A CRUST
FOR THE
PHRENOLOGISTS;
BEING
A VIDIMUS OF LECTURES ON PHRENOLOGY,
Purposed shortly to be offered to the Public,

IN WHICH THE DELUSIVE AND UNFOUNDED CHARACTER OF THAT PRETENDED AND VAUNTED SCIENCE, IN BOTH ITS DEPARTMENTS, PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL, WILL BE DEMONSTRATED.

Then comes my fit again; I had else been perfect;
Whole as the marble, founded as the rock;
As broad and general as the casing air;
But now I am cabined, cribbed, confined, bound in
To saucy doubts and fears.

GLASGOW:
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MDCCCXLII.
Notice.—The Lectures, of which the matter contained in the following pages is given as a vidimus of the line of argument to be pursued in them, are intended to be delivered in Glasgow a few weeks hence, and in some of the principal towns of Scotland and England during the course of the ensuing winter.

Glasgow, Nov. 1st, 1842.
A CRUST FOR THE

PHRENOLOGISTS, &c.

An individual, author of several works on Political and Moral Science, has at present, in a state of advanced preparation, a Course of Lectures on Phrenology, which he purposes to offer to the public, in which he will show the delusive character, and utter groundlessness, of that pretended and vaunted Science, in both its departments, Physical and Metaphysical.

In these discourses the Lecturer will give a critical review of the doctrines, as they are laid down in the standard institutionary books of Phrenology; and will show, from the principles of the science, thence derived, and from the nature of the pretended facts whence its deductions are wholly drawn, that no conclusions resting upon such premises can be true (except by chance) or trustworthy, in any instance.

It will be shown that both classes of their so-called facts*—namely, first, the pretended discovery of the existence and relative sizes of the thirty-five organs of Phrenology; and second, the ascertainment of the measure or degree in which the faculties are possessed by different individuals above others, exclusive of the effects of the education and circumstances peculiar to each, are both of them impossible. It will be shown

* Mr Combe says—Syst. Pren. p. 791—That "Phrenology is the assertion of certain physical facts," meaning the existence of the Phrenological organs.
that every proposition affirming the existence and size of an organ—and every one affirming the measure or degree in which an individual possesses any faculty above others, exclusive of the effects of the education he has received, and of the peculiar circumstances in which he has been placed—so far from being entitled to the name of facts, are conclusions, or inferences, drawn from innumerable, perplexed, and arbitrary considerations, and from estimates of innumerable items of evidence, each one of which is of the most uncertain and undeterminable description.

Mr. Combe lays it formally down, that "For the purpose of comparing mental faculties with cerebral development, it is necessary to show, Ist, that the mental qualities of individuals can be discovered."† And his conclusion on this head is, that "It is possible, by accurate, patient, and continued observation of actions, to discover the true dispositions and capacities which individuals possess."‡

Now this is a gross misrepresentation of what it is necessary to show "for the purpose of comparing mental faculties with cerebral development," for the ends of Phrenology—because, for this purpose it is not merely necessary to show that the mental faculties, and dispositions, and capacities, actually possessed by individuals, can be discovered; it is necessary to show that the measure or degree in which individuals possess those mental faculties, dispositions, and capacities, above others, exclusive of the effects of the particular education which has been given them, and of the peculiar circumstances in which they have been placed, can be discovered: For it is the residue of the force of the manifestations of the faculties in any individual, after due allowance has been made for the effects of

† System of Phrenology, fourth edition, p.
‡ Idem, p.
education and circumstances, which must balance the organic force of his cerebral development, or the power of the Phrenological organs. In every instance of comparison of the power of a Phrenological organ, with the force of the manifestations of its supposed faculty, in any individual, the experimenter in Phrenology is required to make allowance for the effects of education and circumstances. "He must not," says the first lecture, "take the faculty simply as it exists in the individual, modified as it is—exalted or depressed—excited or deadened—by education and circumstances. On the contrary, he is required to make allowance for all these circumstances—for all the circumstances of his life and education. He is required, in considering the force and energy of the faculty, as exhibited in the individual's conduct and actions, to deduct the proper modicum for the exciting circumstances, and to add, in the same due measure, for the circumstances of an opposite tendency to which he has been exposed by his education and the other accidents of his life; and to extract, disentangle, and draw out the natural and original force of the faculty, pure and unalloyed, from all these factitious and super-added influences."

To discover this original or organic force of the faculty is quite a different thing—is a totally different undertaking, and species of inquiry—from that of discovering "the mental faculties" and "capacities" which individuals possess, as they are exhibited in their conduct and actions. To discover the faculties which individuals possess, to a certain extent, from their conduct and actions, cannot be at all difficult; since it is laid down and acknowledged that every individual, "not an idiot," possesses the whole of them. If a man hums a tune, we immediately discover that he possesses that faculty; if he understands the rule of three, the same thing happens; we discover that he possesses the
faculty of number; and in this manner we may discover the faculties of Benevolence, Philoprogenitiveness, and the rest. But to discover the different degrees in which individuals possess these dispositions and capacities: the different degrees in which they are benevolent, for example, or in which they love their children more than other individuals love theirs, is somewhat harder, frequently baffling the close observation of years to accomplish it. "In modern times," says Mr. Maenish, "life is all a disguise. Almost every man walks in masquerade, and his most intimate friend very often does not know his real character. Many wear smiles constantly upon their cheeks, whose hearts are unprincipled and treacherous. Many with violent tempers have all the external calm and softness of charity itself. Some speak always with sympathy, who, at soul, are full of gall and bitterness."†

Nevertheless, it would be presumptuous altogether to deny the very cautiously enunciated proposition of Mr. Combe, that "It is possible, by accurate, patient, and continued observation of actions, to discover the true dispositions and capacities which individuals possess;"‡ because it is probably true in many instances, and the proposition is not a universal one: he does not say "which every individual possesses." But sup-

† Anatomy of Drunkenness, fifth edition, p. 50.
‡ Here, I would ask, how many of the disciples of Phrenology have time for this "accurate, patient, and continued observation of actions," when it is considered that a good number of instances of individuals must be observed, watched, and studied in this "continued" and "patient" manner, to prove the sign of one organ upon the skull, and thirty-five times that number, whatever it may be, to prove the whole Phrenological map? For as the Phrenologists disclaim all pretensions to prove the doctrines in their books, every one must either repeat this process or take their science as they themselves give it out. They tell us that we must "interrogate nature," and prove the doctrines, each individual, or disciple, for himself.
posing the proposition had been put universally—and suppose we should grant it in that form—still nothing would be granted which could avail the Phrenologist in his comparison of an organ with the force of the manifestations of its faculty. For this purpose it is required that it should be further granted that the Phrenologist could discover how much of the force of the "true dispositions and capacities which individuals possess" is to be ascribed to education and circumstances, and how much to the organic power of the faculty—a postulate which never can be granted to the Phrenologists.

That this point of doctrine, then, should have been stated as it has been here done by Mr. Combe is exceedingly extraordinary—that it should have been formally laid down by the greatest master of the science, that, "For the purpose of comparing mental faculties with cerebral development, it is necessary to show that mental faculties can be discovered," without its being noticed at the same time that it is also necessary to discover how much of the force of these mental faculties is to be ascribed to education and circumstances, before such comparison can be made available for the purposes of the Phrenological enquirer—namely, to ascertain whether the force of the manifestations of the mental faculties thus modified agrees with the cerebral development. That such an enunciation of this point of doctrine, I say, should have been made by the greatest master of the science, cannot be characterised otherwise than as a gross misrepresentation of the true state of the case, calculated to veil from the sight of the raw and unsuspecting disciple the main difficulty which attaches to this part of the question, and which interposes a barrier across his path, in this direction, which the Phrenologist will never be able to surmount.

"For the purpose of comparing mental faculties
with cerebral development” Mr. Combe lays it down further, that “it is necessary to show, 2dly, that the size of different parts of the brain can be ascertained during life.”‡ This affirmation is quite vague. It is not the same with the assertion that the size of the supposed organs of Phrenology can be ascertained during life; and whilst it must be admitted, of course, that the size of different parts of the brain may be ascertained in a general way, or to a certain extent, during life—as, for example, whether one individual has a larger or less mass of brain in the forcpart of his head than another—it will be proved that the size of the Phrenological organs, supposing them to exist, never could be ascertained either during life or after death: because, not to mention here numerous other obstacles of a minor description, these supposed organs, or the parts of the brain assigned as their localities, lie generally several of them together under one smooth surface of the skull, whether it be flat and nearly level or consist of one continuous unmarked elevation; and as it is admitted by the Phrenologists that their organs encroach upon one another, and vary their situations in each head,‖ when they show themselves by separate bumps or protuberances; so, of course, when they lie several of them under one smooth surface, being in that situation equally liable to vary their sizes and situations, and to encroach upon one another, unseen and unknown to the Phrenologist, he can never know their divisions or sizes under that predicament; not knowing which organ encroaches or which is encroached upon, or how far they encroach upon one another, and vary their situations, in the dark and impenetrable space beneath that smooth surface—un-

‡ System of Phrenology, p. 84.
‖ Combe’s System of Phrenology, p. 121, 122.
‖ Macnish’s Introduction to Phrenology, p. 66.
less he could see through the skull itself, and there
discover—what no anatomist can discover upon dis-
section—"the brain to be divided and parcelled out
as his imagination figures it to him in her obstinate
vagaries."§

It will be shown that this difficulty, or rather this
obvious impossibility, of discovering the dimensions of
the organs lying under the predicament now stated, is
palpably slurred over, and left totally unexplained in
the Phrenological books. The difficulty is only barely
noticed, and passed by; only six sentences being de-
voted to the mention—for it cannot be called explica-
tion—of this difficulty, in Mr. Combe's "System of
Phrenology," and Dr. Macnish's "Introduction to
Phrenology" put together—four sentences in the latter
work, in which Dr. Macnish affirms the possibility of
discovering the size of the organs under the smooth
surface, but neither shows, nor attempts to show how
it can be done; and two sentences in the System of
Phrenology, in which Mr. Combe neither affirms nor
denies the possibility, but merely states, in the first of
them, the fact, that when several neighbouring organs
are all equally developed, "the surface is smooth," and
"no protuberance can be perceived;" and in the se-
cond of them he tells us to learn "from books, plates,
and casts, or personal instruction"—not how to discover
their dimensions under the predicament stated, but
something else—namely, "to distinguish the form of
each organ, and its appearance when developed in
different proportions to the others;" that is, when they
are separately elevated and protuberant!

The following is the manner in which this subject,
so vital to their science, is treated by these two au-
thors, the passages now to be quoted being the only
ones in which it is noticed by them.

§ Lecture II.
Dr. Macnish puts the question—"Are we always to expect a prominence or bump when a particular organ is large?"

No;" he replies. "If several adjoining organs are all large, none of them will, probably, present any particular projection; there will be merely a general fulness in the locality occupied by them. It is only when an organ decidedly predominates over those in its immediate vicinity, that a protuberance is to be looked for. An inexperienced Phrenologist has much difficulty in estimating the size of organs where there is uniformity of surface, and is hence apt to deny the possibility of following up the science; but one who has sufficiently studied it feels no such difficulty. He estimates the dimensions of the organs correctly, although there is not the slightest bulging out of any particular part beyond those in its vicinity; but this requires considerable experience, and is not to be learned all at once."

These are Dr. Macnish's four sentences on this question, and they are at least intelligible and explicit, although the whole amounts to nothing more than a bare assertion of the possibility of discovering the dimensions of the organs under the predicament mentioned, and this without a blush, in the front of the manifest impossibility of it. But Mr. Combe's two sentences on the same subject are of a far more extraordinary kind. They are as follow:—

"If one organ be much developed, and the neighbouring organs very little, the developed organ will present an elevation or protuberance; but if the neighbouring organs be developed in proportion, no protuberance can be perceived, and the surface is smooth. The student should learn from books, plates, and casts, or personal instruction (and the last is by far the best),

§ Introduction to Phrenology, p.p. 40, 41.
to distinguish the form of each organ and its appearance when developed in different proportions to the others, because there are slight modifications in the position of them in each head!"§

This is all that is said by Mr. Combe upon this question, or upon the method of discovering the dimensions of the organs when they lie several of them together under one smooth surface. But this is not explaining the matter; it is turning tail and running away from it. In the first of these sentences Mr. Combe confesses that when several neighbouring organs are equally developed "the surface is smooth," and that "no protuberance can be perceived;" and when we should have expected that he would inform us how we should discover their different sizes under that predicament, he looks us broad in the face, and tells us to "learn from books, plates, and casts, or personal instruction," what?—to discover their sizes when they are separately elevated and protuberant!—"when developed," as he confusedly expresses it, "in different proportions to the others!" And he never opens his lips upon the subject more.

Yet without proving, or attempting to prove, that the different sizes of two or more organs lying under one smooth surface can be discovered, he seems to expect that we will not press him hard upon this point, but generously overlook it; because otherwise, he states, and informs us with great humility a little afterwards, Phrenology could not have any foundation; thus: "Each organ has a form, appearance, and situation, which it is possible, by practice, to distinguish in the living head, otherwise Phrenology cannot have any foundation!"||

There are, in the same section of Mr. Combe's work

§ System of Phrenology, p. 120.
|| System of Phrenology, p. 122.
in which these passages are found, numerous directions for discovering the size of the organs, but these only explain the manner of doing it where there are separate bumps or prominences, or marked and distinguishable boundaries for each—where they are “developed in different proportions to the others,” to use Mr. Combe’s very distinct and judiciously chosen expression, when he is particularly anxious to make matters very clear.

In one of these directive passages which follows the foregoing he says, “The question will perhaps occur—If the relative proportions of the organs differ in each individual, and if the Phrenological bust represents only their most common appearances, how are their boundaries to be distinguished in any particular living head? The answer is—By their forms and appearances.”§ But where several organs—suppose four—lie under one smooth surface, upon which “no protuberance can be perceived,” there are no “forms” nor “appearances” by which we can “distinguish” any “boundaries,” except those which circumscribe the whole four organs. Of course there is no possible way here of discovering the dimensions of any one of them; because we can never know how much or how little any one of them has varied its situation, or how much or how little they have encroached one upon another.

In another of these directive passages Mr. Combe says, “When one organ is very largely developed, it encroaches on the space usually occupied by the neighbouring organs, the situations of which are thereby slightly altered. When this occurs, it may be distinguished by the greatest prominence being near the centre of the large organ, and the swelling extending over a portion only of the others. In these cases the shape should be attended to; for the form of the organ is then easily recognised, and is a sure indication of the particular one which is largely developed.”

§ System of Phrenology, p. 122.
Here it is seen we have a "prominence" and a "swelling" to guide us. "It may be distinguished by the greatest prominence," he says; and by "the swelling extending over a portion only of the others." But nothing is said in this place, or anywhere else in Mr. Combe's book, about how we are to proceed where there is no "greatest prominence" or "swelling"—where, to use Mr. Combe's own words, "no protuberance can be perceived." When this is the case then, how, I repeat, are we to proceed? Where are, then, Mr. Combe's forms and appearances? "They are all blotted out from his sight—they are all swept away and rolled down to the level of the smooth green turf; and although he may indulge his imagination with the pastime of pourtraying and figuring to himself parterres and serpentines upon that uniform and unvariegated surface, there are no parterres there for all that—not a single row of box or willow to relieve the longing eye of the disconsolate and disconcerted Phrenologist—not the smallest inequality in the bristling sward, so nicely and neatly is the vapid expanse shaven and cropped."*

This doctrine, that the organs encroach upon one another, and vary their situations in each head, is one of their fundamentals; and is employed by the Phrenologists to solve cases which would be otherwise anomalous, and contradict the doctrines. And if there were anything true about their doctrines this must be so, for the organs could not vary their sizes without varying their situations; and when this happens where several are under one smooth surface nobody can ever know it.

Further, it will be shown in these proposed lectures that there is a third impossibility which the Phrenolo-

gists must perform before they can complete one Phrenological observation or experiment; or before they can discover whether the disposable power of an organ exactly balances the (circumstantially) modified force of the manifestations of its supposed faculty: for an organ has other business to transact besides manifesting its faculty—it has other powers to oppose and to contend with, before it gets leave, or can acquire the predominating force required to manifest its faculty at all. These powers which an organ has to contend with, and to vanquish in battle, before it is at liberty to manifest its faculty, are a given number of the other thirty-four organs. It has also a given number of alliances, or confederations, to enter into with the remainder of these thirty-four powers, to assist it in its struggles against those which are opposed and adverse: for all the organs are either friends and allies, or enemies and opponents. Thus, for example, before Benevolence can manifest its faculty, or give a single farthing in charity, it must resist the force, and repel the opposition, of Acquisitiveness, Alimentiveness, and others; and to enable it to overcome these powers, it must, if it be feeble itself, enter into alliances with Love of approbation, and others.

The power of every organ, it is to be recollected, is modified more or less by the forces and influences of all the other thirty-four organs. Every one of these forces must therefore be known to the observing or experimenting Phrenologist, in every instance; and their modifying influences upon the organ whose power is to be compared with the manifestations of its faculty must be calculated, and put into two different scales, which must be balanced against one another, and the difference of their weights placed to the credit of the organ if it be on the side of increasing its power; and to its debit if it goes to diminish it. All this must be done in every Phrenological observation or experi-
ment, before a correct balance can be struck, or tried, between the free disposable force of the organ and the modified force of the manifestations of the faculty!

Who, then, I ask, shall pretend to calculate the result of the workings and counter-workings of these thirty-five powers? What profound mechanic shall pretend to foretell the precise effect of the movements of so complicated a machine? "Each one of these thirty-five organs or faculties of Phrenology constitutes a separate and distinct force; but each has a modifying influence upon all the others, and is itself modified differently upon every change of the relative size or force of these others—changes which are infinite in their modes, and numerous beyond conception—the relative sizes and forces, or combinations, of the faculties and organs never being found precisely alike in any two individuals of the human race. To predicate the result or effects, therefore, of any given combination of the organs or faculties, supposes not only a knowledge of the exact force of every one of them taken separately, but of the altered force and tendency of each under the controlling and modifying influences of all the others—a knowledge depending upon considerations too numerous, too complicated, and too subtile to be fully comprehended, or exactly weighed and estimated by the most penetrating genius."‡ "What effect, I ask, has Individuality upon Amativeness? What effect has Tune upon the same organ? It will not do to say they have none at all; for it is undoubted that each must have some effect, greater or less, upon all the others; and that either the defalcation, or the increase or diminution of power of any organ or faculty, must produce a different natural character, and must alter in some measure the powers and workings of all
the others. If this is denied, let the Phrenologists tell us which organ has an effect upon the others and which not; and let them prove their *dicta* in this matter, in a clear and intelligible manner, and not put us off with a single sentence, and with the interjection of an "Oh! we find it so in nature."†

It will be shown still further, with reference to the doctrine of the *temperaments*, that this doctrine introduces a new and unlimited source of uncertainty and of *latitude* in estimating the force of the organs, which, although the facilities for making that estimate entirely arbitrary were before unbounded, presents us with an additional infinity of itself, applicable to the same purpose.

But I shall not here dole out to the Phrenologists any more of these *crumbs* of argument, but let what has been already hinted suffice upon this division of the science, I mean its Craniology. I shall only remark, what appears to be very little attended to by the disciples, that the Phrenological writers neither prove nor pretend to prove their science to any but themselves—that is, each Phrenologist for himself. They tell us that they cannot exhibit their premises, but only their conclusions in their books—they tell us that "self-conviction can only be founded on self-observation;"‡ that we must "interrogate nature" and "she will afford us premises;" and that "the premises are found in nature, and the conclusions only in the books."§

Thus much, then, just now, with reference to the Craniology of the science. As to the metaphysical

† Lecture IV.—It may be added here that no Phrenologist ever saw, or had experience of, two cases *exactly alike.*

‡ Spurzheim.

§ Combe; Answers to Dr. Roget.
department of it, the Phrenology, properly so called, of the system, which is vaunted and extolled as a new and improved system of mental and moral philosophy, it will be shown that Craniology makes known no new principles of human nature—that it furnishes no new materials to the Phrenological workman with which he should be enabled to construct any new system of mental or moral philosophy. Because all the faculties, propensities, and qualities of Phrenology, that are real constituent principles of human nature, were known from human conduct and action, independently of, and antecedently to, their pretended discovery at second hand, from the bumps upon the skull. This is manifest; because these bumps are merely the signs of faculties which, if proved at all, have been proved from human conduct and actions. Craniology, therefore, presents no new faculty of human nature to the Phrenologist—no new data for the construction of any new or sound mental or moral philosophy.

"This department of their science the Phrenologists found upon their nomenclature of the faculties, propensities, and qualities of human nature, duplicates of which they pretend to have discovered written down upon the skull. I say duplicates; because these writings, or signs upon the skull, must, if true signs of true faculties, have been proved; and if false signs, must yet be pretended to have been proved, from human conduct, before they could be known or established as the signs of those faculties. It is therefore manifest that these faculties, propensities, and qualities were all known and available for any purpose to which they might be applicable, antecedently to, and independently of, Craniology. It is therefore demonstrated that the Phrenologists possess no new materials or data of faculties, propensities, or qualities wherewith to construct any new mental or moral science; and that their uncouth, cumbersome, and absurd system, com-
pounded of Amativeness, Philoprogenitiveness, Acquisitiveness, and the rest, might have been hatched, eoneoeted, and presented to the admiring gaze of all-devouring eredulity, independently of Craniology, by merely adopting the same ridiculous nomenclature, had any new-system-monger taken it into his head to do so. The materials were all at hand, independently of Craniology; the only thing necessary to have been done for such a purpose being to have re-baptised and re-designated them with their new swollen and foot-and-half-long names."

It will be shown, upon this part of the question, what true moral science is, and that the mighty "boon"\(^+\) which Mr. Combe would confer upon moral science by presenting it with a bump which is to discover what actions are right or wrong, virtuous or vicious, moral or immoral, by the smell, or something like it, and which is to supersede all reasoning and inquiry into their effects or tendencies to produce good or evil, happiness or misery, to mankind, is quite of a piece with the uniform absurdity and charlatanerie of his whole Phrenological lucubrations.

In his hodge-podge treatment of this most momentous of all questions, Mr. Combe has raked up, out of Brown's Lectures and "Stewart's Outlines," all the exploded doctrines of Hobbes, Cudworth, Mandeville, Clarke, Reid, and others, which are allowed to oeeup and amuse the hours and years of boys at college; the multiplicity and jarring eharacters of which he fondly imagines may open a way for the reception of his "boon;" though the multiplicity of opinions and jar- rings of the Phrenological writers with reference to their metaphysieal doctrines and their analyses, as they eall them, of their faculties, and with reference to this

\(^+\) Lecture VII.

\(^+\) System of Phrenology, p. 355.
very bump and "boon"—the existence of which the founder of their science totally and flatly denies—are ten times greater than those of the metaphysical writers he enumerates.

I have said that the doctrines of these writers as to the fundamental principle or law of morality are exploded. I say so because, as will be shown, the true fundamental law of morality, or fundamental principle of every general rule of moral conduct, has been fully and irrefragably demonstrated; and because, although this fundamental principle is still denied, disputed, and repudiated in words by the combined powers of all the sinister interests in the world, or by all who participate or hope to participate, in the plunder which sinister interest implies; yet its truth and supremacy is universally acknowledged by all parties, in a far more authentic and unquestionable shape, by the fact of the whole of them, to a man, pleading to its jurisdiction whenever they are brought to defend or advocate their measures or systems in the face of the world. Of the truth of which fact Mr. Combe is, of course, amongst the rest, himself an instance, who, when he defends and advocates his system of Phrenology, does it upon the ground that the adoption and cultivation of it will promote the interest, advantage, and happiness (not the misery?) of the human family. This great law of utility, I say, is universally appealed to by the propounders of new systems of speculative philosophy, as well as by the practical statesman and lawgiver, however they may often, from policy or from ignorance, decline acknowledging the principle in terms.

The speculative moral philosopher, in propounding and advocating his rules of moral conduct, and the practical statesman, in proposing his political laws, universally pay homage to this great principle of utility, and appeal to its tribunal. The former does
this through the press, the latter by his speeches in the senate; though it happens sometimes that the Parliamentary candidate turns his back upon this principle on the hustings, when he tells the populace, whose crude theories and rude hands he fears, that the existing political laws, or “law of the land,” is the only rule or foundation of right and wrong!

“Every general rule of moral conduct, and every political law which is proposed, is either consistent or inconsistent with the fundamental and supreme law of utility; and the problems which moral inquirers, and practical law-givers have to solve, are—What rules of moral conduct, and what political laws are consistent with it.‡ And in every instance in which they are successful in establishing this consistency, in demonstrating clearly to our understandings that any such rule or law has this sanction, that it is calculated to produce the greatest sum of human happiness, taking all circumstances of course into account, remote as well as immediate—we are bound, as reasonable beings—whether it be a general voluntary rule of conduct, such as those of temperance, frugality, industry, fidelity, fortitude, and the rest of this sort,§ or a proposed

‡ In the debate in the House of Commons, May 2d, 1842, on the motion for hearing counsel on behalf of the parties who signed “The National Petition,” Lord John Russell said:—“He did not understand the doctrine which ascribed to every man of twenty-one years an indefeasible right of choosing members. It was or was not a right, in proportion as it was or was not advantageous to the public.” This was exactly the ground upon which the “Petitioners” were bound to meet Lord John and the legislative body. It was language becoming a statesman and a legislator. On that ground all parties are bound to join issue; and I do not scruple to say that every man who denies or rejects this principle is either imbued with tyrannical principles, and has sinister interests in view, or is profoundly ignorant of moral and political science.

§ All these virtues, and every other which is real, are founded on the fundamental law of utility: it is the sole ingredient
political compulsatory law—if it be the former, we are bound, I say, to conform our behaviour to it; and if it be the latter, we are bound to use all reasonable endeavours to promote its establishment. This is moral obligation; and hence we see the extent and limits of the term. We are bound by this principle as rational beings, pursuing our own and the public or general weal, to follow these rules of conduct: and as to the observance of the political laws when established, whether right or wrong, moral or immoral (for these terms are perfectly synonymous), we are bound in another form, as we are answerable and subjected to pains and penalties if we disobey them. If they happen to be wrong, or immoral, we are bound to use all reasonable endeavours to have them repealed; and if their iniquity be flagrant, it may be our duty to disobey them and incur the pains; in other words, moral obligation may demand of us this sacrifice."

It is on this ground, then, solely that I meddle with Phrenology; because it would substitute for this mode of determining moral questions, by reasoning and inquiry into the tendencies and consequences of human conduct and actions, the capricious and self-deceiving decisions of a blind and non-reasoning supposed organ and faculty; and because the attempt and efforts to do so adds a new obstruction to those already too numerous and too powerful which at present exist to the progress of moral science. Besides, this doctrine, that we have a moral sense which distinguishes right and

which constitutes them virtues. They are useful to ourselves or others, as the observance of them is the means of personal and social happiness; and any propounded rule of conduct which possesses not a preponderating infusion of this ingredient is not a virtue at all; whatever may be pretended in favour of blind bumps and non-reasoning faculties.

§ Lecture VII.
wrong without reasoning or inquiry into the tendencies and consequences of actions, is the most dangerous one that can be imagined, as it teaches every man, ignorant or learned, wise or foolish, fanatic or enthusiast, that if he has the self-interpreted sanction of his bump or faculty, it is enough; and that no further explanation or vindication of his conduct is necessary, but that he follows, obeys, and submits to this pretended, unerring, and heaven-derived impulse and guide.

It is for these reasons, I repeat, that I make war upon Phrenology; for otherwise I should not have esteemed it worthy of a moment's attention.

SAMUEL READ.
POSTSCRIPT.

In these proposed Lectures it is believed that a more thorough insight will be given into the true character of Phrenology than has been obtained from any yet delivered in support of the doctrines, or than can be derived even from the Phrenological books; because, in the books, as has been partly shown here, and as will be more fully pointed out in the Lectures, all the main difficulties of the science are slurred over, and passed by with the slightest possible notice of them. The arcanum of the science will be laid open; and the ingenuity and disingenuity of the authors, in overlapping them, will be exposed.

It is only necessary to add further that this pseudoscience has now assumed a degree of importance, from its spread chiefly, it is said, amongst youths of the busy and less informed classes, who, wanting the time and opportunity required to study moral science in its genuine shape and character, are delighted to find in this spurious form of it an easy method of becoming mental and moral philosophers; for Phrenology has the word philosophy constantly in its mouth. These disciples get possession of thirty-five formidable looking terms, which they are taught to believe form, by their combinations, all the characters, and explain all the motives to action, of mankind, although one-half of them have only the shadow of a meaning. These terms they can easily commit to memory, and the moment they have done this, they can talk as profoundly, fluently, and consistently on the subject as the greatest Phrenologist of them all. In this vain and empty study these disciples throw away the great-
est portion of their time and intellectual activity. It is to disabuse these deluded individuals of their blind faith in these futile doctrines that the proposed lectures have been undertaken; for blind faith it can only be, and confessedly is by their instructors, in all those who have not proved the doctrines for themselves, which—considering the time and the labour required to prove even one sign of an organ and faculty, much more the whole Phrenological map—it is manifest not one of them can have done, who have not had the means or opportunity of devoting the greater part of their time to the undertaking.