

THE
RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE
OF
BODY AND MIND

CONSIDERED;


AS IT AFFECTS THE GREAT QUESTIONS OF

**EDUCATION—PHRENOLOGY—MATERIALISM—MORAL ADVANCEMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY—MAN'S FREE AGENCY—
THE THEORY OF LIFE—THE PECULIARITIES OF MENTAL PROPERTY—
MENTAL DISEASES—THE AGENCY OF MIND UPON THE BODY—
OF PHYSICAL TEMPERAMENT UPON THE MANIFESTATIONS OF MIND—
AND UPON THE EXPRESSION OF RELIGIOUS FEELING.**

BY

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P R E F A C E.

IN placing his volume before the tribunal of the public, the author would confess that he is perfectly conscious of its containing some *defective* points in argument,—some reasoning which might be better illustrated,—some subjects which as yet cannot be developed beyond a certain extent, or which require a larger experience,—and some instances of repetition which might have been avoided. But he is fain to crave a degree of indulgence on the ground of the nature of his subject,—of its being greatly an unexplored tract, and containing much of the “terra incognita ;”—and of his own active professional duties, which have crowded his literary labours into a *very late hour* of the night, and which have occasioned frequent interruptions of a most harassing character. Yet he would hope that notwithstanding these difficulties and imperfections, some steps in advance have been taken towards exploring that most important subject, THE RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE OF BODY AND MIND.

Farnham, Feb. 12, 1842.

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the nature and essence of spiritual existence no valid argument against its reality. Exposure of arguments against this doctrine, founded upon the most unwarrantable and gratuitous assumptions. Mind is discoverable by its effects alone,—and its origin and operation, however mysterious, are not more inscrutable than physical agency, in any, and in all its diversified forms. The assertion of a perceptible motion about the brain in thought is not founded in fact; and even if it were true, it would not militate against the theory of an immaterial and governing precipient. Renewed cautions against confounding organ and function. Proofs of an independent presiding spirit, derived from certain mental processes—intellectual, moral, and religious. The same truth proved by the total or partial absence of these properties, in reverie, dreaming, intoxication, delirium, &c., in which the self-actings of *organic* and *animal* excitement are alone manifested. And again, in extreme cases of religious conversion, and in the ordinary processes of education. The possession of a greater number and higher range of instincts in animals generally *over man*, an argument in favour of his being endowed with a superadded and compensating principle, the immaterial soul, by which he attains knowledge and reason. This still further proved by the universal existence of individual consciousness of an interior *self*; the *le moi* of sceptical, the soul of christian, philosophers;—and again, the consciousness that the dissolution of the body is not coincident with the extinction of the indwelling spirit; and, lastly, the instinctive desire after immortality—a feeling essentially distinct from the *love of life* possessed by man in common with other animals. Some mistakes relative to the progressive developement of mind, as connected with the growth of the body. The anomalously wretched condition of man, in the midst of a creation, where good so immensely preponderates, indicates that some awfully perverting cause has interfered with regard to *him*; and, also, in order to vindicate the *revealed character* of God, the necessity for some other state of existence after the dissolution of the body, and the separation of the spirit from its present material tenement. Existing mental phenomena, and especially the obstacles in the way of intellectual advancement, another proof of the immateriality of mind; so also the *moral* condition of man; the tendency to evil rather than good is a point of deviation from original design, and demonstrates the necessity of future existence under widely-different circumstances. Some remarks on the peculiar nature of man, showing the necessity for a future state, and the consequent immateriality and immortality of the soul.

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principle. This dominant principle must not depend for support upon the maxims of expediency, nor upon the hope of any selfish enjoyment, however refined, but upon a *system of duty*, a *faithful obedience* to the declared will of God. Religion alone is able to give preponderance to man's better tendencies, and to ensure *progressive* amelioration. Human perfection consists in the resemblance of man to the moral attributes of his Maker and Designer. Man, as he now exists, the only anomalous imperfection with which we are acquainted. He must be taught to imitate the divine perfections, and these being marked by *regularity*, *beauty*, and *utility*, his mental and moral developement should be similarly characterised. Definition and explanation of these attributes, and the necessity for their *entire* combination to form the character of human perfection. Obstacles arising from the union of mind with matter—from the influence of society—from individual idiosyncracies—and from inadequate methods of instruction. Importance of mental developement in its bearing upon *religious belief*. The faculty of the will considered; mistaken views generally entertained; it is, when unimpaired, the result of *sound judgment* and *correct reasoning*; and therefore perfectly free to choose, but liable to be influenced in its decisions by the condition of the brain and nervous system. Paramount importance of the will in the spiritual economy of man: rules for the guidance of this faculty, and cautions to be observed in its developement and cultivation. The will is influenced to action by *motives*; these must appeal to the understanding and the conscience, enlightened by, and dependent upon, *religious principle*. In man's present fallen and probationary condition, the design of the Almighty Creator is very manifest, viz. *uniform progression towards moral good*, and this must form the first object of the good man's desire. Rigid discipline is to be enforced in early life, without impairing the decision of character; it must teach the power to *choose*, the *obligation to obey*. Importance of distinguishing the effects of idiosyncrasy and education in the formation of habits of mind, and of rightly adapting the mode of treatment accordingly. Regularity of exercise indispensable to success. Too great excitation to be carefully avoided, on account of its consequent disastrous re-action. Benevolence of feeling will strengthen intellectual capacity. The faculty of imagination requires careful developement, since it exercises a peculiar influence upon the moral manifestations of mind. Application of the principle of progressive improvement to the *christian character*; its perfection is personal purity, and entire conformity to the will of

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ARGUMENT.—Unsatisfactory knowledge as to what constitutes life ; its influence upon mental phenomena. Life is a principle super-added to, and united with, matter ; but, like many other first principles, is only cognisable by its effects. It is not the “ sum total of functions,” since it exists in the absence of sensible phenomena ; and it is called forth on the application of the appropriate stimuli : suspended animation from drowning, &c. Neither is life the result of organisation, nor constituted by its own functions. Examination of Sir C. Morgan’s hypotheses and inferences—shown to be unfounded in fact, and unphilosophical and unchristian in application. The origin of evil is enveloped in mystery, but beneficence clearly characterises the works of the Almighty, especially those with which we are best acquainted. Inquiry into the phenomena of life, as exhibited in its origin ; this origin, when traced to its source, is found to be derived from the immediate fiat of the Creator, and is lost in the mysteries of creation. The successive developement of vital function traced in vegetables, animals, and man, in his several stages of growth. The assertion, that the moral

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know not the nature of the ultimate cerebral fibre; but these difficulties are not greater than those which belong to the hypothesis terminating in organisation only:—these difficulties exposed, —therefore inquiries pushed beyond organisation are not chimerical; nor the hope at some future day to become acquainted with this unexplored territory. *Nature* of mind beyond our power of investigation; but we may study the function of brain, the connecting link between mind and matter. Hypothesis of Sir C. Morgan considered, that thought consists in organic movements, and is therefore subject to the laws of matter; answer to this supposition, and proofs that thought does *not* consist in organic movements—that it is not obedient to the laws of matter, and that there are greater difficulties in this hypothesis, than in the simpler, juster theory of *governing mind* directing cerebral organisation. Observations on the senses; their development in inverse proportion to the employment of reason; yet the senses are the grand inlet to knowledge. Reason for this arrangement: the senses are necessary to the conservation of animal life, but their acumen is more than supplied by reason, and spiritual predominates over animal life. The senses may pervert, but do not watch over and guide the operations of *mind*, which is superior to them. Much mental power and action often co-exist without the cognisance of the senses; examples of this law. What is sensation? How and where produced? Causes operating to sophisticate the reports of the senses: influence upon organic life, and reasons for this great difference. Time, and frequency of employment, diminish the intensity of impression;—changes effected by advancing years;—diminishing acuteness of feeling, increased range of intellect, and certain and final disenchantment from the influence of sense. Impressions made on the senses, how conveyed to the spiritual mind, without which they have no rational or moral result. Objections urged against this communication from the crossing and interlacing of notices on their way; this objection answered and illustrated by the transmission of the rays of *light*. *Perception* is said not to reside in the brain, because of muscular movements after dissolution;—fallacy of this argument, and explanation of the facts. Mental and moral consequences of perception;—these arise from the primordial law of the Creator. Defective states of perception, errors, hallucinations, &c.—whence arising. *Conscience*—its legitimate and perverted agency—remorse distinguished from repentance. Natural religion,—*reflection*—proper influence—morbid states of. *Memory*, what is it? it is not wholly mental, not simple attention

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recollection; beautiful, but fallacious hypothesis on this subject; theory of organic movements. Ideas, which are wholly organic in their origin, are not exempted from moral consequences; and man remains responsible for *all* his thoughts and actions: example of this reasoning in social life. Disposition of certain philosophers to lower human nature, so as to make the distinction between man and brutes a mere difference in degree. The question of the after-existence of brutes in another state of being, impossible to be solved; and not important, if possible, because of man's superadded spiritual nature. Arguments on this subject fully stated. Faculty of *imitation* instinctive in its early influence; agency of fashion chiefly operative in the young, and greatly lost in the aged; morbid states of this faculty—its moral relations, and its influence upon large masses of mankind, especially in bringing about political changes.

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ARGUMENT.—Morbid manifestations of mind dependent upon certain conditions of the brain. The tyranny of organic suggestions already mentioned, and their influence as a basis for conduct disproved. Consequences of following such suggestions illustrated by the influence of hunger; necessity for subjugating selfish desire: the infirmities of the body are not to be pleaded in excuse for the obliquities of mind; they are to be watched against and conquered. Influence of sleep in superseding the manifestations of mind;—unwonted irritability and oppression of the nervous system—opposite conditions, but both morbid—use of sleep—unnatural drowsiness; effect on the mental manifestations. Dreaming, not a mental, but purely a cerebral phenomenon, arising from the primary, or secondary irritation of some nervous fibres. Classification of dreams according to the organic irritation which occasions them; dreams arising from the renovation of past feelings—the recollections of by-gone impressions—the thoughts, and anxieties, and business of the preceding day; some irritation of the brain itself—some impression made upon an organ of sense, or some other organ of the body, not immediately an organ of sense, and all these proceeding from one common root—irritation of the brain. Reasons for abjuring the hypothesis, that dreaming is a phenomenon of

mind. Dreaming affords no evidence of the soul's immortality—no proof of the actings of spirit *at all*; on the contrary, the action is morbid and inconsistent with perfect health; and never to be found, but when the body is more or less disturbed. Answers to objections on account of the *rapid* changes in dreaming. Conversely, no intellectual process will *produce dreaming*: the incessant talking of delirium in fever—sleep-walking—some hysterical conditions—the phenomena of fainting, &c.; other states of suspended animation—apoplexy—concussion—slighter injuries of the brain—mere momentary stunning. Influence of gradual decay of the organs upon the manifestations of mind, very different in different individuals, yet always more or less discernible. First occurs, diminished attention—loss of the power of concentration—peevishness, and impatience of contradiction—prejudices and uncontrolled thoughts. These symptoms vary much according as the decay begins in loss of vascular balance, or diminished nervous energy; the distinction of these two states. Torpor of the brain may arise from either condition; very slight alterations of the circulation within the brain produce great effects—irritability—nameless and undefined apprehension of approaching danger—slighter and deeper shades of paralysis; all these conditions are peculiarly liable to spectral illusions; how accounted for; hallucinations, to disprove which to the patient is impossible by argument; and these lapse into insanity, or fully-formed cerebral *disorder*, producing greater misery than any other form of malady. Remedies against it should be twofold—physical and moral. Indispensable importance of long-continued perseverance under adverse circumstances, in order to final success. Brutes are not subject to insanity; hydrophobia even is not an exception to this law, because it is not insanity; the prevailing characteristic of insanity is to be found in the moral impressions which pre-occupied the sufferer before the invasion of disorder; which become first the exclusive idea, and then lapse into insanity. Examples in proof of this argument. Mental alienation differs in nothing from other maladies—in its origin—its progress—its termination; and the only rational treatment is based on the same views, with the curative indications of other disorders. How is insanity to be detected? Difficulties of the subject, with suggestions for their removal. Great difficulty of distinguishing physical infirmity from moral delinquency. Particular attention due to the function of *volition*. Insanity is very frequently an amplification, or distortion of natural character; that is, it is influenced by original *physical* temperament; in every variety, it is purely a

cerebral malady. How far the deeper passions may be *causes* of insanity; their outbreaks are generally *consequences* rather than *causes*. How far religion can be termed a cause of insanity; it never can be in its *legitimate* influence; but erroneous views may: these, however, are not religion; reasoning is quite useless. Answers to objections arising from the non-existence of *organic* disease in the brain of the insane; disorder of function alone is sufficient to destroy, yet organic disease is more frequent in the insane than in others; arguments on this subject—especially those drawn from the *habits* of the nervous system. Bearing of idiocy upon this question; also, what are called mental peculiarities; agency of remedies; early symptoms of cerebral disorder—nervous headaches—pericranial headaches, and distinction between them—congestive headaches—illusions—great instability of pursuit—violence upon trifles—general change of character, when compared with preceding years and months. Hypochondriasis, with disorder of the functions of interior life; these are generally a consequence, not a cause of insanity, as well as feebleness of the bodily muscles; the most successful method of treatment. Demonomania—pseudo-religious insanity. Comparison of connexion between genius and insanity, as between religion and insanity. Injustice of ascribing the *one* and not the other to insanity. Farther elucidation of this subject, as respects the *natural* and *perverted* influence of religion. Cautions on this subject; possession; division of pseudo-religious insanity, into the hopeful and the desponding; characteristics of each peculiarity; causes operating in producing either state, and errors of well-meaning persons, with cautions on these subjects. Influence of physical temperament upon each form of these peculiarities. Accidental phenomena, arising from past circumstances, or past trials—or sickness—or speculation—or superstition—selfishness of the insane; their tendency to introversion; their disposition to suicide is immense; yet every suicide is not insanity; important distinctions, and cautions on the subject of suicide.

CHAPTER IX.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE MIND OVER THE BODILY
FUNCTIONS.—Page 466.

ARGUMENT.—Necessity of considering this subject before entering upon that of the influence of the body over the mind; universality

of the consciousness of such influence, yet great ignorance of its extent, and widely-ramified agency; this influence exhibited in the efforts of self-preservation—in the expressions of the countenance—the smile—the tear—the frown, &c.; also in various emotions; in the manifold forms of imitation—in the contraction of awkward habits—in the moral influence of companionship—in the liability to disorder, especially of the nervous system—in the simulation of approaching death—and in the production of disease. Examples of these states. Influence of mind upon the digestive organs. Agency of mind in the cure of disease, and its application to modern miracles. Distinction between these and genuine miracles: the principles of true and false miraculous agency fully stated; attention especially drawn to the nature of the cures said to have been wrought, these being generally cases of defective nervous energy. Important distinction between *palliative* and curative treatment; also between *being ill*, and *feeling ill*; there is no modern permanent cure of any *organic structural* alteration. Important conclusions drawn from these premises; and necessity for the exercise of charity. The great question of telling, or withholding from, the sick, the extent of their danger, fully considered and discussed, as applicable to the several forms of acute and chronic disorder. Abuse of the Holy Communion, as sometimes exhibited to the sick. Some observations on the case of Miss Fancourt, re-published from the Christian Observer, and a very recent miraculous cure by Dr. Clanney.

CHAPTER X.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE BODY OVER THE MANIFESTATIONS OF MIND.—Page 511.

ARGUMENT.—The great distinctions of physical temperament; these are rarely to be found uncompounded; yet may be safely classed as the sanguineous, the choleric, or melancholic, the lymphatic, and the nervous; the peculiar characteristics of each; their physical agency on the body in health or disease; on the ordinary mental manifestations, and on the disordered mental function to which each is peculiarly liable. Each one gives its tinge to character in health, and, still more so, in the states of disorder. Changes of opinion, as influenced, if not produced, by alterations of physical structure and condition during the progress of life, exhibited in dif-

ferent ages. This influence of body upon mind, though very great, has been represented to be greater than it really is. Too great a mechanical agency of body upon mind, has been attributed to the latter: origin of many of its disorders accounted for: important distinctions on this subject, and the real causes of disordered muscular movement. Morbid sympathies, dependent upon nervous connexion. Office of the great sympathetic nerve; important inference drawn from the size and function of this nerve. Effect of various changes, healthful and morbid, on the functions of organic life, and upon the several manifestations of mind. Nevertheless, these do not supersede man's moral responsibilities, which remain the same under all the *action* and *re-action* of the nervous system of mind on body, and body on mind. Reasons for this dependence and reciprocal agency. The conservative power of nature; various examples of this watchful agency, which might be indefinitely multiplied, but are here limited to the different habits of serous and mucous membranes. Conservative power of sleep. Agency of the atmosphere upon the nervous system, direct and indirect; and upon the manifestations of mind—particularly with regard to its dryness or dampness—its pressure. Changes of sentiment—conversion. Political conversion, though too frequently produced by interested motive, may be the result of this law; exemplified. Complexity of operation of causes producing change, in an organ which experiences the agency of physical pressure from without, and of spiritual commotion from within. Changes of opinion classed under the natural and healthful—the organic and the morbid; the first only arising from maturity of judgment. Vacillation, and obstinate adherence to expressed opinion, are, perhaps, equally opposed to truth. Organic changes depend upon the altered condition of the brain; elucidations of this state. The term morbid change defined; it is intended to represent the agency of *physical causes*. Errors in judgment. Insanity; definition of this term. Influence of physical temperament on the *expression of religious feeling*: this has not been sufficiently appreciated. Religion consists in the service of the head, as in the feeling of the heart; these properties should never be separated. Quietism is not equanimity; examples. The manifestations of mind may be *wholly* or *partially* disturbed; rationale of this process, which differs also according to the original mental calibre. It is not religion itself, but the *expression* of its agency, which is shown thus to vary according to the mutable medium, through which its immutable principles are shown. The spirit of man is uniform and simple;

but the mode of its manifestation is infinitely diversified according to the medium through which it is exhibited. Exemplification of this natural law, in the results of grafting, and in other illustrations drawn from nature. The agency of physical temperament has no influence upon moral obligation. Illustration of this principle, in the manifestations of mind produced by the influence of religion upon minds exhibiting different physical *constitutions* at successive periods of life; on the emotions of the heart; on the conduct of the life, in sorrow and in joy—on a deathbed—and in other important situations. The same is to be remarked with regard to certain morbid conditions of mental manifestation; examples of several of these states in the history of past days. This same influence further shown in prayer—in active duty—and under a variety of circumstances. Various reasonings on the subject; and illustrations of the power of the physical temperament to *modify* the expression of the deep feelings of the heart. Importance of keeping in view the motives to duty. Some effects of fanaticism and rational explanation of the same upon rational principles. Result of these views; to promote charity—diminish the influence of prejudice—cheer the desponding—check the presumptuous—arrest the self-willed devotee of feeling, and stimulate the feeble and the languid.

CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM A REVIEW OF THE WHOLE
SUBJECT.—Page 626.

THE
RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE
OF
BODY AND MIND.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY SKETCH OF THE SUBJECT.

IF we would inquire into the nature and influence of the morbid manifestations of mind, which in every varied shape we constantly perceive around us, we must first know something of the healthy agencies of the manifesting organ; and we must become acquainted with the diversified operations of physical temperament upon the nature and disposition of such agencies: in fact, we must know something of the healthy machinery, before we can understand the deviations from its physiological conditions.

It is a forgetfulness of this principle which has thrown such a degree of abstraction over the writings of psychological authors; and the small amount of good which has resulted from their

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investigations, may be traced to their manner of treating mind as a simply spiritual principle, and overlooking the fact that it has no mode of receiving notices, or of communicating its own actions, except through a material medium, liable to be influenced by health and disease, and by all the circumstances which act upon the body generally, but especially by the original character which has been impressed upon the manifesting organ.

With another class of writers there exists the opposite error, of referring every modification of mind *to the organs only*, and entirely forgetting the presiding spiritual principle, which in a healthy state of things should guard, govern, and direct the bodily movements: an error this, which is as if one referred the musical sounds of a concert to the instruments by which they were produced, in entire forgetfulness of the talent which guided and governed the execution of all those movements of the lips and of the fingers, which bring out, and as it were impart life and feeling to these sounds.

It is remarkable that, in general, persons are quite contented to carry on the functions of thought without observing their peculiarities;—without noticing the complex nature of the operations of mind;—without *introverting* their attention, or watching the movements of interior life. It is indeed strange, that man should be contented to pass through life, even to the confines of the grave, without trying to fathom the depths of his own ignorance;—without seeking to develop the won-

ders of his own understanding ;—without investigating the nature of his own mind ;—without endeavouring to trace to their hidden source the various streamlets of sensation and idea which seem to claim one common origin ;—without seeking to define and explain the emotions of the *heart* ;—and without applying himself in good earnest to the study of that intellectual constitution upon which depends so much of his present position and future hopes, and upon which the dark wing of the night of ignorance still broods.

Yet such is the narrow limit of the human understanding, that this inquiry is beset with difficulties ; and that chiefly because the knowledge of *first causes* is almost always beyond our reach. The veil which conceals them throws inextricably its entangling folds around those who would vainly endeavour to draw it aside, and exhibit the primary movements of mind upon matter.

First principles, as they are termed, do not assist us in this inquiry ; *they* are certain *known* results of *unknown* causes, which we have traced back to their origin, as far as we can trace them, but which are in truth some of those innumerable secondary effects, produced by the agency and influence of *final causes*, all originating from a GREAT FIRST CAUSE. The highest reach of the human understanding is, to discover something of the connection between the two. To endeavour to rise beyond these *first principles* to their origin, is but to walk blindfold in a labyrinth, in which a thousand paths conduct to error, each successive one terminating

in another ; and, at the best, only leading back the wearied and unimproved inquirer to the very spot from which he first started.

In reference to our present object, this knowledge is unnecessary, even were it attainable. It is not necessary to be acquainted with the ultimate nature of *light*, of *heat*, of *oxygen*, in order to trace their effects. It is not indispensable to possess an intimate knowledge of the principle of *life*, in order to study its phenomena. We need not then hesitate to acknowledge the existence of an *unknown* proximate cause of mental action, nor to investigate its results so far as human nature can conduct us ; the inquiry is strictly an inductive one, and we presume only to follow where nature and science lead.

We do not propose to write a treatise on the philosophy of mind, nor on what are called mental diseases ; but rather to point out the influence of physical temperament, both upon the healthy and the morbid manifestations of mind ; or, in other words, to trace the influence of cerebral structure upon its function, and to show how far the emotion which is in itself *spiritual*, or the impression which is in itself *external*, may be characterised by the organ through which these are severally given out or received. In conducting this inquiry, it may be desirable also to glance at the intellectual condition of the lower animals ; and sure we are, that if one half of the acuteness of thought and reasoning, and one half of the diligence, which have been almost wasted on the

science of mind, had been devoted to our present purpose, we should not still have had to lament that an *impenetrable veil* seemed to be drawn over the mode of action of the *brain*,—over the manifestations of mind,—and over the relations of the organ, to its intellectual and moral disturbances.

In the following pages we do not profess to draw aside this veil, but we hope to raise at least one of its folds, by directing the attention to the influence of physical temperament upon the manifestations of mind, both in *health* and *during disorder* ; and in some measure to attempt to trace back *their reciprocal* agencies, in confirming or disturbing the mental operations.

The influence of these views upon the objects and the prospects of education ; the extent to which this subject is occupying public attention ; and the indispensable necessity for fixing its direction according to the *peculiar temperament*, induce us to devote, in the first instance, some time to this subject, rendered doubly important by the extent to which its machinery is applied.

The brain, as well as the senses, requires education in order to secure its greatest amount and perfectness of action. It is only in proportion to the developement of its power, that it gradually arrives at *precision* in the exercise of its functions. Thus, for example, its perception, memory, and imagination, which are consecutive to and determined *by sensation*, grow and expand in proportion as they are called into exercise. And again, judgment, of which these form the triple base,

associates the ideas thus obtained, at first indeed very imperfectly ; but gradually, and by use, and by the correction of frequent errors, arriving at a considerable degree of accuracy.

It will not be out of place, thus early in our inquiry, to remark an essential difference between mental and organic life. There is no want of education, for instance, to the stomach ; it performs its functions without teaching, and is in no way improved by any increase of knowledge. And so, also, with regard to the other departments of organic life ; they admit not of instruction, their full power is inherent in themselves.

While, however, the brain admits of, and requires, a process of education, it must be allowed, on the other hand, that each individual possesses a *natural* character, *conferred* by *physical temperament*, which, though it may be *modified*, *softened*, *directed*, and *improved*, by the *presiding mind*, cannot be entirely changed, and always gives a tinge to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of its possessor.

A little reflection will show, that so far as the *expression* of feeling and thought is characterised by physical temperament, so far it is placed under the agency of physical causes ; and, however it may be controlled, cannot be *superseded*. Habit and exercise may develope power on the one hand, and give increased facilities of action, but they will not alter the character of the mental manifestations. Opposite principles may be brought out to modify the effects of physical temperament, and

indeed it is this natural character which for the most part requires the exercise of *principle*. Education may moderate the influence of physical temperament, and may deepen reflection, and may strengthen and enlarge the judgment, so as to render *mind* superior to the impulse of bodily passion, by a constant reference to the first principles of moral action. But it is not in her power to *supersede* those bodily influences which constitute the sum of man's *natural* character, such as we should find him unrefined by civilization—uninfluenced by the higher moral motives—unguided by religion,—a prey to selfish desire—the creature of passion—with no hope beyond the gratification of to-day—with no aspirations after futurity.

CHAPTER II.

RECIPROCITY OF BODILY AND MENTAL INFLUENCE,
APPLIED TO EDUCATION.

It is very certain that education must proceed ; a mighty stimulus has been applied to the intelligence of man, and its operation can no longer be controlled : knowledge of some kind, good or bad, useful or injurious, *he will* obtain. For the desire has been created, and, as in the case of a starving people, food they *will have*, though at the risk of breaking up the foundations of their most dearly cherished social institutions : so the thirst for knowledge has been cultivated into appetite, and it now stands forward in all the vehemence of passion, whose voice *will* be heard, and the whisper of whose suggestion *must* be attended to. It is no longer a question whether man is to be taught, but, rather, *how* and *what* he is to be taught : the principle that knowledge is good in itself, seems to be admitted, and the great point of doubt is as to the kind and degree of knowledge to be imparted.

A review of the past few years would show that

the mind had been gradually undergoing preparation for this change; and that unless ignorance were allowed to die a natural death, it must soon be destroyed by the spirit of man struggling after liberty and independence, and unfortunately over-acting its part, so as to convert these real blessings into the poisonous fruits of licentiousness, and a too prominent contempt for all authority, which would place a barrier to the exclusive reign of selfish desire.

The results which have flowed from the adoption of the principle that *man must be taught*, could scarcely have been anticipated by its first promulgators. And yet it is now easy to see how, that if every man must be taught a little, each would be raised in his own estimation precisely in proportion to the knowledge he possessed; and that thus trenching upon the grade of society next immediately above him, that grade also must consent to add to its former stock of information and intelligence, so that it may not be amalgamated with that which *was* the lower, but may still be able to maintain that distinction of spirits in society which is so indispensable to its well-being.

This principle once set in motion, would continue to operate on the ascending scale of being, of social man, even to the highest and most cultivated of the sons and daughters of intellect and refinement. A little observation upon the changes which have taken place in society during the last thirty years, will sufficiently demonstrate the truth of this position. And we would fain hope, not-

withstanding the evils which have arisen, that the change has been for the most part beneficial: for although it has developed in some instances an impertinent and misplaced show of knowledge,—and although the race of literary coxcombs, and pedants, and pretenders has increased,—yet this is a *small evil* when contrasted with the amount of real knowledge which has been diffused, the power of usefulness which has been conferred on tens of thousands, and the multiplied comforts which have arisen to mankind; with all the collateral advantages which have attached to the increased and increasing attention to every call of charity, to every suggestion of benevolence. The zephyr of enlarged and liberal feeling has hushed to repose the gusts of passion, and the storms and clouds of intolerance; and the sunshine of peace, and the glory of knowledge, have replaced the darkness of error and the gloom of bigotry: the human mind is no longer held in the degrading thralldom of thinking in the same track which others have previously and so blindly followed: but it is permitted, nay, encouraged, to stand forth in all its native loveliness, and strength, and beauty of form and character; while each day gives it stability, by enlarging the base on which it rests, and adds fresh polish to the column which is reared upon it.

Still it must be confessed that this *good* is not without some corresponding *evil*. Under the genial warmth of the light of intellectual progress, there has been developed an innumerable and misshapen brood of parasites, which have first defaced and

then destroyed the leaves of the tree of knowledge ; while a thousand pigmy shapes of lesser evil, which had passed unnoticed in the gloom, have been forced into a state of impertinent observation : the good laws of legitimate authority have been thrown aside, and the human mind has claimed for itself a recklessness of thoughtless, selfish, and impassioned action, which would sacrifice *any* good at the shrine of present inclination. Society has become a series of concentric but uncombined circles, without a common centre, and without a sufficient bond of union to preserve it from destruction by the first wave of popular discontent ; and its foundation has been undermined by removing that cement (the bond of union for general good) upon which the integrity of the column was dependent.

We might indeed trace (and the inquiry would not be without considerable interest to the mental philosopher) the variety of consequences which have flowed from the mighty impetus thus communicated to the operations of the understanding, an impetus which has constantly gathered, and is still acquiring momentum as it rolls along, according to the compounded ratio of all the cerebral energy which it everywhere enlists in its support, and in various ways converts into operative power ; a principle possessing a new creating energy, and which is therefore constantly reproducing itself, and will continue to do so, unless interrupted by some *morbid condition*, until the human intellect

has reached its highest aim, and there can be no longer any place for exertion.

But we may not be seduced from our path by every interesting point of view which presents a claim to our attention in the richly-diversified scenery of life's magnificent landscape; and although we might rejoice to linger over the successive manifestations of this wonder-working principle, and to trace its hidden agencies, as well as its more overt influence, yet we prefer, for the present, passing over the many phenomena which mark the stirring advances of mind, in order that we may ask *what it is* which has given encouragement and support to this mighty and successive developement of its manifestations.

In one word, it is the progress of *public opinion* by which the strongholds of prejudice have been undermined; conscious bigotry has sought the obscurity which is alone congenial to its sickly growth; ignorance has been shamed out of its continuance, and the measure of knowledge which would have enabled an individual to pass current in society, has been immensely enlarged. The indolent have been roused, and have been feelingly taught, that if *they* will be supine, others will distance them in the race of competition, and will carry off the prize, which, in its just proportion, has been offered to all as the legitimate meed of industry and talent combined.

Such has been this progress, that in order to command public respect and influence, man must

be first entitled to its possession, not by the exterior glare of his situation, but by the real weight of his powers and acquirements; and thus, in some happy measure, the race is not confined to the privileged few, but is accessible to all.

It will at once be admitted as a truth, that in every class of society there are individual peculiarities of mental calibre, and of that point of intellectual expansion, to which each can attain. Yet it will also be admitted, that in proportion as the individual is fully placed under the influence of the laws of habit and association, and graduated exertion, so will his power of acquisition and of action be increased, till he has reached the utmost verge of human investigation and attainment. The *pride of man* revolts from the admission that the God of nature has everywhere placed a limit to research, which it exceeds the *power of man* to overstep; and in acknowledging this so humbling truth, we rejoice, that although Nature has given nothing to man without *much labour*, yet with an all-bounteous hand she has dispensed her favours liberally to the diligent.

Such, however, is the powerful influence of mind over matter, that *this limit* may, for a lengthened and apparently indefinite series of advances, be constantly thrown more and more backward, while a greater fulness and prominence may be given to the attributes of mind.

We have ascribed this advance to the influence of mind upon matter, because we believe that the *original* difference of *mental manifestation* is depen-

dent *first* upon the physical constitution of the *brain* and nervous system. We are not materialists, nor are we thorough-paced believers in the speculations of the cranioscopists* of our day ; but we do believe that the natural *kind and degree* of mental manifestation is dependent upon, and characterised by, physical constitution ; and that this latter may be modified by causes operating *upon it* ; and, *through it*, upon the *expression* of the perceptions, associations, and actions of the immaterial principle.

A single glance at society will demonstrate this proposition. In each one of its successive stages, from the lowest to the highest, will be found a difference of physical temperament, and a corresponding distinction in the manifestations of mind ; obscure and obtuse in the *lowest*, frequently feeble and morbidly acute in the *highest*, and perhaps reaching the maximum of power and strength in the middle ranks of life. This rule may be influenced by situation and circumstances, by health and disease, by education, by laws, habits, religion, and many other causes ; still the principle exists, and will be found intact ; *the manifestations of mind are characterized by physical temperament.*

This proposition requires a little further development. Man is a complex animal, compounded of the most exquisite organization, and of the highest order of spiritual intelligence ; at least in so far as we have any acquaintance with the nature and essence of spiritual existence. A very slight

* Vide subsequent page.

attention to the operations of mind will, however, show that, from some cause or other, these are exceedingly limited in their extent; that a natural thirst for knowledge is grievously counteracted by the difficulties in the way of obtaining it;—that the pathway of science is intricate, and beset with thorns and briers;—that its ascent is rendered steep and wearisome;—and that the laborious hours of the schoolboy, when marked by industry and perseverance, do not result from any natural aptitudes for literature, but commonly more from the fear of punishment than the love of acquisition.

Yet we do see some few finer spirits vanquish every difficulty, and in the full tide of their zeal overcome every obstacle; yea, go forward in the paths of knowledge with enthusiastic delight, counting no present attainment sufficient, while there remains within their view another more distant yet accessible point. Moreover, we do see *different* individuals excelling in *different* pursuits; and this arising, not simply from exclusive devotion to one or the other, but *apparently* from possessing some original affinities towards one object in particular. How are these things to be accounted for, but by supposing that the immaterial spirit does not *now* possess those full powers for which it was originally designed?—that there is some *cause in the way* of its more complete and easy growth and advance towards maturity?—and that these natural difficulties are only overcome by the undefined peculiarities of those few who are

constantly reaching forward towards the perfection of intellect?

Now, if we could ascertain wherein this peculiarity consisted, we should be enabled to explain the other difficulties of the problem. In our opinion, this difference will be found in the *peculiar* aptitude of the brain for *particular* intellectual and spiritual manifestation. It is allowed that the operations of the spiritual principle are not *extended*, but, on the contrary, are *curtailed* by its union with matter. We all know how much the workings of thought are impeded by the materiality of spoken language, and still more by the material process of fixing the ideas thus embodied upon paper. Yet, without these material processes, man would possess no power of communicating his thoughts; and thus remaining as an isolated being in creation, he would become a prey to the solitude of his own bosom, wandering in the gloomy night of unmitigated sorrow, and unparticipated enjoyment. Thus man is dependent for the *manifestation* of his spiritual attributes; or, in other words, for the knowledge of his mental functions, to their material organ *the brain*. And in proportion as this organ is originally *more or less perfect*, as well as according to its *native peculiarities*, so will be the aptitude for peculiar pursuits, and the success with which they will be attended.

This result seems to depend upon a general physiological law: and the original greater or less approach to the more perfect state is strongly marked

in different individual animals of the same species. The sagacity of the horse and the dog are proverbial : but *all* horses and *all* dogs are not equally sagacious ; and the difference is to be sought in the conformation or construction of their brains.

The same principle is applicable to man, since he also possesses a similar, but more perfect organization ; and in him is *superadded* the *immaterial principle*. Still this immaterial soul is equally dependent, *not for its actions*, but for the *manifestation* of those actions, as well as for the *expression* of thought and feeling, upon matter ; and brain is as necessary to the exhibition of *thought* in man as it is to the development of *instinct* in him, in common with the lower animals.

If we required a confirmation of this principle, we should find it in the agency of exterior circumstances ; we should discover it in the steady pursuit of health, and in the brilliant coruscations of intellect under the excitement of cerebral stimulation ; as well as in the *vacillation* of the invalid, the feeble will, the impaired memory, the deficient imagination of the convalescent, and in the inaptitude and listlessness of sickness : and to place at once in close juxtaposition, both ends of this series of phenomena, we should find it in the constant spiritual aspirations of the creature of intelligence and piety, as in the absolute annihilation of mental manifestation of the idiot.

Again, collision with other minds, or the energy of competition, will, by its stimulus to the organ, enable it to do more than it could have done with-

out this excitement: and, moreover, it is constantly subjected to that law of *progressive action*, and of habit, by which every organ capable of sustaining a certain degree of exertion *now*, will be enabled to do a little *more* shortly afterwards; and so may be carried on to an extent and depth of manifestation, which at first could not have been anticipated.

The important inference we would draw from this discussion, is, the necessity there exists for attending to the health, and cultivating the *growth*, of the organ, and of placing it under favourable circumstances for its fullest development.

Education is not *simply* and *exclusively* a spiritual process; nor will it be *perfected*, unless the organ upon which it primarily acts be secured from all morbid irritation, and be gradually conducted to its highest powers of natural action: the object therefore of education is twofold, viz. *physical* and *intellectual*.

We shall presently revert to this subject; but *here* we only wish to insist upon a principle, which will easily account for many of the supposed *anomalies*, or *which have passed as such*, because they were not comprehended; and which will promote enlarged and benevolent views towards those who cannot *see*, and *think*, and *feel*, and *reason with the same organ*. It is, however, abundantly clear, that the immaterial principle *presides* over that organ, through which its operations are manifested; that it is not the servant or slave of *cerebral* peculiarity, but that the latter is placed under the wise direction and government of the former; that man

is a *free agent* ; that by the agency of his will, he can control, or suspend, or encourage, or stimulate any one of his peculiarities ; and that he is morally responsible for all those actions which result, not from the irritation of matter upon mind, but from the agency of thought, and feeling, and judgment, and principle, and reason, and conscience, upon their (as it ought to be) obedient *servant the brain*, the *organ* by which the faculties of the immaterial intelligence are manifested.

Here also we see the influence of *opinion* upon man—an influence which remarkably exhibits the manner in which he is subjected to the twofold agency of physical structure and moral motive ; for it is clear, that the condition of his *physique* operates in modifying the manifestations of his *morale* ; while again the influence of the *latter* is very great upon the power and capacity for action of the *former*.

Thus, in the matter of education, the progress of public opinion has declared, that man must be taught : has irrevocably proclaimed, that ignorance is an evil which ought to be removed ; and has consigned the opposite hypothesis, to the constantly narrowing circle of the few, who love not knowledge for its own sake, because they cannot appreciate its value ; and of those more designing individuals who dread the diffusion of information, lest it should unfold their machinations, and put an end to the thralldom in which they would fain continue to hold the minds of many, by preserving power (*i. e.* knowledge) in the hands of few.

But *public opinion* has declared its compassion for the former class, and has pronounced so decidedly in favour of freedom of thought, that none can with any hope of success aspire to chain it down within its former limits. It has become that broad and ample stream, *which, duly regulated*, may convey health and fertility throughout its course; while any attempt to restrain its onward flow would result only in so accumulating its momentum by opposition, as that it should overwhelm everything in its way, and prove an occasion of devastation and misery, till it had regained its original channel; when passing on in peace, it will again convey blessings to all around.

And it must flow on: the great object in view is, so to preserve its banks from dilapidation, as that it shall be enabled to convey on its broad and ample bosom the fullest amount of good, without danger to surrounding institutions from its occasional outbreaks. Religion and reason are the appointed safeguards, and WITH THESE on the right hand and on the left, there is no danger from the widest diffusion of useful knowledge. The immortal mind can no longer be subjected to despotic control; and in order to the security of our ancestral, social, political, and religious institutions, these must live in the affections of the many who are capable of appreciating their value; they must ensure the approbation of the wise and good, and they must do so by the amount of good which they communicate, and the amount of evil for which they provide a remedy.

Moreover, public opinion has long declared, and is every day declaring in louder strains, that as large and liberal a policy as is consistent with the *conservative* principle of nature, and with that general cession of individual rights to the *few*, for the good government of the *many*, is, under all circumstances, the talisman by which security may be obtained, rebellious spirits may be controlled, the good may be encouraged, and the bad may be prevented doing mischief to themselves or others. Narrow, and confined, and selfish views will defeat their own ends; and nothing but that which seeks to promote its own power by the happiness and worth of others, can long avail. It is to be recollected, however, that these views are decidedly opposed to the *ultra-liberalism* of the day, which will be found, on close inspection, actually to originate in these very narrow, and confined, and selfish dogmas, tending to the *dissolution*, not to the *conservation*, of the connecting links of social order.

It has also been declared by common consent, that the amount of information which was sufficient a few years since, will no longer preserve its possessor from ridicule, will no longer prevent his being fairly elbowed by more industrious competitors; and that if any lay claim to the intellectual respect of his fellow man, it must be by deserving it, by having gained superiority of mind, by superior industry, and by justly demanding attention from solidity of judgment and extent of acquisition.

To this end intellectual man must be educated,

and must avail himself of all the advantages afforded by his situation, in order to create that legitimate influence which arises from the majesty of mind. This however is not to be accomplished by any simply mechanical process ; and in order to success, education must be preserved from the domain of empiricism, and must be placed under the regulation of fixed and suitable principles. The days of prosperous charlatanism are for the most part rapidly passing away ; the human mind has advanced to a state of improvement, in which it is no longer to be duped by a system of irrational influence, based as it may be on the unreal fears and imaginary joys of credulity. These are the mighty weapons so lavishly wielded by the Papal church, for preserving the human mind in the dark thralldom of ignorance, and are decidedly opposed to the means for recalling it, as far as human agency can do so, to wear again the image of the Almighty Creator in the likeness of which it was at first created.

In this country, at least, we *hope* there is no danger of the successful exertion of this sinister bias ; we hope that the mummeries of popery,—the *austerities of penance*—the sale of indulgences—the history of the holy scapular—the absurdities of purgatory—purchased prayers for the dead, and all the lucrative inventions of a crafty priesthood,—*we hope*, at least, that all these evils have perished before the light of truth ; that the receptacle for holy water has been clean purged by the flow of the sacred stream of knowledge, and that the character of the

professed minister of Christ can no longer claim the mysterious homage of the *priest*, but must rest its pretensions entirely on the attributes of the *good man* ; in fact, must appeal for its influence to the reason and reflection of admirers.

We trace the operation of the same principle under other circumstances. Thus the storm can no longer be employed as an instrument of terror, and as an exhibition of the wrath of the offended Majesty of heaven : its rationale is explained—its signal benefits are understood, and gratitude to a God of *infinite beneficence* has supplied the place of that undefined alarm, which was so long cherished for unworthy purposes in the bosom of man.

So, also, the light of science has beamed upon the night of *spectral illusions* : and the only remnant of reality which ever attached to these symbols of *fear*, has been that of the fatal influence exerted over them by returning daylight ; the sun of knowledge has dawned upon them ; yea, they have been dissipated into thin air by the day-star of investigation, and the place of their locality has known them no more.

Once more, the earth-born sons of Æsculapius HAD maintained their hold upon the human mind, by an invidious appeal to the hopes and fears of man's bosom ; those powerful emotions, which, craftily employed, had contributed to preserve a sway which will no longer be yielded, except by the assent of reason, to the majesty of mind. *Now*, when an opinion is delivered by these adepts, they must be prepared to defend it, by an appeal to

the understanding, and by the conviction of judgment ; or, it will be estimated as it deserves to be, viz. as a tattered shred of that juggling, whose requiem was chanted when man first began to think clearly and to reason soundly.

And thus it is with a variety of other illustrations, adapted to every department of life, increasing in proportion as each is withdrawn farther from mathematical demonstration, and is placed more immediately on the manifestations of mind. We do not assert that these correct views have entirely superseded the chimeras and hippogriffs of the olden time, but we *do say*, that they have done much towards this happy issue, and are yet in daily progress ; and we add, that the quackery of *systematic* education *must* eventually give way to the circulation of enlightened principles, and to the cultivation of the human intellect. A few barren scraps of Latin, and Greek, and French, will no longer fill the desires of the mind ; its education must be *intelligent, not automatic* ; and principles of reason and of conduct must now occupy that debateable ground, which has been long contended for between ignorance and prejudice on the one hand, and on the other by that pseudo-knowledge, which, with the *semblance* of information, would leave its possessor without a single ray of duty, to become the easy victim of oppression, or the cruel sport of ill-regulated passion, or uncontrolled desire.

But it can no longer be : man has awakened as from an uneasy dream ; and though the recollection of its circumstances may have passed away

with the first waking train of thought, yet he trembles to slumber again, lest the same distracting images should be presented to him, and lest he should lose the delightful consciousness of exercising his reasoning powers, in the way best calculated to promote the designs of his Creator.

The objects, the pursuit of which should be proposed to himself by the mental philosopher, are, health of body and soundness of mind, so as to ensure, by this combination, the largest quantity of intelligence which may be compatible with the firmest corporeal fibre; secondly, the formation of the social character, so as to render each individual generally acceptable to the largest possible number of his compeers, provided always that *these* be among the wise and good; and, thirdly, to regulate his passions, to destroy his selfish propensities, and to develop the virtues, and the feelings, and the principles of social life, so as to form at once the valuable acquaintance, the faithful friend, the good relative, the consistent patriot, and the obedient subject.

Our attention must be directed for a short time to these particulars. We have already stated, that man is a free agent, that he has power to choose the good, and refuse the evil; that he has the control of his will, and that he is consequently responsible for all he says, or does, or thinks. But in consequence of some perverting agency, he is so entirely prone to prefer the evil, and to be indifferent to the good, that the repression of the former, and the growth of the latter, are objects of considerable

difficulty. Yet we are not supinely to ascribe all the mischief we discover to this cause ; nor quietly to rest contented under its operation, as though such a state of things were entirely beyond our control.

It is a duty to inquire into the occasional causes of this evil. Let, for instance, each parent ask his own conscience, how far he may himself have fostered these deviations from *right*, by a neglect of duty, by a forgetfulness of the course pointed out to him by reason and religion, by example and by habit, by taking education too much as a thing of course, by a distortion of its objects, by the omission of some part of its primary designs, or by the want of that care, and caution, and persevering diligence, with which they should have been carried out and developed. Let him again ask his own conscience, if his attention has been directed to the control of *evil*, and to the encouragement of *good* passions, or to the excitement and regulation of the desires of the opening mind *in the nursery*. Rather let him say, if the early years of childhood have not been suffered to lie *wasted* in this infantile microcosm. *Wasted!* did we say? Have they not been cruelly abandoned to the spoliation inflicted by the unmitigated waywardness of cerebral propensity? Have they not been yielded to the conflicting tendencies of unlimited caprice, indulged in every possible form? Has not this early vantage ground been abandoned to the enemy; and has not the growth of evil been promoted by absolute indifference, or by irregular and unprincipled

opposition? But where this has been the case, man ceases to be a *free agent*, yet, most unfortunately, without losing his accountability; for the voice of reason is stifled by the clamour of passion; justice and benevolence yield their sway to selfishness; the firmness of the will is repressed by the superiority of present desire; the appeal of judgment is no longer heard in the unholy agitation of contending influences; the monitions of conscience are inadequate to grapple with the power of immediate gratification; infant man becomes the creature of impulse, and he is hurried on at the bidding of every fresh emotion, into all the obliquities of *animal* propensity, and into entire forgetfulness of those laws, which are founded not only in the nature of things, but on that sublime code of christian ethics, which has been transmitted to us as the rule of daily life: and this, too, without losing his responsibility, because the evil has arisen from the neglect of developing that germ of good which was in him, and leaving the *spiritual* to become the abject slave of the animal nature.

Thus it would appear, that the free agency of the man is depending upon the education of the child; for if this be not what it ought to be,—rather shall we say, if it be what it too generally is,—he will become the slave of his passions and propensities, and he will lose his intellectual and spiritual freedom. No wonder, then, that we trace around us so much evil, so little good, such starveling intellects, such stunted charity, so great a host of malignant passions, spreading over nature's

fair domain, and enshrouding her finest proportions; for they have been brooded over with fostering though unwonted care; and the existence of this frightful progeny has scarcely been admitted, or even suspected, till, in the undeniable features of maturity, it has not only bid defiance to control, but has claimed for itself the supremacy of government. O that man were wise! that he would consider the lesson thus afforded him by reflection! How greatly would the sum of individual happiness and virtue be increased! How immensely would the aggregate of good be augmented by the accumulation of all these individual sums!

To this end, a first claim to attention is presented by all which relates to the health of the body; and of those several organs and functions, which, in their influence immediate or remote, exert a generic or specific agency upon the organ of mind: and a second and not inferior claim is to be found for all those processes, through which the dominion of intellect may be enlarged, the evil passions and propensities may be controlled, and the mind may be prepared for that moral and religious training, which is to complete the perfection of man as a rational and accountable being.

One of the first laws of physical or organic life, is, that in order to secure its healthy function, every organ must be *exercised*; that lengthened repose is fatal to its *tone*; and that excessive exertion, or irritative action, will result in diminished power or feebleness. And this is especially true of the brain.

Again, the brain is associated with other organs, whose direct or sympathetic influence will exert a beneficial or a morbid agency, according to the state of health or disorder of those secondary organs.

And, lastly, the capacity of the brain for exertion is progressive, for it is a law of the human mind, that it cannot be *stationary*; if it do not advance, it must retrograde. But its physiological condition is to seek after improvement; to carry its powers and principles onwards towards perfection; never to be contented with the attainment of to-day, but to be always advancing; and finally to be seeking after that happy *immortality*, which alone can employ all its faculties, or satisfy all its desires. This consideration will unravel many an intricacy of mental manifestation, and wanting this clue, it would be impossible to explore, what would then appear to be, an inextricable labyrinth.

The *education of the brain*, then, as the *organ of thought*, becomes a question of primary importance; for although the immaterial principle will remain the same under any mode of its exhibition, yet the *manifestation* of its influence will be widely different, and the result upon the individual himself, and upon those with whom he stands associated in a nearer or less intimate connexion, will scarcely be recognized as coming from the same spiritual origin. Good or evil, blessing or cursing, are mainly in the power of the instructor; and as the mind can only be reached through its material organ, it is of the first consequence to consider that

organ, to estimate fairly its physical relations, to judge how far it may also be acted upon through the medium of intellectual manifestation, as well as the degree in which it may be guided by moral and religious principles and motives.

With regard to the agency of physical education, in promoting or obstructing these views, two very opposite errors prevail: the first, in which every effort is made to stimulate the brain, and to produce little prodigies of intellectual development and acquisition, an error which very generally terminates in the destruction of life, or conducts *pari passu* to infantile decrepitude; and the second, in which the brain is allowed to remain *quiescent* during the early years of childhood.

And it may be fairly asked why? Nature has taken abundant care to perfect the organ early, to supply it with all that it would require in order to maintain action; and she has declared, that the senses are given us, as so many channels for the reception of ideas. Why, then, it may be asked, may not attention be awakened to these ideas? Why may not reflection be developed, and association cultivated? In fact, why may not the organ of mind be led to *think*, to *reason*, to *combine*? When the senses are perpetually employed so as to repress intellectual manifestation, why may they not also be engaged in promoting its growth? The effect of regular and moderate exercise, is to increase the aptitude of every organ for its peculiar function, to give it strength, to preserve it from too high a degree of susceptibility, to furnish it with

such a regular supply of blood, as shall enable it to maintain increased action without suffering, and so to strengthen its *vessels* and its *fibres*, as that the former shall not easily admit of over-action, distension, or congestion ; nor the latter of too great tension or irritation, upon every application of more than ordinary stimulus.

On the contrary, a state of repose is fatal to these good results, because it places the organ in a peculiar state of *irritability*, unequal to its due measure of *physiological* action, exposed to a degree of feebleness commensurate with the duration of its listless inactivity, furnished only with such a supply of blood as shall enable it to *vegetate*, (for the supply is always equal to the demand,) and placing its vascular apparatus, and its sentient fibres, in a condition favourable to the development of every morbid action.

It is a perfect mistake to suppose that the brain will suffer from judicious exercise : it is injudicious and *fitful exertion*, grafted upon a state of *feebleness resulting from lengthened inaction*, which is to be feared ; and its means of preservation from such a state are, by gradual employment, to awaken the powers of intellect, and to carry them *safely* onward to their highest reach.

In accomplishing this object, the only caution necessary to be observed, is not to induce excessive, or irritative action. This *may be* occasioned by long-continued exertion, giving rise to fatigue and exhaustion, these being followed by a morbid state

of irritability, and oftentimes by *greater efforts*, and a consequent *semblance of power* ; but really accompanied by a *diminished capacity for exertion*, a state which, if *now mistaken*, will soon result in difficultly-recoverable feebleness. The same event may be brought about, by the abuse of stimuli, and by the lavish excitement of *feeling* and *emotion*, rather than by the cool growth of intellect, and judgment, and principle.

These are evils which would endanger the ultimate *integrity*, and assuredly would diminish the immediate power of the brain, and should serve as beacons to guide the pathway of the instructor. That there should be difficulties to surmount, is one of the laws of the probationary state in which we live, and these should only serve to define the way in which we may securely walk, so as to obtain a high degree of healthful, intellectual manifestation. Every step in advance will not only be a point gained against ignorance, and error, and obliquity, but it will form a resting place, from which to set out for further progress ; and these advances and resting places may be multiplied in an indefinite series ; and they will proceed in an augmenting ratio, because every such advance adds to the future power of acquisition ; and, therefore, after a certain number of steps have been gained, the capacity for reaching onwards has been increased to such an extent, that the same effort will produce an *accumulating effect* ; the sphere of intellectual vision will be enlarged, and the mind will be early

conversant with objects, which, but for this graduated exertion, it could scarcely have hoped to attain.

Surely, then, it can require only a moderate share of intelligence to perceive, how important it is to develop the physical powers of the organ of mind, in order to ensure the largest amount of intellectual manifestation which is compatible with unbroken bodily health.

To secure the latter, it must not be forgotten, that the organ of mind is associated intimately with other organs and functions ; and that it is influenced by their health or disorder ; and this, too, whether they may be mutually and immediately dependent upon each other ; or whether the connexion be only one of *sympathy*, a term which perhaps designates a hidden *relationship*, whose laws we may be as yet unable precisely to investigate.

This term, however, is not to be derided as a synonym for *ignorance* of certain conditions ; for it is not so ; it implies and intends, where it is morbid, the capacity of suffering with a distant organ in a state of irritation ; and it is by no means necessary that we should be enabled to say in what this irritation *consists*, or to trace the mode of its operations ; it is sufficient to show that it *does exist* ; and imbecility alone can doubt it.

One of the most important of these associated organs, and by far the most cruelly abused, is the *stomach*. In point of fact, it often seems to be the great object of instruction, to educate the powers of

this organ, and not even contented with *gastro-nomic development*, to diminish those powers by oppression. If man were a polype, if he were all stomach, this might be unobjectionable; if he were a mere assemblage of bones, and muscles, and nerves, a caveat might even here be indeed entered, without insisting very largely upon its observance; but if he be an intellectual, a social, a spiritual, an immortal being—then, indeed, it were absurd, it were criminal, so to abuse that stomach, as to repress the intellectual, blunt the social, and obscure the spiritual manifestations, so as to leave no just traces of that “longing after immortality” which should characterize his thoughts and actions.

The proposition reduces itself to the most simple form. While the stomach receives only so much as is required by the necessities of the system, so long does the brain remain *unconscious* of having to support its action; the work is *well*, because automatically, performed, and the body is in health. But when one step in advance is taken, and appetite is gratified to *repletion*, the brain becomes conscious of having its energies directed to the *stomach*; it is weakened and oppressed; its aptitude for intellectual exertion is diminished or destroyed; the manifestations of mind become feeble or distorted, and a degree of mal-aise in the system is produced, during the continuance of which, healthy mental progress is impossible.

Now since the state of the stomach is very much within our control; and since it is the most frequent *distant* cause of that cerebral irritation

which so commonly terminates in disorganizing change, it is the highest reach of folly, and of prejudice, so to stimulate its powers, as that they should interfere with the healthy action of the brain.

The mischief, when produced, does not terminate with the irritation of the day ; since this oppression frequently repeated, results in such *permanent change* of the sympathizing organ, that *itself* loses power, and is no longer capable of the same amount of intellectual manifestation. And this enfeebling cause operates in an inverse ratio with *exercise* ; for, as each step in *advance* gives an augmented capacity for future acquisition, so each successive irritation occasions that retrograde movement, which is accompanied by a constantly-decreasing power for regaining the ground which has been lost ; still less of occupying a new field of knowledge or investigation.

The organ of mind possesses individual peculiarities ; these are in some instances hereditary, and handed down from parent to child ; in others, they are dependent upon causes with which we are not acquainted ; and, moreover, they will be modified or changed by any cause which modifies or changes the brain. And since the organ itself depends for its nutrition upon the general nourishment of the body ; and as that nourishment, when prepared by a process of secretion, will partake of the qualities of the secreting viscus, and of that nervous system, without whose aid, no secretion will take place, so there can be no question, but

that the cerebral manifestation will, to a certain extent, partake of the impressions thus received, from the character of the nourishment, during the first years of infantile existence.

From what has been just written, it will follow, that in order to any plans of education being successful, they must be adapted to the individual differences of the organ upon which they are to be impressed; and the *exponent* of these peculiarities is to be sought, not in any arbitrary laws of physiognomy or phrenology; not in any empirical gauge of intellect; but by the slow process of watching the manifestations of mind, and of ascertaining their extent and power. The facial angle of Camper, the occipital angle of Daubenton, the physiognomy of Lavater, the phrenology of Gall and Spurzheim, Vimont, Leuret, &c., will conduct their respective votaries to folly, error, and delusion, but will never tend of themselves to any generally beneficial result.

It is time that these puerilities were abandoned, and that they should give place to the *rational* study of character, as exhibited in the mental attributes. We are fully disposed to allow that the muscles of expression of the countenance will be strongly marked by the prevailing emotions: but even here, there will be found many a source of fallacy; and besides, after all, it is passion rather than intellect, which is thus manifested, so that although the indications of the countenance are not to be rejected, yet they will be of real value, only as beacons to guide further inquiries, and point out

certain dangers to be avoided ; not as affording data sufficient for inferential reasoning, much less for the establishment of conduct.

But if this be the case with that mode of exhibiting mind which Heaven in its wisdom has clearly appointed, what shall we say of that *organic* hypothesis which it has as carefully concealed, which is unnecessary to any known valuable practical result, which is absurd in some of its details, and which *may be* injurious in its application ? We have been nauseated, *satis superque*, with the gaspings of this miscalled science ; and we could wish for no better argument against its utility, than we met with some years since, in a provincial magazine, while waiting the arrival of the mail, in one of our most ancient cities ; in which it was propounded that the skull of a recent murderer had been submitted to examination, and so, forsooth, his jealousy, which had originated the murder, was dependent upon a huge organ of amateness ; he committed the crime for which he suffered, *because* the organ of destructiveness was large ; and he did so at an early hour in the evening, and at no *great distance from a cottage*, *because* his organ of cautiousness was small. True, indeed, that his organ of *veneration* was large, and we might have imagined that this should have controlled the influence of destructiveness : but phrenology is never at a loss : this organ had not been cultivated ; for if it had, this individual might have been saved from crime, and so it appeared from his history, that he did not go to church ; as if ~~the~~ organ of destructiveness

had been *more cultivated* by *murders*, than the organ of veneration by *acts of devotion*. It is pity that the number of murders he had committed, and the number of times he had gone to church, had not been placed in tabular opposition, that we might have formed a fair judgment how far cultivation was a cause of the luxuriant growth of either of the prominent, and apparently opposite organs. From such absurdities, *when so held*, leading to worse results, and terminating in the gloomiest forms of materialism, and in the subversion of moral obligation,—good Lord deliver us ! We refer to a subsequent page for the more serious discussion of this question.

Most happily we are not generally left to such a cheerless system, for the results of religious influence. We trust the time is yet far distant, when we are to be dependent upon *an organ* of veneration for the morality and good feelings of our neighbourhood and country ; and we hope that the diffusion of a rational and scriptural system of Christianity will speedily put an end to these hopeless opinions ; that it will secure the prejudices of the young in favour of religion ; that it will infuse into their minds principles of practical application, and lead to a correct government of the conduct ; and that it will dissipate the illusions of enthusiasm, and place the devotional feelings under the control of sound judgment, rather than under the influence of excited sensibility.

It is not enough that the intellect be developed, and the literary character be fully formed ; the

foundation, indeed, has been very properly laid, but principles of conduct must be supplied, and motives for action must be given, and a powerful and adequate sanction must be sought. The young must not be left to discover these principles, these motives, and this sanction *intuitively*; or they will become victims to the first designing demagogue who will craftily tell them that religion consists in a certain exercise of the imagination, and in the belief of a certain scheme of doctrines; that it has no real, practical bearing, but consists in feelings and emotions; or that it is limited to a certain imperfect obedience to truth; or, finally, that there is no such thing as real religion at all! The young must be impressed with a sense of their moral accountability, which will involve the idea of their being responsible for conduct here; and will naturally lead to defined views of moral obligation,—these being always referred for their origin, as well as for their court of appeal, to the divine precepts of the Bible.

By the influence of these principles the natural temper and disposition will be controlled and directed. We have elsewhere defined *temper* to be the expression of that agency which is excited by the physical temperament upon the intellectual manifestations; while *disposition* forms the *sum and general result* of those mental attributes which are constituted by the *intellectual faculties and the passions*.

Here again, we must ask, what it is which constitutes the *aptitude* for the exhibition of *particular*

disposition? This manifestly consists in those organic peculiarities, which are the gifts of nature, and which require to be sedulously watched—to be fostered on the one hand, or placed under the dominion of counteracting principle on the other; for it must never be forgotten that this original tendency will be developed by early culture;—that it may be strengthened by education—heightened by indulgence—augmented by long-continued habit—and indefinitely applied, through the influence of youthful prejudice.

Hence, the very great importance of giving a correct bias to the first manifestations of conduct; hence the necessity for placing education under the government of reason and principle;—hence the duty of directing and setting bounds to the indulgence of any particular feeling or emotion;—hence the rigid scrutiny which must be kept upon every occasion for sustained action;—and hence the infinite importance of securing early prejudice on the side of reason, religion, and virtue.

In a well-regulated mind these will always go hand in hand; for there are no greater mysteries in religion, than in every department of nature's extended domain—even in that with which we ourselves are closely surrounded. All its requirements are most rational, and calculated to develope the powers of intelligence; and when the *one* has been received by the other, with a heart desirous of doing the will and obeying the laws of the moral Governor of the universe, the fruits of virtue must be the consequence. The seeds of piety placed in the

bosom of rational man, when assisted by the careful cultivation of education, and watered by the dews of heaven, *must* vegetate—*must* progress towards maturity—*must* produce the buds and blossoms of early rectitude of principle—and *must* be followed by the flowers of social and relative goodness, as well as by the fruits of practical benevolence, till having been ripened by time, the harvest has come, and the shock of well-loaded corn has been reaped, and gathered into the garner of the lord of the harvest.

But we may not expect to reap the harvest, unless we prepare the soil, and secure it from the encroachment of enemies;—unless we encourage the growth of virtuous principles, and cultivate the better feelings of our nature, while we carefully repress and eradicate those vices and passions which are always of rapid growth, and which would, if possible, overwhelm all that is valuable in man, and leave him the debased slave of his organisation and appetites.

Perhaps we ought not to quit this part of our subject without one word on the question of genius, that much-disputed and ill-understood phenomenon, the existence of which is denied by some, and to which a most undue importance is attached by others. The preceding observations will have already indicated our view of this subject. We think the term genius admits of an easy explanation by viewing it, as consisting in a peculiar aptitude for the reception of particular ideas;—a quickness of perception as applied to

specific objects;—a fervour of intellect, which catches at a glance the impression intended to be conveyed by certain modes of thought; and which almost *anticipates* the pains which will be bestowed on its cultivation. It is then easily resolvable into a certain unknown condition of the cerebral organ, which it is ours to watch, and guard, and guide to BENEFICIAL RESULTS.

CHAPTER III.

ON PHRENOLOGY IN CONNECTION WITH THE
GENERAL SUBJECT.

IN a former page we have glanced at the subject of phrenology, or the science of discovering and apportioning to multifold organs the several manifestations of mind ; but it is a question too intimately connected with our present purpose, not to require more serious discussion, and a greater degree of calm investigation.

We do not consider it as a question of great *practical* importance, in a work professing to trace the influence of the manifesting organ upon the manifestations of mind, whether the actual work is accomplished by a single organ capable of performing a variety of functions, or by an assemblage of organs combined and united by one homogeneous tissue, with a degree of intimacy which defies division, and with such inter-connexion, that each separate organ is cognisant of the operations of the whole,—provided that *whole* be held *responsible* for the actions of each individual part, as well

as of that union, and concentration of actions, which constitute the entire man.

In this case, whether single or multiple, the organization is held in subjection to the *presiding mind*; the *animal* is preserved in subordination to the *spiritual* being; the former is the servant of the latter; and the spiritual being is held responsible for all the actions and promptings of the lower propensities; and thus the question resolves itself into one of pure science.

Still, as a question of science, without any visible practical bearing, it is one of considerable importance, because in itself *truth is invaluable*, and is therefore worthy to be ascertained at some considerable trouble: knowledge is power; and the certainty that the scientific views from which our *practical deductions* flow are correct, gives a confidence to our belief, and the consequent setting forth of our principles, which cannot fail to impress character upon *action*. Besides, it so generally happens, that a more intimate acquaintance with the composition of bodies, which before we have been accustomed to view as simple and elementary, brings to light qualities, and relationships, and affinities, and aptitudes, of which we were previously ignorant;—and which now shed a new light upon various facts, and circumstances, and actions;—and do actually confer a greater power to think correctly, and to act benevolently.

Hence this question may assume an importance which we do not at first sight perceive. We are quite certain, with regard to many physical bodies

formerly deemed simple and elementary, which the progress of science has since shown to be compounded, that almost in every instance the discovery of their composition has been followed, in numberless ways, by new practical applications of things, previously limited within a certain given circle, and by some new blessings to mankind. And, indeed, in the present instance, *if it were possible to discover*, from the external configuration, the several aptitudes for mental manifestation; and *by it to ascertain more than careful observation upon such early luddings of mental manifestation, assisted by physiognomy*, could give; *if it were possible* thus to ascertain the propensities, and thus to educate certain organs, and to repress certain others,—to stimulate the one, and soothe the other,—to foster the growth of one set of manifestations, and stunt the progress of another, it is very certain that a great point would have been gained towards the happiness and well-being of a spiritual creature, destined for immortality, and placed here in a probationary state of existence.

The question is therefore one which requires to be considered with sobriety and judgment; and we would be most anxious to separate the errors and follies of the votaries of phrenology, and even the occasional absurdity of its details, as enforced by such votaries from the doctrine itself. In the following observations, it is *truth* which we would seek, and not the establishment of our own opinion! and we trust that, whether we are right or wrong now, the truth will ultimately prevail.

It is *true*, that in the circle of our own observation we have met with some startling facts in favour of the doctrine; and it is equally *true* that we have met with other facts of a precisely opposite nature, and with instances of the most *signal failure*, even in Dr. Spurzheim himself. It is also *true* that one failure will invalidate a great number of successful results, because, if the doctrine be not generally applicable to the great mass of mankind, it is, in fact, *inapplicable*. But in all fairness, we would give phrenologists the benefit of two circumstances; first, the want of perfection in a doctrine comparatively novel, and dependent, essentially dependent for support, upon a *great variety of observations*: and, secondly, we would not charge *upon the doctrine*, the ignorance, the want of skill, the hasty judgment, the precipitate conclusions, and the wretched credulity of many of its professors.

But we would ask, in return for this courtesy, less arrogant assumption on the part of phrenologists; a greater degree of modesty and diffidence in drawing their conclusions; and a larger amount of toleration towards the prejudices,—it may be the stupid, but the well-intentioned prejudices of their adversaries. It always argues badly for a cause, when it is supported by vehement assertion; by irritable impatience of contradiction; by overweening confidence of being *right*; and by a want of forbearance towards those, who may not be so quick-sighted as themselves, and who, from their attachment to earlier notions, may not be able

readily to supersede the influence of pristine habits of thought and modes of feeling ; nay, perhaps too, of some peculiarity of physical temperament, if not of *phrenological organization itself*.

There is another important ground for this discussion, and that is, the bearing which it has upon moral accountability. If the doctrine be held as we have stated it, it is evident, that the question of *unity or plurality* of organ is unimportant, and that each must be equally tried on its own merits, in reference to the influence of cerebral peculiarity upon the manifestation of mind ; while each is equally allied *to*, or equi-distant *from*, the doctrines of *materialism*,—a question which will come under our notice in a future chapter.

But it cannot be denied, that the *natural tendency* of phrenology, on minds not instructed to the contrary, is, that man *is the creature* of his organization ; that he is what he is, because he cannot help it, and because of the predominance of certain organs ; and that *if responsible at all* for his errors, they should be looked upon with a very venial eye, where the temptation on one side was so strong, and the power of opposition on the other was so weak ; nor can it still further be denied, that such consequences have been held by some of its professors.

The practical application (*mis-application*, if you please) of this doctrine has been lately shown in the horrible tenets of socialism. These pages may not be sullied by a transcription of its blasphemies and impurities ; certain it is that the doctrines and

practice of socialism strike at the very framework of society,—that they uproot every social and domestic tie—that they destroy all moral accountability—that they overturn the most dearly-cherished institutions of religion and virtue—that they proclaim the omnipotence of inclination, and declare that man is responsible only to himself—that his first duty is to obey the promptings of his organization,—to listen to the voice of passion, and to gratify such passion at any cost, reckless of consequences, unmindful of law, human or divine, and careless of futurity. Certain it is, also, that the doctrines of phrenology are appealed to in evidence of the truth of these abominable conclusions.

It is indeed allowed, that every good is liable to abuse ; and we would not argue against the useful application of a doctrine from its abuse, in the hands of wicked men ; and it has been said, that if phrenology be true, it is *impossible* that it can lead to anything bad, as materialism, fatalism, irreligion, &c. And this is *true*, and might be employed in argument, if the doctrines of phrenology had been thoroughly proven, and rested on irrefragable grounds. But, *pendente lite*, it is not fair to employ this as an argument, because it is assuming the point in dispute as settled beyond the possibility of question. And when any new doctrine is propounded, which confessedly must exert a considerable influence on society, it is not unfair—on the contrary, it is the part of a wise, and prudent, and cautious, and scientific philosopher, to ask himself, “ *whither*

are these speculations leading me? Are they conducting to good or evil? Is their influence propitious to virtue, and the general good of mankind, or the contrary? Do they support, or do they contravene, the great truths of revealed religion and moral action, or do they not? *Because* if they do not support what is so indispensable to man's happiness and welfare, they CANNOT BE TRUE! So we see, that the argument in favour of phrenology drawn from its *truth*, before that truth has been demonstrated, is overwhelmed by the converse proposition, that if the *doctrine lead to practical error, it cannot be speculatively true*; and it is wise and prudent to be satisfied on this head.

Nor indeed do we quite see how such conclusions are avoidable, if the manifestations of mind are traced upwards from the lowest and most imperfect, to the highest and most perfect developement of the nervous system; except by supposing, for man, the *superaddition of an immortal spiritual principle*, which is certainly not *generally* admitted by phrenologists. If the mind of man, and the mind of the horse or the dog, be of the same order, only that one has a larger brain and a greater number of organs * than the other, the responsibilities of each would be the same, according to their relative opportunities of cerebral action. Now, no one would

* It would perhaps be difficult to calculate what size of brain man *should* possess, and what should be the number of *his* organs in proportion to *his* sphere, when we find, in a recent phrenological work of high character, twenty-eight organs in the skull of a goose, ten of which are in the forehead.

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be so absurd, as to make the horse or the dog *responsible* for *their* actions as moral accountable creatures ; but if not, there is no reason, according to phrenologists, why man should be held responsible for *his* actions. And if man ceases to be responsible for his conduct, there is an end of the social compact ; while the hopes of an hereafter are upon a level with the prospect of *to-morrow's joys*.

The positive establishment of this view, by *any* phrenologist, and the natural, unsophisticated, or, perhaps rather, the unguarded tendency of the doctrine being in this direction, it *does* become, not only important but *indispensable*, that we should view it in its *practical* bearing. We give to its professors the full meed of industry ; we allow that they have added many facts to our anatomical knowledge ; we believe in their sincerity and integrity, so far as they think they are promoting the interests of science : but if we believe that they have reasoned incorrectly, we trust that we shall be listened to with indulgence, while we endeavour to point out that fallacy.

It has been alleged against phrenologists, that they make the *size* of the organ *the measure of its functional power*. This, however, is so certainly untenable, that it has been qualified by the modifying explanation, that it is so "*cæteris paribus*." Now, at first sight, this seems to get rid of the difficulty, for it is to be acknowledged, that where nature has sought to accomplish any *single* great object, it is to be effected by a comparatively large

organ. But it is also true, that where *great power and facility of action* are to be obtained at the same time, it is generally secured by a number of minute organs, whose united sum of function makes up the amount required; and therefore, to those who *doubt* the organic divisibility of the brain, it is unconvincing to descant on supposed analogies, which to *them* do not appear *analogous*, and which do not, consequently, seem to possess even the weak support to the doctrine, which analogy at its very best would confer.

Still further, with regard to size, being *cæteris paribus* the measure of functional power, perhaps we might not object to this position: but if it be true, of what avail is phrenology? Because, if a *small* organ of a superior quality can give resulting power far greater than a large organ of inferior quality, of what avail is the test of organic developement? Now, this we most confidently believe, that there shall be two precisely similar external configurations; yet, that the two brains shall possess tissues so dissimilar, as greatly to modify the mental manifestations. We find these differences perpetually in nature; as, for instance, in the countenance of the sheep—in the human voice, or the handwriting of the same classes in society: the organs of speech, and the human hand, are constituted with reference to a great degree of exactitude, yet nothing can be more dissimilar than the *expression* of the *resulting* function. And, again, everybody knows that it is not the *largest*

muscles which possess the greatest amount of energy, or can be relied upon for the exertion of sustained power.

But with regard particularly to this “locus stantis vel cadentis argumenti,” set up by the two little terms,—though confessedly of extensive signification,—“*cæteris paribus*,” what, may we ask, is to be the standard of comparison by which we may judge of *what size* should be the organic developement in brains which possess a certain amount of energy of function, independent of such developement? Who first is to decide as to the *general* amount of intellectual calibre, and to what test is it to be referred, if the organic test, which has been shown insufficient for the purpose, is to be given up? Is the measure of function, in relation to its organic developement, to be referred to some general standard, chosen from a great variety of experiments on the same class of society? Or, is the relative size to be determined in every instance by a reference to the other developements in the same individual, and to the amount of their employment? If so, who is to be the judge? Who shall determine either the general or the local energy of function, except by knowledge of character from experience? And if *this* be necessary, which it unquestionably is, the science of phrenology is useless, because, after all, to determine the *value* of organic developement, it is necessary to be acquainted with the previous history of the individual, in order to ascertain what *are* the *cætera pares*. In fact, the

other conditions of the brain, which modify the organic developement, independent of disease, cannot be taught by phrenology.

In conducting this discussion, we must say a few words on the subject of the mind of the lower animals.

By the term *mind*, as it is to be now employed, we intend a certain assemblage of phenomena, possessed in a greater or less degree by the lower animals in common with man, and which result from the employment of the brain.

These phenomena do not originate from *mechanical* agency. Mere machinery can perform only definite movements, which may be calculated upon under all circumstances, so long as the machine continues in action, and is unbroken. The products of animal mind, on the contrary, cannot be calculated upon, and manifestly differ very materially in individuals of the same species.

We perceive in animals the possession of certain operations inconsistent with the idea of unvarying action as resulting from machinery. We discover, indeed, the exercise of certain faculties, which go on independently of themselves, or of their will, viz. the functions of organic life ; but we perceive, also, another set of functions, by which animals deliberate, remember, will, choose, love, hate, &c., and these are the operations of mind.

In every instance we shall find, that mind is suited to the wants and habits of the animal ; and that it possesses *precisely that degree of developement*, which is necessary to fit it for its *position in creation*,

to preserve it from its enemies, and to enable it to do precisely what is required of it, in order to accomplish certain ends, which form a part of the grand scheme of the government of the universe ; and this is demonstrated from the lowest created being, up to spiritual man, destined for immortality.

The carrying out of this *principle* will lead to a solution of the problem, why man has so much larger an amount of mind than other animals, even to enable him to fulfil the intentions of his Creator ; an amount of mind which would be quite unnecessary, if the present scene of his labours terminated his existence ; and if he were not destined to live eternally in that spiritual principle, which has been *superadded* to his *animal* mind ; and thus man has precisely that degree of developement of brain and mind, which is necessary for his position in creation ; and which he requires for the fulfilment of his duties in society, and his preparation for immortality.

To return to the mind of animals : we notice the exhibition of *mental* phenomena ; and as these must have had an origin, a moving power, we reason backward to the existence of *animal mind*, in a degree and proportion according to the organisation of the animal, which again is admirably suited to the fulfilment of designs apportioned by the Great Governor of the universe.

Mind, therefore, is understood to be a monosyllabic expression of phenomena, which result from the employment of the brain. In this case, *brain*

is not *mind*, any more than digestion is stomach ; MIND is the resulting *function*, and not synonymous with the material substance from which it emanates. This function is not dependent for its integrity or extent upon the absolute size of the organ ; as, for instance, in the amount of mind exhibited by the bee, the ant, the wasp, and other insects, which is far greater than is shown by many other animals occupying, apparently, a more important position with regard to the *size* of their nervous system.

It must be remembered, that if this be true, as to the phenomena resulting from what phrenologists would call an assemblage of organs ; so must it be equally true with regard to each organ from the union of which that assemblage is composed ; and, therefore, the activity of function displayed by any ONE ORGAN, HAS NO POSITIVE RELATION TO ITS SIZE.

The important question of *instinct* naturally presents itself, at the outset of an inquiry of this kind ; and especially in relation to the remarkable fact, that man has very few instincts as compared with other animals abstractedly ; and infinitely fewer, as compared with his importance in the scale of being. The reason is obviously that which we have before given, viz., that the mind is suited to the exigencies of the animal ; *instinct* being, in a word, that knowledge which has been imparted to the animal, *prior* to education, and which, without thought, fits it immediately for its peculiar position in the world. But when there is much reason,

more especially when conduct is to be based on moral motive, there will be less room for instinct.

Instincts are oftentimes *independent of any peculiar organisation of the brain*, and arising out of the organisation of the animal generally. In the brain, however, will be always found a peculiar adaptation to that *instinct* or imparted knowledge, which fits it for its position in animated nature. This is seen in the familiar instance of the fondness of the duckling for *water*, an instinct precisely suited to the organisation of its foot.

But if instincts exist, under some circumstances, for which there is no *peculiar cerebral structure*, it will follow, that even in the lower animals there is a principle *superadded to brain*, which prepares it for the original design of the Creator. And if so, there is nothing unreasonable in the position, that *in man*, the highest order of created intelligence, a more *important, immaterial, and immortal principle has been superadded to his organisation*, existing *independently* of that organisation, except as the medium for its manifestations; and suitable to its continued existence, after the death of this temporary building! This principle *gives* laws to his organisation, so that he differs from the lower animals, not only in the number and degree of his moral feelings and intellectual powers, which he possesses in common with them, and in the *smaller amount* of instinct or *imparted* knowledge which has been *given* him; but in the superior power of *the will*, that will being at the same time placed under the guidance of higher reasoning

faculties, and of greater knowledge—with religious sanctions precisely in accordance with the revelation of his future destinies. The analogy of nature in *every department* generally indicates *original tendencies* undefinable and imperceptible, except by *their resulting effects*, and to manifest these tendencies, appropriate organisations are bestowed upon different individuals; phrenologists, on the contrary, confound the cause and the effect.

The free will of animals seems to occupy a very limited range; and, upon reflection, it will at once be perceived, that *so* it should be, in conformity with their organisation—their wants—their desires—the position they have to fill—the duties they have to perform—and their individual responsibilities.

The *free will* of man, on the contrary, appears to himself to be *absolute*; the conviction of liberty of conduct on his part is perfect; and as he is constituted by nature, it is clear that it should be so, in order to secure his responsibility; and that without this power of selection, and of determining his own choice, he would possess no prospect of happiness.

In every instance *free will* is bounded by *knowledge imparted or acquired*, and by *implanted desires*. Little knowledge has been imparted to the lower animals, constituting *instinct*, therefore freedom of will is limited: much has been given to man, therefore *his* freedom of will is *apparently absolute*. This view will account for many disputes on the subject of *free will*, and for many seeming discre-

pancies of conduct in man, and for his not choosing *good* in preference to evil. It is, that his nature has been subjected to some debasing change, which has limited his will to choose good, or has rather given him a propensity to choose evil ; and that there is a great absence of the desire *to do good*. Thus, man by nature is a free agent ; but the propensity to choose evil has taken away from the perfection of this power ; and he is now dependent, for the just exercise of this property, upon a new desire implanted by the Holy Spirit of God, from whom “ all just works do come.” Thus he is free to choose evil or good ; he is prone to the *former* from his corrupted nature ; he can only be equal to the latter, through the desire implanted by Divine Grace.

Much apprehension has been entertained by many well-meaning persons on the subject of allowing to animals any other mind than that of *instinct* alone, from a trembling anxiety, lest the mind of man, and of animals, should be held to approximate so closely, as almost to amalgamate, or at least to originate from the same source ; thus depriving man of moral accountability for his actions, and causing *them* to originate in mere structure.

But this is a groundless fear, and productive of much error ; it is groundless, because, in truth, the *mental* manifestations of both man and animals are exhibited through the same organ ; and, to a certain extent, partake of the same nature ; but are precisely suited to the situation and destination of each ; the latter (animal mind) being exactly adapted to the

several peculiarities of his station in animated existence ; and the former to his intellectual and social nature—to his accountability for his actions—to his moral and religious character—to his possession of a new principle, a spiritual and immortal soul—and to the future destiny of that soul in a state of rewards and punishments.

It is possible that St. Paul, when he makes the distinction between “ body, soul, and spirit,” really contemplated the entire truth, and spoke of man, as possessing a body, and a *soul*, or *mind*, in common with the other higher animals, adapted to their several designed mental manifestations ; but that man (the highest animal) obtained also a *super-added* principle, here called spirit, for the purpose of showing forth those moral, spiritual, religious phenomena, which arise, or should have arisen, from the original design of the Creator. In this case, there may be more or less of *mental* manifestation in the other animals, according to the peculiar grade of each ; but there is *no* moral or spiritual manifestation, except where man shows the influence of *his* superadded principle or spirit.

A *contrary* position is also productive of *error*, because it asks too much ; and because the *facts* of the case are so directly opposed to the proposition, as to throw discredit even upon truth, by endeavouring to encumber it with that which is not true ; and this gives the “vantage ground” to scepticism and infidelity.

Now the simple truth is, that animals not only perceive by the senses, and that this perception acts

upon the stores of instinct, or imparted knowledge, suitable to their varying wants ; but, also, that they possess a different degree of *intelligence*, and that they exercise such an amount of *reasoning* upon it, as to render their *instinctive knowledge* applicable under changing circumstances. It is also clear, that animals observe minutely, while it is manifest that this faculty of observation would be comparatively useless without the memory of recorded associations ; and it is a fact, that their recollection is of the most vivid character, being, however, the result of external circumstances exclusively. There are few persons who have not experienced the advantage and disadvantage of these mental properties in the horse ; the former as committing themselves confidently to the safe conduct of their animal under different trying circumstances, when they themselves were no longer able to direct his movements ; and the latter, if they had unguardedly whipped their steed, for starting at some fearful object, and found, for a long time afterwards, that he would start ten-fold at the same object, from the *first* impression of fear being associated *with*, and multiplied *by* the recollection of his chastisement, and by the reflection of increased terror arising out of this combination.

But if animals observe well, remember accurately, reason upon their self-recorded observations, and act upon the results, surely we have here a number of mental phenomena, as thought, and reflection, comparison, selection, combination, inference, choice, or will ; and all these we find exercised in

numberless instances. Their foresight of weather, and their defence of themselves from its approaching severity ; and their skill and ingenuity shown in the infinite variety of arrangement for their nests, the construction of their habitations, and other preparations for the care of their young ; the choice of situation for these several purposes, and the varied methods for the protection of their offspring from enemies, are all proofs of contrivance, and of reasoning, which cannot be gainsayed nor disproved.

But if so, we arrive at the conclusion, that the same leading principles are found in the mental manifestations of either, only adapted to their peculiar structure, and for the purpose of gaining certain definite ends ; these ends being always suited to the different purposes of their being, and having always reference to the termination of that being, *final* in the ordinary animal, and therefore irrespective of conduct ; *not terminal* in man, because his is a higher destiny—his a higher position on earth ; and because he is especially created to show forth the attributes of God as they are *revealed* to us, while the animal of a lower grade only illustrates *his* Creator, as respects *natural religion*.

One other observation only on this subject, viz. on the susceptibility of animals to *education*. The greater part of *their* knowledge is *instinctive*, or *imparted*, yet they can, and when domesticated they must, be educated. We do not speak of learned pigs, &c. ; but of education, in their own relative position, as it is very clearly set forth in the

history of the horse, or the dog, &c. For instance, each requires to be *broke* or *educated*, in order to render his instinctive knowledge and natural powers available for the purposes of man.

Before continuing our researches on the phrenological question, we remark, that it must be admitted by all, that the texture, and composition, and function of nerves, are really unknown to us, and therefore we possess no means of judging of their organic distinctions or peculiarities. We cannot, in *this way* at least, undertake to say, that there is a difference between *one portion* of the same substance of the brain, and another portion, so as to establish a cognizable distinction. We do not rely upon this argument, because we cannot trace the reason why any one portion, or the whole of the nervous system performs its function: and we mention it only as a negative fact, that phrenologists, though they refer to external prominences, as resulting from corresponding organic development, yet do not attempt to show, upon the diseased brain, where one organ begins, or another terminates,—nor, indeed, to localize the organs at all; much less to inform us how to distinguish an organ of great power and activity from one of less power and action, the *degree of magnitude being the same in both cases*.

All we really know upon this subject is, that there is a *certain degree* of uniformity of structure, in the nervous system, from the lowest to the highest order of animated existence, and that in the vertebrated animals, this consists of a brain and spinal

marrow ; the former more particularly devoted to the *senses* and intellectual phenomena ; the latter being especially employed for locomotive and organic life.

This system is gradually perfecting up to the highest order of created intelligence—man : but *between him* and the *most intelligent* of the inferior animals, there is a grand hiatus, which does not admit of gradation ; a step which shows that man is not only the perfection of an *oran outang*, but that he is altogether a different being ; that is to say, that he has become a spiritual creature, that upon him has been lavished a *new creation*, suited to his destiny and necessary to his moral responsible existence, viz. a spiritual and immortal soul.

One word on the subject of the idiot ; and under this term I propose comprehending those who are *very* deficient in intellect, as well as those who are absolutely incapable of knowing right from wrong. In this class of unfortunate beings, there are some whose organisation is so defective, that from their birth it has been suspected they would grow up incapable of taking care of themselves ; there are others who originally exhibited an ordinary degree of mental developement, but in whom its traces have been obliterated by an attack of convulsions, or some such fearful bodily ailment ; there are others, who have experienced some violent mental emotion, and in whom all trace of intelligence has been swept away by one desolating storm ; and there are those, in whom no defective organisation has

been noticed, but with whom the power of employing the brain has seemed never to exist, the *essential connecting link* between body and mind having been wanting ; so that there have been no mental manifestations, yet no apparent ground for their absence.

On the contrary, in some rare instances, an accident, a blow, a fall, some acute malady, some overwhelming emotion, has given such a stimulus to the cerebral fibre, that mental energy has taken the place of imbecility, and the *fool* has been reinstated in all the powers and privileges of *the man*.

It is obvious, that these circumstances, which are abundantly explained by considering the brain as the *single* organ of mind, are not to be accounted for thus easily by the supposition of its plurality ; because, in that case, the want of developement within, or the destroying impression from without, should have been exhibited on particular organs only ; and, above all, the existence of organic developement *without* a corresponding display of function, is so fatal to the hypotheses of phrenology, that the occurrence of such instances has been attempted to be denied : still that they do occur, is borne out by the recorded experience of our lunatic asylums.

There is also great difference in the capacity of different brains for carrying on the mental processes ; we are accustomed to say, and very justly, that their minds are of a different calibre, although

there shall seem to be the same degree of organic developement. The brain shall appear to be the *same* ; yet one has the power of a giant, the other of a pigmy. Hence we infer,

First, that though the brain be the organ of *thought*, yet the *generation* of thought, the nature and quality of thought, and the aptitude for its employment, are not dependent upon the *quantum of brain*, not upon any *demonstrable* property of the nervous fibre.

Secondly, neither is the reach of *mental* manifestation dependent upon the perfection of the senses ; for although these form the inlet for a great variety of ideas, yet it will often be found, that the power of abstraction and combination of thought generally, is greatest in those whose senses are not eminently developed ; and, on the contrary, there will often be the least mental developement, where there is the greatest power and acuteness of the senses, as is manifestly the case with the Indian tribes.

Thirdly, great bodily and great mental power are rarely met with in the same individual, and it commonly happens, that where there is much intellectual *activity*, there is a feebleness of vital *power* about the brain, which confirms the position that the capacity for thought is dependent rather upon some *unknown peculiarity* of the cerebral fibre, than upon its *quantity*, or cognizable structure. It is supposed that a tendency towards water on the brain is accompanied usually by a premature deve-

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lopement of thought and feeling. But this is not true ; it is the too great *action* of thought and feeling which overturns the balance of health, and produces or rather calls upon the brain for so much vascular action to support it, that the organ receives more blood than it knows how to dispose of ; the balance of the circulation is overturned, irritation is set up, and effusion takes place by a sort of natural effort to relieve the vascular tension.

A question will very properly present itself here, as to the mode by which this variation of mental calibre is to be accounted for. It is obvious, that many striking talents will depend upon some peculiarity in the organs of sense ; but the marked quickness of association in one ; the depth of reasoning in another ; the strength of judgment in a third ; the power of comprehension in a fourth ; the capacity for minute and accurate details in a fifth ; the habits of observation and reflection in a sixth ; and the power of combination in a seventh ; though they may be influenced by the quantum of blood received and distributed under given circumstances, are really explicable only on the supposition of the existence of some peculiarity in the cerebral fibre.

We also notice here, that there are many important functions of the brain, to which no organ has been allotted ; as, for instance, consciousness, perception, reason, &c. And it is clear that no organ will be charged with these important functions, because they do not chance to be distri-

butable, yet there can be no good reason why a separate organ should not be allowed them, as well as to hope, fear, benevolence, and religion.

If a contrary process were adopted by phrenologists, it would be fatal to their doctrines; for then not only would each prominence be the centre of one peculiar faculty, but there would be certain projections which must constitute so many centres of individual existence; and life would be spent, identity would be lost, and all that is valuable would be merged, in the conflict for power, between these several existences.

It is not to be believed, that there can be separate organic fibres for the production of benevolence, hope, fear, joy, and sorrow—sense of duty to God, &c.; these are all the result of spiritual actions, which are hidden in the deep recesses of the individual, and which are *manifested* to us through the organ of mind, the *servant* of the spiritual principle, modified indeed by the peculiarities of its structure, and of various causes operating upon it, but not exhibited through one chosen spot.

It becomes us then to inquire into the influence of this original constitution; and of various other causes acting upon the brain.

No reasonable person can doubt, that there are *original differences* of mental constitution; and these distinctions exist in different children of the same parents; so that not only varieties, but dissimilarities, and even antipodes, occur in the same family, and under the same system of education.

These distinctions exist anteriorly to mental culture ; they are to be noticed with the earliest dawn of passion and emotion ; the first scintillations of intellect will denote the source whence they are derived, and will exhibit peculiarities which subsequent education will not obliterate and scarcely control, but which will tinge the character for life. It is not always true, that “*fortes creantur fortibus et bonis ;*” but it is true, on the contrary, that *mental differences* in the offspring from their parents do often exist, and are to be found under very great *apparent similarities of organisation*.

We do not conceive that this fact can be accounted for but by the supposition, that the Creator, the Lord and Giver of life, dispenses talent as it pleases *Him*, and confers *peculiarities* which are not *traceable* to organisation, but the manifestation of which may be influenced both by moral and physical conditions. And we perceive the design of these peculiarities, in enabling each individual better to fulfil the duties of that station in life, which has been previously selected for him by an unerring Providence.

Granting this, it is equally true, that there exist certain other differences of mental manifestation, which are dependent upon bodily organisation, which are not produced by education or imitation, and which are oftentimes handed down from parent to child through many generations ; these peculiarities are very markedly apparent under the influence of certain conditions of the brain ; and their manifestation is greatly modified by these conditions.

This manifestation will be modified by cerebral developement, and especially by its *age*. In early life, the manifestations of mind are few and feeble ; bodily pleasure or bodily uneasiness seems to be its first expression, and is thus limited to the wants and desires of the animal. The recognition of those with whom it is associated, and from whom it is receiving constant kindnesses, appears to be the next link in the chain of developement ; and, as arising out of this, the emotion of gratitude and affection. Afterwards the growth of the affective faculties, and of emotions and passions arising out of selfishness, claim the precedence over every other principle, and for a very long time give the tinge of their predominance to mental manifestation.

The intellectual faculties are of far slower growth, and require a longer period, as well as the graduated process of education, for their developement. These also are tinged, in early life, by the prevalence of passion ; or they are characterized by imagination rather than by judgment, and are marked by activity rather than by vigour. It should seem that the brain was naturally apt enough for the reception or expression of the sensitive faculties ; but that the manifestation of the intellectual powers and moral feelings was of a far more difficult order.

Now, while it is allowed that this latter expression is dependent upon the growth, maturity, or decay of the cerebral organ, the inquiry as to the *cause* of this difference is not without considerable interest ; since the one appears so easy, so natural ;

the other so difficult, so laborious. The true solution of this problem is to be found in the fact, that the one has regard to the mere animal, and is therefore easy, while the other is dependent upon the spiritual nature to which the brain is subservient; *but to which, from some perverting cause, it has ceased to be a willing servant.* It is obedient to all the animal impulses; it is very loath to yield itself to the higher faculties of man's moral and social relationship.

But we must carry our views a little further. As age advances and maturity is established, the brain has reached the maximum of its power; reason is fully developed; intellect has acquired its highest tone; passion is subdued to the dominion of moral virtue; judgment has obtained its ascendancy; the full tide of mental power has reached its height; and the light of reason is in the zenith of its strength. But this period passes away; by slow, and generally imperceptible degrees, the brain loses first, *elasticity*, then *power*; the lessened buoyancy of mental operation first proclaims the change which age is about to produce; a few more years, and power is perceptibly diminished; energy of purpose and of execution give way to waywardness and irritability; an impatience of difference of opinion is soon discernible; narrow and confined views, tenaciously held, are exchanged for the previously broad and ample basis of well-formed and enlarged opinion; sinister influence is more easily exerted; passion—the passion of old age—creeps upon the individual; more and more power and

energy are lost, till by degrees the manifestations of the mind of man are darkened by the night, the pitiable night, of second childhood.

There is a remarkable circumstance to be noticed in the history of cerebral action, viz. the change of opinion which we sometimes notice in a very extraordinary manner; not that change which is effected by the slow agency of the causes to which we have just adverted, but a comparatively sudden operation, occasioned sometimes by some physical cause influencing the brain, but much more frequently by a cause purely mental, acting either through the judgment or the passions. And this change is sometimes so marked and so sudden, as to be quite incompatible with any corresponding change in the fibres of the manifesting organ, and is only to be accounted for by the supposition of an altered action of the spiritual presiding principle.

The change of which we speak, is quite independent of that gradual alteration which affects the brain, as well as every other organ, arising from the decay and renovation of its particles, which may operate the varieties in the habits of thought, and modes of judgment and expression which we have just before noticed; and which is perfectly consistent with the continuance of personal identity, and with the entire mental conviction of being the same individual, and of a consciousness that the change is one of *manifestation*, and of the *manifesting organ*, not of the *thinking, presiding, governing spirit*.

There are some other physical causes operating upon the brain, and its manifestations, which we must just notice. One of these is temperature. Every healthy person is conscious of being braced up by moderate cold, and of being relaxed by heat. Winter, therefore, is the time for study, provided that the body be kept moderately warm. The energy of the brain is increased by a certain degree of cold, and diminished by either *extreme*. In too great heat, the individual becomes oppressed, languid, and irritable; and in too great cold, congestion and inaptitude for mental exertion take place; the former state being probably dependent upon the immediate impression of heat upon the nervous fibre; the latter being produced through the medium of the circulation.

Atmospherical pressure, too, has probably a double agency; it is only under high pressure that cerebral phenomena go on, with the degree of elasticity requisite to ensure comfort. There is probably also, here, the double *immediate* agency upon the brain, and the intermediate operation through the vascular system. For as the venous circulation is dependent for its continuance almost entirely on atmospherical pressure; so, if that pressure be diminished, the circulation in the large sinuses of the brain will be impeded to such an extent, that there will be great inaptitude for mental exertion, and a considerable degree of general languor and prostration of strength.

It would appear, then, that both these causes operate upon the circulation of the blood, as well as

upon the nervous fibre. In all probability, mere movement in the brain, occasioned by the arterial action, has an important agency in keeping that organ in a healthy condition. But this action may be too great or too little; the blood may be propelled around its circle too rapidly, and then there exists excitement and over action; or it may be returned from the brain *too slowly*, and then will be found a languor and feebleness of function, a prostration of cerebral energy, which is oftentimes very distressing to the patient, because it so generally wears the appearance of a moral feebleness of will.

Over-action of the brain, and want of sufficient rest, will produce irritability; a *real loss of power*, with a great appearance of action; a state very generally leading to *disorder* of the bodily functions, and this, again, reacting injuriously upon the brain.

When, however, the blood is not propelled to the brain with a sufficient degree of power, or when it is sent up in too large quantities, or when it is too slowly returned *from* the brain, there is an immediate loss of balance in the circulating system; the veins become loaded—congested; there is first heaviness, then dulness, embarrassment; and, finally, if not previously remedied, a cessation of action. And this may exist in various degrees, so as in many instances to escape detection, to be known only to the sufferer, and by him to be reasoned upon incorrectly, and attributed to anything but the right cause.

Another physical agent operating upon the brain

is *nutrition* ; like other organs, its fibres must be renewed ; its perfect nourishment is essential to its well-being. Unless it be adequately nourished, its excitability, or power of receiving impressions, is diminished, and its own interior actions are of a feebler character.

A variety of stimuli act upon the brain, and act differently upon the brain of different persons, and even of the same person at different periods of life, under changed circumstances with regard to general health, action or inaction, freshness or exhaustion, in different conditions of the stomach, and under varying states of atmospherical electricity.

Once more, various morbid states of the physique generally, operate principally upon the brain, and its manifestations of mental agency : these act primarily upon the organ itself, or sympathetically through the irritation of some distant viscus. There may be a suspension of action, as in fainting, or morbid sleep ; there may be excited action, as in enthusiasm ; there may be too great and exclusive attention to *one* object ; or there may be perversion of action, as in all the changing forms of insanity, from the first trace of eccentric movement to the total extinction of the character of man.

Thus then we perceive, that no sensitive, no affective emotion, no operation of intellect, no consciousness of being, in short, *no* manifestation of mind, can take place without the intervention of the brain ; and we perceive also, that this manifestation is modified by varying conditions of that organ immediately ; and intermediately, by many states of health or dis-

ease of body, as well as by different emotions, and principles, and thought, and reasoning, and comparison and judgment.

But although, in order to the production of mental phenomena, there must be a certain condition of the brain and nervous system, yet it would be illogical and absurd, and contrary to fact, to infer that the sentient principle resided in the nerves, or in the part first receiving *the impression*. The eye does not see, nor the ear hear, nor the tongue taste ; the impression is first made upon their nerves ; but the reception of that impression, and its being brought round to the thinking principle, is consciously, through an intermediate agency, and by a direct reference from the percipient organ, to the presiding mind : there appears, then, to be no *necessary* ground for the atomic division of the brain into many little specialties ; and, therefore, before closing this chapter, we must just notice a few of the arguments *for and against* the doctrines of phrenology.

It has been said, that in order to produce various effects, nature has varied the material organ ; and, therefore, that it is reasonable to suppose she has done so with regard to the brain. But the contrary is the fact ; and it would be just as reasonable to suppose it *necessary* to have different eyes for the reception of impressions given by different colours, as to suppose it *necessary* to have different organs in the brain, for the developement of ideas produced by form and colour. As we have stated, the contrary is really the fact ; for the tongue is the organ

of taste, as well as of every variety of language; and the hand is not only the organ of *touch*, but also of prehension, and indication, and expression, &c.

Again, it is said, if the brain were a *single* organ, and one faculty only of that organ predominated, we should always discover the existence of *high*—perhaps too high—action, and yet we do not. But this conclusion is not necessary, because the one organ may possess a *peculiar aptitude* for one function more than for another; and in such case, there is no *necessity* for high action in order to give prominence to the peculiar function. This by no means precludes the combination of *high action* with peculiar manifestation, but only decides that the one is not *necessary* to the other, which is the point in dispute.

Another argument alleged by the supporters of phrenology, is, that when mental exertion has produced *fatigue*, this *fatigue* is removed by a change of subject for attention, or, as they would say, by the employment of *another organ*. But this again is by no means necessary, in order to secure the relief sought. In reading, for instance, one author may be studied till fatigue is the result, and that fatigue will be as effectually relieved by taking up a different author on the same subject, as it would by an entire change of the object, which had first occasioned fatigue, by the concentration of nervous energy upon it. Again, the intellectual powers have been wearied over one subject of scientific inquiry, and they are

as much relieved by changing the object of literary research, as by diverting the attention into an entirely new channel ; the same organs, speaking phrenologically, continue to be employed, and the relief is produced, notwithstanding, by a simple variation in the *mode* of attention. It is *change of action* which is the *source* of relief, not change of organ : even as, by one of nature's laws, it is easier to walk than to stand quite still ; or to have an infinite number of *successive actions* of the same muscles, rather than *sustained or continued* action, even for a short time. Phrenology, therefore, gains no support from this supposed change of organ.

A variety of arguments, however, have been adduced on the opposite side of the question, which it would be right briefly and candidly to notice.

First, it has been said, that in some subject or other, almost every portion of the brain has been destroyed by accident, or lost by disease, or has been found defective, without any apparent corresponding change in the manifestations of mind. We would give phrenologists the full benefit of the answer to this argument, viz. that much of the *connecting tissue* may have been lost or be defective under such circumstance, without involving the *essential structure*, the positive nervous fibres of any one particular organ ; and also that this loss of cerebral substance, and any corresponding change of mental manifestation, may have yet escaped notice ; such is the habit of careless observation among the generality of inquirers. Yet

it must be allowed to be very remarkable, that a set of opposite facts have not been sustained by the phrenologists, in which such injuries *have been* followed by such changes. Until *such facts* have been produced in such a series as to warrant drawing inferences from them, the argument must be allowed to throw some kind of discredit on their very *positive* conclusions ; and we mention *here* this *peculiarity* of their conclusions, because it is an attribute which *does not* belong to profound science or deep investigation ; which *does*, on the contrary, attach to ignorance of scientific research ; and which, therefore, *does* always excite doubt and suspicion in the minds of the most patient investigators after truth.

Secondly, as the same stomach receives and digests different kinds of food, and ultimately converts them also to the same elements of nourishment to the body, which again is distributed to a great variety of purposes ; so there can be no reason why the brain should not receive a great variety of notices, and refer them to the same presiding mind, which again distributes *its* notices, and issues *its* mandates to the several portions of *its* complex dominion. There is a perfect harmony and simplicity in this arrangement, which nothing can surpass, and towards the accomplishment of which there are no insurmountable difficulties.

Thirdly, the same nerves are capable of a variety of functions ; as for instance, in receiving impressions, and conveying sensations *to* the brain ; and of communicating volition from the presiding mind,

through the brain to different parts of the animal economy. It is indeed true, that these two functions are believed to reside in different sets of fibres, the *one* conveying notices to the brain, and the *other* receiving such notices from that organ, and not capable of acting *interchangeably*. But if the same *apparent* fibres are capable of performing two such opposite functions, there can be no reason for supposing a probable necessity for that distinction of organs, which allots different fibres for the execution of different and highly-divisible functions.

Fourthly, the appearances of the skull are *not* to be *relied upon*, as giving indications of the presence of certain organs; for the following reasons :—

a. The external prominences do not *always* correspond with internal projections of the brain, but are occasioned by a different cause.

b. The *shape*, and *thickness*, and *texture* of the skull, have reference to the greater or less liability of the several parts to pressure, or to blows from without, which might endanger the well-being of the sensorial organ; and also in some instances to the attachment of muscles.

c. These appearances are oftentimes dependent upon their having formed centres of *ossification* for the bones of the cranium in early life. In completing the ossification of the head, it is well known that nature has made beautiful provision for its early accomplishment, considering the extent of surface to be walled in. This must have been a very long process, if the radii of ossification had to

shoot from *one common centre* to the entire circumference. Therefore nature has subdivided the work ; first, into several bones ; and then has given to each bone several centres of ossification, from which the radii shoot out, and inosculate with the radii proceeding from other centres ; the whole work being completed by the joining of the textures, and the filling up of the little spaces supposed to be left by the rationale of this process.

Now it is manifest, that each of these *centres* of ossification will naturally possess a larger quantity of ossific matter, than at the inosculation of the radii above mentioned, and, therefore, will retain the appearance of prominences and projections ; and will thus produce the semblance of those organs, the existence of which has been claimed as demonstrated. This fact is beautifully illustrated by the bones of a child's skull now before me, who was murdered by its unnatural parent at three weeks of age ; a very considerable thickness is to be found at these ossific centres, while at the extreme points of radiation the cranium is so thin as to be transparent, and to leave very little ossific matter deposited. Here then would be organs in great activity, in the central bony origins, and of great feebleness, or total absence, at a distance from these centres.

The increase of frontal brain, with the necessary expansion of its external covering, is the *consequence* of *mental effort*. As muscle is developed by exercise, so also is the growth of brain promoted by any extraordinary demands made upon it by the governing mind. Thus the full developement of the

manifesting organ is in some measure dependent upon the mental effort of the creature. This will also serve to explain the *mode* of operation in education, in religious instruction, in the Holy Spirit's influence: the attainment of the objects proposed by all these means is usually *slow* and *gradual*, and is likened by our Saviour himself to the imperceptible growth of corn.

Fifthly, the size of an organ, neither in nature nor in mechanics, is any indication of its power and energy of action. On the contrary, firmness and fineness of *texture*, and *completeness* of adjustment, give that power and energy, which size cannot communicate, but to which, on the contrary, it seems to be inimical.

Phrenologists then err against nature and science, when they attribute increased energy to increased size. The mainspring of a watch is not to be judged of by its size, whether absolute or relative; the most surprising effects are produced by the minutest machinery; the strength of a bone or joint does not depend on its size; on the contrary, large bones and large joints, (and it might be added, large heads,) are commonly feeble; and in all athletic performances, small bones and joints will always endure longer, and sustain more fatigue, and perform better, than those which are larger.

Lastly, phrenologists appeal very loudly to *experience*; they speak of theirs being a science of *observation*—of their accumulation of *facts*—of their deduction from *facts*. Granting them the credit of being accurate and disinterested observers, it must

be urged that they are very far from being *uniform* in their experience, or agreed in their results ; and consequently that they must be *inaccurate* observers, or *inconclusive* reasoners ; besides that there exists a great number of counter-facts, which militate strongly against their conclusions.

Now when the same observers, looking at the same object, arrive at different results, and draw dissimilar conclusions in a matter of observation, which, if true, should be invariable ; and when it is a fact, that, so far from being invariable, there are many most startling discrepancies ; when it is recollected, that according to the supposition, the facts should be invariable, and therefore, that a very few counter-facts will utterly invalidate what a great many can barely substantiate, it will follow, that a considerable degree of doubt will rest upon their conclusions ; and that the wise and prudent will not accept these conclusions, without much hesitancy.

We are free to admit, that these erroneous observations and reasonings may be charged on the infancy of the science, and the inaccuracy of observers, or the incompetence of the reasoners ; but if the science be still in its infancy, if some of its observers be thus inaccurate, and some of its reasoners thus incompetent, who is to decide *at present* on the established facts, or the just reasonings of phrenology ?—again, the wise and prudent will hesitate.

Farther, when it is recollected, that these gentlemen are not disinterested observers ; that they

have a cause to serve, an hypothesis to substantiate; and that they set off to look after facts to support their preconceived opinions, it will follow, that their evidence should be thoroughly and severely tested, before it can be received as *testimony*; and that this fact throws an additional weight into the scale of prudential doubt and hesitation.

The supporters of phrenology appeal very loudly to experience. Now experience may be very easily perverted, by a blind attention to the evidence of the senses on the one hand, or by listening to the suggestions of prejudice on the other.

The phrenologist may be led astray by the evidence of his senses, almost more than any man, in consequence of the skull of some remarkable person presenting some peculiar prominence; in search of support for this phenomenon, he will be led away from the full and mature influence of reason and reflection, and claim for himself the entire credit of being guided by *experience*; whereas this so vaunted term becomes nothing better than blindfold *experiment*, unless it is characterized by that fullness and fairness of induction, which can only result from the accumulation of *our own facts and reasonings, enlarged, tested, modified, by the facts and reasonings of others.*

The baneful influence of prejudice is also grievously felt in the tendency which it creates, to find facts suitable to the favourite hypothesis, and to distort them, so as to make them bend to preconceived notions.

Thus *the theorist* is dazzled away from truth, while the *accumulator of facts* perverts it, and is betrayed from the only path to real knowledge, viz. *patient intelligent observation*, and *enlarged views*, *drawn*, not as inferences from a small number of data, but as inductions from a large series of unprejudiced observations, aided by sound judgment and just reasoning, supported by experience, and verified by *many* inquirers, at different times, and in distant quarters of the world.

We have now honestly recorded our doubts on the subject of phrenology ; and without farther passing sentence on its merits, we shall proceed to consider the question of materialism,—a charge which attaches equally (if at all) to those who consider the brain to be *the organ* of mind, as against those who believe in the complexity of its organisation.

CHAPTER IV.

ON MATERIALISM—ITS REAL BEARING, AND THE
PRESENT DISCUSSION SHOWN TO HAVE NO TEN-
DENCY TO THIS DOCTRINE.

BEFORE we proceed further, it is necessary to consider two classes of objections which have been urged against the foregoing views: first, that of their leading *to materialism*; and next, of their tendency to establish a spiritual agency, of the existence of which there is no proof.

It is remarkable that charges of so very opposite a nature, should be adduced by highly estimable individuals; and yet such has been the case among the author's correspondents, affording no trifling presumption of the accuracy of his views; for although the opposite of *right* is not *always wrong*, nor the opposite of *error* *always truth*; yet when the self-same proposition, contemplated by different persons, from different points of view, or through variously prejudiced media, produces a precisely opposite impression,—the presumption is certainly

in favour of its truth ;—and of its being placed among that class of truths which holds the middle way between contending parties, and which being undefined by those peculiar prominences of character, which each fierce disputant would earnestly seek after, is therefore left unrecognized by the partisan, and unacknowledged by those, who, in the warmth of their zeal, would exclaim with a certain degree of indignation, “ He who is not for us, is against us,” in entire forgetfulness, that this sententious conclusion admits of being, readily turned into an equally forcible truth, “ He who is not against us, is for us.”

These objections must be examined separately ; and, first, the charge of materialism, which applies as much to the *single* as to the *plural* organ ; inasmuch, that if reference be made at all to *organic* influence, it is not very important whether that reference have respect to one organ or many : the real point of objection being, that the brain should be supposed to exert *any* influence upon the manifestations of mind.

Now in the outset of our inquiry it might be sufficient to ask, if the brain be *the organ of mind*—that is, the *medium* through which its manifestations take place ; how could it be otherwise, than that these manifestations should partake of the nature of the medium through which they pass ? And then unless every brain be of the same kind in every individual, and under all circumstances of health and disease—action and inaction—excitement and

collapse—culture and waste—it is impossible that the manifestations can be alike.

Now this supposition is so notoriously contrary to fact, and would, if allowed, conduct to propositions so palpably absurd, that the answer to the charge might almost safely be permitted to rest here, were it not desirable, at one view, to show that the charge of materialism has no foundation whatever.

Did not daily experience bear out the conclusion, that the manifestations of mind *are* influenced by different states of the body in general, and of the brain in particular ; did we not constantly see the effect of various bodily changes—of the irritation of disease—of the influence of medicine—of returning health—of advancing age—and of a thousand other causes, acting *only* upon the organ, it would be very simple *à priori* reasoning—that if the brain be the manifesting organ, which all admit, these manifestations must take a tinge from the medium through which they pass ; just as water, a simple element, takes its character from the soil through which it has passed ; or the air becomes impregnated with the aroma of flowers, or with various noxious exhalations ; or as the rapidity of a current is influenced by the nature of its banks, the declivity of the country through which it passes, the obstacles it encounters, and a thousand other circumstances, permanent or accidental.

Now this *à priori* reasoning is supported by facts :—for it is a fact,

1. That the manifestations of mind are always

characterized by physical temperament, which physical temperament is always constituted by the brain ; so that it may be foretold, by a knowledge of such temperament, what will be the peculiar manifestations of mind.

2. That the capacity for education may always be estimated from such acquaintance with physical structure.

3. That direct or sympathetic disturbance of the brain will introduce disorder into the mental manifestations ; that a simple headache will take away the power of thought ; that a certain little more of morbid condition will occasion unreal fears, illusions, and hallucinations ; and that a still more aggravated form of malady will produce insanity with all its complications.

4. That even a fainting fit, which temporarily deprives the brain of its regular supply of blood,—an hysterical paroxysm,—a trifling giddiness, however produced, or a blow upon the head which occasions stunning, or the mildest form of concussion of the brain, will all suspend the manifestations of mind, and be accompanied by a state very closely resembling death, or the entire absence of such manifestation.

With such reasoning, supported by such facts, it seems almost a waste of time to adduce more argument in support of the views upheld by the present work ; but in a question of such vital importance, and involving in its consequences christian truth, there is no point connected with it which must not be rigidly examined.

Thus, a living writer, whose opinions are deserving of the highest respect, and who occupies a station in the christian world, of the greatest possible usefulness and influence, writes, " Although I do not think that it can *fairly* be *accused* of inculcating materialism, yet I must confess that it requires a good deal of consideration to see clearly the distinction between the *moral qualities* of the mind, and the developement of its functions through the medium of the brain. After all, the single fact, of a person having retained all his faculties *unimpaired*, after that the greater portion of his brain had become dissolved into lymph, seems to me to upset a great part of your reasoning."

And so it must, *if the fact* were such; for if a function be carried on as well without the intervention, and even after almost the entire disorganization of the organ supposed to be appointed for this purpose; it would follow, necessarily, that if the function be carried on *without* the organ, the supposed organ is not the one destined for the performance of that function, which must therefore be carried on by *some other organ*, or *without organic intervention*.

But the fact is not so:—for first, the brain does not receive any material injury, without leaving its traces in future life upon the mental manifestations; and if these traces be few, and feeble, and transient, this constitutes the exception, and not the rule. And, in the next place, it is not a fact, that the mental functions have been carried on, when the brain has been dissolved into lymph; for in all

such alleged instances, the change which takes place is one of expansion, and not of destruction ; the brain is not changed into lymph, but the fluid is poured out into the interior cavities ; the walls of those cavities are pushed *outwards*, and this process continuing, the natural junctions of the different bones composing the skull give way, and by degrees the head becomes enormously enlarged—the brain being always *exterior* to this fluid accumulation, and occupying a surface, large in proportion to the *extension* of a substance, which before occupied a confined space ; and as this change has taken place in early life, and has been very slow in its operation, the brain has become so accustomed to the alteration of its *position*, that the manifestations of mind, though not equal to what they *would have been* in a sound and healthy state, are not so much impaired as would seem probable to casual observers, especially if unacquainted with the existence of the *entire brain, though in a state of greater extension* and proportioned *thinness*.

So much for the facts supposed to be connected with this objection ; but with regard to the *reasoning*, when we differ from such a man, we almost doubt the correctness of our own conclusions ; but we apprehend that the difficulty in his mind arises from not keeping steadily in view that the *moral qualities* do not *originate* in the brain ; that the brain is the *servant of* mind ; that the organization was formed for the individual, not that the individual was suited to the organization ; and that the mind or spirit is an immaterial principle conferred

only upon man, and superadded to his more perfect organisation, to guide, and govern, and direct all his conduct and his motives.

Thus it will be seen that the spiritual functions are not developed *by the brain*, but that they are only rendered cognisable to us through that *medium*. Mental thought and feeling, emotion and passion, so far as they are not connected with purely animal function, which are common to man and the lower animals, originate with the *spiritual principle*, and give laws to the organisation. Nevertheless, the *expression* of these spiritual originations may be, and doubtless is, tinged and characterized, as it is made known to others, through the material medium, which is appointed for their manifestation, and which constitutes a portion of the state of trial and probation in which we are placed ; for the spirit is accountable for its own thoughts,—for the actions and conduct of its servant, the brain ; and upon this has been impressed some debasing transformation, which chains it down to animal propensity, and proves a great source of trial and conflict to the best-ordered minds.

In consequence of this change, the intellect is no longer *so* apt for exertion ; the perceptions are not so accurate ; deep reflection is a burden ; consciousness is liable to error ; and so, also, with regard to all the purely mental manifestations.

If, therefore, we cannot derive the same impression from similar objects, it is, probably, because we look at those objects from different points of

view; or from some difference in *the organs of sense*, through which all our real knowledge is confessedly obtained.

The point contended for is, that the brain does exert an influence upon the manifestations of mind; that it gives a prevailing tinge to them when healthy; that, though originally perfect, some change has passed upon it, insomuch that the instrument is *imperfect*, and that its defects, or diseases, and even its minor morbid actions, do exert a perverting influence over the images of thought; that they do throw a disturbing agency over our perceptions; that they do alter the nature of our sensations; and that oftentimes they do give rise to impressions which are *unreal*.

Against conclusions of this nature the charge of materialism has been brought; and it has been reiterated and deepened, when this influence has been shown to extend to *the will*, so that, according to the function of volition, it should give tone, and energy, and action to the body, and persevering exertion to the mind, so long as the condition of the brain was healthy; or that, in its opposite state, it should enfeeble and even paralyze the bodily actions, and render uncertain and vacillating the operations of the mental will.

We have the highest respect for objections of this nature, because they originate in the excess of *right*,—in a fearful apprehension of diminishing the moral accountability of the spiritual individual by allowing too much for the influence of the

body upon the manifestations of mind ; and we cannot help thinking that we must differ from our *spiritualist* friends more in the *terms* which we employ, than in the *things* of which we speak ; since it does appear so impossible to doubt that the *material brain* and nervous system are the appointed organ, instrument, and servant of mind ; and that as such, its physiological power of conveying mental impulse is very great ; while the pathological influence of its disorders is also quite incalculable in disturbing the harmony, or completeness, or perfection of these notices.

No two things can be more distinct than the *spiritual mind* and the *material brain* : yet the former can receive no intelligence nor communicate any notices without the latter ; and thence it follows, that if the brain be not in a sound state, that intelligence, and those notices, may be incorrect, defective, or perverted.

With regard to the particular function of volition, on which hangs, after all, the essential point in dispute ; since the question really is, whether the man is the slave of his organisation, and that his *will* to do right may be superseded by a corporeal tendency to do wrong ; or whether the brain is the *servant* of mind, and that the mental will is supreme, —gives laws to the material organisation,—and is thoroughly accountable for all its voluntary errors, all its deviations from right, all its listening and yielding to bodily influence ?

With regard to the will, it should be recollected that there is no possibility of communicating the

sentiments except by a separate act of volition for every letter, of every word, of every sentence, which embodies the ideas, whether this communication be made *orally*, or through the medium of *writing*. Admitting the first, which no reasonable person can doubt, it follows that the energy of this function is very great, and that the *integrity* of the brain and nervous system is indispensable, in order to secure a perfect elaboration of the materials of *thought*.

But grant this, and it follows, that *if* the integrity of the brain be necessary to the *perfection* of mental manifestation, and that the brain and nervous system be subject in themselves to every degree of perfectness, as well as to every grade of feebleness and every variety of perverted action, so must there be a corresponding change in the shades of mental manifestation.

Mistakes are often made on the subject of volition, both in a practical and a theoretical point of view. The mere *act of wishing*, and the decided exercise of the *will*, are often confounded with each other; yet no two things can be more unlike. The one is a merely indolent, passive, inoperative desire, (even if it amount to *desire*,) that such an acknowledged good were possessed, but there is no corresponding effort to attain it; the other is a state of high mental and bodily action, in which, if it be a strenuous will, both mind and body are concentrated upon the object to be obtained, and not only concentrated, but energized to the highest pitch of intensity.

A beautiful illustration of the energy of this function has recently come before me; which, when wrought up in this manner, succeeded in controlling one of the most unmanageable of all unmanageable diseases, viz. the paroxysms of hooping-cough. Every one is familiar with the difficulty of repressing ordinary cough—greatly increased by the spasmodic paroxysm just mentioned. No person, by *wishing* to control either the former or the latter, will ever produce the slightest effect. Yet, by the exercise of a determined *will*, by a continued struggle against the recurrence of the paroxysms, and by a constant and energetic warfare, which we should all do well *morally to imitate*, and which should make us all blush for so easily yielding *to temptation*, this liability to paroxysm was undermined and overcome. I confess this case filled me with admiration of the individual for *her* determined energy of purpose, and with astonishment and thankfulness to God for his “wonderful works, and his goodness to the children of men.”

It seems to be universally allowed, even by those who are so fearful on this question of materialism, that we neither have, nor can obtain, *any* knowledge, but such as is communicated to us, through the medium of the senses.

Now the organs of sense are undoubtedly material, and they depend for their perfection upon the integrity of *material nerves*, and a *material brain*, with which these nerves are in the closest *communion*.

Since, then, man can receive no knowledge, except through a *material* medium; and since, again, without the continued assistance of certain other material nerves, he can neither write, read, nor speak, it is clear that he can *communicate* no knowledge except through a material medium.

And since man can *neither receive nor communicate knowledge*, except through a material medium, it is surely not *irrational*, nor *unphilosophical*, nor *anti-christian*, to conclude, that the *intermediate link* in the chain, the *elaboration and clothing* of knowledge so *received*, or to be so *communicated*, is also accomplished through the *instrumentality of a material medium*. And if so, the question of the existence of a *material organ*, as a servant to the spiritual principle, and as *necessary to its manifestations*, is *set at rest*.

We might quote in this place with advantage, the following observations from a little work by the Rev. Richard Warner, entitled "The Anti-Materialist," and published some years since. "All the attainments, and all the powers, which distinguish the most humble from the loftiest mind: the results of scientific research, and the deepest knowledge of the facts, the combinations of genius, and the creations of fancy, derived, as they originally are, through the medium of the *senses*, and depending, as they *entirely do*, on the more or less perfect and delicate conformation and condition of the *material* part of our frame, partake of the *nature of matter*, the fountain from which they spring, and the channel through which they flow.

“The whole mass, indeed, of what may be called *human knowledge*, (that is, of those objects and facts, respecting which the mind has clear, perfect, and satisfactory perceptions,) is limited to the evidence of the senses, and even the purest branch of it, *geometrical and mathematical truth*, rests ultimately on material ideas, on forms and qualities suggested by impressions made on the organs of sensation. The moment we dismiss these palpable guides to what is real and true, we get within the confines of uncertainty. The regions of abstraction may be delightful, but they are a land of shadows, filled by forms without substance, and appearances destitute of actual existence. The honest, though humiliating fact is, that laying aside those truths which are revealed to us by God, in his own sacred Word, we have no perfect knowledge here below, of anything that lies beyond the limits of *matter*; that the mind cannot rest upon aught as *indubitable*, which is not conveyed to it by impressions made upon the bodily faculties of hearing, seeing, tasting, smelling, and touching.”

This argument might be carried still further, by asserting that we do not even know the complete meaning of the term *material*. We really know not wherein the elements of matter consist; and although we are acquainted with some of its properties, we do not know its *essence*; neither are we sure that it may not possess properties, or assume forms, with which we are unacquainted, and which are too subtle to be recognized by our senses. Hence we do not consider the question of the materiality

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of the soul as being very *important*, because what we call *spiritual*, *may*, in fact, be an infinitely fine modification of matter, far too subtle to be appreciated by our present powers. All we contend for is, that the *brain* is not *that modification* of matter ; but that it is *subservient* to the mind. This might supersede the question of materialism ; but we wish to meet it on its own grounds, to take the common acceptation of the term, as generally received, and to show that our views do not conduct to a belief in its cheerless doctrines.

Before entering further upon this subject, and after the avowal of the foregoing paragraph, it is necessary to state, that this question is not so *all-important* as it has been thought by many excellent persons, who have reasoned thus, that *only that* which was *immaterial* could be *immortal*. This, however, by no means follows ; first, because we know not what the term *material* means ; and, secondly, because it is not a property of matter to be *destructible*, but indestructible ; and to exist under ever new and varying forms of combination ; so that even here, there could be no reason why a material soul might not undergo, during the stage of its existence after the death of the body, that purifying and ennobling change, which would fit it for its new state of immortality. The flower which fades, and droops, and perishes, and vanishes from our sight, may enter into new combinations, and soon again appear in the form of some other flower of far richer hues, and of infinitely higher fragrance and beauty.

The property of *immateriality*, then, is not necessary to *immortality*, though, according to our common forms of *speech*, and in comparison with what we *know* of other material substances, we believe the soul to be immaterial, because it wants those properties of matter with which we are acquainted.

There is, however, not a trace of reasoning to support the position, that the higher mental powers which man possesses are the result of *organisation* ; the rational soul is a principle *superadded* to organisation, the latter forming the exquisitely adapted instrument, for the *manifestation* of the higher movements of the former.

Thus, mind is a principle, or, if it be preferred, a being *superadded* to, but not *inherent in brain*, (just as life is *superadded* to organisation,) and is to be found only in man, because man alone is a moral and religious creature, accountable for his actions, where they are social, to his fellow man ; and for *all* his thoughts, and feelings, and conduct, to the Supreme Governor.

This view is attempted to be discredited by an opponent, because he cannot *understand* how *immaterial mind* can act upon *material body*. And what then ? Is this the only *effect* which he cannot understand, and yet which he receives upon trust ? Can he understand how an impression upon a nerve produces pain ? Can he say what pain is ? Can he explain why the process of digestion is performed by the stomach ? Why it is troubled by any mental impression of a sudden character, or

why it is suspended by cutting off the supply of nervous energy? Can he understand or explain how the morbid action of *one* nerve produces morbid action upon some distant nerve? Or can he understand how impressions made upon certain nerves, produce *saliva* in *one instance*, *tears* in a second, or *bile* in a third? Can he understand the simplest phenomena which are around him? Or can he explain the reason for the simplest chemical action?

But if man cannot understand or explain the more obvious phenomena, except by merely stating their *effects*, what reason has he to object against the manifestation of mental phenomena, shown by the *brain* as the instrument or organ, under the influence of mind as the agent, *because he cannot comprehend the process*. It is a law of our existing constitution, that there are many things which we cannot understand, and that everywhere there is a limit placed to our researches.

Since, then, an actual *incorporeal* state of the human soul is nowhere revealed as an object of faith; and since we know not the properties of *immateriality*, and are not in possession of any sufficient grounds, why the soul may not be some infinitely subtle modification of matter, we should consider the settlement of this question as *unimportant*, and as being fairly left within the domain of unexplored philosophical speculation.

All we contend for is, that the brain which we see, is *not* that spiritual essence; though we fully admit, that while the *body and soul* are capable of

independent existence, yet in a healthy condition of the latter they are *co-existing*—intimately blended—in a way of which we are ignorant, and producing effects upon each other reciprocally, throughout the entire circle of sentient and rational life.

It is necessary in this place to consider some of the objections advanced against the immateriality of the soul ; and this is a question of so much importance, in connexion with our grand principle, that the *manifestations of spiritual mind* are influenced by the material medium through which they become manifest, that we must be permitted to notice them in detail.

The immaterial doctrine is said to complicate and confuse discussions on this subject, because we know not the meaning of the terms material and immaterial, as distinguished from each other. It is, however, unphilosophical to urge this objection, because we have already shown, that the distinction is not important ; and because the same objection might be made against a variety of other inquiries, in conducting which, it is agreed by the tacit consent of philosophers in general, to accept certain terms as designating the *amount* of our knowledge of certain circumstances with which we do not profess to be thoroughly acquainted, and as very useful to our ignorance in conducting our investigations.

Such, for instance, are the phenomena of gravitation, and light, and heat, and electricity, and galvanism, and nervous influence, and life, and

affinity, and various other agents, of the nature of which we know nothing, and can only judge by their effects manifested under certain circumstances. But it would be most unphilosophical to allow these to be employed in our researches, and to refuse a similar privilege to the immaterial principle, where the position is precisely identical. Thus, for instance, *life* is a principle superadded to matter: we do not deny its existence, because we know not even the meaning of the term; but we study its operations, and endeavour to acquaint ourselves with its results, tracing them backwards as far as we are able.

Secondly, "God is *omnipotent*; and he could, if he so willed, make matter (the brain) to think; and he could, if he so willed, make thought, or the substance of thought, *immortal*." Now this is admitted;—but again, upon the principle of the objectors themselves, we know not the full meaning of the terms we employ, when we speak of the Supreme Governor of the universe, and can only judge of *him* by *his works*, and by what *he* has chosen to reveal of *himself* to us. In occupying this position, of course I am not contending with the infidel—it would be mere waste of time to argue the point with him.

We judge of God by *his works*; and we find that under many circumstances one rapid stride is made *towards the most perfect* of his creatures, by the superaddition of a new principle. Thus, life is enjoyed by *plants*; then is superadded a nervous

system, and the power of locomotion, instinct, with varying combinations of animal intelligence; and still higher, the human mind.

It is true that God might make the brain to think and reason, and might also make that brain *immortal*; but God has not so *willed*. We find that brain, as brain, does not reason, and that it is liable to disease and decrepitude, decay and death,—to existence under a changed form, and perhaps to existence in many brains, during the course of a lengthened series of years; and this would be inconsistent with the idea of an immortal existence: whereas, the *superaddition* of a spiritual principle destined to live for ever is consistent with the general harmony of God's works, and with what *he* has pleased to reveal of *himself* to his creatures as a *Spirit*—man being created in *his own* image, and therefore partaking in a limited degree of that spiritual nature which is to us *incomprehensible*, but not less an object of belief; nor more incomprehensible than the qualities of matter, or even matter itself.

There is, too, a consciousness in man, that *he* (that is, mind) possesses a power of controlling and superseding, to a certain extent, the very many *morbid states* of cerebral action. Now, if brain elaborated thought, how could it control its own deviations; or how could it exercise self-denial, a state of self-control, which is, however, rendered necessary by our peculiar position, and which can only be effected by the influence of mind over matter?

Seeing, then, that the Almighty Governor of the universe has *not chosen* to confer the higher attributes of reason upon matter, and that he *has* devolved a portion of his spirit upon man, why should we seek to complicate this discussion, by supposing a different kind of brain conferred upon man, capable of an attribute totally distinct and diverse from that possessed by any other brain ; and why should we not accept the simpler spiritual hypothesis ? And though we know not the *nature of mind*, why should we not be contented to study its effects, and to trace the modifying influence of the cerebral organs upon the mental manifestations ?

Now this hypothesis seems to fulfil the great philosophical desiderata, viz. that it is *true* as borne out by the testimony of revelation ; and that, when taken in connexion with the preceding views of cerebral function, it is *sufficient to explain the phenomena*. Nor is the testimony of revelation to be undervalued ; for the entire question must be taken up on broad grounds, and information must not be rejected from any quarter. In purely physical inquiries, a knowledge of *all* the sciences is indispensable for the *full* discovery of truth. Why then, in the present inquiry, ought not the positive statements of Scripture, in *its own peculiar province*, to be held of supreme importance, and to form the sound basis of physico-metaphysical reasoning ?

Thirdly, “it seems unphilosophical to consider *sensation*, and other vital phenomena, as immediately dependent on the body ; but *to regard the*

mental phenomena as something essentially different or distinct."

The real truth is, that it is unphilosophical and irrational to confound things which differ essentially ; to place them erroneously in the same scale, and then to reason upon them, as if each were uniform in nature and properties. Man, in *common* with other animals, possesses sensation and other vital phenomena, which are dependent upon the body ; but these differ essentially from *thought* and *other mental phenomena*, which are superadded to *sensation* and *other vital phenomena*, which do not *originate* in the body ; which *body* is in fact subservient to *them*, and is employed for their *manifestation*.

We do not represent the mental phenomena as *distinct* from the body, but dependent upon it, for their *manifestation* ; the difference consisting in this, that whereas *the animal* is the slave of his organisation, the superadded powers of man are such, as to give laws to that organisation ; and to govern, direct, and control its propensities ; that is, that in man, as in every other gradation of being, the body is formed for the situation and wants of the creature, not stretching beyond the ordinary requirements of animal life, *except in man*, in whom everything bespeaks, that his *physique* is subjected to his *morale*.

Since, however, the latter is not only different from, but essentially opposed to, animal wants and desires, it is surely most unphilosophical to confound the nervous systems of the two ; and to

believe *them* identical, differing only in the degree of developement, and having all their actions referable to the same cause, viz. the uncontrolled influence of nervous fibre.

It is therefore clear, that those who contend for an immaterial principle in man, superadded to, and giving laws to his cerebral structure, are indeed supported by philosophy and fact, and that they are not carried away by vain hypothesis: in truth, *they* have no favourite hypothesis to serve, whereas their opponents *have*, and are desirous of reducing the actions of man to the level of an educated orang-outang.

But it is said by the truly valuable, though we believe mistaken reasoner, that we have *no proof*, or at least *no good proof*, of the existence of an immaterial principle in man, which will not equally apply to *all* other animals. The preceding observations will give a sufficient answer to this objection. Animals have as much mind (animal mind) as is necessary for their situation in life: they are not *moral*, and therefore not accountable beings; they live in the selfish circle of animal desire, and animal gratification. But when the animal becomes a moral and accountable being; when he is to think—to reason—to originate; when selfish desire is to be yielded to general or individual good; when appetites and passions are to be governed; when virtue is to be cultivated, and vice repressed; when man is expected to govern all other animals, and especially to govern himself; when he is to subdue inclination, and to carry out moral princi-

ples in action ; in short, when he is to live a life of self-denial, and of the subjugation of inclination to a sense of duty ; then animal mind would be totally inefficient ; a new principle of a new *moral* character is given him,—the immaterial soul is superadded,—and he becomes the immortal creature : thus proving, that in his origin, progress, present history, and future destiny, he is essentially above the animal creature ; and therefore it would be absurd to deny him the possession of some new principle, which would fit him for his own peculiar situation.

The same unphilosophical confusion exists with a far less candid reasoner,* who believes that *thoughts and desires* are but “ modifications of those parts through whose operation they are engendered ; and *moral motives*, like *physical stimuli*, receive their power from the condition of the structure on which they act.

The whole force of this argumentation depends upon its confusion—“ *obscurum pro magnifico* ;” and if we succeed in showing that it has no foundation in truth, we need not trouble ourselves with the results which have been drawn from it, because if the original proposition be unsound, all the deductions from it will of necessity be baseless.

The first source of fallacy consists in placing *thoughts and desires* together, as having one and the same origin. Now it will readily be allowed that the desires of the animal are but coincident with, and reciprocally adapted to, modifications of

* Sir Charles Morgan.

the organs appointed for their gratification ; and of their dependence upon, and connexion with, their respective sensoria. It will also be allowed, that man, in common with other animals, possesses similar organs, similar desires, and similar associations.

But here arises the confusion, by mixing up things which the animal possesses, with others which he has not in common with man ; and by forgetting to ascribe to the latter those peculiarities which mark him out as so entirely distinguished from any other animal.

Thus, thoughts and desires are mixed up together as if they were contemporaneous ; whereas, no other animal but man possesses *thought* ; they do not think, reason, compare, conclude ; desire is originated by the state of the organisation, and its immediate gratification is thoughtlessly pursued ; whereas, when the same desire is originated in man, it is referred to the interior conscience ; and in a well-disciplined mind its gratification is subordinated to moral motives, to social order, to the fitness of things, to the everlasting beauty of virtue, to the golden rule of doing to others as he would be done by, to the laws of God !

Do any of these motives operate upon the animal ? And if not, it is surely unphilosophical to ascribe them, or not ascribing them, to reason as if they were possessed and operative, and thus to confound things essentially distinct. This primary error being detected, every conclusion flowing from it is vitiated, because *that* is ascribed to animals, as

influencing *their* actions, which, in point of fact, they do not possess.

But, secondly, the *peculiarities* of the character of man—that of his being a reasoning, moral, religious animal, *acted upon* by his organisation, but *governed* by his moral position, which is superior to, and gives laws to, his animal desires, are not fairly ascribed to *him*. It is *true* that *moral motive* is spoken of as existing, and as *deriving its power* from the condition of the structure on which it acts.

Here, there is a sufficient semblance of truth to make the argument pass current as *true*. Thus, it must be allowed that moral action is manifested through a material organ ; and that this action is to a certain extent modified by its peculiarities, and by the indulgence and aggravation of a particular *bias*. But it has been shown that this is the result of some perverting agency ; and that it would not be so, in a perfect state, because the tendency of all such conditions is to produce disorder in creation, where, it is manifest, the principle of order *was* intended to be predominant. And in reasoning upon what *should be*, we must take man, not as he *is*, but as he ought to be ; and *then* his opinions and determinations would exhibit the same *absolute perfection*, as every other work of the Creator's hand, when rightly, that is, fully, understood.

But if moral motive *derive* its power from the condition of the structure on which it acts, it is fair to ask, in what does this moral motive origi-

nate, in what does it consist? Does it *originate* in the structure upon which it *acts*? This would be a solecism in fact, and in language; for it is evident, that if it act upon a certain *structure*, that action is not *inherent* in the structure, *but is ab exteriori*; and as animals in general do not possess *moral motives*, it is clear, that these must spring from some source, which animals do not possess in common with man.

In what, then, does moral motive consist? It has been shown, that it does not consist in the animal structure which is common to man and animals; and it must therefore depend upon some additional structure, or upon some super-added principle.

Even if it could be shown that this additional structure existed for the developement of moral principle; as there exists no affinity between animal structure and moral *motive*, it would be unphilosophical to contemplate this structure, in any other view than as *united* to the *manifestation* of moral action, not as originating such action.

And as this cannot be shown to exist, it is to the last degree inconsequential and unphilosophical to assert, that the actions of the animal, and of reasoning, responsible man, are to be ascribed to the same cause, traced to the same source, and bounded by the same organisation; or to deny that man possesses *desires* in common with animals, dependent upon his organisation, but that he also possesses what animals have not, viz. thought, reason, moral and religious sanction, to guide, and regulate,

and govern his animal propensities; in a word, that he possesses a superadded principle—a spiritual soul, destined to enlarge the boundaries of his position on earth, to fit him for society, to enable him to live the life of a good man, influenced by moral motive and religious sanction, derived from the revelation of the will of the Supreme Governor; to live for ever, when the present state of existence has passed; and to enjoy happiness, or to experience punishment, accordingly as his thoughts and actions have been *consonant with*, or *opposed to*, the design for which he was created.

It will now be necessary to glance at some of the objections against the *immateriality* of the soul:—and first, it has been asserted, that no substance can act upon another substance, without possessing some common property; and since, by the immaterialists, this common property is denied to matter and mind, it is inferred that that which acts upon matter *cannot be immaterial*. It is, however, quite puerile to draw conclusions from such premises; for, first, we know not the nature of matter, and therefore cannot appreciate the several ways in which it may be acted upon; secondly, we know not the nature of spirit, and therefore cannot be acquainted with the varied modes of *its* action upon matter; and thirdly, we know nothing of the mysterious connexion which exists between the two; and yet we pretend to reason upon all these *unknown* circumstances, as if they were governed by the same laws as the fixed sciences,

and to draw inferences from that which may be demonstrated, for that which is incapable of demonstration. That mind *may* possess *unknown* properties, having *affinities* to, and *capable of acting upon*, matter, of which philosophers know nothing, must be admitted by the candid inquirer : to be convinced that *it does so*, requires only an appeal from the philosophism of the schools to common sense ; for then it will be seen that a certain thing has been assumed as a fact, of the existence of which there is no proof. But we assert the separate existence of spirit on the authority of a divine revelation ; and this assumption necessarily precludes the admission of all *physical* analogies, as explanatory of the agency of mind upon matter. Who would require a mathematical demonstration of facts ascertained by the taste or smell ?

Again, it has been said, that the mind cannot exist, without occupying *a place*, and if so, what is that place ? It is very easy to ask questions of this kind, and wisely to consider the negative of such questions as proven, provided that they are not satisfactorily answered. But nothing can be more unphilosophical ; even the common sense of mankind has stamped this position with a proverb, viz. that “ a fool may ask questions, which a wise man *cannot answer*.” In the present instance, however, there seems to be no difficulty in answering the question ; for, by the terms of the proposition, the mind being *immaterial*, we cannot affix the idea of *occupying space* to that which has no particles with which to fill that space. It is very unphilosophical

to consider that there *can be* no existence where there is no space demonstrably filled—no palpable extension. What, for instance, is the seat of *life*? Shall we look for it in the “*punctum saliens*,” or the “*ultimum moriens*,” or where shall we find it? We may not here enter upon the question of *life*, which will come before us hereafter; it is only incidentally mentioned, in order to exemplify undeniable existence, without demonstrable space; and with the *impossibility* of telling *how* life acts upon the assemblage of bodily organs. Life is not *extension*: extension, therefore, is not *necessary* to our idea of existence.

So also with regard to electricity, galvanism, magnetism, chemical affinities of various kinds, nervous influence, &c.; all these are known by their *effects*, yet cannot be shown as matter: we are not acquainted with the mode of their action, or their relation to other bodies: they possess not extension, and are incapable of demonstration.

It has been objected, that if the soul be purely *immaterial*, how can it *accompany the body, having no local existence*? To this, it might be enough to answer, that we know not but that it may have a *local existence*; and that when we speak of the localisation of that which is immaterial, we speak of that of which we know nothing. We know not but that it might pervade the whole body; we know not but that its chosen seat may be the brain; for being *immaterial*, it would produce no inconvenience by its presence, while it would hold the citadel, from which its mandates may be issued.

The fourth objection is, that in order to arrive at any thing like a comprehensible expression of purely mental manifestation, we are perpetually obliged to borrow terms from material objects around us, in order to express an *approximation* towards the idea intended to be conveyed ; and this arises from our knowing nothing of immaterial agency, and being, therefore, obliged to accommodate terms to our exigencies.

Thus we speak of *apprehension*, *conception*, *abstraction*, *emotion*, *contrition*, &c. ; we speak of a *solid* understanding, a *clear* judgment, a *brilliant* fancy, a *capacious* and *retentive* memory, &c., because we are obliged to *borrow terms* from material circumstances around us, (not because the qualities to be represented are material,) in order to explain, in some measure, phenomena, which, in the present state of our knowledge, would be otherwise inexplicable.

As well might it be insisted on, that the brain put forth tenacula in order to seize upon an idea ; or that its two hemispheres rubbed together disagreeably in contrition ;—as well might it be insisted on, that the faculty of the understanding was actually *a cube*,—that the judgment had been sharpened by filing,—that the fancy was transparent,—or that the memory was capable of receiving and retaining large substances, as that the immaterial spirit must have *a local* existence. Both are manifestly absurd ; we know nothing of the laws of spiritual life ; and it should be ours to rest contented with the fact, that the brain is *the organ of*

mind, and with the close study of its manifestations.

Still, we must never forget that the brain is not the *efficient* and *ultimate* agent, although it is the subordinate drudge. The mind, the immaterial principle, is the prime mover; and brain is provided for it, through which all its connexions are manifested. It is true, that if the brain be destroyed, the spiritual principle is deprived of its means of manifestation, but it is not annihilated. Destroy the eye, and external vision ceases, though the power of the brain remains for intellectual vision. One step further: destroy the brain, and the power of communication with the exterior world ceases; the *instrument has become unserviceable*, but the *immaterial principle remains*. We cannot see without eyes, we cannot think without brain; but it is most illogical to conclude, therefore, that the *eye is vision*, or *brain is thought*: this is to confound the organ and the function.

The same truth is further confirmed by the phenomena of certain morbid conditions of the system:—thus, for instance, in paralysis, vain is the utmost effort of the will to move the paralysed muscles. Generally, too, the same cause of morbid action which takes the limb from the control of the will enfeebles also the power of that will; it becomes weak and vacillating, uncertain and variable, inenergetic and inconstant; thus showing that *disorder of the instrument* interferes at once with the usual arrangements of *the body*, and with the

manifestations of *mind*; thus clearly substantiating the point in question.

We infer, then, that there is no good reason for believing that the manifestations of mind originate in the brain; consequently none for tolerating its fearful consequence, that the destruction of the soul would be coincident with, or its well-being would be in any degree influenced by, the dissolution of the body; it has its own moral existence, and has employed the brain in its service, but it has no essential dependence upon the continuance of its structure.

Even had it been differently appointed by the Creator, we have already shown that the destruction of the soul by no means follows upon that change which we call death. Philosophers admit that matter is indestructible, and will continue to exist for ever in its present state, or in new forms and combinations; the Christian *believes* that this new form of being will be a separate and independent existence; and the *christian philosopher* combines the two, and, as he contemplates the dim twilight, and undefined forms of age, or looks upon the sun as it is going down behind the cloud of disease, at an earlier period of life, casts his eye forward in hope to that brighter day when the sun shall no more go down—when there shall be one perpetual day—a day of spiritual enjoyment—of happiness augmented by the consciousness of living in the presence and under the favour and blessing of the Most High God.

As we verily believe in the resurrection of the body, there can be no difficulty in believing that the immaterial spirit, so long and so mysteriously allied with it, should be re-united to its original tenement, and then exist under the same forms and combinations, though the change which shall have passed upon it by the new-creating power of God shall have been one of infinite improvement; so that the body, now perishable, shall be then fitted for eternal existence in another state of being, and its immaterial part, no longer clogged and hindered by its former encumbrance, shall be fitted for the pure joys of heaven, and prepared for the love and service of God.

It were idle and fruitless to speculate on what change of being will then have taken place; but it is easy to perceive, with regard to the *body*, that it will be indestructible,—no longer subject to change and renovation, but always remaining the same; its appetites and passions, no longer directed to the same objects, will be infinitely purified and sublimed, and will receive a new direction, fitted for a state of spiritual being. The stamp of excellence will rest upon it, and it will be no longer liable to disorder, decay, or pain; it will be purified from all that is gross, or grovelling, or sensual and debasing; it will be freed from all its tendencies to evil, and will be no longer a source of temptation, trial, and sorrow, to the governing spirit.

With regard to the immaterial soul, its full-blown powers will be developed; all that here has been obscure, in consequence of seeking its mani-

festation through a gross material medium, will be *then* clear and distinct, in an atmosphere fitted for the expansion of its powers, as originally derived from God himself; the senses will be infinitely ennobled; the perceptions arising therefrom will be deepened, and expanded, and magnified; thought will be capable of a reach altogether inappreciable *now*; the judgment will be freed from error; the present confined range of ideas will be supplanted by the grasp of infinite thought; the memory will combine without effort, and at one view, the past, the present, and the future; the affections will expand into perfect benevolence—love to God and man; association will be capable of taking in at once, all that is lovely and good, while all the former tendencies to evil will be withdrawn;—in fact, the germ of all that was originally “*very good*” in man will receive its fullest expansion—will be placed upon objects of infinite and peerless interest—will be purified from every alloy—and will exist always, undestroyed and indestructible.

There are those who would object that the change is too great to be believed! Is this objection worthy to be entertained? Is this change greater than that which has taken place upon degraded man since he was pronounced by his Creator to be “*very good*,” and the fact of which is constantly before our eyes? But if so great a perversion of its original design, so great a change for evil, has been permitted by the *Omnipotent*, by which *his* gracious purposes have been suspended, is it too

much to believe, that his almighty power *can* and *will* restore man to his original likeness ; that *he* will be triumphant ; that *he* will restore order to *his* distracted world ; and that finally, all creation shall exist to *his* glory ? Surely, then, there is nothing inconceivable or extravagant in this position.

Besides, have we not in nature as great apparent changes ?—transformations apparently as inexplicable ? Is it not as extraordinary, that the seed which we sow in the autumn, should meet our eyes and gratify our senses in the ensuing spring, in all the beauty and the fragrance of the loveliest flower ? Is it not as extraordinary, that the little, dull, and unattractive caterpillar, which we see wrapt in the sleep of apparent death, and enclosed in its self-constructed coffin, should by-and-bye appear before us in life's gayest mood, and in nature's most splendid attire—arrayed in a structure of exquisite and inimitable delicacy—and brilliant with hues of incomparable beauty. The one, ungrateful man sees and does not reason upon ; the other he reasons upon and denies, because he cannot see it. But is this reasonable—is it just—is it philosophical—is it logical—is it wise—is it prudent ?

Perhaps it may be thought fanciful, and we by no means insist upon it, but believing that everything in nature contains some lesson intended for the use of God's creature, man, we cannot help mentioning, that perhaps the above events which happen to the insect tribe, were intended, not only to shadow forth the changes of the resurrection, but also to tell us, that the award of

good and evil in this life was not *final*, and that the equalisation of rewards and punishments would be in future state of existence. For, as in nature, it very generally happens, that the most beautiful caterpillar forms the dullest moth, and the moth of greatest beauty and brilliance is commonly produced from the caterpillar of the least pretensions; so the final state of existence will rectify all the apparent inequalities in the distribution of the goods of fortune, and will make clear that justice, and goodness, and righteousness of the supreme Governor, which here seem to be obscured by events, through the dark vista of which we cannot discern the end, —an end which, nevertheless, will assuredly come, and restore all things to their just equilibrium.

To return from this digression, it has been said, and we think injudiciously, that there is “no case in which the combination of certain elements produces something quite different, not only from each of the simple ingredients, but also different from the whole compound.” If this were true, it would, we conceive, operate against the great change in the nature of man which has been just described; and which is so great, that but for the union of the immaterial spirit with the body, there would be no consciousness of personal identity.

But we apprehend the position is not true. In many chemical combinations, the resulting compounds will differ widely from the properties of the original bases, and this too in a most extraordinary degree, according to the relative preponderance of one or other of those bases. So also new combinations

possess properties, conferred by their *union*, which do not belong to the original ingredients ; as, for instance, the power of dissolving gold possessed by nitro-muriatic acid, but not possessed by either of the two acids when existing alone, and uncombined.

So also in the phenomena of life, the chicken apparently possesses no common properties with the egg, from which under given circumstances it is produced, and wanting which circumstances, no developement will occur.

So again, with regard to the seed above mentioned, it appears to possess no common property with the future flower ; yet under the influence of vital action, the combination of certain elements produces a plant quite different in properties from any which are, or can be supposed to be, in the seed, and which, but for this vital action, under favourable circumstances, would never be discovered.

So, lastly, with respect to the phenomena of *secretion*—for instance, the saliva, the juices of the stomach, tears, bile, &c. ; all these are produced under the influence of vital action, from the same blood in which there exists *à priori* not a vestige of any one of these secretions ; secretions which could not, under any circumstances, be *recombined* into the same *elemental blood* ; much less could that blood be carried back into its original elements, through the several stages of its formation, to its being furnished with its red particles, and through the several processes of making chyme and chyle, of assimilation, digestion, deglutition, insalivation,

mastication, and the original elements taken into the stomach, with all the various sources from whence they were derived.

It has been said, against the supposed immateriality of the soul, that we know nothing of the existence of *matter*, except through *the mind*. Now, to a certain extent, *this is true*; but the conclusion drawn from such truth is erroneous: that is, the inference drawn from this coincidence of mind and matter is erroneous. It is certainly true, that we know nothing of the properties of matter, except as that knowledge is conveyed to us through the consciousness of *mind*. It is equally true, that we know nothing of the existence of mind, except as that knowledge is conveyed to us *through the material organ the brain*. But in either case, it is the *medium* for the communication of knowledge; the *instrument*, not the *agent*, which has relation to matter, and which agent we have before shown may be immaterial; therefore it is assuming the point in dispute, when it is asserted, that the mind cannot be *immaterial*, because it forms the *centre of consciousness* of our knowledge of matter.

Another objection of the same kind is, that we see mind perpetually called into existence before our eyes; and the inference attempted to be drawn from this assertion is, that it is therefore undoubtedly material. Now the absurdity of this reasoning upon the creation of that, which is not obvious to our senses, is extreme. It is perhaps best met by a denial of the assertion; we do not see mind called into existence before our eyes; we never see

any thing of its origin ; we know nothing of its commencement. We may indeed perceive the instrument of mind gradually perfected, so as to become better suited to the developement of its manifestations, which therefore may be said to grow, or to be created. But the fact is, that we know nothing of its essence, and all that can be said is, that the organ appointed for the purpose of conveying notices to the mind, or receiving them in return, for the purpose of exterior communication, is, by an established law of nature, of slow growth and developement ; and that the manifestations of mind are proportionate, in order that the individual may properly occupy his appointed station in society ; and that the beautiful order and harmony which so strongly characterize all the works of the divine Architect, may be preserved in this instance also, one of the most important to the well-being of *his* creatures. This argument, by which the objection is answered, is also supported by the inconceivable rapidity of mental operation, as of reasoning, thinking, writing, speaking, &c.

Now, *thought* is a distinct function or office of the sentient principle, and it would be to the last degree unphilosophical to say, that the function existed in the brain, because we see throughout creation everywhere, brain existing *without thought* ; therefore, thought is not a property of *brain* or *matter*, but a product of the immaterial principle superadded to brain. And we have elsewhere shown, that if thought were material, however indestructible it might be, yet that the same

thought might exist in different persons in distinct generations; and, consequently, there could no longer be that consciousness of personal identity, which is necessary to individual accountability.

The present seems a fit opportunity for introducing one or two observations on the subject of *personal identity*. Since there is no one who pretends to the possession of common sense, yet is doubtful of his being the same individual that he was some ten or twenty years ago, it is almost superfluous to waste much time upon the subject. Yet, since moral accountability rests upon this truth, and since erroneous notions respecting it have been entertained, it is necessary to refer to it briefly.

It has been said, and is admitted, that the body is constantly changing, undergoing decay and renovation; yet the individual is conscious of being the same person, because *SOME* particles of the original body remain, and that if no part of the body had been left unchanged, there would be a loss of this consciousness of personal identity.

Now this is an error; for, first, we have no reason to believe, that any molecule of matter *now* existing in our bodies, will not have been effectually changed, some years since, and perhaps oftentimes; for *no* part is exempted from the general law, and therefore the consciousness of personal identity cannot depend upon the *material fact* of some part remaining unchanged, as a lingering nucleus on which to ground a reasoning, in proof of *identity*.

The truth admits of much easier and more rational explanation, since the consciousness of personal identity flows from that of continued existence. The whole may be changed ; not a single particle of the original body may remain, yet the change has proceeded so gradually, that the greater number of old particles remain, while the new ones are prepared ; and therefore, at any one given moment, there are in the body a much greater number of old than of new particles ; and the consciousness of personal identity has been transferred from one set of particles to another, without any perceptible change. The decay and renovation have gone on by an unperceived process ; and it has been only as a matter of science and reasoning, that we have *known* anything of this change ; the consciousness of personal identity cannot, therefore, rest on any material condition.

In fact, this consciousness does not depend on the body, but the mind ; it has nothing to do with the material particles, but rests for its existence upon the immaterial spirit, and upon the sense of its continued existence. Now this is, after all, to be referred to a species of memory—a recollection of *former self*, as coincident with *present self*.

The material theory would be inconsistent with this fact ; for if the consciousness of personal identity depended upon *an organ* of memory, and *that organ* formed part of a body subjected to the general principles of renovation and decay, *it* would equally be liable to the same general laws, and the particles of matter which entered into the com-

position of the organ of memory of any given individual, might at another time form the particles of the same organ in another person, whereby the consciousness of personal identity must be destroyed ; since the *same person* cannot exist in two different individuals.

Consciousness of personal identity, therefore, is an attribute of mind ; and though the organ of memory (if there be one) may perpetually change ; and though the same thing may happen with regard to the entire brain,—yet, notwithstanding all these changes, personal identity remains, because it is a *mental* and not a *bodily consciousness*.

This is one of those truths which do not admit of demonstration ; no process of reasoning can conduct us to a just conclusion ; and, indeed, reasoning would be utterly thrown away upon that which must be considered as self-evident. Like the consciousness of our own existence, it admits not of proof ; it is inherent in our nature, and placed there by its original constitution ; and the attempt to reason up to its possession, can only be equalled in folly by those philosophers who have doubted of their own existence.

There are one or two other properties of mind which we must notice in this place. It has been alleged, that in contending for the immateriality of the soul, we deprive it of actual properties, and therefore make it to consist *only* in a negation of properties ; and if this were the case, a wily opponent would infer, that if the immaterial spirit consisted only in a negation of properties, it could

not be the originator of all those active functions (and especially the will) which we find in man so uniformly ; and which, if they were not to be ascribed to *this source*, need not be traced farther than the *material organ*, which would then cease to be the instrument, and become the *prime agent*, thus leading back to the full-blown doctrines of materialism.

But like every other argument of the same kind, this proceeds upon a very common sophism, viz. that of ascribing to opponents sentiments and opinions which they have never avowed, and then arguing against them. The advocate for immaterialism does not assert that the spirit has *no* properties, but that it has *no material properties*, and, consequently, is not to be subjected to the laws of matter. Its properties, therefore, are, like itself, *spiritual*, though, by an original law of the Creator, they are *manifested* through, a *material medium*, which, in his infinite wisdom, He has submitted to the governance and control of mind.

But it is contended, that by this mode of reasoning we leave the doctrine of mental influences unexplained ; that we do not say what mind is, but that it consists, as far as our knowledge goes, in certain manifestations, which we perceive only through the *help* of a material structure, *the brain*.

And admitting thus much, is the fact of our ignorance of spiritual nature and essence to be brought against its existence ? Then, indeed, is our ignorance of the nature of God to be brought as an argument against *his existence* ! Are we

really to deny the agency of a Great First Cause, because we are not acquainted with its nature, or because we cannot explain its movements? Or to descend to the level of the objectors, are we to deny the existence of matter, because we are ignorant of its nature—because we know not its ultimate composition—because we are unacquainted with the earlier stages of its organisation and developement? Absurd, indeed, were such a denial; but not more so, than of those who deny the immateriality of the spirit, because *they* cannot conceive the form and the mode of spiritual existence, and know only its agency and manifestation *through* its material organ, *the brain*, which they, therefore, most unphilosophically conclude to be *mind itself*.

The fact is, that the objectors do not bring an unprejudiced mind to this inquiry; they put forth an hypothesis which they wish to be true; and enclosed within the limit of this earth-born wish, they cannot see beyond the little speck of error upon which they have chosen to concentrate their attention.

Again, it has been objected against the immaterial doctrine, that, if such were the case, there would be no change in mind; for that being immaterial, it would partake of the nature of *Deity*, and not be subject to change. Really it is surprising that such glaring inconsistencies should ever be put forth by acute reasoners. For, first, it must be evident, that mind is not *Deity*, even supposing it to be an emanation from God; it is *allied* to mortality—it is no longer good; it is

perverted from its original bias ; its operations are carried on *through a material medium*.

What is known of mind, or of the laws which govern it, to permit this mendacious assurance, that it cannot admit of change ? Absolutely nothing ; only if this were granted, it would be easy to show that it *did* change ; and that this change was not inconsistent with its immateriality. As far as we know the truth, it is, that mind is acted upon by moral, spiritual motives, which we should conceive calculated to produce such an effect. And inasmuch as the nature of man is compounded, and his spiritual agencies are only perceptible through a material medium, it is *possible, probable, certain*, (as we shall presently show,) that the manifestations of *mind* are modified by a *perverting influence* which has passed upon them ; by the *health or disease* of the manifesting organ, and by *many other causes*, acting immediately upon that organ, or intermediately through the agency of some other bodily organ or function.

Those who have felt interested in obscuring this question, have embarrassed it with a variety of presumed difficulties ; for instance, as to the period *when* the immaterial principle is communicated, and *when* it begins to exert its influence. Now it is easy, for a very limited understanding, to ask questions which cannot be answered, and for the best of all reasons, that there are questions beyond the reach of philosophy. The present is one of these curious, useless, unfathomable inquiries. We cannot dive into the arcana of nature, beyond a

certain point; and it is perfectly unimportant to determine, *when* the spirit is connected with matter, or how it takes its origin. All we can be required to show is, that there exists in nature the same inscrutable working; operations whose agency we cannot trace, and only know by their effects.

Now can any philosopher explain, why one plant is an annual, a second biennial, and a third perennial—one deciduous, another evergreen? Is there any means of ascertaining these properties, except by experience? And is there any method of descrying, *when* and *how* this original law was communicated? Can any one explain, how the little acorn becomes the monarch of the forest? how the life which it possesses becomes developed by time, under the influence of moisture? why it has been provided with an apparatus for taking up that moisture, and for nourishing early and feeble life, till it has been enabled, by its roots, to take up its own nourishment? Still further, can any one explain, how flowers are only seen upon the tree after a certain number of years, and how it is only then that it becomes capable of bearing fruit?

Farther, can any one explain, why one animal is oviparous, another viviparous? Of the former, can it be told *how* the developement of the embryo chicken takes place under the favouring influence of incubation, and why the process, if it once cease after a beginning of developement, ceases for ever, and is incapable of renovation? Can any one say *when* the principle of animal life is developed? And,

to go higher into the scale of animated nature, can any one pretend to describe *how* the principle of independent life is communicated to the human ovum, and how the little homuncule is taken care of, and gradually developed, with a mysterious power and wisdom of arrangement, which baffles human skill to conceive of, much more to describe and to imitate?

But if this be the case in many departments of nature, (and instances might be almost indefinitely multiplied,) is it fair to advance it as an argument against the spiritualist, that he cannot explain every question which may be asked? It has been shown that the naturalist cannot give an answer to much simpler inquiries, and that he does not even know the meaning of the terms he employs; can it then in fairness be asked of the spiritualist to explain that which by the supposition is less capable of explanation, because we are still less acquainted with spirit than with matter, while it presents *no properties* which are obvious to the senses. But if asked to explain that which is *less obvious* than what the *inquirer* finds to be inexplicable, it is clear that the advantage in argument rests on the side of the spiritualist, who is only in the same position with his antagonist, on *far more abstruse and difficult questions*.

Again, it has been objected against the *immaterial* doctrine, that in thought there is a distinctly-perceived *motion* about the brain; and, therefore, that the chief mental phenomenon is obviously characterized by a material movement. Now we

take leave to deny the fact in the first place, and to assert, that, *if true*, it would not *prove* the point in question ; while the real facts of the case *prove the contrary*.

First, we deny the fact : we admit that the brain is conscious of thought—that it is conscious of being the organ or instrument of thought, but we deny the perception of *motion* ; first, because it cannot exist, and next, because the cerebral substance, though capable of receiving its peculiar impressions from without, or communicating them from within, in its own peculiar manner, is not *in itself sensitive*, as is constantly shown by the extent of disorganising change which will go on in its fibres, without being perceived.

If it *were true* that this motion was perceived, it would not prove the materiality of thought, but, at the utmost, would only show, that when the organ or instrument of thought was excited into action, such excitation was accompanied by a certain amount of consciousness of what was going on.

Such being the case, with the *à priori* reasoning, we come to the question of fact. Granting, then, that there is a “perceived motion in the brain,” it is fair to ask, by *whom* and by *what* is it perceived ? It has been shown that the cerebral fibre itself is not an easy percipient ; and the truth is, that the process of thought, carried on through the medium of the brain as its instrument, is communicated to the immaterial mind ; that it is perceived by the brain as the organ of mind ; and

that its *perceptions* are immediately referred to some higher governing principle, by which the several phenomena of thought, comparison, reasoning, and reflection, are carried on ; thus bringing us back to, and supporting, our view of the immateriality of the soul, by candidly weighing the arguments against it.

This view is still further supported by the fact, that impressions are sometimes made upon the sensorium, which are not perceived at the time, but which are recollected afterwards. Now if the mind were simply *brain*, the impression made upon it at the time would be *perceived* if sufficiently *impressive*, or the impression would be made, but not powerfully enough to produce a corresponding perception. The fact is, that the impression is made upon brain, and recognized by it ; but the mind which at that moment is abstracted or absorbed by other pursuits, does not attend to the perception, and after a time comes round to it, as to a recollected impression, just vividly re-excited by *attention* to the *impression* previously made.

The eye, the ear, the brain, are all organs of the first importance for their respective functions ; still the eye is not sight, nor the ear hearing, nor does either sense respectively reside in its ultimate consciousness in the eye or the ear. Nor is *thought* primarily developed in the brain—so that (as it is contended) *brain is thought*. The fact is, that all these are *instruments only*, and not the individual mind, which guides, and governs, and directs those instruments.

Once more, there are some mental phenomena, which support the preceding argument; as, for instance, the consciousness of each individual of his own mental existence—a point which is involved in the discussion on personal identity, and which is here only incidentally mentioned, for the purpose of stating, that ideas are states or affections of mind, communicated to the brain as the materials for thought, and not *mind itself*, but are originated by it.

Thinking under the influence of the will, arresting and fixing the attention on the one hand, or diverting it on the other, are so many accumulative proofs of presiding *mind*. These are not processes, which are at all necessary to animal life; they can scarcely be called *necessary* to social man, so perpetually do we find him almost destitute of these important functions; so perpetually do we find him living without thought, exercising no control over his actions, seeming not to desire to fix or to avert his attention. But then these phenomena are to be found where man is *not* fulfilling the great end of his creation, viz. the display of the *goodness, wisdom, and glory* of God.

But to intellectual, moral man—to man not so much as he is, but as he ought to be, and as we find him in the better specimens of our race, these processes are *indispensable*; he cannot live without much thought and reading—without much reflection—without much reasoning—without the application of his inferences to the emergencies of life—without preparation for his wants and enjoyments—

without looking forward beyond the present scene—without aspirations after immortality — without ardent desire to seek, and to obtain, the rewards promised to the good.

But if so, since it is clear that these manifestations do not belong to his animal organisation, it is equally clear, that they are the result and manifestation of that presiding mind, which, however mysteriously it may be united with matter, and dependent upon it for its manifestations, is still *distinct from it*, and will survive the wreck of that which has been “ clothed upon ” its spiritual functions.

The presence and influence of *presiding, directing, governing* mind is further shown by instituting a comparison between the actions of *brain*, when dissociated from the judgment and will, and taken away from its higher purposes, and the same actions when judiciously employed *under the direction of the will*, within the range of its own peculiar office, as the servant of mind.

Thus, for instance, compare the self-actings of the brain, in all the varieties of reverie, with all its castle-building and follies, with all the baseless fabrics of its own creation, and all the intangible tissues of its wildest fancies; go one step further, and compare all the interminable follies, and impossible situations, and absurd associations of dreaming, and all the wild creations of irritated structure, under the influence of alcoholic excitement, or opium, or fever; compare these, which are purely *organic*, with the real actings of

mind, in reasoning, feeling, knowing, inferring, judging, and then see what the material brain is, as the originator of trains of thought, and what it is as the pure servant of mind, employed in the *transmission* of thought, and always subjected to the control of the immaterial being.

But if in the one instance its actings be purely animal and organic, and if, in the other, its manifestations are characterized by far higher attributes, surely the inference is not to be avoided, that the function of the brain is purely animal, *when dissociated from mind*; and that on the contrary, it marks its high original, its present position in the moral world, and its future hopes and future destiny, *so long as it is under the guidance of the immaterial spirit*.

Did we require a further confirmation of this truth, we should find it in the uneducated, the wilfully ignorant man—the creature of impulse—the slave of animal passion—he who has in a great measure discarded the influence of *governing mind*—who exhibits human nature in a rapidly-descending series—acting under the influence of the brain and bodily nerves, while the functions of the super-added mind are well-nigh suspended. Yet this unhappy being is at length aroused from his degradation by *purely moral means*—awakened by the influence of the Holy Spirit of God—conscience-stricken—and finally restored to the favour of the Most High. With such facts of daily occurrence, can the philosopher, the man of inductive habits, doubt the presence of an immaterial principle,

energetic in its action upon the brain, and capable not only of controlling its perverse wanderings, but also of producing an entire change of habits, and pursuits, and desires, and purposes.

The agency of education, in its physical relation to the brain, has been already noticed, and its influence upon the developement of all that is valuable in the moral and intellectual nature of man, will presently claim our attention ; so that in this place we only mention these facts as additional proofs of the immateriality of mind, and of its essential *independence of brain*, although that brain is necessary for its *manifestation*, so long as it remains in close intimacy with the body.

We pass on, therefore, to notice the greater number of instincts, and the higher range they occupy in *animals* generally, when compared with the most perfect animal, *man*. If there were no compensating property in the latter ; if there were no superior advantage in his position, except that of his living in society ; if there were nothing surpassingly valuable in his destination, it were indeed *extraordinary*, that the greatest degree of perfection should have been given to the most helpless, the most defenceless, the most feeble creature ; that to him alone should be given the least power of preserving life ; that upon him alone should be entailed a mass of infirmity and disease, of sickness and sorrow, from which the rest of the creation is comparatively exempt.

The truth is, that the more sagacious animals possess a far larger amount of instinct, or im-

parted knowledge, than man, because they have no means of originating or augmenting their stock of ideas, by study, reflection, or otherwise ; therefore it is necessary, to fulfil the wise designs of the Creator, that they should inherit within themselves all things necessary to their well-being ; and it was consistent with *his* perfect goodness and wisdom, to render them free from the *infirmities* which attend upon the higher creature : not (as we are informed by Revelation) in consequence of his original position, which was *very good*, but because he has fallen from that high estate.

It would be perfectly irreconcilable with that goodness, if man's destiny were the same as other animals ; for then would he have had *fewer* advantages, and *far greater* and overwhelming difficulties and sorrows to contend with. But this apparent deviation from perfection of design, and of will, is quite reconciled by the fact, that the highest animal, man, is gifted with a new principle, which brutes have not ; that to *his* material organisation is super-added an immaterial principle, capable of supplying the lack of instinct—enabling him, by reason and knowledge, to meet the deficiencies of animal force, constituting him a moral creature, fitting him for residence in society, giving him the majesty of mind, placing him in a position in which he might, by proper conduct, secure his own happiness, and in a state of trial and probation during which the attributes of mind should be developed, and the spirit should be gradually prepared for that future destiny of endless happiness, which would

equalize all apparent inequalities here, and vindicate the *present*, by the hopes and prospects of the *future*.

Another proof of the immateriality of the soul, is to be found in one of those truths, inseparable from the existence of man—which is to be found in every man's bosom, but which, being self-evident, does not admit of *demonstration*, viz. that consciousness of *thoughtful, responsible* existence which he possesses. There is an internal feeling in the human bosom, which speaks of something more than merely animal life, and which by sceptical philosophers has been termed "*le moi*." We receive this term with all thankfulness; we care not for the *term*, but the admission of the thing is all-important. The admission that there exists within, *le moi*, a principle of *individual consciousness*, distinct from animal existence, is sufficient for the christian philosopher, who well knows that *le moi* is neither more nor less than the *immaterial* spirit.

When, in fact, the unprejudiced philosopher compares his own actions with those of the highest of the animal creation besides, he will perceive, that in many of the processes of life he has a precisely similar standing; that in many others he is decidedly inferior; and that his supremacy is only maintained by the power which accrues to him from his capacity of remembering, comparing, imagining, reflecting, reviewing, reasoning, judging, in fact, *thinking*; or, in other words, from the actings of "*le moi*"—the interior directrix of life,—the immaterial spirit, which delights and revels in

a consciousness of its own existence, and which feels that it cannot cease to exist.

We shall presently consider some of the phenomena of life and death ; but here we have only to notice, as connected with our consciousness of thoughtful existence, *the belief* that this quality is dependent not upon *matter*, but upon something distinct from it, and which, though now mysteriously connected with the body, will survive the dissolution of its present molecules ; and upon this wreck, will arise to its last stage of spiritual existence. One of our great bards has most feelingly awakened this intuitive truth, in that touching point of Cato's soliloquy, " *This* in a moment brings me to an end—but *this* informs me I shall never die."

So true is it, that at death there seems to be an end of existence, because the mysterious union of body and mind is rent asunder ; and the former being no longer capable of continuing the manifestations of the latter, the effects of its influence are not to be traced *upon that body* ; its life has ceased ; its present arrangement is about to be dissolved, and its material particles will, many of them, enter into new forms and combinations, and will undergo changes which we cannot fathom. But this is no proof that the spiritual existence is not continued ; the servant has performed his period of servitude ; the compact is at an end ; its particles may become obedient to another will : but the *master spirit* remains the same. Having nothing in common with the body,

it cannot be submitted to the same changes, since the immaterial spirit claims for itself an independent life, and the right of governing and giving laws to the body, and controlling and directing its every action ; so now, freed from its terrestrial incumbrance, it escapes from the thralldom of matter, and is free to enter upon a congenial state of existence ; a point at which we stop in our investigation, because, like many other objects of philosophical knowledge, we have no longer a clue to guide our inquiries.

Lastly, we mention the intuitive desire after immortality, the horror at the idea of annihilation, and the ardent longing after a continued existence, as a strong indication of the *immateriality* of the mind, because these are attributes which do not belong *to*, but which are alien *from*, matter. The love of life, and the desire to preserve it, are *instinctive* ; they belong to man in common with other animals, and are totally distinct from that longing after immortality, which we find in the *former only*, and existing everywhere in proportion as the man is more distinct from the animal—as he is more intelligent—more intellectual—more moral—more religious.

In connexion with this fact, there is a mistake often made, and it is one of some importance, because, if not founded in fact, it furnishes a weapon to the enemies of truth. It has been supposed, that the body *assists* the spiritual principle in its growth and preparation for this its final stage, and therefore it has been very wrongfully as-

serted, that the faculties of the mind ripen and improve almost to the term of the body's *extinction*. And so no doubt they *do*; but not so *their manifestation*. For the manifesting organ is subject to certain changes of structure, which produce a very marked influence. Up to a certain period of life, its aptitudes for carrying on the mental functions, no doubt, continue to increase; there is an augmenting light, and accumulating power of radiation. But this, too, has its zenith, and the period of decay comes hastening on; the views become more contracted, more assailable by prejudice—the will is more easily changed, though sometimes exhibiting that selfish pertinacity, which certainly increases as we pass through life; the power of application is lessened, as well as the desire of acquisition; by degrees the judgment fails, till the shadows of evening prevail, and proclaim that man is rapidly hastening to his long night. The imbecility of old age, as a general rule, is proverbial; and when the contrary is remarked, it is the exception which confirms the rule, and which shows the original strength of conformation of the organ; a fact which we often find elsewhere exemplified in the escape of other organs from the general law of gradual exhaustion.

It is true, that this statement is sometimes combated by an appeal to facts, which do occasionally *appear* to militate against its accuracy. But this arises only from taking a short-sighted view; *the influence of experience and accumulated knowledge give an appearance of power*; whereas,

the two ideas must be entirely separated, and that because, upon close investigation, it will be found that they possess nothing in common. A good memory, with correct association, and the early habit of remarking, and comparing, and deriving practical inferences from the circumstances, will gradually produce such a store of ready and useful knowledge, as will be mechanically, or rather automatically, employed, long after *the power* to select and to combine, and to compare, and to infer, and to judge accurately, and to act energetically, shall have ceased.

Thus the conversation and the judgment of those advanced in life will oftentimes be attractive and valuable from their recollected stores, and from the impressions and results of bygone days; whereas, these very persons, if they were called upon to work out new conclusions, or to consider new circumstances, will be found feeble, doubting, erroneous, vacillating, *because* distrustful of themselves. This is more obviously and remarkably seen, in the state of the memory; it is quite proverbial, that the recollection of the events of yesterday is clouded and uncertain, whereas *that* of events having happened many years since, is *clear and distinct*. So with regard to other less cognisable functions; at the present day they are feeble; but in so far as they depend upon the stores of former years, they remain strong and perfect. Thus, therefore, mental power declines with advancing years, not because the spiritual principle is losing power, but that its long-occupied tenement is be-

coming less fitted for its spiritual occupant ; that the time is approaching, when the earthly house of this tabernacle shall be dissolved, and when mortality shall be swallowed up of life.

There is a marked proof of this fact, in all right-minded and well-thinking persons, in the greater prevalence of religious feeling. There is an abstraction from the world, and all its joys and sorrows,—a feeling of their comparative nothingness—a sitting loosely by all the objects of present sense—a truer estimate of life—a gradual estrangement from those things which *have* greatly interested, and a preparation for that change of being, which shall be, when the spirit is dissociated from the body, and when, escaping from all the fetters of this present life, it shall soar away into ethereal regions, better calculated for its final destiny.

If there be one attribute of Deity more strongly demonstrated than another by natural religion, it is that of Infinite justice, and goodness, and mercy. In the great scale of creation, there is a preponderating good, which is perfectly consistent with *partial* or *apparent* evil. If *a creature* be feeble in one point, it is compensated by another. Sagacity may supply the place of strength, or *vice versa* ; yet, upon the whole, it will be seen, that the law of nature is to procure the largest amount of good, and the largest amount of individual happiness, which the circumstances admit—that is, *the fullest amount* of individual enjoyment, which is consistent with the well-being of the whole.

But there appears to be a remarkable exception

to this law in the history of *man*. Though placed in the highest range of animated existence, his joys are less unalloyed—his sorrows infinitely more multiplied, than those of the inferior animals. As his senses are less acute, it is probable that he has far less pleasure, even from their *proper* indulgence, while that indulgence is limited by social associations and moral laws. Add to this, the amount of his sorrows and his sufferings; the difficulty with which he procures the means of subsistence—the burden of the long infancy of his family—his liability to sickness, and pain, and suffering,—his early dissolution! And when to this is appended the catalogue of his mental sufferings, from the constant conviction of his errors; from the wanderings and misgivings of his own bosom; from his fallacious judgments; from his manifold deviations from correct moral conduct, as arising from infirmity, or from the want of will to do right; and all the miseries entailed by the passions of an unsubdued heart, whether indulged or conflicted with; still further, add the amount of his sufferings from the whips and scorns of time—from the contumely of the world—from the selfishness and heartlessness of compeers—from the estrangement of friends—from the insincerity of those in whom he has confided—from the injustice to which he is constantly subjected—from the wounding of his best feelings from a thousand exquisitely tender sources; and, finally, throw into this scale the amount of his sympathetic sorrows, with all the misery, and crime, and hopelessness, and desola-

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tion around him ; or with his more intimate friends, when *they* are called upon to drink the cup of sorrow—when *they* are invaded by disease, or snatched from him by death ; and it will be allowed that his joys are few—his sufferings manifold, as compared with other creatures of far less pretensions in the scale of being.

But if this be the case, and if it be allowed, that the *design* of infinite mind in creation, was to promote the largest possible amount of happiness to his creatures ; and, moreover, that *that design* can never be wholly frustrated, though it may be marred, and even for a time obscured and suspended, *then* two consequences will follow ; first, that some perverting cause must have interfered to prevent the completion of *his* original most perfect design ; and secondly, that in order to obviate this discrepancy—to equalize the apparent inequality in the distribution of rewards and punishments here—and to vindicate the character of God, as a God of love, and justice, and wisdom, and power, and mercy, in this the highest work of his creative hand, there must be some other state of existence, in which the wrong will be set right—the *well-doer* rewarded, and the *evil-doer* punished.

But since such a state does not exist on this side *the grave*, there must be a continued existence beyond it ; and if so, there must be some part of our being, which will escape the dissolution of the *grave*. This part cannot be *material*, because then it would be liable to disorganisation—to existence under many changes of form, and in many different

persons ; and hence the *necessity* for the *fact* of the mind being *immaterial*—of the *body* being created for it—subjected to its will—existing so long as is necessary for its purposes—and being then dis-united, in order to fit it for that glorious change, of which we know nothing, but that it will be one of happiness.

Another proof of this immateriality of mind, and of the necessity for this final equalising change, will be found in the present state of that mind. If we look to its aspirations after knowledge—to the difficulties with which it is encompassed—and to the arrest of its progress on every side, after a certain length of investigation, one thing is clear, that the mind was originally intended for higher flights ; there is a constant sighing and sorrowing after greater attainments ; and because such higher reach is rendered impossible, by the cumbrous material vehicle through which all its actions are manifested, there is also an internal consciousness, that this is not its best state—that it is hindered by the body—and that that body is less subservient than it should be to the mind.

If we carry our view still onward to its moral condition—if we perceive its greater tendency to evil than good—that when we would do good, evil is ever present with us—that the heart revolts from yielding obedience to God, and prefers following the suggestions of its own waywardness ; that its natural love of virtue is lost—that there is no abhorrence of vice, but that, on the contrary, her attractions are most seductive, and can only be

resisted by principle ; when we see how easily the mind is overturned by disease, led astray by passion, or perverted by designing hypocrisy, we are fain to allow, that its powers are diminished by its alliance with the body—that its tendencies are corrupted—that a debasing change has passed upon it—and that this wrong can only be set right in a future state, which again brings us round to the conclusion of the immateriality of mind, and to the necessity of another state of existence.

A few remarks on this state will appropriately close the present section. It is not proposed to treat this subject at large, or to meet and grapple with infidel objections against it—but only to notice incidentally so much as may be necessary to complete the discussion which has occupied the preceding pages.

One position maintained, has been, that the spirit of man is immaterial, and that it is allied to materiality, only so long as is necessary to complete its period of probation here, which is to fit it for continued existence hereafter. But supposing for one moment, that the spirit of man were *material*, it is perfectly *possible* that there might be a continued existence after death ; for, although we do not rightly comprehend how particles of matter, dissociated by putrefaction, and then entering into other combinations, should be so far preserved, as to retain their consciousness of identity ; yet it were absurd, and contrary to all sound reasoning, to say that this was impossible to the Omnipotent ; or that the Almighty Creator of the universe *could*

not re-create so much of the body as should be necessary to maintain *its identity*. *Possibility, probability* even, is not to be measured by our *knowledge* of cause and effect,—for there are many effects which we cannot trace to their cause, and many causes of which we know nothing but by their effects : and in nature there are many causes and effects producing constant changes, or maintaining existing order, of which we *know not* even their existence.

But if such be the case—and our ignorance of many apparently simple circumstances around us be so great ; is it not the highest effort of presumption to limit the power of Omnipotence in this department of his universal government, because we cannot trace the footsteps of the Most High ?

In the immaterial view of this subject, we find the question perplexed, with almost as many difficulties, at least to those who seek to know more than it has pleased God to explain, and to draw aside the veil which has been drawn over the arcana of some of nature's processes. In associating the continued existence of the soul with the revealed doctrine of the resurrection of the body, the question very naturally presents itself, *with what kind of body* will the soul be re-united ? It is a question we cannot answer. All we know is, that as there can be no annihilation of matter, so the spiritual part of man, being less liable to change than that which is material, its continued existence is more easily comprehended, even by *our measure* of knowledge ; and the inquiry as to the kind of

body which shall be fitted for its future existence seems to be more than unnecessary; all we really have reason to believe is, that the change will be one of great purity and excellence; and that the future body will be better calculated for the manifestation of all the intellectual and affective faculties.

Nor is this change more wonderful than that which we have already instanced as taking place in the insect tribe, in the several stages of their transformations; nor, indeed, more wonderful, nor more incomprehensible, than changes which take place in the history of man's own eventful life. For, to say nothing of the perfectly inscrutable process through which his life is first developed, we shall notice only the change which takes place in one instant in the distribution of the blood through varied channels.

In intra-uterine life, the future man has possessed only a kind of vegetable existence, and his organs have been calculated precisely for this state. But no sooner has the respiratory function been stimulated by the first access of air; no sooner has the first cry proclaimed the commencement of independent existence, and of animal life, than the channels of the original circulation become closed—the lungs enter into their newly-developed action—the animal has now to breathe for itself—to nourish itself—to maintain its own temperature,—in fact, to perform the functions of animal life, which it had not done previously.

This change, dependent upon an original law of

nature, but produced by the stimulus of air to the respiratory organs, is not more or less wonderful than would be such a change upon *this body* as shall free it from its infant incumbrances, and shall enable it to exist in the pure atmosphere of heaven, and to lead a spiritual life in the presence of its God.

Such final alteration, as it has been already said, is rendered necessary by the inequality in the distribution of the goods of fortune in this world ; and it becomes still more imperative from the insufficiency of this present state to fill the desires of the mind. Whatever may be the developement of intellect ; whatever may be the literary advantages ; whatever may be the growth of the affections ; however they may be deeply-rooted in family connexions and the purest earthly friendship ; and however they may be expanded upon HIM *who is Love* ; still it is manifest, from the increasing dissatisfaction with the things of the world, that this is not our rest, that *here* we have no abiding city, but that we seek one to come—a state in which there shall be fulness of joy at the right hand of God.

Were it not thus, how impenetrably gloomy would be the bed of death ; how unmitigated would be the sorrow of survivors ; how exquisitely poignant would be their grief ; how unredeemably acute would be their sufferings ! Without the hope of an hereafter, how infinitely preferable the state of the mere animal who dies unregretted, and over whom the tear of separation is never shed ! How exquisitely painful would be the pillow of

sickness, conducting to the hour of dissolution, without one ray of hope beyond it, without one beam of eternity to shed its radiance upon the coming night ; with nothing but gloom—a darkness that might be felt—a darkness that enwraps intellectual, social, moral, religious, and spiritual man, in the destitution of returning to his earth without one hope, one joy, one longing after immortality !

The misery of parting with those whom we have loved is great indeed, under the best of circumstances ; but how immeasurably greater if this parting were *for ever*—if there were no distant prospect of re-union ! *For ever !* how awful the reality, when the grave has closed upon the remains of those most dear to us ! *For ever !* O no, this never can be, that the lot of man should have been rendered infinitely worse than that of the brute creation, while *he alone* wears the image of God, while *he* is evidently God's highest and most perfect work, and while *he* has been created by a God of infinite justice and benevolence, of unspotted holiness, of *him* who delighteth in mercy, and who “ *is Love !* ”

Conscience is peculiar to the human mind : nothing analogous with it exists in the inferior animals ; and, indeed, from its nature, it manifestly belongs only to a creature accountable for his actions, since to none other would it be important to pass a judgment upon its own acts, and thoughts, and words. And as an attribute of mind, not possessed by brutes, it forms a proof of the existence

of that superadded immaterial spirit, which constitutes the great difference between man and the lower animals.

Conscience, then, is a kind of *instinctive moral faculty*, which passes judgment upon conduct, whether right or wrong; which forms the terror of the wicked by its upbraidings, and haunts him night and day with the fearfulness of discovery, and the apprehension of the Divine anger; while to the good its approving smiles support him in adversity; conscious rectitude will enable him to brave the evils and injustice of time, to rise superior to all the tauntings of this world's ingratitude, to bear to be thought and spoken ill of, to submit to have his words and actions misinterpreted, and to be carried buoyant through all the difficulties of life. Where is to be found any analogous principle, elsewhere than in rational, moral, spiritual man?

Conscience is independent of education, though it may be *improved* by culture. It is discoverable with the earliest developement of mind; as soon as a child knows right from wrong, it will pass sentence on its own actions, and the countenance will frequently betray the little offender; while, in after life, the crimson glow of shame, and the altered features, will often tell the torturing monitions of this interior judge, and will reveal even those thoughts of the heart which are scarcely acknowledged by the individual to himself.

A still stronger proof of the power of conscience is to be found in the fact, that the very idea of

being thought wrong, or of having one's actions misconstrued, or even the recollection of those embarrassing circumstances which have previously, though unjustly, produced "confusion of face," will renew that confusion, and will throw over the countenance the appearance of inexplicable blushing. This *fact* shows the great injustice which may be done to the most innocent, and the care which should be taken not to judge from appearances, than which nothing can be more deceptive, though they strongly illustrate the power of the faculty.

Conscience is possessed in various degrees by different individuals: thus, there may be a tender conscience in one, a hardened conscience in another, an unenlightened conscience in a third, a stifled conscience in a fourth, a scrupulous conscience in a fifth, a capricious conscience in a sixth, and a fitful conscience in a seventh. And these differences are mainly dependent on the kind of education the individual has received, and the degree in which the voice of conscience has been fostered or opposed, the frequency with which it has been listened to or disregarded, and the influence of habit in rendering more obtuse or acute its sensibility.

That conscience will be the soundest which exists in a mind strong by nature,—one which has been enlarged by study, which has been imbued with just principles of moral and religious action, which has been accustomed to review its own decisions, and to weigh them in the balance of *good*, as

connected with the wants of society and the laws of God ; and which has habitually referred every portion of conduct, not to the feeling and inclination of the moment, but to the immutable principles of truth. Thus will conscience be uniform in its awards ; it will be tender without being irritable ; it will be firm without sternness ; unyielding without obstinacy ; and consistent in every society, amidst the approving smiles of friends or the frowns of enemies,—proof against the shafts of ridicule, and the still more difficultly-resistible weapon of *persuasion* from those whom we love, and admire, and esteem.

It is evident, from all this, that conscience must attach to spiritual existence, and, consequently, must form a proof of the immateriality of mind ; and its perversions, its want of regularity, its *apparent* assumption for sinister purposes, are all so many proofs of some perverting agency having passed upon this originally good principle. Thus, the conscience becomes hardened by a long course of inattention to its strivings with man ; it is unenlightened in those who willingly are ignorant of the moral code laid down for their guidance ; it is stifled by others, who, persisting in a course of evil, in opposition to their better judgments, must silence its uneasy warnings, in order to save themselves from the constant gnawing of bitter reflection ; it is scrupulous in those, who, attending more to the *appearance* of conduct before man, than to the reality of the principles from which it springs, are everywhere afraid to act, lest others *should*

think them wrong, and thus too generally lose the opportunities for action, while they are debating the fruitless question of what others think of them ; it is capricious in those who, having no settled principles of action, will act, or abstain from action, under very similar circumstances, and without having a good reason to give for either course of conduct ; it is *fitful* in those who will be very conscientious to-day, and relax their principles to-morrow, according to some change in their circumstances or associations ; and it is often *counterfeited* by those who know that reason, and principle, and goodness, will be the best passport to certain advantages, and who really assume the appearance of this invaluable possession, in order that they may pass in the rank of friendship with those others who *sincerely wish* to do their duty to God and their neighbour.

Now, where will there be found any approach to the existence and influence of such faculty except in *man*, in whom is superadded the spiritual principle which is destined to survive the wreck of his organisation ? It may be safely answered, *Nowhere*. But if so, it follows that man possesses an *unique* principle superadded to his other common and ordinary mental manifestations—distinct from them, and belonging to him only, because he is a moral creature, and an heir of immortality.

The soul,—the principle which animates and regulates, which guides, directs, modifies, and governs, all the intellectual and affective faculties, and upon which many of the purely bodily functions are more

or less dependent,—is *in itself distinct from*, and *independent of*, any organised system of matter.

A distinction has been here drawn, which it is necessary to notice, because error in principle very frequently proceeds from admitting ineligible terms; these become current, and afterwards carry with them significations which, perhaps, the original employer never intended they should convey. Thus, a distinction has been made *between the mind of MAN*, which, in fact, (divested of all the obscurity purposely thrown upon the subject,) means *the brain*, representing the organ of which “*mentation*” is the function, and that which is termed the “*theological soul*.”

Now if this term were employed to represent the principle which in man, as a rational, moral, accountable being, is superadded to the *mind* of the highest order of all other animals, there would be no objection, and we might rise from the first development of the nervous system, where there was no locomotion or volition in the ascending scale of animalisation, till we found a more perfectly developed brain, and with it the power of volition, locomotion, affection, and a something very analogous to thought and reason, with acute sensation and largely developed instincts: and this we might call *mind*.

But this most perfect creature does not possess rational motive or reflective action; is not conscientious; acts from impulse; is not restrained by religious principle; does not understand the habit of self-denial; does not anticipate future consequences; is not responsible for its conduct;

possesses not the sanction of human laws, social institutions, moral teaching, or divine revelation. Therefore, in man there is a principle superadded, to which all these are traceable, and from which they emanate; and this principle is the rational, accountable soul, which constitutes man a religious animal, and which forms the bond of union and connexion with his Maker, even the omnipotent Governor of the universe; which receives *his* laws, bows to *his* commands, and obeys *his* will, unless previously alienated from proper dependence upon God. So far, then, as representing the immediate connexion between man and his Maker, through his rational soul, we would not object to the term "*theological soul*."

But inasmuch as the term has been covertly employed by those who believe man to be only a superior animal, endued with a more comprehensive nervous system; that brain being of the same nature, but capable of more extensive action, being itself the seat of thought; its function being that of performing the various intellectual, affective, sensitive, and passionate actions of the body, and terminating there;—man being, in fact, precisely what his organisation makes him; and all the institutions of society, all the laws of man, all the appointments of a christian country, being only so many incumbrances to freedom of action, and having no basis in truth or necessity; it becomes us very narrowly to watch over the term, since, although it may be employed by many sincere philosophers to represent the affinity between the

soul and its Creator, or the soul which is fitted and destined for the study, the belief, and the practice of theology, as revealed to man by his Maker, yet it is also employed by many pseudo-philosophers as a convenient term to enable them to escape the odium of denying the existence of a responsible soul, and avowing atheism at once. But with these gentlemen it is employed to designate *the soul of theologians*; a nonentity with which they have nothing to do, but which, for the convenience of their craftiness, it is desirable not to deny.

Now, it is obvious, that it cannot be a matter of indifference, whether we employ terms of so doubtful a construction, that they admit of being employed as truth, and yet may be rendered available for the propagation of the most cruel error; and, therefore, we strongly recommend the friends of truth and humanity to abjure a phraseology so questionable, and to substitute *soul only* to represent the spiritual part of man; to represent that which makes him to differ from all other animals; which makes him ruler over all those animals;—and more than all, *ruler over himself*;—which teaches him to subdue his inclinations, to love others better than himself, to exert himself in works of benevolence towards his fellow-men, and of piety towards God.

It has been stated, that this soul is spiritual in its nature; and that while it is allied with matter, and possesses matter for its servant and its organ,—its medium of communication between exterior and interior life; yet that it is not a quality of matter,

that it exists independent of matter ; and that it is distinct from any arrangement of nervous fibre of whatever kind, however simple or complicated, however refined or sublimated.

As such, the soul is exempted in itself from all the changes of disorder, disease, decay, and death, so far as these are natural changes, operating upon bodily organisation. There are *spiritual changes* of growth, disorder, decay, death, renewal of life, &c. ; but all these do not come within our province. All we have to notice, is the way in which, not the *soul itself*, but its manifestations, are influenced, assisted on the one hand, or impeded on the other ; quickened or rendered obtuse ; perfected or perverted, through the instrumentality of causes and circumstances, which operate indirectly upon spirit, *through the agency of its material organ*.

As these will come under our notice more particularly in a subsequent part of our inquiry, we shall but glance at them in the present section. Let it be remarked, that these agencies are carried on invisibly ; that they cannot be demonstrated ; and yet, that the experience of all the thinking part of mankind has shown their influence to an extent so great, as not to escape the observation of any moderately accurate observer of himself.

There are times when a state of unconquerable and unwonted sleepiness claims the supremacy, and forbids the student from continuing his pursuits. It is frequently difficult to trace the cause of this oppression, and it often baffles every attempt at removal. During its persistence, the continuity

of thought is impossible; the brain is disobedient; it is contumacious, and its contumacy is carried on into successful rebellion against the authority of its ruler. This state may sometimes be removed by medicinal agents, as tea, coffee, ammonia, wine, &c.; but there *are* periods, when nothing will succeed. And this condition has a tendency to recur, perhaps for several successive nights, until the chain of morbid actions can be broken through.

The influence of *digestion* upon the manifestations of mind, is also considerable. During its progress, the nervous energy is accumulated about interior life; there is a tendency to sleep; and if not, there is no energy of cerebral manifestation; and during this time, the brain should never be called upon for intellectual action. The two functions cannot go on *actively*, and at the same time comfortably together; intellectual pursuits should be carried on when the stomach is unemployed; and the stomach should not be asked to conduct the digestive process, while the brain is busied with other objects of interest, emotion, or occupation. When any morbid condition of the stomach occurs, any temporary indigestion, then happens that distress to the brain, which renders it unfit for abstraction, or for any study of the severer kind.

To these causes of disturbance might be added, atmospherical influence, as regards temperature, pressure, dryness, or dampness, &c.; but we will not anticipate the observations to be made hereafter upon this subject.

We close the present section by mentioning one

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other feature which attaches to the mental manifestations of man, viz. *continued progression*, at least till the organ begins to give way,—a property so totally distinct from any possessed by the lower animals, that it forms a very remarkable prerogative of his nature.

Man's history is that of continued progress. Whereas the young of animals generally, nay, infinitely surpass him in the amount of their imparted knowledge ; and therefore do at once what he could *not do*, even after a long course of instruction ; yet *they* remain the same ; they have no means of augmenting their knowledge ; for reason and experience, *rational experience*, are thrown away upon them : and while their original knowledge is greater, and the accuracy and extent of their senses infinitely greater than his, yet they never get beyond that amount of information which is necessary to their conservation ; they never apply their first principles to *new* situations, but remain unchanged, while the essential character of man is that of constant *change—constant progression* : he is never contented to remain in one state ; he is conscious that nature has given him nothing except as a reward for his labour ; and that to that labour, she has attached a rich progress in intellect and virtue ; and that the former may be carried on till the brain begins to wear out, while the latter will be always improving, especially in proportion as he draws near to that better land, whither he is tending.

This is, however, so essential a principle in the mental constitution of man, and has so large an influence upon the mental manifestations in thought and feeling—in word, and actions, that it is necessary to appropriate a chapter to its particular consideration.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE ESSENTIAL LAW OF PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPEMENT ENSTAMPED UPON THE CHARACTER OF INTELLECTUAL MAN.

IN our own country, as well as in the greater part of Europe, education has claimed for itself, during the last few years, such a degree of increasing attention, and has been followed by such a display of augmented intelligence, that each year has widened the sphere of its operations, and has presented for the mental husbandry, a soil more appropriate for the reception of the intellectual and moral seeds, as well as better calculated for their gradual developement and final maturity.

From the very nature of the human mind, this distinctive characteristic will be more and more deeply marked, since it is essentially progressive; and since, although it may blossom on earth, and be continually reaching onward towards perfection, the perfect fruit is only to be gathered in that ethereal region, where the faculties of the immaterial soul shall have escaped the burden of mor-

tality, and shall be expanded in their final state of spiritual existence.

It is remarkable, that the flame which was first kindled on the altar of individual charity, should have awakened a corresponding emotion wherever its agency has been felt ; so little can it be calculated how far the exertions of *one*, may, by association, become ultimately productive of effects, far beyond the expectation of an original projector. No widely-spread and devastating conflagration has marked the advance of the light and heat which have been thus developed ; they have enlightened without scorching ; they have warmed without consuming ; and they have relaxed without enfeebling. The domain of intellect has been enlarged, while it has been subjected to the will ; the emotions of the heart have been cherished, while the wild governance of the passions has been subdued ; and prejudice has been softened, while principle has been confirmed ; so that man has been continually becoming a more intelligent, a more reasonable, and a more moral creature.

Would that we were not obliged to reverse the picture ; that we *could* believe education to have produced unmixed good—good without alloy. But truth compels us to say, that, like many other terrestrial goods, it possess a mixture of evil, and that too of a somewhat fearful character. With the developement of intellect has arisen a conscious self-sufficiency, an over-weening love of personal importance, an impatience of control, a dislike of

submission to wholesome restraint, an undervaluing of authority, a setting up of lawless inclination, as the supreme rule of ultimate appeal, a sacrifice of relative, social, and governmental ties upon the altar of individual caprice, and of a fashionable ultra-liberalism, which spurns at control, disdains the reference to first principles, which can alone ensure correct conduct, and plunges at once into that anti-social system, in which man lives to *himself*, becomes the lawgiver to *himself*, and refers to *himself* and his wishes, as the standard of right and wrong. Thus a growing contempt of authority may be said to be the characteristic of our age. But this is an evil, which, though it *confessedly detracts* from that which otherwise would have been unmixed good, yet by no means destroys that good, or so perverts it as to render evil predominant.

The good on the one hand, and the evil on the other, together with the conviction that the one *may be* increased, while the other is diminished, will lead us to state the indispensable necessity of attending to the inculcation of those *first principles of action, without which*, education can only be, at best, a longer or a shorter series of constitutional impulses, unharmonized by one master principle, unchastised by the modesty of true science, and unprepared to meet and combat with the difficulties of the way. The progress of mental development is a talent, which will become useful or mischievous, in proportion as the presiding mind,

which guides its agency, shall be imbued with just opinions, of its immediate objects, and ultimate destination.

In order to render this developement successful, it is necessary to take enlarged views of its *object*, as well as of its *subject*. Man is not a simple piece of mechanism, governed by fixed laws, whose movements will remain harmonious, so long as a certain number of wheels and other similar contrivances continue to act according to a prescribed, and necessarily unvarying plan, and so long as these remain subjected to the common agency of a *medium atmospherical pressure*. Neither is he a simple animal, a certain finer and more complicated machinery, whose attributes depend upon his organisation, and result from the harmonizing principle of life, superadded to this organic machinery, the creature of appetites and passions, of instincts and impulse. Nor is *he* finally a spiritual being, of whose mode of existence we can form but a very imperfect idea, and of whose essence we must remain perfectly ignorant; a being wholly abstracted from the laws of animal nature, and incapable of being acted upon, except through the medium of intellectual and moral means.

In fact, man is not an automaton—a simple animal—nor an unearthly being; his instincts are few and feeble; he is gifted with reason and reflection, to guide and govern his purely animal propensities; the manifestations of his mind are enlarged, and he possesses the highest moral sanctions for his control. Moreover, he has the power

of determining his own will; and yet this will depends for its firmness and perseverance upon the healthy condition of the body in *general*, and upon the integrity of the brain in *particular*.

Thus, then, to seek for mental developement in man, as a spiritual being only, would be to secure as signal a failure, though not with so fatally injurious a result, as forgetting altogether the immaterial spirit, to address the exclusive attention to corporeal manifestations.

Although it is true that the immaterial principle cannot be subjected to the processes of growth and decay—of health and disease—of tension and relaxation—of tone and feebleness; yet it is equally true, that the manifestations of mind can only be *recognized* through the medium of bodily organisation, and that these manifestations may be variously *modified* by the changing conditions of the corporeal organs, through which they are rendered apparent. Hence in a mind unaccustomed to distinctions, the *bodily mode* may be confounded with the *spiritual essence*; and error in judgment, if not more serious practical mischief, will be the consequence.

This view of the *subject* for the process of mental developement, defines the real nature of its *object*, viz. to confer the greatest possible degree of expansion upon the successive manifestations of mind,—to carry onward its every faculty to the highest reach of perfection—to procure the health of the body; gradually to accustom it to bear without irritation a still greater frequency and energy of

intellectual association ; and to recollect, that, as a moral and responsible creature, man requires to be strengthened in all that is good, and counteracted in evil propensities—to have his passions subdued—his vices restrained, and the pure principles of moral action placed before him, and inwrought into every part of his character, so as to obtain the nearest possible approach to what he was originally pronounced to be by *Omniscience*, viz. *very good* !

Thus, then, the *object* of mental developement may be defined to be, the closest attainable approximation to the perfection of an *ignorant* creature, which necessitates the zealous pursuit of intellectual acquisition ; and also, to the perfection of a dependent creature—dependent upon others during the first years of his existence ; *dependent* upon the *body* for the *manifestation* of his higher faculties, and *dependent* upon the Almighty Giver of all good, for his moral principles and virtues, and for the sanctions by which they are enforced.

It is of great importance to watch the combined agency of these elements of mental character ; to trace the gradual recession of the *instinctive* night of infancy, as the day of reason dawns, and unfolds to our notice the several faculties of the spiritual mind ; to distribute and associate these according to a classification which shall facilitate our acquaintance with man, and then to hail the rising of that sun of perception, whose reflected beams can alone enable us to explore the nature and habits of the individual—his peculiar manifesta-

tions—his intellectual aptitudes—his moral principles—his religious duties and obligations ; and let it never be forgotten, that not only will the meridian of life be characterized by these early efforts, but that the evening of our days will close in gloom, or it will exhibit the mellowed tints of a departing summer's day, together with that peaceful and unruffled calm, which can arise only from the hushing to repose of the elemental storms of passion ; while this organ must depend upon the powerful agency of a controlling freedom of will, guided, governed, subdued, originated even, by the soft whisper of *religious truth*.

Thus, then, it will be seen that intellectual culture alone will be insufficient to form the *character* in all its length, and breadth, and strength, and depth of manifestation. Man does not live in a world of intellect ; his time is not to be exclusively devoted to the luxury of thinking, and to receiving or communicating the stores of genius. Far otherwise ! He is virtually placed on earth as a social being ; he has relative duties to perform ; his talents have been *conferred* upon him, not merely as a *source of selfish enjoyment*, but as the means and instruments of usefulness, and of happiness to others.

For the use he makes of these talents, he is deeply responsible ; and he is placed in such a scene of trial and probation, as that moral good or evil will assuredly result from their cultivation, their neglect, or their abuse. It is not permitted to him to rest satisfied with *any* measure of intel-

lectual attainment, social good, relative duty, gentlemanlike feeling, or moral influence, while there remains an attainable point in advance upon any *one*, or upon all of these routes ; while there can yet be found on earth *one* individual to instruct, to comfort, to protect, to please, or to improve ; or while there exists virtue to love and to esteem—a God to serve and to obey—or a future state of rewards and punishments.

Every process of mental improvement should have a direct or indirect reference to this final developement of spiritual life ; or it will fail of accomplishing its purpose ; and in the present age, a man *must be* a virtuous character, a philanthropist, and a Christian, as well as a scholar and a philosopher ; or the exterior tinsel of letters and of wisdom will be tarnished by selfishness, prejudice, and bigotry—the lustre of the human mind will be eclipsed, and society will retrograde into that original chaos, when it was *without form* and void.

To secure this advantage, *the heart*, that is, the manifestation of *feeling* and *passion*, of *virtue* and *vice*, must be *carefully studied*. And that success may be obtained from this study, it must ever be recollected, that however these principles must result from spiritual motives and affections, still they must remain as unknown and inoperative, unless there was provided some medium of communication with exterior nature. This *medium* must of necessity be *material* and *organic* ; and as such, will be subjected to the common laws of

animal life, to be improved by exercise, to be enfeebled by inaction, and to be destroyed by giving an undue preponderance to the influence of certain other bodily organs, which, but for great caution, may very grievously interfere with and impede the mental functions.

This proposition may, perhaps, at first sight, appear startling to those who would contemplate *only* the *spiritual nature* of man ; but its truth will appear by reflecting, that man cannot even express his feelings except by signs and gestures ; that he cannot speak or write, without the harmonious influence of bones and muscles and nerves ; all of them so indubitably *material*, that we can never cease to admire the unknown contrivance which renders these material organs the willing servants of the spiritual principle.

It follows, then, that to afford opportunities for the range of moral action ; to develop intellectual aptitudes, to foster good, and to repress evil propensities, and to exercise and improve the organs by which these manifestations are rendered sensible, are the first objects of mental culture.

Moreover, in this pursuit, constant *improvement* or *progression* is the talisman by which the shafts of evil are to be blunted and rendered innocuous, and the tender shoots of virtuous action are to be protected and fostered. Man must not be suffered to grow up as a mere amplification of the child, in all its waywardness and selfishness, in all its paucity of attainment, with all its faults exaggerated, with all its ill-regulated desires, and all its augmented

passions. The human heart will have been studied for nought, and will have been impressed in vain, *unless it be improved* ; unless the temper be ameliorated ; unless the disposition be raised, and purified, and ennobled, and sanctified ; and unless the peace and activity of the spiritual principle be ensured.

This is not to be effected at once, as if by some creative power ; the great object to be constantly kept in view is that the *present state* of mental manifestation *has* resulted from the years that are past, and *should be* a preparative for those which are to come.

In this process of mental developement there is a sort of moral and intellectual *growth*, a species of *επιγενεσις*, or production of part upon part, even nature's modelling process, which the mental cultivator would do well to imitate ; for according to the beauty and aptitude of the motives, principles, and sentiments which *he* fosters, *so* will be the consecutive motives, and principles, and sentiments which will arise from *their* incorporation with the character ; and from their thus forming points for the commencement and carrying on future moral growths.

There is, however, this difference, that whereas in animal and vegetable productions there is a point at which growth is arrested, a short-lived maturity is enjoyed, and the process of gradual decay commences, there is no such limit to mental expansion ; every renewed acquisition is an earnest of more growth ; and it can never be said that the mind is

perfect until it has been abstracted *from life*, and *even then*, we know not but that its spiritual character of progression may cleave to it, and that its higher powers will be constantly advancing by exercise, and developing by accessions of new and more extensive knowledge.

Be this as it may, mental progress *in good or evil now* will be incessant; the mind *must have food*, and it *will grow*; the grand question for the mental and moral philosopher is, whether it shall be furnished with wholesome nutriment or with poison; whether its advance shall consist in the lurid luxuriance of the deadly nightshade of selfishness, or in the unobtrusive but fruit-bearing blade, which will issue in a crop of genuine principles of sterling value.

But it may be asked, How is the attainment of this great good to be secured, if it be opposed to the natural current of the passions and inclinations,—if it contravene, as it most assuredly does, the natural perversity of the human will,—if it do not consist in the simple developement of *intellect*, nor in the growth of the affections; and while it is interminably hostile to every species of ignorance, as well as to all the charlatanism of systematic education?

This end is to be accomplished only by the *education of principle*—of principle which will be available under all the changing circumstances of life; which will afford a guide for the application of intellect; which will give laws to the passions, and regulate the heart; which will control the

wanderings, and define the just boundaries of the imagination ; which will give energy and wisdom to the affective faculties, shall become a primary motive to action, and shall direct every the minutest portion of conduct. It is genuine *principle* alone which can afford a sufficient sanction to the requirements of virtue, or give security for their just application in life ; or upon which character can be safely formed, since it must be everywhere *pre-eminent*, or it is absolutely void ; since to it nothing can be unimportant, nothing indifferent, while every thing must tend to advance or to impede that progressive march towards perfection, which forms the only worthy pursuit of a rational and immortal creature.

This *principle* can only be found in *religion*—a term by many misunderstood, and by others derided and calumniated, but which may be shortly defined to consist in obedience to the commandments of God ; not in any visionary or enthusiastic system of belief, but in the pure precepts of simple Christianity. Without this principle to purify and ennoble the heart, time, and a residence amidst the contentions of society, would impair, instead of improving the moral sense, and would debase, rather than ennoble the intellectual attributes.

Wanting this foundation, it would be futile to expect that *any* process of mental training would place the young in a situation favourable to their fulfilling one day the destination of their existence, because the object propounded by religion consists in the practical desire after the greatest possible

share of *happiness here* in the acquisition of knowledge and the performance of duty ; and having passed through this probationary scene, *hereafter*, in the fruition of *rewards* which are reserved for those who have *so lived*, in the performance of duties, with just views, and from proper motives.

It is necessary to make a distinction between *happiness* and *pleasure* ; the *latter* may arise from a variety of sources, which will not only *not confer*, but which are absolutely inimical to the *former* ; while *happiness* will accrue from many circumstances which are incapable of imparting *pleasure*, as, for instance, from *self-denial*.

It has been observed, that *pursuit* is the great secret of mental serenity ; and this is so far true, that without it there can be no *comfort*, while a state of inaction is absolutely fatal to enjoyment ; yet there may be unwearied pursuit *without happiness*. It is not simply in possessing a constant object of *desire*—not even if it be one of vehement passion, that the essence of happiness consists : it is necessary that the object should be characterised by offering a sufficient and satisfactory good as the result of its attainment.

This position may appear hypothetical, but it is every way proven in life ; the votary of *pleasure* nightly seeks his pillow with a consciousness of disappointment and dissatisfaction, yet awakens to pursue, with eagerness worthy of a better cause, the same course, to be recompensed by grasping the same mortification at the close of each conventional section of time. There bustling activity of

pursuit cannot cheat the mind with the illusion of being happy, because its attention is so dissipated and distracted, that it has no time to listen to the suggestions of intellect, or to the better emotions of the heart, till the hour of retiring arrives; and then exhausted nature claims her privilege of enveloping disappointment and chagrin with her oblivious mantle; and then the victim of unsatisfactory pursuit awakens to a renewal of the same efforts upon the simple stimulus which arises from the craving after action, and from having no other action prepared for its notice. Still, it will be seen that this is really a *perversion* of the principle of *progression* implanted in the human breast.

The same remarks will apply even to intellectual objects, if they form an *exclusive pursuit*. There is, however, here, some *degree of satisfaction* depending upon the just employment of *one* section of the *man*. Attention to this truth will unravel the secret of happiness; for it is attainable exactly in proportion as the object of pursuit is accompanied by *some substantial good*. The acquisition of knowledge is *good*, and therefore its pursuit is, to a certain extent, productive of solid advantage. Where this knowledge is employed to enlighten and improve those around us, it is attended with a still greater share of satisfaction; but *he* alone can be pronounced truly happy, who approaches nearest to the *perfection* of the human character in the largest developement of intellect, in the most extensive application of his resources for the benefit

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of his fellow-men, and in the most complete devotion of his faculties to the service of his Maker.

It will be further remarked, that the greatest capacity for *happiness* will be enjoyed by him who has the most expanded mental power; and the desire after its possession may, therefore, form a powerful motive for the developement of the faculties, and for their subordination to the moral principles. *Without* a large mind, the sphere of duty is everywhere contracted within narrow limits; it consists almost entirely in automatic action,—it is the result of a mere animal mechanism, of which the moving principle is life.*

But there *should be a will* to direct these movements, to preside over them, and give them point; there should be the constant aspiration of an immortal principle *superadded to life*; and the first manifestation of this principle should be the desire after *moral good*.

When, indeed, we look to the *history* of man, we shall find that this has been an *inoperative* principle; yet its traces may be dimly descried through the tumult of surrounding passions, and the perverting influence of conflicting feelings and emotions. The *first* impression of the Creator's hand upon his rebellious and ungrateful creature, man—that which constituted him “*very good*,” cannot be wholly effaced; there are principles to work upon; the great object is to direct these principles, so that instead of allowing the mind to lie waste, or to be

* See subsequent chapter.

overgrown by weeds, the seeds of good conduct may be sown, and fostered, and matured: for it may be assumed, as an unquestioned fact, that *happiness* and *virtue* are, and ever will be, inseparably united; and that to the enjoyment of the former the possession of the latter is an indispensable prerequisite.

While many persons so constantly exhibit proofs of failure in their pursuit after happiness, it is safe to infer, either that there is nothing fixed or determinate in the mode of obtaining it, or that the right road is ignorantly or perversely abandoned. And since real happiness has been shown to consist in the exercise of virtuous principle, *if it be not discovered*, it must follow that it is not sought after in the *exercise* of this principle, and in the consequent submission of the heart to its dictates, and to the commandments of *him* from whom virtue takes its origin, and towards whom correct action will always tend; but in the half-informed exercise of reason, or in the vagaries of imagination, or in the results of a defective experience.

Now, *all these* are inadequate guides. The very circumstance, that the gifts of reason and the manifestations of understanding are *progressing*, and that to secure this advance they require education and cultivation, proves that they are imperfect. Imagination, though a highly useful auxiliary, and the most important groundwork of that belief, whose very essence consists in *obedience*, would lead astray the devoted wanderer if its agency were uncontrolled; and the errors which are occa-

sioned by drawing general conclusions from a limited experience are of daily occurrence.

If, then, man would but consider how small a section of the universe he can be acquainted with, he would acknowledge that the largest experience would be insignificant, compared with the general mass of facts ; and he would learn diffidence from the consideration, that *all* his premises and conclusions would, *in comparison with such mass*, appear as isolated circumstances, and deserving of no more attention than would attach to them *as such*. Since, then, man has no certain guide to happiness in himself, and since its possession would seem to be inseparable from the practice of virtue, it may be inferred that it is not to be attained in anything short of the exercise of this principle.

The *fullest enjoyment* is not to be possessed in a situation where *every wish* is gratified ; the lesser trials and difficulties which are inseparable from a life of probation really add to its interest, because they give a zest to the principle of *progression*, by calling upon man for a constant and an increasing effort to overcome them. It would be great injustice to the young, if their happiness were studied by the removal of every little obstacle from their way, because these difficulties really serve to season the current of life, to render it more palatable by taking away its insipidity, and to prepare the thoughtless and the inexperienced for more important occasions.

A state in which every wish was accomplished would be fatal to desire, as well as to energy of

action ; it would be tiresome from monotony, and painful from possessing no sufficient motive to exertion, no adequate sensation to produce sustained self-denial, or to ensure the growth and maturity of social virtue. There can be no continued happiness where the individual is stationary, much less should he retrograde—there must be progress ; the faculties must be *energetically* employed ; and this is not to be expected, unless an end of adequate importance be furnished as an appropriate stimulus. And since this is not to be found in any temporary good, nor in anything short of that future good which will completely fill and exercise the bosom, it is evident that the powers of the imagination must be placed in requisition to assist the mind in realizing the *supreme future good*, reaching onward through hope, and faith, and confidence, to that distant end which is *attainable*, but which will only be possessed by progressive advances, and by a gradual unfolding of the pursuit *after*, and of the enjoyment *of*, those invisible realities which form the great object of the good man's hope or desire.

Increase of moral virtue, or the fulfilment of the *appetite* after perfection, results from this view. For as it is in the career of literary acquisition,—in the pursuit of scientific inquiry,—in the development of relative interest,—and in the cultivation of that charity which has for its object the wide family of man ; so will it be found also here, that every fresh step in advance is not only a *point*

gained, but that it confers the capacity for still greater happiness.

Now this is in itself a source of satisfaction, because the mind feels that it is growing, expanding its beauties, augmenting its stores, and yielding its meed of usefulness to society. But it is more than this, for by its very progress it is constantly rendered susceptible of still greater improvement, while the difficulties which oppose its advance are smoothed away; its native strength is increased; and the knowledge necessary for its judicious application is acquired.

In proportion to the number and importance of these points or resting-places will be the degree of individual happiness; since its sources will be multiplied, and the means of their cultivation will be more accurately defined; for the judgment will be better informed, and the imagination will be kindled, and taste will be purified, and feeling will be refined, and every faculty will be exalted, and rendered a new expression of delight, and the means of widening usefulness.

In moral progress, *increasing beauty* and *augmented value* must never be separated. Thus it is in nature. By one of its primæval laws, the tender blade, which we first notice in the autumn, during the general decay which reigns around, is in itself an object of interest; its winter of infancy is, however, passed without exciting much attention; in the early spring we again notice its freshened charms; every day adds to its beauty; but it is

only when it has passed through the discipline of sunshine and cloud, storm and wind, that its full value is developed, and that the well-laden shock of corn gladdens the eye, and is associated with the kindred feeling of gratitude for the many whose life will be sustained, and whose comfort will be promoted by its instrumentality.

So, also, with regard to the oak : it is sown an apparently insignificant body ; its early shoots afford a promise of increasing pretensions ; but many summers will pass over before it will exhibit the additional beauty of flowers and fruit, and very many more before it will have reached the fulness of its maturity.

So is it with man : his progress may be slow, but still he *does advance*, and every year gives him newly-developed attributes ; he may have his periods of apparent indolence, but the spring-tide of action returns, and is always attended with augmented means of usefulness. Be it, however, remembered, that man is liable to a process of deterioration and decay—of progressive loss of power—and of debasement of the will.

But when once the essential law of progress is interrupted, and man becomes stationary, he will assuredly *retrograde*, because the stimulation of every day will *exhaust*, unless fresh strength be constantly accumulating ; and then what will be the consequence ? The faculties will become obtuse ; the views will be obscured ; the perception will be clouded ; judgment will be deprived of its data, and the will of its power ; the imagination

will be stunted ; taste will be chained down by the objects of sense, and feeling will be animalized. Thus, the manifestations of mind will appear as the blighted production of an unfavourable season, while the vacillating will precludes the continuance of good desire, describes no beauty in moral virtue, and therefore has no wish to imitate or pursue it.

How important is it, then, that the developement of the human mind should rest on principle, and that the said principle should consist, not in any speculative advantage, but in *obedience to the will of the moral Governor of the universe*. But if so, the object to be sought is not a life of *expediency*, whose growth and advancement are to be measured by an increasing amount of usefulness, or of intellectual attainment ; it is not the simple enjoyment of virtue, nor the pleasures or consolations of religion ; nor is it the fervour of enthusiasm ; but it is a system of duty defined by the moral law of the Supreme Legislator, and requiring regular conformity to its letter and its spirit. In one word, it is not the result of excited feeling, but *of faithful obedience*. The two ideas should never be disjoined ; and it would be well for those who so liberally employ this much-abused term "*faith*," to recollect that the idea here given of the inseparable nature of faith and works is classically involved in the very derivation of the word, since πιστις, faith, claims for its root πειθομαι, to obey, or to be obedient ; the faith cannot exist unaccompanied by the works ; and good works should always proceed from that exercise of the reasoning and imaginative

powers which realizes futurity, and which *believes* because God has *revealed*.

In this way it will be seen that expediency yields to the declared will of Heaven ; the desire of usefulness, though it be cultivated into passion, is not to be constituted the *end of action*. Intellect, though it be richly valued, is not to be unduly exalted beyond its proper subordinate situation. Virtue is to be esteemed for *itself*, rather than for the *reward* attached to its exercise. Religion is to be admired, not for the present good which it confers, but for its restoring man, degraded man, to a higher state of existence, and freshening anew that pristine beauty which has been so much lost by the introduction of *evil* into that creation which was once very good.

This principle of evil will be continually at war with these results, and life will be passed in an interminable struggle between the duties of principle and the inclinations of passion. This is no novel or controvertible assertion ; nor is it *extraordinary*, for *almost all*, if not *all*, the phenomena of the physical world result from a sustained counter-agency, and could not be continued without its influence.

Even if the reasonableness of this proposition were not manifest upon very transient reflection ; yet if we scrutinize the inner man, if we notice what is passing around us, or if we appeal to past experience, we shall find a principle of evil constantly opposing the suggestions of *good*, and only calculated (if the powers of the mind be justly

balanced) to afford that continual stimulus to action, which will preserve slothful man from slumbering on his way over this probationary scene, and which would secure his constantly seeking after a higher state of existence.

But this balance is destroyed: the happiness of *futurity* loses its supremacy in the heart, through the enjoyment of present trifles; and man listens to the suggestions of wayward inclination, rather than to the convictions of conscience and the demands of duty. In the development of mental power and action, therefore, it is of the first importance to foster and promote the one, and to encourage the other.

Religion affords the only adequate method of effecting these objects, since its hopes will stimulate the former, while its sanctions will operate a transfer of superiority to the latter. Let it be recollected, that it is the *perfection* of our *present* faculties which will constitute the happiness of heaven, a state in which the *attention* will be fixed on the sublimest truths, *perception* will be unencumbered by materiality, *reason* will be elevated by knowledge, the *imagination* will be filled by all that is lovely, *conscience* will be guided by virtue, and that desire after excellence which still cleaves as a principle to man, who will no longer require intense application, and careful examination and correction; since the power of acquisition, and the varied modes of intelligence and feeling, will all be ennobled.

Now, although this state may not be attainable

by the most assiduous efforts of the psychologist, it is yet to be sought after ; and though *perfection* may not be reached, *amelioration* may. Let the highest standard of attainment be the object pursued ; for, assuredly, human exertion will fall far short of whatever limit may have been chosen as the term of labour. In a word, those faculties which relate to man's sojourn here below, and those which prepare him for his future state of existence, are to be developed : in both instances, he is to be dissatisfied with mediocrity, and discontented with any *stationary* point ; he is to recollect, that there is a principle of decay, as well as of growth, and that the activity of the latter will depend upon the subjugation of the former ; while the *will to pursue*, and the means of accomplishing these designs, should become objects of peculiar attention.

It may, however, be asked, what is the *perfection* here intended, since *absolute perfection* it cannot be, from the nature of things, as well as from the terms of the proposition ? When we contemplate man's organisation, and consider that a material structure is necessary, and has been appointed for the manifestations of his mind ; and that his spiritual powers are impaired by this dependence ; when we look for the expansion of his intellectual views, and observe, that, notwithstanding his largest desires, a limit is everywhere placed to his researches ; and when we reflect upon his moral position in this world, in a scene of trial and probation, in the midst of difficulties arising from himself, and from those with whom he stands asso-

ciated, we shall conclude that *imperfection* attaches to his every progress, and cleaves to him through life; witness the narrowed understanding—the perverted affections—the defective memory—the toil of cultivation!—the necessity for constant advice, counsel, and guidance; *all proving*, that in his present state of being, *absolute perfection* cannot attach to any of his thoughts, words, or actions, except perhaps in some few instances which admit of demonstration.

Thus mechanical science *may be perfected*; but then, the multiplied failures before this point has been attained,—the difficulty with which it is ever reached,—and the *doubt*, whether the assumed point of perfection may only form a resting-place in the history of man's progress, from which a fresh start may yet be successfully made, afford corroborating evidence of the general truth, and lead to the conclusion, that there is none good but *One*—that is GOD: and that there is none *perfect*, but the *One* from whom *all* approach to perfection has originated.

Perfection is only to be attained in proportion as man resembles his Maker. As man is truly an imitative creature; and as the example of the Supreme has been proposed for his adoption, his aim should be to approach this standard of moral excellence, so far as his powers and opportunities will admit. In the pursuit after relative perfection, every encouragement is afforded to industry; and surely, to fulfil the design of creation, and to restore in any degree man's original likeness to his Maker,

is no mean recompense to those who sincerely wish to banish ignorance, and advance the light of knowledge. And not only does this prospect exist from the very nature of things, (as that it must be constantly augmenting,) but a *promise* of success is specially retained for those who earnestly and sincerely seek to obtain it.

It is a fixed principle, that every being, and every thing, is *perfect* in proportion as it accomplishes the design for which it was produced. Now, so far as we are acquainted with the secret intentions of nature, whether exhibited in the mighty circle of the universe, or in the completeness of its minutest details, we find the attribute of perfection stamped upon them all; and although there are many processes, of which we cannot fathom the rationale, yet, as those which we do understand are perfect, we believe that the same character attaches to those which are *unknown*; and the reason why we cannot comprehend them, is to be found in our own want of research, or in the imperfection of our powers.

Why man, originally pronounced very good, should now seem to be the only imperfect creation of the Omnipotent, has been already explained; and it has been shown, that this does not originate in less care, or wisdom, or goodness in the Almighty Designer, but in wilful man's corruption of himself, and in his obstinate wanderings from the right path.

This truth should, however, operate as a stimulus for him to endeavour to regain a property which

he has so miserably lost ; and since he cannot fathom the essential attributes of bodies around him, nor unravel the purposely concealed designs of the Almighty, nor enter into the comprehensive views of infinite knowledge ; and since a load of imperfection rests upon his highest efforts and best designs, *all he can do* is wisely to consider *wherein* consists the perfection of the divine character, and to imitate this exemplar, as far as the utmost limit of his talents will allow. It is impossible to form an idea of the nature and properties of a purely spiritual being ; it is therefore the attributes of the Creator, *as exhibited in his works*, and as revealed in his Word, which are proposed for our imitation ; and the prevailing characteristics of this magnificent display of wisdom, and knowledge, and power, and mercy, and benevolence, may be shortly stated to consist in *regularity, beauty, and utility*.

Without *order and harmony*, this beautiful world would be a chaos, and would quickly crumble into ruins ; and those magnificent bodies which we notice whirling in immensity, would be destroyed by collision with each other ; while their undeviating appearance, the alternation of day and night, the succession of the seasons, and its consequences upon nature's widely-extended domain, all exhibit the impress of regularity.

From this *uniformity* of action results in great measure that perfect *beauty*, which attends the performance of all nature's operations, and which we can only understand in proportion as we become more intimately acquainted with processes which

(while remaining in ignorance) would inspire far other emotions ; that is, till the ray of truth had enabled us to explain reasonably what at first sight seem inexplicable, and was therefore an object of fear, or of blind and superstitious admiration, rather than of that sublime and satisfying emotion, which arises from embracing a design, and from entering into the means for its accomplishment.

But, again, nothing has been produced without an intention of *usefulness*. It is indeed true, that we cannot always *trace* this property ; but since we find it impressed upon *all*, with which we are thoroughly acquainted, we cannot doubt that it does everywhere exist : and since, within a few years, we have discovered the wisest provisions in circumstances which we could not previously comprehend, it does not require a large stretch of candour to extend this principle of belief to other processes, which as yet we cannot fathom.

The first maxim, then, of reaching onwards towards perfection, is to introduce *harmony* and *regularity* into the manifestations of mind, to develop the intellectual powers, to regulate the passions, and to hold them in just subordination to *every object of good*, and particularly to the performance of the will of Heaven.

This point being attained, the mental machinery ought to work *well*, and spontaneously to elicit that moral beauty, which can only originate from a due cultivation of talent—and from an adequate manifestation, yet judicious subjugation, of *feeling* and

passion and *affection*, to the great design of creation, viz. *the glory of the Creator* !

Much has been written on the nature of beauty ; and without entering into any curious disquisition on the subject, it is important to ascertain, *wherein* consists *moral beauty*. This inquiry will be facilitated, by ascertaining in what consists the beauty of the material objects around us, and we shall probably trace its sources to their *sublimity*—to their possessing properties which are *agreeable to the senses* ; and to the wise adaptation of these properties to fill the particular space which nature has designed.

And if so, by parity of reasoning, *moral beauty* will attach to objects and principles, *in proportion* as they extend beyond the present scenes, and trend onwards to that state of perfect being, of which the sublimest conceptions of the human mind can form such an inadequate notion ; *in proportion* as they fulfil the particular design of the Almighty Maker—give the widest expansion to man's intellectual powers—excite the admiration of his compeers, and are more extensively useful ; and *in proportion* as they ennoble his desires, purify and exalt his wishes, and render him more and more anxious to complete the design of his *being* ; an object, notwithstanding, which seems ever increasingly distant as his knowledge is developed, and as the importance of imitating that moral beauty which is “ altogether lovely,” is more impressively felt.

But from these premises it will follow, that there can be no *moral beauty* in *anything* which under-

mines the simple *natural* impression (and *much less in aught which contravenes it*) of any law of nature or of God ; since in the former case motive must be distorted from its simple design ; and in the latter, *it must* be opposed to the will of Him who is *moral excellence* !

Wherever these properties attach to man, the remaining attribute necessary to compose a finished idea of the doctrine of human perfection, is *that of usefulness*. Nothing has been created in vain ; and if the law of utility really attaches to the lowest productions of the Almighty Architect, *how much more* to *his* best and highest effort in the creation of man in his own *likeness*—the image of perfection !

The solid productions of this process of mental and moral developement may not always excite the *admiration* of the gay, the giddy, and the thoughtless, but they will always command *esteem*. In every department of man's daily history, the standard chosen for imitation is the revelation of the moral attributes of God. Without the infusion of this master principle, the character will want its great quality of moral beauty ; it will be cold and calculating—selfish, and narrow-minded ; it will be the mere child of *reason*—dispassionate, indeed, but wanting in that energy of action, and unity of design, which can alone result from enlisting the affections, as motives to action and exertion.

Reason, only, it is true, may make a very useful member of society—of the family—of the common-

wealth, for reason alone will teach man to be careful of his own interest; and he will soon learn, that in *this care* is involved, not only the *necessity* for not injuring the welfare of others, but even the design of *promoting* it. Reason alone will make him a man of enlightened and cultivated mind, in order that he may extend for himself the pleasures of intellectual acquisition—become more generally acceptable, and (since knowledge is power) that he may widen the opportunities of influence over those around him; finally, reason alone will make him the advocate of religion as a system of morals, because it is the protectress and only rewarder of virtue.

The *reasonable* character, however, when tried by the tests just recommended, will be found wanting in moral beauty; that is, its manifestations of mind will need the essential attribute of religion in order to constitute them truly valuable. The difference is precisely this;—the man of reason only, possesses a methodical regularity of movement, which may even amount to mechanical certainty, and we *may therefore calculate* upon his conduct; but the man of reason and religion combined, possesses claims to affectionate esteem, from the lessened agency of selfishness, and from the proportionably increased devotion of the heart and understanding, and will, to the real comfort and advantage of his fellow man, and to the glory of God.

Such being the nature of the abstract principle of perfection, it may be worth while to notice its

application to real life, and to those natural and social inequalities which are so plentifully interspersed throughout its course. The feebleness of nature, which depends upon the mysterious union of mind with matter; and the degree in which the manifestations of the former are impeded by the greater or less inaptitude of the latter towards its more purely spiritual function; the animal peculiarities which are handed down from the present race to posterity—the great varieties of temper and disposition—and the varying modes of expression and of feeling, arising from the influence of physical temperament, will place obstacles in the onward reach towards perfection, and will often constitute an insuperable barrier to success.

Again, the influence of society, as it operates upon large classes of individuals, is opposed to much progress. In intellect, in feeling, in action, in motive, and in principle, a degree of sluggish contentment impairs the energy of the mind, and leaves it satisfied with a measure of acquisition far short of that which it might grasp. Man is naturally indolent, and he will not bestir himself energetically, unless he have a powerful motive for so doing. And should he want the excitement of emulation—should he find other minds around him contented with a low standard, then will *he* be satisfied with a paucity of mental manifestation, very far short of what he might accomplish by the diligent application of his mental energies.

These very energies are not always equally susceptible of improvement. Although they ought

not to have been such as we usually find them in adult life, under the influence of neglect, perverse will, rooted habit, confirmed prejudice, and evil example, yet under the best moral discipline, and the most judicious management, there will be found original predispositions which must be studied—those which lead to beneficial results should be encouraged, while those which conduct towards dangerous errors (and what error can there be which is not dangerous ?) must be repressed.

It will often happen, that some very important faculty exists in so *minus a state*, and is so completely overshadowed by some more prominent and commanding attribute, that it will require great care to draw it out from concealment, and to give it every fostering advantage, in order that it may fairly compete with the greater original strength and opportunities of some more superficial and, perhaps, more striking quality.

Now the principle of treatment in these cases, is not *to stimulate* any dominant attribute, so that the character might become renowned for one particular excellence—but to obtain developement of all the faculties in such proportion, that *no one* shall interfere with the regularity, beauty, and moral worth of *any other*, or of the *whole* ; and to preserve *all* the manifestations of mind in just keeping with any one individual expression.

In accomplishing this, faculties which have been benumbed by inattention must be roused from their frozen slumber ; those which have been enticed into precocious maturity must be thrown into the

background ; and the original strength of their several peculiarities must be consulted, and diligently ascertained, in order to maintain the harmonious equilibrium of the whole. Moral principle will often afford the boundary-line, beyond which it would be dangerous to employ any talent however dazzling by its brilliance, however tempting by its associations, or by its native facility of cultivation.

Thus, for instance, vanity is often developed in the breast by a conscious possession of some predominating faculty, which gives success among compeers and competitors ; it becomes attached to this success, and exactly in proportion as it does so, virtue loses its attraction and excellence, no longer forms an object for imitation ; moral worth and substantial good obtain a diminished interest, and, at all events, their influence is greatly circumscribed ; the idea of duty is lost in the self-gratulation of triumph ; while the conscious self-importance which is the consequence of this success, induces its subject to despise, or, at all events, lightly to esteem the talents of equals ; the benevolent affections are repressed—the energy of imitation as regards good example is paralyzed ; the character thinks to its own *exclusive* standard, and a superficial but showy manifestation ill conceals the poverty of the soil whence it originates. And since love to God, and our neighbour, are indications of mental *growth*, and since these are ultimately undermined by the exclusive culture we have contemplated, we can but infer the importance

of maintaining a just proportion in the several indications of mind, especially of the intellectual and affective faculties.

Another obstacle in the way of successful progress towards perfection, consists in a want of adaptation of the means to the peculiar or probable situation in life of each individual; so that the faculties more particularly required in after life may be timely developed, and duly exercised. That plan of developement will contribute most to the ultimate happiness and worth of mankind, which educes most effectually habits of *real thought*, combined with such principles of conduct as shall form a good social character, a good citizen, and a good Christian.

This is not attainable by any mere system of *teaching*; intellectual knowledge will be the only result of such process; and unless the heart be stored with principles of conduct, nothing has yet been done, as it ought to be done. If *this* be neglected, all the religious instruction conveyed in creeds and catechisms, and committed to memory as a task, will be useless—will drop as barren flowers, and will yield no fruit.

This, however, is not the fault of catechetical instruction, which is highly valuable; the evil consists in weighing down the *memory* with a load of questions and answers, which never reach *beyond* that faculty, and which are consequently inoperative upon conduct. Instruction must reach the heart, if it would give laws to the understanding,—define the use of the intellectual powers—and

impose those moral restraints, wanting which, with all the temptations of passion, all the opportunities of influence, and all the provocatives of society, the voice of virtue would be stifled, and would be supplanted by the impulse of selfish desire ; man would become the slave of vice, and would *deform* instead of ornamenting the creation of the Almighty.

The importance of mental developement is further demonstrated by its influence upon religious *belief* ; for it is manifest, that without active intelligence this would soon degenerate into superstition. If the creed should involve practically a system of irrational agency and supernatural influence ; if it were independent of the thoughts and affections—if its observances were grounded on the apprehension of some unknown future evil, to avert which certain forms of devotion are to be employed—if it were to become the result of passion rather than of conviction ; if the Deity were represented as an object of dread, rather than of love—as threatening punishment rather than as abundant in mercy—as clothed with anger, rather than as delighting in the happiness of his creatures—as requiring the homage of feeling, rather than as rejoicing in the sacrifice of well-employed talent—if religion were portrayed as a gloomy abstraction, rather than as the perfection of the understanding and of the affections applied to the conduct of every day, and every hour ; and, finally, if it were made to consist in a series of privations, without hope and without joy in this world, then, indeed, would it become

a superstition, which would enthrall the best powers of the mind, and chain them down to the *utmost limits* of Christianity, from which none of its goodly proportions could be seen or appreciated.

Unless the common duties of life be undertaken with just views of the principles upon which they are to be constructed, they will be ill performed ; and this will operate more particularly upon the upper ranks in society, exactly in proportion to the natural influence which attaches to wealth and power ; since the *necessity* for moral exertion increases with the *capacity* for action, and the opportunities of usefulness. Man is not only called upon to *do good*, but to *do all the good he can* ; and with this view, all his resources are to be placed in active requisition ; all his talents are to be employed—all his feelings energized to the *utmost*—and his sphere of usefulness constantly extended with wisdom and prudence.

The agency of man's will has excited ceaseless attention ; and it has done so particularly, because it has been usually represented as presiding over the conduct, and giving *its* tone and temper to the understanding and the heart, rather than as being influenced *by them* ; or, it has been considered as a sort of wayward influence, over which the individual had no control, but that it was acted upon by circumstances from *without*, or suggestions from *within*, according as these circumstances and suggestions were overruled by a good or a bad spirit : both these views are incorrect, and lead to serious error, in doctrine and practice.

The *will* has not been sufficiently considered as the result of sound judgment and correct reasoning ; and as influenced by the state of the reasoning organ—by health and disorder—by preceding associations, habits, and customs ; but it has been exhibited as a *mysterious influence* not to be defined—communicable to-day, but to be withdrawn to-morrow ; it has been described as a faculty which is not unfettered in its choice of good, or refusal of evil, but which rather acts as *under a necessity* imposed by Him from whom all things proceed, or originated from him who perverteth all things.

The consequence of this view of the subject is, that man is contented to be *governed* by a *blind choice*, rather than to *govern himself* with a freedom of will, resulting from the decision of judgment. But no steady and consistent action can be obtained from intelligent creatures without the concurrence of the will. It is, therefore, of great importance to improve this faculty, and as far as possible to abstract it from those causes of vacillation which render it feeble and uncertain ; to revive its languid influence—to strengthen it when impaired—to fortify it for the hour of trial—to preserve it from the torpor of indifference—to give it steadfastness amidst the waves of contradicting impulse—to render it constant to principle—to fix it upon *truth* which cannot change—to protect it from the deadly influence of newly-awakened desire—and so to carry it forward, as to traverse the obliquities of human conduct, and to place it in safety in the haven of perfection.

Since, then, the feebleness and misguided wanderings of the will are the great sources of error ; and since, in spite of the best-directed efforts, they will still remain in some degree influential through life, it will ever be a grand object of mental culture, first, to fortify the will by enlarging the understanding, ennobling its designs, giving it just principles, fixing its dependence where alone it can securely rest, and maintaining it in such a state of active exercise, and in such a situation of pre-eminence, as that *it shall control* the instincts, the passions, and the propensities of animal nature.

Secondly, to correct its wayward tendencies, by the substitution of principled motive for the uncertainty of selfish desire.

Thirdly, to exercise a salutary influence upon its actions, and to ensure for its operations a wise and prudent direction, as well as a fixed, and uniform, and determinate character, by furnishing the heart with sentiments of virtue, benevolent feelings, pure and refined taste, with habits of universal charity ; and,

Fourthly, since the will to choose good and refuse evil is really feeble, and liable to a great degree of apathy on the one hand, and of debasement on the other, it must be led to the only source of solid principle and good desire, viz. to the moral government of the Supreme.

Such are the rules for the guidance of this faculty ; and according to their impression, and to the degree in which they excite attention, its degradation or its worth—its utility or its worth-

lessness—its easy compliance *with*, or its steady opposition *to*, VICE—its *firm choice*, or its wavering disposition towards good.

It must ever be remembered that *it is ours* to choose the good, and to refuse the evil—while the strength to enable us to do so must be *derived*, and *will be given, if sought for, from on high* : so shall we be preserved from estimating too highly our own powers, or from slumbering on through life in apathy, *waiting* for an *influence* which will never be vouchsafed to those who are not sincere in their earnest desires after that firmness of purpose which can alone give weight to words and actions, or render man an estimable character,—one in whom his fellow-man may confide, and whom he may securely love.

There exists in individuals a great difference as to the firmness of this faculty, *accruing* not *only* from the influence of the moral causes we have just contemplated, but depending also upon *physical temperament* ; exhibiting itself on the one hand in an imperturbable firmness ; and on the other hand, in such a mobility of determination, that it is difficult to fix it at all to any useful purpose.

In the former instance, the excessive strength is to be counteracted, not by diminishing power, but by cultivating the judgment, and in the latter, by bringing into action all the resources of mind and body, in order to produce a *fixed character*.

In the family, in society, and in the state, there is required, in every department of their agency, as well as in the government of *self*, a certain yielding

of the will, a submission to authority, more or less limited; for man is indolent and self-willed by nature, and he will not, of his own free purpose, bestir himself to industry, or sacrifice selfish gratification for the good of others.

This effect upon the *will*, must be watched with some delicacy in early life; for as it is convenient to the *teacher* to obtain a pliancy, and a diminished energy of this faculty in the taught; so may this object be thoughtlessly pursued, as if the great aim were to subdue a power which ought to be maintained in all its original *strength*, though placed under the *guidance of principle*.

In the government of this faculty, the *example* of the teacher will be of great consequence; for as the energy of the will may be diminished by the want of this *example*, in those to whom the young are accustomed to look up with reverence, so is it often impaired by capricious requirements, especially by the very common mistake of good-humoured laxity to-day, destroying the *tension* of the will, alternated with monastic severity to-morrow, ruining its *tone*; and so placing it in that fitful and feverish condition, which necessarily leads to debility.

And *then*, *morality* will be found to consist in simply good intentions, unaccompanied by fixed and permanent desire; and *devotedness* to any object will be the mere yielding of a feeble character, never to be depended upon, and ever liable to be driven from its purpose by the zephyr of changing circumstances; much more, therefore,

by the tempest of vice, or the storms of passion, which agitate society to its very centre, and which render its voyage difficult to the young and inexperienced.

The full energy of purpose should be most religiously preserved; since upon it depends that freedom of choice, which will elevate *rational* man above the creature of instinct, and which will enable *immortal* man to prefer the path of virtue, to subdue the inclination towards evil, and to disavow its authority; to escape from the irrational influence of unguarded necessity, and make him responsible for every part of his conduct.

To show that this responsibility rests upon personal choice, it will be necessary to distinguish between the effect of *mere volition*, and the *agency of free will*; the one may be purely *automatic*, the other must result from the exercise of the reasoning powers; the one is generally attended by mere *consciousness*, and follows as a necessary result from it, while the other is aided by *conscience*, and is accompanied by a *conviction* that we might have determined differently, though reason and reflection combine to say that we *ought not*; the one may be *momentarily* suspended by passion, the other may be subjugated by it; the one is unaltered by the torrent of desire, while the other is overwhelmed by it; in fact, the one is chained to animal nature, while the other is attached to *intellectual* and *spiritual* man.

Hence, the very grave importance of not indulging the caprices of the young; since, by such

indulgence, he ceases to be master of himself, and the consequence of this change is debasing to the character, and fatal to its consistency.

It is very possible for a powerful though *secondary* motive, to exert a considerable influence over the will ; such, for instance, as a wish to please those whom we love ; but this will not be sufficient under circumstances of trial and temptation ; it will only operate while the motive is alive, and the feelings are awake to its impulse ; deprived of these, there remains behind no constant energy, no fixed choice, no invaluable object of desire, and no free and reflecting determinativeness to pursue it, notwithstanding all the inconveniences, trials, and losses, which may accrue from such pursuit.

Hence, the freedom and the reasonableness of the will must be cultivated, while every approach to impulsive action is to be deprecated, as leading to irresolution and inconstancy ; the first, depending upon the thousand undefined and uncertain forms presented by objects not absolutely submitted to our senses ; and the second, constituting a faculty, without the permanent duration of action necessary for its useful employment.

The will *habitually* accustomed to exercise energy of manifestation, will be much more to be relied upon, than where no such habit of energy has been formed. Hence, the importance of accustoming the mind to determine for itself, in all the lesser emergencies of life ; and then, when the same process is required on other more important occasions, it will have ceased to be that *strange thing*, which, by

its *strangeness*, destroys the possibility of freedom, and of firmness of purpose.

Moreover, the freedom and determinativeness of the will are both confirmed by its most perfect submission to moral influence; and nothing is so fatal to its energy, as undefined, uncertain, and vague notions as to the boundaries of right and wrong.

Since the will is influenced by *certain motives*, it is important that these should appeal to the understanding and the conscience; that they should of themselves form stable grounds for action; and that, by the frequency of their recurrence, they should be wrought into constant habits; otherwise, the interior presiding mind will be passive, and without consistency; the impulse of action, and the stimulus of occasion will alone be heard, and no broad and general, yet defined, outline will be impressed upon the character.

These motives may be considered as instinctive, or automatic, intellectual, affective, and spiritual.

Among the former may be classed all those which arise from the physical agency of impression, the immediate consequence of any excitement of the senses; that *tact* which results from the harmonious blending of a well-organized system under the influence of its appropriate stimuli; and *taste*, which is the consequence of this action, together with the operation of sympathy and antipathy, aversion, dislike, good or evil desire, &c.

Among the second class of motives, *reason* considers the relation which subsists between causes and their effects, traces consequences to their source, draws inferences from established premises, weighs the probable results arising from certain situations and circumstances, and determines upon the advantages and inconveniences, the expediency or in expediency, of certain actions; always taking for its standard the amount of real or supposed good which may be obtained. Its agency is restricted to prudential maxims, and it draws its inferences from the physical and intellectual nature of man, and from the constitution of society. Though limited, the influence of *reason* is always salutary, because it judges deliberately, and decides upon broad principles. It balances one set of inclinations, by calling in their counter-agents, and so maintains a proper equilibrium by its strict and even-handed justice.

The motives which may be classed under the term *affective*, are those which flow from the infinitely varied modifications of self-love; from the influence of the opinions of others upon our own; from the sentiment of all that is just, and true, and beautiful, in nature, society, and morals; and from the affections, properly so called.

To these should be added religion, which controls, unites, and energizes all the rest. United to this latter motive, reason takes a higher, nay, the highest possible standing, as the counsellor of every action; since it purifies and sublimates that

action, by including in its consequences, the influence of present scenes upon our eternal and otherwise unnoticed interests.

These *combined motives* are all-powerful ; but without the latter, they would be *nugatory*. Physical instinct may be true to *nature*, but then that nature is perverted : reason will be unavailing, and the voice of the affective faculties will be mischievous, unless confirmed, enlarged, strengthened, and governed by *religious principle*,—the first, the last, the only universally-operative agent,—the same under every varying circumstance—to-day, to-morrow, and for that perpetual succession of the *never-present* day, which constitutes eternity ;—a conception too sublime for finite man to embrace, except by supposing an infinite series of periods, with the duration of *any one* of which he is unacquainted.

These motives would proceed harmoniously, were the heart of man always influenced by pure principles and good desires. But the first is lamentably the contrary : man's *physical* nature has suffered that debasing change, whereby his powers are circumscribed, and his intellectual manifestations are deteriorated ; the growth of his understanding is stunted ; his affections are chilled ; and his affinities with evil are greater than with good—at least apparently ; the voice of Divine Truth is scarcely heard ; and thus the will becomes inenergetic, from the want of High Sanction, and from the impossibility of keeping present to the mind those unseen realities which form the bond of union between

the present and a future life ; it is inconstant and uncertain, under the influence of contending and frequently-repeated emotion ; and it is violent or depraved, when borne down by evil inclination, wild passion, or unsubdued affection.

Natural conscience would do much towards enlightening the mind, and guiding it in the right way ; but man is not *always*, nor even *often*, attentive to its monitions ; and, therefore, it is to be cultivated by the aid of revealed religion : and *then*, even in the midst of difficulties, though enslaved by passion, it is disenthralled by principle.

Time and other circumstances may give an increased facility to the operation of this principle, which in itself possesses an inappreciable agency upon the government of the life. It is indeed true, that the love of *virtue for its own sake* may exist in the minds of some few, without distinct views of its nature, of the source from whence it springs, or of the sanctions by which it is supported. But this is a rare qualification, and wherever found, it must be considered as a talent which admits of and requires cultivation ; and which, in order to ensure its full effect, and to employ it favourably, in the onward reach towards *perfection*, must be supported by an appeal to that principle which never changes ; and to that desire after progressive attainment, as well as the fixed determination to pursue it, which will supersede inferior motives, whether drawn from the influence of the example of large masses of mankind, from the opinions of society, or from personal interest ; and which will

place the mainspring of action, where alone it can securely rest, viz. *upon religious principle*.

Not that the agency of example, or the influence of opinion, are to be lightly esteemed ; since by these, the principle which works secretly in the bosom of man is energized to action, and a process of constant amelioration is kept alive in the heart, is supported by reason, and is rendered available for all the real emergencies of life, by an enlightened judgment between right and wrong.

Hence, also, arises a moral tact, which enables man to discover the weak points of his own character, and by this discovery, to diminish the obstacles in the way of his improvement ; since “*mille mala, mille etiam remedia* ;” the knowledge of a disease is more than half its cure ; and when the evil tendencies are *known*, they may be counteracted, and their opposite virtues may be encouraged ; so that the operations of good principle upon the heart, and of virtuous action upon the life, form mutual re-agents, the power and extent of which can only be fully known by considering the changes which are produced by them, and the consequent degree in which the love of virtue is fostered and enlarged.

Were it lawful to hazard an opinion as to the *design* of the Almighty Creator, in stamping this character upon his most perfect creature, we might suppose that the moral developement of man, or the perfection of his free choice, was the object of the Supreme in placing him in his present relative situation : and, that if he were permitted to lose his

original perfectness, it was, that he might be deeply impressed with the necessity for *uniform progression*, and for making the most of the *trials* of this probationary scene, which would all assist to render him better fitted to bear the image of the infinite purity in which he was created; and to copy the example of that infinite wisdom, and mercy, and love, which have been set before him for his humble imitation, and for strenuous exertions after greater likeness to this pattern of his conduct, and anchor of his hopes.

Increasing obedience to the voice of principle; increasing distance from the clamours of passion and prejudice; and increasing freedom from the clouds of error and fallacious judgment; in short, daily improvement, should form the great object of the good man's desire. Yet the conviction of this progress will not encourage self-love or pride; since the effect of every advance is to throw more light upon the widening prospect of attainment, and to increase the sense of responsibility arising from the consciousness of augmented capacity for good. Thus a sentiment of humility is occasioned by the small progress that has been made, compared with the boundless prospect in advance, and the distance at which the forwardest remains, from anything like *conformity* to the sublime model he has chosen for imitation.

There are, however, *minds*, which, from some physical condition of the mental organ, are not susceptible of very high culture; and the great design of successful developement will be best ac-

complished by apportioning the means adopted to the peculiarities of the individual.

In early life, a rigid discipline is necessary to accustom the young to repress their passions ; and yet, that they may feel the importance of decision of character, they must, to a certain extent, be rendered independent ; they must be aware of the *power to choose*, and yet of their *obligation to obey* : nor is this difficult ; since just laws and equal liberty may perfectly consist together, whenever their respective limits have been accurately defined.

In the present case, all which augments the immediate good and future welfare of the young, may be allowed, nay more, may be encouraged, by the influence of the principle whose operation we have traced ; while that alone is placed as a limit to perfect freedom of action, which would keep from destroying the present happiness, or the eventual prosperity of its subjects ; well knowing, that only that deserves to be estimated as contributing to the pleasure of *the hour*, which will also enlarge the spiritual powers, and render them better fitted for the progressive improvement, which is to advance them towards that state of *final perfection* which is only attainable in the world to come.

Now, to this end, nothing is indifferent—nothing useless : the most apparently trivial causes have become, and will continue to be, occasions for mental developement ; and may be rendered instrumental in promoting the design of increasing growth, and augmenting beauty of manifestation ;

even as the simplest natural changes, the varieties of atmospherical pressure and temperature, do tend to advance the natural progress towards maturity and perfection, which is impressed upon every part of nature's widely-extended domain.

No sooner have events, or reasoning, or sensation, occurred a few times in the same order and under analogous circumstances, than they become intimately associated, even long before the mind is aware of such bias ; and, afterwards, the recurrence of the one will most naturally reproduce the other. Now this, which at first sight may appear a very simple process, is, in fact, *a habit*. Hence, the difficulty of distinguishing that which arises from idiosyncrasy or peculiarity of *physical temperament*, from that which is the result of education.

And yet it is important to form this distinction, since the influence of the *former* will be much *greater*, and will be less easily counteracted than that of the *latter*,—inasmuch as that which is natural has a greater affinity with our soil, and possesses a larger power of *cohesive attraction* than that which is by nature extrinsic, and merely implanted by a scientific operation. Yet since these associations will form the basis of character, and give their colour to action ; and since they will exert a beneficial or a baneful agency, it is of the first consequence that they should be rendered available to a good purpose ; that they should be made to *assist*, instead of disturbing and defeating that design of *progressive amelioration*, which forms the most important object of mental developement.

The success which will attend this process, will depend greatly upon the nicety with which the degree of excitement is proportioned to the developement of cerebral power; *too much* will destroy the tone of the organ by occasioning irritation; *too little* will produce languor and feebleness from inaction. In order to diminish the influence of exciting causes, it is necessary that they should be placed under the general law, by which the *vividness* of impression is precisely in an *inverse* proportion to the frequency and regularity of its notices; and that, too, notwithstanding they should be accompanied by so much of variety and change, as that the sentient principle should not be reduced to automatic action, or to that state of *quietism* which is not suited to a busy bustling world, and which detracts, moreover, from the social value of the character.

This result can only be obtained by regularity; since the same impressions are expected to return, and actually do recur, with the same trains of association; that which is painful at first will be diminished in the intensity of its suffering,—while, at the same time, the anticipation of that which is pleasing will not have been disappointed; and desire will not have been stimulated in vain.

But the *period* of mental excitation is not indifferent, any more than the *degree* in which it is permitted; for in the same way as if the stimulus should have been too great; so, if it shall have been applied at an hour of the day approaching to the usual allotment of sleep, wakefulness will

be the consequence, together with a degree of irritability of the brain, very unfavourable to its continued energy, and usually denoted by a high degree of mobility and disposition to action, with greatly-diminished power of supporting exertion.

This excitation may not always be the result of design ; it may be called up by accident, or by manner, or by reciprocity of action ; and, therefore, it is not unimportant to attend to those involuntary mental impressions, which may reproduce associated emotions of a character injurious to a well-regulated mind, and which, when so produced, may be perpetuated by habit, or be re-excited by the thousand occurrences of daily life.

Too great emotion is followed by exhaustion, and consequent reaction—both of which are unfavourable to the expansion, growth, and power of intellect. Thus the common consequence of highly-pleasing sensation is a fit of depression ; too powerful an excitement has been produced, equilibrium has been destroyed, and the balance of nervous function oscillates violently, until serenity can be gently and quietly restored ; and this is to be accomplished, not by creating counter-stimulus in another department of mental operation, but by wisely diminishing the weight which has been unguardedly placed in one of the scales of human action and passion.

For this reason, it is desirable to fix the attention on *things* rather than on *persons*—on abstractions rather than on individuals ; because, in the latter case, passion is too easily excited, and sympathy

or antipathy are awakened, both of which are commonly too powerful stimuli for the young mind.

On a similar principle, contentedness of disposition, and benevolence of feeling, are to be cultivated as a means of expanding the heart, and of strengthening the intellectual capacity, by which it will gradually be enabled to bear a greater degree of excitement with impunity, and too high a measure of susceptibility will be removed.

In this process of mental developement, the early indications of imagination will require attention—the more so, as its operations are frequently unseen and unobserved. In tracing early intellectual progress, we shall notice that internal improvement, in consequence of which the calibre of mind is enlarged, and the increase of knowledge is facilitated. Thus, increasing experience accumulates a treasure of facts and opinions, which, in *their* turn, form the materials for the exercise of the same faculties; the spirit of inquiry is fortified by the action of multiplying observations; the memory becomes more faithful in proportion as connexion is established between ideas; judgment is defined accordingly as it has compared a greater number of objects and results: but the power of imagination increases or diminishes with a most extraordinary rapidity, and *precisely because* it is permitted to luxuriate without *fixed rules* (though, according to some arrangement of its own) among the internal and fantastic representations of external objects.

Hence the importance of attending to a faculty whose mistakes and misapprehensions are not to be combated by reason, since *its* voice will *not* be heard—and there will be no actual attention to the *positive* images of *truth*.

Before we abandon this subject, there remains to be noticed one other application of this principle of progressive improvement—viz. to the advance of the Christian in acquiring greater resemblance to *his* great Exemplar :—to *his* progress in holiness. However unattainable may be absolute *perfection*, still it is to be striven after ; nor should the Christian rest satisfied, with anything short of *perfect purity*, and *perfect conformity to the will of God* ; for *here* he has no continuing city, but he seeks one to come ; *here* he has no abiding resting-place, but is constantly reaching after that rest which remaineth for the people of God ; *here* he is encompassed by infirmity and imperfection ; and while he ardently desires to be free from the incumbrance of this mortal body, he must at *least equally desire* to be gradually preparing for a residence in that holy, happy place, where sin and sorrow cannot enter. “ Be ye holy, even as I am holy. Be ye, therefore, perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect. I am the Almighty God ; walk before me, and be thou perfect.”

Such is the language of inspiration ! *Perfection* is the character of the Christian's aspiration, even the *perfection of the Almighty* ! He cannot, therefore, aim after too high a standard of moral ex-

cellence, and he will be certain of gaining ground by the attempt. True, indeed, that he will not fully and finally accomplish his object *here*—(the very idea of constant progression is opposed to such a result)—but he will seek after conformity to the will of God, till he shall be called, in *HIS own time*, to bid the world adieu, and leaving behind him the incumbrances of dull mortality, to see *HIM as HE is*, and to be transported into His image.

The accomplishment of this object is to be *progressive*. The Christian must *grow* in grace, and in the knowledge of his Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Everything around him indicates advance towards maturity ; and this advance is accompanied by increasing beauty of manifestation. So also will his principles be deepened in himself, and more fully developed in action ; the sentiment of love to God and his people will be expanded into the *desire* of serving, and the *fear* of offending *Him* ; and the motives will be purified, ennobled, and sanctified.

This advance will be continuous ; there is this only difference, that whereas the productions of nature decay and wither, and enter into new forms and combinations, the Christian's *maturity* does not arrive on this side the grave ; the flower which charms by its fragrance, and is succeeded by the promise of fruit, will only be fully ripened in the atmosphere of heaven, and in the meridian splendor of the Sun of Righteousness.

It is true that the Christian, in common with all other men, possesses a compounded nature—

body and soul; and that the former has ceased to be, as it was originally created to be, a *willing* servant of the *latter*, because of the influence of sin. Yet man is left without excuse, for he retains the faculty of *the will*, and to this faculty the body is subservient; therefore he is eminently responsible *for all his offences*. For, although when he *would* do good, evil is ever present with him, this is, because he exerts so feeble a will, and prefers listening to the voice of his passions and inclinations, rather than by a *painful effort* to *choose* the good and *refuse the evil*.

If it be asked, *why* this effort is *painful*, if the power to make it formed a part of the original constitution of man, the answer is obvious; the entrance of sin has *perverted the will*, and alienated it from good; so that to man as he is, every effort after virtue is painful, and for two reasons: first, the essential character of exertion is opposed to his *slothfulness*; and secondly, he has lost all *good disposition*.

Yet it is manifest, that this does not diminish his responsibility; but that, on the contrary, it fearfully adds to the amount of his willingly-abused mercies and privileges, since the Almighty has given him the faculty which he *refuses* to employ. It follows, then, that when the will has been renewed by Divine grace, the Christian is indeed culpable if he do not hold in subjection the propensities of his animal nature; if we do not constantly struggle against its infirmities, and if he do not zealously cultivate *all* his powers, and

talents, and influence, and opportunities, to the glory of his Maker and Redeemer.

In this onward progress, however, the Christian soon discovers his ignorance and feebleness, his helplessness and dependence on *Him*, who is willing to save and to protect, and who has promised to the sincere *His* Spirit to instruct, *His* strength to support, and *His* guidance to lead into *all truth*.

But these blessings must be sought for, or they will not be obtained ; and he must hourly watch and pray, lest he enter into temptation,—that is, lest he listen to the suggestions and promptings of his own perverted bosom ; he must maintain a constant warfare of principle against a deceitful heart ; he must hold fast that which he possesses ; and he must be found faithful unto death—or he can have no ground for expecting a crown of life. Not that this continued struggle gives him any *claim* to that crown of life ; but if the love of God be shed abroad in his heart, he *cannot* be at peace, except by growing conformity to the image of Christ, his great pattern and exemplar.

One of the laws impressed upon locomotive life is, that action is necessary to enjoyment ; and this is truly exemplified in the Christian ; his essential character is that of *progress*. But then it must be progress in *holiness*—not mischievous action, or even that bustling activity of business-like or professional charity, which is too often placed as a substitute for the growth of moral principle.

There is great danger from this latter evil, in the

present day of charitable exertion ; and it becomes the sincere to ask how far the motives for this exertion are single and uncomplicated ; how far they may be alloyed by a desire after the praise of men, or of that influence which necessarily attaches to prominent diligence in the great duty ; and to inquire how far this exertion is simply the work of faith, and labour of love—and how far it is compounded of inferior motives.

Should the result of this inquiry be, that the grounds of activity are not so simple as had been hoped—let not the inquirer on that account lay aside this exertion, but struggle more constantly and earnestly after greater purity of heart. Moreover, let him reflect, that if he be not *advancing*, a *retrograde movement* has already commenced. There is no middle point of indifference, in which the centripetal force of the love of God, and the centrifugal agency of the love of sin, can be so nicely balanced, as that the character may be preserved stationary ; if the former principle of *love to God* be not continually increasing, the latter of *aversion from Him* will usurp the influence and authority.

Against this influence, the authority of misrule, the christian soldier is called upon to struggle continually, and to maintain not only a defensive but an aggressive warfare ; not contented with the preservation of his own standing, but gradually gaining ground over the power of his enemies. To this end are appointed trials and difficulties, in

order that the character may be aroused to exertion, and energized to action, by being continually reminded of the necessity for such efforts.

Here, again, we trace another of nature's universal laws. So far as we are acquainted with them, all the phenomena of the physical world arise from a sustained *counter-agency*: the safety of the houses we inhabit; our own erect posture and progression; the function of respiration, and even the circulation of the blood; the flight of the summer bird—ay, and the expansion of the minutest flower, depend upon atmospherical pressure. Let but this be taken away for a moment, and our houses crumble into heaps of ruin; man's goodly form is prostrate; progression is impossible; the sigh of respiration dies upon the involuntarily-expanded lips; the blood congests in the sluggish veins; the fluttering wing drops powerless; and nature's humblest flower withers and dies.

The same may be remarked of various other natural processes: it is an universal principle: action and re-action form the secret of life and health; and neither the former nor the latter can be maintained without their respective agencies: without these all nature languishes; her works are interrupted; and the harmony, and the beauty, and the value of her productions are destroyed.

So with the Christian: the trials of life, and the difficulties of his way, are the sustaining counter-agents for the developement and perfectionment of his graces; and without these his regular *progress*

is arrested, he becomes lukewarm, the fruits of his principles are immature, and he no longer forms that beacon which should give light to the ignorant and the wanderer from the right path, as well as *afford comfort* to himself.

There is another principle which the *All-merciful* has implanted in the bosom of man, by which he is to realize this essential law of progressive perfection, viz. the *faculty of imitation*—a talent of the first importance to him, and to society at large. If it be recollected, that to this faculty we owe the continuation of spoken language, its importance will be fully seen; but it may be further shown by its effect upon society, and we may trace almost all the good and bad we meet with to the influence of this principle: man is upheld in the right way by the countenance of his fellow-man; and for all the follies, and frivolities, and vices of the age, he finds for himself excuses in the numbers which have gone before him in the same way; so true is it, that the influence of example is incalculable.

But the Christian has placed before him a most perfect example; and it is held up for his imitation, supported by all the most important sanctions and all the highest hopes which can be given to sinful creatures, to whom the means of restoration to holiness have been vouchsafed; even the perfect example of *Jesus Christ*, who was a man of suffering, and acquainted with grief,—who encountered the greatest trials and difficulties from a scoffing

world,—who took upon *him* our nature, and was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin,—who *himself* bare our infirmities, and became acquainted with all the trials arising from a world which lieth in wickedness. Yet from the beginning of *his* ministry to its close there was essential progress; and *he* became a perfect example to *his* people, that they might follow *his* footsteps, and be made like him.

Now, the essential character of this progress, which was consummated in the last sad scene of *his* suffering life, was that of *obedience* to the will of *his heavenly Father*; and this, too, will form the scale of the Christian's growth in holiness, and conformity to the will of his Saviour, as well as of the increasing beauty and augmented value of his fruitfulness:—"His delight is in the law of the Lord, and in his law doth he meditate day and night. And he shall be like a tree planted by the rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season; his leaf also shall not wither, and whatsoever he doeth shall prosper."

In fact, the Christian is *perfect* in *proportion* as he accomplishes the design for which he was created, viz. that of living to the glory of God. This object is to be diligently pursued, but it can only be fully realized where sin and sorrow never enter, and where all will be harmony, and light, and love, and joy. Yet the glory of God will be promoted by the nearest possible approach to his original state of resemblance to the image of God.

To secure this approach, the character and conduct must be marked by *consistency, beauty, and utility*, since these are the prominent characteristics of the works of the Almighty. One of the greatest injuries to real religion arises from the want of consistency in its professors. If the Christian show himself as worldly-minded, selfish, prejudiced, without tenderness and compassion for the errors and infirmities of others,—if he be censorious, conceited, proud,—if he be apt to *take* offence, and not very careful to avoid giving offence,—if he be soon angry, and prone to place an evil construction upon equivocal words and actions,—if he be uncharitable and revengeful,—or, finally, if he be so *yielding* as to give up *principle* in conformity to the world, *then* will *that world* take knowledge of him as not in earnest, or ashamed of his profession, or not a wit improved by its supposed influence; for the contrast will be drawn *unfavourably to religion* between himself with his unamiable manifestations, and some other very amiable persons, who, *without this profession*, manifest far more of the real spirit of divine truth.

But if he be the converse of the character just portrayed, all will be convinced of his consistent attachment to principles which exhibit the second characteristic of the christian conduct, viz. *its exceeding loveliness*; and the combination of these *two* (consistency and beauty) will form the completeness of the character, by the addition of the attribute of *usefulness*; for it is impossible that he can thus act up to his principles, and earnestly strive

after greater progress, without the devotion of all his powers, and talents, and opportunities, to the service of his Saviour.

The result will be, that as a gentleman, a man of intellect, a literary character, a social being, friend, and relative, and, finally, as a man of piety, *he excels*, in every department of life; *cæteris paribus*, his value will be appreciated, and the preponderance will be in his favour; nay, by his delicate tact, by his intellectual aptitude, by his literary taste, by his refined feeling, and by the purity of his thoughts, expressions, and actions, he will command and ensure esteem, admiration, and love,—he will present an attractive picture of the fruits of Christianity.

And when the last closing scene of existence arrives, he will meet the final struggle in peace, without terror, in humble reliance upon *him* who has conquered death, deprived it of its sting, and given a sure earnest of victory to those who remain “faithful unto death.” His fast-shortening hours will be *peaceful*, for he knows in whom he has believed, and whom he has earnestly, though feebly and imperfectly, striven to imitate, and to whose finished righteousness and atoning sacrifice he ascribes all the glory of his salvation.

It should be just remarked here, that this presupposes the integrity and undisturbed state of the brain and nervous system: for if these be suffering from the direct or indirect influence of disordered function, all the manifestations of mind will be disordered also.

In this onward reach towards perfection there are obstacles to the Christian's progress. Perhaps his physical temperament may present difficulties to be *overcome*; for the actions, and thoughts, and feelings of men, are influenced by the medium through which they are manifested; and *that medium* has been perverted from its first pure function by the introduction of sin, and by that debasing change which has rendered man prone to evil.

Still it must be recollected, that in circumstances of *ordinary health* the *physical organ* has been *subjected to the presiding mind*, and that its function of volition is pre-eminent. Hence, a powerful effort of the will, enlightened by revelation, and supported by the promised strength and comfort of the Holy Spirit, will enable man so to triumph over physical infirmity, as that this shall form *no excuse* for defective or erroneous action; he will be wholly responsible for each deficiency or error; and he must be stimulated to exertion—to the exhibition of powerful energy of purpose, in order to supersede the morbid influence. *Physical structure*, when healthy, is placed under the control of *governing mind*; and the latter is entirely answerable for the government of the former.

Again, the Christian is living in society, and is liable to fall in with its customs, to catch its manners and habits, and to imbibe its principles. But if it be true, that the customs, manners, habits, and principles of the many are opposed to the sincere practice of Christianity, there will be some

fear lest he may be induced to comply with that which his own better judgment disapproves and disavows.

It is painful to differ from others, because this very difference involves a tacit *censure* upon their *opinions* or *conduct*: yet it cannot be wholly avoided; the good man's life *must* involve a censure upon those who are living without God in the world. But he must take *care* not to give offence *needlessly*, or his *good* will be misrepresented. He *must* bear a decided testimony for the inflexible *uprightness* of Christianity, and for his sincere belief in its precepts; but he must do so with all that principled tenderness and compassion, and that courtesy of manner, which will disarm prejudice, and which will not *reasonably excite* a recoil against that which is of infinite value. There is no fear but he will vindicate himself completely from any charge of latitudinarian belief, if he will only carefully study the *manner* of contending earnestly for the faith. In fact, the christian *gentleman* must be clearly traced; and then will he win their way to the heart for the truths of religion through so pleasing a channel;—there will be no place for the scoffer; and infidelity will be deprived of one of her strongholds, while it will be practically shown that the spirit of Christ's religion is not opposed to the growth of *intellect*, the expansion of the *affections*, or the cultivation of the *taste*.

There is, however, a still more formidable obstacle in the route towards perfection: and this consists in *fashionable religion*. The intrepid war-

riors, who had braved the rigors of Alpine perpetual snows, and who had conquered all the difficulties of their route, lost their energies when exertion was no longer required,—when they could repose in luxurious indolence, and there were no difficulties to be vanquished. So the christian warrior is safe only in proportion as the warfare is continuous, and as he is aroused to energy and action by the present prospect of difficulties to surmount.

Hence, if he glide along the smooth and plastic current of fashionable Christianity, there is a danger of his becoming amalgamated with it,—of his taking the same mould,—and of his being actuated by a *spirit* which has been declared irreconcilable with *the Spirit of Truth*. His great object should be to lead those who go with him a certain distance, to dive deeper into the requirements of “*all truth*,” and to show them that a spirit of meekness, humility, self-denial, purity of motive, and preference of the will of God to their own will, are *indispensable* ingredients in the christian character, without which it *cannot be complete*. Let not his good be evil spoken of; but let him not so entirely fall in with the follies, and fashions, and temper, and spirit of the world in general, as that it shall be *often difficult*, if not *impossible*, to detect a difference between the Christian and the man of the world, except in profession; for, alas! if a system of belief be the only difference, the lot of the sincere man of the world is to be preferred.

Another difficulty in the way of the Christian's growth, is the want of adaptation in the mode of instruction which he obtains to his own peculiar calibre of mind, and style of temperament. To a refined mind there is something fearfully revolting in the occasional coarseness and vulgarity with which real truth is associated; and it must be some time before the former can be tolerated for the sake of the simple-hearted goodness which it invests and obscures.

There are also lesser distinctions which it is important to notice, apart from this broad line of demarcation. There are *minds* of all *dimensions* in the world, and *brains* of every varied *quality*. Therefore, the same truths must be received through very different media; and, consequently, in order to produce a *similar effect*, there must be an adaptation of the *modes of impression to the prevailing modes of mental manifestation*. The man of deep thought and of no thought at all, the mathematician, the natural philosopher, the metaphysician, the divine, the physician, and the lawyer,—the man of polite education and literary acquirements, the mere gay trifler, the *precisely* moral and the perfectly careless, the sceptic, and the enthusiast,—all these, with many other modifications of spiritual being, require a different *mode* of stating the same truths, in order to disarm them of the peculiar prejudices attaching to their position in society. If, therefore, these differences be not appreciated, and a *similar* plan be pursued with *all*, an obstacle will be thrown in the way of *many*. Yet *even this* the Christian is bound

to surmount, and with the Bible in his *hand*, and with the many spiritual privileges he enjoys in our own happy country, he will be inexcusable if he remain in ignorance or error.

The want of looking to the doctrines of Christianity as *suited* to the intellectual man and the man of science, and holding them up as a *system of belief only*, has often proved an obstacle in the way towards perfection. If religion be considered as a mere question of *faith*, dissociated from *knowledge*, the spirit of inquiry is extinguished, and the *believer*, satisfied with certain grand points of *doctrine*, slumbers on in secure but most dangerous self-complacency.

But this arises from a partial view of *Divine Truth*, and should be counteracted, for religion is addressed to the understanding as well as to the heart; and the *assent* of the former will precede the devotion of the latter; belief will be founded on knowledge, *both* being the gift of God, and derived from the enlightening influence of *his* Spirit; and out of this will arise an increasing choice and preference of good; an augmenting aversion from evil; love to God, and hatred for all that is offensive in *his* sight; devotion to his service; and benevolence to man.

The absence of a tender and enlightened conscience will prove a serious difficulty in the way of christian growth; this, therefore, should be asked of God, but it is also to be sought after. There are those, whose knowledge of the boundaries of evil appears to be deficient; there are those who

want the susceptibility which should warn them of its approach ; and there are also those who are wanting in the necessary tact that would enable them, *when* danger was discovered, to escape from its contact.

In order, therefore, in such cases, to ensure progression, these characters should seek to define moral manifestations, to cultivate the impressibility of their moral *senses*, and to improve by exercise their *aptitude*, which sincere desire, earnest prayer, and frequent danger, will alone enable them to accomplish.

In this pursuit *nothing is to be accomplished without waiting upon God* for a blessing, and *nothing is to be effected* WITH it, if there be not at the same time earnest and persevering efforts to *walk* in the way in which we pray *to be led* ; *to follow* whither we entreat *guidance*, to be *energetic* where we ask for *strength*, to be *holy* where we *implore righteousness*.

Finally, this progress can only be effected by seeking out and studying the weak and susceptible points of the character. Every man is imperfect ; consequently, every man possesses these weak and assailable points ; and christian watchfulness will be of little avail, unless it be directed precisely to those *points* where it is most required. Ignorance of self is the most fruitful source of deviation from the holy law of God ; and as the knowledge of a disease is more than half its cure, so the knowledge of our liability to moral evil is more than half the means of avoiding it. And *having* detected these

weak points, we are to strive against their influence, that the liability to error may be diminished, and the love and the power of good may be nourished up in us,—that we may *so run* as to OBTAIN ETERNAL LIFE.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE THEORY OF LIFE :—THE *UNPHILOSOPHICAL* NATURE OF THE INFIDEL VIEWS CONNECTED WITH THIS HIDDEN SUBJECT.

WE now come to the question, What is *life*?—a question often asked, and never satisfactorily answered ;—a question about which much has been written, and slender information given ;—a question concerning which there is reason to fear that much must still remain obscure, unrevealed, unexplored, and unknown, in the present state of our faculties, and of our knowledge.

Nevertheless, the questions, *What is life?* and What the influence of life upon mental phenomena? are so intimately interwoven with our present inquiry, that we dare not pass them over without consideration.

The origin of living function is enveloped in inextricable mystery; and although various theories of life have been given, it is better to allow that they are all unsatisfactory, that at best they give only the phenomena of life, and do not bring us ac-

quainted with the nature of the original principle, of which we can really only say that it is a principle superadded to matter with which it becomes intimately blended,—that like many other first principles, it has escaped our notice,—and that all we really know is from considering its effects.

But since we know that life exists when none of its effects are visible, and when all its functions seem to be suspended, or at least to be carried on without any visible agency, it is manifest that we can form very little acquaintance with its *nature*, from considering these phenomena; and that therefore it is absurd to say, that “*life is constituted by the sum total of functions which any individual can perform*,” when it is perfectly certain that life exists where there is no apparent function, and where these functions, having once existed, have become suspended.

We must enter into this circumstance a little more in detail: and first, we must prove the existence of life where there is no *apparent* function or phenomenon to distinguish it from positive death. This is remarkable in every instance of suspended animation, in which, as for example in the phenomena of drowning, all the functions appear to be extinct, and which, if left to themselves, would speedily terminate in irrecoverable death. So completely does this take place, that, but for our experience to the contrary, we should say, *Life is gone*: and there is no criterion to ascertain those cases which are recoverable from those which are irrecoverable. Yet in this state of apparent death,

in the *absence of function*, life still remains, and may be recalled: therefore life cannot be constituted by the sum *total of functions*, when it is found to exist independently of all cognizable function.

It may, perhaps, be said, that life is restored by awakening the function of respiration artificially; and so it is, as a means of again setting the machine in motion. But it is not contended that *respiration is life*; it is one of the phenomena of life; and whether it were this, or life itself, still it would be manifest, that vitality might exist without it, and therefore that life must be a principle superadded to, and co-incident with, organisation, though not the result of organisation.

It may, perhaps, be said here, that respiration is the mainspring of vital action, by touching which, the sum total of functions were brought into play, and thus constituted life. But if so, what is it which first *touches* respiration—which brings it *into play*—which *supports* it during a thousand vicissitudes, and which, in spite of ourselves, sustains it against every ordinary obstacle, and against the influence of volition? It is life, a principle superadded to, and independent of, the will; controlling function, but not constituted by it.

There are other cases of suspended animation, as fainting of a prolonged character—some forms of hysteria, trances, &c., so like death as to have been mistaken for it—in consequence of which mistake, parties have been prematurely buried; all these things proving that *life* can exist independent of function.

It is also certain that function may be carried on after life is apparently extinct. It is allowed that imperceptible respiration may be continued—a respiration which cannot be detected; it is also known that parturition may and has taken place after apparent death; and it is supposed that consciousness remains, in a considerable degree, after what is *called death*, together with some other less prominent actions of the body.

But if it be granted that function can be carried on after life has been suspended, or is extinct, we have another proof, that life cannot consist in the *sum total of functions*; there are merely certain phenomena, or *expressions of life*—of *life existing independently of these organs and functions*—of a *principle, not the result of function*, but *being the primum mobile of these functions, and superadded to them*.

Connected with this hypothesis, is the observation of Sir Charles Morgan, that “the great chain of created beings does not exist by an absolute, but by a proportionate harmony; the existence and happiness of some individuals being thus rendered incompatible with that of others. The *cruelty* of this arrangement, so difficult to explain under any dispensation, is a consequence, like the *other accidents of organisation*, of the chemical properties of certain substances, and of their relations to the living forces, of which given animated arrangements are susceptible.” Then is added in a footnote, “It is, however, manifest, that no more is lost than is given, and that what is evil to the

sufferer is positive good to the inflicter. Still every sentient being, as in itself a whole, may justly stigmatize as *evil* all arrangements hostile to its own well-being."

Now it is fully conceded, that the mystery of animated being, and the laws of the Supreme Governor, are difficult to explain, because we know not the terms and conditions which regulate the Divine will; not more difficult of explication, however, than the *origin* of many of the chemical phenomena of which Sir Charles makes so considerable a use; not more difficult than the thousand processes around us, inexplicable to our present faculties; since it is one of the humbling laws of human nature, that on every side there is fixed a boundary to our knowledge which is impassable.

The "*cruelty*" of this arrangement is set forth in broad and distinct colours. Now this is either unphilosophical or it is unchristian. It is unphilosophical, since if *life* has *accidentally* resulted from the sum total of functions, there can be no law against the accidental dissolution of those functions; and where there has been no moral principle involved in the production of life, there can be none in its destruction. It is also unphilosophical, because it supposes an *agent*; an *agent* is unnecessary, if life be the result of a bringing together accidentally certain organs and functions; and if unnecessary in the one case, it is absurd to suppose it in the other.

But the supposition is unchristian, for if the

arrangement be cruel, the *arranger* must be cruel, since no sum total of functions can deserve this epithet; and if so, the Almighty Governor of the universe must be *cruel*. It is needless to waste time in proving this to be an unchristian sentiment; we shall therefore leave Sir Charles to the cheerless enjoyment of such a hopeless and heartless creed, and be contented to prove that the sentiment is unphilosophical and irrational.

It is allowed, that the origin of evil is enveloped in mystery; but it is an unquestioned fact, that goodness and benevolence everywhere mark the works and the wisdom of the Creator, and chiefly in those phenomena with which we are *best acquainted*. Since such is the fact, with regard to those processes which we *do know*; and since we are confessedly ignorant of very many of the concurrent phenomena around us—is it not unphilosophical to conclude, that *cruelty* marks an arrangement which *we cannot* understand; cruelty being *the opposite to that beneficence*, which we find characterising those processes which we *do better understand*.

Besides, we are quite sure, that in many instances, even in the loss of life, there is a prevailing beneficence; and therefore we *ought* to infer the existence of the same in instances which *appear* to us not similarly characterized. We say *appear*, because we cannot be certain, with our present faculties, that things are as they really appear to be.

We have shown that there can be no cruelty in

the dissolution of life, *if life* be constituted by an accidental arrangement of function, neither can there be, if life be given by a creative power. For if life be a principle superadded to organisation, there is no reason for its being given or withheld, continued or withdrawn, *but the will of the Giver*. After all, this *Giver* has been supposed by the *alleged cruelty* of the arrangement ; and it is manifestly unphilosophical to say, that a *Power which can give* a certain boon to an organisation which, by the terms of the proposition, has no choice, nor will, nor agency in the matter, may not *also dictate the laws* which shall regulate the gift, and to which it must be subject. There can be no injustice in the withdrawal of this gift, even if it had not been penally forfeited, as we shall see in a subsequent part of this inquiry. Nor is there any proof that the enjoyment of the ephemeris is not fully equal to that of the most long-lived creatures. As far as we can learn, happiness and *misery* are pretty evenly distributed throughout creation ; and the latter has resulted, not from the *will* of the Creator, who pronounced all his works to be very good, but from that disturbing agency, which has perverted and defaced God's works, and introduced disease and misery into the world ; were it not, therefore, for this disturbing agency, good would immensely preponderate.

It is clear, then, that no sentient being has a right to complain of his lot ; and that it is irrational to talk of the accidental combinations of matter into certain harmonious arrangements of

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organs and functions, the sum total of which constitutes life.

But we must glance a little further at the origin of life. Life exists in the seed ; take, for instance, the acorn, the fruit of the oak, which at its appointed period of ripeness, drops from its parent tree, and presents no character which would induce a belief (independent of experience) that it possessed any properties beyond that of being eatable, and therefore capable of sustaining animal life. But this fruit possesses *life* ; a property, the existence of which can only be shown by future circumstances, but which is, nevertheless, inherent in the seed ; and which may never be developed, or may be most easily destroyed. It will never be developed unless placed under favourable circumstances for awakening the dormant principle ; or it may easily be destroyed by exposure to a little too much heat.

But if placed within the balmy bosom of the *earth*, after a certain length of time, by a very beautiful process of nature's, the surrounding moisture is absorbed ; life is developed ; it is supported during its early stage by the food which itself contains, till the young plant has acquired sufficient power and vigour to procure its sustenance from the roots which it sends forth ; and from this early and apparently insignificant origin, stands forth by-and-bye, the monarch of the forest, slow in its growth, but magnificent in its maturity, and majestic in its decay.

Here, however, is an example of the *principle of*

life, existing unseen, unknown, independent of living phenomena, undeveloped except after a lengthened process; and yet so existing, as under favouring circumstances to produce the most remarkable results. Here is *life*, anterior to the performance of function; *life*, resulting not from organisation, but mysteriously connected with it, and which may be called into action when subjected to nature's laws. We trace this communicated life backwards to the parent stem as the immediate agent, in handing down the principle; but if we ascend up to the first creation, it can only be derived from one of the primal laws of that creation, or, in other words, as a gift of that creating Hand which called all things into existence, and which gives life where He has so appointed.

We take another instance. Life exists in the egg; it may easily be destroyed by *heat*, or *cold*, or *neglect*; it may exist for a long time, if not called into action; but if, once developed, it be then neglected, it is no longer capable of *re-development*; even feeble life is extinct, and decomposition ensues. Now in the egg there is no performance of function—it remains just as we find it, and will so remain if left to itself. But the principle of life is there; submit it only to incubation for a few hours, and the processes of life begin, and if allowed to go on, will, through a beautiful series of actions, result in the interesting little chicken, which will perform automatic acts before it quits the shell, and will enter at once upon instinctive animal or independent life, as soon as it

has quitted it. Now there is nothing in the process of natural or artificial incubation to *give life*; it *exists beforehand*, and has been only called into action. But if so, life exists anteriorly to function, and is the first link in the chain of developement of those organs, *whose functions* have been considered as constituting *life*, whereas they are really the mere expression of a result which has accrued from life existing anteriorly to these functions.

Whence comes this life? handed down, of course, through the parent chicken—but as a principle superadded to organisation;—superadded by whom, but by the *all-bountiful* Author and Giver of life?

Again, we advance to the perfection of animal life in man. Life exists in the original ovum, from which the future man is to be developed; but it presents no semblance of life—it performs no function—it possesses no power of independent life. Under the circumstances appointed by the laws of nature, a new action is set up; dormant vitality is called forth; the beautiful process of gestation commences; intra-uterine life is supported till the full period has arrived that the little embryo is capable of maintaining its own life; *then* extra-uterine life commences: it commences in the first automatic act of breathing, and with it occurs a change in the circulation as wonderful as the developement of life itself; the foetal is exchanged for the adult circulation, by the conversion of a single to a double heart; *instinctive life* commences, to be followed as the organs become perfected by *intellectual life*, to which may be also mentioned, as the crown-

ing point of all, *moral life*, or that which belongs to the now superadded principle of a spiritual existence.

In all this, however, it is clear that life precedes the *development* of organisation; and, therefore, that it cannot be constituted by the sum total of functions, which are the *consequence* of the development, and which cannot, therefore, pre-exist.

Now it has been asserted, that the organisation itself submits to a *progressive* but inevitable alteration; and that the *moral constitution varies with the physical structure*. This is not true; and yet, like most other errors, it possesses *some truth*, or at least so much *semblance of truth*, as to give it currency, and cause it to be received as such.

Thus it is an acknowledged fact, that there is going on in the human body a constant process of decay and renovation; that there is a daily change; and that, besides these changes, it passes through the helplessness of infancy—the waywardness of adolescence—the elasticity of early manhood—the firmness of maturity—the loss of elasticity but not of energy—of commencing decline—the quietude and indolence of decay, and the feebleness of age. It is also true, that in these various periods there is a corresponding difference of *mental manifestation*, and that we shall in vain search for certain traits of mental development, in a period of life unsuitable for their exhibition.

But it is *not true* that the one is a consequence of the other, or that the moral constitution varies with the physical structure. If so, the former would

be dependent upon the latter; and man's moral character would be the result of his organisation, for which, therefore, he would not be held responsible. The error consists in confounding the manifestations of mind with the *moral constitution*, and so making the *manifesting organ* the *moral constitution* or the *spiritual being*; whereas, the spiritual principle or moral constitution is super-added to life—is imparted to man—the *actings* of which are seen through the *medium of physical structure*, but are not caused by it.

The moral constitution cannot vary; it appeals to principles which are immutable, which cannot fluctuate, or admit of change, according to the alterations of physical structure. The spiritual being is guided and governed by spiritual principles, which admit only of spiritual life and growth, and thus will be always progressive, and will be under the influence of good principles, and moral motives and incentives, as well as moral sanctions and obligations.

While, however, the two are essentially distinct, they stand in that relation to each other, of *organ* appointed for carrying on, and manifesting the peculiar spiritual *functions*. And as such, it is allowed most cheerfully that the state of the organ will have a great influence, not on the moral constitution which is unchangeable except by moral influence, but on the *manifestations of mind* which are bright or clouded, direct or oblique, excellent, or the contrary, according to the state of health or disorder of the said *organ of mind*.

We have thus a gradation in the history of *life* from the humblest individual of the cryptogamous plants up to man himself, the highest created intelligence with which we are acquainted. In the former, the proofs of life are to be found, in all the obscurity of function with which it is enveloped ; and as we proceed upwards, we find a fuller upholding of the principle in the beauty and magnificence of flowers and fruits, in the choice of soils suitable to each ; in their enjoyment, or loss of enjoyment, accordingly as they may have been planted or not in a congenial soil ; in their sleep or wakefulness, and that at particular hours ; in their love of light, their instinctive affection for water, their *choice* of soil to root in, their altering the direction of their roots from one that is uncongenial to another which is more suitable in their neighbourhood ; their enjoyment of warmth ; the death from cold ; their liability to disease ; and finally, the developement of something so very like a nervous system, that, although it cannot be admitted as such, yet from its functions it would seem to be as a substitute, given as a protective warning on the one hand, as in the species of *mimosa* ; or to secure its victim on the other, as in the *dionæa muscipula*.

The origin of a nervous system is to be dimly traced in the very earliest and *most limited* productions of animal nature, as in the invertebrated class of animals, ascending by very slow degrees of progressive developement to that amount of advancement, in which we find first very distinct sensation



and volition, even in brutes; and then onward to man, in whom we again find superadded some new principles suited to his present position and future prospects, as thought, memory, reasoning, *reflection*—the power of literary acquisition, choice of action, and conscience.

In all these varying conditions, *life* exists oftentimes unseen, as the prime moving agent, and the determining cause of all the phenomena which ultimately are exhibited in connexion with its effects. In all these instances it *seems* to be producing the effects connected with its continuance,—not, however, as their *determining cause*, but as the commissioned agent of the Great Governor of the universe.

It is not their *determining cause*,—since, if so, its effects would always be the same, instead of being infinitely varied according to the habits and the situation of the individual. The truth is, that the nature of these phenomena is determined by the creating hand,—in every instance, characterized by infinite wisdom and goodness; and the principle of life is given by *him*, in order to bring out, to sustain, and to perpetuate the arrangements which *he* has made.

In every instance, this life must be referred to a hidden principle which we cannot comprehend,—a principle which has been conferred by the same Almighty hand which *created* an organisation precisely suited to the habits, and tastes, and position of the created being, whatever these might be, always, however, marked by bringing out the de-

signs of the Almighty, and by obedience to *his will*.

We have had a variety of theories of life,—chemical, mechanical, mathematical, electrical,—all of which must have possessed some semblance of truth, in order to give them currency for their little day of existence, yet all failing in this particular, that whatever resemblance there might be in some of these *several phenomena* to the phenomena of living action, there was always this essential difference, that no known power could *give life* to any action, *chemical, mathematical, mechanical, or electrical*.

With regard to the latter, it has appeared in so many instances to resemble nervous influence, to be capable of arousing the slumbering actions of life under such extreme circumstances, and to supply the place of volition to the several muscles of the body ; in fact, to present so many *analogies* with nervous influence as to be supposed to be identical with it. We shall not attempt to destroy these *analogies*—they exist : but even granting, what we could not grant, that electricity was not only *analogous*, but also *identical* with nervous influence, yet nervous influence does not constitute life,—it is only one of its phenomena, (an important one, it is true,) and requires life to characterize its agencies, or to render it permanently effective, in continuing any of the vital phenomena.

Here, then, we see that life does not consist in *one of its phenomena*, however important, any more than in that assemblage of functions which we

have before shown do not constitute life. It is allowed that the different functions of the body are more or less dependent upon nervous influence. and that, deprived of that nervous influence, their function will be perverted, or altogether suspended. But this fact will equally apply to the *blood*, and, indeed, more *strongly*; for unless the nervous structure gets a due supply of blood, it will not furnish a sufficiency of nervous influence to preserve the health of the different organs. The truth is, that both the circulation of the body, and the function of *innervation* are vital phenomena;—are necessary to the continuance of life, but are not life itself; they may assist its restoration, when it is only suspended, but they cannot *communicate* life, and indeed must themselves be set in motion through its assistance.

So again with regard to the mechanical hypothesis. No arrangement of machinery could give life,—none could support it—none even could *imitate* its phenomena. It might be sufficient to determine this theory, merely to mention that machinery possesses no power of self-preservation, or of self-restoration. It is set in motion by a certain power, and may go on as long as that power is continued, and as the several parts of the machinery remain unbroken, and in their ordinary succession; but get one wheel wrong, and the whole machinery stops, and can only be again set in motion by agency from the exterior.

But if in the living machine anything injurious to life has taken place, or any læsion has been sus-

tained, the first effort is an attempt to repair the mischief, to preserve the system from destruction, and to protect it from the ravages of disease. In accomplishing this, it is true, Nature sometimes overacts her part, and produces fever, for instance, when she only intends a certain amount of conservative action. But this is a living process, and is only another proof of the existence of life as a principle independent of *machinery*, and unlike any other known agent. The truth is, there is first machinery, which has no power of self-restoration; and *to this life is superadded*, and with it the power of self-conservation.

To this power, as distinctive from the mechanical theory, must be added that of *voluntary locomotion*, and of *volition* generally. No power communicated to machinery will enable it to move under the influence of *volition*, will enable it to choose or select, to judge and to determine, according to certain given circumstances, what will be best to be done, or, more important than *all*, *to be left undone*; a property of which not even the semblance of analogy can be found in mechanical agency.

Not more happy is the *chemical hypothesis*. For, in the first place, *life* resists the changes which result from *chemical action*. So far from the body being influenced by chemical affinities during *life*, it is actually the fact that life enables it to resist their influence; and the chemical action and reaction of the particles of which it is composed, only become cognizable to the senses after dissolu-

tion has taken place, and decomposition has commenced. Nor can the recomposition of these organic elements again take place under the influence of chemical agency ; so that, in fact, *chemical agency* has nothing to do with their formation, continuance, or restoration ; and therefore it cannot form the origin of vital phenomena, or be coincident with life itself.

It has been asserted that the process of *secretion* is one of elective attraction, and consequently under the influence of chemistry. But it is clear that no chemical “ influence can imitate secretion, or form from one and the same fluid different products, as bile, tears, saliva, perspiration, gastric fluid, and many other secretions of very dissimilar properties ; and so it is also clear that the office of the secreting organ cannot be continued, unless it be duly supplied with nervous influence ; and it has been already shown, that however there may be some analogies between electricity and nervous influence, there is no identity ; and that the one is perfectly incapable of becoming a substitute for the other.

Moreover, there are other processes in nature, such as digestion, sanguification, alimentation, &c., which cannot be referred to chemical action, and over which chemical agency has no influence. These are essentially *vital* actions ; cannot be conducted out of the body—cannot be imitated by chemistry—cannot be hastened or arrested by its influence ; and so long as the body remains in health, and under common circumstances, are

altogether exempted from its agency ; while there is an essential property in all, distinguishing them from any analogous processes, a property to be termed *vital*, conferred only by *life*, and inexplicable except by reference to this primordial law.

Seeing, then, that the phenomena of life are inexplicable upon any of these hypotheses, and, moreover, that life exerts a very peculiar influence upon them, we must next inquire into the operation of this influence on the *morale*, or upon mental manifestation ; for assuredly, as it produces a modifying agency upon the body, so does it also upon the mind.

A very little consideration will show that meditation, reflection, selection, association, judgment, &c., are dependent upon life ; since it must be clear that we exercise these faculties upon impressions formerly received by the senses, assisted by others, which we are enabled by research to procure at the moment ; and that by a just comparison of all three, we are enabled to decide. Thus much before we arrive at *action* ; and when we look to *its* phenomena, to *the will*, and to its varied influence upon different parts of the animal economy, and to the nature of that will, whether *energetic* or *feeble*, *right-minded* or *perverse*, *simple* or *fabricated from various sophisticated views*, we shall see at once the influence which life must exert upon the manifestations of *mind*.

It must be recollected that in man there is a spiritual as well as an animal life ; and that the

former is superadded to the latter, and destined to live beyond it. By this man differs from, and is superior to, the animals around him; from this society takes its origin, with all its written and unwritten laws, sanctions, usages, customs, and principles, and from this arises the developement of moral manifestation,—*important* in a social point of view—but *all-important* as regards the formation of christian character, and the display of christian conduct. One remarkable feature of this spiritual life, because essentially different from any attribute of animal life, is its susceptibility of improvement. We have seen that progression is essential to its very existence; and that while *animal life* is perfect for all its purposes from its original, *spiritual life* is always on the increase; and that although its manifestations may be impeded by its connexion with animal life, and its alliance to the material organs by which it is manifested; although its operations may be checked by an imperfect culture of that organ; although they may be perverted and obscured by disease; although they may be dimmed by age, and suspended by death, still the life is in them; still they are making progress through every difficulty to that day when the veil of mortality shall be drawn aside, and, for weal or for woe, the spirit shall stand disenchanted of its mortal coil, and shall enter into fulness of joy, or sorrow inconceivable.

In considering the phenomena of this compounded life, it is quite necessary always to keep

in view the distinction between *sensation* and *passion*. Thus sensation is produced first upon certain nerves, which are the conductors to the brain ; by it the sensation is perceived, and through it the impression is communicated onwards to the spiritual life, where, according to its nature, and actual or fancied associations, it will develop certain mental conditions, which are called passions, such as anger, grief, joy, fear, &c.

Now the influence of these passions upon animal life is so considerable, and operates so largely upon its phenomena, and through them is again reflected backwards upon the mental manifestations, producing very complicated phenomena, that it is necessary to consider them for a moment ; especially since they operate so largely upon organic life, that it has been supposed, though unjustly, that the passions had their seats in the interior organs of animal life, whereas it will be seen that they only exert an influence upon those organs through the medium of the brain.

For example, an impression is made upon one of the organs of sense, which is communicated to the brain, and gives rise to anger : anger disturbs and agitates the animal spirits ; the action of the heart is accelerated, the blood is sent round its course with an increased impetus ; it is determined chiefly to interior life, and the internal organs get an undue supply, as well as that the momentum with which it circulates is increased. Hence arise disordered function, suspension of natural action, perverted secretion, congestion, inflammation, and a series

of morbid actions by which the organs themselves become points of consciousness; the disorder is perceived by the brain; *its* capacity for intellectual exertion is diminished, and the manifestations of mind are altered.

Again, an agreeable impression is produced, which, in the same way, gives rise to the passion of joy. But the effect upon the body is very different; for, although its first revulsive action (if the occasion be a powerful one) is to drive the blood back to its citadel, yet an almost immediate *reaction* takes place, by which the blood is distributed to the skin, and other extreme vessels, and an impression of tone or health is given to the body, which renders it apt to do well, and fortifies it against the impressions of disorder.

Upon the same principle, hope and all other encouraging passions, give firmness to health, and uphold the bodily functions; while fear, grief, &c., greatly suspend, or weaken, or pervert those functions. Sometimes, if their impressions be of a very violent character, or the constitution have been previously enfeebled, or be of a nervous and highly susceptible character, or be particularly prone to disorder, or be possessed of a compact originally weak, or be exhausted by any long, and especially sudden expenditure of nervous energy, animal life may be extinguished by the vehemence of the impression produced upon the mind, and through it on the harmony of the bodily actions.

This generally happens when sudden, by an immediate effect produced upon the head or the heart;

either the vessels of the former, are so distended by the inordinate quantity of blood which they receive, that congestion largely takes place, and by consequent pressure, the function of the organ is suspended ; or some one or more vessels give way ; or there is a considerable breaking up of the nervous fibre ; and in all these cases the phenomena of apoplexy or paralysis are produced.

So, also, if the heart be feeble, its supply of nervous energy may be suspended by the violence of emotion, so that its function may be superseded at *once* ; or fainting may be produced, and the heart may be incapable of resuming its action in time for carrying on the processes of life, (unless, indeed, artificial respiration had been employed, which in such cases it seldom is, though it *might be advantageously*,) or, from an overloaded state of its cavities, it is so gorged as to be unable to act upon its contents ; or from previous thinning of its coats, or other disease, it may irretrievably give way ; and, again, animal life will be laid down under the disturbing agency of spiritual emotion.

This, too, is a frequent source of slow disease, where the emotion has not been of so sudden or violent a character as at once to extinguish life ; or where the original strength of the organ has been sufficient to enable it to make a successful resistance against the immediate morbid impulse. And in this case, perhaps, the phenomena are somewhat different, and disorder of *general function* is the first thing to be observed ; disease making slow pro-

gress, and disorganisation being the work of much time.

Now this change appears to act *thus*: a painful impression is made, is perceived by the brain, and communicated to the mind, which becomes pre-occupied by it, and makes in consequence large demands upon the cerebral agency; then nervous influence, which is daily produced in order to support the bodily actions, and the mental manifestations, is too exclusively taken up by the latter—not so much, perhaps, for the purpose of *manifestation*, as for the infinitely more *consuming office* of bearing up under, or concealing the constant misery of a wounded spirit. Concentrated and hidden suffering is that which makes the largest demands upon the brain. Now, the result of this is, that a certain quantity only being daily produced, and an undue proportion being given to spiritual suffering, enough is not left to maintain the functions of organic life in all their integrity: the supply of nervous energy to the respective organs, is irregular, or insufficient, or perverted; and disorder of the animal functions is the consequence.

Thus, for instance, disease of the heart has been of much more common occurrence of late years, especially after any season of commercial distress, or political excitement. This was very remarkably exemplified after the revolution in France, and in our own country after seasons of great and unfortunate speculation. Something may be allowed to increased habits of observation on this head; dis-

orders of the heart were neglected till recently, till attention was aroused to their existence, by Senac and Corvisart; but this will not entirely account for the greater frequency with which these disturbances are now encountered.

But it will be asked, how is this? since the heart is not a voluntary organ; since it is even *independent* of the will; and since, therefore, it is sparingly supplied with nerves? Affections of the heart are generated by emotion in two ways; first, through the medium of the blood, and, secondly, through the medium of the nervous system; to which might perhaps be added, a third mode of influence, to be termed *sympathy* with other organs; which, however, resolves itself into another form of nervous influence, only, perhaps, that we may not always be able to trace the filaments of nervous connexion.

a. Disease of the heart is produced through the medium of the impression of the circulating fluid itself, which gives rise to uneasiness of the organ;

By being in too great or too small quantity;

By the force with which it beats against the walls of the heart; or,

By the degree of energy which it calls upon that heart to exert to relieve itself of its oppressive load, or to make up for the deficiency of its *supply*, as well as *for its own diminished energy*, by the frequency and the irritability of its beat.

A slight degree of uneasiness only is at first occasioned, then distress and embarrassment; then intermission, and afterwards suspension, or inter-

ruption of action, till by repetition of these morbid states, a change of structure takes place, intended to accommodate the organ to the new modes of its action, but which is *overdone*, and which gives rise to atrophy or hypertrophy of its muscular fibres, in one or more of its cavities, and to those gradual changes which ultimately terminate in disorganisation.

b. A similar result is produced through the medium of the nervous system. But how is this, since its supply of nerves is so sparing, and since it is not dependent on the will? To this question it is answered, first, that the importance of a nerve in the animal economy is not to be measured by *its size*; for not only in this, but in other instances, do we find small nerves performing the most important functions, and exercising an astonishing power by their direct and associated influence; this, therefore, does not form an objection against the degree of agency exerted upon the heart, through the medium of the nervous system.

In aid of this *a priori* reasoning comes the observation of *facts*. Everybody knows that powerful emotions exert an immediate influence upon the heart, and produce distress there, insomuch, that it has been supposed to be the seat of the affective faculties. This is absurd: the impression which gives rise to emotion, whether from within or from without, is first made upon nervous structure, and is then communicated to the heart, producing, by the violence of its action, or the frequency of its repetition, that state of disorder which has been

mentioned, and which occasions a fresh focus of morbid action, by the irregular and perverted distribution of the blood, which gives rise to uneasiness in all the organs which it supplies.

This influence is *then* more extensively felt in producing disorder of the *general health*. Thus, a certain amount of nervous energy is necessary to the function of digestion; cut off this supply entirely, and digestion is impossible: let it be insufficient, and digestion is only partially accomplished; let it be perverted, and a depraved form of digestion occurs; irritation and uneasiness of the stomach are produced, with acidity, and a long train of horrors: these produce a reflex influence upon the brain, shown first in unwonted sleepiness and inaptitude for intellectual pursuits, followed closely by dreams, and uneasy and unrefreshing sleep; next morning, the patient gets up listless and feeble, and the bodily as well as the intellectual functions are disturbed; headache and irritability are the result; nervous energy is wasted upon trifles, or worse than trifles: the hour of dinner recurs; there is less power of digestion than the day before; and this goes on oftentimes in a rapidly-augmenting ratio, till the stomach becomes the seat of chronic inflammation, and ulceration, or other morbid action, which by slow degrees conducts the patient to the tomb, the victim of his own actions, and frequently the miserable and involuntary suicide of his own better feelings and principles.

But the evil does not rest here; for suppose the

stomach itself to escape, yet the food it has partially and imperfectly acted upon, is not fitted for the next stage in the process of assimilation ; for the same reason, the bile and pancreatic fluids, with which it should be now mixed, are either in undue quantity, or of a vitiated quality ; and consequently their proper influence is lost ; the elaboration and assimilation of this half-digested mass are incomplete ; the process of sanguification is imperfect ; and under such circumstances nutrition is impossible ; the process of absorption goes on, without being balanced by an equilibrium of deposit ; the patient grows thin : and now what more takes place ? Even the deepening shades of morbid action ; blood is supplied in insufficient quantity to the brain ; nervous energy is less and less perfectly distributed ; various irritations, more or less severe, take place in the body ; the head is more and more distressed ; there is less and still less aptitude for intellectual pursuit ; there is a greater prevalence of the peculiar temperament, with diminished power of the will ; till the weakest organ of the body fails, and disorder of general function is converted into local disease, which, in its progress, makes more or less inroads upon the constitution, according as the diseased organ is more or less necessary to the continuance of life ; till, sooner or later, the system is worn out by lengthened irritation.

Such is an every-day example of the influence of the mind upon the body. The same fact is shown by many little circumstances, which need only to

be mentioned, in order to secure the assent of common sense to their truth ; witness the suffusion of the countenance in blushing ; the shrunk features and pale goose-skin produced by alarm ; the chattering of the teeth, under fear and other nervous irritations ; the increase of various secretions from mental emotion, as of the tears in sorrow, or the bile in anger ; the palpitation of the heart, under almost every sudden emotion, the short and quickened breathing of expectation, the oppressed and stifled respiration of intense and harrowing emotion ; the arrested and almost imperceptible action of breathless anxiety and expectancy ; the influence upon the muscles of expression of the countenance, alternately lighted up with joy, or worn with anxiety and suffering, and the thousand varied emotions which they are capable of expressing ; the plump portliness of the man at ease, and the extreme thinness of the victim of deep disappointment, or of any long-continued devouring passion ; so that to be dried by grief—to be devoured by remorse—to be consumed by sorrow, are not only common expressions, but literal representations of actual bodily conditions : such is the influence of interior life upon the body.

We have just alluded to *sympathy* ; a term which represents that state or condition of the mind of man, which forms the basis of all active benevolence towards his fellow-man ; and extends into a thousand ramifications of useful and valuable feeling and action ; a condition which actually represents the sufferings experienced by *one*, in consequence

of the sufferings, wants, sorrows, or destitution of others, and the sincere desire to relieve them. There is a corresponding condition of the nervous system, under which one action is physiologically set up at one part of the system, in consequence of some other physiological action being established at another part of that system: and what is of more importance to our present inquiry, one associated *morbid action* is set up in consequence of an analogous morbid action going on at a distance; this too is oftentimes linked in with many other morbid actions, the connexion with which is very generally *untraceable*, and therefore its existence has been denied, or derided, or doubted, or disbelieved, by persons wanting observation, and who are not disposed to give credence to anything short of demonstration.

Yet, as well might it be said, that there was no sympathy in the human bosom; that man had no regard for the sufferings of his fellow-men; that he could listen unmoved to the recital of others' wretchedness; that he could have the power of relieving their sorrows, without the will—without the promptings of desire to succour the miserable; as well might it be said, that this last and tattered remnant of man's original goodness was extinguished, as that the analogous principle was wanting in his physical constitution.

Of late years, the extraordinary influence of the nervous system in producing simulated disease, has attracted no small share of attention; but the knowledge thus acquired is scanty indeed, com-

pared with what it will one day be, when we know more of the nature and extraordinary agency of that system, which links together every part of the body into one mysterious whole, and which is capable of presenting the most sudden and wonderful transmutations. We shall often have occasion to notice this influence as we proceed ; it is here only necessary to put forth the principle, the workings of which will be afterwards detailed.

This sympathetic action, which may arise in the brain, or in any part of the living machinery, extends to all the organs and functions of the body, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. It is this fact which renders it often difficult to trace back a morbid action to its originating cause, precisely because it has no *direct* connexion with it ; and perhaps has passed through a considerable series of sympathies, before the first disturbing cause has arrived at the *present*, *ultimate* morbid action, which, however, never would have existed but for that cause.

One characteristic of these sympathetic affections is, that they are *involuntary*, and may oftentimes be removed by an effort of the will ; a fact which shows that one powerful impression made upon the nervous system is capable of suspending or superseding another powerful impression made independently of the will, and is one most important proof of the supremacy of mind over matter : the mind, that is, the will as a part of mind, triumphs over the morbid actions of the body ; and this affords a beautiful illustration of

what we have before contended for, viz. the existence of a supreme governing principle, *distinct from*, but *giving laws to*, and *acting through the medium of*, the nervous system.

One other phenomenon of life must be here mentioned, which may be called *constitutional predisposition*. This may consist in some large development of one or more organs of the body ; or it may depend upon the peculiarity of the nervous influence which is conveyed to them ; or upon the nature of the nervous centre which receives the impression conveyed from the organ to the thinking principle ; it may be repressed by habit, or augmented by indulgence ; or it may exist at one time, and not at another. But it will constantly lead to thoughtless action, reflection over which almost immediately produces regret, remorse, sorrow, and repentance. Here again, is exhibited the action of two principles ; the one *bodily*, leading to the gratification of body, and often to a forgetfulness of better motives : the other *mental*, which reproves the individual for having listened to, and acted upon, his organic suggestions ; which recalls him to his better self, awakens his principles, calls up his *moral* defences, enlivens his *moral* sense, and carries him back at once to the divine laws, which are given for the direction of conduct, and but for which man would be a selfish demon, and this world a hell of self-gratifying passion, and of animal predominance without control. But, God be thanked, we have also a better principle warring against this influence of body, and

which carries us above its temptations, by the aid of that strength which is from above, and of that *mind* which has been given by God ; and of that grace of His Spirit which has been promised to the sincere, that is, to him who seeks to be *good*, and to *do good—all the good he can*.

Nevertheless, partly from original constitution, partly from early associations, partly from education, and partly from surrounding circumstances and relations, we have to notice great individuality of character, the predominance of intelligence in one, of affection in another, of passion in a third, of animal degradation in a fourth, and of peculiar aptitudes in all these greater divisions of human action and passion. It is very important in the cultivation of self-discipline, and in the formation of character, to study these peculiarities, to repress those which reason and conscience tell us should be discouraged, and to bring out into stronger and more prominent relief such moral qualifications as will prove the antidote against those constitutional or acquired peculiarities which will keep the *animal* in due subjugation to the *moral man* ; and which will preserve his original dignity, or at least restore it in some measure to that goodly likeness whence it has so grievously fallen.

That will be the best system, the most perfect in its demonstrations, and the least prone to error and obliquity, where these several actions are as nearly as possible equipoised ; where passion animates and kindles, and exalts intellectual life to its highest pitch, yet at the same time without

escaping the government of the will ; and where judgment always effectually modifies and controls emotions, that is, in fact, where the moral nature is made to preside over and govern the animal,—and yet where it is preserved from quietism by the zest of that life which forms the mainspring of action, associates man with man, and gives point and energy to existence.

The various degrees in which this *can be* effected, according to the modifying power exerted by animal organisation over moral and intellectual manifestation ; and, moreover, the various degrees in which it is influenced by the predominance of mind, by the prevalence of the will, and by the just government of organic life ; and the consequent preponderance of *mind* or *matter*, of the *spiritual* or *animal life*, of the *morale* or the *physique* ; and the several peculiarities arising out of this predominance constitute individual character, and form the great and broad basis of human action as it is, rather than as it ought to be.

It is, however, time that our attention were directed for a little space to the *termination* of life. This may happen from disease, or it may occur from the general exhaustion and expenditure of that modicum of life which has been given to every one on coming into the world, but which may be shortened by imprudence and disease on the one hand, or lengthened by care, and by the avoidance of causes tending to the more rapid expenditure of the principle of life.

Where death happens from the gradual waning

of existence in old age, it is not from the giving way of *one* particular organ which would constitute *disease*, but from the slow undermining of one function after another, occasioning loss of power and sensibility, disturbing the united harmony of the economy, so that life is carried on by a considerable effort, till the organs are no longer capable of sustaining that effort, and death occurs, perhaps even without a trace of disease.

In this case, it is found that the senses generally give way *first*, and that their results become feeble and uncertain; while those ordinary impressions which should have stimulated them under common circumstances, no longer arouse them into action. A little reflection will show how obviously this takes place. Perhaps the sight is the first to give way; and it is notorious how much this is the case in the comparatively young; after this the hearing becomes less acute, and finally very imperfect; the touch and smelling become obtuse and indistinct; and all these cease to convey *slight* impressions or accurate notices to the intelligent principle within, through the ordinary medium of communication. The *taste*, however, remains somewhat longer, and is perhaps the last remnant of animal existence; this is strikingly shown by the longing, lingering enjoyment of the pleasures of the table, which is too frequently met with in old persons, and which is in them not wrong in itself, but an instance of misplaced attention and enjoyment.

It has been supposed by some that the *survivor-*

ship of taste, the most purely animal sense, was a proof of how far man had departed from his great original,—how debased and grovelling his nature had become, that he should be stimulated and revived by these sordid enjoyments, so ill suited to an immortal creature, rapidly approaching the term of his mortal existence, and preparing for a new state of being, one of infinite holiness and purity. But this is not true; man has quite enough to answer for without making him *responsible* for what he is not *responsible*, and it will be seen that this change really proceeds from Nature's *conservative* wisdom—preserving that sense which is chiefly necessary to the maintenance of *life*. The others limit intellectual enjoyment, moral usefulness, and social duty; but if the same change had passed upon the sense of *taste*, in how many instances would have resulted that gradual “*dépérissement*” of the body, which would terminate in the extinction of life; and how beautifully has Nature taken care to preserve that life, by rendering its nutrition a source of enjoyment!

In approaching natural death, the state of the *brain* becomes an object of considerable importance, because there are persons who contend for the improvement, ripening, and maturity of the mental manifestations, as man approaches the term of his probation, and is about to drop the material veil of his spiritual faculties. Here, again, the truth is obscured by a desire to serve a favourite hypothesis, which after all is perfectly true in itself, but untrue in its application to certain circumstances.

It is perfectly true that man's moral nature is essentially progressive, and that his spiritual growth is exhibited by the control of his passions, the watching over and conquest of his physical temperament, the subjugation of his evil propensities, and the calmness with which he bears the visitations of the storms of life, his equanimity under trying circumstances, his benevolence towards others, his desire to make them happy and good, his abnegation of self, his diminished love for the world, and increased desire after all that is pure, and holy, and virtuous, sufficiently mark the moral growth, the increased firmness, and development of spiritual principle.

With this admission the spiritualist should be contented ; for it is as much as he requires. But when he contends that the *manifestations* of this principle are more accurate, and lively, and brilliant, and more easily adapted to all the changing circumstances, he asks for more than is true ; and when he goes further, and asserts that the intellectual fire burns brighter as it is drawing nearer to its extinction, (with an exception to be presently noticed,) he contends not only for that which is not true, but which is notoriously the contrary ; for, in the first place, we have seen the change which takes place upon the senses, and it is allowed on all hands that there must be a corresponding paucity and feebleness of the consecutive ideas.

Then the facts are, that literary labour becomes irksome ; first, the elasticity and tension of the intellect are impaired—the power of application is

diminished—the love of pursuit is decreased—the perception becomes slow and erroneous—the imagination, for a long time giving way, becomes quite extinct in old age—the memory of the *immediate past* is obliterated—while that of scenes, and events, and reflections long since passed, remains; the aptitude for comparison in order to inferential reasoning, has been constantly wearing out; and the mind comes to its conclusions, for the most part, as the result of applied, and often misapplied experience; and *therefore* the judgment becomes infirm and vacillating; and all these things show, that the brain is no longer that strong and perfect organ which it once was, but that it partakes the *general decay* of nature—a decay, in fact, which *could not occur*, if the centre of the nervous system retained all its energies.

Two circumstances may be urged against the truth of this position,—first, the fact, that we do sometimes see extraordinary mental power in extreme old age; and next, that there seems to be oftentimes a great degree of energy of the brain, shortly before death takes place. Now, with regard to the former, it is admitted to be true in some solitary instances; but these are only *extraordinary*, the exceptions from the general sequences of nature, which confirm rather than invalidate the rule. And as respects the latter, it is one of those phenomena, perhaps inexplicable, but which seems to be dependent upon a peculiar condition, *preceding*, and premonishing the setting in of dire disaster about to occur in some part of the system.

This is forcibly exemplified in the *stomach*, when the wild cravings of *appetite* and *hunger* do frequently and closely precede that state of exhaustion, in which it is incapable of digestion, or carrying on its function,—in which, in point of fact, it becomes dead. So with regard to the brain, this state of excitement, this “lightening before death,” is the intellectual *craving* which closely precedes the dissolution of the connexion between the *spiritual mind and its organ*. So true is it, that the brain follows in its history the usual changes of organic life, while the spiritual mind *rises superior to*, and is not affected *by* them, except in so far as its manifestations are influenced by the state of the manifesting organ.

Another proof of this condition is the feebleness of the organs of voice, and of the power of locomotion ; both these, it is undeniable, become feeble and uncertain ; and why ? but because they do not get a due supply of nervous energy ; the brain cannot send them a sufficient quantity to give tone to their actions ; hence their feebleness and imperfection ; hence the reaction of the brain upon the muscles becomes weaker as man gradually draws nearer towards his long home ; “ in the day when the keepers of the house shall tremble, and the strong men shall bow themselves, and the grinders cease because they are few, and those that look out of the windows be darkened.”

With regard to the functions of interior life, these appear to survive the decay which has been slowly creeping on the other organs of animal life ;

yet even here the work of dissolution is commencing and *slowly carrying on* the final pulling down of this material tabernacle, which serves as the temporary habitation *for*, and instrument *of*, the spiritual principle.

When an individual *really* dies from old age, it will be found that the organs generally become feeble in their function ; that decrepitude gradually creeps upon all, without any *one* becoming the prominent sufferer ; the measure of life, which has been originally given to each individual, is slowly spent without being extinguished, and death takes place, because the feeble flickering light of senile life has no longer power to be supported, and the person drops from present existence, without having become the subject of disease.

Very much more frequently, however, general death occurs from the giving way of one or other important organ ; from its function being suspended by accident, or acute disorder, or some structural disease. And this will be produced from various causes ; first the ordinary predisposing circumstances and occasional causes of disorder ; or the occurrence of any of the acute specific forms of malady by which human life is constantly threatened ; or by the slower process of organic changes so materially interrupting the peculiar function as to take away from the constitution something essential to its well-being, and producing that degree of irritation, under the combined agency of which, the system *ultimately* gives way ; and sooner or later, *according to the degree of importance of*

the organ diseased, in the animal economy ; and according to the nature and amount of its degeneration or deviation from healthy structure.

Various causes may have contributed to this result ; as first, the original feebleness of any one organ ; its tendency, whether necessary or accidental, to frequent disorder of function ; its want of employment, and, far more frequently than all, the abuse of its function—its too great excitement and consequent collapse, and diminished vitality—an effect which always takes away from its power of resisting disease.

This alteration of structure may be simple or malignant : it may consist in too great or too little growth, which would be simple disorganisation ; or a new structure may be developed of a cancerous or tubercular nature, which, from the rapidity of its growth or its deep injury to the system, or the fearful certainty with which it destroys life, is termed malignant.

It will be easy to see how each individual may become accessory to his own destruction by a want of proper attention in preserving the harmonious equilibrium of interior life ; thus the gastronome prepares the way for disease of the stomach by the constant irritation and overloading of that organ ; the brain is enfeebled or exhausted by the habits of every literary person ; the liver gives way from the stimulation of the drunkard ; the heart and the stomach, too, are more particularly under the influence of strong emotion, and exhausting melan-

choly, and so on, with regard to all the functions of interior life.

And it will be remembered, that, begin where you may, such is the order of dependence of one organ upon another, that the absence or undue performance of function of any *one* introduces that disorder, which, unless timely arrested, involves in its fatal influence every other, destroys the cohesiveness of life, produces morbid sympathy, gives rise to constitutional fever—and then ultimately the organ dies, and involves its neighbour and dependent organs in one common ruin.

Take, for instance, the stomach;—the first symptom of disordered action, perhaps, consists in the slightest degree of uneasiness—not, certainly, to be called *pain*—only just a centre of consciousness, which teaches the individual he possesses a stomach, whereas, if *perfectly healthy*, the function of this organ would be carried on unconsciously; and probably with this condition there is a frequent tendency to acidity, so that the work of digestion becomes laborious; and the food received into the stomach is very apt to ferment, rather than to digest.

This state may arise from various causes; and it is very generally neglected. It may be, that the supply of nervous energy is not sufficient to prevent disordered action; and this, because the stomach is asked to do more than its native power will enable it to accomplish; or because the supply of nervous energy is cut off, in consequence of the

brain not producing enough, (which, however, would involve the idea of prior disorder of the brain,) or in consequence of too much being expended upon some other organ or function.

Both cause and effect are generally misunderstood; the patient rests in generalities; he has a weak stomach, or his digestion is not good, or he has eaten something which disagreed with him; and the inquiry ends here, instead of really ascertaining what is the cause for this commencement of evil; and so, the time for remedial agency is suffered to pass unimproved; nature's apprehension of evil is entirely thrown away; till the consciousness becomes a pain, and a grand centre for the radiation of morbid action; digestion becomes more and more feeble; the food is not properly assimilated; the body is not adequately nourished; the blood ceases to acquire all the red particles it demands; the cerebral system is supplied by blood which is not endued with a sufficient amount of vitality; the production of nervous influence is rendered uncertain, irregular, defective, or even irritative; every function languishes; every organ is tossed from its equilibrium, and becomes less and less capable of supporting life; disease advances, and the system is worn out by irritation, if not previously destroyed by *ulceration* of the stomach; so also with regard to other organs, which we cannot now particularize.

How far, then, are the organs of interior life acted upon by passion? How far may they be said to be the seat of those passions? How far

may life be said to be destroyed by emotion? **It** has been asserted that the organs of interior life are the seat of passion; and that we are to look to the influence upon them for the cause of death in all those cases when the event seems to have been produced by emotion. It is more than questionable, however, how far emotion has any *direct* influence upon these organs; that it has an *indirect* influence through the medium of the brain, none can doubt; but unless it be *direct*, other causes may operate intermediately so as to produce the effect which may have been ascribed to the agency of *one cause, which, in fact*, formed only a *link* in the chain of causation.

Now it has been asserted by Bichat, that death from emotion, temporary as in fainting, permanent and irretrievable as is this state when prolonged, is produced first by the suspension of the action of the heart, leading to the extinction of the function of the brain. Now it is perfectly true, that temporary death or fainting is produced by the loss of action of the brain, arising from a defect in its supply of blood; and thus the cause of fainting seems to be the suspended action of the heart. And so it is; but the question here presents itself, "*What produces the suspended action of the heart?*" Why, it is somewhat tauntingly replied, *Emotion!* Granted; but how is *emotion communicated to the heart?* How is a lively feeling of joy, or sorrow, or fear, or suspense, or any other passion given to the heart? Clearly, only through the medium of nerves which communicate everywhere, the

different sensations of the different and distant parts of the animal economy. But these nerves are a still earlier link in the chain of causation ; nerves originate *from*, or terminate *in*, the brain. Whether, therefore, emotion is produced from without or from within, its first impression is made upon nervous structure ; when originating from *without* upon one of the senses ; when arising from within as a mental emotion, still made upon nervous structure, and only capable of manifestation through the material structure, the brain, and therefore, in both cases, cognizable to the heart, only through the medium of the brain.

But if the *first* effect be produced upon the nervous system, and communicated to the heart, then the heart's action is arrested or suspended ; the supply of blood is cut off from the brain, and its function is entirely suspended ; the latter is only a reflex action, dependent not upon a *primary marked* action of the heart, but upon a secondary influence. Still, if fainting or temporary death be produced by a suspension of action of the heart, which is only a consequence or result of another action commencing in the brain, and communicated to the heart, it can no longer be said that death from emotion is produced by a *primary* influence upon the heart, which influence has been shown to be *secondary* and *dependent* upon a primary affection of the brain. It is one of Bichat's favourite dogmas, that the influence of the passions is expended upon *organic life*. If so, the passions *must* have their seat in those organs, or they *must*

not. If the former hypothesis be assumed, **facts** on every side prove the contrary,—show that **they** have a mental origin, and, consequently, that **their** influence upon organic life must be intermediate and secondary. And, therefore, if they have **not** their seat in those organs which are affected only secondarily, it follows that the whole hypothesis fails in its first and fundamental proposition.

Bichat supports his views by the analogy which subsists between *fainting*, which is the result of *emotion*, and the same state which follows disorganisation of the heart; and infers, that as the cause of the one is in the heart, so ought also the other. No reasoning can be more inconsequential; as if an analogous condition of the organ might not be the result of different and even of very opposite causes; and as if there were not a thousand instances to the contrary; witness the flow of tears produced by joy and sorrow—of appetite destroyed equally by the former as by the latter emotion; of chilliness or *peau de poule* produced by very opposite emotions—all, however, agreeing in the one consequence of sending the blood to its citadel.

Again, Bichat supports his opinion by the assertion that the distress which instantly precedes fainting, is felt about the region of the heart, and not about the brain. It is extraordinary, that Bichat did not perceive how readily this was to be explained by the different sensibility of the two organs, the one being *highly*, the other *sparingly* sensitive to lesion; and that, were not this sufficient to explain the phenomena, they would still

be accounted for by the distress occasioned in the heart's action from the interrupted supply of nervous energy. And, after all, it is completely answered by a recurrence to the fact, that the heart *can* receive no notice of the invasion of the peculiar affection *except through the medium of the brain*. It is puerile endeavouring to support his views by the fact, that the actor in counterfeiting death from emotion on the stage always carries his hand to his *heart*, and not to his head, in order to express the violence of his sufferings; as if this were not sufficiently explicable by the prejudices of education, which speak of the emotions of the heart; by the faculty of imitation, handed down from generation to generation; and by the admitted fact, that distress is produced in the heart through the intermediate agency of the brain.

Again, Bichat contends for his peculiar views by the frequent occurrence of disease of the heart, in individuals who have suffered long from mental emotion. There can be no doubt that the *distress* of the organ above alleged to be produced by emotion, and the consequent interruption of its functions, must tend to produce disease of the heart; and it is a matter of recorded fact, that after any great political struggle, or commercial crisis, disease of the heart is much more frequent than in times when the placid brow of prosperity is not even corrugated by a wrinkle of anxiety. But the same will be said of the other organs of interior life, particularly of the stomach, liver, and other abdominal viscera. Nothing, therefore, is more *diffi-*

cult than to fix this as a PECULIAR morbid action; whereas nothing is more easy than to explain all the mischiefs which arise to interior life from *one cause*, viz. the defective supply of nervous energy from that great nervous centre which forms the emporium of organic industry, and distributes their several power to work to different organs, accordingly as they may be differently circumstanced. And even if this argumentation were to fail, which it cannot, still there would remain the unanswerable fact, that under the influence of emotion functional disorder and organic disease of the brain are more common than similar states of the heart, exactly in proportion as we should expect to be the consequence of a *direct* rather than an indirect influence upon the organ and its functions.

Again, the assertion that the cerebral system exerts *no* direct influence upon the circulation, is only a proof how far the investigations of science may be diverted from *truth* by the pre-conceptions of some favourite theory, to the support of which every thing must bend. And, in the present instance, is not the crimson glow of shame produced by an impression of mind upon the circulation? Is not the heart palpitating under the breathlessness of expectation? Is not its action quickened by joy? rendered slower by grief? until accelerated by exhaustion? and made irregular by the alternations of hope and fear, of anxiety, and the relief of excitement from anticipation, of collapse from disappointment, and many other varying conditions? And shall it then be said that emotion

has no direct influence upon the circulation? Let our only hope and wish be truth; and we shall perceive that a mantle of ingenious sophistry has been thrown over this attractive theory. Bichat goes on to state, "Break off and annihilate all the nervous connexions of the heart with the brain, and the circulation still goes on." How has this been tried? Can it be tried, and the individual live? And if not, is it not just as argumentative to say, Break off the connecting links of nervous influence from any other vital organ, and its function remains unimpaired? Yet is not this egregiously untrue?

Lastly, Bichat supports his position by one other argument equally futile with the rest, viz. that where fainting is not produced by emotion, still that *other* disturbances of the heart's action are to be found; and that in all these cases the subject of such emotion refers the uneasiness to the heart. Now this would have been already sufficiently answered by what has been before remarked, that the heart has *no cognisance* of these troubles except through the medium of the brain. But it is extraordinary that so great a physiologist should have overlooked one almost universal law of morbid action, and passion, or sympathy, viz. that the disorder of one organ is perpetually referred to another; and that if the pathologist judged only of the seat of disease from the locality to which pain is referred, he would every day commit the most grievous errors.

Therefore, we conclude from the foregoing reasoning, that death, when it is produced by powerful emotion, is *occasioned* either by an action upon the brain itself, or through its intermediate agency, upon some other organ essential to life ; immediately, or intermediately, therefore, death from mental emotion is produced by the disorder of the vital machinery, set up by the failure or the morbid action of the brain.

Death, that is, *general death*, is, however, as has been before stated, produced by the prior death of some one organ, more or less important to life, which by the arrest of *its* function interrupts the whole. Let us illustrate this position by considering the lungs as that portion of the machinery which has given way ; and here, again, it will be seen how all-important an agent in the animal economy is the brain ; and however justly the heart may have been said to be the *ultimum moriens*, still it must be confessed that the brain is the *primum mobile*, and that the heart cannot exist without the sustained action of that viscus.

It is well known that the chief function of the lungs is respiration, and that this respiration is for the purpose of converting the black blood of the right side of the heart into the red blood of the left side ; and that this process is effected through the medium of the air inspired, which parts with its oxygen, and receives in exchange the carbonaceous matter of the blood ; by which process it becomes renovated, again fitted for going the round of the

circulation, and for maintaining that energy and harmony of action which are essential to the well-being of the individual.

Suppose, then, this function of the lungs to be interfered with, and that either by a defect in its own structure, or by the absence of a due supply of pure air, this change is not effected, the blood is not decarbonized, and *black blood* is sent to the brain; inasmuch as such blood is unfitted to support cerebral action, it becomes at once irregular, and soon ceases altogether. It must be recollected that every kind of suffocation produces its first mischievous effect upon the head, from the mere dizziness arising from the inhalation of non-respirable gases or contaminated atmospherical air, to the fully-formed suspended animation of hanging or drowning: a condition in which the sufferer is recalled from death to life by restoring, it is true, the function of *respiration*. But how? By inducing artificial respiration, and in various ways rousing the nervous energy of the muscles of respiration, till they will re-assume their action; so that even here it will be seen that the *nervous system* is the great agent through which life is suspended and restored; and it should also be remembered that the effect of the transmission of *black blood* is far more prejudicially felt upon the brain than upon the heart itself; and, therefore, under such circumstances, the function of the former ceases earlier than that of the latter.

But the brain has a wonderful influence upon the lungs! Let there be but a momentary suspen-

sion of cerebral action, and the function of the lungs is immediately interrupted; not that the direct action of the brain is indispensable to that of the lungs, but to the continuance of action of the *respiratory muscles*, which are the chief agents in conducting that all-important process. Let it be always kept in view, that so soon as the action of the brain is even momentarily suspended, so do the muscles become paralysed, and breathing is at an end.

Such being the fact, it is a provision of nature's, of exquisite beauty, and worthy of the highest admiration, that these muscles are only *partly voluntary*: a fact of which any individual may convince himself by determining to hold his breath—that is, to cause the work of respiration to cease. It is well known that this can be done only within certain limits, and that after a little while, despite every *voluntary* effort to the contrary, and in opposition to the *firmest will*, the muscles *will act*, notwithstanding every obstacle, and respiration is continued.

The wisdom of this arrangement is still further shown by the action of the heart being altogether independent of the *will*—at least, as a *direct* agent, and under common circumstances,—for it will be seen that the history reported by Cheyne of the individual who could die when he pleased was *extraordinary*; that this power is not possessed by ordinary individuals; and that even if it were, the action is not *direct* upon the heart, but *indirect*, through a power to suspend or supersede the law of

nature mentioned in the last paragraph, by which respiration is recalled in spite of every effort of the will to the contrary ; the exception only proves the rule, which is, that the will has no power over the heart, and for the wisest of reasons,—that the function of the heart does not admit of suspension, without imminent danger to the individual. When, therefore, death takes place by the action of the brain upon the heart, the *first* link in the chain is, interruption of the cerebral function, loss of power, and perhaps paralysis of the intercostal and other auxiliary respiratory muscles, and diaphragm ; cessation of breathing, and of the renovation of the blood consequent upon respiration ; then, not only are the cavities of the heart gorged with black blood, but that viscus itself is supplied with black blood, and black blood cannot support its vital energy ; consequently, its muscular fibres become feeble, and finally incapable of any action.

It is also possible that the interruption of the regular supply of nervous influence transmitted to the heart from the brain may have a considerable influence in hastening this destructive process ; but it should seem that the muscular fibres of the heart did not require this influence to excite them to action beyond, at least, just so much as may be adequate to make them duly sensible of the presence of their peculiar stimulus—*the blood* upon which the heart is to contract, and which it is to distribute over the entire system. But the heart is a centre of nervous sympathy of the first importance, and this sympathy can only be kept up by

preserving it in close intercourse with the brain. Therefore, it is probable that its chief supply of nervous influence from the brain is for the purpose of fitting it to carry on the important office it holds in the moral and social economy of man; the beauty, and value, and intrinsic excellence of this arrangement, are beyond the powers of estimation of the human intellect.

All the other functions of the body,—digestion, secretion, locomotion, and many others, are dependent upon the brain generally, though intermediately. The only corollary we would now draw from this discussion is, how easily and how considerably the brain and its higher intellectual and mental manifestations may be irritated, interrupted, perverted, disturbed, suspended, or destroyed, by their distant organic irritations: the value of this inference will be seen in a future chapter.

Death is not the termination of existence—it is the suspension of the present order of arrangement, and notwithstanding all that infidelity may allege to the contrary, it is most unphilosophical and unwise to look upon this separation as the gate of annihilation; for even taking up the very inferior position of the fate of the *material body*, the general law of nature is, that when the particles of matter, which now enter into a certain arrangement constituting form shall be dissociated, they will undergo a change which prepares them for entering into new forms and combinations. *What* that change may be, it is not for us to say; but there is no philosophical reason against the ulti-

mate re-arrangement of these particles in a combination similar to that which has previously existed : consequently, death forms no argument for the destructibility of *mind*.

Mind, as we have seen at an earlier stage of our inquiry, is a property imparted to matter, so far as regards the greater number of created beings ; in whom it is to be found according to their intended locality, in a greater or less degree of perfection, from the earliest traces of a nervous system up to the most perfect developement of animal instinct. But when the term is employed to represent the mental manifestations of another order of created beings,—of moral, religious, accountable *man*,—it is then spoken not simply of a property attaching to matter, but comprehends a principle superadded to animal matter, associated *with*, but *not* resulting *from*, a certain order of nervous system ; dependent upon it for all its manifestations, but guiding, directing, governing, these manifestations according to its presiding WILL.

Over this spiritual principle death has no power, except that of *suspending* its manifestations : it has no essential property in the present arrangement of nervous fibres ; and when that arrangement is severed, it equally exists in all its integrity, obscured indeed for a time, during the interval of change from one to another *mode of existence*,—a change in itself not more wonderful than the chrysalis stage of the butterfly ; and of the history of which we *know just as much*. Who would conjecture that the chrysalis *had life*, till it was touched ; and who,

independently of experience, would believe that the same chrysalis would in a few days, or weeks, or months, appear as a most beautiful moth? The death of the caterpillar was no annihilation; it was only a suspension of existence, and a preparation for entering into new forms and more beautiful combinations. Just so, but *à fortiori*, the only change upon mind in death, is the suspension of its actions; it is not even pretended that its particles are dissevered; and though we know not the change which has passed upon it, or the nature of its mode of existence during the suspension of its connexion with the body, yet we have the best reasons for *knowing* that it is not destroyed, and for *believing* that, in some way or other, to us unknown, the consciousness of its existence is continued; and that that existence is productive of happiness, or of discomfort to itself, according to the moral position it shall have occupied on earth; according as it shall have yielded its noble powers to become the slave of animal organisation, or as it shall have claimed for itself the supremacy, and by the help of God shall have governed the animal propensities, and submitted them to the great end of existence, the GLORY OF GOD and THE GOOD OF MAN.

The phenomena of death, therefore, afford no argument to the materialist for the destructibility of mind; much *less* to the *moral philosopher*, who does not close his eyes to the existence of a *spiritual* principle superadded to matter, associated with it for a time, as the vehicle of communication with

external nature ; and still less to the *Christian philosopher*, who looks to the page of Revelation, to carry on his views beyond what reason can impart ; and who cheerfully receives what is written for his instruction, willingly acknowledging, that there are many things both in nature and in art, which he cannot explain ; and rejoicingly yielding his assent to revealed truths, though they are beyond his reasoning powers, and *revealed for this very reason*, that *they are* beyond the powers of finite minds to discover or to understand ; *in which, though beyond* his comprehension, he finds nothing opposed to reason, but, on the contrary, presenting, as far as his eye can see, the same analogies of nature around him, with the phenomena of which he is more largely, though still imperfectly *acquainted*.

Thus, then, though the disorder of death has invaded the goodly proportions of the animal frame ; though it has riven asunder its most intimate connexions ; though it has extinguished the lamp of intellect, and suspended all the manifestations of mind ; though the material tabernacle once tenanted by the immaterial spirit is lying in ruins, and presents no traces of its former self,—yet that spirit exists ; there it is ready, and awaiting the time appointed for its final change of being, to enter into those forms and combinations which shall be appointed. Of that time, and of those forms, we *know nothing* ; but we believe that it will assuredly come ; and that the change will be one infinitely glorious and happy, extending all the powers of

intellect and feeling, expanding the affections in a region of perfect purity, where there shall be perfect knowledge and perfect happiness.

It has been asserted that the gradual decay of mental power, and its renovation, form an argument for its future existence. But this is not the case ; it is dependent upon one of the laws of living matter ; it is, in fact, a change of the *manifesting organ*, and not of the *function manifested*, or of the *presiding spirit* which gives laws to that function. The brain is undergoing perpetual alteration, but the same mental phenomena continue ; the same order of temperament, and the same consciousness of identity exist, and give laws to the individual character, and constitute it the *same person*, however it may have been changed by circumstances—however it may have lost its elasticity by *time*—however the angular points and asperities of early character may have been worn down by contact, and sometimes collision with his fellow-men ; and still further, however much it may have been modified by impression, exalted by circumstances, or perverted by disease. Notwithstanding all these causes and many others which act upon the brain, still that organ continues the medium of mental phenomena, just in the same manner as the liver continues to secrete *similar bile*, though every particle of the secreting organ may have been changed many times over.

The inference we would draw from these considerations is, that if this be the case, the present life should be a constant preparation for such a state

of being ; and that there should be a perpetual subjugation of matter to mind, and of mind to moral motive ; that there should be a perpetual keeping under of the body, and the constant education of all that is valuable, and praiseworthy, and good in man, in order that he may grow in everything, that his life may be a perpetual exemplification of the principle of progression, which has been so largely insisted upon in a former part of this volume.

CHAPTER VII.

ON THE MENTAL PROPERTIES: THEIR HEALTHFUL
TENDENCIES, AND DISORDERED INFLUENCE.

IN the progress of our inquiry into the reciprocal influence of body and mind upon each other, it is necessary to enlarge a little on the healthy manifestations of mind, where all is harmony, and beauty, and comfort; and to show in what way these manifestations are to be distinguished from the mental phenomena of the lower animals, in whom *many of the same properties* are to be found, but who want the superadded spiritual principle which belongs to man in the order of God's creation, and which constitutes him only a little lower than the angels. It is necessary for us to inquire into both these points, that we may the better understand and appreciate what are the *morbid manifestations* to be hereafter considered, and wherein they differ from the *defective* manifestations of animals.

In the subsequent observations, it should always

be recollected, that according to the author's belief, the manifestations of animal mind are purely *cerebral* ; while those of man are the offspring of a superadded spiritual principle, characterised, indeed, aye, even modified, and sometimes perverted, by the cerebral medium through which they pass ; by its original affinities, by its education, by its state of health and disorder, whether permanent or temporary, and by all the other agents which promote or undermine the health and comfort of the body ; yet, nevertheless, so as that the spiritual principle be held supreme, and that it be the directrix of the will, the responsible *moi*, which is to give an account of ALL *the deeds* done in the body.

The great characteristic difference between the two is, in the *presence* of thought in the one, and its *absence* in the other ; thought being an attribute of that superadded spiritual principle, which aspires after immortality ; and which, in so doing, stretches out into infinitude ; brings near and appropriates the revealed realities of an unseen future world ; reconciles man to his present lot, by the prospects of futurity ; compares things present with things to come ; anticipates and prepares for coming joy or sorrow ; and identifies man, not only with all times, all places, all people, but with that which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.

But do not brutes think ? We fearlessly answer, No. An antagonist may ask, what then is the sum

of their mental manifestations? Our reply will be briefly this : It is allowed that they *perceive* impressions made upon the senses ; that they *recollect* these impressions, or, at least, that they are capable of being revived by circumstances connected with the original impressions ; and that there appears to be a kind of *reasoning* upon these circumstances, a *reasoning* which results in intelligent action. The power of anticipation has been denied to brutes, and with considerable justice ; for it is clear, that they do not anticipate coming events, at least, by a process of reflective reasoning. Yet there is species of forethought or prescience about them—doubtless from impressions made upon *their more acute senses*, which escape ours, and which leads them to prepare for certain approaching evils, as to seek shelter from the coming storm, to migrate on the approach of winter to a climate better suited to their habits and necessities, and to prepare for the reception of their young. Yet in all these circumstances, and many others, it will be seen on examination, that the action depends upon *imparted knowledge or instinct*, not upon *originated knowledge or reason*.

To exemplify this offspring of animal intelligence, take, for instance, *the horse*, an animal which in his domesticated state at least is very liable to the impressions of fear. He is scared to-day by some object which produces in him apprehension, and the desire to avoid it, which he does by starting out of the way, to the no small annoyance of an unaccustomed rider, who in a

moment of thoughtlessness and irritation freely applies the whip ; and for this indiscretion he will suffer perhaps for months, for on the following day, when the animal has to pass the same object, there is the original impression of *fear*, aggravated by the recollection of the chastisement he had received the day before ; and it will be long before this remembrance will be superseded by kind treatment. Here, then, is the impression of fear, the recollection of suffering, the expectation of both evils, and the desire to fly from them. But this is not *reason* ; for if it were he would have inferred that the chastisement was given for starting, and however unjustly given, he would have endeavoured to overcome his apprehension, and not by increased fear have incurred the risk of more chastisement ; and, moreover, he would have discovered that the subsequent kind treatment was to supersede his fearfulness, and to it he should have at once responded. Here, then, is the great difference between *instinct* and *reason*.

But we have heard of an instance of recollected impression which looks still more like reasoning. A restive animal would not pass a certain spot, for no apparent cause but that he *would not*. His owner determined upon the following method of curing him. He sent his groom to the spot, with directions to keep the animal there for twenty-four hours. On approaching it, he showed the usual vicious determinativeness not to proceed. The groom quietly rode him to the spot, and kept him there. After a time, he began to give symp-

toms of uneasiness, and of a wish to proceed. But no! the groom obeyed orders; no corn, no hay, no water, no stable, no nice clean bed to rest upon, nothing but the constant monotony of maintaining his position, employing only one set of muscles, and sustaining the unvarying and monotonous load of the groom's weight upon his back. When the twenty-four hours were accomplished, he was taken home, and ever afterwards was cured of the disposition to restiveness; and hence it is inferred that he *reasoned* that the indulgence of his evil temper had procured him so much inconvenience that he had better not indulge it again. But it is clear that the simple recollection of the discipline would be quite enough to induce him to pass the spot without his former restiveness; that is, there would be *instinctive*, but not *inferential action*; action the result of instinct, but not the consequence of reason.

None can doubt the superior accuracy and extent of information derived to brutes from their senses, over the more gifted animal *man*; and none can doubt his superiority, evinced as it is by his position in society, and by his supremacy over all the inferior animals. Nor is this reconcileable to the facts, to the history of the creation, or to the wisdom and goodness of the Creator, except by the simple truth of the perfection of brute sense and instinct, or imparted knowledge, to supply the place of that *acquired knowledge* or reason which man possesses, and which renders unnecessary for his conservation that superiority of notice from the

senses which is possessed by the inferior animals. This, again, is exemplified in savage life, where there is little developement of reason, and where the senses are infinitely more acute than in a more advanced stage of civilization. Here, therefore, again, we conclude that brutes do not reason.

It appears, then, that the memory of the inferior animals consists not in mental recollection, but in the renewal of some earlier impression upon the organs of sense, which is perceived by the brain, and awakens into action certain other nervous fibres, which have been stimulated beforehand into associated movement; and that this awakening leads to an instinctive act of volition, which for a moment looks like consideration, reflection, reasoning, result, but which is, in fact, *purely sensorial*. Then, also, the excellence of their senses, and the instinct, which belong to their conservation, and which are so strongly marked throughout the whole of nature's domain, will abundantly explain all that looks like the *anticipation* of a *spiritual principle*; a principle which they do not possess, a principle which is superadded to man, *because* he is a moral and accountable creature, and which we are told by Revelation (as it also commends itself to our reason and philosophy) is in itself both immaterial and immortal.

Thus, then, we are prepared to understand a grand distinction between the thought of man and other animals, viz. that the former originates or possesses intuitive thought, which the other

does not. It is not pretended that man has any other sources of obtaining information except through his senses; but the point of difference is this, that the inferior animal perceives the knowledge communicated through the senses, and instinctively acts upon it; while man equally, though not so accurately or extensively, receives his information through the senses; but then he digests, elaborates, and appropriates that information; he lays it up for future use; he reflects upon it; he associates and compares it with other notices previously received; he rectifies former mistakes, or discovers new modes of appropriation; he weighs the goodness of things in the balance of reason and conscience; he looks forward to the bearings of certain actions, to their future consequences upon himself and others; he divests himself of selfish propensities in active benevolence to mankind; and, above all, he considers what is the supreme will of the *Governor* of the universe, and what will redound most to the glory of his Maker; and then he comes to a judgment, an intelligent, moral, and religious result, which has arisen within himself, from the actings of the spiritual principle, and from its power of ascertaining the present and future relations of things; in a word, from intuitive thought.

This *thought* is liable to *disorder*, another important distinction between the mental manifestations of man, and those even of the superior animals. We believe that their mental properties are perfect in themselves, that is, *adequate to the*

end proposed ; and we have no reason for believing that, during their waking moments, these are liable to any material alteration. The brain continues its action ; the amount of knowledge remains the same ; and the mental phenomena present the same phases, except as use and experience give a greater facility of *employment* to the faculties, in the application of their imparted knowledge.

But man is liable to perpetual disorder in the manifestations of mind ; any disturbance of the spirit will irritate the brain, and render it unfit for the full and perfect performance of its function ; and every little bodily ailment will equally prevent it from being the willing servant of the immaterial principle within. A certain degree of cloudiness, or dimness of thought, creeps over the subject of these lesser ailments—he often knows not why ; there is an inaptitude for mental exertions ; a torpifying stupidity grows upon him ; he thinks with effort, and without result ; and in this very impossibility of continuing the activity of thought, the greatest foe to literary activity, *sleep*, finds its entrance. The student rouses himself from its withering influence, throws aside his books, and thinks he will write. But, no ! not an idea is forthcoming ; and after some vain attempts to originate, his enemy claims the victory, and the majesty of mind lies prostrate beneath the tyranny of, perhaps, some very little derangement, yet enough to overturn the harmony and integrity of the brain's action. And why is all this ? but that

the finer machinery necessary for carrying on the higher functions of intellectual existence is more easily thrown from its equilibrium than those grosser particles which belong to animal nature only? Why is it, but that in proportion to its complication, a greater variety of causes act upon it? Why is it, but that in *the one instance*, nature has done every thing she could to perfect the animal organisation; and that *on the other*, there is a superadded principle, *originally* perfect in its kind, but upon which a perverting change has passed, so as to render it liable to a thousand ills, both bodily and mental, from which spring all the varieties of morbid manifestation. We do not purpose to trace the operation of these causes into the deepening shades of insanity and the cheerlessness of imbecility, through many stages of mental suffering and bodily disturbance; it is enough for our present purpose to show that the *one* is more liable to disorder than the *other*, and that the creature upon which the greatest pains have been bestowed, nature's highest and most perfect work, is in this respect less perfect than the inferior animal tribes,—a conclusion which is *not to be understood*, if the position of man and other animals be the same; only that man is *more perfect*, which ought to render him less liable to *imperfection*; but which is *perfectly explicable* upon the assumption of his compounded nature, and of his possessing a *spiritual principle* over and above the cerebral intelligence of his perfect neighbours.

But we pass on to notice the hypothesis of Sir

Charles Morgan, with regard to "*relative sensibility*"—terms which he employs to denote the keystone of his reasoning, and as opening a way to the explication of mental phenomena. As far as it is permitted to understand his hypothesis, it appears to be a *material offset*, from that utilitarian theory, by which every thing exists, according to a certain *ideal fitness*; and is, in fact, the result of an undefined and powerful principle, which links together all kinds of phenomena, and produces them by that species of action and re-action which arises from certain *ill-understood affinities* between certain *ill-defined particles*; but which, placed within a certain sphere of action, produce effects, how or why it is not sought to explain, but simply because there are such particles, such affinities, and such a sphere of attraction and repulsion.

Here, *sensibility*, or the power of feeling, is taken up as the connecting link in the phenomena of animal organisation, action, and passion, and is employed in the room of that moral or physical fitness of things which we have just mentioned; and the term *relative* explains the relation of the function to its organ, and of organ to function, in the scale of animated being, in reference to immediate circumstances, and to the end purposed to be accomplished. This attempt involves the explication of all *mental* phenomena, upon the relative sensibility of organic life; and looks no higher than to a certain developement of tissue, leading to a peculiar, though confessedly an undefined result. As in almost every other error, there is also in this

a certain admixture of truth, which, to the fond eye of the author, veiled his hypothesis with that character, and was sufficient to make it pass *for truth* with the prejudiced or the careless; with those who look out for support to preconceived notions, as with those who will be contented to receive an agreeable explication, without the trouble of asking whether it is *vraisemblable*.

It is quite true that there is a most perfect adaptation of organ and function to their relative position in animal life; that the organisation is admirably adapted to the habits and instincts, wants and actions, of the animal; that throughout creation there will be found a law of exquisite fitness in organic machinery, to fulfil all the apparent duties of the animal; and that order and harmony reign throughout the wide domain of animated nature, in such way that each animal is *perfect*, occupies its peculiar *locale*, and does not interfere with the actions of any other, except in so far as the universal principle of conservation renders it necessary for one animal to live upon another.

But the great question is, whether this results from a primordial law of a Great First Cause, or from a certain subordinate physical agent, termed "*relative sensibility*," distributed to different animals, in exact proportion to the wants of their organisation, and the necessities of their vital position; and being resident in a *tissue*, whose *developement* in the *various species* is regulated by the sphere of *activity necessary to their PRESERVATION*. Now, it is granted that this is true

with regard to the power of locomotion, but the great question is, how far *this* is dependent upon "*relative sensibility*"; and even if so, how far the principle can be adopted as a universal law, to explain the general movements of the animal economy. It may be allowed that the power of locomotion is dependent upon the will, and that the desire and the will to move are also dependent upon a certain state of cerebral organisation; and, therefore, upon a certain degree of *relative fitness* between the organ appointed to move the *muscles*, and the *muscles* themselves, as well as *the thing to be moved* by this process. The latter is an indispensable link in the chain of *relation*; and if the hypothesis of *relative sensibility* is to explain all the phenomena, the thing to be moved must also possess some portion of the same quality. But it may be incapable of sensibility: therefore the relationship may exist without the sensibility; consequently, *sensibility* may be a mere adjunct, and though very agreeable, by no means *necessary* to explain the power of locomotion.

Admitting, however, for the sake of argument, the *necessity* for this hypothesis to account for the phenomena of locomotion, and its *power of explaining* those phenomena, we next inquire how far it can be adopted as a general principle of explication for other bodily and mental phenomena. That there exists some connexion between the perception of an impression made upon the senses, and the thought which arises from it, or the act of volition which is its consequence, we are free to allow; and

also that there is a connexion between organ and function ; and in the absence of a better *term*, we would not even object to that of *relative sensibility*. But we deny the proposition, if it be intended to assert that this is a *necessary* connexion ; and that the individual upon whom the impression is made, may not, perceiving that impression, choose whether he will attend to it or not,—whether he will allow its influence as a motive to action or not,—and whether, admitting its influence, he will allow himself to become subjected to its tyranny. In fact, on *this point* turns the whole of the controversy ; if the hypothesis be admitted in its full extent, man is not accountable for his actions ; but is, what he is constituted by the *relative sensibility* of the *cerebral tissues*, and the *sensorial tissue* upon which the impression is first made,—the creature of impulse and animal propensity ; but *not* the intellectual, moral, spiritual being, which we see him to be, and believe him to be.

Facts are directly at variance with this supposed method of explaining human opinion or conduct ; for in the best-regulated minds we see action produced, not according to the cerebral movement, which has arisen from the excited sensibility of one of the senses, or of some organ in direct relation with its tissue ; but, on the contrary, we see reason, judgment, moral and religious sanction, relative and social ties, and many other of the better parts of our compounded nature, exert their influence to *oppose* the propensity thus induced ; we see these motives triumph over the voice of passion, and the

moral, spiritual nature gain a victory over the animal; the agency of self-denial places the individual above the reach of his organic suggestions; and he stands forth a monument of the wisdom of the Creator, and of that *goodness* which sustains his creature through the intricacies of moral probation, and enables him to act according to HIS will; for it must never be forgotten that man is frail and feeble: he cannot *will* or *act* without the *power* being imparted to him; but that power will only be vouchsafed so long as *he wills* and earnestly strives to act.

What, then, becomes of this hypothesis of "*relative sensibility*?"—one which is capable of explaining a very *small* series of phenomena, in a way agreeable, perchance, to those who would have it so, but unphilosophical, contrary to reason, and to fact. It is, however, asserted by its promulgator, that "if the link between organisation and function, in this instance, escape from observation, it is a most vicious and feeble conclusion to suppose that it does not exist." We fully admit this conclusion; no one can fathom the link (for instance) which exists between the actual impinging of certain rays of light upon the *expanded optic nerve*, and the formation of a picture of that object by the brain; yet none but a rash or unprincipled disputant would *disallow* its existence. But it is extraordinary, that so acute a reasoner should not have perceived that it is equally an absurd and vicious conclusion to infer, that there *does not exist* an intelligent and immaterial spirit presiding over

this organisation, because we cannot trace the *link* which connects matter with spirit, or the mode of communication which influences both in a mutual re-agency. It is admitted that a mysterious inexplicable connexion exists between the sentient extremity of nerves, and the common centre of nervous influence in all animals: why, then, can it be reasonably denied, that in the higher animal *man*, there may be a still finer organisation,—a spiritual being, upon which the higher manifestations are dependent, and to which are referred those organic movements, which in the lower animals terminate in the brain, and in the production of automatic, or intuitive, or locomotive, or sensual action. According to Sir Charles Morgan's reasoning, it were absurd to deny this conclusion—one, too, which is supported by the wisdom and experience of all ages.

Now to adopt this mode of argumentation, and this conclusion, is not “to suppose that the cerebral tissue exists without any precise and definite function; and that is wholly supererogatory in the economy. It is, on the contrary, to assign it its first place in the animal economy; not to attribute to its fibres powers to which they can have no relation; nor to invest it with a function, towards which it can have no defined affinity; nor to assert, that it is wholly supererogatory. It is, on the contrary, to say that the brain is the organ of mind; that its function is to receive and to convey to the spiritual mind, the notices derived through the senses from the exterior; and to transmit, in return,

the creations of spiritual mind to that exterior existence, in and through which social man is to be found fully developed. The brain, is in fact, the *medium* of communication with the interior spirit, but it is not *spirit itself*; the impressions received do not rest solely upon the cerebral tissue, but are conveyed to the thinking principle within, and, after due elaboration, are again transmitted exteriorly. It is as the several varieties of the senses; they receive; they transmit; they attach; they disperse; they reflect; they refract; they converge, and otherwise diffuse *the rays of light*, but they are not *light itself*. It is as the telescope, the medium of communication with far distant objects, but not the objects themselves. It is as the microscope, the means of developing life, and power, and activity, and beauty, where ordinary sense was unconscious of its existence; but it is not the thing itself which it conveys. It is, in fact, the servant of mind, fulfilling the highest possible function in life, communicating with the highest order of intelligence, and placing man in a due relation to the noble past, and the mighty future; yet being always in itself subordinate, and in a healthy condition, yielding a ready and cheerful obedience to the majesty of mind. But surely, then, it is most unphilosophical and untrue to assert that with such a position in the animal economy, it has no *definite* function, and that it is wholly *supererogatory* in that economy! What organ, may we ask, has assigned to it a more defined place—more certain in its object—less assailable

by disease? So far from being wholly supererogatory, it is shown by the proposition, that no one thing in body or mind can be done without its intervention; all that is contended for, is, that it is the servant of mind! Not that mental phenomena are created *by*, and terminate *in*, certain movements of its tissue, which would be just equal to saying, that the air which wafted the feather on its zephyr breath, or levelled in its fury the monarch of the forest, was created *by*, originated *in*, and received its power and function in each instance from the *thing* which being *acted upon*,—evinced the existence and the power, the ætherial mildness, and the uncontrollable violence of the agent. Thus, then, it should seem, that so far from disparaging the organ, or undervaluing its function in the animal economy, we ennoble its destiny; since, far from tracing its termination to a few dark years of brief existence in the present state, we ally it with futurity, and place it in its due relation to a never-ending immortality.

But it is alleged, that in “different subjects, almost every part of the brain has been found in a state of *disorganising* malady, without any determinate corresponding derangement in the mental functions.” Granted: but what does it prove? Not, surely, that *brain is mind*, for if so, how is the function carried on, when the agent is *disorganised*? Whereas, if the brain be the mere medium of communication, this is perfectly possible, and we have only to admire the conservative efforts of nature, by which, under such *apparently* difficult circum-

stances, she contrives to carry on her operations without any material interruption ; so that, if the fact of the brain carrying on its function under the influence of disorganisation be of *any value*, it is so to those only who look upon this organ, *not as an end, but as a material means* for an immaterial purpose.

Besides, the very remarkable fact, that the brain, although the centre of sensibility, is not in itself generally very sensitive to morbid action, and that it will bear large injury, and much *slow* disorganisation, without great suffering, is another reason why these slowly destructive changes are not much felt, and another proof of its being a medium of communication between external matter and interior mind.

Again, it is said, not only is the brain liable to disorganisation, but also to several varieties of natural appearance ; it is more or less dense—more or less watery and soft ; and yet these persons have exhibited no marked difference in mental manifestation, and have shown no symptoms of insanity ; while after death in insane persons no alteration of structure has been perceived or detected. Now all this *may be* perfectly true, but there are insuperable difficulties in the way of the establishment of this truth. In the first place, we know not, as regards our own eye, what kind of *fibre* is best calculated to carry on the cerebral functions ; consequently, we have no standard by which to compare the most perfect structure.

Secondly, for the same reason, the minute traces

of altered structure would escape observation ; and very considerable deviations from the normal state might occur without discovery.

Thirdly, alteration of function by no means *constantly* involves alteration of structure ; on the contrary, the former generally precedes the latter, and oftentimes all its traces pass away at death, and are no longer discoverable, particularly in regard to the brain, of whose ultimate structure we know so little : and,

Fourthly, little deviations from healthy *function* do not fix our attention ; an individual may be odd, eccentric, passionate, of a violent temper, haughty, perverse, given to frequent change, fond of some peculiar hobby to excess, (who, indeed, is not ?) singular and selfish ; and yet all these conditions may attach to the function, without any corresponding structural derangement, with which, under the circumstances given, we can be acquainted.

And the tendency of this argumentation is to show, that, however the cerebral tissue may be employed as the organ of mind or the medium of mental communication, it is not the *originating cause* of mental operations.

Again, it has been observed, “ that inquiries pursued *beyond organisation*, terminate only in the *wildest conjecture* and the most contradictory propositions ; while the *reduction* of intellectual action to the *same laws* as those which govern other organic phenomena, affords a positive and satisfactory base for moral and metaphysical investigation.” It is allowed, that this is a mysterious

subject, and must ever remain such, so long as we are ignorant of the nature of the ultimate cerebral fibril, and equally ignorant of the connexion which subsists between mind and matter. We deny the proposition, however, that any inquiry pursued *beyond organisation* must terminate in wild conjecture; we *believe not*, if pursued modestly, calmly, candidly, with a desire to investigate, and not to make every fact bend to a preconceived theory. But we ask, are not the difficulties as great, as insurmountable in the way of him who terminates his inquiries with *organisation*? We speak not now of the lower or of the instinctive actions of the brain, but of the elaboration of thought, and reasoning, and judgment, and conscience, and of the higher intellectual and moral attributes of man, in his state of social and civilized privilege. How is thought elaborated? Is it by a process of digestion, or secretion, or vascular movement, or attrition of original fibres, or fifty other suppositions, of which each one is as good as its predecessor; and *better*, till it has been disproved? Is the action of the brain chemical, mechanical, vital? If the latter, wherein does it consist? In what consists the repose of the brain, which is so necessary to its well-being? What constitutes its morbid sympathies? Why is its action enlivened by tea, or annihilated by opium? Why is its greatest brilliance oftentimes connected with feeble *general* health? or with a peculiar frailty of the organ itself? No psychological conjectures can be wilder than must be the answers to this string of questions.

But, if so, inquiries pursued beyond organisation are not *chimerical*, inasmuch as we are not here more surrounded by ignorance than in searching out the hidden causes and changes of *organic life*; and inasmuch as we may hope, at some future day, to throw back the boundaries of knowledge to a greater extent *than at present*, and to become acquainted with some of its unexplored territory. If the opposing principle were acted upon, there would be an end to physiological inquiry, inasmuch as the study of the laws of function would be arrested. Here is the liver, and there is the kidney; both are supplied with nerves and blood-vessels; and each has some kind of resemblance to the other. Yet the function of each is *dissimilar*, and this *difference* is in all probability dependent upon the nerves with which they are supplied. But the organisation of these nerves appears to be of the same character; and if we go farther back—if we trace their fibres and consider them as *ultimately terminating* in the brain, or *primarily originating* from it, we have in either case to inquire a step further than apparent organisation, when we observe homogeneous fibrils executing so great a variety of function; and it is absurd to say, that we should not inquire into these functions, and seek to comprehend their agencies.

But, perhaps, it will be said, that inquiries into function are included in what is understood by investigation into organisation. We are quite content to admit this; all we ask is, to study the *functions* of the brain; and seeing that these func-

tions are *complex*, not to stop short and consider the history and effects of *one* function only, which regulates organic life ; but to let our researches extend to that higher function, which portrays the intellectual and spiritual nature ; which displays man, not only as an animal, but as a moral and responsible being ; and which places him in his own order of creation *above the animals, because he possesses a rational soul, which should govern and direct the body, and whose commands are conveyed by its servant the brain.* We ask not to carry back these researches into the *nature* of mind ; it is clear that we cannot comprehend it ; neither do we seek to explain the essence of that *great creating First Cause*, which arranged the laws that preserve nature in her present order. These things are *above* our comprehension ; let us, then, investigate as far as possible the function of the brain, and the actual connexion between mind and matter. To say that such investigations are futile, is simply equal to saying, that *astronomy*, or the laws which regulate the universe, (and our earth is a part of that universe,) should not be studied, because *geology* brings us acquainted with its interior structure or organisation.

This is still further exemplified, by considering another startling proposition of Sir Charles Morgan's ; viz. that *thought consists in movements, and is, therefore, obedient to the laws of MOTION* ; and that *this truth is demonstrated by the fact, that time is necessary for its developement.*

In reply to this dogma, we assert,

First, that thought does not consist in movements.

Secondly, that it is not obedient to the laws of motion ; and,

Thirdly, that the fact of time being necessary for its accomplishment is no evidence of the alleged *truth* of thought consisting in movements.

First, *thought does not consist in organic movements*: and this only is intended by the term in the above proposition, since, if movements require *time* for their *accomplishment* it must be because they *traverse space*. Let any unprejudiced and learned person, look at the brain, closely packed as it is within its osseous covering, and still more closely invested by its membranes ; and let him ask of what kind of *movements* it can be susceptible ; and then let him consider, if the most visionary psychologist ever propounded a wilder hypothesis—an hypothesis which seems, indeed, to have been the *organic* offspring of Hartley's vibrations and vibratiuncles.

The rapidity of thought, so great as to exceed all possible calculation ; a property, too, by which it readily stretches out into the infinite future, and comprehends all that is known of the past history of the world, and combines with these its moral relations to the Creator ; and *man's own* agency in this great spiritual pageant are inconceivable upon the principle of organic movements, in *advance* and *retrogradation*, and *laterally* at the same instant of time.

Still further, if thought consist in organic movements, it follows, that there must be a moving

power—a something to originate these movements; and this something, whatever it may be, would continue its impulsive power until arrested by some centripetal force, which would again repel the movements back to that situation, in which they first received their centrifugal impetus. Now what is this something? By the proposition, it follows, that it must be a something *organic*; but if so, it is capable of demonstration; and *what* again, we fearlessly ask, *what* is the organic power which presides behind the cerebral tissue, and gives it its movements? If it be said that this resides in a still finer tissue, not demonstrable to our material senses, we again fearlessly ask, *what* sets in motion this still finer tissue? But we accept all this reasoning from our opponent, as *evidence* that there *is behind* the cerebral tissue a moving power—not, however, consisting of organic fibres, but of the *spiritual being* to which the brain is placed in subjection, and which communicates to that brain all the intellectual and moral power which it possesses, and its life-giving energy to every part of the intellectual, moral, and social character.

Hence it follows, that *thought* is not obedient to the laws of motion. The astronomer may calculate the movements of the heavenly bodies, though so distant from our vision; but who can calculate the movements of *thought*, with all its thousand associations, any one of which may break the original chain, and give new shape, and figure, and direction to its former bias. The engineer will tell us how much time and labour will be

necessary to remove a certain natural obstacle, in the way of the accomplishment of one of proud man's favourite schemes, almost to annihilate time and space ; but who can calculate the mental labour which may be necessary to arrive at a given result, by labourers who differ so much in every part of their material and spiritual nature. The mathematician may acquaint himself with the laws of motion in direct, and curved, and parabolic lines ; but is there any known law which accelerates or retards the agency of thought, according to the squares of its distances from the originally propelling cause, and which will enable us to calculate even an *approximation* to the amount of time required by such movements ? There is *none* who can *attempt* this thing ; and, if not, what becomes of the organic movement hypothesis ?

Thirdly, the fact of time being required for the accomplishment of thought is no *evidence* of its consisting in *movements*. It may be, that we know not wherein it consists, and that the connexion between the organ brain—its function, *thought*, and its cause the immaterial spirit, is obscure, and even unknown ; but this affords no evidence in favour of an hypothesis which explains nothing, however agreeable it may have been to the fancy of its inventor. Thus, in order to the elaboration of thought, there must be a perception of certain relations of things ; there must be a comparison of these relations ; there must be reflection upon them ; there must be an adjustment of their differences ; there must be a judgment arising out

of a review of all these elements. But are distinct perception, comparison, reflection, judgment, or properties of matter, to be produced by organic movements? Rather, are they not all mental phenomena, carried on, indeed, by the brain, as its instrument, but set in motion by the immaterial mind? And are there not then more difficulties, more unphilosophical requirements, necessary for the solution of these organic movements, than for the far simpler and juster theory of *governing* mind, directing the obedient cerebral organisation? The mental phenomena of themselves require time for their several processes, and, if so, it is monstrous to infer that thought consists in ORGANIC *movements*.

There are a few observations to be made in this place relative to the senses, which will be important in other stages of our inquiry; and of these we notice,

First, the remarkable fact, that the developement of the senses is generally to be found in an inverse proportion to the developement of intelligence; that their state of greatest perfectness is, perhaps, to be found in the higher order of animals without reason, and that their relative importance is far greater in savage than in civilized life; that is, that they are *most perfect*, where the acts and resources of society are least understood—where the boundaries of knowledge are most limited—where there is the least amount of reasoning power, or, as we should say, where the *animal* predominates over the *spiritual nature*.

But, since it is admitted by all, that we only

increase our knowledge or add to our stores of acquired information through the medium of the senses, it would be curious to ascertain why these are strongest where reason is weakest; or why they should be feeble in inverse proportion to the degree in which they are exercised; a fact which seems opposed to the general law of nature; by which exercise gives the power of habit, and induces facilities of action, which, but for this, would be wholly wanting. This fact appears so paradoxical, that it is really necessary to seek a solution of the difficulty, especially as we are anxious to make clear the distinction between animal and spiritual life; and there is one of nature's laws which seems to reconcile this apparent discrepancy.

It cannot be questioned, that the perfection of the senses is greatest in animal life; next in savage life; and is least where the amount of acquired knowledge is greatest: and yet that the senses are the only means for acquiring knowledge, the only inlet to information, the only source of mental development, and the most prominent and decided part of the cerebral tissue. A little consideration of the circumstances, will afford a solution of this difficulty. In the first place, with regard to the higher orders of non-reasoning animals, or of those which have to trust for their conservation to the amount of imparted knowledge—or instinct given them by Nature, or Providence, or by the God of Nature and Providence; for where we speak of Nature, we always intend to go back to the GREAT FIRST CAUSE. Since then the animal de-

pendes for his conservation upon his imparted knowledge, and has no other means of awakening that knowledge, except by a stimulus applied through the medium of the senses, it was necessary that all the information acquired should be concentrated so as to bear upon these instincts; and therefore the function of the simple brain of animals consists in receiving notices from the exterior through the senses, which awaken the conservative instincts, and prompt to conservative action.

But where there is a more complicated creature; where reason is added to instinct; where a spiritual soul, with its moral and religious responsibilities, is appended to a more perfect organisation; where the knowledge acquired by the senses, does not merely awaken instincts, but refers those instincts to reason, and places them under moral guidance and government; where there is a power to choose the good, and to refuse the evil; where the information obtained is digested, reflected upon, elaborated, and reproduced in new forms of moral and intellectual combination; where the mind of man is carried *backward* to its high original, and *forward* to its future destiny; and, finally, where the creature so placed, possesses a revelation from the *Great First Cause*, giving him rules of conduct, and fully setting before him his moral and religious position in life, it becomes necessary that the mental developements should be in accordance with these high destinies, and that the spiritual should preponderate over the animal nature.

Hence the instincts of man are few and feeble, and were originally intended to be wholly subject to his better part. How fearfully the contrary has been the case! How has he fallen from his high original! How awfully is he carried away by his passions, from the gracious design of *Him*, who pronounced him "very good." The origin of this wretchedness *may be* mysterious: the *fact* is unquestioned, and is one of the deepest mournfulness. But at present we have nothing to do with this subject beyond mentioning its existence; our business is now to account for the seeming *discrepancy* which we have seen to *originate* in man's constitution, and to be *required* by his situation.

But if so, it will be allowed, that it was a first ordonnance of nature, that the *spiritual* should predominate over the animal life. In conformity with this primordial law, that portion of the brain (if such there be) which was allotted to the higher social and moral functions, must be employed, educated, developed; or equally, if any new function devolved upon the more perfect brain of man *as a whole*, it would still require to be exercised, in order to be developed. Further, according to another law of nature's, the function would be more perfect, in proportion to the amount of its healthy employment; and this amount of healthy employment will again be regulated by the degree of nervous energy *imparted*; and will be more complete in proportion to its concentration and centralization; and will be less if more divided, and less concentrated. Power is always lost by the

minuteness of subdivision of the parts upon which it acts; and it is another of Nature's laws, that the brain can only produce a certain amount of nervous energy; and that the intensity of this amount is diminished in proportion as it is distributed; so that if one organ or function receives more than its due allowance, others receive less, and are enfeebled by the abstraction of their required quota. So with regard to the original constitution of man, the senses are less perfect, because the entire quantity of nervous energy is no longer expended upon them, is no longer devoted to organic life, but is shared *with it*, for the purposes of intellectual and spiritual life. All difficulty, all paradox vanishes before this explanation; the wisdom of God is unattainted; the beautiful processes of nature are vindicated; and man again stands forth in his complicated harmony of animal and spiritual being; of his present and his future existence: whereas, on the mere supposition of his possessing a more perfect animal organisation, than his *almost compeers* of horses and dogs, there would be no reasonable explanation of so remarkable a phenomenon. Thus, as we proceed, the wisdom and the goodness of God alike stand prominently and boldly exhibited by the situation of *His* highest creature, man!

We have already remarked, that the brain, although the centre of sensation, is not itself sensitive, at least in the degree which might be calculated upon. Another curious property of this organ and its dependent functions is, that although

the senses are the only inlet to real knowledge from without, yet that mental phenomena are not always discoverable through their instrumentality. It is very important to remark this, because it proves the *subordinate* agency of the senses; they may be employed in the service of *mind*, but they are not *capable* of watching over the operations of mind, or of contravening its intention. The *senses* may be *directed, governed, controlled* by mind; but they have no power of themselves to *direct, to govern, to control*. Hence the *senses* and *mind* are not upon an equality; they do not exert parallel influences, but mind is paramount; one more most important distinction from the inferior animals, all whose actions are governed by reports from the senses.

It is not contrary to the arrangements of nature, that subtle action and great power may co-exist without the cognizance of the senses; on the contrary, it seems to be one of her constant principles, that the most important actions of life are performed without any consciousness of *such* action, until it becomes morbid, and is carried on in excess, or defect, or is perverted: *then* comes a point of consciousness; but *then* disease has commenced. The wisdom of this arrangement is at once perceptible; were it not so, man would be constantly watching over his functions, to which he does not *now* direct his attention, *till* they become disordered—that is, as soon as they require his especial care.

Take, for an example of this unperceived agency,

the action of the atmosphere. We do not perceive its pressure, yet it is very considerable, and by it our bodies are sustained erect, the circulation of the blood is carried on, our houses are upheld, the material fabric of the earth is preserved from crumbling into one vast ruin. The air is invisible, we cannot see it; it is intangible, we cannot control its movements; it is inodorous when pure; its dryness and its moisture vary greatly, and yet we do not perceive it, except in extreme cases; we hear the sounds which it conveys, but we do not discover the vibrations which communicate those sounds; and yet, notwithstanding the want of perceptible agency in all these cases, the air does actually supply the lungs, and support respiration, calorification, and innervation; it supports combustion; it diffuses odours; it gives rain; it wafts ships; it supports the flight of birds, and preserves man and his subsidiary arrangements from total destruction. So the brain, *unperceived*, presides over all the functions of *the body*: and the spiritual mind presides over and directs all the functions of the *brain*.

The questions, what is sensation? how and where is it produced? and how transmitted? are so many points which have formed rallying places for the rival votaries of different systems. Without enlarging upon these debateable grounds, I shall content myself with stating very briefly the agency of these great sentinels and servants employed for the defence and conservation of the *citadel* of the MIND.

Thus the impression of exterior objects affects the senses, their nerves, the brain, the mind. The senses receive impressions; the nerves transmit them; the brain perceives them: and voluntary or instinctive action is the regular sequence in *animal life*. In man we go one step further; the sensation produced in the brain is taken up by that organ; *its* activities are developed; the mind is called into exercise; *that* reflects, combines, compares, *abstracts*, and finally obtains and employs results; it determines and wills; transmits its notices to the several organs of the body, which now execute its behests.

There is a remarkable difference between the functions of sensation, and those of interior life, in the degree of exactitude of the one, and easy mobility of the other. With a certain number of exceptions, arising from disorder, during which sensation is perverted, and its reports are not to be relied upon, there is in general a great degree of regularity and constancy in their action; so that while the functions of the heart, the stomach, the lungs, are altered by a thousand different causes, and oftentimes of apparently a very slight influence, the sensorial function remains very much the same, pursues the even tenor of its way, and is not liable to perpetual changes; changes which could almost threaten the continuance of personal identity. It is not contended that healthful sensation is not liable to the inroads of disorder, that it is not *often* perverted, or that it is not subject to the modifying influence of many morbid causes;

only, that it is not *equally* liable to change, and that, too, upon the slightest possible occasion. Thus a powerful impression made upon the nervous system will quicken the action of the heart—will suspend that of the stomach—will prevent the secretion of bile—will increase some other secretions—will annihilate that of the saliva, and will produce many other great and important changes in the animal economy; while a similar or analogous influence will only give rise to a *slight modification* of sensation.

Were it not so; if, for instance, the perception, the memory, the imagination, the judgment, and the will, were liable to all the mutations of organic life, and that upon the slightest change of feeling, what would be the result? The confidence of man in his fellow-man, little as it *now* is, would be entirely subverted, and *he* would have no reliance upon himself; his consciousness of identity would be obscured by his perpetual vacillations; his opinions, *now* sufficiently variable, would *then* have *no resting place*, but would be subjected to every vital, social, and ephemeral change; and he would become the sport of a thousand opposing impulses or movements—perpetually carried about by the winds of changing feeling, or tossed on the waves of contending passions; now debased to the level of the brutes, and giving unlimited range to the animal propensities, or seeking to soar above his own level, and *give*, rather than receive, laws from Nature; *now* allied to the highest intelligence, or debased even below the range of animal desire,

because there is in him all that is simply brutal in the animal, in connexion with all the *vicious power* of man's understanding.

Time, and frequent impression, or the repeated exercise of sensation, has a very large influence in diminishing its acuteness and intensity ; while, on the contrary, it augments its accuracy. In early life, perception is more vivid, and emotion more intense ; but by degrees the former is rendered more dull, and the latter is decreased. In consequence of this change, adult man is more himself as a reasoning creature ; he has more power to judge, to deliberate, to form a correct estimate, to arrive at more satisfactory decisions ; so that in Nature's wisdom, that which takes away from the *acuteness of feeling*, adds to the range of intellect and action ; and that which pares down the overflowings of the heart, and keeps them within bounds, augments the power of usefulness, and at the same time adds to the will to do good for its own sake. Man, who by the early impressions of feeling upon a sanguine and a nervous temperament, has been carried away into an ideal region of fairy land, is slowly brought back to himself and his true position in society, by the quiet operation of this *noiseless, constant* agent, through impressions frequently renewed, yet always diminishing in the amount of sensation produced, till the sphere of his judgment is enlarged, and he is prepared for his final disenchantment from the influence of *sense*. The period of feebleness, during which the brain exhibits its perpetuity of

change and vacillation in extreme old age, is an exception to the rule, does not often happen, and when it does occur, is only from Nature's compact being extended over a larger period of time than was intended, and therefore is not now to be taken into the account.

It has been a question which has occasioned a great deal of discussion between contending parties, as to where sensation *resided*, i. e. whether in the organ which first received the impression, the result of which was sensation, or whether in the brain, or in some other portion of the system, to which the intelligence of this notice was conveyed. The *importance* of deciding this question has been much overrated ; since, after all, it is not of much consequence whether the impression made upon the organ of sense produces *there sensation, which sensation* is immediately conveyed to the common centre *the brain*, in order that it may be still further transmitted to the spiritual being within, for whose knowledge and guidance the impression has been made, and this sensation has been produced and transmitted ; or whether the impression has been made upon the *organ of sense*, that organ having no power to distinguish, and so the impression has been continuously carried backwards to the *common centre* ; the attention of the brain has been awakened ; it perceives that an impression has been made ; it defines and distinguishes its nature, and then appropriates and employs the knowledge thus obtained. It must be clear that in either case the result is the same ; an impression

is made upon a certain portion of the nervous system ; this is perceived by the brain directly or indirectly, and is conveyed to the sentient principle within, which issues its notices accordingly. It is a point, therefore, which may be safely left to future agitators to determine, though it must be confessed that there seems no occasion for any other than the simple theory, that the impression is made upon the organ of sense, is perceived by the brain, and referred to the spiritual mind.

Thus, were it not for the percipient and discerning influence exerted by the brain, the eye would not see, nor the ear hear, nor the tongue distinguish tastes, &c., unless these were referred to some other common and distinguishing centre ; and even then the results would terminate in instinctive or automatic life ; in the excitement and gratification of certain appetites and passions ; and in the effort of locomotion, as connected with such gratification ; unless these notices were conveyed to the interior and presiding mind, which acts upon them as a rational and intelligent being, *conformable* to its *high destinies*, except some perverting moral cause shall have driven mind from its proper centre, in the *great God and Father of all*.

There is here a mutual dependence which it is right to notice ; the impressions made upon the senses will terminate in no corresponding rational, intelligent, moral results, unless they be conveyed to the inner man ; while, on the contrary, that inner man, deprived of the notices conveyed to it

by the senses, would be shut out from information and intelligence, would remain a chaos and a blank, over which the deepest night of ignorance and brutality would brood, neither awakened by intelligence, nor animated by emotion, nor moved by moral desire; in fact, it would be shut out from the pale of intelligent and spiritual life; it would be as in idiocy, a case not produced by the absence of *mind*, but by the inaptitude of the brain to *transmit* its manifestations.

An objection has been started against this transmission, that the process being to be effected through such a variety of crossings, and net-work, and interlacings, there cannot fail to be such an interruption of notices, such jostlings of intelligence to be communicated from various departments of the animal economy, that inextricable confusion *must* be the consequence, so that no defined information will be obtained. As if the works of omnipotence and omniscience could be traced by the twilight ray of man's feeble intellect; or as if the pathway of the fountain of light and life could be discovered during the all but *night* of man's darkling way; and as if this were the only example in nature of complicated though simple action,—*complicated to us*, because we cannot understand it,—but *simple to Him* who has appointed all things according to his boundless wisdom and knowledge!

Reasoning apart, the one simple fact of the infinite number of rays of light which are given off from luminous bodies in every possible direction,

and always, be it remembered, traversing space in *right lines*, and which must, therefore, intersect each other in every conceivable point; and that this interlacing, to an inconceivable extent, is effected, not only *without confusion*, but, on the contrary, producing an effect of the most perfect harmony; this *one* simple fact is a *sufficient* evidence of the easy transmission of nervous communication through every part of the animal economy, and a *sufficient* refutation of the objection which has been started against this arrangement.

The argument is thus summed up:—the objector says, it is inconceivable that the different notices of the body can be conveyed through the medium of the nerves, with their infinite variety of crossings, and interlacings, and plexus, and ganglia, forming so many different centres, from which are given off fresh channels of nervous energy. The defender replies, Here is no difficulty, for rays of light traverse immensity in every possible direction without the slightest inconvenience. Yet the rays of light, or, at any rate, the medium through which they pass, are undoubtedly *material*. How much less, then, is the difficulty, with the notices of nervous influence which are not material, or which, *if material*, are of a nature so infinitely more subtle as to have escaped the demonstration of their materiality by the grosser experiments which are applicable to light and heat; therefore there is no difficulty in receiving the opinion, that the material brain is influenced and governed by an immaterial agent, that agent being,

in the case of man, his own spiritual essence, the immaterial soul.

We must just remark in this place, one or two circumstances with regard to the perception of impressions. It has been asserted, that perception does *not* reside in the brain, and is a function which does not arise from its peculiar structure, because reptiles and other animals of the inferior classes “exhibit unequivocal marks of perception and volition long after they have been decollated.” It is very important to mark the distinction which exists between muscular motion, arising from the irritation of nervous fibre, and that which depends on the excitement of the same nerves in obedience to the will; the former is a morbid, the latter only is a physiological action. Besides, in inquiries of this kind, it should ever be recollected, that the nerves of voluntary motion are dependent chiefly upon the *spinal* brain; and that, although they are in communication with the intellectual brain, their origin is from the spinal marrow, and are only so far dependent upon the brain, as to be its obedient servants; hence, no argument drawn from their function, as attached to organic life, can be fairly applicable to intellectual *life*.

It is well known, that the muscles may be excited to action by the galvanic aura in the lower animals, some time after they have been decapitated; but it is also known how small a proportion of their nervous system belongs to the encephalic brain, how large, that which is spinal; and, although the fact of the production of muscular

movements is unquestionable, yet it is boldly denied that these can, in any degree, be surmised to attach to *volition*. As well might it be said, that the muscular twitchings which we see in the butcher's shop many hours after the animal has been killed and disembowelled, are dependent upon volition. As well might it be said, that the muscular movements which have been produced in man by galvanic irritation, (see Dr. Ure's experiments,) and which have been made to simulate a variety of living expressions, as the fist clenched in anger, the leg projected in rage, the countenance distorted with passion, *were* the effect of volition. As well might it be said, that in those cases of paralysis of the lower limbs, arising from injury to the spine, in which there remained no power to move these limbs, no sort of voluntary control over them, yet in which the skin was so exquisitely sensitive that the patient could not suffer it to be touched, and in which violent *involuntary* motions of the lower limbs frequently took place, were also dependent on the will ! A remarkable instance of this kind lately occurred to the author, and, amongst other arguments, helped to convince him of the absurdity of those who refer these movements to *volition*, and seek to take away from the importance of the brain, as being the chief organ of perception. The fact is, that in all these instances the perception of the impression is only apparent ; it is not asserted that there is no perception in the organ primarily impressed ; but if there be, it is originally derived from the brain ; and the per-

ception *as to any of the purposes of life*, is imperfect till it has been referred to the brain, the centre of the nervous system, and the great laboratory of mind.

Now when any object has been noticed by the *percipient*, it is either passed by, as having no interest in itself, or possessing no *relative interest* to the individual, or at least not enough to be cognisable; or it awakes attention, and developes that kind of interest, which ensures for it a greater amount of inquiry; it becomes an object for scrutiny: if it be material, an acquaintance is sought with all its forms, and connexions, and relative powers; if it be moral, an inquiry is instituted as to its principles, their relative bearing, their influence upon feeling, affection, action; how far they are calculated to do good, and how far they may be abused; how far they should be fostered or repressed; how far they are consistent with the moralities of our nature; and what are their bearings upon the great family of man, and upon the grand code of Christian ethics to which we refer every part of human *action* and *passion*. Then, indeed, man not only sees and hears, but attends, looks, listens, examines, compares, selects, judges, and determines; in fact, all his higher functions are aroused, and his intimate alliance with immortality becomes manifest.

And whence this interest, this choice, this selection, this preference of good, this dislike of evil, this abnegation of self, this keeping under the *animal* in order to exalt the *spiritual* being? Whence, in-

deed, is it but from that primordial law, which subjugates the body to the higher spiritual principle, places it under control, and renders it duly subservient? This is the original constitution of man ; this is the design of the Creator, for *him* who was created “ in his own image ;” this is the legitimate influence of mind upon body ; and for the exercise of this influence each individual is minutely responsible. That this perfect state is not now to be found ; that disorder has been thrown into the manifestations of mind ; that the first link in the chain should have been broken or perverted—subjected to error, prejudice, hallucination ; that attention should so soon flag from fatigue, or be diverted from its proper object ; that so little interest should be taken in what is right ; that passion should usurp the place of reason ; that the judgment should be so erroneous—the will so vacillating, the determination so feeble—so easily turned aside from the path of rectitude—so little to be relied upon for perseverance ; and generally, that the man should exhibit so feebly the lineaments of the Christian, *is much to be regretted*. While we inquire into the causes of these things, we shall find that some physical conditions will, in part, explain them ; and that any and every form of disordered bodily health will disturb mental function ; yet we shall equally find much which it is impossible to account for upon this principle ; and which we can only explain by taking up the scriptural account, that man *has fallen* from original righteousness, and that, in consequence, he

has become more nearly allied with the unhappy spirits, than as he was originally intended to be, “ *a little lower than the angels.*”

But we must pass on, to notice briefly a few other of the phenomena of mind, and first of *conscience*.

Conscience is a principle, the power of which is felt and acknowledged by all, and which peculiarly distinguishes the rational from the animal creation. Where there is no responsibility, there can be no room for conscience, which is universally in man as an involuntary judge of right and wrong ; which will often prevent action, or the indulgence of thought, by its monitions ; and which will pass sentence upon conduct, almost before there has been time to review it. Conscience may be more or less enlightened and sensitive, according to the amount of knowledge possessed by individuals, and according to the moral culture it may have received ; or it may in some instances be rendered fastidious by over-much care ; or it may be blunted by want of attention ; it may be scrupulous over things trifling or indifferent, while it may be omnivorous over barriers of real importance ; it may be superstitious over appearances, while it may be regardless of principles ; it may most unjustly suffuse the countenance of innocence with the crimson hue of *shame*, where no cause for shame exists, and where the suspicion of its possibility has been the only source of its production ; while, in other instances of seared moral sense, it will turn the brow of unattainted defiance to the world, as a

covering to a secret history of heartlessness and crime. Yet in all these cases of ignorance, of deficient information, of perversion, or of crime, it is still conscience—still the principle originally good, but perverted to error, and imperfect from the natural imperfections of fallen man.

Existing, however, always in proportion to the light of knowledge, and the influence of truth ; and being, therefore, in very different shades and degrees, it is still conscience. But it is a faculty very liable to be turned aside by physical disorder ; it is one which insanity often distorts, and which the minor disturbances of the body very frequently pervert, by producing a degree of fearfulness and hesitation, which render man uncertain in his opinions, changeful in his judgment, and vacillating in action : he becomes doubtful upon trifles ; he magnifies their importance ; he wishes to do right, but cannot discover what is *right* ; when he thinks he has attained to a just judgment, he is turned aside by some veriest straw in the scale of moral action ; he becomes the slave of superstitious observances ; he is always desirous of propitiating the goodwill of his neighbours, and of deprecating the wrath of the *Almighty* ; yet he seeks to accomplish this object, not by the firmness and fearlessness of *right*, but by *seeking to please others* ; and in so doing, is sure to make shipwreck of principle, and of a good conscience.

The frequent failure thus produced will occasion *remorse* ; and this again will give rise to a very unfavourable and depressing influence upon the

powers of life ; for, unlike *repentance*, there is nothing to soften down or alleviate the pang of *remorse*, which is only the sting of *guilt unatoned*, of *passion uncontrolled*, of *obliquity uncorrected*. Now it will often happen, and that, too, dependent upon a peculiar state of the nervous system, that *remorse* occupies the proper seat of repentance ; that whereas the former should only exist, as the result of wilful transgression still persisted in, or, at least, not repented of, nor sorrowed after, nor forgiven, it is often to be found in the heart which has been broken down under a sense of its transgressions, in which contrition flourishes as a wholesome growth, and the past has been deeply sorrowed for, and the future is entered upon, in the fullest intention to *think right* and to *do right*, in the strength of *Him*, in whose strength alone things remain as they are, and by whom, equally, man's life is sustained, and his good resolutions are helped forward towards their completion. It is impossible to conceive a more deplorable condition than that constituted by remorse,—its unalleviated hopelessness—its entire destitution of aught to rest upon—its complete abandonment of all that throws a cheering ray upon futurity—its undermining influence upon the several functions of the body, and *their* reflex action in beclouding the mental vision, and adding the barb of despondency to the torturing arrow of reflection, which places the sufferer in a state of physical abandonment to which the light of divine truth scarcely reaches.

It must be recollected, that conscience is a very

important mental manifestation for good as well as for evil ; indeed, the power which its exercise has upon the *physique*, and the reciprocal influence exerted by the latter upon the former, prove the depth and extent of its manifestations in man's compound nature. Natural religion may be said to take its origin from this principle ; the knowledge of right and wrong ; the consciousness of self-approbation ; when governed by the former, and of self-reproach when acting under the influence of the latter ; the choice, the voluntary choice of good or evil, which is implied in the consciousness of their existence, and the necessary following after the one or the other ;—*all* show that there is in the human bosom, a knowledge of good and evil, a power of choosing or refusing ; and the consequence of reward or punishment, according as that choice shall have been directed aright, or shall have been warped and perverted from its original destiny. And this constitutes *natural* religion ; for in these ideas are involved that of a moral Governor of the universe, who dispenses justice, and rewards or punishes according as the actions of man shall have been good or bad ; not, indeed, according to their appearance, but according to the motives from which they spring in the human bosom, whether from a desire to please God, or to gratify self ; or, in other words, from love to God, and benevolence to man, or from a disregard of both. To conclude in the words of an accomplished author, “ Il n'y a que l'homme malade ou corrompu, qui puisse méconnaître cette émotion inexplicable, mais positive—

cette instinct pur et celeste—cette science ainée qui nous distingue si bien des animaux, cette raison par excellence, qui luit sur toutes les actions des hommes, qui rassure l'innocent, qui agite le coupable. C'est le juge qu'on ne peut fuir; c'est la loi inflexible, dont on ne peut éviter les regards, Dieu, et les hommes pardonnent; la conscience ne pardonne pas."* It is this latter property which occasions its tremendous power over the animal economy.

Intimately connected with the power of conscience, is the habit of *reflection*; that property of the human mind, by which the interior life exists, and without which man is but the creature of impression and of impulse; of causes impressing from without, perceived by the senses, and referred to the brain, as the common centre of action and passion. But in order to reflection, the notices received from exterior life are laid up in storehouses; the accumulated wisdom of past ages and of personal experience, is placed there in readiness for employment. Man soon learns from his failures, that he must not act from impression; consequently, when the forms of thought, and modes of action, are presented to his judgment, the mind is introverted; it falls back upon its own resources; it *reflects*,—that is, it bends its thoughts backwards, towards those materials for decision which it possesses; and from this reflected decision should proceed promptitude and energy of action. Without reflection, man thinks inadequately and acts in-

* Alibert sur les Passions; tome i. p. 65. &c.

considerately. But there are *morbid* states of this process ; man may become *too reflective* a character ; his associations with exterior life may be broken up ; he may be lost in his own thoughtfulness ; become deaf to the impressions of exterior life, from which his knowledge is to be derived ; and while occupied with his reflections, he may allow the time for action to pass by. The contemplative character, and, with a still deeper shade, *the pensive*, are morbid states of reflection, and as such are to be avoided. It must not be forgotten, that man has an active duty to fulfil ; and while he will be a very weak and a very mischievous character if he act without reflection, he will *not be less so*, if the period for action, the light and life of energy and exertion, be shrouded in the vapoury atmosphere of *absorption*.

A very necessary aid to reflection, and indispensable to its success, is *memory*. It is obvious that, without the stores accumulated by the *latter*, the *former* would be abortive, because it would possess no materials whereon to work ; there could be no efficient association, no comparison, no firm judgment ; action must be the result of impulse or of prejudice ; and the influence of reason would be extinguished.

What then is memory ? We are well aware that it is mainly *dependent* upon attention ; but it does not consist simply in a certain exercise of this faculty ; for, *first*, the memory will often be found defective, where the attention bestowed has been very great ; and, *next*, it will often be spontaneous,

and a vivid recollection of persons, or things, or circumstances, will be presented to the mind, independent of any *traceable* association ; as well as of events, which at the moment passed almost unheeded, and produced no sensible impression. For the same reason, it is not the result of *association*, though oftentimes aided by it, and apparently dependent upon it.

Is this *memory* entirely a mental operation ? Is it wholly spiritual—an attribute of the immaterial mind, or simply a phenomenon of *cerebral activity* ? That it is not wholly mental, is shown by its independence of the will, by its existence during sleep, and by its being to be found very perfectly in animals. There is, however, this marked difference : apparently, in animals, memory is *only* to be awakened by association, and does not lead to *reflection*, or to *reflective action*. In both these instances, therefore, it is probably dependent upon the same cause ; and in both cases is the result of a degree of irritation of certain nervous fibriles, which have received an original impression ; and which are subsequently aroused to their original sensation, by any cause which again irritates these fibres. The difference is *this*,—that whereas in both, memory is excited from the same cause ; in the simple animal it terminates in reproducing the original impression, and in the renewal of that impulsive action which was its immediate consequence ; *in man*, it leads to trains of reasoning and reflection, and to a multitude of mental actions, which vary in proportion to the mental calibre,

and to the moral as well as intellectual grade, which is sustained by the individual.

Memory, *in man*, may be increased or diminished in power ; it may be augmented by education and cultivation ; it may be decreased by neglect ; it may be perverted or annihilated by disease ; and it may be subjected to several forms of partial loss, which are very tormenting to their subject, and which should be sedulously guarded against. It has several times occurred to the author, to notice an originally good memory become feeble and worthless from the influence of morbid action in the brain. Sometimes, it has been permanently injured ; at others, it has been *slowly* recovered when the morbid cerebral action has ceased. The term *slowly* is used advisedly, because all changes in the structure of nervous fibre occur very *slowly* and almost *imperceptibly* ; for, however rapidly the function of the brain may be carried on, it is certain that its *structural* changes are of the slowest character ; still disordered memory possesses a power of resuscitation which is great, and which often becomes firm and durable.

In investigating the causes of this loss of memory from physical disorder, it will be seen that the power of *attention* is first attained ; and this will, of course, entirely account for the impaired recollection of immediate or recent impressions ; but it will be found that the loss of memory and attention, are not correspondent, co-incident, and co-equal, which proves that the one is not precisely consecutive to the other. And, also, it is to be remarked,

that the loss of memory extends to things which had *formerly* made a *lively* impression, which *had been* attended to, and *had been* accurately remembered up to a certain period, viz. that of the invasion of physical disorder. It is, therefore, cerebral disorder which introduces this overthrow of the intellectual function.

It is very important to notice this fact, because, as a symptom, it will often lead to the detection of that incipient cerebral malady, which might otherwise have escaped notice ; and, also, because many excellent persons annoy themselves, (and by this very annoyance increase their maladies,) by discovering this defect in the memory ; and still more, by frequently ascribing it to a *moral* cause, to defective interest in objects of the highest pursuit ; and thus blame themselves as incurring *moral guilt*, for what is, palpably and plainly, *physical* infirmity.

On this ground, we shall just notice two or three of the forms in which this incipient loss of memory is to be discovered. First, its earliest trace is visible in a diminished power of *abstraction* ; its subject feels that he has not the power of *directing* and *fixing* the attention, to any subject which involves a train of argument, or consecutive reasoning, even although that reasoning shall attach to the exact sciences, and be aided by a diagram, or a tangible model ; and, of course, much more where it is to be fixed upon abstruse reasoning and abstract science. Even in common and ordinary reading, the patient will have to read, and read

again, and not be one jot the wiser, or in the least degree imbued with the spirit of his author: and this, not, as often happens, from the mind being pre-occupied, and the thoughts directed elsewhere, as occasionally in the healthiest individual, but from the power of directing the attention being absolutely lost.

Absence so called, is a very common cause of forgetfulness, during which state, although the impression upon the brain is *perceived*, and would be acknowledged if inquired after *at the time*, yet is not sufficiently distinct and powerful to ensure remembrance. This *may* be a mental condition, in which either the impression is feeble, or the perception is inaccurate, or the attention is not awakened, or the mind is pre-occupied; in all which cases oblivion will be produced: but it is also frequently a physical condition of the brain, in which it is not fitted to receive a sufficiently powerful impression to ensure remembrance. This may be the consequence of various cerebral diseases; or it may result only from functional disorder, *sensorial torpor*. It is at all times a formidable symptom; not that it may not exist sometimes innocuously, but that it is the frequent companion of disorganisation; and then the fact of its existing sometimes without injury, only renders the symptom more formidable, from the danger of neglecting the more important connexion with incipient disease, under the delusive hope that it may not exist; and this apprehension is increased by the fact, that if the loss of sensorial energy be not remedied, its

shade is always deepening, though perhaps unperceived, till by-and-bye the melancholy truth is revealed, by the patient being reduced to a most pitiable state of helplessness and misery. Let then timely warning be taken from the first discovery of any kind of unwonted forgetfulness.

Sometimes an impression is made upon the organ of sense, but perception does not follow. The eye sees, the ear hears, the other senses are *legitimately* aroused, but the impressions are *indistinctly* perceived, if perceived at all, and frequently stimulate the brain erroneously, so as to produce hallucinations, and many other forms of cerebral disorder; and oftentimes they are not at all noticed. The patient is in a kind of dream, so that though some external impression has been made, yet it has not been perceived; the brain either pursues its former trains of thought, or they may have been broken through, or modified, or perverted, so as to have lost the cohesion of their original impression, and to be made up of a confused variety of cerebral irritations, arising from the number of nervous fibriles, which may have been awakened into action, and which run into confused and fantastic grouping, for want of that regular and decided *perception* which would have led to the exercise of sound reason and judgment. In this way, involuntary trains of ideas crowd upon each other, and usurp a *dominant* situation, which takes away the supremacy from mind, and hands it over to *disordered brain*,—a species of rebellion in the animal economy,

which requires close watching, inasmuch as it borders very narrowly upon *insanity*. Let every one cautiously watch over himself, lest involuntary thoughts be permitted to enjoy the control of mind; and, on the contrary, that all the mental functions be kept in due subordination to that *master spiritual principle*.

There is another state of cerebral disorder, deepening as it proceeds, in which the patient is excluded from the power of receiving impressions *at all*; and this state probably arises from the more extensive disorganisation of the brain, and from the greater hopelessness of the case; a condition of fearfulness, which is only noticed here in order to ensure an earlier attention to the features of cerebral disorder, by which, and by which alone, the more deplorable and hopeless results *may* be averted. Let, then, the first symptoms of unwonted forgetfulness—of unusual listlessness—of unaccustomed indisposition to exertion—of diminished energy—of shrinking from application—of retirement from duty—of omission of details—of perversion of thought, or reasoning, or plans;—let all, or any one of these be early discovered, and jealously watched, for there is no time to lose; the brain must be *saved*, or the tomb will close upon its possessor; or he will inhabit the still more cheerless cell of *insanity*.

This subject must not be dismissed without a caution: this state is one which will not generally *bear depletion*; it does not consist in too much arterial action, nor in venous congestion, but in torpor of the

nervous fibre, which will commonly be augmented by depleting measures. Nothing is more mischievous than to mistake *sensorial loss of energy* for *vascular loss of balance*; and the distinction being easy, the mistake never should be made.

There is sometimes a partial loss of memory upon particular subjects *only*; but this may be accounted for on the principles above detailed; it is only necessary to remove irritation of the cerebral tissue *generally*, to irritation of a small number of its fibres, upon which the impression had been originally made; and the same reasoning will apply to the *partial*, as it has done to the general loss of memory. It will happen frequently that this state is accompanied by a great degree of *vacillation* in the reason and judgment; and it is easily to be understood why the mind, when it has lost its great prop, its main support, in producing unity of design, and cohesiveness of action, *feels* that its great stay is gone, and that it has only adventitious circumstances to support it: hence arises, first doubt as to the correctness of judgment, and then follow vacillation, and eternal change of purpose.

But we pass on to notice the *imagination*. This faculty is known chiefly by its creative power; it has, perhaps, less to do with the realities of life than any other mental manifestation, and it delights to luxuriate in a region of its own creation. It does not yield obedience to any known or established laws, and claims the privilege of submitting to no authority but its own. These

creations are oftentimes at variance with reason, though generally it is anxious to preserve such a degree of *vraisemblance* as to invest them with the air of distant *probability*—a connexion oftentimes so slight as not to be perceptible by ordinary faculties. This faculty is exceedingly useful to the writers of poetry and works of fiction; it is constantly made the basis of the reveries of the romantic young, and the foundation of that airy structure in after life, which has received the designation of *castle building*; it gives character to the waking dreams of time, and deeply tinges the intercourse of society—always casting a glowing colour over futurity, and giving its attractive hues to the new combinations of social life and circumstances, which arise out of its several changes, and from each succeeding exigency. To render its exercise safe, it is necessary that it should be guided and controlled by a sound judgment, and then it will give energy and life to the character; but if this judgment be wanting, it will render it flighty and uncertain in its movements.

This faculty has a large influence upon disease. When pushed beyond itself, it becomes the groundwork of superstition and fanaticism; it invests life with an unreal and undefined boundary, which is so shadowed off into immensity, that its line of demarcation is lost; the individual passes out of the domain of reason; he attends to dreams; he looks after omens; he listens to voices; he receives impulses and directions which have no foundation in reason or religion; he is subject to

impressions, and interior groundless notices; his actions become eccentric; he is deceived by hallucinations; he is subject to various illusions; and he passes into the character of the *monomaniac*. This term is employed, not simply to designate a person who requires seclusion from society, but rather that much more frequent form of mental aberration, in which the patient thinks and acts in violation of the better judgment of the *many wise and good, he*, of course, thinking himself right, and all others *most erroneous*.

Acting as it does most largely upon the hopes and fears of man, the imagination not only possesses a large influence in the developement of monomania, but it operates considerably upon almost every form of bodily disorder. The radiance of hope, and the night of despondency; the buoyancy of cheerful expectation, and the depression of gloomy forebodings; the fearfulness of coming futurity, or the joyful anticipations of to-morrow; the dark unseen, if peopled with shadowy forms of deepest sorrow, or of happiness not to be appreciated; the expectation of improvement, or the apprehension of increasing malady; the striving against disease, or hopelessly yielding to its influence; *all* have their origin in this faculty, and exert an influence for or against life, greater than can be easily conceived; and its *judicious* management, or the *contrary*, will often be the means of *prolonging* or *destroying* life. Hence the importance of watching over its agency, and especially of sedulously guarding it from eccentric action.

The faculty of *the will* has already engaged our attention, while describing the essential character of *progression* which attaches to the human intellect. We shall endeavour to make the present notice brief, and only supplementary to the former discussion.

It must ever be remembered that the moral responsibility of man rests on his own power to change his determinations; for unless he possess this power, he becomes the creature of appetite and passion—the victim of impulse—the bondsman of his organisation. It was necessary that he should possess a faculty of this nature, since it is evident that if he were the *mere* animal, with all the powers of mischief conferred by his intellectual superiority, the greatest disorder must ensue upon the most intimate framework of society; the gratification of selfish desires would be the dominant passion; and to this, the good of others, and even the *ultimate good* of self, would be recklessly sacrificed; *present* enjoyment would be the grand stimulus to action, and every other consideration would give way before the influence of this tyrant principle.

Seeing, therefore, that the constitution of society requires in man a power to consider, and to alter his determinations, and that without it the social compact must be dissolved, it follows that, according to the nature of things, such an arrangement *would* take place; and we are therefore quite prepared for the *fact*, that the *moral Governor* would endue his creature, man, with some faculty to

prevent all this disorder being thrown into his works; and we are surprised to find, not that *will exists*, but that it exerts so feeble an influence over the conduct. And this is indeed inexplicable, except by supposing some such fact as that which has been revealed to us, viz. that some prevailing cause has operated upon the *will*, so that it no longer chooses *the good*, and refuses the *evil*; but that its bias is towards a preference of the latter, and a neglect of the former.

This is still further shown, by considering the *power of the will*. Now it will be found that the *will*, which results from the exercise of reason and judgment, is *very feeble*, and liable to be blown aside by every gale of passion; and that it only becomes strong and energetic by being associated with the *latter*. Hence it follows, that if the voice of reason be weak and that of passion strong; and that while the exercise of the former is favourable to the good order of society, the influence of the latter is decidedly opposed to it,—the tendency of human conduct will be unfavourable to the growth of social virtue, and social happiness, which are coincident with the extension of *moral* worth. In whatever way this may be explained, nothing can be more true, than, that in the history of man, the *prevalence of evil* is undoubted; and that, notwithstanding many good qualities, the *uncontrolled tyranny of his organic suggestions would be such*, that the world *would be* converted into one scene of unmitigated crime, and of unalleviated sorrow.

It is allowed, that the inferior animals possess

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and exercise the power of choice and volition ; they will decide between two plans of action which may come before them, and will select the one which is most congenial to their existing *inclination*. But there is this difference between the *volition* of brutes, and the *will* of man—that the *former* affects only the exterior of things, and is determined by impressions made upon the organ of sense ; while the *latter* inquires first into the hidden nature of the objects presented to its choice—looks beyond the surface—seeks after associations, connexions, and every kind of information, which will determine the nature of conduct, and so assist the judgment : the one is *impulsive* ; the other is *reflective volition* ; the one is *animal suggestion*, the other is *spiritual government*.

This being the case, it is very desirable to enlist as many of the passions as possible, in the cause of virtue and the support of good, and obedience to the will of God ; because these will give strength to the will, and the desire to *do good* implanted by *Him* from whom cometh every good and perfect gift ; the inclination to do right should be cultivated into passion, and should be so invested with benevolence to man and love to God, as to *communicate the energy arising from the alliance of the will with passion*.

It has been objected, that specific directions from the will are not sent to particular muscles, through the medium of the nerves, on account of the intricacies and interlacings of those nerves, and the consequent jostling and confusion of the messages

thus distributed. We shall not retrace ground already passed over, by showing how unphilosophical and untrue is this objection ; and how absurd it is to argue against the *possibility* of the existence of that which every day demonstrates. Take for example the most complex operation of muscle, as of the muscles of the hand in writing ; or of the tongue and lips in speaking. Everybody must be conscious of directing the will to these particular muscles, and must know, that a specific act of volition is required for the formation of *every letter of every word written or spoken* ; and yet the most rapid writer or speaker goes on uninterruptedly without the smallest difficulty arising out of the “commingling, and confusing the different lines of communication.” It is absurd to talk of this as untrue, because we cannot understand it. Is this, then, the only thing which we do not comprehend ? Is there anything beyond mathematical truth which we do fully comprehend, and are we quite sure even on this point ? Here, then, is the *simple fact ; so it is* ; of what avail is *reasoning* to prove that it *cannot be* ?

It has sometimes been asked, why there should be a greater complexity of arrangement and minuteness of subdivision of the nervous, than of the arterial system ? Now to asking questions, there is no legitimate barrier ; and we do not intend to hold ourselves responsible to answer all the questions which may be asked. But in the present instance the reason is obvious ; the arterial system has but *one* function to perform, while the nervous

system has *many*. It is true, that in passing the round of the system, the arterial blood *assists* greatly in the performance of other functions, as digestion, nutrition, secretion, calorification, and even innervation itself, yet the functions of the nervous system are still more intricate, diversified, and complicated.

All this is perfectly consistent with a presiding mind—a mind which governs and directs all the movements of health ; and which is still to be traced in the morbid manifestations of disordered action. In some minds, a difficulty has arisen to conceive *how* the spiritual being can be at the helm, and govern and direct *all* the mental manifestations ; and yet be apparently present in the extremities of the sensitive system, and in the minutest details of action and passion *at one and the same time*. Yet this is borne out by *facts*, although we may not be able to comprehend them ; the doctrine of a *general* and *particular* Providence presents a perfect analogy. The Supreme Being is at the helm, and directs all things. But *He* is equally present, and *his* Providence is equally extended to the remotest events, and details of the lives of his creatures. In the one case, *He* acts as the moral Governor of the universe ; in the other, He acts through his commissioned *agents*—acting, indeed, under their own will, and *apparently* from their own resources, yet fulfilling his designs in the voluntary employment or mis-employment of that will, and of those resources which God has originally communicated. *Thus*, the spiritual part

of man, emanating as it has done from divinity itself, directs and governs all the mental movements; but in the sentient extremities of the system it acts through the medium of its commissioned agents; *agents*, which seem to move independently, but which really have no power when cut off from communication with their original *superior*.

Many circumstances contribute to modify these manifestations of mind, both in their origin and in the remote distribution of nervous fibre, so that not only the mental operations, but all the functions of the body, shall receive a distinctive character from original pre-disposition, from age, sex, temperament, education, climate, parental peculiarities handed down to offspring, and ALL the varied forms of disorder. All these circumstances tend to *modify* the manifestations of mind, and the actions of body, so that every individual becomes characterized by some striking peculiarity, which, in fact, constitutes his individuality, and in which *to himself* mainly consists his identity.

It is scarcely more than necessary to mention this law of nature to ensure its belief; yet it is right to notice one or two obvious facts, which support the doctrine above advanced. Every unprejudiced person must have observed the difference of impression made upon different classes of individuals, as, for instance, upon the children of the *poor* and the *rich*; the one, without care, robust, and strong; the other, with the utmost care, feeble and susceptible of every kind of morbid impression, strongly

contrasting with the power of resisting in a great degree external morbid impressions, which is enjoyed by the former. During illness, too, the one will be attacked by maladies of a *severe* character, rather than by that frailty of function which belongs to their superiors; and all these states must be met and combated by different, and even by very dissimilar methods of treatment. Unless these facts were noticed and acted upon, the science of medicine would become one vast chaos of empiricism.

We shall not now pursue this subject, as we shall recur to it hereafter under the head of physical temperament, and its influence upon the manifestations of mind in a subsequent page. But we have noticed above, that many other causes exert a considerable influence in *modifying* the style of thought and action, of feeling and expression, in every individual. Now this is unquestionably true; but it is not true, that this *modifying* influence is sufficient to produce a change of character; or that the *moral re-actions* of the individual are likewise *necessitated* and independent of *the will*.

Now this is just the point in dispute between the necessitarian and the free-will advocate; between the fatalist and the visionary who imagines that he can control nature by the expression of his will; between the *ultra-phrenologist* and his spiritual opponent. Man *is* or *is not*, however, a responsible agent; if he be so, he must have a will, in order to make choice of good or evil; but if his

moral re-actions are necessitated, and not under the influence of the will, he can no longer be held responsible for his conduct, since none can be called to account for conduct, or thought, or feeling, which are inevitable, and independent of himself. The essential difference between these two views is, that the one *originates action and feeling* in the brain; the other, that *these* (action and feeling) are determined by *mind*, but that they admit of modification in their manifestations, according to the *original peculiarity* or present condition of the manifesting organ. If the former of these propositions be true, all our reasoning falls to the ground: man is not a reasoning creature, and he cannot in justice be held responsible for thought, and feeling, and action, over which he has *no* control. This proposition has been already shown to be monstrous; and it is so completely at variance with the order of nature, that we shall not again pass over a train of argumentation, which has been before detailed, or anticipate that which may be hereafter adduced, when treating of the morbid influence of the body upon the mind.

There is, however, one point which it is necessary to discuss in this place, viz. the distinction between *will* and *inclination*. The two are very often confounded as *synonymous*; we are perpetually told that parties *wish* to do a certain thing, but that they *cannot*. Were it not for the unfortunate philosophical and moral results, which so frequently occur from this want of the energy of perseverance, it would be too absurd to require serious notice;

but unhappily the greatest mischiefs commonly arise from this very source ; the judgment is convinced of the propriety of acting in a particular direction, and the parties *wish* to act so as to secure a certain result ; but the attractions of another line of conduct are greater ; inclination bears towards it, and there being no firmness of purpose, *no will* to oppose to its suggestions, inclination obtains the mastery ; the individual does *not will* to act right, and in spite of his good resolutions at a distance, he constantly acts in opposition to his judgment.

The frequent result of man's acting against his better judgment, and of his being driven away in a direction contrary to his convictions, and to his best resolutions founded thereon, has become one grand resting-place for those who deny the *free agency* of man ; as if man *could* not act aright if he *would* ; as if he could not subdue his inclinations, deny himself, and subjugate his passions, as well as the temptations arising therefrom, if he would only *will*, or be determined to do so. We speak not of *him* as independent of Divine assistance ; we know he cannot act without it ;

“ The breath of heaven
Must swell the sail,
Or all the toil be lost.”

But if that aid be vouchsafed, it is so to the will ; not to indolent, languid desires, and empty longings, and unmeaning aspirations, *but to the will*. It is this only which is energized to action, and *without it* there will be no principled action at

all. But it may be said, *who gives the will?* Why, the faculty of volition is given to man, to be governed by his understanding and his reason, and Divine aid will be afforded to the employment of that faculty; but this employment must originate with man, and he may, if he choose, neglect the suggestion; therefore he *is a free agent*; therefore he *is bound* to watch over and escape from the influence of prejudice and passion, which would distort his views, becloud his vision, and benumb his voluntary power: therefore, he is bound to govern and direct, and deny himself, either for his own good or the good of others. Indeed *self denial*, the first principle of benevolence, can only be found in a *free agent*; and without freedom of volition, the whole nature of man is subverted, his *moral* character is destroyed, his accountability for his actions is submerged in the deep and unfathomable waters of Lethe; the employment of his mental powers can be no longer enforced; and the right use of his reason can be found nowhere, except in the disputations of the schools.

This position is, however, denied; and, strange to say, by two kinds of disputants, who, with very different views and intentions, assert the same thing; and though antipodes to each other in all other respects, show at least in this respect a very close approximation, viz. the ultra-spiritualist who affirms that man has no will of his own, no power to choose good and to refuse evil, no ability to select that which is most becoming his station here; and the *modern infidel*, who refers all these

things to the organisation, and asserts, that man is such as his organisation makes him; that he has no power to change his nature, and that he is not to be blamed for the indulgence of propensities to which his physical system has rendered him obnoxious.

Both these casuists destroy, though in a different way, the accountability of the individual; the former in the more lamentable way, because moral obligation is lessened under the specious pretext of exalting the honour of the supreme moral Governor. But we appeal to the *fact*, that the Almighty has given to man the faculty of *the will*, and if he is not to exert it, it has been given him in vain, which is directly at variance with the perfect character of the *Giver*. And we might also appeal to the consequences, and to the experience, that persons in general, holding such views, are less circumspect, less discreet and valuable members of society, than those who consider themselves morally responsible for their actions. And still farther, we might add, that it is thoroughly inconsistent with the character of a *righteous Governor*, to reward or to punish individuals for acts over which they have had no possible control.

The infidel philosopher who arrives at the same sceptical conclusion, argues that *man's passions* (for it is these which generally lead him into error) result from his organisation; and that thus, control in the well-organized animal, is to be found in their *gratification*, and in their *natural balance*;

this balance being proportioned to the necessities of the moment ; so that no other control is to be placed on the wildness of ungoverned passion, than some other organic excitement ; both being governed by the necessities of the moment, that necessity being of course the inclination of the individual, since " as each temperament has its predominant passions, most men are born victims to some feelings to which they are compelled to obey."

Now if this were true ; if men of a certain temperament are compelled to obey certain feelings attached to their predominant temperament ; if they are the victims of their organisation, there would be an entire end of making man accountable for actions which he has no power to repress ; and the social compact is dissipated, because that compact necessarily implies a surrender of certain selfish wishes and inclinations to the good of the general community ; a subjugation of selfishness to benevolence ; a subjection of passion to principle. This is the keystone of the social arch ; upon this it is founded ; undermine this, and it crumbles into disrupted atoms. What then is principle ? It is the developement of the moral sense, applied to all the emergencies of life ; derived, in natural religion, from a sense of what is right, and just, and fit, and upright ; and in revealed religion, from the obligations of the moral law ; in either case, being sufficient to conduct the individual in the paths of rectitude ; and being dependent upon the exercise of the will, to call up those principles to control natural passions and

desires; and to preserve man from constantly falling into those obliquities of conduct to which he has become peculiarly liable, from the debasing moral change which has passed upon him, and which has rendered him, in the words of his sacred history, "prone to evil, and that continually."

It has been alleged, that repentance for past transgressions, is only that the state of the individual is changed with respect to his dominant passion. Now this is true to a certain extent; but then the change is brought about by *moral motive*, and not by *physical causes*. Repentance has been already shown to be very different from *remorse*; it is to be also distinguished from that transient regret with which it has been confounded, and which involves no real sorrow for the past—no real desire of amendment for the future. The materialist wishes to call this state repentance; because regret is *thus* produced by the gratification of passion, which takes away from the immediate desire for its further gratification, through the satiety it produces, and the organic rest which it requires; but it is a *transient* impression, and is *gone* as soon as that *organic rest* has recruited *organic expenditure*; and then at once is revived the desire for the gratification of passion without any controlling agency.

Not so, *repentance*! Here, there is not the diminished appetite—and, indeed, the gradually induced loathing of satiety, and of exhausted power for the continuance of gratifying impulse; but a *real* and effective *moral* change; a conviction

of what is morally wrong, and a desire after that which is morally right; as well as contrition arising out of that conviction, and the consequent desire for the future cultivation of that which is right, and of avoiding that which is wrong. And in the same proportion as temptation is greater, and the voice of passion is louder and stronger, as arising out of physical or surrounding circumstances; so will there be increased watchfulness to guard against the first risings of the storm, to watch the first heaving of the billows, to stem the torrent ere it become overwhelming in its force and fury; and all *this*, arising from a desire to obey the commandments of the Supreme Governor of the universe. Thus is it *moral motive*, not *physical organisation*, which produces the change, where that change is *real and effective*.

It would be mere quibbling, to say, that this was only a change of state with regard to the *dominant passion*; and that, whereas the *previous state* was obedience to constitutional conditions, the *present one* of repentance was owing to the predominance of *love or fear*—either of *love to God* or of fear of *punishment for offences*. The truth would be, that these spring *from* repentance; but even if it were not so, it is clear that they are arising from *moral, not physical* associations, and therefore are not to be accounted for by the foregoing hypothesis; an hypothesis whose primary object is to tear away moral and spiritual obligation from their influence upon the conduct of man.

This position, however, is only an offset from the

startling proposition, that the brain is *totally useless* in all that regards mind ; or “ *that the mental phenomena are governed by the laws of organised action.* ” Now it must be manifest, upon a very little consideration, that this conclusion thus magisterially drawn, is to the last degree unphilosophical ; for in the first place, it supposes that we are thoroughly acquainted with the nature of mind, which we are not ; and in the next place it supposes, that we are also thoroughly informed of its relation to matter—of which, again, we are really in a great degree ignorant. Again, it supposes that mind is subject to matter—that it is governed by the laws of organised action ; a conclusion which we take leave to deny ; and to assert, on the contrary, that so far as regards mind, the brain is the appointed organ for its manifestation—to receive and to obey its directions ; that it is, in fact, the *servant of mind*—a property superior to, and not dependent upon, organisation, but directing that organised action according to *its will*.

It is equally unphilosophical to assert, that the brain must be useless as relates to mind, unless it be in fact mind itself ; because it assumes the point in dispute, and asserts that mental phenomena are governed by organised action ; whereas it is asserted by the opponent, that so far from this being the case, the organic changes are under the direction of mental influence.

Again, to assert that the brain must be “ totally useless as regards mind, unless it be mind itself,” is to assert that the organ and the function are the

same thing ; and that there can only be *one* cause operating upon that function ; as if it were to be asserted, that the stomach was of no use as regards digestion, unless that function can be performed without nervous influence, upon which, though unseen, it is wholly dependent ; or, as if it were asserted, that the stomach was of no use as relates to the process of nutrition, unless it *completed* the formation of the chyle ; or to the function of sanguification unless it added the last perfecting action to the formation of the blood, viz. the red particles ; all of which are absurd conclusions,—yet not more so, than that which asserts, that the brain can do *nothing*, or that it cannot perform *one alleged* function, unless it can perform *another*.

All these difficulties are smoothed away by the acknowledgment of the simple fact, that the brain is not *mind itself*, but inferior and subjected to it ; that it is the exponent of mind ; that it is appointed to receive its notices, and issue its commands ; while, on the contrary, the mind directs the movements of the brain, accelerates or retards its actions, presides over its physical functions, and regulates its actions in conformity with moral and spiritual principles.

This opinion has been endeavoured to be supported by the argument, that attention is not a *mental faculty*, but a *peculiar condition of the cerebral organ*, induced by the *strength* of impression made upon it. It might here be fairly asked, what is a *faculty*, but a peculiar condition of the organ, which enables it to carry on any one of its

functions, at any given time more than at another. If it be made to consist in mere *excitement* of the organ, through which it is enabled to receive freely the impressions which have been made upon it, and, therefore, to comprehend their full bearing; it is *then* only the increased action of the organ of mind, by which it seeks to acquire information; so that we might fairly say, attention is *a faculty, a peculiar* condition of the mental organ, by which it is enabled more accurately and more usefully to inform itself of the nature of objects, or the tendencies of a subject, or the strong and the weak points of an argument.

This attempt, therefore, to fasten an important mental phenomenon upon organic agency, has signally failed; because, *first*, the faculty may *produce* the peculiar condition of the organ in which it is said to consist; because, next, every variety of function requires, to a certain extent, a peculiar condition of that organic fibre which is concerned in its manifestation; and because, *thirdly*, none can disprove the assertion, that it is *mind* which first called into existence this faculty; or that peculiar condition of the cerebral organ which is fitted for that department of its manifestations which is called *attention*.

Such is the *à priori* reasoning upon this subject: and this is supported by the facts of the case; for if it were not true, that *attention* could be directed to particular subjects by the will—the *moi*—the interior spiritual being; then it would be never fixed, would be always varying at every new im-

pression, and always tossed away from its present object by any new impulse, by any fresh *organic suggestion*. Neither, if the hypothesis were true, could the attention be varied at pleasure from one object to another, at the bidding of the will, and in obedience to mental behests; it could be governed only by the laws of organised action; whereas it is manifest, that however much it is unhappily disturbed by any disorder in the organisation, yet in its state of *organic healthfulness*, it is a cheerful and faithful servant of mind.

Precisely the same reasoning is applicable to another *faculty*, the existence of which as a *faculty* has been denied; and this denial has been supported by a beautiful theory of *organic movements*, in order to account for *spontaneous recollection*. Thus it has been said, "In efforts at recollection the ideas sometimes proceed in a logical and syllogistic series, so that the steps of the process may be retraced; more frequently, the *organic movements* are performed too rapidly for consciousness, and the idea flashes at once on the mind, as if without connexion. It often happens also, that after a protracted but ineffectual effort, the idea arises spontaneously, and interferes with the new trains upon which *the mind* is then occupied. It should seem that, in this instance, the cerebral tissue has been thrown into a state of orgasm by the previous effort, and repeats at intervals the movements upon which it has been exercised, independently of the will, and thus accidentally introduces the required idea."

It is readily allowed, that there is something very difficult of explanation in that form of spontaneous recollection, in which, after frequent and fruitless efforts to remember, the idea at last flashes across the perception, without any apparent cohesion with any preceding train ; but to endeavour to account for memory upon a series of *organic movements*, is unphilosophical and contrary to fact. It is unphilosophical, inasmuch as it supposes the existence of a cause, which is unnecessary ; since if memory be a mental process, conducted under the agency of the mental organ, with submission to the mental guidance, it is unnecessary to suppose a series of organic movements in order to its production. We know but little of mental operation, but that little is opposed to the idea of materiality. And it is contrary to *fact* ; for if there were organic movements, those movements would be perceived, when the attention was awakened to the process. But they are not ; in the highest efforts of memory, there are no perceptible organic movements ; the brain may be aroused ; it may be an active and faithful, it may be a treacherous and contumacious servant, but organic movements are not discoverable ; all that is *felt*, is distress of mind, because the effort of recollection is unavailing.

But the process is evidently a mental process, and not one of organic movement. It often happens, that, in recollection, the ideas are traced back in regular cohesive association to the point which is the one sought for ; and this is taken step by step

as a regular consequence of voluntary attention ; and the action of the brain is perceived only as subsidiary. But, sometimes, the effort to trace back the present, to other by-gone trains of ideas, is fruitless : the thing is not perceived ; but the right chord has been touched, unconsciously, or half-consciously, while apparently busied about other things ; the mind has hunted about for the lost idea, and has picked up the clue, which has conducted, without effort or manifest design, to the thing sought for. But perhaps the pursuit has been abandoned as fruitless, and after all the idea arises spontaneously. Now, this may not admit of easy explanation ; but it is just as much explained by saying that it arises from a series of *mental*, as from a series of *organic movements*, each being equally unperceived, and for the latter of which there is no foundation in reason or analogy. In all probability, in the search after the forgotten idea, some train has been awakened, which, unperceived, leads the inquirer to the object of pursuit ; the original impression made upon some portion of the subsidiary organ has been reproduced, which the mind has caught up and applied. And if this be not wholly satisfactory, at all events, it has more foundation in fact, than the hypothesis of *organic movement*, aiding *organic recollection*, and going no farther than *organisation*. We do not judge it necessary to notice the orgasm of the cerebral tissue, and the repetition of the movements of that tissue, independently of the will, which repetition of movement accidentally introduces the required

idea ; a farrago of nonsense, which one would think must be the product of cerebral tissue, unguided by the judgment, and of cerebral action, when dissociated from its governing and directing principle. Grievous, indeed, is it to observe the follies into which wise men fall, when they wish to substitute preconceived notions for truth ; and to support a favourite hypothesis, rather than yield the mind to any direction higher than mere organisation.

There is an important offset from this hypothesis of organic movement, which has so considerable a bearing on the moral character, that it requires to be noticed in this place. It has been said, that the ideas which flow from impressions commencing in the viscera, are *wholly organic*, and *exempted from moral consequence* ; or, in other words, that man is irresponsible for all actions, the germ of which is to be found in his organisation ; so that for all his animal propensities, for all the lower feelings and passions, and all the consequences to which they lead, he is *not responsible* ; their origin is “ wholly organic,” and therefore they are “ exempted from moral consequence ;” so that the framework of society may be destroyed by the influence of human passion, and yet the destroying individuals are to be held innocent, provided that these actions are stimulated by the tyranny of their organic suggestions.

It is not often that we find error holding out a front so open that it cannot be sophisticated, undisguised even by the flimsy veil of pseudo-bene-

volence ; and it is a real relief when the features of error, its general form and pressure, are thus held up in all their hatefulness. In writing for the general public, we are precluded from taking as examples many of the animal passions ; we shall merely mention, in the present instance, *revenge*, in consequence of which an individual commits murder ! Now if it shall have happened that the first germ of this passion originated in his stomach, because his victim had stolen his dinner when he was very hungry, and he had pursued and inflicted summary vengeance upon him, the perpetration of murder is to be held harmless, because the *first ideas* which led to the crime *commenced in the viscera*, were *wholly organic*, and *exempted from moral consequences*.

And inasmuch as almost all the ideas arise through the senses, the greater part of man's feelings and conduct are dependent upon his organisation, in addition to which much of his moral and social character is governed by passions and sentiments which have their root in the viscera ; *all* these are exempted from moral consequences, and therefore man is irresponsible for almost all that he says and does in life. Now this is a *simple following* out of the principle to its *legitimate sequences* ; and if such be admitted, of what avail are the bonds of social order—what the use of moral sensation—what the value of relative obligation—what the use of moral principle and action ? Man *does* as he is prompted by passion ; he pleases himself, and therefore he is not responsible ! How

frightful the consequences to be derived from such a position ! Far better to live with the beasts of the field ; they can but obey the dictates of their organisation ; and they would be less formidable, because they possess not *reason* to give energy and power to their resolves.

In good truth, man has a spiritual principle given him for the purpose of controlling the irregularities which would otherwise ensue from unbridled passion. His moral sense governs the animal, and makes him answerable for all his conduct ; the whole of his organisation is placed in subjection to this governing, presiding principle, and man is morally culpable if he do not yield obedience to the influence of conscience ; still more so if he refuse to submit his will to the dictates of this conscience, aided as it is by all the moral truth with which he is surrounded, by all the highest sanctions which revelation, and the belief of the existence of an omniscient God, holy and just, encouraging the good, and punishing the wicked, is calculated to produce.

We see the anxiety of a certain class of philosophers to lower human nature as much as possible, so that the apparent distinction between man and brutes should be diminished to a difference in *degree*, and not in *kind* ; and that even this difference should be so shaded off, as almost to blend at certain points of approximation, and to leave no distinctive marks between the two. The design of this reasoning is very evident : if man should obey his passions, and all other organic sugges-

tions, and be held scatheless for all the consequences, *then* it is most desirable that he should have no future account to give of the deeds done in the body! And since not the most sanguine visionary believes that there are future rewards and punishments for the brute creation, then it is most desirable that man should only be a superior brute, because if the same in kind, and only differing in degree, the question of action is only one of *degree*; responsibility for such action *the same*—future consequences *the same*—and therefore rewards and punishments *the same*. If, then, the question of rewards and punishments be only one of degree,—and there are obviously *none* in the one instance, so neither can there be in the other; man gets rid of the notion of accountability, and all is well, if he do not act so as to arouse the passions of his fellow-man; and even then he is *not responsible*, and there are no moral consequences.

The question, therefore, as to what is the distinction between the intelligence of man and brutes is not unimportant. To this may be appended, though not necessarily, the question of the after existence of brutes in another state of being. This latter problem, perhaps, it is impossible to solve satisfactorily, because of our *own knowledge* we *can know nothing* of a state of *after-existence*, and therefore we can form no reasonable judgment of the respective fitness of such after-existence; and it is a point upon which Revelation is profoundly silent, and therefore it may be believed to be one

into which it was not intended we should inquire. It has been thought that this question had an important bearing on *man's after-existence*; but it has not, because, in the first place, supposing man to partake of the *same nature* with brutes, there are different degrees of intelligence, and an omnipotent Creator may have imparted to *one* a capacity for after-existence, which may have been withheld from another less suited to such existence; and, in the next place, comes the truth, that man possesses a *principle superadded* to his more perfect organisation—a principle differing in *nature* from brute intelligence—a spiritual principle—disconnected with matter, and destined to survive its ruin, and to flourish in unceasing and immortal verdure. Now what are the distinctive features between the mind of man and the intelligence of brutes? since, as a mere question of degree, there are *gradations of intelligence* even in *cultivated society*, which will account for much difference of mental manifestation.

It cannot be denied that the inferior animals possess rational minds; and it has been already stated that the great difference in *their* apparent intelligence, and *that* of man is, that the latter originates and acquires, while the former possesses only imparted knowledge, such as it has pleased the Creator to bestow, and in all respects best suited for the situation that animal is destined to fill. It has also been stated that animals do not *anticipate* as a reasoning process, though they instinctively prepare for certain grand events, which

their instinctive knowledge has taught them to expect ; as, for instance, to seek shelter from a coming storm, or to prepare a fit residence for their expected young, or other similar acts, all of which differ from mental anticipation, as not being wrought out, but imparted.

It must be allowed that the intelligence of some animals is great ; that it is even greater than that possessed by *many* of the higher order of creatures, *man*, in some at least of his less gifted specimens. But it is after all of a different kind ; nothing can give to man the superiority of sense, the instinctive sagacity, the inherent knowledge which are possessed by brutes ; while, on the other hand, nothing can confer on the inferior animals the kind of reasoning intelligence possessed by man, and especially that moral soul, which renders him a religious, a responsible creature, and the absence of which leaves the inferior animal irresponsible. It appears, then, that a man of *limited* intelligence possesses knowledge which the *most* sagacious animal has not ; while even some stupid animals excel the finest specimens of the most intellectual men in the amount of their instinctive knowledge ; in the extent and power of their senses ; and in the quantity of their imparted information.

But if so, if it be true that in some features of *animal* intelligence, the most stupid creatures excel man, in all the pride and vain-glory of his intellectual possessions, and, on the contrary, that the narrowed understanding of uncultivated man greatly excels in reasoning power the highest reach of the

imparted knowledge of the lower animals, it follows necessarily that the difference between the two is a distinction of nature, and not only a difference in degree.

Wherein, then, consists this difference ? In both cases the brain is the organ of mind ; in both cases impressions are received from the exterior ; and the mental manifestations are conveyed from within outward, through the *medium of a similar organ* ; in both cases the brain performs the same function. It is not here a question whether the brain is more or less perfect, because, first, that is admitted on all hands ; and because, secondly, as the difference to be explained is not one of *degree*, but of *kind*, we shall not have arrived one step nearer a solution of the problem by showing that in one case the organ is more perfect in its capacity ; since, in truth, while one brain is more perfect in *acquired*, the other is far more perfect in instinctive, or imparted knowledge.

Here, it may be said by some persons, that we are reduced to the alternative of allowing the proximate cause of thought to rest in the *brain* of the inferior animal, or to admit that he has an *immortal mind*. Now it is fully allowed that this question is beset with difficulties, and that it appears to be one of those in which we everywhere find that Nature has placed a barrier to our investigations ; a barrier not to be overleaped, and through which, therefore, it is the part of wisdom *not to pry*, since the seal of omnipotent secrecy has been placed upon it. Yet if we do not too curi-

ously seek after that into which it is forbidden for us to inquire, and if we do not impiously attempt to supersede the creative wisdom of Omniscience, by doubting *His knowledge or His power*, or setting limits to *His goodness*, there is no reason why we may not humbly seek to trace *His agency in all His works*.

Now with regard to these supposed alternatives, first, that we must admit the proximate cause of thought to exist in the brain; we reply that this is *unnecessary*, because the Almighty may have given to the inferior animals a certain something which *we call mind*, of the possession of which *man is conscious*, and refers in matters of opinion or action to his understanding, his judgment, his conscience, clearly distinguishing these powers of thought from the organ which carries them on; and this something called mind, is suited to the condition in life, the wants, the habits, the well-being, the destiny of the respective animals. To this mind the impressions from without may be communicated, and the notices from within may be conveyed; and in the absence of moral motive the functions of life will be performed through the several impulses of passion and appetite, and other organic suggestions.

But the too curious inquirer will wish to know what is the nature of this mind, and what its final destiny? Is it, or is it not immortal? Is it lost with the life of the animal, or is it destined to live again, in the same, or in some new form? We cannot tell; it is a point beyond the reach of

human intellect. But *this* is not a matter of such grave importance as has been represented by *sceptical philosophers*, since no important doctrine rests upon it. It is absurd, and very unphilosophical for man to dogmatise upon a subject of which he is so profoundly ignorant, as not even to know the *meaning* of the terms he employs in order to explain that which is inexplicable. Now, till we know what are the ultimate properties of matter; what is the nature of the ultimate nervous fibre; *how* impressions are made upon it; *how* conveyed by it; *wherein* consists nervous influence; and what are the disorders to which it is liable, it is quite useless to attempt an explanation of the functions of the brain. So that as philosophers, we ought quietly to study the manifestations of mind, without making intimate researches into the *nature of thought*. Thus, therefore, we see that the question of animal mind cannot, in philosophical truth, be brought to bear upon the other question of the brain being the final cause of thought.

Neither is this more important, in regard to the immortality of the spiritual part of man, or his future prospects, responsibilities, rewards, and punishments. For, first, the Almighty may have given to animals a rational mind, suited to their station in life; and this not being a moral mind, and its possessor not morally responsible, there is no necessity for a future state of rewards and punishments, to equalize the inequalities of life; and therefore animal mind may become extin-

guished, or cease to exist with animal life. Or, secondly, it may be destined to revive in a new state of existence,—a state of existence suited to its powers and capabilities,—but not for the exhibition of attributes which it never possessed ; an *animal* but not a *spiritual paradise*, which latter is reserved only for that moral and responsible creature, *man*, whose education *here* is evidently one of probation, to fit him for future activity, and future enjoyment. Either alternative is perfectly possible ; *which* exists, is hidden from us, and it is worse than useless to inquire : for in no case has the truth any bearing upon the immortality of the soul of man, or upon any other great doctrine of our faith. We know not the *whole* ; if we did, we should find order, harmony, wisdom, and beauty : we know not in what way nature has accomplished the mysterious union of mind and matter : but if we *did* know, we should doubtless be astonished at the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness of God, displayed in the simplicity of the arrangement.

There is one other faculty of the mind, which claims our attention for a few moments, because it has an important bearing upon the healthy, as well as upon the morbid manifestations of the spiritual principle, viz. the faculty of imitation. If we go back to early infancy, we notice, that upon this faculty depends almost all the acquired good or evil of that early period ; from the first dawn of intelligence, we shall find the prevalence of this instinctive desire ; there is a natural inclination to

resemble those around us; and the manners and habits of individuals, the speech, the modes of thought and action, are handed down from one generation to another.

That this faculty is instinctive, will also be shown by considering, that there is in the human mind a secret but imperative impulse to imitate that which pleases; and that the early traces of this faculty are to be discovered before the developement of reason, in a degree sufficient to form a basis for *rational* imitation; and that with augmenting mental power, it is to be found standing out as a master principle in the passion of emulation. Another proof of its instinctive nature, will be found in the mode by which we sympathise in the joys or sorrows of others: we joy with those who rejoice; we weep with those who weep, and simply because *they* do so; for this *act* of sympathy will oftentimes precede reflection, as to the cause which has produced those manifestations which we unconsciously imitate.

We see the influence of this principle, in what may be termed the fashion of the day, that fashion, often giving currency to things absurd, and much more frequently to things of little value, so as to give them an undue preponderance *for a time*; and then, by a similar *re-action*, sending them back again, into a state of unmerited obloquy and insignificance. This fashion is frequently changing; but while it continues, it exercises a very powerful influence upon conduct; and thus it is that we find, not only reigning fashion in dress, but we observe

certain pursuits become fashionable. The study of some languages, or of some branch of science hitherto neglected, is now brought out into active notice. The advantage of this influence is manifest ; because each one seeks to obtain all the information of his neighbour, and by a more accurate investigation, to carry on that knowledge one step further, which again excites and keeps up the zeal and activity of the faculty.

This faculty of imitation is greatest in the young, and perhaps becomes less in proportion to the developement of the judgment, and to the increase of experience, leading to greater caution and discrimination. As age advances, the tendency to imitation certainly diminishes to such an extent, that after a certain number of years, we shall find the disposition to receive anything new, to step out of the beaten track, or to take new impressions or new views, become so feeble, as to form a positive obstacle to improvement, and to the enlargement of the dominion of mind. By degrees it forms a sufficient ground of objection, to any *new thing*, that our ancestors did not think, or do so ; age is remarkable for its pertinacity to *old* opinions, and for its indisposition to believe that which is modern.

That such a faculty should possess some counterfeits, should give rise to some errors, and should possess some morbid states, is not surprising ; and, further, that these states should have a considerable influence on the physical and moral health of large

masses, is only what should be expected. We perceive this on a great variety of occasions ; one of the simplest is perhaps that of *yawning*, and there are few who have not experienced the irresistible impulse to this unfortunate state, merely from seeing others yawn. It is a well-known fact to medical men, that such is this propensity in many states of the nervous temperament, particularly in females, that the same form of hysterical malady will become prevalent in a community, where no such tendency previously existed ; and that from the occurrence of a single case. Thus there are imitative diseases : the attacks of hysteria and epilepsy may often be imitated, and that too successfully, so that the deception answers. This exists when there is a sinister object to accomplish, and therefore a *desire* to cultivate the invasion of such malady. Here the *will* and the *mind* are concerned : but the same propensity to imitation, will be found sometimes independently of the will, and occasionally despite its utmost efforts. In these cases, the impression seems to have been made upon the nervous fibre ; and, as we have said, the faculty of imitation precedes reason and reflection, the mobility is communicated *directly* to the muscular nerves, *before* the mind has had time to call its intellectual resources into active operation. In these cases we should *pity*, not *blame*.

The *moral* influence of this faculty is also largely operative ; there is an instinctive inclination to imitate those with whom we are associated ; and it is

only by calling into active operation the strength of good principle, that we can escape from the contagious influence of those around us. It is easy to swim with the stream, but it requires a high degree of moral courage to attempt to stem the torrent ; to dare to be singular ; to be firm and unbending in the midst of parties which court our favour by their attractions. It is very important to know when to arrest this propensity to imitation, and how far to yield our assent to the common modes of thought and action current among men. Such is the power of the instinctive principle, that it was clearly the design of the *Omnipotent Creator*, that man *should imitate* his fellow-man ; and, therefore, the faculty should only be repressed when its exercise interferes with some principle of action, some boundary of right or wrong ; it should be a rare occurrence, when man finds it necessary to separate himself in conduct from his fellows ; but when the occasion does present itself, he should do so unsparingly, unshrinkingly, uncompromisingly.

In these days, perhaps, it is scarcely possible to pass over the influence of this faculty, in bringing about many of the great revolutions of the world : it is this which has made armies invincible, and given a panic to others ; which has made them flee, when none pursued : it is this which has given currency to opinions of misrule and lawlessness, and a contempt of authority, which threatens to overturn our most cherished institutions : it is this

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which forms the bond of union and action among our Chartists and Socialists; and it is this, which uncontrolled will subvert order, sap the foundations of society, and drive us back from civilisation into anarchy and confusion. May God protect us, and avert this evil !

CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE MORBID MANIFESTATIONS OF MIND, DEPENDENT UPON CERTAIN CONDITIONS OF THE BRAIN :—MENTAL DISEASE.

WE have already mentioned the “tyranny of organic suggestions;” we have combated the opinion, that man was not responsible for thoughts originating in some part of his organisation; we have shown that he is minutely answerable for every atom of his conduct, because he is placed in a situation to be superior to his physical system, and to restrain or repress its propensities. We again recur to this subject; first, for the purpose of marking it as the simplest form of disturbed mental manifestation, depending on impressions made upon the body; secondly, for the purpose of inculcating the necessity for watching against these suggestions; and, thirdly, that we may encourage those who suffer much from their recurrence, and whose feeble will renders them an easy prey to the impulse of passion.

First, were man to follow the suggestions of his

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appetites, uncontrolled by reason, unawed by consequences, ignorant of responsibility, careless of character, and uninfluenced by religious motive and sanction, he would degenerate to the lowest animal, and he would be *worse* than the beast, in proportion to his power to injure, by calling into action all the extent of his resources, his knowledge, his skill, his prudence, his foresight, and all the formidable array of mental power which he possesses: and then this beautiful world would become the prey to remorseless impiety. It is easy for the reader to conceive the infinite evils which would arise from such a state of things; but the details would be scarcely fitted for the public eye; we shall therefore exemplify our position only by the simple appetite of hunger.

The desire for food is imperative; and where man has it within his reach, it is easily and properly gratified. But suppose he has no food with which to satisfy its cravings: his neighbour has an abundance of food: nature created food for man; it never intended that the goods of fortune should be unequally divided; therefore the hungry man has a right to the *superabundant* food possessed by his neighbour: and even if that neighbour have not a *superabundance*, but only a bare sufficiency, still the hungry man has a right to it, if he can obtain it, because it is one of nature's universal laws, that the *stronger* should feed upon the weaker. If then food can be obtained upon easy terms, *well!* if not, it must be obtained by violence. If it can be stolen from its possessor, this would be

easier, and therefore better ; but if not, the arm of *might* must be employed to overcome the power of *right*, the violence must be proportioned to the resistance ; and if that resistance be great, it must be overcome by still greater exertion, to be limited only by that which is necessary for acquisition ; and this, even though at the expense of the life of the possessor ; for after all, “ what is life ? ” It is only a state which may be enjoyed by one, or by another ; but to which no one has a greater right than another, and to which *he* has the greatest right, who can *best protect it* ; so that if *I* am to starve, or *my neighbour be killed* in the effort to save *myself* from hunger, *his life* rather than *mine* must be the sacrifice. Thus the apparently simple want of hunger, leads, if uncontrolled, to the overturning all the important barriers of society, and legislation, and morals ; and the greatest crimes are committed, if they stand in the way of the gratification of selfish desire. And if this be the case under circumstances in which passion is not involved, how much *more* where every barrier is swept away at once by its resistless torrent !

How great then is the necessity for watching over the influence of these suggestions, of subduing the principle of selfishness, of calling into action its antagonist principle of benevolence, and the influence of all the laws of God and man, in order that all the functions of the body may be subjected to the superior influence of mind ; and that man may live in the constant and habitual practice of that self-denial which will alone enable him to escape from

this tyranny. But this is religion ! and it is even so : the animal will claim the supremacy, unless the spiritual nature shall have been disciplined ; and by God's grace shall have been placed under the dominion of virtuous suggestion. But this involves a series of acts of self-denial ; a constant struggling with all the lower feelings and propensities, and a uniform cultivation of that love to one's neighbour, which is the second great commandment. In attempting this, the power of the will must be cultivated, and brought into constant exercise, or it will soon become feeble and vacillating ; it will *parley*—and it is already undone so far as regards firmness of purpose.

Thirdly, this subject affords encouragement for those who suffer most from the tyranny of the body. We are treading on tender ground ; and we are particularly desirous to comfort the feeble-minded, but not to give countenance to the indolent ; it is to those who *suffer* from the tyranny of the body to whom we offer encouragement, not to those who carelessly avail themselves of this tyranny, as a *ground of excuse* for their indolence and delinquencies ; or to those who willingly, cheerfully, and knowingly indulge all the suggestions of body, and absolutely luxuriate in their own weakness. To *these*, the condemnation of neglected talent, perverted power, abused mercy, and wilful contumacy will attach. It is always to be remembered, that the body is subservient to the mind ; and that this subjection, though not perfect, is to be constantly enlarged and extended. It is also to be remembered,

that in our present perverted state of being, there is a principle of evil, constantly and rebelliously at work against this subjection. So long, therefore, as man is an imperfect creature, so long will the government of the body, by the mind, be imperfect ; and so long will the suggestions of the body interfere with the finest properties of the christian character, check the growth of christian principle, repress the developement of christian virtue, and shrivel the expansion of christian feeling. At every period of the day, and under all circumstances, particularly those where it is desirable to get rid of body and its connexions ; upon every such occasion, will its suggestions become prominent, will becloud the intellect, pervert the judgment, and render cold the heart. Still the spiritual principle is constantly opposed to these suggestions ; they are never tolerated—much less indulged ; they are fought against with all the weapons of this holy warfare—they are watched over and opposed : and while this is the case ; while the Christian is conscious that he is doing his utmost to bring the body into subjection, though he may lament his deficiencies, and his want of success, yet if his opposition has been sincere, he will escape from the burden of self-reproach. But if his conscience tell him, that he has supinely allowed himself to be enslaved by his animal desires, there is no rest for him at all. His security and happiness consist in opposition ; his certainty of being overcome—his helplessness, his miserable remorse, are the sure result of supineness and inaction ; of listening to the voice of

passion, of being found sleeping at his post, and of being surprised into obedience to the tyranny of his organic suggestions.

Sleep, though it must not be called a morbid condition of the brain, is one of those states which thoroughly suspends the manifestations of mind, and therefore *itself*, and its morbid conditions, become objects of inquiry. The phenomena of sleep are in themselves very curious; and the analogous sleep of plants leads us to see that it is a universal law of nature, not applicable to animals only, but extending throughout the domain of *active* as well as of locomotive life. It is difficult to define what sleep is; and these singular analogies of plants *increase* the difficulty, as it is by no means proved that plants possess a nervous system. Neither is it the stimulus of light which produces this effect, since some plants sleep by day, others at night, and others at different hours of the same day. There is, however, this kind of analogy, that in each case there is a suspension of active life; only such an amount of action as is necessary to *sustain life* is continued, but not enough to exhibit its active manifestations.

With regard to man, his sleep seems to depend upon a peculiar condition of the nervous system; there is invariable disposition to sleep when that system is oppressed; and if the oppression be considerable, the sleep is unconquerable, and not to be superseded; while in the opposite state of irritability it is almost impossible to woo sleep, so completely gone does it seem to the unfortunate

patient. This condition is not always a morbid state, but is accompanied by a degree of excitement of the brain, of an agreeable character, and the patient will pass weeks of almost entire wakefulness, and yet not be the worse for it. During this time, intellectual activity is augmented, but not so the power for long-sustained movement; and unless great care be taken, the functions of organic life generally suffer for this undue expenditure of intellectual energy.

It seems that a certain amount of sleep is generally desirable, but that this differs much in different individuals. It is one of nature's universal laws, that every organ must have its period of rest, and sleep is the *rest* of the brain, during which it accumulates nervous energy, and becomes again fitted for active employment. It is astonishing how little sleep will produce this effect of *rest*; but the *refreshment* produced by *transient* sleep will not last long; it will soon become exhausted, and will require renewal. *After sleep*, the brain should be active and energetic, and a feeling of comfort should pervade the system.

There is a state of wretched drowsiness, which is *not sleep*, but which is almost equally fatal to intellectual usefulness and enjoyment; and the literary man is happy indeed if he has not formed a large acquaintance with this tormenting foe to *improvement*; he may continue his *labour*, but it is *without effect*; he may read or write, but there is no soul infused into either pursuit: there is a dulness of impression and apprehension which pervades the

nervous system. Employment is a burden, and whatever is done, is done languidly *and as a task*. In this state, there can be no fine conceptions, no enlarged views, no delicate tact and perception of relative association ; and the best, though by no means a certain remedy, is to throw aside the books and papers, and indulge SLEEP.

To this necessity of our nature, intellect reluctantly yields obedience ; the hour of retiring is scarcely hailed as a *boon* ; and there is a prevailing regret that mind is so allied with matter that its energetic manifestations cannot be continued without an interval of repose. In perfectly natural sleep, *the brain* enjoys a period of entire quietude. What is the condition of the spiritual principle during this period of torpor of its organ we know not, and it is useless to inquire ; but it is probable that in this stage of our existence the mind is also quiescent during the time of healthy and perfect sleep. But it *may not* be so ; the functions of organic life are continued, though unconsciously—respiration proceeds—the chest is alternately heaved and compressed—the heart carries on its wonted beat—digestion, assimilation, nutrition, secretion, all these functions are respectively carried on unknown, unnoticed, and there can be no reason why the spirit *may not* also be occupied without the cognisance of its organ. This beautiful provision of nature, for the repair of exhausted nervous energy, without which no one of the bodily functions could be long continued, and more especially for the *refreshment of intellect*, is one in

which intelligence seems laid aside ; the subject appears as if dead, and to all intents and purposes is temporarily dead, though preparing for an invigorated resuscitation.

There are various morbid conditions of sleep, which it is necessary to notice, because they are connected with perverted manifestations of mind. One of the most important of these is *dreaming*. Various hypotheses have at different times obtained currency with regard to dreaming, and many of these are more or less dependent upon the assumption that it is a mental process ; nay, more, it has been quoted as a proof of the immortality of the soul : these opinions are much to be regretted, as they afford to the materialist and the atheist strongholds which they would not otherwise possess.

Now dreaming is not a phenomenon of mind ; if it were so, it would partake the qualities of mind. Yet nothing can be more true, than that in dreaming there is no just perception—no real knowledge—no accurate memory—no consequential association—no consecutive reasoning—no well-weighed judgment ; but that, on the contrary, the perception of impressions is always perverted ; the knowledge of things is anything but the truth ; the memory of by-gone circumstances is jumbled in inextricable confusion ; the associations are of the most absurd, and fantastic, and impossible description ; the reasoning, *if any*, is dependent upon these associations, and the conclusions are unspeakably absurd, while the judgment is as op-

posite as possible to any such mental state. It is then worse than inconsequential to speak of dreaming as a state or condition of the mind ; it is entirely resulting from a peculiar condition of the brain, and this condition depends upon the irritation of some of its fibres.

This irritation may arise primarily in itself, or secondarily, from the sympathetic irritation of some *distant organ* ; and in accordance with their origin, dreams will assume the shape of “ Past feelings renovated ;” of recollected impressions ; of the fantastic grouping of thoughts or anxieties which have occupied the attention previously ; of the morbid irritation of some portion of the brain, giving origin to visions of an untraceable character ; or of impressions made upon the brain, through one of the organs of sense ; or through the unwonted or disordered action of some *other organ, not immediately an organ of sense*.

It would not be difficult to obtain something like a classification of dreams under this kind of arrangement, having for their primal root *irritation* of the brain ; thus—

a. Dreams arising from the renovation of past feelings. At some anterior date, powerful impressions have been made upon the affective feelings, and in a state of imperfect sleep these are called up, from the irritation of those cerebral fibres upon which that impression was originally made, not always in a simple uncompounded form, but with a character more or less varied, yet always exhibiting the original root. Thus the author,

when a boy, was subjected to a very thoughtless but fearful accident, through the mischievous intention of his brother, and this impression, during sleep, has been called up many, many times since, even to the present day.

b. Dreams arising from the *recollection* of past impressions. This is a frequent source of dreaming; and these impressions may have been very varied in their character, very distant in time and place, and very different in their nature and object; in fact, they may have been anything in the wide range of personal history; nay, it must have happened to everybody, to observe that the recollection of *dreams* will serve as the basis of future dreams; so that the individual so dreaming shall be perfectly conscious of finding himself in a situation and under circumstances which have previously occurred to him *in sleep*, but of which he has no *waking* recollection, and with which he has no kind of association, clearly tracing back the origin of this form of dreaming to *irritation of the cerebral fibre*.

c. Another fruitful source of dreaming is to be found in the thoughts and anxieties of the preceding day, or of some antecedent period, which are revived during the night, but which, in consequence of the brain having lost the harmonising influence of the reason and judgment, are thrown together in a maze of inextricable confusion, and yet possessing sufficient cohesion to show that the original germ may be traced back to preceding *cerebral occupation*.

d. The brain itself may have become the seat of irritation, either generally over its surface, or throughout its substance, or only partially through a *few*, or through *many* of its fibres : and this irritation may be very varied in its character ; it may arise from simple worry, from a series of those contre-temps which often happen to annoy, and which are frequently in themselves of a very slight aspect ; or it may arise from exhaustion—from the brain's action having been too great or too long continued ; or it may be the product of fever, or of any similar disturbing cause which acts upon the brain primarily ; or that organ may itself be subjected to incipient, but deep-seated, and, if uncontrolled, disorganising mischief ; all of which causes will be fruitful sources of dreaming, and of dreams infinitely varied in character and intensity, from the trifling instance of some mere perplexity, to the highest complication of unheard-of horrors.

e. Lastly, dreams may arise from impressions made upon an organ of sense ; or through the *unwonted* or disordered action of some other organ, not immediately an organ of sense.

Thus a change of temperature during the night, or that kind of restlessness which has led to throwing off the bedclothes ; or an uneasy position from whatever cause, or a sound communicated to the ear ; or a sudden light being thrown in ; or the olfactory or gustatory nerves becoming impressed from an exterior or interior cause, will occasion dreaming ; as also will hunger, or thirst, or indigestion, or disordered respiration, or bile, producing

irritation of the liver ; or any other uneasiness, excess, or defect, or even *unwonted* action (though natural in its proper time and place) of *any organ* or *function* of *the body* ; these all will occasion dreams, and dreams of a peculiar character, though our knowledge is not yet sufficiently advanced to assign that peculiarity of character to the *specific organ or function disordered* ; nor to the *particular character* of such organic or functional disturbance, varied as that must be in its origin, and circumstances, and degree, and intensity.

Yet all these originations of dreaming agree in the one simple point towards which they all converge, viz. in producing irritation of the brain, as varied, indeed, as the cause to which they owe their origin, yet being in every instance *irritation*. There is here, too, ample and satisfactory ground for explaining *every dream*. There is no necessity for carrying the inquiry further ; since to one or other of these heads may every phenomenon of dreaming be referred.

To adopt the hypothesis, therefore, that dreaming is a phenomenon of *mind*, is as absurd as it is unphilosophical ; and, more than this, it is degrading ; for if dreaming be the pure actings of mind left uncontrolled, of what character must that mind be, whose spiritual actings are of so absurd, so incongruous, so irrational, so weak, and so wicked a manifestation ? What, indeed, would be the probable character of heaven, if peopled with *minds*, whose *uncontrolled actings* produce effects like these ? To suppose for dreaming, there-

fore, any other than a cerebral cause is *unphilosophical, because unnecessary*; but it is mischievous in its consequences, because it degrades spiritual man from his own level to that of the inferior animals.

But perhaps we shall have some highly-valued friend and ally, still clinging to the spiritual hypothesis of dreaming; and that, too, upon the supposition that it affords evidence of the immortality of the soul, from its unceasing action. Now were this admitted as a fact, we should say that we have already shown the character of the actions of *such soul*; and we apprehend, that none will wish to claim immortality for such actings. Yet if these be the *uncontrolled promptings of spirit*, when the body is asleep, they must show the nature of that spirit; and therefore it is not unfair to accept them as offering such demonstration; and loaded with such consequences, none but an infidel—none but he who wishes to blot out an hereafter from the sacred page of truth, will be willing to take dreams as the offspring of spirit, or as evidence of an immortal nature.

Take for an instant the high qualities of mental operation, during the waking hours, and contrasting them with the phenomena of dreaming, it will be seen, that the latter are wanting in the manifestations of the former; it will be seen that there is no reason, no reflection, no judgment, no comparison, no *mental will*; the images presented follow each other without legitimate sequence, and by associations over which we have no control.

But if the phenomena of dreaming present attributes which are *not* according to the workings of spirit, and if they are *deficient* in the necessary attributes of mind, the conclusion is surely irresistible, that they are not mental processes, and only possess that *semblance* because they are produced by *irritation of the ORGAN of mind*. The term *mental will* has been employed designedly because in some dreams there is a great appearance of volition, as in sleep-walking, or talking, or changing the position; or in offensive or defensive or fearful movements, according to the character of the dream. But on close investigation it will be seen, that all these are imperfect; they possess *bodily* but not mental volition; the speech is indistinct, confused, and imperfect, and the other movements partake the same character.

But again, dreaming is a morbid action, never existing in the best state of health, and always to be found when the body is disordered, and especially, perhaps, when that disorder affects the digestive organs, because of their intimate sympathy with the brain. The dreams of feverish sleep, the nightmare of hot suppers, the visions, the voices of impending malady, are familiarly known and expected; the sleep of health is not scared by uneasy dreams, while the pillow of the invalid is as certainly haunted by broken slumbers, and all the fearful imagery of an irritated brain. The author has elsewhere asserted, and he now repeats the assertion, that the character of dreams is impressed by the position and connexion of the

disturbed organ ; and that the time *will come*, when dreams will be classified according to that disturbed organ ; and, when reasoning inversely, the irritated organ will admit of being predicated from the character of the dreams.

In every such case, dreaming is produced by the uneasy state of some one organ, whose function is more or less disturbed ; and by this disturbance, the extremities of nerves with which it is supplied, are also irritated ; this irritation is propagated backwards to their origin ; certain fibres of the brain's structure partake this distant organic irritation, and dreaming is the *consequence*.

Thus, then, dreaming is a purely physical process ; and although upon the principle above-mentioned, the character of the dream is dependent upon irritation of nervous fibre ; yet it will oftentimes partake that of impressions made during the waking hours. Still, it is irritation of nervous fibre—not mental action—which forms its essential characteristic ; and the ethereal spirit of man has actually nothing more to do with dreaming than that it is associated with the brain, and that, during waking, the brain is its manifesting organ, and its servant.

It has been alleged as a proof of the *mental* origin of dreams, that the process is so rapid—so far too rapid for any *bodily* operation, that it must be mental, spiritual, partaking of *that action* which is unclogged by matter, unimpeded by time, and unimpaired by space. But this argument really avails nothing, although the premises were granted,

viz. that in *dreaming* the process is infinitely more rapid than in *thought*; so that a very long dream may be passed through in an instant of time,—in a space infinitely too small for a similar operation of mind.

The truth is, that the action of the *brain*, when dissociated from the mind, is far more rapid, than when under its control; that so long as it is under the dominion of judgment, there must be a certain space of time, though confessedly a small one, to *perceive* the impressions, to reason upon and compare them—to judge of their truth or falsehood—to consider their relative connexions—to weigh their importance—to decide upon the feeling, the doctrine, the opinion, which may arise out of such mental process; and *all this* is unnecessary in dreaming. The impression is made directly or indirectly upon certain nervous fibres, and these are linked in with certain others which are, or *even* have been formerly associated, but in wild and inextricable confusion; and in that fantastic kind of grouping, which happens from taking up any number of these irritated nervous fibres, at perfect hazard, and without the *remotest* except an accidental connexion—a connexion of contiguity only,—and even this is ever changing; the slightest movement of the body, a new impulse of the blood, or any other trivial cause, which will give a movement to the little broken bits of organic reminiscences, so that the pattern of the kaleidoscope of life shall be changed, and shall be ever changing, till something occurs to put an end to the morbid

action. Thus, then, it appears that the *rapid* action of *dreaming is against*, instead of *in favour*, of its being an intellectual process, since the one requires time for the developement of *reasoning* affinities, the other has none such to develope.

Hence, in the phenomena of *dreaming* there is no mental manifestation; and *conversely* tried by this test, it will be found, that no intellectual process will produce dreaming. To this may be objected the fact of *waking* dreams. We apprehend, that the objector would not admire the application of this doctrine to himself, or admit that at any time during his waking moments, his thoughts *really assumed* the wild fantasies of dreaming; and if he did, we should know that such an one needed an asylum to preserve himself and others from risk. But the truth is, that waking dreams or *reveries* are not intellectual processes, and are sometimes indulged expressly in order to afford rest to the intellect, and to give the reins to the imagination. But the waking dreamer is conscious of his wanderings, and may be recalled at will to the sober realities of life, and is ashamed of ever having deviated from them. It is a morbid, not a healthy process, and one, which if indulged in, has a most serious influence in weakening the powers of mental manifestation; and, therefore, it cannot be that a healthy process of mental action can ever produce such disordered manifestations, so destructive to intellectual health, so injurious to the well-being of cerebral organisation.

There are other analogous states of the brain,

depending upon certain morbid conditions of the system, as in that well-known form of delirium during fever, which consists in the incessant talking of the patient, and with the putting together of the most incoherent images, though oftentimes with something like a characteristic grouping. This is always done without effort and without injury; the patient seems rather amused with his own creations, and if allowed to pursue his own images uninterrupted by the kindness of injudicious friends, wishing to correct his erroneous impressions, he goes on; no mental effort is required, no mental exhaustion follows; a proof that this process involves no mind, and that it is *confined* to simple irritation of nervous fibre. All that such patients require is to be watched, because the nerves of volition and locomotion may be disturbed, and they might get out of bed, or do other injury to themselves *if unprotected*. In this last word, lies the secret of management; patients require *protection*, not *instruction*, much less *opposition*.

Sleep-walking very naturally follows, as another state of irritation of the brain. This invariably happens as the consequence of *dreaming*; the congestion, fulness, or irritation of a distant organ, often gives rise to dreaming of an analogous character; and the associated muscles act, though independent of the will. Sometimes, under similar circumstances, muscular action seems to be suspended or impaired, as that of the diaphragm in some forms of nightmare, in which the sense of distress referred to this part is very great. So,

when a dream may have irritated the voluntary and locomotive nerves, there is often a consequent action ; the patient is about to fly from some object of terror, or other pressing danger, and may thus walk out of the window, &c. Yet it is manifest in all this, that the mind is not alive to its dangers ; or it would not incur absolute risk to escape that which was imaginary, at least unless *insane*, a form of cerebral disorder which we shall notice presently. In truth, there is simple irritation of nervous fibre, prompting to locomotion, and nothing more ; the whole is a dream, but the irritation of nervous fibre is differently situated.

There are some forms of hysteria which may not be passed over, in noticing disturbed mental manifestations, arising from irritation of the brain. It is probable, that every attempt to pierce the cloud which envelopes nervous action, and the connecting links which maintain the communication between body and mind, will be unavailing. Yet there are constitutions in which the nervous temperament largely predominates, and in which the most extraordinary effects arise from apparently slight causes. Thus, for instance, under such circumstances, a slight mental emotion will be sufficient to alter, or even to suspend, the action of the heart, to produce violently-disordered respiration ; to give rise to spasm of the voluntary and involuntary muscles ; to alter the character of the secretions ; to occasion violent pain where there is no apparent cause of pain ; to suspend the action of the brain, leaving the patient quite unconscious ;

or to produce perverted manifestations of its action, as in involuntary crying and laughter ; or in altering the temper, disposition, and character of the individual ; or in producing that form of mental alienation, which, but for its short duration, would be properly termed *insanity*. Pain in the head, of a peculiar character, remarkable for its violence, and from the small space to which it is referred, is a very common consequence of the hysterical paroxysm ; and yet all this shall pass, and in a few hours—perhaps in a few minutes—the patient shall be perfectly well again ; suffering only from languor and exhaustion. It is quite impossible to follow out the various bodily ailments which are dependent upon an hysterical condition of the nervous system, remarkable for the disturbance they produce at the time ; for their great variety and frequent change of symptom ; and for their passing away, and leaving not a trace behind. All we wish to show is, how greatly the actions of body and manifestations of mind are perverted, by even a temporary and a slight functional disturbance of the centre of the nervous and sentient system.

Again, in the very simple phenomenon of *fainting*, there is a temporary suspension of the action of the brain, by which all the functions of intelligence are interrupted by the mere failure of the heart to supply a sufficient quantity of blood to the head. And this, too, will sometimes be produced by a primary action upon the nervous system ; a sudden fright—an emotion of any kind—a disagree-

able sight—a peculiar odour—a painful reminiscence—an apprehensive foresight, will often produce fainting, temporary death, during which there is a more or less complete suspension of the vital powers; and which, if not judiciously treated, has often terminated in real and positive death. A disposition to frequent fainting is not uncommon, though it may not amount to a complete suspension of action; and this is a very painful state, as it tends most entirely to unfit its subject for thought, and other intelligent manifestation; and yet not to take away the consciousness of such morbid condition. This is a state much to be deprecated, and one of the greatest mental suffering, in consequence of the extent to which the manifestations of mind are impaired while the patient remains feelingly alive to the change.

There are other states of suspended animation which wear still more intimately the appearance of death, as in the consequences of drowning and other similar forms of suffocation. In these cases, the effect produced is purely cerebral; it would be quite absurd to suppose, that the rational and intellectual thinking person were thus subjected to a kind of temporary annihilation. The truth is, that it is uninfluenced by these changes; but its manifesting organ has become incapable of performing its duty; the connecting link has been severed, and the manifestations of mind are no longer to be traced, because *the manifesting organ is no longer capable of its function.*

So also, in apoplexy, it is seen, that the being

who is this moment full of life and spirits, capable of the highest reach of intellect, devoted to literary pursuits, in the full tide of intellectual and spiritual purpose, in the most perfect enjoyment of the largest attributes of man, is suddenly, in a moment, arrested — is prostrate, unconscious — paralytic, with a mass of infirmities of the most painful order—imbecile or childish—the wreck of what he once was ; all his best feelings perverted—all his brilliant coruscations clouded — all his solid intellectual properties *gone*—ay, *fled for ever* ; and why ? Because the vessels of the brain have become congested—or perhaps *a little* clot of blood has been occasioned in some part of that organ ; for in the severe cases, death generally ensues in a few hours. Now, in all this sudden arrest of mental manifestation, it is not to be believed that the source of intellect is destroyed ; but only that the mode of communication is *interrupted*, and consequently the manifestations are not perceived ; it is the fault of the organ, which has undergone a change unfitting it for its function.

The same results will occasionally happen from accident ; as from a blow upon the head, which without producing any serious mischief, *may*, and often *does*, in one instant suspend the manifestations of mind ; and in certain states of great debility and exhaustion from other causes, the brain ceases to be capable of carrying out its functions adequately ; its actions are often perverted ; and the mental manifestations become irritable, peevish, and vacillating, fretful, annoyed by trifles, driven from its

own centre, and seriously intent upon frivolous or unmeaning pursuits. So also in other temporary disturbances of the body, as of the stomach, a very trifling alteration of action in that viscus is sufficient to overturn the healthy workings of mind, by irritating the nervous fibre, and thus giving rise to all sorts of dark and gloomy associations, and images, to illusions and hallucinations without end.

In all these cases of irritation of the brain, whether *direct*, as from some morbid action set up in itself; or *indirect*, as in some distant nervous irritation, thrown back upon the brain; or *associated*, as in the case of mental emotion *first* disturbing that organ, or giving rise to other visceral disturbances, which in its reflex influence destroys the equipoise of cerebral action: in all these cases, one and the same effect is produced; the organ for the manifestation of mind has been rendered incapable of pursuing its function; and disorder or disease is the consequence.

That this organic disturbance is not, however, a simple overturn of function on the part of the brain, that brain being considered as the final cause of thought, (or being the *organ* of which *mentation* is the *function*), is shown by various arguments before adduced; and still further, by the internal consciousness which attends some of these states of suspended animation. In many hysterical conditions of the system, and in some instances of fainting, it is quite certain, that although the manifestations of mind are suspended, the interior workings are still going on, as evinced by the patient pos-

sessing an entire recollection of all that has passed during the interval.

The same is noticed in dreaming: though this process is going on, and the most incongruous images are presented, with all the vivid reality of truth; yet the interior *moi* is conscious, that all this is only a dream, or manifestation of perverted action of the brain, not the over-action of *mind* communicated through that organic medium.

So also in cases of suspended animation continuing for a long time, the patient has been conscious of the wailing of friends around his supposed corpse; he has witnessed the preparations for his own interment; and has had a knowledge of all the horrors which surrounded him, yet without having power enough over the manifesting organ to set it in motion. Now these things clearly show the distinction between *presiding mind*, and *performing*, or functional *brain*; the latter is affected; its office is disturbed—perverted, nay, annihilated, while the mind remains conscious of its integrity, of its own power, and of that power being insufficient to command the action of the nervous fibre. Proof cannot be more complete of the independent origin, yet mutually dependent function of mind and its subservient organ.

But we turn to another part of this subject, the influence of the gradual decay of the organ upon the manifestations of mind. Painful as is this humiliating truth, it is nevertheless unquestionable; and it involves much, and must therefore be maturely considered. Now, we perceive in watching

the manifestations of mind, that strength, and beauty, and power, and extent of these manifestations, is by no means to be found at the earlier part of life, nor even in the highest maturity of the body, but perhaps some ten or fifteen years *after* that body has passed its zenith, and has been declining. Again, then, we infer the mutual independence *of essence*, of body and mind; because the *maturity* of the two do not correspond; and because, so long as we have an opportunity of watching the manifestations of mind, before actual decay of the manifesting organ has commenced, we see these manifestations still progressing, still ripening, and we infer their capacity for a still onward reach; and we who believe in continued existence beyond the present, look upon this as a state of progressive advance towards a condition of life, infinitely superior in intellectual and affective developement.

But this continuous progress is obscured in the great majority of instances, at least, leaving only a sufficient number of exceptions to prove the truth of the rule; we see a cloud drawn over the manifestations of mind; decay of the manifesting organ has set in, and whatever *may be the* mental progress, we no longer perceive it; the light of mental life is gradually quenched in the twilight and sunset of bodily vigour.

This change will occur in different individuals, at very varying periods of life. In some, in whom the nervous fibre has been originally feeble, or in whom it has been intensely stretched by deep thought, by anxious solicitude, by the misery of

domestic trial, by the turmoil of passion, or by the stirring events and associations of party and of politics, the approach of this state of decay will be visible at a much earlier period. So, also, when the brain has been irritated by intemperance of any kind, or where it has been goaded into action by the excitement of wine, spirits, opium, &c., its wretched imbecility will be precociously found.

Yet, under all circumstances, when the strictest care has been taken to maintain the vigour of the brain itself, and of all the associated organs and functions, and when that brain has also originally been a strong one, even here, a *gradual decay* does take place. Perhaps this is first noticed by the individual, in his having less power to command the faculty of attention ; he is obliged more frequently to read, and re-read his author, before he can appropriate his meaning ; not that the thing is difficult, but that, as he says and feels, he cannot *give his mind to it* ; meaning, that he cannot direct the attention of *the brain* upon the object of pursuit ; or, that that brain has lost power and obedience ; in other words, that decay has commenced.

The loss of the power of *collecting* and concentrating the thoughts soon follows. It is impossible to think closely without the habit of concentration ; and hence it will be found, that old persons take partial views of subjects and opinions, and become much attached to their own views, with very little reason to support them ; and precisely because they cannot concentrate their thoughts on the object in

question, so as to take in at once, enlarged and accurate views of the subject : these views, in fact, become *more prejudices* than *results* drawn from accurate and just argumentation : and, by degrees, as the shadows of even-tide thicken, the aged become the easy prey of the best casuist.

The consciousness of this loss of power, leads to considerable peevishness and irritability ; the aged become impatient of contradiction, and without being able to render a reason for their own opinions, they very much dislike the accuracy of their conclusions to be impugned, and are disposed to substitute petulance for argument. In fact, a consciousness of weakness leads to a demonstration of irritability, rather than to an acknowledgment of *inability* to cope with reasoning.

One step further, and this diminished power over the action of the brain is supplanted by that organ becoming rebellious, escaping the control of the mind, and listening to, and acted upon by, its own suggestions. These suggestions are by the supposition *involuntary* ; that is, they arise as a symptom of decaying vigour, and as a proof that the brain ceases to occupy its proper place in the animal economy, and to be that efficient servant of mind, which is according to the perfect order of nature. The bordering of these involuntary suggestions upon the varying forms of insanity, in the production of illusions, hallucinations, &c., will be readily seen, and will be more particularly noticed in a subsequent page.

At present it is only necessary to state, that these

symptoms of decay assume a very different form, according to the existing state of the constitution, and to the preceding habits of the patient. And it is perhaps one of the most difficult problems of medical science, to distinguish between symptoms which arise from exhaustion, and those which are produced by oppression. Yet it is of great importance to determine, since the mode of treatment *peculiarly adapted* to either would be prejudicial to the *other*.

The appearances of decay vary in some pretty distinct features, accordingly as they arise from exhaustion of the brain, or from congestion of its vessels; from sensorial torpor or irritability; from sluggish or excited vascular action; or perhaps, more than all, from nervous irritation, accompanied by an undefined apprehension of coming or impending evil, which makes the patient hesitating, uncertain in his determination, and much given to change. We will endeavour to trace some distinctive peculiarities according to the prevalence of one or other of these states.

a. In exhaustion of the brain, there is commonly a sense of distress about the head, oftentimes severe headache, accompanied by a quick pulse—*the pulse of effort*—with corresponding vascular action about the head; great disposition to wakefulness: the patient is painfully conscious that his brain requires absolute rest, and yet he is scared by uneasy broken slumbers, much dreaming, and a thousand waking fancies; the studious employ-

ment of the brain is very onerous, and aggravates the symptoms.

b. In congestion of the brain, the characteristic feature is torpor, and diminished sensibility to impression; there is a dull heavy weight about the head, and oftentimes giddiness; the pulse is slow, full, and labouring; there is a great feeling of weakness, amounting in some cases to entire prostration of strength: the patient is very sleepy,—the sleepiness is oppressive during the day, and uninterrupted during the night; the brain is benefited by some exertion, and especially by bodily exercise; and it even supports intellectual action with advantage, provided it be not too great; the perceptions are dull, and there is a great disposition to contemplate the gloomy side of circumstances and events.

c. In *sensorial torpor*, which is by no means *always* dependent upon congestion, though sometimes connected with it, there is considerable alteration of mental manifestation; and since in the earlier stages there is not much visible malady, the unfortunate patient very generally gets blamed for something wrong in his *morale*. Thus a prevailing indolence of manner and conduct is often ascribed to the want of mental industry, when it is occasioned by physical infirmity; the patient lies in bed, when he ought to be up; he will be found indolently lounging upon his sofa, when he ought to be studying; the letter-writing of to-day will be postponed till to-morrow; the

ride, the walk, the errand of charity, the matter of business, will be all subjected to a similar procrastination ; there is the absence of interest in all he says and does ; he appears to want the proper amount of relative and social feeling ; and he is inattentive to the wants, the desires, the entreaties of those around him. By-and-bye, cerebral malady stands out in full force ; the cause of all this alteration of character becomes acknowledged ; the deepening shades of sensorial torpor lead to much physical infirmity, and then to the gradual extinction of life. This state is very generally the result of great *over-action* of the brain, which terminates in the loss of nervous power, and in a slow but disorganising alteration of some portion of its substance.

d. Precisely opposed to this state is the form of *irritable brain*. This seems to be dependent also upon some preceding unwonted action, during which the fibre is rendered too susceptible to impression, and the brain has not power enough to control that irritability. The subject of this state feels excessively the merest trifles ; he does not brood over them as in torpor, but he is rendered quick—irritable—irascible—easily wounded—prone to take offence, and always seems to be on the *qui vive* for something to awaken this irritability. It is difficult to preserve such a temperament in good-humour with himself and others ; and the actions resulting from this state, too generally betray want of thought and judgment.

e. A simple alteration in the circulating fluid

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will occasion a considerable difference in the manifestations of mind, and this without producing congestion on the one hand, or inflammatory action on the other, but only that kind either of *slow* or of *excited* vascular action, which is quite compatible with ordinary health. This may be *characteristic* of the individual, and as such may be called *constitutional*; or it may exist for a time only, and be occasioned by some great physical, moral, or mental cause. If the vascular action be *excited*, the brain receives more blood than its function requires, besides the *mechanical movement* which it derives from the frequently repeated impulsion of that fluid *upon its fibre*, through the infinitely minute ramifications of the arterial system. The consequence of this is, an excited state of the organ; the ideas flow rapidly; the conceptions are more brilliant; the imagination is more fertile; the perception is more acute, the feelings intense, the judgment more accurate; and if this state be preserved within the boundary line of health, *good is produced*. But it is a dangerous pinnacle, rarely lasts long, and is commonly succeeded by that sluggish action of *the veins*, which results from their having received more than their ordinary supply during this stage of excitement, and having gradually lost their power of getting fairly quit of it in due time for the next quantity. The result is this; the want of action in the veins is for the time supplied by a little more energy in the arteries, superseding by the *vis à tergo* the diminished action in the veins.

But it is more than can be accomplished by such effort; and the arterial action becomes accommodated to the slow venous movement, always supposing that actual disease has not been produced. And now the ideas become obtuse; they are difficultly elaborated. Reading is a burden; every cerebral effort is marked by painfulness; the student, the author, drags heavily through his work; it is done, but done with effort, without animation, *badly done*; there is much disposition to drowsiness, which is not easily removed, accompanied by a great deal of general languor, a prevailing indifference and distaste for thought, and a feeble, hesitating, vacillating, and ever-changing judgment.

f. Lastly, we notice an undefined form of nervous irritation, accompanied by an apprehension of impending evil. It is probably difficult to conceive any great effect to be produced upon the nervous fibre, without involving at least *some considerable* alteration in the vascular action. And we fully admit that considerable vascular disturbance *MAY exist*; but if it be so, it is not cognizable. And it is quite certain that in many of the heavier forms of cerebral disorder there may be *læsion of* nervous fibre producing *paralysis*, where there shall not have previously existed any remarkable vascular disturbance, and where it shall not even exist at the time, except as a consequence of such injury. And if this be the case in instances of graver læsion, and the fibres may be actually torn without much vascular excitement, it follows that

much irritation of nervous fibre *may exist* without a corresponding vascular change. Experience supports this reasoning, for it is not uncommon to find this kind of patient exceedingly nervous, absurdly fearful, as it might be called—too diffident to act—too distrustful to be firm—too wavering to be relied upon, and with a prevailing expectation of future evil,—that evil, varying in character from the common ills of life, its disorders and its troubles, to the highest possible evil to fallen man, viz. his exclusion from the hope of forgiveness, of happiness, of heaven.

The present may be a fit moment for observing, that all these states of disordered brain are peculiarly liable to spectral illusions, to hallucinations, and to varying forms of insanity. There is still so great a belief in the mental origin of these forms of cerebral disturbance, that it is necessary to notice them particularly.

Spectral illusions are generally dependent upon irritation of the brain, produced either by something wrong in itself, by impending important disease, or by the actual presence of some organic irritation sufficient to prevent its healthy function. Spectral illusions may, however, be produced in several ways. In order to the completion of correct sensation, and of its perception by the mind, there must be first a healthy organ of sense, upon which the impression must be made; the nerves which transmit that impression must be healthy; and the brain which accepts, perceives, and appropriates that impression, must be healthy. If any one of

these links be faulty, illusion is produced. If, for instance, the expanded retina be unhealthy, unreal objects may be perceived ; if the optic nerve be unsound, the impression *correctly* made upon the retina may be perverted in its transmission to the brain ; and even if all shall have gone on well hitherto, and the *brain* be only *pre-occupied*, it will not perceive at all, but the impression will pass unheeded ; and if it shall have been subjected to any form of disorder, *illusions* of various kinds will be produced. These vary considerably ; but they may be expected, wherever any one of these links is *defective*, or in a state of irritation : and especially that form of disturbed cerebral movement, which consists in *spectral illusions*, very generally originates with the third, or last link, in this chain of organic causation.

It is, therefore, treading very closely, and may, perhaps, almost be said to blend intimately with that form of cerebral error which has been termed hallucination. It has been considered, and perhaps with justice, that this is not an error of impression upon the organ of sense ; nor a perversion of that impression on its way back to the sentient principle, but that it originates in the brain, and is altogether unconnected with the organ of sense. The brain is irritated in some of the various ways, to which we have already described its liability, and it is so, either immediately by some commotion within itself, or by the sudden conversion of some other form of disorder ; or by sympathy with the irritation of some distant organ. The second

is a very remarkable form of disorder ; when some distant irritation ceases all at once, and is converted into cerebral malady, assuming, and unhappily often continuing in, the form of hallucination. If the original malady can be reproduced, the secondary evil will probably be relieved ; but when this cannot be the case, it remains oftentimes a permanent but morbid modification of nervous action. We know not how this is produced, as we often are ignorant of final causes ; without, therefore, being too curious to pry into Nature's plans, be it ours, humbly and modestly, to obtain acquaintance with *the effects*, and to guard against them if possible.

In each of these cases, however, when hallucination is once produced, the brain has escaped the province of reason ; argument is unavailing ; the organ is no longer submissive to mental authority ; it is no longer controlled by external realities ; it has escaped beyond the dominion of the external senses on the one hand, or of the presiding mind on the other ; there is no method of combating hallucination but by the subduction of every morbid cerebral action, whether immediate or sympathetic ; and, consequently, the *first*, the *last*, the *only remedy*, is to watch over and direct the morbid action, till the brain re-assumes its healthy function, and puts an end to all the "perilous stuff, which dreams are made of."

The course of our inquiry has brought us down to the extreme verge of reason, and to the commencement of insanity,—a form of malady which

requires some little developement; and first, we must notice some of the phenomena of *cerebral disorder*. But before doing so, we should just remark the disadvantage of calling this class of diseases *mental*, and therefore thinking and reasoning, as if they were spiritual ailments. We have no objection to the term, if employed to designate disorders of the *organ* of mind; but there is an evident confusion of idea on this subject, and oftentimes a *misapprehension*, by which it is understood, that the term is applicable to *mental* as contradistinguished from bodily disorder. There is also a prevailing dislike to acknowledge the present or past existence of any such malady in oneself, or one's connexions; and, indeed, it is most carefully concealed as if some moral guilt or shame attached; just as if it were a malady in any way differing from an affection of the stomach, or of any other organ of the body. This, however, arises from its being thought to be a disorder of the *morale*; and one which entails *disgrace*, rather than excites *compassion* towards the sufferer.

It is allowed that no other bodily infirmity produces an equal degree of misery to friends and relatives, because it affects the *organ* devoted to the manifestations of mind, and strikes at once at all the powers and privileges of *man*. But it is not on this account that its wretched victims are to be treated as outcasts from society, and fitted only for incarceration; the greater the amount of suffering, the more strenuous *should be* the effort to relieve it; and it should never be forgotten, that these

remedies should be *twofold*, of a *physical and moral nature*, so as to operate largely upon the disturbed organ, through the medium of its *organisation and affinities*. No other organ is so favourably situated for being acted upon ; yet on no other organ are mistakes so perpetually made : one set of reasoners employing only spiritual remedies and moral means ; the other utterly despising this treatment, and believing that nothing is to be done except by physical agency. As it has been said, the truth lies between the *two* ; and every person wishing to treat insanity properly, will not only seek to subdue the inordinate, or rouse the languid vascular action ; will not only seek to repair any injury to the nervous fibre ; but will likewise combat hallucinations, and substitute correct impressions—strengthen these impressions by judicious repetition—remove perverted trains of reasoning—replace them by correct ones—and give them the power and influence of habit and frequent association.

Unfortunately, perseverance, though a cardinal virtue in all that is good, does not often fall to the lot of man ; when met by repeated disappointment, he becomes wearied, and fancies that nothing is to be done, because it has not been done already. And it is readily granted, that the work is very onerous, of seeing a patient from day to day, and of combating as often the insane ideas, and to be met every day by fresh arguments in their support, or by the reiteration of old ones ; yet such must be done *patiently*, if there be any hope of success. It should always be recollected, that permanent

impressions upon the nervous fibre seem to be very difficultly made, whether in health or disease. This appears to be one of its peculiarities, that while its impressions are received with great quickness, they have need to be frequently repeated, in order to ensure their permanence. This is seen in the process of education; how frequently repeated, and how constantly forgotten is the impression, which is made upon the intellectual nerves, in communicating the first rudiments of knowledge! How frequently has the instructor to lament that he is just where *he began*, and how necessary it is to repeat impressions frequently, in order to ensure their permanence! So also with respect to its physiological laws; let a nerve be divided, or let any other injury be inflicted upon it, how much longer is it before the reparation is accomplished, than of any other structure of the body! So also in the production of *insane ideas*; it is only the *constant image* which produces the monomaniac; it is only the line upon line, precept upon precept, that will give any prospect of relief; it is only by keeping in view the fact, that great changes are not to be effected on the nervous system except by time and by a frequent repetition of the means employed.

There are those who employ the fact of brutes being free from insanity, to prove, on the one hand, that this malady must be an affection of *mind* independent of body; and on the other, to show, that it is an affection of structure, without any reference to its function. Both are incorrect.

That the lower animals are not subject to this form of malady is certain; hydrophobia, the mad-staggers, and some other forms of disorder, being clearly not to be paralleled with *insanity*, although equally clearly affections dependent upon the cerebral system, in the same way as apoplexy, epilepsy, and paralysis, are not insanity. The simple reason why animals are not insane, is, that the brain wants the *function* which is necessary for the developement and manifestation of man's *super-added principle*, viz. MIND. *They* are subject to inflammation of the brain, or its membranes; but this does *not* produce the disturbance of a function which they do not possess; consequently *their* freedom from insanity only shows the absence of that function which we previously know they do not possess; and which, if possessing, they could not employ, because *their brain* has not been fitted for its manifestations.

On the other hand, the absence of *animal insanity* has been brought forward to prove, that this form of disorder is an *affection of structure, without reference to mind*. For it is said, *animals* possessing brain are not insane; man possessing the same kind of brain, though fitted to his more perfect organisation, is *subject* to insanity; *diseases* happen to one class of animals, which are unknown to another; therefore this is a disease *attaching to the MORE perfect, and unknown to the LESS developed structure*; thus resting in *organisation*, and having no reference to *function*, at least so far as its origin is concerned. The object of this reasoning is to

dispose of the influence of mind upon matter ; and to supersede the idea of man being any thing beyond what his organisation makes him ; and thus to lead to his entire irresponsibility.

Now the fact is, that both in the production of disorder, and in its cure, the brain, as the organ in a state of irritation, is acted upon by moral and by physical agencies ; and in monomania it will almost always be found to take the character of the *moral* impression which pre-occupied the sufferer before the invasion of disease. Nor is this extraordinary : the patient becomes the subject of some deeply interesting, and largely-associated moral affection ; one, perhaps, which involves the happiness and comfort of himself and many others, and very generally presenting a gloomy prospect. On this the mind dwells with sombre reflection, and still darker forebodings. Reason often dissipates the cloud ; but as soon as the reasoning effort is past, the sky is again overcast, and involuntarily the mind returns to its chief object of interest. The depth of that interest is daily increasing ; the reasoning efforts become few and feeble ; the power of resistance to the painful images becomes less and less ; the misery of the present and the future is more hopelessly contemplated, and even indulged ; the impressions upon the nervous fibre, more and more frequently repeated, become almost constant, without interval, without change, without diminution of intensity, till the nervous fibres have lost at least the *habit* of conveying other notices ; the morbid train be-

comes the *exclusive idea* ; man has passed the boundary line of reason—is no longer a responsible creature,—*is insane* !

Two remarkable instances of this kind will exemplify the argument ; one, a gentleman, who, having lived beyond his income, and fallen into increasing difficulties, became insane upon this point—lived in apprehension of a jail, of arrest, and of all the maniacal miseries conjured up from such a state, although there was no danger of such catastrophe, because he owed no one anything, and because, though his resources were greatly diminished, he had still enough, with proper management, to preserve him in *affluence*. The second instance is that of a lady, who was possessed of a remarkable amount of intelligence, and who had been placed in circumstances, in which she had been obliged to exert her brain beyond its power, and, in consequence of which exertion, the integrity of that brain had been destroyed—destroyed by intellectual over-action ; and what now was the character of her maniacal idea ? That she had *no soul*—that God had separated between her soul and herself—that she had no moral duties to perform—no commands to obey ; there was a severance of her former from her present self ; and it was such, that she could hold no communication between her own spiritual principle and the exterior ; and this extending into a thousand ramifications. Both these states were recovered from.

The fact is, that mental alienation, as it is called, with all its species and innumerable varieties, *dif-*

fers in nothing from other maladies, allowing for the difference of organ and function. There are, the same period of incubation—the same premonitory symptoms of disorder—the same transient and slight derangement of function—the same characteristic march of fully-formed disease—the same advance and decline, marked, as in other maladies, not by constant progression, but by occasional advances and retrocessions—the one being greater than the other, according as the malady is loosening its hold, or narrowing its grasp upon the system, and always being marked by this one feature, that in the former case, the entire ground gained is never wholly lost,—and in the latter, the entire ground lost is never wholly regained: exacerbation and remission, called, in the case of insanity, paroxysm and lucid interval, are always to be found. Add to these points of similarity, that its terminations are the same; these being *in restoration to health*, which leaves the patient just as before the invasion of disorder; *or BY some other form of malady* which seems to prove critical of the more important disorder; *or by some alteration of function* which leaves the original integrity more or less impaired; *or by some change of structure*, which is marked by increasing disturbance, and more cruelly perverted manifestations of mind; *or, by the substitution of disease*, and such organic changes as are incompatible with restoration to health; *or, by complete loss of power*, as in idiocy, or atrophy; *or, by the gradual and com-*

plete extinction of life, cerebral life first, and then also, general life.

It may be also added, that the treatment is the same, for that kind of plan, which searches after the originating cause of the disturbance—which seeks to remove that cause—which endeavours to abate its influence by the most appropriate means, (in the case of insanity by means which sympathize with, and soothe the patient in his imaginary sorrows—which partake his sufferings—which console him—which revive his hopes—give confidence to his timidity—remove his fears—relieve his discomforts, and throw a ray of cheerfulness upon futurity,) viz. to remove the immediate cause of mischief—to disarm and abate the predisposing causes—to soothe existing irritation—to control morbid action—and to supersede it by the good actions of health ; these are the simple principles upon which *cerebral and other disorder* is to be met and combated, and successfully removed.

But granting that insanity is dependent upon cerebral disorder, how are we to detect this disorder ? And what degrees of change from ordinary mental manifestation constitute insanity ? since it is allowed by all, that these manifestations vary in different persons, and in the same person at different times. This is a very important and difficult question ; since, by the premises, it is shown that there can be no standard test of soundness of mind so long as sound minds admit of very varying degrees and kinds of manifestation.

Thus it would appear, that what is insanity in one may not be so in another ; that there is no absolute standard of comparison ; and that the question must be decided by comparing the manifestations which now prevail, with those of a former date, which may be said to have indicated the *general character*, from which the present manifestations differ so widely as to constitute *insanity*.

Yet it must be seen that this subject is beset by difficulties ; since in forming a judgment upon it, with regard to others, *the judge* necessarily considers himself as of sound mind ; and the question arises, is this the case ? and who is to be the judge ? Since it is one of the remarkable features in insanity, that the subject always thinks himself *right*, and all others *wrong*, upon the particular object of his deliration.

Again, there are many varieties of mental manifestation so odd, that it is difficult to say what kind and degree of eccentricity may be tolerated, as consistent with sound mind, *or as the maximum* of allowed error ; and on the contrary, to define the *minimum of unhealthy action*, which shall constitute insanity.

Another difficulty presents itself in the complex nature of man, viz. to separate *physical* from *moral* agencies, and to ascribe to each its just influence in the formation of character. There are certain peculiarities of temperament, which give their tinge to thought and action ; but, then, these peculiarities may have been fostered in one by injudicious management, by want of control, by neglected or

erroneous education, by position in society, and by many other circumstances and associations arising out of such position ; and, again, these peculiarities may have been sought out and detected, may have been repressed, and watched over, and directed, and guided, and governed by education—firmness—discipline—will—and religious motive ; and thus two individuals with precisely similar temperaments, will yet possess mental manifestations so very different, that the one may be considered soundness, and the other unsoundness of mind. This has led many persons to infer, that there was no such thing as *sanity* to be met with, except in the Omniscient and Omnipotent God, and that each and every individual was more or less *insane*. Now, although this is certainly too sweeping a conclusion, it is yet exceedingly difficult to define the boundary, especially between *physical infirmity* and *moral delinquency*.

Perhaps the state of the *will* may serve to assist our way from the intricacies of this labyrinth, more securely than any other clue ; and yet, even here it may be said, that the function of volition is more readily distempered than any other ; and that one of the most prominent features of insanity, is the feeble, vacillating will, the *loss of self-control*, and the absence of *self-discipline*. Now, this is granted ; but it is to be remarked, that there is some difference between the cerebral function of *volition*, and the exercise of the *moral will*, which is exhibited through its *agency*. At all events, till we possess a better *test*, we may take this as our criterion, be-

tween *physical infirmity*, and *moral delinquency*. Whatsoever is willingly, determinately, considerably, and deliberately done, must, if it be *wrong*, be placed to the score of *moral wrong*; and that wrong which occurs without the support of the will, independently of it, and even in opposition to its general bearing, may be allowed to partake of the nature of *physical infirmity*.

Now passion, anger, hatred, revenge, and all the associated malignant passions, are, for example, to be counted as *moral evils*, because they occur with the will, notwithstanding that they appear much more readily in an irascible temperament, than in one of a more phlegmatic order; inasmuch as man is responsible for his actions; and if *he* possess a temperament more easily excited than his neighbour, it only becomes him to be watchful over it, the more guarded over all the avenues of passion, the more strenuous in his opposition to evil, the more zealous in the developement of better tendencies.

In a healthy state of the mind, and of its manifesting organ, the former can give laws to the latter, can direct the attention to any given pursuit, can arrest or change the course of its thoughts and occupations, according to its own pleasure; can fix the attention upon any one subject, so long as it pleases; and can then divert it to another; the *transfer being a pure, and distinct, and decisive act of the will*; or, instead of making this entire change, it may direct the train of thought into something analogous with former trains; or it may dismiss the subject altogether. This faculty may

be called self-possession, or the power of governing the physical machinery by moral motives, and appropriate stimuli.

Now, this power is lost in insanity! The brain is no longer the servant of mind; nervous fibre usurps the supremacy, and beclouds, obscures, perverts, or entirely supersedes, the mental manifestations. Hence arise uncontrolled thoughts; images over which the judgment has no influence; imaginations without foundation; impulses which are not to be accounted for; apparently sound reasoning upon false premises; constant change of purpose; action without definite object; disproportioned will, sometimes earnest over trifles, and almost nothing over objects of primary importance; hence the little reliance which can be placed on the promises of the insane, or on any appeal to the higher principles of moral governance; hence the infinite variety of shades of feeling in different insane persons, and in the same individuals at different times; hence that confusion, and jumbling together of incongruous images, because there is no will to direct, no judgment to guide—no mind to govern the organic movements.

Hence arises the great analogy between insanity and dreaming. In both cases, the brain acts independently of mind, and dissociated from the reason and judgment; in both cases the images are of the most incongruous, grotesque, and confused description; in both instances there is a want of natural cohesion; in both instances, there is to the individual a semblance of the most perfect truth,

though, in fact, there is no truth ; in both instances there is irritation of the cerebral fibre, and morbid images are produced as arising out of such irritation, and all its physical associations.

It will be observed, that in insanity, the morbid manifestations of mind are often characterized by the preceding history of the patient ; by the peculiarities of his temperament, by the propensities of his character, by the revival of old associations, by errors of the imagination, by some bodily uneasiness, and occasionally by a mysterious change or influence which we cannot fathom. In this, again, there will be found to be a great analogy with *dreaming* ; and the reason is obvious enough, that when during a sane state, the brain has been accustomed frequently to receive certain impressions ; and these impressions have been made upon an organ, which, by nature, possesses some peculiar characteristics ; when the conduct through life, has been marked by the particular expression of certain habits and modes of thinking, speaking, and acting ; when there has been given a preponderance to the influence of the moral feelings, or of certain other passions and propensities ; when the imagination has been permitted an uncontrolled range, in every possible way, during health ; and when there are a thousand and ten thousand associations, connected with all these and many other intermediate links ; it is easy to comprehend how, when dissociated from the governing principle, *the brain* should take up the recollected impressions of all

these things, and should reproduce them in the confused and heterogeneous images which constitute insanity; a sufficient proof (if it were needed) of this malady being cerebral; and of that cerebrum, as a congeries of nervous bundles, being during its healthy state under the control of another, and a master principle, which we call *mind*.

As a further resemblance of *dreaming*, insanity often takes its shape and form, from some bodily feelings. Very recently there has been under my care a patient, who doubtless from many abdominal feelings, conceived herself to be the subject of tape-worm; and this idea, the predominant one of her insanity, was presented in an infinitely varied series, so as to *account* for all her sensations, and to verify all her present impressions and future forebodings. It is scarcely necessary to add, that she had no tape-worm; and that in her case, insanity resulted from *chronic disorganisation* of the brain.

There are some powerful mental emotions, which are oftentimes mentioned as the causes of insanity; such are the passion of love, or the deep influence of religion. It may be so in some few instances; but we are much inclined to believe, that these are effects rather than causes; and that the brain, already pre-disposed to insanity, is excited by the stirring emotions of these powerful principles; and that with its *insane bias*, it produces, under the influence of strong excitement, insane ideas, which naturally take the shape of that cerebral commotion,

which has been so powerfully excited : and *then* are exhibited those phenomena, which, by unthinking persons, are called *causes of insanity*.

This perhaps, in speculative matters, might not be very important, though even speculative error is sure to be followed by injurious results. But it is a matter of much consequence, when applied, as it too often is, to throw discredit upon religion, with which an *irreligious world* is but too highly gratified. Now religion, properly so called, is the greatest soother of life's cares, the best balm for all its sorrows, the great cure for all its wounds, the only secure refuge from all its contumelies, and the best safeguard for the integrity of the brain. Religion in itself, with all its moral sanctions, is the best preserver from the influence of animal passions and propensities, and the best regulator of all the affections of the heart ; it is the surest guide through all the intricacies of life's mazy course,—through all the labyrinths of society,—through the difficulties and trials of its relationship. Religion, then, affords the best security for the tempest-tossed brain ; it gives peace during the storm—quiet dependence upon the care and guidance of Providence ; and the highest hopes of happiness at the end of the present course, to *those* who *obey* its precepts, and are guided by its requirements : hence it cannot of itself *produce insanity*.

But it is allowed, that when a brain is thus predisposed, and its possessor is, from some circumstances, induced to attend to religion, which had been before neglected, it is perfectly possible that the sense

of this neglect may be so frequently and so powerfully repeated as to become the exclusive idea ; that there should follow the very natural transition, of having forfeited by this neglect, all claim to its consolations, and of having incurred the anger of God, and become subject to all the consequences of final impenitence : and then it is perfectly possible, that such an exclusive idea should become an insane idea, and should upset the integrity of the brain.

There are also mistakes in religion, which would produce a similar influence ; as, in taking only *partial* views of its great doctrines, which lead away the mind from *truth*, and fix it upon some *positive error*, or upon some *misunderstood*, or *misapplied* doctrine ; or upon some injudicious and exclusive view of God's attributes, which by a similar process would produce the same result. But it will be seen at once, that this is *not religion* ; and that the substitution of *real religion*, would be the best cure for its extravagancies. It is not religion, but the want of it, which upsets the brain.

This is powerfully confirmed by the fact, that in all these cases, reasoning with the patients is unavailing ; they are either not accessible to truth, or if they receive its impression for a moment, it is directly obliterated ; the hallucination is not easily to be worn down ; and he who *begins* the treatment of this form of insanity, by administering the consolations of religion, will assuredly fail, though they will be of infinite importance by-and-bye, when the irritation of the brain has been subdued by

physical agencies; and then the moral hopes, and sanctions, and motives of religion, and its inseparable handmaid, consistency of thought and action, will be of infinite service, in quieting and fixing the agitated and feeble cerebral fibres.

The *non-existence* of organic disease in the brain, among many of those who have died insane, has been adduced as a proof, that insanity was a *spiritual*, and not a *cerebral* disorder. The argument is specious but unavailing, because contrary to fact. In the first place, it is not at all extraordinary, to find death produced from the disorder of some one of the organs of the body, without leaving behind it a trace of disorganisation. Yet there can be no doubt, that there has existed *disorder*, and *disorder to such* an extent, as to produce the *death* of the organ, which local death has proved the occasion of general death. This may have happened, and the appearances of disorganisation may have passed away with life; or there may have existed such an amount of disordered function, as to be incompatible with the continuance of *life*, although there shall be no traces of such destructive influence. The latter is the more probable solution of the difficulty. But if disordered function may exist in an organ essential to life, to such an extent as to produce local and general death, and yet leave behind no traces of its existence, there can be no just reason why disordered cerebral function should not also exist during life, without leaving behind it any cognizable change of tissue.

Again, it is a fact, that although the brain of

those dying insane does very frequently exhibit no organic change; and that when organic changes have taken place, it is impossible oftentimes to predicate the nature of such change, *before* examination; so little uniformity has been found between the symptoms *before*, and the appearances *after* death; yet the common changes of disease are much more frequently found in the brain of insane persons, than among those who have not been afflicted with this malady; and they probably exist in many other instances which escape detection, because we are so little acquainted with the healthy structure of the ultimate nervous fibre.

It may be said, that the length of time during which insanity has continued, would have the effect of deepening the impression of chronic alteration; and it may do so in some instances. But by the supposition, there are other conditions, incompatible with life, but which leave no traces of disorganisation; and these, though slower in their operation, because less violent in their nature, would not necessarily produce organic changes in the longer time required for the production of the final result, than in the *shorter* but parallel case of acute malady; so that this also is a question of time, and affords no argument against our main position.

And really, the length of time, during which the symptoms shall have continued without producing disorganisation, is rather in favour of, than against our conclusion; for had it been any other than *disorder of function*, its *long* continuance would have been marked by such progressive or-

ganic changes as would have resulted in an early incompatibility with the maintenance of life ; and when to these are added the *little* knowledge we possess of the structure and functions of the nervous system, we shall find no single argument against our position.

But once more, so far as we are acquainted with it, the habits of the nervous system make against our discovering organic changes : for first, its changes are always produced in an exceedingly slow manner, as we have before observed ; and next, we are quite sure, that in other violent disorders of that system, it is often difficult, often impossible to discover the *influence of change*. It is, for instance, doubtful whether tetanus or hydrophobia produce any cognisable permanent change of structure : and it is more than doubtful, whether that which has been thought (Dr. Reid) to produce these maladies is cause or effect, even granting that it ever existed. In apoplexy, sometimes a trace of disease is hardly to be found ; and catalepsy shall have existed during a long life, and yet nothing be discoverable. A patient shall have been subjected to violent attacks of hysteria, for twenty, thirty, or forty years, and not the slightest visible influence be perceived in any part of the nervous system. Yet no one doubts the existence of these diseases, or of their being diseases of that system, because their effects are not discernible. So that the argument drawn from this source has no foundation in truth, in fact, in reasoning.

The existence of idiocy, not congenital, but pro-

duced from some powerfully operating cause, without any traceable difference in the brain, from that of the healthiest organisation, is only another proof that function may be intercepted, where the organ appears healthy ; or that we have no means of judging of what is healthy nervous fibre ; and it would be well if we would rest contented to *find*, and not attempt *to pass*, the limit, which Nature has everywhere placed to our researches.

There is another fact which is remarkable, especially as we have noticed that the brain *in itself* is not a very sentient organ ; and that, in all probability, its investing membranes are more sensitive than itself ; viz. that although it is true that insanity often exists, where there shall be no discoverable traces of organic change after death, yet, that, on the contrary, such organic changes are scarcely ever found where the manifestations of mind have not been more or less altered. It is said, that the contrary has sometimes occurred ; and on the principle above stated, that the brain is not a very sentient organ, we believe that it may have been so ; yet this is the exception to the general rule, and when observed, is remarked, not as a thing of course, but of wonder. And could we see the *interior* workings of such minds, we believe that they would be found altered, limited, perverted, or changed in some way from their normal condition, although it may not be discoverable in their *external* manifestations. It should be recollected, that there are many oddnesses which are dependent upon cerebral conditions, but which

pass for *mental* peculiarities, and in this way the disordered actions escape notice. Yet *the rule* will be found logically true, that wherever there has been seen a trace of organic change, there also will have been disturbed manifestations.

If we look to the phenomena of cerebral disorder and to the means which are most available for its cure, we shall find that these, too, bear out our original proposition. Since the brain is not very sensitive to pain, or alteration of structure, we should not expect to notice its early manifestations of morbid action very prominently, and they often escape the notice of those most deeply interested. A little girl, just recovering from an acute attack of irritation of the brain—that form of malady which generally terminates in hydrocephalus, was observed to be very *irritable* upon the merest trifles; it was attributed to the very common irritability of convalescence; but as she advanced a little more towards recovery, a great silliness of expression was perceived about her, not amounting *to*, but bordering upon idiocy; so slight as to have escaped the notice of intelligent parents, but which was largely perceived, as soon as their attention had been directed to the subject; and this is passing off as she gains strength. But for a minute attention to the manifestations of mind, this phenomenon would have escaped detection; and thus it is, doubtless, with many other forms of cerebral disorder. Another patient became morbidly *fearful*; she was always nervous, and this timidity was considered as an increase of nervousness; till to fear

became associated the vacillating will, the absurdly scrupulous judgment, the unreal apprehension of evil from the commonest circumstances, which showed to herself and her friends that there was something essentially wrong about the brain, and she was then subjected to proper treatment.

One of the earliest symptoms of cerebral disorder is the disposition to magnify *trifles* ; to be inordinately elated, or depressed by circumstances or feelings, which in a well-poised mind *should not* produce any considerable movement ; the events of life are not weighed in their proper balance, and justly appreciated, but obtain an undue preponderance. This generally passes for zeal, or earnestness, or great feeling, or warm interest in a given subject ; but it is overdone, unnatural, and really a morbid condition.

A certain degree of congestion in the vessels of the brain, giving rise to heavy and protracted slumber, from which the patient arouses with difficulty ; a certain amount of congestive headache in the morning, which renders him languid and miserable for perhaps the first half of the day ; occasional giddinesses of a very transient description, and never amounting to any serious disturbance of the circulation, are yet sufficient to show that that circulation is disturbed ; to mark (as premonitory symptoms to an attack of insanity) the organ which is suffering ; and distinctively to declare, that the perverted manifestations of mind are accompanied by alteration in the vascular condition of its organ.

At another time the patient suffers from what is strictly and properly termed *nervous* headaches ; a state not dependent upon congestion, or increased action of the vessels, but upon a certain morbid condition of the nervous fibre itself ; sometimes confined to a small space, and at others apparently diffused over the whole head, and giving rise to a great degree of irritability of temper, or restlessness of passion ; a wandering after, and frequent change of pursuit ; a general malaise ; a great degree of fidgetiness, which makes its subject thoroughly uncomfortable to himself and others, and which often mark the approach of another and more troublesome form of insanity ; more troublesome in proportion as nervous function is less under our control than that of the circulation.

There is a very troublesome form of headache, which is only named in the present situation in order to distinguish it from the nervous headache just described ; the one being a very common precursor of insanity, and the other being apparently unconnected with any such consequence, and which, for the sake of perspicuity, may be termed *pericranial headache*. The symptoms are much alike ; and the latter has seemed to attack literary and other persons who have *overworked the brain*, but in whom there is no tendency to insanity. Pericranial headache may be known from ordinary nervous headache by its periodicity, generally continuing thirty-six hours, and subsiding without any visible cause ; almost always originating after some extraordinary cerebral exertion ; generally bene-

fited by *bodily exercise*, unless the wind be very high ; never increased by the various movements of the head and body ; and though very distressing to the patient, does not produce that state of irritability of the mind and temper which is the common companion of nervous headache. It is very important to distinguish these two forms of malady, for the sake of the patient, who may require much watching in the one case, and in the other need excite no kind of apprehension.

As in the form of congestive headache, heavy slumber prevails, so in that of nervous headache there is a great degree of morbid wakefulness. Night after night, and week after week, sleep forsakes the pillow ; and although at first the transient snatches which the patient gains seem refreshing, and sufficient to enable him to pass through the day, yet this cannot last long ; and the brain always losing, and never recruiting, gives way under a series of excitements from which it obtains no quietude. A great degree of irritability is the consequence, and perhaps finally a state of morbid vigilance, which too frequently ushers in the fully-formed paroxysm of insanity.

Next comes a certain altered condition of the organs of sense, giving rise in its advanced stage to various forms of illusion, which haunt the insane, and characterize their delirations. An excessive degree of sensibility to impression forms the first link in this chain ; every feeling is rendered too acute, and all the nerves of sense augment the impression which they receive, and

magnify them far beyond the truth. And when to this state of great susceptibility is added the deepening shade *of perversion*, then has the boundary-line of reason been passed, and insanity has commenced ; then the report of the senses is no longer to be relied upon ; and the impulsive patient, or the one who acts from *perverted* impressions on the organs of sense, in other words, the one who acts from momentary feeling, becomes an object of deep *solicitude*.

This being the case, next follows great instability of pursuit and purpose ; the patient has become the creature of every changing feeling ; he no longer appeals to motive, judgment, principle, to guide his conduct, but acts automatically from the character of the impression last made upon the organs of sense, or originated in the interior man, and reflected outwards to those organs, in order ultimately to give rise to the consequences of non-reasoning action.

The manifestations of mind now mark the change which has taken place in the manifesting organ. Perhaps, in the first place, an overweening attachment to some favourite study or pursuit is remarked ; some relative or friend, perchance, playfully notices this change, or perhaps seriously and gently cautions against that becoming *evil by excess*, which in itself was good. The friend is not a little startled and chagrined on finding that his playful and well-intentioned remark excites a violent paroxysm of anger, which it requires some trouble to appease ; and then, and perhaps not till then,

does he find this *emportement* so disproportioned to the cause which produced it, that he becomes apprehensive, his fears are awakened, and after watching closely, he discovers various other alterations of character, which had before escaped notice, but which he now recollects to have existed for some time, producing, however, only a passing emotion of wonder and surprise.

Upon close scrutiny, he detects many causes for alarm ; he finds that many of the *habits*, and of that congeries of phenomena, which in the aggregate we call *character*, are changed,—changed fitfully, without change of circumstances, and without adequate reason. It is impossible to notice these changes, which depend not on any general standard, but on that individuality of character which belongs to each, and which are only detected by a comparison of the present with other manifestations of an antecedent date. It will, however, be found that the cautious have become imprudent; the precise perfectly careless; the neat very inattentive to his person; the benevolent selfish; the religious man inattentive to his duties; the domestic man always from home; the meek turbulent and irascible; the courageous timid; the slow reasoner jumping to a conclusion, and as readily acting upon his results, without reviewing the steps by which he has gained them; the industrious has become idle; the serious frivolous; the prodigal penurious, and *vice versa*; he who has been accustomed to reason, and to estimate very highly the power of reasoning, now under-

values any consecutive argument, as altogether unnecessary for him to whom has been bequeathed powers not far short of an almighty intelligence. This might be multiplied indefinitely; these only are mentioned to show the changes of character which are carried out into every conceivable variety of individuality, and to exemplify the consequences of irritation of the brain. To these may be added the increasing bizarreries of conduct, which are all consistent with the patient's own belief and reasoning upon it; this belief, and this reasoning, however, being entirely dependent upon hallucination.

We must just remark at this stage of our inquiry, some bodily disturbances which very generally accompany the state of irritation of mind which we have just described. The first and chief of these is, dyspepsia, or disordered stomach, in all its ever-changing varieties of shape, and form, and pressure. This is so frequently the case, and from the earliest observations there has been such a marked connexion between *hypochondriasis* (the very derivation of which points to under the cartilages of the ribs for the origin of the evil) and disordered liver, that it has almost been believed that every form of insanity has at its commencement been referred to stomach, and treated as such successfully. None can deny the good which has been effected; but we may differ as to the cause of improvement, and as to the nature and agency of the remedies employed.

We believe, then, that all the phenomena of

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disordered stomach in the insane, are not the *cause*, but the *consequence*, of their insanity. In truth, the brain spends too much nervous energy over its dominant or exclusive idea, and thus the stomach and other chylopoietic bowels are deprived of their required amount, and then fall into a state of disorder, the *result* of which is more or less of *indigestion*, and all the usual wretched accompanying symptoms, which, however, be it remembered, are the *result*, not the precursors of that cerebral irritation, which, carried to a certain point, interferes with the regular function of the organ, and constitutes *insanity*.

There are various muscular movements of an involuntary character which accompany *insanity*; such as frequent cramps and twitchings of various muscles, without the power of controlling them; sometimes only during the night, and occurring in sleep; at others, influencing all the movements of progression during the day; all these being the consequence of that cerebral irritation which is going on, and overturning not only the finer faculties of mental manifestation, but also all the other arrangements of the body which depend upon nervous influence.

But there is oftentimes a great degree of *feebleness* of the voluntary muscles, which seems to arise, not from any deficiency of muscular *power*, as determined by *muscular fibre*, but from the defective volition communicated to that fibre. We are quite aware that paralysis is a very frequent companion of insanity; but this occurs only in an advanced

stage of the malady, and as a consequence of some *disorganisation* of the brain, arising from unwonted pressure upon some part of its substance, or from the rupture of some of the nervous fibres themselves ; while the present loss of power is produced merely by *feeble will*. The patient is generally slow in determining upon all *good* purposes, though often *wilfully persevering* in *bad resolves* ; his judgment is always changing ; but in respect of his muscles, he moves them feebly, except under excitement, and he has a certain fear and apprehension that he cannot move them at all ; he thinks he cannot leave the chair on which he is sitting, the bed on which he is lying, or the house he inhabits ; whereas the performance of all these things requires only an act of moderate volition.

The most successful method of treatment of these cases will be found in obtaining the confidence of the patient, becoming the depositary of his secrets, and gradually and judiciously throwing the bright ray of hope over futurity ; dispelling the gloomy night of despair, and animating him with some motive for effort ; inquiring most accurately after the remote and immediate, the predisposing and the occasional causes of this malady in the individual, and setting to work sincerely to remove or suspend all these influences. It is astonishing how a sudden fearful impression upon the system will sometimes dissipate this feeble will, as if by a charm, and induce that decided exercise of voluntary movement, as shall convince the patient that he is capable of such movement, and he stands at

once a "regenerated" man, "disenthralled" of all his apprehensions by the power of accidental impression. We have mentioned an instance of this kind in a lady who was thrown from a pony carriage, and immediately recovered; and we have known the same consequence result from an alarm of fire, or some other similar power.

But we cannot quit this subject without noticing that form of insanity which is called *demonomania*, including under this term all which may be comprehended in the idea of "religious insanity," if, indeed, these words convey any idea at all. We have before noticed the necessity for precision in the use of terms; and this is one of those uses, which, however sanctified by custom, we cannot but object to; not simply on the ground that no form of *bodily* disorder can admit of the characteristic "*religious*," which might be termed a scientific cavil; but because of the positive error of association, which it produces in the minds of the ignorant, the unthinking, and the prejudiced; as if religion *really did produce insanity*. If any term of this kind must be used, we would suggest the employment of *pseudo-religious insanity*, as at once designating that it was either a *false* impression of religion which gives rise to the malady; or that religion had been *falsely* accused of producing it. In the minds of many, it is held as a most sacred truth that an attention to *religion* has overturned the *reason*—this in *itself* being an *offset* from monomania.

It being certain that there is oftentimes a con-

nexion between *religion and insanity*, as also between *genius and insanity*, it is necessary to consider for a moment wherein that connexion consists ; and it will be found that the two are precisely parallel cases. In the first place, it will be allowed that there are some brains predisposed, from hereditary or original conformation, to *insanity*, as well as others fitted for the developement of *genius*. There are some brains peculiarly adapted to the manifestation of the highest intellectual efforts ; others, to that of the highest moral fruits. And as genius is the highest point of intellectual manifestation, and religion the perfection of moral fruit, so, in both instances, the brain is stimulated to its highest action. But every one knows, that an organ stimulated to its highest pitch of endurance is very likely to be upset, and is placed in that peculiar position, in which it is especially susceptible of disorder ; and hence arises the acknowledged connexion between genius, religion, insanity.

Now, nobody quarrels with genius because it is allied to insanity ; nobody undervalues it on account of this alliance ; everybody considers it as a boon ; courts it as a most valuable endowment ; cultivates its most brilliant manifestations, and cherishes it with the fondest care. *Not so religion* ; when insanity occurs under its influence, religion is blamed ; it is undervalued ; it is considered as an evil ; it is sought to be repressed ; the individual is to be rescued from its agency ; and everything which tends to awaken its association is to

be carefully avoided. How is this? Whence is this great difference of motive, feeling, conduct? Is it not an abandonment of reason and judgment; and a substitution of prejudice, and of alienation from that which is good, because man's perverse heart does not love God?

There are *two* ways particularly, in which religion may be *said* to produce insanity, though we have already shown, it can only give rise to insanity in a brain which is waiting for the first powerful emotion to overturn its integrity; the first its *natural*, and the second its *perverted influence*.

a. Its natural influence. Religion, as setting before man the highest hopes and greatest fears; infinite happiness on the one hand, and indefinite despair on the other; as involving the highest moral sanctions, promises of reward to the obedient, and a foretelling of future misery to the wilfully disobedient; as requiring the fulfilment of a certain moral law, which man in his present state is unable to obey, but for which, if he sincerely seeks it, he is promised that aid which shall enable him to walk in the straight path of truth: the conviction of every honest heart, that he has no claim to the blessings, but has incurred the penalties denounced; and the hopes of present safety held out in the Gospel; the earnest desire to do right, and the fearful array of the many occasions on which that *right* has been abandoned; and the now constant struggle between duty and inclination; are all influential impressions. And when an individual, who has for many years been careless about these

things, begins to turn his attention towards them, and to be really in earnest about fulfilling his duties towards God and his neighbour, it is not surprising that the subject should become an engrossing one, nor that, after a time, it should likewise become *exclusive*. And now the brain has lost its integrity, for it has lost the power of directing the attention from any one subject, and fixing it upon any other, according to the will. This exclusive attention keeps up one set of impressions, under which the reason is overturned, and insanity is formed.

b. Its unnatural influence. This is, when an individual takes up false notions of religion : when he looks upon God as implacable ; when he considers that his sins are unpardonable ; when he looks upon the Omnipotent as a God of vengeance, and not of mercy and love ; when he contemplates himself as predestined to misery ; and when he loses himself in the mysteries of election, and the purposes of God ; in fact, when forgetting the simplicity of truth, he takes up views which he cannot fathom, nor even attempt to comprehend ; *then* it is, that a fallacious, as well as an exclusive impression, and that, too, always of a depressing character, is produced ; and then it is, that one of the most fearful forms of insanity is found. In all these instances, it will be seen, that religion operates by producing impressions of an exciting, or powerfully-depressing nature upon the brain ; and that thus it works in the same way as the highest efforts of genius ; as the passion of love,

especially when unrequited ; as too much business to the merchant, particularly when embarrassing ; as ambition to the warrior ; as political trials to the statesman : there is no difference ; one and the same law exists for all ; the brain is morbidly impressed in all ; the impression becomes *exclusive* ; and the exclusiveness lapses into insanity ; and its delirations are then characterised by the nature of those impressions.

There exists another error on this subject, among many excellent persons, who are not deeply versed in the mental and moral history of man ; this is an idea that insanity is a possession *of the evil one*. It is not our business to inquire, what was the possession detailed in the Scriptures ; our only concern is with what it was not ; and we may certainly say, it *was not insanity*, because it was evidently some *spiritual* and not a *bodily state* ; and therefore, as it cannot be doubted that the essence of insanity consists in *cerebral* or bodily disorder, it cannot be that the two are the same thing.

With these preliminary observations, we now remark, that “ pseudo-religious insanity ” may be subdivided into the hopeful and the desponding.

In the former state, we find the individual full of his own self-importance, and of some extraordinary commission, which is to be accomplished through his or her instrumentality. One patient will imagine himself to be our Saviour, sent on earth to fulfil *his divine* commission ; another, that he is a prophet, and that he is entitled to expect miracu-

lous interposition to support him, and therefore, that he is not required to take sustenance, for that it would even be doubting God's power if he did take food ; a third is sent as an apostle to execute the will of the Most High upon the earth, and especially to convert mankind, and restore them to the image of God ; a fourth is in constant communication from the Most High—receives directions from *Him*, as to all the events of life—hears voices, and obeys impulses ; communicates freely with angels and good spirits ; and is desirous of executing the behests, and is prepared with a special revelation of the will of God to man. One very aged female patient believed herself pregnant, and in labour with the Son of God. In *all* these, to doubt their high commission is the greatest possible offence ; and in every instance it will be found that they are very proud, and disdainful of their *supposed inferiors* : it is desirable not to endeavour to dissipate this illusion abruptly ; for by so doing, the chance of obtaining the patient's confidence is lost, and without it there is no hope of usefulness.

In the second, or desponding state, the patient is without hope, and can receive no comfort ; he is eternally condemned to everlasting punishment ; he is given over to hardness of heart ; the offers of mercy are not made to him, for his sins are unpardonable ; the promises of God are not intended for *him* : he has forfeited all hope of the Divine mercy ; he is given over to the possession of evil spirits ; he is irrecoverably lost ; and in the midst

of mercy, and goodness, and love, he alone is the isolated object of the vengeance of the Most High.

Many causes operate in producing this peculiar state of *pseudo-religious insanity*; and none more than false systems of religious belief, taking up partial views of the truth, and allowing them to remain with such a constant weight upon the heart, that they become exclusive ideas, and overturn the reason. A right and correct view of religion invests its believers with a cheerfulness that *ought* to be cultivated, because none can be so truly happy as the Christian—none can possess such consolations in all the troubles of life—none can so securely rest his infirmities, his unwilling infirmities on the compassion of a Saviour, who was tempted in like manner, though incapable of sin—none can possess so secure a confidence of forgiveness—and none can look forward with such cheerful expectation to the hopes and joys of the world that is to come. But if instead of this rational and scriptural view of the truth, religion shall have been invested with a mysticism which makes it fearful; if its author shall have been represented as the inexorable Judge—as delighting in the sins and the punishments of his children, *because* they would display *His* justice, and add to *His* glory; still more, if *He* shall have been represented as having pre-ordained some of *His* creatures to everlasting destruction; if it shall have been said that they have no power to turn unto God—to seek his ways, or to obey his commands; and that, unless they are of the number of the *elect*—chosen out of

mankind from the foundation of the world—these receiving the power to believe, which is withheld from all the rest of the world ; it is clear, that such a view of religion must fill the bosom of frail man with despondency, and naturally tend to upset his best principles, his highest hopes—take him from the humble aspirant after conformity to the will of God, and place him in the lowest grade of abject, lost, ruined, worthless, and despairing creatures.

The influence of physical temperament over these states is also very considerable. Where the sanguine temperament prevails, there also will be found the prevalence of hope ; and the insane, therefore, will be found a most important personage ; he will be divinely commissioned ; and this commission will keep him up, above all the troubles of life ; will give him an exalted place in his own imagination, will make him the especial favourite of Heaven, and will throw a bright colouring over the gloomy present, and the darkling future ; so that, even here, all shall be bright. But on the contrary, should the patient be of the melancholic character, he views precisely the same objects through exactly opposite media : that which gives hope to the one, produces despair in the other ; that which incites to action in the one, paralyses the other ; that which consoles and supports the one, is productive only of fearful anguish, and anticipated misery to the other ; so that from a knowledge of the temperament, it may always be predicated, which is the prevailing form of insanity.

Accidental circumstances will also exert a considerable influence over the varying forms of insane manifestation. One person shall have led a strictly moral and religious life ; another shall have passed a life of dissipation : one shall have been remarkable for the quiet exercise of all the cardinal virtues—in another, it shall have been difficult to find the trace of any virtue at all ; in one, the history of his path shall have been marked by benevolence—another shall have been guilty of almost every vice against society ; one shall be an individual of very limited mental power—another of the highest intellectual grade, and also of every intermediate mental calibre ; one shall have been ushered into insanity, by some powerful mental emotion suddenly induced—another by the slow consuming fire of some hidden and unexpressed, but abiding feeling ; in one the perversion of insanity shall have been coincident with acute disease—in another it shall seem to have been caused by the slow overturn of the equilibrium of health, produced by the gradual failure of some one or other function ; in one some sudden accession of wealth—in another some equally sudden or more slow reverse of fortune : all these will have operated in producing insanity, and will give a different expression of feature to that disordered state.

In all these, however, a great prevalence will be found of the *depressed forms*, because fear is more powerfully influential, and more generally prevalent than hope ; because, there is in this world a greater, or at least a more marked prevalence of suffering rather than of pleasure ; of doubt, rather

than of certainty ; of apprehension, rather than of cheerful expectation ; of sickness and sorrow, rather than of health and joy ; of terror and fearful looking forward, rather than of the self-possession, and confidence of future prospects ; in fact, the clouds prevail over the sunshine, and therefore the gloomy prevails over the more cheerful expression of feeling.

There have been some other modes of superstition, which have excited a considerable influence over the brain, but which, as they can scarcely be said to be now much operative, we shall barely glance at ; such as the different forms of idolatry ; the worship of the heavenly bodies ; the belief in *their* influence upon the destinies of man, the remnant of which is to be found still in our own notions of the influence of the different phases of the moon upon supposed lunatics ; and the various forms of folly and credulity, which have exerted so deep an influence over the integrity of the brain ; as all the histories of magic, witchcraft, sorcery, the pretensions of the exorcist, the claims of the metallic tractors, the divining rod, alchemy, the secret of perpetual motion, the researches of mesmerism, and, more recently, animal magnetism, homœopathy, the study of the occult sciences, all the unjust and limited views that have ever prevailed among men, and all the effects of fanaticism in every shape, have proved, at different times, so many rocks upon which the intellect has made shipwreck, and has been stranded on the trackless shores of insanity. Hence the infinite importance of preserving the

health of the brain, and the just equilibrium of mental manifestation.

In whatever way insanity may have been produced, it is early shown by a concentration on self, an introversion of the thoughts and feelings, which leads the patient to be forgetful of his social and relative position ; and this is exhibited, not as pure selfishness, which is too often discoverable *in the sane*, but as morbid selfishness ; as, for instance, the insane will neglect themselves, and omit all those attentions to cleanliness, &c., which are so necessary to present comfort, or to the maintenance of the *comforts of self* ; they will be absorbed by the one dominant idea, and in that absorption they will omit to take food, and all the attentions to clothing and warmth, which are so indispensable to health ; they will neglect and be averse from their nearest relatives and best friends, though it is from them they have always derived their comforts, and do even *now* receive all the good which they possess, and all the care bestowed upon them : while seeking their own pleasure, and probably pursuing some illusive phantom, they will neglect their own interests, and be careless of their health, their property, and of all those who have the highest claims upon them ; so that the selfishness of the insane will often be remarked as an antithesis to natural *self-love*.

This, perhaps, is still more distinctly seen in their tendency to suicide : the love of life is instinctive in the man, and is a powerfully operative conservative, or selfish principle : but it is entirely

superseded in the insane. In them it will be perceived, that while the feelings are very deep and acute, the judgment is feeble, and the mind is quite carried away by its own erroneous perceptions ; erroneous, because the percipient organ is faulty : there is generally a deep feeling of wrong, a consciousness of error, a profound conviction of moral guilt, though scarcely ever assuming a tangible form, (and even if it do, it is almost always an unreal and visionary form,) succeeded by an enduring sense of deserving chastisement for their crimes, and a fearful looking-for of judgment to come, a complete despair of safety, or of restoration to the favour of God, and sometimes a belief that they have sold themselves to, and are under the power of, the devil. Under this invariable condition of suffering, they prefer death to the disquietude which torments them ; and death as a physical evil, and the pain which it must occasion, is thought of as nothing, when compared with the moral suffering which they endure from the hell of their own bosoms. Hence the frequency of suicide, affording by the way another proof, that it is not natural but *morbid* selfishness, which is to be found in the maniac ; natural selfishness would tend to the preservation of life : nothing short of a morbid state would induce a person to prefer a condition of ultimate and remediless woe, according to his *own* position, to *one* in which there was a bare possibility of improvement ; or to add to the present accumulation of evils, however great, yet this one other—the extinction of physical life ; or, in

other words, to leap at once into that gulf of torment, the bare apprehension of which has been sufficient to make life miserable.

Yet this tendency exists fearfully: none can doubt this; and none can doubt its being the highest act of insanity. We mean not to say, that every act of suicide results from insanity; we believe the contrary, and that very many such cases are the immediate consequence of present disappointment and sorrows, accompanied by a recklessness of futurity; a desire to get rid of present suffering, and a want of belief in, or consideration of, the future attendant miseries; the influence of passion, and the forgetfulness of principle; feeling being strong, and judgment weak; the present impression being great, and the resulting inclination to destroy life being powerful, while the voice of religion is stifled, conscience and its monitions are not at hand; the soft whisper of truth, the "*this* informs me I shall never die," is inaudible; and the act is committed in a state of moody discontent with the *present*, and of desponding isolation from the *future world*.

But there are many cases of suicide among the insane; and the tendency to self-destruction, as a feature of that malady, is fearfully great. One of the great characteristics of this state, is the awfully little impression upon the morale, that can be made by the ministers of religion, or by friends. Moral means and motives should never be forgotten; but they will be found unavailing: the patient listens indeed, perhaps is convinced; and ten minutes

afterwards, the impression comes upon him ; and the apparently convinced maniac is a corpse by his own hands. It is not our purpose to pursue this subject further, than to show the dependence of insanity upon irritation of the brain ; and the comparatively little use of moral means, unless they can alter that state of irritation of the nervous fibre.

CHAPTER VII.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF MIND OVER THE BODILY
FUNCTIONS.

BEFORE we enter upon the more important subject of the influence of the body upon the manifestations of mind, it will be desirable to spend a few words upon that reflex influence which is exerted by mind upon body.

Every one is conscious of such influence, so far as regards the voluntary muscles: it is in the power of the will to employ, or to preserve at rest, certain muscles according to the object to be accomplished; every body is conscious of the power to accommodate such muscular movements, so as to make them commensurate with the designs of the will, whether these movements be small and rapid, as in writing, speaking, and various other similar functions; or whether they shall be large and less frequently repeated, as in walking, running, leaping, lifting heavy weights, &c. But persons in general are not aware how much the energy of the



muscles may be increased, and how much more than ordinary they will be able to accomplish, under certain states of mental excitement,—particularly under the influence of motives to self-defence, or self-preservation. It is thus, that the delicate female will perform feats of muscular power, which she would have *thought* impossible, and which would have been impossible under ordinary circumstances, but which become *possible* with the aid of mental influence. The same thing will be perhaps still more strongly shown in the efforts which will be made to save her child from danger, for in the female bosom, the love of progeny greatly exceeds the love of life; and, therefore, it is here that the greatest efforts of self-devotion will be found, in order to protect her infant from harm. The same law is traceable in man, though not so strongly shadowed out, because *his* muscular power is naturally greater, and *his* mental emotions are not of so powerful a character: they are of a different order; they will sustain him longer; they will enable him to exercise more fortitude, to endure protracted sufferings, to submit to torture, without the movement of a muscle: and generally to sustain muscular action far longer; this, again, affording another cumulative proof of the body being under the agency of the mental constitution.

A very common form in which this agency is discerned, is in the varied expressions of the countenance under different mental emotions; the muscular movements produced in laughing and sighing; and the influence upon secretion, as in the flow of tears,

&c. Practical physiognomy depends upon this law : Nature has given to the human countenance a large number of muscles, for the purpose of expressing certain feelings, sentiments, emotions, passions ; and according to the frequency or predominance of these mental states, will be the developement of the muscles appointed for such purposes, agreeably to another law of nature, which increases muscular fibre in proportion to its employment ; so that, accordingly as one or other set of feelings, agencies, motives, shall prevail, so shall the countenance acquire that peculiarity of expression, which will be pleasing or the contrary ; will win its way to the heart, or will close the avenues to friendship ; will betray the benevolent or the selfish character ; and in general will expound the characteristic properties of the individual.

So also the emotion of joy will produce the smile of peace ; a keen sense of the ridiculous will occasion laughter ; *ennui* will give rise to the irresistible yawn : fortitude will occasion a fixed state of the muscles of the face, teeth closed, and clenched hands, with the determination not to give utterance to the sense of suffering ; grief heaves the involuntary sigh, and at the same time acting upon the glandular system, the big tear-drop rolls down the cheek of the heart-broken ; the secretion of saliva is arrested—the mouth becomes dry—appetite is gone—digestion is impossible—all the nutritive functions are suppressed ; and if the emotion be long continued, the failure

of the nutritive system is shown in the wasted and attenuated form of its unhappy victim.

The influence of mind upon body is further shown in the faculty of imitation. This is remarkably exemplified in the acquisition of language; an image of the thing is formed in the brain, perceived by the mind, and associated with certain sounds which have been employed to represent such image; and the message being communicated through the nerves to the organs of speech, certain movements of muscle, &c. take place, by the aid of the faculty of imitation, which form the required articulate sounds.

The danger arising from this faculty of involuntarily imitating others, so as to contract their "gaucheries," their awkward habits, their little frailties and infirmities, must have been felt by every person who has at all attended to himself. One cannot be long in the society of an individual who *stammers*, without feeling a tendency towards a similar infirmity, as well as towards an erroneous pronunciation, or any other little foible, such as the method of walking or talking, &c.

The moral influence, as it is termed, of companionship is very great, and is acknowledged by all; so that all are cautious of the society in which they place their children, and all are desirous of preserving them from the contamination of evil desires, and vicious propensities, and immoral practices, because of the danger of imitation.

This is still further shown in the manifestation of disorder; there are very many disturbances of

the health which are produced by this sinister influence of the mind upon the body, and of the faculty of imitation arising therefrom; so that it is very important to remove an epileptic or hysterical patient from the sight of others; or in those who are pre-disposed to these affections, epilepsy and hysteria will be sure to follow.

There is a state produced by this influence, which I have noticed several times, by which I was at first deceived, and which will be best shown by the following history, the *first* in which this condition came to be understood. I had been attending a very dear medical friend, who was seriously, but I hoped, not dangerously ill. An express was sent, begging my earliest attendance, and on my arrival I found there Dr. ———, a mutual friend. Our invalid friend had awakened from a short slumber, with a sense of sinking, and under an impression that he was dying; he had made his last testamentary disposition; he had taken leave of his family; and he accosted me by saying that he was dying. Dr. F—— and myself both thought differently, though both were aware that this impression of mind upon body—this belief of impending death might occasion positive, final, irretrievable death. We stated our opinion to our disbelieving patient; and the case remained an anxious one for some days, from the continuance of the same mental impression, and from the sleeplessness thus induced. We continued our united attendance for a week, and we had the pleasure of witnessing our friend's convalescence, *although*

he remained nervous for a long time, and required change of air and scene ; and *although* the influence of the mind upon the body remained conspicuous and interfered with his progress. The same circumstances have presented themselves to me, several times since, and with always a similar result ; and this phenomenon has now so frequently recurred, that it is invariably placed to the account of the influence of mind upon body.

The same law is exemplified in the production of disease ; witness the sudden disturbance of function brought on by intense feeling or passion—giving rise to fainting on the one hand, and to apoplexy on the other ; witness, the slowly-consuming agency of some deep and hidden feeling—some feeling which sinks into the heart, and preys upon the citadel of life, which pales the cheek, blanches the lip, saps the energy, sinks the eye, quickens the circulation and the breathing, exhausts the strength, and consigns to an early tomb the victim of hopeless, undiscovered passion. Witness, again, the influence of misfortune, as in the following narrative occurring within the author's own circle. Three brothers entered into some most successful speculations, and realized very large profits ; but they continued the speculation ; one bargain more ! And now the tide had turned ; the article they had bought had been carried up by speculation to an unnatural height, and they could no longer sell, except at a loss ; they still hoped for a favourable re-action, but depression was the order of the day ; to save their credit they *must*

sell; they *could* only do so at a ruinous sacrifice; they could not meet their responsibilities; they stopped payment; *next morning* one had died by his own hands; another was seized by apoplexy, and lived only a few hours; the third died in a few months from ulceration of the stomach. Here we see beautifully, though painfully, exhibited, the influence of mind upon body, according to the several peculiarities of that body; the first producing *insanity*, for we will charitably hope, that the suicide was the act of a maniac, and insanity had been rife in his family; the second, in overturning the integrity of the vascular system of the brain; the third in producing organic disease of the stomach.

And this very naturally brings us to mention the influence of mind upon the digestive organs. It is very marked even in a state of health; joy or sorrow will suspend and supersede hunger; every powerful emotion after a considerable meal will upset digestion, and interfere with nutrition; and these impressions frequently repeated will convert functional disorder into organic disease; some *one* of the digestive organs, (whichever happens to be possessed of the weakest power of vitality,) gives way, and becomes the seat of structural change, more or less incompatible with health, or even with life. We have not noticed affections of the *heart*; but *its* diseases are always found to be more prevalent in troublous times; in fact, accordingly as it shall have been called upon for more or less

of extraordinary excitement. Everybody knows what is understood by a broken heart ; and death produced by mental agency upon this viscus is not uncommon.

In conducting this inquiry, we cannot pass over the agency of mind in the cure, as well as in the production of disease, and especially in those cases which have been deemed miraculous. It is an old-fashioned remark, that "*foi est tout.*" Now although we by no means admit this position, yet we apprehend that there will be found none so hardy as to affirm, that faith has not a considerable influence in the removal of disorder. Even those who will be disposed to deny the proposition in theory, will admit it in fact, or when put in another shape ; as, for instance, none will deny that the confidence of a patient in his medical attendant materially aids his recovery, and that the absence of this confidence makes against him ; and further still, that the agency of medicine is assisted or retarded by the presence or absence of this confidence. And what is this confidence but a belief in the power of the physician, and of his means to alleviate and remove the existing suffering ; and what is this belief but faith ? The fact is notorious ; and to secure this confidence, the physician has often to medicine the mind—to humour its prejudices—to meet and dismiss them by a side wind, rather than by open opposition ; and in various ways to recollect, that his best-directed prescriptions will fail of producing their intended

influence, unless he can enlist into his views the beneficial agency of the patient's mind over his body.

And this brings us to the question of miraculous cure; and of those cures so said to be effected in these latter days. No Christian will doubt the reality of these cures as performed by our Lord, and his apostles. None can doubt that our Omnipotent Lord had power to cure diseases at his word, or at his will; and that this power was continued to his immediate successors,—a body of men raised up for an especial purpose as witnesses of the truth of Christ's mission, of His death, of His resurrection. None, moreover, can doubt the principle upon which these cures were effected; or that *faith* was necessary to their completion; “thy faith hath saved thee;” “thy faith hath made thee whole;” “seeing he had faith to be healed;” “I have not found so great faith, no not in Israel;” “Dost thou *believe* in the Son of God?” “The father believed those things which were spoken by Christ.” Therefore, it is not a question with us as to the *miracles of our Lord*, or as to the agency of mind upon body, in producing these effects under Christ's command; these are truths of sacred and inspired history—the objects of our belief—and the promoters of our sure trust and confidence in the Most High.

But our attention is to be directed to those modern miracles, or rather pretended miracles of later days. And in doing this, we would first of all make a distinction between results which

have accrued from the influence of fanatical credulity, and those which may have arisen from the *enthusiastic agency* of a true faith. In the former instance, we shall trace the covert wiles of a designing hypocrisy—the barefaced impudence of mendacious imposture; or, at least, the clouds and darkness of the grossest ignorance: in the latter we find a warm heart, without a very expanded intelligence, carried away by the excess of its own right feelings; and led into extravagancies, which the more deeply thinking must deplore, because of their certain and inevitable recoil *upon principles*, which, in common, all Christians hold most dear, and for the maintenance of which we would earnestly contend. It is always painful to interfere with such hallowed emotions; but if it shall be shown that these agencies, however apparently dissimilar in their origin, do, in fact, produce *similar effects*, by acting upon an identical part of our compounded nature; and that their ultimate results are more conducive to the progress of *error* than of *truth*; it may well be questioned, how far the indulgence of such feelings and emotions may be *praiseworthy*—how far they may be innocuous to the parties so indulged—how far they may not be *injurious* to the *glory of God*, and the *eventual good of man*!

The example of Prince Hohenlohe, the most successful of all modern performers of miraculous operations, may be quoted as a fair exposition of the former condition; while that of some supposed miraculous cures in our own country a few years

since, and of which we shall again have occasion to speak, may be considered as a favourable specimen of the latter. Both parties equally maintain, though with somewhat different arguments, that the power of working miracles still exists, as in the days of the apostles, provided that the party working the miracle, and those on whom it is worked, do really possess a sufficiency of faith, a full and entire confidence in Christ Jesus, and in his Almighty power, with a firm reliance that *He* will exercise that power, through THEIR *believing* agencies.

It would not do for us to follow the history of this seemingly disinterested, and successful operator, or to contrast it with less questionable modern evidence. It should appear, that in the early cases, which gave rise to his reputation, the cure had already been effected by the slow and combined operation of time, and rest, and remedies,—and that there was wanting only a powerful stimulus to the function of volition, to give the required increased energy to the muscles; and then with a knowledge of the influence of mind upon matter, and with a patient of lively imagination, and highly-wrought sensibility, it was not difficult to calculate the probable result; a result which was proclaimed as miraculous, because not produced by *ordinary means*; and which served at once to stamp the cure with a sacredness, which made it more than questionable whether it would be prudent to hesitate, or hint a doubt as to the method of its accomplishment.

The enthusiasm arising from these results, however, gradually faded ; and a reputation, which, in fact, had only rested upon the great *power* exerted by the brain and nervous system, (as the exponents of *mental influence*,) upon all the other vital functions, when that *influence* had been carried up to its highest pitch of tension by favouring circumstances, was gradually outlived. So long as these plans were carried on in public, in the midst of an enthusiastic and ignorant circle—so long, success, at least temporary success, was the result, and miraculous agency the *alleged* cause, But when these experiments came to be repeated, before well-informed and competent judges, the result was either altogether unsuccessful, or it was nothing more than could at any time be produced by any intelligent person, knowing how to give a proper direction to, and proportionably to excite, an already highly-excited brain and nervous system.

Still as we have adduced the present as an example of the influence of mind upon matter, and as we have referred these pseudo-miraculous cures to the physical laws of our incorporated nature ; and as there is abundant evidence, that through the supposed efficacy of a holy name, the deaf heard, the blind saw, and the paralytic was restored to the use of his limbs, it becomes necessary to inquire a little into the circumstances, in order that we may judge of the truth : and especially is it necessary, to recollect that the influence of novelty gives a charm to circumstances and nar-

rations, which prompts mankind to believe and to admire them, *because* they are *new*, without sufficiently investigating their title to *credibility* and *COMPLETENESS*; and entirely forgetting, that in order to establish truth, and to distinguish genuine from pretended miracles, it is indispensable in all questions of deviation from the established laws of nature, that the facts should be authentic—that they should be related by persons capable of judging of the circumstances under which they occurred, and sufficiently impartial to detail them without gloss or exaggeration—equally and most carefully avoiding the ebullition of popular feeling, which always bears to the side of the marvellous, and the frigid scepticism of those who will admit and believe *nothing* which does not possess the *demonstration* of the exact sciences.

Let us judge how far the mind was wrought upon by Prince Hohenlohe in the performance of his cures. It appears from the published documents that there was no hope of success, unless the patient possessed a full and unshaken confidence in God, and a belief, not only that *He could*, but that *He would*, succour those, who in sincerity sought the relief to be afforded through *His* servant, the *operator*. Having ascertained this from the patient, the Prince besought God graciously to remove the disease of the individual, and restore his lost health, both for the immediate good of the patient, the support and comfort of *His* church, and the glory of *His* great Name, pleading for an answer to this prayer, on the ground of the promise

of our Lord Jesus Christ—"Whatsoever ye shall ask of the Father in my name, He will give it you;" on the ground of the faith of the sick individual; and, finally, for the honour of His great name. After a solemn benediction, the patient was asked, if he felt himself relieved, and, having given an affirmative reply, he was commanded in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, to arise and walk without assistance. At the least appearance of fear, hesitation, or anxiety, the patient was exhorted to a firm and unlimited confidence in God—to take courage, and to gain a victory over himself, since Divine grace had assuredly placed him in a situation to employ his limbs, if he would use on his part the required exertion. And then, if the event did not correspond with the prediction, he encouraged the patient for futurity—saying, that it often happened, that the sick were not worthy of this grace at the *moment*, and that their healing at *that time* would not ultimately be beneficial to their soul's health; but that they might, by fasting, by prayer, and penance, and continued progress in good works, so prepare themselves for future acceptance with God, that He would then grant their prayer.

Here is, indeed, abundantly shown the influence of a false religion, which is peculiarly a religion of feeling; but leaving this consideration, it is not easy to divine a process better calculated to exalt the sensibility of the nervous system, to excite the brain to its utmost activity, and to create such a degree of energy of volition, as to give to this

faculty that astonishing power, which, as we have already seen, could carry the patient out of, and beyond himself; and thus effect a permanent cure, in those who were suffering only from a debility of this function; while it would for a time suspend the laws of morbid action, even in some cases of permanent disease; and *these* would recur, when the excitement was past, as was, in fact, the case in numberless instances.

The performance of these miracles attracted the attendance of many who came to be healed, and of many others, who came from curiosity, to witness the exhibition of this extraordinary power, rendered still more extraordinary by the fact, that the acts of healing were entirely gratuitous, and produced no ostensible benefit to the "*healer*." Publicity was apparently courted by the Prince; public places were often chosen for the performance of his miracles; and in the process, there was no effort at concealment, no secret arts, no mysteries, no particular manifestations; everything wore the appearance of the genuine simplicity of one who believed himself gifted of God to heal the sick; all of which shows an intimate acquaintance with human nature, and a consequent power to avail himself of those physical laws, the influence of which he had found to be so predominant, as very generally to produce, and almost to ensure these surprising results; and so much warmth, and zeal, and energy, did he appear to throw into his proceedings, that the general enthusiasm augmented at every word, and that the assembled multitudes

united most earnestly their own prayers, and wishes, and hopes for the recovery of the sick, and for the health of the soul of the performer.

It must be remarked, that the class of diseases upon which these wonders were wrought, were generally those which depended upon some loss of energy of the nervous or muscular systems ; and occasionally, the sphere of these curative essays was extended to *apparently* organic affections. But any well-informed medical person knows, that these affections are often only *apparent*, and depend really upon a certain morbid condition of the nerves which supply the organ ; and that this state is not only *remediable*, but that it often is removed by means which act upon the nervous system ; by those which distract the attention from old morbid associations, and substitute new ones ; and sometimes, without any means at all, by the mere agency of time, and the gradual fading into forgetfulness of the original morbid impression. These experiments were never made upon a deaf and dumb person—upon a case of blindness, produced by disorganisation of the eye—upon spinal deformity which had resulted from the destruction of the bodies of the vertebræ—upon the loss of a limb—or upon a disorganised joint. In fact, the department of cure was limited to that class of *chronic* diseases which depends for its characteristic intensity upon a peculiar laxity of the nervous fibre ; a fact of primary importance, since it shows the influence of mind upon the bodily functions and structure in the cure of disease.

Our space does not admit of very full details as to the history of these cures; one general issue may, however, be stated,—that the patients being previously wrought up to the highest pitch of expectation, they were filled by the enthusiasm of devotional feeling; their bosoms heaved with the liveliest emotions; they were called out of themselves, and in some instances they *actually* felt, and in others *thought* they felt, their pains diminish, and gradually disappear. There is then a great similarity between this influence and that of animal magnetism, and some other curative plans, which have rested their entire value upon the influence of mind over the body; an influence which is most extraordinary—is deeply and extensively operative,—and yet baffles all our efforts to ascertain the mode of its action. In every instance of this kind there is *one master principle*, viz. the agitating influence of the belief of some unknown and supernatural agency—producing a predominant impression upon the nervous system, and through it, upon all the associations of mind, and all the varied functions of body,—that is, upon all the functions which depend for their continuance upon the integrity of the cerebral and spinal nervous systems.

It is certain, that in the instances referred to, a very considerable effect was wrought upon many individuals; but it is also true, that this was greatly exaggerated by the ultra-zeal of warm friends, by an excited imagination, and by a dislike on the part of the sick to acknowledge that they had not *faith to be healed*. In general, the effect was pal-

liative only, diminishing pain, or relieving it for a time, to return after a longer or shorter interval, when the influence of the excitement had subsided : and it was *curative* in those happy instances, in which nature, or antecedent treatment, had already effected a cure ; and an adequate degree of excitement alone, was required to give pristine energy to the restored but weakened organs : or when the malady had fixed its grasp upon the nervous system, and only some new and powerful impression was necessary to supersede its morbid habit.

In estimating the influence of *mind* upon the cure of disease, it is necessary to keep in view the distinction, between that which is *curative*, and that which is merely *palliative* ; the *former* puts an end to disease, and restores the patient to perfect health ; but the *latter* (where organic changes have taken place to such an extent, that they can no longer be overtaken by treatment) consists in allaying irritation, diminishing pain, enfeebling sympathetic phenomena, taking care of the general health, attending to the *functional* derangement of other organs ; arresting, as far as possible, the organic changes which *are going on* in the part primarily affected, and thereby diminishing the danger to the general system, which is almost always destroyed, by the giving way of some one organ in the first place.

Another very important distinction is, between being *really ill*, and *feeling ill*. Many persons are extremely ill without feeling so, to an extent which renders it difficult to awaken the necessary atten-

tion to themselves; and, on the contrary, many others, *without disease*, experience such miserable sensations, that they believe themselves ill, and seek a remedy, which will enable them to escape from their own *feelings*. It is this state, which too frequently drives the miserable patient to the employment of alcoholic or opiate stimuli; or turns him over to the tender mercies of some impudent pretender; especially if the usual medical attendant, under whose care and management he first falls, does not happen to possess his full confidence, or does not know how to preserve it, or is not himself well versed in the mutations of the nervous system.

The limit to this curative influence of mind upon matter, is, that it can effect *no permanent cure of any organic structural alteration*; and this it is which forms the essential difference between the pseudo-miracles of the latter days, which are effected through natural, though ill-understood agencies;—and the miracles of our Lord and his apostles, which were direct, immediate, perfect,—without natural or adequate means, and to which disease of structure was no impediment to the cure.

The agency of the mind upon the body is produced and kept up through the influence of the nervous system, a medium of communication, everywhere distributed with the minutest care, and in the richest profusion; possessing its grand centre in the head, while its various parts and subordinate systems are so closely, so carefully, and so extensively connected with each other, as to indicate

most clearly the perfection of Divine Wisdom, displayed in preserving its uninterrupted and harmonious intercourse, and in securing the most general impression ; not the minutest sensation occurs at the extremity of the system, but it is instantaneously propagated to its centre ; not a desire is excited in the mind, but a corresponding action is set up in the organ destined for its gratification ; and the endless variety of communication with its several regions, by means of plexus, ganglia, interlacing, and decussation of fibres, separate twigs of intercourse, and the one agency of the great sympathetic nerve, is such as to overwhelm the mind with astonishment. In some particular forms of malady, this intimate union and communication may be suspended ; yet it can never altogether cease, but with life ; while in a great number of diseases, there appears to be such an excitation of the nervous system, as to give to the influence of mind upon body a greater power than it would obtain in a perfectly healthy condition ; and these are precisely the states of disorder most favourable for the pseudo-miraculous cures, viz. those which originally result from, or are kept up *by*, disorder of the nervous function.

Without this influence upon the mental system, the physician will in vain employ *all* the resources of his art ; he will be stinted to one class of curative measures, *important, certainly, but less important* than the influence of the medical practitioner upon the mind, and his knowledge of the mental and moral manifestations of the *sick*, and of the best

method of deriving advantage from these conditions. Admitting this to be case, in the greater number of instances, the cure of disease may be well said to be dependent upon *miraculous* agency, if the essential character of such agency were defined to consist in everything which exists beyond the *ordinary bounds* of human intelligence ; which it is beyond our power to explain ; and which exceeds the limits of *perception through the medium of the senses*. Thus it is frequently said, that events take place, as by a special act of the sovereignty of God, without the intervention of adequate apparent means. But if we knew *all* the circumstances of these supposed preternatural events, we should find that it was our ignorance which induced us to imagine the especial interference with nature's established laws ; and which threw the semblance of mystery over events, which *would be explicable*, did we possess *more knowledge*, and a more intimate acquaintance with the laws, which God himself has established in his creating power and providential goodness.

This review of the influence of the mind upon the body, will lead us to the following conclusions :—

a. The more we become acquainted with the phenomena of the nervous system, the more do we find to wonder and admire in the secret mechanism by which these movements are accomplished.

b. Disorders of the nervous system, and especially those which are occasioned by any disturb-

ance in the function of *volition*, are peculiarly those which will be found removable by the influence of *mental excitement*, or by means of powerful *impressions*, acting vehemently upon the brain or nervous system.

c. These impressions *may be bodily* as well as *mental*; but it is the latter which are most powerful in their influence, particularly if they involve the more deeply operative passions of our nature.

d. In *organic structural* diseases of the system, nervous excitement will only accelerate a fatal termination.

e. That form of malady which involves the idea of apparitions, has been clearly traced back to the effects of disordered nervous function.

f. The exercise of charity in judging of disordered mental manifestation is indispensable. In contemplating the extent of structural disease, and disorganisation of the brain, which is often rendered cognisable after the patient's death, and which has scarcely been suspected during life, one deeply painful sentiment presents itself to the feeling mind, viz. that of having judged harshly during life, and of having attributed to moral obliquity that which really arose from physical infirmity. It is often under these circumstance, that we attribute *irascibility*, and too great sensibility upon trifles, to the want of a duly-regulated mind, when they are actually dependent upon an irritated brain: indolence and inactivity are imputed to the absence of sufficient motives to produce action, when they arise from sensorial torpor, from the physical want of

power to set in action those motives ; and the negation of proper diligence and exertion in the right way, is ascribed to the want of a keen sense of moral duty, whereas all these may arise from a feebleness of the function of volition, that again being dependent upon an enfeebled, or oppressed brain.

g. These conclusions may be followed out in a variety of details, but it is unnecessary. It is, however, very important, while stating these facts, to guard them against misapplication. *Every* disordered mental manifestation is not attributable to *diseased brain* ; and it must never be forgotten, that each individual is minutely responsible for all his mental manifestations, so long as he is in a state of cerebral health ; it is for *each* individual to judge of *himself* severely, to scrutinize very narrowly his motives and conduct, and the secret springs of all his actions and emotions ; but it is for every Christian to judge of *others* with an enlarged and expansive charity.

h. While, then, we are careful to avoid falling into a notion of the omnipotence of bodily structure, or of disordered cerebral function, in their agency upon the manifestations of mind, and especially upon human motives, let us be guided by the chaste light of christian charity, in our application of these motives. None sees the *heart*, but God only ; and may we be desirous of leaving the judgment in his hands, who knoweth the end from the beginning !

There is a point often mooted both by medical

persons, by moralists, and divines, and by the public generally, which bears considerably on this influence of the mind over the body, viz. the conduct which ought to be pursued towards the sick, in acquainting them with, or withholding from them, the knowledge of their danger. And as this inquiry is not without its difficulties, and is altogether an important one, both to the sick themselves and to their surrounding friends, we shall venture upon considering it a little in detail.

It is the first duty of the physician to save life, and to sustain health, and to employ *all the resources* of his art to lengthen the duration of existence, and to *preserve it from all dangers which threaten its continuance*. It is to be supposed, that we are now dealing with a christian physician, who believes in a superintending Providence, who thankfully owns, that all his talents are derived from the Author and Giver of *all good*, and who feels himself deeply responsible for the employment of those talents, as the *means* which God has vouchsafed for the accomplishment of *His* designs. Such an one feels, that while events are not in his hands, and that he has no power to command success—but that, on the contrary, the issue is in the will of the Omnipotent; yet, that as he is not acquainted with *that will*, it is his duty to act in conformity with its general principles, so far as he is acquainted with them. Now, one of the general principles is, the preservation of life; and therefore he is doing God's will, in endeavouring to effect this object by *all lawful means*. And he is minutely responsible,

as much for his errors of omission, as of commission, provided they be wilful; or shall have arisen from indolence, or carelessness, or anything short of his having done his *very best*, to arrest the ravages of disorder and to restore health. In doing this, he employs means to an end according to the best of his knowledge; and he often speaks of, and thinks of those means as adequate to produce certain results. It is not that he forgets God, or that he loses sight of *His* power to save life, and to kill; or believes that means will be useful, unless they be so rendered by the blessing of God: he knows and feels all this; but in default of his knowledge of the will of Heaven, in the particular case, he employs fearlessly the means he possesses of accomplishing, what he *does know* of the will of God; and in so doing, he employs these means, as if they were capable of producing their intended results, exactly in the same way, as man every day takes food, with the full and certain confidence, that it will nourish his body, though at the same time, it will only do so, *if God will*.

Much more than enough has been said about this conduct of medical persons, with regard to *means*. We admit, that *he* is culpable, who, in his employment of means, forgets the hand which gives them power: but we insist, that *he* is not less culpable, who employs them *feebly*, because *uncertain* whether he is doing the will of Heaven; and who, from the inertness of his practice, suffers his patient to die, because he will not be a little more energetic, a little more confiding in the application of his re-

sources. By the proposition, therefore, *he* who cannot be acquainted with the certain result of any case, however much he *may forebode evil*, is guilty, if, by lack of zeal and energy in the use of all his means, he puts his patient into a position, in which his forebodings will be probably realized ; and who destroys or impairs that cheerful confidence in himself, from his patient, which we have seen to be almost indispensable to the successful agency of remedies. Moreover it follows, that the physician has not completed his duty, when he has merely prescribed for his patient, if he has forgotten his compound nature, and has omitted to prescribe medicine for his mind ; perhaps has even left that mind to prey upon the body, and to defeat his best intended efforts for the preservation of life. The darkness of ignorance may rest upon it ; the clouds of error may obscure its perceptions ; the storms of unsubdued passion may sweep across its surface ; the recollections of the past may be embittered by many an unrepented sin ; the prospects of futurity may be undefined from being buried in habitual forgetfulness ; or the night of despondency may brood her sable wing over the sick man's pillow ; and each one of these states may be more than a counterpoise to the influence of medicine. It is for the skilful and christian physician to penetrate this cloud, to lift, without *drawing aside*, the veil which conceals these states from public view ; and gently to lead the mind to such considerations as shall give it peace—well-founded peace,—as every one knows,—the state of all others, which will

carry a patient through the largest amount of disorder, and yet carry him safely through. Now in this process he has no right, nor even an excuse for deceiving the patient, as to the probable issue of his malady ; he has no right, nor even an excuse for stating simply the *terrors* of religion :—in announcing the former probability, he should exercise a sound discretion ; he should cling to the side of hope rather than of fear ; should avow, that he himself knows nothing of despondency, that he is energised to action by difficulties, and acts with more vigour and determined perseverance, in proportion to those difficulties ; but that in all cases, it is the will of God, not our will, which determines results ; we cannot command success, but we may and will deserve it. With regard to the moral and religious state, an observation from a medical friend, falls with much greater force, than from a clergyman, and therefore should be guarded ; it should be scriptural, and if scriptural, it abounds in hope and cheerful promise ; it speaks of a God of mercy and love, of one who is waiting to forgive—who is waiting to be reconciled to the sincere suppliant, who delighteth not to punish, who wills and invites all to come unto him, and to be saved from their sins, and relieved from their sorrows.

There are those who would consider this process as *temporising*. We do not admit the term. But granting that it were true, is it nothing to gain *time* under such circumstances ? Is not *time* everything where moments are of such infinite importance ? Is it nothing to gain *time* for the unfor-

fortunate suicidal maniac? If *time* be gained for him, is there not more hope of his safety, than if he were a corpse by his own hands? Is it nothing to extend the day of his opportunities—to administer the hope and consolation which will sustain him, and enable him to evince his sincerity by the conduct of after life? Sickness is not the time for serious thought, but it is often the occasion of inducing that serious thought which leads to repentance towards God, and reformation towards man; which turns the heart, and amends the life; which alters the whole course of thought, and makes of man a new creature, a better husband, father, friend, and member of society; and is it nothing to place him in the best position for this, so desirable change?

It will be seen that these remarks relate to the *mode* of medicining the mind, not to the question as to whether a patient is to be *deceived*! What! *deceived* on the limit of eternity? *deceived*, when perhaps in a few days or hours, eternity may be employed in *cursing his deceivers*? Awful responsibility! and most fearfully punished for its neglect! To place before the patient the almost certainty of recovery, when the hope of such issue is slender, is worse than thoughtless, and infatuated; it is demented or irreligious!! At the same time, a hasty or *brusque manner* of revealing danger, would often snap the attenuated thread of life; and for this, the physician is, *cæteris paribus*, as responsible as he who *takes life*. In both cases, the respective parties may have executed the determinations of

Infinite Wisdom, but with *these* they have nothing to do; *they* have been voluntary agents, and are responsible for their own acts, as *free*; *they* have acted without constraint, and must answer without *excuse*. It is, then, rather to *the manner* of communicating this knowledge than to the thing itself, that so much difference of opinion may exist. By an intelligent observer of human nature—of the progress of malady, and of a patient's individual character, both *moral and physical*, these objects will not be found irreconcilable,—viz. to *speak the truth*, yet *cheer the sufferer*; to state that the sun is setting, and yet to fringe his evening glories with a beauty which is inimitable, except in nature, and which, even in nature, is not to be found, but in *departing day*, when night's sable mantle is about to shroud and sepulchre all the living, glowing tints of light.

We would never justify, or even palliate, the absurd system of keeping the sick in ignorance of his state, and studiously alienating his attention from the great subjects of religion, and drawing an impenetrable veil over his prospects for futurity, on the principle of not disturbing his present peace, and of crying, "Peace, peace, when there is no peace;" as if the slumbering inmate of a house on fire is not to be wakened, lest his sleep should be disturbed, and lest he be *alarmed* upon finding his perilous situation; or as if the careless one who has fallen asleep on the edge of a beetling precipice, when the next nod will probably precipitate him into eternity, is not to be

quietly and gently roused, and warned of his danger! Nothing can be more dangerous in morality; nothing more subversive of all sound reasoning, good practice, social duty, benevolence to man, or religious principle! But when the trembling balance of life is so nicely adjusted, that the slightest weight thrown into the one scale will immediately sink it beyond the possibility of vibration; and when that balance is held by the medical man *under God*, then we should not only consider it as sinful in such medical person, to *throw in* that weight by his own depressing conduct; but that it would be likewise criminal in him to *withhold* the weight of his influence from the opposite scale, in which he is bound to employ every faculty he possesses, to maintain the power of his patient, while the fearful struggle with the destroying cause is continued.

A distinction must here be drawn between acute and chronic disorder. In the former, if danger attend the sick, and the powers of the system are rapidly exhausting, and dissolution is approaching; to withdraw any of the props on which that system rests—to take away the supporting influence of mind, is to sink it inevitably, without any compensating good: for, in such fearful disease really serious thought is impossible; and the individual who so acts is accessory to the destruction of body and soul, if that soul is unprepared to meet its God. In such states of acute suffering, the patient is always too much occupied with disease to think at all, or to think correctly;

and the appointed medium for the reception and conveyance of thought, (the brain and nervous system) is too much under the influence of excitation, or depression, or perverted agency, according to the varying conditions of malady, to rely in any degree upon its manifestations.

But in the lengthened attendance, the changeful forms, the fitful advances, the languor, the progress, the gradual exhaustion of chronic ailment, there are abundant opportunities for leading the patient to a consideration of the brevity and uncertainty of life; to the frequent unfortunate issue of long-continued organic disease; to the agency of remedies, *secondary in themselves*, and under the government of the Most High; successful, or the contrary, according to his will; and to the necessity for preparedness for *every event*, however much we are bound to hope, to seek, to pray for restoration, in submission to *Him*, whose power we daily acknowledge, and to whose appointments we constantly, and often unthinkingly, say, "Thy will be done," when the heart secretly adds, "So far as it is in conformity with *my own*!" The wisdom and the prudence of trying both sides of a question, which involves uncertainty as to its issue, may always be introduced; more especially, where that knowledge involves eternal happiness or misery. The necessity of always making provision for the events of life, for the disposition of property here—for the protection of property from fire, or other accident—and the insurance of life, as a guarantee for the interests of survivors, are so many points

on which to ground the importance and necessity of the individual insuring for himself, when a still higher stake is involved, even present peace, and a future eternity of happiness. The former is very constantly mentioned, and one of the usual arguments is, that patients will not die the sooner for having settled their affairs ; and will they die the sooner for having settled their spiritual affairs, and obtained a guarantee for futurity, in the promises of God, to the sincere penitent ? Again, the goodness and the mercy of God, in afflicting his children, and thus calling their attention to serious things ; to the solemn realities of an unseen, eternal world ; the natural reflections of a sick room, and of abstraction from all the enjoyments which health and activity confer ; the kind attention of friends ; gratitude for the constant supply of the wants of an invalid ; the aids of medicine and science in relieving distressing symptoms ; the great advantage as well as duty of a contented mind ; the direction of the patient's reading ; and the recollection, that in a feeble state of the brain and nervous system, this reading cannot be *exclusive* in order to its being beneficial ; the great original cause of all suffering ; and the hopes and consolations of religion to all those who will embrace her invitations, will afford so many channels, through which the attention may be steadily awakened to its situation and responsibilities, to its present duties and coming prospects.

Even through these natural approaches, the subject is to be introduced with delicacy, and at

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proper opportunities—not, indeed, with a criminal fear of grasping its momentous truths—not with a sheltering lenity of expression, which seeks to obscure truth; but with the delicate tact which belongs to the well-instructed and well-educated: wanting these, the subject will fail of producing a good effect upon the mind, while the injury to the body may be irreparable, and is wholly unwarrantable. Nothing can exceed the extensive mischief which arises from injudicious mismanagement of these advantages, both to the patient and surrounding friends; but in proper hands these great topics may be so handled as to produce a good effect even upon the health; and to neglect such opportunities, is as criminal on the one hand, as to destroy life on the other by ill-timed appeals to powerful feelings. The patient sometimes asks for the probable issue of his maladies—and in such instances, the best mode of reply is by a candid and honest summing up of the general probabilities of such states of disordered function, or organic disease, and of the individual peculiarities of the case in question; and with all the hope which these peculiarities admit, drawing the final inference, that where relative uncertainty subsists, the only safe conduct is, to pursue the means to the proposed end—but to *provide a place of refuge should that end not be obtained*. This is, as we have before shown, the course of prudent men, with regard to the evils of life; many persons even insure, against a time of sickness and old age, when they shall be no longer capable of exertion; and is it not

equally imperative, to be protected from moral evil, "by laying up treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt?" *In this way*, the end will be accomplished, while, if the patient be bluntly told, that there is no chance for him, (which no man of *science* or of *truth* would feel justified in saying,) the intended result would be defeated; confidence in the medical attendant would be destroyed, and the opportunities of moral influence and suasion will be utterly lost; *opportunities*, which would have remained unbroken, and *influence* which would have continued available for the moral good of the sick, had there been as much wisdom and prudence, as over-wrought zeal in the parties concerned.

We cannot avoid just noticing here, the very different influence produced by the mind upon the body, according to the nature and connexions of *the organ* of that body, whose primary irritation has been the first cause of disturbance to the manifestations of mind; *all*, for instance, that is hopeful and cheerful in anticipation, in disease of the lungs; *all* that is dark and gloomy in the same disease of the stomach and liver; and so, also, with regard to many other of the injurious changes which first disturb the manifestations of mind, and *then* re-act upon the already tortured body.

All violent emotion should be avoided; and it is to be recollected, that violent emotion is not a necessary characteristic of religious impression: while its continuance would rapidly exhaust, and perhaps *in itself* might be sufficient to destroy feeble life.

Religion has a power, elsewhere unknown, if judiciously employed, to gild the stormy clouds of the evening of life with the brightness of a glorious sunset—full of hope and of promise for to-morrow's dawn; and it is upon these that the attention of the patient should be fixed. But while we thus speak of the consolations of religion, we do not intend that miserable abuse of the holy communion, which is too common, and too fatal in its influence, upon really serious thought. In itself, religion forms the only source of real peace, and hope, and rest, and joy, and confidence, and cheerful expectation, all of which tend to support the body, while they tranquillise the mind, and prepare it for its coming change, (if it be coming) of throwing off this *mortal*, and of being clothed with immortality. But deeply cruel, and awfully criminal is *he*, who seeks to produce this peace, by an administration of the sacrament, and by inducing the sick to believe, that all the evils of a misspent life are to be obliterated by receiving the holy rite, at the eleventh hour, when there is nothing left to give to God but the last heavings of expiring nature. How awful the responsibility, even when this effect has been produced through inadvertence, or from a fancied want of time frequently to visit a distant patient, and thoroughly to investigate his case! “Want of time” is generally the absence of inclination; for time may be created in some way or other, by introducing order and method into our arrangements, for every real call of duty. Deep and expansive be the stream of our charity in all

things towards others ; severe and impartial be the scrutiny of ourselves ; or we shall one day feel the pang of unmitigated remorse for the criminality we have incurred under this plausible excuse, from the neglect of a most important talent intrusted to our cultivation.

Should any doubt the existence of this influence of the mind over the body, let him make the following simple experiment ; let him examine the muscles of his own arm, in a state of rest and relaxation, and he will find them soft, and, even in a state of health, almost flabby. But let him direct the energy of the will to these muscles, every fibre will be in action, and the arm will become tense and rigid ; let him call upon that arm for extraordinary exertion, and this tension and rigidity are still more marked. Painters and sculptors are well aware of this law, and whenever any mighty effort is to be portrayed, the muscles are as if strained to their utmost degree of tension.

This law, which in its present illustration is physiological, was beautifully shown in a state of disease, in the case of Miss Fancourt, which a few years since powerfully excited the attention of the public in general, and of the author in particular, as being the alleged result of miraculous agency. And although for the present this question of modern miracles seems to have receded from public view, yet as the principles are always the same, and always applicable to every succeeding similar case, our time will not be lost by adding a few

thoughts suggested at the moment by the consideration of its phenomena.*

“ In doing so, I beg to state that I do not call in question the *divine interposition*; the only question is, whether the performance of the cure has been through the operation of natural means, employed with submission to the Divine will, and blessed by Almighty power; or whether it has been wrought by the same power, without the intervention of adequate means, or by a process which is opposed to the ordinary course of nature. Now I firmly and conscientiously believe that the means of cure are obvious; the effect of certain constitutional laws, and adequate to the end proposed. But even if we could not *perceive* that they were so, we should not be justified in drawing a sweeping inference, that the effect *was a miracle*. There are many of the wonders of nature which remain to us *inscrutable*, but we do not *therefore* pronounce them to be *miraculous*. We acknowledge the footsteps of infinite wisdom and love, which moves, where finite minds cannot perceive its traces; and our hearts are raised in faith and dependence upon that all-wise, all-powerful, all-gracious Governor, for a continuance of that government, and of those provisions, of which we humbly seek to avail ourselves, we know not *why*, but only because we have been taught, that the blessing of God has been

* Since the above was written, a new miraculous pretender has appeared in the person of Dr. Clanny; the following observations are only the more called for.

promised to, and will attend upon, the performance of duty.

“ To illustrate this position with regard to the nervous system, on which has hinged the cure of Miss Fancourt, we know that without its influence it is impossible to move *a limb*; only suspend its agency for a moment, by pressure upon a principal nerve, and the limb thus subjected to experiment is powerless and paralysed; take away its influence from the stomach, and digestion is at an end; interfere with its regular supply to the lungs, or to the heart, and the circulation is embarrassed; remove its unceasing distribution from the diaphragm, and respiration is at an end, while irrecoverable death is the immediate consequence. Thus we see its effects; we know its importance; we decide upon its agency; and we are certain that its influence is transmitted through certain white cords; but here our knowledge ends. In *what way these perform their function*, we are not acquainted; much more are we ignorant as to *what is this nervous influence*; but we do not, therefore, infer, when we move a limb, when we walk, talk, taste, see, hear, smell, &c. &c., that all these actions are *miraculous*; they are most wonderful, it is true; but they result from laws, which we *know exist*, though we *know not* the source of their operation. Thus in the present instance of cure, effected through the medium of the nervous system, we pretend not to trace every step of its progress; but as natural means are adequate to the end, and as the system of God’s government

everywhere shows, a working through the agency of means ; we infer, that the same wonder-working agency has here also been displayed, but *that no miracle has been performed*. It is of no consequence to the argument, that the parties believed in the *miraculous* agency of these *very means* ; God often pleases to bestow his blessing upon means, without any intention on the part of the agents, so permitted or employed, of bringing about certain events or effects ; and the very fact of their non-acquaintance with the remedial power of these means, actually added to their influence.

“ This opinion requires to be supported by some observations with regard to the *nature of miracles* ; because it is well known that this forms a stronghold of infidelity ; and that nothing could be more gratifying to the sceptic, than to have the boundaries of miraculous agency so widened, as to embrace within its pale the simple effects of natural phenomena ; because if some *miracles*, or rather *alleged miracles*, can be shown to be dependent upon second causes, the infidel is greatly assisted in his denial of a GREAT FIRST CAUSE !

“ A miracle has been defined to be an *effect* or event, contrary to the established constitution, or nature of things ; or a sensible suspension or controlment of the known laws of nature, that is, of God’s ordinary appointment.

“ In the cure of Miss Fancourt it has been shown, that the effect was not *contrary* to the *established constitution* or *course of things*, and that there was *no suspension*, or *controlment*, or *deviation*

from the known laws of nature ; on the contrary, that the effect produced *was dependent* upon the physical laws of the constitution ; and that these laws, though commonly hidden from our sight, were awakened, in this instance, to the highest energy of action ; that action, however, being perfectly natural, and ready to be called forth by any circumstance of high excitement.

“ But *miracles* have never been performed in cases where the ordinary physical laws would suffice to accomplish the cure, in the hands of our gracious, all-bountiful God. In such a case the event is natural, because it is in conformity with those laws the ordinary operations of which are commonly termed the usual course of nature ; meaning by the term *nature*, not an atheistical fatalism, but the all-wise system appointed by the Almighty for the regulation of the universe under his own infinite supervision and control. The event would be *miraculous*, if *supernatural*, if brought about by some superior *controlling* agency, by a *power* which is above the ordinary constitution of nature, and which, for the purpose of showing forth the *divinity*, changes the course of *nature's laws* so as to produce effects, without the intervention of ordinary means, or by means which are perfectly inadequate, or which have no relation to the end *proposed*. Yet it is not every event, brought about by circumstances which we do not comprehend, that is miraculous ; for before we can decide upon a *miracle*, we ought to be acquainted with the natural and correlative circumstances under which it has taken

place ; for if we know not the ordinary course of nature under given circumstances, we cannot justly say that there has been a suspension of, or deviation from, its laws. And since, in the above case, the ordinary laws of nature were adequate to the end produced ; and since these admirable resources were really called into active employment, although their existence was unknown to the parties so employing them, we cannot hesitate to affirm, that the cure was not miraculous.

“ *Miracles* require a much stronger testimony than *common facts* ; and although we fully receive *the facts themselves* of the present case, yet on the question of *miraculous agency*, we require more testimony. We are then bound to inquire, whether the witnesses possessed the opportunity of becoming acquainted with all the circumstances of the case, and their dependence *upon*, and relation *to*, certain natural phenomena ; and whether they were perfectly free from any bias which might conduce to warp their judgment.

“ Now in both these instances, the evidence is defective ; the parties *were not* acquainted with the extent and influence of laws which govern the function of volition ; and they *also were* under the influence of certain opinions, with regard to the performance of miracles in the present age of the Church, which could certainly give a leaning towards the easy belief of miraculous agency ; and, therefore, however undeniable their testimony as to *the facts* so far as they understood them, we hesitate as to receiving it, for that which requires

a much *stronger testimony*, viz. the *existence of miracle*.

“ To conclude, therefore, the present case appears to be deficient in some of the most important characteristics of miracle :

“ *a.* It is true, that there was *an important end to be accomplished*, as far as the perfect restoration of the patient is implied in such terms. But the miracles of Moses, of our Lord, and of his divinely-commissioned ministers, appear to have had a further object, as to prove the *divine authority* of the prophet ; or of the message of mercy and of love which the *latter* promulgated. On the other hand, I should not be disposed to allow the evidence in favour of Popish miracles, wrought for the purpose of proving the Divine authority of the Popish superstition ; and, on the same principle, should not be disposed to admit the present miracle, in attestation of certain doctrinal views with regard to these latter days of the Church. *In the former instance* of our Saviour and his apostles, the doctrines and the miracles are inseparable ; *in the latter* we can trace no connexion between them : and therefore we do not find that important ultimate good which has appeared to warrant, and even to require, miraculous interference with the laws of nature. I would speak cautiously ; I would not deny the possible existence of such ultimate end, although it appears imperceptible.

“ *b.* It has been laid down as a criterion of miracles, that they be *instantaneously and publicly per-*

formed in the presence of witnesses. Certainly the present case was not publicly wrought; but the evidence as to the facts is abundantly satisfactory, though I have before stated its insufficiency to decide the question of miraculous agency.

“ c. A miracle must be sensible, and easy to be observed in such way that *the reality* of the event may be readily ascertained, as well as that its *origin was supernatural*. Now the evidence in favour of the miraculous cure of Miss Fancourt is here defective, because it rests on the physiological laws of the nervous system, which are not *generally* known, which were not known to the parties, and, indeed, which are scarcely known at all; and, therefore, not being acquainted with the *regular order of nature*, they could not ascertain *what was* the effect of one of her beautiful provisions excited to the highest pitch of intensity; *and what was* a supernatural deviation from her course.

“ d. Lastly, a miracle must be *independent of second causes*, and must not be performed by the aid of their intervention. It is not enough, that the cause is hidden from our view, because then, the greater number of cures performed by medicine would be miraculous. We know that certain remedies will produce certain effects upon the constitution; and in the cure of disease we reason upon these effects, and we exhibit medicine for the purpose of producing them. But in the vast majority of

such instances, we know not the mode of operation of these medicines. Yet reason and experience teach us, that there is such a relation between cause and effect, that we may, in dependence upon providential blessing, securely calculate upon obtaining the latter, from exhibiting the former. Although, therefore, this process is hidden from our eyes, and oftentimes surrounded by impenetrable darkness, there is no idea of miraculous agency; the effect is dependent upon *second causes*, under the blessing and government of the *Great First Cause*. And in the present instance, *the effect* was dependent upon a second cause, of sufficient magnitude to produce that effect, viz. upon the susceptibility of the nervous system, which enabled it, under the powerful agency of strong excitement, to give such increased energy to muscular fibres, as that their feeble actions received immediate strength and firmness, and continued afterwards to be strengthened, to the patient's inexpressible comfort and joy, and to her own and her friends' overwhelming gratitude.

“May we all be more deeply and abidingly thankful for that power, and wisdom, and goodness, and love, displayed in the formation and preservation of the body; this earthly house of our tabernacle, of which we know not one half its wonders; of which they who know the most are often too unmindful; and of which they who know the most, and feel the deepest, are the most feelingly convinced of their ignorance, and comparative imbecility; as well as of the uniformity, and

universality of the Divine superintendence ; they feel themselves surrounded on every side by mysteries which they are unable to fathom, and with deep and reverential awe exclaim, ‘ How wonderful are Thy ways ; and Thy paths are past finding out.’ ”

CHAPTER X.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE BODY, EXERTED OVER
THE MANIFESTATIONS OF MIND.

It only now remains, for the completion of our design, to consider a little the influence of bodily structure and function upon the manifestations of mind.

We must here notice, in the first place, the great physical distinctions which have been called temperaments, and which have commonly been classified as the sanguineous, the choleric, or bilious, the lymphatic, and the nervous. We shall speak of these *individually*; but before we do so, we would state, that a pure example of any one of these temperaments is a rare phenomenon, so that in the description which follows, it is the exception to character, not character itself, which is described; for in actual, individual life, it will be ascertained, that there is a mixture of these arbitrary distinctions, in very different proportions however, and always leaving a preponderance, which gives its tinge to the manifestations of mind, so that it may

be said, one of these great distinctions of temperament presides, however variable the combination, however different the proportion, and however characteristic the peculiar influence upon bodily and mental manifestation.

We shall now notice the physical characteristics of these several divisions of bodily peculiarity, viz. the sanguineous, the choleric, the nervous, and the lymphatic.

a. The *sanguineous* temperament is strongly marked by a florid complexion, fair skin, blue eyes, light hair generally, and oftentimes red, an animated countenance, bright red lips, an active and easily-excited circulation, muscular fibres, firm without rigidity, and elastic without feebleness.

The disorders of such a constitution are usually characterised by high action, accompanied by a certain degree of power to support it: fever is easily lighted up; and inflammatory action is induced with considerable violence, and sustained, too, with no slight degree of pertinacity. In fact, wherever arterial action is concerned, there will it be found to a very considerable extent; and as it is accompanied with power, it will bear exhausting remedies *better* than any other of the peculiar constitutions to be described. There is more tendency to considerable disorder of function than to disease of structure; and the conservative re-action of nature is very strongly marked in this temperament.

With regard to the mental manifestations, the same general law will be observable; there will be

found to be much action, with proportioned power to support it; the impressions received by such a constitution will be of a lively character; its intuitive conception of the relation of things will be very easy: it will possess a good and faithful memory, a rich and lively imagination, great benevolence of disposition, a fondness for society, an equal desire to benefit others, and to be benefited by them; and a very considerable degree of ardour in the pursuit of any object which has excited its interest and attention.

On the other hand, it must be allowed, that it possesses evils arising from the same source. It is irascible, easily provoked, and given to high expressions of anger,—to thoughts, and words, and perhaps even deeds of violence, which a sober judgment would disapprove; the impressions of a graver cast are too transient, and there is a great disposition to the volatile; even the deep impressions of sorrow exhaust themselves in vehement expressions or passionate exclamations; the bitterness of unmeasured and unhallowed grief, passes away with this expression; and the April shower, however violent, soon gives place to the calm and the sunshine of its own self-complacency; it is very ardent in pursuit, but it is uncertain in its effort, and inconstant in perseverance; that which has engaged the whole soul for a short time, passes away, and gives place to *new*, and *because new*, a more attractive source of interest: the same is to be observed in the relations of friendship; the vehement ardour of the day subsides into a coolness

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and indifference, which is exceedingly painful, because the high action has exhausted itself, and requires the stimulus of a fresh object, in order to its being recruited. The same remark may be made of its hatred; it is a transient passion—violent while it lasts, but soon passing away.

The mental, or rather cerebral diseases, will take on the same form; they too will be of a violent character, and mania, rather than melancholy or hypochondriasis, will give the prevailing tinge to its wanderings. There will be a certain degree of joyousness, of self-contentment, and self-esteem, about all its delirations; a consciousness of dignity, an impatience of command, an assumption of superior knowledge, either delegated from the Deity, or perhaps emanating from *Deity itself*, which, with its frequent changefulness, will strongly characterise the peculiarities of this *uncompounded* temperament. Its influence on the expression of religious feeling will be hereafter considered.

This, as well as every other peculiarity of temperament, is constantly found in combination with those of a different *caste*, and these will be modified according to the greater or less amount of that infusion.

But we notice, secondly, *the bilious*, or choleric temperament. Now, wherever this is the prevailing peculiarity, there will be found, a dark complexion—dark hair—dark eyes—penetrating look—a dry skin—strong muscular fibres, but not so elastic as in the former; not disposed to, or capable of, the same amount of exertion; yet perhaps en-

during longer a sustained effort, without giving way so readily, and without the same amount of constitutional suffering.

A great deal of mental power, and the best literary characters, will be found in this class ; because there belongs to it a greater degree of constancy and perseverance of pursuit ; and because the secret of success consists in persevering against present difficulties, and only looking upon them as stimuli to call up the degree of energy necessary to overcome them. There is not here, the same easy conception of the relations of things, but there is a deeper acquaintance with their hidden connexions, a greater seeking-out of their intimate points of approximation, which, after all, constitutes the deepest knowledge of things as they are ; the memory may not be so quick and easy of application ; but it is ultimately more distinct and vivid, though exercised over a few objects : there is more attention to the society of books than of persons ; and the attractions of the library are greater than those of the drawing-room ; there may not be the same fervour of affection, but there is a greater degree of constancy in its exercise, and a greater amount of self-denial, in order to do good to its object ; there may not be the same vehement expressions of grief, but there is a deeper sorrow ; there may not be the same *social attractions* about the person, but he is more to be relied upon in every situation of life, as the man of unshaken firmness, of unbending principle, of uncompromising rectitude,—just in every feeling and action ;

cautious, it is true, in forming his determinations, but not afterwards to be bought from his purpose by *smiles*, or swerved away from the line of rectitude by all the frowns and obloquy which may be heaped upon him ; being, in the truest sense of the word, *courageous*, because he has the courage to stem the torrent of evil—to run counter to prevailing fashion—to yield up himself and all that he has, as a willing hostage to right, rather than be tempted to do what is wrong. It generally happens in public life, that the largest amount of eloquence, connected with a preponderating share of perseverance and fortitude, is to be found in the choleric temperament.

Yet this so happily-adjusted body has also *its evils*. It is peculiarly liable to what are called *bilious* headaches, which may perhaps sometimes be dependent upon the stomach, but which much more frequently *arise* from the *head*, while the stomach only sympathises, or suffers secondarily from its affection. It is not high arterial action, which is commonly to be met with in this temperament, but generally congestion—a sluggish action in the veins of the different organs of the body, and particularly of the head. The constitution will not bear the same active remedies, as in the sanguineous temperament ; yet, if properly treated, can better sustain the repeated impulses of morbid tendency, and rise superior to them. It is more liable than the former to chronic disorder, inasmuch as venous congestion takes place slowly—at first, without exciting much notice or general disturbance ; and

thus the way is prepared for alteration of structure, or slow disorganisation, before almost that it is cognisable ; it is more liable to disorders of the digestive organs, and they persist, oftentimes, with a great degree of obstinacy.

With regard to its morbid manifestations of mind, it must be allowed, that here also there are evils to be combated. It is true, that such a character is not easily given to change ; is not to be tossed about by every fashionable alteration of opinion, or by any change of personal association ; but then it is liable to prejudice ; its conscientious belief may become bigotry ; its firmness, obstinacy ; its caution, suspicion ; its reserve, a concentration into self, which may be very unamiable, and which may curtail its usefulness. So also, its courage may become temerity ; its perseverance, the foolhardy pursuit of objects which are unattainable, or which, if attainable, are only to be reached by an effort disproportioned to their value ; the fondness for literary pursuit rather than society, is apt, too, to make a selfish character, and to take off the man from the *duties of action* to the pleasures of abstraction ; from the realities of life, to the enjoyment of its own little world ; that “ kingdom,” which has been poetically described, as fitted for the presidency of mind. There is also, perhaps, too great a disposition to find fault with the world—to complain of its treatment—to be captious over its dealings—to take umbrage upon slight causes—to be suspicious of evil, where no evil is intended—and to imagine that it is *unjust*, when, in reality, the

difference of thought arises from a want of accordance in the differing physical temperaments, and from a want of unity in the separate views, and thoughts, and habits of action.

In mental disease, *this*, which is perhaps the first germ of disorder, shows itself more strongly : the joyousness of the self-conceited happy maniac, the prophet, the apostle, the Son of God himself, is not here to be met with : but the first striking characteristic trait is the disposition to gloom—to look at the dark side of every thing—to be surrounded by *accumulated ills*—to be the sport of evil spirits and evil thoughts—to be abandoned of God—to become subject to voices, visions, dreams, &c.—to have incurred the wrath of Heaven—to be pursued by vengeance which cannot be escaped—to be followed by enemies, slanderers, murderers—to be weary of life—to bear it along as an intolerable burden—and, finally, to escape from its present evils, and the still greater evils of futurity, by recklessly and knowingly, yet insanely, plunging into these greater evils, by a hopeless act of self-destruction. Yet such is the history—the melancholy history of the choleric patient, among whom are too frequently to be found the hypochondriacs, the monomaniacs, and the suicides of our day.

Most remarkable is this tendency to suicide in the hypochondriac, and in the man who is such with a choleric temperament ; and we would state this, not as a support to the absurd doctrine so frequently held in our coroner's courts, where the absurdity almost universally prevails of finding the cause of

the patient's death, without one tittle of evidence, without even inquiring after it, and very generally with a refusal to inquire after it: when lately this absurdity was heightened, within the author's own knowledge, by the jury finding a verdict, not only without evidence as to the cause of death, but without one shadow of evidence as to the identity of the supposed party, touching whom the inquest was said to have been held. "O what does it signify?" said the foreman, "he will be identified to-morrow." I repeat, that I do not state this in support of the absurd doctrine so frequently laid down, that a person who commits suicide *must* be insane, because no man in his senses would commit such an act. But I state the fact as a very remarkable one, that when the organ of mind is diseased, particularly in a choleric temperament, the tendency is largely developed, to produce *self-disorganisation* of that very organ so disordered: and certainly this is a proof, if such were required, of insanity. This, however, is widely different from that state of things, in which he is brought to *moral* despair, by acts and conduct of his own, or when he has lived a life of opposition to every moral motive, and religious sanction,—a life of self-gratification, without reference to social or relative obligation—alike forgetful of the laws of God and man, and when, with a worn-out constitution and a ruined fortune, he perceives nothing but misery in the world, and futurity is a *blank*—if not a hideous yawning of fearful and remorseless uncertainty; or when a man has lived a life of thoughtless, selfish extra-

vagance in the world, and has beggared himself and his family by his follies, and sees (too late to retrieve his fortunes) inevitable ruin before him ; or when, after a life of diligent prosperity in business, some hidden reverse of fortune places him in the hands of merciless creditors, and he has no higher moral or religious principle to fall back upon ; or when a young person has deviated from the paths of virtue, and “ finds, too late, that men betray,” and cannot bear up under the finger of scorn, and looks to the horror of the shame before man, rather than to repentance before God ; in all these cases, suicide is not insanity. Granted that it is false reasoning, because the proper doctrines and motives are not called into action ; but it is a wilful error ; it is the false reasoning, of continuing alien from God, as all their life has been, and of finishing that life of forgetfulness, by an act of rebellious defiance against *Him*.

c. But we pass on to notice the *lymphatic temperament*. The great characteristic of this peculiar style of constitution, (and unhappily it is not infrequent,) is the prevalence of the white fluids, and the general feebleness of the system. It is commonly marked by a pale and thick skin ; by great softness of the muscular fibre ; by thick lips, which give the appearance of the mouth being only half closed ; by soft hair, generally of a light flaxen hue ; by clear, soft, languid, blue eyes,—and by a feebleness of character, which extends throughout every department of the mechanism. This constitution is peculiarly liable to consumption, glan-

dular affections, atrophy, and all the varied forms in which scrofula proclaims its ravages and its power.

Hence, in all the actions, and in all the disorders of the lymphatic temperament, great feebleness, and utter inability to support action, are the prominent features ; the system possesses very little conservative energy ; and when once morbid action has commenced, there is little chance of arresting it ; it will generally proceed till it has involved the patient in more or less of misery. There would seem to be a kind of exemption from these laws, in some very brilliant children, who come out as prodigies of intellect : we hear of them as evincing mental talents of the first order, and presently we hear of them no more. And why is it ? The organ, stretched beyond its elastic power, has given way ; and fatuity has been the consequence : or if the circulation of the brain, rather than the nervous structure itself, has been the seat of morbid action, the little creatures have fallen victims to hydrocephalus ; so truly may it have been said, that “ man cometh forth as a flower, and is cut down ;” his early life was full of promise, but the night of the grave, or the indistinct twilight of idiocy, has shrouded him for ever from our view ; we hope only to breathe a purer atmosphere, where there will be no danger of destroying the animal machinery by intellectual labour.

But it may be said, that although this precocious talent may have been overdone by injudicious stimulation, yet that, under happier auspices, a different result would have been obtained ; and

so, doubtless, it would to a certain extent, but not entirely; the mischief has consisted, not simply in over-stimulation, but in the inherent feebleness of the nervous fibre, thus affording another elucidation of the principle, that action and power are by no means coincident properties, that they are seldom found together, and that the presence of the former is by no means a guarantee for the existence of the latter, but rather is an indication that it does *not exist*; the deep waters of intellect are calm and undisturbed, but are capable of bearing on their bosom a large freight of mental wealth, while the shallow stream of noisy manifestation ends where it begins, in the bubble of powerless exhibition. This, therefore, does not form an exception to the general law of feebleness, which pervades the lymphatic temperament, and under which it so frequently sinks to a premature grave.

With regard to the mental manifestations of the lymphatic temperament, the same law will influence their developement, viz. *action* without power to support it; if called upon for much exertion, the mind will wear out itself and its habitation in a short time; and thus, it is frequently said that the mind has worn out the *body*. If so, the following is the probable rationale. In the lymphatic temperament, there is more action than power; therefore too much nervous energy is expended upon action; enough cannot be spared for the functions of interior life, and principally for those of nutrition and sanguification; the body is not nourished, red blood is produced in still

diminishing quantities; the supply of nervous energy from its great emporium, is still further lessened, and its distribution still more curtailed; more and more disorder is produced, and the weakest organ or the most oppressed gives way, and perhaps gives way irretrievably; and very frequently it is the brain, the organ of mind, which is first distressed, and then destroyed.

Still further, with regard to the passions and affections, *action without power* is again the characteristic; and, therefore, in all these relations, the flame of life is fast consumed; the heart exhausts the head, and destroys the integrity of the system; there is a certain vehemence of passion and affection which cannot be sustained; and is, therefore, not to be relied upon for continuance, where it is desirable to remain; nor for its permanence, where it is desirable that it should cease; as, for instance, in *anger*, which may be vehement, but will not be long continued, and the offended party will be easily soothed into forgiveness. This proceeds from two causes; first, the inability of the lymphatic temperament to *maintain action* under any circumstances; and next, the impression of this law upon the nervous system in particular, the organ appointed for the manifestation of mind. In mental diseases there will be found a greater number of fools, epileptics, idiots, and of those who, not coming under either of these classes, may still be considered as helpless, feeble, with limited manifestations of mind, and of those who are rather below than above mediocrity, as regards the average

of intellectual calibre, in the lymphatic than in any other temperament.

d. But we notice, lastly, some of the peculiarities of the nervous temperament. The predominance of the nervous system, to such an extent as to constitute this form of character, is to be found in union with each of the former states. Great susceptibility is the chief property of this condition ; only the *mode of that susceptibility* will receive a tinge from the greater or less prevalence of the three formerly described constitutions. In the nervous temperament the patient is generally *thin* ; for there is too great restlessness of action, too great mobility of system, to admit of the deposit of fatty matter ; there is generally very little colour about the countenance, and perhaps this is accounted for, by the fact, that, although a rush of blood to that countenance is easily occasioned by nervous emotion, yet this is only momentary ; the blood rushes back to its citadel, and leaves the countenance deadly pale ; while the general tendency of nervous patients, is to accumulate blood about the heart, and therefore to deprive the surface of its colour. This, too, may be supported by the delicacy of the muscular fibre of nervous temperaments ; and the muscular fibres of the heart, partaking that delicacy,—the blood, if *quickly*, is not *energetically* sent round the system, because the heart wants *contractile power*. The features are generally animated ; but it is not the cheerful, equable animation of the sanguineous temperament ; there is a fickle brilliancy about its light, as the

sun's rays are sometimes seen through an unclouded but a vapoury atmosphere: there is a great degree of mobility and changefulness about the countenance; its expression is most varied and intelligent; but there is an air of languor, and even of occasional melancholy, about its expressiveness, which gives it a very distinctive mark; and the changes of this expression are exceedingly rapid, so that the entire character is known by its susceptibility to impression—by the non-continuance of one state—by the frequent change of emotion, and by the great mobility of the animal system, under the influence of such morbid change.

After all, perhaps this great *mobility* of the system is more characteristic of the nervous temperament, for it is very uniformly and strongly marked both in health and disease. The influence of emotion may be sudden, and may appear to be very deep; but it is quickly superseded by the developement of any new emotion, this again to be easily displaced by the third succeeding wave. This is seen in a very remarkable manner, in disorders of the nervous system; there is oftentimes no possibility of catching or detaining the symptoms; but while one set of functions is disturbed, and we are considering the rationale of morbid action, in order to draw the curative indications; even before our eyes, these symptoms have vanished, and another series of disordered actions has commenced in some other, and perhaps very distant part of the animal economy. This is remarkably shown in the protean forms of

hysteria; the heart, the lungs, the muscles of respiration, the stomach, the bowels, the head, the muscles of organic life, those of locomotion, &c., are all interchangeably affected; the patient laughs and cries vehemently almost in the same instant of time—the ideas are perverted—observations are made which are utterly alien to the healthy character, and are prompted by the nature of the organ, which happens to be at the moment the primary cause of irritation to the brain; or, at all events, occupying the most prominent part in the disordered movements.

The disturbance of the nervous system may produce, [simply, a variety of cramps or spasms, disorders of breathing, of digestion, and of various other functions, which may be disturbed, or altogether suspended; but it may also in this form give rise to *tic-douloureux*, and the severe forms of nervous malady.

Still further, there may be great disturbance of the nervous system at its centre; and catalepsy, epilepsy, the appearance of ghosts, visions, revelations from God, communications from the evil one, and the various forms of insanity, are the consequence. Even here, amidst these deepening shades of malady, the liability to change, the great mobility of the system, and the consequent alteration of appearances, is very characteristic. The phases of to-day are not traceable to-morrow, and have given way to a third set of phenomena on the succeeding day. In fact, versatility is stamped upon all the movements of the nervous tempera-

ment, whether natural or disordered ; and this, together with great susceptibility to impression, and the rapid and powerful developement and manifestation of emotion, constitute its essential character.

Now these several marked temperaments, and all the lesser differences which exist from the interlacing of their minor peculiarities, exert an influence upon all the manifestations of healthy mind, and give the tinge to what is called *character*, which really means the assemblage of mental phenomena, variously grouped according to the greater or less prevalence of any one of those peculiarities ; *how much greater, then, will be their influence*, when the entire machinery is overturned by sickness—when every function is perverted, every organ irritated, and the balance of healthy mental manifestation is destroyed.

One cannot wholly pass over the state of sleep, as a bodily condition which largely influences the manifestations of mind. When sleep approaches, it will first be found that attention flags ; the student is compelled to go over again the same ground in order to catch the idea of his author. In an instant more, the mind wanders ; broken, irregular, and disconnected images are presented, and unless superseded by some new impression, sleep immediately ensues. In this state, all the mental manifestations are laid aside ; and, although the mind *may* go on working, its operations are not discernible. It may be said, indeed, that mental operations go on in *dreaming* ; but a little attention

will show, that dreams are not the result of *mental operations*, but rather of cerebral action, when, by some changed circumstances, it has escaped the control of the presiding mind. For if it be allowed, as it is on all hands, that *mind*, whatever it may be, is superior to body, it will follow, that mental operations, if conducted during a state when the body is not subservient to their influence, will not be impaired by this abstraction, but will be rather improved by it. And then, when the character of dreams is estimated; when it is found that they are full of monstrous, and perverted, and impossible situations; that they observe no order or method, in the concentration of circumstances; that they are full of anachronisms; that time and space are annihilated; that the actions of years are grouped into a few seconds; that they abound in images of the most incongruous and absurd description; that they do not represent the character, but are often diametrically opposed to it; that the nonsense they contain, would be a disgrace to the most starveling intellect; when all these things are considered, it cannot but be allowed, that dreaming is not a mental operation, that it is a bodily agency, the action of brain when dissociated from the presiding mind by the influence of sleep; a purely bodily condition in which are suspended all the functions but those which are necessary to the continuance of life; thus exhibiting one of the modes of influence of the body over the manifestations of mind. The actions indispensable to the sustentation of life are continued,

but those required for the manifestation of mind are laid at rest.

There are few persons who have observed at all, who have not observed the changes which take place, in the course of time, in their opinions—in their modes and habits of thought and action—in the relative importance which they assign to different objects—in their estimate of human action and passion—and in the amount of interest which is claimed by the various circumstances and situations of life. So much is this the case, that it is a common though an erroneous observation, that man gets an entire change of himself, once in *seven* years. Commonly-received errors have generally *some* foundation in truth, and this is one of such errors ; it is an error to assert that this change happens at any determinate period ; for the process is a gradual one, and is constantly, though slowly, going on ; but it is *true that it is going on*, though so slowly, that the change is only perceptible by instituting a comparison between two somewhat distant periods of life. Again, it has been said, that adult life may be divided into three ages—that of love, ambition, and avarice ; and in this there is a great deal of truth : we only require these truths in the present instance, in order to show the general belief in this doctrine of change in the manifestations of mind. And this change occurs chiefly in the manifesting organ ; and is a proof of the influence of body upon mental agency.

At first, in very early life the brain is incapable

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of more than a very little intellectual effort ; and having few instincts, the offspring of man is peculiarly feeble and helpless ; and with all his high future destiny, and with all his larger brain, and all his capacities, he possesses fewer manifestations of mind, than the young of the inferior animals ; a fact which is inexplicable, except by supposing that the brain is prepared for the service of a super-added principle—a spiritual and immortal principle. At this early period, even the reports of the senses are not to be relied upon, except as the report of *one* is corrected or confirmed by that of *others*—a plain proof that the mind does not reside in the senses, and that, although our ideas are obtained through this medium, it is only by association and comparison that they will become data for future thought or action, emotion or passion. The senses, then, must be educated, or instructed ; that is, their *nerves* must be taught to review and to adjust the corrected impressions. But the nerves are *mere carriers* to the brain, and an extension of its range of power ; so that if the nerves *require* to be *instructed*, so must the brain, in which they terminate. And, therefore, the peculiarities of the bodily structure will exercise their power over their primary impressions or movements as well as on their secondary affinities and associations, and their intellectual or affective results. The influence of the body over the mind in its early developement, its maturity, decay, and decrepitude, will be considerable ; at first, partaking of all the elasticity, the lightness, the gaiety of youth ; then exhibiting

the firmness, and the strength, and action of early manhood ; again retaining its firmness, but losing its elasticity and buoyancy ; and then beginning to show symptoms of the decay, which is eventually to terminate in that decrepitude, when the grasshopper shall be a burden. We have already spoken of the exception to this general law, where it does exist ; it is enough, therefore, for our present purpose, that through all the several stages of existence, the body exerts a considerable influence over the manifestations of mind, even in its healthiest condition ; and it need not be said, how much more this is the case, if the body be disordered, and the phenomena of sudden ailment be superadded to this constant *natural* influence. Then the actions of brain and the manifestations of mind are overturned ; so that perhaps an *entire*, at all events a *great*, perversion of thought or feeling, of action or passion, occurs ; that state which we have mentioned as belonging to approaching sleep, is first discovered—brain acting independently of mind, only that the images are perverted, and become liable to all kinds of morbid manifestation.

Not only does the peculiar temperament manifest and display its characteristic traits ; but all the mental manifestations are influenced by physical causes. Thus the intellectual faculties will be found to predominate in one, and in another the affective ; memory will be quick and evanescent in one, slow and retentive in another, quick and yet abiding in a third ; the attention will be easily

directed, or impossible to command; association will be brilliant and correct—brilliant and fanciful,—or slow and yet most erroneous in different individuals, because founded on imaginary points of resemblance which have no existence in truth; and in a fourth person it may be slow yet sound, where it has been worked out with great labour and anxiety; and all these varieties may be *predicated* by an observer, who has at once the intuitive power of discovering the secret springs of action, and of knowing what will be the natural consequence of any given combination of tendencies, which arise out of *physical temperament*.

This influence of body upon mind, though confessedly great, has been sometimes represented as *greater* than it really is. Thus it has been said, that *the mind* is in the *hand*, and that there it originates the *motions* which attach to that organ. But this is untrue; take for example the familiar instance of the hand as the organ of prehension, and let its object be to take up an orange from the table: there is no origination of the mental desire for the orange *in the hand*; on the contrary, the eye is first directed towards it; the impression of the existence of the orange is made upon the optic nerve, and conveyed to the brain; the idea of an orange is thus conceived in the mind, and by association with previous impressions received through the sense of taste, a knowledge of its properties is awakened; the desire after its possession is kindled, and unless there be some opposing moral motive, (as that of the orange not being ours by right,)

the emotion of desire for its possession, is followed by a mandatory notice sent down to the hand to take it; and then, in obedience *to*, and under the immediate influence of, presiding mind, the hand does take it; there being *no mind in the hand*, but that hand being acted upon by the brain as the organ of mind through the nerves which supply it with the power of voluntary motion.

Too great a degree of mechanical agency has been ascribed to *mind*; as, for instance, it has been said, that for want of due *caution*, the mind actually *breaks up or rends* its own animal machinery in the same way as bones or muscles have been occasionally broken or ruptured by intense muscular action. But this is not true, in the first place; for the symptoms of sensorial torpor, which arise as a consequence of cerebral over-action, are *not those which are produced* by the lesion of nervous fibre; the latter is followed by distinct paralysis, while the former does not *produce* any such symptoms, although they may occasionally be found *co-existent*. In fact, the brain is not an organ, of which we can speak *mechanically* at all; and if we do so, it must be merely an account of the poverty of language, not possessing words to express our ideas, and therefore employing those which are only *weakly, because analogically*, applicable, in order to express things of which we know not the ultimate rationale. Thus we are unacquainted with the *precise character* of nervous fibre, and cannot, therefore, tell how far it may be capable of extension, elasticity, motion, and *other*

properties of matter ; and, therefore, it is unwise to talk of *rending a machinery*, of which we know not even that the term *machine* is at all applicable to its nature. And then arises the fact, that the symptoms of *overdone brain* are not those of mechanical injury.

It is difficult, nay, impossible, to say, *à priori*, *what* the brain *can bear* ; since one brain can sustain a degree of effort and continued exertion without injury, under which another sinks ; and like every other organ and function of the animal economy, it is capable of having its power of action immensely increased by exercise ; an effort which it can barely sustain now, will, after a little while, be supported without consciousness of its being an effort ; and so power and action will go on increasing, and mutually creating each other up to a certain point ; and it is not until exercise is followed by exhaustion, that it begins to partake a morbid character. Even then, it is not the organ itself which first suffers, but some other organ or function of the body, the stomach, the heart, &c., digestion, assimilation, sanguification, and so forth ; it is then that *the brain* gets a *deficient* or *deteriorated* supply of less-perfectly animalized blood, than it should do ; *itself* becomes uneasy, restless, irritable ; the sleep is disturbed or oppressed, generally the former, and the brain is not sufficiently recruited for the daily purposes of life. Nevertheless, *these* functions *are* carried on ; and therefore, every day its capital of strength is diminished ; it has less and less power of action ;

one or another of its actions fail, and generally *volition*, because this requires the most active state of obedience to the presiding mind; and now, morbid action has actually commenced, and unless timely arrested, it will go on till the organ ceases to be capable of intellectual employment, or it will approach the confines of idiocy; or insanity and perverted manifestations will follow; or it will become torpid, and incapable of its usual functions, rarely, indeed, but perhaps occasionally, being subject to apoplexy or palsy. But these are rare, and even where they do exist, cannot be ascribed to the mechanical agency of mind, tearing up and destroying its own machinery. It is not, therefore, just so to speak; and it is very necessary to make accurate distinctions in a matter which is so much the subject of dispute.

The contrary has, however, been supported by an argument drawn from the muscular power frequently exhibited, during the paroxysms of delirium, mania, hysteria, epilepsy, and other analogous conditions; and these muscular movements have been ascribed to the *inherent mechanical force of mind*. But this is not *true*, because,

First, no effort of mind, however great, produced under circumstances of unwonted excitement—say under an impression of the fear of death, and the *only mode* of escape being by some extraordinary effort,—*ever did*, or *ever could* give rise to muscular actions of such vehemence as those to which we have alluded; therefore no mind, by the highest effort of the will, stimulated to the utmost by the

greatest possible excitement, *can* produce equivalent movements:

Secondly, the movements in question are independent of mind; for if dependent upon mind, they must have an object! Now, however much it has been asserted, and justly too, that mental emotion will occasion these paroxysms indirectly, yet it never has been propounded by the most hardy controversialist, that the muscular efforts of delirium, mania, hysteria, and epilepsy, are *always* with design; they may be sometimes, as when the maniac struggles to release himself from confinement,—but they are *generally automatic*, having no particular design, and therefore independent of mind; for in order to their being mental, there must be a motive, and if a motive, some end proposed to be accomplished; and,

Thirdly, while *no* effort of mind could produce these movements, and while they *are produced* independent of mind, they are really and in effect, occasioned by irritation of the nervous fibre; this, perhaps, being sometimes produced by the disorder of some organ at a distance; and at others, by an affection of the brain itself, that brain always having, in each case, too great a predisposition to easy disturbance. It is clear, that hysteria and epilepsy may be *feigned*; and thus it would seem as if they might be produced by mind; but the *genuine* is easily distinguished from the *spurious* paroxysm; and the fact of this failure of the assumed state, is really a *proof* of the doctrine we have advanced.

But if these disordered movements of the muscles are sometimes the consequence of sympathetic irritation, in some of the organs or functions of interior or organic life; it follows, that the nerves which supply these viscera, are in communication with the brain; that their irritation, though not sensibly felt in their extremities, is impressed upon the sentient organ; and that this irritation is communicated to the voluntary muscles, in a way to us *inexplicable*, if we are required to trace the links of causation, but which, notwithstanding, sufficiently demonstrates the presiding influence of one grand principle over the whole, so that no one part can suffer, without producing various *sympathetic* sufferings.

It may be well to mention here, an instance of nervous pain produced by this irritation; take tooth-ache for example; the pain shall begin in a tooth—shall be cognizably dependent upon a tooth—shall be cured by the removal of a tooth; and yet, after it has lasted a certain length of time, where is the pain felt? Not in the tooth, but at the angle of the jaw—the side of the ear—the anterior part of the ear particularly—the temple—the side of the head—even behind the ear,—in fact, successively in every twig of facial nervous distribution: and the sufferer, holding his breath in order to relieve the pain, is another wonderful proof of this distant association of nervous influence, in consequence of the immediate connexion of these nerves with the function of respiration.

The law of the nervous system, through which,

pain produced by the irritation of the extremities of nerves, is *felt* not in these particular fibres, but at the origin of their branches, or in some other distinctly-connected twigs, is never to be forgotten ; because it may serve to account for many seeming anomalies, and will at all events silence an antagonist, who seeks to get rid of some of the phenomena of nervous influence, by saying, that the brain is not *conscious* of irritations which take place in the extremities of nerves, especially those of organic life : and thus seeking to dissociate the one from the other, which nature has linked together in a compact *indissoluble*, except with life.

And as if Nature had not taken a sufficiency of care under ordinary circumstances, to keep up this uniformity of action and passion, and to preserve every part of the system in one harmonious whole, she has specially provided for this purpose, *one nerve*—the *great sympathetic*—in order to sustain this inter-communication between every part of the animal economy ; a messenger of good offices from the one to the other, giving notice of all the changes in its several departments, and accomplishing the great purpose of preserving every part of this complicated machinery in *one whole* ; thus proving, that Nature has taken the greatest possible pains to preserve life, and making it wonderful, not that life lasts so long as it *does*, but that it terminates so soon.

The important agency of the great sympathetic, affords an illustration of the fact, that the value of the function of a nerve does not depend upon its

size : for although it is termed the *great sympathetic*, on account of its important office, and the magnitude of its connexions, it is in point of fact very small—perhaps the very smallest of the body, considering the length of its course, its multiplied offices, the number of organs to which it gives twigs, its connexion with the ganglionic system, and the complete dependence upon it for the harmonies of life,—the master-key, which serves to unlock all the rest. The importance of this fact is still further illustrated by the phrenic nerve—very minute, yet long in its course—and given off early, as if to maintain the easiest possible connexion with the brain, and so distributed to the diaphragm, and connected with the function of respiration, that any pressure upon it puts an end instantaneously to that function, and produces immediate death.

We notice however next, that *changes* in the *internal condition* of the viscera, operate powerfully in modifying the nature of our mental manifestations. Now, this is really a fact, which is almost universally admitted, though perhaps little thought is given to the rationale of the process by which it is effected. Man is very fond of excusing his own delinquencies,—his ill-temper, his moodiness, his irritability, his absurd sensitiveness, his moroseness, his captiousness, and all the thousand forms of HOME disagreeables, and placing them to the score of his stomach, his liver, his digestion, his bile, &c. &c., though he will be seldom found to make these excuses for the same failings in others; and the little

underlined monosyllable just noted, requires some more especial attention, since it is *at home* that the peculiarities are seen, and these excuses made. Abroad, man is all smiles, and kindness, and benevolence ; and, generally speaking, interior life does not disturb his apparent good-humour. Now this is *not, that the same influence* is not continued and exerted ; but that the will is called in to resist its agency. If so, the will *may be*, and *ought to be*, exerted at home as well as abroad : and if under given circumstances the mind shows itself capable of being superior to the tyranny of these organic suggestions, it is bound to be so at all times ; it is bound to call in its own master principles to supersede these morbid tendencies, and to be *at home what he is abroad*. Nothing can get rid of his responsibility ; and as it has been before stated, so it is now re-asserted, that presiding mind is the supreme governor ; and that the brain and nervous system are the servants of that principle ; and so long as man remains in a state of society, he must maintain this supremacy.

This by no means supersedes the fact, that irritations of the ganglionic viscera do modify our sensations greatly ; do exert an influence upon the manifestations of mind ; and do tend very much to pervert them. Every one is sensible of this : during the process of digestion, if healthy, there is an inaptitude for cerebral occupation ; and if unhealthy, a variety of uneasy phenomena are produced, so as in aggravated instances to occasion great perversion of action, as in the visions of the

celebrated Nicolai, and the daily sensations of less celebrated personages. We are all sensible how different is our impression of the same circumstances, events, and things, under different states of organic irritation, insomuch that we can scarcely believe them to be the same. This state is generally accompanied by uneasy slumbers, by dreams, nightmare, &c., all of which indicate irritation of some portion of the cerebral fibre, to such an extent, that when dissociated during sleep from the immediate influence of presiding mind, they fall at once into perverted action. And this is that minor state of irritation, which, in a more aggravated form, dissociates the brain from its governing principle, and produces insanity, which is only a darker cloud of that early cerebral irritation, which is exhibited in disordered temper, or captious feeling. Insanity we believe to be, very generally, a primary affection of the brain ; but it has been shown in some instances to be secondary, and to be the result of accumulated irritations, which *commence* in organic life, and which at first merely sour the temper. Hence, the importance of arresting those lesser irritations, by calling in the aid of good principle to extinguish and supersede them in their very earliest stage, while yet they do not possess the power and combination of rebellious subjects.

It may be asked, perhaps, why the nerves of organic life have been thus made to communicate with the brain, when their agency seems only productive of disturbance. The truth is, we only *see*

the *occasional* disturbing agency, and do not perceive the *constant* harmonizing influence. The reason of this communication is, however, obvious ; it is *conservative*, in order that the mind should become acquainted with the wants of interior life, and should minister to all its great functions. If this were not the case, man, with his few and feeble instincts, would be helpless indeed ; and it is in consequence of his high position in the animal creation—of his accountability—and of his being here in a probationary state, that this connexion proves a source of trial to him, and an occasion for drawing out his principles, and throwing him upon himself, and his spiritual resources.

This, again, leads to the consideration of the *vis medicatrix*. A great deal has been said and written, and absurdly too, on this inherent power of nature, by which she seeks to *repair* injuries which *have been* effected, or to *prevent others* from being produced by certain changes which have taken place in the system. The *absurdity* has arisen from supposing the existence of a kind of archæus, or presiding spirit, which watched over the laws,—aided the intentions,—gave notice of the infraction of these laws, and sought to repair the mischiefs thus occasioned in the animal economy. The absurdity consisted not in the facts which were adduced, but in investing one of nature's laws with a *personality*, and making that an *entity*, which is the mere development of a principle. But the principle exists, and that principle, perhaps, shows forth the wisdom, and the power, and the goodness of the Creator,

more conspicuously than almost any of the other wonders of creation. This is seen in a thousand instances, but we must only mention two or three illustrations.

We will take the familiar arrangement by which food is prevented entering the air passages. It is manifest to reason, how erroneous this must be ; and it is known from experience, that the effect would very generally be fatal. Therefore Nature has provided a valve, which in the act of swallowing covers over the glottis, and effectually prevents any food from entering the trachea. This, then, is Nature's conservative arrangement ; but suppose that, contrary to her intentions, the individual breathes while in the act of swallowing, such breathing lifts the epiglottis ; the closure of the glottis is no longer complete ; some minute portion of food enters that aperture, or perhaps only rests upon its edge ; a morbid condition has been produced : but Nature's conservative power is again called in to repair the mischief, and as everybody knows, violent cough is produced for the purpose of expelling the intruding molecule, nor is peace re-established till such expulsion has been effected. An attentive observer will also discover how *immediately* a secretion of mucus takes place from the inner lining of the trachea, to assist in dislodging the foreign body.

The act of sneezing may be mentioned as another conservative effort, intended to remove from the first air-passages any substance which might prove irritating or deleterious to them. *Coughing should*, and al-

ways *would be* (if the patient were careful and watchful) only another instance of the conservative power of Nature ; it should be only for the purpose of bringing up from the chest or windpipe, that which was oppressing and impeding its functions. Hunger, thirst, and other instinctive properties, are only illustrations of this conservative power, and tend to keep the body from injury. The same effect is seen as a consequence of any accidental læsion, as in the event of a wound, a fracture, or dislocation : in the former, the first effort is to unite the divided parts by an adhesive process, and at once to restore them to continuity ; and where this cannot be effected, to accomplish the same object by the formation of granulations, and then tiling over *these* with fresh skin from the edges of the divided surface. In the case of fracture, a soft medium of re-union is first poured out—in this, bony matter is deposited, and the limb is stronger than ever. In dislocation, the muscles will pull back the bone into its place, if they can, or if assisted by favouring circumstances, *the object of the surgeon* ; and if they cannot effect this restoration, Nature will form a new socket for the joint, and do her very utmost to repair the mischief. And in the event of the death of a bone, she is ever fertile in her resources, and pours out such a quantity of new living bone around the dead portion, as to preserve the continuity and strength of the limb, *while she* is effecting the expulsion of the old dead bone.

We might indefinitely prolong this series of instances, but we shall only give one more illustra-

tion ; and that respects the different habits of *serous* and *mucous* membranes. The habit of *the former* is, under circumstances of irritation, to pour out coagulating lymph, which becomes organised, and glues together the contiguous surfaces ; while the habit of *the latter* is to pour out a secretion of mucus, which does not become organised, but is removed. Now the effect of this law is visible, for instance, in the external and internal covering of the bowel ; the former is a serous, the latter a mucous membrane ; and according to the present arrangement, all goes on well ; but supposing these habits to be changed — the mucous membrane pouring out coagulating lymph, and glueing together the two sides of the cylinder of the bowel, what follows but irrecoverable obstruction and death ; or, on the other side, a large quantity of mucus, or even purulent matter is poured out in the cavity of the abdomen, and death equally ensues. Try the same exchange of function in the chest ; the external covering of the lungs is a serous, the bronchial, or internal covering is a mucous membrane. *Now*, all is well, and under inflammatory action there is a good chance of recovery ; but reverse the fact, and the cells of the lungs, the air-cells, are largely glued together ; or a sudden muco-puriform effusion takes place into the cavity of the chest, and death equally follows in both cases. The same observation may be made of the brain, and other very important organs.

But suppose, under circumstances of inflammation, that suppuration becomes inevitable, still we

see beautifully exemplified, the conservative power of nature; for aware how destructive must be the diffusion of pus among the cells of the cellular membrane, constituting, in fact, one of the most formidable cases of morbid action, what is her object? Why, before the formation of purulent matter, she pours out a considerable quantity of coagulating lymph—glues together a certain number of cells—forms a wall all around the abscess, and then, when it must break, always takes care that it should break upon the surface, and not in the interior; at least, the deviations from this process are only exceptions to the general rule.

From all these illustrations it will be seen, that there is no Archæus, watching over, and directing Nature's operations; nay, more, that the presiding mind has nothing to do with this agency; that it is purely physical—one of the primordial laws for preserving existence, everywhere visible in the animal economy, adapted by Infinite Wisdom to the variety of structure and formation—to the uses and abuses of the several organs of the body. This law, as it affects the manifestations of mind, is also to be traced; and Nature's sweet restorer, sleep, is a beautiful illustration of the care which she has taken of the organ of mind. The brain may become jaded; it is relieved by change of employment; but it may be worn out; its energies may be exhausted beyond the power of change to renovate; and then comes *sleep*, only a very small portion of which is *necessary* to give renewed activity to the organ. And this state, too, becomes irre-

sistible ; its claims will be heard ; and the individual goes to sleep, *standing, walking, talking, &c.*, unless a state of morbid irritability and vigilance has been induced, which is sometimes the case. But *then* disorder has commenced ; and all the frightful progeny of perverted mental manifestation may be brooded over with fostering wing, and nurtured into life and activity ; unless, by the judicious employment of mental and bodily means, the irritated brain shall be appeased, and quiet sleep shall be procured.

There is a state arising from over-goaded brain, which may be called *torpor*, and which produces an effect the reverse of irritability. In the one case, there is a busy and restless desire after action ; in the other rest, absolute rest, seems to be the great good of existence ; in the one case, the mind is wandering after fresh objects of excitement ; in the other, nothing annoys it so much as to be aroused into action at all. The effect is a different one ; but the same result of perverted mental manifestation, tinged by the state of the manifesting organ, will be induced.

A very few words must be given on the subject of the influence of atmospherical changes. That this influence is very considerable, is well known ; but the mode in which it operates is often obscure. It may, however, be *directly* through the influence of certain conditions of the air upon the nervous system itself ; or *indirectly*, through the influence excited upon the *circulating* system ; or the *digestive* function ; or still further by containing

certain *noxious properties* which operate unseen, and which, without occasioning positive disease, do nevertheless interfere with the healthful actions of the economy.

There are some properties of the atmosphere which appear to act *directly* upon the nervous system; as, for instance, in the east wind an influence is produced, which is not to be accounted for wholly by its *dryness*. It is confessedly a drying wind; and we cannot breathe in comfort an atmosphere which does not possess a certain degree of moisture: but there are few persons who have not experienced a nameless *malaise*, on the immediate setting in of an east wind; a dulness, a gloom, a tedium, a discomfort, an inaptitude for cerebral exertion; while, on the contrary, after the blowing of the south-west wind, all these clouds have been dissipated—life has been enjoyed—a certain degree of elasticity has rendered all the ideas buoyant and cheerful—and difficulties have been met and vanquished, under which the mind would *otherwise* have been borne down; and efforts have been made, which could not previously have been sustained; thought has been easy—labour an enjoyment—and success has attended every literary effort: and all this has been irrespective of the amount of atmospherical dryness or humidity—supposing them to have been the same in both cases, and in spite of the increased pressure on the one hand, and the diminished pressure on the other, which always, or almost always, attend interchangeably the east and the south-west winds.

Here, then, is an example of atmospherical influence upon the nervous system. The author has known persons of highly sensitive nerves, in whom these atmospherical vicissitudes would operate a change in the feelings several times in the day, and who could often *predict* changes from their bodily *sensations* which were not otherwise cognisable.

The increased or diminished pressure of the atmosphere will likewise operate upon the circulating system; and so, indirectly as well as directly, upon the brain. The venous circulation of the body is mainly dependent upon the pressure of the atmosphere for its continuance and well-being; and a certain amount of pressure is necessary to ordinary comfort; if that pressure be too great, the blood may be returned too quickly to the heart, and that organ may be oppressed, by the increased demand upon its exertions; and if the pressure be diminished, the venous circulation will become sluggish; congestion will occur in the larger veins; and the right side of the heart will be rendered uneasy—unable fully to disburthen itself of its load; the same effect takes place in the venous sinuses of the brain; the latter organ is supplied with a less highly vitalized blood than it requires; and languor, and feebleness, and disorder are introduced into its functions; besides also, that the brain itself seems to require a certain degree of *pressure* in order to carry on its intellectual functions with ease. This is more fully exemplified by the effect of a highly rarified at-

mosphere upon the circulation—the consequent bursting of the blood-vessels, and the disorder introduced into the cerebral functions. Though these are not felt under ordinary circumstances, in the same way as at the summit of Mont Blanc, still they *are felt*, and produce similar influences, though less in degree.

The dampness or dryness of the atmosphere will operate peculiarly upon the mucous membranes of the body, as the skin, the lungs, the throat, the stomach, the bowels. In either case, great discomfort is produced; if there be too great dryness, the skin is parched—respiration is uneasy—digestion is difficult—the bowels are constipated; and, on the contrary, if there be an excess of moisture, the skin is relaxed—the lungs are oppressed—digestion is imperfectly performed—the bowels are worried—and the general system feels feeble and languid; and through this channel, the circulation of the blood is altered—nutrition is impaired—nervous expenditure exceeds the supply—and the brain seems inadequate to its mental efforts. Now, though we cannot alter the qualities of the atmosphere, we may guard against its morbid impression; and from what has been written, many useful hints may be gathered with regard to clothing, the temperature of rooms, their relative dryness or dampness, exercise, food, &c. In respect of temperature, it should be mentioned, that heat exhausts, while cold accumulates nervous irritability; and the object is to prevent an excess of either the one or the other state; for if nervous

energy be exhausted, the brain is enfeebled ; and if too much accumulated, it loses its elasticity, and is unable to employ what it possesses ; torpor is produced from this “ *embarras des richesses* ;” and this sensorial torpor may not only interfere with the cerebral processes, but may even destroy life.

From all this it will be seen, how largely these varying conditions of the atmosphere *may*, nay, more, *must* operate upon the *manifestations of mind* ; the manifesting organ cannot be thus interfered with, without producing a great influence upon its function—not only with regard to the comfort, but the brilliance and correctness of impression—the power of attention, memory, association, reasoning, judgment, all of which may be more or less assisted or perverted by these variations. In addition to all these, there is oftentimes a hidden state which we know not how to explain, and which escapes the researches of the experimental chemist. The air of the crowded city and of the country ; that of the mountain and the valley ; that of the purest character, and that which is loaded with malaria, does not differ materially in its eudiometrical proportions. Yet it does so to the sensations ; we are conscious of the difference ; the first air passages inform us of the change ; they are the conservative sentinels of the body. And we have reason to believe, that while there are these great differences (though in the present state of our knowledge, chemically imperceptible) as to the production of health or disorder, there exist also yet minor differences which are very essential to the comfort

and well-being of *many* of the functions of the body, but particularly of the cerebral organ, and of its *peculiar functions*, the infinitely diversified manifestations of mind.

In our own climate, where the vicissitudes are so great, we are not so much called upon to watch against extremes, which are rare, but against the frequent variations. And although the constitution becomes, by habit, greatly inured to climate; and although there seems to be always, and everywhere, a sort of relation between the one and the other; yet, notwithstanding these two modifying circumstances, the transitions are so great and so frequent, as oftentimes to overturn the harmony of the system, and to produce uneasy or perverted mental manifestations. The absence of sun—the clouds, and fogs, and damps, and gloom of our climate, have been unjustly accused of *producing* the number of suicides which we have unhappily so frequently to chronicle. And again, *this is not true*; for although our proportion of suicides does not exceed that of our neighbours, whose climate is exempted from these peculiarities; yet there can be no question, that it does exert a considerable influence upon the brain, upon the manifestations of mind, and therefore upon *national character*. We would not push this remark too far; it is enough for our purpose, that the climate exerts an influence upon the manifesting organ; and if so, necessarily also, upon its manifestations.

There is a something peculiarly injurious, also, in the mode by which the impression of the atmo-

sphere is received, though it may be the same atmosphere. In the open air, all will be well, but received through an aperture, by which a current is produced, cold will be quickly caught; the impression will be immediately felt by the sensorium; the function of the brain, which has been carried on well to this moment, becomes almost instantly beclouded; listlessness creeps over the frame; dulness and stupidity of thought follow in its train; intellectual occupation becomes a burden; a morbid condition has been occasioned; and both body and mind suffer from its influence.

A few words on the changes of opinion, which seem to take place during the course of life, will lead to the concluding part of the subject. By this we intend *not* those violent and rapid changes which *TRANSMUTE character*, and which are dependent upon some powerful conviction suddenly or gradually wrought upon the mind. These may be considered as spiritual or mental changes generally effected through some very powerful impulse, motive, or emotion, brought before the mind at a time when it has been prepared by circumstances or events, to receive such impression, and to yield obedience to its impulses. This is remarkably the case with the careless man of the world, whose heart has been prepared by the Spirit of God—perhaps through the agency of sickness or sorrow, or some other influence which has commanded attention—to listen, and to receive the truths which are necessary to eternal peace; and then there is a gradual awakening of the attention

to moral and religious motive ; or less frequently, *conviction* flashes deeply upon the mind, and the individual instantly turns to God with, "What shall I do to be saved ?" These instances of sudden conversion are not to be lightly esteemed ; doubtless they do exist ; and if followed by a beautiful consistency of character, they are deserving of the highest estimation.

The same thing is to be traced in a case of much less importance, viz. *political conversion*. Alas ! for human nature ; deeply regretted is to be the fact, that this is too often the consequence of interested motive ; and the frequency of this dishonesty has thrown an air of doubt over the sincerity of all these conversions. And yet nothing can be more likely, than that an individual who has been educated in the trammels of party, and accustomed to go with that party—to think with the same thoughts, and to act, and to believe, and judge, as his party acts, and judges, and believes ; it is not otherwise than perfectly feasible, that such an individual should take alarm at the tendency to evil of some one of its dogmas,—should be scared on the brink of the precipice over which he suddenly finds himself beetling, and should become anxious to quit for ever the ranks of that party which had brought him to so terrible a dilemma ; and under these circumstances there would be a fair and genuine change of opinion. As in all other changes of views upon important subjects, the individual very generally becomes a *bigot*,—exclusively attached to his new opinions, and giving

little toleration to others ; a result very much to be deprecated, especially as these impulsive changes, though taking place with the best of motives, do often arise from error in judgment, or some hasty prejudice : and more especially as they *always* give rise to the appearance of what is *too frequently* the fact, that the change has been effected by new views [of aggrandisement, or new channels opened to interested ambition, and therefore possessing a sordid origin. But confessedly great as is this evil, and still greater liability to mistake and misrepresentation ; that would be a yet greater evil, which holds the individuals whose opinions have been really and conscientiously changed, spell-bound within the precincts of *party* ; and not having moral courage enough to avow that change, and to meet the obloquy which would be the natural consequence of such avowal.

These, however, are not the changes we contemplate, when we speak of that which results from bodily influence upon the manifestations of mind. This is a *commonly* received opinion, although, perhaps, if broadly stated, it might not obtain general acceptance in theory. Yet the germ of this opinion is to be found in experience ; and the fact, that you cannot put old heads upon young shoulders ; that the old and the young cannot live together, on account of their dissimilar habits of thought and action ; all tend to prove that changes of opinion do occur, as the natural result of advancing years. Every one who attends to his own mental operations will have discovered this change

in himself; will have found that the views of twenty were much modified at thirty,—those of thirty at forty—those of forty at fifty, and so on as years advance. It may be said, that these changes are the result of experience; and so in many instances they are; the folly and *étourderie* of youth, give place to the sobriety and judgment of manhood, and the views become more mature with advancing years. But upon what does *experience act*? Does it not consist in a series of impressions made, and more accurately made, upon the manifesting organ? Is it not a greater perfection in the tact of receiving, and comparing, and judging, and of the laws of habit and association; all *functions of the organ of mind*? While, then, we admit, that the mind itself may be operated upon by mental or spiritual motives, we also contend, that the manifestations of mind *may be*, and *always are* operated upon, by changes in the manifesting organ; and that these *changes* are constantly going on, though they be not such, as to interfere with the consciousness of *personal identity*.

In looking at this subject, the complexity of the organ operated upon by physical causes from without, and by spiritual causes from within, must not be forgotten. Everybody knows, that change and renovation are going on all over the system. The brain is not an unique exemption from these causes of change, though they operate slowly. We have reason to believe, that not a single particle of the brain of the present individual belonged to him ten years ago; yet the sentiment of identity has

been preserved by its gradual transfer from fibre to fibre; the loss of substance has never been discovered, because at any *one time*, it has been so small as to be imperceptible; and memory of the past, which would have been obliterated, if it depended simply on impressions made *upon* cerebral fibre—to be *retained* by cerebral *fibre only*, has been preserved by the grand regulator of the manifesting organ, *even by presiding mind*, and this solution clears away every difficulty.

Changes of opinion, then, may be subdivided into—

- a. Natural and healthful.
- b. Organic.
- c. Morbid.

a. We enter first upon the natural or healthful changes of opinion. These are the result of augmented knowledge, juster views, sounder reasoning, more accurate judgment; accumulated observation, greater wisdom, and more enlarged inferences drawn from the mass of facts brought together by experience. That the intellectual faculties should be perfected by habit; that intellectual man should be benefited by experience; that he should learn caution from previous hasty judgment; that he should be rendered more circumspect by former errors and failures; and especially that *for the future* he should be instructed by the results *of the past*,—by previous circumstances and events with which he could not have been acquainted in his early *à priori* reasonings; and, moreover, that time should have deve-

loped tendencies and contingencies which could not have been procured by any ordinary foresight, and which perhaps had been studiously concealed; and, therefore, that he should have become more apt to investigate, and less prone to judge; these are, or ought to be, the result of having the senses exercised to discern both good and evil; and *from these* result those changes of opinion, which are here called healthful, and which man is accustomed to value, and to fix upon them that stamp of *maturity*, which is precisely opposed to the immaturity, the credulity, the narrowness, of the thoughts of the inexperienced young man.

In saying thus much, we would enter a caveat against that system of vacillation which we perceive marking the character of some otherwise estimable individuals. It is impossible to ascertain their opinions, for they change with the daily shifting of the puppets which surround them; they take the shape of their immediate society, and the impress of external circumstances; they distrust themselves, and under the apprehension that their own judgment may be incorrect, they throw themselves upon the judgment of others, and are thus induced to take the mould of the last society into which they were thrown: a state which arises sometimes from diffidence, at others from the want of moral courage to avow their opinions, if different from their neighbours; at others, from a self-complacent desire to be like other persons; again, from the want of having very defined views as to the boundaries between right and wrong;

and, lastly, from a selfish desire to be thought as good, as wise, as happy as those around them.

Now while it is a great evil to be thus unsettled in opinion, and while it is very desirable to possess clear, distinct, and well-defined views, it is not to be forgotten that the *opposite of error* is not always *truth*,—the antipodes to vice not necessarily virtue,—and that the opposite to vacillation is not pertinacious adherence to opinions once formed. Prejudice, bigotry, an obstinate and unchanging attachment to opinions once imbibed, and which shall not be subsequently modified by new and enlarged views, and more accurate reasonings, are to be avoided *as much as perpetual change*. The individual who draws around him the self-complacent panoply of a belief in his own concentrated wisdom, and refuses to alter an opinion which he once believed to be correct, is in danger of falling into the grossest errors, and of exhibiting the unholy example of a man arrogating to himself attributes which belong exclusively to the supreme fountain of wisdom and immutability. Now, even with the most high God, *infinite wisdom* must precede unchanging judgment; and the presence of the latter is perfectly inconsistent with the absence of the former; and since it is readily confessed that man is not thus infinitely wise, (on the contrary, that his acquaintance *is perfect with nothing*,) it is most absurd that he should plume himself upon that consistency of opinion and judgment, which absolutely does not admit *reflection* or *review*.

b. But we pass on to notice those changes of opinion which may be termed *organic*. Every person who has watched these changes in himself, and who has looked abroad at the same process in others, must possess an entire conviction that this change is operated independently of the mental changes we have contemplated; and that the powers, and habits, and modes of thought, and feeling, and action, do vary much with certain changes which are produced in the organ of thought. Thus, the mode of receiving impressions—the perception of these impressions—the ideas to which they give rise—reasoning upon them—reflection—combination—comparison—inference—results—are all drawn differently, according to the maturity and perfectness of the organ.

And this is independent of increased knowledge, or accumulated wisdom; for the brain of twenty, which has had large opportunities of observation, and of acquiring knowledge, (though perhaps being much to be preferred before the brain of thirty, equally cultivated, but where the opportunities of observation, thought, and reflection, have been small,) will never possess the same style of thought, will never arrive at the same set of conclusions, or of opinions formed upon them. The young and the old, the educated and the uneducated, the healthful and the sickly, the sanguine and the melancholic, the choleric and the nervous, can no more travel at the same intellectual rate, occupy the same intellectual sphere of vision, or fix their attention upon the same intel-

lectual points of affinity, than any other utter impossibility can be brought to pass.

The common remark, that the evening and the morning story *differ*, is a proof of how widely this agency is diffused; and how great is the operation of exhaustion or refreshment upon the brain, in the formation of opinion. The accumulation of nervous energy upon the stomach in digestion, and its being thus diverted from the brain, leaves the latter organ enfeebled for its intellectual functions; its energies are lessened its capacities circumscribed; cold and heat operate conversely in affecting its manifestations; all the slighter indispositions, a slight cold, even fatigue of muscle, much more fatigue of the organ itself, will impair the power, pervert the agency, and alter the results of cerebral operation. These, again, will operate very differently at different periods of life, always taking the shape of the physical characteristics of the system, and to be predicated, by knowing these characteristics and the prevailing temperament. And then, as age advances, and infirmities creep on, opinion becomes weak and vacillating, or obstinate and unchanging, according to the mental prevalence of self-love on the one hand, or of diffidence and distrust on the other; both causes operating upon a cerebral fibre, less and less capable of those powerful demonstrations which marked the zenith of its power, the sunshine of its maturity.

c. But we notice, thirdly, those changes of opinion which may be termed *morbid*; always in-

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tending by this term, not those which are affected by *moral*, but by physical causes. The great disorder of the soul or spirit is *sin—moral evil*, which is only to be prevented by the grace of God, and only to be cured by the influence of religion; but this is not the class of morbid actions with which we have to deal; our attention is confined to those morbid manifestations of mind which are dependent upon physical causes; and perhaps these perversions may be all summed up into one of the varying forms of *insanity*.

A question may here be stated as to those errors in judgment which are not purely *spiritual*, which do not arise from lack of information, nor from carelessness and inattention in the employment of such information; which are clearly *not* the result of insanity, but seem to arise from placing the object to be contemplated in a wrong point of view; so that all the lines drawn from it, and all the opinions running upon such lines are erroneous, proceed from false premises, and lead to wrong conclusions: the entire views formed during this process being erroneous. Now, after much consideration, we are disposed to believe that this state arises from a peculiar condition of the cerebral organ, in which it is liable to a minor degree of perversity, not amounting to *insanity*, but producing *incorrect* results; just as any temporary pressure which produces an alteration in the axis of vision will occasion defective sight; and although the effect be so slight, and so transient as to occasion no permanent influence upon the organ,

no *palpable* change in its condition, or functions, or structure.

But the greater number of instances of *morbid* manifestation of mind, of perverse formation of opinion, which are not dependent upon moral causes, are really and intrinsically attached to *insanity*, in some of its varieties. This, perhaps, may be considered as a very sweeping conclusion, and requiring some explanation, in order to prevent misconception of the terms, and the mode of their employment. By the term *insanity* or *insane*, we do not simply mean to express the idea of a person who is unfit for society—who is an object of fear—who requires a special attendant, and medical superintendence; neither do we intend an individual who differs from ourselves in opinion, and entertains views which we think strange and groundless, as if the right to exclusive correctness of thought attached to ourselves; neither do we intend that peculiarity of thought and action, which attaches to individuality of character; neither those legitimate changes of opinion, which are produced by juster thoughts and lengthened experience: but we intend those manifestations of mind, which, without adequate cause of change, are at variance with the individual's former self; a sudden perversion of character, which throws an air of strangeness over the whole mental fabric; a perversity of thought and feeling, which needlessly gives undue prominence to certain points; an inaccessibility to reason and conviction; and the formation of opinions without reason, which are strange, gro-

tesque, inconsequent—at variance with common sense, and especially opposed to the views and opinions of bye-gone days ; a state, in fact, which borders upon the very verge of that fearful precipice into which intellectual man falls, through the dark and easy descent of dreams, visions, voices, revelations, hallucinations, mania, and all the fearful category of mental alienation.

We conclude our present design by some remarks on the influence of the body, or physical temperament, upon the expression of religious feeling.

It cannot have escaped the notice of every attentive observer of mankind, that not only is there much difference in the mode of expression of religious feeling among Christians generally ; but also that this expression is in a considerable degree characterized by physical temperament, and by other analogous circumstances, as disease, exhaustion, debility, &c. Unhappily for the peace and harmony of the christian world, this source of difference of opinion has not been sufficiently weighed ; and that has been too frequently attached to moral delinquency, which really belonged to physical obliquity ; and hence have arisen fierce contests about comparative trifles, which have been elevated into undue prominence and importance—by the warmth, perhaps, of the unduly zealous but *sanguine* advocate, contrasted with the cold and dogged inflexibility of the sincere but *phlegmatic* opponent. The *two* cannot receive the same impressions from looking at the same object, because the *intellectual rays*

which are given off by that object, pass to the mind through very differently characterized media, and are very differently refracted in their course. The great misfortune is, that Christians do not exercise *towards each other* that charitable feeling for physical infirmity, which they are so abundantly willing to extend towards *themselves*: and that while they make every possible excuse for their own hasty judgments, crude opinions, injustice, irritable temper, peevishness, discontent, and a thousand other more deeply-shaded moral evils, on account of their natural propensities—of their being taken off their guard—of their being overtaken by temptation in a moment of unwatchfulness—of their easily besetting sin—of their fatigue and exhaustion—of their bad digestion, &c., they do not admit any of these excuses for *intellectual obliquity* of vision, which they so readily grant to the forgetfulness of *practical morality*. And yet surely the one deserves at least as much consideration as the other; and inasmuch as intellectual brain is of higher worth than merely animal brain, it ought to be conceded that the former possesses a greater number of points of easy disturbance; and that, *when disturbed*, it deserves a more charitable consideration for its deviations from rectitude, because, in the instance of animal passion, there remains the intellectual brain to assist in guiding or repelling its errors; while in the latter case, the immediate organ of communication with presiding mind, is arrested in its healthy action, and is very difficultly capable of carrying on its normal func-

tions; and it is for this reason chiefly, and in the hope of securing juster views on many points, and a more expansive charity in all, that we shall consider this subject a little in detail, and attempt to trace some of its more remarkable results.

Such is the extensive influence of deeply-rooted prejudice on this subject; and so fondly do men cling to modes of thought and action, which have been rendered sacred by time and custom, that it is difficult to secure a candid and unprejudiced attention, even to truth, when it is propounded in a new light; and especially when it leads to the all-important conclusion, that *religion consists in the service of the head as well as in the feeling of the heart!*

It is probable, that the severance of these two propositions, which ought always to be conjoined, according to the individual measure of the intellectual and affective faculties, has oftentimes been occasioned by some influence of bodily temperament. Certain it is, that that peculiar expression of religious feeling, which consists in a species of quietism—a resting in the belief of being only a passive agent in the hands of Providence—of having every event of life, and feeling of the heart arranged by Divine appointment—of having every sentiment prompted by Divine influence—of having nothing to do, but to wait the exposition of events—possessing neither will nor power to act or counteract—but of having every power of the body, and every manifestation of mind, taken from the control of the individual, and passively left to an

unrecognized spiritual influence ; certain it is, that this character of religionist is always to be found in one peculiar form of the melancholic temperament. And it is equally certain, that the opposite extreme—the religion of the *head*—that religion in which the affective faculties bear no part, and the heart is really untouched—which consists in a great display, and outward show of regard for its influence—of contention for its doctrines—of bustling and overweening activity in many of its practical duties—which courts and invites the gaze and the approbation of the many—which seeks to talk much of its doctrines, but to know little of its precepts—which is ever shaping itself to the temper of the society into which it is thrown—which contends for the exterior decorations of religion, but knows nothing of its internal beautifully harmonising influence on all the thoughts and feelings and actions, is equally to be found in one peculiar form of the choleric temperament.

These forms require blending in order to be perfected. It is certain that man can do nothing of himself, except the power be given him to will and to do ; but it is equally certain, that he must exert himself to carry out the will of Divine Providence, and to act in obedience to the Divine laws ; and without this moral accountability is destroyed, as we have previously seen.

It is not asserted, that these two forms of error are *always* the result of the prevalence of the melancholic or choleric temperament. Far from it ; on the contrary, it is readily conceded that they

may result entirely from *mental causes* ; all that is contended for, is, that a predisposition to these several views exists in certain physical temperaments ; that they will be found to predominate in those temperaments ; and that in them *will be* almost always, if not always, the germ of such views, unless they have been counteracted by education, and by the implantation of juster and more expanded opinions of the Divine economy. Every religionist who adopts *either* of these peculiarities is *not* melancholic or choleric ; but every melancholic or choleric temperament will exhibit traces of their influence ; therefore the expression of their views is *influenced* by *physical temperament*.

Now, although it is very generally admitted that mind and body act and re-act upon each other, yet perhaps very few are prepared to allow the truth of the propositions above laid down ; very few, indeed, have considered this state of dependence of the manifestations of mind upon the peculiarities of the body ; and fewer still have thought of what is involved in the *terms* of the announced truth, or have contemplated the *extent* to which the principle may be applied.

It would be allowed that mind and body “ *act and re-act upon each other,*” as a general proposition, by many who would deny this agency when reduced to *particulars*. Thus it would be allowed to pass current as a *general truth*, by many who would reject the fact, that *any given state* of mental or spiritual manifestation has been influenced by the condition of the organ of mind at the time, or

by the peculiarity of temperament enstamped upon it from its origin.

What, then, is intended by those who admit the general proposition? It should seem that it amounts simply to this, that if the body be disordered, the mind will be enfeebled or irritated, or incapacitated for its functions; and that mental impression is capable of disordering the body, disturbing the digestion, and in extreme cases of impairing its vitality.

But it must be allowed that the *whole mind* is composed of a variety of functions—as the *whole body* is composed of a variety of organs; and it is not illogical to infer, that these several functions may be more or less disturbed, as well as that *one* organ of the body may sometimes suffer without the whole body being involved in that suffering; nay, more, it is highly probable, that one or more of these functions will suffer in proportion to their sympathy or connexion with the primary irritating cause. And as in both cases the whole is composed of parts, although forming, when united, one whole, it is most inconsequential to infer, that the whole *must* suffer in either case, without producing a greater effect upon some part than upon another.

And again, it is necessary to inquire *how* the admitted general effect is produced? *How* the body is disturbed by mental emotion! *How* the mind is disordered by the *indisposition* of the body? *How* the sympathy of action and re-action is maintained? Upon this as a fact, there will be no

difference of opinion ; and it will be readily granted by all, that this is accomplished by *nervous communication*. But all nerves have not the same *function* ; therefore their direct and reflex actions cannot all be of the same kind. They carry on different functions according to the organs to which they are distributed ; the nerves of the senses cannot act interchangeably ; those which are concerned in the different secretions of the body would be useless unless distributed to their respective organs ; and the nerves of voluntary motion could not carry on the functions of secretion all over the body, or of expression in the countenance. Then it must be allowed that each nerve has a different office, makes a different impression upon the common centre of sensation, according to the organ to which it is distributed, or the work for which it is intended. And if this be granted, it follows, in a morbid condition, that each nerve, when it becomes the carrier of morbid action makes an impression upon the common centre, *peculiar to itself*, as well as that *general* distorting agency which has already been granted. And if so, not only must the proposition of confining this influence to a general nervous agency be given up, but it also follows, that each irritated nerve of the body may produce a special irritation of the organ of mind, and therefore may give rise to peculiar *mental* manifestations ; and, on the other side, any emotions, and feelings, and thoughts, and actions, may give rise to very varying effects upon the *body*, according to its predisposition to malady, and

according to its original tendencies,—in other words, according to its *physical temperament*.

The *degree* in which this effect will be occasioned, will differ greatly according to the mental calibre first given—according to the degree of its cultivation—according to the education and associations of the individual—according to the direction of his studies—according to his physical habits, and especially whether they have been self-denying or self-indulgent—whether he have made body or mind the supreme object of his attention ; whether he has been accustomed to follow the suggestions of body and mind blindly and implicitly, or whether he has been habituated always to refer action to reason and to principle as its groundwork ; according as the body shall be generally healthy, or shall much more probably possess some feeble organ ; and according to a thousand other circumstances, extending into ramifications too minute to be followed, but embracing every department of vital agency. Still, however greatly this influence may vary *in degree*, it is *only in degree* ; for the agency is *universal*, and is to be found wherever mind and body *co-exist*, and is extensive in proportion to the perfectness of both. This being satisfactorily established, we may be prepared to admit the somewhat startling proposition, that devotional fervour or depression may sometimes be more rationally accounted for, by a reference to the state of the *brain* than of the mind, (the presiding soul,) and this without involving the dangerous innovation of making a man's religious

condition depend upon his *organisation*, which we have before shown to be destructive of moral obligation, and therefore abhorrent to the genuine Christian.

It is not *religion* itself, or the duties which flow from it—nor its doctrines and principles—its motives—its precepts—its sanctions, which can in any degree be influenced by any physical condition of its professors ; those hopes, and fears, and prospects, which are the legitimate offspring of religion, are unchangeable, because their Author is immutable, and they are the result of *His* revealed will, and of the operations of His Spirit in man. But the *joys and sorrows* which arise from its influence ; and all the *manifestations of mind which constitute religious character, as it is met with in the world, may be, and doubtless are*, characterized in passing through the medium which gives them utterance ; precisely in the same way, as the self-same stirring event, which has been witnessed by half a dozen persons, will be differently narrated by each, according as *his feelings* have been interested, and as the peculiarity of his physical temperament has led him to give the preponderance to one or other of the series of phenomena of which it is composed. We ought not to expect *MORE uniformity of expression* upon a subject of the *highest* interest, and which makes the liveliest appeals to *the feelings* ; which, therefore, is influenced in its expression by the capacity of the intellect, and the warmth and prevailing character of the emotions ; and, indeed, to assert that in this matter of the highest moment,

man was independent of his temperament, and of other external circumstances, would be to plunge the correct thinker into a labyrinth of difficulty, which would terminate either in the torrid meridian of enthusiasm, or in the chilly night of the gloomiest scepticism.

The following observations will, we trust, demonstrate the truth of this proposition.

First, there is a unity and simplicity in the spirit of man ; that immortal principle of whose essence we are ignorant, but which *as it is not* an attribute of organisation, and is essentially distinct from it ; *as it is the appointed medium* of communication between man and his *Maker* ; and *as it is destined* to survive the wreck of the beautiful but frail tenement it inhabits, *must be something* essentially distinct from matter. It is the gift of God, and that which distinguishes man as possessing the image of God ; hence, we believe that it emanates from God, and will return to *Him* who gave it ; consequently, that it is single in its nature, immaterial, indivisible, immortal ; and although mysteriously united to the body, does *not derive from it* any of its characteristic properties. There is, except in minds perverted by philosophy *falsely so called*, an eternal consciousness of existence,—a knowledge of individual accountability, and a conviction that to *itself*, as supreme, the several functions, appetites, and passions, are subservient, and receive the laws appointed by the supreme moral Governor for their subjection. Hence man is a

responsible agent, and will be justly called to account for the deeds done in the body.

But while this principle is established, it is equally clear, that every man has a peculiar *mode* of speaking, and thinking, and writing, and acting. The same causes produce very opposite effects upon different individuals, and even upon the same person, under varying external circumstances ; there is also a peculiarity about the *manner* of each, which constitutes the man, which pervades every part of his intellectual and moral functions, and which preserves his identity through every outward change. This peculiarity may be *modified* by disease or by powerful mental impressions ; yet it will always attach to, and serve to distinguish, one individual from others of his kind—nay, more, it will be handed down from generation to generation ; it will be traceable, anterior to education, and will survive its influence ; it may be suspended by some great physical disaster, but will be resumed in proportion as that is remedied. And what does all this prove, but that the immortal spirit, though *unchanged* by its union with the body, has its *manifestations* characterised by the physical attributes of the medium through which they are exhibited. That this is really only following out one of Nature's laws, there can be no question ; the only wonder is, that it should have excited so much doubt, and such violent opposition, when applied to the organ of mind. Let us listen to the facts of Nature's agency before our eyes ; take, for in-

stance, the process of grafting an apple-tree ; it is immaterial whether the stem be taken from the *crab* or the *wild plum*, the fruit produced is not a crab or a plum, but precisely the *kind* of apple which is grafted ; or take a tree which has hitherto borne pears only, and that of *one kind* ; graft it with half-a-dozen *different* grafts of pears, and of apples at the same time ; the result will be that *each branch so grafted*, will produce, not the original pear of the parent stem, but *the pear* or *the apple*, which has been grafted on that *particular branch* ; and this not interchangeably, and without the slightest liability to error. The effect is *invariable* ; and what does it teach us, but that the vitality and the juices of the *parent stem* are so *modified* in their passage through the *peculiar vessels* of each graft, that the *original pear-juice* is exhibited first in a dozen different blossoms, and finally in half-a-dozen different kinds of pear, and as many dissimilar apples. Surely, then, there is nothing extraordinary in carrying out and perfecting this law, in a higher department of Nature's ample domain. The spirit then is *one* ; but its apparent aspects are many, because they are exhibited through material agents, differing, it may be, in their structure, as well as in their aptitude for peculiar manifestations or functions.

If it were necessary to have drawn more largely illustrations of this very simple natural process, we might have found it everywhere ; we might have found it in the *identical* basis of the *diamond* and *common charcoal* ; we might have found it in

the endless varieties of carbonates ; we might have found it in every kind of plant, and flower, and shrub, and tree—in the tallest pine as in the humblest willow which creeps upon the ground, all produced from the same simple element ; we might have found it in man, with all his bones, muscles, sinews, nerves, absorbents, blood-vessels, internal viscera, with each variety of secretion, according to the peculiar function of the secreting organ ; we shall find it in the organs appointed for the most important functions, respiration, digestion, alimentation, &c.—we shall find it in all the organs of sense ; in fact, everywhere we shall find that all these have one common basis, and yet that each carries on its own function, (and in several instances plurality of function,) without ever interfering with the other—the only difference being that the blood brought to each is modified and changed by the structure and vitality of the organ, to produce the result which Nature designs. And why is the brain to be excluded ? Why may not the functions of that organ be *multifold* ; and why may not its manifestations be modified, not only by the *health* or *disorder* of the organ, but by its original structure—its peculiar natural impress—its habits—its associations—its sympathies—its vitality ? It were waste of time to support this proposition by any further elucidations.

It is, however, necessary to insist upon a second principle, viz. that this agency of physical temperament can have no influence upon moral obligation ; since the principles of religion are everywhere the

same; since they are communicated to man by a gracious revelation from on high; and since they are of permanent and universal operation; they are addressed to the conscious principle within, and admit not of change, according to the caprices of every wavering creature of mortality, but abide in their original strength, and fulness, and sobriety, whatever may be the feebleness, the contracted and partial views, the cold or the enthusiastic feelings of those by whom they are received. In fact, no two things can be more distinct than the *holy influence of religious principle, and the expression of devotional fervour*: the former is *uniform* in its operation; the latter is subjected to the agency of physical temperament, habit, society, and a variety of other extrinsic causes, which may be all classed under the general term *physical*.

From these postulates is to be drawn the inference, that the expression of religious feeling is characterized in no small degree by physical temperament, and by other circumstances arising out of the connexion of mind with matter.

This position will be best illustrated by the example of individuals of opposite temperaments, under similar circumstances, as, for instance, the highly *sanguine*, in whom predominate hope and joy; and the *melancholic*, whose prevailing features will be gloom and fear. Let the attention of each of these individuals be *first* seriously awakened to the truths of religion; the *one* will feel disposed to lay hold on the hopes of the Gospel, and will early reap peace and joy in believing; while the *other*

will be weighed down with the impression of his sins, and will scarcely be able to realize the infinite mercy of forgiveness. The *former* will gladly proclaim the change which has taken place in his views, and will avowedly rank himself with those who differ from all his earlier habits and modes of thinking; the *latter*, with equal sincerity, and equal *reality* of feeling, will seek the shade of retirement; will hesitate to join himself in open profession with those who declare plainly that they seek another, that is a heavenly kingdom, and perhaps will distrust his own consistency; and will require the gentle hand of some kind friend to draw the modest flower from its obscurity, that we may be charmed with the delicacy of its fragrance.

It can scarcely be necessary to caution the unwary or the captious reader against the *abuse* which may be made of this physical agency, so as to *mis-represent* the operations of the Holy Spirit of God, as the author of hope, and faith, and peace, and joy, as blended with, or equivalent to, the mere impulses of *animal feeling*, and *characterized* by the varying state of that animal. It is manifest throughout, that real religion is never confounded with animal impulse. It is not the truth or reality of religious feeling; it is not its depth, nor the extent of its *practical* influence; it is not the nature of the motives, nor the degree in which they are operative, which are governed by the organisation; but it is the *apparent expression* of such feelings, and convictions, and motives, and actions.

Passing in review the more advanced life of the two individuals above distinguished, the *first* will be found foremost in all the bustling activity of charity; his purse and his personal exertions will be at the command of the great charitable associations of the day; and wherever his public services may be required, there will they be found. The *latter*, with no *less* sincerity of attachment to the principle, will not be equally conspicuous in the arena of public meetings, nor among the specific agents of charity; he will prefer the unostentatious circle of his own neighbourhood for the field of his quiet operations; he will be found in the humble cottage of the poor; and many an individual will have to bless his unseen, unobtrusive, unknown exertions for the relief of temporal calamity, as well as of moral wants, and spiritual destitution.

So, again, as regards the influence of religion on the affections, the *one* will be pursuing his happy way in the confidence of his acceptance with God, and in zealous devotion to His service; the *other*, with not less of principle, and steady consistency of conduct, will persevere in the performance of duty, and will increase in good works, but will only humbly hope, amidst many fears, that he may at last be found among those righteous, which are "scarcely saved." The *one* will have more of joy, the *other* of peace; in the *one* hope and confidence, in the *other* fear, and a sense of dependence, will preponderate; the *one* will exhibit more courage, the *other* more fortitude; the

one will be chiefly remarkable for the active, the *other* for the passive virtues ; the *one* will court, the *other* will shrink from notoriety ; the *one* may become the fearless champion, while the *other* remains the timid defender, of Christianity ; the *one* may seek danger, while the *other* is only to be found *unappalled* in the hour of extremity, where his conduct and his example are required.

Again, let the two become the subjects of sickness, or of misfortune and sorrow, and there will then be found a remarkable change of expression. The former has been dependent for the manifestation of his character upon an unbroken state of health, upon the integrity of his nervous system ; but let these be disturbed, and where are now his activity, his energy, his peaceful expectations ? He is suspended from active duty, and the victim of disorder becomes irritable ; repines at the events which circumscribe his exertions, and ardently prays for recovery, that he may return to the sphere of his active duties, wanting which, he finds the exercise of the passive virtues encompassed with innumerable difficulties. It is far easier to *do* than to *suffer* ; the very fact of occupation is favourable to strength, and gives energy to exertion, and confidence of success to zealous endeavour ; but take away these props, and let the post of duty be only to bear meekly, patiently, enduringly, the ills with which we are encompassed, and such endurance becomes exceedingly difficult. This, *too*, is a physical condition ; and there are few who have not experienced the benefit

of walking, or of horseback exercise, in dispelling the clouds which hovered around them when they have been wearied, and worried, and perplexed by the intricacies and troubles of life. On the contrary, he who during health may have had less *appearance* of religion, will *now* exhibit its sweetest influence. Always accustomed to struggle against constitutional melancholy, he will not be depressed by its agency; he will be found stedfast in the hour of trial; he will bear much unmoved; his patience will be acknowledged by all; he will not have to contend with the irritability induced by disease, but will earnestly strive after submission to the appointments of Providence; this submission not being a quiet yielding to inevitable destiny which cannot be superseded, and which will be made worse by impatience, but a conviction of the judgment, that what is ordered by omniscient goodness must be right—and a corresponding yielding up the best affections of the heart to Him whose very nature is love—benevolence which knows no bounds, but in the complete happiness of all *His* creatures.

The same distinction will be visible on the near approach of dissolution. It will be presently shown that the phenomena of a death bed are greatly influenced by the physical circumstances which produce it,—that is, by the organ whose primary disturbance, and subsequent loss of vitality, induce general death; in the present instance, therefore, it is supposed that the two are drawing near to the term of their existence under parallel

circumstances, and in such a way that the eye can contemplate the last closing scene, undisturbed by much bodily suffering. The original tendencies of the constitution will be still marked, even when it is about to crumble into ruins; the *one*, full of hope and of confidence, will welcome the last messenger as the appointed angel to introduce him to the mansions of the blessed; the *other*, despite many fears and occasional doubts, (the passing clouds of a summer's evening sky,) will still hold fast the profession of his faith in Christ Jesus, and, relying on the complete satisfaction and atonement of his Saviour, he will leave this world in the trembling hope, that although the passing clouds may have chequered the unbroken serenity of evening, and even although his sun may go down behind the western cloud, yet that it is only darkened as it passes the imaginary line of that distant horizon which separates the present from a future state of existence, where it will rise to shine for ever in unclouded glory. However dissimilar may have been *their actual* feelings, and more especially the *expression* of those feelings, both these characters have been influenced by the same *principle*; have rested their hopes on the same basis; have been actuated by the same motives; have lived in obedience to the *same* precepts; have offered the living sacrifice of their hearts upon the same altar; have reposed on the same supports in their hour of trial; and have been equally accepted by the same compassionate Father and Redeemer. Now, if these characteristics can be

compared with analogous passages in the history of the *lives* of the individuals whose death-bed has been sketched, it will be found that precisely the same phenomena have characterized and distinguished them ; and more, that knowing the peculiarity of temperament, it will be easy to say how each *one* has felt and acted under any given circumstances ; how far they have gone together—how far they have diverged—and, again, how far they have united in the accomplishment of any given purpose in life.

A similar principle will oftentimes explain the difference that is to be found among those really in earnest about religion, some of whom will be characterized by ardent zeal and enthusiasm, and others by quiet steady pursuit, without that glow of exertion which the former will manifest. Religion is in itself an inductive science, and as such appeals to the judgment and the understanding ; but the *belief* in its great truths, which expand far beyond the intellectual reach, depends upon the proper exercise of the imagination, and involves the better feelings of our nature. Thus, it is equally an affair of the heart and of the head ; and the most perfect and the most lovely Christian will be that one who possesses the largest reach of intellect, and the greatest depth of affection ; in other words, the one who can most fully appreciate and receive its sublime doctrines ; and who, at the same time, with the simplicity and confiding affection of a child, can yield himself to the guidance and direction of his heavenly

Father. And where there is so great a difference of intellectual power, of judgment, of reflection, of feeling, affection, and imagination, in different individuals, it is not surprising that there should be very great differences in the modes of thought, and habits of expression, among those who are equally in earnest upon this great subject. Constitutional tendency, and physical temperament, will often account for that which perhaps might be called worldliness by *one* class, which class would in the views of the former be considered as remarkable for *cant*. And this may perfectly consist with, and arise from, individuality of character ; hence the former should not be designated as irreligious, nor the latter as hypocritical.

Again, the circumstances attendant upon conversion will also frequently receive a tinge from peculiar bodily agency. On this subject many well-meaning individuals feel great anxiety, particularly if they cannot mark distinctly the period when that grand change passed upon their unrenewed hearts, and when they first turned to God by His Spirit. Now when the sun *has* risen, we do not require to be convinced that it is *day*, by being told the hour at which its beams first became visible, or the angle of incidence with which they first impinged upon our eye from the distant hill : we look abroad ; we are cheered by the light, and animated by the heat ; we rejoice in its rays, and are energized to action by its influence. So, when the Sun of Righteousness has arisen upon the sinner's intellectual vision, and has shone into his

heart, we do not require to know the hour when this glorious change was effected, because we open our eyes, and we see the sun has risen, and that the summer is nigh; that the individual has brought forth fruits meet for repentance, exhibiting a holy and consistent life, and a humble dependence upon the Spirit of grace.

Now these are those in whom this change will have been so gradual, that it cannot be said with precision *when* it took place. The attention will have been first awakened to this infinitely important topic as a matter of study; its necessity will be perceived; the judgment will be informed; it will be convinced; the heart will be influenced by its determinations; the clouds of error, and the mist of prejudice, will be cleared away by the Spirit of God; the offers of mercy will be received, and the fruits of a holy life will be produced. On the other hand, there are those whose attention is first aroused by some powerful impression made on the imagination or the feelings; or by some awful manifestation of Divine Providence; or by some personal misfortune or sickness; or by some event, apparently of little moment, but which appeals forcibly to the heart. Thus the sinner is arrested; he pauses; he hesitates; he cries out in the agony of conscious guilt, "Lord, be merciful to me a sinner." Here the chief difference consists in the fact, whether the awakening cause was first exerted upon the understanding or the affections; thus distinctly showing that the expression of religious feeling is

characterized by a peculiar physical state ; and we infer, that if this be the case in *one great condition*, so also will it be in many minor shades of thought, and feeling, and action ; shades which, in fact, make up the character by their combination.

But we go further, and we assert that there are some morbid conditions which attend this process, and which evince the dependence of *religious expression* upon physical temperament. In those whose attention has been first fixed upon religion, through the agency of some powerful cause operating on the imagination or the feelings, the influence of conviction will be deeply and permanently felt ; it will often happen that religion will be attended to as an *exclusive idea* ; the mind will not listen to the calls of business, or of relative and domestic duties ; the functions of the body will be upset ; the integrity of the nervous system will be disturbed ; and brooding hypochondriasis, or absolute despair, will be the result. Now this is not the *consequence* of religious influence ; for there is a " balm in Gilead," and the great Physician of souls does not inflict a wound without the power and the willingness to heal. Where, then, either of the above states is found to exist, a morbid irritation of the nervous system, not the agency of religion, is to be blamed : it is *the brain*, as the organ of mind, not the *spiritual principle*, which is the source of these morbid manifestations. This is still further shown by the result of particular treatment. Moral manage-

ment, in the experience of divines, as well as physicians, will produce very little effect, while it often happens that medicinal agents will effectually bring about a cure. Let the ultimate result too be considered. Under the direction of the physician, this particular disturbance of the nervous system will be removed; hypochondriasis and despair will vanish, and their subject will sometimes return to his former gaiety and thoughtlessness; he will be absorbed by the pursuit of trifles; another exclusive idea will commonly occupy his attention, and his future conduct will be tinged by this prevailing impression; he becomes eccentric, and is termed a flighty, romantic, odd creature.

This is not always the case; for God, in His infinite wisdom, sometimes employs this bodily calamity so as to make a permanent impression upon the mind, which (when its material organ has been restored to health) remains subdued by religion; it has left the service of sin, and has laid hold of the *hope* set before it in the Gospel, which *hope* will prove an anchor to the soul, and will preserve the equilibrium of a nervous system too prone to susceptibility.

At another time, with perfectly right intentions, and with every good principle and good wish, too great a degree of eagerness and fervour will be visible in the character; and it will then be marked by eccentricities, which would pass current in the world for peculiarity of manner and habit, but which in the disciples of Christ are commonly magnified, and made a ground of *pre-*

judice against real religion. And this consequence arises from not giving due consideration to the agency of physical temperament, in a state of health, and under certain conditions of excitement or depression. Some practical illustrations of this principle may be useful, as placing before the reader a few of the facts, whence, by induction, these principles have arisen.

1. A young lady whose relatives have shown the constitutional tendency to insanity, exhibited some years since, decided symptoms of mental aberration—taking the form of religious fear—assuming the tyranny of an exclusive idea, and overturning the integrity of the brain. She recovered; but is still liable to occasional derangements of the nervous system; and although truly in earnest on the subject of religion, yet her character is marked by *little obliquities*, which, in the judgment of those who will not make the requisite allowance, will operate as a prejudice against *religion* itself. When will candid inquirers separate the peculiarities of physical temperament, and the influence of physical disorder, from the unbiassed manifestations of *mental* agency.

2. A poor man of active intellect, whose life had been characterized by much deviation from the paths of virtue, was attacked by a similar form of insanity; he was confined to his bed by cerebral excitement, which was called *conviction of sin*, when one day he said that “Jesus Christ himself had come in at the window to his relief,” and from that period he dated his recovery. What rightly think-

ing person does not here recognise a regular paroxysm of mental alienation, in which a spectral hallucination, from its powerful impression upon the sensorium, superseded the first morbid impression, and served to restore its equipoise to the disturbed organ? The sequel of this history is instructive; this illness proved the means of awakening serious attention to the most important of all subjects; and the individual has since proved a useful and a virtuous member of society, and a decided and consistent Christian. True, indeed, he is apt to be visionary and enthusiastic; his personal hopes of salvation rest (as he has constantly affirmed) in this revelation of Christ Jesus to his bodily senses; and he is much excited if any doubt be thrown on its reality; his general cast of character, is that being fond of novelty and of *eccentricities of doctrine*; and he is liable to that determination of blood to the head, and consequent nervous excitement, which declare the precarious tenure, by which even now reason maintains her seat.

Another illustration of this principle will be found in the history of E. F —, a truly excellent woman of liberal education and enlarged mind; whose conduct for very many years may be referred to as unblemished, and whose life, for a considerable period, has been passed between the alternations of long intervals of depression and fitful gleams of cheerfulness, and even of joy. During the former state, a degree of languor is observable in the performance of religious services; there is a listless-

ness and inaptitude—nay, more, perhaps a positive disrelish for the pursuit: the mind is a burden to itself, since the consciousness of this indifference weighs upon it with all the force and impression of criminal neglect, and of consequent doubt as to the reality and sincerity of its endeavours and its hopes. At another period every thing wears a brightening aspect; there is a high degree of enjoyment in every act of religious duty; there is an augmented happiness in the pursuit of sacred objects; there is an eagerness after religious conversation, and a desire to make others sensible of the *primary* importance of Divine *truth*. A superficial observer might here pronounce on the presence or absence of the sacred influences of the Holy Spirit; but a nearer and dispassionate view of the case, would detect the morbid agency of an irritated brain; and might probably discover in the hour of depression, that peculiar state of the nervous system, in which its manifestations are of a feeble or asthenic character; and in which the patient is *comparatively* safe, although it is confessed, that in these instances, an insane weariness of life is sometimes produced, together with a desire, at all hazards, to get rid of the tedium of its continuance; a state which is often considered by excellent persons as a peculiar temptation of Satan, but which commonly owns a purely physical origin. On the other hand, during the alternating reign of spiritual comfort, the accurate observer would equally detect an excited state of the brain attended by a quickened pulse, and a whitish tongue; a

great eagerness of expression on all subjects; a constant disposition to talk; a restless irritability of pursuit from one object to another, and again another; an unnatural hurried manner; a degree of good-humour with all things; an impossibility of fixing and controlling the thoughts to any given point; together with a determined disposition in spite of every effort to wander hither and thither: nay, more, he would find that by local depletion, and the other resources of medicine; by abstinence and absolute quiet; and, above all, by procuring sleep, (which is generally wooed in vain,) in a few days the feverish excitement will be subdued; and the subject of it will be restored possibly to *health*, but more frequently to his former state of depression.

Another individual has been subjected for many years to frequent attacks of nervous irritation, which are mainly characterized by deeply-rooted dissatisfaction with every thing. Surrounded even by the superfluities of this world's good, she seems as if bereft of comfort; and is at the same time tormented by a consciousness of the sin of ingratitude, arising out of the impossibility she feels of entering into or of relishing any of the beauties of nature, or of the luxurious enjoyments with which she is encompassed. But when this morbid irritation of the brain has been removed, there is no longer any distaste towards surrounding objects; there is no longer any sense of the sinful forgetfulness of the bounty of Providence; she glides carelessly along, amused by the veriest trifles,

without a single serious thought beyond the passing hour, and, indeed, apparently, with a studious determination to drive away any similar impression.

It has fallen to the author to notice these effects under a variety of circumstances, and in different forms; once in an individual who had *no* religious duties to perform, because she had *no soul*—an irreparable severance had been made between her body and her former self; and she was no longer a responsible person, because she had no power over what was *once* herself, but was so no longer. Again, the same morbid state is to be found in another instance, where the individual would reason very correctly, as to what she ought to do under certain circumstances; but when placed under those circumstances always acted diametrically opposite, alleging that she had *no power* to control these impulses; and made no effort to control them, because she waited for the power, which was to originate the will, which was to re-act upon the conduct.

It may be said, perhaps, that these were cases of *insanity*. It is immaterial to the inference to be drawn from them. One thing is clear, that they are *exaggerations* of doctrines very commonly entertained, especially the latter; and perhaps the question of *sanity or insanity* is only in this instance a question of degree and not of kind. And then, if these ultra states be called *insanity*, in which the function of the brain is thoroughly overturned, is it not a just inference that minor disturbances of

the same organ will produce similar effects, though in an inferior degree, upon the manifestations of mind.

The RESULT of such instances is not to be forgotten : in the *former*, the irritation of the brain has been removed ; the soul and body are reunited ; and there is a quiet, consistent, pious character—active in the performance of every duty—active, without ostentation—zealous, without enthusiasm. Time has not produced the same effect in the other case, and the hallucinations continue. These cases have been under similar management, and have had the same amount of energy expended upon them ; yet with a different result ; and why ? Not because the reason has not been convinced, for, perhaps, conviction has been more easily wrought in the unsuccessful, than in the successful case—but because, in the one case, the health of the manifesting organ has been restored, and in the other has remained disordered.

Do not these things prove a striking dependence upon physical conditions, for the *expression* of religious feelings ? It is not, therefore, the amount of *enjoyment* which may be derived from the services of religion, but the conscientious perseverance in its duties, which should form the criterion, by which to test the sincerity and earnestness of purpose, which animate and guide the heart.

So, also, with respect to the expression of prayer. A great difference is observable in different individuals in their power of commanding their attention, and associating their thoughts, as well as in

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elaborating and giving utterance to their ideas. The spirit of real supplication may rest as deeply in those who cannot clothe their desires in words, as in those who are superficially gifted with a large volubility of expression. Farther, the same distinction may be observed in the *same* individual, under a *change of physical circumstances*. Only let sickness assail the frame, especially sickness of a character which distresses the head ; or even let it be subject to great bodily fatigue : and now, an oppressive languor creeps upon the mind, obtunds the feelings, impedes the powers of association, distracts the attention, perverts the perception, and destroys that nice talent and gift of eloquent combination, which before might have charmed us by its brilliance and its fervor. And wherein consists this change ? It is not that the immaterial principle is suffering from fatigue, but that the organ through which its manifestations occur, is *in a state of irritation*. It is a well-known fact, that many of the most brilliant public writers and speakers, the coruscations of whose imagination astonish and enchant the breathless reader or hearer, have been persons labouring under this affection of the brain ; varying during their whole life, through all the stages of alternate languor and excitement, from almost idiotic apathy to actual frenzy. How little, then, is the state of man's heart, in the sight of God, to be judged of by such superficial manifestations !

The same observation will apply to the capacity for fixing the attention upon any serious pursuit ;

and this, too, not only as a general principle, but with the most marked difference in different persons. There are some individuals possessed of highly susceptible systems, on whom very slight causes will operate in destroying their powers of attention. It will be found that these same characters are equally liable to disturbances in the economy of the animal functions: and that both will happen in the same way, and may be accounted for, on the principle of their possessing a peculiar irritability of nerves, in consequence of which, a slight point of irritation in any part of the system is rapidly diffused by the agency of those cords through the whole frame; and occasions that depression and re-action which constitute the phenomena of disease. In these subjects, bodily ailment of a trifling character will interfere with the integrity of the cerebral function, and serious thought will become an oppressive burden. Now the dependence of mental manifestation upon a material organ, and the subservience of the *latter* to the *former*, will be shown by the fact, that this indisposition for exertion may oftentimes be overcome by a powerful effort, arising out of a deep conviction of duty, or from the unexpected agency of some extrinsic circumstance. And again, if the sensations of sickness be long continued; or if they should be aggravated by any adventitious cause, or if they should be accompanied by much pain; or if pain and disease having *subsided*, shall have previously produced notwithstanding such havoc upon the constitution as to occasion positive debility; then the

feeling escapes beyond the control even of these powerful motives, and intellectual vigour can no longer be excited by any effort of volition, however strenuous. This it is, which renders the languor of convalescence so much more difficult to bear, than the continuance of positive disease ; the patient *knows* that he is recovering, yet *feels* the consciousness of being inadequate to the performance of the duties which he most desires ; he is chained down by bodily weakness which he cannot possibly shake off, and must wait for a return of bodily strength before he can give effect to his wishes. This consideration should palliate, if not in a great measure excuse, the peevishness, impatience, and irritability, which attend the *convalescence* of those who have borne severe and protracted suffering without a murmur, or a single expression approaching to complaint.

This principle is still further illustrated by the *opposite* condition of the nervous system ; and as we have already instanced a high degree of susceptibility of that system, so now would we make mention of those, in whom impressions do not easily develope morbid irritation. The power of *resisting* the influence of disease varies in almost every individual, and is a well-known physiological fact ; hence, the tendency to destruction of the animal frame is much greater in some persons than in others ; and this difference probably consists in the possession of a greater or less degree of nervous susceptibility. Be this or be it not the rationale of such a condition, it is very certain, that

there are individuals so capable of enduring protracted suffering, as in a great degree to resist its disturbing agency upon the nervous system; and it may be further observed, that their minds *appear* to possess so great a degree of independence on bodily function, that they are not influenced, *to the same extent with others*, by the varying conditions of fatigue or exhaustion, from whatever cause arising. An intimate and extensive acquaintance with the phenomena of health and disorder, will show that this happy immunity depends not upon any original constitution of *mind, but of body*; a state which renders less palpable the associated links in the chain of morbid action, and which defends the nervous apparatus from excitement upon trivial occasions; in fact, which renders it less susceptible of diseased irritation, and better capable of resisting its agency. In these cases, *the brain* is not *the weak* but the *strong organ* of the body, and therefore it is the last to be disturbed by any cause which destroys the balance of health. It will be easily seen, too, that this property, which is a gift of the Creator in the constitution of nature, and originally a purely physical attribute, may be strengthened and enlarged by the action of moral means upon the *organ* through which these manifestations of mind become cognisable; so that a firm and determinate judgment—decision of character—prompt and persevering action—inflexible justice—the influence of the affections and passions—the agency of custom and habit—and above all, the operation of religious

principle, will do much towards *establishing* what God has thus bestowed; and, on the contrary, the absence of these circumstances will render this original gift almost entirely nugatory. The power of withdrawing from *self*, and surrounding objects; of abstracting the mind from things which make a present powerful appeal to the feelings, and of fixing it upon future unseen realities, is in a great measure the result of these two causes; viz. the original constitution of the mental organ developed and enlarged by the influence of those moral agencies which give energy to intellectual and spiritual action; and which diminish the sympathetic connexion that exists between the organ of thought, and the other organs and functions of the body.

This principle will serve to explain the various and even opposite features which are remarked in different individuals, in regard to the *joyful exercise of faith*. *Faith* is, indeed, the gift of God; but the manifestations of its influence to us mortals who cannot read the inmost recesses of the heart, must be made through the clouds of materiality. Its operations upon mind and conduct, and our perception of them, are alike depending upon organic influence; and are, therefore, subjected to the laws which govern organic life. It will be manifest upon reflection, that the active exercise of faith, and hope, and joy, involves not simply a firm belief in certain principles, but also the exertion of imagination; or rather of that exquisite perception and discriminating association which

are the offspring of that mental property ; and these are essentially depending for their manifestation upon the health, and strength, and aptitude of the organ of mind. A little consideration devoted to the individuals themselves will show at once the kind of constitution in which these feelings will be found to predominate ; heightened, it is true, by moral and religious circumstances, but still most strongly marked in certain physical temperaments, in which, abstracting *the attribute of religion*, the same tendency will be found to prevail. It should, however, be distinctly understood that this property, although it *appears* to communicate a certain degree of *vigour* to the principle, is by no means *necessary* to its *steadfastness* ; and perhaps, indeed, it is not easy to estimate the liability of such quickly susceptible minds, to be upset by the powerful impression of this principle, awakened by a conviction of the favour of God, and by the anticipation of heavenly felicity ; and thus, by the re-action of mind upon matter, to have the balance of reason overturned, or the integrity of some one or other weak organ of the body destroyed. Reflection upon these circumstances will show, that the characters so situated are liable to be assailed by very different kinds of trials and difficulties, since the tendency of the one will be to doubt its possession of genuine faith, and to all the depressing consequences of this conviction ; while that of the other will be towards the effervescence of joy, and to the luxury of uncontrolled thought, floating on the surface

of an ever-wandering imagination. Happy, indeed, should we be, that the object to be most desired, and sought after, is not the *joy* of faith, but the humble confidence of child-like dependence; and that the evidence for the existence of this principle of faith is to be sought after, in the unyielding perseverance of duty, through all the difficulties of this world's contumely, rather than in the uncharacterized pleasures which arise from a heart elevated above itself and the things around it, under the precarious agency of excited and joyful emotion.

The operation of the same cause may be traced towards the close of man's earthly existence, and upon the *eve* of his dissolution. I am aware, that I am approaching a very delicate subject; but *truth* is of more value than any indulgence of the erroneous opinions of some worthy persons, who may not have sufficiently considered the influence of the dependence of mind upon matter for its manifestation; and who have, therefore, constituted the death-bed scene an event of much greater moral consequence than it really is. There are some circumstances of great importance to be considered in connexion with this subject, and which will be now pointed out somewhat in detail.

There are individuals who have viewed the *occasionally unimpaired*, and even *increased* thought, and vigour of mind towards the close of life, as an evidence of the *immateriality* and consequent *immortality* of the soul. But it is neither; and therefore the idea should not be entertained, since, if

erroneous, it can scarcely be held without evil effects. And so it is in the present instance; for if the state just detailed be received as lawful evidence of the soul's immateriality, and eternal existence; then the opposite, and by far the more frequent state, in which the mental manifestations are obscured, or perverted by disease, must be received as lawful evidence of its *materiality, decadence, and consequent approach to extinction*; a conclusion which none but the most infatuated will allow. The truth is, as we have seen, that mind is depending for the integrity of its manifestations upon the health of its organ, *the brain*. And when organic life is verging to dissolution; when all the functions of the body, depending upon the brain for their continuance, are feebly performed; and when every circumstance proclaims the approaching separation of all that is mortal in man from his spiritual nature; it is quite impossible to expect that the *manifestations* of his mind should not also be impaired; much less, that they should *generally* be brightened, and rendered more vivid and intense. True it is, that this phenomenon may be observed in some *rare instances*; and it may then be accounted for, on the principle above-mentioned, in explaining the remarkable degree of independence of some minds upon physical causes; namely, partly upon original constitution—partly upon the force of moral influences. But these influences form exceptions to the general rule, *which* is undoubtedly, that the manifestations of mind are rendered feeble or obscure, inefficient, or perverted,

exactly in proportion as its organ may have been subjected to the influence of disease.

Many persons, who are anxious for a triumphant death-bed, are not aware how much of animal fervour may be mingled with such expressions of ecstasy ; and great caution should be exercised before any reliance is placed upon phenomena of this kind. Death is a fearful event ; and though disarmed of its terrors to the Christian, it is still a violence from which nature shrinks ; and to the failing powers of the body, the quiet confidence of submissive hope, " Thy will be done," will be far more appropriate than that exulting language which depends more upon animal excitation than upon spiritual attainment. Even our blessed Saviour prayed that he might be delivered from the hour of his agony, in submission to the will of God the Father ; and with this example in their view, his followers need not be ashamed of shrinking with fear from the physical influence of death. True, indeed, that martyrs have triumphed in joy at the stake ; but then we must remember how much their minds were wrought up to a pitch of unwonted elevation, and the extraordinary support they derived from above, as witnesses for the truth in Christ ; and therefore no general rule can be drawn from their endurance of suffering. Besides, even the powerful stimulus of mere fanaticism has produced almost analogous effects ; and the firm and determined resolution of the Hindoo widow to expire on the funeral pile of her husband, may be quoted as an instance of that ecstatic state

of mind which arises from a powerful impression carrying it beyond its ordinary self. It is very possible that the courage and self-devotion of these deluded victims of false religion may sometimes, perhaps frequently, fail; but that in some instances they do not fail, we have unquestionable evidence, and it is enough for our present purpose if, at *any time*, a powerful impression upon the idolatrous mind shall have produced analogous effects with those which may have given rise to similar consequences, though with very different views, in the case of a worshipper of the true God.

In illustrating this influence of powerful moral motive, it must not be forgotten that we have similar effects produced, without even the semblance of fanaticism to give point to motive, and energy to action, viz. in the unbroken fortitude, and power of endurance, and exulting triumph over the cruelties of his tormentors—pointing out to his enemies the mode in which the intensity of their inflictions might be increased—and courageously bearing up under every ingenuity of torture without an expression of suffering—even taunting his persecutors with their little capacity to produce pain—and all for what? only to sustain the honour of his tribe—only to bear suffering and to die as a Red Indian ought to do, without giving a colourable pretext for triumph to his enemies. And if so inferior a motive can give to this fine and noble, but *natural* character, such a superiority to physical suffering under merely physical exaltation, can we wonder that the Christian

martyr may under similar circumstances exhibit an equal amount (greater he cannot) of superiority to pain, when to a similar state of physical excitation are superadded with him, all the present comforts and the future hopes of the christian religion, and all the supports and sanctions of divine truth?

However, experience shows that the *supposed rule* is fallacious, for many a feeble Christian expires in trembling doubt, while many a careless sinner is remarkable for his calm, or rather his thoughtless dismissal; many a self-righteous pharisee has left this world with exulting recollections of his own good works, on which were built his hopes of happiness beyond it. This observation is grounded, not upon theory, but upon actually witnessing the death-bed of many; and this has occurred to such an extent, and so repeatedly, that the nature of the malady, and the kind of temperament being given, it will be easy to predicate, *cæteris paribus*, the peculiarities of the death-bed. Let not, therefore, surrounding friends be too solicitous about the last words of the dying, under the influence of disease, and of failing cerebral power; but let them rather look back upon a holy and consistent life, spent in the service of God, as the fruit and evidence of faith in Christ; and as springing from the redeemed sinner's being washed, and purified, and sanctified by the blood of Christ, and clothed with his spotless righteousness, by the Spirit of our God. Here let them rest their hopes, on a ground that will not deceive

them, rather than upon the precarious phenomena of dissolution, characterized by physical temperament, encompassed by infirmity, and modified by a great diversity of organic irritation. This will form a testimony to the truth of the Gospel, far more valuable than the last expressions of the expiring Christian. "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord ; they rest from their labours, and their works do follow them."

We all need the motives of duty to be constantly before our eyes ; perhaps, therefore, there is a danger lest the above view of the subject should exert a benumbing influence upon the watchfulness and activity of the Christian ; and lest he should refer ALL the circumstances of mental joy or suffering at this season to purely physical causes. But these phenomena are not *wholly* dependent upon a bodily origin ; and indeed the state of the brain itself, at this very time, will be materially influenced by its *previous habitual* actions. And let him rest assured, that whatever may be his external situation at the moment, he has no reason to expect tranquillity, if his life has not been actively consistent with his profession. This is indeed involved in the previous supposition ; but it needs to be broadly stated, that if the believer in Christ has slumbered at the post of duty, the enemy will have sown tares among the wheat, "while men slept ;" if he has omitted to cultivate his talents to the utmost ; if he has been remiss in attending to the ordinances of religion ; if he has been careless in his walk and conversation ; if he has been proud

and highminded; if he has been negligent in discharging the offices assigned him by Providence; above all, if he has indulged any secret iniquity, or allowed any unhallowed passion, or suffered the existence of any idol in his heart, and that thus his affections have been in a measure weaned from his God and Saviour,—*then*, indeed, though his lamp may not have gone out, yet it will yield but a feeble and flickering light to others; his own hopes, also, will be undefined and uncertain; he will have planted a thorn in his dying pillow; he will have thrown a deep shade over his prospects; he will have brought anguish into his bosom, and will have exchanged the placid smile of serene and humble dependence, for the tears of bitter penitence.

But there are also other circumstances connected with the last hours of life, which enthusiasm and superstition have embraced, and to which they cling with a pertinacity of grasp, not *unusual* when determinativeness has resulted rather from feeling than from judgment. Among these may be reckoned the vision of angels, and an immediate revelation of the glory of the Saviour, and of the heavenly world. Let it then ever be recollected that the spirit, though hovering on the verge of eternal scenes, is still confined to its material tenement; and that whatever it may perceive, is *through the medium* of that corporeal habitation. It is only purely mischievous to suppose it *disembodied*, and capable of its future powers and functions. Besides, these things may be rationally

accounted for. In the failing powers of the body, and particularly of the brain, ocular spectra are not unusual; and these, characterized by an imaginative or enthusiastic disposition, will sufficiently explain phenomena which are purely corporeal in their origin. The true method of estimating these circumstances, as well as others which generally attend the near approach of dissolution, is, by remarking their varieties in different individuals, and by comparing them with the particular organ which is the principal seat of irritation in approaching death.

It will be manifest, upon a very little reflection, that in fatal diseases some one organ gives way first, loses the integrity of its functions and of its structure; or, in fact, *dies first*. This disorganisation may be primarily visible in the lungs, the heart, the stomach, the brain, or any other important viscus. When it happens to be the brain, the manifestations of mind are in ordinary cases obscured or perverted; but in some other instances an artificial brightness and intensity may be given them, just before their final dissolution, as will appear subsequently. And in those instances in which any other organ of the body is the *first* to give way, its effect upon the mental attributes will be in a ratio proportioned to the intimate sympathy and connexion which exists between the failing, dying viscus *and the brain*; *great*, where that connexion is extensive, *small*, where it is remote and contingent; in some cases scarcely at all perceptible; in others, forming one of the most painful

phenomena attaching to the pillow of sickness and the bed of death. And moreover, there will always be individual peculiarities, referrible to natural or acquired idiosyncracies, the principles of which have been already detailed. All these considerations should tend to prove of how *little comparative importance* are the circumstances of the death-bed; how *all-important* is a holy, virtuous life, built upon the love, and devoted to the service, of Christ.

There is, however, one other event to be animadverted upon in this place; *one*, which many excellent individuals appear to consider as of great importance, and as being the effect of a special revelation from on high. All such views are injudicious, and tend to the excitement of much prejudice, because they are opposed to the conclusions of *truth*. Yet the soundest wisdom is to be found in religion; and that is the truest philosophy which contemplates man in *all* his relations, compounded as these are of animal, social, and religious life. The author was particularly struck with this error, on perusing a sermon some years since, on the death of a clergyman, in which a state of this kind is evidently set forth as being very important. Yet it is not only unimportant, but the statement is injudicious. The instance alluded to was clearly one of those common events which might be accounted for on common principles; *the brain*, the organ of mind, had already been failing; and then, just before dissolution, a sudden coruscation of intellect, tinged by religious

feeling and principle, *shone forth*; an effect which indeed might be justly pleasing to by-standers, as an *evidence* of what the *previous life* had been, but certainly ought not to have been considered as the result of an especial communication from the Holy Spirit, whatever might have been the impression upon the mind of a highly susceptible individual, in a moment of deep feeling, enlarged by all the interesting circumstances of a Christian's translation from the misery and feebleness of disease, to the happiness and energy of heaven.

If the opposite conclusion were true in *one* case, it must be true in *all* similar cases; if applicable to *one*, it may be applied to *all* others, in which the analogy is perfect; and the consequences which would arise from this admission, would in themselves be inadmissible; for if it be ascribed to an especial revelation in the case of a good man, the same cause must be alleged as producing a similar effect, when, in the judgment of the most expansive charity, hope must be slender.

The *fact* is, that in *both* instances these phenomena are referable to one physiological law, viz. that *just before* the giving way of any particular organ of the body, there is communicated to it, and to the nervous system at large, a temporary stimulus, which gives to the patient a sensation as if the individual failing viscus were actually in a state of high health and vigour. This law may be easily exemplified; and indeed it is well known to all persons who have a weak digestion; under some circumstances, there will be a *feeling*

of comfort and elasticity diffused throughout the system, and, as it should seem, irradiating from the very organ in fault, the stomach, which to the uninitiated patient speaks a decided improvement of health and strength; whereas, in five minutes afterwards, a consciousness of sinking and debility, and all the other phenomena of indigestion, will proclaim that this organ was only under the influence of temporary excitation, from the *actual* commencement of that morbid action which was so speedily to terminate in failing power.

This principle may be applied to the brain; and it will be noticed that a similar excitation of mental manifestation is a very usual phenomenon as the precursor of dissolution. So frequent, indeed, and so obvious is this circumstance, that it has been noticed by ordinary attendants upon such occasions; who, without reasoning at all, or reasoning only erroneously, have termed it, a "lightening before death," a circumstance which they consider as marking the approach of that event. It is always distinguished by a high degree of energy, and intensity of cerebral manifestation; there is a strength of voice, and earnestness of manner, which for days, and even for weeks previously, have been imperceptible, and which frequently portray the *natural manner in excess*; and by this effort the patient's strength is commonly exhausted, and the last remnant of vitality is extinguished. This may happen alike to *all*; to the righteous as well as to the careless: the object only is different. In the former case, it is charac-

terized by deep views of religion ; in the latter, it relates to family affairs chiefly, or to some other subject of great, but finite interest. But *one cause* is sufficient to account for precisely similar phenomena, differing only in the mode of their application ; and if the first arise from a special revelation, so must the second likewise. Nevertheless the latter occasion is not worthy of such a supposition ; and as it is important not to call in direct *supernatural* agency, in circumstances which may be accounted for on *natural* principles ; and since prejudice is excited in weak minds by such a practice, and a stumbling-block is thrown in the way of those who are *almost* persuaded to be Christians, it is far better to choose the simple alternative of natural or physiological rationale, than to contend for a point on which no one valuable principle rests for support, which *can do* no material good, and which *may do* some harm.

The question may here be asked, of what utility is this discussion ; and what practical benefit will accrue from the conclusions, *if true* ? To this, it might be sufficient to reply, that it is always useful to arrive at *truth*, in any particular case, especially in a disputed one. But in this instance, the following objects may be stated, as attainable through the adoption of these principles.

I. To promote a spirit of charity.

Uniformity in matters of religious belief, so far as it is really attainable, is an invaluable desideratum ; but although there are some cardinal points on which all true Christians will meet, there

are others on which a certain degree of latitude must be permitted both on account of mental obliquity, and physical infirmity; for it is not possible, that all men should think alike; and, even if it *were*, they would still *express* their thoughts so dissimilarly, as to give to their hearers the idea of difference where no real discrepancy existed. Take a hundred individuals from the same class in society, and give them some recent and acknowledged event, on which to detail their own views and feelings; not only will these be different in almost every instance, but the manner in which the opinion is conveyed will be equally diversified; and this manner forms the *style* of the individual, that is, the *appropriate expression of his habits of thought and feeling*. When this style is natural, it is, for the most part, the result of physical conformation; or, in other words, of that combination of mind with matter, and of their long-continued mutual influence, which form the individual character.

If, then, opinion, and feeling, and expression, be allowed to be so various; and if this difference can be accounted for, on peculiarity of physical temperament, may we not claim a similar latitude, not for one event, and that a recent one, but for many and largely-complicated series of actions; for many incontrovertible, though not demonstrable truths; for an infinite series of moral maxims; and for the most important doctrines, some of which exceed the capacity of man's finite understanding, and can only be received as matters of belief? Must we

not allow, that the impressions received through the medium of *physical agency*, and again conveyed to others through a similar mode of communication, *may*, and indeed *must*, receive a *tinge* from such agency; an effect, which does not alter their original character, but only changes the garb in which they are clothed? If, then, there be individuality of character to account for this diversity, while the soul remains *one*, is it not just to account for this variety, upon the manner in which that soul has been united to the body, and upon the medium through which it possesses the power of manifesting its operations, namely, by the agency of physical means?

There is another class of excellent persons, who are much disposed to measure the influence of religious principle by the capacity and disposition to converse about it. They will complain of individuals, that they cannot speak about religion; or they will estimate the value of others, by observing that *they can* converse fluently and freely on this subject. Nothing can be more erroneous than this criterion; for as a general rule, in other circumstances, it will happen, that they who talk the most, feel and do the least; and that they are not to be relied upon, when they come to have their opinions tried by difficulties and perplexities, which require the forgetfulness, and even the abjuration, of selfish inclination and desire. A man of large profession, is at all times one to whom the cautious hesitate to yield their confidence; and experience has shown that volubility of expression is very

generally dissociated from depth of judgment, or the steady influence of principle; and, moreover, that it is often connected with a weak and unstable mind. So, common, indeed, is this result, that in one of the most painful situations we meet with in passing through life, viz. the disposition to suicide—it is said as the result of experience, “Be not afraid of him, *for he talks* about it.” But, granting to any number of persons an equal depth of feeling, and conviction of judgment, there will still be a great individual difference in their capacity for expressing these *identical results*. One man will be able to attend to the actions of his own mind, and to give a clear and connected view of each step, of a lengthened series of ratiocinations; but another will be utterly unable to explain a single grade by which he has advanced to the same conclusion. One will find no difficulty in embodying his thoughts in language, while this may be difficult to another, and impossible to a third. *One* will describe with great minuteness of simple detail; another will give only the broad and prominent outline; while a third will add to every phenomenon the glowing heat of imaginative colouring. One will relate his sensations in the simplest and most natural method; another with all the aids and disguises of rhetoric; while a third will be unable to describe them at all. Yet it will by no means follow, that of these individuals, the second feels the most, or that the third does not feel at all. In all probability, the converse of the proposition may be true, and that, in fact, the last

feels too deeply to find common language adequate to the utterance of his feelings ; while in the first, judgment and feeling may be nicely balanced ; and in the second imagination be the preponderating faculty. But if this be true with the common matters of ordinary reasoning, how immensely is its probability enhanced when the attention is directed to truths beyond the reach of finite capacity ; and when the whole soul is absorbed in the contemplation of those sublime and holy doctrines, which should fill and govern the heart ; or when the eye is stedfastly directed to follow the traces of His footsteps, who has been set forth as an example for our imitation. Here, again, we infer, that the deep agency of Divine truth, and the power of expressing it, are seldom commensurate ; and precisely because the former acts upon the spiritual, while the latter is manifested through the physical constitution of man. Let, then, a great degree of caution, and an expanded charity, be observed in judging of others from their habits of mere talking ; and let the judgment be directed rather to the steady consistency of active religious principle, than to the ready effervescence of feeling, or the learned loquacity of indifference.

II. To diminish the influence of prejudice.

The present view should tend to weaken the agency of that baneful monster, which often keeps the servants of the same Divine Master from each other, enthralling their minds with the fetters of ignorance, and shutting them up, not within the circle of Divine truth, but within a narrow and

exclusive pale of their own creation. It too often happens, that even those whose minds are imbued with the humility of scriptural religion ; whose hearts are warmed by the charity of the Gospel ; and whose extensive philanthropy stands confessed by all who know them ; it often happens, that even these *feel*, though perhaps reluctantly, and almost hating themselves for their feelings, a diminution of esteem for their fellow-Christians, who cannot think precisely as they think, on matters acknowledged not to be of primary moment ; or who are not animated by equally glowing anticipations ; or filled with precisely the same fears ; or stimulated to the same degree of hope ; or who do not enjoy an equal measure of confidence ;—men, whose course is marked, not so much by the expression of their views and feelings, their joys and hopes, as by the quiet, retiring, even, and consistent path they have so long trodden ! While a willing testimony is often borne to the excellence of their character, there is the feeling that *something* is still wanting ; and *which something* does, in the estimation of the prejudiced observer, detract from the completeness of the man, the friend, and the Christian. Now, it will be seen, that in all essential particulars, when tried by the law, and by the testimony, these persons are not found *wanting* ; there is sterling metal, though it may not have been so highly burnished, as would be desirable ; or it may not have been wrought after a particular fashion ; so that it does not reflect so many of the rays of truth as may be exhibited by some other

minds. And this is precisely the case ; the principle is the same, but the mode of exhibiting it varies according to [the individuality of character ; this again being modified in its manifestations, by physical agencies.

With this clue to guide him, when he feels the recoil of prejudice arising in his bosom, the charitable and well-judging Christian will inquire more narrowly ; and possibly may discover, that the difference between himself and another, which produces this aversion, consists in the *expression* of feeling, rather than in the *conviction* of judgment. The latter may be *coincident*, while the former is widely different. Now that which, even in common life, contributes to the entireness of the man, is the solidity of well-informed judgment ; that which thinks accurately, reasons dispassionately, weighs cautiously, judges slowly, deliberates comprehensively, determines firmly, and acts decidedly. It is, then, to the *result in action*, that we should look ; for each step of this process will be influenced by the physical temperament, the previous habits, the prevailing sentiments and feelings. Religion is not merely a matter of feeling, but of *judgment*, and of *action* ; for, although the contrary is too frequently the case, and although feeling predominates, where there is very little judgment, yet it will ever be found, that, in the hour of trial, *this* is not to be relied upon, like the uniform, unbending principle of settled conviction. And it should be recollected, that this, too, is the scriptural test ; for the righteous who enter into

life eternal, and who inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world, are not such as have been most prominent in the display of their feelings; but, rather, those whose genuine unostentatious faith has produced the fruits of righteousness in the life. "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you, from the foundation of the world; for I was an hungered, and ye gave me meat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink; I was a stranger, and ye took me in; naked, and ye clothed me; I was sick, and ye visited me; I was in prison, and ye came unto me. Then shall the righteous answer Him, saying, Lord, when saw we then an hungered, and fed Thee? or thirsty, and gave Thee drink? When saw we Thee a stranger, and took Thee in? or naked, and clothed Thee? Or when saw we Thee sick, or in prison, and came unto Thee? And the King shall answer, and say unto them, Verily, I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me."

If, then, this *unwilling* impression of diminished regard do actually operate even with the liberal and the charitable, how much more with those pious persons whose minds have not been expanded by education, by collision with society, and by the habit of taking enlarged views of men and things! It is individuals of this class, who are particularly subjected to the agency of prejudice; and whose simple honesty requires to be convinced of the importance of making an allowance for the

different *expression* of religious opinions, and feelings, and sentiments, according to the cast of individual character ; this tinge being communicated by the peculiar mode of mental action ; and this again depending not a little on the particular modification of physical temperament.

III. A third object of the present discussion, is *to cheer the desponding*.

There are those who go on heavily through their whole lives—walking in the fear of God—reposing by faith on the atonement of their Saviour, doing his will, and seeking the promised influence of his Holy Spirit, yet apparently wanting in that joy and comfort, which we might consider *should result* from being found consistently in the path of duty. They are disposed to question their sincerity and devotedness to God, because their path is not strewn with flowers ; they doubt the reality of their interest in Christ, because they are destitute of those pleasures which others have experienced in obeying his laws ; and yet they are ever found at the post of duty ; and in the hour of trial and temptation they do not fall away, but are always discovered firmly clinging to that Rock, which will resist the attack of all the enemies of their souls. Notwithstanding, a settled gloom surrounds them, and prevents their seeing that they are secretly upheld by the Spirit of Christ ; and that it is their earnest desire, though supported and encouraged by very little of enjoyment, to obey Christ, and to minister in every way to his disciples. It may be, that, in some instances, the mind is clouded by an

adherence to some idolatrous affection, which may not yet have been effectually given up ; or by the unacknowledged indulgence of some favourite sin ; but it will much oftener happen, that this state is depending upon purely physical causes, and that it may be alleviated by their removal. There are some minds so constituted, as to be always anxious ; fear is their predominant characteristic ; doubt and hesitation mark their conduct ; the dark side of the cloud is alone seen by them ; difficulties are imagined, where none exist ; trials are fabricated from the simplest circumstances ; and life ceases to be *chequered with good and evil* : for *every* point is encompassed with more or less of sorrow, and the heart is *sad*, in the midst of every cause of rejoicing. Now, let such a mind be deeply imbued with religious truth ; and its prevailing natural tinge will be still discernible ; humanly speaking, its way will be marked by tears, and closely attended by fear ; despair will haunt its footsteps ; and it will be well, if soundness of mental manifestation be not the price of a too exclusive devotion to one particular idea. This state may sometimes be removed by causes acting *on the body* ; but *it has* continued through life, and even up to the moment of dissolution ; the departing Christian has remained under a cloud of bodily infirmity, till he has exchanged all that is mortal and material, for all that is immortal and immaterial ; and has entered into that light, where his sun shall no more go down, neither shall the moon withdraw her shining. The night of physical

infirmity has brooded over the evening of his life, with her sable wing; and he has walked on in darkness, assailed by the wintry storm of adversity, in the long night of seeming absence from his God, encompassed by uncertainty, attended by unreal and imaginary dangers, and conscious of being surrounded by foes to his well-being, whose power over him appeared to increase in proportion as his hands hung down. But still he has been enabled to maintain a *principled perseverance*; and a glorious day will suddenly break upon him, when he shall have escaped from the burden of materiality, and shall have rested from his labours, by having entered into the joy of his Lord. *This*, then, is the criterion; not, does the Christian *rejoice* in his path? but does he walk in it *consistently*, reaching *onward*, and *still onward*, after greater conformity to Christ? If so, he will continue to advance, though he may not perceive it, and although to his last hour he may consider himself as wanting in the essential matter of christian joyfulness. The Christian is commanded to *rejoice*, and he has reason to do so, apart from physical infirmity, provided that he is really pursuing the great object of his life; but as well may it be expected that the blind should see, or the deaf hear, as that the Christian, possessed of a *melancholic temperament*, should *always rejoice*: the command, like many others, is given to those who *can receive it*, but not to him; if he rejoice at all, it is when spirit triumphs over an organ unsuited for the manifestations of joy—or,

in other words, when mind obtains the supremacy over matter, and the agency of physical temperament is subjugated by the halcyon influence of the Holy Spirit of God. This state of continued gloom was exemplified in one of the instances above mentioned,—G. K., who was remarkable for her exemplary conduct, but who, during a period of twenty, or even more years, considered herself as lost; and never being able to realize a self-appropriating interest in the finished righteousness of her Redeemer, died without enjoying *hope*, though always clinging to the Rock of Ages.

IV. In these views, there is also ground to check the presumptuous, and to arrest the self-willed devotee of feeling.

There are characters, whose physical temperament is so constituted, that the cloud of doubt scarcely ever crosses the serene atmosphere of their tranquil joys: to these everything looks bright—their present position, and that of those around them, is the best and the most favoured; their sanguine views are scarcely ever disturbed by the storm of dissatisfaction, or by the hesitation of fear, or by the uncertainty of doubt. Faith, it is true, is the gift of God; and it may be communicated in very varying measure to different individuals; but a great *apparent* distinction may very generally depend upon that kind of physical constitution which naturally prompts a greater display of the principle in one than in another; so that the same amount of spiritual faith shall exhibit very different traces, according to the physical temperament through which these

traces are descried. In those in whom there seems to be a predominance of the principle, it will be found that their feelings are easily excited, and that they possess at all times a warmth of character which admirably fits them for zeal and activity on the great theatre of christian exertion, and gives them an extent of influence, which forms a talent most highly to be desired and cultivated. Yet let caution attend their path ; let them recollect how uncertain a *guide* is excited feeling, in pursuit of the solid results of deliberate judgment ; let them not be high-minded, but *fear* ; let them not congratulate themselves that their mountain standeth strong, while it is in any degree based on an arm of flesh ; let them inquire *how much* of natural or physical energy of character attends their exertions ; *how much* their lively views are depending upon the sanguine constitution of their physical temperament ; *how much* their peace and joy are connected with the integrity of their nervous system ; and let them earnestly *pray and strive* to be kept humble and dependent, and to be preserved from being exalted above measure by the abundance of their hopes ; let them, moreover, learn to look charitably upon those who are not thus abundantly gifted ; let them not rashly consider these as necessarily possessing a smaller proportion of faith, but as being perhaps less furnished by nature with the means for its manifestation ; above all, let them avoid a degree of unsteadiness of character, so frequently attaching to this kind of physical constitution, if allowed its unlimited

range, and which really only forms the material and the temporary tenement of that immaterial spirit which will hereafter know all things.

V. The consideration of this subject should stimulate the feeble and the languid.

If the immortal principle be thus dependent for its *manifestations* upon the incumbrances of materiality, still it must be recollected that this forms no excuse for indolence, or lukewarmness, or supine proceeding. For although the operations of mind may be influenced by matter, it must never be forgotten that this matter is again capable of being acted upon by mind ; that it is subjected to the laws of habit and association ; and that an organ remarkable for its defective formation *now*, may by them, and by a *powerful effect of volition*, be carried to a degree of energy and perfection which could not at first have been calculated upon ; that which is difficult to-day, may, through the blessing of God upon christian vigilance and exertion, be rendered presently attainable ; and, after a time, become so habitual, as to be accomplished without effort. *Duty* is the atmosphere we breathe ; and *pursuit* the very life-blood of christian existence. When once man begins to vegetate, he drops the noble attribute of his character ; whenever he can be satisfied with present attainments, there is an end of his usefulness and value ; he must never be contented, unless the character of his day, and of every one of his days, be that of progress ! True, it may be *slow* ; but still it must be *advancing*, or he cannot be holy or happy. If he is feeble and

languid ; if he is less capable of exertion than some of his more highly-gifted neighbours, it is only a motive to inspire him with greater energy of purpose, that he may make up by increased exertion for this apparent loss of power ; and let him remember that God giveth more grace, *not to the indolent*, but to the humble and diligent inquirer. Let him propose to himself, for imitation, the character of Christ ; in it will be traced this attribute of progressive exertion. And let him feel assured, that although others with more splendid talents may outstrip him in his course, yet that Christ delights to dwell with the humble ; that *He* carries the lambs in his bosom, and gently leads those that are with young ; and that the reward is promised not to the gift of brilliant talent, but to the persevering exertion of sincere desire.

CONCLUSIONS.

I. The brain is the organ of mind.

II. Mind is possessed by man in common with the lower animals.

III. In man, however, there is this grand distinction, that he possesses a spiritual principle superadded to animal mind ; of which his enlarged brain is equally the organ.

IV. But the brain is the servant of mind.

V. As such, man is minutely responsible for all his acts and deeds, since it is the spiritual moral principle which gives laws to organisation, and not organisation which gives laws to spiritual manifestation.

VI. The doctrines of phrenology may be true, but are not proven ; they are unimportant to the present discussion ; since, if the brain be divisible into a multitude of organs, they will all come under the one general law above expressed.

VII. The doctrines of phrenology as held by many of its professors, and the materialism to

which they lead, are equally unphilosophical and untrue.

VIII. There is a law of essential progression enstamped upon man's history ; and deprived of this constant progress, he cannot fulfil the great end of his being.

IX. This essential progression is dependent, partly, upon mental experience ; partly, upon the increased aptitude of the organ for conducting its functions.

X. Man is a *free agent* : he can, if he will, choose the good, and refuse the evil ; but that *will may be*, and *generally is, perverted* : and at all events this function of volition is under a number of sinister influences.

XI. This *free agency* may exist in ignorant or in enlightened man ; but in the former it will be limited by prejudice and passion ; in the latter it will be guided and governed by the education of the organ, by moral and religious principles and motives, and by the influences of the Holy Spirit.

XII. These motives and principles are dependent on that future state of rewards and punishments, which awaits mankind according to the deeds done in the body, and which forms a part of revealed truth, being also perfectly consistent with the analogy of nature.

XIII. The morbid manifestations of mind, which are generally termed " mental diseases," are depending upon corresponding states of the brain, as the organ of mind.

XIV. The mind has a wonderful influence upon

the body, both in its sound and disordered conditions; and it is necessary to consider well this influence, in order to maintain the perfect integrity of both, and their reciprocal dependence.

XV. The body, that is, the physical temperament, at all times, and especially its peculiar state at the moment, has an extraordinary influence upon the manifestations of mind; and due allowance should be made for this influence.

XVI. Nevertheless, as mind is supreme, and body subordinate; and as the will is that function through which mind and body are to be governed, man continues responsible for all his actions, thoughts, and feelings; and his physical temperament is never to be admitted as a ground of exemption, from certain moral obligations which remain indestructible, always the same, and invariably operative.

XVII. The whole of the foregoing discussion must be reviewed in order to form a just conception of the relative and reciprocal influence of mind and matter.

THE END.

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