PHRENOLOGY,

OR THE

DOCTRINE OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA.

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POWERS AND ORGANS OF THE MIND,
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* Alimentiveness.

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PREFACE.

The first publication presented to the English public under the title *The Physiognomical System*, contained several summary views of different branches of anthropology, which can be appreciated only after having been examined with great attention in all their details. Several chapters required more development, but the volume was already too large. I, therefore, after the second edition was sold, deemed it advisable to publish several chapters as separate works, and to give another arrangement to my English publications. In one volume, I gave an abstract of the anatomy of the brain,—in another, I treated of the deranged manifestations of the mind ;—in a third, of the elementary principles of education, and I now publish two volumes on phrenology. In the first, I examine the physiological, and in the second, the philosophical part of phrenology. Both these kinds of inquiries are inseparable from each other in the study of mental phenomena. We must first possess positive observations before we are allowed to reason, but being acquainted with a sufficient number of facts, we may draw from them philosophical conclusions.

I rejoice in thinking that the constant and malignant exertions of the Reviewers have been frustrated, and that I am now able to publish the fourth edition of Phrenology, certainly not on account of my works having been praised and recommended by the great oracles of literature and science, but only on account of the intrinsic power of the object explained therein. Let me look for nothing but truth, and it will and must prevail.
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PHRENOLOGY;

OR THE

DOCTRINE OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA.

HISTORICAL NOTICE AND GENERAL VIEW OF THE SUBJECT.

It is sufficiently known that Gall is the first author of this new doctrine. Many details concerning its history, origin, and progress, may be found in the preface of the large work on the Anatomie et Physiologie du System Nerveux en General et du Cerveau en Particulier, Paris, 1810; in the appendix of my Essai Philosophique sur la Nature Morale et Intellectuelle de l'Homme; in the preface of my work on the Anatomy of the Brain; in the Preliminary Dissertation in the first volume of the Transactions of the Phrenological Society of Edinburgh; in the System of Phrenology, by George Combe; and in the article on Phrenology in the third number of the Foreign Quarterly Review.

Dr. Gall, endowed with great power of observation, viz: with large individuality and eventuality, from an early age was struck with the fact, that each of his brothers and sisters, companions and schoolfellows, possessed some peculiarity of disposition. The scholars who first excited his attention, were those who learned by heart with great facility, and who frequently gained from him
by repetitions, the places which he had obtained by the merit of his composition. He observed that his schoolfellows so gifted, possessed prominent eyes. He found this sign confirmed at different places where he studied, in all who excelled in getting easily by heart, and in giving correct recitations. He was always fond of the study of man, of the affections and passions, read various books on those subjects, and paid particular attention to works on physiognomy. He soon conceived, that if memory for words was indicated by an external sign, the same might be the case with the other powers of the mind. He first looked for such signs in the general form of the head, but by degrees he found it necessary to compare individual parts with particular talents and character. But it is to be understood, that in making these observations, he never thought the skull was the cause of the different dispositions of the mind; he referred the organic influence, whatever it was, to the brain.

For many years he endeavored to discover external signs in the head, corresponding to the general powers spoken of by metaphysicians, such as perception, conception, memory, imagination, and judgment; but not being able to advance, and finding contradictions and exceptions without end, he compared great talents for music, mechanical arts, drawing, painting, dramatic acting, poetry, philology, mathematics, and metaphysics, and since he succeeded with respect to the intellectual functions, he also looked to the head for signs of the different characters. Thus, Gall gave himself up entirely to the observation of nature, resorting merely to physiognomical indications as a means of discovering the functions of the brain, and furnishing an uncolored statement of the facts in nature which he observed.

The spirit with which Gall conducted his researches into the moral and intellectual nature of man, is expressed in the publication of two chapters of a great work entitled 'Philosophisch-medicinische Untersuchungen ueber Natur und Kunst im gesunden and kranken Zustande des Menschen. Wien, 1791.' It is to be regretted that the continuation of this work has never appeared.
The first written notice of Dr. Gall’s inquiries concerning the head, appeared in a familiar letter to Baron Retzer, which was inserted in the German periodical journal 'Deutscher Mercur,' in December, 1798.

In 1796 he commenced giving private lectures at Vienna. Several of his hearers, for instance Froriep* and Dr. Walther † published notices of his doctrines. On the 9th of January, 1802, the Austrian Government issued an order, that his lectures should cease, his doctrines being considered dangerous to religion. A general regulation was made upon that occasion, prohibiting all private lectures, unless a special permission was obtained from the public authorities. Dr. Gall never solicited permission, and ceased his lectures at Vienna.

In 1800, I assisted for the first time at one of his courses of lectures, and after having completed my medical studies in 1804, I became associated with him in his labors, concerning the Anatomy, Physiology, and Pathology of the brain, and nervous system. The merit of Dr. Gall as an anatomist may be looked for in the preface of my work on the Anatomy of the Brain, and in the second note added to the article on Phrenology from the Foreign Quarterly Review. The physiological doctrines, as they are published by Dr. Bischoff in Berlin, and Mr. Bloede in Dresden, in 1805, are Dr. Gall’s exclusive property. Every new addition, from that period up to 1813, must be considered as common to us both, because we pursued our inquiries together, as stated in the preface of the large work on the Anatomy and Physiology of the Brain.‡

In 1813, our united labors ceased, and since that period each one has inquired for himself. Dr. Gall’s last publication, ‘sur les fonctions du Cerveau, Paris, six volumes,’ fixes the extent of his physiological and philosophical notions. It contains the history of his proceedings, and that of every special organ he discovered. It also shows the arrangement of the organs which he acknowledges,

* Exposition of the doctrine of Dr. Gall, 3d edition.
† Exposition critique de la doctrine du Dr. Gall, avec quelques particularites concernant son auteur. Zurich. 1802.
and the nomenclature which he proposes. The latter will be found
indicating actions rather than powers, and denotes the spirit in
which he conducted his researches.

In my nomenclature the powers themselves are designated with­
out referring to any good or bad purpose. The reader who takes
an interest in the history of Phrenology, and in the personal merit
of its propounders, will distinguish between the doctrine as the
great founder discovered and understood it, and Phrenology as it
is taught in its actual state of improvement.

We began our joint labors in 1804; all anatomical discoveries,
after that period, are the result of my exertions. In this volume,
at the end of each chapter, I shall recapitulate the original concep­
tions of Gall and my additions. Our ideas on all the other
branches of Phrenology, on the nature of the fundamental powers
of the mind, on education, and on the religious and moral nature
of man, are very different. Gall's notions on those subjects, are
dispersed in his above mentioned volumes, mine are explained in
separate chapters. Let every one earn the merit he deserves. Also,
those who add to our discoveries, have a just claim to every idea
of improvement, and I shall always be disposed to acknowledge it
with a feeling of gratitude.

Gall's first inquiries were physiognomical; he looked for external
signs of internal capacities. They were generally styled Dr. Gall's
doctrine of brain and skull, Gall's Hirn und Schedel—lehre.
When we began to publish in 1808, under our joint names, the
title, Anatomy and Physiology of the nervous system in general,
and of the brain in particular, seemed preferable to designate the
nature of our investigations. In extending my views, I found it
necessary to change the name again. I have chosen that of Phren­
ology, which is derived from two Greek words: ἀγνόη—mind, and
λόγος—discourse; and I understand by it, the doctrine of the spe­
cial phenomena of the mind, and of the relations between the men­
tal dispositions and the body, particularly the brain.

Many, at the outset, ask whether this doctrine be useful. It is,
however, necessary to begin by knowing the nature, reality, and
extent of phrenological principles, before we can be qualified to speak of their application. I take it for granted, that every kind of knowledge is useful, or, as Lord Bacon said, knowledge is power. I only add, that Phrenology concerns the most important element in the nature of man: the manifestations of his affective and intellectual faculties. Now, we examine all the beings which surround us: we divide and subdivide the different objects which nature presents to us: we study mineralogy, botany, zoology; why should we not study man, who manifests the greatest number of faculties, and who is lord of the terrestrial creation? Man, therefore, considered merely as the most important being of creation, ought especially to interest every thinking person. Moreover, it must be surely of the utmost importance to know our own nature. Among the Greeks the divine precept written upon the temple of Delphos was ἐγνώθι σεαυτόν—Know thyself. On the other hand, Phrenology, by specifying the fundamental powers of the mind, will become the basis of philosophy. Farther, our interest in being acquainted with human nature, increases in proportion as we live in society, and as we feel the necessity of influencing those we would direct. It is also evident, that institutions which are not founded on the true knowledge of mankind cannot be permanent. Physicians too, must be aware that moral causes frequently derange the vegetative functions; hence, every medical man, and particularly those who treat the insane, ought to be acquainted with the conditions requisite to the mental operations in the healthy state, and Phrenology, therefore, is an indispensable part of the medical education. Thus, it seems impossible to point out any object more interesting to natural philosophers, anatomists, physiologists, physicians, teachers, moralists, and legislators.

I do not pretend that the study of man has been neglected. On the contrary, reflecting people, in all ages, have thought it especially worthy of their attention. They have noticed the actions of the most remarkable individuals, as well as of mankind in general; inquired into the number and nature of the faculties of man; and invented many systems as developments of the causes
of human action. But though individuals of almost all professions have endeavored to elucidate human nature, it must be allowed that our knowledge of the subject is still extremely defective; and when we consider, that so many great men have been engaged in its study, we are astonished that so little has been accomplished.

It would, indeed, be difficult to imagine this slow progress and limited improvement, if the manifold obstacles to scientific inquiries in general, and to anatomy and physiology in particular, were unknown. Among the former, we may reckon the religious respect which men have for ancient opinions, and their aversion to such as are new; the obligation and the ease of maintaining accredited opinions; our inaptness to think for ourselves; the want of clearness and precision in our ideas, and in the signs by which we express them; the mania for forming systems upon a few solitary facts and hasty conceptions; the jealousy, the envy, the falsifications of opponents; and their malice in drawing dangerous consequences from the most innocent statements.

The particular causes of ignorance in mental philosophy may be divided into natural and artificial. Among the natural, the most important is the difficulty which the examination of mankind presents. It may be observed, in general, that knowledge is less advanced, the more difficult the object of examination. It is easy to describe minerals, their volume, figure, weight, density, color, and other physical qualities. This may also be done at leisure. Hence, mineralogy is eminently advanced. Inquiries relating to botany and zoology are more difficult; and these sciences are consequently less forward. For the same reason we are, even as to plants and animals, better acquainted with their physical qualities than with their vital functions. Anatomy, being easier than physiology, is also more advanced. We may describe and make drawings of animals at leisure; we may anatomize and preserve them with ease; but it is more difficult to observe facts in their lives, to inquire into their instinctive labors, their propensities, and their particular faculties. Of the many books which
treat on human nature, anatomical descriptions form the greatest portion. In anatomy the parts, in physiology the functions, most easily examined, are also the best known. It is infinitely easier to examine muscles and bones, than the nervous system; anatomical and physiological knowledge of the brain and nervous system has, therefore, made the slowest progress. Till our days, the external forms of the brain and its parts only were known; their internal structure was quite overlooked; and the physiological ideas on the brain and nervous system, have been but a succession of errors, ever conformable to the prevailing philosophical system of the day.

Besides the natural difficulty of inquiring into the causes of the functions, there are many artificial obstacles. The metaphysical notions of the schools have greatly impeded improvements in psychology. By substituting such metaphysical opinions, on all occasions for data, which the observation of nature would have furnished, physiologists, and even anatomists, came to regard these opinions as sacred. The schoolmen, for example, say, the soul is simple, and therefore its material residence must be simple also, and all the nerves must end in a point; in other words, the nerves can have only one origin, because each individual has but one soul. Bonnet, Haller, and others, having extended its seat to the whole substance of the brain, were contradicted by the metaphysicians, who did not reflect, that a little more or less room could not enable them to explain the nature of the soul any better; nor that, according to the remark of Van Swieten, Tiedemann, and others, a material point, in which all ideas and sensations should centre, is inconceivable, in consequence of the confusion and disorder which would result from such an arrangement. It appears, indeed, ridiculous, that the naturalist should be guided in his researches and inductions by such frivolous speculations. If metaphysicians, on the contrary, would observe facts and ascertain the conditions with which these are coupled,—on which they depend,—their notions would never be at variance with the inferences of anatomy and physiology; and one science would not arro-
gait the right of setting bounds to the progress of another. The doctrine of a single origin and central point for all the nerves, is neither true nor possible; as may be verified by examination. If, after this, the metaphysician cannot comprehend the unity of his individual consciousness, I ask him, if he can understand how, in automatic life, such different apparatus concur by their varied functions in forming one whole? If he can reconcile, in animal life, the occurrence of double organs with unity of function and simplicity of consciousness? If he can comprehend any single power in the material world?

The principal artificial impediment to the improvement of psychology was the blamable method pursued in the study of human nature. All phenomena were explained by the imagination alone, or by hypotheses. There exist, even at the present day, philosophers who maintain that man is in nowise subjected to the laws of nature; that he can begin a series of actions independent of all cause and motive, and that his actions admit of no explanation. According to these schoolmen, man is separated from all other beings, and is considered as regulated by laws peculiar to himself. They attribute all his operations to his soul; several of them even give it unbounded power over the body. This negligence, in not comparing men with other beings, has been a great obstacle to the progress of psychology. Moreover, the various branches of anthropology, instead of being studied together are cultivated separately. The useful example of the Greek philosophers is neglected; anatomy, physiology, medicine, philosophy, education, religion, and legislation, instead of being studied as parts of a harmonious whole, and united so as to exert a mutual influence, are split into so many particular doctrines or sciences.

Man must be studied as a being of creation; and his nature requires the same method of examination as every other natural object—observation and induction. To what profession, then, does the study of human nature especially belong? Many persons cannot conceive why a physician should be continually speaking of the knowledge of human nature. No profession, however, is
more interested in, and none affords better opportunities for, its examination. The particular province of the physician is, indeed, man in a state of disease; but it is evident that knowledge of the healthy must be the foundation of knowledge of the diseased state; that is, pathology must be based upon physiology. Derangement of the functions cannot be understood if we are not acquainted with their regular and proper actions. Hence all physiological inquiries are most intimately connected with medicine.

It cannot be doubted that, considered even in itself, the most important part of man is the nervous system; and traced in its relations with other parts and other systems, inquiries into its functions must also be more important the greater the influence it exerts upon every operation of the animal economy. Now in man and the more perfect animals, the manifestations of all the functions are more or less subordinate to, and under the influence of, the nervous system. Those of digestion, nutrition, circulation, respiration, secretion, and excretion, are deranged or annihilated when the nerves, which co-operate in their performance, are compressed, wounded, or destroyed. Chemical changes, as acidity in the alimentary canal during digestion, are the more apt to happen the less the nervous power is active. The nerves distributed to the organs of sense and to the muscles, are indispensable to the performance of their functions. Impressions made on the body below the division of a nerve are no longer perceived, and the principle of motion cannot now be directed towards the muscles with which it is naturally connected. We shall also see, that besides the functions of the five external senses, all the instincts, propensities, sentiments and intellectual faculties, all affections and passions, and all the characteristics of humanity, are made manifest by means of the nervous system alone. Hence we must acknowledge, that without a sound physiology of the nervous system there can be neither psychology nor any species of philosophy; and that physicians, in determining the nervous functions, render the greatest service to philosophers, moralists, teachers, judges, and legislators.
From this it is obvious, that physicians, who must study the influence of the nervous system, are especially called upon to contribute to the advancement of the knowledge of man. The exercise of no profession, indeed, makes the necessity of knowing both his physical and his moral state so intimately felt as that of medicine, in consequence of the influence of affections of the mind upon the vital functions. Who has not observed, that grief, jealousy, envy, hopeless love, and similar painful affections, consume the principle of life? The examination of the nervous system, and of its influence, further interests physicians especially, as all mental alienations have their primitive cause in the mediate or immediate derangement of a part or of the whole of it. In pointing out the conditions necessary to the manifestations of the sentiments and intellectual faculties in the healthy state, we consequently contribute also to elucidate mental diseases; no one, then, is more interested than the physician in discovering the nature of man.

Fortunately no class of men is better prepared than physicians to investigate such subjects by accessory knowledge, and by the study of nature in general; nor is any one so frequently and so seriously admonished by nature to revise opinions, to forsake hypothetical reasoning, and to follow the simple method of experience, as he who is occupied in the treatment of disease. No philosopher has such ample opportunity of being intimately convinced, that all our knowledge ought to be reduced to a rational mode of judging from experiment and observation. The physician, moreover, is placed in circumstances the most conducive to a profound and certain knowledge of man. No one has such facility of observing men at all times and in all situations, when liberated from, when incapable of, the restraint and ceremony which custom and convenience impose. He alone has an opportunity of being, during the night or the day, witness of the most intimate relations and the most secret events in families. Both the good and the bad, when sick, conceal their true sentiments.
with difficulty, and who does not desire the friendship and the confidence of the man whom he trusts with his own life, and with the lives of his wife and of his children? To him, supposed to know all that belongs to human nature, the most secret thoughts are exposed, frailties and errors acknowledged; his judgment is guided by unreserved trust reposed. There is consequently no profession more entitled to study mankind than the medical.

Let us now ask: What is the nature of Man? In the present state of our knowledge, it is impossible to give an exact definition of man. Such as we find in books, include the term animal; he who is not aware that man is an animal in many respects, or has many organic parts and numerous functions in common with animals, is little advanced in anthropology. On the other hand, whoever thinks that there is no essential difference between man and animals of a superior order, is also far from having an accurate knowledge of human nature. There is no direct break in the chain of animated beings; and all are linked together by analogies. The idea of a regular scale and an uninterrupted concatenation of objects is obvious; all divisions into orders, genera, species and families, established by human understanding, only mark the particularities, without interrupting the relations that exist among the beings of creation. The last plant and the first animal have a great number of like qualities; just as plants have something common among themselves, and animals with each other. Man possesses many powers in common with animals, and it is reasonable to think that by others he is brought in connexion with beings of a superior order.

The difficulty we encounter in the classification of living beings generally, is also perceptible when we attempt a division of the functions of any one being. Man not only exhibits several functions analogous to those both of the inanimate and organised kingdom, but the whole of those he possesses are likewise connected so intimately that they cannot be considered separately. Even the characteristic qualities of humanity have something analogous with the powers possessed in common by man and animals.
All who have studied nature in general, or man in particular, have always paid the greatest attention to the causes of the phenomena they observed. They are divided into two classes: Materialists and Spiritualists. The former looked for an explanation of the phenomena in various combinations of constituent elements, or in the mixture and form of bodies; the latter attributed all phenomena to beings, principles, entities, substances, spirits, or souls. According to them, planets and comets are moved, plants grow, and animals exhibit their functions by the influence of souls. All activity is a consequence of the agency of immaterial beings. Inertness and form are the essential characters of matter. There is a certain number of elementary matters, and these can exist either singly or in a compound state, but in every case without inherent activity.

The doctrine of the souls, or psychology, is involved in the most inextricable difficulties. Now-a-days matter is considered as active, or endowed with various qualities, and as exercising some influence in the universe. Salt is soluble in water; the quality of solubility is therefore inherent in salt, though this may be latent, till brought into contact with water. Thus matter is not inert, in the sense that it has no qualities, but these may be dormant or inactive, and their exhibition may require the action and re-action of other substances.

The same remarks apply to organised bodies, or those which are composed of different matters, and arranged in such a manner as qualifies them to perform certain functions. They are endowed with dispositions, but these remain inert or inactive without an exciting cause. An egg proper for incubation, and fruit trees in the winter season, possess vitality, but they require the influence of caloric to show it. Thus, organised beings, though composed of a variety of substances, require additional exciting substances; which, in ancient times, were styled immaterial and incorporeal, or spirits, as being without form.

The doctrine of immaterial substances is not sufficiently amenable to the test of observation; it is founded on belief, and only supported by hypothesis. It is an essential item in metaphysics.
Opinions upon such points must vary continually, and none can ever gain general assent. Those which flatter the wishes of man the most, and astonish and promise the greatest advantages, will be the most readily and generally believed.

Many ancient spiritualists admitted two souls, one irrational and mortal, another rational and immortal. Stahl and his school understand by the term soul, a being that produces all the phenomena of man, as well the vegetative as the animal functions.

The majority of modern spiritualists define the soul, a being which has consciousness and will, and which is immaterial and immortal.

Modern physiologists examine the vegetative functions of animals independently of the soul; they speak of certain fluids, called by the ancients spirits, as their causes, but do not agree about their number. Caloric evidently exists, and is essential to life. The influence of the electric fluid is also frequently obvious. Discussions too on the nervous principle are not yet terminated.

The doctrine of active principles becomes particularly difficult, when we come to consider the affective and intellectual functions of man. Religious people often reject all such investigations, and stick to faith. We, however, must be permitted to regret, that the religious codes of neither Jews nor Christians decide on the number, or determine the nature, of the principles which act in man. They admit positively an immortal agent, but do not deny the existence of other principles. Is it true that the body has its own laws, and that the affective and intellectual faculties depend on two separate principles; may we therefore speak with St. Paul of the body, the soul, and the spirit?

Physiologists, following the opinions of metaphysical schools, soon thought of looking for corporeal seats or habitations of the principles or souls. Those who believed in one single soul, as the cause of all the phenomena of man, assigned to it a more or less extensive seat; at one time the whole body, and again no more than a single point. Aristotle placed the sentient soul in the heart.

* 1 Thess. v. 23.
Erasistratus in the membranes, Herophilus in the great cavities of the brain, Serveto in the aqueduct of sylvius, Aurantius in the fourth ventricle, Descartes in the pineal gland, Whaton and Schellhammer in the commencement of the spinal marrow, Drelincourt in the cerebellum, Bontekoe, Lancisi, and La Peyronnie in the corpus callosum; Willis in the corpora striata, Vieussens in the centrum ovale of the medullary substance, and so on.

Metaphysicians also endeavored to explain the influence between the soul and body mutually; and they broached the most extravagant opinions upon this point. Some authors, with Malebranche, consider God as the immediate agent between the soul and the body: others explain the mutual influence of the mind and body by the agency of some medium or middle substance; and hence the great number of vapors, fluids, pneumata, and vital spirits; hence the introduction of caloric and the electric, galvanic, and magnetic fluids.

Inquiries into the nature of the soul, its origin, seat, mode of action on the body, and final destination, belong exclusively to metaphysicians and theologians; they are beyond the province of the physiologist. Both Gall and I, therefore, have always declared, that we merely observe the affective and intellectual manifestations, and the organic conditions under which they take place; and that in using the word organs, we mean only the organic parts by means of which the faculties of the mind become apparent, but not that these constitute them.

The functions of man may be divided into three classes: vegetative, affective, and intellectual. The vegetative are destined to preserve the individual, and to continue the species. The affective and intellectual are the real objects of Phrenology, and of this volume, which will be divided into nine sections. In the first, I shall speak of sensibility in general; in the second, of the relation between the affective and intellectual manifestations of the mind and the bodily constitution or the temperaments, and the viscera of the abdomen and thorax; in the third, of the dependency of the affective and intellectual faculties on the brain; in the fourth, of the neces-
sity of dividing the faculties of the mind, and of admitting the plurality of the respective organs; the fifth section will treat of the means of determining the functions of the cerebral parts; the sixth, of craniology; the seventh, of the division of the fundamental powers; the eighth, of the affective qualities and their organs; and the ninth, of the intellectual faculties and their organs.

SECTION I.

On Sensibility.

This expression has not always the same meaning. It is often confounded with irritability. Sensibility, then, indicates the power of acting in a regular way, according to previous impressions. It is in this sense that we speak of sensible or sensitive plants; and that the sensibility of animals is divided into two sorts: one organic, and another animal; the first, or organic, taking place without, and the second, or animal, existing with, consciousness. Descartes, Stahl, Cabanis, Bichat, Cuvier, Blumenbach, Reil, and others, admit sensibility without consciousness. I limit the sense of the word, and employ it only to indicate the power of perceiving and of knowing impressions made on the nerves.

As I make a distinction between irritability and sensibility, so I also separate consciousness and sensibility from voluntary functions. Sensibility is frequently opposed to the involuntary or automatic functions; but in that sense, by far the greater number of the affective and intellectual functions are automatic.

Now the seat of Sensibility may be demanded. The greater number of physiologists consider the brain, without the spinal marrow and the nerves of the five external senses, as the organ of all consciousness, and in support of this opinion adduce the following proofs. A nerve that is divided cannot produce either sensation or voluntary motion, however irritated. Hence, the sentient prin-
ciple does not reside in the nerves, nor at the place where the impression is made, but in the brain. If a nerve at its origin or in its course be compressed or tied, its function is suspended, but if the pressure be removed, it returns. Hence, the consciousness of all impressions must reside in the brain. When the brain is compressed by a fluid, by an excrescence, by turgid blood-vessels, or suffers a violent concussion, all sensation is interrupted, and is only restored as the compression goes on diminishing or is entirely removed. In convulsive fits, pains are sometimes felt as if ascending along the nerves to the brain. These pains are often cured by dividing or by tying the nerves. After the amputation of a limb, individuals, though perfectly cured, often fancy that they feel pain in the fingers, toes, or other parts of the amputated limb. This pain can only have its seat in the brain. Finally, volition comes from the brain; consequently, the first cause of voluntary motion resides in it. The opinion that all consciousness resides in the brain was formerly supported by the assertion that the nerves are continuations of its substance, and that they have a central point of union in it. This argument, however, can no longer be received, as it is certain that neither the nerves of the external senses, nor the spinal marrow, are prolongations of the cerebral mass; and that no such central point exists; but that every pair of nerves has its own origin, and that the different systems are brought into communication by nervous bundles, and through this medium exert a mutual influence.

OBJECTIONS.

On the other hand, arguments of different degrees of validity may be employed to prove that the brain is not exclusively the organ of sensation and of voluntary motion. Dumas thinks, that those who having lost a limb imagine they feel a pain in it, do so by their power of recollection. If that be the case, Dumas ought to prove that the power of recollection is different from that of consciousness, before he can conclude that that power may exist in
the brain and consciousness everywhere. Besides, why is it absolutely impossible to produce equal degrees of other agreeable or disagreeable sensations by means of the power of recollection? Moreover, after amputations, why are pains particularly excited by wet, stormy and changeable weather? The assertion of Dumas is therefore far from refuting the positive proofs, that all consciousness belongs to the brain.

The same physiologist thinks that the brain can neither be the seat nor the organ of sensation, because it is insensible. It is true that the convolutions of the brain, when wounded or mutilated, do not produce such pains as the nerves of feeling when they are injured. Yet, in certain diseases, the brain becomes very painful, just as happens with other parts which manifest little or no sensibility in the healthy state. Besides, no one says that pains felt in his limbs exist in the brain. They exist in the part where the impressions are made; and consciousness alone exists in the brain. Moreover, we must remember that the sensations of different parts are quite dissimilar, and that although one part does not produce the sensation of another, it cannot on that account be called insensible. The nerves of hunger and thirst cannot perceive the sensation of pride or of compassion; the olfactory nerve cannot perceive the impressions of light, &c., but every particular sensation appertains to a particular organic structure. Now, thinking and willing, are certainly sensations, and no one can, or will, deny that these two functions are confined to the brain; it can only be said, therefore, that the brain does not manifest all sorts of sensation. The assertion, however, that all consciousness resides in the brain, is not yet refuted, and it may still be maintained that the nerves produce the impressions, whilst the brain is necessary to perceive, or have consciousness of them.

It is also objected that acephali, entirely destitute of brain, sometimes live, suck, and move, in various ways; and, consequently, that the brain cannot be the only organ of sensation. In this objection, automatic motions are evidently confounded with consciousness, in the same way as Gautier says, that a beheaded cock flut-
tering in the agonies of death, struggles to fight and defend itself. All similar phenomena, which may be observed in insects, fishes, reptiles, birds, quadrupeds, and even in man, are the result of irritability without consciousness. Such motions, only seem to be accompanied with sensation and will, because the organic structure and mechanical arrangement of the parts, cause the motions to be produced precisely as they would, were they determined by the will, and took place with consciousness. There are many phenomena which happen according to determinate laws, without consciousness, reflection, or will; and muscular motions may be the same, whether they occur as effects of the will, or of any other irritating cause. During sleep and before birth, automatic motions exist in sufficient perfection, while the animal functions are still inactive.

It is not even determined, whether the crying and sucking of the infant are always accompanied by consciousness, or, whether these phenomena belong to automatic life. It seems to me that they are sometimes automatic, and at other times animal, just as motions in general are. It must therefore be allowed, that certain parts of the body produce automatic motions only; and that other parts, subject to the will, are capable of producing motions, which are not the result of its activity, but conformable to their structure.

Duverney is said to have removed the brain entirely from some pigeons, which, notwithstanding, continued to exhibit all the animal functions. Similar experiments on turtles are mentioned by several authors, whose knowledge of the facts, however, has been derived merely from hearsay. We are quite sure that the whole brain cannot be removed without destroying at once the nerves of the external senses, and the animals themselves. It is even generally known, that sportsmen kill wounded birds by pushing a feather into their neck. In order to ascertain the extent to which these reported experiments of Duverney were true, I, myself, cut off the greatest portion of the hemispheres of the brain of fowls and pigeons, even the great commissure of rabbits to the level of the lateral ventricles; and the animals manifested distinctly their senses
of seeing and hearing. They did not take the food presented to them, but they swallowed bread and seed put into their bills. Rabbits mutilated in that manner, walked, saw, and heard; they even took food spontaneously. It is evident, therefore, that the removal of all the superior parts of the brain neither destroys the functions of the five senses, nor the muscular motions. But it is impossible to take away the whole cerebral mass without killing the animals. Hence, Gall, and I, declare, that the experiments made by Duverney must be entirely false; and we have shown, that all that can be concluded from similar ones, is, that the whole brain is not necessary to the functions of the five senses; but still, the conclusion by no means follows, that no cerebral part is absolutely necessary to their functions; seeing, that in animals of a higher order, it is impossible to separate the brain from the nerves without depriving them of sense and life at once.

There are other arguments which give reason to suppose that the external senses have perception. There are animals to which it is impossible to deny feeling and taste, although they present nothing which may be compared to the brain. Now, every nerve destined to a particular function has its own origin, its gradual enlargement, its particular form, and is a whole in respect to its structure; why relatively to its function should it not also be a whole? The functions of the nervous systems of the five senses, are in proportion to the perfection of their particular organizations, and by no means to the quantity of brain. Several insects, notwithstanding the extreme smallness of their brain, are endowed with an extraordinary fine feeling, taste, and smell. Eagles, though possessing much less brain, see farther than dogs; and the smell of the canine tribes, generally, is more acute than that of man, whose brain is so much more considerable. But all these facts do not prove that consciousness resides in the nerves. Voluntary motion is proportionate to the size and organic constitution of the muscles, the exciting cause however, called will, resides in the brain.

It has likewise been observed, that when the internal organization of a sense, as well as its external apparatus, is destroyed, all
ideas belonging to it are lost, or annihilated. It must, however, be granted, that even these arguments do not suffice to explain, why, among perfect animals, the nerves which are pressed, tied, or divided, lose sensation. Perhaps, in them, some parts of the brain are as necessary to consciousness, as the heart is to the circulation of the blood; while in lower tribes, a kind of obscure consciousness may exist, independent of the brain, just as among them, and also among plants, circulation goes on without a heart.

After all, it remains undecided, at least as far as animals of the superior orders are concerned, how far the brain is necessary to the passive consciousness of the external senses. But it is certain that the will, and consequently the voluntary motions and reflection, depend on the brain; for none of these phenomena are displayed without it. The regular motions are, therefore, to be distinguished into such as are regular, but only automatic, and into such as are both regular and voluntary; the latter depend on the action of the brain, the former take place without it. It is also necessary to make distinctions respecting the functions of the five external senses; we are ignorant whether their passive consciousness exists with the presence of their respective nerves alone, or in consequence of the addition of the brain; this, however, is certain, that their active consciousness, accompanied with attention, reflection, and will, can only coexist with the brain.

SECTION II.

Do the Manifestations of the Mind depend on the Organic Constitution of the whole Body, or do the Feelings more especially reside in the Viscera?

Many physiologists and philosophers dwell particularly on unity, both in organic and inorganic nature. They maintain that the whole contributes to the performance of every function, and that no part can do aught in an isolated state. This manner of speak-
ing is not sufficiently precise. It is indeed true, that no part can perform its function if its organization be not healthy: the eyes must be perfect, otherwise they cannot see, &c. All the parts, therefore, which are concerned in the reproduction and nutrition of the organs, contribute, mediately, to the display of every function; peculiar functions, however, are performed by peculiar organs.

In the same manner, the greater number of modern philosophers and physiologists, conceive the possibility of reducing the whole of the mental phenomena to understanding or intelligence. The ancients thought differently; they spoke of two sorts of operations, under the title of soul and spirit, moral and intellectual faculties, heart and head, feelings and thoughts, &c. This nomenclature, however defective, proves that the phrenic functions were early divided into two classes. Different parts of the body were even assigned as their seats; the feelings being supposed resident in the viscera of the thorax and abdomen, particularly in the heart, and the intellect in the head.

To confound the feeling with understanding, is a very grievous error, which must retard the knowledge of man; it seems to have arisen from the simultaneous action of the affective and intellectual faculties. This, however, also happens with the two sorts of the vegetative functions; those which preserve the individual, go on whilst the species is propagated; yet these two cannot be confounded.

All philosophers have agreed to separate intellect from the vegetative functions; the reasons for doing so, also prove the difference between the affective and intellectual faculties. I assume every one as conscious of his existence, of his intellect, and of his feelings. Personal conviction, therefore, is the same, both as regards the feelings and intellect. But, how can we know that others are endowed with the affective powers? In the same way as we know that they possess intellect; by observation and induction in the healthy and diseased state. I think it superfluous to give more details on these points, or to enter very deeply into speculative reasonings, since the purport of this volume is to analyze
the special powers of the mind, and to show their respective organs. From the title of this section, it is evident that it embraces two sorts of considerations, which I shall elucidate in succession.

CHAPTER I.

On Temperaments.

The ancient philosophers, in recognising the influence of the body over the manifestations of the mind, dwelt much on the importance of the temperaments. This expression has not always had the same meaning. Those who regarded mixtures of elements, and bodily constitution, as primary or secondary causes of the mental operations, employed the term temperament, sometimes to indicate the bodily constitution, and sometimes to designate the mental functions.

There is no doubt that the individual corporeal systems, such as the circulatory, secretory, nervous, and others, influence the whole body, modify its functions, and endow them with greater or less activity. But they are mistaken, who imagine that the general organic constitution is the cause of particular feelings and intellectual faculties; for instance, that individuals of a sanguine temperament have an easy conception, a lively imagination, and a strong memory, and are addicted to sensual pleasures and levity; or who fancy that the bilious temperament is the cause of penetration, firmness, obstinacy, of concealment, ambition, of violent passions, &c.

This error is very easily refuted: First, all animals are neglected in the doctrine of temperaments. How can their widely varied and dissimilar faculties be explained by the small number of temperaments or their combinations? Idiots, too, have certainly some temperament; why do they not exert the faculties said to pertain to it? Moreover, daily experience shows that there is no fixed and constant proportion between temperaments and de-
TEMPERAMENTS.

terminate mental faculties. There are many, who, with a melan­
choly look, are not at all melancholy; we find sanguine and bil­
ious people, intellectual or stupid, meek or impetuous; whilst
phlegmatics are often bold, quarrelsome, and imperious; in many
diseases, also, the humors and organic constitution of the body are
much altered, but the faculties of the mind do not suffer a propor­
tionate change. In short, the doctrine of the temperaments, as
applied to the indication of determinate faculties, is not more sure,
nor better founded, than divination by the hands, feet, skin, hair,
or ears.

We, however, do not deny the influence of the organic constitu­
tion upon the manifestation of the feelings and intellectual faculties.
We readily conceive how the organic constitution of the brain may
be modified by digestion, circulation, perspiration, and nutrition,
and how the different states of organization may produce different
degrees of activity of the mental faculties generally; but it is im­
possible to show that the same temperament should bestow great
energy on some faculties, and strong peculiar passions, while the
manifestations of others remain very weak. Thus, to derive de­
terminate faculties and positive propensities from the tempera­
ments, is very different from saying that the faculties of the mind
are modified in quantity and quality by bodily constitution in gen­
eral, and by that of the respective organs in particular. We con­
sider the study of temperaments as the first step in phrenology.
There are some individuals more irritable, more energetic, more
fit to be exercised, and more able to contain their mental exercises
than others; but the organic constitution of the whole body is not
the condition on which the manifestations of the special feelings
and intellectual faculties depend. In my work on characters I
speak of four temperaments, as of four different degrees of activ­
ity. I describe their external signs and exemplify each tempera­
ment by a portrait.
CHAPTER II.

Do the Feelings depend on the Viscera of the Abdomen and Thorax?

A great number of physiologists, physicians and philosophers, derive the propensities and sentiments from different viscera of the chest and belly, or from the nervous plexuses and ganglions of the great sympathetic nerve. Comparative anatomy and physiology suffice to confute this opinion. There are animals endowed with faculties attributed to certain viscera, which, however, do not possess these viscera. Insects, for instance, become angry, and have neither liver nor bile. The ox, horse, hog, &c., have a great number of viscera analogous to those of the human kind, and yet want many of the faculties possessed by man, and attributed to these viscera. There is no proportion, either in animals or in man, between the size of the viscera or of the ganglia of the nervous system, and the strength of the moral sentiments ascribed to them. Several viscera, nervous plexuses, and ganglions, are likewise larger in animals than in man, and yet the attributed qualities are more energetic in man. There is no proportion between the number of viscera and the nature of the propensities and sentiments in different animals. The four-footed beasts have viscera and nervous ganglia very much alike; as the dog, wild boar, ox, horse, sheep, beaver, hare, roe, wolf, tiger, lion, &c.; yet their inclinations are universally different, and even opposite, whilst, according to the above stated hypothesis, the heart of the tiger ought to be the organ of cruelty, and that of the lamb of meekness. Neither is there any proportion between the period of the development of the viscera and the appearance of the propensities and sentiments; in young animals and in children several viscera are sooner developed than the inclinations ascribed to them are manifested; at least, they are not exhibited in the ratio of the development. It is therefore astonishing that Bichat
should have derived all passions from organic life, as he believed that organic life was perfect in new-born children, and yet that children have no passions. Those who, with Reil, maintain that the nervous plexuses and ganglia are the organs of the affections and passions, and who say that these apparatus are destined to weaken or interrupt the propagation of internal impressions to the brain, are guilty of a similar inconsistency; for affections and passions make powerful impressions which reach the brain, and are felt both by animals and man. Moreover, it is a principle in the animal economy, that every organic part manifests only one particular function. Now each viscus has its appropriate office, which is even generally known, and seen to harmonize with its structure.

Confining our view to the human species, we may add, that acephali and complete idiots have visceraind ganglia, and often a very energetic assimilating power, and yet manifest no moral sentiment. Finally, the moral sentiments are not deranged in proportion as the viscera are diseased. From all these considerations, we infer that the viscera of the chest and abdomen, are not the organs of the affective powers of the mind.

Some reply that man, when affected in any way, when influenced by passion, as anger, jealousy, or fear, feels evidently some motion in the viscera, and that it is therefore natural to suppose these affections resident in the bowels. It may, however, be answered, generally, that from sensations experienced, or other phenomena exhibited by different parts of the body, it is impossible to infer that the primitive causes are inherent there. Every part communicates with, and exercises an influence upon, every other. In this way, the great sympathetic or nerve of the abdomen and thorax, is connected with the spinal marrow, with the nerves of the external senses, and with the brain. Without this connexion, animal life would be confined to the brain, and this organ could not excite the instrument of motion. The activity of one part commonly produces different phenomena in others; and as the existence of pain and pleasure does not demonstrate
consciousness of these impressions resident at the place where they are felt, so, peculiar sensations experienced in the thorax and abdomen do not demonstrate that the affections have their seat in the included viscera of these cavities. Sorrow makes the tears flow, anger makes the knees tremble and the lips quiver; but who asserts that sorrow resides in the lachrymal gland, or anger in the knees and lips? Wounds of the brain excite vomiting: the primitive cause of this phenomenon is in the brain; but no one will place the vomiting there. Indigestible aliments occasion headache; and intestinal worms, narcotics, and other poisonous substances, sometimes produce madness, blindness, &c.; but who from this will maintain that headache, madness, blindness, &c., have their seat in the alimentary canal? The remembrance of an injury received acts upon the heart, and increases the strength and frequency of its beats; but is the brain, therefore, the organ of circulation? From these and similar considerations, it follows that the sensations produced in different parts by affections and passions do not entitle us to infer that these are their respective organs.

All that has been said to prove that the abdominal and thoracic viscera are not the organs of the moral sentiments, applies also to the nervous plexuses and ganglia of the abdomen and thorax. These nervous systems are essentially necessary to the performance of the functions of vegetative life.

The influence, then, of the abdominal and thoracic viscera on the manifestations of the mind is only mediate; their functions contribute to the organic constitution of the brain as well as of the body in general, but they are not the seat of the affective faculties.
SECTION III.

The Brain is the Organ of the Affective and Intellectual Functions.

For many centuries the brain has been said to be the organ of the soul; and hence some may think it superfluous to enter into any detailed argument to support this truth. However, there still exist many doubts to be solved, many difficulties to be removed, and many notions to be fixed with more precision. The repetition of passing and contradictory opinions is very different from accurate knowledge of a subject in all its details.

If, according to the ancient philosophers, the intellectual faculties be placed in the brain, and the moral sentiments in the viscera of the abdomen and thorax, that the understanding might not be disturbed by the passions;—if it be said that the nervous plexus or ganglia are the seats of the affections;—if, according to Dumas, Richerand, Sprengel, and other physiologists, the difference of the feelings and intellectual faculties results from the difference of the temperaments;—if Pinel and others do not dare to seek in the brain for the proximate causes of mental alienations;—if Bichat consider the hemispheres of the brain as mere coverings of the internal parts;—if, according to Sabatier and Boyer, the brain be a secreting organ, and, according to the greater number of anatomists before us, the origin and source of the nerves;—if all sensations and ideas be derived from the five external senses;—if the instinctive labors of animals, and the arts of man, be ascribable to their hands, eyes, ears, and other external instruments;—if it be maintained that one nerve can perform the function of another, so that the nerves are homogeneous;—if it be taught by some magnetisers, that, in the perfect state of animal magnetism, the spirit acts without the assistance of the organization;—if the greater number of metaphysicians maintain that the highest faculties of the understanding—reason and will, at least act independently of,
all organization; — if hydrocephalic persons be mentioned, who without brain have manifested feelings and intellectual faculties; — if the same be related of animals whose brain was ossified; — if any of these assertions be admitted, and the brain be at the same time maintained the exclusive organ of the soul, the contradiction is evident. Now there is no author who has not advanced one or other of these suppositions; and, therefore, it will not be superfluous to detail our ideas relative to the organ of the soul, and to inculcate our principle that the brain is the sole organ both of the feelings and of the intellectual faculties.

In support of this truth, I accordingly make the following observations:

Vegetative life requires neither the brain nor the cerebellum. The superior parts of both hemispheres, the great commissure, even more than half of the cerebellum may be wounded, destroyed by suppuration, or removed, without injury to the functions of the five external senses, or of vegetative life. Acephali, or monsters destitute of brain, are frequently born strong and fat, several of them even live some time after birth. Hence, if the brain were not destined for superior functions, its existence would be useless. However, it is more than probable that the largest and most curious and complicated of all the nervous systems, has functions corresponding to the perfectness of its organization.

Moreover, all the parts of the body may be wounded or destroyed — even the nervous mass of the spine may be compressed or injured at a certain distance from the brain, without immediately destroying the feelings and intellectual faculties. In tetanus, produced by a cause remote from the brain, the other nervous systems are sometimes attacked in the most violent manner, while the functions of the mind remain entire till death. On the contrary, if the brain be compressed, or destroyed, its functions are deranged, and the manifestations of feelings and intellectual faculties are suspended or annihilated.

However defective our knowledge of the scale of the brain from the lowest animals to man may be, it is nevertheless certain
that the cerebral parts multiply, whenever the number and energy of feelings and intellectual faculties increase. Now this would not hold good were not the brain exclusively the organ of the feelings and intellectual faculties.

If the development of brain be defective, on the other hand, manifestations of feelings and intellectual faculties are also defective. An infinite number of cases prove the brains of idiots from birth defective, and the manifestations of feelings and intellectual faculties perfect in proportion as the organization of the brain improves; and the development of the brain very considerable, if the feelings and intellectual faculties are very energetic. Of the truth of this last proposition every observer may be convinced by inspecting the heads of those who have excelled in talents, and have been remarkable for their general capacities.

Again, manifestations of the mental faculties always follow the growth of the cerebral organs; in children the brain is small and pulpy, and, therefore, the functions of animal life are not manifested; but in proportion as it increases, the faculties appear; and in its state of highest development the mental manifestations show the greatest energy. Moreover, in proportion as the organization of the brain decreases, the energy of the feelings and intellectual faculties decreases also.

Further, if the brain do not follow the common order of development, if this take place earlier or later than usual, the feelings and intellectual faculties are evinced in the same order.

Certain faculties, also, are more active in men, and others in women, in conformity with the difference observable in their cerebral organizations.

Precisely as the volume and figure of the brain are propagated from parents to children, are intellectual faculties and dispositions hereditary.

To the preceding proofs I may add, that the affective and intellectual faculties are weakened or deranged by age or disease, in the same proportion as the brain is altered. Thus, all concur
to prove that the brain is the organ of the feelings and intellectual faculties.

**OBJECTIONS.**

There are, however, various objections to the above conclusion. I shall answer the most important of these, which are still repeated by authors.

**I. Diseases and Wounds of the Brain.**

To prove the brain the exclusive organ of mind, I have said that its functions are more or less disturbed by its diseases, and by wounds of its substance. Hildanus relates the case of a boy ten years of age, whose skull was by an accident depressed near the lambdoid suture, and as no immediate ill effect ensued from this, the bone was not raised. The boy, who was endowed with strong mental dispositions, by degrees lost memory and judgment, became incapable of learning anything, fell into decay, and died at forty years of age. Repeated observations induced Boerhaave to say, that if the bones of the skull be forced in so as to compress the brain, blunting of the senses, fainting fits, giddiness, loss of consciousness, and delirium, will result. In the writings, too, of Morgagni, Haller, and others, many slight injuries of the brain are mentioned, by which the faculties of the mind were disturbed. It would be superfluous to cite a greater number of such examples. Several authors have even maintained that every injury of the brain necessarily produces some derangement of the functions of the mind.

On the other hand, much has been written and published, which would persuade us, that very considerable injuries of the brain have not impaired the manifestations of the soul. Thus, the case of one wounded in the head by a shot, is recorded, in whose brain the ball remained, and who still lived for many years after the accident, without the least derangement of the intellectual faculties.
After death, the ball was found near the pineal gland.* A child of eight years of age, had its skull broken by a kick of a horse, and pieces of the cineritious substance, larger than a hen's egg, (as it is expressed,) were lost; this child, however, was restored to health; and his intellectual faculties did not suffer.† A youth, fifteen years of age, received a blow on the head with a stone; his skull was fractured, his brain turned black, and issued out at the wound; in a fit of delirium, he pulled away the apparatus which covered the wound, and with it a portion of brain, down to the corpus callosum. This patient was paralytic, but his intelligence was unimpaired.‡ A child of seven years of age, had a severe wound inflicted on his head by falling from a horse, and the brain issued, continually, by new excrescences, without doing any harm to the intellectual faculties. Another child lost a great deal of his brain by fungus, which continued to grow during four months. The cineritious substance in the seat of the wound, was changed into pus; yet the child retained consciousness, and spoke intelligently till his death.§ A stag drove its horn through the orbit into the head of a hunter, so that its point came out at the top of the head; notwithstanding this accident, the man walked to his home, at a distance of two leagues. A great number of similar cases have been noted, partly as extraordinary occurrences, partly as proofs of the brain not being the organ of the mind, and to show that the intellectual faculties were independent of the organic structure.

There are numerous examples of derangement in the intellectual faculties, where not the least defect could be discovered in the brain after death. In many cases of mental alienation, instead of finding any cause in the brain, disease has been observed in very different parts, as in the liver, bowels, &c. Pinel affirms that the most careful dissections have taught nothing respecting the seat of mental alienation, and that diseases of the brain afford no sufficient

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* Memoires de l'Acad. de Chir. t. i. p. 134.
† Ibid. p. 126.
‡ Ibid. p. 150.
§ Van Swieten, t. i. p. 440.
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data to conclude that it is the exclusive organ of the intellectual faculties.

In order to rectify these statements, so opposite in appearance, we must consider two questions. Was it possible, until lately, to estimate properly the nature of diseases and wounds of the brain? And was it possible, before our discoveries, to judge correctly of the effects produced by them on the exhibition of intellect? Now, it was evidently impossible to take an exact anatomical account of an organ, not only unknown, but on the structure of which, notions entirely opposite to the truth were entertained. Moreover, authority too often induces us to admit facts which never existed. Morgagni, for instance, maintains that the brains of the proud and stubborn, are hard and coriaceous; and that those of the meek, unstable, and undecided, are soft. Theophilus Bonnet says, that the brains of some, who happened to die in anger, or fury, were hard, dry, and friable. According to Portal, the cerebral convolutions in the insane are shallow; according to Dumas, the brain in reasonable men is of a round figure; this author avers, also, that the character of any person is mild or hasty, that his ideas are lively and rational, or heavy and confused, that he is an idiot or a madman, according as his brain is more or less dark in its color, more or less firm, &c. Such notions are certainly exaggerated; yet can it be supposed that in madness and idiotism the organ of the mind undergoes no kind of derangement? It seems to me necessary to inquire, into what changes may take place in the cerebral mass, generally, or in any of its particular parts; and, also, to consider, whether derangements may not happen, though imperceptible by any of the five external senses. If in one struck dead by lightning, or killed by gout in the stomach, or hydrophobia, or tetanus, no derangement in the nervous system be recognised, are we, therefore, authorised to say that the nervous system has really suffered no change whatever?

Gall, and I, are of opinion, that all deranged manifestations of the mind result, immediately, from some change in the brain. We recognise the remote causes of cerebral diseases often con-
nected with derangements of the abdominal viscera; but we say that its immediate cause resides in the brain. Intestinal worms occasion bad breath, cough, grinding of the teeth, tickling in the nose, blindness, mental derangement, &c.; but the bowels, which are irritated, are no more the seat of insanity, than of the tickling of the nose, the cough, or the blindness.

It is also true that very considerable injuries of the brain, sometimes disturb the mental manifestations very slightly; and on the contrary, that very slight injuries of the brain are often accompanied with the most violent symptoms. This, however, also happens in other parts of the body. Very large abscesses have been sometimes found in the lungs, without having been accompanied during life by any great derangement of the respiration; but the lungs are no less the organ of respiration on this account. Ossifications have sometimes occurred in the heart without any remarkable disturbance of the circulation; the heart, nevertheless, is still the organ of circulation. It is evidently wrong, then, to ascribe to the wound or to its seat, that which must be attributed to the particular constitution of the patient alone; and thus it is that we may conceive why no bad symptom should occasionally result from a very considerable injury of the brain in patients but little irritable; whilst, in others, very excitable, the slightest wound will produce the most serious consequences; in the same way as one individual being slightly wounded on a finger is seized with tetanus, whilst another bears the amputation of an arm or leg without the least alteration of health.

It still remains for me to mention certain reported cases, in which half of the brain is said to have been found completely destroyed by suppuration, while the intellectual faculties remained unimpaired. Now it seems that in such a case, at least, the half of the mental manifestations ought to have been annihilated. Though these statements bear the stamp of incorrectness, let us admit them as they are related; let us even join to them, one made by Gall, at Vienna. He attended a clergyman in the The-
resian Institution, who for a long time had labored under a pustular erysipelas, which appeared and disappeared from time to time; by degrees his left side became so weak that he could not walk without a stick; and, finally, he was struck with apoplexy, and died in a few hours. Three days before, he had delivered a lecture at the school. On dissecting his head a part of the right hemisphere, as large as the fist, was found changed into a yellowish and grumous substance. Gall was ignorant of the structure of the brain at that time, hence, prevented from examining the case with perfect accuracy. Let us now consider how such facts are to be explained, if the brain be in truth the organ of the mind.

In giving the histories of cerebral injuries, the duplicity of the nervous system has very generally been forgotten. But one half of the brain may be destroyed, and the various faculties still be manifested by the other of the opposite side, just as one of the optic, auditory, or olfactory nerves may be destroyed, without being blind, deaf, or deprived of the smell. It is well known, too, that the two hemispheres of the brain may be in very different states of health. Tiedeman relates the case of one Moser, who was insane on one side, and observed his insanity with the other. Gall attended a minister similarly afflicted; for three years he heard himself reproached and abused on his left side; with his right he commonly appreciated the madness of his left side; sometimes, however, when feverish and unwell, he did not judge properly. Long after getting rid of this singular disorder, anger, or a greater indulgence in wine than usual, induced a tendency to relapse.

These occurrences seem more extraordinary than they are in fact, for an opposite state of each hemisphere is not rare; it exists evidently in the hemiplegia: one side is paralysed, deprived of all activity, the other continues to exert its functions, and the patients seem to have lost no faculty of the mind. One half of the tongue is paralysed, one eye is blind, one ear is deaf; while taste remains on one side, the opposite eye sees, and the other ear
hears. It sometimes happens that only one hemisphere of the brain is inflamed; and in cases of megrim, the blood-vessels are always fullest on the diseased side. On dissecting a child killed by a violent blow on the right side of his head, the right cerebral hemisphere was found pale and bloodless; the left, on the contrary, was injected and loaded with blood—an evident proof that the hemispheres may be in opposite states. If this child had lived after the blow, it is probable he would have been paralysed on one side, and convulsed on the other. I once dissected the brain of an insane female, and found a portion of the inferior large apparatus of increase (thalamus) of the left side destroyed by suppuration, and the nervous bundles and convolutions connected with it diminished in size; while on the right side, all the parts were larger and in apparent health. These examples suffice to show that the brain is a double organ, that one half may be in a state different from the other, and that every special faculty may be manifested, so long as the organ on which it depends, is not utterly destroyed on both sides.

Let us now examine whether or not it has hitherto been possible to judge correctly of deranged mental manifestations. No one feels more sensibly the insufficiency of our actual knowledge of human nature than he who studies the deranged manifestations of the mind. Pinel despairs of our ever knowing the cause of mental derangements, on account of our ignorance of healthy mental function. I shall here do no more than expose the defects in the methods of the procedure adopted by our predecessors.

We may observe, in all reports upon wounds of the head and injuries of the brain, the following very loose expressions:—The patient continued to walk, to eat, and drink; he had his consciousness entire, viz., he knew all around him; he manifested some memory and judgment; consequently, he possessed all the faculties of the mind, none of them were disturbed. If, however, a person of a mild and peaceable character, after being wounded on the head by a stone, become quarrelsome and morose; and if
another, whose life had ever been irreproachable, after a similar accident, should feel an irresistible inclination to steal, it is evident that, though these persons preserve consciousness, memory, judgment, and imagination, we cannot thence infer, that the injuries inflicted have produced no derangement of the mental functions. Further, animals have consciousness, memory, and judgment; but are they, therefore, men? If a man were by disease reduced, in point of faculties, to the level of a dog, but still enjoyed the five external senses, as well as some portion of memory and judgment, would he, therefore, have lost no characteristic faculty of humanity? If partial idiots have perception, memory, and judgment, are all the faculties of the mind manifested? If, in cases of partial insanity, consciousness, memory, and judgment, be preserved, and if imagination be even exalted, are all the faculties, therefore, unimpaired? Finally, if individuals after a concussion of the brain, or a fit of apoplexy, lose the memory of proper names, or of languages, though they preserve the functions of the five senses—memory, and judgment, have they lost nothing whatever? Thus, it is evident that the manifestations of one or more faculties of the mind may be deranged or destroyed, and the patient still be incorreectly said to preserve all the powers which constitute an intellectual and moral being. It follows, also, that hitherto it has been impossible to judge accurately of the effects of diseases and injuries of the brain, because physiologists have considered the general attributes of the understanding only, and been ignorant of the special faculties. From all that has been said, it appears that injuries of the brain must be investigated under the guidance of sounder ideas of the healthy structure and function of that organ, before safe and useful conclusions can be come at, in regard to mental aberration. More details of this kind are given in my work on Insanity.

II. Hydrocephalus.

An objection has been founded on observations, and pretends that although the brain was destroyed, dissolved, or disorganised
by water, the manifestations of the mind have continued unim pair ed.

Zacutus Lusitanus maintains that he saw a child live for three years without brain. He believed that what he saw in the head after death was a double dura mater. Duverney says that he found water only, and no brain, in a head which he dissected. Haller and Soemmerring notice these statements without denying them. Lauffer* speaks of a new-born child whose head contained nothing but water, in which the brain that had once existed was dissolved. This report received, as he maintains, very general accredence, and the phenomenon was spoken of under the name of liquefaction, or solution of the brain.

Anatomists were accustomed to see the brain in its natural state as a compact and solid mass, and if they chanced not to find this solidity of structure, considered the whole organ as dissolved or annihilated. Morgagni, however, reproaches Duverney with his inadvertency, and assures us that in perfectly similar cases, he always found the brain distended into a thin membrane; remarking that the same circumstance had been observed before him by Tulpus, Vesalius and several other anatomists. In order to answer the objection founded on the statements of Duverney and others, we must consider three points: First, the place where the water is found; then, the change which the cerebral mass has undergone; and, lastly, the condition of the mental manifestations.

Sir Everard Home, in his Observations on the Functions of the Brain,† seems to maintain that there is a certain quantity of water in all brains. He even says: 'Facts appear to point out the use of water in the ventricles in the brain, and they account for the great variety which is met with in the form and extent of the posterior cornua of the lateral ventricles, their size varying according to the quantity of water which is necessary to keep up the pressure required.' He says: 'Pressure to a certain degree, uniformly kept up, is necessary to the performance of the healthy

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* Diss de Infante sine Cerebro nato. Halae, 1743.
† Philosoph. Transact. for the year 1814, part II. p. 417.
functions of the cerebrum; and any increase or diminution of this pressure puts a stop to them.' Before Sir E. Home, Ackerman in Heidelberg published the same statements, and now Mr. Magendie in Paris entertains similar notions concerning what he calls Spinocerebral liquor.

It is certainly true that the cavities of the brain vary in size, according to the quantity of the collected water. They are, however, very different in the natural state when quite free from fluid; but the accumulation of water is incontestably the effect of disease; for in animals which are killed, or in men who die a sudden and violent death, no water is found in the ventricles of the brain.

Physicians are not all agreed on the seat of the water in hydrocephalics. I speak here only of those cases in which the skull is distended beyond the natural size; for there are two varieties of this disease, very important to be distinguished in the practice of medicine; the one of these, however, does not belong to this subject. Dr. Baillie, in his Morbid Anatomy, when treating of Hydrocephalus, has not mentioned this difference. Sir Everard Home, in his Observations on the Functions of the Brain, also confounds the acute and chronic hydrocephalus. He 'thinks that the quantity of water may be much increased without material injury to the functions of the brain, when the skull is not ossified; but after that period even a few ounces in the lateral ventricles have been known to produce as much undue pressure as to bring on headache, general uneasiness, a sensation as if the head were too large, loss of spirits, convulsions, loss of memory of recent events, idiotism, insensibility, and death.' Now all these symptoms which he here relates, are of an acute nature, and ought to be distinguished from those of the chronic hydrocephalus.

In the hydrocephalus, which distend the skull to a larger size than is natural, the water is said to be accumulated either in the cavities of the brain, or between the membranes, or between the dura mater and the skull. While the greater number of practitioners consider the two latter varieties as the most common, all physicians admit the three kinds. Professor Walter, at Berlin, has maintained pub-
licly that in sixteen hydrocephalic persons, he found the water external to the brain. Pinel* says, that in hydrocephalus the water is contained between the skull and the dura mater, or between the membranes, and only occasionally in the cavities of the brain.

Odier fancies that the chronic hydrocephalus is always produced in the windings of the pia mater, and he distinguishes it from the acute, which, in his opinion, is formed only by an accumulation in the ventricles; he gives a detailed description of the acute hydrocephalus calling it internal, in opposition to the hydrocephalus, of which I here speak, and which he styles external. Petit, on the contrary, maintains that in all greatly distended hydrocephalic heads, he found the water in the ventricles, and never between the membranes, or the dura mater and skull. Gall and I formerly maintained, that in large hydrocephalic skulls the liquid always occupied the cavities of the brain; recent observations, however, have convinced me that in some, even of a large size, the water may be contained between the brain and the dura mater. In my French work, entitled 'Observations sur la Phrenologie,' art. Hydrocephalus, I speak of a child who died at the age of eighteen months, whose body I opened along with Dr. Roberton at Paris; we found two pounds and a half of water between the arachnoid coat and the dura mater, whilst the brain lay in the base of the skull covered with a thick pseudo-membrane. The child, though always weakly, manifested a common share of mental functions. Since that time, I have dissected, with Mr. Breshet at Paris, two new-born children, whose brains were very small, defective, and only developed contiguous to the medulla oblongata and cerebellum, while the rest of the skulls, well enough formed, were filled with water. The most remarkable case of hydrocephalus I have seen, was shown to me by Mr. Keys, surgeon of Guy's Hospital, in London, on my visit to that metropolis in 1825. James Cardinal, whose portrait I have given, died at the age of thirty years, a few days before my arrival. The two gentlemen mentioned above, had opened the head, and found about nine pints of water.

* Loc cit. p. 475.
between the dura mater and the brain, which was placed at the bottom of the skull, and one pint in the lateral ventricles. Informed of my being in London, they were so kind as to allow me to examine, with them, this extraordinary head. An opening under the posterior part of the falx established a communication between the great cavities of the hemispheres and the space between the brain and the dura mater. The corpus callosum appeared wanting, but it was only split all along in the raphe, or middle line; the masses composing it evidently existed on both sides. The lateral ventricles were particularly distended in the posterior lobes; several convolutions of the right side were quite unfolded, whilst those of the left presented the usual appearance. The convolutions in the middle line of the head above the corpus callosum, which are commonly opposed with the falciform process of the dura mater between them, were raised by the liquid, and formed part of the general surface. The appearance of the anterior and middle lobes scarcely differed from that of the healthy brain: the olfactory nerves were large, those of sight small, and the anterior pair of the corpora quadrigemina very small. The cerebellum was flattened, and its cineritious substance of a very dark hue. The whole of the cerebral mass was soft, and weighed two pounds fourteen ounces and a half.

Let us now examine what change the brain undergoes in dropsy of its cavities. Many anatomists have admitted that the brain in common hydrocephalus was distended like a bladder; but no one knew how this took place; and it seemed inconceivable that a delicate and medullary body, like the brain, could be brought to such thinness by distention, without tearing. Walter, Ackermann, and many others, in admitting the existence of the cerebral mass in hydrocephalic persons, still maintain that it is disorganised. Gall and I on the other hand, hold, that the cerebral substance is not disorganised, and we establish our opinion by anatomical and physiological proofs.

Anatomy shows that the fibres of the brain are vertical or perpendicular to the cavities, and that each convolution consists of two
layers, but closely applied to each other. If, therefore, water be accumulated in the ventricles, so as to act against the convolutions placed around them, it gradually separates the two layers whose natural position is vertical, and makes them assume a horizontal direction. In this manner, the convolutions, in large hydrocephalic skulls, are entirely unfolded, and present the smooth surface of a membranous expansion, which was considered by Zacutus Lusitanus as a second dura mater. If such hydrocephalic heads have not been shaken, and the dissection been made with due caution, the water is limpid; but if they have been carried from place to place, and rudely handled, it is not astonishing that the water should become turbid, and the brain present something of a dissolved or eroded appearance.

We establish our assertions, also, by physiology. If the brain be the organ of the mind, and be destroyed in hydrocephalic persons, they must, necessarily, be incapable of manifesting any mental faculty. One or other of the two following opinions must be entertained: either the brain is the organ of the soul, and not destroyed in such as, affected with hydrocephalus, manifest intellectual faculties; or, the brain is not the organ of the soul; because those whose brain is disorganised, exhibit propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties.

Walter, of Berlin, imagining the brain in hydrocephalus to be disorganised, maintained, that in this disease all the intellectual faculties were annihilated. This, however, is contrary to fact; there are many instances in which all, or most of the faculties, were exhibited, although the disease was very considerable. Tulpius had seen a hydrocephalic person endowed with understanding, and therefore inferred that the structure of the brain must differ from what is commonly supposed. Camper, and many other anatomists, speak with amazement of similar cases.

For the sake of adding still stronger proofs of the brain's being exclusively the organ of the soul, and of refuting at the same time, those who deny intellectual faculties to the affected with hydrocephalus, I shall quote several cases in point. Gall and I observed
for some years a woman with considerable dropsy of the brain, who manifested that share of understanding usually possessed by women of her class. She died at fifty-four years of age of inflammation of the intestinal canal. We found the cavities of the brain containing four pounds of limpid water. We once saw a man of learning, whose skull was much larger than natural, particularly in the anterior and superior part of the forehead. To judge from its size, there must have been from three to four pounds of water in the cerebral cavities; yet he possessed very extensive knowledge. The only inconvenience which resulted from his peculiar state was, that he often fell suddenly asleep in the midst of the most interesting conversation, at table, at the theatre, and elsewhere. At Copenhagen, we saw a girl thirteen years of age, whose head measured twenty-five inches in circumference, nineteen inches from one ear to the other, and as much from the root of the nose to the neck; it must have contained from ten to thirteen pounds of water; although her legs were almost paralytic, and she had to be carried from one place to another, yet she was genteel in her manners, and made as much progress as the other girls at school. At Augsburg, we met with a girl, whose head, at thirteen years, resembled in shape and size that of the woman of fifty-four years mentioned above; she was little, but walked well, and spoke intelligently. Another female, similarly affected, eleven years of age, was shown to us at Marborough; and at Bruchsal, we found a hydrocephalic girl fourteen years old, who kept her bed constantly; she, although certainly too childish for her age, with understanding enough, talked on all that interested her. Dr. Tobias, of Leipzig, showed us a hydrocephalic head of an extraordinary size. The person had lived thirty-six years, and possessed common understanding; this, however, he lost twelve months before his death, which was caused by a violent fit of anger. Messrs. Laumeyer and Nueffer, at Fribourg, in Brisgau, preserved the skeleton of a girl aged seven years, whose skull contained seventy ounces of water, and who, nevertheless, frequently reminded others of events and circumstances she had heard read from the papers some time before.
Dr. Maler, of Carlsruhe, related to us the history of one affected with hydrocephalus, who died at twenty years of age, and whose skull contained above ten pounds of water. This individual displayed ordinary understanding. When I, in 1814, first saw James Cardinal in London, his head measured thirty-three inches in circumference, twenty-four and a half from one ear to the other, and twenty-three and a half from the root of the nose to the nape of the neck. Yet, this lad, then nineteen years of age, manifested all the feelings and intellectual faculties. He could also read and write tolerably well. I examined a man with a still larger head at Musselburgh, near Edinburgh, in Scotland, who had showed tolerably great mental functions. Four other very considerable hydrocephalic heads, exhibiting mental functions, were shown to me in London. Several came within my knowledge and inspection in Paris. These, and many similar examples prove, that hydrocephalic patients are not always entirely destitute of the affective and intellectual faculties.

Such phenomena are easily explained by those who are acquainted with the structure of the convolutions of the brain. They know that even in hydrocephalus of a large size, the brain is not disorganized, but that it is either placed on the bottom of the skull, or that the direction of its fibres has been changed from vertical to horizontal. Now the exhibition of the faculties does not depend essentially on that vertical, horizontal, or inclined position of the cerebral fibres. They may even be lengthened without the internal organization of the brain being thereby destroyed. The optic nerve is sometimes elongated by an excrescence pushing the eyeball out of the orbit, without loss of sight ensuing. All the arguments, then, which have been founded on hydrocephalus, to prove the brain not the exclusive organ of the soul, fall to the ground.

It is sufficiently well known that Gall and I were the first to demonstrate the structure, which permits so wonderful a change as that which happens in hydrocephalus, to occur without total disorganization of the brain. It is therefore rather astonishing, that
some late writers speak of the facts, our discovery, as having been perfectly familiar to them for a long time past. Sir Everard Home, after relating the history of a boy affected with water in the brain, whose head measured thirty-three inches in circumference, and whose faculties were unimpaired, proceeds to say: "The preceding facts explain, satisfactorily, that the cerebrum is made up of thin convolutions of medullary and cortical substances, surrounding the two lateral ventricles which are unfolded, when the cavities of those ventricles are enlarged; and in this unfolded state the functions belonging to this part of the organ can be carried on." Now, our memoir, announcing this truth, was presented to the National Institute of France, in March, 1808, and was, by their report in the same year, made universally known. Sir Everard Home's paper, upon this subject, was read to the Royal Society in May, 1814; six years after our discovery was before every learned society in Europe. I may also mention, that before Sir Everard Home read his paper, I had demonstrated the structure of the brain in the Medico-Chirurgical Society in London. Will he maintain that he never heard our discovery spoken of, even in the very vague manner in which he has related it?

III. Ossified Brains.

Among other phenomena, which, to the superficial observer, seem calculated to refute the principle, that the brain is exclusively the organ of the mind, are the petrified or ossified brains, which, it has been asserted, have not hindered the mind from being manifested. Instead of examining the fact of occurrence, our adversaries, in their eagerness to overturn our opinions, have at once admitted the existence of these petrified brains, because they seem decisive. Gall and I saw bony masses at Vienna, Leipsic, Amsterdam, Cologne, and Paris, which were always shown to us in triumph as ossified brains, and complete refutations of our position: the brain is the organ of the affective and intellectual faculties. Thomas Bartholin, in 1660, was the first to speak of an ossified brain. An
ox, slaughtered in 1670, in the Benedictine monastery of St. Justine, near Padua, according to the story of the monk, who was cook, had a brain as hard as marble. Duverney exhibited such a pretendedly ossified brain to the Academy of Sciences, in 1703. Moreschi, professor of Anatomy at Bologna, and Dr. Giro,* say they examined at Rovigo a similarly ossified brain. They cut it horizontally almost on the level with the corpus callosum, to examine the interior parts; and though the color of the circumference was different from that of the centre, they could not distinguish the cavities, the thalami, the corpora striata, or any vestige of the third and fourth ventricles, of the corpora quadrigemina, or of the pineal gland. The cerebellum presented only parallel transverse ridges. The basis of this supposed brain was only uneven, but exhibited no traces of origins of nerve. The ox, moreover, manifested the same inclinations as every other ox with a sound brain, and was eight years old when killed. Dumas asserts that these facts completely refute our doctrine of the cerebral organs.

The erroneous opinions relative to ossified brains are still very far from being abandoned, though Vallisneri has shown their falsity and untenableness.

The number of these ossified masses which we ourselves have seen, and the number of which Vallisneri speaks, seem to prove that they occur frequently. Let us, in the first place, see what Vallisneri thinks of them. He shows † that the notion of such a thing as a petrification of the brain took its rise only from the ignorance of a Benedictine friar; he states that he has seen the pretended cerebral petrification spoken of by the monk, and says, that it is no brain; he farther proves that these masses are merely bony excrescences of the skull. He has therefore made various drawings of the brain of an ox, to show that there is no analogy between the protuberances observable on these excrescences and the convolutions of the brain. He shows that an excrescence in his own

* Gazette de Santé. Paris, Nov. 11, 1809. No. XXXII.
possession had a much stronger resemblance to the brain of an ox, than that which Duverney had caused to be drawn. He consequently reproaches Duverney with his ignorance in thinking that he and Bartholin had alone observed this phenomenon, and expresses the greatest amazement that the Academy of Sciences should have been deceived by that which Duverney presented as an ossified brain. He, moreover, reproaches Duverney for having neglected to open and examine the interior parts, in order to see that there was no vestige of cavities, of corpora striata, or of thalami; and blames his credulity in supporting his assertion only by the story of a butcher.

To the observations of Vallisneri, it may be added, that the part on the surface, called pineal gland by Duverney, is much larger than the pineal gland of an ox; its form is also quite different; and, finally, it is situated on the surface, not interiorly, as is the case in nature. In the same manner the part which he considers as a cerebellum with its vermiform process, resembles the natural cerebellum in nowise; and Vallisneri justly remarks that Duverney would have found the brain as well as the bony excrescence, had he himself opened the head; he even states a case in point of a butcher of Modena, who, by proceeding more carefully, found both a brain and a bony excrescence of the skull.

Messrs. Giro and Moreschi, maintain that they saw the centrum ovale of Vieussens in the bony excrescence which they possess. This error is easily explained: for, as the brain, when cut horizontally, presents a large white surface, called by Vieussens centrum ovale, so these bony excrescences when sawed in any direction whatever, will also present a white surface like ivory, and this they have considered as a centrum ovale. But why have these gentlemen not found the ventricles, the thalami, the corpora striata, the tubercula quadrigemina, &c.? That, however, which is most inconceivable is, that they found no vestige of nerves, although the ox had preserved not only its intellectual faculties, but also its five external senses! Moreover, the cerebellum of the ossified brain,
of Moreschi and Giro, presents transverse and parallel rings and ridges, but the natural figure of the cerebellum of an ox is altogether different.

Dr. Simson* gives an account and the drawing of the ossified brain of a cow killed at Fettercairn, a village in the county of Angus, in Scotland. He allows that this brain was much larger than the natural one; that the cerebellum, in particular, was six times bigger than usual; that it did not resemble the brain of an ox in shape; that the cerebellum was far above its ordinary level, and much misshapen; he adds that one small end was quite rough, and might be suspected of having been joined to, and broken off from the skull. Dr. Simson, however, thought it was the brain ossified, because the butcher found it in the skull; and because he to whom the cow belonged, said it was such. We may add that all those who looked upon it, saw it in the same light.

Haller† observed that the ossified brain, which Bartholin speaks of, was only a bony excrescence. Soemmering advances the same opinion as ourselves, viz., that all ossified brains, as they are called, are nothing more than bony excrescences, which spring from the internal surface of the skull, and gradually push the brain from its place without destroying its structure. These excrescences are sometimes seen arising from the external as well as from the internal surface of the skull; sometimes, also, from both. We saw a specimen of the latter kind at Goettingen, which Peter Frank had presented to the university; and in the anatomical collection of the medical school at Paris, there is a skull with a bony mass protruding both without and within. The excrescences are sometimes spongy, soft, and smooth; but more usually solid, hard, and uneven, or gibbous, like stalactites or cauliflowers. These gibbosities have been mistaken by superficial observers for convolutions of the brain; but they really present nothing analogous to such as are found in nature. In every one of them the place of

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* In an inquiry how far the vital and animal actions are dependent on the brain. Edinburgh, 1752.
† Phy. t. iv. p. 356.
adhesion to the surface of the skull by a root larger or smaller, may be distinguished, and the whole mass is frequently larger than a healthy ox's brain. The half of such a fancied petrified brain, shown to us by Professor Bonn, of Amsterdam, was larger than a whole natural brain.

As to the influence of these bony excrescences upon the cerebral functions, it is certain, that notwithstanding their existence, men and animals can live for many years, and manifest various faculties. It is, however, improbable that the faculties suffer no derangement from their presence; as in all examples, except that cited by Duverney, which he himself did not see, the same symptoms have been remarked which take place when the brain is compressed from any other cause. The cow, of which Dr. Simson speaks, ate and drank, saw and heard, as well as another animal of the kind, but she had a difficulty of breathing, which made her snort in her sleep; and instead of getting flesh, when she was fed to be slaughtered, she rather pined away and became leaner. The pressure in such cases does the less harm, because the excrescence grows very slowly. Although I have not yet had an opportunity of observing one, I think it very probable that the brain is not compressed in proportion as the bony excrescence increases, but that the cavities of the skull become larger by degrees, just as happens in dropsy of the brain. Whatever then has been said regarding ossified brains, must be attributed to ignorance of anatomy and physiology. Some share of the blame may also attach to inaccurate observations, and excessive love of the marvellous. I repeat here what Gall and I have always said, that if ever a brain be ossified, and the animal preserve its intellectual faculties, we shall be the first to declare our doctrine of the functions of the brain a purely chimerical fabrication.

IV. Metaphysicians.

Metaphysicians are pleased to say that the mind acts independently of organization, and adduce, in support of their opinion, the
fact of the mind's having no consciousness of the organic conditions which Phrenology assigns as necessary to its manifestation.

It is allowed, that the mind does not know, by intuition, that its operations are performed by means of the cerebral organization; but it is a general truth that the mind requires to observe the instruments of its actions, in order to know them. Voluntary motion is impossible without nerves and muscles, but the mind in itself has no consciousness of the existence of these organs. In the same way the external senses cannot exist without the respective nerves of each; the mind cannot see without eyes, nor hear without ears, but it becomes acquainted with these nervous apparatuses or instruments only by observation. In precisely the same manner it is, that the mind knows the instruments of its affective and intellectual operations: by observation alone. Thus, the arguments of the metaphysicians against the dependence of the mental functions on the brain are unsound, and leave the first principle of Phrenology: the brain is the organ of the mind, in its original integrity.

CHAPTER II.

Of the absolute Size of the Brain.

The greater number of natural philosophers, convinced that the brain is the organ of understanding, have concluded that its functions must be proportionate to its size. The brain of man was found to be larger than that of the majority of tame animals, and, without a more strict examination of living beings, man's superiority was at once attributed to the greater absolute size of his brain; Erasistratus, Aristotle, Pliny, Galen, Portal,* and

others, have therefore said, that man has the largest brain of all animals. Modern discoveries, however, have shown that whales and elephants have larger brains than man; and those who measure the faculties of animal life according to the absolute size of the brain, are thereby proved to be in error; for whatever the understanding of the elephant may be, and with whatever justice the whale be declared king of the ocean, no one will attribute either to the one or to the other the superior faculties which constitute the distinguishing character of man. Besides, when we study nature more closely, we find the brain in the monkey and dog smaller than in the ox, ass, and hog, yet the former approach much nearer to man in intellectual endowments than the latter. Moreover, many animals, as the wolf, tiger, sheep, and roe, may be ranged in the same class, the size of their brain alone considered; yet their dispositions are very different, and often opposite. It is the same with the sparrow-hawk, cock, and pigeon. Finally, we see that very small brains produce the most surprising effects. Observe the honey-bee and the ant, contemplate the economy of their dwellings, their local memory, the care they take of their progeny, their anger and revenge, and their natural language! Is there anything more curious than the conic hole of the pyrmicoleon, or the web of the spider? Do we not observe the jealousy of the stag in the cock; the propensity to fight of the wild boar in the red-breast, in the wren, &c.? And if the absolute size of the cerebral mass were a sufficient measure of the affective and the intellectual faculties, ought not all animals, which have the same quantity of brain, to manifest absolutely the same faculties? It would then be inexplicable why one tribe of animals lives in society, another in solitude; why one takes care of its progeny, and another does not; why one constructs, another sings, &c. Nay, more than this, I may state that it is not possible even to measure the faculties in individuals of the same kind according to the absolute size of the brain. Such views show that we must search for another measure of the faculties of the mind than the absolute size of its organ.
CHAPTER III.

Of the Size of the Brain compared with that of the Body, and with that of the Nerves.

The brain of the elephant and whale is greater than that of man, but their bodies are also much larger. This view seemed to prove the superiority of the human brain, and anatomists now said not that man had absolutely the largest brain, but that he had the largest brain in proportion to his body. All nerves being considered as prolongations of the cerebral mass and proportionate to the body, the moral and intellectual superiority of man was naturally supposed to be indicated by the size of the brain, compared with that of the body. A large body will require the greater part of the brain and nervous system to be employed in its functions, and there will then remain a small portion for the exhibition of superior faculties.

The brains of reptiles and fishes are very small in proportion to their bodies. A crocodile of twelve, a serpent of eighteen feet, and a turtle of a couple of cwt.s., have brains that scarcely weigh one drachm each. There are insects in which the nerve of a single sense exceeds the size of their brain. The brain of the great eagle of the Alps (Læmmergeyer) is almost as small as that of the raven, and the turkey-cock has no greater mass of brain than the parrot or crow. These facts afforded the inference that the faculties are in the ratio of the brain to the body.

This conclusion, however, was too hastily drawn, and was not grounded upon a sufficient number of observations; Wrisberg, Soemmerring, Blumenbach, Cuvier, and other anatomists, on putting the principle to the test, found that the sparrow, canary-bird, linnet, red-breast, bulfinch, and several species of monkeys, have in proportion to their bodies more brain than man. The intellectual faculties of these animals ought, therefore, to surpass
those of man; and the rat and the mouse ought to have more understanding than the horse, stag, dog, and elephant, because the former, proportionately to their bodies, have a more considerable quantity of brain. Were such a principle true, there should exist no difference in the faculties of different species of animals, whose brains bear a like relative proportion to their bodies. Moreover, it would be very difficult to determine the exact ratio of the brain to the body and to the nerves in all cases. The proportions stated by Cuvier for man are evidently incorrect. In adults, he says, it is as one to thirty-five. Our observations lead us to conclude, that the proportion of one to forty, or fifty, or even sixty, is more general. For, suppose a grown-up man to weigh only a hundred and twenty, and his brain from two to three pounds, the proportion fixed by Cuvier will be inexact. Besides, this anatomist does not say how he separated the brain from its connexions; what portions of the nerves and membranes he left; whether the blood-vessels were empty or full; nor the age of the subjects of his comparisons.

Haller remarked that children had a larger brain than adults in proportion to their body, and consequently that, if faculties were measurable by the proportionate size of the brain, they ought to excel grown up persons in understanding. It may, however, be replied, that the brain of children is not perfectly developed, and is, therefore, unfit to manifest the intellectual faculties. Haller farther observed, and Soemmerring and Cuvier repeat after him, that it is very difficult to determine the proportion of the brain to the body, because the body grows lean or fat, and augments or diminishes by half its weight, while the brain undergoes no change. The latter part of this proposition is refuted by experience; for though no adipose substance be deposited in the brain more than in the lungs, it still participates in the nutrition of the body as well as every other organic part, and, therefore, its convolutions are more plump and more closely packed together, and the whole brain is heavier in well-nourished men and animals, in the flower of youth and vigor, than in the old, lean, and emaciated, or in
those who have died of hunger or of lingering diseases. Gall and I have given some attention to this point. The results of our observations are as I have just stated them. Haller’s remarks would not suffice, therefore, to refute the idea of estimating the mental faculties according to the proportionate size of the brain.

Wrisberg and Soemmerring thought they might proceed in a surer way, if they determined the faculties according to the proportion betwixt the brain and the nerves: for these, they saw, were much more considerable in many animals than in man. But neither is the ratio in this case universal. The seal, in proportion to its nerves, has a larger brain than the house-dog, and the porpoise more than the ourang-outang; yet we do not perceive a corresponding ratio in the faculties of these animals.

Comparisons of the brain with the spinal marrow, instituted by Soemmerring, Ebel, and Cuvier,* are not more valuable or satisfactory than the others I have mentioned. Cuvier himself quotes exceptions; in the porpoise, for instance. Mr. de Blanville, too, is wrong in saying that the size of the occipital hole of the skull indicates the proportion of the spinal marrow to the brain. The occipital hole bears relation to the medulla oblongata, and by no means to the spinal marrow. Besides, there is no fixed proportion between the spinal marrow, nor even the occipital hole, and the brain; this may be large, and the occipital hole and the spinal marrow small, or vice versa; a case which happens not only in different species of animals, but even in different individuals of the same species. Neither could this proportion, did it exist, be known during life. It would, consequently, be useless in anthropological investigations.

* Leçons d' Anatomie comparée, t. ii. p. 150.
CHAPTER IV.

Of the Facial Angle of Camper: of the Occipital Angle of Dau­benton; and the Size of the Brain in proportion to the Face and Neck.

In order to measure the extent of the brain and, as he imagined, the corresponding energy of the intellectual faculties, Camper drew a line touching the most prominent part of the forehead and the upper lip, and another from the orifice of the external ear to the end of the upper front teeth, and measuring the angle at the intersection of the two lines, he concluded, that the more it was obtuse, the higher were the intellectual faculties, and the more acute the angle, the more stupid the individual. Lavater, Cuvier, Richerand, and a great number of anatomists and physiologists, approve of this facial angle, as it is called. Lavater's well-known progressive scale of heads, from the frog to the Apollo Belvidere, was composed from the idea it gave. Cuvier also arranged several tables, indicative of the facial angles of men and different animals; he fixed that of Europeans at ninety degrees in infancy, at eighty-five in an adult, and in an old decrepit man as fifty degrees. This manner, however, of measuring the intellectual faculties is not more correct than those I have already mentioned. The facial angle applies only to the parts of the brain situated in the forehead, and is inapplicable to all the lateral and posterior organs: hence the facial angle could even, if there were no other objection, indicate those faculties only, whose organs constitute the forehead. Besides, it is quite impossible to determine, in a general way, the proportion of the forehead to the face. In newborn children the forehead is flat; but from three months to eight or ten years of age, it is ordinarily prominent, and forms a more obtuse angle than at birth, or in the adult. Hence Cuvier errs in saying that the facial angle decreases in proportion as the child advances in age. Even if this were the fact, it would only be
possible to say that the facial angle will be of so many degrees in
grown-up and in old persons, when its amount in infancy is known.
But it is utterly impossible to draw general conclusions from indi­
vidual cases, and, among a hundred persons, no two have the
facial angle alike. Yet, Cuvier would have us believe, that all
children, all grown-up, and all old Europeans, ought to have
precisely the same proportion of brain to the face. Moreover,
this facial angle is useless, when we come to creatures lower in
the scale than man; for Blumenbach has observed that three­
fourths of all known animals have nearly the same facial angle, and
are, nevertheless, endowed with very different and opposite pro­
pensities. Finally, Cuvier himself has remarked that the brain is
not placed close to the external forehead in all animals, but that in
a great number the two plates of the skull being separated, the
brain lies at a considerable depth beneath. This occurs not only
among the lower animals, but also in the aged of the human kind,
between the two plates of whose skulls there is often a considerable
space. In hogs, the brain lies one inch, and in the elephant thir­
ten inches deeper than is indicated by the external table of the
skull. Cuvier, to overcome this obstacle to precise observation,
draws the tangent or vertical line from the internal plate. In many
animals, as in some varieties of the cat tribes and of the rodentia,
the brain inclines so much downwards behind and under the fron­
tal sinus, that it becomes impossible to draw a facial angle from
the most prominent point of the forehead.

The facial angle is, moreover, a very imperfect means of estima­
ting the faculties of man. We have seen negroes with extremely
prominent jaw-bones, manifest great intellectual faculties, because
their foreheads were large. Their facial angle, however, would
have made them inferior to many stupid Europeans, whose fore­
heads are small, but whose jaws project little. From all these
considerations it follows, that the facial angle, as a means of meas­
uring the moral sentiments and intellectual faculties, is perfectly
useless.

Daubenton’s occipital angle is formed by a horizontal line, drawn
from the floor of the orbit, to the posterior edge of the occipital foramen, and a vertical line cutting this and passing between the condyles over the surface of the occiput. Now this occipital angle according to the observation of Blumenbach, measures from eighty to ninety degrees in all animals, and, consequently, does not differ proportionately to their varied faculties. The occipital angle would also indicate the development of the occiput only, and not of the lateral and superior parts of the brain; this alone is sufficient to prove its inutility.

Some physiologists, as Soemmerring and Cuvier, have compared the size of the brain in general with the state of the face; and, according to them, animals are stupid as the face is large in proportion to the brain. Cuvier calls the senses of smell and taste whose apparatus occupies a principal part of the face, the most brutish functions. Cuvier saws the skull vertically and longitudinally, in order to compare with ease, the area of the cerebral cavity with the size of the face.

Ancient artists appear to have observed a certain proportion between the forehead and the face; their statues of high-priests, sacrificators, demi-gods, gods, and especially of Jupiter, have large, high, and vaulted foreheads. The superiority, however, of the intellectual faculties, does not result from the proportion of the forehead to the face, but from the development of the forehead itself. There have been great men with large faces, and very prominent jaw-bones. Leo X., Montaigne, Leibnitz, Haller, Mirabeau, &c., had large faces and very considerable brains. Bossuet, Voltaire, and Kant, had, on the contrary, small faces and large brains. Soemmerring errs, also, in saying that the skulls of women are larger in proportion to their face, than those of men. The idea, too, is evidently incorrect as regards many animals; for the face of the sloth and seal is to their brain, smaller than that of the stag, horse, and ox; yet no one will maintain that the former animals excel the latter in intellectual faculties. Finally, the notion is inapplicable to birds, as Cuvier himself allows.

Plato in ancient times, and Bichat and Richerand in our days, have
maintained that there is a proportion between the intellectual faculties and the length of the neck. According to them, the intellectual faculties are weaker the longer the neck is, because the brain is more removed from the heart, and consequently is less excited by the blood. This assertion is too evidently opposed to all natural history and physiology, to render any demonstration of its falsehood necessary.

CHAPTER V.

On the Cerebral Parts compared with one another.

The cerebral parts have also been compared with each other for the purpose of detecting their functions. Cuvier says* that it is possible to determine the exact proportion of the cerebellum to the brain, because health and disease produce no change upon the cerebral mass, and he has composed several tables illustrative of this point. He finds the proportion of the cerebellum to the brain, to be in man as one to nine; in the saïmiri as one to fourteen; in the ox as one to nine, &c. Now, even these few examples prove that the intellectual faculties cannot be measured by the proportion which the cerebellum bears to the brain; for if, according to the opinion of Malacarne, the cerebellum were the organ of understanding, the saïmiri ought to have more intellect than man; if the brain be the organ of the feelings and intellectual faculties, which is our doctrine, the saïmira ought to have less of these than the ox, and the ox be upon a par with the human kind.

It does not appear necessary that the brain, or its parts, should always participate in the healthy and diseased states of the rest of the body; for, why should not that happen with the cerebral parts, which occurs in other organs? every organ of sense, and every viscus may fall separately into disease, and the rest of the body

remain in health. In the same way, each cerebral part may be
diseased individually. Even in admitting that the whole brain is
equally influenced by the healthy or diseased state of the body, it
may still be asked, whether there be any determinate proportion
between the brain and the cerebellum, and any between the par­
ticular parts of the brain? The answer must be affirmative in one
respect, and negative in another. The constituent parts of every
organ are proportionate to each other, as the cineritious and white
substances, the different apparatuses of increase, the ganglia, and
the number of fibres which spring out of them; but the different
cerebral systems, constituting the particular organs which manifest
determinate faculties, are in no constant proportion to each other.
There are large brains joined to small cerebella, and vice versa.
The cerebellum in youth is smaller in proportion to the brain, than
it is in mature years. Sometimes one, sometimes another part of
the brain, sometimes the forehead, sometimes the posterior part is
most developed. The proportions of the particular cerebral parts
to each other are the more varied, the more numerous they are.
Hence, the almost infinite variety of size and form of head observ­
able in the human species. Soemmerring, therefore, errs in say­
ing that in sound brains, the position and mutual connexion of all
the cerebral parts are invariable, and that no considerable difference
in form and size is to be seen among the brains of different men.

From the preceding considerations, it follows, that the faculties
of the mind cannot be determined, either from the form and size of
the whole head, or from comparisons of one part with another.
Another series of observations, then, is necessary in order to point
out the relations between the mind and the brain. I finish this
section by stating that the details of the three preceding sections,
have been greatly elaborated and cleared up, whilst Gall and I lived
together in Paris, and that their elucidation must be considered as
the result of our common exertions and reflections. The reader
may perceive the truth of this fact, in comparing the words of the
hearers of Gall, in 1807 and later, to 1810, with our own pub­
lications.
SECTION IV.

The Brain is an aggregate of Organs.

The brain is exclusively the organ of the manifestations of the mind; but it remains for us to investigate, whether the whole of that viscus is to be considered as one single organ, or as an aggregate of as many particular and independent organs, as there are particular and independent species of manifestations of the mind. On this subject, philosophical writings contain the most absurd and contradictory opinions. Those, who believe in the singleness of the soul, conclude that its organ must be single also; others, who examine the particular faculties of the soul, maintain that every special faculty must appertain to a particular organ.

As soon as philosophers began to pay attention to the beings of nature, it became necessary to divide them into numerous classes. Moses speaks of the brutes which live and feel, and those which reason. The Greek philosophers, calling the cause of every phenomenon—soul, spoke of a soul of plants, a soul of animals, and a soul of man. They also admitted a vegetative and a sensitive soul. The inclinations were regarded as the result of the animus, and the intellect and reason as the apanage of the mens. Pythagoras, St. Paul, Galen, Gilbert, Gassendi, Bacon, Van Helmont, Wepfer, Leibnitz, Fr. Hoffmann, Haller, Blumenbach, Soemmerring, Reil, Barthez, &c., all suppose the various phenomena of animals and man, as dependent on the existence of different causes. Plato and several ancient writers speak of an unreasonable and of a reasonable soul. Those who admit only one soul in man, as Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Stahl, &c., are obliged to acknowledge it possessed of, at least, several faculties. St. Augustin, determined with great exactness the faculties which are common to man and animal, and those which are proper to man. Malebranche, and many other philosophers, speak of principal and secondary faculties; the principal,
are understanding and will; the secondary, are subdivisions of understanding: perception, memory, judgment, and imagination; and of will: inclination, desire, affections, and passions. Some authors have even further subdivided these special faculties; Vico speaks of two kinds of imagination; and others admit several kinds of memory, as a local memory, a verbal memory, a memory of facts, and a memory of time. Thus it is clear that various principles, or various faculties of the same principle, have been admitted at all times to account for the phenomena of mind.

As the principles or the faculties came to be divided and subdivided, so different seats were also assigned to them. The rational soul was placed in the head, the irrational, in the viscera of the abdomen. The ventricles of the brain have, at all times, been considered as of prime importance; the Arabs placed common sense in the anterior cavity, imagination in the second, judgment in the third, and memory in the fourth. For several centuries the brain was considered as the organ of perception, and the cerebellum, as the organ of memory, the strength of which was supposed to be indicated by the protuberance of the occiput. St. Gregorius Nyssenus, that he might explain why the functions of the mind are not troubled, although the different senses propagate different impressions, compares the brain to a town with several entrances and a great number of streets, by means of which it is possible to arrive at the same point. Nenesius, the first bishop of Emesa, in the reign of Theodosius, taught, that sensation has its seat in the anterior, memory in the middle, and understanding in the posterior ventricles. Albertus Magnus, archbishop of Ratisbon, in the thirteenth century, delineated a head, on which he indicated the seats of different faculties of the mind. He placed common sense in the forehead, or in the first ventricle of the brain, cogitation and judgment in the second, and memory and the moving power in the third. Peter de Montagnana, in 1491, published a drawing of a head, on which the seat of sensus communis, of the cellula imaginativa, cellula aestimativa seu cogitativa, cellula memorativa, and cellula rationalis were exhibited. Bernard Gordon, Lodovico
Dolci and several other writers, published similar delineations, and placed common sense in the forehead; and imagination behind it. According to Dolci, understanding was in the cerebellum, and memory occupied a lower seat in the neck. Bernard Gordon placed the cellula cogitativa at the vertex. According to Serveto, the anterior ventricles receive the images on impressions from without; the third ventricle is the seat of thought, the aqueduct of Sylvius of the soul, and the fourth ventricle of memory. Willis considered the corpora striata to be the seat of sensation and attention; the medullary matter, of memory; the corpus callosum, of reflection; whilst the moving spirits emanated from the cerebellum.

Charles Bonnet regarded each fibre of the brain as a particular organ of the soul. Boerhaave said, that imagination and judgment must be attached to different seats, because the former was active in dreaming, the latter in watching. Haller and Van Sweiten* fancied that the internal senses occupied different places of the brain; but they considered its organization as too complicated, too intricate, and too difficult of investigation, to permit us to hope that we should ever be able to point out the seat of memory, of judgment, or of imagination. Professor Mayer, of Frankfort on the Oder, thought it probable that the soul exercised its different faculties in different parts of the brain. He examined the subject, with details, proved that the plurality of organs is necessary, and was disposed to look on the cineritious substance as the organ of memory, and on the cerebellum as the instrument of abstract ideas. Prochaska believed it more than probable that each internal sense was attached to a particular organ. Platner spoke of two organs of the soul, a superior and an inferior. Malacarne could not imagine the medullary substance of the brain as everywhere adapted to receive the same impressions; he denied the central point of the nerves, considered the cerebellum as the seat of the intellectual faculties, whose strength he estimated according to the number

* Van Sweiten, t. ii. p. 454. *Quis memoriam et rationem sedem in hoc mirabili et intricatissimo organo determinare poterit?*
of lamellæ of which this part was composed. Tiedemann, Wrisberg, Soemmerring, and an immense number of physiologists and philosophers, have admitted a plurality of organs, and maintained that different parts of the brain were destined to dissimilar functions.

These quotations, which might be greatly multiplied, show that the idea of a plurality of mental organs as well as faculties is very old, and that they who call it an invention of Gall are in error.

Let us then examine in a general way the proofs which must convince every reflective mind that the brain is a congeries or aggregate of different organs.

It is a general observation that nature, to produce dissimilar effects, has varied the material condition of bodies. This is seen throughout the world: every salt and every metal has its own crystallization; every plant has its particular structure; even the parts of the same tree performing different offices, as wood, bark, leaves, flowers, and fruit, have varying qualities. The organization of every variety of animal, and of every part of the same animal, is also modified; there is a particular organ for every function: the liver for the secretion of bile, the heart for circulation, and the lungs for respiration. The five external senses are separate and independent of each other. There are special nerves for voluntary motion, and others for each sort of sensation. Hence, nature is not so strongly attached to simplicity and unity as certain speculative philosophers are pleased to maintain. This plurality and independent existence of the organs of automatic life and the external senses, renders it probable that the different internal sensations and functions of the mind, are also manifested by different organs.

Besides analogy there are still other proofs of this furnished by the physchology of animals and man in the state of health and disease. The brains of different animals should be different, because their faculties vary. The beaver which builds a hut, the dog which hunts, the blackbird which sings, the swallow which migrates, must have brains whose organization differs widely. Thus
it is not a matter of indifference to have a brain of this or of that kind. Even individuals of the same species do not possess all faculties in the same degree: some excel generally, others are middling in all things; some are geniuses, others are idiots. The organization of the brain in all these cases cannot be equally perfect. Moreover, if the brain were not composed of different organs, why should understanding increase as it becomes complicated? The cerebral organization of the different sexes at least should be modified; for certain faculties are more active in females, and others in males. These modified manifestations are easily understood, if we admit that certain organs are more developed in males, and others in females.

Further, in the same individual, certain propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties are manifested with great energy, while others scarcely appear. One may excel in verbal memory, and be incapable of combining two philosophical ideas; another may be a great painter, and a bad musician, or a miserable poet; and a third, a great poet, and a bad general; piety and stupidity and piety and intelligence, may be conjoined. Every one has his peculiar gifts. Hence the same mass of brain cannot preside over dissimilar functions. If there were but one organ of sense for all impressions, all should be felt as soon as one was experienced; but the external senses, being attached to different organs, one of them may be weak and another strong. It is the same with the internal senses: if the same part were the organ of every faculty, how could the mind, by means of a single instrument, manifest one faculty in perfection, and another in a very limited manner?

Nor are all the propensities and intellectual faculties manifested simultaneously; several appear at an earlier, several at a later period. Some are very energetic in children, others appear only in adult age; some disappear at the age of fifty or sixty, and others last till ninety or a hundred. Now if every faculty were dependent on the same organ, all ought to appear and disappear simultaneously. All these difficulties are removed, if we admit different organs which are developed, and which diminish, at different pe-
riods, as happens amongst the external senses. Smell and taste appear earlier than sight and hearing, because their organs are sooner developed.

The faculties of animal life cannot act incessantly; they require repose. Study of the same subject, too long protracted, causes fatigue; by changing this we may still continue our labors. Now if the brain were a single organ, that performed all the functions of the mind, why should it not be still further fatigued by this new species of action? Although our eyes be fatigued by looking at pictures, we can still listen to music, because there is a particular organ for each of these sorts of impression. Such considerations are very important in medicine, and by attending to them we may often prevent partial insanities, if we see that a person has one organ very active, whether from great size, or excessive irritability, all that has any relation to the peculiar part must be carefully avoided, and the activity of the other faculties be aroused.

As during watching the same organ is not always active, but reposes at intervals; so, during sleep, all the organs do not sink into inactivity together, but a particular one occasionally continues its function, and then the peculiar state called dreaming supervenes. Watching is the state in which the will can call into action the organs of the intellectual faculties, of the five senses and of voluntary motion; but it is most incorrect to define watching, the state in which all these organs are active; for it never happens that all the faculties are so at the same time. Every corporeal organ being fatigued takes rest, and this state of rest is sleep; but single, or even several organs, may be active while the others repose. The peculiar sensations or ideas which result from this partial or particular state of activity, constitute dreams. These are more or less complicated according to the number of the organs active.

It may here be asked, whether the soul or mind can ever be without all idea? It was formerly a general opinion that activity is the essence of the soul; and it was maintained that in the deepest and most complete sleep it still continued to act and to think,
only that no one had consciousness of it. But this must be regarded as an assertion, divested of every proof that could assure us of such a state of action. At all events the state of dreaming proves the plurality of the organs of the affective and intellectual faculties, for it would be impossible to experience, during dreams, a variety of ideas and sensations, if the brain were a single organ.

Sommambulism also proves the plurality of the organs. This is a state of incomplete sleep, wherein several organs are watching. Now it is known that the brain takes cognizance of the external world by means of the five external senses. If, during sleep, particular organs act, dreams arise; and if the muscles be excited, motion follows, or the sleeper walks. Many people, indeed, speak in their sleep; others hear and answer in addition; and some rise and walk about, doing various acts. This is somnambulism. Now as the ear can hear, so may the eye see, while the other organs continue asleep; and there are positive facts which prove, that several persons in the state of somnambulism have the sense of sight, their eyes, however, being open, not shut, as has been reported. Convulsive fits also occur, in which the patients see without hearing.

Some somnambulists have even done things of which they were incapable when watching; and dreaming persons sometimes reason better than they do when they are awake. When we would reflect deeply upon any subject, we escape from the noise of the world and external impressions, by covering our eyes with the hands; and putting a great number of organs to rest, we endeavor to concentrate all vital power in one or in several. In dreaming and in somnambulism this naturally happens, the functions of the active organs are then often more perfect and more energetic, the sensations more lively, and the reflections deeper than in the state of watching. Unaware of the danger they encounter, somnambulists do acts, which, though possible, they would not attempt were they awake, and conscious of the danger to which they are exposed. They ought, therefore, never to be awakened when seen in dangerous situations.

Inspirations, visions, and similar phenomena, can only be ex-
plained by admitting a plurality of organs. They, consequently, contribute to demonstrate that position. In order to understand the nature of visions, it is necessary to bear in mind what I have said of dreaming. The external world is then represented inwardly: we see our friends or our enemies; we speak, walk, eat, drink, sing, hear music, &c., and all this happens in our dreaming brains only. Visions are these internal sensations or ideas, so strongly pictured forth, that though aroused and awake, the person still refers them outwards, and cannot help considering them as realities. These internal perceptions, when transitory, are of no moment, but when permanent, they indicate a true disease of some part of the brain.

From the preceding considerations, we may now explain why many persons fancy that they see spirits invisible to others; believe themselves accompanied by demons; and imagine that they converse with the devil or with angels. It is even known that such illusions have been produced by the external application of narcotic ointments, composed of dulcamara, belladonna, stramonium, hyoscyamus, opium, &c.

Disease also contributes to prove the plurality of the cerebral organs; for how is it possible to combine the fact of partial insanities with the idea of unity of the brain? It is with the cerebral parts as with the nerves of the external senses. Any nerve may be diseased, while the others remain healthy; we may be blind and hear, or be deaf and see. Dr. Parry, of Bath, told me, that in one of his patients, while the motion of the whole tongue was perfect, the taste of one side was impaired. Analogous facts are generally known to medical men; why should not the cerebral parts be similarly affected? One faculty of the mind is often deranged, while all the others remain unimpaired. Monomania, or fixed ideas, may be explained by this consideration. There are also madmen, who are reasonable only in one kind of mental manifestation. I know the case of a chemist who is mad in everything except chemistry; and of an embroiderer, who, during her fits, and in the midst of the greatest absurdities, calculates precisely
how much stuff is necessary for any particular piece of work. From all these considerations it follows, that there are as many organs as special and independent faculties; and consequently that the brain cannot be a single organ, but must be composed of several. I shall now answer the most important objections to this principle.

**Objections.**

I.—Unity of Consciousness.

Metaphysicians incessantly repeat that the organ of the soul cannot be complicated, because consciousness is single. This argument is very old. It has been made use of against Boerhaave, Haller, and Van Swieten, who commented on the duplicity of the senses and of the brain, and consequently on the plurality of the organs. Hippocrates himself said, that the brain of man as well as of animals is double. Van Swieten observes, that as the consciousness of impressions in two similar organs is single, as for example in the two ears, two eyes, &c., so mental consciousness generally, is single, though the brain be double. The phenomenon of single consciousness may never be explained, but it is certain that the brain is composed of two halves, and each half is made up of different parts. Vegetative life is one, but composed of different faculties, performed by different organs. Animal life, or the exhibition of the affective and intellectual faculties is also one, though more or less complicated in different beings, and the various faculties are manifested by means of peculiar organs. In treating of the functions of the five senses, I shall examine the various opinions which have been broached to explain single consciousness; but whether any of these be found satisfactory or not, the plurality of the animal organs is indubitable. The two hemispheres and the individual parts or organs of each may be in different and quite opposite states, and produce different affections. Their mutual influence, and due continuance, on which the unity of animal life depends, being deranged, the unity of animal life will be disturbed also.
It is therefore not true that consciousness is always single, either in reference to external senses, or to the internal faculties. There are diseased persons who see all objects double. Numbers of madmen hear angels singing, or devils roaring only on one side. One of Gall's friends, a physician, often complained that he could not think with the left side of his head; the right side was one inch higher than the left. Gall attended a gentleman who for three years heard peasants insulting him on his left side. He commonly discerned his derangement and ratified his error; but if he took a little too much wine, or had a fit of fever, he always imagined there were voices abusing him. Tiedemann mentions a certain Moor who was alienated on one side of his brain, and observed his madness with the other.

All mono maniacs have a complicated consciousness. I saw in Dublin a lunatic who fancied himself the Duke of Wellington. He thought to have commanded in Spain and to have gained the battle of Waterloo, yet at the same time he was a clever and excellent servant, did his service at table, and in the house with great propriety. I saw him handing round at a table, where there was a large party, everything with perfect order and decency, so that no guest could suspect his aberration.

There are other sorts of remarkable cases which prove that consciousness is not always single. Mr. Combe (System of Phrenology, p. 108,) quotes from the Medical Repository, the case of a Miss R. in the United States, who naturally possessed a very good constitution, and arrived at adult age without having it impaired by disease. She possessed an excellent capacity, and enjoyed fair opportunities to acquire knowledge. Besides the domestic arts and social attainments, she had improved her mind, by reading and conversation, and was versed in penmanship. Her memory was capacious, and stored with a copious stock of ideas. Unexpectedly, and without any forewarning, she fell into a profound sleep, which continued several hours beyond the ordinary term. On waking she was discovered to have lost every trait of acquired knowledge. Her memory was tabula rasa. All vestiges both of
words and things were obliterated and gone. It was found necessary for her to learn everything again. She even acquired, by new efforts, the art of spelling, reading, writing, and calculating, and gradually became acquainted, with the persons and objects around, like a being for the first time brought into the world. In these exercises she made considerable proficiency. But after a few months another fit of somnolency invaded her. On rousing from it, she found herself restored to the state she was before the first paroxysm, but was wholly ignorant of every event and occurrence that had befallen her afterwards. The former condition of her existence, she called the old state, and the latter the new state, and she is as unconscious of her double character, as two distinct persons are of their respective natures. During four years and upwards, she had undergone periodical transitions from one of these states to another. The alterations were always consequent upon a long and sound sleep. In her old state she possessed all her original knowledge, in her new state only what she acquired since. If a gentleman or lady be introduced to her in the old state, or vice versa, and so of all other matters, to know them satisfactorily she must learn them in both states. In the old state she possesses fine powers of penmanship, while in the new writes a poor awkward hand, not having had time or means to become expert. In January, 1816, both the lady and her family were able to conduct affairs without embarrassment. By quickly knowing whether she is in the old or new state, they regulate their intercourse and govern themselves accordingly. The Rev. Timothy Alden of Meadville has drawn up a history of this curious case.

I know the history of a noble family where a son had similar fits, accompanied by a special memory, so that consciousness was double, one for the ordinary state, and the other for the fits.

Dr. Devan read to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, in February, 1822, the history of a case, observed by Dr. Dyer of Aberdeen, in a girl, sixteen years old, which lasted from 2d March, to 11th June, 1815. The first symptom was an uncommon propensity to fall asleep in the evenings. This was followed by the hab-
it of talking in her sleep on those occasions. One evening she fell asleep in this manner; imagining herself an Episcopal clergyman, she went through the ceremony of baptising three children and gave an appropriate prayer. Her mistress shook her by the shoulders, on which she awoke and appeared unconscious of everything, except that she had fallen asleep, of which she showed herself ashamed. She sometimes dressed herself and the children while in this state, or as Miss L. called it, ‘dead asleep,’ answered questions put to her in such a manner as to show that she understood the question, but the answers were often, though not always, incongruous. One day in this state she set at breakfast, with perfect correctness, with her eyes shut. She afterwards awoke with the child on her knees, and wondered how she got on her clothes. Sometimes the cold air awakened her, at other times she was seized with the affection whilst walking out with the children. She sang a hymn delightfully in this state, and from a comparison, which Dr. Dyer had an opportunity of making, it appeared incomparably better done than she could accomplish when awake. In the meantime a still more singular and interesting symptom began to make its appearance. The circumstances which occurred during the paroxysm, were completely forgotten by her when the paroxysms were over, but were perfectly remarked during subsequent paroxysms. Her mistress said that when in this stupor, on subsequent occasions, she told her what was said to her on the evening when she baptised the children. A depraved fellow servant, understanding that she wholly forgot every transaction that occurred during the fit, clandestinely introduced a young man into the house, who treated her with the utmost rudeness, whilst her fellow servant stopped her mouth with the bed clothes and otherwise overpowered a vigorous resistance which was made by her even during the influence of her complaint. Next day she had not the slightest recollection even of that transaction, nor did any person interested in her welfare know of it for several days, till she was in one of her paroxysms when she related the whole fact to her mother. Next Sunday she was taken to church by her
mistress, while the paroxysm was on her. She shed tears during the sermon, particularly during the account given of the execution of three young men at Edinburgh, who had described in their dying declarations the dangerous steps with which their career of vice and infamy took its commencement. When she returned home, she recovered in a quarter of an hour, was quite amazed at the questions put to her about the church sermon, and denied that she had been to any such place, but next night on being taken ill, she mentioned that she had been at church, repeated the words of the text, and in Dr. Dyer's hearing gave an accurate account of the tragical narrative of the three young men by which her feelings had been so powerfully affected.

The same phenomena present themselves, when in a state of somnambulism produced by animal magnetism. It has been repeatedly observed that some magnetised persons acquire a new consciousness and memory during their magnetic sleep. When this state has subsided, all that passed in it is obliterated and the recollection of the ordinary state is restored. If the magnetic sleep is recalled again, the memory of the circumstances which occurred in that state is restored, so that the individuals may be said to live in a state of divided or double consciousness.

Single consciousness, then, even in the sense of personal identity, is not a constant phenomenon, though it is seldom disturbed. The different sorts of consciousness, as special sensations, feelings and notions, are evident in every individual, and can be explained only by the instrumentality of different organs; in the same way as we hear, see, smell, and feel by the assistance of different nerves.

II.

It is also objected that, in conceiving the brain composed of many organs, its unity is destroyed, whilst all organic parts are evidently dependent on each other. It is certainly impossible to deny the mutual influence and dependence of the different organs,
and no one can insist upon this truth more than I do. There is, however, a great difference between saying that the various organic parts exert a mutual influence, and saying that each part does not perform its own particular function. This may be illustrated from vegetative and animal life. Digestion is necessary to the circulation of the blood, and to the secretion of bile; but does the stomach effect the circulation of the blood, or the secretion of bile? Nutrition depends on digestion, chylification, sanguification, respiration, circulation, and other auxiliary functions; but is not each of these functions the office of some particular organ? We observe the same in animal life. Without the auditory apparatus we could not hear any language; but does hearing invent the vocal signs? We shall afterwards see that we cannot arrive at certain ideas without the external senses, but that still the external senses do not produce the conceptions of these ideas. Again, whatever nourishes the brain contributes to its evolution, as is the case with the eyes, the ears, &c.; and no part of the body detached from it can preserve its perfect organization, or perform its function; but can we therefore say that the eye does not see, that the ear does not hear?

III.

The particular organs of the brain, it is objected again, are not so distinctly separated as the nerves of the five external senses. It is true the limits or lines of separation cannot be exactly determined between the different organs, but neither can they in the case of the five external senses. The nerves of motion have not yet been separated from the nerves of feeling in the mass of the spinal marrow, though they must be different. The structure of the skin also must vary at different places, as is evident by the exhalations arising from it, and the hair which grows on various parts of it; but this difference has not yet been demonstrated. Neither the limits of the olfactory nerve, nor of the nerve of sight, are more distinct than are the limits of the fibrous bundles of the
cerebral organs. But as the relation between the optic nerve and sight, between the olfactory nerve and smell may be shown, so we can demonstrate the relations between the bundles of the brain and the affective and intellectual faculties. Anatomy shows that the bundles, which form the convolutions situated in the forehead, are small but numerous, while the posterior bundles are less numerous but large; and we shall see that the faculties of the forehead are more numerous but less energetic, than those whose organs are situated in the posterior and superior parts of the head. The mutual influence of the cerebral functions upon each other requires a communication of the cerebral organs, and in my work on the Anatomy of the Brain I have a separate chapter on the apparatuses of communication.

IV.

The comparison of the internal organs with the five external senses is rejected as affording any proof of the plurality of the organs, because the five external senses may be reduced to a single sense, sensation, just as all the internal faculties may be reduced to the faculty of thinking. It is true, that the five external senses only operate some kind of sensation; but sensation in this sense is a general expression, and embraces different species of sensation, as hearing, seeing, smelling, &c. Gravity, density, volume, &c., are general expressions in physics; but it is necessary to specify their determinate qualities to indicate the peculiar bodies of which we speak, as gold, silver, copper, iron, &c. Life is a general expression, and life's common phenomena, birth, nutrition, increase, decrease, and death, are observed in all living beings, in plants and in animals. It is, however, necessary to discriminate vegetation from animalisation. Secretion is a general expression; but each particular sort must be indicated, and is actually performed by a particular organ; as bile by the liver, urine by the kidneys, &c. We must proceed in a similar manner in considering animal life: sensation is a general expression, and every kind of sensation must
be specified. The having sensations of light, of sound, of taste, or of smell, are very different things. Each of these particular sensations is performed by a particular organ. The faculty of thinking is a common power; but thoughts of space, of form, color, tone, number, &c., are particular kinds which are manifested by appropriate and special organs. This objection, therefore, instead of refuting the notion of the plurality of the organs, proves the necessity of its admission from analogy.

V.

Another objection is the following: the nerves of the five external senses are homogeneous, and their functions only differ on account of their external apparatus. The auditory nerve in the eye, it is said, would see, and the olfactory nerve in the ear would hear; therefore, the internal organs, being destitute of such external apparatus, necessarily perform the same functions. This opinion is still pretty general. As a polypus may be divided into several pieces, and every piece become an independent whole, so Cuvier compares the nervous system to a net, or a broken lodestone, which originally was composed of homogeneous parts; and he proceeds to say that he thinks the different functions of the nerves must be attributed to external apparatus, to the ramifications and combinations of blood-vessels; in short, to an infinity of secondary circumstances, rather than to the internal structure of the nerves. It may, however, be proved anatomically and physiologically, that not the external apparatus only, but also the internal structure of nerves performing dissimilar offices is different. I admit five sorts of nerves, and subdivisions of each: the first of these presides over vegetative life; the second over voluntary motion; the third over the functions of the five senses; the fourth over the feelings; and the fifth over the intellectual faculties. The nerves of the first kind are soft, and of a gray or whitish-red color; those of the second are white and firm. The nerves of the five external senses differ universally in their consistence, color, form, and texture. The
fibres of the brain and cerebellum are white and delicate. Moreover, every nerve, and even the different parts of each, have their origins in a particular quantity of cineritious substance. Now, these anatomical circumstances never vary, and must, consequently, be essential to the structure and function of the nerves. Cuvier is therefore in contradiction with himself, when he says, * that ‘whatever be the position of the parts, and however circuitous the courses nerves must take to arrive at their destinations, certain parts constantly receive their nerves from the same source. Similar nerves have always a similar distribution. The smallest pairs, as the fourth and sixth, which might easily have been supplied by some neighboring trunk, are regularly formed, and destined.† From these anatomical facts, it seems natural to conclude that the nerves are not all exactly alike. Their difference is equally proved by physiology. The divers functions of vegetative life, as the secretion of bile, saliva, tears, &c., suppose organs essentially different: is it not then likely to be the same with the nerves of the five senses? Their external apparatuses are said to be different, because fitted to receive different impressions; but can dissimilar impressions be transmitted to the brain by the same nerves? Could impressions of light be propagated by the auditory nerve? If the manner of propagating impressions from without, and of communicating these to the brain were essentially the same, and weaker or stronger only, perceptions of these similar impressions ought also to be essentially similar, and to differ in nothing but in strength. This proves that the difference of the propagated impressions requires corresponding difference in the structure of the nerves which propagate them. Moreover, the internal structure of the nerves must be different, because they perform their special functions aroused by mere internal irritations. The sensations experienced in dreaming are the same as external impressions produce. A person who has lost his eyes dreams that he sees; another thinks

† J. Hunter made the same observation before Cuvier.
he feels pain in an amputated limb; an increased flow of blood to
the eyes makes us see sparks and luminous bodies; to the ears, it
excites tingling and humming noises. Finally, illusions of the five
external senses in different diseases, are produced by purely internal
causes. All these phenomena force us to infer that the organization
of every nerve is particular.

It is replied that the difference of the organs cannot be demon-
strated. I answer that the contrary also cannot be shown. Hence,
neither the homogeneous nor the dissimilar structure of the organs
is proved or refuted by any consideration on the five senses.
There are, however, many things similar in appearance, and really
different in nature. Many fluids look like water without being
aqueous. Who can distinguish all the varieties of apple-trees by
the difference of their ligneous fibres; and these must, neverthe-
less, be different, since their flowers and fruits are so? Hence,
physiological must supply what is deficient in anatomical proofs.

VI.

Plattner made the following objection: a musician plays with his
fingers on all instruments, why should not the soul manifest all its
operations by means of the same organ? This observation is rath-
er in favor of, than in opposition to the plurality of the organs, for
there are ten fingers which play, and musical instruments have
many chords or holes.

VII.

All voluntary motion is produced by muscles: it is, consequent-
ly, possible that all ideas and sensations may be the result of differ-
ent motions of the cerebral fibres. Those who make this objec-
tion, forget that the various motions are performed by many
different muscles. There are flexors, extensors, pronators, &c.,
and every muscle is composed of many fibres, often having differ-
ent directions. Now, in every position, and in every motion of
the body, other and different muscles start into activity. In the same way we conceive every kind of sensation or idea, attached to particular fibres of the brain.

The two first principles of phrenology examined in the preceding pages, are allowed essentially not to have the claim of original discovery, though we elucidated them with more clearness, and with more details, than any natural philosopher had done before us. Gall's particular merit, however, begins with the specification of the fundamental powers and their respective organs. Here every point becomes new, though his first method of proceeding was physiognomical, and known to his predecessors and contemporaries. But Gall confined himself to the head, and he alone is the founder of the physiology of the brain, in giving consistency and extension to these inquiries.

SECTION V.

On the Means of Determining the Functions of the Cerebral Parts.

After having proved that the faculties of the mind are different, and that the manifestation of every fundamental power must depend on some particular organ, it is natural to ask how the organ of each may be determined. As the idea of the plurality of the organs is very ancient, let us first consider what means have been employed for their detection,—inquire into the cause of the indifferent success that has attended those investigations, and afterwards speak of the manner pursued by Gall and Phrenologists.

I. Anatomy.

Many natural philosophers have hoped to ascertain the functions of the cerebral parts by anatomy, especially by comparative an-
atomy. It is even pretty generally believed that our physiology of the brain is the result of anatomical investigation. This, however, is not the case. I shall here make some reflections on anatomy in general, and on comparative anatomy in particular. There are very few instances where structure indicates function. Who, before observing the muscles in action, could have inferred from their structure that they were contractile? Who from the anatomy of the stomach, could predicate its digestive power? Who, from the structure of the viscera, could decide that the liver would secrete bile, the kidney urine? The structure of the heart was known long before its function. Who, from the structure and form of the nerves, could determine what kind of impressions they propagate? The deepest penetration could not have assigned smell to the pituitary membrane of the nose,—taste to the nervous papillae of the tongue,—perception of light to the optic nerve, &c., from mere examination of structure.

It is the same with the brain. Though the direction of its fibres, their greater or less consistence, their deeper or lighter shades of color, their size, length, &c., be known, what conclusion as to the functions can thence be drawn? None. It is with the brain as with plants whose functions are extremely different, even when differences in the organization are imperceptible, which, however, must exist, as effects proclaim. It is quite certain, therefore, that anatomical knowledge does not indicate function; some other means must, consequently, be used to discover the offices of the cerebral parts. Physiology has, indeed, often preceded anatomy. It was generally known that we see by means of the eyes, before their structure was discovered. If it were possible to determine functions according to structure, we should not have to refute so many errors; to show, for instance, that the feelings neither result from the viscera, nor nervous plexuses and ganglia of the abdomen, nor from the temperaments, &c. Many cerebral organs were discovered by Gall, before their anatomy was demonstrated, and his discoveries might have subsisted for centuries, without any information on the structure of the brain.
When I say, however, that function is not discovered by knowledge of anatomical structure, I am far from maintaining that the structure of a part has no relation to its function. The structure of the heart did not proclaim, yet it was in relation to its function. It is the same with all the parts of vegetative and animal life. A physiological system of the brain would be necessarily false, were it in contradiction with its anatomical structure. If an anatomist could prove all nerves to be only prolongations of the brain,—show their termination in one central point,—demonstrate the absence of difference in the brains of animals with dissimilar faculties, and between the brain of an idiot from birth and that of a person endowed with great talent: in short, if an anatomist demonstrate the structure of the brain to be in contradiction to our physiological principles, or vice versa, he will annihilate our whole doctrine with all its consequences. There is then some relation between the structure and function of organic parts, but the structure of a part, seldom, if ever, indicates its function.

Let us now examine whether by comparative anatomy the functions of the brain can be determined. At first sight, comparative anatomy seems capable of affording important results, but a nearer view shows obstacles that preclude even the hope of aid from it. First, as I have just said, it is impossible to determine functions, from structure. Then, there are animals whose vegetative life presents organs of which man is destitute. May we not conjecture that it is the same with animal life; but how can we conceive any function if we are not endowed with one similar? Accordingly, although it be of the highest importance to know what gradations nature observes in adding to and complicating the brains of animals as their functions are multiplied and ennobled, we must allow that, notwithstanding the most assiduous labors, comparative anatomists have only shown the mechanical forms of different brains without determining the functions of the cerebral parts.

Principles were wanting to enable anatomists to determine the existence or absence of the same parts in different animals; these have been denied or admitted, according to similarity or dissimi
larity of form alone. Anatomists do not even agree in what the brain consists. I call brain the nervous mass joined with the nerves of motion and of the five external senses, and manifesting the feelings and intellectual faculties.

In the lower animals it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether there be a particular cerebral mass intimately united to the origins of the nerves, so as, apparently, to form a whole, the parts of which cannot be demonstrated; or, whether this mass belongs entirely to the nerves of the five external senses; in which case external impressions would be perceived without a brain, according to the definition just given. In fishes, the nervous mass situated in the skull, is divided into several ganglia, whose functions are not sufficiently understood. In birds, the hemispheres of the brain are more considerable than in animals of a lower order, but they are without convolutions. We have rectified the error committed by the anatomists who stated birds to be destitute of commissures, thalami, and corpora striata. The cerebellum of birds consists of semicircular rings. In viviparous animals, its lateral parts become very considerable. The brains of small quadrupeds, as of mice, rats, squirrels, &c., are smooth on the surface and without convolutions. Cuvier, however, is wrong in saying that the brains of the rodentia have no convolutions; for in the beaver they are very distinct. In the greater number of quadrupeds, the brain presents distinct convolutions; but the function of no cerebral part has ever been detected in them. According to Cuvier, all the mammalia, saving man and some of the simiae, are without posterior cerebral lobes. He founds this assertion on the circumstance of their cerebella being uncovered with brain. The conclusion is, however, very incorrect; for the fact exists only in consequence of the horizontal position of quadrupeds. The presence of posterior lobes cannot be denied, because their size and form differ in different animals, or else the anterior and middle lobes ought also to be denied. Nay, it seems to me that in animals, the anterior and lateral cerebral convolutions are proportionally much smaller than those behind; for the pretended
optic thalami, out of which the convolutions placed posteriorly spring, are proportionally much larger in quadrupeds than the external half of the corpora striata, from which those in the front and sides arise. Thus the anterior and middle lobes of the brains of animals do not present a greater analogy to those of man, than the posterior lobes. It is generally to be observed, that the position and form of cerebral parts do not constitute essential proofs of their existence. In man, the ganglion of the olfactory nerve is covered by the anterior lobe of the brain; in quadrupeds, it lies before it entirely; the olfactory nerve of man is separated from his brain; in the greatest number of quadrupeds it is united to the anterior convolutions, &c.; but are the anterior lobes therefore wanting in quadrupeds? Moreover the cerebellum of all men is not entirely covered by the posterior lobes; these lobes nevertheless exist, and are only smaller in proportion to the cerebellum, than in ordinary cases. Finally, animals manifest the functions which are performed by the posterior lobes of the human brain, and, consequently, we must conclude physiologically that the respective organs exist.

Cuvier, in contradiction with himself, states farther, that the brains of quadrupeds have the same parts as the brain of man. By this, however, he can only mean such large portions as the cerebellum, the pons Varoli, the thalami, corpora striata, corpus callosum, anterior and middle lobes. This assertion, therefore, still requires rectification in another respect. The brain and cerebellum of man and animals preserve the same general type indeed, but they present many modifications, and many parts of the human brain are not found in the brains of animals. This point may be illustrated by analogy. All plants and trees have certain common parts, as roots, stalk, trunk, boughs, branches, and leaves; but can we say that all vegetables have the same parts? Various branches might be engrafted on a common trunk and bring forth different fruit, yet the general type of a tree is the same. The laws of vegetation are similar in all plants, but the elements submitted to these laws are different. Precisely so are the laws of the
nervous system; there exists one type from the brain of the insect to that of man, but it presents as many modifications as nature intended to produce different functions; the common parts are, consequently, more or less complicated.

Cuvier thought there was some relation between the tubercula quadrigemina and the nature of the food of animals. According to him, the anterior pair of these tubercles is larger in herbivorous animals, and the posterior in carnivorous. The wolf and sheep, however, have the nates larger than the testes: the general assertion of Cuvier, therefore, falls to the ground. I pass over many other errors, believed and propagated by comparative anatomists, because they belong rather to anatomy than to physiology, and I refer the reader to my work on the anatomy of the brain and its appendix. Here, I only say that comparative anatomy, as hitherto conducted, has, no more than anatomy in general, advanced the physiology of the brain. I think it will suffice, if I quote but one passage of Cuvier in confirmation, where he says * positively, that 'the instinct is indicated by no visible mark in the conformation of the animal.'

II. Mutilations.

Several natural philosophers have endeavored, by mutilations, to determine the functions of the brain. They cut away various parts to see what faculty would be lost. But, in the first place, such means, formerly, could not be accurately employed, and must, therefore, have been entirely useless; the duplicity of the organs was frequently overlooked; the structure of the brain, too, was not known, and the mutilations were made horizontally, while the direction of the fibres is vertical. Moreover, the special faculties of the mind were unknown, and the mutilated animals were said to manifest all the faculties, if they exhibited such as are common and general only.

These means have been pursued without fruit hitherto, and are

certainly inadequate to determine the functions of the brain; for
the organs not being confined to the surface must be cut away on
both sides down to the corpora striata and optic thalami, and a
wound of this extent would kill any perfect animal. But let us
even suppose that it survived such a mutilation, how is it to mani-
fest a sensation of whose organ it has been deprived; and how in-
dicate its want? Such operations, too, are so violent, that seve-
ral faculties might be retained without being manifested. A bird,
whose brain is half scooped out, is not likely to sing, or to build a
nest, &c. Finally, parts deranged by sympathy, are sometimes
more sensible than those which suffer primitively or idiopathically.
A headache often results from something indigestible in the stom-
ach, and this, without any feeling of pain in the stomach itself.

Several physiologists, particularly Fodéré, Rolando, Flourens,
Magnelie, and others, have recently mutilated the brains of various
living animals; from their observations, the inference might be
drawn, that the whole brain and cerebellum are destined to regulate
voluntary motion. This, however, is in contradiction with all
physiological observations on the brain in the healthy state, and I
think that it is impossible to determine the functions of the cerebral
parts by mutilation. At all events this violent proceeding will not
teach more than may be done by observations, made in the healthy
state.

III. Sir Everard Home's Method.

Sir Everard Home,* in his Observations on the Functions of
the Brain, read at the Royal Society, on the 26th of May, 1814,
seems to trust to a peculiar means of determining the functions of
the cerebral parts. He says: 'The various attempts which have
been made to procure accurate information respecting the functions
that belong to individual portions of the human brain, having been
attended with very little success, it has occurred to me that, were
anatomical surgeons to collect in one view all the appearances they

* Philosophical Transactions for the year 1814. Part. II. p. 709.
had met with, in cases of injury to that organ, and the effects that such injuries produced upon its functions, a body of evidence might be formed that would materially advance this highly important investigation. He then informs his readers that he has brought together certain observations, stating them as so many experiments upon the brain, with the conclusions which tend to elucidate this particular inquiry.

Let us first hear his observations. We read, * that in the torpid state, commonly attendant upon any violent shake being given to the brain, the senses are so much impaired, that little information can be gained respecting the effects produced upon the internal organs;—that a coup de soleil is sometimes accompanied by delirium, loss of speech, and the power of swallowing; that blood extravasated in the lateral and third ventricles was attended by repeated fits of vomiting and by coma; that coagulable lymph, spread over the union of the optic nerves, the pineal gland and tuberculum annulare, was followed by permanent contraction of the muscles between the occiput and vertebrae of the neck, dilatation of the pupils, and a great degree of deafness;—that the formation of pus under the dura mater covering the right hemisphere was accompanied by delirium succeeded by coma;—that a tumor in the substance of the posterior lobe of the brain was attended with derangement of the functions of the stomach and bowels, and with double vision; and that a deep wound in the right anterior lobe of the brain, attended with inflammation and suppuration, produced no effect whatever, the senses remaining entire, and the person not knowing that the head was injured. In a case, also, in which the tuberculum annulare had become so hard as not to be cut easily with a knife, a considerable quantity of earthy particles having been intermixed with the medullary substance of the crura and other parts of the cerebellum, and the cerebrum and the upper parts of the cerebellum being unusually soft, the effects were, that the boy had been an idiot from birth, never walked, spoke, nor understood what was said, often went three days without food, and so on.*

* Sect. II., p. 477, &c.
I suppose Sir E. Home did not intend to state such facts as quite new and unobserved; for every one who is but half acquainted with the history of the healthy and diseased state of the brain, knows, that many authors have related cases, in most or in all respects similar. We learn, however, from his paper, that like grave affections of the brain, often produce no perceptible derangement in the manifestations of the mind. I only maintain, that the means Sir E. Home has adopted, are quite inadequate to point out the functions of the brain, and that all hope of success from such a procedure is vain; this, my opinion, is supported by the observations of Sir E. Home himself. He does, indeed, speak of a body of evidence which might be formed, and of conclusions which tend to elucidate this peculiar inquiry; but he has not drawn even one inference. In the various pathological affections of the brain, he has observed headache, giddiness, faintness, loss of memory, want of sleep, delirium, mania, depression of spirits, melancholy, apoplexy, idiotism, hissing noise in the ear, deafness, blindness, loss of speech, irregular pulse, stupor, the mouth drawn to one side, numbness of the arms and legs, spasms in the lower extremity, stumbling in walking, pain between the shoulders, nausea, retching, slow action of purgative medicines, vomiting, convulsions, &c. Sir E. Home is, perhaps, inclined to infer, that the brain is the organ of these symptoms, or it may be of the states which are opposite to them?—The above will be sufficient to show an intelligent reader, that in Sir E. Home's mode we should never be able to determine the peculiar functions of the cerebral parts.

IV. Dr. Gall's proceeding.

At the beginning of this volume I stated that Gall's researches were merely physiognomical; that he compared the size and form of the whole head with the general faculties of the understanding, looked for particular signs only of memory, judgment and imagination, and did not suppose that the feelings also resided in the brain;
but that not succeeding in this way, he compared the form and the size of the whole head with the favorite occupations of those who were remarkable for peculiar talents. During several years he thought, for instance, that great mechanicians may be distinguished by a face capable of being enclosed between two parallel lines; in other words, which was equally wide at the temples, as at the cheek bones, and great musicians by a triangular form of the forehead. He met, however, with exceptions, and was then admonished that he had not yet arrived at the truth, since nature makes no exceptions in her laws. If the eye be the organ of sight, vision can never exist without the eye; so also in regard to the internal organs. If a peculiar faculty be attached to a certain cerebral part, this can never be wanting, if the faculty is manifested. This truth is as evident as the statement, that no effect can take place without a cause. Gall was therefore obliged to give up his early method of investigating general configurations of head. This time, however, was not entirely lost, as he acquired great facility of distinguishing differences in configuration.

Recalling to his mind his first observations, by which he distinguished a good memory from the development of a particular part of the brain, which gave to the eye a prominent appearance, he then sought to discover the organs of particular faculties, and compared peculiar cerebral configurations with the natural vocations of different persons. Thus, when he observed any mechanician, musician, sculptor, draughtsman, or mathematician eminently gifted, and who had displayed his talent from birth, he examined his head, to see if he could discover a peculiar development of any cerebral part. Proceeding in this way, he soon detected peculiar developments in musicians and mechanicians. He observed, that a certain part of the head was always highly developed when a peculiar talent was innate, while the rest of the head was very differently shaped in each individual case. At first he confined his observations to men of partial genius, and such individuals were, indeed, his best subjects, not only because their organs are easily pointed out, but also because they alone resist, or are superior to
the influence of external circumstances and education. These in-
dividuals are also the most proper for confirming the organs and
convincing beginners; for in them the organs are most easily
distinguished, and the relation between development of cerebral
parts and particular manifestations of mind is most evident. It is
also important to observe the characters of persons, who, being
uncultivated, are least capable of dissimulation. As physician to
the establishment for the deaf and dumb at Vienna, Gall was for-
tunately circumstanced for this purpose. Here he could observe
the natural state of mental manifestations, and detect different de-
grees of susceptibility of education. With this view, persons from
the lower classes were also called into his house, and encouraged
in such conversations and behaviour as might show their char-
acters.

Thus, Gall, to discover the mental faculties and their particular
organs, had recourse to the principal actions of men, and then
named the cerebral parts accompanying, after these actions. Indi-
viduals are born mathematicians, mechanicians, musicians, philolo-
gists, metaphysicians, poets, &c.; if he found a certain part of the
brain of each uniformly more developed than the rest, he termed
this the organ of mathematics, music, philology, metaphysics, or
poetry, &c. In the same way, individuals are, from birth, stub-
born, proud, courageous, or thievishly, murderously, religiously
inclined, &c., and the cerebral part that regularly accompanied
these actions, he called organs of pride, firmness, courage, theft,
murder, religion, &c.

Gall, observing that greater than common development of a
certain cerebral part, corresponded with a peculiar talent or deter-
minate inclination, at first, supposed the part so developed, might
be the organ of such manifestation, and the probability of this as-
sumption increased in proportion to the number of confirmatory
observations. Again, if he saw a head with a protuberance, evi-
dently occasioned by the development of a cerebral part, he en-
deavored to get acquainted with the individual, and to learn his
talents or dominant character. If the organ was one on whose
functions preceding actions had already led him to draw conclusions, every new case of correspondence increased the probability of his having been correct. If, on the other hand, it was an organ not yet observed, he compared the actions or inclinations which accompanied it, with its development and the mental frame of others, and concluded accordingly. In these two ways, all the organs Gall discovered were determined. These were, to give them his own names, the organs of propagation, murder, theft, mechanical arts, music, mathematics, and metaphysics, discovered by comparing the larger development of individual parts with the energetic actions, and the organs of love of offspring, circumspection, and religion, by looking for the determinate actions that accompany great development of particular organs.

Now, if energetic functions indicate large organs, and if large organs produce energetic functions, weak actions will indicate small organs, and small organs will produce weak actions. Gall, consequently, compared weak mental functions of individuals with the respective cerebral organs, and small organs with the respective functions; and if weak functions corresponded to small organs, or small organs to weak functions, his first conclusions were confirmed in a negative way.

Many circumstances contributed, from the beginning, to favor the multiplication of these positive and negative proofs. Gall, living in a great city, professionally acquainted with many families, and physician to the director of the schools at Vienna, had many facilities afforded him of observing character in all situations and at all ages. Without children himself, he could spend his income on his favorite pursuits; he was also bold enough to address every person in whose head he observed any peculiar configuration. In our travels, we likewise had great opportunity of observing, and gained much information, and as we met with many distinguished persons, we constantly compared their organization with their capacities. In short, we collected innumerable facts, by visits to establishments for education, to hospitals for idiots and the insane, to houses of correction and to prisons, by our intercourse with
different nations, and our free communication with all classes of society.

Gall at a very early stage of his progress, began to make a collection of casts from the heads of individuals remarkable for qualities, whether talents or moral sentiments. He thus preserved memorials of his observations, which he could often rectify by comparisons and examinations of them in private, and at different times,—a very important point; for our mind is not always equally energetic and acute. He often placed the busts of individuals, who excelled in the same functions together, without distinguishing any similarity in the shape of their heads; sometimes he looked in vain at them for several weeks. Those only who have engaged in such studies, know how long the eyes must be exercised before they can detect every difference in forms and sizes at a glance. The collection of busts had still another advantage. Many of the individuals were remarkable in several points of view, as well affirmatively as negatively, and consequently presented various points for comparison.

At the same time he collected skulls, especially of those who were remarkable for particular qualities, and, if possible, of those whose busts he had modelled in plaster. He thus learned to compare heads with individual skulls, and also to perceive more clearly the forms of the organs.

We extend our observations over both sexes. There is a natural difference in the mental dispositions of men and women, not in essence but in quantity, and quality, which no education can remove. Certain mental powers are stronger, and others weaker in men than in women, and vice versa. The heads of women are generally larger from the forehead to the occiput, and narrower laterally than those of men, whilst they are shorter and broader on both sides.—The same difference is observed in males and females of animals. If this difference of brain coincide with our observation of special faculties in individuals, the probability of having discovered truth increases.

As the arrangement and position of all parts common to men
and animals are nearly the same, it is very useful to compare the cerebral organization of animals endowed with like powers; or to contrast this with that of such as are destitute of these faculties. In this way points of comparison are exceedingly multiplied, and observations, relative to faculties common to man and animals, may be repeated to infinity. The function of no organ, however, has been discovered in animals; all were pointed out in man; and certainly can only be attained, by confining observations to individuals of the same kind, and above all, to individuals of great talent or very marked character. Some facts, in the comparative physiology of the brain, have been pointed out by agriculturists, horse-jockeys, and others, in different individuals of the same species. Peasants find that horses with large foreheads are more docile than those with small, and therefore put them at the head of the team. Jockeys distinguish biting and stubborn horses by the configuration of the forehead. These observations, however, on the different forms of the head, with their consequences, were made without their causes being inquired into, which really consist in the greater or smaller development of peculiar cerebral parts. In fact, comparative anatomy shows that in the lowest animals the brain is very simple, and in the more perfect, more complex. The comparative anatomy and physiology of the brain, then, may contribute greatly to determine the organs. Many animals are mutilated, so to speak, by nature; and it is not necessary to effect this by means of the scalpel, to determine the functions of the cerebral organs. Dr. Vimont has pursued this object with great assiduity and success.

The anatomy of the brain, in particular, confirms us in establishing the organs. First, the bundles which constitute them are distinct, and their plurality, consequently, is as evident as the plurality of the faculties. Moreover, some faculties are very potent and have a great sphere of activity, while others are very weak; the size of the respective organs harmonizes with this fact. It is known, for instance, that the feelings act with greater energy than the intellectual faculties, and anatomy exhibits a corresponding difference in the quantity of apparatus apportioned to each sort of
function. Anatomy also shows, that the various cerebral parts are not simultaneously developed, exactly as the manifestations of the mind start not at the same period into action. In short, the structure of the brain, as of every other part, harmonizes with its function. In an appendix to the Anatomy of the Brain I have specified the individual organs, and shown the difference between healthy brain, and that of an idiot, and that of an ourang outang.

The diseases and injuries of the brain may also be made a means of determining the functions of its individual parts; but I have already observed, that it is, at least, a very uncertain one, therefore, secondary and indecisive, though interesting, when combined with others more direct. In treating of the particular organs, I shall make use of arguments drawn from this source, without, however, maintaining that it is possible to point out peculiar offices solely by its aid. Mental alienations, and especially partial insanities, monomania, and the state of idiocy, are much more available than accidental injuries of the brain. In idiots from birth, the brain is either small or distended by water. In partial insanities, the organs whose functions are most deranged, are commonly more developed than the rest; whoever manifests a certain sentiment or intellectual faculty with peculiar energy will, in a state of great excitement, exhibit this faculty predominantly. I never saw one insane from pride, without great development of the organ of self-esteem. It seems to me, however, that very great development of a particular organ is not indispensably necessary to impress its peculiar character upon every partial insanity; for any part of the body, in general, and of the brain in particular, may grow more irritable than the rest; the energy, therefore, of each cerebral organ may increase, and produce partial insanity.

In many cases of monomania, the part of the head, where the diseased organ is situated, is found hot. The heads of different nations offer a study of great importance. Several anatomists and physiologists have endeavored to point out and to fix particular national forms of head. Their observations, though very defective, are still rather in favor of, than in opposition to, our physiology of
the brain. The foreheads of negroes are narrow, and their musical and mathematical talents are, in general, very limited. The Chinese are fond of colors, and have the eyebrows much vaulted. According to Blumenbach, the heads of the Kalmucks are depressed from above, but very large laterally, about the organ which gives the inclination to acquire, and this nation's propensity to steal, &c., is admitted. In like manner, the modes of thinking and feeling of different nations may be compared with the state of their peculiar cerebral organs, indicated by peculiarity of cranial configuration. It is obvious that here I could only speak of the greater number of individuals in every nation, and the general type of their heads; for the modifications are in all countries infinite; generally speaking, however, there are nations whose heads are longer or shorter, higher or lower, narrower or broader, &c. Many valuable observations might be made by those who visit distant countries. Let us hope that they will pay, at least, as much attention to the study of man, as to that of animals and plants, as soon as they are convinced of the influence exercised by the brain on the manifestations of the mind. The study of national heads is quite in its infancy. Blumenbach, has published on this interesting subject, without perceiving the least connexion between cerebral development and mental dispositions. The same reproach may be addressed to Mr. Bory de Saint Vincent, and others who treat of national configurations and primitive races. Blumenbach admits five varieties and de Saint Vincent sixteen.

It is easy to prove by positive facts that the Caucasian race as well as the Ethiopian of Blumenbach must be subdivided into various families, and I firmly believe that the same will be shown in reference to the other races described by Blumenbach as soon as naturalists will pay more attention to this branch of Anthropology.*

* First, in order to assist travellers in their phrenological observations, I propose the following proceedings. Let them attend to the general constitution of the body. Second, to the general size and form of the head. Third, to the usual description of the face and its parts; as nose, mouth, chin. Fourth, to the relative development of the three lobes of the brain corresponding to the occipi-
MEANS OF DETERMINING THE ORGANS.

There is still another means of pointing out or of confirming the organs: pathognomy, mimicry, or the natural language. Every internal sentiment is proclaimed outwardly by certain motions of the head, body or limbs, and such external manifestations are the constant and inevitable results of activity of the internal faculties. They are, also, essentially the same in all nations and at all times. I shall not here enter on the principles of the doctrine of external signs indicating into activity. I intend to treat of it separately. I here mention only one principle having relation to the seat of the organs; the motions are always conformable to the position of each. If, for instance, an organ situated in the posterior part of the brain be active, the general motions will be backward; and if in the forehead, they will be forward, &c.

By all these means continually employed to multiply observations, the function of every organ may be determined, or the organ of every mental faculty discovered. It is known that physical science, in general, improves in proportion as experiments and observations that relate to it, are repeated. I continue to collect facts and invite others to do the same, and as the number of observations in favor of almost all organs is immense, we consider them as established, and we must be permitted to insist upon the cor-

tal, middle, and frontal regions of the head. Fifth, to the relative elevation and breadth of the head. Sixth, to the relative developement of the basilar and sincipital regions. Seventh, to the relative size of the organs of the animal feelings of the human sentiments, and of the intellectual faculties. To that effect, let a line be drawn from the anterior edge of constructiveness at the temples, upwards to the temporal ridge, and continued along this ridge to the middle of the upper border of cautiousness, and then towards the mesial line of the head, between the organs of conscientiousness, and love of approbation, and terminate between self-esteem and firmness. The portion of brain below and behind this line contains the organs of the animal feelings. If another line be drawn from the anterior edge of constructiveness in the direction of the upper border of tune, causality and comparison, the cerebral portion between the two lines is the seat of the human sentiments, and the portion before the second line, is the forehead, strictly speaking, and the residence of the intellectual faculties. Eighth, to the relative size of the perceptive and reflective faculties. Ninth, and lastly, to the particular developement or defect of the special organs. Four degrees of developement may be designated, viz. 1, predominant, 2, large, 3, moderate, 4, small.
rectness of our conclusions so long as no contrary facts prove that we are mistaken.

It is often said that our observations are not numerous enough to bear out our conclusions. Those who make that objection can only speak from mere supposition, without the least idea of the numberless facts which we have observed. They ought simply to bring forth contrary facts, or remain silent, in a science they have not examined and have no desire to examine. Hitherto it is certain that all those who have inquired into nature herself, whether their motive was to confirm or to refute Phrenology, have been convinced of its reality.

It is also objected, that the organs cannot be verified, because our conclusions are drawn only from individual facts. But this is the case with every physical truth. No physician has observed every fact; no anatomist has seen the viscera of every human being. Yet, reliance on the stability of natural laws bids us admit all physical truths, and infer the structure and position of the viscera to be the same in individuals who have not been opened, as in those who have.

It has even been said, that our observations might be true in one country and not in another. Our travels have refuted this objection, which is contrary to common sense, since mankind is the same in all countries. It is quite impossible to quote the whole of the facts already collected. I can only speak of results, or general deductions from them. Moreover, no one can arrive at personal or individual conviction without having made similar observations. Gall admonished his auditors not to attempt practising Phrenology on account of its difficulty; I on the contrary invite every inquirer to repeat the observations in order to obtain self-conviction. Yet every one should consider it a duty to be well acquainted with Phrenology, before making any application of it, and be aware that every error impedes its progress. Many beginners proceed with too much confidence in their phrenological knowledge, and scarcely doubt of their being liable to mistakes. Let it be remembered, that on my side I can only show what is to
be observed and how it is to be done. I endeavor to advance nothing that may not be seen and appreciated by every other person, but then I do not listen to objections grounded upon reasoning alone, and without observation as a basis; one fact is to me more positive and decisive than a thousand metaphysical opinions. I with Mr. Abernethy, * think that when books of this kind are published, mutual forbearance is requisite on the part both of the writer and the reader. The former should not expect his work to be approved of, till the latter has examined whether his representation is correct, and his conclusions legitimately drawn from the facts he has observed and collected. Neither should the reader condemn the work till he has examined the subject, and is, in consequence, able to point out the errors of the premises or conclusions. The author's view of a subject may, indeed, be correctly formed from the facts which he himself has witnessed, but it may differ from that which more extensive experience would have suggested. For this difference no blame can properly be attached to him; he relates what has fallen under his own observation, and invites others to attend to the same facts.* I really think that every one who, without prejudice, may take the trouble to examine and to repeat our observations, will be convinced of the solidity of our principles of the physiology of the brain, the certainty of which, then, will be like that of physiology in general, but not mathematical.

From the preceding considerations it follows, that Gall compared the size of the cerebral parts with very energetic actions, and with determinate characters, in order to discover the organs of the mind. All functions, however, differ not only in quality but also in quantity, and there are, undoubtedly, several organic conditions which contribute to bestow energy and to modify them individually. But, the size of the organs is the most easily observed condition, and therefore attended to as a means of pointing out the cerebral organs. The reader then must remember that in endeavoring to discover the organs of the mind, in other words, to determine the nature of the functions of the cerebral masses, their size suffices,

though the organic constitution, or the temperament of the cerebral organs, is another very important condition to their natural energy. I never neglect to observe it, and they are therefore mistaken who object that we pay no attention to the organic constitution of the cerebral parts, since it is in fact a leading point with us, that every fundamental faculty must be compared with its appropriate organ, not in individuals of different kinds, not even in individuals of the same species, but in the same individual. This doctrine is expressed in all my publications, and the critical reviewers had no right to state the contrary, and to combat their misstatement as our assertions. If we examine the different degrees of activity of the cerebral organs, it is necessary to consider not only their size and organic constitution, but also the exercise every faculty has undergone, and the mutual influence of the whole.

It is denied that the natural energy of the mental functions depends on the size and organic constitution of the cerebral organs. We have merely to answer, that experience favors our proposition. It may even be shown that the law, under which inorganic and organic bodies manifest their properties, in relation to their size, is quite general and pervades nature. A large loadstone attracts a greater mass of iron, than a small one. The fermentation of liquids is more energetic as their quantity is considerable. Large muscles in the same person, are stronger than small. If the nerves of the external senses be larger on one side of the body than on the other, the functions are also stronger on that side. Soemmering discovered that the optic nerve of man, is larger than that of any animal in proportion to the eyeball, and that the nerves of the muscles which assist the external senses are unquestionably thicker than those of the other muscles. Why should not the same law, that energy of function depends on size, hold good in regard to the cerebral organs? Nevertheless, by reason of internal constitution, we confine our observations entirely to individuals in obtaining the first notions of any organ. I even admit the possibility of the internal constitution of the different cerebral organs varying in the same individual, for instance it seems that the intellectual organs
have more energy in proportion to their size, than the organs of the affective faculties; and the optic nerve may be more irritable than the auditory or the olfactory; yet, it is quite certain that in the same person, great difference in the size of the cerebral parts produces a difference in the manifestations of the respective powers. Indeed, the divers parts of the brain are differently developed; one is large, another small, and experience has convinced us that the functions of parts much developed, are manifested with more energy than those of others which are comparatively smaller.

Thus, Gall, myself, and all phrenologists, determine the nature of the cerebral functions by the size of the individual parts, never confounding the nature of the functions with their different degrees of energy. The region of the intellectual organs may be compared with that of the affective powers, and the basilar region with the sincipital. Then four degrees of cerebral development may be pointed out in every region, viz., the largest, the smallest, and two intermediate degrees, or in other words, the predominant, large, moderate, and small organs.

Now, the question, whether it is possible, during life, to distinguish the development of the cerebral parts in man and animals immediately presents itself. This question, however, must be separated from another, viz., what is the cause of the form and size of the head? This latter is important to general physiology, but its investigation forms no essential part of practical phrenology, which only requires certainty on the possibility of knowing the size of the cerebral parts, without being held to examine the causes of their development. To the first question we must reply differently in regard to comparative anatomy, for it is not always possible to compare one animal with another, or animals with man. It is also necessary, in animals and in man, to consider the period of life. In the human kind it is at one time easy to determine the size of the cerebral organs; sometimes, however, circumstances render it difficult; and, finally, in certain cases, it is impossible.

Considerations in relation to these points constitute, strictly speaking, the doctrine of the skull, or Craniology, and form the subject of the next section.
SECTION VI.

Craniology.

This name designates the doctrine of the skull, but by no means the whole of our inquiries; it can be used in the latter sense, only by those who wish to depreciate phrenology. I subdivide craniology into two chapters. In the first, I examine the cause of the form and size of the head; and, in the second, the possibility of determining the size of the cerebral organs. Here I speak only of the human kind, but these researches may be extended to every species of animal.

CHAPTER I.

Cause of the form, and size of the Head.

Whether the skull or the brain determines the form of the head, is a common question. In its illustration, I shall consider man both in a state of health and afflicted with disease. The brain of the fetus in utero exists before it is surrounded by a bony case; it is covered with a fourfold membraneous coat: the pia mater, which adheres closely to its substance; the tunica arachnoides or arachnoid coat, which has this name from the extreme tenuity of its texture; the dura mater, which consists of two separable layers; and a cartilaginous membrane, in which ossification takes place. This fourfold membraneous coat envelopes the brain, and represents its external form exactly.

Ossification commences at different places or points, and extends from these in radii to the extent required by the size and form of the cerebral parts which are to be included. The bony radiations meet nearer or more distantly from the points whence
they sprung, and constitute the individual bones, of which the regular and connected assemblage forms the skull. At birth, there are, commonly, eight bones; viz., two frontal, which, for the most part, soon unite and form one; there are adults, however, whose frontal bone is divided; two parietal, two temporal, one sphenoidal, one occipital, and one ethmoidal. These, in after-life, are connected by sutures or articulations, and then complete a bony case called skull. In new-born children, generally, the approaching angles of the frontal and parietal bones are not ossified, but membraneous, and the space left between them is called fontanel. All the bones are at this time very thin and most perfectly accommodated to the form and size of the brain. It may here be asked, whether any difference as to the size and shape of brain be perceptible in the foetus? Sommerring has replied in the affirmative; Gall and I are also of the same opinion, and hold, that the heads of foetuses are as indubitably different as those of grown-up persons.

Moreover, it may be demanded whether the form of the head is changed during the birth; and also whether it is possible for midwives to give it an arbitrary form by compression in any way? The head of the foetus when long detained in the passages in difficult labors, is often much compressed. Nature, however, has taken particular care of the brain, even under these circumstances; for the dura mater which envelopes it, adheres to the skull firmly, and prevents the edges of the bones from passing over each other. The prolongations of the dura mater, known under the names falciform process and tentorium, contribute equally to its security; and further, the skull forms an arch, of all forms that which best resists opposing forces. The brain is also a living part, and is naturally elastic. The tumors commonly observed on the upper part of new-born children's heads, are mere accumulations of blood, the consequences of interrupted circulation; after a few hours or days this is absorbed, and the swelling disappears entirely. Transient and not very violent pressure, therefore, does not change the primitive form of the brain. Excessive, it will undoubtedly derange its
organization; and less violent but permanent, will alter its natural from, hinder its development, and certainly injure the manifestations of the mind. If individuals, whose brains are compressed, do not become idiots, their faculties will at least be impaired.

It happens sometimes that the bones of the skull do not touch at birth, and then the brain is compressed during parturition, and the child dies. This fact should be known and considered when an unfortunate woman is accused of having murdered her offspring. It will be obvious, that though in ordinary cases great violence would be necessary to compress the brain, yet, in effecting delivery with the forceps, this may readily happen, and the texture of the brain be injured; in which event the manifestations of the mind would be injured also. These observations show, that up to the period of birth, the form and size of the head depend on the brain.

From this epoch the skull gains hardness and solidity, and some may ask, does the hard skull then yield to the soft brain? If we compare a child's with an adult's skull, that of the adult will be perceived to be much larger than that of the child; the skull, consequently, increases in capacity in proportion as the brain augments in volume. Moreover, all the cerebral parts do not arrive at their complete growth simultaneously; a similar law may be observed in regard to the development of the skull. The forehead, for instance, which at birth is narrow and flat, widens and grows more prominent from the age of three months till that of eight or ten years; afterwards, its middle part does not appear so much developed as it had in early infancy. Children's necks are very small; for the cerebellum which increases at a very late period, is situated in the inferior occipital fossae; in proportion as it grows, however, the skull projects externally. This law is quite general.

Some explain the growth of the skull by supposing the brain to act in a mechanical way. This idea is incorrect. Were the brain exposed to the least compression, its functions would be deranged. The phenomenon of growth, in fact, results from the changes which every organic body unceasingly undergoes. There is a perpetual process of decomposition and reproduction going on
in living beings; the matter which constitutes our body, continually evacuated by excretion, is replaced by new matter furnished by alimentation. Like all other parts of our body, the brain and skull are subjected to this process; and, according to the natural law of relation established between the skull and brain, the brain has an influence on the directions in which bony matter is to be deposited to form the skull. If the whole of the brain or some part increase or decrease, the ossification still follows the size and form assumed. Hard parts, indeed, are generally adapted to the size and form of the soft ones they enclose. In consumption, if one side of the lungs alone be affected, the ribs of that side sink down. If the eye be extirpated, the orbit becomes smaller; and if, on the contrary, it grow carcinomatous, the orbit enlarges as the eye-ball increases in size. Precisely so does the internal table of the skull follow the brain in its size and general configuration.

Let us now cast an eye on the changes produced by old age on the brain and skull. The cerebral parts begin to diminish; the convolutions, which in youth were plump and well nourished, are flaccid, shrivelled, and no longer packed closely together. In proportion as the brain or its parts decrease, they are followed by the internal table of the skull, in conformity with the law of nutrition, of which I have just spoken. Frequently the external table to the end of life preserves the form and size it had at the period of maturity; the skull, in consequence, either becomes very thick, or the two tables are far separated from each other. The orbitary plate of the frontal bone is commonly thin and transparent, yet, in old persons, whose brain has diminished in size, it sometimes happens, that the two tables of which it consists are separated; the inner having receded to a great distance from the outer. From these data it results, that the form of the skull is the consequence of that of the brain; that from the commencement of ossification till death the internal table of the skull is moulded after the fashion of the brain; and that in extreme old age the two tables are often separated, and the bone thus rendered thicker than it was at the age of maturity.
Diseased or imperfect state of the brain also proved this position relative to the contents of the head producing the form of the skull. In those idiots from birth, whose brains have never increased in size, the skull always remains small, (Pl. ii. fig. 1;) on the contrary, if the head be distended by water, the skull participates in the expansion, either generally or in particular situations. (Pl. i. figs. 1. and 2.) Portions of bone depressed by external violence, are often replaced in their first levels by the action of the brain. Fungi of the dura mater also cause the absorption of the skull rather than of the brain, for they pierce it and appear externally. All, therefore, concurs to prove that the form and size of the brain essentially contribute to regulate the form and size of the skull. I do not, however, deny, that in some diseases of the skull, the ossific process may be primitively altered, the brain impeded in its development and injured in its functions. This may happen in some children who die under convulsions from an inflammation of the brain when the blood is carried in too great quantity to the brain, and the absorption and increase of the skull are not quick enough.

It is an error to suppose that the impressions which correspond to the cerebral convolutions, and the blood vessels of the dura mater on the internal surface of the skull, are the result of mechanical pressure. These grooves are the effect of the absorbent vessels. The impressions called digital, occur when the dura mater is very thin. This, in man, occurs commonly at the basis: in individuals, however, who die of consumption, the dura mater is sometimes observed of peculiar delicacy and thinness over a much greater extent, and then the pits pervade almost the whole of the internal surface of the skull, as in the greater number of mammiferous animals.

OBJECTIONS.

Several opinions relative to the size and form of the head are quoted as objections to the position, that in the healthy state the form of the head depends on that of the brain.
I.

Walter, Rudolphi, and others, maintain that a nisus formativus, or formative power, determines the ossification and consequent shape of the skull. The ossification of the skull is certainly not an effect of the presence of the brain; the bone is secreted by particular vessels, which have the power of modifying the internal constitution of the skull. The earthy particles are, nevertheless, deposited in a cartilaginous coat, having the form and size of the brain. Yet, we must here allow, that when the brain is impeded in its development, and water collected between it and the dura mater, the form of the skull is still similar to that which it would have presented had the brain been in a natural and healthy state, or been distended by water accumulated within its cavities. In treating of hydrocephalus, Section III., I have quoted several cases, in which it was impossible to decide by external appearances where the water was accumulated. It seems to me, that the processes or prolongations of the dura mater, called tentorium and falciform process, contribute greatly to determine the form of the head in these cases.

II.

Hufeland remarked, that the form of the head might probably be changed in the countries where burdens are borne on the head. Now, in the first place, very young children bear none; and, before they begin to do so, their skulls are fully ossified and capable of great resistance. Secondly, those who bear burdens on the head, use cushions or rolls, so that pressure is received, not on the top of the head nor on any one point, but diffused over a large surface, including even the lateral parts; consequently, the head cannot be flattened from such a cause. Moreover, the head is free from burdens during the greater part of life. Finally, this opinion is refuted not only in theory, but also by experience. Gall and I
examined many individuals who had carried loads on their heads from youth up to mature years and old age, and whose heads were, nevertheless, much higher than those of others who had never borne any burden whatever.

III.

It is objected that, in America, several tribes of savages give arbitrary forms to the heads of their children. I pretend not to say that such reports are false, but I am far from being satisfied with what has been said of the Caribs to that purpose. I have seen several skulls of Caribs; they were all low and laterally extended, particularly at the temporal bones; yet they presented as marked diversities as the skulls of any European nation could do. I have also seen skulls of Europeans equally low. The upper surface of all the Caribbean skulls is variously vaulted, and bears, except in one, no marks of modelling from the pressure of a smooth and level board.

I have interrogated several gentlemen who had been in the island of St. Vincent, to gain information on the attempts of the Caribs to deform themselves. The accounts were all in contradiction to each other, and I am still in a state of complete uncertainty.

In reference to the cause producing the configuration of the Caribbean skull, I have farther reason to doubt. Throughout Europe, the foreheads even of new-born children are higher and more prominent than those of adult Caribs. Caribs are, therefore, either born with foreheads as low as we see in the skulls, and their farther development is prevented by artificial pressure; or their foreheads are higher from birth, and are afterwards flattened or depressed by art. I have heard various statements as to the period during which the board is applied to the head; one gentleman told me that it is worn for six weeks only; another assured me that it is borne six months; a third, that it is kept on during two years. Admitting the last period to be correct, I am not yet convinced of the reality of its pretended effect on the configuration of the forehead. At
two years of age, the cerebral parts situated there have not acquir-
ed their full development; the foreheads of Caribs, when arrived
at maturity of years, must certainly be larger than when still in in-
fancy. Now, as the constituent particles of the brain and skull, as
well as of the rest of the body, are changed perpetually, and as
pressure is not continued during after-life, the future development
of the brain might go on unimpeded.

Notwithstanding these skeptical observations, it is certain that
various ancient tribes in America gave to their heads artificial forms,
and that the flat-headed Indians of North America owe the depres-
sion of their heads to artificial means, and that a constant pressure
alters the shape of the skull. I even consider this a question of
the highest importance; and I certainly do greatly wish that it
were possible to prevent, by artificial pressure, the growth of cer-
tain parts of the brain. But in examining flat-headed Indians after
death, or in instituting in animals a series of experiments on the
effects of pressure upon the configuration of the skull and the or-
ganization of the brain it would be necessary to observe, whether
the development of the cerebral parts was entirely impeded, or
whether the compressed parts increased in another direction, so
that the form of the head alone was altered.

IV.

A great number of anatomists and physiologists maintain that the
form of the head is modified by its muscles, and that several eleva-
tions ascribed to the development of the subjacent brain are effects
of muscular action. There are, indeed, many bony processes on
the skull, but they are effects neither of cerebral development nor
of muscular action: these elevations are for the insertion of mus-
cles. I here speak only of those forms and of those protuberances
of the skull which I consider as corresponding to development of
brain.

Those who assert the influence of the muscles upon the form of
the head, do not agree about their effects: some maintain that they depress the organs; others, that they produce elevations. It is easy, however, to prove that they have not the slightest influence on the form of the skull.

If the muscles really did determine the form of the skull, they ought, obviously, to act in the direction of their insertions; and the protuberances of the occiput and sides of the head ought then to be directed downwards, not backwards and sidewise. There ought also to be some proportion between the size of these protuberances and the strength of the muscles inserted into them; but it often happens that large protuberances correspond to weak muscles, and vice versa. Negros, indeed, have larger masticating muscles than Europeans, and their heads are also narrower across the temporal region. From this fact some anatomists have concluded that the muscles compress the skull. At variance with this, however, we see that while the basilar region of the skull, covered with muscles, is narrower than the upper in children, it is quite the contrary in adults. Europeans who have very weak masticating muscles and wide heads, and others who have strong muscles and narrow heads may be met with every day. Lions, tigers, hyenas, and dogs, are much narrower at the temples than oxen, horses, stags, &c.; the former, it is true, have stronger masticating muscles than the latter, but women have weaker muscles and narrower heads, whilst men have stronger muscles and wider skulls.

Moreover, according to the hypothesis which I am combating, the muscles ought to act upon the external table of the skull, and make it recede from the internal, yet the two are absolutely so near at the places where muscles are inserted, that the skull becomes transparent. It sometimes happens that the skull grows thick in old persons, or in consequence of chronic diseases of the brain, because the internal plate shrinking, diminishes the cavity of the skull, while the external one preserves its elevation and form.

The processes or depressions of the skull ought, also, to be not only proportionate to the strength of the muscles, but likewise to
the time during which they have acted — circumstances which, however, are not observed. And were the protuberances or depressions produced by the muscles, they ought to be conformable to the forms of their insertion; but what muscle can produce the figure of the organs we have indicated, as of amativeness, destructiveness, constructiveness, &c.? The form of these protuberances, in fact, always corresponds to that of the cerebral parts, whose great development occasions them.

Besides, there are many protuberances where no muscles are attached, as those which indicate firmness, veneration, benevolence, self-esteem, and circumspection. What muscle draws the skull outwards in the direction of those eminences? In many animals, as in the hog, ox, elephant, &c., the tables of the skull are far separated, but the cells formed in the interval are irregular, and never correspond to the insertion of muscles. If the muscles arise from the interior of the skull, as in the tortoise, the head ought to be small and contracted, and the orbit of the higher animals ought by degrees to grow smaller; as there are muscles attached to its internal surface. Neither of these circumstances, however, occurs.

Finally, in the foetal state, muscles do not act with force enough to influence in any way the form of the head; which, however, differs as much as in adult age. Thus it is evident, that muscles do not determine the form of the skull.

V.

Professor Ackermann, of Heidelberg, thought that the frontal sinuses of man, and the cells between the tables of the skulls of animals, were produced during inspiration; the air, according to him, gradually distending them. He maintained that very active individuals who take much exercise in walking and running, have larger sinuses than usual, and that animals which live in the open air, and inspire a great deal of it, have the greater number of cells
in their skulls. Several considerations, however, prove this assertion, which is not grounded upon experiments, but hypothetically advanced, to be erroneous.

The possibility of the air exerting any distensive power, supposes a great cavity already existing, into which it must be received; but how has this space between the two tables of the skulls been first produced? Let us, however, admit the sinuses formed and the air drawn into them, and then ask, what may be its action? Ackermann imagines that, being warmed, it distends the cells by expanding. Is it not, however, more probable that it would rather escape by the aperture through which it had entered, than act with such force as to distend them? Even supposing that the air did distend the cells, they ought to be like bladders, and not angular, as they are. Moreover, they do not all communicate; there are also cells in the bones of the extremities, even in the foetus, to which the air never penetrates; why then should not cells be also originally formed between the tables of the skull? Finally, Professor Ackermann's opinion is a mere supposition. I know individuals of sedentary habits who have large sinuses, and others who live much in the open air and have none. The ox, too, and hog have larger cranial cells than the stag, roe, and reindeer; the lazy owl, than the active eagle; and the stork, wild duck, wild goose and swallow, have none whatever, notwithstanding their frequent and rapid flights. Ackermann's opinion, therefore, falls to the ground.

In concluding this chapter, I repeat that these considerations on the cause of the size and form of the head are interesting to physiologists, but are in nowise connected with phrenology as a practical science. The business of phrenology is to show, that there is a relation between the manifestations of feelings and intellectual faculties, and size and form of cerebral parts; and that the size of the cerebral parts can be distinguished by the external configuration of the head. Let us then examine, in detail, this second point of craniology.
CHAPTER II.

It is in general possible to distinguish the size of the Brain and its Parts, by examining the external Surface of the Head or Skull.

This proposition is to be regarded under three points of view. First, it is possible and even easy to distinguish the size of the cerebral organs; secondly, we meet with various difficulties and obstacles to this; and, thirdly, it is sometimes impossible.

Possibility of distinguishing the Size of the Brain and its parts.

This study must be begun by acquiring exact notions of the different forms and sizes of heads in general, and of their particular regions; the common, too large, (Pl. I. fig. 1 and 2,) or too small size of a head, (Pl. II. fig. 1,) must be known. The antiques can only be made use of with certain restrictions, for they are generally colossal. It is remarkable, however, that their form and size vary universally. What a difference, for instance, between the heads of women and men, of gladiators, high-priests, philosophers, great poets, generals, and others. It is evident that the ancient artists understood the animal, moral, and intellectual, regions of the head.

The next point should be to acquire precise ideas of the difference between the size and shape of the head and of the skull. The skull in all its dimensions is smaller, but still preserves the general figure of the head unimpaired.

The skull, as I have said already, is composed of two tables, between which lies a cellular spongy mass, called diploe. These tables, scarcely perceptible in infancy, are distinct in adults, but their distance is so very inconsiderable, that, in general, up to the period when the brain begins to diminish in size, it is not only possible, but easy, to determine its size and form by examining the skull,—for there is never any space between the skull and the brain,
and, as I have said, the two tables are not sufficiently distant to oppose any obstacle to accuracy.

It is however objected, that, because the tables are not parallel, it is impossible to measure the size and form of the brain and its parts from the size and form of the skull. This objection falls to the ground as soon as our procedure is known. It is by no means necessary to appreciate very minute differences of size, in order to determine the development of the cerebral organs. These occupy extensive surfaces, and are of very different volumes between their lowest and highest states of development in the different regions. Let it be understood, that the idea of size of organs, is not to be confounded with the notion of protuberances. Every individual in the healthy state has all the organs; the only point to be determined, is, whether the whole brain, or one, or several of its parts, be large or small, and the mutual relations of the organs are to be borne in mind. If one be much, and those in its neighborhood very little developed, the large organ presents a protuberance; but if the neighboring ones be proportionally developed, the surface remains smooth. Now this may happen whether the organs are small or large. It is also necessary not to confound bony excrescences and irregular elevations with those protuberances which indicate development of particular organs. Moreover, it is necessary to know those bony elevations which occur regularly, as the mastoid process behind the ear, the spina cruciata of the occiput, the zygomatic process before the ear, &c., and which are no indication of cerebral development. It may be well to state, that it is not always necessary to touch the head to ascertain the size and form of the cerebral organization; the size and sense of sight often suffices. The size of the organs situated in the forehead, is even more easily distinguished by sight than by touch. It is necessary to feel the organs only which are covered with hair.

Finally, the development of the cerebral organs differs in regard to length and breadth; for the fibres which compose them are sometimes thick and short, sometimes thick and long, or slender and short, or slender and long. This difference of development
must have some influence on the manifestations of the faculties. Long fibres seem to produce more activity, and thick fibres more intensity.

II. Difficulties of distinguishing the Size of certain Parts of the Brain.

Every science has its difficulties, and Phrenology is not exempt from them. They are more or less important, and more or less easily overcome. Platner, of Leipzig, has said, that the size of the organs situated in the middle line of the head cannot be determined, as the longitudinal sinus runs there. But this venous canal is too small, to prevent the development of the organs on each side of it from being ascertained, for they are much broader. The hemispheres of the brain being sometimes a little separated, there is then a slight groove along its course. The organs of philoprogenitiveness, self-esteem, and firmness are frequently found with a channel in their middle. He who knows Phrenology, however, cannot be misled by this.

In appreciating the size of the organs on the sides of the head, particularly of constructiveness, acquisitiveness, and secretiveness, the thickness of muscle which covers them must be taken into account, and ascertained by touch. Large temporal muscles may be supposed if those of the face in general are bulky. Those who begin to practice Phrenology, find a difficulty in the frontal sinus, and many adversaries even maintain that it is impossible to determine the state of the cerebral parts situated behind it. This objection is particularly applied to the organs of individuality, size, weight, and locality. The first thing to be known, and which truly concerns Phrenology, is to ascertain how far the size of the cerebral parts situated about and above the root of the nose, can be distinguished by the external appearance of the head or skull. It is evident that the difficulty in question is confined to a small portion of the forehead, and cannot be reasonably objected against Phrenology in general. Farther, it is important to conceive a clear idea
of the meaning of sinus. This expression means hole. Now any opponent, possessing a skull with frontal holes, thinks himself authorized, or flatters himself to be able, to set up the whole of Phrenology without showing the circumstances of the skull in his possession.

There is sometimes a hole or empty space between the two tables of the skull in the forehead, though they are not more, and often even less, distant from each other than in others where the same part of the forehead is filled up with diploe. Now such holes cannot be considered as a difficulty in the study of Phrenology. The essential point to be considered is the distance between the two tables of the skull. This is little in young children and increases with age. It happens, also, that in adults a bony crest is perceived at the edge of the superciliary arch, which, evidently, cannot be taken as an indication of cerebral development whether it be hollow or filled up with diploe. Now, if in these two sorts of cases, we make abstraction of the external crest, the internal table will not be found more inward, than in other persons of the same age, whose foreheads do not present such a crest.

When the intellectual faculties, principally the perceptive powers, lose their energy, and in chronic insanity the brain and internal table of the skull often retreat, whilst the external appearance of the forehead remains unchanged; and in such cases it is impossible to make phrenological observations. Thus, I admit that the frontal sinus or space between the two tables of the frontal bone, in adults, throws some uncertainty over the state of the organs of individuality and size; a single difficulty, however, is not to cause the whole of a science to be rejected; it should only invite the practitioner to be more careful in his decisions. But if the frontal sinus be very large and occupy a greater part of the forehead, if the brain had suffered from old age or from any chronic disease, then, phrenological observations are no more possible, as will be mentioned hereafter.

The cerebral parts, situated around and behind the orbit, also require some care and experience on the part of the phrenologist,
to be judged of accurately. Their development is discoverable from the position of the eye-ball, and from the figure of the superciliary ridge. According as the eye-ball is prominent or hidden in the orbit, depressed or pushed sidewise, inward, or outward, we may judge of the development of the organs situated around and behind it.

It may be questioned whether all organs reach the surface; and, consequently, whether all faculties of the mind may be determined by the size and shape of the head. There are many convolutions, it is true, in the middle line between the two hemispheres of the brain, and others at the basis and between the anterior and middle lobes which do not appear on the surface; but it seems to me that a great part, at least, of every organ does present itself there, and farther, that all the parts of each organ are equally developed, so that though a portion only appear, the state of the whole may be inferred. The whole cerebellum reaches not the skull, yet its function may be determined from the part which does. The cerebral parts, situated in the middle line between the hemispheres, seem proportionate to the superincumbent convolutions; at least, I have always observed a proportion, in the vertical direction, between them.

The greatest difficulty is when any organ is so much developed as to push its neighbors from the places they commonly occupy. There are two varieties of this case; either a single organ is extremely large, or several are very voluminous, and the surface remains almost smooth. In the first case the difficulty is not very great; for every organ having its own form and its particular direction, it is only necessary to recall these, in order to ascertain which it is. It requires more practical skill, when several neighboring organs are almost equally developed; but even then, the direction of the protuberance and its most prominent point facilitate decision.

Against Phrenology it is farther objected, that though it be possible to measure the form and size of the brain by the form and size of the head, it is yet impossible to determine the size of the organs by the size of the head or skull, because they are not confined to the surface or to the convolutions of the brain. It is indeed true, that the organs are not confined to the surface of the
brain; they extend from thence to the great swelling called corpora striata and optic thalami, and several even to the medulla oblongata, and they probably include the commissures; but as the peripheric expansions of the five senses indicate the development of their respective nerves, so the convolutions of the brain proclaim the development of its whole mass. This will be understood by analogy: animals which have a large external apparatus of smell, large nostrils, large turbinated bones, and, consequently, a very considerable nervous expansion upon the pituitary membrane, have the olfactory nerve very much developed. In the same manner the retina or expansion of the optic nerve, is in proportion to the nerve itself; such also is the case with the organs of the feelings and intellectual faculties. The convolutions are peripheric expansions of internal nervous bundles, to which they consequently bear proportion; it is therefore possible to determine the whole mass of the organs from merely viewing the convolutions.

III. *Impossibility of determining the Size of the Brain.*

It still remains for me to speak of those cases in which the form and size of the brain and of its parts are not indicated by the form and size of the head. According to a general law of organic parts, the brain, as it has increased gradually and for a term, begins also, after the period of maturity, to decrease by degrees; the convolutions, which were plump and prominent in youth, sink and part from each other, and the composition of their parts being no longer equal to their decomposition, their size diminishes. Then it is that the skull, as to external form and size, often remains the same, whilst its internal table, following the brain, makes it become thick and spongy; the diploe being at the same time not only more considerable, but the tables less solid. Sometimes this shrinking of the brain goes on unequally, and then the skull is very thick in one place and very thin in others. Sometimes, also, the whole grows thin. In these cases where the deposition and absorption in the bone are unequal, or the skull thin, it may happen that such skulls
are broken or depressed by blows, whose slightness would not have done the least harm at the age of maturity. Thus old and decrepit persons cannot serve to confirm the doctrine of Phrenology, because it is impossible to judge accurately of the size of their brain from the size of their head, and, also, because the organs are not very active at this age. Yet, to discover and to establish the physiology of the brain, it is sufficient to confine our observations to individuals, before the flower of mature years begins to fade.

In certain cases of chronic insanity, too, the brain diminishes in size, as other nerves do, when they have been long diseased, and the internal table follows it, while the external one preserves its usual position. These also are cases in which the size and form of the skull do not indicate the size and form of the brain. The skulls of the insane are often very thick; but their texture is not so generally spongy as hard, dense, and heavy, like ivory. Thickening, however, is not a necessary accompaniment of their augmented density and weight.

Sir E. Home, in his observations on this subject, errs in classing together depression of the skull by external violence and thickening of its different portions. He has no idea of cerebral diminution as a cause of the skull’s increased thickness, but always considers this as occasioning such changes as he observed in the brain. Dr. Baillie, in his Morbid Anatomy, does the same. Yet, disease often begins in the brain, and is propagated to the skull. I do not deny, however, that the skull may be diseased, and exercise a pernicious influence on the brain.

Researches relative to the skulls of alienated persons, though important to physiology and pathology in general, and intimately connected with Phrenology, are not essential to it, in as far as determination of the functions of the brain is concerned. I even admit, in those individuals who have been long diseased, the impossibility of measuring accurately the size of the brain and its parts from the size and shape of the head. For farther information relative to the causes of the density and thickness of the skulls of the insane, I refer to my work on Insanity.
SECTION VII.

Division of the Faculties of the Mind, and Nomenclature.

Philosophers have, at all times, thought it necessary to make divisions and subdivisions among the faculties of the mind. Gall rejects all which have hitherto been conceived or admitted: the division into instinct in animals, and understanding in man; that of the human mind into understanding and will, and the subdivision of understanding into attention, memory, judgment, and imagination; and of will into inclination, propensity, desire and passion. He admits various faculties of the mind, but thinks that all manifest the same modes of action; he therefore denied the possibility of classing the mental powers in kinds, according to their distinctive nature. He first speaks of the external senses and their apparatus, and then of the internal faculties and their organs, beginning at the basis of the brain and finishing at its summit, taking only the situation of the respective organs as a guide to the order of his descriptions.

I agree with Gall, that the divisions of the mental faculties, as hitherto established by philosophers, are incorrect, but I do not think with him, that the cerebral organs are susceptible of the same modes of action. I conceive it possible to divide them, and to establish a new classification according to their special and characteristic functions.

Gall, being unacquainted with the special faculties, and not being able to find out organs for the powers which philosophers consider as such, observed man in action, and named the organs accordingly. This kind of denomination is still perceptible in his last publication. Actions, however, seldom result from one single power, and often proceed from abuses of the faculties; the nomenclature, therefore, assumed and modified by Gall, was, in my opinion, always very defective. No organ should be named after any action, and cer-
tainly not after the abuse of its function. The names of theft and murder, given to two organs, allowed fair play to the opponents. It is true, that individuals who steal from infancy, notwithstanding the most careful education and the severest punishment, have one portion of the brain particularly developed, but all persons in whom the same part is large, are not thieves in the common acceptation of the word. It is the same with the organ, formerly called, that of murder; those who from infancy have a strong propensity to destroy and to kill have a part of the brain highly developed, but all those who have that organ large, do not necessarily murder. Gluttony and drunkenness depend on some organic cause; but we cannot speak of special organs of those disorders. The abuses of physical love depend on a certain organization, but no one speaks of an organ of adultery. Theft and murder then are abuses of two faculties, as I shall explain hereafter.

Gall's proceeding, was also defective, as far as he observed actions only which accompanied different organs. In this way he could determine the special functions, only of a few organs, in other words he specified the nature of very few fundamental powers. Hence, in treating of the special organs, he complains that he does not know their sphere of activity. On the other hand, Gall discovered the organs only when extremely large, while the others around them were small. This mode of observing was necessary at the commencement, it was the way to arrive at more philosophical considerations, which bring Phrenology in harmony with all other physical and moral truths. But he erred in adopting powers for individual actions and characters, and naming them accordingly; and he erred in paying greater attention to individual elevations, than to size in general. In this way the idea of bumps, became accredited, and served the opponents to ridicule Phrenology.

It was necessary to modify that manner of considering Phrenology; I undertook to specify the nature of the fundamental manifestations of the mind, and to name the powers independently of any action, or application; and I established a new division of the
mental operations, according to the nature of the special powers, and modes of action, separating in the talents and characters of individuals, that which belongs to each power itself from what depends on its combination with other faculties.

All the functions of man which take place with consciousness, are ascribed to the mind, and constitute animal life. They may be divided into two orders, a division admitted from the remotest antiquity, and known under the names Soul and Spirit; moral and intellectual faculties; understanding and will; heart and head. I shall designate them by feelings and intellect, or by affective and intellectual faculties.

Both orders of the cerebral functions may be subdivided into several genera, and each genus into several species. Some affective powers produce only desires, inclinations or instincts; I denominate them by the general title propensities. The name propensities, then, is only applied to indicate internal impulses which invite to certain actions. They correspond with the instincts, or instinctive powers of animals. There are other affective faculties which are not confined to inclination alone, but have something superadded that may be styled sentiment. Self-esteem, for instance, produces a certain propensity to act; but, at the same time, feels another emotion or affection which is not merely propensity. All the faculties which I call propensities are common to man and animals, but those of which I now speak, and which I shall name sentiments, are partly common to man and animals, and partly proper to man.

The second order of mental powers is destined to make us acquainted with the existence of the external world, with the qualities of the bodies that surround us, and, also, with their relations; I call them intellectual. They may be subdivided into four genera. The first includes the functions of the external senses and of voluntary motion; the second, those faculties, which make man and animals acquainted with external objects, and their physical qualities; and the third, the functions connected with the knowledge of relation between objects or their qualities; these three gen-
era, I name *perceptive faculties*; the fourth genus comprises the faculties which act on all the other sensations and notions, and these I style *reflective faculties*.

Each genus of faculties, both affective and intellectual, consists of several species, and each species offers several modifications, or varieties, even idiosyncrasies, or monstrosities. The essential, however, of the faculties always remains, and is even unaltered by disease. The essential nature of the faculties is that which must be determined, and the result of this proceeding is a new philosophy of the mind. In speaking of positive actions, it is highly necessary to indicate the special faculties which produce them, for the mutual influence of the special powers, is so great, that the inactivity of one faculty sometimes becomes a cause that certain others act in a determinate manner, which would not have happened, had all been duly balanced and equally active.

In explaining Gall’s proceeding, and the spirit which conducted him in his observations, I stated that he named the organs according to the talents and characters he observed. There are mechanicians, musicians, mathematicians, metaphysicians, poets, &c.; some persons, also, are known for their cunning, ambition, pride, quarrelsomeness, benevolence, or religious feelings; and it is certain that persons highly endowed with such talents, and guided by such feelings, have the organs which Gall speaks of, under the titles, organs of cunning, religion, pride, ambition, poetry, music, mechanics, mathematics, &c., largely developed. But in considering the fundamental powers, I was obliged to change the nomenclature, though I admit that the organs, as they are named by Gall, are much developed in persons, distinguished by peculiar characters, or individual talents. In my opinion there is no organ of cunning, of religion, of poetry, mathematics, mechanics, &c. I consider these mental operations, as compound, and think that their elements must be determined. I consequently do not give names to the organs according to actions, but solely according to the nature of faculties. I shall elucidate my meaning by means of the external senses. There is a power of seeing, and an organ
of sight, but there is no organ of seeing red, blue, yellow, or squares, triangles, or other colors, or forms. We speak of a sense of hearing, and not of a sense of hearing the song of birds, the music of man, or the noise of a cannon, &c. In the same way, there is an organ of the propensity to conceal, but none of hypocrisy; an organ of the desire of applause, but none of emulation, or glory; a sense of reverence, but none of this or that mode of worship, and so on.

This distinction between the faculty itself and its application, explains how the same organization, in different individuals, may be accompanied by good or bad actions, for the essence of the faculty is preserved, and its application alone differs, and is good or bad. The feeling of reverence, being directed to the God of Christians, to saints, angels, or to natural objects, or being satisfied by all sorts of actions, by singing of psalms, by fastings, burning candles, or by charity and peacefulness, &c. is always one and the same.

The nomenclature of Phrenology, therefore, is to be established according to the fundamental powers themselves, and by no means according to their application. I am aware that neither English philologists, nor the English public, like to admit new words, and I must apologize for having introduced several. The English language presents very few single words, which express my conceptions of the peculiar faculties of the mind. Hence, I had to choose between speaking by circumlocution, and adopting new names. Now, I think with Locke, that we have still the same rights as our predecessors, and I, therefore, proposed new single names, formed as much as possible, in conformity with the spirit of the language. Having established different propensities, as peculiar faculties of the mind, in order to designate propensity, I have taken the termination iée, which shows the quality of producing, and ness, which indicates the abstract state; iéness is therefore joined to different roots; the preference being always given to English words generally admitted; but when such were not to be found, to Latin participles, so commonly used in English to express meanings simi-
lar to those I was in search of, as destructiveness, productiveness, &c.

The termination ous, indicates a sentiment, as anxious, cautious, pious, conscientious, &c. and I should have been very glad to have found similar adjectives for every primitive sentiment of the mind; when they occurred, I have added ness, in order to express the abstract state, as cautiousness, conscientiousness, marvellousness, &c.

The names of the intellectual faculties are easily understood, and do not require particular explanation.

If under any head of the nomenclature, there be a better name than I employ, or one which indicates more exactly any determinate faculty, but no determinate action or effect of the faculty, I shall be glad to use it; for I am always disposed to acknowledge truth, and obey real improvement.

I cannot insist too much on the importance of not confounding the fundamental powers with their applications; and of not confounding protuberances with general development. Gall was particularly attached to the idea of protuberances, viz. to the principal means of making the first phrenological discoveries. All his writings, and particularly the three last plates of the large work confirm me in this opinion. It would be difficult to look at these plates without thinking of protuberances. The reader naturally asks, what is in the intervals between the elevations? Such elevations, however, occur but rarely, and the habit of looking for isolated organs thus acquired by beginners, has, undoubtedly, retarded the progress of Phrenology. Adversaries also support their objections by supposed exceptions; for they imagine that an organ is large only when it presents a protuberance. This, however, is not the case, and it is better to consider the size of the head in general, to divide it into various regions, and to observe which and what parts of each, are most developed. The medulla oblongata, or the occipital hole, or the external opening of the ear, will serve as a central point from whence various radii may be drawn toward the surface in all directions. I farther divide the head into two regions in its height, by drawing a horizontal line, which begins in the
middle of the forehead, and ends above the occipital bone. The region below this, I call basilar, and that above it sincipital. In its length from forehead to occiput, I divide the head into three regions. From the mastoid process behind the ear, backwards, is the sincipital region, from the mastoid process to the temples, or constructiveness, is the middle, and from constructiveness forwards, the frontal region. The occipital region corresponds with the posterior lobes; the middle regions with the middle lobes, and the frontal with the anterior lobes of the brain. Heads, again, are narrow or wide laterally, and the lateral regions are therefore to be examined in relation to the height of the head. These various regions are different even when the whole surface is smooth, which may happen in heads of all sizes.

The analysis of the greater number of the fundamental powers of the mind, their divisions into orders, genera, and species, the new nomenclature, according to the nature of the special powers, and the division of the head into regions, is my work.

SECTION VIII.

Order in which the Organs may be treated.

From the preceding section it results that a certain order may be established amongst the organs of the mind. Gall never adopted any philosophical principle in his arrangements of the organs. He frequently changed the order in which he considered them, being, however, always guided by their localities. In his latest publication he begins at the basis and ends at the top of the head. Not allowing any essential difference in the modes of action of the primary powers, he deems it sufficient to take the mere situation of the organs to regulate the order of his descriptions.

I, on the contrary, admitting different modes of action in the special faculties of the mind, conceive the possibility to classify
them according to the nature of the mental operations. I first speak of the organs of the affective powers or feelings, and then of those of the intellectual faculties, viz. in the same order as I divide and subdivide the fundamental functions of the mind. In the two editions of "the Physiognomical System," in 1815, I followed this principle in arranging the organs, and adopted a certain order, which was allowed by the phrenologists in Edinburgh. I changed that order in my successive French and English publications. Mr. Daville adopted for his marked bust that in my work 'Phrenology' of 1825. Mr. Combe does the same in his last edition of Phrenology. It is impossible to arrive at a correct classification, until all the organs and all the special faculties of the mind are ascertained; and then new modifications may appear preferable to those who teach Phrenology. Let it therefore be understood, that, though marked busts or plates may be numbered differently, the plates of the respective organs, once considered as established, have never been altered; the place of secretiveness, for instance, has been invariably the same, whether it be marked and referred to as the 7th or 8th organ of the brain. I now treat of the organ of secretiveness, before acquisitiveness and constructiveness, since it belongs to the middle lobes of the brain, whilst the organs of acquisitiveness and constructiveness lie above the Fissura Sylvii. Hence, anatomy indicated this rectification, and reasoning is not against the change, because secretiveness assists the preceding propensities as well as those which follow.

Thus, the numbers of the marked busts or plates indicated merely the order in which the organs are treated or described by phrenologists. This order has been changed at different periods by Gall, as well as myself, and different arrangements may be proposed by other phrenologists. It is immaterial in Phrenology whether a teacher speaks of combativeness in the 5th or 7th place, and so with respect to every other organ. It is therefore wrong in my opinion to commit to memory the numbers of the organs, and to go so far as to take phrenological notes in numbers, or to use them in conversation and private correspondence, instead of
the names, as without abandoning the numbers in descriptions, confusion and perplexity will be unavoidable.

Before I enter into details upon the organs of the mind, I shall answer a question which may be put in regard to every organ, viz.:

*Why do you admit a particular organ of this, and not of another function?* When actions alone are spoken of, it is certainly difficult to conceive the necessity of particular organs; yet the answer is decisive when we can say: experience demonstrates it. Moreover as I look for fundamental powers and not merely for their organs, the necessity of every one may be proved even by reasoning, that is, by the general proofs which confirm the plurality of the powers and organs. In considering these proofs, in relation to every faculty, we may be sure in our proceeding. Every faculty is fundamental, and a particular organ must be pointed out for it:

1. Which exists in one kind of animal and not in another;
2. Which varies in the sexes of the same species;
3. Which is not proportionate to the other faculties of the same individual;
4. Which does not manifest itself simultaneously with the other faculties, that is, which appears or disappears earlier or later than they;
5. Which may act or repose singly;
6. Which individually is propagated in a distinct manner from parents to children; and
7. Which singly may preserve its proper state of health, or be affected by disease.

Gall did not determine any of the organs in conformity with these views. He followed an empirical method only, looking for organs according to the actions of man. But I have no hesitation to maintain that in pointing out the special or fundamental powers of the mind, my proceeding is philosophical, founded on principles, and adequate to refute the following objections made against the object of our investigations.

Some adversaries say that too many, others that too few, organs are acknowledged, and that they might be multiplied infinitely.
The former should know, however, that each is admitted by the same proofs which demonstrate their plurality generally, and that it is verified by experience. The independent existence of one organ is neither more nor less certain than that of any other; and if similar proofs be admitted confirmatory of one, they must be agreed to in regard to every other. On the other hand the opponents who think that enough organs are not admitted, should consider, that every faculty may be applied to an infinite number of objects. Seeing is always seeing, but to what an infinity of objects may the power be directed! Hearing is always hearing, but how various the impressions perceived by this sense! It is the same with the internal faculties. Constructing is always constructing, but how infinite in number and variety the objects that may be produced! Moreover, it is to be observed, that a great number of actions result from combinations of different powers; and, therefore, it is not surprising to see so many effects produced by a small number of primitive faculties. Are not twenty-four letters of the alphabet sufficient to compose all imaginable words? The muscles of the face are not very numerous, yet almost every individual of the human kind has a different physiognomy. There are few primitive sounds; few primitive colors; only ten primitive signs of numbers; but what an infinity of combinations do not each of these furnish? Let us suppose from thirty to forty primitive faculties of the mind, and then consider all possible combinations, with their modifications; and we shall not feel surprised that we observe such a number of modified functions. I repeat that the organs are not multiplied unnecessarily, but that determinate principles are followed in establishing each of them, such only as nature presents being recognised.

Some opponents have a peculiar turn of mind. They rely on their saying that Phrenology is not complete, as if this imperfect state could refute that which is discovered and confirmed. The physical analysis of matter is not yet complete; shall therefore all discoveries of modern chemists be denied: such a conclusion would be evidently erroneous. In the same way this incomplete state of Phrenology does not refute that which is certain in it.
Some metaphysical speculators imagine that several powers, which in Phrenology are considered as special, might be ranged as constituents of other powers; for instance, that combativeness and destructiveness might be reduced to one and the same power; in the same way secretiveness and cautiousness; self-esteem and love of approbation.

We prove our assertions by reasoning and facts, nor shall our constant observations deserve less confidence than mere a priori reasoning, particularly since we find in practical life that nature is not so simple in her means as many metaphysicians fancy. Why different nerves for different sensations, and again others for voluntary motion? why so many different glands for the individual secretions, &c.

Other metaphysicians indulge in their fancy, and speak of discrepancies of Phrenology, supposing that there are special faculties of the mind, for which they find no organs in the map of the phrenological bust.

Let me admit, for the sake of argument, such powers to exist, why do those who find them necessary not look for the respective organs? why should we do all? or shall the organs which we have discovered, not be true, because we do not know those organs which some metaphysicians suppose to exist. Some, for instance, think it necessary to admit an organ of the love of parents, since there is one for the love of children. Let those who want an organ of the love of parents, find it out and prove it, as we do in regard to the organ of philoprogenitiveness; or shall the organ of philoprogenitiveness not exist because that of the love of parents is unknown? I for my part, do not think it necessary to look for an organ of that kind, since I do not think that the love of parents is a special faculty. Nature has distributed powers for necessary phenomena. The preservation of the species depends on the care which parents take of their offspring, and it is obtained by a special power. Parents are supposed to be independent of their children, and if in old age they should want their assistance, other feelings, as attachment, consciousness, reverence and benev-
olence are sufficient to explain gratitude and any other help they
give to their parents. Others want an organ of self-love. I might
reply, look for it, and prove it! I see necessity for doing so.
Self-love seems to me attached to the whole of Self, and an attribute
of every faculty which when active wishes to be satisfied.

Many consider it as a discrepancy of Phrenology that I admit
an organ of coloring, and another of tune, and none of taste, and
none of smell. There is, however, a great difference between
these mental phenomena. In treating of the external senses, I
shall speak of their immediate and mediate functions. The imme­
diate functions are independent of cerebral organs, only as far as
they are referred to special objects they are the result of internal
mental operations. The sense of smell, perceives odors; that of
taste, savors; that of hearing, sounds; and that of sight, different
shades of light. When these different perceptions or sensations
are referred to external objects, individuality and eventuality are
active. This is common to all the external senses; but the mind
operates on sounds and the shades and modified impressions of
light in a peculiar manner, in which it does not operate on odors
and savors. It transforms sounds into tones, melody and harmony,
and the impressions of light into coloring, and for these peculiar
operations of the mind, there are special organs in the brain.

I shall now begin to treat of the special faculties, which I admit
in Phrenology, and in the order which seems to me in the mean­
time as the most philosophical. An invariable order cannot be
adopted till Phrenology is complete. In discussing the fundamen­
tal powers of the mind, I shall always follow the same procedure:
I shall first consider the individual actions which lead us to think of
a special faculty; then give the history of the discovery of the or­
gan; I shall add my remarks where Gall, myself, or other phrenol­
ogists happen to differ in opinion; and afterwards describe the
seat of each organ, and name it according to its essential nature;
finally I shall examine its influence on the other faculties and the
effects of its inactivity. It is my intention rather to make known
the philosophical spirit of these inquiries, and the manner in which
I conceive they ought to be conducted, confirmed or amended, than to quote the numerous facts observed in support of our opinions. Gall was fond of quoting individual facts; these, however, be they ever so numerous, can never produce conviction. I have neither the wish nor the intention to persuade, but invite every one to convince himself by personal examination, since there can be no self-conviction without self-observation. I think, however, that by our unabated inquiries during so many years, we have acquired the right to demand that no conclusion be formed until our observations have been repeated. Is it not painful then to see that this is not done in Phrenology as it is in all other new discoveries? I cannot but regret that physiologists and philosophers do not examine with sufficient zeal and care the doctrine of Phrenology, which undoubtedly one day will become the basis of all philosophical, moral, and political sciences.

SECTION VIII.

ORDER I.—FEELINGS, OR AFFECTIVE FACULTIES.

The affective faculties have their origin from within, and are not acquired by any external circumstances. They cannot be taught and must be felt to be understood; in themselves they are blind and act without understanding; finally they are partly common to man and animals, partly proper to man.

Genus I.—Propensities.

There are several species of propensities; each species has a particular nature, and they all exist in animals and man.

Organ of the Desire to Live.

It is highly probable that there is a peculiar instinct to live, or love of life, and I look for its organ at the basis of the brain, between the posterior and middle lobes, inwardly of combativeness.
Organ of the Propensity to Feed.

Alimentiveness.

The common opinion of physiologists is, that hunger, or the desire to take food, depends on the nerves of the stomach alone. Gall and myself, placing all other instincts into the brain, thought it probable that the instinct to feed, depends on a cerebral portion, though we did not know its situation in the head.

Mr. Crook, lecturer on Mnemonics, seems to have been the first who observed the development of a peculiar part of the brain, in relation to the instinct in question, though the view he took is probably too limited. He observed several individuals who were exceedingly fond of good living, and he found their heads anterior to the organ of destructiveness very large. He thought that this organ produces a fine exquisite taste, and called it the organ of gustativeness.

Dr. Hoppe, of Copenhagen, as stated in two communications published in the Phrenological Journal, No. V. and VII., looked for an organ of the appetite for food, at the same spot of the head where Mr. Crook admits the organ of gustativeness, viz. before that of destructiveness: 'we observe,' says he, 'that the chicken is no sooner out of the egg, than it picks the grain that lies on the ground, and the new-born babe sucks the nipple. Is this to be explained without the supposition of an organ analogous to that which makes the duckling immediately plunge into the water. Neither am I able otherwise to conceive how the new-born animal can discriminate what is useful for its nutrition; that, for instance, the chicken, never mistakes gravel for grain, and that the wild beasts always avoid poisonous plants without ever tasting them.'

I agree with the idea that the propensity or instinct to feed, is fundamental, and attached to a portion of the brain situated before the organ of destructiveness, and under that of acquisitiveness, embracing the anterior circonvolutions of the middle lobes in man, and the corresponding cerebral parts in animals. But I neither
think with Dr. Hoppe, that this propensity discriminates what is useful for nutrition, nor with Mr. Crook, that it produces the delicacy and nicety of taste; I confine this power to the mere desire to feed, in the same way as the cerebellum to physical love, or amativeness, considering these two like all other propensities, as blind and deprived of intellect. In this way the comparison between nutrition and propagation is complete, each class of these functions, comprising three sorts of nervous activity, partly vegetative, partly instinctive, and partly sensitive.

Now all concurs to prove that the above mentioned portion of the brain, is the organ of the instinctive part of nutrition, or of the desire to feed. It exists not only in carnivorous, but also in herbivorous animals. The goose, turkey, ostrich, kangaroo, beaver, horse, &c. &c. have a middle lobe as well as the duck, eagle, pelican, tiger, lion, dog, &c. The desire to feed, is common to all animals, and the carnivorous animals want the organ of destructiveness in addition to that of the instinct to feed.

The functions of the anterior circonvolutions of the middle lobes in man, were unknown before the observations of Mr. Crook and Dr. Hoppe. It is, however, remarkable that they are developed from the earliest age, sooner than many other parts, and proportionally larger in children and young, than in adult persons and animals. This instinct acts in conformity, from the first appearance of young beings in this world, and is generally the most active in early life. In treating of destructiveness, I shall mention the reasons which induce me to think that it does not determine the food of carnivorous animals, or the taste for animal food, this being the result of the sense of taste, or of the gustatory nerve. This latter sense too, in my opinion, explains that which Mr. Crook calls gustativeness, and ascribes to the organ in question, that which I confine to the instinct to feed.

This propensity is particularly assisted by the smell, and the olfactory nerve is in all animals in the most intimate communication with the middle lobes, so much so, that in the ox, sheep, horse, dog, fox, hare, rabbit, &c. the internal part of the middle
lobes, seems to be almost a mere continuation of the olfactory nerve. In man also, the external and greater root of the olfactory nerve, is in connexion with the anterior convolutions of the middle lobes.

Farther, the middle lobes are in particular communication with the nervous bundles, which constitute the anterior lobes, and the anterior external portion of the crura, in other words, the organs of the intellectual faculties; and the propensity to feed puts into action many of the perceptive powers, and the voluntary motion of many parts, before the food is transmitted to the stomach for digestion.

This organ, though indicated by reason and comparative anatomy, is merely probable, and can be confirmed or rejected like every other, according to direct observations alone, in comparing cerebral development, in relation to the special propensity. I possess many facts in confirmation.

I. *Organ of the Propensity to Destroy, or of Destructiveness.*

A difference in the skulls of carnivorous and herbivorous animals, gave the first idea of the existence of an organ of destructiveness. If we place the skull of a carnivorous animal horizontally, and trace a vertical line through the external meatus auditorius, a good portion of the cerebral mass will be found situated behind it, whilst in herbivorous animals, the corresponding portion of the brain will be observed to be very small.

Every one agrees that there are carnivorous animals, but all have not the same opinion regarding the cause of this. Some say it is useless to search in the brain for a particular organ of destruction, which determines the kind of food nature destined for man and animals, because she has given to carnivorous animals the feeling of hunger, the taste, teeth, and such instruments as are necessary for seizing and killing their prey. These instruments, however, prove only the harmony that subsists between the internal faculties and the corporeal structure. Man employs his hands in taking aliments,
but some interior sensation advertises him of the necessity of taking food. The tiger, lion, cat, &c. have teeth and claws, but an internal power excites these animals to use them. A sheep could not employ such instruments, any more than does an idiot his hands to perform offices for which they are adapted.

The propensity to kill, exists beyond doubt in the world, and it is more or less energetic in animals of different species, and even in individuals of the same kind. There are some species which kill no more than they require for their nourishment, while others, as the wolf, tiger, polecat, &c. kill all living beings around them, seemingly for the mere pleasure of destroying.

It is readily granted that many animals have the propensity to kill. But let us see whether man is also endowed with a like disposition. Carnivorous animals confine themselves to the destruction of a certain number of species for food; but man kills, from the insect to the elephant and whale, to apply them to his purposes; he almost alone is truly omnivorous, and he sheds the blood even of his fellow-creatures. I find it superfluous to combat those who say that man eats flesh only from depravity or vicious habit; because his teeth evidently partake of the structure of those of both carnivorous and herbivorous animals; his stomach rather resembles that of carnivorous, than of frugivorous tribes; and finally, because he thrives upon flesh, and, in some regions, it constitutes all his subsistence.

In man this feeling presents different degrees of activity, from mere indifference to the pain of animals, to the pleasure of seeing them killed, or even to the most irresistible desire of killing. This doctrine may shock sensibility, but it is not the less true, and whoever would study nature, and judge sanely of its phenomena, must be ready to admit the existence of things as they are. It may be observed that among children, as well as adults, among the uncultivated as well as the polite and well-bred classes of society, certain individuals are very sensible, and others very indifferent to the sufferings of other beings. Some persons feel a pleasure in tormenting animals, and in seeing them tortured or killed, even when
it is impossible to ascribe this disposition to bad habit, or neglected education. There are even individuals who choose such a profession as will gratify this propensity, if it be very energetic. Thus a journeyman apothecary at Vienna became an executioner; the son of a rich merchant of the same city, renounced commerce and became a butcher; and a rich Dutchman paid the butchers, who furnished the navy with beef, for permission to kill the oxen.

We may also determine the existence of this propensity and its diversities, by the impressions made upon different spectators by public executions; these are insupportable to some, and afford great delight to others. George Selwin sought eagerly for such spectacles, and always endeavored to stand near the executioner. It is also reported of La Condamine that, being fond of executions, and endeavoring to pass through the crowd upon a certain occasion, as the soldiers pushed him back, the executioner said to them, 'Let that gentleman pass, he is an amateur.' Professor Bruggmans, of Leyden, told us of a Dutch priest, whose desire to kill, and to see killed, was so great, that he became chaplain of a regiment, solely to have an opportunity of seeing men destroyed in battle. To gratify the same propensity still farther, he kept in his house a number of domestic animals, as dogs, cats, &c. to have the pleasure of killing their young with his own hand. He also slaughtered the animals for his kitchen, and was acquainted with all the hangmen of the country, who sent him regular notice of each execution, and he did not grudge to travel on foot for several days, to witness the scene. In the field of battle the propensity to destroy is active in very different degrees: one soldier is overjoyed at sight of the blood which he sheds, while another, moved by compassion, spares the vanquished, and stops of his own accord, whenever victory is secure.

Highwaymen are frequently not contented with robbing, but manifest the most sanguinary inclination to torment and murder, without necessity. John Rosbeck not only maltreated his victims, to make them show their concealed treasures, but invented and
employed the most outrageous cruelties, merely to witness their sufferings; neither fear nor torture could break him of this horrible habit; after his first apprehension, he was confined for eighteen months in a small subterranean dungeon, his feet loaded with chains, standing in muddy water up to his ankles; in addition to all this, he was tortured most cruelly; nevertheless, he confessed nothing. On being enlarged, his first act was to steal in full daylight, and having committed new murders, he was finally executed.*

At the beginning of the last century, several murders were committed in Holland, on the frontiers of the province of Cleves. For a long time the murderer escaped detection, but at last suspicion fell on an old man, who gained his livelihood by playing on the violin at country weddings, in consequence of some expressions of his children; led before the justice, he confessed thirty-four murders, and said that he had committed them without any cause of enmity, and without any intention of robbing, but only because he was extremely delighted with bloodshed. At Strasbourg two keepers of the cathedral having been assassinated, all efforts to discover the murderer for a long time were ineffectual; at last a postilion was shot by a clergyman, called Frick. This monster had hired a post-chaise for the express purpose of satisfying his horrible propensity to destroy. Arrested, he confessed himself the murderer of both keepers of the cathedral. This wretch was rich, and had never stolen. For his crimes he was condemned to be burned at Strasbourg. 'Louis XV.' says M. de Lacretelle,† felt a rooted aversion against a brother of the Duke Bourbon-Condé, Count of Charolois, who would have renewed all the crimes of Nero, had he ever mounted a throne. While a child he betrayed a cruelty of disposition, which excited horror. He delighted in shedding the blood of those he had debauched, and in exercising various barbarities on the courtezans who were brought to him. Popular tradition, as well as history, accuses him of different homicides, and it is added that these were com-

† Historie de la France, t. ii. p. 50.
mitted without cause, and when unmoved by anger; for he shot at slaters, merely to have the barbarous pleasure of seeing them fall from the tops of the houses.'

These latter facts, which fortunately for humanity are very rare, prove that this terrible propensity is sometimes quite independent of education, of example, or of habit, and that it depends on innate constitution alone. Many crimes indeed are so detestable, and are accompanied with such repugnant and horrible circumstances, that it would be impossible to explain them in any other way. Prochasca relates, * that a woman of Milan caressed little children, led them home, killed them, salted their flesh, and ate of it every day. He quotes also the case of a person whom this passion excited, and who killed a traveller and a young girl to eat them. Gaubius † speaks of a girl whose father was incited by a violent impulse to eat human flesh, and who, to gratify his singular desire, committed several murders. This girl, though separated from her father for a long time, and educated carefully among respectable persons not related to her family, was overcome by the same horrible desire to eat human flesh.

Many idiots are mischievous, and manifest the propensity to kill. Numerous facts are recorded in books, and several have fallen under my own observation.

Individuals are occasionally alienated only in the propensity to destroy. At Berlin, Mr. Mayer showed us a soldier whose general health was bad; he was very irritable, and much weakened by grief for the loss of his wife; he had every month a fit of violent convulsions, the approach of which he felt, accompanied with an immoderate propensity to kill; he then begged to be chained; but at the end of a few days the fit left him, the fatal propensity disappeared, and he himself fixed the period when he might be safely delivered. At Haina we met with a man who at certain periods felt an irresistible desire to maltreat others; he also knew his unfortunate propensity, and begged to be confined till his fit was

* Opera minora, tom. ii. p. 93.
† Oratio prima de regimine mentis quod medicorum est.
over. A person, of a melancholy turn of mind, having seen a criminal executed, was so much upset by the spectacle, that he suddenly became possessed with a propensity to kill, although he felt the strongest aversion to commit the act; he spoke of his deplorable situation, weeping bitterly, struck his head, wrung his hands, exhorted himself, and admonished his friends to take care and to fly; he even thanked them if they restrained him.

Pinel has also frequently observed the fierce impulse to destroy, and speaks of one man who showed no mark of alienation in memory, imagination, or judgment, but who confessed that his propensity to murder was so involuntary and irresistible, that his wife, notwithstanding the love he bore her, was near being immolated, he having only time to warn her to fly. In his lucid intervals he made the most melancholy reflections, expressed horror at himself, and was disgusted with life to such a degree, that he several times attempted to put an end to his existence. 'What reason,' said he, 'have I to cut the throat of the overseer of the hospital, who treats us with so much humanity? Yet in the moments of my fury I feel the same desire to attack him as others, and to thrust a dagger into his breast.' Another madman, who, during six months in the year, suffered periodical fits of fury, felt the decrease of the symptoms, pointed out the periods when the danger was over, and begged those about him not to set him free when he felt incapable of governing his blind impulse to destroy. In his calm intervals, he confessed, that during his fits, it would be impossible for him to restrain it; he said, that if he met any one then, he saw, as it were, the blood circulating in their veins, and felt an irresistible desire to suck it, and to tear their limbs with his teeth, to do so more commodiously. Pinel also relates the history of a young female, who every morning had a fit of mania, during which she tore all that fell under her hands, and committed every sort of violence against those who came near her, so that they were obliged to restrain her by a straight-jacket; yet in the afternoon she repented of the actions of the morning, and asked pardon, which she always despaired of obtaining. Pinel quotes another
example of a monk alienated by devotion, who thought he had one night seen the Virgin Mary surrounded by a choir of angels and happy spirits, and received an express order to kill a certain person whom he considered as an infidel; he would have executed this commission, had not his actions and manner betrayed him. The same author speaks of a credulous vine-dresser, who was so violently shaken by the sermon of a missionary, that he thought himself and his family damned to everlasting pains, if he did not save them by the baptism of blood, or martyrdom. He therefore first endeavored to murder his wife, who escaped with difficulty; he then killed two of his children, to procure them eternal life; and when confined to prison before trial, he cut the throat of a criminal in the same room with him, still with the intention of doing some expiatory act. His insanity being proved, he was ordered to be shut up in the Bicêtre for life. Long solitary confinement exalted his imagination, and because he had not been executed, he fancied himself the Almighty; or, according to his own expression, the fourth person of the Trinity, sent to save the world by the baptism of blood. Having been confined for ten years, he became tranquil, and was permitted to converse with the other convalescents in the court of the hospital. He passed four years in this way, and his health seemed restored, but he was again suddenly seized with his former superstitious and sanguinary ideas. The day before Christmas he conceived the project of offering up an expiatory sacrifice by killing all who might fall under his hands; he consequently got possession of a shoemaker’s knife, with which he gave the keeper a thrust from behind, which fortunately slipped over the ribs; he then cut the throats of two other lunatics, and would have continued his homicides, had he not been overpowered and prevented. These and many similar examples, which occur in the state of health and disease, prove that the propensity to kill and destroy is innate, in man as well as in animals. Does not the whole history of mankind indeed confirm this position? In all ages the earth has been drenched with blood. The God of Israel was fond of blood-shedding; and without it there was no remis-
sion of sin. With what view then has this propensity been created?

We cannot imagine that the propensity to destroy is given to man that he may murder his fellow-creatures. Carnivorous animals, though endowed with the propensity, do not kill individuals of their own kind; they only use it in slaying, that they themselves may live. What then is the natural food of man? To a great extent, the flesh of other animals, and this he can only procure by inflicting death. Does this propensity then determine the sort of food proper for those possessed of it? Gall thinks it does: I am not of his opinion. It is certain that the propensities of animals are in relation to their whole nature, and that the disposition to kill is in relation to the sort of food they use; but an impulse to kill is not the same as an impulse to choose flesh as aliment. One special faculty produces the propensity to kill, another makes choice of flesh. There is consequently no proportion between the propensity to kill, and the want of food. Some animals destroy more than is necessary for their support. Some of the human kind like meat, but cannot slay an animal; others have no reluctance to kill, and yet prefer vegetables for nourishment. Children, in general, have the propensity to destroy more energetic than grown up persons, yet they prefer fruits and vegetables to meat.

We have still to inquire into the essential nature of this faculty. I think that its sphere of activity is wider than the mere disposition which it generates to take away life. It seems to produce the propensity to destroy in general, without distinction of object, or manner of destroying. It may wreak itself upon inanimate things, animals, or man, and in this signification may then be perceived a necessary and consistent power in the plan of creation. Throughout nature one being lives upon another, and violent death is consequently a law in the system of the world. Had nature indeed created animals and destined them to live upon the flesh of others, without giving them at the same time the means of obtaining their object, and inclination to inflict death, there would have been contradiction. Nature has even taught carnivorous animals to put
ethers to death in the most speedy way possible, by wounding their neck opposite the place where the spinal chord decussates. Sometimes also there is a necessity for destroying what is useless, before its place can be supplied by what is useful; and many things relatively hurtful provoke us to destroy them. In this sense it is lawful to destroy others to preserve ourselves; nay, the act is even rewarded, and looked on as virtuous, in every war of defence. On the contrary, whenever the faculty leads us to destroy what ought to be preserved, it is abused.

This faculty then is gratified by destroying in general, and its manifestations are perceived in those who like to pinch, scratch, bite, break, tear, cut, stab, strangle, demolish, devastate, burn, drown, kill, poison, murder, or assassinate. It prompts us to exterminate noxious objects, and the causes of dangerous situations.

Gall formerly called its organ that of murder, because he discovered it of large size in the heads of two murderers; but no faculty can be named from its abuse. The error Gall committed, however, was natural, for the functions of all the organs are most easily discovered in their state of extreme development, when they are very apt to produce abuses. Such then was the origin of this erroneous name of a faculty, whose well regulated employment is, like that of every other, essential to life. I think the name, organ of the propensity to destroy, or of destructiveness, is the most general and the most conformable to its sphere of activity.

At the beginning Gall placed the seat of this organ too far behind the ear, but a great number of observations convinced us that its seat is immediately above the ear. (Pl. VI. and VIII. fig. 1 and 2, VI.)

II. **Organ of Amativeness.**

Physical love is commonly considered as a peculiar sort of sensation; but physiologists and philosophers are not agreed as to its origin. It is certain, that none of the causes which are generally admitted suffice to explain its existence, for it is manifested
without these, and its energy is not proportionate to them.* It is therefore necessary to find other conditions adequate to account for the phenomenon of this desire.

Gall did not think there was an organ of this propensity in the brain, but discovered it by accident. Being physician to a widow who was subject to violent hysterical fits, during which her head was drawn backwards with great force, he sometimes supported it with his hand, and was astonished by the great thickness and heat of her neck. Acquainted with her peculiar character, he asked himself, whether the size of her neck, and consequent development of her cerebellum, might not have some relation to her inordinate passion?

Continuing observations began from this hint, he soon established the point to his own satisfaction; and it is now impossible to unite a greater number of proofs in demonstration of any natural truth, than may be presented to determine the function of the cerebellum.

It would be interesting as well as important to show, that those animals which have a nervous mass corresponding to the cerebellum, reproduce by sexual union. This alone, if it could be verified through all classes of beings, would be sufficient to prove the peculiar function of this portion of the brain. The minuteness of the smaller animals, however, prevents demonstration by dissection, and at the present we may say the undertaking is impracticable.

In new-born children, the cerebellum is to the brain as one to nine, ten, thirteen, twenty, or more; and in adults, as one to five,

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six, or seven. Professor Ackermann maintained that the cerebellum was perfectly developed at the end of the second year. Gall and I have compared the heads and skulls of children from two till sixteen years old, and have always found that at these ages it is still imperfectly developed. But in proportion as the cerebellum increases, its function appears. It has been said that the cerebellum grows in proportion as the sexual propensity becomes active; but other proofs show evidently that the development of the cerebellum always precedes this desire.

In adults, the cerebellum having attained its full size, the amative propensity is most energetic, and then there is a constant relation between its development and the goadings of the inclination. It is well known that men feel in very different degrees the impulses of the sexual passion: some individuals are almost or wholly deprived of it; others experience it moderately; whilst others again feel its ungovernable violence. In the first, the cerebellum is very small, (Pl. III. fig. 2,) in the second, it is of a middling size; and in the third class, it is very large and prominent.* (Pl. III. fig. 1.)

* Plures viros hácece appetentia abusos, eamque ob causam carceratos vidimus, quibus, è magnitudine cerebelli, collam quàm maximum fuit. Equos, tauros, arietesque, quibus profusius collum, majore propagandi vi donatos esse, agricolae et armentarii à longinquitate temporum animadverterunt. Notum est etiam collumbas, que in hac re allis excellunt, a majore magnitudine colli distinguui.

Virum et mares majorem quam feminas copulandi cupidinem sentire certum est. ‘In venere exercenda,’ ait Hippocrates de Geniturâ, ‘longè minorem quàm vir voluptatem mulier percipit, vir verò etiam diuturniorem.’ Plurima apud animalia mos est unum marem pluribus cum fœminis vivere; sed in paucis speciebus una fœmina pluribus cum maribus conjuncta est. In multis speciebus, mares per totum annum veneris stimulum sentiunt, dûm fœminæ certis solis annis temporibus a maribus suis amari volunt. Imò, in animalibus matrimonio conjunctis, mares fœminis multò salutiores sunt.

In omnì animalium specie, cerebelli configuratio ad veneris appetentiam referre videtur. Nam mares fœminis, et fœminæ maribus, ejusdem specie imprimis, dêdit sunt.

A nimia hujus organi activitate perturbatio oritur. In erotomania cerebellum grande plerunque observatur. Asseri tamen non potest, omnibus erotomania laborantiibus magnum esse cerebellum. Hoc organum enim, sicut omnia alia, sine ullâ præcipuâ magnitudine, morbidâ activitate agrotare potest.
Besides it is indubitable that men, (Pl. V. fig. 1 and 2,) and male animals in general, have a larger cerebellum than women.

Actio reciproca, que existit inter cerebellum et partes genitales, etiam cerebelli functiones probat. Sic castratio cerebelli incrementum iniminit, nam in hominibus atque animalibus castratis cerebellum crescere desinit. Quam ob rem ennuchis atque animalibus, in primâ ætate castratis, est collum vâlo exiguum, et copulandi cupidto nulla. Contrà, hominibus caeteraque animalia, post plenos annos castrati, quanquam testium expertes, sensum tamen eroticum et copulandi stimulum conservant. Hinc testes cupidinem non producere patet.


Quæ facta veteribus planè nata fuère, sed causa usque ad nostrum ætatem laturit. Castratio, àdæm de causâ, eraniorum figurâs necnon armentorum atque aliorum animalium cornua mutat. Bobus castratis longiora, quâm tauris, sunt cornua. Cervorum, testibus injuriam passis, cornua male crescent; cornubus defalcatis paulo ante rugition, nullò minus certa est corum propagatio.

Cerebello vulnerato partes genitales in sympathiam trahuntur. Gall, Vindobonæ Austriacorum, duos milites, est vulnerato occipite, impotentem fieri observavit, quorum unus, duobus post annis, veneris appetitatem et copulandi potestatem iterum receptit, puerosque genuit. Formey Berolinensis narravit nobis historiam cujusdam qui, occipite vulnerato, primum priapismo, dein impotentiam, vexatus est. Veruntamen sex post mensibus virilitatem recuperavit. Baronius Larrey, Parisis, plures milites, occipite vulneratos, quorum partes genitales decreverant, nobis monstravit. Unus, dum septemdecim annos natus, occipite vulneratus est. Postea penis et testes magnitudine propria defecerunt; vox eæminia permansit, et barba per vitam fuit nulla. Veneres semen in cerebello secerni ac per spinam descendere putabant. Sic Hippocrates, de Geniturâ, III, sub fine: 'Quibusque juxta aures venæ sectæ sunt, hi coeunt quidem et genituram emittunt, verum medicam et debilem ac infrequam; nam plurima geniturrence partes a capite juxta aures in spinalem medullam procedit.' Alio loco (Lib. de Aĉirus, Aquis, et Lœis, Sect. I.) 'Atque mihi, inquit, sanè videatur ea medicatione seipsos perdere. Vene enim retrô aures sunt, quas si quis secet, sterilitatem inferet his quibus secantur; quâr id etiam ipsis ex earum incisione accideret certum est. Quandò igitur postea uxores adeunt, impotentensque se factos vident, cum illis coire primum quidem nihil molestis cogitantes quiescunt (Scythe. ') Apollonius Rhodius, de Medæae amore ergà Jasona loquens, illam ardore con.
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(Pl. IV. fig. 1 and 2,) and females. This, however, is by no means an invariable law; there are exceptions, and these occur


Nonnulli contendunt, copulandi appetentiam organum proprium habere non posse, quia plurima animalia tantum certis anni temporibus catullunt. Hæc objectio candem vim haberit, si contra aliam, quæcumque sit, amoris causam
more frequently among mankind than among animals; yet there is a constant relation between the development of the cerebellum and the propensity in question.

It has been objected, that the brain in general is larger in men than in women, and that consequently it is not astonishing that the cerebella of men should also be larger than those of women. Many individuals, however, have large brains and small cerebella, and

opponeretur; exempli gratia si sanguinem, aut partes genitales, hujus appetentiae causam acciperemus. Porro plurima organa non omni tempore officiis suis fungi notum est: mammæ non semper lac secernunt. Idem igitur cerebello accidere potest. Difficilis quidem est questio, utrum animalium cerebella, du rante rugitu, magnitudine crescant, an magis excitentur; experimenta desunt, scimus tamen, dum catuliunt, colla insolito modo calescere.


Organa, ad eandem functionem pertinentia, sese invicem incitare notum est; sic famæ incitat gustum, gustus famæ, et ambo incitant digestionem. Sic quæ copulandi appetentiae seminis secretionem, et hæc istam incitat. Attamen, hic est variarum partium incitatio sit mutua, earum ratio non est directa. Digestio appetitui non semper respondet, nec appetitus digestioni: itemque nec veneris appetentia seminis secretionem, nec hæc functio illam propensionem semper adequat.

Ex hisce considerationibus hujus appetentiae abusus facillime concipiuntur. Oriuntur enim eodem modo quo abusus famæ et sitis. Corporis regenerandi causa nutrimenta sumenda sunt; sed quæm nutrimenta, aut ë nimià quantitate, aut ë malìà ipsorum qualitate, saluti obnoxia sunt, evenit abusus. Famem sitimque est semper conditio certa, sed voracitatis ac ebrietatis organum non datur: Res item se habet cum veneris appetentia; pendet a cerebello, nimia autem cerebelli incitatio aut ejus conditio vitiosa abusum producit.
There is consequently no proportion between the brain and the cerebellum. The sexual propensity, moreover, is never in proportion to the size of the brain; but cæteris paribus, always to that of the cerebellum.

This organ, like all others, may be confirmed from observing nations as well as individuals who feel this propensity in a high degree. Various pathological facts in confirmation of the functions of the cerebellum are mentioned in the Memoires de Chirurgie, by Baron Larrey, in the Elements of Physiology, by Richerand, in the work on Apoplexy, by Serres, &c. Gall and myself have observed several facts of this kind.

We may even take the position of the cerebellum as confirmatory of its destination. The desire destined to preserve the species, is the most common in animals, and the cerebellum accordingly is the most inferior portion of the brain.

From all that has been said, and from the infinite number of observations made on man and animals, we conclude that the special function of the cerebellum is fairly established, and think that the mutilations practised by M. Flourens, and Mr. Magendie, at Paris, do not invalidate our conclusions drawn from the healthy state. The former infers from his experiments, that the cerebellum serves for the regulation of muscular motion; whilst similar experiments made by Magendie, occasioned an irresistible tendency in the animals to run or swim back.

The only point we have still to examine, is the name which will best express the primitive faculty. Gall calls it the *instinct of propagation*. It certainly is essential to that end, but it often acts without there being any intention to continue the species, and is also satisfied in various ways incompatible with such a purpose. We do not usually speak of the nerves of the instinct of nutrition, but of those of hunger and thirst. The same language should be used when speaking of the organ in question. Gall’s name does not express the whole sphere of activity of the faculty. Now I constantly insist on the importance of adopting titles which do not designate determinate actions. Physical love indicates a more
general application than the love or instinct of propagation, but this instinct or desire is no more physical than the love of offspring, or self-love, or the love of glory, &c.; I therefore prefer the name of Amativeness.

To observe accurately and to substantiate the organs in general, it is necessary to know their situations. The organ of amativeness is situated at the top of the neck, and its size may be known by considering the space between the mastoid process immediately behind the ear, and the protuberance called occipital spine in the middle of the hind head, in all its dimensions. Those who would make observations on the cerebellum of the lower animals, should know the variety of structure it presents among them. In birds it is almost single; in the mammalia it has lateral parts or lobes added to its fundamental or middle portion (processus vermis). More details of the structure of the cerebellum are given in my work on the Anatomy of the Brain.

Practical Reflections.

The reader must bear in mind that the cerebellum is only the organ of the amative impulse, and not of the generative power. Its influence in society is immense. It may excite various feelings, such as combativeness, adhesiveness, and destructiveness, inspire timid persons with great moral courage, and at other times and under different circumstances, mitigates our nature, and increases the mutual regards of the sexes towards each other. The cock shows benevolence to hens; in general the males are milder to females than to individuals of their own sex, and so are men more kind and generous towards women, than towards other men. Fathers are commonly more attached to daughters, than to sons, and mothers are often prepossessed in favor of their sons. Female servants frequently show greater attention to young boys than to girls. The attraction of sexes towards each other is involuntary, and society improves, if both sexes meet, &c.

On the other hand, this propensity has caused great disorder
as well in civil as in other peculiar, especially, religious institutions, where its activity has not been duly considered. Can it be reasonable to admit every youth to a profession, the members of which are compelled to swear chastity for life? If such a vow be necessary, would it not be better to destine to the profession of religion those only who are born eunuchs, or those in whom the cerebellum is very little active?

The disorderly satisfaction of the amative propensity undermines the health of individuals, and even of the species; and I think that as soon as young persons understand the difference and the distinction of the sexual functions, they should be taught the laws of propagation, and not be kept in a state of ignorance that may provoke a fatal curiosity, compromising in the end their own and their descendants bodily and mental constitution. This work being devoted to physiological inquiries alone, it would be out of place to say more on the influence of the organ of amativeness here. Important reflections might be made since we see seduction encouraged, and have daily opportunities of witnessing the disastrous consequences of neglecting its proper direction. I wish every one were convinced how nearly legislators, moralists, teachers, physicians, and all friends of humanity are concerned in regulating the sexual propensity. In this respect I refer the reader, to my philosophical principles, in the chapter, where I treat on the happiness of man, and to the first section of my work on Education.

III. Organ of Philoprogenitiveness.

I shall consider, in the first place, whether it be necessary or not to admit a particular feeling which watches over and provides for the wants of a helpless offspring, and then state the circumstances which led to the discovery of its organ.

Neither males nor females of certain tribes of animals take any care of their progeny. Their eggs are resigned to chance, or rather to the influence of some external agent. This happens amongst insects, fishes, and reptiles. Among birds, too, the cuc-
koo is a striking example of absence of parental solicitude. Its propensity to physical love is great, but it neither builds a nest nor hatches its eggs. These are deposited in the nests of small birds which live on insects, and they hatch and rear the young cuckoo, with particular attachment.

The females of other kinds of animals alone take care of their progeny; bulls, stallions, dogs, cocks, &c., are indifferent about their young, while the cow, mare, bitch, hen, &c., are extremely attached to them.

The males and females of other tribes, again, form an attachment for life, and both sexes tend their offspring. The instinct of parental love is, however, more energetic in the females. The fox, which resembles in so many points, differs from the dog in so far as he is attached to his female for life, shares in all her cares, and if she happens to be killed, continues to provide for the young ones. Parental love, nevertheless, is stronger in the female than in the male; for if both be pursued, the male leaves the young sooner than the female. Many kinds of birds also live in pairs, and are jointly solicitous in satisfying the wants of the young. These differences are constant; does not each of them, even on the slightest consideration, seem to require peculiar organization?

In the human race this propensity is generally stronger in women than in men. This truth is proclaimed not only by the difference between fathers and mothers, but also by that between the sexes universally. We never hire male servants to take care of our children. Girls show the predominance of philoprogenitiveness early in life, by their choice of play-things. They attach themselves to dolls and cradles, whilst boys prefer drums, horses, whips, &c.

Among all kinds of animals which take care of their progeny, there are always some females who feel little or none of the propensity, and certain males who manifest the inclination strongly. There are even women who look on children as a heavy burden, though the majority deem them their chief treasure and greatest source of happiness; and this not only in the miserable portion of society, but indiscriminately among rich and poor. Cases of insan-
ity are by no means unfrequent in which the function of parental love is deranged.

All the general arguments, in fine, adduced to prove the plurality of the organs, may be applied to the organ of philoprogenitiveness in particular.

To answer the objections made against love of offspring, as a fundamental power, will be an easy task. This feeling is certainly not the result of reason, since it acts sometimes in opposition to reason in spoiling children. It acts like an instinct, or as a propensity. It has been said, that it is the result of self-love, of the desire of suckling, and of the moral sentiments, and not of a peculiar propensity. These causes, though commonly admitted, are, however, inadequate to produce the love of offspring, since in many animals strongly attached to their progeny, they do not exist. Birds, and the males of mammiferous animals, do not give suck, yet many of them love their young. Mothers very frequently do not suckle their children, they are, nevertheless, exceedingly attached to them. No animal, lower in the scale than man, has any idea of duty, or moral responsibility; and the tenderness of mothers, of the human species, is never in proportion to the moral and religious sentiments with which they are endowed. On the other hand, this feeling cannot be the result of benevolence in general, since it exists often in a high degree in the most brutal tribes, as in the Caribs, and in ferocious animals.

Others again have said, this propensity cannot be fundamental, because it is not always active. The same objection may, with equal propriety, be made against every instinct of animals, and against all the desires of man. No fundamental power seems capable of acting continually; each demands repose from time to time, and its intermissions of activity are shorter or longer, wherever the cause of activity resides, whether in the blood, in the viscera, or in the cerebral parts.

It is further objected, that mothers are not alike fond of every individual of their family, that they sometimes prefer one to another, nay, that they even hate one, and remain attached to the rest.
This observation holds good, not only in mankind, but also among animals; still it is wrong to infer from it, that philoprogenitiveness is no fundamental faculty. The external senses are not equally nor always agreeably affected by all kinds of impressions, nevertheless they have their particular functions. The stomach digests one sort of food more easily than another, and, notwithstanding, it remains the organ of digestion. The sense of taste cannot be denied, since certain savors are unpleasant. Moreover, philoprogenitiveness is not the only feeling that acts and requires satisfaction; a mother will naturally prefer that child who pleases the greatest number of her faculties, and whose dispositions most nearly resemble her own; and she may be less kind to another who is differently constituted, or who disturbs her happiness.

The love of offspring, then, must be considered as a fundamental power, and a peculiar organ for its manifestations admitted. Let us now see how this was discovered.

At an early period of his observations, Gall was attracted by a peculiar and very regularly occurring protuberance on the back part of the heads of females. (Pl. IV. fig. 1.) He also found a similar projection in the skulls of children and of monkeys. Convinced that the large mass of brain in this situation must perform some important function in the animal economy, all his efforts, during a period of five years, to detect its office, were notwithstanding unsuccessful. At first he fancied it might indicate the greater nervous irritability and sensibility of women and children; but he soon saw that irritability was a common quality of every organ, and therefore abandoned this supposition. In his courses of lectures delivered from time to time, he was in the habit of mentioning his difficulties relative to this protuberance, when at last a clergyman remarked, that monkeys were very much attached to their young ones. Reflecting on this suggestion, viewing the situation of the cerebral part, immediately above the organ of amativeness, and appealing to observation, Gall soon established its proper function. The development of the organ he found constantly to coincide with the energy of the propensity, which prompts
to protect and succor the young. Species, sexes, and individuals, powerfully endowed with the love of offspring, have the organ greatly developed. Women and females have it commonly larger than men and males. Gall possesses the skull of a woman who became diseased, and had the notion of being pregnant with five children; the corresponding organ in this skull is exceedingly large. Several nations are remarkable for this propensity. The attachment of negroes and Indios to their offspring is known; and they have the organization on which the feeling depends prominent.

As the English language possesses no single word that indicates love of offspring, I have employed two Greek roots, which, in conjunction, define accurately the primitive propensity. The title that results is long; but I could not say philogenitiveness, because that would indicate the love of producing offspring. As, however, progeny is synonymous with offspring, and philoprogeny means the love of offspring, I adopt the term philoprogenitiveness for the faculty of producing the love of offspring.

Practical Reflections.

The faculty of philoprogenitiveness is obviously destined to the preservation of the tender and weak offspring, and its intensity is the strongest in a mother during the first months after birth, when it is the most necessary to the tender and helpless progeny. Sometimes it is too active, and produces many disorders, principally by spoiling children. Parents might often spare themselves a great deal of pain and much uneasiness, did they maintain this propensity in harmony with the other primitive faculties. A mother may behave unjustly to others for the sake of her children. On the other hand, the small size of the organ, or its inactivity, renders her indifferent to children. (Pl. IV. fig. 2.) This condition ought to be considered as one of the indirect causes prompting to infanticide. Gall and I have examined the heads of twenty-nine women guilty of infanticide, and in twenty-five of them the organ of philoprogenitiveness was very small. The small size of this organ,
however, does not excite a mother to destroy her child; but she
who is destitute of the love of offspring is less able to combat those
external circumstances which provoke a commission of the crime.
Such a mother will not resist as she would have done, had she
been influenced by the powerful sway which philoprogenitiveness
exerts over the female mind.

I have already pointed out the place of philoprogenitiveness.
Although the protuberance, which indicates its great development,
be commonly single, the organ itself is always double, that is,
there is one on each side of the middle line of the head. It ap­
ppears single when the posterior lobes of the brain are very near to
each other, and double when they are somewhat separated. This
difference of form is common to all the cerebral organs situated on
each side of the mesial plane. This organ is often large, rather in
breadth than in length.

By means of this and the preceding organ, it is very easy to dis­
tinguish the skulls of males from those of females of the same kind;
and it is peculiarly worthy of notice that throughout all animals
there is a striking similarity preserved in the form of the skulls of
each sex. The skulls of men and males are generally shorter and
wider, those of women and females longer and narrower.

Some phrenologists in Scotland think that a softness of manner,
and a sympathy for whatever is weak and helpless, generally ac­
company, and are connected with large philoprogenitiveness. I
have already mentioned, that Gall entertained a similar idea at the
beginning, but gave it up, and that the love of offspring may be
very active in individuals of rough and brutal manners. The Carib
race, endowed with great ferocity, are much attached to their young,
and submit to all the inconveniences of bringing them up, amidst
privations and hardships of every kind. The New Zealanders are
359, we read, "The New Zealanders, both parents, are in general
fondly attached to their children, and treat them with great kind­
ness and indulgence. Mr. Ellis, during the short time he spent at
the Bay of Islands in 1816, went one day to the residence of the
chief Telora to request him to accompany himself on a short excursion, which the chief immediately agreed to. But, says Mr. Ellis, before we sat out, an incident occurred which greatly raised my estimation of his character. In the front of the hut sat his wife, and round her playing two or three children. In passing from the hut to the boat, Teloro struck one of the little ones with his foot. The child cried, and though the chief had his mat on, and his gun in his hand, and was in the act of stepping into the boat, where we were waiting for him, he no sooner heard the cries than he turned back, took the child up in his arms, stroked its little head, dried its tears, and giving it to the mother, hastened to join us.'

The tiger, hyena, and the most ferocious tribes of animals, show a fondness for their young, not inferior to that of the gentlest and most docile. Philoprogenitiveness produces only sympathy for young beings, but not tenderness in general. It may be combined with other tender feelings, and increase their activity towards children.

IV. Organ of Adhesiveness.

Friendship is commonly considered as the result of reflection, the consequence of some analogy between the faculties of individuals or as an effect of mutual interest. Some particular instinct, however, producing various attachments, must be admitted amongst animals in whom no moral consideration nor any idea of interest can be supposed to have weight. This seems to be evident from numerous examples among animals. I have been assured by good authority that a female fox, brought up with a male fox and left loose and free, carried to him hares, rabbits, and one morning a guinea fowl, though there were none of the latter tribe within the reach of seven miles. All dogs are not susceptible of the same degree of attachment, though the treatment they receive ought to excite it; some, on the contrary, are attached in opposition to their interest, and though abused and maltreated, still remain faithful to their masters, and die on their graves. Moreover, there is
something involuntary in attachment, and its manifestations are too early and too sudden to result from reflection. It is evidently a feeling, and a feeling of the animal nature. Even criminals have frequently displayed great attachment to their associates; and instances are not wanting in which they have preferred self-destruction to denunciation of their companions. Thus, a highwayman, confined in the prison of Lichtenstien, near Vienna, hanged himself, that he might not be forced to betray his accomplices. Mary Macinnes, executed in Edinburgh for murder, had gained the affections of a person, whose name need not be mentioned, and her attachment to him continued strong in death, and assumed even a romantic appearance in the last moments of her mortal career. He had sent her a pocket handkerchief, having his name written in one corner, and also half an orange, with a desire that she should eat the latter on the scaffold, in token of their mutual affection; he having eaten the other half, the preceding morning, at the corresponding hour. She held the corner of the napkin in her mouth, almost all the night preceding her execution, and even on the scaffold. When seated on the drop, the turnkey gave her the half orange, she took it out of his hand without the least fear—she seemed to have forgot eternity in the ardor of her attachment. Phrenol. Transact. p. 376.

Though the necessity of some organ of attachment was evident, it was difficult, however, to point out its seat in man; his actions being sometimes embellished by the appearance of friendship, whilst but little of the feeling subsists in reality. Gall examined the head of a woman, at Vienna, who was looked upon as a model of friendship; she had suffered many changes of fortune, had been alternately rich and poor, but was always attached to her former friends. He found the cerebral part situated upward and outward from the organ of philoprogenitiveness, very prominent, and called it the organ of friendship. He neglected, during a long time, to make farther observations on this organ, but many facts have subsequently been gathered, and its seat is now ascertained. (Pl. V. fig. 1 and 2. IV.)
The strength of attachment is very different in different species of animals, and even in individuals of the same kind; it is greater in women than in men, and greater in one nation than in another.

This faculty induces individuals of the same kinds to congregate, and live in society. In several species, too, the males and females are attached for life, and dwell domestically together. The fox and many birds are examples of this. The two sexes would leave each other as soon as the amative propensity is satisfied, did not nature, by a peculiar instinct, prevent this. Yet it is to be observed that the instinct of attachment for life, and that of society, are not mere degrees of energy of the faculty of attachment. For there are animals which live in society without being attached for life, as the bull, dog, cock, &c.; others which live in society and in families, as starlings, ravens, crows, &c.; and others again which are attached for life without living in society, as the fox, magpie, &c. The instinct, therefore, of living in society, and that of living in family, are modifications proper and peculiar in their nature, in the same way as the relish for vegetables or flesh is a modification of smell and taste in carnivorous and herbivorous animals. Man belongs to the class of animals which is social and attached for life; society and marriage are consequently not effects of human reflection, but of an original decree of the Creator.

Gall does not coincide in the opinion that attachment for life in man and animals results from this feeling. He thinks that marriage exists in animals, since both the male and female concur in taking care of their progeny. I grant that this feeling may assist the love of offspring, and may be influenced by amativeness and philoprogenitiveness, but it seems to me, that if attachment of sexes were the result of philoprogenitiveness, both sexes would only remain together as long as their love of offspring lasts, and is necessary to the preservation of their young. On the other hand, men and women may be attached to each other for life, without the least desire of offspring. It seems to me, that the special faculty now under consideration extends its sphere of activity still farther, and that it attaches us to our parents, brothers, sisters, and friends,
and to all beings around us, to plants, animals and things; in short, to all we possess, whether animate or inanimate. It produces also the feeling of habit or custom. Friendship consequently is only one of the modifications of the faculty. If attachment for life belong to some portion of its organ, it must be to that which is nearest the organ of philoprogenitiveness.

In conformity with the preceding considerations, the name Adhesiveness seems to me capable of denoting this special faculty, whose objects are friendship, marriage, society and attachment in general. The term adhesiveness has been used hitherto merely in a physical sense; but many other words, which now bear a mental signification, were in the like case originally. Attachment would indicate only the effect of this faculty, and I require a name which expresses the faculty of producing such an effect. Abuse results from its too great energy, in regretting over-much the loss of a friend, &c. Without attachment men become anchorites and hermits.

V. Organ of Inhabitiveness.

When we examine the habits and manners of animals, we see that different kinds are attached to particular regions and countries. Nature having intended that every region and every country should be inhabited, has assigned to all animals their dwellings, and given to every species a propensity to live in some particular local situation. If we place an animal in any region other than that destined for it, it feels ill or uneasy, and seeks to return to its natural dwelling. Some seek the water from the first moment of their existence. Turtles and ducks, as soon as they are hatched, run towards it. Other young animals again, stay upon dry land; some of these prefer elevated and mountainous regions; some the level country; and others the marshes. Among the feathered tribes, some live in the higher, others in the lower regions; for the power of flying does not produce the instinct that prompts the eagle to soar into the highest regions of air; other birds, though their power of
flying is very great, have not this propensity. Some birds build on the tops, some in the middle, and others in holes of trees; some on the earth, some in the banks of rivers, &c. Now what is the cause of this modified instinct?

It is often said that animals choose their particular dwellings according to their general organization. Birds are organized to fly, fishes to swim, and the chamois and wild-goat to climb upon mountains.

It is true, that the external and internal organization of animals is adapted to their manner of living; fishes cannot exist in the air, nor birds under water. Moreover, animals commonly find their food in the places which they inhabit. This alone, however, is not the only condition that determines their particular dwellings. Some love situations where there is no food; the chamois and wild-goat dwell upon rocks which are entirely barren, and are obliged to descend into the middle regions to find their sustenance. Again, there are kinds which like the higher regions of the air, and which yet seek their food upon the earth. Eagles and hawks hover very high, but catch their prey upon the ground. Does the lark require to ascend into the air to sing? In the philosophical part, where I treat of the innateness of the faculties, I show that it is impossible to attribute the origin of any faculty of man or animals to external circumstances.

Parrots, eagles, pigeons, and swallows live upon very different substances, and are very differently organized, yet they are all fond of flying high in the air. In conformity, then, with these considerations, we must admit the existence of a particular faculty with its special organ, which determines animals in the selection of a habitation.

Let us now say a few words on the opinion of Gall upon this subject. After having paid great attention to the organ of pride in man, he examined such animals as are generally esteemed proud, the cock, peacock, &c., but could distinguish no analogy between the cerebral organs of these animals and those of proud persons. He, however, observed in tribes which have a great propensity to
elevated stations, as in the chamois and wild-goat, a protuberance which he identified with the organ that produces pride and haughtiness in man.

It is certain, and must be conceded, that animals which live on mountains, or which are fond of high regions, have one part of their brain more developed than the species of the same genus which live in flat and low countries. This difference is very sensible in roes, hares, rats, cats, &c. Yet it appears to me that this circumstance by no means authorizes the conclusion, that the faculty which leads animals to seek elevated situations is essentially the same as that which makes man proud and haughty.

Gall thinks that the situation of the organ of pride in man corresponds with that of the organ of the instinct which prompts animals to seek physical elevation. I, on the other hand, maintain, that the place of an organ can prove nothing, when animals of different kinds are spoken of. For if different animals be endowed with dissimilar faculties, their organs may still occupy corresponding places of the head. We have, I suppose, three sorts, whose faculties are quite different. The organs of these fill, in each, the skull; of course, it is here evidently impossible to maintain that the faculties of the three are the same, because corresponding places of the head are well developed. It is true, that when an animal possesses a faculty in common with man, the organ of that faculty is situated in both in the same part of the head. Now it appears to me that the place of the protuberance which indicates the instinct of animals for physical height, does not correspond with that which in man produces self-esteem and pride. In animals it is immediately above the organ of philoprogenitiveness; but the corresponding cerebral part in man was unobserved by, and unknown to Gall. Certainly, it is not the organ of self-esteem; this lies much higher. Hence, a comparison of the situations of the organs of both faculties is rather against than in favor of Gall's assertion.

He also supports his opinion by saying, that different faculties which are merely physical in animals, become moral in man, and
quotes physical love as an example. Now I think that all physical faculties common to man and animals preserve their nature in man, and that the faculty of physical love is in itself always the same. It is obvious, however, that this propensity may be accompanied by other sentiments, especially by attachment. The bull is sometimes particularly attached to one amongst a herd of cows; and I have seen Canary birds which would not mate with certain individuals. Though separated, they still remained attached to their former partners. Moreover, if the organ of amative-ness be singly active in man, it is always without morality; in some hydrocephalic persons and idiots from birth, physical love resembles that of animals entirely. Hence, whatever is moral in amativeness depends on other faculties which accompany it; it is also observed that man and animals modify the manifestations of the propensity, in proportion as they are endowed with other dispositions. If a man or an animal be prone to attachment and physical love at the same time, these faculties will act conjointly; physical love will be modified by attachment, and attachment by physical love.

Platonic love, it is replied, ordinarily finishes in physical love. I agree with this; but can we therefore conclude that platonic is the same as physical love? I am not hungry because I have taste or smell; but if the sense of smell be stimulated by any savory odor, and that of taste and the feeling of hunger be thereby excited, and notwithstanding my first intention not to eat I eat, will it be maintained that smell and the desire to eat are the same? If we examine platonic or moral love, we find that all the sentiments which are felt at the same time with the propensity to physical love, may be attributed to other special faculties and their respective organs. In the same manner it seems to me impossible to confound the instinct of physical height with the sentiment of self-love and pride: I believe it possible to have a great opinion of one's self in all regions, and in all countries.

Gall adds that mountaineers are proud, and particularly attached to their independence and moral liberty. Being attached to
mountains does not exclude self-esteem and firmness, which lead to independency. Moreover, I do not think that the inhabitants of Switzerland have more natural pride than the Hungarians. The former, however, struggled for independence, while the latter could not endure the civil liberties which the Emperor Joseph the Second allowed them. The Spaniards are notoriously proud, but show little inclination to be free.

Gall quotes several examples of proud persons being particularly fond of climbing upon mountains, and to great elevations. My experience has shown me both proud and humble persons, who felt a peculiar pleasure in going upon towers and other elevated places; but they did so to see the scenery of the surrounding country. This inclination then belongs to the organ of locality, as I shall afterwards explain.

Finally, Gall particularly insists on those natural expressions, or actions, by which the sentiment of pride is manifested. Proud children, says he, mount upon chairs, in order to be on a level with grown-up persons; and adults, of small stature, often do the same to gratify their self-love; proud persons keep their body erect, and have a haughty gait. In general, all expressions of pride and superiority are combined with physical elevation: thus, kings and emperors sit upon elevated thrones; they receive their power from above, &c. &c.

All external manifestations of proud persons may be explained upon the pathognomical principle of the motions of the body in general, and the motions of the head in particular, being in the direction of the organ which is active. Now the organ of pride is situated upwards and backwards, and all the motions of pride are in these directions.

Thus, I separate the instinct which carries animals to physical elevation, from the sentiment which produces self-love and pride; and I consider the first as a modification of the feeling which determines the dwelling-places of animals.

The cerebral part above the organ of philoprogenitiveness in man, is more or less developed, independently of the neighboring
ORGAN OF INHABITIVENESS.

parts, and must be considered as endowed with some peculiar function. On the other hand, the instinct of animals to choose a peculiar dwelling-place is special, in no proportion to any other instinct, hence, it must be attached to a particular organ. This being modified, its modified functions are explained in the same way as those of the senses of taste and smell in herbivorous and carnivorous animals; the organ, however, cannot be pointed out by comparing animals which live in different elements; our observations must be confined to such as inhabit the same element or the same country, and chiefly to individuals remarkable for a higher degree of the peculiar dispositions. This propensity being common to many animals, its organ must be deeply seated in the brain, and must be looked for in the region of the other propensities. I consider in animals the cerebral part immediately above the organ of philoprogenitiveness, as the organ of the instinct that prompts them to select a peculiar dwelling, and call it the organ of inhabitiveness. It is known that cats are more attached to places, and dogs to persons. The former remain in the house which is sold, while the latter follows his master. My attention has been, and is still directed to such individuals of the human kind, as show a particular disposition in regard to their dwelling-place. I have many facts in confirmation. I saw a clergyman in Manchester, known to his friends as particularly attached to his dwelling-place, so that he should be unhappy if obliged to sleep elsewhere. I examined his head in company of several gentlemen, some of whom were opponents, but every one was obliged to admit that the spot of the head where No. V. is situated, was warmer than the rest of the head. I merely asked what part was the warmest, and all agreed at the same place. Some nations are extremely attached to their country, while others are readily induced to migrate. Some tribes of the American Indians and Tartars, wander about without fixed habitations, while other savages have a settled home. Mountainers are commonly much attached to their native soil, and those of them who visit capitals or foreign countries, seem chiefly led by the hope of gaining money enough to return home and buy a little
property, even though the land should be dearer there than elsewhere. I therefore invite the phrenologists who have an opportunity of visiting various nations particularly fond of their country, to examine the development of the organ marked No. V., and situated immediately above philoprogenitiveness.

Some persons think that inhabitiveness may give the delight to see foreign countries, and to travel, but it is quite the reverse; the former delight depends on locality. Those who have inhabitiveness large and locality small, do not like to leave home; those who have both organs large, like to travel, but to return home, and to settle at last.

In all civilized nations, some individuals have a great predilection for residing in the country. If professional pursuits oblige them to live in town, their endeavor is to collect a fortune as speedily as possible, that they may indulge their leading propensity. I have examined the heads of several individuals of this description, and found the parts in question much developed.

A friend of mine, M. de Tremmon, of Paris, suggested the idea to look for an organ of which agriculture is a result, since there are organs which dispose man to hunt, to build, to collect food, and to cultivate arts and sciences. This remark is undoubtedly philosophical, since nature attaches pleasure to every occupation on which the preservation of the species depends. Now, agriculture contributes greatly to the general welfare, and it is not probable that nature was negligent in this point. Hence, I have also examined the organ marked No. V., in relation to this peculiar disposition, and have found it large in several who are fond of living in the country, and of agricultural pursuits. I mention these ideas only to excite investigation, not by any means as being certain and established. Once confirmed, inhabitiveness will be considered as presenting modifications in the same way as every other special power does.

Mr. Combe, and several members of the Phrenological Society of Edinburgh, think that the function of the cerebral part we are discussing, 'is to maintain two or more powers in simultaneous
and combined activity, so that they may be directed towards one object,’ and name it the organ of concentrativeness.

‘The first step,’ says Mr. Combe,* ‘in the discovery of this function, was the observation that certain individuals are naturally prone to sedentary habits, and find it painful to stir abroad without a special motive, and this too of considerable urgency. Other persons experience equal difficulty in settling; their strongest desire is to engage in some active employment, in which their attention shall be carried as it were out of themselves, and occupied in external objects and occurrences. The former were perceived to possess this organ large, the latter small.’

‘The next step was the observation that some persons possess a natural tendency to live, as it were, within themselves, whose minds seem habitually occupied with internal meditation, and of supporting a close and vigorous attention; who, in short, have a natural facility of concentrating their thoughts, without the tendency to be distracted by the intrusion of feelings or ideas foreign to the main point under consideration. Such persons possess a command over their intellectual powers, so as to be able to apply them in their whole vigor to the pursuit which forms the object of their study for the time; and hence they produce the greatest possible results from the intellectual endowment which nature has bestowed on them. Other individuals, on the other hand, have been observed, who find their thoughts lost in dissipation, who are unable to keep the leading idea in its situation of becoming prominence, are distracted by accessaries, and, in short, experience great difficulty in combining their whole powers to a single object. These persons, even with considerable reflecting talents, fail to produce a corresponding general effect, and their mental productions are characterized by the intrusion of irrelevant ideas, and the unperceived omission of important particulars, arising from the disjointed action of their several faculties. The organ was perceived to be large in the former, and small in the latter.

‘Probably it is by the exercise of a power resembling concentrativeness.

trativeness, that animals, such as the chamois, who are fond of heights, are enabled to maintain in action all those faculties which are necessary to preserve their position, while they browse in difficult or dangerous situations; and, at the same time, avoid the aim of the hunter. There appears, therefore, nothing in the limited observations of Dr. Spurzheim inconsistent with the more extensive views now taken of the functions of the faculty.'

As the analysis of the fundamental powers of the mind is an essential object of Phrenology; and as every suggestion which comes from Mr. Combe deserves my full attention, since he is undoubtedly one of the most able and successful defenders of Phrenology, I shall examine all his arguments which make him admit an organ of concentrativeness. His actual ideas on this faculty seem to be modified from his former conception. I examine them as they are stated in the third and last edition of his System of Phrenology. But if I do not agree with him on this subject, it is not from want of esteem for his opinions, but merely, because I am not convinced of their correctness. Further investigation and observation must decide who of us is in the right and who in the wrong.

'Some persons,' says Mr. Combe, l. i. p. 135, 'possess a natural consciousness of every thing that goes on in their own minds, in which power others seem remarkably deficient. The former can detain their feelings and ideas, and deliberately examine their character and consistency; the latter cannot do this; their minds are like the surface of a mirror, on which each feeling and thought appears like the shadow of a moving object, making a momentary impression and passing away. They experience great difficulty in detaining their emotions and ideas, so as to examine and compare them; and in consequence are little capable of taking systematic views of any subject, and of concentrating their powers to bear on one point. I have observed this organ to be large in the former, and small in the latter.

'It is difficult to describe in words the manner of a man's mind; but the difference in manifestation is so great between those in whom this organ is small and those in whom it is large, that if
once comprehended, it will always be recognised. In conversing with some individuals, we find them fall naturally into a connected train of thinking, till they have placed it clearly before the mind, or passing naturally and gracefully to a connected topic. Such persons uniformly have this organ large; we meet with others who, in similar circumstances, never pursue one idea for two consecutive seconds; who shift from topic to topic without regard to natural connexion, and leave no distinct impression on the mind of the listener, and this happens even with individuals in whom reflection is not deficient; but this organ is in such persons uniformly small. Mr. Combe quotes largely from a letter on this subject in the Phrenological Journal, vol. iii. p. 193. I copy the following passage: 'In Mr. Combe's work lately published, second edition, 1825, the primitive feeling which gives rise to the phenomena of concentrativeness, is said to be, the tendency to concentrate the mind within itself, and to direct its power in a combined effort to one object. This however may be considered rather as a description of the operation of the power, than a statement of the primary element to which its phenomena may be traced. If we attend to what passes in our minds, when we endeavor to concentrate our thoughts upon a subject, we shall find that we do not attempt any direct coercion on our different faculties, but simply endeavor to seize upon the object of thought and keep it steadily before the mind. We are all occasionally conscious of ineffectual efforts of attention; if we examine what we do on such occasions, we shall find that it consists in an attempt to think of some subject, which is for the moment less attractive than some other objects, which are the causes of distraction. An affective concentration of the faculties take place only when the original leading conceptions are of themselves powerful and permanent, and the concentration will be found, consequently, to be most perfect when there is least effort to produce it. We are sensible of this on occasions which may be either painful or pleasant, when a subject associated with strong emotion has taken possession of the mind, and when we find ourselves incapable of banishing from our thoughts, even
though very desirous of doing so, the train of conceptions which has so strongly concentrated our powers upon itself, and continues to keep them in a state of sustained and perhaps distressing activity. We speak of our minds having the command of our ideas. This may be correct enough in popular language, but philosophically speaking our ideas command our mind, and even in those cases which appear most like exceptions to this principle, it will be found on examination that it is merely one class of ideas assuming the predominance over another. When we voluntarily change our train of thoughts, or endeavor to concentrate our minds upon one subject, the process is one in which, under an impression of necessity or expediency of attending to the particular subject, we pass from the train of irrelevant ideas, and endeavor to reach by the aid of our associations the subject which we wish to study; almost every individual is capable of this single effort, and he may repeat it again. But that uninterrupted sustaining of the attention so given, which constitutes concentrativeness, depends on a quality distinct from efforts of attention; a quality most strongly marked where least effort is necessary, and that is simply the property which this mental power possesses of giving continuance to thoughts and feelings when they have sprung up in the mind. This property appears to exist in different degrees in different minds, to which of course, the diversity in the manifestations, with which we are so often presented, is to be mainly attributed.

'Its deficiency,' states the latter in another passage, 'in the more ordinary degrees, discovers itself in different ways according to its combination with other faculties. In some individuals it produces an indisposition to settle into any regular plan of life, or if this has been controlled by circumstances and other faculties, there may still be seen a want of method, forethought and continuity, in the various concerns of intercourse or business. The individual does not appear like one driving constantly towards a particular object; his mind takes its direction from shifting circumstances, and if other faculties conspire, he may be characterized by a sort of careless facility or vivacity of disposition. Mr.
Combe, 3d edition, p. 196, adds; 'When comparison and causal­ity are large in combination with large concentrativeness, there is a tendency to systematic knowledge; when the latter is deficient this is not felt, and I regard one element in a systematic mind to be the power of giving continuousness to feelings and ideas, there­by enabling the intellect to contemplate the relations subsisting among them. Where he treats of the modes of the intellectual faculties, art. Attention, p. 531, he says: 'Concentrativeness gives continuity to the impressions of the faculties. Individuality and Eventuality direct them to their objects, and firmness maintains them in a state of application, and their faculties greatly aid atten­tion.'

The organ No. V. is small in my head, and when I objected against the former definition of concentrativeness: 'the tendency to maintain two or more powers in simultaneous, and combined ac­tivity so that they may be directed towards one object,' consider­ing such an operation of the mind rather as intellectual than affective, I was told that I could not easily conceive this primitive power, since the organ is small in my brain. I confess that this answer never satisfied my mind. I allow that several feelings and their respective organs are small in my head; but this did not prevent me to conceive their existence in others, being guided by reason­ing and by facts. It is a fundamental principle of my philosophy, that no individual can be taken as a standard of mankind, and I can assure that I have this principle present in all my philosophical disquisitions. I always make abstraction of myself. I admit a faculty as fundamental, if I can concentrate all the reasons, which prove the plurality of organs, as stated above, and its special organ, if it be confirmed by all the means which we employ to establish the organs.

It seems to me that intellect forms what is called conception, and I can assure that I conceive the definition which Mr. Combe actually (3d edition) gives of concentrativeness, viz. a primitive faculty, which gives continuity to the impressions of other faculties, to feelings and ideas. The former definition seemed to me in-
cluding intellect, and I could not conceive how a directing faculty should be situated among the former propensities. But from the new definition I conceive that such a faculty, if it exist, is not intellectual but affective, since it does not imply knowledge, conception and direction; but then if it be confirmed as a special power, another name must be given adapted to its essential nature and actual definition, viz. Continuity of impressions, be they feelings or ideas.

I shall first examine whether such a primitive faculty is necessary to explain the mental phenomena. 2d: If it be admitted, whether it is the same as inhabitiveness; and whether there are sufficient observations to decide about its organ.

Nature never multiplies the means of producing effects without necessity. Now I acknowledge that certain persons have more concentration of mind than others. I even find that certain persons are concentrated in their feelings, are susceptible of concentrated grief, attachment, or any other feeling, whilst they have no concentration of intellect, though their intellectual powers are not wanting; on the other hand, some persons are concentrated in intellect, and have very little continuity of their feelings. If concentrativeness be a primitive power, it should be applicable to feelings as well as intellect in the same person. Farther, the continuity of impressions seems to me to depend, first on the more or less development of the special organs. Every predominant organ becomes, so to say, the centre of all others, or concentrates the activity of all others around its own. He who has cautiousness extremely large, and hope small, feels anxiety combined with every other power. He who has acquisitiveness, or love of approbation, predominant, employs all his intellect and feelings to gratify acquisitiveness or love of approbation; very large marvellousness lies in every event of providence; very large ideality looks every where for perfection; a mother with predominant philoprogenitiveness may be concentrated in the love of her children; destructiveness concentrates in carnivorous animals their external and internal senses in order to catch their prey. 2d. If individual organs, when
single but predominant, concentrate all mental activity, it may be
still more easily done, when several large organs are combined to­
gether. Predominant benevolence, reverence, prudence, marvel­
ousness, and conscientiousness combined together, will find con­
centrated enjoyment in the contemplation of Christian principles,
whilst predominant destructiveness, secretiveness, combativeness
and firmness, concentrate all powers to do mischief. Those who
have certain feelings very strong, and individuality and eventuality
very small, will be absorbed by their active feelings in the midst
of large companies. Eventuality which knows the activity of the
other powers, and all knowledge expressed by verbs, is essential
to intellectual concentration. Those who have individuality, event­
uality, comparison and language in an eminent degree, will always
attract the attention of their hearers and readers, and their intellect­
ual continuity and concentration will increase, by causality, mirth­
fulness, courage, cautiousness, love of approbation, self-esteem
and firmness. There will be no systematic mind without large
comparison, whatever the developement of No. V. may be.

Since the combination of powers gives continuity to their activ­
ity, their association seems to be of greater influence than a single
primitive feeling. I admit association to exist as well as concen­
tration, but I deny them to be fundamental powers, and consider
them as effects or modes of action in the same way as attention,
pleasure, and desire. 3d. The continuity of impressions, of feelings,
and ideas, will also depend on the temperament, or bodily consti­
utition of the organs. Certain constitutions receive the impressions
quickly, but lose them soon again, others receive them slowly and
keep them long, others again are quick in perceptions and tenacious
in keeping them. This is particularly striking in reference to under­
standing and memory. But it is the same with the feelings. But
there is no necessity of a peculiar organ for the phenomenon. Mr.
Combe compares his concentrativeness with firmness, the former
giving continuity of impressions, and the latter maintaining them in
their application. Maintaining, however, a power in its application
seems to me rather special than giving continuity to its activity,
since the former operation is not replaced by another power; for instance, if I feel reverence, and individuality directs this feeling to the Supreme Being, a peculiar feeling, firmness, maintains it in this application, and reverence and firmness may continue to act, that is revere God without the aid of any other faculty. Acquisitiveness collects property, conscientiousness requires that it is done with justice, and firmness maintains the possession of just property. Maintenance depends on a special feeling, acquisitiveness itself may continue to collect, but it is not the power that keeps and maintains.

The anatomical connexion, too, of the organ of firmness with the other organs is of a peculiar appearance, and different from that of No. V. with the other cerebral organs. The organ of firmness is situated in the midst of the feelings, so to say, to give them perseverance in this application. It is for this reason that firmness is so often and so easily confounded with will.

Thus, in the first place, I do not think it necessary nor probable that there is a special feeling, which gives continuity to the impressions of the other faculties. In the next place, if there be such a particular feeling, it cannot be the same as that of inhabitiveness. With all possible deference to Mr. Combe's acuteness of mind, and to his greater development of No. V. I take the liberty of stating, that I cannot agree with him when he says, p. 146, that 'at the same time there appears to be nothing in the notions of Dr. Spurzheim, concerning inhabitiveness, inconsistent with the more extensive views now taken of the functions of this faculty.'

I apprehend that Mr. Combe commits a similar error as Gall, who confounded inhabitiveness with self-esteem, and considered them as functions of the same organ. In my opinion if there be an organ of concentrativeness it must be different from that of inhabitiveness. Persons may be concentrated or not, in the same way as proud or humble, in all situations, by water and by land, in low and in mountainous countries.

'I conceive,' says Mr. Combe, p. 149, 'that concentration of mind is favorable to inhabitiveness, and that men and animals whose faculties are more concentrated, have the greatest inclination to re-
main in one place. I also conceive that persons with concentrated powers may remain in one place, if it be necessary to do so in order to gratify the continued activity of their powers, whilst the local situation has not the least influence on their mental determination, nay, whilst they may feel an aversion to the place itself, but the stronger feelings prevail and keep them where they are. Concentration and inhabitiveness then are neither the same, nor proportionate to each other.

Mr. Combe adds: 'animals which browse on rocks, and which place their nests in high and difficult situations, or by the banks of rapid rivers, would require for their well-being and comfort just such a faculty as this, which should enable them to maintain their position with ease, and at the same time to provide for their food and safety.'

Food and safety are necessary to the preservation of animals, and the Creator has not abandoned them to chance, but I do not find that animals have a determinate instinct of inhabitiveness in proportion as they are exposed to danger. The hare and mouse in the fields, in order to escape their enemy, stand in need of concentrativeness, as well as the eagle that hovers in the air and pounces upon his prey. Cautiousness and secretiveness are surer safeguards than the continuity of other impressions. In my opinion, then, if there be an organ of concentrativeness, it is sui generis and different from that of inhabitiveness.

Moreover Mr. Combe speaks, p. 147, of the disease of concentrativeness. 'This organ appears to suffer in those lunatics whose attention is immovably fixed on some internal impression, and who remain absorbed in silent and profound meditation, insensible alike to the threats or caresses of those around them, and to the effects of external objects. Mr. Combe is right in adding that 'this state now attributed to diseased concentrativeness must be distinguished from dementia approaching to idiocy, in which a fixed look and silent calmness appear not from internal meditation, but from utter insensibility to stimuli. In disease of concentrativeness the patient possesses intense consciousness, and when cured is able to give an account of all that passed in his mind during the malady; in de-
mentia the period of the disease forms a blank in existence, the individual recollecting nothing.'

This argumentation is not clear to me. How can concentrativeness be diseased, since internal impressions continue whilst external impressions are without effect! I have been attentive to patients of that description, and observed in them the organs of individuality and eventuality, particularly the latter, very small.' Their inactivity is sufficient to explain the inadvertency of such lunatics to external impressions. Whenever these two organs are small, there will be little attention paid to external objects and events, however active the feelings may be.

From the preceding remarks it follows, that I do not think it necessary to look for an organ of concentrativeness, but phrenology, being founded on facts, and Mr. Combe appealing to facts, it was and still is my duty to repeat his observations. This I have done and continue to do in order to see whether a cerebral part in the neighborhood of inhabitiveness coincides with the continuousness of the various mental phenomena. It is necessary to proceed according to our general method of pointing out the organs: viz., in making observations on individuals in the positive and negative manner; on both sexes; on nations, &c.

Mr. Combe began with comparing a large development in the region of No. V. with a peculiar tendency of mind. 'The first idea,' says he, p. 136, 'that led me to the conclusion, that it is the tendency to concentrate the mind within itself, and to direct its powers in a combined effort to one object, was suggested by a lady, who had remarked this quality in individuals in whom the organ was large. The Rev. David Welsh, and Dr. Hoppe of Copenhagen having been informed of these views unknown to each other, communicated to me the inference that the faculty gives a tendency to dwell in a place, or on feelings and ideas, for a length of time, till all or the majority of the other faculties are satisfied in regard to them.'

From what I have said above it follows, that Mr. Combe now defines concentrativeness, the power of giving continuity to the
other faculties. As far as such differences of mental phenomena exist, we agree perfectly, we only differ in this explanation. He brings in a special power, which I consider as superfluous, I do not doubt that he has observed the region of No. V. large in individuals who dwelt on their ideas or feelings, I only say that the facts which have come under my observation, do not allow me for the present to adopt his conclusion. I know individuals of great mental concentration, either in feelings or in intellect, or in both, where the region of No. V. is large or small. I know individuals who do not like to change their occupation, who are quite absorbed with an object for a time, but whose heads are very depressed at No. V. Mr. Deville in London, who has collected many facts to this very purpose, also found that great concentration of mind, does not always coincide with large No. V.

I know individuals greatly disposed to sedentary life and to mental contemplation, who have the part of the head above philoprogenitiveness very small. I know two gentlemen, both constantly occupied with external objects and occurrences, one possesses that portion of the head small, and the other has it large, &c.

From individuals we extend our observations over sexes. In the former edition I said, 'This organ is also commonly larger in women than in men, and I leave every one to decide upon the sex which supports the more close and vigorous attention.' Mr. Combe replies, 'in Scotland, and I may almost say in England, although my observations there have been less extensive, this is not the case; the development being larger in men than in women.'

There are two ideas to be examined, 1st. Whether women in general have No. V. larger or smaller than men. 2nd. Whether they have more concentrativeness. 3d. It seems to me certain, that the posterior lobes are more elongated backwards in women, in general, than in men. Any callipers may give this conviction. No. V. is commonly less in women than philoprogenitiveness, adhesiveness, and love of approbation. And this is probably the cause, that Mr. Combe considers No. V. larger in men than in women, viz. in relation to the three other neighboring organs,
which are much smaller in men, and make in them No. V. appear larger, but the distance from the meatus, and auditorius externus to No. V. in itself, is the longest in women in general. Now in considering No. V. as the organ of the power, which gives continuity to the impressions of the other faculties, its greater development should be expected in women, if the feelings, particularly the religious sentiments, love of approbation, adhesiveness and philoprogenitiveness, are concerned. It is almost an axiom that women are guided by feelings, whilst men are superior in intellectual concentration. Hence there is great concentrative ness in the feelings of women, and there is none in other respects. How can this be combined with Mr. Combe's statement that women have the organ smaller than men?

The preceding facts seem to confirm my opinion, about inhabitiveness. It is conceivable that women, who by nature are intrusted with maternal care, and domestic concerns, are particularly endowed with inhabitiveness. They remain at home, whilst their husbands go out for food, in hunting, fishing, or laboring in the fields. Yet inhabitiveness is still less than the neighboring organs mentioned above, which require greater activity.

In order to point out organs we have also recourse to national heads. The region of No. V. is more developed in Malays, New Zealanders, Esquimaux, Negroes and all Celtic tribes, than in the Teutonic and Tartar races, and the difference of the posterior lobes in men and women, of the two latter sorts of races, is greater than in both sexes of the former tribes. In the French, of Celtic extraction, No. V. is larger than in the Teutonic Germans. Mr. Combe explains thereby, why the French, though their intellectual reach is limited, attain the greatest perfection within the sphere which their faculties are calculated to reach, and why they write the best elementary works on science of any people of Europe, since they bring their powers to bear in a regulated manner on the point under consideration, and presented clearly and definitely, to the understanding. The Germans, on the other hand, though they have more powerful reflecting faculties than the French,
and also greater perseverance, appear inferior to them in concentrativeness. They introduce more frequently extraneous ideas and feelings, and do not arrive at so neat and complete a whole in their compositions.

This mental difference is perceptible in the study of natural sciences, and indicated by the spirit of the languages of both nations. It is true the French language is positive, easy and clear, whenever a sentence finishes, whilst the German speaks out various ideas, and links them together at the end of the sentence. It seems to me that the German language requires more concentrated attention than the French, which rather invites to take isolated views of a thing. Mr. Combe ascribes the spirit of systematizing to concentrativeness; now this spirit is really too strong in the Germans, yet their No. V. is smaller than the same region in the head of the Celtic French. The French bon ton of conversation is to shift from topic to topic, and not to fatigue too much the attention of others. They are particularly fond of natural history, anecdotes and details. They leave nothing to the auditor or reader to guess. But on what mental operations does this clearness of elocution and style depend? In my opinion whenever individuality and eventuality come into play. In that line alone they write the best elementary works. Their philosophical language, on the other hand, which expresses the intuitive operations of the mind, and the moral nature of man, betrays very little concentrativeness, whether I take this term in its old or new signification. There remains still an excellent means of pointing out the organs to be considered. It is one principle of the natural language, and according to which the head is moved in a direction, which corresponds with the situation of an organ in action. 'Preachers and advocates,' says Mr. Combe, p. 148, 'in whom No. V. is large, while speaking with animation, move the head, in the line of concentrativeness and individuality, or straight backwards and forwards. When combativeness predominates over concentrativeness, in a pleader, he draws his head backwards and to the side in the line of combativeness, and advances it in a corresponding direction.'
I beg to remark, that drawing the head forwards, alone proves that there is some activity going on in the forehead. Combativeness alone keeps the head backwards and sideways, and every single organ in the occipital region, draws and maintains the head backwards, as long as the organ is active. Mr. Combe will not contest that those who prepare themselves to make a powerful and combined reply, want the assistance of their intellect, or presence of mind, or individuality, eventuality, comparison, causality, and language; an individual in that state will carry his head and his look forward, he may even put a single finger, commonly the index, between the eyebrows, but at the same time his various feelings may be excited, particularly love of approbation, self-esteem, firmness or combativeness. I was particularly attentive to the natural language of the improvisatory Sgricci in private society, and whilst publicly engaged in composing a five act tragedy. It evidently indicated great activity in the forehead. The common sense will never be found in the region of No. V.

Finally, there is a longitudinal convolution of the brain, lying above the corpus callosum, which Mr. Combe brings in as confirming his opinion about concentrativeness, since it extends from the bottom of No. V. to the organs of the intellectual faculties. But this convolution does not begin at the bottom of No. V., but runs all along the middle lobe at its internal border, and communicates with philoprogenitiveness, combativeness, destructiveness, and alimentiveness; and extends in the musical line, above the corpus callosum, in connexion not only with No. V. but also with love of approbation, self-esteem, firmness, reverence, and benevolence. It continues into the organs of the intellectual faculties, particularly into those of language, individuality, and eventuality. This apparatus or structure, seems to be destined to establish a communication between the feelings and intellectual faculties, particularly to produce mental cognizance of the feelings (eventuality,) to conceive each as a unity, or fundamental power, (individuality) and to design their activity by artificial signs (language.)

In concluding, I cannot help thinking that Mr. Combe lays too
much stress on No. V. This organ is in the region of the animal propensities, and smaller than any other of the animal propensities. Its sphere of activity in giving an instinct for a local habitation, appears to me extensive enough. Yet as Mr. Combe and myself have only truth in view, the function of No. V. stands open to farther observation. If it give continuity to the impressions of the other faculties, feelings as well as ideas, it must be confirmed by multiplied observations, but then the name concentrativeness must be changed.

VI. Organ of Combativeness.

The disposition to quarrel and fight is unfortunately but too apparent in the world. Gall, to discover the cause, called together boys from the streets, coach-drivers, servants, &c. and made them fight. There were some who were quarrelsome and fond of fighting, and others who were peaceable and timid. In those who came willingly to blows, that part of the head which corresponds to the posterior inferior angle of the parietal bone above the mastoid process, was prominent; (Pl. V. fig. 1. V.) in those who declined the combat the same place was flat or depressed. (Pl. IV. fig. 2. V.) Similar configurations were found in the heads of brave and valiant officers, of quarrelsome students, of duellists, of those whose greatest pleasure consisted in fighting and making themselves feared; and of the inoffensive and peacefully disposed. This organ is generally more developed in men and males than in women and females, though there are several examples on record of women, even delicate ladies, who followed the war. Moreover, the propensity to fight is stronger in some nations than in others, and is sometimes very active in lunatics. Hence it must be considered as fundamental.

Gall at first named ‘organ of courage’ the part in the situation indicated. Considering, however, that it is possible for a man to be courageous in various ways, to have courage to do any thing of which he thinks himself capable, to play on an instrument or sing
before company, though he may have no propensity to fight, he changed this name for that of quarrelsomeness, and then for that of self-defence, which last he retains. These modified applications are easily explained by the combination of the propensity in point with other feelings. I, however, do not think that this propensity is given merely for self-defence, many other propensities requiring its assistance in the natural order of things.

The propensity to fight is active in different degrees, not only in man, but also among the various species of animals; some never fight, others are fond of fighting. Even individuals of the same kind differ in their manifestations of this disposition. One dog incessantly looks for an opportunity to give battle, and never shrinks from an opponent; another passes peaceably along and flies on the approach of an adversary.

The heads of courageous animals, between and behind the ears, are wide, (Pl. VII. fig. 1. and 3. V.) those of timid and shy ones, on the contrary, are narrow at the same spot. (Pl. VII. fig. 2. and 4. V.) The different organization of game and dunghill fowls is very marked in the situation indicated. Horse jockies, and those who are fond of fighting cocks, have long been familiar with the fact.

An animal may evince an unwillingness to approach a place or object, which he associates with some former suffering. Imperfect vision is another cause of shyness. A horse whose sight is defective, is apt to mistake one object for another, and may not be able to make the distinction until he has approached very close to the object, or he has put his nose to it; either the object really is or he fancies it is strange to him, he is afraid of it, and consequently shuns it; many horses too grow shy as they grow old. Moreover, violence and punishment are not the most suitable means to impel an animal to do that which he is unwilling to do, whilst lenient usage and coaxing is more likely to succeed. Yet there is an innate feeling of courage, which must not be overlooked.

It is said that the propensity to fight results from bodily strength. There are, however, several species which though weak are fond of
fighting, while others, though large and strong, avoid it. We may find striking examples of this among dogs. The fighting cock is also smaller than the dunghill bird, and hares are stronger than rabbits, yet less courageous. Some men, and even women, though very weak and delicate, are nevertheless intrepid and courageous, while tall and robust individuals are oftentimes cowardly and complying.

Physical courage and the capacity to meet and to repel attack is necessary to animals as soon as they are attached to females, to progeny, to dwellings or to friends; for, according to the arrangement of nature, it is necessary to fight in order to defend. Such a propensity must therefore exist for purposes of defence; but it seems to me that it is, like all others, of general application, and not limited to self-defence; I, therefore, call the cerebral part in which it inheres, the organ of the propensity to fight, or of combativeness. Sometimes it acts with greater energy than is proper, is delighted with combats, and then produces disputes, quarrelsomeness and attack, which are abuses. It is useful to all great characters, to religious and civil reformers. Luther and Knox, I am sure, possessed it in a great degree.

The ancient artists seem to have known the configuration indicative of a high degree of this propensity; for they have given it to the heads of their gladiators and wrestlers.

It may be asked, if the absence or inactivity of this organ produces fear? Gall thinks it does, but it appears to me that the absence of no organ can originate a positive sentiment such as fear. It is certainly conceivable that the absence of an organ may produce modifications in the manner of thinking and feeling; that the absence of this, for instance, may render a character peacefully disposed, but I think that a positive action can alone produce fear. It seems to me that Gall generally erred when he spoke of negative qualities. If fear did result from the absence of courage, how should it be possible to be at the same time courageous and fearful. Yet this happens among animals and mankind. In my opinion the sensations of fear and anxiety, are ascribable to the organ of cautiousness.
VII. *Organ of the Propensity to Conceal, (Secretiveness.*)*

Cunning is so active amongst mankind, that Gall soon conceived the idea of looking for its organ in the brain, and observation very soon led him to its seat. He complained, however, of not being able to determine the sphere of its activity. He ascribes to the same organ, cunning, prudence, the savoir faire, the capacity of finding means necessary to insure secrecy, hypocrisy, lying, intrigue, dissimulation, duplicity and falsehood. In poets, the talent of inventing, or conceiving interesting plots, for romances and dramatic pieces; and finally, he attributes to it slyness in animals. In all individuals remarkable for such actions, a considerable or large development of the organ, situated in the middle of the line of the head, above the organ of destructiveness, is to be observed. *(Pl. VI. fig. 1. and 2. VII.)*

What then is the fundamental power of this organ; Gall first observed it in cunning persons, particularly in one who was deeply involved in debt, but who had the address to conceal his real situation from all his creditors, and cheated all his acquaintances, and even his mother, of considerable sums of money. He died of phthisis, and Gall got his head, which is very large in the midst of the lateral regions. Cunning being an obvious ingredient, in many appearances of social life, Gall considered it as fundamental, and continued to do so. I grant that this power too often acts as cunning, but I do not think that this name indicates the special propensity itself. This was to be determined without considering the objects upon which, and the manner in which, it acts; and in considering the proceeding of sly animals and cunning men, and all the functions depending on this power, I conceived it to be the propensity to conceal, to be secret in thoughts, words, things or projects.

This instinctive tendency seems to be active throughout the animal kingdom, and concealment is necessary in many cases where strength is wanting, either in behalf of defence or attack. Sly animals, if pursued, hide themselves dexterously. The fox,
ORGAN OF SECRETIVENESS.

in approaching the poultry, is careful not to be observed; a cat watching a mouse moves no limb; a dog secretes his bone; children play hide and seek; prudent or cunning persons conceal their intentions, and sometimes profess opinions opposite to those they really entertain. Some are particularly delighted in knowing secrets, or in making a secret of things publicly known.

The uses and abuses of this faculty are various, but concealment is the essence of all its manifestations. Every stratagem in war, and every kind of deception, results from it.

There is no great politician, and no great commander, without large secretiveness. Those in whom it is deficient, are not attentive enough to circumstances, time and place, they commonly are deficient in tact, and follow their instantaneous emotions.

Secrecy, hitherto, was a large play-ground for civil and religious governments, but it is a pleasant feeling for philanthropists to think, that the liberty of parliamentary transactions, and of the press, detects the tortuous ways and selfish views of deceitful governors, and that honesty will become the best policy in state concerns and court affairs, as it is in social intercourse.

Persons in whom secretiveness predominates, judging others by themselves, never see the conduct of others in a plain and simple point of view, but conceive that every one endeavors to deceive his neighbor. They try to attain all their purposes by indirect means. Some of them are delighted in the most trifling mysteries, in concealing all their transactions. No one shall know when they go out or when they go in. Many insane are cunning in concealing their state of mind. One in Bedlam, at London, constantly tries to conceal himself in his bed or in any corner of a room he is in.

'How polite,' says Mr. Combe, (System of Phren. p. 146,) 'acquiescent and deferential are some persons in their manners to all who are present, and how severe in their vituperations when the same individuals are gone. This conduct results from secretiveness addressing itself to the love of approbation in others, and endeavoring to please them by the profession of feigned respect.' I add,
that in such conduct the inactivity of conscientiousness is not to be overlooked.

Mr. William Scott, of Edinburgh, thinks that secretiveness is essential to actors and all great artists, and that it confers the positive power of calling up at will the natural language of such faculties as they wish to exhibit for the time: Mr. Combe objects to this view. I am also of opinion that secretiveness is necessary to artists, only as far as they wish to express or represent manifestations of that kind. The same principle holds good with secretiveness as with self-esteem, cautiousness, benevolence, or any other feeling. The actor, painter, or sculptor, will succeed better in the expressions of those feelings he possesses. The one for instance will play Iago in an original and masterly way, without the natural disposition of secretiveness, but an actor might succeed in performing the part of a noble, candid, and benevolent character, without secretiveness. Da Viney could without secretiveness compose the Lord’s Supper, the character and expression of Judas excepted.

Good humor in playing tricks, or in detecting concealed purposes, and every kind of disguise, depend on secretiveness, but the ludicrousness of such actions, or the tendency to show humor, results from the feeling of mirthfulness.

Secretiveness is frequently combined with acquisitiveness, and acts as cunning in thieves and other criminals. It prompts them to think that they can conceal their deeds. It is large in beggars who deceive pious and charitable persons by feigned complaints.

This propensity is very active in mankind, and its organ commonly large.

VIII. Organ of the Propensity to Acquire, or of Acquisitiveness.

It is a fact that many individuals have a particular propensity to steal. History informs us that Victor Amadeus I. king of Sardinia was, upon all occasions, in the habit of pilfering objects of little value. I have the history of a well-bred individual, who, from in-
fancy, was given to thieving. He entered the military service, hoping that the severity of its discipline might prevent him from indulging his propensity. However, as he continued to steal, he narrowly escaped hanging. Still struggling against and anxious to overcome his inclination, he studied theology, and became a capuchin. But the disposition followed him into the convent, and he could not resist gratifying it by stealing such articles as candlesticks, snuffers, scissors, drinking cups and glasses; but he did not conceal his stolen goods; he said that he had taken them away, that the owners might have the trouble of carrying them home again. There was a person employed by the government of Austria, settled at Presburgh, who filled two rooms with stolen articles, of which he never dared to make any use. The wife of Gaubius, the famous physician at Leyden, felt such a strong propensity to steal, that she always endeavored to take something away from the shops in which she made purchases. Her husband ordered a servant to follow her, to prevent, or at least to compensate, her thefts. The countess M***, at Wesel, and J***, at Frankfort, manifested a similar thievish disposition. Madame de N*** had been educated with great care, her understanding and talents entitled her to a distinguished place in society, but all would not secure her against an overwhelming propensity to steal. Lavater speaks of a physician, who never left the rooms of his patients without putting something into his pocket, as keys, scissors, knives, spoons, thimbles, buckles, &c. but who sent them back again to their owners. Moritz, in his Treatise on the Human Mind, details the history of a certain thief, whose propensity to steal was so energetic, that even when dying he stretched out his hand with the intention of stealing his confessor’s snuff-box. Dr. Benard, physician to the king of Bavaria, related to us the history of an Alsatian, who was rich and not at all avaricious, but who had a great propensity to steal. He had been educated with much care, and sometimes severely punished on account of his unhappy disposition; his father made him a soldier, and as he continued to rob in the army, he was hanged. We have the history of a very learned man’s son, who excelled
his comrades at school, but who from his earliest infancy robbed his parents and all those around him. Every kind of correction was useless; the military service was tried, but though he several times suffered severe punishment, nothing could restrain his propensity to steal. The chaplain of a regiment in Prussia, a man of great intelligence and ability, could not help stealing from the officers. The commander esteemed him much, but as soon as the chaplain made his appearance, desks, presses, and cupboards were shut up, for nothing on which he could lay his hands was safe: he seemed almost to act without a motive, for he restored, with pleasure, the things he had stolen. At Copenhagen Gall and I saw an incorrigible thief in prison, who sometimes distributed what he had filched among the poor. There was another who had been shut up for the seventh time; he observed that it seemed impossible to alter his behavior; and therefore begged earnestly to be kept in prison, and provided with the means of earning a livelihood. A young Calmuck, brought to Vienna by Count Stahrenberg, Ambassador of Austria at the Court of St. Petersburg, became melancholic, and fell into a nostalgia, because his confessor, who instructed him in religion and morality, forbade him to steal. The confessor, a man of understanding, discovered the cause of his disease, and gave him permission to steal, on condition that he would give back the articles he pilfered. The young Calmuck profited by this license, and having stolen his confessor's watch during the consecration of the mass, he, leaping with joy, restored it after the service was over.

Moreover, the propensity to steal is proved by the state of disease. We know several cases in which women felt it in a high degree only during pregnancy; and certain individuals manifest it only when alienated. Hence it is obvious that this propensity must be innate.

We might multiply examples of this kind almost to infinity; they prove that the inclination to steal is not always the effect of bad education, of poverty, idleness, or of the want of religious and moral sentiments. This truth is so generally felt that every one
winks at a little theft committed by rich persons, who in other respects conduct themselves well. These thefts are said to be the consequences of mental abstraction.

Gall in assembling boys, coach-drivers and persons of the common classes, and inquiring into their characters, learned that some had a peculiar tendency to pilfer, and that others showed a horror of theft, and he was obliged to think, as to the cause, of an original difference of mental constitution. Being physician to the Deaf and Dumb Institution, he had it in his power to make observations on the primitive condition of those children who were received without any previous education. Some of them were remarkable for a decided propensity for stealing, whilst others did not show the least inclination to it. Some of them were easily reformed, but others were quite incorrigible. The severest punishments were inflicted upon one without any effect. On examining the heads of all these boys, Gall found the region anterior to the organ of secretiveness uniformly developed in relation to the propensity to steal. During our travels, we have examined the heads of a very great number of thieves; and it is unquestionable, that those who have a great propensity to steal, have a particular part of the brain greatly developed.

However, to consider stealing a natural propensity, is so contradictory to common opinion, that the idea has excited much opposition. On the other hand not every one who has this organ large is a thief, though according to Christian morality many are thieves, who according to the civil laws enjoy distinction in society. Let us, however, examine each objection. It has been said that stealing supposes the pre-existence of property, and that, as property is the result of social convention, stealing cannot be owing to any natural propensity; consequently, that it is absurd to admit an organ of theft. In this objection there are two things to be considered; and first, whether property itself be not grounded upon some natural and particular instinct? In my work on the philosophical principles, where I treat of the innateness of the faculties, I show that many actions which are considered as the effect
of society, or as factitious, result from particular innate faculties. We have already seen that society itself is the consequence of a particular propensity, with which all other faculties in their manifestations are necessarily combined. It is also easy to demonstrate, that the sentiment of property is natural and not factitious; even animals possess it: birds have their own nests, quadrupeds their burrows, and all defend their habitations against foreign aggression. Tame animals have also their stalls in the stable, and on entering every one takes its own. Nightingales, red-breasts, &c. have their districts, and drive away all others of their kind, even their young, when they are grown up. The constancy of storks and swallows to those nesting-places of which they have once taken possession is well known. Bees and many insects fight even till death in defence of their hives or nests against intruders. Every one is aware that a dog defends his bone more courageously in his master's than in a stranger's house. Sportsmen and game-keepers observe, that of some species of animals a certain number only inhabit the same district, and do not permit others of their kind to approach or take possession of their territories. Each herd of chamois drives away all others from the tract it occupies. Man does the same. Suppose two persons living together in a state of nature, as it is called; if the one gather fruit, and the other endeavor to eat it, will not the gatherer feel that the fruit is his peculiar property? Examples might be greatly multiplied in illustration; those already cited prove clearly that the propensity to appropriate or the feeling of property is natural to animals and man, and anterior to and independent of legislation. In animals this sentiment submits only to force, but man, susceptible of moral feelings and obedient to justice, determines the conditions under which objects become property. The sentiment, therefore, must have preceded and produced laws of property. Laws of themselves cannot give birth to any feeling.

Now we may inquire, whether stealing is natural; and if so, the effect of a special propensity? To answer in the affirmative is both irrational and dangerous: irrational because the Creator
could not bestow any faculty absolutely hurtful on man; dangerous, because it would apologize for acts punished as crimes by the law. To this objection Gall used to answer: No one can deny that theft occurs in the world; and as it exists, it was not against the will of the Creator; the propensity to steal is also more or less energetic, and there are very few who have never stolen anything; finally, the organ is very considerable in inveterate thieves.

It is however impossible to think that God has created any faculty purely injurious to mankind, which would be the conclusion, were there an organ whose sole function was theft. On the other hand, it is certain that there is no action without a faculty, and no manifestation of a faculty without organization. Theft, therefore, must depend upon a certain faculty, and this must be manifested by means of an organ; but theft, being injurious, can only be an abuse of that faculty. This point may be made clearer by analogical reasoning. Gluttony and drunkenness are effects of a certain power, but there is no faculty solely destined to these actions: they are abuses of the special propensity to feed. Adultery and incest are not peculiar faculties, they are abuses of the amative propensity. Quarrelsomeness is likewise an abuse of the propensity to fight. Moreover the organ under consideration cannot be that of theft, because various persons who have it much developed never steal; they cannot, however, be destitute of that which is its fundamental function. To this Gall replies, that he cannot determine whether any person he meets in society, with this organ large, has stolen or not, that he knows only the disposition. This answer does not, however, remove the force of the objection; the faculty would still be the same, viz. the disposition to steal. Hence let us examine into the nature of the propensity which produces theft.

Gall at last called the organ, that of property. But some thieves steal without intending to retain the article, and both men and animals occasionally filch things entirely useless to them: magpies and ravens, for instance, carry away money, spoons, stones, and similar things, of which they can make no use: certain thieves also
restore, or suffer to be restored, whatever they have taken away. Consequently, the faculty which steals is not essentially that which keeps possession; it precedes this, and is rather the propensity to take possession. The name possession, therefore, does not characterize the special faculty. Yet this faculty prompts to say 'mine.'

From all I have observed in animals and men relative to the functions of this faculty, it seems to me that its essence is a propensity to acquire, without determining either the object or manner of acquiring, and a desire for hoarding up and collecting: it also produces selfishness, for those largely endowed with it never forget themselves, and in every thing look for its usefulness; the objects they desire, however, and the means they take to acquire, whether gaming, trade, industry, or theft, result from the influence of all the other faculties. In ancient times the statistical knowledge was confined to that of battles and victories, to the number of captives and to booty. Now-a-days industry replaces war. Watt was a conqueror of a different kind from the ancient heroes, and his discoveries and inventions prodigiously favor acquisitiveness.

This faculty is essentially necessary to man and animals, as their subsistence often depends on it. It is acquisitiveness which prompts to make provision for the future. As some carnivorous animals kill more than is necessary for their maintenance, in the same way animals and man not only gather what is immediately necessary, but hoard up stores, sometimes take what belongs to others, and collect articles of which they can make no use. The abuses of the faculty have different names according to circumstances, as usury, plagiarism, fraud, theft, piracy, pillage. Its essence is not the desire to steal, nor that of property, but the propensity to acquire and to hoard.

Having thus determined the special faculty of this organ, and explained the nature of its abuses, its admission can no longer be said to be dangerous. The organ of the propensity is situated beneath the anterior inferior angle of the parietal bone, (Pl. VIII. fig. 2. VIII.) above secretiveness, and the name acquisitiveness designates the sphere of its activity.
IX. Organ of Constructiveness.

Gall observed, that those who displayed a peculiar disposition to mechanical arts had a face of a somewhat parallel form, as large at the temples as at the cheeks; from thence he inferred that the disposition to mechanical arts was indicated when the brain at the temples is prominent or large. Further observations on mechanicians, architects, sculptors, and painters, in whom this organ is large, soon pointed out its precise situation. In animals the ability to construct is not in proportion to their understanding. The beaver, with less intellect, surpasses the dog in constructiveness. The skulls of animals which build and make burrows, and of others which do not, present a remarkable difference at the place of this organ, as is seen in the heads of rabbits and of hares. The beaver, marmot, hamster, &c. have it distinctly expressed.

In a certain skull preserved at Rome, said to be that of Raphael, and casts of which are seen in phrenological collections, the organ of which I speak is exceedingly large. Gall possesses the skull of a milliner of Vienna, who was very dexterous in changing the forms of her wares, and in it also the organ in question is prominent. This organ is larger in some nations than in others, larger in the Italians and French than in the English, larger in the Esquimaux than in the New Hollanders.

Adversaries of Phrenology may ridicule a comparison between Raphael, a milliner, and a field-mouse. They may laugh at a doctrine which, as they conclude, attributes to a similar organ the sublime conceptions of Raphael, the petty productions of a milliner, and the unnatural habitation of a field-mouse. But does not the sloth creep by means of organs similar to those by which the horse gallops, and the roe bounds with the swiftness of the wind? Does not the ass bray by means of organs similar to those by which a Catalani sings? The faculty I now consider did not alone give rise to the sublime conceptions of Raphael; it was however essential to their execution; for it seems to me to produce every thing that may be called construction. By its means birds build
nests, rabbits make burrows, the beaver its hut, and man constructs, from the hovel to the palaces of kings and the temples of God. It produces fortifications, ships, the engines of war, the implements of manufactures, instruments of all kinds, furniture, clothes, and toys; it is essential not only in every mechanical profession, but in all that in any way require manual nicety, as in the arts of drawing, engraving, writing, carving, and sculpture. Locksmiths, watchmakers, joiners, turners, and all those who use tools, are directed by it. The propensity to construct generally, or constructiveness, seems to me the special faculty of its organ; it, therefore, constitutes only one part of the mechanical arts, giving manual dexterity, and being destined to execute mechanical conceptions of whatever nature. For the same reason it is necessary to those who excel by their ability in musical performances, to clever experimenters in physical doctrines, to good operative surgeons; some insane as well as some idiots possess it in a considerable degree. Fodéré in his work on Cretinism remarks, that he has known several Cretins who understood, without even having had a master, the repairing of watches and the construction of some pieces of mechanism. On the other hand, persons of great intellectual endowments can never acquire manual dexterity. Too large a development of this organ, and its activity not being guided by the higher sentiments, produces abuses. A man for instance may ruin his family by building, or peril his life by constructing dies for coining false money, &c.

Genus II. Sentiments.

After mere propensities, follow another kind of faculties, which I call sentiments. Each of these joins to a propensity an emotion, or feeling, of a specific kind. Several of these are common to man and animals, others are proper to man. I shall first consider those which I entitle the inferior sentiments.
X. Organ of Cautiousness.

We often meet with individuals who are naturally timid, fearful, undecided in their opinions, and incapable of taking a resolution; while we see others who act without hesitation, and instantly obey every internal impulse without timidity or fear. Many children are very timorous, and easily affrighted by the presence of strangers. Women and females in general are more timid and careful than men and males. Whole nations also are remarkable for wariness and circumspection, whilst others are noted for their levity and carelessness of disposition. The Scotch and Irish offer excellent instances of this difference of character. Insane persons are sometimes exceedingly timid, and are terrified without any assignable reason. Finally, whole species, and individuals of the same species of animals differ in degrees of shyness and circumspection. Such a peculiar feeling then must be considered as fundamental. Now what is the special faculty? Gall says, that 'man and animals were necessarily endowed with a faculty which should induce them to look forward to coming events and avoid danger. Without such a disposition, they would have been incapable of taking any measure for the future.' He calls the faculty that prompts these actions foresight. Now I do not believe that it foresees; it is, in my opinion, blind and without reflection, though it may excite the reflective faculties. It incites us to take precautions, it doubts, says but, and continually exclaims, take care. When too active, it causes such abuses as uncertainty, inquietude, anxiety, irresolution, melancholy, and hypochondriasis.

The organ of this sentiment is established, and its place is indicated on the upper, lateral and posterior part of the head, towards the middle of the parietal bones. (Pl. V. fig. 2. XII.) Two persons at Vienna, remarkable for their irresolute characters, were one day in a public place; Gall stood behind them and observed the shape of their heads; he found them extremely prominent and large at the place I have just indicated. This observation gave
him the first idea of this organ, which was soon afterwards established in men and animals. The form of the heads of circumspect persons, and of those who are rash and incautious, is very different. Shy and circumspect animals also, as the stag, roe, pole-cat, otter, mole, and those which place sentinels, as the chamois, crane, starling, and bustard, have the cerebral parts just mentioned greatly developed. These animals certainly have not understanding enough to induce us to think, that their habit of placing sentinels is the result of reflection. We should rather say, that such an act may be commanded by nature by means of some peculiar organic arrangement. Moreover, animals which see in daylight, but which do not dare to seek their food except during the night, have the upper and posterior lateral parts of their heads more developed than those which go out during the day. The skull of the eagle is very different, in the above-named situation, from that of the horned owl, which sees during both the day and night.

When treating of the organ of combativeness, I mentioned that anxiety and fear could not arise from a want of courage, but must be positive affections of some primitive feeling. They result, in my opinion, from a modified state of circumspection.

We may suppose, nevertheless, that any one destitute of combativeness will be overcome by cautiousness sooner than another who feels a great propensity to fight. Deficiency of cautiousness, on the contrary, modifies the action of the other faculties in so far as they are allowed to act according to their own natures without restraint from any feeling of timidity.

The diseased state of the organ of cautiousness is very common, and predisposes to suicide. Many considerations on this point may be found in my work of Insanity.

At the end of the article on the organ of cautiousness, Gall speaks, as he expresses himself, of negative qualities. He examines and endeavors to refute my manner of explaining fear. Let us see his arguments: he begins by defining what he calls negative qualities, viz., qualities which are results not of the action, but of the insufficient action or total inactivity of any fundamental power.
Amongst other things he says, 'if fear be not the result of the want of courage, what are the faculties which may inspire aversion and even horror for women, if not the want of physical love; aversion for music, if not the want of the musical talent; erroneous judgment, if not the defect of intellect; aversion for food, if not the defect of appetite?' 'How can Mr. Spurzheim,' he asks, 'conceive hatred, calumny, cruelty, or imbecility, since there is no fundamental power for either hatred, calumny, cruelty or imbecility?'

Gall, in this essay on negative qualities, takes no notice of my ideas on the affections of the fundamental powers; he then confounds ideas which are common, with ideas which are peculiar to each of us; moreover he does not separate the phenomena from their explanation; this, however, is necessary, since we often admit the same fact and differ in its explanation. To refute my opinion on fear, he recurs to analogies, but evidently confounds the result of certain faculties being inactive, with some of their positive affections, with their imperfect and deranged actions, and with sensations which arise from exhaustion of the powers. These notions then must be separated, and the mutual influence of the special faculties considered, in order to clear up the point at issue.

After having stated that there is no fundamental power for hatred, calumny, cruelty or imbecility, Gall continues to say: 'I myself easily conceive these phenomena. External objects procure us pleasure only in so far as there exist points of contact between them and the cerebral organization. If this contact ceases to exist, the external objects are no longer in harmony with our faculties; disinclination and aversion succeed. Who has not felt that a surfeit of certain enjoyments produces indifference, or even real disgust for what had before been desired most ardently? In the same way, if our limbs are exhausted by fatigue, we feel aversion for walking.'

I admit, with him and many others, the relations between the internal faculties and external objects, and I take up these considerations in the philosophical part. There I explain my opinion on pleasure and pain, considering them as general affections: for
every faculty being active desires, and being satisfied or agreeably affected, procures pleasure; not being satisfied or disagreeably affected, it gives pain. Thus each fundamental faculty can excite pleasure or pain, and both in different degrees.

Gall merely states that there is no organ for hatred, calumny, cruelty or imbecility, and does not indicate the cerebral organs on which these phenomena depend. Before I explain my ideas upon this particular, I shall examine our opinions on fear, as they have occasioned this discussion.

I consider fear as an affection of the sense of circumspection. Gall replies, that 'cowardice (poltronerie) is always passive, but fear sometimes negative and sometimes positive, and that the most courageous person feels fear, if he finds himself exposed to a danger above his powers. If we say,' continues he, 'that a man or an animal is afraid, we do not always mean to say, that they are affected with fear in the same way as one is affected with anger. The expression often means, that a man or an animal is a poltroon or coward. And in this case they are possessed with fear more easily than if they were courageous. Numerous armies,' says he, at the end of the article, 'composed of men remarkable for their courage, have had fits of fear. Did not the intrepid Roman sacrifice to Fear?'

Let us suppose that the two expressions, to be a coward, and to feel fear, are synonymous, still I neither see that we can therefore infer, that fear is negative, nor that the knowledge of danger and the sensation of fear take place in the same faculty. I, however, conceive that the knowledge of any danger may affect the sense of circumspection in a manner to which the name fear is applied, just as it may excite courage and make a person fight with fury. Neither courage nor circumspection know the danger nor reflect on it. Sometimes the most innocent and harmless things inspire fear.

'If circumspection,' says Gall, 'were the source of fear, careless beings ought always to be free from this feeling; and one should be the more fearful, the more circumspect one is; circumstances which we do not find confirmed by experience.'
Even the most careless of beings is not entirely destitute of circumspection; and other faculties, such as adhesiveness, love of approbation, self-love, and reflection, may excite the little dose of circumspection that exists in such a manner as to produce fear. Moreover, any one endowed with courage, self-esteem, acquisitiveness, and firmness, even if his circumspection be considerable, will feel less fear than another with smaller circumspection, and deficient courage, self-love, and firmness. The reader must also bear in mind the meaning which I attach to the term affection, and remember that affections do not depend only on the different degrees of activity of the faculties; that the sense of touch, for instance, though obtuse, produces the sensation of itching; and that, in the same way, fear is an affection or quality of circumspection. Moreover, the intrepid Roman who sacrificed to Fear was not, could not be, entirely deprived of circumspection; and in personifying Fear, the ancients brought sacrifices to its shrine, in order to secure themselves from its dangerous influence, and to turn the divinity against their enemies.

I said, that if fear resulted from the absence of courage, I could not understand how the same person or animal might feel fear and courage at the same time. Gall replied, by asking, why I here neglect the principle upon which, on other occasions, I insist strongly, viz. that the actions are seldom the result of a single organ? This question, however, is inconceivable to me, since I explain by means of the simultaneous action of circumspection and courage, the possibility of feeling fear and courage at the same time. The same principle readily explains several phenomena which Gall merely mentions.

Let us still examine whether the analogies, quoted by Gall, refute my opinion on the origin of fear. He compares fear with fatigue, disgust, and other sensations, which result from the satisfaction and exhaustion of certain faculties. Will he then maintain that fear is ever the result of courage when exhausted? He compares it also with the inactivity of faculties, with imbecility, and with the imperfect functions of the intellectual faculties or false
judgments. None of these comparisons, except that with imbecility, is conformable to the definition given by Gall of negative qualities, among which he includes fear, hatred, calumny and cruelty. Several persons are fond of reasoning, but their conclusions are false; others are fond of singing, and of making melodies, but cannot produce harmony. Erroneous reasoning, however, is by no means an effect of the inactive state of the intellectual faculties. Hatred does not seem to me the consequence of the inactive or exhausted state of any faculty. He who has little benevolence and the other moral feelings inactive, whilst his self-esteem, his desire to acquire, and feelings of an inferior order, act with energy, will hate all who oppose his personal views. Even he who has attachment, justice, and benevolence, and at the same time self-esteem, may hate a person who forgets his duties to others, and is guided by selfishness alone. Justice and attachment when offended may increase or excite indignation and hatred; but these affections always reside in feelings of an inferior order. It is the same with calumny. No one will speak ill of others because he is fatigued with praising them. But selfishness, self-love, and the love of approbation, when offended and not guided by justice, may feel pleasure in calumniating.

Finally, cruelty never results from the inactivity, or exhaustion, or fatigue of benevolence. Benevolence, when active, always prevents cruelty; but when inactive, other feelings, destructiveness for instance, encouraged by self-love, firmness and selfish motives generally, may act in a cruel manner.

Thus, all Gall’s statements in refutation of mine, and in support of his own opinion in regard to the origin of fear, are rather for, than against me. I, therefore, continue to think that fear is an affection of the feeling of circumspection, and not a result of the inactivity of courage, or of courage satisfied or exhausted.

In the fourth volume of the octavo edition, published in 1823, Gall has once more taken up our discussion on fear. He replies to my opinion, and to that of Dr. Demangeon. I shall here answer him, only however in as far as my own is concerned.
Gall first states, that I am wrong in supposing that the expressions *avoir peur* and *être poltron* are synonymous. He however had used them as synonymous,* and instead of reproaching him with his incorrect French, I merely said, *in supposing* that these two expressions were synonymous; I intended to discuss ideas only, and not words, particularly as the French was a foreign language to myself as to him. This short explanation may suffice to rectify Gall’s accusation.

Moreover, he retracts the analogies and his reasoning on them, declares fear to be an affection of courage, and says that he employed analogy only to make himself clearer in his ideas on negative qualities. I allow this to be, but I still continue to oppose him in admitting that fear is sometimes negative. To the notion of this sort of fear my answer remains the same. I therefore only examine whence *positive* fear arises. Gall considers it as an affection of the organ of courage, and not as the result of circumspection. He supports his opinion, by asserting that fear is not in proportion to circumspection. Why has he not attended to my answer to this argument, viz. that I do not consider fear as an affection of quantity, but of quality of circumspection? According to his manner of arguing, fear increases in proportion as courage diminishes, and is evidently always a negative quality. Thus Gall has elicited no new argument which obliges me to change my opinion, and our discussion on fear remains exactly where it was before his last publication.

**XI. Organ of the Love of Approbation.**

Vanity is natural to mankind, and in comparison with its frequency, Gall thinks pride a scarcity. Children even when very young are fond of approbation; emulation stimulates the youth to exertion;

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*Quand on dit,* says he, *tom. iii. of the editions in folio and quarto, 'qu’un homme ou un animal a peur, on ne veut pas toujours dire par là que, dans ce moment, il est affecté de la peur; comme on est affecté de la colère ou de la frayeur. On entend dire par cette expression que c’est un homme ou animal peureux, poltron.'*
few adults are insensible to the voice of applause; and multitudes, governed by the feeling of ambition, sacrifice to it quiet, sleep, health, and even life.

Observation proves that this sentiment is more powerfully felt by women than by men; the earliest infancy betrays the difference. To many women a new gown is an object of admiration, and every article of dress an object of display. Many of them are extremely anxious to please and satisfy others.

Certain nations also are governed by it more than others. Montesquieu considered it as the true pivot of the French government. Its derangement is a frequent symptom of insanity. Finally, it exists in many animals, as in the horse, dog, cat, &c. for they are fond of being caressed and flattered.

Gall discovered the organ of this sentiment whilst engaged in examining that of pride. Having met with an insane woman, who thought herself queen of France, he was disappointed in his expectation of finding a large organ of pride. He, therefore, turned his attention to the rest of the head, and saw that the parts on each side of it were very prominent. He then reflected on the behavior of the insane from pride and from vanity: the former, imperious, arrogant, and fond of commanding; the latter, polite, affable, and courteous, comporting themselves in a manner evidently indicating a wish to please; and soon learnt to separate the action and indication of each of these sentiments. Having afterwards examined the heads of several individuals, known for their ambition, and found a configuration similar to that of the insane woman, he began to speak of an organ of ambition and of vanity. Is this its fundamental faculty?

'The sentiment of self-esteem, vanity, and ambition,' says Gall,* 'is fundamental.' He quotes and admits the opinion of Count Segur, according to which there is no nation without vanity, which is the cause of the mutual hatred of nations. Thus he evidently confounds pride with vanity. So does Dr. Brown in his Philosophy.

I regard self-esteem as the basis of pride, a sentiment manifested by the organ last spoken of, while the faculty I now consider

*T. iii. p. 326 and 328.
looks for the approbation of others, whether deserved or not, whether in a good or in a bad cause. It makes us attentive to the opinion entertained of us, and induces the question, what will the world or the people say? It is fond of approbation in general, without attending to the manner of acquiring it, and may therefore be directed to objects of the highest importance, as well as to such as are of no moment, or even hurtful. Its sphere of activity is very extensive; for it is sensible to caresses and flattery, to compliments, to applause and to glory; it wishes to be distinguished and honored, and men endowed with it make use of many and various means to attract attention. They dress fashionably, and resort to ostentation and showy things of all kinds; they look for decorations, titles and other worldly distinctions. Ambition is the distinguishing epithet of its agency, if the object aspired to be of great importance; vanity, if claim be laid to distinction on the score of trifles. Its activity extends through all ranks of society. The general who leads back a victorious army is elated with the applause of his countrymen, and the slave is delighted if the manner in which he has performed his task be approved. Combined with the lower feelings it may be pleased by the reputation of being the greatest eater and drinker, the best fighter. Some would do everything to gain fame. It is one of the most powerful motives in society.

This fundamental power though essential to society, by its too great activity causes many abuses. It favors industry, but also introduces luxury, it produces polite manners, but makes us slaves of fashion and is the mortal enemy of personal liberty. Nations who possess it in an eminent degree are scarcely fit for a free government. The number of those who wish to distinguish themselves only by talent and virtue is small.

The organ of the love of approbation is established. Being much developed, it generally elongates the posterior, upper, and lateral part of the head. (Pl. V. fig. 1. and 2. XI.) Sometimes, however, it is more spread out on either side, and then the head is widened rather than elongated. I propose the name, love of approbation, for this special faculty.
Self-esteem is one of the faculties generally attributed to external circumstances; but its activity is so very great and universal, that I am astonished it has not been at all times considered as a special feeling. The fall of man is ascribed to pride. Haughtiness is observed in individuals who have no pretensions to influence over others, either by birth, fortune, or personal talents; whilst many who enjoy these advantages are remarkable for the modesty and humility of their deportment. Poor, ignorant and pitiful creatures have sometimes the greatest opinion of their own personal importance; and children may frequently be found who are fond of showing superiority. In every community we find leaders and followers; no profession has ever been free from the influence of pride; even teachers of humility have too often shown it in all their actions. Proud persons constantly use the pronoun of the first person, viz. I say, I think, I do; I, and always I. Whole nations in whom self-esteem is active think themselves superior to all the world besides; they know everything best, and their sanction seems to them of the utmost importance.

Self-esteem is more common in men than in women; boys frequently place their judgment above that of others, while girls always look for the approbation of those who surround them. It is stronger in some nations than in others. Moreover this sentiment is often deranged, and many lunatics think themselves ministers, kings, and emperors, or even the Supreme Being; and there are a greater number of men than of women alienated by pride.

A feeling similar to the pride of man seems to exist in certain animals, as in the turkey-cock, peacock, and horse.

Gall thinks that the organ of self-esteem is the same as that of the faculty which makes animals dwell upon mountains and elevated places; hence he calls it the organ of haughtiness; meaning to designate at once physical and moral height. In speaking of the organ of inhabitiveness, I have given the reasons which induce me
to differ from him, and have in a former page said, that I conceive one faculty necessary to produce the propensity to determinate inhabitation, and another to cause the sentiment of which I now treat.

Gall's attention was first drawn to the sentiment of pride, from having examined the head of a beggar, the middle of the upper and back part of which presented an elevation he had not observed before. Having asked the man the cause of his mendicity, he was astonished to hear him accuse his pride as the origin of his miserable condition. He had conceived such a high notion of his own importance as to believe himself infinitely above learning a trade or profession. Thus incapable of earning a livelihood, begging was his only resource to save himself from starvation.

We have such a number of observations confirmatory of this organ, in individuals in both sexes, in whole nations, and in disease, that we consider it as established.

What then is its fundamental power? The word pride, although the sentiment commonly manifests itself in a way that would warrant the name, is still too harsh, and would indicate a degree of activity which produces many disorders. Christian morality warns us against pride and presumptuous conduct, and inculcates humility and meekness. It would, therefore, be improper to adopt the characteristic sign of an abuse as the title of a primitive power. This sentiment seems to give us a great opinion of ourselves, constituting self-love or self-esteem. Too active, it produces pride, haughtiness, disdain, contempt, presumption, arrogance, and insolence. A moderate degree of it gives dignity and nobleness to the character, and secures against low-mindedness; but I do not believe Gall is right when he says,* modesty and lowness of mind result from insufficient development of this organ. I think a person may be proud and basely-minded at the same time. Real lowness of mind supposes a deficiency of the sentiments of justice and ideality, for a person who is proud, just, and inclined to improvement, will never be guilty of a mean action. Modesty also does not result

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* Edition in 4to. t. iii. p. 322.

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solely from the absence of pride; this condition only permits the moral sentiments and cautiousness to act in a certain way, to which the title 'modesty' is applied. Self-esteem contributes to personal and national independency, though it is not sufficient to secure liberty. It is an essential ingredient of the love of dominion. These ideas, however, can only be clear to those who are acquainted with the fundamental powers of the mind, and the effects of their mutual influence.

On the other hand, nobleness of character is not the result of self-esteem alone. Noble or notable primitively meant the being remarkable in any way. I heartily desire to see this name given only to those who excel by their superior qualities. The signification, however, of that which is superior, both as regards qualities and actions, varies exceedingly. Among warlike nations personal courage is one of the first and most valuable qualities, and conquerors and those who contend for absolute power, accord to their soldiers and companions in arms all the principal distinctions. They are praised and called nobles, they form a congregation, and their nobleness consists in qualities which favor the personal views of their leader.

History shows us that this spirit prevailed more or less among ancient nations, and that it has always had a principal influence during ages of barbarism. Among the Romans many occupations, although indispensable to life, were considered as ignoble and unbecoming in a soldier. Many lazy and idle persons think themselves above others, who are obliged to earn their daily bread. Warriors have generally understood better than the members of any other profession how to secure the first rank in society, they have always been the most powerful, and have used their strength to further their own advantage. The priesthood also succeeded at an early period in acquiring distinction and nobility, as dispensers of eternal happiness, and as administrators of the divine legislation. Wealth, though it gives great influence in society, has never been considered as sufficient of itself to confer nobility on its possessor, but the rich have been permitted to purchase titles.
of nobility. Self-esteem with acquisitiveness, whilst benevolence and justice remain inactive, contends for privileges.

Ideas upon nobleness having gradually become sounder and sounder, we can now say, that the nature of all men is essentially the same; that each individual differs from his fellow only in the degree of talents and feelings he possesses, that it is a duty incumbent on every one to contribute to the general welfare and common happiness, and that talent and virtue constitute the essence of nobility. Individuals are in reality noble in proportion as they possess the superior faculties of mind. Now since distinctions should be conferred on the score of superior qualities alone, it follows that they are to be personal, and not attached as hereditary rights to certain families. If it be unjust to punish children for the crimes of their parents, I see no reason why unworthy children should be rewarded for the merits of their ancestors. Let every one reap the fruits of his own labor, and enjoy as far as he is deserving. To confer any hereditary privilege is to do an injustice to posterity. I admit, it is true, mental dispositions, under certain conditions, to be hereditary; as these conditions, however, have hitherto been neglected, and are not likely to be observed for some time to come, I cannot help saying, that it is improper to permit degenerate children to enjoy privileges, which parents received as rewards of talent or virtue.

In the actual state of society, I do not find it reasonable to confer similar marks of distinction upon soldiers, clergymen, artists, legislators, and every modification of characters and talents, since the services rendered by each to mankind, are not equal. The merits of a moral teacher, and of a soldier who aids a conqueror in his views, are in my opinion very different.

Jesus constantly admonished his disciples against greediness of superiority; greediness with them was to consist in humility.
Superior Sentiments.

I have hitherto gone over the affective faculties which are common to man and animals; and even here, in this purely animal portion of his nature, man is the most perfect of all terrestrial beings. He alone possesses all the faculties which are but sparingly distributed through different tribes of animals. Besides every faculty is susceptible of many more modifications and of greater energy in man than in animals. So far however man is merely an animal. His pride, vanity, selfishness, and other inferior feelings, we have seen, are the causes of innumerable disorders; the addition of certain superior faculties was therefore necessary to regulate the actions of the inferior feelings, and to establish his moral character. Now here it is important to recollect, that no superior feeling any more than those of an inferior nature results from intellect. It is also important to specify each kind of these feelings, and to inquire how far they operate amongst animals. One of them cannot be entirely denied to brutes; for this reason I shall begin with it.

XIII. Organ of Benevolence.

Philosophers frequently ask, is man by nature good or bad? Both opinions find supporters, and both have opponents. The answer is not so very difficult as has been imagined. Men are not born alike in this respect. Many children are good-hearted, benevolent, and sensible to the sufferings of others. Common people, without education, often display a great deal of benevolence and sympathy. Some individuals find their chief source of delight in doing acts of charity. St. Vincent de Paul offered to bear the chains of a criminal, in order to restore him to his wife and children, who suffered the extreme of misery and distress. Individuals who devote their lives to the relief and consolation of the wretched, are to be found in great numbers.

On the other hand, we see children complete egotists, and en-
tirely thoughtless of others; many arrived at mature age think of
themselves alone, and benevolence towards their fellows is known
to them merely by the name. Some tribes, and even whole na-
tions, are mild and peaceable, whilst others are warlike and cruel.
The Hindoos and Caribs are remarkable and well known instances
of the extremes of goodness and cruelty.

Derangement of benevolence is occasionally a symptom in in-
sanity. It is sometimes too active, and in other cases not active
enough.

Benevolence, as an innate feeling, may also be proved by a
reference to animals, and by comparing the natural dispositions
either of various kinds, or of different individuals of the same
species. Several kinds are naturally meek, as the roe and sheep;
others are wild and mischievous, as the chamois and tiger. Some
dogs, horses, cows, monkeys, &c. are meek and familiar, while
others are fierce and bad tempered.

There are examples on record where animals have shown high
degrees of benevolence to others and even to man. A respecta-
ble family of Paris told me that they had a horse and a cow living
together in the same stable; that the horse several times got untied,
went to the corner where the sack of oats stood and drew it in his
teeth near the cow, probably to make her partake of the good
cheer. Many dogs also exhibit the same feeling. Dupont de
Nemours saw a swallow caught by one foot in the noose of a pack-
thread attached to the roof of the French Institute at Paris; the
prisoner screamed, and attracted all the swallows of the neighbor-
hood; after a long and tumultuous consultation, a great number
formed a line, one after another darted at the packthread with their
bills, and in half an hour delivered the captive.

From the preceding observations it results, that benevolence is
an innate and particular faculty, and by no means the effect of ex-
ternal circumstances, as some have supposed, still less of the de-
finity of courage; since it is certain that many quarrelsome
persons are good-hearted, and timid and cowardly individuals often
mischievous and cruel.
It was some time before Gall thought of looking for goodness of heart in the brain. The servant of a certain family at Vienna, with which the doctor was intimate, having been frequently praised for benevolent and kind dispositions, he at last moulded the man's head in plaster. Observing a considerable protuberance on the superior and middle part of the frontal bone, just where the hair begins to grow, he set down the occurrence as worthy of farther attention, and having subsequently examined the heads of a great number of benevolent and kind people, the function of the cerebral part in the above situation was speedily confirmed.

It is interesting to remark, that among the antiques, the head of Seneca, in the seat of the organ of benevolence, is much higher than that of Nero. The same striking difference may be seen by comparing good portraits of Malsherbe and Danton.

Good-natured animals have also the part corresponding to the organ of benevolence in man elevated and prominent. (Pl. VIII. fig. 1 and 3, XIII.) Such as are vicious and bad tempered have, on the contrary, the same place flat or hollow. (Pl. VII. fig. 2 and 4, XIII.)

Gall considers benevolence, justice, the sense of morality and of conscience, as belonging to one and the same fundamental power. He first makes some general reflections, and then comparing the moral sense with benevolence, thinks himself authorized to conclude that benevolence is only a higher degree of its activity. He also considers conscience as a modification of benevolence. He shows that that feeling does not depend on social intercourse; and allows it necessary to determine by laws what shall be just and what shall be unjust, that is, to establish an arbitrary conscience. 'Man,' says he, 'nevertheless, being destined to live in society, requires the sense of morality; without it no association, no family, no nation, can be united.' * Hume in his inquiry concerning the principles of morals, also admits an instinctive principle of humanity and disinterested benevolence implanted by nature in the human heart, which takes delight in whatever tends to the

* T. iv. of the editions in folio and quarto.
happiness of mankind, which renders virtue an object of regard on account of its utility, and vice an object of abhorrence on account of its pernicious tendency.

According to this hypothesis, all social animals, as the sheep, duck, cow, horse, &c. ought to possess the moral sense. This, however, is not the case. Yet there is no proportion between the moral sense and benevolence. Many, who have the organ of benevolence much developed, possess very little of the feeling of justice. I agree with Gall, and many other philosophers, upon the innateness of the moral sense; but I do not think that the sentiment of justice is the same as that of benevolence. I support my opinion by the arguments, which prove the plurality of the faculties; I also acknowledge the necessity of positive laws, but cannot assent to the explanation given by Gall of conscience; for we see many animals endowed with benevolence which never demonstrate the feeling of repentance.

Such are the considerations which induce me to admit a sense of morality, independent of reason and different from benevolence. This latter is itself a fundamental power, producing mildness and goodness, and a long catalogue of modified actions variously styled; benignity, clemency, mercifulness, compassion, kindness, humanity, cordiality, urbanity, hospitality, philanthropy, the love of our neighbor, and charity.

Cruelty, being a positive sensation, cannot be the consequence of the want of benevolence, as Gall supposes. Goodness of heart cannot exist in a high degree in those cruel beings who delight in tormenting others, and in cold-blooded criminals; but active cruelty belongs to the organ of destructiveness, unrestrained by the superior powers. Another opinion of Gall, of which I cannot approve is, that benevolence may degenerate into bad temper, and into the propensity to rejoice in the evil that happens to others; in the same way as the sense of taste may degenerate into disgust at food, physical love into aversion to the other sex, and the sense of melody to aversion to music. The inactivity of benevolence, or its exhausted state, may produce indifference to its functions,
and make us avoid any opportunity of doing beneficent actions; but active wickedness, and pleasure in the pains of others, like cruelty, depend on inferior feelings, unaccompanied by superior sentiments.

Benevolence though admirable in its nature must be combined with the sentiments proper to man and with intellect, otherwise it produces abuses. Indulged for itself it may encourage idleness, careless conduct and profligacy, and produce great disorders in society and the worst consequences.

Sentiments proper to Man.

Gall formerly considered morality and religion as one power, but later he assigned benevolence and morality to one organ, and the knowledge of God and religion to another. The points to be examined here are: 1st. Whether man is a moral and religious being by nature; 2nd. whether morality and religion may be separated from each other as to their essence; 3d. whether morality and religion are single powers, or whether they depend each on several fundamental feelings; and 4th. whether the manifestations of the moral and religious feelings depend on the instrumentality of the brain.

Let us first examine whether mankind is morally religious by nature. Some churchmen would persuade the credulous, that preaching and religious instruction alone produce sentiments of religion and morality. The ancient philosophers, on the contrary, believed and taught that man was religious by nature. Plutarch observed that there was neither town nor village in the world without a god. Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, and many others have made the same remark, and the fathers of the Christian church themselves have commented on this truth, in order to prove that the belief in a God was innate.

The innateness of religion is not only proved by its universality among mankind, but also by the sameness of the ideas which prevail on all essential points of belief. It is with religion as with the
principles of all the fundamental powers; they are the same at all times and under every variety of circumstance. The laws of music and of painting are universally and invariably the same, and in every religion there is something venerated, whether it be a log, a stone, or a star; the jealous and vindictive God of the Jews, or the meek and benevolent Deity of the Christians.

To this it is objected, that the Supreme Being has revealed his will from time to time, and that religious ideas have been preserved by tradition. But religion existed before the time of the Jews, and even since they appeared as a distinct people, their revelation has been limited to themselves, and other nations have not ceased to have creeds entirely different. There are many nations who never received the revelation either of the Jews or the Christians, and who still manifest religious sentiments and have peculiar forms of worship. It must even be granted that as man was destined to have a revelation, he was also necessarily made capable of receiving it. Who would attempt to make any animal, inferior to man, acquainted with revelation? It is a general law that neither man nor animals can be instructed unless endowed with the individual faculty which appreciates the peculiar sort of knowledge conveyed. Dogs do not learn religion any more than music. Revelation, then, can only have regulated the religious sentiments which existed previously to its annunciation, and I think with Bishop Butler,* that Christianity is a republication of natural religion in its genuine simplicity.

Phrenology does not examine the superiority of any religious creed, or in what the true religion consists; it does not decide how long mankind may still be abused by religious errors, or whether it is right or wrong to make it a trade. It merely admits innate dispositions to take up religious considerations. It teaches only that sentiments of religion are inherent in the nature of man, that they are part of the plan of creation, and that the human race will never exist without them.

The next point to be considered is, whether morality and reli-

gion result from the same fundamental power. It seems to me of the highest importance to specify the difference between religion and morality. I call religious each power which brings man in relation to supernatural beings, particularly to God: and moral, those on which the actions of man, concerning the beings around him, depend. Christianity is at once religious and moral; religious in as far as it teaches the existence of God and his revealed will and doctrine; moral in as far as it commands the works of charity and justice. There are persons who fancy themselves very pious and religious when they say that they believe in revelation and in the doctrines of faith; when they go to church regularly, sing psalms, and follow up all the rites and ceremonies prescribed; though at the same time they are very selfish, and cheat their neighbors whenever they can. Nay there are some who hope for eternal salvation through belief in the doctrines alone, without doing any good works, and in leaving this part of religion to the care of their Heavenly Father himself. Now, in this sense, an atheist may be moral, and a believer in divine revelation immoral. There is certainly a difference between the belief in revelation and that in the revealed precepts intended to produce works of charity and righteousness.

Sterne, T. Shandy, vol. i. c. 140, says, 'that there is nothing more common than to see a man who has no sense at all of religion, and indeed has so much honesty as to pretend to none, who would take it as the bitterest affront, should you but hint at a suspicion on his moral character, or imagine he was not conscientiously just and scrupulous to the uttermost mite.' Sterne, however, thought that we have no dependence upon morality without religion, but adds, 'that, on the other hand too, there is nothing better to be expected from religion without morality,' and he allows that 'it is no prodigy to see a man whose real moral character stands very low, who yet entertains the highest notions of himself in the light of a religious man.'

Our moral and religious natures are joined together, but they are not the result of, or their strength proportionate to each other.
in Phrenology they are examined separately as to their existence and nature.

Farther, there are several moral and several religious feelings, and all their manifestations depend on cerebral organs. Many religious persons find it difficult to admit the latter point. Yet its certainty is proved by incontestable facts, and phrenologists instead of apprehending this truth, consider it as the best means of putting an end to all discussion as to the necessity of religion. Indeed, if religious manifestations depend on the brain, the necessity of religion is established, and the certainty that it can never be neglected as one of the natural institutions of society, proclaimed. This innateness does not exclude the idea of revelation, and phrenologists rely on the principle, that the Creator of the world and the revealer of true religion is the same God, who could not be in contradiction with himself at different periods, nor give any commands in opposition to the primitive laws of nature; they rather think that he prepared the brain in relation to his revealed will.

The first moral quality is benevolence, styled in Christianity the love of our neighbor. It has been considered in the preceding pages. The following is also moral on many occasions, though its influence is still greater on religious manifestations.

XIV. Organ of Reverence.

Gall, viewing the actions of man, and considering the vast variety of characters in the world, observed a great difference upon the point of religion. Some are eminently devout, and pray with great fervor; others pay very little attention to acts and forms of religion. In examining the head, in relation to this difference among individuals, he found that the very pious were frequently bald; it was evident, however, that baldness could not cause devotion; for every bald man is not pious, and women, though they do not grow bald, are in general devout. He then saw that the heads of pious people were very elevated. (Pl. VIII. fig. 1. XIV.) Lavater had already made the same observation.
Priests who have chosen the ecclesiastical state from natural inclination, and those who have entered it influenced by circumstances or peculiar motives, as well as religious and irreligious persons, present very different configurations of the upper part of the head.

The best artists would seem to have felt the influence of an elevated head, for they have always given this form to their pictures of saints, of holy personages, and particularly of Jesus. We cannot flatter ourselves with having the true portrait of Jesus, but it would be interesting to inquire whether painters have composed such representations as we possess, guided by an internal impulse, or from having observed devout and benevolent men; in the same way as the ancient artists sculptured Jupiter with the forehead of a mighty genius.

Observation, then, shows that persons naturally devout have very elevated heads, and Gall assigns the feeling to the cerebral part immediately behind the organ of benevolence; this he formerly called the organ of theosophy. He adopted that name from Lavater, who speaks of a configuration of theosophy; but it is certainly incorrect, since we cannot flatter ourselves that we know God; we can only form notions of the Deity according to our own nature; we anthropomorphise and attribute to him all the superior faculties of man in their highest state of perfection; but who would venture to say, that the Supreme Being does not possess many other faculties of which we have not the slightest notion? We can speak only of a Supreme Being without determining the whole of his nature. To understand his nature we ought to be his equals. History also shows that the sentiment of devotion has neither revealed the nature of God, nor the number of divinities. The ancients adored many gods and goddesses; and since the unity of God was believed, he has been represented as endowed with very different qualities.

Gall finally called the organ of that sentiment manifested in devotion, the organ of God and religion. He thought that it proves the existence of God, and said, 'as every other faculty of man and animals has an object which it may accomplish, it is not possible
that while there is an organ of religion, God should not exist; hence, God exists.'

This faculty, however, is a sentiment; it is blind, and does not reveal the existence of any object. Farther, though devout persons have elevated heads, yet not every one who possesses the cerebral part in question large is devout and religious. In all the busts and portraits of Voltaire it is represented as much developed; and certainly he was not religious. I have also found the organ very considerable in an individual, who assured me that he did not believe in the existence of God. Man, in my opinion, arrived at the belief in a Supreme Being by means of his reflective faculties, since that is an effect without cause. Gall first observed this organ in individuals in the act of adoring God, and saints in the exercise of devotion. My observations induce me to consider its special faculty as the sentiment of reverence in general, without determining either the object to be revered, or the manner of reverence to be bestowed. By its agency man adores God, venerates saints, and respects persons and things. What indeed can be more natural than to venerate in any way the Being who is considered as the Cause of all things? I have already appealed to the history of the ancients, who admitted a greater or less number of gods, and venerated them in various ways. Without going so far back, we may take at the present time nations and individuals, who have all different ideas of God, according to their creeds and intellectual faculties, in proof of my position that this faculty does not determine the object to be venerated, nor the manner of venerating. Its application to religion is very noble, but it finds also many other objects in society. It produces deference and respect towards parents, tutors, and superiors in general. I therefore prefer the name of reverence to that of veneration, since the latter disposes to think of religious veneration and adoration.

The sentiment of reverence, though essential to religion, does not include the whole of the ideas comprised in that name; it only occasions the part called worshipping. Its determinate actions depend on its combinations with other faculties, and on the direction
it has received from education. By far the greater number of persons do what they are taught to believe agreeable to God. One sings psalms, another repeats ten or twenty or more times the same form of prayer; one eats vegetables, another burns candles, &c. and all this to the glory of God.

The functions of this sentiment are at one time moral and at another religious; combined with benevolence and justice, it respects truth and contributes to the happiness of others; separated from these feelings, however, and united with selfishness, self-esteem, destructiveness, and the religious sentiments which I shall examine hereafter, it may do great harm to humanity, though its tendency be eminently religious. Let us respect truth, talent, and virtue, but not falsehood, stupidity, or immorality; true merit, but not mere appearance and external show, liberty but not oppression. Let us adore the God of true Christianity in spirit and in truth, by moral actions, but not by superstitious ceremonies, and childish amusements.

XV. Organ of Firmness.

A peculiar natural sentiment that varies in individuals and nations, is frequently exhibited in our intercourse with mankind. Some children yield readily, others are obstinate and stubborn. Some grown-up persons, also, can scarcely be said to have a will of their own; they follow the last impulse they receive, and without strength to resist, are the easy instruments of all whom they meet. Others are of an immovable character, firm in their resolutions, and constant in their principles; they do not attend to exhortations nor to examples; their conduct is uniform, and their exertions may be calculated on in various situations of life.

Lavater observed, that persons endowed with perseverance and firmness, had the top of their heads very much developed. Gall made the same remark, and so many facts bearing on this point have been collected, that we consider the organ of this sentiment as established. (Pl. v. and Pl. vi. fig. 2. xv.)
ORGAN OF FIRMNESS.

It is not easy to define the feeling accurately, which inheres in the part just pointed out. Its effects are often called will; but will, in the true sense, is rather the result of reflection than of any of the propensities or sentiments. It is true, that persons endowed with this feeling in a high degree, constantly say, I will, but they employ I will in the same way and with the same signification as is expressed by the words, I want, I desire, I insist upon, I command. The faculty here spoken of gives constancy and perseverance to the other powers, contributing to maintain their activity. It is another ingredient of the love of dominion. Its applications bear different names as they emanate from its combination with other faculties, and relate to the situation of the individuals in whom it is active. He who has firmness combined with pride, ambition and selfishness, does not willingly obey others, but is himself fond of commanding; whilst he who is firm in his decision, but just and benevolent at the same time, seeks for independence, claims equal rights with every member of the community, and requires the same duties of all. The influence of the faculty is always great, as well when the individual is well as when he is ill disposed, that is, according as it is combined with the superior or inferior feelings.

Being too active, it produces many disorders, such as infatuation, stubbornness, obstinacy, and disobedience; it is also one of the causes of mutiny and sedition; its insufficiency leaves the other faculties to take the lead, and renders men inconstant, changeable, and yielding to circumstances. It is however to be remarked that perseverance in the gratification of predominant dispositions may be observed in persons whose organ of firmness is small. An individual with large acquisitiveness, and small firmness, may make great and constant efforts to become rich, but he will be unsteady in the means he employs; whilst another, with large firmness, steadily pursues the plan he adopts.

The seat of the organ has already been indicated; it is in the midst of the other feelings, and seems to strengthen their general activity.
XVI. *Organ of Conscientiousness.*

The manifestations of a feeling of justice and conscientiousness, or the love of truth and duty, are eminently deserving of attention in the study of mankind. Many jurisconsults and other persons connected with the law, think that positive legislation is the source of justice, whilst the sentiment of justice, in reality, precedes legislation and is its cause. Those are also wrong who maintain that revealed religion has produced the feeling of justice or righteousness; whilst the feeling of conscience is innate and indirect only in its application by revelation. But before proceeding farther, let us distinguish two significations of the word justice. It means the innate faculty which views all actions in the point of right or wrong, and it indicates determinate actions as being just or unjust. Revealed religion and civil legislation determine that which is positively just or unjust, but it must be ascertained whether there is a fundamental sentiment which disposes mankind to look and to wish for justice, and which receives the positive, civil, or religious legislation. I use the term justice in conscientiousness in the first signification.

In speaking of benevolence, I have shown that Gall confounds this primitive sentiment with that of justice. We therefore differ in our explanations of the phenomena of morality, he ascribing them all to a single faculty, and I admitting two different sentiments, one of benevolence and another of conscientiousness. In the same manner he considers the notions of man on the existence of God and of religion as the result of one faculty, whilst I think that several feelings, each dependent on a special organ, are concerned in producing religious ideas.

It is certain that the feeling of duty or conscientiousness is not equally strong in all men. Children, before they have received any education, are very different in this respect. Some pay no attention to representations on the point of justice, others listen to them with pleasure. Children, however, in general seem to pos-
sess the feeling of justice in a higher degree than adult persons. Among the latter some have an internal monitor which constantly advises them of their duties, and without having the law they do that which the law prescribes. But those who think that this internal monitor or primitive feeling is the best guide of innocence, and the sure punisher of those who act in opposition to its dictates, are greatly mistaken; for it is quite obvious that the natural feeling of conscientiousness is very weak in many individuals, and that the law or the regulations of a watchful police are indispensably necessary to keep them in order. Very few look always and only for truth, and receive it from whatever source it comes. It is, for instance, not predominant in those who may say of the assassination of a prince, 'it is more than a crime, it is a fault.' Nor can it be considerable in an author, who writes, Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing. The doer of ill must be destroyed not punished, the doer of good is lucky not virtuous; this is the first step of wisdom. Plutarch, in the life of Flaminius, remarks, that of all virtues the rarest is justice. It is also certain, that he who is dragged into criminal acts by very strong internal propensities unbalanced by the feeling of justice, rarely feels compunction for his misdeeds, or repents sincerely. The brute inclinations constitute, if I may so express myself, his principal character, and all the actions which result from them are in harmony with his inclinations.

This fatal truth, though it may displease those who dream of nothing but the dignity of human nature, is nevertheless proved by observation, and is conformable to Christianity. 'A good tree,' said Jesus,* 'cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.' 'The natural man,' says the Apostle Paul,† 'receives not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.' Cardinal Polignac‡ speaks of men who are born wicked, and to whom crime is delightful. 'Why should a criminal,' he asks, 'who does not consider himself wicked, re-

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* Rom. vii. 18. † 1 Cor. ii. 14. ‡ Antilucrece, t. i. p. 164.
pent?" Indeed the greatest criminals do not commonly think themselves guilty, and therefore cannot repent. Some of them with incredible stubbornness deny the most satisfactory proofs of their guilt, and audaciously insult those who bear witness against them; others, with impudent sincerity, relate a series of horrible trespasses, and find a subject of merriment in such crimes as make humanity shudder. Mr. Bruggmanns, at Leyden, showed us the skull of a robber chief, who had precipitated different persons into the canals, only to have the pleasure of seeing them struggling in the agonies of death. On his trial, this wretch said: "What will you do with me—I am not an honest man?" We saw a girl at Munster who had assisted her mother to kill her father, and who did not manifest the slightest repentance. If her crime was spoken of, she only shrugged her shoulders. In short, the reports of the trials of almost all inveterate criminals justify the observation, that there are certain guilty persons who are never guided by conscience, and who never feel either remorse or repentance. Such beings are even proud of their power of doing evil, and relate with pleasure the most remarkable stratagems and actions of their criminal lives.

Sterne, (in Tristam Shandy, vol. i. p. 140,) has a remarkable passage to this effect. "Whenever a man's conscience does accuse him, (as it seldom errs on that side) he is guilty; and, unless in melancholy and hypochondriac cases, we may safely pronounce upon it that there is always sufficient grounds for the accusation. But the converse of the proposition will not hold true, viz. that whenever there is guilt, the conscience must accuse, and if it does not, that a man is therefore innocent. This is not fact; so that the common consolation, which some good Christian or other, is hourly administering to himself,—that he thanks God his mind does not misgive him, and that consequently he has a good conscience, because he hath a quiet one, is fallacious; and as current as the inference is, and as infallible as the rule appears, at first sight, yet when you look nearer to it, and try the truth of this rule upon plain facts, you see it liable to so much error, from a false
application, the principle upon which it goes so often perverted, the whole force of it lost, and sometimes so vilely cast away, that it is painful to produce the common examples of human life, which confirm the account.

'A man shall be vicious, and utterly debauched in his principles, exceptionable in his conduct to the world, shall live shameless in the open commission of a sin, which no reason or pretence can justify; a sin by which, contrary to all the workings of humanity, he shall ruin forever the deluded partner of his guilt, rob her of her best dowry, and not only cover her own head with dishonor, but involve a whole virtuous family in shame and dishonor for her sake. Surely you will think conscience must lead such a man a troublesome life; he can have no rest night or day from its reproaches.

'Alas! conscience had something else to do all this time, than break in upon him. Perhaps he was gone out, in company with honor, to fight a duel, to pay off some debt at play, or dirty annuity, the bargain of his lust; perhaps conscience all this time was engaged at home, talking aloud against petty larceny and executing vengeance upon some such puny crimes as his fortune and rank of life secured him against all temptation of committing; so that he lives as merrily, sleeps as soundly in his bed, and at last meets death as unconcernedly, perhaps much more so, than a much better man.

'Another is sordid, unmerciful, a strait-hearted selfish wretch, incapable either of private friendship, or public spirit. Take notice how he passes by the widow and orphan, in their distress, and sees all the miseries incident to human life, without a sigh or a prayer. Shall not conscience rise up and sting him, on such occasions? No, thank God, there is no occasion. I pay every man his own; I have debauched no man's wife or child; I have no faithless vows or promises to make up. Thank God, I am not as other men, adulterers, unjust, or even as this libertine, who stands before me.

'A third is crafty and designing in his nature. View his whole
life. It is nothing but a cunning contexture of dark arts, and unequitable subterfuges, basely to defeat the true intent of all laws, plain dealing and the safe enjoyment of our several properties. You will see such an one working out a frame of little designs upon the ignorance and perplexities of the poor and needy man; shall raise a fortune upon the inexperience of a youth, or the unsuspecting temper of his friend, who would have trusted him with his life. When old age comes on, and repentance calls him to look back upon his black account, and state it over again with his conscience; conscience looks into the statutes at large, finds no express law broken by what he has done, perceives no penalty or forfeiture of goods, sees no scourge waving over his head, or prison opening its gates upon him. What is there to affright his conscience. Conscience has got safely entrenched behind the letter of the law, sits there invulnerable, fortified with cases and reports so strongly on all sides, that it is not preaching that can dispossess it of its hold.

'A fourth man shall even want this refuge, shall break through all the ceremony of slow chicane, scorns the doubtful workings of secret plots, and cautious trains, to bring about his purpose; see the barefaced villain, how he cheats, lies, perjures, robs, murders; horrid! but indeed much better was not to be expected in the present case. The poor man, was in the dark, his priest had got the keeping of his conscience, and all he would let him know of it was, that he must believe in the Pope, go to mass, cross himself, tell his beads, be a good catholic; and that this in all conscience was enough to carry him to heaven.

'Thus, conscience, placed on high as a judge within us, and intended by our Maker as a just and equitable one too, by an unhappy train of causes and impediments, takes often much imperfect cognizance of what passes, does its office so negligently, often so corruptly, that it is not to be trusted alone, and therefore we find there is a necessity, an absolute necessity, of joining another principle with it, to aid if not to govern its determinations.'

My only intention is to prove that there is a fundamental power which seeks for justice, which is more or less active in different
individuals, being so weak in some as to be by no means sufficient to restrain or to direct the inferior propensities. Weakness of the feeling of justice is a lamentable cause of disorder in the world, and is the true source of almost all moral and political vices. This deficiency makes man break engagements of all kinds; makes it necessary to declare royalty inviolable, and to make the ministers of kings answerable; it is this deficiency also that renders positive laws indispensable to keep the individual propensities in order. The feeling of justice is the attribute of a noble mind, and is an essential condition of union and general happiness.

Dr. Guillié, of Paris, in his work on the instruction of the blind, maintains that these unfortunates are naturally deprived of sensibility, shame and conscience. Mr. John Joach Roques has answered and refuted this extraordinary accusation in the fifth volume of the Revue Encyclopedique.* Conscience is certainly independent of sight. The blind, the deaf, and the dumb, follow their natural inclinations, before they have received a moral education. The lower feelings are predominant in the greater number of them, as well as of other persons, and their actions, therefore, mostly resemble those of animals. Yet the want of sight or of hearing does not exclude either justice or benevolence. These faculties exist, and may act independently of each other. Convinced then that there is in mankind a sentiment which seeks for justice, and that its energy is very different in different individuals, and even in nations, I shall now consider its origin.

I have already explained and proved that the sentiment of benevolence is not the same as that of conscientiousness. Benevolence may even be contrary to justice. I may find it my interest to be very benevolent to certain persons. This behavior, however, cannot easily be called just. Moreover, the morality of our actions cannot be founded on religious faith and hope; and still less on selfishness; such virtue would degrade those who practice it. Hobbes, however, taught, in the middle of the seventeenth century, that we approve of virtuous actions from self-love, knowing

* Page 610.
that whatever promotes the interest of society has on that very account an indirect tendency to promote our own. Mandeville too, at the beginning of the last century, maintained that man is utterly selfish, that he has a strong appetite for praise, and purchases this praise by moral virtue. Moreover, Hume thought utility the constituent or means of virtue. Even Dr. Paley is an adherent of the selfish system under a modified form. He makes virtue consist in the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness. According to him the will of God is our rule, but private happiness our motive. On the other hand, Cudworth, Dr. Hutcheson, Dr. Reid, Dr. Price, Day, and Stewart maintain the existence of a moral sense, which produces the sentiment of right and wrong independently of any other consideration. Adam Smith (Theory of Moral Sentiments) admits an instinctive principle of sympathy, which leads us to transform ourselves in imagination into the situation of others, and compels us to approve or blame their conduct, according as we find ourselves disposed or averse to participate in the feelings from which it springs. Sympathy is an innate principle, but morality an after-thought, derived from mature reflection. Thus, he derives mediately conscientiousness from reason; but the desire to be just in one's actions is no science to be taught, and by no means in proportion to the intellectual faculties. Do we not see daily that the moral conduct of many does not answer their intellectual capacities? I wish every critic of Phrenology had shown as much love of truth and moral excellency as mental cleverness.

It is said that Socrates invented morality at Athens; but Aristides was just before Socrates lived, and Leonidas had died for his country before Socrates taught, that to love our native land was a duty. I admit a fundamental sentiment of the desire to be just, which, in my opinion, also produces remorse or repentance, and constitutes the essential part of moral conscience. This feeling, however, does not determine what is just or unjust, right or wrong, true or false. These particular determinations depend on the other faculties with which the sentiment is combined; thus, a person
endowed with conscientiousness and some of the lower propensities will call that just, which another, who possesses conscientiousness combined with benevolence or reverence, will call unjust.* A criminal in stealing from the rich and in giving to the poor, may sometimes consider his actions as just. The combination of conscientiousness with other faculties, also, explains why various legislators have taken such different moral principles as the basis of their regulations.

These latter considerations teach us, that we cannot trust to the natural conscience of man to perform that which is right and advantageous for all; first, because few examine their actions according to justice; and secondly, because those who do so are easily misled, and, influenced by their individual faculties, often arrive at erroneous conclusions; hence follows the necessity of establishing a determinate justice, or the law. The widow in Europe desires to have a good settlement made by a deceased husband: in India she desires to be burnt on his funeral pile.

Now, a question of much importance arises: Is the law or positive justice arbitrary? or is there a natural law which ought to be universally acknowledged and admitted as obligatory in all countries? Hitherto masters have commanded, and the law has made sin; but is there then no morality that is universal? Chemistry never varies, geometry and arithmetic ever remain the same; may it not be so with morality likewise? These considerations are philosophical and practical, they, therefore, belong to the philosophical part of Phrenology, where they are examined in detail. Here I confine my inquiries to the fundamental powers of the mind and their respective organs.

Gall and I differ widely in our opinions upon justice. According to him, there is no particular organ of conscientiousness; he formerly considered what is called conscience as resulting from the dominant character of an individual, being opposed to his parti-

*‘Al the ways of man are clean in his own eyes, but the Lord weighteth the spirits;’ Prov. xvi. 2. ‘Every way of a man is right in his own eyes, but the Lord pondereth the hearts;’ Prov. xxi. 2.
ular actions. In this view there were consequently as many consciences as faculties; he even spoke of a good and of a bad conscience,—the first being the opposition of the good, and the second the opposition of the bad faculties to a particular action. Thus, if a good-natured man commit a fault or offend any one, he repents, and his conscience torments him because he has acted in opposition to his dominant character. On the other hand, a usurer and a libertine are sorry for having neglected a good opportunity, the first of deceiving, the second of seducing, some unsuspecting and innocent person. Gall called this opposition of the dominant character to any line of conduct, the natural conscience; but he said that we cannot trust to this, and that it is necessary to establish some positive conscience; that is, to determine what is to be done and what is to be let alone, without the individual desires of any one being considered. In consequence: Thou shalt adore one God, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not kill, &c.

It is certain that good-natured persons repent when they have committed a fault. A mother, for instance, who has been dishonored and consigned to the most unfortunate of situations, may in a moment of despair and confusion deprive her new-born child of life; but the fatal concourse of circumstances being past, and the natural sentiments of benevolence and justice beginning again to act, she will feel the contradiction between her dominant character and her action. At Spandau, in Prussia, we saw a man who, although always looked upon as good-natured, had assassinated his wife in a paroxysm of rage. Existence ever afterwards hung upon him as a heavy burden. Yet it must be remarked that the opposition of the natural character alone to any action does not constitute conscience; a criminal will not feel repentance for having acted in a way which may be good in itself and not hurtful to him. A thief who voluntarily gives a part of his booty to the poor will not repent having done so, unless the act betrays him. Gall, in saying that usurers repent having neglected a good opportunity of deceiving others, confounds repentance or remorse with the being sorry for, or being displeased. It seems to me that every organ not being
satisfied, or being disagreeably affected, produces pain or sorrow; but I cannot conceive that every faculty produces repentance or remorse. This as I have said before, is a peculiar affection of conscientiousness.

The preceding considerations farther induce me to disapprove of Gall’s division of the conscience into natural, good or bad, artificial or positive. I divide it, first, into natural or absolute, the effect of conscientiousness combined with all the other faculties proper to man, those which are common to man and animals being held in subordination; secondly, into individual, particular, or relative, which results from the conscientiousness of every one combined with his other faculties; thirdly, into positive, which is fixed by legislation whether divine or civil, as by the commands, Thou shalt not eat meat on Fridays or Saturdays; Thou shalt go to church every Sunday, &c. Thus the sentiment of conscientiousness is the basis of morality; it raises our mind to consider between wrong and right; desires to be just; thinks of duty and moral obligation, and loves truth without determining justice on truth. This feeling in itself, like all others, is liable to aberrations and mistakes. Ravaillac, the murderer of Henry IV. king of France, and Louvel, the assassin of the Duke of Berry, and Inquisitors speak of justice. This sentiment may excuse every cruelty in religious fanaticism.

The organ of conscientiousness is situated between firmness and cautiousness. More details of this kind are given in the volume on the Philosophical Principles of Phrenology.

XVII. Organ of Hope.

I shall now examine the affective powers, which besides benevolence are essential to religion, and principally give faith or belief in the miraculous part of religion; or, as some express it, in the doctrines of religion, as if the moral part were not also a doctrine of Christianity.
Gall considers hope as belonging to, or as a part of the function of every faculty; but I think that he confounds this peculiar feeling with desire, or want. Every faculty being active, desires, therefore even animals desire; but there is something more than this in man—a peculiar feeling which is by no means proportionate to the activity of any other faculty. We may desire ardently, and yet be without hope.

The sentiment of hope is indeed necessary to the happiness of mankind in almost every situation. It often produces more satisfaction than even the success of our projects. Its activity, however, varies greatly in different individuals; whilst some easily despair, others are always elated and find every thing for the best; constant hope sustains them in the midst of difficulties; the first plan for accomplishing any object having failed, only stimulates them to form new ones, which they confidently expect will succeed. Those who are everlastingly scheming, or building castles in the air, possess this faculty in a high degree. It seems to induce a belief in the possibility of whatever the other faculties desire, without producing conviction; for this results from reflection.

This sentiment is not confined to the business of this life; but passing the limits of present existence, it inspires hopes of a future state, and belief in the immortality of the soul, which is promised by Christianity.

Hope, like any other faculty, may be too strong or too weak. In the former case it induces us to expect things which are unreasonable, not founded on probability, or altogether impossible. When its energy is too feeble, on the contrary, and circumspection predominates, this is apt to produce despair, melancholy, lowness of spirits, &c.

The organ of hope is situated laterally on each side of that of veneration.

The organs of conscientiousness and hope, are intimately connected on one side with firmness, and on the other with acquisitiveness.
XVIII. *Organ of Marvelousness.*

There is still a sentiment which exerts a very great influence over religious conceptions, and which, in my opinion, contributes more than veneration to religious faith. Some find all things natural and regulated by the laws of creation; many others are amused with fictions, tales of wonders, and miraculous occurrences. They find in every passing event extraordinary and wonderful circumstances, and are constantly searching after whatever can excite admiration and astonishment. This sentiment is to be observed among mankind at large, both among savages and civilized nations. In every age, and under every sky, man has been guided and led by his credulity and superstition. The founders of all nations have had a fabulous origin ascribed to them, and in all countries miraculous traditions and marvellous stories occur in ample abundance. Almost all histories, until within the two last centuries, reported seriously supernatural facts. Hercules in his cradle suffocated serpents; Romulus was nourished by a she-wolf. There are many disposed to believe in dreams, sorcery, amulets, magic, astrology, in the mystic influence of spirits and angels, in the power of the devil, in second sight, and in miracles and incomprehensible representations of all sorts. Some also are disposed to have visions, and to see ghosts, demons, and phantoms. This sentiment gains credence to the true and also to the false prophet, aids superstition, but is also essential to the belief in the doctrines of refined religion. It is more or less active, not only in different individuals, but also in whole nations; its functions are often disordered, constituting one form of insanity, called demonomania.

The legislators of antiquity, aware of the great influence of this faculty, made frequent use of it to enforce and to confirm their laws. They spoke in the name of God, of angels, or of supernatural powers. The angel Gabriel purified the heart of Mahomet when a child. Mahomet visited at night the different mansions in heaven, and being introduced by Gabriel, he was welcome every
where, and saluted as the greatest prophet. Whatever Mahomet did is represented as miraculous, and no pious Mahometan doubts of its truth. In our own days, the religious sects of Swedenborgians, Methodists, Quakers, and many others, particularly demonstrate its influence and presence. Men at large have a strong propensity to believe in miracles; but the fact that accounts of supernatural agency prove so generally false, is a reason for looking upon them with distrust. Miracles indeed ought on this account to be sifted more than common facts. In dramatic representations, the introduction of ghosts, angels, transformations, and supernatural events, proclaims its activity both in the author and in the public, by whom such exhibitions are relished and sought after.

The existence of this feeling is certain. This disposition is inherent, or part of our mental constitution, like the disposition to trace effects to adequate causes. Its organ is situated anterior to hope, and a great development of the convolutions on which it depends enlarges and elevates the superior and lateral parts of the frontal bone. It is remarkably prominent in the head of Socrates, of Torquato Tasso, Dr. Price, Young, Stilling, Wesley, &c. My observations on it are extremely numerous, and I consider it as established.

The preceding facts determined me formerly to designate this feeling by the name of supernaturality; and it is certain that it is principally manifested by a belief in miraculous and supernatural circumstances, in the foundation of religion by supernatural means, and in its points called doctrines. As, however, the feeling may be applied both to natural and supernatural events, and in every case fills the mind with amazement and surprise, I do not hesitate to change the name of supernaturality into that of marvellousness. This name I prefer to that of wonder, adopted by Mr. Combe, because, according to Dr. Johnson's dictionary, wonder is applicable only to surprise excited by natural objects, whilst marvellousness embraces both kinds of astonishment caused by natural and supernatural circumstances.
XIX. Organ of Ideality.

That 'a poet must be born,' has passed into a proverb, and education is generally acknowledged inadequate to produce poetic talents. Children sometimes exhibit such powers previous to any instruction, and there is the greatest difference among adults in the capacity. Pope says of himself, 'I lisped in numbers for the numbers came.' Those who study the phenomena of insanity, know that the talent of poetry is often excited and developed by this diseased condition. 'Several facts,' says Pinel, 'seems so extraordinary, that they stand in need of the most respectable testimonies, in order to be admitted. I speak of the poetical enthusiasm which characterizes certain fits of mania when verses are recited, which are by no means the result of reminiscence alone.'* Pinel mentions several of his own observations, and quotes the case of a girl from Van Swieten, who, during her fits of mania, showed a rare facility in making verses, though previous to her illness she had been employed in manual labor, and had never had her understanding cultivated by education.

Before we left Vienna, Gall had looked for an organ of poetry, and even observed that the heads of great poets were enlarged above the temples, in a direction backward and upward; (Pl. IX. fig. 2 XIX.) but he spoke guardedly on this point at that time. Since we commenced our journey, however, we have multiplied observations and accumulated facts to such an amount, that Gall admits an organ of poetry as quite certain.

It is true, that great poets, both of ancient and modern times, Homer, Pindar, Euripides, Sophocles, Terence, Ovid, Horace, Ariosto, Torquato, Tasso, Shakspeare, Milton, Lord Byron, Schiller, Goethe, Wieland, Racine, Corneille, Voltaire, &c. &c. have the cerebral part, indicated above, much developed. It seems to me, however, that there is no peculiar or single faculty of poetry in the widest acceptation of that term. We must therefore determine the essential of every kind of poetry, which I am inclined to

* Second edition, p. III.
attribute to this organ as its special faculty, whilst the species of poetry produced, depends on the combination of this with the other faculties of the individual poet. It cannot be the faculty of versification; for some authors, J. J. Rousseau, Buffon, and many others, write in prose, and yet their expressions are highly poetical; while others make verses which contain no tinge of poetic feeling. Still less is it the faculty of rhyming, since among the ancients rhyme was entirely unknown, and among the moderns poetry is not always in rhyme.

Now all great poets have this part of the brain much developed, but all who have it large are not necessarily great poets, though they may be fond of poetical conceptions. Women illustrate this point; they often possess the organ much developed, are fond of poetry, but seldom excel in its composition.

I think that the poetic turn of mind results from a peculiar mode of feeling, a certain manner of viewing the world and events. A plain, unadorned description of things as they are, cannot be called poetry; vividness, glow, exaltation, imagination, inspiration, rapture, and warmth in the expressions, are requisite to constitute compositions worthy of the name; all is represented in exaggerated terms, in a state of perfection, such as it ought to be. Poets picture forth a fictitious and imaginary world. Thus I admit a sentiment which vivifies the other faculties, and impresses a peculiar character called poetical or ideal. It may be combined with both the affective and intellectual faculties, and aspires to imaginary perfection or completion in every thing. It produces the sublime in the arts, makes enthusiasts of us in friendship, virtue, painting, music, or any other direction which our natural feelings or talents take. Combined with attachment, it produces sentimentality; with the higher sentiments it leads to nobleness and delicacy of character; with self-esteem and love of approbation it causes susceptibility.

The organ of this sentiment is placed by the side of marvellousness, and the two frequently act together, particularly in mythology. Poetry is often embellished by the addition of the myste-
rious and supernatural. I have collected many facts on this organ, and am quite certain that its function corresponds to the manner of feeling just now described. The degree of exaltation experienced by poets varies according to its greater or smaller development.

Too great activity of the sentiment is a frequent cause of unhappiness, since it makes us look for a state of things, which, as it does not exist, we cannot find. I call its organ that of Ideality. It is small in criminals.

XX. Organ of Mirthfulness.

There is something peculiar in the human mind, called Witz by the Germans, and Wit by the English, terms which have no exact equivalent among the French, though the mental operation they express is very active in France. I explain this peculiarity by the combinations of the faculty, producing wit, with others, being different in Germany, England, and France. The French, eminently endowed with love of approbation, search constantly after distinction; they are consequently fond of merry sayings and showy expressions, delight in what are called bon mots, esteem the esprit de saillie et de repartie, and designate facility in these particulars by the name bel esprit. The Germans and English, on the other hand, frequently combine the faculty in question with that of reflection, and call it Witz and Wit.

Those who write like Voltaire, Rabelais, Piron, Sterne, Rabe­ner, Wieland, and all who are fond of jest, raillery, ridicule, irony and comical conceptions, have the upper and outer parts of the forehead, immediately before the organ of ideality, of considerable size.

It is difficult to define the primitive faculty whose exhibition accompanies this organization. Gall considers it as an intellectual power, and calls it in French, esprit de saillie, or esprit caustique, though he allows that this name does not indicate Witz or Wit. I repeat that, in my opinion, these words denote compound operations of the mind. Wit is commonly said to consist in facility of
comparing objects, in order to discover their similarity or dissimilarity. But one may have the greatest talent for comparing ideas or objects, without possessing wit. The mode of comparing philosophically also differs very widely from that of comparing wittily; a comparison may be witty, but philosophically erroneous at the same time.

I do not consider the faculty as intellectual, but as affective; as a sentiment which disposes men to view every thing in a gay, joyful and mirthful manner. It may be applied to words, to things, to ideas, to arts, and to every mental manifestation. Hence the different names it receives from its modified functions, such as wit, good-humor, caricature, mockery and irony. The poet, painter, sculptor, draughtsman, musician, orator, &c. often proclaim its activity in their productions. Combined with inferior feelings, and not restrained by benevolence, reverence and justice, it is apt to offend by sarcasms, epigrams, and satires.

The faculty, it seems to me, was given to man to render him merry and gay,—feelings not to be confounded with satisfaction or contentment; these are affections of every faculty, whilst gaiety and mirthfulness belong to that which now occupies our attention. Its organ is situated, as I have said, in the upper and lateral part of the forehead, before the organ of ideality. (Pl. IX. fig. 1. XX.)

Mr. William Scott, of Edinburgh, has taken a particular view of this faculty. He believes that its primitive function is to distinguish differences. According to him, the faculty of comparison perceives resemblance, the one we speak of in particular, differences, and causality, situated between the two, necessary connexion: the three combined, therefore, form the truly philosophic understanding.

Mr. G. Combe formerly thought well of this view, and therefore preserved the number and name of this organ, as they stand in the two first editions of my Physiognomical System. In my French publication I changed these, as I considered the name wit insufficient, and the faculty so styled, a feeling. I continue to do so, being more and more convinced that the alteration is proper.
Mr. Combe, in his third edition, both of his Elements and of his System of Phrenology, has adopted my new order of numbering the organs, and seems disposed to adopt my view of this special faculty. As to the view taken by Mr. William Scott, I reply, that in my opinion the same power which perceives resemblances, perceives differences also. I see no reason for adopting two faculties for the act of discrimination. The same power perceives the harmony and disharmony of tones; there is only one power of coloring; and the proportion and disproportion in dimensions are felt by the same faculty of size; in the same way, I think that comparison alone distinguishes similitudes and dissimilitudes, differences, analogies or identities. But even granting Mr. William Scott's supposition of one power for perceiving resemblances, and another for perceiving differences, I still think it necessary to admit a special feeling of mirthfulness. We may excite mirthfulness, it is true, by making comparisons of things which differ, but we may do so also by comparing things which resemble each other. If amidst incongruity and difference we seek for analogies, the faculty of comparison is active, and combined with mirthfulness it will undoubtedly make us laugh. But we may laugh heartily at a single object, without allusion to any difference. Those who are the most disposed to laugh and to be merry, are not always the most intelligent and the most skilful in distinguishing either analogies or differences. The feeling of mirthfulness, therefore, seems to be special. It may be excited by pointing out differences or resemblances, by the agency of various feelings, by playing tricks, or by inspiring fear. The fundamental power then cannot be wit. This is only one of its applications, and results from its combination with intellect. Mr. William Scott, in his well elaborated article of wit and the feeling of the ludicrous (Phrenological Journal, No. xiv. p. 195.) thinks that the view I formerly took of this faculty is more correct than that which I now entertain; and that it is an intellectual power which compares for the purpose of discovering contrasts, and of bringing together incongruous, disproportionate and opposite ideas. I grant that wit requires comparison and a contrast, be it incongruity, or
even absurdity; in mean, burlesque or dignified objects; be it in
travestling, exaggerating or diminishing reality; but I see no proof
that these mental operations result from the faculty in question
alone, and therefore from an intellectual faculty. Religion becomes
reasonable by the influence of the reflective powers; religion,
however, depends primitively on feelings. Why then should not
a peculiar feeling excite comparison, in a way that its functions are
ludicrous or laughable; dignity or meanness, exaggeration or dimi-
nution, are neither the effect of comparison, nor of the peculiar
feeling now under examination, but of other feelings. Hence, if
the power we wish to determine appears under various modifica-
tions, this happens on account of its combination with other affec-
tive or intellectual faculties; the ludicrous, mirthful, or comical
alone remains essential, but it becomes wit by contrasting, or by
a peculiar mode of acting in comparison, and absurdity by con-
trasting in opposition to the laws of reason. The comic tendency
of this power is constant, but the perception of differences does
not seem to be its essence; since persons may easily feel differen-
tes or even see the contrast, without wishing to amuse or without
being amused. I therefore propose for this faculty the name of
mirthfulness. Its organ is before the organ of ideality, and above
that of tune. It is remarkable that the anterior, lateral, and upper
region of the brain contains the organs of such powers as seem to
be given particularly for amusements and theatrical performances.
The next also belongs to them.

XXI. Organ of Imitation.

Gall would not probably have thought of searching for the organ
of a faculty for imitating, had not one of his acquaintances, Mr.
Hannibal, at Vienna, who possessed this power in great perfection,
and was an excellent actor, desired him to examine a transverse
furrow in the middle of his head. The hollow Gall found, but he
was more struck with a considerable elevation of a semi-globular
form before it. Shortly after this, in the Institute for Deaf and
Dumb, he perceived a configuration of the upper and fore part of the head exactly resembling that of his friend's, in an individual, who, having for the first time put on a mask at the carnival, imitated perfectly all those who frequented the institution. These two cases furnished a basis for further observation, and after much research both in Vienna, and during our travels, and finding a regular coincidence between the development of the cerebral part in the situation described and the faculty of imitation, we admit its function as demonstrated. Those who have it highly developed are fond of acting and of dramatic representation; they also often imitate the gestures, voice, manners, and in general all the manifestations of man and animals. (Pl. ix. fig. 2. xxi.)

The existence of the faculty of imitation is proved in the same way as every other primitive power. It is in general more active in children than in adults; and it is known that children learn a great deal by imitation: they do what they see done by others: they repeat what they hear told. It differs much in adults, and is not at all proportionate to the other faculties. Those who have it large speak not with words only, they accompany all they say with appropriate and descriptive gestures, and imitate the voice, air and behavior of those who form the subjects of their conversation. Sometimes idiots from birth imitate much of what they see and hear. Cabanis* mentions the case of one whose desire to imitate the attitudes and movements of others was irresistible. Pinel † relates the case of an idiot female who imitated all that was done in her presence, repeated automatically what she heard told, and imitated with great correctness the gestures and gait of the insane in the hospital. Finally, the correspondence between this natural capacity and the state of a certain organic apparatus, proves beyond doubt the existence of such a power.

Its sphere of activity is very great, especially during infancy. Some, throughout life, manifest it in an eminent degree, and feel a peculiar pleasure in theatrical performances. Though indispensa-

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* Du Rapport entre le Physique et le Moral de l'homme, t. 1.
ble to actors, it, however, of itself neither constitutes the comedian nor the tragedian. Its combinations with other mental faculties show how far individual actors are fitted to play particular characters. Alone, the faculty does nothing but imitate, and any actor may copy the manner of playing of others, without being capable of conceiving the expressions or natural language of a given character. To do this, the individual faculties, which constitute that character, must be combined with imitation. This view explains why an actor may be perfect in one line and scarcely middling in another. The possession of the faculty of imitation is essential to success in the arts of drawing, sculpture, and painting; it gives what is called expression and life. Without it the productions of artists are stiff and inanimate. It gives the facility of feeling and performing dramatic music, and of acquiring the accent of foreign languages. It aids orators essentially, by regulating their declamation and gesticulation. It is the basis of the talent of ventriloquism.

The three faculties last discussed are essential to theatrical performances. They most generally act in combination with the intellectual faculties, but their nature seems nevertheless to be rather affective than intellectual.

It is difficult to say, to what extent animals possess this faculty. Monkeys do various things like man; but is this in consequence of mere imitation, or of their having certain powers in common with man? The latter part of the question would seem to be well answered, in many cases, in the affirmative. On the same principle, the imitation of singing-birds may be explained, rather by the faculty of tune, than by imitation alone. The power of tune perceives, recollects and repeats the song of other birds, or of man; yet I admit that the primitive power of imitation exists among many tribes of the animal kingdom. Parrots not only repeat harmonious tones, but all sorts even of harsh and discordant noises.

Gall attributes to imitation the pleasure which some persons feel in being masked. For my part, I think that the love of imitating
costumes, actions and gestures, and the desire of concealing the face with a mask or *domino* for the sake of intrigue, cannot be confounded together. Whenever concealment interferes, the organ of secretiveness is active, and plays a principal part.

**General Reflections on the Affective Faculties.**

Reasoning will never refute the idea of peculiar organs being necessary for the affective manifestations of the mind. The mind in itself may be simple, but observation shows, that each sort of affective operation is attached to a particular part of the brain. Another essential point is, that the affective faculties depend on internal sources, that they are often active spontaneously, and not from the excitation of external causes; moreover, their functions are always involuntary; and, finally, they exist independently of understanding, for they are blind impulses, and are only enlightened by the addition of reason. They are almost the sole causes of the variety of action that degrades or exalts the human character. It is a just idea to represent ignorance as an evil spirit. Love, too, is well figured with bandaged eyes. Emblematic portraits of all feelings might be similarly circumstanced; for the very highest sentiments of human nature, without the guidance of intelligence, err incessantly. How necessary then to cultivate the powers which point out the sources of our errors, and how blasphemous and irreverent towards the great Creator every attempt to repress the exercise of intelligence! The friends of humanity cannot stigmatize sufficiently, nor expose in too strong a light to the execration of mankind, that abomination, religious despotism, which interdicts reason, and requires of those who would obtain eternal happiness, blind faith and unenlightened obedience. Such a tyranny can be exerted only to continue errors of every description, and with these to inflict every kind of evil upon the world; it even renders the possibility of avoiding or correcting falsehood unattainable.

In treating of the preceding organs, I mentioned the discoveries
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of Gall, and added the analysis as I found it out, with respect to the greater number of their respective faculties, particularly of the moral and religious feelings. Gall always derived the preceding powers from within, but did not admit their nature to be merely affective.

SECTION IX.

Of Understanding, or the Intellectual Faculties.

I call intellectual every faculty which procures to man or animals any kind of knowledge, cognition of any impression, be it of hunger or thirst, of the sensation of fatigue, of pain, of the affective functions, of the existence of external objects, their qualities or relations. Knowledge, then, is the essential object of the intellectual faculties. I divide the order of intellectual faculties into four genera, which I shall investigate separately in as many chapters. In the first, I shall speak of the external senses; in the second, of the faculties which know external objects and their physical qualities; in the third, of the faculties which procure notions of relations; and in the fourth, of those which reason or reflection the operations of all the other mental powers.

CHAPTER I.

Genus I.—Of the Intellectual Faculties.

External Senses.

The external senses permit man and animals to communicate with the beings around them; it is by their medium that determinate consciousness of the external world is acquired; without them, man, animals would only have an internal existence, but and
not, as Richerand says, a mere *vegetative* existence. What then can be more interesting to man than his senses, to which he owes so many sensations, so many enjoyments? Hence, the assiduous study of their functions and structure by philosophers, physiologists and anatomists, who nevertheless made little progress, and left many essential points in darkness. On the other hand, various extravagant and contradictory opinions have been the fruit of their labors. Of a few of these I shall take a brief notice.

I do not remember that the affective powers have ever been derived from the external senses; but this is not the case in respect to the *intellectual* faculties. According to many ancient philosophers all ideas are innate, and are only excited by the external senses. Since the time of Bacon and Locke, the greater number of philosophical systems rest upon the axiom of Aristotle, that all ideas of the mind begin with impressions furnished by means of the external senses. Dr. T. Brown says,* 'In the external senses we find the rude elements of all our knowledge, the material on which the mind is ever operating, and without which it seems to us almost impossible to conceive that it could ever have operated at all; and could even see its absolute activity, or have been conscious of its own internal existence.' According to this principle, the perfection of the intellectual faculties must depend on that of the external senses. Now if the ideas and sensations of man and animals are either produced or excited solely or specially by one or other of the five senses, they ought to manifest capacities according to external circumstances and accidental impressions; their faculties ought to bear relation to the state of the five senses, and to the education these have received; and individuals ought to be susceptible of change and modification at pleasure. Daily experience, however, contradicts this hypothesis with all its conclusions.

Another class of philosophers maintain that the mind acts independently of all organization, and that the senses are rather an impediment to, than instruments in, its action. They complain

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*Lectures, stereotype edit. p. 109.*
much of the illusions of sense, and despise all testimony and every conclusion grounded upon sensation. According to them, that only is truth which may be conceived by the understanding alone. If the influence of external objects, of social institutions, of education in general, be denied, it would be to contradict the history of all times and of every individual. If truth resulted from reflection alone, it would be easy to establish general laws, and it would be unnecessary painfully to collect a great number of facts, and to perform a great number of experiments in order to deduce general principles. But history proves the insufficiency of reflection alone, that is, of reflection unguided by experiment.

Finally, another sect of philosophers admits two sources of intellectual manifestations, an external and an internal, on one or other of which all are dependent.

I shall first consider some generalities of the external senses; afterwards show that many faculties, attributed to them, cannot result as effects of their activity, and, in fine, examine the special functions of each external sense.

**Generalities as to the Five External Senses.**

I. *Doubleness of the Organs.*

The organs of every external sense, as of the functions of animal life in general, are double: there are two eyes, two ears, two nerves of smell, of taste and of touch. Some authors have denied the doubleness of the cerebral organs, but the denial was founded on their mistaking doubleness for symmetry. It is true that both sides of the brain are seldom symmetrical, the right hemisphere is generally larger than the left, but is this want of symmetry not the case with the eyes, ears, and other double parts? Thus the want of symmetry does not prove that they are not double. Indeed the nerves generally are larger on the right side of the body, which is also larger and stronger than the left. It is commonly maintained, that the right hand and foot are larger in the generality of cases,
because they are more used and exercised than the left. But this may be answered by the fact of the plurality of infants being right-handed. Of ten children born, there are perhaps seven who from birth employ the right hand without any teaching, and though the remaining three be taught to use it, they nevertheless feel greater strength in the left. But the superior power of the right hand is not the result of exercise, for, as I have said, all parts of the right side are stronger than of the left, even to the hemisphere of the brain.

Disease, too, most frequently attacks the left side.

The organs of animal life, then, are double, while those of vegetative life are mostly single.

II. The Consciousness of every Sense is Single.

Another generality of the five senses is, that while each has two sentient apparatuses, and accordingly receives double impressions, consciousness is still only single. Various theories have been offered of this phenomenon, and sight has generally been examined in its discussion. The explanation has been given by

1. Touch.

Many suppose single consciousness to be a consequence of the information communicated by the sense of touch. At first, say they, objects are seen double, but touch rectifies the error. This was Buffon's opinion. He supported it by the following experiment: If we look with both eyes towards two objects in the same direction, and fix our eyes upon the nearer, we see it single, but at the same time the farther double; if, on the contrary, we fix upon the farther object, we see it single, and the nearer double. This experiment, according to Buffon, proves evidently, that objects are seen double, but judged single by the rectification of the touch. As the same object, however, appears at one time double, and at another single, how is it possible to infer that touch has cor-
rected sight? why is the correction only relative, referring now to the nearer, then to the farther object? It seems to me, that a very different conclusion may be drawn from the experiment, viz. that touch has nothing to do with sight. Sight, and all its modifications and allusions, depend on the organization and position of the eyes and on the laws of the refraction of light.

Moreover, no one recollects ever having seen objects double during his infancy. None of those born blind who have recovered their sight by a surgical operation, ever saw objects double. Neither have we observed nor heard that animals take single objects for double ones. The butterfly does not confound a flower, nor the lamb its mother, with their shadows. Even animals which live during so short a time, that they can never rectify their vision by touch, are not deceived by the multiplicity of objects. Sometimes, moreover, in morbid affections of the eyes, and from squinting, man sees double, notwithstanding all his preceding experience. It is consequently evident that the cause of single vision is not to be found in the sense of the touch.

2. Corresponding Points.

Others explain single vision by saying, that if the image of any object fall upon points of the retina, which are commonly affected simultaneously, the object appears single; but if the image fall upon different parts of the retina, which, in general, are not affected at the same time, the object appears double. This explanation is very commonly received. Cuvier and Richerand admit it. It is rare, however, that the same corresponding parts of the retina in both eyes are affected at the same time.

3. Inequality of the Eyes.

Several again maintain that inequality of the eyes causes the single consciousness of sight. According to them, the impression on the stronger is alone perceived. It is indeed true that very few
have both eyes equally strong, consequently the impression upon each eye is of unequal force. But if only a single impression were perceived, why should we see better with both eyes, and hear better with both ears, than with one?

4. Decussation of the Optic Nerves.

Ackermanns find an explanation of single vision in the decussation of the optic nerves. Such an arrangement, however, does not exist in the auditory nerves. And the single consciousness of sight, hearing, smell and taste, must all necessarily be explained in the same manner.

5. Active State.

Gall ventured to give another and a different explanation. He distinguishes two states of activity in organs of the senses, calling one active, the other passive. The functions are passive if performed independently of the will; the eye, for instance, necessarily perceives the light which falls upon it, and the ear the vibrations propagated to it. Now, we perceive passively with both organs, says he; we see with both eyes, hear with both ears, but the active state is confined to one organ, and commonly to the strongest. We see with both eyes at the same time, but we look with one only; we hear with both ears, we listen only with one; we feel with both hands, we touch with but one, &c.

There is no doubt that we look with one eye only. In placing a pencil or any other thin body between us and a light, keeping both eyes open and throwing the axis of vision, the stick, and the light into a right line, did we look with both eyes, the pencil should occupy the diagonal and its shadow fall on the nose. But this always falls on one eye, on that which the person, who makes the experiment, ordinarily uses in looking with attention. If the pencil be kept in the same position, and the eye not employed in looking be shut, the relative direction of the objects will seem to
remain the same; but if he shut the eye with which he looked, it will be altered, and the pencil will appear removed far from its former place. Again, let any one look at a point but little way distant, both eyes will seem directed towards it; let him then shut his eyes alternately. If he close the one with which he did not look, the other remains motionless; but if he shut that with which he looked, the other turns immediately a little inwards, in order to fix the point. Moreover, the eyes of many animals are placed laterally, and cannot both be directed at once to the same object. Finally, the gestures of man and animals prove that they look with one eye, and listen with one ear; for they direct one eye or one ear towards the object to be seen or heard.

To this Walther and Ackermann have opposed an erroneous conclusion from a certain experiment. Knowing green to be a compound of yellow and blue, they inferred that this color would be produced by looking through spectacles of which one glass was blue and the other yellow. Gall and I often tried this experiment, but never with any such result. Both glasses of the spectacles being equally thick, we found objects tinted with the color of that before the eye habitually used. When they were of different thicknesses, the color of the thinner was perceived.

It may be asked, which eye is most ordinarily employed in looking. Le Cat thought it was changed every day. Borelli believed the left eye to be strongest; but Le Cat asserted that sometimes the right, sometimes the left, had greatest power. We have observed that, as in general the whole right side of the body is stronger than the left, so the greater number of persons look with the right eye. All do not, however, look with their strongest eye.

Notwithstanding what has been said, Gall's explanation seems to me little satisfactory. Indeed it is very remarkable that passively, we perceive at the same time the impressions of both organs of any sense, not only if one, but also if different objects impress the two. Even different impressions of different objects may be perceived by both organs of two senses at once. We may, for instance, with both eyes see different objects at the moment that with both
ears we hear different sounds. As soon as we are attentive, however, as soon as we look or listen, we perceive but one impression. It is impossible, therefore, to attend to two different discourses at once. The leader of an orchestra hears passively all the instruments, but he cannot be attentive except to one. The rapidity of mental action deceives several, and makes them think it possible to attend to different objects at the same moment. It follows that there is a difference between the active and passive state of the senses; but whether this difference suffices to explain the single consciousness of every sense is another question; I think it does not.

First, this explanation would only apply to functions in their active, not at all in their passive state; and the cause of single consciousness must be the same in both. Farther, the active state is not produced by the external senses themselves, any more than voluntary motion by the mere muscles. Some internal power renders the senses active; they themselves are always passive, and merely propagate external impressions; they appear active only when something internal employs them to receive and to transmit impressions to the brain. It is therefore probable that the internal cause which excites only a single organ of the external senses to activity, is also the cause of the single consciousness of different impressions. Gall's explanation of single consciousness is consequently not only grounded upon an inaccurate notion, but would be far from satisfactory, were the supposition even true.

6. Commissures.

Another explanation of single consciousness may be found in the commissures, or uniting fibres of both organs. For though every organ of sense be double, similar parts on each side are united by a peculiar apparatus. The impressions of both organs may possibly be combined by this arrangement. In admitting that this would explain single consciousness in the case of any given sense, it would not, however, explain single consciousness of impressions received by different senses.
7. Central Point.

The explanation having the old idea of a central point for its basis, will no longer be listened to, as anatomy proves that no such point exists in the brain. From all that has been said, it is evident that no fact either in anatomy or physiology explains the single consciousness.

8. Singleness of Mind.

It seems more probable that the singleness of mind explains its single consciousness. But from what I have said, it follows that consciousness is not always single. Single consciousness therefore must be distinguished from personal identity. This latter seems to depend on the special power which I name Individuality.

III. Every Sense has its own peculiar Nature.

A third generality of the five senses is, that its own power suffices to each to perform its function. Although much has been said of the mutual rectification of the senses, and of their habits, it is a general principle, that the power or capacity of every sense is inherent in the sense itself. Farther, the relation of the senses to external impressions is determinate and subject to positive laws. As soon as odoriferous particles impress the olfactory nerve, the impression is at once either found to be agreeable or otherwise, and according to this relation between external impressions and external senses, the manner of acting of man and animals varies. No preceding exercise or habit furnishes each sense with its special power; this depends on its peculiar organization alone. If the organization be perfect, the functions are, in like manner; and if it be imperfect or diseased, these are defective or deranged notwithstanding all preceding exercise. If the optic apparatus be perfect in birds, when they break the shell, their sight is perfect; on the
contrary, if the organization of the eye and ear in new-born ani-
mals be imperfect, seeing and hearing are the same; and if the
eyes of adults be diseased, vision is deranged. In the aged the
functions of the senses lose their energy, because the vital power
of the organs decreases.

It is, indeed, absurd to suppose, that the Creator should have
produced any sense incapable of performing its functions without
support from another and a different one; for example, that the eye
should not see without the aid of touch, or the ear not hear without
assistance from sight. In Phrenology, the following positions are
of prime importance: none of the senses acquire their faculties
from any of the others; every sense produces special sensations;
all senses may procure the idea of existing objects, and one sense
is fitter than another to acquaint us with particular bodies and their
qualities.

Touch, proves that a straight rod, which, half plunged into wa-
ter appears crooked, is straight, and this is a kind of rectification;
but this must not be confounded with the idea, according to which
one sense acquires its faculty by the rectification of another.
Touch shows that the rod plunged in water, which looks crooked,
is straight; but the eyes will always see it crooked, since the laws
of sight are determinate, and we see according to the laws of the
refraction of light. Such rectification of the senses is mutual and
general, not the prerogative of any one in particular. The eyes
may rectify the sense of touch: if, without our knowledge, a piece
of thin paper be placed between our thumb and fore-finger, we
may not feel but see it. Even smell and taste may rectify the
senses of sight and of touch. Many fluids feel like water, but
smell and taste proclaim them different. Thus every sense has its
peculiar and independent faculty, is subject to constant laws, and
depends on the state of its appropriate organ for its capacity to
perform its office; but every sense also recognises impressions im-
perceptible to another, and in this way are the senses mutually
aidant in coming to exact notions; for instance, in the study of nat-
ural history.
Another observation generally applicable is, that though no sense acquires its faculty by exercise, yet the function of every one is strengthened by it. The sense of feeling, long and carefully exercised, acquires a very high degree of perfection. Thus the blind know the proximity of external objects by the impression of the air upon their faces. Le Cat speaks of one born blind at Poi­ scaux, who distinguished the distance of the fire by the degree of its heat. Saunderson, though blind, in handling a series of medals, discerned the false from the true more exactly than many con­ noisseurs. Le Cat mentions a blind sculptor, Ganibasius of Vol­ terra, who traced the living face with his fingers, and modelled it in potter’s clay. The deaf and dumb, in the institution of Mr. Eschke, at Berlin, knew perfectly what was written on their backs, though covered with clothes. Boyle and others relate histories of the blind, whose touch was so acute, as even to enable them to distinguish colors and their shades. The same thing is stated of the blind Weissenburg, of Manheim. This man had about thirty pieces of different-colored clothes, and could indicate with precision the hue of each; but he often made mistakes in the color of strangers’ clothes. The cards with which he played were marked; he did not distinguish them by their colors, as those who were not acquainted with this imagined. Many blind persons have assured me of their incapacity to distinguish colors. A few, however, discern white from black, because white surfaces are in general smoother than black. When the blind pretend to distinguish colors, they do no more than determine surfaces of greater or less degrees of smoothness, without acquiring any idea of color in itself.

The sense of taste as well as every other is strengthened by exercise. Certain articles are tasteless or unpleasant at first; for instance, oysters and truffles; but having been eaten several times, their particular savor is distinguished. A common opinion is, that the sense of taste is blunted by spiced dishes and refined cookery.
EXTERNAL SENSES.

But who will maintain that our cooks and dainty-mouthed gourmants have a more obtuse taste than savages, who distinguish the flavor of some roots insipid to a civilized palate? Do not the frequent accidents from poisonous vegetables, hemlock, belladonna, and improper mushrooms, prove that the taste of the sober countryman is no surer guide than that of the voluptuous citizen? We must, however, admit in regard to taste what happens universally; too strong impressions blunt its sensibility; the functions grow more energetic only by a due quantity of exercise.

The sense of smell may also be exercised. Many physicians, on entering a sick room, distinguish the kind and state of certain diseases. It is related that some negro tribes follow others by the scent, as dogs do, and even distinguish between a negro and a European. Smell is blunted by the application of very strong and penetrating odors; conformable exercise alone strengthens its functions.

The sense of hearing, like the senses already spoken of, is cultivated by exercise. The blind Weissenbour, of Manheim, judged exactly of the distance and stature of persons who spoke to him standing. The blind Schoenberger, of Weide, in the Upper Palatinate, had the sense of hearing so acute, that it was sufficient by tapping to indicate the place where the nine pins were set up, or the situation of the target to be shot at, to enable him often to throw or shoot successfully. Blind persons indeed often find a pin or piece of money which makes a noise in falling.

Finally, the eyes acquire a very high degree of acuteness by exercise. Le Cat mentions a deaf woman of Amiens, who distinguished what other persons said from the mere motion of their lips. When a foreign language was spoken, she discovered it immediately. Gall and I observed similar cases at Berlin and elsewhere; nay, we conversed with several who understood us, even when we concealed the mouth; the motions of the face were sufficient. It follows, then, that though exercise produce not the faculties of the external senses, the functions of each may still be rendered more energetic by exercise.
V. The Function of every Sense is modified.

A fifth general consideration of the external senses is, that their functions are modified not only in different kinds of animals, but even in different individuals of the same kind. The taste and smell of carnivorous and herbivorous animals undoubtedly differ. The ox and horse find hay to be savory, while the dog and wolf find flesh to be well-tasted. The senses are also modified by different ages according to peculiar habits or circumstances, and even participate in the various states of health. This fact explains the longings felt during pregnancy, or experienced by hypochondriacal and hysterical people, and also why we are sometimes disgusted with what we formerly liked. Moreover, several substances, inodorous to man, make a strong impression on the olfactory nerves of certain animals. Some animals, too, are much excited by odors, to which others are indifferent. One odor is agreeable to one individual, and disagreeable to another. In the same way, the eye and ear must differ in animals living under water, from those of creatures which inhabit the air; the eyes even differ in those animals which see in the night from those which see during the day. One individual likes a color or a sound displeasing to another. Thus the functions of the external senses are universally modified.

FUNCTIONS TO BE DENIED TO THE FIVE SENSES.

I. Most of the Perceptive, and all the Affective and Reflective Faculties.

To specify the functions of the external and internal senses is an essential point in Phrenology, however difficult the task may be. Physiology in this department is but little advanced, and whether the external senses have consciousness or not is still a matter of dispute. The considerations on sensibility in the first section of this work, and those contained in this chapter, leave the
point still undecided. I shall, therefore, confine myself here to such points as may be proved by experience.

The axiom of Aristotle,* that all activity of the mind begins with the external senses, is not less erroneous than is the assertion that the sense of touch is cause of the instinctive labors of animals and of the mechanical arts of man. It is easy to show, in a general way, that the notions of external objects acquired by man and animals, are not merely dependent on the external senses, and in particular cases that such and such a talent is not the effect of this or that individual sense. Let us begin with the general refutation.

That the cognition acquired by animals and men of the external world, and the superiority of the human understanding cannot be attributed to the external senses, appears to me in this, that there is no proportion between intellectual operations and the senses, either in different species of animals, or in different individuals of the same species. Many animals surpass man in acuteness and strength of external sense, yet none approaches man in understanding. Moreover, idiots frequently possess very perfect senses, while the most intelligent have them occasionally very weak. A fact mentioned by Darwin † also proves that the five senses are mere intermedia, and that the import of their impressions must be judged of by something internal. An old man, who had had a paralytic stroke, preserved the senses of hearing and of vision untouched; he, however, could only receive ideas by means of the latter; when he was told that it was nine o'clock and breakfast-time, he repeated the words distinctly, yet without gaining any information from them; but if his servant put a watch into his hand, and showed him the hour gone by, he said, 'Why, William, have I not my breakfast?' On almost every occasion, his servant could only converse with him by means of visible objects, although his hearing was perfect.

The case of James Mitchel, in Scotland, furnishes evident proof

* Nihil est intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.
of the external senses not producing the affective and intellectual faculties, but of their being mere intermedia between the external world and the internal mental powers. As this case is of the utmost importance, I shall state it with some details, drawing upon the accounts published by the late Dr. Gordon, Dugald Stewart, and James Wardrop, as well as all I learnt from his sister on a visit I paid to Nairn.

He was born on the 11th of November, 1795, deaf and blind, of intelligent parents. It may be supposed that he is not without some internal sense of hearing, since he takes great pleasure in striking hard bodies upon his fore teeth, which he sometimes continues to do for hours together. 'When a bunch of keys,' says Dr. Gordon, 'was given to him, he seized them with great avidity, and tried each separately by suspending it loosely between two of his fingers, so as to allow it to vibrate freely, and after tingling all of them amongst his teeth in this manner, he generally selected one from the others, the sound of which seemed to please him most. This was one of his most favorite amusements, and it was surprising how long it would arrest his attention, and with what eagerness he would on all occasions renew it. Mr. Brougham, having observed this circumstance, brought to him a musical snuff-box, and placed it between his teeth. This seemed not only to excite his wonder, but to afford him exquisite delight; and his father and his sister, who were present, remarked that they had never seen him so much interested on any former occasion. While the instrument continued to play he kept it closely between his teeth, and when the airs were ended, he continued to hold the box to his mouth, and to examine it minutely with his fingers, expressing by his gestures and by his countenance great curiosity.'

He was always possessed of so much of the sense of sight as to be able to distinguish day from night, and to perceive bright colors, particularly white and red. He was fond of shutting the house-door or window-shutters, and remaining for a considerable time with his eyes fixed on some small hole or chink through which the sun's rays penetrate. He, however, seemed to derive no informa-
tion from sight, as he always turned away his head while examining the bodies presented to him.

His senses of touch and smell were very acute, and by their assistance he was soon able to distinguish things and persons, strangers and those of his family. 'When a stranger approached him,' says Mr. Wardrop, 'he eagerly began to touch some part of his body, commonly taking hold of his arm, which he held near his nose, and after two or three strong inspirations through his nostrils, appeared decided in his opinion. If it happened to be unfavorable, he suddenly went to a distance with the appearance of disgust; if favorable, he showed a disposition to become more intimate, and expressed by his countenance more or less satisfaction.' When I visited him in 1816, his sister told me that of late years he had made less use of his smell than formerly, in making himself acquainted with external objects, and no fact has shown that he ever distinguished the presence of any one by the smell alone. In the year 1808, the drums of both ears were pierced, the one by Sir Astley Cooper, the other by the late Mr. Saunders. In 1810, when fourteen years of age, Mr. Wardrop performed an operation on his right eye, which enabled him to see surrounding objects, if not very minute. He nevertheless continued to examine everything with his other senses, as if he had been totally blind and deaf. He is most attracted by red, and looks longer at it than at any other color; then comes white, and after that yellow. He gathers together in the field flowers of the same kind. He cannot measure exactly the distance of the objects from him, but he puts out his hand in their direction, and examines them in the mode already stated. This young man, though deprived of the two principal senses of relation, was from infancy anxious to acquire knowledge of external objects. He also manifested the different feelings without having been able to observe them in other persons.

He was always fond of young children; he took them affectionately in his arms, but never associated with, nor joined in the amusements of boys of his own age. He, however, liked the company of the boy who attended him in his excursions, in order to keep
him from dangerous situations. Early in life he was uneasy when his attendants were changed; later he was less sensible to it. He was very much attached to his relations. Dr. Gordon had mentioned, that Mitchel was not sorrowful at his father's funeral; that he moved rapidly among the crowd, touching almost every body, and examining some very minutely. The Rev. Thomas Macfarlane, on the contrary, in a letter to Mr. Glennie, of Aberdeen, dated the 7th of May, 1812, positively says, 'When the coffin which enclosed his father's corpse was brought from the house, and placed upon chairs in the court before the manse, previous to the interment, I approached to the coffin, and soon after saw James Mitchel come from the house in considerable agitation. He turned about rapidly, and snuffed very much, evidently guiding himself by the smell. He directly approached the coffin, smelled it most eagerly for several seconds, then laid himself down upon the lid on his face, and embraced the coffin, while his countenance discovered marks of the most lively sorrow. I stood close by him; and after a short time patted his head once or twice; upon which he rose, and returned into the house. This occurred immediately upon the coffin being brought out, and about twenty minutes before it was lifted in order to be carried to the churchyard. As the accuracy on this subject has been doubted, I purposely delayed writing to you, till I should have an opportunity of conversing with the Rev. Pryce Campbell, minister of Ardensien, brother-in-law to Mrs. Mitchel, who was present at the funeral, and by whose direction every thing was conducted. I fell in with this gentleman. I took an opportunity of asking him if he observed any marks of sorrow about James Mitchel on the day of his father's funeral. He replied, that he observed the most unequivocal marks of grief in his countenance, and added a circumstance which escaped my notice, that when the coffin was about to be lifted, in order to be carried to the churchyard, James Mitchel clung to it, endeavoring to prevent its being carried away, and he, (Mr. Campbell,) was obliged to remove him from it by force.' Both these gentlemen remark, that the circumstances mentioned by Dr. Gordon, of Mitchel's running through
the crowd, and touching every person, do not amount to a proof that he was insensible to the loss he had sustained. In acting thus, Mitchel was merely examining the assemblage of people around him, and in this instance his curiosity overcame his grief. He went several mornings to visit the grave, patted gently the turf which had been laid over it, and at last, as if hopeless of his father’s return, became sorrowful even to tears. Shortly after his father’s death, his mother being unwell and confined to bed, he was observed to weep. Afterwards, the mother left Ardelach and went to Nairn. James Mitchel returned three times to visit his former habitation. On his first visit, he went through the different apartments of the manse, examined the furniture, and having done so, betrayed an anxiety to be gone, and returned directly to Nairn. On the other visit, several workmen were employed taking down the kitchen. He stood some time evidently very much displeased at what was going forward, and then went away without having been prevailed on to enter the house. On his third visit, the manse was repaired, and he came home in good-humor, and to communicate what he had observed to his sister, he lifted his hands, one after the other, in succession, from the floor towards the ceiling of the room. In the year 1814 he had a severe illness, during the course of which he took a particular fancy to his aunt, his father’s sister, who was at that time living with his mother, and insisted on her sitting constantly by him. It happened, that his sister was taken unwell before his own perfect recovery, and he would not now allow this aunt to sit down near him, but always made signs that she should go up stairs, where his sister was, nor did he rest till he had made good his point. He showed a wish to get up stairs himself, and upon being brought up seemed quite satisfied when his sister patted him, and shook hands with him. Thus there can be no doubt of his affection and consideration for others.

He is generally placid, and of a mild temper, but if too much teased, or if interrupted in his amusements, he is irritated, and sometimes gets into paroxysms of violent rage, when he tears his clothes. He is now grown up, and no longer under the control of
his mother and sister. He is cautious, but not timid. He would formerly take food from no one but his parents and sister. From infancy he has been fond of retiring to a dark corner, and kindling a light. He continues to dislike darkness; after nightfall he seems happy in reaching a room where there is a candle or a fire. Means have been used to teach him to make baskets; but he wants application to finish any thing, and throws the materials into the fire; yet he knows from experience the danger of fire, water, and sharp instruments. He has frequently amused himself with a dead fowl in the kitchen, placing it repeatedly on its legs, and laughing when it fell. He was allowed to touch his father's corpse; as soon as he felt it he shrank away. This was the first time he had ever touched a dead body. Several years later, a neighbor who had frequently indulged him with a pipe and tobacco, died. His sister brought him to the room where the body lay, and allowed him to feel it. This he did very readily, not shrinking away as formerly when he touched his father. He even seemed rather anxious to examine it; when he had so done, he stood for a few seconds rather thoughtfully, and then smiled. He now retired willingly; but not before he showed that he recognised the person, and was sensible of what had happened. This he did by making his usual sign for smoking, and by putting his hand to the ground, his sign for interment.

He seems now apprehensive of dying. When, in 1814, he was so much reduced as to be incapable of walking without support, he could not be prevailed on to lie a single day in bed. He watched the first appearance of dawn, and insisted on being dressed immediately; thinking probably that he would not die out of bed. He could bear to see nothing white near his bed, or even in the room with him, when unwell. Several times something white being by accident thrown across the foot of his bed, he appeared most unhappy till it was removed, and even when linen was put to the fire to air, he was in the greatest possible distress. This dislike was explained from his having always seen dead bodies laid out in white.

He always took pleasure in making prisoners of other persons
by locking them in the stable, or in a room, laughing and jumping about all the while. His sister sent him one day with a half-penny to buy two pipes. He understood the signs, went out to a shoemaker's house, where they were to be had, and returned with one in his hand. They suspected that he had another about him, and giving him to understand that he ought to have brought two, his sister insisted on his going to fetch the second. He then unbuttoned his coat, and laughing heartily produced the second pipe. The Sunday after this, when his sister gave him a half-penny, as usual, in church, to put into the poor's box, he placed it between his teeth like a pipe and laughed, but she having given him a shake, he dropped it into the box. When I saw him, he was allowed four pipes of tobacco a-day. His love of smoking being well known, several persons in Nairn gave him tobacco, when they met him in the street, but this he never produced until he had had his daily allowance at home. He used formerly to break his pipe as soon as it was smoked out; he now makes each serve twice before he breaks it. When he has received tobacco from strangers, however, it serves much oftener, as he is aware that two a-day are his allowance. They once gave him a more durable pipe, but he threw it away. He did the same with old shoes, in order not to be forced by his parents to put them on any more. It is quite certain that he has ideas of property. He once, at no great distance from the manse, met a person riding a horse which had been purchased a few weeks before from his mother. On feeling the animal, he seemed instantly to recognise it. The rider dismounted, to see how Mitchel would behave, and was much amused to find that he led the horse to his mother's stable, took off the saddle and bridle, put corn before him and then withdrew, locking the door and putting the key in his pocket.

He is extremely fond of walking and running about, of riding, and of bodily exercise in general. Since his sight has improved, he makes long excursions, but he always returns to his meals. When yet a child, he attempted to build small houses with turf, leaving little openings resembling windows. For hours he employ-
ed himself in the bed of the river which runs within a few yards of the house, selecting stones of a round shape, nearly of the same weight, and having a certain degree of smoothness. These he placed in a circular form on the bank, and then seated himself in the middle. He often floated pieces of wood on the water. He always liked smooth bodies. He often endeavored to smooth sticks or rods with his teeth, or caused the boy who attended him to smooth them with a knife.

He early showed a great partiality to new clothes; after the measure is taken, nothing else seems to occupy his mind. He literally persecutes the tailor and shoemaker, until his coat or shoes are finished; he is their guest morning, noon, and night. He prefers persons well-dressed to those who are not. He never liked to take his regular meals in the kitchen, yet in coming home before dinner time, he will take a potato from the servant. He particularly courts the good opinion of his sister, and if made aware that he has done wrong or offended her or his mother, he shows evident sorrow.

In the following anecdote a peculiar proof of his kindness will be found. He had once received a severe wound in his foot, during the cure of which he usually sat by the fire, his foot resting on a low stool. More than a year afterwards a servant boy with whom he used to play, happened to be confined from a similar cause. Young Mitchel perceiving that his companion remained longer in one situation than usual, examined him attentively, and seemed quickly to discover, by the bandages on his foot, the reason of his confinement. He immediately went up to a garret, sought from amidst several other pieces of furniture the little footstool, which had formerly supported his own wounded limb, brought it down in his hand to the kitchen, and placed the servant-boy’s foot gently upon it.

It is difficult to say whether he has any notion of religion. He accompanies his relations to church, behaves quietly, and kneels at family prayers. Three months after his father’s death, a clergyman being in the house, on a Sunday evening, he pointed to his
father's bible, and then made a sign that the family should kneel. Did he so by habit alone?

James Mitchel has always shown an inquisitive turn of mind, great memory, and an eminent degree of judgment and reflection. Dr. Gordon said: 'The knowledge which he has derived from the senses of touch, taste, and smell, seems fully as extensive as what any person of the most perfect faculties might be supposed to acquire, if he could by any contrivance be prevented from using his eyes and ears for the same period of time, from the moment of birth, and in the same retired situation of country. The train of his thoughts seems to be regulated by the same principles as that of the soundest minds. His actions neither indicate incoherence nor fatuity; but every thing he does appears capable of being easily traced to rational motives.' And I might add: *why not, since his brain is very well organized!* Indeed he always felt an internal desire to acquire knowledge. He every day explored ground where he had not been before. He wished to become acquainted with every thing that fell into his hands. He amused himself in visiting the carpenter's, or other tradesmen's shops, handling their implements, and trying to discover what they were engaged about. He knows the uses to which all common things are put, and is pleased when the use of any thing with which he is not acquainted is communicated to him.

Once when still young, he was caught creeping on his hands and knees along a narrow wooden bridge, which crossed the river at a point where the stream is rather deep and rapid. His father wishing to discourage him from such a perilous attempt again, ordered a servant to push him off and plunge him once or twice into the river. This measure had the desired effect. But several years later, having got angry with the servant boy as they were playing together in a boat, he took him, plunged him into the water and drew him out, just as he had been served himself on the former occasion. He was soon aware of the advantages which other persons enjoyed. He sometimes proceeded alone in his excursions; but finding any obstacle, he waited till his boy arrived and
assisted him. He now goes alone to great distances, for instance, from Nairn to Fort George. He easily learnt to measure time. On one occasion his mother went from home, and he seeming anxious about her, his sister bent his head gently, as laying it on a pillow, and shutting his eyes, once for each night the mother was to be absent, in order to show him that he would sleep so many times before her return.

In this way too it was signified to him how many days were to pass before his new clothes would be made. His ready interpretation of signs showed a considerable share of reflection. He used natural signs, all addressed to the sight of those with whom he conversed. When hungry, he approaches his mother or sister, touches them in an expressive manner, carries his hand to his mouth, and points towards the apartment or cupboard where the eatables are usually kept. He is quite alive to proper and regular behavior; his sister expresses her satisfaction or displeasure by different manners of touching his head or shoulder. Gentle tapping is a sign of satisfaction; a quick slap, of displeasure. He indicates riding on horseback by raising his foot and bringing the fingers of each hand together under the sole, in imitation of a stirrup. When he wants to go to bed, he inclines his head sidewise, as if to lay it on a pillow. He indicates a shoemaker by imitating with his arms a shoemaker’s motions in pulling his thread; so also a tailor by the motions made in sewing.

From the preceding facts it follows, that Mitchell’s mind displays a great share of native strength, and is destitute only of the vehicles of its exhibition, the eyes and the ears.

It is certainly a great pity that he received no education, since none of his powers are dormant. By means of touch he might have been taught many artificial signs; but the internal activity of his mind is lost to those around him, and consequently to the study of mankind.

A similar case of a girl exists in Cambridge. She became blind and deaf at the age of three years, is now about ten years old, and shows various feelings and intellectual faculties in a high degree.
I saw another case of this nature in the institution for deaf and dumb at Paris. It was a female, and at first only deaf and dumb. She received the usual instruction of the deaf and dumb, and learned to write before she lost her sight. She then continued to converse with her other companions by signs adapted to the touch. She could indicate her mental activity by the signs she had learnt, or in writing into the hands of those with whom she conversed, or others would take her hand and make therein the signs she understood.

A fourth of these remarkable cases which deserves the attention of philosophers, exists in the American Asylum, at Hartford, in Connecticut. Her name is Julia Brace. I shall first extract from the American Annals of Education, published by Mr. Woodbridge, Vol. I. Oct. and Nov. 1831, the following notice, and then add some interesting facts, which were related to me when I saw her in August, 1832.

She is the eldest of seven children, and born at Hartford, June 13, 1807. At four years of age she was seized with the typhus fever, on Monday, November 29, 1811, and on the Saturday following she became blind and deaf. She remained dangerously ill for four or five weeks. During the following summer, she was again twice sick, but her health became established, and has continued excellent ever since.

Before her illness, she had not only learned to speak, but to repeat her letters, and to spell words of three or four syllables, and for some time after the loss of her sight and hearing, she was fond of taking a book, and spelling words and the names of her acquaintances. She retained her speech pretty well for about a year, but gradually lost it. For three years she could still utter a few words. One of the last of these was mother.

Julia was at first unconscious of her misfortune. She seemed to imagine that a long night had come upon the world, and often said, it will never be day. She would call upon the family to light the lamp, and was impatient at their seeming neglect even to give her an answer.
'One day, in passing a window, she felt the sun shining warm upon her hand; she immediately held out her hand, and pointed with delight to indicate that the sun shone. From the January after her illness until the following August she would sleep during the day, and be awake through the night, and it was not until autumn, by taking great pains to keep her awake during the day, that she was set right. She was afterwards as regular in this respect as other persons.

At first, after her recovery, she was not inclined to walk, but after leading her with a stick, the apprehension which might have deterred her, gradually vanished, and she began to grope her way unassisted, like other blind persons. She gradually returned to the previous habits and occupations of her childhood.

From the period of her recovery, she seemed to perceive the return of the Sabbath, and on Sunday morning would get her own clean clothes and those of the other children. The intervention of a day of fasting or thanksgiving confused her reckoning, and does so even now, and some time elapses before she gets right. If her mother was reading, she would find a book and endeavor to do so.

During the first winter after her recovery she was irritable almost to madness. She would exhibit the most violent passion, and use the most profane language. The next summer she became calmer, and her mother could govern her to some extent, by shaking her and stamping on the floor in sign of disapprobation, and by patting her head when she conducted well. She is now habitually mild, obedient, and affectionate.

She has a strong feeling of propriety. After her illness she was unwilling to wear clothes, and would pull them off violently. At length her mother took one of her frocks and tried it on her sister, with a view of altering it for her. Julia took the frock and put it on herself. Later she cried for new clothes, and became very fond of dress.

Since the summer after her illness, she would take care of her little sisters, she would wander with them in the field, gather
whortleberries, knock down apples from the trees, pick flowers, and make them into nosegays for the infant.

She would take care of her sisters, and hold and attend them while they were infants, but when young she refused to take care of either of her twin-brothers. Later she was kind to her brothers and sisters, and when she received a present, was always fond of sharing it with them. If it was an orange, it was divided very exactly into equal portions; if an apple, which she knew to be more common, she used less care.

The poverty of her mother often obliged her to go out and work for the whole day, and the children were left in charge of Julia on such occasions. If they went to the cupboard or drawers when her mother was absent, she would stamp on the floor (the method which necessity had taught her mother to use in restraining her) shake them, and if possible keep them away. When any mischief was done, she would often administer immediate punishment. At one time, while giving the children their bread and milk, the bowl was broken: in imitation of what she supposed would have been done by her mother, she whipped the little offender. But feeling of her eyes immediately, and finding that she was crying, she took her into her arms and endeavored to soothe her with kindness and caresses.

Her ideas of the right of property were very strong. When any thing is presented to her, she will not retain it until she has given it back, and by its being returned, or by some sign of property, she is convinced that it is given to her. Her countenance then exhibits marks of pleasure; she remembers it for months, and will bring forth the present whenever the giver comes. It has been remarked, that, notwithstanding the state of poverty in which she passed her childhood, when she was subsequently brought into houses where tempting articles of food and dress were constantly thrown in her way, she has never been known to take the most trifling object without leave. She was equally tenacious of her own property, and felt deeply any invasion of her rights.

Once in her childhood, one of her three little brothers had
disturbed her toys in the drawer. She arraigned them before the opened drawer, as a tribunal, pointing them to the mischief they had done, and was determined to find out the rogue, but not one of them would either confess or expose the offender. After feeling of each of them awhile, in order to find which trembled, without success, being satisfied that they intended to deceive her, and that one of them at least was guilty, she adopted what seemed designed as a stratagem to disappoint them. She gave each one a box on the ear, and in order that the offender should not escape, she then felt of the mouths of all three of them. She found two of them crying: this she seemed to think a proof of innocence, and in order to assuage their grief, she gave them sugar; and showed them kindness, as tokens of their acquittal of the charge; but the third, who gave no signs of sorrow, received an additional portion of cuffs.

'While the inmate of a school, observing that a great part of their time was occupied with books, she often held one before her sightless eyes, with great patience, as if to wait for some influence upon her. In reference to this point, the spirit of government was even extended to her favorite kitten. She would spread a newspaper before it, then putting her finger on its mouth, and perceiving that it did not move like those of the scholars when reading, would shake the animal, to express displeasure at its indolence and obstinacy.

'From a child, she entertained the idea that the tallest ought to rule; and when shorter persons than herself in the houses where she has lived, bade her to do, or not to do any thing, she would respectfully let them know that she was the tallest. This idea, it is supposed, she entertained till she was grown taller than her mother; but she has now given up this childish notion.

'It is obvious that her only means of perceiving external objects are the smell, the taste, and the touch. The touch is her chief reliance, and enables her to distinguish every object with which she has been familiar, sometimes by means of her fingers, and sometimes by her lips and tongue. But her smell also is surpris-
ingly acute, and often enables her to ascertain facts which seem beyond her reach.

'She has now been a resident for several years in the American Asylum, at Hartford, where she is supported in part by the voluntary contributions of visitors, and in part by her own labors in sewing and knitting. A language of palpable signs was early established, as a means of communication with her friends. This has been much improved by her intercourse with the deaf and dumb, and is now sufficient for all necessary purposes. Her countenance as she sits at work, exhibits the strongest evidence of an active mind, and a feeling heart within, and thoughts and feelings seem to flit across it like the clouds in a summer sky. A shade of pensiveness will be followed by a cloud of anxiety or gloom; a peaceful look will perhaps succeed, and not unfrequently, a smile lights up her countenance, which seems to make one forget her misfortunes.'

I observed the same appearances in her countenance when I saw her; and she was on that day, I was told, in good spirits. Her whole history shows spontaneous activity of mind, and the manifestations of the special powers, as admitted in Phrenology. From the above-mentioned facts we perceive her love and care of children, her combativeness in punishing her brothers and sisters; her love of approbation, her cautiousness, her acquisitiveness, conscientiousness, reverence, benevolence, order, time, and reflection. She knows the inmates of the institution, and has chosen one girl for her particular friend. She was always fond of childish sports, and of playing tricks to others, in concealing things, or in shutting them up in rooms. When fatigued of being exhibited to strangers, she endeavors to get out of the way. She delights in order, cleanliness and dress. At the day of my visit her head-dress was most carefully arranged, and it was her own doing. She examines with her hands the hair-dress of other ladies she meets with, and imitates the fashion. Since she has been in the American Institution, only once she was disobedient to the superintendent, the Rev. Mr. Weld, but being placed into a narrow room she was completely corrected. She possesses great manual dexterity, and like other blind
persons she threads her needle with her tongue and lips. She knows many more palpable signs than James Mitchel, yet I think that both might have been taught to converse with others by the touch, or written signs, on a more extensive scale. At all events, these unhappy individuals furnish an evident proof that there are innate dispositions, and that the external senses are not the laws of the affective and intellectual faculties.

II. The external Senses do not produce the means of their own gratification.

The five external senses receive and propagate impressions which affect them agreeably or disagreeably; but they cannot produce the means of their own satisfaction. Animals, therefore, are confined to the enjoyment of those impressions presented to them by nature. They prefer the taste of one thing to that of another; they prefer particular odors, colors, sounds, but they cannot, at will, command or excite impressions calculated to gratify the senses of smell, sight, or hearing. Man alone is capable of this; he alone, in order to procure pleasure by the medium of his senses, cultivates gardens, and establishes manufactories of perfume; he alone plants flowers to gratify his smell, and to delight his eye. Man, however, has not conceived these acts by means of smell; for this sense is much more acute in the ox, horse and dog, which cultivate no flower-gardens, and which have no rose-water. In the same way, animals have no cookery, and no musical instruments; they cannot voluntarily charm their palate or their ears; for the same reason, they have no artificial language, and no tradition. We shall afterwards see that man possesses superior intellectual faculties, which produce the artificial enjoyments of the external senses and internal perceptive powers.
III. Individual Faculties, which are erroneously attributed to the external Senses.

To the Sense of Feeling or Touch.

I. The consciousness we have of the existence of the external world is considered as a prerogative of touch. It is said, that man by moving finds limits or resistance to his progress, and is thereby advised of external existences. Our vision however finds limits as well as our motions, and, consequently, we should perceive the external world by sight, even though we did not by touch. Moreover, the sentient power resides not in the external organs, but in the mind. I cannot, therefore, conceive why the sentient being should not recognise impressions made on it in every way, mediately as well as immediately, by an obstacle to farther vision, as well as by an impediment to its endeavors to act. In either case there is only an external impression. For what reason, too, does the sentient being, assumed unconscious of the external world, make any motion whatever? Why do insects and many animals act as soon as they are born? The tortoise and duck, scarcely hatched, run towards the water which they have never touched. How do they distinguish water from solid bodies? How can young birds be acquainted by touch with those branches upon which they perch for the first time on leaving their nests?

Farther, all nature opposes this hypothetical opinion of the schools. Man and animals are naturally much more disposed to transfer their internal sensations, aroused by external objects, to the outward world, than to concentrate external nature within themselves. We see and hear from without, at least it seems so to us. The infant, without being instructed, turns his head towards the side whence come the sound and light which impress his ears and eyes. An afflux of blood to the optic nerves makes us see flashes of light, and to the auditory nerves tingling or other peculiar sounds. In our dreams we see landscapes, persons and objects, with which
we are familiar; we hear music, we walk in peculiar places, and have a thousand different sensations. The insane hear heavenly choirs, see angels; and many looked on as sane consider their internal sensations as realities, they distinguish the figures of their genii, see spirits, &c. These and similar phenomena take place inwardly, but are, by the mind, transferred to the external world.

The faculty of separating impressions from without and the external world, from the internal sentient power, cannot be attributed to any external sense; this faculty is of a much higher nature, and exists internally as well as the one which says, 'I feel hence I am.' Perceptions of impressions, recognition of the faculty which perceives, and reflections upon this acquired knowledge, are very different things. The internal faculty which knows the existence of external objects, acts by means of all the external senses; the sense of touch has no preference, no monopoly. De Tracy* has demonstrated, in a very excellent manner, that the sense of touch has not the prerogative of producing the notion of the external world. He says the nerves are merely agitated by various impressions; the auditory, optic and olfactory, as well as the tangent nerves. For what reason, then, should these last alone excite the idea of an external cause or existence?

2. The second prerogative attributed by Buffon, Condillac, Cuvier, Dumas, and others, to the sense of touch is, that it alone produces the ideas of space, dimensions, extent, distance, figure, number, motion and rest. But we have only to examine the functions of animals in a cursory manner, to prove this assertion quite incorrect. Animals which acquire no, or very imperfect, information from touch, still judge of distance, figure, and plurality. If the swallow and bat catch insects on the wing, while flying with very great swiftness, do they not measure distance? When young birds leave their nests for the first time, do they fly against houses and trees, instead of sitting down upon a branch? Do we observe young animals which have never yet left their native place, run away indif-

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*Ideolgie, tom. i. p. 114
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ferently, whether they perceive an enemy afar off or near at hand? Animals born with imperfect eyes, or altogether blind, can neither see external objects nor measure distance; but those which are born with perfect eyes see immediately, and measure distance, figure, motion and plurality exactly. The partridge, quail and duck avoid from birth every object which lies in their way. It is, therefore, evident that the sense of touch has not the prerogative of producing ideas of extent, distance, form, and motion. Locke, indeed, demonstrated this truth long ago; and it is certain that not only touch and vision, but also hearing and smell, may excite ideas of distance, direction, motion and plurality. Animals turn towards the wind, and judge of the direction in which impressions come.

Ideas of extent, form, distance, motion and plurality, thus excited by different senses, is to me an evident proof that none of them belongs immediately to any external sense; for I consider it as an axiom in the philosophy of mind, that no special faculty manifests itself by means of two or several organs. Every special faculty is attached to some one particular organ. My conclusion is confirmed by facts and direct proofs. The faculties of knowing and measuring space in general, and of distinguishing distance, forms, number, motion and rest, bear no proportion to the external senses to which they are attributed, either in animals or in man; these faculties are internal, and produce their respective sensations without being excited by the senses of seeing or touch; birds migrate; dogs and pigeons find the places to which they are attached again, without being acquainted with the interjacent country or objects; and birds build nests like those of their kind without instruction; these acts follow from internal faculties, and without any external excitation from touch or sight. Finally, the physiology of the brain shows that there exists particular organs of powers, the manifestations of which are in proportion to their respective apparatuses. These faculties, therefore, must be separated from the functions of the external senses, and attributed to particular internal organs.

3. The third supposed prerogative of touch is, that it is the surest of all, and the rectifier and correcter of the other senses. In
treated of the external senses in general, I have demonstrated that
no sense acquires its faculty by means of another, but that each has
it from nature independently; that all are subject to particular
laws; and that their functions are perfect or imperfect according to
the organization of their proper apparatus. Thus, from this con-
sideration it follows, that touch neither produces the faculties of
the other senses, nor rectifies their errors. Indeed, it is easy to
prove, both by the healthy and the diseased state, that touch is not
surer than any other sense, and that it does not rectify the other
senses, any more than it is rectified by them.

If we cross two fingers, and touch a round body, a pebble, for
instance, or a pea, we seem to feel two bodies. A thin and flex-
ible piece of paper between the fore-finger and thumb is not felt.
In various diseases individuals fancy they receive impressions from
without; they feel warm or cold, tickling, creeping, and other sen-
sations; just as they hear voices, which have no external existence,
and are produced by an internal cause. Whoever will reflect on
these considerations, combined with those exposed when speaking
of the mutual rectification of the senses, may perceive that touch
has no superiority over any other sense.

4. I have already said, that some physiologists and philosophers
believe that the sense of touch produces many of the instinctive
labors observed among animals, and the mechanical arts among
men. But neither are the instinctive labors of animals, nor the
mechanical arts of man, in any proportion to the acuteness of
touch, or to the perfection of the external instruments. A great
number of insects exhibit peculiar instincts before their antennae
or instruments of touch are developed. Many animals have those
instruments to which peculiar faculties are attributed, without being
possessed of the corresponding functions. Would it not be more
natural to suppose that apes and monkeys should possess the pow-
er of constructing, because they have hands, than that the beaver
should build because it has a tail? Monkeys, indeed, have hands,
they can put wood on a fire, they also are very sensible to cold
and warmth, but have they understanding enough to keep up the
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fire? According to the opinion announced, insects, crayfish, lobsters, and especially cuttlefish, ought to have exact ideas of extension, of size and of geometry, in consequence of their numerous and perfect organs of touch.

The external instruments, moreover, are often similar, while the functions are quite different. There is a great variety in the form and texture of the cobwebs, which different species of spiders make to catch flies. What diversity of structure in the nests of birds whose bills are similar? Animals of the same genus vary much in their food, and in their manner of living. The large titmouse builds its nests in hollow-trees; the long-tailed titmouse in clefts of branches; the bearded titmouse among reeds; the titmouse of Poland suspends its delicate and curious dwelling from a slender bough; the cuckoo again, though endowed with all the requisites for building, constructs no nest whatever. The hare and rabbit have feet exceedingly alike, yet the hare lies in the open fields, while the rabbit makes a burrow.

On the contrary, similar acts are performed by animals with a variety of dissimilar instruments. The proboscis is to the elephant what the hand is to man and to the monkey. It is by means of the bill that the swallow attaches her nest to the wall, and that the thrush cements the interior of her's, while it is by means of his tail that the beaver covers his hut with mud. The hands of monkeys, and the feet of parrots and squirrels, are certainly different; yet all hold up their food when they eat; the hog ploughs the earth with his snout, and the dog scratches it with his feet, in digging up truffles. In the same way similar internal faculties produce similar effects by means of perfectly different instruments.

Again, man and animals exhibit many faculties which cannot be considered as effects of external instruments. Who, for example, can show, from any external organ, that crows should live in society, and magpies in pairs? that the cuckoo and chamois should be wild by nature, and the pigeon and goat tameable? that bustards and cranes should place sentinels? that ants should gather provisions. &c.?
Finally, even in the human kind, there is no proportion between manifestations of faculties and perfection of external instruments. If man owe his arts to his hands, why do not idiots invent? Why do painters drop the pencil, sculptors the chisel, and architects the rule and compass, as soon as their understanding is fatigued? and why do many bring forth stupendous works by the assistance of crippled hands or of stumps? Who can measure the architectural talent from the conformation of the hands? These considerations prove that the external instruments do not produce the faculties. I do not however deny their importance; I should even admit some relation between internal faculties and external instruments. Without instruments the internal faculties could not manifest themselves; without muscles, the will could not move a limb; without hands, or some equivalent, we could not seize any object; carnivorous animals could not destroy without claws and teeth; without these instruments, therefore, they could not subsist. Moreover, as the instruments are more perfect, the manifestations of internal faculties are also more perfect. Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that the propensities and intellectual faculties which make use of the external instruments, must be derived from within.

We have still to consider whether or not acuteness of feeling produces the instinctive labors of animals and the mechanical arts of man. Experience proves that it does not. There is no proportion between fineness of skin or acuteness of feeling, and manifestation of the faculties of the mind. Some individuals have rough hands and an obtuse feeling, and yet produce surprising works. No artist ever judged of the capacity of his pupils from this acuteness of touch. It is even still a question whether man's sense of touch is more acute than that of animals. It is generally believed to be so, because his skin is destitute of hair and covered with a very thin epidermis only, while the lower animals are clothed with hair or feathers. There are some tribes, however, which have no hair, as the elephant, the Turkish dog, snails, &c; and whose sense of feeling is very acute. Other animals, though covered with hair, immediately feel the smallest insects which alight on their bodies.
Finally, it is even impossible to conclude that because the skin is covered with hair, feeling is less acute. Sometimes in diseases the hairy scalp of man grows extremely sensible, and the least movement of the hair gives excessive pain; the epidermis is thickest at the points of our fingers, yet there feeling is considered as the most acute. Consequently, the nerves of touch, though covered with hair, may be even more sensible than when destitute of such a covering, and it is by no means obvious that the feeling of man is more acute than that of animals.

The wisdom then of Solon, Socrates, and Plato, and the masterly productions of Homer, Euclid, Raphael, and others, were not the result of their mere hands; nor are the surprising instincts of animals the effects of their antennae, feet, teeth, proboscis, or tails. I, however, repeat, that it must be allowed that the external instruments, though they are not in proportion to the internal faculties, cannot be in contradiction to them; and that the internal faculties perform their functions with greater facility and more accuracy as the external instruments are more perfect. Therefore, the hand of man, which is composed of so many movable parts, capable at every moment of changing their direction, and of grasping external bodies, is fitter for appreciating tactile qualities than the feet of birds invested with scales, or of quadrupeds covered with a horny substance. Yet it is nevertheless certain, that the external instruments are never the cause of the internal faculties.

5. It may be asked, whether feeling produces ideas of consistency, of hardness, of softness, of solidity and fluidity, of weight and resistance? I think it does not. For the mind, to examine these qualities of bodies, employs the muscular system, rather than the sense of feeling properly so called. There is also no proportion between the faculty of measuring such qualities, and the sense of feeling, or the muscular system. Moreover, the sense of feeling being lost, if the muscular power remain, we may perceive weight and consistency. Now the muscles are excited by internal causes, and therefore ideas of weight, resistance and consistency are, in my opinion, the result of some internal faculty. I once for all
observe generally, that when any function results from the active state of an external sense, the faculty which conceives the idea is internal. We have seen above, that the faculties which take cognizance of extent and size, form and number, are internal. In this manner we may also conceive how internal faculties employ different external senses, if that be possible, and how sometimes they can make use only of a single sense. The mind, for instance, wishes to move the body from one place to another, and this can be done only by means of the muscular system; the mind wishes to perceive music, and this also can be done only by means of the auditory nerve; but the mind wishes to perceive the size or form of a body, and this may then be done either by the sense of sight or by that of feeling. Notwithstanding these modifications, it remains always certain that every reaction of the mind upon external bodies has its cause in some internal faculty, while the sensations, which result from the passive state of the five external senses, constitute their immediate sphere of activity.

Taste.

No feeling and no intellectual faculty having been supposed to be derived from the sense of taste, there is no occasion to speak of this sense here.

Smell.

A great number of physiologists ascribe to the sense of smell the surprising faculty by means of which many animals discover and return to their dwellings from very great distances; but there are many facts of this kind which cannot be explained by smell alone. A dog, for example, at the end of several months, and from a distance of more than a hundred leagues, finds his former dwelling and master, though he has been carried away in a coach; though it has rained repeatedly during this interval of time; though he has gone by water and comes back by land; though he is obli-
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ged to make circuits instead of taking the nearest way; and though
the wind has changed in all directions. Pigeons, likewise, though
transported to a distance of twenty or fifty leagues, and shut up for
several weeks, return to their former cotes; the falcon of Iceland,
confined for many months, often flies away in the first moment of
its liberation: these, and similar phenomena, cannot be explained
by the sense of smell. It is necessary to admit another superior
faculty, sometimes called the sixth sense.

Hearing.

A very common opinion is, that music and language are results
of the sense of hearing. But this is not the case. I shall first
show that this sense cannot produce music. Le Cat, Ackermann
and others, think that the cochlea is the most important part of the
ear, and the principal instrument of the musical faculty. The
latter has accordingly maintained that man alone had the cochlea.
Different quadrupeds, however, possess this part even more perfect
than man, as sheep, cats, dogs and hogs, and these animals certainly
are not fond of music. Hence, the opinion of Ackermann and
of Le Cat is erroneous. Besides, birds, whose ear is almost des-
titute of this part, sing. Le Cat, aware of this contradiction, an-
swered, that the whole skull in birds is more sonorous than in
quadrupeds, because it is less covered with muscles; he thinks that
if nature had joined a cochlea in addition, they would have been
still more sensible to melodious sounds, and as passionately fond
of music as almost all animals are of food; but, continues he, as
birds are destitute of the cochlea, their musical talent depends more
on their throat. Le Cat is mistaken: there is a great number of
singing birds whose skulls are covered proportionately with more
muscles than those of some quadrupeds, the ant-eater, for instance.
The heads of the goldfinch, bullfinch, chaffinch, linnet, &c., are
covered with considerable muscles, while that of the green wood-
pecker, which certainly is not a melodious bird, is almost destitute
of them. The heads of the hoarse March thrush, of the monoto-
nous cuckoo, of the miserable chatterer of Bohemia, &c., are not covered with more muscles than the skull of the sweet mocking bird, of the melodious black bird, and of the vineyard thrush, with its delightful song. If we suppose that the whole skull of birds is sonorous, the only consequence to be drawn from it would be, that a weak sound is greatly strengthened in them; but why certain birds are so fond of singing, and why some nightingales continue their song till they die from exhaustion, would be quite inexplicable.

Hearing in general cannot produce music, because there is no proportion either in animals or in man between it and musical talents. Many hear very acutely, and are yet insensible to music. Among birds, the female hears as well as the male; if hearing then produce music, why does not she also sing? Among men there are some whose hearing is very obtuse, and whose talent for music is very considerable. Finally, hearing cannot produce music, because hearing perceives only tones which are already produced. The first musician produced music from an internal impulse, and that music of course he had never previously heard. Singing birds, moreover, which have been hatched by strange females, sing naturally and without any instruction the song of their species, as soon as the internal organ of the faculty is active. Hence the males of every species preserve their natural song though they have been brought up in the society of individuals of different kinds; hence, also, musicians who have lost their hearing continue to compose; hence likewise the deaf and dumb have an innate feeling of measure and cadence.

Le Cat confounds the crying of dogs at the sound of a hunting horn, and the stamping and neighing of horses at the blast of a trumpet, with the faculty of music. If it were, we must allow that fishes, reptiles, and even spiders which are allured by sound, are sensible to music. Buffon, Dumas, Bichat, and others, think that the talent of music depends on the equality of the power of hearing with both ears. If, however, inequality of power in the ears sufficed to destroy the perfection of the musical ear, a good
musician would be extremely rare; for by far the greatest number of men hear better with one ear than with the other. Dr. T. Brown compares the pleasure of music in the ear, with tickling in the nerves of touch. Now some persons are ticklish, others are not. So some persons have a musical ear, others have not. This is mere assertion; and refuted by observations already mentioned. We therefore maintain that hearing does not produce music. It is, however, necessary to perceive and to execute it; but this consideration belongs to the chapter on the sphere of activity of each faculty, and here I intend only to prove that hearing cannot produce music.

Some authors derive music and the vocal powers of birds from the larynx. But if the larynx gives the instinct to sing, why do not all animals endowed with this part manifest the faculty? Cuvier has also found that the larynx of many birds which sing, and of others which do not, is similar in structure. What difference is there between the throats of the females and males of the same species? Is there even in man any proportion between the agreeableness of the voice and musical talents? Nay, have not many individuals great musical talent and little voice; and do not others sing very agreeably without excelling in music? Music, therefore, is neither the result of hearing nor of the voice.

It is also a very common opinion that hearing alone, or hearing and voice conjointly, produce the faculty of speech. The best way of refuting this error is to inquire in what language consists, and how it is produced? Language in general is the medium by which sensations and ideas are communicated, and this may be effected by sounds, gestures, or other signs. Language, farther, may be divided into two kinds: natural and artificial, or conventional.

It is a natural law that the internal faculties of man and animals, as soon as they are active, manifest themselves by the media between them and the external world,—the five external senses, and muscular motion. These external manifestations take place according to determinate laws, and though modified in every species of
animal, they are always conformable to certain kinds of sensations or ideas; they constitute the natural language. The horse neighs, the lamb bleats, the cow lows, the child cries, &c. according to their wants. This natural language is general, because all animals require to communicate their sensations, were it only for sexual purposes.

Animals have only natural language, which consists partly of sounds and partly of gestures, like the natural language of man. But man has, besides his natural language, the faculty of producing arbitrary signs, whether sounds or gestures. Animals, on the contrary, are destitute of the power of producing arbitrary signs, though they have also that of learning those of man. I shall, hereafter, consider the faculty which produces arbitrary signs, and that which learns them. I here intend only to prove that neither hearing nor voice produces the faculty of speech, and that both stand in the same relation to language as they do to music, that is, that they are only certain intermedia or means of manifestation. There are animals which can pronounce words, imitate various sounds, and hear very well, but which, nevertheless, have no arbitrary language. Some imperfect idiots also hear and pronounce with facility the words taught them, but cannot maintain a conversation. Their mode of communication or their language becomes consistent in proportion to their internal faculties. Moreover, if orators and poets become insane, their eloquence is changed into incoherent raving. It is therefore evident that the faculty of speech does not result primitively from the voice and hearing.

Besides the faculties of speech and music, there are others still which act upon the external world by means of hearing, and which are commonly attributed to this sense. Here I must mention an error which was once very common, and into which even Kant and Herder have fallen; namely, that it is impossible to communicate any abstract notion to the deaf and dumb. Le Cat says, that the deaf are more unfortunate than the blind, because many truths are heard and very few are seen. Herder even thought that the deaf and dumb imitate all they see done, whether good or evil.
These and similar erroneous opinions result partly from the common mistake, that our sensations and notions are produced by the external senses, that nothing exists in the mind except what passes by them, and partly also from supposing that arbitrary vocal language produces sensations and ideas. It is, however, certain, that all the internal faculties may exist without hearing; and, consequently, that deaf persons in whom this sense alone is wanting may manifest all the other faculties; they are destitute only of the means of communication which hearing supplies, and are, therefore, obliged to make use of others. Hence they impart their sensations and ideas, that is, they speak by gestures.

Sight.

We have still to examine whether sight produces any intellectual faculty. It is commonly supposed that the art of painting is derived from the sense of sight; and it is certainly true that eyes are necessary to perceive colors, as are ears to perceive sounds; but the art of painting no more consists in the perception of colors, than music in the apprehension of sounds. Sight, therefore, and the faculty of painting bear no proportion to each other. The sight of many animals is more perfect than that of man, yet they do not paint; and even among mankind, the talent of painting cannot be measured by the acuteness of sight. Great painters never attribute their power to their eyes. They say, it is not the eye, but the understanding which perceives the harmony of colors.

From all these considerations it follows, that many intellectual faculties, which have been attributed to the five external senses, do not belong to them.
The external senses destined to bring man and animals into communication with the external world may be divided into two sorts. By means of the first two in number, we are acquainted with external bodies when they touch the sentient organs immediately. These are touch and taste. The second, including the remaining senses, perceives remote bodies. I do not say that perception or sensation can take place in a sense which is not affected by some immediate impression: this is an indispensable condition; but to say that we are acquainted with remote bodies and their qualities, is not to say that we perceive without impressions. This latter phrase would be contradictory and absurd. We perceive remote bodies either by particles detached from them, and carried to a sentient organ, as to the olfactory nerve, or we perceive them by intermedia, as light and air. In both cases it is certain that man and animals become acquainted with remote bodies and their qualities.

In general only five external senses are spoken of, but it is necessary to speak with greater precision. I therefore first separate the general expression, sensation, from the determinate sensation of hunger and thirst; secondly, from voluntary motion, to which voice belongs; and in the third place, from the sense of feeling as well as from touch. I consider the word sensation as an expression altogether general. Every act of consciousness, or every perception of an impression, whether external or internal, is sensation. Hunger and thirst, then, constitute a particular class of sensations attached to particular nerves; and voluntary motion ought not to be confounded with the sense of feeling as is generally done. For many years I have been convinced, by anatomical, physiological and pathological proofs, that the nerves of motion and feeling are quite different. This difference is spoken of by Herophilus, who believed that it must exist, as voluntary motion
is sometimes impossible, while feeling remains or is even increased in acuteness, and as feeling is oftentimes lost while voluntary motion continues. In modern days, Reil has stated that the medulla of the nerves produces sensation, and their investment motion; but entire nerves—nerves consisting of both these parts—are distributed to the muscles in which there is motion, and to the skin in which there is sensation. Besides the pathological proof of the difference between the nerves of motion and of feeling, considered in all my publications, since 1815, the physiological and anatomical reasons made me believe in the existence of these two sorts of nerves. As to the details of this discussion and of my claims to priority of this doctrine, I refer the reader to the third section of my work on the Anatomy of the Brain. Thus, the functions of the muscles exist independently of the five external senses, and are only combined with these that they may be aided in accomplishing their offices. From the preceding considerations it results, that the greater number of functions, commonly attributed to the senses, do not belong to them, but depend on the existence of internal faculties. The external senses as intermedia of the exhibition of mental powers, which they are, in fact, have certain functions that may be called mediate, while those which the senses themselves suffice to perform, may be styled immediate. In other words, the immediate perceptions depend on the external senses, while the mediate functions permit the acquisition of determinate ideas conceived by internal faculties.

According to the observations in the first section of this work, on sensibility, the brain seems to be necessary to every kind of perception, even to that of the immediate functions of the external senses; but it is not yet ascertained, though it is probable, that one fundamental power, inherent in a particular part of the brain, knows and conceives, as sensations, all the varied impressions made on the external senses. Some phrenologists think that each external sense has a peculiar portion of brain for this end, and that the combined action of its nerve and of this cerebral part is necessary to the accomplishment of its functions. That the nerve of taste
and a portion of brain, for instance, are necessary to perceive savors; the olfactory nerve and a cerebral part to distinguish odors, &c. I do not believe that consciousness happens without brain, but I see no reason to surmise that the immediate functions of each external sense require a particular portion of the brain in order to be recognised as determinate sensations.

Let us now consider the immediate functions of each individual sense.

**Immediate Functions of the Sense of Feeling.**

Feeling is the most extensive of all the senses; it is continued not only over the whole external surface of the body, but even over the intestinal canal. It produces the most general perceptions of pain and pleasure, sensations of temperature, of dryness and moisture. All its other functions which procure notions of existing objects and their relations, are only mediate. In my opinion, even the ideas of roughness and smoothness belong to an internal faculty, namely, configuration. The mediate function of the sense of feeling may be called touch, of which the sphere of activity is very considerable and important: it is particularly combined with the nerves of voluntary motion, and the two kinds together may assist the functions of all internal faculties, as well affective as intellectual. Hence the reason why nerves of feeling and motion are most intimately connected with the organs of the affective and intellectual faculties. The five external senses, it may, indeed, be readily conceived, should be in connexion with those cerebral organs which they particularly assist; and farther, as the nerves of motion and of feeling may aid all internal faculties, that they should be in connexion with all the internal organs, just as the nerves of feeling and motion, mutually aidant, are connected with each other.
Taste.

Taste is the second sense by means of which man and animals are made acquainted with external bodies, when these touch the sentient organ immediately. After feeling, this sense seems to be the most general and the most indispensable of all to living beings which consciously take food. It seems also that it is active early in life. The fifth pair of nerves, branches of which are distributed to the membrane covering the palate, the velum pendulum, the pharynx, and chiefly to the tongue, is of great size in new-born children, as are the nerves of motion and feeling also.

An opinion commonly prevails that the acuteness of taste depends not only on the nervous papillæ of the tongue, but also on its flexibility, softness and moisture. Ackermann, who derives the perfection of the human mind from the acuteness of the five senses, asserts that the nerves of taste are proportionally more considerable in man than in animals; that the tongue of man is the most flexible and soft, and that its nervous papillæ are covered with the finest skin. In many animals, however, as in the dog, monkey, &c. the skin of the tongue is as thin and fine, and its structure as flexible as in man. The mobility of the tongue has, indeed, less relation to the taste than to the function of speech. The principal condition to an acute taste is certainly large gustatory nerves spread over a considerable surface; but in this point many animals surpass man. In some, the lingual nerve as well as the whole fifth pair, is much larger than in the human kind; the nervous papillæ of the tongue are also more numerous and their apices more extensive. Though the tongue of several species is covered with a very rough skin, they distinguish and select certain plants conformable to their taste, and reject others which are contrary to it. Moreover, when we see that eating is to animals the most exquisite and permanent pleasure, and that great numbers pass almost their entire existence in eating or ruminating, we shall with difficulty deny them a taste more perfect than that of man.
I cannot agree with those naturalists, who maintain that the taste of birds is very obtuse. Blumenbach has shown that the organ of taste is large, and the sense very exquisite in the duck. A great number of birds do not swallow their food suddenly; the titmouse, for example, laps it. The greater number of birds which live upon insects, seeds, and berries, crush and bruise them. If we present the canary bird, the bulfinch, or nightingale with different sorts of food, each of them will choose that which is most agreeable. If we give ants' eggs to young nightingales, many rather die of hunger than eat, because unacquainted with that sort of food; and if we even put them into their bill, they commonly drop them; the eggs, if crushed, however, are swallowed with the greatest avidity; it is evident from this that their taste is very acute. Even the birds which swallow their food suddenly, as fowls, pigeons and others, distinguish different berries and seeds with the extremity of their bill. If we mix the seed of vetches with that of robinia caragana, pigeons and fowls will pick them up indiscriminately, but will always throw away the latter. These birds therefore like others, prefer one sort of food. Tame storks, accustomed to catch rats and mice thrown towards them, jerk these several times into the air and catch them again in their bill, in order to crush before swallowing them. If we cast a toad to them, however, they will catch still, but immediately drop it. They also eat bees and large flies greedily; but regularly reject any other insect which does not please their palate. Such also is the case with swallows and other birds which live on insects.

These observations render it improbable that every insoluble body is insipid, or that every substance to affect the organ of taste must be dissolved in the mucus which covers the tongue. In many physiological writings, the axiom of chemistry, \textit{corpora non agunt nisi soluta}, is applied to the organ of taste. 'The tongue,' says Richerand, 'is covered by a mucous, whitish yellow, or bilious slime. This covering, more or less thick, prevents the immediate contact of sapid particles, and we have only a false idea of tastes. All aliments seem bitter if a bilious disposition exist, or insipid if
there be a superabundance of mucus.' The tongue, however, it appears, may perceive many spirituous, oleaginous, or other impressions produced by seeds and insects, without their being dissolved and mixed with the mucus which covers it.

M. Dumeril, Professor of Physiology at Paris, maintains (in an essay on the smell of fishes) that fishes are destitute of taste; this sense, according to him, being supplied by that of smell. Fishes, says he, have not the hypoglossal nerve, and the continual pressure of the water must blunt the sensibility of the lingual nerve. Now supposing that fishes were destitute of the hypoglossal nerve, it would not follow that they had no taste; for the hypoglossal serves only for the motion of the tongue, while a branch of the fifth pair which exists in fishes, is the sole organ of taste. The tongues of many fishes are covered with numerous nervous papillæ, and at the point are even moveable, flexible, and soft. Hence there is not only no anatomical reason to deny taste to fishes, but it is even from their possessing this sense that they may be taken with a bait. Again, if the pressure of water blunt their taste, why should it not blunt their smell also? But pressure produces no such effect; the sole of the foot does not lose its sensibility, though pressed on during a long life. In short, this opinion of Dumeril seems more remarkable for its singularity than for its correctness.

The very lowest tribes of the animal world must also have nerves of taste. Insects prefer different kinds of food, though their gustatory nerves have not yet been discovered.

Neither in man nor in animals can taste be considered as an infallible guide to the wholesomeness of the body tasted. Unsavory articles may be wholesome, while substances which please the palate may act as poisons.

The taste of the sick often affords an indication in distinguishing, or in aiding nature in the cure of disease; no good physician, however, will have unbounded confidence in it. The sense of taste is necessarily in most intimate relationship with the whole digestive system. I have already mentioned that this sense is modified in different kinds of animals, and in different individuals of the same
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kind, even in different ages, and in the healthy or diseased state. As the organ of taste is the first developed, so it seems to lose its activity last. Old persons commonly love good cheer, which is also necessary for them. When sight has failed, when the ear no longer does its office, when the skin has become stiff and almost insensible, the aged may often be seen eating and drinking as heartily and with as much pleasure as their grand-children.

The sphere of activity of this sense is confined to sensations of taste; that is, it perceives only impressions of savor. Mediately, it assists nutrition. The nerves of taste have the most intimate connexion with those necessary to the motion of the jaws, with those of the organ of voice, and with the glossopharyngeal nerve. Accordingly the organs on which these nerves are expanded exert the greatest mutual influence.

Smell.

By means of smell the external world begins to act upon man and animals from a distance. Odorous particles detached, inform them of the existence of particular bodies. Several physiologists regard smell as a completion or a finer and higher degree of taste. But the system of the olfactory nerve is particular. It is, as it were, the explorer and the guide of the sense of taste, and must exist very low in the scale; insects are attracted by odors, but their olfactory nerve has not been discovered.

Dumeril, supposing fishes to have no taste, regards smell as its substitute; and in support of his opinion maintains, that odoriferous particles cannot be transmitted by water. We have already seen that the organ of taste exists in fishes, and it is not probable that nature has produced any organic apparatus without an appropriate object. It is besides strange to maintain that odoriferous particles are not transmitted by water, as fish of various sorts, lobsters, &c. are taken by bait. It is remarkable that this sense does not exist in cetaceous animals, which occupy so high a place in the scale of being. Dumeril thinks also that their taste supplies the place of smell.
It is admitted that many animals excel man in acuteness of smell; their olfactory apparatus being much larger. But this occurs differently among the most stupid and the most intelligent animals—in oxen and hogs, in dogs and horses.

Cuvier maintains that the olfactory nerve is larger in carnivorous than in herbivorous animals; but there is no relation between the acuteness of smell, and the instinct to eat flesh or vegetables. Man, who is omnivorous, and the sea-calf which lives only on fish, have both very small olfactory nerves. The turtle, mole, sheep, ox, horse, &c. however different their food is, have an olfactory nerve proportionally larger than the wolf, dog, tiger, &c. Comparative anatomy, therefore, as also comparative physiology, oppose Cuvier's opinion. Many hundreds of plants supply herbivorous animals with food, while the carnivora live commonly upon a smaller variety of flesh; to distinguish their food, therefore, the organ of smell in herbivorous should be larger than in carnivorous animals. Moreover, if nature endowed carnivorous animals with a very acute smell for the purpose of discovering their prey, it is improbable that she refused the weak victim an equal advantage to enable it to detect and escape its enemies.

Odors act powerfully upon the brain; we, therefore, apply stimuli to the olfactory nerves, which often revive sensibility in cases of suspended animation.

The smell in its immediate functions perceives odorous particles emanating from external bodies, without any reference to the object. All functions besides are mediate. It assists the faculty which conceives the existence of the world, and informs man and animals of the existence of food; it assists farther individual propensities, as amativeness, alimentiveness, adhesiveness, philogenetiveness, &c. To that effect the olfactory nerve seems to have a particular connexion with the anterior lobes, and convolutions of the brain situated sideways, outwards, and backwards. The nose is near the mouth, taste and smell bearing close relations one to another.
Hearing.

Hearing is the second sense which makes man and animals acquainted with remote existences, and is the first which perceives external objects by an intermedium, the air. The auditory nerve is found from man down to the cuttle-fish; farther it has not been distinguished, though several animals, lower in the scale, are not destitute of hearing. The auditory apparatus is more complex as animals are more perfect, and this is the case both with the external and internal ear. Except Ackermann, all physiologists allow that many animals surpass man in the faculty of hearing. That physiologist, however, deriving human intellectual superiority solely from the external senses, asserts that the hearing of man is the most perfect, on account of the cochlea of his ear, which according to him is the most essential part, and is wanting in animals. But this assertion may be refuted both anatomically and physiologically. First, it is certain that the organ of hearing is more perfect in many animals than in man; that their external ear is larger, more moveable, and capable of being turned in all directions and opposed to soniferous undulations. Moreover, the auditory apparatus of many animals has large cavities which increase the sonorous vibrations, and which cannot be confounded with the mastoid process of man; in some, these are empty; in others they are divided into compartments; and in the ox are composed of many concentric partitions. The auditory nerve is also much larger in many animals, as the ox, horse, stag, sheep, &c. than in man; and the cochlea not only exists among them, but is in many even more perfect than in the human kind. Hence, it is anatomically proved, that the organ of hearing is in many animals larger and more perfect than in man. The same may be demonstrated physiologically. In observing the functions of animals, we may convince ourselves that many of them perceive sounds which are imperceptible to man.

The sense of hearing is not active in new-born children, but it
improves by degrees, and in proportion as its apparatus is developed. In the same way the auditory power declines in proportion as the vigor of the organ decreases. Several authors maintain that the deafness of old persons depends on the blunted sensibility of the auditory nerve; they think that repeated impressions exhaust sensibility. It is, indeed, true, that sensibility is blunted and exhausted by too great exercise; but I think that, in the ordinary state of health, dulness of hearing in old persons depends on the decrease of the auditory apparatus. In the young and healthy, the auditory nerve is expanded in a humor which occupies the cavities of the internal ear; this in the aged diminishes at the same time that the nerve itself decreases. Hence, when Pinel, during the severe winter of 1798, caused the skulls of several old women who had lost their hearing to be frozen and then opened, he found the cavities of the internal ear perfectly empty, while they were filled with ice in younger persons who had died with this sense unimpaired.

The immediate functions of the sense of hearing are confined to the perception of sounds; yet it assists a great number of internal faculties which are commonly attributed to it. It potently aids the affective, as well as the intellectual faculties of space, individuality, tune, speech, and through the instrumentality of these, all the other powers of the mind. The auditory nerve, indeed, has a nearer connexion with the organs of the feelings than of the intellectual faculties; it embraces the nervous bundle of the cerebellum, and is connected with the vocal nerves; the voice called forth by command of the feelings, as well as the natural language of their activity, is more energetic than when summoned by the intellectual faculties to aid them in the expression of their desires.

We may conceive that the sense of hearing bears relation to the internal faculties which act by its means; precisely as even external objects are in harmony with internal faculties, or internal faculties with external objects; as the laws of vibrations, for instance, though they exist in external vibrating objects, are conformable to the laws of the internal faculty of tune; or as size, number, and
succession, which exist in the external world, are in relation to certain internal faculties. Yet this sense, like all others, presents infinite modifications in different beings, even of the same species.

**Sight.**

Sight is the second sense which informs man and animals of remote objects by means of an intermedium, light. Those who attribute the excellence of man's intellectual faculties to the perfection of his senses, maintain that his sight is better than that of animals. They consider this superiority as a result of the greater distinctness with which they say objects are seen by man; to the transparency of the diaphanous parts of his eye; to the irritability of his iris, and to the position of his crystalline lens. Richerand even believes that the pigmentum nigrum impedes and disturbs the distinctness of vision; and that perhaps on this account animals have false and exaggerated ideas of the power of man. Experience answers these errors. The iris of many animals is very moveable, and they see during both the day and night, and to greater distances than man. The falcon perceives the heron, still invisible to man; the eagle, beyond the reach of human sight, sees a hare upon the ground; the turkey and fowl recognise the far distant bird of prey, and warn their surrounding broods, when it is impossible for man to distinguish the enemy. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the sense of sight is more acute in many animals than in man.

None of the senses has occupied physiologists and philosophers more than sight and touch; but these have also been the subjects of the greatest number of errors. Many false notions have been and are still current, in regard to vision. Dr. T. Brown reproduces various misconceptions of his predecessors.

This sense has been said to acquire its faculty either by touch or by habit. But I have already proved, in speaking of the generalities of the external senses, that no one acquires its faculty from any other or from habit. Vision depends on the organization
of the eye; and, according to this, it is weak, energetic, good or bad. Some animals enter the world with perfect eyes, and they see accurately from the first. The butterfly and honey-bee fly on the first attempt through the fields, from flower to flower; and the partridge and chicken as soon as they have left the shell, run through stubbles and corn, while other animals born blind distinguish size, shape, and distance of bodies, only by slow degrees. This is the case in the human kind. I cannot insist too forcibly on this truth; every sense has its own laws, and its functions depend on the state of its organization. In the looking-glass we must see ourselves and other objects enlarged, diminished, lengthened, shortened, multiplied, near, distant; and so forth, according to the laws of the reflection of light.

Some also maintain, that without the sense of touch our eyes would represent all objects reversed and double: and that the external world would seem to be in the eyes, because it is painted on the retina. Objects are actually reversed in the eyes; but, as Berkeley and Condillac have elucidated, they are not painted on the retina, that nervous expansion is only impinged on by the rays of light. How or why we see objects upright, is not, however, explained. An internal faculty makes animals acquainted with the external world, and they are more disposed to transfer all internal sensations and ideas of external bodies to the outward world, than to concentrate impressions of these inwardly. According to a law of nature, the impressions of our senses are not merely transferred into the external world, but are even carried to the places whence they come. We deem the sonorous body to be in the direction from whence come vibrations of the air. And if animals take wind, they do not look for the impressions received in a direction opposite to that whence they proceed. Impressions of light are also referred to the place whence they emanate; and, consequently, such as arrive from above are referred upwards, those from below downwards, and the object is thus seen in its right position.

No one recollects having in his infancy seen any object reversed, and natural history presents no such example in animals. Accord-
ing to the absurdities into which speculators have run, young birds ought to take the root of a tree for its top. It is unfortunate that natural philosophers and physiologists in examining the functions of the senses, have confined their reasonings to man alone, thus excluding animals entirely. I have now spoken of vision being single, although the impressions are double; of the eye's capacity to distinguish distance; and shown that animals' inability to measure distances exactly between themselves and external bodies only occurs when their eyes are imperfect. Thus the organ of vision has its peculiar faculty, whose manifestations depend on the state of the eye's organization; and vision, like every other sense, is subject to invariable laws of its own. A straight stick, half plunged in water, must needs appear crooked. In a vessel filled with water, we see a stone or other body at the bottom, which is invisible, circumstances remaining the same, with the exception of the vessel being empty. The most learned men, notwithstanding all conviction to the contrary, see images behind the looking-glass, as do parrots and monkeys. We see our persons reversed in the concavity of a spoon, our right hand on the left side, and our left on the right; but in a conic mirror, convex in the circumference and concave from the basis to the apex, we see our persons also reversed, but the right side opposite the right, and the left opposite the left, as in a common looking-glass. We know that the last two in an avenue of trees are as distant from each other as the nearest, yet the distance appears to decrease as they are more remote. A square tower from afar off appears round; and mighty trees, in the distance, seem no larger than small bushes at hand. All these and similar conceptions are necessary, and in accordance with the laws of optics.

Those who reproach the sense of sight with committing the errors I have refuted, call to their aid the experiment of Cheselden on a person born blind. As in Cheselden's own account of the experiment, there is no mention of double or reversed vision after the operation, Le Cat therefore said, that these persons were acquainted with the situation of objects by touch, and consequently
could not easily be misled by their sight when it was acquired. I, however, ask why they were not acquainted with the size and shape of objects? and why, though feeling informed them that objects touched not the surface of their bodies, they still seemed to touch their eyes? This even happened in Cheselden's case of the blind-born individual who underwent the second operation twelve months after the first; and who, consequently, was already acquainted by the one eye with external bodies, and with their size and shape; yet the testimony neither of his touch nor of his sound eye was sufficient to persuade his other eye that portraits were not elevated objects.

Diderot has very well answered this reproach made against sight. Pictures, says he, produced the same effect upon savages when they saw them for the first time. They took portraits for living persons; they spoke to them, and were much astonished at receiving no answer. We ought to consider, continues Diderot, that vision cannot be perfect before the organization is perfect. The humors of the eye must have become clear, the iris must be conveniently dilatable, the retina neither too little nor too highly sensible, and the whole eye-ball fit for exerting all the particulars necessary to distinct vision. He also said very well; sight is not necessary in order to be sure by touch that any substance exists; why should touch be necessary to sight in order to be sure by sight that the same thing exists?

Mr. Wardrop's case* of a lady who was blind from the earliest age, and received sight by the operation of an artificial pupil, when she had reached her 46th year, confirms every one of my ideas on

*I remain thankful to Mr. Wardrop, though I cannot help being surprised by his omitting my name in his paper, read before the Royal Society of London, on the 15th June, 1826, and inserted in their philosophical transactions. He, however, knew that I indicated the few experiments which were made in order to ascertain what notions the lady had of size, form, position, color, distance and motion. Meeting me before the house where she lived, he spoke to me of the case, and kindly offered to bring me to the patient. No one who knows my anxiety about the knowledge of men, will doubt that I immediately availed myself of his kind offer. It was on the third of March, 1826, and, as I was told, fourteen days after the last operation.
the functions of sight. As Miss D**** could only see with one eye it was superfluous to ask her about double vision. She perceived external objects, but stated to be in moving about more uneasy than she was before the operation, from fear of hurting herself against the objects. She never fancied that she saw them in her eye, though she saw their distance very imperfectly. She at once distinguished large bodies from small ones; but when I saw her the first time, she seemed unable to discern well their forms. Various colored, viz. yellow, red, white, blue, and greenish wafers were shown to her, the different colors produced different sensations in her mind; and that of yellow was the most agreeable. It did not seem prudent to fatigue the eye too much, and we confined our experiments to one more with respect to motion. I placed a glass of water on the table, requesting her to take it. On approaching her hand towards and near it, I moved it to a greater distance; upon which she immediately said, 'you move it, you take it away.'

Mr. Wardrop and the patient allowed me to see her again on the 8th of March. Meanwhile I had marked with ink on paper several figures of different forms, some of the same form with different size, such as a small and large circle, a small and large square, &c. She easily perceived the different sizes, and after having been desired to draw with the finger on her other hand, the forms she drew under the names long, round, square, similar forms were shown to her, and she pointed to them exactly. She was sensible of number. In order to ascertain that she saw the objects in their natural and not in a reversed position, nor the right side to the left, and vice versa, I had prepared a figure larger on one end and pointed on the other, and as she distinguished the size of both ends, I bent now the thinner end upward and then downward, and she indicated each time as the position shown to her was in reality. Another figure with a thinner end communicated with the pointed end of the former figure, and she never confounded the left and right side with each other. Several differently colored ribbons were presented to her eye; she perceived different impressions,
and gave a decided preference to some of them, to yellow for instance, and then to pale pink. She called the two latter shades pretty. I relate merely the particulars as I observed them in connexion with phrenology; the rest of this highly interesting case, which claims the attention both of physiologists and philosophers, may be seen in Mr. Wardrop's paper.

The immediate function of sight is confined to the perception of light. All its other offices are mediate. The eyes may assist all the external senses, all the affective powers, and all the intellectual faculties. The connexion of the optic nerve with the brain also shows that sight chiefly assists its posterior, lateral, and anterior part.

Thus, the spheres of immediate activity of the five senses are very limited: feeling perceives only dryness, moisture, and temperature; taste savors; smell odors; the ears sound; and the eyes light; all their other functions are only mediate, that is, internal faculties by means of the external senses perceive various impressions, conceive peculiar ideas, recognise the existence of bodies and their qualities, and again act upon the external world, by means of the senses and voluntary motion.

The chapter on the external senses as it is published in the first volume of the large work, entitled Anatomical Physiologie du Systeme, &c. has been elaborated by the joined exertions of Gall and myself, during the first years of our stay in Paris. The reader will perceive that since that time I have limited the functions of the external senses, and divided them into immediate and mediate.
CHAPTER II.

GENUS II. OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.

Perceptive Faculties.

By this name I distinguish certain faculties necessary to acquire those notions of the external world, which the five senses cannot produce. I shall in the first place make some general remarks upon the forehead, or frontal region of the brain, in which their organs are placed.

In comparing one kind of animal with another, and with man, we find that the forehead is developed in relation to the intellectual functions. Animals are still commonly said to act by instinct; there is no doubt, however, that many of them know the objects which surround them, remember events which have happened, and modify their actions according to these. An old fox having escaped many snares, and knowing that he is watched, is more cautious, and far slyer than a young one, in his approaches to the poultry-yard. A bird, which has had its nest once destroyed, conceives the necessity of secreting its second more carefully, even of constructing it with greater nicety than the first. A dog resists its instinct to pursue a hare, because it recollects the lashing received on a former occasion for having followed its inclination. Similar facts might be infinitely multiplied. Those cited prove, that animals are not subjected to an absolute necessity in their actions, but that they are in a certain degree intellectual and susceptible of education. Now the size of their foreheads coincides with the degree of their understanding. The brain in animals, low down in the scale, instead of rising and forming a forehead, is even inclined downwards. By degrees it becomes horizontal, then elevated, and forms a forehead of greater or less capacity; finally, in man, it is the most largely developed, and expands into a forehead which, in some cases, even projects beyond the plane of the face. Phys-
ioignomists have universally given much attention to the development of the forehead. Lavater has composed a scale of foreheads from the frog to the Apollo Belvidere, with a view to prove the relation between the front lobes of the brain, and the intellectual operations.

It is a curious fact, that domestic animals have the forehead more developed than wild ones, and that animals are tameable in proportion as their forehead is developed. The cause of the tameableness of animals has long been sought after; and it has been asked, whether they are tame by nature, or subdued and made subservient to man by means of his understanding? It was long believed, and many philosophers and physiologists still think, that the state of domesticity among animals is solely the work of man. But this opinion is erroneous; otherwise why should we find it impossible to tame every species, though we be better acquainted with their manners now than were the men of two thousand years ago, and consequently better able to adapt external circumstances to effect this end? It is indeed possible to tame individual wild animals, a single chamois, one tiger, and so on, but never the whole race of chamois or tigers. The hunting tigers of Tippoo Saïb, which were brought to the tower of London after the fall of Seringapatam, seemed tame only to their Indian keeper, and to the persons they had been long accustomed to see; but they were with difficulty retained so, and ultimately became fierce and untractable. The young of undomesticated animals, kept in confinement, are always wild, and fly into solitude; whilst certain creatures are domestic against our wishes; mice everywhere infest the abodes of man; and dogs, in Egypt, regarded as impure and having no master, nevertheless haunt villages and towns; never stray far from human dwellings, and consequently are originally tame and domestic.

Gall speaks of a peculiar organ of educability and tameableness in animals; he shows a scale to prove them more tameable in proportion as their foreheads are higher. The latter fact in itself is true; but Gall's explanation seems to be a mistake. The forehead is certainly not occupied by a single organ. I think that all the in-
tellectual faculties, as also the feeling of benevolence, contribute to render animals tameable. Gall himself, in speaking of the organ of benevolence, says, that animals endowed with it are more docile and more serviceable than others. I consider all such general observations on, and comparisons of the foreheads of different animals, as a striking manner of showing, that the state of development of the front region of the brain coincides with the degree of the understanding.

All philosophers have made the analysis of the intellectual faculties an object of their disquisitions, and all physiognomists have laid great stress on the influence of the forehead. Yet the analysis of the intellectual powers, however various, even that given by Gall is still very defective, and the determination and description of their organs are very inaccurate. I have discovered five organs in the forehead, in addition to those mentioned by Gall, and have introduced a more accurate delineation of the forehead in general, and of the greater number of its organs in particular.

The common observer attaches himself to the perpendicular or retreating state of the forehead, in order to decide about its greater or smaller development, and it is a common objection to Phrenology that such and such persons have retreating foreheads, and yet are very clever. The forehead will always appear retreating when the lower portion is more developed than the upper; yet the whole forehead may be small, large, or of various sizes. The same may be said of perpendicular foreheads, which happens when the upper portion is as prominent as the lower. Some perpendicular foreheads are exceedingly small and shallow, and their mental dispositions very limited. Hence a perpendicular or retreating forehead is no fixed indication of talent or its defect.

In order to judge of the size of the forehead, or of the anterior lobes of the brain, it is not sufficient to look at persons in a front view, but it is necessary to view them in profile, since the anterior lobes, or the organs of the intellectual faculties, begin with constructiveness, where the frontal bone meets the sphenoidal. The portion from constructiveness forward is the forehead. Now, in a
retreating forehead it may be very long or deep at the lower portion, and a perpendicular forehead may be very short or shallow; so that the moral and physical appearances correspond with each other.

What I have said of the frontal sinus, in the section on Craniology, must be remembered here, as far as the frontal sinuses impede the examination of several organs of perceptive faculties.

It is a remarkable fact, that the forehead increases very early, and continues, when exercised, to grow very late in life. I had positive observations that after the age of thirty-six and forty years, the forehead has increased an inch in size.

I begin with considering the perceptive faculties, and I take the following view. Several make us acquainted with the existence of individual objects and their physical qualities, others perceive the different conditions and relations concerning space, time, number and order.

Locke and Reid made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities of matter. Locke called primary qualities extension, divisibility, figure, motion, solidity, hardness, softness and fluidity; and secondary qualities, sound, color, taste, smell, heat or cold. Dr. Reid adds, that our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of the primary qualities in themselves, but only a relative and obscure notion of the secondary qualities.

Dr. T. Brown is against this distribution of primary and secondary qualities altogether, and admits with Kant, and other philosophers, that all sensations are only relative, and that we never know the things, or their qualities in themselves.

I also consider all knowledge of man, as mere phenomenal; but give a new analysis of the powers of sensations and perceptions. I greatly limit the immediate functions of the external senses, and adopt various internal powers of perception.
INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES, WHICH PERCEIVE THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS AND THEIR PHYSICAL QUALITIES.

XXII. Organ of Individuality.

The first conception our understanding must have of external objects is their existence; to acquire such knowledge, the external senses are not of themselves sufficient, although without an impression on them this conception cannot be determinate. The organ of the faculty which procures knowledge of external objects must therefore be considered the first in respect to the order in which the intellectual faculties operate accordingly.

I speak, under the name Individuality, of the faculty which recognises the existence of individual beings, which embodies several elements into one being or object, as tree, house, man, army, navy, &c. whose activity and presence are denoted by substantives, or abstract terms in language, and which in all probability constitutes the personal identity. I acknowledge that objects are inseparable from their qualities, and that these constitute objects, but I think it possible to conceive an existence or entity without knowing its qualities, as God, the mind.

Individuality produces what Dr. Reid called perception, as different from sensation, but coextensive with it; that is, he understood by sensation merely the feeling of the mind, which immediately follows the impression from without, on any of our organs of sense; and by perception the reference of the sensation to its external corporeal cause. Certain particles of adverse matter, for instance, act on the olfactory nerve, and produce a peculiar smell; this is sensation, according to Dr. Reid, but when the peculiar sensation is referred to an object, for instance, a rose, then there is perception. This is the effect of individuality.

This faculty takes cognizance of all existences, objects, things, and beings. Aristotle introduced the images, ideas or phantoms in the mind, in order to explain the action of sensual organs on the
mind. This conception is exploded. Impressions alone are admitted, since sounds and odors can give no images. The figurative and metaphorical language has done harm in philosophy as well as in theology. This faculty prompts those who have it strong, to use their senses with reference to what is around them. It makes them fit for and inclined to observation; it enables them to see and know the particularities or individualities. This faculty, therefore, is indispensable in every practical line; it prompts to the study of natural history, geology, mineralogy, botany, &c. It is strong in persons, who cultivate any branch of natural science with success, it predominates in those who are satisfied with individual notions of objects without aiming or arriving at principles. It is a fundamental quality of good servants, and good card-players. It assists artists in the knowledge of the particulars of their art; for instance, musicians in the knowledge of the individual notes and keys; an architect in having the particulars of a building present; a mathematician to remember the parts of his calculations. In short, it gives presence of mind of individualities, and reality to our conceptions.

When it is excessively active, it is like all other powers, liable to be abused, and originates great errors in philosophy, in personifying phenomena and abstract ideas, as motion, life, ignorance, wisdom, attention, memory, judgment, &c. &c. When it is small, the individual fails to observe external objects. He may visit a house, and come away, without knowing what objects were in the room. Such a person walks in the streets, or through the country, and observes nothing. His external senses may be in perfect health, but they are not called into activity; when this observing power is feeble, when this faculty is inactive, persons may be disposed to deny the existence of external objects, and not to see objects before them.

The skeptical philosophy of Pyrrho and Bishop Berkeley, is accounted for by the defect of this faculty. It is impossible to those who have it strong to deny existence, in the same way as a person endowed with great causality cannot imagine an effect without a cause.
The cerebral portion, on which this faculty depends, is situated immediately above the root of the nose between the eyebrows; its greater development enlarges the forehead at this spot; its elongation contributes to the beautiful form of nose called Grecian.

This organ is developed in early age, and gives to young children the great tendency to observe the external world, and to become acquainted with it. It is therefore advisable to follow this indication of nature, and to make them acquainted with external objects.

Some nations have this organ stronger than others; the English have it larger than the Scots in general, and the French again have it larger than the English.

Dr. T. Brown (Lect. xxv. and xxvi.) says, that by smell, taste, sound or sight alone, we could not become acquainted with the existence of corporeal substances; and that to touch, which procures us the ideas of extension and resistance, we are indebted to refer our sensations to a bodily cause. 'If we had,' says he, 'no sense but that of smell, no sense but that of taste, no sense but that of sound, no sense but that of sight, we could not have known the existence of extended resisting substances, and therefore could not have referred the pleasant or painful sensations of those classes to such external causes, any more than we refer directly to an external cause any painful, or pleasing emotion, or other internal affection of the mind.'

Dr. Brown had no idea of individuality, nor of the other perceptive powers as detailed in Phrenology.

XXIII. Organ of Configuration.

Gall was desired at Vienna to examine the head of a little girl, who had extreme facility in recollecting persons; he only found that her eyes were pushed laterally outwards, and that she had a certain squinting look. He then spoke of the organ, whose large size is indicated by distance between the eyes, as that of the sense or memory of persons. Some individuals have indeed an eminent
power of recollecting those persons they have once seen, while others possess such talent in a very slight degree. This difference is perceptible in very early life, and is very remarkable in many tribes of animals. Insects recognise individuals of their own kind and of their peculiar family. Honey-bees distinguish those of their own hive from those of others. In a flock of sheep all lambs know their mothers; elephants and dogs have occasionally displayed very striking powers of recognising masters and keepers after having been separated from them for a long time.

I consider the faculty under discussion in the following manner: to me there seems to exist an essential and fundamental power, which takes cognizance of configuration generally, and one of whose peculiar applications or offices is recollection of persons; for persons are known by their forms. I separate the faculty which appreciates configuration from that of individuality, since we may admit the existence of a being without taking its figure into consideration. Individuality may be excited by every one of the external senses, by smell and hearing as well as by feeling and sight, while the two latter senses alone assist the faculty of configuration. It is this power which disposes us to give a figure to every being and conception of our minds; that of an old man, to God; to death, that of a skeleton, and so on. The knowledge of configuration, or form, is essential to animals and men, with respect to their connexion with external objects. This power is active from the earliest age. Children are delighted with pictures, and at the age of maturity, pictures, dioramas, panoramas, cosmoramas, are still objects of delight. Nature, therefore, is always the best book to read.

The organ of configuration is situated in the internal angle of the orbit; if large, it pushes the eye-ball towards the external angle a little outwards and downwards. (Pl. x. fig. 2. xxiii.) It varies in size in whole nations. Many of the Chinese I have seen in London had it much developed. It is commonly large in the French, and contributes to bestow their skill in producing certain articles of industry. Combined with constructiveness, it invents the
patterns of dress-makers and milliners. It leads poets to describe portraits and configurations, and if in a high degree of development, it induces those who make collections of pictures and engravings to prefer portraits. It is essential to portrait-painters. Crystallography also depends on it; and to me it appears, that conceptions of smoothness and roughness are acquired by its means.

Dr. T. Brown thought that the notion of figure belongs to that of extension, and at the same time that we cannot separate length and breadth from color.

XXIV. *Organ of Size.*

Notions of the dimensions or size of external objects seem to me peculiar. There is no relation between such conceptions, and the senses of touch, or sight, or any internal faculty of the mind. On the other hand, the idea of dimension cannot be confounded with that of configuration, for bodies of similar forms may be of very different sizes, and *vice versa*; and these two sorts of ideas are not acquired with like facility. Some easily judge of form and cannot distinguish the proportions of size.

The power of size is important to geometricians, architects, carpenters, mechanicians, portrait painters, and to every one who measures dimensions. It measures the size of the heavenly bodies and of terrestrial objects. In union with locality it procures the conceptions of perspective. Its organ is placed at the internal corner of the superciliary arch on both sides of individuality.

Dr. Brown ascribed the notions of length in different directions to the remembered succession of muscular feeling.

XXV. *Organ of Weight and Resistance.*

Treating of the sense of feeling, I mentioned that it could not excite ideas of consistency, density, softness, and hardness, nor of weight, lightness, heaviness or resistance. These notions depend on an internal operation of the mind and require a particular
organ. This faculty, then, procures the knowledge of the specific gravity of objects, and is of use whenever weight or resistance are worked upon with the hands, or by means of tools; in sculpturing, carving, turning, polishing; in lifting up any weight by the lever, or any machine; in resisting the pressure of the opponent in boxing; in calculating the resistance of a current, the tide, or pressure of the wind; to direct a ship in certain directions; in using the bow with dexterity; in keeping the hands, arms, and body, steady in shooting; in touching the strings or cords of any musical instrument with accuracy; it is therefore necessary to musical performers, be it on the harp, violin, violincello, pianoforte, organ, &c.; to eminent engineers, as far as the knowledge of momentum and of statics is concerned; to able printers, particularly of copper and lithographic plates; to clever workmen in mosaic, &c. Mr. Simpson, in an essay, published in the Phrenological Journal, vol. ii. p. 410, proposes the name equilibrium for that of weight, considering that it was essential to our animal existence that we should have an instinctive perception of gravitation, operating constantly and independently of reason. That state of rest, says he, which the law of gravitation constitutes the natural state of all bodies, solid, fluid, and aeriform, is called their equilibrium. The simplest animal motions, what are they but alternate disturbance and restoration of equilibrium? The land animal walks and runs, and avails itself of the resistance of the earth; the bird flies by its instinctive perception of the resistance of the air; the fish, using its fins and tail, instinctively perceiving the resistance of the water. Some degree therefore of the power of adapting motions to the law of gravitation, some power over equilibrium must be possessed by the whole animated creation, for without it it is plain they must perish.

In my opinion the essence of the intellectual faculties is knowing, and not instinctive action, and the lower animals do without knowledge many things which man knows in doing them. An ant may find an object too heavy, and calls upon others of its tribe for assistance, in order to move the object to the common abode, without any notion of weight; in the same way as a squirrel may sit down
on its hind legs and tail whilst eating, without any perception of equilibrium. I find throughout nature a difference between regular actions and the powers of knowing them. Accordingly I consider the power in question as destined only to procure notions of gravity and resistance, and of equilibrium; farther, such notions may influence various actions, and give greater dexterity to perform them; for instance, to keep the equilibrium in standing, walking, and gymnastic exercises; but the impulse to swim, fly, or stand upright, seems to me different from the knowledge of doing so in consequence of the laws of gravitation. The perception of the equilibrium belongs to this faculty, and its disturbed or diseased state seems to produce giddiness, and even seasickness, as Mr. Simpson first observed. Moreover, this faculty may enable us to be easy in looking over precipices and from high situations, and the effect of intoxication may be attributed in a great measure to its deranged functions; its sphere of activity, however, appears to reach beyond the meaning of the word equilibrium, and I still prefer the term weight. The organ is small, and situated externally of that of size, above the orbit towards the superciliary ridge.

XXVI. Organ of Coloring.

The qualities of bodies already examined are the most essential, and the knowledge of them is also more important to man and animals than of the quality of color. In speaking of vision, I have shown that it is insufficient to bestow excellence in coloring upon the painter. The eyes, it is true, perceive the rays of light, and are affected agreeably or disagreeably by their different modifications or colors, but they do not conceive the relations of colors, their harmony or discord, and have no memory of tints. To prove this, we have only to compare, in man and animals, the faculty of perceiving light vision with the faculty of conceiving colors. I am not certain that animals are destitute of the faculty which distinguishes color, though they do not paint; for there is a great difference between producing, and being capable of perceiving.
Animals have the senses of smell and taste, but cannot furnish them with enjoyments, and they may possibly perceive different colors, their harmony or discord, and yet be incapable of painting.

Certain persons are almost destitute of the power of perceiving colors. I know a family, all the individuals of which distinguish only black and white; Dr. Unzer, of Altona, could not perceive green and blue; and at Vienna I saw a boy who was obliged to give up his trade of a tailor, because he could not distinguish different colors. I have observed similar instances at Paris, Dublin, Edinburgh, and London. Those who do not perceive colors have sometimes a very acute sight, and readily appreciate the other qualities of external bodies, as their size and form. There is nothing more common than that a painter should be an admirable draughtsman and a vile colorist. Thus, as the faculty of perceiving and employing color is not in proportion to the sense of sight, nor to the understanding in general, on the other hand, sight may be entirely lost, and the memory and judgment of colors preserved. The blind traveller, Mr. Holman, does not feel the least impression of the strongest light, but he recollects the various colors he has formerly seen, and judges of their harmony and discord. Hence there must be some particular faculty which cognizes, recollects, and judges of the relations of color. It is necessary to painters, dyers, enamellers, and to all who are occupied with colors. It is this faculty that is charmed with the flower-garden and the enamelled meadow, and sometimes shows an extraordinary energy and correctness. Goethe relates, that the workmen in mosaic at Rome, employ fifteen thousand varieties of colors, and fifty shades of each variety, from the lightest to the darkest, hence in all 750,000 shades. He adds, that this profusion of colors is sometimes insufficient.

The faculty which takes cognizance of colors, is more active in women than in men, generally speaking, and in certain nations more than in others. Those of the East seem to possess it in a high degree. It is, however, necessary to distinguish in this faculty, as in every other, great activity from perfect action or good
taste. Moreover, it is to be remarked that this faculty perceives the harmony of colors, but does not understand how to adapt coloring to the subject of a picture. This depends on superior intellectual powers. In the first acceptation, many women are good colorists, and have attained eminence; but in the second, as in all other departments of the arts, they have been surpassed by men.

The organ of coloring is situated in the middle of the arch of the eye-brow. Its greater development is proclaimed by a full and much arched eye-brow; this external sign, however, is less certain than when the arch is drawn outwards and upwards, so that its outer part is more elevated than the inner. (Pl. xi. fig. 1. xxvi.)

INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES WHICH PERCEIVE THE RELATIONS OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS.

XXVII. Organ of Locality.

Though Gall's eyesight was very good, yet he could not always discover or recognise the places where he had been before. One of his fellow students, called Scheidler, on the contrary, had a surprising facility in recollecting localities, and never forgot the exact place where he had in his rambles discovered a bird's nest, and this without making any mark to guide him. As Gall, at a later period, began to collect busts in plaster, he moulded his fellow-student Scheidler, remarkable for his excellent local memory, and distinguished above the eyebrows, on either side of the mesial line of the head, a protuberance strongly marked. He then made observations on every person endowed with a similar faculty. He one day met a woman in Vienna, who had the protuberances corresponding to those presented by Schiedler's forehead, so extremely developed, as almost to amount to a deformity; on speaking to her he learned that she had the greatest propensity to travel; that she had left her parents at Munich, solely to see foreign countries; that she never lived long in the same house, because she liked change of place; and that her greatest pleasure consisted in travelling.
The pictures and busts of great astronomers, navigators, and geographers, as of Newton, Cooke, Columbus, &c. present a great development in the situation indicated. (Pl. xi. fig. 2. xxvii.) This is the faculty which prompted Columbus to seek a new continent, and which makes and stimulates every zealous traveller. Bloede, of Dresden, speaks of one Augustus, of Schneeberg, who had at one time been a miner, and who with a kind of ridiculous eagerness which prevents him from staying longer than one or two days at the same place, runs every year over the greatest part of Saxony, Lusatia, and Silesia; he has a fixed station for every day, like migrating birds, and brings the various landlords, who assist him, compliments and salutations from all their friends; he then gives the details of his last journey, with the greatest volubility, keeping his body fixed, and his eyes shut. Bloede assured us, that this odd personage has really two large protuberances in the situation mentioned. At Torgau, in Saxony, we saw a blind man in whom the same part was much developed, and who told us that he liked to hear geography and travels spoken of, and that he had often dreamed of foreign countries. Mr. Holman, the blind traveller, has this organ very large, and he told me that he knows London better than the servant who accompanies him, in order to avoid carriages and unknown obstacles. In going through the streets of a town, he conceives and forms in his mind a geographical plan of it. The seat of the organ of locality has been proved in man by many thousand facts.

Animals must also be endowed with it, otherwise they could find neither their progeny nor their dwellings, after they had been obliged to leave them in quest of food: The faculty indeed is very active in certain animals, while others are almost destitute of it. This dissimilarity is not only perceptible in different kinds, but also in different individuals of the same kind. One dog loses himself almost immediately after going out; another finds its usual abode and master from an enormous distance. There was a dog transported in a carriage from Vienna to Petersburg, which six months afterwards returned to Vienna. Another transported from Vienna to London, still found means to come back, by attaching
himself to a traveller in the packet-boat, and going with him to Mentz, whence he set off by himself for Vienna. Another carried from Lyons to Marseilles, and shipped to Naples, nevertheless, came back to Lyons by land. Another found his former master in Suabia, after having left his new master in Hungary. These, and many other similar facts, prove that they are wrong who derive such a power from the sense of smell; for smell could aid none of the dogs whose history I have given. Besides, these creatures do not always return by the nearest way. Moreover, the sense of smell cannot lead back pigeons to their coverts from which they had been transported to the distance of twenty leagues and more, shut up in a bag. The falcon of Iceland, though long confined, the first time it is flown at a heron, often mounts vertically into the air, seems to distinguish its native regions, and takes the direction of the north. It is equally impossible to maintain that such a faculty is an attribute of the eyes, because there is no proportion between its energy and the excellence of vision. It must therefore be the appanage of an internal organ.

This faculty of locality being innate and active by internal excitement, explains a phenomenon observed among animals, many species of which, chiefly birds, as swallows, storks, starlings, quails, nightingales, and others, migrate at certain periods of the year. These creatures also return, not only to the same climate and to the same country, but to the same spot, to the same window, chimney, or tree. The migrations do not result from scarcity of food alone, for though it is true that the faculties are excited by external wants, and that certain birds leave one country in quest of food in another, yet the faculties must exist before they can be stimulated. Besides, every faculty may be active without excitement from external want, and this is rendered evident by the circumstance that certain birds migrate before food is wanting, and come back before it is to be found. Moreover, if migratory birds be confined in a cage and fed abundantly, they become unquiet at the periods of their flight. Finally, why do not all birds leave their ordinary dwelling when food is scarce or wanting? These
considerations show the necessity of admitting an internal and innate power as a cause of all the phenomena.

The special faculty of its organ and the sphere of its activity remain to be determined. It makes the traveller, geographer, and landscape-painter, recollect localities, and in union with the faculty of size, gives notions of perspective, space and distances. It seems to me, that it is the faculty of locality in general. As soon as we have conceived the existence of an object and its qualities, it must necessarily occupy a place, and this is the faculty that conceives the places occupied by the objects that surround us. It not only procures this kind of knowledge, but it is also fond of it; and as their cause, explains all the phenomena of which I have spoken. Notions of localities and places are not the same as those of size or dimensions; these latter concern each individual object, while the former implicate the various situations wherein individual objects are placed in relation to each other.

Dr. Brown ascribes the notions of distance to a compound operation of touch and sight. Gall ascribed the coup d'œil as to space and the capability of measuring a given ground to locality alone; it seems to me the joined effect of locality and size. Locality, size, and form, are essential to the practical knowledge of Phrenology, and those who have these powers weak, and their organs small, are wrong in stating their own inability as an objection against Phrenology. The modified application of the special faculties may induce beginners in Phrenology to doubt of their reality, if they do not find in every individual who shows an organ larger the same manifestations of the mind. Amongst several persons who have the organ of locality large, one may pay particular attention to local situations of external objects; another may be indifferent about them and not know how to find his way round his abode; but may be delighted in seeing cascades, high mountains, and romantic scenery; in the same way as one is gratified with noisy songs, and another is pleased only with music of the great masters, or, as one is satisfied to live upon potatoes and beef, and another is gratified by truffles and game.
Space does not seem to me a mere form of our understanding, as Kant has maintained. It is true the conception of space cannot be attributed to any of the five senses, but space certainly does exist in the external world. The conception of causality or necessary consequence also, cannot be attributed to the five external senses; but the relations and succession of phenomena called cause and effect, exist in nature. The same truth applies to all the categories established by Kant, which relate to external objects; internal faculties constitute them, and they are adapted or in relation to the external world; in other words, all conceptions of external objects are results of internal faculties calculated by creation to apply to the external world.

XXVIII. Organ of Order.

The idea of order supposes plurality, but this may exist without order. The mind, acquainted with external objects, their physical qualities, the places they occupy and their number, may still consider the order in which they are ranged with regard to each other. There are individuals, even children, who like to see every piece of furniture, at table every dish, and in their business every article, in its place, and who are displeased and unhappy when things are in disorder around them. The Sauvage de l'Aveyron, at Paris, though almost a perfect idiot, could not bear to see a chair or any other article out of its place. As soon as any thing was disarranged, he went of his own accord and put it right. This disposition to arrange, however, differs from that philosophical method which results from consistency of ideas. The faculty of which I speak in this place, gives method and order to objects only as they are physically related; but philosophic or logical inferences, conceptions of system or generalization, and ideas of classification are formed by the reflecting faculties. The faculty here discussed is merely fond of putting particulars in order according to physical considerations: as in a library, books according to their size and form, and in natural history, animals according to their configura-
tions. In general, order may be applied to form, size, color, things, words, &c. Its organ is situated between those of coloring and calculation. Cleanliness or tidiness appears to depend on it. It seems also that it produces the pleasure of seeing things complete. Order is impossible, while the subject of arrangement, as a collection, is imperfect.

XXIX. Organ of Calculation.

Some individuals remarkable for great arithmetical talent attracted Gall's attention. Even children are found who excel in this power. There was a child seven years old, called Devaux, who took extreme delight in running about the fairs of his native town, and making calculations for the merchants. A boy of thirteen years of age, born at St. Poelten, not far from Vienna, surpassed all his school fellows surprisingly at figures. He learnt with ease an immense quantity of numbers by heart, went through the most complicated arithmetical problems mentally, and very soon solved them. Mr. Mantelli, a counsellor of the Court of Appeals at Vienna, took a particular pleasure in solving questions in arithmetic; and his son, of five years of age, did little but calculate during the whole day. In individuals so inclined and endowed, the external angle of the eye-brow is either much pressed downwards or elevated. (Pl. xii. fig. 1. xxix.) This configuration results from a greater development of the cerebral part situated behind the outer angle of the orbit. The portraits and busts of great calculators, as of Newton, Euler, Kaestner, Jedidiah Buxton, Hutton, &c. present this external sign. The organ is established by an immense number of observations.

Certain races of negroes make five the extent of their enumeration, that is, they count only as far as five by simple terms; all their numbers after five are compound, whereas, ours are not so till we have passed the number ten; while our terms, six, seven, &c., are simple, they say, five-one, five-two, five-three, &c.—Negroes in general do not excel in arithmetic and numbers. Ac-
accordingly their heads are very narrow in the seat of the organ of number. Individuals among them, however, have considerable powers of computation, and the organ larger and more energetic than many Europeans.

I am not certain whether this faculty exists in animals. Bitches are said to perceive if one of their puppies be taken away; but this does not prove that they count their young ones: they may perceive by the faculties of individuality and configuration that there is one wanting. George Le Roi has observed, that magpies count three; for if there be a hut in the neighborhood of a tree, upon which a magpie has built its nest, and if three persons enter it, the magpie will not visit its nest before the three have gone away; if, however, more than three enter, it can no longer keep count, or compare the number of those who went in with that of those who come out. Dupont de Nemours thought that magpies could count nine.

Whatever concerns unity and plurality—number, belongs to this faculty. Hence its end is calculation in general. The recollection of numbers of houses, or of pages where we have read interesting passages, depends on this faculty. Gall called the organ of the power under consideration the organ of mathematics; but I think it only calculates; and whilst arithmetic, algebra, and logarithms belong to it, the other branches of the mathematics and geometry are not products of its activity alone, but of its union with size and locality. It may be applied to size, but also to form, color, and melody.

XXX. Organ of Eventuality.

Gall admits, both in man and animals, a peculiar organ of educability, or of the memory of things and of events. Individuals are met with every day who have a general knowledge of the arts and sciences, and who, without being profound, know enough to be capable of speaking on them with facility,—individuals who are deemed brilliant or clever in society. The middle part of their
foreheads, Gall found was very regularly prominent. (Pl. x. fig. 1. xxx.) At first, he called the cerebral part in the above situation the organ of the memory of things, because those largely endowed with it were commonly well informed, and knew a great deal; he afterwards named it the sense of things. In comparing animals with men, and one kind of animal with another, he found that tame have fuller foreheads than wild animals, and that animals are generally tameable as the forehead is more largely developed; he therefore called it the organ of educability. But I conceive that Gall in this attributes to a single faculty manifestations which depend on intellect generally. The title educability is evidently bad, seeing that every faculty may be educated, in other words, exercised and directed. Moreover, animals and men vary their actions according to motives given by the whole of the faculties whose organs lie in the forehead, and also according to various feelings.

The peculiar cerebral part, which I have already indicated, is largely developed in children. It varies in size among adults, is larger in boys than in girls, and differs in magnitude among entire nations. Individuals who have it large are attentive to all that happens around them, to phenomena or events, to facts; they are fond of history, of anecdotes; are inquisitive, and desire information on every branch of natural knowledge.

Moreover, it seems to me that this faculty recognises the activity of every other, whether external or internal, and acts in its turn upon all of them. It desires to know every thing by experience, and consequently excites all the other organs to activity; it would hear, see, smell, taste, and touch; is fond of general instruction, and inclines to the pursuit of practical knowledge, and is often styled good sense in our proceedings. It is essential to editors, secretaries, historians, and teachers. By knowing the functions of the other powers, this faculty and individuality contribute essentially to the unity of consciousness, and to the recognition of the entity myself in philosophy. Eventuality seems to perceive the impressions which are the immediate functions of the external senses, to change these into notions, conceptions, or ideas, and to be essen-
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tial to attention in general. Its sphere of activity is very great, and expressed by the verbs in their infinitive mood. Every philosophic system has taken account of some operations of this faculty.

XXXI. Organ of Time.

Conceptions of time are evidently peculiar in their nature; they may exist even without order and number. Yesterday, to-day, tomorrow, the day after to-morrow, &c. form a succession, having no regard to the number of days. There is more connexion between time and order, and also more between order and number, than between time and number.

Order relates more peculiarly to objects, time to facts or events. The conception of time is of a higher character than order or number. Accordingly, the organ of time occupies a higher place in the brain than that of order, which is in a middle situation, or of number, which is the lowest and most external of the three. The natural language of time and of number proves indeed that the organs of these faculties occupy different places; in thinking of time the eyes are turned upwards, and in calculating they are cast downwards and outwards.

The faculty of time conceives the duration of phenomena, their simultaneousness, or succession. Its application to chronology requires the assistance of number, in order to recollect the dates. It is one of the essential constituents of music, and some musicians have great facility, and others great difficulty, to play in time. Its organ is situated between eventuality, locality, order, melody, and causality, and often acts in their connexion.

According to Dr. T. Brown, the power of time enters in the conception of extension.

XXXII. Organ of Tune.

The organ of tune bears to the ears the same relation as that of color does to the eyes. The ear hears sounds, and is agreeably
or disagreeably affected by them; but it has no recollection of
tones, and does not judge of their relations. It does not perceive
harmonious combinations of sound, but separate tones only; and
sounds as well as colors may be separately pleasing, though disa-
greeable in combination. In treating of the sense of hearing I have
already demonstrated, that music has not originated from its exis-
tence. Besides the proofs there adduced that the ear is not the
instrument of musical perception, there exists direct evidence of an
internal organ being necessary to this; for sometimes in epileptic
fits and in delirium, individuals do not hear, but sing with great
precision, and then this organ is active, while the functions of all
the others are suspended or deranged. A greater development
of the organ on which musical perception depends enlarges the
lateral parts of the forehead, (Pl. xii. fig. 2. xxxii.) but its form
varies according to the direction and form of the convolutions com-
posing it. In Gluck, Haydn, and others, it had a pyramidal form;
in Mozart, Viotti, Zumsteg, Dussek, Crescenti, and others, the
external corners of the forehead were only enlarged and rounded.
It lies higher and is more apparent in individuals whose brains are
narrow at the basis, whilst its appearance is less visible in those
who have the cheek bones much elevated. The surest indication
of its development is, if it be more prominent than the external
angle of the eye.

The heads of birds which sing, of those which do not, and of
the individuals of the same kind which have a greater or less dis-
position to music, differ conspicuously at the place of this organ.
The heads of male singing birds are easily distinguished from those
of females of the same kind by the different development of the
organ of tune in each.

There is a striking analogy between colors and tones and their
respective organs: colors being perceived by the eyes, and sounds
by the ears; there being primitive colors and primitive tones; there
being an agreeable succession of colors as there is of tones, that is,
there being colors and tones which agree with one another, and
others which do not; colors must harmonize, and tones must be
concordant; lastly, the concordance both of colors and of tones may be considered by the faculties of order and number. In this manner, indeed, colors and tones are calculated, and the principles of painting and music established.

Mr. W. Scott has published in the Phrenological Journal, vol. ii. two essays on music, and the different faculties which concur in producing it. One of his propositions is singular, 'there seems,' says he, 'to be a correspondence in all cases between the voices of men and women and their cerebral development.' I know the most positive observations to the contrary. Persons with small heads who have a bass voice. It is true the voice is modified by the activity of the feelings according to the laws of the natural language, since all movements of the soft parts are concordant among themselves, and indicate the nature of the active powers. In combativeness, for instance, there is muscular contraction, and therefore the voice is pitched low and sharp; but generally speaking, the voice is neither in proportion to the head nor to the development of the organ of tune, it is modified only by the activity of the special feelings.

Mr. W. Scott considers, also, imitation as necessary to practical musicians, particularly to vocal performers. I think this proposition too general. Imitation invites to imitate, and gives the power to do so, but it may imitate a good or a bad execution. It is, however, necessary both to the composition and performance of dramatic music; but not to musical expression in general. Every dramatic expression but this alone, depends on it. Music is composed according to the combination of the fundamental powers with tune and time, and the different compositions will be well executed by performers who possess combinations of powers similar to those of the composers. If manual dexterity be indispensable to the performance, the powers which give it are additional requisites. The consideration of this kind, however, belongs to the treatise on the combinations and modifications of the special powers, whilst this volume is destined to the examination and analysis of the special faculties of the mind and their nature.
XXXIII. *Organ of Arbitrary Language.*

Dr. Gall, in his youth, noticed that several of his school-fellows learned even things which they did not understand with great facility by heart, whilst he, with the utmost difficulty, engraved in his memory a very small number of words; and he observed that all the boys who excelled in verbal memory had prominent eyes.

He afterwards spoke of an organ of words, the great degree of whose development is denoted by prominent eyes. Sometimes the eyes not only project but are also depressed, and then the under eye-lid presents a sort of roll, or appears swollen. *(Pl. xiii. fig. 2. xxxiii.)* Those who have such a physiognomical sign are fond of philology; they like to study the spirit of languages. Dr. Gall speaks of the two configurations as the signs of two different organs, under the titles, organ of words, and organ of languages.

It is quite true that some easily learn the spirit of different languages without having a great memory for words, and that others readily acquire its words without catching the spirit of a language; yet it seems to me, that the memory of words and philology in general, depend on the same special faculty. In the philosophical part of Phrenology, I show that judgment and memory are not different degrees of activity of any faculty, but general modes of activity of several; and that each may exist independent of the other. It seems also to me, that the organ of words must have its laws as well as those of color, of melody, or any other faculty; now the law of words constitutes the spirit of language. I am satisfied that this opinion is correct, because the spirit of every language is the same, just as the essence of all kinds of music is alike; that is, the laws or principles of music and of language rule universally, and are constant; they are only modified in different nations by modifications in their organs, and dissimilar combinations of these in each. I, therefore, admit only one organ of language.

Before the special faculty of this organ can be understood, we must examine the question so often treated by different authors;
what is the influence of signs upon ideas? According to many philosophers and to common opinion, signs may produce ideas. Accuracy of language is said to be necessary to accuracy of thought. This, however, is to christen the child before it is born. I think with St. Martin, that it is more reasonable to put the question in an opposite way: what is the influence of ideas upon signs?—though the Institute of France gave its prize to him who developed the influence of signs upon ideas. In speaking of the influence of signs upon ideas or the contrary, the question ought to be more distinctly stated, and it should be asked, whether artificial signs can produce ideas? Now, I am convinced that no arbitrary sign can produce any idea; I am satisfied that ideas precede, and that arbitrary signs follow; that without ideas there would be no arbitrary sign; and that without having first had the idea, its arbitrary sign is without meaning. We have an evident proof of this in persons blind from birth. The words red, green, blue, white, give them no conception of color.

Here I must explain what is meant by an idea. Some philosophers, after the etymology of the word, call every sensation which presents an image, idea. In this sense, however, there are very few ideas; even the sensations of the external senses would not all deserve the name; for savors, odors, tones, and colors, do not present any image. Other philosophers style sensations produced by means of the external senses, ideas. Others again understand by the expression, every sensation produced by activity, both of the external and internal senses. Moreover, ideas are spoken of as of two kinds, simple and compound; the first being acquired by the external senses, the second being the result of reflection—abstract and general ideas. I propose to confine the term idea to the conceptions of the perceptive faculties, and to call the functions of the reflective faculties reflection. The organic apparatus of all the internal faculties may be active, and a being may consequently have an inclination, a sentiment, an idea, or reflection, without manifesting it by any sign whatever. Man and animals, however, are destined for society; it is consequently necessary that
they should communicate and understand their sensations, ideas and reflections, and this communication can take place only by means of signs.

These signs are either natural, or arbitrary and artificial. Natural signs conform universally to every faculty. Every being endowed with a given faculty manifests its activity essentially in the same manner, and understands its natural manifestations in others; whilst beings endowed with different faculties can neither communicate their own sensations so as to be understood, nor understand those expressed by others. This law is common to man and animals. Animals which have certain faculties in common with man, understand their natural manifestations in the human kind. The dog, for instance, understands signs of anger in his master perfectly, because possessed of the faculty which produces anger; but he will never understand the natural signs of adoration. From this it must be evident that individuals of the same kind understand the natural signs of peculiar faculties better, if the faculties which speak in others are of equal strength in themselves. The natural language is also known under the name of pathognomy, and deserves to be treated of separately.

The second sort of signs are arbitrary and artificial. Natural language, I have said, is common to animals and man; artificial language is a prerogative of the human kind, and is a result of certain superior intellectual faculties, which contrive means of gratifying all the others. To communicate his sensations and ideas, man generally uses the artificial rather than the natural language, though this last regularly and involuntarily accompanies the first. As natural language is principally expressed by the voice and various motions, so the same means are the readiest and most natural for producing artificial signs; but if the voice do not serve, as in addressing the deaf or persons at a distance, we then recur to gestures and to written signs. How absolutely artificial vocal signs are without meaning in themselves, is evident from untutored man's universal ignorance of any other than his mother tongue. If, moreover, we would communicate certain sensations or ideas to an individual only,
we must choose arbitrary and secret signs—signs which he alone understands. Hence, it is certain that artificial signs do not by themselves produce any idea.

The superior intellectual faculties form the conception of producing artificial signs for mental acts generally; and, therefore, sensations, ideas, and reflections, must exist, before there can be arbitrary signs invented to indicate them. It follows, moreover, that signs must be multiplied and modified according to the sensations and conceptions of the mind; hence there are as many sorts of signs as of faculties. There are words or signs to indicate individual objects,—nouns. Others to denote the qualities of substantives,—adjectives, which in certain languages agree with the substantives; and which are also susceptible of different degrees. As there are different sexes among living beings, the signs admit of genders. The number of objects is also considered; sometimes number alone, sometimes number combined with order, and sometimes with order and time; one, two, three, &c.; or first, second, third, &c.; or first time, second time, third time, &c. There are other words again which may be used instead of substantives,—pronouns; and these are either personal, possessive, demonstrative, or relative. Other signs,—verbs, denote the state of the subject spoken of, whether a person or thing, and this state may be active, passive, or neuter; it may be affirmed or denied by certain terms in a positive (indicative); conditional (conjunctive or subjunctive); or imperative manner; it may, moreover, be considered in relation to time, whether present, past, or future. Other signs explain the verbs,—adverbs, many of which being analogous to those indicating qualities of substantives, denote places, times, numbers, quantities, &c. There are also particles which indicate different operations of the mind: some causes, some connexion or conjunction; others, condition; and others again, time, order, sudden mental emotions,—(interjections). There are artificial signs then for every operation of the mind, and if all signs may be reduced, etymologically considered, to nouns and verbs, their significations are still different and their terminations are therefore changed.
Now there is a particular faculty whose office it is to learn signs, which are, as we have seen, produced in conformity with the activity of all others, by superior intellectual faculties. It differs from those which produce artificial signs, and also from those which produce the sensations and ideas these are assumed to express. There is, indeed, no proportion between these different kinds of faculties. Among mankind, some excel in one of them and not in the other. It is very possible to have many ideas without great powers of learning the arbitrary signs which express them; and also to know many words without having many ideas. By this faculty of arbitrary language then, we perceive the connexion of audible and visible signs with things signified.

To converse however by means of audible signs, besides the inclinations, sentiments, ideas or reflections, and the words or vocal signs invented to express them, we must possess the organs of voice and the sense of hearing. I have already said, that arbitrary language is more necessary to the manifestations of the intellectual faculties than of the propensities and sentiments. The organ of language accordingly occupies a transverse situation in the midst of the perceptive faculties.

This, like all other organs, seems composed of different parts. Some persons are apt to forget proper names, while they recollect words denoting qualities of external bodies. Disease or accident has entailed this peculiarity in several instances. One Lereard, of Marseilles, having received a blow from a foil on the eye-brow, lost the memory of proper names entirely; he sometimes forgot the names of his intimate friends, and even of his father, as he stated in a letter written to Gall, for advice. Cuvier, in his Historical Eulogium on Broussonnet, delivered in the Institute of France, in 1808, relates that this famous botanist after an apoplectic fit, could never recollect either proper names or substantives, though he recovered his prodigious memory of other matters. He knew the forms, leaves, and color of plants, and recollected their epithets, but could not recall their names.

Gall thinks that in consequence of being destitute of this faculty,
monkeys, ourang-outangs, and other animals, want the power of speech. It seems to me, however, that animals have it in some degree; for they learn to repeat arbitrary signs, and understand them as far as they have the sensations expressed; and I am of opinion that animals want speech for the same reason that they have no clothes, make no fire, and do not produce food. It is certain that deficiency in vocal organs is not the cause of animals having no artificial language; for some of them pronounce words, even sentences, nay, and understand what they say, but yet produce no artificial sign whatever.

Half idiot children there are who never speak, though they do many things like reasonable persons; and then parents, relations, and even physicians, cannot conceive their partial imbecility. Now, though such children be not deaf, though they pronounce various words, yet they never go on to speak, and the cause of this is often looked for in the organs connected with the production of voice, the tongue, amygdaloid glands, palate, &c.; but the state of these parts is never the reason of the want of language. The organs of voice, it is true, produce sounds, but they do not originate or cause vocal language: persons deprived of several, as of the tongue, the palate, have yet continued to speak.* Their pronunciation of course was not so distinct as that of other persons, but they felt the necessity of communicating their sensations and ideas, and therefore contrived to speak. On the contrary, these half idiots pronounce single words very well, but cannot keep up a conversation, nor fix their attention, nor combine their expressions. They are consequently destitute of the power of learning, as well as of the intellectual faculty of inventing arbitrary signs.

There are two occasional causes of such partial imbecility, a slight hydrocephalus, distending the brain and pushing the eyes forward precisely as a very considerable development of the cere-

* Bartholin speaks of this in a boy who lost his tongue by suppuration from small pox: Huxham saw the same in a girl: Schenk, Tulpius, Richter, &c. speak of similar facts. There is also a dissertation by Aurran, De Feminæ Elinguis Loquela. Argentor. 1766.
bral parts behind the orbits does. These children may therefore present the external mark which in a healthy state of the brain denotes great strength of the faculty of arbitrary language. This circumstance, however, does not prove the impossibility of discovering the state of the organ on which it depends, as certain adversaries of Phrenology have maintained: it presents only a difficulty which must be removed. The state of the organization generally must guide our judgment. The second cause of this partial imbecility is some real defect of organization: the cerebral part, whose function is arbitrary language, may be either wanting or very slightly developed, and then individuals so constituted never speak. Their eyes, instead of projecting, lie deeply sunk in the orbits, the roofs of which, instead of being plane, are quite concave.*

I therefore admit only one organ of language, which produces similar phenomena in regard to language or arbitrary signs, as the other intellectual faculties do in regard to external impressions. It makes us acquainted with arbitrary signs, remembers them, judges of their relations, and gives a disposition to indulge in all exercises connected with words.

CHAPTER III.

Reflective Faculties.

The intellectual faculties, hitherto considered, give knowledge of objects, their physical qualities and relations. I now come to those which reflect on all the others, affective as well as intellectual, and constitute what is called reason, or reflection.

* What is to be done with such children? Those affected in the first way ought to be sedulously strengthened by a good physical education, and by avoiding too incessant exercise of their feelings and intellectual faculties. The fibres of the brain with age occasionally become stronger, and resist the pressure of the water accumulated in its cavities. Too early instruction is under all circumstances hurtful, but it is especially so to these children. The disease springing from the second cause, or deficiency of organization, is of course irremediable.
A wide range of sciences falls under the scope of individuality, eventuality, and the perceptive faculties in general, such as all branches of natural history, anatomy, chemistry, and all sciences the substance of which consists in a knowledge of the existence, appearances, and properties of natural objects. Further, the details of history, statistics, geography and trade, all belong to the department of simple knowledge. The knowing powers, with an active constitution, and some propelling feelings, as love of approbation, acquisitiveness, and others, are sufficient to explain the eminence of some professors in those branches of knowledge, without great reasoning powers. But then such persons are never distinguished by profound and comprehensive views of abstract principles. These are conceived by the reflective faculties.

XXXIV. **Organ of Comparison, and General Harmony.**

The greater number of persons are satisfied with individual knowledge, and the principal charm of popular speakers consists in a clear statement of facts, and copiousness of illustrations. Close reasoning and rigid induction is always disagreeable to the public, because the reasoning powers are less developed, and less exercised. Phrenology alone explains why reason is so rare. Many persons, however, are delighted with comparisons. It is a rule in teaching to proceed from known, to unknown ideas, and to establish analogies.

Gall often conversed on philosophical matters with a friend of his who possessed much vivacity of mind: whenever the latter was put to difficulty in proving rigorously his positions, he had always recourse to a comparison. By this means he painted his ideas, and his opponents were defeated, and carried along with him.

Gall, perceiving this characteristic trait of mind, examined his head and found an eminence, of the form of a reversed pyramid, in the upper and middle portion of the forehead. (**Pl. xiv. fig. i. xxxiv.**) He confirmed this observation in many subsequent in-
ORGAN OF COMPARISON.

stances. He possessed the skulls of two Jesuits, who had this faculty and its organ in a high degree. He names it perspicacity, sagacité comparative, esprit de comparison.

This organ is developed in all popular preachers, who very regularly speak by parables, and choose their similitudes from facts generally known. To succeed in persuading a popular audience an orator must always speak in examples and by analogy; he must bring spiritual things near to terrestrial objects, by comparing them with each other, and imitate the manner of preaching of Jesus, who very frequently spoke in parables.

This faculty attaches us to comparison, without determining its kinds; for every one chooses his analogies from his knowledge, or from the sphere of activity of his other faculties. He who has the organ of locality in a high degree derives thence his examples, another from forms, astronomy, mechanics, &c.

The operations of this faculty are often called reasoning, but it is very different from the inductive reasoning of a sound logic. It proves by analogy and is prone to convert an illustration into an argument.

Those who possess this faculty in a higher degree, feel differences and analogies which escape others, in whom it is smaller though very active.

This faculty compares the sensations and notions excited by all the other faculties, points out their similitudes, analogies, differences, or identity, comprehends their relations, harmony, or discord. Its tendency and activity are perceived in language which abounds in figurative expressions, viz. the external sensations are compared with the internal, and the same vocal signs are used to express both kinds of functions.

Comparison is the origin of proverbs, which convey instruction under figurative expressions.

The Scotch phrenologists were for some time disposed to confine the power of comparison, to the perception of analogies and resemblances; and to ascribe, with William Scott, the perception of differences, to wit or mirthfulness, as already mentioned above
when I treated of that feeling. In my opinion this faculty perceives the differences as well as resemblances, analogies, and identities. The faculty of tune perceives the discord, and the harmony of tones; and coloring perceives disagreeable and agreeable, or incon­gruous and congruous impressions of colors. In the same way, I attribute to comparison, the perception of differences and analogies, and as a higher degree of musical talent distinguishes the slightest differences of tones, so a greater developement of comparison seems necessary to feel the nicer differences in arguments, and constantly to discriminate in philosophical reasoning.

The great aim of this faculty seems to be to form abstract ideas, generalizations, and to establish harmony among the operations of the other faculties. Coloring compares colors with each other, and feels their harmony; but comparison adapts the colors to the object which is represented; it will reject lively colors, to present a gloomy scene. The laws of music are particular, and tune compares tones; but comparison chooses the music according to the situations where it is executed. It blames dancing music in a church, it is opposed to walking with fine clothes in the dirt, to superb furniture aside common things, it feels the relation between the inferior and superior feelings, and gives the preference to the latter.

Its influence, however, presupposes the activity of the other faculties, and it cannot act upon them if they are inactive. This explains why some persons have taste and good judgment in one respect and not in another. He who is deprived of reverence, may not be careful enough about its application. He may deride what others respect. But if another possess it in a high degree, and at the same time comparison, he will wish to bring his reverence in harmony with his other powers.

Mr. Combe, in his System of Phrenology, p. 470, mentions a new view, suggested by Mr. H. Watson. I am delighted to know that this gentleman is engaged in the pursuit of Phrenology; he is destined to render great service to its cause, but my comparison makes me differ from him as to the essential function of this faculty. He conceives, that its simple function probably is a per-
ception of conditions, and he proposes the term *conditionality* as the name. I copy a few illustrations.

'When we utter the word man, we address individuality alone, we speak of a being which exists, without specifying his form, size, color, or weight, without mentioning his actions, and without intimating his condition. When we say, the man walks, we add a new idea, that of walking. In this proposition we call in the aid of eventuality, which perceives action or events. If we say, the tall man walks, we address size, individuality, and eventuality; or if we say, the black man rides, then color, individuality, and eventuality combine in uttering and in understanding the proposition; but suppose that we are told, that the miserable man runs along the road, here we have first, the man; second, his condition, miserable; third, his action, running; now what organ takes cognizance of his condition.' Before I answer I copy another example; 'suppose that we are told, that Mr. A. and Miss B. were married last week, at the altar of their parish church. Individuality takes cognizance of Mr. A. and Miss B. as individuals, and of the altar and church, as things which exist; locality will inform us of the place of the marriage, and time of the date of it, but in all this nothing is said of the condition of the parties, their married state.'

In my opinion, the cognizance of these different conditions is tested by eventuality. This faculty not only shows the active, but also the passive and neutral verbs. It perceives a man walking, but also a man being carried, a man asleep, two persons being married. To be young, or old, good, just, or the contrary, are physical or moral events, which are made known to eventuality. Hence there is no necessity of a new organ of conditionality.

XXXV. *Organ of Causality.*

Gall observed that those who were attached to the study of metaphysics, presented such a hemispherical development of the superior part of the forehead, as is seen in Mendelssohn, Kant, *(Pl. XIV. fig. 2. XXXV.)* Fichte, Locke, and others.
It is remarkable that the ancient artists should always have given to their busts of philosophers a large forehead, and represented Jupiter Capitolinus with a forehead in the middle part more prominent than is ever seen in nature; they seem to have observed that development of the forehead has a relation to great understanding. It is farther remarkable, that this larger development does not extend to the lateral upper portion of the forehead. The organ of mirthfulness, which the Edinburgh phrenologists are inclined to consider as that of perceiving differences, is small in the busts of Demosthenes, Cicero, and other great men; it is particularly defective in Jupiter. In this respect, therefore, the observations of the ancient artists coincide with mine, to prove that the organ of mirthfulness is not necessary to a philosophical mind.

Gall ascribes to the hemispherical configuration of the upper part of the forehead the love of metaphysics, or profound reasoning. To this I must, however, object, first, that in the configuration described, both the middle and lateral parts of the front cerebral lobes are involved; and that the special faculty of both is not the same. It happens indeed that sometimes the middle, sometimes the lateral parts are most developed. Moreover, the name metaphysics does not designate a special power of the mind. And I therefore ask, what is the special faculty of the lateral parts? Let us examine the most active faculty in metaphysicians. Their object is to investigate the nature of all things, even the nature of God, and of the immortal soul. Though, with Kant and others, I think that it is impossible by reasoning to penetrate these subjects, it may still be asked, what faculty endeavors to do so? Metaphysicians, in their attempts to explain phenomena, necessarily examine the relations between cause and effect. Philosophers in their explanations of natural phenomena by reasoning, always suppose or admit some cause, and then develop their subject by mental induction according to it. It seems to me, therefore, that the special faculty of the cerebral parts on either side of comparison, examines causes, considers the relations between cause and effect, and prompts men to ask, Why?
The effects of causality are immense: the cultivation of fields, plantation of trees, all the artificial enjoyments of the external and internal senses, the invention of instruments of all kinds; in short all which man produces by art, depends on this faculty. It is the fountain of resources. It knows the conditions under which events happen, brings these to bear, and produces effects; for man cannot create, he can only imitate nature; he cannot attain final causes, which nevertheless must exist; all he can know is the succession of phenomena, and if one uniformly succeed another, the preceding is considered as the cause and the succeeding as the effect.

This succession of events may take place without being perceived. To this end a special faculty is given to man. Animals do many things instinctively according to laws, but they do not know them or their cause; whilst man by this power, has the irresistible conviction that every phenomenon of nature has its cause, and is led by successive steps to the first cause. Farther, in considering the actions of man, we must admit motives or moving causes from which they proceed. The law of causation cannot be too much recommended and attended to.

The application of this faculty to metaphysics appears to me an abuse, since that study is beyond the reach of human nature and capacities. In consequence, investigations of that kind have retarded the progress of true, practical, and useful knowledge.

Comparison and causality combined constitute reason, which has its laws, and depends on the activity of the other faculties. Without causality, no argumentative reasoning; without great comparison, no comprehensive views, and no nice distinction. If a person with small reflective faculties write a book, he may shine in narratives, provided individuality, eventuality and language, be amply developed, but when he endeavors to reason, he will be feeble and confused. Reason, however, or the reflective faculties, are no sure guide for themselves alone, though they are the most important powers of the mind. They themselves decide, but the object to be judged must be furnished. In intellect, sound judgment
requires strong reflective faculties and sound knowledge, and to judge soundly of the feelings, as of the moral and religious nature of man, great reflective faculties and the activity of the special feelings are necessary. Reason determines the relations and right employment of the feelings, but does not produce them.

Thus the faculty of individuality makes us acquainted with objects, that of eventuality with events; comparison points out their identity, analogy, or difference, and finds out their harmony; finally, causality desires to know the causes of all occurrences. Consequently these faculties together, pointing out general principles and laws, and drawing conclusions, inductions, or corollaries, constitute the truly philosophic understanding.

General Reflections on the Perceptive or Knowing Faculties.

The conception of organs for the perceptive powers and their subdivision is mine. Gall, neither admitted the division of the mental powers into feelings and intellect, nor their subdivisions. He treated of an organ of educability, or the memory of facts; of another for the recollection of persons; of the special organs of colors, localities, numbers, and music; and of two more, one for learning languages, and another for their spirit; whilst I speak, first of faculties which perceive the existence and physical qualities of external objects, and then of those which procure notions of relations. To the former belong individuality, configuration, size, weight, and coloring. The latter alone has been pointed out by Gall. According to him, music depends on one organ, and language on two; whilst I admit the organs of tune and time as essential to music, and only one organ of language. I also limit his organ of educability to eventuality, and consider order as a fundamental power.
I now bring this volume to a close, hoping to have accomplished the aim I had in view: the determination of the physiology of the brain, the specification of the primitive faculties of the mind, and the discovery of their respective organs. The fundamental powers of the mind, as demonstrated in Phrenology, are evidently very different from those admitted in any of the systems of Philosophy hitherto promulgated. The relations between Phrenology and the schools of Philosophy are discussed in a separate volume. The special organs of the mental functions, except those of feeling and of voluntary motion, are all contained in the head. Those of the faculties most commonly possessed by animals are at the basis of the brain, and the others, as their functions rank higher, occupy superior situations; those, consequently, of the powers peculiar to man compose the entire upper and fore parts of the cerebral mass. The organs of the faculties, too, which have something analogous in their nature, as of the propensities, of the sentiments, of the perceptive and of the reflective powers, are regularly found together; and those of the faculties which more especially aid each other are also in each other’s vicinity. We can, therefore, speak of the organs under rubrics: amativeness, philoprogenitiveness, adhesiveness, and inhabitiveness, are all in one neighborhood; combativeness is surrounded by amativeness, philoprogenitiveness, adhesiveness and destructiveness; secretiveness is between alimentiveness, destructiveness, acquisitiveness, and cautiousness; self-esteem and firmness go together; so do adhesiveness and love of approbation; so also benevolence, reverence, hope, and marvelousness; individuality and the powers which perceive the physical qualities of external objects are vicinant; individuality, eventuality, comparison, and causality, run into each other, and so of the rest. Organs are, farther, placed nearer the mesial line of the head, as their functions are more important. Finally, the organs of the affective powers comprise by far the greatest mass of the
brain; those of the intellectual powers, though very numerous, are extremely small. The whole of the organs, common to man and animals, are generally larger than those which are proper to man.

The primitive powers of the mind and their respective organs, having been proved by observation and induction, cannot be attacked by reasoning alone; supported by invariable facts, they must be admitted as existing by the will of the Great and Supreme Cause of the universe. 'Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven,' is the great and leading commandment; Phrenology enforces it upon new grounds, and may be shown to furnish the most effectual means of rendering man better and happier than he is. This, indeed, must be the ultimate result of Phrenology.
Explanations of the Figures representing various Portraits, and of the Numbers referring to the various Organs marked in the Plates.

Pl. I. fig. 1. Hydrocephalus: idiotic child. Fig. 2. Hydrocephalus: adult and intelligent.
Pl. II. fig. 1. Idiot, 25 years old. Fig. 2. Lord Bacon.
Pl. III. fig. 1. J. M * * *, historian, has II. large. Fig. 2. A French abbé, full of vanity but feeble in amativeness; II. is small.
Pl. IV. Two female heads. Fig. 1. has the organ of philoprogenitiveness large. Fig. 2. has it small.
Pl. V. Two views of heads from behind. Fig. 1. has vi. i. and xii. large, x. and xv. small. Fig. 2. on the contrary, has vi. i. and xii. small, and x. and xv. strongly marked.
Pl. VI. fig. 1. has vii. and xiii. large; vi. i. x. and xv. small. Fig. 2. has vi. i. x. and xv. large, but vii. and xiii. small.
Pl. VII. fig. 1. and 2. Heads of bull-dogs. Fig. 3. and 4. Heads of horses. In fig. 1. and 3. vi. and xiii. are large; the same organs in fig. 2. and 4. are small.
Pl. VIII. fig. 1. with a large development of xiii. and xiv., whilst vi. and i. are very small. Fig. 2. has vi. i. viii. and xv. large, and the anterior and upper part of the head small.
Pl. IX. fig. 1. Sterne: xx. is very considerable. Fig. 2. Shakspeare, has xix. and xxi. much developed.
Pl. X. fig. 1. has the middle part of the forehead, marked xxx. very prominent; in fig. 2. ix. xxii. and xxiii. are very strong.
Pl. XI. fig. 1. P. P. Reubens; xxvi. very large. Fig. 2. Captain Cook: xxvii. much developed.
Pl. XII. fig. 1. Jedidiah Buxton: xxix. very large. Fig. 2. Handel: xxxii. very strongly indicated.
Pl. XIII. fig. 1. has eventuality and language strong. Fig. 2. Horne Tooke: language particularly indicated.
Pl. XIV. fig. 1. J. Abermethy, D. D., with large comparison. Fig. 2. Kant: the upper part of the forehead is very prominent.
# NAMES OF THE ORGANS.*

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* The numeration of the organs being in this edition different from that in the former editions, does by no means indicate that the situations of the individual organs have been altered. The place of amativeness, for instance, formerly numbered I., and now marked II., is always the same, and so it is with several other organs. Their numbers are changed merely because I now treat of the organs in another order.
Fig. 1.

Fig. 2.
Fig. 1.

Fig. 2.

Fig. 3.

Fig. 4.
PHRENOLOGY,

OR THE

DOCTRINE OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA.

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

PHILOSOPHICAL PART.

THIRD AMERICAN EDITION,

GREATLY IMPROVED BY THE AUTHOR, FROM THE THIRD LONDON EDITION.

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PREFA CE.

Whoever wishes for truth is a philosopher; and of philosophers there are as many varieties as there are departments of knowledge, as well physical as metaphysical. The title, however, is more particularly given to him who looks for exact notions and positive knowledge, founded on principles dependent on the relations between cause and effect.

It is unfortunate for humanity, that those who assume distinctive titles do not act up to them. From this cause it is that the most noble appellations fall into discredit. Pretended patriots have sometimes been more dangerous than declared enemies—pretended Christians worse than heathens. Who would not be styled a philosopher, or friend, or lover of wisdom? Yet this name is often applied to decry individuals and their manner of thinking. Let us only observe, that all who call themselves philosophers deserve not the title, any more than those who are called noble do their titles.

The ancient philosophers were, in general, metaphysicians, that is, they examined objects without the reach of observation; for instance, the primitive cause of the universe, the origin of beings, the cause of life, the nature of the soul, its immortality, &c. I incessantly repeat, that the aim of Phrenology is never to attempt
pointing out what the mind is in itself, or its manner of acting, or its final destination. Phrenologists are observers of nature, and as such they examine only the manifestations of the mind and the circumstances under which these take place in this life. To prove Phrenology, a great mass of incontestable facts has been collected. This volume contains philosophical reflections, and inferences drawn from phrenological observations. It will be divided into eight sections. In the first I shall make remarks on various systems of mental philosophy: in the second I shall enumerate the fundamental powers of the mind which are ascertained by observation and admitted in Phrenology; state their aim, the disorders which may result from them, and the consequences of their inactivity: in the third, I shall discuss their origin: in the fourth, the conditions of their manifestations: in the fifth, the religious constitution of man: in the sixth, the moral constitution of man: in the seventh, I shall make some practical reflections; and, in the eighth, explain several philosophical expressions according to the fundamental powers of the mind.
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PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
OF
PHRENOLOGY.

SECTION I.
OBSERVATIONS ON VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.
GENERAL VIEW OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

It may be indifferent to phrenologists whether the first wise men were among the Egyptians, Chaldeans, Indians or Chinese. As the fundamental powers of the mind are innate and essentially the same in mankind, it is probable that in every nation some individuals excelled and took the lead of their countrymen. My object is here to take a very summary view of the most important schools of philosophy.

It is known that before the Greek philosophers, learning was hereditary in peculiar tribes or castes, and wisdom the monopoly of certain families, of the priests in Egypt, of the Levites among the Jews, of the magi in Chaldea, Assyria, and Persia, of the brahmins among the Indians, of the druids among the Celtic nations, &c. All knowledge was confined to priesthood, and the vulgar relied on their sayings and interpretations of nature and heaven. The whole tendency of barbaric philosophy, though employed upon important subjects, both divine and human, was mystical. Instead of investigating truth from clear principles, there was every
where a public, or vulgar, and a concealed or more philosophical doctrine. The sacerdocy directed the religious and civil concerns, the administration of justice and the education of youth, clothed their dogmas in an allegorical dress, and transmitted them principally by the way of tradition, to which the vulgar gave their simple and easy assent. Ignorance, superstition and impostors prevailed. It is, however, an important fact, that the doctrines of a Supreme Deity and the immortality of the soul were universally received.

The founders of the Grecian states introduced the mode of instruction used in their native countries in a poetical dress, and under the disguise of fables, mystery, prodigies, and mythological enigmas. The management of the civil and religious affairs were in the same hands during the first period of Greece as well as elsewhere. By degrees, however, practical wisdom appeared under the exertions of the seven wise men; and Thales from Miletus, the first of them, introduced the scientific method of philosophising.

Theogony and Cosmogony, (God and nature,) were the principal objects of philosophical inquiries in the remotest ages. The chaos, as eternal, was generally admitted, and the creation from nothing was unknown. The sum of the ancient Theogonies and Cosmogonies seems to be: the first matter, containing the seeds of all future beings, existed from eternity with God. At length the Divine Energy upon matter produced a motion among its parts by which those of the same kind were brought together, and those of a different kind were separated, and by which, according to certain wise laws, the various forms of the material world were produced. The same energy of emanation gave existence to animals, to men, and to gods, who inhabit the heavenly bodies and various places of nature. Among men, those who possess a larger portion of the Divine nature than others are hereby impelled to great and beneficent actions, and afford illustrious proofs of their Divine Original, on account of which they are after death raised to a place among the gods, and become objects of religious worship. Upon the basis of such notions the whole mythological system and all the religious rites and mysteries of the Greeks may be founded.
necessity in the motion of the particles of matter, seems to have been admitted as the first principle of nature.

Anaxagoras of Clazomena first affirmed that a pure mind, perfectly free from all material connexions, acted upon matter with intelligence and design in the formation of the universe. Instead of mixing mind with the rest, he conceived it to be a separate, simple, pure, and intelligent being, capable of forming the eternal mass of matter. Like Thales, he believed the sun and stars to be inanimate fiery bodies, and no proper objects of worship. Of course such doctrines offended the Athenians and their priests; Anaxagoras was banished and went to Lampscus, saying to his friends that he had not lost the Athenians, but the Athenians had lost him.

The Ionic school investigated particularly the origin and nature of things, considered the external objects much more than the nature of man, and in men paid little attention to those subjects in which the happiness of human life is immediately concerned. They admired virtue and extolled virtuous actions without taking the pains of establishing the principles and inculcating the precepts of sound morality. No distinction was made between thoughts and objects thought of.

Socrates gave a new direction to philosophical investigation. He united with a penetrating judgment, a liberal mind and exalted views, exemplary integrity and purity of manners. Observing with regret that the opinions of the Athenians were misled and their moral principles corrupted, by philosophers who spent all their time in refined speculations upon the origin and nature of things, and by sophists who taught the art of false eloquence and deceitful reasoning, Socrates endeavored to institute a new and more useful method of instruction. He conceived that the true end of philosophy is not an ostentatious display of superior learning, neither ingenious conjectures, nor subtle disputations, but the love of truth and virtue. He estimated the value of knowledge by its utility; and recommended the study of astronomy, geometry and other sciences only as far as they admit of a practical application to the purposes
of human life. His great object was to lead men into an acquaint­ance with themselves, to convince them of their follies and vices, to inspire them with the love of virtue and to furnish them with useful moral instruction. He thought it more reasonable to exam­ine things in relation to man and the principles of his moral con­duct, than such as lie beyond the sphere and reach of human intel­lect, and consequently do not relate to man. His favorite maxim was: whatever is above us, does not concern us.

Socrates had many disciples who formed schools or philosophical sects, such as the Cyrenic sect (by Aristippus from Cyrene in Africa); the Megaric sect (by Euclid of Megara); the Eliac sect; &c. The most important were the Academic sect by Plato, the Cynic by Antisthenes, the Peripatetic by Aristotle, and the Stoic by Zeno from Cyprus.

Plato at the age of twenty years attended to the instruction of Socrates, remained eight years with him, and was his most illustri­ous disciple. At the death of Socrates he went to Megara and studied under Euclid; he then travelled in Magna Græcia and was instructed in the mysteries of the Pythagorean system; he also vis­ited Theodorus of Cyrene, and became his pupil in mathematical science; he even went to Egypt to learn from the Egyptian priests astronomy, returned to the Pythagorean school at Tarentum and finally to Athens, where he opened a school in a small garden and spent a long life in the instruction of youth. He mixed the doc­trines of his masters with his own conceptions, and showed a great propensity to speculative refinement: he therefore attached himself to the subtleties of the Pythagorean school, and disdained the sober method of reasoning introduced by Socrates. His discourses on moral topics are more pleasing than when he loses himself with Pythagoras in abstract speculations, expressed in mathematical pro­portions and poetical diction.

According to Plato, philosophy as it is employed in the contem­plation of truth is termed theoretical, and as it is conversant in the regulation of actions, is practical. The theoretical philosophy in­quires, besides the contemplation of truth and virtue, the right
conduct of understanding and the powers of speech in the pursuit of knowledge.

Plato remembered the inconveniences which several of his predecessors among the Greeks had brought upon themselves by an undisguised declaration of their opinions. On the other hand he knew how successfully the Egyptians and Pythagoreans had employed the art of concealment to excite the admiration of the vulgar, who are always inclined to imagine something more than human in things which they do not understand. Yet he did not, after the example of Pythagoras, demand an oath of secrecy from his disciples, but he purposely threw over his public instruction of various subjects a veil of obscurity, which was only removed for those who were thought worthy of being admitted to his more private and confidential lectures.

Plato divides his theoretical philosophy into three branches: theological, physical and mathematical. He admitted God and matter as eternal, since nothing can proceed from nothing, but he ascribed to God the power of formation; farther, he speaks of the soul of the world from which God separated inferior souls, and assigned them down to earth into human bodies as into a sepulchre or prison. From this cause he derived the depravity and misery to which human nature is liable. Life is the conjunction of the soul with the body, death is their separation.

The human soul consists of three parts: 1st, Intelligence; 2d, Passion; 3d, Appetite.—Passion and appetite depend on matter; intellect comes from God, and the rational soul alone is immortal. The human understanding is employed, 1st, upon things which it comprehends by itself, and which in their nature are simple and invariable; or 2d, upon things which are subject to the senses and which are liable to change. Sense is the passive perception of the soul through the medium of the body.

In his republic or political doctrine, he wished to subjugate passion and appetite by means of reason or abstract contemplation of ideas, a conception which prevails still now-a-days, and which will be cleared up by Phrenology.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

His notions of morality were exaggerated. He placed the greatest happiness in the contemplation and knowledge of the first good—God; and the end of knowing God, in endeavoring to render men as like to God as the condition of human nature will permit. This likeness consists in prudence, justice, sanctity and temperance. To attain this state it is necessary to be convinced that the body is a prison, from which the soul must be released before it can arrive at the knowledge of real and immutable things. The virtuous tendency of man is a gift of God, the effect of reason alone, and cannot be taught.

The followers of Plato introduced in his philosophy various changes and new opinions, and increased thereby its obscurity;—This happened particularly in Alexandria, where Platonic philosophy was mingled with traditionary tenets of Egypt and Eastern nations, and with the sacred principles of the Jews and Christians.

Aristotle, from Stagyra, a town in Thrace, at the age of seventeen years went to Athens, devoted himself to the study of philosophy in the school of Plato, and continued in the Academy till Plato's death. Several years later he was chosen as preceptor of Alexander son of Philip, was eight years with Alexander, and when Alexander undertook his Asiatic expedition formed a new school in the Lyceum—a grove in the suburb of Athens, which was used for military exercise. Since he walked in discoursing with his disciples, his sect was called the Peripatetics. He had two classes of disciples. In the morning he instructed the select, in the evening the Lyceum was open to all young men without distinction. His study is rather that of words than of things, and tends more to perplex the understanding with subtle distinctions than to enlighten it with real knowledge.

His logical dissertations are not sufficiently clear; they contain many subtleties which of course produce obscurity. He was fond of syllogistic reasoning, but did not carefully distinguish between words and ideas. He reduced the general terms to ten classes—or categories. Plato had learnt the arrangement of categories from the Pythagorean school, who considered ten as a perfect number.
Aristotle’s categories are, 1st, substance;—2d, quantity;—3d, relation;—4th, quality;—5th, action;—6th, passion;—7th, when or time;—8th, where or place;—9th, situation or local relation;—10th, habit. Later, five other general heads were added, viz. opposition, priority, coincidence, motion, and possession. In his physics, the explanation of the natural appearances is tedious.—In his metaphysical doctrine of the Deity and soul, he divests God of the glory of creation, connects him with a world already formed by the chain of necessity, but makes him the first spring and cause of all motion. God is constantly occupied with the contemplation of his own nature, and so removed from the inferior parts of the universe that he is not even a spectator of what is passing among the inhabitants of the earth, and therefore cannot be a proper object of worship, prayers and sacrifices.—The human soul has three faculties: nutritive, sensitive and rational. By the nutritive faculty life is produced and preserved;—by the sensitive we perceive and feel. He nowhere says whether the soul is mortal or immortal. He placed moral felicity neither in the pleasures of the body, nor in riches, civil glory, power, rank, nor in the contemplation of truth, but in the exercise of virtue, which is in itself a source of delight. Virtue is either theoretical—the exercise of the understanding, or practical—the pursuit of what is right and good.—Practical virtue is acquired by habit.

Aristotle, by his metaphysical doctrines offended the priesthood. Apprehensive of meeting with the fate of Socrates, he left Athens, saying: I am not willing to give the Athenians an opportunity of committing a second offence against philosophy. He had continued his school twelve years, and appointed Theophrastus, one of his favorite pupils, as his successor.

The Cynic sect, founded by Antisthenes, an Athenian, was not so much a school of philosophy as an institution of manners. Socrates perceiving the great tendency of the Athenians for futile speculations, extreme effeminacy, luxury and vanity, recommended practical wisdom. The Cynics fell into the other extreme.—They taught simplicity of manners, but passed beyond the limits of decorum, and at last became ridiculous and disgusting.
Zeno admired the general principle of the Cynic school, but could not reconcile himself to their peculiar manners, nor could he adopt their indifference about every scientific inquiry. He attended the different masters of philosophy, and then became a founder of a new sect, called Stoic from Stoa—porch, viz. the place of their school. There were great contests between Zeno and the academy on one side, and between Zeno and Epicurus on the other. Zeno borrowed his doctrine on physics from Pythagoras and Plato; he excels more by his strict system of moral discipline. Whilst Epicurus taught his followers to seek happiness in tranquility and freedom from labor and pain, Zeno imagined his wise man not only free from all sense of pleasure, but void of all passions and emotions, without fear and hope, and capable of being happy in the midst of torture. Epicurus believed in the fortuitous course of atoms; whilst Zeno admitted fate, or an eternal and immutable series of causes and effects. According to the Stoics, wisdom consists in the knowledge of things divine or human. Virtue is the only true wisdom; and the mind of man is originally like a blank sheet, wholly without character but capable of receiving any. The conformity to nature is the great end of existence. Virtue is to be sought for not through the fear of punishment, or the hope of reward, but for its own sake. Virtue, being in conformity to nature, is in itself happiness.

Man has duties towards God, towards himself, and towards his neighbors. God is the author of all that is good, and the Supreme director of all human affairs. The pious man reveres God in all events; is in every thing resigned to God's will; considers whatever befalls him as right, and the will of God; and cheerfully follows wherever divine providence leads him, even to suffering or death. Piety, in short, is nothing but a quiet submission to irresistible fate.

Man's duty with respect to himself is to subdue his passions of joy and sorrow, hope and fear, and even pity. It is virtuous self-denial and self-command. Man may withdraw from life because life and death are indifferent things, and death may be more consistent with nature than life.
Our duty towards others is to love all men, even our enemies. A wise man will injure no one, will feel pleasure in protecting and serving others. He will not think himself born for himself alone, but for the common good of mankind. He is rewarded for his good by itself without applause or recompense. The wise man will disdain sorrow from sympathy as well as from personal suffering. He is ready to exercise lenity and benignity, and to attend to the welfare of others and to the general interest of mankind, but pity towards a criminal is weakness.

Another great branch of Greek philosophy sprung from Pythagoras and sprouted out into the Eleatic, Heraclitean, Epicurean, and Skeptic sects. Pythagoras, probably from Samos, went to Egypt, spent there twenty-two years, underwent at Thebes many severe and troublesome ceremonies in order to gain the confidence of the priests and to be instructed in their most concealed doctrines. His method of teaching was mysterious and after the example of the Egyptian priests. He even boasted to be capable of doing miracles, and to have received his doctrine from heaven. He had public and private disciples. The oath of secrecy was given by the initiated concerning the doctrine of God and nature. He taught theoretical and practical philosophy. The former contemplates things of an immutable, eternal and incorruptible nature, the other teaches things necessary for the purposes of life. Theoretical or contemplative wisdom could not be obtained without a total abstraction from the ordinary affairs of life and a perfect tranquillity of mind; hence the necessity of a society separated from the world for the purpose of contemplation. Man was composed of body and soul, the soul of a rational principle, seated in the brain, and of an irrational part including the passions and seated in the heart. The rational part (φυσική) is immortal, the irrational part perishes. The rational soul after suffering successive purgations by transmigration, and sufficiently purified, is received among the gods and returns to the eternal source from which it first proceeded. The Pythagoreans, therefore, abstained from animal food and from animal sacrifices. The object of all their moral precepts was to lead
man to the imitation of God. They supposed, like the Egyptians, the air full of spirits and demons, who caused health or sickness among men and beasts.

Among the Eleatic sect was Democritus, the derider who laughed at the follies of mankind, whilst Heraclitus of Ephesus, another follower of Pythagoras, was perpetually shedding tears on account of the vices of mankind and particularly of his countrymen, the Ephesians.

Epicurus, an Athenian, was of opinion that nothing deserved the name of learning which was not conducive to the happiness of life. He excelled by urbanity and captivating manners, made pleasure the end of his philosophy and wisdom a guide to it. He treated vulgar superstitions with contempt, dismissed the gods from the care of the world, admitted nothing but material atoms, was opposed to the austerity of the Stoics, and rejected providence and fate, doctrines so strongly maintained by the Stoics. He considered the regulation of manners (Ethics) as more important than the knowledge of physics. He was an enemy of the third part of philosophical doctrines—dialectics, as only productive of idle quibbles and fruitless cavilling.—He placed truth above any other consideration, and the end of living in happiness. Philosophy ought to be employed in search of felicity: bodily ease and mental tranquillity through temperance, moderation, fortitude, justice, benevolence and friendship.

Among the philosophers who regarded the testimony of the external senses as illusive, Pyrrho, from Elea, the founder of the Pyrrhonic sect, carried his doubts to the extreme. This school rejected every inference drawn from sensations, and admitted as a fundamental principle that to every argument an argument of equal weight might in all cases be opposed. The Pyrrhonic philosophers had the tendency rather to demolish every other philosophical structure than to erect one of their own. If it be true that Pyrrho carried his skepticism to such a ridiculous degree that his friends were obliged to accompany him whenever he went out that he might not be run over by carriages or fall down precipices, his mind was deranged.
The Romans conquered the Greeks by arms, but submitted to their understanding and manners. They found among them philosophical systems for all tastes. The gloomy and contemplative adopted the Pythagorean and Platonic creeds. Brutus was favorable to the union of the Platonic and Stoic philosophy. Cicero was rather a warm admirer and an elegant memorialist of philosophy than a practical philosopher himself. He held Plato in high respect, especially for his philosophy of nature; he also was an admirer of the Stoic system concerning natural equity and civil law; he praised their ideas concerning morals, but he was continually fluctuating between hope and fear, averse to contention, and incapable of vigorous resolutions, and full of vanity. Cato of Utica was a true Stoic;—Lucretius and Horace were of the Epicurean sect;—Plutarch, like Cicero, rather an interpreter of philosophers than an eminent philosopher himself. Epictetus taught the purest morals, and his life was an admirable pattern of sobriety, magnanimity and the most rigid virtue. Marcus Aurelius was the last ornament of the Stoic school.

About the close of the second century arose at Alexandria the Eclectic system: a mixture of the different tenets of philosophy and religion, to the detriment of both. Pagan ideas were mixed with Christianity, and the different sects of philosophy were arbitrarily interpreted. Subtle distinctions, airy suppositions and vague terms were introduced; and innumerable trifles were proposed under the appearance of profound philosophy.—Pagans became Christians and associated their ideas and language with Christianity, and the fathers of the Christian church studied the ancient philosophers to furnish themselves with weapons against their adversaries, to show the superiority of the Christian doctrine, and to adorn themselves with the embellishment of erudition. Many did not distinguish between the light of revelation and that of reason. Nothing could be expected for philosophy from those who were busily occupied in disputes with infidels and heretics.

From the beginning of the seventh century to the twelfth the Scholastic and Mystic theology sprung up. The irruptions of
Barbarians had confined philosophy and learning to monastic institutions, whilst the people were ignorant and superstitious. During the dark ages up to the fourteenth century philosophy resembles a barren wilderness; it was the handmaid of theology; and though the Scholastics paid to Aristotle almost religious reverence, their minds were darkened by Aristotle's dialectics and logic, and their idle contests continued to disturb the world. The syllogistic form of reasoning became general, and the forms of technical phraseology were infinite. I copy only one example from Dr. Th. Brown's lectures on philosophy, (sterotype edition, p. 327) where he quotes how a scholastic logician proves by a long technical argumentation that the impossible differs from what is possible: 'whatever of itself and in itself includes things contradictory, differs in itself from that which of itself and in itself does not imply any thing contradictory. But what is impossible of itself and in itself involves things contradictory, for example, an irrational human being, a round square. But what is possible of itself and in itself, includes no contradiction. Therefore what is impossible in itself differs from what is possible.'

Various sects, as the Nominalists, Realists, Verbalists, Formalists, Thomists, Scothists, and Occamists, were at open war with each other.

The Aristotelian philosophy was kept up, since it was the common opinion that the ancient Greeks had attained the summit of science, so that after all the question was what Aristotle, Plato, or Pythagoras had taught, rather than what was true. Philosophy and religion were so mixed together that some called themselves Scriptural philosophers, not to show that the general principles of reason and the natural law of morality agree with the doctrine of Scripture, but to designate that all philosophy, even of physical and metaphysical science, is derived from divine revelation. Others called themselves Theosophists, and professed to derive their knowledge from divine illumination or inspiration. Fraud and hypocrisy were encouraged, to secure the credit of the church among the vulgar and ignorant. Nay, it became a rule: abroad, with the people; at home as you please.
At last in the fourteenth and fifteenth century, the taste for polite literature revived in Italy, and the bold reformers in Germany endeavored to correct the errors and corruption of religion. Luther perceived the connexion of philosophy and religion, and declared, that it would be impossible to reform the church without entirely abolishing the canons and decretals, and with them the scholastic theology, philosophy and logic, and without instituting others in their stead. Luther, Paracelsus, Ramus and Gassendi were eminent demolishers of the Aristotelian philosophy.

After the revival of letters and restoration of sciences, Bacon, Descartes and Leibnitz were eminent in philosophy. Bacon became the great reformer and founder of true philosophy. He established observation and induction as the basis of knowledge, whilst the essentials of Descartes' philosophy, like those of many predecessors, were thought, and the knowledge obtained by thought. Leibnitz, like Plato, never arranged his philosophy methodically, yet he admitted two kinds of perceptions: one without and the other with consciousness; farther, he considered the knowledge procured by the senses as individual, accidental and changeable, but that obtained by thinking and reasoning as general, necessary and positive. According to Leibnitz the reasoning power is endowed with principles, all phenomena are intellectual, and there is a harmony pre-established between the knowledge à priori and external sensations. The latter only quicken the former. Phrenology denies the established harmony of Leibnitz between innate ideas and external sensations; it considers sensations and ideas as acquired, and admits only innate dispositions to acquire sensations and ideas. Yet it admits also a kind of pre-established harmony, concerning existence, between the special powers and the object of their satisfaction. Wherever there is a power, it finds an object. This has been the cause, that many philosophers have derived the powers from their objects of satisfaction. There are objects to be perceived; these were said to be the cause of the perceptive power, whilst the power of perceiving and the object of being perceived exist separately and are only calculated for each other.
There may, however, be many objectivities which man cannot perceive for want of special powers.

Hobbes was persecuted for his theological and political heresies, and therefore his views of philosophy were neglected, though Locke borrowed from him some of his most important observations on the association of ideas. According to Malebranche, God is wherever there is mind, and God is the medium of sensation. Malebranche furnishes to Locke his notions on habits and genius, to Hartley his theory on vibrations, and to Berkley the ancient theory of Pyrrho, viz. that the material objects have no other existence than in the mind.

Locke's philosophy became the basis of the greater number of philosophical opinions in England and France. He denied the innate ideas and innate principles of morality, and maintained with Aristotle* that all knowledge begins with experience, or that all primary notions begin with sensation. According to him, the mind begins with external sensations, and then by means of its perception, retention, contemplation, comparison, reflection, or by its faculties of composing and abstracting, it executes all the particular operations of thinking and volition. In his system even the feelings and moral principles result mediatelty from the understanding.

Locke has some merit; he is a great lover of truth, and his work contains many judicious remarks brought together from various quarters, and he has greatly contributed to do away the rubbish of a learned jargon about the innate ideas and Platonic mysticism. But there is a want of originality, consistency and precision in his work. He is a wordy commentator of Bacon, Hobbes and Malebranche. The besetting sin of all his compositions is diffuseness and indistinctness. —Hobbes had compared the mind with a slate, Locke compared it with a white paper. This prepared the errors of Condillac, who gave all to the senses; and to those of Dr. Hartley who explained the operations of the mind by vibrations, and who thought * that all the most complex ideas arise from sen-

* Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.
sation, and that reflection is not a distinct source, as Mr. Locke makes it.

I think with Dugald Stewart that the work of Locke has been more applauded than studied. The French writers, particularly Voltaire, have most contributed to his celebrity. Voltaire said that Locke alone had developed the human understanding, and he calls him the Hercules of metaphysicians; yet the French did not understand the basis of Locke’s philosophy, when they maintained that he denied the innate dispositions of the mind, and when they confounded Condillac’s philosophy with that of Locke.

Among the Scotch philosophers the most remarkable are, Hume, who not only confined all knowledge to mere experience, but also denied the necessity of causation;—Dr. Reid, who speaks of intellectual and active powers of man;—Dugald Stewart, who deserves more credit for his style than for his ideas;—and Dr. Th. Brown.

The principal modern schools of philosophy in Germany, are the critical philosophy, the transcendental idealism, and the philosophy of nature. Kant, the founder of the critical philosophy, distinguished two kinds of knowledge, one experimental (Kritik der reinen Vernunft,) and another founded on belief (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.) He maintained that the first kind is only relative, subjective, or phenomenal, or that we know only the relation of the subject to the object; that we do not know either the subject or the object in itself, but both in their mutual relations only, and that this relation constitutes their reality to us. The subject conceived endowed with particular categories which are applied to the object; whatever is general and necessary in knowledge belonged to the subject, while the particular and variable is the attribute of the object. Hence all experimental knowledge is founded upon dualism; upon the union of the subject and object; for, even the categories, though inherent in the subject, and conceived by the mind from within, acquire objective reality only by their application to the object. Kant, though he considered both subject and object, had, however, the subject more in mind than the object. He reduced all categories or forms, according to
which the mind acquires experimental knowledge, to four kinds—to quantity, quality, relation, and modality; of these the two first concern objects in general, and the two last the relations of objects to each other and to our understanding. Thus Kant admits notions independent of experience, as conceptions of space, time, cause, and others; and considers these conceptions, not as the result of external impressions, but of the faculties of the subject: they exist from within, and by their means we are acquainted with the objects. Our notions of morality, of God, and of immortality, are not experimental, but belong to the practical understanding, and originate a priori. Liberty is a postulatum.

Fichte went farther, and taught the system of transcendental idealism, according to which all certainty and reality is confined to the subject, who has knowledge only of his own modifications, and by means of abstraction and reflection, arrives at intellectual intuition.

The philosophy of nature of Schelling rejects subject and object, makes no abstraction or reflection, but begins with intellectual intuition, and professes to know objects immediately in themselves. It does not consider the objects as existing but as originating; it constructs them speculatively a priori. Absolute liberty and existence without qualities, are the basis of this system.

As the philosophy of Locke has hitherto prevailed in England, as it has given occasion to that of Condillac, and as the system of Dr. Th. Brown admits more fundamental powers of the mind than any former philosophy, I shall compare them with phrenology.

I agree with both authors in placing truth above any other consideration, and in maintaining that we cannot examine the mind in itself, but are confined to the contemplation of the mental phenomena.

Locke and Brown consider the functions of the external senses as dependent on the nervous system, but the other mental operations as independent of organization; whilst phrenology proves that every mental phenomenon depends on some bodily condition or organ, after the example of the external senses.
Locke admits in the mind understanding and will;—Dr. Brown, intellect and emotions. The subdivision of understanding by Locke is into perception, retention or memory, contemplation or judgment and imagination; and that of will into various degrees, from simple desire to passion. The subdivision of intellect by Th. Brown is, 1st, into simple suggestions, including every association of ideas, conception, memory, imagination, habit, and all conceptions and feelings of the past; and 2d, into relative suggestions of coexistence or of succession; the former of which include the suggestions of resemblance or difference, of position, of degree, of proportion, and of the relation which the whole bears to its parts; and of which the second comprehends judgment, reason and abstraction. His subdivision of emotions is into immediate, retrospective and prospective. He admits a greater number of primitive emotions independent of intellect, and in this respect he comes nearer phrenology than any other philosopher; he also calls the division of Locke into understanding and will, illogical. Thus in the great division of the mental phenomena he agrees with phrenology, which positively has the priority over him. But Dr. Brown's subdivisions of the mental phenomena are very different from the phrenological analysis and classification. Farther, Dr. Brown considers the various emotions of the mind independently of brain. His philosophy therefore coincides with phrenology only in the first principle, viz. in admitting mental phenomena different from the intellectual states of mind; but his philosophy can never be confounded with phrenology.

Locke denied the innate ideas and the innate moral principles. I agree with him in that respect, but he admits only innate dispositions for ideas, and derives the moral principles from them, whilst I admit also innate moral dispositions, which are as essential to the conception of moral principles as the innate intellectual dispositions to the formation of ideas.

The reason why Locke denied the innate maxims of morality, viz. because certain children or adults and certain nations are without them or possess them variously modified, is not at all valuable,
since innate faculties may be inactive on account of the defective developement of their respective organs, and their functions may be modified by their combined operation with other faculties.

Locke derives the primitive activity of the mind, from external impressions on the senses; phrenology on the contrary, in admitting external senses and two orders of internal faculties, maintains that the internal dispositions, though they may be excited by external impressions, are often active by their own inherent power alone. According to Locke, moral principles must be proved. I think they must be felt. It is to be remarked that according to phrenology, there is an internal and spontaneous or instinctive activity, independent of external impressions, as far as the feelings are concerned, but also as the intellectual faculties and experimental knowledge are implicated. The abstract conceptions or intuitive notions are furnished by the intellectual faculties themselves. The notion of identity, for instance, or that the same is the same; that the whole is greater than the half; that two and two are four; that nothing can exist except in space; that nothing can happen except in time; and that there is nothing without a cause, &c., are internal operations of mind as well as the instincts, propensities, and sentiments.

Another essential difference between Locke, Dr. Brown and all other philosophers on one side, and phrenology on the other, is that the former think that we perceive the existence of external objects and their original qualities, such as size, figure, mobility, number, color, &c., by means of the five senses and their impressions alone; whilst I treat of the immediate and mediate functions of the senses (See Vol. I. Art. external senses,) and ascribe very few ideas to the external senses, but the greater number, as those of size, figure, weight, color, order and number, to internal faculties.

Thus I admit in the mind external senses by which the mind and the external world are brought into communication, and made mutually influential. The internal faculties are feelings and intellect. Both sorts may act by their internal power, or may be excited by appropriate impressions from without. The knowledge of our
feelings is as positive as the experimental from without. Every
determinate action of any faculty depends on two conditions, the
faculty and the object. The intellectual faculties are perceptive
and reflective. The feelings and perceptive faculties are in relation
and adapted to the external world, whilst the reflective faculties are
applied to the feelings and experimental knowledge and are destined
to bring all the particular feelings and notions into harmony.

From this summary view of philosophy it follows, that the an­
cient philosophers were principally occupied with theogony, cos­
mogony, physics, logic, dialectics, ethics and politics, and that in
reference to man they examined his intellectual operations, moral
actions and social relations, rather than his nature.

Though this important object—the basis of all political sciences
—has been investigated by later philosophers, its study will be
newly modelled and its principles established by phrenology, in
showing a posteriori the nature, number and origin of the human
faculties, the conditions of their operations, their mutual influence,
their modes of acting, and the natural laws by which their manifes-
tations are regulated. I conclude this chapter with D'Alembert, in
saying, that hitherto there has been a great deal of philosophizing in
which there is but little philosophy.

CHAPTER II.
RECTIFICATION OF PARTICULAR VIEWS OF PHILOSOPHERS.

In order to prosecute advantageously the study of the mental
functions, a capital error must be avoided,—an error which pre­
vails in the systems of all philosophers, and which consists in their
having been satisfied with general ideas, and not, like naturalists,
having admitted three sorts of notions: general, common, and spe­
cial. This distinction is essential to the classification of beings into
kingdoms, classes, orders, genera, and species. In knowing the
general qualities of inanimate objects, such as extension, configuration, consistency, color,—even in knowing the common qualities of metals, earths, or acids; we are not yet made acquainted with iron, copper, chalk, or vinegar. To indicate a determinate body, its specific qualities must be exposed. In natural history it is not sufficient to say that we possess a stone, a plant, an animal, a bird, &c., it is indispensable to mention the species of each possessed, and if varieties exist, to state even their distinctive characters.

In the study of the human body, general and common notions are also distinguished and separated from those which are particular; the body is divided into several systems, such as the muscular, osseous, nervous, glandular, &c.; determinate functions, too, are specified, as the secretion of saliva, of bile, tears, &c. But this distinction between general, common, and special notions is entirely neglected in the study of the mind, and even in that of the functions which in animals take place with consciousness.

**Instinct.**

Zoologists divide and subdivide the organization of the beings they study, and determine the structure of each particularly, but they consider their animal life in a manner quite general. Whatever is done with consciousness is explained by means of the word instinct. Animals eat and drink, and construct habitations by instinct; the nightingale sings, the swallow migrates, the hamster makes provision for the winter, the chamois places sentinels, sheep live in society, &c., and all by instinct. This is certainly a very easy manner of explaining facts; instinct is the talisman which produces every variety in the actions of animals. The knowledge conveyed, however, is general, and therefore completely vague. What is instinct? Is it a personified being, an entity, a principle? or does the word, according to its Latin etymology, signify only an internal impulse to act in a certain way in ignorance of the cause? I take it in the latter signification; thus the word *instinct* denotes every inclination to act arising from within.
Instincts, moreover, are merely effects, and do not express peculiar causes producing determinate inclinations. In stating that one animal sings and that another migrates, we specify some sorts of instincts, but leave their individual causes undetermined. The term instinct may be compared with that of motion. Planets revolve round the sun; the moon round the earth; the magnetic needle points towards the north; rivers fall into the ocean; animals walk, run, or fly; the blood circulates; and all these phenomena are conjoined with the idea of motion. Motion certainly attends on all, just as the actions of animals are always joined with instinct, but the causes of the various motions and of the different instincts are not alike, and must, therefore, be looked for and specified.

Finally, it is an error to say that animals act solely by instinct. It is true that some of their doings, such as the labors of insects, are the result of mere instinctive powers, but many animals modify their actions according to external circumstances; they even select one among different motives, and often resist their internal impulsions or instincts. A dog may be hungry, but with the opportunity he will not eat, because he remembers the blows which he has received for having done so under similar circumstances. If, in following his master, he is separated from him by a carriage, he does not throw himself under the feet of the horses or its wheels, but waits till it has passed, and then by increasing his speed he overtakes his master.

This shows that some animals act with understanding. On the other hand, though new-born children cry, and suck the finger, they certainly do not act from understanding. And, if men of great genius manifest talents without knowing that such faculties exist; if they calculate, sing, or draw, without any previous education, do they not so by some internal impulse or instinct, as well as the animals which sing, build, migrate, and gather provisions? Instinct, then, is not confined to animals, and understanding is not a prerogative of mankind.

The above reflections on instinct elucidate the ideas entertained by philosophers generally in regard to the mind and its faculties.
Many of them reduce all the mind's operations to sensation, and all its faculties to sensibility; others call this general faculty understanding, or intellect.

**Understanding.**

We must make reflections on understanding similar to those already made on instinct. There are, in the first place, different sorts of understanding, which may exist independent of each other. Great painters cannot always become great musicians; profound mathematicians may be without any talent for poetry; and excellent generals may be miserable legislators. Hence, in the study of man, it is necessary to specify the different kinds of understanding or sensation. For, if we say, with Destut de Tracy, that memory, judgment, and imagination, are only modifications of sensation and the effects of unknown causes, it is still necessary to specify the kinds of sensation; since sensations of hunger, friendship, hatred, anger, or compassion, and knowledge of forms, colors, localities, &c., cannot be of one and the same sort, any more than the senses of feeling, smelling, tasting, hearing, and seeing. Thus, then, it is necessary to specify the various internal, as well as the external senses.

Moreover, the causes of the different kinds of understanding must also be pointed out, and new observations in consequence become necessary. Finally, I repeat, that man does not always act with understanding. Suddenly threatened by any danger, the limbs are drawn back before there has been time to think of the means of escape. All the gestures and peculiar sounds which accompany the rather energetic expression of the sentiments, are as involuntary as the feelings themselves, and by no means the effect of understanding. Who can say that he always acts with understanding? We too often choose the worse even in knowing the better.

The greater number of philosophers explain the actions of man upon the supposition of two fundamental powers: understanding
and will. They, however, merit the same reproach as the zoologists who consider the actions of animals as effects of instinct, and those of man as effects of understanding alone. They attach themselves to generalities, and neglect particulars; they ought, however, to specify the kinds of will as well as those of understanding. For it cannot be the same faculty which makes us love ourselves and our neighbors, which is fond of destroying and of preserving, which feels self-esteem or seeks others' approbation. Moreover, the causes of the different kinds of love and of will, which are taken at one time in a good, at another in a bad acceptation, must be laid open.

Many philosophers who consider understanding and will as the fundamental powers of the mind, have conceived particular modes of action in each of them. In understanding they admit perception, conception, memory, judgment, imagination, and attention, —one of the most important of these modified operations; to the will they ascribe sensuality, selfishness, vanity, ambition, and the love of arts and sciences, in proportion as understanding is enlightened and external circumstances modified.

All philosophical considerations on the mind hitherto entertained have been general; and whilst the study of the understanding has especially engaged one class of thinkers, another has devoted itself to that of the will, principally as embracing the doctrine of our duties. The proceeding of either was fallacious. They have always taken effects for causes, and confounded modes of action, in quantity or quality, with fundamental faculties. They have also overlooked one of the most important conditions to the exhibition of affective and intellectual powers, viz. the organization of the brain. They considered the functions of the external senses in connexion with organization, but were not aware that all phenomena of mind are subject to the same condition.

The first of these classes of philosophers is styled Idealists, the second Moralists. This separation, and the consequent destruction of that harmony which ought to reign between the two, are to be lamented. Idealists and moralists differ not only in
their pursuits, but each crimination the other, and endeavors to confine him within certain limits. Idealists deride the studies of Moralists, and these often decry Idealists as the greatest enemies of mankind.

Many ponderous volumes are filled with their several opinions. I shall only consider, in a summary way, the most striking of their particular views, and begin with those of Idealists.

I. Consciousness and Sensation.

Speculative philosophers incessantly speak of single consciousness and of there being nothing but consciousness and sensation in animal life. Dr. Reid and others consider consciousness as a separate faculty, and Condillac reduced all phenomena of mind to sensation, so that his philosophy is to mind what alchemy was to matter. Now though it be true, in a general way, that all operations of the mind are accompanied with consciousness, it by no means follows that consciousness of the impressions is one of its fundamental faculties. Consciousness is a general term, and is an effect of the activity of one or several mental faculties. It is identical with mind and exists in all its operations: in perception, attention, memory, judgment, imagination, association, sympathy, antipathy, pleasure, pain, in affections and passions. Mind cannot be thought of without consciousness. There are various kinds of consciousness, which are the special faculties of the mind, which may be possessed separately or conjointly, and which must be specified by philosophy.

II. Perception.

Two important questions present themselves: first, whether all the impressions which produce consciousness or sensation, come from without, through the external senses; and secondly, whether all fundamental powers of the mind are perceptive, or have consciousness of their peculiar and respective impressions, or whether
some of them procure impressions, the consciousness of which is only obtained by the medium of other faculties?

The majority of modern philosophers have investigated the perceptions of external impressions only, which they consider as the first and single cause of every varied mental function. The mind, say they, is excited by external impressions, and then performs various intellectual or voluntary acts. Some thinkers, however, have recognised many perceptions as dependent on merely internal impressions. Of this kind are the instinctive dispositions of animals, and all the affective powers of man. Those who would consider this subject in detail, may examine, in the first volume of Phrenology, my ideas on the external senses and on the affective faculties. There it will be seen that I admit two sources of mental activity; one external and the other internal.

An answer to the second question is given with more difficulty than to the first. Dr. Reid with some of his predecessors, distinguished between sensation and perception. He understood by the former the consciousness of the mind which immediately follows the impression of an external body on any of our senses; and by perception the reference of the sensation to its external corporeal cause. Certain particles of odorous matter act on the olfactory nerve and produce a peculiar sensation. When this peculiar sensation is referred to an object, for instance a rose, then it is perception. Gall thinks that each external sense and each internal faculty has its peculiar consciousness, perception, memory, judgment, and imagination; in short, that the modes of action are alike in each external sense and in each organ of the brain. To me, however, the individual faculties of the mind do not seem to have the same modes of action; I conceive that the functions of several faculties are confined to the procuring of impressions which are perceived by other faculties. The instinct of alimentativeness and all the fundamental faculties, which I call affective, seem destined only to produce impressions, which accompanied with consciousness are called inclinations, wants, or sentiments. The affective functions are blind and involuntary, and have no know-
ledge of the objects respectively suited to satisfy their activity; the nerves of hunger do not know aliments; nor circumspection, the object of fear; nor veneration, the object deserving its application, &c. &c. Even supposing the affective powers had an obscure consciousness of their own existence, a point which, by-the-bye, is not proved, it is still certain that the intellectual faculties alone procure clear consciousness. The internal senses of individuality and eventuality, combined with those of comparison and causality, determine the species of both internal and external perceptions. As it is, however, much more difficult to specify the internal than the external sensations, the species of the former have remained almost entirely unknown to philosophers.

Thus, perception is an essential constituent in the nature of the intellectual faculties generally, and one of their particular modes of activity; yet it is no special faculty of the mind; it is a mere effect of activity in the perceptive powers.

From the preceding considerations, it follows that in my opinion every fundamental faculty of the mind is not perceptive, consequently I make a distinction between perceptive powers and kinds of perception. There are as many sorts of perceptions as fundamental functions, but the intellectual faculties alone seem to be perceptive.

It is remarkable that consciousness and perception are not always single, that in the same person they may be healthy with respect to some faculties and diseased with respect to others. There are also cases on record, where persons subject to nervous fits, completely forget what occurs during the paroxysms, when these are over; and remember perfectly during subsequent paroxysms, what has happened during preceding fits. The same phenomenon is related of the state of persons under the influence of animal magnetism. Mr. Combe mentions the fact observed by Dr. Abel in an Irish porter to a warehouse, who forgot when sober, what he had done when drunk, but who, being drunk again, recollected the transactions of his former state of intoxication. On one occasion, being drunk, he had lost a parcel of some value, and in his sober
moments could give no account of it. Next time he was intoxicated he recollected that he had left the parcel at a certain house, and there being no address on it, it had remained there safely and was got on his calling for it. It seems that, before recollection can exist, the organs require to be in the same state they were in when the impression was first received.

III. Attention.

Almost all philosophers speak of attention as a primitive power of the mind, active throughout all its operations, and the basis on which observation and reflection reposes. "It is attention," says Helvetius,* "more or less active, which fixes objects more or less in the memory." According to Vicq d'Azyr, apes and monkeys are turbulent, because they have no attention. Dr. Reid † makes a distinction between attention and consciousness, calling the first a voluntary, the second an involuntary act; whilst other philosophers, with Locke, confound these two mental phenomena. Dr. Brown confounds attention with desire; he thinks that without desire there can be no attention.

To all that has been said upon attention as a faculty of the mind, I reply, that attention, in none of its acceptations, is a single faculty; for if it were, he who possesses it in a particular sense should be able to apply it universally. But how does it happen that an individual, animal or man, pays great attention to one object, and very little or none to another? Sheep never attend to philosophy or theology; and while the squirrel and ringdove see a hare pass with indifference, the fox and eagle eye it with attention. The instinct to live on plants or flesh produces unlike sorts of attention. In the human kind, individuals are influenced in their attention to different objects, even by sex and age: little girls prefer dolls, ribbons, &c., as playthings; boys like horses, whips, and drums. One man is pleased with philosophic discussion, another with witty

* De l'esprit, ch. de l'inegole capacité de l'attention.
conversation; one with the recital of events which touch the heart, and another with accounts of sanguinary battles, and so on.

The word attention denotes no more than the active state of any intellectual faculty; or, in other terms, attention is the effect of the intellectual faculties, acting either from their proper force, or from being excited by external impressions, or by one or several affective faculties. Hence there are as many species of attention as fundamental faculties of the mind. He who has an active faculty of configuration, of locality, or of coloring, pays attention to the objects respectively suited to gratify it. In this manner we conceive why attention is so different, and also why it is impossible to succeed in any pursuit or undertaking without attention. It is, indeed, absurd to expect success in an art or science, when the individual power on which its comprehension depends is inactive. Again, the more active the power is, the more it is attentive. The affective faculties, though they have no clear consciousness, yet excite the intellectual faculties, and thereby produce attention. The love of approbation, for instance, may stimulate the faculty of artificial language; boys who are fond of applause will be apt to study with more attention and perseverance than those who are without such a motive.

Thus, perception and attention, though both modes of activity, may be distinguished from each other, as perception denotes knowledge of the external and internal impressions in a passive manner, or, as perceptivity or passive capability of Kant, whilst attention indicates the active state of the intellectual faculties and their application to their respective objects, or spontaniety, in Kant’s language.

IV. Memory.

Memory is another mental operation, which has, at all times, occupied speculative philosophers. Those, too, who have written on education have given it much consideration. It is treated of as a faculty which collects the individual perceptions, and recalls
them when wanted; and is further considered as being assisted by the faculties of attention and association. Memory varies more in its kind than any other of the intellectual faculties recognised by philosophers. It is notorious that some children occasionally learn long passages of books by heart with great facility, who cannot recollect the persons they have seen before, nor the places they have visited. Others, again, remember facts or events, while they cannot recall the dates at which they happened; and, on the contrary, this latter sort of knowledge gives great pleasure to others. The Jesuits, observing nature, consequently admitted a memory of facts, a local memory, a verbal memory, and so on. Even the causes of these differences in memory were looked for. Malebranche supposed some peculiar and modified state of the cerebral organization to explain the facts, such as softness and flexibility of the cerebral fibres in youth, their hardness and stiffness in old age, &c.

Is memory, then, a fundamental power of the mind? Gall thinks not; he considers it as the second degree of activity of every organ and faculty; and therefore admits as many memories as fundamental faculties.

My opinion also is, that memory is not a fundamental faculty, but the repetition of some previous perception, and a quantitative mode of action. The question arises whether memory takes place among both the affective and intellectual faculties. It is true the affective powers act without clear consciousness, and the mind cannot call up into fresh existence the perceptions experienced from the propensities and sentiments with the same facility as the perceptions of the intellectual powers; yet it renews them more or less, and consequently, I cannot confine the mode of action under discussion to the intellectual faculties. However, I distinguish between the faculties which have clear memory and the species of notions remembered: the perceptive faculties alone have clear memory, and all kinds of perceptions are remembered. Further, as the intellectual faculties do not all act with the same energy, memory necessarily varies in kind and strength in each and in every
individual. No one therefore has an equally strong memory for every branch of knowledge. Attention too, being another name for activity of the intellectual faculties applied to their respective objects, naturally strengthens memory: viz. it facilitates repetition. Exercise of the faculties, it is further evident, must invigorate memory, that is, repetition is made more easy. Let us now see the difference between memory and

V. Reminiscence or remembrance.

We have reminiscence, if we remember how certain perceptions have been acquired, while memory consists in the perfect reproduction of former perceptions. Reminiscence is often taken for a fundamental faculty of the mind; sometimes, also, it is considered as a modification of memory.

I neither consider reminiscence as a fundamental faculty, nor as a modification of memory, but as the peculiar memory or repetition of the functions of eventuality, that faculty which takes cognizance of the functions of all the others.

This view shows how we may have reminiscence, but no memory of the functions of our affective faculties. And also, how we may remember having had a sensation which we cannot reproduce, and repeat a perception without remembering how it had been acquired. Thus we may recollect that we know the name of a person without being able to utter it, and also repeat a song without remembering where we learned it. The special intellectual faculties, in general, repeat their individual perceptions and produce memory, while that of eventuality, in particular, recollects, or has reminiscence. Reminiscence, then, is to eventuality that which each kind of memory is to the other intellectual faculties.

VI. Imagination.

This expression has several significations: it is employed to indicate at one time a fundamental power, called also the faculty of
invention, and in this sense it is said to invent machinery, to compose music and poetry, and in general to produce every new conception. Imagination, again, is sometimes taken for the faculty of recalling previously-acquired notions of objects. This signification even corresponds to the etymology of the word: the images exist interiorly. At another time imagination indicates a lively manner of feeling and acting. Imagination, in fine, is a title given to facility of combining previous perceptions, and of producing new compositions.

To the preceding considerations I answer, that imagination is in no case a fundamental faculty. There can be no single faculty of invention, or else he who displays it in one ought to show it in all arts and sciences. And it is notorious that powers of invention are very different in the same as well as in different persons. A mechanician who invents machines of stupendous powers, may be almost without musical talent, and a great geometrician may be perfectly insensible to the harmony of tones; whilst the poet who can describe the most pathetic situations and arouse the feelings powerfully, may be quite incapable of inventing mathematical problems. Man, it is certain, can only invent, or perfect, according to the sphere of activity of the peculiar faculties he possesses; and therefore there can be no fundamental power of invention. Each primitive faculty has its laws, and he who is particularly endowed in a high degree, often finds effects unknown before; and this is called invention. Imagination is, consequently, no more than a quantitative mode of action of the primitive faculties, combined particularly with those of causality and comparison. Inventions are, probably, never made by individual faculties; several commonly act together in establishing the necessary relations between effects and causes.

The fundamental faculties sometimes act spontaneously, or by their internal power, and this degree of activity is then called imagination also. In this sense imagination is as various in its kinds as the primitive faculties. Birds build their nests, or sing, without having been taught, and men of great minds do acts which they
had never either seen or heard of. In calling the degree of activity of the faculties which produces these effects imagination, it is still a mere result of existing individual powers. All that has been said of imagination, as the faculty of recalling impressions, is referrible to the mode of action styled memory of the intellectual faculties, and is not an effect of any single power.

Finally, imagination, used synonymously with exaltation, or poetic fire, results from activity of the fundamental faculty which I call ideality, and to the consideration of which mental power in Vol. I. of Phrenology, I refer my reader for farther information.

From the preceding reflections on perception, attention, memory, and imagination, it follows, that they are quantitative modes of action of the fundamental faculties, each of which may act spontaneously, or be roused by external impressions. The intellectual faculties alone perceive or know impressions, and being directed towards the objects of which respectively they have cognizance, produce attention; repeating notions already perceived, they exert memory; and being so active as to cause effects as yet unknown, they may be said to elicit imagination.

VII. Judgment.

Judgment is commonly believed to be a fundamental power of the mind. It is said to have been given to counterbalance imagination and the passions, and to rectify the errors of intellect. Memory and judgment are sometimes also maintained to exclude each other, but experience shows this opinion to be erroneous, for some persons possess excellent memory as well as great judgment. These two kinds of manifestations, however, may also exist separately; and the conclusion then follows, that they are neither the same faculty nor the same mode of action. Let us first see whether judgment be a fundamental power or not.

Gall, observing that the same person may possess excellent judgment of one kind, and have little or none of another, that a great judge of mathematics, for instance, may have almost no
capacity to judge of colors or of tones, considers judgment as the third degree of activity of every fundamental faculty; and admitting as many kinds of judgment as special faculties, denies it the prerogative of being looked on as a primitive power. In his opinion, every fundamental faculty has four degrees of activity: the first is perception; the second, memory; the third, judgment; and the fourth, imagination.

I, myself, neither consider judgment as a fundamental faculty, nor with Gall, as a degree of activity, or as a mode of action to every faculty. Judgment cannot be a quantitative mode, and certainly not the third in degree, for some individuals judge very accurately of impressions as soon as perceived, without possessing the memory of them to a great extent; and others, with an excellent memory of particular kinds of impressions, judge very indifferently of the same. It even happens that certain faculties are in the highest degree, or spontaneously, active, while the judgment in relation to these very powers is bad. In other cases, the faculties are exceedingly active, and also judge with perfect propriety. Moreover, judgment cannot be an attribute of every fundamental faculty of the mind, since the affective powers, being blind, neither recollect nor judge their actions. What judgments have physical love, pride, circumspection, and all the other feelings? They require to be enlightened by the understanding, or intellectual faculties; and on this account it is, that when left to themselves they occasion so many disorders. And not only does this remark apply to the inferior but also to the superior affective powers; to hope and veneration, as well as to the love of approbation and circumspection; we may fear things innocent or noxious, and venerate idols as well as the God of the true Christian.

I conceive, then, that judgment is a mode of action of the intellectual faculties only; and not a mode of quantity but of quality. The better to understand my meaning, let us observe, that there is a relation between external objects themselves, and also between external objects and the affective and intellectual faculties of man and animals. These relations are even determinate, and in their
essence invariable; they admit modifications only. Hunger and aliment, this and digestion have a mutual relation. Now, if these relations are seen to be perfect and to exist as they are usually found, we say the function is good or healthy. If the sense of taste approve of aliments which man commonly employs and digests, the taste is good and perfect; but there is disorder or aberration whenever the functions depart from their ordinary modes of manifesting themselves; if, for instance, the taste select articles generally esteemed filthy or unfit for food, such as chalk, charcoal, tallow, &c. it is disordered or bad.

The intellectual faculties are in relation with the affective powers and with external objects, and their functions are subject to determinate laws. The faculties of coloring and of melody cannot arbitrarily be pleased, the one with every disposition of colors, and the other with every combination of tones. Now, the functions of the intellectual faculties may be perfect or imperfect, that is, be in harmony, or the contrary, with their innate laws, and the product of these two states announced is judgment; for the intellectual faculties alone know their own and the relations of the affective powers with the external world. The expression judgment, however, it must be observed, is used to indicate as well the power of perceiving the relations that subsist between impressions themselves, as the manner in which this power is affected by these. We distinguish different savors from each other, and we feel the different impressions they make. In both these operations we judge. The same thing holds in regard to all the perceptive faculties: they perceive the relations of their appropriate and peculiar impressions, and recognise the effect this act of perception produces. The faculty of coloring, for instance, perceives several colors, and is then affected agreeably or disagreeably; in consequence, it approves or disapproves of their arrangement. The perception of any relation whatever is the essence of judgment.

The judgment of the faculties which perceives the physical qualities of external objects, even of tones or melody, is also called taste. We are said to have a good or a bad taste, or judgment, in
coloring, drawing, and music, in speaking of forms, proportions, &c.

Each perceptive faculty feels impressions and relations of one kind only; that of configuration knows forms; that of coloring colors; and that of tune tones. The judgment, or the more or less healthy action of each, is in like manner confined to its special function. There are consequently as many kinds of judgment as perceptive faculties, and one kind must not be confounded with another. The regular and perfect manifestation of the functions of the two reflective powers, however, examining the relations of all the intellectual and affective faculties to their respective objects, and the relations of the various powers among themselves, particularly deserves the name judgment; it essentially constitutes the philosophic judgment, which is applicable to every sort of notion. It is synonymous with reasoning. Comparison and causality being the highest intellectual powers, and an essential and necessary part of a reasonable being; their perfect action or good judgment consequently ranks above all other kinds of judgment. However, reason or the reflective faculties in themselves are not infallible; they may be deceived by the erroneous notions and feelings on which they operate. Sound and true reasoning requires two things; first, sound reflective faculties; and second, exact notions and just feelings, viz. sound premises.

VIII. Association.

Several philosophers in Great Britain, and especially Dugald Stewart, have lately spoken much of a peculiar faculty of association. They have examined the laws of its activity, and ascribed to it a great influence on our manner of thinking and feeling; they have even considered it as the cause of the sublime and beautiful.

These propositions I conceive are erroneous; association, in my opinion, being only an effect of the mutual influence of the fundamental faculties. One being active, excites another, or several, and the phenomenon is association; which occurs not only among
the intellectual faculties, when what is called association of ideas results, but also among the affective and intellectual together; and, indeed, among all the fundamental faculties. The sight of a rose may recall one we love; ambition may excite courage, or an intellectual faculty; artificial signs may arouse the perceptive faculties; and these, in their turn, make us remember arbitrary signs.

Association is a phenomenon of some importance in the practical part of anthropology; and when I come to speak of the modifications of the mental functions, I shall enter into its consideration at some length.

The principles of association are the same as those of sympathy. Faculties whose organs are situated near each other, or which act at the same time, will readily excite one another. Faculties also, which contribute to the same peculiar function, will be apt to exert a mutual influence. The strongest of the faculties will further excite and overwhelm the weaker with ease.

The mutual influence or association of the fundamental faculties explains the principles of Mnemonics, or the science of artificial memory, and shows its importance. To enable us to recall ideas or words, we may call in any of our other faculties, which acts with great energy, to assist. If that of locality, for instance, be vigorous, ideas will be easily recollected through the assistance of localities; that is, by associating ideas with localities. Local memory will remember the peculiar ideas associated with particular places. The same means or faculties, however, it must be understood, will not serve in every case. Individuals must severally make use of their strongest to excite their weakest powers; one will employ form, a second color, a third places, and others numbers, analogies of sounds, causes, and so on, with success.

This consideration in its whole extent may be kept in view with advantage in education. No intellectual faculty is ever to be tutored singly, but all which are necessary to the perfect understanding of a subject are to be exercised together. Geography will aid the memory of events, and the reverse; and so on with the rest.
Association also elucidates the common saying, We think in our mother tongue. The meaning of this phrase is not determined; if language be supposed primitively to produce thought, a grave error is committed; for we think in no language; the feelings and ideas existed before the signs which express them, and we may have feelings and thoughts without a term to make them known. Language is only associated with the feelings and thoughts; but as this is done very frequently and with extreme rapidity, even in conformity with the succession of thoughts, we are said to think in our native language. The fact, however, is interesting in itself, and proves the importance of the mutual influence of the faculties. Several of the modern languages, it is true, have a determinate structure, and do not admit of inversions, and ideas consequently follow regularly in a certain order; but ideas are not therefore results of the signs by which they are expressed. It is obvious, however, that the structure of a language must give a peculiar direction to the mental operations; and again, that the prevailing spirit or general mental constitution of every nation may be known by its language. The French directs the mind especially to individual objects and their qualities; the German, on the contrary, forces it to combine, at once, all particular notions. Notwithstanding these admitted effects of language, signs must never be confounded with ideas, nor simultaneous action mistaken for identity.

The second idea which Mr. Alison and others entertain of association as the source of the beautiful and of the pleasure that flows from it, is also unsupported by observation. Pleasure does not derive from association only. Every faculty is in relation to certain impressions; these, being either in harmony with it, or the reverse, produce pleasure or pain. The power of configuration is pleased with certain forms, and displeased with others. The faculty of coloring likes certain colors, and dislikes others. In the same way impressions of tones are immediately pronounced agreeable or disagreeable. The perceptive faculties are pleased by their respective harmonious impressions.

On the other hand it is, however, certain that association may
increase or diminish the absolute pleasure or pain. Pleased with a rose in itself, we may call it beautiful; but the pleasure and the beauty may still be heightened by recollections of the person who planted or presented it. Impressions, little agreeable in themselves, may gain by association. A national air may rank very low as a musical composition, and even offend a scientific ear, and yet delight him, the scenes of whose boyhood, and of whose home, the remembrances of whose relations and friends, it recalls.

IX. Categories.

Even those who recognise certain laws, or categories, according to which the mind operates, confine too much their considerations to general views. If Kant, in his treatise on Experimental Knowledge, admits a category of quality, his conception is still general. We know, it is true, the qualities of natural objects, but there are various kinds of these, and none of them are either specified in Kant's philosophy, or considered as fundamental faculties of the mind.

Idealogists have therefore recognised certain effects and modes of action of the mental powers, and certain laws according to which the mind acts, but few of the fundamental faculties. Among the categories of Aristotle and Kant those of space and time, and that of causality by Kant, are fundamental faculties of Phrenology, but the others are mere modes of action and general conceptions. The various conceptions of philosophers exist in nature, but they are defective, and need rectification, that is, the faculties and their modes of acting must be specified and their existence demonstrated by observation; in this way alone will philosophy become applicable to man in his social relations.

Moralists.

Man must soon have felt that every kind of mental operation could not be called intellectual. Philosophers have accordingly
acknowledged a second, and a different sort, which they name *Will*.

Living in society, man is in relation with his parents, his friends, his enemies, with those who are inferior or superior, and by an innate power he examines his actions in a moral point of view. In conceiving supernatural beings, and admitting their influence on his situation, he also contrived means to render himself agreeable to them.

Those philosophers, then, who examine the moral conduct of man, and its rules, viz. moralists, are particularly interested in the knowledge, not only of the intellectual faculties and their modes of action, but also of the inclinations and sentiments, of the affections and passions, of the motives of our actions, of the aim of our faculties, and of the means of arriving at it. The study of moralists, however, is not more exact than that of idealogists. Like them, ignorant of the fundamental powers of the mind, they confound modes of action with the faculties themselves, disagree about the origin of morality, its nature, and the means of advancing it; the philosophic doctrines of the will, affections and passions. I therefore begin with their elucidations.

**X. Desire and Will.**

Many philosophers understand by the expression *Will*, all sorts and all degrees of inclinations, desires, and sentiments. Moralists commonly say that the will alone is the cause of our actions and omissions, and even that mankind is degraded by any other explanation than this. The will is considered as an entity and styled weak or strong, good or bad. These terms, however, are vague, and require consideration.

In the common acceptation of the word, will is no more a fundamental power than the instinct of animals, it is only the effect of every primitive faculty of the mind, and synonymous with desire; each faculty being active produces an inclination, a desire, or a kind of will; and in this signification there are as many species of
will as fundamental faculties; the strength of each, too, is in proportion to the activity of the individual faculties, and exists involuntarily. Such a sweeping and general acceptance of the term Will, then, is evidently defective.

That desire which overthrows the others is also called Will. Now, in this sense, every faculty in its turn may become Will. A dog, for instance, is hungry, but having been punished for eating the meat he found upon the table, he, without ceasing to feel appetite, for fear of a repetition of the blows, does not indulge; he desires to eat, but he will not. Will, therefore, in this acceptation, cannot be any fundamental power, it is only an effect of the most active powers.

Let us here ask, whether man in his healthy state of mind is compelled by nature to consider certain desires as superior and others as inferior? The answer is affirmative. I shall detail this point later, in speaking of the moral nature of man; meanwhile I adopt it as quite positive, and only add that the preference given is founded on intelligence which knows the different desires, and determines the election which is made. Now by calling will the mental operation which appreciates the value of the desires, and chooses among them, it is evident that it depends on, and is proportionate to, intellect; hence, that it is not a fundamental faculty.

It is of the utmost importance to be aware that there is no moral will without intelligence, though this does not constitute will, and that will is no fundamental power, but the effect of the reflective faculties applied to the affective and perceptive powers of the mind.

Legislation, in general, recognises intelligence as an indispensable condition of will. Idiots, and the insane, therefore, are not answerable for their actions. All the affective faculties, indeed, are blind, and dispose us to act according to pleasure, not according to will, which may frequently be opposed to pleasure. In conformity, the moral code of Christianity distinguishes between desires and will.

Let us for a moment suppose that will is a fundamental power,
and of a higher order than intellect; but, on this hypothesis, how can will act at one time in this and at another in the opposite direction? How happens it, that in one the will looks only for selfish gratifications, and in another for general happiness? Can will take a determinate direction without any cause? Is it different in itself, or is it influenced by other causes—may it, for instance, be excited by the feelings? In this case, however, it would become dependent and exposed to aberrations.

The Christian law commands the will to resist inferior temptations, and to follow the inspirations of the Spirit. Pious persons, also, in their addresses to the Great Guiding Power, pray that their will may be directed towards certain actions, and turned away from others. This proves that they consider will as susceptible of being influenced, and by no means as independent, and acting without any cause. Such an independent will would, indeed, be a principle, and could have only one, never opposite tendencies.

Thus, in the world, will has been separated from mere desires, or from the affective faculties; and intelligence been considered a condition necessary to its manifestations. Yet intelligence does not constitute will; for a person with an excellent intellect may take very little interest in the welfare of other beings. He may acknowledge the better, and still incline and even yield to his inclination to pursue the worse. Two conditions then, the feelings and intellect, are necessary to will; in other terms, will consists in the application of reason to the affective and perceptive faculties.

The greater number of persons take their individual inclinations and pleasures for will, forgetting that these give motives blindly and involuntarily. We may, indeed, say, that the exhibition of true will is very rare; it is too generally in opposition to our inclinations. This state has been noticed by several moralists. 'The spirit,' it is said, 'is willing, but the flesh is weak.'* 'For that which I do,' says the Apostle Paul, 'I allow not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.'†

* Matt. xxvi. 41. † Rom. vii. 15.
Here it is sufficient to know that will can neither be confounded with the individual inclinations nor with intellect; and that it is no special faculty, but the application of reason, or the reflective powers, to our desires and notions. I shall afterwards show that in its true signification it is the basis of liberty.

XI. Affections.

There is a great confusion of ideas in the works which treat of the affections. The name affection is sometimes given to fundamental powers, as to physical love, to self-love, to the love of approbation, and to hope. Affections are also confounded with passions. Moreover, affections are occasionally put for the pathognomical signs, which indicate different states of satisfaction or discontent of the fundamental powers; for instance, smiling, laughing, sighing, yawning, shedding tears, &c.

I employ the word in none of the preceding significations, but solely according to its etymology, to indicate the different states of being affected of the fundamental powers. The sense of feeling, for instance, may convey tickling, itching, burning, or lancinating pain; its various modes of sensation are affections. In the same way the internal faculties may be differently affected.

The affections of the fundamental faculties may be divided into qualitative and quantitative. The former may again be subdivided into five sorts: 1st, general, which exist in each fundamental power; 2d, common, which inhere in several faculties; 3d, special, which belong to individual powers; 4th, simple or compound; finally, 5th, which are common to man and animals, and which are proper and peculiar to man.

The quantitative affections may be subdivided into two sorts: 1st, the fundamental powers and their qualitative affections may be active in very different degrees, from indolence to passion; and 2d, they may act with more or less quickness and duration.

Among the qualitative and quantitative, and among the simple and compound affections, we may also distinguish those which appear
in the state of health from those which occur in disease. Let us now quote examples of each kind.

A general quantitative mode of action or affection is desire: each faculty being active, desires; hence, there are as many sorts of desire as fundamental faculties. The sensations of pleasure and pain are two sorts of general qualitative affections; they are effects, and happen, the former if any faculty be satisfied, the latter if its desire be not complied with. There are consequently as many kinds of pleasure and of pain as individual faculties.

The mode of being affected, called sentiment, is common to several affective faculties. That known under the name of memory, belongs to the intellectual faculties. Fury is common to combativeness and destructiveness. Simple affections take place in individual faculties. Anger, in my opinion, is a special affection of combativeness or destructiveness; fear, of circumspection; compassion, of benevolence; and repentance or remorse, of conscientiousness. Compound affections, on the contrary, depend on the combined activity of several faculties; jealousy, for instance, whose essence is egotism, is modified according to the peculiar faculties which desire, as physical love, friendship, love of approbation. Envy is another compound affection: it is jealousy without benevolence; it increases by the want of the superior feelings. An envious person covets for himself alone; he would possess all enjoyments, to the entire exclusion of others; while a jealous man desires to enjoy and is especially careful not to lose possession of the pleasure he enjoys.

The affections common to man and animals, and those proper to man, depend on the respective faculties. Anger, fear, jealousy, envy, appear in man and animals, as the faculties to which these affections belong inhere in both; while adoration, repentance, admiration, and shame, pertain, like the faculties from which they arise, to man alone.

Let us now remark that the fundamental powers and their qualitative affections may be more or less active or strong. The different degrees of activity are called velleity, desire, ardent desire,
passion; of the agreeable affections, pleasure, joy, and ecstasy; and of the disagreeable affections, pain, grief, and misery.

The nervous irritability, which is styled sentimentality in friendship, irascibility in courage, sensibility in benevolence, indicates only a higher degree of excitability or activity of the fundamental powers, and irregularity of application.

The affections may, further, be sudden and transitory, or slow and durable. Finally, the difference of the affections in the healthy and diseased state is easily understood. The complete absence of a faculty may be called imbecility, if it never existed, and fatuity, if it have been destroyed by disease. Fury, melancholy, despair, and irresistibility of any inclination, are diseased affections. But this subject is treated of at greater length in my work on Insanity, and I shall not dwell longer on it here.

Physicians, as well as moralists, must study the doctrine of the affections, on account of their influence on the vital functions and on man's actions in society. The same may be said in regard to the following article on

XII. Passions.

This word passion is commonly confounded with affection. What I have stated upon the affections, however, being known, the signification which I attach to the term passion will be easily understood; I use it to indicate only the highest degree of activity of any faculty. Passions, therefore, are not fundamental powers, but quantitative modes of action, and effects; there are, consequently, as many sorts of passions as of faculties.

Physicians, idealists, and moralists, incessantly complain of the influence of the passions, since they ruin health and often occasion insanity, disorder judgment, cloud reason, and are causes of many errors and criminal actions.

Passions being the highest degree of activity of every faculty, we easily conceive why great results, whether good or bad, follow from them; why they advance the arts and sciences, and why they
may be excessively dangerous. This depends on the nature of the faculties which act with the utmost degree of energy. The lower feelings, however, let me remark, are commonly the most active; and in speaking of passions, we are apt to think of them. Still, the superior sentiments and the reflecting powers also act with passion in some, that is, they act with the greatest possible energy. Two feelings, selfishness and the love of glory, have been considered by Helvetius as the greatest, or principal passions, and the cause of all our actions. There is no doubt that these two feelings are very active in the majority of individuals, and excite and employ the other faculties to procure their satisfaction. But certain it is, also, that they cannot produce talents. There are ambitious people eager for distinction, who labor hard, and who notwithstanding all, never excel in any one particular.

As there reigns a natural harmony among the fundamental powers, those faculties which are too energetic, or which act with passion, must obviously disturb this balance or order. A youth in love, and a fanatic in religion, sacrifice the rest to their passion, and do harm. Yet in complaining of the passions, we do not stigmatize the fundamental powers themselves, but only their too great energy. This remark applies to the religious and moral feelings, as well as to the most brutal propensities. Selfishness, though it undermines morality, is still necessary to self-preservation. The love of approbation, though the main cause of political slavery, has a useful destination in private life. And religion, though the source of incalculable misery, procures the greatest consolation to humanity.

I shall make one observation more upon passions: the factitious passions, spoken of in books, do not exist. The primitive powers, on which they depend, are innate; their applications alone may be called factitious. Love of approbation is inherent in human nature; its satisfaction by external marks, titles, &c. is artificial.

I conclude with repeating that the various conceptions of philosophers, of idealists as well as of moralists exist in nature,
but they are defective and need rectification, that is, the fundamental powers of the mind and their modes of acting must be specified, and their existence demonstrated by observation. This great task was reserved to Phrenology, by which alone philosophy will become applicable to man in his social relations.

SECTION II.

The following new classification of the fundamental phenomena of the mind is the result of all physiological inquiries, contained in my work entitled Phrenology, and constitutes a summary of its philosophy.

ORDER I.

Affective faculties or feelings.

The essential nature of the affective faculties is to feel emotions. I shall indicate their nature, the aim of their existence, the disorders to which they dispose, and the consequences of their inactivity.

Genus I.—Feelings common to man and animals.

Hunger and thirst are desires felt and known by means of the brain, and there is a special organ in which these impressions inhere.

(Alimentiveness.)

Aim: The preservation of the individual.
Disorders: Gluttony—Drunkenness.
The inactivity is accompanied by want of appetite.
Destructiveness.

_Aim_: Destruction, and the violent death of animals, for the sake of living on their flesh.

_Disorders_: Murder, cruelty.

_Its inactivity_ prevents destruction.

Physical Love—(_Amativeness._)

_Aim_: The propagation of the species.

_Disorders_: Fornication, adultery, incest, and other illegitimate modes of satisfaction.

_Its inactivity_ predisposes to passive continency.

Love of Offspring—(_Philoprogenitiveness._)

_Aim_: The preservation of the offspring.

_Disorders_: Too active; it spoils children, or causes their loss to be felt as an insupportable calamity.

_Its inactivity_ disposes to neglect, or to abandon the progeny.

Inhabitiveness.

_Aim_: Animals have peculiar instincts to dwell in determinate localities. Nature destined all places to be inhabited.

_Disorder_: Nostalgia.

Attachment—(_Adhesiveness._)

_Aim_: Attachment to all around us. It appears variously modified, and produces friendship, marriage, society, habit, and general attachment.

_Disorders_: Inconsolable grief for the loss of a friend.

_Its inactivity_ predisposes to carelessness about others.

Courage—(_Combativeness._)

_Aim_: Intrepidity and defence.

_Disorders_: Quarrelsomeness, disputation, attack, anger.

_Its inactivity_ predisposes to cowardice, timidity, and fear.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

SECRETIVENESS.

_Aim_: To conceal.
_Disorders_: Cunning, duplicity, falsehood, hypocrisy, dissimulation, intriguing, lying.
_Its inactivity_ predisposes to be deceived by others.

ACQUISITIVENESS.

_Aim_: To acquire that which is necessary to our preservation.
_Disorders_: Theft, fraud, usury, corruptibility.
_Its inactivity_ makes one's own interest be neglected.

CONSTRUCTIVENESS.

_Aim_: Construction in general.

CAUTIOUSNESS.

_Aim_: To be cautious and circumspect.
_Disorders_: Uncertainty, irresolution, anxiety, fear, melancholy.
_Its inactivity_ predisposes to levity.

SELF-ESTEEM.

_Aim_: Self-esteem.
_Disorders_: Pride, haughtiness, disdain, arrogance, insolence.
_Its inactivity_ predisposes to humility.

LOVE OF APPROBATION.

_Aim_: Love of approbation and distinction.
_Disorders_: Vain glory, vanity, ambition, titles, distinctions.
_Its inactivity_ predisposes to indifference about the opinion of others.

GENUS II.—Affective faculties proper to man.*

BENEVOLENCE.

_Aim_: Benevolence in general.

*The rudiments of some of them exist also in animals; but they are much stronger and more extensive in their sphere of application in man.
Disorders: Benevolence to the undeserving, or at the expense of others.
Its inactivity predisposes to selfishness, and not to regard others.

Reverence.
Aim: To respect what is venerable.
Disorders: Idolatry, bigotry.
Its inactivity predisposes to irreverence.

Firmness.
Aim: Firmness.
Disorders: Stubbornness, obstinacy, and disobedience.
Its inactivity predisposes to inconstancy and changeableness.

Conscientiousness.
Aim: Justice, conscientiousness, and duty.
Disorders: Remorse for actions which are innocent, or of no importance.
Its inactivity predisposes to forgetfulness of duty.

Hope.
Aim: Hope.
Disorders: Love of scheming.
Its inactivity predisposes to despair.

Marvellousness.
Aim: Admiration, and belief in supernaturality.
Disorders: Sorcery, astrology, the belief in demons.
Its inactivity predisposes to incredulity in revealed ideas.

Ideality.
Aim: Perfection.
Disorders: Too great exaltation, eccentricity.
Its inactivity predisposes to taking things as they are.
MIRTHFULNESS.

_Aim_: Glee, mirth, laughter.
_Disorders_: Raillery, mockery, irony, satire.
_Its inactivity_ predisposes to seriousness.

IMITATION.

_Aim_: Imitation, expression in the arts.
_Disorders_: Buffoonery, grimaces.
_Its inactivity_ hinders expression in the arts, and imitation in general.

ORDER II.

Intellectual faculties.

The essential nature of the intellectual faculties is to procure knowledge.

Genus I. External senses.
Genus II. Internal senses, or perceptive faculties, which procure knowledge of external objects, their physical qualities, and various relations.

- Individuality.
- Configuration.
- Size.
- Weight and resistance.
- Coloring.
- Locality.
- Order.
- Calculation.
- Eventuality.
- Time.
- Tune.
- Language.

Genus III. Reflective faculties.

- Comparison.
- Causality.
SECTION III.

Origin of the Mental Dispositions.

Not the nature of the mental powers only, but their origin, or the cause of their existence also, has constantly been an object of investigation. Philosophers have never differed in opinion upon the vegetative qualities of man. His digestion, circulation, respiration, and various secretions and excretions, are natural functions, and cannot be acquired by will nor intelligence; but, in regard to the origin of the mental powers, many, and different opinions, have been, and are still, entertained. According to some, man is every thing by nature; to others, there are a few general fundamental faculties which produce all particular manifestations; whilst others, again, hold that man is born without any determinate disposition, a tabula rasa, or blank sheet, and that his faculties are the result of external impressions both natural and artificial. Let us examine these different opinions, and see how far each is exaggerated.

CHAPTER I.

Man is every thing by Nature, or, all is innate in Man.

According to the philosophers of antiquity, we look in vain for qualities in man which are not given to him from birth. This language was used both by profane and religious writers. Plato, in his Republic, considers philosophical and mathematical talents, memory, and the sentiments of pride, ambition, courage, sensuality, &c., as innate. Hippocrates, in treating of the qualities necessary for a physician, speaks of natural and innate dispositions. Aristotle, in his work on Political Science, adopts the principle, that some are born to govern and others to obey. Quintilian said, 'If precepts could produce eloquence, who would not be eloquent?' Cicero, Seneca, &c. were of opinion that religion is innate; so
thought Lavater also. Herder* considered man's sociability, his benevolence, his inclination to venerate a superior being, his love of religion, &c. as innate. Condillac† says, 'Man does not know what he can do, till experience has shown what he is capable of doing by the force of nature alone; therefore, he never does any thing purposely till he has once done it instinctively. I think this observation will be found to be permanent and general. I think also that, if it had been duly considered, philosophers would have reasoned better than they have done. Man makes analyses only after having observed that he has analyzed. He makes a language after having observed that he had been understood. In this manner poets and orators began before they thought of their peculiar talents. In one word, all that man does he did at first from nature alone. Nature commences, and always commences well. This is a truth that cannot be repeated too frequently.'

'When the laws,' says he in another passage,‡ 'are conventions, they are arbitrary. This may be the case; and, indeed, there are too many arbitrary laws; but those which determine the morality of our actions cannot be arbitrary. They are our work in as far as they are conventional; but we alone did not make them; nature dictated them to us, and it was not in our power to make them otherwise than they are. The wants and faculties of man being given, laws are given also; and, though we make them, God, who created us with such wants and such faculties, is, in fact, our sole legislator. In following these laws conformably to nature we obey God; and this is the completion of the morality of our actions.'

The ancient institution of castes, or tribes, in eastern countries, shows that endeavors were made to preserve the purity of the races. The prejudice of nobility in certain families can be explained only by admitting the innateness of dispositions.

The religion of Christ also recognises the innateness of the

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* Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie der Menschheit. Th. 1. S. 252.
† OEuv. Compl. 8vo. t. iii. p. 115.
‡ Loc. cit. p. 55.
faculties. According to it, all is given from above. 'A man can receive nothing, except it be given to him from Heaven.'* 'No one can come unto me except it were given to him by my Father.'† 'Who hath ears to hear, let him hear.'‡ 'All men cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it is given.'§ St. Paul says, When the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the word of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another.'||

The doctrine of predestination is also conformable to the opinion that every thing is innate. Pious persons implore the influence of God and of various spirits. The doctrine of divine grace also agrees with the principle that man has natural gifts. Thus the principle of innateness is obvious, and has been admitted from the remotest antiquity; but what it is that is innate, and how it is so, are points not sufficiently known. Before I examine them, however, I shall rectify the two other notions, already mentioned, in regard to the origin of the faculties of the mind.

CHAPTER II.

A few general Faculties produce all particular Dispositions.

Philosophers, at all times, have had a great fondness for general conceptions. They have shown the same liking in their explanation of the causes of our actions. A certain activity of the mind is commonly admitted as necessary to profit being made of external impressions; but some general modes of action have seemed sufficient to account for all the particulars.

* John, iii. 27. † John, vi. 65. ‡ Matt. xiii. 9.
1. **Wants and pleasure produce our Faculties.**

The expression Want is here taken as synonymous with desire. This general term, however, designates no determinate faculty, but the effect of each power being active; there are as many wants, or desires, as fundamental faculties, and these wants are proportionate to the activity of the faculties. Those, therefore, who speak of wants, in this sense, must specify them, and point out their individual causes. For it cannot be the same cause which finds pleasure in construction and in demolition; in benevolence and in cruelty; in righteousness and in sensual enjoyments; in the study of history and of mathematics; in poetry and in ascetic contemplations, &c. Thus the general proposition of philosophers, that desire of pleasure and aversion to pain produce our actions, must be rectified. The pleasures are different, and effects of individual active faculties; these then must be made known, and the objects of their satisfaction indicated.

2. **Attention is the cause of our Faculties.**

Attention is very commonly considered as the cause of all internal faculties. Helvetius even said, that each well-organized person might exercise his faculties by means of his attention, with such success as to arrive at the first rank in society.

The word attention as I have shown, has two acceptations: it denotes consciousness in general; and consequently, in this sense, accompanies the activity of every faculty; and it explains why one animal or man pays great attention to one object, and very little or none to another; why individuals are attentive to different objects, even according to sex and age; and why attention is proportionate to the activity of the respective faculty, so that, if the senses be not exercised, much stronger impressions are required to arouse their attention. The attention, therefore, of every faculty may be cultivated and improved by its exercise; but attention, as a general quality, cannot be the appanage of any particular power.
Moreover, as attention also denotes a distinct consciousness, a reflection on sensations and actions, the aptitudes and instincts of animals cannot certainly be its effect in this signification. No one will maintain, that the rabbit, badger, mole, marmot, or hamster, make burrows, because they have examined with attention the advantages of such dwellings; or that the beaver builds a cottage, because it has studied the laws of mechanics. Among men, geniuses also burst forth quite unconscious of their talents. This kind of attention then may excite, but can never produce, the particular faculties.

3. Understanding is the cause of our Faculties.

This proposition is also cleared up by Phrenology. The affective powers must be separated from the intellectual faculties, and there are several sorts of understanding, and each special power, affective or intellectual, is a fundamental gift, in the same way as each external sense.

4. The Will is the cause of our Faculties.

This opinion is refuted by daily observation. Who can doubt that every thinker as well as every dreamer in philosophy has occasionally felt the limits of his faculties, and has done things disapproved of by reason. What had then become of the will? I do not agree with those who object, that man is degraded by having his actions explained. Those who use such language seem to me to speak without attaching any meaning to their words. Is man degraded by having it said, that he must submit to the laws of the creation? Can he change the laws of his organization, of his senses, of his understanding, or alter the principles of music, algebra, &c.? Were man degraded by a determinate nature, all beings are so, even God himself, seeing that, by his nature, he cannot will evil, nor do an injustice. Now, if God act according to his nature, man cannot be degraded by laws dictated to him by the Creator,
or by his will not being absolute. In the same way man is not degraded by our saying, that he cannot produce the talents and feelings he desires.

CHAPTER III.

Man’s Faculties are the result of Education.

The doctrine of innate ideas, of innate moral principles and of predestined actions lost its authority by degrees, and it was easy to combat it, as it is not conformable to nature. That so many errors on this point should have prevailed during centuries is almost inconceivable; for every day observation belies the principle. How could philosophers maintain that man is every thing from birth, with the fact before them of the difference in so many particulars between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, occasioned by the dissimilarity of the laws which governed each nation? And is it not obvious too, that several modern nations neglect the arts and sciences only because their religious creeds interdict such pursuits? And further, is not every one of us aware that his notions and his actions are modified by external circumstances, and by the education he has received? The doctrine of universal innateness has been examined and refuted by Locke, Condillac, and others, and I find it superfluous to say more on the subject here. But some of these authors and their followers fell into the opposite extreme, and conceived men and animals born indifferent—tabula rasa, or blank sheets, and maintained all the instincts of animals, from the insect to the dog and elephant, to be the consequences of instruction. Helvetius,—the great champion of this opinion—maintains that foxes hunt because they have learnt hunting from their parents; birds sing and build nests in consequence of instruction; and man becomes man by education.

The opinion of Helvetius and his school, being still much ac-
credited, and many institutions being founded on it, deserves a particular examination, but the answer to their positions is, that education produces no faculty whatever, either in man or animals. According to their hypothesis, arts and sciences ought to improve in proportion as they are taught, and mankind ought to become perfect under the care of moral and religious preachers. Why then is the progress of the arts and sciences so slow? Why are we forced to allow that men of genius are born? Why has every one of us certain faculties stronger than others? Truth lies at neither of the extremes, but between the two, and this is what I shall endeavor to prove. I shall consider, under three separate heads, the ideas according to which man acquires his affective and intellectual faculties by education. The first concerns the external senses; the second fortuitous circumstances; and the third, instruction and the external circumstances which are voluntarily prepared.

1. Of the external Senses as cause of the mental faculties.

The external senses, it is certain, are indispensable to the acquiring of knowledge of the external world, and to the fulfilment of social duties; it is also certain that they are given by nature. But it is only because they are absolutely necessary to our actions that they have been considered as their cause.

This subject has been particularly examined in the first volume of this work, and I shall only repeat that the internal faculties are not in proportion to the external senses, and that these are mere intermedia. The hands may be used to take food, to write to a friend, to draw, to play on a musical instrument, &c.; but they do not produce hunger, friendship, drawing, music, &c. Let us observe instead of supposing, and we shall find that the internal faculties are only manifested by means of the external senses and of voluntary motion.
2. Of fortuitous or accidental Circumstances as the cause of our faculties.

The following language is very common:—Necessity makes man act and invent; occasions produce talents; revolutions bring forth great men; danger gives courage; society causes the passions, and these are the principal motives of our actions; climate and food beget powers, &c.; in short, circumstances produce the mental faculties.

Whatever has been said of fortuitous circumstances as the cause of faculties, may be reduced to two considerations: they present the faculties with opportunities necessary to the exhibition of their activity; or they excite the faculties, without, however, originating them.

Demosthenes,' says Helvetius, 'became eloquent because the eloquence of Callistatus made so deep an impression on his mind that he aspired only to this talent.' According to the same author, 'Vaucanson became famous in mechanics, because, being left alone in the waiting-room of his mother's confessor, when a child, he chanced to find a clock, and after examining its wheels, endeavoring, with a bad knife, to make a similar machine of wood. He succeeded, and therefore constructed his surprising machines, the automatons. Milton would not have written his Paradise Lost, had he not lost his place of secretary to Cromwell. Shakespear composed his plays because he was an actor; and he became an actor because he was forced to leave his native country on account of some juvenile errors. Corneille fell in love, and made verses to the object of his passion, and therefore became famous in poetry. Newton saw an apple falling, and this revealed to him the law of gravitation, &c.'

In this manner of reasoning the origin of the faculties is confused either with the opportunity necessary for their manifestation, or with some external excitement. It is evident that external circumstances must permit the internal faculties to act; oppor-
ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS.

opportunities, however, do not, therefore, produce faculties. Without food I cannot eat; but I am not hungry because food exists. A dog cannot hunt if it be shut up, but its desire of hunting is not produced by leading it into the fields. Many millions are often placed in the same circumstances, and, perhaps, a single individual alone takes advantage of them. Revolutions make great men, not because they produce faculties, but because they offer opportunities necessary to their display. Circumstances often favor the attainment of distinction and the acquisition of celebrity, but every individual does not reach an eminent place. Buonaparte alone knew how to acquire supremacy over all French generals who rose before and with him. The Revolution of Spain is far from having produced the same results as that of France. It is not certainly enough to be an actor in order to compose such plays as those of Shakspeare. Theatrical performers were almost ranked with slaves, at Rome, yet Æsop and Roscius appeared; whilst in Greece, where this profession was esteemed, no actor of renown is on record. France has produced a greater number of eminent actors than England; yet in the former country performers were excommunicated and in the latter honored. How many children are exposed to similar influences without manifesting the same energy of faculties, while, on the contrary, some individuals not only make use of occasions present, but prepare and produce others which permit their faculties a still greater sphere of activity!

On the other hand, it is true that our faculties are often excited by events, and that without external excitement they would remain inactive. Yet however useful, the study of excellent models may be in the arts, I am still convinced that the principles of every science, art, and profession, are readily conceived by those who possess the faculties each requires in a high degree. This is the case with moral principles and religion also, which are easily developed if the innate conditions on which they depend be possessed.
Society.

Many authors treat of the natural state of man in opposition to his social condition, and consider numerous qualities as the result of society. According to their hypothesis, man is made for solitude; the social state is contrary to his nature; and many of his virtues and vices would never have existed, had he not abandoned his state of isolation.

Excepting certain idiots, however, where, and at what time, has man lived a solitary being? History, so far as it goes, shows that he has always lived in society; in families, at least; and families, though scattered through the woods, form communities. As we find man every where united in societies, then, is it not natural to conclude that he is a social being? Animals, it is necessary to recollect, in regard to the instinct of sociability, are divided into two classes: several species are destined to live in society, as sheep, monkeys, crows, &c.; others to live solitary, as the fox, hare, magpie, &c. Man belongs to the social class. Now we may easily conceive that the social animals are endowed with faculties destined for society, and that these cannot act without it. And every individual is, in fact, generally calculated for society; all his faculties are in harmony with this aim. Bustards and cranes place sentinels; a flock of wild geese forms a triangle in flying; a herd of chamois is led by a female; bees act in concert, &c.; and all these peculiarities inhere in animals along with the social instinct. Consequently society is itself a natural institution; a law established by creation; and the faculties of social animals are not the result of society. This proposition is also proved by the fact of social animals having different and often opposite faculties; which if society produce any of them could never happen.

Misery.

Want, that is, some disagreeable sensation, misery, poverty, or painful situation, is often considered as the source of the instincts,
propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties of man and animals.

Want, in this signification, certainly excites the internal faculties, but it is not true that it produces them; or else the same external wants ought to create the same faculties in animals and in man: yet we observe that not merely every kind of animal, but even every individual, acts differently under like impressions from without. The partridge dies of hunger and cold during sharp winters, and the sparrow falls benumbed from the housetop, while the nightingale and quail take wing to temperate climes before the season of want arrives. The cuckoo requires a nest to lay its eggs in as well as the wagtail or the redbreast, and yet builds none. The idiot makes no effort to defend himself from the inclemencies of the weather, while the reasonable man covers himself with clothing. Moreover, the faculties of animals and man are active, without any necessity from external circumstances. The beaver, though shut up and protected against the weather, builds its hut; and the weaver bird, though in a cage, makes its tissue. It consequently follows, that external wants excite the activity of the internal faculties, but do not produce them; and in this respect their influence is important. The faculties of the poor, for instance, are more active than those of the affluent; when the faculties, however, have not been given by nature, external wants cannot excite them.

On the other hand, misery exercises innate benevolence and improves the softer feelings, whilst riches are prone to excite and encourage lower passions, and in this sense it may be said that the Lord inflicts pain upon those he likes, that is, they grow better; and Jesus Christ condemned riches, yet it remains certain that misery does not produce benevolence.

I have already shown that the expression Want, taken as synonymous with inclination or desire, is the effect and not the cause of the internal faculties; that there are as many wants as different faculties; and that wants are proportionate to the activity of these.
Climate and mode of Living.

Several philosophers have supposed that climate, mode of living, and even the nurse's milk, might be the cause of man's faculties.

In this manner of thinking, the modifications are confounded with the origin of our faculties. The opinion, however, must be considered. The arguments adduced in support of it only prove that manifestation of the faculties depends on the organization; for climate, eating, drinking, &c. have a powerful influence upon the body. Instead, therefore, of denying the influence of climate, food, air, light, &c. I consider it as of great importance, in as far as the activity of the faculties is concerned. The milk of nurses certainly contributes to the growth and organic constitution of children, and consequently to the manifestation of the affective and intellectual faculties, inasmuch as the body is necessary to this. All these external influences, however, cannot, it is evident, produce any faculty. If parents were right in attributing the inferior propensities of their children to the nourishment they had received, why should not grown-up people, who live on beef, veal, mutton, pork, &c., accuse the ox, calf, sheep, and pig, for their want of intelligence, and their peculiar character? The activity of our faculties varies with the modifications of our organization, just as the milk and butter of cows vary according to the food they live on; or as the flesh and fat of animals are modified according to the articles with which they are fattened. The activity of men fed on game differs much from the activity of men living upon potatoes and other vegetables; and it seems possible to show the influence of different aliments upon certain systems in the healthy state, just as it may be shown that some medicines act more upon one than upon another. From the same reason we may also conceive the utility of certain rules of fasting in subduing sensual appetites. Particular degrees of excitement suppress the activity of certain faculties, while they increase that of others.

Climate certainly exerts a great influence upon the organization,
and it is natural to suppose that one contributes more than another to develope certain faculties. The influence of climate is not, however, so powerful on man as on animals; for man, by means of his intellectual faculties, opposes its effects. The Jews are a proof of this. They are dispersed over the whole world, and though somewhat modified in different countries, their primitive and characteristic organization is still everywhere the same. The effects of innateness and of the laws of propagation are much more potent than those of any thing external. In saying, therefore, that climate and food influence the activity of the faculties, this is not to be confounded with their primitive origin.

3. Of prepared Circumstances, and Instruction as the cause of our Faculties.

Having once considered external circumstances as cause of the mental faculties, men naturally thought that to teach arts and sciences, and moral and religious principles, to found academies and schools, to pay large sums to masters, and to study the works of great men, might be sufficient to produce superior talents.

This opinion must be opposed, by observing:

i. The Constancy of the Nature of Animals and Man.

Were animals susceptible of change from every impression and not endowed with determinate natures, how comes it that every species always preserves the same characters? Why do not fowls coo when they are reared with pigeons? Why do not female nightingales sing like males? Why do birds of one kind, hatched by those of another, display the habits and instincts of their parents? Why does the duck, hatched by a hen, run towards the water? Why does not the cuckoo sing like the bird that reared it? Why do squirrels, when pursued, climb trees, and rabbits hide themselves in burrows? Why are dogs attached in despite of the unkind blows they receive, &c.? It is true that animals are not confined
in their actions solely to such as are required for their preservation. They vary their manners according to the circumstances in which they live; and are susceptible of an education beyond their wants. Horses, monkeys, dogs, &c., may be taught to play various tricks. This power, however, of modifying their actions is still limited, and is always conformable to their nature.

The same reasoning applies to man. If his faculties be the result of external influences, why does he never manifest any other nature but his own? Children pass most of their time with mothers and nurses; yet boys and girls, from the earliest infancy, show the distinctive characters which continue and mark them through life.

ii. The Occurrence of Geniuses among Animals and Men.

Did animals and men learn all from others, why should individuals, similarly circumstanced in regard to manner of living and instruction, excel the rest? Why should one nightingale sing better than another living in the same wood? Why, amongst a drove of oxen, or horses, is one individual good-tempered and meek, and another ill-natured and savage? M. Dupont de Nemours had a cow which singly knew how to open the gates of an enclosure: none of the herd ever learned to imitate its procedure, but waited impatiently near the entrance for their leader. I have the history of a pointer, which, when kept out of a place near the fire by the other dogs of the family, used to go into the yard and bark; all immediately came and did the same; meanwhile he ran in, and secured the best place. Though his companions were often deceived, none of them ever imitated his stratagem. I also knew of a little dog, which, when eating with large ones, behaved in the same manner, in order to secure his portion, or to catch some good bits. These are instances of genius among animals which are by no means the result of instruction.

Children often show particular dispositions and talents before they have received any kind of education. Almost every great man has, in infancy, given earneasts of future eminence. Achilles,
hidden in Pyrrha's clothes, took the sword from among the presents of Ulysses. Themistocles, when a child, said that he knew how to aggrandize and render a state powerful. Alexander would not dispute any prize at the Olympic games, unless his rivals were kings. At fourteen years of age, Cato of Utica showed the greatest aversion to tyranny. Nero was cruel from his cradle. Pascal, when twelve years old, published his treatise on Conic Sections. Voltaire made verses when only seven years of age. The number of such instances is very great, and it is unnecessary to mention more here, as they must be within the scope of every one's knowledge.

iii. Individualities among Animals and Men.

Individual animals of every species have universally something particular in their mental constitution; every bird of the same brood does not acquire its song with equal facility; one horse is fitter for the race than another; and sportsmen know very well that there is a great difference among dogs. It is the same with the human kind. Children of the same parents differ in talents and disposition, though their education has been the same. How then should the same education possibly produce the peculiarities of different children? Or why have not teachers yet found means to confer understanding, judgment, and all other good qualities? Why are we not all geniuses? Why cannot moral and satirical discourses keep us from abusing our faculties? And why must we lament so many errors and crimes?

To prove that man acquires his affective and intellectual faculties by education, some assert that the savages who have been found in the woods, and destitute of all human faculties, resemble beasts only because they have not received any education.

This presumption is refuted as soon as the condition of these unfortunate beings is known. They may be referred to two classes; being ordinarily defective in organization, with large dropsical heads, or brains too small and deformed. They are al-
most always scrofulous, have hanging lips, a thick tongue, swollen neck, bad general constitution, and an unsteady gait; they are more or less completely idiots, and have commonly been exposed and left to the care of Providence, having been found burdens by their parents. In some countries, the lower classes consider such unhappily-constituted creatures as bewitched, and take no care of them. Idiots too have sometimes a determinate propensity to live alone, and consequently escape to the woods. At Haina, near Marbourg, where there is a great hospital, Dr. Gall and I were told, that on sending people to search for some idiots who had escaped, others were found who had fled from different places. We saw a mad woman near Augsburg, who had been found in a wood. At Brunswick we saw a woman also found in a forest, who was incapable of pronouncing a single word. The pretended savage of Aveyron, kept in the institution of the Deaf and Dumb at Paris, is an idiot in a high degree. His forehead is very small, and much compressed in the superior part; his eyes are small, and lie deep in the orbits, and we could not convince ourselves that he hears; for he paid no attention to our calls, nor to the sound of a glass struck behind him. He stands and sits decently, but moves his head and body incessantly from side to side. He knows several written signs and words, and points out the objects noted by them. His most remarkable instinct, however, is love of order; for, as soon as any thing is displaced in the room, he goes and puts it to rights.

Such unfortunate beings, then, are idiots, not because they are uneducated, but because their imbecility unfits them to receive education. It is difficult to conceive a well-organized person long wandering about like a savage in our populous countries without being discovered. Were such an individual, however, to escape in infancy, and be afterwards discovered in a forest, though he could not be acquainted with our manners, and the sciences we teach, he would still manifest the essential and characteristic faculties of the human kind, and would soon imitate our customs and receive our instructions. The girl of Champaigne proves this assertion.
Thus, education produces no faculty either in man or in animals; but let us not conclude that education is superfluous. My ideas on education are published in a separate volume, and I only remark here that it excites, exercises, determines the application, and prevents the abuses of the innate faculties; and that on this account it is of the highest importance. Mechanics and peasants, confined to their laborious occupations, are frequently ignorant; but many of them, with a good education, might surpass thousands of those who have enjoyed its advantages.

From the preceding considerations on external circumstances, it results, that they either present opportunities which favor the activity of the faculties, or excite and guide, but do not in any wise produce them.

I shall now consider the share Nature has in originating the powers of man and animals, in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Innateness of the Mental Dispositions.

Let us see now what is innate. The fundamental powers of the mind, as well as the organization on which their manifestations depend, are given to man by the Creator. The constancy of human nature affords the first proof of this position. The human kind, in as far as its history is known, has ever been the same, not only as regards organic, but also as concerns phrenic life. The skeletons of ancient mummies are the very same as those of the men at the present day; and all ages have exhibited virtues and vices essentially similar. Thus, the special faculties of man have ever been the same; the only difference observable at different times, is, that they have been more or less active, and variously modified in individuals. Here one has unjustly seized a piece of
ground, there a place of distinction; here mistresses have been celebrated on an oaten-reed, there on a harp; conquerors in one quarter have been decorated with feathers, in another with purple and crowns, and so on; these modifications are, however, all grounded upon primitive faculties essentially the same. And man, though endowed with proper and peculiar faculties, still receives them from creation; the truly human nature is as determinate as the nature of every other being. Though man compares his sensations and ideas, inquires into the causes of phenomena, draws consequences, discovers laws and general principles, measures immense distances and times, and circumnavigates the globe; though he acknowledges culpability and worthiness, bears a monitor in his interior, and raises his mind to conceive and to adore a God,—yet none of the faculties which cause these acts result either from accidental external influences or from his own will. How indeed could the Creator abandon and give man up to chance in the noblest and most important of all his doings? Impossible! Here, as in all besides, he has prescribed laws to man, and guided his steps in a determinate path. He has secured the continuance of the same essential faculties in the human kind,—faculties whose existence we should never have conceived had the Creator not bestowed them upon us.

The uniformity of the essential faculties of mankind, notwithstanding the influence of society, climate, modes of living, laws, religion, education, and fortuitous events, affords another great proof that nothing can change the institutions of nature. We everywhere find the same species; whether man clothe himself or go naked, fight with slings or artillery, stain his skin, or powder his hair, dance to the sound of a drum or the music of a concert, adore the sun, moon, and stars, or in his religion be guided by Christian principles, his special faculties are universally the same.

I have also spoken of genius, in order to prove that education does not produce our faculties, and mentioned that children often show peculiar faculties before they have received any kind of instruction. External circumstances are sometimes very unfavorable
to the exhibition of genius; but gifted individuals do not always wait for opportunities, they even make them, and leave parents, professions, and all behind, to be at liberty to follow their natural inclinations. Moses, David, Tamerlane, and Pope Sixtus the Fifth, were shepherds; Socrates, Pythagoras, Theophrastus, Demosthenes, Moliere, Rousseau, and a thousand others, who have lived to adorn the world, were the sons of artificers. Geniuses sometimes surmount great difficulties, and vanquish innumerable impediments, before their character prevails and they assume their natural place. Such individuals, prevented by circumstances from following their natural bent, still find their favorite amusement in pursuing it. Hence peasants, shepherds, and artisans, have become astronomers, poets, and philosophers; and, on the other hand, kings, and prime ministers, employed themselves in the mechanical arts; all, indeed, unites to prove the innateness of the primitive mental faculties.

Men of genius, however, have been said to form a particular class, and to be incomparable with persons whose faculties are of middling excellence.

This, however, is the same as saying that hunger and circulation do not depend on organization, because all have not inordinate appetite and fever; or that the mole does not see with its eyes, because the stag sees better; or that man has no smell, since the dog's is superior. But, if we admit that organization causes the highest degree of activity of the different faculties, the lowest degree must also depend on it. Moreover, the greatest genius in one particular is often very weak in others. William Crotch, at six years of age, astonished all who heard him by his musical talents; but in every other respect he was a child. Caesar could never have become a Horace or a Virgil, nor Alexander a Homer. Newton could not have been changed into so great a poet as he was an astronomer; nor Milton into so great an astronomer as he was a poet. Nay, Michael Angelo could not have composed the pictures of Raphael, or the contrary; nor Albano those of Titian, and so on.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

The mental faculties again must be innate, since, although essentially the same in both sexes, they present modifications in each. Some are more energetic in women, others in men. The feelings are, in general, stronger in women, the intellectual faculties more active in men. These modifications inhere naturally, and it is impossible to give to one sex the dispositions of the other.

We may add, that in every nation, notwithstanding the uniformity of its opinions, customs, professions, arts, sciences, laws, religion, and all its positive institutions, each individual composing it differs from every other by some peculiarity of character. Each has greater capacity and inclination in one than in another direction, and even in childhood manifests his own manner of thinking and feeling. Every one excuses his frailties by saying, It is my nature; it is stronger than I; I cannot help it, &c. Even brothers and sisters often differ extremely, though their education is uniform. The cause of difference, must, therefore, be internal.

The innateness of the faculties must also be admitted, because there is a direct relation between their manifestations and a certain organic apparatus.

Finally, if we believe that man is a being of creation, it is only rational to suppose that his faculties are determinate and ordained. I consequently, with all these considerations in view, contend for the innateness of every faculty of the mind. But here it is of importance to notice an observation of Locke upon innateness. He, to show that ideas are not innate, stated that children do not manifest certain qualities, and that different nations have different, nay, opposite principles of morality. This position, however, in relation to the innateness of ideas and moral principles, must not be confounded with the innateness of the faculties. No sensation, no idea, no principle, is innate. Sensations and ideas of external objects follow from external impressions, and these being accidental, ideas of them cannot be innate; but the faculties which perceive impressions, and conceive ideas, are innate. Thus the idea of a stone, plant, or animal, is not innate; but these objects make impressions on the senses, which produce sensations or ideas in the mind, and
both the senses and the mental faculties are innate. In the same
manner, sensations and ideas of external and accidental events, and,
in general, determinate actions of the faculties, are not innate.
The propensity to love, and not the object of love; the faculty of
speaking, not the peculiar language; the faculty of comparing and
judging, not the determinate judgment; the faculty of poetry, not
the particular poem, &c., is innate. There is, therefore, a great
difference between innate faculties and innate ideas and sensations.

It is also true that children do not manifest all the faculties, but
we cannot from this conclude that these are not innate. Birds do
not make nests, the hamster and marmot do not collect provisions,
the swallow does not migrate immediately after birth; neither do
animals propagate, nor females give suck, when they come into the
world; yet all these qualities are innate. This difficulty is easily
explained. Every faculty has its own organ, in proportion to whose
development are its manifestations. Now in childhood several
organs are very little, and in adult age very greatly developed;
and while some are proportionately larger in children than in the
grown-up, others are fully developed in both. The manifestations
of the faculties being, as I have stated, always proportionate to the
development and activity of their organs, it becomes evident why
some of them do not appear in infancy.

Why moral principles differ in different nations is also obvious.
I agree with Locke that they are not innate, but maintain that the
faculties which form them are. I shall afterwards show that moral
principles depend on several faculties, and vary in nations in con-
sequence of different combinations of their organs; the justice of a
libertine without benevolence and veneration must differ entirely
from that of a charitable, modest, and continent person. The
same fundamental faculties exist everywhere, but their manifestations
are universally modified. Men everywhere adore a Supreme
Being; they everywhere have marks of honor and of infamy; there
are everywhere masters and servants; all nations make war, wheth-
er with clubs and arrows, or with muskets and artillery; and every
where the dead are lamented, and their remembrance cherished, whether it be by embalming their bodies, by putting their ashes into an urn, or by depositing their remains in the tomb. Hence, though the functions of the faculties in general are modified in different nations, and of those consequently which determine the moral principles also, the same fundamental powers still appear in the customs, manners, and laws of all.

An essential part of the study of man, therefore, is to show that his nature is determinate, that all his faculties are innate, and that nature's first prerogative is to maintain the number and the essence of his special powers, whilst she permits many modifications of the functions of all, in the same way precisely as she preserves species, but continually sacrifices individuals.

The second right of nature is to allow more or less activity to individual faculties in different persons; that is, she endows all with the same faculties, but gives them in very different degrees. Some few are geniuses, but the majority are middling in all respects. Nature then produces genius, and the individual dispositions of every one.

Finally, nature has stamped a difference upon the sexes: some faculties are more active in women, others in men. Men will never feel like women, and women will never think like men.

These are facts which observation proves. Philosophers, therefore, can only examine how nature produces such phenomena, and see whether it is possible to imitate and to assist her.

Thus, the principle of Phrenology—that the faculties of the mind are innate—is indubitable.
SECTION IV.

The Brain is indispensable to mental phenomena.

After having seen what nature does in man, let us inquire into the means by which she effects it. Religious people commonly believe in a mere supernatural dispensation of gifts; but there cannot be a doubt of natural causes also contributing to produce the phenomena of mind.

I may follow the example of other natural philosophers, and confine myself to proving a relation between the body and the manifestations of the mind, or, I may endeavor to determine the special powers of the mind and the respective organs. This latter task has been accomplished by Phrenology. Here I shall only show, in a summary way, how reasoning coincides with observation. It is important duly to appreciate my expressions upon this subject: I do not say that the organization produces the affective and intellectual faculties of man's mind, as a tree brings forth fruit, or an animal procreates its kind; I only say that organic conditions are necessary to the manifestations of mind.

I never venture beyond experience; and therefore consider the faculties of the mind only in as far as they become apparent by the organization. Neither denying nor affirming any thing which cannot be verified by experiment, I make no researches on the lifeless body nor on the soul alone, but on man as a living agent. I never question what the affective and intellectual faculties may be in themselves, do not attempt to explain how the body and soul are united and exercise a mutual influence, nor examine what the soul can effect without the body. The soul may be united to the body at the moment of conception or afterwards; it may be different in every individual, or be of the same kind in all; it may be an emanation from God, or something else. Whatever metaphysicians and theologians may decide in regard to these various points, the position, that manifestation of the faculties of the mind depend, in this
life, on organization, cannot be shaken. Let us then consider the proofs which reasoning affords of this principle of Phrenology.

i. *Difference of the Sexes.*

The faculties of the mind are modified in the sexes: some are more energetic in men, others in women. Do then the souls of men and women differ, or is it more probable, that the faculties are modified because their organs or instruments vary? Phrenology shows that certain parts of the brain are more developed in men, others more in women; and thus renders the peculiarities in the mental manifestations of each, easily explicable. There are, however, many instances in which the intellectual faculties of women resemble those of men, and the contrary.

ii. *Individuality of every Person.*

The mental faculties are modified in every individual. Now, is it probable that the soul differs universally, or is it more likely, that as the whole human kind has descended from an original pair, all modifications of the faculties may be explained by differences in the organs on which each respectively depends? Like species of animals, and man also, have essentially the same corporeal structure; there is merely difference of proportion and development in the various parts of which the body is composed; and these differences in the organs produce corresponding varieties in the functions attached to them.

iii. *Ages.*

Mental manifestations are modified by age. Either the soul, or its instruments, therefore, must produce these modified manifestations. It is ascertained that certain faculties appear early in life, or at a later period, according as the peculiar organs of each are developed.
DEPENDENCE OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA.

The same law holds in both affective and intellectual faculties: the manifestations of all are not simultaneous. Several of both orders appear in infancy, others not before maturer years; several, too, disappear earlier, whilst others endure till the end of life. Now as we know that manifestations of the mental powers always accord with certain organic conditions, it is impossible to overlook their dependence on organization.

iv. Influence of Physical Conditions.

All that disorders, weakens, or excites the organization of the nervous system, influences especially the manifestation of the mental faculties also. It is generally observed that organs are enfeebled if their growth be very rapid; their functions too, are, in consequence, less energetic. This is chiefly remarkable in the climacteric years, or periods of increase; a knowledge of which is so very important in practical medicine. Vegetables are known to increase particularly at two periods; in the spring, and in the middle of summer. The growth of the human body is also more rapid at certain times than at others. Now rapid growth weakens the organs, both of vegetative and animal life, and consequently the functions they perform respectively. Girls who grow too suddenly turn pale, chlorotic, and consumptive, &c. Individuals, therefore, during the periods of growth, are not fit for active business, and ought not to exercise their intellectual faculties much. Rest is necessary till the organs acquire maturity, when all the faculties of the mind and body will resume their energy. Organs of particular faculties are occasionally too soon developed, and are then apt to be exercised overmuch. Incurable exhaustion often results from this, and early genius is nipped in the bud.

Adult men and animals are still subjected to variable degrees of excitement from seasons, temperature, food, and especially from particular laws to which the organization is subjected. We see animals resume and abandon at different periods, their instinct to sing, to build, to gather provisions, to live solitarily or in society,
to migrate, &c.; and the faculties of man do not always act with
the same degree of energy. Who can overlook the influence of
such evacuations as the catameni, hemorrho"ids, &c.; or of preg-
nancy, digestion, fasting, and whatever exhausts the corporeal
powers? Who can deny the effects of disease upon the manifesta-
tion of our faculties; or of external and internal excitements, as
of agreeable impressions, fine weather, music, dancing, &c.?
Now all these act upon the organization only; manifestation of the
mental faculties consequently depends on the organization.

Exceedingly defective mental powers have been known to grow
very active when excited by external or internal causes. Haller
relates the case of an idiot, who happening to be wounded on the
head, manifested great understanding so long as the wound remain-
ed open, but who, as soon as this healed up, fell into his former
stupidity. He speaks of another patient whose eye being inflamed,
saw perfectly during the night whilst the inflammation lasted.
Father Mabillan, in his infancy, gave little promise of superior
abilities; but, having received a blow on his head, he, from that
moment, displayed talents. I have heard of a boy who, at the age
of fourteen, seemed incapable of improvement; having fallen down
stairs one day, however, and got several wounds in his head, he
afterwards began to excel in his studies. I have seen a girl, nine
years old, whose right arm grew gradually weak and almost para-
lytic, in consequence of a blow on the same side of the head; her
lower jaw trembled incessantly, and she was often convulsed; but
her intellectual faculties had acquired great energy and perfection;
her whole deportment indeed, was exceedingly imposing. I shall
mention only one other case of this kind from the Edinburgh Re-
view,* in an article upon the Retreat, an institution near York for
insane persons of the Society of Friends: 'A young woman, who
was employed as a domestic servant by the father of the relater
when he was a boy, became insane, and, at length, sunk into a
state of perfect idiocy. In this condition she remained for many
years, when she was attacked by a typhus fever; and my friend,
having then practised some time, attended her. He was surprised to observe, as the fever advanced, a development of the mental powers. During that period of the fever when others are delirious, this patient was entirely rational. She recognised, in the face of her medical attendant, the son of her old master, whom she had known so many years before, and she related many circumstances respecting his family and others, which had happened to herself in her earlier days. But, alas! it was only the gleam of reason: as the fever abated, clouds again enveloped the mind; she sunk into her former deplorable state, and remained in it until her death, which happened a few years afterwards. These facts are positive, and there can be no doubt of similar causes influencing the faculties of the mind surprisingly; yet they can only act immediately upon the organization. We must perforce conclude, that when physical and organic causes excite the most impudent lasciviousness, the most arrogant pride, despair which rejects all consolation, and so on, these various manifestations depend on the organization.

Sleeping and Dreaming.

The states of watching, sleeping, and dreaming, also prove the manifestations of the mind dependent on organization; for corporeal organs can alone be fatigued and exhausted. Now it is known that mental operations cannot be continued incessantly, that rest is indispensable, and that a regular recurrence of that inactive state of the mental faculties called sleep, is necessary to enable them to display their perfect energies.

If single organs be by any cause excited, and enter into action while the others are inactive, partial sensations and ideas, or dreams, arise. Dreams, then, are almost always the result of certain material causes, and are conformable to the age and organic constitution of the dreamer. Men and women of an irritable habit of body, find difficulties and endless impediments in their dreams, and generally suffer pain, and feel anxiety and alarm. This constant relation between dreams and bodily frame, which has been verified
by an infinity of observations, proves further that the mental manifestations depend on organization.

vi. Exercise.

The possibility of exercising and of training the faculties of the mind, also shows their dependence on the organization; for that an immaterial being can be exercised is inconceivable.

vii. Relation between the Brain and the manifestations of the Mind.

The preceding arguments are founded on reasoning, and prove that all manifestations of the mind depend on organic conditions. In the first volume of this work it is demonstrated, that individual faculties manifest themselves by means of particular cerebral parts, and that the faculties appear, increase in strength, and diminish in vigor, in proportion as the organs on which they depend are developed, increase in size, and shrink again. The brain of the new born child scarcely shows any traces of fibres; these appear, become firmer by degrees, and attain perfection between the twentieth and fortieth year. As years accumulate, its convolutions, which had been plump, become flabby, and are less closely packed together.

In conformity with the state of the brain at birth, animal life is confined to spontaneous motions, to the perception of hunger and thirst, to some obscure sensation of pain and pleasure, and to an imperfect state of the external senses. By degrees the number and energy of the affective and intellectual faculties augment, and the child begins to acquire knowledge and determinate ideas of external objects. Through the periods of boyhood and adolescence the faculties gradually gain strength; and, in manhood, they at length manifest the greatest degree of energy. From this state of perfection, however, they soon begin to decline; and, in extreme old age, the propensities are blunted, the sentiments weakened, and the intellectual faculties almost or entirely annihilated.
If the organs of the faculties, however, do not follow the usual order of increase, but be either precocious or tardy, their respective functions are also manifested with corresponding variations. If the intellectual faculties are often more energetic in rickety children than beseems their age, their brain will also be found extraordinarily developed or irritable. Independently of all disease, however, particular portions of the brain are occasionally developed at too early a period, and then their functions likewise appear prematurely.

On the other hand, when parts of the brain or its whole mass arrives very late at maturity, the mental imperfections of childhood remain longer than usual, sometimes till about the tenth or twelfth year, so that parents despair of the rationality of their children. After this age, however, the cerebral organs will often take on a particular growth, and the faculties then appear with great vigor. One of the most distinguished physicians at Berlin, when ten years old, could not use his organs of speech, and Gessner, at the same age, had made such slender progress in his studies, that his preceptor declared him half an idiot; yet it is known how famous he became afterwards.

If the growth of the cerebral organs be incomplete, the faculties of the mind are equally defective. It is impossible to determine with exactness the degree of organic development necessary to the due manifestation of the mental powers; for this depends not on the size of the organs alone, but on their peculiar constitution also. A very small brain, however, is always accompanied with imbecility.

Children have sometimes the same organic constitution of brain as their parents, and then manifest precisely similar affective and intellectual faculties. Characteristic forms of head are often transmitted from generation to generation; and thus are mental faculties propagated in families during centuries. It is an acknowledged fact, that children who resemble each other, or their parents, manifest similar faculties, making allowances for difference of age and sex. I have seen twin-boys so like each other that it was almost
impossible to distinguish them; their inclinations and talents were also strikingly similar. Two other twin sisters are very different; the muscular system in the one being most developed, the nervous in the other; and while the first has little understanding, the second is eminently talented.

To conclude this point, I say that, as the peculiar organs of the affective and intellectual faculties can positively be demonstrated, it is impossible to deny the dependence of mental phenomena on the organization.

The principle of Phrenology, therefore, that the manifestations of the affective and intellectual faculties of the mind depend on the brain, is also ascertained.

SECTION V.

ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

General view.

The examination of this subject has been opposed at all times and in all countries by all sorts of obstacles. This higher portion of human nature has constantly been injured, and trampled upon by civil and religious establishments. In this respect, in particular, man has been treated as a beast that stands in need of a master. It may be added that Cicero’s sentence—‘man desires to be deceived’—finds its special application as far as his religious dispositions are concerned. Those who dare to think for themselves and to instruct others, must still be prepared to struggle for truth. The ancient philosophers commonly took care not to offend the ignorant multitude on the religion of the state, but initiated their chosen disciples with their secret thoughts upon these matters.

The religious doctrines in general are involved in numberless contradictions and inconsistencies. The great remedy consists in
the love of truth and free inquiry. Refined ideas are commonly buried under heaps of rubbish and superstition, so that it is extremely difficult to separate the true from false doctrines. We find sublime precepts at the bottom of all the great religious systems among the Indians, Chinese, Roman Catholics and others, though the chief place is occupied by childish, ridiculous, useless and sometimes mischievous observances. No Christian who has arrived at refined notions of an All-perfect Being will object to the Shastra treating of God in the following expressions; 'He who considers the Being that is infinite, incomprehensible and pure, as finite, perceptible by the senses, limited by time and place, subject to passion and anger, what crime is such a robber of Divine Majesty not guilty of. Acts and rites that originate in the movements of the hands and other members of the body, being perishable, cannot effect beatitude that is eternal. Those who worship forms under appellations continue subject to form and appellation, for no perishable means can effect the acquisition of an imperishable end.' Yet the religion of the common Indians is disfigured by, and almost reduced to, external ceremonies. Similar remarks are applicable to the other great establishments of religion. The sublime principles are too often neglected or even forgotten by the fault of those who teach and of those who are taught. The former commonly lay more stress upon the necessity of belief in the messengers who revealed the doctrine, and upon ceremonious observances, than upon virtuous actions; and the latter find it more easy to follow outward ceremonies than to excel by inward virtue, self-denial and wisdom.

On the other hand, men of disinterested, kind and pious feelings, of amiable and charming habits, great goodness, love of truth and sound judgment, are met with in all countries and under every church-establishment, among the Jews and Gentiles, Mahometans, Roman Catholics and Protestants. These individuals, as St. Paul said, have the law written in their heart, and we are wrong in ascribing their moral perfection to the religious creed in which they are born and brought up. Fenelon, for instance, would have been
mild, amiable, innocent, benevolent and useful to his fellow creatures under any church-government, because his pure mind inhabited a pure body. He therefore preserved his innate goodness and candor in the midst of the selfishness, hypocrisy and intrigue of the French court.

However delicate the object of religion may be, I do not hesitate to examine it, placing truth above any other consideration, relying on the decrees of the all-wise Creator, and being intimately convinced that truth is the corner-stone of human happiness, and that true Christianity will gain by free investigation. The principal points to be considered are, atheism; God's existence; God's attributes; God's relationship with man; the importance of a temporal revelation; the aim of religion; its improvement; and the sublimity of Christianity.

On Atheism.

Atheism is the doctrine which denies the existence of God, the creator of the universe. It has been an object of discussion among thinkers of ancient and modern days. Many ancient philosophers denied the existence of a Creator and Supreme Being that governs the world; they believed in an essence or ether, commonly styled the soul of the world, which as they said penetrated all beings and produced all phenomena. The soul of man was a portion of it, and at the death of every one united with other bodies. Others went still farther by rejecting such a general cause infused into all beings, and by admitting only a certain number of elements and their combinations: mere mixture and form of matter. This sort of atheism then may be confounded with materialism. According to it there is no God, no creator, no soul, no religion, no immortality, no beginning, no end, nothing but matter governed by invariable laws.
2. On God's existence.

The number of Atheists has always been, and ever must be very small, but that of Deists seems to be considerable. It appears certain that the heathen philosophy from the remotest times admitted a supreme Deity, the fountain of all other divinities. In discussions of this kind, however, Deists are often confounded with Atheists, and the latter denomination is used in order to decry every new idea unfavorable to any old or accredited belief. In this erroneous sense, to be an Atheist means a mere unbeliever, which may happen with respect to any religious notion or interpretation of individual passages of the revealed law, whilst the person persecuted under the name of Atheist, may firmly believe in God's existence and his all-wise government. The names of an Atheist, a Deist, and an unbeliever or infidel, therefore, ought to be carefully distinguished from each other, their significations being extremely different. The term Atheist should be applied only to him who rejects the idea of a Creator and of a supreme governor; that of Deist to him who confines his belief in the existence of a Supreme Being, the creator of all, according to invariable laws; finally, an unbeliever or infidel in any religion is he who disregards the divine revelation given to man since his creation. An unbeliever in that sense among Christians contradicts the divinity of Jesus, among the Mahometans the divine mission of their prophet. Unbeliever or heretic may also be called, he who denies certain interpretations of established churches. The Protestants are heretics in the eyes of the Roman Catholics, and the Quakers in the English church.

There is no positive religion or established creed without acknowledging the existence of a Supreme and other subordinate heavenly beings. The Jewish dispensation, and Christianity, being proclaimed as God's will and command are inseparable of the belief in God's existence. Even reason alone cannot consider the admirable concatenation of all things in nature and their mutual relations without thinking of a primitive cause; and it is obliged by its very nature and laws to admit such a cause—an all-wise Creator—a Supreme understanding—God.
3. On God's attributes.

According to the doctrine of mythology, individual deities were intrusted with particular powers and presided over individual natural phenomena. The believers in one single God ascribed to him various attributes. Even in the Jewish law and in Christianity the Supreme Being is represented as endowed with very different qualities. The God of Israel is a God of war and partial to the Jews; that of the Christians, on the contrary, a God of peace and the father of the whole of mankind. I shall not transcribe all particulars of this kind, contained in the Old and New Testament, but the intelligent reader may earn great benefit from comparing them in detail.

Reason is obliged to resign any endeavor to determine the whole of God's nature. Man, in order to be able to conceive it, ought to be God's equal, but an inferior can never understand a superior Being. At all times, therefore, man, confined to his natural endowments, anthropomorphises God; that is, attributes to him such qualities as his intellect can penetrate and as seem the most agreeable and most harmonious with his own inclinations. Savage tribes make their gods glorious warriors, always armed and occupied with battles. Nations who believe in one Supreme Being, ascribe to him the qualities of a tyrant whilst they continue to live in ignorance and barbarism, and they believe in his softer feelings in proportion as their own manners and habits are more refined. Stupid persons are not shocked by inconsistencies in God's commandments, whilst reasonable men think him degraded by such suppositions. The worship varies according to God's attributes. If men fancy God an ill natured Being, armed with infinite power, who takes delight in the misery of his creatures, they fear him, but cannot love him. The doctrine of God's attributes is also of great influence on the moral conduct of man, since he feels inclined to imitate his maker. If God indulge in fancies, tricks, and lower passions, why should man not be allowed to follow the example of his Great Master. If God be revengeful,
why may man not become intolerant. But if God be love, forbearing and forgiving, then man must forbear and forgive as he hopes to be done by, by his Creator.


It is natural to think that the Maker is in relation to his work, but with respect to the relationship between God and men innumerable opinions prevail in different religious systems. In every one there are articles of belief, which may be subdivided into two kinds. 1st, they are relative to the divinities in Paganism, or to the Supreme Being in Judaism, Christendom and various other religious doctrines.—2d, they concern man in his social intercourse. In Paganism, Judaism, Christianity, Mahometism, Buddhism and all other established churches, the doctrine of ceremonial observances and outward performances is blended together with moral precepts, and the whole is founded on religious belief in such doctrines being revealed by supernatural ways and means. Now it is a fact that among all nations, and at all times, ceremonial observances made up the principal part of religious duties. Among the Indians and Jews a peculiar cast of people is appointed to preside over the execution of such external performances and to teach this important point of their religion.

Even among Christian sects outward forms and ceremonial observances are more or less numerous, and a particular profession, though their service is greatly altered by the New Testament, is kept up and intrusted with teaching religion and with attending to the fulfilment of religious duties. But as among all Christian churches some sort or other of service to God, to his praise and glory, is prescribed, and as priesthood too often confound their personal views with the Supreme Being; as some even seem to wish to persuade the ignorant that they themselves must live splendidly to the glory of their heavenly Father; our duties towards God deserve to be well defined.
Gall admits a fundamental faculty of God and religion. In my opinion the religious phenomena are the result of several faculties. Causality searches for a cause of every thing and of every event. Individuality personifies the Supreme cause it arrives at; another faculty inspires admiration and wonder, and believes in some relationship between God and man; a third feeling inspires respect and reverence, and religion exists. It is strengthened by the feelings of hope, conscientiousness and cautiousness.

Natural religion implies the belief in a Supreme Being and implicit obedience to his will, consisting in the laws of the creation, whilst revealed religions make known to men God's particular decrees. Natural religion, therefore, distinguishes between the pretended ministers of God and their versions, and the Creator and his eternal laws.

Phrenology proves not only the innateness of religious feelings, but also their acting without understanding like all other feelings. Their direction depends on the use of reason. The reflective faculties ought not to be neglected in any religious consideration any more than in every other knowledge. Nay, natural religion may, like natural morality, become a science.

It is commonly believed that there can be no religion without revelation. This however is an error, which will not be committed by those who understand the innate feelings of man. This is rather the language of priestcraft. It is to be regretted that religious people are averse to reason. It may be so since many points of their doctrine do not stand the scrutiny of reason. I think with an able writer that 'religion has been wronged by nothing more than by being separated from intellect, and by being removed from the province of reason.' I also think with him that 'Christianity was given not to contradict and degrade the rational nature, but to call it forth, to enlarge its range and its powers; that it admits of endless development, and is the last truth which should remain stationary.' I farther say with him; 'Religious and
moral truth is appointed to carry forward mankind, but not as conceived and expounded by narrow minds, not as darkened by the ignorant, not as debased by the superstitious, not subtilized by the visionary, not as thundered out by the intolerant fanatic, not as turned into a drivelling cant by the hypocrite. Like all other truths it requires for its full reception and its powerful communication a free and vigorous intellect. God gave reason to man, and why should its use be interdicted in the most important subject, religion.

Natural religion is entirely guided by reason, and the feelings proper to man. It seems hostile to priesthood to conceive the Supreme Being as reasonable. He is particularly described as having negative qualities, whilst his positive powers are those of the animal nature. Sometimes he is represented as an arbitrary tyrant, nay, very often he is demonised by fanatics. Atheism, however, would be preferable to demonism. We cannot conceive the whole nature of God. To be able to do so, we ought to be his equal. But to degrade him under the better part of our nature is abomination. Let the idea of him be formed at least after the image of a good, noble minded and reasonable man. Theologians and priestcraft have shockingly abused the religious sentiments of man and turned them to their advantage, quite forgetting the sublime lessons of Christianity. They think it sufficient to cover themselves with the shield of mysteriousness and to demand unbounded belief. But reason tells us that religious belief must work on kindness, reverence, justice in practice, and that religion cannot exclude intellect and moral conduct. It also tells us that any religious creed that does not tend to the glory of God and the general good of man is objectionable and may degenerate to demonism. Doctrines which are contradictory in themselves or contradict common sense must be surrounded with awe and imposed; this is expedient to selfish or superstitious theologians, but it is not in conformity with reason and pure Christianity. Reason cannot deny the reality of revelation; it even finds in it a great motive of moral conduct. But human reason does not discover that God is fond of
perfumes, tabernacles, songs, all sorts of fineries; sacrifices, &c; such things he must be told by God's messengers. In general no irrational notion of God's attributes, providence and likings can be admitted without being supported by special revelation, but the friends of mankind must lament the mischief priests have inflicted on their fellow creatures and on the good cause of religion, by their nonsensical views of God and his decrees. It would have been more profitable to mankind at large, if the teachers of religion had been penetrated with the superiority of pure Christianity, and if they had followed the example of their great model. Reason perfectly agrees with the precepts, to refer every thing to God as the first cause; to venerate his almighty power and providence; to submit to his decrees and arrangement of things; to feel gratitude for his benevolence; and to adore him in truth and in spirit. Natural religion, as well as the systems which are announced as revealed, endeavors to make us acquainted with God's attributes and with our duties to him, but having reason and the powers proper to man for its guide, it rejects all notions which are opposed to them.

Phrenology brings new light. Hitherto reason alone was considered as a sufficient guide in natural religion; but reason is influenced by the feelings as well as by intellectual notions, as by materials on which it acts. If our knowledge be incorrect, our judgment cannot be sound. In the same way our judgment of religious subjects depends on the feelings with which we are animated. But then it is a law of the Creator that reason places the feelings proper to man above those which are common to him and animals. Those who believe in natural religion as well as those who rely on revelation, will modify their religious conceptions according to their innate dispositions or gifts, and he who possesses the human feelings and the reflective faculties in a high degree, will reject any revealed law or interpretation that contradicts human sentiments and reason.

According to reason the Supreme Being is all perfection, and can neither gain nor lose in felicity by the terrestrial creation.
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his happiness depended on his creatures, on their respect to him or on their regulations, his nature were imperfect. 'The giving glory to God,' says Bishop Taylor,* 'and doing homage to him, are nothing for his advantage, but only for ours; and God created us, not that we can increase his felicity, but that he might have a subject receptive of felicity from him.' It seems, on the other hand, reasonable to admit that all sentient beings have been created for their own happiness, and that to secure this the Creator has traced them determinate laws. The end of natural religion, then, is an entire submission to the Will of the Creator, be it accomplished by love or by fear; 'For this is the love of God,' says St. John,t 'that we keep his commandments.' We may suppose that he prefers the motive of love to that of fear, which, however, is also reasonable, since he makes no exceptions, but applies his laws invariably. The first law, says Michel Montague,‡ which God gave to man was that of obedience. Thus, if we can do nothing for the sake of God, nothing to promote his happiness, it follows that all our doings concern ourselves, our like, and the other beings of creation, or that in this life religion consists in morality, and that morality becomes religious as far as it is the will of God. All religious regulations, therefore, ought to be only auxiliary means of rendering mankind morally good. Hence it is presumptuous and pitiful to perform ceremonies by way of rendering service to God. Many ceremonies destined to glorify God, are ridiculous, and rather calculated to amuse children than to edify reasonable beings. Their aim, which may be laudable and respectable, ought never to be disguised, nor obscured by absurdities or immoral proceedings. It is edifying to assemble and to sing together the greatness of God's perfections, but it is ridiculous to attribute to him qualities for which we despise each other in society; let us reflect on the benevolence and justice of the Supreme Being, but let us not debase him by low passions; particularly, let us never lose sight of the principal object of religion, viz. the moral improvement of man. As we can understand God's nature

* Sermon xii.  † First Epistle, v. 3.  ‡ Essais, liv. ii. ch. 19.
only as far as we possess qualities in common with him, and as we possess qualities in common with animals, and others which are proper to man, it is evident that in speaking of man being created in the likeness of God, only his higher nature can be said to constitute this likeness. Our religion or union with God or liking to him, then, only consists in exertions of such powers, which constitute our higher nature. In unfolding and enlarging these powers we truly honor God. Nothing foreign to our original constitution can be required from us, and the cultivation of our rational and moral existence is evidently the noblest tribute we can render to our Creator and the end of our godlike nature.

Importance of Revelation.

It is certain that religious and moral feelings are innate, but the regulation of their manifestations is an important point. We learn from history that the functions of these powers have been liable to infinite abuses and disorders. The principal object of revelation then is, to regulate and direct the actions of the religious and moral feelings. Reasonable persons, therefore, will never object to revealed laws, but they will not submit indiscriminately to every thing commanded in the name of God. It is really of consummate importance to bear in mind that the pretended ministers of God are men, and therefore liable to be deceived themselves as well as to deceive others. We should never forget that a revealed law must be in harmony with the skill of the Creator, or adapted to human nature, and tend to the honor of God and the welfare of mankind. Interpretations to the contrary give a deathblow to all assumed prerogatives of infallibility.

It is remarkable that the belief in Divine revelation is quite general. It is known that the most ancient governments were theocratic and that their civil and religious regulations were imposed as the will of God. Farther, a peculiar kind of craft, or the same spirit has always guided those who call themselves the ministers or confidents of God, and there is something common to all the relig-
ious creeds both of ancient and modern times. Every religion has its miracles, mysteries, and martyrs. Each boasts of the most irrefragable testimonies, the most respectable authorities, and the most plausible reasons; each is proposed as true, and requires unbounded belief and blind obedience. The Indians who rub themselves with cow's-dung; the Jews who eat no pork; the Mahometans who neither drink wine nor eat pork, but make, at least, one pilgrimage to Mecca during their lives; and the believers in the infinite number of other religious creeds scattered over the world, have all received special revelations. Diametrically opposite and even immoral opinions, have been defended even to death, and always in the persuasion that God was rather to be obeyed than man. If any article of faith be found irrational, it is called a mystery, and belief in it is not at all less obligatory. Who does not know that it is the will of God, and necessary to salvation, to make war, or to maintain peace, to immolate victims, or to preserve that which God has created, to sing kneeling or standing upright, the head covered or uncovered, to repeat certain prayers in a foreign language, to eat certain dishes on certain days, to eat them cold or warm, to burn perfumes, &c., &c.? However dissimilar religious doctrines may be in regard to the attributes of God, to his influence on us, to the nature of the soul and its future state, belief is always supported by revelation; it is always God who has spoken either immediately or by means of his messengers.

Religious belief has its advantages and disadvantages. To the former belong the powerful influence it exercises on our actions; and though I am far from rejecting natural goodness, I am, however, convinced from experience, that benevolent persons who have religious belief, are more ready to assist their suffering neighbor than those who have no other motive to act but their innate charity. This, too, is easily conceived since our actions depend on motives; and the greater the number of the latter is, with the more confidence we may expect their effect. On the other hand, however, I do not think that religious belief alone is sufficient to dispose every one to act with charity and righteousness. I merely reckon
it among the powerful motives of action, and like to see it employed as a means of happiness, but lament every sort of disorder inseparable from its misapplication.

Another great advantage of religious faith is to inculcate determinate notions of God's attributes and perfections and of the final state of man. Reason can conceive either beginning or end; it is confined to observation and induction, and the number of those who are apt to reason, is small. It is, therefore, necessary to impose to the great bulk of mankind, whatever they must believe, omit, or do.

But here lies the great stumbling block, the delicacy and difficulty to distinguish truth from error, true from false prophets, and voluntary from involuntary deceivers. The ignorant are satisfied with faith without reasoning. They commonly obey every commandment which is proposed as divine. They attach themselves more to the legislator and to the manner of communicating his will than to the excellency of his precepts. They look for miracles from those who announce the law. They are most ready to believe in that religion which promises most, and flatters the feelings of man to the greatest amount. It is obvious, therefore, why pretended ministers of God have always been, and are still interested in presenting ignorance as a virtue, and in preventing thinking people from communicating their opinions freely. As their religious interpretations do not always agree with the innate laws of intellect, it is rather convenient to interdict the exercise of reason, and unfortunately, hypocrites succeed too easily.

Reason indicates quite another course. It does not allow to any one to arrogate the right of commanding in the name of God; it commands to pay more attention to the nature of the revealed laws than to the time when, the place where, and the means by which they are made known. The precepts of Christian morality, for instance, have been and will be always the same, independently of time and place, for they are inherent in, and adapted to, the nature of man. Truth has its own intrinsic value, and does not acquire its worth from those who teach it. It may be overlooked
or not be felt by the ignorant, but it cannot be in opposition to reason. The superior qualities of man, called Theological, for instance, cannot be given to mankind in order to gratify the selfish views of some individuals or to entail misery upon the community. Reason will admit every cognition of any immutable law, whether physical or moral, as the will of God, but it will not acknowledge any proposition contrary to the evident decrees of the Creator, nor will it pardon those who impose duties to others which they themselves neglect.

The aim of Religion.

Notions of this kind are intimately connected with those of the relationship between God and man. Most contradictory opinions prevail amongst religious persons. This study has been and commonly still is, considered as the monopoly of a peculiar profession, and degraded to a technical phraseology. A priesthood everywhere decided about the articles of belief, and declared the terms unbeliever and immoral as synonymous. But we ought to be aware that belief cannot be forced upon man any more than physical love, attachment, benevolence or any other feeling. Religious intolerance therefore can only encourage hypocrisy. On the other hand, religious belief must be distinguished from our innate moral feelings; hence the moral and religious sentiments may act separately from each other, or in union.

Though marvellousness is an essential part of the constitution of man, religion should be ranked with other sciences and liberal researches. I think with Dr. Channing that 'the claims of religion on intelligent men are not yet understood, and the low place which it holds among the objects of liberal inquiry will one day be recollected as the shame of our age.' Whoever believes in the existence of God, should consider religion as the most important object of his reflections, and being personally concerned in this respect, his union with God should be left free from human authority, particularly from the spirit of those who have seized upon it as
their particular property. It is evident that all mental applications ought to be rational; is it not therefore strange that religion—the most important of human concerns—shall not admit the use of human reason, but that on this subject human understanding shall be obscured by symbolic terms and trampled upon by civil and religious governments; and that in this enlightened age, religion shall remain a technical study, disjoined from all liberal inquiries, and disfigured by errors which gathered round it in times of barbarism and ignorance?

Priesthood, it is true, does no longer lay down all the moral precepts; their power has gradually diminished, and civil governments have established a moral code independently of religious belief, so that nowadays we distinguish between civil laws and the rules of religious legislators. Who does not observe many of the pretended Christians neglect the moral precepts of their religious code, confine their religious duty to the belief in the miraculous part of Christianity, and conduct themselves according to the laws of their civil government. Civil legislators now decide even on the value of religious systems, declare one preferable and dominant, and merely tolerate the others. They feel their rights and their duties, and endeavor to promote general order and happiness; their statutes, in fact, are wiser and more forbearing than the interpretations of revealed legislation. It is a positive historical fact that religious governments have done more mischief to mankind than civil rulers. Nay, civil governments have been and still are faulty and injurious to the commonwealth in the ratio of their interference with, or of their being guided by religious opinions. Perceiving the influence of religious ideas on mankind in general, civil rulers often unite with priests for the advantage of both parties whilst the sacerdocy commonly contend for exclusive superiority. In the actual state of things it is still impossible to prevent every kind of disorder which may result from the union of, or the contest between, civil and religious powers. Among many changes, necessary to the progress of human happiness, a religious reform is indispensable. Mischief is unavoidable so long as religion and morality are
under the direction of two distinct classes of governors, and so long as civil governments interfere with theological opinions strictly speaking. Sacerdotal supremacy must terminate, and civil governments should abstain from meddling with any religious belief which corresponds with the general order and happiness of the community. There should be no exception in the civil code. It should be the same for every member of the nation: for those who sing to the glory of God, and for those who do not sing; for those who on certain days eat flesh, and for those who eat vegetables; for the rich and the poor, for the gay and the gloomy. It should have only one aim, general happiness. Whatever does not concern this, ought to be out of its province. Every marvellous conception, which neither is in opposition to general happiness, nor troubles the order of the community, should be remitted to the conscience of every believer, and every kind of Churchdom should be abandoned. Religious teachers might form a liberal profession, and their lessons should be attractive, enlivening, and above all, practical. Farther, in every religious system, its morality or the ideas which it involves respecting purity or impurity of tendencies, innocence or guilt of actions, should constitute its most important part. Religion should unite all men in peace before their Creator, but theological subtleties and technical phraseology will never produce such a desirable effect, and many generations will pass, and great changes must take place, before man arrives at that degree of perfection.

On the Improvement of Religious Notions.

It does not appear superfluous to examine whether religious notions must remain stationary, as priesthood universally maintains, or whether they vary and must vary with the different degrees of civilisation, and may improve like the functions of every other innate faculty. Common sense tells, that persons of mature age cannot feel and think like children, and that civilized and well-informed people cannot be satisfied with notions that please the
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

It seems evident that priesthood should not be permitted to check religious and moral improvement any more than academies have the right to impede the advancement of arts and scientific inquiries in general. The cold, obscure and technical theology of the times of slavery, ignorance and superstition is to give place to intelligible doctrines which harmonize with human nature. I respect every one's manner of thinking provided it agrees with the general welfare of mankind, but history shows that the religious notions of man, however slow their variations and improvements have been or may be, do not remain unchanged. Progress is the supreme law of the human mind. An irresistible proof of my proposition may be drawn from the revealed law itself. God manifested his will at different times and always with improved additions. He made a covenant with Noah, his seed, and with every living creature;* he made another with Abraham;† he again instructed Moses and revealed the whole Mosaic law.‡ But Jeremiah foretold that this covenant should not last, but be succeeded by a new one.§ In fact, neither the Jewish dispensation nor Paganism was adapted to the civilisation when Jesus Christ appeared; and St. Paul in the most positive way, speaks || of 'the mediator of a better covenant, established upon better promises,' adding that if that first covenant had been faultless then would no place have been sought for the second. The gospel, particularly the sermon on the mount, contains rules of conduct very different from those of the Mosaic law. The interpretations of Christianity are numerous. Those which seemed adapted and necessary to former generations, will no longer attract enlightened minds. Religious ideas cannot be stationary any more than civil legislation. Jesus frequently spoke in parables, complained of his disciples not understanding their meaning;¶ distinguished between the things as they were from the beginning of the creation, or had been modified in time; ** and positively stated, that he had to say many things which they could

* Gen. ix. 12. † Ibid. xvi. 4. ‡ Exodus. § xxxi. 31
|| Heb. viii. 6. ¶ Matth. xv. 16. ** Mark x. 6.
not yet bear.* I firmly believe that in many points of Christianity the letter which kills must be replaced by the spirit which vivifies; and that wherever reason is allowed to reflect on religious matters, the uniformity of doctrine is impossible. It is a common tendency of the sacerdocy to keep religious notions stationary and to monopolize certain advantages connected with their office. It is therefore natural that they decry every improvement which may be proposed. Accordingly the Roman, English, Scotch or any other dominant church will contend for the necessity of some uniform discipline. But then even in admitting the soundness of the principle the great difficulty remains concerning its application and decision about the nature of the discipline, that is, whether it shall be childish or reasonable, useful to a few or profitable to mankind at large. It has happened that priesthood in feeling it necessary to yield to the march of intellect did it secretly and without mentioning it openly. Sometimes they altered the language, but continued to act with the former spirit. This their proceeding must change. Religious opinions as they have been established in dark ages to the advantage of a few, require a reasonable reform in the actual state of civilisation. To that end it is desirable that in every country the clergy keep pace with the public in the acquirements of natural sciences. In that case alone they will be ready to admit every improvement which reason and justice demand not only in language but also in work.

* Sublimity of Christianity.

It is not my intention to examine the various systems of religion which have governed mankind at different times and in different countries. I shall, however, say a few words on Christianity, which deserves the most serious and continued attention of every reflective mind on account of its influence on mankind. The lawgiver and the law surpass all other codes in excellence. In proportion as men's moral sentiments have been refined, Christ's

* John xvi. 12.
moral character has been found praiseworthy. Since the introduction of Christianity all private and public economy and all institutions have been changed, and mankind have made great progress; but in every advanced condition of the world, Christianity unfolds nobler views and keeps in advance of every improved stage of society. Whoever applies Christian morality in his daily transactions is conscious of its adaptation to his noblest faculties. In short, this moral code seems to me the most pure, the most noble, and the most salutary, of all which are mentioned in history. Its laws alone are universal and invariable. It alone appeals to reasoning and to the consequences of its knowledge as the best proofs of its excellency; alone it is forbearing; alone it invites examination, and asks the inquirer to hold by that which is true; it alone is founded on the faculties proper to man, alone places general happiness above partial love and personal interest, and alone agrees with the natural law of morality. I do not hesitate to say that, in my opinion, true Christianity is little understood. Many, many changes must take place before it can be reestablished in its primitive purity. I say with Benjamin Franklin,* 'I do not desire faith diminished, nor would I endeavor to lessen it in any man. But I wish it were more productive of good works than I have generally seen it; I mean real good works, works of kindness, charity, mercy, and public spirit; not holyday-keeping, sermon-reading, or hearing; performing church ceremonies or making long prayers, filled with flatteries and compliments, despised even by wise men and much less being capable of pleasing the Deity. The worship of God is a duty; the reading and hearing of sermons may be useful, but if men rest in hearing and praying, as too many do, it is as if a tree should value itself on being watered and putting forth leaves, though it never produced any fruit. The great Master, thought much less of these outward appearances and professions than many of his modern disciples. He preferred the doers of the word, not the mere hearers; the son that seemingly refused to obey his father, and yet performed his commands, to him that pro-

* Dr. Franklin's Memoirs and private correspondence, vol. iii.
fessed his readiness but neglected the work; the heretical but charitable Samaritan to the uncharitable though orthodox priest, and sanctified Levite; and those who gave food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, raiment to the naked, entertainment to the stranger, and relief to the sick; though they never heard of his name, he declares shall in the last day be accepted, when those who cry Lord! Lord! who value themselves upon their faith, though great enough to perform miracles, but have neglected good works, shall be rejected. He professed that he came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance; which implies his modest opinion, that there was some in his time who thought themselves so good that they need not hear even him for improvement; but nowadays we have scarce a little parson that does not think it the duty of every man within his reach to sit under his petty ministrations, and that whoever omits them offends God.

Materialism and Spiritualism.

I lament with all philanthropists, that man is so much inclined to run into extremes. Idealists have commonly too much confidence in their reasoning powers; they neglect observation, consider religion and morality as mere means of leading mankind, and assume their own manner of thinking and of feeling as a type of the human race; while moralists demand blind and unbounded confidence in their assertions as emanating from a superior authority, and discountenance or interdict reasoning. In this way, idealists and moralists wage continual warfare, mutually disparage their subjects, and retard the knowledge of the nature of man: they are more attached to the love of dominion than to the love of truth. Abuses and prejudices are kept up for the sake of selfish views, and dialectic subtleties are called reasoning. If they love truth, let both parties examine, without prejudice. Philosophers will find that man is naturally inclined to religious considerations; and the interpreters of the will of God, if they do not act from selfish motives, will not reject the light of reason; they will soon be con-
vinced that the feelings are blind, and must be guided by reflection; which can alone establish harmony among the fundamental powers and their functions.

It is certain that 'there is a much more exact correspondence between the natural and moral world than we are apt to take notice of;'* and that truth and the knowledge of nature are neither dangerous nor in opposition to morality and true religion. It is proved by incontestable facts, that the affective and intellectual faculties are inherent in the nature of man, that their manifestations depend on the cerebral organization, and that the physical world is subservient to the moral; but ignorance, hypocrisy, and envy, have taken part in the discussion. The basis of Phrenology was first attacked, viz. its reality was denied. To others it seemed more convenient to blame its consequences, and without knowing why or explaining how, to cry out that it is dangerous. This, in all ages, has been the reception of every discovery. The disciples of the various philosophical schools of Greece inveighed against each other, and made reciprocal accusations of impiety and perjury. The people, in their turn, detested the philosophers, and accused those who investigated the causes of things of presumptuously invading the rights of the Divinity. Pythagoras and Anaxagoras were driven from their native countries, on account of their novel opinions; Democritus was treated as insane by the Abderites, for his attempts to find out the cause of madness by dissections; and Socrates, for having demonstrated the unity of God, was forced to drink the juice of hemlock. Several of those who excelled in physics in the fourteenth century were punished with death as sorcerers or magicians. Galileo, when seventy years of age, was cast into prison for having proved the motion of the earth. Vesaliius, Varolius, and Harvey, were persecuted on account of their discoveries. Those who first maintained the influence of climate upon the intellectual faculties of man were suspected of materialism. The pious philosophers Bonnet, Linnaeus, Buffon, the virtuous Lavater, and many others, have been treated as materialists and fatalists.

* Bishop Butler, Sermon vi.
The instances of Aristotle and Descartes may be quoted, to show the good and bad fortune of new doctrines. The ancient antagonists of Aristotle caused his books to be burned; but in the time of Francis I. the writings of Ramus against Aristotle were similarly treated. Whoever opposed Aristotle was declared heretic; and under pain of being sent to the galleys, philosophers were prohibited from combating Aristotle. At the present day, the philosophy of Aristotle is no longer taught except at the university of Oxford in England. Descartes was persecuted for teaching the doctrine of innate ideas; he was accused of atheism, though he had written on the existence of God; and his books were burnt by order of the university of Paris. Shortly afterwards, however, the same learned body adopted the doctrine of innate ideas, and when Locke and Condillac attacked it, the cry of materialism and fatalism was turned against them.

Thus the same opinions have been considered at one time as dangerous because they were new, and at another as useful because they were ancient. What is to be inferred from this, but that man deserves to be pitied; that the opinions of contemporaries on the truth or falsehood, the good or bad consequences of a new doctrine are always to be suspected; and that the only object of an author ought to be to point out the truth. Ancillon is therefore right in saying with Bonnet: *Reason does not know any useless or dangerous truth.* That which is, is. This is the proper answer for those who, valuing things only by the advantage they themselves may reap, are incessantly asking, *Cui bono—what is this good for?* and for those also who anxiously ask, *To what does this lead?* Jesus, the son of Sirach, long ago said, *We ought not to demand what is this good for; the usefulness of every thing will be known in its due time.*

Gall and I never doubted that ignorance and knavery would attack our doctrine with abuse; what does not man abuse? Tell him that he ought to expiate his sins, and in his superstition he will immolate his children. Have not Lucretius and his disciples bent all their powers to prove, that belief in the immortality of the soul in-
spires fear of death, and poisons every enjoyment of life? while Christians consider it as the basis of order, of happiness, of morality, and the chief and best solace amid all the calamities that assail them. Establishments for vaccination, and conductors for lightning upon buildings, are, in the opinion of some, laudable and beneficial to humanity; but, in the eyes of others, they are offences against Divine Providence. In one word, man finds some cause of complaint in all; but we may say with St. Bernard, 'We ought to judge differently the complaints of the ignorant and those of the hypocritical. The former complain from ignorance, the latter from malice; the first because they do not know the truth, the second because they hate it.'

Malebranche has very well painted the enemies of new truths. 'Persons of solid and true piety,' says he, 'never condemn what they do not understand; but the ignorant, the superstitious, and the hypocritical do. The superstitious by a slavish fear are enraged when they see an ingenious and penetrating man. If he assign the natural causes of thunder and its effects, they deem him an atheist. Hypocrites, on the contrary, though led by particular motives, make use of notions generally venerated, and combat new truths under the mask of some other truth; sometimes they secretly deride what every one respects, and produce in the minds of others a reputation which is the more to be feared, in proportion as the things which they abuse are more sacred.'

It is a pity that religious people and those who contend for knowledge, instead of uniting their exertions in order to establish truth, constantly endeavor to restrain each others' pursuits; the former particularly maintain, that knowledge is to be limited by religion, whilst the latter admit with Lord Bacon that 'a little natural philosophy inclines the mind to atheism; but a farther proceeding brings the mind back to religion,' adding at the same time with the same extraordinary man that 'there are, besides the authority of scriptures, two reasons of exceeding great weight and force why religion should dearly protect all increase of natural knowledge: the one because it leads to the greater exaltation of the glory of God; for as
the psalms and other scriptures do often invite us to consider, to magnify the great and wonderful works of God, so if we should rest only in the contemplation of those which first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like injury to the majesty of God as if we should judge of the store of some excellent jeweller by that only which is set out to the street in his shop. The other reason is because it is a singular help and a preservative against unbelief and error: For says our Saviour, you err, not knowing the scriptures nor the power of God; laying before us two books or volumes to study, if we will be secured from error. First, the scriptures revealing the will of God, and then the creatures expressing his power.' There is no revelation of natural sciences, but the revealed truth does not prohibit the knowledge of nature. Moses was well acquainted with all the Egyptian learning; Solomon petitioned for wisdom from God, and in the prophecy of Daniel it is said that 'science shall be increased.' Its progress indeed has been extraordinary since the times of Lord Bacon, yet I think we may still repeat that which he mentions in his essay on the Interpretation of Nature, viz. that 'the new found world of land was not greater addition to the ancient continent than there remains at this day a world of inventions and sciences unknown, having respect to those that are known.' None of the arts and sciences conducive to the commodities of life is revealed,—will therefore pious people reject them? Let us rather come to the conclusion that understanding and religion do not exclude each other, but should be cultivated in harmony; that divines have no more right to interdict the examination of the Creator's works than natural philosophers are allowed to stop the investigation into his revealed will concerning our moral conduct in this life and our state in that to come.

Phrenology, by maintaining that the manifestation of the faculties of the mind depends in this life on the organization of the brain, is said to establish materialism. Let us set out by observing, that the word materialism has two different significations. One class of materialists maintain that there is no Creator; that matter has always existed; and that all the phenomena of the world are effects of
matter. The ancient Romish church used materialism in this sense, and, at the present day, the word is often taken as synonymous with atheism. The position, that mental manifestations depend on the brain, has nothing in common with this sort of materialism. He who inquires into the laws of phenomena, cannot be an atheist; he cannot consider the admirable and wise concatenation of all things in nature, and their mutual relations, as existing without a primitive cause.

Another kind of materialism is taught by those who admit a Creator, but maintain that man does not consist of two different entities—body and soul; and that all phenomena, ordinarily attributed to the soul, result only from forms and combinations of matter. The soul, in their opinion, is a fluid of extreme tenuity, distributed over all things, and enlivening the whole organization. Neither has Phrenology any thing in common with this opinion. Neither Dr. Gall nor myself have ever endeavored to explain final causes; we have always declared, that we make no inquiry into the nature of the soul, nor into that of the body; that we are led solely by experiment. Now we have seen that every faculty is manifested by means of the organization. When our antagonists, however, maintain that we are materialists, they ought to show where we teach that there is nothing but matter. The entire falsehood of the accusation is made obvious by a review of the following considerations: The expression organ designates an instrument by means of which some faculty proclaims itself; the muscles, for example, are the organs of voluntary motion, but they are not the moving power; the eyes are the organ of sight, but they are not the faculty of seeing. We separate the faculties of the soul or of the mind from the organs, and consider the cerebral parts as the instruments by means of which they manifest themselves. Now, even the adversaries of Phrenology must, to a certain extent, admit the dependance of the soul on the body. In the very same passage in which Professor Walter of Berlin imputes materialism to our physiology of the brain, he says: 'The brain of children is pulpy, and in decrepit old age it is hard. It must have a certain degree
of firmness and elasticity, that the soul may manifest itself with great splendor. But this consideration does not lead to materialism, it shows only the mutual union of the body and soul.'

The mutual relation between mind and body is an ancient doctrine. Many placed the feelings in the viscera, and intellect in the brain. The whole brain is commonly considered as the organ of understanding, whilst we consider the anterior lobes as sufficient to intellect, and ascribe special manifestations of the mind to individual portions of the brain. In fact we assign smaller organs to mental manifestations, and therefore cannot be more materialists than our predecessors, whether anatomists, physiologists, or philosophers and moralists, who have admitted the dependence of the soul on the body. Materialism is essentially the same, whether the faculties of the mind be said to depend on the whole body, on the whole brain, or individual powers on particular parts of the brain: the faculties still depend on organization for their exhibition.

To show that all ancient and modern philosophers and the fathers of the Christian church agree with us, that the manifestations of the mind depend on the body, I shall quote a few of their opinions. Plato considered the body as a prison of the soul. Seneca says: 'Corpus hoc animi pana ac pondus est, (Epist. 66.) The Cartesian, by their doctrine of the tracts which they suppose in the brain, admit the influence of organization on the intellectual operations. Malebranche, when explaining the difference in the faculties of the sexes, and the various and peculiar tastes of nations and individuals, by the firmness and softness, dryness and moisture of the cerebral fibres, remarks, that our time cannot be better employed than in investigating the material causes of human phenomena. Charles Bonnet said, 'That mankind can only be known and penetrated by their physical nature.' St. Thomas* said, 'Though the spirit is no corporeal faculty, the spiritual functions, as memory, imagination, cannot take place without the bodily organization. Therefore, if the organs cannot exercise their activity, the spiritual functions are disturbed. For the same reason a

* Contra Gentiles, c. 12. n. 9.
happy organization of the human body is always accompanied with excellent intellectual faculties.' St. Gregorius Nyssenus* compared the body of man to a musical instrument. 'It sometimes happens,' says he, 'that excellent musicians cannot show their talent because their instrument is in a bad state. It is the same with the functions of the soul; they are disturbed or suspended according to the changes which take place in the organs; for it is the nature of the spirit, that it cannot exercise conveniently its functions but by sound organs.' St. Augustin,† St. Cyprian,‡ St. Ambrose,§ St. Chrysostom,|| Eusebius and many other religious and profane writers, consider the body or even the brain as the instrument of the soul, and distinctly teach that the mind is regulated by the state of the body. Phrenologists, therefore, leave the question of materialism, where they found it.

SECTION VI.

ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

The objects contained in this Section are of the greatest importance, not only to individuals but to mankind at large. They have been examined at all ages, but they are far from being sufficiently understood, and the most contradictory opinions have been defended. I shall consider in succession the doctrine of fatalism, necessity, free will and morality, in reference to Phrenology.

Fatalism.

Phrenology, by contending that all mental dispositions are innate, is said to lead to fatalism. In reply I remark that this term has different meanings. Certain writers understand by fatalism every thing in the world and the world itself as existing, and all events as

* De hominis opificio, c. 12. † De lib. arbit. ‡ De operibus Christi. § De Offic. || Ho mil. II. III. super Epist. ad Heb.
results of chance, and not of a supreme and guiding intelligence. This fatalism involves atheism, and cannot be reproached to Phrenology. Another kind of fatalism admits the creation of the world, and in every being a determinate nature, and operations according to determinate laws, in inorganized as well as organized beings, in vegetative and animal life. No one doubts of this truth in reference to other beings. We can never gather grapes from a thorn bush, and an apple tree can never bring forth pears; and a cat can never be changed into a dog, or any animal into another.

It is also certain that the faculties of mankind and their laws are fixed by creation. First, his existence is involuntary. Who has called himself into being? Does it depend on the will of any one to be born in this or in that country? or those parents? under this or that system of government, or of religion? Who has determined his sex? Who can say, I am the eldest or youngest because it was my choice? Who has chosen the circumstances, surrounded by which he sees the light, the capacities of teachers, the mental frame of those about him from earliest infancy, and the thousand other accidents that influence him through future life?

The organs of vegetative life perform their determinate functions without our will; the liver can never perform digestion; the kidneys can never secrete bile; what is poison can never become wholesome aliment, and so on. It is the same with animal life. The existence of the five external senses and their laws are an effect of creation. It does not depend on our will to have the power of seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting; we can never hear or see with our fingers, nor smell with our lips, &c. It is impossible to see as red that which is blue, or to see as great that which is small. The propensities, sentiments and intellectual faculties, their mutual influence and their various relations to each other, are determined by the Creator. The determinateness of these faculties may, doubtless, be termed fatalism.

Moreover the individual dispositions of body and mind are given in different degrees and their manifestations depend on organization. There are individuals deaf, blind, stupid and intelligent, from birth.
Bishop Butler* says, 'If, in considering our state of trial, we go on to observe how mankind behave under it, we shall find that some have so little sense of it, that they scarce look beyond the passing day; they are so taken up with present gratifications as to have in a manner no feeling of consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life, any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded and deceived by inordinate passion in their worldly concerns as well as in religion; others are not deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away by the little passions, against their better judgment and feeble resolutions, too, of acting better; and there are men, and truly there are not a few, who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their mere will and pleasure to be their law of life; and who, in open defiance of every thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing with no remorse and little fear that it will be their temporal ruin; and some of them under the apprehension of the consequences of wickedness in another state. And to speak in the most moderate way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so with respect to their temporal interests as well as with respect to religion.' Daily experience, indeed, shows, that in different persons the various feelings and talents of the mind are active in different degrees. This kind of fatalism is certain, and founded in nature, and even in the Supreme Being himself; for perfection and infinite goodness and infinite justice inhere in the nature of God, and he cannot desire evil. So also the feelings proper to man, according to nature, must desire the common welfare. It is therefore not astonishing that the philosophers of China, Hindostan, and Greece, the eastern and western Christians, and the followers of Mahomet, have blended a certain kind of fatalism with their religious opinions. Indeed, it cannot be dangerous to insist on such a fatalism in so far as it exists. Christ, his apostles, and the fathers of the church have done so. A proverb of Solomon is, 'the Lord gives wisdom;' according to Christianity, 'The

*Analogy of Religion, p. 92.
tree is known by its fruit;" * St. Paul says, "And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. For whom he did fore-know, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son; that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified." † And again: "Who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?" ‡ St. Augustin taught openly and distinctly our dependance on God, and commanded the preaching of this truth. 'As no one,' says he, 'can give to himself life, so nobody can give to himself understanding.' § He calls gifts of God, all good qualities, as the fear of God, charity, faith, obedience, justice, veracity. He says, ‖ that God has not distributed in an equal manner noble sentiments any more than temporal good, as health, strength, riches, honors, the gifts of arts and sciences. I declare then that I believe in that fatalism or in that determinate arrangement by the Creator, according to which the nature of man, his fundamental dispositions of body and mind, their relations and dependence on organization, are fixed. Man in this life can never be an angel. I believe farther in a certain kind of

**Necessity.**

The doctrine of necessity has also occupied many minds; it has been admitted by some and denied by others. It is necessary to come to a clear understanding about the meaning of the word. I take it as the principle of causation, or in the sense of the relation between cause and effect. This principle is admitted in the physical and intellectual world; but in the moral operations of the mind it is not sufficiently attended to. Yet there is no moral effect without a moral cause, any more than a physical or intellectual

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* Mat. xii. 33. † Rom. viii. 28—30. ‡ 1 Cor. iv. 7. § Lib. de Fide, c. 1. ‖ Lib. de Coreptione et Gratia.
event without an adequate cause. The principle of causation in the moral world is expressed by the connexion between motives and actions. It seems to me surprising, that this connexion should have been theoretically questioned, while every human being is daily dependent upon its truth. It is perceived in all our projects, in the direction of our family, in the regulations of the government, and in every social proceeding. Motives are proposed whenever we wish to produce actions.

Without the law of causation in the moral world there would be no foresight of events, and no science of politics. One might act reasonably or unreasonably, justly or unjustly, well or ill, because he acts without motive. Such a state is contradictory in itself, and in this supposition all institutions which implicate the happiness of mankind would be useless. Education, morality, religion, reward and punishment should all be inefficient, man being determined by no motive. And we might expect from every one hatred and perfidy as well as friendship and fidelity, vice as well as virtue. Such a state is merely speculative, whilst in reality man is subjected to the law of causation like the rest of nature. This state alone has been professed by ancient philosophers and legislators, and is supposed by religion and moral doctrines, which furnish the nobler motives to direct man in his actions. But I do not believe in

*Necessity as irresistibility.*

It is positive, that the mental faculties are innate; that their manifestations depend on cerebral organs (Fatality;) and that without power we cannot act (Necessity.) The adversaries of Phrenology object, that, therefore, all actions must be unavoidable and irresistible, and that there is no responsibility.

It is a fact that without power we cannot act, but it is also a fact that the power being given we need not act. Neither in animals nor in man are all the faculties active at the same moment and irresistible. It constantly happens that one power acts while
the others are quiescent, and that one deed rather than another is
done. If this were not, it should be the height of cruelty to pun-
ish animals to prevent peculiar actions. If a dog be punished for
having eaten under certain circumstances, do we not see that
though hungry, he will not touch a bit under the same occasion?
And is it not precisely so with man? He has a great number of
faculties, but are they always active, are they irresistible? We
can walk, dance and sing, but are we constantly forced to do so?
Who does not often feel within himself a wish for something or an
inclination to do some act which he combats by other motives? In-
dubitably then, neither animals nor man are irresistibly forced to act;
St. Augustin long ago said,* 'God in giving the power does not in-
flict the irresistibility.' Man then is free and accountable; how far?

* Lib. de litera et spiritu, c. 31.

* Free will, or liberty and responsibility.

Some philosophers attributed to man an unbounded liberty;
they made him independent of every natural law, so to say, his own
creator, and his will the sole cause of his actions; nay, they gave
him an absolute liberty without motives. Such a liberty, however,
in a created being is contradictory, and all that can be said in
favor of it, is destitute of signification.

Being free is the reverse of being forced, and free will or liber-
ty is the opposite of irresistibility. The whole constitution of
man, though determined by the Creator, does not exclude liberty,
deliberation, choice, preference and action, from certain motives
and to certain ends. All this is matter of experience universally
acknowledged, and every man must every moment be conscious
of it. Liberty belongs to the constitution of man.

Some moralists, with Dr. Price, maintain that understanding is
necessary to establish free will, others derive it from an innate
moral sense which is everlasting with truth and reason. My view
of free will or liberty is as follows. It consists in the possibility
of doing or of not doing any thing, and in the faculty of know-
ing motives and of determining one's self according to them. Three things then must be considered in liberty: will, the plurality of motives, and the influence of the will upon the instruments which perform the actions.

The first object to be considered is the meaning of the word Will. I have already stated, and repeat for the sake of clearness, that many authors confound will with the propensities, inclinations, or concupiscences, and therefore deny the existence of free-will. Internal satisfaction and free-will, however, are very different things. Satisfaction accompanies the fulfilling of every desire. The sheep and tiger do not act freely, because they are pleased, the one with grazing, and the other with tearing his prey in pieces. Each faculty of animal life being active, gives a desire or an inclination which man and animals experience involuntarily. They are forced to feel hunger if the nerves of that sense act in a certain manner; they must see, if the light strikes the retina of their eyes, &c. Man, then, has neither any power upon accidental external impressions, nor over the existence of internal feelings. He must feel an inclination if its appropriate organ be excited; and not master of this, he cannot be answerable for it. But inclinations, propensities, or desires, are not will, because man and animals often have these, and yet will not. A hungry dog, for example, which has been beaten, occasionally refuses the food offered to him; he is hungry, he wants, but wills not to eat. It is the same with man. How often are we all obliged to act against our inclinations! Thus, experience proves not only that the faculties do not act irresistibly either in man or in animals, or, in other words, that there exists liberty or freedom, but also that inclinations are not yet will. Freedom, however, presupposes will. How then is will originated?

To have will, to decide for or against, I must evidently know what has passed or is to happen; I must compare: hence, will begins with the perceptive and reflective faculties, i.e. with understanding; the will of every animal is therefore proportionate to its understanding. Man has the greatest freedom, because his will
has the widest range; and this because he has the most understanding. He knows more than any animal; compares the present with the past; foresees future events; and discovers the relation between cause and effect. It is even to be observed that not only will, but also our participation and accountableness, begin with the perceptive faculties. Idiots have sometimes inclinations, but they are neither free nor answerable. It is the same with children before a certain age; they are said not to be capable of distinguishing good from evil. A man of great understanding and good education is also more blameable for a fault than an uncultivated and stupid individual. Thus, the first condition to freedom is will, an effect of knowledge and reflection.

The second concerns what is to be known and compared, viz. motives. Will is the decision of the understanding, but is adopted according to motives. These result principally from the propensities and sentiments, and sometimes from the perceptive faculties; hence they are as numerous and energetic as these, and the animal which has many and powerful faculties, has many and vigorous motives, and freedom in proportion. The plurality of motives, then, is the second condition to liberty. An animal endowed with only one faculty could act but in one way, and cease from action only when this became inactive. If, on the contrary, it were endowed with several faculties, it would be susceptible of different motives, and a choice would become possible. Yet a plurality of motives is not alone sufficient to freedom of action; for, in that case, the stronger faculty would occasion the deed. If you offer food to a hungry dog, and at the same moment make a hare run before him, he will eat, or follow the hare, according to his strongest propensity. This is not freedom; the strongest propensity only prevails. If, on the contrary, the dog, endowed with the faculty of knowing and comparing, has been punished for following hares, he may tremble and have palpitations without pursuing; he chooses between different motives, he desires, but he remembers the chastisement, and he will not. Thus liberty requires will and a plurality of motives. It, however, demands still a third condition, viz.,
the influence of the will upon the instruments by which the actions are performed.

In cases of disease, it sometimes happens that different motives are known, and that the will has no influence upon actions. In convulsive fits, for instance, the patient may know what he does, but necessarily beats his chest, or head. It is remarkable, too, that the will may put certain faculties into action, while others are abstracted from its influence. It cannot excite the affective faculties, nor prevent their activity, and therefore we are not answerable for our feelings; but it has greater power on the intellectual faculties, and can reproduce their actions in thinking of their functions. It also influences the external senses by means of voluntary motion, and thus has power over the instruments of action. This is the reason why man is accountable for actions proceeding from feelings, though these themselves are involuntary. But soon as voluntary motion is withdrawn from the government of the understanding and will, liberty, responsibility and guilt are no more. Thus, true liberty is founded on three conditions united, and ceases as soon as any one of them is wanting.

'Examine it narrowly,' says Diderot, 'and you will see that the word liberty is a word devoid of meaning; that there are not, and there cannot be, free beings; that we are only what accords with the general order, with our organization, our education, and the chain of events. These dispose of us invincibly. We can no more conceive a being acting without a motive, than we can one of the arms of a balance acting without a weight. The motive is always exterior and foreign, fastened upon us by some cause distinct from ourselves. What deceives us is the prodigious variety of our actions, joined to the habit which we catch at our birth, of confounding the voluntary and the free. We have been so often praised and blamed, and have so often praised and blamed others, that we contract an inveterate prejudice of believing that we and they will and act freely. But if there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue; nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished. What then
ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

is the distinction among men? The doing of good and the doing of ill! The doer of ill is one who must be destroyed, not punished. The doer of good is lucky, not virtuous.—Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing; this is the first step to wisdom.'

Similar passages may be found in many works of French writers. But their ignorance of human nature is evident. Man is supposed to be a blank paper, tabula rasa, and therefore, every motive considered as 'exterior,' whilst, according to Phrenology, every condition of liberty is given to man, like all his powers, and their employment is left to the influence of his reflective faculties. Freedom or liberty however is not absolute, and in itself it is a gift of the Creator. Man is free though he is not free to be so, and he is made free in order to be answerable or accountable for his actions. There is no effect without a cause, and no action without a motive, but man has received certain faculties to examine the motives of action and to make a choice among them. These faculties again act according to laws which are determined by the Creator, as well as those of life and nutrition. Man, therefore, cannot will every thing indiscriminately, he is obliged to give the preference to that which seems good and to place one motive above another. This choice among motives constitutes our free will.

'God exercises,' says Bishop Butler,* 'the same kind of government over us with that which a father exercises over his children. It evidently appears that veracity and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this government to a being who can have no competition or interfering of interest with his creatures. The intelligent author of nature has given us a moral faculty, by which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as virtues and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert, which moral discernment then implies a rule of action.'

True liberty in itself, however, has not yet a moral character, for many animals exhibit liberty, in different degrees. We must consequently examine where the morality of actions begins.

* Part I. Ch. vi. of the opinion of necessity.
On Morality, its origin and nature.

The doctrine of morality—Ethics—is the most interesting subject which can come under our views. Ethics embraces all that is loved in God and in man, the notions of good and evil, of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, of merit and demerit, of moral liberty and responsibility.

The majority of every existing community require to be conducted by regulations which must even be imposed upon them in a dogmatic way. A very few only are capable of understanding the concatenation of causes and effects; and even the natural laws will be incomprehensible dogmas to the great mass of mankind. Belief in, at least submission to, the true laws is quite indispensable to the well being of man, and hence obligatory upon all, but specially upon those who know them.

It is remarkable that hitherto all nations have adopted their religion, and a part of their moral laws, from revelation. We may therefore easily conceive that the priesthood will continue to estimate their services highly, to keep religious notions stationary, and to make their own interpretations pass as the revealed will of God.

All positive laws are imposed, but the obligation of bowing to them is no proof of their being what they ought to be. Indeed the most opposite rules of conduct have, at different times, been enjoined even as divine and infallible, and it has not generally appeared singular that divine laws have varied according to persons, localities and circumstances. I cannot, however, help saying that my esteem is not great for a legislator who is constantly in contradiction with himself, who desires moral good, but who notwithstanding his omnipotence corrects only by exterminating, who punishes the innocent on account of the guilty. My intention here is only to show that belief, or the necessity of obeying, does not prove the perfection of positive laws.

Some actions in the Christian doctrine are styled good, and others bad or sinful, and whilst the first are commanded, the last are forbidden. Good actions are farther stated to be done after
the spirit, and sins after the flesh, though the flesh is allowed not to be evil in itself. But if actions be not specified, how can we know which are good and which are bad? Is there no standard, according to which they may be judged universally?

In every branch of natural science positive and exact knowledge is sought after. I think that the same ought to be done in regard to the morality of human actions. Mere faith in religious opinions will no longer suffice, the reign of positive truth should begin. The moral nature of man ought to be examined, with observation as a guide, and reduced to principles capable of general and constant application. Invention in the knowledge of man cannot be permitted, and arbitrary interpretations must give place to invariable laws; actions done in conformity with which will be declared as good, and those not in conformity as bad. Morality must become a science.

The nature of every being is regulated by laws, and the human body is evidently so. The laws of propagation and nutrition cannot be changed, and from analogy we may conclude that the moral nature of man is not left to the guidance of chance. But in what do the moral laws consist, or how are they to be determined? Shall it be by force, by a majority of votes? or are they to be sought from among the works and decrees of the Creator?

It is of the highest importance to be convinced that human nature is governed by natural laws. Many philosophers have acknowledged the existence of natural laws of morality as well as of organization. In the opinion of Confucius 'law is that which is conformable to nature.' Cicero thinks that the law cannot vary, but that it is the same for every nation; and that no injustice, whatever name is given to it, can be considered as law, though a whole nation may submit to its infliction. Lord Bacon calls the laws of nature the law of laws. Charron says, that wise men conduct themselves, that nature is their guide, and that the laws are at the bottom of their hearts. Montesquieu observes, that to say there is neither justice nor injustice except that which is so declared by positive laws, is to say that the radii of a circle are not equal before
it is traced. Nevertheless this writer allowed governments the power of determining or making the law; his comparison, however, proves that the law exists prior to governments, which are established merely to watch over its execution; the number of governors is here a secondary point, the object remains invariably the same, viz. the enforcement of the natural law. St. Paul speaks in the most decisive manner of natural morality, in stating that some persons without the law do things ordered by the law, since this is written in their hearts.

"Man," says Volney,* like the whole world of which he is a part, is ruled by natural laws, which are invariable in their essence, regular in their application, consequent in their effects, and the common cause both of good and evil. They are not written in the stars, nor hidden in mysterious ideas; but inherent in human nature, and identified with man's existence. They act on his senses, advertise his intelligence, and bring with every action penalty or reward. Let man learn these laws, let him understand his own and the nature of things around him, and he will know the cause of his griefs and the remedy."

Volney believed in the existence of natural laws; but he did not, in my opinion, understand the basis of natural morality, when he conceived that it was self preservation. In his hypothesis, animals should have a moral nature; but from what I have already said, and from what I shall still say, it follows that neither personal interest nor selfishness of any kind can be recognised as the foundation of morality.

From the great influence of the natural laws upon the condition of mankind it follows that it is exceedingly important not to err in their determination. To elucidate the natural laws in general, and those of morality in particular, I make the following remarks.

In examining the origin of morality we find that the greater number of persons derive the moral sense from revelation; that some philosophers consider it as innate; whilst others ascribe it to intelligence, or even to personal interest.

* Ruins, ch. v.
The ancient doctrine that revelation is the only cause of morality must be given up, since the moral feelings are innate independently of religion, and since revelation can only direct the innate sentiments in their functions. On the other hand it is also certain, that neither the moral nor any other feelings can be derived from intellect. This may guide the functions of the feelings, but cannot produce them. The details of these propositions are found in the first volume of this work, where I treat of the moral powers of man. I therefore here confine myself to the consideration of personal interest as the cause of morality.

Man, say the partisans of selfishness, acts by interest; he does that which gives him the greatest pleasure, or seems the most advantageous. Egotism, continue they, is not confined to the search after the pleasures of the body or of sense, but extends over all internal sensations, and all moral and intellectual enjoyments. To act, in order to experience pleasure in the moment of action, or to obtain reward either in this life or in that which is to come, is still to act from self-interest.

I grant that man is eminently selfish, and that selfishness in union with pride makes him believe what he likes. We may admit with Benjamin Franklin, that he who for giving a draught of water to a thirsty person should expect to be paid with a good plantation, would be modest in his demands, compared with those who think they deserve heaven for the little good they do on earth. The basis of morality founded on selfishness, indeed, is unworthy, ignoble, and uncertain at the same time. Wherever it prevails man will be unhappy; and agreement, in regard to that which is morally good, impossible. Individual inclinations of legislators will determine the laws; and their self-satisfaction be the principal motive of their regulations. This is the law of the strongest, assisted by intelligence. It advises governments to treat subjects with benevolence and justice, because in this they find their own advantage; to keep the community in ignorance, as it is easier to persuade and arbitrarily to guide ignorant people than to convince those with cultivated understandings; and to foster superstition,
since it is an excellent means of effecting whatever seems convenient.

The insufficiency of this morality has been felt, and therefore it has been deemed necessary to add, that every one has a title to satisfy his selfish desires, provided he does not trench on the rights of others. This is the doctrine which moralists of modern times endeavor to establish. It is certainly far superior to the vile system founded on the right of the strongest, which, for so many centuries, has desolated the world. Self-love, which undoubtedly exists in man, is here combined with love of others,—also an inherent principle in human nature.

This doctrine, if followed, will put an end to many abuses, and prevent numerous disorders; in many respects it will also promote general happiness. Whoever loves humanity must therefore desire to see it propagated. Nevertheless, the doctrine is founded on the inferior motive of personal interest; and it is what neither Nature nor Christianity teaches.

Other philosophers, still considering self-interest and intelligence together as the cause of morality, say that the strong govern the weak; and that if the weak occasionally become the strong, they throw off the yoke, and impose their own will in turn. Thus it is always the strong who govern. In these circumstances one fears another, and then both agree upon what shall be considered as law. This system, therefore, is founded on convention or agreement between the governors and the governed, for their common advantage.

Let it be understood that no sentiment results from any other, nor from intelligence. Fear then cannot produce the moral sense. Animals are sensible to fear, and yet are ruled by the right of the strongest. Fear, it is true, may become a motive to act and to make laws; but it conceives neither the necessity nor the justice of making laws.

Positive facts and reasoning prove, that the basis of morality is inherent in human nature; but those who treat of justice and virtue and admit this innateness, do not always attach the same meaning
to these expressions, and their nature and essence are not yet determined. Both terms are taken at one time for faculties, at another for actions. Further, in considering virtues as good actions, and in maintaining that every good action which has required an inward struggle is virtuous, the meaning of the word virtue is still very variable. The same thing happens with the terms vice, immoral or unjust, and sin, in the language of religion.

The ancient philosophers spoke of cardinal virtues, but these are only the just employment of certain fundamental powers. Temperance, for instance, is the right use of the pleasures of sense; prudence, of circumspection and intelligence; force, of courage and firmness; justice, of conscientiousness, benevolence, and self-love, together.

The virtues styled theological result from three fundamental faculties: hope and charity belong to primitive sentiments, faith or religious belief depends on hope and marvellousness.

Hitherto religious and civil governments have decided on what they desired should be called virtue or vice. The same action has, according to circumstances, been declared on one occasion a virtue, and on another a vice. Courage is virtuous in conquerors, as well as in those who defend themselves against aggressors. The church of Rome commands celibacy as a virtue, while other governments reward those who bring up a family. It is remarkable, that all codes, revealed or profane, with one exception, have declared the amor patriae, or love of country, a principal virtue. The Christian doctrine alone acknowledges no exclusionary patriotism, it alone commands universal love.

As in every religious system and civil code the determination of right and wrong varies, the perplexity of the lover of truth must be great; and as long as virtue is defined according to circumstances, or depends on the good will of civil and religious legislators, it will be contradictory and cannot become absolute. Absolute virtue, however, is to be proved; in other words, morality is to become a science. This cannot happen as long as philosophy and religion are not united, and as long as the fundamental powers of the mind,
their origin, their modes of action, the effects of their mutual influence, the conditions of their manifestations, the laws of their improvement and the moral and religious nature of man are not perfectly understood.

Whatever may be said against the plurality of the faculties and their peculiar organs, they must be admitted. Both vegetative and animal life is, in fact, more or less complicated in the different orders of animals. The vegetative is exceedingly simple in the lowest tribes of all. Nutrition is limited to mere intus-susception, absorption, and assimilation. It becomes complicated by degrees, and in the mammalia includes mastication, deglutition, digestion, chylification, sanguification, respiration, circulation, assimilation, and a great number of secondary and auxiliary functions, as the secretion of bile, of pancreatic juice, of urine, &c. Even the particular functions which aid in reproducing the organization, as intus-susception, digestion, respiration, circulation, &c. are performed by a greater or less quantity of apparatus. Yet in the most complex, as in the most simple animals, the end is the same, viz, the preservation of the individual.

Animal life is also very simple in the most inferior classes of living beings. It begins with the sense of feeling, is complicated by the addition of taste, smell, hearing, and seeing; by various instincts or propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties; and, finally, attains its utmost complexity in man; he alone unites all the faculties which are dispersed among different animals; and, farther, is endowed with several in peculiar. The faculties of man, then, are multiplied. Let us now examine whether there be any subordination among them or not; let us see if they be all equally important.

Neither in vegetative nor in animal life is every function of like excellence. Mastication, and the mixture of saliva with the food, are less important than digestion, circulation, and assimilation. The secretion of certain glands is less necessary than respiration, &c. The same law holds in animal life. Of the external senses, every one would rather lose the sense of smell than of sight.
ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

Who would not rather give up some talent, as drawing, music, painting, than the faculty of reflection and reason? Every one is offended if we call him stupid; not if we say that he wants such or such a talent. If we farther examine the influence of different faculties of animal life upon the happiness and preservation of mankind, we shall be convinced that several are much more important than others. The love of approbation is of far less consequence than benevolence; the Christian religion, indeed, ranks charity above all the other virtues. It must, therefore, be granted that the faculties of animal life are important in different degrees. A great line of distinction between them may at once be drawn by separating such as are common to animals and man, from such as are proper to man. A double nature of man was long ago remarked, and has been designated by different expressions; as the flesh and the spirit; the animal and the man, or the carnal and spiritual part of man.

Now, are the faculties common to animals and man, or those proper to humanity, to have the superiority? The answer is obvious. The general law of nature is, that inferior are subordinate to superior faculties. Physical are subject to chemical laws; gravity, for instance, is modified by chemical affinity: the particles of a salt attract each other in opposition to their gravity, and form crystals. Again, physical and chemical laws, though existing in organic beings, are modified by those of organization. Plants do not increase by juxtaposition; nor do they assimilate mere homogeneous substances. In the muscular and circulatory systems, the physical laws of motion and hydraulics are preserved, but they are influenced by the laws of life. Chemical laws remain in digestion, but swayed by organic laws. Physical, chemical, and vegetative laws exist in living creatures, but modified by those of phrenic life. Animals take food, so do plants; but animals choose it, guided by the sense of taste. Plants propagate their species automatically; animals feel a propensity to do so. The propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties of animals, consequently modify the properties of their organization extremely.
The same principle must be applied in regard to the distinguishing part of human nature: all inferior laws, physical, chemical, organic, and animal, are subordinate to those of the peculiarly human faculties. These, therefore, compose the moral character of man. Thus, as the faculties are not equally important, and as some must be subordinate to others, I divide them, in relation to actions, into three orders: one excites man and animals to determinate actions, as hunger, physical love, the propensity to fight, to build, to gather provision, &c.; I style these *faculties of action*; another, because they assist and modify those of the first kind, I call *auxiliary*; and another, which ought to direct, I term *directing faculties*.

The faculties proper to man are obviously superior to those common to him and animals, since, by means of his peculiar nature he is master of all that breathes, and, therefore, ought to be master of his own animal nature also. I, consequently, lay down the following principle:—The faculties proper to man constitute his moral nature and his absolute conscience, that is, all actions conformable to them are absolutely good. And now liberty assumes the character of morality, if the will produce actions flowing from motives which are proper to man. Man, then, has not only the largest share of liberty, from his superior will and great number of motives, but he alone possesses *moral* liberty. The feeling of conscientiousness is to morality, that which will or the perceptive and reflective faculties are to liberty. As long as actions spring from motives common to man and animals, they are not primitively moral, though they may be conformable to morality. Inferior motives, however, must still be employed in guiding mankind, and must frequently supply the place of such as are moral. We even see that purely moral motives have but little influence in the world.

*Extent of Morality.*

In regard to morality, an important question concerns its extent. Is man the only aim of the terrestrial creation, that is, is all the rest made for him? An affirmative answer can only be the result of too
much self-esteem;—the contrary seems evident, since nature produces poisons for man as well as for other animals. Geology also proves that many beings existed before man. It is however a natural law that superior employ inferior beings to their advantage; and in consequence of his superiority, man, as he is their master, may make use of all the other creatures upon earth. Still this does not prove that every thing exists merely for the sake of man. The human kind may govern all animals, but it has also certain duties towards them, and I cannot believe that man has any right to torment animals for his gratification or amusement.

Benevolence and reverence are essential qualities of human nature, and man's duties towards his like form the principal object of morality. It is commonly stated that he is created to be happy. This proposition, however, is vague, and individual happiness is too often confounded with the general weal: the former results from the satisfaction of the faculties each person is more particularly endowed with, but it varies, since individual gifts differ widely; hence it can never become the universal standard of moral actions: actions which are evidently bad may be accompanied with pleasure. Mere pleasure, therefore, is not the aim of man's existence any more than individual happiness; these, indeed, are synonymous expressions.

I am of opinion, that the Creator viewed general happiness as superior to that of individuals, and that he intended to produce the second by the first. All nature seems to prove this idea.

In considering the immense system of the celestial bodies, it is probable that the earth might rather perish than the universe be destroyed. Geology teaches that our globe has continued to exist while many kinds of animals have disappeared from its surface. Species are preserved while individuals die. The totality of living bodies exists, but particular parts perish. Again, nature has established a law of violent death, and of the sacrifice of individuals for the sake of general preservation. All animate beings exist at the expense of each other, and all are thereby preserved.

Man makes no exception from this general arrangement, and it
is, therefore, quite certain that the happiness of all mankind is preferable to that of nations; this to that of families, and this again to that of individuals. Personal interests, it is allowed, must be neglected sooner than those of our country, or than family affections. But the same reasons that lead to this conclusion, prove also that the species is more worthy of our love than our native country.

The superiority of general happiness is also confirmed by the essential difference of the two natures of man. The greater number of animals find their enjoyments in selfishness; some, however, live in society, are attached to each other, and feel a kind of love for the country of their birth; but man alone is susceptible of exercising good-will towards the whole of his own species, and every other being of creation. I am confirmed in my opinion, that general happiness is the aim of man's existence, since I see the truth of what afflicts many amiable minds, that the just perishes in his righteousness, while the unjust prospers in his wickedness. This happens under the government of the animal nature, which feels no pleasure in general happiness, nor pain in the commission of injustice. It shows the predominance of the animal nature, but is it not probable that the Creator intended the satisfaction of those faculties which are proper to man as well as of those he holds in common with the brutes? There can be no doubt he did. I think that both natures are to be gratified, that no faculty is made in vain, and that all that stamps superiority upon man is not bestowed merely to make him unhappy. Now, as the more noble powers are not satisfied in the actual state of things, religious people hope that they will be ministered to in another life, and this is considered as a conclusive argument in favor of the immortality of the soul. As the peculiarly human nature, however, is preferable to the animal, it must follow that even in this life, its satisfaction is superior to that of the other. I entertain this opinion the rather because the animal part may be satisfied under the dominion of the human, which leads to the recognition of duty universally; while the brute nature has no feelings of obligation, and looks for mere selfish enjoyments. Wieland, in his Agathon, expresses this idea
almost in phrenological terms, yet it must be understood that he considered the mind as free and in conflict with the senses. He calls the mind the spiritual part, and the senses the animal part of man. In order to render man that which nature intended him to be, says he, the harmony of these two natures must be preserved. If this harmony, continues he, is possible, it can be effected only by the subjection of the animal part to the spiritual, the intelligent and the free. This subjection is the more reasonable, for the animal part incurs no danger from the sway of the spiritual, and has no reason to dread any denial of its legitimate enjoyments, since the former knows too well what is necessary for the common good of the whole man to refuse to the animal portion what is necessary to its existence and its welfare. But the animal part knows nothing of the wants of the spiritual, cares not about its own restless struggles against every attempt at control, and the instant that reason slumbers or slips its bridle, it assumes an arbitrary supremacy of which the destruction of the whole internal economy of our nature is the inevitable consequence.

Thus, I do not believe that in the eye of God, the unjust who thrives is worth the just who perishes; I rank the unjust among animals; like them he is pleased with what flatters himself alone; he is even more dangerous than they, on account of his superior understanding.

The proposition (it is one which troubles many minds)—moral errors are unavoidably punished in this life—finds it solution also, in the superiority of general happiness. The strong and able-bodied man may not seem to suffer from excesses and sensuality; but his descendants have often to pay the penalty. The love of domination is ministered to by the ignorance and servility of nations; these, however, must bear its blighting influence. He who begins by subjecting his countrymen to his will, and finishes by aiming at the empire of the world, must injure, and make thousands and millions wretched. The few who amass riches do so at the expense of the many who remain poor, and so on. Thus the evil which results from any infraction of the natural laws, is not always felt by
him who is its first cause; it is, however, certainly experienced sooner or later.

Finally, as I perceive that, in the kingdom of justice, and of general happiness, the individual is never forgotten, whilst individuals enjoying happiness so easily forget their neighbors, and the general weal, I most anxiously wish the kingdom of individual happiness at an end.

Thus, general happiness appears to me the principal aim of phrenic life, as the preservation of the species is the chief end of vegetative life. General happiness is the touchstone for all natural morality, for all social institutions, and for all the actions of man. Every deed which favors the general weal is good, and the more this is opposed the worse is the act.

Here we may ask, whether there are certain races of men in civilized society, or certain classes, who deserve the lot of mere animals? These, on account of their inferiority, are employed by man for his pleasures and purposes; are the highly gifted among the human kind also permitted to use for their advantage those who are less favored by nature? Or, are there individuals who may arrogate privileges, and claim immunities?

To reply in the affirmative would be against natural morality. This declares God to be the impartial parent of all, and permits man only to do good to his fellow man; it does not exclude the agency of self-love, but makes it, along with all other faculties common to man and animals, subordinate to those proper to man. Indeed, I know of nothing more important than it is, to prove the existence of natural morality, and to specify its laws. For, as mankind must be governed, a true legislation is extremely desirable.

Both religious and civil regimens have done immense injury to mankind, and this in proportion as the inferior faculties, such as self-love, love of approbation, courage, destructiveness, and even attachment and circumspection, have dictated their positive laws. The animal is the enemy of man, it justifies absolute power, the right of the strongest, the spirit of party and of sect, national pride
and hatred, and every kind of personal design. It looks only for convenience. Religion itself is employed as a tool in its purposes. The misery of man will certainly endure so long as the faculties common to him and animals determine that which is to be done or omitted.

Attempts have been made, with more or less success, to improve legislation, but all the means have been derived from inferior faculties. Evils, therefore, may have been mitigated, but they could not be entirely abolished. Final success depends altogether on the sacrifice of personal interest, or of individual to general happiness.

The universality and constancy of the natural laws deserve a particular attention. Their basis is the same, at all times and in all countries; they are independent of personal and of local circumstances. Were it not presumptuous, even absurd, in naturalists to endeavor to create physical and chemical laws, and in gardeners to change the laws of vegetation? Those who breed and rear animals must treat them according to their nature; they will never feed parrots with bitter almonds or parsley. The organization of man is also allowed to be subject to natural laws, though several are unknown or neglected in social life.

That the five senses, in their healthy state, propagate external impressions according to determinate laws, is farther admitted. No one can see as great that which is small; taste as sweet that which is sour; nor see as blue that which is scarlet. Without perfect regularity in the functions of the senses, it were altogether impossible to acquire any positive knowledge of the physical qualities of external objects.

Now, why should not the same determinateness pervade the affective and intellectual faculties? It is, indeed, commonly admitted in as far as the intellectual operations are concerned. The principles of the arts and sciences are always pointed out. Who doubts of the mechanical laws? They are the same now as they were in ancient times. The mechanician never attempts to warp or change them in constructing machines; in inventing, he only
makes new applications of laws that are invariable. Mathematical laws, also, have not changed with ages; every mathematician, whether aware of them or not, applies them in his calculations. A great musical genius produces harmonious tones, and a great painter agreement of colors, according to natural principles, and without previous study. The laws of all arts exist in nature, and are only discovered, not created. A deep thinker needs no logical precepts to enable him to perceive sound from false reasoning. Thus the intellectual operations of the mind are governed by natural laws, which can neither be changed by revelation nor by human enactments, neither by praying, by fasting, nor by offerings. They who are born gifted with great talents discover the laws of their faculties, make these known to the less favored in capacities, who then learn and apply them in their mental operations.

In the same way, they whose peculiarly human faculties hold such as are common to man and animals in subordination, act in a moral way without precept, and even with pleasure; nay, if constrained to do evil, they would feel positive pain, precisely as does the great musician from bad music. Moral precepts are necessary to those only who do not possess them in their interior. Now, as the Creator has provided for physical and moral laws, when will man cease to invent laws, and begin to study those the Creator has traced for his guidance? And when will he be wise enough to submit to them?

**Existence of Evil.**

The natural law of the subordination of the faculties leads us immediately to consider moral evil. The first step is to inquire whether evil exists or not. Having settled this point, I shall then examine its origin.

Two kinds of evil are commonly spoken of; the one physical, the other moral. There is an evident opposition throughout all nature. Earth, water, and air, present a perpetual scene of destruction and reproduction, of pain and pleasure. And even as
temporal good is often distributed unequally and without personal desert, so physical evil is frequently inflicted without any fault on the part of the sufferer, and this both among animals and the human kind. Why should domestic animals so often be ill fed and harshly treated in reward for their services? Why should all suffer by contagious diseases? Wherefore must the children begotten in debauchery, expiate the sins of their parents? Why, when the hail-storm ravages the wide-spread harvest of the indolent and rich man, does it not spare the little garden of the laborious poor? Such melancholy queries have been put at all times. The Preacher says, 'There is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness.' * All things,' says he, 'come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good, and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sworneth, as he that feareth an oath. This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun, that there is one event unto all: yea, also the heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and madness is in their heart while they live, and after that they go to the dead.'† In another passage he continues: 'I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favor to men of skill: but time and chance happeneth to them all.' ‡ Physical evil, indeed, does not merely exist, it even invades all according to the established laws of creation.

Moral, no less than physical evil, occurs in the world. Even in thinking himself abased by his wickedness and imperfection, man must acknowledge its existence. Moses said, 'God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.' || David thought, that 'there is none that doeth good, no not one.' § The Psalmist said, 'the wicked man delights in blood.' Christ

* Eccles. vii. 15. † Ib. ix. 2, 3. ‡ Eccles. ix. 11, 12  
‖ Gen. vi. 5. § Psalm xiv. 3.
taught, that "out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witnessing, blasphemies."* St. Paul speaks of men, "being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness, envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; and of whisperers, backbiters, haters of God despiteful, proud, boastful, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful; who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them." Moral, as well as physical evil, then, has always existed, and the time when it will be rooted out seems yet to be far off.

Origin of Evil.

The origin of evil has been a fertile subject of discussion. Evil seemed incompatible with a perfect Creator. The notion of a malevolent principle, therefore, came to be entertained. This still prevails among those who, personifying evil, speak of a devil. To explain the existence of evil, however, is a simple and easy task. It is only necessary to know that all natural phenomena depend on certain conditions or circumstances; that things are in relation to each other, and that these relations generally are governed by fixed laws. Now, as soon as the conditions are wanting or their laws violated, proper effects are not elicited, and evil results. In the inanimate as well as in the animated world, the natural laws must be rigorously followed. The chemist must obey the laws of chemistry to produce crystals; plants grow well if they be cultivated according to their habits and wants,—it matters not whether the cultivators be Roman Catholics or Heretics, Jews or Mussulmans. Man enjoys good health or suffers from infirmity, in proportion as he attends to or neglects the laws of his vegetative functions. Neither prayers, nor offerings, nor any other religious ceremony whatever, suspend these natural laws; their execution

* Matt. xv. 19.
is invariably and without distinction rewarded, and their neglect indiscriminately and regularly punished. The infidel who lives moderately and observes all the dietetic rules, has always better health than the orthodox believer who neglects the natural laws of his organization, but prays loudly for soundness of body. The former, if he practice the laws of hereditary descent, will have children preferable to those of the pious man who chooses his wife for her wealth or mere exterior beauty. I suppose, that one without religious faith, even an atheist, submits to the natural laws of the vegetative functions; that he avoids all noxious influences, is laborious, industrious, and regular in his business, while another is very religious in the common acceptation, sings, prays, fasts, eats no meat on Fridays, recommends his soul to God, &c., but, at the same time, is lazy, intemperate, disorderly in his business; and I ask, of these two, whose condition in life will be the most flourishing? Thus, physical evil results from the infraction of the physical laws, and moral evil from the infraction of the moral laws of creation.

I pass over in silence the opinion which recognises two creative principles—one good and another bad. Neither do I speak of original sin in the first man, nor of the origin of evil in admitting free-will; for, in this latter I find no explanation of its existence. It is true, that without liberty there can be no guilt; but its admission gives no idea of the origin of evil. For as soon as free-will is spoken of, good and evil are supposed: or to what purpose is free-will, were there not two different things, good and evil, between which the free agent may choose? It is said, that man abuses his liberty; but by what motive does he so, if there be not something within which provokes him to act badly? Bishop Butler* made the same remark. His words are: 'To say that the fact that creatures, made upright, fall, is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to say no more than that an event's actually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of its happening. But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very nature of par-

* Analogy of Religion, Part I. Ch. V.
ticular propensions. Liberty is neither sufficient to explain the nature nor the origin of moral evil.

Are there any bad faculties? Dr. Gall is disposed to admit wicked propensities. He says, that man must submit to the laws of creation in regard to moral as in regard to physical evil; that no one can say he is without temptations; and that all thoughts and inclinations are not innocent or virtuous. He even thinks that moral evil enters into the plan of the Creator.

If he say, however, that excessive activity of certain faculties produces illegal actions or moral evil, morality is not yet proved as a natural science; it is at most conventional. I am intimately convinced that no faculty in itself can be bad, and that all the innate powers of man have some aim, that every one is necessary; that none leads inevitably to evil; but that each may produce abuses. The faculties are no more bad than any other entity in nature. I think with Philo the Jew, Eusebius,* and St. Augustine, that nothing—fire, water, iron, &c., is bad in itself, or a cause of evil; with Augustine † in particular, that evil is not a substance, and that abuses only are ills. I consider no power in itself as either good or bad. These appellations are applicable to actions alone. I therefore say of every faculty, what the Apostle Paul said to the Romans;‡ "as you have yielded your members servants to uncleanness and to iniquity; even so now yield your members, servants to righteousness, unto holiness."—Christianity in speaking of evil propensities, means irregular actions of the feelings, but not the primitive feelings themselves. Evil results only from infringing the natural laws of morality, dictated by the faculties proper to man. The faculties common to man and brutes act in animals in the same way as in man; but they are never said to sin or commit a crime; which by the by is a new proof that liberty has not produced moral evil, for animals modify their conduct and suppress various instincts by other motives; but none of their actions can be considered in relation to morality.—The philosophers who maintain man to be born good or bad, are not ac-

* Præpar. Evang. Lib. vii. n. 22. † Lib. de Vera Religione, c. 20. ‡ vi. 19
quantied with the fundamental powers of the mind and with their mutual relations. This knowledge alone satisfactorily explains the nature and origin of evil.

Practical reflection.

I firmly believe that it is under the government of the natural laws alone that mankind will ever and can ever become one family; these, however, are still very obscure. I have published a catechism on them, but it will be long before they can be generally understood and applied in practical life. Mankind is not prepared to submit to the precepts of natural morality. The spirit of selfishness, ignorance and superstition—these natural enemies of truth—are still too powerful. Yet the only remark to be made is, that the laws of the Creator are invariable and indispensable to the happiness of man; that he must submit to them or suffer, and without submission the common weal is impossible; that all partial views must disappear; finally, that arbitrary regulations may last years, and centuries, but must come to an end at last, while the empire of Creation will endure as long as the human kind remains.

Comparison of natural morality with the Christian morality.

The preceding considerations on natural religion and morality may, I fear, offend the timorous; if they sincerely love truth, however, they may be easy and remain quiet. For if we admit that the author of the universe and the God who gave us a revelation are one and the same Supreme Being, we must also allow that the revelation made in time cannot be at variance with the laws of creation, otherwise God would have been in contradiction with himself. An impostor, like Mahomet, changes his decrees as convenience requires, or as caprice impels; but reason will never admit contradictions in a Divine legislation. To conceive revelation in opposition to natural laws, is either to prove it false, or advance that the Creator of all things is not the God who revealed the law;
or that Supreme intelligence may change its decrees, endow man with natural faculties, and then command these to cease entirely from acting, or to act in opposition to their nature. I am of their opinion who think that the Christian morality is the same as the morality of nature, and that its revealed law is merely a repetition in positive terms of the natural law. They differ only in the manner of being communicated, the one being the internal, the other the external revelation of the same unchangeable Being, who is the same at all times, infinitely wise and good. With this view present, we conceive why the master of Christianity said, 'that light is made to give light,' and why he several times spoke of the things as they were from the beginning of the creation and ought to be such. I hope the time will come when Christianity will be purged of all paganism and superstition. The purity and excellence of its moral precepts, indeed, will be more justly appreciated as human nature is better understood, and the superior feelings become more energetic. Then it will be admitted that the design of Christianity is rational, and free from the load of superstition which had been mixed with the law of the Creator.

The corner-stone of any religious system is certainly its morality, and the ideas which it inculcates respecting purity and impurity of character, merit or demerit, innocence or guilt. There can be no better standard of refined notions of an all-perfect Being, and no worship more acceptable to the Almighty, than practices which render a man respectable and useful as a human being; than righteousness, reverence, beneficence, self-command and wisdom. Christian morality, like that of nature, is reduced to a few principles which are simple, invariable, and applicable in all situations, and under all circumstances. It considers our duties towards God and our duties towards our like. The former are called love of God, the latter love of our neighbor.

The meaning of the particular precepts of Christianity still gives rise to many discussions. Various interpretations have been disseminated, and even absurdities been substituted, for the wise regulations of the Gospel. It was, therefore, a point of some im-
portance to prevent man from reading and reflecting on the scriptures. The result, however, has been, that the Gospel legislation has fallen into discredit; for the arbitrary interpretations of individuals have been confounded with its primitive laws. Every friend of humanity must grieve to see absurdities put into the mouth of the Supreme Being. Were merely rational interpretations of scripture given, there would be less cause to complain of the general want of religious and moral feelings. The human understanding is too much enlightened now to be satisfied with superstitious doctrines, which are useless both to God and to man. Rational and salutary precepts cannot and will not be rejected. Let us proceed then, and consider some of the leading points of Christian morality, which surpasses, in perfection, all other moral codes of civil legislation.

Jesus reduced his moral doctrine to two grand heads: the love of God, and the love of our neighbor. "On these two commandments," says he,* "hang all the law and the prophets." It is therefore most desirable to understand their meaning, but I apprehend it is little the case.

The first admits the existence of a God, the Creator of all. Besides, it commands respect towards him, and obedience to his will. "Thy kingdom come," says Christ,† "thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." "This is the love of God," says St. John,‡ "that we keep his commandments."

The human understanding cannot but look for the workman, or cause of all that exists. By his powers of reasoning, man arrives at a first cause, which, being personified, is styled God. The Gospel inculcates the same idea. St. Paul says: § "Every house is builded by some man; but he that built all things is God."

"Reason farther judges of the qualities of God according to his works. "The invisible things of God," says St. Paul also,‖ "from the creation of the world are clearly seen; being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." The attributes which man ascribes to the supreme Ruler are of the

* Matt. xxii. 40. † Matt. vi. 10. ‡ 1st John, v. 3.
§ Heb. iii. 4. ‖ Rom. i. 20.
greatest importance, since man feels disposed to imitate them. Further, the will of the father depends on his nature. It is therefore not indifferent to demonise, anthropomorphise or divinise the godhead; and to understand the nature and extent of his will.

It is exceedingly important to be convinced that the natural laws are the will of God. Jesus makes a distinction between things as they were from the beginning of the creation, and the legislation of Moses.* He speaks of things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world, † and of things which his apostles could not bear;‡ The Creator, or God, and Revealer, must be the same, and cannot be in contradiction with each other. The first great commandment of Christ, is not, I think, sufficiently understood; it has, indeed, been abused in the most detestable manner. Arbitrary, contradictory, and absurd interpretations were imposed in the name of God; and dissension was, therefore, unavoidable. Those who governed found it convenient to gratify their pride and selfishness, by interdicting reflection, and by commanding blind obedience and prostration of the understanding. Such a proceeding is common to priestcraft of all ages.

This was and is an excellent means of securing themselves in personal enjoyments, of concealing selfish intentions, and of enforcing conviction of their infallibility; but it does not prove that the Gospel prohibits us from reasoning, from examining, from believing that which is true, or rejecting that which is palpably false and absurd. In my opinion, those who think force lawful for the support of any opinion, civil or religious, that cannot be supported by reason, and has no relation to the common welfare, may think every untruth lawful, especially when the temporal interest of the deceivers is joined with the eternal interest of the deceived. Jesus said, many times, 'Let them hear, who have ears to hear.' 'Are ye also,' said he to his disciples, § 'yet without understanding?' 'I speak as to wise men,' says St. Paul to the Corinthians;|| 'judge ye what I say.' 'Prove all things,' says the same apostle to the

* Matt. xix. 8. † Matt. xiii. 35. ‡ John xvi. 12.
§ Matt. xv. 16. || 1st Cor. x. 15.
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Thessalonians,* ' and hold fast that which is good.' 'Beloved,' says St. John, "believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God.' †

Thus, I believe that all natural laws of the vegetative functions, of intelligence, and of morality, are part of the will of God. If we submit to them, their influence will be more marked and more salutary than any adherence to arbitrary regulations. Man ought to know that he can create nothing, but that he has understanding to recognise whatever is, and the conditions under which it is. He may only imitate the proceeding of nature, that is, obey the will of the Creator, to elicit what is for his good. 'The Son of God can do nothing, if he have not seen it done by the Father,' said Jesus.

The first commandment of Christianity embraces all kinds of truth, and ought never to be lost sight of; it explains every thing as happening by the will of God. Fire burns, water extinguishes fire; hemlock kills man, and nourishes the goat; fertile countries, when well cultivated, yield abundant harvests; industrious and orderly individuals and nations prosper; intemperate persons ruin their health; ignorance commits errors, intelligence avoids them; the animal part of man looks for selfish and lowly gratifications; the peculiarly human nature finds satisfaction amid the joys of general happiness; and all this occurs by the will of God. Let us then admit it as the will of God also, that the faculties proper to man are to be the sole guides of human actions.

In examining natural morality, we have seen that we can do nothing to advantage the Supreme Being; that our relations with him consist in respect for, and submission to, his will. Hence, that true religion is summed up in the fulfilment of our duties to ourselves, to our like, and to the other beings that taste along with us the sweets of existence, and in relating all our duties to the will of the Creator.

The worship prescribed by Christianity is also reasonable and spiritual; it consists not in what we are to eat or drink, nor in any difference to be made between the days lent us to enjoy. The Sab-

* 1st Thess. v. 21. † 1st John, iv. 1.
bath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath.* 'The hour comes, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth.'† 'God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwells not in temples made with hands, neither is he worshipped with men's hands, as though he needed any thing; he who gives to all life, and breath, and all things.'‡ 'When ye pray, use not vain repetitions as the heathen do; for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking.'§ Finally, prayers are heard only, if they be conformable to the will of God, and supported by our submission to the laws of the Creator. Under the guidance and fulfilment of the natural laws alone, mankind can become happy; and in neglecting them, all prayers will be in vain.

Thus, the first great commandment of Christianity is perfectly agreeable to the experience of all times, and is the basis of all positive regulations; it embraces all natural laws and even includes the second commandment of Christianity. This, however, on account of its importance, has been announced separately; it is: *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.*

This precept is very simple; but, like the first, has not escaped manifold abuses. It has always been, and is still eluded by various interpretations. A great number flatter themselves that they are Christians, without ever expending a thought on the happiness of their neighbors; some are not ashamed to bear the name of Christians though they think all the inhabitants of a country and the country itself made for them. The first absolute king who pretended to be a Christian was a curse to Christianity. On the other hand, in combining the second precept with several passages of the Gospel, some have discussed the question whether Christianity abolishes private property and establishes community of goods or not? The early Christians made a trial of a true commonwealth; several religious orders or monasteries did the same; but experience has shown that mankind is not yet in a condition to live in such a state of purity. Nevertheless, it is cer-

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* Mark ii. 27. † John iv. 24, 52. ‡ Acts xvii. 24, 25. § Matt. vi. 7.
tained, that if the second commandment were fulfilled, there would be no peculiar property.

To this may be started the objection of there being a fundamental feeling in which inheres the desire to acquire, a feeling very active in animals and in man. Now, Christianity opposes no natural disposition; on the contrary, it commands acknowledgment of the natural order, and, indeed, is declared to be destined to re-establish things as they were from the beginning of the creation. The propensity to acquire certainly exists in man as well as in animals; man is also influenced by attachment to his family and country, and both of these feelings are powerful motives to action; yet they also give rise to many disorders, and occasion a great deal of mischief. They are not interdicted by the second precept of Christianity, but they are placed under the dominion of a superior sentiment, which desires general happiness, and places the well-being of others on a level with our own, our family's, and our country's.

Christianity consequently commands, 'Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets.' As well as nature, Christianity proclaims original differences among men. It allows that some are more, others less, talented; but it makes each answerable only for the gifts he has received; commanding that those who have received much, give much; that is, contribute largely to the general happiness. Thus, true Christians form a separate society; they receive among them none who are profligate, selfish, ambitious, or who are governed by inferior faculties; but only those who find pleasure in the satisfaction of their peculiarly human powers. They scout idleness with its attendant vices from among them. They have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office; there are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit; and the manifestation of the spirit is given to every one to profit withal. In short, they consider as brothers and sisters those only who do the will of God; who love each other as themselves.

* Matt. vii. 12. † Rom. xii. 4. ‡ 1 Cor. xii. 7.
The accomplishment of this precept is extremely difficult, but it is essential to see that it is indispensable to the constitution of a Christian. To maintain that it is not, is to be deceived, or to be a hypocrite. Jesus constantly admonished his disciples to love one another.* 'By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one for another.'†

Many flatter themselves with being Christians, when they say that they believe in the divinity of Jesus, in his mission and miraculous actions; and all the while neglect the moral principles he inculcated. Jesus, however, has loudly declared, that practice of his commandments is indispensable, in order to enter into the kingdom of God. St. Paul says, ‡ 'The kingdom of God is not in word, but in power.' And St. James.§ is very clear in writing: 'What does it profit my brethren, though a man say he hath faith and have not works? Can faith save him?—as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also.'

It is, indeed, scarcely possible to find a true Christian; but the unbeliever who deems Christian morality merely fanciful, is more excusable than those who call themselves its disciples, but suit Christianity to their own tastes. Such conduct has done incalculable injury to mankind, and by spreading abroad false conceptions of its nature, has greatly lowered the Christian system of morality in general estimation.

The second precept of Christianity is, therefore, also conformable to natural morality, or to the faculties proper to man. For these look for general happiness, and are satisfied with neighborly love, without any regard to personal distinctions.

The third precept of Christian morality concerns its propagation. Jesus commands his disciples to preach his doctrine as preferable to all other systems of morality; to be indulgent and forbearing; to give freely, as they have freely received; and to pardon faults and errors, provided they be corrected. He who does not act according to the law is to be excluded from their

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society; excommunication, therefore, is the severest punishment it admits.

How lamentable it is that these sublime principles of morality have been so dreadfully disfigured, as now not to be recognisable in social intercourse! Understanding has, from time to time, endeavored to oppose arbitrary interpretations, and hence divisions arose. Unfortunately, and in direct contradiction to the mild spirit of Christianity, unbelievers in its doctrines have been persecuted. This was the most certain means of confirming disensions, and is the more to be regretted, as these have always been based upon secondary things, which in themselves never had and never will have any influence on mankind. By degrees the essential was distinguished from the indifferent portion, and in several countries men are now permitted to do whatever they think agreeable to God, provided it do not trouble the order of society. Civil governments are at present superior to the priesthood in wisdom. They allow people to believe that God is fond of perfumes, of music, and of various ceremonies, and they tolerate those who show their love of God by fulfilling their social duties, by esteeming every day alike, and saying with St. Paul, *'the kingdom of God is not meat and drink.' Let us hope that religious toleration will become general, and that the aim may be no longer confounded with the means: the aim must be the same every where and at all times; the means must vary according to the natural dispositions of individuals, to the education they have received, and to the circumstances in which they are placed, but still be dictated by the faculties proper to man. Let us hope that the maxim, that no man ought to suffer in his person, property or reputation for his opinion in matters of mere supernatural doctrines, will be established in every enlightened nation.

It is indispensable to obey the will of God, but it is by no means likely that he is pleased with the errors of his creatures, or that he leads them into temptation by trifling and insignificant commandments. It is evident that they are not arrived at refined

*Rom. xiv. 17.*
notions of a Supreme Intelligence, who lay the greatest possible stress upon the necessity of a belief in Mahomet's pretended mission; who consider all other virtues as useless if this single point of the prophet's divine appointment be not instantly present to the mind of the aspirant to eternal life. This doctrine, however, prevails throughout the Coran. Farther, Mahomet establishes a scale of meritorious actions in which idle, ridiculous, useless and sometimes mischievous observances occupy the chief place, while many useful and virtuous actions are passed over as unimportant.

—May a similar reproach not be made to various creeds among Christians?

Is it not rather probable that God has given to man, and identified with his being, such laws as are necessary to his happiness? Surely it is. They, therefore, who call themselves the ministers of God, ought to make it a principal business to study his will, especially the laws of nature, and to consider it an imperious duty to teach these, and by submission to them, to give an example of belief in their truth and excellence.

On the other hand, those who understand the natural morality of man, will approve of several propositions of Christianity, which are sometimes declared to be unnatural and absurd. These they will consider as inherent in man, noble in their application, beneficial in their effects, and conformable to the law of nature. They will allow that all the faculties common to man and animals are to be subjected to those proper to man. There are three kinds of positive legislation which I shall call to mind in the order of their imperfection or excellence. In the first, there are only absolute masters, who arbitrarily determine what is to be done or omitted, whose pleasure, in fine, is the only reason of their regulations. This administration is the morality of the strongest; it prevails among barbarous nations, and may, in the 19th century, come to an end among the civilized nations of Europe. The second, which prevails among civilized nations, rejects the right of the strongest, and all sorts of privileges. The animal faculties, however, are permitted full scope for their activity, but without having power
to constrain other persons to minister to their desires. This morality abolishes slavery, the rights of feudalism, respects property, and allows every one to exert his faculties for his own advantage, under the sole restriction, not to take aught that belongs to others. It commands us not to do to others what we would not that they do to us. Thus, the inferior animal faculties still dictate the law, though they are limited by those which are proper to man. Many are susceptible of living under the reign of this degree of moral perfection, civil and religious liberty. Their selfishness opposes the grant of monopoly and privileges to others, and their moral feelings reject them as unjust. The desire to acquire, and attachment, that is, commerce and exclusionary patriotism, here exert a very great influence. Nations, therefore, thus far advanced, are united and powerful, and defend their situation vigorously. They use every effort to advantage their community; but, besides, every one lives for himself, brings up his children for his private ends, and uses all his energies to increase his wealth.

The third, and most perfect legislation, results from the supremacy of the peculiarly human nature. The faculties proper to man guide the aim of every action; all are therefore directed towards the universal good. The animal nature becomes a mere auxiliary to this end. Commercial liberty is introduced, national pride and prejudices cease, and nations are allied. Natural morality even here differs in nothing from that of Christianity. Universal charity and love of truth prevail. He who does the will of the Creator, prospers. There is no distinction of person. Every one does to others what he wishes to be done by them. In this way we understand Jesus when he desires his disciples to abandon their wives and children rather than the doctrine he teaches; he only places man above animals. He does not command abandonment of wives and children, if they love each other as themselves, but of those only who do not the will of God. Animals love their offspring, but parental love is certainly inferior to the love of mankind. Jesus therefore acknowledges as mother, brother, or sister, those only who love their neighbors as
themselves.* He wished man to be and to act according to the faculties proper to human nature. If this were so, all would work with pleasure for the common happiness; those who engaged with great talents, would require the same recompense as those who were industrious with slender endowments; private property would be at an end, and general peace would reign on earth.

Jesus felt that his doctrine was too difficult for man as he is, but he supported his superiority by its salutary effects and by experience, which shows that it is perfect. Nations may prepare themselves for such a kingdom of love; but Jesus himself did not rely on this motive alone; he attended also to the motives of reward and punishment. Moreover he was prepared for the disputes his teaching occasioned. Whoever proposes a new doctrine brings forth an object of difference. Now the moral principles of Jesus being especially opposed to riches and worldly distinctions, to that, therefore, which man desires most eagerly, necessarily excited adversaries and caused persecutions. He came not on purpose to excite dissensions between brothers, relations, or man and man; but he knew that dissensions were unavoidable in the natural order of things. Now let every one judge for himself, whether it were better to live quietly in error and in injustice, than to suffer and struggle for truth and general happiness.

Thus, my conviction is, that the moral precepts of Christianity are those of the Creator. I cannot, however, believe that such a pure system of morality will be easily, or soon adopted. But this can take nothing away from its perfection. It will ever remain the object all regulations ought to have in view, for its reception is the indispensable condition to universal peace. In my work on Education, I speak of what will avail in procuring the conditions under which man can receive this moral doctrine. Meanwhile, it is certain that they only usurp the name of Christians, who by their enactments prove that their sole aim is individual happiness; or, who strive after riches and worldly distinctions, and other advancement of their merely private estates; or, who live at the expense

*Mark iii. 35.
of others; or, finally, who are apt enough to laud, but ever ready to act in contradiction to the precepts of Christianity. It is, indeed, blasphemous to bear the title of Christian without acting up to the sacred duties it requires. Let us, therefore, in acknowledging the purity of Christian morality, put it in practice, before we dare to arrogate the noble name of Christians.

Natural goodness of man.

There is, undoubtedly, a great deal of moral evil in the world. Man, it is also certain, is commonly inclined to evil, that is, to follow the activity of the animal faculties, which are, for the most part, very energetic, and submit with difficulty to the guidance of the powers proper to man. I am, nevertheless, astonished to observe so much goodness in the world. Its abundance evidently proves that man is naturally good, and by no means in consequence of his social institutions; these, indeed, are for the most part, calculated to pervert him. The poor are surrounded with temptation and exposed to corruption on all hands, and the lives led by the rich, especially their idleness and luxury, invite them to immorality. All ranks have their superstitions, and all believe in error, as well as in truth; all pay for temporal and also for eternal happiness, and all subscribe to the first dogma proclaimed necessary to secure the good things here, or to purchase the joys of immortality hereafter,—an entire abnegation of reason.

A true picture of society would, indeed, be frightful. Happily, man has received from the Creator so large an infusion of goodness, that it is not to be annihilated. It is lamentable, then, that certain persons attach themselves more to the letter than to the spirit of some symbolic propositions of the gospel, and that mystical, contradictory, and noxious interpretations are rather believed in, than simple, reasonable, and salutary views.

There are some naturally good, some who instinctively, so to say, do the things which Christian morality commands. But, have we not all heard religious people say, that this natural disposition
to do well profits those who exert it in nowise? Some may wish to excuse their sins in degrading the nature of man, not aware that in degrading man they degrade his Maker, since they tell us at the same time that man is made according to the image of God. Let us examine into the origin of faith and of charity, discuss their comparative excellence, and determine the merit which belongs to natural benevolence.

In regard to the origin of religious belief and charity, I refer to the first volume of this work. I shall only repeat that they spring not from the same fundamental faculty, that they may exist separately or conjoined, and that they may be active in very different degrees. These propositions are as important as those according to which charity and the disposition to faith are inherent in the nature of man. We may, therefore, proceed to ask which of the two is the most important?

Pious people commonly decide on this question according to their individual feelings. But this manner of judging frequently leads into error, and is apt to deceive. Let us, therefore, make abstraction of ourselves, and consider the subject generally.

We are very ready to believe that which we like; this, however, is not always truth. Religious systems, and the various sects of each are all founded on belief. Jews, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Inquisitors, Quakers, &c., all fancy they possess the true interpretation of the revealed will of God. Hence, simple belief does not indicate abstract truth. Religious belief is the result offeelings, and all feelings without exception, are blind; religious belief consequently may be deceived; and I think it causes error whenever the faculty on which it depends ceases to act in harmony with the other powers proper to man. It has, unquestionably, done a great deal of harm in the world. Some standard, by which its manifestations may be regulated, is therefore extremely desirable.

What shall we say of those who maintain that Christianity does not require good works? Simply, that they wish to make their task very easy; not reflecting on the very nature of a covenant, which cannot be made without conditions; and not knowing the gospel
of Jesus Christ, who desired that his disciples might be known by their works, and the excellence of his doctrine by its effects. Such a basis alone is unobjectionable, since it includes its validity in itself, and soon changes faith into conviction. Now as pure charity is the aim of the doctrine, and was the practice of the life of Jesus, charity is evidently the chief of his precepts.

Farther, the tendency of charity is solely to do good; but religious belief may do evil too; it easily finds an excuse for self-love, personal views, and abuses of many complexions. Priestcraft when asked what is right, commonly answers, expediency or our decision. History proves this accusation of religious governors.

We may add, with the Apostles St. James and St. Paul, that faith without works is dead. Every hypocrite may say, I believe. Faith should be considered only as an additional motive to exercise charity; and in its inferiority it alone should never be the basis of any religious doctrine. Priestcraft of all denominations, contending for their supremacy, wish to lead the people blindfolded.

'Beware of false prophets,' says Christ,* 'which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Ye will know them by their fruits.'

Finally, even those who have no religious faith, or belief, still admit charity and its good effects. Thus, I do not hesitate to place, with St. Paul,† charity above faith.

In regard to the merit of natural benevolence, I think, that the moral laws are as positive and inherent in our nature as are those of vision, and of the harmony of colors and tones; I also conceive that Christ has commanded certain works because they are good in themselves and according to the will of the Creator, but not that these works are good by their being commanded; and, farther, that the truth of religious interpretations is proclaimed by their compatibility with general happiness. If man can do nothing of himself, that is, by the powers which he has received from his Creator, what can be the benefit of the priesthood? How could Jesus Christ speak of gifts or talents? How can man be made answerable?

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* Matt. vii. 15.  † 1 Cor. xiii.
Those who say that natural human benevolence is worthless, might also say that the goodness of God is without value.

Persons, it is true, who are naturally good, deserve less credit for their beneficent actions than those who do good principally because it is commanded. The former are charitable because they find pleasure in charity, while the others of charity make an act of virtue. In reference to energy and effect, however, natural benevolence is superior to that which results from faith. The faculties which act from internal vigor are rewarded by their indulgence; they persevere with pleasure and constantly tend to action, while those which must be excited by other motives become inactive as soon as these cease to operate. The naturally good do more acts of beneficence without faith than those who, little endowed with primitive charity, take mere faith as their guide and rule of conduct. Those, however, who unite natural charity and faith are the most assiduous in doing good; but, to reject natural benevolence is equivalent to saying that pure and natural gold is not worth such as is extracted from very heterogeneous minerals, and that a swift and willing horse is inferior to one which must be spurred to go quickly.

I finish this section by asking, what individual can determine moral evil and moral good, that is, dictate the moral laws? I think that it is with moral as with all other principles; a blind man cannot establish the principles of coloring, nor one born deaf those of music; the great painter gives the rules of his art, and the great genius for music indicates the laws of harmony. In the same way, he who possesses the faculties proper to man in the highest perfection, and in whose actions they predominate, he who can challenge the world to convict him of sin, has a right to determine moral principles, and to fix rules of moral conduct. Those, therefore, who would make exception and say, Follow my words and not my deeds, have no title to give rules of action to the community, or to superintend their practice. How noble was the saying of Christ in reference to this point, *If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not.*

* John, x. 37.
SECTION VI.

Practical Considerations.

In every science the theoretical must be distinguished from the practical part. The former considers principles, the latter applies them. Both, however, must be in harmony with each other. Saying that experience contradicts a theory, only means that the theory was inexact, and not founded on sufficient experience. But it does not indicate that no theory or principle should be established. Farther, I think with Socrates, that knowing and acting ought to be inseparable, and that useful knowledge is alone worth attending to; no philosophy, therefore, which cannot be applied in social life deserves to have a student. The knowledge of the human mind is interesting to physicians in reference to insanity, and to teachers and legislators in determining the means of perfecting mankind. I have treated these subjects in separate volumes; I shall here add some considerations which concern us in our social intercourse, and which may contribute to further general happiness. This I shall do in four chapters. The first will treat of the modifications of the affective and intellectual functions in individuals; the second, of the difficulty of judging the actions of others; the third, of sympathy and antipathy; and the fourth, of the happiness of man.

CHAPTER I.

On the Modifications of the Affective and Intellectual Functions.

In philosophy it is commonly admitted, that the world is different to every species of animals, and even to every individual of the same species. This is easily understood, when we consider
that all the beings of nature are in relation one to another, and that these, endowed with consciousness, recognise this; in other terms, perceive various impressions made on them by other beings. Now, it is evident that each must perceive impressions in proportion to the number and energy of its sentient faculties. Hence it results that the world differs to different species of animals; that it is essentially the same, but modified to individuals of the same kinds; and that man, who unites all the faculties distributed among the other living tribes, and possesses some peculiarly and alone, has, so to speak, the most extended world, though this be still modified to individuals, as it is among animals of the same species.

I shall now investigate the modifications of the faculties more in detail. First then, the manifestations of every faculty are greatly modified in different kinds of beings. This appears from the functions of those faculties, both of vegetative and animal life, which are common to man and animals. The liver secretes bile, the kidneys secrete urine, the salivary glands saliva, &c.; yet these secretions vary in different kinds of animals; and are even modified in individuals of the same species. The power of motion is modified in different kinds of animals, and the consistence, texture, and taste of its organs, the muscles, also vary. The external senses offer modifications according to species and individuals. Now, are the faculties attached to the brain also modified in different animals?

If we examine their applications, there can remain no doubt of it. The function of the cerebellum must be modified in every species, because the individuals of each prefer others of their own kind. Sometimes also it is quite inordinate. Modifications of philoprogenitiveness are not less certain. Animals love the young of their own more than those of other kinds. Inhabitiveness must be modified in animals which live in the water, on dry land, in the air, and at greater or less elevations. Adhesiveness presents many modifications in solitary and in social animals. Destructiveness and constructiveness are much modified; all animals do not kill in one way, and the nests of all birds are not built in the same man-
The song of birds, and the instinct to migrate, are modified universally. Similar observations might readily be made in regard to the whole of the propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties. Thus it is certain that all are modified both in species and in individuals. Nay, it seems to me that there are idiosyncrasies of all the mental functions, as well as of digestion and the external senses. Certain stomachs do not digest some particular substances; some individuals cannot bear certain odors, savors, colors, and sounds; and some cannot endure certain modes of feeling or thinking, certain successions of tones, of ideas, and so on. The same thing is approved or disapproved of by different people according to the manner in which it is proposed.

Another cause of the modified manifestations of the faculties is their mutual influence. I only consider the human kind at present. It is indubitable that if two or more persons do the same thing, it will be done in a modified way by every one. Inasmuch as the faculties are essentially the same, the same actions are observed in all mankind: nay, in as far as nations have similar predominating faculties, there prevails a certain analogy in their actions and manners, because these are effects of the special faculties and their combinations; it is only their modifications and different combinations that produce varieties in action. Every faculty may act combined with one, or two, or more. The number of binary, ternary, and more multiplied combinations is, therefore, immense, especially if it be remembered that each may be modified in itself, and may be more or less energetic. As this subject, however, is of the highest importance in anthropology, and indispensable to the elucidation of my ideas, I shall treat it somewhat in detail, and choose examples easily understood, and interesting to every one.

Physical love alone, combined with adhesiveness, philoprogenitiveness, benevolence and veneration, or with the propensities to fight and to destroy, acts very differently. Two affectionate mothers, of whom the one has philoprogenitiveness combined with much self-esteem, much firmness, a great propensity to fight, and little benevolence; and the second, philoprogenitiveness combined
with adhesiveness, benevolence, veneration, and very little self-esteem and propensity to fight, will love their children in very different manners. Determinate or individual justice varies extremely. Justice gives laws universally, but these are modified according to the particular and combined faculties of legislators. What a difference in the characters of Lycurgus and Solon; but what a difference in their precepts also!

Man universally believes in one or several Gods; but what a difference between the Gods of different nations, and even of different men! The Gods seem to be every where represented with faculties conformable to those of the nations by whom they are adored, or of the religious legislators who have commanded in their name. The sages of the Orient thought God the centre of light and the source of all wisdom; but the Scythes took him for a valiant hero, constantly armed and occupied with battles. The ancient Egyptians supposed their Supreme Divinity to have little eyes, brown skin and dark hair, whilst the natives in the North fancied him to be of exceedingly white complexion with blue eyes and fair long hair. The Caffres imagined him to be black with a broad flat forehead. The God of the Jews, particularly of Joshua, and the Deity of the true Christian, are extremely modified. If different individuals, even of the same religion, be asked their opinion about God, we observe great diversities. St. Peter and St. John speak, the former with fear, the latter with meekness and love, of the same Christian Deity. The holy spirit did not so guide the Apostles as to suspend the peculiarities of their minds. If we examine the opinions of the reformers, Luther, Calvin, Zwingle, and others, do we not always observe the faculties of the individuals? Who, for instance, finds not in the principles of Melanchthon, the mildness and moderation of his character? A person endowed with veneration, combined with charity, attachment, and understanding, without pride, destructiveness, and amativeness, will establish a system of religious observance quite different from his who is endowed with veneration combined with covetiveness, pride, amativeness, and destructiveness, without charity and under
standing. Every one who dares to think for himself, interprets the Bible according to his own feelings. The ambitious contrives to find in it doctrines which favor his love of dominion; the timid discovers a gloomy system; and the mystical and fanatical finds a visionary theology.

The Evil Spirit or Devil, too, was represented with forms quite opposite to those of God. The Romans, Celtic nations and Germans saw him black, whilst the ancient Egyptians painted their Typhon with a red beard and similar hair, almost as the Germans formed their good principle.

Music is different in every nation. We easily distinguish that of the Italians, Germans, French, Scots, &c. Even the music of each composer offers something particular, and connoisseurs distinguish that of Gluck, Mozart, Haydn, and others. It is the same with painting. All painters are colorists, but there is a difference in their modes of coloring; and every one as regularly prefers certain colors as subjects. Hence the difference in the pictures of Titian, Rembrandt, Paul Veronese, Albano, and others. The canvass of Titian shows reflection and combination; that of Paul Veronese his fondness for architecture; Albano again betrays his amorous inclination; and so of the rest. The same object, represented by various masters of painting, will always show the peculiarities of every artist's mind. How different, for instance, the Virgins of Raphael, Correggio, Guido, Titian, Murillo, Carlo Dolce, Caravaggio, Rubens, &c.

The languages of different nations present fine examples of modifications produced by the mutual influence of the faculties. I even admit as a principle, that the spirit of its language proclaims the predominating faculties of a nation. I have spoken of a faculty which learns and knows the signs invented by the superior intellectual faculties, to express the feelings and ideas. It is evident, therefore, that a nation with many feelings or ideas must have many signs, and that the number of any one kind of these indicates the energy of the faculty they represent. Thus, the Greek and French languages have a greater number of tenses than the German and
English. The French, on the contrary, is poor in expressions of reflection and of sentiment; moreover, it has few that are figurative; while the German is rich in all of these, and has also many more signs of disjunction. Frenchmen have the organs of individuality and eventuality very much developed, and are therefore fond of facts; but their faculties of comparison and causality are commonly smaller. In consequence of this, the French Institute does not admit analogies as proofs; these consist according to it only in facts. The Germans, on the other hand, are fond of analogies, perhaps too much so, for they compare and wish to explain every thing. French expressions are individual, without any comparison; therefore, similar sounds denote many different objects. From this it appears that the discriminating faculties are not very active in Frenchmen. The same deficiency is evident in the very different names they give to very similar objects. The German and English tongues are more systematic than the French. The common language of Germany is even conformable to the system of Linnaeus. Whilst the French say, bouvreuil, chardonneret, pincon, &c, the Germans and English preserve the generic name fink, or finch, and join to it a sign of distinction. In the same way, while the French say, rasoir, couleau, canif, serpette, &c; in German and English the generic name messer or knife is retained, and a sign of particular destination affixed, as feder-messer, or pen-knife; tafel-messer, or table-knife; &c. For this reason also, the number of roots of the French language is much more considerable, though that of its words be much smaller than those of the German. Another proof that the French language is very unsystematic, lies in the fact of its very often having a substantive without its derivative adjective, or the contrary, to designate the same idea. These illustrations show the evident influence of the faculties generally, in establishing languages. Thus the number and nature of signs is in relation to the special powers of the mind which invent them. The faculties of individuality and eventuality being the first active in children, we may understand why nouns and verbs are soonest employed, and constitute almost the whole
artificial language of infancy; and why all words may be reduced etymologically to these signs. By degrees, as other faculties become active, other significations of signs are discovered, even though their roots remain the same.

The construction of languages proves also the modified manners of thinking of different nations. The French like facts, and direct their attention to them, without first considering causes. It is natural, indeed, to begin with the subject, then to join the action of the subject, and after this to express other circumstances. This the French do regularly. If cause and effect be considered, they always begin with the effect, and relate the cause afterwards. The Germans proceed in a very different manner, and their tongue in this respect requires much more attention than the French. It also ordinarily begins with the subject; then follow expressions of the relation between subject and object, both of which are mentioned; and lastly, the action of the subject upon the object is considered. If an effect and its cause, again, are spoken of, the cause is commonly denoted first and the effect after it. Certain languages are known to admit of a great number of inversions, others of very few. The former appear to me the more logical; for it seems natural that attention should be given first to the most important object. The French language begins almost always with the fact: hence French understandings consider the fact as the most important.

From these observations upon language, we may conceive that the spirit of no one language can become general. I am of opinion that the spirit of the French will never please Germans; and that Frenchmen, on the other hand, will always dislike that of the German; because the manner of thinking, and the enchainment of ideas, are quite dissimilar in the two nations.

I am farther convinced that different philosophical systems have resulted from various combinations of faculties in their authors. He who has much of the faculty of eventuality will never neglect facts. He who possesses less of it, and a great deal of the faculties of comparison and causality, will begin to philosophize with causes,
and construct the world, instead of observing its existence. He, on the contrary, in whom the faculty of causality is less active, will reject this mode of consideration, and may think it unphilosophical to admit a primitive cause. Another who has individuality very small may doubt of external existence. The philosopher in whom the superior sentiments are very energetic, directs his mind principally to moral principles, and then we have various systems of virtue and morality, according to the predominance of one or other of these. One makes virtue consist in prudence, another in benevolence. One considers all actions as done from love of praise or from vanity; another from self-esteem, from love of self-preservation, self-interest and so on. Philosophers as well as other men think differently, and each is also apt to consider his own manner of thinking and feeling as the best; his consciousness tells him it is so; but every one errs who assumes himself as a measure of the absolute nature of man. In examining human nature, we ought to make abstraction of ourselves entirely; we ought never to admit in man a feeling as the strongest, and a manner of thinking as the best, solely because they are conformable to our own; nor ought we ever to deny in others what we ourselves do not possess. We should observe mental phenomena in the conviction that all the essential kinds or particular faculties inhere in human nature; and we should observe how and under what circumstances each faculty can and does act. In this way I think it possible to determine the absolute nature of man, and to become acquainted with the infinity of modifications occurring in individuals.

It would be easy to quote examples in the case of every faculty, to prove the mutual influence of the whole; but I shall only dwell on this principle, in reference to abuses of the faculties, for the sake of showing how peculiarities may be explained which seem inconceivable to those who know nothing of Phrenology.

Suppose, for instance, we are told that of two inveterate thieves presented to us, one has never scrupled to rob churches whilst the other has, the robber of the church may be distinguished from the other: he who has the smallest organ of veneration is the thief of
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

Suppose we see two women in confinement, and are told that one has stolen, and that the other has concealed the stolen things; the former will have the organ of acquisitiveness larger, and that of the propensity to conceal less, while the second will have the organ of secretiveness much developed. If we would detect the chief of a robber band, we examine the organs of self-esteem and determinateness. We may distinguish an habitual vagabond thief from a coiner of false money by his having, besides the organ of acquisitiveness, the organ of locality larger, and smaller organs of cautiousness and of constructiveness. We may also distinguish dangerous and incorrigible criminals from the less desperate and more easily amended. They who have the organs of the sentiments proper to man and of intellect very small, but those of the propensities to fight, to destroy, to conceal, and to acquire, very much developed, will be corrected with far more difficulty than such as have the organ of acquisitiveness very much developed, but at the same time the organs of the human faculties and of intellect large, who, in short, are susceptible of moral will.

CHAPTER II.

On the difficulty of judging others.

Having examined the modified manifestations of the faculties of the mind, natural order leads me to consider the difficulty of judging, and of determining the motives and actions of others. From the preceding views it follows, first, that the judgment of every one as well as all his other functions must be modified. If we but attend to the judgments of different individuals upon the same object, if we note their reflections, and consider what each praises or blames, we may speedily be convinced by experience of the truth of this. It may, indeed, be admitted as a principle, that every one judges according to the natural modifications and the mutual influence of
his faculties;—that all judge others by their own nature, or take themselves as the measure of good and evil. Therefore it is that God has at all times been anthropomorphosed; every one has modified the Divinity, and conceived a Creator conformable to his own manner of judging and feeling. And when philosophers, moralists, and the virtuous, regard conscience as the severest judge of malefactors generally, they suppose in these degenerate beings the sentiment they feel themselves;—they judge themselves in the actions of others. In the same way, whatever is conformable to our manner of feeling and thinking is apt to be approved, and the contrary to be disapproved of. To judge well, therefore, we must first distinguish the common nature of man from the modifications of every individual; and then we must know our own nature and the modifications of our faculties to avoid censuring or lauding others according to our own favorite sentiments or ideas. We must, in fact, judge others and ourselves by one and the same standard—absolute good and evil.

It is also difficult to judge of the actions of others, and to determine their real motives, because the motives of the same action may be quite different. Appearances are proverbially deceitful. I shall quote but a few examples in illustration; a very superficial glance, however, will, at all times, show us many motives for the same act done by different individuals. One gives to the poor from ostentation, another from duty, a third from the hope of gaining heaven, and others again from real charity. One wishes to know the history and situation of the unfortunate,—if he be of his sect or party, &c, before he does good; another relieves as soon as he sees misery, every one is his neighbor, his left hand knows not what his right hand does. One goes to church because it is usual; another to see or to be seen; another to obtain the good opinion of the pious; and another from feelings of sincere veneration. One is neat and clean only when he goes into society, while another is so at all times, even in solitude. One cultivates an art or science from vanity; another because he is charmed with it; and a third because he finds it advantageous, &c.
It is the same with the abstaining from abuses. One, for instance, from charity does not steal; another steals everywhere except in the house where he lives; another robs churches, but not the poor; another does not steal, for fear of being punished, for fear of injuring his reputation, or from a sense of duty and justice, &c. In short, every one knows that the same action he did, or abstained from, has not always followed from the same motive. Thus, if an action or omission is to be judged, it is necessary to consider whether it resulted from the natural energy or inactivity of the respective faculty, or whether other faculties exerted a determinative influence. In judging others, we must remember that every faculty may be active by its own energy or by the excitement of other powers, and, again, may be inactive by its own insufficient energy, or by the influence of other faculties. Hence it follows, that, on one hand, every function does not suppose large development of the respective organ; and, on the other, that organs may be greatly developed without producing abuses. The organ of acquisitiveness may be very large without causing theft; the organ of amativeness much developed without occasioning libertinism; and so of the rest. The functions of very large organs may be suppressed, though certainly not without difficulty. The activity of every organ only produces a particular inclination; the faculties mutually influence each other, and regulate their subordination. Thus we cannot judge of other persons from our own sentiments and intellectual endowments, nor by one or several, but by the whole of their faculties together; and then only censure or praise their actions as they disagree or harmonize with the absolute moral nature of man.

The principle that every faculty may be active by its internal energy, answers the question so often proposed in books: What is the origin of the arts and sciences? In examining their source, writers commonly begin from remote antiquity, and endeavor to show how external circumstances have produced and improved them. Without denying the importance of external circumstances as exciting causes, I still think that the most important, the pri-
mary cause, indeed, is overlooked; that, namely, which exists in
the conate organization; the same, in fact, as that of the instinctive
labors of animals. Man invents and cultivates arts and sciences in
the same way and for the same reason that the beaver builds its hut,
and the nightingale sings. Every sentiment and every intellectual
faculty may act by its internal activity without external excitement;
and this is the primitive source of the arts and sciences. Scarcely
could Handel speak, before he articulated musical sounds, and his
father, grieved at the child's propensity to music, banished all
musical instruments from his house; but this sublime genius was
not to be extinguished by the caprice of a mistaken parent; for the
boy contrived to get a little clavichord into a garret, and applying
himself to this after the family retired to rest, he soon learnt to
produce both melody and harmony.

Nature, then, invented arts and sciences, and revealed them to
man by means of his organization. Arts and sciences are also
gradually perfected only in proportion as they who cultivate them
are possessed of energetic organs.

Inferences.

The consideration of the two sources of activity of the faculties
leads me to the following question: What actions in reference to
morality deserve the greatest confidence, those which result from
the goodness of nature, or those which are the effect of virtue?
Though I think that good is always good in itself, and must ever
be approved of, I still allow that there is greater merit in virtue
than in natural goodness. I agree with the definition of virtue
which all the great ancient and modern philosophers have given, as
Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Kant, and others. I admit that
those who have vanquished temptations deserve particularly to be
rewarded, and that by the possibility of being either virtuous or
vicious, our actions have the greatest merit or demerit.* Never-

* Non virtus est, non posse peccare, cum renunciatur improbitati, statim ad-
sciscetur virtus. &. Ambrosius.—Nulla sine labore virtus est. Non est gloriosa
theless, I confess that for my own part and guidance in society, I trust more to natural goodness than to virtue. I love goodness and esteem virtue. Guided by early experience, which shows that the greatest number of persons act more from the dictates of their propensities and sentiments than of their understanding and moral will, I never choose for my intimate friends individuals in whom the inferior organs are very large, and the superior very small. In the same way I think, that if the intellectual faculties act by their internal energy, they effect much more than if they be excited by sentiments or motives emanating from any other source.

From the modifications of our faculties results still another very important practical rule—indulgence. It is impossible that others should feel and think on every point as we do. Precisely as it is generally admitted, that the functions of the external senses cannot be altogether the same, and without any modification—and as it is proverbially said, _De gustibus non est disputandum_, so also are the internal faculties modified, and no one has a right to desire another to feel and think with him. A certain indulgence is indispensable in society. I do not maintain that every manner of feeling and thinking, and every action, are to be tolerated. There is a

_victoria nisi ubi fuerint gloriosa certamina._ _Idem in Ps. 118, et De Off._—_Posse peccare datum est primo homini, non ut proinde peccaret, sed ut gloriose appararet, si non peccaret, dum peccare posset._ _St. Bernardus de Lib. Arb._—_Vita nostra in hac peregrinatione non potest esse sine peccato, sine tentatione, quia profectus noster per tentationem nostram fit, nec sibi quisquam innotescit, nisi tentatus; nec potest coronari, nisi vicerit; nec potest vincere, nisi certaverit; nec potest certare, nisi ininicum et tentationes habuerit._ _St. Augustinus super Ps. 60._—

_Quidam in juventute luxuriose viventes, in senectute continentem fieri delectantur, et tunc eligent servire castitati, quando libido eos servos habere contempsit. Nequaquam in senectute continentem vocandi sunt qui in juventute luxuriose vixerunt; tales non habent premium, quia laboris certamen non habuerunt, eos enim spectat gloria, in quibus fuerint gloriosae certamina._ _Isidor. de Summo Bono, Lib. i. c. 31._—_For there are some eunuchs which were so born from their mother’s womb, and there are some eunuchs which were made eunuchs of men, and there be eunuchs which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven’s sake._ _Matt. xix. 12._—_Joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons which need no repentance._

_Luke. xv. 7._
common touchstone for all mankind. Feelings, thoughts, and actions, must be conformable to the absolute conscience of man; but all other modifications ought to be permitted. This principle may be applied to both sexes, and to all conditions, and to all ages; no friendship can be permanent without indulgence upon many modifications in the manner of feeling and thinking. It is the same in regard to religious and other opinions. St. Paul said to the Romans, 'One believeth that he may eat all things; another, who is weak, eateth herbs; let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not, and let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth. One man esteemeth one day above another, another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind. We then that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves. The kingdom of God is not meat nor drink, but righteousness and peace.'

CHAPTER III.

On Sympathy and Antipathy.

The principle of the universally-modified manifestations of the faculties leads me also to the consideration of sympathy and antipathy. Throughout all nature, beings have relations with each other. As we have seen that there are relations between the faculties of the same individual, so there exist relations between the faculties of different individuals. Indeed it is generally observed, that certain beings cannot exist together in society, while others dwell in harmony and peace. Attraction and repulsion in physics, and affinities in chemistry, are remarkable and well known; and even among vegetables, some species perish in the neighborhood of certain others, while many species increase and prosper very well together. Among animals, the same law obtains, not only as different species, but also as different individuals of the same kind are concerned.
Certain individuals of the same species manifest a particular attachment, while others cannot bear with each other. In a herd of cows, the bull is commonly more attached to one than to any of the rest; birds, too, pair by choice, &c.

It is the same with mankind. Be it, however, remembered, that I do not speak of sympathy and antipathy in the same sense as many authors do when they discuss the sympathies and antipathies of the stomach and the five senses. They then describe what is called idiosyncrasy. Certain persons, for instance, cannot digest a particular kind of food, cannot endure certain odors, are disgusted with particular savors, and cannot look at certain figures, or touch certain bodies. I have already said that I admit idiosyncrasies in the internal faculties; but I here speak of the natural relations between the faculties of different individuals. Some are, as it were, born for each other, while others mutually feel an invincible aversion. This may be explained in the following manner: First, certain faculties of man are eminently social, as attachment and charity; others are quite the contrary, for instance, selfishness and pride. Again, according to a general rule, every faculty desires to be satisfied. Hence every one is pleased with whatever is conformable to his manner of feeling and thinking: every one wishes to enjoy; therefore every one likes those who procure or permit him enjoyments. It is consequently evident, that there is no single and invariable combination on which sympathy depends. These vary in the same degree as the faculties of different individuals are modified. Before we can decide whether two individuals will sympathize or not, we must consider all their faculties; and then we can see as certain that understanding must like understanding; and every intellectual faculty, manifestations of a similar power in others. The musician is pleased with music; a mathematician with mathematics; a philosopher with philosophical ideas; a philologist with languages, &c. In the same way, the sentiments proper to man look for and sympathize with similar sentiments. A charitable man likes mild and benevolent people; the religious choose the society of the devout, and so on.
Thus, the faculties of the understanding and the sentiments proper to man favor sociality.

It is not precisely thus with the faculties common to man and animals. Some of them, however, are social, as attachment, and, in a certain degree, amativeness and philoprogenitiveness; but the greatest number are eminently antisocial. The interested, for instance, do not like the interested, except in as far as their own selfishness is satisfied. Proud persons cannot suffer others endowed with the same feeling. The haughty and interested not only dislike one another, but are also disliked by those who are possessed of the superior sentiments. This is the case, too, with the propensities to fight and to destroy. Thus every one will sympathize with those in whose society his faculties are satisfied; and antipathy will be proportionate to the obstacles in the way of this, that is, to the prevention of enjoyment.

It is the animal nature which causes so many unhappy and ill-assorted marriages. Amativeness or adhesiveness brings husband and wife together; perhaps they have thought of money, beauty, sometimes of health and intelligence, but they have forgotten the other dispositions, which are independent of physical love and of attachment, which cannot be bought, and which no intelligence can give, but which, nevertheless, contribute greatly to the happiness of those who bind themselves by indissoluble ties. All the other numerous faculties which are not satisfied soon change the original sympathy of the couple into indifference or even into antipathy, and then follow disorder and misery.
CHAPTER IV.

On Happiness and Unhappiness.

In speaking of happiness or unhappiness it is difficult to understand each other. Both ancient and modern philosophers take different views of happiness, and modify accordingly their ethical doctrines. Thales placed it in the health of body, in a competent fortune, and in a cultivated mind; Socrates in the love of truth, useful knowledge and virtue; Plato in the contemplation and knowledge of the first Good, God; and in endeavoring to make man as like to it as the conditions of human nature will permit; Aristippus in agreeable impressions on the senses; Anniceris in pleasant sensations and moral feelings; Hegasias, a disciple of Aristippus, in voluptuousness; Epicurus in mental tranquillity, bodily ease, and freedom from labor and pain; Diogenes in an absolute independence from circumstances; Zeno in the freedom from all sense of pleasure, and pain, from hope and fear, from all feeling and emotions in every situation, in self-denial and self-command. Marcus Aurelius said, that the true contentment of heart is not found in the study of arts, in eloquence, riches, glory, sensual pleasures, in short nowhere but in the practice of actions which the human nature demands. Paley denied that happiness consists in the pleasures of sense, as in the animal gratification of eating and drinking, or by which the species is preserved; neither in the refined pleasures of music, painting, architecture, gardening, theatrical exhibitions, splendid shows; nor in the pleasure of active sports, as of hunting, shooting, fishing; neither in greatness, rank, honors, nor in the exemption from pain, care, labor, business, molestation; but he placed it, 1st, in the exercise of social affections, as husband, wife, children, kindred, and friends; 2d, in doing good to others; 3d, in the pursuit of great engagements and important occupations, and 4th, in health.

Yet it cannot be denied that some find their happiness in the
cultivation of arts,—in fishing or hunting; whilst another delights in examining metaphysical questions, or mathematical problems; and another in religious proselytism. Servile minds despair of supporting existence in a state of civil liberty, whilst the truly free man considers civil and religious liberty as the greatest good upon earth, and indispensable to his happiness.

Phrenology easily explains these and many other views of happiness. Human nature is composed of numerous special dispositions and every special disposition may be active in different degrees. Now every faculty being active and satisfied, is happy or pleased; and every active faculty which is not satisfied is displeased or unhappy. Every one, then, who gives a definition of happiness, expresses the state of his own mind, or the powers active in him; he takes his individual happiness as the standard of happiness in general. No one, however, can measure the happiness or unhappiness of others by his own, hence he finds his happiness in the gratification of his active powers, in the same way as the sheep whilst feeding on grass and the tiger whilst devouring its prey, are happy each in its own manner. To speak with precision, it is necessary to divide and subdivide happiness and unhappiness. Both concern individuals, families, associations, nations or mankind at large. Farther, human nature being vegetative, affective, intellectual, animal and human; it follows that individuals, families, associations, nations, or mankind may be happy or unhappy according to the special powers. In individuals the sum of happiness is made up by the sum of gratification of the active faculties, and in every society the sum of happiness consists in the number of happy individuals. Farther, happiness and unhappiness may be subdivided into temporal or eternal. The latter lies beyond the reach of my inquiries. I am satisfied with stating that in my opinion both these sorts of happiness are not incompatible with each other; I do not believe that we must be miserable here on earth in order to be happy in the life to come.

In speaking of happiness, an important remark is to be kept in view, viz. that the satisfaction of the active powers, not the special
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gratification, is the foundation of happiness. The satisfaction of hunger, not the enjoyment of dainties alone, makes happy. Running and moving about makes children happy, the individual game is not the essence; the satisfaction of all special powers varies according to age and social circumstances, and they are mistaken who think that individual and particular gratification constitute happiness. In this respect there is more compensation in the world than many imagine, in taking themselves as the standard of others.

I shall first treat of individual happiness, and then of that of societies. The first condition of happiness certainly is health. Is it then not astonishing that this condition is so much neglected; whilst the laws of hereditary descent and the dietetic rules ought to be put into practice? Without health we are unfit to receive education, and to fulfil our duty in social relations. Without health we are a burden to ourselves and to others.

The next condition of happiness is mental activity. This however is very different according to the special dispositions of the mind. It is a matter of fact that, (and Phrenology explains why,) by far the greater number of individuals look for their happiness in the satisfaction of the faculties common to man and animals, such as in the sensual pleasures, in the love of offspring, in the love of approbation, in the love of acquiring, and so on. In certain countries inferior pleasures alone are permitted; means of subsistence are provided for; the people have plenty to eat and to drink, but all intellectual pleasures, and those beyond the range of mere animality, are interdicted. Very few persons cultivate arts and science for the pleasure they procure in themselves. They do it to furnish means necessary to the satisfaction of some animal desires. Finally, those who are happy in the exercise of the faculties proper to man are exceedingly rare. They are those who, as St. Paul says, have the law written in their hearts; those who find their happiness in the abnegation of selfish desires, and in actions of general happiness; those finally who in the eyes of common people are called dreamers or fools.

It is a common saying, that man to be happy ought to have few
wants. The expression want is here synonymous with desire,—the effect of every faculty’s activity and is as various in kind as the fundamental faculties; each want individually being proportionate to the activity of the power from which it results. Wants or desires then, or in other words the activity of the faculties are not the immediate cause of happiness or unhappiness. The whole of the mental powers acting with energy may be sources either of bliss or of misery. This follows on the possibility or impossibility of gratifying their impulses. He who has many faculties active which he can satisfy, is more happy than the man who has no desire whatever: but it is better to be without desire than to possess very active faculties with no means of ministering to their cravings. Even those who are eminently endowed with the superior sentiments, and who would like to see every one happy, find a kind of misery in the injustice of mankind. The unfortunate of this kind, however, are by no means the most numerous.

The human as well as animal faculties produce wants or desires. To be just is a want for the righteous, as to take nourishment is for him who is hungry. As, however, the animal faculties are the most generally active in men, if wants are spoken of, we commonly think of inferior powers, as of self-esteem, vanity, personal interest, sensual pleasures, and so on. Now as happiness depends on the gratification of active faculties, and unhappiness on their non-satisfaction, it is obvious why those who are fond of ostentation, luxury, riches, distinctions &c., are commonly unhappy: it is impossible to appease their wants or desires.

It is also necessary to distinguish in the doctrine of wants in reference to morality, between the faculties themselves and the satisfaction of their desires. The satisfaction may vary and produce good and evil.

Religious sentiments are inherent in human nature, they frequently act with great energy, and have done an immensity of mischief to mankind. Yet religion itself should never be ridiculed; well directed, it may increase our own and our neighbor’s happiness, though certain notions and certain actions, called religious, are fit
butts for mockery. Religious belief may admit reasonable things as well as absurdities, just as we may take wholesome or unwhole- some food.

I shall now consider the happiness of societies. It depends, 1st, on the same principles of individual happiness; and 2nd, on some new principles which modify those of individual happiness. Here I take for granted, what I have stated in the section on the moral constitution of man, viz. that general happiness seems to be the aim of the terrestrial creation, and that it is impossible without the powers proper to man; or that general happiness falls together with true morality.

Though reason compels us to think that the Lord of the universe in his goodness and perfection, destined man to be happy, it is certain that to whatever side we turn our eyes, we perceive individuals who are unhappy and who lament their lot. 'I have travelled over the world,' says Volney, (Rains, ch. iv.) 'I have visited villages and towns, and perceiving misery and desolation over all, my soul has been deeply afflicted by the ills which weigh heavily upon mankind. With a sigh I have said, and is man then born only to suffer misery and pain? I shall ask the ashes of legislators, how empires rise and fall? In what reside the causes of prosperity or decay of nations? On what principles the peace of society and the happiness of mankind must be based?'

It is not necessary to insist on the existence of human misery, but let us ask for its causes. Various marvellous conceptions of Divines are articles of faith, and do not fall within the reach of my province, confined to observation. The natural causes of human misery may be reduced to two: ignorance and immorality. Both are great. From the cradle man is imbued with prejudices; he is taught to fear his Maker, who is terrible. Man is the object of his anger; he was told to be tried by visitations and to be destined to lament, to give up the use of his reason and to rely with unbounded confidence in his civil and religious leaders. The most noble part of human nature, his moral and religious sentiments, have been turned to his oppression, and he had not sense enough
to distinguish truth from falsehood. Man can never be happy, till he knows his fundamental powers, the conditions on which their manifestations depend, and till he submits himself completely to the will of his Creator, or in other terms, to the natural laws.

The ancient speculators in philosophy and religion, by their doctrine that the mind operates independently of the body, or is rather impeded by it in its operations, have done great harm to mankind. On that account the body has been and is still neglected; with the progress of civilisation, it degenerates, and becomes effeminate; diseases multiply and misery is inevitable. The neglect of the body is even cause that no family and no nation is lasting.

Our ignorance of human nature and of the influence of the body on the mental phenomena extends over the laws of hereditary descent. The neglect of these laws, however, is of incalculable consequences and prepares innumerable sufferings of body and mind. Bodily strength, infirmity or disease, as well as mental energy, weakness or derangement, are hereditary. Phrenology teaches why. The study of the natural laws then ought to be the Vade mecum of every philanthropist.

The other great cause of human misery is immorality. Philosophers are right in recommending the cultivation of intellect, and by doing so, many disorders will be removed, but the aim will not be attained without attending with the same care to the moral nature of man.

In the section on the moral constitution of man I have shown the innateness, nature and necessity of morality. It will last as long as the human kind, and is indispensable to its happiness. Phrenology explains this part of human nature better than it has been done by any philosophical doctrine. It shows why religiousness may be combined with selfishness, cunning and deceit; why in the midst of wickedness some persons are naturally virtuous; and why selfishness, stupidity, base passions and want of justice are so common.

The great activity of the animal nature is evidently a fertile
cause of human misery, for two reasons. Many are unhappy by not satisfying their excessively energetic feelings, without any moral consideration. It is therefore extremely interesting to examine why the brute nature of man is so active, and why the multitude place happiness in the satisfaction of inferior feelings, and carry in themselves the cause of their own and others’ misery.

Farther, human misery depends on the relation between the two natures of man, on the different degrees of their activity and on the resistance of the inferior to the superior. For as the moral laws exist, and as few feel naturally disposed to submit to them, the greater number have to combat their animal propensities. Now, as pain is felt each time any inclination is opposed, or any law is obeyed, which would willingly be eluded, or whose necessity is not understood, it is obvious that in the actual state of things the virtuously good must spend a life of suffering.

These ideas are admirably developed in the doctrine of Christianity. Morality is there declared the aim which must be obtained, whether with ease or with difficulty, with pleasure or with pain, through love or through fear. The great difficulty of vanquishing the brute nature is acknowledged, but the necessity of fulfilling the law or will of the Creator is still insisted on. For this, therefore, reward is also in proportion to the pains of success; eternal life is promised to those who gain the victory, and the ‘joy in Heaven over one sinner that repenteth shall be more than over ninety and nine just persons which need not repentance.’

Without pretending to know what the cerebral organization was at the beginning, or whether it has suffered any change in the lapse of time; but in the conviction that the manifestation of the mind depends on the brain, I dare to say, that the wickedness of mankind, the disobedience to the peculiarly human nature, will continue so long as the brain remains such as it is. I dare answer in the most positive manner the following passage of Volney: (Ruins, ch. xiv.) ‘Man who despairest of mankind, hast thou scrutinized the organization of sensibility, in order to determine with precision,

whether the motives which dispose man to happiness are essentially weaker than those which remove him from it?" But I still say with him, "If at one time, and in one place, certain individuals become better, why should not the whole mass improve? If partial societies become more perfect, why should it not happen with society at large?" Phrenology explains why so few find pleasure in cultivating their intellectual faculties, and why almost all seek enjoyment in gratifying some one or other of the sentiments;—why the animal nature is so active, and the powers proper to man proportionately so weak. The cerebral mass devoted to the intellectual operations is to that of the affective functions scarcely as one finger to the whole hand, and the organs of the animal feelings together are much larger than the organs of the human sentiments. These observations are founded on the invariable laws of nature, and it is impossible to insist too much on the error of philosophers; to consider understanding as the chief and fundamental cause of our actions, and to overlook the influence of the brain in the mental phenomena.

What must be done to better the lot of Mankind?

The friends of man have at all times been interested in this matter. They have proposed many and various means, natural and supernatural, according to the ideas they had conceived of the cause of human misery. Hitherto, however, there has been little or nothing effected. From this I infer that the measures employed were insufficient.

Bishop Butler speaks of the moral government, of the superiority and advantages of virtue, of the natural tendency to be virtuous and of the hindrances to be so, but he adds: "that these hindrances are so far from being necessary that we ourselves can easily conceive how they may be removed in future states, and full scope be granted to virtue." To this end he supposes "a kingdom or society of men perfectly virtuous, for a succession of many ages, to which, if you please, may be given a situation advantageous for a universal
monarchy. In such a state there would be no such thing as faction, but men of the greatest capacity would of course all along have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to them, and they would share it among themselves without envy. Each of these would have the part assigned him, to which his genius was particularly adapted, and others who had not any distinguished genius would be safe and think themselves very happy by being under the protection and guidance of those who had. Public determinations would really be the result of the united wisdom of the community, and they would faithfully be executed by the united strength of it. Some would in a higher way contribute, but all would in some way contribute to the public prosperity, and in it each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest, confederacies in injustice, accompanied with faction, and intestine treachery, would be found mere childish folly and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity, allowing both a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general influence which such a kingdom would have over the face of the earth, by way of example particularly, and the reverence which would be paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the world must gradually come under its empire, not by means of lawless violence, but partly what must be allowed to be just conquest, and partly by other kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it, throughout a course of ages, and claiming its protection one after another in successive exigencies. The head of it would be a universal monarch in another sense than any mortal has yet been; and the Eastern style would be literally applicable to him, that all people, nations and languages should serve him. And though indeed our knowledge of human nature, and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility without some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here on earth, should unite in one society of government, in the fear of God and the universal practice of virtue, and that such a government should
continue so united for a succession of ages, yet admitting or supposing this, the effect would be as now drawn out; and thus, for instance, the wonderful prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the Scripture, would be in a great measure the consequence of what is predicted to them, that the people should be all righteous and inherit the land forever. (Is. i. 21).—The prediction of this kind, continues Bishop Butler, cannot come to pass in the present known course of nature.

Phrenology affords a clearer insight into human nature, and in my work on Education I consider all that I deem requisite to improve the species and to establish God's moral government, which, as Bishop Butler says, is not fictitious but natural. Here I confine myself to a few general indications, which are commonly neglected by those who exercise some influence on society.

The causes of human misery being ascertained, it is evident, that whatever impedes human happiness must be removed or at least diminished. The study of human nature forms the foundation. This being done, moralists will see, that human happiness requires more than to preach moral principles, to give alms, to found charity-institutions, to follow religious ceremonies, and to cultivate the arts and sciences; they will apprehend that the evil is to be attacked by the root, that is, that natural means must be employed to improve dispositions. The body, the temple of the soul, will be more attended to; the laws of vegetative functions and of hereditary descent will be appreciated and put into practice. The maxim, make the tree good and it will bring forth good fruit, will be constantly present to philanthropists and legislators. In short, ignorance and immorality will be attacked by all possible means. All that can augment or excite the animal nature is to be avoided, and every condition that may develop the faculties proper to man is to be encouraged. Governments cannot be serious in their desire for morality so long as they encourage lotteries, countenance games of hazard, and keep mercenary soldiers in pay. The importance of the faculties proper to man, or his moral constitution in regard to general happiness, is a point which cannot be too strongly nor
too often recommended. The superior powers are satisfied by their own functions. The just, the benevolent, the religious and the disinterested need not foreign aid to satisfy their noble feelings. Inferior inclinations, on the contrary, almost always depend on the caprices of others for their gratification. The egotist, for instance, is opposed in his undertakings by those who, like him, think chiefly of themselves. The ambitious man is unhappy if he be not approved of, or honored to the extent he thinks he has deserved. He who, prompted by charity, does good, finds his reward in the deed itself; but he who does good to gain approbation, or gratitude, is liable to be deceived, and, in the very act, often prepares himself a source of sorrow. In proportion, therefore, as the animal nature shall lose in energy, and the peculiarly human faculties gain in strength, the sum of human happiness will increase.

As man, in the actual state of things, cannot be left to himself, as his actions must be directed by social institutions, it is much to be wished that these were conformable to the invariable laws of natural morality. I fear, that notwithstanding the sincerest love of truth and the purest intentions, some means which are useless, and even noxious, will be resorted to, on account of human nature not being sufficiently known.

Whatever may be done, however, the progress will necessarily be slow. Governments must as a first step begin by nourishing pure intentions, by giving up all selfish and exclusionary views and in all their particular regulations, by favoring general happiness.

Let those whose duty it is to direct society, reflect on the two natures of man; on the superiority of the one over the other; and, farther, on the faculties which compose each; let them be convinced that every fundamental power exists of itself; that charity is not the result of faith, nor faith of charity; and that all the faculties, though existing independently, may be combined, and mutually aid and excite each other.

Though the animal faculties being the principal cause of human misery, must, by all means, be diminished, yet it is to be remembered that no fundamental power can be annihilated, but the actions
of all must be directed. I have explained my ideas sufficiently, not to be suspected of speaking in favor of any arbitrary regulation; yet I shall always insist on the necessity of restraining the animal faculties by those proper to man. In my opinion, consequently, personal, as well as moral liberty is limited. I have already treated of moral liberty; I shall here add my views of that which is personal in connexion with general happiness.

CHAPTER V.

Of Personal Liberty.

Man, it is said, is born free. This proposition has been used by some authors in a very extensive signification. Every one, they have said, may do whatever he pleases. This interpretation, however, is incompatible with the constitution of the human mind. Let us observe the order of nature, that we may understand the will of the Creator.

Personal liberty we see is first limited by the laws of nature. Conception, birth, growth, health, and every function of vitality, as subjected to positive circumstances, force us at once to look on man as very dependent. Farther, man depends entirely upon others during his long infancy. And, again, as a social being, he has duties to fulfil, and rights to reclaim; now, the idea of mutual obligation is incompatible with unbounded, or that liberty which admits every kind of individual gratification. We must live and permit others to live; we must do our duty as child, as parent, and as citizen. The elucidation of these points belongs to the study of the law of nature, or of the rights and duties of man.

The personal liberty of man is also limited by the reality of his two natures, and by the superiority of the one. The animal faculties must be subordinate to the powers proper to man, and the true
Christian is still the slave of justice. This principle, the touchstone of the excellence or imperfection of civil laws, bounds at the same time those who govern and those who are governed, and it proves clearly that by the will of the Creator the personal liberty of man is limited. It has, indeed, been said repeatedly, that without morality no society can exist, and that liberty is not licentiousness. This is strictly true. The laws, however, must be just in favoring the common welfare.

Finally, the faculties proper to man may deviate from their natural destination, and this they do each time they act separately. Benevolence without justice and reflection, may do much evil, and justice without benevolence may be too severe. Thus even the most noble parts of man's nature are limited, and kept in check by each other; all must act in harmony to elicit good.

The truth, that personal liberty is very much circumscribed, is never neglected without great disorders following. We must, however, add that no one has any natural right, arbitrarily and from selfish motives, to limit the personal liberty of others. Volney says, 'Wheresoever I cast my eye, whatever the period of which I think, I find the same principles of increase, or of destruction, of elevation and of decline. If ever a nation be powerful, or an empire prosper, its conventional laws are conformable to those of nature. If, on the contrary, a state sink in ruin or be dissolved, the laws are imperfect or vicious, or the government is corrupt and violates the laws.' Civil restrictions ought to be the mere application of those of nature; they ought to be the same for every member of the community, and the aim of their imposition—the general happiness. Nature applies its laws constantly and indiscriminately; nature is incorruptible, and makes no exceptions. Human regulations alone are liable to this reproach. Governors and the governed are subjected to the same laws of propagation, of nutrition, of health, disease and death. Who can deny that nature is equally constant in the application of its moral laws? Happy period when every one will be obliged to conform his conduct to them!
In order to elucidate my ideas on the necessity of submitting the individual desires to the natural laws of morality, I shall quote physical love, attachment, self-love or covetiveness, and the love of approbation, and whatever I say of them will apply to the other feelings common to man and animals. The subordination of the animal nature to proper humanity, seems to me as necessary to the happiness of mankind, as is attention to matters used as food to individual preservation. A poisonous substance can never become wholesome aliment, and any action inimical to the happiness of mankind will never lose its essential and immoral character.

Is it permitted to limit physical love in society? The faculties proper to man decide the question. For as these are destined to general happiness, physical love being an animal feeling, must be restrained whenever it acts in opposition to their dictates. Now, there can be no doubt that the number of inhabitants in a country influences their state of being. Too crowded a population unavoidably causes misery and degeneration of the species. Both natural and Christian morality forbid us to exterminate or to forsake such unhappy beings as exist; society is even bound to take care of them, but their farther multiplication, as well as every other cause that militates against general happiness, may be lawfully opposed.

The most enlightened economists, admit that population increases in the ratio of the means of subsistence, in the same way as all living beings multiply or perish, according as they are well or ill supplied with nourishment. Vegetation prospers if the soil be well manured. Birds that live on insects are more or less numerous in districts, according to the quantity of food they afford. Herbivorous animals abound in lands which are rich in forage, and countries are peopled in proportion as they furnish the means of living. It is true that a greater number of sober and temperate than of gluttonous and luxurious persons may live in a given district, but nourishment is still the principal condition influencing population. The equilibrium between aliment and consumers is always preserved;
s sometimes, however, at the expense of a vast quantity of individual suffering. Were it not more meritorious, therefore, in governments, and more beneficial to the community at large, entirely to prevent the evil which becomes necessary to diminish the number of inhabitants? Since beggars, and those with hereditary dispositions to diseases, only propagate to the detriment of society and entail misery on their progeny, were it not better to prevent them from marriage altogether?

Let those who think differently reflect on the destination of mankind, and on all that is done, or rather neglected in society as relates to marriage, and they will not, without distinction, defend personal liberty in regard to propagation.

Both civil and religious regulations have, in some instances, restrained the desire, or even abstracted the power of propagation. Libertinism is interdicted in all countries, and adultery is punished as a crime. Soldiers and sailors are prohibited from marrying; they, however, are the stoutest and best made men; for bodily weakness and disease exempt and exclude from the military and naval service. Now, if society can prevent the choice of its youth from propagating, nay, if it think proper to make them expose their lives for the common welfare, as it is said, why should it not also have the right to interdict the marriages of those who propagate to the common calamity?

Let us farther reflect on the celibacy of priests of the Romish Church, and even on the example of Christ's apostles, who were advised against marriage. Now, if the prohibition of marriage be just and necessary as soldiers, sailors, and priests are concerned, and if polygamy in general be inadmissible, why should the propagation of infirmities and vices be endured? I think that marriages ought to be regulated by the rule of natural morality, and that this is an essential condition to general happiness. More details on this subject are given in my work on Education.

Another point conformable to the civil laws of all countries, but contrary to the morality of nature and Christianity, concerns exclusive love of every kind. Love of our family and of our country,
are natural it is true, but both are common to man and animals, hence they must be subordinate to universal charity. Farther, attachment to those around us is laudable, but justice and truth are to precede every other consideration. The man must always triumph over the animal; hence we must prefer truth and general happiness before our country; we must give up national pride and the innumerable prejudices and evils that result from it, for the sake of entire humanity. Let us appreciate things in themselves and independently of occasions or causes. The Samaritan who has compassion on an unfortunate Israelite, dresses his wounds, and takes care of him, is truly his neighbor, and not the Jew or the Levite who looks at him and passes on. On the score of universal love, man, indeed, generally, and pretended Christians particularly, are very far behind. There is no nation which practises this noble precept of Christianity, and nothing but a perfect knowledge of human nature will ever incline men to follow it, or induce them to change the erroneous and pernicious opinions they entertain on this subject.

I arrive at the third point, which is equally delicate and contested, but indispensable to general happiness; I mean the restriction of selfishness. This feeling is the most formidable of all the enemies of mankind. It particularly induces neglect of the natural laws of morality, and divides society; it excites one individual against another, family against family, and nation against nation; it saps the foundations of empires, for it sells places, justice, and even puts up Heaven and immortality at a price; it concentrates all power in an individual, and establishes absolute governments, &c. We may therefore ask whether society has the right of restraining the desire to acquire, and how far it may enforce it?

The answer is similar to that given to the questions implicating the other animal faculties. The desire to acquire is a fundamental power, and cannot be annihilated by any enactment; it is a strong motive exciting the other aptitudes and dispositions, and may be most usefully employed; however, to what extent its activity is admissible is a point not yet determined. As an animal feeling,
it must necessarily be subordinate to the moral nature; indeed, as all countries have laws against its abuses, the propriety of limiting its desires is evident.

We are, now-a-days, permitted openly to maintain the injustice and the violation of natural morality and of true Christian principles, committed when individuals are secured in the possession of peculiar privileges and immunities. We may now also dare to say that personal merit is preferable to the pride of ancestry; that it is more just to reward talents than incapacity; and that every one should be obliged to exercise his natural powers to add to the common stock of industry, and ought only to reap the fruits of his own exertions.

This, the effect of civilisation, is a great step towards natural morality—the only basis of general happiness; but I dare maintain that it is not yet sufficient to render it paramount. The obstacle lies in the inequality of natural talents, and in the weakness of the moral sentiments, in by far the greater number of individuals. So long as every one shall work merely for his own interest, fortunes will necessarily be unequal. A few will succeed each other in opulence, and many will dwell in poverty and misery. This inconvenience is mentioned in the Christian system; a difference of natural gifts is recognised; but all are commanded to employ their endowments to the common advantage.

In this, as in every discussion having the actions of man for its object, I start from the principle that natural morality ought to govern mankind, and that general happiness is preferable to that of individuals. He then who uses his faculties to the furtherance of the common weal, ought to enjoy full liberty, and to meet encouragement in his noble purposes; while all who think only of their private interest are to be superintended, lest the commonwealth suffer by their undertakings.

Great manufactories, for instance, which are so apt to ruin the body and the mind of those engaged in them, must be overlooked; no one has the right to make others vicious and unhappy, that he may procure enjoyments or amass riches; and if personal morality
suffice not to prevent the doing evil, society has a prime right to interfere, and, guided by general morality, to supply all that is defective.

Hence, universal happiness, as it is the aim of legislation in general, must be the basis of all enactments relative to property. So long as individuals shall be suffered to collect riches without limits, the causes of misery and of slavery will endure. The poor will sell themselves to the rich, and the rich will find easy means of imposing their arbitrary will as law upon society.

This, however, is a subject surrounded by innumerable difficulties. Much has been written upon it, but all has not yet rendered it clear in every one of its points. Property must be respected, otherwise civil wars and the dissolution of society would be unavoidable; but, again, if in the regulations concerning property, general happiness be neglected, the order of things established cannot be permanent. Fortunes get more and more concentrated, the equilibrium is disturbed, and in the end the rich to maintain possession are obliged to repel by force the attacks of the poor, who think themselves strong in their numbers. The division of property is, therefore, a necessary condition to general happiness; hence, primogeniture is inadmissible, and opposed to natural morality, which recognises reward as well-bestowed for personal merit alone. I have already said, that if it be unjust to punish children for the faults of parents, it cannot be just to reward them for the merits of sires; I add—

That to me it seems necessary for the nations which would secure a permanent existence, to fix the maximum of the property that may be acquired, as well as the conditions, viz., natural morality, in conformity with which it may be amassed; or else, as it seems fair that every one should enjoy the fruits of his labor, parents might, under certain conditions, be permitted to acquire to the extent they pleased, but still have the power of transmitting a certain sum only to their children when arrived at the age of maturity, while the rest of their gains should revert to the commonwealth, and be employed in purposes of public usefulness. This
would be the best way of doing justice to the community, and of preventing idleness, that foster-parent of vice.

History proves that nations attain the highest prosperity when every one is permitted to work for his peculiar advantage; but history also proves that this prosperity is not permanent; its very causes involve the elements of decline; for luxury, indolence, moral corruption, degeneracy of body, and feebleness of mind, are consequences of its temporary endurance, and these are the sure precursors to the death of empires. I leave this discussion to those who are occupied with politics. I am particularly interested in calling the attention of all thinking people to the necessity of founding society on the broad basis of natural morality, itself the sole, sure, and unalterable foundation of universal welfare. This ground is more stable than that which sensual pleasures or the arts and sciences can supply. The indulgence of inferior appetites degrades, morality ennobles human nature, and is indispensable, whilst the arts and sciences are mere embellishments of existence. Jesus taught his disciples to be satisfied with their daily bread and with what is necessary to their existence. He condemned riches in the most severe terms.

To impress still more deeply the importance of subordinating the animal feelings to the faculties proper to man, I shall speak summarily of the love of approbation. This sentiment exists in animals and in man, and exercises a powerful influence over all our actions in society. Still to permit its unbounded activity is a very great error. Nations in whom it prevails are scarcely fit for a free government, servility, so to speak, is their natural bent. Blinded by external appearances they overlook the common welfare. Titles, decorations, encomiums are effectual instruments in the hands of their governors to enslave them.

Two prime errors are to be guarded against; in the first place, distinction is never to be conferred on account of actions resulting from the animal nature, undirected by the superior faculties; and again, distinction ought never to be the aim of human actions.

From all I have said then, it follows that I consider the submis-
sion to the natural laws and the practice of natural morality as indispensible to the welfare of mankind at large, and that all social institutions ought to be founded on this natural morality, which has been, is, and will ever be, invariable. Individually I call those happy who enjoy good health and without difficulty subject their animal nature to the faculties proper to man; who, for instance, are satisfied with such things as are merely necessary—with their daily bread; who desire not superfluities, luxuries, riches, or distinctions; who taste of all pleasures in moderation, enjoying every thing, but abusing nothing; who cultivate art or science for the delights it affords; who in every situation do their duty, and who stand not in need of others or foreign aid, to satisfy their active faculties. Unhappy, on the other hand, are almost all who look for their personal well-being in things which are opposed to natural morality; who have many and active faculties, the satisfaction of which depends on others; whose inferior faculties, in short, are the most energetic, especially if they injure the health, and if their indulgence be expensive.

SECTION VIII.

Explanation of different Philosophical Expressions.

Nothing is more vague than the language of philosophy. Many expressions have several significations, and almost every term in use has been invented to designate actions, and not the faculties which produce them. To make this difference felt I shall collect several of the most common words, and in one column give their usual signification, in another their explanation according to the fundamental faculties, referring the reader to the passages either in the physiological or in the philosophical part of this work, in which the terms as they occur are more particularly explained.
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS.

Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties.

**Absolute.**

Unconditional; not relative. Nothing but God is absolute. In man every thing is relative and conditional.

**Admiration.**

A tribute paid by individuals to whatever appears to them good and excellent. It is an affection of the sense of marvellousness.

**Adoration.**

The external homage paid to the Divinity. The effect of the sense of veneration.

**Affectation.**

A singular manner of speaking; the making an external appearance in order to attract the attention of others. It results from the love of approbation when not combined with understanding; it increases in combination with secretiveness and ideality.

**Affections.**

Certain states of the mind. They are the modes of being affected of the fundamental faculties. See p. 56 of this volume.

**Ambition.**

Great desire of preferment and distinction. An effect of great activity of the love of approbation applied to things of importance. See p. 206, vol. i.
Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties.

Anger.
Uneasiness upon a receipt of any disagreeable sensation. A violent emotion with an inclination to revenge.

Apathy.
The quality of not feeling; exemption from passion; freedom from mental excitation. Inactivity of every fundamental faculty; it is partial, or more or less general.

Ardor.
Heat, or eagerness in action. Great activity of every fundamental power.

Art.
A word used in opposition to nature; something effected by skill and dexterity. The result of individual powers of the mind.

Attention.
Application of the mind to any subject. The result of the individual intellectual faculties. See p. 42 of this volume.

Attrition.
Grief of sin arising from the fear of punishment. A disagreeable affection of the sense of conscientiousness caused by that of veneration, assisted by benevolence and circumspection.
Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties.

**Beautiful.**

Each agreeable sensation by means of hearing and seeing. It designs the harmonious relations between external impressions and the intellectual faculties of the mind, principally the senses of extension, configuration, coloring, tone, and order.

**Belief.**

Credit given to something which we know not of ourselves. Hope disposes to belief; hope and marvellousness produce religious belief.

**Benevolence.**

Disposition to do good. A fundamental faculty. See p. 212, vol. i.

**Charming.**

Pleasing in the highest degree. Springs from a high degree of satisfaction of every fundamental faculty.

**Compassion.**

Painful sympathy. A disagreeable affection, or mode of action of benevolence.

**Confusion.**

Distraction of mind and indistinct combination of ideas. Defect of order in general, discord among the functions.
Common Significations.

**Conscience.**

The faculty by which we judge of good and evil.

**Constancy.**

Unalterable continuance. The effect of firmness assisted by the activity of the individual faculties.

**Consternation.**

Astonishment accompanied with terror. An affection of marvellousness and circumspection without hope and courage.

**Contempt.**


**Contentment.**

Acquiescence without plenary satisfaction. A degree of satisfaction of every fundamental faculty.

**Contrition.**

Sorrow for sin. A disagreeable affection of conscientiousness, caused by benevolence, veneration, and marvellousness.
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS.

Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties.

**Courage.**

Active fortitude. A fundamental power. See p. 185, Vol. i.

**Cruelty.**

Delight taken in the pain of others. It results from the satisfaction of destructiveness without benevolence.

**Cupidity.**

Unlawful longing. Great activity of acquisitiveness.

**Desire.**

Wish to enjoy. A result of every faculty in action. See p. 53, of this vol.

**Desolation.**

A sort of mixture of melancholy and despair. A disagreeable affection of attachment, and of benevolence, or of circumspection without courage, hope, and firmness.

**Despair.**

Hopelessness. A disagreeable affection of circumspection without hope.

**Despise.**

An act of contempt. A disagreeable affection of self-
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<tr>
<th>Common Significations</th>
<th>Explanation according to the Faculties</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diffidence.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Want of confidence.</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>The effect of circumspection,</td>
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<td>combined with secretiveness</td>
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<td>and intellect.</td>
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<td><strong>Disdain.</strong></td>
<td><strong>A sort of contempt.</strong></td>
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<td>A disagreeable affection of self-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>esteem.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disorder.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Irregularity, neglect of rule.</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Want of order and time; often</td>
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<td>also want of justice and benevole-</td>
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<td>nce.</td>
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<td><strong>Doubt.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Uncertainty of mind.</strong></td>
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<td>The effect of circumspection,</td>
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<td>combined with intellect.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Duty.</strong></td>
<td><strong>That to which a man is by any</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>natural or legal obligation bound.</td>
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<td>The effect of conscientiousness.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Envy.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pain felt at the sight of excel-</strong></td>
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<td>lence or happiness in another.</td>
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<td>The effect of selfishness, combined</td>
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<td>with various inferior powers, and</td>
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<td>without benevolence.</td>
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Ecstasy.
Rapture and excessive elevation of the mind. The faculties of marvellousness, ideality, mirthfulness, and hope, dispose to this state of mind.

Faith.
Belief in the revealed truths of religion. The effect of marvellousness and hope.

Friendship.

Fright.
A strong and sudden fear. A strong and sudden affection of circumspection.

Fury.
A violent fit of anger. An affection and strong irritation of courage and destructiveness.

Genius.
A man endowed with mental powers in a high degree. The highest degree of activity of the individual faculties.

Grief.
Sorrow for something past. A state of dissatisfaction of every fundamental faculty.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties.

Hatred.

Ill-will. A compound affection, it results from opposition to our selfish views, whilst benevolence and justice are inactive.

Happiness.

State of satisfaction. The effect of the satisfaction of every fundamental faculty.

Haughtiness.


Honor.

Reputation, dignity. Its basis is the love of approbation. It is often modified by self-love and veneration.

Hope.

Expectation of something which we desire. A fundamental power. See Vol. i.

Horror.

Terror, mixed with detestation. A disagreeable, more or less compound, affection of benevolence, veneration, justice, circumspection, approbation, and configuration.
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS.

Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties.

Idea.

Thought, mental image. The effect of each intellectual faculty.

Imagination.

The power of forming ideas, and of representing ideas of absent things. The spontaneous and great activity of every faculty; activity of ideality. See p. 38, of this volume.

Impatience.

Inability to suffer delay. Great activity of every fundamental faculty.

Impetuosity.

Great vivacity in action. Great and quick activity of the fundamental faculties, principally of ideality, self-love, courage, of the love of approbation and of mirthfulness, without circumspection.

Inattention.

Want of attention. Inactivity of every intellectual faculty. See. p. 35 of this volume.

Indifference.

Unconcernedness. Little activity of every fundamental faculty
Common Significations.

Indignation.

Anger, mingled with contempt or disgust. A compound affection of self-esteem, justice, courage, and the love of approbation.

Indolence.

Laziness, carelessness. Little activity of the fundamental faculties.

Insolence.

Pride, displayed in contemptuous treatment of others. The effect of great self-esteem, courage, and other inferior feelings, combined with little justice.

Instinct.

An impulse to act in the mind not determined by deliberation. The effect of spontaneous activity of every faculty. See p. 28, of this volume.

Jealousy.

Suspicious caution, or rivalry. A compound affection of selfishness, and various fundamental powers.

Joy.

A lively and agreeable emotion of the mind. An agreeable affection of every fundamental faculty, particularly of the feelings.

Judgment.

The power of judging; the determination come to. A mode of action of the intellectual faculties. See p. 40, of this volume.
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS.

Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties.

Knowledge.

Cognizance, clear perception. The effect of the activity of every intellectual faculty.

Love (physical.)

The passion between the sexes. A fundamental power. See vol. i. p. 147.

Lukewarm.

Indifferent, not ardent. Little activity of the fundamental faculties.

Melancholy.

A gloomy temper. A disagreeable affection of the feelings, particularly of circumspection.

Memory.

The power of recollecting things past. An internal repetition of its function by every intellectual faculty. See this vol. p. 36.

Moderation.

Forbearance; not going to extremities. A moderate activity of every faculty.

Modesty.

Decency, purity of manners. Little activity of self-esteem with benevolence, circumspection, and justice.
Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties.

Morality.
Practice of the duties of life. The effect of the faculties proper to man, particularly of conscientiousness.

Negligence.
The habit of omitting, or of acting carelessly. Little activity of the individual faculties, particularly of order, of the desire to acquire, &c.

Nobility.
Persons of high rank. True nobility results from activity of the superior sentiments.

Pain.
A disagreeable sensation. A disagreeable affection of every fundamental faculty.

Passion.
Violent emotion of the mind. The highest degree of activity of every faculty. See p. 52, of this volume.

Patience.
The power of expecting long, or of suffering without discontent. Moderate activity of the faculties, supported by circumspection, firmness, and sometimes by benevolence; also, the activity of individual faculties, assisted by firmness.
**Common Significations** | **Explanation according to the Faculties.**
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**Perplexity.**

Distraction and irresolution of mind.  

A compound affection of circumspection, combined with the love of approbation and justice, increased by little courage.

**Pleasure.**

Gratification of the mind.  

An agreeable affection of every faculty.

**Pretension.**

Claim, true or false.  

Great activity of self-esteem, increased by the love of approbation.

**Rage.**

Violent anger.  

Great activity of courage and destructiveness.

**Ravishment.**

Violent but pleasing excitement of the mind.  

A high degree of pleasure produced by the satisfaction of every faculty very active.

**Regret.**

Vexation for something past.  

A disagreeable affection of every faculty combined with the remembrance of some enjoyment lost.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties.

Reminiscence.
Recollection. The peculiar memory of the power of knowing facts (Eventuality). See p. 38 of this vol.

Remorse; or, Repentance.
Pain of guilt. A disagreeable affection of conscientiousness.

Science.
Knowledge built on principles. It is the effect of the reflective applied to the perceptive faculties.

Self-esteem.
A fundamental power. See vol. i. p. 208.

Sensation.
Perception by means of the The knowledge of every impression either external or internal. See p. 32 of this vol.

Shame.
The passion felt when reputation is supposed to be lost, or when a bad action is detected. A disagreeable affection of the love of approbation, combined with justice and circumspection.

Sorrowful.
Mournful; grieving. A disagreeable affection of every faculty.
Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Spite.

Malice, rancor.

A disagreeable affection of self-esteem and courage.

Stupor.

Great diminution, or suspension of sensibility.

A great degree of inactivity of the faculties.

Sublime.

Exalted, high in excellence.

The effect of ideality, combined with the superior sentiments, and intellectual faculties.

Temperance.

Moderation and sedateness.

A moderate activity of the inferior feelings.

Temptation.

The act of tempting, and the state of being tempted.

The effect of every active faculty which incites to action.

Tranquil.

Quiet.

The effect of little activity.

Uneasiness.

State of disquiet.

The effect of great activity of every faculty.

Unhappiness.

Distress.

The state of dissatisfaction of every active faculty.
Common Significations.  Explanation according to the Faculties

Unreasonable.

Want of reason.  Inactivity of the reflecting faculties.

Vengeance.

The desire and act of rendering evil for evil.  Self-esteem being offended, combined with courage, destructiveness, and other inferior sentiments, whilst benevolence and justice are inactive, incites to revenge.

Virtue.

Moral goodness, that which gives excellence.  Every action conformable to natural morality; the result of the contest between the two natures of man.

Want.

The state of not having; desire.  Want, in the sense of desire, is the effect of every active faculty.

Will.

A faculty of the mind, and the determination which results from it.  Decision according to motives which are proper to man, and enlightened by the reflecting faculties.—See p. 47 of this volume.

Wisdom.

The power of judging rightly.  The regulation of every action, by the rule of natural morality.
Recapitulation and Conclusion.

In this volume I flatter myself with having proved that idealists and moralists have confined themselves to general notions of the mind, and have taken mere modes of action for fundamental faculties. I have proposed a new classification of the faculties of the mind, capable of being ascertained by observation and applicable in social life. Moreover, I have examined into the origin of the fundamental faculties, and shown that neither outward circumstances, nor education, nor the external senses, nor the will, explains their existence; but that each is innate, and depends on the cerebral organization for its exhibition.

I have particularly insisted on the moral nature of man, and am convinced that the lovers of truth will not now accuse Phrenology of teaching either materialism or fatalism, in the sense that the faculties being innate, act irresistibly. I have considered the conditions necessary to liberty, the nature of moral liberty, and the origin of evil. I have compared Christianity with the natural morality of man, and am of opinion, that true Christianity will gain by the knowledge of human nature. I have decided in favor of natural goodness, because it may rather be depended on than the goodness which is prompted by virtue. I have entered into some considerations relative to the practical part of Phrenology, and spoken of the modifications observable in the manifestations of each faculty; of the difficulty of judging of others; of the necessity of mutual indulgence; of natural sympathy and antipathy; and of the happiness of mankind. At the end I have given an explanation of several expressions according to the fundamental faculties of the mind, and their modes of action.
Conclusion.

The object of anthropology in its extensive signification is immense, extremely difficult, but important and interesting in the same proportion. It will still require much exertion to be rendered perfect. I shall be happy if I succeed in calling the attention of others to the study of man, and particularly to the consideration of his moral nature, which is essential to general happiness, and which, I think, has been too much neglected in modern times. I conclude in hopes that the things prescribed by Providence, and the victorious forces of truth will finally prevail.

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