A TREATISE
ON
THE NATURE OF MAN,
REGARDED AS TRIUNE;
WITH AN OUTLINE OF
A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS.</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PASSAGES FROM THE CONSCIENCE BY THE LATE PROFESSOR MAURICE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;THE HISTORY&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO LETTERS</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOVE</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REASON</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ BODY—THE MAN</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN OUTLINE OF A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Page 161.—"Our days are different in many respects from Butler's. Amongst us, more than amongst our fathers of the last century, the questions are debated, How are we to educate ourselves, how are we to educate men and women and children of different classes, from the highest to the lowest? Till we determine what we are, what there is in these men and women and children which can be educated, till we settle whether we are to be treated and are to treat others as atoms of a mass, or whether each of us is a distinct I, and must be taught to believe that he is so and to act as if he were, I cannot conceive that we shall make much advance in the science of Education; though we may be overwhelmed with statistics that bear upon it, with new theories and mechanical arrangements which might be profitable, if we knew for what purpose they were to be used. But if education means not the dwarfing as much as possible every individual boy and man, but the awakening him to a consciousness of what he is, to a conscience of what he ought to do, then we must press the demands which
I have made at the beginning of this Lecture, "Who directs those who undertake to educate, who educates us when they leave us or their power over us is exhausted?" Those who try to evade that great controversy really settle it in their own way, which is, it seems to me, an utterly mournful way, a way that leads to despair. I cannot but hold that there is a solution of it which encourages the best hopes, which justifies the most steady and vigorous efforts, in the education of others and of ourselves."

And again—page 175.
"For this reason I rejoice greatly that I belong to a country which is so little interested in Mental Philosophy merely as such, so much interested in Politics, as England is. I believe the soundest Moral Science will be that which is demanded by the necessities of Practical Politics; that out of such a Science a living and Practical [not a technical and artificial] Mental Philosophy may in time be developed.¹ The Moralist never maintains his own position so well as when he asserts the highest dignity for the Politician. The separation between them has been an intolerable mischief; there will be Psalms in earth and heaven to celebrate their reconciliation."

¹ Brackets and italics by the present writer.
EXTRACT FROM THE HERMIT.*

(Pages 132-3.)

For one day sitting, as he often sat,
In silent meditation, seeking truth;
Reviewing earnestly beliefs of men,
The Christless super-egotism of the soul—
The mirage of a brain-born phantasy—
The low and carnal cold indifference—
And all those million-fancies that absorb
A little self-made image of God's truth;
Suddenly came new light, that show'd within
Three principles distinct in unity;
Man so made after God,—he ask'd himself,
'Can Love make Reason, Reason dissolve Love,
'Or can this Body's self either destroy,
'By either be destroy'd? Was this the truth
'Of the divine fiat original,
"LET US MAKE MAN IN OUR IMAGE"?

* A poem by the present Author.
For, God is Love; emotion of all things;
Joy of the morning; song of folding eve;
Breath of the angel; and the mother's kiss.

Spirit is Reason; Man's intelligence;
Knowledge of all things; wonder of his being;
King o'er the creature; and the law of Truth.

Body is Christ; the perfectness of Man;
Glory of inward and of outward life;
Type of the future; unity of all;
The Three in One made visible on earth.

When, with this wonder-conception overcome,
This intuition of Man's parent-birth—
Rapt from the present, caught up in the soul,—
Lovingly in its light he framed a creed,
One faith for all, one hope, one complete love,—
And read a coming change in Man's belief,—
With happier times; gentler and nobler lives;
And worthier aims; truth-purified desires;—
Faith and true Knowledge blended into one;
Peace between Heart and Mind for evermore.
THE HISTORY.

LORD BACON was in the habit of introducing the subject of his inquiry to the reader, under the title of "The History," instead of using the more formal term of "Introduction," which, by the very nature of its formality, cramps, in some sense, the healthy and natural flow of the understanding, in expressing itself upon the subject immediately in hand. And, inasmuch as, in all matters of philosophical observation, the treatment is necessarily inductive or inquisitional, the common sense and prudence of such a method of procedure becomes immediately obvious.

In introducing the subject of the triune nature of Man to the reader, I have, for many and important reasons, followed a similar course; among them chiefly: First, That I can have no object or reason for dealing with such a subject at all, except to evolve some truth, and to get at, through public consideration, the basis of such subject; and to know how far the human understanding is capable of dealing with it.

Secondly; to write such a treatise, it was absolutely

1 Historia.
necessary to keep to a narrative form, a form of relation, or the mind would certainly, though perhaps unobservedly, have constantly verged towards some line and rule method of expression, some scientific outline, or hard and fast tone of examination, and so ended by withdrawing itself wholly from life.

And Thirdly; though I put the subject forward as one upon which Man's mind may realize a good deal more than it yet knows of itself, or of the nature of its workings, my wish has been solely to deal with the question in relation to life, and not to end in the melancholy manner, (to which some modern forms of thought appear to tend), of regarding Man only as a machine.

The substance of the following Treatise is already before the reader, in a poem (The Hermit) I published some months ago. That poem closes with the conception (the preface to this work) which this treatise endeavours further to evolve, and gives it both in its human and divine aspect. And as it would be impossible for another mind to enter fully and clearly into the subject (as here put) without knowing how it originated and developed itself in my own, I have (and for no other reason) given the letters which have passed between myself and private friends on such subject; and then, without attempting to prove it in a scientific form, have proceeded to give observations and notes which bear directly or indirectly upon it.
My doubts as to the possibility of explaining life in the modern acceptation of the term 'science,' (which by the way, only means exact truth, not line and rule as distinct from free life 1) may best be expressed by reference to the symbol, and the life, of the Trinity. In order to express trinity in unity in a mathematical or scientific form, we have to place three lines together within a fourth curved line, by which we obtain the double symbol in one. But if we turn to our creed, we find only three persons in one God; there is no fourth necessary (as in the symbol) to express the unity. Each is a person in himself, but each and all are only three, not four. 2 Mathematics (science) must express a living and distinct form with two lines only within the third curved line, if it is to give a true symbol of the life. And this it is impotent to do, as no two straight lines can in any way compose a figure, and if we curve either of them it loses its individuality, and ceases to be a true expression of the three in one. Science, therefore, cannot truly symbolize life, and if it cannot truly symbolize it, much less truly can it be it. 3

I would willingly have omitted the personal parts of the following letters, but that they are so interwoven

1 Or rather, both, so far as we can realize. See Part on Reason.
2 The same thing is done in our hymn books. Hymn writers wishing to expound the Trinity, give four verses.
3 See Part II. on Reason.
with the subject which follows, that it would have been impossible to do so, without breaking up, so to speak, the rhythm of the argument itself, and presenting their contents in a patched and disconnected form to the reader. The opening paragraphs of the first letter refer to the conception of the third part of *The Hermit*, which also is indissolubly bound up with the contents of this treatise, so that both may be truly said to have direct bearing upon the subject of this book.

The subject is so vast, and, assuredly, of so important a nature, that I trust the reader will give me credit for no other motives in dealing with it, than of a desire to write out what I had to say upon it, and to leave it to the consideration of mankind. I am aware that I am laying myself open to the charge of being called an empiric,¹ a schemer, an unscientific theorist, etc., etc., but to all such charges the answers are, that life is *something more than science*, that empiricism rightly understood, means original inquiry, that to theorize rightly is to speculate² truly, and that when all such considerations are based upon an *intuition of the soul*, a man cannot be altogether at variance from truth. Nay more, that when so many and various forms of thought and teaching are around, it cannot be unwise, but must be well,

¹ Experience of life, not "professional training," is the true school for philosophy.
² To "see mentally."—Shakespeare. Dr. Newman.
to endeavour to refer them to some fundamental cause or constitution of Man.

Metaphysics a few short years ago gave way to psychology; and we hear now that our more advanced thinkers are already preparing the way for the development of psychology into physiology. When this process has been accomplished it may occur to some to ask, what will be the next step, since the human mind will assuredly not stop short of its energy and action. Shall we revert again to metaphysics, and perhaps again to psychology, and again to physiology, and so go the round of the three great principles of human thought; or will the mind take an old new turn, and falling back upon the inquiries of 200 years ago, begin to refer everything to the constitution and action of "material spirit" in the brain? Some such course must be adopted, unless a living philosophy spring out of the present condition of things. Such a living philosophy this treatise modestly attempts to outline.

It is clear at the outset that the material organs of the Heart and the Brain,\(^1\) correlate the fundamental principles of action—Love and Reason; and that the

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\(^1\) If it be objected that there are other organs in the body, as well as those preferred, it may be answered, that these other organs, but qualify the action of the vital organs, as the faculties of the mind (begotten of the unity of the three principles) qualify the action of those principles.—See Part III., on the Mind.
material Body forms a third in the triune organization of Man. It is clear also, that this position correlates his belief in a divine Trinity, and that so far, such a philosophy would fit into, rather than gainsay, his fundamental position of belief. It is clear also, that such a philosophy gets over the difficulty expressed in the mathematical (scientific) symbol of the Trinity; for here in Man, we have two living and distinct organs, or principles, within a third, the Body; and that these together constitute the unity, the Man. Locke, in his haste to sweep the understanding free of all superstition and pre-conception, overlooked the true limit and meaning of words, and so in his able essay "On the Human Understanding," starts with a fundamental error which travels through the whole book. He asserts in his first chapter that there are "no innate principles in the mind," but an examination of the limit and meaning of the word "principle" would have opened the "eye" of his "understanding" to his error. For what does the word "principle" mean? A beginning, a something which exists in itself, and which has always existed; this we believe to be its abstract defini-

1 See Chapter on Body.

The following expositions of Body, in relation to Love and Reason (in their divine aspects, Soul and Spirit) will be found to explain the Real and Ideal, the Object and Subject, views of Philosophers.
tion:¹ but here the vice of applying abstract definitions to the "life" comes in. Had Man never existed he would never have known there was such a thing as a "principle," therefore the extent and true limit of meaning of the word must be correlative with the life of Man.² The word "principle" therefore has a positive application to something within, or part of, or rather, the whole, Man: by which we arrive at its living meaning; namely, something which constitutes an actual portion of the Man himself. But how are we to realize its nature, since it is intangible? Simply by referring to some outward and material part of the Man which exactly correlates it in its importance and exercise in the life itself, and so stepping by an exact and logical process of observation from the material to the immaterial, from the matter to the spirit,³ or rather that which correlates and unites the two, namely, the life. But such considerations as these would however lead us for the present too far away from the subject in hand.

¹ "That from which a thing proceeds" is a common definition of the word. But (for an instance) circulation "proceeds" from the heart: therefore the heart is its "principle."

² We cannot consider the meaning of words as without ourselves, since they originate within us.

³ We can reason only upon the inward from the outward, though the process is dangerous, as it leads to a mode of thought which makes "spirit" dependent upon "matter," "essence" upon "substance," which is not so.
One of the most important considerations which will occur to a reader upon the view put forward in the following pages, will be that of Man's relation to Animal life, a subject upon which we have heard a good deal lately. It may be said that, taking correlations as a basis of a philosophy of Man, the Feeling, Instinct, and Bodies of Animals is as true a view of their natures as the one here put forward is of Man's, and that granted the latter to be true, the former of necessity follows. Our reply to such an observation would be that, there is unquestionably, from a material point of view, some relationship between godlike and responsible Man, and the brute world, but the true extent and limit of this relationship is the one real thing to be ascertained, not vaguely guessed at. There is also, we believe, some direct relationship between Man and Angels, though how, or what, it is, we are perhaps as far from knowing, as the brute creation is from interpreting Man. And to the same extent as Angels are, in heaven, invisible to Man, so is Man's under-

1 The feeling which leads man to disclaim all relationship to brutes is the same which in superstitious ages led him to so mercilessly abuse the body. Extremes meet in philosophy and in superstition. Man's true knowledge is concerned with himself.

2 If Man were only the outcome of "forces" he could never have heard of Angels, for "forces" could provide him with nothing which was no part of themselves. And with a visible immaterial existence within himself, how absurd to deny them!
standing invisible to the brute instinct. The whole question of relation and difference is an inward and spiritual one; and to the like extent, probably, as Man knows and notices how his "spirits"1 are influenced, affected, and altered by outward circumstances, without any change in physical conditions, and the whole form and order of his thought or belief changed, is the extent to which the inward constitution of the highest form of animal, differs from the lowest form of Man.2 and 3

Another difficulty which will occur to a reader

1 There is material, human, and divine, "spirit," in Man.
2 It is a mistake to suppose that the development of Man is a question of civilization. It is not so. Granted that a Man in these days relinquished all forms of belief and thought beyond those of his own momentary gratification, and belly, it is conceivable that he would quickly sink in this enlightened country to the lowest form of 'savage' life. Development is a question of inward self-support and truth (the "I ought and I ought not"4 of the conscience) and these only can exist by faith.
3 Physical observations upon human degeneracy do not prove equality. The lowest form of man is perhaps no nearer to the beast, than the highest form is to the god. And instances of disordered function proving lack of intelligence are simply childish. A machine out of order does not do its work properly, but if some one on this account came and told us it was not a certain machine, but some less complicated and different structure of man's handiwork, we should think him deranged. It is the subtle difference between things that makes all the difference.

4 The late Professor Maurice on The Conscience.
will be, as to the view of the Soul, put forward in the following treatise, and how that which is traced by correlation to be part of something human, namely, Love, can be considered as the divine or immortal part of Man. Religion teaches us to regard the Soul as something apart from the Body, something that never dies, but passes into Hades, or elsewhere, till the time of, by the absolute fiat of God, the resumption of the flesh. But the *absolute fiat* of God is just what makes all the difference in relation to a Man's understanding powers: for we have here, in the fact of resurrection\(^1\) at all, a miracle of the highest order to be performed. Consequently it is clear to all human reasoning that the mind of man cannot pass beyond this barrier, but must for ever rest content with an interpretation of things beneath it. We could not conceive resurrection at all but by the aid of divine Power, in other words, miracle; so that resurrection itself is a reunion of parts, formerly a whole,\(^2\) in some mysterious manner. Might not this reunion of parts be regarded as again the inbreathing of "the breath of life," and which in its most essential nature is of the quality of "Love?" The resumption would correlate

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\(^1\) If we could understand resurrection we could understand the origin of life. And it would be as foolish to deny the belief in the one, as the fact of the other.

\(^2\) For no one believes that any part of the *same* material Body the Life previously possessed is the body of the resurrection.
the origination, and the divine quality in Man would but be placed in superiority to the human, so reversing the present order of things in being. The essence of "the things of faith" we hold to be Love; it is so we know in human affairs,—that Reason is a secondary power to it, and that the two together merged in Animation (the body) make up life. So that the reader will allow that there is no inconsistency in a treatise which principally regards Man in his human aspect, in treating of the Soul\(^1\) as the divine aspect\(^2\) of the principle of Love. But, however we view the question, the one thing to be remembered is, that Man is not a three-fold thing disjointed, but a unity.

The words of our Lord "what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul," require some explanation, as they point to a duality, not a trinity, or unity, in Man. And they suggest the ever recurring thought, of some immaterial immortal substance in Man which never dies or ceases to

\(^{1}\) No belief has more puzzled sincere men than the mystery of—what, or where is the "soul" in Man? Developed natures and men of knowledge cannot tell us. Church of England divines have written to say that "the immortality of the soul cannot be proved from the bible." An eminent writer tells us that, Christ nowhere explains a separation of Soul from Body. If we consider the "soul" as stated, in the belief before us, all these difficulties disappear, and our faith lives in our understanding and remains divine.

\(^{2}\) or property in, or condition of.
own a personality, spoken of in Genesis at the creation of Man. It is clear that the "breath of life" and the "soul" spoken of in the text, must mean one and the same thing, or there is an inconsistency or contradiction in the sacred record, which the present writer for one, does not believe in. How, then, can we intelligibly explain the two as one, and also get over the difficulty of the "duality" only, as opposed to a "trinity," in Man, in the above-quoted expression. The context, or occasion will prove the one; our view of the triune nature of Man will solve the other.

The first position will best be shown by something of the nature of a negative argument. Supposing, for a moment, a man were to assume there was nothing but a unity in any living thing (an outcome of mere "forces," we will say, to take an idea familiar to the ears of men in these days), that there was no such thing as a duality, or as a trinity; in fact, that there was no God at all; and that all things were but the outcome of material eternal law. Nature herself, would at the outset, contradict him. For exactly as

1 Whether this is so, or whether the soul returns to God who gave it, till the time of the resurrection, are questions about which we need not puzzle ourselves.

2 Gen. ii. 7. Breathed into his nostrils the "breath of life" (spirit), and man became a living "soul." Or both, in fact the "divine" conditions in man's nature.—see on.

3 "Force" would be the correct word.
there is light and darkness, heat and cold, winter and summer, in the natural order of things, is there 'yes' and 'no' in the 'will' of Man, whatever that 'will' itself be; and having established this 'yes' and 'no' we have established, in the same breath, a 'duality' in the nature of Man. But Nature herself proves, nay, mathematics prove, that no two things can exist together as two without a third thing to unite them; and this third thing must be in itself an individual or thing, or not being so, it has not the life-power or personality which unites. The instance of the triangle before referred to, as the symbol of trinity, proves this from a scientific point of view. Consequently in establishing the unity of the duality we at the same moment establish the trinity. But in the case before us, our Lord was referring to the duality of things, the 'yes' and 'no,' the 'body' and 'soul,' the 'present' and 'future,' without any reference to the 'past,' which none the less is part of Man, and which in the instance before us, would constitute the 'third' thing in relation to 'present' and 'future.' But life is always before us, though what has transpired is none the less part of it. Consequently in the words of the text quoted, our Lord makes no reference to the 'past,' but to the present, as it only is for the time being the life: and in omitting the 'past,' he omits (in relation to life) that 'third' thing, "reason," whose chief faculty (reflection) is to apprize
us of our past deeds in relation to our present course of conduct. So that the text might be explained to read:

What shall it profit a man, if, forgetful of experience (past) the passing hour (present) be gratified at the expense of the soul (future).

The 'third' thing or 'principle' in the unity of Man's nature, is the "spirit," a word to which the reader will observe no distinct signification has yet been given. Its only true functional meaning in relation to Man, is to his Reason, Intelligence, Intellect, or "spiritual" enlightenment, whichever of these equivalent terms we may prefer to use; and it correlates in this sense, Man's belief in a third person in the heavenly trinity (Holy Spirit) and expresses in its fullest and highest significance the measure of true "knowledge" (spiritual intelligence) possessed by Man.

Our Lord upon the occasion just referred to, addresses himself to Man in his acting, not in his knowing capacity, to Man as a unity, not as a trinity, to Man high or low, ignorant or learned, as religion always applies itself; so makes no reference to the "spirit," reasoning power in man, which none the less is part of him, and exercises only an influence second to his "soul" (love?) in shaping the destinies of the world.  

1 We often speak of the "human soul." And here is a definition of what we mean.

2 It is useless to close our eyes to the fact that, in those days,
Another important position which will occur to a reader in reference to this view of Man, is, namely, when astronomy has revealed so many worlds to Man, his belief in the Trinity has been shaken: a belief credible he states, when men held this earth to be the sole world in the universe, but not possible now. How should the Son of the infinite God, it is asked, come to die upon this one little earth, when we know of a plurality of worlds? We cannot believe it, it is said, Man's knowledge has outgrown such belief. The answer to this position is the same as to others like it, and the error arises from regarding (with the increase of knowledge) the whole universe in present relation to Man. All that Man needed from God was a condition of things which should set him right with his God. Beyond this the religion of the infinite is nought to him. And such a necessity is provided in the person of Christ, who is "of God, and related to ourselves. Our sphere of existence, even so far as the next life is concerned, might well be confined to this material system of the universe—and Christ might even now be reigning in some part of it. The Bedouin's belief in the Sun, and that Allah reigns there, is more intelligible and "reasonable" than a philosophy which denies Man's relation through a revealed scheme to his Creator.

It is important to remember that in all the expressions of our Lord, as recorded by the four Evangelists, there is not one in which he speaks of Himself as "equal" to God, only "of" God. And if we turn to our creed, we find the same teaching expressed in the words "equal" to the Father as touching His Godhead, and "inferior" to the Father as touching His Manhood." Might not the distinction conveyed here by our Lord Himself, and in the creed, be the key to His real but ever mysterious relationship to the Creator? And He always speaks of the "will of the Father," not His own will, implying thereby superiority at the same time as in our doctrine of the Trinity we believe in equality.
how it relates to him as a "fallen creature"; in what way such a philosophy of his nature can be shown to have a direct relation to his life, as a Man. It is clear that, if Man's fundamental nature be triune, if he really, not ideally only, is made after the image of his Creator, the unfallen or perfect state of that nature will be in the pure and faultless expression of those principles of which he is a compound. Granted that Man (as an acting responsible being) is made up of Love, Reason, and Sense, or Body, his perfectness will be in the perfectness and unstained possession of those qualities. And it is, perhaps, not possible to conceive a more perfect Man than the living embodiment and expression of those visible qualities of his nature. Christ himself, the great exemplar, in his human aspect, is but the expression of them. And it follows that, if this be true, his (Man's) fallen nature must necessarily be the contraries of these three qualities of his being, namely, Hate, and its relatives, Unreason, and its relatives, Immorality, and its relatives, in all their variability, power, and change. And exactly in proportion, as a Man was able to shake himself free of these, to live out and independent of them, would he be an arisen

1 Precisely as we regard "unreason" and "immorality" as unsound, and phases of evil, so should we regard "hate." We are taught to "hate" evil of all kinds, and nothing else—evil in men, not the men themselves.
creature. So that this philosophy of Man, not only shows him what he is, what are his difficulties, and what his end and goal, but dovetails into his belief in things above and beyond him, and establishes the mystery of a triune God. He sees and reads himself, in a glass, as it were; knows the nature of his impulses and actions, the enemies that are within and without him; what best suits his own present happiness and future good. And in action, when he loses all sight of his inward constitution and self, and acts only as the Man, he does not forget that he knows what he is, that his impulses and motives can be traced, even by himself, to their origin, but goes forward with a quiet consciousness of his own responsibility and power.

If we compare such a view as this with life, we find that it exactly correlates it in all its best aspects, though no such view is made the intelligent basis of education. For exactly as a Man overcomes the three “contraries” of his original nature, as pointed to above, do we regard him as a good, a reasonable, and a refined (purified) Man. The practical definition of St. Paul’s image of the dark mirror would be, that Man can see his own original nature in the mirror of truth. And it is not, perhaps, too much to say that, the whole divisions and differences of religious sects may be traced

1 And his inability to do this perfectly is made perfect in his Christian faith.
to this fundamental origin—the ignorance, undevelopment, or abuse, of some one chief faculty or principle of life, in Man. For though it is true that all such differences have had a visible origin in outward circumstances, it is equally true that outward circumstances but reflect the condition of inward life, and that this in the end must be made accountable for error, division, and abuse of personal power.¹

The reader will have observed in the foregoing that I have made no use of the important words "will" and "conscience,"² in relation to Man in his triune nature, as they belong solely to Man in his unity, and express themselves solely in relation to his personality and conduct. The "will" represents the "life" of man, as "conscience" represents its correlative the "law,"³ and the two in their unity make up the personality—Man.

¹ That Christ came to sow "divisions among men" has been objected to this view, that He came to bring a "sword" not "peace," but the answer to such is, not that there is not one concrete catholic body of truth (as in Christ Himself) for Man to grow towards and obtain hold of, but that Man, as was foreseen, would not believe in such, but would prefer to exercise his own will in all matters of faith, however ignorant; and that consequently, through his imperfection, divisions would arise.

"Peace upon earth, good will toward men," was the trumpet-note of His mission.

² For a definition of "will" and "conscience," see Part III, on The Man.

³ See notes to Chapter on Love.
It would not be difficult to show how each part or principle in Man has its "life" and "law" respectively, and how these in their mysterious union, merge into "will" and "conscience," the "life" and "law" of the unity of Man, but as this treatise is not devoted to an analysis of life, but to life itself, such considerations would lead us too far away from the direct line of relation (life). The whole mechanism of human conduct might be displayed, but none of it, without supernatural light, foretold; here is the glorious mystery of life itself.

The reader will now glance hastily over the personal parts of the following letters, and pardon, I hope, some repetition necessarily entailed by the obligation to preface this treatise with the main considerations which would arise as the subject developed itself, and which, with other objections, are in part met and answered in the letters. It was natural that the religious aspect of the subject should have first absorbed attention, as if it affected only the interpretation of Man's faith, it would be of enormous importance to Man. That the question has been before other minds will be seen by the lengthy quotation from Mr. Ruskin, and the reference to Goethe's reflections (only 40 years ago) upon the then existent state of belief. The names of correspondents have been omitted only because they would not have interested the general reader, and might have occasioned
a feeling of privacy or particularity about that which is in its nature universal.

LETTER NO. I.

London, S.W., Dec. 9th, 1870.

(written, as dated, nearly three years ago.)

My dear Friend,

I have safely received Part II of my poem, and am greatly obliged to you for the time and thought spent in reading it. I have posted to you to-day, Part III of The Hermit, for a first reading in its newly-conceived form. I must give a brief explanation of the reason of its being altered; and add something about, what is to myself, the all-important nature of its contents. And as this letter necessarily partakes of something of the nature of a Chapter, and is certainly the most important one I shall ever write to you, I have written it in chapter form.

Ideas which arise in us may be broadly divided into two classes; those which spring from actual association, and those which generate in thought only. The two first parts of my poem were wholly written by 'thought only',¹ but, when I approached part III, I considered that, in order truly to convey the Hermit in feeling and thought to the reader, I must go bodily into the associations to be conveyed. When I was in the country I had my doubts as to whether I was following the right course; but wrote on, hoping it would

¹ Or rather, everything but actual association.
prove so. Not till I returned to London did I discover that I was fundamentally wrong as to the manner in which the subject must be treated. One thought then showed me that, whereas Parts I and II were written by 'thought only,' so Part III must also be written, in order to preserve the same tone, and carry forwards to a close the spiritual history of my hero. I then destroyed the whole of what I had written at Ivy Cottage,¹ and took paper, without one idea in my mind, to reconstruct the Part. I soon saw that, as it was my intention to occupy the end of the Part with earnest and serious and real thought, upon the nature of man, little or no imaginary work should be allowed in it. And, in its present state, the first fault you may feel is, that it has no narrative. If you do feel this, and consider it ought to have narrative, I shall inweave sufficient to give it a more historical form. One does not forget that the highest forms of truth have been conveyed by parable and allegory,—to which our true life-stories are parallel.

I must now pass on to speak of, what is to myself, an all-important discovery; viz., the actual and complete meaning of the words in Genesis;—"Let us make man in our image." I well remember talking with you on this subject two years ago; and as my belief about it has in no way changed, but only become more and more fixed, it will be the best proof I can give, that, so far as my own personal understanding and judgment are concerned, it was not

¹ In the New Forest, Hants, where the Author passed some weeks of his hermitage.
then, nor is now, a mere idea, or poetic imagination. The conception which at first was an assurance in my mind, has now become a scientific fact;\(^1\) (A\(^3\)), a discovery which exactly correlates revelation. Part III of my work, (of which this truth is an essential portion, and not worked arbitrarily into verse,) explains the belief, and briefly exemplifies it; so that I need not, in this long letter, go into any exposition of my faith in its reality. But a little more must be said. You will at once recognize that I am now referring to the doctrine of the Triune nature of man;—which is that, Love or Soul\(^8\) is one principle, and correlates the First Person\(^4\) of the Trinity; that Body or Sense is a second principle, which correlates the Second Person; and that Reason\(^6\) or Spirit is a third principle, which correlates the Third Person, and which combines the others in a unity. (B). I came to this conclusion without thinking of its religious

\(^1\) i.e., living truth.

\(^8\) The capital letters in brackets refer to the next letter.

\(^6\) It has been objected that the expression, God is Love, is intended only to convey to us an idea of the character of God. I would reply, that I refer to the divine condition of feeling in man (soul) not the human condition (love) as applicable, so far as we can know anything of such mystery, to the nature of God.

The prayer in the Church Service—"Almighty God, with whom do live the spirits of them that depart hence in the Lord, and with whom the souls of the faithful, after they are delivered from the burden of the flesh, are in joy and felicity," certainly implies feeling, as expressing the nature of soul.

\(^4\) See the original derivation of this word.

\(^6\) 'Intellect' is another word for the principle of Reason.
bearing, by the discovery that Love, Reason, and Sense were three distinct principles or existences in Man. And, parenthetically, of its religious bearing; as of the Godhead we believe in three Persons, so may we now of the manhood believe in three principles. In this way is Man verily a "type" of his Creator.

But, you will say, this is all very serious, and may or may not be true, yet if true,—as from the way in which you put it, it seems to be,—how do you know, or why do you think, that so obvious a truth has not been seen and held by divines and thinkers for ages? Simply because, I reply, I have never met with it; it is not taught by theologians; it has not been promulgated by philosophers; and, so far as I am aware, it is one of those grand truths which men live close to for ages, and do not discern. The savants of Newton's age must have been astounded to find that this world was to their knowledge over 5,000 years old before men discovered that it was not a flat and motionless earth, but a revolving sphere. If this truth, the Triune nature of man, has been known for ages, it is strange so important a belief should not be generally taught. It is new to me. I have met with it in no book. I have never heard of it from any teacher. And to show that I may be right in thinking it has not yet been grasped in its reality, I will quote the passage from Mr. Ruskin, (an educated man,) which, at a time when I was very unsettled in my religious views, led

* See Letter No. 2 for remarks upon the Body, Soul, and Spirit, view of Man.
me (partly) to reflect upon the words of the bible quoted. I think you will at once see from the quotation that the Author has not—in trying to expound the same words—found the same meaning in them which I have been given to find.


The Chapter is headed "The Dark Mirror," and the Author, in the paragraph immediately preceding, has been speaking of the necessity of a painter's possessing a true and pure sympathy with life in order to his being a good painter.

And adds:—"The true presence, observe, of sympathy with the spirit of man. Where this is not, sympathy with any higher spirit is impossible."

He then goes on:—"For the direct manifestation of Deity to man is "in His own image." After His likeness. "Ad imaginem et similitudinem Suam." I do not know what people in general understand by those words. I suppose they ought to be understood. The truth they contain seems to lie at the foundation of our knowledge both of God and man; yet do we not usually pass the sentence by in dull reverence, attaching no definite sense to it at all? For all practical purpose, might it not as well be out of the text?

"I have no time, nor much desire, to examine the vague expressions of belief with which the verse has been en-

1 Italicized by the present writer.
"cumbered. Let us try to find its only possible plain significance.

"It cannot be supposed that the bodily shape of man resembles, or resembled, any bodily shape in Deity. [see note.] The likeness must therefore be, or have been, in the soul. Had it wholly passed away, and the Divine soul been altered into a soul brutal and diabolic, I suppose we should have been told of the change. But we are told nothing of the kind. (C.) The verse still stands for our use and trust. It was only death which was to be our punishment. Not change. So far as we live the image is still there; defiled if you will; broken if you will; all but effaced, if you will, by death and the shadow of it. But not changed. We are not made now in any other image than God's. There are, indeed, the two states of this image—the earthly and the heavenly—but both Adamite, both human, both the same likeness; only one defiled, and one pure. So that the Soul of man is still a mirror, wherein may be seen, darkly, the image of the mind of God.

"These may seem daring words. I am sorry that they do; but I am helpless to soften them. Discover any other meaning of the text if you are able;—but be sure that it is a meaning—a meaning in your own head and

1 Equally so with the soul I would prefer to think. Are not both the work of the same Creator? And does not Christ's life express a divine "resemblance" in the Sense? I do not say is the "shape,"—I say "resembles" it.—T.B.W.
"heart; not a subtle gloss, nor a shifting of one verbal expression into another, both idealess. I repeat that, to me, the verse has, and can have, no other significance than this—that the soul of man is a mirror of the mind of God. A mirror dark, distorted, broken, use what blameful words you please of its state; yet in the main, a true mirror, out of which alone, and by which alone, we can know anything of God at all.

"How?" the reader, perhaps, answers indignantly. "I know the nature of God by revelation, not by looking into myself."

"Revelation to what? To a nature incapable of receiving truth? That cannot be" &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Ruskin here leaves the question; and goes on to say that, in so far only as you love truth, can revelation exist for you;—"and in so far your mind is the image of God's."

I think you will agree with me that the foregoing is no exposition of the real, as opposed to the ideal, meaning of the text. No man who approached the subject in such a spirit would discover any truth. The Author here takes the symbol, viz., the mirror, (D), for the fact. Indeed, I could show in two or three sentences how Mr. Ruskin's explanation as fact, is nonsensical. For, if the soul is the mirror, how can the soul look into itself? Ideally, he is right; Really, his explanation has no mean-

1 The Author is indebted to no one more than to Mr. Ruskin for the things which belong to Christian culture.
ing. It is an attempt to place a real interpretation upon St. Paul's figure. The Author has not assured his understanding of the fact of what he writes. (E.)

Since writing the foregoing, I have come upon the following speech of Goethe's (to Eckerman) uttered in his eighty-third year.

"The mischievous sectarianism of Protestants will one day cease, and with it the hatred between father and son, sister and brother; for as soon as the pure doctrine and love of Christ are comprehended in their true nature, and have become a living principle, we shall feel ourselves great and free as human beings, and not attach special importance to a degree more or less in outward forms of religion. (F.) Besides, we shall all gradually advance from a Christianity of words and faith to a Christianity of feeling and action."

This was spoken in 1832. Need I look farther for evidence that the truth in question is as yet unseen? And what words could point more remarkably to such a truth? (G.) A truth, which I believe to be, the base of all true and future philosophy of man; to be the foundation of all sound education; and to explain to us our real yet ever mysterious relationship to the Creator.

The letter here concludes with the remark that genera-

1 Italicized by the present writer. See next letter.

Lewes' Life of Goethe.
tions to come would be taught differently, (H), that it was my duty to give the truth in the simple form in which I received it; (I), and adds that superstitions and weak people might say its belief was blasphemous,—that the author had made himself a god, and other false things;—that to all such, silence would be the answer... that if it was a truth it would stand, if it was an error it would fall... and that the reader would accept it or reject it of his own free-will.

The following letter was sent at the same time:—

London, S.W., Dec. 1870.

My dear Friend,

The letter you should receive with this was written a week ago, and the packet sealed. Since then, I have made progress with Part III of my poem, and think it better not to send it you in its present crude form. I feel now that I shall write it. What, therefore, my long letter contains with reference to the part, will serve for a little history of its conception.

But you will need the key to the subject of my long epistle. The truth it puts forward came to me in the following lines:—

Can Love make Reason, Reason dissolve Love,
Or can this Body's self itself destroy,
Either, by either be destroy'd?
LETTER NO. I.

If, as I think must be the case, the answer no arises in the understanding of every developed nature, the truth in question is clear. It has fitted itself into my understanding without proof. I question whether it ever could be proved. 1

But we cannot prove our faith.

I have poetically exemplified it, in its religious aspect, in the following lines:—

For, God is Love; emotion of all things;
Joy of the morning; song of folding eve;
Breath of the angel; and the mother's kiss.

Spirit is Reason; Man's intelligence;
Knowledge of all things; wonder of his being;
King o'er the creature; and the law of Truth.

Body is Christ; the perfectness of Man;
Glory of inward and of outward life;
Type of the future; unity of all:
The Three in One made visible on earth; 2—

which, as they are, convey the meaning.

St. Paul, in his beautiful passage, which Mr. Ruskin merely paraphrases, all but, from an ideal point of view, 3

Dr. Newman says that, of the concrete "demonstration is impossible." I do not go so far as this, (it all depends upon what limit of meaning we put upon the word "demonstration") but the opinion of such an eminent thinker supports my position for the present.

The Author throws the whole burden of his philosophy upon the sound distinctions expressed in these three verses.

1 Dr. Newman says that, of the concrete "demonstration is impossible." I do not go so far as this, (it all depends upon what limit of meaning we put upon the word "demonstration") but the opinion of such an eminent thinker supports my position for the present.

2 The Author throws the whole burden of his philosophy upon the sound distinctions expressed in these three verses.
expounds this truth. He says: "The soul is a mirror in which may be seen," &c. Seen by what? A mirror cannot look into itself. Sense without Intelligence cannot look into it. In which may be seen by the principle of Reason some image of the mind of God.

But, for the present, I wish strictly to confine my belief in such a truth to its human aspect alone, viz., as a scientific fact of the fundamental or living structure of man.

Your attached Friend,
T. B. W.

The foregoing letter was returned to the author with the following criticisms written in the margins, opposite each paragraph, and which criticisms are given at the head of each paragraph of Letter No. 2. The capital letters and references denote the paragraphs in Letter No. 1, to which each criticism refers.

LETTER No. 2.

London, S.W., January 23rd, 1871.
(written, as dated, nearly three years ago.)

My dear Friend,

I safely received the letters last evening, and must thank you all for the consideration given to

1 Exactly as, in psychological stories, the intellect (reason) sees, in a well of transparent feeling, and pourtrays life. Vide Part on Love and Psychology.

2 i.e., real truth.
the subject I introduced in my long letter of the 14th ultimo. Before the matter is, however, allowed to rest in the minds of my friends, I think I should reply to the notes and remarks which have been made on my views; and I therefore (as I leave here on Wednesday for two or three weeks, and shall have my attention taken up with other things) do so to-day. And I shall not ask either of you to take the trouble of now criticising what I say, though of course any remarks which may throw light upon the subject will be always acceptable. I will take the marginal notes as they come in the long letter, and answer them, and then conclude with some observations upon our mutual friend Mr. G.'s kind letter.

(A) page 26. W. C. H. "All scientific facts are capable of demonstration—but you do not demonstrate this or prove it to the reader." Our good friend overlooks the facts,—1st, that it would require a volume to "demonstrate" a new philosophy,—and 2ndly, that the letter was only meant as an appeal to the intuitive understanding of the "reader" upon the question of whether the base of such a philosophy was sound. I gave the key in the three lines of verse, and upon the answer to the question there put the whole problem turns. Granted three principles in Man, and a new and living philosophy arises upon them. And this proposition overleaf W. C. H. does not question. But I will say more on this farther on.

(B) page 26. W. C. H. "I view this as a fancied resemblance, not as a positive fact." I think this remark has
arisen from the natural impossibility of any man's accepting the doctrine fully, without reflection, and without applying its teaching to our belief in the Trinity. But as a criticism, the remark throws a doubt or shadow over one's understanding without applying itself to the whole, or pointing to any part of the statement, which it questions. There must be some direct and real relationship between God, the words quoted from his inspired writer, and Man. Therefore the presumption is in favour of the truth of my statement until an error in its assertion has been exposed. W. C. H. would have been right in calling such statement a "fancied resemblance" if it did not refer the reader to some base in man, upon which he may build up the belief it affirms. But the following sentence pointedly does so, and states upon what foundation such belief rests.

(C) page 29. W. C. H. "In what spirit?" If W. C. H. will re-read Mr. Ruskin's passage, I think he will agree with me that it is not in the calm and dispassionate tone in which we feel we ought to approach questions of this kind. He is not writing a poem, but endeavouring to explain a profound truth. I have underlined in pencil the two or three touches I refer to.

(D) page 80. W. C. H. "St. Paul's figure not necessarily a mirror but a darkened glass." I do not catch the truth or difference W. C. H. may mean this distinction to convey. St. Paul's passage, I take it, is a beautiful image intended to portray a certain amount of truth. And as all imagery must be interpreted from the ideal point of view, in showing
LETTER NO. II.

its difference from, and relation to, the real, I believe I have done right.

(E) page 81. W. C. H. "Have you done this?" A controversialist would simply answer—You have not shewn where I have not done so. But my object is not controversy, but truth. I can only therefore say that up to this point W. C. H.'s notes have not suggested to my mind any error.

(F) page 81. W. C. H. "I think this all alludes to the 'Odium Theologicum' of various sects—not to the Triune nature of Man." Undoubtedly W. C. H. is right in regarding this as the first meaning in Goethe's mind,—and undoubtedly also he is right in thinking that the doctrine in question was not in any distinct form before Goethe's mind when he uttered the words quoted. I therefore grant the truth of W. C. H.'s criticism so far as it goes. But my object in quoting Goethe was to show that, only forty years ago, to the greatest and most universal mind then living, the "doctrine" of Christ was not "comprehended in its true nature," and also that he prophesied that it some day would be. But what relation, W. C. H. may ask, has this to the doctrine of the Triune nature of Man? Clearly the one, true, essential, and complete relationship; in that only as Man knows himself truly can he truly interpret Christ. Mr. Ruskin's opinion assists here—"The truth they contain (the text from the bible quoted) seems to lie at the foundation of our knowledge both of God and man." By a right understanding of man, shall we come to a complete know-

1 i.e., the Christian life.
ledge of the perfection of the Christian religion. But more upon this farther on.

(G) page 31. W. C. H. "I do not see that they point thereto at all." Granted that anything is not "comprehended in its true nature," the next thing mentally, when you hear a great mind express some opinion on it, is that there is some truth underlying the whole, which Man's knowledge has not yet reached. W. C. H. I think mainly interprets Goethe's words as referring to his own time. But Goethe states that he is speaking of the future. And it is only by means of the fullness of our right knowing, that such universality of creed and practice, as Goethe refers to, can be brought about.

(H) page 32. W. C. H. "Why?" My good friend would not say that we have reached such "fullness of our stature" of knowing, and being, and understanding of things. Man is the same in his constitution in a state of barbarism, as he is in a civilized state. His knowledge works all the change which takes place in him. Whence the grand importance of a true education becomes self-evident. And at a time when philosophers are lost for want of a general or fundamental conception of Man to which to refer all their special inquiries; when science is feeling after some one central science round which to group or rather fit in all its discoveries and give them a direct relation to life; when Christians seem hopelessly severed into sects, all hoping they are right, yet all partly doubting whether

1 i.e., spiritual intelligence.
they are so,—it is not impertinent to speak of men, sooner or later, "thinking and feeling" differently, for as soon as such knowledge is obtained, it is evident they must do so.

(I) page 82. W. C. H. "What form?" I must quote my own words in the letter. The doctrine it puts forward came to me in these lines:

Can Love make Reason, Reason dissolve Love,
Or can this Body's self itself destroy,
Either, by either be destroy'd?

I came to see this in the first place by observing that the three main religious bodies in this country were as a rule (with, of course, exceptions) divided by the three different main forms of character into which society may be separated. But this is by the way. We are here, in the above lines, on the common ground of every day experience. And if W. C. H. will regard the subject in this light till he has satisfied himself upon it, I shall be glad. Without wishing to be personal, to better illustrate my meaning, I should like to refer the questions just put to himself. Will he allow that any amount of "reasoning" or mental opposition by self imposed effort, would ever have "dissolved" his "love" for one other? Supposing he had willed to set his thoughts and everything else which was part of him to work against it, could he have ever wholly removed it? If he answers 'no' (and this is the common answer of history and every true love-story) then it becomes clear that "love" is a distinct thing in itself, and independent of "reason,"
though working with "reason" in the mystery of the unity of man.

"But what of those who never love at all?" W. C. H. may ask. This a question of which principle is dominant in each nature. This dominance is called character. The action of the subordinate principles passes unobserved. But, W. C. H. may say—where a man knows his conduct to be right, true "love" and right "reason" are never opposed. Granted, as true in perfect natures, but we here leave our inquiry upon man in his Triune nature, and begin to regard him in his unity.

As to the third principle, the principle of Sense, or material Substance, this is the vehicle of the other two. Either one may, perhaps, be said to combine the other two; because in a perfect nature all would be in equilibrium. Mr. Ruskin in an earlier volume of his Modern Painters to that quoted from, has, in reference to things of material Nature, well explained how two things cannot exist together as one without a third to join them. We might illustrate this in various ways. Two lines converging at a point do not become a unity, or a body, without the aid of a third, Δ. Two arms, or two limbs, require the trunk of the body to unite them. Or take a different kind of illustration. Man

1 They, of course, merge into universal benevolence in the complete man.

2 The exposition of the relation of the mathematical symbol to the Trinity, as shewn previously, was not taken from Mr. Ruskin's remarks. It was a separate observation of the Author's.
and wife are said to be *one*, but this is only an expression. They only *really* become *one* in a third life, namely, in their child. But these considerations would for the present lead me too far away from what I must say.

I will now reply to the remarks in Mr. G.'s kind letter* (you have the original), in their order. Mr. G. first says:—

"As my mind has been very little exercised on *metaphysical* subjects," etc. I am happy to say I have not the least intention of leading Mr. G. or any one else into the old forms of *metaphysical* inquiry. I should at once state an important distinction in my own understanding between what I have before explained and metaphysics. The former

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* The letter referred to:—

... *January, 1871.*

My dear Sir,

I have not had time before this afternoon to perform the promise I made to you last night, to send you a few lines on the subject of Mr. T. B. W.'s paper. I have thought it over, but as my mind has been very little exercised in metaphysical subjects, I am a very incompetent judge of its merits.

The idea of the Triune nature of man is, you know, an old one, but the idea that this triune nature correlates the three persons of the Trinity, is, I believe, (as Mr. T. B. W. states) entirely new, at least it is new to me.

The proposition is one which I think is at least well entitled to consideration and discussion, and assuming it to
is, or will be, the Science¹ of Man, the latter is the Science of Mind. The former proposes to treat of man as a living and free Agent; the latter only analyzes the powers and faculties of his Mind. For the sake of this distinction I generally speak of my "understanding" instead of my "mind."² Philosophy has for ages been practically a dead letter, because it has not yet ever got beyond analysis into life.

¹ i.e., living truth.
² The one (understanding) perhaps, represents the contemplative, the other (mind) the meditative, attitude of the immaterial man. The one sees, the other thinks. In this way they correlate deduction and induction. The one looks through, the other traces up. Two aspects of one and the same thing.

be true, it would doubtless lead thoughtful men to a higher and nobler conception of Man's nature and place in God's system, and might gradually tend to the elevation of the human race generally.

But is the proposition true? or is it only a creature of Mr. T. B. W.'s imagination or fancy? Certainly the truth does not appear to my mind as it does to his, self-evident, and the reasons which he adduces for his belief in its truth are not by any means satisfactory to my mind.

The fault may perhaps be with me and not with him, but I am really unable to follow or indeed clearly to understand his argument, and his illustrations from what St. Paul and Goethe say appear to me not to bear at all upon the question.

Indeed he says, I think, that his proposition cannot be
Mr. G. then says that "the idea of the Triune nature of man is an old one," though not so the belief of its relation to the Trinity. I conclude the "old idea" to which my friend refers is precisely the same idea you say another friend stated, namely, of Man being made up of Body, Soul, proved, yet he calls it a scientific fact, which, as Mr. W. C. H. suggests, is (or ought to be) capable of demonstration.

A difficulty occurs to me with regard to the second part of man being correlative to the second person of the Trinity, namely, that this second person did not become incarnate, did not take upon Himself man's nature, until within the last 1,900 years. It will be answered, probably, that He did appear in human bodily shape on several occasions previous to the Christian era, but this is still I believe matter of controversy amongst sincere believers in Revelation, and even admitting it to be so, it does not I think meet the objection.

The verses in which Mr. T. B. W. embodies his new idea strike me as very fine.

I write in haste, but I will not let another day pass, although my remarks are not, I know, of any practical value.

With kind regards to Mr. T. B. W. when you write to him,

Believe me,

Very sincerely yours,

J. S. G.
and Spirit. This seems to me a case in point of how near we often are to truths without actually and correctly realizing them. I think those who conceived this belief were unable to divest the question of its religious bearing, and begin by looking at man as he really is. Substitute the words Love and Reason for the words Soul and Spirit, and the question becomes one of observation, experience, and knowledge. There was I think always more or less confusion in the minds of men as to the difference (if any) between Soul and Spirit. Most people use the words as synonymous. But Spirit (in the biblical sense, as Holy Spirit) means Intelligence, another word, in its highest form, for the principle of Reason. It has no reference whatever to the ordinary sense in which the word is used, of emotional energy. This is solely, so far as it is not sensuous force or energy, a function of the Soul. So that to pass on I must simply say that the old belief was close to the truth (in fact, one side of it) but did not enter into it.

Mr. G. then speaks of my view of its relation to the Trinity; to which remark I must beg to refer him to what I have already said in reply to W. C. H.'s note—page 87. Mr. G. then, for the moment, "assuming it to be true," expresses precisely my own feelings of its practical issue. Then comes the remark that the reasons I have adduced in support of my belief "are not by any means satisfactory to his mind." My kind friend will allow this is difficult to

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1 Increase of heavenly knowledge, or light.
2 The divine side.
answer because it does not give me any difficulty to explain. If the difficulty be, which I expect it is, that the problem is not worked out, I must answer that it would have been impossible in a letter to state the whole, but if the central facts are correctly enunciated, all deductions will naturally follow. All sciences have sprung from some one important observation of the nature of things: and given this, the key is in the reader's understanding. The science of Astronomy sprang from the falling of an apple. One ordinary sheet of notepaper would have sufficed to convey the law (gravity) believed to underlie this movement, into another reflective mind.

Mr. G. then says that my quotations from St. Paul and Goethe do not "appear to bear at all upon the question." Perfectly true; they have no direct reference to the doctrine before us, and were only brought in for two reasons, first, to show at the outset that I was not going over old ground, i.e., talking about things already known; and secondly, because Mr. Ruskin merely paraphrases St. Paul, and I thought it would be useful, and save confusion, to show how what I had to say dovetailed into what St. Paul had said; and also to show the relationship of the real to the ideal. Goethe was a man of science as well as a poet, and made two or three of the most important discoveries in science ("the only real human thought"—Mr. Matthew Arnold) which the last three generations have known. He was in the habit for years of referring all his observations upon the

\[1\] Of course, meaning realized truth.—See Part on Reason.
matter in hand to a fundamental type of the thing. Hence it was natural, my kind friend will allow, that I should place a deeper significance than a first meaning only upon the words quoted from such a man, and feel that in their author's mind they referred to some common science or truth of us all.

Mr. G. then remarks upon what is certainly an apparent paradox, namely, that I speak of "a scientific fact which cannot be proved." The remark about the belief being "proved" was an afterthought, (it is an interlineation in the letter) and should not have been put in. I meant it in this way. Not that we may not sooner or later satisfy ourselves about man being the expression of three principles, but that the way in which these principles work into and affect each other, in short, exist together in unity, appears difficult of "proof." But this is certainly part of the development of the truth itself; and it will eventually become a question only of how far we have the capacity of understanding our natures. I did not mean the sentence about "proof" to express any doubt of my own belief of the Triune nature of man.

Mr. G. now puts me the only difficult question to answer in the notes; and it is difficult, because, regarding man in his relation to the Trinity, which I have affirmed, it requires a distinct appreciation of the nature of the Trinity from the beginning, to positively explain it. And this my kind friend will allow is the chief mystery of our faith; and must ever remain a mystery. "Sincere believers in Beve-
"... may speculate their lives long as to when Christ took upon himself the bodily form, without ever reaching any firm conviction on the matter. But I must here point out one important fact. My kind friend in this passage of his letter leaves the firm ground of inductive thought, and passes up into deductive speculation, a mode of procedure which, he will be the first to allow, cannot aid exact knowledge but must tend to confuse it. It is the mode of thought which men have practised for ages, and would be practising now, but that science has stepped in, and shewn them the opposite way is the one in which to make progress. Our only sure course is to reason from fact up into mystery, not from mystery down to fact. Mr. G.'s difficulty is I think this—if Christ has only taken the bodily nature within the last 1,900 years, in what way can this new creed be shewn to have any application to His person of the Trinity before that time? I must answer inductively as far as I can. First, then, the fact of Christ's having appeared in the bodily shape is a sufficient answer as regards the time since His appearance. Secondly, the words in Genesis must have some real meaning, and the explanation given answers to such for all time. Thirdly; That as from the fall (here following the course of the Bible) a Visible bodily interference on behalf of man was promised, it may from that hour be assumed that Christ consented, at the proper time in God's dispensation, to "become flesh," and as there

1 Deduction is, none the less, the necessary complement of induction.
is no such thing as Time in heaven, the consent can only be regarded as consentaneous with the act. And as Christ took his bodily nature with him into heaven after his resurrection, it is a fair assumption that some form of bodily or visible nature is and has been coexistent with Time—Time to us. If not, Christ's resurrection need only have been a spiritual resurrection. Finally, we believe in the visibility of ourselves in heaven, we believe that we shall see each other; and it is this nature of visibility, this quality of substance, whatever its form, which I mean man's corporeal nature is typical of, and correlates.

I have now I think replied to all the notes excepting the one of our mutually dear friend. "Reason is the highest form of truth" but not "the law of Truth." My expression is simply a poetical illustration of the nature of a principle, and I think a true one. The word "law" is only used in antithesis to the "life" of the verse before—the love in all things. These two are of course one, and are united as before shewn by a third.

I must not end without thanking you personally for your share in the matter. I see you only refer to a "strikingly beautiful" passage by Mr. Ruskin, quoted in the long letter. It is a beautiful passage; but rich diction is dangerous of use where the object is solely to expound the abstract truth of a biblical verse.

* Spirit is Reason; Man's intelligence;
Knowledge of all things; wonder of his being;
King o'er the creature; and the law of Truth.
But this letter is already long enough. I will only observe therefore by way of conclusion, that, as all speculations become philosophies when they are shewn to contain a good deal of truth; and all philosophies become sciences when they are purified into fact; and all fact is the result of intelligent observation, not a few sincere men may throw light upon this subject.

Your attached Friend,

T. B. W.
[Since an important want of something absent, will be felt by a reader, in perusing the main outline of the following chapter, the author would expressly mention that it is an exposition of feeling, taken in itself, apart from life, or thought proper, and not a merely sensational effort of the emotional powers. The whole chapter has been written throughout solely with an eye to the essential truths it puts forward of the constitution of the living man.]
RELIGION\(^1\) teaches us that, in a future state, Love will be the sole law of conduct to Man, Love in union with Intelligence, Intelligence developed, or (rather) unfolded, to the full limit of the creature comprehension. It behoves us, therefore, to see, what, or how much, of this glorious faculty we possess in this present state of being, what is its relation to lower conditions of life (than ourselves), and what to that fruition of life which is to be.

That there is some quality or principle of Love within us, no one doubts, and that it has, or should exercise a large influence in the affairs of life, but what it is, what is its relation to our understanding powers,

\(^1\) In order to introduce occasional reference to the realities of "soul" and "spirit" within us, it was found necessary to commence this chapter on Love, upon the level of religious feeling. A lengthy exposition, or second reading, from a scientific point of view, follows farther on.
what to our whole and living selves, philosophy, nor any
code of education at present teaches us. We feel dimly
and uncertainly after the realization of ourselves in
Love, more than in anything else, but the circumstances
of life, the infirmities of the body, and the business of
the world, make us take different views, not only of its
nature, but of its reality, and land us eventually in a
compromise of ourselves.

And, that this compromise is not the real truth, there
is an ever-recurring thought arising from the inmost
recesses of our natures, to tell us; we feel partly
ashamed of ourselves in having regarded it as such,
yet, we argue, that so complex are the conditions of
life, a man has done wisely who has made the best
bargain with himself, possible under circumstances.

But, this self-suspicion is a certain sign that we are
not at the root of the matter; that we have not either
in practice, or in education reached the fundamental
condition of things. The love of the natural man,
which leads to lust, and the love of the christianized
man, which induces a spiritual emotion, we feel to be
two; we are constantly endeavouring to reconcile
them; to make both agree; and, though we remember
that “perfect love casteth out fear,” we are in a con­
stant state of flux, between that which originates in the
body, and the things which belong to the soul.

To remedy this imperfection, we turn to ourselves,
and endeavour to ascertain how these two opposite conditions of life actually exist in one; how the human and the christian dwell together in unity; how that which is material co-operates and agrees with that which is divine. The christian life we feel, beyond all doubt, is a superinduction upon our original nature,¹ a something not of it, but superior to it, and above it, a something which does not contradict it, but asseverates and correlates it, a something which raises the creature above that which is natural to its state. And we find after a certain amount of discipline that this superinduced life adds really to our happiness, not only irrespective of future hopes, but as regards present being; we grow to despise, discard, and not care for, things which before pleased us, and, with a braver heart, and no less ability to work, we find ourselves better qualified for our duties in the world.

It is therefore of fundamental importance to ascertain what relation this superinduced life has to our original faculty for love; how far this natural faculty is affected by this unnatural or spiritual one; and to what extent, and in what manner both may be regarded as living together as one. Which introductory

¹ "A religion contrary to our natures."—Pascal.

"Christianity is simply an addition to nature. It does not supersede or contradict it; it recognizes and depends on it, and that of necessity."—Dr. Newman.
remarks bring us to the point at which we wish to set out, namely, the relation of "soul" to "love."

That the "natural man" possesses a "soul" as well as the christian man, is allowed; therefore this "soul," (about which we have felt such a mystery), is a natural part of the "natural man." Without revelation, and by the light of natural religion only, we know that the strongest motive power in man, is Love;¹ that it is the power which moves him, and which has always moved him, to great deeds,—that to it we owe all the noble self-sacrifice which the world has gained,—therefore we conclude, that, this faculty in its true and pure use, is the highest and chiefest and most essential faculty with which the "natural man" is endowed.

But immediately we view the same in relation to religion and christian revelation, a new and glorious light is thrown upon the same principle, and we at once feel that, although previously we knew how to live and die for our own and our fellows' good, we now know that, not only may this supreme principle have a higher and more glorious use within us, but that, it is, in itself, the chief element of our immortal being. Love, which we regarded before, only as an immaterial existence in our bodily natures, now becomes the immaterial substance of our future hopes: we read in it the "soul"

¹ I am not here concerned with the negative, or evil, side of Man's character.
of Man; the divine life which he owns by virtue of his divine origin; the immortal existence of his past, his present, and his future being.

For the immaterial, we believe, cannot die, inasmuch as it is something within and apart from the material. The same organic structure and pulsation in which we now live, might have represented Man, without any necessary immaterial faculty of Love or Reason within him. It was not necessary, in order that Man should be Man as he outwardly is, that his inward self should possess any qualities or faculties, superior to, or hoping in, a state of things, above and beyond his present self. The material organism might have been material within, that is, its instinct of locomotion, self-protection, and support, might have existed wholly devoid of those faculties which we connect with his immaterial being. Hope, imagination, religion, belief, faith, intuition, understanding, these are things wholly foreign to the natural wants of the animal man. And they could not have been "developed" but through the agency of some power or forces or conditions parallel and akin to them, which, as Man is individual, we sum up in the unit of a first cause, an intelligence, a creator, a father,

Philosophers call it the Subject, or Unextended. The Christian, the "immortal soul." Or we may speak of it as the dual life-principle, (life-in-law), which takes form—the third thing embodying it—according to the will of its Original.
God. Nature cannot develop that which is superior to herself; either her faculty of development, in producing such a creature as Man, must be unlimited, or she must possess one original creative power, in producing him, and this power we subtract from matter, and embody in the idea of God. We frustrate our own intelligence if we regard matter as producing that which is not itself; and we deny our philosophical sense of progression, if, in producing such, we, to ourselves, ascribe the limit.

That two courses only remain open before us: either to regard the universe as the expression of power which has its fixed limit in Man, which is nonsense; or to add to that power an unlimited capacity of production; in which sense, since that which has been is an essential portion of that which is to be, we feel that, we too, shall in some manner, have the self-consciousness of a second being. So that to return to our point: The immaterial faculty of Love, in the "natural man," is the chief motive power and influence within him. And to this we now add its mysterious and divine aspect, and call it, in its religious sense, the "soul" of Man.

Having now to some extent, cleared the way for a consideration of Man as he really is, in relation to that

1 In precisely the correlative sense to its being the "heart" of Man. The threefold expression of one principle: heart, love, soul—material, human, divine.
which he believes himself to be, we may proceed to show—first, the relation of, and distinction from, Love to Reason; secondly, the relation of, and distinction from, Love to Body; and thirdly, the action and interaction of Love with "will" and "conscience," as expressing (in body) the unity of Man. Some remarks

* Bishop Ellicott, on the *Threesfold Nature of Man*, has said:

... "Is it not very noticeable that in the frequently recurring contrasts of our material and immaterial natures,—contrasts which at first sight might be thought only to imply a twofold nature,—the terms regularly opposed to each other are of such a kind as really to give to the assumption of a threesfold nature a very high degree of plausibility.

... Now are we, on the one hand, to understand by spirit, as used in the text, (1 Thess. v. 26), the Holy Spirit,—the Holy Spirit as far as it dwells in man, the Neshama of the Rabbins, the divine afflatus,—or are we to understand it, on the other hand, as simply denoting the higher portion of our purely human nature, the realm of the powers of the mind, the seat of the conscience, the arbiter of choice, the medium of our cognizance of the divine, that portion, or, if that term be thought to imply too specifically a distinct and separate entity, that side of our immaterial nature which alone admits of association with the Holy Spirit of God? In which of these two senses is
upon Love in relation to Psychology, Life, and Religion, will naturally follow.

And in writing upon this subject, the first difference which we note is, in the style by which we can express the matter in hand. For that short, sharp, incisive mode of expression, which is so suitable to intellectual argument, would be wholly out of place in treating of the things of Love. Argument can be well expressed in

it to be taken in the text? ... [Answer, in the latter, follows.] ... ... ... ...

... It is thus [see sermon] that the term soul becomes almost synonymous with that of heart, and points to that assemblage of feelings, movements, and impulses, of which the heart is the imaginary tabernacle.

... ... Finally then to sum up all, let us say that our text has led us to these conclusions:—that body, soul, and spirit are the three component parts of man's nature. That the spirit may be regarded more as the realm of the intellectual forces, and the shrine of the Holy Ghost. That the soul may be regarded more as the region of the feelings, affections, and impulses, of all that peculiarly individualizes and personifies. Lastly, that these three parts, especially the two incorporeal elements, are intimately associated and united, and form the media of communication, both with each other, and with the higher and lower elements.
concise and pointed periods, but feeling needs for its vehicle the limit of its own utterance. Though our best and most intense feelings express themselves in the fewest words, we cannot without violence to our natures, treat of the things of love, without allowing them their own expression. Hence style varies with the measure of intensity we bring to our subject; and in things of the heart, the most emphatic relation is that which unarbitrarily deals out its own desire.

... All we have done is to trace out a few outlines, and to lay down a few elementary definitions. Nevertheless it is my humble conviction, that these outlines are not untruly drawn. Nay I would dare to say, that if any of you should feel induced to carry out these thoughts for yourselves, and to supply what is deficient, you would perchance not only obtain a deeper insight into the peculiar language of Scripture, but also appreciate more fully the essential character of those temptations that try alike body, soul, and spirit, that loosen the bands of the compound nature, and destroy the entirety of its constituent parts.—The Destiny of the Creature.—Sermons preached at Cambridge.

[A reader wishing to follow this out further from its religious side, will do well to read the excellent sermon from which these few extracts have been made,—since writing the text of this treatise.—T. B. W.]
Love, to Reason.

That the human heart has an equal share with the intellect in the things of life, everybody will allow. Nay, some go so far as to say that, all things may be resolved into feeling. Aristotle's final definition of knowledge was, that it was a feeling—feeling, perhaps, in this sense, meaning material sensation. But since it is impossible to regard all the chief faculties of Man as but the expression of material being only, this, like all

The following is a scientific exposition of the same considerations given in the narrative above. Notes from Professor Bain's "Mental and Moral Science" are appended to support the views expressed in the text. Such notes have been extracted from Professor Bain's works (and those works read) since writing the main outline of this treatise.

Since life is not abstract definition, the reader will here at the outset observe that I should be wholly wrong in endeavouring to establish a hard and fast linear division between these two principles in Man. By endeavouring to do so, I should express the very spirit and emotion in life, and set out with the fundamental error which Spinoza made. Spinoza set out to explain the universe, including Man, by mathematical or abstract formula, and, as a necessary consequence, ended by annihilating life itself. Life is the embodiment of science, not science of life; hence it is clearly
other abstract and extreme definitions, confutes itself. For immediately we admit the immaterial, which thought and argument certainly are, without reference to the nature of the feeling in which they arise, we admit that which is intangible, immeasurable, indefinite, and therefore in and of its very nature, mysterious. And to arrive at the mysterious is for all philosophical purposes, and sound forms of thought, to arrive at that which is of the same property as the soul,—the soul in impossible to explain life by science. We, as living beings, exhibit science to the best of our individual faculty; but if we look out upon the field of Nature, we see science nowhere nakedly expressed. Nature, herself, clothes her anatomy (science) whether of "law" or "order"—with more or less perfect individual and general life; in the same way must Man clothe his individual conceptions and truths with concrete and animate thought. If he omits to do this, he omits the conditions of life itself, and his scarecrow or anatomy does but frighten or delude his neighbours.

Love, therefore, stands to Reason, as Life does to Science. Love contains in itself a nature of intelligence, as Life contains in itself a nature of science, which, to each, is its law or condition of support. The special or individual here correlates the general or whole, in precisely the

* That is to say, each principle has an individuality, though not a personality.

b See Part on Reason.
common language being only regarded as a "mystery." And in establishing this mystery, we establish the reality of that which is the substance of Love,—Love being of this mysterious essential power, and in practice, the most potent influence within us. One step nearer to the material, we describe it as Emotion, which emotion we know has some direct and exquisite connection with the material organ, of which it is a part. So 

same way as the spiritual conditions of Man, which are special, correlate the human or natural conditions of his being. All are one, and all have their first healthy expression in actual, emotional life.

[Emotional spirit,\textsuperscript{a} is, itself, the first step into the mystery of life.\textsuperscript{b} Inward constitution does not account for it, inasmuch as it is produced, in by far the majority of cases, by circumstances without. Here we first touch life pro-

a The emotions of Animals are certainly, in a sense, parallel to the emotions of Man. The only difference that we can observe is, that these emotions in no recognizable way affect the lives of animals. Hence we should naturally assume that animals lack an "intelligence" which Man possesses. And this intelligence would be the spiritual conditions of life, said to have been given him from the first. If the text, "Let us make man in our image," contains a realistic meaning which it has taken ages to solve, we may be infallibly sure that the other text, "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life," contains such a meaning also.

b See on—notes to narrative.
that, to shorten this digression, we find ourselves once more upon the realizable grounds of Matter, having stepped by degrees from mystery, through emotion, down to it.

All these considerations are questions of degrees of interpretation and intelligence. We are so apt to divide arbitrarily between Matter and Spirit, Body per,—for life is a conglomeration of circumstances, wholly distinct and separate from personal constitution or law. What will come to us from without we never can foresee or tell; what will be our "bodily state" when it does come,—this we can never foreknow. Hence life as life

* is something wholly apart from that which by physical nature we are,—and will come to us and affect us just in so far as we are prepared to meet it.

Here we have two distinct things,—conditions of life without ourselves, a constitution of life and law [see note]

* That is, as life active, represented by "will," is superior to, and therefore, in a sense, independent of, life passive, as represented by "law."

b If we take a seed (the simplest form of self-generative matter), and deprive it (in thought) of all speciality, we find it to be the expression of two things—"life" and "law," in indistinguishable union. The "third" thing uniting them is part of each, viz., the Matter itself.

* The "requisite conditions" to bring forth and express the life, correlate the "outward circumstances" which embody and affect the life of Man.
and Soul, Love and Reason, Sensation and Rest, that we overlook the fact that they are all indissolubly, part and parcel of each other, and that the whole framework of things moves onward in one unchanging groove. For knowledge we are obliged to make these divisions, though we know in practice how every thing within us is merged into one indivisible whole. And the true understanding.

within ourselves,—our action will assuredly be the measure of what we know or believe concerning both. If we have come to believe ourselves animals, we shall act as animals; if we have an idea we are gods, we shall endeavour to imitate gods; if, as is most likely the case, we are men, we shall strive, whatever the conditions which approach, to act as men. Man, we have affirmed, is the expression of the union of the divine and the material. The human is the expression of the union of the two. If we omit the divine we are right in believing in only the animal; if we accept both, we are true to ourselves and our faith.—Which parenthetic remarks will enable us to keep life and association well in view throughout.]

The fundamental relation and distinction between Love and Reason is, of course, that of Feeling and Thought to each other. Every man knows who has observed the workings of things in his own nature at all, to what an important extent and difference our actions and very beliefs depend upon the measure of Feeling we admit into their
point of division or distinction is that, where we find the *vital* conditions of our life, affected by the true or false action of such conditions.

Which brings us again to first nature of things, to the nature of Nature around us, to our belief in a triune God, verified at every turn of Nature itself, and to the vital condition of our own being, which, whether in philosophy we recognize it or not, is most certainly consideration. According as the age is more or less heroic, practical, or scientific, do men entertain Feeling in the consideration of their ideas; and therefore, it is clear, to obviate this gradation or occasional flux, which has no understood standpoint, a recognition of a truth such as that before us, is fundamentally important. For we should for the first time realize the fact that no idea or consideration or belief could be regarded as a life-truth, unless it had some measure of Feeling in it; and that consequently all our abstractions, or *vice versa*, extravagant emotional notions, were extremes, one way or the other; and that the intermediate state was the truth, for each individual life, according to the measure of itself. By which we mean that no man or woman's *abstract* ideas or idealess emotions are life-truths, but to arrive at such for themselves personally, they must take the reason[able balance of their own natures. Here we introduce the term reason[able, because it is the balance between physical or bodily energy, and emotional life.
threefold. For philosophy delights to treat with things as a whole, to merge the whole universe into one unindividual substance, to regard first causes as existing in themselves, life as but the expression of unlimited heat and time, and finally, as a matter of course, ends, by annihilating all individuality,¹ and bringing the framework of nature to a standstill. This we know is not life; we know we are individual; we know we can

¹ As in the death-in-life philosophy of Spinoza.

We do not mean to imply by this concrete statement of the nature of personal truth, to each one of us, that special or individual use of principle is therefore to be disregarded. It could not be disregarded, even if we willed to do so. For character, as we have suggested in the second letter, is the expression of the dominance of some one of these three principles in our natures. We simply mean that our ideal or concrete universal truth will be the expression of these three principles in perfect use and individual perfection, and that such must ever be the standard for a conception of original truth.

Feeling, which has its first individual expression in what is called Emotion, and which at the point of individuality,⁰ we sum up in the term Love,⁰ has its practical, or partly

⁰ Is it the "breath of life" which gives it an "individuality" within us?

⁰ Definition of Love. "Personality" begins where it enters our unity.—see on.
LOVE.

decide upon matters of conduct; we know we can accept an affirmative or a negative belief in creation; we know that we can pray; and in knowing these, we discover the diversity of our own natures, we accept such for the truth of things, and we frame our belief and interpretation of them upon such sound perception of what we really are.

And that which makes us more happy than anything latent and passive life in what we term sympathy. All our actions have more or less sympathy in them, whether that sympathy takes the form of self-interest,—sympathy for self only,—or of general good feeling which we call our "humanities." This (illegitimate) word "humanities" conveys to us an important fact, yet contains no idea in itself. We have to call in Reason (intellect) to define it. We then for the first time know what we mean by it; and discover that it is the expression of latent sympathy for and with our fellow-man. Hence in this way we arrive at the clear and unartificial observation that sympathy proper and intellect proper are two distinct things,—though part and parcel of one and the same Man.

The words Love and Reason, but particularly the word

* Professor Bain:—"There are only three ultimate modes of mind—Feeling, Volition, and Intellect."—Mental Science, p 215. Why is Sensation omitted? Substitute Sensation for Volition (for Will of course affects all equally) and we have the same truth as that before us, viewed from another position.—T.B.W. For "Sensation" in relation to "Mind," see on.
is a complete love. Poets have sung the reality of this glorious passion; historians have related the change of empire upon its base. Passion we have called it, and so it unquestionably is in our first natures, but with our second natures, comes a spirit, which, though it does not change, and in no way alters the fact of its being a passion, brings a fire to it, which, living in it and with it daily, purifies it, elevates it, ennobles it, chastizes it, makes it the intensest, most active, most

Love, disappears almost entirely from the works of philosophic and scientific writers, and so when we turn to our studies, and do not find it spoken of there, we begin to doubt its reality. Philosophers and men of science do not doubt its truth in the things of life, but they cannot find a way to treat of it in their works. The simple fact is that, neither of these forms of thought actually represent life. Philosophy proper deals with speculation; Science with anatomy: the field of both stops short with analysis.* Hence we might expect, unless we had a life-philosophy, that the diction of such works would necessarily be different from the diction required to express the actualities of life,—or rather, that such diction would stop short just below the words which correctly embody and convey personality.

It would here be in place, and an interesting experiment, to trace out the different results and modes of opinion depending upon the measure of Feeling and Thought, plus

* And life passive.
subtle, most potent agency in our living, acting, individual being. The lines,

That glorious undying flame
Which burns and purifies the inward man,

truly express the influence of this power within us, this natural passion, when spiritualized; it becomes a spiritual emotion, increasing the action of the heart, diminishing the action of sense, and raising a man physical constitution, which such conveyed and contained. We should find such opinion varying and changing, first according to outward circumstances, which modify and represent life, and secondly, according to the proportionate power of each principle in each individual Man. And we should at once, in consequence, observe, that a true education for happiness and general well-being in every way, would be an aid and development, so far as possible, of the

* We here mean Feeling and Thought as "immaterial," and within the material Body. Professor Bain, in speaking of Feeling as "a mode of mind," we conclude, also, regards it, in such sense, as "immaterial," or part of the Subject or Unextended nature in Man. The two views are, therefore, here, at one. At the same time, we doubt, whether the positive division of Man into Object and Subject can now be maintained. Has not Physiology shewn the two to be mysteriously and (so far as this life is concerned) indissolubly one? Hence we, as in the last note to Professor Bain's opinion, treat of them as one. Our principles oblige us to such belief.
above and beyond what, without it, he would ever be capable of being.

This "spirit" comes to it through Man's intelligence or Reason,¹ to which principle of our triune being 'spirit' essentially belongs. For it is important to

¹ The absence of which allows of what we regard as "sentimental" or un[reason]able love,—which shows us the difference between the false and the true.

And the want of observation of this truth is the secret of pressure or weight we feel upon the heart when we attempt to christianize or spiritualize it except through the medium of the head. In so far as this "spiritualization" checks the healthy action of the heart, we may be certain our interpretation of it is false. Life was not lessened, only raised, by the new "light" to Man. Light falls upon the brain before it reaches the heart. In the same way must spiritual (religious) truth pass through it.

lesser or weaker principles in his nature, in order to enable him to enter into and understand a concrete conception and interpretation of universal harmony and truth.

And such equivalent development being impossible,—which, if so, would destroy all individuality and variation in life, and so do away with the beauty of life itself,—we should arrive at the opinion, that special processes of thought and feeling were admirable in so far as they did not contradict, but aided, other truth, coming from other prin-

² We need not fear an absolute uniformity. The infinite variety of society is the infinite variety of life.
remember and observe that, there is no change in physical conditions when a man receives a new intelligence or belief; it is all a matter of "understanding," the influence of a something which is no part of his bodily nature, a something which, if he continued to believe in it, he would take with him wherever he went. It is a creed, a belief, which he calls a revelation, which makes all this subtle difference in the nature of his principles and variations of character,—that all such speciality was in itself excellent, just in so far as it did not produce negation,—and that all men and all things were reaching forward to one eternal whole.

Such considerations as these would however lead us too far away from the special work before us, namely, to offer some remarks upon Feeling, expressed in personality as Love. We keep the words Feeling and Emotion well before the reader, in order to convince him that we have no intention of treating this great principle and power within us, in a sentimental or merely passion[ate manner. We have defined sentiment already, in a few passages belonging to the third part of this treatise; and of passion, as Love, we may as well now say a few words.

Passion, then, is but the expression of the intense or predominant influence of a principle of life within us. We know well enough that only certain natures, constituted

* "Individuality" in itself, "personality" in so far as it is part of our select, the unity.
loving; he is the same man in every pulse of his body which he was before. And this "new spirit" he interprets by his Reason, accepting what is real, rejecting what is unreal; to which end, that he might know the evil from the good, this special faculty was given to him. For understanding (mind), though it could comprehend, could not define between the two; unless it possessed within itself some principle of definition.

Love, therefore, stands out as the glorious enterprise after a certain manner, are capable of this quality of intense human passion, in any important way. Therefore, we who lack it, or whose natures are mainly dominated by another principle, or whose passion has by suffering become more of a spiritual power (the relation of which to passion we shall define farther on) come to doubt, till we know more, as to its reality. But the facts of life are not to be gainsayed by any intellectual doubts as to their truth, and we have therefore simply to define it as what it really is. Natures, passionately constituted, if happily possessing a good measure of intellectual power, become heroes, or, good and great men. Passion, of this kind, which will move to noble service, is unquestionably the most enviable gift of Nature to a Man,—it is the vitality of his intellectual power, the life working in the law of his brain, the substantive energy which carries him through the difficulties and competitions of the world. But, should it take an ignoble form, it becomes as great a curse to him as it might be a blessing.
LOVE.

of the human Man. He who gains it perfectly, gains the chief the world can offer him; he who gains it but in part, only the fruition of a part of his best self. For Love is, in itself, a principle of realization, as Reason is, in itself, a principle of definition. The one realizes the things of the heart, the other defines the things of the brain. And to know that we realize love truly is

1 Its mode of realizing.

And here again, we come upon the grand truths of education and association. Life, we have before said, in every practical sense of the word, is something without us,—here we see the truth and reality of such. Place a nature so constituted as to have emotional energy in predominance over his passive or intellectual faculties, in good or bad circumstances, and you do much to make or mar the man. For the very fact of such intense active qualities in his nature renders him ten times more liable to good or evil influences from without. The intellectual nature is tolerably safe where he is in danger. Intellect cares little for the enjoyment or activities of the heart or the body, but these are essential to the very health and true development of the emotional nature. Provide him with these in their purity and nobleness, and he will afterwards develop his intellect; deprive him of these, and he will turn his sympathies to ill account.

Here again then we have a striking distinction between the intellectual and emotional character in youth. The true culture of both is, of course, ample opportunity to develop
to know ourselves truly. The riddle of Socrates is still unexpounded. For till we can rightly interpret ourselves, we cannot even love completely.

And it is one of the strangest infatuations of modern intelligence, to believe, that any philosophy or school of thought, is worth a straw, which ignores this first principle of life and happiness within us. Till men open

their several individual qualities, with special aid or advantage for the growth of the weaker powers in each.

We have used the terms Thought and Feeling, instead of Love and Reason, in exposition of the nature of our belief, and the reader may ask us why we have done so, instead of keeping to our original terms. Our answer would be that, we have for the time being, left the level of life for the level of analytical exposition, and that in order to do so, we have taken the terms which belong to such level. We do not stickle about words, for the sake of words, as such. All we wish to convey is the distinctive truth of the matter we are concerned with. And in order to do this, we may observe, that words, like conditions of thought or feeling or life, have their level of being. If we speak of three lines enclosing a space—there is nothing distinctive in this, the word line refers to infinite varieties of convolution of figure,—but, if, in reference to such abstract definition we give the concrete term of triangle, we know at once, and in future, always what we mean. It becomes personal, so far as anything abstract can be personal, and possesses henceforth in our
their eyes to this fact, they need not wonder that the world will pay little heed to them. For, inasmuch as, the whole fabric of social life is within our power, it is not too much to say that, till in our after-schools of thought and faith, we give this great principle of life its due share, we shall but artificially live; our very ideas of social life will be partly false (false as a wrong

minds an individuality. So, in dealing with the indefinite quantity, Feeling, we have been obliged to descend to the level of unindividual analysis, in order to describe it: and we would now rise to the reality of life, and give it, in person, the distinctive appellation of Love. Philosophers and men of science, we think, will accept the truth of this exposition, as real, and not fanciful, either in the use of the term itself, or in relation to ourselves or to others.

Our Love, therefore, towards another, is simply the measure of our feeling towards him or her, as the case may be. And the word rises more strikingly into definitive truth, in relation to the sex, inasmuch as it always, for the time

a That is, our unity; b that is, so far as it is part of that unity.

c Much mischievous misapprehension prevails as to the truth and right use of this word. It is, of course, purely a personal and particular term; its impersonal or general meanings, are, according to degree, sympathy, kindness, good-feeling,—"social-humanities." And our fundamental answer as to its personal reality would be—No man who is untrue to himself can ever know it.
interpretation of love would be false"). and our beehive philosophies will but embrace coteries, without one existent true interpretation of things before the world. That there is some one living code of universal truth, no sane man denies. And a true interpretation of Man is the exposition of it.

1 Such as Socialism and the other melancholy "isms," born in but sentiment, the burlesque of truth.

being, at least, expresses a preference, that is a greater measure of feeling, for some one of the sex. Whether this Love, (measure of feeling) will remain single and individual throughout life, is a question of whether it was true and real at the outset, and whether education and personal self-training have induced conditions, both of thought and feeling, (which, in sensation, make up character,) to make it to be so.* The measure of feeling remains, in some form or another, in the man, and will therefore in some form or another find its outward expression. And, true culture and education for self, and for the subject, will be the truest and best and worthiest mode of such expression.

At which point we come round again to Thought, to explain to us what is the worthiest and best mode of such expression. We have to call in Intellect to aid us here. We cannot get on with Feeling alone. Feeling will not supply us with the necessary light—the knowing nature,—we must

* The strongest argument for a personal love is that Man himself is personal.
Love, to Body.

The emotion of the heart and the sensation of the Body are two. The one is immaterial, the other material. We know that there is a material "spirit" within us, and that therefore this is immaterial, but the emotion of the heart conveys personality and feel-

...go elsewhere for that. We turn at once to our Intelligence, our Intellect, our Reason, for such information—that is to our principle for acquiring, realizing knowledge, in the mind. Here we are given to know, according to the measure of our understanding, and experience of the truth of things. We find a certain stock of knowledge assimilated a into our natures, which will express itself readily at the will of our minds. The "will" is the power (we have defined farther on) which "turns on" all our personal intentions.

...We have again made use of three terms, Intelligence, Intellect, and Reason, without expressing any "reason" for doing so, or for right of choice of one over the other. Our explanatory comment already contains the truth, and why we have chosen Reason as the specific term for a principle in the nature of Man. Common language is generally the safest guide in matters of this kind, and not seldom contains a clue to the fundamental nature of things. It is again a question

a "Incorporated" would be a better word. But "assimilated" suits the times. Diction is a true key to the tone and spirit of an age.
ing, this spirit conveys only animal sensation. We can subdue it by material agencies, but we cannot make it express any special quality or feeling within us. It is the concentrated essence of the material being, but it contains in itself no property of influence or effect upon us, as men. We are subject to its influence merely of degree, or level of thought, and application of that thought to the facts of life. The lowest definition we can arrive at, in which Man regards himself only as animal, is that of Intelligence, and is so the term employed, in reference to Man, which deals mainly with his animality. The word Intellect is a scholastic term, and has no direct relation to life. It had its origin with the schoolmen who first began to philosophise at all. It refers only to conditions of thought within the actualities of life, and as such, would not be a proper term in reference to a principle of the whole, the acting Man. But Reason, the old and excellent word, contains the very notion and idea of practice in itself, and refers directly to Man in his personal and individual nature. It is therefore the right word for us to use in a treatise dealing with the complete Man. And it contains in itself, by its old attributes of responsibility and superiority (of Man) to animal conditions, those divine properties of life, of which, we affirm, Man is, in part, a compound.

To sum up our observations, therefore, upon Love in rela-

* The word however has now such a common acceptance, that we have used it generally throughout this treatise.
in our material totality, but we are not influenced by its virtue in any human or direct way. Our "spirits" rise as it rises, but the quality of our feeling is in no way affected or changed. We are what we are, as men, whether it rises or not. Though our human love is indissolubly connected with our material conditions, it is not subject, in its essential being, to the

1 We can chemically distil a material "spirit," but we cannot produce an emotion. The one commences wholly within; the other is induced by agencies from without. What we take bodily causes the one; what we receive spiritually affects the other. The one is the expression of intelligence; the other of animal heat. Circumstance produces the one; physical law the other.

Emotion is the first step (from the material) into the mystery of life.

The conditions of matter represent the law in which life exists. Both are necessarily part of each other, but both must for ever be regarded as two. Man can break "law" at any moment, therefore he must regard "life" as something apart from it. At which point we grasp the distinction between "life" and "law." And Man being the "third," is the expression of their union.

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health or disorder of those conditions, therefore it is something more than it, or in a sense, independent of it.

The desire of Love is association; the desire of the

1 Few words cover a wider variety of meanings, from the noblest to the basest, than this word "desire.

...
LOVE.

Body, lust. And the desire of the Spirit or Reason in Man, is thought, reflection, solitude. Love, which is an ever realizing principle within us, seeks itself in love, and is never so happy as when in the company of kindred love. In action, its desire is honour; in repose, tenderness. In the work of the world, it seeks to lessen suffering by direct means; in the privacy of home life, it finds its sweetest exercise in adding to the happiness of

cannot express life; and we know of nothing more melancholy than that of seeing an intelligent man endeavouring to squeeze himself into a mathematical formula. Concrete thought, it is clear, when true, is the embodiment of a certain amount of life, which life, in order to be life, must contain in itself a certain amount of true (abstract) structure. The one is not life without the other; the other is formless without the one. At which point we come round to the fact, that, Man, himself, must be in some measure or manner, the embodiment of the two.

[Whence we come to see, that, Feeling is the Concrete property in Man, Intellect the Abstract quantity. Feeling puts together in a living form that which Intellect could only express in a linear or anatomical one. Feeling, as a life principle in Man, embodies the designs of Intellect; Intellect as a designing principle, the conditions of Feeling:—Body, is the result, or expression, of their unity. We might carry this consideration much farther, and show how such exactly

b See next Part.
LOVE.

another. The desires of the Body are to it, dust; and the hope of its ambition is an ever onward, higher, impersonal good.

The action and interaction of Love with the material senses is as cunning as the exquisite workmanship of an infinite Creator could design. For Love looks out at correlates Man’s immortal belief in a Divine Trinity; a [see note.] how Love is the first term which conveys to our human intellect the initial idea of a God; b how spiritual Reason (which we have lowered to the (material) term law, but which, in its infinite variation cannot be ultimately regarded as such) induces an (abstract) interpretation of the constitution and course of all things; and how Body (as the expression of their union) is the tangible realization of the two. But such considerations would lead us too far away from the practical work in hand.

a The reader will observe that our conception of the triune nature of Man, exactly correlates the substance of the Athanasian Creed. Such conception however has been evolved without direct reference to any Creed. Faith, and a disinterested observation of the different views and teachings hold by different men, from the theologian to the man of science, has been the origin of the work.

b The word “soul” conveys to us no idea in itself. It is an immaterial something without any quality. No one knows what they mean by it. But immediately we apply the most essential quality of life to it, (love), it springs into being in our minds, as something akin to this, but superior to it. Hence we trace by correlation the relation of one to the other.
the eye of sense and reads its own image in the eye of another. By a glance we know the nature of an emotion, and the "tone" of the spirit is felt in a single word. By the pressure of the hand we guess the measure and quality of feeling towards us, and by the ear we detect cadences in the harmony of mind. The very soul of

Of Love, to Body.—The Man.

Before proceeding to deal with each principle in relation to life, we should now offer a few remarks upon what we mean as to the relation of Love to Body—The Man. And first be it said, that we here append the expression *The Man* to our term the Body, simply because Body is the outward visible expression of the Man. Common language always speaks of Feeling and Thought as within the Man, and common language, we again affirm, is an excellent key, when dissolved into its original meanings, of the truth and nature of most things. We know ourselves at first only by our outward Bodily expression, but we know very well what is meant by "coming to know" a person; and how we then slowly and unobservedly lose all consideration of his outward and material self, and remember and think of him only by what we have found him to be within.

Now in order to define what we mean under the heading just above, we must again, as in the former instance, have recourse to the analytical level of things. We must introduce terms representing analysis, and employ, instead of Love and Body, those of Feeling and Sensation. In doing
man or woman may become expressed in bodily symbol, and the desires of a heart made known through the measure of its intensity in outward expressional form. And the very opposite may equally be true. For by the stillness of the senses, we can guess the power within,—a power which, godlike in its majesty, controls completely the bodily form, yet, at the same moment, bespeaks the intensity of its own very being.

The needs of the Body are obvious, and are the first which, if we observe closely the working of things within us, we shall see that an altered condition of "thought" and feeling at once rules our minds.

We have here introduced the word "thought," simply because it will at once be observed that we can make no progress without it. We cannot proceed to define, without a defining principle. Strictly speaking, under this heading, the word is out of place: we have no right to introduce "thought" or "intellect" (reason) at all; but we shall be lamentably in the dark without it. Close the eye (stop the action) of the defining principle within you, and see if you can proceed, by the aid of Feeling and Sensation alone, to interpret anything of the relation of the one to the other? Absurd, says the reader, you stop the action of your "mind" in so doing! Not so, we reply, we stop the action of our "intellect"—our "mind" is the expression of our intellect plus our Feeling, and plus our bodily self. *

* See Part III, on the Mind.
wants of life. But the needs of Love, who can guess them, in their infinite variety, power, and aim? For Love is in itself threefold, as are the other first principles of Man's nature, threefold. It desires, it requires, it aims. It desires association, it requires spiritualization, it aims for ever beyond its present self. And these three conditions express parallel conditions in the other principles.

In which manner we come to see how men who write under the dominant influence of strong emotion, rarely give us much light upon any subject. We feel as we read them, what they say is all very noble, very great, or very good, but that our intelligence is not advanced one whit by what they say. We admire, but we do not enter into. We applaud, but we do not understand—that is, see nothing new in what they tell us, or any clear convincing argument to meet the difficulties in hand. We give them our hearts, but withhold our reasonable judgement. Hence, observe, we give them half ourselves, or a third, perhaps, as the case may be; for we may, or may not, approve of their manner of outwardly conducting what they have to say or to do.

We first get a strong grasp of the distinction between Feeling and Sensation when we observe the absolute power which the Feelings, under excitement (whether reasonably guided or not) possess over the body. Every man knows that he possesses this power, and that it is but a question.

* And vice versa, as the case may be, as in death, for instance.
LOVE.

of Man, to enter into which would require analysis, and lead us away from life. To state them is sufficient to show their distinction from the needs of the Body. Were we to follow them, we should find this distinction growing more and more apparent, the difference between the life of Love and the life of Sense opening out into broader and wider lines of divergence—till we came out at last into two different spheres of thought and feeling, hope and conduct, desire and consideration, want and being.

The cravings of the Body and the cravings of Emotional feeling are terribly distinct. Who has not felt the
desires of the one, who does not know something of
the longing of the other? Let a Man, only for a brief
while, overthrow the education of his childhood, his belief
in things above and beyond, and without himself, let him
but for a little while empty himself of all belief of any
kind, and there will come upon him a terrible hunger, a
desire he cannot forestall, a craving he cannot satisfy, a
want that will not be still. For Life will be to him only
the measure of his sensation, he will be but the expres-
sion of animal desire; the pulsations of his body will
beat but the gratification of his lust, and his whole being
will be worthless except in so far as it ministers to the

of philosophers and men of science,* for attempting to do so,
and we unequivocally believe such to be true. We believe
the demonstration of such is simply a question of observa-
tion of the real workings of things in actual life, plus the
faith and ability necessary, in such exposition, to enable one
to establish it. Analysis, we are aware, ultimately loses
sight of all individuality; but analysis, we may also add, also
loses sight of all practical life. We are not here only to
know, but to live, living as living is the chief happiness of

* Professor Bain divides Man into four—Sensation, Intellect,
Emotion, and Will. It will be observed, therefore, that we,
instead of introducing new and fanciful distinctions, affirm that
these will express the truth of his nature. "Will," and "con-
science," which we also introduce, are shown to be the expres-
sion of three principles in unity.
life of Sense. But let Love, spiritual Love, have an expression within him, and the life of the man will bechanged; he will see with other eyes, hear with other ears, taste with other lips, handle with other hands; hiswhole being will become modified by the new life within him,—modified, purified, and changed, as the darkness
every man, and it may be confidently affirmed, that if weknew all that interested us, and were not under the necessity
to work, life as life, would be the ultimatum of our enjoyment.
It is not so much the pleasure of discovering, as thepleasure, profit, interest, and good, which we hope toaccrue to our life, that presses us on.

Emotion then we affirm is something within us, producedby circumstances without; Sensation is something alwayswith us, under the dominion of physical law. Here wehave a clear distinction, by the introduction of a thirdquantity, circumstances, which practically interpreted meanlife. [Such distinction is seen more strongly by bringing inthe principle of intellect.] How far a man would be subject
to any emotions at all, or be capable of shewing any inwardlife of love (sympathy) when alone, we need not attempt toexplain. Clearly enough he could express no “sympathy”for any one, if he never met with any one with whom to sympathize. But this simply points to the inactivity of afaculty of life within him, not to the absence of such faculty:and the instance itself is one of those extreme cases whichborder on the abuse of intellectual power. We can abuse
is changed into morning by the newly arisen light. Love will work in him, as religion works in the minds of saints, the very aspect of Nature will appear to him not what she was—Emotion will have arisen in desire; the truth and the life of Love.

Love, and "conscience" in the unity of Man.

The relation of Love to "conscience" is one of the most beautiful in the organization of our wonderful being. For Love seeks ever to realize, to realize itself without reference to other conditions or wants of our natures, and, but for such a law as conscience, would, by very virtue of its dominant power and influence over us, forego and forestall all the other necessities and obligations of life within us. Love would grasp to itself the very hours that should be spent in labour, and, per-

the right use of our intellects precisely as we can abuse the body, and abuse our feelings also. Hence, we affirm, that inaction is simply parallel to undevelopment; and is no sign whatever of the absence of a condition of life, or of the constitution of such.

We have said thus much upon the nature of Love to Reason and to Body respectively, to meet the material views of a reader: we shall now quit analytical exposition for the remainder of this treatise, and treat of our subject upon the human level alone—addressing the understanding of a reader.
haps, circumstanced as we now are, would end, in so doing, by falsifying itself. Conscience, however, as the living law, or arbitrator, of our triune being, monitions to truth, at each step of our lives, suggests or rather points out the right course of action in mixed circumstance, directs to what we call self-denial, that is, a temporary setting aside of some preferred course of conduct,—shows the "line" of life in our varying organism, as the builder shows the "line" of form in his material structure, and arbitrates inwardly upon all things, which suggest themselves as the appropriate expression or duty at each turn of life. Love, so in its most beautiful self, finds that it too must occasionally give way, that "the web of our life is of a mingled yarn," that it must exercise, like its fellow, Reason, but a continuous share in the life of the human Man,—resting in so doing, in the glorious satisfaction that each year can but add to its vitality and reality, and that it, in the realized future, is to be supreme.

Love, and "will"—in the unity of Man.

And it follows that, if "conscience" so regulates and approves Love—conscience as expressing the "law" in the unity of our natures—that its correlative, the "will" as expressing the "life" or acting personality of our unity, will by degrees, grow to appreciate such regula-

1 See next Part.
tion, and, though for freedom's sake, wholly independent of it, yet be none the less ready to accept its arbitration as the highest and best thing for the creature good. For we cannot regard "conscience," the most essential law within us, as other than belonging to God, and therefore belonging to "soul," the divine within us, both in its individuality, as part of Love, and, as a matter of course, a part of our whole selves. The most intricate and subtle part of the interpretation of our natures would be, to show, how each principle, though individual, is of necessity part and parcel of the whole Man, in the same mysterious sense in which the Persons of the Godhead are part of the unity, God. But it is the observation of this truth which brings the "will" to consider the advisability of not contradicting that which in its origin is beyond itself,—that which, though in subordination to it, is none the less infinitely superior to it, in origin, end, and aim. At which point we touch the relationship of the Creator to the creature, and observe how that which is independent as the "will" for conduct, is none the less wisely, in itself, in subordination to That from which it originates. Love, therefore, as a principle of life in Man, is in the same sense under the dominion of "will," the life, as under the direction of "conscience," the law:

"The expression of the consciousness of Soul."—The Hermit, p. 130, l. 22.

* See Part on Reason.
by which we simply mean, that we should have to give up all idea of personality, all notion about the 'I' in Man, all belief in manly self-control, duty to God, and responsibility to our fellow-man, if, in submission to this great principle within us, we came to any other (educational) conclusion.

Psychology.
The "word" of the "soul," or the "breath," or the "spirit" of the "soul." Here we have, in this observation, the truth of the origin of the "word" in man. By the union of "life" with "law," "soul" with "spirit," or "breath" with "substance," is the "word" produced, and the first act of creation in man is shewn to be the "word," which, by outward embodiment, through the agency of will, becomes visible in deed. Here then we understand the statement of the Evangelist: "In the beginning was the Word"; for the word is but spiritual till it is made substantive in act.

The condition and states of the human soul are the true subject of psychology. Out of this deep well of human feeling we weave stories for the education of mankind. And we endeavour to trace herein the development of a human life. The sighs and the sorrows, the hopes and the fears, of a human heart are traced out in their

1 that is to say, our feelings rise into our intellect, and are there converted into law or formation.
LOVE.

93

evolution to teach us what is the life in man. Would we know the wants of a human soul? To this source, then, it seems we must turn for edification.

A great problem is before us—how far the evolution of feeling can be truly said to represent life? Does the soul evolve itself only, without reference to any principle of argumentation which shall give it intellectual life? Will the upward expression and yearning of feeling suffice only for the wants of human endeavour? Can the soul teach us to read the infinite, to understand the word of God, apart from some formative power within us? Are the expressions of intense feeling only, sufficient to interpret the problems of life? Let us see whether the great master of modern psychology found them so.

"I have left plain and meadow," (says Faust, in his study,) "veiled in deep night, which wakes the better soul within us with a holy feeling of foreboding awe. Wild desires are now sunk in sleep, with every deed of violence: the love of man is stirring—the love of God is stirring now.

"... We are accustomed to see men deride what they do not understand—to see them snarl at the good and beautiful, which is often troublesome to them. Is the dog disposed to snarl at it like them? But ah! I feel already that, much as I may wish for it, contentment wells no longer from my breast. Yet
"why must the stream be so soon dried up, and we
"again lie thirsting? I have had so much experience
"of that! This want, however, admits of being com-
"pensated. We learn to prize that which is not of
"this earth; we long for revelation, which nowhere
"burns more majestically or more beautifully than in
"the New Testament. I feel impelled to open the
"original text, to translate for once, with upright
"feeling, the sacred original into my darling German.

[He opens a volume, and disposes

himself for the task.]

"It is written: "In the beginning was the Word."
"Here I am already at a stand—who will help me
"on? I cannot possibly value the Word so highly;
"I must translate it differently, if I am truly inspired
"by the spirit. It is written: "In the beginning
"was the Sense." Consider well the first line, that
"your pen be not over hasty. Is it the sense that
"influences and produces everything? It should stand
"thus: "In the beginning was the Power." Yet, even
"as I am writing down this, something warns me not
"to keep to it. The spirit comes to my aid! At once
"I see my way, and write confidently: "In the be-
"ginning was the Deed."

'The reachings of a great soul after truth seem only
to be darkened by some other shortcoming in the nature

"Faust, p. 36.—Mr. Hayward's translation.
of the whole man. "I, formed in God's own image, "who already thought myself near to the mirror of "eternal truth; who revelled in heaven's lustre and "clearness, with the earthly part of me stripped "off"—I...Faust...Goethe, could so write this, as superior insight to the revealed word of God! We are to conclude that Goethe was in earnest, and that the Deed, as the original, stood to him as more intelligible than the Word.

*The Hermit*, a novel, by Emilie Carlen, is another instance at hand to the English reader, of the issues of German psychology. Here we have Life likened to the ocean, upon which the hero starts as a "Free Sailor" to find out the acme of human existence. Through flood-tides of passion he at length arrives in the pure harbour of quiescent love. His first wife, the embodiment of passion superior to every other condition of life, is wrecked in the violence of her own feelings, symbolized by a storm at sea, when endeavouring to reach her lover. Passion cools within him, the hero, and he marries his first love, who has been true to him through all his vagaries.

How far this mode of depicting life is true to life, is very questionable. For in it, all the freedom of will and self-responsibility are done away with, and conduct is merged in something akin to fatalism. Whether the

*Faust, p. 19.*
one want here is not the intellectual action (or share) of self-rule, occasioning a balance in the feelings, which would otherwise regulate, or rather dominate, life, may be more than questioned: indeed we more than question such as we read these books—we doubt their reality, their truth to the facts of life—we feel ourselves spun round with a web of inextricable fatalism—a garment of our own spinning, which the sooner we are out of the better, and again breathing the pure air of healthy and actual life.

Again, the tracery of human conduct in a web of feeling, has been well depicted by George Eliot, in his novel *Romola*, where a “Spirit,” 1 of three centuries gone, descends upon the heights of Florence, to observe . . how “the great river courses which have shaped the lives of men have hardly changed;” and that, “those other streams, the life-currents that ebb and flow in human hearts, pulsate to the same great needs, the same great loves and terrors. As our thought follows close in the slow wake of the dawn, we are impressed with the broad sameness of the human lot, which never alters in the main headings of its history—hunger and labour, seed-time and harvest, love and death.

“Even if, instead of following the dim daybreak, our imagination pauses on a certain historical spot, we

1 *vide* Proem to *Romola*.—George Eliot.
"may see a world-famous city, which has hardly
changed its outline since the days of Columbus,
seeming to stand as an almost unviolated symbol,
amidst the flux of human things, to remind us that
we still resemble the men of the past more than we
differ from them, as the great mechanical principles
on which those domes and towers were raised must
make a likeness in human building that will be
broader and deeper than any possible change. And
doubtless, if the spirit of a Florentine citizen, whose
eyes were closed for the last time while Columbus
was still waiting and arguing for the three poor
vessels with which he was to set sail from the port
of Palos, could return from the shades, and pause
where our thought is pausing, he would believe that
there must still be fellowship and understanding for
him among the inheritors of his birth-place.
Let us suppose that such a Shade has been per-
mitted to revisit the glimpses of the golden morning,
and is standing once more on the famous hill of San
Miniato, which overlooks Florence from the south.
The Spirit is clothed in his habit as he lived.

"it is a face charged with memories of a keen and
various life.\(^1\) It is not only the mountains that he

\(^1\) The reader is probably well-acquainted with this remarkable
work, and will recognize, in the necessary abbreviations, that
much injustice is done to the Author’s description.
"recognizes, but the dark sides of Mount Morello, the steep height of Fiesole, and the green slopes sprinkled with villas which he can name as he looks at them. He sees other familiar objects, the square turreted mass of the Old Palace in the very heart of the city, the great dome, and the well-known bell-towers—Giotto's, with its distant hint of rich colour, and the graceful spired Badia, and the rest—he looked at them all from the shoulders of his nurse.

"Surely," he thinks, "Florence can still ring her bells with the solemn hammer-sound that used to beat on the hearts of her citizens and strike out the fire there. And here, on the right, stands the long dark mass of Santa Croce, where we buried our famous dead, laying the laurels on their cold brows and fanning them with the breath of praise and of banners.

... But, "why have five out of the eleven convenient gates been closed? And why, above all, should the towers have been levelled that were once a glory and a defence? Is the world become so peaceful, then, and do Florentines dwell in such harmony, that there are no longer conspiracies to bring ambitious exiles home again with armed bands at their back? These are difficult questions: it is easier and pleasanter to recognize the
"old than to account for the new. . . . And, who
"are the Priori in these months, eating soberly-regu-
"lated official dinners in the Palazzo Vecchio, with
"removes of tripe and boiled partridges, seasoned by
"practical jokes against the ill-fated butt among
"those potent signors? Are not the significant ban-
"ners still hung from the windows—still distributed
"with decent pomp under Orcagna’s Loggia every two
"months?

"Life had its zest for the old Florentine when he,
"too, trod the marble steps and shared in those dig-
"nities. His politics had an area as wide as his
"trade, which stretched from Syria to Britain, but
"they had also the passionate intensity, and the detailed
"practical interest, which could belong only to a nar-
"row scene of corporate action; . . . he loved
"his honours and his gains, the business of his count-
"ing-house, of his guild, of the public chamber;
". . . he loved to strengthen his family by a good
"alliance, . . . he loved his game of chess under
"the loggia, his biting jest, and even his coarse joke,
"as not beneath the dignity of a man eligible for the
"highest magistracy. He had gained an insight into
"all sorts of affairs at home and abroad, . . . and
"in this way had learned to distrust men without
"bitterness; looking on life mainly as a game of skill,
"but not dead to traditions of heroism and clean-
handed honour. For the human soul is hospitable, and will entertain conflicting sentiments and contra-
dictory opinions with much impartiality. It was his pride besides, that he was duly tinctured with the learning of his age, and judged not altogether with the vulgar, but in harmony with the ancients: . . . and in his old age he had made haste to look at the first sheets of that fine Homer which was among the early glories of the Florentine press. But he had not, for all that, neglected to hang up a waxen image or double of himself under the protection of the Madonna Annunziata, or to do penance for his sins in large gifts to the shrines of saints whose lives had not been modelled on the study of the classics; he had not even neglected making liberal bequests towards buildings for the Frati, against whom he had levelled many a jest.

For the Unseen Powers were mighty. Who knew—who was sure—that there was any name given to them behind which there was no angry force to be appeased, no intercessory pity to be won? Were not gems medicinal, though they only pressed the finger? Were not all things charged with occult virtues? Lucretius might be right—he was an ancient and a great poet; . . . there were even learned personages who maintained that Aristotle, wisest of men, (unless, indeed, Plato were wiser?), was a
thoroughly irreligious philosopher; and a liberal scholar must entertain all speculations. But the negatives might, after all, prove false; nay, seemed manifestly false, as the circling hours swept past him, and turned round with graver faces. For had not the world become Christian? Had he not been baptised in San Giovanni, where the dome is awful with the symbols of coming judgment, and where the altar bears a crucified image disturbing to perfect complacency in oneself and the world? Our resuscitated Spirit was not a pagan philosopher, nor a philosophizing pagan poet, but a man of the fifteenth century, inheriting its strange web of belief and unbelief; of Epicurean levity and fetichistic dread; of pedantic impossible ethics uttered by rote, and crude passions acted out with childish impulsiveness; of inclination towards a self-indulgent paganism, and inevitable subjection to that human conscience which, in the unrest of a new growth, was filling the air with strange prophecies and presentiments.

... He was a noteworthy man, that Prior of San Marco,” [Girolamo Savonarola] thinks our Spirit; somewhat arrogant and extreme, perhaps, especially in his denunciations of speedy vengeance. Ah, Iddio non paga il Sabato”—the wages of men’s sins often

1 “God does not pay on a Saturday.”
linger in their payment, and I myself saw much
established wickedness of long-standing prosperity.
But a Frate Predicatore who wanted to move the
people—how could he be moderate? He might have
been a little less defiant and curt, though, to Lorenzo
de' Medici, whose family had been the very makers of
San Marco: was that quarrel ever made up? And
our Lorenzo himself, with the dim outward eyes
and subtle inward vision, did he get over that illness
at Careggi? It was but a sad, uneasy-looking face
that he would carry out of the world which had given
him so much, and there were strong suspicions that
his handsome son would play the part of Rehoboam.
How has it all turned out? Which party is likely
to be banished and have its houses sacked just now?
Is there any successor of the incomparable Lorenzo,
to whom the great Turk is so gracious as to send
over presents of rare animals, rare relics, rare manu-
scripts, or fugitive enemies, suited to the tastes of a
Christian Magnifico who is at once lettered and
devout—and also slightly vindictive? And what
famous scholar is dictating the Latin letters of the
Republic—what fiery philosopher is lecturing on
Dante in the Duomo, and going home to write bitter
invectives against the father and mother of the bad
critic who may have found fault with his classical
spelling? Are our wiser heads leaning towards
"alliance with the Pope and the Regno,\(^1\) or are they "rather inclining their ears to the orators of France "and of Milan? "There is knowledge of these things to be had in "the streets below, on the beloved marmi in front "of the churches, and under the sheltering loggia, "where surely our citizens have still their gossip and "debates, their bitter and merry jests as of old. For "are not the well-remembered buildings all there? The "changes have not been so great in those uncounted "years. I will go down and hear—I will tread the "familiar pavement, and hear once again the speech of "Florentines. "Go not down, good Spirit I for the changes are "great, and the speech of Florentines would sound as "a riddle in your ears. Or, if you go, mingle with "no politicians on the marmi, or elsewhere; ask no "questions about trade in the Calimara; confuse your- "self with no inquiries into scholarship, official or "monastic. Only look at the sunlight and shadows "upon the grand walls that were built solidly, and "have endured in their grandeur; look at the faces "of the little children, making another sunlight amid "the shadows of age; look, if you will, into the "churches, and hear the same chants, see the same

\(^1\) "The name given to Naples by way of distinction among the Italian States."
"images as of old—the images of willing anguish for a great end, of beneficent love and ascending glory; see upturned living faces, and lips moving to the old prayers for help. These things have not changed. The sunlight and shadows bring their old beauty and waken the old heart strains at morning, noon, and even-tide; the little children are still the symbol of the eternal marriage between love and duty; and men still yearn for the reign of peace and righteousness—still own that life to be the highest which is a conscious voluntary sacrifice. For the Pope Angelico is not come yet."

Our quotation, not the best which might have been chosen to illustrate the truth in question, and marred by abbreviations, for which we would apologise to the Author, will nevertheless suffice to point out the main outline of the powers of human nature invoked to produce it. Here we have, apart from the exercise of imagination, which is a compound quantity within us, and the uses of memory, which re-exhibit in like colouring our own experiences of the past,—the "Spirit," or reasoning principle in man, reflecting over and upon the conditions of feeling within and without itself,—pourtraying character thereout; and weaving from its own inner self the pictures of many others,—

1 See Chapter on Body. Imagination and memory are concrete aspects of individual principles.
a principle which only in our own personality becomes known to us as individual. This truth is much better and more clearly illustrated in the character of Romola, the heroine of the story, where the Author's powers of self-analysis and reflection upon the evolution of the life of feeling become fully manifest. 1

It is this fact that we depicture only instead of realizing the states of character delineated, that conduct, in the purely psychological process, becomes non-essential as directly affecting the issues of the characters disposed. 2 [see Romola.] Conduct is ruled after such method by inner conditions, and is nothing in itself as moulding and making character. The associations and conditions of life proper are treated as secondary, if of any importance at all, in their influence and effect upon the life, and in the absence of any knowledge of right or wrong or creed of intellectual conduct, the life becomes only a drawing out (a cruel process) instead of

1 Or take the profound expression in reference to Lydgate, in Middlemarch, where the Author, in a philosophical passage with regard to him, says:—"He [Lydgate] had two selves within him apparently, and they must learn to accommodate each other and bear reciprocal impediments."

2 The distinction pointed out in this paragraph is a subtle study in itself, and will only be followed by the true student of human nature. We have not stated that psychology (as generally understood) cannot exhibit the principal aspects of human nature, in relation to life, but that such, treated in their separateness, do not truly, or rather, fully, depict life.
a living in, the complement of personal truth. Of love as love there can be no abiding, inasmuch as the feeling itself is constantly on the rack for something beyond the truth of its own nature—the law which gives this love its individuality is absent: it is therefore only a feeling without form or character in itself.

It is only in the strongest natures, such as Shakespeare, that we get the truth of human nature fully developed and displayed. Few of his readers are aware, so qualified by the other conditions of life are his dramas, that in the principal ones, such as Hamlet, Othello, and Julius Caesar, we are following a development of feeling natured within the character of a given man. Circumstances here play such an important part in the conduct and moulding of the life, life itself is made to exercise such an influence in and upon the character presented to it, that we practically lose sight of all "evolutional" theory in the true outline of the history of the man concerned. Head has as great an influence as heart upon the shaping of the destinies of the life before us—there is no drawing out, as such, of conditions of feeling apart from knowledge of facts, except perhaps in the case of Hamlet, where fatalism, the dominant weakness of an incapable will, is made to expose more fully than in the other dramas the action of feeling by itself, in relation with the problems of life. Hamlet is lost as to any high road for conduct.
amid the vagaries and difficulties of thought and situation around him, and in his memorable soliloquy gives vent to the expression of a poor and incapable soul. Decision of character to act out some course, upon some given principle, was, as Gervinus has well pointed out, the one weak trait in his character: given this, and he would have been a patriot, a hero, a philosopher, and a man. He might, when accosted by the Ghost, have uttered Brutus's words, before his perversion by Cassius, or more truly Shakespeare's own inner feeling:—

"What is that you would impart to me?
If it be aught toward the general good,
Set honour in one eye, and death i' the other,
And I will look on both indifferently:
For, let the gods so speed me, as I love
The name of honour more than I fear death."

Such lines, coming directly as they do from a noble heart, are ennobling and refreshing.

Personal Love.

The beauties of personal love are perhaps, also, nowhere better displayed than in some of Shakespeare's dramas, though filial affection seems to have been his strong point of success. Cordelia's love for her father, and Desdemona's beauty of nature, are rare types of
the worth of filial affection. His purely love dramas, such as *Romeo and Juliet*, and *As You Like It*, (if the latter may be so classed), express more directly the influence and intensity of true human passion, than an unselfish emotional Christian interest in another. Shakespeare, we must remember, wrote in an age when passion was dominant—before the intellectual and spiritual self-rule and enlightenment of a more advanced Christian age had come into being. The strength and truth of human passion was with him the strongest moral power. He did not recognize, apart from superstitious authority, a stronger moral power than this—the affection of a true heart living in the conscientious integrity of its own spiritual nature, known and understood. Passion therefore, inviolate passion, stood to him as the one high goal and destiny of human happiness and endeavour. And a noble ideal it was! which wrought its power and influence in the chivalry of the Middle Age. Men might well indeed be proud of it, and content with it, so long as it answered the needs of human society.

But there is a Divinity which shapes out a progressive order and change in the history of a human world. Men's passions cannot stagnate, or society would stink in the corruption of its own desire. Progressive order must o'errule, above the wants and interests of human free-will and endeavour. Free as we are, we un-
doubtlessly, whether for good or for evil so far as concerns ourselves and those immediately around us, work out the unseen purposes and will of God. The world moves onward in a groove of divine setting. We cannot foresee or ordain the order of this movement. But we can unconsciously regulate and qualify it, so making it living and human. The progress of the world is not a material progress, but a spiritual evolution of the life and the will of God. All order changes to the order of His omnipotent will. "Our little systems have their day"; our codes and laws of practice come into being and pass away, bearing with them and on them the impress of a human shaping, fallible in the complexity of infinite nature and skill.

Hence we change; and passion changes; and human nature changes; and love changes. A new order of feeling becomes natural to the human heart; a love more spiritual than before, yet none the less true or real because more spiritual. Passion, without intelligent "law," the undeveloped aspect of an outgrowing love, becomes changed into a softer and yet stronger feeling, more delicate by nature of its spiritual tendencies, yet firmer by virtue of its power of law. The reality (of love) becomes merged in the totality of man's nature, and is not something apart from his better (higher) and knowing self. Though special in its nature, as intellect is special, its action is that of a binding force to the
true uses of intellect, supporting and directing all its true exercise and function, yet moulded and guided itself in the action of that which is without and (as law) superior to it. The qualifying distinctions become merged in the personal whole, and life is the expression of a healthy, active, and free nature.

Without love, life would indeed be barren. It is the basis of all healthy action; the buttress of all human strength. Creatures of a flying world, should we be, drifting nowhither, unless love moulded and made us into a human and personal whole. We fall back upon it for all our sweetest realities; it is the stay and comfort of all our sorrows and cares. Life would be an

It is remarkable that in all the principal epochs of personal and national life, we are thrown back, as it were, upon these inner conditions of feeling, and sense and intelligence vanish before a power superior to them. The heart of a man is moved as the heart of a people is moved, by exceptional circumstances in the hour and conditions of a life,—feeling moves onward all the while, though apparently passive in its action,—what we have to secure is that at such exceptional periods we do not mistake the reality for the sham. Nothing more beautifully illustrates the trinity of the Divine Original than the fact that we, in peaceful times, mistake intelligence as superior to feeling, whereas the truth is the former is secondary, and, in a sense, dependent upon the latter. So also is it in personal things. A mistaken feeling will upset
intelligent vagary, a will-o’-the-wisp unreality, floating through the misty air of idealism, unless love brought it down to the fact of human things, and bound it there in its own sweet prison-house of duty, law, and service.

Thou art the vision of my life,
The picture of ideal home,
Thou art the love that warms my breast,
And my true home,
sang the poet, in his days of hope and enterprise, when thinking, as he tells us, he was always thinking, of her whom he loved—

One in whose image a Cordelia’s store
Of heart-love leavened all accomplishments,
lines which aptly described her, as stated in the foreknowledge of unrealized love.

...
. . . within my heart

I see thy face,

he wrote, expressing the perception of fixed affection, true to himself and the one whom he loved, through the comings of changing time.¹ [see note.]

The influences of love upon the life and character of man have been well shewn, by some of the leading novelists of the day, as well as by the poets of ancient and modern time. Not only has it been observed to form the very nucleus round which character centres itself, but its power for good or for evil, as a magnet to conduct, has been realized by some of our ablest writers. From the highest to the lowest grade in life, this observation holds true—that according to the measure and quality of the love realized, apart from the influences of head and hand, is the motive power or tone in the life affected, and the influence for good or for evil dominant over all. Let but the heart be satisfied and full, with

¹ We here, and in the following three paragraphs, approach "sentiment," induced by the using of the word "heart" for the word "love," in the expository relation. Love seems to require a something of its material belongings expressed with it, in order to give it a reality apart from spiritual conditions. Sentiment, in the sense above used, refers to the sensuous conditions of our being, [see chapter on Body] which of necessity form a certain proportion in the nature, quality, and extent of personal love. We here touch our unity, as distinct from our threefold self.
the truth of its own best nature, and the life is secured from the chief third of human evils, and made happier than outer circumstance can in any way provide. Hence, then, the necessity of a true self-knowledge. For granted that true love is the first consideration, then it follows that only through a mode of thought and feeling which will lead us to apprehend and realize this, is true human happiness attained.

Compromises never realize it; but make sad havoc with the human mind and will. It is not an outward thing to be arranged, but an inward thing to be felt and understood. And the best guide to a knowledge of approach to its truth is, the feeling of the life strengthened and made sure, not weakened and spread out, in the association of the one believed to be loved. True love is the individualization of a man, not the separating of himself into two. The woman becomes part of his own nature; and in the reality of this truth, not only in its word, does she ever feel herself truly loved.

Harmony, grace, melody, song, the dance, and the

1 In the inner life of the nature of each. Materially, of course, a third life is required, as already shown.

2 The truth of which observation is beautifully realized in the Divine record of the making of woman. However we may read the book of Genesis, whether as allegorical or real, nothing is gained by giving up both in favour of primordial germs, developments, and the like. Things had an origin. Revelation (or history) is better than theory, till we can realize.
LOVE.

harp; all these belong to love, as the expression of inner happiness, joyous in the emotion of its own true life and nature. For what are either, without the inner feeling to accompany them, and make them pleasant and pleasurable, good for the heart of man? Do we enjoy them in the senses at all, except as living inlets to the heart or soul? Or rather, what is the sense of enjoyment when merely sensuous, compared with the delight which is experienced when accompanied by true inner feeling? The colour, the beauty, the form, the visible expression, these truly are sensuous in their nature, but what is the pleasure they bear to us compared with the inner enjoyment which interprets them, and realizes in itself the conditions which give form and variation to all? Test peace and contentment against the outward conditions of material realization, and the insubstantive reality will weigh down the material poundage like feathers in the scale of human nature.

The influences of love upon home life, viewed practically, apart from love in itself, have only to be referred to to render the truth of effect upon character obvious to every reflective mind. From the lowest condition of human nature, civilized or uncivilized, the effect of mental or physical association is traceable in every life. To the Christian it (personal love) is part of his nature, part of his own true life, except when the life itself is set apart to other and higher considerations. Love however here
is supreme, for there is no true self-denial, or self-sacrifice, or devotion; which is not prompted, where true, by the reality of love. In domestic life it is the very fibre of practical action—the doing of things for their own sake, as superior to doing them for necessity only—it underlies all manner of mind, and habit, and tone of thought; it is the motive power to politeness, which is only in its true aspects, the expression of tenderness felt and realized within. In ruder times, whether in the shape of desire, or unintelligent passion, it has been the cause of many a death to the competitor for its solace and cares. We have here, however, only to do with Christian love, with love as known to man in the light of revelation; with that love which we find human nature capable of owning and expressing in its true outgrowth and development. Such love or feeling will be the basis of future social life, whether in its simplest and most elementary form of toleration, or in its higher aspects of affection, intelligent association, friendship or personal love. The affectation of mere mannerism will disappear in the reality of intelligent feeling; science will express herself upon the recognized truth of a substantive condition of life within herself; the aim of the modern mind will be to live the totality of human nature.

Love, and Life.

The healthy action of the affections is the humanising
condition in Life itself. But for these, the business of the world would slowly "harden the heart" of Man; mind would gradually resolve itself into merely mechanical action for the evolution of selfish and personal desires. Love is as a well-spring of inner life in human nature, which should never cease to flow, but ever rise slowly and steadily upwards into all the calculations of human interests, permeating them in their intricate windings and associations with its own sweet nature of sympathy, purity, and singleness of desire. It is in the human Man what the song and the perfume and the eternal inner life of material Nature are to the World, ever rising again and again under new conditions, to awaken and gladden and stimulate the life and the heart of Man. Without love, our journey through this world would indeed be a labour through a flat and desolate wilderness, in which no melody rose by the highway, no song or true sunshine ever fell on the eye or ear. Love is the reality and the poetry of life; an ever-recurrent growth in the heart of true human nature; the symbol of hope in the future; the forecast of the human soul. By it and through it do we realize something of all things: it makes known to us the invisible God.1

1 "For, it is through our human affections that the immortal and the infinite in us reveals itself."—Thrown Together.—Florence Montgomery.
Love, and Religion.

And in knowing Him, in knowing that this inner feeling of human nature is the earthly expression of His Divine attributes; in knowing that this immaterial something within us is the one true inroad to a knowledge of the human soul; in knowing that God has given it to us as the source of our best happiness in this life,—we fall back in trust upon the reality of human affection, as the key to the mysteries of a future and happier world.
[The following chapter, on Reason, is the converse of the foregoing chapter, on Love. Everything to which it refers is treated solely from the intellectual point of view. It will be found to explain much more practically the nature of ourselves, because intellect (reason) is the balance or focus of two opposite conditions of our natures.]
REASON.

I have premised in the previous part of this Treatise, on Love, a relation and a distinction between it and Reason. I have now to show the same from the Reason point of view,—to give in outline its own special nature and function, and to show its action and interaction with the other first principles and faculties of Man.

The narrative relation or argument will take the following form—

Of Reason:

(1) Its relation to and distinction from Love.

(2) Its relation to and distinction from Body (sensation): and its action and interaction with “will” and “conscience,” as expressing (in person) the unity of Man. Some general remarks upon Reason in relation to philosophy, life, and religion, will naturally follow.

Reason, to Love.

Reason is essentially the scientific faculty. Its pure and prime function is to deal with matters of fact. Fact in this sense is often called law; but we mean more

1 A truism: but all forms of fundamental thought necessarily contain them.
than law as generally understood,—we mean living law, or that which can, not in relation to still or material life only, be realized, grasped, and made sure in the mind. Reason being a faculty *within* the mind,¹ not the *whole* mind, (as often understood), we see at a glance, how there may be and must be a vast many things which we can in *part* realize, that we cannot surely call fact: all we can call fact comes within the faculty of Reason, and is of and belonging to it. But Love, we have asserted, is in its nature, something *distinct* from Reason, a faculty or principle of itself. Can Reason, then, *weigh* Love, which is no part of it, and convert it into fact?

No,—never has done so, and never so far as the human understanding can conceive, will be able to do so. There is no instance on record in the history of human thought, in which Love has been realized by Reason, and made part of fact. The understanding (mind) can apprehend love, can speculate upon it, can predict certain conduct of love under certain given circumstance, but this, besides being quite another thing from realizing it, is vague, imaginative, and never wholly true to what eventually occurs. So here, at the outset, we have a clear conception of the *distinction* of Reason from Love.

Our whole philosophy would fall to the ground, if See, *The Man.*
these two great principles of human action were not
felt in the living man to be distinct. The mystery of
their union makes us doubt their being so, but life is
the truer test and evidence of the case. Where Love is
concerned, who does not know the weakness and futility
of Reason? Where Reason is concerned, who does not
know the absolute necessity of the expulsion of all
Love? The pure and complete action of each is in their
separateness. The perfect fullness and life of the Man
is in their union. Of Reason we are as sure as we are
of our own identity. Of Love we have the best proof
in the fact, that all reason would be worthless with­
out it.

And it is no argument to prove the unreality of Love,
to refer to the imperfection of Man,—to his inability,
in by far the majority of cases, to love, or to show any
proof of the real existence of such a faculty. We are not
here concerned with Man in his imperfection, but with
the original type of his nature. Such argument, there­
fore, against Love, that because Man cannot perfectly
exercise it, it is not individual, may be met by applying
the like to Reason. Who would affirm that Reason
(intellect) has no individual existence, because the
vast majority of men are unreasonable? Will the
philosopher or man of science allow that, because the
many about them are unphilosophic and unscien­
tific, therefore there is no such thing as Intellect?
And if not, what right have they to deny the reality of Love?

To merge it in mere Sensation. That it is only a pleasurable expression of the Animal man. This is a conceivable position. But if the Intellect can have a life apart from Sensation, why cannot that which is superior to Intellect? For the chief faculty of the understanding, intuition, no one claims as belonging to Intellect. Sensation, it is evident, cannot possess it. It is the first function of the Soul (love). So that to deny the individuality of Love (soul), and assert the individuality of Reason (intellect), is to make the lesser more than the greater—that which can discover below that which can only prove.

Reason, so we see, is the true definer between them. The one, Love, is essentially immaterial; the other, Sensation, wholly material. The one, Love, is emotion; the other, Body, sense. When we speak of “hurting our feelings,” we never mean hurting our “senses,” which shows that the distinction is sound, and has a direct relation to life. Man knows his majestic inward power over that which hurts the body only, and this he

1 That is, so far as the material organ (brain) and immaterial thought are two. All these distinctions turn upon the distinction between material and immaterial.

2 Schelling speaks of the “Intellectual Intuition,” but this is simply a compound expression, referring to both principles.
REASON.

has always referred to the qualities of his soul (love). Were everything but the expression of animal sensation, how could we become possessed of a power directly contrary to it, a power which can negative it, or at any moment destroy? To pure Reason we owe all our mechanical productions. To it we also owe all the discoveries, or rather, the realizations, in science. For imagination, intuition, and the whole understanding of Man, have much to do with the discovery part of a problem; but to pure Reason we owe its realization. Many things may be true, or partly so, which Man’s understanding has dealt with, which are yet unproved, and which may for ever remain so. Reason decides; gives the absolute fiat, as to whether the speculation or belief may, or may not, be rightly called science. It eliminates all personal feeling, all indefinite consideration, all notion as notion, and decides incisively upon the evidence in hand. And, that it is something within, and apart from the Mind, may be seen by reference to evidence. In all cases of political law, Reason has to proceed upon the evidence produced. It has to decide upon that, and that alone. The highest judge, as a judge, is allowed no speculation upon the case before him. The evidence is all the case to him.

1 A spiritual power, correlating and superior to it.

2 Correlating the “absolute fiat” of God, as referred to in “The History.”
He may have grave doubts as to the truth, merit, and extent of that evidence, but his personal opinion must merge in his public administration of the law. At this point justice comes in, and claims a higher court of appeal, a court of equity, in which the man, as a Man, not as a judge or law-distributor, may estimate the truth of the case. Law, so we see, is to Equity, as Reason is to Mind. Mind, or the complete (understanding of) Man, contains Reason, but Reason is not the whole of Mind.

Reason, to Body.

The relation and difference between Reason and Brain is as the immaterial to the material. Though we cannot regard them apart, it is important to remember that Reason (special) Thought, is wholly immaterial. To the uninitiated it has no necessary connection with the organ of the Brain, but is a mysterious power within them, as it is still, to all the candid who know more of the nature of things. It is a spiritual, immaterial power, varying according to the measure of this "spirit," whose expression is converted into "law" by

1 The supreme court of equity is, of course, the Sovereign.

2 If I were asked to state what I mean by "spirit," whether "human" or "divine," in Man, I might instance it in this simple way—The voice of a friend is the "cause" of a new resolution: this is not a material but a "spiritual" cause. If it refers to human act and endeavour, things which can be known, realized, and
the law in things material, which union of the material and the divine, begets the human, "reason," which is the faculty before us in Man. This spirit[ual intelligence, animating as it does the whole Man, begets more than "reason," inasmuch as it illuminates the whole (understanding of) Man (mind), and in this way originates all his intelligent faculties. The same power, it has been shewn, has a direct influence upon (the true nature of) Love, (soul), and it unquestionably is the animating principle of the body of Man. We could not conceive life at all without this "spirit"; by it only can we comprehend the origination of the first monad of being. So that, though there is a direct connection between Brain and Reason, there is a distinct separation between them; and this separation we proved, it is a "human" spirit: if it refers to the essential mystery, hope and fear, beginning and end of all things, it is (of the nature of) a "divine" spirit—of the god or devil in man—and, in the same sense, a divine "cause." Here all things are referred to the "Life" in Man, which is the beginning and end of all human knowledge.—see concluding chapter.

1 That is to say, it only becomes known to us as law when in association with Matter.

2 The truth of this distinction between material and spiritual comes out strongly when we refer to the facts of life, which alone are life proper. Our "wills" decide upon every course of conduct. They are not Matter, nor are they spirit dissociated from Matter: therefore (in thought) we divide between them.

3 So well expressed in the Creed—"reasonable soul."
affirm, on the immaterial side, as the principle of Reason in Man.

The "laws" of material organism are read by Reason. By it we enquire into the specific relation of atom to atom in our own bodies. By it we read the nature and relation of law to law. It points out to us the correlations existing in our own organic being. And it leads us to interpret the "laws" of nature. It defines "law," and shows where it merges into "order," that is, becomes something more than law, as "reason," we have just shewn, merges into "mind," the "something more" than it. By it we discover that life is the expression of "variable combinations of invariable forces: that there is no observed order of facts which is

1 Regarding Man for the moment (as Goethe would) as a plant, there is some truth in the observations that our organs correspond to those of the living tree: as, for instance,—the vascular system in Man corresponds to the sap system in plants; the alimentary to the root-absorbing function; and the nervous, to the seed, or fruit-producing power of the tree. But these observations might be carried ad infinitum. And, side by side with these remarks, we may add, that the distinctions we have affirmed of the nature of Man, have been read in a very different light. Thought has been regarded as "chemical action in the brain"; Feeling, as only animal instinctive quality; Body, as mere material sensation. In marked contrast with these views, may be placed the religious interpretation of Man—as body, soul, and spirit. The reflective reader will now observe that it is simply a question of what level we take upon which to regard Man. And that
not due to a combination of forces; and that there is no combination of forces which is invariable—none which are not capable of change in infinite degrees." 1 In which manner we come to realize the fact, that we are really independent of law, 2 so far as we can realize dependence, though none the less, at the same moment, living within it.

Material changes in the Body, do not affect this positive faculty (Reason) in Man. Disease 3 only does so; and disease, we have before hinted, cannot be taken into consideration in dealing with the organic truth of our natures. For disease is untruth, falsity, evil. 4 We never could arrive at any philosophy at all upon the nature of Man, if we obliged ourselves to take into consideration every effect of disordered function. We do not do this in reasoning upon Nature. We take Nature always in her healthy aspects, and proceed to work out our problems upon the most perfect specimens of original type we can find. Hence, in treating of the relations between Reason and Body, we accept only conditions of the healthy subject.

the level for a practical philosophy of his nature, must be the level of life.

1 The Reign of Law, p. 98.—His Grace the Duke of Argyll.
2 Which, according to the principles here laid down, we must of necessity be.
3 Or disorder.
4 It is the machine out of order, which of course, till it is repaired, cannot properly do its work.
The dependence and interdependence of Reason with our material totality is as wonderful as could be conceived. Reason is as a balance, acting between two opposite forces or powers, ever adjusting them, never allowing them to act without due reference to each other; always referring to past and future alike, for the true and beneficial interest of present. It is in the triune nature of Man, what conscience is (as already shewn) in his unity—the monitor, guide, and friend, alike, of kindred powers within him. It is, perhaps, specially meant, as the rule for our passive conduct, as conscience is the rule for our active conduct: for (one) Reason, certainly, in practice, represents the still-life of Man; (the other) conscience, the active life. And it (Reason) is on this account the faculty held in most practical reverence by men,—as the power which adjusts law, in bodies politic—which "law" is the unseen anatomical structure and support of social and political life.

Reason, and "will"—in the unity of Man.

Reason in relation to "will," the 'I' in Man, may also be traced. Although no true act in life is contrary to right reason, reason seldom, if ever, absolutely rules the act. We are rarely called upon to

"The distinctive feature of Conscience is its close relation to the Will."—Sir James Mackintosh. Quoted by Professor Bain.
do anything, without reference to other conditions and influences than those which belong only to Reason. Therefore, from this point of view, Reason is a thing within us, a something not our whole selves, in relation to intelligent action, but a faculty which has a share in the conduct and course of life. The business of life never precludes Reason; always, in a double sense of the word, includes it. It includes it in decisions upon the wisdom or unwisdom of different courses of conduct; it includes it in the sense that it is something more than a reason[able procedure on our part: that it is a practice or course of action which contains in its doing, other and vital energies which are not of Reason, but something without, and apart from it. A man who proceeded to his business under the influence of Reason only, would live and move simply as a machine. There would be nothing in his association or practice to interest any one; he would live for himself, and for himself alone. He would be an automaton.\(^1\) Of course it would be impossible wholly and solely to do this, but extremes point the nature of things; it is only by seeing what our principles lead to at their utmost limit that we can test their truth.

Hence, the true share of Reason, in relation to the

\(^{1}\) Much of our mechanical action is but the expression of intelligent selfishness. Or, it is cruelty to self, and to the public generally.
business of life, is the "common sense," or fact, part of it. All we call "common sense" which is not "reason," is unsense, non-sense, or ignorance of the true living conditions of things. Immediately we (in business) speculate, we surpass reason; immediately we realize—bring our apprehensions within the hard line of fact, we employ reason—reason in its pure individual use and power. By step by step realizing our apprehensions (which we can progressively do, if they are based upon sound principles) we add, through the medium of "reason" to our stock of "common sense"; and in this way the world, though without knowing the why or wherefore of it, grows wiser.

That the special faculty of Reason is the bringing of things within the range of "common sense"—living fact of truth—may be seen by imagining what the state of things would be in the world without it. Suppose, for a moment, we possessed the great faculties of intuition, imagination, and will to act, without the principle of Reason—the power to convert into linear truth much of what we saw, apprehended, and desired to perform,—how should we be off as regards life in every actual sense of the word? Our apprehensions would be useless, for we could turn them to no account; our imaginations, instead of being so many glorious gleams of Nature, which we hoped in time to convert into form, would be so many will-o’-the-wisps, deluding us;
and to act, we should be impotent, for although we possessed the will and the power, we should lack that assured knowledge of truth, which constitutes the unseen background upon which we consciously or unconsciously move forward in all our deeds, and which, so to speak, is the concrete substance, the structure, the animate framework of human intelligence, upon which, and by which, and in which, we live and move and have our being. Remove Reason, as the fact-creating principle in Man, and we remove all that is solid in knowledge from beneath our feet. Take out this cement, Reason, and the whole structure of the world-made temple of Interpretation of Nature would collapse before us: all the particles would be left, nothing would be removed; but the building would be serviceless to us; we could but grope among its ruins for relics of that which had passed away, endeavouring here and there to find some fragment of the order-creating principle which once animated and sustained its frame.

All fundamental structure owes its origin to the true and pure use of the principle of Reason. By it we build. The outline, line and rule, method and order of all Form, which Man has produced, is of it, and from it, and it alone. Mental Form as well as material Form, both alike are its property. Immediately we want something more than form, we want something
which pure Reason cannot of itself supply. If we ask a builder to construct or decorate our house with certain expression of Taste, Beauty, Feeling, we ask him to do that, which he, in his original capacity, does not comprehend. He declines to undertake such; and probably tells us he can make little progress with his exact structure, so long as we trouble him about considerations with which he is not concerned. We must go to the Architect if we want something more than pure Structure: he represents the Man, the Builder Reason. Beauty, Feeling, Life, Taste, Grace, in our house, can only be supplied by one, whose function it is to exercise (in his work) all the faculties in union with which Man is endowed.—Whereby we see the true relation of Reason to Man.

Its relation to the Fine Arts may also be traced. First, as regards Music. Music, we are told now-a-days by good authorities, "is a science." The expression implies that it is only a science; that it is nothing more. To answer, we should have to bring forward the definition of science we have just by analogy prefigured, and show that, inasmuch as Music is something more than number, law, order, in their realizable sense, inasmuch as it is living law, breathing number, animate order, it of necessity partakes (as to the uninitiated), of the whole and living Man, and therefore is something

1 not of Reason only.
more than we can truly bring under the term science. Till science can express life, life is something more (to us) than science; and the same holds good of the complete nature and power of Music.

In Painting, we think the Artist would tell us that he makes but little use of pure Science (reason). Does he use a rule? express a feature by measure? a colour by argument? a shadow by mechanical degree? Are the groupings, the compositions, the accessories, the foldings, the lights, the contrasts, regulated by law only? Is not the complete understanding, the concrete powers of the Man, engaged upon the work? And are not these the expression of life, without any reference to anatomy at all? Where the anatomist is seen, we know the artist fails. If he cannot clothe his knowledge of structure with living, breathing, expressional Life, we recognize the imperfection of the Man, in his work. So that here too, it is clear that, though a knowledge of structure is essential to success, structure must disappear in something which is much more than it,—namely, in the Life.

In Sculpture, what should we think of a figure, which, at any part or turn of its proportion, presented to our eye an angle? Or, if we found a line which should have some gentle undulation or curve, a pointed feature, or even an eyebrow straight, what should we feel, as we gazed upon it, was the sympathy or ability of its
Author? Must not each angle be moulded, each line be breathing, each feature be instinct with life? And, though the anatomy be perfect, must it not be unseen, lost in that which is more than it—merged in Life?

In Poetry we know well enough the fate of the anatomical singer. However able his work may be; however much he may have probed the essential being of things; whatever his power of conception, his understanding of the inmost life and progress of Man,—howsoever much he may have realized to himself alone, the mysterious workings in the depths of a great mind at an epoch of a world’s history,—if he cannot bring these out into the living and tangible expression of every-day life, the public will give him the go-by, will not even offer him the just reward of his service, effort, and endurance, but, like the Levite in the parable, will pass by on the other side.

If then, we regard Reason as representing the Law in things material, the Living Law in things relating to Life, that is, their Anatomy; and in relation to things of Mind, the Theory of Numbers, we shall have outlined its great, important, and special function in the life and unity of Man. And who shall say that

1 Mr. Browning’s *Prince Hohenstiel Schwangau*.
2 Which embrace all the exact sciences.
3 Its religious aspect we do not here enter into.
this is not a great and special function; and that in order to carry out these important objects in our economy, a special faculty or principle was not needed? Could we have accomplished them without a special faculty: a faculty whose one prime function was to do this and nothing else? Would "laws of development" have supplied us with such special powers? or would they enable us to "account for" the fact of our possessing them? And if not (and we shall never be able to prove that they would) is it not more intelligent to regard ourselves in this light, to build up a system of belief upon it, a system which may underlie all our education, seeing that it has its origin in an intelligent interpretation of life itself?—Our wisest system of education, so long as the world lives, will be that which depends upon the truest interpretation of ourselves, that which makes the most of our faculties and powers, not that which makes the least of them; that which develops them and explains them in all their fullness, not that which dwarfs them and cramps them into but one expression of animal law.¹

Reason, and "conscience"—in the unity of Man.

Our reference to the Fine Arts has led us for a short

¹ These emotional passages are out of place. I point such to show how naturally we pass from Intellect into Feeling. Feeling is, therefore, clearly enough, the life of our being,—not sensuous feeling (sensation), but spiritual emotion (love).
space from the direct line of argument with which we set out, namely, to show, next to the relation of Reason to "will," its relation to "conscience," the living law in the unity of Man. Reason, then, we have seen, is the law and life of Structure; conscience is the law of conduct (to Man) within that structure. Law (reason) here represents the intelligent order and harmony which should pervade all things intended for the abode of Life; conscience, the order and harmony of Life within that abode. The freedom of Man is expressed in his "will" (the 'I') to break that law when and how he chooses; and his true education, culture, wisdom, and faith, consist in his not doing so,—not yielding blindly to a fatalistic interpretation of things, but in reading at each epoch in his life, the providential order, which, if he will follow it, is working for his good. To assert that there is no such order, and that Man shapes his own course independent of any visible (to him personally) right road in life, is to plunge him into Chaos, for it is an assumption which places the universe under the dominion of absolute Chance. Physical observations contradict this. Mental constitution contradicts it. The heart of Man contradicts it. We know and feel a power without us, whether we choose to recognize that power as Intelligent or not. And here we come upon an apparent contra-
diction. For Shakespeare has made one of his characters say—

There's a Divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough hew them how we will.

And Man, feeling the superiority at each turn of his life, of his will, above all conditions whatsoever, has been known to utter—

Man shapes his own course in each weary age;
By the sole exercise of his sovereign will
Ordains the future history of the world.

But, if we regard the law in the universe as Intelligent, and "working out good to those who seek but good," and if we regard the right action of Man's "sovereign will" as aiming in the same direction, no contradiction occurs; individual harmony arises, which not one whit interferes with Man's personal freedom and will,—he interprets everything as he can for the best, and acts accordingly.

Reason, therefore, is the essential structure of God, underlying the action of conscience (in Man). If we are three, we need one law in ourselves by which we can act, and conscience supplies us with that law. The "will" as representing its correlative the "life," our personal selves, our totality, acts out itself, drawing its

1 i.e., we can do evil if we like, but we cannot do more good than God intends for us.
intelligence from the "Mind," which three represent the whole, the acting, the individual man. [see on.] We decide upon our conduct by the light of past experience, present need, and hope in the future, measuring out unobservedly as we do so, the nature, quality, and extent of the several faculties of our triune being.

We who prefer action to thought, are apt to overlook the importance of Reason (proper) in the affairs of life. Conscience and Will seem to supply us with all we need: the power to act; a law by which to regulate our conduct. Men of action live so; ready only for honour, death, the parade or the flame. And though of course Reason participates more or less in the thoughts of all men, this exclusive use of the active faculties in man, leads to an entire forgetfulness of the passive side of our natures, which contains assuredly some of the noblest qualities which are in the human Man. For in this passive side, not only is our sense of beauty, of law, of order, developed, but the chief faculties of the mind itself, by which the human race progresses and is benefited, have their origin in the enduring qualities of our natures. Meditation, contemplation, apprehension, even religion itself, all these are the outcome, or have their chief exercise in the passive side of our natures. In fact the capacity of patience and endurance from which they all spring, is perhaps the greatest faculty in man, the truest sign of greatness, and the most reliable
instinct of power. For to court death under trial, to be willing to die, to say that life is not worth owning, and to seek to get rid of it,—these are no signs of power, or utility, or worth, or merit in a Man. He is the noblest character, who can meet his circumstances at each epoch in his life, and conquer them. Such a man a people may trust: if they cannot trust him, they will find no one worthy.

By these indirect observations we see, that, perhaps a perfect life is the equal use of both the active and passive faculties in Man. Certainly however it is true that, it is only by special and individual use of them that we advance; yet none the less should we remember that such action is but special and individual, and that it has but a place or a share in the complete need, duty, responsibility, and religion of Man. By losing sight of this fact, public opinion, upon all matters, is drawn violently, first in one direction, then in another; believing for the time that each new theory or idea is the sum total of everything. A glance at the history of thought shows the truth of this, and what enormous influences for good and for evil, new schools (special processes) have, and have had over the histories and destinies of Man.

Reason and Metaphysics.

The relation of Reason to Metaphysics should also be outlined. Metaphysical has been called the science of
Mind. But till we know what "Mind" is, not only shall we be helpless to write a "science" upon it, but even to speculate with regard to it in any real and intelligent manner. For immediately we sever "Mind" from "Life," in order to speculate upon "Mind," we remove all the acting powers in Man, and begin to regard him simply as a living machine. Reason or Intellect, according to this mode of procedure, has been the power or faculty within a man which enabled him to dissect his own attributes, to point to this or that power or condition of being; in short, has been the full and complete exercise of his understanding or Mind itself. Mind, in this sense, has embraced the whole of his being, that is, has taken into consideration as part of itself, not only his Feelings, but his Sensations, and examined and explained them all according to a purely philosophical or still mode of life. Hence metaphysics, except as an exercise for the mind, has been practically a dead letter. For mental faculties are not tangible like the material elements of the body, so that physiology has become—inasmuch as its teachings can in some sense be realized—a more important study, and of more service to Man. That no real science has grown out of such study of Mind is the necessary consequence of the

1 See next Part.

2 Sir William Hamilton's *Metaphysics*. Part of Dr. Whewell's *Works.*
fact that such study was in itself empirical. Till we
know what Mind is, we can make no progress in the
“science” of “Mind”: and that “science” itself will
only be the expression of the realizing principle within
us. At which point we come round to Reason—Reason
as the scientific faculty, as we have defined it. The
measure of the knowledge of Mind, will be the measure
of Reason’s ability to exactly interpret it. And this
will probably advance with time.

Kant, as a metaphysician, regarded Feeling as one of
the “three fundamental phenomena of mind.”¹ Spinoza,
in his Ethics, says, that “we have knowledge in three
ways: 1st, from the senses; 2ndly, from reasoning;
3rdly, from intuition.”² Swedenborg, that there are
“three degrees of Love and Wisdom; the lowest reach­
ing us through the senses; the second being attained to
by the sciences; the third and highest reached by the
internal perception of truths, both moral and intellectual
—that is, intuition.”³ And Goethe, in referring to
animal life,—that “every living being is not a unity
but a plurality.”⁴

These observations of eminent thinkers are introduced
² Dr. Willis’s Life and Correspondence of Spinoza.
⁴ Lewes’s Life and Works of Goethe.

I have taken these and other quotations at second-hand from
standard Authors. The whole substance of the treatise stands
only as they all point in one direction, namely, towards a triune nature in Man. When men of science and philosophers, of such different schools, agree in regarding all things in relation to Man, in a "threefold" light, there is good reason to believe that some real truth of such underlies all such opinions, and that we shall not truly know and interpret ourselves till such truth has been realized in our understandings. It would not be difficult to introduce other opinions all pointing the same way; not to mention the Christian's everlasting belief that he too is made up, in some mysterious manner, of three natures—body, soul, and spirit.

Metaphysics.

Metaphysics⁴ is the outcome of the exercise of pure Reason. It is the result of this faculty, and of this alone. We proceed by the exercise of Reason to dissect Mind, believing all the time that we are exercising upon an original intuition of the constitution of the living Man.

Goethe's expression refers to an infinity, not a triunity, of parts, in the living organism. It is the opinion of a Biologist. It can therefore only be used in connection with the present view of Man, in so far as it affirms that he is more than a "unity." Biology deals with analysis and parts. The philosophy before us has sole relation to life.

¹ That is, of course, Metaphysics proper. The term as here used is a misnomer. I do not mean the Philosophy of Mind.—see on.

² Or, intellectual philosophy, as it has been called.
cising the total understanding of our natures. "Will" alone is this,¹ for "will" is the expression of the unity of Man,—by which remark we see, that it is only in the unity of our powers that even our understanding has complete exercise. For immediately we omit the emotions or the sensations, which equally with Reason qualify thought, we omit influences which are of equal importance with "reason" to that thought,—and therefore fail to express the totality of ourselves.² In this way, Reason or intellect proper, overlooking or despising the emotive and the sensuous part of Man’s nature, proceeds with certain schools of thinkers to argue and decide life-problems of and for itself, believing itself to be the total interpreter of the truth. Reason so produces Rationalism, which, by reversing the expression, allows us to define Rationalism as Reasonализм: a separate and distinct use of one first principle or faculty in Man. And men proceed to reason and believe in this way, because they find the emotions and the senses mainly within and beneath their power, attributing this dominance over them to their "intellectual" power. But this is a fundamental error. It is not to their "intellectual" power that they are indebted for this ability of self-rule, but to their will—the expres-

¹ As embracing in itself both our active and passive natures.—see on.
² See next Part.
sion of the unity or totality of their nature—which "will" contains of necessity as being such, all the faculties, powers, conditions, properties, and principles of the complete Man. So that in attributing to "intellect" that which is truly the gift or born nature of the whole Man, we attribute to a special principle what belongs really to our whole constitution—our total self. And here we see how men who have often little or no "intellectual" training have tremendous powers of self-control,\(^1\)—of rule over their feelings, and over their bodies,—simply because this rule is not the outcome of intellectual development, but of inborn quality, personal experience through difficulty, trial, test, training, and of all that goes to make up the acting Man.

Intelect, therefore, we observe, has no power of rule in itself,—except in so far as concerns itself. It has no power of rule over the Man.\(^2\) The Will has this power; and the will is the expression of the whole, the unity, Man. The truth comes out in strong light by bringing the feelings (love) into comparison. The expression, we know, of the feelings, without a due share of reasonable thought in them, is vulgarly called "wind,"—or platitude,—that is to say, such expression, in attempting to rule the action or belief of the man, makes him

\(^1\) An observation from life.

\(^2\) i.e., only an individual power, a share with the other principles of his nature, in a general power.
absurd, a fool, for the very reason that they (the feel-
ings) are but a part of the man, and have no power of rule in themselves, beyond themselves. And the same may be shewn of the Senses. Every one knows the vulgarising and animalising effect of influence caused by one whose animal nature dominates all his actions,—we feel ourselves in contact with something which is scarcely man,—and we charitably attribute to lack of education or the like, that want of inward self-develop-
ment which would bring into proportionate influence, the other principles and powers of his nature.

The relation, therefore, of Reason to the self-ruling or acting powers of Man, is, of course, (as our prin-
ciples would oblige us to affirm) that of a third in rela-
tion to his whole being. We have already outlined its special uses in the economy of man's nature, and these, it has been shewn, are of enormous importance in everything that relates to the affairs of life. It is the substantive¹ quality of our being. By it we put to-
gether everything. Upon it we live. It is therefore a passive self-affecting power within us, which truth we have already seen from a different point of view. Con-
science correlates it in relation to action. It is the abode of still-life; the faculty of formation; the principle embodying design.

¹ That is, as form or law, . . "the form or true definition",—Bacon's expression.
When we look out upon the field of Nature, or contemplate the universe, we intuitively look for design. Our very nature obliges us to do this. We look for that in the works of the world which our own being embodies. We have a special faculty of design within us; therefore we expect to find the same expressed in the works of creation. From the very fact that our mind is a condition embodying definitive powers, we necessarily regard it as a constitution; and constitution, except from that which was likewise constituted, we could not conceive. Hence we arrive at the truth of constitution in Nature; whose expression in infinite life, we truthfully call infinite design. And design is the expression of Reason; to which is superadded, in the works of the Artist, that which is equally part of himself, conditions of feeling, embodiment of actual being. So that the works of the infinite Creator and the works of finite Man, correlate each other at every turn,—necessarily so; since man is the outcome of God.

There is so much danger now-a-days of merging all forms of thought into insubstantive generalizations, that we cannot insist too strongly upon the fact of Mind possessing definitive powers, because upon such

1 Recognised in the question—why is this so and so?  
2 in preferred to un. Shakespeare writes insubstantial for unsubstantial.  
3 These remarks have been called forth by Mr. Mill's definition of mind, as "the permanent possibility of feeling," which
fact, all true and real definition rests. And in order to support such position we have only to realize the fact of some duality in "mind." Given two things which cannot truly be expressed under one term, or as one, and we have the fact of constitution before us. For these two things cannot, as we have before shewn, exist together as one, without a third thing to unite them; so that we arrive at the essential structural basis of a trinity. And given a trinity, we have the expression of the Creator before us, in whom all things are, and from whom all proceed. In order to do away with the belief in Creator-ship, we must do away with the fact of the trinity in ourselves,—and this, if attempted, we affirm, will lead to blank nonsense in the affairs of thought,—or rather, what is equally bad or worse, an utter annihilation of all notion of personality and will at all,—which would assuredly be the ruin of man, and therefore is assuredly false.

For the first definitive power we should put our hands upon is Reason itself. What could be more definitive than Reason? more special in its pure application and power? Add to it "Will," and we have two as implies the absence of all individual principle in Mind. See next Part on The Man. The text and the note remain as they were written before the death of the eminent writer referred to.

1 Observe, we here speak of definitive "powers," not of individual "principles." "Will" is not a principle but a power. "Reason" is both. See next Part on The Man.
opposite powers in the human mind as it is possible to conceive. Reason never acts, always defines. Will never defines, always acts. Desire is sometimes mixed up and confused with the action of "will," but this is little more than a superstitious or ignorant abuse of language. We know that when under the influence of the strongest desire, we possess a will to gainsay it. The question is simply whether we will use that will, or whether we will allow it to lie passive, and our action to merge into desire. The two are as distinct as it is possible to define distinct powers, which are part of the same unity. Hence, here, without reference to any orderly expression of man's nature, we find powers as opposite as it is possible to conceive them to be.

Reason, and Philosophy.

I have now shown in outline the relation of Reason to the other first principles and acting powers of our natures, and would conclude this chapter with some remarks upon Reason in relation to philosophy, life, and religion, as proposed at the commencement of it.

We have shown at page 122, the relation of Reason to Mind, and we have also, in few words, at page 135, surmised that our threefold nature first finds its individual expression in Mind,¹ and that the "will" draws its intelligence from this living source. We here first therefore come upon the complex unity of Man, and

¹ For a definition of Mind, see the beginning of next Chapter.
observe how, through "will" and "conscience," as representing our active selves, we draw upon our stock of life, emanating from the three first principles of our natures. In the association of "will" and "conscience" with Mind,¹ [see note] or, to reverse the position, of "reason," "love," and "sense," with "will" and "conscience," is the explanation (as regards life) of the three in one and one in three of Man's nature.

But as these principles, each with its own life and law,² beget, in our unity, faculties equally part of each, an explanation of the nature of these faculties, of their origin, true use, and relation to each other, would constitute, so far as the understanding could realize such, that self-knowledge which, to apprehend truth within

¹ A reflective reader might here remark that I make a "fourth" of Mind, and that, is not this equivalent to the "circle" in the symbol of the Trinity? The answer would be, that "Mind" has no existence apart from the principles of which it is the expression, and that the "circle" has, apart from the lines which it surrounds.² The Mind is not a "fourth," as it is wholly dependent on others; the "circle" is a "fourth," as it is wholly dependent upon itself. The sole force of the observation it will therefore be observed, lies in the relation of living principles to abstract quantities, and shows, I think, effectually, the true relation of life to science.

² The "life" of Reason is its individuality in our natures as Law; the "law" of Love is its individuality in our natures as Life. Both are One, in Animation (Body).

³ See page 7, in "The History."
and without us, we seek; and inasmuch as such self-knowledge would be more than law (reason, or science) and less than life proper (love, or deed)—something uniting the two—something without or superior to actual (mental) realization, and less than speculation or comprehension removed from the real—we should require a term for such self-knowledge, and this (technical) term would be the "philosophy" of Man.

In this way we arrive at some clear notion of the meaning of the word philosophy, in relation to Man, and of the individual to the body politic. We observe that all alike have certain general and fundamental constitutional similarity, in short, that all are born alike, and that such generality or conditions of life, which all have in common would constitute the "science" of Man: and that beyond this, in that fullness of our natures, in which all are different, would be that self-knowledge (for each one) or philosophy of life, which may be attained, through true education, sooner or later, by every individual. The "science" of Man would therefore constitute the base of education; self-culture would develop upon this; individuality would grow out of self-culture; and personal life, directed by conscience, which takes cognizance of all conditions of our being, would be the aim of the individual Man.

Philosophy, therefore, in regard to Man, may be defined as an explanation of himself, so far as he can
understand himself,—what he is, what is the nature of his constitution, how one part within him is related to every other part, the origin of his faculties, the conditions which affect conduct, the true bearings of conscience in relation to outward circumstances, the practical, personal, true ends and aims of life. It treats of the passive conditions of our being; of modes of true education; of the relation of religions truths to our own personal selves,—how far these can be shewn to have a direct application to our own constitution, when rightly and fully interpreted; dissolves all knowledge proper into our spiritual personality—leaving no dross or eddies and ends of theories or beliefs to darken our perception of concrete and living truths; clears everything before the eye of the understanding; makes way for the action of will and conscience in the affairs of personal life. All this is simply true self-knowledge; but as it is both concrete and abstract in its nature, as it takes in all both separately and wholly which relates to the individual Man, we need some term by which we may denote such universal knowledge of the wants and sympathies and needs of the human creature;—and this therefore we term the "philosophy" of Man.

The relation of Reason, therefore, to such a philosophy, would be that of the exact, or scientific, portion of it. For since Reason seeks to realize everything in order to "know" it, it is clear, that if Man be more
than law, or measureable quantity of being, such realization of his whole self can never take place. The spiritual elements of our nature, which are above Reason, express the infinite variability of life and character within us, and since “spirit” is superior to “reason,” we cannot realize its conditions of life. It is probable that in all problems which the human mind works out, that it is this “spirit” which enables it to see all it can truly (in a living manner) “know,” for to “know” this “spirit” of life itself, we must have a condition of life superior to it. Such truth of our natures exactly correlates “possession” or “inspiration,” in which “states” the human mind and reason proper make no personal effort to attain that which they relate, beyond the faith and abnegation of self, and yielding up of whole being to the power believed to be directing without. And in parallel “states” to this, intuitions of the soul arise, which are universally recognized as the most essential truths.

It is when we turn to ourselves only to discover or relate a thing, and “reflect” upon it, that we begin solely and purely to use our faculty of “reason.” And in so doing we embrace only our own personal experience of things around and within us, and so

1 Or divine. We must either accept this position as true, or do away with the realities of “spirit” and “soul” altogether.

Faculty, principle, or power, all these words alike apply to
REASON.

formulate that which we have come to "know." At this moment (in our relation) we become less than life. We abstract from the total conditions of being elements which are part of the personal whole. We take that we are sure of, and can measure, and call it a living truth. To "know" human "spirit," we must be able to produce it. And this we can never do. We cannot even "condition" a material "spirit." Hence Man can make only a machine.

Dr. Newman, in his late work, The Grammar of Assent, has endeavoured to show by a series of propositions, the relation of exact thought to philosophy, and the relation of philosophy to religion. The book, reason. It would be "faculty" in subordination to a higher power as "spirit," "principle" in relation to itself, and "power," to that beneath it, or which depended upon it.

1 We can "produce" the law of gravitation in figures, hence we "know" it. But no quantity will truly represent a human desire.

2 A man of science proper may here call me a Metaphysician. My answer would be—In so far as metaphysics is removed from life actual, I do not believe in it; in so far as it gives an intelligent interpretation of the nature of ourselves, in relation to that life, and to the mystery in all things, summed up in the term "God," I do.

3 For an excellent review of this work, see the North British Review, July, 1870. So far as theological views are expressed, the book might have been written by any Christian.

a I use the word "know" here strictly in its scientific sense. It of course applies relatively to the things of "mind."
though very ably written, is perhaps not conclusive to reflective readers, because several important or fundamental positions are assumed or unexplained. Mind, for instance, is nowhere outlined, though it, as in all philosophical works, very frequently occurs. Imagination, reason, science, natural religion, revelation,—these, and like terms or positions come under Dr. Newman's review, but we do not seem to have a firm footing beneath us as we read, simply because, we believe, Dr. Newman has not assured his own understanding of the real meanings of all such several terms used. Given these, clearly expressed and understood, and we may proceed to apprehend truth to the limits of human comprehension.

An important observation occurs at page 190 of this book, where Dr. Newman points to a significant difference between a "truth" and a "knowing" of what we believe to be true, and which statement we here select simply because it is fundamental, and will enable us to illustrate the position before us—the relation of Reason to the concrete powers of Mind, that is, Philosophy.

Dr. Newman says:—"Certitude, as I have said, is the perception of a truth, or the consciousness of "knowing, as expressed in the phrase, "I know that I "know," or "I know that I know that I know," or "simply "I know"; for one reflex assertion of the "mind about self sums up the series of self-conscious-"nesses without the need of any actual evolution of
"them." And the next paragraph begins:—"Certitude is the knowledge of a truth—but what is once true is always true, and cannot fail, whereas what is once known need not always be known, and is capable of failing." Here we have an important position. A "truth" is stated as a "certitude," something which never fails; a "knowing" is stated as questionable, something which may fail: yet this "knowing" is the very process by which we perceive the truth." What is the difference between the two, and how does the same human mind (be it ourselves or anyone else) arrive at such?

Now, in the first place, be it observed, the words have a close relationship to each other. For we cannot be said to "know" a thing, in any real sense of the word, without that knowing being "true." The terms are therefore, in a sense, correlative. Our knowing is not a knowing if it is not true, only a belief. And our truth (in relation to Man) is not a truth, if it is not complete, only a "knowing." The correct use of the terms therefore, is the realization of the fact of their expression. A "knowing," that is a "reason," we know we can "realize," but a "truth," the expression of our concrete selves, we cannot realize, except by induction from our whole being. Here then we have a

\[1\] For the very reason that the unmentioned conditions would qualify and alter it.
fundamental difference between the terms "knowing" and a "truth," which exactly correlates reason and mind, in their relation to each other.

And this brings us to the profound distinction between living beings and abstract quantities. A thing is true in the abstract if elements are omitted, but never so in the concrete, for the very reason that the omission of those elements alters the conditions of the life. It is not necessary to tell the whole truth in an algebraic equation—there being no end to it,—but a life is the sum total of fixed and relative conditions. Omit one of these, and you qualify the whole constitution; change your algebraic formulæ from \( x \) to \( b \), and you do not affect your argument.

Whence we come round again, as in all matters of philosophical observation upon the relation of life to knowledge, to the fundamental relation and difference of abstract to concrete, whose balance of intercommunion is reason itself. Our "knowing," we affirm, is the measure of Reason's ability to realize—whether material or spiritual—things appertaining to the constitution of Man; our truth (Philosophy) is the complete unity of our perfected powers. That is truth to us which exactly correlates the expression of our own constitution, and this it is which true knowledge grows towards.

1 That is, it is true just so far as we are able to explain it, in relation to a whole.
Another important observation bearing upon this part of our treatise occurs at page 323 of this work. Dr. Newman says, in opening his chapter upon Natural Inference:—"I commenced my remarks upon Inference by saying that reasoning ordinarily shows as a simple act, not as a process, as if there were no medium interposed between antecedent and consequent, and the transition from one to the other were of the nature of an instinct,—that is, the process is altogether unconscious and implicit. It is necessary, then, to take some notice of this natural or material Inference, as an existing phenomenon of mind; and that the more, because it illustrates and, as far as it goes, supports what I have been saying of the characteristics of inferential processes as carried on in concrete matter, and especially of their dependence upon some particular faculty which has the oversight of them." And the next paragraph begins:—"I say, then, that our most natural mode of reasoning is, not from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes." Here we have the same truth we have already pointed out in a different form. Reason[ing is spoken of as a "simple process," and in a certain relation to "the mind." Our definition is implied though not explained. The distinction as regards reasoning, "not from proposi-
tions to propositions, but from things to things," can be taken, as Dr. Newman explains it, as the relation of abstract to concrete, in other words, as "law" to "life," or, in relation to Man, as Reason to Mind.

We have no wish to enter into verbal subtleties in this work, knowing, on the whole, how dangerous and profitless they are, but before parting with Dr. Newman’s book, we must make one more quotation, as it points to a fundamental difference we are endeavouring to establish throughout, and shows how two eminent minds may differ upon such. Dr. Newman says, in this same chapter, page 331:—“And now I come to a further peculiarity of this natural and spontaneous ratiocination. This faculty, as it is actually found in us, proceeding from concrete to concrete, belongs to a definite subject-matter, according to the individual. In spite of Aristotle, I will not allow that genuine reasoning is an instrumental art,” etc., etc. We should have to reply—Yes, it is so, because in its

1 Every proposition is a formula, something abstracted from a whole.
2 Or fixed formula.
3 Though words must have their proper meanings as principles their distinct life.
4 Ratiocination, or reasoning proper, is here mistaken for the total energies of Mind. Our “reasoning” from things to things will never endow them with the whole conditions of life.
pure use it is the expression of one first principle in Man, but thinking proper is not so,—this is an act of the Mind.—Dr. Newman's work is an excellent specimen of pure reasoning removed from the actualities of life.

Fundamental and universal as I believe this position to be, of the relation of Reason to Mind, and through it, of a true understanding of all knowledge proper in relation to observed mental truth, I must again, at the risk of making this chapter tediously long to a reader, leave our direct line of relation for another quotation. His Grace The Duke of Argyll, in his very able work, The Reign of Law, after giving in his chapter on "Law, and its definitions," an outline of the many uses of this word—which must have lifted a burden from many a mind—coming upon science proper in relation to "pure truth," says, pages 70-71:—"Mr. Lewes, in his very "curious and interesting work on the Philosophy of "Aristotle, has maintained that the knowledge of "Measure—or what he calls the "verifiable element" "in our knowledge—is the element which determines "whether any theory belongs to Science, strictly so "called, or to Metaphysics; and that any theory may "be transferred from Metaphysics to Science, or from

1 That is, concrete or general, not abstract or particular,—as taking in all (passive) conditions of our being. No "science" proper can "measure," or "reasoning" contain, this.
"Science to Metaphysics, simply by the addition or withdrawal of its "verifiable element." In illustration of this, he says that if we withdraw, from the "Law of Universal Attraction, the formula, "inversely as the square of the distance, and directly as the "mass," it becomes pure Metaphysics. If this means "that, apart from ascertained numerical relations, our "conception of Law, or our knowledge of natural phe- "nomena, loses all reality and distinctness, I do not "agree in the position. The idea of natural Forces is "quite separate from any ascertained measure of their "energy. The knowledge, for example, that all the "particles of Matter exert an attractive force upon each "other, is, so far as it goes, true physical knowledge, "even though we do not know the further truth, that "this force acts according to the numerical rule ascer- "tained by Newton. To banish from physical Science, "properly so called, and to relegate to Metaphysics, "all knowledge which cannot be reduced to numerical "expression, is a dangerous abuse of language."

His Grace then goes on to speak of the more complex definitions and uses of the word Law in relation to Function, Plan, and Purpose, as visible in the higher "laws" of Nature, and adds, pages 86-7:—"The fact "to which I have previously referred, [the passage "quoted] is a fact of immense significance, that one of "the most able supporters of the Positive Philosophy
"in England relegates to Metaphysics the great scientific fact of Physical Attraction, when it is considered apart from its numerical relations. But if this be considered Metaphysics, then let it be remembered that many of the most certain truths we know belong to the same category. From a similar point of view, it might be argued, and it has actually been argued, that Number and all numerical relations are purely abstract conceptions of the mind, having no other reality than as they are conceived. The same reasoning may be applied to all our most fundamental conceptions—without which Science could not even begin her work. The existence of Force under any form, of which the existence of Matter is only a special case, may be regarded as a purely metaphysical conception. It is surely a comfort to find that, if all ideas of Plan and of Design in the Adjustments of Organic Life are to be condemned as metaphysical, they stand at least in goodly company among the necessities of Thought."

We venture to think that both His Grace and Mr. Lewes are here in the right, and that a true interpretation of Man,—that is, in the present case, of the relation of Reason to Mind, will explain the apparent difficulty. We have affirmed throughout that Reason is a distinct principle in Man’s nature, and that in “Mind,” as expressing the passive unity of ourselves, it first finds its
individual (share of) expression, with the other first principles which constitute the unity, Man. We have also affirmed that its highest as well as its lowest expression is of the nature of Law,—hence, whatever be the mode in which it expresses such, be it weight, "measure," or limitation, knowledge, matter, or condition, it is confined, in its true use, to the quantity of its own being. Science, therefore, properly so called, is the limitation of Reason's ability to realize—whether material or spiritual—things appertaining to the constitution of Nature and of Man; beyond this is "truth" as distinct from "knowledge," which the human mind (or Man) can apprehend or experience in the concrete. We "know" a friend after 20 years' experience, but certainly not in any scientific sense. All the realities of life (Man active) would have to be "relegated to Metaphysics" if we were dependent upon "scientific verification" for the truth of them. It is the same with the realities of Mind (Man passive). What we have to secure ourselves against is error in apprehending such, not in looking to Science to make them more sure.

We would relegate to the limbo of unremembered terms the word Metaphysics. It either means, "the science of the principles and causes of all things existing," which in relation to Man, is absurd, or it means "the science of mind," which, as generally understood, contradicts one of the first axioms of Euclid,—that the
less cannot contain the greater. We can, of course, have a science of mind, as we can (as already shewn) have a science of Man, but this will be only just the measure of Reason's ability to realize the constitution of mind. Beyond this is Mind itself, with all its glorious, immeasurable, speculative, personal powers. We would substitute for "Metaphysics" the "Philosophy of Mind": and this only as regards the affairs of thought, for "mind" itself, as we have already stated, and shall have further to show, has only its complete exercise in the action of Will,—as embracing both our active and passive natures,—and is indissolubly associated with our material self. Hence, our ultimate "truth" will be a "Philosophy of Man."

By way of concluding our remarks, therefore, upon Reason in relation to Philosophy, we may assume that Reason would be a kind of balance between our spiritual (immaterial) apprehensions on the one hand, and material evidence on the other. We should look for it to harmonise all our conceptions of the nature of things; to withdraw them from the (spiritual) realm of speculation, as equally from the (material) realm of sense,—to give them a living unity, an expression in direct relation with life.

In this way we should avoid system-building on the one hand, as materialism, pure and simple, on the other. The whole is greater than its part.
For Reason, as the recognized Living Law in the unity of our triune being, could not, without a perversion of its own energies, express solely the one or the other. As a living law within us, it would reject a mechanical interpretation of the nature and origin of life and things; as a law-in-life it would reject equally apprehensions which could be shewn to have no direct reference to the nature and constitution of Man. As both, in their unity, it would express both individually; as regards itself only, and as regards Man wholly,

The life-in-law and law-in-life in One,¹

the fundamental or structural order of all (visible) things.

I trust the reader will excuse some repetition in this part of my treatise, necessarily entailed by the fact that my object has been, at the cost of literary execution, to bring into clear view a distinct outline of what I believe to be the true nature and uses of philosophy, so far as practical life is concerned. Beyond this, I do not care to go, that is to say, I have no wish in this work to enter into speculations upon first causes, schemes of the universe, explanations of the origin of things, and the like, all of which I believe to be the result of a perversion of our true human powers, and of a looking without ourselves to realize that of which we are inwardly truly

¹ The Hermit, p. 111.
a typical part. Evidence is not wanting\(^1\) of the need of some fundamental conception of the nature of Man, into which we may dovetail all our general and particular beliefs, seeing that they all are but the outcome of the same one, and individual, mind.\(^2\) Indeed, it is perhaps

\(^1\) That is, of course, inductively viewed.

\(^2\) The following passages, extracted from Mr. Lewes’s great work the *History of Philosophy*, show plainly enough the need of a practical knowledge of ourselves. Though we cannot agree with the eminent Author that Positivism is the complete truth, we can none the less feel our obligations to him as a man of science.

“The cardinal distinctions of this system [Positivism] may be said to arise naturally from the one aim of making all speculations homogeneous. Hitherto Theology which claiming certain topics as exclusively its own (even within the domain of knowledge) left vast fields of thought untraversed. It reserved to itself Ethics and History with occasional incursions into Psychology; but it left all cosmical problems to be settled by Science, and many psychological and biological problems to be settled by Metaphysics. On the other hand Science claiming absolute dominion over all cosmical and biological problems, left Morals and Politics to metaphysicians and theologians, with only an occasional and incidental effort to bring them also under its sway. Thus while it is clear that society needs one Faith, one Doctrine, which shall satisfy the whole intellectual needs, on the other hand it is clear that such a Doctrine is impossible so long
one of the most startling facts to reflect, that all the knowledge, mechanism, interpretation of the nature of things, science, art, wisdom, and understanding, originate in one and the same constitution, Man, and that could we rightly read and understand such constitution, we should have in our hands the key to all true knowledge and practice. Our Spiritual, Sensuous, and Material philosophies would take their several places as three antagonistic lines of thought and three antagonistic modes of investigation are adopted. Such is, and has long been, the condition of Europe. A glance suffices to see that there is no one doctrine general enough to embrace all knowledge, and sufficiently warranted by experience to carry irresistible conviction.

"Look at the state of Theology:—Catholicism and Protestantism make one great division; but within the sphere of each we see numerous subdivisions; the variety of sects is daily increasing. Each sect has remarkable men amongst its members; but each refuses to admit the doctrines of the others. There is, in fact, no one general doctrine capable of uniting Catholics, Protestants, and their subdivisions. Look also at the state of Philosophy. There is no one system universally accepted; there are as many philosophies as there are speculative nations, almost as many as there are professors. The systems of Germany are held in England and Scotland as the dreams of alchemists; the Psychology of Scotland is laughed at in Germany, and neglected in England
in our interpretation of his nature, and instead of being alarmed at the discovery of new truths in any one special direction, we should endeavour forthwith to give them their true relative place in the constitution of Man. That the old forms of thought which modern scientific men have demolished, were the outcome of the uses of special powers within us, is self-evident, and they have been demolished because they were so found

and France. Besides this general dissidence, we see, in France and Germany at least, great opposition between Theology and Philosophy openly pronounced. This opposition is inevitable; it lies in the very nature of Philosophy; and although, now as heretofore, many professors eagerly argue that the two are perfectly compatible and accordant, the discordance is, and always must be, apparent.

"With respect to general doctrines, then, we find the state of Europe to be this: Theologies opposed to Theologies; and Theology and Philosophy at war with each other. Such is the anarchy in the higher regions.

"In the sciences there is less dissidence, but there is the same absence of any general doctrine; each science is on a firm basis, and rapidly improves; but a Philosophy of Science was nowhere to be found when Auguste Comte came forward with the express purpose of supplying the deficiency. The speciality of most scientific men, and their incapacity of either producing or accepting general ideas, had long been a matter of complaint; and this has been one great cause of the con-
to be special, and removed from concrete knowledge and the actualities of life. It still remains for some patient worker, who loves an affirmative more than a negative mode of labour, to show what truth (in relation to Man) was contained in each one such several philosophy, and give all these part truths a concrete interpretation in relation to the living Man. That many of them have failed mainly from being dissevered from action, is clear, more especially as (we have already shewn) it is only when the human sympathies (faculties) are at work—in what I may call mental action as distinct from passive theoretic thought—that Mind itself has its complete energy and expression. The proof of our spiritual realizations is in their correlating some visible condition of actual life; the proof of our mate-

"For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."—St. Paul.
rial realizations is in their supporting some visible truth of the spiritual. Positivism, perhaps, expresses the complement of our intellectual nature, as the Sensuous philosophy, when complete, will express the complement of our bodily nature; and to these must be added the Philosophy of Feeling (known in its scientific aspect under the name of Psychology) as expressing the known qualities and workings of the human heart or soul. Our ultimate concrete "philosophy" will be the working of all these three into one.

Reason, and Life.

Since Reason is not the whole of the intelligent sympathies in Man's nature, but only a part of them, it is clear that Reason proper can only influence us according to the true measure of its own share. Every man knows, however much he may be under the dominion of intellect in passive life, that in life active other and weightier considerations come into play. The faculties of the soul have the first claim upon every man's nature, as expressing within him those divine yearnings for knowledge of eternal truth which it is the test of his life to endeavour relatively to realize, and truthfully and faithfully to hold; and next to these, and the sympathies of the heart, are the needs of the body, which will have their share of attention at whatever cost to our spiritual selves. Hence Reason may be regarded as, what in truth it is—a kind of balance or equilibrium between
the "life" of the body (sense) and the "life" of the feelings (soul). It is a law between the two, harmonising all our conceptions of action and contemplation into one human, or present, realization of things visible and things to come: an immaterial individual power, growing with "sense" and "soul" alike, in their ever-varying and shifting presentations of now and future.

Reason, and Religion.
That the realizing faculty in Man should be able to comprehend the spiritual conditions of his nature, is impossible, simply because these outline its functional power. In the same relation as the material organic structure of Man stands to his rational or human conditions of being, do the spiritual or divine conditions of his nature stand to the reason-able. Our intelligence, as we have before shewn, is the expression of two op-

I have shewn this truth from its divine aspect, in the introductory lines to Part III of The Hermit. The word personality is used for the word individuality in the sixth line, because the line would not allow of the correct word. I may here also as well mention, that the word Mind is used for the word Intellect (as very commonly) in the introduction to Part I of the Poem,—and also in the last line of the preface to this work. In Part III, page 130, line 11, the words Soul, Reason, and Sense, refer to the divine, human, and material, natures of Man respectively. Also, page 131, lines 10 and 11, Sensuous, Mind, and Soul, refer to the material, intellectual, and divine, natures of Man respectively.
posite conditions—material and spiritual—and is necessarily therefore, in a sense, a compromise between them. Their union is the point of realizing power in the constitution of Man. Mind is the embodiment of the two; but Mind being subject to material conditions, is unable to comprehend the infinite, just in so far as it is subject to them. Hence we observe the reason why natures highly "spiritualized" are able to apprehend more of the unrealizable than others less so endowed. And the philosophy of Mind will necessarily be limited in its interpretation of the infinite, by those very finite conditions under which it is only known to us to exist. Reason will realize within it according to the measure of its relation to the material and spiritual conditions of which it is a compound, and Religion will claim for itself that vast field in the constitution of Man, of the unrealizable, of which it is the complement.

Were there no elements in Man's nature correlating mystery, there would be no basis for Religion. But the spirit-soul in Man is itself a mystery. It is of the nature of God. Wherefore Reason bows meekly before that great Unity of which it is but a human part.

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1 In the dual aspect of human nature.

2 There is, of course, an every-day false aspect of this truth. Spiritualism is a phase of it.
[The following chapter on Body, is an exposition of the relation of the material nature of man, to the feelings and the intellect. The subject has not been treated from a physiological stand-point, but from that of Body in relation to actual life. Body is the visible unity of the two previous natures explained,—and has its own individuality.]
BODY—THE MAN.

The faculties of the "Mind" are the products of the unity.

Granted that Man is the expression of three principles, and the origin of the faculties of Mind becomes instantly clear. For inasmuch as, no three things can live together in unity without begetting properties or conditions which are equally part of each, the functions and faculties of "mind" (in Man) must spring out of them. And these, as a matter of course, it would follow, must have some exact relation and belonging to each "principle" or thing, and, by the very nature of their existence in unity, beget powers as mysterious and various as the life itself.

So that here, at the outset, we have some tangible and intelligible outline of the fundamental constitution and nature of Mind, regarded not apart from any one part of Man, but in his visible and generic totality. And as we are in the habit of generally considering Man in relation to his mind, some observations upon such will here be in place.
If the principal faculty of soul, so far as we know it, is what we call intuition, and the principal faculty of reason, what we call reflection, and the principal faculty of body, what we call sensation, then, these three in their unity will beget the principal faculty of Mind, and this beyond all question is imagination. It is the interpretative power in Man, and it has more to do with his life than any other. Now it is clear that intuition, reflection, and sensation make up together the chief qualities of imagination, which pierces, observes, and shapes bodily life out of every form and condition of things around it, and which in its highest development has no tangible limit. We cannot regard imagination as apart from any one part of Man, and the effort to do this has been the chief cause of failure in the many endeavours to define it.

Again, if we take the "will," a word which represents the acting life in Man, we shall find that it likewise is a compound of the three chief acting powers in the principles which constitute his nature. The energy, aspiration, or intensity of the soul, is, so to speak, its vital power; the knowledge, enlightenment, or spiritual intelligence in Man, its immaterial substance; and the health and vigour and generic ability of the body, its arm, which acts and which is responsible for the deed.

Again, if we take "conscience," a third word which
BODY—THE MAN.

175

refers to the unity of Man, we shall find that it likewise

can only be explained as the outcome of all three, and

individual parts of his nature. For we cannot speak of

conscience without direct reference to "reason" (Coleridge
couples them both together without defining them,) and that it has an equal share in the "soul" is,
of course, also clear, and, that it is common to speak of
it as something within, and apart from the body, this

clearly is unsound. [see note.]

1 Conscience is the Moral Law: this is the stand-point of the

Materialist. But how can it be more "moral" than "immoral"

if all things are but the outcome of physical law? The immor-

ality itself would be physical law. Is not the definition self-

contradictory?

The late Professor Maurice, I think, in his book on The Con-

science identifies "conscience" with the Ego, the "I," in the

opening chapter of his book. But is this correct? The Will

is superior to the conscience, and independent of it: therefore

the Will is the "I," and the conscience the law to that I.

It has been objected that we say I will, and therefore that

"will" cannot possibly be the Ego. To this it may be answered,

that every reflective mind frequently says, I wonder that I don't

do so and so, implying thereby a dual Ego in our natures, which

makes the difficulty more confounding. We here however refer

to distinct principles of life within us, and therefore it is clear,

that the point of union of these principles can only be termed

the Ego or Self. Hence we affirm it to be the Will, without any

object in so doing beyond the recognition of what constitutes

our responsible selves. Man's deeds are his life, inasmuch as

they vitally affect his own material being—shaping or regulating

(mainly) the "molecular movements" which are supposed by
It may be said that these kinds of subdivisions of the nature of Man are very easy, if you will only make the base wide enough,\(^1\) [see note] as in calling Man triune, and then take some equivalent faculty in each principle and apply it to some one faculty of the unity (of Man): but it must be remembered that up to the present time there is absolute confusion in the use of terms in reference to Man: no one reads two books consecutively without finding them used in different, and sometimes opposite meanings, and that if this treatise only suggests a way in which such terms may come to be used correctly and orderly, and in what way Man may by degrees grow to make a cosmos in his understanding, some thinkers to rule him—\(\text{and more or less influencing others.}\)

In any additional sense to this, the word Man can only be used as expressing the Ego,\(^a\) our whole selves, and which is clearly shewn in the third verse of our preface.

A Berkeleian, we are aware, makes the Ego or Spirit, a "perceiving immaterial substance," but this definition can only apply to the divine conditions of our being. Hence we make the Will the Ego, as embracing, in itself, all aspects of our nature.

\(^1\) The "width" of the "base" must be the "width" of man's nature, or we start with an idea or a thought only, instead of a reality.

\(^a\) Observe, we always say \textit{in Man}, a clear proof of what we mean, and that we refer to the will.
instead of the chaos now reigning there, not a little, good will have been obtained. But the soundest defence of our method of procedure is, that it is impossible to explain the faculties of Man, or to interpret him in any other way.\footnote{To the objector or critic who recognizes himself to be the expression of distinct faculties or powers, the question will always remain—Can you put Man together in any other way?} The Analogy of Bishop Butler rests upon a similar basis—the fact that his is the only way in which we can interpret in their unity, natural and revealed religion.\footnote{I have left this paragraph in the text to show the reader how the work grew in my mind. I do not intend it to express any doubt of the truth of the interpretation of Man. The paragraphs respecting Mind, to page 174, were written before the two previous chapters on Love and Reason.}

[The bearings of such a view as this upon the nature of faith, will at once occur to the intelligent reader, as, it is clear, that if Man may be induced to regard his petty preconceptions, and differences from catholic christian truth, as the result of some ignorance, undevelopment, or one-sidedness of his nature, and that such can be proved or explained in time by means of a developed living philosophy of himself, there is hope that he will for his own well-being, take steps to remove the evil, and obtain the good.]

Were this treatise devoted to an analysis and exposition of the several faculties of Mind, it would here be
in place to treat of conditions of our unity out of which such spring, such as judgement, memory, reflection, intuition, imagination, conception, or the complement of the attributes of mind to be found in a standard metaphysical manual. Such work however would belong properly to a philosophy of Man: the present treatise is an exposition of the threefold constitution of his nature. We shall therefore now proceed, in this chapter on Body, in the same manner as in the previous chapters, and conclude it with some general remarks upon physiology, and the conditions of Body in relation to practical life.

Body, to Love.

That the Body has a ceaseless influence upon the Mind, as embracing in itself the spiritual agencies of both heart and intellect, is patent to every one. Nay some go so far as to say that, because such influence is paramount, therefore all things are but the expression of bodily conditions. We know too well how our thoughts and feelings are marred, checked, influenced by the infirmities of the Body, and in such states of infirmity or weakness are prone to believe that they are indeed the beginning and the end of them. But if we take our eye for a moment from the things of Sense, and look at the things of Reason or Love in relation to it, and to themselves, we shall see that all such feelings or thoughts are but temporary, not only because
they would of necessity vary and change with every “bodily state” in which we found ourselves, but because they correlate like changes and relations in Love and Reason to each other. For who does not know the effect of reasoning upon the nature of his love, and who has not realized the effect of his Love upon the notion, opinion, or belief of his Intellect? Our “opinions” upon things without us, vary as much perhaps according to the measure of feeling or intellect we bring to bear upon them, as to the “state” of our bodily health or sensation at any particular hour or period of our life. The inability to “think” in states of bodily depression does not disprove the reality of a principle of thought within us, but that the conditions in which it works are for the time being, out of order. And in like manner, the depression, weakness, doubt, and despondency of our love, during similar depressions of body, does not disprove the reality and oneness of that love, but only that it is unable to exert itself, on account of infirmity of the sense. We find ourselves as unequal to bodily acts, as we are to acts of reason or love, so that we might reverse the position and say, from the intellect or the heart, that the body must be dependent on these, for we, our inward selves, are observing its incapacity for action. All our powers, to be a unity, are, of necessity, concrete,—
equally dependent on each other; and the infirmities of the body rather go to prove its *inferiority* or subordination to the mind, inasmuch as the Mind\(^1\) is, in *itself*, in perfect health and order, when the body is incapable. The idea within us seems in perfect being, when the material which conveys it is in imperfect—the immaterial substance, as it were, watching and waiting its hour, when it may resume its purpose and function through and in the material which conveys it.\(^2\)

Though our Bodily quality may be said to be the expression of the quality of our Love, both are, as before shewn, independent\(^3\) of each other. And we ought rather to expect this *sameness* of condition and quality, in a body which is to be a perfect organism, than any dissimilarity in the quality or constitution of each. Finite power might force three *different* substances together as one, but only infinite could make three exactly similar (so similar that there is no line of demarcation between them) live together in unity. The unity would be no unity except it expressed mystery, for Man would separate its parts, and regard

\(^1\) Mind, in this sense, embracing (as according to our principles of interpretation of Man) the immateriality, the Reason-Love or Spirit-Soul in Man.

\(^2\) Or makes it (bodily) known.

\(^3\) Independent in kind, dependent in degree.
them for ever as distinct. Consequently it is clear, and at this point we catch a gleam of light into such mystery, that no triune nature of any kind could really be expressed except through the medium of insoluble mystery. God expresses his infinite power to us, in composing one concrete being, who is the expression of that which lie can observe, but never wholly interpret—that is divide. Could we anatomatize our inmost selves, we should be superior to the Original Power, whatever it be, which produced us; and our not being able to do so, leaves us below that Power, the measure of the mystery beyond our interpretation. And this is the measure of relation between the human and the divine.

And in like manner as the organic action of the Heart underlies all life in the Body, and precedes all things of Love, so ought we to expect that the necessities of the Body should precede the enjoyments and realizations of Love. For the present is the life of the Body (sense) as the future is the life of the Soul (love); the two are as opposite poles of one and the same thing, whose point of existence or balance is expressed at its centre, by another support or power (reason) which is of necessity part of each. All similes are but in part true; but, in the present instance it is obvious, that no straight line or pole could have an existence in space, without a support at its centre.
rather than demur to the fact, that the condition of our sensations would to an important extent, but not wholly, rule the action and desires of our inward selves. In proportion as they improved, rose, or strengthened, should we anticipate that our spiritual constitution would have freer play in our minds, and, vice versa, as they weakened and fell away, should we expect a like depression and lack of power in our mental property of being. And the sudden changes we might experience for better or worse in such changing conditions, we might attribute without fear to some correlating change in our bodily nature.

And, parenthetically, should it be said that this is nothing less than placing all things under the control of material conditions, we should have to answer, that it is so just in so far as our materiality concerns us, and no farther. No philosophy of man will make any progress which overlooks material conditions to their full extent and limit, and no philosophy would be true that attempted to do so. Our sole method of safe procedure in dealing with matters of the understanding is, to follow them through to their limit, taking in all conditions which arise before us, and when we come to a stop, to see where we are, and what we have arrived at. In this method, we proceed through matter into spirit, and find

1 spirit-soul, or the "life-in-law," or essentiality of our natures.
that when we have taken into account every material condition which can affect us, there still remains that important and insoluble mystery, ourselves.  

Matter we observe to be the body in which spirit dwells, though this spirit is none the less under the dominion of material change. We rise from the utmost allowance for every physical law, as affecting our being, which can be made, to discover that we have powers and motives for conduct (which alone is life proper) above and superior to these,—that we forget in conduct every trace of their existence or effect upon us—loving and reasoning, thinking and feeling, hoping and fearing, to all intents and purposes, independent of them.

The measure of the influence of Sense, therefore,

1 Life proper, perhaps, begins at the very point where our power of interpretation ceases. "There are powers in man, the activities of which lie beyond the sphere of consciousness."—Sir W. Hamilton. Fine confession for a philosopher!

2 Independent in kind, that is, as Life to Matter: dependent in degree, that is, as Matter to Life.

3 [And the truth of the limitation of our power of interpreting things comes out into stronger light when we endeavour to realize a substantive existence beyond our present state of being. Intuitively feeling as we do that there is some state of existence for Man in addition to the present one, we mentally try to follow the properties of our present life into such new state;—which endeavour takes the form
upon Love (soul) in relation with reason, is, perhaps, the measure of the vitality of our faith. For as Soul (love) represents within us the life of the future, exactly in proportion to its strength and power over us, would be the weakness and influence of Sense or sensation upon us, as men.—The history of the lives of saints shows the power of the will, (the ‘I’) over the laws of the body. These “laws” it has been well proved, can be wholly forgotten to have any existence, by those who are informed with life superior to them.

[Our “sentiments” are the expression of our sensations, or first material feelings, without the real or sub-

of a “disembodied spirit” floating through space, or of a soul disengaged which has past into Hades, or to God, and awaits only the time of its renewing its known personality. But when we turn to life, and see before our eyes, a touch upon the brain of another, cause that life to cease, without the slightest known or realizable change in its nature, beyond the cessation of life, we have, for the moment, grave doubts as to whether the life contains any property of being beyond its present self,—whether all our belief, and trust in an immaterial soul, is not a beautiful vision, a dream that has passed away. Not till we realize the fact, that, so far as human knowledge can help us in such matter, the resumption of life will occur under parallel conditions to those which originated us,—that the immaterial, by virtue of laws which transcend human interpretation,
stantive truth of our intellects. When this substantive truth is added to them, they become reason[able opinions, and with the addition of emotional sympathies, life facts. So that sentiments taken in themselves, (without reason, which we shall come to shortly) and without emotional truth, cannot but be "superficial," by which we arrive at a definition of the fact of what they are always considered to be. Sentiment, we know in life, goes but little way, and is apt to produce, if left to

will grow together and form life, exactly parallel to the accretion of kindred atoms of material being,—that the spirit-soul being the divine aspects or states of human condition, will in a higher range of law, correlate in personality the personality of reason-love,—that as the man is stayed up from the material by properties of divine element within him, so will the Man-in-God be re-formed and re-united by the central or essential conditions of eternal Being.

Time, we are apt to forget, disappears at the hour of death, and eternity is the expression of past and future in one. Hence, all the laws which have affected our growth in Time, will become, to us, merged in one indivisible whole. And the conditions of matter which supported us for a Time, will be as the rind or shell, which encased the ever-living principle of life within us. We cannot conceive an end of the principle of Life: therefore we cannot conceive an ultimate end to ourselves.

It is not to be expected that our human and finite powers
itself, more harm than good. But add to it the equalising expression of the other principles of our nature, and it becomes helpful and necessary in every active way.

Body, to Reason.

The relation and distinction of Brain to and from Reason is as the material to the immaterial. Through the nervous system and the brain, not only are all modes should enable us to realize a single fact beyond their own nature, or that the finite in man could grasp one condition of the infinite. Those who do away with the divine element in man are perfectly right in referring everything to the material. For the "human" could have no existence save between the material and the divine. The divine is the support of the human, and the material the base of (in man) the divine. Hence, without the divine, man is clearly only animal. And as such, his life would, in its entirety, be only the expression of animal being. Our ideas of "humanity" would be a dream, except in so far as they involved and contained the divine. Hence we arrive at a distinct notion of the substantive value of religion in relation to things present,—and how Nature herself, in expressing the will and opinion of her Cause, in what we call "laws," correlates the essential or divine in Man. To "fall," is to disbelieve in an infinite condition of Life; to disbelieve, is to fall from the life of eternal truth.]
of thought indissolubly associated with Matter—believed
to correlate each movement of Thought—but the union
of Matter with Spirit, Object with Subject, is complete.
Were this treatise devoted to an analysis of the condi-
tions of Matter in relation with Thought, I should now
introduce the evidence of eminent physicians and phy-
siologists, such as the late Sir Henry Holland, Professor
Huxley, Dr. Laycock, and others, bearing upon such
aspect of the question, and follow out their opinions
with that degree of interest and consideration which
such nature of observation induces, upon the relation of

1 Dr. Laycock.

2 It is a pregnant fact that in Holy Writ it is nowhere stated
not to be so.

In their works:—"Chapters on Mental Physiology. Lay
Sermons, Essays, and Reviews. Mind and Brain, or the Corre-
lations of Consciousness and Organization.

Distinctions between Emotion and Sensation.
The probing of a wound by another, which we observe, causes
a keen sensation through a sensitive body, but does not cause
an emotion, or stir the heart. A second and entirely new
movement must arise to cause this.
The hearing of a frightful accident sends a thrill through the
nervous system of the body, but causes no movement of thought
or feeling proper. Both of these begin in a new internal move-
ment, akin to perception.
The witnessing of a great display of muscular power causes a
corresponding movement in the body, but does not raise a
single intelligent thought or feeling proper.
And, vice versa, a purely intellectual oration, rather cramps
Matter to Reason. But the reader will observe that, inasmuch as this part of my treatise is not devoted to such an analysis, but to the consideration of Body, as the third living principle in the constitution of Man’s nature, I should be wholly wrong in treating my subject solely from a physiological stand-point. We are concerned with Body, as the visible expression of immaterial conditions within us, equally in connection with material conditions,—and in such light we shall proceed to view it. And the most significant difference between this part of our work and what has gone before, will be the total absence of anything relating to the emotions, affections, or love, and to all the (personal) actualities of life. Hence the reader will judge for himself how far these are separable within us.

We have shewn in our preface that instead of there being a “fourth” in the constitution of Man, summed up under the term “Mind,” there are only three conditions of life in unity. We have shewn also that the up the bodily energies than otherwise, whereas a purely emotional oration disperses, pro. tem., all intellectual action proper.

—The reader can “verify” these remarks by observation of the workings of his own nature.

And should it be observed that all this is so simply because different sets of nerves in the body are affected, this would be a very superficial observation. The question would still remain—Why is it that such different outward circumstances differently affect us? Simply because, it may be answered, they are
term Body, or Materiality, properly expresses the “third” in such unity, and we have, in this way, exposed the error of introducing imaginary quantities. We have made use of no term in our exposition which does not express some real quantity in our materiality, or some yearning, power, or want in our spiritual conditions,—and therefore, as a need within us, taken for a reality of our natures. We have explained each term as we proceeded, and kept carefully clear of all merely technical terms. And now, in these expositions, under the heading of Body, which of course could not explain itself, we make use of our “knowing” faculty—the principle of Reason—to relate what we have to say upon such.

We have seen that intellectual action proper is wholly dissociated or distinct from the action of the feelings, and that a revulsion in feeling, a novel attachment, a “new heart,” does not alter in the least a scientific fact of our intellect, such as the law of gravitation. We have observed also that the “life” in man, is none the

“addressed” to different parts of our organism. But this would explain nothing. For, how can things wholly without us, be said to be “addressed” to any one part of us? There can be but one answer to such observed fact, and that is, the nervous conditions of our organism are special, and made to respond, not only to the needs of the organism, but to the affairs of life.

The sensuous nerves are in close connection with the intel-
less modified or qualified by such altered condition of feeling, and that his opinions, views of life in relation to practice, habits of thought, and general conduct, are vitally affected by such inward change. In like manner, therefore, should we be prepared to suspect, that all the changing conditions of this “vehicle of sense,” would equally modify and qualify our modes of apprehending such intellectual knowledge, as equally the latent or active conditions and affections of the heart. A revolution in belief of both heart and intellect, we have observed, dominates and orders the whole life of the body,—except in so far as such life is automatic and instinctive,—and the waning or change in such belief gives freer play to the impulses, desires, and conditions of the sense. The question then becomes an all-important one, as to how far each principle or condition of life in us, is to share in our daily conduct, for without such knowledge, we should have no guide through the ocean of probabilities, temptations, and ideas, daily moving around us. This problem, we

The Hermit, page 20.

The intellectual are superior to the sensuous, and can affect their action at any moment. A sensual thought can be checked almost instantaneously by an intellectual one,—it is only the automatic or vibratory motion of the sensuous nerves which continues after the “will” has acted against it.

The nerves of the heart as related to the emotions seem to
have affirmed, can only be solved through the medium of conscience, which we believe to be the one high road to all true practical and self knowledge.

That the conditions or "states" of Bodily life are mainly under the direction of the notion, opinion, or "law" of our intellect, is patent to everyone, who observes closely the workings of his own nature. Necessity has certainly much to do with the shaping of our actions, but this may be rightly called the automatic, or instinctive, aspect of our conduct, as possessing in itself nothing more than appetite, or unintelligent need. Add to a man's nature one new atom of true knowledge, and you qualify, more or less, his previous notions of necessity. The history of the past becomes legible to him only through the medium of intellectual knowledge, and by the aid of a little "science" you open the eye of his understanding to the wonders and works of God. Hence, we observe, that intellectual knowledge proper is a fixed and relative power in relation to the things of Sense.

[Again, the "life" in the heart of Man may be stand quite apart from the sensuous and intellectual nerves, and have, as it were, a life to themselves. This is why, perhaps, so many men live lives wholly without reference to the things of the "heart." Yet these nerves or conditions of organism, when in action, have a power over and superior to the others.

A physiologist may be able to explain these life-facts more fully.
observed by the true student of human nature, to have a marvellous influence over every action and habit of the Body. Creeds may be true or false, but the state of a man's feeling is a potent ever-shaping condition in the hourly affairs of the most mechanical or ignorant life. If the "heart" is at ease, and in healthy action, few things come wrong to a man, in the wear and tear of the world; if the heart is empty or falsified, everything is a burden, and seemingly contrary to what we ought to do. The base of the life is unsound: it is but a question of how long it will endure,—buttressed, it may be, for a time, by false and extraneous conditions.

The life and law in the body of man constitute the unity of ourselves. By the observance of this truth we keep close to the facts of our creed, and follow out the development of all after conditions. Life itself is but the sum total of these three—Life in its infinite variety, power, advancement, and aim. [see notes and].

The future philosophy of Man will be built up upon this basis.

All dramatic work, truly interpreted, is an exposition

1 Form, or order.

2 "Now, it cannot be doubted that this love of unity may lead to an erroneous application of the fundamental truth or idea to religion, sociology, and scientific research. In the first place, it has led men to forget the antithetic or correlative truths, ideas, and desires—the idea of the Many, of freedom (or change), of contingency. Secondly, it has been erroneously ap-
of different "states" of life, arising out of the three principles of Man's nature. These states are, of course, infinitely variable, according to the quantity and quality of condition they contain. The "law" preponderating over the "life" gives the intellectual nature; the life preponderating over the law gives the emotional nature. And the body, preponderating over both these internal conditions, gives the phlegmatic, or animal, nature. Such definitions can however only be taken as guides, not rules, in the interpretation of our natures.

The qualifying distinctions at hand are the effects of applied to things not in relation to each other. Of the latter class is the instance mentioned by Reid, of a musician who thought there could be only three parts in harmony—to wit, bass, tenor, and treble—because there are but three persons in the Trinity; and of which a thousand similar instances might be quoted. Of the former are numerous theories in civil and ecclesiastical government, the base of which is a principle of enforced unity amongst heterogeneous or irrelative elements—or, in other words, theories of civil and religious autocracy; and it is often manifested as insanity as well as error."—Mind and Brain, vol. II., p. 129.—Dr. Laycock.

I have introduced this note from Dr. Laycock to show the danger of regarding things only in a threefold light. Man's nature can only be fully expressed under the word complex. It is a trinity and unity in relation to each other, a trinity and a duality in relation to each other, a duality and a unity in relation to each other. And as each and all of these are living conditions, they may be expressed (as they do express life) in the converse way. Hence, the inevitable result is infinite variability.
education proper, and of association, upon the life and character of Man. Indeed, so far do these affect and rule him, that they may practically be termed life itself. In the body we live, suffer, or enjoy, as the case may be, but the spiritual or immaterial conditions of our being are the ruling power or passion within us. How far these are made, moulded, or determined, by education, it would be impossible to state. But, that a true education would correctly make and mould such is self-evident. Hence, we may observe, that it is not the bodily conditions only which rule us—not what we are by material constitution—but that which we imbibe, learn, or hope in, externally to our bodily selves. And this influence is probably double that of our material natures, inasmuch as our affections and intelligence are two to one to our bodily self. Whatever therefore is true education, and the like, it is clearly paramount as concerning the facts of our daily existence.

That our bodily conditions of life are strangely affected by our spiritual, has been well, and frequently observed. A doubt, or illusion, respecting states of bodily health, has been known of itself to cause physical disorder, without any derangement in the body itself. The removal of such fancy has proved the cure, and all symptoms of functional disorder have disappeared. A recurrence of the same belief has again
produced the like malady, followed by similar results. And that such fancy was not in itself the result only of physical conditions, has been observed in the fact that advice (false or true) of the nature or quality of such malady, has modified the state of a patient’s health. The effect of the “spirits” upon bodily states is a common observation, and these are generally mainly ruled and regulated by circumstances without ourselves. It would seem as though the spiritual (intelligent) nature in man, had a power or pressure upon the material organ in connection with it, forcing it into healthy or abnormal action—aff ecting the molecular movements in the brain; and producing thereby an influence in and of itself.

To sum up our remarks therefore upon Body in relation to Reason, in the nature of Man, we would affirm, that our sentiments, senses, and sensations, constitute the triple (material) unity of bodily “life” in Man. Our sentiments, as we have before shewn, express themselves under what is generally known as the superficial

\[1\text{ If it be objected that Animation cannot be said to have “life” apart from Life proper, then it may be answered, that nothing in Nature which can be strictly named Law can be said to be living. Science must be content to own all her “laws” as without life.}

Observe, how many of us, every week of our lives, individualize, not to say worship, this word Science, (Intellect).
of a man—thought, which is not thought proper, but more akin to what Hartley has termed ideation, the closest connection between thought and sensation—our senses are the individuality or being of the Body itself, and the inlets and outlets to spiritual conditions—and our sensations are the automatic or purely material parts of our totality, whose vitality seems that of an electric force or forces energizing through otherwise inanimate conditions. From Spirit through Matter we learn to know something of the nature of Spirit, by observing its workings in material conditions; from Matter through Spirit we learn to

1 "Again, in entire accordance with Descartes' affirmation, it is certain that the modes of motion which constitute the physical basis of light, sound, and heat, are transmuted into affections of nervous matter by the sensory organs. These affections are, so to speak, a kind of physical ideas, which are retained in the central organs constituting what might be called physical memory, and may be combined in a manner which answers to association and imagination, or may give rise to muscular contractions, in those "reflex actions" which are the mechanical representatives of volitions."—On Descartes' Discourse.—Professor Huxley.

2 "When we say we can recall the sensation of hunger, we verbally confound our power of thinking a thing with our power of feeling it. There is in truth a generic difference and distinction between Thought and Sensation which it is fatal to overlook; nor could it have been overlooked but for the introduction and adoption of that much-abused word 'idea' instead of thought." History of Philosophy, vol. II., p. 338.—Mr. Lewes.
know something of the nature of Matter—the latest secrets in the conditions of Animation.¹

Body, and "will"—in the unity of Man.

The relation of Body to will, in the unity of our natures, is that of a principle to a power, in connection with each other. Though our bodily self has an important influence in all matters of conduct, it is clear that the will, by putting it to the test, is paramount, either for good or for evil. Nor can it be supposed that the measure or quality of such "will" is dependent solely upon bodily conditions, for the palpable reason that it has the power to destroy the body. It is the belief, or motive, ruling in the spiritual conditions of Man’s nature, which principally makes and supports the "will": remove these, and the body is dominant. So that according to the measure of a man’s true knowledge is the measure, probably, of his true use of "will," and of due recognition of bodily needs.

It would therefore be probably true that the lower a

¹ Flesh, or vegetable, as eaten by man, is not life, but soon through solution, is assimilated into conditions of life. The extraneous elements pass off, and become re-conditioned by nature. And we are prevented from being misled by such special discoveries, by remembering, what is the very basis of this treatise, that Feeling itself is Life, Intelligence itself is Life, Animation itself is Life. A proof of their individuality within us is in their power to negative each other (through the medium of "will") in conduct,
life in the scale of true intelligence, the lower would be
the bodily or animal conditions of such life, through
the non-use or abuse of (unintelligent) will. A false
intelligence, or mistaken interpretation of the nature of
things, would produce a false or superstitious action
through the medium of will, and, vice versa, an en-
lightened or spiritual understanding, a clear and
pure use of the transcendent powers, for good or
for evil, in will. But that the Bodily nature of Man,
would always exercise, in a perfect interpretation of
the constitution of things, its own fair share in the
action and conduct of every-day life, is self-evident.

Body, and "conscience"—in the unity of Man.

And precisely as this will, the "life" in the unity
of Man's nature, embodied in conduct the true interpre-
tations of conscience, the "law," so would the substan-
tive conditions of the personal life itself, grow on and
out in the truths which its own true development em-
bodyed. The growth in spiritual truth would be the
growth in bodily life, and, vice versa, the growth in
individual manhood would be the development of the
will of God. By the embodiment of the "heart" in
the positive conditions of life, man would come to
realize himself, and discover at the same time, the pre-
sence and will of his Creator.

1 Or, what the Germans would call, subjective outgrowth.
Physiology.

We have shewn that Psychology proper is the relation, by the principle of Reason in Man, of the various states, conditions, and realizations of Feeling,¹ and that Metaphysic is the critical examination and definition, by Reason proper, of the totality of Man's immaterial nature, in relation with, but more especially, in distinction from his material conditions of being. It remains therefore to define Physiology (in relation to Man)² as the examination, by the principle of Reason, in all their various relations, states, and details, of the properties, functions, and being of Animation (body), apart from Feeling and Thought proper, which in their unity make up the totality, Man. So many and various are the aspects from which this vast subject may be treated, that a philosophy of physiology seems almost necessary at the outset, to explain and point out the various points of view from which the material constitution of man may be studied. With such a work before us, we might see for the first time how to fuse all such several and distinct considerations into an organic whole: and it would also tend to lift the mind above the material level of things, and to show in

¹ How far philosophers are in the right in using the term Psychology in relation to Sensation, remains to be seen.
² And I am not here concerned with anything without him.
clear light the relative influence and importance of our
spiritual (immaterial) and bodily natures.

That the fundamental basis upon which we have
written this treatise is implied, though not explained, in
the time-honoured phrase, "the physical, moral, and
intellectual natures of man,"¹ will be recognized by
everyone at the outset of these observations upon the
physical aspects of human nature. It would therefore
perhaps at first sight, and essentially viewed, become a
question of what, or how much, of these several condi-
tions of life within him, a man made use of in his
physiological studies, as respecting the ultimate mode,
and style and character of his work. It is a common
observation that the non-use or abuse of an organ or
limb of the body, ends in a lessening or weakening of
such organ or limb, and the parallel might hold true (so
far as any parallels are true) in reference to the higher

¹ Dr. Combe, whose excellent work on the Principles of
Physiology is now, perhaps, out of date, (though none the
less sound, and always true), says in his second chapter,
entitled, Causes of the Neglect of Practical Physiology in
Social Life—Slow and Insidious Origin of Disease:—" 'It is
much more rational,' " says Professor Mulder of Utrecht, "' to
prevent than to cure disease. For myself, if it were a
matter of choice, I would much rather see preservers of health
than curers of disease among us, although it is certainly most
desirable that there should be both. It is unfortunately the
considerations of physiology itself. According to the measure of the true use of his whole self which a man exercised in his studies of Matter, would be the measure, or chief virtue, or dominant "spirit," of the results of such study, and of its influence upon others. I of course refer here to the philosophical and educational aspects of physiology, taken in itself as a mode of explaining both Man and Nature.

That the human mind, divested of all associations and conditions of practical life, will, in its study of Matter, evolve just the leading or dominant quality of the nature from which it originates, is patent to everyone, inasmuch as the removal of such conditions (which alone are life proper, in relation to past, present, or future) leaves naked to the impressions of sense, the intellectual property in living association with matter. Man may become probably as much "Matter" as he may become
"Spirit," by merging his whole nature in some one special and individual mode of thought. Indeed, precisely as mania (to use another forcible symbol) is frequently produced by the morbid dwelling upon some one aspect or condition of things, so may, perhaps, the human mind, by setting aside all the realities of life and nature for which it practically exists, end by evolving for itself some one death-in-life philosophy of the nature and origin of all things.

These general observations are introduced to point to the probable nature or cause of the wide divergence of thought and opinion existing now-a-days, among physiologists themselves, upon the origin of Man, the nature of Matter, the nature of Force, and the like; and among the public generally, who base their opinions mainly upon physiological evidence. At any rate, it is development and efficiency of almost any organ and quality, has often been the theme of admiration and surprise. There can scarcely be a doubt that were physiological principles followed to an equal extent in the cultivation of the physical, moral, and intellectual powers of man, a corresponding degree of success would reward our exertions for his improvement."—p. 14. We endorse every word of the passage; and think if speculative physiology would turn its attention to the nature and origin of disease, and to the prevention of it, a vast amount of good might be done.
true that, apart from any and all such studies, the mind of man gradually grows ignorant, or loses sight, of the powers it possesses, and on this account it would seem more rational to surmise, that the essential condition of things, the truths of life, are hidden from our view within,—instead of do not exist—and are only to be obtained—as everything else only is to be obtained—by working for them.

We would therefore surmise that a true (philosophical) physiology of man will only be obtained by a true, complete, and concrete exercise of the whole powers of life within him, whatever those powers be, in relation to present or future, in relation to life, in relation to faith, in relation to all things which make up the sum total of human being.\(^1\) By putting together in their living unity the several forms and phases of thought and opinion respecting the essential conditions and nature of Matter, the probable origin and constitution of Force, the nature and effect of such Force in and upon Man, in relation with his intelligent faculties, his moral powers, and his will, we may come to know something more of the truth of the nature of such things than we are at present aware of.

\(^1\) Practically viewed, that every educated medical man should take into consideration the moral and intellectual powers (influences) in dealing with physical disorder,—which cannot be properly cured without reference to such.
That the principle of Reason in ourselves, what from an analytical point of view we have here defined as Law, fixed in its nature, but relative in its action according to the conditions in and among which it works, would be the starting-point of a concrete (philosophical) physiology of Nature and of things, will be clear to all who have followed closely the positions already taken up in this work. For by its expression within us, do we only know anything in any real form; hence our knowledge of the life and evolutions of Matter must be dependent upon it. We have here however a universal point of departure, for every man's Reason, as Law, is constituted the same; and therefore, to take a complete and general survey of the conditions and modes of Matter, everyone must similarly exercise this essential power within himself. No changes in organic conditions, we observe, alter the essential constitution of this living Law within us; only derangement does so, and derangement, as we have before observed, is but another name for dislocation—a rupture, removal, breakage (or decay) in our bodily conditions of being. Dissolve these conditions entirely, and death follows: hence what remains of us after death is the inherently true and essential condition of Life—that which by organic dismemberment has been set free.  

1 that is to say, the type or figure of the life remains, which can take form again at any moment,
It therefore follows that a concrete (or apart from a special and individual) physiology of the nature of Man, can only be obtained by a constant reference to this living Law within us, for immediately we regard the subject apart from this, we lapse into special processes, individual cases, and the like, and lose sight of our standard of associative physical truth—the essential Law itself—which all have in common. Here we have a common stand-point, and not one which makes the discovery of disorder its ultimate goal, but rather a knowledge of perfect order of the living organism, in relation to that round which it centres itself. Physiology might here create its "ideal"—its court of equity—to which to refer all its ultimate differences.

Descending a step lower in the scale of observation, the first thing we notice is, that all bodily states, properties, and conditions, are intuitively referred by the human mind to questions of "law," though from where or whence this notion of law itself has been derived, few concern themselves to answer. Hence we have hitherto in physiological enquiry, started with an assumed position, (and a right one, though unexplained) that law is the ultimate nature of all organic bodies.¹

From this point we descend to analysis, and begin to

¹ This is a sweeping statement, but I believe it to be profoundly true, and that it may be verified by observation of the workings of our own natures. The gist of the whole proof lies
enquire into the individual states of individual substances. We apportion to ourselves distinct spheres of inquiry, and labour on in these with only occasional reference (if such) to any other mode of observation. And probably we push our special conclusions to unwarrantable limits. Absorbed with the importance of that we ourselves are concerned with, and seeing clearly its vast influence and bearing upon the nature of things within and without us, and, may-be, with some eye to ambitious results, we force our special (discoveries) realizations out of all due proportion to things in the fact that, after a man has given up the chief wishes of his heart, (as respecting this world,) which we have affirmed throughout is Life proper, there remains to him the free use of his Intellect, though, if he observes closely the truth, without the "light" of concrete or life-truths. Consequently, Intellect is, verily, not ideally only, a step lower in the grade of creation or essential condition of things. It is a step nearer to Matter, which is, in itself, wholly dissociated from Feeling or Soul. Hence Law (Intecllect) must be the highest condition or "ultimate nature" of all organic bodies. And the "life" they possess, which we have affirmed throughout, must bear the same relation to the "life" of Intellect (Law) as the life of Law (Intecllect) bears to the Life itself, Feeling, or Soul.

- It is a common observation with able critics upon much intellectual argumentation, that there is little or no "light" in it. The fact is, the essential conditions of life are not seldom absent. And this is explained as above.

- And this is (shows) the relation of Knowledge to Life,
as a whole, to the melancholy perversion of true human thought, and the healthy progress of society.

Hence we would observe, and with no other object do we make these remarks, that the one all-important point to keep in view is the speciality of our work, and of its relation to things as a whole. It is for want of this observation, and for, perhaps, a little more candour of statement at the outset of our publications—such as an abstract (by way of preface) of what we mean its contents to convey in relation to a whole—whether of Man or of Nature, how far we mean them to explain the problems of both or of either,—that much mischief is caused, and no little of that a priori infidelity, which, according to an eminent philosophical physiologist, it now requires a Bishop Butler to cure.

M. Taine, in his late work, On Intelligence, has given us a vast mass of observation upon the physical aspects of human knowledge. After defining the elements of knowledge, in their order, as Signs, Images, and Sensa-

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1 Professor Huxley.

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2 Much of the philosophical portion of this work appears to have been written against the metaphysical "entities" and "phantoms" which M. Taine found in his way, in his vigorous analysis of Man (or the most of him) into an "event." The following quotations show what analysis (as well as metaphysics) can do when left to itself.

In his Chapter upon The Human Person and the Physio-
tions, we have a Book upon The Physical Conditions of Mental Events; then a Part on The Different Kinds of Knowledge; then a Book on The Knowledge of Bodies; then a Book on The Knowledge of Mind; and finally, by way of conclusion, a Book on The Knowledge of General Things. Up to the last page of this work, we seem to have been dealing with the whole Man, more especially as the conditions of life, known severally under the terms mind, soul, spirit, body, and matter, are dealt with occasionally in turn, and either explained to the Author's satisfaction, or summarily dismissed as only "events" in the order of human existence. But

logical Individual, M. Taine says:—"Hitherto we have considered our events, without occupying ourselves with the being they appertain to, and which each of us calls himself. We must now examine this being. Philosophers usually give it the principal place, and a place wholly distinct. 'I experience sensations,' say they, 'I have recollections, I combine images and ideas, I perceive and conceive external objects. This Ego or self, unique, persistent, and always the same, is something different from my sensations, recollections, images, ideas, perceptions, and conceptions, which are various and transient. Besides this, it is capable of experiencing some of these and producing the rest; and thus it possesses powers or faculties. Now these faculties reside in it in a stable manner; by them it feels, recollects, perceives, conceives, combines images and ideas; it is, then,
here we are told—at the 542nd page—that there is another region into which M. Taine will not enter—namely, that of metaphysics: and this we are left to suppose is a new order or province of Life,—namely, Thought proper.

It would be beside the purpose of this treatise to make any remarks of the nature of criticism upon the contents of this work. M. Taine has advanced our knowledge of the physical conditions of mental life, and so far as this is serviceable to us, we ought to be grateful to him. He has also helped to bring into more prominent light the "life" of the Body, towards which realization physical science has of late years been grow-

an efficient and productive cause. Thus they arrive at considering the Ego as a subject or substance, having for its distinctive qualities certain faculties, and they suppose that, beneath our mental events, there are two kinds of explicative entities, first the powers or faculties experiencing or producing them, then the subject, substance, or soul possessing these faculties.

Now these are metaphysical entities, pure phantoms, begotten of words, and vanishing as soon as we examine rigorously the meanings of the words. What is a power?—A despotic sovereign has absolute power; this means that, as soon as he commands a thing to be done, whatever it may be, the confiscation of property, the death of a man, it will
ing; and as this is the “principle” of our triune existence with which we are here concerned, an allusion to M. Taine’s work, however cursory, is in place. We would however offer a well-meant protest against the title of the book, as conveying in itself, to the uninitiated, more than the Author intends it to convey; and we would also affirm, by way of qualification of the work, that there is a whole philosophy of the nature of things, in relation to Man, lying within the sphere of M. Taine’s observation. Language must have a more definite meaning than M. Taine allows to it; and such being the case, our point of departure from M. Taine, so far as a philosophy of the living Man is concerned, would be at the first paragraph of his

be done.—A constitutional king has limited power only; this means that if he commands certain things, the dismissal of a minister, the promulgation of a law, they will be done; but that, if he orders other things, such things, for instance, as we mentioned just now, they will not be done; this is all that is meant. All that the word power here denotes is a constant connection between one fact, the order of a prince, and certain other facts following it. And so again we say that a healthy man has power to walk and a paralytic man has not; this simply means to say that, in the healthy man, the resolution to walk is certainly followed by the movement of his legs, and this resolution is never so followed in the case of the paralytic; here again power is
preface. Intelligence, Intellect, Understanding, these three words are here taken as equivalent; and we believe we have already shewn their true and several relations to the "mind" of Man.

It is an old observation and experiment, in dealing with special processes which attempt to explain the whole nature of things, or of Man, to pit one against another, and leave them to demolish themselves. Positivism, for instance, could scarcely be said to have anything in common with M. Taine's mode of procedure, from which the notion of law as law is necessarily (or

but the perpetual connexion between one fact which is antecedent and another which is consequent.

So again with force. A particular horse has force enough to draw a cart weighing five thousand kilogrammes, and has not force enough to draw the same cart when more heavily loaded. A particular stream of water has force enough to move a wheel, and has not force enough to move a heavier wheel. This means that, when the horse's muscles are contracted, the cart of five thousand kilogrammes will be moved, and the other cart will not be moved; that when the stream falls on the boards of the wheels, the first one will turn and the second one will not. Here we have connexions only, one between the muscular contractions of the horse and the movement of the cart; the other between the stream of water and the wheel turning round. A particular force exists when a particular connexion exists; it ceases when this connexion

144
nearly) excluded, by the very fact of the resolution of all mental processes into a mere series of "events."
For by the term law, we imply an exact, realizable, or measureable quantity of something, which can be ascertained and made known, either in the living organism or Nature herself. But an "event" signifies little more than "effect," without reference to any intelligent influence, or law-forming property at work. Yet strangely enough we find this very condition at work in Nature—in shaping the crystal, in moulding the creature, in enlightening Man. This gradual condition of intelligence. When two events are connected, and the second of them has a particular magnitude when compared to others similar to it, we say that the force has a particular magnitude. When the magnitude of the second event is double, the magnitude of the force is double. The force of the muscular contraction is double, if the cart moved weighs ten thousand kilogrammes instead of five thousand; the force of the stream of water is double, if the wheel set turning is twice as heavy as the first wheel. In general, if we are given two facts, one antecedent and the other consequent, connected by a constant link, we term the particularity of the antecedent to be always followed by the consequent, force, and we measure this force by the magnitude of the consequent.

The names power and force, then, do not denote any mysterious being, any occult essence. When I say that I have
gence which he absorbs, and converts into form and fact for his own benefit, must be part of the nature from which he absorbs it. And its condition of "law" must be equally part of the same condition. Either Man himself must be a creator, and make that which has no existence apart from himself, or the conditions of formation which he makes use of must be latent in that from which he originates. The one supposition makes him a god, the other leaves him a God-made man. Hence, it is clear, that the resolution of mental

power or force to move my arm, I merely wish to say that my resolution to move my arm is constantly followed by the movement of my arm. In fact, if, with the aid of physiology, I examine this operation somewhat more closely, I find in it a number of intermediate steps—a molecular movement in the cerebral lobes, another molecular movement in the cerebellum, another molecular movement propagated along the marrow, and thence into the motor nerves of the arm, a contraction of the muscles of the arm, a displacement of their points of attachment. I have power to move my arm in the same sense that a person working the telegraph at Marseilles has power to move the telegraph needles at Paris. Between my resolution and the displacement of my arm, there are all the intermediate steps enumerated; between the operator at Marseilles and the needle at Paris, there are a thousand kilometres of telegraph wire. It is a constant particularity that the signals of the worker are followed a thousand kilometres
processes into "events," is only a *reductio ad absurdum* of Man's own constitutional powers.

"Power" and "force," therefore, (to refer to the quotation below,) like "faculty," "principle," and "substance," have relative and distinct meanings, and though nothing in themselves except a relation (so far as the whole Man is concerned) are nevertheless equally parts of the conditions of life or states in Man. And they rise to the level of law, precisely at that point or juncture in the conditions of his life at which they are

off by the play of the indicating needles; it is a constant particularity that my resolution is followed, through ten indispensable intermediate links, by the movement of my arm. There is nothing more than this.—Unfortunately, of this particularity, which is a relation, we construct, by a mental fiction, a substance; we describe it by a substantive name, force or power; we attribute qualities to it; we say that it is greater or less; we employ it in language as a subject; we forget that its existence is wholly verbal, that it derives it from ourselves, that it has received it by way of loan, provisionally, for convenience of discourse, and that, being simply a relation, it is nothing in itself. Led away by language and custom, we suppose there is something real in it, and reasoning from false premises, increase our error at every step.—In the first place, as the being in question is a pure nonentity, we can find nothing in it but emptiness; this is why, by an illusion of which we have already seen instances, we make
capable of entering "form," at any given circumstance, or in any relative states or conditions of life. The will is powerless in man until it embodies itself in act: here it becomes visible, and its freedom made known. By assuming form, it expresses the condition of the inward, unknown and unrealized till such form is assumed. The philosophy therefore of Mind, apart from Life, can only make will not free, seeing that it deals only with a state of things within the actualities of human nature. Mr. Spencer, therefore, in his able and remarkable work, the Principles of Psychology,¹ very naturally comes to

¹ Much of this work, I venture to think, will shortly be treated of as belonging to Physiology.

of it a pure essence, unextended, incorporeal, in short, spiritual.—In the second place, as the event only arises through this force, the event is wanting if the force is wanting; the force is the cause of the event. Besides this, it precedes and survives the event; it is permanent while the event is transient; the event may be repeated or changed, the force is always one and the same; it may be compared to an inexhaustible stream, of which the event is a wave. Hence we come to consider it as an essence of a higher order, placed above the facts, stable, monadic, creative. From its model, philosophers go on to people the universe with similar entities. And yet, it is in itself nothing more than a character, a property, a particularity of a fact, the particularity of being always followed by another fact, a particularity de-
the conclusion that the will is not free, seeing that he deals only with the passive conditions of our being. And the same remarks will hold good with respect to the distinctive faculties of mind, which must be under some positive law or order of association, in order to express themselves in any way as distinct. This law is their formation or individuality, without which we could possess no distinctive faculties at all. "Events" as mere "effects" would leave us but a chaotic jumble of past impressions, out of which no knowledge, or fruit or flower could be gathered.

We have some sympathy with M. Taine in his untached from the fact by abstraction, set apart by fiction, kept in a distinct state by means of a distinct substantive name, till the mind, forgetting its origin, believes it to be independent, and becomes the dupe of an illusion of its own effecting.

II. The fall of this illusion causes the fall of another. "Power," say the spiritualists, "identifies itself with the being possessing it.... That something by which we can ought not to be considered as distinct from the soul." [Quotation from Garnier.] The faculties and forces of the Ego, then, are the Ego itself, or at least a portion of the Ego; many spiritualists go so far as to admit, with Leibnitz, that the Ego is nothing more than a force, and that in general the notions of force and substance are equivalent. Now we have just seen that powers and forces are but verbal entities
slaughter upon the Ego, so far as it is taken to imply a substantive something in our natures apart from our bodily selves. This notion is probably as old as the "substance and accidents" philosophy, and the Analysts have done good work in demolishing the idols of the Schoolmen. For to imply a something within us apart from our bodily selves, is to create a dual condition of life in Man, but how such opposite conditions exist together in unity, it would be impossible to explain. If the substance or Ego be something wholly distinct from the Body or accidental self, how are they

and metaphysical phantoms. So far, therefore, as it is made up of forces and powers, the Ego itself is but a verbal entity and metaphysical phantom. That inner something of which the faculties were different aspects, disappeared with them; the one permanent substance, distinct from events, is seen to vanish and re-enter the region of words. All that remains of us are our events, sensations, images, recollections, ideas, resolutions: these are what constitute our being; and the analysis of our most elementary judgments shows, in fact, that our Self has no other elements.

[M. Taine then proceeds to give instances to show that the Ego, as a substantive something, is unreal, and considers it done with. He proceeds next to demolish the other only remaining "verbal entity" (matter) "which still subsists at the two extremities of science"—psychology and physics. How we can have any accretion of knowledge, if all things
related to each other? and how is this substance affected by the real conditions of life? The truth is, as M. Taine and his predecessors have well shewn, that there is no such substance as substance in our natures apart from our bodily selves, but that there is an immaterial condition of life, better described as spiritual, permeating our whole being, and that this spiritual con-

1 Philosophically known as "Subject."

* The nervous system, no doubt, is the physical aspect of this observation. Vibratory and molecular action through the grey and white matter of the brain will probably explain the highest conditions of Sense in relation with Reason, but no further.

are but "events," apart from constitution of any kind, is not explained.] M. Taine then goes on:—

III. Having upset this entity [the Ego] at the summit of nature, there remains, at the foot of nature, another entity, matter, which falls by the same blow. Hitherto, the most faithful followers of experience have admitted, at the foundation of all corporeal events, a primitive substance, matter possessed of force. Positivists themselves underwent this illusion; in spite of their reducing all knowledge to the discovery of facts and their laws. [How "facts" can have any "laws" is nowhere explained.] Beyond the accessible region of facts and laws, they placed an inaccessible region, that of substances, real things, the knowledge of which would certainly be most precious, but in whose direction research
dation is subject to like changes with our bodily natures. It grows in accretions of spiritual strength as our body grows in accretions of bodily strength, and it finally "crystallizes" into character, and mode of life, precisely as the body grows into definite and mature form. The "soul" of man we discover to be, the aggregate condition and quality of essential feeling—a first principle, made use of, and applied in the life,—

ought not to stray, since experience attests the futility of all inquiry concerning them. Now the analysis which reduces substance and force to verbal entities is applicable to matter as well as to mind. In the physical as in the moral world, force is that particularity which a fact has of being constantly followed by another fact. Isolated by abstraction, and denoted by a substantive name, it becomes a permanent subsisting being, that is to say, a substance. But it becomes so for the convenience of discourse only, and the attempt to make anything more of it, is founded on a metaphysical illusion like that which sets apart the Ego and its faculties. Scientific men themselves come involuntarily to this conclusion when, provided with mathematical formulae and with the whole of the facts of physics, they attempt to conceive the ultimate particles of matter. For they arrive at picturing atoms, not according to the coarse imagination of the crowd, as little solid masses, but as pure geometric centres, with relation to which, first, attractions, then repulsions increase with increasing proximity. In all this there are but move-
and the "spirit," the intelligence or mode or law of life, inherent in the nature likewise, by virtue of its origin, but varying, affecting, changing, and moulding the life as it proceeds.

Professor Huxley has acutely observed that "what is commonly called materialism has no sound philosophical basis," and we find below M. Taine resolving matter into a mere series of events, whose condition of

ments, present, future, or possible, connected with certain conditions, variable in magnitude and direction according to a certain law, and determined with relation to certain points.

Thus, in the physical as in the moral world, nothing remains of what is commonly understood by substance and force; all left subsisting are events, their conditions and dependences, some of them moral or conceived on the type of sensation, others physical or conceived on the type of motion. The notion of fact or event alone corresponds to real things. [What "real things" are when "matter" and "ego" have no existence, M. Taine does not tell us.] In this way, the Ego is a being as much as the chemical body or material atom; only it is a more compound being, and consequently subject to more numerous conditions of origin and conservation. Chemical body, material atom, self—that which we term a being, is always a distinct series of events; what constitutes the forces of a being is the property of certain events of its series to be constantly followed by some particular event of its own or of another series; what constitutes the sub-
"permanence" is the one sole claim which it has to reality. Consequently it is clear, that unless we give up the fact of our own identity, some other mode of apprehension of the unity of ourselves must be conceived. What is the true philosophical conception of the nature of Man? This is the pressing question. Unless we do away with the idea of life at all, we must have some firm basis upon which to regulate our

stance of a being is the permanence of this and other analogous properties. This is why, if we cast a general glance over nature, and drive out of our minds the phantoms we have set up between her and our thought, we perceive in the world nothing more than simultaneous series of successive events, each event being the condition of another and having another as its condition.

[Why moral events are conceived on the type of sensation more than the immoral energies in man, requires to be answered. Again, if that we term a being, is always a "distinct series of events," how do we rise above the primary conditions of sensation? How does the power of arbitrary formation become part of us? And, if "what constitutes the forces of a being is the property of certain events of its series to be constantly followed by some particular event," what are the relations of these "forces" to the "being" itself? And finally, what is "our thought"? and what is its relation to outward "events"?]
mental acts. This is the object required: and we fear that M. Taine and his school, have, in their energy to get rid of fictions, suffered no little themselves as regards a true and practical interpretation of the nature of Man. For since Matter and Ego have no existence, what does really exist? Granted, as a starting-point, that Man exists. Then, we affirm, we have to do our work all over again. We have to retrace our steps into the reality of our own natures, and see what actually exists there. And whatever the form or variation of such existence, that is truth to us during the nature of such existence.

We come then to the conclusion, to which our principles at the outset would lead us to affirm, that all philosophical efforts to get rid of matter and its conditions will prove abortive. Not only so, but that matter is in itself, as known to man, a principle of life or existence in his nature, subject to like changes and affections with the other conditions of his being. Its union with that which is superior to it is through the medium of law, itself a part of it, and its relation to life active and practical is that of a third in relation to the whole Man. It has its opinions, wishes, and notions, as have also, in their separateness, the other principles of life in his nature, and the unity of all these three is summed up in will and conscience, for practical

1 By virtue of our unity.—See page 196.
life, and in *reason* for passive life, acting as it does as a pole or balance between two opposing forces in the nature of man—the inner conditions of feeling, and the desires of sense. It is, we verily believe, owing to the want of a due recognition of these “inner conditions” of life, that sense rules the many to their “own despite” and misery, and life is made miserable in the want of a true knowledge of ourselves. That which is essential we overlook because it does not directly concern us in the practical affairs of the world; yet withal, it is the one real thing which can ease the “heartache” of humanity, and make duty itself pleasureable in the reality from which it originates.

Body, in relation to Life.

The organization of the Body, and its importance and influence in the affairs of actual life, is so well known, to the students of Matter, and the common sense of the world, that any display of a moderate experience and knowledge of such would here scarcely be in place, or in any way serviceable to the main issues of this work. That, believe what we may, and know what we may, the bodily life has to be gone through with, supported, and enjoyed or suffered, is, from the cradle to the grave, the experience of humanity. Whatever our creeds or philosophies, our hopes or our fears, our wishes or failures, “the Body needs must toil that it may live,”

1 The Hermit, p. 115.
either in indigence, health, or affliction, in weariness, want, or decay. Nothing more surely proves the distinctive relations of our inner conditions of life, to the things of sense, than our powers of reflection upon the agitation of these aggregated particles of matter we term Body, when under new influences, apart from our true personal selves, and the quietness and calmness which accompany conduct that is personal, and related to life as a whole. Separateness of nature finds only its true expression in general life and well-being: we are constituted so that we cannot live true lives apart from each other. The harmony of national life is in the homogeneity of its parts: the aggregate is not the mass, but the sum total of individuals. Man is made to help and better his fellow-man: in this is the happiness and human good of all.

Body, in relation to Religion.

And, if in this sense of fellow-aid in the body, we find a growing sense of desire and reaching after that which is beyond, or above, or superior to the present.

We leave the question open for physiologists to consider whether there are not three distinct spheres of life in the material organism, which, through the nervous system, mutually affect and influence each other. Observation upon different states and conditions of feeling in the living man, will only prove this. See note 8, p. 193.
conditions of our lot, a nobler spirit inhabiting us, and a worthier purpose of life growing within us, then we attribute this to that source from whence we have learnt to understand so much of what appertains to human good and bodily well-being, and in the growing out of things human seek to realize some little of the divine.
AN OUTLINE OF
A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE.

THAT the "Faiths of the World" must eventually resolve themselves into some one true interpretation of the nature of things, is a universal belief common to mankind. At present however every form of religion holds its own interpretation to be the truth. Peoples and societies, apart from the Christian world, have no notion of a common stand-point, and here in Christianity itself, we see multitudinous and various differences. Each Church or sect has its own code of practice and belief, and so far as humanity generally is concerned, such may or may not be true and practicable. The divisions in the Church produce endless controversies, and no little atheism and infidelity must be laid to their door. Philanthropic generalizations of all kinds, we find only remove us farther from the truth of individual life, and scepticism, the bane and blight of intellectual inquiry, lands us only in a melancholy self-questioning as to the nature and origin of ourselves. Is there then, the human heart cries out, no pathway by which we
can escape from such dilemma, and grow slowly into a realization of the truth? Faith in the God who made us, and in ourselves, we believe to be the answer to such dilemma.

The inability of the human mind to grasp that which is without it, or to believe wholly in that which is superior to itself, obliges us, in inquiries of such kind, after truth, to reverse the natural process of the faithful heart, and trace upwards from ourselves, instead of downwards from That which caused us, the problems of human knowledge. For immediately we leave the actual and real for the divine and immaterial, we quit the limits and realizations given to us of the truth of such speculations, and either proceed solely according to the direction of the faithful heart, or wander into personal apprehensions of the unknown and sublime. We have no warrant for the truth of our affirmations as to the nature of such: we may be wrong or right according as the world and our fellows choose or not to believe in us: we may have part truth and part error in our minds; superstitious credulity mixed up with immortal fact: the living with the dead in our belief of eternal realities.

And that this method, the inductive, is true to human nature and to the truths of human knowledge, in relation to faith, is proved by the fact of Christian revelation—a making known or visible in the sense that
which was superior to such conditions. The divine in itself is made known and part of the real and actual conditions of human existence,—through such conditions the divine is by the human apprehended, and hence the sanction or approval, as it were, by God of such modes or methods of apprehending truth. Man, it is well known, cannot understand that which has no part in his own nature, therefore through his own nature has God been pleased to make known to him Himself.

The human interpretation of Christianity is, therefore, an understanding of the truths of such, as they express themselves in man. Beyond this, to man, is mystery; except in so far as he can trace by correlation that which is more than himself. The belief in resurrection, the doctrine of atonement, the hope in immortality, the faith in an unseen world—all these, by the necessary and natural limitation of human knowledge, are superior to man's understanding, yet only, in themselves, secondary aspects of the great human Light himself, who taught them,—but "broken lights of Thee"1 who brought the true creed of divine and human nature alike into the world, and, so to speak, the "stepping-stones" by which men may rise into a new and unknown world. They are not statements to be denied, but truths to be affirmed till we can grow into a nearer interpretation of them, by a fuller know-

1 In Memoriam.
ledge of ourselves, and of the order of the world. He who could bring us the one true creed of the nature of God and man must be the one sole light to whom the world in its difficulties will always turn; and in the same sense as it has hitherto accepted doctrines inexplicable to itself, but which can be understood in the light of a later age, affirm and hold good that, which though still mysterious, remains in a like manner to be proved.

An important distinction at the outset of our observations upon the things of faith, is the relation of Knowledge to Life. Life is something more than Knowledge, therefore all knowledge must stand in a subordinate position towards it, that is to say, be something within it, or less than it, or the abstract of it, or the anatomy of it. It is on account of this truth, that every man feels when he is called to the actualities of life, that his (exact) knowledge has, in a sense, to be left behind, that it is something within or apart from him—something less than his total self, and that if he turns to it only and always, he is not realizing the totality of his nature. To live, we have to embody our knowledge in an unseen form in our acts, it must not be recognizable even by ourselves as we go forward, or the anatomy of

1 Knowledge is to Life, as Mind is to Man.—see on.

2 This remark simply goes to prove that every original personal act is an act of faith—in God, (in Nature), or in ourselves.
existence shows through—we make ourselves only the expression of mind, in the things of life.

Such being the case, we might expect that in matters of religion, a parallel relation might be shewn between doctrine as knowledge, and Christianity as life, and that the relationship of doctrine to Christianity would be the same as that of knowledge to life. Precisely as to the extent in which we lived by or leaned upon any one special form or expression of doctrine, should we fall short of Christianity as a whole, that is, the life, and our actions and modes of thought, and apprehensions of truth, would be part truth only, for the very reason that they were within the reality of things as a whole—and by the omission or due bearing of those other elements inherent in the life itself, would our view of Christianity itself be warped, and our practice narrowed into a parti-statement or embodiment of that, which when duly viewed, was a whole.

Here also, then, we find ourselves face to face with the relations existing between Mind and Man—which we have already, in our chapter on Reason, endeavoured clearly to define. The knowledge of the things of Mind will always be something within the philosophy or concrete realization of the life and nature of Man,

Take the following in proof of this position—The highest mental truth may be unanswerably proved to-day, but a man possesses the power to contradict it in practice to-morrow.
and we might surmise that just in so far as our knowledge of the things of mind fell short of our experience of the totality and life of man, so would our apprehensions of the things of faith, fall short of the totality of the life of faith, or the Christian's realizations in practice of the knowledge of that in which he believed. And the mystery in the unity of our own natures would correlate the mystery in the unity of faith.

That the "life" of our Lord must always be the key to this unity, will always be allowed by every Christian, therefore it becomes a question of what is the true relation of all doctrine to that life, since we should expect it to fall into it, so to speak, to merge in it, to be lost in it, to be the anatomy or inner structure of it, and nothing more, or less, in relation to the unity of faith. All doctrine may therefore be at the outset surmised to be but so many parts of this organic whole, and that just in so far or where we wrongly fit this together, or omit part, or add to it, do we misinterpret the truth of the Christian religion. And to do this, to rightly fit and frame the whole together, is the work of the theologian, the ad-minister and interpreter of the word of God. Just in so far as he can competently do this, without exaggeration or depreciation, might we consider him fully qualified for his work, a true "physician of souls," and a human light in the world.

The past, the present, and the future, therefore, as
revealed in the life and character and teaching\(^1\) of Christ, are the true subject of theology. And this must be treated of and taught in a concrete form, as Christ treated of it and taught it, if it is to be of any real service to the life and character of man. Christianity claims to be no less than an explanation of the nature and order of a world, in relation with its Creator, and the best proof of its divinity, or claim to such mission, is the very fact of its perfection. It makes known to us the summit of human apprehension; it explains to us correlative the nature of ourselves. This, in itself, is a sufficient proof of its divine or God-ordained nature; for any creed which could do this must of necessity be supernatural. For immediately we lapse into a present realization of things, we fall short of the totality of our own natures. It is a fact in the constitution of the human mind, that when left to itself, it will not realize the complement of its own nature. We are always less than ourselves when we look only to ourselves. No purely mental conception of the nature of things, apart from the conditions of mind which faith induces, would ever have made known to us what we now know of the world, or of man. There is a constant tendency in our knowing faculties to narrow into the realization of law only, and to rest satisfied, or

\(^1\) Character and teaching are always the outcome of the "life," where there is no conscious deception.
dissatisfied, there. It is faith only which keeps open the "pores"\(^1\) of our spiritual nature, and leads us on to endeavour to apprehend and know things in the concrete. And the true relation of the (human) natural to the supernatural may perhaps be eventually found to be to us what we should regard as "degree"—a power of law or spiritual conditions over material formation or nature: so that, in a sense, we all become supernatural, when, through the aid of faith, we effect otherwise incapable results over ourselves. And the same remark applies equally to "miracle"—the performance of a deed superior to the natural powers of man, but accomplished through the aid of supernatural power.

And the truth of these general observations comes out in fuller light when we remember, that in the Word of God, there is little, or but occasional, reference to knowledge, as such, to conscience,\(^2\) to philosophy, or to anything purely human in its nature or origin. For religion exists only to keep us in constant remembrance of an unseen but omnipresent God, to lift the human man above himself into his former self, and therefore little or no merely human agency or help is referred to or required. The Omnipresent Spirit is the power

\(^1\) of course a figurative expression. Feeling proper, in the unity of our natures, is the substance of our spiritual selves, as we have already surmised.—see pages 218-19, and page 239.

\(^2\) as considered apart from God.
which is to do all things; not the philosophy, or self-culture, or work, or labour of man. Precisely as we know and discover to keep ourselves above the wants and habits of the merely animal nature, so do religious realities keep us up and above the human—that is to say, creatures of God, not forgetting His presence and existence, in the freedom and sovereignty of our manhood, but for ever seeking our highest happiness and good in the contemplation of His mercies, and the guidance of His hand.

And, as the past, the present, and the future, as read in the light of the revelation of Christ, are the subject of theology, the Word of God, so are the birth, the life, and the death of the Lord, expressed in His resurrection, their unity, the hope and contemplation, the sustenance and reward of the Christian life. In the "life" of the Saviour, we renew the life of man, and in his appointed means receive the necessary means for the growth in, and conduct of, His divine will. The "means" are, in themselves, but typical of the "life," and immediately we lower the conception of such, we lapse into special processes, individual theologies, and begin to worship the knowledge of the truth, instead of

1 In this sense only, could the flesh and blood, to be partaken of, have had any real meaning to the disciples. And this is, of course, so far as our present life is concerned. We profit by the "death" of Christ, at the time of our own death.
the "life" and reality of it. We divide the life to suit our own special proclivities and sympathies, into material, or spiritual, or substantive notions of blessings to be derived from the means themselves, and so do away with the unity of the truth in the fallibility and weakness of our own faith and will. Mind is called into action to explain and propound that which is greater than itself: the Man is lowered to the philosopher, the philosopher to the rationalist, the rationalist to the sensuist—till ultimately, through a series of reductions of the truth, we find "the faith"—into which all human knowledge will be eventually found to merge—a byword among the nations, a something which everyone can explain—simple as it beautifully is in its true catholicity to the simplest and lowest mind, yet its sublimity and glory and wonder wholly lost sight of by man.

To turn however to the more practical aspects of the difficulties and realities of the faith, let us affirm in conclusion of these general observations, that in the unity of human nature shall we read the (typical) unity of God—that all analysis as such would but darken our perception of concrete and living truths, that life is the mystical unit or outcome of all such several and distinct forces which constitute its parts, and that to

1 "The flesh profiteth nothing,"—but as the means, and as the "life" of the body.

2 theological.
AN OUTLINE OF

...to understand the realities of faith, we must humanly proceed, at least in the first place, to rightly understand and appreciate and know ourselves. For man is made in the image of God.

The doctrine of the Holy Trinity may be apprehended in the manner already shewn in the body of this treatise. Mind, in Man, has no existence apart from the principles of which it is the expression: it is therefore the symbol of unity in man. There are but three principles, and Body is one of them—containing the other two. The others have a material locus by the very fact of everything connected with matter necessarily having a locus, in so far as such connection exists. The material aspects or conditions of these principles, are, however, only the outward shows of them: the principles themselves are immaterial, as proved by their affection through the nature of man. They, the principles, represent the life and law round which a material existence centres and conditions itself, and they, in their essential nature, are mysterious, and represent the soul and spirit in man. The unity of the whole is Mind, as before shewn, and this correlates the unity of the Godhead. There

1 "Heart," "love," "soul"—material, human, divine. No man confuses his material heart with his soul. Feeling proper (or love) is the living connection between them.

2 Or, in, and about.
are three Persons in the Godhead, not four as the mathematical symbol, taken in its literal or abstract reality, would suggest. The circle in the symbol is the equivalent of the immaterial Mind, and would mislead if taken to represent anything material or positive in itself. The Tres et Unus can only be rightly understood by remembering this: it is not the making the Unus a fourth, but the equivalent of Mind in Man; that is, the unity.

The "unity of the faith" is, therefore, the unity of the truth, and all separate systems or forms of worship fall into a true interpretation of the catholic whole. Ideas of substance or spirit or material benefit, derivable from means themselves, become recognizable as to their true limit of meaning in the true realization of the nature of the whole, that is to say, in an intelligent understanding of what is the nature and the life of the faith itself, believed in and worshipped, and of the ultimate nature of soul and spirit, as understood in ourselves, as understood in the life and nature of Christ, and as a medium of communication in themselves for the essential benefits of the faith. Superstitious forms of ceremonial, and idolatry of mental conceptions, apart from the reality of the life itself, in its totality,—whether material, of the nature of "substance," or spiritual, would eventually resolve themselves into an intelligent interpretation of the doctrine
in which they were conveyed—for no form of doctrine can be sound which contradicts the true intelligence and visible constitution of man. They, the doctrines, must, when they surpass the mental knowledge of things, and the conditions felt necessary to sustain the healthy, active, and Christian life, clearly disappear, not in statement, but in mystery,¹ that is to say, in the conditions of life which are superior to the apprehension of the human mind. Here then we have a fundamental definition of the basis of all doctrine, as such, that which disappears in mystery, is beyond the apprehension of man’s understanding, but correlating it, and a support to it. And such would be the equivalents of “soul” and “spirit” in man.

And it follows from this interpretation of the nature of things, and of faith, that a natural and a supernatural understanding of them contains the whole, and that all scholastic or purely mental conceptions of the nature of doctrine, as such, are unsound, because they are apart from the life, and represent generally the intellectual or purely philosophical aspect of the nature of things and of man. The systems of theology which exist upon the philosophies which have fallen, fall with the philosophies which have supported them, and though creeds are the science of the faith, in so far as

¹ The distinction between the circle and the immaterial Mind is here unobservedly (at the time) borne out.
they are true, they are of no more direct service to man as regards the life of faith, than are the anatomies of Nature or of himself, or than is a constant reference to structure to understand the freedom and spontaneity and responsibility of life itself. The pure and natural doctrine, as taught by Jesus, merging as it does into the supernatural, contains the whole of the Christian creed in its life aspects, and apart from these, scholastic additions are true only just in so far as they support them, and correlate them, and add in every way to the truth of the life itself. Substance is life: in no other sense can we regard it: in this sense it is the other half, so to speak, of law (spirit) or formation, whether in the nature of intelligence, order of ceremonial, simplicity of belief, or purity of spiritual conduct. As life, we partake of it, but in no other sense, and this view exactly correlates the whole system or exposition of truth before given in these pages, namely, of love being the (human) "life" in man. And it is life also, of course, as soul, since soul is the one thing necessary, according to the faith, for a man to take care of, and (humanly) save. Immediately we attach any notion of substance as substance partaken of in the commemoration service of the death of our Lord, we lapse into

1 This philosophical python has bruised the lives of Christians for centuries. I of course refer to the word here strictly in the sense of its relation to theology.
idolatry, and begin to worship the associations of words. Life, in its spontaneity, is put out in the nature of man;—for the very reason that that which is vital and immaterial, though possessing a condition of its own in itself, cannot partake of or interchange with that which has a material or positive condition—the "breath of life" can feed only on its own quality and nature, not on that which is grosser or more substantive than itself. Practically viewed, all theology which teaches a benefit derivable from the "sacrament," other than in the sense of "life," is clearly unsound.

It would be beside the purpose of this concluding chapter of my treatise to enter at length into the vexed questions of theological controversy: I will conclude therefore what I have already written, with two or three more observations, and then pass on to philosophy, science, politics, and education, upon which I have a little to say. Generally viewed, then, we would affirm, that the true interpretation of the things of faith may be read in a true interpretation of the nature of man: that scholastic theology, apart from natural and supernatural aspects of human nature, and the Word of God, is untenable: that creeds are, as already stated, the science, or unseen structure of the faith, and nothing more, or nothing less: that the nature of man, rightly interpreted, correlates the substance of the Athanasian Creed: that the divisions in the English Church, into High,
Low, and Broad, may gradually interpret their differences in a true understanding of the nature and the basis of the creeds and the Church itself: that constitutional sympathies and differences, traceable in a true philosophy of man, have much to do with the divisions in the Christian world: and that these, when more rightly and fully understood, will open the way for a living interpretation of the nature of the faith: and finally, that the relations between "Church" and "State" are those of the divine to the human, existing together as they do in human nature, yet separable in so far as the interests of each are concerned:—

"Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's."

That Philosophy is the "handmaid of Religion," is an old metaphorical expression, though it would be difficult to show in what direct and real manner philosophy has hitherto supported and aided the faith. The systems of Morals and Ethics, already before the world, have had a tendency to draw the human mind away from the facts of religion, rather than to support and fit into them, and live, so to speak, in direct subordination to and with them. Systems of Philosophy have attempted to explain the realities of faith itself; and the world has gone on its way, in consequence, doubting the truth and vitality of the one, and heeding little
the apothegms of the other. Science has come to the aid of human nature; and man has lifted his head again for a little while in the hope that there are even yet better things in store for him.

That a Philosophy of human nature or of man is the one thing needed or required to meet the wants of the age, is a position which will be little doubted. For out of him, so far as he can realize anything, proceeds all the world knows, or is likely to know, in the present dispensation of things. Man's constitution is, therefore, the ultimatum of human knowledge—the goal of the human heart—since in a true self-knowledge exists the best road to a true human life. In such a life we best honour God, and prove the divinity of that which caused us.

It would be unnecessary to recapitulate the positions already taken up in this treatise, with respect to the nature of human nature: they are already before the reader, and will remain so to the end of time. Besides, in not doing so, we avoid the risk of mere system-building, in matters of life-knowledge, or of formal repetitions of things, which if true, are true to all. It will be more to the purpose, therefore, of these concluding observations, to make some reference to them in relation to life, without bringing the anatomy itself into view: and to point a few considerations which may be of moment to the whole.
Practically viewed, therefore, the great sphere of philosophy is the union of spiritual and material truth. Precisely as, on the one hand, we look to the divine conditions of our nature, as summed up in religion, to explain to us the nature of our spiritual being, and to science to make known to us the laws of material nature, so is the union of the two, in the life and constitution of man, the great sphere of philosophy. It is only by means of our natural powers of reason, that we can comprehend the "laws" or formations in Nature, so is it only by the aggregate powers of our manhood that we can add these to our immaterial nature, and realize the unity of ourselves.

That the systems of Morals and Ethics have hitherto stood apart from the realities of life, may be accounted for, in part, by the fact that they have dealt with mysteries or ideas in the human mind, of which no tangible notion was formed of their nature, or application realized of the forces in human nature to which they applied themselves. Moral Philosophy, in consequence, has received several definitions, and eminent men of the present day, are scarcely agreed as to what they mean by the term, or what they intend to teach by it. Of Ethics, we have only to refer to the different systems summed up in Professor Bain's able collaboration of the past efforts of men in this respect, to shew the divisions, up to the present hour, existing with regard to them.
All, more or less, have stopped short in analysis, out of which the present age is, probably, shortly to emerge.

The philosophy of human nature will, therefore, become the philosophy of "humanity," and a practical knowledge of ourselves issue in a true and complete education. And observe, this statement in no way supposes "equality," or leads to "socialism," but implies the very opposite, inasmuch as all men are different, have different powers for action and knowledge, and equal "rights" with each other in the advantages of life, and the opportunities and honours of society. Nay more, those who are of "gentle birth," as the saying is, or who have had greater advantages than others for ascertaining something of the aggregate truth of things, are more likely always to be of true service to society generally, than the upstart or specialist who thinks to mould everything according to his own individual idiosyncrasies, and to shape the sum total of the wants of society according to the limited vision of his own narrow ken. Precisely as the ends of truth in the abstract are only truly advanced by the patient labour of many enquiring men, so are the facts of life in the concrete, whether philosophical, political, or social, only truly made known to us and assured by the diligence and wisdom of a nation's greatest men.

And here it is important to observe that all forms of
philosophy, as such, already before the world, are, in a sense, special, and make no pretence to apply themselves actually to the realities of life. They are, therefore, but so many modes of education, by which we may draw out the several powers or forces in the nature of man. They are of the nature of analysis, and stop short, as aforesaid, with exposition of the passive stage of human nature, and make no direct application to man's active self—in short, do not acquaint him in any way how to act, and in what way he will best secure his own happiness and well-being. Metaphysic has expounded the abstract nature of things; psychology the nature of feeling; physiology the nature of sense; but nowhere in the whole range of human philosophy (at least, so far as known to the present writer), is there any system or code of teaching intended to apply itself directly to life, as more than mind: that is to say, to the unity of our natures in relation with our active powers, and to the effects of conduct upon mind, as forming character, and indeed, mind itself. That this is however the practical nature of things, so far as man is concerned, so far as life is concerned, and so far, in the main as character is concerned, will be self-evident to the reflective mind—whether with or without the influence of education upon the life itself,—and therefore it becomes a question as to how far we can rightly guide or estimate the influence of education
proper upon the life and character of man. Given a true system of education, and the issue is simply how far it is rightly applied or made use of by every individual, and how far the conditions and associations of life around him permit him to make use of such to his full benefit and well-being. The development of character will be of course in the main the issue of the conditions of life under which the life was produced,—the sins of the fathers, and their errors also, are visited upon the children,—but these will be always materially and ultimately biassed by the power for truth and self-individualization\(^1\) in the nature of the individual man. "This above all, to thine own self be true," certainly contains the whole of the matter, but unfortunately, as always the case in these general maxims, without we know what is "the self," and how to "be true" to it, we are incapable of holding to the wisdom which the poet and philosopher would prescribe. But given a knowledge of this "self," what it is in the sight of God and man, and what we really mean by the aphorisms we teach, then it becomes a question merely as to how far we will respect it, and avail ourselves of them. That it is more generally in matters of feeling, in their share of life, that men err and go wrong, than in the laws of the head or intellectual apprehensions of duty or wisdom, under certain phases of conduct, is qualified by the nature and measure of his faith.
unquestionably true, and this is the more important to be observed because it is generally in matters of feeling that we are apt to think that the facts of life are little or indirectly concerned, whereas the truth is they are more vital as expressing the essential conditions of man's nature than all the knowledge he may otherwise possess, and more vitally influence his whole course and practice of life than anything else he may own or obtain. Indeed, the reader will have observed, from the exposition already given in these pages, that this is the essence of life and character itself, and that it not only does not lead away from all real knowledge, such as science, and the like, but that it is the very basis of all true scientific progress, and that through it and by it and in it alone, shall we gradually grow to comprehend the true and living and concrete nature of things, and to apprehend the cosmos in the light of the beautiful and the divine. Practically stated, we would affirm, that the growth in the knowledge of the concrete or living laws of Nature—apart from their separateness or distinctness or individualization—is through the medium of essential feeling, and through this alone.

The reader will therefore here form a clear and practical opinion of what we mean by philosophy in its relation to Nature and to Man, and gather some insight into its importance and dignity when viewed in its relation to and with a knowledge of life, and all that tends to
the advancement and well-being of the human race.¹ Its influence upon the age is spiritual, because like mind, it is immaterial: and because on this account, it leaves with us no tangible evidence of its effects or material benefit we can produce, we are apt to overlook its services altogether, and think that it is a study or mode of thought practically serviceless so far as the ends of real life are concerned. Not only, however, is this not the case, but it, philosophy, is the very substance of human progress, in the sense of its being the concrete human exposition of all that can be known to man. It represents to us, with every generation, the "spirit of the age"; it is the tone and habit of mind of a nation's life, during an epoch of knowledge, or fixed general mode of apprehending or viewing the nature of things; it is the faith of humanity in that which, whether for eternity or for time only, is superior to human knowledge, inasmuch as it keeps open the avenues of the mind for the reception of the mysterious, or supernatural, in its true and living union with the known and the natural, and maintains thereby a constant medium for the progress and outgrowth of human knowledge. It is the expression in the nature of man of what he calls "mystery," and his endeavour to apprehend it. And

¹ Probably what I have here endeavoured to expound is the basis of what has hitherto been generally treated of under the term Moral Philosophy.
so long as mystery remains, philosophy will remain, expressing as it does the healthy outgrowth and activity of the human mind. The failure of endeavour to apprehend the unknown would be the greatest calamity to man, inasmuch as there is no such thing as a stationary status of society: human nature is ever progressing or regressing in healthy life or knowledge. Philosophy, therefore, practically represents the modes of each era in the history of a world, of apprehending the concrete or living truths of man, and of nature without him, and of the relation of one to the other. It puts together the truths of science, since they nowhere exist apart from each other; it views nature without by a realized understanding of nature within self; it attempts to deduce or arrive at the interaction of first causes or principles by observation of their influence upon, and relation to and with, each other, in man. And apart from theory or analysis of what constitutes goodness in his nature, taken in its passive inoperative status, as a support to religion, it endeavours upon the basis of true human principles, which are the complement of human nature, to work out, in their relation to practice, an observed order of self-knowledge, which, taken in itself, apart from all and every system, shall be found to exactly correlate the truths of the Christian faith.

Finally, therefore, it would be as well to avow the

\textit{vide Ethical systems extant.}
fact, that philosophy proper is not a growth in intellectual knowledge, but a progress in the realization of life-truths. And that such a distinction holds good, and is all important to be observed, I think the present state of disintegration in the intellectual world goes far to prove, and that the contempt with which philosophy itself has come to be regarded, is altogether unsound. We have no wish however, be it said, to bolster up a system of philosophy, knowing on the whole how dangerous and profitless such systems generally are; and we would much rather simply define it, so far as any further definition is necessary, as an exposition (or the accretion) of life-truths, observed from the workings of human nature, upon the basis of the principles and practical conduct already laid down and advised. That such is the ultimate nature of the uses of mind, must be patent to everyone; therefore it becomes a question, so far as a defence of philosophy is necessary, as to whether mind is or is not to have any concrete action of its own? And granted the answer to be in the affirmative, then we have only to ascertain what is the true use of this extraordinary immaterial power within us.\(^1\) Imagination, speculation, and all the higher powers of human nature, find here their true use—as seekers after truth,—ever producing novel combinations, out of which or from which new lights may glance or arise, in the

\(^1\) And without us—the atmosphere in which we dwell.
endless convolutions and relations and mysteries of the warp and woof of Nature, and of mind itself.

We have dwelt thus much upon the nature of philosophy in itself, not only on account of the doubt and hesitation now felt with regard to it, but also to free ourselves from any imputation of being desirous to build up a system or code of philosophy, or to endeavour to do otherwise than treat of the nature of things else than as related to practical life. That conduct, in a sense, makes mind, and is in this way responsible for many of the "opinions" and "finished convictions" to be met with, is, I believe, unquestionably true; and it is therefore another question as to how far a true philosophy of human nature may trace out, interpret, and remove the errors from such. For apart from the fact that intellectual systems are, in themselves, only a part of the nature or constitution of man, it is clear that a settled conviction of the ultimate nature of things, at a period of great outgrowth of human knowledge, runs counter to the fact of natural evidence in itself, seeing that it presupposes an existent knowledge of all that can be known. Till we have good ground for believing that the sum total of the human intelligent energies are before the world, we have no warrant for an assumption of assured conviction as to the nature and origin of all things: and this common-sense observation may remove a few objections existing to the outgrowth of
Christian truth. The fact that the knowledge of human
nature is yet in its infancy, is a sufficient proof of the
limitation (and probable error) of systems of philo-
sophy, as regards their relation to the concrete and
living nature of things, already before the world; and
we have good hopes that a steady and practical pro-
gress in the knowledge of the life and constitution of
man, may be of universal service to the sphere of intel-
lectual truth itself. Systems which set aside facts, as
producing the opinions which they affirm, can only
be in themselves but partial: there can be no true
philosophy of any kind which does not account for the
origin of that which it endeavours to explain. Hence
our endeavour, from human nature itself, to shew
clearly what we mean by the terms mind, soul, spirit,
life, and the like, and to point to the fact that until we
have some intelligent and generally accepted apprecia-
tion of what we mean by such terms, our philosophies
themselves cannot but be, in a sense, superficial. For
immediately we attach separate and distinct notions of
what they mean to our own individual philosophies, we
lapse into special processes, and begin to regard the
universe, or cosmos, or human nature itself, apart from
the opinion or conception of our neighbour, and to seek
to apprehend the universal in the light of the particular
and the unknown. Human nature must have some con-
crete true expression of the several forces, faculties, and powers of which it is composed, and to get at this, apart or distinct from every scholastic philosophy or creed, must be the true end and aim of the seeker after life-truth. Hence, then, we would close these observations with the proposal that the time has come for such general recognition of the nature of man, or of mind, or of all such several terms as we may find it necessary to use in our exemplification of the nature of things as a whole, and that these will only be truly understood and interpreted when viewed in direct relation to life. Nay more, we would affirm that all true art, and poetry, philosophy, and religion, will be found to express itself in orderly relation to each, not as separate systems (studies) or spheres of thought which we may set aside and regard as naught in their relation to and with the knowing or exact, "scientific," powers of man, but that these all severally and individually have a true and living relation to each, traceable in the glorious sphere of philosophy itself—that neither is complete without the other, that neither is true without the one—and that the ultimatum of human philosophy is to truly understand and appreciate this divine setting of the faculties and powers in human nature, and gradually and surely and truly to make them known to man.

That a knowledge of human nature in the abstract,
and of the effect of spiritual associations or conditions upon the material nature of man, must constitute an important element in the progress of the human race, towards universal truth, is self-evident; therefore we proceed to offer a few observations upon the relations of Science to Life,—not in their analytical sense only, but of the extent to which we may observe, through the medium of our "exact knowledge," the effect of spiritual associations, mental influences and conditions, upon the life and character of man.

It is not our intention to give here a resümé of what we have already said, in our chapter on Reason, as to the nature of the "scientific faculty," or principle in man, or of the distinctions we have already affirmed between science proper and the theories or speculations of mind; but to pass on to a few general observations upon the effect of actual everyday associations upon the bodily nature of man. We have shewn in our chapter on Body, what we mean by our material nature, as distinct from our spiritual or immaterial principles of life, and we can therefore dispense with any further exemplification of the relations of such to each other in the abstract, and pass on to the conditions of actual life.

That the associations of everyday life have far more to do with our bodily health and "opinions," and notions of the ultimate nature of things, than we are
A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE.

255

aware of, is, I believe, importantly true; and it therefore becomes a question, observed at the outset, as to how far such associations may be traced in their influence upon the bodily life of man. For not only are these associations overlooked, as without the region of actual knowledge, but the sphere of observation itself is one which is seldom if ever referred to. I refer here mainly to the spiritual (religious) influences upon the bodily (present, personal) life and character of man, as they constitute in themselves a sphere of observation for knowledge, as such, well worthy the study and reflection of man. The essential truth of this position we take to be the substance of the true creed (humanly viewed) itself, for no creed, we have affirmed, true in itself, can be really prejudicial ¹ to the health and pure vitality of the human body. And next to this, the religious element in human nature, we find the mental or philosophical, and scientific aspects of thought and feeling, wearing and affecting, to a visible extent, the material life; so that here also we might pause to enquire as to the exact living truth in each and all of these systems or forms of spiritual influence upon bodily life and conditions, and so lose² ourselves again

¹ That is, not more so than natural wear and tear of human duty or work. Every man's conscience probably knows the true measure of this.

² observe into mystery.
in the depth of enquiry as to what is the real truth, and exact knowledge, with respect to each one of them. Distinctness (or individuality) of principle we should find, in their interaction with each other in ourselves, would be the inmost result of our enquiry, leading us again upwards into philosophical observation upon their action and inter-association, and of their relation one to the other.

From this position of "mind" again we should descend to "science" (reason), and make separate studies of the effects of different spiritual influences upon ourselves. Deduction and induction would here go on in our own nature, either as to the effects to be probably produced from a given cause, or the constitutional nature of self to be discovered from a quality or influence supplied. In this way the whole truth of the assumption we have made as to the nature of man, might be tested or proved, in a thousand manifold ways. The chemist might operate upon himself, after his manner of tests; or the mathematician upon himself, after the manner of unknown quantities to be found from given relations; or the psychologist after the manner of his own, of testing evidence of probable issues by the quality of a feeling present with him at any time.

Practically viewed, however, we would here call attention to the fact, that the questions of proof would

1 from a scientific point of view.
shortly resolve themselves into the conditions of life; and that all our mental products (influences) have far greater influence upon the life and character of the body than we are at present aware of; and that we are here upon the threshold of spiritual influences proper, (religious as they are generally called) upon the nature and character of man. It is the sphere of science to examine into these, in order to understand thoroughly the nature of, and changes in, what we term matter; and for this reason I have specially directed these few observations, upon the relation of science to life, to this branch of so great a subject; and more especially as this work has a religious issue from beginning to end. Observation has induced me to believe, that many of our physical disorders have their real origin in spiritual (and mental) maladies, infirmities, or illusions, and that these therefore, if primarily removed, would remove the first cause of such disorders: and that even in minor cases, a mental delusion is not seldom traceable to some form of spiritual (religious) belief. In short, that taking human nature in its totality, it will eventually be found that a creed will modify a disease. And it follows from this position, that the true creed will best relieve the bodily infirmities of man.

We have shewn in our chapter on Reason, the origin of the term "law," and that laws, as such, have no existence in themselves apart from things in their
totality, but merge into "spirit," in human and material nature; and that it is only by our personal abstraction of them that they have any existence apart from things as a whole. In this way therefore, from the lower aspect of science itself, we broach the truth already asserted from the religious aspect of the question, and see how, if we are to understand human nature wholly, we must ultimately trace out the influence of these several "laws," in their totality, upon ourselves. And, as the knowledge of law increases with every discovery of a new relation of things in the concrete, it is clear that the ultimatum of human knowledge will be the discovery of the interassociation of all these laws—a sphere as boundless and infinite as Nature herself. And, that the lapsing or removal of any one of these influences or laws, would cause an entire change in the affections\(^1\) or being of the remainder—a truth best illustrated by observation of the removal of an influence in the workings of the character of man. And, that the addition of an influence, an increased or novel spiritual power, would produce a like change—miraculous to us if very great—upon the previous status or mode or operation or life of the nature or order itself.\(^2\) And such being the inductive

\(^{1}\) modes.

\(^{2}\) see Dr. Gladstone's remarkable lecture on *Miracles as Credentials of a Revelation*. 
fact of the matter, as regards both material nature and ourselves, we contradict the evidence of our own experience, if we deny to the workings of things in their totality a like liability to change, apparently arbitrarily, upon the addition or direction or action of a (novel) power within. In human nature we know it to be the "will" which decides, according to the nature or measure of the want (the life) within itself, as to what course, when free of pressure,\(^1\) it shall take for itself; and therefore the necessary conclusion is, that, given an Original Cause, (and nothing we know of could have existed without it), a like use of "will" (or self) directs the affairs of the world.

I am aware that I am here on the border-land of Ethics and Metaphysics, and that these observations, with respect to "will," are scarcely in place in what professes to be the scientific outline of this part of our treatise; but I believe the time has now come when absolute separation, for study, between

\(^1\) Influence from without of any kind, or lack of intelligence, does not gainsay the absolute nature of will. And absence of freedom, in things essential, is absence of the reality of life. Fate is a supposition of our own, which we can gainsay at any moment by a deed. The strongest proof of this is the "freedom" of man to deny or forego that which he does not or will not understand. Here is absolute proof of the absolute freedom of will. I can deny or believe; therefore, whatever be true, I am free.
matter and spirit, is no longer tenable; and that we must, in accordance with Dr. Laycock's example, begin to study human nature in the concrete, in order to arrive at any true and practical life-knowledge, which may be of service to man. I am aware also, that this however could not be safely proceeded with unless we had a firm basis of physiological knowledge beneath our feet, and that we shall always be greatly and entirely indebted to the patient labours of physiologists themselves for this knowledge, and for their researches into the higher aspects of nervous conditions. But that these, taken in themselves and apart from those still "higher laws" which constitute the facts and realities of life, and provide us with absolute power over the body we live in, would not help us far in such life-knowledge, or of the capacities we possess for the chief associations and deeds of life, must be self-evident to all who take an unbiassed and general view of the powers of human nature, and of the responsibility of man,—more especially as to his higher abilities for (predetermined) action, and extraordinary powers for influence, for good or for evil, in any one direction, over the life of his fellow-man. Whence, then, we find ourselves once more at the door of the universal question, What is the true education of man? which we believe can only be truly answered as, the drawing or leading out of all those several and personal powers
which he possesses, for his own good, and therefore for the good of society generally. And such an outline necessarily contains the powers of soul and body, will and spirit, feeling and conduct: in short, all that constitutes the healthy life and sympathies of the individual man. This we conceive to be the ultimatum of true education: and it is strangely true that the Christian faith supplies the very motive and influence and direction and spirit and feeling and self-culture to lead to such an end; so that here on the basis of physiological and natural enquiry, we find no incongruity or opposition or violent severance between the natural duty to self and the personal duty to God.

We might come then to the conclusions (so far as physiological and scientific evidence are concerned), that the health of bodily life and the health of spiritual life are not antagonistic, but one: that the invisible or immaterial influences upon our natures are (in importance and weight) in relation to the material, as in the constitution of our nature—the natural inference: that a true and practical life-knowledge will only grow gradually by close observation of the effects of outer influences upon mind, and “opinion”—modifying, as it does, matter by slow and imperceptible degrees: and that all these form a sphere for observation hitherto relegated to metaphysics, which can only be advantageously studied through some generally accepted opinion as to the con-
stitution and ends of the life of man; but that when so realized, it will bear good fruit for the well-being of society generally, and the advancement of true civilization throughout the world.

Professor Maurice tells us that "the Moralist never maintains his own position so well as when he asserts the highest dignity for the Politician." And, we will add, the Philosopher also; he likewise should pay here his devoirs, and pray that the knowledge with which he has been enlightened may be so guided as to issue in the best practical good for himself, and for his fellow-man.

The application of acquired knowledge to life is, of course, the most difficult task in the world. It may be doubted whether any philosophical knowledge is real and true, which cannot sooner or later be brought to bear upon the realities of life. If not capable of being so, it is probably a strained or one-sided view of the question it deals with, and, therefore, in its extremeness and one-sidedness, is inapplicable to the wants of man. It may be more in itself, in extent and ability, than any age is capable of entertaining, but then a part of it should be made applicable to the needs of the time, and the remainder stand over till society is ripe for its reception. A system or code of teaching which cannot healthily be applied, to some extent, to the wants of its

1 from quotation before preface.
own age, most probably contains some radical defect in itself. The principles of human nature are, to us, eternal; and towards a true understanding of the nature and use of them, modern society is tending.

The intellectual aspects of human nature will, it is clear, eventually become the "law" to society: an embodiment in law of the science of man would be the ultimatum of political life and freedom: the embodiment in Sovereignty of the feeling, or "life" of the nation, the ultimatum of political happiness and light: the education and business-life of the nation, is the object and care of the "State." By State we mean Statesman—the Minister of the Crown, and voice of the representatives of the people. The well-being of society generally will always be found to be, as we have already shewn, in the well-being of the individual man.

The application of these principles to the wants and conditions of an age, would, of course, be the care of a Statesman. The life of society is necessarily slow and progressive, because few men have the advantage of knowing (generally) the necessities and wants of their fellow-men. The conservative element in our nature makes us always anxious to secure that which is sound, and which has been proved by time: change implies risk; we never can foresee the result of any new dis-

1 Or simply, that cohesion expressed in Leadership, as embodying national interests.
covery, or the issue of a personal or public act. Every onward movement in the life of a nation is a movement of faith, either in human nature, or in the knowledge, of man. Our safety, meanwhile, lies in the strong arm of justice embodied in Sovereign power: we breathe freelier in the knowledge of secured justice, while the truth passes out into law. With the progress of time the spirit of society changes; and what was once dangerous becomes safety itself, and an improved life to society at large.

Such is the true history of all true reforms. The contrary is, or would, of course, be the case, when they have no basis in sound principle, or are one-sided or intemperate in their expression, or are of the nature of party-moves only, where one body in the nation seeks to secure its own ends without reference to the interests and wishes of the other. Progression is, perhaps, to some extent, necessarily arbitrary, on account of the vanities and weaknesses of men; but it is seldom, if ever, that changes are made without the real nature and measure of their truth being known.

The few observations which it is incumbent upon me to make, at the close of this treatise, on politics, will necessarily partake of something of the nature of the general, more than the particular or directly practical, not only because I have no direct interest or duty to

1 In which I of course include his belief.
serve in the political world, but also because two or three of the more important questions of the day are scarcely yet ripe for legislation. That the present position of the Church in this country is however the question which will shortly most closely absorb public attention, is, I believe, a statement which no one will be likely to gainsay, and therefore a few remarks, from one who has endeavoured to consider the subject from all points of view, may not be out of place. If the National Church is a "valuable ally" in the maintenance of order and good government in this country, and does not interfere with the liberties and privileges of any section of the community, it appears to us, from the conservative point of view, that it is not the business of the politician or Statesman to advocate any important change in the present condition of things; but, if on the contrary, it can honestly and satisfactorily be shewn that the Church does not hold a true position, or one altogether satisfactory to herself, then it would have to be considered by the Statesman what would be the true nature of any change in the present existing relations between Church and State. We have already shewn, or rather stated, what we believe to be the essential truth of the matter; therefore we cannot now be accused of writing over our subject, or making only superficial comments upon that which is of so great and national importance. The application of essential truth
to life, is, as we have before said, the great difficulty and labour of those who have to govern or regulate the affairs of men; and on no question is this more vitally true than on the present one—as to what are the true relations, for practical life, between the Christian Church organization and the laws of the State. We have shewn also, throughout this treatise, what we believe to be the truth of Christianity, humanly viewed; and have endeavoured to establish the universal belief, that there is no fundamental difference or severance between the divine and the human aspects of our glorious faith,—in fact, that they are one, and as indissoluble, so far as this life is concerned, as the bodily and spiritual natures of man. That the question must be taken up on the affirmative ground, of what is truth, rather than on the negative ground of what is not truth, as now held by Dissent, is, I believe, an all-important consideration: nothing would be a greater calamity to the nation than an utter collapse of all national opinion and Church-life, into new creeds and endless sects and divisions: the country must have some realized opinion as to what it is going to do, in the event of any change. For our own part, we view Christianity wholly, as the one light and blessing to the world; which has a human interpretation in itself, supplying all the wants of, and best happiness to, man. In it will be found the substance of all noble character; the true use of intellect;
the one guide to hope and conduct; and he is happy indeed who has the strength and fortitude to best believe in it, and live it.

Two issues, it appears to us, remain before the country: as to whether, in the present state of things, a union between the English National Church body and the three great bodies of Nonconformists—who hold, it must be remembered, all the fundamental doctrines of the faith, including the great doctrine of the Trinity—is possible; or an entire separation and breaking-up of all existing relations, leaving the National Church to hold together as it best could, claiming as it still would to represent the true character of Church-life in the country, without any direct or special countenance or aid from the State. A revision of the Prayer-Book, and a removal of all unnecessary restrictions of law, which fetter the action and life of the Church,—and, in a sense, set it apart politically from the other great religious communities in the country,—and a re-adjustment of her emoluments, so far as the State has an interest in them, and all this in union with her own wish and will—these ends, if attainable, might lead to the union we have before premised, to the mutual advantage of all, without a single essential doctrine of the faith, or any primary act of service, being set aside. The elements of Popery in the National Church, should now be left to take care of themselves; if they are
true, they will outlive all the criticisms men can heap upon them; if they are not true, science will shortly undermine them—at least, where the light of natural truth is allowed to men. The parables of our Lord prove the reality and importance of the natural aspects of the faith: it is only scholastic bigotry and superstition which ignores them.

Generally viewed, however, we would now observe, for the benefit of those who take only a one-sided view of this great question, that according to the stand-point from which you start to view it, will your conclusions land you in a different issue from your neighbour. The politician has, therefore, as we have before assumed, to begin with the interests of the country, and the wants of the age in which he may happen to live, and endeavour to secure the greatest possible amount of truth within his power to such end. This observation also allows us to put the general issue in, we believe, its true light, namely, that the politician is not himself responsible for any change which may be brought about, which may be considered advantageous to the country and not to the Church, as an establishment: the Church should state her own true position and claims, and leave it to the Crown and the country to support them. We are disposed to think, that very much of the dissatisfaction prevalent at the present time respecting the position of the Church, is owing to her silence as to
what she believes rightly due to her, what is her true position, and what her just claim for support. If the Bishops and Clergy would only tell us their real minds on these points, we should know much better how to act with regard to them. All the responsibility is, however, at the present hour, thrown upon the State, or rather the Statesman, who may happen to be at the head of affairs. This is altogether unsound. Surely the Church is responsible for her own position? and, if she believes in it, ought to make known her claims,—more especially so at a time when the country is rent with divisions, and when there are not wanting signs of "revivals" in the coming age.

Upon the question of "disestablishment," we would however observe, that there are certain advantages arising out of such change, which ought not to be overlooked, and which might more than counterbalance the benefits we derive from a church system supported directly by State law. A Church which has its origin in and from God, cannot, it is clear, in any real sense, be "disestablished"; therefore it may be doubted, seeing its real "establishment" is without our own doing, whether we have yet reached, for practice, the essential truth of this universal question. For supposing the Church to be "disestablished" forthwith, she would at once set about re-organizing her own administration, and still maintain, so far as she was
AN OUTLINE OF
able, her own true position in the land. To us, therefore, it appears to be nearer to the truth of this profound question to say, that the Church should be aided, not established, in her human wants, free, not tied by State law, in her divine mission; and that the practical application of these two principles to the affairs of national life, would go far to meet the difficulties and perplexities of the age. That the "position of the clergy"—a question we should not have referred to, had it not been mooted elsewhere—would be seriously affected by any such change as disestablishment, we may be allowed to doubt: they would then occupy the same position as all other "professional" men; and there would accrue to them, we believe, that measure of reverence and respect which is their due—a respect which would be certain, in some sense, to wane or be lost, if the Church, for a time only, held an anomalous position. Abnormal or unsound conditions in human affairs beget the like feeling and distaste for things superior to them—all sense of nationality, or belief in self, or natural conviction of the truth and order of things will disappear from a people, exactly in proportion as the public affairs or regulations of the State are unhealthy, unnatural, artificial, or unsound.

So far therefore as we consider the question of disestablishment from a political point of view, we cannot
but regard it as otherwise than a regressive step, in the interests of national life and civilization, and of the wants of the age in which we live. That it would occasion a considerable increase of life and vitality in the Church, we may be also allowed to surmise,—bringing to the front, as we assume now it would, ten volunteers to one, at present to be found, in the interests of “mission” work, both at home and abroad,—and therefore, as a true move on the part of men towards a greater vigour and enterprise and progress in the faith in which they believe, and a step in direct harmony with all sound human knowledge and natural belief, that it would, through law, or grace, or nature, be divinely blessed by God. For the checks to such an outgrowth, we should have to look without the fold of the visible and invisible Church of God—to the forces in the world antagonistic to all true progress of Christian life and practice, to superstition, idolatry, spiritual wickedness, intellectual error, immoral habit of mind or conduct: in short, to all those forces collectively which constitute “evil” in God’s harmless material world. Against these we should always have to “protest,”1 to build up a Church against them if necessary: for who shall say what of them are yet in store for the experience of the world?

Upon the difficulties in the way to the prosperity and

1 The simple origin of the word Protestant.
good government of Ireland, we are not here about to enter at any length, but merely to point a few suggestions, bearing upon the present position of Irish relations and Irish responsibilities, and upon what appears to us to be the only national way of meeting them. We have heard a good deal of late—all very well and very useful in its way—about the opposition presented by the Roman Catholic clergy in Ireland, to her material wants and temporal interests, but no one, so far as we are aware, has yet pointed out the fact that it is the Irish Members of Parliament themselves who are really responsible to Ireland and to the nation for the present state of things, and that it is to them, and them alone, that Parliament should look for all that concerns the political wants and well-being of that country. Ireland has come to be looked upon too much as a place where any ambitious man, with a little more than average ability, plenty to say, and unbounded sympathy with Irish "woes," may "run down" and secure a seat, and although, in the ordinary course of affairs, this is unavoidable, still we believe that these gentlemen should in no way be liberated from the fair share of responsibility they undertake towards the order and good government of that country, and that it is to them, and to them alone, that Ireland should represent her sufferings and "injustices"—the reality of which it should be their place to prove before the House—and
that Parliament, nationally viewed, has nothing to do with the interests and forces which may be in the background,—influencing, no doubt, to a great extent, the conduct of Irish Members. Again, so far as we are aware, we never hear any real representation of the state of Ireland from an Irish Member—men who should know everything about the country, and represent it to Parliament—no practical outline of her real wants, her grievances, or causes of failure; but more generally the public, and Parliament also, get only second-hand information upon such, emanating also sometimes, it is natural to suppose, from self-interested Irish sources. If the Irish Members were called upon to represent the real state of the country, and made responsible for it to the British Parliament, much of the sentiment and ill-feeling still existing between the two countries would, we believe, disappear: and, though we may be allowed to doubt whether Irish " woes" will ever wholly cease so long as there is a camp in that country hostile to her material progress, we cannot but believe that, in the natural working of things, they must be slowly and surely lessened. As to the question of her nationality, or "Home Rule" business, Nature has herself decided, so far as this age of the world is concerned, as to what country and kingdom Ireland shall belong—it would be absurd to suppose that, in these times, these western islands could long hold their own but as one
nation: ¹ and there never has been and never will be in any one nation more than one supreme governing body in the land. This, for the British Kingdom, is the Crown—of which the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament are but individual parts. Ireland has her share in its protection, aid, and support. She has also her share in the Christian graces, real sympathies, and practical good-will, of our beloved Queen. Let her therefore be content. Her discontents, at any rate, do not originate in her form of government. She must look elsewhere to find them. Parliament is prepared to meet Irish affairs in a spirit of complete toleration and justice—to address her changes and proposals and laws to the heart of the people, knowing that the Irish are a people of feeling: surely therefore it is self-evident that her present difficulties are without the sphere of (English) political life?

Upon the questions of education for both Ireland and England—the abrogation of the law of entail—the readjustment of representation, to secure a better knowledge of the wants of the age in which we live ²—it

¹ By which I imply only that unity is the source of all national power.

² Also, the clearing away of the haunts of vice in the heart of London, and the building of dwellings in which families can live moral lives; the making plateaus of garden land about them, to let in the light and air of Nature; the giving
would be mere immodesty on my part to dwell, having already referred to so many profound considerations, more to show their relation to the philosophy of human nature I had put forward, than for any other reason. Indeed, I may truly say, for this cause only, as each one of the subjects on which I have written is, as we all know, a life-study in itself; but it seemed to me necessary, in fact incumbent upon me, to show to what practical conclusions the principles I had laid down would lead, and which are now before the reader, for his consideration, application, or comment. That the British Constitution, including an Upper House wholly independent of the Lower, is a true representation or outward embodiment of the constitution of man, is a fact I have hitherto, in the few political observations I have made, omitted to state; and this is, I believe, the true reason why it has worked so well in practice during the life-time of a people. In fact, I believe it is the truest representation of what government should be now upon the face of the earth, though subject in its body or practical working, not in its con-

additional lung space to this great city, by widening the bounds of commercial centralisation; the altering the social habits of society proper,—all these are secondary measures and influences requiring the study of the Statesmen of the age.
stitution, to modifications to meet the wants of each age. That changes will go on, apart from violent or abstract alteration in the nature of the constitution itself, is the very beauty and truth (as in the human body) of the nature of the constitution, permitting, as it does, the healthy ongrowth and outgrowth of the life and knowledge and habits and associations of a people. Whether when we reach the complement of our natures, expressed in intellectual law, we shall still continue to be a people, or make way for younger and more vigorous races, it would be here of no service to speculate or dwell: enough for ourselves that we embody the just deeds of mind in law, and abide by them. It is perhaps as impossible for us to foresee the future history of man, as it would have been for our progenitors some 500 years ago to foretell the present state of civilization in the world, or to predict with us what are the destinies of the untold heathen millions in modifying the life of man. But that a sound knowledge of human nature is the one human high-road to the future successes and well-being of the world—if it can be let alone by wars and ambitions, which we doubt and disbelieve—is a position which God has ordained for us to know, and science, in the shape of human knowledge, has predicted for us to fulfil. We wait and watch and hope and fear, trusting in the meantime that truth may remain uppermost, that laws may be
made serviceable to all that really tends to human good, that charity may abound, that faith may continue, knowing, as we well do, that in all essential human labour, where light is salvation and mercy reward, the strength is without ourselves, and the power and the glory are of God.

THE END.