THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM

BY

CARL DU PREL.

Dr. PHIL.

Translated from the German

BY

C. C. MASSEY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

GEORGE REDWAY, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

1889.
This Translation is Dedicated

TO THE HONOURED MEMORY

OF

MRS. ANNA KINGSFORD, M.D.,

AT Whose INSTANCE IT WAS UNDERTAKEN.
## CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. INTRODUCTION.—SCIENCE: ITS CAPABILITY OF DEVELOPMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. ON THE SCIENTIFIC IMPORTANCE OF DREAM:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Positive Side of the Sleep-life</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Confused Dream</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Relation of Sleep to Somnambulism</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Metaphysical Application of Dream</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. DREAM A DRAMATIST:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Transcendental Measure of Time</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Dramatic Sundering of the Ego in Dream:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) The Body</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) The Mind</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) The Human Enigma</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. SOMNAMBULISM:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Natural Somnambulism</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Artificial Somnambulism</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. DREAM A PHYSICIAN:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Dream-images as Symbolical Representation of Bodily States</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Diagnosis in the Somnambulic Sleep:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Self-Inspection</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) The Diagnosis of the Diseases of others by Somnambulists</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Curative Instinct in Dream</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Health-Prescriptions of Somnambulists</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRANSLATORS' PREFACE.

The work of which the following translation is now offered to the English public was published at Leipsic three or four years ago. In Germany it has been extensively noticed, and among other recognitions of its importance may be mentioned the fact that Edward von Hartmann has devoted a large part of one of his most recent treatises—'Moderne Probleme'—to an examination of it. The author, Baron Carl du Prel, Doctor of Philosophy, was already known by earlier works of a speculative character, especially marked by an attempt to appreciate the significance of the doctrine of Evolution, from a standpoint hitherto unrepresented in the prevailing treatment of the subject. Qualified by a philosophical training, not always found in combination with scientific studies, du Prel has ventured on the suggestion and discussion of problems for which that combination is eminently required. The list of his published works will be found on an outer page; 'Die Monistische Seelenlehre' and 'Die Mystik der alten Griechen' having appeared since the publication of the here translated 'Die Philosophie der Mystik.'

The influence of the philosophies of Kant, Schopenhauer, and E. von Hartmann is especially observable in the speculations of this author. It was necessary that the doctrine of soul (in the sense of a super-organic Subject) should pass through the solvent of those systems, that it might be freed from a dualism which neither science nor philosophy would permanently endure. If in this process—especially in its post-Kantian development—the doctrine itself seemed
altogether lost, that was consequent on the assumption that no data existed for the empirical support of a reformed conception. *Behind* the phenomena of consciousness, both objective and subjective—thus, behind consciousness itself—must certainly be placed the ultimate reality or being of which consciousness offers only a reflection or representation. This inscrutable being is therefore termed 'the Unconscious.' But now the question arises whether this 'Unconscious' lies *immediately* behind our physically conditioned consciousness, or may be pushed back indefinitely, so that there is room for a root of conscious individuality, only *relatively* unconscious for the organism of sense. Du Prel finds an answer to this question in the recognition and significance of what is now known as the psycho-physical 'threshold of sensibility,' and in its occasional mobility or displacement.

It is fortunately no longer necessary to contend against scepticism for the genuine character of the somnambulic (or Hypnotic) consciousness, spontaneous or induced. Even if the unanimous report, after full investigation, by the Committee of the Medical Academy of Paris in 1831, should still be ignored, recent scientific researches, especially in France, have placed the general fact beyond the possibility of dispute; at least, in any well-informed quarter.

But du Prel is the first, I believe, who has shown by systematic analysis and comparison, that somnambulism and cognate states are not essentially abnormal or morbid, but are in truth a mere exaltation of ordinary sleep, and that the faculties evinced in those states are incipiently manifested also in dream, and are even indicated, though still more indefinitely, in waking life. The importance of establishing the fact of this continuity in our psychical nature will be apparent to every attentive reader of the following work. For, far from reducing the advanced phenomena of somnambulism, as regards their psychological significance, to the level of the illusions which are the mere dramatic *form* of dream, the whole dream-life—emerging
sometimes even in apparent waking—is reclaimed from its presumed worthlessness for scientific and philosophical purposes. But there is at the same time reclaimed from the crude or traditional misinterpretation in which 'superstition' really consists, a large field of fact, to which modern rationalism, for want of an explanation, has impatiently and rashly applied that term.

It may not be superfluous to direct the reader's attention, at the outset, to the essential difference between the dualism of consciousness as conceived by the author—the division of two 'persons' in one 'Subject'—and the traditional and popular idea of the dualism of soul and body. This is, in other words, the dualism of Matter and Spirit, of Nature and the Supernatural. It is here that Science, or rather scientific thought, has broken with Religion, or would, with Herbert Spencer, identify the province of the latter with the barren postulate of an ultimate Unknowable. This dualism reappears, in another form, as that of matter and force, receiving an idealistic solution in Schopenhauer's conception of all force as the Will behind consciousness and its 'Vorstellungen'—the phenomenal world. Physicists have already attained to a monistic conception of matter and force; or, at least, it is agreed that, though distinguishable as concepts, these factors are not therefore naturally separable. And it has become evident that force in its higher manifestation, as vitality, can no longer be supposed divorced from its material or medium, nor can consciousness be held potentially exempt from any sort of organic support or expression. This, indeed, is a conclusion long ago anticipated in ancient speculations* upon psychic bodies. That in modern times this conclusion has tended to materialism, or to those forms of pantheism which deny individual survival, is incontestable, though with the philosophical recognition by science of the converse proposition, that the world is objectively a phenomenon of consciousness;†

* See Cudworth's 'Intellectual System,' for a collection of opinions on this subject.
† Huxley's 'Lay Sermons,' xiv. On Descartes' 'Discourse,' etc.
it is strange that the probability of other modes of phenomena, therefore of other sensible worlds than our own, which must be for us supersensible, though not supernatural, has been so little considered.*

The absence from Christian teaching of anything which can be called a psychology (such as occupies so prominent a place in some Eastern systems of religious philosophy) has left Western belief in immortality without any more definite conception of what survives in man, than that of a spiritual substance or principle, with which is identified the self supposed to be already known in consciousness. The Neo-platonic idea that the soul is only partially known in the physically conditioned consciousness—thus asserting a transcendental individuality—though not without some Patristic patronage, was not easily intelligible, and has long dropped out of view, as it is not to be confused with the doctrine of the trichotomy of man, which distinguishes soul from spirit. In the Christian belief, the soul is wholly introduced into a heterogeneous form, the body. That was a dualism which could not long survive scientific tendencies of thought; and as it is, in the West, the only traditional form of belief in individual immortality, that belief has long been decaying with the increase of intellectual activity among the people.

The dualism of consciousness, on the other hand—the discovery of an intelligence which emerges in clearness and power just in proportion to the cessation of the organic functions with which the consciousness of waking life is associated, carries with it no consequence inconsistent with the monistic conception of nature. But it would not of itself resolve the dualism of soul and body, without the evidence which this transcendental intelligence affords of another function connected therewith. The Subject, which includes the two halves of our consciousness divided by the movable 'threshold of sensibility,' is shown to be an

* Balfour Stewart's and Tait's 'The Unseen Universe' is the best-known English speculation in this direction.
organising as well as a thinking principle. The facts pointing to this conclusion which are adduced in the following work by no means exhaust the evidence for it. The history of inventions shows that the genius of discovery has unconsciously followed the organic constructions of nature, the principle of which is inferentially in ourselves. The numerous examples of this analogy, showing also the antecedence of the human invention to the knowledge of the natural construction—thus negating the derivation of the former from such knowledge—are strikingly exhibited in a recent German work;* and another German author professes to prove that the very same law of proportion—that of the 'golden section'†—prevails alike in the organic and inorganic kingdoms of nature, and in the productions of human art, in architecture, music, poetry, and painting;‡

I will here translate some striking remarks of my author, from his 'Monistische Seelenlehre.' After referring to the first of the two just-mentioned works—that of Kapp—he says:

'At first sight it seems highly wonderful that technical products, invented and fabricated in the condition of clearest consciousness, should agree in fundamental character with products of Nature. And yet is this quite naturally intelligible. Our surprise springs from the supposition we make of a double source, a dualism of forces, which does not at all exist. The brain-processes on which those technical inventions depend are not evoked by consciousness, but only illuminated by it. As, according to Spinoza, the flung stone, if it had consciousness, would believe its flight to be voluntary, so we, when thought is lighted up by consciousness, suppose the process of thought to be an

* E. Kapp: 'Philosophie der Technik.'
† Euclid: Book II., Prop. 11.
‡ Zeising: 'Neue Lehre von den Proportionen des menschlichen Körpers—Das Normalverhältniss der chemischen Proportionen.'
activity of consciousness. Instead of wondering that there is an unconscious thinking, we should rather understand that, in fact, there is none other: that is to say, there is indeed a thinking which is accompanied by consciousness, but none that is caused by consciousness. Organism and consciousness are not governed by heterogeneous forces, whose products, nevertheless, wonderfully harmonise, but in both provinces it is one and the same force differentiated, and therefore the products must agree. That surprise of ours arises from the presupposition of a dualism in man: in the monistic explanation of man it loses its justification.'

In art, following unwittingly the precedents of nature, there is the same activity, the same faculty of nature itself, only now raised to consciousness. The technical discoveries of inventive genius are secondary projections of the organising faculty of nature in man, and follow the type of the primary.

In the same work—'Die Monistische Seelenlehre'—other phenomena are brought into account for the further proof of an organising faculty in the human individual. These phenomena are chiefly of what is called in German Doppelgängerei, and are similar to some dealt with in the recent publication of the English Society for Psychical Research, entitled 'Phantasms of the Living.' Du Prel is, however, careful to discriminate the cases which may possibly come under the explanation (telepathic hallucination) most favoured by the acute authors of the above work, from those which seem to require his own hypothesis. As regards the evidential value of the testimony to such facts, as well as to those adduced in the following book, it is unnecessary to contend that the cases are all individually unassailable, if collectively and cumulatively they form a class with identical features pointing to the same theoretical explanation, when no other cause of such apparently significant coincidences can be shown. For it is just this recurrence, this community of features, which constitutes experience, and distinguishes that from the altogether exceptional and unrelated facts
which must be proved, if at all, by particular evidence of such strength, that the improbability of its being forthcoming for what is untrue is greater than any improbability we can oppose to the facts for which it is found. The objection that the evidence in any special case does not come up to a certain standard, may be fatal when that case stands in isolation, but is much less formidable when the case in question is raised to probability by likeness to a class, in respect of characteristics not includable in suppositions by which the class itself could be attacked. The independent agreement of alleged facts, in particulars where agreement could not be anticipated on the supposition of a cause of fallacy common to the class (such as imposture, delusion, etc.), is a circumstance of evidence not less important for the establishment of the whole class, than is the independent agreement of witnesses for the establishment of a single fact; and a second-hand story, perhaps very loosely reported by an ancient author, may possibly in this way be corroborative of much better testimony to more recent facts.

But not only does an alleged fact gain in probability by a relation to other alleged facts, but also by a relation to our intelligence. It is the absence of this relation, even more than non-referability to common or admitted experience, which makes us unreceptive of evidence that would otherwise suffice to convince. When we see how a thing can have happened, we are much more ready to give a fair hearing to evidence that it has happened, than when the material offered is quite indigestible by our intelligence. And thus an explanatory hypothesis is hardly less necessary for the reception of facts of a certain character, than are facts for the support of a hypothesis.

If, moreover, the author has succeeded in showing, in what is perhaps one of the most impressive arguments of the book, that the faculties alleged to be displayed in the somnambulic state are antecedently to be expected upon the doctrine of evolution, and from the accepted physio-
logical theory of cognition, the presumption is shifted, and the positive evidence must be more benevolently considered. The force of that evidence may be variously estimated; but it was at any rate strong enough, two generations ago, to convince such witnesses as the Committee of the French Medical Academy,* and later, as regards clairvoyance, (of the possibilities of simulating which he had made a special study), the celebrated expert, Robert Houdin;† and to elicit from such an understanding as Schopenhauer's the remark, that whoever doubted clairvoyance was no longer to be termed sceptical, but ignorant.

But, in truth, incredulity is a disposition that has very little regard for evidence. In his 'History of Rationalism,' Mr. Lecky has expressly pointed out that the tide of scepticism, as to phenomena hitherto accredited, which set in towards the close of the seventeenth century, was due entirely to general intellectual dispositions, and was not at all referable to more accurate conceptions of evidence. A few minds of a high order, exceptionally tenacious of facts, which they subjected to the severest scrutiny, attempted at that period to direct public attention to the evidential aspect of occurrences underlying what were, doubtless, very superstitious errors of interpretation. In vain. They were unanswered, unheeded. The Devil was going out of fashion; and as in popular belief the Devil was a principal party to most transactions exceeding ordinary powers of explanation, in the German phrase, 'the child was emptied out with the bath;' the facts were dismissed with the interpretation. And so it has been till recently; so, perhaps, it still is.

But to return to the philosophy of this book.

The hypothesis of transcendental individuality, coexistent with the earthly life, and constructive of the organism by which consciousness is (from the earthly standpoint) dualised, necessitates the doctrine of Pre-existence. That doctrine, though never popularly entertained in the West,

* Post, pp. 182, 183.  
† Post, p. 241.
has seldom been without distinguished representatives. The learned Dr. Henry More, towards the close of the seventeenth, or early in the eighteenth century, thus speaks of it in his treatise on the ‘Immortality of the Soul’ (Book II., c. 14): ‘The consequence of our soul’s pre-existence is more agreeable to reason than any other hypothesis whatever; has been received by the most learned philosophers of all ages, there being scarcely any of them that held the soul of man immortal upon the mere light of Nature and reason, but asserted also her pre-existence.’ The same author also ascribes to the soul, not only consciousness, but an organising power and function. He defines the soul of man to be ‘a created spirit endued with sense and reason, and a power of organising terrestrial matter into human shape by vital union therewith’ (Op. cit., Bk. I., c. 8). And further on he says: ‘... the frame of the body, of which I think it most reasonable to conclude the soul herself to be the more particular architect (for I will not wholly reject Plotinus his opinion), and that the plastick power resides in her, as also in the souls of brute animals, as very worthy and learned writers have determined’ (Bk. II., c. 10). And, again: ‘... those two notorious powers, and so perfectly different, which philosophers acknowledge in the soul, to wit, perception and organisation.’ Had Dr. Henry More gone a little further with Plotinus, to the doctrines of Pre-existence and the ‘plastick power,’ he would have added that of transcendental individuality, in distinction from the personal consciousness and functions, not conceiving the soul to be wholly plunged into the successive bodies it constructs. In any case, however, a restatement of the argument, as we have it in the following book, would now be necessary, to meet the advance of modern experience, thought, and science.

Many at the present day are independently of opinion (without having at all derived their view from the philosophers of whom More speaks) that individual survival of physical dissolution is only to be thought of in connection
with the assumption of pre-natal existence. But the whole conception of immortality undergoes an important change, if we regard the personal consciousness, with its Ego, as a mere partial and temporary limitation of a larger self, the growth of many seasons, as it were, of earthly life. The substitution of this conception, with all that it involves in relation to ethical and social problems, for that of a mere continuity of the personal consciousness, whose interests arise entirely out of a brief experience and temporary conditions, is hardly less satisfactory than the provisional filling of the huge void between the personal life of average humanity, and the spiritual regeneration which is the only aspect in which religion can condescend to regard immortality. The scope of this speculation would, however, be quite misconceived, were it supposed to offer a substitute for religion, or to be inconsistent with higher and more spiritual truth, in whatever forms of religion that may be veiled. Rather might the contrary easily be shown to be the case. The transcendental does not drive out the Divine, but enlarges possibilities and opportunities in relation to it. The true theme of religion is not the future life, but the higher life. It does not offer to teach us a psychology, and any religious prejudice against an extension of our psychological conceptions would be only a repetition, in that province, of the still unforgiven error of opposition to the true astronomy; and with not so much excuse, since there is less that can be mistaken for psychology in the New Testament than that could be, and was, mistaken for cosmogony in the Old Testament.

If it should be asked, What, then, according to the theory of subjectivity propounded in this book, is the individual, or what is his state after death? the answer can only be given generally, in a similitude suggested by the author, of the smaller of two concentric circles expanding to the larger. The circumference of the inner circle is the organic threshold of sensibility, which death removes altogether, as it is already partially removed in states analogous to death,
revealing then those phenomena the report of which excites incredulity, just because they exceed the faculties of the normal, or organic, consciousness. The psychological conception thus offered us of the more circumscribed personality, which we falsely suppose to exhaust our individuality, is somewhat that of a preoccupation of consciousness with its temporary circumstances; a limitation to which we can discover a resemblance in special preoccupations within the personal life itself. Often in childhood, or in crises of later life, our whole identity seems sunk in an absorbing interest, and only when the tension is relaxed do we again expand to our normal comprehensiveness of relations and interests, and recognise in the late contraction of consciousness a mere episode, which may soon be a forgotten one, of our life. But in those moments of concentration the attempt to reduce things to their true proportion, by reference to the total circle of the personality, would be scarcely more suggestive of the reality of that circle, than is now the philosophy of transcendental individuality recognisable as a true account of our identity. The submergence, the latency of general interests by preoccupation with particular ones, can even now contract the personality, the sense of identity, to a 'fixed idea,' and can amount to the insanity which blots even from memory our true relations to the world about us. The latency of the transcendental consciousness is only a stronger and more enduring case of preoccupation, just as the whole organic condition of our life on earth is more rigid and determinate than are the superinduced cerebral modifications which are the physical correlates of particular psychical states.

There is thus nothing unintelligible in the distinction between personality, understood of a certain fixed state, or preoccupation, of consciousness, the reactions of character on the special circumstances of a life-time, and the individuality of which those conditions are but a particular and transient determination. We often hear it said, in reply to metaphysical conceptions of identity, that con-
tinuity of consciousness is indispensable to the sense of identity, and that no doctrine which fails to take account of this can be regarded as a doctrine of individual survival. Thus, in Buddhism, the successive personalities, constituted and linked together by Karma, are quite inconceivable as a true case of Palingenesis, without the unitary bond of transcendental subjectivity. And it is probable that the unfamiliarity of this latter conception has caused European commentators on Buddhism to overlook indications of it which are certainly to be found in Buddhist books, and in recorded sayings of the Master. Other views of reincarnation, such as the French Spiritist doctrine of M. Rivail (Allan Kardec), identify the derivative and successive personalities, though without continuity of consciousness or memory. The nexus is here only a sort of heredity. But the personality is definable as the circle of consciousness, and is not identifiable with another and eccentric circle, but only with the subject which has the same centro, though a larger circumference. Moreover, the consciousness of identity is indispensable, only we must not look for it in the wrong quarter, in the leaves of successive seasons rather than in the tree which puts them forth. Transcendental subjectivity makes provision for the continuity of consciousness; but, at the same time, it will be seen that the urgent demand for it of the personal Egoism greatly exaggerates its importance in relation to the total sphere of the subjectivity. The interest of the tree in last year's leaves is just the nutriment and growth it has derived through them. The experience and the whole activity of one of our objective life-times will be assimilated for results quite other, perhaps, than those the interest of the contracted Ego proposed, and probably bearing but a minute proportion to the gradually accumulated psychical content of the whole individual. The constant aim of philosophy, in its ethical aspect, is to bring the personal Ego to the point of view of the transcendental subject, to which the mere happiness of that Ego is indifferent. What
to us, as 'persons,' are ideal motives, which only the noblest of the race can invest with actuating emotion, may, for the larger self, be of immediate moment, and alone of interest, except so far as it may also concern itself with maintaining the objective mode—the organic personality—which it has constructed for its own purposes. This, however, must be taken with the qualification mentioned in the text (Vol. II., p. 297). For, as the dispositions which manifest themselves in the personality are results of former life-habits, transferred to the subject (for which all is not gain alone), we can as little attribute moral perfection to the latter, as perfect health to the organism which always seeks to drive whatever may be morbid in it to the surface. Our earthly lives are just this surface, and the most rational conception of one aspect of Karma (of which this part of the text is evidently an independent exposition) is quite analogous to the process of Nature in the endeavours to expel disease.

With what admirable economy the doctrine of Palingenesis, associated with the truth revived in this book, that the soul 'does not sink wholly into generation,' fits the progress of the individual into the progress of the race, avoiding all the waste of energy involved in the now favoured conception that the former is merely sacrificed to the latter: how the philosophy, or science, of biological evolution is shown to induce an expectation of the very phenomena which uninquiring rationalism would discredit; and how the materialist, who strangely claims a peculiar interest in that science, is found to be 'hoist with his own petard;' what probability there is, from the relative planetary ages and conditions, that exaltations of consciousness and faculty, which for us as a race belong only to the remote biological future, are already a realised attainment elsewhere in the Kosmos; how, as regards the value of life itself, Pessimism is reconciled with, or, rather, is subordinated to, Optimism, while its partial truth is admitted and its necessity is explained—all this, with much more than can be even

* Plotinus.
summarily alluded to here, seems to some students of the subjects dealt with to be expounded in these volumes with an ability and force which it is hoped may be appreciated by a larger circle of English readers.

The translation is as literal as I could make it. I have ventured occasionally to add foot-notes, intended to be explanatory or critical. I regret that the French word 'somnambule'—used throughout in the German text, and which I intended to retain only when a female of the class was denoted—occurs more indiscriminately in the first volume of this translation. Should the latter reach a second edition, the English form 'somnambulist' will be substituted in every case.

C. C. M.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

It is not always the business of philosophy to split hairs, and to devise subtle problems. The weightiest problems are just those which are hidden by their every-day character, or behind unwarranted presuppositions, of which we are unconscious, only because we are continually making them.

Such a problem it is which I would suggest in the following work—the question whether our Ego is wholly embraced in self-consciousness. The affirmative answer to this question, the most proximate and constant of human problems, is evidently a mere presumption, and not less so because carried on through our whole life. Moreover, this presumption is not only logically unjustified, but is also—as will be shown—erroneous. Analysis of the dream-life leads to a negative answer to the question propounded; it shows that self-consciousness falls short of its object, that the Ego exceeds the self-consciousness.

If, however, we are more than that of which our self-consciousness informs us, and indeed not in the sense of a pantheistic dissolution, but with preservation of individuality, then it is evident that the question of the soul has been falsely stated. Instead of succession of the here and the beyond, we have their
simultaneity, that is, the simultaneity of two Persons of our Subject.

Not always in the development of philosophy has this problem been concealed; it has already been suggested in Indian philosophy, later by Plotinus, and finally by Kant. But its importance and fertility can only be favourably conceived according to the degree in which our intelligible* being is held to be cognisable. Our problem must thus be recognised as the cardinal point of a philosophical system, as soon as it is provable that the intelligible being can be made accessible to experience. That is in fact the case.

The circuit of the knowledge and self-knowledge possible to an organised being is determined by the number of its senses, and by the strength of the stimuli on which its senses react; i.e., by its psychological threshold of sensibility. In the biological process this threshold has been continually movable, and so in the succession of life-forms there has been not only a differentiation of the organs of sense, but also an exaltation of consciousness. But at the basis

* [The 'intelligible' being (or character) is a term of the Kantian philosophy, and is there used in opposition to the empirical. The noumenal, or intelligible, character corresponds, psychically, to the 'thing-in-itself' behind the phenomenal 'object.' The hypothesis in the text of the cognisability of the human noumenon supposes it to be potentially empirical—capable, that is, of presentation to consciousness under certain conditions. Such a presentation would reveal new determinations of the internal sense (in Kantian phraseology); in other words, would manifest another character, or personality, within the limits of subjective unity. The consciousness of the transcendental 'self' is of course only to be understood in the sense of ordinary 'self'-consciousness: i.e., as objectification of the subject in its determinations, or inner content.—Tr.]
of this biological mobility of the threshold of sensibility, there must be the same mobility of it in the individual. This also is susceptible of proof from the analysis of our dream-life; but it is most strikingly apparent in somnambulism. The displacement of the threshold of sensibility is thus common to the biological process and to somnambulism; and hence results the weighty inference, that in somnambulism not only is the mode of existence of our intelligible being indicated, but also there is an anticipation of that future biological form which will have as its normal possession those faculties, of which we have now only an intimation in this exceptional condition.

Thus the negative reply to our question, whether the self is wholly contained in self-consciousness, throws light in its consequences as well on the direction of the biological process, as on the intelligible side of our being. Accordingly—and this is the most important result of our problem—the province of mysticism is revealed to the understanding. If man is a being dualised by a threshold of sensibility, then is mysticism possible; and if, furthermore, this threshold of sensibility is a movable one, then is mysticism even necessary.

This is in brief the purport of the following work. The latter will not deal with the historical, objective forms of mysticism, but the subjective foundation of all mysticism shall be investigated, in order then to turn to account the results obtained for a philosophical doctrine of man. Now, it is the rule, that only in the suppression of the activity of the senses can the inner working of our mystical, intelligible Subject occur, as the stars are first visible with the going
down of the sun. We are therefore directed to the study of the sleep-state, especially in that deepening of it which we designate somnambulism. Modern science has lost intelligence for mysticism, only because it has almost entirely neglected the study of somnambulism, which is subjectively presupposed in the phenomena of mysticism. And yet there is no province which offers to psychologists and philosophers so rich a harvest as this; no other admits of so deep a penetration into the enigma of man and of his place in the universe.

Mysticism is not to be considered in isolation, but must be conceived in its organic connection with the totality of things. Every philosophy, in which mysticism is not a necessary part, must be from the outset defective in its principles; but conversely, mysticism can no more be arbitrarily extracted from the true view of the Kosmos, than can the focus from an ellipse.

Mysticism does not stand beside the other phenomena of Nature unconnected with them, but forms the last communication between all phenomena. So far from it being an obsolete view, much rather obsolete are those, though modern, conceptions in which it has no place. So far is mysticism from belonging only to a surmounted past, that much rather will it first attain its full significance in the future. As well the Kantian 'Critique of Reason,' as the physiological theory of sense-perception, and Darwinism, point convergently to a view of the world into which mysticism will be organically fitted.

The natural sciences have already reached their central depth, because in the conceptions, Force and
Atom, phenomena are reduced to the supersensuous. This must happen also in the science of man, and indeed—as shall be shown in this work—in a manner deviating as well from pantheism as from the dualistic doctrine of the soul. The phenomena of dream and somnambulism prove the existence of our intelligible Subject, and so we arrive at a closer definition and description of the Unconscious, which is to be conceived individually, and not pantheistically, and is not unconscious in itself, but is so only for the being of the senses.

The attempt to erect a philosophical fabric of doctrine on the empirical basis of the sleep-life can accordingly occasion no surprise; for as soon as it is shown that this sleep-life possesses positive characteristics, peculiar to itself, it will become the duty of philosophy to apply to this third of our existence, not yet turned to metaphysical account, a like study, though it may be a more arduous one, as to the waking life. An essential part of experience has thus hitherto not been worked out, and it is just that which contains the reconciliation of the harsh antagonisms in modern intellectual development. Now since it is from these theoretical antagonisms that the harshness of our social antagonisms has grown, the reconciliation of the former must compose also the latter. And in this I see a proof of the correctness of my views; for the conformity of theoretical truth with practical good is among my firm convictions.

Now if I, standing quite apart from the traffic of life, have not steered for this practical goal, but have been carried to it by inner necessity of thought, I shall still welcome an unprejudiced critical apprecia-
tion of my work, if only for the reason that in our social conditions the spread of reconciling and composing views would be very desirable.

Thus every criticism will be welcome which is adapted to advance the subject and myself. But I cannot hope for such from that sort of critics who are only able to explain every departure from their opinions by the insanity of the author; and who, while they attribute wild error to an author who has devoted years of study to a subject, think they understand the subject much better without such study. I have undoubtedly the right to demand from a critic, not only philosophical preparation, but also a knowledge of the most important of the works I have cited; but to emphasise this demand is unfortunately necessary at a time when journalistic reviewers, who have made no regular study in any direction, are thought capable of criticism in every direction, and who, without thoughts of their own, have leisure to disfigure and maltreat the thoughts of others. But apart from this limitation, I know very well that conflict, which Heraklitus called the father of all things, is also the father of truth.

DU PREL.

June, 1884.
PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.—SCIENCE: ITS CAPABILITY OF DEVELOPMENT.

The endeavour of the human intellect is to explain the significance of the world and of ourselves. Religious and philosophical systems succeed one another, and each offers a different solution of the problems. Nevertheless, in this exchange of views there is progress. Truth is not a thing which can be accidentally and once for all discovered by genius as a complete structure, but is a growth, a slowly ripening product, and the process of scientific development is the evolution of truth itself, which thus first appears at the close of the process as its result.

Epochs of time follow one upon another, each with its characteristic representations of the meaning of the world and man's position therein. These representations impart to every period of culture its particular colour, even in relation to the practical conduct of mankind. The conduct of man always results from his idea of the world; the construction of his earthly life reflects metaphysical conceptions. The political and social quietism of the Buddhist
peoples is thus a consequence of their aspiration for Nirvana, just as the precipitate material development of our time, with its worship of the golden calf, results from our recognising Sansara* alone as real. Whenever in history we come upon a generation sunk in materialism, we can at once infer that even in theory ideals have for it no value, and that it is no longer influenced by metaphysical conception, a fact which is most strikingly apparent in the irreligion of the masses. Disbelief in the metaphysical logically results in misplacing the emphasis on the earthly. Our century, indeed, lives in the delusion that it is thereby preparing the golden age upon earth; but whither we are in fact tending we may learn, for instance, from the statistics of suicide. From these it appears that in civilized Europe hourly three persons destroy themselves, and that for a succession of years the number of suicides has been frightfully on the increase.

Since a logical instinct leads to a correspondence between the conduct of men and their conception of the world-problem, it follows that whoever will improve men must first conceive that problem otherwise than they do; thus, that the moral progress of humanity is thoroughly dependent on the evolutionary capacity of science. If science has in itself this capacity, then there is at least the possibility of an impulse towards better conditions, and of again reaching a form of culture coloured by ideals; otherwise not. The question of the power of science to develop is therefore of the highest importance, even in practical regard.

* The vortex of life.—Tr.
The historical consciousness of humanity answers this question in the affirmative, so much so that many might consider a particular examination of it to be superfluous, since the self-evolution of science is not doubted by even the dominant opinion. But though such is the belief in intellectual progress, that one can no longer sit down on an ale-house bench without reproach, yet it is associated with completely false conceptions, and these can only disappear with the yet higher elevation of the belief, on the one side, and on the other with the renunciation of certain hopes which we now attach to it.

The first condition is that we should conceive progress otherwise than as mere breadth. True progress is always in the depth,* whereas every generation imagines that it leaves to its successors only the task of extension on the same level. The other misconception to be discarded is that, with the development of the sciences, the world-problem will become more comprehensible. The contrary is the case, at least up to the present, and apparently will be so for a long time, whatever the possibility of this hope being ultimately fulfilled.

Our inquiry is thus concerned with the two questions: how far intellectual progress takes a deepening direction, and what it contributes to the explanation of the world-problem. How intimately these two questions are connected will appear at the close; but

* As Bacon says: 'No perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level; neither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science if you stand but upon the level of the same science and ascend not to a higher science.'—'Advance- ment of Learning,' i. 5.—Tr.
they must receive separate treatment, in accordance with the axiom, *Qui bene distinguuit, bene docet*.

The tendency of the self-evolutionary power of science to vertical progress may be illustrated by the following instances. Trusting the illusion of the senses, by which sun, planets, and fixed stars seem to rise in the east and set in the west, the old Greeks set astronomy the task of explaining these apparent movements on the supposition that they were the true ones. This task proved continually more difficult; more and more cycles and epicycles seemed requisite to account for the observations; but it was always believed that the method was the right one, and that future generations had only to labour further on the same level. But when the thought of Copernicus—anticipated in the secret teaching of Pythagoras and the Kabala—exposed the sense-illusion in which human understanding lay imprisoned, then it became also clear that success was not to be expected from further labour 'on the flat.' A new, vertical path of progress was laid down.

Similar examples might be drawn from other branches of empirical science; but it is more instructive to turn to philosophy. That would explain the world. But what world? The world which is manifested to us by our senses. And philosophy, like astronomy, took the appearance for the reality. It was an unquestioned assumption that our perceptions accommodated themselves to things.

It was believed that the whole world, as it lay outside of us, by means of our sense-apparatus, projected itself into the brain, and there produced a
reflected image of itself. Thus truth was to be captured by investigation of the object. But now, again, when Kant (who himself compares his discovery with that of Copernicus) exposed the fallacy of the assumption actuating this endeavour, and urged the prior examination of the subject and its cognitional forms, the signal was again given to discontinue the level working, and to sink the foundations of research.

And it is only in Kant’s sense that the modern evolution theory will work, however little this may be yet understood. The biological process begins with the simplest organisms, and it is in the complicated human organism that it has reached its present height. A tree stands in very few and simple relations to external nature; it reacts upon sunshine and rain, wind and weather, and unfolds itself accordingly. In the animal kingdom these relations to the environment have continually widened and multiplied, and hand in hand with the organic proceeds the intellectual development.

Organization and consciousness rise parallel to each other from the oyster to the man. And even if with contemporary man organic formation represented the most multitudinous relations possible with nature, yet would the circle of these relations be continually widened in the historical process, through the technical arts and theoretical sciences. The elevation of consciousness would thus still proceed, even were the evolution of organic forces concluded.

From the standpoint of every animal organism we can thus divide external nature into two parts, which are the more unequal as the organic grade is lower.
The one includes that part of nature with which the sense-apparatus establishes relations; the other is for the organism in question transcendental; that is, the organism lives in no relation to it. In the biological process the boundary-line between these two world-halves has been pushed continually forward in the same direction. The number of senses has increased, and their functional ability has risen. While, that is, the senses differentiated, and became sensitive to continually weaker degrees of physical influence, that which Fechner named the psychophysical threshold was continually pushed forward. Influences behind that threshold do not come into consciousness. The biological rise and the rise of consciousness thus signify a constant removal of the boundary between representation and reality at the cost of the transcendental part of the world, and in favour of the perceived part.

Darwin thus has proved that from the standpoint of organism, a transcendental world is continually given; and Kant has proved the same for man by his distinction between the 'thing in itself' and the phenomenon.*

The most extreme opposition to this conception is materialism, so that to regard the doctrine of evolution as supporting materialism belongs to confused thinking. The materialist is wholly imprisoned in

* The 'thing in itself' is not identifiable with the transcendental, if the latter is conceived, as in the text, as potentially empirical. For what *can* be sensibly known is knowable only under percipient forms, whether these are a development of our present ones, or specifically different; the resulting 'object' being still phenomenon, behind which a reality, independent of perception, will be just as much in demand as for the world of our present senses.—Tr.
appearance. He holds the eye to be the mere mirror of phenomena, and the world to be just what it is for sense (im Kopf); and so in the investigation of the object is to be found the solution of the world-enigma. Of Kant's problem he has no apprehension; he is like a man wearing blue spectacles, and explaining the blueness of objects from themselves. A part of the world having no relation to our senses has no existence for him. Materialism is the offspring of an assumption by which it stands or falls, namely, that all the real is sensuously perceptible. Feuerbach says that 'the object of sense, or the sensuous, alone is really true, and therefore truth, reality, and the sensible are one.' But this assumption, that to every force in nature there is a corresponding sense, that there are as many senses as forces, stands in contradiction with the demonstrable fact that consciousness is an unfinished product of evolution. The magnetic and electrical forces escape our direct perception, and could not be proved were they not convertible into equivalent amounts of other forces which address our senses. Only for this reason, that perceptibility and reality are not coincident, is the world an unsolved problem. Were they identical, a few centuries must suffice for the discovery of all truth.

The whole biological process is a protest against the presupposition of materialism. For every grade of organization there is a different circuit of the transcendental—the unrelated part of the world. Materialism also regards man as a product of evolution; yet is so illogical as to assert that the disproportion between perceptibility and reality, which exists in the whole biological process, exists for man
no more. For materialism, the senses relate us to all external forces of nature, and with the failure of the relation fails also the force. That, however, is a *petitio principii*, implying the vicious circle: the sensuous alone is actual; there can be no supersensuous, since this would be sensuously perceptible. Contrary to this assertion of materialism, we must, therefore, rather say, as there are parts of nature which remain invisible to us, being out of relation to our sense of sight—for instance, the microscopic world—so are there parts of nature not existing for us, owing to entire absence of relation to our organism. 'The subtlety of nature,' as Bacon says, 'far exceeds the subtlety of sense and understanding.'*

The proposition that every true advance of knowledge has a vertical direction was strikingly exemplified in the last century by materialism itself, when, constrained by natural phenomena, it had to give up its own assumption. In the physiological theory of sense-perception it became experimentally evident that perception and reality do not coincide. There are rays of the sun which we do not see, vibrations of air which we do not hear, etc. And in physics it became necessary to set up the atomic theory, so that now even materialism, making use of non-sensual concepts, has broken into the region of metaphysic, whose existence it denied, since it declared the identity of the perceivable with the real. Thus, while supposing science so near its conclusion as to be only capable of peripheral extension, mate-

* 'Novum Organum,' i. 10.
rialism found itself compelled to carry on the work by a deepening of its central concepts.

In the history of science it has often appeared as if the objective horizon of knowledge was at least in sight, and as if nothing remained but to press forward upon existing lines for this horizon to be reached. Especially was this illusion excited by the development of the natural sciences, since it was believed that the only right method of research, the experimental (which certainly has led to undreamed-of advances in every department), had been found. Yet is Natural Science still very far from its goal, and already it is seen that after completion of her task new prospects will be opened in the vertical direction. Science has now herself acknowledged that when she has explained the world as it lays before our eyes, it is only a represented world that will have been explained—a secondary phenomenon, a mere product of our sense and understanding. Great, therefore, as her task undoubtedly is, it is but a preliminary labour of the human intellect; and she must disembogue into the stream of philosophy, that they may together solve the problem of knowledge. It will appear that the division of intellectual labour was only temporary, and that the opposition, amounting to hostility, between Philosophy and Natural Science, only confirms the words of Bacon*—'Tum enim homines vires suas nosse incipient, cum non eadem infiniti, sed alia alii præstabunt.'

When each has performed its special task, the reunion of the divided tendencies will result in unexpected gains, which will also lie in the deepening

* 'Novum Organum,' i. 113.
of conceptions. The question will then be further dealt with of the relation between the represented world and the real world, between things and our cognitional faculties. The inclination towards Kant, who raised this question, is already manifest in natural science, which no longer, as formerly, puts it aside as the offspring of an intellectual self-torture, but has practically justified it. Science herself is on the point of perceiving that the explanation of the empirical world is fundamentally nothing else than an explanation of the speciality of the human mind. And soon she will have nothing to object, if one says to her, with Schopenhauer: 'The being-in-itself of force, and the conditioning of the objective world by the intellect (wherewith is also connected the à priori certain truth that neither the causal series nor matter has had a temporal beginning) deprives physics of all independence, or they are the stalk by which the lotus of physics is rooted in the soil of metaphysic.'

The most distinguished representatives of science have already attained to this point, and it is with Kant they take counsel. Thus, philosophy and science are urged from different sides towards one point, where their union will establish a sure basis for further investigation of the world-problem. We know already, as a general truth, that we cannot grasp the whole reality with our present number of senses. Our external consciousness in relation to reality is quantitatively defective; it is similar to a sun, but its rays do not reach the boundaries of the all. The modern doctrine of evolution shows us

* 'Parerga,' ii. § 87.
why it is so. But we have also to consider the quality of our consciousness in its relation to the world. The latter undergoes qualitative changes in the generation of consciousness; objects are transformed in sensibility. That which in nature is vibration of ether is in consciousness light; and atmospheric vibration, sound. We thus find ourselves, as it were, at a masquerade, since we are not truly cognizant of things, but only the modes in which our senses react upon them. So that not only are there more things than senses, but the things are also different, in fact, from what they seem in representation. Whence it follows that otherwise constituted beings would also have had another world.

The result of human thought on the world-problem may thus be expressed by saying: Consciousness does not exhaust its object, the world.

We pass to the second great problem for intellect to explain: man. As the world is the object of consciousness, so is the Ego the object of self-consciousness. As consciousness seeks logically to penetrate its object, the world, and to determine its content, so also self-consciousness the Ego. In the latter undertaking, almost everything has still to be done. As regards the world and consciousness, at least the conception of materialism has been eliminated; but it is still partially maintained in regard to self-consciousness and the Ego; materialism still flatters itself with the hope of being able to reduce all psychology to physiology. But even granting that it succeeded in this, it would then stand again at the point where further progress must be vertical. The problem of mind, even were it solved in the
materialistic sense, presents immediately a new problem. The philosophy of the next century will undoubtedly include in its programme, as a pendant to the Kantian problem, the as yet scarcely pro-
pounded question, *whether self-consciousness exhausts its object.*

Such a question is just as warrantable in regard to subjective as to objective consciousness, and we have every reason to expect that in both cases the answer must be negative; thus, that the like relation exists between consciousness and the world, and between self-consciousness and the Ego. Self-consciousness may be as inadequate to the Ego, as consciousness to the world; or the Ego may as much exceed self-consciousness as the world exceeds consciousness. This is not only logically thinkable, but has also in its favour analogy and the doctrine of evolution. If nature has laboured for millions of years, by means of the struggle for existence on our planet, to raise the consciousness of the world so far that it perceives the enigmatical character of the world, and the obscurity of the metaphysical problems, it is a highly hazardous supposition that, on the contrary, the self-consciousness of nature, first kindled in man, has succeeded at the first cast, not as capability of develop-
ment, but as an already completed product, comprehending, that is to say, its whole object, the Ego. Thus, if the existence of a transcendental world follows from the theory of knowledge accepted in this century, the theory of self-knowledge which will belong to the next century will bring with it the recognition of a transcendental Ego. It is also evident that the question concerning the relation of self-consciousness
to its object, the Ego, has the same importance for the explanation of the human problem, that the question of the relation of consciousness to its object, the world, has already had for the explanation of the world-problem. The question of the soul, which has been stationary for centuries, would be advanced to a wholly new stage if it could be shown that self-consciousness only partially comprehends its object, whereby, indeed, the stumbling-block, Dualism, would be removed, and the question solved in the sense of Monism.

Meanwhile, it may suffice to call attention to this problem, in order to show that here also, when the present superficial work of psychology is accomplished, further advance will tend again in the vertical direction.

We can turn now to the second of our questions, namely, What contribution is afforded by the progress of the sciences to the explicability of the totality of things? The extent to which science is capable of development depends on the answer to this question.

Our century is characterized by the scientific contemplation of things, and so far from this period being near its close, it rather appears that the most important discoveries have still to be made in the vein which it is at present working, before a new period is ushered in by another deepening of the mine. Were the work of the human intellect always on one plane, the problem of the world must necessarily become continually clearer to us. But as every advance leads ultimately, as has been shown, to a deeper level, it follows, on the contrary, that
the world-problem must rather become always more difficult.

It is remarkable in the process of intellectual development, that every discovery of a new partial truth does not diminish, but multiplies the number of given problems. The more we know of the world, the more extraordinary it is. To him who knows least of it, it appears far simpler than to genius. Thus culture makes us modest, if not in our human relations, yet certainly in regard to the riddle of the world. The opposite of this is what we see in the sufficiency of the average mind, which is also especially distinctive of our generation. Goethe describes it as the finest happiness of man to have investigated whatever can be ascertained, and silently to revere what is inscrutable. But now irreverence in presence of the world-problem, metaphysical conceit, is greater than at any former time, and the irreligion of the masses shows that this irreverence and this conceit have infected the whole popular consciousness.

It was this sense of the inscrutability of the world-problem that Socrates expressed in the well-known, but little understood, saying, 'I know only that I know nothing.' Certainly he did not mean thereby merely that there was knowledge to which he had not attained. There would have been nothing admirable for Plato in such a commonplace. Were the sphere of the problematical uniform, i.e., if intellect had only to force its way upon the surface, then all knowledge would be attainable, given only a long enough life. Socrates rather meant that his ignorance had become greater with every addition to his knowledge, as indeed must be the case, if all progress leads into
the profound. He felt that human consciousness does not exhaust its object; that thus, from the standpoint of intellect, truth generally is not knowable. In this sense Faust says, 'I see that nothing can be known' (Ich sehe, dass wir nichts wissen können)—a sigh which may be scientifically expressed: There are not only boundaries of knowledge which are historically surmountable, but also limitations of consciousness and knowing which are only biologically surmountable.

If every solved problem produces new ones—if thus the problems are continually on the increase—then will the most learned be the most modest, and to such will their ignorance appear greatest. Still more is it the case when we perceive that every phenomenon of nature, profoundly analyzed, draws us into the impenetrable darkness of metaphysic: that at bottom the tendency of a stone towards the centre of the earth is just as inexplicable as the thought of man.

Metaphysically, there is thus no distinction of intelligibility in things: all are alike incomprehensible. It is only an illusion of the materialists, that in the scientific treatment of things all obscurity is resolved into light. Force and matter they suppose to be intelligible—spirit is for them unintelligible; therefore do they strive to resolve it into force and matter. Yet is the very opposite true. If anything is generally intelligible, it is spirit, consciousness, of which alone we know immediately, while all nature is only mediately cognizable, so far, that is, as it can affect our consciousness. All matter is thus resolved into states of consciousness. Of being, other than representation, we know nothing. To be and to be known
(\textit{esse} = \textit{percipi}) are the same thing. Spirit is thus the primary and real; matter is merely a secondary phenomenon, whose reality stands temporarily therein; and the whole material world of representation would be otherwise, were the perceptive faculty of spirit changed. It may sound plausible to deny spirit, because it cannot be grasped with the hands, and to regard matter as real, because one can knock one’s head against it; yet the reverse is true. Even Huxley, near as he stands to materialism, finds himself compelled to protest against it. ‘But when the materialists stray beyond the borders of their path, and begin to talk about there being nothing else in the universe but matter and force and necessary laws, [and all the rest of their “grenadiers”]* I decline to follow them. . . . Matter and force are, so far as we can know, mere names for certain forms of consciousness. . . . Thus it is an indisputable truth that what we call the material world is only known to us under the forms of the ideal world, and, as Descartes tells us, “Our knowledge of the soul is more intimate and certain than our knowledge of the body.”’†

It is, therefore, clear that we cannot discover truth in a one-sided investigation of the objective world; for this investigation leads us only again into the profound, and confronts us with the problem of spirit.

* The sentence in brackets, omitted in the German translation, refers to the following passage earlier in the same ‘Lay Sermon’: ‘The method or path which leads to truth, indicated by Descartes, . . . refuses to listen to the jargon of more recent days, about the “Absolute,” and all the other hypostatized adjectives, the initial letters of which are generally printed in capital letters, just as you give a grenadier a bearskin cap to make him look more formidable than he is by nature.’—Tr.

† Huxley, ‘Lay Sermons,’ xiv., on Descartes’ ‘Discourses.’
It is alike true of mankind and of the individual, that it is when we are only beginning to learn that we believe ourselves to know most. The world comes no nearer to our understanding, but the more we learn, the more wonderful and enigmatical it appears. 'The well of nature,' says Fechner, 'deepens the more, the more we seek to draw from it, our own organization itself lying in the deepest depth of it.'\* Not in spite, but just on account of, the mountain of learning which we have already reared, but whose accumulation has only magnified our ignorance, does the world appear less simple to us than to a South Sea Islander.

The history of the sciences is therefore rather a rising consciousness of the world-problem, than its solution. Astonishment — as Professor Johannes Volkheit once wrote to me—is thus not only the beginning, but also the end of philosophy.

In the development of philosophy and the sciences the process of accommodating our representations and ideas to reality is accomplished. Truth is agreement of representation with actuality. Truth is anticipated before proof—it begins with hypothesis. As a rule, the capacity of a hypothesis—its explanatory range—is over-estimated; but in this tendency there lies a right logical instinct, which conscious logic expresses by saying that the number of explanatory principles must not be increased without necessity. Thus every hypothesis should aspire to extend its range of explanation as widely as possible. But the investigator should never forget that when the truth of a hypothesis is known, every further confirmation

\* 'Zend-Avesta,' i. 426.
belongs to mere surface-working; and further, that every hypothesis has only a limited capacity. When its limit is reached further progress is on a deeper plane; and the first sign of this new period consists always in the discovery of phenomena which stand in *contradiction* to our hypotheses.

It is the characteristic of our modern science not to leave the discovery of new facts to accident, but to seek them with conscious purpose. But this should not be done only for ever to find new proofs of our theories, but rather in the quest of empirical contradictions to these theories, for thereon depends the true, the vertically directed, progress.

In regard to our understanding of the world all phenomena divide themselves into two categories, those which agree with our theories and those which contradict them. Were phenomena of the first kind only, no further progress would be possible; the process of accommodating representation to reality would be completed. Whoever believes progress to be as certain in the future, as is its continuity in the past, must admit *à priori* the existence of phenomena which conflict with our theories. To seek these, and to bore down with these, should be the task of every inquirer who is penetrated with the conviction of the intellectual progress of mankind. This is very finely expressed by John Herschell: 'The perfect observer will have his eyes, as it were, opened that they may be struck at once with any occurrence which according to received theories ought not to happen, for these are the facts which serve as clues to new discoveries.'

* 'Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy,' § 127.
It cannot be denied that our generation, intoxicated with its scientific successes, has almost wholly lost sight of this rule. Each of its imposing results in the horizontal direction strengthens the illusion that now at last has been discovered the single way to knowledge of truth. In place of the \( a \ priori \) conviction that experience must contain phenomena in contradiction to our theories, as certainly as future progress itself is certain, arises the \( a \ priori \) prejudice that such phenomena are not possible. This prejudice adopted into the programme of research would announce the arrest of science.

If we hold firm by the conviction that the human consciousness does not exhaust its object, but by ascending must gradually rank itself therewith, if we always keep before us the words of the Apostle, that human knowledge is only piece-work, then are we in the right intellectual disposition to open up continually new paths of progress. But if we revel in the enjoyment of the heretofore attained piece-work, if we begin to be enthusiastic about it, then however well we may have succeeded hitherto, the words of Bacon will apply to us: 'Imagined wealth is a chief cause of poverty, and reliance on the present leaves neglected the true resources for the future.'*

Doubtless, we should also endeavour to subject the phenomena of the world to our theories; but never, therefore, to forget that this is only a part of our task, and that it is not upon those phenomena which appeal most to our understanding, and in

* 'Instauratio Magna,' Preface.
whose agreement with our theories we are conscious of a victory of intelligence, that we can found true progress. More valuable are such facts as place our understanding in great embarrassment, for these necessitate reformation of our theories, and exalt the adaptation of our ideas to reality, which in the organic as in the intellectual region is only possible through alteration.

A negative case in opposition to dominant theories is thus the most valuable that an investigator can find. For so we can never apply the scale of acquired knowledge to that which has yet to be won, nor determine the range of the possible from past experience. A new phenomenon may easily contradict all our known laws, and yet be conformable to a law unknown to us, which suppresses the former. So, for instance, magnetism is in contradiction to the law of gravitation. That there are natural forces unknown to us, with expressions conformable to law, follows, however, immediately from the fact that the world never loses its problematical character. We must, therefore, not only admit à priori that experience will present contradictions to our theories, but we cannot even assign a limit to these contradictions; since it would be evidently illogical to assert that forces unknown to us can contribute only phenomena within a determined limit. The progress of the sciences continually widens the circuit of the possible. Instead, therefore, of always opposing impossibility to new phenomena, we should rather bethink ourselves that it is for Nature to determine the range of possibility, while we can know nothing of any impossibility, except logical and mathematical
contradictions, the wooden iron and the crooked straight line.

Modern science does not possess this candour of judgment in regard to Nature in the degree to be desired. This is especially the case with the materialists. In their darkness they imagine that the materialistic consciousness exhausts its object; the future can only bring advance along the surface; and the intellectual labour of countless future generations is to consist only in a repetition of the eternal refrain: The materialists of the nineteenth century were right. In a minor degree, this is the fault also of the learned generally. Kant has said, the words 'I know not' are not easily heard in academies. Professional scholars are always disposed to regard every new discovery as a breach of patent.

It must be admitted, however, that this limitation of prospect has its use. It is a beneficent illusion, this belief of mankind that the goal of its research is in sight. They would falter in their pursuit of truth, could they imagine it only at an illimitable distance. Truth entices her followers ever further and further towards the far-off consummation, by suggesting that her favours are immediately obtainable. Thus it is that Kepler describes his search after Truth. Now vanishing from his sight, now re-appearing and beckoning him on, she seemed to him like the coquettish Galatea in Virgil's 'Eclogue':

'Malo me Galatea petit, lasciva puella,
Et fugit ad salices, et se cupit ante videri.'

Now it is this illusion which interposes itself between human intellect and the perception that further progress is always in the direction of greater
depth, and thus arises a disposition unfavourable to new discoveries. And as the best intellectual disposition for the inquirer is the most complete freedom from prejudice, that is often expressed in the paradoxical saying that ignorance makes us fitter for discovery than learning. Even the celebrated physiologist, Bernard, notwithstanding his materialistic bias, delivers himself in this sense: 'It has often been said that to make discoveries one must be ignorant. False in itself, this opinion hides a truth. It means that it is better to know nothing than to have in the mind fixed ideas, resting on theories of which one is always seeking confirmation, neglecting everything which does not harmonize with them. This disposition is one of the most mischievous, and is eminently opposed to discovery. In fact, a discovery is in general an unforeseen relation, not comprised in a theory, for otherwise it would be foreseen. An ignorant man, not knowing the theory, would in fact, in this respect, be in a more favourable mental condition; the theory would not embarrass him, nor prevent his seeing new facts not apparent to him who is preoccupied with an exclusive theory. But we hasten to add that here is no question of elevating ignorance into a principle. The more instructed one is, the more anterior knowledge one has, the better will the mind be disposed to make great and fruitful discoveries. Only it is necessary to maintain mental liberty, and to believe that what is absurd, according to our theories, is not always impossible in nature.'*

But intellectual prejudice arising from theoretical

---

presuppositions not only suspends progress, but produces also positive ill-effects. For in our theories we have woven about the abundance of natural phenomena an ideal net, and have distributed them according to categories. Now if for the firm conviction that this system of categories has only a provisional value, we substitute the prejudice that it is complete—as the learned are much disposed to do—then must all newly-discovered phenomena adapt themselves to these categories, however alien in their nature, and though they should in fact necessitate an alteration of the system. If it is forgotten that the traditional distribution corresponds only to the material of our contemporaneous knowledge, new observations will be subjected to the old categories, and violence will often be done to them. Or should this not succeed, then are the unacceptable phenomena thrust aside with the well-known saying about 'isolated facts' proving nothing. As if in the domain of the actual there were degrees and scales of value, and only the facts of daily experience could rank as such! 'What is new,' says Bacon,* 'is usually conceived after the old fashion.' But it is to deny all future progress if we assume that all phenomena to be hereafter observed must necessarily fit into our old pigeon-holes. Suppose that Leverrier, the discoverer of Neptune, had conceived the remarkable eccentricities in the motion of Uranus, not as a new fact in itself, but in the old way, i.e., as deducible from the then known factors. Reasoning under that prejudice he would not have found Neptune, but would have ascribed other masses or distances to the already known planets, to the

* 'Nov. Org.,' i. § 34.
deplorable confusion of astronomy. Such a confusion always arises whenever new phenomena are forced into an old pigeon-hole, a proceeding which, in modern science, is unfortunately very frequent, and which always reminds me of a certain chambermaid, in whose case the same sort of prejudice found a very comical expression. Wishing to pick up as much as possible of the conversation she overheard, and hearing of the just visible star, Aldebaran, she conceived 'in itself new' information 'in the old way,' and always spoke of the star as 'the old baron' (Alten Baron). And afterwards, when the same maiden, who had always lived in the plains, was taken by her mistress to the Tyrol, and saw mountains for the first time, she fell into the like mistake, and again conceiving this new experience in the old way, asked with much surprise for what purpose they had been heaped up. Still better may those scholars, of whom Kant says that they 'never see anything but what is conformable with what they have seen before,'* be compared with the negro mentioned by Livingstone. The latter had presented him with a spoon, and taught him the use of it by drawing with it from a milk-pail. The negro, however, interpreting the new fact in the old way, took the milk out of the pail with the spoon, but then poured the contents into the hollow of his hand and drank from that.

That man in his attempt to make things intelligible should try to conceive new phenomena in the methods familiar to him is quite justifiable. But this endeavour should be hypothetical only, and should not proceed to a violent accommodation of

* Kant (Rosenkranz, iii. 5).
phenomena, as is often the case, especially in modern psychology. So it is equally right for modern science to lay stress upon the inductive method, and to demand that all philosophical speculations should start from a basis of actuality. But these catch-words are often greatly abused. We must, indeed, turn to experience for enlightenment in the first instance; but we need not prescribe to experience what it shall offer us, and what not. We are not to expect that Nature, like the idol in a pagoda, will always incline her head to our theories, but must rather recognise, à priori, the certainty that there are phenomena for which we as yet possess no intellectual receptacles. While thus turning to Nature for enlightenment, we must not forget what Kant said: 'It is something very absurd to expect enlightenment from reason, and yet to dictate to her in advance upon which side she must necessarily determine.'* This is still more true of Nature, whose mysteriousness has been only increased since human intellect has applied itself to her. We have our reason for the investigation of the phenomena presented to us; but we misuse it when in our questions to Nature we already introduce half the answer: that is, when we presuppose that experience is only to be found within our theoretical limits. We thereby announce that human reason is incapable of development. In presence of high Nature, we should be naíve, and apply to the kingdom of truth what Christ said of the kingdom of God; that we cannot enter unless we are as children.

Briefly to resume the foregoing. We have seen that consciousness does not exhaust its object, but is

* Kant (Rosenkranz, ii. 577).
in a continual process of accommodation to it. The rise of consciousness, however, multiplies and complicates the problems. *Qui accroît la science, accroît le travail.* By the rise of consciousness in the biological process, the boundary between the sensuous and the transcendental world has been continually displaced, and it will be thrust back yet further, were it even by the addition of a sixth sense. The biological development is continued by the historical development of consciousness in the like direction, if only through modification of the organ of knowledge. We stand, moreover, in the presence of an inexorable alternative: either there is a progress for the future, in which case we must always and *à priori* grant the existence of facts which contradict our theories; or there are no such facts; and then we must also deny future progress, to which, at the highest, only a labour on the level could be ascribed. The choice cannot be difficult. If we cannot discover in the materials of our knowledge such contradictory phenomena, we have in that fact the clearest proof that we have fallen into the error censured by Bacon, of having conceived what is new in itself in an old method; that is, we have forced the contradictory phenomena into the old receptacles.

Owing to the capacity for development, not only of science, but of the human cognitional organism itself, it is therefore to be expected that progress leads always again in the profound, and intellect receives perpetually further accessions of problems. And if that enigmatical form of life, man himself, still at present toddling in child’s shoes, shall retain maturity, yet will it even then be able to say with Solon: ‘Learning without intermission, I advance in age.’
CHAPTER II.

ON THE SCIENTIFIC IMPORTANCE OF DREAM.

1. The Positive Side of the Sleep-life.

In the ensuing inquiry, it will be especially and distinctly apparent that the empirical method of research, which applies itself exclusively to facts of experience, cannot lead to a successful issue unless accompanied by the purely logical penetration of the problem. It will also be shown that in the question here to be considered, mere experience must lead to false conclusions, and the right answer can only be obtained from the logical processes of thought.

The 'enlightened' sceptic regards simply the fact that on each morning he awakes from a more or less confused dream, and thence infers that 'all dreams are illusions' (alle Träume sind Schäume). To convert him from this opinion by an appeal to experience would be a quite hopeless undertaking; for it is characteristic of scepticism to allow validity only to such facts as compel attention through their frequency, the rare ones being suspected on account of their rarity. 'The sceptic,' said Jean Paul, 'disbelieves in meteorites because of the multitude of flints,' and all reports of remarkable dreams he would only meet with the usual evasions, with doubt and suspicion, with suggestions of deception or acci-
dental coincidence. There is nothing to be done with him in this way. But if not destitute of all logic, he may be easily convinced that logical investigation is requisite to the discovery of truth. Placing one's self at the standpoint of the sceptic, and interrogating his thought by the Socratic method of intellectual midwifery, it is not difficult to bring him to the confession that dreams have a greater importance than is commonly believed; nay, that with great probability we may be visited every night by significant dreams, though in the memory of the morning only confused images thereof are preserved.

First of all, it is clear that for a scientific proof that dreams can be no more than illusions, it would be necessary to show that the organic conditions of dreaming admit of no higher significance. The causes of our dreams must be exposed; and it must be shown that from these causes nothing can result but phantasms without deeper sense, and that the course of our dreams can never be influenced by other causes. It is therefore necessary to investigate the nature of the dream-organ, and the source whence this draws the material of its representations.

Physiologists indicate the brain as the seat of consciousness in sleep as in waking, an opinion certainly supported by the experience that the impressions of the daily life pass over into dream, and mingle indiscriminately with the dream-images. But already the fact that much that was forgotten emerges again from the unconscious in dream, proves that in dreaming there is activity in folds of the brain, which in waking are either functionless, or whose functions remain below the psycho-physical threshold of sensibility, that is,
do not result in consciousness. Sleep is induced by the quiescence of the nerves of sense, and of the outer folds of the brain in which they disembogue. The content of the waking consciousness is submerged; this must therefore be dependent on the activity of these outer folds. On the other hand, in sleep there is an inner waking—dream; the representations of dream, therefore, if they are to have their seat in the brain, must, at all events, lie in its deeper folds. But what the faculties are which accede to these, for the daily life unconscious, folds, can certainly not be antecedently determined.

But now, if the deepening of sleep implies the successive insensibility of the folds, that might easily extend to the cessation of function in the whole cerebral nerve-system, and the inner waking nevertheless continuing, and appearing to be even exalted, we should be obliged to transfer the dream-consciousness to another organ. But consciousness,* so far as we know, presupposing nerves, there would be nothing left but to suppose that in deep sleep the organ of dream is that nerve-system of ganglia, with the solar plexus for centre, which is still so little understood by our physiology. We know even less of the potentialities of this mysterious structure than of those of the brain. In short, physiology cannot demonstrate that the dream-organ is, from its nature, incapable of significant dreaming.

To inquire, now, into the sources of the dream-consciousness. We are capable of ideas in sleep,

* I have thus at this place and in the context translated the author's word 'Vorstellungen,' it not being essential to his meaning here to preserve the more definite rendering 'representations,' or 'ideas.'—Tr.
otherwise we could not dream at all; but the dream-images are so heterogeneous, and so distinguishable from the content of our daily consciousness, that they must come from a region from which we are excluded in our waking life. The nerve agitations underlying these images must therefore in waking remain below the threshold of sensibility, and in sleep this threshold must be displaced. It is thus from the region of the unconscious that the dream-images emerge; in sleep the unconscious becomes partly conscious, as conversely the conscious disappears.

Further, this unconscious region, thus illuminated in sleep, may lie either within our own organism or in the world external to it. In the first case, the exalted bodily sensibility, on which the dream-images depend, would be of interest only to the physician; in the latter case sleep would produce a rapport with the external world distinct from that of waking sensibility, and thence, certainly, dreams of very real import would result.

Such a rapport is easily conceivable, for we are wholly ignorant how far the threshold of sensibility is displaced in sleep. Nor can we assert beforehand that our perceptive faculty in sleep extends only to the inner organism; and it would be illogical to infer a determinate limit to the effect from an indeterminate cause, namely, from the unknown degree to which the threshold is displaced.

The external waking condition is partly subjective, partly objective; that is, it includes bodily feelings and also extends to the outer world. The question thus suggests itself, whether the internal waking of dream has likewise both these characters; in other words,
whether the displacement of the threshold can afford a relation to the outer world, by which we thus obtain information not accessible to us in the waking state.

This question must be answered in the affirmative. Physiology has long proved that consciousness is not co-extensive with the material arriving to the external senses. There is thus more relation between us and Nature than consciousness testifies. There are tones not perceptible for our ear, beams which produce no light for our eye, and substances which are indifferent for our taste and smell. Now, though our sensuous consciousness disappears in sleep, we nevertheless remain immersed in the general life of Nature, of which we are a part; sleep can only suspend the sensuous relation to Nature, but not that which is unconsciously present in waking existence. Rather can sleep alone, in displacing the threshold of sensibility, make this unconscious conscious. But it depends on the degree of this displacement how far the limits of our sense-consciousness are removed in sleep.

If sleep simply suspends the relation to the outer world mediated by the senses, but leaves that more general relation by which we are interwoven with Nature not only unimpaired, but even free to arrive at consciousness in the inner awakening: if thus, in order to produce significant dreams, it need produce no new relation, but only realize that which is already present, then not only is there no objection to the possibility of such dreams, but they are even necessitated by the mere displacement of the threshold of sensibility.

Sleep has, therefore, not only the negative side, that it suspends the sense-consciousness, but also a
very positive one, if by it a relation to Nature which does not attain to consciousness in waking life becomes available. Dream is by no means a mere remnant of the daily consciousness, but a new consciousness qualitatively different from that. It being the task of philosophy to explain what man and Nature are, and what is the relation between them, if in sleep another relation obtains than in waking, then is our modern psychology, which treats sleep and dream as mere dependent phenomena, on a false path. Sleep and waking are of equally real importance for the solution of the human enigma; they are mutually complementary, and man cannot be understood unless we take into consideration both sides of his relation to Nature. And these two sides can the less be divided that they do not really alternate, but are always simultaneously present; the rapport with Nature given in sleep is not suppressed in waking, but only retires behind the threshold of sensibility: with the occurrence of sleep it is not newly produced, but is merely raised above this threshold.

Of the positive side of the sleep-life we can only speak in so far as through it there is a change from waking knowledge. This can happen as regards the content of the knowledge, and its form. It is therefore to be inquired how far these two factors are changed in sleep.

A new content of knowledge is delivered through every displacement of the threshold of sensibility giving occasion to new perceptions. The question thus arises: Are there forces of Nature of which we become aware in sleep, but which escape the consciousness of sense? We must reply in the affirmative.
According to physiological laws, weaker stimulations are suppressed for consciousness by stronger ones. The content of consciousness is therefore furnished by the stronger stimulations, the weaker only acting below the threshold. The former being suppressed in sleep, it follows that the latter resume their sensibility. Wienholt made experiments with his perfectly healthy children in their sleep, which prove the existence of natural forces, whose stimulations are never felt in waking life. He made passes with an iron key at the distance of half an inch from the side of the face and neck of his son, fifteen years old, without touching him. After some passes the boy began to rub the place and make uneasy movements. On the other, still younger children, he made similar trials with lead, zinc, gold, and other metals, on which, in the great majority of cases, the children averted the parts so treated, rubbed them, or drew the clothes over them. The most remarkable impression resulted from the mere approach of the metal to the ear.*

Sleep, therefore, is accompanied by a perception at a distance, and announces the presence of substances which do not excite feeling in the waking man. But if these feelings contribute the material of our dreams, then, certainly, in the case of Wienholt's children, dreams must have been set up, somehow corresponding to his manipulations, and such dreams we may already with good reason designate as true. The far-feeling, by the dream-images it excited, was thus, in a certain sense, a far-sight, if only a symbolical one. Suppose, further, that Wienholt had approached

* Dr. Arnold Wienholt: 'Heilkraft des thierischen Magnetismus,' III., i. 234. 1805.
his substances from any distance towards a sensitive part of the body, the actual contact would have been temporally anticipated by feeling, supposing only that no deviation from the straight line of approximation were possible; that is to say, that this did not depend on Wienholt’s will, but on a law of Nature. With the beginning of the far-feeling the children would have been also clairvoyant in the relation of time (previsionally).

Thus sleep not only brings a new material of knowledge, but even alteration of the forms of all knowledge, time and space, is also introduced with the new content.

But to the contemplation of dreams the following consideration may lastly be commended, having reference to the as yet undetermined limit of our capacity for perception in sleep.

Ordinarily, we remember our dreams only in part; as a rule, only those which immediately precede our waking, those of deep sleep being lost to recollection. It is just in the latter, however, that the capacity for significant dreaming must especially develop itself, since the displacement of the threshold of sensibility progresses with the deepening of sleep. Remembered dreams can usually contain only insignificant phantasms, since they are either those which immediately follow the falling asleep, or immediately precede the wakening, and are thus connected with the slightest displacement of the threshold. If we are ever to have an experimental psychology, and succeed in providing deep dreams with a mark for recollection on awakening, then shall we perhaps find that these dreams are unexpectedly noteworthy, while
at present we are reduced to the exceptional cases, which are relatively so rare that the sceptic thinks himself entitled to disregard them.

Nor, assuredly, is the sceptic in any way bound to accept this expectation in place of present facts. According to the logical rule, that the burden of proof lies upon the assertor — affirmanti incumbit probatio—he has a right to insist on my proof for the assertion of even the exceptional significance of dreams. The proofs from experience, which my treatment of the subject so far has not included, must therefore at length be adduced. But since in this debatable region each particular case is open to endless possible objections to which no determinate weight can be assigned, it will be well to strengthen the foregoing arguments, which had regard to the mere probability of significant dreams, by further ones from which even their à priori certainty may be inferred.

We have got thus far, that sleep has its positive sides, and that therefore we cannot estimate its faculties by those of the waking state. It is logically conceivable that we might be 'clairvoyant' while asleep, though not so while awake. Further, the circumstance that most dreams are unremembered, whereas the perceptions of the senses in the waking state could never pass out of recollection beyond recovery in a couple of hours, cannot otherwise be explained physiologically than by a difference of the organs with which the waking and dream states are respectively connected. Deep dream must, at the least, depend on the activity of other folds of the brain than those in function while we are awake: possibly
even of another nervous centre altogether. For if we infer the similarity of the organ from that of the consciousness, the dissimilarity of the consciousness would imply the dissimilarity of the organ. And as the failure of memory in the case of deep dream can only be ascribed to the want of a common organ with the waking consciousness, the survival of memory between the light dream and waking must result from an at least partial community of organ. The withdrawal of the bridge of memory proves physiologically the change of organ; the preservation of the bridge, the community of organ. But inasmuch as it is only with the change to an organ of whose nature we know nothing that the significant dream can occur, the logical possibility of the latter must again on this ground be admitted.

But to add to this mere conceivability the à priori certainty, a double inquiry is necessary.

(a) Our remembered dreams—which are those of light sleep—we find to be without special sense and significance. Senselessness and possibility of recollection are thus given together, without the connection between them being as yet apparent. It is, however, quite possible that they are effects of a common cause, and for this cause we have to seek.

If the dreams of light sleep are remembered because the organ is partly the same as in waking consciousness, they being thus partly excited by the latter as it revives from its torpor and gradually resumes its functions, then in such dreams we have not the simple activity of one organ, but the mixed activity of two. The senselessness of these dreams is therefore to be explained by this mixture. They are
implicated with too many ingredients of the waking consciousness. The same is applicable to the dreams immediately ensuing upon sleep, the waking organ not being yet completely at rest. To this organ, and to its insufficient suppression, the senselessness is to be ascribed, not to the true dream-organ. The confused dream thus belongs to an intermediate condition between sleep and waking, whereas the dream-organ can only exhibit its unmixed activity in deep sleep. Only then can the inner waking be present as a pure condition; the disturbing causes, the fragmentary sensations and ingredients of the waking memory, which are made over to the dream-organ to be worked up with its own products, having then disappeared. During their continuance an orderly activity is not to be expected. If, then, the confusion results from the community of the organ, it follows that this confusion will disappear with the change of organ, supposing—what is yet to be proved—there is then to be any dreaming at all.

The confused dream, therefore, claims our first attention. The causes of confusion being exposed, we shall know whether the dream-organ is responsible for it or not.

(b) From that inquiry it will appear that the dream-organ in itself, free from disturbing causes, is adapted to higher productions, the occurrence of dreams in deep sleep being presupposed. It is only in exceptional conditions that the dream of deep sleep can be ascertained, yet in these much better than the dream of light sleep. For the latter can only be recalled by the defective recollection of the dreamer; whereas the former in almost its whole course is
displayed to the external observer, so much so, that the orderly activity of the dream-organ is found to increase with the deepening of the sleep. It is in somnambulism that the deep sleep exhibits itself in connection with ideas, and in sleep-walking with acts founded on ideas. It needs, then, only to be proved that sleep, somnambulism, and sleep-walking are intimately related conditions, to dispel the last objection against the possibility of orderly and significant dreams.

This relation must therefore be the object of a second inquiry. In this chapter, however, I may properly confine myself to somnambulism, since we are only concerned with the proof that deep sleep has representations (dreams). I will only remark that a false use of speech has established itself, which an individual writer can no longer avoid. According to literal meaning, *somnambulism* (*somnus*, sleep, and *ambulare*, to walk) and night-walking are not distinguished, whereas the conditions indicated by these words are in fact as different as idea and act, or, to be more precise, as a dream associated with mere speech, from one translated into acts.

2. The Confused Dream.

Falling asleep and waking up happen gradually. It is in the transition state that those dreams occur which we remember, so far as the community of the organ extends, and which are confused owing to failure in the unity of the organ. These dreams are a mixture of fragments of the daily consciousness, of functions of the dream-organ, and of images having
their origin in vegetative excitations within the organism. Excitations from three different sources thus cross each other in light sleep, and confuse the course of the dream.

For it is the peculiarity of dream, that in it all stimuli are forthwith translated into perceptual images, and hence a kaleidoscopic sequence of unordered representations is necessarily introduced. Abstract thoughts and memories immediately become imaginary percepts; the local direction of thought becomes a spacial transportation.

In waking, our thought is regulated; it receives direction from the conscious aim of the will and attention. But this order would be wholly lost if, as happens in dream, all the abstract were converted into images with apparent reality, if attention and aim failed, if every nerve excitation set up a representation of sense, every association of ideas becoming a combination of images, and every feeling connected with them asserting itself without restraint. There is in waking also a slight tendency to this continued perturbation, and as this has to be kept down, intellectual labour is attended with a strain which gradually tires the brain. But a dream, though ever so long, does not tire, no aim being kept in view, no order being attempted, and the inner consciousness being merely passive.

All these disturbing elements crowd in upon dreams with undiminished force. Every mental suggestion receives plastic interpretation as from sense. Since every nerve excitation is referred to a percept, all judgment must rest upon false premisses, and turn out distorted, as in madness. A very pro-
ductive source of confusion are the associations, according to which thoughts enter consciousness in waking as in sleep, but which in dream become pictures, running off with more vivacity, and in a purely mechanical and unrestrained way. Every idea evokes, from the immense stores of memory, others connected with itself, and the consciousness of the sleeper is assailed by whatever can be dragged in by the laws of association. As these laws include mere temporal connection, without any intrinsic relations, so that even contradictions may be thus reciprocally elicited, such merely automatic play of association must result in great confusion.

Every emotion connected with a dream-idea has free play; every gentle movement of the will is translated into action. Finally, even the outer nerves of sense are in light sleep to some extent impressionable, and their stimulations turn into dream-images. The apparatus called the 'Volumeter' makes it possible to read off the degree of psychical agitation in the dreamer by the column of water in a glass tube, the depression of the column showing that the sleeper often still perceives remote sounds with mathematical certainty, and is not dead to external stimulations.*

By externally stimulating sight, smell, and hearing, the course of a dream may even to some extent be voluntarily determined. A person on whose mouth a few drops of water had fallen, had such a lively dream of swimming that he even made the usual

* Conf. 'Ausland,' Nos. 6 and 7.
motions with his hands.* Another, having some scent held before his nose, dreamed himself in a perfumer's shop, where he became faint and unwell.† Beattie relates the case of a sleeping officer, who, by words whispered in his ear, was made to dream all the circumstances of a duel, from the first interchange of words to the discharge of a pistol placed in his hand.‡ I myself, at a time when I regularly awoke from my first sleep, used always to remember dreams filled with noises and voices, till I observed them to be occasioned merely by the circulation of the blood, which became audible by laying the ear on the pillow, like the sound of a shell placed to the ear.

Even internal agitations of the brain prolong their influence into dream. If we read deep into the night till we fall asleep, we have dreams in which we are deluged with an uninterrupted throng of words. This, the after-effect of the reading, appears thus to be no mere abstract thinking, but tends always to sensible representation, and often, on gentle stimulation of the vocal muscles, produces movements of the lips, or, by transplantation of the brain stimulus to the peripheral extremities of the ear, seems associated with a soft hearing of the read words, only first perceptible, however, when sleep has deadened the stronger auditory excitations from without.

The dream of light sleep is often determined in its course by the last representation of the waking

† Spitta: 'Schlaf- und Traumzustande der menschlichen Seele,' 278.
‡ Beattie: 'Dissertations, Moral and Critical, on Memory and Imagination, Dreaming, etc.' London, 1783, 4to.
consciousness, a phenomenon which is also often met with among the insane. *

As continual disturbers of the course of the dream are also to be mentioned those inner excitations connected with the nutritive processes, which influence the consciousness in dream, though not in waking. On this account authors who admit the possibility of significant dreams have always prescribed a light diet before sleep. Plato recommends moderation at that time, and the Pythagoreans especially interdicted beans, which, being with difficulty digestible, cause unquiet dreams. Artemidorus advises the interpreters of dreams to ask before explaining them whether the dreamer had retired to rest after a moderate or an excessive meal. † According to Philostratus, dream-interpreters would not descend to expound dreams following on the enjoyment of wine, because it was only to the temperate that the godshad imparted the gift of seeing the future. ‡ Similarly speak Pliny § and many others.

Considering all these disturbing causes together, and remembering that every excitation is translated into a dream-image, the confusion of the dream of light sleep is very explicable; and since it can only contain a succession of fragments without coherence, it is equally explicable that in the recollection of it, as a rule, only fragments are apprehended, not the whole course of the dream. As in waking one can only retain in memory an intelligible sentence, but

* Griesinger: 'Pathologie und Therapie der psychischen Krankheiten,' 74.
† Artemidorus: 'Symbolik der Träume,' i., § 7, Vienna, 1881.
‡ Philostratus: 'Vita Apoll. Thyan,' ii., § 37.
§ Plinius: 'Hist. Nat.,' x., § 211.
ON THE SCIENTIFIC IMPORTANCE OF DREAM. 43

scarcely a senseless succession of words, so the succession of representations in dream, when without intelligible connection, is hardly recoverable by memory.

Thus we cannot hope to meet the characteristic functions of the pure dream-organ in the intermediate state between waking and deep sleep. Since, however, with the removal of the disturbing causes, the course of the dream is forthwith regulated, and even, as we shall see, with an aim, it can be accurately said that all the irrational part derives from the participation of the organ which is active in waking life, while all the rational is due to the freedom of the dream-organ from disturbance. Until the organ of daily consciousness is completely at rest, the dreams connected therewith — and these are just such as we remember—are worth no more than the delirium of a fever patient or the phantasms of a lunatic. Madness and dream exhibit, in fact, many common phenomena; whence it is said in the Talmud: 'No dream without folly.'

If, therefore, our dreams are confused as long as we are in some measure awake, the dream-organ being in no degree responsible for this, it of course follows that the effect must cease with the cause; thus, that in deep sleep the significant dream must be introduced, if there is any dreaming at all in that condition. But, as the bridge of memory fails between deep sleep and waking, the existence of the orderly and significant dreaming can only be proved when either the dreamer translates his dream into acts; or accompanies it with words; or lastly, when, contrary to the rule, it is recollected. The first case happens in sleep-walking, the second in the
somnambulic state, while in regard to the third we are dependent on the reports of trustworthy vouchers.

3. The Relation of Sleep to Somnambulism.

With the deepening of sleep must diminish the confusion of the dream. As the cerebral nerve-system, sense, and brain become less sensitive, those disturbing contributions from the external, and from the remnants of the waking consciousness, disappear. The activity of the brain-organ must then be more orderly, and finally the confusion of the dream be completely removed. But perhaps the dream itself then ceases; perhaps these disturbing impressions are the sole material of dream; and deep sleep is not only without representations for the memory, but is altogether dreamless. This has often been asserted, and the question deserves investigation.*

Now, here it is somnambulism that helps us out of the difficulty. Induced by the treatment called ‘magnetic,’ but also spontaneously, it is a condition of

* 'Hazlitt, in his “Round Table,” has made an assertion which, if true, would go far to prove that the mind is perpetually active in sleep. He states that if a person is suddenly awakened at any given time, and asked what he has been dreaming about, he will be at once recalled to a train of associations with which his mind had been busied previously. This experiment has been tried upon myself, and I have tried it upon others, and I am satisfied from the result, as well as from reasoning, that the statement is not correct. In some few instances the persons would recollect ideas passing through their minds, but in a great majority of cases they had no recollection whatever of any such circumstances.'—Macnish: ‘Philosophy of Sleep’ (Glasgow, 1830), p. 81. On the supposition of another organic basis of the true dream-consciousness, the above experiment could not be expected to succeed, and its failure is no argument against a consciousness in deep sleep.
sleep which is also connected with an inner waking. In this state, however, a regulated series of representations are introduced. The consciousness of the somnambulist has no longer rapport with the external world through the external senses; the suppression of sensibility through them is at the greatest attainable point; instead of which a new, and at the same time orderly, rapport is established. From the self-consciousness of the somnambulist the 'I' of daily life has disappeared. It embraces, indeed, the material of this daily life, and that wholly, and thus coherently, not only in fragments, as in ordinary dreaming. But this total material is not referred to the 'I' of inner waking, but to another and foreign 'I.' The identical subject splits itself, therefore, into two persons. Somnambulism thus shows us that our daily consciousness does not exhaust its object, because to it that remarkable and radical prolongation of the Ego, which emerges in somnambulism, remains hidden, and belongs to the so-called 'unconscious.'

This somnambulism proves that the dramatic sundering of the Ego, which in ordinary dream only occurs phantasmically, has its truth in the real nature of man; that the daily consciousness includes one person only of our Subject, while to the other person emerging in somnambulism, the first appears as non-Ego. Mention of this relation is only made here in order to point out that the unity of the Subject of these two persons makes their severance by an insurmountable barrier highly improbable. Light sleep is an approximation to the state of somnambulism; the faculties of the latter will thus undoubtedly, if but exceptionally, be manifested in the former, and
the belief in significant dreams, which has never been wholly extirpated, follows naturally from the fact that somnambulism differs only in degree from sleep. Hence these two conditions evince their relationship in a whole set of consonant phenomena, pointing also to the relationship of the psychical functions which are active in them.

The external condition of sleep-life is similar in the ordinary dream and in that of somnambulism. In the latter, the ball of the eye is directed inwards and upwards, and this appearance, as Aristotle noticed, is incident also, though less markedly, to common sleep. Ammianus Marcellinus cites it as an opinion of Aristotle, that as dream-images begin to occur, the eyes again look out straight in front;* but later observation has not confirmed this. Also that somnambulists accompany their visions with words, is only an extension of the experience that movements of the lips, if not articulate speech, often occur in sleep; and even in waking, when we are in a state of abstraction, the muscles of speech are frequently excited.

The phantasms of the dreamer, if different in regard to their content from the dream-figures of the somnambulist, are nevertheless so greatly related thereto, that if in the transition state both become mixed, they cannot be distinguished from one another; and hence the constant danger of confounding ordinary phantasms with [true] visions in the utterances of somnambulists. In the exceptional cases where somnambulists remember their visions after awaking, they themselves relate them as dreams, proving that the inner consciousness is similarly affected by the representations of both conditions.

* Ammianus Marcellinus: Histor. xxi. 1.
ON THE SCIENTIFIC IMPORTANCE OF DREAM. 47

It has, moreover, been observed that as well the natural as the artificially induced somnambulism happens more easily by night than by day;* and according to Dupotet and others, actual sleep is the best condition in which to excite somnambulism.† Sleep is thus a mild sort of somnambulism; it lies midway between that and waking life. It is only by regarding somnambulism as a deepened or exalted sleep that we attain to a right comprehension of its phenomena; whereas a wholly false conception of it arises if we consider it, with Wirth,‡ as a mediate condition between sleep and waking. If somnambulists can undergo the most painful operations without feeling them, if in general they can be awakened by no pinching, cutting, burning, or the loudest noise, what is thus evinced is the highest extension of the insensibility of ordinary sleep, which, according to Wirth’s views, ought more to resemble death.

This opinion of Wirth requires no special refutation, inasmuch as all the phenomena of somnambulism present themselves as an exaltation of analogous phenomena of sleep.

Thus in both conditions we find certain modifications of the faculty of memory, differing only in degree. Dream drops the material of daily consciousness, retaining only fragments; while, on the other hand, there is an exaltation of memory in the frequent recollection of long-forgotten scenes of our life. The somnambulist preserves the material of the daily consciousness in its entirety, and often shows

† Dupotet: ‘Traité Complet de Magnétisme Animal,’ 179.
an incomprehensible memory of the past. Conversely, from dream we awake with defective recollection, from somnambulism with none at all. Exceptions are rare in relation to waking; on the other hand, dream in this also shows itself an approximation to somnambulism, that it often supplies the bridge of connection for the material of the somnambulic consciousness.

In both states the visions are often only allegorical and symbolical representations of bodily or psychical condition; in both, also, we find the phenomenon of the dramatic severance; and it is another indication that sleep is a mediate condition between waking and somnambulism, when somnambulists, after the cessation of the magnetic condition, are still in sleep able to see their 'guardians' and 'guides,' the products of the dramatic severance.* The boy Richard said that though he was to come no more into the somnambulic state, yet he would see his guardian spirit in ordinary dreams, when necessary for the direction of his health;† and Strombeck's Julia, one of the purest examples of natural somnambulism, said that for some time after the cessation of this condition she would still be able voluntarily to put herself into a slumber in order to learn what would be beneficial to her.‡

But even isolated somnambulic conditions are introduced, and again are terminated, by the natural sleep; and when the aptitude for somnambulism has

* Gorwitz: 'Richard's Natürlich-magnetischer Schlaf,' 133, 139.
† Gorwitz: 'Idiosomnambulismus,' 192.
altogether ceased, sleepiness and yawning often occur at the usual hours of its former occurrence.*

The analogies are thus very numerous, and since somnambulism always appears as a deeper sleep with exaltation of the phenomena of the latter, it is self-evident that the curative power which physicians value in sleep belongs in a still higher degree to somnambulism. It is incomparably more refreshing than ordinary sleep, as it is incomparably more intense; somnambules praise it with enthusiasm, and on awaking from it feel themselves wonderfully strengthened. Julie described her natural magnetic condition as a precious sleep, an hour and a half of which was worth six of common sleep.† Thus only is to be explained the successful prescription of a somnambule, to place her in a nine days' trance for the cure of her lungs.‡

If, now, sleep and somnambulism differ only in degree; if, further, the somnambule is not living merely in a world of phantasms, but stands in a veritable rapport with the external world, the dreams being true—even the apparently dead in this condition are notoriously aware of all preparations for their funerals, without any feeling of sense—it is not to be doubted that our everyday sleep likewise, if very deep, can be accompanied by true dreaming; and since the organ of external sense fails, it would be wonderful if just the limits of sense-perception were maintained. Horace's 'Post medium noctem, cum somnia vera' has thus more truth than our school

† Strombeck : 'Geschichte,' sc. 30.
‡ Schopenhauer : 'Parerga,' i. 275.

VOL. I.
wisdom will admit, and we cannot doubt that if we could remember our deep dreams, we should meet in them all the so-called wonders of somnambulism.

But sleep is not only the negation of waking, but has its positive sides, as appeared in the foregoing by different characteristics which somnambulism contains on an augmented scale. Sleep and somnambulism, which are not diverse in nature, can therefore not be treated as different by the inquirer, as usually happens with very poor results. The phenomena of common sleep are magnified, and therefore more distinct, in somnambulism. On the other hand, the phenomena of somnambulism are relatively rare and are much contested. For one physician who has observed and studied somnambulism, there are twenty others who have seen nothing, and studied nothing of it, and who roundly deny everything, because it does not fit into their materialistic systems, and degrades the whole physiological psychology, with its vivisections, to a science of a much lower rank, one in which not causes but merely concomitant appearances are discovered. Thus it is that it has still required—and that a hundred years after Mesmer—the public representations of magnetizers to bring official science again to this point. But if now it is shown that the disputed phenomena of somnambulism are exhibited in elementary form in everyday dreaming, we thereby obtain a very certain measure of their actuality, and enlightened scepticism will be obliged to take in its sails still more than it has up to the present.

But sleep-walking also, as a third form of the sleep-life, in which visions are translated into acts, sensible excitations being transferred to the motor nerve
system, cannot be arbitrarily separated from ordinary
dream, but must be included in the comparative
study.

Briefly to recapitulate our results up to the present,
it appears that the common dream, so far as it is
remembered, contains almost without exception only
unsignificant phantasms. But this is due merely to
the activity of external disturbing causes; in deep
sleep these causes cease, and hence the effect, the con-
fusion of the dream, must fall away. This cannot be
proved directly, because the memory fails; but is
indirectly evident from the thorough-going relation
between dream and somnambulism, which not only
brings a succession of regulated ideas, but also an
orderly rapport with the outer world, and is thus a
veridic dream.

No one to whom all this is clear will make any
further opposition in principle to the numerous
reports of remarkable dreams, an opposition which is
unworthy of the truth-loving inquirer. It is very
easy to assume the deportment of an enlightened
sceptic and 'esprit fort' by joining in the vulgar cry
that dreams are nonsense; it is, however, quite un-
scientific to infer the character of all dreams from
our fragmentary recollections of those which are con-
stantly perturbed from without. This will become
more completely evident if—as there is reason to hope
—experimental psychology succeeds in making the
dream of deep sleep accessible to memory.


That dream has had few philosophical results is
not really its own fault, but that of its interpreters.
The content of our dreams is difficult to catch, and more difficult still is it to understand this content, since dream is a cluster of intricate problems. This intricacy explains the two extreme modes of regarding dream—that of the old philosophers, and that of the modern dream-contemner. One who knows that in dreams highly important phenomena are to be discovered, if only in a fragmentary form, is disposed to the superlative view by the very difficulty of understanding them. Thus the ancient Greeks. Others, again, will take the disorder of the presentations for mere presentation of disorder, and will deny to dream any scientific significance whatever. Thus the moderns. Extreme opinions are never true. We have here to hit the mean between the ancients and the moderns, between over-estimation and under-estimation.

As in the Bible, so among the old philosophers, many dreams were ascribed to a divine origin. Zenophon and Plato often speak in this sense. Aristotle thought, indeed, that only to the wise are illuminative dreams sent by the gods;* but he does not deny them. These opinions are easily explained by their connection with the oracle-cult and temple-sleep among the Greeks. The ancients understood, with fine intelligence, that there is no essential distinction between the ordinary and the somnambulic sleep, the phenomena of the latter being only an exaltation of those of the former. It is, therefore, not strange that these philosophers scorned to contribute experimental proofs of clairvoyance in dream from private life. The modern reader certainly misses this evidence;

* Aristotle: 'On Prophecy in Dream.'
but a Greek author could content himself with a mere reference to the oracles, from which, as Plato says, it was generally known that Greek State polity had derived the highest advantage.

The Epicureans were singular in their view that dreams were thoroughly insignificant phenomena. Gradually for inspiration was substituted the faculty in the human soul itself to lift the veil of the future; and Cicero (‘De Senectute’) believed that chiefly in dream the soul reveals its divine origin (Atqui dormientium animi maxime declarant divinitatem suam). Mahomet made his disciples relate their dreams every day, and believed himself also to be inspired in dream; and we find both opinions prevalent in the Christian epoch among the fathers of the Church (Tertullian, Augustine, etc.) and the laity.

That in our time, not reckoning a brief reaction at the period of the Romanticists, the pendulum of opinion has swung round so much to the opposite side, is due to the predominance of physiological methods of research over metaphysical and speculative theories of cognition, whereby the psychologies of waking and of dream were alike much affected. The result, especially in the materialistic schools, has been the prejudice that all psychical phenomena are merely the operation of organic conditions—cum hoc, ergo propter hoc; whereas it is apparent from the least consideration that physiology can never succeed in showing more than the mere parallelism of psychical and organic conditions. This parallelism, however, is not in the least decisive of the question which condition is cause, and which effect, or whether possibly both conditions, as between each other, stand
in no causal connection at all, but are both effects of a common cause; just as the appearance of the stars is neither cause nor effect of night, but their parallelism is produced by the setting of the sun.

Dreams are nonsense (Träume sind Schäume)—that is still the current opinion. But even were dream in fact only conditioned by bodily states, it would still merit scientific investigation; we could conclude from the effect to the cause; and at least medical science, which in this respect might learn from old Hippocrates, should concern itself with our dreams.

But, in fact, the study of dream frees us much more thoroughly from that physiological prejudice than can the investigation of psychical functions in waking life. The neglect of this study, arising from the under-estimate of the dream-life, has left a deficiency in the preparations for definitive judgments; the material of empirical facts is still much in need of being supplemented. We must therefore devote a long inquiry into the mere analysis of the phenomenon, that we may not be misled to premature explanations, and deserve Fontenelle's reproach: 'Avant d'expliquer les faits il est nécessaire de les constater; on évite ainsi le ridicule d'avoir trouvé la cause de ce qui n'est point.'

If, however, in the following there is more than a mere aggregation of empirical facts, the purpose is not to deliver a definitive explanation, but only to indicate the direction in which empirical investigation of dream-life must be instituted, in order to obtain a scientific result. It will thereby appear that dream has not merely a scientific importance in general, but one peculiar to itself, and that it fills a vacuum, so
that the analysis of waking consciousness cannot be substituted for it. It will further be shown that metaphysically, also, dream has a real value, and is a door through which we can penetrate into the obscurity of the human enigma. In dream are exhibited other forces of the human Psyche, and other relations of the Psyche to the whole of Nature, than in waking life; and those inquirers stand in their own light who treat dream as a mere chapter of physiology. By missing the peculiar importance of dream, they renounce to their own disadvantage the data which it offers for the nearer determination of the human Psyche, whose definition is still in such confusion. As yet a whole third of our existence has scarcely been realized for metaphysics; an omission the more improper in that the psychology of waking life is unadapted to this phenomenon of dream, which teems with specific characteristics. To judge dream-life merely by its analogies with waking life is an actual contradiction, for the foundation of the former is an entire negation of the consciousness and self-consciousness which are the basis of the latter. Just from this fact is derived the hope of attaining to a rational doctrine of the soul, for the question what the soul is, evidently demands a preliminary inquiry, whether soul and consciousness are identical. Now, this prior question is answered in the negative by dream, which shows that the concept of soul exceeds that of consciousness, as, perhaps, the attractive force of a star exceeds the sphere of its light.

The investigator of dream-life is distinguished, then, from the physiologist who identifies consciousness and soul; and from the metaphysician who,
while believing in a metaphysical substance behind consciousness—variously called thing-in-itself, or idea, or will, or the unconscious—yet seeks no metaphysical kernel of individuality beyond the sphere of the self-consciousness, but holds that the individual Psyche is rooted immediately in the thing-in-itself, the individual having therefore a merely phenomenal significance.*

The physiologists are very summarily disposed of, since, as already said, at most the parallelism of bodily and psychical conditions can be proved, from which a causal relation is far from following. But on the supposition of such a relation, dream could still be studied with advantage by physiologists, as from its special characteristics they might strengthen and multiply the evidence for their views. A detailed refutation of these physiological views can the more

* In strict metaphysical propriety, any distinction of the soul, whether mediatelly or immediately, from real or noumenal being, leaves it only a phenomenal significance. A transcendental consciousness—such as the author infers from the evidence adduced in this work—would still be phenomenal, though in another order or degree. The metaphysician who limits individual consciousness to the mode at present known to us—who denies transcendentalism—can have no other warrant than a supposed absence of positive evidence of other states of consciousness; as a metaphysician he has no right to pronounce upon this question, as it does not concern the distinction between noumena and phenomena, but the possible range of the latter. On the other hand, he is clearly within his right in pronouncing, rightly or wrongly, on the question whether a noumenal definition of individuality is at all possible, and in maintaining that subjectivity must ultimately be sought in the Absolute Spirit, of which all consciousness can only be phenomenal, or manifestation. It is very necessary to keep clearly in view the distinction between the noumenal and the transcendental; a positive knowledge of the latter being always possible or conceivable; whereas the 'thing-in-itself' can never be object in or for consciousness, however we may exalt our conception of the latter.—Tr.
easily be dispensed with, as the most distinguished psychologists—Maudsley, Fechner, and many others—hold them to be completely fallacious.

Those phenomena only of dream-life are scientifically applicable which can be recovered on waking. But of what we dream our memory includes only a slight fragment, and thus there is a great quantitative disproportion between remembered and forgotten dreams. Moreover, the dreams preceding and following deep sleep are penetrated by the materials of the waking consciousness, becoming filled with images foreign to this, as sleep deepens. The signature of the memory diminishing with the depth of the sleep, while, on the other hand, the special peculiarity of dream accedes in the same proportion, there results also a great qualitative disproportion between remembered and forgotten dreams. This is certainly the chief reason for the contempt of dreams, which is almost justified as regards the generality of remembered dreams, but not as regards others, lost as a rule for memory, but of which sometimes fragments at least survive in waking consciousness. The majority of intrinsically remarkable dreams are unfortunately lost; even when we wake from them immediately, only obscure ideas and feelings can be traced, and the deepest degree of sleep, that induced by magnetism and hypnotism, is followed by complete oblivion.

But from the fact that the representations of deep sleep are obscure upon awakening, it does not follow that they were so also during the dream. 'I rather conjecture,' says Kant, 'that these may be clearer and more extensive than even the clearest in the waking
state; for this is to be expected from a being so active as the soul, when in complete rest from the outer senses, although corporeal sensation being absent at the time, on awaking there is a failure of the association by which the continuity of personal consciousness is sustained. The acts of some sleep-walkers, who in such condition sometimes show more intelligence than at other times, though recollecting nothing thereof on awaking, confirm the possibility of what I surmise concerning sleep.* It is thus only in the waking reproduction, not in the production during the dreaming, that those representations are obscure. And somnambulism is the evident confirmation of this.

But for the scientific significance of the dream-images it is necessary, not only that they should be clear, but that they should also be regulated in some way, not be a mere confused medley, as the contemners of dreams assert. Now, the fact is that long dreams often exhibit as logical a concatenation of incidents as could come before us in the waking state. It is also the fact that in other dreams the law of causality seems to be completely in abeyance, or at least that the causation is being constantly broken, the play taking a collateral, or a wholly new direction with interruption of all continuity. Therefore this continual disruption either belongs peculiarly to the nature of the dream-organ—in which case dream could have but slight scientific interest—or, referring the order in the representations especially to the dream-organ, we must regard the almost constant aberration as a constant disturbance of the course of

* Kant: 'Träume eines Geistersehers.'
the dream, and must show the cause of it. In light sleep such disturbances continually occur. The susceptibility of the senses is not completely suppressed; not only peripheral excitation, gleams of light notwithstanding closed eyelids, impressions of sound, of pressure, of skin-sensibility, are conveyed to the brain, but also internal irritations of the organism due to the greater activity of the vegetative functions in sleep. Such stimulations are referred by the dream-organ, often with strong exaggeration, to a more or less adequate cause, transposed into outer space, that is converted into a perceptive image. This is the same process from which, in waking also, the represented world takes its rise, peripheral stimulations being referred by the *à priori* causality function of the understanding to an object in external space.*

So long, therefore, as outer and inner stimulations can be conveyed to the brain, the course of dream cannot be regular; there is a continual metamorphosis of the dream-images, which pass over into one another, and all logical concatenation fails. This must be all the more the case, inasmuch as dream, as Volkelt† very well demonstrated, has the characteristic of not enduring abstract conceptions. All thoughts which

* In a mere allusion to the idealistic theory of perception, the author is not to be reproached for the apparent inconsistency of postulating 'peripheral' stimulations of an already objective organism as the occasion for the construction of a world under the form of space. But it may be as well to remark that the inconsistency is apparent only. If in 'perception' the subject is active, and in fact constructs its objects, the result being a world thoroughly conformable to the law of causality, the very occasion of this process must have its external representation in the completed product, implying the objectification (representation) of the subject itself, as organism, or body, in a world of space.—Tr.
† Volkelt: 'Die Traumphantasie.'
introduce themselves immediately take on a sensuous form; what is in waking an association of ideas, is in dream an association of images.

If in dream I find myself in an empty room, which I recognise as the dwelling of a friend, the latter forthwith steps in at the door; if I find myself in the company of a friend, and some peculiarity of his dwelling occurs to me, instantly I am transported to it.

Attention and consciously directed reflection have no place in dream; rather are we completely passive, the images being evoked according to the laws of association with as little regularity as in waking also, when perhaps we are lying on the edge of a wood, and turning over the leaves of half-forgotten memories in the book of our life without regard to date.

The peculiar nature of the dream-organ, and therewith the scientific importance of dream, can be first recognised when such outer and inner stimulations of the organism cease, and association no longer intrudes fragments of memory into the dream-world. The pre-condition is a very deep sleep, wholly excluding the outer senses from the outer world, and breaking down the bridge of memory.

The diversion or breaking off of the series of representations thus always results from disturbing causes. On the other hand, it cannot be proved from deep sleep itself that the self-determining dream-organ produces an orderly series, there being as a rule no recollection; but quite apart from somnambulism, it can be proved from a certain species of very remarkable dreams, even of light sleep, in which a dream-play of long duration is wound off, while, nevertheless,
the possibility of interruption is excluded by want of time. These dreams offer a very good opportunity for observing that the undisturbed dream-function produces coherent sequences of representations.

I select an instance from my own experience whereby the apparent contradiction in the above concise expressions will at once explain itself.

I dreamed that I entered a friend's room, and to my surprise found it divided by a curtain waving down from the ceiling to the floor. We conversed together for some time without my putting any indiscreet question; but he guessed my curiosity, and saying he would show me what the curtain hid, he stood up and raised it. This caused a noise like the unrolling of a starched material. At the same moment I awoke, just as my brother was crumpling together a stiff paper, occasioning the same sound that I had heard in my dream. In a single case such a coincidence might of course be regarded as accidental, but this sort of dream is so frequent that that explanation appears quite inadmissible.

This dream was thus elicited by a peripheral excitation of the hearing, while yet the dramatic preliminaries to the dream climax, corresponding to the excitation, apparently preceded the latter. Beginning and end of the dream are therefore contemporaneous, or are so closely compacted that we can regard as contemporaneous the lapse of time during which the dream-organ functions according to its own nature, a disturbing cause being excluded for want of time. Since, however, the course of the dream took up a not inconsiderable time, at least apparently, and was thoroughly coherent, the elicitation of co-ordinate,
dramatically accentuated sequences may be regarded as of the nature of the dream-organ. The contemmers of dream, therefore, direct their reproaches to a false address. Disturbing causes are always throwing impediments in the way of the natural orderly activity of the dream-organ, which takes them up with the result that it seems to be in the nature of the dream-organ itself to piece together heterogeneous, senseless fragments in a mosaic patchwork.

It is, moreover, to be observed that the high scientific importance of this species of dream appears also from the disproportion between the short, vanishing point of time, and the multitude of representations crowded into it. Such dreams afford almost a sufficient proof of Kant's doctrine of the ideality, i.e. of the merely subjective validity of the time-form; but even for the transcendental realist, for whom time has both subjective and objective validity, they prove at least this much, that subjective time does not coincide with objective, that different beings may have different scales of time, and that even one and the same being has not always the same scale.

Kant has shown that all the content of perception clothes itself in the cognitional forms of time and space. But it now appears that these forms are only unchangeable for the sensuous daily consciousness, and that sleep provides a new measure of time and space. In this respect, also, has sleep a whole positive side of its own, and thus the psychology which takes for its object only the waking man, must necessarily miss the correct definition of man. Philosophy deals with nature as perceptible by sense, with man as he perceives by sense, and with the relation between
the two; on this basis its systems have been erected, yet the world and man are still problematical. But now that sleep is seen to have positive sides, a philosophical system has to be founded on the basis of the dream-life, since therein man and nature alike appear otherwise than in waking life. When this hitherto wholly neglected third of our existence has been likewise turned to philosophical account, we may perhaps hope that the nature of the world and man may be thoroughly explored.

The interruption of the orderly dream-function by outer or inner irritations suggests the comparison with insanity. As the dream-function is in itself quite orderly, and confusion is only introduced by disturbing fragments which the dream cannot reject, so it has long been recognised by physicians that the thinking of the insane appears quite logical as soon as one knows from what presuppositions it starts. The lunatic errs in his premisses, e.g. in his fixed idea, not in his consequences. He often refers mere inner feelings to outer causes, which to him, just as to the dreamer, acquire the actuality of sense, and dramatically influence him; but his feeling is real, he reacts quite logically upon it, and his insanity lies only in his projection of it into the external world.

The psychical activity of the dreamer is thus not in itself absurd; it first becomes so when disturbing matter is presented to it from the bodily sensibility; and so also the insirmity of the insane is not really insirmity of intellect, the appearance of which is only produced by the intellect having to operate with the false material imposed upon it by nervous sensibility. Only from this necessary distinction between in-
intellectual disease and brain disease is to be explained the frequent observation that insane persons in their last hours exhibit full clearness of consciousness, apparently then first recovered. Lemoine* knew an insane person who suffered under an hallucination, but attempted to explain, quite in a scientific manner, the images hovering before him. His senses erred, therefore, but not his intellect.† It is so also in our dreams; and we must all the more recognise the rational concatenation of ideas, when we see that the dreamer endeavours to weave into the sequence the most heterogeneous and disturbing feelings, as well can be done.

Confusion is thus the rule of dream from the standpoint of memory, but not from that of the dream-organ; it is only in appearance that the criterion of memory makes the confused dream the rule, and it is only in appearance that the absence of that criterion makes the orderly dream exceptional.

The vegetative functions of the organism, respiration, circulation of the blood, digestion, etc., still introduce disturbance into the course of the dream, even if peripheral excitations have ceased to be possible. The sensibility to internal stimulations is even heightened during sleep, such coming then to be perceived which could not penetrate the waking consciousness owing to the prevalence of peripheral excitations. Dream is therefore very unquiet after meals or after excesses in drinking. Therefore the Brahmins and the Greek

* Alb. Lemoine: 'Du Sommeil.' Paris, Baillière, 1855, § 211.
† Probably no physician would consider this a case of insanity. It is like the celebrated case of Nicolai. The accepted test of insanity with hallucination seems to be the acceptance of the latter as objectively real.—Tr.
philosophers always prescribed temperance, which alone makes us susceptible to significant and divinely-inspired dreams. Of this opinion were also the priests of the temple of Æsculapius.* And Cicero says,† 'It cannot be doubted that the number of true dreams would be greater were we to fall asleep in a better condition; but filling ourselves with wine and flesh, we have obscure and confused dreams.' So in the Middle Ages, Agrippa von Nettesheim and others recommended fasting with fumigations and anointings.‡ And to this day, Indian parents prepare their children by fasting for prophetic dreams. This is founded on a true insight that the dream which is characteristic of the dream-organ, and is determined by its pure activity, does not occur as long as the internal vegetative irritations of the organism exercise a disturbing influence.

It becomes a question, therefore, whether this pure dream ever occurs at all. Hitherto we have only got so far, that the dream-organ exercises a pure function in the measure that sleep gains depth and the disturbing excitations diminish. The peripheral nerve-extremities of the external senses are the first to obtain rest, the brain remaining still sensitive to internal irritants; and in so far as these may arise not only from the regular internal functions of the organism, but also from the same when irregular and diseased, dream has a great importance also for medical diagnosis, even if the diseased motions are only represented by symbolical images.

* Philostratus: 'Vita Apollonii,' i., c. 6.
† Cicero: 'De Divinatione,' i., § 29.
‡ Schindler: 'Der Aberglaube des Mittelalters,' 247.
The relaxation of the nervous system thus proceeds from without inwards, and if this process went on without arrest, insensibility must finally extend to the central nerve-system, the brain; but this stage would only be reached in the deepest sleep. Now as physiologists certainly know little about the causes of sleep, neither can they determine the limits of its operation. But here, again, the magnetic sleep is instructive, as this has very often been utilized for the most painful operations, no feeling whatever being conveyed to the brain.

If, now, in the deepest sleep of which the organism is capable, we should still dream, though without subsequent recollection, and if the brain-life has no participation in this experience, the importunate question arises (as already remarked), with what organ then do we dream, if not with the brain? As long as the brain is active, it is easy to speak of a dream phantasy; but since this can only be thought of in connection with the brain, or at least as accompanied by phenomena in the brain, this phantasy, regarded as the cause of dream, is wholly excluded by the dream of deep sleep. In the remembered dream, the activity of the phantasy is easily to be traced; it cannot, however, be regarded as the peculiar cause of dream, because, as Aristotle remarked, it is to be placed within the dream,* and because the significance of the dream-images rises with the depth of the sleep, whereas the contrary must be the case if we think of the phantasy as in connection with the brain-life.

* Aristotle: 'On Sleeping and Waking,' k. 2.
Upon these grounds, and further, because dreaming even in the deepest sleep is a fact which, though in natural sleep seldom, in magnetic sleep always, can be proved, it follows that Schopenhauer was completely justified in admitting a special organ of dream. The phenomena of magnetic sleep and the statements of somnambules suggest a connection of the dream-faculty with the ganglionic system, a connection easily explaining the fact that dream can be remembered only in the degree to which the brain-life is still participant; and that the absence of memory of deep and magnetic dreams results from the transfer of the faculty of conscious representation to another seat, of which the brain on awaking consequently knows nothing.

Schopenhauer says that in dream, somnambulism, and related conditions, we obtain the objectively represented intuition by a different organ than in waking, that is to say, not by the outer sense, and he speaks therefore of a special dream-organ.* Fechner also is of opinion that the psycho-physical scene of our dreams is different from that of the impressions of waking life, and that 'with the temporal oscillation of the psycho-physical activity of our organism from waking to sleep is connected a spatial [local] oscillation or circulation ... such, that during waking the stage of dream remains wholly beneath the threshold, while that of waking impressions is somewhere and somehow above it; in sleep, on the other hand, the stage of waking life sinks quite beneath the threshold, while that of dream is elevated relatively to this completely submerged stage of

* Schopenhauer: 'Über Geisterseher.'

5—2
waking life, and with the occurrence of actual dreaming rises even above the threshold of consciousness. . . . Were the psycho-physical stage of dream and waking consciousness the same, dream would be a mere continuation of the latter (as happens when the eyes are closed [without sleep [during the stillness of the night], and material and form would be the same, whereas it is quite otherwise.' Finally, Fechner agrees with the view that in light sleep both stages can be animated, and he thence explains the confusion of our dreams, there being no partition wall between the stages, but interaction between the two.* These considerations, and the proof adduced by Reichenbach, that the seat of the odic brain-activity shifts according as we sleep or are awake, the odic intensity predomi-
nating in the large brain during waking, in the small brain during sleep,† favour the view that in sleep an organ is active, which in waking is either functionless, or whose functions remain below the threshold of sensi-

* Fechner: 'Revision der Hauptpunkte der Psycho-physik,' 286-288.
† Reichenbach: 'Der Sensitive Mensch,' i. 409, ii. 627.
ON THE SCIENTIFIC IMPORTANCE OF DREAM. 69

the brain, but that it passively receives them from the Unconscious. Experience alone, however, not à priori theories from this standpoint, can decide of what faculties we may be capable by means of these new avenues.

The material and formal difference of our dream-representations from those of waking thus only necessitates the hypothesis of new avenues of perception; but if we consider the fact of absence of memory on waking from deep sleep, that suggests an actual transposition of the stage of consciousness, and thus an interchange of functions between the brain and the ganglionic system.

Now, as this forgetfulness after waking resembles a change in the sense of personality, all the more as this alternation of consciousness contains a material and formal difference of representations, so in fact the change of sleeping and waking presents a temporally successive dualism of personalities, locally comprehended in the human subject.

But this problem belongs no longer merely to physiology, for these proceedings in the ganglionic system are to be regarded only as concomitant, not as causative phenomena, and so the scientific investigation of dream passes into the domain of metaphysic, so far as the latter has the nature of man for its object. The attempts heretofore to attain to a definition of man by analysis of the waking consciousness have led to no undisputed results. Now, however, it is shown that we have a second consciousness, and therewith is discovered, not only a second way to solve the problem of our interior life, but also the cause of the former miscarriage.
When the proper dream-world arises, when the brain-life is reduced to latency, or, at least, is restricted to vegetative functions, then we have a phenomenon to which none other approaches in importance, since it signifies nothing less than that man is a double being, though not in the dualistic sense of the old doctrine of the soul. It is thus dream, not waking, which is the door of metaphysic, so far as the latter deals with man.

If we have two consciousnesses, rising and sinking like the weights in a scale, then from the investigation of both can we first attain to the definition of man; and the opinion that the human psyche possesses other faculties in dream than in waking, that it, moreover, stands in other relations to the whole of Nature, appears at least logically admissible. If, further, the disappearance of the cerebral consciousness does not signify the disappearance of consciousness generally, then it becomes clear that we can alternately pass through two different states of consciousness, that is, in alternation of waking and sleep. But this is only possible if both states contemporaneously exist, though unconsciously to each other. Potentially, the dream-consciousness must be given even in waking, and the waking consciousness in dream, just as the light of the stars is present when the sun shines, but is first visible when that sets. One may then well say that scarcely any fact is of more remarkable import than that one subject can embrace two persons.

By attending only to the remembered content of dream, we do little more than supply a chapter to physiology; whereas the gravamen of dream lies in
ON THE SCIENTIFIC IMPORTANCE OF DREAM. 71

the problem before us, 'for which the weighty and primary fact is that we dream; the content of dream being of secondary consideration. According to the logical rule, the actuality of a fact proves at the same time its possibility. Ab esse ad posse valet consequentia.

But in the case of facts which appear to us unintelligible, we are always prone to convert this into an impossibility for intelligence—an illogical proceeding—in order to prove their non-existence. Now, since the assertion of man's double nature may certainly be considered one of the strangest, and is, certainly, the most important inference from dream-life, further elucidation is indispensable. It will thereby appear that this assertion does not imply a return to the dualistic doctrine of the soul, but that in existing philosophy we have already the germs of a monistic doctrine.

There are two problems, with which all philosophizing is concerned, the World and Man. Into the one our consciousness seeks to penetrate; into the other, our self-consciousness. Philosophizing upon the world has taken the following course: it started with an investigation of the object, and ended by perceiving that the subjective condition of cognition must be investigated first. At this point stands Kant. As result it was recognised that consciousness does not exhaust its object. This is the quintessence of the philosophical theory of cognition. Our thinking on the world ends with contradictions, whose solution lies in a region not illuminated by consciousness. Here, now, is the point where Science, Physics, Physiology, and the doctrine of Evolution flow into
philosophy. Theoretical Physic shows that not only our practical powers, but even the number of senses, are inadequate to objects. All operations of Nature depend on minute processes, which escape our senses, in the interior of bodies, and for the understanding of which we have set up the atomic theory as a provisional hypothesis. Finally, the doctrine of evolution shows why the world exceeds our consciousness. Consciousness is a product of evolution, and, in the biological process, has emerged from constant and painful struggle for existence; it grows up, therefore, to its object, the world, only by degrees, as a creeping plant to its support. So also are we men, as the highest existing products of evolution, yet limited by our whole organization to relations with only a fragment of the whole of Nature; the transcendental world beyond our senses remains closed to us.

Thus, in brief, is the relation of consciousness to the world-problem characterized, as has gradually become historically clear.

We pass to the other problem, man, to consider the relation of self-consciousness to that. It is at once presumable that self-consciousness also does not exhaust its object; a presumption which rises to certainty when we consider that self-consciousness is only a special case of consciousness, not different in itself, but merely by its direction—that is, by its object. This object is ourselves. Thus what is true of consciousness generally must also be true of its special case. Self-consciousness must be capable of evolution, of exaltation, thus gradually illuminating the outline of its object. In the biological process, self-consciousness appears first with man. The
biological evolutionary capacity is illustrated by the individual. The child still speaks of itself in the third person; it is by degrees that its consciousness reaches this inner object, and thus becomes self-consciousness, which cannot sooner arise; as the sunbeam in space first gives light when it is intercepted by an object. But were this light in us all not so weak, there would have been no need for the inscription on the temple at Delphi: 'Know thyself!' Nor would Plato have said that most men only dream, the philosopher alone strives to be awake.

Self-consciousness, this latest bloom of the biological process, has in man only its first foundation, and its content is therefore exceedingly poor. Analyzing this content we find, as Schopenhauer has shown, the primacy of will in self-consciousness. In all our sentiments, feelings, and desires, we recognise ourselves as a willing substance, and also the identity of this substance through the whole course of our lives. That this will is blind would imply the assertion that self-consciousness exhausts its object—a very disputable proposition. On the other hand, it is clear that in self-consciousness we can find only a blind will as object; for were we even cognizant in our metaphysical substance, yet could this knowing not in itself be known as object, just as the eye can see everything but itself. This could only then be the case if man had two consciousnesses, one of which had a greater sphere than the other. Only thus would a self-mirroring take place. If we, as metaphysical beings, comprehended ourselves as earthly beings—as a larger circle is concentric to a smaller one—we could then, to a certain degree, be even cog-
nitionally an object to ourselves. The content of self-consciousness could become an object of consciousness, and, with Descartes, we could propound as a fundamental fact: ‘I think, therefore I am.’ But even then we could know ourselves only wholly on the side of will; the will would still have the primacy in self-consciousness; and cognition, as fact of our inner being, would be only a secondary phenomenon to the will, cognizable itself only as turned outwards; but would be no apprehension of our metaphysically knowing part. Our earthly consciousness can thus be object to our metaphysical eye, but the latter cannot see itself; and still less can our earthly consciousness, as the smaller circle, embrace the larger circle of the metaphysical consciousness, though the converse may well be. As will, on the other hand, we are in both circles identical, and the earthly consciousness can only apprehend this will by the direction which brings it to self-consciousness, and, at the same time, it cognizes this will as apparently blind.*

* Some attempt to explain the above rather difficult passages may not be unacceptable to the reader. The object in self-consciousness is the will-character or disposition as motive power in thought and action. This is the only self cognizable by the merely reflective consciousness. But the very cognition of the will-self proves that the whole self is not cognized, since therein is also this very act or faculty of cognition, which cannot be at the same time its own object. To the self-consciousness of the ‘earthly’ (i.e., the physically organized) man, the ‘will’ thus necessarily seems ‘blind’ (without conscious intelligence), just because we have to divorce it, as object, from cognition. So that by the merely reflective self-consciousness, consciousness itself can never be discovered in that which is its only possible object. But it may be quite otherwise if this object, the self, is more than it can appear, as object, to the reflective consciousness. Its two moments, will and cognition, would then be reunited in a direct cognition of the external, derivative, ‘earthly’ self, which
It is evidently an error of omission that the question has not been investigated, whether self-consciousness exhausts its object, or is not rather capable of evolution, reaching the limits of its evolution only with the limits of its object, as also consciousness would be no longer capable of evolution were it to comprehend the whole world, peripherally and centrally. A presentiment of the true state of the case has certainly existed in religious and philosophical systems. The doctrine of the soul proves this. But the latter does not indicate the true relation, as well because it divides man dualistically into body and soul, as that it conceives the earthly self-consciousness as a function of this immaterial soul—in which process the eye would see itself, the knowing subject would be its own object—instead of simply saying that we ourselves are in part unknowable, transcendental, that we can only know ourselves in the will, whereas to a transcendental self-consciousness the knowing substance can be object only as directed outwards, as empirical consciousness.

In modern philosophy and science this doctrine of the soul has therefore been abandoned, but 'the child has been shaken out with the bath.' It is understood, indeed, that soul and consciousness are not identical

it would envisage as both volitional and cognitional. And yet the metaphysical self would be under the same disability of cognizing its own cognitional part; and thus the 'blindness' ascribed to Will, as thing-in-itself, by Schopenhauer, is shown to be a necessary illusion of self-consciousness; or, rather, it is thus shown that this apparent blindness is no proof of the fact. Behind self-consciousness is the incognizable consciousness itself; incognizable, however, to the same mode of consciousness, or personality, but a quite possible object to another, higher, more interior and comprehensive consciousness of the same subject.—Tr.
concepts, and the advance to the doctrine of the Unconscious is quite consequent. But science knows only the physiological unconscious, philosophy only the metaphysical unconscious, and that not in an individual, but in a pantheistic sense. Hegel calls it Idea, Schopenhauer, Will; with Hartmann it has two attributes, Representation and Will. Germs of a rational doctrine of soul in the sense above indicated are to be found in Kant and Schelling, but hitherto they have only been turned to advantage in Hellenbach's 'Individualism.'

That these germs have now to be developed is an anachronism, since this task should have been appointed for the reformation of the old doctrine of the soul, which it would thus have followed in historical succession; and its accomplishment would then have preceded the rise of the pantheistic systems, to the considerable advantage of the latter. That these should have been the immediate solvents of the old doctrine of the soul was thus a leap, the intermission of a stage, with the result that the new systems could not penetrate the popular understanding. The latter has appropriated only their negative side, and is gone over to the comfortable materialism which flatters its lower instincts, but which owes its apparent clearness only to its dryness, and must draw after it the destruction of our culture, unless belief in metaphysic can be revived.

The modern pantheistic systems are all rooted in transcendental idealism. They have in them tendencies, however, partly to transcendental realism (which with Hartmann has even a systematic foundation), and partly to metaphysical individualism. Pure
idealism must logically leave out of account the question whether there is a metaphysical quintessence, even in the individual as such. That Schopenhauer should have even suggested the problem: how deeply the roots of the individual Will extend into the thing-in-itself? was in direct opposition to the idealistic foundations of his system. If time and space are the *principia individuationis*, having no validity for the thing-in-itself, then is the thing-in-itself One only, which in the world of phenomena is, as it were, optically divided into a multiplicity of individuals, by means of the representational forms, time and space. For idealists there can be no third interposed between phenomenon and thing-in-itself; man as individual is not of metaphysical nature. But at all events the question of the metaphysical root must have been as applicable to every atom as to man. That Schopenhauer raised this weighty problem at all can only well be explained as an inclination to individualism, of which his later works contain several indications, as already his earlier view of Nature shows him disposed to realism. Schopenhauer would doubtless in time have given up his pantheism in favour of Individualism, and his Idealism in favour of a Transcendental Realism; it being natural to every philosopher, his term of life corresponding; himself to bring to maturity the latest germs in his system, instead of leaving their further cultivation to the historical development of philosophy.

If self-consciousness does not exhaust its object, then corresponding to the transcendental world must be a transcendental Ego; and our sense of personality, by which we know ourselves as mere willing beings,
does not coincide with our whole Ego. The sphere of our earthly personality would be only the smaller circle included in the larger concentric circle of our metaphysical subject, and the earthly self-consciousness would not cast its beams to the periphery of our being. Secondly, the question would arise whether the metaphysical subject is in itself unconscious, or only relatively so, as lying beyond the illuminated sphere of the earthly self-consciousness, so that this Unconscious would be only an Unconscious for us as earthly persons.

The thought that individuality extends its roots down into the thing-in-itself is thus at least logically admissible, and it is therefore a neglect of philosophy to put aside this possibility, and to proceed forthwith to the definition of the 'thing-in-itself.' The actual proof could certainly only be afforded by experience; but empirical proofs of supposed impossibilities are not sought for, and it may be that it is only for that reason that they have not been found.

But from the mere conception of metaphysical individualism may be obtained indications where and when such empirical proofs must be discovered, and of what character they must be. For the terminology to be adopted in this inquiry a few words will suffice. The whole circuit of the human being shall be designated Subject. As in regard to the world, we distinguish between the transcendental—beyond consciousness—and the empirical—within the reach of consciousness, so in regard to man, the empirical Ego, the person with self-consciousness, is to be distinguished from the transcendental Subject, which could only be named a transcendental Ego, if to this Subject
not only willing, but also knowing and self-consciousness are to be ascribed.

If, now, the earthly self-consciousness, like the consciousness of the world, were capable of evolution, then would the boundary-line between the empirical Ego and the transcendental Subject be no impenetrable partition-wall, but from the standpoint of biology would be instable. But from the instability of this boundary-line would follow the à priori probability that the germinal dispositions to extension of self-consciousness beyond its temporary limits must now and then come into action, so that intermediate conditions of empirical and transcendental psychology could be observable.

The thread which holds together the personal self-consciousness consists in memory. Without this, personal identity in self-consciousness would be suspended; the feelings would be only experienced in isolation: there would be no survey of them in their succession. Were there no bridge of memory from feeling to feeling, self-consciousness must begin anew with every new feeling, and be again dispossessed with every following one. The feeling of personality would be atomically broken up, as pearls on a string roll asunder when the string is unknotted. Now from this it becomes à priori certain, that occasional functions of these germinal tendencies of transcendental psychology must be associated with modifications of memory of some sort. It is thus of the greatest importance to track the functions of memory in all our psychical conditions, especially in the very abnormal ones. It is of course implied that an occasional displacement of the boundary between trans-
cendental and empirical Ego must be connected with corresponding changes in the state of empirical consciousness and self-consciousness.

Should man be a double being in the sense indicated—which duplicity would not be dualistic, but only, as it were, optically produced by the boundary-line between conscious and unconscious—these two halves must be related to each other like scales of a balance; in proportion as the empirical Ego retreats, must the other advance, and conversely; as the stars optically disappear with the sun’s rising, and appear with his setting. Corresponding to this relation will be the proportionate content of memory.

On the given presupposition of metaphysical individualism, we can next say, proceeding deductively, that it can only be proved from psychical conditions in which the retirement of empirical consciousness and self-consciousness would facilitate the emergence of the transcendent Subject. Such conditions we live through experimentally in dream, and they fill a whole third of our existence. Dream thus offers most chances of proving a metaphysical individuality. The dream-world is therefore the empirical basis for individualism; as the external world should afford the explanation of the world-problem, so the dream-world that of the human problem.

It would be a mere misunderstanding to refuse to the world of dream the dignity of an empirical basis for the reason that its presentations are illusions and not reality. They have, at any rate, the reality of appearances, and, moreover, for the present purpose it is absolutely indifferent whether dreams are
illusions, which as to their content they certainly in most cases are; but we are concerned solely with the mere facts that we dream, and that in our dreams, be their content what it may, definite functions are recurrent which have no analogy with waking life.

Individuality being presupposed, something can be affirmed à priori, even concerning the quality of these functions. If, that is, our Subject falls apart in two halves, the empirical and transcendental, only apparently, in consequence of the limits of the self-consciousness which does not exhaust its object, these halves cannot possibly be of wholly heterogeneous natures, therefore their modes of functioning cannot be thoroughly different, and both must be related, as well in knowing as in willing. Thus the functions to be expected from the transcendental Subject, which were above determined only with reference to the occasion of their appearance, may now in some measure be defined with reference to their quality, and indeed so, that now no objection can be made to our speaking of a transcendental, willing, and knowing Ego. From the conception of individuality, yet further à priori determinations may be deduced. For our cognition, for instance, all things act in time and space, and our whole conceptual understanding of Nature depends on expressing the modes of action of things in relations of time and space. Now had these cognitional forms of ours no validity whatever for the transcendental world and the transcendental Ego, the capacity of consciousness and self-consciousness, for evolution in the direction of the transcendental, could not be at all thought as possible, and as the two worlds would be separated by an insuperable chasm,
we could never set foot in that region which exceeds our empirical consciousness. These representational forms of time and space, however, even though cor-responding to transcendental reality, might have a signification for our transcendental Ego other than for the empirical; it is still, at least, not decided à priori that the same measure of time and measure of space must avail for the transcendental as for the empirical Ego. If, therefore, any psychical conditions whatever could be shown in which there is cognition with modifications of time- and space-relations, this again would warrant the inference of a transcendental-psychological function.

Our demands on the transcendental Ego thus constantly gain in definitude. Whether it exists remains, provisionally, still undecided. But if it exists we are logically safe in deductively pronouncing on what occasions, that is, in what psychical states of the empirical Ego, it can come to the front and exercise its functions, and, approximately, how it must exercise them. The result up to the present may be comprehended in a few words; if a transcendental Ego exists, it will be manifested in the following determinations as facts of experience:

1. A duplication of human consciousness.
2. An alternation of the two states of consciousness in inverse proportion to their intensity.
3. Modifications of memory in connection with the alternation of the two states.
4. Functions of knowing and willing in both states, and that probably under
5. Modifications of the measure of time and space.
We at once see that it is the dream-world which
presents the facts of experience thus theoretically resulting from the conception of metaphysical individuality. The dream-world, therefore, must contain the solution of the human enigma—if that is possible at all. Of course only an exact analysis of our dreams could afford the reliable inductive proof that metaphysical individuality is the true solution of this enigma. Provisionally, however, and deductively, has been shown the great probability that the enigma will in this way be solved. For if the logical consequences of a presupposed hypothesis are found to agree with facts of experience, the truth of the hypothesis is in the highest degree probable.

If there is a transcendental Ego, we stand with only one foot of our being in the phenomenal world. But then it is also clear why the relations of man to this phenomenal world, as known by self-consciousness, cannot offer the solution of the human enigma. Only by including in our regard the other side of our being, can we succeed in that. In waking, we know nothing of this other side; the empirical self-consciousness does not comprehend the transcendental, but is comprehended by it. In sleep is given at least the negative condition for filling the empirical self-consciousness with a transcendental content, which content would present itself as dream-image. It is true that even the empirical Ego must encounter influences from the transcendental world, inasmuch as the two Egos are indeed identical; but for the empirical consciousness such influences remain below the psycho-physical threshold of sensibility, the susceptibility being first exalted in the degree that the influences from the empirical world cease; the
threshold is depressed, that is to say, new material of sensibility is afforded, and the deepest sleep brings with it even the greatest susceptibility for such influences, which otherwise remain unconscious.

But though in this we have evidence of the capacity of the empirical self-consciousness for evolution, we are not to suppose that even in deepest sleep the psycho-physical threshold is altogether removed. We have the germ only of this evolution in us, and even in trance, ecstasy, and similar conditions, it may not be susceptible of a development which would correspond to a biological process of millions of years. This consideration alone should suffice to restrain us from an over-estimation of dream. To which is to be added that transcendental influences, if they are to be perceived by us, must always clothe themselves in the cognitional forms of the empirical consciousness, and thus have only the value of allegories, symbols, perhaps only of emblems. That is the case also with supersensuous conceptions. If, for example, we cannot represent time otherwise than under the figure of a line which we draw, that is because supersensuous conceptions, to be represented to us, must clothe themselves in the forms of our consciousness. In like manner dream-images of true transcendental content can be only symbolical, that is, true only somewhat in the sense in which it is true that time is a line.

In the alternation of sleeping and waking we have thus identity of Subject and difference of persons. We are at the same time citizens of two worlds, and it is merely the alternate latency of each consciousness that presents this contemporaneity as mere suc-
cession. Still more distinctly than by the mere alternation of waking and dream, this duplication of our nature is revealed in that remarkable class of dreams in which our Ego is dramatically sundered. If in dream I sit at an examination, and do not find the answer to the question put by the examiner, which then my next neighbour, to my great vexation, excellently gives, this very clear example shows the psychological possibility of the identity of the Subject with the contemporaneous difference of persons. The example is even more remarkable than if it were our real double nature, for in this dream the two persons even know of one another, and that not in regard to their identity, but in regard to their difference. To object that a possibility in dream does not prove real possibility would be to misconceive the problem. The psychological actuality, thus possibility, is not in the least affected by the example being taken from the mere world of dreams, and the illusory nature of dream here disparages only the one circumstance that the two persons of the Subject stand opposed to one another perceptibly. Thus the existence of a transcendental Object is proved by the cognitional theory of consciousness; the existence of a transcendental Subject by the cognitional theory of self-consciousness. There the world of sense is the basis from which we must proceed, here, the dream-world. Only upon the basis of this dream-world can an empirical establishment of the doctrine of soul be undertaken, this endeavour being hopeless as long as we limit ourselves to the analysis of the waking half of our being, even were the strife between physiologists and psychologists at length decided in
favour of the latter. Logical speculations alone will no more establish the doctrine of the soul than the mere emotional needs of believers, in which only the wish is father to the thought.

If philosophy, starting from the empirical facts of dream, shall have accomplished this task, then, and first then, will be the time for it to attack the further question, whether that which is proved in dream in relation to the Microcosm repeats itself in a larger sphere, in relation to the Macrocosm. The question then will be whether there is an all-embracing World-Subject, dramatically sundering itself in millions of suns and milliards of beings in space and time.
CHAPTER III.

DREAM A DRAMATIST.

I. The Transcendental Measure of Time.

The more familiar we are with the history of philosophy, thus the slighter our hope that its study will yield us new data for the solution of the world-enigma, the more does that enigma oppress us. This suggests the review, within experience, of such phenomena as have not yet been duly explored, and from which the metaphysical information latent in them as not yet been sufficiently extracted. This undertaking is additionally justified in that modern philosophy has abandoned the construction of *à priori* systems, and knows that only in facts of the phenomenal world should its foundation be laid.

Such insufficiently utilized facts of experience are indeed numerous, but even the existence of most of them is contested, because they do not belong to every-day experience. Inferences from these can therefore for the present have no cogency.

But we are about to discuss a phenomenon which enjoys the advantage of being wholly undisputed, without having been as yet sufficiently turned to account. This phenomenon belongs to the world of dream. It has, in the first instance, a high interest for Æsthetic and Psychology; but on closer inspection
it will be found also to contain, and at the same time to solve, a metaphysical problem.*

The poetical endowment of our fantasy in dream has found many admirers; but it has been supposed that this endowment is only of a lyrical nature. This is plainly said by one of the latest inquirers in an otherwise highly interesting work:† 'The aesthetic value of dream lies not in its dramatic, but in its lyrical element.' The following investigation will give chief prominence to the dramatic element of dream. Then, when we seek the force of this dramatic endowment, we shall attain to some important consequences in which physiological psychology will be reconciled with the spiritualistic doctrine of the soul with regard to the legitimate ingredients of both.

To evince the importance of the dream phenomenon under investigation, a short preliminary remark is necessary. It was, I believe, Helmholtz who first proved experimentally that the transmission of excitations in the nervous system requires a measurable interval of time. There is therefore a moment of suspense before consciousness comes into play. From an excitation in the peripheral nerve-extremities of our external senses, to the occurrence of a sensation in the central organ of the nerves, the brain, a time elapses, only indeed the fraction of a second, but with a duration proportionate to the intervening extent of the conducting nerves. Fechner, moreover, has shown in his 'Psychophysics' that the antecedent conversion of the excitation in the brain into a con-

* Volkhelt: 'Die Traumphantasie,' 189.
† Muller's 'Archiv für Anthropologie,' 1850, 71-83.
scious act of sensibility claims a further particle of time, so that there is here also another moment of suspense.

The functions of the nervous system are therefore associated with a definite measure of time. Since consciousness is awakened by means of an organic basis, the nervous system, it is subject to the delays occasioned by the limited celerity of the nerve-excitations. Within a given time only a definite number of sensations is possible. Thus if with the change of object an uninterrupted succession of atomic processes is completed in a minimum of time, the translation of physiological changes into consciousness does not represent them individually, but the resulting sensation is the equivalent of their completed sum. We perceive nothing of the continual growth of a blade of grass, but first such amounts as we can compare; the transitory intervening stages being lost for our consciousness.

If, however, it could be proved from experience that in certain conditions consciousness takes place without any retardation, it would follow that such acts of consciousness are no longer associated with the material substration of the nerves to which the restrictive interval of time is due. And if, further, we can comprise in a minimum of time such a succession of representations as in the normal state would require hours, it is incontrovertible that this sort of consciousness is independent of the nerve-apparatus, whose functions are, as experimentally demonstrated, much more restricted in point of time.

If, now, there were beings whose measure of time in perception did not coincide with our own, but
was longer or shorter, it would follow that the world would be wholly otherwise presented to them than it is to us. We could never come to an understanding with such beings concerning objects; we should not believe that we and they were living together in the same world; each class would probably impute illusion to the other. This question has been examined by a very circumspect writer, Ernst von Bär, the forerunner of Darwin, and he has shown that the phenomenal world would undergo a powerful transformation, were our measure of time in perception altered.* The same inquiry has been taken up more recently by Felix Ebertz;† so that I was able to found upon these works an attempt at a scientific solution of the question concerning the intellectual nature of the inhabitants of the planets.‡ As certainly as we are able to say with regard to the physical nature of such inhabitants, 'other worlds, other beings,' so certainly, with reference to their intellectual nature, can it be said, 'other beings, other worlds.'

We mark off a space of time according to the number of changes in Nature comprised in it. This number for us, however, depends upon our subjective celerity of apprehension, that is to say, upon our congenital scale of time. A definite sum of perceptions thus produces for us the appearance of a definite duration, the foundation of which is this our congenital scale. Were the whole process of Nature quickened or retarded, with a corresponding change in our measure of time, we should be quite unaware

* Ernst von Bär, 'Reden,' i. 257.
† 'Die Gestirne und die Weltgeschichte.'
‡ 'Die Planetenbewohner,' 114.
of the fact, and should not believe our life to be longer or shorter than in our present condition.

But though these arguments cannot be logically assailed, the reader will be prepared with the objection that the conceivability of a thing does not prove its reality, and would have to be satisfied that such hypothetical beings, with an altered scale of time, actually exist upon other stars. Now the question, whether there are such beings, admits of an answer, without the necessity of a journey to other worlds than our own.

We are ourselves such beings, and that not only exceptionally, but during a whole third of our existence, that is to say in dream, as also in certain other conditions.

Collecting facts of experience, we may in the first place refer to the observations of physicians who have stupified their patients by narcotics. Usually this condition lasts only a few minutes; but on awaking the patient believes a much longer time to have elapsed. This can only result from the fact that in the narcotic condition he has experienced a much longer succession of representations than would be possible for the normal consciousness in the same duration. He has changed his scale of time, whereas in memory the represented series is judged according to the normal scale, and is thus believed to have occupied as long a time as would be required upon that scale. Now as such a process is impossible according to physiological laws, it necessarily follows that this process is not a physiological one, in other words, consciousness is here independent of the nervous system.
A like change of the temporal scale, with the disappearance of normal consciousness, is also incident to indulgence in opium and hashish. The faculty of representation is thereby enormously accelerated. One of the strongest opium-consumers, De Quincy, says that under its influence he had dreams of ten, twenty, thirty, even up to sixty years' duration, some even which seem to exceed all limits of human experience.* A hashish-eater described a dream to Hervey,† in which the representations ensued with fabulous rapidity. 'It seemed to me,' he said, 'as though something had been taken away from my brain, like a spring from a watch, and that the whole chain of my recollections ran off of themselves with unheard-of rapidity and incoherence.'

At the approach of death, also, the extraordinary exaltation of memory, connected with a change in the measure of time, has been frequently observed. Fechner‡ relates the case of a lady, who fell into the water and was nearly drowned. From the moment when all bodily movements ceased till she was drawn out of the water, about two minutes elapsed, during which, according to her own account, she lived again through her whole past, the most insignificant details of it being represented in imagination. Another instance of the same mental action, in which the events of whole years were crowded together, is described by Admiral Beaufort from his own experience. He had fallen into the water, and had lost (normal) con-

* Spitta: 'Schlaf, und Traumzustände der menschlichen Seele,' 203, Anmerkung.
† Hervey: 'Les Rêves et les Moyens de les Diriger,' 480.
‡ 'Zentralblatt für Anthropologie und Naturwissenschaft,' Jahrgang 1863, 774.
consciousness. In this condition 'thought rose after thought, with a rapidity of succession that is not only indescribable, but probably inconceivable by anyone who has not himself been in a similar situation.' At first the immediate consequences of his death for his family were presented to him; then his regards turned to the past; he repeated his last cruise, an earlier one in which he was shipwrecked; his schooldays, the progress he then made, and the time he had wasted, even all his small childish journeys and adventures. 'Thus travelling backwards, every incident of my past life seemed to me to glance across my recollection in retrograde succession, not, however, in mere outline, as here stated, but the picture filled up with every minute and collateral feature; in short, the whole period of my existence seemed to be placed before me in a kind of panoramic review, and every act of it seemed to be accompanied by a consciousness of right and wrong, or by some reflection on its cause or its consequences. Indeed, many trifling events, which had long been forgotten, then crowded into my imagination, and with the character of recent familiarity.* In this case also, but two minutes at the most had passed, before Beaufort was taken out of the water.

We thus possess a faculty, ordinarily latent, of looking into the inner world of our Ego, with a measure of time other than that of our waking life. In other words, the normal self-consciousness does not exhaust its object—the Ego. This normal self-consciousness with its physiological measure of time is only one form of our self-consciousness. Man has a double

* Haddock: 'Somnolism and Psychism,' p. 213.
consciousness, the empirical with its physiological measure of time, and a transcendental with another measure of time peculiar to itself. Now, that this transcendental consciousness forthwith emerges, as soon as the empirical is set to rest, is most strikingly evinced by our dreams. Since the transcendental measure of time is a characteristic incident of these, it is evident that the physiological scale is inapplicable to them.

Jean Paul, in his 'Musæus,' makes the short but striking observation, that the dreams of one night would require more than a day for their narration. In fact, we can always convince ourselves that the number of our dream-representations are temporally so crowded together as often to seem to fill enormous spaces of time; yet, notwithstanding the rapidity of their passage, without the loss of one of their moments. As in waking we estimate our subjective time-consciousness according to the number of representations experienced, on which, indeed, rests the conception of duration, so also in dream. Since, however, the dream-representations ensue according to the transcendental scale of time, we dream of long episodes of life, journeys, etc., a whole flood of representations precipitate themselves upon us; and in the briefest period we believe ourselves to have lived through months, and that not first in the ensuing recollection, but in the dream itself. Thus we carry over into dream the waking habit of estimating duration according to the number of perceptions upon the physiological scale of time, while our consciousness is, in fact, then subject to the transcendental scale. Thus one, intoxicated with hashish, believes himself
to live through tens of years; confirming what has been already said, that the process of Nature might run off at any rate whatever, without our detecting the difference, supposing only a corresponding change in our measure of time.

These comparative scales of time are very finely illustrated by a Turkish fable, related by Addison:*

'A Sultan of Egypt, who was an infidel, used to laugh at a circumstance related of Mahomet in the Koran†, as what was altogether impossible and absurd. But conversing one day with a great doctor in the law, who had the gift of working miracles, the doctor told him he would quickly convince him of the truth of this passage in the history of Mahomet, if he would consent to do what he would desire of him. Upon this, the Sultan was directed to place himself by a large tub of water, which he did accordingly; and as he stood by the tub, amidst a circle of his great men, the holy man bid him plunge his head into the water, and draw it up again.

'The King accordingly thrust his head into the water, and, at the same time, found himself at the foot of a mountain on a sea-shore. The King immediately began to rage against his doctor for this piece of treachery and witchcraft; but, at length, knowing it to be vain to be angry, he set himself to think on proper methods for gaining a livelihood in this strange country. Accordingly he applied himself to some people whom he saw at work in a neighbouring wood. These people conducted him to

* Spectator, No. 94.
† The story from the Koran is here given after Addison's narrative.—Tr.
a town that stood at a little distance from the wood, where, after some adventures, he married a woman of great beauty and fortune. He lived with this woman so long that he had by her seven sons and seven daughters. He was afterwards reduced to great want, and forced to think of plying in the streets as a porter for his livelihood. One day, as he was walking alone by the seaside, being seized with many melancholy reflections upon his former and his present state of life, which had raised a fit of devotion in him, he threw off his clothes with a design to wash himself, according to the custom of the Mahometans, before he said his prayers. After his first plunge into the sea, he no sooner raised his head above the water but he found himself standing by the side of the tub, with the great men of his court about him, and the holy man at his side. He immediately upbraided his teacher for having sent him on such a course of adventures, and betrayed him into so long a state of misery and servitude; but was wonderfully surprised when he heard that the state he talked of was only a dream and delusion; that he had not stirred from the place where he then stood; and that he had only dipped his head into the water, and immediately taken it out again.

There is a passage in the Koran in which Mohamed relates what might suggest the suspicion that he had substituted hashish for wine.

'It is there said* that the Angel Gabriel took

* I copy this account from the Spectator, where, however, the note is appended: 'No such passage is to be found in the Alcoran, though it possibly may be in some of the histories of Mahomet's life.'—Tr.
Mahomet out of his bed one morning to give him a sight of all things in the seven heavens, in paradise, and in hell, which the prophet took a distinct view of, and after having held ninety thousand conferences with God, was brought back again to his bed. All this, says the Alcoran, was transacted in so small a space of time, that Mahomet on his return found his bed still warm, and took up an earthen pitcher (which was thrown down at the very instant that the Angel Gabriel carried him away), before the water was all spilt.'

Turning now to the analogous phenomena of ordinary dream, it will be seen that this fable has, in fact, discovered with great insight a characteristic of the condensation of impressions by means of the transcendental scale of time: viz., the dramatically pointed succession of the representations. For we find the same distinctive mark in a certain sort of dreams, by no means rare, and which experience can always verify, since they can even be artificially induced. It had already been remarked by the elder Darwin, in his 'Zoonomy,' that external sensations affecting the consciousness of the dreamer, and thereby awakening him, can nevertheless be the occasion of a long, spun-out dream, interposed in the brief moment between the sensation and the awakening.* But the awakening thus externally caused is, at the same time, internally motivated by the dramatic climax of the dream. Thus, for instance, Cartesius was once awakened by a flea-bite, and, at the same time, from a dream which concluded with a duel in

which he received a stab in the same part of his body.

Even during sleep our sensory nerves are exposed to various external irritants. When these impressions are transmitted to the brain, it reacts, as in waking. It is in the nature of the brain to refer these impressions to causes in external space. Thus arises the phenomenal world, in waking, as in dream; only that in the latter the cause is taken from the imaginary world, and in place of one cause, a whole chain of causes is made to bring about the sensation. In this chain it is that Dream appears as a dramatic artist, and as well in that, as in the process of condensation connected therewith, may be compared to the magician in Addison's Turkish fable.

Some characteristic examples will serve for illustration. Hennings* relates the dream of one who had fastened his shirt-collar too tight, and had a painful dream of being hanged. Another† dreamed of a journey in an American prairie, and of an attack by Indians, who scalped him. He had drawn on his night-cap too tightly. Another dreamed that he was attacked by robbers, who laid him on his back on the ground, and staked him to it through his teeth.‡ On awaking he found a straw between two of the latter. Gregory relates that another took a hot bottle to bed with him, and then dreamed of an ascent of Etna, in which he found the heat of the ground almost unbearable.§

* 'Von Träumen und Nachtwandlern,' 238.
† Lemoine: 'Du Sommeil,' 129.
‡ Scherner: 'Das Leben des Traumes,' 233.
§ Scherner: 'Das Leben des Traumes,' 234.
The distinctive peculiarities of these dreams—their dramatic character, and the condensation of representations—are still more significant when the exciting cause is some external accident suddenly occurring. To begin with a dream which has become historical. Garnier* relates that the first Napoleon was asleep in his carriage when the infernal machine exploded under it. The report roused him from a long dream, in which he was crossing the Tagliamento with his army, and was received by the cannon of the Austrians; so that he sprang up with the exclamation, 'We are undermined!' and awoke. Richers‡ mentions the dream of a man who was awakened by a shot fired off near him. He dreamed that he had become a soldier, had suffered unheard-of hardships, had deserted, was taken, tried, condemned, and finally shot. This whole dream was thus the work of a moment. Steffens.§ relates: 'I was asleep in a bed with my brother. In dream I saw myself in a lonely street, pursued by a strange sort of wild beast. As is often the case in dreams, I could not cry out, and ran along the street. The animal gained on me. At last I came to a flight of stairs, and being stiffened by terror, and exhausted by running, I could get no further. I was seized by the beast, and severely bitten on the thigh. The bite awoke me, and—my brother had pinched me on the thigh. Reflection,' says Steffens, 'somehow connects this external event with the dream. But it remains to be explained, how that which was the subjective *climax

* 'Traité des Facultés de l'Âme,' i. 4, 36.
‡ 'Geist und Natur,' 209.
§ 'Karrikaturen des Heiligsten,' ii. 700.
7—2
of a whole succession of dreamed incidents could be at the same time the external occasion of them! Or shall we here adopt the invariable refuge of superficial minds, accidental coincidence? Such facts instruct us rather that those perceptual forms, which for the waking state have an unconditional reality, are proved by even ordinary dreams to belong to a condition which is only relative.'

Volkelt* says: 'A composer once dreamed that he kept a school, and wished to make something clear to his pupils. Having explained, he turned to one of the boys with the question, "Have you understood me?" The boy screamed out like one possessed, "Oh yes!" He angrily reproved him for so yelling. Then came a chorus from the whole class, "Oh yes!" followed by "Curjo!" and finally, "Feuerjo!" And then he was awoke by an actual cry of "Feuerjo!" in the street.'

Count Lavalette† relates: 'One night, asleep in prison, I was awakened by the Palace clock striking twelve o'clock. I heard a sound as of the grating being opened, and the guard relieved. I fell asleep again immediately, and had a dream'—then follows the account of a frightful dream, the particulars of which, according to the feeling of the dreamer, must have occupied at least five hours—'when suddenly the grating closed again with great violence, the noise of which awakened me. I made my watch strike; it was still twelve o'clock, so that this fearful fabric of imagination could have lasted only two to three minutes, the time necessary for the relief of the

* 'Die Traumphantasie,' 108.
† 'Mémoires et Souvenirs du Comte Lavalette,' i. 28.
guard, and the opening and shutting of the grating. It was very cold, and, therefore, the relief was very quick; moreover, the gaoler next morning confirmed my reckoning. And yet I can recall no event in my life, the duration of which I could assert with greater certainty, of which the particulars were better impressed upon my memory, and of which I was more completely conscious.'

Maury* was ill in bed, and dreamed of the French Revolution. Bloody scenes passed before him. He spoke with Robespierre, Marat, and other monsters of that time, was dragged before the tribunal, was condemned to death, and carried through a great crowd of people, bound to a plank. The guillotine severed his head from his shoulders. He woke with terror, to find that a rail over the bed had got unfastened, and had fallen upon his neck like a guillotine, and, as his mother, who was sitting by him, declared, at that very moment.

Let us now analyse the problem which is to be solved. Accident explains nothing in these cases, since such dreams are very frequent—I have, myself, elsewhere† reported about a dozen from my own experience—and always the awakening cause agrees in character with the final catastrophe of the dream: flea-bite and dagger-stab, report of shot and being shot, falling rail and guillotine, etc. For the same reasons we must reject the supposition that the imagination only skilfully weaves into the course of the dream the material imported by external accident.

* 'Le Sommeil et les Rêves,' 161.
† Oneirokritikon: 'Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift,' 1869; and 'Psychologie der Lyrik,' 28-30.
Dream is rather a completely accentuated drama. Its apparent duration, however, cannot possibly be the actual one, since we often dream of whole days, whereas at the most hours, and often even only minutes, have elapsed. Did the two durations coincide, then, inasmuch as the final event of the dream is only the awakening cause disguised by imagination, the effect must have preceded the cause,* which is impossible. It is, therefore, absolutely certain that a process of compression takes place in the series of representations, and thus also that we dream with a scale of time other than the physiological one. But even so, the difficulty is not yet removed; since the awakening cause forms in these dreams always the final event, and, moreover, determines the whole purport and course of the dream. However compressed may be the whole series of representations comprised in the dream, still that would not alter their relative position as antecedent to the awakening cause. It thus appears that we still have the effect before the cause, since it is quite indifferent whether this effect has lasted only a second or whole hours.

For the solution of this problem a further point of attachment must be reached. The necessity of seeking for this solution is apparent from the fact that all our dreams seem to contain the same problem, those of the above-mentioned class having merely the advantage of

* According to what has been above pointed out, and is indeed sufficiently evident in the class of dreams described, viz., that they are a dramatically connected whole; the climax or catastrophe being not only the subjective aspect of the external awakening cause, but being also the strictly appropriate conclusion of the dream. Thus the awakening cause must have suggested the whole sequence of representations constituting the dream.—Tr.
presenting it more distinctly than others; owing to the circumstance that they are excited by the same cause which also awakens; thus making the process of compression in the sequence of representations clearly apparent. But the same would undoubtedly take place, were the exciting cause transmitted to the brain without interrupting the sleep and becoming an awakening cause. The transcendental measure of time cannot possibly be due to the awakening: it must thus be incident to all our dreams, if only the external irritant is strong enough to affect the consciousness of the dreamer. It is indifferent which of our peripheral senses is affected. The ear appears to be the most sensitive; but the above-cited examples show that dramatic dreams can be produced by external accidents conveyed through other senses also. The deeper the sleep, the more are the outer senses closed; but as dreams still occur, it follows that the greater number of them are to be ascribed to exciting causes within the organism, that is, to the vegetative functions which go on during sleep. These also produce dramatic dreams. Thus one of my friends dreamed of receiving a letter summoning him to Berlin to be present at an execution. He set off and came to the scene of punishment, but was made so unwell by the sight of the spurtling blood that he was sick. And this actually happened, he awaking at the same moment. Macuish relates a case in which a man afflicted with chronic and acute gout dreamed every night that he was in the dungeons of the Inquisition, suffering the most ingenious tortures. This horrid dream did not leave him for a long time, so that the invalid every evening looked forward with dread to the coming night.
Here is an instance from my own experience. I had an apparently very long dream, towards the end of which I lost myself in a long gallery of an extensive building. There came towards me from the other end of the gallery a lady with a rustling train. I went close by her in order to discern her features in the dusk, and recognised a lady whom I seemed to have known long ago; whereupon, with the imagination still available in dream, I went through the ceremony of my introduction to her. But in saluting her as I passed, I caught my foot in her train, and at the same moment awoke with a nervous spasm of this foot, by which it was turned a little outwards, so as quite to correspond with its situation in the dream. Now, this long dream was evidently elicited by the spasm, and took up so short a time that my cigar had not gone out.

It seems, then, that all our dreams in fact happen in the same way, whether the exciting cause is within or without us. The brain receives a stimulus, and applies to that its own inherent law of causality, that is, constructs by imagination a corresponding cause. This cause is objectified, and through the transcendental scale of time assumes the form of a concentrated series of representations, with dramatic reference to the conclusion. But this will not always suffice to explain the final event, the length of the sequence of representations varying exceedingly. As we cannot assume that the transcendental scale is different according to the individual, this difference of length must either lie in the peculiarity of the exciting causes, or depend upon the degree of imagination in the dreamer; or perhaps the length of the dream is conditioned by both causes co-operating.
A comparative glance at artistic production will here be not without interest. In the mysterious laboratory of the poet, dramatic conceptions originate, for the most part, in some scene hovering before him, the dramatic motivation of which, intuitively epitomised, often presents itself to him suddenly. How far this brings him, evidently depends on the degree of imagination. The close and frequently observed affinity of dream to the poetic art is thus revealed in a further particular. The condensation of the ideal sequence seems to obtain in every kind of artistic creation, and to belong generally to the nature of intuition; so that even scientific or philosophical problems are often suddenly penetrated in a series of unconscious and condensed conclusions. A hypothesis is for the most part the child of imagination, and all great theories have come into the world as hypotheses.

Mozart has made the following interesting statement about his own productive faculty: 'When I am all right and in good spirits, either in a carriage or walking, and at night when I cannot sleep, thoughts come streaming in and at their best. Whence and how I know not—I cannot make out. The things which occur to me I keep in my head, and hum them also to myself—at least, so others have told me. If I stick to it, there soon come one after another useful crumbs for the pie, according to counterpoint, harmony of the different instruments, etc. This now inflames my soul, that is, if I am not disturbed. Then it keeps on growing, and I keep on expanding it and making it more distinct, and the thing, however long it be, becomes, indeed, almost finished in my head, so
that I can afterwards survey it in spirit like a beautiful picture or a fine person, and also hear it in imagination—not indeed successively, as by-and-by it must come out, but as all together. That is a delight! All the invention and construction go on in me as in a fine, strong dream. But the overhearing it all at once is still the best.' Mozart did not foresee how interesting would be his involuntary comparison with dreaming. Giving to his words a rather more precise expression, they mean that the secret of musical compositions lies in the compression of auditory representations. One is involuntarily reminded of Luther's forcible saying: 'God sees time not lengthwise, but crosswise; all is in a heap before Him.' Here Luther refers the omniscience of God, to whom he ascribes the transcendental measure of time in its highest degree, to the compression of representations, and compares it with the intuitive cognition of genius, wherein that, which to the man of ordinary reflection appears as a temporal succession, is changed into a juxtaposition to be surveyed at a glance.

If, now, we compare these results, to which we are led by regarding the mode in which dream and genius operate, with the theories of materialists, who see in all thinking only modifications of the brain, it is intelligible why we seek in vain in such theories for any fine conception or great discovery. There functions in them only the physiological measure of time, not the transcendental; so that here, too, we may say: Thou resembllest the spirit thou conceivest ('Du gleichst dem Geist, den du begreifst'). Nor, on the other hand, can I wonder, especially having regard to the above-quoted saying of Luther, that
Splittgerber, in an otherwise excellent recent publication,* finds the problem of the dramatic dream so difficult that he is driven to the following hyperbolical explanation: 'There remains at last no other solution of the problem before us than that of the supermundane origin of the soul, according to which she is confined to the limits of space and time only through her connection with a material body in the present world; and is relieved from these fetters, if only approximately, in the early stages of the dream-ecstasy, recovering her higher freedom and divinely-related nature.' Such explanations recall Plato rather than Aristotle; but at least they prove that Splittgerber has recognised the whole importance of the problem, and has taken up his own position very clearly.

From a psychological-aesthetic, our problem has gradually assumed a metaphysical character. The chief question remains to be answered: how can a dream which is induced by an excitation of sense close with an event apparently contemporaneous with that excitation? If this contemporaneity be real, then, however compressed may be the dream, it still antecedes that which excites it; and we have the impossible supposition of an effect before its cause. The solution can, however, be extracted from the results already obtained.

It is experimentally certain, that in the waking state the process of representation in consciousness requires a measurable time. But it is also a fact of experience that in certain conditions of the mind this law no longer obtains. Consequently our physiological measure of time does not lie in the nature of the mind,

* Splittgerber: 'Schlaff und Tod,' i. 131.
whose cognition is retarded by the nervous system. In artistic production and in dream this hindrance is thrown off with the reflective consciousness, and the transcendental scale of time is set free. But the same consciousness, in which lies compressed the series of representations in the dramatic dream, must also somehow become aware of the exciting occasion before the latter; according to the physiological measure of time, can inform the brain, i.e., the physiologically mediated consciousness. In this brief interval the condensed series of representations is inserted, and at the very moment at which the exciting cause enters the brain, consciousness closes with a corresponding event in the dream. For that mode of apprehension which takes place with the transcendental measure of time, the effect is thus ended when the cause first presents itself to the apprehension associated with the physiological measure of time. The enigmatical phenomenon, that in dramatic dreams the effect apparently precedes the cause, is explained therefore by the duality of our consciousness, that is, by the duality of persons of our Subject. But whoever will not accept this solution of the problem has necessarily to choose among the following hypotheses:

1. The effect in dramatic dreams antecedes the cause. This is logically excluded.

2. There is in the nature of dream a teleological arrangement, by which, at the moment that waking is caused by an external excitation of sense, the dream concludes with an event corresponding in character. This supposition is indeed logically admissible, but is purely arbitrary because unevi-
3. This teleological arrangement might also be brought about by the clairvoyance of the human Psyche, foreseeing in its transcendental consciousness the awakening cause, and teleologically disposing the course of the dream, either so that the future awakening cause determines the course of the dream as its final cause, or that the transcendental consciousness so contrives it that the sudden disturbance of sleep should be mitigated.* This supposition can be dispensed with by those who recognise the process of condensation in the series of representations in dramatic dreams.

4. The temporal and qualitative agreement between awakening cause and dream-climax is only apparent and accidental. To this opinion rationalists will incline, in order to escape the hypothesis of a transcendental consciousness, and thus of a second person of our Subject. But that the rationalistic view is untenable we learn by experiment, since the dramatic dream can be artificially excited, in which case the simultaneity and agreement between an actual event and one dreamed are always found.

Of these four suppositions, therefore, only the third is admissible. The choice can thus only be doubtful as between that and the view here adopted of a transcendental measure of time. From both views, however, the same inference results: as well if we attribute to the Psyche the faculty of clairvoyance,† as of ideation without the physiological scale of time, there is the same inference to a transcendental consciousness, i.e., a second person of our Subject.

* Conf. Hellenbach: 'Magie der Zahlen,' 141.
† Prevision.—Tr.
Thus if the aesthetic-psychological problem of dramatic dream is pursued to the point where it disembogues into metaphysic, these dreams at all events prove to be among the desiderated phenomenal facts which admit of being put to a better philosophical use than heretofore. In these phenomena the veil which hangs over the mystery of man is continually being lifted to some extent. The transcendental half of our being does not fall within our consciousness; self-consciousness does not illumine our whole Ego; the doctrine of the Unconscious thus receives a new confirmation, but at the same time this Unconscious appears as individualized, not universal and metaphysical. As the moon turns to us only one half of its orb, so also our Ego; but as the moon's mutation enables astronomers to observe at least the edges of the other half, so our Ego has its mutations in certain states by which the transcendental half of our being is partially visible. It is true the transcendental mode of cognition has in dream only a phantastic material to work upon, but were we confronted with the external reality with that measure of time, we should resemble Ernst Von Bär's hypothetical beings; we could see the grass grow; and whereas millions of ether-vibrations must be accumulated to be for us a beam of light, we could possibly distinguish them in their atomic detachment.

Kant has said that we cannot at all judge whether other thinking beings are subject in perception to the same conditions of time and space as ourselves,* and

* 'As for the intuitions of other thinking beings, we cannot judge whether they are or are not bound by the same conditions which limit our own intuitions, and which for us are universally valid.' The passage occurs in the subsection of the Transcen-
Malebranche supposed that there might be creatures who could think as much in half an hour as we in a thousand years. The foregoing contribution to Kant's doctrine of the ideality of time has, however, shown that we ourselves belong to this species of beings. But there are yet further characteristics apparent which must be applied to the definition of man, as the cases in which memory and imagination have been exalted far above their normal power.

The results obtained from the facts already considered are sufficiently interesting to encourage the hope of finding in other related phenomena yet further material for the definition of man. We should thence soon see reason to conclude, what has already been suggested by this investigation, that the philosophical systems of our century, in attempting to define the Kantian 'thing-in-itself,' have often only defined the Ego-in-itself. This transcendental being is characterized, relatively to the time-form of its cognition, in the dramatic dream. We have therefore to see whether in similar states reality does not offer material for cognition to the transcendental consciousness, and how the latter deals with such material.

We have first, however, another task to perform. For if the human consciousness, with its physiological scale of time, has only a relative validity, and, as experiment teaches, this scale of time is connected with an organic basis: if, further, as a matter of fact, 

*Note:* The text refers to a footnote regarding a book or article titled 'Transcendental Exposition of the conception of Space,' to which the reader is directed. The footnote continues: "...of the Transcendental Esthetic, which is a short paragraph added in the second edition."—Tr.
another scale of time is substituted in the dramatic dream, then this latter scale can no longer be connected with the organic basis. Thus the physiological scale of time is not essential to the human mind, and since to this is possible a mode of consciousness liberated from that scale of time, and thus from the organic basis, it follows that its connection with the organic body is no necessary relation.

Thus from the apparently insignificant facts of dramatic dreams results the weighty consequence of a transcendental being in us. But that our self should exceed our self-consciousness, that we should be more than we know of ourselves, is a paradoxical view, of which even the bare psychological possibility might by many be disputed. This psychological possibility has, therefore, first to be investigated. Thereby we shall make the acquaintance of yet a second empirical fact, which in its consequences is as important as the dramatic dreams, but, in its aspect, also just as insignificant. It can only be due to this apparent insignificance and familiarity that philosophy has not yet utilized it.

Fig. 1.—Dramatic Sundering of the Ego in Dream.

(a) The Body.—Unless dreams are to be regarded as inspirations, we must be ourselves the authors of them. Their whimsicality and beauty need not prevent our claiming them. But as in dreams we find ourselves placed in the midst of dramatically succeeding incidents, every dream may be described as a dramatic sundering of the Ego; and the dialogues we seem to carry on in them are in truth monologues.
Again, we are not only player and spectator on the dream stage, but part of us goes to the composition of the stage itself. As the lyric takes from himself the hue with which he overspreads nature—one calls to mind the reed-songs (Schilffieder) of Lenau, and the sea-songs of Greif—so also the dreamer. The poet produces only an illusion, that is, he only changes an already given object; but the dreamer, as he constructs the whole scene out of himself, produces an hallucination.* This dream-scene corresponds to his mood, whether that is a deposit of the waking life, or arises spontaneously in dream. Dream conjures up landscapes in wonderful conformity to our moods; and every light tone of mood is symbolized in the finest way, and all the more that in sleep our feelings have free course, whereas in waking they are more or less restrained.

This solution of the unity of the Subject, this externalization of interior processes, is, however, only possible if they are conceived by consciousness, not as interior, because it does not produce them, but obtains them by delivery. The question is thus of the relation of these processes to consciousness. They can only be of two kinds, either bodily or mental.

Of corporeal changes of the organism, many are under conscious control; the vegetative processes, on the other hand, the action of the heart, circulation of the blood, digestion, assimilation and separation of

* The distinction between illusion and hallucination is familiar to all students of these subjects; but for the general reader it may be as well to state here that an illusion is a false appearance induced upon some objective reality, whereas hallucination is the objectification of a pure construction of the mind, without any basis of external reality.—Tr.
substances, are independent of consciousness. The feelings excited by these are externalized in dream as its images. Thus if the sundering of the Subject into a plurality of persons happens, so far as this results from bodily changes of the organism, the boundary-line between voluntary and involuntary movements must be at the same time the breaking-place of this sundering. In sleep, indeed, voluntary movements cease, and only unconscious reflex-movements can occur, but it seems that we take over into dream the measure of waking [self-consciousness].*

As regards the psychical processes in the organism, physiology teaches that every thought enters consciousness only as a ready-made result, the process of its origination going on in the Unconscious. It further teaches that every sensation, every feeling, attains to consciousness only upon a stimulation of a certain degree of strength, and unless this degree is reached remains unconscious. The boundary-line between conscious and unconscious thinking and feeling is called the psycho-physical threshold; internal

* Aber es scheint, dass wir den Massstab des Wuchens in den Traum hinübernehmen. The meaning seems to be, that in dream, as in waking life, the proper self-consciousness does not appropriate the actions of the organism which in the waking state are both involuntary and unconscious; so that when these come to consciousness in dream they suggest its secondary personalities. The muscular reflex movements of waking life, though involuntary, are of course not all unconscious, but to the finer sensibility here attributed to deep sleep, some disturbances of organic processes, which would not rise to the sensational level in the waking state, are perceptible; but only as transmuted by the symbolism of dream. Thus the measure of normal consciousness is so far carried over into dream that, when exceeded, the new accession is represented as alien—foreign to the persisting self-consciousness.—Tr.
processes which, by reason of a sufficiency of stimulation, overstep this threshold, become conscious, others remain in obscurity. If, therefore, there occurs in dream the sundering of the Subject into a plurality of persons, then—so far as psychical changes are the cause of this—the psycho-physical threshold must be the breaking-place of this sunderance.

Hence it is apparent, that without such a psycho-physical threshold, dividing the voluntary and conscious from the involuntary, unconscious, a dramatic sundering would not be possible; on the other hand, whenever a sundering occurs, there must be a conscious and an unconscious, and then there always happens a falling apart of the Subject into a plurality of persons at the point where the threshold is disturbed.

Dramatic sundering often occurs, even in waking, that is, when hallucinations from the Unconscious introduce themselves among the perceptions of sense. In dream, somnambulism, and all ecstatic conditions, an interior waking takes the place of the external sense-consciousness, but, being itself limited, likewise borders on the Unconscious. The two conditioning factors of the cleavage, Consciousness and the Unconscious, and the psycho-physical threshold dividing them, are therefore again present here, notwithstanding that in sleep the threshold is displaced. The state of dream first becomes intelligible with the perception that the sundering occurs at the place of rupture of this threshold. A closer examination may, however, be the more called for, as the region of the unconscious soul-life is overgrown with the jungle of superstition, because the sundering of the Subject

8—2
into a plurality of persons is often mistaken for an actual plurality of Subjects.

If external or internal stimuli in sleep offer feelings to the dream-consciousness, without the latter knowing whence and how they are derived—feelings, in short, which come from the Unconscious, to which, for a sleeper, the external world also belongs—there is always thus occasioned a dramatizing of such feelings. This is very distinctly shown in the experiments for the production of artificial dreams, such as Preyer, among others, has instituted. A sleeper, on whose face he sprinkled some sprays of water, said, in dream: 'Pray take a cab; it is raining terribly!' His face being blown upon, he complained of a draught, and was sure the window was open. On a tinkling being made close to his ear, he said, 'You are breaking all the glasses,' etc.*

The sundering of the Ego in connection with this dramatizing is still more evident when the feelings presented have their origin within the organism. This is especially occasioned by internal morbid conditions. As long as the internal organs are healthy, their functions proceed without consciousness. The perfectly healthy man knows only from books where these organs are situated. But when they are out of order we feel their functions, and in our sleep they excite corresponding dream-images. Van Erk had a patient, a girl of eighteen, who in consequence of a difficulty of breathing, always had on going to sleep the horrid dream that her deceased grandmother came in at the window and knelt on her chest to

* Preyer: 'Der Hypnotismus,' 283.
suffocate her.* Impulses, which in waking remain unconscious, are set free in dream, and determine our actions therein, so that it was already observed by the ancients that we are more immoral in dream than in waking.†

Somnambulism is usually connected with morbid conditions, on which account it is still more apparent that every sundering depends on the projection of interior states. According to their general health, somnambules believe themselves to be in beautiful flowery meadows or in wild and terrible places. The first appearance corresponds with the depression of sensibility and abatement of pain in the somnambulic state, which by the feeling of contrast must give impression like that of redemption; the latter, on the other hand, corresponds to the enduring remnant of sensibility. There is often a symbolical representation of the internal condition, so that, for instance, somnambules see only faded or malodorous flowers. One of Werner's somnambules constantly saw a fresh rose when she was well, a dark-coloured, evil-smelling tulip when she was ill.‡ Becker's somnambule on one occasion felt very tired, but afterwards strengthened by the sleep, and contrasted the two conditions with lyrical colouring: 'Black clouds hung to-day in my sky, and the grass in my meadow was quite withered. These were bad signs. . . . Now the grass seems quite green again, and the blades are

† Sophokles: 'OEdipus,' 981; Plato: 'Republic,' ix. i.; Cicero: 'De Divinatione,' i., c. 29.
‡ Werner: 'Symbolik der Sprache,' 118. Stuttgart, 1841.
broad and luxuriant, and nod to each other with the breeze as if they were intelligent.'*

If the dream scenery of somnambules is thus determined by their general health, on the other hand the actual personal cleavage seems first to occur in consequence of localized and intermittent, if not transient, feelings. This is the case especially in spasmodic conditions. Terrible human forms then appear about to seize upon the patient, while the intervals of relief are motived by benevolent guardian spirits and guides who protect and defend him. This personification extends also to the natural healing power of the organism, and even to the power of applied curatives, as in the case, for instance, of that somnambulic girl who, falling asleep by the *baquet* filled with metallic substances, saw her guardian spirit clad successively in iron and copper, by which also is represented the metallic operation of the *baquet.*†

The emergence and retreat of the 'guide' often exactly corresponds with the occurrence and subsidence of the morbid symptoms. With Magdalene Wenger the spasms and the 'guide' were concurrent; he disappeared with the sense of alleviation, and then she said, mistaking effect for cause, that he had taken away the spasms, and that she would thenceforth be free from them.‡ When the alleviation is partial, good and bad spirits appear in conflict, especially in so-called 'Possession.' In the rapidity with which such dream scenes succeed one another is reflected the skill of fantasy, whose personifications keep pace

* 'Das geistige Doppelleben,' 110, 343.
† 'Archiv f. d. Thierischen Magnetismus,' x. 3, 37, 40.
‡ Perty: 'Die Mystische Erscheinungen,' i. 321.
with the quickly-changing bodily states. Every remission of pain is immediately represented by a friendly figure bringing help and chasing away the hostile demon. Selma saw in her ordinary sleep a black dog who told her he was her greatest tormentor. But in her ensuing somnambulic state she herself explained that he was only a symbolical phenomenon, signifying her spasms.* This is so far very remarkable in that with every deepening of the sleep-life the tendency to personification should be greater; but here the case is not of the interpretation of a present feeling, but of memory, and with the possibility of comparison every change of state must bring with it a change of judgment. Schindler reports a similar case. One of his somnambules saw her deceased aunt enter, saying that the patient's life was in danger, but that with her help she would be cured. Later, however, with an exaltation of the sleep she herself described this vision as mere personification of her condition, which from an obscure feeling had been elevated into a dream-image.† It thus appears that the subjective signification of such visions is then first perceived when there is consciousness of the difference of one condition from another. In like manner we recognise the illusory character of our dreams upon awaking, though while they last they are taken to be real. The belief in their reality disappears with the change of condition. This has doubtless occasioned the error always met with in text-books of physiology, that we only mistake our dreams for real, because in dream, comparison with

* Wiener: 'Selma, die jüdische Seherin,' 41.
real things fails. This is only partially true. The deception certainly disappears in the presence of a standard of comparison; but it can also be absent in the absence of the standard. It is not only conceivable that dreams should be accompanied by the consciousness of illusion, as often transiently occurs, but with many dreamers this consciousness seems to be constantly present, without the images disappearing. Such dreamers have therefore the faculty of directing the course of the dream at pleasure, as when, for instance, they fling themselves down from a tower, only to see what will come of it.*

The standard of comparison disillusionizes; but as a rule can only be presented by the entrance of a new condition, namely, waking. On the other hand, the failure of this standard in dream is indeed the sine quit non of deception; it is the condition without which the deception does not occur, but not its positive cause. This positive cause, which must be additional to the merely negative condition, and which, as far as I know, has not yet been sought, must be discovered if we would understand the essence of dream. But this cause is very soon to be found in accordance with what has been already said. It is the psychophysical threshold. In every condition, in waking as in every exaltation of the sleep-life, man consists, as it were, of two halves. As far as his waking or dreaming consciousness extends, so far his Ego. But he conceives as non-Ego all that oversteps the threshold from the Unconscious. Consequently the dualism of the Conscious and the Unconscious, the

* Jean Paul: 'Blicke in die Traumwelt,' § 4; Harvey: 'Les Rêves et les Moyens de les Diriger,' 16, 17, 140, Paris, 1867.
psycho-physical partition, is the common cause, as well of the dramatic sundering, as of deception which makes dreams seem real. This goes so far, that sundering and deception occur, even notwithstanding the standard of comparison, whenever that is given to us \textit{without} change of condition. We may therefore have hallucinations also in waking, mingling subjective visions with objective things, without being able to distinguish the one from the other.

The sundering in dream often seems not quite to attain to the point of actual severance, by which is easily to be explained that enigmatical phenomenon that in dream we frequently see two characters (Wesen) simultaneously in one person. On the other hand, it may happen that, by a new sundering, \textit{i.e.}, by a new feeling overstepping the threshold, the old one is driven away, in which case the person beheld suddenly changes form, or there is fusion of two forms. But the psycho-physical threshold is always the line of cleavage, and with the continued retirement of this threshold new lines of cleavage and new forms continually appear.

In proportion to the progress of somnambulic patients towards recovery, their guardians or guides presently declare that they will henceforth come seldom, or for a shorter time, or not at all,* quite as it must be in the projection of subjective states. To that also correspond the external circumstances under which the guides appear. A somnambule wandering through terrible regions sees the guardian spirit on the other side of a chasm, and cannot reach him; the temporal remoteness of the cure being thus spatially

* Perty: 'Mystische Erscheinungen,' i. 245.
symbolized. But as soon as the cure comes about, the guide appears unseparated by the chasm, and in a pleasant valley.* One of Werner's somnambules expressed herself still more plainly. Werner asked her how her health would be when she went on an intended journey. She replied, 'My Albert (guide) cannot be so near to me there, because thou art not, but he will still come and relieve me as far as possible.' Physiologically translated, and divested of the dramatic sundering, that means that she will miss the magnetic treatment, but that its after-effects will still be felt. Somnambules often remain at the stage of interior feeling, without external projection of it. Werner's somnambule 'knew positively' that her guide was always near her without seeing him. It was two months before she saw him as image, and even this only gradually became a clear perception.†

(b) The Mind.—Not bodily conditions alone are externally personified in dream and somnambulism. The spiritual Ego also can be dramatically sundered. This distinctly appears from the fact that the Ego of our dreams can make its entrance in different forms of consciousness. We either sit as spectators in the stalls, unconcerned in the scene enacted before us, or we are ourselves participant in it on the stage, or we are in both capacities at once. In the first case it is the inwardly waking dream-Ego that is the spectator, while translating into externality the feelings emerging from its unconscious sphere; it thus remains purely receptive towards the dream-images, which seem foreign to it (just as its Un-

* 'Archiv,' vii. 2, 46.
conscious so seems); and it regards them objectively so long as the sphere of its will* is untouched by them. But there is an end of this receptivity and objectivity as soon as the importunate images excite the feeling and will of the dreamer, or arise there-from; then can the dream-Ego under the illusion of reality no longer maintain its indifference, but leaps, as it were, upon the stage. In the third sort of dream, when we are at once spectators and actors, the identity of the Subject is not indeed wholly re-
stored—the two persons remain asunder, but the spectator nevertheless knows the actors as his own doubles. Thus in this case the inner self-consciousness of the dreamer asserts itself, therefore he remains spectator; but along with it is an apparently ex-
ternal consciousness, whose externality is imposed by the fact that its content issues from the Uncon-
scious, so that we stand at the same time upon the stage.

In modern dream literature one constantly meets with an attempt to distribute our dreams in different categories, according to their content and their ex-
citing causes; but each inquirer arrives at a different and more or less arbitrary principle of discrimination. It seems to me that these attempts must be given up, and that the only useful classification is one derived from the formal rôle of the Ego, which would like-

* Will is here used in the larger sense of the word, in which not mere conscious volition, or even volitional power, is signified, but that in the individual character or disposition which deter-
nines the emotional value—thus the motive force—of any mental impression or idea. The sphere of the will is all the conscious-
ness that is coloured by feeling, or has an 'interest' for us. To be a motive force in us any new idea or impression must enter into this association at some point.—Tr.
wise give the distinction of dreams with reference to their exciting causes, as the latter are above the threshold of the dream-consciousness or below it. The cleavage-point of the sundering would therefore be also the principle of distribution.

That there can be a severance within the intellectual sphere of dream, that thus the psycho-physical threshold persists in dream, even if in some measure displaced, and that only the representations issuing from the Unconscious lead to the severance, and are transposed outwards, is distinctly proved by many dreams. It is well known that there are processes of understanding which make it eminently clear that the thinking depends on an unconscious activity, and only the final result emerges ready-made into consciousness. This is especially the case with genuine artistic productions, and generally with every fine performance; and on a small scale whenever that happens which in German is called 'einen Einfall,' in French 'un aperçu.' Hartmann speaks of this as follows; and if I premise that I do not understand the Unconscious in Hartmann's sense, as world-substance alone, but conceive it as individual metaphysical background of the Ego, I can in this sense fully subscribe to his words:

'If consciousness were the selector, it must be able to see by its own light what was eligible, which, as is well known, it is not, since only that which is already selected emerges from the background of the Unconscious. If, then, consciousness were the selector, it would grope about in absolute darkness, could accordingly not possibly choose appropriately, but only take at random what first came to hand. . . .
The reflection just made holds good of the association of ideas in abstract thinking as well as in sensuous imagining and artistic combination. If a result is to be arrived at, the right idea must readily offer itself at the right time from the storehouse of memory; and that it is just the right idea which appears, for that the Unconscious alone can make provision. All aids and artifices of the understanding can only facilitate the office of the Unconscious, but never take it away.

A suitable and yet simple example is wit, which is a mean between artistic and scientific production, since it pursues artistic aims with, for the most part, abstract material. Every witticism is, according to the common expression, a flash (Einfall). The understanding may perhaps make use of aids to facilitate the flash; practice, especially in the case of puns, can impress the material more vividly on the memory, and altogether strengthen the verbal memory; talent may endow particular persons with an ever-sparkling wit; in spite of all that, every single witticism remains a gift from above; and even those who think they are privileged in this respect, and have wit completely in their power, must have the experience that just when they most wish to compel it, their talent denies them its services, and that nothing but worn-out absurdities or witticisms learned by rote will out of their brain. These folk know also quite well that a bottle of wine is a far readier means of setting their faculty a-going than any intentional effort."

* Hartmann: 'Phil. des Unbewussten' [vol. i. p. 285 of Mr. Coupland's translation of the ninth edition, Trübner, 1884. I have copied the above passage from Mr. Coupland's translation. —Tr.]
Now if, as already explained, all from the Unconscious which oversteps the threshold is transposed outwards, so with regard to intellectual processes, every idea induced by involuntary association must appear as an external image, and every such suggestion (Einfall), every flash of wit, must be placed in the mouth of another. And so it is in fact. The whole fluidity and mutability of the dream-images depend on the conversion of abstractly associated ideas into transitory images. And since the intellectual process, whereby anything 'occurs' (einfalls) to us has its course in the Unconscious, it must in dream take on the form of the dramatic sundering. This is so much the case, that when puns and witticisms are forthcoming in our dreams, those that arrive impromptu and without trouble are placed in the mouth of another, while those which are the products of conscious thought remain our own. Thus Boswell reports an account by Dr. Johnson of a dream in which he was engaged with another in an argumentative contention, and how he was vexed by the superiority of his opponent. No wonder; for the dreamer, Johnson, was split into two persons at the line of cleavage of the threshold; the one worked with unconscious talent, the other with the conscious understanding, and therefore came off the worse.

Bertrand gives a similar example. He was asked by another in a dream if he knew the origin of the word 'dame.' He replied that he did not; but being desired to consider, he replied, after some time, that it must come from the Latin domina. But this derivation was denied by the other, who looked at him as if in the enjoyment of his perplexity. When at
length Bertrand gave it up, the other replied, laughing, 'Don't you see that it comes from the Latin word *damnare*, because we are plunged into perdition by women?*

Thus all processes of understanding, which have the character of sudden suggestion (Einfalls), and in which consciousness is not productive but receptive, lead in dream to the dramatic sundering of personalities. This must be the case also with acts of memory, which are often of sudden occurrence, when the recovery of what was sought must happen dramatically. Maury relates that the word *Mussidan* once suddenly came into his mind. He knew that it was a town in France, but where situated he had forgotten. Some time afterwards he met a person in dream, who said he came from Mussidan. When the dreamer asked where this town was, the other told him the Department of Dordogne, of which it is the capital. On awaking, Maury remembered his dream, looked in the map, and found to his surprise that his dream companion was better up in geography than himself.† He rightly observed that evidently he had only transferred his own recollection to the mouth of another; but how it is that first in such cases the dramatic severance happens can only be explained by the psycho-physical threshold.

There is a dream well known among students, that, years after the college 'final,' they seem to be sitting at the examination, and to be unable to answer the questions put. It is only a weaker form of this that I have often myself dreamed, after the lapse of twenty-

* Bertrand: 'Traité du Somnambulisme,' 441.
† Maury: 'Le Sommeil et les Rêves,' 142.
five years, that the examination was approaching, and that I was quite unprepared for it. Now it often happens in the examination that a schoolfellow answers the question in which we have failed. Van Goens relates:

'I dreamed I was in the Latin class, at the head of it, and determined to keep my place if possible. The tutor gave out a Latin phrase, but I remained dumb, and cudgelled my brain in vain to find the translation. I saw the boy next to me making signs of impatience to be asked—a proof that he knew the answer. The thought that I must give up my place to him nearly enraged me. But it was in vain I thought—I could in no way construe the phrase. The tutor at length passed me over, and said to the next one, 'Now it is your turn.' This scholar immediately explained the meaning distinctly; and the interpretation was so simple that I could not conceive how I had missed it.'*

Van Goens adds that, after twenty-six years, it is still unintelligible to him how the soul, which in vain seeks something with the greatest effort, can be in one second the same soul which knows the same thing very well, while imagining itself, at the same time, not to know, but to hear it said by another.

The above theory solves the difficulty very simply. And all dreams, in which we ourselves put a question which another answers, belong to this category, and it can only be from the fact that this answer emerges from the unconscious, that it is unfamiliar to us, and is always taken for a disclosure of something we knew not.

* Moritz: 'Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde,' xi. 2, 88.
But this does not show how it happens that these questions in dream are put at all. The questioning is evidently a dramatic deliberation, as the answer is a dramatic finding. When in waking we try in vain to remember something, perhaps a name, it often suddenly occurs, quite without premeditation, hours after we have ceased thinking about it. There is therefore thinking; unconscious, yet directed to an aim, the result of which then comes into consciousness. This thinking is also possible in dream, and it explains the action of many night-walkers who perform literary work in dream. Therefore we cannot exclude even the process of unconscious consideration in dream, the conclusion of which then introduces itself as an answer from a foreign source, after a dramatic representation of the preliminary wavering and seeking. A similar wavering is apparent when we utter a word, and at the same moment perceive that it is not the right one. In this case we correct ourselves also in waking—in dream we are corrected by another. Maury, when he was learning English, spoke that language with someone in a dream, and wishing to say to him that he had called on him the day before, used the words: 'I called for you yesterday.' The other at once told him that this expression was wrong, and that he should have said, 'I called on you yesterday.' On awaking, Maury looked and found that his censor was right.*

The first tendency to this dramatic sundering can even show itself in waking; but is not developed to the point of perception (zum Bilde); as when we are vexed with, or reproach ourselves for an irrevocable

* Maury: 'Le Sommeil,' etc., 143.
act, this internal dissension expressing itself, with many very emphatically, as by striking the forehead, etc., and it is not without psychological interest that they address themselves on such occasions with the 'thou,' as though concerned with another person of their Subject.

It would be impossible that the events experienced in dream should come as from without and unexpectedly, often even occasioning us the greatest surprise—while yet we are evidently ourselves the authors of the whole—unless the soul of the dream-author and the soul of the dream-spectator were strangers to each other—that is, unless they were at least divided by a psycho-physical threshold. And so, also, those dreams which bring interchange of speech instead of actions, must be the dramatic presentation of intellectual processes, passing on this side and on that side the threshold.

We can now no longer find it strange that in the heightened sleep-life of somnambulism the dramatic sundering is so frequent, and that the somnambules have their 'guides' constantly at hand, to whom they put questions, and from whom they get answers. The literature of that subject is full of such instances. But whoever also studies the phenomena of 'possession' and insanity, will no longer doubt that in all these cases the psycho-physical threshold is the line of cleavage of the dramatic sundering.

Like the multiplication of objects by two opposite mirrors, the sundering of consciousness in dream seems always on the increase. It happens, for instance, in dream, that we are at the same time spectators and actors, when again the two cases are
possible that the spectator either recognises, or does not recognise his own double in the actor. This 'double-going' is quite another case from the falling asunder of the Subject into a number of different persons, and is again to be distinguished from that in which we mingle and take part among the stage company without leaving our psychical centre behind in the parterre—that is, without persistence of a self-consciousness that would unite the plurality of consciousnesses.

It is to me, I confess, doubtful, whether such a subject-consciousness happens in dream. To describe it, not in the abstract but perceptibly, it must have the following character: When I am active merely on the stage, I see myself there, it is true, yet only so as in waking I can look down on my body and see my limbs, without my sight being an object to itself. The eye cannot see itself. But if I am at the same time sitting as a spectator, my whole form appears upon the stage, as in waking I can see myself in the mirror, and look into my own eyes. This last case is again to be distinguished, according to whether the 'double' is known as such or not, and again, whether if there is this knowledge, his proceedings are strange to me, like those of another person, or not.

Volkelt relates two dreams, from which there is at least an apparent possibility of the self-duplication of the Ego upon the stage. In dream he saw himself with sunken cheeks, rolling about in bed, while at the same time he was anxiously pacing up and down the room, with the idea that his second self had poisoned himself, and was near death; but, with all his anxiety, it seemed to him, also, that he would not himself be 9—2.
hurt by the other's death. In like manner, one of his friends dreamed that he surprised his beloved in the embraces of a strange man, and that he was about to attack the offender, but observed that the latter had his own appearance, and consoled himself with the thought that he had kissed the maiden himself.* Both these dreams prove, indeed, the double-going of the sundered personal consciousness; but they do not prove the Subject-consciousness, for, in the first case, the anxious walker in the room knew not his psychical identity with the poisoned man; and in the second, although the lover knew his identity with the offender, yet both were on the stage. Thus, even in these dreams, the Subject-consciousness, which should look on without acting, is wanting.

It would be very important to know if that ever happens in dream. We might thus obtain a decision on the very old problem of self-consciousness, and solve it by facts of empirical psychology of a kind not possible in waking.

All modern philosophy recognises that there can be no self-consciousness without sundering. In self-consciousness the Ego appears doubled, first as being, then as knowing. Only thus can self-consciousness contain anything: I know that I am. It therefore seems that no other explanation of this phenomenon is possible than that in analogy with dream we should take the facts simply as they are, and just say that in self-consciousness a dramatic sundering of the Ego takes place, since a single Subject falls apart into two persons, only that in waking there is no illusion of sense.

* Volkelt: 'Die Traumphantasie,' 25.
Defective and obscure as the memory of the content of our dreams often is, it is still more difficult to recollect the forms of consciousness occurring in them; and I must therefore leave here undecided the question whether a pure Subject-consciousness grasping together the personal consciousnesses which remain mutually alien is possible. Such could be represented as a larger circle, enclosing two smaller excentric ones.

But the general fact of the dramatic sundering in dream is already important enough. It gives us at least such an advantage as perhaps an astronomer might derive from the discovery that two stars together have a common point of gravity lying between them, although the further problem whether besides these two stars there is yet a third, as central sun, remains unsolved.

(c) The Human Enigma.—It is possible that some readers of the last chapter may censure me for refinements, satisfactory perhaps to the professional psychologist, but of no general interest. To remove this impression, and to indemnify them for their trouble, in what follows there will be deduced from the foregoing results certain consequences which may at any rate claim to be of very general interest. Philosophy has always recognised that the greatest enigma of Nature is man himself. But it is just on this enigma, whose solution concerns our highest interests, a solution upon which, according to Kant, 'depends the true and lasting welfare of the human race,' that the results already obtained throw an important light.

* Kant's Werke: 'Rosenkranz,' xi. 1, 19.
The dramatic sundering of the Ego in dream will be admitted by everyone to be an indubitable fact. Now from the fact of such sunderings result two important propositions, which can the less be doubted in that they are simply the analytical dissection of the fact itself.

(a) It is *psychologically* possible that a subject consists of two persons, without the latter knowing their identity with each other, and with the subject. This assertion is not in the least invalidated by the objection that dreams are merely illusions. They are so indeed; but the *psychological* fact that our consciousness can persist in such a deception remains; and it is only from the fact of this illusion that we shall now further conclude: Namely, that what in dream is psychologically not only possible, but actual, is evidently possible also outside dream; for the consciousness which invents our dreams can neither change its whole nature, nor disappear with waking, but at most can retire for the waking man into the Unconscious. The sun still shines, even when intercepted by clouds.

Now provisionally supposing that fact of dream, the sundering, to be also a fact outside dream (only that in waking there is no perceptive illusion), then would our sensuous, personal consciousness not be exhaustive of our whole being, but would light up only a part of it. There would exist besides this sense-consciousness—our earth-face, as it were—yet another personal consciousness—an Unconscious for this earth-face—and even a comprehensive Subject—consciousness, uniting the two persons, would be possible. We should thus resemble the double star
above mentioned, but of which one star would be in obscurity, and possibly in the deepest ground of our being the double star would have its central sun.

Now if our self-consciousness is not conterminous with our being, the physiological psychologists, who allow to man only his earth-face, strive in vain to solve his enigma. They do not deny the Unconscious, but they say it is in itself unconscious, and not only so for our personal Ego. But as positive assertion, this is evidently illogical, for the earth-face can pronounce only upon itself, not upon what is beyond its horizon. Were the Unconscious for itself unconscious, it evidently could not take on the form of consciousness in the dramatic sundering in dream-life; still less would the fact be explicable that in somnambulism there awakes an inner, second Ego, which speaks of the bearer of the earthly aspect as of a distinct person, naming it 'the other,' or 'the others.'

Now as this second Ego cannot possibly be produced by the magnetic sleep from nothing, but can only be awakened for our consciousness, it must exist before and after, though unconsciously for our daily Ego. . . . Thus it follows from the facts of somnambulism, that not in dream only does our Subject fall asunder in two persons, but we are always in this condition, though without the earthly side knowing of the second Ego. There may well, however, be a knowledge by this latter.

There is no objection to calling this second Ego the soul, provided we do not confound it with the popular conception of soul, which identifies soul with the sense-consciousness, and asserts the indestructi-
bility of our earthly side; whereas upon the latter so little stress is to be laid that we could be content to expose it to the materialistic account of the physiologists, by whom, at most, would one of our persons be explained, but not the second Ego, not the Subject.

At the present day, the conception, Soul, is treated as mythical, and psychology is taught without Psyche. But from an unprejudiced study of dream we may recognise the necessary revival of this conception in a higher form, no more as wholly opposed to the body, but as identical therewith; identical, however, only in the sense in which the two persons of the dream are so in dream. Physiologists reject the soul, because they would explain man unitarily, in which they are quite right. They are for monism, not the dualism of an immortal soul and a mortal body. But as the persons of a dream in the Subject of the dream have a common centre, and as the dualism of a double star is monistically suppressed in the common point of gravity about which they circle, so also have sense-consciousness and the Unconscious a common centre, and this doctrine of the soul is not dualistic, but monistic—that is, it explains man unitarily.

It is a logical consequence of the dramatic division in dream, that the science of the future, far from giving up the conception of soul, much more probably will find itself necessitated to set up, besides the earth-aspect and the soul, spirit, or a self-consciousness comprehending them, as a third. Even if this third be not yet provable, our first inference from the act of severance in dream has yielded this result, that only in the direction indicated shall we succeed in
the solution of the human problem. To proceed to our second inference.

(\(\beta\)) It is psychologically possible that two persons of a single Subject may converse with one another, without knowing their identity. Again, this is a fact of dream which as a psychological fact is untouched by the objection that dreams are illusions. Certainly they are, but the fact of an illusion is not an illusory fact. If in dream two persons of one Subject can discourse together as friends, there exists the logical possibility of this in waking; it is possible that we are in communication with our second Ego, without our knowing it as identical with us.

Since according to the old logical rule, principles of explanation are not to be multiplied unnecessarily, we must adhere to the dramatic severance as long as it is in any way sufficient for the phenomena to be explained. Before all must we adhere to it, while we are dealing with the sleep-life; we will therefore either set down all the 'guides' and 'guardian-spirits' of the somnambulists as wholly subjective constructions, so long as they show no other marks than our dream-figures, or explain them only from the dramatic severance of the actual man, from his double nature, when they betray signs never to be met with in the mere dream-figures. The third possibility, that the guides are actual third persons, that is, other Subjects, must remain excluded until they exhibit characteristics not to be explained by even the double nature of man. But as we do not know the faculties of our second Ego, nor, therefore, how much they will explain, this is a case which cannot easily occur.

Thus, when Tasso asserted of his visions, that
they could not belong to his phantasy, because what he learned from them exceeded his knowledge, he reasoned rightly; but it does not thence follow that these visions were foreign Subjects who inspired him, for there remains as the third possibility his own double nature, by means of which the two persons of his own Subject acted dramatically on one another.

Pure subjective illusions occur in the ordinary dream severance, as in the example already cited, in which I cannot find an answer, and it is supplied by my schoolfellow. This is merely dramatized memory; it cannot in this case be said that the one person was ignorant of what the other knew; it was only not known at first, and then it recurred. But if we add to this incident the further character, that I received an answer which had never been in my consciousness, and which exceeded its capacities, we should then be obliged to explain this severance from the double nature of man, and to admit, that by the displacement of the psycho-physical threshold in sleep, a part of my unconscious was projected into my normal Ego. The displacement of the threshold approximates to the growth of a new sense, or at least to the exaltation of the normal sensibility, wherefrom new information could unquestionably be obtained. In somnambulism that often occurs. Richard Gorwitz,* for instance, showed remarkable faculties in the magnetic sleep, but he referred them always to a black man, whom he believed himself to see. If a stranger entered the house, he was in-

* Gorwitz: 'Richards natürlich magnetischer Schlaf,' Leipzig, 1837.
formed of it by his mannikin; if he knew what remedy would be useful to him, it was this mannikin who prescribed it. If there was something he did not know, he said that the mannikin—his second Ego—had left; in general his expressions betrayed an oscillation of the psycho-physical threshold, as by saying that the mannikin only gave him information 'when he was in a good humour.'

The two results for psychology and metaphysic, which are yielded by the fact of the dramatic severance, are thus decidedly very fruitful. The one conducts us on the right way to solve the problem of man; the other enables us to reclaim a great province from the region of spirit-seeing, and to distribute it between the psychology of the earthly aspect and that of metaphysic.

The dramatic division of the Ego thus draws a thick line through half of all the stories of spirits, by explaining them from our faculty of projecting and personifying subjective conditions. And were this division, the falling asunder of the Subject into two persons, not merely incidental to dream, but the metaphysical formula for the explanation of man, many other such stories could be similarly dealt with, though there would remain the spirit, namely, our own, which indeed is first rightly proved by faculties not derivable from our earthly nature, and which are manifest in the dramatic division. That such faculties do actually emerge in somnambulism will be shown in the next chapter. Our first deduction was the existence of a soul, having a wider sphere than that of its earthly nature, but separated from the latter merely by the psycho-physical threshold, thus
remaining connected with it in a monistic sense. That, however, leads to the further question, how far the soul, the Unconscious, projects beyond the consciousness. But that we do not know, and it can only be proved that the projection is very extensive. We have to distinguish between our sense-consciousness, our soul-consciousness, and the still problematical Subject-consciousness. Representing these as three unequal circles one within the other, the sense-consciousness filling the smallest, the soul-consciousness the middle one, and the Subject-consciousness the largest, the periphery of the innermost circle would stand for the psycho-physical threshold. By its displacement in the rising series to the ecstatic conditions, sleep, somnambulism, trance, apparent death, etc., the centre of the inner circle is more and more obscured; that is, the sense-consciousness tends more and more to disappear, but the circle itself is widened; that is, the consciousness extends itself more over the region of the so-called Unconscious. Already in common sleep the Ego of sense sinks; in the magnetic sleep the line of the inner circle is so far thrown back towards the periphery of the outer one that the somnambulists speak of their sense-Ego—the inner circle—only in the third person. That happens also in delirium, and is conventionally expressed by saying, 'He is beside himself,' 'He is wandering.' The content of consciousness in these conditions naturally retains its full reality, even when it is dramatically transferred to another person. Now there is no condition of ecstasy in which the outermost circle can be completely reached. The proof of this is easily adduced. There is no condition
of sleep with ecstasy *without* visions. Visions depend on the dramatic severance, but the latter is only possible on the condition that a conscious and an uncon- 
scious, with a threshold dividing them, are both present. Whence it follows that the foundation of visions must be our own unconscious spirit, with which we are in communication, and with dramatic severance, just because the consciousness does not illuminate the whole outer circle, but an Unconscious always remains.

It thence happens that the progressive displacement of the threshold of sensibility with the deepening of sleep multiplies also the divisions of the Ego; that is, continually brings new dream-figures upon the boards without the retirement of those already present. Therefore in the crises of somnambulists the number of their visionary forms increases. So Brendel relates of the somnambule Höhne, 'The greater or less multitude of angels present determines with Höhne the different stages of her clairvoyance, indicating and expressing them; in her ordinary sleep-waking condition there are but a few guardian spirits, in exalted states they number from six to ten, in pro- 
found sleep sixteen are present.'* This is evidently an effect of the gradual deepening of the sleep, with which continually deeper layers of the Unconscious and its faculties are raised above the threshold, giving occasion to multiplied personifications. With the insane also the fluctuation of the threshold is in the same way frequently apparent. Boismont describes

* F. Brendel: 'Kritik der kommissarischen Berichte und Protokolle über die ärzliche Behandlung der somnambule Christiane Höhne,' 138 (Freiberg, 1840).
an insane person, who was able to place before himself his own double, conversing and contending with him, being often to his vexation refuted. The same alienist says of his patients that they often conversed with three, and even up to twelve and fifteen invisible persons. He adds that those who spoke several languages heard the strange voices the more or less distinctly as they themselves spoke the language of them well or ill: a circumstance most clearly indicating that it was their own Subject which divided itself into such visionary forms.*

But if consciousness in even our highest ecstasies does not exhaust our whole being, leaving beyond an unmeasurable fund of the Unconscious, which can furnish new divisions, then certainly man appears as a being of groundless depth, reaching with his roots into the metaphysical region, which will perhaps, however, remain always closed for his sense-consciousness, that being capable of no state in which the psycho-physical threshold could be carried back into this region. Whoever will explain visions without dramatic severance, thus ascribe to them reality, must conceive man as a double being, with one foot on the earth, the other in the realm of the spirits, with whom he holds intercourse. Whereas, on the other hand, if visions are explained by the dramatic severance, man is in that case also a double being, but with both sides rooted in a common stem; and even if from these visions we obtain but slight information concerning the side of our being which lies beyond the threshold of our self-consciousness, still the problem of a transcendental psychology is given, to be solved

* Boismont: 'Des Hallucinations,' 28, 583.
by later science, without abandoning monism, nor the conformity of all phenomena to law.

The double nature of man remains alike irrefragable, whether we see in the visions of ecstasies transcendent beings, or recognise in them only our own dramatized transcendental being. On this point of our double nature, thus at any rate believers in spirits and sceptics can join hands in reconciliation.
CHAPTER IV.

SOMNAMBULISM.

1. Natural Somnambulism.

It is not enough for the scientific definition and characterization of a body to take account of the properties which it exhibits under normal circumstances. Rather must these circumstances be artificially altered, until they offer occasion for the manifestation of qualities usually latent. Thus the physicist and the chemist subject bodies to experiment, in the special arrangements of which the question is put to the body: What art thou? And the body answers by the way in which imposed conditions react upon it.

The definition of man, the most interesting object, but also the greatest riddle of Nature, has not yet been found, notwithstanding the thousands of years in which the question has been disputed, only because he has been almost exclusively studied in his normal condition, but not subjected to experiment by the alteration of circumstances.

That will not remain so always. Our grandchildren will pursue experimental psychology, as we experimental chemistry, and they will perhaps solve the problem of man by giving occasion, through alteration of his normal circumstances, to modes of activity
usually latent, but affording us an insight into his nature.

But in what manner, by alteration of circumstances, can the psychically normal man be brought to abnormal functions? To answer this question, we must first know on what circumstances the psychically normal condition rests.

The psychically normal man is characterized, if we know what influences he experiences from the side of natural things, and in what ways he can react upon these influences. We must know his sensibility and his modes of activity. These two factors form the psychical man, and stand to one another in exact relation; the more susceptibilities, the more activities. But of the natural influences to which man is subjected, those only can come into consideration which produce a distinct impression on his consciousness. Influences which, if they occur, do not come to consciousness in him, occasion no reaction, and are therefore without concern for his psychical definition.

From the standpoint of every psychical being, Nature is thus divided into two halves: the one acting upon consciousness, the other not. Physically and indirectly, if not directly, no doubt the human organism is influenced by all things in Nature; but it is a fundamental law, that natural processes only affect consciousness when the spatial or molecular movement from them possesses a certain degree of strength. This necessary minimum of strength on the objective side of Nature corresponds on the subjective side of man to that degree of susceptibility which is designated 'the threshold of sensibility.'
This threshold is further called 'psycho-physical,' because in every affection of consciousness a physical movement of Nature, crossing the threshold of sensibility, is converted into a psychical feeling. Natural processes of insufficient strength remain below man's threshold of sensibility, do not come to consciousness in him.

The psychical normal man, the object of our inquiry, is therefore to be characterized by the possession of a normal human threshold of sensibility. But the experimental psychology, which is so highly to be desired, is only then possible if man's normal threshold of sensibility can be so displaced, that natural influences, ordinarily remaining below the threshold, may be felt. To these abnormal influences of Nature would answer, in reaction on the side of man, abnormal psychical activities. The more we learned to know of these, the more could we continually understand of the definition of man. The solution of the human problem is thus possible on the condition of an experimental psychology; but the latter is only possible if man's threshold of sensibility is alterable, can be made to shift; impossible if, on the contrary, this threshold is fixed and immovable.

But it is displaceable. Apart from slight displacements in waking life, occurring in morbid conditions, or even through mere direction of attention, the organism experiences daily a very important displacement of its threshold when it falls to sleep. In sleep the psycho-physical activity of man sinks for a while below the threshold.* Therefore sleep is accompanied by an inner waking, and to this a content of feeling.

* Fechner: 'Elemente der Psychophysik,' ii. 439.
is given by the displacement of the threshold: a content which does not enter consciousness in the day-waking state, because in presence of the grosser influences of the outer world these gentle excitations cannot effectuate themselves, and therefore go on below the threshold. These excitations, for the most part arising from the inner sphere of the body, are the causes of our dreams.

Thus sleep is no mere negation of waking, but contains also positive sides. It displaces the threshold of sensibility so that the world of day disappears from consciousness; but just for this reason is the inner consciousness susceptible to influences which in waking do not overstep the threshold. So has the setting of the sun not only the negative result that darkness overspreads the earth, but also the positive one, that the weaker beams of the stars, before lost in the greater light, then become manifest.

The processes which come to the inner consciousness in sleep take place also in waking; they only remain unconscious. So sleep does not produce new influences on the organism, and new reactions of the same, but it raises over the threshold those which were below it during waking; it thus introduces to consciousness new influences and modes of reaction, which reactions take the form of dreams.

The more the threshold of sensibility is displaced, the more positive sides of sleep would become apparent, producing always new psychical reactions. Therefore would deep sleep, as connected with the greatest displacement of the threshold, without doubt afford us very valuable disclosures concerning the nature of man, if it were not unfortunately lost to
memory. The question arises for experimental psychology whether dreams can be preserved before they are forgotten, or if this were not possible, whether dreamers could be brought to speech.

Both these problems will undoubtedly find their solution, which has indeed already partially happened, and that in somnambulism. Thus this condition, the clear inner waking of the deep magnetic sleep, is the natural foundation for the experimental psychology of the future. It therefore deserves to be studied with much greater zeal than heretofore. The human problem confronts us still in such gigantic dimensions that it is only a reproach to the stupidity of the materialists, who decry it by asserting that man is a mere chemical combination, and nothing more; this problem can, however, only be solved by subjecting man to experiment in the somnambulic state. For, as Mesmer said, 'The faculties of man are manifested through the effects of magnetism, just as the properties of other bodies are developed by the elevation of heat which chemistry supplies.'

The psychical faculties of man which come into play in somnambulism are simply reactions upon such natural influences as do not cross the threshold of sensibility of the normal man. Therefore somnambulism induces susceptibility to finer influences than are received by the senses of the waking person. Now, as the senses in waking evoke faculties the more remarkable, the more finely they are organized, so must the sense educated in somnambulism, receiving influences too fine for the day-senses, release faculties superior to those of the waking man. In fact, these faculties are so remarkable that already many a
physician has been misled in his enthusiasm to declare somnambulism to be a higher condition than that of waking life, while others would see in it a falling back into the instinctive nature-life of animals.

Here, as so often, the truth lies midway. The displacement of the threshold of sensibility in the different conditions of sleep is not continually progressive, but often very wavering, and so accordingly must be the psychical faculties awakened by this displacement. Conformably to this, the utterances of even the same somnambules and in the same crisis are of very unequal value. But we must be withheld by another reason from over-estimating this condition. Somnambulism is the influence of Nature and of men in presence of a passive state; man is therein psychically decentralized, mostly in complete dependence on the magnetiser, against whom it is only seldom that a self-conscious will asserts itself. So far somnambulism is not a state of equal dignity with waking. On the other hand, it is quite indisputable that in somnambulism faculties are often revealed, if only transitiorily, far superior to those of men whose outer senses stand open to the world, and whose threshold of sensibility is at the normal point.

The question is thus suggested, whether upon other planets there may exist beings of more favourable constitution in regard to this threshold of sensibility, in whom the faculties, which in somnambulism are exhibited only inconstantly and germinally, would be found in full development, and as a normal possession? Whoever accepts the doctrine of evolution will not doubt the existence of such beings standing evidently higher than man; he can, at least, not deny
that such beings lie so much the more probably in
the womb of the future, as man, standing at the
present apex of earthly organization, prophetically
announces them in the rudimentary way.

If, however, the somnambulist germinally indicates
such higher beings, without belonging to them,
somnambulism cannot, indeed, be considered a state
superior to waking; but, regarded from the philo-
sophical standpoint, it is more important than waking.
For every intellectual advance is either merely his-
torical, within constant limits of sensibility as deter-
mined by the threshold, or biological—that is,
conditioned by a favourable displacement of the
threshold. Every historical advance has, during its
course, its boundaries, namely, in the insuperable
threshold of sensibility, beyond which lies the solution
of the deepest problems of humanity. Therefore is
somnambulism philosophically more important than
waking; it reaches over man as capable of develop-
ment historically, anticipating his biological successor;
and though this anticipation is but germinal, yet the
study of somnambulism shows clearly that inexhaustible
results for the doctrine of evolution are to be obtained
from the impermanence of the threshold. At the same
time, the claim of materialists to appropriate the
doctrine of development for the support of their views
is very clearly seen to be mere presumption. A
doctrine which asserts that only the sensuous is
actual, and which denies the world lying below our
threshold of sensibility, stands in radical contradic-
tion to the Evolution theory.

Somnambulism, just because depending on the
displacement of the threshold of sensibility, offers to
psychology a whole cargo of new and very weighty problems. Now, it is in the nature of man to prefer erroneous solutions to a confession of insolubility; on which account his explanations always take the form censured by Bacon: 'That which is in itself new is nevertheless usually conceived in the same way as the old.'* That has also happened in this case. Somnambulism is a phenomenon in itself new and quite peculiar, and therefore cannot be judged in the same way as what is old, that is, according to analogies of the psychical conditions of waking; because in it we are concerned with the Psyche below the threshold, but in waking with the Psyche which is above. From this alone is apparent the perversity of explaining somnambulism, with its marked peculiarity, according to psychological laws of the waking life. The already-cited story which Livingstone relates of the negro to whom he presented a spoon, should be read by the physiological opponent of somnambulism with the addition, 'de te fabula narratur.'

Even the ordinary dream demands this special explanation. If we analyse our dreams, at first sight, certainly, they seem to contain merely the materials of the waking life thrown together in a disconnected, irregular state, and only the waking life which holds together its rationally-combined representations seems decentralized in dream. But, with closer observation, it is easy to see that dream also has its positive sides, for as it is connected with the displacement of the threshold of sensibility, the sleeper then first experiences influences, formerly remaining below

* Bacon: 'Nov. Org.,' 1, § 34.
the threshold, from his own interior bodily sphere; his consciousness thus obtains a new content. On these influences the Psyche reacts with faculties latent in waking life; thus the self-consciousness also receives a new content.

With the displacement of the threshold of sensibility, therefore, are opened a transcendental world, closed to the day consciousness, and a transcendental Ego. Here, again, is a proof that the normal consciousness does not exhaust the world, nor the normal self-consciousness the Ego. We must, therefore, speak of a doubled consciousness and of a doubled Ego in us, lying this side and that side of the normal threshold, and that all the more, as the two Egos only alternately appear without interchanging the content of their consciousness. The awakening somnambulist revets, without memory of his dreams, to the point of time at which he fell asleep. Moreover, the faculties corresponding to the perceptions of the two Egos are so very different, both in form and content, that we are obliged to speak of the duplication of personalities, notwithstanding the displacement of the threshold; but by reason of this impermanence of the threshold, the dualism of persons is again monistically resolvable into the unity of a common Subject. But since, according to the figure of the two weights, the transcendental Ego awaking in sleep awakes the more clearly, the greater the loss of the day-man’s consciousness, the condition of deepest sleep must necessarily be the most favourable for the distinct definition and characterization of the transcendental Subject.

That condition, however, throws us back upon somnambulism for a solution of the human problem.
Somnambulism is exalted sleep. To understand this phenomenon rightly, we must first attempt to ascertain its physiological significance for the economy of the organism. With this view an explanatory consideration of spontaneously occurring somnambulism is requisite, and it must be asked to what end Nature introduces so important a deepening of sleep.

The intensity of every sleep corresponds to the need of the organism, and is induced by physiological causes not sufficiently known, a fact which must not make us overlook the teleological character of sleep, which is shown in its effect. The more the brain-life is suppressed, and the longer it is in a condition of complete rest, the more and longer is the recuperative force active in the organism. Sleep restores the forces worn out in waking; therefore we feel refreshed when we have slept well, and the intensity of the effect corresponds either to the duration or to the depth of our sleep.

In illnesses, if the organism is much weakened, a sleep of extraordinary length is often the crisis, in which the change for the better occurs. Every physician knows the healing power of this critical sleep.

Long-lasting sleep is frequent, and its curative tendency was observed before modern times. Schubert relates, from the 'Philosophical Transactions,' the case of a boy who slept for sixteen weeks, and when at length he awoke, the disease and the desire for sleep had both departed. In the 'Acta Eruditorum' of 1707 is an account of a sleep which lasted, first fourteen days, then six months. Fiolet describes a sleep of four years, interrupted with but short waking intervals.* Micrulius reports of an aged priest in

* Schubert: 'Geschichte der Seele,' i. 245.
Stettin, who, having to read three masses on Christmas night, after the first felt the need of a little rest, and dropped in his cell into a sleep of thirteen days. The physician Mayo even knew of a girl of twelve years old who fell into a sleep which lasted thirteen years, so that she grew up in it from a child to a mature woman. Similar cases, often giving rise to suspicion of simulation, have now and then been reported in our own day.

Now it seems to me that the physiological importance of spontaneous somnambulism lies in this, that herein the curative force of Nature sinks the organism into a sleep, the depth of which stands for long duration. If, without prejudice to physiological causes, the long sleep, and the deep sleep of somnambulists, have a teleological significance, that suggests the view that even the remarkable psychical faculties appearing in somnambulism are an extension in the same direction of this teleological principle—those, at least, which are connected with disease and its cure. Seeing with what instinctive certainty somnambules give information concerning the character of their disease, concerning its causes and development, and the requisite treatment and remedies to be applied, one is much disposed to say with Schopenhauer: 'Nature only then truly comes to clairvoyance, when its blindly-working restorative force does not suffice for the removal of the disease, but needs assistance from without, which now is rightly prescribed in the clairvoyant condition by the patients themselves.

† Mayo: 'Truths in Popular Superstitions,' 107.
‡ [In fact, hardly a year passes without reports of several such alleged cases in the newspapers.—Tr.]
Thus to this end of self prescription she introduces clairvoyance. . . . Thus in the one case and in the other, it is Nature herself that kindles the light, by which to seek and afford the help which the organism needs from without. The application of the gift of seership of the somnambules, once developed, to other things than their own condition of health, is a merely accidental use, and even misuse, of the same.*

This opinion of Schopenhauer's is, as said, very specious, but is logically not unavoidable. For it is conceivable, that not only the clairvoyance which is applied beyond the bodily sphere of disease is accidental, but generally that all clairvoyance is only accidental to the somnambulic state. Somnambulism would then not be the cause from which clairvoyance arises, but simply the condition without which it cannot arise. Physiologically regarded, there would then be no direct causal connection between somnambulism and clairvoyance, and even teleologically regarded, the remarkable psychical faculties of somnambulism would not lie in the direction of an extension of a teleologically acting curative force of Nature. There would, indeed, be given the causal, and at the same time teleological connection between the recuperative force of the organism—merely a collective designation for the individual organic forces co-operating—and the deep sleep introduced by physiological causes, in other words, the complete suppression of the sense-consciousness. But, on the other hand, we should no longer be directly introduced to the inner waking of the transcendental Subject within this loss of consciousness; and deep sleep would be only a condition

* Schopenhauer: 'Ueber Geistersehen.'
of clairvoyance, not its cause, just as the going down of the sun is only the condition, not the cause, of the shining of the stars.

It is the more necessary to keep in view this distinction between cause and condition, because the ordinary sleep also is not the cause, but merely the condition of the inner waking which shows itself as dream. The internal feelings which give occasion to our dream-images are present in waking also, but remain below the threshold. So, perhaps, the visions of somnambules are not newly produced, but only cross the threshold, and if the displacement of this is defective and wavering, then—as frequently happens—these visions are so also. If, finally, deep sleep is not the physical cause, but only the occasion of the inner waking, that disposes of the chief objection urged by scepticism against artificial somnambulism, that it is naturally inconceivable how magnetic passes can make anyone clairvoyant.

Schopenhauer's teleological propter hoc, according to which consciousness is pressed into the service of the blind curative force of Nature, may thus be changed into a mere cum hoc, the transcendental consciousness manifesting itself when, but not because, the sensuous consciousness is suppressed. Moreover, for the present purpose, it is quite indifferent which of the two opinions the reader will adopt; what is here to be proved being merely the existence of the transcendental Subject, and for that it does not much signify whether deep sleep is the cause or only the occasion of its introduction.

For the physician, on the contrary, this distinction is very important. For it appears that our physicians
explain absolutely nothing at bottom, when they curtly put aside somnambulism as disease and hysteria. If, as to its cause, somnambulism is frequently morbid, it can yet be quite healthy as to its psychical content, as soon as deep sleep is recognised as mere condition and occasion of the entrance of the transcendental Subject. As little as night is the cause of the stars, being only the condition of their visibility, is hysteria the cause of clairvoyance. Somnambulism is not only no disease, but, on the contrary, heals the diseased, directly, through its deep sleep, indirectly, from the fact that in this deep sleep somnambules are capable of self-prescription.

That the psychical faculties of man can be exalted through disease, just because there is this distinction between cause and condition, is shown frequently also in insanity, since this is often the occasion for such functions of the transcendental Subject as have the greatest resemblance to the phenomena of somnambulism. Mesmer, therefore, seems to have been quite right when he called severe diseases of the nervous system—such as Epilepsy, Catalepsy, Insanity, etc.—an incomplete somnambulism, which could be healed if the efforts of the organism to overcome the disease were reinforced in the same direction by application of artificially induced somnambulism.

Physiologically considered, the somnambulic sleep is therefore one of the forms of the curative force of Nature; for in waking there is heightened sensibility of the organism, in sleep heightened restorative force. The curative force of Nature therefore suppresses the sense-consciousness when the enfeebled organism needs to be strengthened by exaltation of the restora-
tive functions. Hippokrates knew that, when he said that in mania ecstasy was good.*

But the first philosophical interest of somnambulism is certainly on account of the inner wakening introduced in the absence of sense-consciousness, when the displacement of the threshold of sensibility enables the usually insensible modes of action of natural things to be felt, and therewith usually latent faculties of the Subject to be liberated. These faculties are of such a remarkable nature that they are still always doubted by rationalistic scepticism. I must, however, reserve the account of them for a special work. Here I will only adduce two examples, choosing those which are the most violently disputed, viz., clairvoyance and the healing instinct; whereby it will appear that what calls itself scepticism is frequently nothing more than a deficiency in philosophical circumspection.

The most remarkable characteristic of clairvoyance is that time and space are therein overcome—that thus it occurs as far-seeing in space and as fore-seeing in time. The rationalist holds that for impossible. Now, it is clear, on the other hand, that as we do not know what time and space are, we have no right at all to declare their superability in certain abnormal processes of cognition to be impossible. It is only the vulgar who suppose themselves to know what time and space are; the philosopher confesses his ignorance. But should he, with Kant, hold time and space to be mere forms of our knowledge, he will, from this standpoint of transcendental idealism, find

* Hippokrates: 'Aphorisms,' vii. 5.
clairvoyance first rightly possible; and it was just thus that Schopenhauer, as a Kantian, believed in it.

The curative instinct of somnambules has encountered still more violent attacks from physicians. Yet is it conceivable by mere reference to the analogy of hunger and thirst. These feelings admonish the organism to repair exhausted forces from time to time; but they are quite general in their demands, that is, have no reference to any special chemical substances. Hunger and thirst are therefore gentle diseases, for which Nature suggests the remedy by an indefinite feeling in the sensibility, but not yet specialized in the idea. But if hunger and thirst attain a high degree, then is the faculty of mental representation also excited, and so arises the vision of the curative means. Thus the traveller in the desert, consumed with thirst, sees himself surrounded by springs and brooks, and Trenk, in the entrenchments of Magdeburg, had the vision of luxurious repasts. Now, if the threshold of sensibility is shifted, that is, if the sensibility is refined, then are hunger and thirst specialized, definitely directed instincts appear, as sympathy or antipathy, in different sorts of illnesses or in pregnant women, even opposed to the usual taste, and in conformity with the need of the child. Still more specialized are the needs of the organism in the highly exalted inner life of somnambules, the displacement of the threshold of sensibility being therein very considerable, and these needs attain to consciousness, though at other times they remain below the threshold, or are limited to a vague general feeling. Thus, whoever regards the curative instinct of somnambules as an inconceivable marvel, should logically also
confess that the only quantitatively distinguished and less specialized curative instincts of hunger and thirst are just as inconceivable. They only appear to us intelligible, because custom has effaced their problematic character, and we confound habit with explicability. As Cicero says, we do not ask the reason of things continually seen.*

The healing instinct is not peculiar to Somnambulism alone, but belongs to other conditions characterized by the displacement of the threshold of sensibility; having indeed its foundation in this displacement; as in ordinary dream, in unconscious febrile states, etc., in madness and in 'possession,' of which an example is quoted by Horst.† The healing instinct does not merely prescribe medicinal substances. Among the 'possessed,' for instance, there is often a sudden requirement of rapid circular movement.‡ Now, this same movement appears in the so-called dance of the Dervishes, as a means of exciting the somnambulic condition; and as somnambules often prescribe the same for themselves, the reason evidently lies in the necessity for intensifying the somnambulism, that is, for deepening the sleep.

In like manner the other faculties of somnambules show themselves as only exaltations of tendencies which are weakly apparent already in ordinary dream, and even in the waking state, e.g., in idiosyncrasies; so that only one who is ignorant of these preliminary stages can believe that scepticism is incumbent upon him in regard to the extreme developments. The

* Cicero: 'De Naturâ Deorum,' ii. 38.
† Horst: 'Zauberbibliothek,' v. 206.
‡ Gorres: 'Die Christliche Mystik,' iv. 174.
existence of these preliminary stages is, however, another proof that somnambulism does not produce new faculties in man, but only, by the displacement of the threshold of sensibility, brings those already existing from latency into manifestation.

2. Artificial Somnambulism.

As all things of Nature can be known in their pure essentiality, if freed from their accidental constituents, their dross, as it were, and offered thus prepared to the understanding, so also somnambulism. As a natural phenomenon it enters as an incident of diseases, or of an intense emotional upheaving—as in the Christian mystic—or even under the influence of different chemical substances—as in witchcraft. But in all these cases accidental concomitants adhere, since the symptoms of these occasional causes are often intermingled with the symptoms of somnambulism. Now if physicians do not know the distinction already insisted upon, between occasion or condition, and true cause, they often take the symptoms of the displacement of the threshold in somnambulism for symptoms of those, for the most part, morbid causes, whereby the threshold is displaced.

It often happens, for instance, that the symptoms of religious ecstasy, when this supervenes—post hoc, but not propter hoc—upon hysteria, are curtly dismissed as symptoms of hysteria, or of insanity when somnambulism is induced in that condition; and as in fever morbid phantasms often occur, the visions of the somnambulism, which often follows upon fever, are also therefore described as worthless phantasms.
Now to the powers inductive of somnambulism belongs the influence which one man can exercise upon another. But because this influence can be regulated at pleasure—little as the laws of this regulation are yet known—somnambulism also may be induced as an artificial preparation, purified from its accidental ingredients.

It is true that hitherto this artificial somnambulism has been applied almost exclusively to the diseased, whose sensibility generally disappears with the disease itself; but a later experimental psychology will present somnambulism with all the greater purity, if it takes for its object, though rarely obtainable, the sound, and at the same time, sensitive man.

Artificial somnambulism takes place when a man—somnambulist—is, by another man—magnetiser—subjected to the influence of animal magnetism. This magnetic sleep is much deeper than that produced by the natural healing force alone, but essentially resembles the sleep of natural somnambulism; the inner waking, moreover, is much more complete and clear in the magnetic sleep;* and accordingly in the latter the psychical faculties, also, of somnambules are purer and intensified, though in both cases essentially alike. On all these accounts the magnetic sleep is more adapted to exhibit to us the nature of the thing than is natural somnambulism; but from the essential similarity of the phenomena we may know that in both conditions the same process, psychically and physiologically, takes place; that is to say, that it is one and the same force which is often set free in the interior of the organism, but can also be com-

* Kieser: 'Archiv für tierischen Magnetismus,' i. 3, 15.
municated by one man to another. Man can accordingly even place himself artificially in the magnetic sleep; an art of which the old Indian secret teaching in the Vedanta philosophy knew more, and even the Indian fakirs of the present day, who let themselves be buried alive, know more than we Europeans.*

Artificial somnambulism, therefore, presupposes an inner tendency, not actually produced by the magnetic treatment, but only excited to activity thereby; this treatment only facilitates the setting up of a process, which Nature frequently induces from her own initiative as a curative crisis, but it permits an arbitrary elevation and regulation of this process.

The discovery, or rather—historically expressed—the rediscovery of animal magnetism, is due to the physician Mesmer, and fell at the end of the last century. That was a time very unfavourable for the right estimation of this discovery. Materialism then already dominated the minds which were pressing on to the Revolution. Consequently, that happened, which usually happens with important new discoveries; first the facts were denied, and when they could be denied no longer, they were judged from the standpoint of the then dominant system, according to the typical case of Livingstone's above-mentioned negro. The materialistic psychology believed itself all the more justified in this judgment, that, as already said, symptoms of disease are frequently intermingled with symptoms of somnambulism arising within the disease. Cause and condition were already at that time confounded, and a causal connection was believed to exist between disease and

* Preyer: 'Der Hypnotismus,' 43-60.
the phenomena of somnambulism, and therefore somnambulism, as to its content, was explained as morbid, whereas only the cause of its condition is morbid.

This materialistic-physiological judgment of somnambulism naturally conveyed a wholly false conception of its phenomena, whose value can as little be expressed in terms of materialism, as pounds can be measured with an ell yard. They not only find no place in materialism, but would rather burst the ring in which its system of thought is confined.

But it would be unjust to hold the generation of that day exceptionally reprehensible. It is historically provable that at all times the representatives of science have been just those who have opposed the greatest obstructions to really new ideas. And that is natural. Goethe somewhere says that the greatest enemies of new ideas are the old ideas; and this hostile à priori prepossession must therefore be at its highest point among those who know the old ideas best, and who have systematised them most. The very fact of the high development of any branch of science must dispose its professors to shut out ideas which have a tendency to burst the old frames. Wholly new phenomena have no place in any system, because therein the old phenomena are already connected in an articulate whole, and it is not in the nature of systematisers to leave open spaces suggestive of imperfection. When, for example, the Paris Academy [of Sciences] received information of the fall of meteorites in France, it rejected it as superstition, and even such a mind as Goethe ridiculed in his youth the meteor of Einsisheim. Among the ancient Greeks, on the other
hand, the fall of stones from the sky was recognised as a fact without any prejudice. And it is from the very advances in astronomy that this fallacy of opinion is to be explained. Greek opinion had not become shut up and petrified in a system, and could therefore more easily assimilate new facts than could the highly developed astronomy of the moderns, who accounted that to be impossible which was only indigestible for their system. Thus does the science of Nature, by the fact of its cultivation, come to be Nature's Procrustean bed.

So, also, is Mesmerism quite indigestible for Materialism, which, stiffened into a system, has lost its pliability, and instead of the system being reformed, the facts are disparaged, and we hear of hysteria, hallucination, and, finally, even of deception, only that it may not be necessary to recognise the unaccommodating phenomenon of clairvoyance. Physiologists prefer to seek the explanation of the human problem in the mangled bodies of animals, to extracting it from their own interior natures. They are people looking about everywhere for the hats which are on their heads. *

Whoever, imprisoned in system, sets out with the presupposition that all psychology must be resolved into physiology, is logically compelled to deny clairvoyance. And if he ignores the distinction between cause and condition, he must pronounce it an impos-

* If the scope and aim of physiological researches of this character were as ambitious as the text assumes them to be, the reproach would, no doubt, be amply justified from the author's point of view. But whatever else might be said, in the proper place, of the practices of physiologists, it seems scarcely fair to tax them with an absurdity not at all suggested by the special objects of their experiments.—Tr.
sibility for one man to become clairvoyant because another man makes magnetic* passes down his body. But this impossibility will also be conceded by every intelligent person; there is no force in the human hand to make another individual clairvoyant. But the following is quite logically possible:

With the magnetic passes which I make down another organism there streams from my hand a material agent, which is invisible to the nerves of sight, except, perhaps, in the dark. This agent is transferred to the other organism, combining with the similar agent in that organism, and in a manner not yet sufficiently explained, distributing or localising it, whereby the organism is sunk into a deep sleep.

The causal connection extends up to this point: the magnetic pass is the cause of the magnetic sleep. Now, supposing that in this sleep ordinary dream-visions occurred, the pass is not the cause of these, but the deep sleep, itself the last effect of the pass, is the condition of the visions, whose cause, however, lies in the interior of the organism, that is, in its physiological dispositions. By much less can the magnetic pass be the cause of the true visions of clairvoyance. But in the sleep thus caused occurs a displacement of the psycho-physical threshold; the line which, in waking, marks the constant division between conscious and unconscious is removed, a new material of feeling is furnished, first from the interior bodily sphere, but next from the external world, and with the new feelings are naturally introduced new cognitions and faculties. The magnetic pass is therefore

* He would of course begin by denying the 'magnetic' character of the passes.—Tr.
no cause of these faculties, which are already latent in us, but it has only by suppression of the sense-consciousness removed the obstruction to the experience of these faculties. The magnetic pass thus supplies merely the condition under which it is possible for the transcendental Subject, restrained below the threshold by the sense-consciousness of waking life, to overstep that threshold.

Not only is all that logically possible, but it is confirmed as fact by thousands of experiments. What is true of the light of the sun is thus true of the light of sense. As the one in its setting and rising neither produces nor destroys the stars, but occasions their optical appearance and disappearance, in like manner the transcendental Subject emerges from, or retreats into, the Unconscious, as the sense-consciousness goes down or rises.

To no one can even the logical possibility of clairvoyance be made intelligible, if he does not understand this important distinction between cause and condition. And yet it was understood even so long ago as by Plutarch, when he said: 'As the sun does not first shine when it escapes the clouds, but is constant, only seeming dark and invisible to us by reason of the vapours, so also the soul does not first obtain the faculty of seeing the future when it emerges from the body as from a cloud, but already now possesses it, but is blinded by union with the mortal part of us.'

By the rediscovery of this mysterious force, which is not very aptly designated animal magnetism, the foundation is laid for an experimental psychology.

* Plutarch: 'On the Cessation of the Oracles.'
That this discovery is still insufficiently recognised—the recent researches into Hypnotism show a tendency for the better—is easily explained by remembering the concessions which such a recognition would imply on the side of medical science. The mere definition of the thing sufficiently shows the difficulties which stand in its way. I intentionally select a definition which brings mesmerism to its most paradoxical expression, but is nevertheless correct. The magnetic treatment is a method of healing in which the patient assumes the part of the physician—he undertakes his own diagnosis and himself prescribes the remedies—while the physician, when he is the magnetiser, is the medicine. It is somewhat difficult for a physician to believe that, nor will he easily be convinced that an uneducated person in sleep understands more of diagnosis and therapeutics than a highly trained physician awake. Yet Hippokrates declared that the best medicine was dream.

The opposition is therefore natural. But that magnetism and somnambulism are healing means is irrefutably consequent upon the fact that there is a natural somnambulism introduced by Nature in many diseases as a critical and favourable symptom, just as artificial somnambulism introduces a very deep sleep, which must bring with it the recognised curative effect of light sleep in an exalted measure. But to the depth of sleep corresponds not only its physiological curative power, but also the clearness of the inner wakening, since it determines the degree to which the threshold of sensibility is displaced. By this displacement the faculty of perception extends to
interior conditions and is raised to a clear inner self-inspection. This makes possible a diagnosis, the value of which is not to be less esteemed because the technical terms of science are not also at command.

But even in relation to the external world, the organism is subjected not only to influences known to us in waking, but also to others which, lying beneath the threshold of sensibility, are first perceived with its displacement. From chemical substances of the animal and vegetable kingdom it experiences influences which in waking manifest themselves only very seldom as idiosyncrasies, and it feels their useful or deleterious relation to itself, as happens also in the animal instinct. On this capacity depends the faculty of somnambules to prescribe for themselves the suitable remedies.

The remarkable faculties of somnambules are not always found united in one individual, but distributed, so that for a complete view of this condition the observation of many cases is requisite. Moreover, the individual distinctions are very important.

As to the organ of perception, and the mode of perception, of somnambules, we are still much in the dark. The brain-consciousness being suppressed in them, the ganglionic system, with the solar plexus, has been said to be the centre of perception, and so far rightly, that the psychical functions of somnambules are accompanied by parallel changes in the ganglionic system, just as there is a parallelism between sense-consciousness and changes in the brain, interpreted by materialists into a causal relation.

Let us pause here a moment, that we may not fall into the same error in our judgment of somnambulism.
Materialism confounds the condition, without which there is no mental activity, with its cause. Because the mind acts through its organ, Materialism says that it is developed from the organ. Mental activity is normal with the healthy brain, and morbid in brain diseases; from which Materialism infers the identity of mind and brain activity. But if the violin player plays well or ill according to the character of his instrument, the identity of artist and instrument is not thence to be inferred. Psychology has therefore never found a better expression for the relation between mind and cerebral-system, senses and brain, than that of Plato: 'We know through the senses with the soul.'* Everyone would say of the relation between eyes and spectacles, that we see through—that is, by means of—the spectacles with the eye; but according to the logic of Materialism light would be a function of the spectacles.

Now, as waking consciousness proceeds parallel with corresponding changes of the senses and brain, so the transcendental-psychological functions seem to be parallel with corresponding changes in the ganglionic system, whose central seat, the solar plexus, was already called by the ancients the brain of the belly. With a somnambule of the physician Petitin, the pit of the stomach protruded like a ball.† Bertrand's somnambule said, pointing to her stomach, she had something there which spoke, and of which she could inquire. Her instinct taking on the dramatic form of dream, she bent with her face over her stomach, rubbing the latter lightly with her fore-

* Plato: 'Theæt.,' 185.
† Fr. Fischer, 'Der Somnambulismus,' iii. 110.
finger, and then answered all the questions which she put herself, or which were put to her.*

A somnambule with Werner more particularly described the dualism of brain and solar plexus, as it reveals itself on the transition to somnambulism. Before her senses were suppressed, but while she was already gravitating towards somnambulism, she said: 'Where am I? I am not at home in the head. There is a strange struggle between the pit of the stomach and the head; both would prevail, both see and feel. That cannot be; it is a tearing asunder. It is as if I must send down the head into the stomach if I would see anything. The pit of the stomach pains me, if I think above; and yet down there it is not clear enough. I must wonder, and that with the head, over the new disposition of the stomach.'†

That the ganglionic system can assume the functions of the cerebral system is apparent also in the animal kingdom, as in molluses, and such insects as have highly-developed instincts, but imperfectly developed senses.

Brain and solar plexus, the two foci of the two systems, are also just those parts of the human organism which can be most effectually magnetised. Their antagonism has already been declared in the Vedanta philosophy. It is a fundamental doctrine of the Vedas, that he, whose senses are restrained, comprehends and knows everything from the 'hollow of the heart.' Therefore is the Yogi praised who has found the union (joga) with the heart (manas).

* Bertrand: 'Traité du Somnambulisme,' 137.
† Werner: 'Symbolik der Sprache,' 124.
In general, so many parallels may be drawn between the expressions of our somnambules about their condition, and what is said in the Vedas concerning the Yogi, that it is easy to see that in both cases it is one and the same thing that is spoken of. Thus it is said: 'The self-restrained man is awake when it is night for all beings; and when all beings are awake, that is the night of the right-seeing sage.'*

Similarly, the seeress of Prevorst: 'In this state I do not dream; it is not to be taken for sleep; it may be so for the outer world, but for the inner world it is the clearest waking.'† So another somnambule: 'This state is like nothing less than sleep, but is the brightest waking.'‡ When it is said: 'He who is united with Brahma has the eyes fixed to the middle of the eyebrows,'§ in this external mark may be recognised that by which the somnambulic state is indicated, the ball of the eye being continually turned back towards the root of the nose.

Now in this state of ecstasy there awakes, according to the Veda, the inner person (Prussha), which is distinguished from the waking person, the former knowing the identity of all beings (Tat twam asi); the latter—Ahankara—is described as concerned with the self-assertive Ego.|| Even Mesmer's theory is indicated in the Vedas, for the ether of the cosmos is also within the heart. 'Spirit—Prussh—this is

* Bhagavadgita, ii. 70.
† Kerner: 'Die Seherin v. Prevorst,' i. 149.
‡ Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 87.
§ Bhagavadgita, v. 21.
|| Windischman: 'Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte,' i. 1570.
all . . . who knows this in the hollow of the heart throws off the fetters of ignorance. *

The Vedas are thus clear upon this point, that the consciousness interiorly awaking in somnambulism is other than the sense-consciousness of our Ego. But the somnambulic consciousness also demands a supporter, and since the person of the sense-consciousness, the Ego, is not this supporter, we have to distinguish between Ego and Soul, between Person and Subject; for, as Aristotle said: 'It is decisive of the question, whether the soul exists, if among the activities and emotional states of our Subject are to be found such as do not belong to the body.'† Now somnambulism proves the existence of such functions in an abundance of phenomena, and therefore is the proof it affords of the existence of a soul of far more convincing cogency than all that is offered in philosophical and religious systems. But the doctrine of soul must assume a different form from that which it has in religious systems, where soul and Ego, Subject and person, are identified, while somnambulism proves that there is the greatest distinction between them. The religious view could naturally not withstand the attacks of materialism, which shows that the sense-consciousness, as connected with the organism, must with this be perishable, that thus the Ego is no real being, but merely a condition, a product of our organism.‡ Against that

* 'Atharva Veda mundaka,' i. cap. 1.
† Aristotle: 'De Anima,' i. c. 1.
‡ There is in this passage, as elsewhere, an ambiguity in the phrase, 'sinnliche Bewusstsein.' If it is taken to include the whole normal consciousness of waking life, the concession in the text to materialism would be wholly inconsistent with the dis-
there is nothing to be urged, and even the pantheistic systems of philosophy concede it. But materialism is only victorious against the religious doctrine of soul, which does not distinguish between soul and Ego; it is powerless against a doctrine in which even the functions of the body, unconscious for the Ego, are traced to the soul; in which the soul is considered as the producer, not the product, of the body, and in which the whole organism, together with the sense-consciousness, is conceived as a transitory phenomenal form of this soul. Against this soul lying beyond our self-consciousness, and evidenced with the fullest clearness in somnambulism, materialistic arguments prove nothing, and it is also not open to the current objection of dualism; but, on the contrary, the dualism of mind and body is in it monistically suppressed.

When somnambules themselves speak of the manner of their perception, it is naturally in the language of sense; thus they talk of seeing, hearing, etc. This is, of course, only a make-shift, and perhaps one cannot conceive the far-seeing in space as if by somnambulism the sense of sight experienced a telescopic extension. It is, therefore, better to recognise in this designation of the mode of per-

---

triction upon which the author so strongly insists, between cause and condition. And since he thinks there is good ground for believing that the consciousness which awakes in somnambulism is connected with the solar plexus as its organ, one does not see how, according to the above admission, it can any more survive that organ than the sense-consciousness can survive the brain. It must be added that in the narrower meaning of 'sinnliche Bewusstsein,' the religious doctrine of the soul is no more solicitous for the preservation of mere organic sense-consciousness than is the author.—Tr.
ception of the 'inner sense' a mere translation into the language of waking experience, rather than by literal interpretation to be misled into scepticism, or to undertake premature definitions of this inner sense. Determinately, we can only say *that*, not *how*, somnambules perceive; and since we must presuppose the universal validity of the law of causality for this state also, it is a necessary inference that there exists an organ of perception, and a regular connection between this organ and the outer world, by means of a material agent; the organ being there even in waking life, but below the threshold of sensibility, whose displacement in somnambulism makes perception possible. Could a dreamer be asked if he slept, he would say no; and this question is answered in the same way by somnambules with reference to the inner waking; and all the more rightly as what they perceive is a part of reality. Obscurely intelligible as this inner sense still is, yet in somnambulism the outer senses are so closed, that for the inner perception they are not taken into account; it is, therefore, not surprising to hear that even the born blind see in somnambulism, * as even in ordinary sleep they have dream-images.

To make intelligible the different functions of somnambules, and to dissipate the doubts in respect to them, a long investigation is necessary, and this I reserve for a distinct treatment. I must confine myself here to mere indications, the partial exposition of which in the next chapter will, however, suffice to show, that both the modes and the content of cognition of somnambules far exceed the consciousness

* Kieser: 'Archiv für tierischen Magnetismus,' ii. 1, 22.
and self-consciousness of sense. The latter form, therefore, only one of the psychical conditions possible for men, and only the half man is defined if his mental nature in waking only is considered. Not in waking, but in somnambulism can we undertake an interior diagnosis and specify the necessary remedies. An antithesis to waking shows itself also in the greater conformity of mien and gestures to the inner feelings of somnambules; their language is improved, and their memory embraces things long forgotten. Their visions are frequently allegorical, as indeed is often the case in the common dream, so that they do not usually themselves understand the meaning. Their faces are expressive of a meditation corresponding to their new condition, and of a highly elevated well-being. When their inner life rises to the highest clearness, a moral and intellectual exaltation is also evinced; the latter, however, not as enhanced reflection, but as an intuitive mode of knowledge, as happens in conditions, related to somnambulism, of instinct and artistic production, with predominant infusion of feeling and imagination. If to this is added Clairvoyance, discarding the cognitional forms of space and time—the best confirmation of Kant's doctrine—it may well be said that in somnambulism is revealed a world closed to the consciousness of sense, and an Ego closed to the normal self-consciousness. Physiological and philosophical theories of cognition have been long in clear agreement that the world is our representation, not coinciding with reality; and they recognise a transcendental world lying beyond our senses.* This is confirmed by

* [The author is here referring to the fact that a consciousness, or senses, in course of evolution cannot be adequate to their
somnambulism, which shows that our consciousness does not exhaust the world, since the mere displacement of the threshold of sensibility in some degree lifts the veil from the transcendent world; and the like of self-consciousness; as a special case of consciousness, our self-consciousness not exhausting our Ego, since a mere displacement of the threshold of sensibility reveals the transcendent prolongation of the Ego, and ourselves as inhabitants of that transcendent world.

Hitherto the Unconscious has only been recognised by physiology in relation to the vegetative functions of the organism, which are performed without participation of the conscious will, and in thinking, the thoughts emerging in consciousness being conceived as the final result of an unconscious process. Philosophy has made a greater advance, and Hartmann has shown this, for our consciousness insoluble, being of the Unconscious in the whole world of phenomena. This indicates a definite direction for the further development of philosophy. The first concern is a closer definition of the Unconscious. Evidently that is only possible, if there are conditions of man in which the normal threshold of our consciousness and self-consciousness is pushed back. Now, that happens in somnambulism. We know from it, that our unconscious functions are only relatively unconscious, possible future content, which he calls the 'transcendental world.' On the other hand, it would be an utter misunderstanding to identify the transcendent world in this sense (in which it is mere future or potential phenomenon) with Kant's 'thing-in-itself,' unless we were to suppose that the biological evolution of organic consciousness could bring it to a point at which it would know immediately, without the subjectively imposed forms of space and time which characterise phenomenal perception.—Tr.}
that is, for the man of the senses, that they are, however, accompanied by a transcendental consciousness, whereby the self-diagnosis of somnambules is possible. The like is true of instinct and of the productions of genius, which are likewise accompanied by a transcendental consciousness. But because this transcendental consciousness pertains to our Ego in its transcendental prolongation, and individuality in somnambulism is by no means pantheistically dissolved, but is exalted rather, a large province must first be divided off from the Unconscious of the pantheistic system, and metaphysical individualism re-enters upon its invaded right.

The individual thus lies this side and that side of the threshold of sensibility. These two halves of our being are related as two scales of a balance: the one rises above the threshold as the other sinks below it. When somnambules awaken, their consciousness and self-consciousness shrink into the normal condition of waking life. The threshold of sensibility thus certainly effects a dualism of our being; but this is, as it were, only optically a dualism of two persons of one single Subject, as the dualism of a double star is monistically suppressed in its common point of gravitation. The doctrine of the human soul, which on account of its dualism has been given up by modern science, thus loses this objectionable character, and is monistic.

Somnambulism, therefore, forms the foundation for a doctrine of man, which may be conceived as a doctrine of his duality in unity.

Now, the study of somnambulism has certainly convinced me, that the positiveness with which I speak
of its reality and high philosophical importance must seem strange to those who find among materialistic authors an equally positive denial of all its facts.

This is usually accompanied by the assertion that somnambulism has been exposed as deception by the Paris Academy. This utterly untrue assertion is repeated in good faith and belief by the opponents of magnetism, and no one takes the trouble to inspect for himself the historical documents of the Paris Academy. Büchner says: 'Already in the year 1783, on the occasion of the presence in Paris of the celebrated magnetiser, Anton Mesmer, a scientific commission under the leadership of Bailly and Arago delivered an exemplary judgment, which after careful examination described the whole thing as a swindle, resting upon hallucination, deception of the senses, excited force of imagination, and imitative tendency. The Paris Medical Academy also arrived at the same results after many thorough examinations.'* Spitta disposes of the subject with equal brevity, saying: 'The wretched swindle of magnetic cures . . . had been exposed in the year 1784 by the sentence of two commissions of investigation ordered by Louis XVI.'† In accordance with this statement, Spitta leaves the most interesting state of sleep, the magnetic, and the most interesting state of dream, somnambulism, wholly untreated, notwithstanding the title of his book, which thus no more fits the contents than a man's broad-brimmed hat a child's head; for the title includes mesmerism, which is excluded in the contents.

* Büchner: 'Kraft und Stoff' (1883), 361.
† Spitta: Schlaf- und Traum-zustände der menschlichen Seele' (1883), 124.
Now, I will first show that the assertion in question, which is transmitted like a disease from one opponent of magnetism to another, is untrue.

Mesmer had repeatedly applied to the Academy, which did not vouchsafe him a hearing, until directly ordered by Louis XVI. to investigate the subject. The judgments delivered were, however, by no means exemplary, as Büchner asserts, but frivolous and unscrupulous. Two citations will prove this.

In the 'Report of the Royal Commissioners,' it is said:

'Les malades distingués, qui viennent au traitement pour leur santé pourraient être importunés par nos questions; le soin d'observer pourrait les gêner ou leur déplaire; les commissaires eux-mêmes seraient gênés par leur discrétion. Nous avons donc arrêté, que notre assiduité n'étant pas nécessaire, il suffirait que quelques-uns d'entre nous vinssent à ce traitement de temps à temps."

Not more scrupulous was the Medical Academy, as appears from the following citation from its report:

'Nous avons cru enfin ne pas devoir fixer notre attention sur des faits rares, insolites, merveilleux, qui paraissent contredire toutes les lois de la physique, parceque ces cas sont toujours le résultat de causes compliquées, variables, cachés, inextricable.'

No wonder that the physician Jussieu refused to put his signature to such a report.

From the last citation it is evident that the Medical Academy in no way pronounced mesmerism a 'swindle,' as Büchner and Spitta assert, for the facts, even 'wonderful' facts, they conceded, and it

* They are to be found in every considerable work upon the subject, e.g., in Bardin and Dupuis, 'Histoire académique du magnetisme animal,' Paris, Baillière, 1841.
could therefore be only the *theory* of Mesmer which was rejected. This recognition of facts is expressed even by the Academy of Sciences in the report of the Royal Commissioners:

'Rien n'est plus étonnant que le spectacle de ces convulsions. Quand on n'a pas vu, on ne peut s'en faire une idée. . . . Tous sont soumis à celui qui magnétise; ils ont beau être dans un assoupissement apparent, sa voix, un regard, un signe les en retire. On ne peut s'empêcher de reconnaître à ces effets constants une grande puissance qui agite les malades, les maîtrise, et dont celui qui magnétise semble être le dépositaire.'

It may be mentioned by the way that Arago, who is named by Büchner, was actually not then living. I shall speak of him further by-and-by, when I shall claim him on my side.

Whoever adduces the Report of the Commission of 1784 against Somnambulism in general, only proves thereby that he has never read this report. For in 1784 animal magnetism exclusively was in question, and it was later, *after* the appearance of that report, that the first cases of somnambulism were observed and published by a pupil of Mesmer, Puysegur. Mesmer himself, indeed, was acquainted with somnambulism, but he kept the secret. The Academies had no knowledge of it, and it was not at all an object of their investigations.

It results from the foregoing that Büchner, in order to condemn somnambulism, appeals to a judgment in which nothing whatever is said about somnambulism. But in what follows I shall show, that of another report of the Paris Academy, dealing specially with somnambulism, he has no knowledge at all. This report, ignorance of which is not permissible to a physician, is *unanimously in favour of*
somnambulism, and conforms all those wonderful phenomena ascribed to it, to which also clairvoyance especially belongs.

Already in 1820-21 experiments were instituted in the Hôtel Dieu, and thirty physicians subscribed the conclusion, that the opinion of the Commissions of 1784, that the phenomena of magnetism rested upon the heightened imagination of the patients, was erroneous. The patients fell asleep also when magnetised without their knowledge, and even through closed partition doors.

Finally, on the 10th October, 1825, Froissac proposed to the Medical Academy a new investigation of the matter. After some weeks a preliminary report was read, which set forth the necessity for the investigation:

1. Parce que les expériences d'après lesquelles ce jugement (of the year 1784) a été porté, paraissent avoir été faites sans ensemble, sans le concours simultané et nécessaire de tous les commissaires, et avec des dispositions morales qui devaient d'après le principe du fait qu'ils étaient chargés d'examiner, les faire complètement échouer.

2. Que le magnetisme jugé aussi en 1784 diffère entièrement par le théorie, les procédés, et les résultats, de celui, que les observateurs exacts, probes, attentifs, que des médecins éclairés, laborieux, opiniâtres, ont étudié dans ces dernières années.

This second reason refers to the circumstance that the subsequently discovered somnambulism had not come into discussion in 1784.

There was now named a commission of eleven physicians of the Academy, who spent five years on the investigation of Magnetism and Somnambulism, and on the 21st and 28th June, 1831, their report was read by the physician Husson. The facts of somnambulism were therein unanimously recognised:
the insensibility of the magnetised; their capacity for undertaking the diagnosis of their own interior organisms and those of others, of predicting the course of their own and others' diseases, and of prescribing effectual remedies; the exaltation of memory; clairvoyance without the use of their eyes; the action at a distance of the magnetiser, etc.

In this report the Commission says expressly, that it was instructed to investigate Somnambulism, 'qui n'avait pas été étudié par les commissaires de 1784.' Similarly, Arago speaks of the more recently discovered somnambulism, 'contre lequel on n'a plus le droit d'invoquer le rapport de Bailly' (of the year 1784).

I repeat, therefore: For the rejection of somnambulism Büchner appeals to an historical document which in this respect, according to the later declarations of the Academy itself, has no validity; while on the other hand, neither Büchner nor Spitta is aware of that document, which completely contradicts the opponents of somnambulism. But that ignorance is not now allowable in either a physician or a philosopher, for the report of 1831 says even of Magnetism, that it 'devrait trouver sa place dans le cadre des connaissances médicales,' while in a theoretical regard Magnetism and Somnambulism are as important for the philosopher, as practically for the physician. In this respect, indeed, Büchner is not alone among his colleagues, for that the very smallest number of them take an interest in this study I know myself, at least as regards the city in which I live, though the facts are at hand. For there half-a-dozen magnetisers are carrying on their business, and are much resorted to.
The physicians, indeed (yet with some exceptions), talk of 'swindle,' and say that the custom obtained proves nothing. True: it proves, at least in itself, nothing for magnetism, but very much against our medical science; for the public does not desert physicians who can cure diseases.

It is the fact, as Büchner says, that in 1837 a prize of 3,000 francs was offered for the somnambule who could read without use of the eyes, and that the prize was not won. The physician Pigeaire had brought his daughter, a somnambule of twelve years old, to Paris for this purpose. In private representations before certain Academicians, the clairvoyance was established—among the witnesses was Arago; but the Academy knew how to get out of it, and in the decisive sitting there was no experiment, because the physicians declared it an insufficient precaution that the girl's eyes were bound with linen cloth, covered with cotton, and then veiled with a black velvet mask, to see through which, Arago said, was an impossi-bility.

But of another prize Büchner seems to be ignorant. Dr. Berna, namely, offered 70,000 (!) francs for those Academicians who could read through the masks which the Academy had rejected in the case of Mdlle. Pigeaire, with the superfluous addition that he had no objection to the sum being expended on the poor.*

Having illustrated by two examples the proceedings

* Pigeaire: 'Puissance de l'électricité animale,' 143-176 (Paris, 1839). [It might, of course, be replied that the Academicians did not pretend to be experts in this mode of deception. But what, then, will be said of the opinion formally expressed by one of the most celebrated of modern experts in similar arts—Robert Houdin—after full investigation with another clairvoyant? See post, p. 240. Tr.]
of the opponents of Somnambulism, I may leave judgment upon them to the reader; adopting for myself only one thing which characterises them—brevity. As against Büchner and Spitta, I add here two propositions, from which all opponents of somnambulism may escape if they can. The first contains an historical fact, the second a logical inference from it:

1. By the investigations, extending over five years, of eleven physicians of the Medical Academy in Paris, whose unanimous Report of 1831 was publicly delivered, Somnambulism, with all its so-called 'miracles,' but of which the conformity to law is not to be doubted, has been proved an incontestable fact.

2. Against these positive instances, according to the logical rule, all negative instances of ever so many experimental failures in the past and future have not the smallest weight.

Now, as this judgment of the Academy stands by no means alone, but is reinforced by an incalculable number of completely authenticated facts subsequently observed by hundreds of physicians, whoever wishes to learn the truth has only to read to be convinced; and I am unquestionably justified in declining further notice of that which calls itself euphemistically scepticism (but which is, in fact, neglect of the sources of information, and therefore ignorance) and in passing on upon my own way.

At the present time attention has been again directed to Magnetism, by the performances of the magnetiser, Hansen. The phenomena elicited by him were at first denounced as swindles, but afterwards—that the discovery might be claimed for official science—they received the name of Hypnotism. Physio-
logists have since become zealous students of this hypnotism, which they had neglected for forty years after its discovery by Braid, and which includes a part of the mesmeric phenomena. It is indeed not to the honour of science that it should have needed public exhibitions to incite it to the study of such important phenomena; meanwhile, it is at least no longer to be feared that mesmerism will again fall into oblivion, and if the physiologists persevere in their zeal, and will extend their experiments, it is certain that they will induce the other phenomena of mesmerism. And however sceptical they have been concerning what other observers have seen, they will not remain in that disposition as to what is not only seen but done by themselves. Perhaps the word 'Hypnotism' will still be retained, but that will be only because they are ashamed to use the term 'Mesmerism.'

Hypnotism and Mesmerism are by no means coincident in their range. Braid himself defined hypnotism as a 'result of modifying influence which fixed and intense attention directed to particular parts of the body exercises on the physical processes occurring in them, whether this attention is excited by external influence and intentionally, or from the free will of the patient, who to his concentration adds the expectation that certain changes will make their appearance.'* Now, Braid merely proved by his experiments that concentrated attention is one of the means of eliciting phenomena having a similarity to those of mesmerism; but he has not shown that other means of this nature do not exist. All phenomena of mesmerism may spontaneously follow upon diseases, deep

* Preyer: 'Der Hypnotismus,' 109.
trouble, religious emotion, etc., and, even if concentrated attention should be supposed in such cases, that wholly fails when sleeping persons are magnetised with success, and even with remarkable ease; which is only to be explained by the fact that ordinary sleep is an incipient somnambulism. Dupotet tried magnetising with thousands of sleepers, and proved the same phenomena in all.* So also the cautious and sceptical Deleuze says that natural sleep is the most favourable moment for influencing anyone magnetically.† Even animals can be magnetised, as is proved by the experiments of Lafontaine upon lions, hyænas, dogs, cats, squirrels and lizards.‡ From which it appears, that while in hypnotism a subjective factor on the side of the affected person is present, in Mesmerism an objective agency on the side of the magnetiser elicits the phenomena, and is taken up by the recipient organism. But should attention and imagination be supposed even with sleepers and animals, this false idea is disposed of by the magnetising of plants. Dr. Allix, in Turin, experimented on a *mimosa pudica*, which by reason of its shrinking, as if with alarm, from contact with the human hand, has also been named 'sensitive,' or *Noli me tangere*. He made it insensitive to touch by magnetising, as also by chloroform.§

If, moreover, Braid only admits the subjective factor, and were right, the magnetic agent would still not be disposed of, for the third case is conceivable,

* Dupotet: 'Manuel de l'étudiant magnétiseur,' 15.
† Deleuze: 'Histoire critique du magnetisme animal,' ii. 236.
‡ Lafontaine: 'L'Art de magnétiser,' 325, etc.
§ Fürst H. Zu Wied: 'Das unbewusste Geistesleben,' i. 140.
that concentrated attention is not of itself effectual, but liberates this magnetic agent in the organism; which would thus be a case of self-magnetising. We cannot suppose magnetisers to be a class of mankind by themselves: rather must everyone be more or less in possession of this agent; and there is no sufficient ground for doubting that one organism can impart it to another, presumably by means of the nerve-apparatus terminating the nerves beneath the skin at the finger-tips, and which is called the corpuscule of Paccini. According to the literature of the subject, this still doubted objective agent can not only be made visible in a dark room,* but somnambules see it also outside this room, as they unanimously agree, and it is even measurable.† For this reason it was a mistake to abandon so quickly the standpoint of Mesmer—who at once saw in magnetism a physical phenomenon—and to direct attention almost exclusively to the remarkable psychological phenomena of somnambulism, because this physical agent could not then be proved. Whereas the physical foundation of magnetism should first be established.

The so-called miracles ascribed to somnambulism, the conformity of which to law will be recognised in the next century, are not only facts, but also facts of the very greatest importance. In regard to both statements I can appeal to Schopenhauer, who undertook the study in the evening of his life, but unfortunately did not complete it. With reference to the actuality of somnambulism, he says: 'Who at this day doubts the facts of animal magnetism and its

* Reichenchbach: 'Der sensitive Mensch.'
† Robiano: 'Névrurgle.'
SOMNAMBULISM.

clairvoyance, is not to be called sceptical, but ignorant.' And as to the importance of the thing, he says: 'The phenomena under discussion are, at least from the philosophical standpoint, of all facts presented to us by the whole of experience, without comparison the most important; it is, therefore, the duty of every learned man to make himself thoroughly acquainted with them... Then, however, will a time arrive, when philosophy, animal magnetism, and natural science in the unprecedented progress of all its branches, will throw mutually a light so brilliant upon one another, that truths will be apparent which can only thus be attained.* In fact, somnambulism offers the most convincing proof of another order of things than those of sense, and also that we men ourselves are linked with that order by the side of our Subject which for the Ego is unconscious. Somnambulism proves that Schopenhauer and Hartmann are right in laying at the foundation of human phenomena a Will and an Unconscious; but it proves also that this Will is not blind, and that what to the Ego is unconscious is not unconscious in itself; that, further, between us and the world-substance a transcendental Subject must be interposed, a willing and knowing being; that thus the individuality of man avails beyond his temporary phenomenal form, and the earthly existence is only one of the possible forms of existence of our Subject.†

The science of man is therefore still unwritten. It may be that physiological psychology, the path heretofore pursued, will yet explain the earthly mode of

*Schopenhauer: 'Versucht über Geistersehen.'
† Cf. Hellenbach: 'Philosophie des gesunden Menschenverstandes,' 222.
existence according to its content, but not its fact; we shall first obtain true light upon the human problem when we penetrate our Unconscious, to which somnambulism forms the single aperture; for, as the astronomer must wait for the night of the world for the observation of the stars, so must we await the night of our sense-consciousness, that the emergence of our transcendental Subject may be visible.

It cannot be said that the study of somnambulism has hitherto been carried on in the right way; rather must it be confessed that there are faults on this as on that side the walls of Troy. Against à priori negations on the side of opponents is to be set off enthusiasm on the side of adherents. But it may be confidentially expected that from this parallelogram of intellectual forces will be developed as resultant a period of unprejudiced study of the object upon the experimental basis, as Jean Paul has predicted: 'Of the discoveries which throw light at once upon the human double world of mind and body, scarcely any century has made a greater than that of the last in animal magnetism, only that centuries go to the education and nurture of the wonder-child, till it grows up to be the wonder-worker of the world.'

* Jean Paul: 'Museum,' i. § 1.
CHAPTER V.

DREAM A PHYSICIAN.

1. Dream-images as Symbolical Representation of Bodily States.

In sleep our senses are closed to the outer world; so that normal consciousness, depending on the stimulations of these senses, disappears with the suspension of its supply. But in sleep there is an inner waking, which is dream. Dream-images also must have an exciting cause of some kind, and if this does not lie in the outer world, from which we are excluded, it must be sought within us.

Thus the question arises: In what relation stand dreams to our interior? This question is evidently not solved by speaking of the free activity of our imagination. Imagination in dream can indeed be called free, in so far as no conscious will, no attention, no definitely directed consideration evokes the images; but to admit freedom in the sense of causelessness is forbidden by the universal validity of the law of causality. The course of our representations in dream as in waking must be derived from our bodily states and psychical dispositions. In other words, dream-images must contain veiled intimations concerning health and disease of the body and the soul. The connection between our state of health and our
dreams must further be one conformable to law, that is, definite interior conditions must also draw after them definitely coloured dreams, or at least the general direction of the dream-imagination must be determined by them.

Dream is thus a symbolical representation of interior conditions of the dreamer; it is a symptom of health or disease. That this symptom is neglected by our physicians, everyone knows from his own experience. Perhaps none of my readers has ever met a physician who asked him about his dreams. It was otherwise, according to Aristotle's testimony, in the beginnings of medical science: 'The expert among physicians say that great attention is to be paid to dreams.' He gives the reason himself, when he says that to definite diseases correspond definite dreams.* In the following, it shall be shown that this neglect cannot be justified; and that, notwithstanding its symbolical disguise, dream is often a finer and more reliable symptom than the beat of the pulse and the state of the tongue.

It is generally known that the physician's most difficult task is diagnosis. Most mistakes are made in reasoning from the bodily symptoms to the internal cause of the disease. Thus, for instance, a young married lady of my acquaintance was treated by an English physician in India for cancer in the stomach, and, finally, her return home was prescribed; but on the journey the terrible cancer took the form of a sweet child, which unfortunately and naturally did not survive. Such extreme cases are, indeed, rare; but that many errors occur in medical diagnosis cannot

* Aristotle: 'On Prophecy in Dreams,' c. 1 and 2.
be denied, and are very intelligible, as this is the physician's greatest difficulty. If he succeeds in it, his trouble is, for the most part, crowned with success; and when it is quite superfluous, the mere appearance giving the necessary information, as, for example, in surgical cases, there the profession achieves its highest triumphs.

If, now, interior states are reflected in our dreams—if dream is a symptom—regard to it is the more relevant as it may assist the physician in just his most difficult duty—diagnosis. But the task of the physician is at present a double one; he has not only to investigate the disease, but must also prescribe the appropriate remedy. Now, the following inquiry will yield the somewhat surprising result, that dream is in both respects a physician, that it offers indications as well for cure as for diagnosis.

Dream depends on internal feelings of the organism, which determine the general quality of the dream-images. No other cause is conceivable. It is true, the inner excitations are present also in waking, but they do not come to consciousness, the brain being then preoccupied with the energetic impressions of the outer world. As the sunlight, outshining the stars, makes them disappear from sight, so do the sensations of waking consciousness repress those inner feelings; and as, when the sun has set, the mild light of the stars is again perceptible, so also in sleep different inner excitations, unregarded in waking, attain to perception. But through the nervous system the brain is in connection with all parts of the organism, so that every internal stimulation of a part of the body is transferred to the brain, where in
sleep it has its symbolical representation in a corresponding dream-image. Thus these dream-images come to be symptoms of internal conditions, and are as such the more valuable, because in waking the patient experiences nothing, or very little, of them, so that they are lost for the purpose of diagnosis. Internal feelings must be of a somewhat coarse nature to enter waking consciousness. Whereas the exalted susceptibility to inner excitations in sleep has the consequence, that much weaker degrees of morbid excitation attain to consciousness in dream than in waking, and therefore that diseases are announced earlier than they can be traced in waking consciousness. Symptomatic dreams are thus, as it were, prophetic, and while in waking we may suppose ourselves to be still in sound health, dream already betrays the first tokens of incipient disease.* Repulsive incidents in dream often depend on bodily states which in waking remain quite obscure, but are perceived by the dream imagination which represents the objective stimulation symbolically. Aristotle has already expressed the same in saying: 'Since the beginnings of all dreams are small, so also are those of diseases and other conditions arising in bodies. These must evidently, therefore, make their appearance earlier in sleep than in waking.'†

Dream is therefore a finer means of diagnosis than symptoms in the waking state, and betrays earlier stages of impending diseases, than does the other.

* [Practically, it is evident this would be of little use unless the dreamer not only remembered, but had the skill himself to perceive the import of his dreams; for the physician would not then have been called in.—Tr.]
† Aristotle: 'On Prophecy in Dream,' i. 1.
Maudsley says: 'Dreams sometimes have a truly prophetic character in regard to certain bodily affections, the early indications of which have not been sufficiently marked to awaken any attention during the mental activity of the day, or to do more than produce an obscure and formless feeling of discomfort, but which nevertheless declare themselves in the mental action of dreaming; when other impressions are shut out. When the disease ultimately declares itself distinctly in our waking consciousness, then the prophetic dream, the forewarning, is recalled to mind with wonder.'*

Every disease has its so-called incubation period, during which the patient is apparently still quite sound. At this time medical diagnosis detects no symptoms at all, these consisting in very weak excitations which do not enter consciousness, and only in dream are perhaps represented in images. Diagnosis is nevertheless facilitated by the circumstance that a property of dream is exaggeration, the inner sensations being, as it were, microscopically magnified by dream. Thus the old physician Galen† relates the case of a man who dreamed that his leg was turned to stone, and a few days later this leg was paralysed. Macario dreamed of an acute pain in the neck, but found himself quite well on waking; a few hours afterwards, however, he fell into a violent inflammation of the tonsils.‡ Teste, Minister under Louis Philippe, dreamed that he had a stroke, which,

† Galen: 'On Prophecy in Dream'
in fact, happened to him three days later.* If Teste had related this dream to a person inclined to superstition, such an one would, from the subsequent fulfilment, have inferred the prophetic nature of our dreams in the spiritualistic sense, whereas it is evidently only in the physiological sense that this true dream is to be so described. But if, on the other hand, Teste had related his dream to an intelligent physician, the latter might possibly have been able to prevent the fulfilment.

To external impressions, also, we have often in dream that exalted sensibility to which the exaggeration of the dream-image is due. The hot bottle at the soles of the feet makes us dream that we are stepping through fire, while if the bedclothes get displaced, leaving the feet free, we dream that we are wading through a cold brook. Hervey once dreamed that his chimney smoked, yet remarked nothing of it on waking. Some hours after he woke again, when the smoke had meanwhile become very strong.†

Simon Scholzius, a learned physician, tells of one who dreamed that a tall man, dressed like a Pole, approached him, and flung a stone against his breast; awakening in alarm, he felt, in fact, a severe pain in the middle of his breast, struck a light, and perceived just there a black spot, of the size of a hand, which gradually disappeared by cupping and blistering.‡ Friedreich relates that, when a candidate for the medical profession, he once watched by a sick person who had an ulcer in the leg, which, from fear of the

* Hervey, 232.
† Ibid., 352.
‡ Hennings: ‘Über Träume und Nachtwandler,’ Weimar, 1802, § 245.
knife, he would not allow to be opened. Suddenly he awoke from a dream, crying out that they had cut open the ulcer by force, this being found on examination to have burst of itself.*

The inner feelings are often thus dramatically motivated by the imagination through events in dream. The orator Aristides dreamed in the temple of Æsculapius that a bull attacked and wounded him in the knee; on awaking he found a tumour there. Arnold de Villanova dreamed he was bitten in the foot by a black cat; next day came on the same place a cancerous ulcer. Conrad Gessner dreamed he was stung by a serpent; a few days later there rose a plague-boil on the breast, of which he died.† It was a frequent experience of Krauss that dreams of dental operations were the forerunners of violent toothaches, and that dreams of bites of a tiger or of a venomous snake indicated the parts of the skin where soon afterwards an ulcer broke out.‡ Krauss sees the symbolical expression of physiological processes not only in the representations of dream, but also in the delusions of the insane, and he thinks the exciting organ is the same in both. The close relationship otherwise apparent between dream and insanity seems to justify this inference from similar representations to similar exciting causes. Thus Maury mentions an insane man who suffered from the delusion that he was a woman, and pregnant; Maury had the same idea himself in a dream, and as he traced it to a nervous

* Radestack: 'Schlaf und Traum,' 119.
† Perty: 'Die mystische Ercheinungen der menschlichen Natur,' ii. 365, 378.
‡ 'Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie, 1858 and 1859; Der Sinn im Wahnsinn.'
pain in the bowels, that was possibly also the case with the insane man.

According to Boismont, even waking hallucinations of a dramatic nature may precede other symptoms as forerunners of diseases. A lady, going one evening to her room, was terrified by the sight of a skeleton, which drew a dagger and thrust it into her left side. During the night an inflammation settled in the same side.

So in dreams perceptions of the general sensibility (synaesthesia) are sharpened, and those slight changes in the disposition of the organism, which escape waking perception, and whereby morbid conditions are first prepared, are often, long before the outbreak of the disease, represented in symbolical and usually dramatic form. This is especially the case when there is in the organism a chronic predisposition to a form of disease; therefore such predispositions may be inferred from frequently recurring dreams of a similar general character. It is said by the French physician, Verey, that bloody fluxes are announced by dreams of red colour, lymphatic effusions by dreams of inundations, internal inflammations by dreams of conflagrations. One dreamed of wild cats regularly before the recurrence of his chest-

* Maury: 'Le Sommeil et les Rêves,' 141.
† Boismont: 'Des Hallucinations,' 248. [There are well-attested cases in medical experience which suggest a different interpretation of this instance. No doubt the hallucination was connected with a latent morbid condition; but both the character and position of the later symptom—the inflammation in the side—may probably have been determined by the shock and impression upon the imagination produced by the hallucination itself. See Carpenter's 'Mental Physiology,' c. xix., p. 682.—Tr.]
‡ I. H. Fichte: 'Psychologie,' i. 540.
DREAM A PHYSICIAN. 199

spasms; another of throngs of people before his attacks of fever.* Carus reports that a man who was subject to painful and sudden spasms of the chest dreamed regularly before the attacks that he was pursued and bitten by cats; another was charged by bulls in his dreams when attacks of violent headache were impending.† In all such cases the value of the dreams for diagnosis lies chiefly in this, that they announce not only actual, but pending complaints, and can therefore be treated as timely warnings.

The association of ideas also frequently plays a part; Bonetus cites the case of a lady who could foretell her complaints quite regularly and certainly a few days before their occurrence by dreaming of her physician.‡ It is not necessary here to accept prevision; even these dreams were only symptomatic, and though not distinctly indicating the parts to suffer, yet in the heightened susceptibility of sleep an indeterminate uneasiness could be perceived, and the dream-image of the physician arise from mere association of ideas, which plays its part in dream as in waking. Hervey also relates an interesting dream of this nature. A traveller upon a journey to the sources of the Nile was seized with a violent inflammation of the eyes, which did not leave him till his return to France. Ten years later he remarked to his surprise that the scenes and events of that journey were constantly turning up in his dreams. This went on increasingly for six weeks, when finally he

* Siebeck: 'Traumleben der Seele,' 31.
† Carus: 'Psyche,' 238.
had another violent attack of inflammation of the eyes, from which he had remained exempt for ten years.* In this case the first beginnings of the inflammation were felt in dream six weeks before the outbreak, and awakened the associated representations of ten years before.

It has been observed that very agitated dreams precede the outbreak of insanity, e.g., oppressive nightmares; and that even after recovery the conditions of insanity still make themselves felt in dream. That is the case also with other disturbances of the organism, and what we name disease extends in its course beyond that threshold of waking sensibility, on either side of which we speak of health because we only perceive the grosser symptoms. Pathological dreams which continually recur are to be placed alongside the constant delusions of the insane. Burdach mentions a man who continually raved of a general advancing and retreating with his army. On dissection there was found in the brain a hydatid, rolling backwards and forwards, whose mechanical excitation had taken a symbolical representation as in dream. Another insane person believed that he felt in his body the heads of three frogs, and on dissection it appeared that this delusion had been produced by three indurated scirrhous glands of the epiploon.† Thus in madness as in dream, the seat and nature of the suffering can be inferred from the special character of the conscious impressions. For this reason Esquirol passed many nights by the bedsides of his insane patients, who often in sleep betrayed the causes of

* Hervey, 360.
† Perty: 'Mystische Erscheinungen,' etc., i. 61.
their disease.* We thus confound the cause with the effect, if we refer difficulty of breathing, from which we awake, to nightmares, or palpitations of the heart to fearful dreams, or explain bodily disturbances of the insane by their madness. The bodily affections are rather, on the contrary, the causes of the representations in dream and madness. Subsequently, indeed, the evoked images, by the force of their apparent objectivity, increasingly react on the bodily affections which are at the foundation of them; in this mutual action, and because the intensification is also symbolised, we have the reason that the dream-images do not remain of the same character, but are transformed as the dramatisation rises, till at length they awaken us. This wakening seems mostly to result from the fact that the excitement of the nerves of sense reaches a degree at which the system of motor nerves is also set in tension, and some muscle in motion. Even very slight tensions of the muscles immediately excite in us corresponding dreams, wherein we imagine ourselves running, flying, or falling, but they are seldom of such a degree as to occasion actual movements of limbs. Our sleep is in general motionless, only now and then the twitching of a limb, or even of the lips, betray that nerve excitations are transferred to the motor system, eliciting adequate dream-images. This is often apparent in the jerks and suppressed growls of dreaming sporting dogs. We have only to suppose a rise in this process of excitation of the motor nerves to get the phenomenon of sleep-walking. In that case there is no stopping at the mere dream-representation, but the night-walker translates his dream into action.

* Boismont, 273.
Inasmuch as our psychical affections, the feelings and dispositions of waking life, if of deep impression, always draw after them physiological changes of the organism, these are taken over in sleep, and are symbolised in dream. Dream-images thus often correspond also to our psychical conditions, and all the more that in dream they have full play, free from internal restraint. In waking we can combat unhappy moods by consideration of causes, by hope for the future, and in the worst case by religious and philosophical resignation, but in dream these rational repressive means fail us. So joyful as well as sad dispositions often manifest themselves in dream by extravagant images; dream thus offering indications for both bodily and psychical diagnosis. The material of dream is often supplied by external feelings, as a rule, however, by the internal; imagination working up this material in its own way.

As regards bodily feelings, we can sum up the foregoing in the words of Hippocrates: that in dream the soul knows the causes of disease, at least in an image. But when we comprehend this somewhat more closely, we shall gain the key to the understanding of one of the most remarkable phenomena of the somnambulic sleep, one which, although already confirmed by hundreds of physicians, still encounters doubt, because looked at by itself it is unintelligible, and which first becomes intelligible when its elementary form has been discovered in ordinary sleep, of which it is merely an exaltation.

For our dream-images not only point generally to the seat of inner feelings, but frequently represent the suffering organ itself more or less objectively (plas-
tisch). In such dreams the spatially constructed organ of the feeling enters the consciousness of the dreamer; symbolism, it is true, still takes place, but in such images of ordinary sleep, we already find the beginning of that penetrative feeling of the body as to its morbid symptoms of which such wonderful reports appear in the literature of somnambulism.

Among later investigators it is Scherner who has taken most trouble to prove the connection between organic nerve-excitations and dream-images, whereby often the plastic, if also phantastic, representation of the organ is obtained. We have from him the following programme: 'On the nerve-excitations from the interior of the body, dream forms, in a way unattainable to waking consciousness, immediate perceptions of the inner disposition of the body; the plastic formation either enters simple and clear, or is symbolically adorned in the knowing soul. Therefore with every specific nerve-excitation, according to which the corresponding sort of dream is formed, flow into the dream the architectonic copies of the sphere of the body belonging to the nerve-excitation, and the utmost the phantasy has to do is only to paint out all the figures acceding to it in corresponding symbolism. If the nerve-excitation arises in the organ of sight, as so often happens before waking, the structure of the retina is represented perceptibly in dream; if the excitation belongs to the stomach and the bowels, one is astonished at the fertility with which the imagination excels itself in representing the great and small circuits of this organ, its windings and its longitudinal course. Springs the excitation in the heart or lungs, we are pleased with the distinctness with
which the sketches of these organic movements are delineated.'

Scherner has certainly found the right point of view for the interpretation of dreams; but when he proceeds to the application, it often appears that the frame is too narrow, as other factors intervene, dream being no mere product of this inner penetrative feeling of the body. We must take into account, also, the spontaneous activity of imagination, which not only determines the modes of symbolising the material of sensibility, but also introduces foreign constituents according to the laws of association. We therefore cannot consider all the constituents of our dream-images as reflecting our bodily conditions.

Our state of health furnishes, as a rule, only the ground-tone of our dreams, giving unity of character to the images perceived, while the painting in detail seems to proceed wholly from the imagination. An interesting dream of this sort, in which the bodily condition furnishes only the general cue, and imparts unity of direction to the series of representations of the otherwise independently active imagination, is related by Volkelt:

'One evening, being in pleasant company, I had drunk more beer than usual, and therefore felt next morning a certain lassitude and leaden heaviness in all my limbs. In the intervening night I dreamed I went for a walk in the chief street of my native town, but not in my usual dress, but burdened with a black travelling cloak, the fur cap on my head, cloth shoes on my feet. I dragged myself slowly along, with the abashed feeling that this difficulty of movement came from excess in beer. Suddenly I
find myself sitting on the pavement; over my feet a
great heap of mantle is spread out. I turn home-
wards, and now carry the mantle folded up over my
left shoulder. Then there approaches me an un-
known maiden, who expects me to carry her rather
large basket. I decline, since I had nothing to do
with her basket. Then I see an old schoolfellow
by me, and already my mantle has transformed itself
into a small school-wallet slung on my back. On this
my companion hangs something else. At length he
stops my way at a corner of the street, supporting
himself against the house, and flinging his hands
about him, on which I awoke.

The feeling of bodily lassitude and heaviness
comes in every trait of the dream to evident expres-
sion (clothing with travelling mantle, fur cap, cloth
shoes, sitting down burdened, demand to carry a
basket, school-wallet, school-fellow weighting me still
further, and bringing me to a stop). That feeling is
certainly the incitement which gives direction to the
dream, and so far forms the bond of connection; but
only occultly, and behind the imagination. For
within the dream-phantasy, which is out and out of
visible presentation, the incitement cannot exist in its
original undisguised character. It is here symbolised
in that succession of images.*

Now were an art of dream-signification in this
physiological sense possible, that would come much
in substitution of our science of life, as the process
itself of life would be reflected in our dreams, while
our present physiology is founded chiefly on examina-
tion of the dead body.

In the first place we have seen that consciousness of our bodily condition is much more extensive and distinct in dream than in waking. What in the day is either perceived not at all or only as general feeling, is in dream particularly distinguished and symbolised. Now since the desistance of impressions from the outer world, in other words, suspension of the empirical consciousness, is the condition for that more distinct penetrative feeling of the body, and the threshold of sensibility can be so displaced that a content of consciousness can emerge which for the waking man is transcendental, it is presumable that the elevation of this content is in proportion to the depth of the sleep. We should thus undoubtedly obtain valuable disclosures, could we preserve the memory of the dream-images of deep sleep, or if in deep sleep we could be brought to speak upon our condition. It is not inconceivable that experimental psychology—a science as yet scarcely born—may discover means to these ends; but meanwhile it is only in somnambulism that one of them is in some measure attained. The somnambulic sleep is much deeper than ordinary sleep, and will therefore also bring with it a clearer sensibility of the body. Somnambules, moreover, can be made to speak, and concerning their bodily health they often do so spontaneously. It may therefore be supposed that the phenomena of somnambulism will offer a valuable contribution to the proof that dream is a physician.

2. Diagnosis in the Somnambulic Sleep.

(a) Self-Inspection. — That inquirer is lost for science who in the phenomena of Nature seeks only
confirmation of his preconceived theories, and who, confounding the horizon of his knowledge with the horizon of things, holds that only for possible which is within the first. If we approach Nature with à priori prejudices, we run the double risk, of either overlooking phenomena opposed to our hypotheses, or of explaining them falsely, that is to say, in the sense of our hypothesis.

Psychology is the most difficult of all sciences, and we have consequently only a narrow possession of assured knowledge in it. Here before all things is it therefore necessary that we should not allow ourselves to be blinded by the dominant common opinion, provisionally abstaining from every definitive judgment, and holding simply to the facts; for facts remain unshaken, but hypotheses are capable of development, have always changed, and will always change, till we are well-nigh omniscient. Only an omniscient person could judge à priori what phenomena are possible, what not; but in a province so little explored as is psychology, we must rather be prepared à priori to meet with the incomprehensible. Man is to us the greatest of all problems; we know not what life is, how an organism arises and maintains itself, and only from experience shall we gradually learn what forces and tendencies are latent in our soul. Wieland* says: 'Perhaps it is exactly the greatest man of science who least ventures to declare anything impossible which does not obviously belong to the class of four-angled triangles.' And in psychology especially we must follow this sound

* Wieland: 'Werke,' xxx. 97.
principle, to hold all for possible which does not contain a logical contradiction.

To common-sense it sounds very plausible, and even a thing of course, that a physician educated by years of study and experience should be better able to judge of a disease and its remedy when awake than an untrained person in sleep. But the plausible is not always the true, and it is not common-sense that discovers truth. The history of the sciences rather proves that every intellectual advance realises a paradoxical opinion, and intellectual development may be traced in the successive discomfitsures of common-sense. There is no logical contradiction in the assertion that persons in the somnambulic state judge diseases more correctly than the thoughtful physician; the phenomenon is thus in the first place possible, and since it has already been a thousand times confirmed by physicians themselves, it is also actual. Now if these facts wholly and utterly contravene our physiological systems, one can only say, so much the worse for our systems! for in the end these must always yield to facts, not facts to them.

It has already resulted from the foregoing inquiry that dream is a means of diagnosis. Now as the somnambulic sleep is incomparably deeper than ordinary sleep, it is presumable that faculties which in ordinary sleep are only exhibited in an elementary form, will appear in somnambulism in an exalted degree.

Sleep brings with it an inner wakening, dream, and that in proportion as it excludes our senses from the outer world. This exclusion is in somnambulism more complete, the inner waking therefore clearer.
Now as in ordinary dreaming the inner material of feeling finds its more or less distinct representation, usually only in symbolical transformation, so will the clearer somnambulic dream bring with it a further, more distinct, consciousness of the bodily condition; as, moreover, persons in this sleep can be brought to speech upon their conditions, it is easy to understand that they are better informed concerning a disease which they see, than is often the physician, who only judges, that is, infers causes from symptoms.

The phenomenon of the magnetic sleep was already known to antiquity. Much that is wonderful in what the old physicians and philosophers relate of sleep, applies only to the magnetic sleep, between which and the ordinary sleep they do not distinguish. Only by observing this distinction will Hippocrates be fully understood. On the other hand, the Greek authors distinguish accurately between ὅναρ and ὅπαρ, for which our language has only the one word, dream. This is the linguistic expression for the fact that we see in all dreams only worthless phantasms, without recognising transcendental psychology; while the Greeks fell into the other extreme, and held transcendental psychological dreams to be divine inspirations.

Puységur had put a sick young man into magnetic sleep, who, waking interiorly and perceiving the seat of the disease, uttered of his own accord the words: 'I have an abscess in the head; it will suffocate me if it falls upon the chest.' The want of scientific precision in the murmured words might easily have caused Puységur to suppose them the delirium of fever. But not being prejudiced by system, he had
the gift of allowing facts of a new character to avail as such; he pursued the thing further, and thus became the discoverer of one of the most important phenomena in the province of psychical knowledge.* He soon found that all somnambules, if their sleep reached the proper depth, possessed the faculty of self-inspection. With reference to this penetrative feeling and diagnosis of their own organism, somnambules can be considered their own physicians. Somnambules may be compared to the stethoscope in regard to the investigation of the interior organism.

In magnetic sleep, therefore, as in ordinary sleep, there is an inner waking, but it reaches a higher degree of clearness. It seems that in this deep sleep the inner organs are no longer seen in the form of phantastically transformed symbols, but in actual plastic representation, parts affected by disease being particularly discerned in this perception. The ordinary dream is occupied much less with the sound organs than with the diseased ones; the latter are those which repeatedly obtrude themselves in the images, and impart to these their constant character. But whereas the symptomatic dream-images give only indirect information of the causes of disease, the magnetic dream represents perceptibly the causes themselves, and the inner machinery of the organism. This fact is mentioned by Hippocrates in his treatise on dream: 'When the soul by sleep is released, not indeed altogether from the body, but from the gross service of its parts, it retreats into itself as into a port for protection from storm; it then sees and

knows all that goes on within, painting this condition in different figures and colours, and explaining distinctly the state of the body.' In his third book, 'On the Habits of Life,' he says also: 'All that passes in the body, the soul sees even with closed eyes.' The same condition is evidently referred to when it is said in the Vedas: 'When the soul reaches that hidden chamber in which Brahma resides, then the gross body quakes, and the soul with searching glance sees through this dwelling (the body), which is the house of the man.* Still more briefly in another place: 'In its body it goes about as it pleases.'†

The self-inspection of somnambules is in no way dependent upon an abstract knowledge, but merely on an exalted faculty for internal sensations, developing itself to perceptive presentation, and plastic reproduction of the inner sphere of the body, as according to Scherner can happen even in ordinary dream. The clearness of these presentations reaches very different degrees, but rises by habit, and whereas somnambules at first do not get beyond an account of mere internal feelings, their utterances frequently attain to the exactitude of anatomical descriptions, such as a layman without abstract knowledge would give from mere perception. Frau von U., magnetised by a clergyman, described her ear, saw four little knuckle-joints, one like a hammer, another like a stirrup, the third round, the fourth small, in a tube of water.‡ A cataleptic patient said to Petetin: 'A

* Windischmann: 'Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte,' i. 1358.
† 'Kommentar des Sankara über Brahma-Sutra,' iii. 2, 3.
‡ Kieser: 'Archiv für den thierischen Magnetismus,' vii. 1, 73. 14—2
physician would think himself fortunate if he had my disease for a quarter of an hour; Nature would reveal all her secrets to him, and if he loved his science he would not wish, as I do, to be soon well again."

This self-inspection being without abstract knowledge, the anatomical descriptions of somnambules naturally leave much to be desired in regard to learned exposition. The same would be the case with a medical student, if early in his course he had to report upon a section with his still defective knowledge. The utterances of somnambules are therefore not to be suspected on account of this defect in their description. Sleep can exalt the capacity for internal feeling, and that can lead to a representation of the organs concerned; but it is in no way apparent how it can awaken abstract knowledges not formerly in the mind. When the physician Deleuze put one of his colleagues into the somnambulic state, the sleeper spoke of his internal disease in quite scientific phraseology.† It would be in the highest degree suspicious were all somnambules to speak like professors, but the anatomical and physiological blunders which occur so often in their utterances are not so.‡ But these utterances become deceitful just when their own reflections get mixed up with their perception, and this danger is especially near when they are plied with questions which cannot be answered from self-inspection.

* Petetin: 'Electricité animale,' ii.
† Deleuze: 'Histoire critique,' etc., i. 168.
‡ Instances are to be found in Morin's 'Du Magnétisme et des Sciences occultes,' Paris, Baillière, 1860, p. 196.
Reasonable physicians, therefore, adhere to the rule of waiting for the spontaneous utterances of the somnambules, which then are usually given with definitude. That indicates the moment when the internal sensibility has risen to the point of self-inspection. It is just then that the magnetising physician may, with advantage, direct this inspection by skilful questioning. Premature questioning cannot awaken the self-inspection, and there is not only the danger of the somnambules seeking for answers which must be false, because not arising from self-inspection; but also, owing to the peculiar rapport in which they stand with the magnetiser, that the latter’s ideas and reflections may get transferred to them, so that they become the mere echo of the physician. Much, therefore, depends on the intelligence with which the physician puts his questions. Van Ghert’s somnambule said that she saw very distinctly into her body when the physician himself saw with her and helped her by his thoughts; all was then clearer and more distinct.* Another praised the influence which the physician’s questions had on her perceptive faculty; when he desired her to look at her lungs or any other organ, everything opened before her eyes.† Another saw only the diseased organs of her body spontaneously, the sound ones only when the magnetiser placed his hands over them.‡ The celebrated Hufeland adduces three different cases of self-inspection, illustrating its partial character. One of his

† Ibid.: ‘Archiv,’ ii. 1, 86.
‡ Dr. Fischer: ‘Der Somnambulismus,’ iii. 201.
patients saw her bowels quite spontaneously and suddenly, when she laid herself on her bed; when she stood up the vision ceased. Another time she awoke suddenly in the night, crying out that she saw her brain and spinal marrow. A second saw only those parts of her interior organism lying near places touched by Hufeland. And a third saw the interior flesh and veins of her arm immediately she touched a magnet, and this she carefully avoided doing, the sight being disagreeable to her.*

Very remarkable is the faculty which somnambules possess of knowing the future course of their diseases. This was known to Hippocrates, who said that there were dreams in which the diseases of the body were predicted. Much as the sceptic may be inclined to doubt such a faculty, it has nevertheless been confirmed by a very large number of physicians with great certainty. It may suffice here to refer to the judgment of the medical faculty of the Paris Academy. The physician Delpit reports of an epileptic who during an attack predicted the time of her recovery to a minute.† In Bertrand’s ‘Traité du Somnambulisme’ are mentioned more than sixty convulsive attacks of a dangerous character which were foreseen, and their occurrence and duration determined to the minute by somnambules. The same physician reports the case of a somnambule, who announced a delirium of forty-three hours, fourteen days before, knowing nothing of it in the interval.‡ Dr. Bendson’s somnambule gave out the time exactly when she should

* Hufeland: ‘Ueber Sympathie,’ 200, 202, 155, 199.
† ‘Bibl. Med.,’ i. 6, 308.
‡ Dupotet: ‘Traité,’ etc., 440.
be relieved from a worm, and even its exact length. *

Even the prevision of death occurs with somnambules without their having any memory of it in the intervals of waking consciousness. Souvages treated four persons who rightly predicted the day and hour of their death, and a man of sixty years of age, who predicted his death a month before, and who died of a frost-fever. †

On the other hand, prognostications of death, even with otherwise reliable somnambules, are frequently erroneous. Deleuze renounces even the attempt to explain, and says it is one of the darkest points in this province. It seems to me, however, that the thing explains itself, if we remember that somnambules do not foreknow by reflection what is to happen to them, but see all in images as every dreamer does. Now, if there is presented the image of a very dangerous crisis, or deep swoon, that would have the greatest resemblance to dying or even death. And Deleuze himself indicates the right explanation, for he admits that the crises which the somnambules had taken for death were always very alarming and dangerous. ‡

The organ of dream is still the formative imagination, even if it must be allowed that it is not the imagination we have in waking, and which is then not approximately equal to the faculty as it exists in dream. Therefore, such predictions will not enter consciousness as abstract knowledge, but as image, although that may seem to be contradicted by the often

* Kieser: 'Archiv,' xi, 1, 161.
† Souvages: 'Nosologie,' ii. 738.
‡ Deleuze: 'Instruction pratique,' etc., 422, 426.
extraordinary exactness with which time is fixed. A somnambule who predicted the point of time of a severe spasmodic attack, added: 'I see myself now run off to bed.'* They see not only the interior of the body, but even future events in images. 'What I say of myself is quite as though I saw it ... and so I see my different postures this day quite clear as in images. It is just as if pictures hung before me, in which my postures had been copied, and so I can describe them beforehand.'†

Thus, as in ordinary dream thought does not remain in the abstract, but immediately passes into the representation of things, so also with somnambules. A further proof that there are only differences of degree between dream and somnambulism is to be found in the fact that in both the forms of the images frequently agree, being often allegorical, and often, as it were, with a dramatic severance of the individual, because we place thoughts, awakened in us in dream, in the mouth of another—thus exercising in dream a sort of ventriloquism—and all dream-representations, though having their seat within ourselves, are forced upon us always from without. The allegorical picture-form runs through the whole history of the widow Petersen's disease. She foresees different situations which she is to encounter in her illness; but this knowledge is pictorial and allegoric; a dove accompanies her, either as an indication of her relation to the future, or as actually speaking to her; or as holding a letter in its beak.‡ In this dramatic self-

* Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' Karlsruhe, 1824, § 100.
‡ Kieser: 'Archiv,' xi. 2, 82; xi. 3, 67.
determination are often introduced the guides and guardian spirits of somnambules, giving occasion to manifold superstition.

As somnambules foresee in images the future development of the disease, and with that can often determine what advantage they will derive from the magnetic treatment, so also they are frequently able to see in the same way what would have happened without that treatment. Thus one patient declared that, but for magnetism, apoplexy, from the bursting of one of the larger vessels in a violent congestion, would occur, putting an end to her life within a year.* Another saw that she would have died in eighteen months, because without the magnetic treatment five incurable tumours would have arisen.† Obviously, the truth of such deliverances cannot be established, and they are therefore of but small value. Not only the effects, however, but also the causes of their diseases are known to somnambules in different degrees of clearness. Often there arises in them only the instinctive feeling of the cause, often they see in their interiors an irritant object foreign to the organism. Thus Kerner's somnambule saw a piece of mother-of-pearl, which years before she had inadvertently swallowed, grown into her stomach, and how, in the course of further treatment, it was gradually forced out, showing seven fissures, the thing coming, in fact, to view after a purge.‡ Somnambules often discover the occasion of their illness by a long retrospect, as in the case of one who referred the headaches

* Kieser: 'Archiv,' xi. 1, 22.
† Puységur: 'Recherches,' etc., 171.
‡ Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 94.
from which she had long suffered to a fright she received fifteen years before, when her brother fell through into a hidden well.*

Now, if anyone wishing to dispense with the hypothesis of actual clairvoyance, should still conclude that the knowledge of somnambules is in the abstract, supposing that by means of their exalted sensibility they obtain indications enabling them to reason from their present condition to its past cause and future effect, he would not thus attain his object; for the predictions of somnambules often extend to events not prepared in the organism, even when concerning their own persons, but resulting from external accidents. Meissner's somnambule dreamed that she was floating on a wave, and struggling with the greatest energy against drowning; the next day she fell into the bath in a swoon, and, being alone, was in danger of being drowned.† Another saw in dream a man approach her saying: 'How long has she been ill?' and then make magnetic passes from her head to her feet. Three days later she was called into the parsonage-house, where this second sight was fulfilled.‡ Hortense, a somnambule, had predicted in dream that at a certain hour she would fall down. To prevent this her husband and the physician were present at the time named, and when she had to leave the room her husband took her under his arm. But suddenly a rat sprang past her, and she sank with a scream on the ground.§ Something similar is reported by Klein

* Kieser: 'Archiv,' vi. 1, 100.
† Ibid. : 'Archiv,' x. 2, 101.
‡ Werner: 'Die Schutzgeister,' Stuttgart, 1839, p. 316.
of the somnambule Auguste Müller. On the 14th January, 1817, she disclosed to her magnetiser that on the 12th of February, between three and four in the afternoon, she would swallow a pin unless she was prevented. On the day named, therefore, she was not let out of sight, and all pins were removed. It happened, however, that she got up, and turning her back to those with her, conveyed the pin of her gold brooch to her mouth. Slipping through her fingers, it was indeed thrown up again by coughing, but left a small scar in the uvula.* Such cases, which could be multiplied indefinitely, sufficiently prove that the utterances of somnambules rest on actual clairvoyance, and have nothing to do with operations of the understanding. With many, however, it seems that this clairvoyance remains confined to the development of disease, and does not embrace events which are due to accident. This was the case, for instance, with the somnambulist observed by the physicians of the Paris Academy, who predicted a succession of his epileptic seizures, of which only the first in fact occurred, the last being prevented by the accident in the meanwhile that he was killed in attempting to stop a runaway horse.†

It is a hint given to us by Nature herself, that the spontaneous utterances of somnambules have almost always exclusive reference to their disease. The physician should therefore be contented with bringing to their consciousness only that which lies, so to speak, already on the tongue, as Socrates considered

† Dupotet: 'Traité,' etc., 144.
himself as only an intellectual midwife to his pupils. If he compels answers of another nature, he will find that his own ideas are unwittingly transferred to the somnambules, or he will excite in them an ingredient of reflection, foreign to their condition, and quite unadapted to the discovery of the desired information. Such attempts may even lead to the mental disorganization of the somnambules.

But restricted as this clairvoyant insight remains, in general, to the internal sphere of the body and the course of disease, and though the utterances of somnambules cease to be reliable in proportion as they overstep this sphere, yet attempts have always been made, both in modern and ancient times, to make prophets of somnambules, or to obtain from them elucidations of metaphysical questions, which must be regarded as wholly worthless, as they do not spring from natural instinct, but from reflection, containing therefore only presentations of the religious conceptions in which the speakers have grown up, with phantastical additions.

That the self-inspection and clairvoyance of somnambules in relation to disease is in fact only a natural instinct, not produced, but only excited and unfolded by the magnetic treatment, is best proved by the fact that this capacity is not exhibited only in artificial somnambulism, but often in a still purer form in the natural somnambulism which in the course of disease is often spontaneously induced and suddenly developed. Such a case is related by a Florentine physician, Antonius Benevenius: A young Florentine, named Gasparo, being wounded by an arrow, tried to draw it from his breast, but the iron
point remained in, leaving the wood in his hand: Soon afterwards he began to prophesy; he named the persons who came to visit him long before their arrival, and designated the hour of his recovery; but said that later on he should travel to Rome and should there die. Benevenius assures us that at the hour appointed the point of the arrow came out, the prophetic gift then ceasing, and, further, that Gasparo in fact died afterwards at Rome.*

Thus, in waking, our healthy organs perform their functions imperceptibly for our consciousness, and we are sensible only of those which are morbidly excited. In ordinary dreaming this inner sensibility is exalted, especially in relation to diseased organs, and the exciting cause is represented in symbolical images. Finally, in somnambulism, self-inspection is among the most constant phenomena, inclining likewise especially to the diseased organs, often without any symbolism. But as the ordinary dream often dramatises the internal feelings, and a severance of the dreaming subject occurs, so is it also with somnambules when the result of the self-inspection is imparted to them by seeming guardian-spirits, or by a deceased person with whom the mind is much occupied. Even the process by which the disturbed organic forces seek to restore their equilibrium often takes on the form of a struggle between a good and a bad genius. There is no reason to attach importance to this form, and to infer from it the actual existence of such spirits, which have no more reality than the personalities into which our Ego dramatically sunders

itself in the common dream; but just as little reason is there, because scepticism objects to this form, on account of it 'to shake out the child with the bath,' and deny the capacity of somnambules for self-inspection. This fallacy, of laying the accent on the form, and holding the nature of the thing to be inseparable from this form, has been very destructive in the history of somnambulism, because among the old Greeks, in the dramatic sundering of the somnambulic sleepers Apollo and Æsculapius made their appearance, and the Christianity which succeeded, having deposed these gods, believed it necessary to give up the whole institution of the temple-sleep.

It may be well to pause here, and introduce an attempt theoretically to explain the facts of somnambulism which have been considered up to this point; for as in what follows we shall meet with even much more remarkable things, the sceptical reader might easily want patience to peruse a succession of phenomena which he holds, à priori, for impossible, unless he is first provided with a standard by which to judge of them, and their possibility is made clear to him.

We see that in the inner wakening of somnambulism there is a knowing and a willing, while our normal experience disposes us to see in knowing and willing functions only active in waking life, and connected with certain changes in the nervous system and its centre, the brain. Now since in deep sleep, as a matter of fact, this central nervous system has no relations with the external world, while nevertheless an inner wakening occurs, and the soul of the sleeper experiences influences, first from the sphere of his internal organism, but often also from beyond its
limits, it follows immediately from this fact, that the cerebral system of nerves is not the soul's only means of connection with the outer world, but that we stand in conjunction with Nature by yet another, and, as it were, subterranean way. Now if we do not forthwith adopt the Psyche, free from body, of the Spiritualists, but even for this subterranean connection would seek an organ of material mediation, physiology directs us to the system of so-called sympathetic nerves—named also, on account of its multiplicity of nerve-cells, the ganglionic system, a still very mysterious structure, of which not much more is known than that it governs the vegetative-life process of the organism. As the cerebral nerve-system has its central seat in the brain, so the ganglionic system has its centre in the solar plexus. This is a collection of combined nerves, larger and smaller, mutually connected in the cavity of the chest, near the pit of the stomach, behind the stomach. The functions of these two systems of nerves, brain and ganglions, go on quite independently of one another; heart-action, digestion, secretion of bile, etc., are not subject to our conscious will, and continue in sleep. Externally, to the eye of the anatomist, this mutual independence of the two nerve-systems appears as an almost complete isolation from one another.

This visible independence must certainly be in some way grounded in the inner nature of man, and the fact of his inner waking in sleep requires, indeed, that to this sympathetic nerve-system not only sensibility, but even capacity for consciousness* should

* That is, that it should be able to take the place of the brain as the apparent centre of consciousness. All sensation is, of course, consciousness, but the distinction implied in the text is thus explained.—Tr.
accede. Such an opinion is decidedly not arbitrary. After the experiments of different investigators with decapitated frogs, and that of Pflüger upon the sensorial functions of the spinal marrow, there remains no doubt that a capacity for consciousness must be attributed to every nerve-cell, and we shall have the less hesitation in this, as in our time physics and chemistry, impelled by the facts of Nature herself, have had to throw overboard the conception of dead matter, and to ascribe even to atoms a capacity of sensibility, thus the rudiments of consciousness.

Now, if material changes in the system of sympathetic nerves are accompanied by a ganglionic consciousness, that is nevertheless independent of our brain-consciousness. Physiology has introduced the conception of the 'psycho-physical threshold,' to indicate the boundary line between those material changes in the organism which are felt by us and attain to consciousness, and those changes which proceed without an accompanying consciousness. Whether the first or the latter is the case, depends on the force of stimulation of these processes on the central nerve system. This psycho-physical threshold thus limits merely the sphere of brain-consciousness, and such stimulations as remain below this threshold may nevertheless be accompanied by a ganglionic consciousness. That this is in fact the case, is proved by sleep, and particularly by somnambulism. The fact of inner waking affirms nothing else than that processes of the organism which in waking remain unconscious, are then perceived. But this fact is explicable by two hypotheses. Either this inner waking has nothing whatever to do with the brain-
system of nerves, and then the ganglionic system must be regarded as the supporter of consciousness; or the system of sympathetic nerves in sleep conducts the excitation received to the brain, and there elicits a response, and in that case, at least, the psycho-physical threshold must necessarily be displaced in sleep, and all the more, the deeper the sleep is. Many phenomena of somnambulism appear to testify to the occurrence of both processes, and that in sleep the isolation of the cerebral nerve-system from the ganglionic partially ceases.

Man summarises in the word 'I' all the feelings which lie on this side the psycho-physical threshold of sensibility, because he refers them to a single supporter, and makes his personal consciousness dependent on them. Excitations below the threshold remain unconscious. That such excitations take place, we know positively; and that fact of itself already obliges us to distinguish between our person and our subject, between consciousness and soul, in so far as subject and soul project beyond the limits of our personal consciousness. The thread which binds together the individual feelings, and thereby makes a personal consciousness possible, is memory; without memory no identity of person. Now, if it can be proved—and somnambulism proves it manifestly—that even the unconscious nerve-excitations are held together by an individual supporter, and are connected with one another by the thread of memory, then the consciousness accompanying them will be likewise a personal consciousness, but this consciousness will be other than that of the cerebral consciousness which is composed from the nerve-
excitations lying above the threshold of sensibility. Our Subject, our Soul, falls asunder, therefore, into two persons, not, indeed, different in themselves, but divided by the threshold of sensibility. If the memory which connects the successions of feelings of each single person severally also connected those of the two, were there no threshold of sensibility marking off one person from the other, both persons would flow together in one, identical with the Subject comprehending them; consciousness and soul would then coincide. This, however, is only the case in Somnambulism; but we awake from this state without memory, and then the bridges of connection, by which the two persons could communicate, fails.

Medical-Councillor Klein says of his somnambule, Augusta Müller, of Karlsruhe, that whenever she meditated on her own condition or the disease of another, respiration ceased. She then resembled a marble figure, all colour left her face, and no other sign of life could be remarked than a weak pulse in the hands.* Thus we see here very distinctly the retreat of the diurnal life as reverse of the inner waking. But the sayings of somnambules unanimously point to the ganglionic system as the material supporter of the interior sense. They often speak of the stomach as the seat of their presentations, so that many reporters use the term 'seeing with the stomach.' But of a seeing in the physiological sense it is not here allowable to speak, though the presentation which takes place in the inner waking has either really the form of a perceptual image, or at least somnambules employ that mode of

expression in describing it. An analogy with physiological seeing is also so far given, that the organ of the inner sense cannot be at the same time itself the object, as the eye sees all but itself. Kerner's patient said she saw all parts of her body except the stomach (that lying too near the focus of sight); most clearly of all she saw the marrow and the blood, as through a glass lying on the pit of the stomach, now appearing clear, now obscure.* Another somnambule, on being asked what parts she saw, answered: 'All that I will, except the stomach and part of the forehead above the nose, with which the ray of perception proceeding from the stomach is in connection.'† Nevertheless, even the stomach is also frequently an object for the inner sense, and with the Seeress of Prevorst even the solar-plexus; she describes it as a sun moving slowly, she sees its nerves shining, and delineates the course of several of them with complete anatomical correctness.‡ This inner sight, concentrated in the region of the stomach, is very frequently referred to in the sayings of somnambules, and must therefore have a real foundation of some sort.

The solution of our external personality by the transcendental in the somnambulic state, also very well explains that the disease is quite differently conceived, not only as to its quality, but as a fact, and in regard to the fate of the individual. While the transcendental consciousness expects a cure with the greatest assurance, despair of it remains in waking. A patient who, waking, was always much

* Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 75.
† Kieser: 'Archiv,' iv. 2, 172.
‡ Kerner: 'Die Seherin von Prevorst,' 82, Stuttgart, 1878.
troubled and spoke of dying, in the magnetic sleep was quite cheerful and laughed at the fears by which she was tormented when awake.* Another in waking thought herself lost, but was always full of hope in sleep.† Somnambules, however, insist on an energetic combating of the evil by the physician, not feeling the fear with which in waking they anticipate his methods; they warn him against mild proceedings from false pity.‡ It can only result from complete solution of the sense-consciousness by the transcendental, from the dualism of two persons of one Subject, that a somnambule spoke of her approaching death in her twenty-fifth year in the same cheerful tone as of other things.§

This solution is not always complete; there is often in somnambulism an opposition between the sensuous and the magnetic Ego, then reflected in the dramatic form which the self-inspection takes on. A French idio-somnambule (that is, one with whom somnambulism occurs spontaneously, without magnetic treatment) was irritated with the violent pains which she suffered in the stomach, as by another person assailing her, and continually bade the same to be silent and to go away || Yet more distinctly was this the case with the already-mentioned Widow Petersen, who dramatised her self-inspection by a symbolical dove. Light is thrown upon her utterances, which sound like senseless phantasms, when they are looked upon

† Aubin Gauthier: 'Histoire du Somnambulisme,' ii. 359.
‡ Kieser: 'Archiv,' ii. 1, 174.
§ 'Archiv,' vii. 2, 38.
|| Ibid. ii. 2, 199.
as representing that tension between the magnetic and anti-magnetic Ego. The self-inspection had not yet attained to clear perception when she said: 'There comes the dove with a sealed letter, which it will open.' Then the curiosity of the sense-consciousness prevails, when she continues: 'Ah, now I see a second smaller dove, picking the seal with its beak.' The magnetic Ego again comes forward in the words: 'Get back, says the larger one; that cannot be. I see for the patient; thou hast not the power. Is not that humiliating to the small dove, which means as well by me as the large one? But the old one remains immovable; she thinks it out thoroughly, and is therefore steadfast. Now the dove has three letters, one in the beak and one under each wing. . . . In eight days I shall learn the contents of one, later of the second; the third will be opened on New Year's night.'* Thus the self-inspection took place later, as on this occasion the transcendental consciousness had not sufficiently emerged to succeed.

Self-inspection is only thinkable on the principle of a changed relation of our consciousness to the organism, by displacement of the threshold of sensibility. As we thereby obtain knowledge of our interior parts, which fails us in waking because the nerve-excitation giving the information remains below the threshold, it follows that our sense-consciousness does not embrace the sensibility of our whole Subject—in other words, the normal consciousness does not exhaust its object, the soul. A doctrine of Soul which is restricted to the analysis of our conscious representation and thinking is therefore incomplete,

and will never succeed in solving the human problem. We must study all those conditions of man in which the sphere of consciousness extends itself. That happens in ordinary sleep and in somnambulism, first in reference to the interior of the body, and especially the diseased parts of it, as in waking, indeed, the sound organs are unfelt, but the diseased ones immediately become objects of consciousness. But since in the inner self-inspection the living active organism is observed, and the process, by which the curative power of Nature seeks to restore the disturbed equilibrium of the organic forces, is represented in symbolical images, and often dramatically, the study of somnambulism promises much more valuable conclusions concerning man than can result from reports of dissections, even if in addition we subject half the animal kingdom to vivisection. Vivisectors can therefore only believe their method indispensable, because they are wholly ignorant of somnambulism, and in general hold the materialistic explanation of life to be the only possible one. On the other hand, all physicians who have studied somnambulism are agreed that from it alone can valuable conclusions respecting the economy of the organism be obtained; and thus they can see in vivisection nothing but useless cruelty.*

Notwithstanding obscure points connected with this fact of self-introspection, the experience already gained enables a general theory of the phenomenon to be sketched. Here, as throughout the whole province of transcendental psychology, the necessity of distinguishing between consciousness and soul,

* Deleuze: 'Instruction pratique,' etc., 440.
Ego and Subject, is imperative. In the development of the body the Ego has absolutely no active part, our vegetative functions are for it unconscious. But somnambulism teaches that for the soul they are by no means unconscious; for if somnambules know disorders in the organism as disorders, and even preferably concern themselves with these, they must necessarily possess some kind of standard of comparison, a representation of what ought to be. To see through a disorder as such, the healthy normal condition must be known. It follows that the normal process of life, also, and not only its disturbances, must go on with a transcendental consciousness, which can only be, if the soul, the supporter of that consciousness, is identical with the organising principle in us. Darwin himself is, indeed, disposed to admit that the struggle for existence aims only at the adaptation of organisms to the conditions of existence, so that the higher developments of species from one another would still require an impulse of organic formation. That this formative impulse is provided with consciousness, is shown by self-introspection, and that to the supporter of this consciousness a will must be ascribed, is proved by the functions of the natural curative-force, which, as it can only be regarded as a continuation of the organising impulse, must participate in the consciousness of the latter.

The prognosis of somnambules leads us to the like result. When somnambules predict in detail the course of their disease, often to the extent of months, that implies some sort of knowledge of the laws of the inner life, which again is only possible, if the
subject of the prognosis is identical with the organising principle.

(b) The Diagnosis of the Diseases of others by Somnambules.—As our visible body is the nearest object of our sensuous consciousness, but also mediates the relations of the latter to the external world, so also is the interior of the organism merely the nearest object of the somnambulic sense, which, however, likewise stands in manifold relations with the external world. This is not the place to inquire how far the inner sense can go beyond the sphere of the body, and what modifications our perceptive forms, time and space, thereby undergo. Here we are only to show that, and how far, dream is a physician, and only that extension of the inner sense beyond its own bodily sphere shall at present be investigated, which occurs in the somnambulic diagnosis of the diseases of others.

According to the experience of physicians who have concerned themselves with this subject, it is the rule that somnambules with the faculty of introspection can also see through foreign organisms. As regards the fact of this capacity, I will first refer again to the already-mentioned report of the Medical Academy in Paris, wherein it is said: 'The magnetised person, sunk in somnambulism, judges the diseases of those with whom he puts himself in rapport, determines the character of the disease, and indicates the remedies.'

It will contribute somewhat to the elucidation of the subject to point out here that even in waking we can exceptionally experience influences from without not conveyed to us by the normal sensibility of the
senses, and which must therefore depend upon a slight function of transcendental consciousness. There is, for example, the case of so-called idiosyncrasies, the best known being the insuperable repugnance of certain persons for particular animals, most often cats, a repugnance frequently evinced when the proximity of the animals is unknown. But I must reserve the treatment of this subject for another occasion, contenting myself here with the remark that such idiosyncrasies occur in an exalted form in somnambulism when the object is kept at hand—a proof that these waking antipathies depend in fact on a slight awakening of the transcendental consciousness.

It seems that even the capacity of determining the diseases of others is already exceptionally apparent in the waking state. An elementary form of it perhaps insinuates itself even into professional diagnosis, which does not always solely depend on reflective judgments and logical reasoning from the symptoms to the cause of the disease, but often upon an intuitive glimpse, especially when there is a great affection between physician and patient, from which results a relation similar to the somnambulie rapport, and to that which is often observed between mother and child. As, however, in all arts and sciences reflexion and intuition are mutually more or less exclusive, and only in genius come to an ideal equivalence, physicians with a predominant tendency to abstract understanding attach but small value to this sort of half-instinctive diagnosis.

The oldest instance of it is, nevertheless, that of a physician. Galen (who, from his own statement,
appears to have owed much of his practical knowledge to observation of the sleep life) is reported to have defined the course of approaching diseases with such remarkable exactness, that we are reminded of the magnetic clairvoyance of somnambules. To the Senator Sextus, then apparently quite well, he predicted that in three days he would be attacked by a fever, which would leave him on the sixth day, would return on the fourteenth, and would disappear on the seventeenth after a crisis marked by a general perspiration, as events proved. Another physician having recommended bleeding to a young Roman in fever, Galen forbade it, saying that a bleeding from the left nostril would occur of itself, and then the patient would recover.* For the benefit of those who would still ascribe such diagnoses to Galen's extraordinary professional skill, other cases may be mentioned. Des Cartes believed that two hysterical young girls had predicted each other's crises.† In the Mercure de France (September, 1720, and June, 1728) there is an account of two Portuguese ladies, who appear to have enjoyed great celebrity for their diagnoses. One of them was in great estimation with the Queen of Portugal, and received a large yearly salary. She saw into the interior of the human body, the circulation of the blood, and the digestive process; and discovered diseases which had escaped the most skilful physicians.‡ In a later time, Ludwig von Voss writes to Dorow: 'Do not

* Puységur: 'Recherches,' etc., 319, 322; Colquhoun: 'The Secret Sciences,' etc., 113.
† Dupotet: 'Traité complet de Magnetisme animal,' 440.
‡ Le Brun: 'Histoire critique des Pratiques superstitieuses,' i. 58 (Amsterdam, 1733).
laugh if I tell you that I can feel where one has been sitting on a sofa or a chair half an hour before, especially in the case of men of much vitality; that yesterday I felt that one had come from far, and was tired; that I knew with my whole person, by his influence on me, he must have been occupied, particularly in the afternoon, with calculations and with mental strain in them. . . . In my person has been developed the strange unhappy faculty of knowing in the quietest condition all the sufferings and infirmities of men, and even the slightest fibre set in activity in another’s brain by thinking. In the street I have to get far out of the way of people, especially of those who are ill. On first entering a room, I know immediately what is the matter with everyone.'*

To what a degree of clearness this insight into foreign bodies can attain, remarkable instances are related by the English physician Haddock. He says of his somnambule Emma: ‘When patients will allow themselves to be personally examined by Emma, as a rule I request them not to inform me of their symptoms before the clairvoyante has undertaken the examination and has described the internal condition and the symptoms; and it not seldom happens that they express their astonishment when they hear Emma exactly describing their symptoms, and indicating the suffering parts so rightly, or naming the time of day at which periodical attacks recur; all without a word having been said either to her or to me. . . . On two or three occasions Emma has shown the seat of the disease of insane persons,

* Clemens: ‘Das Ferngefühl nach Zeit und Raum,’ Frankfurt, 1857, p. 28.
who were not actually present, on her own head, and from these indications I have ventured, on phrenological grounds, to say what would be the principal symptom of intellectual disturbance in those cases, and the physicians of those patients have confirmed my account.'*

Even cases in which the accuracy of the diagnosis has been established by subsequent dissection are not rare. Naturally such diagnoses, given from mere perception by the inner sense, without any abstract knowledge of anatomy and the physiology of the human body, have not the scientific, or even verbal, precision which belongs to professional reports upon sections. Nevertheless a skilful physician will draw useful conclusions from such statements. Frau Lagendrè, a somnambule who had been magnetised in order to obtain her opinion upon her mother's condition, gave the following diagnosis: 'The right lung is shrivelled up and compressed; it is surrounded by a tough glutinous membrane; it swims in a quantity of water. The right lung no longer breathes, it is dead. There is some water in the cavity of the heart.' Now after the death of the mother, which, according to the prediction of the somnambule, occurred the next day, the dissection was undertaken by Dr. Drousart and Moreau, secretary of the Royal Academy of Medicine, and entirely bore out the above statement.†

As the self-introspection depends on the feelings experienced by the somnambules of organs of whose functions normal consciousness is unaware, so the

* Haddock: 'Somnolism,' etc., 192, 193.
† Gauthier: 'Histoire du Somnambulisme,' ii. 363.
vision through foreign organisms presupposes a still
greater displacement of the threshold of sensibility
and emergence of the transcendental half of the being.
Now, on the doubtless correct assumption that such
perceptions depend upon material influences, as of
perhaps a subtle emanation, this clairvoyance would
thus appear to be quite a natural capacity, which can
only not be awakened in the ordinary condition
because the foundation of a feeling is then wanting.
The transcendental Ego stands in another relation to
the outer world than the empirical Ego; it is as it
were only the prolongation of the latter, the root of
our being, whose connection with the external can
then first be felt when the life is drawn down from
the stem above ground, and its summit, the sense-
consciousness, into the root. To denote this altered
relation the term 'magnetic rapport' has been adopted.
The magnetic treatment is, however, far from being
the only means of introducing this rapport, that is,
this displacement of the normal relation to the ex-
ternal. And it cannot be too much insisted upon,
that it is not the whole Subject that is pushed into
another relation with the external, but merely the
person of day-waking consciousness; the rapport is
not first produced by somnambulism, but exists for
the Subject before and after it; only not for the
person of consciousness. This person knows only of
five connecting threads with the outer world, it has
only five senses; while our Subject has at its disposal
further threads of connection, whereof some are
sensible in the condition which we call somnambulism.
The number of these threads we cannot at all deter-
mine à priori, experience alone can inform us on this
point; but even had no somnambule ever been observed, there could be no doubt whatever of the existence of such threads of the Subject, that is to say, of unconscious relations between us and things. This is not only a logical consequence for the pantheistic conception of the world, but even materialistic monism, by reason of the Evolution theory, cannot escape it, though the books of materialists prove that Logic also belongs for them to the Unconscious.

The relation of man to Nature will never be understood, as long as we conceive the Subject to be absorbed in the person of consciousness, nor will the definition of man ever be reached if the Ego above the threshold of sensibility is held to be alone existent, and the delusion survives that an exhaustive account of man can be given by a physiological psychology. Man is like those stars (e.g., Procyon) which with an obscure companion are united into a double star, and describe an ellipse about a common point of gravity. Now if one only holds the clear star for actual, and recognises only those lines of gravitation which bind it to the centre of attraction of the Milky Way, its motion becomes a mystery, which is first solved when one admits also the further lines of gravitation which are directed to the dark companion-star. So also he, who will be a monist, who will conceive man and Nature together, must take into consideration the dark companion of our conscious Ego, the Ego which lies beneath the threshold of sensibility. It is the insight that between us and Nature there exists a more comprehensive rapport than that of the five senses, that first puts us on the right foundation for seeking the solu-
tion of the human problem; but whoever neglects our occult companion, and pursues physiological psychology, resembles an astronomer who would explain the motions of Procyon by the central sun.

The rapport of Somnambules with the outer world is first directed to their magnetiser, through whose body they appear to be able to see with especial ease. Van Ghert's somnambule fell to crying when she compared her own inner state with that of her magnetiser, whom she declared to be sound in all his organs.* But the rapport next extends itself to persons with whom they are connected by sympathy and affection; they concern themselves willingly with friends, whom they endeavour to inspect in order to help. Finally, it is in the power of the magnetiser to extend this rapport also to indifferent persons, and when this happens through bodily contact or through a material vehicle, e.g. hair, we have another proof of an actual material influence exciting the clairvoyance. The rapport must be dependent on some sort of material agency to which the normal man is not susceptible. Van Ghert's somnambule fell into rapport with every patient who touched a string extending from her at any distance; she even herself felt the disease of the person thus in connection with her, and could declare the evil he suffered from, its cause, and former treatment, quite correctly and particularly.† Professor Mayo says: 'From Boppard I sent to an American friend who was staying in Paris a lock of hair, which Colonel C., whom I was then treating, had cut from his own head, and

* 'Archiv,' ii. 1, 80.
† Ibid. iii. 3, 49, 70.
had wrapped up in notepaper from his own desk. The Colonel was quite unknown even by name to the American, who could have not the slightest indication of the person to whom the lock of hair belonged. His commission, which he punctually executed, was to give the paper containing the hair into the hand of a Paris somnambule.’ The deliverance of the latter, which was correct, was that the Colonel suffered from a partial paralysis of the hips and legs, and that for a complaint of another nature he was accustomed to use a surgical instrument.* In the Saltpetrière in Paris, a somnambule was put into the sleep for the purpose of determining the disease of another person. She fell into violent agitation even before the patient had opened the door, and then refused to make the diagnosis in his presence. When he had withdrawn, she contradicted the medical opinion that the disease was in the chest, asserting that it was heart disease, and predicting a violent hæmorrhage on the fourth day, and death on the tenth; as in fact happened, the correctness of the diagnosis being also established.†

An interesting diagnosis is that of a somnambulist celebrated in his time, Alexis, on the occasion of a meeting with the famous prestigiator Houdin, who had come to Alexis on the supposition that he had to deal with an expert in his own art, and thinking to expose him. He brought to him some hair of his son, whose age Alexis rightly declared, with the addition that the son had pains in his right side. But he immediately contradicted himself, saying that

* Mayo: ‘Truths in Popular Superstitions.’
† Mirville: ‘Pneumatologie,’ i. 32, Paris, 1853.
it was Houdin himself who must have these pains, which he perceived because his son's hair had been touched by him. The son, on the contrary, Alexis declared to be perfectly sound, and when Houdin denied this, he said that the little swelling on the right eye, about which the father was very uneasy because the physicians feared Amaurosis, was not at all dangerous.* The whole report of the meeting of these two men should be perused, the celebrated conjurer finally declaring, after many experiments, that there was not in the whole world a conjurer who could by his art imitate the capacity of Alexis.† It may be said that the judgment of a conjurer has no value, and only a professional man of science could decide in this case.‡ But that is just the question, who is here the expert? It is only now for the first time that the ground-lines of a transcendental psychology can be sketched, and the laws of somnambulism are as yet little known to us; official science from Mesmer's day, thus for a whole century, has notoriously held aloof from these phenomena, declaring them to be à priori impossible;§ so that this science has really

* Mirville.
† [This declaration Houdin put into writing, signed, and sent to the Marquis Eudes de Mirville, who transmitted it with a memorandum to the French Academy of Sciences. The text of Houdin's letter is given in Mirville's 'Pneumatologie,' vol. i.—Tr.]
‡ [That could not well be said, at least in this country, where the testimony of well-known men of science to phenomena usually discredited is always met by the objection that the professional conjurer, and not the man of science, is the right person to expose the trickery which may deceive observers not specially trained in such arts. (When the conjurer in his turn gives testimony, it is said that he is not the right sort of conjurer.)—Tr.]
§ This disposition is no doubt the reason why the evidences have never been fully and fairly entertained; but it is doubtful
no experts at all. Nor will it soon be otherwise; official science having been but just awakened from its dogmatic slumber by the performances of the magnetiser Hansen. For the rest, whoever looks on clairvoyance as an impossibility, and therefore as trickery, by this very assertion designates the conjurer as the professional expert in this province; and thus for a sceptic the declaration of a Houdin must carry as much weight as that of a professor.

To cite a case of correct diagnosis in very recent times, even a decided sceptic will have nothing to object against the judgment which the president of the Upper Consistory at Münich, Dr. von Harless, has passed from his own experience. When a lady in Leipzig was suffering from a critical spine disease, his friend Professor Lindner—without the knowledge of Harless, who was averse from such things—consulted a somnambule in Dresden upon her condition. 'On his return he imparted to me the following statement. He had asked the somnambule if she could transport herself in spirit to a neighbouring town (known to her), and into the room of a sick person there residing? She replied in the affirmative, on condition that some indication was given her by which to distinguish the house in question from the

whether in England any well-known man of science, (with the single exception of Faraday in a possibly inconsiderate sentence), has ever explicitly committed himself to a judgment of a priori impossibility. The scientific countrymen of Bacon have learned to be cautious in their language, if not to be really free from the unphilosophical prejudice in question. Indeed, the latter is so far from being the case in relation to these phenomena, that the result has been a not very candid pretence of general amenability to evidence, coupled with a practically absolute refusal to consider it.—Tr.]
neighbouring ones. It was answered that the house might easily be known by two signs, for first it lay obliquely opposite the choir of a church; and secondly, there was a pump—the only one in the street—just in front of the house. The somnambule seemed satisfied, and after some time she said she had found the house, and the room in which the patient was, and that the latter was just then suffering again from paroxysm, and sat or lay upon a sofa; whereupon she described the room and the dress of the patient. The indications, so far as the questioner knew, agreed. He then asked if the patient could be helped. The answer was that this was very easy. The illness was the result of a violent chill.'*

When astronomers refer to the ether as the material mediating agent between the eye of a man and a star a hundred billions of miles distant, that does not strike us as mystical, and we believe it on his word. But when such a rapport of somnambules is spoken of it sounds mystical, because our physical apparatus cannot trace the agent, and because we do not reflect that there are many more threads of connection with the outer world for our Ego below the threshold of sensibility than for the conscious Ego.

The fact that this rapport is mediated by a material agent, which is only mystical just at present, but for which the discovery of the corresponding spectroscope is merely a question of time, is inferred from various observations. Puységur reports of a somnambule that she merely went round a patient unknown to her, of whose name even Puységur himself was ignorant, and then gave a completely

* Harless: 'Bruchstücke aus dem Leben.'

16—2
correct diagnosis.* But every doubt of this material agent disappears before the frequent experience that, with this intuitive inspection of other bodies, the symptoms of the disease can be transmitted to the somnambule, and a community of feeling of it be set up. For this reason a distinction has been made between intuitive and sensitive somnambules, but they evidently differ only in degree. Szapary says of a somnambule: 'In order to investigate a disease and judge of its curability, the seeress had always to go herself into the diseased individual, and take upon herself in spirit all the patients' infirmities and sufferings. In this condition she then saw the morbid processes of others in her own body, compared them with healthy conditions, and prescribed the necessary dietetic course and the corresponding remedies. Such ingessions, however, always weakened her, and the more, the more painful and offensive the disease, but she nevertheless made the sacrifice willingly.... Later on she went into the sleep again, when she began to cough, and continued doing so more and more violently, and complained very much of spasmodic pains in the chest. It was clear to me that this phenomenon was derived from the disease of the physician who stood in rapport with her, which he confirmed, for at the same time, ten miles off, he was in a similar condition.'† Faria, who was much experienced in these things, thence explains the unwillingness of somnambules to undertake the diagnosis of infectious diseases, and he asserts that if the image

* Puységur: 'Recherches,' i. 365.
† Szapary: 'Ein Wort über animalischen Magnetismus,' 110, 142, Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1840.
of the sick person can be impressed on their memory during the sleep, they will recognise him when accidentally meeting him.*

This sensitive participation in a disease, usually only during the continuance of the rapport, is confirmed also by Werner, the magnetiser being there the intermediate link between the diseased person and the somnambule: 'Every attempt of mine during the illness of R—— to magnetise another, was known to her immediately in the next crisis, and painfully felt. A relative on a visit to me suffered fearfully from headache. I laid my hands on her forehead and on the crown of her head, which considerably relieved her. Next day R—— complained that through my hand she had contracted some of the headache. And, in fact, even after the crisis, she complained of headache all day.'†

As, with many somnambules, diagnosis is of this sensitive character, in certain cases they resist undertaking it. Consumptive patients are not willingly examined by them,‡ and from contact with the epileptic and syphilitic they turn with horror.§ Puységur relates the evil consequences following upon the diagnosis of an epileptic girl, the somnambule who undertook it declaring that in proportion as these consequences to herself increased with further contact, the sick girl would be relieved and cured.|| This reminds us of the well-known mediæval transplantatio morborum.

† Werner: 'Die Schutzgeister,' 297.
‡ Pigeaire: 'Electricité animale,' 244.
§ Deleuze: 'Instr. pratique,' 447, 453.
|| Puységur: 'Memoires,' ii. 155, 165.
The most remarkable somnambule in existing records was undoubtedly Frau Hauffe, the 'Seeress of Prevorst.' Of Dr. Justinus Kerner's book it may be predicted that it will be among the most read in the next century, though in our own the journalism representing pretended enlightenment has succeeded in placing it and its author under the ban of mysticism, which has not, however, prevented five editions of it from appearing. Now as to the reproach of mysticism, that can at most apply to Kerner's explanatory attempts, which may be contested, but not the facts he reports, to which many other observers, laymen, physicians, and philosophers, are committed. Kerner's opponents should therefore have offered better explanations than his, instead of acting as if by this reproach the facts themselves were dismissed from the world. But experience shows that the reproach of mysticism always marks only the point at which the understanding of the 'enlightened' censurer comes to a halt, and he finds himself under the necessity of flinging his gun at the mark. But understanding, as we know, comes to a halt with each at a different point, and so everyone carries about a sack, the repository of all that is 'mystical' according to the horizon of each. The largest sack of this kind, whose capacity is always in inverse ratio to the understanding, is that of the savages. Our reflective verbs and the genders of our nouns still give us information of this condition, since all natural phenomena were animistically explained. Even now we can see by our peasants, that Telegraph and Railroad appear mystical to them; and with our so-called learned the size of the said sack and thereby
the narrowness of the corresponding understanding is accurately expressed in the use of \textit{\`a priori} judgments, in which the subjectively impossible, that is, the not understood, is translated into the objectively impossible. The frequent or rare use of the word \textquote{impossible} is therefore the surest gauge which is offered by the speaker himself for the estimation of his intellectual capacity.\textsuperscript{*} The less cultivated a man is, the more of an \`a-priorist is he; the more cultivated, the more circumspect, and that not only in believing, but also in disbelieving.\textsuperscript{†} The King of Siam declared the Dutch ambassador mad when the latter mentioned the fact that in winter in his country water became so firmly frozen that one could go upon it;\textsuperscript{‡} and even Pliny somewhere uses these, in this respect, significant words: \textquote{Who would have held it possible that there were black men before he had seen a negro?} As long as we have still anything to learn from experience, and we have certainly still most to learn, there is only one \`a priori judgment which is justifiable in the mouth of a mortal: the logically self-contradictory is impossible. Everything else is possible; if it contradicts our former experience, it is this ex-

\textsuperscript{*}[Except when, as is usual in this country, by a sort of intellectual cunning, this word is studiously avoided, while the conception it denotes is still predominant, being evinced by the habitual assumption that no unfamiliar phenomena can rest upon good evidence.—Tr.]

\textsuperscript{†}[An observation which is much needed in this age. Culture, or rather intellectual acumen, has long been associated with the rejection of popular beliefs, and so we have come to confuse the accident of an intellectual epoch with the essential character of intelligence and progress.—Tr.]

\textsuperscript{‡}Wallace: \textquote{Die wissenschaftliche Ansicht des Uebernatürlichen,'} 3, Leipzig, 1874. [See Hume's \textquote{Essay on Miracles}, for the same story.—Tr.]
perience that was defective; and if it contradicts the laws known to us, there are then unknown laws, suppressing the known ones, as the magnet suppressed gravity before anything was known of magnetism. This digression seemed to me necessary, because I am about to cite the thoroughly honest Justinus Kerner, which in these days needs some courage. For at present most men derive their intellectual knowledge exclusively from the daily Press. Of the quality of this knowledge one may get the best idea by considering that the State still unfortunately admits just anyone to the business of journalism (Press-handwerk) without requiring from him any sort of intellectual preparation.* From this cause phrases and catchwords get planted firmly in men's minds, and are devolved without being subjected to any examination; and thus also the name of Justinus Kerner has become a bugbear suggestive of superstition, and people who have never read a line of him are seized with a shudder of imaginary enlightenment when they hear him mentioned. But I am now concerned only with the facts reported by Kerner and others, and I do not myself altogether approve of his way of accounting for them.

As a sensitive somnambule Mrs. Hauffe was extraordinarily distinguished. 'For the ailments of others she had so acute a sense that upon approaching

* [However true it may be that the people are educated by the daily Press, it is more than doubtful whether the State could advantageously insist on the education of journalists. In any such attempt the standard could only be the established culture—the old ideas, which, as Goethe said, are the greatest enemies of new ones—and as the result the influence of journalism would be more than ever unfavourable to conceptions subversive of the dominant modes of thought.—Tr.]
a patient, and even before contact, but still more after it, she at once experienced the same feeling and in the like place as the patient, and to the greatest astonishment of the latter, could exactly describe all his sufferings, without his having given her any previous verbal information. Usually, she felt the mental condition along with the physical, thus the momentary disposition of grief or joy, etc. The physical state was transferred to her body, the psychical to her soul. . . . One evening there came to us a Mrs. Burk (who was wholly unknown to us), from Göppingen. She desired me to let her be felt by Mrs. Hauffe, in the latter's waking state, on account of a pain in the region of the liver, but otherwise she told me nothing whatever of her state of health. Not to seem obliging, I brought her to Mrs. Hauffe. The latter felt the lower part of her body, became very red,* and said she felt palpitations of the heart and pains in the region of the liver; but what was very distressing to her, that she had suddenly almost lost the sight of her right eye. Mrs. B. was astonished, and said she had for many years been nearly quite unable to see with her right eye, a defect of which she had said nothing to me, because she knew it was an old and incurable ill. Without close investigation the defect of the eye could not be discovered, since it was a paralysis of the nerve. The obscurity in Mrs. Hauffe's eye continued for several days, and the pupil had become quite insensitive, as by a cataract. Only by degrees, by people with sound eyes looking fixedly for several minutes together into the darkened eye,

* [Presumably indicating a sudden transference of the patient's sensations to herself.—Tr.]
did the latter recover its power. . . . On the 5th September, 1827, I gave into Mrs. H.'s hand a ribbon, on which the name of a sick lady (quite unknown to me, as was her complaint) was sewn, probably by herself, and which she had touched or worn before sending it. The name was that of a Mrs. M. in U. Scarcely had Mrs. H. held this ribbon in her hand for a few minutes than she experienced a great disgust, choking, and the most violent sickness. Then she felt pains, particularly in the bone of the left foot, uneasiness in the breast, and extreme irritation in the uvula. Loathing and a terrible choking continued; she required the hand which had held the ribbon to be frequently washed; but nothing availed. At length she fell into a state of catalepsy and apparent death. . . . At six o'clock in the evening, when I received the Swabian Mercury, I read in it a notice of the death of the lady to whom the ribbon had belonged. She had been several days buried before the ribbon was put into Mrs. Hauffe's hands. . . . Van Helmont relates the case of a gouty woman who always got severe attacks of gout after sitting on a sofa on which her brother, who had been dead five years, was wont to sit."

The inspection of other bodies is, like self-inspection, critical, the cause of the disease and its later course being frequently known. A somnambule, being asked by a father about his insane daughter, said that the latter had fallen from the top step of a ladder twelve or thirteen years before, which was the original cause of her complaint; the father could not remember

the incident, but learned at home that in fact it so
occurred.* Bertrand’s somnambule said to a patient
who was brought to her that the wound on his head
proceeded from a ball which had entered through the
mouth, smashed the teeth, and gone out at the back of
the neck.† Alexander Dumas relates in the thirteenth
book of his ‘Memoirs’—and the same narrative is
given by Dr. Foderé in his ‘Pneumatology’—the
case of a young lady who was put into somnambulism
to discover the disease of her mother. She thereupon
became pale, and tears were in her eyes as she said
that her mother would die the next day. She de-
scribed in detail the state of the interior organs, lung,
liver, bowels; and as the mother in fact died the next
day, the complete correctness of the diagnosis was
able to be established by dissection. Two members
of the Academy were present at it; but to one of
these gentlemen even a proof so striking did not
suffice, and he preferred to call the girl a deceiver, the
limit of his own understanding being for him the
limit of things.

Thus, if our theories are not to lag behind the facts,
we must recognise that the Ego below the psycho-
physical threshold, the so-called unconscious, is only
relatively unconscious, from the standpoint of the
Ego above the threshold of sensibility, not uncon-
scious in itself. This transcendental half of our
being, lying beyond the sphere of our normal con-
sciousness, stands in other relations to things than
does the man of five senses, and has other modes of
perception than his, and in these also the scale by

* ‘Archiv,’ xi. 2, 42.
† Gauthier: ‘Hist. du Somn.,’ ii. 303.
which we measure time and space in the day-consciousness undergoes a change. When, however, this transcendental Ego comes forth in dream and somnambulism, its perception often takes on allegorical and symbolical forms, or even the form of the dramatic sundering of the Ego, and then, indeed, we should decline to superstition should we take this mere form of knowledge for real.

3. The Curative Instinct in Dream.

We can now proceed to the somewhat difficult question, whether dream, which in relation to diagnosis and prognosis can be termed a physician, is so also as regards medicinal science. If this question related singly to sleep, there would be no difficulty, for that in sleep occurs the process by which the organism is recuperated, and that it has a natural restorative force, has long been known. But our question concerns dream, the inner wakening, and we do not ask if restorative processes, but if conscious ideal processes, related to medicinal science, occur. Now since that, which in the inner wakening emerges as clear idea and clear will, often already in the external waking state makes itself felt as obscure presentiment and impulse—and, therefore, all instincts have their root in the transcendental half of our being, and depend on a breaking through of the isolation of the two nervous systems—and since, further, the instincts which are directed to the healing process are only to be regarded as a continuation and modification of the natural curative force, it is with this that our inquiry must begin.
Man passes about a third part of his life in sleep. As to the causes of sleep physiology is not yet clear; but it is incontestable that we require this periodical suspension of our conscious life, and that regular and sound sleep is one of the chief conditions of bodily well-being. Man can therefore be even killed by artificial prevention of sleep. I believe that the punishment of death by sleeplessness formerly existed among the Japanese. It occurs also as Tormentum insomniī in the witchcraft cases in Germany, England, and the States of the Church, the witches being kept continually awake; they were driven round ceaselessly in the prisons till their feet were disabled, and they fell into a condition of utter despair and imbecility.*

Accordingly, the opposite proceeding, the placing a sick person in the deepest possible sleep, by which the restorative force is intensified, must be highly conducive to health.

This proceeding is that of Nature in spontaneous, of the physician in artificial, somnambulism; but in both cases it is found that the natural curative force is more energetic than in waking and in normal sleep. Nature takes a critical sleep as curative means into her service in very many diseases; and as it has been observed that even plants grow more quickly in periodical conditions resembling sleep, so also somnambulism evinces an exaltation of the restorative process. The somnambule Julie renewed teeth which had been extracted within a few weeks;† and

* Soldan: 'Geschichte der Hexenprocesse,' i. 263.
† Strombeek: 'Geschichte eines allein durch die Natur hervorgebrachten Magnetismus,' 144.
Wienholt reports a case in which the diseased teeth of a somnambule were restored during a six days' sleep.* Braid, also, the discoverer of hypnotism, has observed that the latter, as distinguished from ordinary sleep, effects extraordinary cures in acute diseases, and improvement in chronic ones.†

The like is the case also with artificial somnambulism. As a condition of deep sleep, it is already a very real remedy, able to cope with even surgical cases by the mere exaltation of the natural curative force. Many are the declarations of somnambules concerning the special benefit of the magnetic sleep. A consumptive patient once in the somnambulic state desired her physician to place her in a nine days' trance (Scheintod), during which her lungs enjoyed complete rest, so that she woke entirely cured.‡

If there is a healing force in Nature, the secret of medicine can only consist in strengthening and guiding it. Maxwell, the forerunner of Mesmer, knew this. From his proposition: 'There is no disease which is not curable by the spirit of life without help of a physician,' he draws the right conclusion, and continues: 'The universal remedy is nothing but the spirit of life increased in a suitable subject.'§

Now it is this mode of cure which Mesmer re-discovered. He wished to heal the diseased organism by the forces inherent therein, which he only excited to activity and directed. This is effected by magnetism. Modern physicians are nearer to this stand-

* Wienholt: 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 3, 30.
† Preyer: 'Die Entdeckung des Hypnotismus,' 144.
‡ Schopenhauer: 'Parerga,' i. 275.
§ Maxwell: 'Magnetische Heilkunde,' ii. Anhang.
point than they often know themselves. With every year they are more averse from treatment by drugs, which not only proceeds from the false materialistic assumption that man is only a chemical problem, but even in regard to the effects is only a driving out of the devil by Beelzebub. To this mode of treatment applies the saying of Petrus Poterius concerning the physicians of his time: 'That instead of healing disease sooner than Nature could do without them, they often so manage that Nature is obliged to fight disease and physician at the same time.'* Maxwell expresses the same when he says: 'They do not know much, who, to cure a disease, see themselves obliged to make a worse one.'† And Montaigne, when his friends advised him to call in a physician, used to answer that they should let him first recover his strength, so that it might be able to resist the attack.

In modern medicine the opinion has been more and more gaining ground that Nature and not the physician cures, that the art of the latter consists only in supporting and directing the curative force of Nature; that is to say, by medicaments to offer Nature the means of attaining her aim. By this conception, which is now that of every physician, the doctrine of remedies is brought into very close relation with the curative force of Nature. But now, if it is asked in what connection the capacity of somnambules to find the remedies advantageous to them stands to the natural curative force of their organism, it is evident that this question refers only to a special case of the

* Poterius: 'Opera omnia,' 604.
† Maxwell: 'Magn. Heilkunde,' ii. 4.
more general question of the relation of Nature and mind, the unconscious and the conscious, Will and Idea. Everyone will answer differently according to his philosophical standpoint, but this is not the place for a philosophical discussion of this question. It may therefore be enough to remark that every doctrine of Monism, be it pantheistic or materialistic, is already compelled upon logical grounds to regard spirit, consciousness, idea, as natural continuation of the process of organic development. Conceived from the standpoint of biology or of physiology, in both cases consciousness appears as the natural flower of the organic life-stem, the prolongation, as it were, of the organic. Mind is drawn from Nature, and since the law of development prevails in Nature, it prevails also in history. To the account of this relation the Darwinian philosopher Spencer has devoted the best of his works.*

Thus only when we recognise the dependence of our sense-consciousness upon the mother-stem of the organism, is it intelligible that, as Zeising has proved, the rule of the golden section, as formative principle, governs not only organic Nature, but even the ancient Greek and the Gothic temple architecture;† that further, as Kapp has shown, in the discoveries of technic art organic models are unconsciously imitated, as, for instance, the eye in the camera obscura, long before any scientific analysis of this model.‡ This idea of Kapp's is so fruitful that it affords a clue to the solution of the seemingly insoluble problem of the

* H. Spencer: 'First Principles.'
† A. Zeising: 'Neue Lehre von den Proportionen des menschlichen Körpers,' Leipzig, 1854.
‡ Kapp: 'Philosophie der Technik,' Braunschweig, 1877.
nature of the inhabitants of the planets.* The study of the four works named is not required of my present readers, but to eventual criticism it is indispensable; for the relation of mind to Nature is of fundamental importance for the following inquiry, and it is here that the critic who would subvert the further results must take his stand. To anyone adopting my solution of this question—and, I repeat, it is the only solution for the Monist, even if a materialist—this and the following chapter will appear quite naturally intelligible.

If the realm of mind is only the natural prolongation of that of Nature; if their histories, as biology, are to be conceived in the sense of the doctrine of development, so that Hegel and Darwin are mutually complementary; if Idea is related to Will as flower to branch; if the same force that forms the brain also determines the functions of brain, then is it self-evident that whatever acts in nature must assert itself in consciousness; but then it is easy to see in the curative instinct, and in the involuntary idea of the remedy, only a natural continuation of the curative power of Nature. And if even the waking consciousness adheres to its organic stem, that is still less strange in the case of dream-consciousness, since in sleep, the sounder it is, the deeper we are sunk into the organic impulse of Nature. Thus, if there is an objective curative force of Nature, from the standpoint of monism there must also be a subjective curative idea, which in waking announces itself only as instinctive craving, but in sleep as vision of the remedy.

* See the author's work: 'Planetenbewohner,' Leipzig, 1880.
So that dream, which has already appeared as physician in regard to diagnosis and prognosis, is one also in regard to the remedy. Waking, ordinary sleep, and somnambulism, are members of a series. Sense-consciousness is at the highest in waking, disappears in proportion to the depth of sleep, and in somnambulism is suppressed to the point of insensibility. But the inner waking is proportional to the abstraction of the sense-consciousness, and is most clear in somnambulism. Whoever, therefore, will study the abnormal capacities associated with the inner waking, must follow them through all three conditions. Already in waking he will meet with its most elementary forms; will find them more distinctly in sleep, and still more so in somnambulism. In this way the phenomena of each condition throw light upon those of the other, while they remain unintelligible when considered apart.

Accordingly, it is in waking that we have first to seek the psychical faculty of discovering remedies, though in this condition it can only appear as unconscious instinct. I cannot, however, dwell long upon this stage, and it will suffice to adduce two well-known facts: the instincts of animals in regard to their nourishment, and the remarkable inclinations of pregnant women, who often reject customary food and express the strangest longings—such as for broken points of lead pencils. I have lately seen a lady in this condition who disliked being kissed by her husband when he had just been smoking, but a few days after the birth of the child this smell became again as agreeable to her as it was before the pregnancy. These phenomena are evidently of a kind with those
health-instincts which survive with somnambules long after their magnetic condition has ceased. One of Kerner’s somnambules said that an inner impulse to take a certain remedy remained with her a long time, even without her going into the sleep, and informed her what was good for her or the reverse.* Another said to Kerner: ‘Since I was magnetised, foods most of all disgust me which are unsuitable to my state, which now is the ordinary one. Flesh and pastry disgust me; milk and apples are the only things right for me.’† Now, when Kerner himself used the remedies prescribed to him by somnambules, he acquired, he says, a disinclination to the foods which aggravated his complaint, chiefly meats; whereas he had the greatest appetite for things which he formerly disliked, as vegetables.‡ Thus the nutritious instinct here got transferred to the magnetiser.

It is one of the constant effects of magnetism that it excites inclination to beneficial, and dislike to deleterious foods.§ According to Reichenbach, the sensitives always and instinctively observed a pure diet, and it is only another expression for the displacement of the threshold of sensibility, when he says, that with them ‘Nature with her vegetative power prevailed more strongly.’|| A patient of Wienholt’s was seized with an insatiable voracity for indigestible things, such as codfish, meat-puddings, yellow peas,

---

† Id., 386.
‡ Id., 362.
|| Reichenbach: ‘Der sensitive Mensch,’ i. 386.
brown cabbages, and often ate them against his will. That lasted four months, and always with the most
wholesome effects.* Bonetus tells of a man who
never could eat bread, but in an attack of fever
had a desire for it, and before the next attack ate a
quantity voraciously. The fever was then stopped;
but after the cure the disinclination for bread re-
turned.† Brentano mentions that the famous nun,
Catherine Emmerich, when she was a child, brought
health-plants, known only to herself, from a distance,
and planted them at home, and also extirpated the
poisonous herbs for a long way round.‡ Similar
things occurred with other religious ecstatics, con-
cerning whom modern rationalism is still ignorant
that they were merely somnambules with a religious
colour.

Thus it cannot be doubted that the healing force
can penetrate into the waking consciousness as in-
stinctive impulse. But we are concerned with the
question, whether it also extends into the subjective
world of ideas, and this has to be proved for the
dream state. Anciently it was not at all doubted
that dreaming persons could discover appropriate
remedies for diseases. Hippocrates, Aristotle, Galen,
Aretæus, Pliny, Cicero, and, in later times, Tertullian,
Lord Bacon, Montaigne, and many others, asserted
the possibility of vision of remedies in dream; and
it is only now that one is obliged to re-inspect the

* Wienholt: 'Heilkraft,' etc., i. 366.
† Muratori: 'Ueber die Einbildungskraft,' ii. 258.
‡ 'Die Tyroler ekstatischen Jungfrauen,' i. 119 (1843). The
anonymous author is the Prussian State-Councillor, Wilhelm
Volk.
evidence instead of saying that the thing is 'notoriously' so.

There are two considerations well calculated to suggest the possibility, and indeed the necessity, of such indications of curative means occurring in dream, and thus to deprive them of their marvellous character, and I mention them to procure a better reception for what follows. They are, first: that a blind healing force is really far more wonderful than the production of an ideal representation of the means; and second, that with sleep is associated the displacement of the psycho-physical threshold, whereby a new material of sensibility is introduced, and the suggestions obtain a wholly material foundation—indeed, are in some measure necessitated.

By referring the curative instinct in sleep and the prescription of somnambules to the curative force of Nature, the problem is only, indeed, pushed back; but it is pushed back upon a fact which is subject to no doubt, and which has at all times excited the admiration of thinking physicians, and so much is already gained.

If we consider the perverse modes of life led by most, especially in civilized countries, the crowding of population in our great cities, which are hot-beds of all possible insanitary conditions, and further reflect that, in the country especially, most sick persons either subject themselves, or are subjected, to an irrational treatment, even non-professional persons must allow that the curative force of Nature has in fact no small task laid upon it, and in so far as, notwithstanding all, it is equal to it, we must feel the greatest respect for its capacity of performance. Still more striking
to a layman is the activity of this force in cases of external injury, cuts, bullet-wounds, fractures, etc., because here it is particularly apparent that the physician is only the assistant of nature. But it is the physician himself who will most admire the curative power of nature in diseases, when he follows her strenuous efforts for the restoration of health. The more he understands this, the more will he also recognise that nature alone can help immediately, the physician only mediately, through nature. The physician outside can indeed support the one within, which governs every organism, but cannot supply its place. Modern medical science is even disposed to see in diseases themselves only crises, brought about by our internal physician, the curative force of nature, to overcome the life-threatening mischief by means of the peculiar tendencies of organic activity.

Carus, speaking of the curative force of nature, says: 'The mere simple self-closing of an injured vessel, and the stoppage of bleeding, is in this regard a highly important process. How gradually the stream of blood into the injured vessel takes another direction, and thereby relieves the pressure upon the wounded parts, how the coating of the vessels gradually draws itself together, how by coagulation of the blood the peculiar form called the thrombus arises, and how now peculiar processes of vegetation are set up, by the influence of which, without anything of all this coming to consciousness, the closure of the wound is finished, while at the same time wholly new conduit vessels are formed, and the course of the blood, perhaps quite interrupted in the injured
part, is in this way perfectly restored, invite the most multifarious reflections... and in saying that it is the highest commission of science to penetrate consciously into the depths of the unconscious soul-life of the world, I may add that it is particularly the task of medical science to follow these unconscious curative movements, and to bring them to the clearest knowledge, that they may be as far as possible intentionally furthered, in suitable cases imitated, and especially occasioned.'*

*In fact, the curative force of nature is to be compared with the organic process of growth. As we can consciously bring the material of nutrition to the organism, but it is nature's part to dissolve, distribute, assimilate, and partially to reject; so the physician can indeed support the healing process, but he must always leave the principal office to nature.

Now, unsignificant and ill-defined as this phrase, the curative force of nature, may be, it cannot be asserted that this force, real as an objective fact, is an impossibility in the world of subjective ideas. That could only be asserted on the supposition of an insuperable boundary line between nature and mind. But monistically regarded, mind is only the continuation of nature, and therefore the curative force of nature must be able to proceed into the world of ideas. What else is man than a piece of nature, and one, too, in which nature has attained to self-consciousness? It thus needs only the further consideration, that by displacement of the psycho-physical threshold in sleep, a new material of sensibility attains to per-

* C. G. Carus: 'Psyche,' 101.
ception, to see that nature makes use of the organ of perception produced by her so far for self-knowledge as to make self-inspection possible, and to view objectively the activity of the organic process and of the curative force. As all the unconscious proceedings of life, the formative impulse of the organism, the nutritious instinct, selective affinity in the assimilation of food, the sympathies and antipathies of the soul-life, of which we can give no account, come to consciousness in somnambulism, so also the curative force of nature; and if this inner physician awakes in us, he can also, by reason of the material of sensibility brought to him by the displacement of the threshold, obtain ideas related to the healing process.

As by displacement of the psycho-physical threshold a whole new material of sensibility is afforded, it can be presupposed that this change of our relation to the things of nature makes possible influences of the same important to the healthy state, so that unusual longings or aversions, unknown to the normal condition, are awakened. To show that this conjecture is correct, a whole succession of experiments could be cited, of which two must be here noticed.

The celebrated chemist, Bezelius, in association with Reichenbach and the bath-physician, Hochberger, instituted highly instructive experiments at Karlsbad in 1845. They went to a so-called sensitive, a Fraulein von Seckendorf, before whom was laid a large number of chemical compounds wrapped in papers strewed upon the table. Being asked to pass the inner surface of her right hand lightly over them, she felt herself very differently affected by the different
DREAM A PHYSICIAN.

packets: many were quite without effect upon her; others exercised a peculiar attraction on the hand. She was now desired to separate the packets into two sets, according to this difference. 'The creator of the electro-chemical system appeared not a little struck on perceiving on the one side, that of the substances which had attracted her, exclusively electropositive; on the other, that of the non-attractive ones, merely electro-negative bodies. Not a positive showed itself among the negative, not a negative among the positive; the partition was perfect. . . . That which had been brought about in a century at the cost of infinite diligence and acuteness, the electro-chemical classification of bodies, was accomplished by a simple sensitive girl in ten minutes by merely feeling with her empty hands.'*

It can only be remarked here, by the way, that this sensitiveness of certain persons is a somnambulic faculty surviving into the daily life, as in the above case Fraulein von Seckendorf told her visitors before the experiment 'a series of wonderful somnambulic occurrences which she had experienced.' Suffice it to observe that this sensibility applies also to organic substances. Kerner gives many remarks of a somnambule on the subject: 'Whenever in this sleep I take a plant in my hand, and hold it for awhile, I so penetrate it, that from the small veins or form of the leaves I can read, as it were, what qualities and powers they possess.'† It is therefore not surprising, if sensitives and somnambules feel the effects of substances,

* Reichenbach: 'Aphorismen über Sensitivität und Od.,' 7, 8; Wien, 1866. 'Der sensitive Mensch,' i. 706; Stuttgart, 1854.
† Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 376.
that they know more of their qualities than the normal man, for whom these feelings remain below the threshold, and that those in whom the curative force of nature comes to consciousness know the peculiar tendency of these substances, and whether they further or disturb the curative force. The seeress of Prevost reacted so finely on the contact, and even on the mere proximity, of minerals, plants, and animal substances, that she immediately felt their medicinal effects. Siemers experimented on a somnambule with about two hundred medicinal substances, which she touched with the tips of the fingers of her right hand, often also putting some of them on her tongue. If she was unwell she had a finer sense. Many substances he gave her in extract, powder, decoction, tincture, or raw root, and yet she could identify them. This somnambule saw sometimes in Siemers' house bulbs of crocus, amaryllis, hyacinths, and tulips, and, with few exceptions, correctly indicated the colours of the future flowers, and whether they would be single or double.* It is related of the scullion of an English consul in Egypt, that, being magnetised by the consul for his cough, he asked for sugar of agrimonium from the medicine-chest of an Italian who was present, and found the right bottle by touch.† Similar influences affect many persons, even in waking, as so-called idiosyncrasies. Many have the St. Anthony's fire from eating strawberries or crawfish. Goethe had an antipathy to garlic, as Schiller had to spiders. It is related of Tycho Brahe that he trembled at the sight of a hare, and Platen, as

* Perty: 'Die mystischen Erscheinungen,' i. 263.
† 'Archiv,' viii. 2, 127.
my father, who saw it, told me, when at school, would spring up in horror from his desk if he saw a spider.

Thus as the organic formative impulse comes to consciousness in the interior self-inspection, so also can the curative force of nature come to consciousness in the inner waking in sleep and somnambulism. Sanitary-Councillor Schindler says: 'If we follow the processes set up by the organism to neutralize poisons introduced into it—as the conversion of metallic oxides into the less injurious sulphide; the processes by which foreign bodies are removed by suppuration, capsulation, absorption, and expulsion; those which the body effects to remove by empyrosis a broken-in bone; intestinal processes by which the passage of the bowels is restored; if we follow the cicatrising of wounds, the production of new nerves, muscles, and bone-masses, the restoration of circulation by the new formation of a collateral network of vessels when a large vessel has decayed; if we consider those which occur every day in inflammation and fever, which are only to be looked upon as vital processes to save the individual from foreign influences; we must confess that no physician could proceed with more circumspection, and that a physician can only act with advantage when he has sought out the healing method of nature—when he has become her servant. But where now is the health-artist? is he not within us? and is not the whole of medicinal science derived from our exploration of the curative method of this internal physician? When, therefore, we call medicine an empirical science, we have only to reflect that healing is older
than medical science, and that the physician in us healed long before there was a science of healing. This physician in us is quite like the instincts of animals . . . Instinct comes to consciousness in the somnambule, who gives it words, and seeks the remedy, as the conditions of recovery.'*

Now since the bodily organs of the outer as of the inner waking, brain and ganglionic system, can only be anatomically and physiologically explained in connection with the whole organism, and the blood only as product of the whole vegetative life, so in principle it is quite self-evident that we cannot detach the functions of these organs from the general natural activity of the organism. Nature and mind are thus inseparable, and materialism, which in all mind sees exclusively the function and secretion of bodily organs, can certainly not escape this consequence. But if it concedes this, it must admit the conscious representations of the dream-life in relation to the healing process as a necessary inference from this conception; and the following instances cannot appear to it impossible marvels, but as entirely natural things; and it must then contest and deny the curative force of nature itself, and that finger-cuts heal of themselves. Materialism has thus only itself to understand—and that is little enough—to concede the possibility of health-dreams. But if one speaks of these things to a materialist, he feels them as an injury to his understanding, and rejects them as superstition—another proof that with this sort of natural philosophers logic is not to be found.

For every monism, since it is logically forbidden to regard nature and mind as merely mosaic fragments in juxtaposition, the health-dream is only the latest issue of organic activity. Now materialism is monism, and it connects nature and mind, will and idea, body and soul, in the sense of conceiving soul as mere effect of body. This is only partially true: the sense-consciousness is attached to the functions of the nerves and brain. But were it wholly true, from the fact of the healing force materialism must all the more infer the possibility of the healing idea. To the materialist, therefore, it can at most appear striking that Cabanis, who has had the greatest influence on the development of materialistic conceptions, raises no objection to this opinion, confirmed as it was, moreover, by his own experience.

'L'on voit dans quelques maladies extatiques et convulsives, les organes des sens devenir sensibles à des impressions qu'ils n'apprêvevaient pas dans leur état ordinaire, ou même recevoir les impressions étrangères à la nature de l'homme. J'ai plusieurs fois observé chez les femmes qui sans doute eussent été jadis d'excellentes pythonisses, les effets les plus singuliers des changements dont je parle. Il est de ces malades qui distinguent facilement à l'œil un des objets microscopiques, d'autres qui voient assez nettement dans la plus profonde obscurité pour s'y conduire avec assurance. Il en est qui suivent les personnes à la trace comme un chien, et reconnaissent à l'odorat les objets dont ces personnes se sont servies ou qu'elles ont seulement touchés. J'en ai vu, dont le goût avait acquis une finesse particulièr, et qui désiraient ou savaient choisir les aliments et même les remèdes qui paraissaient leur être véritablement utiles avec une sagacité qu'on n'observe par l'ordinaire que dans les animaux. On en voit qui sont en état d'apprêvoir en elles-mêmes dans le temps de leurs paroxismes, ou certaines crises qui se préparent, et dont le terminaison prouve bientôt après la justesse de leurs sensations, ou d'autres modifications organiques attestées par celle du pouls et par des signes encore plus certaints.*

* Cabanis: 'Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme,' ii. 35; Paris, Musson, 1855.
Thus, without speaking of somnambules, Cabanis concedes half the somnambulic programme, and can do so, since these phenomena do not contradict monism, even of a materialistic sort. It may be incidentally mentioned that Cabanis was one of Mesmer's earliest pupils, a fact which seems not to be sufficiently known, but which has been proved by the physician Mialle.*

The second form of monism is pantheism. This sees a soul-principle ruling in the organic activity of the body itself, and thus can still less object to the possibility of health ideas, since the curative force and the curative idea are inseparably connected. This conception has been developed most completely by Hartmann. For him organic growth, the replacement of lost parts of the body, the healing force of nature, are connected with ideas which he ascribes to the Unconscious—that is, to a metaphysical world-substance.† On this account he has been violently attacked from the side of the men of science, and so far rightly, that exact science can explain the life-process only from the organism itself. But if Hartmann is read without any prepossessions, it will soon be found that he has a very sound kernel. He analyses the organic processes very acutely, and in so doing cannot escape the inference of an unconscious idea.‡ Now, if the sound constituents of the scientific, and of this philosophical conception are combined, we find ourselves compelled, as if accord-

* Cf. Deleuze: 'Faculté de prévision,' 141.
† Hartmann: 'Philosophie des Unbewussten,' Abteilung A.
‡ In opposition to Schopenhauer, to whom the Unconscious, the 'thing-in-itself,' was exclusively Will.—Tr.
ing to a psychical parallelogram of forces, to locate every idea connected with the unconscious or instinctive tendencies of the organism in the individual psyche, in the transcendental Ego lying beneath the psycho-physical threshold. Not for this do these organic processes go on unconsciously, though truly they do for the Ego above the threshold. This third sort of monism unites the sound constituents of materialism and pantheism, dropping the unsound ones of both, and seems best to correspond with the facts. It is also that which can least of all dispute the possibility of health-dreams, since, according to its own conception, the possibility of such dreams has only one condition, the displacement of the threshold of sensibility, which is a known fact of dream.

After these introductory observations, we can turn to particular examples of health-dreams; and I will begin with one which shows the necessity of cautious judgment. A Colonel B. was shot through the head, and otherwise injured, at Leipzig, in 1636. After long sufferings, there appeared to him by night the form of a lady, who enjoined him to throw away a gold tube which had been placed in the head to carry off the discharge, and said that he would thus be healed. The physicians declared that his death would infallibly ensue, but the dream being repeated still more impressively the next night, the colonel obeyed, and in the morning the physicians found the wound healed.* Like every foreign body in a wound, this gold tube must naturally have occasioned a troublesome irritation. Now, as such irritations in dream often even lead to reflex movements to get rid of

* Hennings: 'Ahnungen und Visionen,' 317.
them, this one could easily have been the provocation of a dream-image in which the removal of the tube would be dramatically enjoined; and as it is certainly allowable to assume that the tube was no longer necessary, that explains the self-closing of the wound, without adding this case to the class of health-dreams, to which it has much resemblance.

The rationalistic explanation may be more difficult in the case of a dream, connected with dramatic prognosis, which Bautzmann relates of a young girl: The dream announced to her the impending illness, its duration, and all its particular incidents; there appeared to her two men, who enjoined her to mark in the calendar the days and weeks on which this or that should be the case with her. Among the rest, the men recommended bleeding, which, however, the physicians and her parents would not permit, till she herself opened a vein in firm trust in her dream, whereon the violence of the disease immediately abated.*

As there is a danger of proving nothing when one would prove too much, it is advisable to exclude all those dreams in which an action to be performed upon the organism is recommended or commanded, since such dreams may always proceed from local irritation, which may either occasion an actual reflex movement for relief, or a dream-image, motivated by what has already occurred.

But the rationalistic explanation is excluded, if there are dreams, as Hippocrates in his book on dreams affirms, in which are seen the kinds of nutrient that are advantageous for the body, or the

* Perty: 'Mystischen Erscheinungen,' i. 112.
remedies of the latter are represented in consciousness. Such a vision is recorded by Bourdois, of the Medical Academy of Paris: A man began to rave during a violent attack of cholera, and Bourdois thought he heard the word 'peach.' Respecting the instinct thus uttered, he had that fruit procured, and the sick man ate it eagerly. This desire, which, had it occurred in waking, would have been describable as unconscious instinct, was thus for the transcendentental Ego connected with an idea, that came to consciousness by the displacement of the psycho-physical threshold.* In the course of the night the patient ate some thirty peaches with the greatest avidity, and the day after he was well.†

Melancthon suffered from a painful inflammation of the eyes, which would yield to no treatment. He once dreamed, as Camerarius states, that his physician prescribed to him white Eye-bright (Euphrasia officinalis), and by the application of this remedy he was cured. A similar case, in which the health idea took on a dramatic form, is given by Ælian in his 'Miscellaneous Stories.' The celebrated Aspasia, who afterwards became Queen of Persia, had in her youth a swelling in the face, by which she was much disfigured. The physician who was called in de-

* That is to say, in the normal waking state, the definite desire for the definite thing, peach, would have remained below the threshold, and would have come into the consciousness above the threshold only as an indefinite craving, to which no name could be given. By the exaltation of the sensibility, called the displacement of the threshold, in an abnormal condition, the sub-physical consciousness of the idea, the exact dictate of nature, became psycho-physical—that is, could take on the sense-expression in the image, peach.—Tr.

† 'Dict. de Médecine,' v. 190.
manded a fee which her father could not afford, so that she had to forego his aid. Aspasia was therefore inconsolable; but there appeared to her in dream a dove, which soon took the form of a woman, and said: 'Be of good courage; despise physicians and their physic. Powder one of the roses which adorn the statue of Venus, and are now faded, and lay this rose-powder on the swelling.' The maiden followed this counsel, and the swelling went down. The essential thing in this dream was the dramatic health-instinct. The form in which such dreams are clothed is always taken from the ideality of the subject, and therefore appears in space and time. In our days, this Aspasia would have taken roses from a statue of the Virgin Mary, or the prescription would perhaps have been brought by a messenger, as a telegraphic despatch. It would be wholly fallacious, on account of such forms, to fling away the kernel of the thing, as Ælian would perhaps have done, because he regarded Mariolatry as superstition, or as a Catholic would do, because he rejected the belief in a goddess Venus. It would be equally fallacious to take this external form of dream into account. Dream very frequently takes on the dramatic form; it is a sort of ventriloquist, or, better expressed, a verbal intercourse between the Ego above the threshold and the one below. Thus regarded, all that somnambules and the modern spiritists say of their guardian spirits and guides is perhaps dissolved into vapour; but modern scepticism has not the least right to throw away the kernel also on account of the form.

Avicenna relates, that one who had an inflammation of the tongue dreamed he should hold in his mouth
the juice of the lettuce, by doing which the complaint soon abated.* Even the phenomenon, very frequent in somnambulism, in which the place is seen where the remedy is to be found, seems to be a possible incident of ordinary dream. A boy of five years old having sustained an injury to a bone, giving rise to gangrene, an amputation was about to be performed. In the night he saw himself transported into the apothecary’s shop, where was a vessel for salves with a Latin inscription, which on awaking he could still remember; the salve was tried, and he recovered.† It is related of a sleep-walker, that during her illness she dreamed that the water of a neighbouring spring would make her well. She drank much of it, and when they once tried to deceive her with other water, she knew the deception.§

That a similar instinct can be exalted into vision even in waking, has the proof, among others, of the numerous instances of fainting travellers in the desert, who see images of oases and springs. A negro who had lost his way, as I have read somewhere, having been for sixty hours without food and drink, saw around him clear springs of water, by which he thought to refresh himself, wherein this Tantalus was naturally disappointed. Mungo Park, in a nearly fainting state on a journey in Africa, dreamed incessantly of the richly-watered valleys and pastures of his home.§

So Trenk, tormented by hunger in the trenches of

* Nudow: ‘Theorie des Schlafes,’ 139; Konigsberg, 1791.
† Splittgerber: ‘Schlaf und Tod,’ i. 141.
‡ Fischer, ‘Der Somnambulismus,’ ii. 80.
§ Schubert: ‘Geschichte der Seele,’ ii. 205.
Magdeburg, saw himself surrounded by luxurious banquets; and George Back, one of Franklin's first expedition, when near starvation from frightful privations, constantly and regularly dreamed of rich repasts.* The need of the organism comes thus to be an object of vision. The self-prescriptions of somnambules follow the same law, need and vision in their case being only much more detailed.

In the 'Frankfurter Konversationsblatt' of 25th of August, 1842, there is an account of an English officer who had fallen ill of fever in war. During a sleepless night he had the vision of a venerable man, who said to him that he could only be cured by cold washing in the court at daybreak, after which he should dry himself, and return to bed. He followed this dramatized instinct, and recovered.

The Jewish seeress Selma, of whom Dr. Wiener gives an account, had numerous dreams of this nature, as to which it is questionable whether they should be ascribed to ordinary or to somnambulic sleep. She once dreamed that someone offered her a roll of bread smeared with hog's-lard, saying, 'Eat, it is hog's-lard!' On awakening, she felt ravenous for hog's-lard—an inclination which, as a religious Jewess, she strove to conquer. She kept her dream from the physician, fearing that he would counsel her to obey the craving. But when next night the dream repeated itself, and she believed she could no longer resist the desire, she told her physician, who, as he said, would long ago have prescribed something of the sort, had he not been withheld by her religious

scruples. It was, perhaps, an after effect of just such a dream and a surviving obscure instinct, that made her complain one day that she had an appetite for a certain food, but, in spite of all reflection, could not specify it. In the evening, however, when she was in the somnambulic state, and was asked if she had not a particular appetite for something, she named fresh pigeons' eggs and a fieldfare.*

It would be mere verbal contention to claim this faculty of prescription for instinct, instead of recognising in it a somnambulic capacity becoming free even in ordinary dream; for, in the first place, the word 'instinct' tells us nothing, and is only a name for something unknown, and, secondly, there is no justification for the distinction. If we would attach some definite meaning to the word 'instinct,' we must admit that, for the Ego below the psychophysical threshold, which in dream shows itself movable, it is connected with ideas; while, if it succeeds in overstepping the threshold in waking, it drops the idea, and only expresses itself still as obscure impulse. Thus in sleep the healing-force of nature acts in the sphere of ideas; in waking, only within the sphere of will. But were it only blind will, as Schopenhauer thought, it could not show itself in somnambulism in connection with idea.

The relationship of the health-dream with somnambulism appears also in this, that many dreams are reported in which the remedy for the diseases of others is seen. All these reports show that on the part of the dreamer the pre-condition is a deep internal

* Wiener: 'Selma, die jüdische Scherin,' 22, 35, 40; Berlin, 1838.
agitation through trouble concerning the disease, in general, a sympathy of the soul, whereby a like relation appears to be produced, as in somnambulic rapport, so that it is questionable whether this phenomenon does not already belong to the province marked off, by a fluid boundary line, as somnambulism.

A dream of this nature, which has classical celebrity, is that of Alexander. He fell asleep by his friend Ptolemaus, who was dying of a poisoned wound. In dream he saw a dragon who held a plant in his mouth, and said that with it he would heal his friend. On awaking, Alexander specified the exact colour of the plant, and the place where it was to be found, and was sure that he should know it when he saw it. The soldiers who were sent found the plant, which not only soon healed Ptolemaus, but also many other soldiers who had likewise received arrow-wounds. Pliny relates of a mother who dreamed she was to send her son, who was in the field, the root of a wood-rose which she had seen the day before; and her son, who had hydrophobia from the bite of a mad dog, was cured.

Remarkable is the dream of the physician, Christopher Rumbaum, of Breslau, which excited in his time an extraordinary sensation. It is to be found, with assurance of its historical truth, in the Breslau Collections (April, 1718); it was cited by most writers of that time, and by many was held to be purely supernatural. Rumbaum had under his

* Curt. Rufus, ix. 8; Cicero de Divin., ii. 66; Diodorus, xvii. 103; Strabo, xv. 2-7.
† Plinius: 'Hist. Nat.,' xxv. 11.
‡ Conf. Horsb.: 'Deuteroskopie,' ii. 122.
treatment a friend to whom he was much attached, but whom he saw no way of helping, and despairing of his restoration, he fell asleep, disturbed in mind. In dream there appeared to him a book in which was especially described how the cure was to be effected; he applied the means thus indicated, and the patient recovered. So far the dream might be explained by dramatized health-instinct and rapport. But we are expressly assured that first, some years later, a book appeared in the press, wherein this method of treatment was to be read on the same page on which Rumbaum had read it in the dream. Now, unless anyone will explain this part of the dream as a mere accident—which was not the opinion of the better informed contemporaries—he must admit the phenomenon of prevision. This is not the place to speak of that; but it may be observed that Kant has conclusively shown time and space to be intuitional forms of our sense-consciousness. In the chapter, 'Dream a Dramatist,' it appeared that our transcendental consciousness has a completely different measure of time, which already suggests the possibility of prevision.

The clear ideas of dream often leave behind them after waking an obscure presentiment or impulse, which need not, however, originate in sleep, but can occur spontaneously in all waking conditions connected with a displacement of the threshold. Physicians know that in nervous diseases, fevers, pregnancies, scurvy, etc., definite nutritious instincts often occur, with the knowledge of what is advantageous in the apparently hurtful. Hunger itself is such an instinct, so that dream directed to a particular nutriment may
be explained as a specialized hunger, which has obtained its content as idea by the displacement of the threshold. Now, as also dream directed to a particular remedy is properly only the specialized healing-force of the organism, which has received its representative (ideal) content from the transcendental region of consciousness, these health-dreams offer no difficulty whatever to the understanding. If it is considered further, that somnambulism is a deeper sleep, in which the complete suppression of sense-consciousness is accompanied by a proportionately clearer waking within, that thus in this sleep also, the capacities of ordinary dream are present in an exalted degree, there is no longer anything unintelligible in the advanced phenomena of somnambulism with reference to the healing instinct.

4. The Health-Prescriptions of Somnambules.

The health-prescription of somnambules is the last issue of the sanative power of nature, and is rooted in it. In the sanative power nature works herself, and directly, in the health-prescription indirectly, determining, to functions in her interest, the organ of ideation which she has created. It is not from the brain, the reflective activity of understanding, that the health-prescription flows, but from the organ of inner waking, the ganglionic system. This, as already noticed, experiences influences not accessible to the waking brain-life, from earthly substances; and it is therefore explicable that it may be able to feel the utility or hurtfulness of these substances. If, however, an idea must be thought in all circum-
stances as a brain idea, still the first excitation to it must be sought in the ganglionic system, which in sleep is less isolated from the cerebral system, and could awake there an echo of its own feelings in the form of ideas.

Schopenhauer says: 'Nature properly only permits clairvoyance (of which somnambulism or speaking in sleep is the prelude), when her blindly working sanative power does not suffice for removal of the disease, but needs remedies from without, which are then rightly prescribed by the patient himself in the clairvoyant condition. To this end of self-prescription she brings forward clairvoyance, for "natura nihil facit frustra."' Schopenhauer has presented this important point of new departure, which somnambulism reaches in clairvoyance, in the clearest light by comparing it with the similarly important point of new departure in the biological process, when Nature makes the step from the plant to the animal. With elevation in the organic scale, the needs must be more complex, and to seek out and select their objects the organ of cognition must arise, for which the sight of things comes to be the motives of action. Schopenhauer continues: 'Thus, in the one case as in the other, Nature herself kindles a light by which the assistance needed by the organism from without can be sought and obtained.'* Thus, according to Schopenhauer's theory, somnambulism repeats on the small scale what happens in the process of nature on the large one, and is a special case of the latter. Now, if, instead of seeing, with Schopenhauer, the

* Schopenhauer: 'Parerga,' i. 276.
substance of man in a blind universal willing, I seek this substance in the transcendental willing of the individual, this will being, for me, not absolutely, but only relatively blind (namely, for the man of the senses), if I thus substitute a representing and willing Ego for a merely willing and blind 'thing in itself,' every parallel of Schopenhauer can be accepted, and so far I can adopt his theory of somnambulism. The health-prescription is thus in the line of prolongation of the sanative power, which makes use of this consciousness for the search for external remedies.

Two sorts of somnambulism are to be distinguished, the natural and the artificial; not, however, according to the content of their phenomena, but according to the exciting cause. Nature herself introduces somnambulism in the course of many diseases as a beneficent crisis; artificial somnambulism ensues upon magnetic treatment, which does not actually produce this state, but only awakes the predisposition to it residing in the organism. The magnetic physician is therefore, like every other, merely the assistant of nature. Now as Nature of herself can introduce somnambulism, and as both sorts are by no means always connected with health-prescriptions, it follows that this condition has in itself a sanative power, which explains why the health-prescriptions of somnambules insist in the first place upon magnetic treatment, which should come to the aid of the natural disposition and develop it. That is very obvious, for as common sleep exalts the vegetative life-processes of the body, this must be much more the case with the deep somnambulic sleep, and to
these vegetative functions belong also all sorts of the natural sanative power.

Further incidents of common sleep are the disappearance of sense-consciousness, and the incipient inner waking in dream. These also are both exalted in somnambulism, and since in the inner waking that faculty is brightened, which even in the outer waking state emerges as instinct for a particular nutriment or remedy, there result perfectly definite health-prescriptions, the fruit of which is the strengthening of the somnambulic disposition by magnetic treatment, this state being in itself one of sanative power, quite apart from the fact that it often converts the dreamer into a self-prescribing physician.

The magnetic mode of treatment is at present unfortunately, but quite accountably, in great discredit. Owing to the great difficulty, even apparent impossibility, of explaining the very strange phenomena of somnambulism, science has hastily flung its gun at the mark, and has confounded the impossibility of explanation with the impossibility of the thing, although the decision of the question of the magnetic sanative power has nothing to do with the possibility or impossibility of a theoretical explanation. We cannot explain mineral magnetism, and yet we use the compass for navigation; we do not know what electricity is, yet we apply it. Under these circumstances healing magnetism is now more in the hands of ignorant laymen than of scientific physicians, and is overspread with all possible superstitions. But it is not for Science to find fault with that for which she herself is responsible, since she has parted with the control of the subject. Recently scientific attention
has again been directed to it; literary contributions to it are constantly on the increase, and it is no longer to be feared that this most important of all phenomena will again fall into oblivion. A time is thus coming when magnetism will triumph, because it will be applied at the right time, not first with patients who are given up and have already exhausted every other resource, and further, because it will be exercised by physicians, or at least under their control. Even then we shall perhaps know no more of the nature of this mysterious force than at present; but physicians will not on that account abstain from the application of it, and will confess that they could prescribe few of their medicaments if experience of their effects were not enough to dispense with preliminary explanation of their mode of action.

Somnambules thus prescribe magnetism for themselves, and in many cases see in it the only remedy advantageous to them. At the same time they lay the greatest stress, not only upon particular hours of treatment, but even on the number and kind of magnetic passes they are to receive.* They show the magnetiser the movements of the hand which he has to apply in his treatment;† and they know this instinctively, even if in waking they are ignorant of magnetism. The physician Koreff knew a somnambule, who, in waking, had no acquaintance with the subject, and yet instructed her physician, who was

* 'Archiv,' vii. 2, 55; Reichenbach: 'Der sens. Mensch,' i. 324, 331, 469.
likewise ignorant of it, the number of magnetic passes to be given.* Experience, in fact, teaches that the different manipulations which occur in magnetic treatment bring with them also important different modifications of the somnambulic state. Tardy's somnambule lived in two totally different conditions, according to the magnetic treatment to which she was subjected; the content of her consciousness changed, as to that of another person, when she was magnetised in one way in the morning and in another way in the evening. She said to her magnetiser: 'I feel that my sleep quite changes its character; I now again see everything which appears to me in the usual morning sleep, but nothing more of that which I see besides in the evening.'†

It is very remarkable that even the auto-somnambules see in magnetic passes a means of exalting the natural somnambulism. Possibly the historical origin of animal magnetism in ancient India may be thus explained, for it may easily be that the first application of it was directed by an auto-somnambule.

Now what in the organism is excited by magnetic treatment is not at all a new force, strange and mysterious to it, but are simply its own active forces, exalted and moved to livelier activity. What the organism is doing in every moment of life to maintain the balance of inner forces and outer disturbances, it does in common sleep in a higher degree, and with still more energy in the magnetic sleep, which thus merely sustains a natural activity of the organism.

* Deleuze: 'Instruction pratique,' etc., 400.
† Tardy: 'Suite du Traitemen,' 117, 118.
This natural effort of the organism to remove morbid disturbances is always proportioned to the mischief to be combated. Thus only is to be explained the always recurring phenomenon, that as the health is restored, sensibility to magnetism is lost. When the patient is restored he cannot again be placed in the magnetic sleep. 'I laugh,' said a somnambule, 'to think of the vain attempts you will make tomorrow to put me to sleep. You will not succeed, for I shall be well.'*

It is therefore one and the same force which forms the organism, sustains the life process, and repairs injuries; its activity is greatest in the magnetic sleep, but it discontinues this when the aim is attained. And, again, it is the continuation of this same natural force which in waking produces hunger, and the instinct for definite food, which in ordinary sleep, acting representationally, elicits the vision of the remedy, and which, when the inner waking reaches its greatest clearness in somnambulism, is exalted to the stage of self-prescription. As these organic forces form the body according to a definite type, so they restore it after this type in their health-functions.

Whoever holds in earnest the monistic conception that mind is only the continuation of nature, will not find it difficult to recognise continuity in the succession of formative impulse, natural sanative power, nutritive instinct, and health-idea; indeed, to such a monist, it might even be suggested à priori that instinctive health-ideas must occur. The organic formative impulse is related to the natural sanative power, just as the interior self-inspection to the health-

* Tardy: 'Essai,' etc., 60.
idea, and as the sanative power requires for its explanation that already the formative impulse is schematised by an idea, so also the health-idea is only explicable if the interior self-inspection is already a critical one. Self-inspection is not in all cases connected with health-ideas, and even when these occur, they first develop gradually from an obscure feeling to clearness. But that health-ideas are not only rare exceptions is shown in the fact that their simplest forms occur already in ordinary sleep, and can therefore appeal to an unbroken succession of observers of this phenomenon. Hippocrates, who constantly recommends physicians to have regard in diseases and dreams to the 'divine,' by which the transcendental psychological capacities are to be understood, says concisely: 'In dreams are seen the nutriments which are good for the body.' Similarly speak Aristotle, Galen, Aretæus. Cicero says, the qualities of different plants are shown by dream.* Later, it is the physician Abdallah-Abnusina (Avicenna) who cites health-ideas in dream.† Then follow Ficinus,‡ Janitsch,§ and others, down to the most recent time.

In citing cases of health-ideas I shall not divide them into those in which the somnambules prescribe for themselves and those in which they prescribe for others, a distribution which would belong rather to a book of reference, but shall adopt a principle of division which will advance our understanding of

* Cicero: 'De Divinatione,' i. 10.
‡ Marsil. Ficinus: 'De Immort. Animae,' xvi. 5.
the matter, that is, will discover the source of the prescriptions.

For there are only three sources from which these prescriptions of somnambules can logically flow: (1) The instinct of somnambules elevated into the ideal sphere; (2) The reflection of somnambules; (3) The reflection of the physician transferred to the somnambule. That the first of these is the true one will now be shown; the proof being further strengthened by the refutation of the others.

(a) The Prescriptions of Somnambules are Instincts.

The use of the word 'instinct' can here no longer mislead the reader, who already knows that instinct for me is connected with the idea which lies below the psycho-physical threshold, and belongs to the consciousness of the inwardly waking transcendental Ego. The excitement of this idea depends on the material of sensibility accessible to the transcendental consciousness, and only in so far as sensibility and idea remain below the threshold can we from the standpoint of the sense-consciousness speak of an unconscious instinct.

The proof that the prescriptions originate from such an instinct can only be derived from the way in which they come, and from what they contain.

They come in the deep sleep of somnambulism, and are the more definite the more the sense-consciousness is suppressed, that is, the deeper the sleep and the clearer the inner waking.

The physician Wienholt therefore advises that only in their deepest sleep should somnambules be asked about remedies, and he assures us that he had never
then received a direction that was not to the purpose, though often, indeed, one more heroic than he would himself have ventured. Still more is the instinctive character of the prescriptions betrayed by their coming from the insane and 'possessed,' in which case every other source is excluded, a proof how rightly Mesmer and Puységur judged, when they called the insane ill-regulated somnambules. Strombeck saw a person in an insane state who gave out categorically how she should be cured; no attention was paid to it, and she became completely mad. Even bodily ill-usage, which somnambules, like the insane, inflict upon themselves, may be referred to instinctive impulse. A somnambule of Petetin, if she got an arm free, could inflict violent blows on her stomach. The region of the stomach was also the chief object of such attacks among the convulsionaries of St. Médard at the beginning of the last century. The three-volume work of Carré de Montgéron, which is full of official documents, is one of the most remarkable accounts of these occurrences, which excited all Paris during thirteen years, but remained so little understood, that all the copious polemic to which they gave rise turns on the question whether these phenomena were to be ascribed to God or to the devil. The maltreatment of themselves by these convulsionaries calls vividly to mind the cruelties inflicted on their own bodies by Indian penitents, of

* Wienholt: 'Heilkraft,' etc., 1, § 14.
† Strombeck: 'Geschichte eines durch die Natur hervorgebrachten animalischen Magnetismus,' 144.
‡ Carré de Montgéron: 'La vérité des miracles opérés par l'intercession de M. de Paris, etc.', Cologne, 1745.
whom Windischmann speaks,* adding that he has seen many phenomena of this sort, arising from confused somnambulism, in madhouses, where the treatment of such individuals was not understood, and which impressed one like an assembly of Indian penitents, in which everyone was busy in his own way.

To such ill-regulated somnambules belong also those 'possessed' persons of the middle ages, who were brought under the description of witches, just because medical science had no category for somnambules. So indications of somnambulism in prognosis and health-prescriptions are found in the 'possessed' children of Annaberg, of whom it is said: 'The children began to rage violently, with frightful distortion of the limbs and whole body. . . . Their breath has been often taken away, and they have devised and demanded remedies for themselves, which have been of immediate service. . . . They have known beforehand how they would be tormented, and when it would cease.'† With the possessed nuns of Unterzell, also, whose abbess, Maria Renata, was burned as a witch in 1749, the prescription of remedies occurred.‡ Tertullian, too, was aware of this phenomenon of possessed persons speaking as physicians, and as, according to the spirit of his time, he could only ascribe this to demons, he arrived at a very artificial explanation: 'When demons cure diseases, it is because they have themselves caused

* Windischmann: 'Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte,' i. 1481.
† Hauher: 'Bibliotheca Magica,' iii. 28-47.
‡ Horst: 'Zauberbibliothek,' v. 206.
them; they prescribe effectual remedies, and then it is believed they have driven away the disease, because they have ceased to cause it. *(Quia desinunt leedere, curasse creduntur).*

Self-prescriptions occur, moreover, with those somnambules who have the faculty of self-introspection and of diagnosing the diseases of others, and must therefore be regarded as a prolongation of these instinctive faculties, thus as the latest flower of Nature's sanative power.

One of the most remarkable cases of this sort is the history of the disease of Frau Marnitz, who was treated in vain for heart disease by more than twenty physicians for years, but then, becoming spontaneously a somnambule, knew her disease, defined its course, and restored herself by her prescriptions.

As the introspection is no abstract knowledge, but intuitive representation of the interior, so also the health prescriptions. Instinct passes over into the perceptive sphere, producing dream-images; that is, the somnambules have a vision of the remedy. Professor Ennemoser knew a somnambule whose representation of her remedy took the form of a large nut filled with milk; she described it as big as a head and covered with fibrous flesh. Her exact description of the tree suggested a cocoanut, which was procured from Hamburg, and the patient improved daily.

Thus, while there is seldom an abstract naming of the remedy, the description of it, and of its medicinal

* Tertullian: 'De præser.,' c. 35.
† Dr. A. Schmidt: 'Bericht von der Heilung der Frau Marnitz,' Berlin, 1816. (Cited in Perty's 'Mystische Erscheinungen,' i. 307.)
‡ Ennesmoser: 'Der Magnetismus,' 140; Leipzig, 1819.
qualities, are often so definite as to afford the physician a sufficient clue. But if there is a doubt, the somnambules will frequently take in their hands the drugs between which the uncertainty exists, and find the right one by tasting;* for the influences, which for the normal man remain below the threshold of sensibility, come to consciousness in them, and awaken instinctive inclination or repugnance. Wienholt's somnambule said of a remedy that it was to be prepared from a plant growing in a boggy place outside the city gate; she described its form and size, and desired that it should be cut small, boiled, and then drunk with milk. Of a necessary condiment she could only say that they were grains, larger than anise, brown, with a shrivelled appearance, and a taste like pepper. Different seeds being laid before her, she chose *grana paradisi.* In another case, no one knowing the plant she asked for, she desired that when awake she might be persuaded to take a walk on the rampart, that in a later sleep she might be able to indicate the place where it was to be found.† The physician Billot tells us of a somnambulist who had prescribed a plant for a sick lady; he indicated its place in a wood, four hundred metres from a certain house, at the foot of an oak. He was taken to the wood, where he did not find the plant, but then lay down and went to sleep; on awaking, he directed them to a north-easterly search. The distance from the house was measured, and at the foot of the oak the plant was found.‡

* Kluge: 'Versuch einer Darstellung,' etc., 165.
† Wienholt: 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 3, 26, 45, 47, 75, 188.
‡ Billot: 'Recherches psychologiques,' etc., ii. 317.
This further pursuit of the perceptive representation, by which the place is found, often occurs.

A somnambule of Puységur prescribed for herself a vegetable which she could neither name nor properly describe. She now proposed to her magnetiser that he should presently go with her for a walk in the garden, where she would see it and feel an instinctive impulse to pluck it. When she awoke she had forgotten everything—as is commonly the case, for the reason that the idea is below the threshold—but in the garden she plucked a plant, without being able to allege any other motive than her caprice, till she had collected enough for the prescribed medicament.* Another somnambule specified the place where the remedial herb was to be found at a distance of a mile, knew no name for it, and could only say that it was bitter.† To another, after awaking, Puységur repeated his own (the somnambulist's) prescription, mentioning where the plant was to be found, a league off, at which knowledge of the magnetiser the patient was surprised.‡

A somnambule of Reichel indicated a white case in a certain row in a druggist's shop which she had not entered for eight years, as containing her medicament.§ Römer's somnambule prescribed everything for herself. Once she required a drug from the shop, and gave the colour of the case and its number in the row, from right to left and the reverse. There being

* Morin: 'Du Magnétisme,' etc., 200.
† Puységur: 'Recherches,' etc., 81.
‡ Id., 145, 147.
§ Reichel: 'Entwicklungsgesetz des magnetischen Lebens,' 67; Leipzig, 1829.
some scruple about compliance, she was displeased, till the physician went to the shop, and, as the drug seemed to him proper, allowed its use. Another remedy she saw in a porcelain case covered with dust and cobwebs, in a shop she had never entered. The physician brought her two medicaments wrapped in paper, but she knew by the smell the one she had prescribed. She also prescribed for another patient a remedy out of the same shop, from the third case of the sixth row, of which she could only further say that it was thick and black.* A similar case is vouched for by Carus.†

In degree as the inner waking is clearer, the idea of the remedy gets defined from general signs to particulars. Dr. Hanak reports the case of a somnambulist who prescribed for himself root of Angelica, and a certain black herb with long leaves; he could not name it, but only the mountain on which it would be found. It was Gentiana Amarella Linnaei, and when it was brought to him he recognised it immediately as that which had appeared to him in the magnetic sleep.‡ A patient of the physician Bende got the idea of musk powder, so that she saw the, to her unknown, musk, from whose body the drug that was to heal her fell. She first described it as bright brown, and of the size of a small roe; in a later vision the image was more distinct, and she saw the bag from which the powder fell, but in waking spoke

* Römer: 'Historische Darstellung einer höchst merkwürdigen Somnambule,' 17, 19-31; Stuttgart, 1821.
† Carus: 'Lebensmagnetismus,' 93.
‡ Hanak: 'Geschichte eines natürlichen Somnambulismus,' 86, 91. From the Latin, Leipzig, 1833.
of it as of a plant.* Even the treatment to be applied by the physician is frequently seen in image. A somnambule saw ten leeches at work on her chest, and suggested this to the physician, who followed her counsel. † Another dreamed that her physician, to cure her of her deafness, magnetised her feet in a warm bath, and the hint was adopted with complete success.‡

Haddock's somnambule, Emma, was very remarkable in this, as in many other respects. There came once to Haddock a gentleman whose daughter suffered from a brain disease defying all medical treatment; to mediate the rapport, he left behind him merely a paper with pencil sketches by his daughter. Haddock gave the paper to Emma, and asked her if she could find the person who had made the sketches, and could state her condition of health. She soon found the young lady, described exactly the external symptoms, and her own perceptions in relation to the internal state of the brain, to which organ she referred the whole cause of the disease. After recommending different mesmeric passes, she exclaimed, pointing to the ceiling of the room: 'There is what, with mesmerism, will cure the young lady.' She then described small bottles and bowls in a workshop in Manchester, in the window of which stood a bust. Haddock now recollected a homoeopathic apothecary's shop at that place, with a bust of Hahnemann; he procured a case of those medicaments from there, and put it, sealed, into Emma's hand. She indicated exactly the

* 'Archiv,' xi. 3, 37, 40, 87.
† Dupotet: 'Manuel,' etc., 73.
‡ Champignon: 'Physiologie,' etc., 324.
position of the remedy, which was ipecacuanha. They gave her a globule, and she described its composition (lactine, flour, with spirits of wine diluted with tincture of ipecacuanha), saying that the real medicine was mixed with two other things and with something sweet. The remedy was completely successful.* Now, that Emma could perceive the substance in homeopathic dilutions shows the high degree in which the threshold of sensibility was displaced with her; but it also shows, quite apart from the success of the cure, that though the actions of such dilutions may remain below the threshold of sense-consciousness, while allopathy has a more perceptible influence, this is far from being a reason for rejecting homoeopathy. To say more here upon this point is, indeed, superfluous; for from the very important work of Professor Jäger on 'Neural Analysis'—notwithstanding that it is systematically ignored—every reader may be irrefragably convinced that the human nervous system immediately reacts upon the most attenuated homeopathic doses, a fact which Jäger has exhibited in a very striking way by experiments with a Hipps's chronoscope.†

The opinion that the health-prescriptions proceed from the transition, into the sphere of ideas, of the sanative power of Nature herself, receives very important confirmation from the fact that the vision of the remedy commences with undefined images, and gradually becomes clear. For if already ordinary sleep exalts the vegetative functions, and if the magnetic treatment, in deepening the sleep, did nothing else

---

* Haddock: 'Sommolismus,' etc., 183, 187.
than further exalt the sanative power of Nature, it follows of necessity that the excitement of ideation by the sanative power is a gradual process in course of magnetic treatment, and the therewith connected exaltation of the sanative power, and thus that the vision of the remedy can also become gradually more distinct. The inner waking and the distinctness of the vision is just proportional to the deepening of the sleep and the displacement of the threshold of sensibility. Auguste Müller prescribed a medicament to a patient, but remarked that she should 'dream the way to use it on the following night.'* The perception proceeds from the general to the particular. A clairvoyante with Wolfart received first the representation of water containing earth and salt; by little and little the image developed into that of an alkali and carbonate health-spring with the most definite characteristics of the immediate neighbourhood, and finally the name Ems was uttered.† It is very often the case that somnambules know of no remedy, but feel that they will find one in a later sleep.‡ Thus there here takes place within the dream-life an exaltation similar to that which is frequent in waking, from a mere indefinite presentiment to distinct vision, as is perhaps also the case in second sight. There are also somnambules who in the ordinary somnambulic state can find no remedy, but discover it in the exalted condition called trance (Hochschlaf).§

It often happens that somnambules later on correct

† Wolfart: 'Jahrbücher,' ii. 2, 69.
‡ 'Archiv,' ix. 2, 126, 127.
§ Dupotet: 'Traité complet, etc,' 256.
their own statements and prescriptions. The reason of this may be twofold. If they have been disturbed by premature questioning, before the moment of spontaneity has arrived, their statements do not flow from the pure spring of instinct, but are adulterated by reflection or memory. The difference of two statements may also be due to the inconstant depth of the sleep, with which, as has just been said, the definiteness of the instinct, and the clearness of the idea proceeding from it, also change. There is thus no reason for interpreting such corrections in the sceptical sense. Deleuze refused a somnambule a medicament she had demanded, and succeeded in dissuading her from it; two weeks later she was glad that she had not taken it, its application having been properly delayed till now, which was the right time for it. The insufficient depth of the sleep on the first occasion was, therefore, the cause of this fallacy in regard to the time. But if the sleep is at once deepened, the correction can follow immediately. It is therefore desirable to repeat former questions, in the case of such deepening. A somnambule of the physician Koreff pronounced herself incurable, and was perhaps right, so far as she measured the disease by the force hitherto applied by her physician in combating it. But when the latter, by the greatest effort, had placed her in a deeper sleep, she awoke so strengthened, that the incorrectness of her prognosis was apparent. It would have been very instructive, had the physician repeated his question before the awaking, when it is likely it would have received an answer differing from the first statement. Koreff even cited the case of a somnambule who corrected the self-prescription of
another somnambule, and succeeded in dissuading the latter from it, and in inducing her to adopt the true remedy.* But it could only exceptionally happen that the judgment of another's disease should be truer than the patient's own.

The instinctive source of prescriptions appears also in this, that they frequently borrow from dream-life its well-known form of dramatic self-sundering. The somnambules in that case do not see the remedy, but learn it from an inner voice, or it is imparted to them by a visionary person, as in the already-mentioned dreams of Aspasia and Alexander. Such cases often occur, and have given occasion to superstitious conceptions, because their explanation by reference to the similar and familiar phenomenon of dream-life has been neglected. The reality of the adviser has been believed, which might have been prevented by the simple consideration that in that case the reality of the dragon in Alexander's dream, and of the symbolical doves which play so frequent a part, must be also accepted. The transcendental subject in the individual betrays itself as the source, when the somnambule only hears a voice, but sees no person.† Even these voices are at first only heard faintly, as from a long way off; but afterwards, especially after long operating on the pit of the stomach, always more distinctly.‡ The physician Heineken reports the following remarkable answer of a somnambule, whom he had questioned concerning the mode of her introspection and prescriptions: 'All

* Deleuze: 'Instruction,' 1, 130, 426, 424.
† Werner: 'Symbolik,' 121.
‡ 'Archiv,' x. 3, 303.
my limbs are as if penetrated by a stream of light; I see the interior of my body—all its parts seem transparent; I see the blood flowing through my veins; I observe exactly the disorders which are in one part or the other, and think attentively on the means by which these can be removed; and then it seems to me as if someone called out to me, You must employ this or that.*  It thus appears that the remedy first presents itself as a sudden suggestion in the course of introspection. It appears further—quite in agreement with what was said in the chapter on 'Dramatic Self-sundering in Dream'—that this suggestion necessarily assumes the dramatic form, because its overstepping the threshold of sensibility is emergence from the unconscious. Now, if this explanation of dramatic health-prescriptions is correct, we are led by it à priori to the hypothesis, that when the deepening of the inner life fails of the necessary degree, the suggestion is left out, and, therefore, that there must be somnambules possessing only the gift of introspection, without that of prescriptions. Now this is very often the case, which is only explicable if the above theory of dramatic sundering is correct. Such somnambules, in whom the latent faculty for prescriptions remains unconscious, often get the physician to suggest different medicines; and if he mentions one that is appropriate, they know it to be so. This is again a proof that the faculty for prescribing is not essentially wanting, but is only retained in the unconscious. Our unconscious memory often follows the same psychological rule. If, for instance, we cannot recall

* Heineken: 'Ideen und Beobachtungen,' etc., 128.
the name of a place, the unconscious existence in us of the name nevertheless enables us to determine critically among successive suggestions made by someone else, rejecting them till the right name is mentioned, when we recognise it at once.

St. Augustine makes mention of a boy who often had visions, lay without feeling, and with eyes open saw nothing—evidently a case of somnambulism. He affirmed that he saw two boys who announced to him the cause of his illness, and he was finally cured because his physician adopted the treatment prescribed by these visionary boys.* This dramatic sundering occurred also with the Jewish seeress, Selma, already mentioned. She saw her guardian spirit and an old man; the first prescribed linseed oil, the second olive oil. Later on the dream recurred in a different form; she now saw her sister, who went with her into a shop and asked for linseed oil; the shopkeeper considered olive oil more to the purpose, but tried in vain to persuade the sister. It is remarkable that this sister, who was in good health, had a similar dream the same night.† In this dream is evidently reflected the still present indistinctness of vision.

Another form of prescription appears in visionary writings. The Petersen somnambule saw Roman letters forming themselves large and bright, as if gilt.‡ The particular form of such visions appears to be often involuntarily determined by the magnetiser; for Bertrand mentions one, all of whose patients had similar visions of the remedy, by seeing themselves

† Wiener: 'Selma,' 149, 151.
‡ 'Archiv,' xi. 1, 95.
in a waste place, which, when they were questioned about the disease, became over-grown with the remedial plant proper for each case.* So also are allegorical and symbolical forms borrowed from the dream-life. A patient saw her condition symbolised as a flower adorned with all its leaves, but with a dark spot on the side of the calyx, to signify her chest complaint, from which she foresaw long years of suffering.† Another saw in the stalk of her symbolical plant a worm eating through the pith up to the flower, which then fell off.‡ The somnambule of the Medical-Councillor Klein saw in vision a mountain-journey, the scenes of which represented the physical and psychical struggles connected with her magnetic cure.§

Finally, the instinctive origin of the prescriptions may be inferred from their singularity. This is especially observable in such instinctive actions as are adopted to deepen sleep. If, for example, the long-continued rotatory movements customary among the Dervishes are intended to excite the somnambulic condition, the imitation of this proceeding by somnambules can only have the deepening of the sleep for its object. It deserves mention that, according to Reichenbach, this rotatory movement occurs in connection with the phenomena of the Od light.|| Chardel knew a patient who put herself into somnambulism, and was clairvoyant, by turning round till

* Bertrand: 'Traité du Somnambulisme,' 420.
† Werner: 'Schutzgeister,' 202.
‡ Ibid.: 'Symbolik,' 141.
§ 'Archiv,' v. 1.
|| Reichenbach: 'Der sensitive Mensch,' ii. 165, 166.
she was giddy. * A patient of Deleuze suffered on a journey, away from her magnetiser, a dislocation of the thigh-bone, which she herself set in an access of somnambulism; and whereas before she could not endure the least touch, she now stood up, went round the room, and made rotatory motions without any trouble. † The like was also observed among the convulsionaries of St. Médard. One of these passed from one to two hours daily for several months in these rotations, making about sixty in a minute; he stood on the tip of one foot, the other describing a circle in the air. Another, a woman, confined herself to motions of the head, so rapid that her features could scarcely be distinguished. ‡ We already find the origin of this method of exciting clairvoyance in India. Thus it is required of the Brahmanic novitiates to turn round twelve times twenty-four times, and, if strength suffices, twenty-four times forty-eight times. §

But the medicinal remedies also betray their instinctive source by their strangeness. Comparing the counsel given by the Delphic Pythia to the epileptic youth, Democrates, || and the prescriptions given in the temple-sleep which are preserved upon some votive tablets, ‖ with the mediaeval ones of Paracelsus, and those of somnambules, so striking does the relation appear between the whole series of

* Chardel: 'Essai de Psychologie,' 254.
† Deleuze: 'Instruction,' etc., 439.
§ Agroucherada-Parakchai, ii.
|| Theodor Fuschmann: 'Alexander von Tralles,' i. 568; Wien, 1878.
‖ Conf. Sprengel: 'Geschichte der Medizin,' i. 162.
these phenomena, that the hypothesis of their common source in somnambulism spontaneously suggests itself.

If the prescriptions of somnambules are rooted in the sanative power of nature, and are of an instinctive character, it is antecedently to be expected that they will show a relationship to the remarkable instincts of animals. Already in antiquity these instincts excited such surprise in observers that it was thought that animals must participate in the divine soul, and even later inquirers are inclined to ascribe infallibility to those instincts that relate to the provision for offspring. This infallibility is also claimed by many magnetisers for the prescriptions of somnambules. That in this they have gone too far is apparent from the fact that the prescriptions are frequently phenomena of a mixed character, and it is often difficult to decide whether the utterances are free from constituents of the waking consciousness, reflection, or fancy. This danger, and the further one, that opinions of the magnetiser himself may be transferred to the somnambule, are particularly to be apprehended when the prescriptions are elicited by much questioning, and hence the spontaneity of the healing-vision is desired as an indication of instinct. Puységur relates that a somnambule often intentionally concealed her vision, fearing the inquisitions and experiments of the bystanders, which interfered with her self-inspection.* Faria commends the suddenly arising visions as especially to be relied on, preferring them to others which are gradually developed,† and in this

* Puységur: 'Recherches,' etc., 190.
† Faria: 'Sommeil lucide,' 349.
he seems so far right, that the latter more easily admit the false stimulations above referred to.

True instinctive prescriptions, therefore, never present themselves as an abstract knowledge in the somnambulic consciousness; they have the external forms peculiar to dream-life: intuitive perception, dramatic sundering, and symbol. The danger of foreign influences is at its least in auto-somnambulism; in this, therefore, when it rises to the stage of prescription, we see the most perfect form of the sanative power of nature; and in such prescriptions the somnambule appears as little subject to deception as the natural sanative power itself. Kerner says of one of his somnambules, that what she prescribed for herself acted ‘with mathematical certainty,’ but her prescriptions for others were of less avail, his explanation being that the patients did not closely observe the hours prescribed for the remedies, a point much insisted on by somnambules, * who explain failures, and also the alterations they make themselves in their prescriptions, by the imperfect execution of their directions.

As the prescriptions cannot depend on theoretical knowledge, and therefore the assurance of success can only have the form of a firm belief and trust, all utterances containing theoretical explanations and reasonings must be regarded with suspicion. Even in the rest there is still danger of deception, for the images of the exalted dream-phantasy in somnambulism have the freshness and vivacity of really instinctive visions, and are indistinguishable from these,

* Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 373.
as with some insane persons products of imagination are indistinguishably mingled with real objects. It is therefore easily explicable that somnambules are convicted of mistakes, and that they even withdraw them themselves.* The influence of rapport with the physician further accounts for the observation which has been made that German, French, and English somnambules often only echo the medical theories prevailing in their countries.† But though particular cases may be referred to these two sources of health-prescriptions, in general they can be excluded—a further indirect confirmation of the view that prescriptions are instinctive.

(b) The Prescriptions of Somnambules do not issue from Reflection.

Independence of reflection is the characteristic sign of all instincts, and is therefore found in the health-prescriptions of somnambules. This is apparent from a whole succession of phenomena. It is first of all to be mentioned that, according to experience, the most reliable prescriptions are those given by somnambules who are quite ignorant, and that even little children evince this faculty in a high degree.‡

These prescriptions are often exceedingly strange, seeming even senseless. If, however, the opinion here maintained, that somnambulism depends on a displacement of the threshold of sensibility, and on partial emergence of the transcendental consciousness,

† Kieser: 'Tellurismus,' ii. 190.
‡ Ennemoser: 'Der Magnetismus nach der allseitigen Beziehung,' 126.
is right, the singularity of many of the prescriptions is at once explained. For with this displacement the relation of sensibility to chemical substances must be altered; a wholly heterogeneous material of sensibility is brought to the Subject. The prescriptions, therefore, must be frequently as heterogeneous as is this material of sensibility from which they are derived; and the remedies must thus more or less depart from those in use in medicine, which have regard rather to the normal relation of man with Nature. Römer's somnambule said: 'To-morrow morning, punctually at a quarter past nine, I must drink half a glass of shoe-nail water;' adding to the astonished hearers the further direction that fifty shoe-nails should be scalded with boiling water, put upon the fire with a pint and a half of water, and boiled away to half a pint.* That sounds absurd, because for the normal sensibility it is probably quite ineffectual; but we do not at all know what effects there are which remain below the threshold. Indeed, the whole system of homœopathy rests upon such sub-threshold effects.

Many prescriptions recall the sympathetic remedies of the mediaeval Paracelsists and the folk-lore of the present day. The efficiency of some of these means is admitted by many unprejudiced physicians, as is the impossibility of a scientific explanation of it.† It seems, however, that somnambulism will explain not only this, but also the origin of folk-lore remedies, by prescriptions given in the ecstatic state. Paracelsus himself, it is related, got up at night and in a half

* Römer: 'Historische Darstellung,' etc., 35.
† Dr. Fr. Most: 'Die sympathetische Mittel und Kurmethoden,' 1842.
ecstatic condition declared the remedies for different diseases. The folk-lore belief in the transference of diseases to plants—*transplantatio morborum*—plays a part in somnambulism also.* A patient of Werner directed that nails cut from her fingers and toes, and mixed with hair of her own and of the magnetiser, and with blood, should be buried under the roots of a tree. When it was all putrified and risen into the tree as sap, her health would improve. This was a genuinely magnetic and likewise sympathetic remedy.

A consequence of the displacement of the threshold of sensibility is that the inclination or repugnance to medicines differs in the waking and in the somnambulistic state. Medicaments for which in waking somnambules have the greatest dislike, they often willingly adopt in their magnetic condition, or if the medicaments are made homogeneous to them by magnetic treatment. They like to drink magnetised water, and praise its sanative power. One somnambule required all that she ate or drank to be magnetised, and a cup of coffee, in which her physician’s brother-in-law had secretly put his finger, excited in her pains and convulsions.† Another was always made sick by common milk, in whatever composition it entered, though this never occurred when the milk was magnetised.‡ On the other hand, somnambules often know food to be deleterious which in waking they prefer. Selma warned her friends against giving her

* E.g., Werner: ‘Schutzgeister,’ 289.
† ‘Archiv,’ v. 3, 83. [For this was what is known as ‘cross-magnetism.’—Tr.]
‡ Tardy: ‘Essais-Vorrede,’ 13.
pears, however much she might beg for them;* and one of Römer’s somnambules prohibited in general everything which she should ask for when not in the magnetic sleep.† They have often no regard whatever to their normal inclinations or the reverse for food and medicines, a somnambule of the physician Heinecken prescribing for herself rhubarb on the following day, to be administered by force, as she had a special abhorrence of it.‡ In other cases this difficulty is got over. Thus, one somnambule prescribed for herself different remedies; those which she liked to be offered to her when awake, the others she would take in somnambulism, e.g. tartar emetic and ipecacuanha. She named the different physics, having read the labels clairvoyantly, now in this, now in that apothecary’s shop. Waking, she believed herself incurable; in somnambulism, on the contrary, she was full of hope.§ But though the names of the medicines can be known clairvoyantly, as a rule they are not named, but only described. The faculty is not in the least reflective, but depends on feelings and intuitions which, if symbolised, the somnambules themselves understand only by degrees, or partially, or even not at all. Frau Marnitz could not name euphorbis, buck-bean, or formic spirit, but described the appearance and locality of the former, and of the latter the appearance, taste, and position in the druggist’s shop.||

A somnambule being asked how she knew a herb,

* Wiener: ‘Selma,’ 77.
† Römer: ‘Histor. Darst.,’ 44.
‡ Heinecken: ‘Ideen und Beobachtungen,’ etc., 115.
§ Gau̇thier: ‘Histoire,’ etc., ii. 358.
|| Perty: ‘Myst. Ersch.,’ i. 264.
PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM.

whose locality she had given, to be curative, when she yet did not know its name, sensibly replied that herbs have no name in themselves, but only receive them from men.* Yet Puységur's inference that names as abstract and arbitrary denotations can never be known by somnambules seems not in general correct. Some very remarkable experiences of Tardy may be regarded as transitional phenomena to the knowledge of names. From an old work on medicines he had extracted a long list of remedies for tapeworm, the names of which he read to his somnambule, an uneducated girl of the lower orders. She rejected a number of them, but eagerly adopted bitter orange-peel and hemp-seed. She could give no other explanation than that she had heard the names first mentioned with repugnance, but these latter ones with pleasure. Very disagreeable symptoms, from which she had suffered for more than four years, were thus removed.† Another time, for the similar complaint of another patient, he enumerated to his somnambule many remedies; this time she rejected the one used by herself, and recommended one of the others mentioned to her.‡ She once named for a patient a herb not known to Tardy himself, who, however, procured it; in a later sleep he showed it to her, merely asking if she knew it, and she at once replied that it was an advantageous remedy for that patient.§ But the most striking phenomenon of this sort is in the case of the somnambulic boy Görwitz, who, being

* Puységur: 'Recherches,' etc., 148.
† Tardy: 'Essais,' 66; 'Journal de Traitem.,' 94, 95.
‡ Tardy: 'Journal,' etc., 115.
§ Tardy: 'Essai,' etc., 67.
asked by his physician (his brother) about poisons, 'dictated with incomprehensible accuracy the most difficult names of poisons, the enumeration of even a small part of which would fill many quarto pages.'*

There remains to be noticed a phenomenon which is apparently most difficult to explain by the principle of instinct. Many somnambules prescribe the application of technical apparatus, stating the construction and delineating it themselves. The so-called mineral baquet used in the earlier days of mesmerism was often filled according to the instructions of the somnambules themselves. Römer's somnambule of fifteen years old sketched a machine in sleep, adding explanatory names. This machine had a cylinder, like an electric machine, certain constituent parts of the baquet, but in other respects differed from all known physical appliances; it was of a strictly geometrical construction, and according to the physician was a very interesting contrivance. She devised this machine in a simple form for her own use, in a more complicated one for stronger constitutions; she also made a sketch of this one on a larger scale, cut it out, fastened it on paper, and lastly prepared a model in paste. When a beginning was made with this complicated apparatus, a sketch of which is given in Römer's book, she found fault with departures from her model, and corrected the mistakes. The machine was to be placed by her bed during her sleep to enable her to judge of it.† The seeress of Prevorst also had,

† Römer: 'Hist. Darst.,' 11, 12, 24, 26.
early in her disease, a dream, in which there appeared to her a machine, by use of which she hoped to be cured; no attention was paid to her dream, although it was several times repeated. Finally, after an interval of four years, the same dream-image recurred dramatically, her 'guide' holding before her the machine, and reproaching her with her earlier neglect to apply it, as it would have cured her. In the morning she sketched this machine on paper. Every use of it was followed by shocks, as from a galvanic battery, succeeded by spasms, after which she always felt stronger. I have myself seen the sketch* of this machine in the possession of Kerner's son, the Councillor Theobald Kerner. A similar fact is briefly mentioned by Carré.†

It would be a mistake, however, to ascribe prescriptions, when raised to the point of technical construction, to deliberate reflection. If the wonderful structure of the snow-flakes,‡ or of the protozoa,§ or the mathematical principles followed in the formation of plants, are not allowed to be analogous cases, we may still point to the ingenuity with which spiders spin their webs, and bees construct their cells. To refer such instincts to the understanding would be to ascribe to animals a more than human intelligence. The birch-weevil (Rhynchites betulae) towards the end of May cuts strips off the leaves of the birch, rolling them into funnel-shaped chambers, and marking out suitable cradles for its eggs. A regular

† Carré de Montgéron: 'La verité,' etc., iii. 581.
‡ Semper: 'Der Stil. I Vorrede,' München, 1878.
§ E. Häckel: 'Das Protistenreich,' Leipzig, 1878.
pattern seems to be followed, which, however, can be changed according to the needs of the beetle, if he finds no leaves conformable to it. Debay has copied these leaf-sections with the greatest exactitude, and Heis found, after careful investigation, that for their particular purposes they agree perfectly, even in the smallest technical details, with results of calculations only to be arrived at by help of certain parts of higher mathematics, which had remained unknown up to a recent date in that science. *

It is certainly more permissible to say, with Cuvier, that animals are somnambules, than to attribute to them superhuman intelligence; and so it is also more permissible to ascribe the delineation of technical instruments to instinct than to the conscious deliberation of a girl of fifteen, to whom the very word 'Physics' was perhaps unknown. Readers of the remarkable book already referred to, Ernst Kapp's 'Philosophie der Technik,' will understand this striking phenomenon of somnambulic life without difficulty, and will agree with me that Kapp might have made use of it as a strong confirmation of his theory.

The instinctive character is especially manifest in the prescriptions of somnambules for others, for if these were to be referred to reflection, the understanding of somnambules must be greater than that of men of science. In diagnosis, the method of physicians is to reason reflectively from symptoms to internal causes, while somnambules know the disease in-

* Duttenhofer: 'Die 8 Sinne du Menschen,' 227; Nordlingen, 1858.
tuitively or sensitively. This is also the case when they prescribe for others.

It seems that this can even happen in common sleep. Magnenius, at least, seems to assert it in effect, from his own experience, in his book upon Tobacco. When he went to sleep with his thoughts directed to a sick person, remedies were presented to him in dream which he held to be incomparable when he considered them in the morning, and which he applied with the greatest benefit.* Tertullian also, whose experiences with somnambules made him even a heretic, reports that a person in his 'illuminations'—probably somnambulic—prescribed for other people.†

Deleuze knew a girl of sixteen who dictated medical treatises upon different diseases. She answered his questions clearly and distinctly. But one day she could say nothing whatever about the nature of gout, and the means of curing it. Other diseases, she said, were at least potential in her own constitution, but of gout she had not in herself the slightest germ, and she could therefore only speak of it if placed in rapport with a gouty person.‡ Deleuze, who proceeded very circumspectly and sceptically, had similar experiences with other somnambules, showing that even here, where reflection seems to be implied, the foundation is a pervading feeling of the organism, but perhaps not sufficiently intense to exclude any admixture of mental ingredients; at least in the treatises of the girl above mentioned, Deleuze found that principles of medicine were favoured which were

* Boismont: 'Traktat von Geistern,' 222; Halle, 1721.
† 'Archiv,' ii. 2, 160.
‡ Deleuze: 'Histoire critique,' etc., i. 193.
in vogue then, but which underwent subsequent alterations. As we saw, the health-instinct is much exposed to interference; its ascertainment is therefore very difficult, and blind confidence in the prescriptions is at all events misplaced.

But the directions of the pure instinctive utterance seem to be always attended with success. Medical-Councillor Wezler, of Augsberg, having suffered for years from a nervous complaint, was told by a somnambule to use washings with a soap, the preparation of which she described. He was in a short time relieved from his sufferings, and he considered this cure so extraordinary that he tried the remedy with other patients, and cured the most obstinate cases with it.* I can only refer briefly here to another very remarkable case, the history of the cure of the Countess Maldegem, whose disease, related to insanity, was of years' standing.† With Haddock's somnambule, Emma, also, the curative instinct was so extraordinarily developed that even physicians of high position did not disdain to seek her elucidations upon cases in their practice.

Even prescriptions for others often take on the form of the dramatic self-sundering. In one of such cases a boy was being treated for a disease of the eyes which got continually worse, notwithstanding the physicians. There was a perpetual running from the eyes, and when the lids could be at all raised it was seen that the eyes were wasting. The despairing mother, a Spaniard from the colonies, while sitting at

* Wezler: 'Meine wunderbare Heilung durch eine Somnambule,' 58; Augsberg, 1833.
† Kerner: 'Seherin von Prevorst,' 457.
the sick bed, took refuge in prayer, and in this condition of inward agitation, so favourable to somnambulism, she had a vision in which the Virgin herself appeared. She was heard to exclaim on a sudden, 'Thanks, holy Virgin, I will go seek them!' She thereupon went into the wood, accompanied by two ladies, who could get no reply from her; she there plucked herbs, tearing them out by the roots, and at home made a decoction of them, and of this put cataplasms on the child's eyes. She was much alarmed when in the morning she heard what she had done, and waited anxiously for the physician; but he found the mischief so much abated that he ordered the application to be continued. The mother could not, however, herself recollect what herbs she had picked, but in the evening fell again into somnambulism, returned to the wood, and with a second application of the cataplasm the child was completely cured.*

According to Dr. Bendsen, prescriptions, both for self and others, not seldom occur in insanity; and he adduces a case in which Frau Petersen in an excess of mania rapidly uttered a very successful prescription. It is true Frau Petersen was a somnambule, but the fact that she herself, in later conditions of somnambulism, remembered nothing whatever of this prescription, is for the expert a sure sign that it did not originate in this state, but in insanity,† for the bridge of memory only connects related states, between heterogeneous ones it breaks down. This is by no means the only characteristic which somnambulism and insanity have in common, again compelling the hypo-

* Lafontaine: 'Mémoires d'un magnétiseur,' ii. 179; Paris, 1866.
† 'Archiv,' xi. 2, 124, etc.
thesis that in many cases madness may be nothing else than unregulated somnambulism, resting on an oscillation of the threshold of sensibility, with dramatic sundering of the Subject into two persons, and a dramatic explanation of the material of sensibility. In such case the community of characteristics may often lead to the error of putting the insane and somnambules in the same category, whereas regard to the distinctive characteristics requires a separation of these categories. In the Middle Ages, somnambules were confounded with witches, and as long as men of science refuse to study somnambulism there will always be the danger of mistaking it for madness, and of including patients in the same institution who require different treatment.

Now, if health-prescriptions occur in dream, somnambulism, and madness, appearing further in the reports of witch-trials in the Middle Ages, and lastly, as is affirmed by the distinguished witness, Wallace,* among the phenomena observed with modern mediums, that is proof that this exaltation of the health-instinct is common to all conditions which are connected with displacement of the psycho-physical threshold, and which can be so far comprehended under the general conception of ecstasy, that, in them all, the disappearance of self-consciousness proceeds parallel with an inner waking.

(c) The Health-Prescriptions are not to be explained by rapport with the Magnetiser.

In the surgical ward at Leipzig, Herr Hansen showed the following experiment in the presence of

* Wallace: 'Defence of Modern Spiritualism.'
different professors. He requested Dr. Hermann to turn his back to him, face to the wall, so that he could not see what Hansen was about. The latter then laid his right hand on Dr. Hermann's head, and with his left hand took a steel pen, dipped it in ink, and drew it through his own mouth. At the same moment Dr. Hermann declared that he had the taste of ink in his mouth, and this lasted an hour, not being even removed by the taste of food taken for the purpose.* I cite this experiment only as an example, which has become very well known, of the rapport existing between magnetiser and magnetised. This rapport can extend itself to all the senses, even to what goes on in the central seat of the senses, the brain, so that even the dispositions and thoughts of the magnetiser are transferred to the somnambule.

It is thus also doubtless possible that even the medical ideas of a magnetising physician rebound, as it were, from the consciousness of the somnambule, especially if the physician, instead of merely exciting the health-instinct, facilitates the interchange by indiscreet interrogation. And so he will be a sort of ventriloquist, hearing his own echo, while he supposes that he is receiving valuable information. Hence it has often been suggested that somnambulic health-prescriptions derive, through rapport, from the mind of the physician. But admitting this possibility, it is still the fact that only a percentage of the prescriptions are to be referred to this source, and the majority of them must be explained by an exalted instinct. That is best proved by the important differences

* Zöllner: 'Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen,' iii. 529.
existing between medical prescriptions and those of somnambules.

Medical-Councillor Schindler says: 'Finally, we must also regard all specific remedies as magical; for our chemical and physical sciences do not suffice to explore the action of remedies, so it is a relation, unknown to us, of the life of Nature to the individual life which gives natural bodies their healing potency. The magical healing-instinct, as it expresses itself in sleep and in magnetic conditions, is often far removed from ordinary therapeutics, and somnambules generally prescribe for themselves very simple remedies, often such that we can see in them no relation to the disease, but often also such as seem to be suggested by the mind of the physician. Thus a somnambule patient of mine prescribed for a blindness, following upon an injury to a nerve of the fifth couple in the socket, sponging with extr. stramonii, and for another complaint tea of anagallis arvensis, a herb which I was not aware had a healing virtue. Another time, I could not make out the remedy desired, and the patient indicated it in the index of a materia medica which was brought to her for the purpose, and at the same time improved upon the dose prescribed in the recipe, although she had no knowledge of apothecaries' weights. The magical effects of remedies, by which I mean their specific effects, are very little known to us, and if what the ancients handed down concerning the effects of stones belongs more to the region of fable, the action of metals is yet still obscure to us, and of herbs in this respect we know only a very small part. Very much remains here to be done, and it is a question whether homœopathy in its similia
similibus has already found the key to further investigations.*

Now, the displacement of the threshold of sensibility affords an excellent opportunity for obtaining new information concerning these still unknown effects of metals and herbs. Those effects do not fall within the sense-consciousness, and are therefore not included in medical science, which might have had a rich field of experience in somnambulism, which, when its prescriptions are based on effects remaining below the threshold, proves that the inner consciousness of somnambules does not draw its material from the mind of the physician.

Were the prescriptions always the result of rapport, somnambules could not, as often happens, energetically oppose the physician’s treatment. It is very frequently the case that instinct tends in a direction quite different from that of the physician’s deliberate judgment. Usually, indeed, the magnetiser is not a physician, and can form no judgment for himself of the disease and its remedy. But when he is a physician, his methods are often censured, his treatment is corrected, or remedies are prescribed between which and the disease he knows of no connection, because this is only apparent to consciousness below the threshold. The contradiction by the physician often begins at the diagnosis, that of the somnambules being more or less opposed to the professional, in that they treat cases of the same disease individually, as in the regular practice can perhaps only be done by the family physician of many years who knows his patients accurately. Even in the same disease of

* Schindler: 'Magisches Geistesleben,' 268.
the same patient the remedies are often changed according to the season of the year and the weather.* Somnambulists thus do not know the disease as a species, but only in the individual case; every disease is with them a case by itself, the treatment for which is to be changed even according to external circumstances. It is therefore quite possible that the pharmacopoeia can be enriched from the prescriptions of somnambulists, though except in the case of very simple remedies, for morbid conditions of little complication, means appropriate to individual cases will not be adapted to all included in the specific concept of the disease, nor can general rules be taken from these prescriptions.

The opposition of somnambulists to the science of the physician also appears in the prescription of remedies, from which, or at least from the doses, he recoils in alarm. This is the more remarkable, as the displacement of the threshold makes the sensibility more acute, influences too weak for external consciousness making themselves known. Therefore when somnambulists, as often happens, double and multiply manifold the usual single doses, when poisons are advantageous to them, of which only a fraction could be taken by the normal man without danger to life, that does not well admit of any other explanation than that not only are new relations between drugs and disease known through somnambulism, but also the old relations are changed or suspended by a change in the whole physiological disposition of the organism. And so somnambulists often prescribe for themselves a very strict diet, even

* Kerner: 'Blätter aus Prevorst,' v. 59.
long abstinence from food and drink, without suffering the emaciation which might have been expected; a phenomenon forthcoming, moreover, in typhus and febrile diseases. Professor Ennemoser knew a boy who lived for a week on magnetised water only.*

A somnambule prescribed for her child five drops of opium, and on waking was in despair when she heard that they had been given to him. Being again in the somnambulic state, she was easy about it, and the child recovered. For herself she prescribed and actually took 350 drops of opium, all the symptoms of poisoning ensuing, but which again disappeared.† Another replied to the scruple expressed by the magnetiser to the dangerous dose, that in waking she should share this scruple and refuse consent, but in sleep she felt that the dose would do her good, and would restore her in ten days, as was confirmed by the result.‡ Kerner reports of a prescription of poison sufficient to kill twenty men, but the seeress disregarded all representations; when they offered her half, she pushed it away and demanded the whole, which at last, procured from several shops, was given to her. She drained the glass empty, without the predicted success being accompanied by other evil effects.§

Puységur, to try if a prescription of a somnambule, who had ordered for herself seven grains of tartar-emetic, to be taken in an orange, really sprang from her clairvoyant instinct, prepared half a dozen oranges, putting two grains in the first, three in the second,

* Ennemoser: 'Der Magnetismus nach der allseitigen Beziehung,' etc., 60.
† Archiv, vii. 2, 147, 150.
‡ Puységur: 'Recherches,' etc., 61.
§ Kerner: 'Blätter aus Prevorst,' iii. 181.
and so on up to the last, with seven grains in it. She refused them impatiently one after the other till the last, which she seized gladly.* Nevertheless no case is reported in which a somnambule has killed herself by such prescriptions. A formal change in the disposition of the organism must therefore be supposed, according to which the normal effects of medicaments cease, and abnormal effects take their place. Teste somewhere mentions a somnambule who smoked two large pipes of tobacco without any ill effects.† The physician Despine was treating a girl of eleven for softening of the spinal marrow. In somnambulism she could eat what she liked, in waking she lived only upon milk and eggs; it was as if she had two different organs of digestion. In waking she was paralysed in the lower extremities; in somnambulism she could walk, run, swim; in waking she could only sit between wadding and eiderdown, in somnambulism she wallowed in the snow and took ice-cold baths.‡ Only thus is it to be explained that even poisons are taken without injury, as with evident reference to somnambulism it is said in the Gospel: 'And if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them.'§ It is also reported of the Mohammedan sect of the holy Sheikh Ruffai that the disciples take arsenic and poisonous herbs without harm.||

* Colquhoun: 'Historische Enthüllungen,' etc., 490. [I have not been able to find any English work by John Campbell Colquhoun (author of several books on these subjects) with a title corresponding to the above.—Tr.]
† [It should be added, presuming this to be implied, that she had never smoked before.—Tr.]
‡ Pigeaire: 'Electricité animale,' 272, 277, 278.
§ Mark xvi. 18.
Now if chemicals act otherwise on somnambulists than on persons in the waking state, the opposition of the former to the medicaments offered to them, and their choice of those which seem unadapted to our system, are intelligible, as also the fact that the treatment of such patients according to the principles of science is for the most part unsuccessful. Koreff, who found, not without a feeling of humiliation, that his patients rejected his remedies and chose others from which he could anticipate no effect, draws the right inference—that the physician who has satisfied himself of the somnambulists' clairvoyance should trust entirely their prescriptions, for which he has no scientific gauge; that he can only choose between two methods, not combine them.*

Somnambulists often depart from the practice of physicians in the opposite direction also, for heroic remedies substituting others apparently quite inadequate, or reducing the customary doses. The Seeress of Prevorst, by means of an infusion of lime blossoms, pear juice, and castoreum, put into a long sleep a sufferer from delirium tremens, on whom the strongest doses of opium were no longer of any avail.†

Independence of the physician is further shown in the insistence upon the exact time to a minute for the administration of nourishment and medicine, for which particularity the rational system has no data. Julie, who was very exact in this respect, referred an indisposition to the fact that coffee had been brought to her three minutes too late. Once she received

* Deleuze: 'Instruction,' etc., 455, 460, 461.
† Kerner: 'Seherin v. Prevorst,' 102.
it thirty seconds too soon, and declined it with a ‘not yet,’ but that time having elapsed, she got up of herself to take it. It is the ‘watch in the head’ by which they estimate the time, like the ordinary sleeper when he wakes exactly at a predetermined hour. It is also often an impulse from the transcendental will giving effect to itself. So Julie felt impelled to take a walk; in half an hour she bounded back as if pushed, and said it was as though her feet were urged.*

The critique of somnambulists extends not merely to the physician’s medicines, but also to the magnetic treatment applied by their magnetisers. Somnambulism awakens not only instinctive knowledge of the mode of magnetising advantageous for each particular case, but it imparts to somnambulists, or exalts in them, the power to magnetise themselves or others. A dropsical patient stretched out her hand towards the physician, as if to charge it fully with magnetism, and then magnetised herself over the whole body.† Already in the Report of the Paris Academy (1784), it is said that the patients sought for and magnetised each other. A young man who was frequently in the crisis then went quietly and silently through the hall and put others in the same state by magnetic passes. On awaking he remembered nothing of it, and could no longer magnetise.‡ Puységur had a servant who, being asked what was the best way to magnetise a deaf person, gave the directions: ‘With the thumb of one hand in one ear, and

† Deleuze: ‘Hist. crit.,’ etc., i. 240.
‡ Gauthier: ‘Hist. du Somnambulisme,’ ii. 244.
the little finger of the other hand in the other ear.' This somnambulic servant was largely interrogated by Puységur without coming to be the mere echo of his magnetiser. The physician is thus not the source of this critique of the magnetic passes, but it is the sanative power of nature reaching up into the sphere of ideation, the best proof of which is the fact that somnambulists in sleep magnetise much more effectively than in waking. To this magnetism is even the greatest curative action ascribed. Koreff knew two somnambulists who could put anyone into the sleep, even if he had shown himself hitherto quite unsensitive; they produced very beneficent crises, stopped the most violent pains, and in obstinate diseases often suddenly introduced such revolutions that effects were accelerated which otherwise would be slowly attained. The most remarkable scene, says Koreff, is when two somnambulists of different degrees of lucidity magnetise each other; the more elevated subjects the other to his will, evokes in him unexpected crises, rules his feelings, and compels his limbs to movements recalling the most expert jugglers.*

Rapport, then, will by no means explain all the prescriptions. When that is the source, it may be known by the excogitative mode of speech, agreeing with the reasoning judgment of the physician upon the case. In very many cases rapport cannot even possibly be the source—those, namely, in which somnambulism is not induced by a magnetiser, but by nature herself for beneficent ends. Moreover, even in artificially-induced somnambulism the instinctive

* Deleuze: 'Instruction,' etc., 407, 408.
source could be brought to a test by a decisive experiment. It would only be necessary to magnetise the physician himself, after he had deliberately concluded his scientific diagnosis and therapeutic, and to see if his somnambulic deliverance agreed with it. I find only one notice of such a case, which is in the letter of a lady to Deleuze. She was magnetised for months without success. One day the magnetiser, not feeling well himself, intermitted the operation, on which she offered to exchange parts, and the physician having become the somnambulist, she interrogated him concerning her disorder, and got rid of it by means of his prescriptions.* Such an experiment would be very instructive for the physician, who could thus compare the conceptions of his intellect, the inferences from external symptoms to internal causes, with his instinct, which proceeds reversely. I am convinced that this experiment would very seldom result in the agreement of the two diagnoses, but that the dualism of the two persons of the one Subject would be reflected in that of the diagnoses and prescriptions.

When in the year 1831 the professional Commission, which had been engaged in its investigation since its appointment several years before, caused its Report, confirming all the substantial phenomena attributed to somnambulism, to be read in the Medical Academy of Paris, the deep silence of the assembly betrayed the disturbance of their minds. Then, when as usual it was proposed that this report should be printed, an Academican, Castel, rose and protested against the printing of it, because

* Archiv, iv. 1, 127.
if the facts reported were true, half of our physiological science would be destroyed. So: down with truth! live the system!—that has ever been the principle of all the prejudiced.

But it has been shown by the foregoing dissertation that what somnambulism threatens is our supposed, not our true, physiological science. With regard to health-prescriptions especially, their exact analysis has exhibited them as the combination of two parts, each of which is quite familiar to physiology, so that henceforward the union of these parts can only be objected to by that scepticism which cannot do an addition sum. These two parts are: 1. The reciprocity of Will and Idea;* 2. The displacement of the psycho-physical threshold.

The will excites the idea, and the idea the will. If the intuitive representation of a thing homogeneous to my present condition occurs to me, that excites the want; as, for instance, the sign of an inn with its suggestion of foaming beer glasses may excite thirst. If, conversely, the want of the thing is already in the will, it excites in waking the thought, in sleep the representation of the thing. So, for example, in erotic dreams. Thus the Neoplatonist, Plotinus, says: ‘When desire arises, then comes imagination and presents the object.’† That will can excite thoughts is everyday experience, and the great

* ['Will' here stands for the teleological activity of the organic forces, and is distinguished from Idea, the representation of that activity, or of its end, in consciousness. It is not necessary to refer these expressions here to the philosophy of Schopenhauer in the full significance there attached to them.—Tr.]
† Plotinus: 'Enneads,' iv. 4, 17.
majority of men have no capacity for objective* thoughts, but only for such as are evoked by the egoistic will, interest, or want; and even the great majority of scientific books are open to Bacon's censure, that 'human understanding is not a pure light, but suffers influences from will and feeling.'

Now, were we not so unphilosophical as to lose surprise in regard to daily experience, retaining it only for what is rare, this surprise would be regulated solely by the objective content of a phenomenon; and then we must unavoidably confess that it is far more wonderful that will can excite thoughts in waking than that it should excite representation in sleep. For all thinking by concepts and all language are rooted (as Lazarus Geiger has convincingly proved‡) in intuition; representation (Vorstellung) is the radical, the primary in our thinking, and all concepts, all words, are only condensed representations. In sleep, therefore, the action of will remains stationary, in the sphere of representation, whereas in waking it protrudes into the sphere of abstract thinking—into thoughts of what is willed. The

* [I.e., non-egoistic; egoism here, of course, including all that is related to the self by the affections. But the proposition is surely too broadly stated, since all the intellectual work of life requires objective thinking in some degree. Intellectual capacity is in fact measurable by the degree of objectivity attained by thought. This is its abstraction from all egoistic intrusion, as from prejudice, preconceptions, and prepossessions, not less than from the importunities of sense or personal concerns which distract us, and prevent the object of thought from developing its pure reality in our intelligence.—Tr.]


latter case is thus, notwithstanding its familiarity, far more mysterious than the other. The sceptic who disputes the possibility of vision of remedies in dream is therefore to be referred to this fact of waking life.

The other factor of the somnambulic health-prescriptions is the displacement of the psycho-physical threshold. The threshold divides those influences from the outer world which are conscious from others which remain unconscious, but yet go on of themselves, only are not felt. The displacement of the threshold thus makes the unconscious conscious: it must increase the material of sensibility. Thousands of experiments with somnambulists have proved that they receive from substances influences of which in waking only sensitives are susceptible, or which show themselves in idiosyncrasies. Our waking capacity to react upon all things with inclination or disinclination is exalted in sleep, so that somnambulists even feel the chemical constituents of compounds. It is therefore natural that they are also informed upon the beneficial or hurtful tendencies of the same; for in sleep, as in waking, pain is the accompanying sign of what is injurious, pleasure of what is advantageous to the organism. Had we not this impulse to seek the suitable and to flee from the unsuitable, we should be incapable of life.

As well, then, as the faculty of sensibility in waking can produce in a thirsty man the thought of water, can this greatly exalted faculty in sleep produce in the diseased organism the representation of chemical substances advantageous to it.

Thus the so-called miracle of health-prescriptions is in both its parts quite conceivable, and, in view of
the great quantity of evidence, must be recognised as an intelligible fact by everyone who can add the two parts together.

There are sceptics who do not indeed deny the facts of somnambulism, but disparage their value because they are of a morbid nature. They are that, certainly—every displacement of the psycho-physical threshold is at the same time a displacement of the normal sound condition; but they are only morbid in regard to the exciting cause and for the Person of the external consciousness, not at all in regard to their transcendental content; and this scruple cannot better be removed than by the proof that dream is a physician, that the transcendental Person is the physician of the empirical Person.

This language will no doubt sound strange to many; but, since the faculties of somnambulists cannot be explained from the external consciousness, we must even have the courage just to say that somnambulists are inspired. But by whom inspired? It is not necessary to accept their 'guardian spirits' and their 'guides' as realities and as the inspirers, because the phenomena are as well explained by the simple hypothesis that the somnambulists are inspired by themselves. These inspirations originate, however, from the region of the unconscious; it is the Ego below the threshold that lets itself be known when external consciousness disappears. A psychical relation of some kind must be at the foundation of the appearance that these inspirations come from without, and no other explanation is to be found than that the inspiration originates from the same Subject, indeed, but yet from another Person than that of the external
consciousness. This second Person, however, can then be only relatively unconscious for the Person of external consciousness, but not in itself. To sum up the result in a few words, that is to say: Our normal self-consciousness does not exhaust its object, our Self—it comprehends only one of the two Persons of our Subject. Man is a monistic double-being—monistic as Subject, dualistic as Person. The contention of monists and dualists is thus resolved by comprisal of alternatives.
THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM

BY

CARL DU PREL.

Dr. PHIL.

Translated from the German

BY

C. C. MASSEY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:
GEORGE REDWAY, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
1889.
CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAPTER

I. THE FACULTY OF MEMORY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Reproduction, Memory, Recollection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Exaltation of Memory in Dream</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The Wealth of Latent Memory in Dream</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Exalted Memory in Somnambulism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Memory in the Dying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>The Forgetfulness of Somnambulists on Waking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Alternating Consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>The Association of Psychical States with Ideas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Theory of Memory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Janus-Aspect of Man</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Transcendental Subject</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The Dualism of Consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The Bi-Unity of Man</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Our Place in the Universe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ethic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I.

THE FACULTY OF MEMORY.

1. Reproduction, Memory, Recollection.*

We possess our past in the form of images lying in our memory as copies of reality. Thereby is our empirical self-consciousness connected; the so-called pure self-consciousness, the feeling of personality, arises because we refer the succession of our experiences to an identical Subject which knows itself as permanent in all change of the feelings. Were the successive feelings divided and atomically isolated by loss of memory, personal consciousness could no more arise than if all these feelings were distributed among as many individuals. There would only be a constantly alternating consciousness; with every new feeling a new Ego would awake. An identical self-

* [Reproduktion, Gedächtniss, Erinnerung. 'Recollection' seems to me the proper English word to include the element of recognition, whereby the author distinguishes 'Erinnerung' from memory in general ('Gedächtniss'), which may be the mere 'reproduction' of a past impression, without the knowledge that it has been previously experienced. But 'Erinnerungs-vermögen,' —the faculty of memory in general— I sometimes translate 'memory' simply.—Tr.]

VOL. II. 22
PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM.

Consciousness first comes into existence when the changing feelings are strung together on the thread of remembrance, and without remembrance it is not thinkable. Because, moreover, rational thinking and acting are dependent on the clearness with which we preserve past experiences; and on the circumspection with which we conclude from them to the future, the faculty of memory must be recognised as the root of all higher intellectual powers. We accordingly see that with biological organic elevation there is growth of memory, while, on the other hand, the perturbed feeling of personality in madness is connected with disturbances of memory. This fact, pointed out by Schopenhauer,* had been already expressed by Augustine: 'Memoria enim mens est, unde et immemores amentes dicuntur';† and yet earlier, in the biography of Buddha, it is said that at his birth all diseased persons became sound, and all the insane received back their memory.‡

In the chapter on the scientific importance of dream, we arrived deductively at the proposition that should metaphysical individualism be true—that is, if our Ego extends beyond self-consciousness—with the emerging of that part of our being which lies behind self-consciousness, certain modifications of the faculty of memory must be connected. Thence, conversely, it follows that from the analysis of memory, and particularly of its occasional modifications, we shall arrive at the inductive proof that the self-consciousness does not exhaust its object, that is, that metaphysical individualism is true.

* 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,' ii. 32.
† Augustinus: 'De spir. et an.,' c. 34. ‡ Salitavistara.
Now, if our Ego is more than our self-consciousness reveals, that is the same thing as to say that for this self-consciousness we can only unconsciously be this more. As the plant grows in the light, but its roots are sunk in the dark bosom of the earth, so would our Ego be sunk with a metaphysical root in an order of things lying beyond our knowledge.

For this kernel of our being the familiar word 'soul' might fitly be retained, but then it must be otherwise defined than hitherto. For the spiritualism heretofore prevailing divides man dualistically into body and soul; in life the soul holds the body together, and provides the fabric of thought. Its most important function thus lies within the consciousness, or rather it is the consciousness. In death the soul is divided from the body, is spatially transferred to a world beyond, and called to other functions, variously depicted by religious systems.

But a monistic doctrine of soul must have quite another purport. There is no true antithesis of body and soul, force and substance—modern science, it may be added, has already, especially in the atomic theory, made important advances in this direction—there is, moreover, certainly a world beyond, that is, beyond our consciousness; in other words, our sense-consciousness has its limits just in its senses; we ourselves belong already now to that world beyond, so far as our Ego exceeds self-consciousness, thus as—but only relatively—unconscious being. We are not temporally and spatially divided from that beyond, are not first transposed there by death, but are already rooted therein, and what divides us therefrom is merely the subjective barrier.
of the threshold of sensibility. This threshold thus limits consciousness and therewith self-consciousness. Since both are products of evolution, their capacity for further evolution suggests itself at once. With this the problem, from how much transcendental—not transcendent*—reality the threshold of sensibility excludes us, is as yet wholly unsolved, and can generally only so far be solved as the threshold of sensibility is removable.

Let us now see what results from a monistic doctrine of soul can be obtained from the analysis of memory.

Removal into the transcendental world can only be thought in a monistic sense as the displacement of the threshold of our consciousness and self-consciousness, whereby what was formerly unconscious rapport with nature becomes a conscious one. But if, when this happened, our normal rapport with nature was changed or suppressed, our normal consciousness and self-consciousness being diminished or even ceasing, that would in effect certainly resemble a spatial transfer into quite another world. Were our five senses to be suddenly taken away, and senses of an entirely different kind given to us, though standing on the same spot we should believe ourselves inhabitants of another star.

Now the life of man contains empirical conditions in which, by displacement of the threshold of sensibility, his normal consciousness disappears, and in the same degree his Unconscious comes to the front.

* [The distinction is between what is merely beyond the sphere of normal experience, but is to be conceived in connection with it, and what would belong altogether to a 'supernatural' order of things.—Tr.]
These conditions have the common characteristic that they occur, as a rule, in connection with sleep. Thus in an analysis of memory, therefrom to obtain inductive proof that our Ego exceeds the boundary of normal consciousness, we must keep chiefly to those states of sleep, in the alternations of which with waking the day-consciousness sinks and the unconscious rises, like two scales of a balance. In this alternation our always identical Ego must change its circumference, because the rapport with nature which gives its content is changed; but this must be the case still more if in the sinking scale there are memories which may lie perhaps only in the one scale, but perhaps in both. In forgetting and in recovery of memory our Ego would, as it were, extend itself and again shrivel up. Were such phenomena demonstrable, it would not only be proved that self-consciousness and Ego are not coincident in different conditions, but the extension of the Ego must be the occasion for taking cognisance of our transcendental being, and determining some of its properties which in the normal state lie outside the sphere of our knowledge. We shall therefore for the present offer no theory of memory—that will present itself spontaneously at the conclusion—but the changes of this faculty in different conditions shall here be investigated, for in these changes we shall necessarily encounter the transcendental Ego, if indeed it exists. As from the logical conception of individualism* changes of memory are inferable deductively, so, from the analysis of these changes, the transcendental Ego must be inductively manifest.

* [I.e., in the author's sense of a single Subject embracing two Persons.—Tr.]
Every intellectual organisation has memory; this is a given fact. But to trace the changes of this endowment, we have to distinguish between memory, reproduction, and recollection. The faculty which the psychical organism has of reviving as a mental representation an impression of sense formerly experienced, is called Memory, which has imagination (die Phantasie) in its service. Memory is the common source of reproduction and recollection. If a representation revives in me without my recognition of it, that can only be termed reproduction; we only speak of recollection when there is at the same time recognition. In the latter case a further element is added to reproduction. Aristotle indicated in this fact the central point of the problem.* Reappearance of a representation in the imagination, and recognition of it, are obviously different things; the first may be thought as a mere physiological reflex-movement, the latter is a reflective judgment. There is often an intermediate state between reproduction and recollection, when, with the re-emergence of a representation, is connected an undefined feeling that we have had it before, without our being able to assign to it a determinate position in the past.

Our memory embraces by no means all the representations and feelings of past life. By far the greater number are forgotten, and relatively but few remain to us. How is that? Why do some representations adhere to consciousness while others sink down? Why, of those which are forgotten, can some be re-awakened and others not? Is the cause of this

in the consciousness, or in the representations—that is, in the things? Is the subjective factor of perception decisive, or the objective? One would expect our consciousness to be like a mirror, indifferent to the quality of the representations, or like the surface of water, on which all the scenes and occurrences on the bank are depicted with equal fidelity. But it is not so. Already in the perception of things we bring to them different degrees of susceptibility, and this subjective factor determines also our remembering or forgetting. This difference of susceptibility does not, however, lie in consciousness as such, which is indifferent to the quality of representations, but in our will. It depends on the relation of the representations to our interest, which is, as it were, the string on which part of our impressions are threaded, and forms the content of our empirical self-consciousness. That consciousness is connected with recollection lies in this: that we are not only knowing but also willing* beings, and since the will maintains its identity through the whole course of life, it belongs to the single personal self-consciousness. Were we merely knowing beings, then should we certainly resemble mere mirrors, and there would be no recollection. Schopenhauer says: 'If we consider the thing deeply, we shall arrive at the result that memory in general needs the support of a will, as of a point of attachment, or rather of a thread on which the memories are strung and which holds them

* 'Willing' and 'will' are here, of course, not to be understood in the sense of mere volition, but refer, in contradistinction to pure intelligence, to that in the individual which is the source of all his emotional interest, of all the value ('Gefühlswerth') which his experiences or ideas have for him.
together; or that the will is, as it were, the ground to which individual memories cleave, and without which they could not endure, and that therefore for a merely knowing, quite will-less being, memory cannot be conceived. So far Schopenhauer is decidedly right in his conclusion; the will determines the content of memory. It is like a sieve which drops by far the larger number of impressions. But the fact of reproduction and recollection is opposed to the opinion that this forgetting of impressions is equivalent to their loss. What can re-emerge, what can be remembered, must as much cleave to a support of some kind, as the unforgotten impressions to the will. And if such a foundation is not to be found within our self-consciousness, that again obliges us to say that our self-consciousness does not know our whole Ego, for the theory of the material brain-trace of every past impression is quite inadequate, and in the sequel will be sufficiently controverted.

Schopenhauer says that the will, as kernel of our being, is blind. This opinion cuts away the foundation to be sought for the forgotten impressions—those, that is, which have disappeared from the outer con-

* 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,' ii. c. 19.
† ['The will, which, considered purely in itself, is without knowledge, and is merely a blind incessant impulse, as we see it appear in unorganised and vegetable nature and their laws, and also in the vegetative part of our own life, receives through the addition of the world as idea, which is developed in subjection to it, the knowledge of its own willing and of what it is that it wills. And this is nothing else than the world as idea, life, precisely as it exists. Therefore we call the phenomenal world the mirror of the will, its objectivity. . . . Will is the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world. Life, the visible world, the phenomenon, is only the mirror of the will.' Schopenhauer: 'The World as Will and Idea,' vol. i., p. 354; Haldane and Kemp's translation.—Tr.]
sciousness. But it can easily be shown that even if in self-consciousness we find only a blind will, it by no means thence follows that the will also is blind.

The mere conception of self-cognition presupposes in the knowing substance a duality of attributes, one of which is directed upon the other. Self-cognition implies a substance going apart into subject and object. This substance is subject in so far as it knows, object in so far as it is known. There is thus required, for the possibility of self-cognition, one attribute for the act of cognition, and a second for the content of cognition; and the latter is just the will. If these two attributes are severed in self-cognition, then the knowing attribute cannot find itself again in the act, but only the second attribute, the will, as the eye cannot see itself. Should this not suffice as answer to the supporters of a blind will, the following may be added: According to Schopenhauer, only the will in us is metaphysical, the primary; intellect is secondary. The brain, included in the phenomenal world, is itself only a phenomenon. But if the whole organisation, according to Schopenhauer objectified will, gives us information concerning the directions of this will, that must be true of every special organ, and the brain can only be the objectified cognition-impulse of our metaphysical substance. If, however, all cognition is wholly foreign to the will, it is not at all comprehensible how it should come by the cognition-impulse; though a substance having the two attributes, knowing and willing, might well acquire a cognition-impulse in a new direction. It would therefore follow from Schopenhauer's premises that the brain, since it corresponds to earthly things
as the eye to light, is the objectified will to know earthly things. The means by which this correspondence is established have since Schopenhauer's death been sufficiently discovered—struggle for existence, selection, sexual selection, increased adaptation in the biological process. Metaphysically regarded, intellect is therefore developed for earthly things:* scientifically regarded, it has been developed and adapted by earthly things. These two points of view are not inconsistent, but supplement each other, as end and means, teleology and mechanism.† Now, an intellect developed by earthly things themselves for adaptation to them must be limited to these objects—that is, can only be developed for cognition externally directed; but a secondary intellect never can know its metaphysical supporter, whose aspect as feeling only can be open to it, because desire and suffering are excited by earthly things.

* [The physical environment.—Tr.]
† [So Schopenhauer: 'The etiology and the philosophy of nature never do violence to each other, but go hand in hand, regarding the same object from different points of view.'—'The World as Will and Idea,' Haldane and Kemp's translation, vol. i., p. 183. What Schopenhauer's attitude would have been, or rather was, to the Darwinian Evolution doctrine must be apparent to everyone who understands his philosophy. For instance: the Will which objectifies itself in nature being one and the same, Schopenhauer does not admit a one-sided adaptation of organism to environment, but simply insists on its mutuality. Thus he says: 'We must not merely admit that every species accommodated itself to its environment, but also that this environment itself, which preceded it in time, had just as much regard for the being that would some time come into it . . . and the Ideas whose manifestations entered into the course of time earlier, according to the law of causality, to which, as phenomena, they are subject, have no advantage over those whose manifestations entered later; nay rather, these last are the completest objectifications of the will, to which the earlier manifestations must adapt themselves just as much as they must adapt themselves to the earlier.'—Op. cit., vol. i., pp. 208, 209.—Tr.]
A brain developed by the things of nature can, therefore, not be adapted to an object which lies outside the things of nature, any more than sexual selection can breed an insect proboscis corresponding to the calyx of a March blossom. A secondary intellect, applied to self-knowledge, can therefore perceive its metaphysical will-side through pleasure and pain, indeed, but a second attribute of its being, if such exists, must remain closed to it. It is hence again possible that in self-cognition we do not exhaust our whole Ego.

The application to memory is manifest. Granted that our metaphysical Ego has two attributes, cognition and will, it would well be possible that the will has to decide what impressions we should retain in the secondary intellect and what forget, that thus the content of our empirical self-consciousness would be determined by it, while yet in the other attribute is to be found the required foundation for all those impressions which can emerge, be reproduced, or recollected. In this case this second attribute would be the repository for all impressions without distinction. Forgetting would be limited to the earthly brain-consciousness, but would not apply to our transcendental consciousness, which in union with the will makes up our whole being.

As has been above shown, there are conditions of sleep in which our transcendental Ego can come forward; we must therefore attentively observe whether on these occasions ideas present themselves which do not adhere to the will—that is, which are forgotten, but which by their reappearance betray the existence of a second foundation that can be only
our transcendental consciousness. Such recollections must apparently arise from an exaltation of memory by the condition of sleep, not, however, as really reproductions, but revealed by the displacement in sleep of the partition-wall between the empirical and the transcendental subject. But especially will it appear that in these modifications of memory such ideas are introduced as were indifferent for the will; or if the number of these should be very considerable, that would suggest the conclusion that there is no such thing as a real forgetting, but ideas having no interest for the will are only not retained by the secondary intellect, that is, disappear from external consciousness.

2. The Exaltation of Memory in Dream.

The content of our daily consciousness disappears for the most part when we fall asleep; there is thus certainly no general exaltation of memory in dream. What shall here be shown is simply that in dream the conditions occur for reproduction of individual impressions which were once in consciousness, but were forgotten, this fact proving that memory is independent of the degree of interest which these impressions had for the will. Agreeably to the above distinction between reproduction and recollection, we have to consider whether only the reproductive power is exalted in sleep, or also recollection; that is, the faculty of recognising reproduced impressions as earlier ones.

The content of our dreams goes over into the waking consciousness only by fragments; it is therefore difficult to determine the degree to which memory
is exalted in dream; it will, moreover, appear that many impressions are reproduced in sleep without being recognised. In this case mere reproductions are taken for productions, for original images—a further difficulty in determining how far the power of reproduction is exalted. All we can be sure of is that but for these two difficulties a still greater exaltation of memory could be proved.

It is at any rate easy to show that sleep frequently reverses the former process of forgetting. Forgetting is either partial, the possibility of reproduction remaining, though without recollection; or complete, when the impression cannot be revived at all. And so the exaltation of memory reverses this process either partially or completely, memory rising either to reproduction alone, or to recollection. This will be made clear by examples.

Maury relates that he once wrote an article on political economy for a periodical, but the sheets were mislaid and therefore not sent off. He had already forgotten everything that he had written, when he was requested to send the promised article. On re-undertaking the work he thought that he had found a completely new point of view for the subject; but when, some months later, the mislaid sheets were found, it appeared, not only that there was nothing new in his second essay, but that he had repeated his first ideas in almost exactly the same words.* Thus there was here only a half forgetting, the condition of reproduction remaining; and the case is not to be confused with the frequent forgetting in a quantita-

* Maury: 'Le Sommeil et les Rêves,' 440.
tive respect, when the deduction is from the object, not from memory itself.*

The exaltation of memory in dream, since it reverses the process of forgetting, often stops halfway—there is reproduction without recollection. So Hervey once dreamed very vividly that he met a young man who seemed known to him; he went up to him; and shook him by the hand, and then both looked at each other attentively. 'I don't know you at all,' said the other, and turned away; and Hervey had to own to himself with embarrassment that neither in fact did he know the other.† This dream is very instructive; there is the reproduction of an impression, but the dreamer cannot identify it, and only in the first moment is there an obscure recollection. Reproduction happens within the dream-consciousness; but that has not yet enlightened the whole depth of memory, there being an unconscious reserve still lower down; this is the psychological reason that the want of recollection is put into the mouth of another, i.e., is dramatised; for when in dream any proceeding of it is dramatised, the fracture at which the Ego dramatically splits itself coincides with the partition-line between consciousness and the unconscious.

Leibnitz relates another such dream: 'I believe,' he says, 'that dreams often renew old thoughts. When Julius Scaliger had celebrated in verse all the famous men of Verona, there appeared to him in

* [That is to say, when both elements of memory (reproduction and recognition) are present in as much of the matter as is remembered, but that is only partially recalled. This is, of course, by far the most usual case.—Tr.]
† Hervey: 'Les Rêves,' etc., 317.
dream one who gave the name of Brugnolus, a Bavarian by birth, who had settled at Verona, complaining that he had been forgotten. Julius Scaliger did not recollect to have heard him spoken of, but upon this dream made elegiac verses in his honour. Afterwards his son Joseph Scaliger, being on a journey through Italy, learned that formerly there had been at Verona a celebrated grammarian or critic of that name, who had contributed to the restoration of learning in Italy. This story is to be found in the poems of Scaliger, with the elegy, and in the letters of his son."* Now Leibnitz is doubtless right in thinking that Scaliger had formerly known of Brugnolus, and in dream only partially recollected the fact; but the proof that this explanation is correct must be afforded from the dream itself, and in fact lies therein. There is here, to begin with, reproduction, but no recollection; therefore the dreaming Scaliger did not recognise Brugnolus. Then, however, there enters the hitherto latent recollection; but as first it emerges from the unconscious, the dreaming Ego sunders itself, and the recollection is dramatically transferred to the mouth of Brugnolus. Had Scaliger slept more deeply, a further exaltation of memory would have taken place, the process of forgetting would not have been reversed by successive stages, but rather he would have immediately recollected the reproduced Brugnolus, the latter would not have complained of being forgotten, and would perhaps have remained quite silent.

We possess, therefore, in waking a latent memory,

the content of which partially returns in dream, often with, often without, recollection. It is now, however, important to show that while memory in waking always gravitates to impressions which have the greatest interest for us, in dream it is much more emancipated from this interest.

Impressions which in waking sink back into the unconscious almost as they arise—i.e., are forgotten, because they are of slight interest—are often reproduced in sleep. Even things perceived during waking, but not attended to, and not distinctly in consciousness, are presented objectively in dream. This often happens only fragmentarily; items from past scenes of life enter and break off again before well begun. But the absence of the element of interest in latent memory is all the more shown when such reproductions have not the characteristic of recollection, or obtain it first in reflection, often after awaking. Hervey saw in dream a number of men defiling by, who seemed to come from a feast. He observed them very attentively, and remembered one of their faces after waking. He now thought he recollected, as was in fact confirmed, that it was an exact copy of a face in a journal of fashions, which some days before he had carelessly glanced through. Thus with reproduction there was here associated a creative activity of imagination, for the motionless superficial picture in the journal was in dream converted into a living and active being in three dimensions. Another time he saw in dream a blonde young lady in company with his sister. In the dream he thought he knew her as someone whom he had often met before; then awaking for a moment
with the image in his memory, it was quite unknown to him. He fell asleep again immediately, the lady still before him, and again known to him, but at the same time he was conscious that on waking a few seconds before he had not recollected her. Surprised at this forgetfulness again recurring in the dream, he went up to the lady and asked her if he had not already the pleasure of her acquaintance. She assented, reminding him of the watering-place, Pornic. Struck by this word, he became quite awake, and now recollected accurately the circumstances of the acquaintance.

In this dream reproduction was evidently associated with a recollection, not, however, extending to the place of the first acquaintance. On first waking, the momentarily exalted memory again receded, but only partially—i.e., the reproduction remained, the recollection [recognition] being dropped. In the continuation of the dream, memory was still further exalted, the watering-place occurring to the dreamer; but as this emerged from the unconscious, the dream took on the dramatic form, and the dreamer's sudden suggestion, presented from the unconscious, is placed in the mouth of the lady. The vivacity of the suggestion, however, enabled the whole recollection to remain on the second waking. In a later section it will also appear that the second waking was merely the effect of this suggestion, that is, of the incursion of a memory which by association drew with it a whole succession of ideas, and thus also the waking condition which had been connected with them.

To this class belongs also the case of a friend of
Hervey, a distinguished musician, who in dream heard a remarkable piece of music performed by a band of singers. On waking he remembered the melody, and, delighted with his inspiration, wrote it down. But after many years, a sheet of old pieces of music falling into his hands, to his astonishment he found in it that which he had dreamed.* He could in no way recollect that he had ever heard or even read the piece before. And yet the dramatic form in which it was brought before him, proves that a reproduction had taken place in the dream.

All the easier is it to understand that impressions which had great interest for us, and were yet forgotten, are reproduced in dream. Reichenbach says: 'Waking, I cannot, with whatever effort, distinctly recall the features of my wife, who died some twenty years ago. But if I think of her in dream, and her image is represented, I get the same with such accuracy that I have again before me every expression of her fine features in all their loveliness.'† Pfaff had begun an oil-painting of his father, but the latter dying and other existing portraits not being of sufficient assistance, he had to leave it unfinished. Many years after he saw his father in dream, the features being so faithfully represented that on waking Pfaff at once sprang up, and was able to paint over and finish the dusty portrait.‡ Fichte mentions a musical amateur, a good composer, who happening once to omit noting down a melody which occurred to him, forgot it. He afterwards recollected it in dream,

† Reichenbach: 'Der sensitive Mensch.,' ii. 694.
‡ Pfaff: 'Das Traumleben,' 24, Potsdam, 1873.
with full harmony and instrumental accompaniment, and was able to retain it on waking.*

That sleep as such, in the physiological sense, cannot exalt memory, will become more evident as we proceed; it is not the cause, but only the occasional cause, of this phenomenon. There are other occasional causes of this kind, and the characteristic they have in common with sleep directs us to the actual cause of the exaltation of memory.

Memory is often much exalted in the delirium of fever, irrespectively of the psychical value of the impressions, or in the complete absence of such value. Coleridge mentions a maid-servant who in the delirium of fever recited long passages in Hebrew which she did not understand, and could not repeat when in health, but which formerly when in the service of a priest she had heard him deliver aloud. She also quoted passages from theological works in Latin and Greek, which she only half understood when the priest, as was his custom, read aloud his favourite authors on going to and from church.† A Rostock peasant in a fever suddenly recited the Greek words commencing the Gospel of John, which he had accidentally heard sixty years before; and Benecke mentions a peasant woman who in fever uttered Syriac, Chaldaean, and Hebrew words which when a little girl she had accidentally heard in the house of a scholar.‡

* J. H. Fichte: 'Psychologie,' i. 543.
‡ Radestlock: ‘Schlaf und Traum,’ 136. [The difficulty of explaining the above cases by reproduction is that the original
PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM.

Now, as sleep beclouds the brain, and in the delirium of fever the brain is morbidly excited, these two opposite conditions could not well cause the same phenomenon, but can only be the occasional cause of exaltation of memory. It is common to both conditions that normal consciousness disappears in them; and as from this fact only forgetfulness, not exaltation of memory, can result, we must conclude that in this disappearance of normal consciousness lies the occasional cause of the emergence of the transcendental consciousness. In the Middle Ages such phenomena were frequently ascribed to the devil, as Jordanus, in his book on 'Divine Operations in Diseases,' citing many examples, affirms.*

One of the most remarkable instances—too long for quotation here—of extraordinary memory in an imbecile, is adduced by Schubert;† Even the condensation of ideas, their succession with the transcendental scale of time, has been observed among the deranged. All these instances prove that even if madness is connected with disturbance of memory, as Schopenhauer and St. Augustine say, yet the faculty of reproduction may experience an extraordinary exaltation.

impressions had not the strength—that is the distinctness—of the reproduction. An unknown language overheard is a mere sound; for the ear; unaided by any understanding, is incompetent to trace the articulation into the right distinction of words, etc. Even supposing, as is probable, that the recitations of the priest and of the scholar were slow and deliberate, they would have to be often repeated, and attentively listened to, even with some effort of intelligence, to be accurately imitated at the time of hearing. There is no doubt, however, that the involuntary reproductive power of dream is more accurate than the consciously imitative power in waking.—Tr.]

* Hauber: 'Bibliotheca magica,' iii. 641.
† Schubert: 'Geschichte der Seele,' ii. 66-68.
THE FACULTY OF MEMORY.

Such occasional causes, characterised in common by alteration of external consciousness, are very numerous; thus we find this exaltation of memory also in madness, hypnotism, in hysterical ecstasy, and in the incubation period of many brain diseases. Ribot mentions an insane person who could name everyone that had died in his parish during the past thirty-five years, with particulars of their age, and of the mourners who followed the coffin. Apart from this capacity, he was completely imbecile. Insane persons with whom no other impression abides are often very sensitive to music, and can retain melodies which they have only once heard.* A deranged person, who was cured by Dr. Willis, said that in his attacks his memory attained extraordinary power, so that long passages from Latin authors occurred to him.†

By the facilitation of reproduction in dream and its independence of waking interest, many cases are explained which might easily lead to superstitious notions were this principle of explanation not kept in view. A girl of seven, employed as neat-herd, occupied a room divided only by a thin partition from that of a violin-player, who often gave himself up to his favourite pursuit during half the night. Some months later, the girl got another place, in which she had already been for two years, when frequently in the night tones exactly like those of the violin were heard coming from her room, but which were produced by the sleeping girl herself. This often went on for hours; sometimes with interrup-

† Reil: 'Rhapsodien,' 304.
tions, after which she would continue the song where she had left off. With irregular intervals this lasted for two years; then she reproduced also the tones of a piano which was played in the family, and afterwards she began to speak, and held forth with remarkable acuteness on political and religious subjects, often in a very accomplished and sarcastic way; she also conjugated Latin, or spoke like a tutor to a pupil. In all which cases this entirely ignorant girl merely reproduced what had been said by members of the family or visitors.

From the same author I take another case in which the constitution of memory is also very clearly seen to be independent of the intellectual life. A young uneducated lady, who had learned only to read and imperfectly to write, became insane, and in this condition perfected herself in writing even to dexterity. Rational intervals of several weeks’ duration often occurred, but in these she could scarcely read and write, the faculty for both being quite restored to her with the return of insanity.*

The danger of a superstitious interpretation is still greater when such phenomena are associated with dramatic self-sundering; as in the above-mentioned dream of Scaliger, on which doubtless many spiritists lay hands.† Since in this dream there is, indeed,

* Brière de Boismont: ‘Des Hallucinations,’ 342, 344.
† [It is perhaps to be regretted that the author does not define more precisely what he means by ‘superstition.’ The belief in ‘spirits,’ i.e., in conscious personal intelligences without physical embodiment in our sense, seems to be a necessary adjunct to the acceptance of a transcendental individual subject of consciousness; for whatever the ‘material’ supporter (Träger) of this may be, it must be much more subtle than the physically apparent organism, and cannot hold to this the relation of a derivative. It
reproduction, but not recollection, it might easily seem that the dreamer perceived something that was not from himself, as he perceived it without consciousness that it was from himself. As, further, there was dramatic severance, and the latent impression was placed in the mouth of the dream-figure of the deceased Brugnolus, many might see in this a sufficient proof that we can have intercourse in dream with the dead. Exaltation of memory and dramatic severance are, however, everyday phenomena of dream-life; we are, therefore, of course obliged to prefer the simpler hypothesis with the help of these two principles of explanation.

It may nevertheless be expedient to dwell a little longer upon these dreams.

When I put a question in dream which is answered by a dream-figure, or conversely, question and answer evidently proceed from the same mind, my own, that is to say, there is reproduction without recollection.

...would therefore survive the dissolution of the physical body, and in that case there seems no evident reason why it should not communicate with organic principles similar to its own, though these may be still connected with an external body. I am not at all suggesting that such an explanation of any of the cases mentioned in the text is to be preferred, but am simply venturing a protest against the rather indiscriminate adoption of one of the loose phrases of modern 'enlightenment,' by an author who has been so careful himself to point out the unintelligent fallacy of such expressions, whenever they stand in the way of his own hypothesis.—Tr.]

*[It is, however, one thing to prefer a simpler hypothesis, even when that requires an assumption to be introduced into the evidence, and quite another thing to describe an alternative hypothesis as 'superstitious,' for no other reason than that it refuses to make an assumption of fact,—viz., that what is dreamed is a reproduction of past knowledge, and not wholly new—an assumption in some cases opposed to the most positive statements of the witnesses, or even also to all apparent probabilities. —Tr.]*
But in dream we distribute in two mental storehouses what lies in one, and this division is then dramatically completed by the apparent objectivity of a second figure. Latent memory often shows itself very distinctly in the course of such dreams. To Maury there once suddenly occurred, when he was awake, the word Mussidan; he knew it to be the name of a French town, but its situation had escaped him. He soon after dreamed of meeting someone who said he came from Mussidan, and on Maury's asking him where the place was, replied that it was the chief town of Dordogne. On waking, Maury doubted this information, but on consulting a geographical dictionary found to his surprise that his interlocutor in sleep was right.*

In other cases it is less clearly manifest that the apparent unconscious is only a latent impression, and such dreams then obtain a false significance. Büchner calls the following a supernatural dream: The widow of a preacher was sued for a debt of her deceased husband; she knew that it had been paid, but could not find a receipt. Much disturbed, she lay down and dreamed that her husband came to her and said that the receipt was in a red velvet bag in a hidden drawer of the writing-desk. She verified the dream on waking.† Now certain as it indeed is that we cannot solve all dreams rationalistically, we must be careful not to draw the boundary line at the wrong place. Exaltation of memory and dramatic severance sufficiently explain as well the above dream as the following, for the explanation of which we require only the admissible assumption that exaltation of memory

* Maury, 142.
† Hennings: 'Ueber Träume und Nachtwandler,' 365.
can go still further. A landed proprietor in England was in expectation of a judgment against him for an alleged debt which he was firmly convinced had been paid by his father, who had been dead some years. No voucher, however, could be found. In dream his father appeared to him, and said that the papers were in the hands of a former solicitor, not generally employed by him, but who had been concerned with this particular business. But should this person have forgotten an affair already rather old, he was to be reminded of a Portuguese gold coin, in the valuation whereof a difference arose, which was settled by the two drinking it out in a tavern. This dream was so exactly verified, that the man of business in fact only recollected the circumstance on mention of the gold coin. The proprietor obtained possession of his papers, and won the suit which had been already half lost.*

It must here be remarked, by the way, that even when latent memory will not account for the content of a dream, the future, not the past, being disclosed, we are nevertheless not to infer that the dream was supernaturally inspired. The hypothesis of clairvoyance of the psyche itself would be more permissible, because simpler and possessing the same range of explanation; and even a dramatised clairvoyance would not far exceed the limits of the admissible explanation.

3. The Wealth of Latent Memory in Dream.

The question, how far exaltation of memory in dream extends, has to be examined with regard as

* Brierre de Boismont, 259.
well to the quality—that is, to the clearness—of the impressions, as to their quantity.

An impression reproduced from latent memory alone cannot be more distinct than the original; but it is otherwise if the creative imagination adopts the object. This was the case in the above-mentioned dream in which a picture out of a journal of fashions became incorporated into a three-dimensioned living and acting being. Now since memory undoubtedly plays a great part in dream, but the dream-figures excel the usually very nebulous images of waking recollection by a freshness and palpability so great as completely to induce the illusion of reality, it must be inferred that memory and imagination combine in all these dreams wherein the dramatic course of the dream-action is not offered as a representation of the past, but is the independent invention of the dream-poet. When, on the other hand, the indefinite impression of the original perception remains indefinite in the dream, we may conclude that the activity of memory is unmixed. Hervey worked in a room from which he could see across the court and garden into the windows of a neighbouring house, at which a flower-maker often sat. She interested him, although from the distance her features were always undefined. She frequently came up in his dreams, but whether he saw her in them at a window, or seemed to meet her, or speak with her, her features remained always indefinite, as was not the case with the other dream-figures. The features also of a man who had once begged of him in the dusk of evening, appeared in dream undefined.*

* Hervey, 23.
Distinct perceptions, on the other hand, seem not to become less distinct on reproduction in dream. It appears, therefore, that in regard to their quality, reproduced impressions are equal to reality. This seems to be the case also with auditory impressions, even when, as with the before-mentioned neat-herd girl, the tones heard were neither attended to nor understood. The basket-maker, Mohk, observed by Varnhagen, once heard a fast-day sermon which deeply moved him. In the following night he got up and walked in his sleep, repeating with verbal fidelity the discourse he had heard. On waking he knew nothing of what had happened. These accesses recurred for many years often daily, either by day or by night, in company or alone, especially after drinking brandy. His sayings often contained reminiscences from the sermon which he had heard more than forty years before.* A servant known to Splittgerber had similar fits, sinking on the bed and repeating in fluent high German, which at other times he did not speak, the sermon he had heard, the church hymns, and indeed the whole Sunday service, almost literally.†

The somnambule Selma recited in the crisis a long comic poem a year after she had heard it delivered; afterwards Freiligrath's 'Mohrenfürst' which had been read to her the year before; and lastly she delivered a long youthful poem of her brother's, which he himself no longer knew and had lost for thirteen years.‡

These examples introduce the further question,

* Moritz: 'Magazin zur Erfahrungs-seelenkunde,' iii. 1, 42.
† Splittgerber: 'Schlaff und Tod,' i. 223.
‡ Wiener: 'Selma, die jüdische Seherin,' 55, 60, 120.
how far into the past dream memory can reach without the clearness of the impression being impaired? It seems, however, that time has no influence at all upon impressions lying in the transcendental consciousness; indeed, recollections from childhood are those which dream prefers. A friend of Maury's had been brought up at Montbrison. Five-and-twenty years later he proposed a visit to the scene of his childhood. The night before the journey he was transported in dream to Montbrison, and he was there met by a gentleman who introduced himself as H. T., and as a friend of his father's. As a child he had seen this person, but recollected no more about him than the name. Now, when he actually got to Montbrison, he was much astonished to meet there the gentleman he had seen in the dream, whose features however were somewhat altered. This latter circumstance shows that this dream-figure was merely a recollection from youth.*

Plato and Aristotle have remarked† that in old age the recollections of childhood are renewed. This suggests the question whether these early impressions only are preserved, being exempted from the general forgetfulness of senility, and therefore coming more frequently to speech, or whether memory has actually an exalted power of reproduction for them. At first sight the former opinion might be favoured, since impressions of youth, for the very reason of their remoteness in the past, would have been most frequently reproduced, and must thus have become firmly engraved upon the memory. But upon closer

* Radestock: 'Schlaf und Traum,' 135.
examination we must decide for the second view. What is so often seen in science, that a fact remains unexplained and unfruitful only so long as it stands in isolation, is the case here. The power of an old man's memory for the impressions of his youth can only first be rightly understood when it is associated with other related facts, and the true explanation can only be that which embraces the whole class of such facts. It will thus appear that these recollections are not merely characters remaining on the tablets of memory after all the rest have been washed off, but are due to an actual exaltation of memory, as they are frequently preceded by a long period of forgetfulness.

It is reported of Kant by his friend Wasiansky, that in his old age, notwithstanding his decadence and general infirmity of memory, recollections of his youth were renewed with great vivacity.* Of Heinsius it is related that of all his philological learning he retained only the fourth book of the 'Æneid,' which he had committed to memory in his youth.†

An old man at Gottingen, aged seventy-six, knew his wife and children all day long if they were pointed out to him in the morning, but next morning always had again to ask who they were. Along with this weakness and brevity of memory for the present, he could with remarkable ease sing the songs of his youth and narrate its incidents, while he had totally forgotten all his later experience.‡

Comparing these phenomena, which every reader

* Wasiansky: 'Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren,' 46.
† Radestock, 298.
‡ Perty: 'Blicke in d. Verborgene Leben,' 25.
will have observed in his own circle, with related facts in dream, somnambulism, fevers, and madness, it is easy to recognise in them a true exaltation of memory. A cashier of the Bank of Glasgow was busy with customers in his office, when another entered, and was so impatient that to get rid of him he was paid his money in haste. On making up the accounts, many months later, they did not balance by six pounds. In vain the cashier passed several nights endeavouring to find the error, when in a dream the above transaction, with all its details, was presented to him, and on waking he easily discovered that the sum paid to that customer had not been entered.*

If we consider how seldom it is that long dreams are remembered, and, moreover, that reproduction often occurs without recollection, we may infer that reminiscences from childhood are less rare in dream than they appear to be.

A lady during an attack of fever saw herself as a little child lying in a clay-pit, and a nurse standing by wringing her hands. She took this as a mere vision of imagination, till she learned from her father that she had in fact, by the fault of her nurse, fallen into a clay-pit.†

In many cases it cannot be doubted that long periods of forgetfulness have preceded the reproduction, so that momentary exaltation of memory must be conceded. It often happens in dream that we speak half-forgotten languages more fluently than in waking, and that there is here no illusion may be known from those cases in which this phenomenon

* Brierre de Boismont, 258.
† Kerner: 'Blätter aus Prevorst,' viii. 109.
occurs in a very exalted degree. Jessen mentions a peasant who having in his youth learned Greek, in the delirium of a fever, to the astonishment of the bystanders, recited long-forgotten Greek verses.* Lemoine knew an insane person who in one of his attacks wrote Latin letters with remarkable facility, though at other times he could do nothing with that language.†

Sir Astley Cooper gives an account of a soldier who in consequence of a wound in the head fell into a long stupefaction, being at length so far restored by an operation in the hospital that he could speak; but no one knew what language he was speaking, till the admission of a Welsh milkmaid into the hospital led to the disclosure that he, who had been absent from Wales for thirty years, was now again speaking his long-forgotten native language quite fluently, whereas he could now not recollect a word of any other. When completely recovered, his Welsh was again forgotten, and he again spoke English.‡

Exactly the same thing is recorded of a Welsh girl.§ Dr. Rush mentions an Italian who at the beginning of his illness spoke English, then French; but on the day of his death only his mother tongue.||

Dr. Carpenter speaks of a man who had left Wales in his childhood, his whole subsequent life being spent in the service of different members of the same family, and had so entirely forgotten his native language that he could no longer understand his

* Jessen: 'Psychologie,' 491.
† Lemoine, 313.
‡ George Moore; 'The Power of the Mind over the Body.'
§ Passavant: 'Untersuchungen über Lebensmagnetismus,' 153.
|| Kerner: 'Magikon,' v. 364.
compatriots when they visited him. But after sixty years, in the delirium of a fever he spoke Welsh, of which, however, on his recovery he had again lost all recollection.*

A patient of Deleuze, forty years old, who when a child had come to France from St. Domingo, in somnambulism always spoke only the dialect of the negroes by whom she had been brought up.†

Anastasius Grün, in his biography of Lenæus, prefixed to his edition of the works of the latter, reports that that poet, when in the madhouse, sometimes spoke pure Latin, and, what he never did at other times, German with a Hungarian accent, as if he had been transported to the country of his childhood.

Similar observations have often been made with regard to idiots. According to Griesinger, psychical diseases are frequent, but not always connected with disturbances of memory, which is often complete, as well for events of earlier life, as for those during the illness.‡ Maudsley says: 'The remarkable memories of certain idiots, who, utterly destitute of intelligence, will repeat the longest stories with the greatest accuracy, testify also to this unconscious cerebral action; and the way in which the excitement of a great sorrow, or some other cause, as the last flicker of departing life, will sometimes call forth in idiots manifestations of mind of which they always seemed incapable, renders it certain that much is unconsciously taken up by them which cannot be uttered, but which leaves its relics in the mind.

† Deleuze: 'Instruction pratique,' 152.
‡ Griesinger: 'Pathologie und Therapie der psych. Krankheiten,' 69.
It is a truth which cannot be too distinctly borne in mind, that consciousness is not co-extensive with mind. . . . Consciousness is not able to give any account of the manner in which these various residua are perpetuated, and how they exist latent in the mind; but a fever, a poison in the blood, or a dream, may at any moment recall ideas, feelings, and activities which seemed for ever vanished. The lunatic sometimes reverts, in his ravings, to scenes and events of which, when in his sound senses, he has no memory; the fever-stricken patient may give out passages in a language which he understands not, but which he has accidentally heard; a dream of being at school again brings back with painful vividness the school feelings; and before him who is drowning every event of his life seems to flash in one moment of strange and vivid consciousness."

Many readers may find this last fact difficult to believe, but it has been observed so frequently that there is no room for doubt. It will be referred to again later on.

Thus exaltation of memory occurs not only in dream, but also in several other conditions. Sleep is therefore not the actual cause of this phenomenon, but only an occasion. The true cause must be common to all those conditions, and is no other than the disappearance of the normal habitual consciousness and its content. Even the mere stopping up of the chief inlet of sense-impressions, blindness, as it usually exalts other psychical capacities, can also awaken the latent memory. A captain who had lost his sight.

* Maudsley: 'Physiology and Pathology of the Mind,' pp. 15, 16, 17.
in consequence of wounds received in Africa declared that from this time wholly extinct recollections of certain places returned with the utmost distinctness.*

Without, at present, drawing conclusions concerning the nature of the processes denoted, but not explained, by the words 'forgetting' and 'remembering,' thus much is clear from the foregoing, that our self-consciousness does not exhaust its object. It is only a part of our psychical being of which we receive information, externally by sense-rapport with the external world, internally by our recollections. Every disappearance of normal consciousness in dream, fever, madness, narcosis, and blindness is at the same time connected with an extended consciousness of our psychical being in another direction. If this extension is an equivalent—as according to the analogy of the equivalence of physical forces in nature may be surmised—then is the figure which has been often resorted to, of two weights of a scale, to be understood in the exact sense. Now in somnambulism, disappearance of normal consciousness occurs in a higher degree than in the conditions already considered; it may hence be supposed that our transcendental consciousness will there be especially conspicuous, and will exhibit forgotten impressions in special abundance; for somnambulism is exalted sleep, and must therefore exalt the functions of ordinary sleep.

4. Exalted Memory in Somnambulism.

It is only in individual flashes that exaltation of memory reveals itself in ordinary dream, while in

somnambulism all the content of waking consciousness appears accessible to recollection, or, at least, to be capable of reproduction. And that this re-emergence of old impressions has been preceded by a real and radical forgetting, is the less to be doubted that, as we shall see, on awaking they are forthwith again forgotten.

There often appears to be a certain opposition between the two halves of our consciousness, as, for instance, with the somnambule of Dr. Class, who in the crisis recollected just such songs as she had not learned by heart, whereas others which in waking were thus perfectly known to her, did not present themselves.* But it is far more usual for the somnambulic consciousness not only to embrace, but even to exalt the waking consciousness. Thus the physician Pezzi relates that his nephew once in waking wished to recite a passage from a discourse relating to the fine arts, but could not recall it. In his next somnambulic state he not only recovered the whole passage, but even gave volume, page, and line where it occurred.†

As in ordinary sleep, so in this state, impressions are frequently reproduced which, from their slight interest for the mind, have been quickly forgotten, or of which only the main purport has been preserved. Ricard knew a young man, a somnambulist of average memory, who in the crises experienced such an exaltation of it that he could recite almost verbally a book that he had read the day before, or a sermon

* 'Archiv f. thier. Magn.,' iv. 1, 76.
† Passavant, 148.
PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM.

which he had heard.* Naudin received from a somnambule detailed particulars concerning the names, compositions, and quantities of the numerous medicines administered to her by different physicians in the course of her illness, though in waking she knew nothing about them. A somnambule of the physician Wienholt had a bad memory in waking, but boasted of its improvement in somnambulism, and recited several passages from a prose book that interested her, which the physician was certain she had read but once.† Medical-Councillor Schindler had under his treatment a somnambule who dictated to him the whole history of her disease, particular incidents of which he no longer recollected himself.‡ Councillor Becker's somnambule recollected in the magnetic sleep all the particular circumstances of her first meeting with him when he had treated her casually many years before. She knew more details of it than he did himself, but after waking had again forgotten everything.§ Puységur treated a patient who in his fourth year had had to have an operation performed in consequence of an injury to his head, who had accesses of insanity, and had lost his memory to such a degree that he did not know what he had done an hour before. In somnambulism he recollected everything exactly, described the former operation, and the instruments used in it, and predicted that he should never get his memory again in waking, as the result proved.||

† Wienholt: 'Heilkraft des thier. Magnetismus,' iii. 1, 252-293.
‡ Schindler: 'Magisches Geistesleben,' 90.
§ Becker's: 'Das geistige Doppelleben,' 51.
|| Puységur: 'Journal du traitement magnétique du jeune Hébert,'
But as in ordinary sleep, so in somnambulism, such reproduced impressions are not recognised; recollection fails. This is a source of illusion, for somnambules may take mere images of memory for new intuitions, bygone scenes in their life for clairvoyant visions, and may refer them to the future, no time being indicated in such intuitively represented images, and their knowledge not being in the abstract. The physiologist Mayo reports of a girl, who knew absolutely nothing of astronomy and mathematics, that she once in somnambulism wrote down whole pages of an astronomical treatise, with calculations and delineations. She was convinced that this was the product of intuition, but afterwards she found that the whole manuscript verbally coincided with a treatise in the 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' and she herself said in another crisis—for waking she knew nothing—she believed she had read it in the library.* The most faithful reproduction is therefore possible without recollection.

Another incident of dream, the reaching back into a remote past, belongs also to somnambulism. A somnambule is mentioned by Mauchart, who could

* Mayo: 'Truths in Popular Superstitions.' [One is tempted to ask here if the girl's 'belief' in the second crisis was not, perhaps, elicited by that sort of interrogation which the author has before (vol. i., pp. 304-5) described as so dangerous a source of disturbance to the pure activity of the inner consciousness. That the girl should have read through, even with only sufficient attention to obtain a correct optical impression, a long abstruse dissertation on a subject of which she was profoundly ignorant, and which therefore would have no interest for her, seems extremely unlikely; whereas facts of a similar character, known to those who have concerned themselves with the phenomena of trance-speaking and automatic writing, aggravate by their number the difficulty of the supposition required in each case to bring it under the above explanation.—Tr.]
not read or write; in the magnetic sleep she once repeated a whole lesson, heard the year before, from a course of instruction preparatory to confirmation, with all the questions and answers, the clergyman's voice and the responses of the children being most distinctly imitated.* Dr. Nick's somnambule recollected in the crisis the most insignificant incidents of her illness, of which waking she knew little or nothing.† Wienholt's patient related scenes from her earliest youth, of which she knew nothing when awake, as the smaller details of her inoculation for small-pox in her second year.‡ Reichenbach says of sensitives, that they are almost without exception remarkable for weakness of memory, but he also observed the all the more remarkable exaltation of their memory in somnambulism.§

A somnambule extolled the improvement of her memory, which was particularly exalted by breathing upon her head.|| A young sleep-walker could sing correctly melodies which she had only once heard.¶ A somnambule who had only once seen the opera 'L'Africaine,' in the crisis sang the whole second act, of which she knew nothing waking.** The like has also been observed with persons under anaesthetics. Professor Simpson's patient said that during the operation she had amused herself by playing on the piano, and had performed quadrilles which she had

* Mauchart: 'Repertorium,' v. 79.
† 'Archiv,' etc., i. 2, 23.
‡ Wienholt: 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 2, 98, 208.
§ Reichenbach: 'Der sensitive Mensch,' ii. 691, 721.
|| Wienholt: 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 3, 293.
¶ Unzer: 'Der Arzt,' 74 Stück.
** Ladame: 'La Névrose,' etc., 105.
THE FACULTY OF MEMORY.

known in her youth, but had forgotten. Now she recollected them completely, and played them often.*

When the physician Petetin placed his finger on the pit of the stomach of his somnambule, and dictated to her fifty French verses which she could not know, she repeated them without a fault; in the waking state her memory was so bad that it would have taken her two days to learn them.†

Lafontaine, a once celebrated predecessor of the magnetiser Hansen, on one occasion made a humorous application of this faculty of somnambules. In the theatre at Rennes a young actress had asked him to put her to sleep. Then, being called to rehearsal, she desired to be quickly awakened, that she might repeat the part she had only once read through. The magnetiser, however, persuaded her to go upon the stage in the somnambulic condition; and, to the surprise of the other actors, she said her part without a mistake. Being wakened immediately afterwards, she had forgotten it again, and would not believe that she had just repeated it.‡

Lastly, there has also been observed in somnambulism the recollection of a forgotten native language, of which many instances (in delirium) have been already given. A somnambule of Lausannes, who had lived in France from her fifth year, spoke in her crisis the language of her childhood—the Creole patois.§ A man who when a child had lived in Poland, but afterwards had not spoken a word of

* Mrs. Crowe's 'Nightside of Nature.'
† Petetin: 'Electricité animale,' 256.
‡ Lafontaine: 'L'Art de magnétiser,' 324.
§ 'Archiv,' etc., ii. 2, 152.
Polish for from thirty to forty years, returned to this language on being put under æther; speaking, singing, and praying for nearly two hours in Polish.*

It thus appears that the somnambulic consciousness, besides its own exclusive content, has also at its command that belonging to the waking state, and that indeed more faithfully and fully than the waking consciousness itself. On this point, also, the Committee of the Medical Academy of Paris reported in 1831.†

Memory, at every waking, links yesterday with to-day, so as to form an uninterrupted life, the dreams of the intermediate night being forgotten. So the somnambulic consciousness connects itself with earlier magnetic crises, with a survey of their content, yet without dropping the content of the waking consciousness. This will be discussed later on, but must be mentioned here as offering the only explanation of the remarkable fact that somnambulists in the crisis also remember what took place around them in previous swoons. So that in swoon also the disappearance of sense-consciousness is associated with the emergence of transcendental consciousness, which in a subsequent magnetic crisis can annex the impressions of that earlier state. To decline this explanation would be to go out of the frying-pan into the fire; for then we must ascribe to a clairvoyant vision of the past what is here regarded as memory. A patient of Wienholt knew in somnambulism everything that had been done and said by others about her, or had passed within herself, during swoons in

† Dupotet: ‘Traité complet de Magnétisme,’ 156.
THE FACULTY OF MEMORY.

which, externally, she was quite unconscious; and everything that had happened in her delirium, with all that was then said by herself or others. She was afterwards very sensitive about much which she had said in this state, and which neither in the magnetic sleep nor in waking would she have uttered.* Nasse has observed the like with one of his patients.† But even this phenomenon is not confined to somnambulism. Dr. Abercrombie relates the case of a boy of four years old, who was stunned by a fracture of the skull, and was trepanned. On recovery, he had no recollection either of his fall or of the operation; but at the age of fifteen in an attack of fever he gave his mother an exact description of the operation, of the persons present at it, their dress, and many other particulars.‡

Jean Paul has expressed his admiration of this remarkable phenomenon: 'The magnetic clairvoyants manifest recollection, not only reaching back into the obscurest time of childhood, but even for what seems not so much to have been forgotten as never to have been known, that is, what has happened to them earlier in deep swoons or complete insanity.'§ It is not, however, seriously to be supposed that things never perceived can be recollected, as reproduction presupposes former perception. But if the view hitherto maintained throughout is correct, that the true cause of exaltation of memory is not in the different conditions in which it occurs (dream, fever, madness, somnambulism), but in their common sign,

* Wienholt: 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 3, 433.
† Reil: 'Beiträge,' etc., iii. 3, 329.
‡ Kerner: 'Magikon,' v. 3, 364.
§ Jean Paul: 'Museum,' etc., § 14.
the disappearance of external consciousness, it appears that with every sinking of this weight, the rise of the other, namely, the transcendental consciousness, is connected. Now, since this must also happen in swoon, it follows that on a later reappearance of the transcendental consciousness, it must recollect the impressions it had on the earlier occasion. That persons in swoon betray no signs of interior consciousness is a fact they have in common with dreamers, and their non-recollection of any transcendental consciousness on recovery is also constantly the case in somnambulism, and very naturally, just because this transcendental consciousness sinks when the external rises again. And as in somnambulism we can learn the ideas of earlier similar states, the same result may be anticipated in cases of swoon.

We have thus a constant confirmation of the fact that our external consciousness has another spiritual background, that the individual intellect has not for its supporter the blind Universal Will of Schopenhauer, that, therefore, with the disappearance of this intellect the conscious personality is by no means abolished, but the transcendental consciousness possessing as a focus its own Ego, and for which the word 'forget' has no application, is released.

5. Memory in the Dying.

Goethe relates a case known to him, in which an old man lying in extremis quite unexpectedly recited the most beautiful Greek sentences. In early youth he had been made to learn by heart all sorts of Greek sentences which could incite a promising boy to
emulation. He did not understand what had been lodged mechanically in his memory, and had not thought of it for fifty years at the time of his death.* So Dr. Steinbeck relates that a country clergyman, called to the bed of a dying peasant, heard him praying in Greek and Hebrew. Come to himself, the sick man said that as a boy he had often heard the parish priest pray in those languages, without troubling himself about the import of the sounds.†

This stretching back of memory to the time of youth is one of numerous analogies between the condition of somnambulism and that of the dying. But they are to be found also in other conditions, of which the common characteristic is privation of consciousness in a greater or less degree. Passavant knew a lady who suffered from violent headache; when the pain was at its highest, it suddenly ceased, and then she found herself in a pleasant condition with which, according to her statement, was associated an extraordinary memory, reaching back to her earliest years.‡ In the vision of a haschish-eater were represented friends whom he had not seen for years; with distinct particularity he saw a dinner he had been at five years before, and all the guests, and was unable to reconcile his definite recollection of the scene, as one already experienced, with its repetition in apparent reality.§ In the visions of an opium-eater scenes of his childhood appeared which he had so entirely forgotten that in his sound senses he

* Eckermann: 'Gespräche mit Goethe,' iii. 326.
† Steinbeck: 'Der Dichter ein Seher,' 463.
‡ Daumer: 'Der Tod,' etc., 34.
would not have recognised them as belonging to his own past. But in the visions they were not only reproductions, but recollections.*

Now in the case of the dying, with the approaching total disappearance of external consciousness, the transcendental consciousness seems to emerge in equivalent amount, the transcendental-psychological functions often attaining a high degree of development. These phenomena are best vindicated against the doubts of so-called enlightenment by showing them to be the combination of constituents separately present in other conditions, and which only excite surprise in their union.

Thus we have, in an earlier chapter, made acquaintance with the remarkable phenomenon of the condensation of ideas. Fechner says: 'In dream the soul sometimes exhibits the faculty of eliciting in the briefest time a vast multitude of representations which in waking we could only develop successively in a long time.'† Thereby is proved a form of human cognition directing us to an Ego beyond the external consciousness. But if to this new form a new content also should be added, the acceptance of a transcendental subject would be yet more unavoidable. Such a content is offered by exalted memory in dream, somnambulism, and in the dying. Now the question is, whether this form and this content can be combined; that is, if the process by which the phantasms of dreams can be condensed is valid also for the true recollections which exalted memory introduces.

* De Quincey: 'Confessions of an Opium-Eater,' p. 259, ed. 1856.
† Fechner: 'Zend-Avesta,' iii. 30.
Now this combined phenomenon occurs with the dying very frequently, and exceptionally even in ordinary dreams. Uexhüll had for three consecutive nights a sort of vision in a succession of images. He saw his whole life from earliest childhood to the present so clearly and vividly that he could have drawn the scenes as they passed before him. He had at the same time in himself a consciousness continually corrective of any tendency to mis-construction of what he saw; and with that was connected even a moral significance of the spectacle.* A dream of Seckendorf, in which latent memory functioned dramatically, is well known and often mentioned. There appeared to him in dream a man of ordinary figure and dress, who told him that he might ask one of two things, to have either his past or his future fate displayed in its successive order. Seckendorf chose the past, whereupon a mirror was held before him in which he saw even those incidents of his earlier life of which in waking he was scarcely aware, as distinctly and vividly as if they had just happened. He saw himself, for instance, as a child of three years old, with the utmost particularity, and with all the circumstances of his bringing up. Every school scene with his tutors, every vexatious incident, passed in that mirror vividly before his eyes. Soon after it represented, in the sequence of his life, his earlier residence in Italy, where he once left behind him a lady whom he would certainly have married had not fate called him suddenly away.† The vivacity with which his feelings in the dream were excited by

* Splittgerber: 'Schlaf und Tod,' i. 103.
† Moritz: 'Magazin,' etc., v. 1, 55.
departure from his beloved awoke him. The continuation of the dream as it was afterwards connectedly renewed does not here concern us. We find the characteristics, as in related phenomena, that the latent memory does not arise as abstract knowledge [as the mere knowledge that a thing occurred], but reproduces the earlier impressions; and that these are associated with the sentiments formerly attaching to them, which, however, is perhaps only the case when such reproductions are also recollections; finally, that the sequence of representations is connected with the transcendental measure of time, that is, are condensed without their particularity being impaired.

This exaltation of memory, associated with a transcendental measure of time, has also been experienced by persons in danger of drowning. A friend of De Quincey, having fallen into a river when a child, saw, in the interval before she was pulled out, the whole course of her life, down to the smallest circumstances, pass before her as in a mirror.* But the most explicit account of this nature is from Admiral Beaufort, who wrote it to Dr. Wollaston; an account the more valuable as Beaufort, being from his profession well acquainted with such phenomena in similar cases, was not much surprised at his own experience, adding that accounts of other sailors agreed with his own as exactly as could be expected from differences of condition and mental constitution.†

Exaltation of memory with condensation of ideas

* De Quincey: 'Confessions,' etc., p. 259.
† Fichte: 'Anthropologie,' 424; Haddock: 'Somnolism,' etc., 254.
thus affords to the dying the possibility of a complete and clear survey of their past life. But that these representations would stand to us in a quite objective relation is not probable; rather would the interest originally attaching to them accompany them more or less in the recollection, the difference between our present and former dispositions determining the measure of criticism with which we follow them up. In this way may well be interpreted that debtor account which, as the Bible says, is held before us at death: it is the content of latent memory, combined by the transcendental scale of time, which is revealed in dying.

Such a case was in the last century reported to the Prussian Government by the clergyman Kern, of Hornhausen: Johann Schwerdtfeger, after a wearisome illness, was near death, and fell into a swoon of many hours. Then he opened his eyes and said to his clergyman that he had had a survey of his whole life and all its faults, even those which he had long forgotten; everything being as present to him as if it had just occurred.*

This combined phenomenon, occurring with dying persons, of exalted memory and compression of its representations, may be still further complicated by the addition of the well-known incident of dream, dramatic self-severance. The particular form of the severance will naturally be derived from the individual's circle of ideas. Thus with John the Prophet of Fröschweiler, who fell into a violent illness with loss of consciousness, when he was supposed to be dead: in this condition he had a vision in which he

* Passavant: 'Untersuchungen über Lebensmagnetismus,' 165.
was carried by two angels first through a cloud and then through the starry heavens, and at length saw the Temple of God with the Ark of the Covenant. From this God took the Book of Omniscience and read out to him all his past sins.* One of the 'enlightened' of our days would be indignant at having belief in such a story imputed to him, but this indignation would result simply from his incapacity to do an addition sum. Were this combined phenomenon resolved into its elements and the latter shown to the enlightened one, he would recognise them; but add he cannot, nor recognise the factors in the sum-total. This sort of scepticism is very prevalent, and in such cases it is always well to offer the factors individually to the brain which cannot digest the total.

With the close relation of the conditions of somnambulists and of the dying, it should also be mentioned that the declarations of the former concerning the process of dying are in agreement with the accounts we have been considering. Thus Magdalene Wenger says that the whole life, even if lasting eighty years, appears to the dying quite briefly compressed, and everything is recollected with the utmost clearness.† Such a vision was that of the religious somnambule, the nun, Catherine Emmerich; in dying she saw her whole past life depicted, as though it had been that of another nun.‡

So Passavant cites a somnambule observed by him, who had a retrospect of her whole life, and related

* Splittgerber: 'Schlaf und Tod,' ii. 45.
† Perty: 'Myst. Erscheinungen,' i. 325.
‡ Perty, ii. 433.
incidents, which were verified, from her earliest youth; her moral condition, also, being revealed even to her most hidden thoughts, as she said happened to everyone in dying.* This corresponds to the phenomenon observed in other conditions, that the transcendental consciousness is not purely passive like a mere mirror, but with the impressions revive also the sentiments, and thus the recollected acts of life are accompanied by the movements of conscience which were associated with them.

This faculty which the dying have of phantasmagoric representation, wherein the events of years are crowded into a few seconds, and the several phases of life are surveyed in relation to its intellectual and moral development, has from the most remote times been known, and its psychical significance appreciated. Plotinus says: 'But in time, towards the end of life, there enter other recollections from the early periods of existence . . . then will she [the soul], being freed from the body, again acquire that of which she had here no memory.'† So John Baptista van Helmont:

* 'Passavant: Untersuchungen,' etc., 99.
† Plotinus: 'Enneads,' iv. 3, 27. [In the latter sentence Plotinus seems rather to be referring to the Platonic reminiscence—the recovery by the soul of its transcendental knowledge—than to memory of the forgotten experience of the outer consciousness. But the complete recollection of the past existence after death is also a doctrine of Indian philosophy, where it is associated with prevision of the next incarnation. 'This same Self has two stations: any given present embodiment and the embodiment that is next to follow. And there is a third place—the state intermediate between the two—the place of dreams. Standing in the place of dreams, it sees both these stations, this embodiment and the embodiment next to come. In the place of dreams it steps on to the path it has made itself to the next embodiment, and sees the pains and pleasures that have been in earlier lives, and are to be in after lives,' etc.—'Brihad Upanishad' (Gough's 'Philosophy of the Upanishads,' p. 179).—Tr.]
'Therefore the mind being separated from the body, doth no more use memory, nor the inducing of remembrance, by the beholding of place or duration (non intuitu loci aut durationis), but one only thing is now unto it, and there it containeth all things.*

Thus does the inference become constantly more irresistible that the word 'forget' has only a relative sense; that everything that has ever been experienced can be again reproduced, since forgetting simply signifies the transition from the outer consciousness to the transcendental, which according to the degree of its emergence brings with it more or less of its content.

6. The Forgetfulness of Somnambules on Waking.

Everyone knows that it is easier to recollect narratives which are within the limits of probability, than when, as in Eastern tales of magic, the imagination of the reader is taxed with extravagances and impossibilities. In the first case, the ideas introduced stand in regular causal connection; in the latter, the law of causality is continually violated, and this circumstance makes recollection difficult; and so we have an aesthetic enjoyment of such fables which offer us a pleasant release from the monotony of the law of causality.†

* [Or: 'It comprehends all things in a single Now.' Van Helmont: 'Ortus Medicinæ; Imago mentis,' s. 23. I give the rendering in the text—not having the Latin work before me—from the old English translation by 'J. C., sometime of M. H. Oxon,' London, 1662.—Tr.]

† [The characteristic of magical tales—such as the 'Arabian Nights'—is not the abrogation of the law of causality, but the introduction of imaginary causes. There is no à priori impossibility in tales of magic; on the contrary, it is the possibility of conceiv-
Now, in dream also there is a want of this causal connection of the individual representations; they succeed each other without inner coherence and without mutual support.

It is, however, not only the content of dreams that makes their recollection difficult, but this recollection depends on the faculties of the dreamers, not only because the strength of memory varies with the individual, but still more because there are different kinds of memory. That of a Cuvier, of whom it is said that he forgot nothing he had read, because he gave to everything its place in the system, is quite different from that of an expert in memory, who can repeat backwards and forwards a long succession of words or of unconnected figures. It seems, at all events, generally the case that the recollection of what was dreamt is less vivid than that of actual experience, for otherwise we must unavoidably confuse at least the coherent dream with reality. In fact that often happens, and I myself once went into barracks in parade uniform, having dreamed that I had been ordered to take the watch, and recollected the order, but not that I had dreamed it.

The usually very defective recollection of dreams is facilitated not only by their exceptional coherence,
but also by other circumstances. Dreams in the course of which we have taken active part, as players on the stage, cling to memory better than those in which we were only spectators of images not concerning us. Recollection has also a proportion to the sentiment attaching to the images; interesting dreams, or such as appeal strongly to the affections, will be more easily reproduced on awaking than others. On this account the impression of dreams that have thus moved us, even if we have forgotten them, survives as a disposition. Our psychical condition on waking is by no means one of indifferent vacancy, to be first qualified by the daily consciousness, but is frequently a mood of seemingly unmotivated happiness or sadness of which no other explanation can be given than that it results from forgotten dreams. Thus Nebuchadnezzar awaked in terror from a dream which he had totally forgotten, but the feeling survived.*

The deeper the sleep, the more difficult the subsequent recollection. Now, those dreams in which the motions of the nerves extend to the motor system—evidenced by movements of the lips or limbs—may be regarded as approximations to the deep sleep of sleep-walkers and somnambulists; and in this case, since somnambulists wake without recollection, the dreams of ordinary deep sleep must also be forgotten. That is confirmed by Moreau, according to whom those dreams are the least remembered in which the dreamer speaks or moves.† Maury says also that he

* Daniel ii.
† Moreau de la Sarthe: 'Dict. des Sciences médicales,' article 'Rêves.'
THE FACULTY OF MEMORY.

had often suddenly awakened persons speaking in their sleep, who then never recollected their dreams.* The elder Darwin cites the case of the wife of one of his friends, who spoke often and audibly in sleep, but after such nights never recollected her dreams; whereas she could easily tell them when she had not spoken in them.† From these facts we again see that the absence of memory of sound sleep cannot be explained by the absence of dream.

It often happens that we awake without recollection, but in the course of the day a quite indefinite, impalpable intimation of dream, like a gleam of summer lightning, passes through the consciousness, and forthwith vanishes again. This transitory touch of recollection is no doubt elicited by some external impression, it may be only a word, or by a momentary mood corresponding to a fragment of the dream, or sufficiently related to it to refer us to it by association. But it only glances upon us, and next moment we try in vain to seize the fragment of the dream. This impression is too transitory to afford a proof, but in passing to its correspondence in the phenomena of somnambulism its significance will be apparent. For all the hitherto mentioned phenomena of dream-life we shall find in their exaltation in somnambulism.

That which is defect of memory in the case of dreams rises to complete oblivion after somnambulism. This phenomenon seems to be common to nearly all conditions of ecstasy; it was also observed in the oracular utterances of the Greeks, with the Sybils, in the demoniac conditions of the Middle

* Maury, 218.
† Darwin: 'Zoonomy.'
Ages, in sleep-walking, and in the delirium of fevers. In the modern literature of somnambulism there is scarcely a book which does not speak of it. Dr. Valenti took from his somnambule her kerchief, hid it in the kitchen, and told her exactly the place. On waking she missed her kerchief, and looked for it in vain; again, in the sleep she knew exactly the place of concealment, but at the second waking had again lost all recollection.*

Hundreds of such experiments have been made, and often very comical ones. The widow Petersen, whose illness is the subject of a long history, preferred to eat when awake than when in the magnetic sleep, because in the latter case she did not know after waking whether she had taken anything. A somnambule of Kerner's said: 'This morning in the magnetic sleep I drank elder-tea; on waking I felt no taste of it. Waking, I ate meat, and then fell into a magnetic sleep. I then again had the taste of elder-tea, and not of the meat; but on coming out of this sleep I had again the taste of the meat.' Kerner himself says of this patient: 'Shortly before the sleep she had drunk barley-coffee; in the sleep she drank valerian-tea; on waking, she had in her mouth the taste of the barley-coffee she had drunk when she was awake, but had not the least perception of the valerian-tea she had taken in the sleep.'†

There can even be an opposition of instincts in the two conditions; as, for instance, in the case of the physician Pezzi's nephew, who in the crisis complained of want of appetite and nausea; but on waking,

* 'Archiv,' vi. 1, 124.
† Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 236-254.
immediately wanted to eat, the indisposition returning with the sleep.* Another somnambule had taken wine in the sleep, but on awaking had forgotten it; having, however, the taste still in her mouth, she asked if wine had been given her.†

Similarly, with regard to mental sensations, that also has been observed which we already know as a phenomenon from the ordinary dream, namely, the survival of a mood associated with it, and which is apparently motiveless, the dream itself being forgotten. Professor Beckers, who had under his observation a very remarkable somnambule, once told her what she had said in the sleep the day before, about a vision she had had of a deceased friend. She was much struck by this, saying that since that sleep she had, to her own surprise, felt completely at ease about the deceased, and to her former painful thoughts about her (deceased’s) death, the conviction of her survival had succeeded.‡ A somnambule of Schelling’s had in the crisis a presentiment of a death in her family, and begged her magnetiser to divert her mind from these thoughts as much as possible by cheerful conversation during the crisis, that she might have no recollection of them on waking.§ Melancholy impressions in somnambulism are especially apt to survive as a corresponding mood in waking, of which the patient can give no account, having forgotten the occasion. It is therefore desirable to give a cheerful direction to the thoughts before awaking him.

* Passavant: ‘Untersuchungen,’ etc., 148.
† ‘Archiv,’ iv. 1, 26.
‡ ‘Das Geistige Doppelleben, 26.
§ ‘Jahrbucher der Medizin,’ ii. 43.
The law governing waking recollection is that of association, by which an idea which has once been connected with another will draw the latter after it into consciousness. Thus Quintilian says: 'Returning after some time into a particular neighbourhood, we not only know it, but recollect also what we have done there, the persons we met, and even the silent thoughts we had there recur to us.'

By the law of association ideas and recollections of similar psychical conditions are connected into an entire series. Our waking life forms a single whole, as does also the somnambulic life. If dissimilar conditions, as waking and somnambulism, alternate, recollection unites the similar conditions, bridging over the intervening periods of forgetfulness. Thus the thread of recollection runs uninterruptedly through the like conditions; with every return of the same condition its former ideas are reproduced, even though they have been forgotten in the interval. It is the same law that immediately repossesses us of our past life on waking from sleep, and includes in the somnambulic consciousness the ideal content of earlier crises. The more dissimilar the psychical states, the more completely are they divided; the more similar they are, the more prominent are the links of association. Ordinary sleep—the intermediate condition between waking and somnambulism—is not divided from waking by a sharply-defined partition; there is to some extent a play of memory between the two; we dream of our daily life, and partially recollect our dreams. On the other hand, the dissimilar states of

* Quintilian: 'Instit. orat.,' xi. 2.
THE FACULTY OF MEMORY. 57

somnambulism and waking are only exceptionally bridged over by memory.

We find here the explanation of the fact that many even common dreams are repeated or continued in successive nights—a phenomenon which doubtless occurs more frequently than is recollected upon waking. Treviranus mentions a student who regularly began to talk as soon as he fell asleep, the subject being a dream which he constantly took up at the point where it was broken off the previous morning.* Hervey dreamed of a scene of jealousy, concluding with a murder. He was awakened by his emotion, but forgot the dream so quickly that all he could enter in his journal was the fact of this sudden forgetting. Many weeks afterwards he dreamed of a trial in which he was examined as a witness of that murder, and he not only could state all the details of the occurrence, but had an exact recollection of the features of the murderer and of the victim.† Maury dreamed eight times within one month of an individual, a mere creature of his imagination, who always appeared with the same traits and continued the proceedings of earlier dreams.‡

In this noteworthy phenomenon of the connection of similar states by memory, I see an auxiliary to diagnosis, of which scarcely sufficient use has been made. We read, for instance, in the history of the disease of the widow Petersen, who often had attacks of insanity, that she once prescribed very successfully for a man afflicted with pains in the back, but was afterwards quite ignorant of the fact, not only in

* Boismont, 344.  † Hervey, 311.
‡ Boismont, 264.
waking, but even in somnambulism. It seems also, unless the observation was defective, that these prescrip-
tions had been given in an access of insanity, as is also indicated by the terms she used. Now, that the insane can prescribe for themselves has been frequently observed; but the above case would show that they can also, like somnambulists, prescribe for others.

To illustrate memory between similar conditions from quite another province, even aesthetic diagnosis might profit by it. I have often observed that poets are of two sorts; some having a remarkable memory for their productions, which they could recite for hours upon invitation; whereas others can recollect nothing of their own verses. This, for example, was to my knowledge the case with Martin Greif. This is explainable if what has been produced in the condition of true poetic exaltation cannot be reproduced in the very different condition of waking reflection.* I can therefore easily credit Montaigne's account of a poet who was absolutely unconscious that it was his own

* [A friend to whom the MS. of this translation was submitted, objects here the instance of Virgil, who 'wrote five lines a day and knew the whole thing thoroughly.' As a test for 'aesthetic diagnosis'—for determining, otherwise than by aesthetic judgment of the performances themselves, their relative merit, the presence or absence of memory in the author is obviously worthless; for though the idea and its first expressive form may be the product of a different state from that in which the memory of ordinary consciousness resides, this would be usually supplied by the attention necessarily claimed by the product itself, and by the work of polishing, revision, etc. But for the same reason, the memory of many great poets for their own productions affords no argument, on the supposition of the transcendental source of their inspiration, for community of memory between a state of poetic exaltation and that in which the ordinary level of the 'threshold' is restored.—Tr.]
THE FACULTY OF MEMORY.

poems which another person was reciting.* It is said also of Linnaeus that in the decay of his memory in old age he was delighted by the reading of his own works without recognising them.† Walter Scott composed 'Ivanhoe' in a fever; when he recovered he had only the general idea of the romance which was in his mind before he fell ill.‡ That, on the other hand, memory is extraordinarily facilitated in similar psychical conditions we have a proof in the case of the soldier, who during a carouse lost an article belonging to his superior, and afterwards did not know where even to look for it; but in his next

* Muratori: 'Ueber die Einbildungskraft,' i. 195.
† Ribot: 'Maladies de la Mémoire,' 41.
‡ Ribot, 41. ['Ivanhoe' is a mistake for 'The Bride of Lammermoor.'] The following, from Lockhart's 'Life of Sir Walter Scott,' is a particular account of this interesting phenomenon: 'The book' (says James Ballantyne, Scott's printer) 'was not only written but published before Mr. Scott was able to rise from his bed; and he assured me that when it was first put into his hands in a complete shape, he did not recollect one single incident, character, or conversation it contained! He did not desire me to understand, nor did I understand, that his illness had erased from his memory the original incidents of the story, with which he had been acquainted from his boyhood. These remained rooted where they had ever been; or, to speak more explicitly, he remembered the general facts of the existence of the father and mother, of the son and daughter, of the rival lovers, of the compulsory marriage, and the attack made by the bride upon the hapless bridegroom, with the general catastrophe of the whole. All these things he recollected just as he did before he took to his bed; but he literally recollected nothing else—not a single character woven by the romancer, not one of the many scenes and points of humour, nor anything with which he was connected as the writer of the work. "For a long time," he said, "I felt myself very uneasy in the course of my reading, lest I should be startled by meeting something altogether glaring and fantastic. However, I recollected that you had been the printer, and I felt sure that you would not have permitted anything of this sort to pass." "Well," I said, "upon the whole, how did you like it?" "Why," he said, "as a whole I felt it monstrous
bout recollection returned and he found it.* In like manner a porter, having when drunk delivered a parcel at the wrong house, forgot it when sober, but easily remembered it when he got drunk again.†

The somnambulic conditions are connected with one another by a remarkably sharpened memory. Braid, whose fame as the discoverer of hypnotism has recently revived, observed that hypnotised patients remember with great exactitude everything that has happened in earlier crises, often years before, while knowing nothing of it in the waking interval.‡ With every new crisis the course of ideas of earlier ones returns, is continued, and is often taken up at the point where it was broken off by waking. When Professor Lebret's somnambule was wakened while singing, she looked about her in surprise and perplexity; but as soon as she fell asleep again she resumed the song in the same key, and at the same syllable at which she had been interrupted.§ With the Seeress of Prevorst this connection of similar states was strikingly manifested, and was a certain indication of the great difference between waking and the magnetic sleep, thus of

gross and grotesque; but still the worst of it made me laugh, and I trusted the good-natured public would not be less indulgent." I do not think I ever ventured to lead to the discussion of this singular phenomenon again; but you may depend upon it that what I have now said is as distinctly reported as if it had been taken down in shorthand at the moment; I should not otherwise have ventured to allude to the matter at all. I believe you will agree with me in thinking that the history of the human mind contains nothing more wonderful! P. 402.—Tr.]

* Joly: 'De l'Imagination,' 47.
† Ferty: 'Blicke,' etc., 35.
‡ [Braid, Op. cit. See also Carpenter's 'Mental Physiology,' in which Braid's conclusions and experiments are summarised.—Tr.]
§ 'Archiv,' etc., ii. 2, 115.
the high development of her somnambulism. Her
magnetic dreams are distinguished by their sensible
and poetic course from the ordinary ones, not offering
the motley confusion of images of the latter. Broken
off in one night, they resumed in the next at the
point of interruption. There once being brought to
her a lithographed copy of the mysterious delineation
she called the 'circle of life,' she immediately noticed
a point too many in one of the marks, and on Kerner
fetching the original prepared by herself, the com-
parison confirmed what she had said.*

This phenomenon, the failure of the somnambulic
interval in the supplementary memory, is here for
brevity and convenience called loss of memory. But
there is, in fact, no real forgetting; the transcendental
consciousness, in which lie the somnambulic ideas, re-
tains them after the waking; this consciousness itself
with its whole content remaining undisturbed, but being
in waking overlaid, as it were, by another, the external
consciousness. That the latter in its waking knows
nothing of those somnambulic ideas is natural, for it
never had them, and can therefore not be said to have
forgotten them. At the waking of somnambulists
there is thus no actual forgetting, but a relief of one
person of our subject by the other, which also has
another circle of ideas. If the ideas apparently
forgotten in waking re-emerge in every later crisis,
that is no new production of them, but a proof that
the consciousness to which they pertain has preserved
them. And laying the accent on the dualism of the
two persons of our subject instead of on the identity

of the subject in the change of persons, even the semblance of a forgetting falls away.

The most instructive cases in illustration of the above are those in which the apparent loss of memory extends to things immediately antecedent to waking. Thus Gmelin asked his somnambule if a gentleman present might waken her instead of himself. She assented; but, being immediately wakened, was surprised and embarrassed by seeing a stranger near her.* The physician Petetin's somnambule, being in the crisis, once undressed her sister, dressed her hair, plaited it, brought her shoes and stockings and silk ball dress from the chest; then, suddenly waking, she asked her sister with astonishment where she was going in such a toilette.† Such cases are instructive, in which a consciousness extending through long periods sinks down with the cessation of somnambulism. A somnambule had prescribed for a patient for a disease during seventeen months; but becoming afterwards acquainted with her patient, and the latter giving a history of her sufferings, she had no suspicion that she herself had been the physician.‡

The psychical condition is not always the same in somnambulism; and especially there is an exaltation of the latter, called the deep sleep (Hochschlaf), distinguished from ordinary somnambulism by difference of the visions. Between these dissimilar conditions there is likewise a failure of memory. Wienholt says of his somnambule that the purport of her deep sleep

* Gmelin: ‘Materialien für Anthropologie,’ ii. 95.
† Petetin: ‘Electricité animale,’ 283.
was as much lost in the subsequent state of somnambulism as that of the latter in the waking state.* According to Dupotet, if ordinary somnambulism succeeds to the deep sleep, memory of the latter is present, indeed, but only for a few minutes, which can be utilised for the most instructive elucidations; it then disappears.†

Seeing that somnambulic states follow each other immediately with a closure of memory, it is easy to understand that somnambules, waking without memory, are thus relegated to their former reckoning of time. Höhne, for instance, had been continuously in the magnetic sleep from the 1st January to the 10th May, and on waking exhibited a comical surprise that spring had arrived since she had lain down— as she supposed—the day before.‡ Kerner's somnambule, also, reckoned time when she awoke as in the same hour in which she had fallen asleep. She knew nothing of what had happened with her during eleven months, while she remembered well all earlier events; during her magnetic sleep she had been removed to another place, and she could not find her way about the house in which she had nevertheless for weeks been performing household duties, apparently in a waking state; the rooms were quite strange to her.§ A young lady lamented in somnambulism the death of her mother, of which they had told her. She was kept for some months, till her

* Wienholt: 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 2, 208.
† Dupotet: 'Traité complet,' etc., 253.
‡ Perty: 'Mystische Erscheinungen,' i. 305.
§ Kerner: 'Gesch. zweier Somnambulen,' 343.
recovery, in the magnetic state, and on waking she only knew that her mother was ill, and had been sent into the country. As she would not be restrained from a visit to her, they were obliged to tell her of the death, when she again burst into tears.* Chardel mentions a certain count, flying from the Revolution, who wished to take ship from Brittany, but was first obliged to put his wife into somnambulism, as only in this state was her great horror of the sea alleviated. When, after landing in America, she was awakened, she had no remembrance of the journey, and supposed herself to be still in Brittany.† Two sisters, magnetised by Chardel, desired that they might be kept in somnambulism with their eyes open. In this state he found them the next day, though meanwhile the night sleep had intervened. Some months thus passed; spring had come, and Chardel took the sisters, who had been put to sleep in the depth of winter, into the open air to a charmingly-situated place, and awoke them. They seemed to themselves as under a spell, eagerly inhaled the spring air, rolled in the grass for delight, and ran about after flowers. Of the whole period of their somnambulism they knew nothing, and indoors sought the feminine occupations which had employed them at the fireside four months earlier.‡

On waking from even common sleep we do not know its duration; and could we not judge the hours elapsed from our regular habits, or from some recollections of dream, we should resume our last reckoning of

* Billot, i. 110.
† Chardel: 'Essai de Psychologie,' 344.
‡ Ibid.: 'Esquisse de la Nature humaine,' 237, 239.
time. The somnambulic sleep does not occur regularly at determined hours, and leaves behind it no recollections; thus those waking from it have no measure of its duration. Kerner says of the Seeress that by a change within the somnambulic state a magnetic period of six years and five months was almost wiped out of memory. But some time after, memory returned, and indeed so completely, that she recollected the most insignificant things of that period. Kerner adds the true observation, that with old people also, such forgetfulness of long periods often occurs.*

A somnambule of Wienholt, knowing in the crisis that on waking she would reckon time as before, gave instructions to those about her to behave so that she should learn nothing of her somnambulic state. Her mother was on the Saturday, the day of her waking, immediately to speak of the household work belonging to that day, to cut short her objection that it was Tuesday, and go on to talk of other things. On waking she was alarmed to hear that it was Saturday, but became composed again, and the prescribed conduct had the desired effect.†

The same thing has been remarked with the insane. Dr. Pritchard observed a lady who was subject to sudden accesses of delirium, and who, on coming to herself again, resumed the conversation at the sentence or word interrupted by the attack.‡ The same physician relates the case of a man who was engaged in splitting wood with a mallet and wedge. In the

* Kerner: 'Seherin v. Prevorst,' 196.
† Wienholt: 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 3, 28, 29.
‡ Perty: 'Blicke,' etc., 25.
evening he hid these tools in a hollow tree, and told his sons to go with him next morning to make a hedge. In the night he became insane. Being suddenly restored many years afterwards, his first question was whether his sons had brought home the mallet and wedge. They replying that they had not been able to find them, he got up, went to the field where he had been working so many years ago, and found in the hiding-place the wedge and the iron ring of the mallet, the wood part having mouldered away.*

In the records of Christian mysticism, also, we find memory similarly estimating the somnambulic interval, as in the case of Maria von Oignys, who lay three days in ecstasy, and to whom after waking this period seemed only a moment.† In the Middle Ages, moreover, somnambulism was frequently regarded as a work of the devil, and oblivion of past things was accounted one of the secondary symptoms of possession.‡ Maria Garcia, who was tormented by evil spirits for seven years, had no recollection of it after her cure.§

Somnambulism being the common point of divergence of very different conditions, for all phenomena which it offers, even for those which are exceptional, we can point to analogous phenomena in other conditions. Such an exceptional case, for instance, is when the forgetfulness on waking includes not only the somnambulic interval, but also a fragment of the

* Kerner: 'Magikon,' v. 3, 364.
† Gorres: 'Christl. Mystik,' ii. 276.
‡ Cf. Springingsgut: 'Disputatio theologica de horrenda et miserabili Satanei obsessione,' 1656.
THE FACULTY OF MEMORY.

preceding state. A village schoolmaster, put into somnambulism by Puységur, on waking remembered being asked by his wife to go to Puységur; but what happened from the moment of his resolution to do so, how he went to him, and by what way he reached the house, he had forgotten.* It cannot well be supposed that the mental tension, the expectation of somnambulism, anticipated that condition, and then became involved in the forgetfulness. Such anticipations do no doubt occur. An Englishman, who had often made the railway journey from London to Dover, assured me that passengers intending to cross the Channel were often seized with sea-sickness in the carriage. But the retrogressive prolongation of forgetfulness must be otherwise occasioned, since it has been observed by physicians as a consequence of swoons and injuries to the brain from accidents, when there can be no question of anticipation. A horse bolted with a man who was driving his wife and children; he was thrown out, and sustained a concussion of the brain. The last recollection of this drive which remained to him afterwards was the circumstance that he had greeted a friend in the road when still two miles from the place of the accident. Of the bolting of the horse, his own exertions to stop him, and the alarm of his family, he knew nothing.†

7. Alternating Consciousness.

When states connected by the bridge of memory are very sharply divided from others which have their

* Puységur: 'Mémoires,' etc., ii. 81, 83.
† Ribot: 'Maladies de la Mémoire,' 63. For similar cases, Farlet: 'Dictionnaire encyclopédique des Sciences médicales': 'Amnésie.'
own coherent material of consciousness, this distinction becomes exalted into a change, and by repetition into a formal alternation of consciousness. Now, since it is by memory that we know our personal identity through all mental modifications in time, the cases now in question form an interesting contribution to the fact that an identical Subject can fall apart into a duplicity of persons.

It may here at once be remarked that it is this fact which in a later study will be applied to the foundation of a monistic doctrine of the soul. For in the alternation of consciousness we have first the psychological fact that one Subject can appear successively in two different Persons. Next, from this fact of double consciousness, it results that beneath this succession of persons there must be a simultaneity, so that the change of persons is only a change of manifestation of the underlying Subject, the apparent succession depending merely upon the failure of memory as between the two thus mutually unconscious persons. The material of memory of the identical Subject is distributed between the two Persons of the alternating consciousness, and that material which for the externally functioning consciousness is latent, is yet simultaneously present, though in relative unconsciousness.

Now, if this psychological principle, indispensable for the explanation of the fact of double consciousness, can be regarded as metaphysically applicable to the solution of the human problem, the foundation-stone of a monistic doctrine of the soul would thus be laid. This is not the place to develop such a doctrine; but the facts following are already to be considered with
reference to the end in view, though we can draw only a provisional inference, that the falling apart of one Subject into two Persons, which is a fact in the empirical sense, is at least possible in the metaphysical sense. It may seem a paradoxical suggestion that the man of manifest consciousness is only one person of a Subject, whose other person belongs at the same time to another order of things—to a metaphysical world; but the fact of double consciousness within the empirical personality shows at least that there is no psychological difficulty in the conception.*

In this sense, therefore, is to be regarded the following observation, pointing simply to a void in scientific speculation: Science and philosophy, that is to say, have put aside the dualistic doctrine of the soul, and have passed over into materialism and pantheism, without sufficiently entertaining the third possibility, a monistic doctrine of the soul.

Haller mentions a man who at alternate but regular intervals lost and recovered his memory; and he himself knew a young girl who was subject to the like condition at the physiological periods.† Griesinger relates the case of a lady, who in the

* [In accordance with the above view may be quoted the opinion of one of the acutest and most accurate of inquirers into the obscurer facts of psychology, the late Mr. Edmund Gurney: 'I may recall the undoubted phenomena of what has been called 'double consciousness,' where a double psychical life is found connected with a single organism. In these cases the two selves, one of which knows nothing of the other, appear as successive; but if we can regard such segregated existences as united or unified by bonds of reference and association which, for the partial view of one of them at least, remain permanently out of sight, then I do not see what new or fundamental difficulty is introduced by conceiving them as simultaneous.'—‘Phantasms of the Living,’ vol. i., pp. 69, 70.—Tr.]
† Huber: ‘Das Gedächtniss,’ 46.
midst of a conversation sometimes suddenly broke off, and began to talk of other things, but after some time again took up the first subject with the word at which it had been suspended, without any consciousness of the interval.* Hermogenes, of Tarsus, was already a teacher of rhetoric in his fifteenth year, and an author in his eighteenth, but in his twenty-fourth he suddenly forgot all his knowledge, so that the sophist Antiochus said of him that he was an old man in his youth, and in his later life became a child.† Van Swieten mentions a boy of eight, who in the hot summer days forgot all that he had learned, recollecting it again in autumn and winter.‡ This was perhaps the same boy of whom Tissot speaks, a premature genius who completely lost his memory in the dog-days, but recovered it after a few days of cool air.§ The inhabitants of the Valais, according to Zimmermann, send their children in summer to the hills, because in the valleys they would lose their memory.|| A case of regular alternation of consciousness by disappearance and return of memory is reported by the elder Darwin. He knew a young lady, who every other day was in a condition of ecstasy, lasting nearly the whole day. In these accesses the same ideas recurred of which she had spoken on the former occasions, while on the intervening day she knew nothing of them. She thus seemed to her relatives like a being with two souls.

* Sparner: 'Physiologie der Seele,' 289, Stuttgart, 1877.
† Perty: 'Blicke,' etc., 25.
‡ Steinbeck: 115.
§ Tissot: 'V. d. Gesundheit der Gelehrten,' § 74.
|| Muratori: i., 196.
THE FACULTY OF MEMORY.

In the crisis she saw and heard nothing of what happened about her, discoursed connectedly and very intelligibly with absent persons whom she believed to be present, declaimed poems, and if she was in want of a word, it was in vain that those near tried to help her by loud and distinct repetition of it—she had to find it for herself. If anyone held her hands, she complained, without knowing how she was restrained, as also if anyone closed her open, staring eyes.*

Another case of alternating consciousness is when one of the subjective persons lives in the past; as, for instance, that lady who had been many years married, and who often during the day fell into a condition of insensibility to every sound, and received visits, as she supposed, from her deceased mother. She conversed with the latter over her own state of health, in reference to her approaching marriage, replied to apparent objections, and desired that a physician might be consulted. She resented the familiarity of her husband, who sat on her bed and called her his dear wife, and treated him with maidenly reserve, as only engaged to her.†

The celebrated Dutch alienist, Schröder van der Kolk, cites the case of a girl of twenty, who after long illness fell into a remarkable condition, which had lasted already four years. After waking in the morning, a kind of St. Vitus’ dance occurred at a definite hour, the patient beating about with her hands to right and left. This lasted half an hour, when she recovered, but she conducted herself quite like a child. On the following day the spasms re-

† Lorry: ‘De Melancholia,’ i. 78, Paris, 1765.
turned; after their cessation, the patient again behaved like a sensible girl. She spoke French and German well, and showed herself well-informed. But she knew nothing of the preceding day, her memory attaching itself to the one before that, the so-called clear day. On the childish days she had begun to re-learn French, without making much progress, while on the clear days she spoke it fluently. Schröder had visited this patient on fourteen days, which were all childish days, and she always recognised him. But when he came for the first time on a clear day, he was quite a stranger to her, and she could not remember to have ever seen him. This change occurred during the four years with such regularity, that its hour could be appointed. Once during this time the girl fell into an intermittent fever, which, being intentionally allowed to run its course, lasted into the clear days, when she did not know what was the matter with her, and behaved as though she had had no attack. During the summer, she went with her parents into the country, the childish day being chosen for the removal. On waking next day, she was much surprised at the change of residence, and knew not how she had come to the place.*

A similar case is reported by Dr. Mitchell: Miss R. enjoyed naturally very sound health, and entered her marriageable years without having suffered any considerable illness. She had very good abilities, and easily acquired knowledge and accomplishments. Besides domestic and social education, she was very well read, and could express herself well in writing. Her memory was well stored, and variously em-

* Spomer: 282.
bellished. Unexpectedly, and without any warning, she was one day overcome by a deep sleep, which lasted many more hours than usual. On awaking, she had clean forgotten every trace of her attainments. Her memory was a blank. She learnt again to spell, read, write, and reckon, and made quick progress. Some months later, she fell into a similar sleep, from which the former subjective person awoke, with no knowledge of the intervening time. Now was developed a double existence. Her former one, she named the old, the later, the new condition. She had no more consciousness of her double character than two different persons of each other’s nature. In the normal state she possessed her former attainments; in the new one only what she had learnt in it. In the old state, she wrote fluently; in the new one, her writing was undecided and unformed. These states had alternated already for four years, and every time the change followed upon a long and deep sleep. The conduct towards her of the other members of the family came to be regulated entirely with regard to her condition for the time being.* Such cases involuntarily remind one of those generations in the animal kingdom, when an organism appears to be drawn apart into a diversity of individuals, as here a psychical subject into two persons.

Gmelin describes a patient who in a change of consciousness took herself for a totally different person, a French emigrant, and tormented herself with imaginary misfortune. She then spoke French and only broken German, took parents and friends for sympathetic strangers, and recollected nothing.

* 'Archiv,' etc., iii. 168.
referring to her true personality, yet displayed a more than ordinary activity of intellect. On awak-
ing, she knew nothing of her other person, but was restored to her old condition.*

In the case of the somnambule Julie, fourteen years of the past disappeared from her memory, as though during that time she had been another individual. She had four distinct states, each of which had its own memory and its own life, connected, as the Court physician Köhler said, with the similar ones preceding and following it. News which she heard in the one condition interested her in the highest degree when repeated to her in another.†

It is evidently only to this alternation of con-
sciousness that Thucydides refers, when he says that after the celebrated pestilence in Greece, some people lost their memory to such a degree that they no longer knew their nearest friends, or even themselves.

Schubert reports, from verbal information from the historian Leopold Ranke, that the Marchesa Solari spoke French in Venice in her childhood—her mother having been a Frenchwoman—but afterwards forgot it. But during a fever she forgot her later acquired Italian, and now spoke French fluently. After her recovery, she again forgot French, and spoke Italian. The latter, again, she lost in her old age, and returned to the language of her childhood.‡ Schubert mentions the case of an apprentice in a book-shop, who, being scolded by his master, fell into a dream-paroxysm,

* Gmelin: 'Materielen für Anthropologie,' i. 3.
† Strombeck: 'Geschichte eines allein durch die Natur her-
vorgebrachten animalischen Magnetismus,' 114, 139, 169, 206; Braunschweig, 1813.
‡ Schubert: 'Geschichte der Seele,' ii. 203, 207.
similar to catalepsy, in which he took himself for a
paterfamilias with wife and child to provide for. In
the waking state he lived as an apprentice; in every
new paroxysm he went to his business as a pater-
familias. Both states took their separate course; in
the dream, he never thought of himself as an appren-
tice, nor in waking as the father of a family; on the
other hand, the similar phases were connected. If in
the one condition anything associated with the other
was mingled, he took it for a dream.* Bertrand's
somnambule had three different states besides the
waking one; in the latter she knew nothing of either
of them; but her somnambulism embraced the two
others.† More recently, cases of alternate conscious-
ness are reported by the physicians Azam and Dufay:
A woman who in her normal state was serious,
reserved, and industrious, often fell into a sleep, on
coming out of which she was as if changed, exhibit-
ing unrestrained hilarity, heightened imagination, and
coquetry; completely remembering all former phases
of this state, but also of her waking state. After a
longer or shorter time she fell again into torpidity,
from which she awoke into her normal condition,
when she had no memory of the other condition. The
older she became, the shorter and rarer were these
normal phases, and whereas formerly the change was
only gradually induced, it now occurred with the
utmost rapidity. Similar was the case of another
patient, whose memory in somnambulism included
both her states, and who spoke therein of her other

* Schubert: 'Geschichte der Seele,' ii. 72.
† Bertrand: 'Traité du Somnambulisme,' 308.
'stupid state,' which had only its own exclusive memory.*

Even insanity can be interrupted by another—a normal consciousness. Dr. Steinbeck mentions a cretin who, like all his kind, was idiotic, and in his normal state was deaf and dumb. But without any external occasion he fell into a clairvoyant condition, and in this he spoke very clearly and with intelligence.† If such phenomena can be induced by even momentary encroachments in the organism, there is thus proved the existence of a transcendental consciousness which only needs opportunity to manifest itself. An instance of this is the case of the Swedish peasant, who in 1771 lost speech, sensibility, and consciousness, only in the summer of 1782 recovering by degrees the use of some senses. On a day in August of that year, while washing his head with cold water, he suddenly felt a spasm through all his body, and exclaimed in a weak voice, 'Herr Gott! this is wonderful! Where have I been so long?' There were slight effusions of blood from different parts of the head; he recovered his understanding, knowing all whom he had formerly known, and being surprised at their aged appearance; while he knew no one who had first come to him during those twelve years, however often seen. He regarded his illness as

* Revue Scientifique, May, July, September, 1876; Nov., 1877; March, 1879. [There is also the more recent case of Louis V., a full account of which, compiled by Dr. A. T. Myers, will be found in the Journal of Mental Science, for January, 1886. Mr. F. W. H. Myers has made this and similar cases the theme of very curious and interesting speculations ('Multiplex Personality') in the Nineteenth Century, and in the 'Proceedings' of the Society for Psychical Research, x. 2.—Tr.]
† Steinbeck: 'Der Dichter ein Seher,' 110.
an actual sleep, and knew not how long it had lasted, having forgotten everything which had happened in this long interval, though all that was anterior returned to his memory. He remained sound henceforth.*

To alternating consciousness are to be referred also many cases of 'possession.' Kerner describes the maid of Orlach as denoting by the word 'I' the monk by whom she was possessed, while she spoke of the maiden—that is, of herself—in the third person.† Alternation of consciousness is thus by no means confined to somnambulism, which is only one of its occasional causes. Notwithstanding, therefore, that these occasional causes are for the most part morbid, the psychological possibility of this alternation must have its foundation in the nature of man; and as these phenomena clearly evince the possibility, at least, of a duality in man, we are justified in asking whether they are available for the solution of the human enigma. This inference had already been drawn by Plotinus, when he said: 'All that goes through the body ends in the soul; the rest belongs to the soul alone, if the soul is anything in itself, if it has a determinate nature and a peculiar operation. . . . If the souls are united (in somnambulism) then they possess their memories together (that is, somnambulism comprehends also the waking consciousness); if they are and remain separate (in the waking state), the one keeps its own property a long time, that of the other only a short time.'‡

* 'Proceedings of the Royal Academy of Sweden of the year 1786.'
† Kerner: 'Geschichte Besessenereuerer Zeit.'
‡ Plotinus: 'Enneads,' iv. 3, 26 and 27.
A remarkable double consciousness was exhibited by the young Hebert, whom Puységur magnetised. Owing to a severe blow on the head, in his fourth year, an operation was necessary. Attacks of insanity supervened, and he lost his memory, knowing nothing of what he had done an hour before. But as soon as he entered upon the magnetic crisis, not only did the attack of insanity cease, but his memory returned, and he knew accurately the events of his life. He described the inception of his illness, the operation, in which his brain had been injured, the instruments employed for it, and asserted that magnetism would restore him from insanity, but that he would never recover his memory, as in fact was the case.*

A somnambule of Dr. Wolfart, being asked as to her future health, always fell into a state of terror, in which she spoke of the misfortune impending over her. Years afterwards, she was crippled in the feet, and by a succession of mishaps so impaired in intellect that she knew no one, and could only utter incoherent sounds and words. In this condition Wolfart found the patient after an absence of thirteen years. When he had put her into the somnambulic state she knew him at once, spoke quite coherently, recalled her former prognostication, but then awoke again in her disordered condition. He succeeded a second time in putting her into somnambulism, with the like good result, but on her awaking the improvement was again lost.†

Desault relates that a man after a blow on the head could at first remember only recent events, but

* Puységur: 'Journal du traitement du jeune Hebert.'
† Wolfart: 'Erläuterungen zum Mesmerismus,' 283.
not long after, by an inexplicable change, lost memory of such, while he could recall all the occurrences of his childhood.*

Le Camus reports the case of a weak-minded, almost imbecile, youth, upon whom all instruction in languages and sciences was thrown away. After a fall on his head he became distinctly clever, intellectual, and highly cultivated, quickly seizing what had been taught him in vain before, and was afterwards, as Père Bouhours, a celebrated scholar of his century. The same author cites Pope Clement IV. as having to thank a wound in the head for his eminent memory; and also the case of an insane woman, of whom he knew, who was completely cured through a leap down into the street.† Carresi observed the case of yearly recurrent mania, which was completely cured by a fall on the head.‡ An insane woman, who believed herself to be possessed, chattered incoherently, and imitated the cries of animals for hours at a time, would often be suddenly and incomprehensibly changed; all foolish ideas then disappeared, as if blown away, and she spoke rationally and instructively to the astonished company.§ That insane persons often shortly before death recover their understandings, and appear entirely changed, has been frequently observed.||

All these cases stand in striking contradiction to the materialistic opinion, that consciousness is a product of the material brain. All that materialists can

---

* 'Frorieps Notizen,' xxii., No. 12, p. 188.
† Le Camus: 'Médecine de l'Esprit.'
‡ Steinbeck: 209.
§ Boismont: 124.
|| Freidreich: 'Handbuch der allgemeinen Pathologie,' 497.
adduce on their behalf is limited to this, that diseases of the brain often, but by no means always, are accompanied by diseases of the mind, that is, by disorders of the consciousness which is mediated by the senses and brain. The transcendental consciousness, however, remains as undisturbed thereby as the sight of the eye remains undisturbed by the dimming of the spectacles. If madness can be interrupted by a second and sound consciousness, whose brightness and clearness often break through the obscured brain-consciousness, then is madness a phenomenon restricted to this brain-consciousness. As has been already elucidated in many cases, the obscuration of the sense-consciousness is the condition of the emergence of the transcendental consciousness, however this obscuration may be induced, whether by sleep, fever, or somnambulism. Now, since madness itself likewise resembles such an obscuration of the sense or brain-consciousness, it is conceivable that it can awaken faculties which remain latent in the sound, normal condition. This appears to have been the case with a page in the service of a distinguished Spaniard, who was considered to be of infirm mind. Some time afterwards he became insane, when he answered excellently everything that he was asked, and discoursed on many important subjects, especially on the art of government—for he believed himself a king—with such arrangement and novelty of thought, that even his master heard him with the greatest pleasure, and begged God to leave him in that state. And so the physician who restored the patient to health received neither from the page nor from the master the thanks he had deserved and expected; for with his restoration
of health the page lost those high faculties, and his old slowness of intellect returned.*

If memory must be regarded as the root of all mental development, it is self-evident that the transcendent consciousness cannot be considered merely as a latent faculty of memory—the storeroom for all the impressions which penetrate the sense-consciousness—but that also all intellectual faculties of ordinary life have their transcendental root. Thence are to be explained the cases adduced, in which a faculty, not only of memory, but of thought, latent in the normal condition, breaks through even the insanity of the brain as developed for the relations of earthly existence.

We have seen that loss of memory marks the partition dividing the somnambulic from the waking state. That, however, is to be taken only as the general rule. Exceptions are frequent, and the consideration of them is the more imperative, since they open the possibility—if as yet only distantly—of an experimental psychology, by which hereafter clear rays of knowledge may be thrown on the metaphysical well-spring of our intellectual being, which the physiological school still and for ever vainly seeks.

Recollections from the somnambulic state can be preserved for waking consciousness, either immediately or indirectly, by a prior reproduction in dream. Ordinary sleep being a condition intermediate between waking and somnambulism, and the latter being only its exaltation, it is presumable that the threads of memory are more easily spun between the similar states of dream and somnambulism, than between the

* Meimers: 'Ueber d. thierischen Magnetismus,' Leenge, 1788.

VOL. II. 27
PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM.

extremes of waking and somnambulism, which, being dissimilar, are for the most part divided by loss of memory.

From the relationship of conditions it results that forgotten dreams re-emerge much more easily in later sleep than in waking. Sir Humphry Davy, who experimented with nitrous oxide, which he inhaled, says of his condition that he gradually lost all perception of external things, while on the other hand lively recollections of earlier experiments presented themselves.* In like manner an insane person remembered in her illness only the events of that state, but after her cure only the experiences of her health.† Representations belonging to the magnetic condition are often reproduced in ordinary dream; and that would undoubtedly appear much oftener, if every reproduction were also a recollection. But as recognition does not always happen, such reproductions are taken as originating in dream. This reproduction in dream extends as well to the inner visions of the somnambulists as to their external impressions during the magnetic sleep. Somnambulism and dream appear often so closely related that they pass into one another, and that even faculties which are usually peculiar to somnambulism are prolonged into dream. Dr. Cless says of his somnambulists that the material of their dreams was always derived from occurrences in their magnetic sleep, or at least had reference to them: the dream-images even partially completing the presentations and obscure knowledge of the somnambulic state. And Kerner's somnambule said towards the

* Hibbert: 'Phil. of Apparitions,' 162.
† Jessen: 'Psychologie,' 567.
end of her illness, that even after the cessation of her magnetic state the proper medicaments would still occur to her in ordinary dreams, and the memory of these dreams would survive into the waking state.* Auguste Müller once indicated a medicament imperfectly, and with the remark that she would dream it further in the night between eleven and twelve o'clock.† In the case of a patient of Dr. Nasse, external occurrences during her crisis passed over into dream still more distinctly. Though in the waking state there was no direct memory of the events of the crisis, these survived in sleep as dream, and thus often passed into the waking memory. Thus she related as a dream of the night how a plaster had been placed over both her eyes, and she had notwithstanding detected coloured paper; how she had felt out metal discs buried in the sand; and she wondered at the absurdity of this dream, these things having been in fact only experiments. Her reproductions in dream went often to the smallest detail, with complete repetition of particular acts and speeches.‡ The guarantee that in these cases a dream really intervened, excluding the supposition that the actual events of the somnambulic state were remembered, and only represented as dreamt, consists not only in the fact of the memory, but also in the circumstance that the somnambule knew beforehand of this reproduction in dream, and often predicted it in the case of striking particulars.

In a narrative of the physiologist Burdach, also,

* Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 260.
† Dr. Maier und Klein: 'Geschichte der magnetisch hellsehenden Auguste Müller,' 9.
‡ Reil's 'Beiträge,' etc., ii. 3.
dream appears as a bridge for memory. One of his friends heard one morning that his wife had been seen the night before walking in her sleep on the church roof. He took the opportunity of her midday sleep to question her, directing his mouth to the pit of her stomach, when she gave him a full account, and mentioned that the ball of her left foot had been hurt by a nail on the roof. On waking she answered with surprise the question, whether she felt pain in the place which had been indicated, in the affirmative, and on seeing the wound was unable to explain its origin.*

The absence of memory in somnambulists is thus all the more the rule, since in the exceptions we can so frequently presuppose the mediating instrumentality of dream. A true exception can only then be admitted when memory exists immediately after waking from somnambulism; in all other cases it can be assumed that what is remembered is not the original image or event, but merely a copy in dream. Distinguishable from the cases in which a dream-reproduction is interposed between somnambulism and waking, dream being thus the bridge between two dissimilar conditions, are other cases in which the visions and incidents of somnambulism are remembered directly, the somnambulist being, however, under the illusion that they had been only dreamt. That as regards external occurrences this is sometimes the case is apparent from the above instance of Nasse's somnambule. That subjective visions are taken after waking for dreams is all the more intelligible, and happened, for example,

* Radestock: 'Schlaf und Traum,' 168. [Speaking is not a usual incident of ordinary sleep, and it is presumable that in the above case the mid-day sleep partook of the somnambolic character.—Tr.]
in the case of Auguste Müller. She said in the crisis that her landlord’s son should partake of a tea, the preparation of which she would know and prescribe after waking as by a dream. When she woke she asked if anything had happened to this boy; she having dreamed that he had fallen ill, and that she had got for his restoration a warm tea, the composition of which she then described. But not only the experiences, internal and external, of somnambulists, but also their own acts during the crisis, appear to them after waking as dreams. A sensitive of Reichenbach mentioned on waking a dream which she had just had; the content of this dream was, however, nothing else than what she had been saying to the bystanders. Kerner’s somnambulule sprang up in the crisis exclaiming that she must have a bunch of seven grapes, rushed through the courtyard into the garden and up to the top of a high ladder which stood against a grape trellis, and so on to the town wall, two stories high, to a grape-stock, and returned with a bunch of seven grapes, which she ate. At coffee in the morning she said she had had a strange dream of going up a ladder and reaching a bunch of seven grapes, and eating them with great enjoyment.

For a future experimental psychology it is very important to observe this distinction, whether the somnambulists have a direct memory after waking of their experience in the crisis, only mistaking them for dreams, or whether they remember indirectly by means of a really intervening reproduction in dream.

† Reichenbach: ‘Der sensitive Mensch,’ ii. 693.
‡ Kerner: ‘Gesch. zweier Somnambulen,’ 294.
When they are left to themselves, their somnambulism passes off into ordinary sleep—when reproduction in dream becomes possible—but if artificially awakened, memory, if it occurs, is direct. That was the case with the thirteen years' old somnambule Hennig, who on awaking knew clearly and accurately all that had happened in the magnetic sleep.*

Often the mere intention of the somnambulists suffices to carry the memory into waking life. Passavant knew one who could at will retain or not retain her visions.† According to Faria, recollection only occurs with those who in the crisis are conscious of being in a dreaming condition, and these are very few.‡ Dr. Steinbeck knew a somnambule who when suddenly awakened did not remember her visions, but easily remembered them when gradually awakened.§

The connection of representations occurring in waking and sleep alike, according to laws of association, these are a means by which somnambulists can secure recollection. A somnambule of Hufeland to this end did as we often do: she made a knot in her handkerchief, and when on waking her eye fell on it, the intended recollection occurred.|| Another tied a ribbon round her arm, or a thread round her ring-finger, when she wished to transmit to waking memory an idea from her somnambulic state.||

The more developed the somnambulism, the more dissimilar is it from the waking state, and the more

† Passavant: 'Untersuchungen,' etc., 95.
‡ Faria: 'De la cause du Sommeil lucide,' 228.
§ Steinbeck: 'Der Dichter ein Seher,' 439.
|| Hufeland: 'Ueber Sympathie,' 172.
||| Ennemoser: 'Mesmerische Praxis,' 498.
difficult is memory. As the sickness progresses, the crises are more intense than in the period of convalescence, and often after complete recovery the susceptibility to magnetic treatment ceases altogether. Memory is accordingly easier during recovery than in the height of the disease. But as the ordinary dreams of deep sleep are forgotten, and only the confused dreams of light sleep are remembered, so the remembered visions of somnambulism are less instructive, because they presuppose a greater approximation of the otherwise divided states. There are, however, exceptions, so that on this point also a future experimental psychology will not be without profit. Dr. Nick vouches for the following case: A somnambule said in the last crisis of her illness: 'A month hence, I shall remember not only all that I have seen in my crisis, but shall be able to find my way to the different places where I have been, but which I have seen from here.' Her somnambulism, exalted to clairvoyance, had been utilised by obtaining from her information as to the illnesses of distant persons. And when, later, she was completely restored, and in the enjoyment of blooming health, she remembered her visions on visiting the places which she had clairvoyantly seen, and she was able, without inquiry, to find the residences of those persons to see whom she had been directed from time to time in the crisis.* Another somnambule, of whom Van Ghert reports, obtained in the crisis the vision of the father and of a friend of her magnetiser, and described them in such exact detail, that the latter was obliged to admit the accuracy of the description at once, or later

* 'Archiv,' ii. 2, 46, 49.
as regarded changes in the friend, whom he had not seen for eight years. Some days afterwards, the father came for the first time to the town, when the somnambule, who had never seen him, immediately accosted him as the father of the magnetiser, with the remark that she must have seen him somewhere, though she knew not where. And subsequently there was the same recognition of the friend. In a later crisis, however, the recollection was complete, and she declared that she had in the earlier sleep seen both as distinctly, and in the same aspects, as afterwards in waking.\

When somnambulism is profound—the deep sleep—it is divided from the lower degree by the same partition as is the latter from waking. Apparent exceptions are to be explained by imperfect exaltation of the state, the two conditions being still so far related that not all the threads of memory are severed. And when visions of the profound sleep are reproduced in somnambulism, there are often only indefinite recollections, as in a dream. Often also they are distinct, but only in the first minutes, just as in the morning we often have a transient memory of a dream, but seek it in vain a few minutes afterwards.

Memory connects divided states according to the same psychological laws by which the past and present are connected in waking life. Impressions revive each other according to laws of association, and this occurs the more readily the greater the interest of the exciting impression. That the reproduction of impressions is connected with the interest originally felt

* 'Archiv,' iii. 3, 63, 64.
† Ibid., x. 1, 106.
in them—allowing for the blunting effect of time—is a fact not only of dream experience, but which has been observed by physicians of the insane. Boismont knew an apothecary who had been occupied with chemical researches, and who, when insane, talked very readily of them, but no longer knew anything of the substances with which he had experimented, while, on the other hand, he knew all the names of distinguished men with whom he had been acquainted, because such acquaintance, flattering his vanity, had a greater interest for him. The same physician reports the case of an opium-eater, in which even time had failed of its usual weakening influence, and the original interest revived. In his narcotic visions re-emerged the image of a woman whom he had one evening met in the streets of London, but had not seen for a long time. Waking, he remembered her without emotion, but in the visions her image excited in him the original interest.* These observations seem to contravene the cases reported above, in which the exaltation of memory in states of sleep often repeats the most insignificant impressions, which in waking scarcely reached our notice, and in which, therefore, memory appeared independent of interest, whereas it now appears as dependent thereon. This apparent contradiction is perhaps resolved by the already frequently observed distinction between reproduction and recollection, the first not demanding the interest which facilitates the recognition of reproduced impressions.

More important than these spontaneous recollections for an experimental psychology are those which

* Boismont, 168, 197.
are awakened by the magnetiser. In many cases his mere order suffices for the preservation of a somnambulic impression. Werner—whose work contains interesting observations, but who misses the principle of explanation afforded by the dramatic severance of the Ego in somnambulism—brought to a somnambule, as the present of a third person, a rose and a short letter, which he read to her. In reply to his question as to a means of carrying over this incident to her waking memory, she said that his earnest injunction would avail. On asking her next morning if she had received a present, she at first knew nothing about it, but then related as a very vivid dream that someone had sent her a rose and a letter, the contents of which she verbally repeated. She was extremely struck when they now brought her the rose and letter, and from this recollection fell again into the somnambulic state—a phenomenon of frequent occurrence, which has still to be spoken of.

This case is one of numerous instances in which the will of the magnetiser can control and direct the somnambulist at pleasure. The suggestion that this is only thought-transference is at least not in all cases maintainable: the will of the magnetiser alone explains, for example, the fact of a somnambule at his command retaining from her crisis the memory of a matter forgotten by himself, that matter alone being recalled.

To excite recollections, the magnetiser often makes use of the association of ideas, connecting the impression to be revived with some object, the sight of which on waking calls up the memory. So far Tandel seems to be right in explaining the absence of
memory of somnambulists from the want of associations of thought between the two conditions,* though, indeed, this is less a solution of the problem than a further definition of it.

The will of the magnetiser can suppress an impression as well as excite it. A girl who, in the waking state, had met in the street a criminal who had murdered his wife, was magnetised to allay her agitation. Her magnetiser put her to sleep, and ordered her to forget the whole thing, and when she was awakened no trace of it remained in her mind.†

Van Ghert connected the impression to be revived with an object or a number; on naming the number in waking, the recollection followed. As we may preserve an idea in memory by associating it with a knot in a handkerchief, so can the somnambulist by similar arbitrary signs, a ribbon round the neck, a wafer stuck to the nose, etc.‡ One somnambule desired that a little ribbon round her left ear should be pulled, in order to revive the idea associated with it. By this means, after waking, she repeated without a mistake a dictation, the writing of which had filled a large sheet.§

Thus association of ideas not only facilitates memory in a similar psychical condition, but also as between dissimilar ones in which it is not spontaneous, and is usually absent.

This principle might undoubtedly be utilised in experimental psychology. All systematic education

* Perty: 'Die Myst. Erscheinungen,' i. 254.
† 'Archiv,' iv. 1, 131.
‡ Kieser: 'Tellurismus,' ii. 250.
§ Ibid.: 'Magikon,' iii. 1, 65.
associates the new instruction with the existing circle of ideas. In the training of animals the principle of association is employed. In the education of children it is even applied as between waking and sleep, as when a child is punished for uncleanliness in sleep, and is thus successfully restrained in that state. Muratori says: 'By a resolution made during waking to refrain from certain acts to which we are accustomed in dream, the habit is overcome. The idea of the resolution is by the imagination linked with that of the act, both having been associated in waking consciousness. The idea of the resolution, again, recalls the sentiment with which we conceived it in waking. And this sentiment either awakes us, or imparts to us sufficient circumspection to withstand the incitement to the proscribed act.'*

It is only a step from this to the 'magnetic' education. The somnambulic state being connected with the suppression of the sense-life, the instincts and dispositions which depend on this sensibility can be suppressed by frequent application of magnetism, and by subjection of the mental activity alien to the induced state. Champignon treated a somnambule who was an excessive drinker of coffee, and who could not renounce the habit, although her disease was referable to it. He detached her from it by an

* Muratori: 'Ueber die Einbildungskraft,' i. 258. [The character of our dreams can also be thus controlled, at least negatively. The translator, when a child, being occasionally troubled by afflicting dreams, added to his nightly prayer for his family a petition that he might not dream of any misfortune to those dear to him. The dreaded dreams never recurred, and afterwards, when he came to reflect that the prohibition was really self-imposed, he found a simple resolution before going to sleep equally effectual in shutting out all distressing dreams of a nature at all anticipated by the prohibition.—Tr.]
energetic command in the crisis, and by a firm determination that she in waking should conceive a regular dislike to this beverage. The opponents of magnetism insist much on the possibility of its misuse to immoral purposes. If this cannot be denied, as indeed it is the case with all earthly things, justice demands the admission that on the like psychological grounds the somnambulist may be morally influenced. The influence of the magnetiser upon the senses and thoughts of the somnambulist is undeniable, and this influence can be employed for good or for evil. Champignon knew a girl who led an irregular life with her magnetiser, and whom he resolved to reform. In somnambulism, according to his wish, she felt, for the first time, a violent remorse and made the best resolutions. Awake, she was as dissolute as ever. The inclination to improvement lasted only until she met her former magnetiser and allowed herself to be put to sleep by him. Henceforward there was no difference between her disposition in somnambulism and in waking. A similar attempt, but with better results, was made by Deleuze. *

This educational value of somnambulism is the less doubtful, since somnambulists can be induced by the magnetiser to undertake acts, of which the motive is not apparent to them in waking. I refer to the strange but well-established fact of the magnetic promise. I can vouch for the following case.

Hansen had made the acquaintance of a family in

* Champignon, 238, 239. [Mr. F. W. H. Myers has called attention to this subject in articles in the Nineteenth Century which have been reprinted in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, parts x. and xi.—Tr.]
Vienna, of whom one, the husband, was very susceptible to magnetism. On a Wednesday, two days before Hansen's departure, they were together, and it was agreed that they should go to Hansen again, for the last time, on Friday. But the husband having been put into somnambulism by Hansen, the latter, by agreement with the rest, obtained from him a promise that he would come on Thursday at 5 p.m. On awaking, he knew nothing of this, and on leaving said: 'We shall meet again on Friday.' On Thursday it suddenly occurred to him to visit Hansen, but on his wife reminding him of the arrangement for Friday, he dropped the idea. In the afternoon, when they were taking a walk, he reverted to his proposition, which the wife turned him from again, as before. But when 5 o'clock struck, he left his wife standing in the street, and ran to Hansen's. Arriving at the door of the house, he asked himself what he was doing there, and was perplexed, till Hansen accosted him by saying, 'I have expected you,' and explained.

Thus the magnetic promise operates, notwithstanding the absence of memory, as an obscure impulse to an act, apparently voluntary, but from which there is no escaping. The will of that gentleman, to fulfil the promise, came from the transcendental region and reproduced the idea of visiting Hansen, which, however, the normal consciousness could not recognise as memory. The philosophical kernel of the problem lies therefore in this, that from our transcendental individuality, cognitional and volitional beyond the sphere of our self-consciousness, there can enter our life the impulse to acts which seem to us our free determinations. For immediately behind the act is
the will of the magnetised person to fulfil his promise; and that this can be elicited by an overpowering foreign will is a different problem.

Mouilleseaux exacted from his patient, when in the crisis, a promise to pay next day, at a particular time, a certain visit for which she was indisposed. He then awoke her, taking every precaution that she should not be reminded of her promise; and at the appointed hour stationed himself with some friends in the neighbourhood of the house she was to visit. As the clock struck, the somnambule made her appearance, walking about undecidedly, and at length entered with evident embarrassment. When now Mouilleseaux informed her of the promise, she told him that the thought of going had been continually haunting her since the morning, that all her disinclination had been in vain, and that she could only get rid of her inward restlessness and disquiet at the appointed hour, when she set out.*

Dr. Teste once ordered his somnambule to heat the oven in her room next day at noon—it was in July—to light two candles, and wait for him with her embroidery for an hour. When he arrived, she had done all exactly as directed. Motive for her absurd proceedings she could not assign; and when, as the hour was struck, she extinguished the fire and lights, and laid aside her work, she knew just as little why she did so.†

A magnetiser gave a boy-somnambulist a coin, with directions to buy pears with it. He accepted it, laughingly producing from his pocket another coin.

* 'Exposé des Cures de Strasbourg,' iii. 70.
† Teste: 'Le Magnétisme animal expliqué,' 431.
PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM.

Asked, on waking, how much money he had in his pocket, he was surprised to find two coins in it, but on going out at once bought some pears.*

Thus can the ideas and will of somnambulists be directed, and dispositions or indispositions, lasting into the waking state, can be implanted in them, they being ignorant of the cause of their impulses.

Deleuze forbade a patient to look at her feet after waking—leeches, of which she had an abhorrence, having been applied to them—and, in fact, she remained in complete ignorance of what had been done. Another patient requested her physician to impose upon her his will, that when in the waking state she should be about to partake of food which would not agree with her, she should be inspired with an uncontrollable distrust of it, which happened with success.†

In this way patients can be determined in the waking state to take medicines which they detest; nor do they then know that they are only obeying a command. This result can also follow on their own firm resolution, and Bertrand says generally, that if they undertake to do anything in waking at a definite hour, they carry it out, without knowing why.‡

Such a will-impulse, acting on the waking life from the transcendental region, can, it seems, even take on the dramatic drama-form, as was the case with that extraordinary girl-somnambule, about whom Billot corresponded with Deleuze. This girl had prescribed resin fumigations to be undergone at a certain hour. It was forgotten, and she was admonished by an

* Archiv,' iii. 2, 83.
† Deleuze: 'Instruction pratique,' etc., 138, 435.
‡ Bertrand: 'Traité du Somnambulisme,' 183.
hallucination, a thick cloud rising before her eyes from a censer, the odour of which brought the prescription to her memory. Another time the hallucination was of a squirt, whereby she was reminded of her prescription.*

The common objection that in all such cases the absence of memory is only feigned, is set aside by the consideration that the magnetic promise is only a special case of the dependence of the thought upon the will of the magnetiser, and that for this there is not even required an actual state of somnambulism. Hansen laid his hands on his sleeping schoolfellows, and then formed different mental representations, which were transmuted by the sleepers into dream-images, as was proved in the morning when he asked them their dreams. In a company at Berlin, by general agreement, he caused the jeweller Ehrenwerth, who had gone out into the shop to serve a customer, to bring back with him three valuable diamond rings and place them in Hansen’s hand.† An eye-witness told me of an evening party in Norderney, at which a magnetiser compelled a lady to fetch a sponge from a neighbouring apartment, and to wash the face of one of the gentlemen with it. Notwithstanding all her visible reluctance, she could not withstand this mental command. Sceptics of the physiological class, if not convinced by the magnetiser Hansen, will perhaps be more disposed to credit the testimony of Braid upon this point.‡

* Billot: ‘Recherches psychologiques,’ i. 74.
† Zöllner: ‘Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen,’ iii. 556, 532.
The fact that a human brain can convey its impressions by mere will to another, and that the memory of them survives even the change of psychical state, is of such great philosophical importance that its value indeed is inestimable. If man can believe himself to act independently, while he may nevertheless be receiving the impulse from another, unexpressed, will, in this relation of mankind even the problem of human history may possibly find a solution. To some, the history of humanity, like the life-history of individuals, seems to be the resulting product of the interaction of individual wills, equivalent, in dependence on the potencies of Nature, climate, food, etc., to a natural mechanism; others see biological and historical development guided teleologically to an end, and determined by a cause, which we know not. That the latter view is reconcilable with the former, or even if not, is still logically admissible, is apparent from the above cases; for there is only a difference in the mode of conceiving one and the same thought, whether we refer the hidden impulse of our actions to a transcendental Ego, or to Schopenhauer’s Will, or to Hartmann’s Unconscious, or to the Christian God. We may be of this opinion or that, yet since the impulse to action does not always lie in our sense and brain consciousness, we may agree with Lichtenberg, that ‘On this globe we serve an end, the attainment of which cannot be hindered, though all mankind conspired against it.’

8. The Association of Psychical States with Ideas.

Loss of memory on waking, with revival of the former ideas of the sleep on return to it, is a
mark of the completely-developed somnambulic condition. The more dissimilar the psychical states, and the more decidedly they are divided, the more exclusive of each other is the circle of ideas; in other words, the closer is the association of particular states with the ideas awakened by them. In accordance with this rule are the phenomena of recurrent and continued dreams in ordinary sleep. A hypnotised person was made, by whispering, to dream that he was engaged in the anatomy of a section, and then that he was frightened by a lion in the Zoological Gardens. Being hypnotised a second time on the same day, all the gestures and motions recurred, and in the same order, as in the dream of the morning; and on waking it appeared that the whole dream had returned. In the night it recurred for the third time in normal sleep.* The same or a related state thus draws after it the same ideas; and, on the other hand, this association explains the fact that every revived idea tends to induce the state by which it was before excited. Nor is that difficult to understand, for no recollection is isolated, but draws after it, according to the laws of association, many others with which it was once connected; and as all these ideas revive with more or less of their original interest, the earlier psychical state to which they belonged must be more or less excited by them. This is seen not only in the ordinary dream, but even in waking life, which is by no means uniformly the same psychical condition, since every impact of memory tends by its interest to restore the state to which it refers.

Sitting in public, and given over to our own

* Heidenhain: 'Der sogenannte thierische Magnetismus,' 58.
thoughts, it is possible to apprehend nothing of a loud conversation at a neighbouring table. Attention is not aroused by it, but that the clatter of words has nevertheless reached our ear is at once apparent if the conversation takes a turn interesting to us, or if one's own name is mentioned. This name, associated with so much of our ordinary life, is the most effective of memorial impacts, bringing us at once out of the state of absorption to one of attention and circumspection. Thence it happens that sleep-walkers awake if their name is called, often to their destruction, if the normal Ego has not grown into the situation of the moment. Many somnambules, also, can be awakened by the utterance of their names. Next to our names, those ideas are best adapted to excite the state formerly associated with them, which are of particular interest to us and have once deeply moved us.

It often happens that we suddenly wake out of our first sleep, because in the incipient dream an object intrudes, which, being an actual memory, recalls the psychical condition (waking) of its former perception. Other ideas will often suffice to awaken us, when they lead by association to the memory of real life. If sleep has reached a certain depth, this impact of memory will only produce the effect in case the idea is of psychical importance, and elicits our desire to awake. If of a painful nature, our eyelids are even slowly raised, as often as this easily excited idea is suggested. The thoughts which prevent sleep are also those which interrupt it, resembling those attendants in the cell of a prisoner condemned to death by sleeplessness, who recall him to consciousness as soon as he closes his eyes.
Now, this phenomenon, that fragments of memory from a dissimilar condition tend to reproduce that condition itself, is exalted in the relation of somnambulism to waking life. By the same law, according to which an access of waking memory in sleep awakens, conversely, somnambulism returns with the recurrence of a somnambulic memory in waking. A somnambule after her recovery knew nothing of her magnetic state, but whenever inconsiderately reminded of it, she immediately retired and slept. On every conversation about her condition, not only in her presence, but if only in the house, she either became uneasy or fell asleep.* A somnambule of Kerner, having in the crisis announced the arrival of her father, and then awakened, fell again into somnambulism on some one inadvertently saying that it did not seem as if her father would come that day. The same thing happened during a walk in the garden, when a child who was with her spoke of a knife lying in the manure-pit, of which she herself had spoken in the crisis.† On one occasion in the crisis she was much amused by a clairvoyant perception of the maid plucking a duck in the kitchen of the upper floor. She indicated parts where the roots of the feathers had been carelessly left in, her account being confirmed when they went up to look. Sitting at tea in the evening with the family, that duck was served up, when she suddenly cried out: 'There are the roots in the duck of which I dreamt last night!' sprang up and hastened, in a state of somnambulism, to bed.

* 'Archiv,' iv. 1, 83, 86.
† Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 320, 288.
She explained that the sight of the duck had re-induced the condition.*

The same relation rules between the deep sleep (Hochschlaf) and somnambulism. Werner’s somnambule having passed from the latter condition to the former on hearing music, returned to her ordinary somnambulism when it ceased, having then no knowledge of her words in the deep sleep, and said that even Albert (her visionary guardian, product of the dramatic severance) would not tell them to her, for if she heard them she would at once fall again into the deep sleep, which was not good for her.†

That other states also can be induced by fragments of memory from them is shown by the insane. It is necessary to avoid speaking to them, after their recovery, of their earlier illness, because not only are they thus disquieted, but they may even relapse. A young man had become insane from seeing, after many years’ separation, his affianced bride, whom he had believed faithful, the wife of another man, and a nursing mother. Being cured, he knew nothing of his early love, but the whole memory returned on once seeing a woman suckling an infant.‡ The Abbot Eleutherius had adopted a ‘possessed’ boy, who while with him was freed from his delusion, but relapsed when the abbot once made an incautious allusion to it.§ This further exemplifies the relation between madness and somnambulism, supporting the opinions of Mesmer and Puységur, that madness is in general only a dis-

† Werner: ‘Schutzgeister,’ 180.
orderly somnambulism, which can accordingly be cured by rightly regulated magnetic treatment.

It seems to me that some light is also thus thrown upon the still unexplained witches' sabbath. It is said that nothing was more harassing to the witches when prepared for their journey than the cry of the night watchman or the ringing of the church bells. At the sabbath itself, no one could make the sign of the cross or utter the name of Jesus; in both cases the spell was broken and the whole assembly disappeared, to the glory of the religion so detested by Satan.* It is easy to see that the broken spell signifies only the awakening from the somnambulic visions, effected by the impact of memories which in the Middle Ages were associated with the most intense interest, even for apostates.

Whoever examines the literature of somnambulism, with its indispensable yet undigested material of observations, will find much in it to convince him of the mischief in magnetic treatment, resulting from the neglect of this association between ideas and the psychical conditions which support them. If somnambulism is to be rightly guided, it must be kept completely separate from the waking state; every impact of inappropriate memory must be avoided, otherwise both conditions will be disturbed by admixture, and the valuable faculties which emerge in somnambulism will either be lost or not developed in their purity. Kerner says: 'Somnambulists should never be told what they have done and said, if their

clairvoyance is to be preserved." It had a very bad effect on the Seeress of Prevorst to be told after waking out of the magnetic sleep what she had said in it, and she then often relapsed into it.† Dr. Wienholt, supposing the crisis to have begun, asked his somnambule if she would be magnetised again in the evening. This occasioned a strong swoon, for hitherto, according to her wish, it had been concealed from her in waking that she was a somnambule. Another subject of the same physician being asked by what signs she knew that her sleep was becoming less complete than formerly, replied that recently she had remembered a great deal from it in waking.‡ A somnambulist said that a magnetic sleep, the full memory of which remained, was of no use for health.§ Of the extraordinary boy, Richard, his brother and physician said after the recovery: 'Richard could never hear or read anything relating to what had passed in the peculiar state of magnetic clairvoyance; even remote references, or expressions which had been then used with a special signification, excited his aversion, though he was conscious of no reason. Thus he got hold of some notes of mine, in which something about his sleep was remarked in an illegible hand. He tore up the paper as soon as he touched it. Casually and thoughtlessly turning over the pages of my poems, he stumbled upon the "Wunderblume," which he had recited in the magnetic sleep, and he flung the innocent little book on the

* Kerner: 'Blätter aus Prevorst,' xii. 21.
† Ibid.: 'Seherin von Prevorst,' 105.
‡ Wienholt: 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 3, 207, 286.
§ 'Archiv,' xii. 1, 89.
floor in a rage."* Fischer, praising the successful
treatment by which a clergyman had restored a
cataleptic girl, adds that the chief points of this
treatment were: never disturbing the patient in any
somnambulic action, but rather assisting her in what-
ever she would do; while in the waking state treat-
ing her as quite well, and encouraging her to uninter-
rupted occupations with her duties.† He thus kept the two conditions completely apart by
preventing all retrospection. Ennemoser recommends
that neither in sleep nor waking should somnambulists
receive praise or blame for their seership;‡ and Cham-
pignon cites an instance of the dangerous results from
communicating to a somnambule the phenomena of
her sleep, which excited her anxiety.§

Their own instinct often suggests to somnambulists
precautions for keeping the two dissimilar conditions
apart. A patient of Kerner desired to be left alone
that she might arrange her room again in the same
way, even to the smallest trifles, in which it had been
previous to her illness. She must so see it on waking,
that she might not relapse. With wonderful rapidity
she now put away all the apparatus belonging to her
condition as a sick person; she flung the medicines
out of window, got rid of phials, etc., and placed the
table as it had been before her illness. A chair which
had then been there she fetched at night up a flight of
steps, springing with it into her room without a light
and without collision. They were to give her a cap

* Görwitz: 'Richard's natürlich magnetischer Schlaf,' 145.
† Fischer: 'Der Somnambulismus,' iii. 128.
‡ Ennemoser: 'Mesmerische Praxis,' 482.
§ Champignon: 'Physiologie,' etc., 269.
on her waking, and say that her hair had been cut off by order of the physician. She then lay down in bed, and her somnambulism passed into ordinary sleep, from which she awoke. There was only one person left with her, and she expressed her satisfaction with the cap recommended by the physician. The next day, however, she became again somnambulic, a passer-by in the street pointing her out to another, saying that was Miss St. ——, who was now no longer a somnambule.* Another patient desired that she might not have the report of the physician on her complaint given her to read till after the lapse of a year, as it would trouble her, and she would fall back into the former state.† Regard must also be had to the rapport still partially subsisting between patient and physician even after recovery, as is shown by the instance of a patient who fell into somnambulism again, the physician, eight days subsequent to her recovery, and after she had left, having spoken of her illness.‡

From the necessity of keeping the two conditions separate, it follows, of course, that somnambulists who in the crisis are occupied with the ideas and interests of their daily life, are injured in health, or at least in the development of their somnambulic faculties. Somnambulists who are remunerated for their pre-

* Kerner: 'Gesch. zweier Somnambulen,' 293. [There was in this case a very clear somnambulic memory of antecedent circumstances, since she was able perfectly to re-arrange her room. And as that is commonly the case, the patient often referring in this state to the normal one, it would seem that the same memories which would awaken from light sleep have not that effect in the deeper sleep of somnambulism.—Tr.]

† 'Archiv,' v. 1, 42.

‡ *Ibid.,* vii. 2, 144.
scriptions must gradually lose the gift, even if it had existed, since to connect this state with a pecuniary consideration is to associate it with the waking state, or to bring it to memory in the latter when the recompense is received. Here, also, the good deed must carry with it its own reward. Puységur, in allowing a somnambule to be placed in rapport with patients for the purpose of prescribing for them, rightly therefore made it a condition that there should be no remuneration, nor even thanks, since such reminders of the somnambulic state must excite her surprise and displeasure. The complete separation of the two states is the chief condition for the pure development of somnambulism. And so Puységur recommended, that even when somnambulists prescribed for themselves, the origin of the prescriptions should be concealed from them. It is not easy to persuade an intelligent person, who has neither anatomical nor physiological knowledge, that any benefit could accrue from following prescriptions self-given in sleep, since the absent knowledge must appear indispensable without such an explanation of the health-instinct, and of its development in the particular case, as would build a bridge of memory between the two states. The somnambulist should therefore be left in the belief that the prescriptions are due to the insight of the physician, and the latter should be allowed to accept the credit.*


As a sentence written on a clean surface is more legible than if new letters are confused with old ones,

* Puységur: 'Recherches,' etc., 369, 407.
so, for the reception of a theory, the head should first be cleared of antagonistic views. To evince the existence of a transcendental consciousness it must therefore first be shown that the facts of memory are not explicable from the ordinary consciousness.

Plato, in the 'Theaetetus,' compares memory with the impression left by a seal upon wax. We think and know what has been impressed as long as the copy of it lasts; but if that is obliterated, or if the impression could not be made, there is forgetfulness or ignorance.* This image, which Plato uses, not to explain, but to illustrate, physiologists who recognise only the sensory consciousness must needs take literally. According to that, memory would depend on material brain-traces, left behind by impressions; by the act of memory such traces are continually renewed, re-chiselled as it were, and so there arise well-worn tracks, in which the coach of memory is conducted with especial facility.

The deductions from this view had already been drawn by the materialists of the last century. Hook and others reckoned that, since \( \frac{1}{3} \) of a second sufficed for the production of an impression, in 100 years a man must have collected in his brain 9,467,280,000 traces or copies of impressions, or, reduced by \( \frac{1}{3} \) for the period of sleep, 3,155,760,000, thus in fifty years 1,577,880,000; further, that allowing a weight of four pounds to the brain, and subtracting one pound for blood and vessels, and another for the external integument, a single grain of brain-substance must contain 205,542 traces.† This calculation is about

* Plato: 'Theaet.,' § 33.
† Huber: 'Das Gedächtniss,' 21.
correct in figures, which, however, certainly proves the incorrectness of the hypothesis. If the presupposition that memory has to be explained from the senses and brain-matter leads to such whimsicalities, pretending to be exact science, then every unprejudiced person will give up the presupposition as untenable, and will rather believe in a transcendental consciousness, independent of the brain-matter, than in millions of carbon and nitrogen atoms in the brain, preserving material traces of all impressions, and transmitting them to their successors in the continual regenerative process of our life.

Moreover, our intellectual life does not consist in mere impressions; these form only the material of our judgments. These brain-atoms do not help us to judgment, notwithstanding their magical properties, so that we must suppose that whenever we form a sentence or a judgment, the impressions are combined, like the letters in a compositor's box,* these atoms, however, being at the same time compositor and box.

We will therefore abandon the materialists to their 'exact' amusements, and seek the true theory in the bare analysis of the process which takes place in memory. We have already seen the necessity of distinguishing between reproduction and recollection; and evidently, even if the theory of material brain-traces were true, it would at most explain the reproduction, the re-emergence of an impression, but not at all its recognition. The brain-traces can thus not at all dispense with this latter subjective factor. Re-emergence of an impression and recognition of it are

* Huber, 53.
by no means identical conceptions. The confusion of them was long ago censured by the Greek philosophers. Aristotle says distinctly, that memory is more than the bare return of an old image, being at the same time a knowledge about another image, which is no more present; in memory a present image is known as the copy of an earlier one. Memory—μνημονεύμα—is no mere image of phantasy—φάντασμα—but is connected with the thought that this image is the repetition of an earlier perception.* So also Plotinus says that memory depends, not on the survival of sense-impressions, but on an intellectual activity, the soul being not passive in memory, but active.†

An organ is therefore indispensable, by which the reproduced impressions are also recognised; but this recognition is only possible by comparison, and presupposes that the earlier impression is still present, that is, was not forgotten. The ordinary consciousness does, however, in fact, forget; and we are thus constrained to admit a transcendental consciousness, an organ which not only preserves, but also judges. This organ, as well as all other faculties, may no doubt be ascribed to the carbon atoms; but atoms with such properties are themselves souls, and the materialist escapes from one soul to accept millions of them. And still it remains unaccounted for, how from millions of atoms a single consciousness should result. The theory of material brain-traces leaves therefore, at all events, an unexplained residue: recognition and the unity of consciousness; it only

* Aristoteles: 'On Memory,' c. 1 and 2.
† Plotinus: 'Enneads,' iv. 6. 3.
explains less than the soul theory, but this less at a much greater expense of explanatory means, coming in the end to this, that in place of one soul an accepted millions of atoms, indistinguishable from souls, but which, to save appearances, have been rebaptized by a materialistic name. Thus this theory offends against the most elementary rules of logic, and it again appears that even exact methods of research, when they dispense with logic and philosophy, can lead only to scientific license.

In truth, reproduction occurs very often without recollection, as for instance in the already mentioned dream of Scaliger; the distinction between the acts is therefore no arbitrary one, nor a mere ideal division of a process in reality single, but belongs to the nature of the fact. All recollection happens, moreover, according to the laws of association even between psychically dissimilar states. But if ideas can elicit each other of themselves, the indispensable laws of association make the brain-traces superfluous, and the theory is thus guilty of useless multiplication of principles of explanation.

In short, without a psychical organ behind the sense-consciousness, the process of memory is inexplicable, and it is manifestly the simplest hypothesis to regard this organ, the transcendental consciousness, not only as the storehouse of impressions, but likewise as the active principle in the recognition of them.

There can be no right theory of remembering without the right theory of forgetting. The phenomenon of alternating consciousness shows that very clearly. It is only when we know what becomes of an impression
when it is forgotten, that we can answer the question whence it comes to memory.

Now, what is the process of forgetting? It is a disappearance from the normal sense-consciousness. There can be no destruction of the impression, or its reproduction would be impossible. Excluding the brain-trace theory, there must be a psychical organ, preserving the faculty of reproduction, even if the impression, as product of its earlier activity, should be destroyed. This organ lying beyond the self-consciousness belongs to the unconscious. If, however, this organ had simply the latent faculty of reproduction, and did not rather draw into itself and preserve unchanged the impression as product, we should have again within this organ to distinguish between the conscious and the unconscious. The hypothesis would thus explain nothing, the difficulty being merely pushed back and transposed. There is therefore no alternative but to say that this organ is not in itself at all unconscious, but only so from the standpoint of the sense-consciousness; that it is not merely a latent faculty of reproduction, but takes up into its consciousness the impression, as the latter disappears from the external consciousness. By this admission of a transcendental consciousness, the possibility of memory is explained by the mere transposition of the psycho-physical threshold, with every retreat of the boundary between the sense and the transcendental consciousness. If a forgotten impression sank into a real unconscious, it would not be apparent how in memory this unconscious should suddenly become again conscious. The forgotten, therefore, cannot thereby cease to belong to a con-
sciousness, and since forgetting is the disappearance from the sense-consciousness, we must admit the existence of a second. And so to say that an impression is forgotten means that it has passed over from the sense-consciousness to the transcendental.

The two theories may be compared by application of an image. Materialists say that every impression leaves behind a material brain-trace. Every memory would thus amount to an extension of the sense-consciousness—none other being recognised by the materialist—beyond its former sphere, whereby that old trace is brought to light, being otherwise in darkness. But since in fact it is in the state of sleep that memory is exalted, and that the more as the sleep is deeper—that is, the greater the suppression of the sense-consciousness—this exaltation cannot depend upon an extension of the sense-consciousness, as if the sun by augmentation of its rays should throw them further into a dark room. This image must be a false one, and we must look about for another. Compelled to admit a double consciousness, and to represent forgetting and recollecting alike as a transition from one consciousness to the other, we are driven to the comparison of the sun in relation to a star. When the sun, the sense-consciousness, enlightens, the star is invisible. Nor does it become visible when the extended light-sphere of the sun reaches it; but on the contrary, it is when the sun goes down (when the sense-consciousness is suppressed) that the light of the star is visible; not that it is now first produced, but that it is now first apparent. The double-consciousness is held together by the bond of a common Subject; that is, to continue
the similitude, sun and star form a double star, and move about a common centre of gravity. In somnambulism, as we have seen, the ordinary consciousness is not only preserved, but by revival of forgotten impressions is completed; whereas the ordinary consciousness knows nothing of the transcendental, being divided from it by absence of memory.

Whoever is not content with words in the place of ideas, will agree with me that every theory of memory is unintelligible which speaks of impressions becoming unconscious (in forgetting), and becoming conscious again (in recollection). Such a proceeding can, indeed, as Shakespeare says, be on the tongue but not in the brain.*

Now, as this chief difficulty disappears in the theory here represented, that theory is simpler than any other. In forgetting there is nothing whatever changed in the idea, and this has not in some inconceivable way become unconscious, or even obliterated, but something is indeed changed in the Subject of the man. This Subject has a double-consciousness, so that it falls asunder into two persons, and in forgetting, as in remembering, what takes place is simply a transfer of possession of an idea between these two persons. Not the idea is unconscious, but only one of these persons, the Ego of ordinary consciousness, is unconscious as regards the idea. The theory of remembering thus results from the theory of forgetting, and the greater simplicity of this conception is shown also in this, that it does not present two problems, remembering and forgetting, for solution, as if

* ['Such stuff as madmen Tongue, and brain not.'—Tr.]
they were two fundamentally different psychical acts, but reduces both problems to one, memory and forgetting alike depending on the continual fluidity of the boundary-line between the two persons of the one Subject. Both acts take place only for the sense-consciousness. What we forget is not obliterated as an idea, but remains in the transcendental consciousness; what we remember is not newly produced as an idea, but only emerges into the sense-consciousness.
CHAPTER II.

THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL.

1. The Janus-Aspect of Man.

The transcendental-psychological faculties of man are not his normal possession; they are manifested only in exceptional conditions, which from the standpoint of sense-consciousness and normal existence appear as more or less morbid, but that by no means implies the morbid nature of the faculties themselves. Yet are these exceptional states not to be regarded as a higher condition of man, since the transcendental-psychological faculties are far from completely developed in them, but only emerge as a partial illumination of the psychical world, or like a faint glimmering of the stars in twilight, when they are not yet visible in their pure splendour.

The imperfection of these faculties admits different interpretations of them in relation to their importance; for either this imperfection is inherent, or it is only that the conditions of their manifestation are insufficient, as twilight is insufficient for the bright light of the stars. In the latter case, the faculties being in themselves complete, and only the conditions of their appearance defective, the problem belongs at once to the philosophy which has to explore the transcendental being of man; but in the former case,
if these faculties are as incomplete in themselves as they are defective in experience, the problem is in the first instance biological. For even if these faculties have no importance in themselves, and are not to be taken into account for the earthly existence of the individual, they might still be evolutionary, and thus of importance for the race.

In this case we shall understand them by comparison with other indications of the biological process, in common with which they exhibit abnormality, dispensability for the earthly existence, and incomplete development. Now every organism shows such indications, and it is the teaching of Darwin that has thrown light upon them. They are intelligible only from the standpoint of the theory of evolution.

Both views, the philosophical and the biological, must be here examined, and it will then appear whether we have to choose between the two, or whether, perhaps, both are right. A third view is also to be mentioned, since it is an historical one—the mystical. According to the doctrine of the mystics, man is either an angel who by a metaphysical sin has fallen into earthly existence, or at least a man fallen by sin in paradise, who has lost a higher earlier state, to regain which is his task. So that while for biologists the transcendental-psychological faculties are evolutionary germs, the mystic regards them as rudiments which have not been condemned to utter obliteration, but are rather the plank from which the lost condition can be again reached. We can here pass by the question, whether the individual can attain this condition either wholly or partially within the duration of his earthly life; but admitting that man has this
task, his regeneration is attainable only on the same path of the biological process, which biology assigns to the race. Whether we regard the transcendental-psychological faculties as evolutionary germs or as re-developable rudiments, the end remains the same; in the one case we have to gain, in the other to regain.

The question, therefore, is of the relation of transcendental-psychology to evolution, and then to philosophy.

The theory of evolution has hitherto drawn only one of the conclusions inherent in it respecting man; the other has been left out of consideration, and yet it is not only the more important, but it also liberates the theory from the false position by which it has fallen into materialism. Materialism has reinforced itself from Darwinism, whereas it will appear that the Evolution theory does not support, but vanquishes, materialism.

Selecting from the evolutionary succession of earthly life-forms any member whatever, two sides of it come into view. Every life-form in its whole organisation, in its structure, instincts, and habits, refers back to the biological past in which it is rooted. Comparison with past animal forms shows the gradual development of Nature. But on the other side, every plant and animal form is again, as it were, prophetic, and shows the direction in which development by modification of structure, by further differentiation of organs, by changes of habits and instincts, will proceed. As in the reptile-like fishes the later kingdom of actual reptiles is, as it were, pre-announced, so in the kingdom of birds by the numerous kinds of
Pterodactyles dug up in the Jura; the Amphioxus is, as it were, a general programme for the succeeding vertebrate kingdom; and in the family of apes is the final member of the biological evolution announced: man, related by his foot to the gorilla, by his hand to the chimpanzee, by his brain to the ourang—the best proof, by the way, that he descends from no one of these forms.

Now if we would not treat the evolution theory one-sidedly, if we would be logical, we must consider man also from the double point of view. Darwinism has thrown a retrospective glance upon the history of development of the earthly life, but is at no trouble to discover in human nature those indications which are prophetic, and which must be as present with the existing final member of evolution, as with every earlier one. As to every product of nature the indications of future development, no less than the rudiments of the past, are attached, so must man also have his Janus-aspect.

But as a further development of physical organisation beyond the human is highly improbable,* it is to psychical indications in man that we have to look for the field of future evolution. Darwinism has thus dealt with but one half of the task prescribed by the doctrine of evolution; to solve the other, the abnormal functions of the human psyche must be drawn into consideration, and these as appertaining to cognition no less than to will. But as with all earlier life-forms the future development only

* See Wallace's 'Contributions to Natural Selection,' and the author's 'Planetgenbewohnern' ('Darwinist. Schr.' viii., Leipzig, Ernst Günthien Verlag.).
announces itself as from behind a veil, so is it also with man; his more important, biologically prophetic, tendencies can only be seen in germ, and also exceptionally; and we should even antecedently expect that there must be a disturbance in the normal equilibrium of the psychical man, in order that these germinally slumbering tendencies may be disengaged. We have already seen that in dream, somnambulism, in various morbid states, as the delirium of fever, and even in insanity, such phenomena are abundantly observable. In these conditions there come to light capabilities of human consciousness and will which in normal conditions remain latent.

The ‘mystical phenomena’ of human nature, as Perty names them in his excellent compilation, are thus a necessary consequence of the doctrine of evolution. We must expect, in accordance with analogy, that such germinal tendencies slumber in us, and obtain expression with opportunity.

The above point of view appears to be the only one by which these ‘mystical phenomena’ can obtain sense and intelligibility. They point prophetically to the future, like organs forming in the embryo, whose functions come partially into operation years later, or like those germs of larva-life which attain maturity only in a later condition. The alternate generation of animals also presents analogous phenomena.

Now even if,—by an unwarrantable restriction,—such phenomena should be recognised as established only when they are reported by physiologists, psychologists, and physicians of the insane, we should still have an extraordinary wealth of material at our disposal. Yet it must be insisted, that the number
of such cases can be only of slight importance for the honest investigator. If in the North-German plain but one erratic block had been found, geology would have drawn from it the inference that the glacier-world of the north had once advanced its gigantic tongues thus far. And when the first and then single Archæopteryx had been dug out of the Solenhofer slate, all naturalists were agreed that this one example proved the descent of birds from reptiles. Honesty therefore demands that just such importance should be ascribed to a well-proved case of extraordinary function in the human psyche, even were it but one. Just in that case, indeed, if only one single fact of this kind were uncontested, it would have to be preserved in our handbooks of physiology and psychology as carefully as the Archæopteryx in the Museum at London. But honesty demands yet more: if possibly by one such fact our whole materialistic conception of the world should be upset, not only should we not therefore be justified in ignoring it, but rather must it just therefore, if possible, be graven upon marble, for on account of its singularity would it be incomparably more important.

About this there can be no doubt, that we encounter facts within our experience which prove that the principles of explanation of our present science must be multiplied, and in regard to which the words of Schelling apply: 'It is no longer speculation, but Nature herself that disturbs the repose of the old hypotheses.'*

Unhappily this honesty towards facts which directly threaten dominant materialistic conceptions is now

* Schelling: A. ix. 362.
very rare. We have laid down a system of the world like a Procrustes-bed. What fits into it is accepted, what does not is misdealt with till it does, or is altogether ignored. Facts shall be accommodated to our understandings, and it is just exact science which substitutes its subjective horizon for the objective horizon of nature, quite regardless of exactitude in the boundary given it. Every professional scholar allows only that to be possible which is possible according to the laws prevailing in his special department, and thinks himself entitled to apply his short measure even to philosophical problems. But to know the world, he needs, not the microscope, but the telescope; and since the world is an organic whole and every separation of special province is arbitrary, and justified only by the limitation of our energies, to every specialist will apply the saying of (I think) Lichtenberg: 'Whoever understands chemistry alone, does not even understand that.'

Scientific integrity, on the other hand, sounds in what Herschel said: 'The perfect observer will keep his eyes open in all divisions of knowledge, that they may be struck at once by every event which according to accepted theories ought not to happen, for these are the facts which serve as clues to new discoveries.'* This golden precept is, alas! not followed, because, as Schopenhauer said, a framed hypothesis makes us lynx-eyed for all that confirms it, and blind for all that contradicts it. That is unfortunately only too human, but the searcher after truth loses his superiority if he shares this weakness,

* Herschel: 'Introduction to Study of the Natural Sciences,' § 27.
and if he applies his individual faculty of conception as measure to high Nature, she will never reveal to him her greatness.

Men of science with a larger survey, and who are free from the narrowness of the professional specialist, usually meet with less prejudice phenomena which can only be called 'mystical' from the standpoint of our scarcely awakened understanding of nature. Even cultivated laymen bring to them a greater pliability of intellect than the systematist whose intelligence is often trained into a groove. But with the former also we commonly find that they content themselves with an admission that the facts are 'remarkable,' and a quarter of an hour later have forgotten them, simply because they can make nothing of them.

Science has opened up departments in which all the perceptible phenomena are deducible from a few laws. This achievement is most notable in astronomy. Passing on to more complicated fields of phenomena, she has here also exposed a great number of laws. Our most circumspect men of science are far indeed from asserting that there are no facts which fall outside these principles of explanation; they admit that there are other laws than those which we have skimmed from the bare surface of phenomena in the swift advances of science since the time of Bacon. But for the ordinary materialist, the true principle of science, that everything in nature happens according to law, has been converted into another principle, that everything happens according to such laws as we already know in matter, and that other laws there are not. Facts not to be explained by push and pull shall not
exist. But if mankind had always proceeded on this narrow principle of materialists, we should be now still at the standpoint of the Botocudos; and it may from this be inferred how far such a principle would bring us on our future way.

From the fact that man's knowledge about the world has received continual additions, it immediately follows that to every time other truths are given than those hitherto demonstrable. Nevertheless, every generation has been under the prejudice that it stood on the apex of the pyramid, and has supposed all phenomena of nature to be deducible from just those laws known to it, so that all future generations had the mere subordinate task of dragging new stones on to a structure of which the architectural conception was complete. But true progress is not extensive, but vertical; and so it has always been such investigators as were free from this prejudice who have been destined to make revolutionary discoveries. In philosophy this prejudice is termed à priorism, and 'exact' science has been foremost in casting ridicule upon it. Yet this science, if it fails to see that the far more important part of its task is not to subject further phenomena to known laws, but to discover unknown laws, is quite like the à priorist Hegel, who proved that there could not be more than seven planets. 'That which opposes the discovery of truth,' says Schopenhauer, *is not the false appearance proceeding from things and misleading to error, nor even immediately the infirmity of intelligence, but preconception, prejudice, setting its à priori back to truth, and resembling a contrary wind, which drives back

* Schopenhauer: 'Parerga,' ii. § 17.
the ship from the direction in which alone land lies, so that now helm and sail work in vain.'

It cannot be enough insisted upon, that no phenomena are mystical in a true sense, and that it is only we who are this; for possibly even one of so great a mind as Aristotle's would have spoken of mysticism had he been told that in this century an instantaneous correspondence between habitants of different quarters of the world would be possible. Under this protest we can retain the word, and inquire how the mystical phenomena are to be explained. When the spiritualist of the Middle Ages interpreted them religiously, or ascribed them to demoniacal influence, that, at least, was only a false exposition; but far greater is the fallacy when science simply denies them, and that upon à priori grounds. The right relation to them lies midway; we must investigate such phenomena scientifically.

In the whole of nature we find the greatest harmony between the structure of life-forms, their instinctive tendencies, and vital relations, so that from one of these factors the rest can be inferred. Each shows itself an inclusive whole, when it has attained the condition of adaptation. Exceptions are but apparent, only proving that every adaptation is the work of time, that every form occupies a middle station in the kingdom of nature: organs which are more or less obsolescent point to the past; accordingly germinal indications and psychical beginnings are prophetic of the future. We have no right to make man an exception; he also according to his middle station has two sides.

If from rudimentary forms of his anatomical
structure we infer his biological past, we are also obliged to recognise abnormal functions of his Psyche as veiled indications of the future. It can at most be asked, to whom this future belongs, there being logically only three possible hypotheses. The mystical phenomena either denote a higher life-form which will one day exalt the race on earth, or, all nature being conceived as a rising scale, we may suppose that such forms are already to be found on other stars; lastly, our own individual future may be signified in the abnormal faculties.

All three hypotheses are logically admissible, and even compatible; for if man be destined to emerge, like a butterfly, from his present caterpillar state, when the transcendental faculties, of which in his earthly existence he has but an indistinct glimmering, would be his normal possession, this might easily be the very same result to which the biological process on earth is leading. This direction of the biological process would even be the inevitable one, if, as is always conceivable, the theory of transmigration of souls has a germ of truth. If the transcendental subject were destined to return repeatedly into the earthly existence, if these successive existences were so connected, according to the law of Conservation of Energy, that we brought our moral and intellectual dispositions from one existence to the other, these dispositions and the physical aptitudes being a cooperating factor in the formation of the organism with which we clothed ourselves, then would our individual development have at the same time the aim of preparing the future type of planetary man. But the second hypothesis is also consistent with the other
two; for from the different ages of the different planets result also differences in the elapsed periods of the biological processes upon them, so that we can suppose both stars which have not yet arrived at the earth's organic stage, and others which have already surpassed it.

The abnormal functions of human consciousness claim therefore the same regard as their counterpart, the rudimentary organs. They cannot be a complete contradiction in the human soul, since such contradictions are to be found in no living being. Nor can it be denied, on the other hand, that they do not quite harmonise with the earthly existence, which could dispense with them. The explanation of them can therefore only lie in the fact that our existence is an intermediate condition. Phenomena of an unconnected and meaningless character in this there cannot be, and it is therefore in the future that we must place their significance. If we leave out of consideration the butterfly of the future, the chrysalis change of the caterpillar will also seem to us meaningless. Whenever we meet with such irrationality we should always be disposed to ascribe it, not to Nature, but to her interpreters.

As the young boar, before his tusks have grown, pushes about him already as if they were there, or as

"Before the calf's projecting horns have shown upon its front,
It pushes angrily therewith attacking foes,\"*

so similar phenomena, which might be added from the early life and embryo state of organisms, reveal their meaning only to those inquirers who keep the

future of organisms before their eyes. This, however, is the standpoint which we have to take up in regard to analogous cases from our psychical region, if we would relate man seriously to nature, and would be in earnest with the evolution theory. For as Kant says: 'All natural dispositions of a creature are destined to complete and teleological evolution. With all animals this is confirmed as well by external as by internal or anatomical observation. An organ without a function, an aimless arrangement, is a contradiction to the teleological doctrine of nature; for if we depart from that principle we have no longer conformity to law, but an aimlessly sportive nature, and disconcerting chance takes the place of the guidance of reason.'*

However highly we may estimate the exaltation of human consciousness through the historical progress of the sciences, the exaltation of those mystical accessions is only to be attained by a biological change in the human life-form, or of the brain, and such, that sensibility is exalted by a further displacement of the threshold. But if the human species is in the biological sense capable of evolution, this disposition must exist also in the single individual, i.e., the threshold of sensibility must be movable. There must thus be the possibility of realising this disposition, of an actual removal of the threshold, and from this must evidently result important conclusions concerning the nature of things, and of man who reacts upon their influence.

It was Anton Mesmer who discovered this capacity of sensibility, and he was very clear as to the results

* Kant, vii. 1, 319.
to which it led. He adduces examples from the displacement of the threshold of taste and smell.*

Now if sleep is the condition of this displacement, the degree of the latter must depend on the depth of the former, the magnetic sleep being thus especially favourable. But this phenomenon can only be utilised for science when the sleeper can inwardly awaken and communicate his feelings. This happens in somnambulism. Mesmer does not speak of this in his books, but from his Aphorisms it is clear that he knew it.† He kept silence upon this knowledge, as did formerly the Egyptian and Grecian priests of the temple of Æsculapius. This is expressly confirmed by his pupil Christian Wolfart, tutor at the Berlin University.‡

The mystical phenomena thus become intelligible from the movability of the threshold of sensibility. They are transcendental faculties, reactions of the soul, conformable to law, on external influences which remain normally unconscious because going on below the threshold. When these influences are unfelt, there is also no reaction, and therefore it is one and the same threshold which hides from our consciousness the transcendental world, and from our self-consciousness the transcendental subject.

The mystical phenomena of the soul-life are therefore anticipations of the biological process, and so there is an intimate connection between Darwinism and transcendental psychology.

Darwinism has become a determining idea for the

† Ibid., §§ 254-257, 264.
‡ Wolfart: 'Erläuterungen zum Mesmerismus,' Vorrede.
natural science of our day. I have truly nothing to object to this, and prejudice against this doctrine can scarcely be imputed to me, since in both my treatises on the Philosophy of Astronomy* I have not only attempted to prove indirect teleological selection within cosmical physics, and to sketch cosmical biology in the sense of a monistic theory of development, but am also much disposed to accept the capability for evolution of the transcendental Subject in the sense of a metaphysical Darwinism. But it is not to be denied that, in our feverish anxiety to measure nature with the Darwinian scale, we are in danger of forgetting that Darwinism is only one half of the Evolution theory, and that thus it does not offer us the only and decisive word, when the question is of man's place in nature. It is a merely arbitrary proceeding, to accept a theory, but to detach from it its weightiest consequences. That, however, is what is done by the materialists, therein resembling people who retail an anecdote but forget the point.

We can now turn to the philosophical consideration of the transcendental faculties, in which they appear as anticipations of our future existence.

2. The Transcendental Subject.

The materialistic hypothesis that the human mind is dependent on corporal matter, primarily the brain, is supported by as many phenomena as the opposite spiritualistic hypothesis, which makes body depend

on mind. It follows that there is no general causal connection between body and mind, neither being conditioned by the other, but that there is merely a parallelism of their changes, which is only possible if both are derivative from a common cause; we must therefore accept a pre-established harmony in the sense of Leibnitz.

The dualism of body and mind is only a special case of the dualism of matter and force, to resolve which is the task of natural philosophy, and only secondarily of transcendental psychology. If the dualism of matter and force is resolvable, is thus not objective in the nature of things, it must reside subjectively in the nature of the Psyche. Matter and force in their disunion, as dead matter and immaterial force, are mere abstractions of the mind, are therefore never in experience found apart, and their apparent dualism is referable to a dualism in our powers of perception, since it pertains to the position of the psycho-physical threshold whether the force side or the material side of the nature of things is perceived, they being always present together, and only distinguishable in thought. Every force acting upon us must thus have its material side, even if it is not sensible to us. What is for us insensible is not therefore immaterial. And it is only a being for whom the action of some forces does not pass the threshold of sensibility, for whom they are thus not sensibly, but only intelligibly apprehended, that can accomplish this ideal separation of force and matter; such abstractions, on the other hand, being impossible to a being that is not dualised by a threshold of sensibility, for whom therefore all forces acting on
him would arrive at sense perception. For such a being even thought directed upon him must be represented materially, resembling, perhaps, an hallucination. Where, on the contrary, there is a threshold of sensibility, it must depend on the intensity of the action whether we perceive nothing or have palpable matter.

Until this view prevails, we have no right to call ourselves monists; but least of all is materialism monistic, for force and matter are its last words in the analysis of every natural phenomenon, and thus it remains in a dualism which for it is unresolvable. It moreover appears that exact science itself leads to the monistic conception in the above sense. In the writings of Crookes and Jaeger* there seems to be already indicated a physical and chemical science, in which force and matter no longer appear as heterogeneous things, inextricably coupled, but only as the extreme terminal forms on one line. If, however, the dualism of matter and force is suppressed, all metaphysic must from the standpoint of another faculty of perception be only physics, and the question, whether to man metaphysical insight into the nature of things be possible, must be answered in the affirmative, if the threshold of his sensibility should prove to be displaceable.† But this is the case in somnambulism; in which condition, therefore, forces are sensibly perceptible, as, for instance, the odic streams of light connected with magnetic passes. We cannot, however, assign the boundary of the possible; and

† [This must not be taken to mean that the 'thing-in-itself' is penetrable, i.e., that ontology is attainable, by any possible sense, all sensible representation being necessarily phenomenal.—Tr.]
if all matter is visible force, and all force invisible matter, it will then depend simply on the position of the threshold, whether I can read the thought of another, or whether I not even feel its impact.

Thus if materialists apply to the conception of matter just the scale of human sensibility, holding reality and perceptibility to be coincident, that is purely arbitrary, with equal right could matter be measured by the scale of another sensibility, with the assertion that there is neither gaseous nor fluid matter, and that only such things are material by which a head can be broken. But it is just as inadmissible to conceive as supersensuous, in the spiritualistic meaning, what is imperceptible; for from the standpoint of another sensibility the hippopotamus might be called supersensuous.

Our senses, therefore, are a quite arbitrary and relative scale by which to assign the boundary between matter and force, body and mind. Each sensibility—that is, each threshold of sensibility, draws the boundary at a different place. Below all senses there must be the insensible, and the aggregate conditions of solid, fluid, and gaseous are only condensed products of a fourth aggregate condition, which Faraday and Crookes term radiant matter, and in which matter—from the standpoint of our sensibility—appears volatilised into bare force.

The ultimate elements of matter thus require to be highly condensed in order to be perceptible by our sensibility. But the more the material side of a thing presents itself to us, as in a block of granite, the more its force side disappears from us, and we then speak of dead matter. The more, on the other
hand, the force side emerges, as, for instance, in thought, the more its material side disappears, and we then speak of immaterial forces. But it is quite inadmissible to regard this ideal distinction of force and matter, mind and body, as a real separation, and to hypostasize these two sides of a thing as independent.

The normal condition of man depends on the normal position of the threshold of his sensibility, which determines the given boundary for him between force and matter. Now, as by every displacement of the threshold this boundary also is displaced, the solution of the dualism between force and matter must result from the study of transcendental psychology in the special case of the opposition of body and mind; since the transcendental Subject must be regarded as the common cause of body and mind. If I think a thought, this is a proceeding of which only the force side lies in my self-consciousness; on the other hand, could this process be observed from without, what would be perceived would be merely molecular changes in a brain, the material side of the process alone being visible. The interior observer will the more easily incline to spiritualism, and deny the material side; the external observer more to materialism, and to denial of the force side. In truth, the two sides of the process are indivisible.

If by the displacement of the threshold in somnambulic conditions there ensue not only new influences of things upon us, but also new reactions of our Subject upon these influences, our psychical Subject therein shows itself in greater extension than in waking. Therefore in our self-consciousness is re-
vealed, not our whole Subject, but only our Ego posited in the phenomenal world, only those psychical reactions to which occasion is given by the influence of sensibly perceptible things, while those faculties which correspond to influences remaining below the threshold remain ordinarily latent. We have therefore to distinguish our transcendental Subject from the Ego, the self-consciousness of sense. Now in this Subject, à priori to our whole sense-phenomenon, the dualism between our organism and organically mediated consciousness is certainly annulled; but in its place there arises only another and deeper dualism, that between the transcendental being on the one side, and our organic phenomenal form with its sense-consciousness on the other side. In this dualism a geometrical problem is thus as it were changed into a stereometric one, and the task is now before us, first closely to show the existence of this stereometric dualism, but then to resolve it monistically.

Not only philosophy, especially Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious, but the natural sciences themselves, in their investigations concerning reflex movement, the curative force of Nature, instinct, genius, unconscious inferences in sense-perception, etc., have sunk posts to some depth into the dark region of the Unconscious, raising long since a suspicion that the weightiest problems may there issue in solution, and particularly the question how the Unconscious is to be conceived, whether pantheistically, or individually through proof of a transcendental Subject, with readoption of the doctrine of soul in a modified form. If in this Unconscious a Will side is encountered, we shall first fall into the
arms of Schopenhauer; if, on the other hand, we encounter ideation, the tendency will be first to Hartmann. But if both aspects are demonstrable in our Unconscious—and otherwise it certainly ceases to be individual—then between our sensuous phenomenal form, and the still thinkable all-one World-being, a transcendental Subject will be interposed. But from this all-one World-Substance a merely willing transcendental Subject would differentiate itself much less distinctly than one which was also ideational, and therefore in transcendental-psycho-logical researches the accent must be rather upon the ideational side, i.e., prominence must be given to the dualism between sense-consciousness and transcendental consciousness, even should the monistic solution of this opposition be thereby rendered more difficult.

Transcendental psychology has therefore chiefly to investigate the transcendental consciousness lying beyond the normal consciousness, as the former is observable in exceptional cases by the displacement of the threshold of sensibility. Its manifestation being, as a rule, at the expense of the sense-consciousness, in sleep and related conditions, sleep it is, or rather dream occurring in sleep, that forms the portal to the dark region where we are to find the metaphysical root of man.

It has already been remarked, that one very usual phenomenon of sleep-life forces the inquirer in this direction. That is, since every dialogue in dream is evidently only a dramatised monologue arising from a severance of the dreaming Subject, it is logically thinkable and psychologically possible that the human Subject might even in reality be dualised
into two persons, of which one only would be accessible to our self-consciousness. It is thus by appeal to a fact of nightly experience that the possibility is first expressed that the sundering of one Subject into two persons might be the metaphysical formula for the explanation of man. The inquiry concerning 'dramatic self-sundering in dream' is thus the foundation of all transcendental-psychology.

But through the further inquiry concerning 'the metaphysical application of Dream,' to the bare possibility of a transcendental Subject in us, is now added its great probability. As the consciousness, so also the self-consciousness can only in course of gradual biological evolution adapt itself to its object. The principle of the psycho-physical threshold of sensibility, which, since Fechner, has played so large a part in the theory of consciousness, must thus be applied to that special case of consciousness which we name the self-consciousness.

The falling asunder of our Subject into two persons would, however, be not only possible and probable, but it would be certain, and would be therefore the metaphysical formula for the explanation of man, were faculties of the soul, exceeding those of the sense-consciousness, demonstrable. In this case the reality of the transcendental Subject would be proved. Even for this our past inquiries have prepared us. In the chapter on 'The Transcendental Measure of Time,' we have learnt to know this Subject in relation to the form of cognition. The doctrine of Kant, that time is a form of our consciousness, was confirmed, but so far limited to the sense-consciousness as the swift course of representations in dramatic dreams affords experimental
proof of a transcendental measure of time. This result has value also in another respect. For Kant says, that in all phenomena only so much true science is to be found as they contain mathematics, that therefore the doctrine of the soul remains remote from the rank of a true science, because mathematic is not applicable to the laws of the inner sense, for one would have to bring into statement the law of continuity in the flow of its inner representations . . . for the pure inner intuition, in which the phenomena of the soul should be constructed, is time, which has only one dimension.* But now if we see that these representations do not always run off with equal rapidity, and that in dream there takes place in them a process of condensation, we are led to suspect a relation between the rapidity of the flow, on the one side, and the strength of the excitation, as well as the not in all conditions similar sensibility, on the other side. The hope, justified moreover by Fechner’s Psycho-physics, may therefore be entertained that the doctrine of the soul also may still be capable of mathematical treatment.

But even in regard also to the content of the cognition, the reality of a transcendental Subject has already resulted from the foregoing chapters. In that on Dream a Physician’ it has been shown to possess a cognitional content which is wanting to the sense-consciousness. It is indifferent to the main purpose, whether we refer these inner representations to the ganglionic system itself, which plays so large part in somnambulism, or whether we will recognise only

* Kant: ‘Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft,’ Vorrede.
the brain as an organ of ideation. In the latter case the ganglionic system would be simply the place of origin of those excitations which are at the foundation of the new cognitional matter, while these excitations, the ganglia being no longer isolated from the brain, would be transmitted to the latter, and would there evoke their echo, as it were, in the form of ideas. Now since for this brain the ideas emerge from the unconscious,* they must unavoidably take on the form of the dramatic sundering of the Ego, that is, be placed in the mouth of the inspiring guides and guardian spirits of the somnambulists. That happens in fact very often, but not always, and therefore the question as to the organ of these ideas remains an open one.

The explanatory formula of the 'dramatic sundering of the Ego' has therefore a remarkable double aspect. On the one hand it has a highly sceptical application; for if in dream the dreamer's Subject can apparently fall asunder into two persons, the guardian spirits of the somnambulists can be similarly explained. But if in the somnambulic dream should be mingled ideas which could not have had their origin in the sense-consciousness, we must, whether they take the form of dialogue or not, admit an Ego lying behind the self-consciousness, an alter Ego, and then the severance of the Subject into two persons would be truly the metaphysical formula for the explanation of man. Now, 'Dream as physician' has exhibited ideas of this foreign nature; thus must our

* [That is, are not associated with any antecedent consciousness. It seems desirable to point to this as the test of ideas, etc., impelled into the consciousness mediated by the normal organ.—Tr.]
Subject necessarily exceed the periphery of self-consciousness, that is, the reality of the transcendental Subject is proved.

Finally, in the chapter on 'Memory,' we have had to attribute to the transcendental Subject a peculiar cognitional content. It has thereby become manifoldly clear that psychical man can be subjected to experiment. We can thus entertain the hope that psychology also will attain the rank of an experimental science, on an equality with physics and chemistry. Only so, however—as appears from the chapter on 'Somnambulism'—shall we be able to solve the riddle of man. As certain as it is that without these means that riddle must always remain dark, so probable is it that with this aid of experimental psychology we shall yet solve it, in agreement with that fine sentence of Bacon's: 'As the genius of a man is not known or valued till it is excited to display; or as Proteus did not assume his different forms till it was attempted to bind him, so Nature, stimulated and confined by art, shows herself more manifestly than when abandoned to herself.'*

Now, the condition in which the Protean transcendental Subject can be stimulated is somnambulism. It is not alone animal magnetism which can awaken this condition; there are other causes which also introduce it: as disturbances of the cerebral life, a high tension of imaginative power, profound internal agitation, and likewise inspiration of certain vapours, the use of different vegetable substances, and the influence of minerals. So that somnambulism is by no means historically confined to the knowledge of

* Bacon: 'De Augmentis Scientiarum,' 51, 2.
animal magnetism. We find it in all times. Somnambulism is the fundamental form of all mysticism. It explains to us different phenomena of remote and classical antiquity, it delivers to us the key to the understanding of the most remarkable documents of mankind: the Vedas and the Bible. But especially is it the period of mediaeval culture, from the comprehension of which our modern enlightenment is more remote than ever, which we learn to understand in the study of somnambulism. Without this, not only enchantment and witchcraft, but also Christian mysticism, remain problematic; for it is from somnambulism that magic of whatever quality sets out.

Although the foregoing inquiries yield not much more than the bare proof of a transcendental Subject, nevertheless their results have already supplied sufficient data for gradually laying the foundation for that conception of the world which results from the premisses hitherto obtained.

If there is no true dualism of force and matter, then neither can the transcendental Subject be a pure spiritual being, nor the transcendental world a pure immaterial world. There can thus be no pure spiritual rapport between this being and this world, but transcendental physics on the side of nature will awaken transcendental psychology on the side of the Subject.

As, then, to our sense-organism correspond the laws of physics known to us, so to our transcendental Subject correspond those properties of things, conformable to law, which for us are transcendental, and can only be perceptible by a displacement of the threshold of sensibility (whether through somnam-
bulism or through biological exaltation), whereby
the barrier of our present sensibility is thrust back;
for biologically, it is only a question of time, when the
supersensuous will obtain sensible evidence, and the
transcendental faculties will become normal.

Following the lead of a celebrated man of science,
there is in recent times much talk of the bounds of
natural knowledge, because there are still men of
science who consider it unnecessary to study Kant.
Kant has shown that and why there are not bounds
of natural knowledge, but certainly limits,* and that
the difference between these two conceptions is very
real and important. He says: 'As long as the cog-
nition of reason is homogeneous, determinate bounds
to it are inconceivable. In mathematic and in natural
philosophy human reason admits of limits, but not of
bounds, viz., that something indeed lies without it at
which it can never arrive, but not that it will at any
point find completion in its internal progress. The
enlarging of our views in mathematic, and the possi-
bility of new discoveries, are infinite; and the same
is the case with the discovery of new properties of
nature, of new powers and laws, by continued ex-
perience and its rational combination. But limits
cannot be mistaken here, for mathematic refers to
phenomena only, and what cannot be an object of

* ['Bounds (in extended beings) always presuppose a space
existing outside a certain determinate place, and enclosing it;
limits do not require this, but are mere negations, which affect a
quantity, so far as it is not absolutely complete.'—Kant's
'Proleg.,' § 57. I have had recourse here, and in the text, to Mr.
Mahaffy's translation of Kant's 'Prolegomena,' though our word
'limits' does not seem to give the full sense of the German
'Schranken' in this place, nor to express the distinction from
'bounds' (Grenzen).—Tr.]
sensuous intention, such as the concepts of metaphysic and morals, lie entirely without its sphere, and it can never lead to them.*

Limits of natural knowledge are therefore given by the very nature of our organ of cognition, sense, and brain, and are only surpassable so far as there is a shiftability of the threshold of sensibility. Boundaries of natural knowledge can be overcome in the historical progress of science, because herein 'the knowledge of nature is homogeneous;' limits, on the other hand, apart from somnambulistic conditions, can only be overcome biologically.† In somnambulism the limit is individually movable, in the process of nature biologically; at the foundation of both processes is the movability of the threshold in relation to consciousness. Thus in somnambulism we belong

* Kant: 'Prolegomena,' § 57.
† [Kant, however, was speaking of the distinction between phenomena and 'things-in-themselves.' The biological process might indeed, by providing new subjective conditions of perception, bring within the field of phenomena for us what are at present no such objects; but this enlargement of the sphere of our cognition would not reveal the thing-in-itself, in place of the mere 'object,' unless our cognition ceased to be conditioned by forms (Time and Space) which are referable to the Subject. And though Kant distinctly recognised the possibility of an understanding other than ours, which should be intuitive of the thing in itself, exempt altogether from the necessity of determination by sense for intuition of objects (and which would thus penetrate to the very truth and being of things), it would be a complete misconception of his meaning to suppose that any exaltation of sensibility, or any alteration of the subjective measure of time, revealing a new phenomenal world, would transcend the 'limit' of cognition, or do more than push back its provisional boundaries. The author is undoubtedly right in quoting Kant against those who talk of irremovable boundaries of knowledge, when they mean that our present sensuous cognition cannot be transcended; but on the other hand, the 'limit' affirmed by Kant is not surpassable by any 'biological process.'—Tr.]
individually to that transcendental world* which must also be disclosed by biological exaltation of consciousness.

Biological exaltation of consciousness signifies a gradual adaptation to the as yet still transcendental order of things; in this adaptation there must therefore happen an approximation to the condition of consciousness of those beings who belong to that transcendental order of things. We are ourselves, however, as Subjects, in this position; the biological exaltation can therefore only take place by appropriation from the transcendental consciousness. The sixth sense of the eventual man of the future could only be such as we already possess as transcendental beings; it is one and the same world in which we are as transcendental beings, and to which the future man will be adapted. Both somnambulism and the biological process change stimuli below the threshold into feelings above it. Therefore in the faculties of somnambulists lie not only veiled indications of the nature of our Subject, but also of the future earthly life-form, and—as far as this may be elsewhere already realised—of the inhabitants of other stars.

The reader who is acquainted with my work on 'The Inhabitants of Planets,' will now understand that by this work I was necessarily introduced to the problem of mysticism; no great mental transition being required to see that our abnormal faculties might be normal for other beings; and especially from the standpoint of the Evolution theory, the extension, cosmically, of the conception of the movable

* [Which is not to be confounded with the noumenal world.—Tr.]
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 145

threshold of human sensibility in abnormal states, and in the biological process, is very natural. Therewith is the ground-plan sketched for a monism of the cosmical life, showing an interior connection of the different phenomenal forms of life in the kosmos, as physical astronomy has restored an outer connection for the scene of life by the discovery of gravitation, and the proof by spectral analysis of the similarity of cosmical substances.

If there takes place biological adaptation to the same transcendental world to which we as Subjects already belong, the identity of both worlds being apparent from the fact that this Subject is the true quintessence and supporter of our phenomenal earth-form, then must this quintessence, as the monistic cause at once of our bodily phenomenon and of our earth-consciousness, determine, both organically and mentally, the future man, and conduct him further and further into the transcendental mode of existence. The difficulty that we are so disposed to think of every supersensuous existence as immaterial, and of every material existence as one of gross substance, disappears when we recognise the dualism of force and substance as existing only for the mode of perception. If force and substance are only two inseparable sides of one thing, we cannot disclaim materiality altogether for our transcendental Subject, even if only in the sense of a fourth aggregate condition; we can but conceive in the bosom of the biological future an organism of a mode of existence like that of our Subject. If thus considering the question we proceed from nature, we can already recognise in the succession of her kingdoms, from the stone, through the
vegetable and animal up to man, a continual material attenuation; proceeding from the transcendental Subject, we cannot logically represent its existence, as we attain to it in death, as diametrically different from the earthly. The distinction between the condition before and after death must be taken to be as slight as it is admissible to think it; according to logical rules, it is the greater, not the lesser, difference which requires proof. But this difference is relatively small if there is no dualism of force and matter, and so the latter must be attributed to the transcendental Subject; whereas it would be great were the transcendental being a purely spiritual nature. Of a pure spirit, however, we can form no conception, as Kant shows in the beginning of his ‘Dreams of a Ghost-Seer;’ immortality first becomes conceivable when we reject all dualism of force and matter, body and mind. Beckers says: ‘The bare general conception of immortality, without any conception of the how, can have no scientific signification; were it therefore really impossible scientifically to conceive post-mortem existence, immortality must be given up altogether as an object of possible knowledge, for both doctrines stand in indissoluble connection, the “if” not being here to be solved without the “how.”’ *

Now, if we drop the dualism of force and matter, this ‘how’ will no more be quite unintelligible; but the transcendental existence will be brought still nearer to the earthly if we consider that the faculties of that existence are not first acquired at death, but

* Beckers: ‘Mitteilungen aus Valentin Löscher,’ etc., ii., Vorrede, Augsburg, 1835.
are already unconsciously possessed, and that in somnambulism, as an anticipation of death, we have already an intimation of them. Death cannot bring about a fundamental change in our physical substance, contradicting the continuity which we find in all nature; but it can indeed disclose latent faculties, since it removes the obstacle to their disclosure. Now, this obstacle is the bodily organisation and its consciousness; the somnambulic faculties do not obtain expression by means of the body, but in spite of it; it is therefore superfluous ballast for the supporter of our transcendental faculties, as for the future biological life-form. To both the latter we can only attribute such a materiality as from the standpoint of our gross senses would appear bare force. This representation of the future man does not, indeed, admit of strict proof. If biological progress on the earth should be historically solved (perhaps on the condition of continual brain-development), then could transcendental psychology and Darwinism be harmonised with Schelling's doctrine of immortality, which rests on the idea of a succession of three conditions of the collective human life; the first step being the present one-sided natural life, the second the one-sided spiritual mode of existence, the third the union of the natural and the spiritual life.* In this third life the transcendental faculties would thus be in normal possession within a planetary mode of existence.

As for the condition of the Subject, so also for that of the transcendental world, the least possible difference from the world of sense must be adopted; it cannot be toto genere different from the latter, but

must in its sort be likewise material. If we would be really monists, and would drop the dualism of force and matter, we must assent to Schelling’s statement that ‘every other or spiritual world must in its nature be as physical as this present physical world in its nature is spiritual.’* A closer representation of that world is, however, not possible, because it would require senses corresponding to it. There still sticks to us the prejudice derived from the catechism, of conceiving the transcendental world as a kingdom of spirits, and as a 'beyond' specially separated from the 'here'; and now because this conception has been exploded by modern science, we have 'shaken out the child with the bath,' and are become materialists. But as the transcendental Subject is itself in us, and rules the unconscious soul-life, so also is the transcendental world in the world of sense. The 'beyond' is only a beyond for our threshold of sensibility, a mere complementary part of the here; as biologically constituted, we are only adapted to this part of the here, while the beyond is related to our cognitional apparatus as the experimentally provable prolongations of the solar spectrum to the eye, whose adaptation has extended only to the rainbow colours. We cannot limit the conception of the threshold of sensibility to the particular senses, but must have regard to our total organisation as a limit to cognition. As the oyster, for instance, possesses in its organism a threshold which shuts it out from the greater part of our sensible world, so also the human organism forms a threshold against the transcendental world. Of a spatial beyond we can only so far speak as, combining

* Schelling: Werke, A. ix. 94.
Kant and Darwin, we must recognise in space-dimensions biologically acquired cognitional forms, so that we approach the thought of a fourth dimension into which the transcendental world would still extend itself. If our organism draws a barrier across the actual, that concerns not only our particular senses, but also their central seat, the brain, with its cognitional forms of space and time. Other grounds, moreover, there are for the hypothesis of a fourth dimension; Kant contributes philosophical, Gauss and Riemann mathematical, and Zöllner cosmological, reasons for it, and with such patronage it can dispense with the approval of the so-called 'enlightened.'

The question, from how much of reality the threshold of sensibility shuts us off, must refer not only to consciousness, but also to self-consciousness. That is to say, it is one and the same threshold which excludes the transcendental world as also the transcendental Subject. Kant himself was very clear upon this. In relation to self-consciousness, he has, as we shall see later on, set up the profound distinction of our Subject from our Person; in relation to consciousness, however, he says:

'As it cannot be said that something is a part of a whole, if it has no connection whatever with the other parts (for otherwise there would be no discoverable difference between a true and an imaginary union), but the world is truly composite; a substance unconnected with anything in the whole world will belong not at all to the whole world—it is no part of it. If there are many such beings out of connection with things of the world, but having relation among themselves, there arises from them another particular
whole; they form a whole particular world. That is therefore not truly said which is taught in the lecture-rooms of philosophy, that in metaphysical understanding only one world can exist. . . . The mistake here made has arisen inevitably from the fact that the explanation of the world has not been kept strictly in view. For the definition includes that only in a world which is truly related with other things; but the theory forgets this limitation, and speaks of all things in general existing.* Here Kant removes all requirement of a habitat for the transcendental Subject.

Now, since this other world, to which as beings of sense we are not related, but to which as Subjects we belong, must be thought as likewise in its nature material, the like being true also of our Subject, the transcendental psychological faculties lose their miraculous character and receive a natural one. Those forces, conformable to law, which govern the supersensuous world, are the same by means of which the Subject in that world informs itself and acts. The law of causality avails, therefore, also for this supersensuous world and its relation to our Subject; only that the conception of causality must be widened, and cannot be merely concerned with forces of the world of sense. It is the application of this false scale of our known natural laws to the transcendental world which suggests that hackneyed phrase of rationalism, that the phenomena of somnambulism contradict the laws of Nature. They contradict only the laws of the sensuous half of the world, but

* Kant: 'Von dem wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte,' § 8.
in their nature are just as conformable to law as the fall of a stone. It is therefore thoroughly unwarrantable to attempt to discredit them by the term miracles. What is a miracle from the standpoint of one half of the world can belong to law from the standpoint of the universe. The clairvoyance of somnambules is therefore a miracle for 'enlightened' journalists, much as telegraphy is a miracle for savages. In this sense Augustine long ago defined miracle when he said, 'A miracle does not happen in contradiction to nature, but in contradiction to that which is known to us of nature.'* So Kant: 'If it is asked, what we are to understand by miracles, they can be defined (since the question really refers to what they are for us, that is, for our practical reason) as events in the world, the operative laws of whose causes are, and must remain, utterly unknown to us.'† Only the transcendental operative laws must, however, 'remain utterly unknown' to us; on the other hand, there is no miracle if the question is only as to an historically or even merely individually drawn boundary of natural knowledge in relation to modes of operation within the empirical world.

The condition of sense-consciousness depends on the retention of the threshold of sensibility in its normal position; the mystical phenomena of the human soul can therefore only be explained by the movability of this threshold. Only thus is it conceivable that our cognitional forms can be modified, that we can experience heterogeneous influences of things, and can heterogeneousy react upon them;

* Augustinus: 'De civitate Dei,' xxi. 8.
† Kant, x. 101 (Rosenkranz).
in short, that the veil can be lifted which hides the transcendental world from consciousness, and the transcendental Subject from self-consciousness.

Upon the basis now obtained, we can gradually proceed to investigate the relation of the 'here' to the 'beyond,' and to explore the problem of death—that mystery which stands at the partition of the two worlds. To this end some further excursion will still be necessary.

The self-inspection of somnambulists could not be critical without the possession of a standard of comparison; that is, without the conception of the normal bodily system; the prognosis of somnambulists would not be possible without intuitive knowledge of the laws of the inner life; the prescriptions of somnambulists would be of no value if they did not come from the same Subject which accomplished the critical inspection and knew the laws of the development of disease. But all these phenomena, would be impossible, were not the transcendental, Subject at the same time the organising principle in us. But it does not follow from this that a metaphysical principle is set up in place of the factors of Darwinian evolution; the significance and operation of these factors remain quite undiminished and undisturbed by our reduction of them to mere means of which the organising principle avails itself. This principle must respect the laws of the matter on which it is to act, and therefore can itself only be expressed in conformity to law.

With the transcendental Subject thus revive two problems—Teleology and Vital Force—which are prescribed indeed in modern science, but they by no
means revive in the old form. In the long strife of opinions on this point I can see only an idle verbal contention, as conceptions are notoriously very ductile, and the first question is what we mean by Teleology and Vital Force, which can both be so conceived as to avoid the objections of opponents. It is wholly illogical to set up the conformability of matter to law as contradicting teleology. The contrary to teleology is chaos, but not conformity to law, which is rather in itself first rightly teleological, and all the more as the mechanism is the more perfect. The better the mechanism of a watch, the more perfect is its teleology.

Just as little is the vital force to be conceived as opposed to the laws of organic matter. Materialists think they have disposed of the vital force when they resolve it into its factors, whereas it is just those factors which it includes in itself. The sum 12 is not disposed of by showing that in it are the ingredients 4 + 5 + 3. The organism consists of material substances, and the material forces act in it. But these forces act in the organic kingdom convergently, and mechanically produce a teleological product. Chaos must be declared permanent without such a teleological principle in the organism; and if chaos could be overcome for the mechanism of nature at all, this nature must have succeeded in just the opposite direction to the exaltation of organism. Let us first hear a man of science upon this.

Professor Barnard says: 'Supposing that all the substances of which the earth consists were thrown together in their elementary form, it is possible that with the first operation of affinity there would be
many weak combinations; but it is also certain that
these must successively give place to stronger ones,
till all were united in forms having the absolute
maximum of stability, unless the process was arrested
by a stiffening of the masses making further move-
ment impossible. But in the combinations arising
during the growth of animals and plants, just the
opposite of the process takes place; that is, we see a
rising from the lower to the higher level, the intro-
duction of the weaker instead of the stronger, the
non-stable instead of the stable. And animal com-
binations—that is, those which are formed when the
type of life is highest—are as a rule far less stable
than the vegetable ones. The presence of the life-
principle in organised bodies causes the physical
forces, effecting the changes in such bodies, to act in
a manner in which they do not act as soon as this
fails.**

Thus, if we analyse the changes in our organism,
we first encounter physical substances and forces. It
is not only false to set up a vital force in place of
these, but it is also false to introduce among them
such a vital force as co-ordinately active on the same
level. We do not find the vital principle on the same
level with the natural forces, but first deeper, behind
the natural forces, and these are subordinate to it, as
the law of gravitation is subordinate to the architect
when he constructs an arch. It can be shown that
this arch consists materially of lime, oxygen, hydro-
gen, carbon, etc.; but that is not to say that the arch
has arisen of itself.

In the inorganic kingdom, therefore, we find tend-

* Barnard: 'Progrès des Sciences.'
ency to stability; in the organic kingdom, notwithstanding that the substances and forces are the same, tendency to instability, differentiation, organic exaltation. Therefore in the organic kingdom must necessarily be given a principle comprehending these forces, utilising and subjecting them; not a vital force among these forces, but a vital principle behind them. Indirectly this is proved by the fact that the problem of life even more evinces its scientific insolubility, only materialists holding it for solved, because they confound the conditions without which life does not appear, with the causes of its appearance. The direct proof of the vital principle lies on the other hand in this, that in its absence there are no organic forms, notwithstanding that the substances and forces are the same. Had we in both kingdoms these same substances and forces without a plus on the side of the organic kingdom, organic parts could not always appertain only to organisms, and it must at least as accidental misformation be possible, that boughs of trees should terminate in finger-ends, or eyes and ears occur in plants.

If, as the older vitalists asserted, there existed a vital force co-ordinated with the other forces of matter, then would it only act like these, uniformly according to definite plan.* Therefore must we seek this life-principle, not within the course of nature, but behind it in the transcendental region. This conclusion is unavoidable. For organisms can be regarded in two different ways—causally, by the man of science, and teleologically, by philosophers; and the latter all the

* Hartmann: 'Gesammelte Studien und Aufsätze über die Lebenskraft.'
more, that the factors of Darwinian evolution are quite unable to elicit other characteristics than those which are for the time most favourable. That this antinomy of the judgment, this duality of the point of view in regard to organised beings, actually exists, has been proved by Kant,* and his reasons, being logical, will always remain valid. But antinomies find their solution only in a deeper region than that in which they are present, as geometrical antinomies are only stereometrically resolved. Now, if in the organic kingdom the mechanical and the teleological judgment are alike unavoidable, while each yet seems to make the other superfluous, the principle which makes both explanations possible must be sought in a region outside them both, thus outside the representation of Nature, yet containing the ground of that. As, therefore, the principle is sought in which the two heterogeneous principles of explanation agree and originate, Kant—not with a mere subjective logic, but investigating the faculty of reason itself—comes to the conclusion: 'Now, the common principle of the mechanical on the one side, and of the teleological derivation on the other, is the super-sensuous which we must place beneath the nature of phenomena.'†

We have now the materials for a definition of this life-principle. It is transcendental nature, and as in somnambulism it exhibits the faculty of critical self-inspection and curative functions, it must also be the organising principle in us, thus a willing not less than a cognitive being. In a word, the life-principle in us is the transcendental Subject. Its transcen-

* Kant: 'Kritik der Urtheilkraft,' §§ 63-65.
† Ibid., § 77.
dental faculties are not mediated by the sense-organism, but are evinced in spite of it; they are not effects of this organism; for, from every monistic point of view, on the contrary, the organism with its apparatus of sense must be the product of this transcendental Subject, which fashions the organism according to the laws of matter and governs its functions. As organising principle in us, it is for the organism, à priori, prior to it, from which it necessarily follows that our earthly phenomenal form is only a transitory form of the transcendental Subject.

We can now first determine the significance of death for the transcendental Subject; the organism of sense is necessary for it as the means of just that mode of operation and knowledge in the phenomenal world, which is our mode; but not for operation and knowledge in general. The senses determine the quality of the consciousness, but not the capacity for consciousness, as coloured spectacles determine the quality of seeing, but not sight in general. Since the transcendental faculties are independent of the apparatus of sense, and even presuppose its possibility, the falling away of this apparatus in death cannot affect our true being. Death deprives us of sense-consciousness, but because we belong essentially to the transcendental order of things, it must bring to free development those transcendental faculties of which in somnambulism we obtain only intimations, the organism hindering their development. In this sense speaks the Apostle of the transcendental faculties of the illuminated who 'have tasted of the powers of the world to come.'*

* Paul: Hebrews vi. 5.
The latency of these powers in us is only from the standpoint of the sense-consciousness; they are germinal only from the standpoint of the earthly phenomenal form, and also so far as, without regard to the continuance of our transcendental individuality, they are destined to arrive at biological maturity in the man of the future. Death thus peels off the earthly phenomenal form from that true individual being which shows itself biologically in the capacity for evolution of the human type. We can therefore say with Schelling, 'Death might thus be not so much a departure as an essentialisation, wherein only the accidental disappears, but the being, the true man, is preserved.'

Thus if with Plutarch we can already call ordinary sleep 'the lesser mysteries of death,' that is true in a higher degree in somnambulism, and as in sleep the sense-consciousness is extinguished, but an inner waking takes its place, so in death the sensuous world-image, the world as representation, sinks, but the transcendental consciousness, the transcendental world remains. When Sterne says: 'I must be a fool to fear thee, O death! for as long as I am, thou art not, and when thou art, I am not'; we may apply this not only in the materialistic sense, but rather in that of transcendental psychology, which distinguishes between the phenomenal Ego and the Subject.

Analysing the earthly consciousness, we necessarily come upon the transcendental as its foundation. The organically mediated consciousness, to which the senses deliver its empirical content, is left to be

explained by physiology, whose jurisdiction here is not to be diminished; but the pure consciousness, which is unitary, notwithstanding the spatial multiplicity of cells, is transcendental. So the sense of personality of the phenomenal Ego is physiologically conditioned; but the pure self-consciousness which is single, and notwithstanding the temporal change of cells expresses the identity of the Subject, is transcendental. In the self-consciousness there lies a cleft, because we therein appear as well subject as object; and this is only possible if a transcendental Subject distinguishes the phenomenal Ego from itself as object, like the somnambulists, who speak of themselves in the third person.

Science itself tends continually to the recognition of consciousness and self-consciousness as outside its principles of explanation; it is in nowise to be seen how, from the stratification of atoms and their changes of position, sensibility and unity of consciousness should arise. But still less susceptible of physiological explanation are the phenomena of transcendental consciousness, which we find in somnambulism. Now as principles of explanation must always be adopted with proportion to the phenomena to be explained, so that neither shall the phenomena exceed the principle nor the principle the phenomena, we must seek the causes of somnambulic faculties, not in the physiological region, but in the transcendental. This necessity has been recognised by pantheistic systems, but in describing that which is not physiologically explicable, as the product of the monistic world-substance, their principle of explanation as much exceeds the phenomena, as for
materialists the phenomena exceeds the principle. The pantheistic scale is too large, the materialist too small. We must therefore reclaim for the transcendental Subject what pantheists seek too far off, materialists too near. Idealism prevents the recognition of this Subject by pantheists; but by Kant, the founder of this idealism, it has been recognised. He calls it the intelligible Subject, because it is not sensible, that is, is not found in our self-consciousness, and can only be intellectually inferred.* If stress is more laid upon the other circumstance, that it is divided from the supporter of my phenomenal consciousness only by a movable threshold, yet is thus exceptionally sensible, we can name it, as we have already done, the transcendental Subject.

When Plotinus says, that there are as many archetypes as individual beings,† the unconscious in man stands for the transcendental Subject; when he says that their self-knowledge is of two kinds, that it relates either to the cognition of the soul—ἐπάνω τοις ψυχικαῖς—or to the intellect—νοεις, and in the latter case one knows one’s self not as a man, but quite otherwise,‡ he thereby recognises that self-consciousness does not exhaust our being. When he says that by complete withdrawal from the external, and self-absorption, the union with the Intelligible is possible, but that such a condition can only be transitory during the earthly life, and no ecstatic can long maintain it,§ he there indicates somnambulism, which shows that we can

* Kant: ‘De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis,’ § 3.
† Plotinus: ‘Enneads,’ v. 7.
‡ Ibid., v. 4, 8.
§ Ibid., iv. 8, 1; vi. 9, 3, 11.
indeed provide conditions under which the transcendental Subject can display its activity, but that this activity is not at the command of our will, but presupposes the passivity of our will and consciousness. When the Stoics in general name the soul the daemon of man, it is from the presentiment that apparent inspirations proceed from the transcendental Subject. When Hamann somewhere says, 'Not man has reason, reason has him,' and similarly Marcus Aurelius defines the internal life* of the soul as its intercourse with the daemon within it,† here, too, underlies the presentiment that impulses of the will and representations can pass over from the transcendental region into organic consciousness, as some facts in the chapter on 'Memory' have shown. If we add the Archæus of Paracelsus, the homo internus of Van Helmont, the homo noumenon, or the Intelligible Subject of Kant, or the Original Ego (Ur-Ich) of Krause, what is common to all these views is that the essential kernel of man is not to be thought pantheistically, but as individual, herein agreeing with the popular conception of the soul; but they have also in common a distinction from this conception, in that the latter regards Soul and Ego, Subject and Person, as identical; whereas for the former only the personal Ego lies in the self-consciousness, the Subject beyond that in the Unconscious, but by no means as an Unconscious. That from this difference must result wholly different views on life and death, although belief in survival is common to both, is clear.

* [Fürsichsein. A strict philosophical rendering of this Hegelian phrase is not here required.—Tr.]
† 'Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius' (translated by Long, 1881), ii. 12, 17; iii. 6, 12, 16; v. 27.
Now it is very remarkable that all philosophers who have hit upon the distinction between Subject and Person, have also admitted the possibility of the mystical phenomena of the soul-life. In the popular doctrine of soul they are likewise not denied, but the transcendental being is here exchanged for a transcendent one, as with somnambulists when they speak of their guides, the intercourse between two persons of one Subject being to them an intercourse with spirits. But mystical phenomena are denied by the physiological psychologists; in their system, which knows only the Person of the man, but not the Subject, and which therefore takes the half for the whole, there is no room for such phenomena, and so they think that there is no room for them in nature. This opinion is, as I have shown above by two examples, as a rule the more rigid and unyielding, the greater the ignorance of the facts of somnambulism.

On the other hand, whoever has informed himself in this province will hold mystical phenomena to be possible, because it can be proved by facts that the soul is richer in ideas than the consciousness, and that the threshold dividing soul and consciousness is movable. Thus also may be understood those phenomena of the soul-life, not less mystical than clairvoyance, and for which physiological explanation leaves always an insoluble residue—the will to live, genius, and conscience. These most precious expressions of the human spirit spring from the same source as the transcendental faculties generally—the Unconscious; but they also show most clearly the imperfections of the philosophical systems of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, the former defining this
Unconscious as blind will, the latter characterising it as ideal also, but both erring in conceiving the Unconscious pantheistically. The will to live affirms the value of the individual life, without prejudice to the denial of it by the earthly consciousness.* But in genius and conscience likewise is the sense of individuality exalted, even if this is not so with the earthly consciousness, in which willing and knowing frequently take a direction quite opposed to the transcendental.

Still less is materialism competent to explain this transcendental enigma of the human spirit. We move in a contradiction if we see ruling in all expressions of the spirit only blind forces of nature. To admire genius, which by its penetration illuminates the essence of things, and yet to account blind and stupid the nature which brings this genius forth, is a logical contradiction; for as Augustine says: Omni miraculo, quod fit per hominem, majus miraculum est homo.† It is a logical contradiction for materialists to admire the intellectual force of a Kant more than the force of gravity of the table at which he wrote, to prefer the poet to the commonplace man, the sister of mercy to the Promoter,‡ the saint to the sinner. And accordingly, consistent materialists, teachers and pupils alike, deny ethic and aesthetic, in

* [That is to say, the will to live is imposed on the Person by the transcendental Subject, the personal (or earthly) life being for its advantage, though perhaps burdensome to the Personality, or though the understanding of the latter may embrace the pessimistic view of human life. Suicide is the occasional, relatively rare, rebellion of the personality against the transcendental will. —Tr.]
† Augustinus: 'De lib. arb.,' x. 12.
‡ [Gründer.—Tr.]
theory and in practice. Schuricht, who examines the expediency, at most, of murder and robbery, but finds the question of their permissibility quite unintelligible*—wherein he is more honourable, because more candid, than those materialists who flatter the recognition of morality—is as consistent as the Socialists and Anarchists who carry over the doctrine of 'Force and Matter' into practical life, negativating with dagger and dynamite the restrictions of human brutality, who see only a chemical difference between holy water and petroleum, and apply the latter, when they are free to do so, to libraries, picture galleries, and churches. So a Dubois-Raymond, whose book on Goethe's 'Faust' shows that a highly-cultivated understanding is compatible with an entire absence of aesthetic development, is in his way as consistent as the cynics in modern art.

From the standpoint of the earthly consciousness, all inspirations of will and thought, of philosopher, artist, and saint, from the transcendental region, are wholly and utterly aimless. That is undeniable, but it is their patent of nobility. Therefore is the aesthetic ideal attainable only when we regard the things of nature not in their relation to the Person, but to the Subject—though not will-less, as Schopenhauer thought†—and the ethical ideal is attainable only

† [As Schopenhauer did not recognise transcendental individuality, his denial of will in the aesthetic attainment of genius referred solely to the personal will. Thus, he says: 'Genius is simply the completest objectivity, i.e., the objective tendency of the mind as opposed to the subjective, which is directed to one's own self—in other words, to the will... genius is the power of leaving one's own interests, wishes, and aims entirely out of sight,
when in life we do not seek the advantage of the Person, but of the Subject. In artistic inspiration, as in the voice of conscience, our consciousness is that of the transcendental Subject.

So through our whole life is protracted the strife between our earthly phenomenal form and our true transcendental being. What is beautiful from the point of view of the Subject is not beautiful from that of the Person, and therefore remains caviare for the multitude; and actions, ethically valuable from the standpoint of the Subject, are worthless and unintelligible from that of phenomenal Egoism. Nay, life itself, from the standpoint of earthly consciousness a vale of tears, is from the standpoint of transcendental consciousness a valuable possession, not in spite of suffering, but on account of it. But we who are to participate in the transcendental order of things, should not surrender ourselves to the illusions of the earthly consciousness, this veil of Maya; we should bring the earthly will to silence in the aesthetic contemplation of nature, in the ethical formation of our life, and should regard this earthly existence as a transitory phenomenal form in correspondence with our transcendental interest.

thus of entirely renouncing one's own personality for a time, so as to remain pure knowing subject, clear vision of the world. . . . But when some external cause or inward disposition lifts us suddenly out of the endless stream of willing, delivers knowledge from the slavery of the will, the attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing, but comprehends things free from their relation to the will, and thus observes them without personal interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively, gives itself entirely up to them so far as they are ideas, but not in so far as they are motives.'—'The World as Will and Idea,' vol. i., pp. 240, 254 (Haldane and Kemp's translation).—Tr.]
3. The Dualism of Consciousness.

Every dream in which I ask a question, the answer to which surprises me, or wherein I carry on a controversial dialogue, shows a dualism of persons who are nevertheless, as subsequent waking makes known, formed by one Subject. In these ordinary dreams, however, it is only the content of our waking consciousness that is dramatically distributed. But this consciousness, reunited on waking, is again to be regarded as only half the comprehensive consciousness, whenever surprise at the answer received survives the waking, for the information obtained from the answer then betrays a foreign source, even from the standpoint of the waking life. A dramatised memory surprises, indeed, the dreamer, but not the awakened person, who recognises his former possession; but a dramatised clairvoyance surprises also the awakened person, who, on combining the consciousness of the figures of the dream, finds therein this inexplicable ingredient, exceeding all the capacity of the waking consciousness, and the latter has therefore to be supplemented by a transcendental consciousness which is ordinarily latent. This view mediates between the superfluous Spiritualistic explanation of somnambulic dreams, and the physiological explanation, in which the problem is mutilated, if not summarily and wholly denied. If, for instance, we find somnambulists clairvoyantly aware of the course of their diseases, it is certainly in accordance with the psychological laws of dream that such a revelation, emerging from the Unconscious (i.e., from the transcendental consciousness), should be placed in the
mouth of their guardian spirits; but by this time we know that what comes from beyond the consciousness need not therefore come from beyond the soul, but that such revelations may be derived from transcendental consciousness. On the other hand, we shall not deny the possibility of such clairvoyant dreams of somnambulists, for every displacement of the threshold of sensibility must necessarily evoke new faculties, and the remainder of the problem, the passage of a transcendental idea across the threshold and into the sense-consciousness, offers no difficulty.

The admission of a transcendental Subject implies the admission that this Subject stands to nature in other relations than those of sense, since otherwise the sensuous self-consciousness must exhaust the whole Ego, and there could be no subjectivity transcending it. But from the phenomena of somnambulism it results, that these relations with nature are far more intimate than those of the sense-consciousness, suggesting that in nature all acts upon all, and all on us. From the standpoint of the historical limits of our natural knowledge, there is only in nature an action of some upon some, as from the standpoint of the biological barriers of knowledge only some acts upon us. Since nevertheless the historical limits are continually being thrust back in the progress of the sciences, and the biological advance of consciousness is possible only on the ground of an already existing transcendental relation of the organism to nature, we are forced to conclude that in nature all acts on all, and therefore all on us. This consideration deprives the transcendental faculties of
somnambulists of their apparently miraculous character.

To interpret the dualism of consciousness, and therewith of the two halves of our being, an antagonism between them must be shown in relation, first, to the time of their activity, secondly, to the material of it.

If I ask a person in the magnetic sleep if he is asleep, he will deny it, and rightly, for, like every dreamer, he is inwardly awake. It thence follows that this inwardly awake somnambulist believes himself or herself to be not identical with that person who lies there with closed senses, while yet the identity is indisputable.

The counterpart of this phenomenon is the following. When a somnambulist reawakens to the life of sense, the bridge of memory is withdrawn, which, if it connected the two conditions, would let the bearer of the transcendental consciousness be known as identical with that of the sense-consciousness, and the two persons of the Subject would flow together into one. But since they remain separate, there is a dualism of consciousness, thus of persons, the sphere of the Ego being defined by the range of memory.

Now, if we take both these phenomena, observable in somnambulism, without any preconception, as they are; if we let them speak for themselves and accept their expressions, even though they seem paradoxical; if we simply define these phenomena, conceiving them in a merely analytical judgment, we must then say: the human Subject consists of two persons. Now, it is the office of transcendental psychology to verify this dualism of persons, yet on the other hand, as the
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 169

demand of the understanding for a cause will not suffer it to rest in this dualism, to recombine both persons to one Subject.

From the beginning of time, from the oldest records of humanity in the Vedas to our own day, through all religious and philosophical systems, there runs in ever-changing form the assertion of an inner kernel of being in man, which can be brought to manifestation. But the means of awakening this inner man were always such as should suppress the sense-life of the soul. As, therefore, the transcendental being was brought to activity only at the expense of the life of sense, the suppression of the latter being the condition, not the cause, of the emergence of the former, an antagonism appeared between the two halves of the being in relation to the time of their activity, and their mutual relation resembled that of two weights in a scale, the one rising in proportion as the other sinks. The means applied were partly those of slow efficacy, such as mortifications, fasting, and asceticism, whereby the conversion of the moral nature was aimed at—designated regeneration in Christian mysticism—partly they were external and of momentary operation, herbs or gases, by which deep sleep as the condition of the inner wakening was most speedily attained. Even if by long exercise this precondition could be dispensed with, yet must the external man be sunk in a state of passivity that the inner man might arise; this passivity with the Indian Yogis and Christian anchorites coming to be more or less habitual. According to the Buddhists, the external man cannot know the true nature of things; only a Yogi, by means of ecstasy and concentration of thought, can attain intel-
lectual intuition of eternal principles, even if but incompletely during bodily life.*

Now, what since Mesmer has been called artificial somnambulism is an essentially similar form of that phenomenon which extends through all ages, and is little distinguished from other ecstatic conditions; but there is scarcely a doubt that even the means rediscovered by Mesmer for awakening the inner life, the magnetic pass, was already known in antiquity, and was applied in the temple-sleep.

Even of this artificial somnambulism that may be said which the Apostle Paul wrote: 'The more our outward man dies away, the more living is the inward.'† Here also, as in historically antecedent analogous states, appears the temporal antagonism of the two halves; the greatest passivity of the sensible man brings the highest ecstasy, that is, the clearest inward awakening of the transcendental—or in Kant's expression, the intelligible—man, while in the energetic abandonment of the personality to the phenomenal world, the inward man is reduced to silence. That which a suggestive myth of Tiresias reports, that he first received the prophetic sight after Juno had blinded him; what Philo meant when he said, 'When the divine light shows itself, the light of man is hidden, not appearing again till the divine is hidden, as the prophets said: 'Your spirit departs, as it were, when the spirit of God comes, and only returns when this withdraws';' what Plato makes Socrates say, 'If we would have pure knowledge of anything,

* 'Brahma-Sutra,' iv. 4, 7.
† Cor. ii. 4, 16. [In our version: 'Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day.'—Tr.]
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL.

we must be quit of the body—the soul in herself must behold all things in themselves: and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers; not while we live, but after death;* that, finally, which is always recurring in different forms of Christian mysticism, 'Sensuum occasus veritatis exortus est'†—all are but different expressions of one and the same knowledge, confirmed also by somnambulism, that the inward sense of man is only manifested when the outward senses are suppressed; that the higher powers of the soul rise in proportion as the life of sense is depressed.

In principle, our ordinary behaviour is according to this knowledge, since for intellectual work we seek silence and solitude, excluding every distraction, and sometimes close the eyes in deep thinking; and the fable that Empedokles blinded himself, that freed from sense perception he might be better able to think, need not be true to be significant. Artists, poets, and philosophers of all times agree that in the greatest abstraction from outward life there at length arises an unconscious productivity, the sole source of intellectual results of enduring value, not in spite of its being the easiest, but because of that, though indeed not to be voluntarily induced. This sounds paradoxical; but we are not to understand the unconscious production in the quite literal sense, which indeed has never yet yielded a fine idea. Literally, this unconsciousness is applicable only to the faculties of sense and reflection, and only in proportion to the unconsciousness of these can the underlying transcen-

* Plato: 'Phædo' (Jowett's translation).
† J. Bona: 'Principia vitae Christianæ,' i. 25.
dental consciousness emerge. Genius is not reflection at its highest, but a qualitatively different mode of knowledge, an intuition. There is the utmost confusion in the materialistic supposition that genius, the highest of phenomena, can be explained by mechanical molecular changes in the brain; nor is it logical to take conclusions concerning this mode of production from those who do not speak from their own experience, instead of giving credit to those who have only to look into the depths of their own mind to describe the derivation, so far as it is accessible to their self-consciousness in general. Such descriptions, by philosophers and poets, are sufficiently numerous.

But if the transcendentonal mode of cognition occurs exceptionally even in waking, as in the case of genius, yet its qualitative speciality proves that while physiological conditions can conduce to it, this mode of cognition is not through the sense-consciousness, but in spite of it. The threshold of sensibility, as a partition-wall dividing the two beings in us, cannot therefore be regarded as an insuperable barrier preventing all communication, seeing that these two beings form but one Subject; the exceptional emergence of the transcendentonal consciousness in waking is therefore not more wonderful than that the reflective mode of production—as, for instance, solution of mathematical problems—also happens exceptionally in sleep.

But it remains the rule, that if not exactly deep sleep, yet the greatest passivity of sense-consciousness is the condition of the emergence of the transcendentonal consciousness, its ideas being the clearer the more the senses are obscured, as a light shines
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL

brighter the darker its neighbourhood is. The same condition can also be provided by diseases, as was expressed by a somnambule of Professor Becker, who in the crisis said of the two persons of her Subject: 'The more ill your body, the stronger I am; the more healthy that is, the weaker is my appearance.'

So, also, Dr. Mayer said of one of his somnambules, that when her gaze was to be directed to a distance or to penetrate deeply, or, in general, when her spiritual part would meditate upon an important subject, to investigate the condition of her own body or that of others, and the means of cure, she put herself into a state of abstraction of the inner from the outer person, represented by a deep corporeal swoon or apparent death, the duration of which varied, according to the difficulty of the matter under consideration, from several minutes to some quarters of an hour, whereupon, usually with a deep breath, she recovered life, colour, speech, and movement.† This description is only incorrect, in speaking of a difficulty of consideration, in the sense of reflection. Only an intuitive mode of cognition takes place, not in itself to be called difficult, but merely in so far as its condition, the deepening of sleep, does not immediately occur in sufficient degree. A star has not in itself difficulty in shining, but so far only as there is still wanting the conditioning, but not causative, nocturnal darkness.

Christian mysticism, also, offers numerous examples in which protracted diseases that diminish the powers of the external man promote the release of the trans-

* 'Das Geistige Doppelleben,' 108.
† Kieser: 'Archiv für thierischen Magnetismus,' vi. 1, 31.
cendental faculties.* And in the same sense Kant says, 'that impressions from the intelligible world—
to which we also ourselves, as transcendental Subjects, 
belong—are not possible "so long as all goes well";'†
that is to say, as long as the normally healthy condi-
tion is maintained.

Such phenomena can be elicited, not only by long
illnesses, but even in health, by sudden attacks. In
the history of martyrs we frequently meet with cases
in which the faithful, in the midst of the greatest
torture, fell into a state of rapture and inward bliss,
often with release of the transcendental powers of the
soul, a phenomenon which was ascribed to a special
divine grace. When, on the other hand, the same
phenomenon occurred in the witch trials of the
Middle Ages, and the witches during the severest
suffering on the rack fell into a peaceful and vision-
ary sleep, then was this 'witch-sleep' attributed
to the devil. But with martyrs and witches alike the
unendurable agonies produced a deep swoon, providing
the condition for the inward awakening of the trans-
cendental being.

All magnetisers are agreed that magnetic sleep is
the more recreative and beneficial the deeper it is,
but also that the clearness of the inward waking is
proportional to the depth of the sleep.‡ Conversely,
the depth of the sleep is to be inferred from the
clearness of the inward waking.

Now, if this antagonistic relation justifies us
already in speaking of two persons of our Subject,

* Görres: 'Die christliche Mystik,' i. 388-402.
† Kant: 'Träume eines Geistersehers, zweites Haupstück.'
‡ Dupotet: 'Manuel de l'Etudiants,' 156.
which retreat before each other like day and night, this justification is yet more incontestable when we see that the somnambulic dream is by no means a chaotic reproduction of the waking experience—(like the ordinary dream)—and that, further, the sense of personality in this deep dream is by no means suppressed, nor does the individual melt away pantheistically—as it assuredly must if the earthly being had its roots immediately in the undifferentiated world-substance. On the contrary, not only is there exaltation of the sense of personality, but the psychical functions emerging therewith are also qualitatively different from those of normal waking consciousness. One of Wienholt’s somnambules said, that when she went over from ordinary into somnambulic sleep, by degrees other ideas pressed forward; her self-consciousness was first weaker, and then continually stronger. And another somnambule of the same physician said that she often passed into the magnetic from the ordinary sleep, which she observed by the attainment of full consciousness and true and vivid ideas. Yet more significant is the expression, that in somnambulism her fundamental character came out stronger.* But such an exaltation of the psychical individuality, instead of its resolution into the general life of nature, is antecedently presumable, if the view here presented is true, that between the phenomenal individual and the All-One, there is interposed the transcendental Subject.

But the right to speak of two persons of our

Subject is most strikingly apparent from the fact that their antagonism extends to the material of their activity. In the first place, disease and its cure are in somnambulism quite differently judged than in waking. A somnambule of Deleuze repeatedly declared in the sleep that only magnetism could save her; while in waking she had the greatest repugnance to it.* Another sighed over her unbelief in magnetism, and prescribed the means of overcoming her dislike to it.† A somnambule in the crisis prescribed for herself copious bleeding, but predicted quite truly that when the proposal should be made to her awake, she would be vehemently opposed to it, but in resisting it would fall into a swoon—an opportunity of which advantage should immediately be taken to bleed her.‡

Puységur reports the case of a somnambule who in waking always received her magnetiser in ill humour, reproaching him with the inefficacy of his treatment; sleeping, she begged his forgiveness with tears, and called him her preserver.§ Similar repugnance was shown in waking by a woman who in the crisis had prescribed for herself an operation in the neck, although she was told that she had herself advised it.|| The boy Richard very unwillingly followed in waking the diet which he had prescribed for himself, but in sleep reproached his friends for not having prevented his dietary trans-

* Deleuze : 'Histoire critique du Magnétisme animal,' ii. 104.
† Ibid., ii. 172.
‡ Dupotet : 'Manuel,' etc., 110.
§ Puységur : 'Du Magnétisme animal,' 394.
|| Dupotet : 'Manuel,' 3.
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 177

gressions.* Kerner’s somnambule said that immediately after waking she would want sour milk, which was to be absolutely refused her.

Somnambulists thus reject in one state what in another they desire, and conversely; their sympathies and antipathies change with their condition, and they blame in one what they did in the other. The two states are as much opposed—as the Report of the Medical Academy of Paris says—as the states of two different persons could ever be. Remedies to which, waking, they have the strongest repugnance, they in sleep prescribe for themselves, and require that they shall be forced to take them; while on the other hand they insist on having denied to them what is disadvantageous, even if they should express the greatest desire for it.† Wienholt’s somnambule, besides sleep and waking, had a third state, which she called ‘wild shuddering;’ in this she often longed for what in somnambulism she had prohibited, and if it was given to her she put it in her mouth, but immediately spat it out again, as wine, meat, chestnuts, etc.‡ So that the transcendental will persisted in this state. Auguste Müller, who stayed at Wildbad for treatment, was in the crisis quite satisfied with that residence, but in waking it displeased her, and one afternoon she ordered a coach for her departure. As the appointed hour approached, she fell into the magnetic sleep, went into the open air and up a hill in the neighbourhood, where, waking in the evening, she was much

† Ennemoser: ‘Der Magnetismus nach d. allseitigen Beziehung,’ etc., 134.
‡ Wienholt: ‘Heilkraft,’ etc., iii. 355.
surprised to find herself in a wholly unknown place.* A second attempt to leave the wells was similarly frustrated by herself. It would be interesting to know whether on both occasions somnambulism only accidentally supervened just before the intended journeys, and then gave occasion to this remarkable severance of the Subject, or whether, as would almost appear to be the case, the occurrence of somnambulism arose from this severance, and was thus induced by an impulse of transcendental will.

Especially remarkable, and to be found in most books on somnambulism, is the case of the woman Plantain, who in 1829 was operated upon by Dr. Cloquet for cancer in the breast. In waking she could only speak with terror of the impending operation, which she had herself advised in sleep. Having been put into somnambulism for the operation, she spoke of it calmly, took off her clothes herself and sat down in the chair. With the same tranquillity she went on speaking during this frightful operation, and no gesture, no accelerated breath or pulse, betrayed the slightest feeling. Such instances prove that the transcendental being considers the personality of sense in a purely objective relation, in an attitude of as much indifference to its fate as to that of a stranger—as it must be, since the two halves of the being lie this side and that side of a threshold of sensibility. Dream already shows us this mutual objectivity of the two persons of a Subject in relation to ideation and will. It is on this that the phenomenon of the dramatic sundering of the Ego depends, when I am astonished by the thoughts of a

* Klein: 'Geschichte der Auguste Müller,' 92.
second dream-figure, or remain indifferent to its reverses.

But if in the transcendental consciousness the pleasure and pain of the ordinary man are regarded objectively, and estimated according to a standard of its own, there arises the weighty philosophical question, whether this transcendental indifference does not extend to the whole sum of our fate in life. In fact, there is nothing to exclude this inference. Since, moreover, we now know that the fruits of this life are not lost for the comprehensive consciousness of the transcendental being, it looks as if this being itself had chosen this lot, not being moved by the sufferings of our earthly life, but yet enjoying the fruits of it. Should we in this way conceive the earthly life, notwithstanding its preponderant suffering, as a transcendental prescription, then—and only then—disappear at once the contradictions encountered by theistic and pantheistic systems between the miseries of existence and providence; and the complaints of man against nature, which no philosophical system can seriously contend to be groundless, are silenced.

The dualism within the human soul further shows itself in this, that in somnambulism there emerges also a moral side, which in waking is either absent altogether, or is not found in the same degree. Already is the ennobling of the language, so oftento be observed, perhaps a sign of this. A somnambule of Deleuze, speaking in the crisis on religion, morality, and metaphysics, gave utterance to opinions quite different from those held in the waking state.* A somnambule

* Deleuze: 'Hist. critique,' etc., ii. 173.
treated by Champignon, who wished to devote herself to the stage, thought quite otherwise as soon as she was put into the sleep. Asked why she wished to go upon the stage, she replied: 'Not I, but she.' And when the physician, acquiescing in this assumption of distinct personality, suggested that she should dissuade her, she replied: 'What would you? she is a fool!'

Reichenbach had a somnambule who had concealed from him that an officer was courting her, but in the sleep, in an access of greater candour, she betrayed to him the secret, but with the request that he should say nothing about it to her in waking.† She therefore not only knew that she would be less disposed to confidence in waking, but also that she would awake without memory. The widow Peterson was never guilty of falsehood in the 'deep sleep,' though ordinarily not indisposed to it; in this condition, she said, it was not possible for her to deceive her physician. Also in the deep sleep only once was she angry about a trifle.‡

It is not indeed easily supposable that somnambulism could bring to pass an actual moral elevation, a qualitative change in the moral constitution, but we may well admit that latent moral dispositions attain expression by a change of condition, because it is just by this change that the interests of the two persons of the Subject are known to be not identical. The merely intellectual exaltation in somnambulism might awaken of itself this moral dualism by chang-

† Reichenbach: 'Der sensitive Mensch,' ii. 686.
‡ 'Archiv,' x. 1, 108.
ing the relative weight of motives. Lastly, a moral opposition can be introduced by the change of sympathies and antipathies in regard to others which we find in somnambulism. For in waking, our judgment of men is apt to be biased by their intellectual superiorities, to the neglect of any rigorous moral criticism. In somnambulism, on the contrary, no importance is attached to this external tincture of the understanding, which belongs only to the earthly personality, and it is the inner moral constitution of the transcendental being which determines sympathies or antipathies. In like manner somnambulists esteem chemical substances of the mineral and vegetable order, not according to their effects on the normal man, but according to those which more manifest the inner nature of the things.

If, however, somnambulism is accompanied, more or less expressly, but almost universally, by a moral change which, at least from the standpoint of the earthly person, is an elevation, this phenomenon stands in apparent contradiction to the notorious experience, lamented, not only by the fathers of the Church, but previously by the Greek philosophers and poets, that in sleep we are less moral than in waking.* I can satisfy myself with none of the explanations of this fact in dream-literature, but believe that the following sufficiently accounts for it. Dream is pictorial; it endures no abstract thoughts, and does not abide in movements of the will. Every agitation, however gentle, of thought or will is converted into image and action. These agitations, often

originating only in bodily condition, cannot be imputed to the man as a moral being; and are in waking suppressed, but live on in dream as long as their flight of images is still determined by physiological conditions. But the deeper sleep becomes, the more are these confused dreams put to silence, the transcendental half of man's being determining their lapse in proportion as the organ of the confused dreams is reduced to insensibility. The qualitatively quite different dreams of somnambulism thus belong to the transcendental Subject, and the moral opposition of the being of sense and the transcendental being must also mirror itself in the difference of the dreams appropriate to each. The apparent moral deterioration in confused dreams, which is further strengthened by the image-language of dream, and, on the other hand, the moral elevation of the somnambulic dream, are therefore explained by the dualism of persons of our Subject, and are, in fact, one of the best proofs of this dualism. Were dreams of one quality only, were there no change of persons with the deepening of sleep, then assuredly the dreams of somnambulism also would continue and even exalt the tendency of the light dream, and the above-mentioned opposition would be not only apparent but real. Were man monistically constituted in the sense of materialists, no opposition in the moral character of our dreams would arise from a mere deepening of sleep; but this is easily explained if we admit a dualism of the soul within the metaphysical monism. Upon interrogation this dualism is also confirmed by somnambulists themselves, who must indeed know more about their own condition than one who stands without,
and is confined by the barriers of sense. They all speak of their magical Ego, which they differently denominate, or of a being instructing them which they say they see, or perhaps only hear. So long as the transcendental being suffices for the explanation of this inspiration, it would be illogical to admit a transcendent being; so that the expressions of somnambulists need not mislead us. As in dream it is impossible to detect in a dialogue a monologue, that is, to recognise in the other dream-figure one's own double, so is it impossible in somnambulism, in which the difference between self and double appears deeper. But it is very evident from these inspirations that the dramatic severance of the Ego is not to be applied only in the sceptical sense, for the utter rejection of them, but that it is in fact the metaphysical formula for the explanation of man, whose inner being makes itself known exceptionally even in waking, as, for instance, in the case of the genius of Socrates.

A somnambule of Kerner said: 'That which goes out from me into another whose interior I am to examine, I cannot more fitly describe than by saying, it is my magnetic self, all the forces of the soul.'* Even in the involuntary actions of somnambulism this dualism betrays itself. A somnambule of Reichenbach had ordered some linen to be made up, which was delivered while she lay in the magnetic sleep. She conversed therein vivaciously with the sempstress, and showed great delight when she displayed the linen; but then desired that she might be awakened, just as another girl might have called for a friend to show her the needlework. Being

* Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 192.
awakened, she knew nothing of what had happened, and had again to be told that the linen had arrived. So also in locating their perception in the ganglionic region of their solar plexus, somnambulists imply this dualism. They frequently act as if another person was speaking to them from the region of the stomach.

It is reported of a French somnambule that she rubbed this part with her finger to excite its activity, and then bent down her head as if to listen. In this wise she exactly described what was going on in the next house, and predicted what would happen to her up to the end of her illness. At the same time she suffered violent pains in the stomach—spasms being often the condition of the inner wakening—and got angry as if with a third person, whom she entreated with tears to be silent. Throughout this state she distinguished the person inspiring her from herself.

Similarly, that somnambule whose magnetic self in the dramatic severance seemed a visible genius, which she always named 'Messkuss,' desired her magnetiser to put some questions to him, and on his refusing, because 'Messkuss' knew nothing, her injured feeling dramatising itself, she said that Messkuss had been made angry by that speech, had gone away, and would not return.

Diminution of sense-consciousness, the condition of the emergence from latency of the transcendental faculties, being common to insanity, 'possession,' and somnambulism, it is to be expected that the dualism of consciousness would find expression also

* Reichenbach: 'Der sensitive Mensch,' ii. 689.
† Schindler: 'Magisches Geistesleben,' 134.
‡ Kieser: 'Archiv,' ii. 1, 159.
§ 'Archiv,' x. 3, 40.
in the former conditions. Thus a 'possessed' person replied to the admonitions of her confessor that the latter was not her confessor, but Trine's, that being her own name.* Insane persons frequently speak of themselves in the third person.† Even in ordinary diseases, it happens that the patients speak thus of their own selves in the past, when there is a failure of the continuity of consciousness.‡ An insane person had an exact memory of her past up to the beginning of her disease, but these reproductions were not recollections, and she ascribed them to another. Speaking of herself, she used the remarkable expression, 'The person of myself,'§ which designates with philosophical accuracy our earthly phenomenal form.

This severance occurs also under chloroform. A nursemaid who was lately sent to a dentist, screamed during the operation, but at the same time asked herself the question—as she related after waking—who it was that was screaming so violently. The double feeling is very pronounced with somnambulists in the 'deep sleep,' so that they speak of themselves in the third person. To the question, 'Why she, not thou?' the answer of one of them was, 'She is the body which thou seest and touchest, the spirit is the I, and its body is now the soul, which at other times is carried by her body; this is also the reason why double sleepers¶ speak of themselves in the third person.'¶

* Reichard: 'Beiträge zur Einsicht in das Geisterreich,' i. 316.
† Ladame: 'La Névrose hypnotique,' 43.
‡ Griesinger: 'Krankengeschichte,' 341, etc. Leidesdorf: 'Lehrbuch der psychischen Krankheiten,' 117.
§ Leuret: 'Fragments psychologiques,' s. l. folie, 277.
¶ [The 'double' sleep is the condition known as 'deep-sleep' (Hochschlaf). —Tr.]
\* Archiv,' xii. 1, 159.
After all the reasons adduced, which oblige us to recognise a dualism of the soul, it is scarcely necessary to add that we are already justified in this by the one logical reason, the want of continuity of consciousness which is insisted upon by Griesinger. Without memory no Ego, as was observed by St. Augustine, who, praising the miracle of memory, said that it was his soul, his self, and that without it he could not so much as name himself.* Several threads of memory, however, signify a severance of persons within one Subject. Therefore, says Leibnitz, 'Could we suppose, either two different and unconnected faculties of consciousness to be alternately active in the same body, the one always during day, the other during night, or the same consciousness to be active at intervals of time in two different bodies, the question must arise whether in the first case the day man and the night man—so to say—would not be two persons as different as Socrates and Plato, and whether in the second case there is not a single person in two different bodies.'†

The first of these suppositions actually happens in somnambulism, which therefore proves the dualism of our Subject. Every personal consciousness is held together by the memory connective of its ideas, and the bridge of memory failing between two psychical conditions, we must logically speak of two persons.

This question is definitely decided when we see that somnambulists in the change of condition feel themselves as different persons. Kerner says of one:

* 'Confessions,' x. c. 6.
† Leibnitz: 'Neue Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Verstand,' ii. 427, s. 23.
'Before she let herself be wakened, she took leave of me as usual before wakening, as though she were now going away, and after awaking appeared another person; it was her magnetic self, the self that was my intimate, that, as it were, took leave of me.' And of another he says: 'She greeted me on entering the magnetic sleep, and took leave of me before her other, waking, self reappeared.'*

Now, as the interests of the two persons of our Subject are not identical, somnambulists request their physicians, and indeed insist, that the two halves of their being shall be kept as much apart as possible. Thus Dr. Kluge reports of a young lady, that in the magnetic sleep she would take off her superfluous clothes, that she might more conveniently work at the embroidery frame; but as soon as the time for waking approached, she always laid the embroidery aside, reclothed herself, and resumed exactly the same position in which she had been before falling asleep, that she might not be frightened on awaking by her unusual appearance.'†

That this double consciousness can even be simultaneously present, we have the testimony of Van Helmont, who having tasted root of wolf's-bane with the tip of his tongue, fell into an ecstasy, in which he saw his condition as objectively 'as though it belonged to a man from another world.'‡

At the highest point of this objectivity occurs that extraordinary phenomenon, the seeing by somnambulists of their bodies as apart from themselves, a

* Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 151, 172.
† Kluge: 'Darstellung, etc.,' 386.
‡ J. B. Van Helmont: 'Demens idea,' etc., §§12-16.
special case of the so-called 'double,' as also happens in severe illnesses and especially with dying persons. Such a case at Frankfort is related by Schopenhauer: 'How do you feel?' asked a physician here not long ago of his patient. 'Better now, since we have been two in the bed!' was the answer, the patient dying soon after.* A similar case was reported to me lately by Dr. Billinger in Munich. He was treating for pneumonia notha a man of eighty, who to the doctor's question, 'How are you feeling?' a few days before his death replied, 'One of us quite well, the other miserably.' Now, this happens at the height of somnambulism, in the so-called 'deep,' or double sleep. The very clear inward wakening associated with this state thus produces also the greatest opposition of the two persons of our Subject, and somnambulists then speak of their body as of a foreign object, although there is often still a feeling of identity. A somnambule, who thus saw her own body lying before her, said to her physician that it was repugnant to her to rejoin it. Another, describing her ecstasy, said she at first fell into a somnambulic state, but then saw her body apart from her, motionless, cold, and pale like a corpse, while she appeared to herself as a mist, but yet thought apart from her body. In this condition she saw and understood far more than in somnambulism. After a quarter of an hour at most, the mist moved towards her body, she lost consciousness, and the ecstasy came to an end.†

Rightly to judge of somnambulism, we must always remember that it is by no means an exaltation of

* Schopenhauer: 'Über Geistersehen.'
† Champignon: 'Physiologie,' etc., 100, 101.
the ordinary intellectual and moral consciousness, this ordinary consciousness being on the contrary suppressed; moreover, that it can by no means produce new psychical faculties, but affords merely the suitable condition for the emergence from latency of the transcendental person in us, with which these apparently new faculties are associated. Somnambulism is only the condition of these faculties, not their cause; they are already latent in us, and emerge with favourable opportunity. If, however, psychical faculties exist latently in us, that is equivalent to saying that normal self-consciousness does not exhaust our Ego, a second person of our subject being beyond the former. But this dualism is the more to be asserted, as these two persons only emerge alternately, their activities not mingling. This at least is the rule, and therefore the conditions, in which the transcendental side of our being is available, are those of sleep. Thus Van Helmont says, that the magical powers of man are dormant, and need only to be awakened;* and the mystic Tauler expresses the same when he says: 'If man is to act inwardly, he must retract all his powers, as into a corner of the soul, excluding all images and forms; his state must be one of forgetfulness and imperception (nichtwissen); there he may work.'† Conversely, the transcendental person is again latent, when the ordinary person awakes. The sensuous comprehension connected with the earthly existence is, as Philo says, produced like Eve, while Adam, the spirit, sleeps.‡

---

* Helmont: 'De Magneticâ vulnerum curatione,' § 159.
† Görres: 'Christliche Mystik,' i. 468.
‡ Philo: 'Leg. Alleg.,' ii. 1092.
Somnambulists themselves similarly represent the fact. The somnambulic boy Richard, whose physician was his brother, having predicted something of the future, and being asked by his friends why they also had not such knowledge, excellently replied: 'You really know it also, but do not know that you know it.'* In other words: the transcendental man is clairvoyant, but the earthly man knows nothing of it because his sense-consciousness isolates him from his own essential being.

The unconscious in us accordingly obtains further definition as individual, and not, like a drop in the sea, to be pantheistically resolved; and moreover as in itself conscious, but independently of the sense-organism. It is not our whole Subject, as the dualists suppose, that is now engaged with the functions of sense, first hereafter applying itself to transcendental functions; but both halves of our being are contemporaneously active, though the transcendental remains concealed for the earthly person.

In the dualistic doctrine of the soul, the sense-consciousness is its present function, while the organ serving this function—senses and brain—belongs to a body in itself dead. According to this conception, if the transcendental Subject is represented in a circular form, this circle to divide our head from the trunk, we should penetrate the circle with the sense-consciousness, the dead mass of the body remaining outside it.

But for a monistic solution of the dualism of body and sense-consciousness, we cannot ascribe a special bodily function to the soul, and the instrument of

* Görwitz: 'Idiosomnambulismus,' 136.
this function to the body; rather must both, the body and the earthly active soul, proceed from a common principle: the transcendental Subject. The ordinary mode of cognition must thus—and so far the materialists are in the right—certainly be regarded as a function of the brain; but for this body along with all its conscious and unconscious functions the transcendental Subject is \( a \ priori \); it has built itself, on behalf of its immersion into earthly things, the corresponding bodily instrument, and provided this with the necessary cognitional apparatus for its information. Be it only remarked by the way, that this conception, referring only to the metaphysical significance of biological processes, forestalls no possible physical explanation of these processes, therefore not, in particular, the modern theory of evolution.

If, however, it is the transcendental Subject itself, that forms for itself the earthly body, then again does it appear as highly probable that the immersion in earthly things is a voluntary act of this Subject.

4. The Bi-Unity of Man.

Thus there lies, unrevealed to our self-consciousness, a transcendental Subject in the background of our being, the root of our individuality; it is distinguished from the sense half of our being by form as well as content of cognition, as standing in other relations to Nature, that is, receiving other impressions from her, and so reacting otherwise on them, than the sense-man.

But this confronts us with a philosophical problem which imperatively demands solution: the problem
of the bi-unity of man. It has appeared, indeed, that the two halves of our being do not in our experience simultaneously function; they stand, that is, in temporal antagonism; but this difference of time is only optical, as it were, like that of the sun and the stars; notwithstanding the dissimultaneity of functions there must therefore be simultaneity of existence, and as a functionless existence is unthinkable, it may be said, continuing the analogy: as the stars still shine by day, though not for our sight, so also the transcendental Subject functions constantly, though unconsciously for the earthly man. Were the dissimultaneity of functions not merely optical, but real, we should be driven to admit that somnambulism originates transcendental faculties. But this is not thinkable; it can only elevate above the threshold of sensibility what was already latent beneath it. This latency, however, exists only for the brain-consciousness, for which indeed the whole Subject is transcendental, that is, latent.

Now if the Subject must be considered as constantly active, then sense and transcendental functions go on side by side together, that is, we are beings of simultaneous membership of the world of sense and of the transcendental world. The chief distinction between dualistic and monistic doctrines of the soul is here indicated; we are not first at death transported into the supersensuous world; but we live in it now already, only that as earthly persons we know nothing of it.

That brings us to the point at which the possibility of mystical phenomena is first provable. It is upon the problem of mysticism that the dualistic doctrine
of the soul is historically wrecked, the historical result being that both were given up. Now, if instead of being wrecked upon this problem the monistic doctrine of the soul would explain it, then were the possibility of mysticism demonstrated for the multitude of those who ignore its reality by simply not looking into it.

If the two persons of my Subject be successive, as is asserted in the dualistic doctrine of soul, then no mysticism is possible, except perhaps by intervention of superterrestrial beings, be they angels or devils. Herein the Middle Ages were quite consistent.

If, on the other hand, we are simultaneously members of both worlds, then transcendental psychology results at once from the mobility of the threshold, and, notwithstanding the stability of our sense-consciousness in the phenomenal world, our involution with the transcendental world must frequently be betrayed.

The simultaneity of the two persons of our Subject is thus the foundation of all mysticism, and is presupposed in every change of their forms; mysticism stands or falls with the bi-unity of man. From this formula the least that can be inferred is that between the two persons of my own Subject, the unconscious and the conscious, mystical relations may arise; for since sense-consciousness isolates us from the totality of Nature more than it connects us with it, whereas the transcendental consciousness is far more intimately involved in this totality, it follows that with the mobility of the threshold of sensibility faculties must come to light, which from the standpoint of sense appear impossible.
In this respect we can with Görres call somnambulism 'a magical relation of man to himself';* i.e., a relation between the persons of our Subject. The real mystic, no doubt, goes still further, asserting that we not only come into magical relation with our transcendental Subject, but through this Subject also with other transcendent beings.

That these magical faculties are not first acquired at death, but are already latent in us, is a very old doctrine. Hindu philosophy recognises the magical powers of Psyche, called *arta ahancarasya*—that is, the powers of my Ego. The emergence of the transcendental Subject in ecstasy is described with remarkable precision in the Upanishads of the Vedas, and in India, Mesmer and Puységur would certainly not have enjoyed the fame of discoverers. With evident reference to the solar plexus which plays so large a part in somnambulism, it is said: 'In the hollow of the heart resides the immortal Person.'†

The knowledge of the magical powers of man has never been lost in India. But it is only the exoteric constituents of this knowledge which we hear of in the extraordinary performances of the Indian fakirs;‡ though it is said that members of the 'Theosophical Society,' which consists of Indians and Europeans, and professes the investigation of the magical powers of man, are being partially instructed in esoteric doctrines.

* Görres: 'Die Christl. Mystik,' iii. 316.
† [With all respect to the author, it is nearly certain that no such reference was intended. Similar expressions are frequent in the Upanishads, but to give them a physiological sense would be contrary to the whole spirit of the philosophy, and to its poetic expression.—Tr.]
‡ Jaculliot: 'Voyage au Pays des Fakirs charmeurs,'
In the Agrouchoda-Parichai verses, it is ordered that seventy priests, all over seventy years of age, should guard the 'law of the lotus'; that it should remain concealed from the people; and that not only priests revealing the secrets to the public, but even he who should reveal the secrets of a higher degree to an initiate of the proximate lower degree, should be put to death. Against such secrecy there is in principle certainly nothing to object, as the result of degrading science to the popular level may be seen in the materialistic demoralization of our generation, and as in like manner many aspects of American Spiritualism show the result of popular contact with occult mysteries.

The magical powers of man were also well known to the Greek philosophers, especially to the Alexandrian school, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Plotinus, etc., and in the Middle Ages we find this knowledge in Paracelsus, Van Helmont, Porta, Cardan, Maxwell, Robert Fludd, Agrippa von Nettesheim, Wirdig, Athanasius, Kircher, Campanella, etc. Thus our century stands alone in its ignorance of the positive side of our Unconscious.

First in Hartmann's 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' is the problem of the Unconscious again taken up, and the main lines of its different emanations have been sketched; but for him the transcendental Subject resolves itself into the world-substance. On the other hand, in Kant, who in this, as in so many respects, has not been overtaken, we find this Subject strongly accentuated. His epoch was very little disposed to admit magical powers in man. But Kant held the thing to be
possible, because as an approved logician he knew that everything is possible except what contains a logical contradiction, that therefore we can prescribe nothing to experience, but must accept what it offers, be it ever so astonishing. So that when Kant heard of the magical powers of his contemporary Swedenborg, he not only collected accurate information about him, but determined also to read the works of this mystic. That happened which must always happen in such cases—an acute and exact understanding is in no sympathy with the uncontrolled presentations of intuition. But Kant was highly astonished at the similarity of the theory of the transcendental nature of man, which he had himself deduced from pure reason, to that of Swedenborg.

Because Kant spoke not without self-irony of his deceived expectation, his ‘Dreams of a Ghost-seer’ has been chiefly regarded from its negative side, and to the overlooking, or with the wish to overlook, its very positive statements. Among the latter is that which expresses the fundamental problem of the monistic doctrine of the soul: ‘I own that I am much disposed to assert the existence of immaterial natures in the world, and to place my soul itself in the category of these beings.’ And that there may be no doubt that he meant the simultaneity of the two persons of our Subject, he adds: ‘The human soul should therefore be regarded as already in the present life connected at the same time with two worlds, of which, so far as it is confined to personal unity with a body, the material only is clearly felt.’ Finally, he expresses definitely his belief: ‘It is therefore as good as proved, or, to be diffuse, it could
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 197

easily be proved, or, better still, it will hereafter be
proved, I know not where or when, that the human
soul even in this life stands in indissoluble com-
munity with all immaterial natures of the spirit-
world, that it mutually acts upon them and receives
from them impressions, of which, however, as man
it is unconscious, as long as all goes well.' In preg-
nant language, however, is the monistic doctrine of
the soul expressed as follows: 'It is therefore truly
one and the same Subject which belongs at the same
time to the visible and to the invisible world, but not
just the same person, since the representations of the
one world, by reason of its different quality, are not
associated with ideas of the other, and therefore what
I think as spirit is not remembered by me as man.'*

Similarly Swedenborg taught: 'Man is so con-
stituted that he is at the same time in the spiritual
world and in the natural world. The spiritual world
is where the angels are, and the natural world is
where men are; and because man is so constituted,
he has an interior and an exterior, the interior by
which he is in the spiritual world, and the exterior
by which he is in the natural world.'†

In the introduction to his 'Dreams of a Ghost-
seer,' Kant says, with reference to Swedenborg's
clairvoyance, that 'amazing inferences would have to
be drawn if only one such event could be supposed
to be proved.' At present, therefore, the matter
stands thus: Since Kant's death the magical powers
of somnambulists have been so confirmed that only for
ignorance is scepticism any longer possible. Now,

* Kant: Werke (Rosenkranz), vii. 45, 52, 53, 59.
† Swedenborg: 'Leben und Lehre,' Frankfurt, 1880.
since Kant would confess to-day that hundreds of such facts are proved which 'lead to amazing inferences,' we are logically obliged to put up with just those inferences. The above citations contain them. But those citations do not exhibit what might possibly have been a merely transient phase in Kant's development; for he never abandoned his opinions on the \textit{homo noumenon} whom he referred to an intelligible world. By his solution of the problem of freedom* —which solution, according to Schopenhauer, is among the most profound that man has ever uttered† —Kant shows that throughout his whole life he had the same belief which he has expressed in his 'Dreams of a Ghost-seer,' and which goes upon the double nature of man. The monistic doctrine of the soul accordingly has the support of Kant's principal work, and, indeed, as Schelling also has recognised,‡ of the profoundest parts of it.

The systems of our century—Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and Hellenbach—are only developments of Kantian germs, which prove their extraordinary productive powers again in this, that also the monistic doctrine of the soul is preformed in them.

But from the history of philosophy also, it appears that the bi-unity of man is unavoidably concluded from the magical powers of the soul. The Alexandrians, who not only knew of these powers, but

---

* 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft' (Rosenkranz), 418-427. 'Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,' 224-231. 'Metaphysik der Sitten,' 80-100.
† 'Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie.'
‡ Schelling: 'Ueber das Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit' (Werke, vii.), 333-416.
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 199

themselves experienced them, were also led immediately to inferences agreeing remarkably with those of Kant. According to Plotinus, the soul is not totally sunk in the body—as is asserted in the dualistic doctrine of the soul—but 'only a part of us is imprisoned by the body, as if one stood with his feet in water, the rest of the body being out of it.*

According to him, man has a double soul, a double Ego; the higher abiding purely in the supersensual, and the lesser involved in the body and its activity.† The higher soul does not depart from the intelligible, it remains in the intelligible even during the earthly life, and lets down only the lower soul, which is, as it were, dependent from it, into the world of sense.‡ This conception recurs in Plotinus in a great variety of expressions; he places true realities in the intelligible world, and says that a part of the soul never comes forth from it. 'If finally I should venture to declare my conviction, contrary to the opinion of others, freely and decidedly, it is that our soul is not totally immersed, but a part of it remains continually in the intelligible; only the part existing in the sensuous when it is predominant, or rather when it is overpowered and confused, prevents us from attaining to the perception of that which is beheld by the superior part of the soul.'§

The Alexandrian philosophers came to the front at a time when Greek philosophy had resolved itself into scepticism. In despair of finding truth by way of discursive thought, and attributing the fault to the

* Plotinus: 'Enneads,' vi. 9, 8.
† Ibid., i. 1, 10; vi. 7, 5.
‡ Ibid., iv. 3, 19; iv. 8, 8; iii. 4, 3; iv. 7, 13; iv. 3, 12.
§ Ibid., iv. 1, 1.
sensuous character of our cognition, they sought to attain truth in conditions of ecstasy liberated from sense. 'Therefore,' says Plotinus, 'souls are to a certain extent amphibia, because necessarily alternating they lead a life divided into this side and that side.'* Now, from the simultaneity of the two persons of our Subject, it follows that with the suppression of sense the transcendental consciousness forthwith emerges, and is not then first produced. This also is perceived by Plotinus, who says that on turning away from sense the supersensuous spontaneously presents itself without any further process being needed to elicit it. As soon as the obstruction—the sense-consciousness—is removed, the natural activity of the soul, which is directed to the supersensuous, is apparent.†

The Neo-Platonic Ammonius Sakkas also teaches the bi-unity of man. He says that the soul is partly on earth and thinks through sense, partly in the intelligible world (ἐν νοητῷ τόπῳ) in immediate thought.‡ Plutarch expresses himself still more distinctly; indeed, it sounds as though he were already prepared to indicate the sundering of the Ego as the formula for the explanation of man, warning against mistaking the second person of our Subject for an alien Subject—as somnambulists for the most part do—when he says that the reason is that part of the soul which, in the sinking of the latter into body, is not engulfed by matter; it is therefore in truth not in the man but outside him, and it were more correct to name it

* Plotinus: 'Enneads,' iv. 8, 4.
† Ibid., i. 2, 3, 13; i. 6, 6.
‡ Zeller: 'Greek Philosophy,' iii. 2, 436.
the demon than the reason.* In the Christian conception of the world which followed, this inner demon of man is changed into a guardian angel, and the transcendental Subject is confused with a transcendent Subject.

If we take any of the mystics of the Middle Ages, we find there also the same views. In the 'Theologia Germanica'—of which the author is, I believe, still unknown—which was discovered by Luther, and by him, as by Schopenhauer, was highly prized, it is said: 'Now, the created soul of man hath also two eyes. The one is the power of seeing into eternity; the other of seeing into time and the creatures. . . . But these two eyes of the soul of man cannot both perform their work at once, but if the soul shall see with the right eye into eternity, then the left eye must close itself and refrain from working, and be as though it were dead. For if the left eye be fulfilling its office towards outward things—that is, holding converse with time and the creatures—then must the right eye be hindered in its working—that is, in its contemplation. Therefore, whosoever will have the one must let the other go; for "no man can serve two masters."'†

Sense and transcendental cognition stand thus, it is true, in temporal antagonism, but not in the sense of the dualistic doctrine but of the monistic, that is, they are both possible within the earthly existence. This antagonism, and the high estimation of transcendental cognition, which runs through all mysticism, have always been conducive to asceticism, and con-

* Plutarch: 'De genio Socratis.'
† 'Theologia Germanica,' c. 7 (tr. by Susanna Winkworth).
tempt for the body and its earthly impulses, among the mystics of the Middle Ages, as before with the Indian and Alexandrian philosophers, whose ideal of incorporeity (ἀσωματικά) was so extreme that Plotinus, ashamed of his body, refused to sit to Amelius for his picture, and even concealed his birthday and origin.*

Thus we find an agreement of views, not only among all mystics who observed the transcendental faculties in themselves, but also among all philosophers who discovered these faculties in abnormal organizations, or in normal ones in abnormal states. Hence the inference from these phenomena to the double nature of man is logically compulsory. When, moreover, we see that Kant, independently, as it seems, of any experience of this nature, by mere penetration of his extraordinary intellect into the human problem, was driven to similar conclusions, which he retained throughout his life, the concurrence of these three lines of thought may well be regarded as a striking voucher for the truth of the monistic doctrine of the soul.

Now if between man and the thing-in-itself, call we that God, or Pan, or Nature, there must be interposed the transcendental Subject, then the problem of our existence appears in a completely new light. Neither theism, with the dualistic doctrine of the soul, nor pantheism, nor materialism, gets over the contradiction between man's instinct for happiness and the sufferings of his earthly life. These sufferings cannot be ascribed to his deserts in any system in which man by foreign power springs from nothing into

* Porphyry: 'Vita Plotini.'
existence at birth, that is, first at birth obtains individuality. To relieve us from this contradiction, we require a system in which pessimism is allowed its incontestable truth, and yet birth appears as the free act of a being whose individuality can therefore not first arise at birth, and who is thus of more than phenomenal significance for the brief period of [physical] life. With the recognition of pre-existence, the chief difficulty falls away, because then desert and punishment are still logically thinkable; but the hypothesis most immediately suggested is that the will of our transcendental Subject has itself brought about our incarnation, which will must be regarded, in the metaphysical sense, as free.

In the history of philosophy it is an often-recurring opinion that man, as a pre-existing being, freely be-takes himself to the earthly existence. According to Philo, souls, impelled by attraction to bodily materialization, are continually descending from heaven to earth,* their connection with a body being thus their free act.† According to Plotinus, also, the soul is not united to the body by a foreign power, but every soul enters a body corresponding to its condition and its will; each determining its position in life by its own act and inclination.‡ At birth we lose recollection of the transcendental existence, as somnambulists lose recollection of their sleep life on waking; but this loss of memory applies only to the earthly person; only for this is it true that, as Plotinus says, one of our two existences is concealed

* Philo: 'Quod a Deo mittuntur somnia.' † Zeller: 'Philosophie der Griechen,' iii. 2, 492. ‡ Plotinus: 'Enneaden,' iii. 2, 12; iv. 4, 45; iv. 8, 5; v. 1, 1.
from us. 'This activity, however, is not concealed from the whole self, but only from a part of it; just as, when the vegetative function is active, the perception of this activity by the faculties of sense is not transmitted to the general consciousness of the man.**

Now if, as indeed is admitted by Fichte and Schelling, the Ego is my own act, that is only conceivable if there is a dualism of persons in my own Subject. In this sense only can I be cause of myself; every other conception would amount to the causa sui, *i.e.*, suggests (as to Schopenhauer) Baron Münchhausen, who lifts himself out of the bog by his own cue.†

My transcendental Subject may be cause of my earthly personality; it is thus not the individuality that begins at birth, but only the sensuous, the earthly-conditional Ego.

Twice already, in the course of the foregoing exposition, have we approached this conception of the earthly existence as a free act. In principle it follows from the proof of a transcendental Subject as organising principle in us; this Subject, however, in which the dualism of body and sensuously-conscious soul is monistically suppressed, we encounter at last, in the analysis of all psychological and physiological functions. Now, as we have seen, to these real grounds for the spontaneity of our earthly existence there accedes a logical reason. For if materialism, pantheism, and the dualistic doctrine of the soul involve us in ethical contradictions, by making in-

** Plotinus: 'Enneaden,' i. 4, 9.

† ['The materialist is like Baron Münchhausen, who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs, and himself also by his cue.'—'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,' vol. i., p. 34 (Haldane and Kemp's tr.).—Tr.]
dividuality originate at birth and emerge out of nothing by a power foreign to it; after dismissing these aimless, because contradictory conceptions, there remains only the teleological conception, removing these contradictions, and deriving the earthly life from the impulse to incarnation of a transcendental Subject. The true proof of this conception can indeed only be afforded by facts, and evidently we can only find these in analysis of that occurrence which introduces our earthly existence—birth, and of that mystery which antecedes birth: the metaphysic of sexual love.

If organic being originated only in physical and chemical relations, it must be within the province of biology to solve the problem of life. But to this task it has not grown. Life cannot be explained from matter, but requires life again for its explanation, and presupposes *omne vivum ex ovo*. Nor has the future any promise, since biology as such can always show only the conditions without which life does not arise, never the causes from which it arises. This confusion between condition and cause is, it is true, common enough in biological text-books.

We are therefore directed beyond the physiological process of birth, in order to obtain from the analysis of sexual love the positive proof of the spontaneity of our earthly existence.

The metaphysical significance of love has been known by only a few philosophers. It seems as if this investigation has been refrained from upon grounds of decency, without regard to Bacon's words, that what is worthy to be is worthy to be known.*

*Novum Organum*, i. s. 120.
Schopenhauer, by deep penetration of this problem, knew that love is metaphysical, *i.e.*, that its quality, intensity, and direction are determined by a metaphysical will, calling into existence the child to be expected from the connection of these particular parents.* This metaphysical will is not distinguished by Schopenhauer from a universal blind will. But as behind the human phenomenal form we have found first the transcendental Subject, the coincidence of the love of the parents with the impulse to incarnation of the pre-existing child is immediately suggested.

To perceive the instinctive source of love, it is necessary first to exhibit its relation to the universal sexual impulse, the instinctive character of which is manifested most distinctly by many prearrangements in the animal kingdom. Every instinct refers to an aim of Nature external to the individual acting and to its consciousness; nor is this at all affected by the Darwinian conception of instinct as originating through biological habit. Now this aim of Nature betrays itself in the results of the instinctive act. We have therefore to ask wherein the result of love is distinguished from that of the sexual impulse. This difference must show whether in both cases there is an instinct, or not. Now, in the animal world the result is the quantitative multiplication of individuals; variations from the specific type are so slight, showing themselves first as cumulative after so many generations, that we may neglect them in comparison with the much greater variations of the human posterity. *After* quantitative multiplication of individuals in the animal world, the struggle

* Schopenhauer: 'Ueber die Metaphysik der Geschlechtsliebe.'
for existence acts unfavourably to this quantity, but favourably to quality, since only the fittest survive, and by transmission of peculiarities the race is by little and little improved. Selection thus ensues first within the already existing generation. So that in the animal world the sexual impulse is indiscriminate—at least, we may here neglect the cases of sexual selection described by Darwin—and accordingly individuals of the posterity are almost only general, and repeat the parental type. But now, with the selection of the parents themselves by a breeder, the process of improvement of the race would be considerably shortened and hastened—that is, differences in the posterity which naturally would proceed at a minimum rate would be already accumulated in every new generation. Now this is Nature's own proceeding, resembling in this artificial breeding, when instead of the sexual impulse she introduces love. Love is a natural selection as between the parents. Thus in man the sexual impulse is specialised—and the more individuality there is in the man, the more individuality is there in the selection—and therefore, also, his posterity vary from the common type. And so the result of love reveals to us its natural aim. If I love just this maiden, but my friend just that one, and we would both strongly decline an exchange, the upshot is that the aim in both is posterity, and that not children in general (for such identity of result would not explain the difference of means demanded by instinct), but children of different sorts. A difference of parents, a difference of children. Thus, since in man the general sexual impulse becomes love, what is changed in the world is just the con-
stitution of the next generation, and nothing else. Love, therefore, anticipates the next generation in regard to quality; the sexual impulse only in regard to quantity. In the animal kingdom, improvement is indirectly aimed at, the supplementary struggle for existence first making the selection; but in man it is directly aimed at, because already, without going beyond the parents, there is selection, though not by the parents, we, indeed, choosing our wives ourselves, but in the sense of nature, that is, instinctively. The subsequent struggle for existence completes in humanity only that result which love has already prepared. Therefore is it that love is a force so potent and glorified, because it denotes the point at which the quality of the next generation is determined. In the animal kingdom, the general impulse, supplemented by the struggle for existence, suffices to maintain the racial type, perhaps even to educe new species and kinds; in man, on the other hand, the new means of definitely-directed choice, acceding to the general impulse, reveals a new aim of Nature: accelerated variation from the race type. We are not, however, to infer that through this reinforcement of means the development of the human form to new species and kinds must be accelerated; for it may well be that the individualization of posterity, provisionally at least, is in substitution of the further modification of the human race as such. Nature having highly developed the human brain and highly differentiated the prehensive organs—that is, changed them into hands—man has become, biologically, stationary; technic inventions dispensing with organic perfection. Therefore Aristotle calls the hand
the instrument of instruments. And so it may be said that humanity, the general impulse being converted into love, has become biologically stationary, because the individualisation of posterity satisfied the purpose of organic change.

Thus with the multiplication of Nature's means we are to conclude an alteration of her aim. Schopenhauer says: 'As the being, the *existentia*, of these future persons is absolutely conditioned by our sexual impulse generally, so is their nature, *essentia*, by the individual selection in its satisfaction, *i.e.*, by sexual love, and is in every respect irrevocably fixed thereby.' But this 'in every respect' is dropped by Schopenhauer himself, since he especially refers to the bodily constitution of the next generation. This, therefore, is not to the purpose, because the individualisation of posterity is much less corporeal than in the diversity of characters and abilities. As psychical differences appear, in the result—the new generation—the centre of gravity in the means applied must be also psychical. Although bodily beauty certainly determines the choice, that is only because it is the outward expression of a particular psychical quality which unconsciously attracts us, and therefore in the unconscious physiological regards by which we are led we attach the greatest value to the countenance—in which the psychical quality attracting us finds its most marked expression—and only secondary value to the rest of the form.

Love being an instinct having its aim outside the lover, its problem is not to be explained from the consciousness. The particular direction of the passion lies in unconscious motives. Beauty, far from being...
the ultimate explanation, is only the conscious means to instinct for its unconscious aim. It is, however, quite another question whether marriage is contracted from love. Marriage is often decided by passion, but this is by no means always the case, especially in our time; so that Bahnsen was quite right in saying that there are two principal sorts of marriages, the physical and the metaphysical,* those which spring from worldly motives, and those in which we are led by the Unconscious. Thus what Spinoza says of the affections generally, 'That man strives after nothing, wills, longs for, or desires nothing because he esteems it good, but, on the contrary, esteems that therefore as good which he strives after, wills, longs for, or desires,'† is certainly true of the object of love. We do not love a maiden because we find her beautiful, but because we love her we find her beautiful. In love the earthly consciousness of our person confounds cause and effect. We, limited in our sensuous consciousness to the earthly order of things, hold that for the essential of love of which we are conscious: the pleasure in a particular individual of the other sex. But as the sufficient cause of a proceeding is known only from the effect, and this is also true of instincts, the peculiar significance of the sexual impulse can only lie in this, that a living being feels impelled by an affection difficult to overcome, to deposit the material of a germ-cell in a place suitable for its development, love adding the further condition that not every place is regarded as alike suitable, a

† Spinoza: 'Ethik,' iii.; 'Lehrsatz,' 9.
selection consequently being made. As in every instinct, so here also there is consciousness of the means without consciousness of the aim; that we know beforehand the consequence makes no difference; for this knowledge of the consequence, which is not always desired, will not explain the affection, even if the consequence is desired. The underlying will is a metaphysical one, which by no means always coincides with the will of our earthly person.

The mystery of love thus lies in the Unconscious, and even more than in the common sexual impulse, because though we know the consequence, generally, of our act, we do not at all know the speciality of the consequence in the particular case. We know that offspring will follow, but not at all what offspring. The transcendental origin of the instinct is shown as well by its power as by its opposition to our earthly interest. The particularity of the result thus consists in the individual constitution of the offspring; love accordingly anticipates the quality and individuality of the offspring, and therefore every lover holds this special maiden suitable to himself. There are no two passions whose individualisation would be quite similar, as, also—which, metaphysically, is the same thing—there are no two men completely resembling one another. Every lover considers his love as unique of its kind—a feeling which is no deception; for even if different men may love in the same degree, the quality of the love is still not the same, but rather in each particular case is distinguished by undefinable shades. Every true passion exists in its subtlest character and effusion as a unique phenomenon. To this singularity of the cause corresponds the singularity of the
effect, the thoroughly specialised individuality of the child. It is therefore a profound saying of Schopenhauer: ‘As inexplicable as the entirely special and exclusively appropriate individuality of every man, is also the wholly peculiar and individual passion of two lovers—nay, at root the two things are one and the same: the first is that explicite which the latter was implicite.’

As love is an instinct, the derivation of it from conscious motives must fail. With all gradations of love, the corresponding advantage is for the earthly person more or less the same, but not for the Unconscious, whether we call that the Universal Will (Weltwillen) with Schopenhauer, or transcendental Subject. Not with the happiness of the earthly person is love concerned. Were passion determined by beauty in itself, were it only consciously motivated, marriages following upon the most passionate love must be the happiest, which is not the case. Therefore it is love, not marriage, that is the proper theme of poetry. When a passionate lover is unfortunate in marriage, he is surprised because he supposed the foundations of his love to be in his consciousness, where they are not at all, and hoped to attain his personal ends, whereas he has only furthered transcendental ends.

Consciousness is often in opposition to the passion, and so betrays that it has no part in it. Therefore in love occur the most striking antinomies of feeling. It may happen that qualities which would repel us in friendship, in love do not sober, but ensnare us, though we well understand that they may be objectionable for marriage life. Love is indifferent to the doubts of consciousness; it judges the loved
object according to its own standard. Many an one loves a maiden not only in spite of faults condemned by his consciousness, but on account of those faults, which are agreeable to the Unconscious. Such, for instance, are expressions of feminine humour and levity, which may promote passion, while we recognise them with misgiving. We may call to mind Philina in 'Wilhelm Meister.' Such characters are frequent among actors, not merely because the life of the stage develops them, but also because such dispositions are likely to take to the stage, and yet notoriously it is to just such actresses that the powerful considerations of social position are unhesitatingly sacrificed, notwithstanding the warnings of experience against such marriages. The highest degree of antinomy of feeling in love is shown in the fact that it is compatible with hate, nay, contempt—as in the case of Des Grieux and Manon Lescaux. Such a realised dialectical cleavage is only to be explained from the cleavage of consciousness and the Unconscious. When Ovid somewhere says, 'Odero, si potero, si non, invitus amabo,' he is wrong in supposing that love and hate are alternatives; for in all love there is the invitus amabo, and it is also compatible with hate. Therefore are we impressed with the psychological truth of the scene in which Othello, possessed with hatred and contempt for Desdemona, first kisses and then kills her. This real-dialectic of feeling is an inexhaustible theme of love.

The unconsciousness of the motive in love appears in this also, that we attach so little importance, as regards maidens, to the development of their consciousness, that is, to their cultivation. For the off-
spring, cultivation is of no importance whatever as not being hereditary. On the contrary, the less defined, springing more deeply from the Unconscious, are the psychical qualities, as is peculiarly the case with the female sex, the more the charm works upon us.

Since nature in humanity acts according to the principle of individualisation, the sexual impulse loses its general character and proceeds with choice, and even with such exclusive speciality of choice, that the general impulse is quite silenced. This is the important distinction between impulse and love, expressed mythologically by Plato in speaking of the primitive man whose divided halves longingly seek each other and strive for union, which may perhaps be considered as an obscure suggestion of hermaphrodism as a primitive biological form.*

Schopenhauer's theory is thus undoubtedly the true one; but it needs correction and completion. The individualisation of man concerns particularly the psychical qualities, character and intellect, and so love must particularly anticipate these, not merely the definite bodily constitution of the next generation. Now, as these psychical qualities determine the historical condition of humanity, here also history again appears as the continuation of biology. It would therefore be inconsequent to suppose that the Will underlying love only introduces our existence, then leaving us free, that is, abandoning us wholly to the play of our conscious motives. We cannot suppose the organising principle in us to have provided us with an apparatus of brain whose functions it has not designed; and as little can it be supposed that

* [The latest and most serious revival of this idea will be found in L. Oliphant's 'Scientific Religion' (Blackwoods, 1888).—[Tr.]
the metaphysical Will would have projected the
definite constitution of the next generation, yet
without troubling itself about the use of the qualities
produced. Moreover, we have already had frequent
occasion to see that man can be motivated from the
transcendental region without the mediation of his
consciousness, and that may also well be the case in
history.

As biology reveals an unconscious end in the
elevation of forms and their consciousness—science
not disturbing this conclusion by its discovery of
conditions and means—so also must history have a
teleological significance. Undoubtedly therefore the
metaphysic of sexual love is related to history, and
if the generation for the time being has a definite
historical function, its definite constitution will be
anticipated in love with reference to this function,
whether that concerns the revolutionary deeds of
historical heroes, who so strikingly appear as the
right men at the right times and in the right places,
or the revolutionising thoughts of intellectual heroes.
To the remark, that many able men have had able
mothers, it may perhaps be added, that the mothers
of able men have been passionately loved. In the
brain of the discoverer, and already in the love of his
parents, is anticipated the high-hanging intellectual
fruit which is to be plucked, as in the long neck of
the giraffe the high-hanging tree fruit is anticipated.
Schopenhauer, who admits the latter, should con-
sistently have admitted the former, and he would
thus have attained to a deeper conception of history,
though that would have contravened the blindness
of his Universal Will.
Schopenhauer, however, must be supplemented. The metaphysical Will underlying love is incontestable; but if between man and the world-substance there is the transcendental Subject, then obviously the metaphysical Will is to be placed in such a Subject, and the love of the parents coincides with the incarnation-impulse of a transcendental, pre-existing Subject. With that, the theory of Schopenhauer, which is constantly incompatible with the blindness of the Universal Will, becomes clear, this Subject being not blind, and being better adapted to the remarkably astute arrangements which Schopenhauer imposes upon the Universal Will. The biological view, which lets individuality be determined according to physiological laws of heredity, does not interfere with the transcendental view according to which the Subject can take into account these laws of heredity, and just by reason of them incarnate itself through particular parents. For the rest, the question certainly arises, whether the transcendental Subject is exactly reflected in its human phenomenal form, or whether this is modified by the material of the germ-cell. Many phenomena of somnambulism favour the latter view.

The metaphysical Will, which Schopenhauer has discovered in love, is therefore the individual will of a transcendental Subject, which seeks the earthly phenomenal form not only for objective reasons, to further the aim of the race, but also for subjective reasons, to advance itself. Thus this point of departure, taken from the metaphysics of sexual love, also leads us to the monistic union of biology with transcendental psychology, because man, as the common
point of differentiation of both directions, advances the development of the race, as of his own transcendental subject.

We shall first have a true philosophy of history when we conceive it, according to this double tendency, as a teleological problem, instead of attributing to it a merely earthly aim, a possible golden era of the future, such as Socialists dream of in their fallacious optimism. History must certainly be regarded as a continuation of biology, in which the struggle of ideas and the survival of the fit, that is the true, ideas will more and more take the place of mere struggle for the means of existence; but the transcendental view has also its validity. It is a prejudice of our century to believe that the teleological conception of history cannot co-exist with the mechanical—to which the mechanic of ideas also belongs. Mechanism and teleology would only be irreconcilable opposites if there could be no teleological mechanism—an assertion most inappropriate to the century of machines. From the instincts of animals we learn the psychological possibility of acts of which the aim is unconscious while the means are conscious. We have seen further that somnambulists, either from their own design or from a so-called magnetic promise, perform acts in waking, of both the means and aim of which they are conscious, while yet the impulse behind them does not belong to their earthly will. Thus, looking to the parallelism of life with the waking state, and of our pre-existence with the somnambulic sleep, the psychological possibility is not to be denied, that human history is composed of acts motivated by ideas and impulses.
transcendently derived; while we, like somnambulists, are immovably convinced of our own deliberate agency.

There remains, then, only the question, whether the multitude of these will-impulses of individuals are dissipated without rule or connection, or are combined by a single principle which through the conflict of particular directions seeks the diagonal direction. To discover this single principle is perhaps for ever interdicted to the human intellect; but we cannot doubt its possibility, since even in the transactions of ant-hill or bee-hive, in the division of labour among Hydromedusae, or in the conduct of tentacled Polype fighting among themselves for booty, the presence of a unitary bond in a multitude of individuals is very evident. If, therefore, the question of the prophet: 'Leavest thou men as the fishes of the sea, as the creeping things, that have no ruler?''* must, as regards human history, be answered in the negative, it only remains to ask to whom this question is to be addressed: to the personal God, to the single Universal Will, or to the plurality of transcendental subjects, whose consciousness of their solidarity, however, must, with the continual development of the purpose of history on a large scale and in the whole, have grown into antagonism to the will of the earthly individual. Practically, it is indifferent which address we suppose for this question of the prophet, and if only we do not, like the materialists, deny that it has any address, we should join hands over all other differences of opinion, with a common faith in human solidarity, instead of contending, as

* Habakkuk i. 14.
unhappily those do who have nevertheless still a belief in metaphysics generally—the religious and the philosophical. It is not really a question of the form of metaphysic, be it this or that religion or philosophy, at a time when a common danger has to be encountered in the total rejection of metaphysic, with the already alarming consequences of that rejection.

Thus the metaphysical explanation of sexual love, which is a tributary to the teleological conception of history, is only a logical inference from the philosophical conception that our life and our nature are our own act. This free act, if it extends not only to the existentia, but also to the essentia, must originate where the individuality is determined: in the love of the parents. Therefore it was necessary to bestow some remarks on the metaphysic of sexual love, especially as the present time is so disposed to regard love and marriage merely as an affair of our earthly personality, as an égoïsme à deux, as the French call it.

The conception of life as a free act is logically compatible with either the optimistic or the pessimistic estimate of earthly existence; for the act can be either on account of the value of the earthly existence, or notwithstanding the contrary, life in the latter case having still an educational value. Whoever recognises the dualism of Subject and person will not, even if a pessimist, see a contradiction to pessimism in the impulse to incarnation.

In somnambulism it is very apparent that the will of the transcendental Subject does not coincide with that of the waking person, and may even be in express opposition to it. Now if, following Buddha and Christ, the saints of all religions, and the majority
of deep thinkers and poets, we regard the world as a vale of tears, we must conceive the earthly life just as a transcendental self-prescription, similar to those prescriptions of somnambulists, in which they have no consideration for the pleasure of their waking person. The opposition between transcendental will and earthly will, which in somnambulism appears only in relation to particular circumstances of life, must extend itself to the total content of life, in so far as the same does not correspond with the earthly desires. The impulse to incarnation is only explicable if the sufferings of life are of transcendental advantage to the Subject, which has wholly different interests from the earthly person. The transcendental advantage of the earthly life appears even on two sides to be greater, the more evil we experience. Necessity is the mother of inventions, but also of Christian sympathy; so that necessity advances both the historical progress of the race and the moral progress of the individual. The evil in the world, which the struggle for existence brings with it, is therefore in the result optimistic; for this struggle advances the biological elevation of the life-forms and their consciousness, and advances individual development intellectually and morally; even in periods of crass materialism, reckless egoism, looking only to the earthly advantage of the individual self, though useless for the educational value of existence, will further the progress of civilisation, if not of culture.

Thus pessimism is true for the earthly individuals, but optimism for the race and for the transcendental Subject, which enters on the inheritance of the earthly
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 221

life. We may therefore be sure that we are on a right standpoint, when upon it an aut-aut of opposed opinions, as optimism and pessimism, is changed into an et-et, and that not eclectically, but by monistic reconciliation, for truth is represented by the hypothenuse, not by the perpendicular.

It was shown in the chapter on 'Memory' that the transition from consciousness to the unconscious signifies, strictly regarded, a transition to transcendental consciousness. That is not to replace Darwinism by transcendental psychology. Darwinism confesses that its understanding ends with the transition to the Unconscious, and therefore leaves heredity a problem. Thus transcendental psychology begins at the point where Darwinism ends. But what is true of the becoming unconscious of memories must avail also generally of ideation, the condensed amount of which constitutes our psychical faculties and dispositions. The transcendental subject thus appears to be the heir of our psychical attainment in life, and therefore also we must insist rather on the moral than on the intellectual powers, because with the change in organic form at death, the mode of cognition changes, while the moral relations in the transcendental order remain the same. Agreeably to which, we see also that somnambulists, frequently in very striking opposition to the waking condition, estimate men, according not to intellectual, but to moral cultivation, their sympathies and antipathies being thus determined.

Hellenbach,* whose philosophical works are of

* Hellenbach: (a) 'Philosophie des gesunden Menschenverstandniss'; (b) 'Der Individualismus'; (c) 'Die Vorurtheile der Menschheit.'
weighty importance for the monistic doctrine of the soul, and who, like the Buddhists in their doctrine of Karma, pursues the law of the conservation of energy, in its intellectual and moral application, into the transcendental world, expands into a transcendental optimism when he says: 'When by little and little intellectual labour has become converted into talent, and moral conquest into good dispositions, then is the earth, though a vale of tears indeed, yet not a purposeless one; then can the common understanding apprehend the value of the struggle of this life, in which alone character can be developed and formed; then is material welfare—the single aim of materialists—only the means, though, truly, not unessential means, to a far higher aim.'* Hellenbach is eminently a monist, and far more consequent than our men of science, when he says: 'The magical formula, which gives a moral foundation to the world, is called Conservation of Energy, Capitalisation, thus just the principle which we find in astronomy, in the evolution of plants and animals, as of culture and social science! On this fundamental principle science will rear its edifice of monism; only for morals, for the development of the noblest creature of earth, it shall have no recognition, the force accumulated in man shall be lost.'†

That the process of life has not for its aim the bringing ephemeral beings into existence, and then destroying them again; that also the truth is not with pantheism, in allowing the individual to be reabsorbed at death into the world-substance, like raindrops in

† Ibid.: 'Vorurtheile,' etc., ii. 257.
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 223

the sea, has been already proved by somnambulism, which reveals rather the strengthening of individuality, and the exaltation of consciousness. At the strengthening of individuality must also the earthly existence be aimed; we find the same in the biological succession of animal forms; and in the relations which are already repeatedly coming to light between biology and transcendental psychology, we must recognise this exaltation as the aim with which the transcendental Subject incarnates itself; for the earthly man is the common point, determining on the one hand the development of the transcendental Subject, on the other that of the race.

But the accent is laid exclusively on the race, if with the materialists we suppose that the acquirements of individuals are stored up only in their germ-cells, determining only the type of ensuing generations, species and kinds, while the transmitting individuals themselves are laid aside by death. Much more, evidently, would be accomplished by heredity, if one and the same life-process should secure the development of individuals in their transcendental survival, and that of the race in its earthly continuance. This arrangement would be very conformable to the economy of nature, so significant in all provinces; whereas if biological and historical progress should consist simply in what we bequeath objectively, whether children, or works of arts, or philosophical thoughts, everything, however, being lost which we have gained subjectively as faculty, the law of economy would be altogether contravened. Should Kant and Goethe, Buddha and Christ, have laboured and suffered only for the race, without
thereby at the same time advancing a transcendental subject of their own, nature would be in the highest degree wasteful.* If, on the other hand, to the physiological inheritance is added the transcendental, that would be the very ideal of the economy of nature, since nature would then be comparable to a machine, which in turning out its products continually improved itself, and acquired capability for the production of higher results.

As the fruits of our existence, its moral results, the Karma of the Buddhists,† as well good as evil, are transmitted to the transcendental subject, the transcendental world is connected with the world of sense by the two greatest generalisations of modern science—Conservation of Energy and Evolution. In pantheistic systems the individual labours more or less in foreign service, and only partially for self-advantage, being only a transitory part of the world-substance. In materialism, which attributes to the individual only a phenomenal significance, and denies every metaphysical significance, the individual labours just pour le roi de Prusse, that is, for the next generation, and so on to the latest, when it will appear that the whole labour has been in vain. In the monistic doctrine of the soul, on the other hand, our life has first of all an individual aim, but then also a general one, which may even fall due in one's own lifetime, for every one of us plays a part, if not in the external history of mankind, yet in the psychical history of others.

Schopenhauer very rightly explains our attach-

* Cf. Hellenbach: 'Vorurtheile,' ii. 181.
† Olcott: 'Le Bouddhisme,' Paris, 1883.
ment to life, notwithstanding the preponderance of suffering, by the fact that we not only have the will to live, but are this will. The monistic doctrine of soul retains this view with slight modifications; life is a transcendental self-prescription of our Subject; attachment to life rests upon a transcendental act of will which must accompany us throughout life, persisting with the same intensity even when it conflicts with the will of the earthly being. Had we only the earthly will, without being metaphysical will, such a contradiction would not occur, that we should consent to life long after we had condemned its substance; rather would attachment to life rise with its joys and desist with its sufferings, and suicide must follow at the moment when the weight of suffering obtained the least preponderance. Suicide could cost us not even an effort, if we consisted only of the atoms of the materialists, and had accordingly only a degree of will to live exactly fixed by what life contained for us, instead of being a metaphysical will to live, which remains the same whatever may be the life's content; for even suicide takes place not because that will has ceased, but in spite of its continuance. The transcendental Subject holds itself indifferent to the sufferings of the earthly person, reckoning them even for its own advantage; it therefore insists on this existence, as somnambulists in the crisis may desire an operation from which they shrink in waking life. All apparent contradictions are therefore removed when we admit the dualism of subject and person, whereas for materialists they are quite insoluble.

With Schopenhauer and Hartmann, the world-
process, which has for its aim the denial of the will, is at bottom a protracted suicide of Pan, and our existence is our own work only inasmuch as we are ourselves that Pan. But if, with Schopenhauer, we recognise that we are the metaphysical will to live, with only the correction that we are will in the individual sense, then is this another way of saying that we have ourselves chosen our existence in the proper sense of the word, namely, as Subjects, not as Pan; that thus, also, the attachment to our existence, which so often survives the esteem of life, is explained by the persistence of the transcendental individual will, we, like somnambulists, as Subjects willing what as persons we dislike.

But if birth is a free act of will, then already must the love of the parents be identical with the impulse to incarnation of a transcendental being, and the parents cannot be regarded as the producers, but only as the adoptive parents of their children, which explains at once the futility of all attempts to deal with the problem of life as one of physical and chemical relations. It is difficult to justify marriage from the standpoint of pantheism, but from that of materialism, which regards love and marriage as only physical, it appears positively as a sin (of which opinion also Alexander von Humboldt seems to have been*); for parents have no right for their own satisfaction to bring into this existence a new being—a fraud upon it, if it has no metaphysical background. Only if love is identical with the transcendental act of will of the being pressing into existence, if marriages 'are made in heaven,' are they also justifiable.

* Mainländer: 'Philosophie der Erlösung,' i. 349.
Thus the monistic doctrine of soul, distinguishing between Subject and Person, sets the man altogether on his own feet, which neither pantheism nor materialism succeeds in doing; it silences not only complaints against those by whose means we enter this life of preponderant suffering, but also complaint of life itself.

But this self-establishment of man introduces two further problems for solution, of which one is not considered by Schopenhauer, while he has started the other in opposition to his system, and is the first to attempt its solution. These questions are: our attachment to individuality, and design in the fate of the individual.

The attachment to individuality, such that we should insist on the preservation of our own, even in a desired exchange of our circumstances for those of another, (a desire really contradictory, it being the individuality itself which determines the whole lot,) must have a metaphysical foundation; for radically, even without a correction of Schopenhauer's premisses, it is identical with the particular individual direction of the parents' love. Attachment to individuality must thus depend on the fact that as transcendental beings we already possess this individuality. The question then arises how we obtained it.

In somnambulism, the transcendental Subject shows a very decided individuality. We appear therein as willing and knowing beings, as in waking, only the nature of the knowledge and the direction of the will are different from our person's; all the faculties of the latter reappear in somnambulism, and indeed in striking exaltation; our feeling
is deepened, sympathies and antipathies are much more decided, intellectual powers and moral consciousness often impressively elevated. The whole spiritual individuality is exalted, and the contrary happens to what the presuppositions of pantheism or materialism would lead us to expect. Especially observable, however, is the energetic activity of imagination, which already in our ordinary dreams is so productive that it seems quite insufficient to refer it to the imagination of the waking person, and a special dream-organ must be admitted. If there is, as none will deny, a difference between the products of waking and dream imagination, then, notwithstanding the essential similarity of function, we must distinguish between the activity of the imagination of consciousness and that of the Unconscious, i.e., of the transcendental Subject; and even if in both conditions the activity of imagination should be connected with a material substratum, yet the difference of the products at least compels us to suppose another seat of activity in dreams, which we should perhaps have to seek in deeper layers of the brain, justifying the expression 'dream-organ.' The higher productivity of the unconscious imagination of the dream-organ is the more to be admired, that, as has been sufficiently shown, it is never in unmixed manifestation in ordinary dreams. We cannot properly speak of a mere exaltation of the imagination of consciousness by sleep (though for convenience the expression may be allowed), because the consciousness, and with it all its psychical faculties, are depressed by sleep, while the powers of dream are awakened inversely as
the deepness of the sleep. That, however, is true of all apparent exaltations of psychical powers in dream and somnambulism. We cannot speak of an exaltation of the warmth of the sun when the mists of morning, too dense to be fully penetrated by its beams, are swept away by a fresh breeze; and when the threshold of sensibility, admitting to our consciousness only a small measure of the activities of the transcendental Subject, is depressed by a deep sleep, there is no true exaltation of psychical activities. The real point of radiation of all psychical faculties, even in waking, lies deep in the Unconscious, and they are only observed closer to their common point of origination—the transcendental Subject—when the threshold of sensibility is depressed in dream and somnambulism. In waking consciousness they are mediated, but not produced, by the differentiated organs of sense; thus for materialism man falls to pieces into a psychical mosaic, but in somnambulism, as also in works of genius, they are attached to the undivided psychical unity of the transcendental Subject.

Now, if in this Subject are rediscovered the psychical faculties of waking life, and only feelers, as it were, are extended by it into the material world, the capability of psychical development of the personality of sense must belong also to the transcendental Subject; that is to say, the latter must be able to take up into itself the deposit of our conscious activity, and experience a growth, as the stem of a tree obtains growth by means of its outstretched boughs and leaves. Now, if the real heir of our attainments in the world
of sense, of all, that is, which in Darwinism is thrown to the Unconscious, is the transcendental Subject (as in the chapter on 'Memory' appeared most strikingly to be the case), and inasmuch as this Subject possesses essentially the same psychical powers as its projection, the man of the senses, the capacity of the transcendental Subject for development cannot be limited to the single case of the earthly existence, but the marked individuality which we already bring with us into this existence must have been acquired in a similar way to that in which it is augmented in this life. The transcendental Subject must, therefore, have become that which it is by a succession of different modes of existence.

From the strength of the impulse to incarnation, or, what is the same, of sexual love, is to be inferred a great advantage from immersion into the world of sense, and the consequent desirability, in the interest of the Subject, of the repetition of this mode of existence, so that the unconscious attainments of one existence may be transmitted to the next. The hypothesis of a transcendental consciousness, which many followers of Darwin might repudiate, is therefore completely compatible with Darwinism. The 'Unconscious' is merely a negative term for that which is positively denoted as transcendental consciousness, so that the content of both is obtained by the same biological processes. When the Darwinian says that activities and excitations tend to unconscious aptitudes, dispositions, and talents, the transcendental psychologist indicates the same process in saying that the transcendental Subject is the heir of the person. The Darwinian says that such dispositions are for the
person unconscious; but the transcendental psychologist adds that they are unconscious only for the person, not for the Subject. Darwinism is not overthrown, but only cosmically extended, when the eminently Darwinian saying, 'Habit is second nature' is converted into, 'The first nature, that which is introduced with existence, is biological habit.' If Palingenesis takes place, we can go even further, and grant to Darwinism that this biological habit is that of our ancestors; for in that case those ancestors would be just transient phenomenal forms of the same transcendental Subjects which in later generations came again to incarnation.

Fundamentally, it turns upon what we mean by the word 'heredity.' According to Darwin, habits are transmitted to the germ-cells, and so to all later generations, species, and kinds; according to the transcendental psychologist, habits pass as predispositions to the transcendental Subject, and so determine its later phenomenal forms, which these later generations just are. These two views are not opposed to each other; they may both be true, only in that case there is the question whether principles of explanation are not unnecessarily multiplied, a double cause being accepted when perhaps one suffices. The proof of the Darwinian process lies very close at hand: referring to the resemblance of children to the parents; but the proof of the transcendental psychological process is still nearer, namely, in ourselves; it occurs as often as an idea passes over from ordinary into transcendental consciousness, as was shown in the chapter on 'Memory.'

Palingenesis is an idea wholly distinct from that of
transmigration of souls, against which the Darwinian of our day can adduce no better reasons than had already been adduced by Aristotle against Plato.* Just therefore is Palingenesis only thinkable on the foundation of a metaphysical Darwinism, and in this form it is unavoidable for everyone who still retains the conception of the soul at all, and recognises, besides, the truth of Darwinism. It is not the proper place here to pursue this in greater detail. But though, no doubt, Palingenesis is an idea which for the present has gone much out of fashion, that does not prevent our returning to it, as Lessing returned to it.† In Darwinism, well understood, there lies the germ of Palingenesis; to the materialist, of course, it will seem not only paradoxical, but (as usual) 'impossible'; though Voltaire (I think it is) somewhere observes: 'Not to be twice-born, but once, is wonderful.'

Those who think the metaphysical Darwinism, tending to Palingenesis, a crude explanation of individuality, should consider that the alternative explanations offered by materialism and pantheism are by no means less crude. They do not simplify the problem of life, if only because they do not seek in it unity; it returns with every birth; and becomes permanent when in every birth they see a new creation.

The doctrine of transmigration needs to be corrected in this also, that re-birth can only be regarded as the exception, not as the constant rule, as is, indeed, inferable from the simultaneity of our earthly

* Arist. : 'De Anima,' ii. c. 1 and 2.
† Lessing: 'Erziehung des Menschengeschlechtes.'
phenomenal form with the antecedent Subject underlying it. Moreover, from the finitude of planetary relations, the advantage to be derived from reincarnation cannot be regarded as endless and inexhaustible, necessitating eternal re-births; and, finally, the biological process appears to aim at a gradual expansion into the transcendental mode of existence, even without the supposition of Schelling's third Phase as the consummation of times.

So that not only the existence of man in general, but also individuality, is metaphysically determined, and is our own work; and the attachment to this individuality, which as transcendental Subjects we possessed already before birth, is thus explained.

With respect to the further problem of an individual life-aim, to such an opinion the system of Schopenhauer is highly unfavourable; yet to it was this honest inquirer driven by a profound investigation of the problem of human existence.* It is difficult to see how the blind Will of Nature should come to a purposeful disposition of our fate in life, even to particulars; whereas the solution is easier on the hypothesis of a transcendental Subject. Nevertheless, the idea is still so paradoxical, that even the mere psychological possibility of a disposition of our fate by our own Subject must appeal to analogous facts of inner experience before it can be admitted. Such facts are really at hand; in an earlier chapter dream has actually afforded us the proof of the psychological possibility of a falling asunder of the Subject into two persons; and again it is dream that

* Schopenhauer: 'Parerga I. Ueber die anscheinende Absich-
llichkeit im Schicksal des Einzelnen.'
teaches us that the individual disposition of a life's fate is possible outside dreams, since in dream it really happens; and all the more as in both cases the same agency has to be admitted—the transcendental Subject. It has been already pointed out that, and why, the waking imagination is insufficient to explain the dream images, that we are therefore driven to the admission of a special dream organ, even if we can only understand by that the imagination of the Unconscious—that is, of the transcendental Subject. Schopenhauer shows the reason for admitting a special organ of dream: 'Moreover, the images of imagination are always introduced by association of thoughts, or are motived, and are accompanied by consciousness of their voluntary character. Dream, on the contrary, presents itself as a complete stranger, obtruding itself, like the external world, without our assistance, and even against our wills. The entire unexpectedness of its proceedings, even the most insignificant, impresses on them the stamp of objectivity and reality.'* Now, in the chapter on 'Dream, a dramatist,' we have found that this unexpected and objective obtrusion as from without is always the sign of a dramatic self-sundering in dream, and always happens with the emergence of impressions from the Unconscious, the threshold of sensibility being the place of cleavage of the Subject into two persons. And this applies not merely to the personages of our dream, but also to the dream-stage, in which not only is there a falling asunder of our Unconscious on its physical side—with which Scherner dealt—but the psychical Unconscious also

* Schopenhauer: 'Über Geistersehen.'
comes into play, as, for instance, when in dream we are lost in contemplation of an evening scene by Lenau, or a bright landscape lies before us. The dream-organ, therefore, the transcendental Subject, determines not only the incidents of our dream, but also the scenic decorations, though as dreamers we know it not.

Now this is for Schopenhauer a point of departure for his transcendental speculation on Design in the Fate of the Individual: 'And indeed it is this analogy with dream which enables us to see, if only in the nebulous distance, how the secret power, which rules and bends the external circumstances affecting us, may nevertheless have its root in the depths of our own unfathomable being. For in dream also the circumstances, which are there the motives of our acts, come together casually as external and independent of us, nay, often as repugnant to us; yet have they a secret and teleological connection; because a hidden power, to which all the incidents of dream are obedient, directs and adapts these circumstances, and that simply and solely with reference to us.'

Now it is easy to see that, transferring this dream-relation to actual life, the transcendental Subject affords an incomparably better explanatory cause than the blind universal Will. To be convinced of that, we have only to hear Schopenhauer further:

'But the strangest thing is that this power'—he is still speaking of dream—'at last can be none other than our own will, yet from a standpoint not falling within our dreaming consciousness; therefore it is, that the proceedings of the dream so often take
a direction wholly opposed to our wishes in it, striking us with amazement, grief, nay, terror and mortal agony, without the fate, which yet secretly we ourselves control, coming to our rescue. . . . Yet these impediments are provided, and our eager wishes are frustrated by blow upon blow, by our own will; though from a region lying far beyond the representing consciousness in dream, so that it emerges in the latter as inexorable fate.'

Now as in the foregoing Schopenhauer infers a particular dream phantasy, so by transferring the dream-relation to life, in what follows he infers a fate-will independent of our consciousness and hidden from it; only that the will of a transcendental Subject is far more suggested than that of the transcendent universal will: 'Now may there not be, in analogy with what is disclosed in dream, a similar state of things in the fate of real life, and in its conformability to scheme, which perhaps everyone, in the course of his own life, has remarked?' Schopenhauer next speaks of the hard 'buffets of fate,' which we so often experience in the frustration of our earthly wishes, and says: 'Now it is often afterwards manifest, that the frustration of such a plan has been thoroughly conducive to our true good; this, therefore, may also be the case when we are not made aware of it, especially if we seek our true good in the metaphysical-moral region.'*

Schopenhauer far outstrips the thought of his

* Schopenhauer: 'Ueber die anscheinende Absichtlichkeit,' etc., 231-233. [It is interesting to compare this whole view of the providential, or teleological, character of the individual fate in life, with the Buddhist conception of it as the result of Karma. The two may not be irreconcilable.—Tr.]
century, when at the close of his treatise he assigns to the distant future of philosophy, the problem of which Kant prepared the solution by his distinction between the thing-in-itself and its phenomenon; namely, the reconciliation of the opposition between free-will and necessity, mechanism and teleology, course of nature and providence. But whereas the conception of an aim of individual life has certainly a paradoxical sound in the system of Schopenhauer, it will be much clearer as soon as we distinguish the Ego from its phenomenal form, the transcendental Subject from our earthly person. As beyond our dream-consciousness we are in dream not only poet and manager, but even scene-painter, so also the threads, by which fate leads us through life, unite in our transcendental Subject, even if nothing of this is betrayed to our ordinary consciousness. Our transcendental Subject thus not only introduces us into life and determines our particular individuality, but also leads us through life; but it cares only for our transcendental good, and is regardless of our wishes, just as in dream we, the secret directors, are regardless of our wishes in the dream.

That striking thought of Schopenhauer will thus not remain as a mere product of idle speculation in the history of philosophy, but will form one of the root-conceptions in the philosophical and religious consciousness of the next century. One need only read Hellenbach’s important work, ‘The Magic of Numbers,’* to perceive that this speculation is supported by manifold analogies even from the province of mechanics in nature. In this remarkable work

Hellenbach shows the true kernel of the Kabalistic doctrine of the design of our fate, he frees Schopenhauer's thought from its false position in the system of that philosopher, thereby making it capable of development, and himself profoundly extending it. Journalistic criticisms, indeed, the function of which seems now only to extol, in market cry, the products of mediocrity, passes over such books with a silence most favourably explained by want of intelligence.

The view, that the earthly existence rests upon a transcendental self-prescription, is only the complement and logical development of the doctrine of the intelligible character and of the intelligible freedom, as we find it in Kant and Schelling. Every view which regards the earthly birth as beginning of existence generally, and then, notwithstanding the dependence of our existence upon foreign factors, will yet elicit from it sense and significance, ends in contradictions which disappear when for these two premises we substitute pre-existence and transcendental self-prescription. Schelling says: 'The being (Wesen) of man is essentially his own act,'* citing Fichte: 'The Ego is its own act.' Only on this principle is the possibility revealed of reconciling necessity and freedom; but the only way to save freedom, without which, according to Schelling, 'philosophy would be wholly worthless,'† yet for which there is no room within the causal connection of natural things, is through the Kantian philosophy. 'Idealism first has raised the doctrine of freedom into that region where it is alone comprehensible. The intelligible nature of every thing, and especially

* Schelling, A. vii. 385.  † Ibid., vii. 338.
of man, is consequently beyond all causal connection, as beyond or above all time. We can therefore never be determined by any antecedent whatever."

If not psychologically, we can yet be metaphysically free. Kant has already declared that the question of the possibility of freedom does not properly concern psychology, but transcendental philosophy. To man as phenomenon of the world of sense freedom cannot be attributed; only therefore can freedom be saved, if phenomena are not things in themselves, if they have an intelligible cause what is not phenomenon, and can thus not be determined in their causality by other phenomena of nature. Only in this case can an act be regarded as a necessary phenomenon, and yet at the same time as free in relation to its intelligible cause. Now within the world of sense man is subjected to the law of causality, his acts proceed as necessary from his empirical character. As every natural thing has an empirical character, determining its reactions upon external influences, so also man. Motive and character are the two factors from which the act, as necessary product, results. On the other hand, man is for his own self-knowledge in the inner determinations of his acts not an object of sense, but an intelligible object; the empirical character must therefore be phenomenon of an intelligible character. 'So then would freedom and nature, each in its entire significance, be encountered in the very same acts, and without any contradiction, according as their acts are compared with their intelligible or with their sensible cause.'†

'It may be conceded, that could we see so deeply

* Schelling, A. vii. 383.
† Kant, ii. c. 25.
into a man's mentality, as shown by internal as well as by external acts, that every, even the smallest, springs were known to us, as also all the external occasions acting on them, his relations to the future would be calculated with as much certainty as an eclipse of the moon or sun, and yet it might still be maintained that he is free."

Regarding man as a mere product of nature, it may be objected to Kant's doctrine of freedom that it gives man an exceptional position in distinction from other natural objects. But this is by no means the case; for in every natural thing we have to distinguish a sensible and an intelligible side. Thus we may say with Schelling: 'If freedom is the positive conception of the in-itself in general, the inquiry concerning human freedom is universalised, because the intelligible, upon which alone it was founded, is also the nature of things-in-themselves.'† We must therefore carry over this positive conception of the in-itself to other natural objects. The intelligible in natural things is force; Kant designates the intelligible in man, reason; Schopenhauer, will, another reason for uniting both attributes in the transcendental Subject.

It is quite indifferent for our inquiry whether we go a step further with Schopenhauer, and assert the identity of force and will. The man of science will decline to call every force will, but certainly not to regard every will as a force. But force, the last word of all science, is a metaphysical conception, and belongs to the intelligible side of man, as of all natural things.

The doctrine of freedom, therefore, by no means assigns to man an exceptional position in nature; for not only in him, but in everything, we have to distinguish a phenomenal and an intelligible side. Schopenhauer, who so greatly admired this doctrine of Kant, has shown that there is only a difference in degree of evidential distinctness between the intelligible, the will, in man and in things. His comparison, in this respect, contains, in my opinion, the deepest thought of his philosophy, and, perhaps, the most expository glance that has ever been thrown upon the springs of nature. 'The old error is: where there is will there is no causality, and where causality, no will. But we say: wherever there is causality there is will, and no will acts without causality. The punctum controversiae is, therefore, whether will and causality can and must coexist simultaneously in one and the same occurrence. What makes the knowledge, that this is so, difficult, is the circumstance that causality and will are known in such fundamentally different ways; causality wholly from without, mediately, through the understanding; will wholly from within, immediately; so that the clearer in any given case is the knowledge of the one, the more obscure is that of the other. So that where causality is most evident we perceive least the existence of will; and where will is undeniably apparent, causality is so obscured that the immature understanding can venture to deny it. Causality, however, as we have learned from Kant, is nothing more than the à priori cognisable form of the understanding itself, and thus the being of the Representation (Vorstellung) as such, which is one side of the world: the other side is
Will: it is the thing-in-itself. Every inversely related manifestation of causality and will, every alternate emergence and retreat of them, depends on this, that the more a thing is presented to us merely as phenomenon, i.e., as representation, the more distinctly apparent is the à priori form of representation—causality: as in inanimate nature;—but conversely, the more immediately conscious we are of will, the more the force of representation, causality, retreats: as in ourselves. Thus the more prominently one side of the world emerges, the more we lose sight of the other.'*

Now, as in all natural things forces are constantly present, and, in a certain sense, active; as they are not first roused by the changes which are their occasions, but their activity is only diverted into another direction; as the gravity of a stone acts when the stone is at rest, and not first when it falls; so also must the intelligible in us, though latent for our self-consciousness, be present, and in an unknown way be active in us at every moment of the earthly existence. That, however, is to assert the simultaneity of the two persons of our Subject, and so Kant’s doctrine of freedom expands, not into the dualistic doctrine of the soul, with its succession of persons, but into the monistic doctrine, in which they are contemporary. Now, it is clear that Kant was logically necessitated to admit the possibility of magical relations between two persons of our Subject, and to investigate the case of Swedenborg upon this supposition. The transcendental Subject is a settled

* Schopenhauer: 'Wille in der Natur' ('Physische Astronomie').
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 243

thing for Kant, and just because he says, that 'the transcendental Subject is empirically unknown to us,'* would it have been illogical to deny to this unknown a particular faculty, e.g., clairvoyance. What connects the two persons is the unity of the Subject; what divides them is—in the language of modern psychology—the threshold of sensibility, which cannot, however, be regarded as an insuperable barrier, since it is, in fact, displaceable. When these displacements occur, the faculties of the transcendental person are projected into the sensuous person, and now it is only to be asked, whether there are organisations which in this respect vary so greatly from the normal type, that the threshold, which for the latter is only displaceable, is for them constantly displaced. Kant did not, indeed, answer this in the affirmative, but he held it to be possible, and is sufficiently logical to infer from that: that between the two persons of our Subject direct magical relations are possible; that between our transcendental and other transcendent beings—should we think of these as connected in a community like earthly beings—direct relations can likewise exist; and thus that indirect relations between these transcendent beings and our sensuous being are possible through mediation of our transcendental being. Of the actuality of such phenomena Kant could not convince himself in the case of Swedenborg. We, who know somnambulism, which Kant did not know, we who know the magical relations between the two persons of our Subject, could no longer rightly say that 'the transcendental Subject is empirically unknown to us.' We should be very

* Kant: ii. 428.
Illogical if with this *greater* logical necessitation we were *less* decided than Kant in drawing the inferences which he drew. But this logical fallacy is committed by the so-called Enlightenment, in denying the bare possibility of magical phenomena of which we obtain knowledge in somnambulism.

In a contradiction of principle to these facts stands, besides, only materialism, which denies all metaphysic in general, and especially the soul. But it is not difficult to show that this denial, according to the present standpoint of science itself, is an anachronism, because it resolves itself, when analysed, into many particular assertions, the refutation of which materialists themselves have already undertaken, so that only the absence of logical circumspection can reconvert the result of the addition into the sum opposed to it. For the denial of the human soul affirms that self-consciousness exhausts its object, the Ego, which contradicts the capacity of consciousness and its special case, self-consciousness, for biological evolution. If the Evolution theory is true, then must man have a double aspect, and show not only the rudiments of his biological past, but also the tendencies to higher faculties of his Psyche, which will be manifested by the displacement of the barriers of his consciousness—that is, of the threshold of sensibility. It is just modern physiology that has shown the existence of this threshold for each of our senses, so that there is a transcendental world upon whose influences our transcendental Subject reacts, though the sense-consciousness knows nothing of it. For the possibility of a biological exaltation beyond
man by alteration of form, or at least of exaltation of consciousness by alteration of the cognitional apparatus, material processes in the external world must be given, in which this process of adaptation has taken place. For consciousness to ascend there must be the requisite supports, but also the latent faculty of consciousness for higher psychical products. To see that needs only scientific knowledge of theoretical physics and the physiology of the senses. The basis of materialism is the assertion that only sense is real. This basis of their system materialists themselves have destroyed, but they will not see that the system has been consequently overthrown.

That may be truly said of the materialists which Brentano said of the Philistine, that he only understood four-cornered things. When they have got a round thing, they first make it four-cornered—only that even with this quadrature of the circle there remains an irresolvable residue. They make the metaphysical problem of the macrocosm into a mechanical problem, and the problem of the microcosm, bristling with metaphysic, they make into a chemical one. According to them, the first is to be solved in the crucible, the second in the retort.

The monistic doctrine of the soul, however, shows—and is thus applied against Pantheism—that with the disappearance of consciousness, and in proportion to this disappearance, new faculties of the Psyche appear, whence it immediately follows that our self-consciousness has not information of our whole soul, that therefore there is a transcendental Subject
underlying our sensuous being, infinitely richer and deeper than it displays itself in our sensuous consciousness.

Now, if in those conditions in which the transcendental Subject emerges—the fundamental form of them being somnambulism—multiplied relations between us and Nature occur, with new mode of reaction of our Subject, what appears is the exaltation of our individuality within the unconscious, but no pantheistic solution of it in the world-substance.

Finally, the monistic doctrine of soul must be opposed to the soul-doctrine of religious metaphysic. This allows the soul to originate at earthly birth, and yet ascribes to it immortality. But immortality logically implies pre-existence; Aristotle has demonstrated that only an unoriginated being can be intransitory.* Dogmatism arrives further at its idea of the soul—as Vaihinger shows in his excellent commentary on Kant†—by the confusion of an analytical judgment with a synthetical one; from the analytical cognition that the Ego denotes a logically simple substratum, it forms the synthetical proposition that the thinking Ego is a simple and therefore immortal substance. But if in our consciousness there is only a logical Ego, a real Ego can only be behind consciousness as transcendental Subject, which cannot be found if the soul is entirely sunk in the body and is wholly comprehended in the self-consciousness. The dualistic doctrine of soul presupposes both, not, however, as proved facts, but as

* 'De Coelo,' i. 12.
† Vaihinger: 'Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft,' i. 250.
petitio principii. It allows the soul to be first wholly on this side, then wholly on that, thus successively earthly and transcendent, whereas according to the monistic doctrine it is simultaneously earthly and transcendental. We thus simultaneously lead both existences, a proceeding the psychological possibility of which is apparent in every dream wherein we ask a question of someone which the latter answers; for as my Subject comprises both dream-figures, and only dramatically sunders itself in them, a monism is at the foundation of this apparent dualism. This psychological formula for the explanation of dream is also the metaphysical formula for the explanation of man. In dream, as in waking, the threshold of sensibility forms the dividing line between the two persons of the Subject, and so the idea of the Neoplatonist, that man is a double being placed at the boundary between the sensuous and supersensuous world,* obtains a scientific support.

Now, as in the dramatic severance of dream the Subject is drawn asunder into simultaneous persons face to face, so in other cases the Subject falls asunder in a temporal succession of persons. Such are the cases of alternating consciousness, of the dualism of butterfly and caterpillar, and of the generation-changes of animals. But even in these cases, there is a fundamental simultaneity of persons, the butterfly being always latent in the caterpillar, the later condition in the earlier. It is therefore natural that the comparison of the transcendental Subject with a butterfly which lays aside the caterpillar body should be found in the earliest times. Perhaps priority

* Zeller: 'Philosophie der Griechen,' iii, 2, 434.
belongs to Nong-ssee, the commentator of the oldest Chinese philosopher Laotse, who says: 'The human body resembles the chrysalis integument of the caterpillar or the slough of the snake. We assume it only for a brief time as a place of residence. When the caterpillar-hide dries up, the caterpillar is not therefore dead; when the snake has sloughed, it is not therefore dead.'*

Man, a double being, is therefore not defined by assigning his position in earthly nature. Important as this position may be, because we form the organic summit of this nature, the words of Job apply to it: 'Man that is born of woman is of few days and full of trouble. He cometh forth like a flower, and is cut down; he fleeth as a shadow, and continueth not.'† But whoever recognises the transcendental Subject in us will see that the earthly misery is for our transcendental advantage, and that this earthly existence is our own act. Neither the vain contents of our life nor its transitoriness can mislead us with reference to the position of man in the world; for if the sense-consciousness knows nothing of the transcendental Subject, then also the loss of the sense-consciousness cannot injure this Subject. This is the meaning of the experience, that the transcendental consciousness the more prevails as the sensuous disappears. Certain now as it also is that the activity of the transcendental Subject within the earthly existence cannot attain to a normality of function—the result for which mystics and saints have always striven—yet must it be pos-

† Job xiv. 1, 2.
sible, if we submit man to the experiment, to learn to know this transcendental Subject much more exactly. The first thing is to show that the dualism of soul and body is untenable, because the body also is psychical, and even organic processes are accompanied by transcendental consciousness. That is proved by the critical self-inspection of somnambulists, and the curative force of nature acting ideationally, that is, in health-prescriptions. The organising and the thinking in us are thus identical; the transcendental Subject is the common root of soul and body, which it forms and maintains according to an ideal plan in itself. The dualism of soul and body is therefore not real, but exists only from the standpoint of our self-consciousness. Thereby also will the frequently-alleged division of man into spirit, soul, and body, be monistically resolved. That also is true only from the standpoint of our self-consciousness. In the self-consciousness we know the spirit only in so far as it is soul, that is, as it feels and thinks by means of organism. Soul is our spirit within the self-consciousness; spirit is the soul beyond the self-consciousness.

Man, an amphibium of a higher sort—as is fundamentally every being, nay, the atom itself—is thus a monistically double being: monistic as Subject, dualistic as person.

The monistic doctrine of the soul, as it has solved the enigma of life, has also solved that of death.

The problem of immortality receives its solution in like manner as all philosophical problems in the history of philosophy are solved: the either-or of parties in the strife of opinions is changed into the
as-well-as. Death dissolves the connection of the two persons of our Subject. It destroys one of the persons, and so far materialists are right; but as the Subject at death only lays aside its earth-spectacles, as it were, it remains unaffected by death, and so far the spiritualists are right. Were our Ego wholly comprehended by the self-consciousness, were the soul in its totality sunk in the body, there could be no immortality; for the sense-consciousness must cease with the senses. Only what is beyond sense can survive death; that is, immortality is only possible if the soul exceeds the consciousness, if there are in man powers independent of the body, and therefore not to be destroyed with the body. This excess is very distinctly manifest in somnambulism. That remarkable phenomenon, that somnambulists in the crisis know no fear of death, is thus not only intelligible, but appears as necessary. Somnambulists, who in the crisis are conscious of themselves as transcendental Subjects, know that in death they only lose a consciousness for which the transcendental consciousness offers more than a compensation. The deeper they are sunk in the transcendental existence, in which they feel themselves freed from the burdens of life, the greater is their repugnance to return to the sensuous consciousness and to reunite themselves with the body which they see objectively lying before them. Notwithstanding they awake without memory, they can still estimate the condition they have just left from its after effects in feeling—as often happens on waking from beautiful but forgotten dreams—and then lament their wakening. Especially is this the case with the ‘deep sleep,’ from which they unwillingly
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 251

return to the waking state. Deleuze says there are somnambulists who in self-inspection describe their condition as very dangerous, and yet are so indifferent that they refuse to name the remedy.* Only in the lower degrees of somnambulism is there still fear of death, but in the deep sleep, the symptoms of which often dangerously approximate to those of dying, somnambulists frequently oppose resistance to the will of the magnetiser to awaken them.†

Now, if death has for somnambulists no sting, it follows that the voluntary incarnation of the transcendental Subject happens in no optimistic conception of the earthly existence, but in spite of its sufferings. This is no slight voucher for the truth of pessimism, but a much greater voucher for the fact that from the transcendental standpoint pessimism is not the last word, as, moreover, we may already learn from the consideration of earthly things. The earthly misery is not only of transcendental advantage, but even in its results on this side it is optimistic, because it gives an impulse to progress and to charity. Since the intellectual and moral acquisitions of life are the inheritance of the transcendental Subject, the earthly sufferings must be esteemed as necessary means to transcendental ends. Of very few men can it be denied that they would make a bad and, even for their sensuous nature, disadvantageous use of earthly possessions. Wealth without idealism is a great danger; and if oxen had plenty of money, they would still only buy plenty of hay. But we should all as transcendental beings pay the penalty were we to gain the objects of our earthly egoism.

* Deleuze: 'Instruction,' etc., 121.
† Chardel: 'Esquisse,' etc., 282.
Thus death cannot harm our transcendental Subject. Only the sensuous consciousness is bound to this form of organisation, but the dissolution of this form leaves untouched the cause, of which this organisation with its consciousness is the effect. So in death we shall find ourselves again as transcendental beings, as we awaken from sleep as sensuous beings. Transposition to the other side is only a figure of speech to express another organisation, for which, indeed, the world, as our present representation, disappears. Materialism says that we die and the world remains. The contrary is true; we remain, but our world sinks.

Schopenhauer was right in saying that the utterances of somnambulists about the other side are worthless reminiscences of their religious instruction. That is frequently the case, but even when not so, their revelations can possess only an allegorical or symbolical value, because with death the forms and means of cognition change; so that many somnambulists themselves say that they cannot find the right words, their expressions are only to be taken figuratively, as translations, as it were, from the language of the transcendental world into that of the world of sense. Negatively, the condition of the transcendental Subject can be defined by saying that what is true of its connection with the body does not apply to it; but positive indications are only to be found in the study of the higher grades of somnambulism, yielding, indeed, very rich results, the statement of which I reserve for another occasion.

In the consciousness embracing the whole life, we have already found one of the most important con-
stituents of the transcendental consciousness, that which preserves the spiritual unity of the Subject, notwithstanding the changes of the forms of existence, of which the earthly existence is only a limb. Intellectual and moral education in this change is only possible if the thread of memory does not break off. 'The practical power of the transmigration theory as motive stands and falls with belief in the essential identity of the person of my successor with me, and is not preserved by the mere continuance of the hypostasised sum of merit.'* But for this educational end it suffices that the person should be contained in the Subject—consciousness, as happens with somnambulists; on the other hand, the simultaneity of Subject and person does not require that both should have the same range of memory. Should anyone desire that the persons also of the Subject should be connected with one another by memory, so that we should be like Pythagoras, who was conscious of having lived as Pyrander and as Midas, and of having been killed as Euphorbus by Menelaus,† and who recognised the shield in the temple of Juno at Argos,‡ such a wish requires the standpoint of the dualistic doctrine of the soul; in the monistic doctrine its fulfilment would be a doubling of consciousness.§

* Hartmann: 'Das religiose Bewusstsein,' 344. [This refers to the doctrine of Karma, as to which a prevalent opinion among European Orientalists is that the only link between the individual who is said to be 're-born' and his successor is inheritance of merit or demerit, or their consequences. The doctrine of transcendental subjectivity, comprehending, as offshoots, the successive personalities, is essential to the intelligibility of the idea of Karma.—Tr.]

† Ilias, xvii. 59.
‡ Diogenes Laertius, viii. 4.
§ [This remark seems not well considered; for if the memory
The belief, as presentiment, in immortality, which we find almost everywhere and always, and which is only lost in decaying periods of culture, by generations sunk in terrestrial materialism, could not have this extraordinary prevalence, temporally and spatially, were it not, what perhaps all presentiments are, a weakened certainty across the threshold of sensibility, such that, the ideational character failing it, there remains to it only a presentiment with the associated interest for feeling—the wish for continuance. If the idea of immortality thus originates, then must this mere presentiment of the sensuous consciousness be encountered again as firm persuasion, as soon as the transcendental consciousness emerges. Now this immovable conviction of immortality is a constant characteristic with all somnambulists, and even with those among them who are already believers, it is much more decided than in waking. It would therefore be an interesting experiment to put a decided materialist into somnambulism; and it may be predicted with certainty that in every true ecstasy he would deny his theory.*

Thus the monistic doctrine of the soul solves many contradictions and removes many difficulties. That, on the other side, it presents new problems is not to be denied, for that is in the nature of things,

---

* [For such an experiment to be of any value, it would be necessary that the magnetiser should also be a materialist, or at least not decidedly otherwise-minded, or the result would be ascribed to his influence.—Tr.]
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 255

every new insight raising new problems, and usually more than it settles. If the phenomena of somnambulism are ascribed to a transcendental Subject, as against this multiplication of problems the physiological interpretation is doubtless simpler; but this greater simplicity is only apparent, for it is quite arbitrarily obtained, not corresponding to the nature of the phenomena, which cannot be deprived of their peculiar character. Problems are not solved by hiding their difficulties; the supposed profit very soon turns to loss. Kant says: 'If a science is to be advanced, all difficulties must be disclosed, and even latent ones must be sought out, for each of them demands a remedy which can only be found by growth of the science, either in range or definiteness, so that thus even obstacles promote the profundity of sciences. On the other hand, if difficulties are intentionally concealed, or even evaded by palliatives, they break out sooner or later in incurable mischiefs which destroy science in a complete scepticism.'*

If, for instance, Leverrier had neglected and not first rightly disclosed the irregularities in the motions of Uranus, 'the remedy' would not have been 'demanded,' and the discovery of Neptune would have waited for an extension of the range of astronomical science in some other direction; but as he made a special study of the difficulty before him, 'the obstacle promoted profundity,' and Neptune was discovered even before eye of man had seen him.

In psychology, on the other hand, the method of concealment is very injurious, and especially is this the case with the physiological interpretation, or

* Kant: viii. 235.
rather mistreatment, of transcendental-psychological phenomena. Theoretically, this is shown in the fact that problems, which are solved by the monistic doctrine of the soul, pass for unsolved, because the materialistic or the dualistic solution is insisted upon. But still weightier is the prejudice practically.

Somnambulism, as the fundamental form of all mysticism, is the single opportunity for obtaining knowledge of the transcendental Subject. This opportunity having been neglected, that is, transcendental psychology not having been recognised as the substitute for the critically shattered dualistic doctrine of the soul, the most recent generations have tended inevitably towards materialism, with results becoming constantly more apparent in our social conditions.

Whenever we encounter social evils, we find the ultimate cause in erroneous popular opinions. Now, if we ask which of the existing systems of thought is responsible for these erroneous and practically injurious opinions, undoubtedly it can only be the one which has the least ethical motive power. But materialism has none whatever; for if the world is only a physical problem, and man only a chemical one, then has morality no significance.

If, however, all social evils can be traced back to false views, so must true views draw after them good conditions. Now, certainly I have never intended to excogitate a system adapted to the practical benefit of society, and only theoretical grounds have forced me into the monistic doctrine of the soul. But as this doctrine, being the mere exposition of somnambulism, is theoretically unavoidable, while practically it offers
to the individual very powerful ethical motives, it forms a further proof of the agreement of the true and the good. As materialism acts injuriously, because it gives man a false consciousness of himself, so, on the contrary, in the monistic doctrine of the soul is Schelling's saying verified: 'Give man the consciousness of what he is, and he will soon be what he ought.'*

5. Our Position in the Universe.

Our transcendental Subject being contemporaneous with its terrestrial phenomenal form, it results that our cosmical position is not defined by assigning to the earth its astronomical rank,† and to man his biological rank upon the earth.‡ If Nature and man have a metaphysical side, then must the problem of cosmical position be much more deeply conceived; it becomes that of the relation of our terrestrial to our transcendental position; philosophy and religion appear as necessary complements to the sciences. Ethic itself, a social problem only while man is considered simply as a terrestrial being, first becomes a true metaphysical problem when it is admitted that our position has an extra-terrestrial projection. Now, with our present sufficiently clear perception that the solution of the social problem is everlastingly frustrated by terrestrial egoism, or at least will everlastingly have to contend with it, that thus a radical solution is only possible through an ethic which itself first emerges as a problem upon the supposition that

* Schelling, i. 157.
† Proctor: 'Our Position in the Universe.'
‡ Darwin: 'Descent of Man.'
man has a cosmical position, the question here occupying us appears to be one also of eminent practical importance. For man as a citizen of the universe, an ethic is possible; but if he is only a citizen of the earth, then is there no ethical problem, but only a social one. Ethic stands or falls with the assertion or denial of our position in the universe. The education of mankind for citizenship of the universe is the task of philosophy and religion. True, there have been philosophers for whom philosophy has only the task of reflecting the world in thought, not the education of the human race. But the two tasks are inseparable, for their final aims coincide, and both find solution in the same way. If his place in the universe is made clear to man, therewith also is his task as an ethical being appointed; and, on the other hand, unless he knows his place in the universe, unless it is made clear to him by philosophy, he cannot act conformably to it. Theory and practice, therefore, do not admit of separation, and philosophy must educate man to citizenship of the world just because she shows him his position, though in her often purely ideal striving she may not herself be conscious of this final aim.

So far it may be said, that all speculations from the oldest times turn upon the question of man's place in the universe. Every religious and every philosophical system solves this question in its own way. Therefore to all religions and all philosophies we have still provisionally to oppose Pascal's words: 'Tu varies, donc tu n'est pas la vérité; la vérité n'est qu'une.'

It cannot, however, be denied, that in the succession
of all these systems, the question itself, if not the answer, has been made continually clearer, and that the attempted solutions, notwithstanding their partial opposition, are still supplementary to each other. That is even the case where the opposition seems to be one of principle, as, for instance, between optimistic and pessimistic systems. The phenomenal world, in fact, offers points of support for both views; the conceptions of a Leibnitz and a Schopenhauer do not wholly exclude each other, but are complementary. Regarding the world with the eyes of the astronomer, in the movements of the stars we see the highest harmony and conformability to purpose. The materialist says there is only conformability to law, and that is so far true, that the astronomer as such will never find God or the universal reason among the stars. But it is a fact that astronomers, almost without exception, not only believe in this reason, but are even theists, because only for a dull eye is research concluded by discovery of the laws of the kosmos. To him who does not lose sight of a question as soon as it is pushed back, the cosmical laws eliciting results so remarkable become themselves the problem, and he tends naturally to optimistic conceptions.

Every effect has a cause, which must indeed be equivalent to the effect; thus the intelligent effect must have a cause somehow to be conceived as intelligent. It may be a fallacy to individualise or even anthropomorphise this cause, but it is a still greater fallacy to see in laws the ultimate explanation of all phenomena. As we can imagine a world-pulp, in chaos and yet ruled by physical and chemical laws, as consequently law can preside as well over chaos as
over harmony, therefore the cosmic laws do not coincide with the concept of law, but are a special case of it, and though the astronomer cannot be contradicted in his reference of phenomena to laws, and is not to be interrupted during his statement, yet to his last word the question can and must be annexed—how comes it that just the harmonic special case of conformability to law is presented? And that it is presented, optimists will always explain in favour of their own view.

But now opponents will rightly say, that it is not only a question of the harmonic motions of the planets about the sun, but also of what living figures this sun shines upon; and with this comes the turn of pessimism. It is not to be denied that the systems of Hartmann and Schopenhauer have a solid empirical basis, thus must pessimism also be relatively in the right. Now as the fundamental cause of all earthly suffering we find Darwin's struggle for existence, and this must incline us to Schopenhauer's side; but, on the other side, it is just this struggle which is the driving-wheel of all cosmical, biological, and historical development, so that again the result seems optimistic. Now, as both conceptions rest on experience, that only can be a true comprehension of Nature which is just to both sides.

Corresponding to the results of the struggle for existence, optimism remains valid for the biological and historical capacity of the race for development; pessimism is limited to the individual. If, further, there accedes to man, besides his terrestrial place, a place in the universe, then pessimism has the further limitation, that it is valid only for the earthly phase
of our existence. Then would pessimism, with all
its justification, be only a partial aspect within the
optimistic view.

Now whether man has such a place in the universe
besides his earthly place is only another form of the
old question, whether religious and philosophical
systems are true, or materialism. The disproof of
the latter makes way for the place in the universe,
and this disproof is easier than to decide what is
truth in religion and philosophy; for in these at-
ttempts to solve the world-problem, truth is not to be
found as a ripe product, but only as a distant ideal.

No wonder that mankind from time to time is
lamed and sceptical, and then sets itself more limited
tasks by turning to investigation of the things of
sense. This is the case with recent generations,
whose application to this task has been successful
beyond precedent. But in such periods religion and
philosophy are slightly esteemed, at least by those
whose historical knowledge of philosophy is defective,
and who, because the world's riddle is unsolved,
overlook the other fact, that in the successive at-
ttempts at solution a progress is to be noted. In this
case scepticism is the greatest, and its full expression
is just materialism, which upbraids philosophy, not
only as slow, but as altogether wrong.

All men of science of great eminence are in recent
times certainly far from identifying themselves with
materialism, which they even rather contest, whereas
among the public the popularisation of the sciences
has only advanced materialism. The public will thus
answer the question as to the universal place of man
by denying the problem. So that I shall not only
find readers who ascribe to man a position in the universe other than that supposed by me, but also others who deny the problem itself, man, as individual and as race, being limited to earthly existence. To these I shall appear—as the ancient Greeks said—like a man who with one hand milks the he-goat, and with the other holds a sieve underneath.*

In such a state of things it only remains to attack the opponent on his own domain. Since materialism has its root in the sciences, it is thus just from these that the existence of the problem must be proved, and upon their foundation must its solution be attempted.

The natural sciences, emphasising the irrefragability of their results, call themselves the exact sciences. It is undeniable that if in an experiment nature answers, as it were, a question put to her, this answer cannot further be doubted, but must be regarded as decisive; for if the laws of nature are unchangeable, in every question the single experiment suffices. On the other hand, it is clear that by physical experiments only physical problems, and by chemical experiments only chemical problems, can be solved. Philosophical problems lie not at all in the province of the natural sciences; the latter can thus contribute no positive content to philosophy, but only negatively limit it by their veto upon philosophical dicta which are contrary to the sure results of natural research. Further, the incontrovertibility of the experimental sciences does not extend; therefore do we see opinions

* [Kant also makes use of this simile to denote the case of one proposing an absurd question and another attempting an answer. —'Krit.' d. r V. (Tr. Logik).—Tr.]
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 263

differ also among men of science, as soon as problems are touched which cannot be solved in crucibles and retorts. With all the respect which Häckel and Bär enjoy as men of science, they get small thanks from their colleagues for the circumspect confession that the sciences are piece-work, and force and atom metaphysical concepts.

Among extreme materialists differences are indeed never profound; they can only relate to things not so much the subject of controversy as of wager, since it is the retort, not the understanding, that has to decide. This harmony is easy to attain by a general denial of all philosophy. But the latter, driven from the province of research, re-enters by the back door; for when the materialist asserts that our senses and organism reveal to us only a limited number of substances and forces, and that, therefore, there can be in great Nature nothing else, with the huge 'therefore' a mere branch of knowledge inflates itself to a conception of the universe, containing, indeed, a very poor philosophy, but still just a philosophy.

More strikingly than philosophy herself can demonstrate her justification, is this proved by the exact sciences in our time. The characteristic of all philosophy is the sentiment that the perceptible world, the world-image flowing through our sense channels, is only the product of our organisation, that we know not the reality of things, but only the modes in which our senses react upon reality. From Protagoras, who named man the measure of all things—πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*—to Kant, who has stated the problem more comprehensively and deeply than

* Aristotle: 'Metaphysic,' x. i.; Plato: 'Theæt.,' 152.
any other man, this truth has been constantly preached in philosophy. Materialism, on the other hand, takes phenomena for things in themselves. Were they really so the explanation of the world would be easy. But that reality is by no means identical with its reflected image in our consciousness—thus that philosophy is indispensable—the exact sciences, theoretical physics and the theory of sense-perception, have now themselves experimentally demonstrated. Every educated man of science knows now that the so-called qualities of things are in fact only qualities of our organisation, thus that enlightenment upon this organisation is by no means enlightenment upon the objective world-problem. Our representation of objects is conditioned by the peculiarities of our senses: quantitatively because our senses do not approximately report all natural processes; and qualitatively because the external influences of things are changed by the senses. Ether-vibrations, for instance, are first perceived by us in million-fold condensation, and then not as vibrations, but as light and colour.

The world is therefore our representation. Materialism is self-refuted by its latest researches; it has sawn away the bough on which it sat. Thus that materialism still exists is an anachronism, and it could not be, if everyone reflected.

It is therefore on this problem, which philosophy has always accentuated, and whose experimental solution science has facilitated, that the lever must be set, in order to come to an understanding on the position of man in the universe. The relation of reality to our organism must be established, for the materialist standpoint, that all reality is sensuous,
that perceptibility and reality coincide, is fundamentally contradicted since the theory of evolution was brought by Darwin on to a firm track. The whole biological process, the exaltation of sense and consciousness, signifies a constant increase of perceptibility. It is this subjective factor that has continually increased, not the objective things. Perceptibility and reality were thus never conterminous, and in their identification by materialism the course of the biological process is as though the objective highway grew in length with the advancing footsteps of the traveller, or the wall grew with the plant climbing it.

If man is a member of the biological series, then must he also have his Janus-aspect. If man has five senses, corresponding to definite processes of nature—which may all be referred to modes of motion of matter and of the ether—it does not follow that in objective nature there are no more modes of motion. We have no organ for perceiving electricity and magnetism—unless they are first changed into equivalent amounts of other forces—so that there are more things than senses. To conclude from the number five of the senses to the number five of modes of motion is a logically fatal leap. The number of the forces prevailing in Nature is thus unknown to us, and the external process of the few we know is converted in perception, e.g., atmospheric vibration into sound.

The denial in principle of a supersensuous world is thereby definitely set aside. Therefore did Protagoras add to his judgment that man is the measure of all things the weighty words: 'of things that are, that they are; of things that are not, that they are
not '—πῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστώ. The human senses change: forthwith there is a quite different world; our senses multiply; forthwith will Nature appear far richer.* The sight is lost; forthwith the greatest part of Nature vanishes. Now as not only each particular sense, but also every collective organism, has its barriers of sense, and perceives only a fragment of reality, evidently the materialistic edifice resting on this fragment is anything but a solution of the world-problem. With equal right could a blind man declare his world to be the whole world. There was in the year 1876, in the medical hospital at Leipsic, a patient to whom almost all sense and muscular feeling were wanting; only through the right eye and left ear was he in relation to the external world. If these senses were closed, he fell asleep. He could not be awakened by shaking, but only by calling into his left ear and by light thrown on his right eye.† This patient has just the same relation to the normal human individual, as the latter would have to a being with more than five senses; and if the sense-material of such a patient is inadequate to explain our world of sense, just so is the sense-material of a Vogt and a Büchnner likewise inadequate to explain the whole world-problem.

Spectral analysis proves that the colour-spectra of stars, thus also the chemical constituents and their combinations, are very different. That is first true of the suns, the fixed stars, but in analogy with our

* Conf. du Prel: 'Die Planetenbewohner,' cap. vi.; 'Ueber die Intellektuelle Natur der Planetenbewohner.'
† 'Archiv f. d. ges. Physiologie,' xv. 573.
system must be true also of the to us invisible detached planets of the stars. According to the adaptation doctrine, the inhabited stars must thus be populated by very diverse organisations. Supposing the materialistic school to be represented on all these stars, and that a cosmical congress of materialists were to be appointed, to which each star should have deputed its Ludwig Büchner; and supposing further a possible communication by a common language at this congress, yet would this not by a long way afford the means of a common understanding. If one only sees a rose, the other only smells it, they will have no common understanding about the subject, but each will conclude the other to be speaking of something quite different. Our Ludwig Büchner would in this congress of the universe speak of his five senses, but could only be understood by those who had senses similar and of the same number. Now, should the inhabitant of another star begin to speak, our Büchner would shake his head, and advance the celebrated theory of illusions and hallucination; should however a third, who happened to have the same sensibility as the second, support him against Büchner, the latter would now advance the still more celebrated theory that hallucinations are sometimes infectious. But next a fourth shall come, of such a material constitution as to be perceptible by none of the human senses. Now, would Büchner hear words, but see no speaker, he would therefore say that he himself was now also suffering from an illusion of hearing, and was undoubtedly infected. But should all the rest of the party assert the visibility of the speaker, that again Büchner must explain as an infection of them by the
speaker! In short, in such an assembly, each would be reduced *ad absurdum* by the mere existence of the rest, and they would break up in tumult, unless perhaps some philosopher, acquainted with the cognition-theories of all stars, were present. He could enlighten them, and convert all from materialism by making intelligible to them the incontrovertible truth, that objectively, certainly, there is but *one* world, subjectively, however, just as many worlds as modes of existence and sensibility. But without such a philosopher, the assembly would as little come to an understanding as a company of fools.

Hence it is apparent that materialism must surrender if only it understood itself, and could reflect on the bearing of its own theory of perception. And it is quite useless to dispute about the universe and man's place in it with an opponent who is not thoroughly acquainted with the results of physiological and philosophical theories of cognition; he is not qualified for controversy.

The simplest conception of the position of man in nature is that it is only individual, subjective, and limited to the earth spatially and temporally. The first objection to this is that even the individual existence has an influence at least in its effects on the general history of man, thus in a certain sense survives. By the co-operation of individuals mankind has hitherto accumulated, and will continue to accumulate, civilisation. This view is recognised by the Arabs, in their rule that every one must either plant a tree, or write a book, or leave behind him a child. From this standpoint, indeed, the single life has as yet no
metaphysical significance, but still an historical one in regard to the race.

But how stands the matter also with respect to this race?

The life of the earth will have an end, and the earth itself will have an end. Of mankind and its world will it at some time be said: *Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium*. Of what use is it, for every world to produce its peculiar culture, if it is sometime to be buried and forgotten? Of what use is our culture-history, if, nevertheless, the earth is always to remain an isolated star, and the history of man is never to debouch into the general stream of cosmic history? May not rather that conception of history which, since Lessing, Herder, and Hegel, has become the common property of the cultured, receive a cosmical extension?

It is difficult to see how such a process should come to pass, but logically it is well admissible. In that case our planet would be for a time indeed an isolated star, a cosmic island in the ocean of space, but would yet at length be drawn into the general stream of universal history, as many an island in the seas of our world remained isolated till the age of discoveries. It is not necessary to take the comparison literally, and to fancy future journeys to the moon or Mars. True, it may be conceived that only for the present do we stand so helpless before the atmospheric ocean, as primitive man before the great water, till at length—with triple brass about the breast, as Horace says—he ventured on planks upon the waves. Attached by our original organisation to the earth's floor, we have nevertheless the capacity for inventions by
which also the water and the air may become our elements. But with the limits of the atmosphere is a limit also drawn to our power of existence, and even if we could get quite beyond the attraction-sphere of our planet, we could still not live on a Mars or Jupiter.

Materially, our earth is not isolated from the kosmos, otherwise, to say nothing of the bond of gravitation, no beam of light could reach us from other stars. It is thus a question whether, with a better employment of the connecting forces, human thought, at least, might not be able to traverse space. That we cannot represent to ourselves the 'how' of such an intercourse, proves nothing at all against its possibility; even to an Aristotle it would have been still incomprehensible, that without crossing the ocean we should exchange thoughts with our antipodes. It is not inconceivable that the spectral-apparatus, which at present only informs us of the chemical constituents of the stars, will in time be developed to a cosmical telegraph. Moreover, we know not by far all the forces of nature; there may thus possibly be other means of telegraphy, the application of which would be more hopeful.

Astronomically regarded, the universe is a whole, held together by the bond of gravitation. Now, shall this unity and harmony of the kosmos apply merely to the mechanical side of nature, shall, in fact, every world remain condemned to atomic detachment? If the most important phenomenon of nature is not matter, but mind in its different phenomenal forms, if thus mind seems evidently the aim of nature, then is it hard to believe that the unitary bond of nature should
embrace only the material masses of the stars. Mind would be a very useless appendage of the universal order, if its development, likewise, did not tend to solidarity. Whoever would sooner believe in the senselessness of the expounders of Nature, than in the senselessness of Nature herself, will find the thought that in universal development there is no other aim than the play of mechanical forces of gravitation, as strange as the assertion that the essential significance of a great city lay in its aggregation of houses, and not in the collective mental life of its inhabitants. So also is it to be presumed that Nature's accent is laid on the mental beings, not on their habitations.

What remarkable revolutions, socially, have steam and electricity brought after them! But we cannot at all guess the number of still unknown forces; we may, however, suppose it all the larger, as Physics teach that all natural forces are metamorphoses of an unknown primitive force, so that each can be changed into each according to equivalent relations. Even if, therefore, we already knew all the present forces of nature, still new metamorphoses of them might occur by the mere further development of the globe, as perhaps chemical combinations began when the earth had attained a definite stage of cooling.

Now, since it is evidently illogical to say that forces unknown to us could introduce phenomena only up to a limit known to us, at least the possibility of cosmical intercourse must be conceded. That opens the prospect, that even after the dying out of man upon the earth when it has become wholly cold and uninhabitable, the attainments of human culture might be preserved. Mankind would
find its historical heir in the kosmos, and even though the earth itself should plunge into the sun, could it still be said: *non omnis moriar*!

But the philosopher's quiver contains yet other arrows for despatch, should this one miss the mark. Hitherto the question has not been suggested, whether it is precisely to man that this task must be confided. The prospect of the realisation of a cosmical history perhaps only therefore seems so bad, because we suppose the attainment to depend on man. Yet not only is it possible that on the earth itself man may be relieved by a still higher organic form, better grown to the task, but also that the initiative in the introduction of cosmical history may proceed from inhabitants of another star. These possibilities also have to be examined.

When from the foremost of the ships, with which Christopher Columbus sailed across the Atlantic, there sounded the sailors' cry of 'Land!' the signal was given that from this moment the history of the old world associated itself definitely with that of the newly-discovered region. The initiative came from Europe, or rather from Columbus alone, in opposition to all the learned, since it was considered absurd, the earth being round, to try to go uphill with ships. As is well known, Columbus did not suppose himself to have discovered a new world, but rather to have reached the east coast of Asia; but at least he had gone upon the right idea, that in his way the earth could be circumnavigated, and had only mistaken the dimensions of the globe. From the America of that time the attempt had never been made; from Europe it succeeded, because there the necessary
presuppositions were given; there came an enterprising spirit, gifted also with correct insight into the physical relations of the globe, and European civilisation had in respect to navigation advanced to the point that the means for execution also offered.

Let us transfer this relation to the kosmos, always remembering that the connection of stars need only be telegraphic. Our neighbour-planet, Mars, was detached from the sun earlier than the earth, and its geological and biological development must have proceeded more rapidly than on the earth, for not only has it, with its smaller diameter, evolved more quickly—as is proved by its extended region of polar snow—but also the distribution of land and water is more favourable; it has relatively more land than the earth. The obstacles to continuity of history were thus less upon Mars than with us. Its inhabitants accordingly attained earlier to general co-operation, and its civilisation must therefore have advanced more rapidly. Thus the inhabitants of Mars may well have conceived a future connection with earth as less paradoxical than it seems to us. It might even be that Mars in its biological evolution has already surpassed man. Its inhabitants have perhaps not only the scientific disposition of forces of which we are ignorant, but even higher senses than we have. Phenomena of electricity and magnetism which we prove by apparatus, they may perhaps perceive organically. The sense of sight is perhaps more efficient than our eye armed with the telescope; their solar spectrum has perhaps more than seven colours, and they perhaps see colours on this side of the red and on that side of the violet end of the spectrum.
Inhabitants of Mars who might in this way possibly be informed even of the general activity of mankind might thus appoint their Columbus for Earth, while Earth's culture might comparatively still be similar to that of the Americans before the discovery.

Now suppose the Europeans, without entering America, had succeeded in causing a sound there like that now produced by a cable telegram, such a rattling would have remained quite unintelligible to the savages. They would not have recognised it as a sign of correspondence from remote inhabitants of the Earth, but would have taken it to be senseless, or a miracle, or a swindle; while the Europeans, unable by application of other forces to make themselves understood, could not have complied with the demand from the other side for more rational signs of communication.

So also would the quality of a message to us be not at all at the choice of the inhabitants of Mars, but would be dependent on their knowledge of nature and on the existing relations of nature. Suppose they were at some time in a position to produce on our earth some very slight, but yet quite inexplicable effect, in the frequent repetition of it we should ourselves see anything but an intelligent communication, whose defective quality was first conditioned by the poverty of the means. Our learned men would begin by disputing the credibility of the reports of a phenomenon, according to all known laws impossible; they would next perhaps talk of hallucinations, or take the affair for a colossal swindle of a delinquent. They would require that rational inhabitants of Mars should telephone across a decided 'good-morning,'
and they would pronounce the actual correspondence-signs irrational, instead of referring them to the great limitation of the means of correspondence. Those who suspected the true state of the matter would be treated with smiles of superiority. In short, that would happen which has happened everywhere and always: the professed learned would do everything to suppress the new truth. 'In the sciences also,' said Goethe to Eckermann, 'what has been laid down and learnt at the schools is regarded as property. Comes now one with something new, opposed to, or even threatening quite to subvert, the Credo which we have for years repeated after others, and again handed on to others; passions are excited against him and all means are employed to suppress him. He is resisted in any way possible; by pretending not to hear, not to understand, by speaking of the thing contemptuously, as not at all worth the trouble even to look at and inquire into it; and so a new truth may be kept long waiting till it has made a path for itself.'*

Hitherto only the possibility of an interplanetary intercourse has been spoken of, and I do not at all complain of the sceptic, if he refuses to be satisfied thereupon; we shall, however, arrive not only at the probability, but even at the certainty of a place of man in the universe, in the degree that we fulfil the already prescribed task of striking materialism on its own ground.

For this purpose we must return again to man. Should the initiative in the bringing about a cosmical intercourse proceed from him, there are only two

* Eckermann: 'Gespräche mit Goethe,' iii. 20.
ways: he finds the means either in the forces of external nature, which he at present knows too little, or he finds them in himself, inasmuch as he is an evolutionary organism. In the latter respect we have now to apply to our question the attainments of Darwinism.

Darwinists, who conceive the biological part of the Earth as a process of evolution, fall into contradiction with their own theory, if instead of future organic development they suppose perpetual arrest.

Theories of evolution and Darwinism are not necessarily identical. The doctrine of evolution affirms the *succession* of higher and higher forms; Darwinism affirms their derivation, their descent from antecedent forms.* We have not to enter upon this controversy. For our purpose, two facts, not contested by anyone, suffice. It is certain that an exaltation of forms has taken place; the earliest strata of the Earth show the simplest; the latest, the highest organisations. But it is also certain—and without this fact the doctrine of descent would never

* [The antithesis in the German is *aufeinander*—*auseinander*. It is not easy to understand how any theory which does not recognise the descent of forms from antecedent ones can be described as a theory of evolution. There is doubtless room for other theories of evolution than the Darwinian. Teleology, for instance, is not recognised in the latter, which works entirely with the struggle for existence and natural selection, or the survival of the fittest for an environment. But teleological evolution recognises the emergence of higher from lower forms—thus descent—as fully as does Darwinism, but postulates an ideal immanence of the higher forms in the ancestral types, and raises the question whether there is not an evolutionary adaptation of the environment itself to the germinal forms which develop as the external conditions become more suitable to their life. Certainly this view is more agreeable to a monistic conception of Nature, whose phenomena find therein the perfect harmony and correspondence to be expected from the unity of their source.—Tr.]
have arisen—that in the long chain of animal forms each member in its structure and functions is adapted in general to its environment, but that it betrays deviating characteristics in a double direction, those recalling preceding stages in the biological past, and germinal dispositions which point to the biological future. This holds true of the foetal life and of developed conditions, of the structure of organisms and of their mental peculiarities, as perhaps in the girl's play with dolls already a future stage of development is indicated. Every life-form has thus a Janus aspect, looks back to the past and forward to the future. Already this appears in inorganic nature: the so-called nebulous stars—cosmic mist with bright shining kernels of light—point back to the diffused misty condition with uniform illumination, and again the future solar system finds itself preformed in them.

The Darwinist cannot stop with man; he must grant the possibility of a higher form of life, or at least of an exaltation of human faculties of sense beyond the present threshold of sensibility, and the evolution of new senses. But since the world, as represented by us, is a product of our sensibility, every exaltation of sense, every development of a new sense, must change the world-picture. The oyster represents the world differently from man, and from the oyster up to man a continual multiplication and exaltation of sense-faculties has taken place. This process was just as continuous as gradual. The threshold of sensibility has in the biological process been continually thrust forward; the senses became susceptible to constantly weaker degrees of physical influence. This was accompanied by division of
labour; from the general sensibility spread over the surface of the skin arose separately localised centres of sensibility differently functioning. By this division of senses consciousness, and with it the world-image, were continuously enriched, points of contact between the external reality and organisms continuously multiplied.

Taking from the chain of life-forms an intermediate member, its representation of the world is much less opulent than ours; but the world as present to our organism was already objectively present when that intermediate member still represented the organic apex. Only for that consciousness was it not, subjectively was it not yet; it was then quite truly a supersensuous world. The Evolution doctrine thus necessitates the admission that for us men also there is a supersensuous, or, as Kant says, a transcendental world, which we are travelling towards, but which is first, perhaps, perceptible to a higher form of life.

The transcendental world is therefore a consequence for Darwinism and for the physiological theory of cognition. Physiologists themselves have, it is true, a very defective apprehension of this result of their own premisses; but at least they cannot complain of philosophy if she speaks out a word placed upon her tongue by themselves.

Hereby is the whole uncertainty of human speculations on the world-problem at once clear. We would philosophise upon the world knowing it only in part, the transcendental part being closed to our consciousness. Could the curtain be lifted which divides us from it; could we at once acquire all senses, the potentiality of which is in the bosom of Nature and
which perhaps are enjoyed in the stars; should our organism suddenly come into sensible rapport with every point of reality: we should believe ourselves transferred to quite another world.

We see the world as we are sensible of it; we judge concerning the world as we see it. The more modes of sensibility we had, the nearer should we come to true cognition. The same world which is known by five senses in a five-fold different way, would by a sixth sense again be perceived quite differently. But who will assert that the whole reality is exhausted by five senses? The physiologist has no right to say so, the Darwinist still less; but least of all will the philosopher make this pretension, if he belongs to the Kantian school.

The deficiency of our senses is even experimentally demonstrable. In electricity and magnetism we have forces to which no sense corresponds; we know of ether vibrations upon which our organ of sight does not react, atmospheric vibrations which are not perceptible to our ear. Since, moreover, the things change in perception, the senses certainly do not inform us of the substance of things which can only be one and the same. With other senses we should have other representations, thus other concepts, another language, another philosophy.

If, therefore, the materialist asserts that there is no transcendental world—which yet for all sub-human organisms he must admit—that nature does not extend beyond the human threshold of sensibility, that our senses apprehend the whole world, that our representation of the world is the exact copy of the true world, he is to be refuted out of every text-book
PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM.

of theoretical physics and physiology. If, further, materialists like Vogt and Büchner so misunderstand the common place, that philosophy must rest upon experience, as to take the experience of five human senses for that experience on which exclusively true philosophy should stand, and then to set up the materialistic system as this true philosophy—a philosophy so unintellectual, that in it the feat seems to be performed of solving the maximum of problems with the minimum of intelligence—such teaching, indeed, may find followers in a time of intellectual mediocrity; but our posterity, studying this time with historical criticism, will set up a laugh over this materialism announcing itself as a philosophy—a laugh which will be Homeric.

As against materialism it must, therefore, rather be asserted that the whole content of reality is not disclosed to us, and that we only incline to regard the circle of nature as bounded—and just so bounded that it can be measured by the radius of human sensibility—because the human organisation itself is bounded; but that this is a simple substitution of the subjective for the objective horizon, and not a whit more rational than when the child runs to the point where the rainbow falls; that reality in the course of the biological process has revealed continually new sides of being, and that it is still richer than our representation of it. In short, it is to be asserted that with the increase of organs of perception, things themselves increase, not objectively, but subjectively.

From the foregoing it is clear that to be able to speak the last word upon the world-problem, nothing less is necessary than that we should have ceased to
be men, that we should have learned one after the other all possible modes of feeling and existence; for even were reality according to quantity wholly compassed by the human senses, yet physical things and processes receive by assumption into consciousness such qualitative change, that no longer the least similarity exists between, for instance, a beam of light and the ether-vibration at its foundation. The whole of nature, as we see it, would thus even then remain a mere symbol of reality, whose true significance would be concealed from us.

As we see, science itself in its ultimate issues turns into philosophy, first in theory of cognition, the critique of sense and reason lifting materialism clean off its hinges; physiology itself refuting the identity of the sensible and the real, which materialism presupposes. Materialists have thus deprived of its foundation their own conception of the world, without recognising the consequent downfall of all their conclusions; for if one fells an apple-tree, one cannot say that the apples still hang in the air.

As we are unable to adopt at pleasure other modes of feeling, in order to get nearer the nature of things, with some right may the attempt to penetrate the transcendental world be declared unprofitable, but that world can be denied only in a quite subjective sense, as the blind may dispute the existence of colours, or the deaf that of melodies.

If our image of the world is known to be dependent in quantity and quality upon our senses, it may in some degree be determined, what changes in it would happen through modifications of our senses. Astonishing is the multitude of modes of perception
thence inferable. But I need not enter more into detail here, as I have attempted this in my book, 'The Inhabitants of the Planets.' Men of science of the rank of Bär and Wallace have gone into the subject;* on the other hand, our ordinary materialists dismiss the question very summarily; their logic culminates in the assertion that because on the Earth there are only protoplasmic creatures (Eiweiss-geschöpfe), there are only such in all the Kosmos. They thus transfer their own barrenness of imagination to high Nature, and lag behind even the father of materialism, Democritus, who knew that man does not perceive much that is perceptible, and that other beings might have senses which we want.†

Like a red thread there goes through the biological process a continuous displacement of the boundary line between the actual and the transcendental world; what to us men is actual was to earlier stages partially supersensuous, transcendental. The senses have developed and multiplied, i.e., the biological process signifies exaltation of consciousness. But if, now, every life-form always already in germinal dispositions announces the next stage, it is presumable, that for man the veil which hides from him the transcendental world will, at least exceptionally, be somewhat pushed back, and that he may then be able to cast glances into this region, so far as these germinal, developable dispositions qualify him. Of this region philosophical and religious mystics have always reported, and the occult sciences of all times

* Ernst von Bär, 'Reden.' Petersburg, 1873. Wallace: 'Scientific Aspects of the Supernatural.'
† Zeller: 'Greek Philosophy.'
have been occupied with it, without sure results having ever been obtained. Such can first now be hoped for by the application of experimental methods of investigation, and will not fail to appear. The study of somnambulic states alone already reveals that in numerous cases man is qualified for perceptions which could never be conveyed to him through the apparatus of sense. Nay, he who has no leisure to survey this province for himself, can still, from observation of his own dream-states, gain the insight that there is for human consciousness a source exceptionally independent of the organism of sense. The natural somnambulist, the sleep-walker, the magnetic sleeper, often even the common dreamer, reveals with closed senses, powers which with open senses are impossible. Far-seeing in time and space, somnambulic clairvoyance, veridic dreaming, pre-sentiments, second sight, etc., are phenomena which occur it is true only abnormally, but yet have already been proved a thousand times, and indeed principally by physicians, who certainly were equipped with the necessary scepticism. All these states prove that between man and nature another rapport, at least in tendency, is given than that mediated by the senses and the brain, the central seat of all sense-impressions. Our sense-impressions, which are conveyed from the peripheral nerve extremities to the brain, are the normal sources of our consciousness; but this brain consciousness is only one of the possible forms of consciousness in general, only, as it were, our every-day terrestrial aspect. We bear in us also the dispositions to yet another consciousness, both as to content and form. When a future event is dreamed,
or information is obtained in dream of an occurrence unknown to the dreamer,* such a consciousness, as to content, is independent of the sources of sense; but when, as in the case of a more common experience, a dream of a few minutes seems to fill months, here the form of consciousness is abnormal.

Now, how are these phenomena connected with our question of the place of man in the universe?

From the theory of sense-perceptions and from the evolution theory, resulted inferences concerning the nature and perceptual modes of cosmical beings, whose senses are adapted to another reality than that which we perceive, or are adapted to our reality in another mode than ours. But the abnormal functions of human consciousness afford facts which are incomparably better suited to enlighten us concerning the cosmical possible forms of cognition. Since, however, these modes of cognition announce themselves, if only germinally, in our own soul-life, it is not only probable that the height of terrestrial organisation is not yet reached with man, but it is certain that in man himself there is a kernel, to which the laws of sensibility do not apply—an organ for which the cog-nitional forms of space and time avail differently than for the sense-consciousness. Since, finally, the functions of this organ attain to freer activity in the degree that the sense-consciousness is suppressed, so that the latter shows itself to be a hindrance to the development, it follows that the total annulment of the sense-consciousness can only be looked upon as a

* Such a case, viz., the discovery of murder by a dream, was recently again judicially proved, as is reported by the Neue Wiener Tageblatt of 13th January, 1881.
total removal of this hindrance; thus death does not affect the true substance of man; nay, it permits the cognitional mode which was suppressed in the earthly life again to attain unimpeded activity. If, therefore, it is just with dying persons that these abnormal functions of consciousness are so frequently to be observed—for many instances we have only to refer to one of Wieland's works (xxx. 236)—such a fact is impossible according to the current physiological psychology, but necessary* according to the theory here represented. Theories, however, have to address themselves to facts, not the reverse.

Now, from the fact of abnormal consciousness in somnambulic sleep, and more rarely in ordinary sleep, in dying, in second sight, and in similar states, result different consequences for our question, in which we have to distinguish between man as race and man as individual.

For humanity results from the abnormal powers of the human psyche the consequence, that these faculties belong to that side of the human Janus aspect which is turned to the biological future; thus in human nature there lie already veiled indications of the next higher stage of being; and since we cannot suppose that we men are cosmically at the summit of life-forms, it may be further inferred, that wherever the biological process may have outstripped the earth's, there are beings having those powers normally, which with us are manifested only in abnormal, more or less morbid, conditions. It is, however, clear that such beings will be better fitted than we to take the initia-

* [In fact, although the manifestation of such consciousness by the dying must be exceptional.—Tr.]
tive in the introduction of a cosmical history. Accordingly, it would not be we who would send the Columbus, but he would land, as it were, among us.

For man as individual, on the other hand, results the following: If the human psyche, not by exaltation of sense-consciousness, but on suppression of the same, reveals powers which physiologically are quite inexplicable, then is the soul something else than the mere effect of the organism, thinking is something else than a mere secretion of the brain. Material the soul even then can still be thought, but this materiality nevertheless stands as high above that of our body as the latter above the materiality of the stone. This substance of man belonging to the transcendental world, existing behind the sense-consciousness, and only exceptionally encroaching upon it, is thus the prime cause of the organism, and if materialists will recognise in the soul only the last effect of the organism, the truth is thereby just turned upside down.

Soul and consciousness are not identical concepts. The soul, in so far as it belongs to the transcendental world, is unconscious, but not in itself, only in regard to the brain consciousness. The magnetic sleep, which on one side elicits the phenomenon of clairvoyance, is on the other side associated with such a suppression of the brain consciousness, that in this state the severest surgical operations can be performed without pain. This relatively, but not in itself, unconscious soul, as the true substance of the individual, is connected with the Ego of the man, the supporter of the normal ordinary consciousness, as one Subject, but this Subject splits itself into two
THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL. 287

personalities. The man who alternately wakes and dreams is only one Subject, but this Subject has two alternating consciousnesses, which have only a few points of contact with each other. A still better analogy for the relation of the two persons of the one Subject is afforded by the somnambulic sleep, because the somnambulist indeed possesses completely the memory of his ordinary consciousness, but after waking knows nothing more of his somnambulic consciousness.

The definition of man cannot be confined—as materialists confine it—to one of the two persons, but must embrace the whole Subject. When physiologists infer, from the dependence of the ordinary consciousness on senses and brain, that man is destroyed when these are gone, they resemble those somnambulists who in the waking state deny the visions of their clairvoyance; as person they are right, but not as Subject.

Somnambulic clairvoyance, already known to Plato and Aristotle, in the temple sleep and in the old mysteries, and in recent times established by a whole succession of experiments, is now just a fact which must be reckoned with, and to which our systems must adapt themselves. This obligation is not diminished because this fact, though always recurring in time, has a relatively rare distribution.

But now if the personal consciousness of the ordinary man is only one of the possible forms of the individual soul-consciousness, then is man not only called, as part of the race, to co-operate in cosmical history, he is no transient phenomenon, made by some fatality serviceable to an aim which is
foreign to him, but is himself, as individual being, perfectible in the succession of his soul's possible forms of consciousness. As in the erection of a building there is not only the gain of the building itself, which arises, but also the architect's advantage in the furtherance of his experience and science—so in human history it is not only civilisation as such that progresses, but also every co-operator. Pessimism of the terrestrial order of the world is therefore not the last word of philosophy, but perhaps corresponds to the great difficulties of an architectural building, which are just suited to advance the architect.

According to the current conception of history, the work of one generation is always only for the profit of succeeding ones, and even should the golden age bloom in the future, it would still be only the latent generations that would enjoy the collective product; but at last, after man had died out, the futility of the whole game would be exposed. Here, however, man is his own heir, the Subject inherits from the person, and what I have acquired morally and intellectually remains with me. The law of the Conservation of Energy, by which all physical processes of Nature are brought to their simplest expression, avails also for the psychical world.*

So should we again arrive at the oldest of philosophical conceptions of man, the migration of souls; but this old theory would be revived in a new and incomparably higher form, which could only be described as palingenesis. This would have to be conceived, not as transplacement into another objective space, but rather into a subjectively different

* Hellenbach: 'Der Individualismus.'
world; it would not be change of place, but change of perceptual mode. The content of a human existence on earth is determined by our five senses; the combined mode of reaction of these senses on external impressions determines our image of the world. Now we might suppose this earthly existence drawn apart into five successive existences, to each of which one of these senses should be allotted, and we should then have a quantity of soul-migrations into a subjectively different world, which yet objectively would always be the same. Suppose, now, there were altogether only five modes of perceiving terrestrial things—which is certainly not really to be thought—so would the human soul by these five successive modes of existence have exhausted the terrestrial existence. Transfer this relation to the kosmos, then would the cosmically possible modes of existence be first run through, when the sum of the perceptible, qualitatively and quantitatively, had been exhausted on the side of the soul, the evolutionary process of the objective world extending the spatially appointed task also temporally.

To materialism, death is transition from being to non-being; to the old theories of migration of souls it was a transition from being to another being, whether to another body or to another star; here, on the other hand, death appears as transition from a being to a being—otherwise, as a displacement into quite another world, into that transcendental world which is veiled from our sense-consciousness. To existence in this transcendental world would correspond those faculties which remain in general latent during our earthly existence, only partially emerging.

Vol. II.
in abnormal states. Death would be comparable to somnambulic waking within sleep, *i.e.*, during the abeyance of sense-consciousness.

So that perhaps we need not have been at the trouble to deduce man's place in the universe from the possibility of our planetary intercourse; for as Subjects we stand already in the transcendental world; our metaphysical substance is rooted in it, and in view of that it seems of no importance that in a transient phase of existence we have no presentiment of this connection of the whole; for these halves of the world, divided for our sense-consciousness, flow together again as soon as this consciousness is discarded.

That besides the physical world there may be a metaphysical one, will not be recognised by our generation, intoxicated by a one-sided scientific culture. For a Kant this idea was a matter of course. For a Kant it was also well conceivable, that as Subject we may belong at the same time to the visible and to the invisible world, and yet as person only to the one. For him it only remained a question of proof by facts; and as it seemed to him that such were wanting, he trusted to the future in the words already cited: 'It will hereafter yet be proved, I know not where or when, that the human soul even in this life stands in indissoluble association with all immaterial natures of the spirit-world, that it reciprocally acts on them and receives from them impressions, of which, however, it is as man not conscious as long as all goes well.' From which it may be inferred what language Kant would have used if he had had the opportunity of observing even only the phenomena of somnambulism.
I do not conceal from myself that in the foregoing only the most general hint of a scheme of things is given, and that the fundamental ideas require further development to induce the reader's conviction. I do not intend to decline this duty, but must here confine myself to a concluding remark, consideration of which by the sceptic seems much to be recommended. Our present science recognises each singly of the factors from which results the spiritual conception of the world here attempted, which is simply a synthesis of the theory of cognition and of Darwinism. If, that is, the theory of cognition be true—say as it is represented by Wundt in his 'Contributions to the Theory of Sense-perception' (Leipzig, 1862)—then is there a transcendental world; if Darwinism, or, to speak generally, the Evolution theory, be true, then for every stage of organisation there is a different boundary line between the real and the transcendental; then it is only a question of time when the dividing-line existing for a particular stage of organisation is thrust still further back; then it is for us men also only a question of time, when sensible evidence will be obtained for what is to us at present still supersensuous. Add the recognition of abnormal states of human consciousness, in which already the laws of the transcendental world gleam through, then have we all the necessary supports for this spiritualistic conception. But if science has already recognised each particular item, on what ground could she still neglect the addition, and object to the complete sum?

What is the aim of our earthly existence? The answer to this question is made relatively easy in the monistic doctrine of the soul, and is not abandoned to arbitrary speculation. For from the past we know that the aspect of the human Janus-head which is turned to the individual future looks in the same direction to which biological progress also tends. The dispositions to transcendental faculties which are shown in states of ecstasy, are at the same time anticipations of our transcendental existence, and germs of development of the biological man of the future; these dispositions depend on influences of natural things which lie below the threshold of sensibility, and for which just therefore there is no organ of sense-perception. Without such influences below the threshold the biological process would not be directed, and could also never even come to organic beginnings; with such unconscious influences, on the other hand, a definite direction is also imparted to the biological process: it has to convert influences below the threshold into feelings above it, which is equivalent to a constantly progressive adaptation. First the material organism is subject by nature to the grosser influences of the external world, and to these our cognitional apparatus has adapted itself, so that thus it is just the finer influences of nature that are accessible indeed to the unconscious, the transcendental Subject, but have still elicited no biological organ of adaptation, by which our sense-consciousness could be extended to this transcendental section of the world. If we consider the immense increase in
perception of nature in the formation of an organ adapted to the light-vibrations of the ether—the 'solar' eye of which Plotinus* and Goethe speak—it is supposable that an instrument attuned to yet finer influences must raise us to an unsuspected biological stage.

Now since the biological process is to raise the unconscious into the conscious, to make the possession of the Subject the possession of the person, and its ideal consummation coincides with the transcendental existence of our Subject, the transcendental faculties of the latter, of which states of ecstasy give us at least an indication, offer the single opportunity of anticipating in thought the biological progress also. This progress presses into a world which in its kind is likewise material and subject to law, and to which as Subjects we already belong, not as pure spirits, but as beings whose activity can depend only on transcendental knowledge and on the use of transcendental forces conformable to law, for just because our consciousness as well as our self-consciousness leaves over an unconscious, is the sundering of the Ego, the monistic duplication, the explanatory formula, not only of our dreams, but metaphysically of man himself.

But now, if the indications of transcendental faculties, revealed by somnambulism, are at the same time the germs of biological evolution, the biological aim of our existence coincides for the race with this transcendental aim for the individual. The biological process shows in the succession of life-forms an exaltation of beings and of their intellectual and

* Plotinus: 'Enneads,' i. 6, 9.
moral consciousness; the transcendental aim of earthly existence can, however, be no other than the exaltation of our transcendental individuality, which is attained by the heirship of the Subject to the terrestrial personality, and its terrestrial attainments in faculty and dispositions. Now herewith is given the transition to Ethic.

Even in pessimistic systems life is of transcendental advantage, in so far as the will to live is impelled to renunciation. What leads to this is the exaltation of consciousness, which, according to Schopenhauer, should drive the individual, according to Hartmann, the race, to renunciation. For the monistic doctrine of the soul the means are the same, but the end is different; by the intellectual and moral exaltation of the terrestrial person the transcendental individuality should be exalted with it. We thus attain the aim of earthly existence when we subordinate the interests of our person to those of the Subject. The whole content of Ethic may be comprehended therein, that the person should be serviceable to the Subject; every revolt of the person, in its own favour, against the Subject is immoral.

The theoretical distraction with regard to the moral principle has perhaps never been so great as at present. That is seen with terrible clearness in its reflection: distraction of our practical morality, and the thick overgrowth of terrestrial egoism. Now since Ethic is the proper touchstone of a conception of the world, systems must be judged by their fruits, because the true and the good—consensus boni et veri—are as indivisible as error and evil—consensus mali et falsi—and the monistic doctrine of the soul has to give an
account of itself herein, whether it can set up a moral principle which is theoretically unassailable, and the recognition of which could result beneficially for our social relations. ‘The measure of value of a philosophical conception,’ as Hellenbach says,∗ ‘is ultimately the moral principle which proceeds from it.’ And it must be so, if the consensus boni et veri is a truth.

Whoever would learn the present position of the theoretical problem of Ethic cannot do better than inform himself from Schopenhauer and Hartmann.† He will there see clearly, that in relation to the ethical problem we are in presence of an antinomy which is far too little emphasised. Schopenhauer has already shown that the Kantian ‘Thou shalt,’ the categorical imperative, rests on a petitio principii, and not less clearly has Hartmann shown generally that no authoritative moral principle fulfils its office. But, on the other hand, it is a fact of our consciousness, that the voice of conscience has really this imperative form. An irrefragable demand of logic stands therefore in contradiction with an indubitable fact, and it is for Ethic to solve this contradiction.

Now the single possibility of this solution lies in the monistic doctrine of the soul, in the distinction of our Subject from our terrestrial person.

We find, in fact, in our consciousness the imperative ‘thou shalt’ — a foreign authority opposed to our earthly will. For the dualistic doctrine of the soul this foreign authority means God. ‘When thou

∗ ‘Vorurteile der Menschheit,’ ii. 238.
PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM.

sayest, I am alone with myself, there dwells ever in thy heart that highest Being as attentive and silent observer of all good and all evil; this judge, who dwells in thy soul is a strict judge, an inflexible requiter.* For materialism, on the other hand, this foreign authority means: customary thought. Thereby, of course, nothing at all is explained. The question is not whether the 'thou shalt' has arisen through customary thought, but whether it is obligatory. This is the ethical problem, and for this materialism has no answer; it can prove no distinction of value within our acts. The question is not as to the existence of a conscience, but as to the duty of obeying it;† not how moral development has proceeded, how social ethics have arisen, but whether there is a metaphysical ethic, whether the moral development of mankind, which might just as easily have been a false development, is a progress, and has its ground in the ethical significance of the world.

For the monistic doctrine of the soul, the moral imperative comes ultimately from the transcendental Subject. Thus the authority ceases to be foreign,

* 'Gesetzbuch des Mann.'
† [That is, whatever may be the nature of the apparent or supposed authority, is moral obligation generally conceivable, and how? In the usual terminology of the subject, it is a question not of the standard, but of the sanction. Theology is just as incapable of supplying a truly moral sanction as is materialism. The juridical conception of obligation is essentially self-regarding, and it can only be transferred to Ethics by an enlargement of the conception of Self, either as suggested in the text, or better still, by an ultimate identification in thought of the Self with the Universal or Supreme, whereby the distinction of wills is theoretically sublated, the separate interest of the individual being seen to rest upon a fallacy—a solution which is common to Indian religious philosophy and (with a metaphysical modification) to Christian mysticism.—Tr.]
but as authority remains; and even though proceeding from our own Subject, it is still not to be presupposed as *petitio principii*. There remains as before the question how such a conflict of two wills in us is possible, and of the obligation to obey the transcendental will. The existence of a conflict presents no difficulty; the situation of a pre-existing Subject, a member of the transcendental order of things, is so thoroughly different from that of its transient phenomenal form in the world of sense, that a difference in the directions of the wills must result of itself. If now the Subject, by reason of its better acquaintance with things metaphysical, appears in a world of moral significance as the better part of us in the voice of conscience, yet must the reverse be likewise possible; the Subject also, according to its moral nature, is a product of development; we can therefore by no means ascribe to it a sanctity of nature in opposition to the unholy nature of its earthly phenomenal form. Were the greater morality always on the side of the Subject, and were every revolt of the person against the Subject already, as such, immoral, then could the terrestrial existence have no educational value, the Subject could not be enriched by the moral fruits of this existence, the earthly phenomenal form could not advance it. Our moral consciousness can thus erect itself against the innate dispositions as the higher, and in each of its conquests there is a progress aimed at in a righteous revolt of the person against the Subject. So that, if the revolt of person against Subject is in the interest of the latter, it then ceases to be immoral.

Subject and earthly phenomenal form are in the
monistic doctrine of soul by no means radically different substances, so that morality is limited to the Subject, immorality to the person, which would preclude all moral progress in the terrestrial existence. Rather may the reverse also occur, and in Sanctity especially the moral progress of the terrestrial being is the more intense—that is, its revolt against the Subject is justified.

In its own interest, therefore, the transcendental Subject can in all acts of virtue be subordinate, i.e., the revolt of the person against the congenital nature can be a righteous one; on the other hand, in all cases of sin the conscience is to be regarded as the higher authority, only that it must first be shown how the voice of conscience can be prohibitive for us, and why revolt against it must in all cases be regarded as immoral.

First, it is clear that conscience, although the voice of one's own Subject, can appear to us as foreign authority only in the same sense as in dream we place the answer to a question in a strange mouth. The seat of conscience is in the unconscious; its voice must therefore always take on the form of the dramatic sundering, which is just why it appears as a foreign authority. There is no reason for limiting this form to the domain of thought; it must just as surely occur also in the domain of will, and if so, then the earthly 'ought' resolves itself into a transcendental 'will,' which, just because it comes from the unconscious, that is, belongs to the Subject, must needs in the sensuous consciousness appear as an 'ought' dictated by a foreign authority. Conscience
is thus a will-impulse from the transcendental region, like others we have already recognised. By the same psychological laws, according to which a memory suddenly occurring in dream is placed in a strange mouth, and the transcendental will of somnambulists represents itself in their health-prescriptions as an injunction of the guardian spirit, must also the moral will of the transcendental Subject take on for the earthly consciousness the form of an 'ought.' The apparent presence of this foreign authority is only wanting because the dream-state is wanting, but it is presumable à priori—though no dream of this sort occurs to my memory—that agitations of conscience in dream and somnambulism must be represented as teachings or commands from a strange mouth.

The monistic doctrine of the soul consequently annuls the antinomy indicated above, and therewith the stumbling-block of all ethic, since it explains the imperative 'ought' as an appearance, resulting from the dualism of our consciousness, from the distinction of the Subject from the person. The 'ought' ceases to be a petitio principii, and because it proves itself to be a transcendental will, not only is the alien character of the authority, but the authority itself removed. On the other hand, however, in this way the motive force of the 'thou shouldst' is not only not diminished, but is even for the first time rightly grounded. This is best seen from the apparent exaltation of the moral consciousness in somnambulism, in which the tendencies of the waking life are often energetically opposed by it.
The monistic doctrine of soul thus affords a moral principle full of value, which stands firm of itself, without requiring to lean upon further presuppositions. This is also the case, no doubt, with Pantheism, because it also seeks the moral authority in ourselves as individual phenomenal forms of the world-being; thus resolves the 'ought' into a metaphysical will. The transcendental consequences of our acts, without which ethic generally cannot be founded, are given in Pantheism; but the moral motive force derivable from the unity of the world-being is very slight. Solidarity with other beings, by reason of the unity of the world-substance, can indeed be logically demonstrated, but the logical conviction does not attain the requisite interest. The motive force of a moral principle depends on how near me is the nature for whose redemption I am called to co-operate, and from which the moral authority proceeds—and this proximity is the greatest possible, if a transcendental Subject is supposed; it depends, further, on the nearness of the aim to be reached by moral action, and this nearness also is the greatest possible, when I already experience the transcendental results of my acts by discarding my earthly phenomenal form through death. If, on the contrary, this nature is too far divided from us, as the world-substance from our phenomenal Ego, and if the aim is first attained at the consummation of the world-process, the retardation of this process by my immoral action can signify little to me, especially if there is a failure of the bridge of memory, connecting the succession of existences in which I shall yet
emerge in the world-process.* On the other hand, I am in the highest degree concerned to submit myself to the moral 'ought,' if it is a will of my own Subject, springing from my own transcendental deliberation. Therefore, this moral motive attains validity already within terrestrial existence, in somnambulism, and that much more energetically than in waking.

An unconscious world-substance, splitting itself into milliards of individuals in space and time, neither can, as unconscious, find the means for its redemption, nor with the constant change of consciousness can the redemption be specially desirable to it. The positive condition of the world-substance, as long as it is unconscious, is completely equivalent to the negative condition of not-being which is to be attained, as a pain below the threshold of sensibility is equivalent to the painless state. But attributing to the world-substance a consciousness before the sun-dering, or along with it, there still remain unaffected by that the spatially and temporally divided individuals, on whom is imposed co-operation in the work of redemption.

The contemporaneity of the transcendental Subject with terrestrial person is thus the foundation, not only of all mysticism, but also of all Ethic, because only then can the moral 'ought' be a transcendental will. Ethic with a metaphysical significance is itself

* [The re-emergence here is not that of an individual re-incarnation, the 'I' that shall re-emerge in terrestrial personality being not a transcendental individuality, but the universal being or spirit which in pantheism is the only true Subject, which continually rephemonenalises itself, and is thus first differentiated.—Tr.]
mysticism, and must be similarly founded. Con-science is transcendental nature; if it belonged to the terrestrial soul, it could not be directed against the impulses of the latter; it could not oppose our strongest inclinations, and subject the terrestrial soul, as somnambulism subjects the person to the Subject.

Kant, in his 'Dreams of a Ghost-seer,' has declared Mysticism possible, supposing man to be 'a member at once of the visible and of the invisible world.' It is therefore antecedently presumable that he would give the same foundation to his Ethic. And in fact in his 'Metaphysic of Morals,' the resolution of the 'thou shalt' into a transcendental will is expressed with a distinctness leaving nothing to be desired, and which was unavoidable, since Kant in fact looked upon man as a being belonging simultaneously to the intelligible world and to the world of sense. He says: 'And so categorical imperatives are possible thereby, that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, so that were I such alone, all my acts would be at all times confor-m able to the autonomy of the will, but since I regard myself as at the same time a member of the world of sense, they should be conformable. . . . The moral "ought" is thus his own necessary will as member of an intelligible world, and is thought by him as "ought" in so far as he considers himself as at the same time a member of the world of sense.'*

Now the moral principle of the monistic doctrine of the soul is certainly open to the reproach of eudæ-

* Kant, viii. 88, 89.
monism, inasmuch as it strives for the good of our Subject; but this eudæmonism is a transcendent one, and the concern of all Ethic is to combat earthly egoism, i.e., to advance the good of fellow-men. Now if the transcendent interest of my Subject coincides with the collective earthly interest, because the first is attained by action which advances the latter, then transcendent eudæmonism, which moreover attaches to the theistic and pantheistic conceptions, cannot be placed on the same level with the earthly eudæmonism; for whereas the former might change earth into a paradise, the latter has often made a hell of it, and will do so again, unless the ethical consciousness is revived. All that has as yet been done to combat the bestialism threatened in the social revolution turns upon symptomatic cures, whose relative value is still not to be denied; but a radical cure is only possible by improving humanity from within, and for this it is before all things requisite that we restore to it that of which materialism has deprived it: the consciousness of its place in the universe, and therewith the ethical conception of the world.

In the monistic doctrine of soul man is product of his own development; his character, his life itself, and even his fate are his own work. Hence the moral responsibility for our acts, which fails if birth is the beginning of our existence, life, character, and fate having been conferred by foreign causes. And as our earthly phenomenal form is the product of our intelligible character, so also after stripping off this phenomenal form we shall be that which we have made ourselves through the earthly existence, whether we have thereby advanced or injured our Subject.
This is the transcendental justification, before which all human complaint of terrestrial injustice is dumb.

In death we shall be participant in the order of the transcendental world; but it cannot be our task to try for participation in it here, as the mystics of all times have striven. Of our free decision we have entered on this earthly world, and our task therein can only be continual moral and intellectual progress. The fulfilment of this task, which deposits and sublimes the unconscious precipitate of intellectual and moral dispositions, therewith also exalts or injures the heir of these, the developable transcendental Subject. We thus determine by our conduct on earth at the same time the constitution of our future phenomenal form, and therein lies the transcendental justification of palingenesis. It is in our own power to lengthen or to abbreviate the process of this palingenesis, and to determine its proximate constitution, till we are participant in an order of things to which in death we transitorily and certainly only partially attain. 'We have,' says Hellenbach, 'only to understand by Hell and eternal punishment the biological process, and by eternal joy the emancipation from it, in order to bring the doctrine of migration of souls into harmony with Christianity.'*

We must, therefore, work out the earthly existence on behalf of the transcendental Subject, and this does not happen if we withdraw from its struggles, or fold our hands on our lap in earthly resignation. Our will to live has not an earthly motive, but is a transcendental willing of our Subject; therefore is it present, even when the contents of the life are not

* 'Die Vorurtheile,' etc., ii. 185.
correspondent to our earthly wishes; this transcendental will of the Subject is for the earthly person an 'ought;' therefore is there in the life of the penitence, and in that of Indian and Christian anchorites, as in the daily increasing suicides among civilised peoples, a misconstruction, springing from accentuation of the life here, of our position in the universe, and of our task, an immoral revolt of the person, knowing only the earthly phenomenal form, against the striving of the transcendental Subject for our true good.

Fechner has propounded a remarkable idea, that the conscious individuality of man is by death first resolved into the conscious individuality of the globe. He justly extols this conception, in that 'No view can offer a stricter, more complete, more inviolable, natural justice, none can better answer to the words, that everyone shall sow what he has reaped.'* There are, however, different objections to this idea. One is expressed by Hellenbach: 'As the cells of our body form the organism which has a higher consciousness, so may Fechner conceive of the earth-spirit, of which we, as it were, form the cells; but then it is necessary to carry out the analogy: we shall know just as much of the existence of the earth-soul and its consciousness as the cells of us.'† Now, this transcendental justice, by reason of which we are

* Fechner: 'Zend-Avesta,' iii. 287. [I cannot refrain from recommending here a later and much smaller work of the same author, entitled 'Buchlein vom Leben nach dem Tode,' which has been excellently translated into English by a German friend of Fechner's, Herr Hugo Wernecke ('On Life after Death,' London, Sampson Low, 188, Fleet Street, 1882).—Tr.]
not—as in the dualistic soul-doctrine—required for our works, but—as Fechner will have it—by our former works, exists in a still far higher degree, and is not exposed to Hellenbach's objection, if our own Subject-consciousness accompanies the consequences of our acts, instead of the consciousness of the earth-spirit, and if the Subject can form no other organism than one completely homogeneous to its own nature, and only the external expression of its inner nature. All transcendental psychology, however, proves the existence of such a Subject-consciousness, and that along and simultaneous with the sense-consciousness, and especially in the chapter on 'Memory,' it has moreover been found that for this consciousness there is no forgetting, that we thus carry over the consciousness of our acts into the transcendental existence. Transcendental justice is therefore present in such a degree that we can speak of a moral order of the universe.

Another objection may be raised to Fechner's conception. Apparently, indeed, it greatly simplifies the problem, because in it the single consciousness is taken up at death into the consciousness of the next higher circle of nature, which again on its side forms a constituent of the divine universal consciousness. Thereby the transcendental or intelligible world-order coincides with that of sense. But therein lies just the difficulty, that sense is made the measure of reality. Every world is this particular world only for the particular organisation, and every change of organisation changes the world-picture. We must thus from the evolution theory conclude that the barrier between sensible and intelligible worlds is a
fluid one, and, indeed, by reason of the biological process, temporal, and by reason of the different but contemporary phases of this process, also spatial. To the plurality of worlds on this side, depending on the plurality of different forms of organisation, must thus also correspond a plurality of worlds on that side, as these could not be for all beings coincident. Neither death, therefore, nor, undoubtedly, re-birth, can have the same significance for every being; both events transpose different beings also into different relations. If the boundary-line between sensible and transcedental worlds is temporally and spatially fluid, then it is not the same boundary that is overstepped by every being at death and at re-birth. But for the same reason we cannot so oppose the two worlds to one another, as, with Kant and Schopenhauer, to place freedom in the intelligible world, and necessity in the world of sense; rather from the fluidity of the frontiers results the fluidity also of the boundary between necessity and freedom; and if in the earthly phase of our life we see ourselves spell-bound in the realm of necessity, yet must our life as a whole be regarded as a gradual transition from necessity to freedom, in which we enjoy only so much freedom as we have won by our progress, and thus deserved. Already our earthly relations show that freedom may be either the greatest furtherance to development, or a hindrance to it, and a 'gift of the Greeks.'

The sufferings of life, which incite us to acts of progress and love of neighbour, are also means to the advancement of the Subject. But they have also a yet more direct aim; they have in themselves already that purifying power of which pessimist poets and
philosophers speak in accord with Christianity.* We can constantly uphold the saying that by earthly sufferings the will should be brought to renunciation, but that refers only to the earthly will, and the Nirvana to be striven for is not annihilation, but the transcendental order of things, which is also not attained by quietism, but rather by restless activity on the battle-field, on which we ourselves have set ourselves. Therein lies the metaphysical significance of suffering, to which the Subject destines us in its transcendental indifference to the fate of its earthly phenomenal form. Therefore, says the mystic Eckhard, 'The swiftest steed that bears you to perfection is suffering;'† and in the Book of Ecclesiastes, ascribed to Solomon: 'Sadness is better than mirth; for by sadness is the heart bettered.'‡

That our earthly existence is a mere means to a transcendental end, that no value attaches to it for its own sake, is distinctly enough indicated by the vanity of our whole earthly striving in every direction, by the restlessness which, insatiably endeavouring, sees in every step attained only the foothold for a further spring, lasting satisfaction never being achieved. Distinctly enough, also, is this vanity of the earthly motive indicated in history, every people, when it has performed its task in civilisation, retiring from the scene. Here, also, in the historical as in the individual life, the objective result may appear a failure, inasmuch as no state of blessedness, nor even of completion, is found; yet by our co-operation in this

* Schopenhauer: 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,' ii. c. 48.
† Eckhard: 'Werke,' i. 492.
‡ Eccl. vii. 3.
process a transcendental aim of existence and of history is attained, for the Subject thus advances itself to and makes itself capable of higher form of the phenomenal life, because not only the race and its culture, but also the organising principle itself are perfected. Just because this work is always to be carried further, it leads to no earthly rest. And this thought allows no lament over the disillusions of the life of the individual and of nations.

Only one thing we see really attained by our earthly existence: the exaltation of individuality. This alone, therefore, by reason of its transcendental consequences, can be the aim of existence,* and here indeed the individual aim for the transcendental Subject coincides with the historical aim for the race. Not in itself, therefore, should the will to live be renounced, though indeed every stage of progress attained by it should be renounced, not in favour of the nothing, but in favour of a higher stage, and that this may happen have we placed ourselves in this world of preponderating suffering. 'There is only one inborn error,' says Schopenhauer, 'and that is that we exist in order to be happy.' Life is something 'which should be disagreeable to us, and from which we, as from a mistake, have to return.' It would be more true—as he says—'to place the aim of life in our woe than in our welfare.' He even says right out that we 'have more to hope for our salvation and redemption from what we suffer than from what we do.'†

If in our earthly infatuation we hope in life and

* Cf. J. H. Fichte: 'Psychologie,' i. 119-125.
† 'Welt als Wille,' etc., ii. 49.
history to reach an ideal finality, and see in all phases of development only an approximation to an earthly point of rest, so that thus the whole aim lies in this extremity; on the other hand, the transcendental view teaches us that the aim of life as of history fulfils itself on the whole line, though not in the earthly sense. The aim of the individual life is the same that Hartmann assigns for the biological process and for history: the elevation of consciousness intellectually, aesthetically, and ethically. Earthly ills and moral evils are the objects to be overcome by this elevation of consciousness in continual labour. Our generation, which emphasises alone the earthly, and has lost almost every presentiment of its transcendental place in the universe, is restlessly troubled to repress physical ills by intellectual exaltation of consciousness in the progress of natural science and appliances. The one-sidedness of this striving is, however, signified in this, that avoiding the Scylla of ills we already run the risk of wreck on the Charybdis of evil. We are thereof urgently warned by the grave social mischiefs of the present time. But if every sin hides in itself an error, if every social mischief is rooted in erroneous conceptions of the place of man in the universe, then can the moral evil, which acts in this mischief, only be overcome by such an elevation of consciousness as enlightens us also in the transcendental sense.

But if materialism, knowing only intellectual and earthly progress, is one-sided, so also religions incline to one-sidedness in the opposite direction, since they only teach the overcoming of wickedness. Certainly the moral man stands higher than the intellectual, but religions miss their own ideal if they ignore in-
tellectual progress. It is not served by preaching only morality; it is preached to deaf ears if morality is not grounded; and that can only happen when it is derived from our transcendental place in the kosmos, which on its side can only be perceived by elevation of consciousness. Our vocation is thus as well moral as intellectual; the first was emphasised in the Middle Ages, now the last. But we shall only attain a true culture when we recognise both sides as justified and indivisible, and each is freed from its exclusive emphasis, that is, when we learn to perceive that the apparent substitution of science for religion is only a process of differentiation, a division of labour.

There are two possible courses for explaining the enigma of things. Either one proceeds from the world in order to explain man, or from man in order to explain the world. Heretofore, in the development of the sciences the former way has been followed far too much, to the neglect of the latter. Truth certainly is to be found in both ways, but both must be pursued in order to establish their agreement. Without disputing that the one-sided point of departure, from the consideration of objective things, can lead us to ideals of religion, philosophy, and art, it is not to be denied that the consideration of objective things carries us easily into byways. So we see that just in our time, notwithstanding the surprising progress of the natural sciences, respect for the great world-problem has continually diminished; and yet only on the ground of this respect can religion, philosophy, and art thrive. Always more wonderful sides of sensible nature have been disclosed to us, but the view of the other side of things we have there-
upon so far lost, that perhaps in no historical century has the metaphysical indifference of the masses been so great as now. The spread of the materialistic view of the world is only another expression for this metaphysical indifference. We have ceased to think largely of the world and of man, and therefore are we without large and ideal conceptions. If in the world is seen only a heap of chemicals and sherds on which man also leads a merely chemical existence, there is no room for great ideas. The modern man, when he sees in the heavens at night

Wie das Uebermass der Sterne
Prächtig uns zu Häupten glüht,*

('How the excess of stars glows splendid overhead'),
is no longer excited metaphysically by this complication of flaming worlds, but only scientifically; he sees only the one side of things, the law of mechanics according to which it all moves, as on our star he recognises only laws of physics and chemistry. He resembles one in whom the execution of a symphony occasions only speculations upon vibrations of atmospheric waves. We have lost respect for nature, and in vain self-conceit we at best retain respect for the expounders of nature, as Comte has expressed it forcibly enough: 'Aujourd'hui pour les esprits familiarisés de bonne heure avec le vraie philosophie astronomique les cieux ne racontent plus d'autre gloire que celle d'Hipparque, de Kepler, de Newton, et de tous ceux qui ont concourus à en établir les lois.'† It is only remarkable, and for Comte an insoluble contradiction, that the intellectual heroes he

* Goethe: 'Der Brautigam.'
† 'Philosophie Positive,' ii. 25.
names did not think as he does. We have thus admiration for the mind which penetrates nature, but no longer admiration for this nature herself, of which yet our mind is only a part. And yet must mind and nature be of equal value, because only so much mind can be applied to nature as is latent in herself, and that all the more if she reveals herself according to eternal laws. As little as a landscape ceases to be beautiful by being painted, because, as Shakespeare says, 'The art itself is nature,'* as little does nature cease to merit our respect, when we have succeeded in explaining her. The labours of genius do not degrade nature, but raise her, because genius itself is nature's work. Greater than Newton appears the world of stars which he explains, and in which he is included; greater than Linnaeus is the wonderful vegetable world, and higher than the science of psychology is its object, Man; for in intellectual labour nature explains herself, as she only adorns herself in the artist who purely displays her. Therefore should every recognition of genius lead us to recognition of nature. What will be attained when once science has accomplished its whole task? The true significance of this world, ourselves included, will not be thereby revealed, as the symphony is not explained by the mere laws of acoustics. After, as before, the world will carry in it a metaphysical note of interrogation; nay, a world wholly explained scientifically will then appear all the more clearly as an unsolved philosophical problem. Therefore in science itself, which has narrowed the true representation, lies the corrective, by means of its capacity

* 'Winter's Tale,' iv. 3.
for development, again to extend this representation. When once its aim is attained, it will even thereby clearly perceive that it has explained only the phenomenal world, and is able to deliver nothing in reply to the questions, whence we come, whither we go, and what we are. Thus if the first results of natural science have been to take away our respect for the world-problem, the later results will be again to exalt it. And, finally, we shall see that we were mistaken in regarding nature as something thoroughly irrational and dead, in which everything occurs according to blind laws, reason on the contrary being something merely subjective, characteristic merely of that piece of nature we call man.

The consideration of objective nature does therefore not silence our metaphysical consciousness and need; rather is nature an object highly fitted to produce in us that Faustian craving for knowledge which cannot rest at the mere discovery of the conformity of phenomena to law. Therefore also can this Faustian urgency not be placed in us as an inward contradiction; it must be destined to work itself out; it cannot be condemned to disappointment, and if it remains unsatisfied in this life, there is in it a guarantee of transcendental persistence; it cannot be there subjectively, without an object corresponding to it objectively, and we can as surely infer from this Faustian urgency a metaphysical world, as à priori from the abnormally elongated insect proboscis a corresponding calyx in flowers.

But if the objective view may indeed conduct us to metaphysic and ethic, yet we reach the end more quickly by changing the point of philosophical
departure, and if, proceeding from man, we go on from him to the explanation of the world. According to our conception of man will the world then appear in a particular light; one conception of the world will result if we consider man only according to his sensuous nature, another if we preferably emphasise his mystical properties, as in this book. But that is only to pursue the task of which the foundation was laid by Kant. He has given us the perception, not again to be lost, that we must criticise reason, before we criticize the world. But if we proceed from man in order to explain the world, it must be the whole man; the deeper we explore him, the deeper also will seem to us the significance of the world; and if in somnambulism, as the fundamental form of all mysticism, we find a transcendental kernel of our being, then shall we penetrate also into the transcendental order of things.

If thus, supplementing the problem of external cognition, we apply diligently to self-cognition, this is the shortest way to revive our demand for metaphysics, without which no religion, no philosophy, no true art is thinkable.* And stronger than ever must this demand revive, if we will apply the

* ['Behind the reproach of atheism, in itself absurd, and for the most part malicious,' says Schopenhauer, 'there lies, as its inner meaning and truth, which gives it strength, the obscure conception of such an absolute system of physics without metaphysics. Certainly such a system would necessarily be destructive of ethics; and while Theism has falsely been held to be inseparable from morality, this is really true only of metaphysics in general, i.e., of the knowledge that the order of nature is not the only and absolute order of things. Therefore we may set up this as the necessary Credo of all just and good men: "I believe in metaphysics."'—'The World as Will and Idea,' vol. ii., p. 380 (Haldane and Kemp's translation).—Tr.]
safe methods of the sciences of cognition to self-cognition of the mystical kernel of our being, without thereupon losing sight of objective nature. But every generation which shall be at the same time just to both problems will have found the transition from mere civilisation to true culture, and will find itself in that disposition which the immortal Kant denoted when he said: 'Two things fill the mind with ever-new and increasing admiration and reverence, the oftener and the more persistently they are reflected on: the starry heaven above me, and the moral law within me.'

* 'Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,' Beschluss.

THE END.
ERRATA.

Throughout: For the words 'somnambule,' or 'somnambules,' read 'somnambulist,' or 'somnambulists.'

Vol. ii., p. 150, note, for 'dem' read 'der.'
Dr. Carl du Prels Schriften:


Die Planetenbewohner und die Nebularhypse. Neue Studie zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Weltalls. 1880 - - - M. 2.

Unter Tannen und Pinien. Wanderungen in den Alpen, Italien, Dalmatien und Montenegro. 1875 - - - - - - M. 5.


Philosophie der Mystik. 1885 - - - M. 10.


Die Mystik der alten Griechen. (Unter der Presse.)