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ON THE WATCH-TOWER

As the years roll by the Annual Report issued by our President-Founder from the General Headquarters of the Society at Adyar becomes an ever more and more bulky volume, and this year amounts to some 120 closely printed pages, most of which are purely statistical. As to the Convention itself, the greatest enthusiasm and most uncomfortable overcrowding is reported. The Headquarters' compound resembled a military encampment. Delegates were present from the Scandinavian, British, French, Dutch, Italian, Australian, New Zealand, and of course the Indian sections; the Parsis were numerous represented and twenty-nine of them had journeyed South from distant Bombay, Surat and Hyderabad; a contingent of Buddhists came from Ceylon, and education was strongly represented by the Principals of five colleges. To accommodate all the guests, some 800 persons, the compound was filled with temporary structures—

Huts, bathing-rooms and long ranges of contiguous habitations ordered in advance by individual delegates and branches. . . . The flat roofs of the main building and the two others situate along the river bank were covered with leaf and bamboo structures, and the new extension of the

Adyar Library, an imposing-looking two-story building, being fortunately unfinished inside, the upper and lower floors were ingeniously laid off in small single apartments for the accommodation of European, Parsi, Buddhist and Jain delegates. Sixty-five persons had to be supplied with food and lodgings after the European fashion, while the long brick dining-floors near the Brahmin Well, converted for the time being into lofty dining-halls by superstructures of bamboo and palm leaf, were enlarged so as to contain 120 running feet in length, affording the opportunity of having 700 Hindus eating their meals simultaneously.

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THE enormous increase in attendance was partly owing to the fact that the Indian National Congress was simultaneously being held at Madras, from which Adyar is five miles distant, but was more especially due to the ever increasing popularity of Mrs. Besant among the Indians. In fact the arrangements for her lectures completely broke down owing to the crowds, and this, too, in spite of her giving an extra popular lecture on the opening day on "The Value of Theosophy in the Raising of India." The lecture was delivered in the open air, as the Headquarters' Hall can only accommodate 1,500.

Mrs. Besant
Lectures

On one of the lawns an area of 7,500 square feet was enclosed with a fence, and seats and carpets for the holders of tickets for reserved places. . . . But by early dawn such a crowd had gathered that they swept away the fence and took possession of all the ground, the benches and chairs were passed over their heads to outside, and the crowd squatted on the carpets spread around the platform. By the time that the President-Founder and Mrs. Besant appeared, the audience numbered some 5,000 persons. Our distinguished guests, high European officials and ladies, highest officials of Native States, Rajahs, Nawabs and Zemindars, had to be content with places under the trees and outside the crowd; the great mango and banyan trees were full of onlookers.

In spite of a severe cold our eloquent colleague's voice carried splendidly and all heard her every syllable.

Mrs. Besant's usual set of Adyar Lectures were delivered in the Convention Hall, the audience of which had to be limited by ticket. Her subject was "The Spiritual Origin of Man," and we were informed some months ago that she was going "to tackle the Pitris"—a good hearing.

OUR President in his Address reported "a year of unrelaxing activity and gratifying success," and was especially delighted to state that Theosophy had now spread to no less than forty-six nations, the flags of which he had caused to form part of the decorations of the Convention Hall. Though no new sections have been formed, Colonel Olcott reports that South America and Cuba are shortly to apply for Sectional charters. Forty-seven new Branches, of which twenty-one are in India, have been formed, and also twenty-seven dormant Indian Branches have been revived; altogether from the beginning 761 Branch charters have been issued. A general statistical report of the number of members is not given, except in the case of the Indian Section, which has added 730 new members to the roll in the last twelve months, and has now 7,595 active members on the books. The Adyar Library reports the number of its original MSS. as 3,219, with 2,453 duplicates, and of printed books 10,469 with 861 duplicates. The Librarian further reports:

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Report

On comparing our Library list with that of the Mysore Government Oriental Library Catalogue issued in 1900, we find that they have 2,139 original MSS., exclusive of commentaries, etc.; that they have more than 200 MSS., that we should like to possess copies of; that we have in our collection more than 100 MSS. that they would like to possess copies of; and that we have secured more than 20 MSS. that are unique. . . . More than fifty useful MSS. are so far damaged as to become useless for reference very soon if not ordered to be re-written. I would recommend that they be re-written on strong fibrous palm-leaf, for the following reasons: The fibrous palm-leaf is cheaper and more durable than paper. The cost of copying on palm-leaf is comparatively less. The art of writing on palm-leaf, which is fast dying out in India, can by this means be revived.

We hope this excellent recommendation will—now that funds are available—be adopted, and that the memory of this most ancient art be kept ever green at Adyar, and in all other ways most cordially wish health and strength to our rapidly growing embryo Brucheion. Of Literature we note that the year's output includes twenty-six books in English, and also translations and original works in Danish, Swedish, Dutch (7), French (7), Italian (9), German (4), and in Indian vernaculars (14), such as Bengali, Tamil, Urdu, Gujarati, Hindi, and

Canarese. In English fifteen Theosophical monthlies are published, also in Swedish, German (2), Dutch (2), French (3), Spanish (2), and in Indian vernaculars (4), making a grand total of some thirty periodicals, an output with which any movement might be content.

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THE most important announcement made by the President-Founder was the expansion of the utility of "White Lotus Day," and the giving to it a more general character.

"Day of Remembrance" We most cordially approve this new departure; indeed for the last two years we have publicly recommended this change—the making of "White Lotus Day" a day of grateful remembrance of all our prominent colleagues who have passed away, and an occasion of recognition of their labours and good services. We are thus to have as it were a yearly Shrâddha meeting in memory of our Theosophic Pitris; and a very sensible and real thing it should be if only we can realise that they are still working with us, they on their side and we on our side of the mystic veil of Death, which from being an impenetrable wall of irresolvable density becomes with added knowledge an ever more and more transparent atmosphere to Theosophic insight. Of this "Day of Remembrance" Colonel Olcott writes as follows:

The death of one after another of our most respected colleagues has caused me to conceive the idea of guarding against the possibility of our soon forgetting their services, by giving a broader character to White Lotus Day, originally proclaimed by me just after Madame Blavatsky's death. A sentence which occurs in one of the letters of a Master to Mr. Sinnett has dwelt in my memory ever since I read it, *viz.*, "ingratitude is not among our vices" (*Occult World*, 2nd ed., p. 107). As we are whirled along on the current of busy external life, harassed by cares and excited by experiences of good and evil fortune, we are but too prone to forget those once dear and admired associates, who stood beside us in our battle for Truth, but from time to time have passed out of our sight. Men who were young and in the prime of life when our Society came into view, are now old and nearing the goal of their life's Karma; they disappear in the course of nature, leaving behind them only the records of useful work, to be soon obliterated in the page of everyday life. For my part, I cannot see why, in keeping fresh the memory of H. P. B., we should fail to bear in mind the names and deeds of those who made possible the accomplishment of the purpose of her

delegated mission. Each country mourns its departed Theosophical leaders; France has lost Blech; Holland, Meuleman; India, Rustomji Master, Damodar, Nobin Bannerji, K. M. Shroff, and others; the Ceylon Buddhists recall the names of Medankara, Ambaghawatte, Batuwantudawe, Mohittawatte, and others; England has recently lost Louisa Shaw; Australia mourns Staples, and so on and so on. If the older members have forgotten these former leaders what chance is there that our new recruits will ever know to whom their gratitude is due for service ungrudgingly rendered? Our Society is still young and it is not too late for us to begin this labour of love and respect. I am gratified to know that this suggestion of mine has been received with warm welcome in the American, British, French, Italian, Scandinavian and some other sections, so that, in now announcing the step I am about to take, I shall have the general, if not the unanimous concurrence of my colleagues. Henceforth, then, the White Lotus Day shall be our "White Lotus Day of Remembrance" and when we gather together let it be a part of the programme of the meeting to include in the discourse upon H. P. Blavatsky the names of her greatest colleagues; those which have a world-wide celebrity to be mentioned throughout all the Sections and the others to be remembered by the Section to which they respectively belonged.

This is a wise enactment of our President-Founder's; it would have been appalling to contemplate the growth of a calendar of Theosophic saints. None of her old friends can doubt but that H. P. B. would be—nay is—the first to approve of this; indeed we have often longed to hear the personal opinion of "the Old Lady" on "White Lotus Day" and its exclusive method of keeping. For our part we feel sure that our old guide, philosopher and friend has made some strong remarks sometimes, and so we hope that her *umbra* may now be permanently appeased.

* * *

BUT what on the whole must we think of the twenty-eighth General Report of the Theosophical Society? It is indeed very difficult for anyone who is not continually visiting the various Sections and continually holding private conversations with the most observant members and also keeping a very vigilant eye on the spread of general Theosophic thought in the various countries of the world, to form any accurate notion of the general position. From the Report itself we can glean a certain amount of statistics and occasionally a certain amount of just estimation of the general state of affairs in various

The Present
State of the
Movement

countries from individual writers, but for a general view we have to depend on the President-Founder's eyesight; and he most naturally sees enthusiastically and hopefully. Now as to the indications of statistics, there are, according to the vulgar logion, "lies, d— lies, and . . . statistics." Indeed, it requires long training to appreciate the value of figures, and experts usually flatly contradict each other. Then again the various General Secretaries report very variously; some omit all statistics, others insist on the statistics of the unimportant; there is no plan. But taking all this into account, allowing for all omissions and all exaggerations, there is no doubt but that the movement is alive, the leaven is working; we are a distributing agency of imports and exports of the most varied kind, an engine that pumps in and pumps out new and old, an ever-moving mixture of chaos and cosmos, a heart beating strongly, an embryonic Hercules, whose birth will some day amaze the wiseacres who have pronounced the Eternal Wisdom too old to conceive again.

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Now that the Abbé Loisy is officially condemned by the Holy See, it is interesting to see how conservatism in the Roman Catholic Church justifies that condemnation

The Loisy Case in face of the spirit of reason to which all men appeal, whether consciously or unconsciously, when defending themselves or their opinions before their fellows. In an able letter to *The Times* of January 25th, "Catholicus" puts the case of the Vatican against the Abbé Loisy in the following series of questions:

(a) Is it true that M. Loisy holds that Christ was not conscious that He was true God and consubstantial to God the Father?

(b) Is it true that M. Loisy holds that Christ did not personally teach the doctrine of the Atonement?

(c) Is it true that M. Loisy holds that the Catholic Church as an organised body had no place in the consciousness, or personal teaching, or design of Christ?

(d) Is it true that M. Loisy holds that Christ did not actually institute the Holy Communion as an ordinance of the new Law to be observed for all time?

(e) Is it true that M. Loisy denies the historic truth of the Resurrection?

The denial of the dogmas involved in these questions is held to be logically deducible from this distinguished scholar's works, and therefore the Holy Father, as the guardian of the foundations of the faith, had no choice but to acquiesce in the condemnation of such heretical opinions. "Catholicus" is perfectly correct; it is just these so-called foundations of the faith that are called into question this day. The traditional interpretation of these dogmas is called into question on all sides, and nothing less than this is the issue that is being fought out in Christendom. For instance, take question *e*; how few among the thoughtful and intelligent believe in the resurrection of the physical body, and that too not only among laymen but among the clergy, and among them not only questioned privately but publicly repudiated. For instance, in the February number of *The British Workman*, the Rev. R. F. Horton, M.A., D.D., one of the best known Nonconformist divines in this country, writes in answer to the categorical question "Do you believe in the resurrection of the body?"

There is a book published recently by the late Mr. Frederick Myers, of Cambridge, entitled *Human Personality*. It is an argument to show on scientific grounds that we survive death. The scientific evidence which is there offered by Mr. Myers would lead us to suppose that what Christ meant was this:—When physical death takes place that entity which we call the soul is liberated, and it proceeds necessarily to form to itself in whatever environment it may be another body, a body which stands to the body which has been on the earth in just the same relation as the body of Christ after the Resurrection occupied to the body He wore during His earthly life. If, therefore, you ask, Do I believe in the resurrection of the body, I must reply, I do not believe that the actual particles which are laid in the grave will be at the resurrection recovered and replaced; but on the other hand I do believe (and what is more, I suspect that in a few years there will be no intelligent person who does not) that the living personality survives the grave, and shapes, and must shape, a body to itself in whatever place it may occupy.

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As all of our readers must be aware, M. de Blowitz, the late Paris Correspondent of *The Times*, was regarded by all Newspaperdom and by Diplomacy as the Prince of Journalists and as the man who knew more of European politics than any Foreign

The Creed of
De Blowitz

Office. His memory was phenomenal and his journalistic exploits are world renowned. In his posthumous work *My Memoirs* (London: Edward Arnold; 1903) he breaks the silence of journalistic anonymity and also lets us into the secret of some of his deepest convictions. Thus he writes (pp. 133 and 134):

I believe in the constant intervention of a Supreme Power, directing not only our destiny in general, but such actions of ours as influence our destiny. When I see that nothing in Nature is left to chance, that irresistible laws govern every movement, that the faintest spark that glimmers in the firmament disappears and reappears with strict punctuality, I cannot suppose that anything to do with mankind goes by chance, and that every individuality composing it is not governed by a definite and inflexible plan. The great men whose names escape oblivion are like the planets which we know by name, and which stand out from among the multitude of stars without names. We know their motions and destinies. We know at what time the comet showing in infinite space will reappear, and that the smallest stars, whose existence escapes us, obey the fixed law which governs the universe. Under various names, in changing circumstances, by successive and coordinate evolutions, the great geniuses known to the world, those whose names have escaped oblivion, reappear. Moses is reflected in Confucius, Mohammed in John Huss; Cyrus lives again in Cæsar, and Cæsar in Napoleon; Attila is repeated in Peter the Great, and Frederick II. in Bismarck; Louis le Débonnaire in Philip VII., and Cataline in Boulanger. Charlemagne and Joan of Arc alone have not yet reappeared, the one to revive authority and the other *la pudeur*. Everything moves by a fixed law, and man is master of his own destiny only because he can accept or refuse, by his own intervention and action, the place he should fill and the path traced out for him by the general decree which regulates the movements of every creature.

THIS animastic spirit, which blessed men have called the pneumatic soul, becomes a god, an all-various demon, and an image, and the soul in this suffers her punishments. The oracles, too, accord with this account; for they assimilate the employment of the soul in Hades to the delusive visions of a dream.—SYNÆSIUS, *De Insom.*

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EARTH

AN article in the last number of this *REVIEW* enters into an elaborate criticism of the statements relating to the "Constitution of the Earth," set forth in a Transaction of the London Lodge, issued recently under that title. The writer of the article seems to be under some misapprehension with regard to the nature of the paper criticised. He repeatedly refers to it as my "theory," in the same way that one student of physical science might discuss the claims and arguments advanced by another.

The contents of the Transaction referred to embody no theory at all—no more than any theory of mine was embodied in the doctrines of Reincarnation and Karma set forth originally in my earliest Theosophical writings. But just as, in the first instance, I was enabled to pass on teachings that had been received under peculiar circumstances in reference to those great principles of evolution, so from time to time at later periods I have been able to set forth a great deal of profoundly interesting information relating to the growth and development of this world and its inhabitants, on the basis of which, to a large extent, the views of nature adopted by many Theosophical students have since been formed. These fundamental teachings—so rapidly passing into the extensive literature of Theosophy that their origin is generally forgotten—have never been "theories" of mine, although I may often have written in their support. They have been teachings passed on, and some readers have been disposed to accept my conviction that they have emanated from sources of information eminently entitled to our trust. It has rarely been possible for me to explain the exact circumstances under which they have reached me, and many readers, no doubt, have on that account been distrustful of their authenticity. But like every other communication emanating from what I have called the "Occult World," statements in the nature of those

referred to (interpreting the evolution of humanity or the origin of worlds in a manner clearly outside the range of physical investigation) are statements to take or to leave at the discretion of the reader; to leave, certainly, if they are found by any inquiring mind quite out of harmony with convictions already established there, or with the general dictates of reason so far as that mind can apprehend them.

Now this recent paper about the Constitution of the Earth is pre-eminently one of those statements to take or to leave,—to work with in thought or to reject as unmanageable, according to the disposition of the thinker. But, from any point of view, it is unreasonable to criticise the story told by the light merely of such knowledge as physical students possess at present concerning the laws relating to matter. The paper under consideration asserts over and over again that various phases of the process which nature went through in constructing this planet, have to do with forces and energies of which physical science at present has no knowledge whatever. We have so recently in the progress of natural science become familiarised with the idea that new discovery shows to be possible achievements which the conceit of an earlier generation would have declared incompatible with known laws, that surely critics of occult information should be careful in applying that spirit to its consideration. Especially in this case, this amazing and altogether bewildering story concerning the Constitution of the Earth which I was enabled to present to my readers, lies for the present outside the range of any such criticism as that directed against it by Mr. Wybergh.

The situation may best be understood by remembering, what indeed I have indicated in the paper itself, that the whole story told to me was not spontaneously conveyed to me for the purpose of publication by the teachers from whom I received it. It was extracted from them by degrees in connection with attempts I was making to obtain an interpretation of volcanic phenomena that might be more satisfactory than any which ordinary scientific research had been able to evolve. I learned that the true explanation of volcanic phenomena could only be attained by an apprehension of huge natural facts connected with the inner Constitution of the Earth, the existence of which was not

even suspected by modern science. These facts could only be apprehended with the help of information concerning the actual way in which the planet had originally been built up. Again the method employed for its construction could not be properly apprehended by the present generation of students because the vast process involved the employment of many natural laws, the existence of which was as yet quite unsuspected. Undeterred, however, by these warnings, I pressed forward with my enquiry and was kindly furnished with the body of information I endeavoured in turn to set forth in the paper under review, the interest and significance of which, I may here interpolate, I conceive to have been entirely missed so far by what may be described as the Theosophical public at large.

Undoubtedly the whole story contains much that at present is quite irreconcilable with our habits of thought. To me and to some of my friends, there is much, on the other hand, in the whole story which appeals to imagination as eminently plausible. Above all things the idea of the earth as filled from the core to the surface with conscious life of one kind or another, appeals to me as infinitely more harmonious with natural probability than the clumsy conception of the whole mass as consisting of mere homogeneous rock. That this last crude elementary conception is at all events at variance with many of the assurances we have received from the highest occult authorities from time to time, must be obvious to every attentive student of Theosophical literature. But nothing is further from my present purpose than to deal in detail with the considerations that seem to lead Mr. Wybergh to favour the homogeneous rock theory, and I am quite content, meanwhile, to leave the information which I passed on concerning the Constitution of the Earth, to be available for reference by students at a later date, when possibly the advancement of occult knowledge in other directions shall have enabled them to reconcile its details more satisfactorily than is possible at present with the "known laws of nature."

A. P. SINNETT.

THE NEW VIEW OF THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST

IF criticism has destroyed many dogmas which pretended to transcend the reality of the physical world, it has, on the contrary, fixed more deeply and determined more clearly the reality of others. So if the *world truth* is still for us a serious reality, its claims are more solid than they used to be, its assertions much stronger than those of the spirit which has declared the world truth to be a tale. It is by force of claims of this kind that we still believe in the existence of God; not of a God like to the one which Laplace could do without in his construction of his system of the universe, nor of a God for which Kant could find no room in a world interpreted according to the dualism of traditional philosophy; our God must, and really does, possess new claims for his existence, and therefore a new nature on which these claims are grounded. And with the new conceptions that we have gained about his nature a new light has been thrown upon the relations between God and man, and a new meaning has also been disclosed in the history of Revelation. What this new meaning is, considered in the light of modern philosophy, and what are the claims of the historical personality of Christ for realising in itself the new conception of God's nature, I shall endeavour to show in the following considerations.

One of the chief merits of modern philosophy has been to realise a deeper and fuller meaning of man's nature; through this we have improved our knowledge of God also. Idealism and Positivism, the two main currents of modern philosophical thought, have met each other on the ground of a more positive study of man. Idealism has come to this point by bringing the principle for the interpretation of reality from the external objective world into the thinking subject; Positivism by building a naturalistic synthesis at the apex of which stand man and society. So that,

although for neither of these schools is man any more the being *per quem omnia facta sunt*, he is still the one for whom everything has existence. This anthropocentric attitude of philosophy has led philosophers to recognise in the mind and activities of man the highest essence of things, the principle of reason realising in itself the character of that supreme reality attributed to God.

A philosophy of man is thus evidently at the same time a philosophy of Christ ; and the features of the personality of Christ in which philosophy can see the results of its speculation concretely manifested, have been scientifically fixed by modern criticism, which has thus laid down the principles of a positive Christology.

It is evident that the person of Christ is real for us in the first place through history. The original Christ for us is not Christ in himself, as it was to those who knew him personally while he was living on earth ; but it is the historical Christ. Our idea of Christ is nothing but a reproduction in our consciousness of what Christ was to the consciousness of his historians. Hence the first thing to do for a positive study of the personality of Christ is to fix the figure of the historical Christ in the earliest sources of his history, so that Christ's image ascertained in this manner reproduces most faithfully the real Christ, and we may substitute such image for the real Christ himself. This work has been successfully accomplished by modern criticism, the conclusions of which are accepted by men of great authority in the Church.

After we have so ascertained the historical personality of Christ, then we can enquire how the person of Christ realises in itself the attributes of the divine nature. And here we find two different ways.

The first consists in starting from a transcendental ideal of reality formed *à priori*, in hypostatising such ideal in a personal God, and then inquiring how far such a God allows in himself the true nature of man so as to be a real man without ceasing to be God. Such is the process of early theology, and it is still maintained in the traditional theology of the Roman Catholic Church. In this process the divinity of Christ is first admitted, and then the relations between God and man are studied and interpreted

according to their possibility determined by the new fact of the Incarnation.

The data of such theology are, as it is easy to see, an assumed conception of God, a certain idea of man, and a set of relations between man and God, of which the most problematical are those imposed by the Incarnation of God.

The second process for establishing the divinity of Christ is that which may be indicated as the process from man to God; it moves in an opposite direction to that of the former, and it is based upon the conclusions of the modern philosophy of man. *Man* is the starting-point of this new process; and this is a positive and concrete beginning in opposition to the arbitrary and abstract ideal of God from which the old theology started. Man, created in the image of God, is the being in which we can read something positively real and true of the nature of God. And when through man we have reached the ideal of God, such ideal does not cease to be concrete, essentially human and consequently intelligible.

Seeing that in the old method the formation *à priori* of the transcendental ideal of God was quite deprived of any positive ground, as has been proved by critical philosophy, and the hypostatizing of such divine ideal into a personal God, not to say into a human person, was quite arbitrary and mysterious; so the fundamental postulate of ancient theology had to be the *acceptance* of Christ's divinity, and its task simply to define, without destroying it, the mystery of Christ's double nature. Mystery, the unintelligible, was its ground, and its work was to manipulate it so as to render it more or less acceptable. The unintelligible was taken as a necessary and permanent element in the interpretation of reality; whereas the development of the intelligibility of the universe has shown how the unintelligible is only a provisory expression of the intelligible itself.

A science of mysteries is a contradiction *in terminis*, so that theology had to change radically its method and attitude in order to find a place amongst sciences. The more positive method which it has adopted and the limitation of the number of truths which it pretends to explain, have already reconciled to it the attention of serious thinkers, and we can see with satisfaction how

its object is every day invested with a more scientific character as this object comes to be identified with the first principle of philosophy.

There are, in the history of the development of this ideal, three different types of God-man. The first in which the divine nature of Christ is chiefly revealed through the operation of physical wonders; the second in which Christ is described as the Verbum of God transcending the limits of the phenomenal world; and the third in which Christ realises in himself the fulness of human nature, and for this reason realises in himself the true nature of God also.

The divinity of Christ through his taumaturgical virtue is chiefly represented in the Synoptics, while the second ideal is the characteristic of the fourth Gospel; the third is the ideal of Christ accepted by modern thought. It is only from the second and third standpoint that Christology can be considered as a science, and only through the third that it can be considered as a positive science.

The first standpoint, besides having a very questionable historical ground, expresses a character of supernaturality only relative to certain conditions of our spirit; and this character has become less intrinsic and less becoming to the nature of God the more we have progressed in the knowledge of the nature of God himself.

The second ideal does not contain in itself any element leading to a proof of its realisation in the person of Christ. When applied to illustrate the nature of Christ, it presupposes the divinity of Christ, in relation to which humanity still remains an external fact, so that each nature, the human and the divine, is in itself independent the one of the other; they are brought to unity in Christ only through the mystery of the Incarnation, which, in this respect, is a merely accidental historical event.

The third standpoint is the view of Christ according to the idealistic philosophy. This ideal cannot be realised save through human nature. Which of these three ideals is found realised in the person of the historical Christ; how far does Christ realise any one of them; and whether he realises it so as to constitute a characteristic of the historical personality of Christ alone;—these

are the three questions on the solution of which depends our attitude towards accepting or rejecting the divinity of Christ.

As to the realisation of the first ideal, that is to say the one in which the divine nature is manifested through the operation of physical wonders—besides the strictly relative value which these facts possess for proving the character of divinity, the personality of Christ which is historically most credible is quite deprived of this character ; and this conclusion, moreover, is now accepted by men of the greatest authority in the Church. Facts which appeared wonderful to a past generation need not appear so to us ; nay while divinity may have been recognisable to them through such wonders, it need not be so for us. Indeed, we may say that this kind of supernaturality has for centuries been a stumbling-block in the way of the acceptance of the divinity of Christ.

If then the divinity of Christ is really independent of it, it should be abandoned, not only as useless, but as dangerous to the cause of Christian faith, at least in our days. Since our ideas of the natural have changed, our ideas concerning the supernatural have also changed. Facts which were thought to be supernatural fifty or sixty years ago, have now entered into the sphere of the natural. With the progress of positive science the limits of the realm of the supernatural have been pushed further and further back, till its reality has become quite suspicious. The supernatural, if it still has any meaning for us, is nothing but an expression of the same principle which we call nature. When considered from the point of view of its unintelligibility, it is, so to speak, the raw material of what is becoming intelligible and natural ; it is the object of faith continually becoming the object of reason through the progress of the latter. We do not of course condemn such kind of supernaturality as impossible, on account of the character of unintelligibility attached to it, as some modern Catholic apologists think ; we acknowledge that the claims of the unintelligible subsist along side of and according to the nature of the intelligible ; the unintelligible is just as positive a fact as the intelligible ; miracle, in a certain sense, is just as real as the ordinary course of nature ; but it is the conception of the unintelligible as the necessary manifesta-

tion of the supreme principle, perpetually unchangeable and inaccessible to the power of reason, it is such nature of the unintelligible that finds no room in the modern views of reality.

Moreover, the fact that such kind of supernaturality may have been successful in gaining the belief in the divinity of Christ amongst those who knew him personally, does not constitute an argument for its gaining our faith. We are out of the conditions and circumstances which might enable us to realise how Christ's presence may have influenced them. The Christ with whom we are in immediate contact is not the original Christ; we do not know what virtue may have departed from him. In terms of critical philosophy we should say that the conditions, under which the acceptance of the divinity of Christ is possible, are different from what they were, and that, too, in a twofold respect, *viz.*, in the changed conditions of our spirit, which realises to-day a higher stage of the development of the reason, and in the changed object, that is to say Christ himself, who is real for us in a different manner from that in which he was real to his earliest historians.

All that we know from his historians is that he was God *to them*, that was to say he was manifested in the manner in which they thought God might have manifested himself to them; but what was the element of the personality of Christ which may have had most weight in gaining their assent to this truth, we cannot say. And if the truth is to survive the belief of those who first accepted it, it must possess an evidence transcending the limits of their personal experience; it must be based on reasons whose value stands above the power of gaining the assent of man through any historical or social conditions. Such truth must possess an everlasting power reaching the very innermost and unchangeable part of human nature; and we have reached this unchangeable and truly divine attribute of Christ's nature in the moral character of his person.

To-day the greatest interest centres itself round the person of Christ; his life has been represented by his great biographers in all its different aspects, and the more his personality is studied, the more has it gained in admiration and sympathy. On the other hand it must be noticed that the modern spirit is very little

disposed to admire in Christ what used to be admired by our ancestors. A striking feature of the development of the modern spirit is its success in reaching to an interpretation of nature that shall ever more and more approximate to its true meaning. Hence there is a great aversion of the modern spirit for any misleading interpretation of nature, for admitting mysteries and secret virtues in the person of Christ. Our admiration is fixed on something more suitable, more in harmony with our speculative and practical tendencies. Thought has received a larger interpretation, by virtue of which it is no longer looked upon as the ultimate characteristic of man. What makes of man a being in himself, the highest manifestation of spirit, is morality.

Thus a continual need of finding a concrete manifestation of the moral principle, and of reducing to rational unity the most different and startling manifestations of nature, characterises the modern spirit in its highest achievements; and nothing answers better to these needs than the personality of Christ studied in the light of historical criticism. And as a test of real progress in its development we are glad to see that our spirit approaches towards that highest ideal of human consciousness which is the consciousness of Christ. It is the moral beauty which shines in his face, the moral power that acts on human will, and the inexhaustiveness of such power acting inwardly and identifying itself with the self-conscious energy of the human individual, which reveal to us the presence of the divine nature in Christ.

At the same time we are bound to acknowledge that there is an Antichristian current, which professes the deepest contempt for Christian ethics, and looks upon these as being the source of all the evils and diseases of our modern society; but we can say at once that the positive spirit of this school is far weaker than that of the Christianising tendency, and by this I mean not only of the Christians under any Christian denomination, but all those who recognise in Christ a superior manifestation of human consciousness. The hatred of modern Antichristianism, as represented by Nietzsche and his adherents, is chiefly directed against Christian morality, the ground on which all the modern admirers of Christ meet together.

We must admit, however, that when an idea succeeds in

asserting itself through what may be considered as the mind of society, and becomes a vital principle of the life of society itself, such an idea does not belong to the vitality of a single individual mind, but is a revelation of the very nature of the principle that develops itself in the phenomenal evolution of the human spirit. Of such a character is the fundamental idea of the Christian system. To devise a moral system different from the Christian, to put it forth as a better one, and to condemn mankind because it still finds the Christian system more suitable to its spiritual life, is to forget the positive reality of human nature; it is to consider man not as he is but as we may wish him to be.

A Christ who would personify in himself the moral ideal of Nietzsche would be no more real than the Nietzschean conception of man itself. Nietzsche, the condemner of the world truth, has substituted himself for the world truth. "Nietzsche the truth itself"—this is the Nietzschean spirit, and so we are brought back to the beginning of his "History of an Error."* And from the conquests already accomplished by Nietzschean philosophy we can judge how little such philosophy realises of human nature in itself. The success, not great indeed, of Nietzsche's Antichristianism is due mainly to the reaction which it represents against the elements of corruption inevitably brought in with the development of the Christian idea. That morbid *Verleugnung* (self-denial) which Nietzsche condemns in the Christian idea, has its root in the weakness of those spirits who have thought to find in Christianity the sanction of their unhealthy state. When we compare the Nietzschean antidote for this sickness with the root of Christian morality, we can hardly find any difference even in the words in which they are expressed. "Not peace but war"—these words belong to Christ and to Nietzsche; nay, Christianity even in its degenerated manifestation represents but the degeneration of a *strong idea*. Its ideal is not sympathy for sympathy's sake, but it is sympathy for rescuing the weak from his weakness and making him strong. We may say that sympathy in Christian morals plays only a provisory rôle; its aim is to destroy weakness, and when this is attained, it goes on to the further realisation of the full development of the

* *The Twilight of the Gods*—"How the World Truth has become a Tale."

Christian ideal; that men should realise in themselves the idea and the will of Christ, and in this manner achieve the Kingdom of God on earth.

A man freed and capable of distinguishing between the ideal of Christ and the realisation of such ideal as manifested in any particular body of men, cannot accept the verdict of Nietzsche against Christianity. And to-day we can look at the ideal of Christ with more faith and assurance than ever, as such ideal appears to us in that purity which it has reached only through the controversies, the schisms, the heresies, and the reformations, that have tried Christianity since its origin.

If there has been, and there is still, any obstacle in the way of the full development of the Christian idea, it is the action of those institutions which claim for themselves exclusively the authority of continuing the work of Christ amongst men. The theological teaching of the Church has principally contributed to accentuating that dualism and opposition between man and God, in which the Church, consciously or unconsciously, has found a support for asserting the necessity of her ministry. It is only after we have succeeded in reaching the true meaning of freedom as the natural goal of the development of reason, that we have been able to grasp the full meaning of Christ's idea, so long kept hidden from us behind the fallacies of theological dualism.

So far we have seen what is the claim of Christ to divinity, *viz.*, in so far as he realises in himself the only possible ideal of the God-man. In the realisation of such ideal there are different stages. To judge which one of these stages Christ has realised in himself is a matter which entirely depends for us upon historical evidence. History, however, is by itself insufficient to show whether a fact has taken place within the limits of its full possibility; and so history cannot give evidence as to whether Christ has exhausted in himself the ideal of the God-man. And this for no other reason than because of the nature of the testimony which history can produce.

The realisation of the divine ideal in Christ, however, remains to be perceived and ascertained by us by another way than that of history, that is to say by its moral power. Christ indeed not only personifies in himself his moral ideal, but identifies himself

with it, so that such ideal assumes in him the life and power of an active principle. For this reason the nature of Christ himself is will, just as the nature of his moral ideal, when reduced to its highest and simplest expression, is will.

And the action of Christ through which our will is reduced to his own, not by violence but through the development of its own nature, such action cannot belong but to a divine power. Christ as God acting as will makes himself real and evident in the personal religious experience.

We may say that he acts as a directing principle upon our consciousness with that secret virtue that is proper to the nature of genius. But while genius realises only one side, and that only in a certain degree, of the divine nature, and touches men only according to their power of realising more or less in themselves that particular side in which genius manifests itself, Christ does not admit onesidedness, but he moves everybody; he acts on *man quâ man* and not as restricted within the limits of space and time, and it is for this reason that his person translates into a positive reality the transcendental ideal of God-man.

Manifestly then, Christ having in this way become a real God to our consciousness possesses a divine nature based not upon reason but upon faith. That is to say we cannot admit that the divinity of Christ subsists as an object of general experience, but it stands for the transcendental principle which makes general experience possible, for that principle which in its universality is personal as well, that is the will. But as the object of faith is not essentially different from the object of reason, at least beyond the limits of the phenomenal development of the latter, so the new claims of the divinity of Christ do not stand in opposition to reason, but they are investing every day more the nature of reason, till this will have completely reduced to itself the object of faith.

In the progress already made in this direction we can see how it is possible to accomplish the rationalisation of the new claims of Christ as God. When we shall have reached a deeper insight into the nature of morality, and in the light of this shall have realised a higher appreciation of the personal merits of Christ, then we may succeed in predicating of Christ the divine

nature with such a character of exclusiveness and uniqueness that any uncertainty will have disappeared about his being the one whom we expected. And then no other man but Christ will claim for himself the nature of God.

F. TAVANI.

OF REVELATIONS IN GENERAL

THE article of Dr. Wells in the January number entitled "Of Private Revelations," opens up a subject of the greatest importance to students of Theosophy. It is a subject upon which everyone must have an opinion, and which many can discuss; and above all, it seems to me necessary that each individual student of Theosophy who takes for granted as true what has been declared by writers on Theosophy should keep clearly in mind the reasons for his belief.

It goes without saying that, as we cannot all have knowledge for ourselves at first hand, a certain amount of belief is necessary in our Theosophical studies; but the importance of the question is as to the nature of this belief and how far it extends. I think I shall not be far wrong if I say that in theory this belief should be only provisional, that is, only until it has not been proved false by reason or experience. These are the two criteria with which we are to judge what is said concerning Divine Wisdom by those whom we presume know more than we. But many things in Theosophy pass beyond our reason, and others are not likely to come within the range of our experience as yet; hence judgment according to our reason and experience is a safe guide to lead us on but a part of the way.

There is indeed, for some, a still higher standard of judgment, intuition; but it is a faculty available with certainty to but a limited few; and as the majority of us are constituted at present, far safer in general seem to be reason and experience, whatever intuition may do for us in the future.

Now, if the various statements about the details of Theosophy were in perfect harmony, there would not have arisen the question brought forward by Dr. Wells ; but the fact is they are not harmonious, and there are, as Dr. Wells puts it, "private revelations." What, then, is an earnest and sincere student to do in the face of such conflicting statements ?

It seems to me the solution depends on the point of view from which we regard the body of information we possess concerning Theosophy ; and I think there are two such standpoints. One is to regard the exposition we have of Theosophic truths as so much revelation, declared and revealed to us by the Masters of Wisdom through their pupils. It is true in outline and in detail, but differs from the revelations in other religions in that it does not demand faith in it ; it appeals to reason and judgment, but is nevertheless a revelation of Truth, and nothing that comes to light later can in any way conflict with its statements.

The other standpoint is to regard the information we have as so many fragments of knowledge contributed by men and women who have studied, each in his or her line of thought, more deeply than we have—fragments that go to make a nucleus of the fuller knowledge that is to be. But these men and women speak with no authority, though they speak with certainty ; and that facts ascertained later should contradict what they declared in no way diminishes the value of their labours as pioneers.

Now of these two points of view Dr. Wells accepts the first and takes for granted that the knowledge we possess is a revelation, for he talks of "the rational and intelligent systems given us by the Masters," and therefore when "private revelations" apparently contradict this "system," naturally Dr. Wells demands a further revelation giving him permission to accept or reject such private revelations as truth. Dr. Wells, it seems, has those on whom he can rely in case of conflict of opinion, for he says, "but for us there are authorities above and beyond the private revelations of the most highly gifted among us."

Few are in this happy position of Dr. Wells, and many would not care to be in such a position at all ; for there are those that would much prefer to keep an open mind between conflicting, though equally reasonable, explanations, rather than choose

the one or the other on the *ipse dixit* of even a Master of Wisdom himself. I do not in the least mean to imply that Dr. Wells is not perfectly in the right, as regards himself, in relying upon authority that will instruct him as to what is correct or not ; but I think in the majority of cases such trust will do harm, and will be fatal for the further comprehension of Theosophy which we all desire.

If on the other hand we regard the exposition of the Divine Wisdom that we possess as merely the statements of those who presumably know more than we, perhaps even as coming from the Masters of Wisdom themselves, but such exposition to be taken on its own merit only, without a shadow of authority, to be amended by the consensus of Theosophic opinion on the discovery of new facts, then private revelations and all other revelations fall into their proper place. Each revelation then has no more value than have the experiments and theories of a scientist to the scientific world; it is to be examined and judged and criticised, perhaps even to be accepted provisionally if reasonable, till other well-ascertained facts contradict it, or till we can check it for ourselves at first hand.

The study of Theosophy then becomes a search after Wisdom hampered in no way by *à priori* statements that are to be taken as gospel truth. This does not mean that we are ungrateful to the self-sacrificing labours of those that have taught us; far from it, they are the pioneers who have shown us the way, and our love and gratitude should be without measure towards them; but Divine Wisdom is too high an ideal to be limited in any way.

Two thousand five hundred years ago the same difficulty arose as to private revelations, and surely the same answer is the best even now. Let me quote what the Buddha then said in the *Kālāma Sutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III., 65, 2-3, which begins as follows :

“ The men of the Kālāma tribe said to the Blessed One : ‘ Lord, there are Samaṇas [ascetics] and Brāhmaṇas who come to [the village of] Kesaputta, and expound and make clear their views. They revile and abuse the opinions of others and controvert them. There are others, Lord, who come to Kesaputta,

and hold forth and expound *their* views, and revile and abuse and controvert the opinions of others. Now because of these, Lord, we have doubt, we are perplexed. Lord, which of these Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas are speaking the truth, and which speak the false ?'

" [The Blessed One replied :] 'O ye Kālāmas, it is right to doubt, it is right to be perplexed ; for perplexity arises concerning a matter of doubt. But, Kālāmas, when you know for your own selves thus, " These doctrines are wrong, faulty, censured by the wise, when accepted and followed they lead to evil and misery," *then*, Kālāmas, cast them aside, even though you have heard them, or they are tradition, or they are found in the sacred books, or they seem to follow logically, or you deduce them, or they agree with your views, or they are probable, *and even though the person who utters them is your teacher !* "' "

Surely a nobler declaration for liberty of thought and judgment there could hardly be ; and was not he who thus declared it himself a Master of Wisdom ?

Dr. Wells says that he limits himself to a declaration of Independence. He has not hit upon the right phrase, for a declaration of Independence comes from a belligerent determined to combat those who oppose his independence. But is there anyone who desires to force Dr. Wells to accept or reject any views? As far as my knowledge extends of Theosophy and its students, there is none. Rather when there is a conflict of opinion, let us follow the wiser course and make a declaration of—Neutrality !

C. JINARĀJADĀSA.

" WHEN we stand aside and watch for a moment, it is almost painful to observe on what a scanty fund of real knowledge the strongest and most decided opinions are accepted and upheld."

" The aim of all study is the education in method. It ought to develop the power of observation rather than supply opinions. It ought to fit the student to discern between what is plausible and what is true."—BISHOP CREIGHTON.

“ DID JESUS LIVE 100 B.C. ? ”

IN undertaking the very laborious and delicate task involved in the consideration of this amazing question, my main hope was not that I should be able positively to decide the problem one way or the other, for of this I had no shadow of expectation, but that it might be possible to lift the subject out of the elementary stage of assertion and faith into the comparatively clearer atmosphere of careful definition, objective evidence, and impartial criticism. As I wrote in the Foreword :—

“ It is not with any hopes of definitely solving the problem that these pages are written, but rather with the object of pointing out the difficulties which have to be surmounted by an unprejudiced historian, before, on the one hand, he can rule such a question entirely out of court, or, on the other, can permit himself to give even a qualified recognition to such a revolutionary proposition in the domain of Christian origins ; and further, of trying to indicate by an object lesson what appears to me to be the sane attitude of mind with regard to similar problems, which those of us who have had some experience of the possibilities of so-called occult research, but who have not the ability to study such matters at first-hand, should endeavour to hold.”

Since the book has been published, however, I have had many questions addressed to me to the following effect : But what do you *really* think about the matter *yourself* ? I may be wrong, but I have always felt in face of such questioners that *they* at any rate had made up *their* minds whether *pro* or *con* ; but be that as it may be, they were evidently persuaded that I must have made up my mind privately, though I did not say so publicly ; that in fact I really believe positively one way or the other (the majority of them hoping that I am of the 100 years opinion), but that I won't say so in print because I can't prove it.

Now it is just this attitude of mind that I deplore. I hold right down to the depths of my being that to arrive at truth a man must exercise the most scrupulous impartiality; that no defence of the opinions of colleagues merely because they are of colleagues, no adoption of occult declarations merely because they are occult or chime in with our prejudices, can in any way advance the cause of truth, which is our very first and foremost care in the Theosophical Society. For even granting that to all appearance short cuts to right views may be found by following the intuition in a matter where the objective evidence is obscure or contradictory and the intellect is unable rightly to decide, it cannot but be—in my humble opinion at least—that in spite of, or rather just because of, its apparently lucky guess such a soul has missed the opportunity of all that moral and intellectual struggle by which alone it can grow into the stature of the true man.

Indeed the careful study of such problems as the question thus prominently brought before us—a question beset with the most terrible forces of prejudice—is an opportunity not only for the exercise of a concentration of the mind that keeps it in health and brings growth to the intellect, but also for the practice of a most real and virile meditation in which all prejudice has to be eliminated, and the whole nature fixed in contemplation of truth, with a dauntless determination to follow at all hazards whithersoever she may lead, no matter how many hitherto most highly prized prepossessions may have to be abandoned before we are lightly enough clad, naked to seek the Naked, and hasten to the light. It is this *attitude* that counts; all else is ephemeral, and this was my main object in writing my essay.

Indeed I did not expect that it would be taken any notice of outside our own ranks; so wildly extravagant to the ordinary mind, I thought, such a proposition must seem to be, that I hesitated whether I would send out any copies for review. In brief, I expected silence, or at best ridicule. I am therefore agreeably surprised that the copies sent out for notice have met with a reception which I regard myself as most kindly considering the fiercely controversial and distressing nature of much of the material I was bound to deal with in treating the subject. The

reviews that have come to hand I regard as a very serviceable gauge of thoughtful public opinion, and I therefore append them for the benefit of those of my colleagues who are interested not only in the problem itself and its proper treatment, but also in the further psychological problem of how the public discussion of such a subject may affect the general mind. If any of my readers have come across any other notices I should be glad of their indicating to me the name and date of the periodical in which they have appeared.

G. R. S. M.

The Times :—

Mr. Mead is a theosophist scholar whose previous works dealing with Gnosticism and with Gospel criticism are of some value, not only to theosophists, but to theologians. He tells us in his "foreword" that he has been encouraged in his investigations by "occult" research—the extra-normal experiences of his "colleagues" which tend to throw doubt on the traditional history. His book, however, is devoted mainly to a close and learned investigation of the Talmud Jeschu stories and the Toldoth Jeschu or medieval Jewish Jesus legends as compared with the Christian tradition, and the writings of Epiphanius of Salamis; and of the "persistent obsession" in early Jewish tradition of the 100 B.C. or Jannai (Jannai, king of the Maccabæan line, 104-78 B.C.) date for the life of Christ.

The Yorkshire Daily Observer :—

If a striking title can secure attention in this crowded time, Mr. Mead's book should be assured of a multitude of readers. The question which it argues is an old puzzle of New Testament students, arising out of statements concerning Jesus contained in the Talmud—that vast treasury of Jewish lore. Mr. Mead examines these, as also other stories concerning Jesus found in the "Toldoth Jeschu," and in some references made by Epiphanius. On the examination of these little known tales he expends an amount of patience, labour, and learning which the ordinary man, so dear to the heart of "Ian Maclaren," would deem ridiculous. Happily, however, the world is not yet peopled exclusively with fat, plump, commonplace people, and those who follow Mr. Mead can be sure of reward in matter which will set them thinking. Of course the real interest of these old world stories as to the birth of Jesus is to be found in their bearing on the question of the origin of Christianity. It may be that Mr. Mead is inclined to make too much of mystical references and strange caricature names, through which, even at this distance of time, we can see the fierce glow of religious hate. It is pushing a theory very far to find that Balaam is a veiled Talmud reference to Jesus, and that in recounting the sins and punishments of Doeg, Ahitophel,

and Gehazi, the hated and hunted Jew found an ingenious way of pouring the vials of his religious fury on the heads of the leaders of the Christian faith. It is, indeed, true that, in certain Talmud passages, Balaam is a frequently substituted name for Jesus, and upon the identification of these names Mr. Mead spends a very large amount of critical research. But the real interest of these researches lies elsewhere. They are contributions to the study of the origins of Christianity, and their uniqueness lies in the fact that very few writers ever enter the fields where Mr. Mead works with such praiseworthy diligence. The ordinary reader trusts too implicitly, in these matters, to his Geikie and his Farrar, and even the student who has a dash of the heretic in him is too easily contented with his Renan. For both these classes of readers Mr. Mead's chapters will open up new fields of thought. The reader will find himself in the midst of those fierce fanaticisms, and weird, occult theosophies which were part of the atmosphere in which infant Christianity grew. Without an adequate acquaintance with these, Christian origins cannot be understood. This knowledge Mr. Mead's readers will obtain if they follow him closely, and their view of the beginnings of Christianity will be correspondingly full and true.

The Sheffield Daily Telegraph :—

Mr. Mead describes his book as “an inquiry into the Talmud Jesus stories, the Toldoth Jeschu, and some curious statements of Epiphanius—being a contribution to the study of Christian origins.” His previous wanderings in historic byways have resulted in much curious lore associated with Gnosticism and the neo-Platonists ; and he seems to have been attracted to this adjacent field as one likely to contain a hidden treasure. We can hardly think that it will repay working. The Toldoth Jeschu abound in unedifying material, and they are not even relied upon by the Jews themselves. To Christians they are painful reading ; and no critic, of whatever creed, would think of accepting them as evidence. What, then, is their fascination for Mr. Mead ? They seem, he thinks, to indicate that Jesus may have lived a hundred years before the days of Pontius Pilate ; and this is the view which Theosophical clairvoyants maintain on the authority of internal intuition !

For those who desire an introduction to this branch of literature, Mr. Mead has made it easily accessible ; but he has said nothing to convince any reasonable being that the question which forms the title to his book should receive any other answer than a negative.

The Scotsman :—

Written by a professed theosophist, this work is yet entirely free from the taint of dogmatism of any kind. It is indeed a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject which is as abundant as it is chaotic. The author has collected and reviewed this mass, and has summarised and criticised it until he has shaped it into something of a coherent whole. The

Rabbinical and other Hebrew legendary and historical matter dealing with the reputed origin and life of the Messiah is carefully sifted, and the subject is approached with befitting reverence. Whether the author has proved his case or no is another matter, and he himself does not claim to have arrived at any solution of the problem the title of his book sets forth; but only to have laid down the date and suggested trains of thought of probable elucidatory value. That the book is most valuable from a suggestive point of view cannot be denied. It merits the attention of all interested in Christian criticism.

The Chatham and Rochester Observer :—

This book with its remarkable title deals in a very critical spirit with the origins of Christianity, and enters very minutely into the Talmud Jesus stories, the Toldoth Jeschu, and some curious statements of Epiphanius and the early Pagan writers. Although critical in the highest degree, the author does not dogmatise, and preserves a philosophical calm throughout. His attitude is indicated in his Foreword :—

“ This book is not intended for the man whose ‘ Christianity ’ is greater than his humanity, nor for him whose ‘ Judaism ’ is stronger than his love of human kind ; it is not meant for the theologian who loves his preconceptions more than truth, or for the fanatic who thinks he is the only chosen of God. It is a book for men and women who have experience of life and human nature, who have the courage to face things as they are. . . Traditional theology, traditional history, traditional views in general are being questioned on all hands, and there is an ever-growing conviction that the consciousness and conscience of a Church, whether that Church be the Congregation of Christendom, or the Dispersion of Israel, evolve from century to century; that religion is not an exception to the law which is seen to be operative in every department of nature and human activity; and that, therefore, it is incumbent upon all who have the best interests of religion at heart, ‘ to maintain the right and duty of [any] Church to restate her belief from time to time, as required by the progressive revelation of the Holy Spirit, ’ as one of the objects of the Churchmen’s Union declares.”

In the 436 pages of the book, the author takes the reader through all the available data, without, however, arriving at any definite conclusion. “ When all is said and done, we find ourselves in a position of doubt between, on the one hand, the seeming impossibility of impugning the genuineness of the Pilate date, and on the other, an uncomfortable feeling that the nature of the inconsistencies of the Hebrew tradition rather strengthens than diminishes the possibility that there may be something after all in what appears to be its most insistent factor—namely that Jesus lived in the days of Jannai.”

The suggestion has been thrown out that the solution of the problem is to be achieved not by research open to normal ability and industry, but by “ occult ” powers. A handful of friends of the author “ who are endowed

in this special fashion are unanimous in declaring that ‘Jeschu,’ the historical Jesus, lived a century before the traditional date. They, one and all, claim that, if they turn their attention to the matter, they can see the events of those far-off days passing before their mind’s eye, or, rather, that for the time being they seem to be in the midst of them, even as we ordinarily observe events in actual life. They state that not only do their individual researches as to this date work out to one and the same result, but that also when several of them have worked together, checking one another, the result has been still the same.” While unable *à priori* to refuse any validity to these so-called occult methods of research, and although he has been enabled to verify the truth of the statements in some instances, the author does not feel justified in accepting the remainder on trust. “ That there should be entrusted to an apparently favoured few, and that, too, comparatively suddenly, a means of inerrant knowledge which seemingly reduces the results of the unwearied toil of the most laborious scholars and historians to the most beggarly proportions, I am not prepared at the present to accept. It would rather seem more scientific to suppose, that in exact proportion to the startling degree of accuracy that may at times be attained by these subtle methods of research, the errors that may arise may be equally appalling.” Mr. Mead does not look, therefore, to the seer for much practical help in his enquiry, and, as we have indicated, he works his way laboriously through all the available material, without, however, arriving at a definite conclusion to his startling question.

The Glasgow Herald :—

People brought up in Christian surroundings will be disposed to answer this seemingly preposterous question with a very decided “No.” Still, the author of this learned work is not propounding a mere theological riddle, nor can he be said to be coming forward wantonly merely to increase the number of puzzles that confront the student of Christian origins. He finds the question a very persistent one among the traditions that were current among the countrymen of Jesus. Passages from the Talmud are quoted narrating in great detail a Jesus story of no very creditable character in the time of Alexander Jannæus, one of the Maccabean heroes who reigned over the Jews 104-78 B.C. This story, developed during the century that elapsed before the canonical date of the life of Jesus, formed the genesis of the “common document” which criticism is endeavouring to recover as the basis of the synoptic gospels. The author has been a very diligent student of the Talmud, and perhaps his lengthened account of that extraordinary body of traditions is one of the best in our language. Still it is always to be remembered that there are two views of the Talmud—that of Eisenmenger, which corresponds nearly to what a commentary (say) on the Tridentine decrees by a fanatical Protestant lecturer would be, and that of the late Emmanuel Deutsch, who regarded it as the greatest storehouse of wisdom and morality in the world. The author inclines

to the latter view, which is by no means universally accepted. Still, he does not blatantly undertake to answer the question of his title, but pleads for further investigation into the Jewish traditions. The argument throughout is marked by great erudition and remarkable modesty, but certainly not all will agree with the proposed method of "occult" research.

The Expository Times :—

The question is not a fool's question. It is serious, and Mr. G. R. S. Mead, B.A., M.R.A.S., takes it seriously. Says Neubauer (*Med. Jewish Chronicles*, 183, 273), "The Jewish history-writers say that Joshua ben-Perachiah was the teacher of Jeschu ha-Notzri, according to which the latter lived in the days of king Jannai; the history-writers of the other nations, however, say that he was born in the days of Herod, and was hanged in the days of his son, Archelaus. This is a great difference, a difference of more than 110 years." Thus the Christians say that Jesus of Nazareth was born in the days of Herod, but the Jews assert that he was born about 100 years before that. Which is right? Mr. Mead solemnly and seriously investigates the question through 440 octavo pages.

Is he so partial to the Jews then? Not at all. He cares little for Christians as such; he probably cares less for Jews. His interest in the question is of another kind. Certain friends of his have told him that they know for certain that Jesus of Nazareth was born 100 B.C. They are not Jews. They have no interest in deceiving him. They are of various nationalities. They differ in person, in speech, in sex, in creed—well, no, not in creed, for they are all theosophists. They agree really in these two points, they are all theosophists, and they are all sure that Jesus was born 100 B.C.

So Mr. Mead investigates the question, as we have said, and the conclusion he comes to is that no conclusion is possible on the subject. The crux of the controversy is with the name of Pilate. But Mr. Mead concludes that there is as much to say against Pilate's having anything to do with the death of Christ as for it.

The Literary World :—

A more unsatisfying essay than this it would be difficult to instance. Mr. Mead has done much first-rate work, on untraditional lines, in early church history, and has propounded theorems of which a good deal more will be heard. He always writes as a scholar, with complete avoidance of infelicities of theological utterance such as too often have handicapped suggestive heterodoxies.

These positive and negative good qualities are still active in his latest work, which nevertheless seems preordained to be reckoned among blind alleys.

For the canonical date of Jesus the evidence Scriptural and classical is serious, and Mr. Mead is under no misapprehension as to its weight. It is

necessary for his purpose to lighten it, but he is too straightforward to get much beyond peradventures. If the Christian tradition, which makes the birth and death of Jesus fall under Herod and Pontius Pilate respectively, can be shown to be untrustworthy, if the well-known passage in Tacitus can be treated either as an interpolation, or at best as but part of a Christian formula picked up by the historian, if, in a word, such evidence as has hitherto satisfied men who are neither knaves nor fools can really be set aside, then other considerations may come in.

Mr. Mead is a theosophist, and he tells us that he has many like-minded friends, among whom are a few intimates “ whose power of response to extra-normal ranges of impression, vibration, or stimulation ” appears to him to be highly developed.

“ This handful of friends of mine who are endowed in this special fashion are unanimous in declaring that ‘ Jeschu,’ the historical Jesus, lived a century before the traditional date. They one and all claim that, if they turn their attention to the matter, they can see the events of those far-off days passing before their mind’s eye, or, rather, that for the time being they seem to be in the midst of them, even as we ordinarily observe the events in actual life. They state that not only do their individual researches as to the date work out to one and the same result, but that also when several of them have worked together, checking one another, the result has been still the same.”

Thus the way is made ready for a degree of attention to certain Talmud Jeschu stories not commonly regarded as furnishing any historical materials. Into this, the larger part of Mr. Mead’s book, we cannot enter. These Jewish legends will certainly be new to most readers, and the Toldoth Jeschu, a thirteenth-century anti-Christian composition, is more fully represented than seems quite necessary.

Mr. Mead, after all his researches, ends with a confession which is candid if disappointing. “ I feel at present somewhat without an absolutely authoritative negative to the very strange question ”—and most of his readers will share the feeling that from first to last there is as little that is “ authoritative ” to warrant the propounding of the query.

The Asiatic Quarterly Review :—

The question of the precise year and date of the nativity of our Saviour has often come up for inquiry, but the question discussed in the present work raises the subject in a more than usually important aspect. To use the wording which we find on the title-page, it is “ an Inquiry into the Talmud Jesus Stories, the Toldoth Jeschu, and some Curious Statements of Epiphanius; being a Contribution to the Study of Christian Origins.” As might have been anticipated from such a mode of stating the subject, the work is one of a very great amount of learned research. Authorities, ancient and modern, but principally theologians of Germany, are cited all through the work, the places being specified in the footnotes.

The question that comes up for discussion in this work is a large one, and in this volume of nearly 450 pages the author arrives at length at the conclusion that the problem with which he sets out has not yet been solved, and he awaits further light. The materials, however, for the further pursuit of the inquiry are all brought together in this volume, and the author is at very evident pains to hold the balance carefully as between the different authorities whom he quotes. He has read everything of any importance that has been published relating to the subject of which he treats. He is evidently a very widely read man, and is possessed of much critical acumen, as also of all the best qualifications of historical inquiry and original research. The work will, we doubt not, be largely read by Christian theologians, who, taking them as a class, are not at all reluctant to inquire into the bases of belief.

The work begins with a good synopsis of the contents, but there is no index, an omission which in the case of a work containing so many names and so much of detail will be felt by readers to be a drawback to its usefulness.

The Primitive Methodist Quarterly Review :—

This is the fifth book by Mr. Mead that we have had the pleasure of bringing before our readers. In our notices of his earlier volumes we have been glad to recognise, whether we agreed with him or not, the learning, the earnestness, the scientific method and the deep religious spirit by which they have been animated. The title of the present volume will, we anticipate, cause many readers to regard it as a piece of cranky speculation. That is one of the disadvantages under which it labours, though, on the other hand, it is calculated to catch the attention of many who would otherwise have paid no attention to the book. It is not, however, a work to be dismissed with a mere shrug of the shoulders. The author is well aware of the feelings which the propounding of such a question will excite in the minds of most people. And he does not wish to prove, for he himself is not convinced, that Jesus lived 100 B.C. He simply argues that there is a case for enquiry. What has set him to work, apparently, has been the fact that some occultists, whose statements he has verified on other matters, assure him that the usually accepted date of the life of Jesus is 100 years too late. He does not feel warranted in accepting this statement on their authority, but he points out that there is Jewish corroboration for it. This is true; the Jews have in fact two dates in their traditions, the latter considerably later than the time which the New Testament assigns to Christ, and the evidence for this latter is about as good as for the pre-Christian date.

The main part of the book, then, is occupied with the Jewish stories in the Talmud, and the Toldoth Jeschu. A rather long, though not too long, account is given of the Talmud. It is very unfortunate for students of early Christianity that the Talmud is so largely inaccessible. Very few Christian scholars have had the linguistic training that would enable them to read it,

and Jewish scholars have been for the most part too uncritical to make their work of service to those trained in a scientific method. Fortunately the material on this subject has been made fairly accessible in German and English, so that Mr. Mead has a good deal of matter ready to his hand. The task of the student, however, will be greatly facilitated by the publication of Mr. Herford's *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, which rests on many years' work devoted to the study of the Talmud. We cannot, in our space, follow Mr. Mead through his discussion of the Jewish tradition. We may call attention, however, to the fact that he brings out a very extraordinary statement made by Epiphanius that Jesus was born in the days of Alexander Jannæus. The statement is amazing and has been almost entirely overlooked, probably put down as one of the author's numerous blunders.

It should, no doubt, be accounted for by his acquaintance with the Jewish traditions, though it is not easy to understand how he came to attach any value to it, especially as he contradicts it elsewhere. As we have said, Mr. Mead does not commit himself to the Jewish as against the Christian tradition. He thinks, however, there is a case for enquiry. To this, of course, no objection can be offered. Nevertheless, we feel sure that the enquiry must end in substantiating the Christian date. We take this view, not on any dogmatic grounds, but because the evidence seems to us to point conclusively in that direction. We may cheerfully let the famous passage in Tacitus go the same way as the equally famous passage in Josephus without feeling that the case must be abandoned through the loss of its strongest support. The evidence of Paul settles the question so far as we are concerned. Once we accept the genuineness of his chief epistles, we cannot get away from the Christian date. We are glad to say that, in spite of Van Manen, Mr. Mead is still disposed to accept the authenticity of these epistles. To our own mind this involves the rejection of the Jewish tradition. Of course, his evidence does not stand alone. It is substantiated by a large and practically consistent Christian tradition, including the other New Testament writers. As we made clear in our review of Mr. Mead's *The Gospels and the Gospel*, we are disposed to place the date of the Gospels considerably earlier than he does. He follows Schmiedel in New Testament criticism too closely. We rate their historical value much higher, and consequently on purely critical and historical grounds adhere with confidence to the usual view. Nevertheless Mr. Mead has brought out not simply an interesting but a valuable work, even apart from the special thesis which he investigates. One or two details may be referred to. The reference on page 227 to Cephas seems to us to create an unreal difficulty, inasmuch as there is an obvious reason why, in mentioning so large a number as 500, Paul referred to the fact that while some were dead the greater part were still alive. There is no hint that Cephas was not alive at the time. He can have been no other than the Cephas mentioned in the ninth chapter, who was obviously alive at the time Paul wrote. On page 351 the usual view is stated that the Ebionites did not derive their name from a

man called Ebion. Mr. Mead says this "has been now for many years admitted by scholars of every school." Dalman has very recently rejected the common interpretation that it means "poor" and revived the old derivation from Ebion. Why is Tertullian spoken of on pages 281-3 as "Bishop of Carthage"? [In error; *dele* "Bishop."—G. R. S.]

SOME MENTALLY TRANSFERRED PICTURES


ALTHOUGH the possibility of reproducing drawings seen only by another person has long ago been proved, and several series of such experiments have been published with illustrations, the peculiarity of some of the results obtained by my boys fourteen months ago, tempts me to add to the records of what has been accomplished in this direction.

The experiments were originated by the boys themselves as an amusement during the Christmas holidays, and it was through happening to find one of the extraordinary reproductions that I continued them under stricter conditions, the outcome being the facsimiles illustrating this article.

Success, however, lasted but a very short time, and although I have tried on several subsequent occasions to get a further series of "transferred" pictures, the attempt has been a complete failure, the power to "see" on the part of the younger boy having apparently disappeared.

In fact it would seem that the success of such experiments depends upon the temporary condition of the brain of the reproducer, excitement of a certain sort giving the best results, while in a normal state he may see nothing. Thus the periods during which such "thought transference" is possible, are probably few and far between, and may be only hit upon by accident, although I think that nearly everybody possesses the power occasionally.


In the case of children, the sudden appearance and disappearance of this faculty may be connected with the psychic stage through which so many pass, and which is usually lost at the age



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
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4 Original First Reproduction Second Reproduction.



5 Original




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
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8



9



of eight or nine years. The boy Paul, for instance, who was the transmitter in most of the experiments I am about to describe, was constantly frightened by presumably astral sights up to that time, but has since "grown out of" them, so that the faculty of reproducing unseen figures in his brother's case, may also have been "grown out of" since he made the drawings.

It may be noted that boys have always been supposed to possess greater clairvoyant power than adults, and that a boy is always selected in the East when the crystal or ink mirror is to be consulted.

The drawings, as here reproduced, have been accurately traced from the originals, and I will now proceed to explain under what conditions they were made.

(1) Paul (age 12) drew the cat's head. He then made his brother Felix (age 8) sit with his eyes shut while he stood behind him resting one hand on his head and gazing at the picture. Felix had not seen the picture and could not possibly do so in this position. After a few minutes Felix (who was provided with paper and pen) drew the outline and eyes. Paul then said "Don't you see anything more?" Felix replied "Yes, I see the ears," which he added.

(2) Paul drew the letter A, which was almost immediately reproduced. Felix said he saw it in white on a black ground.

(3) Paul drew the monogram of Christ. Felix took some time to reproduce it, somewhat incorrectly, not knowing what it was. Had he, however, been shown the figure and been told to copy it from memory, it is probable the result would have been no better, as his knowledge of drawing is quite rudimentary. After this, probably owing to both boys getting tired, several similar experiments failed altogether, or were only partially successful.

(4) *December 29th.* Paul drew the figure and on this occasion we both looked at it together, each putting one hand on Felix's head. The moment we did so he exclaimed "Why, it's all ready for me!" and immediately drew the figure in pencil, saying "I can't do it very well. The cross line ought to be in the middle." I then told him to draw it more correctly in ink (second figure).

(5) I drew the pistol and the conditions were the same. Directly our hands touched Felix's head he laughed and said: "Oh, it's just the sort of thing you would draw! How does one draw the trigger of a gun?" He then drew the figures, saying, "I can't draw it properly. I don't know how to do the trigger." When shown the original he declared it was what he had seen, the lines being red on black. At the time of these experiments he was rather excited, having been romping. It was just before his bedtime. Owing to his excitement no further trials were made on this occasion.

(6) *December 30th.* Same conditions. Felix was first tried with the picture of a black doll. He drew the head and eyes but with a bird's body. Next he was given the picture of a fir-tree. After a long time he drew the trunk and two upper branches but could not put in the lower ones. We gave him about ten minutes' rest, after which we tried him with No. 6. He instantly said "I'll draw it. It's a beastly crawling thing!" and drew the reproduction. In all these experiments it was absolutely impossible for him to have any knowledge of what was drawn. When he did not see the figure immediately he generally wrongly described it, as was the case with a final trial on this evening.

December 31st. 4.10 p.m. In the same way as before Felix was tried with the word ZOE. He first read it as HAVE, but when told to look again, said "I see O—O—E—N—O—E." He insisted it was N, but when shown the original he declared he saw the word vertically, reading from top to bottom sideways. In this position the Z became N, for which he mistook it. On this occasion no will power was used. The word was simply looked at by Paul and myself, resting our hands on Felix's head. The word was held horizontally, but Paul said it crossed his mind that Felix might mistake Z for N.

(7) Experiments resumed at 6 p.m. Felix wrongly described several figures shown him and seemed to have lost the faculty of seeing. Thinking it might assist him, we gave him an antique crystal ball and told him to look into it instead of shutting his eyes. We then acted as before, holding the sketch before our eyes while resting our hands on his head. Almost immediately he said he saw something in the crystal and drew the picture,

calling it a snake. He had never seen visions in the crystal before though he once tried to do so.

(8) He was immediately successful in seeing the Union Jack. Although we were only looking at the black and white figure he described it in its proper colours. In neither of these three experiments were we consciously trying to will him to see the picture, but simply intently gazing at it ourselves. No sort of hint was given as to the subject. Without contact he could see nothing.

(9) He saw a pig directly our hands touched him, drawing it at once to the best of his ability. For the first time the reproduction was reversed. He said the pig appeared in its natural colours.

January 1st. Experiments both with and without the crystal failed completely. Felix declared he saw several things in the crystal (one was a key) but they were not the things we were looking at.

LEOPOLD MONTAGUE.

THE LAND OF BATTLES

THE king of the country of which the following legend is told was an ill ruler. Not that he was wilfully cruel and heedless of his people; but that he lacked the image-making power which should help him to know that which he did not see; moreover, he was one who failed to perceive when the old order of things must pass away and give place to another, better fitting the needs of the time. Besides, he chose his servants badly, and did not sufficiently heed their methods of rule. The Crown Prince was less worthy than his father; for he was cruel, selfish, vicious and unrighteous in all his dealings. The second son of the king was staid, thoughtful, and pure of life; but he had little influence with his father. For many years the kings of the land heeded the nation rather than the men and women who composed it; thereby (with much pain and recklessness of human life) a strong people

had been builded, for the weaklings sank under their burdens, and died. The chief cities and the court were in the south; but much wealth flowed from the mines in the bleak and barren north. These mines were hells of grievous pain; there the felons worked in chains, and with them slaves, and a few very poor and ignorant peasants. All the peasant folk toiled bitterly and hardly for their bread. Life was very stern and dreary throughout the land, save for the nobles and for men of exceptional strength and gifts. Those who ruled in the past thought chiefly of their country; but the time had now come when, the nation being strong, the rulers were beginning to think mainly of themselves, their riches, and their joy. Hence a heedlessness of the pain of the poor and ignorant which had served its turn in days gone by (when the nobles were wellnigh as prodigal of their own lives as of those of others, and were heedless of personal hardship when need arose that they should suffer it), became a bitter curse and abiding shame to the land.

Nevertheless, great men arose in that country. From the stress and struggle, from the darkness of the shadow of death, came forth those who were very mighty in their faith and power. Seers arose crying of a hidden glory beyond the night of pain; prophets proclaimed a coming Day of the Lord; songs and music were made which told of greater things than the singers knew; men, beggared of all external shows, rejoiced in the work of their hands and brains, and, mad with creative fire, forgot their poverty and hunger; wealthy men and women left ease and plenty in the cities and embraced poverty for the love of God. Even in the loathesome darkness of the mines there rose among the criminals, a poet; and his songs, unknown to himself, rang from the dark through all the land, and the sorrowful and sinful sang them with tears in their eyes—songs, wherein he voiced not only his own agony and shame which had called them forth, but the pain and travail of the ages; the cry of sorrowing life, trembling in the grip of a law it could not understand.

Nevertheless the times were evil, and the sorrow great. It was the greater because among the pinched peasantry there were bands of the stronger and more brutal, who, forced by hunger, became outlawed robbers; they pillaged the poor, fired the

wretched villages, and, where they could, seized wealthy travellers and claimed ransom for them. The king and his nobles did not heed these things, which happened chiefly in the remote regions of the north, until there arose there a man who drew these wandering bandits together, and held them by his power of leadership. He seized a little fortress on the frontier, and destroyed it; and to him escaped some prisoners from the mines. In certain villages there were riots; also some of the men of these villages sent a petition to the king, telling their wrongs in terms which he held to be threatening and treasonable. Therefore he sent one of his chief officers to deal with the malcontents severely, and to suppress the outlaws.

With this officer went a young man who was a favourite of the Crown Prince; he was very comely, proficient in arms and feats of strength, witty, a sweet singer, and a man possessed of a great power of winning people to do his will. He was the son of a high official of the court (an unrighteous man who had risen to his position because his wife was fair in the eyes of the king). The young man had always lived a life of great ease and luxury; he was flattered, and imitated in dress and gait and bearing by the youth of the city; he had unusual influence for one so young. He went with the official who was to deal with the troubles in the north; and he grumbled much because of the scant comfort the barren land afforded, though the king's officials showed them all possible service and courtesy. At first the youth was sickened at the punishment of the malcontents; but after a while he thought more of the unsavoury food and dull life (for the outlaws evaded them and there was no excitement of combat) than of the sight of a criminal writhing under the lash, or a peasant cursing God and the king because his house was burnt and his children in want. Moreover, it was customary among the philosophers of the court and the city to teach that all were born to a fate ordained by their past actions in lives lived formerly on earth; and it was commonly said by the less instructed (and sometimes the more thoughtless and selfish) of the people who received this doctrine, that it was impious to interfere with the Law which governed the lives of men.

One day the young man was sent, with a small body of

troops, to deal with a village in which there had been a riot. When he reached this place he found it full of armed men; before he knew what had befallen he was surrounded by the outlaws. But there came forth a man making signs of peace, who said his leader did not desire to make the king's troops prisoners, nor to demand ransom; but he wished for speech with the young man who was in command. The youth's wrath was great because he had been outwitted; but he was helpless, and had no power to resist. He entered the house of the headman of the village; and the leader of the outlaws came in alone to speak with him.

He was a man fifteen years older than the youth with whom he craved speech. He was very tall and powerful, carelessly and poorly clad, and rugged of feature, for he was of the people. But his voice was mellow, deep and pleasant to hear, and his bearing very dignified and stately. A man who in the highest bliss of heaven, if he might reach thereunto, would keep a chastening memory of hell.

Some there be who believe not in hell, and declare it is not. But there are others who affirm they know, through the power of their life hidden in glory, that it also lies hidden in darkness. And thus the poets who have sung of the heavenly places, have also told of the ways of darkness. For, say they, if life be one and undivided, then so long as there is light and darkness, height and depth, all men must ever be in the depths, even as they are in the heights. It was the shadow of the depths that rested on this man's face, though memory of them abode not with him. So, though he knew not why, his mirth was never unbridled, nor his triumph other than sober. And also, in like manner, the glory of the hidden heights abode with him in his hours of sorrow, and caused him to endure—he knew not how.

“Sir,” he said, gently and courteously, “I seek you humbly, as a suppliant. You are young; your heart cannot yet be hardened to pain. Our lord the king is neither cruel nor willingly unjust; but he understands little that he does not see plainly set forth before his eyes; he hears the words of his servants and believes them; they are selfish and greedy, heedless of their duties. You are in favour with the king and the prince; your

father has much power ; you have rank, riches, and the power of winning men to do your will. The king will hear your voice. I plead with you to show mercy. Will you be a voice to these dumb and helpless folk who suffer in a land forgotten it would seem by God, and assuredly forgotten by the king, save when he sends here fire and sword to waste its desolation."

"I do not understand your eloquence, sir," said the young man drily. "I do not feel disposed to be voice to a band of rebels and thieves. Moreover, I think you are a leader of the devastators."

"It is true. I am so. But I act thus, not because I love pillage, but to force the king to suppress the evil which I represent. Also I restrain these men from violence towards women and children and the aged. Rebels and thieves we are ! Who helped us to be rebels ? Who taught us to be thieves ? Our shame is our shame ! But our rulers, sir, cannot but share it with us. You have seen the people's pain with your own eyes. The pain of the peasants, not the outlaws. It is for them I plead."

"For the men you rob !" retorted the other. "Yes, I have seen it. But they probably suffer less than I should do under the circumstances."

"No doubt. What then ?"

"They have made their lot in the past. Pain, like pleasure, teaches. Many of these people are little above the beasts in wits ; though their pain be grievous (of course, I regret it), yet my regret is partly weakness. Were I more impersonal, sir, I should view it calmly ; if they feel pain yet they learn thereby, and their wits are developed. In the end an advantage."

The elder man did not speak for awhile. His face grew white with wrath.

"If I were not half pledged to let you go unhurt," he said between his teeth, "I would—" he checked himself. "Will you spare this village ?" he said. "They are very poor. The crops have failed for two years ; and there has been much sickness. They can hardly pay the governor's taxes—hence the riot. Will you spare them ?"

"I cannot. I have my orders."

“ You had orders to deal with this place at your discretion.”

“ How do you know that ? ”

“ Is it not true ? ”

“ I shall not be questioned by you, sir,” said the young man sullenly. “ This village will receive its deserts. I find it harbouring a band of robbers.”

“ I know what that means. Will you plead for the petitioners of the king ? They have written complaining of their governor, who, under your favour, is a greater thief than I or my men ; he, in reply, charges them with treason. Two of them are to be hanged ; they will leave widows and young children ; eight are condemned to the mines ; two, scarce more than boys, to be scourged in the market-place of their wretched village. Will you use your power to save these people ; or to soften their sentences ? ”

“ I am sent here to enforce the king’s law,” said the young man. “ The law is just. I must not interfere with it.”

“ Listen to me,” said the other. “ You were sent, whether those who sent you knew it or not, to give you a chance of great service, which you may take if you will.”

“ I know that,” said the young man drily. “ Let me tell you frankly, since we are alone, I do not choose to imperil that chance as you would have me do, by becoming a champion of rebels, rather than a servant of the king.”

The elder man looked at him long and earnestly.

“ The greatest wisdom most men can pray for,” he replied, “ is to know their chance when it comes. You do not know it. That in itself is so pitiful that I can but sorrow—for your pain to come. For I too believe in the law of which you and I are a part.”

“ What do you mean ? ” said the young man angrily.

“ Since you can feel in no other way,” said the outlaw, “ you will be made to sooner or later in your own person. Then you will learn your lesson. Then you will understand.”

The other sprang up angrily, and laid his hand on his dagger.

“ Sit down,” said the elder man quietly, “ I purpose nothing against you. I’ll stay you here no longer. You might have averted what now I shall bring about. That is all.”

He bowed, walked out, and in ten minutes he and his men rode away. He took up a strong position in the hills, and more and more malcontents flocked to him. At last the Crown Prince himself was sent with reinforcements, for the state of the country was more serious than had been at first supposed. The route by which he came was kept very secret ; it was known to none save the commander of the original punitive expedition, and to the young man who accompanied him as the next in command. He was now in command of a small but important fortified place, on the route of the Crown Prince. Now he had cast his eyes on the beauty of the daughter of the chief magistrate of the little town. This official and his wife were of the people ; and his daughter was at heart a rebel. The suffering of the peasants filled her soul with rage. She was very beautiful, and she caused the young man to believe that she loved him, while she yet guarded her honour. One day she asked him by what route the Crown Prince approached. He refused to tell her, pleading that honour forbade him to speak. Then she laughed, crying :

“ And what, I pray you, of mine ? You teach me my answer ! ”

Whereat the young man's honour went the way of his wits, and he told her all she desired to know. Then she bade him come to visit her secretly when her father was gone on business to the mines. But when he went she was not there ; and during his absence from the place he should have guarded the rebel leader seized it ; and other of his men fell on the Crown Prince unaware, slew many of his soldiers, and carried him, a prisoner, to the fortress. He was a prisoner by whose means they might have made terms with the king at their pleasure ; but a woman, the mother of one of the youths who was scourged in the market-place, and died in consequence, stole into the fortress and stabbed him. Thus the way to the throne was made plain for the more thoughtful reformer prince, who wrought mightily for his people in the days to come. When the king knew his son was dead he rose up at last against the outlaws who wasted the land and destroyed them ; but first his vengeance fell on the youth who had been the means of the prince's death. He degraded him from his rank, and sent him to the mines for life. The prisoners

there hated him, seeing in him a former oppressor; the lesser officials, who had found him arrogant, rejoiced to humble him and make him suffer in body and soul. He endured a year of agony, and then he escaped. He went through the mountain passes, in hunger and cold, and terror unspeakable lest he should be retaken. On the third day he saw from a rocky height a curl of blue smoke, and knew he was near a human dwelling. He found that a rocky gorge and a river were between him and the place whence the smoke rose. He threw himself into the river and tried to swim; but the water was cold as ice, and his heart was wellnigh stilled. He clung to the rocks, gasping, and strove with the stream; as he strove he saw a hand steal through the boughs of an over-hanging tree and it grasped his wrist. Slowly the man upon the bank above him drew him up, and he fell, dripping and panting, on the earth. He dragged himself stiffly to his feet and looked at the man who had saved him. Instantly he knew him and saw that he, too, was known by his rescuer. Shuddering with cold and weariness he prayed the outlaw not to betray him.

“I shall not betray you,” said his captor quietly, “I have other work to do. But I shall hand you to the villagers near my camp. They, I doubt not, will claim the king’s reward for the arrest of an escaped prisoner. They are poor; it will mean much to them.”

The fugitive knelt shivering on the earth, and pleaded.

“Think! and have mercy,” he cried, “I am not twenty-five, and even in the mines men live to be old. I may live forty years, and they will never again give me a chance of escape.”

“No,” said the outlaw calmly. “Our lord the king does not send prisoners to the mines that they may escape; he sends them there to be punished.”

His captive’s teeth were chattering, and his eyes were dim with tears of weakness and despair.

“They will flog me for escaping,” he pleaded.

“That will not be illegal, will it?”

“What do you mean?”

“I only ask, if they flog you, whether it will be unlawful?”

“N—no,” faltered the fugitive.

“Then,” said his captor, “why complain? Are not the king’s laws just? Surely I should be wrong to interfere with them. I know you think with me.”

The escaped prisoner flung himself on the ground at his captor’s feet, and sobbed. The outlaw knelt and touched his shoulder with his finger tips.

“You say the law is just,” he said. “Always, and everywhere, and to every man. You may be right. God knows! But this I know; it is just as regards you.”

His hearer moaned; he was past speech or entreaty.

“Not,” said the other, “as most would say, because you caused the death of your prince, by reason of your selfish carelessness and lust. But for another reason. Because in your praise of justice (a praise but of the lips, too, or you would not be weeping on the ground at my feet) you grew careless of pain. Because in the bliss of heaven you forgot the agony of hell. Because the king’s law is twofold; because there is the justice of sternness, and the justice of gentleness. Because you were part of the law, and failed to administer it when you were given the chance. Because you praised one half of the law, while the ease was yours, and the pain another’s; because you forgot that praise as soon as you bore the suffering. Because of these things I say, if you be sent back to the mines for ten, twenty, thirty, forty years—if you be sent back, sold to your gaolers and flogged because you tried to escape, then if there be any prisoner in the mines who deserves such usage, that man is yourself! Do you hear me?”

The prisoner lay on the earth, and tried to think. At last he rose.

“You are quite right,” he said faintly. “I’ll plead with you no more. Do as you please with me. It is a pity we always learn our lessons too late to prove that we know them.”

“If you really think that, perhaps the king had better have a prisoner the less, and a rebel the more—had he not?”

“No,” said the young man, shivering with the chill of his wet clothes and the keen air. “That cannot be. I am the king’s prisoner; but I am also his loyal subject.”

The outlaw laid his hand in friendly wise on his captive’s shoulder.

"So am I," he said gently. "Come to my hut. There is a fire. You will fall ill with the cold."

"I hope so," said the other bitterly, "I wish I could die of it."

The elder man smiled.

"You are not going back to the mines if I can save you from them," he said. "Since that is so you will perhaps be less anxious to die."

Then, since the young man was now wellnigh fainting with weariness and hunger he led him to his hut, and treated him courteously as a guest, giving him dry clothing and food and spreading a bed for him on the floor that he might rest. He slept long; when he woke he learned from the outlaw that, during his year in the mines, the king had wellnigh exterminated the brigands, and only their leader and a few men remained. They were in an impregnable hiding-place, but they had little food. The leader, in order that he might feed his guest without unfairly lessening the supplies of his followers, ate but once in three days. One day he said to the young man :

"The spring is come; and through the mountain passes these men go to seek another country. Will you go with them?"

"Do you also go?"

"No. I go to my own land for a little space. I come from the eastern deserts."

"Do you go to raise the people?"

"No. I have served my king by rebelling against him, so that he might take heed and sweep away the robbers who wasted the land. Now he is dead; and I have a word to speak in the ear of his son who is newly crowned."

"How do you know the king is dead?"

"I know it. How, I cannot tell. Also I know what I must do; why, I cannot tell. I must go to my country, and then to the city; where I shall speak the word to the king I once asked you to speak. And this king will hear, and comfort the people."

The young man's eyes filled with tears of shame.

"Is there no use in telling you I am sorry?" he said.

“There is much use—if it is true.”

“It is true. I would give my life to have another chance such as I flung away.”

“Come with me, then. Perhaps the chance will come to you again, sooner or later.”

“I will come,” answered the other, “I will go with you to your country.”

So the twain journeyed to the east; it was a barren land; they halted in a great dry desert, where was a ruined city, and a little reed hut among the ruins.

“It is in my mind,” said the elder man, “how, I know not, that here you will find, in another guise, the chance of service you missed when it was offered to you. Stay here till I return. I am born of a restless race, and I put their restlessness to use. But my soul has reached a time of pause; it waits in a barren land. Keep this place for me till I shall come again.”

“This I will do,” said the youth, with tears in his eyes, “upon my faith and honour.”

So these two, who had grown to love each other, parted. The elder went to the city, and there he spoke burning words of the people’s wrongs; and they sank into the new king’s heart, and bore fruit. Nevertheless, the words were spoken on the scaffold, for they hanged the speaker as an outlaw.

And the young man in the east, knowing naught of this, intent on keeping his promise, and redeeming his failure of the past, sat alone in the reed hut in the desert and waited for him to return.

But of the tale of his return another legend tells, which I will seek to lay before those who love to hear of such matters.

MICHAEL WOOD.

WE are almost all of us slaves of phrases.—BALFOUR.

GUNAS, CASTE AND TEMPERAMENT

IN any endeavour to deal studiously with so immensely wide a subject as Theosophy the individual will generally bring to his examination, as standards of truth and of utility, definite knowledge or convictions derived from other and earlier studies or interests. Each student finds his individual point of contact with the new subject, and Theosophy usually opens to him as a new light on matters already more or less familiar, and expands to the mind by associating these with a more comprehensive view of the general order of things.

It is interesting to notice what widely different interests have provided the lines along which widely different minds have converged upon our many-sided movement. Food reform, religious and spiritual needs, various scientific interests, psychical experiences, philosophical and metaphysical problems, social aims, psychological studies—all these and many more, yield their varied claims for a new unification. Within the Theosophical movement we therefore witness a constant blending and harmonising of specific individual knowledge and experience with the teachings regarding the fundamental principles of nature with which we are familiar.

These correlations have, of course, a double interest. Not only will Theosophy throw additional light on the earlier study and, frequently, offer a solution of problems with which it was unable to cope; but, on the other hand, the earlier work may often familiarise one with facts in material nature which appear to conform with what our literature tells of laws or causes in the superphysical worlds. Difficulty always attends any endeavour to deal formally with these apparent conformities, for one cannot trace the trajectory of a spiritual law, nor calculate its point of incidence in material affairs. We learn that certain influences operating on higher planes work in a given way and in a given

sequence, and in the endeavour to recognise the operation one may refer to occurrences in the physical world which correspond more or less closely with our idea of the causes described. But this idea may well be faulty; and one is by no means certain whether the correspondences observed really stand in any direct relation with the causes first considered.

Yet a certain interest always attaches to anything in nature which appears to conform in any way with those initial operations on higher or inner planes to which the order of things in the physical world is due. We learn, for instance, of an original creative impulse, the first Life-wave, which "created" physical matter. This matter, however, has no combining-power, and cannot therefore serve, in that state, for building the Forms of the successive kingdoms of nature. The second Life-wave provides the combining-power, and, this being given, the Forms then succeed in evolutionary order and establish the mineral, the vegetable, and the animal and human worlds; this seems sufficiently clear on the one side. On the other hand we are interested in Radium, which transmutes itself into Helium. And one of the peculiarities of Helium is that, by all accounts, it cannot be got to combine with any other chemical element. Neither will Argon be forced into any chemical combination, nor are Neon and Krypton and other "meta elements" found in combination. They have no valency, no combining-power. Physical matter *minus* chemical properties, in this sense, is at least an actuality; and "fractionation" experiments strongly suggest that many orders of such matter may exist.

The description of the first Life-wave tells, then, of something with which we find a correspondence in nature. Chemistry likewise provides a parallel with the description of the second Life-wave; for directly we deal with the active chemical atoms whose valencies are known, we see that their combining-power rules all further procedure. In the inorganic or mineral world their combination is relatively simple. But presently we find *groups* of these atoms acting as more or less stable units,—“compound radicles,” to distinguish them from “simple radicles” which are atoms acting singly. Around these “compound radicles” more complex chemical aggregations gather, and in

association with them the higher valencies or combining-powers of the chemical atoms are exhibited. The spectroscope shews that these "compound radicles" exist as actual, physically-connected units—controlling entities, one is tempted to say—within these more complex molecules; and following this further development we are at once on a high road which leads through organic chemistry into all the mystery of vegetable and animal life and form. "Meta elements" and "compound radicles" are thus terrestrial actualities which conform in many particulars with our ideas of the operation of the first and second Life-waves. Quite possibly the facts upon which Sir Norman Lockyer bases his *Inorganic Evolution* may be illustrating the action of these first and second Life-waves on the cosmic scale. The stellar evolution shews stages of a ceaseless process of "creation," whereby physical matter, as we know it terrestrially, is constantly being brought into new existence. And in the earliest stages of this physical "creation," in nebulæ and so forth, we trace the presence of this widely-disseminated material, Helium, anticipating the later-born chemical elements proper.

Such open facts at least help one to appreciate the mystical accounts of the life-problem. We feel that any phase of what is explained to us may be exemplified in common occurrences—not necessarily afar off in time or space or state, but now and here and as we are, and perhaps much nearer to us than we had been prone to fancy.

In this spirit, then, it is proposed to trace certain interesting parallels between earlier work connected with phrenological studies, and those highly mystical subjects the Gunas and Karma as these are presented in our literature. Phrenology, or cranial psychology, is another of the many subjects which have been brought forward for location in the wide Theosophical scheme. Many who have taken the trouble to give it careful study have found it full of a peculiarly unique interest—an interest which assumes a yet profounder significance when one passes to consideration of the directly spiritual references of such a work as the *Bhagavad Gîtâ*. The *Gîtâ*, primarily a scripture of Yoga, treats directly and intimately of just those mental, psychological difficulties which beset anyone who would fit himself to deal prac-

tically with the spiritual aspect of the problem of life. Considered in this light it is also a scripture of practical psychology, dealing with man as he knows himself and as he experiences in consciousness the turmoil of his changeful states. The *Gîtâ* seeks no justification from current modern theories or systems of thought and experiment, but directly addresses the consciousness within, and in these particulars it falls into line with the practice with which its teachings are to be compared. It disarms criticism, for in reading it we feel that we ourselves were already assessed and writ down in terms which extort our assent. It appears to be reviewing our past in the light of our to-day,—and on the morrow we find that it was also prophetic. Therefore such scriptures live, their truth perpetually endorsed in the experiences of succeeding generations of men.

Apart, however, from what meets with this inner assent, the *Gîtâ* contains many references of an explanatory nature to matters which do not come within the recognition of the reader. We find references, for instance, to the particular operations of the Gunas, and to applications of kârmic law; and we gather that these are determining factors in the phases of consciousness—the intimately-known tendencies, impulses, difficulties and limitations—amidst which men have ever sought the way of peace. In many instances, unfortunately, we fail to gather the help, which these explanations were designed to afford, through not being able to distinguish the incidence or the play of these determining factors in the current of our thought and feeling. And how could phases of thought and feeling of which we were conscious be identified, severally, with these mysterious influences whose names convey so little so the mind? Owing to these difficulties, the Gunas, however intimately woven into our human condition, appear to stand apart from our experience. They are not recognised and are thus often regarded as inexplicables—as matters with which one is unable to deal.

In the recently published *Studies in the Bhagavad Gîtâ*, we have an interesting and instructive treatment of these difficult subjects. The Gunas, or Rays, are dealt with in their relation to certain of our individual characteristics; Karma is said to express the stage of evolution, to define the active capacities, of the

Ego ; and it is represented that the Caste system of ancient India provided a social order which was specially designed to favour the operation of these spiritual agencies in human life as there and then existing. Again, then, the suggestion is pressed that these Gunas or Rays should be recognisable in some form among ourselves. No confusion of a Caste system can be supposed to obliterate wholly distinctions established by an ordinance so basic as are the Gunas. The study of human types among ourselves should reveal mental and physical differentiations—signs of some kind—which fall into parallel with the natural human classification described in the *Gîtâ*. Failing this, it is difficult to see how we can apply these descriptions to the problems of life and consciousness as we have to face them.

As this is often the position with regard to these subjects—Gunas, Karma, Caste—it may be useful to turn to certain observations familiar to those who have put the claims of Phrenology to a practical test. Phrenologists have long adopted a classification of human beings, according to their natural types, which accords closely with the ancient Guna-divisions. Experience has also compelled them to apply other standards which strongly suggest an identity with the gradation of the ancient Caste-system, wherein the Karma of the Ego was expressed. And in their examination of the individual, phrenologists observe the modification of these factors in a manner which finally differentiates every man from his fellows, mentally and physically, with a particularity that would satisfy any expectation one might found upon considerations of kârmic law.

The review of the phrenological classifications and standards will probably shew, under a different nomenclature, that the modern system and that of the *Gîtâ* are one and the same thing—as seen, of course, from opposite ends of the scale. The Gunas, variously blended in the seven Rays, are seen in the seven physical types or Temperaments, each associated with definite typical mental characteristics. The Caste of the individual conforms with what the phrenologist calls his “organic Quality.” And Karma is further particularised and made individual in the special cranial development by which the man’s “character” can then, finally, be judged. Phrenology thus involves far more than

mere groping after "bumps." It is a systematic analysis of the entire physical aspect of man, and the declaration of its significance in mental values. These mental values, moreover, are stated in terms which all can understand; for cranial psychology deals with man, as does also the *Gîtâ*, as he knows himself in experience of his conscious states,—a circumstance which much facilitates the comparisons which are to be drawn.

Our interest will centre largely on certain points, referred to above, which stand quite apart from craniology pure and simple. In any given instance one needs to consider, firstly, the physical type or Temperament of the individual; and, secondly, the Quality of his physical and nervous organism. These most important factors, Temperament and Quality, are not assessed from cranial indications. They have certain variable cranial concomitants, which will hereafter be sufficiently described, but they are not judged from cranial signs. Each physical type or Temperament has its broad, unmistakable mental equivalent—is, in fact, the physical configuration of a definite mental type whose general tendencies, proclivities, aversions and so forth are easily observed. Our proposition is, that in these seven human Temperaments we are dealing with the physical and mental expression of the Gunas whose interaction produces the seven Rays which severally define the types of all that fall under their dominance as they traverse the different planes. In discerning the man's Ray we thus discover the groundwork of his entire nature; for it is this Ray which gives its colour, its typical characteristics, to the causal body, thus marking the line of easiest ascent—the man's line of least resistance. Temperament represents that continuous warp of man's inner being across which kârmic shuttles weave progressive phases of "character" life after life. If Karma should grant a high-toned, or impose a poor physical and nervous organism, "character" and mental status are modified accordingly; and this is precisely the condition dealt with in the second consideration, Quality, or the level at which the man stands within his proper Ray. Quality thus corresponds with Caste, in so far as Caste may be said to follow from the interaction of this form of kârmic freedom or restriction with the Guna tendency. Certainly, the Castes are not main-

tained in our modern society, and in many particulars our temperamental types are considerably mixed. But the Caste-level of the individual can often be clearly recognised, in spite of the confusion which appears to result from our accentuated individualism. The foregoing will suggest that studies of Temperament and Quality deal with matters basic to human nature and character. If these can be reasonably accurately judged with regard to any normally constituted individual, they will indicate the ground-plan of his emotional and mental nature, and this without reference to cranial minutiae.

But Karma brings about yet further modifications of the physical vehicle. The brain-formation may in any given case mark the possession of certain "faculties," or it may restrict the expression of the life in one or another particular direction. Also, the play of the temperamental tendencies may thereby be strengthened or checked or coloured in varying degree. The formation of the brain may be considered to decide *what* the man shall be able coherently to express of himself; and in the ordinary life of "the masses" it also largely decides *how* he will habitually conduct himself. From however little of giving or of withholding in this or in that particular of brain-formation there follows subtle modification of the man's "character," and the latter is thus viewed as a complex resultant of the intricate interweaving of Temperament, Quality and brain-development—considering these, of course, in their psychic aspects. These psychic factors or elements are in no stable equilibrium; they rather resemble primary and secondary groups of tendencies which are thrown into the most involved interaction and opposition by promptings both from within and from without. Subject these factors to the compulsion of individual circumstance and association, and their play in consciousness is what the man calls 'himself'—*is* the man as he knows himself and as he has to deal with himself. It is with this view of man's mental constitution that cranial psychology addresses his immediate state.

In any approach to the condition of the meditative life, our psychologist considers that another factor is brought into play—the Will. This Will is no cranial "organ," for it sets itself to employ all organs after a new fashion, in opposition to the usual

brain-habit. Neither does it appear to be Temperament as this is usually regarded, for it opposes established temperamental inclinations. Nor is it Quality, for it requires conformity with new standards and advances totally new ideals. And as Will is no one of these things, neither is it their combination as hitherto experienced, nor any habit built up of their psychical constituents. Will appears as a new factor upon the scene, surveying the field from above and calling for a new and harmonious determination of the warring elements within it. Its advent may be heralded by a profound and surprising discontent wherein the man sees that what he had previously called his "character" and his "will" were but an unchosen and unguided drift of tendencies in which he himself had been wholly submerged—weight of drift, "will"; its general direction, "character." He realises that he himself had never exercised any original Will, and that his "character" was but a kind of distemper for which he now has to discover a remedy. But he can neither discover this remedy, nor even rightly comprehend the nature of the newly-suggested standards and ideals, until some measure of quiet is established among the conflicting impulses from which he now has to extricate himself. In this disorder, a psychology having no religious bearing may serve him as little as a religious system which knows nothing of psychology. Both may figure in the wreckage amidst which he has to effect a new self-adjustment and to prepare a new and unmapped Way—often utterly confused as to his true relation to the psychical elements which had hitherto comprised and bounded his entire being.

Upon this general problem, as also upon questions of individual character and ability, the psychology which we are to consider throws an interesting light. It has provided many and many a man with a practical philosophy of life, and with detailed knowledge of the means of character-building and attainment, which proved invaluable in his hour of greatest need. Perhaps it will be best to deal first with the purely phrenological aspect of the subject, though one cannot possibly enter into details of proof regarding this much-abused science and the claims or assertions which it advances. These are usually grossly misunderstood by its critics, who, very often, have never got within judging

distance of the subject ; and, for the most part, the "disproofs" of which one hears from the latter shew little regard for the conditions within which the claims are found to be valid.

The problems of human consciousness and character are hardly likely to be solved in the physiological laboratory. Emerson's suggestion, that if one would prove to a man that his judgment upon facts is wrong, one should shew him the *same* facts in their right order of thought, might better be applied. The appeal is to experience. As the occurrences to which Mesmer and others drew attention have finally been recognised by our official science, so must the facts affirmed and re-affirmed by generations of investigators of phrenology be finally considered and seen in their right order of thought. Dr. Hollander's works are a hopeful sign, and reference to them will be found useful by any who seek detailed discussion of their theme.

Phrenology presupposes that the brain is *an* immediate, material organ of the mind ; not necessarily the *only* material organ or means concerned in functions which might be called "mental," but simply *an* organ by means of which mind is expressed in ordinary life. Other means may exist. For instance, it may be a condition of my being able to play a certain passage upon the piano from memory, that I must not *think*. If I endeavour consciously to remember the notes to be played, I fail. But if the fingers are simply put to it without conscious thinking on my part of what they are to do, a different, subconscious "memory" achieves the end. And the fingers (?) may even so "remember" as to play the passage (owing to my unconscious mistake in starting them) in a key in which they had never played it before. The memory of the fingers is thus fused with their memory of usage of a different key ; and possibly my physical brain has nothing to do with the performance, further than to listen to it and to object to mistakes, which will be instantly detected. A musical friend tells me that he visualises the entire score when playing from memory ; and another "lets his fingers go" and gives his attention to appropriate figures and scenes which rise before him. Individuals differ, and "mind" may act by many channels. But the brain is one of its means of action.

Further, different portions or areas of the brain are said to be the seat, severally, of different faculties or powers of the mind, each faculty—Combativeness, Hope, etc.—being expressed through its appropriate area of the brain-cortex. Hence the phrenologist's localisation of the various "organs" of the brain. This is often gravely supposed to imply that phrenology postulates the existence of so and so many separate and independent consciousnesses, each habitually acting by itself without necessarily involving others. But this is not postulated. The mind is regarded, rather, as a many-sided unity, more or less coördinated in the individual (generally, decidedly less) with the play of any one "faculty" intimately involving others. For instance, "Constructiveness represents the entire mind of man in its constructive aspect"; that is to say, the constructive aspect of a man's entire mind is called into play in the building of, let us suppose, a cabinet. If the mind lacked Continuity the cabinet might finally go, unfinished, to the lumber-room. It might, on the other hand, be completed with Conscientiousness or "anyhow." An artistic mind will design and construct it artistically; but if Ideality and Sense of Proportion were wanting, the set and build of the thing would be totally different. And so on in all particulars that may be expressed cabinet-wise. The work will proclaim the mind that produced it, whatever the nature of the work may be. And if an otherwise capable mind were poorly endowed with Constructiveness, the cabinet would be represented by elaborate preparations which might never take shape at all. It is owing to this principle of mental action that we habitually betray ourselves both in what we do and in what we leave undone, all efforts to the contrary notwithstanding.

It is also a principle of phrenology that, *other conditions being the same*, the larger brain is the better; *other things being equal*, greater power accompanies the greater size. Yet it is everlastingly advanced as an "objection" to phrenology, that men with small heads often show greater general ability than others with large heads. The vitally important proviso relating to temperament, quality, shape, etc., is entirely ignored.

Other "objections" appear to be based on the assumption that the phrenologist has never studied craniology, or examined

skulls and brains or brain-casts and models; that he is consequently not aware that some skulls are very much thicker than others; that he supposes the bony protuberance sometimes strongly marked at the back of the head to contain a nodule of brain-substance; that he is possibly ignorant of even the existence of *sinuses* which in certain regions throw the inner and outer surfaces of the bone out of parallel, etc.; that he imagines every skull to be of exactly the same thickness at all points; that, in fact, phrenology is merely a vague speculation which is incapable of being put to the test of practice and of being proved in every-day experience. One cannot here deal with these curious misconceptions. They would not have been mentioned but for the fact that, even from high places, one constantly hears them and their like put forward to disperse, as though it were a bubble, a body of knowledge which has been steadily accumulating for a century past. Even if the entire phrenological idea were supposed to be wrong, one still has to face the fact that everything happens as though it were right. Judgments upon its exceedingly intricate data may differ—as they do upon the data of chemistry, spectroscopy, physics and so forth—without necessarily impugning either the science or the individual.

It appears possible to put the entire subject of the localisation of the “faculties” before Theosophical readers in a non-disputative manner which will at least suggest its perfect reasonableness. Phrenology has been discredited on the score of its being empirical, *i.e.*, of being based wholly upon experience and the observation of phenomena without regard to accredited science and theory. Certainly its facts so fostered this independence that the phrenologist has been content to leave opposing theories to those who framed them, simply fortifying his isolated position with further facts and more minute observation. Yet his empirical localisations really fall into a natural and interesting harmony with facts and principles derived from physiology, craniology, sociology and Theosophical thought. Granting that the brain is an organ of the mind, we may take as a starting-point in this correlation the following account of the stages of brain-evolution from John Fiske’s small work *Man’s Destiny* :

“ In the lowest vertebrate animal, the amphioxus, the cerebrum and cerebellum do not exist at all. In fishes we begin to find them, but they are much smaller than the optic lobes. In such a highly organised fish as the halibut, which weighs about as much as an average-sized man, the cerebrum is smaller than a melon-seed. Continuing to grow by adding concentric layers at the surface, the cerebrum and cerebellum become much larger in birds and lower mammals, gradually covering up the optic lobes. As we pass to higher mammalian forms, the growth of the cerebrum becomes most conspicuous, until it extends backwards so far as to cover up the cerebellum. . . . In the higher apes *the cerebrum begins to extend itself forwards, and this goes on in the human race.* The cranial capacity of the European exceeds that of the Australian by forty cubic inches, or nearly four times as much as that by which the Australian exceeds the gorilla; and *the expansion is almost entirely in the upper and anterior portions.* But the increase of the cerebral surface is shewn not only in the general size of the organ, but to a still greater extent in the irregular creasing and furrowing of the surface. This creasing and furrowing begins to occur in the higher mammals, and in civilised man it is carried to an astonishing extent. The amount of intelligence is correlated with *the number, the depth, and the irregularity of the furrows.* A cat’s brain has few symmetrical creases. In an ape the creases are deepened into slight furrows, and they run irregularly, somewhat like the lines in the palm of your hand. With age and experience the furrows grow deeper and more sinuous, and new ones appear; and in man these phenomena come to have great significance. The cerebral surface of a human infant is like that of an ape. In an adult savage, or in a European peasant, the furrowing is somewhat marked and complicated. In the brain of a great scholar, the furrows are very deep and crooked, *and hundreds of creases appear which are not found at all in the brains of ordinary men.* In other words, the cerebral surface of such a man, the seat of conscious mental life, has been enormously enlarged in area; and we must further observe that it goes on enlarging in some cases into extreme old age.”

The more important passages are here italicised by the pre-

sent writer. The later ones emphasise the point that the mere size of the brain is no measure of its value. Far more significant in that respect is its development of inner surface in the formation described, which the phrenologist judges by its concomitant signs and calls the Quality of the organism. The earlier passages tell at what point in the intelligence-scale the frontal lobes of the cerebrum begin to extend, and that the continued expansion of the anterior and upper-frontal region marks the ascent from the state of the savage to that of the intellectual, civilised man.

The accompanying cranial development also, naturally, illustrates this movement, which can be followed from the diagrams appended. These do not represent the relative sizes of the different skulls. They merely show, irrespective of size, the skull-development which accompanies the brain-development described above, beginning with the anthropoid apes. In the Gorilla skull may be noticed the bony formation which converges from the outer angle of the supra-orbital ridges to form the immense coronal crest. This crest, according to Robert Hartmann,* corresponds in the adult animal with the two temporal ridges, which are widely separated in the human skull, and appear relatively low down on either side of the head. In the aged male Gorilla the bony excrescences or outworks of the skull may assume huge proportions, while the frontal area is seen to be depressed. In the Chimpanzee we see this coronal crest divided and a new skull-area appearing in the rounded interspace. In the Orang pictured, the area between the temporal ridges is clearly marked. In the Mitred Langur (a small monkey inhabiting Java) we see a head in which this new development is carried to a degree which strongly suggests the activity of the Mánasic element. In comparing these animal skulls with the human, considerable allowance must always be made for their more extensive and ramified *sinuses*. Nevertheless, this head suggests that there may be good Mánasic reason for the peculiar "sacredness" with which an allied family of these monkeys is said to be regarded in India. In the celebrated Neanderthal skull, unearthed in 1857 and thereafter much discussed, we have an exceedingly low type of human head which has many marks in common with the

* *Anthropoid Apes*, p. 63.

skulls of the anthropoids. Apart from mere size, neither this nor the following aboriginal Australian skull compares very favourably with that of the Langur. The protruding jaws, retreating forehead and massive bones all indicate the low, undeveloped type, though the frontal and upper-frontal regions are wider and more rounded than they are in the larger apes. Stages of this continued movement can be followed in different races and families of men till it culminates in the advanced type shewn in the last diagram. Here, the expanded frontal and lofty dome of the head shew the immensely increased volume of the brain under these areas, as described by Fiske.

It is not pretended that these skulls are here shown in any precise order, or that the Langur has any place at all among the anthropoid apes. The diagrams are merely intended to facilitate a general survey wherein skull-development and brain-development can be sufficiently followed in relation to intelligence-development. The frontal is seen to extend forward in the anterior region, over the eyes; and the dome of the skull gradually thrusts itself upward, as it were, between the flanges of the crest shewn in the gorilla-head, till it finally arches wide and high over the temporal ridges and exhibits extensive new areas as well as new proportions. With this high-domed head and its characteristic proportions is also found a much higher type of physical and nervous organisation, a much higher Quality, and these various factors differentiate it widely from anything observed among savage and undeveloped human races.

G. DYNE.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

THE student of nature, who starts from the axiom of the universality of the law of causation, cannot refuse to admit an eternal existence; if he admits the conservation of energy, if he admits the existence of immaterial phenomena in the form of consciousness, he must admit the possibility, at any rate, of an eternal series of such phenomena; and, if his studies have not been barren of the best fruit of the investigation of nature, he will have enough sense to see that when Spinoza says, 'by God we understand an absolute infinite Being, that is an unchangeable Essence, with infinite attributes,' the God so conceived is one that only a very great fool would deny, even in his heart. Physical science is as little Atheistic as it is Materialistic.

HUXLEY.



Urag-Urag



EUROPEAN ABORESIS TYPE



Chimpanzee



TYPICAL AUSTRALIAN (ART'S TYPE)



Aged male gorilla



NEANDERTHAL SKULL



Gorilla (male)



MITRED LANGUR

OF PRIVATE REVELATIONS. No. II.

IN my previous paper I stated my case as a matter of conflicting authorities,—I set what seemed to me the old doctrine and the new side by side and I appealed to “those who knew” to say if they could reconcile the two. It seemed to me that in opening what I hoped would be a useful discussion I could not keep my paper sufficiently free from the personal element in any other way. I felt it a matter of the first importance to make it impossible for any one to treat it as a “clash of opinion” between Mr. Leadbeater and myself, personally,—a thing entirely contrary to my wishes and feelings, and which would have destroyed all the good I expected from the discussion. Of course I took it for granted that I was writing for Theosophists,—that everyone received at least this much “on authority,” that above us Ordinary Persons there are as many degrees as below us; that there are Pupils of the Masters of all grades of advancement, and that above even the Masters we (more or less) know there are higher Beings whose grasp of sight is beyond Theirs. If there is anyone who does not grant this,—who thinks that Mr. Leadbeater’s, as I always thought, rather loose and careless statement in the *Astral Plane* (p. 12, 3rd ed.) that “in the case of a student of occultism trained by a capable Master a mistake would be impossible except through great hurry or carelessness” is to be pressed to its utmost length as if it were a “passage of Scripture,” and amounts to a claim of absolute infallibility for the student in question—I will only say that I am certain that Mr. Leadbeater himself would be the first to disclaim it, and that I don’t see that any argument between us is possible on those terms,—we are not in the same world.

But if this be admitted, I *do* claim the right to set one authority against another, and weigh their importance. I might have put it, but for the reasons I have given, as a discrepancy between Mr. Leadbeater’s own statements. No one could put

the reasons for our coming into earth life more beautifully than he has done (pp. 47 and 48). He says: "It must be remembered that we are here for a purpose—a purpose which can only be attained upon this physical plane. . . . There are lessons to be learned on this plane which cannot be learned anywhere else. . . . At present the physical plane is the principal theatre of our evolution, and a great deal of very necessary progress can be made only under its conditions." Then, but half a dozen pages forward, comes the passage I have already quoted, that "the possibilities of the Astral Plane, both of enjoyment and of progress, are in every way much greater than those of the lower level." Now Mr. Leadbeater enunciates these two propositions, and Mrs. Besant reviews his book, without manifesting the smallest sense of any incongruity between them. To me, however, using my best intelligence upon them, in the light of the Theosophical system as I received it from my teachers—teachers who also have every claim to my respect—these two statements are mutually destructive; and I propose in the remainder of this paper to endeavour to justify this view.

Permit me to begin, as it may seem, a good way off my subject. A Catholic friend, one whose mind runs more in accordance with my own than almost any other, once said to me after a discussion: "You are so impatient of limits." And if I were to seek a phrase which should, in few words, sum up the meaning of my life it is just this. Born more than sixty years ago, a little before the first beginnings of the new thought, in a minister's family retaining to the full the sentiments and feelings of the Protestant Dissenters of the olden time, I went, hardly more than a boy, to their Seminary as "a student for the ministry," as we phrased it. When I came to study History and Philosophy, my mind opened to the fact that I was shut in by almost the narrowest bounds one can imagine; the theology of John Calvin, the opinions of the deacons of the chapel, of the congregation, companions in College who felt no inconvenience, had no thought of the vast world outside. The "petty murmurs of their burgh" sufficed them, as they seem to do their successors to this day; but I was different somehow, I couldn't breathe. I did not understand myself, I was too young; but without much

argument I simply drifted away into what was at least the National Church, not the Church of a small minority, even of Englishmen. But this, too, in time, began to pinch. I had none of the average Englishman's self-satisfaction with himself and his religion; though of unmixed English blood (as far as I know) I have more of the Celt than the Saxon in my nature. It could only be a question of time, *when* I should pass to what claims to be the World-Church. It is a common idea that men in becoming converts to the Catholic faith give up their freedom, "commit intellectual suicide" as is often said; but for educated men, and especially for the Anglican clergymen who were "going over" in such numbers about then, and even for myself, who was not a clergyman, this is not the case. True, the limits are solid bars; but the extent of free thought and action within them is far greater than in the Anglican Church. What I said to myself in substance was: I find the Catholic Church is right in so many points which I have been taught were wrong—I see so much promise of a healthy and useful mental life there which I can't get elsewhere, that I can't but try it. I accepted the great idea of a Divinely guided teaching Church as a whole, and found it for a long time of immense value for my development. But if you should ask whether I ever succeeded in seriously convincing myself that everyone who did this or that would be damned for ever for it, I'm afraid you "have me" there. Indeed, I doubt much if the make of my mind is such as to allow me to take *anything* on authority; I must always put everything to the practical test—does it *work* right?—and of that I must always be the judge, and not my theology books or my Bishop. In short, as a Frenchman has summed it up, such as I come to say: "The Catholic religion is the *only* rational religion," subject only to the almost certainty that sooner or later one will finish the sentence, "and *that's* not rational." Thus, in time, I came against the limits of the Universal Church; it couldn't tell me why and how I came into the world, nor rightly guide me in it, nor give me a reasonable or credible view of the life after death. I couldn't be satisfied with less than a Cosmic Religion; even the World Religion was too small! A large statement for so small a man, isn't it? but thus I *am* made; there's no help for it.

When the time was ripe and the field was clear I came upon *Esoteric Buddhism* ; and here was the very Cosmic Religion I was wanting ! My whole heart went out to it ; it “ came to me,”—but not by authority, and not by arguments. As for arguments, someone has said (a Frenchman again, I think) that arguments are never more than the excuses we invent for our belief, not its reasons ; and for authority, what was there ?

I have never seen a Master, or heard one, or had a letter from one. Mr. Sinnett’s letters, which formed the foundation of his book, were received through the intermediation of Mme. Blavatsky ; and how much of the *very* personal element *that* involves I doubt if there is anyone living who can define. Its “ authority ” to me was, and still is, the logical completeness and intelligibility of its scheme of the world ; the “ authority ” of the heliocentric system, of the undulatory theory of light ; an authority continually being confirmed by the new discoveries of science and philosophy to this very day.

Now, what is the essential part of this scheme, which (to avoid hurting the feelings of weaker brethren by calling it the Theosophical system) I may for convenience call the “ Esoteric Buddhism ” doctrine ? To my mind its point is that man is *not* the body we see with our physical eyes or the brain and nerves we disengage from it in our anatomical studies ; that the true Self is a fragment of the God above us, and like Him “ was, is, and ever shall be,” dwelling ever on a plane far above physical or astral, unchanged whether the physical and astral bodies die or live. That, having to qualify itself hereafter to sit at the right hand of God to judge the living and the dead, it is forced for experience sake from time to time to put forth a manifestation of itself into physical life that it may “ learn by the things it suffers ” to rule wisely when the time comes for rule. That each of these fleeting personalities (as we call them) is, by the dignity of the Divine spark which uses it, so far a separate existence that it must have its completion on the Astral and Devachanic planes ; but (justice thus done) it passes for ever away, leaving no trace but in the growth and experience the true Self has gained by it.

I found in this system an intelligible reason why I come into the world at all—a point on which the Christian system has

no light to give; a clear explanation of why I find myself in this actual body and in these particular circumstances and no other, for they all belong to and correspond with the point of development at which my true Self has now arrived; a motive for exertion, so that my development may go on more quickly; and lastly a well defined hope for the future—a prospect of an endless succession, “to go on and not to die,” which answers to the full the “impatience of limitations” which I have spoken of as the characteristic of my mind.

This, for the general view; for my present purpose I must add one point of detail. I found in the “Esoteric Buddhism” doctrine, as indeed is found in the statements of all mystics and theosophers who have ever written, that the Astral and lower Mental planes are, in a special sense (in which, curiously enough, the physical plane is *not* involved) the realm of Illusion. The dead weight of the physical body is not *all* a disadvantage;—it hinders much progress, but also much falling back; when freed from it, the temporary personality, on its way to yield up its fruits of experience to the Self which has made it and used it, and then to vanish away, is liable (like the shades which flitted helpless as the dead autumn leaves before Ulysses in the underworld) once loosed from its anchorage in the physical, to be carried about by every breeze of desire, and deluded by the vain dreams of which its new world is the appropriate home; and this the more completely as the Divine Spark which once animated it has more and more withdrawn itself into its own life.

Such has been the doctrine of all seers from time immemorial, and it seems to me that to state it is enough to explain why I was so painfully impressed by *The Other Side of Death*. My task has been considerably lightened by my friend Mr. Jinarajadasa’s frank admission that its doctrine *is* new, and in contradiction to previous authority. It thus remains only for me to justify my interference by showing how deeply seated and how far-reaching the real difference is. If we are to treat life on the Astral Plane as Mr. Leadbeater seems to instruct us, as in all cases and for all dwellers there an enormous advance on the physical world, a life always one step nearer reality, and for everyone far fuller of opportunities for good

than the present life, I can fully understand what consolation is thus given for those who have to die and for their friends ; but I *don't* see clearly what is left of *my* Theosophy. Our coming into physical life at all is thus made as inexplicable as it is in the ordinary Christian view ; and our returning to it, a pure injustice. The conception of Kâma Loka as a portion of the Astral Plane specially devoted to the dead is abolished ; and where Devachan itself comes in is not clear. We are in an altogether new world, where *our* laws don't work. Nor can I see how the utter unreasonableness of our being thrust out of this better world of the Astral down to earth—a real Fall of Man—is helped by the statement that we have lessons to learn which can only be learnt on the physical, true as that is. It fits into the old system, but not into the new. In that we are better placed on the Astral for *all* our lessons, without exception. I don't see how, on this hypothesis, our return to the earth can be explained in any way but the old Greek one, that our souls are tied to bodies by way of punishment for their sins out of the body ; but I don't think we are prepared for this.

But even these are details ; the essential point is that in this mode of viewing man's progress, we have quite lost sight of the real Man, on the higher planes, and have fallen back upon that old conception I have so often had occasion to protest against in *The Vâhan*—that what we perceive on this plane is the Man himself. I think that Mr. Leadbeater can hardly be conscious how completely an uninstructed reader will draw this conclusion from his book. I will go further, and venture to suggest (with bated breath and whispering humbleness !) that he himself has spent so long a time in studying the Astral Plane, of which he is unquestionably the greatest master and doctor amongst us, and has done so much good and valuable work upon it, that his sense of proportion has rather failed him and he has allowed himself to fall, for the time, rather out of touch with the *higher* planes from which alone *truth* is seen. That these are within his reach when he pleases I raise no question ; that, if he *does* so please, he will speak more cautiously, I am assured. The mischief of this travesty which careless readers will make of his *real* knowledge is that it is pure and simple Spiritualism, of the

old-fashioned kind, such as the true *thinkers* of that persuasion have already to some extent outgrown. Once grant to the Spiritualists that it is the Man himself who functions on the Astral for an indefinite time, growing and flourishing just as on earth, only more so—and we have abandoned to them the whole position. The “Summer Land” with its marrying and giving in marriage, its schools, lectures and museums, Mr. Sludge the Medium’s “sainted mother”—the “dear departed angels”—the “Spirit controls,” and all the rest of it, are all contained in it. Short of committing suicide to get on to the Astral, against which our author considerably furnishes us with more or less conclusive arguments, what can we do better than get someone from the other side to control us permanently? Whoever he is, he is one stage nearer reality than ourselves, he is wiser and better than we.

This, surely, cannot be Mr. Leadbeater’s meaning. He cannot intend to ask us on the authority of his present visions so completely to contradict all he himself has in former times taught us. But if he does so, there is for me but one answer possible. I must say to him: “Whilst I am ready and glad to receive any farther development of our views by fresh knowledge obtained by you or any other seer in whom I have the confidence I have in you, I will *not* accept from you anything which completely destroys the system I have learned. Theosophy, as I understand it, is my house, my only shelter from the desolation outside I know so well; and I altogether decline to permit you to get up a little explosion and blow out my doors and windows, under plea of giving me more light. I do not hold my system on personal authority, and I do not give it up on personal authority. Convince my *reason*, and I am yours.”

But I fully anticipate that many of my readers will answer me: “We don’t see that any of these dreadful consequences do follow; we find no difficulty in taking it all in as a regular development of Theosophical doctrine; it’s all right, why do you bother us?” To this plea I can only answer submissively that the power of seeing what follows from a statement and of drawing the logical consequences from given premises, is one distributed to mankind in various degrees; and if they can-

not see, they cannot, and there's an end of it. The case is that of an old story of J. M. W. Turner, the painter. A John-Bullish sort of a person was remonstrating with him: "But, Mr. Turner, your pictures are not natural—I never see such colours in a landscape as you put on!" Turner looked him up and down from top to toe, in silence, and then replied quietly: "No, Sir, I don't for a moment suppose you ever did." I have done my best to show that the point is not an unimportant one; that it forms a sort of "parting of the ways," and that by following this direction we are in danger of being led seriously astray. Say what you will, the Astral *is* the plane of illusion, as every Mystic and Theosopher (I thank thee, Mead, for teaching me that word!) has known and said; and it is not from thence that a true picture of life on *any* plane is to be gained. Thus have I heard.

ARTHUR A. WELLS.

THE ONLY-BEGOTTEN SON

A FRAGMENT OF A CHRISTMAS SERMON

THREE times has God sent into the world His only-begotten Son that they who believe in Him might not perish but might have æonial life; three times has the Lamb been slain from the foundation of the world and the morning stars have sung for joy; each manifestation has been a more perfect, a more complete outpouring of the Spirit of God; each manifestation has meant that what up to now was the true life has become an external husk, what was the tenant has become the house, what was the wearer has become the garment, what was the ensouler has become the ensouled.

At first there was chaos, and into chaos descends the Word of God, the only-begotten Son, giving us what we foolishly call dead matter; giving us the mineral kingdom, which already touches the realm of desire and which proves its life by responsiveness to the subtle vibrations of the chemical world; giving us the vegetable kingdom with its patent and visible life, its almost

human method of propagation, its fuller excursions into the world of desire. So the world is made full of life, but there is as yet no conscious life; life there is indeed, but not conscious life.

And into this world of life descends again the Word of God, the only-begotten Son, giving us the animal kingdom which possesses not only life, but conscious life, and life is now no longer the ensouler but the ensouled; consciousness has come to birth within the life-sphere, and the life-sphere becomes an outward husk; consciousness wears life as a garment, dwells in life as a tenant. But though the animal kingdom stretches up into the realm of mind, yet into the realm of spirit it does not penetrate.

And then into this animal kingdom, this world of consciousness, descends again the Word of God, the only-begotten Son, and there is the third great outpouring of the Spirit of God; once again the Lamb is slain from the foundation of the world and the morning stars sing for joy; for to us this is the only true and real giving of the only-begotten Son, and it means the birth of spiritual life within the animal self, it means that the animal self has at last become an external husk, that it is no longer the ensouler but the ensouled, no longer the tenant but the house, no longer the wearer but the garment; it means that *genus homo* has become *genus Deus*, that the Divine Self is now the ensouler, the wearer, the tenant, and that this only-begotten Son is born within us.

This is the birth that we commemorate this Christmastide, and on this wise was the Christ born.

Did you think that there was only One Life slowly evolving upwards without any fresh influx and without any break? My answer is that there are two breaks in evolution, that twice was upward growth impossible, had it not been for a new influx of the Spirit of God, for a new descent of the only-begotten Son; and though I do not insist so much on the existence of the first of these gaps in evolution, for here our decision must rest on intellectual study and scientific research, yet I do insist on the second gap, for there our decision rests on personal experience and on what takes place in our own hearts. And the experience of my heart is not an experience of One Life, but an experience of

two lives ; there is a lower and a higher contending within me, there is no unity but antagonism ; and this conflict is between the Divine Self as spiritual power, and the animal self as physical life. I do not believe, then, that the desire of the chemical atom is the same in kind as the aspiration of the child of God, or that the physical life of the ant is the same in kind as the spiritual life of the saint ; man is indeed not a new creation, but he is a new inspiration, a new outbreathing of the only-begotten Son into the animal nature of man.

Did you think that this salvation through the only-begotten Son was a specifically Christian idea, that it was a new thought introduced by the crucifixion of Jesus and the teaching of Paul ? Turn to the Zoroastrian religion, from which during their Babylonian exile the Jews borrowed their characteristic monotheism and their new name of Jehovah, " I am that I am," a religion whose Supreme One was Ahuramazda, and whose only-begotten Son was Vohu-mano, the Good Mind of God, and you find as the title of a lost chapter of the *Dinkard* :

" Concerning the advancement of the creatures through the wisdom of Ahuramazda, and the righteousness of Vohu-mano lodged in them, and the good creatures goaded thereby into purity and joyfulness ; and that a complete understanding of things arises through Vohu-mano having made a home in one's soul."

Here, many years before Jesus, you have John's message that God so loved the world that He sent His only-begotten Son ; here too, you have the indwelling Christ manifesting in the purity, the wisdom and the joy of those in whom He is being unveiled.

Or read John's proem to Philo, who never heard the name of Jesus and who was quite an old man when the ministry of Jesus began, and what will he say to you ? It is so in accordance with his own teachings and his own language that he will consult the rolls of his own writings to find out where he himself has said it. For Plato had already called the created universe the only begotten offspring of God ; the Stoic philosophers had called the archetypal forms behind phenomena, the substance whereof the things we touch and see are only the shadows, the Words of God ; and now Philo recognises in the Divine Self the

one great Word of God, which he tells us dwelt in Abraham and Melchizedek and Moses, which he calls not only the only-begotten Son of God, but the First-born of God, the Image of God, the Pattern of God, the Shadow of God, the Man of God, the High Priest of God and the Paraclete of God ; and in one place, where he enumerates the seven principles of man, the highest is " the holy and sacred Word of God," and though he calls this a break-off from God, yet he warns us that in reality God is One and the breaking-off is only an illusion. Now you must not conceive of Philo as a great original thinker, for that he was not, but as giving currency to the philosophical ideas of his time ; and when John uses the language of Philo and borrows all his technical terms, you cannot suppose that John meant otherwise than Philo meant.

What then, you will say, is there new in Christianity? We all know the definition of a Latin Father whose teachings are accepted by the Protestant Churches, and whose works are an obligatory study for candidates for Anglican orders. Augustine says :

" That which is called the Christian religion existed among the ancients, and never did not exist from the planting of the human race until Christ came in the flesh ; at which time the true religion, which already subsisted, began to be called Christian."

The thing that is new in Christianity is that Jesus came in the ripeness of time to fill the empty niche in the Alexandrian teaching, and in the Jesus of tradition the Eastern Fathers recognised no mere man but a special incarnation of the Word of God ; in Jesus this Divine Self, this only-begotten Son, was fully demonstrated, perfectly actualised and completely unveiled.

ARTHUR BAKER.

You will not understand it as understanding some particular thing.
A LOGION OF " ZOROASTER."

THE ONE THING NEEDFUL

It is sometimes asserted—with how much of truth it becomes our serious duty to consider—that members of the Theosophical Society, as a body, are not as broad-minded as many of those outside it.

It may be that the very wideness of our outlook contributes towards the comparative narrowness of which some complain, and that the fact that the truths we intellectually hold are so all-embracing, may make it especially easy to leave them as intellectual truths, and to fail to weave them into our hearts in the only way that will give them life and warmth.

To prove us guilty of this very natural failure would only mean that we are doing what I suppose all the followers of the great religions have done in their time and all the churches are doing now, contenting ourselves with creeds and theories and letting the spirit and the life escape us. The fact that our creed is wide where others are narrow, that our outlook is vast compared with the outlook of many, is not in itself enough to prevent our sinking them to the level of the “letter that killeth,” and making of our very “tolerance” a stumbling-block and a cause of offence.

I am among those who believe that the Theosophical Society has already done a great work, and is destined to do a still greater one; a work, moreover, that may be unending, no matter what changes may come in its organisation in future years, or by what name it may be called, or indeed whether it have any name or organisation at all. For the real work of the Society does not depend upon its having a successful form (that were a comparatively easy thing and comparatively short-lived), but upon the inner spirit of its members, as a whole, and upon the extent to which it can adapt itself to the constantly changing conditions and phases of thought in the world outside it.

Adaptability, then, in its widest and deepest sense, is, I

venture to think, the great need of the Society if it would continue to be a living force, caring nothing for its own form, *as a form*, because it knows that every form, however perfect, must in the end be broken, but caring infinitely to be worthy to contain the Life which inspires and guides and upholds all forms. This should be the goal of its aspiration and not success in the eyes of the world, for effort after these two objects would probably be found to lead in two opposite directions.

It has often been said that Theosophy is science, philosophy and religion combined ; separately it is none of the three. The world does not want a science ; it has its experts in this wide field. It does not want a new philosophy ; of philosophy, as philosophy, it has had its fill. Neither does it want another religion ; but it does want *religion*. And religion, in its real sense, is the force that can combine these three lines—the scientific, the philosophic and the religious, and enable them to work harmoniously towards one end. It is this welding force that the Theosophical Society can supply, and if we were to realise the extent of our possibilities in this direction, we should not, as we sometimes do, regret our incapacity to compete with experts in their separate and distinct fields of work.

We often talk of the power of Theosophy to bring life, or to bring back life, to religion and to philosophy, to bring back the wider vision to science, without perhaps realising, even in part, what is involved in the idea. Surely, to bring life into something means the putting a part of ourselves into it, and thereby incurring a responsibility which we are bound to fulfil. It means to bring and to adapt to a limited form a life which is greater than the life manifesting through that form, and I think it means accepting at least some of its limitations and working from within them and through them to the brighter light.

Here comes in the great need for adaptability ; and perhaps its lack suggests a cause for the impression produced in some minds that we are not as broad as the wideness of our views should make us. We are perhaps too much inclined to look at things from the outside, and so to arrive at a mild, philosophical interest in the various phases of thought, which their adherents are quick to detect. That kind of interest breaks down at the

critical moment and proves to our little world (which does not really matter) and to ourselves (which is of vast importance) that our tolerance, which seemed to us so fair and sound a structure, was after all built only upon the sand, and that we must set to work again to erect a better.

It is not a strange thing that we should take long in acquiring this, the most unerring of all the marks of wisdom, and the most difficult to attain. And were it not that our ideals are so high, its absence to a large extent in us, as in mankind generally, would not perhaps be noticed. But our ideals *are* high and we want to keep them high, and to pass one landmark after another on the way to the goal. Moreover, we desire that the Theosophical Society, whatever its form, should remain a power and become an increasing power to influence modern thought, and to do this it must be ever a pioneer. Modern thought is moving fast, though results may be long in showing. In almost every department there is a tendency towards a greater wideness and tolerance, the first faint gleam of that new Life which is waiting to dawn on the world. We must take note of this and of other signs and see that we do not lag behind, but forge always on ahead; otherwise there will be no reason for our existence, and after lingering on for a time as a lifeless form, we shall presently vanish and live only as a memory.

I have sometimes thought that in the next great human development, which we call a Race, the adaptability which is the result of a true inner tolerance, is the quality that will admit individuals to the special privilege of a place among its pioneers. We have heard that in the past the Fifth Race was formed by taking apart, by segregation. May it not be that in the future it will be different, and that from among the men of the present time will be chosen those who can enter most understandingly into the greatest variety of conditions without defilement, who have forgotten most completely the meaning of mental isolation?

To the individual, the country, the nation with the fewest limitations will be given the widest opportunities.

S. MAUD SHARPE.

FLOTSAM AND JETSAM.

THE following most instructive account of what scientific terminology calls synæsthesiæ, or associated sensations, cannot fail deeply to interest our readers, and that too, Colour-Hearing not only because of the facts which corroborate so much that is familiar to the student of things psychic, but also because of the delicious piece of serio-comedy with which the journalistic scientist concludes his paragraph. We do not deny that the persistence in memory of the first casual association of impressions or ideas does play a very important part in the "image language" of psychism, but that this in any way explains the "inner significance" of such associations and the complex phenomena of the "aura" will satisfy few thoughtful laymen, and presumably no other sept of the priests except the one to which Kaiser belongs. The account is taken from the *British Medical Journal* of December 5th :

A remarkable instance of the subjective condition known as associated sensations or synæsthesiæ is recorded in the *Revue Philosophique* for August, 1903, by Dr. Alfred Ulrich, Medical Superintendent of the Swiss Epileptic Colony at Zürich. The subject was a boy, born in 1878, of neuropathic family, who developed epilepsy in his 13th year after an attack of measles. He was in certain directions mentally endowed. At the age of 5 he showed a remarkable power of mental arithmetic, and his intellectual development was unusually rapid, but after the epileptic attacks showed themselves his mental faculties, and especially his memory, rapidly deteriorated, although his colour sense remained extremely acute, so that he could recognise the most delicate differences of shade. From his earliest years, he said, the human voice had had colours for him ; indeed, he heard nothing without a definite impression of colour. The colours were much more transparent than those on paper, and such as he had never seen or conceived, very delicate and very beautiful, like the colours seen in a prism. All sounds were coloured, including cries of animals as well as the human voice. The most intense impressions of colour were experienced, however, on hearing the vowels sounded. *A*, for example, gave the impression of light green, but in addition a sickly taste was experienced, a sensation of cold, and a

sensation of form as of a flat surface like a field of glass; the impressions followed each other like clouds, one being transformed into another. *E* was yellow with other associated sensations, *i* black, *o* red, *u* dark green, and *y* white. The impressions aroused by the vowels were perfectly constant, and not only so, but seeing the vowels, whether printed or written, gave the same sensations only less vividly. The spoken consonants were of a light yellow colour with a slightly grey tinge. The cry of a dog was yellow, of a black-bird red, of a raven greenish, of a cow indigo, and of a goat light yellow. Sensations of form were associated with colour and auditory sensations; thus a circle always appeared red and had a sound of the vowel *o*. Smells also had associated colours; thus, that of iodoform had a deep red colour, also a sour, bitter taste. Impressions of taste had colours; thus sweet was carmine, salt an agreeable yellow; and impressions of colour had accompaniments of taste and temperature. Cold was green and heat was red. Careful observations by this expert were made at different times during a period of three years and always with the same results. A brother of the patient had had colour-hearing from his fifth year, but as is the rule the colours aroused in the two brothers by the same sounds were different. The case is remarkable, not only as an example of associated sensations, the most common of which is the so-called colour-hearing, but because this subject combined in himself all the different varieties of synæsthesiæ described up to the present time. It is probable that a considerable number of healthy persons, estimated at 10 per cent., have the faculty of hearing colour, many of whom do not know that they are different from the majority. Almost every one has experienced the association of sensations of common sensibility with sounds, as of the squeaking of a slate pencil on a slate, or the filing of metal, setting the teeth on edge. Epileptic auræ sometimes exhibit what may be a correlated subjective phenomenon of which may be mentioned the "dreamy state" associated with sensations of smell, and the aura described by a patient as an awful smell of green thunder. As a general rule, the colour sensations are aroused by sounds in series rather than by indiscriminate sounds, such as the vowels or notes of the musical scale. The subjects, who are usually quite healthy persons, notice the association from quite early life; the same colour is usually aroused by the same sound, and by no other; but the colours and other associated sensations are not the same, as exemplified by the two brothers, in different persons. As to the inner significance of such associations one of the more probable suggestions in regard to colour hearing, which, however, has not been confirmed, is that made by Kaiser (*Archiv. f. Augenheilk.* for 1896), that the associated colours are those of the letters of the alphabet in the book first used in learning to read, and from a similar hypothesis the explanation of many of the other associated sensations could doubtless be built up.

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THE very superior tone of the writer of "Research Notes" in

The Athenæum of January 23rd will not blind our readers to the importance of the facts on which he comments.

Nerve-Rays We remember but a short time ago when one school of nescience explained a certain class of "telepathic" phenomena as "muscle-reading" pure and simple. The "muscle ray" being now clearly differentiated from the "nerve ray," we may hope that at length we are approaching to a saner estimate of the nature of the source of the rays—the sun in man—the mind. *The Athenæum* writes :

A good deal of nonsense has already been talked according to custom about Dr. Charpentier's discovery of the rays emitted by human nerves and muscles; and it has been said that they not only "explain" telepathy and other imperfectly evidenced phenomena, but open an entirely new field to science. As to the last statement, it has been known ever since the time of Dubois-Reymond that, just as an electric current, if strong enough, will produce contraction of living muscles, so violent contraction of living muscles will produce an electric current. At first there was some reason to doubt whether Dr. Charpentier's discovery did more than carry Dubois-Reymond's experiments a stage further. But the learned professor of Nancy's last communication to the Académie des Sciences puts the originality of his discoveries out of the question, and there seems now every reason to believe that he has at last succeeded in obtaining direct and external proof of nervous action. According to him, the rays coming from the nerves are in great part stopped by aluminium, and foil of that metal no thicker than half a millimetre will arrest them almost completely. On the other hand, the rays emitted by great muscles, such as the heart, pass easily through aluminium of the thickness named, as does another sort of ray thrown off by both nerve and muscle, which is apparently the ordinary N ray recently discovered by M. Blondlot. It is also to be noticed that the nerve-ray is increased by compression of the nerve, differing in this respect from the muscle-ray, which does not increase when its source is compressed, and the phosphorescence excited by it in a calcium sulphide screen seems also to be stronger than in the case of its congener. This may really be the beginning of very important discoveries, because hitherto nervous action has only signalled its presence to the external world by its action on the muscles. In time it may even become possible for us to form some guess as to what nervous action really is, which at present remains a mystery.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

A THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE CHRISTIAN CULTUS

Pagan Christs: Studies in Comparative Hierology. By John M. Robertson. Issued for the Rationalist Press Association, Ltd. (London: Watts & Co.; 1903.)

THE main theses of these industrious and relentless 430 pages are: "(1) that the Gospel story of the Last Supper, Passion, Betrayal, Trial, Crucifixion, and Resurrection, is visibly a transcript of a Mystery Drama, and not originally a narrative; and (2) that that drama is demonstrably (as historic demonstration goes) a symbolic modification of an original rite of human sacrifice, of which it preserves certain verifiable details."

With regard to his first thesis Mr. Robertson claims that the traces of the Mystery Drama are most clearly distinguishable (by the dramatic action and dialogue) in the first Gospel, which he regards as being older than the second. For our part, though we are strongly of opinion that there was a Mystery Play underlying the dramatic ending of the Gospel story, we have to look for it in the "common document" rather than in "Matthew." Indeed, we are somewhat disappointed with the comparatively brief treatment which Mr. Robertson gives to the consideration of the Gospel text. Very valuable, however, are his references to the Letter to the Galatians, which he ascribes without hesitation to "forgers," but which we hold to be in all probability genuinely Pauline, as indicating the existence of a Mystery Play and the personification of the God or Master by the celebrant. Thus in *Galatians* (iii. 1) Paul upbraids his fellow-believers in that distant province as foolish, "before whose eyes Jesus Christ was openly set forth crucified"; and again (in vi. 17), he says: "I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus." With these passages we may compare the Mystery ritual preserved in the *Acts of John*, during which a "passion" was clearly represented (see *Fragments*, pp. 431 ff.), and the admission of Epiphanius concerning the Pagan resurrection Mystery rite and the stigmatisation of the body (see *Did Jesus Live* 100

B.C. ? pp. 409 ff.)—very important witnesses, with which, however, Mr. Robertson does not seem to be acquainted.

With regard to his second thesis, it mainly centres round the very ancient reading, Jesus Barabbas (Bar-abbas—"Son of the Father") in *Matthew* xxvii. 16, 17. The preservation of this name, Mr. Robertson holds, "tells of the common association of those names in some such rite as must be held to underlie the Gospel myth—that, in short, a 'Jesus the Son of the Father' was a figure in an old Semitic ritual of sacrifice before the Christian era." Now Marcus the Gnostic declared that "Jesus" was a substitute for a very ancient name, and in our last book, *Did Jesus live 100 B.C. ?* we have ventured on the suggestion that this ancient name may have been "Iexai" (pp. 373 ff.), the spouse of "Elxai," the Hidden Power, or Holy Ghost. Where we differ from Mr. Robertson is in our estimate of the transformations wrought in the literary workshops of earliest Christendom. It is to these mystical assemblies and confraternities of the time that we have to turn if we wish to supply the missing link in the evolution from barbarism through low grades of culture to the high grade of a spiritualisation of these deeply rooted religious passions of mankind. But Mr. Robertson despises everything that savours of mysticism; he considers religion the enemy of all true culture, and the priest the personification of all that is inimical to right reason. This being so, he is as extreme in his views as are the traditionalists in theirs. The explanation is to be found in the middle, if by chance it is in any way discoverable; and the Gnosis is the historic link in this case.

Again, Mr. Robertson denies that there are any historic elements at all in the Gospel-stories. The most that he will allow is that if by any chance an actual historic person was connected with the doctrine of what he calls the "Jesuite cult," "for such a connection there is a quasi-historic basis in a Jesus who appears to have been put to death by stoning and hanging about a century before the death of Herod" (p. 90; see also pp. 186, 199, 238). Here we have Mr. Robertson practically endorsing the Jewish 100 years B.C. date, as indeed he does in his two recent works, *Christianity and Mythology* and *A Short History of Christianity*. But what we want is more than brief references and statements of belief; we want the Jewish tradition to be thoroughly sifted, and we want the "Pilate" factor eliminated in some reasonable fashion, before we can venture to remove 99.9 per cent. of all our books on Christian origins from our shelves.

In spite, however, of our want of sympathy for the very hostile

attitude which Mr. Robertson doubtless feels himself bound to assume to religion of every kind, we fully appreciate his great industry, his keen critical abilities, and his evident desire to get at the truth. In all human affairs things are mixed, for we men are from the "Mixture," and we may make what Mr. Robertson calls the "great surrender" to reason without necessarily agreeing with his own very extreme views, which labour under the great danger of too easily characterising—mentally if not literally—those with whom we differ in opinion as knaves or fools. Among many other carefully worked-up subjects in the book is an instructive essay on Mithraism.

G. R. S. M.

A POPULAR ACCOUNT OF MRS PIPER

Mrs. Piper and the Society for Psychical Research. Translated and slightly abridged from the French of M. Sage, by Noralie Robertson, with a Preface by Sir Oliver Lodge. (London: R. Brimley Johnson; 1903. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

THE case of Mrs. Piper has come to occupy so important a position in the field of scientific psychical research, that all students will give a hearty welcome to this interesting general account of its leading features from the beginning. The detailed accounts of observations made in connection with Mrs. Piper fill hundreds of pages in the Proceedings of the S.P.R., while the discussion and critical analysis of these observations are hardly less bulky; but this very abundance of material makes it all the more difficult even for a systematic student to form a clear, connected and lucid conception in his own mind of this remarkable case as a whole, with all its curious and baffling variations and transitions. And yet fully to appreciate its significance and grasp its import, it is very essential that the student should have the case as a whole, in outline at least, constantly present before his mind's eye. Indeed I am inclined to think that a not inconsiderable proportion of the adverse criticism to which particular phases of the case, or particular sets of experiments and observations, have been subjected, very largely misses its mark simply from the absence, in the critic's mind, of a grasp of the case as a whole. And though the reader of the account now under notice must be emphatically warned at the outset against forming any final opinion

upon the value of the evidence as to personal survival after death obtained through Mrs. Piper, from the study of this general account only, without recourse to the more detailed records already referred to, still I feel very strongly that he will approach those fuller records in a far more intelligent spirit, will weigh and consider them with a much fuller grasp and understanding, after its careful perusal, than he could possibly do without such a general preparatory acquaintance with the case, as that perusal will give to him.

In the Publisher's Note prefixed to this volume, it is made abundantly plain that the S.P.R. as such does not stand sponsor for M. Sage's speculative comments, while it does accept his volume as a faithful and convenient *résumé* of experiments conducted under its own auspices.

Sir Oliver Lodge's Preface of half a dozen pages is guarded and cautious, reiterating the disclaimer just mentioned of all responsibility for M. Sage's comments and sentiments; indeed it rather makes one feel that the President of the S.P.R., while accepting the book as what its author himself calls "*un modeste ouvrage de vulgarisation*," is yet rather inclined to think that a more strictly neutral account of Mrs. Piper's case might perhaps have been preferable. And personally I am inclined to agree with him, although, like him, I doubt whether such a book would have been equally readable, or equally calculated to rouse and attract the interest of the general reader. As is so often the case, here too it was a choice between opposite disadvantages, but at any rate there can be no question as to the usefulness and value, as a preliminary introduction to a study of Mrs. Piper's case, of the book as it comes before us in English garb.

The account of Mrs. Piper's early history and the first phases of her mediumship is distinctly interesting, and I hope that some day one or other of those who experimented with her in those early days will give us a more detailed account of them than M. Sage can find room for. We have such very ample and full details of all the later phases and fashions of her development since she came under the close observation of Dr. Hodgson and the S.P.R. that it almost seems a pity that the record of so remarkable a case should not be made complete by the addition of a really carefully compiled and full account of its early beginnings.

B. K.

ESSAYS ON THE VEDĀNTA

Aspects of the Vedānta. (Madras: G. A. Natesan & Co.; 1903.
Price As. 12.)

THIS useful little volume consists of eight essays in praise of the Vedāntic religio-philosophy. We cordially welcome it as containing the attempts of thoughtful and educated Indian gentlemen to set before the West what is best in their own traditional thought, the truly philosophic and deeply religious heritage of their fathers. Perhaps the best paper is by Paṇḍit Sitanath Tattvabhushan entitled "The Vedānta in Outline"; it is a very clear and impartial statement of the evolution of Vedāntic conceptions. In another paper, entitled "The Vedāntic Doctrine of the Future Life," the same able writer cites a passage from the "Shaṅkara" Commentary on the 53rd and 54th aphorisms of the third pāda of the Brahmasūtras, which is worth reproducing, as it is about the only passage in which the views of the Materialistic schools (the Lokāyatikas and Chārvākas) were, as it is thought, categorically refuted. This interesting quotation runs as follows :

" If the properties of the soul are to be set down as the properties of the body because they exist while the body exists, why should not they be concluded as *not* properties of the body for their not existing while the body exists? Form and such other qualities, which are really properties of the body, exist so long as the body exists; but the vital functions and the rest do not exist in the body after death. Besides, form and other properties like it are perceived even by others, but the properties of the soul, sensibility, memory, etc., are not perceived by anyone else than the soul to which they belong. Then, again, one knows the existence of these properties in the body while it lives; how can one be sure that at the destruction of one body they are not transmuted to another? Even the possibility of this refutes Materialism. Then as to the true character of consciousness, the Materialist will perhaps admit that consciousness is the knowledge of matter and material objects. If so, he must also admit that inasmuch as matter and material objects are objects of consciousness, it cannot be their property. For matter to perceive matter is as impossible as it is for fire to burn itself, and for a dancer to climb upon his own shoulders.* Form and other properties of matter cannot, we see, make themselves

* Nevertheless we have the old axiom among Greek thinkers: "By fire we fire perceive, by water water," etc.—G. K. S. M.

or other properties their objects, Inasmuch, therefore, as consciousness makes both internal and external things its objects, it is not a material property. If its distinction from material objects be admitted, its independence of them must also be admitted. [By no means; "spirit" and "matter" apart may be argued to be severally non-existent.—G. R. S. M.] Moreover, its identity in the midst of changing circumstances proves its eternity. Remembrance and such states of the mind become possible only because the knowing self is recognised as the same in two successive states. Thus in the consciousness 'I saw this before' the seeing and the recognising self is known as the same. The argument that because perception takes place while the body exists, therefore it is a property of a body, has already been refuted. It is as valid an argument as that because perception takes place while such materials as lamps, etc., are present, therefore it is a property of lamps, etc. The body is only an instrument of perception like lamps, etc. [Surely this is mistranslated; if not, it is a not very convincing argument.—G. R. S. M.] Nor is the body absolutely necessary even as an instrument of perception, inasmuch as a variety of perceptions takes place in the state of dreaming, when the body is inactive. Thus the existence of the soul as something different from the body is an irresistible fact."

And to think that after such an "irresistible" argument the Châr-vâkas and Lokâyâtikas could hold up their heads and the Baudhdhas keep on denying the Âtman! Yet they did, and I am afraid their modern representatives will continue cheerfully in their "error," as a Church Father would call it. The truth of the matter seems to be that these two opposed classes of mind see the facts *in different orders*, and their values are consequently antipodal—and yet they are both Monists.

It is also interesting to note that our learned Paṇḍit at the end of his paper rejects in set terms the orthodox idea of metempsychosis as laid down in Manusmṛiti. There can be no return to the brute according to the teachings of the Vedânta "interpreted scientifically," he says. We fancy, however, that the last word has not been said either orthodoxly or heterodoxly on that mystery.

G. R. S. M.

THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

A History of the Problems of Philosophy. By Paul Janet, Membre de l'Institut, Prof. à la Faculté de Lettres à Paris, and Gabriel Séailles, Maître de Conférences à la Faculté de Lettres de Paris. Translated by Ada Monahan and edited by Henry Jones, LL.D., Prof. of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Vol. I. Psychology, Vol. II. Ethics, Metaphysics, Theodicy. (London: Macmillan & Co.; 1902.)

ALTHOUGH Philosophy assumes a distinct and special colouration in each nation which brings any substantial contribution to the vast edifice of human thought and knowledge, yet in its essence it is universal. Neither national nor racial, the problems with which it deals concern humanity as a whole; nay, they are not even, strictly speaking, limited by our planetary conditions, but ever widen outwards, upwards, downwards, towards that whole of experience with which ultimately Metaphysics finds itself confronted. And at all times, since Pythagoras visited India and Solon and Plato sought Wisdom in ancient Khem, down to our own day, when both Philosophy and Science are growing constantly more and more international, it is in these fields of endeavour that the basic unity, the essential brotherhood of man has more especially revealed itself.

And our new age bears conspicuously this wider imprint. Into the Western world is now pouring the wealth of the long stored-up treasures of thought won by the efforts of the past in India and the farther East, which in their turn are receiving the stimulus of the new science and the younger philosophical thought of the West. But on a smaller scale, it is no less important that an active interchange of mutual stimulus and suggestion should take place between the peoples and nations that make up this western world itself. And hence we welcome the addition to our philosophical libraries of the useful and valuable work which forms the subject of this notice, and that none the less because recent French philosophical work is at present on the whole much less fully or adequately represented among us than is the case with that of its German neighbour.

It must not be imagined, however, that we have here any original work, or any new contribution to the solution of the problems whose history is traced. That is not the intention of the authors, nor have they aimed at producing a complete or exhaustive treatise, which, on the

lines here adopted, would have demanded at least four large, instead of two moderate sized volumes. So we must only look for what they intended to give us, a *livre de classe*, a students' text-book, rather than a detailed treatise; but a students' text-book on distinctly original lines, and one very useful and valuable in many ways, even to one well read in the original work of the great philosophic thinkers of the centuries.

As the authors say themselves, they have not aimed at producing a history of systems of philosophy, or of schools in their historic order, but a History of the Problems of Philosophy. They have taken one after another, in their dogmatic order, the great problems of philosophy, and given their history, indicating their origin, their various aspects and forms, and the stage they have reached in our own day.

And even in this their scope is limited to European thought; of Eastern philosophy, whether Chinese, Hindu, or Buddhistic, they tell us nothing. Indeed, the time is not yet come for such an attempt. Far too much preparatory work remains still to be done in these fields, before the materials will be available for treatment in a systematic and co-ordinated manner. Hence they are content to begin their survey with the dawn of Greek speculation, thence bringing it down to our own times, and in so doing they have a task already almost gigantic before them.

The problems dealt with in the first volume under the general head of Psychology are: (1) What is Philosophy? (2) The Psychological Problem; (3) The Senses and External Perception; (4) Reason; (5) Memory; (6) The Association of Ideas; (7) Language; (8) The Feelings; (9) Freedom; (10) Habit. This volume contains some 390 pages, giving an average of thirty-nine for the treatment of each of these topics. And when it is remembered that in each case most of the notable and important moments and phases of their development are clearly and intelligently outlined, the student will more readily realise how great is his debt to the French spirit of lucidity and terse exposition which alone has made such condensation possible, without obscurity and also without depriving the treatment of vitality and interest.

To give some idea of the method pursued let us take the problem of "Reason," which may thus be stated: "Is the mind a *tabula rasa*, a blank page on which phenomena are inscribed from without? Or is it not rather a primordial activity, an original faculty which acts according to its own laws? Is human knowledge purely empirical, or does it not presuppose certain notions, certain principles, which are alway

present in the mind, govern all its acts, and are a guarantee of their validity? Is the mind, in short, gradually built up of those phenomena which, owing to their constant relations, stand out, as it were, in relief from the confused mass of facts; or rather shall we not find in it in some *primary notions* which go beyond experience, some universal and necessary principles which govern the relative, and enable us to establish fixed relations between the phenomena, to bind together this fluctuating matter, and to construct out of it the systematic edifice of human knowledge? ”

Such is the statement of the problem, clear and definite, like an enunciation in Euclid. But at the dawn of philosophy in Greece the problem of knowledge was not yet even recognised by Heracleitus and the Eleatics, nor indeed did the Pythagoreans even, so far as we know, reach that point. It is only very gradually, and by more or less devious ways, that the real nature of this problem slowly emerges into clear light. Socrates was the first in Greece to call attention to one of its aspects: the activity of the Mind in knowledge, which he regarded as innate, inherent in the soul. Plato completed and perfected the theory of Socrates; while Aristotle, laying more stress on the empirical aspect of knowledge, modified and transformed it still further, thus paving the way for the empiricism of the Stoics and Epicureans. The empiricism of Epicurus was indeed as thoroughgoing as any modern scientist could desire, for he regards sensation as the primary source of all knowledge, as the ultimate criterion of truth.

In Neo-Platonism we find an attempt to fuse and reconcile these three great systems: Platonism is represented by the doctrine of the One; Peripateticism by the first emanation, the *νοῦς*, reason; and Stoicism by the world-soul.

We need not linger on the brief account given of the development of Christian philosophy through Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, but some interest attaches to the Arab theory as formulated by Averroës, whose teaching, as summed up by Aquinas, is that the intellect is a power entirely distinct from the soul, and is one in all men—a doctrine derived from Aristotle, but elaborated by Averroës into a distinct philosophical position.

In classical and medieval times, philosophic thought had mainly concerned itself, in its enquiries concerning reason, with the problem of general notions. Science was conceived of as a system of classifi-

* Cf. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*.

cation, as a means of arresting the flow of sensible phenomena, of finding a fixed object for thought, of gradually lifting thought up to the immutable, to God. But with Bacon and Descartes we enter on a new phase, in which the object of knowledge is no longer General Notions. Bacon discovered the theory of induction and Descartes aimed at reducing the universe, as it appears to us, to a combination of intelligible elements, worked out deductively on the lines of a mathematical rationalism. Bossuet, Fénelon and Malebranche in part continued the work of Descartes, adding elements from Aquinas and Catholic theology.

Spinoza like Descartes regards mathematics as the ideal of knowledge, of which he recognised four kinds : knowledge obtained, 1st, by hearsay ; 2nd, by ordinary inductions, chance and methodless generalisations from sensations ; 3rd, rational knowledge (*ratio*), which corresponds to the *ἐπιστήμη* of Aristotle, that is demonstrative science ; and 4th, there is the *intellectus scientia intuitiva*, that is the immediate knowledge of principles answering to the *νοῦς ποιητικός* of Aristotle. Empirical knowledge, Spinoza holds, is necessarily inadequate because it only expresses the relation of our bodies to foreign bodies and consequently expresses neither the one nor the other clearly. Hence he is led to despise both general ideas, which are abstracted from sensations and inductive science as we understand it now. In fact, Spinoza is a nominalist and for him true science (*ratio*) rests, not on abstract and general notions, but on properties which are common to the whole and to its parts, and which consequently can be abstracted from all experience. These common notions or properties of which we have an adequate idea, are the mathematical properties : extension, figure, motion, rest. Thus Spinoza's *ratio* brings us back to the mathematical physics of Descartes. But this reasoned knowledge is not the highest form of knowledge ; beyond it lies the *scientia intuitiva*, the knowledge of God, to whom all things are to be referred and from whom all things are to be deduced.

Locke, in England, had revived Empiricism, attacking the doctrine of innate ideas ; and reducing Reason to the discursive understanding, and Leibnitz, who was an eclectic, endeavoured to reconcile Locke's system with that of Descartes in his *Monadology* with its pre-established harmony. But Hume went even further than Locke and did away with even the small amount of activity which Locke had allowed to the mind in cognition, seeking to explain the principle of knowledge by Association and Habit.

They were succeeded by Kant, who treated the problem of reason from an entirely new point of view. As he put it himself: "It has hitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to objects . . . Let us, then, make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics if we assume that objects must conform to our cognition." And this led him to that critical standpoint which forms the basis of modern philosophical thought. The analysis given of Kant's doctrine by MM. Janet and Séaille, though exceedingly able and lucid, is too long for reproduction and too terse and condensed to be abstracted here. But short as it is, it suffices to make one understand that Kant was perhaps the first thinker who included *all* the elements of the problem of Reason in his purview, and who made an effort to bring them to unity.

Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in Germany, basing themselves on Kant, went beyond him, and gave back to Reason, which Kant had reduced to the modest *rôle* of a regulation principle, its old supremacy. They all made magnificent efforts to formulate a metaphysical theory of the universe which should be final.

In Scotland, on the other hand, Reid and his successors met Hume's scepticism by appeals to common-sense, which in truth was merely reason without a capital letter.

In France, Victor Cousin, borrowing from Kant the principles of his polemic against the empirical school, made an effort to return to an ontological doctrine of reason, emphasising specially its spontaneity and its impersonality.

Schelling and Hegel in Germany, with Victor Cousin in France, had thus made the whole theory of knowledge dependent on the principle of the Absolute, while on the other side, Sir W. Hamilton, the last representative of the Scottish School, interpreting Reid's doctrine along Kantian lines, again emphasised and renewed the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge. James and Stuart Mill, on the other hand, continued, though they materially modified, the work of Hume and gave new life and vigour to the empirical arguments, and their work again leads directly to Herbert Spencer, the last of the great empiricists in English thought.

The foregoing very brief analysis of our author's chapter on Reason will serve to give some idea of the scope and manner of their method of treatment. It is, unfortunately, somewhat scanty and imperfect in respect to the later phases of German thought and the corresponding development in England; nor does it take into account

the most recent English and German developments. But to have adequately covered that ground would have added unduly to the bulk of such a work, and, moreover, the most recent and fresh developments of philosophy are hardly suitable for treatment in a text-book such as this. But students will find much to be grateful for, and indeed it is exceedingly rare to find so clear and lucid a treatment even when far more restricted periods of time and phases of thought are alone dealt with.

The second volume deals with the problems of Ethics, Metaphysics, and Theodicy, following the same general lines as those already indicated, and with equally useful and admirable results. But one cannot help feeling a certain regret that the exigences of space should have necessitated such great brevity in the treatment of some of the topics dealt with. Indeed, one is led to feel the wish that the authors would expand their scheme and give us a series of moderate sized volumes, each dealing with one of the great divisions of the subject which have been enumerated. Nothing could be more useful, and I venture to think nothing more helpful to the student, than to be able to follow out the history, development, and treatment of these problems one by one with all needful detail, especially through the century we have just completed. For the conception the authors have worked upon is an admirable one, and it deserves to be applied upon a larger and more adequate scale.

B. K.

MAGAZINES AND PAMPHLETS

Theosophist, January. In this number Col. Olcott resumes his "Old Diary Leaves," entering the year 1895. Mainly occupied with the Judge affair, he finds time to describe at length how, "in order to fit himself to be an adviser of students of human nature" he attended a great bull fight at Madrid; and the only consolation to his benevolent soul for the horrors he witnessed was that, besides the bulls and horses, two of the men engaged were also wounded. Next we have one of Mr. Leadbeater's lectures; the conclusions of Mr. Stuart's paper on "The Ego and its Life Cycle," T. Ramachandra Rau's 'Avatâras,' and G. B. Babcock's "Is the Agnostic Position logical?" A short paper from Horatio W. Dresser closes the list.

Theosophy in India (late *Prasnottara*) opens No. 1 of its new and enlarged series by an Editorial, appealing for contributions to its pages. To a young Editor there is something terrible in the insati-

able gulf which opens monthly before his eyes, hardly to be filled even if, like Curtius, he throws himself into it, as he has so often to do. He has many in England who can sympathise with him and wish him good luck! Prof. Bireshwar Banerji applauds the Text-book No. III., and says that its appearance *in English* is a circumstance at which the true friends of progress ought to rejoice. Hirendra Nath Datta speaks eloquently on what the Hindus owe to Theosophy. We have also another of Mrs. Besant's lectures on Myers' *Personality*, and the "Dreamer" opens a series of papers on "Some Problems of Metaphysics," with one on "The Theory of Reality."

Central Hindu College Magazine, January. The observer "In the Crow's Nest" sees much that is encouraging in the work of the College and the extension of the use of the new Text-books. Mr. Banbury, under the heading of "Clay-Modelling in Schools" lays down as the great principle of teaching that "the only royal road to learning is doing." Interesting at the present time is the Indian student's account of the Japanese Universities, and Prof. Arundale's paper on the College has already been copied into more than one of our Magazines.

Theosophic Gleaner, January. Here Narrain Rai Varma gives a "Study of the Three Faults of the Mind." His conclusion is that "passing from Wrong Thinking—which is unfettered, loose thinking—into Right Thinking, which is *partially controlled* thinking; from Right Thinking into Concentrated Thinking—which is *well controlled* thinking; and from Concentrated Thinking into Stilled Thinking—which is *completely controlled* thinking;—is Nirvâṇa!" "Herbert Spencer," the "Cellular Constitution of the Universe" and "Vegetarianism" furnish material for the rest of the number.

The Dawn, January, in its opening article meets point-blank the most profound conviction of the European mind, that civilisation means the multiplication of *wants*, and presses upon us in a way with which we heartily agree that the Indian peasant would *not* be improved by learning to need expensive clothes, furniture, food and whiskey, but (on the contrary) would lose all which makes his value and gives him self-respect in his life of abject poverty.

In the *Indian Review*, Mr. F. Barr, M.A., treats of "Clerical Missions in India," in courteous and moderate language, only making more effective his condemnation. His opening words are: "However faintly it is realised at home it is well known in India that Missions here are now run as commercial enterprises." Of the doc-

trine they preach he gives one specimen, heard with his own ears. "The missionary was talking of the Fatherhood of God, and said—'but our Father is not the Father of the Mahomedans, my brethren—O no,' and so on with more trite falsehood." In practice, "if there is trouble in the East, a missionary is at the bottom of it"; and for theory, there is much reason in his claim that most of the popular looking down upon Hindus in England and America arises from the manner in which the "benighted heathen" have been trotted out on the missionary platforms for the last hundred years in the perpetual appeal for funds. Along with the other speeches at the opening of the National Congress we have a full report of Mrs. Besant's discourse on "Hindu Social Reform on National Lines," and also of her Adyar lecture on "The Value of Theosophy in the raising of India." *East and West*, for January, permits Mr. J. J. Vimadalal to follow up what he rightly calls "Mr. Beaman's excellent and impartial article on Theosophy," by the first of a series of what promises to be a very good and useful statement of its teachings.

The Vahan, February. This month the space for "Enquirer" is much reduced by correspondence and "Stray Notes"; and the few questions are not of sufficient general interest to need notice.

Lotus Journal, February, announces that with its new volume, beginning in March, it will be enlarged to twenty pages to enable it to provide matter for younger children as well as the elder ones, and the Editors also hope to give more illustrations. Improvements of this kind should not have been needed to make the little paper self-supporting. The present number has a lecture by Mr. Leadbeater, and (amongst other good stuff) a very interesting account of the Hindu funeral rites, contributed from Benares by our old friend Miss Willson, of whom we are glad thus to hear.

Revue Théosophique, January, opens with an appreciation by M. Courmes of Dr. Pascal's series of articles in the *Revue* entitled *Les Lois de la Destinée*, which have now been concluded and published in a volume by the "Publications Théosophiques," 10, Rue St. Lazare, Paris. Having ourselves read the book we cannot but agree with M. Courmes that "for a careful reader it is impossible not to perceive that at least a large corner of the veil which hides from us as a rule the mystery of the vale of tears in which we live has been lifted," and we heartily recommend it to our French-reading friends. We hope to publish a longer notice of this work in our next issue. Héra concludes the valuable paper on "The first lessons Theosophy has to give," to

which we drew attention last month ; and the translation of Mrs. Cooper Oakley's *Hidden Sources of Masonry* is continued.

Theosophia, for January. The original articles in this number, after the New Year Editorial, are "Horary Astrology," by H. van Ginkel, and a paper on the Central Hindu College, founded on Mr. Arundale's article to which we have already referred.

Der Vâhan, for January and February, contain each thirty pages, and have more the character of an independent magazine than the earlier issues. We note that it introduces itself on the title as the only German Magazine representing the original Society founded by H. P. B. and Col. Olcott—"pity 'tis 'tis true!" A very interesting series of papers giving an account of some of the experiments on social life made in America, by H. von Schewitsch, is to be continued. "Folk-lore"; "The Psychological Origin and Final Aim of Art"; the usual abstracts of *The Theosophist* and our own REVIEW; Reviews and other matter fill up the issues, and we are glad to see a number of original answers to questions, as well as translations from those of the English *Vâhan*. There is more good done, to writers as well as readers of such answers, than by almost any other kind of writing; they are read and appreciated by many who do not look at serious treatises and who thus learn more Theosophy than they are aware of.

Also received: *Sophia*; *Teosofisk Tidskrift*; *South African Theosophist*; *Theosophy in Australasia*; *New Zealand Theosophical Magazine*; *Teosofisch Maandblad*; and the Santiago *Sophia*.

Of other works, the following: *Broad Views*, February, in which the article on the "Memory of Nature," by Mr. Sinnett, the Editor, is a model of the way in which our doctrine should be stated in order to draw the attention of an educated outsider; *Modern Astrology*; *Mind*, here the series on Theosophy is opened under the name of Mary F. Lang and promises exceedingly well; *Light*; *La Nuova Parola*, which probably in Italy aids the Theosophical cause more effectively than a more avowedly Theosophical work, which would not in most cases be taken seriously—it is better covertly to make people think the truth, as they suppose, of their own accord; *The Race Builder*; *Dharma*; *Theosophischer Wegweiser*; *Humanitarian*; *Logos Magazine*; *Anglo-Russian*; *Indian Nation*; *Lo Nuevo*; *La Science Astrale*. Also *Horlick's Magazine* (6d.), a new and bright periodical, edited by our old friend Mr. A. E. Waite, who contributes most interesting papers on "The Legend of the Holy Grail" and "Mesmerism and Hypnotism."