself to irrational propositions. What was irrational was soon, and even if not immediately, yet soon enough considered the characteristic of what was Holy."

The reason that, historically, the Arians and Athanasius took so long a time to settle the question at issue between them was that each party appealed to a different standard. The Arian asked, is this doctrine true, and rational? Athanasius demanded that the doctrine should be "pious" or "religious."

The Arians occupied the stand-point of rationalism. Reason is the faculty by which man judges of truth. Therefore, it is impossible to accept anything as true if it is not rational. Truth must be measured by the laws of thought. Truth has nothing to fear from investigation; the more experiments are made, the more certain is truth. Newman says ⁽⁶⁶⁾ that "this miserable procedure of making sacred and mysterious subjects a matter of popular talk and debate" is "a sure mark of heresy." On the contrary, the more talk and debate occurs, the more is human reason stimulated, and guided to the truth. Fortunate indeed would religion be nowadays if it occupied so great a portion of the thought of the world as to be discussed and debated about. For then reason would have an opportunity of ascertaining the truth in religion. It is reason that sanctifies opinions, and not opinions reason; just as the Apostolic Constitutions say that it is man who sanctifies a place, and not a place the man.

Athanasius occupies the stand-point of religion. He has no more opprobrious epithet for his opponents' arguments than that they are irreligious. He repeats this accusation numberless times in the course of his polemic against them ⁽⁶⁷⁾. "Can anything be more irreligious ⁽⁶⁷⁾? he exclaims. "Unseemly is such an enquiry, both unseemly and very blasphemous, yet parallel with theirs; for the answer they make abounds in irreligion ⁽⁶⁸⁾." "They would not in their folly have committed so great an act of irreligion ⁽⁶⁹⁾." "Whereas one may marvel at these men, thus devising excuses to be irreligious ⁽⁶⁹⁾." He never refutes their position on the ground that it is false.

Dorner ⁽⁷¹⁾ holds that "Athanasius aptly directs attention to the lack of a religious principle in the system of Arius when he

says,—The entire position taken up by Arianism is a false one ; for, instead of asking, How could Christ, although God, become man ? it asks, How can Christ be God although man ?” Evidently Athanasius is here begging the question at issue ; and as “there is no religion higher than truth” it cannot be irreligious to demand the proofs of what one is required to believe. In a later Chapter we shall see how sharply this stand-point differentiates itself from that of reason, that Atzberger drives us to the dilemma whose horns are orthodoxy and reason.

How little Athanasius used his reason, may also be inferred from the vicious exegesis to which he is addicted. Voigt (⁶²), who is so partial to Athanasius, is forced to acknowledge that only with difficulty would Athanasius’s interpretations of Scriptural texts stand the examination of a thorough exegesis. Gwatkin, orthodox but scholarly, confesses (⁶³) that “as a critic he does not stand very high. His ignorance of Hebrew is evident, and often causes him serious difficulty. The whole discussion on Prov. viii : 22 might have been avoided by a single glance at the original. His mistakes are not uncommonly grotesque.”

This difference of standards is clearly illustrated by the fact which Athanasius is never weary of bringing up against his opponents. They are always “changing their colours (⁶⁴),” and unable to agree to any formulation of belief. Newman adds that (⁶⁵) “The truth only is a real doctrine, and therefore stable ; everything false is of a transitory nature and has no stay.” It may be asked, however, whether scientific doubt and “holding in solution” is not an absolutely necessary characteristic of the honest exercise of reason. If we are to think at all, we must be ready to accept the conclusions of reason ; and, as Bacon says, we will only know that we have a mind by change of opinion. Scientists are as unable to formulate a binding dogma as the Arians were, for that would preclude all further advance.

On the contrary, nothing is easier to understand than that when intellectual suicide has been committed, there is no difficulty in formulating dogma and in agreeing to it. The lowest fetish-worshipper agrees with Athanasius in this matter ; as long as unreasoning and blind obedience is yielded, the rationality of its object is made of no importance. Harnack saw this and approves (⁶⁶) of the judgment of the Macedonian Sabinus of Heraklea (⁶⁷), that the majority of the Bishops at Nicaea were uneducated ; for the universal acceptance of the Formulary is only intelligible if it be supposed that the question at issue was too deep for the majority. This criticism is not directed against the content of the Formulary, but against the fact of any Formulary being accepted almost unanimously by a great number of serious thinkers, under the suspicious circumstances of the compulsion of the unbaptised Constantine.

Intellectual arguments can only be refuted by intellectual arguments. Only when prejudice and superstition are concerned in the matter do combatants have recourse to objurgations. And

the very fact that any particular disputant uses objurgations proves that his passionate prejudices are involved, and that his rational arguments have failed him.

This may be said of Athanasius. His polemic is full of the most opprobrious epithets. The Arian heresy is a damnable heresy⁽⁶⁸⁾, and the Arians are consciously dishonest. "Let everyone consider the guile and subtlety of this heresy, for knowing how hateful and vile a thing it is, there was a necessity to throw a covering of nonsensical and unintelligible distinctions over it. The doctrine was to be published that the Son of God is a creature. But they think they will be able to tone down such a harsh statement as this, and so they add⁽⁶⁹⁾." The Arians are insane⁽⁷⁰⁾, frantic with rage⁽⁷¹⁾, blasphemers⁽⁷²⁾, ignorant⁽⁷³⁾, and gulfs of impiety⁽⁷⁴⁾. They are shamelessly obstinate and depraved⁽⁷⁵⁾.

The Arians are indecent and immoral⁽⁷⁶⁾. They do not state their doctrine clearly because they are seeking ecclesiastical preferment and fear the displeasure of the emperor⁽⁷⁷⁾. Their heart is a seat of corruption⁽⁷⁸⁾. They are called "abhorred of God"⁽⁷⁹⁾. They are the children of the Devil⁽⁸⁰⁾, "even the Devil himself who is their father, I venture to think, would have been abashed at last, and would have yielded to the invincible arguments that have been employed in this conflict⁽⁸¹⁾." He calls them with evident relish "diabolical" and "satanical," not only in one treatise but in many⁽⁸²⁾.

That Athanasius hates his opponents he confesses openly: "Now are they not worthy of all hatred for merely uttering this⁽⁸³⁾?" But he goes still further; he would have them punished to the utmost⁽⁸⁴⁾ and wishes to have them stoned⁽⁸⁵⁾.

Whatever may have been the custom of the times of Athanasius, such morality is in strange contrast with that of the Sermon on the Mount. And although Athanasius and his party were in visible connection with the Church of the Apostles, they had unconsciously drifted far from its universal charity.

With this implacable hatred and disposition to use shameful epithets may be contrasted the suave nature of Arius. He is only known through his bitter and remorseless opponents; and yet one of them⁽⁸⁶⁾ describes him as follows: "high in prowess, humble in spirit, mild, meek, full of sympathy, pleasant in speech, more pleasant in manners, angelical in person, more angelical in mind, serene in his rebukes, instructive in his praises." He was too noble a man to be swayed by prejudice and passion, too refined to stoop to such degrading epithets as Athanasius. Whoever reads the fragments of his writings preserved to this day will agree that this description is not far from the mark.

Athanasius does not simply ignore the standing of rationalism. He frankly antagonizes it. In fine scorn he exclaims, "As if a thing could not be because they cannot understand it⁽⁸⁷⁾." Again, "It does but remain that they should deny him also, because they understand not how God is, and what the Father is⁽⁸⁸⁾."

Newman agrees with Athanasius in calling the irrational a mystery. He says, "It is a depth and height beyond our intellect, how what is two in so full a sense can also in so full a sense be one, or how the Divine nature does not come under number (⁸⁰)." "It is no inconsistency to say that the Father is first, and the Son first also, for comparison or number does not enter into this mystery (⁸⁰)." "Yet what is a mystery in doctrine, but a difficulty or inconsistency in the intellectual expression of it? And what reason is there for supposing that Revelation addresses itself to the intellect, except so far as intellect is necessary for conveying and fixing its truths on the heart? Why are we not content to take and use what is given us without asking questions? The Catholics, on the other hand, pursued the intellectual investigation of the doctrine, under the guidance of Scripture and Tradition merely as far as some immediate necessity called for it; and cared little though one mode of expression seemed inconsistent with another (⁸¹)."

Why are we not content to take and use what is given us without asking questions? Because this plea will hold good for the most debased idolatry and ancestorworship as well as for Christianity. If we are not idolaters, but Christians, it is because our reason forces us to discriminate between the rational and irrational; but having accepted the rational, shall we commit intellectual *felo da se*?

Why should Revelation address itself to the intellect, except so far as intellect is necessary for conveying and fixing its truths on the heart? Because then we would give up distinctions between Revelations and accept the revelations of Simon Magus as well as those of Paul and Peter. Yet, granting the impossible, that we should use our reason to accept none but Christian revelations, and then should accept this Christian revelation whether rational or irrational, we might accept the Revelation if we were sure that it was the original revelation, and not the invention of Athanasius. For, on the above grounds, it would be possible for any man to state any nonsense or gibberish as eternal truth, and defend it on the ground of its being a mystery and depth and height beyond our intellect. We must ask, Was the Homoöusion an integral part of the original revelation of Christianity? The supposition is that it was not; because it was rejected at the orthodox Council of Antioch, and is not to be found in Revealed Scripture, as "containing all things necessary to salvation." It might be said that it was a private revelation to Athanasius; but such private revelation is not sufficient authority to make reasonable men accept the irrational and self-contradictory.

Can a thing exist, although we cannot understand it? Yes, if the existence of the thing can be proved experimentally, and scientifically; no, if the existence of the thing is the result of private speculation, and contains inherent self-contradictions. If we cannot accept doctrines concerning Christ, because we

cannot understand them, should we not also refuse to accept the Doctrine of God, because we cannot understand him? No: the doctrines of God the Father contain no inherent self-contradictions, and are results of inductions; whereas the doctrines of Christ as given by Athanasius contain gruesome contradictions, and rest only on private revelations granted to him.

To cap the climax, after distinctly asserting that because men cannot understand a thing, this is not a reason it is not so; and after discrediting the use of reason, Athanasius dismisses his opponents' arguments because they are unsatisfactory to reason! "And their positions while unscrutinized, have a show of sense; but if any one scrutinize them by reason, they will be found to incur much derision and mockery (⁹²)."

Thus Athanasius dismisses rationality when it makes against him, but employs it when it makes for him. The gross unfairness of such a procedure is palpable; and instead of injuring his opponents, it invalidates his own arguments, and shows that they are beneath contempt.

13. *Athanasius Convicted of Heresy by Modern Christian Teachers.*—After labouring so long to bring about the Nicene definition, and after convicting his opponents of heresy in so unmeasured language, had Athanasius possessed the gift of foresight, he would have been sad enough to find that some day his orthodoxy should be impugned by reputable Christian Teachers. But this has come to pass. Dorner declares (⁹³) that "it must of course be allowed that the doctrine of the Trinity, as laid down by the Nicene Fathers, leaves much to be desired. In one point above all, to-wit, that the Father is represented, not merely as the logical commencement of the Trinitarian process, but not seldom also, as the root and source of all deity, and identified with the Monas."

14. *The Result.*—If it should be asked, then, who was in the right, Athanasius or Arius, it must be answered that both have been left behind in the march of civilization.

Philonism, the only logical interpretation of the philosophico-religious symbol of Nicaea, has long been dead as a philosophy. Consequently, the philonistic interpretation of Christianity must be abandoned.

The simile of the light and its ray has for ever become unintelligible, under the guidance of the Law of the Conservation of Energy. There is no such thing as a process of begetting a ray which does not decrease the substance of the light of which it is begotten. As this simile was the only proof for the theological contention of the nature of God and the World, this conception must be abandoned.

Athanasius's conception of an effect which is absolutely simultaneous with its cause is also out-grown. The cause invariably precedes the effect.

The only things that remain are the undoubted facts of Ante-Philonic Christianity.

CHAPTER. III.

THE INNOVATIONS OF THE ANTE-ATHANASIAN FATHERS.

1. *Philonism as a Philosophy.*—It has been seen that until the day of Athanasius all Christian writers held the Philonic subordination of the Son to the Father. But the Author of the Fourth Gospel, Paul of Tarsus and Origen explicitly asserted even the most characteristic distinction of Philonism, that between "The God," and "God."

This correspondence is so clear that none can avoid the conclusion that these writers distinctly adopted Philonism as their philosophy, and accommodated the facts of Christianity to it.

That such a proceeding would not be improbable is evident. Here was a system of philosophy almost universally accepted among enlightened Jews. This system will easily adapt itself to an identification between the Messiah and the cosmic Logos. Therefore as they claim Jesus of Nazara to have been the Messiah, if the Christians identify him with the cosmic Logos, they will thereby only follow the lead of the Jewish interpreters and assist the Jews in accepting Christianity.

Besides, although nobody to-day accepts Philonism, in those days it seemed to enlightened Jews to be the final form of truth, as it employed all great Greek speculation and harmonized with their own Scripture and its developments of their days. There need therefore have been no consciousness of deceit in this naïve identification.

In view of all this, it is plain that the Author of the Fourth Gospel and Paul were Philonists, albeit Christian Philonists. In their teachings the Christian element, and the Philonic element should be held apart. As a whole, their writings may be characterized as a Philonic interpretation of Christianity. We must endeavour therefore to remove this interpretation, and reach those facts of Christianity which both of them received by hearsay only, or, if we must accept the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel, after an eventful interval of sixty years, at the very least. This is a space of time quite long enough to change one's conception of a truth, even if the fact of writing the account at the advanced age of ninety or a hundred, would not of itself incline the critic to expect some involuntary misapplication or misinterpretation of the facts due to the incipient mental feebleness of old age. After thus removing this Philonic specu-

lative element, the facts of original Christianity as Paul and the Author of the Fourth Gospel received them will remain.

It is impossible to claim for the philosophy of Philo divine inspiration. The reason of this is that all his philosophic tenets can be traced to Greek philosophy. Philo's philosophy was then no more inspired than any other system of philosophy, as for instance, Herbert Spencer's. If therefore this extraneous philosophy be removed from early Christianity the facts of the earliest Christianity will be reached, as they were handed down from the Apostles before the teachers of Christianity mixed them with Philonism. This original Christianity can be called Ante-Philonic Christianity, or the Christianity of Jesus.

Every thoughtful man gathers from the facts he knows some system of philosophy, on the basis of which he interprets the Universe. Thus there are at the presentday Darwinians, Spencerians, Häckelians, Materialists, Positivists, Collectivists, Hegelians, and Kantians. It is absolutely necessary to the exercise of the intellectual faculties that each man should be free to choose the system of philosophy to which he shall adhere. When for instance, an Hegelian or a Darwinist fills the position of teacher of geology, he will impart to us the facts of geology coloured by his own private conviction in respect to philosophical matters. In order to get at the actual facts of geology the student must subtract from all the teacher says his Hegelianism or Darwinism, since it may be that he himself is a Positivist. No system of philosophy can then be regarded as a finality, and to limit the facts of a science to those in harmony with a certain philosophy would be intellectual suicide. Now this is exactly what the early Christian teachers did.

If, for instance, a man is a Positivist, and does not believe in Philonism as a philosophy, he cannot accept the teaching of a "Logos" as a cosmical reality, mediating between man and God. Now, according to the Ante-Athanasian Fathers, he cannot be a Christian without believing this tenet of Philonism, because they mixed the facts of Ante-Philonic Christianity with Philonism, which at the time was a philosophy very widely accepted in the East. Both Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa saw this danger, that if Philonism, as a philosophy, was abandoned, then Philonic Christianity must go by the board too. Therefore they were at great pains to bolster up the Philonic conception of the existence of such a cosmic reality as a "Logos" of God. For if there is no Logos in existence, how shall a man hold the orthodox dogma that Christ is the preëxistent Word of God? Therefore, if a man be of any school of philosophy other than Philonism, say Positivism, Kantianism, Hegelianism, Evolutionism, then he cannot be a Christian of the type of the Author of the Fourth Gospel, or of Paul.

As a matter of fact, Christianity has not been able to enforce Philonism on the thinking world. Nobody outside of a theological seminary to-day holds Philonism as a statement of his.

philosophic belief. Nobody hears of Philo except in the history of ancient Philosophy. And yet Philonism is the only rational explanation of the growth of the Christian dogma. What then shall he do? Shall he become a Philonist, or give up Philonic Christianity, the Christianity of the Fourth Gospel and Paul?

If this issue be pressed, the whole world will answer, give up Philonic Christianity; for no man who thinks will be willing to throw away his rational philosophic belief which has been brought forth by the unequalled triumphs of modern science, and which therefore has a basis of fact, in order to embrace Philonism, which was nothing more than a rough syncretism of ancient philosophy, and which has no basis but the very unscientific imagination of Plato or Aristotle. He who would do so would not be led by the desire to know truth, but by the willingness to subordinate truth of which he is scientifically certain, to that of which he is not certain, and which rests on nothing more than doubtful authority.

This answer is not a theoretical answer; it is a principle on which the philosophic world has acted ever since the days of Galileo. The conquests of science have been held to by scientists, whatever else in the form of prejudice or belief has been given up. No philosopher has ever hesitated to deny what has been proved to him to be false; and Philonism as a philosophy has long ago died out of the world for all practical purposes.

Yet a man need not give up all Christianity, if he give up Philonism. To be sure, he gives up what the Philonists thought was the interpretation of Ante-Philonic Christianity, the Christianity of Jesus. He gives up the Philonic interpretation of Christianity, not the facts of Christianity itself. He cannot insist too much upon the fact that in thus rejecting the Philonic interpretation he is not rejecting anything which is intrinsically valuable. He is only rejecting the early accretions of Christianity, the earliest additions to it, the earliest changes from the Christianity of Jesus, who certainly was no Philonist. He rejects nothing but what is in itself relatively valueless, though consecrated by centuries of unquestioning and unreasoning belief. That which the Philonist Paul and the Author of the Fourth Gospel received, that he receives; but he does not receive their Philonic interpretations of these facts; which Philonic interpretation can only be understood if he is willing to throw overboard all modern scientific investigation, and become a philosophical Philonist once again. For how can an astronomer or a geologist believe in a "Logos" with its crude derivation from the allegory of human speech, "unspoken" and "externalized"? It is impossible for the world to go back two thousand years, to an age of second childhood.

2. *Is Philonism Divinely Inspired?*—It may be objected to all this that the early Church considered the writings of the New Testament, inclusive of the Fourth Gospel and the Pauline Epistles, as divinely inspired, so that if a man accept the divine au-

thority of the writings, and if he has proved that they contain bald Philonism, then Philonism itself is stamped with the divine authority of inspiration.

To this he should demur ; for as he can account for every tenet of Philo in former Greek philosophy, he can prove distinctly that Philonism was no new revelation of any kind whatsoever. Besides, because Jude quotes the Book of Enoch, that is no reason why he would consider the Book of Enoch as divinely inspired. In any case, however, Jude quotes from the book of Enoch only a few lines of minor importance, while the Fourth Gospel and Paul have borrowed from Philonism the very marrow of their philosophy. He cannot therefore reject Philonism if he still accepts the philosophical doctrine of the Fourth Gospel and of Paul ; they are identical. If the one falls, the other falls with it.

This fact of the divine authority of the Scriptures should not be permitted to mislead the student. In the olden days any supposititious divine writing was by its believers held to be literally inspired. Witness the original Sybilline books of Rome, and the Philonic belief that the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek, called the Septuagint, was as divinely and literally inspired as the original Hebrew Scriptures. The old myth connected with the origin of the Septuagint is well known. The seventy interpreters were said to have been locked up separately, and to have produced a version exactly alike, witnessing to the literal Divine inspiration afforded them. Thus the Early Church considered all the canonical New Testament Scriptures as Divinely and literally inspired, although this may be denied without touching the general belief of their inspiration. Besides the early Fathers looked upon many uncanonical Scriptures as inspired. This shows that the belief in inspiration was a general one, and easily accorded to any suitable writing, even when it was as foreign to Christianity as the *Poemandres*.

3. *What Remains of Christianity When the Philonic Element is Removed ?*—What will become of Christianity if from it be taken its Philonic element, which is the speculative element of Christianity, and which, as philosophy, must ever be open to change and revision ? The original Christianity of Justin Martyr was little more than a syncretism of Philonism with the Baptismal formula. If the Philonic element be abstracted, there remains in Justin's philosophy nothing more than the dogmatic element of the Baptismal formula, which in itself, without further interpretation, will testify for subordinationism (as it did to the Ante-Athanasian Fathers) as well as to the coequality of the individual names mentioned.

But if the Philonic element be abstracted, then subordinationism itself means nothing, beyond utter indefiniteness as to the meaning of the names mentioned. The student may and must interpret these three according to the best light he has and in his own philosophic language.

4. *The Baptismal Formula.*—If there remains nothing of Christian philosophy but the Baptismal Formula, the old question will reappear. Is not the Baptismal Formula, as it stands in the Gospels, an evident interpolation, such as, for instance, the explanation of who it was who wrote the Fourth Gospel: "This is the disciple which testifieth of these things, and wrote these things, and WE (therefore not John himself) know that HIS (therefore not John himself) witness is true," Jno. xxi: 24, and also the statement of the Trinity which is on all hands conceded to be spurious: "For there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost: and these three are one." I Jno. v: 7. It must be acknowledged that where the Baptismal Formula stands, it seems to have been added later, just as the latter passage, in order to make more definite what seemed symbolic of the doctrine. Besides, if Jesus taught his disciples a Trinity, how was it that it was not recorded anywhere, and the very word "Trinity" is not found until Theophilus of Antioch, more than a century later, invented it? How could Jesus have taught his disciples a doctrine the very name of the content of which was not invented for a whole century?

That one mention of the Trinity in the New Testament is on all hands acknowledged to be spurious at any rate does not make it improbable that there existed interpolators whose very purpose it was to bring forth such a doctrine. There is but one other mention, and that is that of the disputed Baptismal Formula. From internal grounds, therefore, it is quite likely that the Baptismal Formula may itself be later in origin than the materials of which the First Gospel was made, especially as the Formula is added as an appendix to the Gospel, as any one can see who takes the trouble of consulting the text, Matt. xxviii: 19.

It should not be forgotten that until the day of Basil the Gloria Patri, a version of the Baptismal Formula was still so fluid that the traditional form was not more common than numberless others such as, for instance, "Glory be to the Father, through the Son in the Holy Ghost." Consequently the argument for coequality of the three persons from the collocation of the Three Names by the particle "and" has little ancient evidence or authority.

5. *What Does the Baptismal Formula Mean?*—Yet, this very fact that there existed early interpolators with this purpose in mind, as is certainly the case in the mention of the Trinity in the First Johannine Epistle, proves that very early the statement of the three names was considered the Baptismal Formula; and all early writers employ it. It will then be wisest to refuse to settle the question where the points are so much in dispute; and to ask simply what is the most natural non-Philonic interpretation of it.

A very satisfactory and natural interpretation of it may be given.

"The Father" stands for the fact that God is the Father of all men.

"The Son," that all men are Sons of God.

"The Holy Ghost" stands for the fact of the spiritual powers which Jesus handed down to his disciples, and from whom alone they could be gotten.

Thus the Baptismal Formula may be accepted without adding any new and foreign ideas to the teachings of Jesus, who distinctly spoke of his Father as "my Father and your Father" and said that greater miracles than these which he performed would be accomplished by those who had faith as a grain of mustard seed.

Nor, in speaking of the Baptismal Formula, need a man hesitate to use the word "Trinity" of the three names mentioned in it, on account of its Athanasian and Augustinian implications. The word occurs first in Greek in the writings of Theophilus of Antioch, A. D. 200; and in Latin, in the works of Tertullian, half a century later. The fact cannot too much be insisted upon that in both these instances the word was first used by men who avowedly and confessedly were subordinationists. To their minds, therefore, in coining the new word that was destined to become so famous, its connotation in no manner implied the Athanasian and Augustinian coequality. Therefore none need scruple to use the word Triad or Trinity in a sense far removed from that of Athanasius. It need not mean anything more than the fact of the collection of three names, whatever he may decide these three names referred to may mean.

6. *Suggestive Survivals.*—It is perhaps in the nature of a slight digression to notice some significant survivals of earlier beliefs in the Nicene Creed at this place; yet a consideration of them may shed some light on the problem of the Baptismal Formula.

In the first place, the Nicene Creed contains the statement that Jesus Christ is the "Son of The God." This is a reassertion of the ancient Philonic distinction, held to by Paul, Justin, Clement and Origen. What is the significance of this survival? It would seem to be a phrase used here because of traditional usage, so outworn, in fact, that the significant distinction was not even noticed by the passionate Athanasius. The very fact of this traditional usage shows that it had descended from the most ancient times, and is suggestive of a period when the Philonic distinction, with its philosophical cosmological implications, and the latter's ignoring of the cosmological significance of the Holy Ghost, was the current belief. The subordinational implication of this survival becomes clearer when it is remembered that Origen could still say that it was blasphemy to pray to the Son, and that only an *improper* prayer could be addressed *through* him to the Father. Nor was he ever during his lifetime been faulted for this statement. A survival of this is seen in the endings of prayers to-day.

In the second place, is the phrase "Light of Light." This is a reassertion of the ancient light-and-ray simile. Significant it is, again, that this illustration of the Divine Nature neither sug-

gests nor leaves any loop-hole for a cosmological function of the Holy Ghost. Ephrem the Syrian saw this, and altered it from light-and-ray to light-ray-and-heat. But in altering this he acknowledged that he viewed the illustration in a cosmological light, and that as such the illustration pointed to a time when the Holy Ghost was either unknown or purposely ignored in connection with the Divine Nature. Other incomplete similes were the *double-hoofed* animals, showing the security of resting on the Father and the Son. So Irenaeus, and Athanasius. Again, the two images on the two sides of a penny. So Irenaeus. These survivals betray an utter ignorance of the Holy Ghost.

Once more. The Nicene Creed—that is, the Chalcedonian Creed of the 150, whatever the origin of this formulary be,—asserts that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, not from the Father and the Son. This shows that even as late as the Council of Chalcedon the position of the Holy Ghost was not yet secure, and puzzled the minds of the framers of that Symbol. When the Filioque was added, this action was an acknowledgment, first that the formulation in the Creed was considered in a cosmological light, and secondly that its early form was considered unsatisfactory. This then shows that the Council of Chalcedon had not heard of the incorporation of the Holy Ghost into a compact Trinity. Even Athanasius involuntarily repeats the early phrase of the Son and Holy Ghost being *hands* of God, which is a survival from a time when both Son and Holy Ghost were subordinated to the Father, and not clearly mutually distinguished, one *hand* being similar to the other.

These facts do not seem strange when the opinions of the Ante-Athanasian Fathers, given elsewhere, are considered. Irenaeus, Clement and Hippolytus ignore the Holy Ghost wherever they are not absolutely forced to notice it. It is often confused with the Son, and in the days of Origen it was not yet settled whether the Holy Ghost was God, identical with the Son, or subordinate to him. Tertullian, A. D. 200, first calls it "Deus."

Now, all these facts are unexplainable unless it be assumed that the Baptismal Formula was something heterogeneous in respect to Philonism. Stripped of Philonism, it need not have had any deeper significance than is hinted at above. Yet, coming in contact with Philonism, it was inevitable that as it collocated the three names, some of the implications of the first two should have in time been transferred to the third also. It would seem that the Ante-Athanasian Fathers were uneasy, and sometimes unconsciously so, when they broached the subject of the nature of the Holy Ghost, and by their contradictory and partial statements revealed the real origin of the later dogma.

All this mental shuffling could never have taken place if the later doctrine concerning the Holy Ghost had been known. If the Baptismal Formula had to the minds of the Ante-Athanasian Fathers meant all it is claimed to mean in later times, it is simply inconceivable how those illustrations of the light-and-ray, or the double-hoofed animals, could ever have been used. The

conclusion must then be that the early Fathers had a *triad of names to explain by a duality of philosophical principles, The God, and the Logos*. Under these circumstances the triad of names need not, of themselves, have meant more than is hinted at above.

7. *The Facts of the Life of Jesus and Philonism Remain, When the Baptismal Formula is Removed.*—In the search for the Christianity of Jesus, or the facts of Christianity before they become interpreted by Philonism, we only analyzed the Christianity of the type of Justin M., which contained the facts of the life of Jesus, Philonism, and the Baptismal Formula. If, however, the student should endeavour to analyze the Christianity of the Author of the Fourth Gospel and Paul, he will find only two elements: the facts of the life of Jesus, and Philonism. The Baptismal Formula, or a declaration of three names is lacking.

In the case of Paul, this is well-known and universally acknowledged. In the case of the Author of the Fourth Gospel and the Johannine Epistles, it has only been modern criticism, as recognized in the Revised Version of the Scriptures, which has proved that the mention of the three names in the Johannine Epistle was an interpolation.

Now this interpolation is particularly interesting. It is undeniable that the place in which it occurred was preëminently fitted for such an assertion. The point to be made here is that if the writer of the Johannine Epistle had desired to insert a mention of the three names, here, of all others, was the place for it. Besides, if he had known of it, it seems almost impossible to believe that he would not have inserted a mention of it, and been more explicit about his own obscure statement. This was the place of all others to make a mention of it, and yet he did not!

There is another point which is worthy of consideration. Both Paul and the Author of the Fourth Gospel do not make any mention of the three names (we do not say Trinity, because this word is not found anywhere till a century later, in the writings of Theophilus). If the dogmatic position be correct, it seems impossible that the writers of such important and general works as these two would have omitted any mention of what was the very backbone of the Christian religion, the Trinity. Both the Fourth Gospel and the Pauline Epistles were written for the very purpose of teaching the ground work of the faith; and yet in them is no single mention of or allusion to the doctrine which is the foundation of all others.

This fact will appear still more clearly if any post-Nicene writing in length and importance equal to the Fourth Gospel, or the Pauline Epistles be compared with them. The post-Nicene writings are full of references to the Trinity on every page, the writings of Paul and the Author of the Fourth Gospel have not a single one. Is this contrast not significant? Besides, if the doctrine of the Trinity be the doctrine which is the most important of all, why does it not appear in these New Testament writings which were written in order to instruct Christians in the very foundation of the faith? It is usually said that the rea-

son why the later writers were forced to speak of the Trinity was that the doctrine was in the Nicene days disputed, whereas before it was never questioned, and therefore never spoken of. But it is capable of demonstration that in the days of Paul and of the Fourth Gospel there were relatively as many opponents to a doctrine of the Trinity as in the Nicene times. There were already in the time of Paul, all kinds of Gnostics, and monotheistic Jews who scouted the Divinity even of the Messiah, Jesus, let alone the Holy Ghost. Here were the opponents : why did not Paul rise to the occasion, as Athanasius did against the Arians ? Are we to suppose that Paul had less zeal or courage than Athanasius ? This silence of Paul on the crucial point, under fire of the Monotheistic Jews, is only to be explained on the supposition that he knew nothing about the Athanasian dogma.

And why does not Jesus, before his death, anywhere speak of the doctrine of the Trinity which he came to reveal ? Why does the Author of the Fourth Gospel not make Jesus declare the truth of the dogma of the Trinity ? Why is the only mention of the Trinity in any Gospel tacked on to the very end of the First, as if it had been an afterthought, without any explanation of the Trinity, beyond bare mention of the three names ? If before this summary command Jesus had explained the whole dogma of the Trinity to his disciples, why do we not find a single reference to it anywhere ? And if the dogma of the Trinity was one of the esoteric teachings of Jesus, why then was it made public by Jesus himself, according to the First Gospel ? Thus the doctrine of the Trinity can neither have formed part of the public or esoteric teachings of Jesus.

8. *The Facts of the Life of Jesus Remain.*—It must now be asked, If from the Fourth Gospel and the Pauline Epistles all Philonism be removed, what remains ?

It must be first noticed that preëxistence was ascribed to Jesus because he was the Logos ; he was not identified with the Logos because preëxistent. Outside of these Philonic writings there is no mention of the preëxistence of Jesus. Nowhere does he claim it. Suppose, however, that it should be asked that the Author of the Fourth Gospel was correct in reporting the fact that Jesus had himself claimed preëxistence before Abraham. Why then do none of the other Gospels report it ? It is a fact of immense importance, that Jesus should himself claim preëxistence ; is it possible to believe that the writer of any of the former Gospels could have thought he was giving a satisfactory and sufficient account of the life and doctrine of Jesus, while omitting this tremendously important assertion ?

Let it be supposed, however, that Jesus did claim existence before Abraham. Why should this fact necessarily identify him with the cosmical Logos ? Plato claimed a preëxistence, the very details of which he remembered ; why should not, on these grounds alone, Plato be identified with the cosmical Logos, as well as Jesus ? In fact, the preëxistence of Plato rests on his own authentic statement ; that of Jesus on the statement of an

author who wrote at least sixty years after his death, and who was prejudiced to believe it, on account of his private philosophic belief in Philonism. Therefore the preëxistence of Plato is on such grounds only more probable than that of Jesus.

If then the student removes from the Fourth Gospel and the Johannine and Pauline writings, as well as the other New Testament writings all traces of Philonism, there will only remain the account of the natural life of Jesus of Nazara, the teacher of righteousness, and healer of the sick, a character unblemished by selfishness or deceit.

9. *Baring-Gould's Summary.*—Before leaving the domain of the New Testament, in this enquiry concerning the nature of Jesus of Nazara, it will be worth while to examine what the New Testament in general says on the subject, in the opinion of Baring-Gould (1).

“To resume what has been said : of eight witnesses in the New Testament, six, namely, Matthew, Mark, Luke, James, Peter, Jude, do not identify Jesus with God. Three, to wit the evangelists Matthew, Mark, and Luke have on the contrary texts which express belief in his humanity alone, and S. Luke in the Acts puts similar language into the mouth of S. Peter. Two only, John and Paul, speak of Jesus as one with God, but even they have ambiguous or seemingly contradictory passages.” The texts Baring-Gould advances are as follows :

(1) It is possible that when the evangelists made Christ the Son of God, they did not make him God. Matt. v : 9, 45, 48 ; vi : 25, 26 ; Luke vi : 35, xx : 36. See Ex. iv : 22 ; I Chron. xvii : 13 ; Job i : 6 ; ii : i ; xxxviii : 7 ; Ex. vii : i ; xxii : 28 ; Ps. lxxxii : 1-6.

(2) Many texts in the evangelists are hard to reconcile with the Divinity of Jesus. Matt. xvi : 15, 16 ; xix : 17 ; xx : 23 ; Mk. viii : 29 ; x : 18, 40 ; xiii : 32 ; Luke ix : 20 ; xviii : 19 ; xxiv : 19.

(3) The Fourth Gospel and Paul advance higher claims (Philonic). Jno. i : i ; v : 18 ; x : 30 ; xiv : 9, 11 ; xvii : 5 ; xx : 28 ; I Jno. 7 : 20. I Rom. ix : 5 ; Phil. ii : 6 ; Col. i : 16, 1-7 ; Col. ii : 9 ; Titus ii : 13.

(4) The Fourth Gospel and Paul have texts hard to reconcile with above if they be taken in any but the Philonic sense, and even in that case. Jno. v : 19, 20, 38 ; vi : 38 ; vii : 16, 28 ; x : 30-36 ; xx : 17 ; viii : 40. Acts ii : 22 ; iii : 13, 15, 22 ; vii : 37, 52 ; x : 38 ; x : 42. Rom. v : 15 ; I Cor. xi : 3 ; xv : 28 ; Eph. i : 3 ; I Tim. ii : 5 ; and others.

From these texts Baring-Gould concludes as follows : “To any one who already believes in our Lord's incarnation, the passages quoted will not offer much difficulty, for the bringing into prominence of one side, is not a negation of the other side ; but to one who is simply an enquirer groping for an authority which will make him embrace Christianity, instead of Buddhism, the scriptural evidence is by no means conclusive ; it fails, on examination, to satisfy the ordinary demands of scientific reasonings.”

BOOK V.

THE RESIDUAL MESSAGE.

CHAPTER I.

THE INNOVATIONS OF JESUS OF NAZARA.

1. *The Sources of the Biography of Jesus.*—In order to attain any accuracy in a judgement concerning the actual innovations of Jesus of Nazara it is necessary to begin with a bibliography of his life. The first-hand documents are of course the writings of the New Testament. Among these must be made a selection of the more helpful sources.

If the Johannine Authorship of the Fourth Gospel, and the Pauline inspiration of the Deutero-Pauline writings be accepted, the latter, and the other Johannine writings must be eliminated from the authorities to be relied on, since neither of these authors can escape the imputation of technical Philonism. Of the remainder of the New Testament, the First Gospel and the Book of Acts should also be avoided. The Book of Acts is under evident Pauline inspiration, dealing for the most part with the life and deeds of Paul, whereas the First Gospel, as well as the speeches of Peter in the beginning of the Book of Acts, present the Jewish-Christian interpretation of the life of Jesus, and not the life itself.

The life of Jesus may then be sought with least hesitation in the account given of it in the Second and Third Gospels.

Such a discrimination between the books of the New Testament need not appear to discredit the rejected sources. Their authenticity, their authority, their historicity, their power, is not impugned. They are to be passed by only in the exceedingly delicate task of criticism which the following sections undertake. It is so difficult, that it were foolish to complicate it by the endless controversies which a consideration of these debatable books would entail. The first duty would be to dissect out of them all Philonism. But this proceeding would always be open to the charge of reasoning in a circle, as it would have to judge of the evidence before permitting the latter to judge of the conclusions

to be drawn from a study of it. The part of wisdom is, therefore, simply to omit these groups of evidence.

2. *Alexandrian Apocryphal Literature.*—Having decided on accounts of the life of Jesus which must for the present be considered authoritative, it is necessary to discriminate, in the story of the life of Jesus, between the elements of doctrine which existed before his day, and those which may be justly considered his innovations. This task is necessary, since the modern student is not a Jew, and has no desire to return to obedience to the teachings of the Rabbis. He is a disciple of Jesus of Nazara only, and therefore must reject all those elements of the life of Jesus which belonged to him as a Jew. Thus alone is it possible to reach the cosmical significance of his teachings.

The Apocryphal Wisdom Literature may be called an incipient Philonism, and includes also the Aramaic Commentaries of the Old Testament. Their doctrine of Wisdom, as a personified attribute of God, might be held to be sufficient groundwork for the preëxistent divinity of Jesus, although in a subordinational sense, if such a proceeding would not bar the Holy Ghost from any place in the Godhead. The orthodox divines had all identified Jesus with the Logos or Wisdom, leaving no place in the Divinity for a third principle. Thus, even if this plea for the divinity of Jesus be advanced, the result is a contradiction of the Trinitarian dogma, which could not then be said to rest on the authority of Apocryphal literature alone.

Justin M. and Irenaeus, among others, felt this difficulty, and being unable to fuse a philosophy of the two principles with the Baptismal Formula of three names, confused both Son and Holy Ghost, and at one time identified the one, at other times the other, with Wisdom.

But to return to the Apocryphal literature, it must be remembered it was never recognised by the Christian Church and Christian writers as anything but Apocryphal, and if it should be accepted, as the Roman Catholic Church does, every doctrine in it may, just like Philonism itself, be traced to heathen sources. Hence none can claim for it the authority of divine revelation. Its doctrines were the beginnings of that tendency which resulted in Philonism, and were but rough attempts at a syncretism of heathen philosophy with the Hebrew literature. Besides, as the orthodox Athanasius does not usually use it to strengthen his own position, none need scruple to dismiss it as unable to account for the Christian dogma independently of Philonism. And if it could be shewn that it was, like Philonism, the groundwork of Christian dogma, then the student would be forced to separate it from the original facts of Christianity in order to find the Christianity of Jesus. The latter was no Alexandrine Jew, and no Apocryphal Targumist, since he was educated in Nazara as a common carpenter, if tradition is to be believed. If, again, Jesus was an Apocryphal Targumist, then his doctrine was nothing new or characteristic of himself, or authoritative for

us, who know too much history to care to become Targumists of the Alexandrian or Aramaic variety. If it be believed that there were any facts which originated in the teachings of Jesus these must be sought for outside of the Alexandrian Apocryphal literature.

3. *The Old Testament Frame.*—We must now examine the Old Testament Scriptures in respect to the Christianity of Jesus. The question may be put as follows: Were the Old Testament Scriptures sufficient to warrant the construction of the Trinitarian dogma, or of the Preëxistent Divinity of the life of Jesus? Critics of good standing, such as, for instance, Plummer, consider that the doctrine of Wisdom in the Old Testament is merely a poetic figure, such as the primitive Hebrew language used in profusion. Besides, even if it be granted that the cosmological significance of Wisdom was fully realized in the Old Testament, it will remain that in Prov. viii: 22 Wisdom is spoken of as "created," a hopeless subordinationist conception, even on the elaborate defense of Athanasius, who assumed the whole Philonic cosmology, and did not know enough Hebrew to find that his famous distinction did not obtain in the original.

In the second place, in the Old Testament alone, there is absolutely no indication of an identification of this Wisdom with Jesus, or even with the Messiah expected by the Jews. There is no word to show that this Wisdom is ever to leave the Father and to appear on earth in the form of a man. In fact, at the time of the writing of the book of Proverbs, Wisdom is represented as already on earth, standing at the street-corners, without any necessity of an Incarnation. Besides, Justin M. was so much in the dark about Wisdom that he identified it with either Son or Holy Ghost, as happened to suit his argument. He could not have made a blunder in so vital a question if any distinct dogma had existed in his day.

In the third place, not even the Prophetic utterances of the Old Testament prove the Messiahship of Jesus. The Jews, than whom no people looked forwards more earnestly to a great deliverer, did not recognize him in Jesus. Surely, if the prophecies had in any way been fulfilled in him, the instructed Rabbins would have seen the application; for if the realization was so different from the prophecies that the Jews could not recognize their fulfilment, then it can only be said that, living so far removed from the time of their fulfilment, and receiving all the reports at second hand, we have no means of judging more accurately than the Jews, nor any right to suppose their judgment was not truer than ours. This holds good even on the supposition that of the two phases of the prophetic Messiah they did not grasp the "law of the cross," and were loth to see in Jesus the fulfilment of this hope. For it remains that a suffering Messiah had, in the opinion of the Rabbis, been prophesied, and they would surely have recognised Jesus as this one, even had they failed to grasp the two apparently contradictory expressions in one.

In the fourth place, the innovations ushered into the world by the life and deeds of Jesus-of Nazara must be sought. Had all the life and teaching of the Master been only fulfilment of the Old Testament literature, then all the authority of the great Teacher would have been logically and practically contained within its sphere of influence. Then the Christian would be a Jew only, and not a disciple of Jesus. Few, however, would today have the assurance to identify salvation with becoming a Jew; and it would become a question why that obscure and ignorant Semitic tribe at one time dwelling in Palestine should be more sacred than nations dwelling there before and after it. On the contrary, a man can with reason only lay claim to the name of Christian if he seek to follow the life of Jesus only as a Christ. Abstracting the Pauline and Johannine Philonic element, the Christianity of Jesus need have no more connection with the writings of the Old Testament than would be natural in the case of a Jew born within the sphere of its influence, and who used its convenient adaptability in order to convey his message lucidly to the people. This great Message of Jesus, as it existed in his life-time, stripped of its Hebrew trappings is that Christianity of Jesus which the earnest student seeks. This is the Christianity of Jesus, not of the Jewish-Christian interpreters, or of the Johannine writers, or of Paul, or of the later ecclesiastical writers.

4. *Elements Common to the Life of Jesus and the Old Testament.*—The first question which occurs to the student in following the method outlined above is that of miracles. Jesus distinctly and repeatedly appealed to his miracles as proof of his authority (¹). Even though in some Johannine writings he seems to appeal to them only as a last resort, yet the fact remains that he points to them as a test of veridicity; and often his words on the subject are so strong that it is impossible to evade the conclusion that he considered them his most cogent legitimization.

Yet, did these miracles show that he was unique, and different from Old Testament saints?

No: Elishah did as marvellous works as he. Elishah, or Elishah's skeleton, resurrected the dead man by touching, which is as marvellous as the raising of Lazarus. As Jesus raised the widow's son at Nain, Elishah raised the Shunamite's son, and Elijah the son of the widow at Zarephath. Multiplication of food was also performed by Elijah with the widow's cruise, and Elishah by the multiplication of the widow's oil, and the feeding of a hundred men on twenty loaves. Elishah was, as well as Jesus, in the habit of healing the sick, as appears from the cure of Naaman and the revengeful infliction of leprosy on Gehazi. Besides, both Elijah and Elishah did more marvellous works than Jesus did; Elijah burnt the sacrifice on Mount Carmel, burnt the captains and their companies, and divided Jordan. Elishah did likewise in dividing the Jordan, destroyed the mocking children at Bethel, supplied water to the alleged armies of Moab, healed the deadly pottage, made the iron axe to swim,

and smote the whole Syrian army. Besides, Moses did marvellous things, especially in respect to the manna, and Joshua made the sun and moon stand still.

In point of miracles therefore, it may be seen that Jesus was not one whit in advance of Moses, Joshua, Elijah or Elishah. The fact that he did perform miracles will not prove his divinity more than it will prove the divinity of Moses, Joshua, Elijah, or Elishah.

In the second place, it must be asked whether the resurrection of Jesus was not a unique fact or belief in Jewish history. To this question it must be answered, No. Enoch and Elijah had been translated to heaven without seeing death, something far more remarkable than being forced to die and then rising again. Besides, the belief in a resurrection was a common doctrine of the Pharisees. So living was this belief that Herod long before the resurrection of Jesus, feared that the latter was the resurrection of John the Baptizer whom he had put to death. The sisters of Lazarus acknowledged a belief in a resurrection at the last day. Josephus believed that the souls of those who "depart out of this life according to the law of nature, are again sent in the revolution of the ages into pure bodies (?)." According to Josephus the Pharisees believed that souls have an immortal vigor, and that under the earth, (*i. e.*, in Sheol) there will be rewards and punishments according as they have lived virtuously or viciously ; that the latter are assigned to an everlasting prison, but that for the former there is power to revive and live again (3). Paul declared that the hope of his sect, the Pharisees, was a resurrection both of righteousness and unrighteousness (4). Likewise the Fourth Gospel (5) and the Enoch-Parables (6) and Daniel (7). The second book of Maccabees looked only for the resurrection of the Jews (8) but the Synoptical Gospels seem to refer only to a resurrection of those who are accounted worthy to obtain it (9). These who are resurrected are as the angels in heaven (10) although what and who the angels in heaven are is not clear, except that they are beings who do not marry, nor are given in marriage.

In respect to the resurrection, therefore, it is evident that Jesus of Nazara introduced no new conception, or no new teaching concerning it. His own resurrection would not be to Jews an unusual fact as to probability, although possibly as to shortness of delay before the resurrection.

In the third place, it must be considered whether Jesus of Nazara introduced any innovations into Judaism in respect to the doctrine of everlasting punishment.

The parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus only repeats the usual Jewish belief in Sheol, divided into the Paradise, in which Lazarus abode in the bosom of Abraham, and in which Jesus said he would be together with the penitent Thief, and in a Gehenna which is an eternal prison of fire. Elsewhere Jesus speaks of the "gehenna of fire (11)" as if he were speaking of a well-known

place. Evidently Jesus of Nazara introduced no innovation into this conception, and therefore it possesses now no more authority than it possessed then, being the popular Jewish conception of the latter state.

This leads the enquirer to the question of angelology and demonology. Here he finds that Jesus adopted without any change the whole Jewish conception of these beings. He speaks of guardian angels (¹³), and speaks of the kingdom of Satan and his angels as opposed to that of God and his angels (¹⁴). Twice he calls Peter Satan (¹⁵) and innumerable times speaks of the possession of devils, which he casts out (¹⁶). All this is only the statement of the common Jewish belief of that day. The student has here nothing to do with the question whether Jesus knew better than these opinions which he assented to in order to make his teachings intelligible to the people who held these beliefs. This latter view would entail tacit dishonesty in one whose mission was to reveal truth. The critical stand-point is that in these matters his opinions did not vary from those of the Jews. The inference is then that in his opinion these popular Jewish conceptions were absolutely correct representations of the great realities beyond.

In the fourth place, it must be asked whether Jesus of Nazara invented the "Golden rule," to do "unto others as we would be done by." The slightest acquaintance with the life of Hillel, the great Jewish Rabbi, will reveal the fact that he had taught it before Jesus did. He used it as a sufficient test of belief for gentile proselytes. None can claim, therefore, originality for Jesus in this matter, even if the prior use of this maxim by Confucius be disregarded.

In the fifth place, Jesus's doctrine of the kingdom of heaven must be considered. There is a sense in which the conceptions of Jesus in respect to this important event were original. Yet there are many sayings of his in respect to it which harmonize wholly with the Jewish views on the subject, with the exception that he himself claimed to be the Messiah. This assumption of honour will be noticed further on. For the present there is only need to refer to the passages in which a speedy and physical restoration of all things is announced. "Verily I say unto you, There shall be some standing here which shall not taste of death till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom (¹⁷)." "So shall it be in the end of this world. The Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity; and shall cast them into a furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth (¹⁸)." "Verily I say unto you, That ye which have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit upon the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon the twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel (¹⁹)." "But he shall receive an hundred fold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions."

and in the world to come everlasting life ⁽²¹⁾." Paul likewise believed that the end of the world should come in his own lifetime ; speaking of "our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come ⁽²²⁾," and saying "Then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air ⁽²³⁾." All these passages, whether actually spoken by Jesus and accurately reported, or merely attributed to Jesus by the Apostles or writers of the Gospel, or written actually by Paul, cannot belong to the doctrines which originated with Jesus, as they agree wholly with all Jewish notions on the subject, as may easily be seen by any who will take the trouble to examine the numerous Apocalypses of the times, or the Jewish teachings of what the coming of the Messiah at the end of the world, at the renovation, was to be.

In the sixth place, the student must consider those passages in Jesus distinctly claims for himself Messianic honours. The title "Son of Man," although once used by Daniel, is so indefinite that it is impossible to argue from it to any apparent self-glorification ; in fact, it assumes humility, in comparison with the title, Son of God. Also, Jesus refuses to be called good, this being a title which is applicable to God alone ⁽²⁴⁾. Yet at Cesarea Philippi, Jesus accepted from Peter the statement which is unmistakably Messianic in character, that he was the "Christ, the Son of the living God ⁽²⁵⁾." As the student is not concerned here whether Jesus actually did so, or whether this report was only attributed to him by disciple or evangelist, there is no need to enter into the interminable discussions which have been called forth by this statement. It is sufficient to remember that such a statement and action was in perfect keeping with what would naturally have occurred to a Jew who claimed to be the Messiah. Consequently it cannot be considered to have been a doctrine original with Jesus, and therefore belonging to the innovations of Jesus of Nazara. The fact of claiming to be the Messiah was no original thing. Students of history remember how many claimants to that honour existed before and after the time of Jesus.

In consideration of all these facts, it would seem easy to ask, was Jesus of Nazara an Innovator at all ? Did he consider himself such an one as was to bring to the world some great or new truth ?

This may be determined more easily by asking, What was his relation to the Law of Moses ?

On the one hand, it is possible to quote a large number of passages in which he reaffirms the law in the most consistent manner ⁽²⁶⁾, as, for instance, when he implies in the Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus that the brothers of the latter might be saved by obeying the laws of Moses and the Prophets. There is here no word of necessary faith in himself.

Again, he gives new commandments as to the subject of matrimony, and claims the right to keep the Sabbath as he pleases ⁽²⁷⁾. He came to "fulfil," that is, to establish or complete what

was lacking in the Law and the Prophets. Besides, he believes in not putting new wines in old bottles, an evident reference to the forms of the law.

If both of these stand-points be grasped into one consistent view, it will appear that he supported whatever was good in the law, and so far preferred to keep the old forms, as forms which were understood by the people, and would easily reach their hearts. Wherever he disagreed with the law, he set it aside and announced the higher law of righteousness and morality as the supreme law of man.

In such a sense, therefore, did Jesus of Nazara consider himself an innovator.

CHAPTER II.

THE CHRISTIANITY OF JESUS OF NAZARA.

1. *Contrast of the Methods of the Rationalist and the Historical Critic.*—So far the reader has only considered in a negative way the religious innovations of Jesus of Nazara. We have only examined certain aspects of his teachings which need not be regarded as distinctively characteristic doctrines of his, as they can be demonstrated to have been held and taught by Jewish teachers before him. In this separation of Jewish from Christian teachings, the student necessarily takes issue with many of the views of the traditional stand-point, which contents itself with accepting all that Jesus taught as distinctively Christian. The most cursory investigation of the religion of the Jews as it existed in the time of Jesus shows how thoroughly Jesus was himself a Jew. It is therefore necessary to separate from his teachings the current Jewish belief : and the residuum may fearlessly be considered the fruit of his great religious genius.

Yet, in separating from the teachings of Jesus the current Jewish beliefs, there is no depreciation of their great value. Although Jesus transcended the greatest of the Jewish teachers, yet in a historical sense, had they not existed, he could never have been what he was. They were, without doubt, stepping-stones only to his universal sympathy and divine insight ; but stepping-stones are important, and without them, the first steps could never have taken place. The first shoot of a plant is by no means the perfected flower ; but without it, the flower would be impossible. As the greatest and best of all prophets, Jesus towers above all his Jewish predecessors ; yet without them, it is hard to see how he could have been what he was ; he certainly could never have preached many of the doctrines which can be traced to them. Genius cannot create out of nothing : before Jesus could preach there must have existed the language spoken commonly in Judaea, the many common religious notions which he shared with the people, and the familiarity of the people with the conception of prophecy, the literature of the Old Testament, and the past history of Israel. Out of all these materials Jesus could choose that which would make his thought intelligible to them. Then, he could adapt many elements in new combinations, and finally mould many popular conceptions into that shape in which he gave them to the people. In view of all this, therefore, it is hard to over-estimate the value of this Jewish religion which must be separated from the distinctive teachings of

Jesus, to these very individual doctrines. To separate them thus is no proceeding inspired by disrespect or lack of appreciation. On the contrary, the more we find in common between Jewish ideas and the teachings of Jesus, the greater the value which all Christians will attach to them. Of course, this value will be no more the result of blind prejudice, but of intelligent appreciation of the real historical significance of the great development of religious thought which Jesus initiated.

This method of procedure, which has been adopted so far, is on the whole more just than that of the modern school of the rationalist. His method decides of the narrative according to what he thinks might have happened in reality, under the control of the laws of the Conservation of Energy, and of Sufficient Reason, and leads us to results which beg the question. Before a man can do so, he must let the historical critic ascertain to the best of his ability what the actual facts of the Christianity of Jesus were; then he may, if he pleases, let the rationalist decide what may possibly have happened, and what is only prejudice or superstition. But the method of the historical critic is not always wholly faultless. He, as well as the rationalist, is often fond of reasoning in a circle, or of begging the question. We are endeavouring to decide of Christianity by impartially collecting and examining the facts; we should therefore beware of judging whether facts should be admitted to consideration from their agreement or disagreement with our conception of Christianity. Sometimes the historical critic is right in his judgment, although the method of arriving at the result is highly unsatisfactory. Cone, for instance, in his "Gospel and its Interpretations" attributes the Gospel conception of a spiritual kingdom of heaven to Jesus, but that of a physical second coming to the disciples or later writers, only because he judges such a conception to be unworthy of Jesus. But in doing this he forgets that he is endeavouring to decide of the character of the teachings of Jesus by the facts of the Gospels. Such procedure must be reasoning in a circle. Many will agree with the results of Cone's argument, without approving of the means by which he reaches the result. The student may separate from the distinctive teachings of Jesus the conception of a physical second coming by noticing that it agrees wholly with Jewish hopes of the national restoration of their political independence, the twelve apostles sitting on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. Whether Jesus himself ever spoke those words ascribed to him, as is quite possible, or whether the writers of the Gospels incorporated into their writings hopes of their own, and ascribed them to Jesus, it will be for ever impossible to decide with that degree of certainty which would be necessary to permit the student to let them be a factor in a final judgment of the character of Jesus. As a matter of fact, on investigation the conception of religion by which the world is richer through the life and labours of Jesus, has nothing to do with an investigation of

the character of Jesus himself. But it has much to do with the historical question, Which of the doctrines taught in the New Testament cannot be traced to Judaism, and which of these doctrines preceded Philonism? This question can be decided by dispassionate consideration of documents, without touching the probable content of the message of the Master of Nazara in its gross inclusive form.

Who Jesus was, what the actual facts of his life were, what his character was,—all these questions fall to the lot of the New Testament critic, who can go deeper into his specialty than can be done here, and whose results will be more satisfactory than these. That he will attain final results is not to be hoped for; the only thing which could bring these about would be a projection of the mind backwards nineteen hundred years, and a scientific history and investigation of what actually happened by means of photography and phonography. His available data are every day crumbling more and more in his hands. With the patent difference of Chronology exhibited by the Gospels, has vanished all hope of a determination of whether there was any development in the doctrine and teaching of Jesus, except by the easy and invalid process of begging the question, and reasoning in a circle. Then, even if he should collate all the words reported to have been uttered by Jesus he would have only such a limited selection from all the words which an actual man must have uttered during the space of three years, or even one year, that he can never hope to have anything like a satisfactory account of Jesus, as the latter left no authentic written documents whatsoever, that we know of. The scholar may, in view of all these difficulties, be grateful that the task of the critic of the New Testament is not his, and address himself to the more humble but more hopeful task of investigating what new ideas were brought into religion by the life of Jesus of Nazara.

Humble as this task is, we can not hope to accomplish it satisfactorily and fully within the limits to which we must confine ourselves here. This task deserves a treatise, and not a Chapter. We can therefore only hope to point out some of the most important and salient characteristics of his teaching, and limit ourselves to stating these as briefly as possible. In view of these necessary limitations, we should avoid asserting that there are no other distinctive doctrines of Jesus which may have not been omitted, or that perhaps too much credit has been unintentionally given to the reforming genius of the Master. Space restricts us to a few plain principles which will meet with universal assent.

2. *The Sermon on the Mount.*—Whatever of the first Greek Gospel formed part of the Hebrew "logia" of Matthew, it is pretty certain that the "Sermon on the Mount" was a portion of it. Whether this be the case or no, it is admitted on all hands to be one of the most characteristic of the doctrines of Jesus. That it is original in almost every respect, will soon be seen; and

moreover, it is from internal grounds, most probably, the greatest portion, if not the whole, of the Matthew's Hebrew "logia" which Papias mentions.

The fifth Chapter of the First Gospel contains besides the Beatitudes five distinct new commandments, each of them beginning with the words "ye have heard that it was said by them of old time" followed by the injunction "but I say unto you." Here the writer distinctly makes a contrast between the teachings of the Jews, and that of Jesus. Evidently the writer considered that Jesus was teaching doctrine not only opposed to, but even contradicting that of the Jews. Therefore it must be new, original, characteristic doctrine.

The first three commandments, concerning killing, adultery, and swearing, agree in this, that the sin is said to consist not in its external objective expression, but in its internal, subjective motive, and impulse. This spirituality accords with the Beatitudes, which likewise draw a sharp distinction between the welfare of this external world, and that of the soul. The external objective life is immaterial to the welfare of the soul, which only uses it as a means of sanctification. The tears, the self-denial of purity, the meekness and suffering of this world are only evils to the body : the soul profits by them in increased will, in increased desire after God, increased disgust for the world, and great chances to learn spirituality and love. This life is not an end in itself : it is a means by which the soul may attain to those spiritual heights which stand high above the heavens.

The fifth commandment is still more a distinct application of this principle : we must love, not only those who love us, but also those who hate us. The purpose of life is to let divine love stream through the being ; therefore, we must learn to love : and it is immaterial what the feeling of others towards us is. Power to love those who hate us is of course limited by selfishness ; for regard for our own selves will dictate self-preservation, which means hate against those who injure our bodies, and opportunities in the world. But if we are sufficiently humble we will be able to love all.

The fourth commandment is an application of this principle to several possible circumstances of life. If a man smite us on one cheek, we shall turn to him the other. If a man sue us at the law and take away our coat, we shall give him our cloak also. If a man compel us to go with him a mile, we shall go twain with him. We shall give to him that asks and lend money to him who is desirous of borrowing from us.

The principle of all this is non-resistance to evil, unless we adopt dishonest exegesis, that will eviscerate all these definite and distinct commands of their evident purpose. Of course the Essenes had taught all these doctrines, so that in one sense, the traditional explanation of these commands supposes that they are only consciously exaggerated forms of the usual precept of kindness. But this supposes that Jesus used the above words in

senses which he knew they did not bear to others. It would be a form of dishonesty, even in a good cause. Besides, what would have been the use, on the traditional hypothesis, that Jesus should come to this world to reveal divine objective truth, if he did not mean to say anything different from what everybody else knew centuries before his coming? Would it be likely that he would come into the world to preach what he came to preach in words which to all honest interpretation meant the opposite of what he meant?

The best guarantee that this doctrine was original with Jesus is that not only the Jews did not receive it, but even the Christian Church has never seen its way to accepting it unreservedly. That Jesus meant it in earnest may be seen by reading how in his own life he always acted on this principle. He never rebelled against the authority of Caesar, never counselled an appeal to arms. He was silent before his accusers, and patient under the burden of the cross.

The Jews before his coming never countenanced any such practices, and this must have been the opinion of Jesus who states his doctrine as if it were in direct contradiction to what he knew had been the teaching of the Rabbis. Even if such injunctions had been preached among the Jews, it is certain from historical sources that the latter never applied them to practical life. Even the followers of Jesus could not receive them. Paul confesses that he withstood Peter to the face, and in his writings advised that every man should live peaceably with his neighbour, "as much as lieth in you," not, "at whatever risk or cost it may be to you." We may compare the morals of the times of the Council of Nicaea with those of Jesus by first looking at the silence and meekness of Jesus when accused before his opponents, and Athanasius cursing and blaspheming at those who disagreed with him. The Roman Catholic Church has openly espoused the doctrine of the "two swords," and temporal power. Finally, those who like Tolstoi have in later days reasserted this doctrine are widely considered as afflicted with some light form of mental disease. Surely in view of all this we need not hesitate to assert the originality of this doctrine, and that therefore it is one of the characteristic doctrines of Jesus. The basis of it is absolute submission to the will of God, which was brought out much more prominently by Jesus than it had ever been before.

3. *The Fatherhood of God.*—In the remainder of the Sermon on the Mount there is perhaps no expression so often repeated as that of "Father," in reference to God.

In the Sermon on the Mount, God is not the Jahweh of the Israelites, who protects them as a chosen race, and who avenges them on all the heathen, but the universal Father, who is kind, numbers the hairs of his children, feeds the birds, clothes the lilies, and gives his children all they can possibly need. He is never angry; on the contrary, he sends the rain on the just and the unjust, and gives his Spirit to all who ask him.

The prophets had occasionally spoken of God as a Father to them who would turn to him, and once in the Psalms, that he will be a Father to the king. But usually the prophets were engaged in denouncing his wrath and his terrible judgments ; and he was so holy, so far removed from them, that they even dare not pronounce his name.

What a contrast is this to the conception of a Father who loves his children tenderly, who needs not to be placated by sacrifices and sin-offerings, since he sees the returning prodigal son from afar, and runs to meet him with open arms. To the prophet, the God could only be reached by the intermediation of a priesthood, and its sacrifices ; to Jesus, the God can be reached by the earnest desire of any repentant heart, without the least intermediation. With open arms does he receive the prodigal who has wasted all his goods in the far country, and kills for him the fatted calf, and adorns him with new raiments and rings. Besides, the Parable of Dives and Lazarus seems to imply that only obedience to the Father's command of morality and kinship are needed for Salvation.

Nor need this loving conception of the Father seem to encourage sinners in their sin. The prodigal suffered bitterly the relentless consequences of sin. Yet, as soon as the prodigal had come to himself, and desired to return—not before this, however—the Father runs to meet him with open arms. Such a Father as this may easily inspire with trust, and with faith. It is to awake this feeling in the breasts of his disciples that Jesus speaks so much of the Father. A God like the thundering Jahweh, who dwelt amidst darkness, dare be trusted only on the strength of formal covenants and sacrifices ; but a Father who loves his children and is loved by them may be trusted so implicitly that all anxiety will be removed from life, and that mountains may be removed by faith in him. If the Father in heaven clothes and feeds the birds and flowers, will he not clothe and feed his dearer and nearer children ? Life becomes peace, in the midst of turmoil ; for the tender Father who is omnipotent, will overrule all for the good of those who love him.

What is the consequence of the universal Fatherhood of God ? Of course, the universal Sonship of Man. Therefore, as Jesus never weary of speaking of God as "Father," "my Father," "your Father," "the Father," so he speaks of himself as the Son of God, and endeavours to assure his disciples of their sonship too. Although to-day it is consistent with orthodoxy to speak of God as "my Father," it is suspicious to speak of oneself as a Son of God. So little has the world yet understood this truth which Jesus enunciated so boldly, that although granted in his case, it is suspicious to speak of it in our own.

Yet there is a distinction often made which we may notice. Jesus announces directly only his own sonship, and never speaks of "our Father," except in the case of the prayer he taught his disciples. The reason of this may be that he was actually what

he wanted to make them, and any other course might easily have caused the disciples to fancy themselves already "finished," "perfect," as he was. Hence, too, they are made to strain after this potential divine sonship of theirs. It is doubtful, however, whether such a fine distinction would have persisted from his actual words into so many recensions of his words as to appear finally in one of the Gospels. If it had, some particular notice of it would also appear. Whether the sonship was realized or not, God was the Father of all, and consequently, potentially and actually, on a spiritual plane, all men were his children.

On the whole, then, it may be held that this doctrine of the loving Fatherhood of God is one of the doctrines characteristic of the teachings of Jesus.

4. *The Parables of the Kingdom.*—Among the most characteristic of the sayings of Jesus are the "parables of the kingdom," as they are called. Their subject is the "kingdom of heaven" which it was the duty of John to preach as being at hand. It was come already; it was among them. Consequently, it could not be the earthly Messianic advent of the Anointed of God, who was to establish the earthly resources of the Jews, until every son of Israel should have twenty-eight thousand slaves from among the Gentiles apiece. Absolute subjection to the Romans had only come lately, and with it, the extinction of any hope of independence in the more reasonable minds. If the Kingdom of God was already among them, and the Kingdom of God was not the rule of the Romans, then it followed that this Kingdom of God was a spiritual kingdom, rendering unto Caesar the things are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's. This spiritual kingdom was the assembling of spiritually developed souls, seeking the righteousness of God above all earthly welfare. Thus the publicans and the harlots had already begun to enter it, even before the scribes and Pharisees.

It is true that the term, "kingdom of God," was familiar to the Jews long before the coming of Jesus. But to all faithful children of Israel, it meant the return of political independence. As all Semitic races were more or less theocratic in political constitution, so the Jews had been strongly imbued with the notion of a theocracy. It is true that the Judges had been in early times replaced by kings: but then the Priest-hood had remained a political institution, and when the Romans finally abolished the kingdom, the Sanhedrim, or College of Priests, administered the internal political affairs. Therefore to a Jew the separation of Church and State was out of question in the coming kingdom of heaven.

Here it was that the conception which Jesus had and preached of the kingdom of heaven was original. It was a kingdom of righteousness, that had no relation whatsoever to the political government. To Caesar must the things of Caesar be rendered; to God, the things of God. The kingdom was one of righteousness that could exist at any time, anywhere, that was to persist

through ages, just because its welfare was not bound down to the political conditions which might exist at any moment.

At first, doubtless, Jesus may have conceived of a spiritual kingdom of heaven that was separated from all political entanglement, the separation of Church and State, without exactly consciously expecting any but the Children of Israel to form part of it. His journeys always were limited to Jewish territory; and once when in the moment of bitter dejection he went over into Syrophenician territory, he showed his true feeling by giving a harsh answer to a woman who besought him for help. It was only when he was particularly roused by her persistence that on a sudden impulse he granted her prayer; and thus perhaps did he first realize that his kingdom of heaven was to extend to all nations.

His immediate disciples did not understand this wholly. Witness Peter who had to have an express vision to persuade him to follow the servants of the heathen centurion, and later still was withstood to the face for dissembling with Judaizers. Nor has this complete severance of Church and State been better understood by the Christian Church. At the time of the Council of Nicaea ground under the heel of the unbaptized Constantine, in Russia and England wedded wholly to the political organism, in its Roman Catholic branch lusting for supreme temporal power, the Christian Church has at almost every phase of her existence clung tenaciously to the loaves and fishes of the State, forgetful that her Master held totally different views.

Since, therefore, the Jewish Church before, and the Christian Church after, the time of Jesus believed in union of Church and State, there need be little ground for hesitation in supposing that the doctrine of separation of Church and State, that is, disestablishment, was an original doctrine of Jesus, and deserves to be known as characteristic of his teaching.

How beautiful is the notion of a kingdom of heaven living in the world, informing it with spiritual light and life; moveless amidst continual political changes, full of righteousness, light, and peace!

5. *Modern Formulation of the Innovations of Jesus.*—Before the majesty of the Divinity revealed in Jesus of Nazara it were useless to pretend admiration or approval. The teachings which he enunciated appeal to every heart as being ultimate statements of spiritual truths; and the intuition of each heart accepts them as divine. Let us lose ourselves in contemplation of them, rather than in disputing concerning their miraculous attestation. Let us endeavour to catch the spirit which left behind the curses of the law, and began its teaching with the blessings of the Beatitudes.

NOTES.

BOOK I—CHAPTER I.

(1) iv Esdras, vi : 55. (2) In Farrar's Life and Words of Christ, Vol. i, Chap. i. (3) For proofs that the resurrection was a common Jewish notion, see Matt. xxii : 23, 28, 30, 31 ; Mark xii : 18, 23 ; Luke xiv : 14 ; xx : 27, 33, 35, 36 ; John v : 29. Besides, it may be seen that Jesus connected his idea of the resurrection directly with the popular notion, or perhaps that he derived his conception of it from thence, John xi : 24, 25. (4) Psalm xxxiii : 6, 9. (5) Genesis i : 3. See Psalm cxlvii : 15. Isaiah lv : 10, 11. (6) Isaiah ii : 1. (7) Psalm xxxiii : 4. (8) Psalm cxix : 89. (9) Jer. xxiii : 29. (10) Job xxviii. (11) *Ib.*, verse 15-19. (12) Proverbs viii : 1-4. (13) *Ib.*, verse 22-29. (14) *Ib.*, verse 30. (15) In Cambridge Gk. Test. In Jno. i : 1. (16) Ecclesiasticus i : 1, 4, 9, 20. (17) Wisdom vii : 21. (18) *Ib.*, verse 24. (19) *Ib.*, verse 27. (20) *Ib.*, verse 25-26. See Hebrews i : 3. (21) Genesis iii : 8.

CHAPTER II.

(1) Heinze, Logoslehre, p. 16. (2) *Ib.*, p. 18. (3) *Ib.*, p. 24. (4) Clem. Al. Strom. v. 599, D, in Euseb. Praep. Ev. xiii, 13,676, c. (5) Heinze, p. 37. (6) *Ib.* p. 54. (7) *Ib.*, p. 59. (8) *Ib.*, p. 60. (9) *Ib.*, p. 75. (10) *Ib.*, p. 77. (11) *Ib.*, p. 79. (12) *Ib.*, p. 80. (13) *Ib.*, p. 81. (14) Cicero, De Natura Deorum, ii : 22. (15) Diogenes Laertius, vii : 134. (16) Heinze, p. 83. (17) *Ib.*, p. 85. (18) Clem. Al. Strom. v. 591, Af. (19) Tertullian, Ad Nationes, ii : 4. (20) Heinze, p. 90. (21) Origen, C. Cels. vi : 71. (22) Heinze, p. 93. (23) Cicero, De Natura Deorum, ii : 15, 41. (24) Heinze, p. 100. (25) *Ib.*, p. 101. (26) *Ib.*, p. 105. (27) *Ib.*, p. 107. (28) *Ib.*, p. 144. (29) *Ib.*, p. 145. (30) *Ib.*, p. 169. (31) *Ib.*, p. 184. (32) *Ib.*, p. 187, allegorical method. (33) *Ib.*, p. 191. (34) *Ib.*, p. 215. (35) *Ib.*, p. 238. (36) *Ib.*, p. 286. (37) e. g. Fragm. ii : 13. 323, a. (38) Quaest. in Gen. ii : 62 ; ii : 147. (39) Leg. Alleg. iii : 1 : 128. (40) Qu. det. pot. ins. i : 207. (41) Euseb. Praep. Ev. xi : 18,537, c.

CHAPTER III.

(1) The Platonic formula for matter. (2) i : 66. (3) i : 5. (4) i : 414, 415, 562. (5) Logos endiathetos. (6) Logos prophorikos. (7) i : 5. (8) Logos spermatikos. (9) i : 501, 502 de Somn. ii : 28. i : 684. (11) i : 501, 502. (12) i : 308, 415, 427, 502. (13) i : 655, 656. (14) Ho theos, theos, ho deuterios theos. (15) i : 501. (16) i : 128. (17) Aisthesis. (18) Logos. (19) Nous.

CHAPTER IV.

(1) Harnack, Über das verhältniss dess Prologs des 4ten Evang. zum ganzen Werk, Zeitschrift für Theol. und Kirche. ii Jahrgang, iii Heft, 1892. (2) Epiphanius, Samarit. Haeres. ix : 4. In Pearson on the Creed, p. 185, note. (3) John i : 6. (4) John i : 18. (5) i Corinthians viii : 6. (6) S. Matt. xii : 48-50. Who is my mother, and who are my brethren ? And he stretched forth his hands toward his disciples, and said, Behold my mother and my brethren : For whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in Heaven, the same is my brother and sister and mother. S. John xx : 17. But go to my brethren and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father and your Father ; and to my God and your God. S. Jno. xiv : 12. He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also ; and greater works than these shall he do ; because I go unto my Father. S. Matt. xvii : 19, 20. When the question was asked concerning, Why they could not do the works he could, he answered, not that they were different from him, but because they had not faith enough. (7) "All things are delivered unto me of my Father," Matth. xi : 27. If this only referred to his human nature, he would have received all things not from the Father but from his own divine nature, and would have said : "All things are delivered me of my own divine nature, of myself." See Math. xxviii : 18. Luke x : 22. John v : 26, 36 ; vi : 37, 39 ; x : 29 ; xiii : 3 ; 16 ; xiv : 28 ; xv : 15 ; xvii : 7-11 ; xx : 20 ; Acts ii : 22 ; iv : 10 ; xiii : 22 ; xvii : 30 ; x : 38 ; Heb. iii : 2.

EXCURSUS TO BOOK I—CHAPTER IV.

In the Fourth Gospel, the word "God" is used 82 times, of which only 19 times it is used without the article. It is the purpose of these lines to enquire whether there is any rational discrimination in this difference, or whether it be due merely to chance. The text used is Tischendorf's.

In the following places the word God is used with the article. I : 1, 2, 18, 29, 34, 36, 50, 52 ; iii : 2, 3, 5, 16, 17, 18, 33, 34, 35, 36 ; iv : 10 ; 24 ; v : 18, 25, 42, 44 ; vi : 27, 28, 29, 38, 46, 69 ; vii : 17 ; viii : 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 47 ; ix :

3, 24, 29, 31, 33 ; x : 35, 36 ; xi : 4, 22, 22, 27, 40, 52 ; xii : 43 ; xiii : 3, 31, 32, 32 ; xiv : 1 ; xvi : 2, 27 ; xix : 7 ; xx : 31 ; xxi : 19.

In the following places the word God is used without the article. I : 1, 6, 12, 13, 18 ; iii : 2, 21 ; vi : 45 ; viii : 54 ; ix : 16, 33 ; x : 33, 34, 35 ; xiii : 3 ; xvi : 30 ; xvii : 3 ; xx : 17, 17.

For the sake of brevity, the following texts are of the latter class. (1) I : 1, 2. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with the God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with the God. (2) I : 6. There was a man sent from God whose name was John. (3) I : 12. But as many as received him, to them gave he the power to become the sons of God. . . (4) I : 13. Which was born, not of blood, . . . nor of the will of man, but of God. (5) I : 18. No man hath seen God at any time ; the only-begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him. (6) III : 2. We know that thou art a teacher come from God, for no man can do these miracles thou doest except the God be with him. (7) III : 21. But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God. (8) VI : 45. It is written in the prophets, they shall be all taught of God. (9) VIII : 54. It is my Father that honoureth me, of whom ye say that he is your God. (10) IX : 16. This man is not of God, because he keep not the Sabbath day. (11) IX : 33. If this man were not of God, he could do nothing. (12) X : 33. Because that thou, being man, makest thyself God. (13) X : 34. Is it not written in your law, I said, ye are Gods ? (14) X : 35. If he called them Gods, unto whom the word of the God came. . . . (15) XIII : 3. And that he was come from God, and went to the God. . . . (16) XVI : 30. By this we believe thou camest forth from the God. (17) XIX : 7. And by our law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God. (18) XX : 17. I ascend unto my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God.

The meanings of these texts may be summarized as follows :

I. "Sent from" or "Come of" God, 15, 16, 2, 6. A colloquial and popular expression, not referring theologically to "the" God. Equivalent to "divine."

II. Not "of God." 10, 11. Equivalent, in common phraseology, to "divine."

III. "Sons of God," 3, 4. Likewise.

IV. Deeds "wrought in God," 7. A popular locution for the belief that the deed is not "right."

V. Quotations from the Old Testament, "taught of God," 8, 13 ; "see God," 5.

VI. The Jews apply to Jesus the term God, either from themselves, or from suppositious claims of Jesus himself, 9, 6, 12, 13, 14, 17.

VII. Jesus applies to himself the term God, or accepts their charge by silent assent, 13, 14. The misunderstanding between the Jews and himself seems to be, that they are not aware of the Philonic distinction, and he is. Consequently, to them, the term God is a direct blasphemy ; to him it is only the proper technical statement of his position.

VIII. The Word is God, as against "the" God, of the Father, or first God, 1, 15.

IX. Jesus takes especial pains to point out that he like all other men has a Father and a God, 18.

Next in order are a class of texts which mention together the Father and the Son, with the article before the name of the former.

(1) I : 1. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with the God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with the God. (2) I : 29. Behold the Lamb of the God, which taketh away the sins of the world. (3) I : 34. And I saw, and bare record, that this is the Son of the God. (4) I : 36. Behold the Lamb of the God. (5) I : 49. Rabbi, thou art the Son of the God ; thou art the King of Israel. (6) I : 51. Ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of the God ascending and descending upon the Son of man. (7) III : 2. Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God : for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except the God be with him. (8) III : 16. For the God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son. (9) III : 17. For the God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world. (10) III : 18. Because he hath not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of the God. (11) III : 34. For he whom the God hath sent speaketh the words of the God. (12) III : 36. And he that believeth not the Son shall not see life ; but the wrath of the God abideth on him. (13) VIII : 40. But now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth, which I have heard of the God. (14) X : 36. Thou Blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of the God. To the Jews

unacquainted with the Philonic distinction this was blasphemy indeed ; but not to him.

The cogency of the texts quoted above seems to lie in the fact that while they all agree in calling the Father "the" God, while mentioning the Son with him, there is no instance in the Fourth Gospel of this juxtaposition of the two persons in which the Father is not called "the" God. Besides, no text can be shewn where the Son is called "the" God.

A further text in which both are mentioned, and in which the Father seems to be more especially referred to as the only God, is

(15) XVII : 3. And this is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent. A distinction seems to be established here between "the only true God" who sends, and Jesus Christ who is sent. The inference is that Jesus Christ is not himself the only true God.

All the other texts mentioned above refer to the Father as "The God," and explain themselves.

NOTES TO BOOK II—CHAPTER I.

(1) I Corinthians, I : 18, 21, 23, 25 ; ii : 14 ; iii : 19. (2) II Tim. ii : 23 ; Titus iii : 9. (3) See Excursus on Evidential Value of Miracles. (4) Acts ii : 22 ; viii : 13 ; xix : 11. I Cor. xii : 10 ; 28. Gal. iii : 5 ; Heb. ii : 4. (5) Romans i : 1-32. (6) Ephes. v : 16. (7) II Cor. iv : 4 ; Col. i : 15 ; Heb. i : 3. (8) Col. i : 15. (9) I Corinth. xi : 7 ; See Rom. viii : 29, Heb. i : 9. (10) Col. i : 15. (11) Col. i : 15. (12) Romans viii : 29, Heb. i : 9. (13) Col. i : 17 ; i Cor. viii : 6. (14) Col. i : 17 ; Heb. i : 3. (15) Col. ii : 9. (16) Gal. iii : 19, 20. I Tim. ii : 5 ; Heb. viii : 6 ; ix : 15 ; xii : 24. (17) Col. i : 19. (18) See (20), (21), et seqq. (19) Eph. iii : 9. (20) Heb. i : 2. (21) I Cor. viii : 6. (22) Col. i : 1. (23) Heb. i : 2, 9, etc. (24) I Cor. xv : 26-28.

EXCURSUS ON THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF MIRACLES.

We find it an universal claim of Christian Fathers that the miracles of Christianity are the very greatest of the proofs of the divine authority of Christianity. This claim is universal, being limited to no one branch of the Church, and the reason why the faith may be accepted even if not understood, because it is the basis of miracles. Greg. Nyss. Great Catech., cc. 11, 12, 23, 34. Greg. Naz. Or. c. 42. John. Damasc. de Fid. Orth. iii : 27. Lact. iv : 27. Athan. Lett. xlix : 8. Orig. c. Cels. i : 2. Just. ii Apol. 6. We read that heathen Gods were exorcised by Christians. Min. Fel. c. 27. Athan. Vit. Anth. 78, 80. Tren. Ref. Haeres. ii : 31 : 2 ; ii : 32 : 3, 4 ; iii : 11 : 9 ; v : 17 : 2.

BOOK II—CHAPTER I.

In the Epistle to the Romans, the word God appears 153 times, of which 35 instances lack the article, the remainder having it.

The passages which read "The God" are as follows, I : 8, 9, 10, 19, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 28, 32 ; ii : 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 13, 16, 23, 24, 29 ; iv : 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 5, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30 ; iv : 3, 6, 17, 20, 20 ; v : 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15 ; vi : 10, 11, 13, 13, 17, 22, 23 ; vii : 4, 22, 25 ; viii : 3, 7, 19, 28, 21, 31, 34, 39 ; ix : 5, 6, 8, 11, 14, 16, 20, 22 ; x : 1, 3, 3, 9 ; xi : 1, 2, 2, 8, 21, 23, 29, 30, 32 ; xii : 1, 1, 2, 3 ; xiii : 1, 2 ; xiv : 3, 6, 6, 11, 12, 17, 18, 20, 22 ; xv : 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 15, 16, 17, 30, 33 ; xvi : 20, 26.

The passages which read "God" are as follows : I : 1, 4, 7, 16, 18, 21 ; ii : 17 ; iii : 5, 18, 21, 22 ; iv : 2 ; vii : 25 ; viii : 7, 8, 9, 14, 14, 16, 17, 27, 33, 33 ; ix : 26 ; x : 2, 17 ; xi : 22, 33 ; xiii : 1, 4, 4, 6 ; xiv : 4 ; xv : 8, 32.

The former passages all refer to the Father as distinctly "the" God. In consequence, it will be necessary to explain the latter usages. They are for the greater part quotations, or remainders from the common speech of the times before the Philonic distinction was observed. This will be plain from the elementary, and common character of the phrases.

In i : 1, the Gospel of God, means the Gospel of the Son, who is "God," as appears from i : 9, where his Gospel is distinctly mentioned. The Sonship of God is a very common conception, which dates from the earliest times. Hence the use "God" is only deference to common usage. I : 4, viii : 14, 16. Besides, quotation from the Old Testament, where the distinction did not exist, is responsible for ix : 26. "Beloved of God" does not refer to the Father especially, but to the Divinity, i : 7, as also the many attributes and common usages which follow : power of God, i : 16 ; xiii : 1 ; righteousness of God, iii : 21, 22 ; fear of God (Quotation) iii : 18 ; wrath of God, i : 18 ; glorified not as God, i : 21 ; to make boast or glory of God, ii : 2, 17 ; law of God, vii : 25, viii : 7 ; please God, viii : 8 ; spirit of God, vii :

9, 14; will of God, viii : 27; xv : 32; God's elect, viii : 33; it is God who justifieth, viii : 33; zeal of God, x : 2; truth of God, xv : 8; hearing word of God, x : 17; goodness and severity of God, xi : 22; wisdom and knowledge of God, xi : 33; minister of God, xiii : 4, 4, 6. In all these instances the reference is not to God as an individual so much as to the general divinity of the attribute or function, with many remainders from common indiscriminate usage. Likewise, "God is able to make him stand," xiv : 4, the reference is only to the divinity, not the Father particularly. "Heirs of God, joint-heirs with Christ." VIII : 17. This reminds the reader that to be a joint-heir with Christ of the same God implies a stand-point from which Jesus is viewed not so much as God but as man, when the God above him would then be to him "God."

There are in the epistle two passages in which the Father and the Son are mentioned together, omitting the article in the mention of the former.

III : 22. Even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ. This is however a special case of a passage like, iii : 21.

VIII : 17. And if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs of Christ. This passage has already been noticed, and may be helpfully studied in context with such as i : 4; viii : 14, 16.

The student may now turn to the 25 passages in which the juxtaposition of the Son with the Father always is accompanied by the presence of the article before the word God, as referring evidently to the Father. See i : 8, 9; ii : 16; iii : 23-24; 25, 26; v : 1, 2, 8, 10, 11, 15; vi : 10, 11, 23; vii : 25; viii : 3, 34, 39; ix : 6; xiv : 18; xv : 5, 6, 7, 17; xvi : 25-27. In these there is no question that "the" God refers to the Father.

The cogency of this proof is increased by the fact that with the exception of the two passages explained above there are no other texts in which both Father and Son are mentioned together, and in which the distinguishing article consequently does not appear.

In the two Epistles to the Corinthians the Philonic articular distinction does not appear as clearly as in the Epistle to the Romans.

Yet, out of 173 times the word God appears, it lacks the article only 52 times; a relation noteworthy in fact of the like relation in the other Pauline Epistles.

The Passages with the article are as follows :

First Epistle : I : 2, 4, 4, 9, 14, 20, 21, 21, 25, 25, 27, 27, 28; ii : 7, 9, 10, 10, 11, 11, 12, 12, 14; iii : 6, 10, 16, 17, 17, 17; iv : 5, 9, 20; v : 13; vi : 11, 13, 14, 20; vii : 15, 17; viii : 3, 8; ix : 9; x : 5, 13, 20, 32; xi : 3, 12, 13, 16, 22; xii : 6, 18, 24, 28; xiv : 2, 25, 25, 28, 33, 36 (?); xv : 9, 10, 15, 15, 24, 28, 38, 57.

Second Epistle : I : 1, 3, 4, 9, 18, 19, 20, 21; ii : 14, 15, 17, 17; iii : 4, 5; iv : 2, 2, 4, 4, 6, 6, 7, 15 (?); v : 5, 18, 20, 20; vi : 16; vii : 6, 12; viii : 1, 16; ix : 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15; x : 4, 5, 13; xi : 7, 11, 31; xii : 2, 3, 21; xiii : 7, 11, 13.

The passages without the article are as follows :

First Epistle : I : 1, 3, 18, 24, 24; ii : 1, 5, 7; iii : 7, 9, 9, 9, 16, 19, 23; iv : 1; vi : 9, 16, 19; vii : 7, 19, 24, 40; viii : 4, 6; ix : 21; x : 31; xi : 7; xii : 3; xv : 10, 34, 50.

Second Epistle : I : 1, 2, 20; ii : 17; iii : 3; v : 1, 11, 13, 19, 21; vi : 1, 4, 7, 16, 16, 26; vii : 5; xii : 19; xiii : 4, 4.

On the whole, it will be found that the cases in which "God" is used in the Epistles to the Corinthians are in many ways the same as in the Epistle to the Romans. Again, there are some different uses, as will appear.

In the first place appears one use of God, evidently referring to the Father, i : i : 3; ii : 1 : 2, which seems to be a stereotyped form of salutation, handed down from universal tradition. It will be found in every other Epistle of or attributed to Paul. It would not be natural to change this to suit the Philonic distinction.

Just as unlikely would it be to do so in respect to other well-known conceptions and expressions, as, the will of God, i, i : 1; ii, i : 1; viii : 5; the power of God, i, i : 18, 24; ii, vi : 5; vii : 7; xiii : 4; viii : 5; the wisdom of God, i, i : 24; iii : 19; ii : 7; the testimony of God, i, ii : 1; the co-labourers, husbandry, building of God, i, iii : 9; mysteries of God, i, iv : 5; kingdom of God, i, vi : 9, 10; xv : 50; the gift of God, i, vii : 7; the commandments of God, i, vii : 19; the grace of God, i, xv : 10; ii, vi : 1; the knowledge of God, i, xv : 34; the promises of God, ii, i : 20; the righteousness of God, ii, v : 21; the mysteries of God, ii, vi : 4; the fear of God, ii, vii : 1.

Then come a series of passages in which the general attribute of divinity is referred to under the name of God without specifying any more definite

conception. God giveth the increase, i, iii : 7 ; the temple of God, i, iii : 16 ; vi : 19 ; ii, v : 1 ; vi : 16, 16 ; abide with God, i, vii : 24 ; spirit of God, i, vii : 40 ; xii : 3 ; ii, iii : 3 ; there is none other God than.....i, viii : 4, 6 ; ii, vi : 16 (a quotation) ; law to God, i, ix : 21 ; glory to God, i, x : 31 ; xi : 7 ; as of God, ii, xii : 17 ; manifest unto God, ii, v : 11 ; beside ourselves to God, ii, v : 13.

There remain several passages in which although the Father is referred to in juxtaposition to the Son, yet is he only spoken of as "God." "And ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's," i, iii : 23. "That God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself," ii, v : 19, and "we speak before God in Christ," ii, xii : 19. In the latter case, the reference is quite general to divinity, and this would explain the use. Of the two former cases, it would appear that we would expect the Philonic article, but possibly it may be dispensed with in considering the Father from the stand-point of Christ, no divinity being here ascribed to him. For it must be remembered that the nerve of the distinction is, that where no divinity is ascribed to the Word or Son, there the Father is merely God ; but where the Word or Son is spoken of as "God," as divinity, there the Father is distinguished as the pre-eminent divinity by the use of the article. And that seems to be the case here, that the Father is looked at from the stand-point of the Son, and hence is merely called God in general.

In the course of these remarks the following instances of juxtaposition of the Son with the Father, in which the latter is referred to as merely "God," have been noticed : i, i : 1, 3, 24, 24 ; iii : 23 ; iv : 1 ; ix : 21 ; ii, i : 1, 2 ; v : 19, xii : 19.

On the contrary, the passages in which the juxtaposition is marked by the Philonic distinction are numerous, and quite unmistakable. I, i : 4, 9, ii : 7 ; viii : 6 ; xi : 3, 12 ; xiv : 36 (?) ; xv : 15, 24, 28, 57 ; ii, i : 3, 19, 21 ; ii : 14, 15, 17 ; iii : 4 ; iv : 2, 4, 6, 15 (?) ; v : 18, 20, 20 ; ix : 13 ; xi : 31 ; xiii : 31. The type of these passages is : "The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," ii, xi : 31. The difference of rank is here very clear. Likewise the famous passage, "And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject to him that put all things under him, that THE God may be all in all." I, xv : 28. "But thanks to THE God, who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ," i, xv : 57.

In the Epistles to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, and I and II Thessalonians, the word God appears 158 times, of which 42 are without the article.

The passages in which the article appears are as follows : Gal. i : 1, 4, 10, 13, 15, 20, 24 ; ii : 20, 21 ; iii : 6, 8, 11, 17, 18, 20, 21 ; iv : 4, 6 ; vi : 16. Eph. i : 17 ; ii : 8, 10, 16, 18, 22 ; iii : 2, 7, 9, 10, 19 ; iv : 6, 13, 18, 24, 30, 32 ; v : 1, 2, 6, 20 ; vi : 6, 11, 13, 17. Phil. i : 3, 8 ; ii : 9, 27 ; iii : 9, 14, 15, 19 ; iv : 6, 7, 9, 18, 19, 20. Col. i : 3, 6, 10, 15, 25, 25, 27 ; ii : 2, 12, 19 ; iii : 3, 1, 6, 12, 16, 17 ; iv : 3, 11, 12. I Thess. i : 2, 3, 8, 9 ; ii : 2, 2, 4, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 ; iii : 2, 9, 11, 13 ; iv : 2-3, 5, 7, 8, 14 ; v : 9, 23. II Thess. i : 3, 4, 5, 5, 11, 12, ii : 4, 11, 13, 13, 16 ; iii : 5.

Further, I Tim. i : 17 ; ii : 3 ; iii : 5 ; iv : 3, 4 ; v : 6, 5, 21 ; vi : 1, 11, 13, 17. II Tim. i : 3, 6, 7 ; ii : 9, 15, 19, 25 ; iii : 17 ; iv : 1. Titus i : 2, 3 ; ii : 5, 10, 11, 13 ; iii : 4 ; Philem. 4.

The passages in which the article does not appear are the following. Gal. i : 1, 3 ; ii : 6, 19 ; iii : 26 ; iv : 7 (?) , 8, 9, 9, 14 ; v : 21 ; vi : 7. Eph. i : 1, 2, 3 ; ii : 4 ; v : 5 ; vi : 23. Phil. i : 2, 11, 28 ; ii : 6, 6, 11, 13, 15 ; iii : 3. Col. i : 1, 25. I Thess. i : 1, 4, 9 ; ii : 5, 15 ; iv : 1, 16 ; v : 18. II Thess. i : 1, 2, 6, 8 ; ii : 4, 4. I Tim. i : 1, 2, 11, ii : 5 ; iii : 15 ; iv : 5, 10 ; II Tim. i : 1, 25 ; Titus i : 1, 4, 7, 16 ; iii : 8 ; Philem. 3.

The uses of the above passages are as follows :

There is the usual formula of salutation, found everywhere, as noticed above, Gal. i : 1, 3, Eph. i : 2, 3 ; vi : 23 ; Phil. i : 2 ; Col. i : 2 ; Thess. i, i : 2 ; ii, i : 1, 2 ; Tim. i, i : 2 ; ii, i : 2 ; Titus i : 4 ; Phil. 3. This must be a traditional formula which originated before the Philonic distinction was recognized, and which the writer found ready-made, and used without further thought.

Then come the general references to the divinity in traditional expressions, which are found in all Pauline writings. It is to be noticed that they do not in the minor Epistles agree with each other as much as in the greater writings. To live unto God, Gal. ii : 19, children of God, Gal. iii : 26, Phil. ii : 15 ; heir of God, Gal. iv : 7 ; knew not God, Gal. iv : 8, Thess. ii, i : 18 ; know God, Gal. iv : 9, Titus i : 16 ; known of God, Gal. iv : 9 ; angel of God, Gal. iv : 14 ; kingdom of God, Gal. v : 21 ; Eph. v : 5 ; the will of God, Eph. i : 1 ; Thess. i, v : 18 ; Tim. ii, i : 1 ; glory and praise of God, Phil.

i : 11 ; salvation of God, Phil. i : 28 ; form of God, Phil. ii : 6 ; turned to God, Thess. i, i : 9 ; God is witness, Thess. i, ii : 5 ; please not God, Thess. i, ii : 15 ; iv : 1 ; trump of God, Thess. i, iv : 16 ; called God, temple of God, Thess. ii : ii : 4 ; commandments of God, Tim. i, i : 1 ; house of God, Tim. i, iii : 15 ; living God, Tim. i, iii : 15 ; i, iv : 10 : word of God, Tim. i, iv : 5 ; power of God, Tim. ii, i : 8 ; steward of God, Titus i : 7 ; believe in God, Titus iii : 8. Beyond these commonplace expressions are general ones, referring to the divinity, not the person of God. "God accepteth no person," Gal. ii : 6. God is not mocked, Gal. vi : 7. God is rich in mercy, Eph. ii : 4 ; God worketh in us, Phil. ii : 13 ; worship God, Phil. iii : 3. The election of God, Thess. i, i : 4, Titus i : 1. A man is righteous with God, Thess. ii, i : 6.

There remain two verses that are more difficult to explain, and where it would be natural to expect the article. "To the glory of God the Father," Phil. ii : 11. The explicitness with which the Fatherhood of God is here mentioned, may supply the lack of the article. More difficult is, "For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Jesus Christ," Tim. i, ii : 5. This text, however, insists on the fact there is but one God, and that the mediator between man and God is a man. This cosmology does not deny the subordinationism of the Philonic distinction, agreeing with it in every point.

There remain two classes of passages to be considered, those which contain a juxtaposition of the Son and the Father.

The first class does not use the article with the name of God, the second does.

Of the first class are Gal. i : i : 3 ; iv : Eph. i : 1, 2, 3 ; v : 5 ; vi : 23. Phil. i : 2, 11 ; ii : 6, 6, 11. Col. i : 1, 2. Thess. i, i : 1 ; v : 18 ; ii : 1 : 1, 2. Tim. i, i : 1, 2 ; ii : 5 ; ii, i : 1, 2. Titus i : 4. Phil. 3.

Of the second class are Gal. i : 1-4 ; iv : 4. Eph. i : 17 ; ii : 10, 16 ; iii : 19 ; iv : 6, 18, 32 ; v : 2, 20 ; vi : 6. Phil. i : 8 ; ii : 9 ; iii : 14 ; iv : 7, 19. Col. i : 3, 15, 25 ; ii : 12, 19 ; iii : 3, 1, 17 ; iv : 3. Thess. i, i : 8 ; ii : 14 ; iii : 2, 11, 13 ; iv : 2-3, 14 ; v : 9. Thess. ii, i : 12 ; ii : 16 ; iii : 5. Tim. i, v : 21 ; vi : 13. ii, iv : 1. Titus ii : 13.

The first class have been for the most part explained, and the others can be explained in like manner. It remains only to give an example of the latter class. "But when the fulness of the time was come, the God sent forth his Son....." Gal. iv : 4. This exhibits the Philonic distinction perfectly, and is increased in cogency that nowhere in these epistles the term "The God" is applied to the Son or Word.

CHAPTER II.

(1) Irenaeus Fragm. 2, 3. Ref. Her. v : 30 : 3. (2) Ir. Fragm. 2. (3) Ir. Ref. Haer. iii : 3 : 1-3. (4) Justin M. Apologia i : 44 ; ii : 10, 13. (5) Just. Apol. i : 46. (6) Just. Apol. ii : 13. (7) Just. Apol. ii : 13. (8) Just. Apol. i : 61 ; ii : 6. (9) Just. Dial. c. Trypho 56 etc. (10) Ir. Ref. Haer. iii : 1 : 2. (11) Ib. iii : 3 : 3. (12) Ib., ii : 11 : 1 ; ii : 19 : 9 ; ii : 18 : 1 ; ii : 29 : 3 ; ii : 30 : 7 ; ii : 31 : 1 ; ii : 32 : 5 ; ii : 35 : 4 ; iii : 1 : 2 ; iii : 3 : 3 ; iii : 4 : 2 ; iii : 5 : 3 ; iii : 8 : 1 ; iii : 8 : 4 ; iii : 10 : 6 ; iii : 11 : 1, 4 ; iii : 12 : 5 ; iii : 12 : 11, 13 ; iii : 16 ; 7 ; iii : 24 : 1 ; iii : 25 : 3, 7 ; iv : 6 : 2 ; iv : 18 : 4 ; iv : 19 : 2 ; iv : 20 : 1, 2 ; iv : 26 : 5, 4 ; iv : 33 : 7 ; v : 4 : 1 ; v : 6 : 1 ; v : 15 : 2 ; v : 17 : 1, 3 ; v : 19 : 2 ; v : 36 : 3 ; Fragm. 6.

(13) Ib., ii : 35 : 4. (14) Ib., iv : 6 : 2. (15) Ib., iv : 18 : 4. (16) Theophilus ad Autolyicum ii : 10, 22. For the identification of Jesus with the Logos, see Justin i apol. ii : 6, 13.

(17) Ir. Ref. Haer. ii : 28 : 4. (18) Just. Dial. c. Trypho. 128. See Ib., 56, 60, 126. Apol. i : 11, 13, 20, 58 ; ii : 6. (19) Just. Apol. i : 12. (20) Just. Apol. i : 13. (21) Ib., i : 32. (22) Ib., ii : 21. (23) Just. Dial. c. Trypho. 84. (24) Ib., 86. (25) Ib., i : 27. (26) Just. Ap. ii : 6. (27) Just. Dial. c. Trypho. 57. (28) Ib., 56. (29) Just. Apol. i : 63. (30) Just. Dial. c. Trypho. 56, 60-62, 55, 57. (31) Ir. Ref. Haer. iii : 8 ; 2 ; iii : 11 ; 1, 2 ; iv : 20 : 2 ; iv : 20 : 7 ; v : 6 : 1. (32) Ib., iv : 20 : 5 ; v : 18 : 2. (33) Ib., iii : 16 : 7 ; iii : 18 : 1 ; iv : 17 : 6 ; iv : 20 : 1 ; iv : 38 : 3 ; v : 12 : 6 ; v : 15 : 3 ; v : 18 : 3. (34) Ib., v : 18 : 3. (35) Ir., Syrian Fragments, "c." (36) iii : 21 : 9 ; iv : 38 : 1. Ir. Ref. Haer. (37) Ib., iii : 6 : 1. (38) Ib., iv : 6 : 2. (39) Ib., iii : 6 : 1 ; iii : 12 : 5 ; iii : 18 : 3. (40) Ib., v : 6 : 1 ; v : 16 : 1 ; v : 28 : 4 ; iv : 20 : 1.

(41) Ib., iii : 9 : 1. (42) Ib., iii : 16 : 7. (43) Ib., ib. (44) Ib., v : 18 : 2. (45) Ib., ii : 28 : 6. (46) Ib., iv : 6 : 6. (47) Ib., iv : 6 : 7. (48) The term occurs 22 times in the Apologies, and 9 times in the Dial. c. Trypho. (49) Just. Ap. i : 13. (50) Ib., i : 6. (51) Ib., i : 33. (52) Ib., i : 61. (53) Ib., 65, 67. (54)

Ir., Ref. Haer. iii : 16 : 7 ; iv : 26 : 5 ; iv : 28 : 2. (55) Ib., iv : 20 : 7. (56) Ib., v : 8 : 3. (57) Ib., iii : 17 : 3. (58) Ib., v : 36 : 3. (59) Ib., iv : 7 : 4 ; iv : 20 : 3. (60) Ib., iv : 20 : 7, 8. (61) Ib., v : 17 : 1. (62) Ib., iii : 17 : 1. (63) Ib., iii : 18 : 3. (64) Ib., iii : 24 : 1. (65) Ib., v : 18 : 2. (66) Ib., iv : 20 : 5. (67) Ib., iv : 38 : 3. (68) Ib., iv : 33 : 7. (69) Ib., iv : 20 : 12.

CHAPTER III.

(1) Ad Aut. i : 12. (2) Ad Aut. i : 3. (3) Ad Aut. i : 4, 8 ; ii : 18, etc., 11, 34. (4) Ad Aut. ii : 18. (5) Ad Aut. ii : 13. (6) Ad Aut. ii : 33, iii : 17, 23. (7) Ad Aut. ii : 13. (8) Ad Aut. ii : 9. (9) "God then having his own Logos internal within his own bowels begat him emitting (belching, vomiting), along with his own Wisdom before all things.....God made all things out of nothing : for nothing was coequal with God : but he being his own place and wanting nothing willed to make man by whom he might be known..... He had this Logos as a helper in the things that were created by him.....Ad Aut. 2 : 10. "But when God wished to make all that he determined on, he begat this Logos, vomited forth, the first born of all creation, not himself being emptied of Logos, but having begotten Logos and always conversing with his Logos." ii : 22. (10) "He (the Logos) is called "arche" because he rules, and is Lord of all things fashioned by him. He then, being spirit of God,.....came down upon the prophets." ii : 10.

CHAPTER IV.

(1) C. Noetum, 14. (2) Philosoph. x : 33 ; C. Noetum 10. (3) "Nous." (4) C. Noetum, 11. (5) C. Noetum, 15. (6) Tertullian Adv. Praxeam iii : 13. (7) "God was alone, and there was no being coeval with him when he willed to create the world.....Not that he was destitute of reason (Logos), wisdom or counsel. They are all in him ; he was all. At the time and in the manner he willed, he manifested his word (Logos) through whom he made all things. Moreover he placed over them his Word, whom he begat as his counselor and instrument, whom he had within him, invisible to creation, till he manifested him, uttering the Word, and begetting light from light..... And so Another (Other) stood by him, not as if there was two Gods, but as though light from light or a ray from the sun." Bull Def. Fid. Nic. iii : 7 : 8. C. Noet. 10.

CHAPTER V.

(1) Clemens Alexandrinus Stromata ii : 19. (2) Strom. v : 12. (3) Strom. i : 1, 2, 5, 8, 11, 16. (4) Protrepticon 6. Paedagogus ii : 10. Strom. i : 17, 23, 25 ; ii : 1, 18 ; v : 1, 5, 8, 11, 14 ; vi : 2, 3, 6. (5) Strom. ii : 15. (6) See (3). (7) Strom. i : 11. (8) Strom. i : 7 ; ii : 1. (9) Ib., i : 20, ii : 4. (10) Ib., i : 5. (11) Ib., vii : 16. (12) Ib., v : 10. (13) Ib., ii : 2 ; 5 ; iv : 26 : 1 : 62 ; v : 10 : 66. Fragment of p. pronoias, in Dindorf iii : 497. Zahn iii : 40. (14) Paed. i : 8 : 71. (15) Strom. v : 11. (16) Ib., v : 11 : 71 ; v : 12 : 81 sqq., vi : 18 : 166 ; ii : 2 : 6. (17) Ib., v : 1 : 6. (18) Ib., iv : 25. (19) Ib., iv. (20) Ib., iv : 25 : 156. Zahn Forsch. iii : 17. Fragm. from Hypotyposes preserved by Maximus Confessor. (21) Strom. v : 6 : 38. (22) Ib., v : 6 : 34 ; Paed. i : 7 : 57. (23) Paed. i : 9 : 31. (24) Strom. v : 3 : 16. (25) Ib., iv : 25 : 156 ; Paed. i : 8 : 74. (26) Strom. v : 14 : 94. Paed. i : 12 : 98. (27) Strom v : 6 : 32. (28) Paed. i : 12. (29) Ib., i : 7 : 56, 57. Strom. vii : 1 : 2. (30) Paed. i : 5 : 24 ; iii : 7 : 39 ; Protrept. viii : 81. Strom. iv : 3 : 148. (31) Strom. v : 6 : 38. (32) Ib., vii : 2 : 5. (33) Ib., v : 1 : 6. (34) Ib., vii : 2 : 8. (35) Ib., iii : 1 : 2. (36) Protrept. x : 110. (37) Strom., v : 14 : 89. (38) Ib., vi : 7 : 58. Further, Christ is "begotten of the Will of the Father," and as "coming forth for the sake of Creation." Strom., v : 3 : 16. See Tatian, Ad. Graec. 5 ; Theophilus ad. Aut. ii : 22, Tert. Adv. Prax. 5. (39) See (49), Strom., vii : 2. (40) Ib., ii : 22 : 131 ; Irenaeus v : 6. Tert. de Bapt. v. Recogn. v : 23. Dahne, De Gnosei, p. 103 in note. (42) Strom., vii : 2. (43) Ib., vi : 16. (44) Ib., ii : 20 : 117 ; v : 13 : 88 ; vi : 16 : 138 ; vii : 14 : 87. (45) Ib., iv : 26 : 163 ; Quis Dives Salvetur 34. (46) Strom., vii : 2 : 9. (47) Protrept. i : 8 ; viii : 79 ; See Hermas Sim. v : 6 ; Athenag. Supplicatio 10. (48) Strom. vii : 18. (49) Strom. vii : 2. (50) Ib., vi : 17 ; vii : 1. (51) Ib., vi : 17, end. (52) Strom., vi : 7 : 58 ; Paed. i : 6 : 42 ; iii : 12 : 101. (53) Strom., iv : 8. (54) Ib., ii : 4 ; iii : 5 ; vii : 10. (55) Ib., iv : 22. (56) Ib., vi : 14. (57) Ib., vi : 9 ; vii : 3. (58) Ib., vi : 12. (59) Ib., vi : 13.

CHAPTER VI.

(1) The reason of Origen's self-mutilation was the avoidance of scandal, Eusebius H. E., vi : 8. That it was not due to a literal interpretation of Matt. xv : 1-5, may be seen from his Commentary on the passage, where he

treats its literal interpretation on which many have supposed him to have acted as an instance of the errors which would flow from literal interpretation. See C. Celsum vii : 48. See Tillemont iii : 506, 526, 527. Mosheim, 674, Neander, ii : 470. Redepenning, i : 452, and Robertson's Ch. Hist. in re. See Farrar's life of Origen in "Lives of Ante-Nicene Fathers." (2) Redepenning, i : 218 ; 231, 457, 458. (3) C. Cels. viii : 30, etc. (4) See Jer. xxiii : 24 ; Is. lxvi : 1 ; Ps. cxlviii : 3, 4 ; Matt. v : 34 ; Acts xvii : 28 ; Rom. viii : 19-21. Origen says, De Princ. ii : 1 : 3, As our body is provided with many members, and is held together with one soul, so I am of opinion that the whole world also ought to be regarded as some huge and immense animal which is kept together by the power and reason of God, as by one soul. Again, De Princ., ii : 8 : 1, That there are souls in all living things. I suppose is doubted by no one. See C. Cels. v : 13. The Logos is a living animal, De Princ. i : 2 : 3. See Job xxv : 5. (5) See Bigg, Christian Platonists, p. 198, note. (6) Especially John ix : 2. (7) See (5).

(8) See Bull, Defensio Fidei Nicaeana, I : 9 : 1. Alexander of Jerusalem, Theoktistos of Caesarea, Dionusios of Alexandria, Firmilian of Caesarea, Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Athenodorus, Pamphilus Martyr, Eusebius of Caesarea. Athanasius, Didumos of Alexandria, the teacher of Jerome, Titus of Bostra, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory Nyssen, and John of Jerusalem supported the orthodoxy of Origen. Methodius, who at first opposed him, finally came to admire him. Rufinus, spoken of highly by Jerome, was a warm champion of Origen. Later John Prais of Mirandola, James Merlin of Victurnia, Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam, Sixtus of Siena, Claudius Espencaeus, Gilbert Genebrard, and Peter Halloix openly espoused his cause.

(9) See De Princ. Pref. 4. (10) Bigg, op. cit., p. 159, note 2. (11) De Princ. ii : 9 : 1. (12) Ib., i : 2 : 5. (13) Ib., i : 2 : 6. (14) Ib., i : 2 : 13. (15) Ib., i : 2 : 27 ; i : 2 : 10 ; iv : 28. (16) Ib., i : 2 : 4. "The Scripture says : 'Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee.' Here 'this day' means 'always,' for God has no morning or evening ; the time which the Son was itself over the unbegotten and eternal life is the 'day' in which the Son was begotten. The begetting, as little as the day has any beginning." In Joh. i : 32. "If the Son is an image of the invisible God, it is an invisible image ; but I would make bold to add that as being also a likeness of the Father there is not a time when he was not..... And when did not that image of the Father's ineffable and nameless and unutterable hypostasis, the express image the Word who knoweth the Father, not exist ?" De Princ. i : 2. "As one cannot be a father if there be not a son,.....so God cannot be called almighty even if there be not those over whom he may exercise power ;.....but the Wisdom of God which is his only begotten Son, inasmuch as he is in all things unchangeable and unalterable and in him all good exists as substance, which plainly is not at any time susceptible of change or conversion, on this account is his glory declared to be pure and unalloyed."

(17) Bigg p. 181, Note 2. Justinian, Ad Menam. (18) In Joh. ii : 2. (19) In Joh., Tom. ii p. 47, Ed. Huet. (20) See (17) C. Celsum vi : 64. (21) See (9). (22) In Joh. ii : 2 : 51. C. Cels. viii : 12, 750, 751. (23) C. Cels. v : 39, 608. (24) C. Cels. vii : 57, 735. (25) De Princ. i : 2 : 4, de Orat. c. 15. "The Son is 'other' as to Nature, and subordinate to the Father." (26) In Joh. ii : 8. In Jerem. Hom. xix : 1. C. Cels. vi : 60. (27) In Joh. xiii : 25. (28) C. Cels. viii : 14. (29) De Orat. C. 24. In Joh. ii : 18. (30) De Princ. i : 2 : 2. C. Cels. v : 39. (31) De Princ. i : 2 : 4. (32) C. Cels. vi : 64, 681. (33) In Joh. ii : 71. (34) De Princ. ii : 6 : 1. (35) In Jer. Hom. viii : 2. Opp. iii p. 171. Hom. xviii : 90, pp. iii, p. 251, 152. (36) C. Cels. viii : 12. (37) De Princ. ii : 6 : 3 ; iv : 30. (38) Comm. in Matth. xiv : 7. In Joh. i : 36 ; vi : 3. C. Cels. vi : 64. (39) Bull, Def. Fid. Nic. ii : 9 : 6, iv : 2 : 6. (40) Ib., iv : 1 : 10. (41) In Joh. Tom. xxxii p. 416, ed. Huet. The following are the passages quoted by Bull. C. Cels. i. "They came bringing gifts which they offered as symbols to one, who was, so to say, a compound of God and mortal man ; the gold as to a King, the myrrh as to one who was to die, and the frankincense as to God." "We believing Jesus himself, when he says of the godhead which is in him, 'I am the way the truth and the life' and whatever else there is to the like effect ; and on the other hand, when he thus speaks of the past of his being in a human body, 'Now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth' we say that he became something compounded. 'Something more divine within the manhood which was seen, which was he that is properly the Son of God, God the Word, the Power of God, and the Wisdom of God.'" "God who appeared in human body for the benefitting of our race." C. Cels. 2. "For if God commanded, and the Creatures were made, who must he be who according to the mind of the

prophetic Spirit, was able to execute so great a commandment of the Father, other than he who is, so to call him, his living word and the truth? We say not this, not as separating the Son of God from Jesus; for after the Incarnation the body and the soul of Jesus have become in the highest degree one with the Word of God. The body of Christ is 'that which is truly the temple of God the Word of Wisdom and Truth.'" C. Cels. 3. "He, who, we believe, and are persuaded, was God and the Son of God from the beginning, is also the very Word, and the very Wisdom, and the very truth: whilst of his mortal body and the human soul within it we say that it has by its—not communion only—but, union also and intimate commingling with him, received the greatest gifts, and by partaking of the divinity has passed into God." C. Cels. 4. "God is good, beautiful, happy, of the best and fairest form; were he to descend to the condition of man he must undergo a change; but the change will be from good to evil, from beautiful to base, from happy to unhappy, from the best to the worst. Who would wish to be thus changed? It is true that a change and transformation of this kind is incident to mortal man, but it befits an immortal being that he continue to exist even in the same state. God, therefore, could never become the subject of such a change. That, however, which came down unto men, was in the form of God, and out of loving kindness unto man. He emptied himself, in order that he might be comprehensible by men; but yet certainly there was no change from good to evil in him. Now if Celsus thinks that the immortal God, the Word, in having assumed a mortal body and a human soul, undergoes change and transformation, let him learn that the Word, remaining Word still in his essence, is not affected by any of those things by which the body and the soul are affected but condescending at a particular time to that which cannot look upon his brilliancy, and the splendor of his Godhead, becomes as it were flesh, being spoken of after a bodily fashion."

"A reply might be made to this by distinguishing between the Nature of the Divine Word, who is God, and the soul of Jesus. The Maker of the Universe being in essence God the Word." C. Cels. 5. "It were not then reasonable that those who have been taught to ascend in nobleness of nature above all created beings, who are in training to attain to the bright and unfading wisdom, or have even already attained unto it, being, as it is, a radiance from light eternal, should be so far overpowered by the sensible brightness of the sun and the moon and the stars, as, because of their sensible light, to suppose themselves to be in some inferior position, and to offer them adoration seeing that they themselves have so great a light perceptible by thought, the Light of Knowledge, the true light, and the light of the world, and the light of men.....And we speak thus concerning the sun, moon and stars not as at all dishonoring such vast works of God.....but as having some perception of the divine nature of God, which transcends with ineffable superiority, and besides also of that of his only-begotten Son, who transcends all else."

"Seeing that he who has filled heaven and earth and has said, 'Do not I fill heaven and Earth? saith the Lord,' is with us and near to us, (for I believe him when he says 'I am a God near at hand, and not a God afar off, saith the Lord') it is absurd to seek to pray to the Son, which is not present to all things or to the moon or to any of the stars." C. Cels. 6. "For no one can worthily know him who is ungenerate and the first-born of all generated natures as can the Father who begat him, nor can any one know the Father as can the living word, who is both his wisdom and truth. I make a distinction as to what is meant, and say, if it be meant, comprehensible by Logos that is within us, whether endiathetic or prophetic, we will also say that God is not comprehensible by Logos-reason, but if we use the expression Logos having in mind 'the word Logos was in the beginning, and the word was with God and the word was God,' then we declare that by this Logos God is comprehensible."

"And who else is able to save the soul of man, and to bring it to God who is over all, but God the Word? Who being in the beginning with God on account of those who have been joined unto the flesh, and have become the very same as flesh, because flesh, in order that he may be comprehended by those who were unable to behold him, in that he was the Word and was with God and was God. The Son of God, the Word, was the immediate Creator, and, as it was, the actual framer of the world; whilst the Father of the word was primarily creator by reason of his having given commandment to his Son, the Word, to make the World." C. Cels. 8. "But if anyone from these words shall be distracted with fear that we are deserting to those who deny that the Father and the Son are two hypostases, let him give heed to that saying, 'And of all of them that believed the heart and soul was

one,' in order that he may understand those words 'I and My Father are one.'" We therefore worship the Father of the Truth and the Son who is the Truth, being two things in hypostasis, but one unanimity and agreement and identity of will."

(42) See (9). (43) In Joh. xi : 6 Opp. Tom. iv p. 60, 61. Tom. xiii, p. 234, and xxxiv p. 244. (44) In Joh. ii : 61, 62. (45) De Princ. i : 3 : 4. (46) In Joh. ii : 62. (47) De Princ. i : 3 : 5. (48) De Princ. i : 3 : 7. (49) Ib., i : 3 : 8. (50) Ib., ii : 1 : 22. (51) Ib., iii : 1 : 10. (52) Ib., iii : 1 : 11. (53) De Orat. c. 15. Opp. T. i p. 222. C. Cels. v : 4. (54) In Num. Hom. xii : 1. In Matth. xv : 31. (55) De Princ. i : 3 : 5.

CHAPTER VII.

(1) Adv. Hermog. 3. (2) Adv. Hermog. 18. (3) Adv. Hermog. 18. (4) Adv. Hermog. 20. (5) Adv. Prax. 2, 3, 8, 19, etc. (6) Adv. Prax. 2. (7) Adv. Prax. 4, 8, 9. (8) Adv. Prax. 3. (9) Adv. Prax. 4. (10) Adv. Prax. 5. (11) Adv. Prax. 6. (12) Adv. Prax. 7. (13) Adv. Prax. 7. (14) Adv. Prax. 7. (15) Adv. Prax. 8. (16) Ad. Prax. 9. (17) Adv. Prax. 13. (18) Adv. Prax. 19. Adv. Prax. 26.

BOOK III—CHAPTER I.

(1) See end of De. Syn. Nic. Also, adv. Ar. i : 30. "How clamorously they have accused the Nicene Bishops for assuming unscriptural terms, although these are very innocent and inoffensive ones but suitable enough for subverting their heresy, and yet they themselves have done the very same thing, and have invented unscriptural terms on purpose to dishonour our blessed Lord." In the report of Eusebius of the Creed of Nicea, occur the following words, immediately after the Creed : "Since then no divinely inspired Scripture has used the phrases 'out of nothing' and 'once he was not,' etc., there appeared no ground for using them or teaching them." And yet the Nicene Creed contains the word "consubstantial," which is unscriptural.

(2) In Illud Omnia, C. 32. (3) Or. Adv. Ar. i : 30. (4) Homo-ousios ; homoi-ousios ; homoiou. (5) Reg. Fid. C. 1. (6) Conc. Nic. p. 74, English Ed. 5. Ad. Ep. Aeg. C. 8. (7) Sent. Dion. C. 7. Such passages are Matth. xi : 27 ; Acts ii : 22 ; iv : 10 ; xiii : 22 ; xviii : 30 ; Heb. iii : 2. (8) See all through the Or. adv. Ar. (9) Adv. Gent. xvi : 8. (10) Conc. Ar. et Sel. c. 33. (11) Sent. Dion. C. 16. (12) In Illud Omnia C. 6. (13) Ib., C. 27. Ib., ii : 9. (15) Ib., ii : 23. (16) Ib., iii : 16. (17) Ib., i : 49 ; ii : 64 ; iii : 55. (18) Ib., i : 49 ; ii : 1, 19. (19) Ib., i : 55. (20) Ib., ii : 7 ; iii : 17. (21) Ib., ii : 33 ; iii : 2. (22) Ib., ii : 43. (23) Ib., ii : 50 ; 64. (24) Ib., iii : 16. (25) Ib., iii : 28. (26) Ib., iii : 55. (27) Ib., i : 22, iii : 1. (28) Ib., i : 53 ; iii : 28. (29) Ib., ii : 7 ; iii : 17. (30) Ib., iii : 59. (31) Ib., iii : 2. (32) ii : 28, etc.

CHAPTER II.

(1) Athan. Or. in Ar. i : 9, 10, 40, 54 ; ii : 1, 4, 35 ; iii : 28, 61 ; ii : 73. (2) Or. in Ar. i : 4, 7, 37, 49, 52, 53. That the Arians relied on Scripture may be seen from the fact that the following texts are brought forward by them, and interpreted differently by Athanasius : Deut. vi : 4 ; xxxii : 39. Ps. xlv : 8 ; cx : 3. Sept. Prov. iii : 19 ; viii : 22 ; Matth. xvi : 13 ; xxvi : 39 ; xxvii : 46 ; xxviii : 18 ; xii : 28. Mark vi : 38 ; xiii : 32 ; Luke ii : 52 ; x : 22 ; John iii : 35, 36 ; v : 22 ; xi : 34 ; xii : 27, 28 ; xiii : 21 ; xiv : 10 ; xvii : 5, 11, 23. Acts ii : 22, 36 ; iv : 10 ; xiii : 22 ; xvii : 30. i Cor. i : 24 ; xv : 28 ; Col. iii : 1 ; Phil. ii : 6-9 ; Heb. i : 1-4 ; iii : 1, 2.

(3) Or. in Ar. ii : 36. (4) De Sent. Dion. C. 7. (5) Or. adv. Ar. ii : 77. Also ii : 36, 44. iii : 28. Ad. Serap. iv : 21. (6) Or. adv. Ar. ii : 36. (7) Ib., ii : 46. Ad. Serap. iv : 5. (8) De Decr. i : 1. (9) Ib., 32. (10) Or. in Ar. i : 30. (11) De Decr. i : 19 ; vii : 31. (12) Ib., v : 29. (13) Gwatkin, Studies in Arianism, p. 44, 45. (14) Ib., p. 42. See Zahn, Marcellus, 11-27, 87. Against, see Dorner, ii : 247. Voigt, Athan. 46. And Atzberger, Logoslehre, 84.

(15) De Decr. v : 18. See Or. in Ar. iii : 59 ; iii : 30 : 1. (16) Or. in Ar. ii : 43. Ad. Ep. Aeg. 8. (17) Or. in Ar. i : 37. (18) Ib., i : 52. (19) Ib., i : 44 ; iii : 28 ; Serap. iv : 15 ; Gent. vi : 7 : 33. (20) Gwatkin, Studies in Arianism, p. 21. (21) Voigt, Athan. p. 192. (22) Atzberger, Logoslehre, p. 30. (23) Newman, Arians, ii : 5 : 4 : 3. (24) Ib., ii : 5 : 4 : 2. (25) bl., ii : 5 : 4 : 3.

(26) Prov. 8 : 22 sqq. (27) Or. adv. Ar. 2 : 3, 5 ; 1 : 56, 2 : 11, 12, 18, 20. (28) Or. adv. Ar. 2 : 44, 73. (29) Ib., 2 : 45, 46. (30) Ib., 2 : 46. (31) Ib., 2 : 47. See 2 : 46, Prov. 9 : 1. De Sent. Dion. 11. (32) Ib., 2 : 65. (33) Ib., 2 : 47. See 48. (34) Ib., 2 : 62, 67. (35) Ib., 2 : 50. (36) Ib., 2 : 51. (37) Ib., 2 : 60. See 57-72. (38) Ib., 2 : 61. (39) Ib., 2 : 68. (40) Ib., 2 : 69. (41) Ib., 2 : 70. (42) Ib., 2 : 74. (43) Ib., 2 : 71, 53. (44) Ib., 2 : 75. (45) Ib., 2 : 79. (46) Ib., 2 : 81, see 78-82. (47) The Lord created me the beginning of his

ways for his works. (48) Cyril in Joh. 5 : 2. Aug. de Cor. et Gr. 31. de Pecc Mer 1 : 3. Gen. ad lit 6 : 20. (49) He is supplied by Greg. Naz. Orat. 19. 13. Theod adv. Gent. 6. Aug. de Trin. 13. (50) De Decretis 13. (55) De Decretis 14.

CHAPTER III.

(1) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 32. (2) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 33. (3) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 34. (4) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 38. (5) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 23. (6) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 26. (7) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 27. (8) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 4. (9) Or. Adv. Ar. 3 : 62, 67. (10) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 18. (11) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 21. (12) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 23. (13) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 14, 15, 20, 28 ; 2 : 35. Ad Serap. 2 : 5, 6 ; 4 : 6. (14) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 34, 36. See 1 : 59. (15) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 36. (16) Newman Transl. Or. Ar. 1 : 201. (17) Newman, Arians of 4th Cent. 2 : 5 : 2 : 1. (18) Newman Arians of the 4th Cent. 2 : 5 : 2 : 7. (19) Newman Arians of 4th Cent. 2 : 5 : 2 : 4.

CHAPTER IV.

(1) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 20. (2) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 57. (3) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 19. (4) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 48. (5) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 24. (6) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 24, 57, 48, 49. (7) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 23, 24, 29 ; 2 : 22. (8) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 24, 29. (9) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 58. (10) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 51, 74. (11) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 29, 30. (12) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 48 ; 4 : 11, 12. (13) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 21. (14) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 21, 46, 53, 57-60, 73, 74 ; 3 : 60, 62 ; 4 : 11 ; 27. Ad Serap. 2 : 6. (15) Hebrews 1 : 1-4. (16) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 56 ; 2 : 1-5, 11, 12, 18, 20. (17) Ib., 1 : 56. (18) Ib., 2 : 20. (19) Ib., 2 : 5. (20) Ib., 2 : 3. (21) Ib., 2 : 60. (22) Voigt Athan. p. 242. (23) Harnack, Dogmgesch. 2 : 195. (24) Newman Transl. Or. Ar. 1 : 261. (25) Athan. de Decr. 11. (26) de Syn. 47. (27) Gwatkin p. 69. (28) Eusebius de Eccl. Theol. 3 : 2 pp. 152-3. (29) Ath. de Decr. 26 p. 182. (30) Basil c. Eunom. 2 : 20 p. 256.

CHAPTER V.

(1) Orat. adv. Ar. 1 : 37. (2) Ib., 1 : 37. (3) Ib., 1 : 38. (4) Ib., 1 : 39, 40. (5) Ib., 1 : 40, 41. (6) Ib., 1 : 40, 41. (7) Ib., 1 : 41. (8) Ib., 1 : 42. (9) Ib., 1 : 43. (10) Ib., 1 : 44. (11) Ib., 1 : 45. (12) Ib., 1 : 46. (13) Ib., 1 : 47. (14) Ib., 1 : 48. (15) Ib., 1 : 49. (16) Ib., 1 : 50. (17) Ib., 1 : 51. (18) Ib., 1 : 52. (19) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 54. (20) Ib., 1 : 55, 59. (21) Ib., 1 : 56. (22) Ib., 1 : 57. (23) Ib., 1 : 58. (24) Ib., 1 : 59. (25) Ib., 1 : 60. (26) Ib., 1 : 61. (27) Ib., 1 : 62. (28) Ib., 1 : 62, 63. (29) Ib., 1 : 64. (30) Ib., 2 : 2. (31) Ib., 2 : 3. (32) Ib., 2 : 3, 4. (33) Ib., 2 : 4. (34) Ib., 2 : 5. (35) Ib., 2 : 6. (36) Ib., 2 : 7, 8. (37) Ib., 2 : 10. (38) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 11. (39) Ib., 2 : 11. (40) Ib., 2 : 12. (41) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 12. (42) Ib., 2 : 13. (43) Ib., 2 : 15, 16. (44) Ib., 2 : 14, 17, 18. (45) Ib., 2 : 18. (46) Ib., 3 : 1. (47) Ib., 3 : 2. (48) Ib., 3 : 3. (49) Ib., 3 : 4. (50) Ib., 3 : 5. (51) Ib., 3 : 7. (52) Ib., 3 : 7, 8. (53) Ib., 3 : 9. (54) Ib., 3 : 10. (55) Ib., 3 : 11. (56) Ib., 3 : 12. (57) Ib., 3 : 13, 14. (58) Ib., 3 : 14. (59) Ib., 3 : 17. (60) Ib., 3 : 18. (61) Or. Adv. Ar. 3 : 19-22. (62) Ib., 3 : 19. (63) Ib., 3 : 20. (64) Ib., 3 : 21. (65) Ib., 3 : 22. (66) Ib., 3 : 23. (67) Ib., 3 : 24. (68) Ib., 3 : 25. (69) Ib., 3 : 35. (70) Ib., 3 : 36. (71) In Ill. Omnia 1. (72) Ib., 2. (73) Ib., 3. (74) Ib., 4. (75) Ib., 5. (76) Or. Adv. Ar. 3 : 37. (77) Ib., 3 : 38, 39. (78) Ib., 3 : 40, 41. (79) Ib., 3 : 42. (80) Ib., 3 : 43. (81) Ib., 3 : 44. (82) Ib., 3 : 44. (83) Ib., 3 : 45. (84) Ib., 3 : 46. (85) Ib., 3 : 47. (86) Ib., 3 : 48. (87) Ib., 3 : 49. (88) Ib., 3 : 50. (89) Ib., 3 : 51. (90) 3 : 52. (91) Ib., 3 : 54. (92) Ib., 3 : 55. (93) Ib., 3 : 56-58. (94) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 61. (95) Ib., 2 : 62. (96) Ib., 2 : 63. (97) Ib., 2 : 63. (98) Ib., 2 : 64. (99) Newman Transl. Or. 2 : 67. (100) Newman Transl. Or. 2 : 370. (101) Petavius de Inc. 11 : 1 : 15. (102) Aug. de Pecc. Mer. and Rem. 2 : 48. (103) Irenaeus adv. Haer. 2 : 28 : 6. (104) Grey Nar. Orat. 30 : 15. (105) Cyril Alex. Thesaurus Op. Tom v. p. 221. (106) Liddon Div. of Christ, pp. 458-467. (107) Liddon Div. of Christ, pp. 456-458. (108) Luke 2 : 40. (109) John 1 : 14.

CHAPTER VI.

(1) Or. Adv. Ar. 2 : 18, 38 ; 3 : 26. (2) Ib., 1 : 14. (3) Ib., 1 : 30. (4) De Decretis 28. Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 30. (5) Or. Adv. Ar. 1 : 31. (6) John Dam. F. O. 1 : 8. (7) De Sent. Dion. 16. (8) Or. Adv. Ar. 3 : 16. (9) Ib., 2 : 18. (10) Ib., 1 : 25, 27 ; 2 : 42 ; 3 : 3, 4, 13, 15 ; 4 : 2. (11) Ib., 1 : 27. See 4 : 3. (12) Ib., 1 : 25. (13) Ib., 1 : 26. (14) Newman Transl. Athan. Or. Ar. 1 : 219. (15) Newman Transl. Athan. Or. Ar. 2 : 412.

CHAPTER VII.

(1) Or. Adv. Ar. 3 : 59. (2) Ib., 3 : 60. (3) Ib., 3 : 61. (4) Ib., 3 : 62. (5)

Ib., 3 : 68. (6) Ib., 1 : 29. (7) Ib., 3 : 67. (8) Ib., 3 : 63. (9) Ib., 3 : 64. (10) Ib., 3 : 65. (11) Ib., 3 : 66. (12) Ib., 3 : 67. See 1 : 26. (13) Newman Arians of 4th Cent. 2 : 5 ; 2 : 2.

CHAPTER VIII.

(1) Or. adv. Ar. 3 : 9. (2) Ib., 3 : 8. (3) Ib., 2 : 78. (4) Notes on Ed. of Athan. Chrstn. Lit. Co. p. 396, Note 6. (5) Ib., 1 : 22, 35, 52 ; 2 : 33 ; 3 : 1. (6) Ib., 1 : 31. (7) Ib., 2 : 27. (8) Ib., 1 : 21. (9) Ib., 3 : 9. (10) Ib., 2 : 2. (11) Ib., 3 : 6. (12) Ib., 1 : 22. (13) Ib., 1 : 22. (14) Ib., 1 : 20. (15) See 2 : 43.

CHAPTER IX.

(1) Or. adv. Ar. 1 : 35. (2) Ib., See 1 : 35, 36 ; 2 : 18. (3) Ib., 2 : 37. (4) Ib., 2 : 40. See de Sent. Dion. 23. (5) Ib., 2 : 38. (6) Ib., 2 : 38. (7) Ib., 2 : 38. (8) Prov. 1 : 23 ; Jer. 23 : 29. Ps. 119 : 101. John 6 : 63. (9) Or. adv. Ar. 2 : 39. (10) Or. adv. Ar. 2 : 36.

CHAPTER X.

(1) De Decr. 3 : 11. (2) Ib., (3) Or. adv. Ar. 1 : 25. (4) Ib., 1 : 13. (5) Ib., 1 : 14 ; 2 : 32. (6) Ib., 2 : 33. (7) Ib., 2 : 35. (8) Ib., 2 : 42. (9) Ib., 3 : 11. (10) Ib., 3 : 13. (11) Ib., 3 : 66. (12) Ib., 1 : 27. (13) Ib., 1 : 19. (14) Ib., 3 : 15. (15) Newman Transl. Ath. Or. adv. Ar. 1 : 220.

CHAPTER XI.

(1) Or. c. Gent. 39 : 2. (2) Ib., 39 : 1-6. (3) Ib., 40 : 3. (4) Ib., 40 : 4. (5) Ib., 40 : 2. (6) Ib., 41 : 1. (7) Ib., 40 : 6. Or. adv. Ar. 2 : 32. (8) Ib., 41 : 2. (9) Ib., 42 : 3. (10) Ib., 43 : 1. (11) Ib., 43 : 2. (12) Ib., 43 : 3. (13) Ib., 44 : 3. (14) Ib., 47 : 1. (15) Ib., 47 : 3. (16) de Decr. 3 : 7, 9, 4 : 17, 5 : 20. Orat. adv. Ar. 2 : 31, 71. 4 : 33, 26. (17) Irenaeus 4 Praef. adv. Haeres. (18) Hilary of Poitiers of Trin. 7 : 22.

(19) De Decr. 3 : 7. (20) Sokrates, 1 : 6. (21) Organon. (22) Or. in Ar. 2 : 30. (23) Or. in Ar. 1 : 16. (24) Ib., 2 : 32. (25) Ib., 2 : 32. (26) Ib., 1 : 22. (27) Ib., 3 : 4. (28) Ib., 3 : 1. (29) 3 : 1. (30) Ib., 3 : 5. (31) Ib., 4 : 2. (32) Ib., 4 : 4, 5. (33) Ib., 4 : 9, 10. (34) De Decr. 8. Or. in Ar. 2 : 26. (35) Or. in Ar. 2 : 24, 25, 28. (36) Or. in Ar. 2 : 30. (37) Atzberger Logoslehre des Athan. pp. 79, 80. (38) Athan. Exp. Fid. 1 p. 99 A. Cf. Or. in Ar. 2 : 35. (39) Harnack, Dogmengeschichte p. 207.

CHAPTER XII.

(1) Augustine Solil. ii : 1 : 1. (2) De Vera Relig. xi : 5 : 8 ; de Civ. Dei. xi : 28. (3) De Vera Relig. vii : 13. (4) Conf. xiii : 11 ; de Civ. Dei. xi : 26 ; de Trin. ix : 4 : 4 to ix : 12 : 17. (5) De Trin. x : 11 : 17 ; x : 14 : 6. (6) Ib., xi : 2. (7) Ib., ix : 4 : 10. (8) Ib., xii : 4 to xiv : 12 : 15. (9) De Civ. Dei. v : 11 ; xiii : 24. (10) Ib., xxii : 11. (11) Ib., v : 11. (12) Ib., vii : 30 ; ix : 3. (13) Ib., vii : 30. (14) Ib., viii : 4 ; x : 27. (15) Ib., ii : 23 ; v : 19. (16) Ib., v : 16. (17) Ib., viii : 4. (18) De Trin. xv : 23 ; xiv : 6 ; Conf. x : 25. (19) Ib., xv : 14 to xxvi : 47.

CHAPTER II.

(1) Or. adv. Ar. i : 2, 3. (2) Ib., i : 8. (3) Ib., i : 18. (4) Ib., ii : 34. (5) and (6) Ib., ii : 40. See iii : 18. (7) De Decretis 25-27. (8) Ib., 27. (9) Ib., 27. (10) Or. adv. Ar. ii : 40. (11) Bull Defens. Nic. ii : 1 : 2. (12) Poemandres, i : 4. (13) Orig. in Heb. (14) Clementine Homilies xx : 7. (15) Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, ii : 218.

(16) Theod. Eccles. Hist. i : 4. See Sokr. i : 6 ; Athan. in Ar. i : 5 ; de Syn. 15, 16. Epiph. Haer. lxxix : 6, 7 ; Hilar. de Trin. iv : 12 ; vi : 5. "And that before he was begotten, or created, or purposed, or established." See Athan. de Syn. 16 ; Or. in Ar. ii : 19.

(17) Athan. de Syn. 16 ; Or. in Ar. ii : 19. "Who begat an only-begotten Son before eternal times, through whom he has made both the ages and the Universe, and begat him, not in semblance, but in truth." See Eusebius in Athan. Or. in Ar. ii : 24.

(18) Athan. de Syn. 15 ; Or. in Ar. i : 6. "Understand that he is conceived to be radiance and light." (19) Dorner, Lehre der Person Christi² 292. (20) Ib., ii : 287. (21) Justin c. Trypho 126. (22) Ib., 128. (23) Ib., 128. (24) Petav. ii : 6. Newman, Arians p. 106. (25) Strom. vii : 3 p. 509. Pet. A secondary cause. (26) Strom. vii : 2 p. 504. (27) Ap. Routh Sacr., 4 : 354. The Saviour is ever being born. (28) Or. c. Cels. vi : Pet. de Trin. i : 4 : 5. (29) Tert. adv. Prax. 9 ; adv. Hermog. 3. (30) don disclaims responsibility for this statement, which however is not from any other author. (31) Liddon, Div. Christ, pp. 418, 419.

- (32) Liddon, Ch. 7., pp. 419-427. (33) Dorner, de Person Christi, ii : 333. (34) Liddon, pp. 416-418. (35) Dorner, ii : 300. (36) Liddon, p. 426-7. (37) Liddon, p. 425, 426. Euseb. Hist. Eccles. v : 28. (38) Voigt, Athan. p. 195. (39) Mohler, Athan. p. 176. (40) Dorner, Person. Christ, v : 293. (41) Dorner, ii : 294. (42) Ib., ii : 295. (43) Ib. (44) Voigt. Athan. p. 195. (45) Dorner, ii : 288. (46) Ib., ii : 295. (47) Newman, Transl. Ath. Or. Ar. 2 : 292. (48) Gwatkin, Studies p. 27. (49) Baur, Dogmengeschichte 1 : 490. (50) Liddon, pp. 17, 18. (51) Atzberger p. 104. (52) Mohler 1 : 5. (53) Baur Dogmengeschichte 1 : 491. (54) Harnack, Dogmengeschichte 2 : 222. (55) Newman Transl. of Athan., Or. in Ar. i : 213. (56) De Decr. 16, 18, 32. Or. in Ar. i : 1, 7, 14, 18, 20, 33, 35, 38, 49 ; ii : 5, 10, 25, 36, 41 ; iii : 54, 58, 63, 66. (57) Or. in Ar. i : 213. (58) Ib., i : 25. (59) Ib., i : 55. (60) Ib., ii : 18. (61) Dorner, Lehre. Person Christ, vol. ii : p. 293. (62) Voigt, Lehre des Athan. p. 248. (63) Gwatkin, Studies in Arianism, p. 69. (64) Or. in Ar. i : 33 ; de Syn. 9 ; de Decr. 1. (65) Newman, Trans. Or. in Ar. i : 190. (66) Harnack, Dogmengesch., ii : 225. (67) Sokrates, Hist. Eccles., i : 8. (68) Or. in Ar. i : 55. (69) Ib., ii : 19. (70) Ib., i : 1 ; ii : 9, 29. De Deu. 9. (71) Ib., ii : 23. (72) Ib., i : 49 ; ii : 64. (73) Ib., i : 49 ; ii : 1, 19. (74) Ib., i : 55. (75) Ib., ii : 7 ; iii : 17, 55, 58. (76) Ib., i : 22 ; iii : 1. (77) Ib., i : 15, 53 ; ii : 43 ; iii : 28. (78) Ib., i : 36. (79) Ib., iii : 16, 41, 58 ; de Mort. Ar. i ; In. Ill. Omn. 6. (80) Ib., ii : 7 ; iii : 17. (81) Ib., iii : 59. (82) Or. in Ar. iii : 8 ; de Sent. Dion. 27 ; Ep. Aeg. 5 ; Hist. Ar. 66 ; Theo. Hist. i : 3, p. 731, 741. Sok. i : 9 ; Hilar. c. Const. 17. De Decr. ii : 5 ; vi : 27 ; vii : 29. (83) Or. in Ar. ii : 38. (84) Ib., iii : 2. (85) Ib., 28 ; de Decr. iii : 28. (86) Greg. Naz. in Newman Trans. i : 183. (87) Ad. Scrap. ii : 1. (88) Or. in Ar. i : 15. (89) Newman, Trans. ii : 334. (90) Ib., ii : 412. (91) Newman, Ar. of 4th Cent. ii : 5 : 4 : 2. (92) Or. in Ar. i : 23. (93) Dorner, Person Christi, ii : 327.

EXCURSUS ON SUBORDINATIONISM.

It is remarkable that all through the Ante-Nicene Period Jesus was referred to as Messenger or Servant of God ; an evident subordinationist term.

Aggelos or Messenger. Novat. de Trin. xi : 25 sqq. Harnack, Dogm. vol. I, p. 155. "As a rule this name is not to be understood as a designation of the Being, but as a designation of the Office of Christ : but the matter has never been thoroughly cleared up." And no wonder, for even Harnack's explanation will not account for the full connotation of the word. "As the Logos-doctrine gradually became universal, the designation Messenger became harmless, and disappeared." It may be asked, how could a word chosen by early writers to designate their meaning be "harmful" except to a conception they did not hold ? The word is common from the earliest times.

Pais or Servant. Barn. iii : 6 ; iv : 3, 8. Valentin. ap. Clem. Alex. Strom., vi : 6 : 52. Ascensio Jesaia, i Clem., 59, 2 sqq. Barn., vi : 1 ; ix : 2 ; Act., iii : 13 : 26. iv : 27 : 30. Didache, ix : 2 : 2. Mart. Polyc., xiv : 20 ; Act. Pauli et Theclae, xvii : 24 ; Ep. Orig. ad Afric. init. ; Clem. Strom., vii : 1 : 4. Sybill. i, verse 324, 331 ; 364 ; Diogn., 8, 9, 10 ; viii : 9 : 1.

CHAPTER III.

- (1) Baring-Gould, Origin and Growth of Religious Belief, p. 139, Vol. II.

CHAPTER I.

- (1) John 12 : 37-43 ; Jno. 7 : 31 ; 9 : 16 ; 10 : 21 ; 11 : 47. Matth. 11 : 20-24 ; 12 : 22-35. Mark 3 : 22-30. Luke 11 : 14-23. Jno. 10 : 32-38 ; 6 : 26-31 ; 12 : 30 ; 14 : 11 ; 15 : 24. (2) Josephus B. J. 3 : 8, 5. (3) Josephus Ant. 18 : 1, 3. (4) Acts 24 : 15. (5) Jno. 5 : 28, 29. (6) Enoch-Par. 51. (7) Daniel 12 : 2. (8) I Macc. 6 : 9, 14, 23. (9) Luke 20 : 35, etc. (10) Matt. 22 : 30-33 ; Mark 12 : 24-27. Luke 20 : 34-39. (11) Matt. 5 : 22, 29, 30. Mk. 9 : 43-48. (Is. 66 : 24). (12) Mk. 7 : 7-17. Mt. 23 : 23 ; Mk. 12 : 24-27 ; Mk. 12 : 28-31. Mk. 10 : 19. Mk. 12 : 3-8. (13) See Mk. 2 : 23-28 ; 10 : 2-10 ; 7 : 15 ; Mt. 5 : 27, 28, 38-43, etc. (14) Mark 3 : 23. (15) Luke 22 : 31 ; Matth. 16 : 23. Mk. 8 : 33. (16) Luke 13 : 11 ; 10 : 17-20 ; 11 : 14 ; 13 : 32 ; Mk. 1 : 23, 34 ; 3 : 11, 15, 22 ; 5 : 2-5 ; 6 : 7 ; 9 : 17, 22. (17) Matth. 18 : 10. (18) Matth. 16 : 28. (19) Matth. 13 : 41-43 ; 49-50. (20) Matth. 19 : 28-30. (21) Mark 10 : 29-30. (22) I Co. 10 : 11. (23) I Thesa. 4 : 17. (24) Mark 10 : 18. (25) Matth. 16 : 13-23 ; Mk. 8 : 27. Luke 9 : 18 sqq.