AN INQUIRY
CONCERNING
THE NATURE AND OPERATIONS
OF THE
HUMAN MIND,
IN WHICH
THE SCIENCE OF PHRENOLOGY, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY,
PUNISHMENT, AND EDUCATION,
ARE PARTICULARLY CONSIDERED.
(A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE MECHANICS' INSTITUTION,
LONDON.)
WITH NUMEROUS
ADDITIONS, CORRECTIONS, AND NOTES.

BY JAMES JENNINGS,
AUTHOR OF THE FAMILY CYCLOPAEDIA, OBSERVATIONS ON THE DIALECTS OF THE
WEST OF ENGLAND, ORNITHOLOGIA, &c. &c.

"Quod ea varit." "A subject which, till it is well thought of, and handled and discussed freely,
boldly, and fearlessly, by all mankind, will continue, as it long has continued
to perplex, to divide, and to mislead us."
"Nil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuit in sensu."

LONDON:
POOLE AND EDWARDS,
(SUCCESSORS TO SCATCHRD AND LETTERMAN,) 12, AVE-MARIA-LANE.
1828.
Price 2s. 6d.
3/3.
To A. J. HAMILTON, Esq.

OF DALZELL, SCOTLAND.

DEAR SIR,

In the acquisition of a high degree of Happiness, three things appear absolutely necessary: Friendship, Sincerity, and Truth. That I possess your Friendship I hope and believe; that you are sincere I have no doubt; and that both you and myself are in the pursuit of Truth, wherever she may lead, I am equally well assured. To you, therefore, I dedicate these pages, as I know that, should you find any errors in them, your kindness will point them out; should you find Truth, you will approve.

I am,

DEAR SIR,

Sincerely and faithfully yours,

JAMES JENNINGS.

LONDON; March, 1828.
Mr. Deville of the Strand, who is distinguished for his intimate acquaintance with practical Phrenology, has kindly looked over that part of this Tract which relates to his favourite pursuit, and has added a few Notes, which his initials, J. D., designate.

Errata.—Page 10, line 8, for suit read suits; page 11, line 18, for annulare read annulare; line 22, for Chiselden read Cheselden; line 25, for receives read receive; page 12, line ult. for genera read orders; page 16, line 22, for entitled read entitled.
ON THE

NATURE AND OPERATIONS

OF THE

HUMAN MIND.

"Trace Science then, with modesty thy guide;
First, strip off all her equipage of Pride;
Deduct what is but Vanity or Dress,
Or Learning's Luxury or Idleness;
Or tricks to show the stretch of Human Brain."

Pope.

We are met this evening to consider one of the most momentous and important subjects that can occupy the attention of man. A subject concerning which volumes have been written; a subject that is by no means yet exhausted; a subject with which it behoves us all to become, as much as possible, acquainted; a subject, a correct knowledge of which does not depend on the deductions of learning, nor on the dicta of the professor; nor does it lie in the supposed arcana of any mysticism—the jargon of the schools; nor in the wordy vocabulary of the system builder. A subject which, for all practical and useful purposes, may be studied with equal advantage, and with equal facility, by the Peasant as well as by the Prince. A subject which, till it is well thought of, and handled and discussed freely, boldly, and fearlessly by all mankind, will continue, as it long has continued, to perplex, to divide, and to mislead us. I need scarcely add that the subject to which I allude, and to which I now propose to direct your attention, is what has been usually termed the Human Mind;—to a knowledge of the nature of intellectual man—to a knowledge of ourselves.

It may be useful in the commencement of our inquiry to remark, that as all our knowledge, it will now I presume be generally admitted, can only be derived through the medium and by the operation of the senses; and, as such knowledge is the result of facts observed and recorded, or observed and communicated, either
by ourselves or others (the more of which each of us can observe, communicate, and record the greater probability there is of our arriving at Truth in any inquiry,) so, in our researches concerning the important subject before us, it is extremely desirable, not only to observe (accurately of course) what is passing within and around us, to communicate to others and to record such facts; but also, as much as possible, to dismiss any previous impression and conceptions, not warranted by facts, from our minds. Or, if we shall not be able to do this, it behoves us, at least, to be extremely cautious in drawing inferences from such previous impressions which our knowledge of facts does not, at present, warrant, and which, possibly, future and more extended observation may completely overthrow. Thus always endeavouring to keep the mind in a state or disposition to be taught—a state of no ordinary import in the pursuit of knowledge, and the best result of knowledge—Human Happiness. A state it must, however, be admitted, not always easily attained, and sometimes, with difficulty, borne; but a state, on subjects concerning which certainty has not been yet attained, it is our duty, nevertheless, to endeavour to attain and bear. And if Doubt be not the commencement of wisdom, candid and liberal inquiry will be found, at any rate, the best road to it.

Knowledge, it scarcely needs to be observed, is a plant of slow growth. How many years—how many ages,—how much of human effort—of unwearied diligence—of anxiety, labour, and care have there not been already consumed in bringing us to our present state of intelligence! Ages yet to come, much care, much anxiety, and much benevolence, too, must still be employed in the progressive addition to our knowledge; when, most probably, the future inhabitants of the Earth will look back with a smile, upon the efforts and the labours of what we may now esteem our philosophical Giants; but which futurity will most assuredly contemplate with very different eyes—as slight glimmerings in their more extended horizon of knowledge, and of little or no importance!

For, what do we now actually know of the Nature of the Mind?—May it not be fearlessly asserted that, with all our observed and recorded knowledge concerning it, we are still like infants?—Effects and operations have, it is true, been often noted; but the causes of these effects and operations have been more rarely traced; or if noted and traced, they have not been noted and traced with that care and accuracy which the subject requires. It cannot be denied that the Prejudices, and the Hopes and Fears of mankind, have been too often the chief excitments, the chief arbiters in such inquiries.

We are, besides, continually told of the obscurity of the subject—of the difficulty of all metaphysical inquiries—of the unprofitable nature of such speculations, and a tremendous et cetera of objections sufficient to deter ordinary minds from the pursuit. The very terms
metaphysics and metaphysical have been made abhorrent; added to which, we are often told that a few favoured minds only seem destined to unfold and to explain the mysterious arcana of the Human Mind.

I care nothing about the retention of such terms as metaphysics and metaphysical; you may discard them and as much other intellectual and non-intellectual verbiage and rubbish as you please; I care little for terms, I ask for facts. But I protest most decidedly and emphatically against such doctrines and dogmas! To what do they tend?—To discourage ordinary minds from the pursuit of this self knowledge, a knowledge of all others the most to be prized, and without which all other knowledge is, comparatively, vain.

Similar to such dogmas, such extinguishers of inquiry, is the trite assertion that Truth is to be found in a well. I do not exactly know to whom the world is indebted for this precept; but, according to my humble apprehension and experience, Truth, so far from being found by digging deep into any subject, as is usually believed, is most commonly to be met with in open day, on the surface, and within the reach of every one. I am sure, at any rate, that the most useful Truths are very often the most exposed; and for this reason, and for this reason only, very often overlooked. As far as my inquiries have hitherto gone concerning the Human Mind, I have found them abundantly confirmatory of the same position.

But, it may be said, Have we not already before us, concerning the Human Mind, tract upon tract, treatise upon treatise, and volume upon volume;—in fact, is not the literary world deluged with works upon the subject; have you not in the works of Locke alone a whole library?—True, you have whole libraries upon the subject; but may I not, with some service to the cause of Truth, ask, Are not most of the writings on the Human Mind enveloped in a cloud of words and dust; and are they not calculated rather to suit the theories or fine fancies of our theorizers than the great original which they profess to describe; and hence, when compared with the only standard by which they can be properly estimated, the mind itself, few, if any, of the voluminous writings concerning it, will correspond with that noble, that intellectual portion of man?—I know no one work written professedly on the subject that is not liable to great and serious objections.

While I state this, I entreat that I may not be misunderstood. Many writers of eminence, (among whom may be named, Locke, Hartley, and the late Dr. Brown of Edinburgh,) have done considerable service to mankind by their inquiries concerning the Human Mind; but what I am desirous of pressing upon your attention is, the necessity of examining all that is stated with a sincere desire to obtain the Truth, regardless of previously received theories, admitted dogmas, or the authority of names; an authority of the most dangerous kind, and against which we cannot be too much on
our guard. I am afraid that Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding has made as many university pedants as any book that was ever written.*

In what I shall myself state, I can most cordially assure you that it would give me considerable uneasiness could I suppose that any person present, would adopt one opinion stated by me this evening, till, by inquiry and examination, he had thoroughly satisfied his own mind of its truth. What possible satisfaction can any one receive from instructing or attempting to instruct others, if he do no more for them than just to make them capable of parrot imitation?—The mere assent to any proposition, with which it is to be regretted too many persons rest satisfied, is little else than a mockery. I trust that our inquiries here to-night will tend to something more than this.

* The same may be said of many of the Poetic-Philosophical writings of Pope. Of his Savins I have spoken elsewhere.* Perhaps there will be found as many fundamental errors in Porsn's Essay on Man as in any popular work in our language. There is this particular evil tendency in Pope's dogmas, that they appear extremely specious, and have misled, I doubt not, a great many minds either incapable of or indisposed for examination. The poetical dress too in which they are conveyed is extremely seductive. I shall perhaps be asked for some example of Pope's errors. His mistakes on Instinct are pointed out in a note to the House Sparrow's Speech in my Ornithologia; but I may mention here the sophism on which he insists in his Essay—whatever is, is right, and with which he concludes his first Epistle.

"And, spite of pride, in erring Reason's spite,
One truth is clear. Whatever is, is right."* Surely if, whatever is, is right, the absurdity of Mr. Pope's writing at all must be evident. Is it not also evident that many things in the moral world are not right, and that we are continually endeavouring, very wisely in my opinion, to make them so? It is therefore extremely unphilosophical to say every thing is right, when daily experience and our sufferings inform us to the contrary.

Speaking of Brutes, he says,

"See then the acting and comparing powers
One in their nature which are two in ours.''

The note on instinct in the House Sparrow's Speech, above referred to, is a sufficient refutation of this doctrine.

"For forms of government let fools contest,
Whate'er is best administer'd is best."

But are we not, therefore, to choose the best form of government—that is, one calculated to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number? Yet, according to Pope, contesting about it, that is, I presume, arguing about its fitness or unfitness for promoting human happiness, is foolery. And this is called by some, the fine philosophy of Pope!

Indeed we can scarcely walk over a line in this Essay without stumbling; he says again:

"Take Nature's path and mad opinions leave,
All states can reach it and all heads conceive;
Obvious her goods, in no extreme they dwell,
There needs but thinking right and meaning well."

* See Metropolitan Literary Journal, page 301.
In the present disquisition I shall endeavour, as much as possible, to divest the subject of all technicality and mystery; and if I shall not, in every case, succeed in doing this, I trust you will attribute it to the difficulty under which most of us labour, and from which I do not pretend to be exempt, namely, that of not being able readily do divest ourselves of impressions received early, and which very often accompany us during the whole period of our existence here. Those however who expect this evening, from me, a systematic discourse concerning the Human Mind will be, I fear, disappointed: I promise no such thing. My aim in calling the public attention to the subject has been, chiefly, to excite discussion concerning it; believing, as I do, that it is a subject, the consideration of which is of the utmost consequence in promoting human happiness; and to make such observations as will, I hope, lead to more correct conceptions concerning the nature of the mind, as well as concerning its multifarious operations; and also to prompt my auditors to more extensive observation and inquiry than the subject has hitherto received; or which it has been thought capable of receiving, at least by ordinary minds. If in this Lecture I attempted to systematize I should do that of which in other writers I have just complained. I am desir-

Who can tell us, in morals, where Nature's path is? what thinking right is and what meaning well is? The meaning well of some persons will be found foolishness; the thinking right of others very wrong or never understood; and Nature's path, if found and followed, will frequently mislead us.

To go from the Essay on Man to his Universal Prayer, which is one of the most unexceptionable of Pope's pieces—yet, when he says, "And binding Nature fast in fate

Leit free the human will," who does not see here a complete absence of justness of thought and philosophical precision?—while in his Essay he says, speaking of the Universe, that it is all

"Direction which thou canst not see;
All harmony not understood."

What sort of harmony there can possibly be in the supposed Freedom of the Human Will I leave the advocate of Pope to prove.

His writings concerning women are any thing but just:

"Most women have no characters at all," he says; then I say, let Man take the discredit to himself for not paying more attention to the formation of their characters. See the conclusion of this Lecture.

The truth seems to be, that he really knew very little concerning the nature of the Human Mind or of effect and cause. He seems to have skimmed over the surface of things, but was, very possibly, an indifferent observer; or, he was contented to take his philosophical opinions on trust from St. John, Lord Bozingham. In soter seriousness, while I am willing to offer my homage to Pope as a Poet, and can abundantly testify to the pleasure which his poetical writings have afforded me, yet to him as a Philosopher, or a moralist, I cannot defer: his Essay on Man is beset with errors and contradictions. It has, nevertheless, many fine lines, (such as those at the head of this Lecture,) some good poetry, and occasionally some philanthropy; but it ought to be read with great circumspection; indeed I greatly question the propriety of its being placed in the hands of the young, before their principles are fixed, and their minds have acquired tone and stability.
out of calling your attention to facts; I leave to future observers, to more able hands, when we possess a much greater accumulation of facts, to systematize; we have systematized, I believe, on this, as well as on some other scientific subjects, much too soon.

The term mind has been used with many different shades of meaning. Dr. Johnson's first definition of it in his Dictionary is, intelligent power; his second intellectual capacity. A very slight consideration will convince us that neither of these definitions suit exactly the subject which we are now considering. The fact seems to be, that the term mind, like most terms in common use, is a very vague and indefinite one, so that, perhaps, scarcely two persons will be found who agree concerning it. Sometimes mind, in its most enlarged signification, implies, not only the intellectual powers of man, so called, consisting of that assemblage of impressions and processes distinguished by various names, such as sensation, perception, ideas, memory, judgment, imagination, the Passions, &c. including, besides, such terms as reason and will, but also of some organ or recipient which receives such impressions, and in which are performed or take place, the various processes which have been very often denominated, in conjunction with the organ or recipient itself, the mind; sometimes the understanding. But the analytical inquiry which I propose in this discourse will lead us to take a very different method in the nomenclature of mind.

Whenever, therefore, I speak in this lecture of the mind, it is to be understood as implying simply the organ or recipient, to which I have just alluded, and not to the processes performed by or which take place in it. The seat of this organ or recipient is, apparently, the brain; but whether distinct from it, as many believe, or a consequence merely of its peculiar nature—that is, whether it be distinct from the brain, or the brain itself, are questions into the discussion of which it is not my intention to enter; it will be sufficient for our purpose to know and to admit that such an organ or recipient exists.

The human brain consists of the whole of that mass which, with its surrounding membranes and vessels, fills the greater part of the skull. It is said to be larger in man in proportion to the nerves belonging to it than in any other animal. It is divided into the cerebrum, cerebellum, tuber annulare, and medulla oblongata; the whole of which weighs usually about 48 or 50 ounces; but its weight varies in different subjects.

The cerebrum, which is by far the largest portion, is contained in all the upper part of the skull; it is divided into a right and left hemisphere by a membrane, a process of the dura mater, termed falx. Each hemisphere is again subdivided into three lobes; the two lying in the front portion of the skull being the largest. It is surrounded with membranes, and accompanied with blood vessels. The outer substance of the brain is called cortical or cinerious, it being of a greyish colour resembling wood-ashes. The interior,
called medullary, is of a whitish colour with a slight tinge of yellow; it is greater in quantity, more opaque and firmer in texture, than the cineritious part. Spread on glass and viewed with a microscope it appears a kind of pulp consisting of globules much smaller than the blood; plunged into boiling oil, macerated in alcohol or in some of the diluted acids, it becomes firmer and more elastic, and on being macerated in a particular direction, exhibits a fibrous appearance. The cortical part also exhibits something of the same kind. The cortical and medullary parts of the brain are also frequently blended together so as to form streaks.

The cerebellum or little brain is situated in the back part of the skull, beneath the posterior lobes of the cerebrum, from which it is separated by a membrane called tectorium. It is divided by the falx minor into two hemispheres, which are again subdivided into lobules. It consists of cineritious and medullary matter, similar to that of the cerebrum; but the cineritious bears a greater proportion to the medullary in the former than in the latter.

The tuber annulare is of a roundish form and about an inch in length and of the same width; it is connected with the cerebrum and cerebellum. From the tuber annulare arises the medulla oblongata, which forms the beginning of the spinal marrow.

Cheselden says that wounds in the cerebrum, though very dangerous, are not mortal; but in the cerebellum and medulla oblongata cause sudden death; and in the spinal marrow, loss of sense in all the parts which receives nerves from below the wound. A proof, I presume, that the chief seat of vitality is in the cerebellum and medulla oblongata.* Yet some late cases of wounds in the cerebellum appear to contradict this statement of Cheselden in regard to that organ.

From the Brain arise nine pairs of nerves; some in solid cords, others in separate threads which afterwards unite into cords. Of these some have their origin in the cerebrum, some in the cerebellum, some in the tuber annulare, and some in the medulla oblongata. From these, of course, those supplying the organs of smell, sight, taste, hearing, and feeling in part, are derived. The great intercostal or sympathetic nerve communicates with the fifth and sixth pair; the pair called pars vag a arises in the medulla oblongata. This and the sympathetic pair supply some of the most important parts of the body with nerves; such as the Lungs, Heart, Stomach, Diaphragm, &c.

The nerves are described by anatomists as pairs not because they proceed together from the brain and spinal marrow; but because

* "A wound in the cerebellum does not generally cause sudden death: but injury or wound in the left lobe causes a wasting of the testis dexter, and vice versa a wasting in the testis sinister; this has been proved beyond a doubt. An injury of both lobes of the cerebellum destroys the procreative power."—J. D.

The Phrenologists say that the organs of amaneress are in the cerebellum.
they proceed from the opposite lobes of the brain, or from opposite sides of the spinal column, and supply similar parts on each side of the head and body with similar nerves. And, hence, it often happens in paralysis, that, on one side of the body, all the nerves perform their office imperfectly, while on the other side no diminution of nervous energy is evinced. And, hence, as all the sentient faculties have a double set of organs, it is apparent why the intellect is sometimes clear although one set may be considerably diseased.

From the spinal marrow are given out thirty pairs of nerves; these, in conjunction with those arising from the brain, communicate energy and feeling to the whole body; and also, by their extreme sensibility, convey to the brain, the mind, by what means is not even now accurately known, the slightest as well as the strongest impressions made upon the different organs; and hence our pleasures and pains, our hopes, our fears, and our affections.

Having directed your attention to the brain, we shall not I trust be unprofitably employed in now devoting a few moments to Phrenology; a science which, by the zeal of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, has latterly excited no ordinary interest; and which promises, should their positions concerning this Science be confirmed, to be of no common importance to mankind.

As I have lately paid some attention to this science, I hope the Phrenologists will pardon me if I say, that they seem to have been much too eager to theorize and systematize; that the facts already observed and recorded concerning the mind appear to me by far too few to warrant us in mapping out the skull as the Phrenologists have done. But there is, notwithstanding, one fact alleged by these gentlemen which, if subsequent and more extensive observation shall confirm, will enable us to attain some precision in this novel science. The alleged fact to which I allude is, that the Intellectual Powers reside in the front part, and the Animal powers in the back part of the skull;* or, to speak more correctly, that portion of the brain which is in the forepart of the skull is employed in intellectual operations; and that portion which is in the back part of the skull is engaged in such operations and functions as belong to the mere animal. The Phrenologists, however, proceed much farther than this. They say that man is endowed with thirty-three or more (some say, thirty-five+) distinct organs or faculties in the brain; that in proportion as these are developed, prominent, will be the disposition of the individual for the performance of actions to which those faculties prompt him. They have divided these faculties into two genera, namely, Feelings and Intellects. The Feel-

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* "This is fully proved." — J. D.

† "That there are thirty-five organs, together with the seats of them, is now proved beyond all doubt; taking the individual cases in my own collection, I now have upwards of seventy thousand without one in contradiction." — J. D.
... they divide into two genera, namely, Propensities and Sentiments. The Propensities consist of amativeness or Physical Love; of philoprogenitiveness or the Love of Children; of destructive or Propensity to destroy, &c. The Sentiments consist of Self Esteem;—Love of Approbation;—Cautiousness, &c.

—The Intellects, they say, consist also of two genera, namely, the Knowing Faculties,—the Reflecting Faculties. The Knowing Faculties consist of a knowledge of objects, or a memory of facts;—of Form, of size, of weight, of colour, of space, of order, of time, of number, of tune, of language. The Reflecting Faculties are those of comparison, of causality, of wit, of imitative

Now, without going at large, here, into the meaning of the term Faculty, I am desirous of exciting your attention to the use which the Phrenologists make of it: for, calling these different portions of the brain Faculties, is, it appears to me, to assume that which I am obliged still to think requires much more proof than has yet been brought forward to establish it. I cannot therefore yet assert to their proposition that the Brain consists of thirty three or more faculties.

But to proceed: They say that, when the hinder portion of the skull, and, consequently, the brain, exceeds or only even equals in quantity the front or intellectual portion, the individual possesses so much of the mere animal that the front portion is not sufficient to keep the animal in check; in other words, is not sufficient to prevent the possessor of such a skull—of such a brain, from performing actions injurious to Society; that is, of course, immoral, vicious, or criminal actions. That, on the contrary, when the greater portion of the brain is before, more or less predominating intellectuality of some kind will be found, and the animal powers or propensities be held in proper subjection.

The Phrenologists say, moreover, that in proportion to the size of each Faculty, will generally its power be found to correspond; the protuberances in the skull at the same time corresponding to the size of the faculty. A small faculty being an indication of small power, and a large one vice versa. A high and broad forehead having, of course, many of the faculties much developed, is a strong indication of considerable intellectuality—a low, narrow, and receding one the reverse.

The quality and quantity of the brain, they say, are to be estimated by observing the situation of the orifice of the ear, and the size of the skull before and behind. In persons of high intellectuality this orifice will be found from one to two inches nearer to the back part of the head than it is to the front. In judging, however, of the qualities of a skull, of the powers of the intellect of any individual, this is not all; it is necessary to note whether there be great or little distance between the orifice of the ear and the crown of the head;
whether the skull be wide or narrow, as well before as behind. In short, it would appear, from this view of it, that upon the size of the brain depends, in a great measure, the quantity of animal as well as mental power which any individual may possess; thus bringing us back to the vulgar and trite opinion, too commonly ascribed, that he who has, literally, few brains has little sense. Careful attention to these several indications—indications, it must be admitted, which every one may readily apprehend—will, the Phrenologists say, always give us a general outline of the character of every man.

Without, however, assenting to so much as this, it does appear to me that Phrenology deserves a serious investigation; and that, for the present, our attention ought to be emphatically directed to this conspicuous and obvious indication. If it shall be found that the intellectual portion of the brain is always in front, and also that the quantity of intellect is in proportion to the quantity of brain; and if it shall, also, be found that the animal propensities or faculties exist always in the back part of the skull, and that these are in greatest force in proportion to the size also of that part of the brain, data of infinite importance will be obtained. It will be afterwards desirable to ascertain, if possible, of what particulars these general indications consist; and I think it is probable that some organs for particular functions may be discovered; but I suspect that some, if not much, of the mapping of the Phrenologists will require considerable modification. I suspect too that a good deal must be attributed, after all, to the quality as well as to the quantity of brain;—that brains of similar size and shape vary much in their intellectual powers as well as in their physical propensities.† In justice to Dr. Spurzheim, I ought to state here, that since this Lecture was prepared, I have had the pleasure of hearing that Gentleman at the London Institution, and he most decidedly admits, that although the size of the different organs is of great moment, yet that a great deal also depends upon their quality and activity.

That many, if not most, of our intellectual operations are carried on in that portion of the brain which is in the front part of the skull, is I think extremely probable: for if any one will attend to what passes within him during, or rather immediately after, the progress

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*"We do not say that he who has few brains has little sense; it is the quality, combined with health, which gives power; for the largest and smallest brains, in 1900 casts in my collection, have the greatest powers of mind."

J. D.

†"I have stated that quality as well as quantity must be taken into consideration. The temperament must not be overlooked; this Dr. Spurzheim has described in his work entitled 'Phrenology in connection with Physiognomy."

J. D.

May we not rationally conclude that what is called temperament depends, in great measure, if not entirely, upon the quality of the brain, and the condition of the nerves, with which, of course, the brain has general connection?
or operation of active and intense thought, when the brain has laboured, as it were, with a variety of ideas; or when efforts are made to comprehend and remember many complicated processes in our reasoning, or a variety of different facts or circumstances, particularly if the subjects presented to the mind be new; and if, immediately afterwards, the actual physical state of the brain be examined, we shall, I think, not fail to find that such efforts occasionally, (as far as regards my own experience, I may say very often) produce much action in the fore part of the brain, so as to induce sometimes a head-ache, which is not infrequently accompanied with increased heat, plainly discoverable by ourselves as well as others on feeling the forehead. Hence I think it is fair to conclude that the higher and more complex processes of thought are carried on in the anterior portion of the brain.

If, besides this, it shall be found that any one portion of the brain, by being more used than another portion, increases in size so as even to alter the external form of the skull—and some observed facts seem to indicate this—we have the encouraging hope held out to us not only that the intellectual powers may be increased by use, as we know they in general are, but also that the animal propensities by disuse, or by proper use, may be rendered subservient to the nobler part of our nature, and be made to minister only to our legitimate pleasures and our happiness.

In the hitherto imperfect science of Education I anticipate great and important results from such a study of Phrenology, combined, as it ought always to be, with Physiognomy, a science, by the way, that has not been attended to as it deserves; and I would particularly recommend those, who are engaged in the instruction of children and youth, to pay accurate attention to both these yet imperfect sciences. There is reason to hope that the labours of instruction may be, by the study, greatly abridged, and the pupils themselves essentially benefited and improved. Some of the results to be obtained from such a study, are, that mankind generally will become more feeling, more benevolent, and more humane. At least, I think, that such results will be the inevitable consequence of a better acquaintance with the nature and operations of the mind.

We have thus seen what the Phrenologists have done to elucidate the nature of the Human Mind—the Brain;—their inquiries are based, as they ought to be, on fact; from this they will I hope never depart; and we ought to be grateful for the zeal and for the success, (amidst much unnecessary and uncalled for ridicule and opprobrium) with which they have pursued and still continue to pursue their observations and their labours. Let them proceed;

* "It no longer remains in doubt respecting the change of the brain by an increase, when successfully employed, in any course of new studies."—J. D.
humanity will assuredly reap much advantage from their efforts, their talents, and their zeal.

Let us now examine this surprising, this stupendous organ, the Mind, particularly as regards its operations, a little more closely.

The Human Mind evinces, and is excited by, two orders of sensations; namely the PLEASURABLE and the PAINFUL; to these two orders the chief, if not all, of its operations may be referred; the great differences in both orders consisting in degree. It appears also to be actuated and regulated by invariable laws: for although we cannot always demonstrate, in every analytical inquiry concerning the mind, the cause of every operation or action, yet, from the great number of operations and actions whose causes we can distinctly observe and trace, there is legitimate ground for the inference that the mind operates and is regulated by invariable laws; in other words, in mental, as well as in corporeal operations, there is NO EFFECT WITHOUT A CAUSE. The truth of this position will appear as we proceed.

To many of our pleasurable, as well as painful sensations, have been given, either from their intensity, peculiarity, or duration, distinctive names; some of them have been called Passions; a more vague and indefinite term than this can scarcely be imagined. In a little manual, which has lately fallen in my way, entitled ELEMENTS OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE,* the Passions are described under the following names: Ambition, Anger, Antipathy, Curiosity, Fear, Hope, Joy, Love, Shame, Grief, Sympathy, and Wonder; and these are again divided into many species and varieties.

In the same work the Faculties of the Mind are described to be Perception, Attention, Retention or Memory, Recollection, Imagination, the Power of Comparing, Discernment, the Power of Abstracting, the Power of Compounding, Reasoning, Judgment, Will, Design, Foresight, Liberty, Conscience.—A few grains of pure metal amidst the most incongruous and inconsistent mass of dross that was ever obtained from any philosophical crucible!

Let us examine a few items of the catalogue; and, in the first place, what is meant by the term Faculty?—Faculty, according to my apprehension, is any innate power or ability with which we are endowed: thus we have the faculty of seeing, of hearing, of feeling, of smelling, of uttering sounds, of moving the muscles, &c.; and if it shall be proved, according to the statements of the Phrenologists, that Amativeness, and Philoprogenitiveness, &c. form and occupy distinct portions of the brain, and are born with us, these may perhaps be denominated faculties; but these cannot yet, I think, be admitted as faculties, and, therefore, in our present inquiry we shall not consider them as such. But how Reasoning, Judgment, Will,

* By R. C. Dallas, Esq. 2d edit. 1808.
and some others just mentioned, came to be arranged as faculties, it is not my business to explain. Reasoning and Judgment are manifestly mental processes, carried on unquestionably by some of our faculties, but they (that is, the processes themselves) are not faculties. It behoves us, therefore, to be extremely cautious in the use of the word Faculty. It is very often greatly misapplied; and, by such misapplication, is very likely to mislead us in our inquiries on this highly interesting subject—the Mind. Indeed if the Phrenologists should succeed in persuading mankind to adopt their present nomenclature, it appears to me that almost every action will have its appropriate faculty; and although I do not say that this cannot be, I am, nevertheless, disposed to say that it is extremely improbable.

This misapplication of the term Faculty, has been made by many very able and eminent men. The poet Akenside appears to have fallen into an error similar to this when he tells us, in his notes to the Pleasures of Imagination, that we have a natural sense of the ridiculous, as if ridicule or the talent for ridicule, like the smell or sight, were born with us; whereas ridicule, it is evident, is produced by association: for what appears ridiculous to one person is often not in the least so to another; were ridicule a natural sense, I apprehend this could not be.

Now, as to the Will, (about the freedom of which so many volumes have been written,) if by the will be meant the desire to do any act or obtain any thing, which to every unsophisticated understanding it assuredly is, such will will always be found to be the effect of some previous process or operation carried on in the mind; and this, whether the mind be conscious of such process or not; and hence the impropriety of the term Free-will: for, as the mind in its processes or operations is governed or influenced by invariable laws, the will, such as we here consider it, cannot be free; it can only be what the motives presented to it cause it to be, whatever those motives may be. The will therefore, the desire to do any act or obtain any thing, is produced by the operation of fixed and determined causes arising in the very natures of things; let us pursue the series as long as we please, or at least as long as we are able so to do. It is obvious, therefore, that the will cannot be a faculty.* If, however, by the term will be only meant a

* Since this tract has been in the press, Dr. Haslam has given a series of Lectures on the Mind to the London Medical Society; these Lectures have been since published in the Lancet. It is not my wish or intention to make any comments on them generally, not having read the whole with sufficient attention; but as the definition of the will, as given in the Lancet, No. 217, page 125, appears to me incorrect, I take the liberty (I am sure with the most sincere feelings of respect for Dr. Haslam,) to say that the will is not, according to my apprehension, "the effort of attainment," which Dr. Haslam states it to be: for the will, being the desire to do any act, or obtain any thing, is a state or disposition of the mind, and, consequently, can-
power or capacity to choose, to select from the objects presented to the mind; this power, or rather perhaps process, of the mind we have manifestly the ability to use; but in our choice, that is, the process of choosing, we weigh the various things or motives which are presented to us, or which arise in our minds, and are influenced, determined, doubtless, by what appears to be, or are supposed to be, either directly or indirectly most beneficial to us,—most productive of the greatest quantity of pleasurable sensation,—in a word, happiness. To suppose that we choose without something influencing, determining our choice, would be absurd; it is evident that there always is some motive or motives, however latent or unperceived, which do influence, determine the mind. What now becomes of the so much vaunted term free-will; and of the will itself as a faculty?

It must not, however, be forgotten, that the motives which determine, produce the will to do even a single act, may be, and often are, very various: internal feeling, mental process, besides the innumerable variety of external objects, heat, cold, human society, &c. are sometimes more or less combined to produce such will.

These errors in the use of terms have very much obstructed our progress in inquiries concerning the mind. They have arisen, most probably, from two sources,—our ignorance, and from the application of the common language of life to subjects for which such language is, unfortunately, not well adapted; as it is almost impossible to avoid using such language, we all know, in a very indefinite and uncertain manner. Thus the processes of reasoning and judgment have been separated and made, as it were, distinct ideal beings. How often do we not ask, What says reason? Where is your judgment? Whereas, if we examine both these processes, for processes, be it remembered, they are; we shall find that, if not identical, they are so very similar as not to require the distinctions which many writers on the human mind have given them. I have defined reason, in the family cyclopedia, that process or processes of the mind by which different ideas or things are compared, their fitness or unfitness perceived, and conclusions drawn from such comparisons and perceptions. Is not judgment the same, or, at least, a similar process of the mind?

not be an effort. It may be the product of effort, or may cause effort, but the will is not itself an effort. The effort of which the state of mind called will is often the cause, is no more the will than the hand-writing is the hand itself. It is true, we do sometimes say, that such a person writes a good hand; but we all know that this is a figure of speech for the hand-writing. The will is not, therefore, according to Dr. Haslam, "simply the effort of attainment," but a state or disposition of mind evinced by a desire or wish to obtain or avoid, &c. certain things. The will, that is the state or disposition of the mind so called, is, of course, the product of some cause or causes; and we cannot conceive of a will without a cause; and, indeed, as far as we know of the mind, there never was a will, that is, a state or disposition of the mind to obtain or avoid, &c. without a cause or causes producing it.
Once more, if **reason** be a faculty,—and, if a faculty, it ought in every individual to be the same; that is, similar to the senses of sight, smell, &c. ;-if it always enabled us to distinguish good from evil, and truth from falsehood, no such discrepancies and discordances as are found amongst mankind could exist. But do we not find that what appears reasonable to one person appears the most unreasonable and preposterous to another?—*Our reason* is influenced greatly by the manner in which our minds have been exercised and excited (as well by surrounding *media* as by our internal feelings), and hence the influence which surrounding circumstances, strong feelings, have upon our reasoning; and hence also the powerful effect of *education* in all our reasoning processes. What a field is here opened for *charity* and *forbearance* towards the opinions and actions of those who think and act differently from ourselves!

I have been somewhat minute on this mistake concerning the term *faculty*, because the explanation will be of considerable service to us in all our researches into the nature of the mind. It is a mistake which, as I have said, has been often made, and that, too, by many estimable and able men. *Even Dr. Johnson* calls **reason** the Rational Faculty; and the *will*, that power by which we desire and purpose. *Locke*, too, calls Reason a Faculty; and we have seen that *Arens* fell into a similar error. If therefore such popular and able writers have made these mistakes, we need not wonder at the mistakes or inferior followers in the same path. *Dr. Johnson*, however, in such definitions, as well, indeed, as in many others in his Dictionary, seems to have been more studious to fix and determine the meaning of words as they have variously used by authors, than to give one intelligible and definite meaning, to which it is desirable, however difficult, to confine every word.

It will now be necessary that I should direct your attention to another, and I believe the latest, writer in this country of any eminence who has employed his energies in the development of the nature of the Human Mind. The writer to whom I allude is Mr. Owen. He has not, it is true, given us his sentiments in an elaborate treatise; what he has written directly concerning the mind is contained in the space of a very few pages. This was first published about five years ago in the *Introduction to my Family Cyclopædia*, and, as that work may not be known to many of my present auditors, I will take the liberty to state the substance of Mr. Owen’s observations; which are, in fact, descriptive of an *instrument* that he some years ago invented, a plate of which is given in the work to which I have referred. This Instrument, the late Professor **Pictet**, of Geneva, advised Mr. Owen to call the *psychograph*; a term to which, however, there are certainly very strong objections. The design of Mr. Owen was, by this in-
instrument, to render mental phenomena and operations more intelligible to those unwilling or unable to enter into abstruse and, as they have been termed, recondite speculations.

The *Psychograph*, Mr. Owen informs us, may be made either of metal or wood; it consists of ten slides, each slide representing a faculty or quality (or the germ of it) of the human mind at birth. The slides are divided into parts; the first and last of which on each side denote the extremes of that particular faculty or quality belonging to, or constituting a part of, the human mind. The interval between these extremes is in nature infinitely divisible. In Mr. Owen's *Psychograph* the division is carried only to 100 parts, these being sufficient for the purpose for which the *Psychograph* was designed.

According to Mr. Owen's *Psychograph*, the Human Faculties or Qualities, or the germs of them at birth, are the following, namely, Strength, Courage, Sensibility, Perception, Reflection, Memory, Imagination, Judgment, Affection, & attachment.

As the aim of Mr. Owen, in the construction of this instrument, was to direct the attention to facts, he informs us that "it is of little consequence whether the faculties and qualities, which are by the *Psychograph* predicated of any human being, are precisely in conformity to nature, or whether they are really more or less in number, or whether they shall be designated by the names given to them, or by any other terms. In these respects, 'the *Psychograph*,' continues Mr. Owen, "may be, and no doubt is, very defective; it pretends to no accuracy in such points, because accuracy cannot at present be attained: but it is a sufficient approximation to nature for the present purpose."

"For instance, human nature consists of a certain physical conformation, which must possess some degree of bodily strength;—sensibility, or power of feeling; the germs of more or less natural courage, perception, reflection, memory, imagination, judgment, affection for others, and attachment to self. And it is evident that individuals possess, by nature, these different faculties and qualities in various degrees of strength and weakness, of perfection and imperfection."

"Since then," proceeds Mr. Owen, "there is so wide an interval between the extremes of each faculty and quality, and that this interval is infinitely divisible, it is improbable that any two human beings have ever been endowed with any one of these faculties or qualities precisely in the same degree since the creation of man; but when the number of these faculties which enter into the combination of a human being is taken into consideration, it becomes highly probable that no two infants ever have been, or ever will be, born alike.

"Certain proportions and combinations of these powers produce in the individual the highest degree of general excellence of cha-
racter; other proportions and combinations form an infinite variety of natural character between these two extremes. These faculties and qualities grow as the child advances in age, and, by training and instruction, the growth of any of them may be retarded or encouraged, and thus the natural combination may be materially modified. When this knowledge shall be raised to the rank of a science, and its principles applied to practice, the human character may be so improved in every individual, that, compared with the past or existing generations, the new race of men will be regarded as superior beings. This science may be called, the Science of Training and Instruction, or the Science of the Influence of Circumstance over Human Nature; and will be of far more real value to mankind than all the other sciences united. By means of its practical application, the natural powers and qualities of each individual may be so directed and modified, as to produce that combination which is best for the individual and for society. The child, however, can have no control over the formation of the particular powers and qualities which belong to him at birth; nor over the circumstances which, through infancy and childhood, determine the peculiar direction and modification which these powers and qualities receive."

Mr. Owen, in conclusion, emphatically asks, "Why, then, is punishment, for the correction of moral error, awarded to human beings? Is it possible that human nature can become a fit subject for punishment of any kind? Has it ever been, or can it ever be, other than an instrument of cruelty, and of the grossest injustice? Experience has proved that punishment never has attained its object. Facts, open to the inspection of every one, likewise prove, that by other methods, which preclude all the evils created by punishment (and they are incalculable), more may be accomplished in a few years, for the improvement of the moral well-being of society, than has been effected by punishment through the past period of man's existence."

In this account of the Psychograph, I have most carefully followed Mr. Owen's description, except in substituting the expression human mind for human nature; an expression to which Mr. Owen seems particularly partial: why, I do not know.

Now, in examining these particulars of the mind, although it must be admitted they are much more simple than those to which we have before adverted, we shall still, I think, find that Mr. Owen has occasionally misapplied the term faculty; but what I have said before on this word will enable us to judge of the propriety of any of the terms which Mr. Owen has used. I cannot, however, avoid observing that, if courage be a faculty of the mind, so, it appears to me, must its antagonist timidity or fear be; if there be such a faculty as self-attachment, as probably there is, both courage and fear will be found, I presume, modifications of it. It does, how-
ever, strike me, that the faculties of the mind are much fewer in number than they have been commonly supposed to be; and that it is, probably, by the combined operation of those faculties, whatever they are, that most of our writers on the mind have been misled. Mr. Owen, we see, calls Judgment a faculty: I think it is a process, carried on by one or more of our faculties, doubtless; but that there is no such thing as an aggregate faculty of Judgment, Reason, or Will, in the mind, every inquiry which we make will, I think, confirm.

Mr. Owen, it is true, with that benevolent candour which so strongly marks his character, informs us, that it is of little consequence whether the faculties and qualities which are by the Psychograph predicated of any human being, are precisely in conformity with nature; or whether they are really more or less in number; or whether they shall be designated by the names given to them, or by any other terms. In these respects, he admits that the Psychograph may be defective.

As far as regards mere names, it is certainly of little or no consequence what kind we apply to mental operations or faculties, provided they do not mislead us in our pursuit of knowledge; but when names are applied to operations of the mind, or to the faculties of the mind, which convey meanings that, to the operations themselves, or to the faculties themselves, do not belong, much error will be the probable result; such nomenclature should, therefore, be, as much as possible, avoided. So far am I from thinking with Mr. Owen, that it is of no consequence to us to determine what are, and what are not, faculties of the mind, that I think it is of the greatest importance in these inquiries to know, if we possibly can, of what, and of how many, faculties the human mind consists. The Phrenologists are, beyond question, of the same opinion—all their efforts tend to the fixing and defining of these grand landmarks—the faculties, or organs of the mind—the brain. Had the Phrenologists avoided, for the present, a new nomenclature, and simply contented themselves with numbering what they assert to be organs, without forcing upon us a new set of terms, they would not have raised, what I fear are, some new obstacles in our pursuit of this interesting inquiry.

I would ask, I am sure with the greatest deference and respect to Mr. Owen, Is it nothing to distinguish accurately what is born with us, from what is acquired by us in our progress through the world? We know very well, that formerly an opinion was generally entertained, that ideas were born with us; but, thanks to the labours of Locke, that great and dangerous error has been long since overthrown, and we now smile at such an opinion. Yet I am not sure whether the doctrine which teaches that Reason, Judg-

* See some further observations on Phrenology, at the end of this Lecture.
mment, the Will, and some other operations, or effects of operations, of the mind, are faculties, is not considerably more injurious to the progress of truth, and to our pursuit of knowledge and happiness, than that of innate ideas; and we have seen, too, that such a doctrine has been, and is now very commonly, very generally accepted and believed.

From what has been said, it will now be, most probably, asked, What, then, after all, do we know concerning the nature of the Mind? It appears, with certainty, very little; we are unquestionably in the very infancy of such knowledge. We have yet, I think, to get rid of some unintelligible jargon—some scholastic verbosities, that not a little impede our progress in the pursuit of this truly valuable and important science; but, besides this, it is quite necessary that we should all, if possible, become accurate observers of what passes within and around us, taking nothing for granted, but always endeavour to obtain and to state facts, by an accumulation of which only can we hope to inform ourselves and our species in the science of self-knowledge, and, of course, happiness. I have mentioned, in a preceding part of my discourse, that the most useful truths are often the most exposed, and, for this reason, too often overlooked. I am disposed to think, relative to the mind, that this is peculiarly the case.

I do not think sufficient attention has been paid to our ordinary and simple sensations; and I think that our first steps in such inquiries ought always to be directed to these: for all that we know must be derived through the medium of what are usually called the senses—namely, Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, Feeling. Mr. Owen appears to have arranged these under one order—sensibility, or power of feeling. The effect of the stimulus or impression which external objects make upon the different senses when conveyed to the mind—the brain, as they instantly are after being made; or when an idea or ideas arise in the mind itself, and there act, is called sensation. When this sensation is perceived by the mind, it is called perception; which is, it appears to me, nothing more than a recognized or apprehended sensation.

From the great disposition which there is in the mind to repeat sensations once made upon it, it often happens that, without the presence of the object which first excited the original sensation, it will nevertheless arise in the mind, and this, too, frequently without our being conscious of the cause which produces it; although, from what we know of the laws of the mind, it could not have arisen there without a cause; it sometimes happens, too, that sensations or perceptions once excited are often beyond our control; that is, we cannot by effort, however strong, prevent the recurrence of them; nor on many other occasions can we command their recurrence. These sensations are, as I have said, of two orders—pleasurable and painful, the degrees in both being infinite; and it
appears to me that all our researches into the nature and operations of the mind must be bottomed on this simple view of it, namely, that it is capable of receiving a variety of impressions—sensations both pleasurable and painful: that these sensations, in numerous instances, become perceptions, perceptions ideas; and that from these the whole apparatus of what is commonly called the mind is most probably made up.

The disposition to repeat perceptions, ideas—whole trains of thought, has been called a faculty—memory; but much of what is usually called memory consists of processes. It is the greater or less facility with which impressions once made upon the mind can be again voluntarily called up, that constitutes a good or a bad memory. The Phrenologists, we see, have given to the memory many organs; such are those of Facts, of Form, Size, Order, Language, &c.; and they thus account for some persons remembering things relating to any one of these well by their having such organ strongly developed; yet we must not forget Dr. Spurzheim’s admission of quality and activity. In consequence of this, if it be a truth, and I think it is, any Phrenologist who estimates the mental organs by their appearance only in the skull will be frequently at fault; and herein it is that the science is manifestly defective; as, under such circumstances, till we know, besides the development itself, the quality and activity of the brain, we may make a very improper estimate of the mental powers of any given individual: and that this has been already done by some gentlemen who are esteemed adepts in the science, I have personally reason to know. The Phrenologists do not seem to think sufficiently of the necessity of using the mind in any given way in order to alter its quality and excite its activity. Now, although I do not contend that use alone is omnipotent, it is nevertheless of infinite importance: many skulls of indifferent promise will be found to contain a fine mind.

Besides this susceptibility of the mind, in regard to sensation generally; it is to be observed that there are also dispositions in it to avoid pain, and to receive or desire pleasure; these dispositions are inherent in the mind, and are, in numerous instances, exemplified soon after birth. To the operation or effect of these dispositions are given the various names of Grief, Joy, Fear, Anger, Love, &c. Many of them, from being attended with considerable emotion, have been called Passions. They do not seem directly

* St. Pierre, who, from his writings, we conclude must have been an amiable man, says that "Nous avons observé qu'il n'y ait que deux passions dans le coeur humain, l'amour et l'ambition." Now, if Love and Ambition be Passions, and, according to St. Pierre, the only passions of the human heart, how absurd must be any attempt to eradicate what, being denominated a Passion, has been commonly supposed to belong to us as animated beings! Yet how often does this ingenious writer, in his works, inveigh against ambi-
under our control, but indirectly they frequently become so; they
may be so modified by circumstances, habit, education, &c. that
some pains, as well as pleasures, become obliterated; whilst
others are generated by the habits, usages, and customs of the
society in which we live. Some of these pleasures and pains are
much more capable of being controlled than others. Those which
are least so are HUNGER and THIRST, essential to the existence

\textit{emulation!} against \textit{emulation!}—\textit{L'Emulation,} says he, \textit{"est la cause de la plu-
part des maux du genre humain.} Elle est la racine de l'ambition; car l'\emulation
produit le désir d'être le premier, et le désir d'être le premier, n'est
autre chose que l'ambition, que se partage, suivant positions et caractères, en
ambitions positive et négative, d'ou confond presque tous les maux de la vie
sociale!" \textit{Vœux d'un Solitaire.—}From all that he says, and from all that can
be gathered on the subject, it appears that to prevent men from desiring dis-
tinction, from desiring to be approved in their conduct by their fellows, is,
most probably, impossible; what then should be the object of the governors of
mankind—of those having influence either in great or small communities—
of FATHERS and MOTHERS of families, &c. &c.? to direct this disposition into
the most beneficial channels—into those channels capable of conveying and
imparting the most happiness. Thus, if men become desirous, and, if you
please, ambitious of doing good—of promoting each other's happiness, (and I
confess individually that I do feel such ambition,) surely such ambition can-
not be bad—it must be meritorious—deserving of approbation; always re-
membering that we are not, in doing good, to trample upon the rights and just
demands of others: for the evil might thus become greater than the good we
might do; and besides, we cannot force any one to become happy contrary
to his inclination—voluntariness being one of the essential ingredients of indi-
vidual happiness. I conclude, therefore, that both \textit{ambition} and \textit{emulation}
are then only bad when they tend to produce misery—unhappiness; and that
when they, on the contrary, tend to promote general and individual happi-
ness, they are meritorious.

"There is, it will be observed, a great want of philosophical precision in the
passage of ST. PIERRE above quoted: "Two passions of the human heart"
is too common-place and vague. The distinction which has been sometimes
made by writers between the head and the heart, the former being considered
as intellect, and the latter as feeling, is notoriously incorrect, and should never
be adopted in philosophical writing. It may do very well for an oratorical
flourish and the rounding of a period, but as a mode of conveying truth it is
detrimental. The heart is a viscus upon the regularity of whose action de-
Pends the healthy circulation of the blood; in consequence of the nerves ac-
companying it, and indeed the whole sanginiferous system, its motion is very
liable to be affected by innumerable impressions both painful and pleasurable
made upon the brain. No one wants to be told how soon the heart palpitates
on the application of powerful, new, or extraordinary stimuli to the mind—
the brain: the centre of \textit{sensation} as well as \textit{intellect} is not however in the
heart but in the head—the brain, as will be seen from what has been stated
above, as well as by accurate observation of what passes within ourselves:
the heart does not of course think—thought is in the brain, and, as far as is
known, in the brain only. I am aware it may be said that, in calling \textit{ambition}
and \textit{emulation} two passions of the human heart, the expression is \textit{figurative},
and that most persons will know what is meant: not exactly so. I have no
objection to figure in elucidation of truth; but here the figure manifestly ob-
scures it. It is such expressions as these that have misled us, and ever will
mislead us in the pursuit of truth.

C
of the individual, and that for the continuance of the species, usually denominated Love. I am extremely unwilling to call sympathy a faculty of the mind; but whether it be a faculty or not, it is, at any rate, a disposition of the mind; and it is unquestionably a disposition too of considerable importance in numerous mental operations. That we are, on various occasions, excited to feel for and with others, is indisputably true; many of our best and kindest actions proceed from such sympathy. There is, as far as is known of this quality of the mind, a peculiar, not to say a mysterious nature about it which demands our serious investigation. Many of the impositions and frauds which have been practised upon mankind, have been effectuated by an artful appeal to our sympathies or our fears; and, therefore, although our sympathies are extremely valuable to us, as forming some of the strongest links which connect us to our fellows, yet they, very often, notwithstanding, demand control.

The sympathy evinced by the sexes towards each other has been called by most persons a passion—Love; the Phrenologists give it a direct organ, the cerebellum (as we have seen), and call it amativeness. This sympathy is, it scarcely needs to be observed, extremely powerful. When under suitable regulation, and combined with intellectual pleasure, it confers, perhaps, the most exquisite happiness of which we are capable; if ill directed, it is often productive of the most consummate misery. No wonder that, in all ages, Love has been one of the most predominant springs of human action! Man has still to learn the best mode of regulating this powerful lever in the elevation of his happiness.

Besides such sympathies, which might be called the social sympathies, and which we can occasionally regulate, there are other sympathies not so immediately, if at all, under our control. These are evinced when any derangement producing pain takes place in our bodily organs, the mind sympathizing with such derangement and suffering more or less accordingly. So also if the body communicate pleasurable emotions to the mind, a corresponding sympathy is the result. The mind likewise communicates its sympathies to the bodily functions, and, in a remarkable degree, it does this to the stomach; so that no sooner, upon any occasion, does the mind labour under painful emotion than the stomach almost instantly becomes affected, and dyspepsia either temporary or of some continuance is very commonly the result. On the contrary, if the sympathies be pleasurable, and not in excess, they contribute to the general health; and, generally, when they are painful to a certain degree, disease. Excessive pleasure, as well as excessive pain, produces not only disease, but sometimes causes immediate death. Such indeed is the intimate connexion of the mind and body during our whole existence here, that they mutually act and react upon each other. For want of a proper sense of
the great importance of this truth, and from an inattention to, or our ignorance of those laws by which they are mutually governed, our knowledge of the method of curing disease, and especially mental disease, still continues in a very imperfect state.

From what has been said, let us now see to what practical utility our present knowledge of the mind can be applied.

It is well known that, if we wish to become dexterous in any art requiring considerable employment of the hand, the art of writing, for instance, we must use it often, and for a long time, before we can attain the ease and dexterity of a master; nay, that without long and constant use such dexterity cannot be acquired. The mind, the organ, the recipient, the elaborator of our ideas, the instrument in which our sensations, elaborated into thought, arise, appears to be similar in its nature to the human hand; it must be used before it becomes dexterous. Slight and casual impressions produce occasional motions often irregular, and by no means to the purpose; to be efficient, they must be long continued regular and uniform.

We know also that, in the performance of any manual operation, such as weaving, sewing, &c. &c., any motion not necessary to the proper performance of the process, be introduced and continued for a long time, the difficulty of getting rid of such bad habit is often great, not to say sometimes impossible: hence the necessity of learning the proper motions in the first instance. A similar mode of reasoning applies to the mind: in order that its motions or operations should be useful, regular, and appropriate, its exercise in such motions or operations is absolutely necessary; and this exercise must not only be adopted early, but be long continued, and of such a kind that no bad habits may be introduced: for, once introduced, their eradication is always more or less difficult, and sometimes, as in manual arts, almost impossible.

I trust, therefore, that I may be pardoned for repeating here what I have before stated in another work. Without education (which is another term for applied knowledge) man is an insulated being, connected to society by few ties and wholly unacquainted with his duties. I consequently state a trite truism when I say, In order that man may become a good member of society, it is necessary that he should be educated; no one becomes good or virtuous by accident. The education to which I here allude, is not only that usually called such which is obtained, for the most part, from schools and universities, or through the medium of books, but also that concourse of circumstances which surrounds the child from his birth, and attends upon him through his future life, moulding his thoughts and directing his actions, and which makes him often either the best or the worst of his species.

But it is, however, found, (to continue our simile of the hand,)
that some persons will more readily acquire dexterity in some manual arts than others; and sometimes different means must be used with different persons in order that such dexterity may be acquired. So, in the mind, there is often a predisposition, if I may so call it, (the Phrenologists will tell us, I presume, that this predisposition arises from some enlarged or active organ) to perform certain motions or actions. Of course, where such predisposition exists, the attention and care necessary for inculcating such actions are necessarily abridged; while, in the mind less apt, more attention and care will be necessary to produce them; but they may generally be produced notwithstanding. And, hence, in education it is of the first importance to have this truth continually before us: namely, that the method of instruction must be varied according to the nature and disposition of different minds. This has not been hitherto sufficiently attended to in any of our processes of education; and hence, often, the failure of many well-intended efforts to fashion the human mind.

It cannot therefore be too strongly insisted upon that the early exercise of the mind, and for a long continuance in any given way, is of paramount importance to the future life; always remembering that variety is necessary in the employment of the mind in order to obtain at once its health, energy, and activity. Yet, although a consideration of predisposition in the outset of life is extremely necessary, and should be sedulously attended to, it is consolatory to know, that, in general, this predisposition, whatever it may be, becomes ultimately so much modified by education—by surrounding circumstances, as to be very often superseded by other powers operating more forcibly upon the mind.

I here speak of the predisposition for actions which I suppose ought to be performed, in other words good actions; but there is sometimes another predisposition for motions or actions which ought not to be performed, namely, bad actions.

This consideration has been a stumbling block to myriads, and is the constant theme with those who seem determined to see objects only through a certain medium. Now, in considering this predisposition, we must remember that we are not often called upon to contemplate it in its effects on the human character, until it has acquired through the exercise of long habit, or bad education, vicious circumstances, a force which it did not originally possess, and that, most probably, an early attention to such disposition, and an introduction of counter motions, if I may so speak, into the mind, will counteract, obliterate, or render it quiescent. Indeed, it is in the study of such predispositions (the exceptions to man's general character) and in the introduction of such counter motions that the business, or rather the Labour, of Education, as far as concerns the moralist, principally consists.
The mind, as I have before stated, operates or is influenced by invariable laws: there is no such thing as chance either in the natural or moral world. Does any one question this?—It may be illustrated by the most common conduct and the every-day transactions of life;—we have no occasion to refer to any thing in the least recondite or abstracted to prove it.

Whenever we wish to accomplish any object by the assistance of another, what is the first step which we take? we consider the capabilities of the person whom we think of engaging to assist us in the object of our pursuit, well knowing that, unless his mind and body possess certain qualities either inherent or acquired, he will not suit our purpose; there being neither predisposition nor acquired ability for the performance of certain actions, we know of a moral certainty, that if we engage such a person in our service, we shall fail in the object which we desire to obtain by such assistance. This is so obvious and so true, that no one will, I dare say, for a moment dispute it; yet is it not founded on our experience and the philosophical axiom as true as it is beautiful, that there is no effect without a cause? which axiom, nevertheless, I fear many will yet be found to deny, and by consequence, deny the necessity of moral actions, as an inevitable effect of the nature and disposition of man.

It has been also objected to this doctrine that we have the power of suspending certain actions altogether, and of others for a limited time, according as our pleasure or our will may prompt us. Undoubtedly we have: thus we may avoid taking food for a considerable period; we may say we will do absolutely nothing, and do nothing accordingly; we may say we will take no thought for the morrow; we may choose or not to go to a particular place on a particular day, and so on. But in all such determinations to act or not to act, we shall find there is and always will be some motive or motives which produce our pleasure or our will so to conduct ourselves. We resolve, for example, to prove the truth of the above statement by avoiding to take food for a considerable period; we do so for a certain time, while the motives for our remaining so continue more powerful than any other motives; but let us wait till the sensation of hunger, of uneasiness, of pain, shall excite us to relieve the hunger, the uneasiness, and the pain, and our resolution of refusing to take food will be gone. Yet during the whole period of such an experiment, we shall be as much the patients of necessity as we are at the most active period of our lives.

In speaking, however, of the necessity of moral actions, we must be extremely careful to distinguish this necessity from Fatalism, with which it has, I fear, been sometimes confounded. Fatalism implies that, do what we will, certain consequences will follow in defiance of all our efforts to the contrary. The necessity of which-
I here speak, implies that certain consequences follow certain actions; and that, if we desire to produce those actions, we must introduce the causes, if we can, which will produce them, or they will not be produced. So if we know the causes of bad actions, and these causes be within our control, if we withdraw the causes the actions cannot take place. Hence do we not often predict, with almost mathematical certainty, the effect which the introduction of certain causes will produce?—Now, unless there was a necessary connexion between cause and effect, this we never or but rarely could do. The further we extend our inquiries into the nature of the mind, the more we shall be convinced that it is regulated by determinate laws—that chance has no place in its chain of causes and effects. And it is extremely fortunate for human happiness that such is the case: for were the mind regulated by no laws, what a chaos should we exhibit both in our thoughts and in our actions!

The denial of the necessity of moral actions has arisen chiefly, I apprehend, from the fear that, if such necessity were generally admitted, how true soever in fact, some if not all of the bulwarks of our social and moral edifice would be destroyed. It is necessary, however, to meet this question fairly, as it is one of the deepest interest to mankind. We can never cure any deep-seated wound without examining it, and, if required, by probing it also to the bottom. Let us go then at once, not to the restraints laid on us by the habits and customs of society, but to those painful and tremendous restraints and penalties applied with the best intentions, no doubt, to prevent, chiefly by the prospective operation of fear, those great moral aberrations, those crimes, under which society in enlightened England is at the present time grievously labouring.

Now, from a contemplation of the Punishments, even to death, which are so continually presented to our notice, is either of the objects attained for which the Punishments are specifically inflicted—these objects of course are, the reformation of the individual and the prevention of crime?—Alas! the history of our criminal jurisprudence—of our police, informs us, that the more often a human being is submitted to imprisonment, trial and punishment, in the same ratio generally is his disposition to immoral conduct increased; and as to the prevention of crime—need I answer the question?—Well has Mr. Owen asked, “Why then is Punishment for the correction of moral error awarded to human beings?”

But it may be said, What! would you suffer the wretched outcasts of society, the nightly marauder and the daily thief, to roam at large, so that it may become impossible for the peaceable and unoffending citizen to appear in our streets?—I answer, certainly not; although our present practice is unquestionably bad, Rz-
SRAINTS are assuredly necessary; but such restraints ought only to be introduced as may be precursory and preparatory to a better order of things.

I have really no desire to examine the present circumstances by which the minds of a very large portion of the people of this vast metropolis are constantly surrounded; it is, however, necessary that we should look at them. On the one hand we behold immense piles of wealth, the possessors of which too often ostentatiously and ridiculously display it; on the other, squalid poverty and pining want; need we wonder that the sufferers in the last mentioned group should occasionally cast a longing glance at so many superfluous piles. Hence we cannot pass through any of the more crowded streets, and those also inhabited by the lower classes, without witnessing the most painful traits of moral character, both in male and female, in young and old. Let us look too at those

"Who weekly catch
The morsel lost by law-forc'd charity,
And die so slowly that none call it murder."—COlRIDGE.

Let him who is at all in the habit of traversing our streets as I am, tell us how often, in the course of his peregrinations, he witnesses the personal contention of fighting, both in the young and in the adult; and let him at the same time tell us of the supineness or indifference which is evinced at such demoralizing exhibitions, the nurturers of every bad passion—the panders to crime.

I might go on and readily show how, step by step, the young pilferer and the accomplished felon are produced, till at last, and not before, in comes your restraint in the shape of Punishment, and the law takes its course. This is not, this cannot be the way to produce good moral conduct. The theme is too harrowing to be dwelt upon; it is, besides, time that I should proceed to the remaining objects of my lecture; before doing which, permit me for a moment to glance also at the upper classes of society—those classes where elegance and accomplishment are presumed to have their chosen seat, and to ask, Is it at all probable that while Duelling shall be countenanced, shall be patronized, shall be fashionable, and the phantom Honour beckon our Fathers, our Brothers, and our Friends to blood, that the mind will ever be in that state of affectionate feeling and regard for our fellow creatures, which can produce extensively useful and benevolent results?

But to proceed. Our mental operations, then, are prompted, are caused, either by sensations arising within ourselves, as hunger, thirst, &c.; or by those objects with which we are surrounded, as heat, light, cold, human society, &c. &c. Such promptings exercise over us a control more or less powerful, depending upon their intensity, their duration, or the mode in which
they are applied. In the new-born child the sensation of hunger or pain prompts him to express his uneasiness by crying; and excessive, nay, even moderate light, will, for some time, cause him to close his eyes. After a short time the image of his nurse, who ought, if possible, always to be his mother, becomes impressed upon his mind; and the pleasure which the bland aliment milk affords him, with her soothing endearments, excite the first rudiments of reflective ideas—of thought. By degrees the operations of his mind, at first simple, increase; he loves, he dislikes; and accordingly as he is disciplined, will they ultimately become the reflected images—copies—effects of those circumstances by which he has been, from his birth, continually surrounded; and they can be no other. Hence arise his hopes, his fears, his views of justice, and of right and wrong. This is a fact which must, I presume, be universally admitted: upon its universality rest both its value and importance as a Truth.

We see, therefore, and I think it will be useful again to recapture our positions here, that the mind, the recipient, the organ of thought and emotion or passion resides in the brain; that sensation, reflection, imagination, judgment, most of the passions, &c. into which the mind has been divided, appear, according to our present knowledge, to be nothing more than the effects made upon it by the external objects by which we are surrounded; by some internal impression, stimulus, conveyed to it through the agency of the nerves; or by a process arising in the mind itself—the brain.

From this view of the mind, let us now see how it may be fashioned by education, so as to become highly instrumental in the production and increase of human happiness. By education, we must remember, I here mean that concourse of causes or circumstances which surround and form the human character; and not merely those scanty, incomplete, and often inefficient processes commonly so named.

Man, we should never for a moment forget, is by far the most imitative of all animals; and he is so in consequence of the superior capacity and powers of his mind. It has been said that the whole creation is a miracle; but in contemplating the human mind, a small part only of that creation, the apparent simplicity of its original nature, and its capacity for the reception and combination of ideas—of thought, miraculous as creation is, we cannot hesitate to affirm that the human mind is one of the most miraculous things with which man is acquainted. Who, for example, did he not know the fact, would believe that from about thirty simple sounds, or less, the whole fabric of human speech is erected; and that most of the alphabets of the different languages of the world are comprised in less than that number of signs?

It is necessary, also, to observe, in regard to the formation of
the human character, that the mind for ever shrinks from all attempts to force it into any mode of discipline or action; that while it may be led by gentleness and argument almost anywhere, the least appearance of force or violence produces revolt and repugnance, so that it has been truly said, it is much more easy to "lead" man wrongly, than to "drive" him right. This disposition in the ignorant and uninformed has been frequently called obstinacy; but it is, nevertheless, the result of a general law of the mind which we all obey. There is no other effectual way of removing such obstinacy, than by enlightening the understanding—imparting knowledge.

Why is it that PUNISHMENTS do not succeed in their object? The answer is obvious—they force, not lead the mind to act. No reasoning or persuasion is applied by the law to the criminal. Circumstances have made him what he is. You may lead him with much trouble and care from his vicious courses; but you will never drive him from them. BENEVOLENCE,—KINDNESS, are therefore the grand levers, the most powerful and efficient engines in working a reformation in the human mind—an alteration in human action. When I say you will never drive him from them, I mean, you will never by driving alter the state of his mind, nor the nature of his pursuits: for, upon the removal of your restraint, he generally returns to the same or a worse state than that in which he was when your penal process began.—Why? Because the causes of his delinquency still surround him; these are WANT, BAD HABITS, and BAD SOCIETY. While he is so surrounded, impelled, how can he reform? The wonder is not that he continues vicious—the wonder would be were he to become reformed.

A society has been lately formed in this metropolis, or its immediate neighbourhood, for the purpose of providing means of employment for persons who are discharged from prison, and who have no means of supporting themselves. To such a society every benevolent person must wish success, as it will tend to diminish, in some degree, the evils attendant on our present modes of treating criminals. But would not our Benevolence be much

* That WANT (by which I here mean, that state of painful privation of food and raiment which the sufferer has no legitimate means of obtaining,) suppresses or annihilates the social sympathies in those who are the patients of its influence, is undeniably true; hence the great indifference which those suffering under its absolute dominion evince for the suffering or pain of others. It is well known that, in cases of absolute famine, the benevolent affections are rarely exemplified in the sufferers by it; occasional exceptions will doubtless be met with, but the general position cannot be controverted. Want, therefore, in its numerous ramifications, is destructive to the moral feelings—the moral sense of the mind.
more valuable and efficient, if exerted in preventing those demoralizing circumstances which necessarily produce felons from surrounding so many of the people? Do we not know, are we not assured, that contact with prisons, in the way in which prisoners do come in contact with them, produces extensive moral contamination?

It may be here useful to say a few words upon the utility of Labour—muscular exertion, and its effects upon the mind.

So useful and necessary an ingredient has Labour been presumed to be, and, in some cases, we must admit actually is, in preventing the recurrence of immoral acts, that our Legislators and others having influence among us, have erroneously supposed that, provided you have employment for the mass of the people, all the machinery of society will work well. A more dangerous mistake was never possibly committed. It is true, while the demand for labour is continual, and equals or exceeds the supply, the effects predicated generally to a certain extent, take place: but let the demand for labour cease, and you have thrown on your hands a mass of disorderly machinery, which, the less it has to do, the more difficult it is to be managed. This would in some degree, perhaps, be the case, were the idle mass well informed and intelligent; but when this mass is uninformed and ignorant, the results from their idleness and ignorance will always be tremendous. The necessity, therefore, of their becoming intelligent on this account, is of itself sufficiently obvious; but when, in addition to this, we know that, by enlightening the understanding—enlarging their sphere of knowledge, they become more docile, more rational, more virtuous, more fitted for admixture with the already intelligent portion of society, and that an infinitely larger quantity of talent becomes developed for the advantage of all—these considerations are more than amply sufficient to convince us that the more knowledge—the means of happiness, are diffused, the more certain and permanent must be the prosperity of any state, and that ignorance is its bane.

Let us never forget that Labour, in excess, renders the mind incapable of much thought of any kind during its continuance; and, after its cessation, so much repose is necessary to restore the lost energy, that little time can be found, by the laborious classes of society, for mental operations. I call that Labour in excess, when ten or twelve hours a day are devoted to continued muscular action, such as reaping, threshing, mowing, walking, &c. &c.*

* It may be objected to this statement, that we occasionally find minds of considerable power among the labouring classes: we do so; but these form exceptions, not the rule. The extraordinary natural powers of some minds will, it is well known, overcome obstacles which are quite insuperable to others of the ordinary standard. We must not, therefore, take the exception for the rule.
Need we wonder, therefore, that the laborious husbandman, and many other of the laborious classes of society, are ignorant and reduced to, or rather not raised from, the state of a mere animal!—But, in order that such classes of our fellows may become intelligent, docile, and useful members of society, you must supply them with the means of becoming so, or mere animals they must and will remain. If you do not bring their reflecting powers into exercise, how can you expect them to reflect; if you do not even give them time for mental operations to take place, how is it possible that high moral worth shall be engendered, shall be exemplified?

But, although Labour in excess is extremely injurious to the due development of the mental energies, yet moderate labour, on the contrary, appears to be directly and eminently beneficial to it: for, whenever the mind is too long and too much employed, the body too little, disease of some kind is very commonly induced. Hence, many of the extraordinary and indescribable varieties of insane and hypochondriacal cases pervading intelligent and refined society, which baffle and confound our present imperfect art of medicine; and hence, the necessity of well understanding the nature and operations of the human mind, among many other qualifications, in order to become the most efficient master of the healing art; the moderate exercise, therefore, of both mind and body, consisting of alternations of the exercise of each, is absolutely essential to the enjoyment at once of mental and bodily health, to which there is no royal road, but it must be sought by every son of Adam in a similar way, if it be desired to be obtained. In this respect, for the citizen, Gymnastic Exercises promise to be of considerable utility; and therefore, in the present state of society, ought to be encouraged.

"By ceaseless action all that subsists.
Constant rotation of the unwearied wheel
That nature rides upon, maintains her health,
Her beauty, her fertility. She dreads
An instant's pause, and lives but while she moves.
Its own revolveancy upholds the world."

So says one of our most pleasing and natural poets, Cowper: the subsequent lines on exercise and activity, are too long for quotation, but they are beautifully descriptive of the necessity of labour for the production of both mental and bodily health.

And here, a word or two, in passing, of the Tread-mill. There can be no doubt that, for the time, the Tread-mill has some beneficial tendency upon the mind, by the labour which it causes, in suspending, perhaps in some cases in lessening also, the moral morbidness of the criminal: but the probability is that, upon the
cessation of such labour, the trains of thought, and the dispositions which induced the moral aberration, will too often return; the disposition for criminal acts, it is to be feared, will be often increased by vindictive discipline; and, I believe, the history of this engine warrants this conclusion. What is wanted is not only a suspension, of course, of the morbid trains of thought, but, besides this, other trains of thought, and other dispositions must be, if possible, introduced, or the disease never can be cured. Here is the work, here is the labour, of the reformer of the criminal: and it appears to me, that benevolence and kindness only can effectuate this gigantic task.

But, as I have said above, should we not be more beneficially employed in preventing than punishing crime? And it does appear to me that, till societies are established throughout the land, not only to employ the unemployed and idle, but to inform, interest, and engage their minds, society must be content—the wealthy must be content to suffer the terrible anxieties attendant on the great and lamentable inequalities of condition so conspicuous in this country.*

* There will be, I apprehend, no great difficulty in putting such societies into active operation. The chief thing wanting is the will of the wealthy to establish them. They must be a sort of joint stock companies, voluntary associations, not establishments by law, and may be called simply, Societies for the Employment of those who have nothing to do. Such companies will produce nothing, in return for the capital employed, but the pleasures resulting from doing good, increased security to the wealth of their domestic fire-sides, and an abundant diminution of crime: results of infinite value in an estimate of human happiness, and results which, it is devoutly to be hoped, the wealthy, for they only have the power to establish such societies, will ere long see the imperious necessity of obtaining for their own comfort, their own happiness.

Such societies ought not to be established upon the common work-house plans, most of which are very inefficient. They should always be situated in the country. London and its immediate vicinity—the vicinity of all large cities, should be avoided. They should be situated where land can be obtained in sufficient quantity to supply, by culture, all the food, at least, of the inmates; and where every kind of manufacture necessary for clothing them should also be produced. Hence, the necessity of every kind of useful handicraft being there exercised, as well as, of course, all the variety of agricultural employments, including gardening. So that, when any person applied for employment, some one may be immediately found which the applicant could perform. In all the various labours, no more machinery should be introduced than is absolutely necessary; and spade cultivation, instead of the plough, in agriculture, will be found, perhaps, an essential part of the plan. Nothing should be purchased for the establishment which can be produced in it in sufficient quantity for the use of the inmates; and no article produced in the establishment should be sold, (that is, thrown into the general market,) except in so far as such sale would be necessary to the comfort and well-being of the inhabitants. The residence of the inmates should be perfectly voluntary: while there they should be comfortably fed, clothed, and properly instructed;
To expect, therefore, any one to become docile, rational, virtuous, unless the proper means be taken to make him so, is truly absurd. We now well know, whatever difficulties beset us in fashioning or altering the character of the adult, that children receive impressions with the greatest readiness, and hence it is that too early an attention cannot be paid to the method in which they are brought up. Surround them with proper circumstances, impress them with just ideas, with suitable knowledge, and, we need not doubt, we shall not fail to obtain the desired result; provided also, the same or similar circumstances surround them in after life.

Till lately, in most of our systems of education, if systems they can be called, which have little else except the elements of disunion and discord to recommend them, two mistakes have been committed, upon which it is necessary that I should make a few observations. One of these is, in supposing that the education of very young children is of trifling or of no moment; and the other in concluding, that when we are enabled to take an active part in the business of life, our education is finished, whereas in truth it is but just begun. The whole life of man may be designated as merely a large educational process, in which we shall find that and, during their hours of rest, they should be provided with suitable recreation and employment for their minds, by books, &c. but they should be paid nothing whatever for their labour; so that the moment a demand for it arose in the general market, they might be induced to quit the establishment. The hours of labour should be of course moderate; at most, not more, except under particular circumstances, than eight hours a day; so that eight hours might be allowed for sleep, and eight for meals, and recreation, and instruction. It does not appear to me necessary to enter into a further detail of such a society here; but I will just observe, that the immediate superintendents of it must be benevolent and intelligent men; without which qualifications, such a society could do little good. I conclude, of course, that those who may be engaged in the offices of instruction, will be persons of enlarged views, and well acquainted with the best mode of influencing, and operating upon, the mind. I am quite sure that, to the wealthy, such societies will not only become agreeable engagements for them, in disposing pleasurably of their superfluous time; but they will both directly and indirectly add incalculably to the sum total of human happiness. Perhaps, too, the following positions might be usefully impressed upon the inmates of all these societies: No person has a right to live by the labour of another, if able to labour himself. It is the duty, therefore, of every member of a state, to support himself, and those who are immediately dependent upon him, by his own labour. The exceptions to this rule are, infancy, disease, old age, and physical or mental incapacity, or the impossibility of finding employment.

It may just be added, that although nothing has been said about the employment of the female sex in such societies, yet it is concluded that the same care will be taken to find employment for them as for the male sex. Among their diversified labours, I presume that spinning, sewing, knitting, and weaving, will be particularly prominent, not omitting occasional employment in the garden and in the field.
we have always many things to learn—and those too of great importance in the furtherance of human happiness and well-being. Hence the necessity, as I have before said, of our endeavouring to keep the mind in a disposition to be taught. The education, therefore, of young children, should be most carefully and sedulously attended to; and the adult—the man—will find his account in a zealous endeavour to obtain all the useful knowledge—a knowledge of facts within his reach; a knowledge of the best means of producing and increasing both his own and his fellow-creatures' happiness; and to whom it will become, and ought to become, at once, both a duty and a pleasure to communicate to others what he has himself obtained.

The previous steps in the education of children ought to be to take into consideration their natural capacities or predispositions. In this affair I am not without hope, that our friends the Phrenologists, may become very able assistants. I am sure that their science has my hearty good wishes; and I am also sure that nothing which I have said to-night will tend to discourage any one from the pursuit of apparently so valuable and interesting a study if pursued with the caution which I have ventured to suggest concerning it—namely, that we are still in the infancy of such knowledge.

But again to proceed.—In one child, the memory may be already so powerful as to require no further particular exercise or attention; while in another, it may be so weak that scarcely any reflective process can be carried on. It is upon this quality of the mind, memory, that most of our other mental processes depend: he who has not a ready memory, that is, who cannot readily excite in his mind former sensations, perceptions, ideas, cannot have a large range of intellect. Nothing, however, is more clear, than that this disposition of the mind, as well as, indeed, most others, may be greatly increased by use; and hence the absolute necessity of using our faculties—of exercising our abilities, in order that they may become active and efficient. Without use, or being disused, a faculty, ability, or disposition, whatever it may be, soon loses, in general, both its activity and efficiency. This fact cannot be stated too strongly: for no notion can be more erroneous than that which supposes, if we have once been taught or have acquired certain impressions or ideas, that the object of education, or any other object, is accomplished; the impressions must be occasionally repeated, or they will vanish from the mind.

When therefore we hear persons complain of want of memory, it will, in general, be found to consist in a want of attention or application; a person who is fond of music will tell us he has no memory for studies totally different from his favourite pursuit; why? because he pays no attention to them; let the attention be paid, and the result will be accordingly. Under ordinary circum-
stances, there are few persons who have not sufficient memory to retain all the impressions necessary to constitute a virtuous and a happy being: the excessive application of memory is, in morals, neither wanted nor desired.

It must not be forgotten here, that when powerful trains of ideas and circumstances connected with them have been once introduced into, and for a long time have surrounded, the mind, a sudden abstraction of such trains and circumstances, without supplying other stimuli of equal or superior interest, will be often attended with very serious results. Hence the disappointments that usually arise when men retire from an active life, with a fortune, to enjoy what has been erroneously termed otium cum dig·nitate. Pleasurable sensations are not the usual results of quiescence. To possess these, the mind must be excited, impelled. He therefore who retires to such a state, without providing for himself some train of exciting ideas equal or nearly equal in intensity to that which he has given up, will be greatly disappointed in his expectations. He may, and often does, become a voluptuary, but his mind suffers from the absence of the customary stimuli, and peevishness and disease are the usual concomitants. A fine field will, however, always be open for such men in the career of active benevolence, and the various opportunities for the diffusion of knowledge — of happiness, which such persons must abundantly possess. They need not have one idle moment.

Again to return. In another child the imagination may be so lively, eccentric, exuberant, as to usurp the place of the judgment, and hurry the possessor, in maturer years, into errors of the most fatal kind. In another, the consideration of self may be so predominant as to absorb every sentiment of general benevolence; and, in manhood, to ripen into cruelty and general misanthropy. In another, the desire of distinction may grow into such exuberance as, in given circumstances, to produce the desolator and the tyrant of the human race.

That such predispositions should be encouraged or counteracted according to their nature early, admits, I presume, now no question; how they are to be encouraged or counteracted, and what are the dispositions best adapted to form the most virtuous, the most perfect character, are questions by no means, I am sorry to be obliged to admit, of such easy solution. That they may, however, be encouraged or counteracted beneficially both for the individual and for society, there is no reason whatever to doubt.

It appears, too, that in the education of the human mind, and indeed in its general employment, in order that we may obtain the most beneficial results, particularly to the individual, variety in the objects presented to it, and with which it is desirable that it should be surrounded, is of the first importance. To keep the mind continually directed to one object, how agree-
able soever that object might be, is frequently, nay, generally, mischievous in the ultimate result. In children, it is peculiarly injurious; and in adults, the mischiefs resulting from the mind being directed to or engrossed by one object, are often distressingly exemplified. The effect of concentrating the feelings, when death breaks asunder the strong catenation, and where, at the same time, remaining ties are slender, is often astounding; sometimes produces insanity, and sometimes death; but it is also exemplified on many other occasions.

As health of the body is best promoted and preserved by a great variety of muscular motions, so the health of the mind will be best insured and preserved by an introduction of, and by the excitement produced by, a variety of sensations, ideas, thoughts—useful and suitable ones of course. These observations are as applicable to the adult as to the child; diversity of employment, of thought, being equally necessary for both: for we find wherever the mind is exclusively employed on one subject, it matters little what the subject is, that it very often becomes unfitted for, or incapable of judging justly about others concerning which it has not been exercised. Hence, frequently, the unreasonable preference for pursuits in their nature comparatively trifling and sometimes manifestly injurious. Happy then is he who can excite in his mind vivid and useful trains of thought—a disposition for a variety of modes of action and employment, so as to preserve both body and mind in that healthy state of feeling and complacency so essential to the enjoyment of pleasurable existence!

In this respect much may be, doubtless, accomplished by discipline and habit. The habit, therefore, of varying our thoughts, and if possible also our occupations, ought to be acquired as a means of insuring good, mental as well as bodily, health; and thus providing, as much as we can provide, against those unexpected and unforeseen calamities which sometimes await us, and from which none can be, from the very nature of things, always exempt.

I might here, and would most willingly, did your time permit, enter into an examination of the nature and effects of Ambition and Emulation, of Praise and Blame, of Reward and Punishment, (of Criminal Punishment, I have already spoken,) and their uses as means of forming or re-forming the human character; but these subjects, interesting as they are, would lead me into a wider field. I will, however, just observe, that I think both Ambition and Emulation, and Praise and Blame, or, to change the terms, approbation, and disapprobation, may be advantageously employed in the education of youth, and in the improvement of the human character; but that the manner in which they are usually so employed is nevertheless bad. I am aware that this opinion is in direct opposition to the opinion of many estimable men; but I
I have well considered it, and have as yet seen no reason to depart from the conclusions to which I have come. Of natural rewards and punishments, arising out of the nature of things, and, which, in numerous instances, we have no power to avoid, it is scarcely necessary to speak; but artificial rewards and punishments, (and more especially the latter, which ill-judging man has decreed for moral error,) upon examination will prove to be both injudicious and unwise, and are injurious to the general happiness, seeing that we have other means which are much more effectual in producing that which we all desire. See a preceding note.

But it should not be forgotten that the most powerful means for the education of the human mind, the formation of the human character, are those circumstances by which the child is immediately surrounded; which attend him when awake; which hover over him when asleep: and which even prompt his dreams. The looks, gestures, and conversation of his mother; the more grave conversation and behaviour of the father; the opinions and conduct of the child's associates, and the general manners and customs of the society in which he moves—all make up that course of causes which forms the character of almost every individual that ever did or ever will exist.

This view of the Nature of the mind, of its Education, is extremely consolatory, as, by it, we have the cheering hope and promise that many, if not all, of our moral evils may, with care and attention, be eradicated: for as no effect can take place without a cause, so we know that the human mind cannot become immoral, vicious, criminal, without a cause; and that it must become virtuous by the introduction of causes calculated to produce so desirable an end. To expect children or adults to become virtuous, without the introduction of such causes, that is, motives, as will induce them to become so, is of all things the most preposterous.

This view of the mind, and of Education, will also lead us to the practice of the most extensive Benevolence and kindness, not only towards the human race but to all animated Nature. It will abate our malice, destroy our pride, and neutralize our anger. When we see our fellow-mortals rushing to their own unhappiness in the career of vice and immorality, shall we not be disposed in the kindest and most affectionate manner to dissuade them from their unfortunate and disastrous course—from their unhappy aberration? shall we not shew them the beauty of virtue, and the best paths to obtain happiness—those which abound with pleasantry and peace?

In a discourse which I desire should become as general and as useful as possible, I have studiously avoided the introduction of topics which might be likely to produce any hostile difference of opinion; but this view of the human mind (I hope and believe, as far as our knowledge extends, a just one,) will be found in the
closest accordance with practical Christianity; that Christianity which is taught by its Founder, separated from the errors which are too often mixed up with it. On this subject I do not wish to say more here. Those who are admirers of the sublime morality of the New Testament (and who is not?) will know how to make the application.

To those, therefore, to whom the care of the rising generation is immediately intrusted,—to our Fathers and our Mothers, I would say, much depends upon yourselves, upon your own conduct. Think not that whilst, in words, you direct or correct your child, and your own actions oppose your doctrine, such a character as you desire shall arise,—impossible! To those concerned in the Education of youth, our Schoolmasters generally, the Clergy, and our Doctors, who preside at the fountain of what is termed Learning, (a thing of small value indeed in an estimate of human happiness)—be assured, most learned Sirs! that not all the knowledge contained in all the tomes, ponderous, or light, or gay, or grave, which adorn your shelves, will prevail against that living example which is seen in your own persons and in the usages around you. To our Governors, I would say, men become virtuous or vicious, happy or miserable, according to the circumstances by which they are surrounded: to you more immediately belongs the duty of forming such circles, or of improving them if formed. To expect men to become peaceable, orderly, virtuous, intelligent, while causes are continually arising, operating to make them the reverse, is as absurd as it is to preach peace to the winds.

But, although living example, as here stated, is by far the most powerful means of fashioning the mind—the human character, there are others, which, particularly in our present state of knowledge, must by no means be neglected. Next to living example, or actions, opinions and conduct may be inculcated through the medium of Language with considerable effect; and this effect will be greatest according to the manner in which they are conveyed.

Who needs to be told, that an eloquent discourse combining at once simplicity and elegance of diction, and an appeal to the most powerful feelings of the mind, or the interests of man, makes more impression when spoken with grace and effect by a person of whom we entertain a high opinion, than when read in the closet?—This disposition of the mind to be impressed with living eloquence is a very general one, and is found in every country having the least pretensions to civilization—nay, even among savage tribes. Eloquence, therefore, under suitable regulations, offers many and solid advantages; but it is exceedingly liable to be abused. I am disposed to believe that more mischief than good has been hitherto effected by it. I hope, however, that this will not always be the case; I hope that Truth and Eloquence, and I may also add
poetry, will form such a legitimate alliance that an immense accession of human happiness will be the ultimate result.

Other, and perhaps, upon the whole, after living example, some of the best, media, for the conveyance of instruction and fashioning the human mind are Lectures. We have daily examples in this metropolis, that many of the sciences are well taught by such means; and surely the science of the formation and education of the human character may be effectually brought before us, and comprehensively and practically inculcated.

The last method which offers for the education of the mind is solitary reading. This is, it is true, much less immediately effectual than either of the methods to which I have just alluded; but from its nature it may be made almost universal, and hence its effects are, and, whilst mankind continue to acquire the art of reading, and whilst books are to be obtained, will be extensive, exciting, powerful, and useful; and more especially will these effects be such, provided care be taken in the choice of the literary stimulants placed before the mind.

Before I quit the subject of Education, I cannot avoid calling your attention especially to the mode in which children, and indeed adults, can be most effectually excited—taught. In morals we have just seen that example is much more powerful than precept. Why? because an action more vividly impresses the mind than words, the symbols of such action; action being, besides, in morals an exemplification of the state of mind of the actor, it must, of necessity, outweigh many a dry moral precept, the utility of which is not always perceived, and the practice of which is too often neglected by the propounders, the teachers of them. This method applies to most if not to all the sciences. Language and the Science of Grammar may be much more effectually taught vivá voce, in conjunction with books or with written or printed formulæ, than by books alone. This has been strongly exemplified in the new mode of teaching languages; and there can be no doubt that it may be advantageously applied to many other sciences and arts. Sensible objects always make more impression upon the mind than descriptions of them in books. Hence the power of example in morals; hence the efficiency of experiments in chemistry and natural philosophy; and hence the advantage of real specimens in every department of natural history, both animate and inanimate. Hence also the very superior advantage of dissecting the real subject in anatomy to any description of it, however accurate, in a book.

From this sketch of the nature of the mind, of its operations, and of moral education, the difficulty, if not impossibility, of carrying into effect such benevolent designs as are necessary to produce the results which may with confidence be predicted, in present society (London for instance), must be immediately perceived. For, although improvements in education are daily taking place,
these relate to particular sciences only, rather than to the very comprehensive and important one of morals; and are carried into effect without much, if at all, disturbing the arrangements or prejudices of society. Such is that just alluded to of teaching the languages by a new and more expeditious method, of which a gentleman of the name of Hamilton has been an active and exciting agent; yet we must be extremely cautious.

• It is, perhaps, scarcely necessary, to state that this Gentleman is in no way related to my Friend, Mr. Hamilton, of Dalzell, to whom these sheet are dedicated. I take, however, the present opportunity to say that I was, about four years since, Editor of the Metropolitan Literary Journal, in the first number of which is a Paper detailing Mr. Hamilton’s new method of teaching languages, which those who are desirous of information concerning that method may consult. Notwithstanding the temperate terms and rigid impartiality with which that Paper was drawn up, Mr. Hamilton thought proper to attack me by name, (although my name is not appended to the Paper,) in a rude and unjustifiable manner, in one of the daily prints; to which, of course, I did not reply, except in a notice to the Correspondents of the Journal, determining not to be drawn into a controversy on the subject: for one among other more substantial reasons, that, as I had no immediate interest to serve in the agitation of such a question, I did not think it worth my while to pay ten, perhaps, twenty guineas, for the use of half a column of a Newspaper, to answer an unhandsome attack.

Mr. Hamilton had stated, again and again, in his public addresses, that (with very few exceptions) no word in any language had more than one meaning, and in that meaning ought always to be translated. Now, however desirable it might be, that this position should be true, I believe what has been stated in this lecture will abundantly prove its incorrectness. Of the great evils attendant on language being that words, more especially those of frequent occurrence, have often many meanings, and hence in language not a few of our errors, mistakes, and difficulties. How many foreigners are there who very little in their long use of English never acquire correctly that of the auxiliary verbs will and shall, when applied to the different persons of the verb? In controverting Mr. Hamilton’s position, I cited several examples, and among others, one from the Latin, which was an incorrect one; without, however, attending to the errors or mistakes into which the Paper stated that the teacher had fallen, he pounced upon my incorrect example, and flourished his rod in no measured style.

A paper appeared a few years since in one of our Philosophical Journals, in which the French words fer blane were translated literally white iron; this the mere English scholar could not understand, no such thing in this country being so named: the thing meant was, what is usually called tin-plate; that is, iron plate covered with the metal called tin. It is remarkable that we very often call this substance tin, and the worker in it a tinman: let us imagine what notable nonsense would be produced, if a Frenchman literally translated these words into his mother tongue! The French, on the contrary, call tin-plate, fer blane, white iron, and the worker of it ferblanter, that is, a worker of white iron. Ferblanter must not, therefore, be rendered a worker of white iron, but tinman.

I have found that in translating, from the French in particular, the literal rendering of terms of art would be frequently peculiarly absurd and very often never lead to the thing designed to be expressed. While literal renderings alone would frequently mislead the pupil, they are nevertheless ex-
in estimating the acquisition of such knowledge: Language, we must remember, is the means not the end of human knowledge. It will be, I fear, not infrequently found, that the more languages we acquire, ceteris paribus, the less we know; and this for a very obvious reason: so much time has been spent in their acquisition, that none, or comparatively none, can be devoted to the obtaining of a knowledge of facts; facts, and not sounds or signs for sounds, being necessarily the basis of all our knowledge.

The science of morals, therefore, to which I have adverted, cannot, I fear, be carried into practical operation in present society. A conviction that it cannot, has induced Mr. Owen, and other individuals, to endeavour to form villages of, what are termed, mutual co-operation, where the demoralizing circumstances now pervading general society may be shut out; and where knowledge and labour may be more equally divided and diffused, so that Comfort, Independence, and Happiness, may be possessed by, as they are the undoubted right of all.

These visionary schemes, as they have been called by those who, I believe, know nothing or very little about them, have been assailed by the witling and the sciolist with that species of attack which their ignorance of the subject necessarily produces; for, when they understand what they now do not, they will assail them no longer.† If there be Truth in the doctrines which I have stated concerning the mind, and concerning education, some such societies as those contemplated by Mr. Owen, and others, having similar views and convictions with him, must be and will

† A very ingenious work in defence of the Co-operative System has lately appeared, to which I would particularly solicit the reader's attention; it is entitled the Revolt of the Bees, and teems with the most benevolent sentiments. It is written in dialogue after the Greek model, with elegant terseness and considerable naïveté; it is one of those books which are not very likely to make a great noise, but its merit will be acknowledged when the puny bantlings of the day have expired and are forgotten: it richly deserves to be read and studied.
be entered into by mankind, sooner or later, in order to get rid of much, if not all, of that deplorable mass of moral evil which exists in the present state of society. It is a consummation which their Convictions and their Benevolence will effectuate, and which human Suffering imperiously demands.

What, then, is the conclusion to be drawn from the consideration of the whole matter?—That we know very little concerning the actual nature of the Human mind. That we do not know with certainty, whatever may be our hopes and desires on this interesting subject, whether the brain itself be the mind, or whether some more refined and ethereal substance pervades and resides in it during our existence here. But, although we do not know much of its nature, we know, fortunately, a great deal of its processes and operations; and to these it behoves us to be accurately attentive, in order, as we have seen, that the greatest possible quantity of good—of happiness, may be produced for the whole family of man.

I am sorry to have trespassed so long upon your time and your attention—a few moments more and I have done.

That a devotion of our energies to this momentous subject, and especially to Education in the most enlarged sense of the term, will contribute greatly to improve our knowledge concerning the mind and the means by which Human happiness may be greatly increased and more generally diffused, there can be, I apprehend, no question.

Although we cannot re-make man, we can so re-form, mould, and direct him, that he will no longer be the same being which we now too often unfortunately behold him; and, although we have no reason to expect that he will so far improve the condition of his natural and moral existence here as to be no longer liable to mortality, we may reasonably expect, nevertheless, that during his continuance here, his days may be rendered infinitely happy, and possibly more numerous. These consummations we are fairly entitled to anticipate from the more general diffusion of knowledge, from the prevalence of more enlarged and liberal principles of Government, and from the exercise and enlargement of the benevolent affections.

Throughout this Discourse, I have not mentioned, except incidentally, the Female mind, considering that what I have said on the Human mind applies to both sexes. It may, however, be useful, before concluding, to observe, that directly the female of our species, Woman, has not engaged so much of the attention of the Male sex in regard to her mind and the formation of the human character as she is entitled to and deserves: for, after all, we shall find that much, nay most, of the formation of the human character will always depend upon women—the mothers of our
offspring. The necessity, therefore, of their being well acquainted with the modes in which character can be best formed is indisputable; in a word, women must be imbued with a knowledge, and an intimate knowledge too, of the nature and operations of the human mind, or they cannot be good moral Govemesses and Instructresses of our offspring. Instead of the weak and helpless beings we too commonly behold them, they must be taught to think for themselves; to submit to no dicta but those of Truth; and to hold in no estimation those dogmas and opinions by whomsoever uttered which have no basis but custom—no authority but superior corporeal energy, or the overweening vanity of the other sex.

Besides this, if man himself desire to enjoy in the society of woman the greatest quantum of happiness, the sooner he raises her from a state of pupilage and vassalage to one of independence of thinking and of acting the better. To this end he must impart to her his knowledge—make her the companion of his thoughts—give her a taste for mental pursuits—for literature—for his best modes of obtaining happiness; he must encourage her in shaking off the trammels by which she has been so long kept down; and soon will she become not only more efficient in the production of happiness for him, but also for herself, and all those around her.

Let it not be supposed, that in recommending this course, I advocate pedantry, which is offensive in either sex; nor even learning, if by learning be meant a mere knowledge of Greek and Latin; this is indeed of trifling moment in the scale of happiness; nor would I advocate, for an instant, the Love-sick sentimentality of novel reading, which, as novels are generally written, is the worst of all reading;* but what I desire for woman is, a more ex-

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Sir Walter Scott has, it is true, in his novels, generally avoided much of the love-sick sentimentality to which allusion is here made; but he has, unfortunately, fallen into another error, which, it is to be feared, does infinite mischief to the progress of truth and the expansion of intellect, by persuading us that now

"The wine of life is on the lees;"

as well as by giving us false views and notions of former periods of society,—of golden and romantic times, which, in reality, never existed except in the imagination of the novelist and the poet.

If it be a truth that man is a progressive being; that, by the accumulation of knowledge, his well-being and his happiness can only be increased, surely to inculcate the notion, that former periods of society, its infancy, were those in which great happiness peculiarly abounded, is injurious and unwise. With whatever gorgeousness and pomp remote and by-gone times may be painted, we may, I think, be morally assured, that the means of happiness, and, consequently, happiness itself, were not so generally diffused as they have been
sensive acquaintance with facts—with real and substantial knowledge, on every subject which can contribute to the happiness of our species. We, men, experience great pleasure on the intellectual exchanges of thought which pass between us; the intellectual exchanges of thought between man and woman are far more exquisite, and, therefore, more to be sought after and desired. Speaking individually, I can say, that I never experience so much intellectual pleasure as when in the company of an intelligent lady. I presume, too, that such pleasure is reciprocal, and on this account, of course, more to be esteemed.

That many of the Laws of this country are extremely oppressive and injurious to woman, depressing to her mind, and consequently to her happiness, cannot be doubted; the customs of society still more so—more offensively galling. One of the worst of those laws is, perhaps, that of primogeniture; the practice, too common with the wealthy, of bestowing their largesses upon the male branches of their families, to the comparative neglect of the helpless and defenceless woman, is also decidedly unjust, and injurious to the best interests of the human race. Surely, if any difference be made in the distribution of wealth, that difference ought to be in favour of those who are least able to take care of themselves! Such, however, is the Law and the Practice upheld in later times; and that, from the absence of that powerful engine, the Press, much wrong was committed and suffered without the possibility of redress, or of the sufferers having any chance of their being even heard. At the present day, although much suffering is still unfortunately the lot of many of our population, their complaints are at least heard, and, in consequence, sometimes alleviated, if not effectually redressed. He, therefore, who looks back to remote periods of history for better times than the present, (I do not mean by the present, this day, this week, or this year,) for times in which the happiness of all was more generally consulted, looks back to what has never, in all probability, existed.

As the world grows older, our knowledge of the means of producing happiness increases; and, therefore, nothing can be more unphilosophical, nothing more injurious to the progress of truth, than such writing; which will be, of course, most injurious in proportion to the fascination through which the sentiments are conveyed. That the historical novels, by the author of Waverly, are in this predicament, is greatly to be lamented; their redeeming qualities, compared with this original sin, are comparatively few, and as dust in the balance against the mischiefs which, while they continue to be read, they will inevitably produce on minds more intent upon filling up the tabula rasa, than of examining the tendency of the sentiments which they contain. The springtide of their success has, however, it is presumed, reached its height; the next age will, most probably, see the current recede. Had the gifted author more frequently kept in view a moral purpose, rather than mere amusement, in those novels, of how much more real happiness might be not have been the instrument in producing? how much the progress of intellect, and of human improvement, might be not have accelerated?
by our present Institutions; the sooner, therefore, they are departed from the better, in favour of

"Woman, to whom we owe
Our highest Happiness below,
Must she be will-less—thoughtless—all
Which men for their good pleasure call
Feminine?—or shall she arise,
And learn, with us, to scan the skies;
O'er meads and mountains with us roam,
And bring progressive science home;—
Search with us knowledge man to bless,
And, thus, make exquisite his happiness?"

The theme is an animating one;—it will afford me infinite satisfaction, if what I have said, shall in any way contribute to the happiness of that Sex for whom I shall never cease to feel a warm affection, and whom also I respect and esteem.

Perhaps I cannot more appropriately conclude than by a few lines addressed to a Lady on the Education of her child.

"Teach him a sympathy to feel
For Nature—for the general weal.
Grave this—a lesson on his heart—
May he the precept wide impart!

"Be kind to all—to man—to beast,—
Bird—fish—worm—insect"—Thus a feast
Of happiness will he partake,
And happy other beings make.
Teach him—All violence is wrong!
A truth as useful as it's strong.—
There's no effect without a cause:—
This one of nature's wisest laws.
To be all which you may desire,
Your child will certain things require:—
Fit circumstances must surround
Him, or your wishes he'll confound,
Crabs on the cherry do not grow;
Nor does the pine produce the sloe.
All kindred things produce their kind;—
Thus is it with the human mind:
If you would wish him to be kind,
Impress kind conduct on his mind;
Not by mere words, but let the deed
Of kindness done before him plead;
Chieflly, the deed performed by you,
Which, seeing done, he'll wish to do.
"You will, no doubt, some learning give,
And teach him in the world to live;—
But what he'll want, as much as sense,
Is active, warm benevolence.

* For other observations concerning woman, see my Family Cyclopædia, and the Lecture on the History and Utility of Literary Institutions.
This will produce more happiness
Than all besides he may possess.
This teach him, and his little heart
Will kind impressions soon impart.
Thus will there in his bosom spring
Affection for each living thing,
And thus will be his Friends' delight
That beauteous boy of promise bright.
"Seductive lady! is the theme!
Instruction, now a rushing stream,
Overflows its banks on either hand
And widely fructifies the land.
A goodly harvest may we see,
When all shall wise and happy be!
Meantime one word should be impress'd
In letters large on every breast—
It is most potent, and will well
Perform what can't the prison cell:
What vengeance always fails to do—
It is, fair lady! seen in you—
Kindness!—repeat the word again—
Kindness! and thus I end my strain!*

* From "Ornithologia, or the Birds, a Poem, with an Introduction to their Natural History, and copious Notes."

POSTSCRIPT.

The author is desirous of adding to what has been said relative to Societies of Mutual Co-operation, that he does not believe the knowledge by which such Societies can become permanently established, is yet sufficiently diffused. Most of the persons with whom he has come in contact, who have evinced a disposition to enter into such associations, appear to overlook the necessity which there is, in order to insure the well-being of the Society, that there should be among the Co-operators certain mental agreements, dispositions, and tastes, in regard to leading objects, which, if not identical, ought, at least, to partake of considerable similarity. Many of such persons appear to possess zeal, without an adequate portion of knowledge to attemper it—no such Society could long exist amidst a prepollency of ignorance. They seem to think that the disposition to bring their quota of labour into the common stock of the Society will be sufficient to insure its general and individual prosperity. From this the author is, however, obliged to dissent: he is convinced that again and again, attempts to establish such Societies, without the requisite dispositions of mind, and a knowledge by far more extensive than falls to the lot of the present majority of those now disposed to enter into such co-operation, must fail: for, while it is admitted that one of the constituents of such a Society is a disposition to labour, yet a bond
of mental union must also be sought, which is not less necessary; nay, is even more essential than the disposition for corporal activity. *Mind, mind, mind,* ever must be the pervading, the governing influence in such undertakings.

Another error has also been committed by many who are sincerely desirous of establishing a Pantisocracy, not excepting Mr. Owen himself: too much stress has been laid on the form of the buildings for such associations. The parallelogram, for example, has become with the public a sort of standing jest. The author thinks that the form of the buildings is comparatively immaterial. If *Pantisocracy* be not as valuable in a cottage as in a palace, it is good for little; and, although our present knowledge might enable us to acquire comforts unknown to former ages of the world, if the principles of Pantisocratic association be good, be the best which can be devised for the general happiness, whether we shall live in cottages or palaces must simply depend upon the taste and disposition of the *Pantisocrats* themselves. To avow an individual taste, the author frankly confesses his predilection for an *insulated cottage* as a residence, to all the embellishments which art and luxury can bestow on contiguous dwellings, whether consisting of *streets, squares, or palaces.*

But although the author is obliged to admit that his expectations of seeing a Society established, at present, on genuine *Pantisocratic* principles are not sanguine, yet he nevertheless thinks that approaches may be, and he hopes are gradually made towards it; and that those who have influence in human affairs, will find the imperative necessity of directing, by some benevolent and well-devised plans, the current of our population, now directed so strongly to our large towns, over other and more genial soils. In a word, an example must be set by the upper classes themselves, of *remaining in their native provinces* to succour, to stimulate, and to improve those by whom their Lands are made productive. The fashionable congregation of the aristocracy, the wealthy, and the wise, in our overgrown towns, in London in particular, must be avoided. The *absentees* must return to their patrimonial or other rural inheritances and retreats, where each proprietor, gathering round him an intelligent, a social circle must make it his *business* as well as the *pleasure* of his life, to diffuse knowledge and happiness in every direction; exciting by his presence, and warming by his rays, those germs which are ever ready to burst forth beneath the auspices of a benevolent sun.

In Ireland, the *return of the absentees,* and the establishment of such circles and such residence, will do more, he verily believes, in one year, than has been done by all the acts of Parliament that have ever been passed for the improvement of that populous, fertile, yet unfortunate, country.

*END OF THE LECTURE.*
PHRENOLOGY.

The following Letter, being explanatory of some points in an interesting science, may, perhaps, find acceptance among those who are desirous of pursuing mental inquiries. It originally appeared in the New Times Newspaper, in December last.

Sir,—An abstract from the Phrenological Journal was published in Paper a few days ago, which appears to me to require some notice, contains positions to which I do not think some of the most intelligent of Phrenologists will assent. It is to be lamented that enthusiasm in a favourite pursuit is very apt to lead us astray; in Phrenology our enthusiasts have been occasionally very much at fault. If the positions stated in the abstract examined by an impartial inquirer, I much fear that the science of Phrenology, admitting the writer of the paper has given a correct account of it, will be esteemed as not worth a straw.

However, I do not think phrenology so poor a science as this paper would teach us to believe. The writer has, or some one for him, adopted a singular method of proving his positions. He applied to the "hatters" to ascertain the difference between the size of the skulls of persons moving in the three classes of society; namely, the upper, the middle, and the lower classes; and he finds from the "hatters" that the upper classes have the largest skulls, the middle classes the next largest, and the lower classes the least. Now, Sir, admitting this as a general truth, which I am by no means disposed to do, what does it prove? Absolutely nothing in regard to the intellectuality of the different classes: for, according to the writer's own showing, a large skull may possibly possess power of some sort; that is, great animal or great intellectual power, as it may happen. But, leaving this, no notice whatever is taken in the abstract, for I have not seen the original paper, of the power of education, in altering the state and disposition of the mind as well as (there is great ground for believing) the size and form also of the skull. If, therefore, the upper classes should be found, as no doubt they in general are (for the best of all possible reasons, because they have time and opportunity to direct their minds to intellectual pursuits) more intelligent than the lower classes, is not this sufficient to account for the difference, without presuming that nature has drawn such outlines? and which, as far as my experience goes, I beg leave, respectfully, (as regards the size of the skull, not the intellectuality,) to deny: for, from extensive acquaintance with the skulls of a numerous class of agricultural labourers in the West of England, I am persuaded that their skulls generally are as large, if not larger, than those of any other class in society. The size of the skull alone is, therefore, no criterion whatever of the intellectuality considered apart from the various regions of the skull from which the size is made up; for it is demonstrable that two persons may have skulls exactly of the same size, yet that from the regions of the brain being differently developed, their intellectual faculties may be as wide as the Poles asunder; nay, that skulls with similar developments may, and do, vary greatly in their intellectual powers. Dr. Spurzheim, Mr. Deville, and indeed now, I believe, all intelligent phrenologists admit, that not only must the size and position of the organs be taken into the account in an estimate of the skull, but also the quality and activity of any particular brain, it is impossible exactly to predict,
by a simple examination of the skull, of what the brain is capable. But it has been too much the practice with all the phrenologists to leave the power of education, in altering the state and disposition of the mind, out of the question; as if daily experience did not teach us the wonderful effect which habit and education have upon us, in exciting us to activity, and in altering the quality of our minds!

It is true that we can, and do very generally, on observing the situation of the meatus auditorius, predict of any skull that, from nature, there is given more or less ability for intellectual pursuits, or for the exertion of great animal power; but in both cases, education, habit, the quality and activity of the mind, must be taken into the account, before a true estimate of any one's character from his skull can be made. How often do we not see a large subject, with a large head, as torpid as the stream of Lethe, while a little subject, with a little head, has the utmost energy, activity, and intelligence. The size simply of the skull is, therefore, of little moment; it is the form, quality, and activity, of the organs to which we must attend.

Let it not be supposed from this, that I estimate phrenology lightly; I do not. I believe that if it be studied with care and circumspection, it may be made eminently useful to mankind; and I believe not one of the least important of the results from its study, will be that of rendering us all more kind, more tolerant, and humane.

I add my real signature to this communication, because I think disinterestedness of purpose is best evinced by it.

I am, Sir, &c.

JAMES JENNINGS.

London; Nov. 29, 1837.

END.
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London: Poole and Edwards, Stationers' Court.
To THOMAS CAMPBELL, Esq.
Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow, &c. &c.

London, Jan. 2nd, 1829.

Sir,—As it is generally understood that you are the Editor of the New Monthly Magazine, I take the liberty to call your attention to an article which appears in the number of that periodical published yesterday, and which I am quite sure you did not write, and most probably before its publication, never saw; for if you had, I think you could never have suffered such trash to be made public. And were it not that the name of the author of the Pleasures of Hope, seems to sanction what appears in that Magazine, I should not think it deserved the least attention.

The article to which I allude treats my work on Birds, lately published, and which has been, I am happy to say, very well received by those who are competent judges of it, as a work of utter worthlessness, and, in your critic's opinion, stale, flat, and unprofitable! Not content with abusing the poetry, he has pounced upon the prose; and although I have candidly, and, I trust, modestly explained in the Preface my motives for my attempt, and that it is designed as an elementary work; yet all that I have said seems to have rendered the poor thing more pertinaciously blind. I am, however, sir, obliged to draw this conclusion, either that your critic is totally incompetent to judge of the merit and value of my work, or that all the numerous journalists and other scientific persons who have spoken of it are fools!

It is very easy, sir, for a critical butcher, with a knife and saw, to cut up the labour of three years, and the accumulation of a life of observation, with all the efferentry and cruelty of ignorance and malice; but it is not very easy for those who are the objects of his cold-blooded operations to bear them. He may wrap himself up in his anonymous cloak, and welcome; I have no wish to see him in his nakedness; but of this I am sure, that he is neither a judge of my work, nor of the science of which it treats.

In conclusion, and not to weary you with a long letter, let me entreat you, sir, for the future to exercise your discretion as an Editor, and refuse such trash offered to you as criticism, or disavow your wholesale judgment, which has not been improved by the alliance of the most obedient humble servant,

JAS. JENNINGS.

P.S. You will observe, sir, a few of the public testimonies to the value of my work on the preceding page. I could ad duct many letters from some of the first naturalists of the age, and fellows of the Linnean Society, to whom I am personally unknown, who have voluntarily and unsolicitedly expressed their approbation of it; but such gratifying communications I have, of course, no right to make public.

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