

III.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL MEETING ON

May 28, 1884.

The eighth General Meeting of the Society was held at the Garden Mansion, Queen Anne's Mansions, S.W., on Wednesday, May 28, 1884.

PROFESSOR HENRY SIDGWICK, PRESIDENT, IN THE CHAIR.

The following address was delivered by the President:—

The last time that I addressed you at any length I endeavoured to define the nature and grounds of our claim that we are investigating in a scientific manner phenomena which in the recent progress of physical science have been too long and too persistently neglected. Since then, in consequence of an article which has appeared in the *Nineteenth Century* by two of my colleagues, and of a lecture which I was expressly asked to deliver on this subject at the London Institution, some discussion of our work from this point of view has been carried on in journals that are for the most part hostile to our endeavour; and it appears that I might with advantage take up again the subject that I dealt with about a year ago, and make one or two more remarks on our general scientific position. In so doing I have no intention of occupying your time by any comments on the misrepresentations of fact or the blunders in logic which our opponents have committed: our aim, in my opinion, should rather be to consider whether we can learn anything from our critics—even from ignorant and prejudiced critics—which may assist us in the novel and difficult work in which we are engaged. We may at any rate see what appear to the careless glance of outsiders to be the weak points of our position, and give them a careful reconsideration.

The first point that it is important to get clear is the exact relation in which the conclusion that we have, to our own satisfaction, established, stands to the generally accepted conclusions of physical science. Is it true, as an opponent has asserted, that if Thought-transference, as affirmed by our Committee, were admitted to be a fact, "physiology would be overthrown"? The statement might pass as a loose and hasty way of characterising the extreme strangeness of our results; but I cannot conceive its being deliberately maintained by anyone actually acquainted with physiological investigation. An instructed physiologist

would know that supposing it generally accepted that ideas and feelings can under certain special and rare conditions be conveyed from one mind to another otherwise than by the recognised channels of sense, all ordinary physiological research would go on exactly as before. No "working hypothesis" of physiological method would have to be abandoned; no established positive conclusion of physiological inquiry—nothing that has been ascertained as to the nature of the process by which visual, auditory, tactile, or other sensations and ideas are ordinarily produced in the mind—would have to be modified. What would have to be given up would be merely the single negative conclusion that ideas and sensations could not be transmitted from one mind to another except in certain ways already known. It was very natural for physiologists to form this conclusion provisionally in default of evidence to the contrary; but to abandon it in view of the presentation of such evidence would be a mere enlargement, not in any sense an overthrow of existing physiology.

The question, then, is merely whether evidence enough has been produced. And here I have always admitted, and indeed emphatically maintained, that what we allege to be facts are so contrary to the analogy of experience—at least so far as experience has been systematised by science—that until a large number of mutually corroborative testimonies are collected we cannot expect the scientific world to be converted; they will say, and reasonably or at least plausibly say, that it is less improbable that the testimony to these facts should be false than that the facts as testified to should be real. And I think that the case is one in which no one can say exactly how much evidence is wanted; we have to balance conflicting improbabilities; and the improbabilities are of a kind that we have no scales to weigh exactly. Indeed the improbability on one side necessarily appears greater or less to different persons, according to what they know of the witnesses personally. Hence though I am myself convinced of the trustworthiness of our records of experiments, I do not complain that other persons who do not know the witnesses are not yet convinced. And I have always been anxious to urge on our members and friends—many of whom are rather inclined to think that we have already collected facts enough to convince a "fair mind"—that we cannot precisely define the requirements of a fair mind in dealing with matters so unfamiliar; and that we ought to continue patiently piling up facts and varying the observers and conditions, until we actually get the common sense of educated persons clearly on our side.

At the same time, I am obliged to add that none of our critics appear to me to appreciate the kind and degree of evidence that we have already obtained. They often imply that the experiments in Thought-transference are such as could be performed by "cheating mediums or

mesmerists," by the simple means of a code of signals which the investigating committee cannot find out; quite ignoring such cases as that given in Part I., pp. 22-3, where the cards guessed by one of the Creerys were unknown to any one but the four strangers who went to witness the experiment; and where, therefore, as I have before said, the investigators must either have been idiots, or one or other of them in the trick. Similar remarks may be made about the experiments reported in the last part of our Proceedings; where four or five different persons must either have been guilty of untruthfulness or collusion, or of most abnormal stupidity, if the phenomena were not genuine.

Again, our opponents leave out of account that besides our own experiments in 'Thought-transference between persons in a normal condition, and the records of spontaneous telepathic phenomena, "apparitions, &c.,"—of which we have collected a very large number on first-hand evidence—we have the experiments in Thought-transference in the mesmeric state, in which we have only obtained over again results repeatedly affirmed by others. And here I think we may put forward an irresistible claim that this mesmeric evidence of a generation ago, which undoubtedly failed to satisfy orthodox medical opinion at the time, should be carefully reconsidered; the ground of our claim being the now universally admitted fact that in the controversy which took place from 1840 to 1850 between the mesmerists and the accredited organs of medical opinion, the latter were undoubtedly to a great extent wrong; that they repudiated sweepingly an important part of the phenomena reported by the mesmerists, which no instructed person now denies to be genuine. No instructed person now questions the genuine reality of the hypnotic or sleep-waking state as a special abnormal condition of the human organism, in which the hypnotised person is, in a quite peculiar way, subject to delusions suggested to him from without, and can in some cases be made as perfectly insensible to pain as he can by inhaling chloroform or laughing gas. But at the time I speak of the *Lancet* and other medical organs refused to admit the genuineness of these phenomena, as decidedly as any of them now refuses to admit the reality of community of sensation. When the most painful surgical operations were successfully performed in the hypnotic state, they said that the patients were bribed to sham insensibility; and that it was because they were hardened impostors that they let their legs be cut off and large tumours cut out without showing a sign even of discomfort. At length this unbelief, in all but the most bigoted partisans, gave way before the triumphant success of Mr. Esdaile's surgical operations under mesmerism in the Calcutta Hospital: and hence, when subsequently a German professor (Heidenhain) reported that he had obtained results similar to Braid's,—which had been previously neglected,—orthodox medical science willingly

allowed the hypnotic state to take a recognised place in physiological works. The existence, indeed, of a peculiar *rapport* between the mesmeriser and his patient—such as the transference of sensation manifests—has still the weight of medical authority against it; but this weight is surely diminished by the fact that it was so long and obstinately thrown into the wrong scale as regards the hypnotic state generally.

When confronted with this mass of testimonies, the argument of our opponents sometimes takes a new turn. They say that our very demand for *quantity* of evidence shows that we know the *quality* of each item to be bad. But the quality of much of our evidence—when considered apart from the strangeness of the matters to which it refers—is not bad, but very good: it is such that one or two items of it would be held to establish the occurrence, at any particular time and place, of any phenomenon whose existence was generally accepted. Since, however, on this subject the best single testimony only yields an improbability of the testimony being false that is outweighed by the improbability of the fact being true, the only way to make the scale fall on the side of the testimony is to increase the quantity. If the testimony were not good, this increase of quantity would be of little value; but if it is such that the supposition of its falsity requires us to attribute abnormal motiveless deceit, or abnormal stupidity or carelessness, to a person hitherto reputed honest and intelligent, then an increase in the number of cases in which such a supposition is required adds importantly to the improbability of the general hypothesis. It is sometimes said by loose thinkers that the “moral factor” ought not to come in at all. But the least reflection shows that the moral factor must come in in all the reasonings of experimental science, except for those who have personally repeated all the experiments on which their conclusions are based. Any one who accepts the report of the experiments of another must rely not only on his intelligence but on his honesty; only ordinarily his honesty is so completely assumed that the assumption is not noticed.

Here, however, some say that we ought to get evidence that can be repeated at will; that they will not entertain the idea of “rare, fitful and delicate” phenomena which cannot be reproduced at will in the presence of any number of sceptics. But I have never seen any serious attempt to justify this refusal on general principles of scientific method. The phenomenon of Thought-transference—assuming it to be genuine—depends *primâ facie* on the establishment of a certain relation between the nervous systems of the agent and percipient respectively; and as the conditions of this relation are specifically unknown, it is to be expected that they should be sometimes absent, sometimes present, in an inexplicable way; and, in particular, that this peculiar function

of the brain should be easily disturbed by mental anxiety or discomfort of any kind.

Still we should be very glad to get evidence of this kind ; we ought to relax no effort to obtain it. And one special source of interest for us in the marvels related by the Indian Theosophists—with whose doctrines, I may remark, we are in no way concerned—lies in the fact that they are alleged to consist largely in the production at will of “telepathic” phenomena ; similar in kind to those of which, as occurring spontaneously, a large collection has been made by our Literary Committee.

(A provisional Report on some of these Indian cases was then laid before the meeting.)

IV.

FOURTH REPORT OF THE LITERARY COMMITTEE.

Committee:—W. F. BARRETT, F.R.S.E.; CHAS. C. MASSEY; REV. W. STAINTON MOSES, M.A.; F. PODMORE, M.A.; and EDMUND GURNEY,* M.A., and F. W. H. MYERS,* M.A., *Hon. Secs.*

A THEORY OF APPARITIONS.

PART II.

OUR last Report—it may be remembered—brought us only to the threshold of the subject of Apparitions, as popularly understood. In that introductory paper we approached our main theme by three distinct steps. We first considered the general state of opinion with respect to it, the *à priori* arguments and assumptions which tend to preclude inquiry into it, and the method which we hold that the inquiry ought to pursue. We then explained that we intended to base our own theory on an experimental basis, and to connect the striking phenomena of death-wraiths with quite humble and unemotional forms of Thought-transference—embracing the whole set of facts, large and small, experimental and spontaneous, under the term “telepathy.” And finally we justified this interconnection of the phenomena, and showed by examples that distinct effects—similar to those obtained in experimental Thought-transference—have been spontaneously produced on the emotions, the will, the senses, or the intellect of one person, by some corresponding affection of another person at a distance.

But among effects produced on the senses, one particular class was purposely deferred—that, namely, which concerns the sense of *sight*. It is this deferred class of telepathic disturbances that we have now to consider. Among these we find undoubtedly the furthest and most eccentric of the phenomena which the telepathic theory can be made to embrace; and our account of them will require that the theory, as so far stated, should be somewhat expanded. But for all that, they will not drive us from our old basis. We are about to treat visible apparitions as “transferred impressions.” Viewed in this light, it will be found that even the most startling of them are not without experimental analogy; and that, moreover, we can lead up to these extreme cases by *quite gradual steps*, starting from a point where the experimental analogies are perfectly obvious.

To begin with the commonest and simplest form of experiment—

that where the impression of a card or number is transferred, without sensory communication, from one mind to another. Here the percipient sees the object "in his mind's eye," not as external to himself at all. Now we find an exact parallel to this lowest grade of visualisation in cases where the impression originates, not in the fact that the agent is concentrating his attention on a card or number, but in the fact that he is dying. Such a case is the following, given to us by Mr. Robert Rawlinson, of Lansdowne Court West, Cheltenham.

I was dressing one morning in December 1881, when a certain conviction came upon me that some one was in my dressing-room. On looking round I saw no one; but then, instantaneously, in my mind's eye (I suppose), every feature of the face and form of my old friend William Stanley, of Ponsonby Hall, Cumberland, arose. This, as you may imagine, made a great impression on me, and I went at once into my wife's room and told her what had occurred, at the same stating that I feared W. S. must be dead. The subject was mentioned between us several times that day. Next morning I received a letter from George Stanley, then consul-general at Odessa, whom I did not know to be in England, saying that his brother had died at a quarter before 9 o'clock that morning. This was the very time the occurrence happened in my dressing-room. It is right to add that we had heard some two months previously that W. S. was suffering from cancer, but still we were in no immediate apprehension of his death.

Mrs. Rawlinson has kindly confirmed the fact of her husband's coming into her room, and describing his experience, at about a quarter to 9 on the morning in question. She adds that the name of W. S. had not been mentioned by anyone for weeks; and that her husband "is the last person to imagine anything, as he had always been particularly unbelieving as to anything supernatural." *

In this case, the spontaneous picture—originating, as we hold, in the condition of the dying friend—was not more definite and vivid than that which the unexcited mind of the mere experimentalist has often been able to transmit. A very important point of difference does, no doubt, exist; for the spontaneous picture did not represent anything on which the mind of the agent was at the moment concentrated; we cannot conceive him to have been gazing at his own face and form in a mirror. This point, however, may be postponed till we have completed our sketch of the graduated stages in the process of visualisation.

In the following examples, the vision was not of a single figure, but of a *scene*, vividly flashed upon the sense, and for the moment engrossing the attention, but still rather inward than outward, and not in any way confounded with the objective world, or located in the actual place where the percipient was at the time.

* We cannot exclude this expression when quoting the words of our informants. We ourselves, of course, regard all these occurrences as strictly *natural*.

The first case is from Miss Henrietta Wilkinson, Enniscorthy, Ireland.

I live in Ireland, my nephew in London. At the end of October or beginning of November, 1881, when he was eight years old, he went one day with his mother and sister to Kensington Gardens. While playing there he had a severe fall on his back ; his mother had to call a cab and take him home, then send for the doctor. He was very ill for three or four days, lying in a dark room and kept perfectly quiet. The accident happened on a Saturday, I think. On the Sunday his mother wrote to tell me of it, which letter I received on Tuesday. On the Monday night I was in bed, dropping off to sleep, when I opened my eyes with a start, and saw quite distinctly a London street, leading from Kensington Gardens to my nephew's home. All the people, cabs, and horses were running very fast in one direction, towards my sister's house. Amongst them were my sister and her two children, also running. They stopped a cab, got in, and arrived at their own house. I saw no more, but exclaimed, " Maurice is hurt !" why, I do not know, as my nephew looked all right in the street. It all seemed to come from outside myself. I thought it very strange, and told it to my family next morning, before my sister's letter arrived. I am not perfectly sure of the day of the week, but know it was the day after the accident, my sister wrote, and that it was the night of the day after she wrote that I saw what I tell you.

I think it was my nephew's thoughts of me that gave me the vision, I being the person he would think of, next to his father and mother.

Asked whether she had ever, on any other occasion, had a dream of death or accident which had impressed her, she says :—

No, I remember none. It was quite unique. But why call it a dream, when I was wide awake ? Had it been a dream I don't think it would have made the same impression on me.

The following corroboration is from Miss Wilkinson's sister, Castle Hill, Enniscorthy.

January 8, 1884.

I distinctly remember my sister relating to us (myself and another sister) her vision or dream *before* she got any letter. It made a great impression on her, and she told us with surprise and a little alarm. She told us on Tuesday morning, and the letter telling of the accident arrived soon after.

MARTHA WILKINSON.

The next account was sent to us by the Rev. A. Shaw Page, Vicar of Selsley, Stonehouse, Gloucester, in the words of his sister, Miss Millicent Anne Page. We have slightly shortened it.

I was staying with my mother's cousin, Mrs. Elizabeth Broughton, wife of Mr. Edward Broughton, Edinburgh, and daughter of the late Colonel Blanckley, in the year 1844, and she told me the following strange story :—

She woke one night and roused her husband, telling him that something dreadful had happened in France. He begged her to go to sleep again and

not to trouble him. She assured him she was not asleep when she saw what she insisted on then telling him—what she saw, in fact. First a carriage accident, which she did not actually see, but what she saw was the result, a broken carriage, a crowd collected, a figure gently raised and carried into the nearest house, and then a figure lying on a bed, which she then recognised as the Duke of Orleans. Gradually friends collecting round the bed, among them several members of the French Royal family—the Queen, then the King—all silently, tearfully watching the evidently dying Duke. One man (she could see his back, but did not know who he was) was a doctor. He stood bending over the Duke, feeling his pulse, his watch in his other hand. And then all passed away : she saw no more. As soon as it was daylight she wrote down in her journal all she had seen. From that journal she read this to me. It was before the days of electric telegraph, and two or more days passed before the *Times* announced “The death of the Duke of Orleans.” Visiting Paris a short time afterwards, she saw and recognised the place of the accident, and received the explanation of her impression. The doctor who attended the dying Duke was an old friend of hers ; and as he watched by the bed, his mind had been constantly occupied with her and her family. The reason of this was an extraordinary likeness—a likeness which had often led to amusing incidents—between several members of the Broughton family and members of the French Royal family who were present in the room. “I spoke of you and yours when I got home,” said the doctor, “and thought of you many times that evening. The likeness between yourselves and the Royal family was, perhaps, never so strong as that day when they stood there in their sorrow, all so natural ; father, mother, brothers, sisters, watching the dying son and brother. Here was the link between us, you see.”

We have placed these two “transferred impressions” together on account of their essential similarity, though the occasion was in one case but the tumble of a little boy in the park, in the other the tragic death of a “son of France.” For in both cases, it will be observed, the scene was not flashed from mind to mind *at the moment of its occurrence*, but considerably later, though at a time when the agent’s thoughts were deeply concentrated (as we *know* in one case and may *presume* in the other) on a mental renewal of the agitating scene, coupled with a thought of the very person to whose perception that scene was in fact transferred. This *deferment* of the impression is certainly not a point which any one would have invented in order to add to the marvel of a story. To the ordinary reader it would seem a mere confusion and weakening of the tale. But we need hardly say that to those who have grasped the conception of telepathy this very point is of the utmost interest and importance. It shows us one of the precise phenomena to which our actual experiments point—the translation from agent to percipient of a *represented* image with almost the distinctness of an actual sensation—as where a diagram which the agent is merely recalling to memory is transferred with pictorial vividness to the percipient’s mind. In the Kensington Gardens story the very inaccuracy of the scene, as

represented to the percipient's mind, suggests the manner in which it has already been modified in the agent's memory. The confusion of people, cabs, and horses, "running very fast in one direction," strongly suggests the half-delirious recrudescence of the agitated scene in the mind of the little invalid.

We shall now give an example of a less unusual type, where there is more distinctly a transference of actual sensation. It has a resemblance to the experiments where the percipient is able to reproduce a diagram at which the agent is actually gazing; or, again, to our previously cited case, where Mrs. Severn felt the precise pain suffered by her husband at a distance, from an accidental blow on the mouth. The account was sent to us by the Rev. Canon Warburton, The Close, Winchester.

Somewhere about the year 1848 I went up from Oxford to stay a day or two with my brother, Acton Warburton, then a barrister living at 10, Fish Street, Lincoln's Inn. When I got to his chambers I found a note on the table apologising for his absence, and saying that he had gone to a dance somewhere in the West End, and intended to be home soon after 1 o'clock. Instead of going to bed, I dozed in an arm-chair, but started up wide awake exactly at 1, ejaculating "By Jove, he's down!" and seeing him coming out of a drawing-room into a brightly illuminated landing, catching his foot in the edge of the top stair, and falling headlong, just saving himself by his elbows and hands. (The house was one which I had never seen, nor did I know where it was.) Thinking very little of the matter I fell a-doze again for half an hour, and was awakened by my brother suddenly coming in and saying, "Oh, there you are! I have just had as narrow an escape of breaking my neck as I ever had in my life. Coming out of the ball-room, I caught my foot and tumbled full length down the stairs."

W. WARBURTON.

In a second letter Canon Warburton adds:—

My brother was hurrying home from his dance, with some little self-reproach in his mind for not having been at his chambers to receive his guest, so the chances are that he was thinking of me. The whole scene was vividly present to me at the moment, but I did not note particulars, any more than one would in real life. The general impression was of a narrow landing brilliantly illuminated, and I remember verifying the correctness of this by questions at the time.

This is my sole experience of the kind.

Here the actual scene, intensely realised in the moment of imminent peril, seems to have flashed itself from mind to mind with startling but evanescent distinctness. We may remark that these sudden and vivid impressions in a state between sleeping and waking (of which we have many examples) do not fairly fall under the category of *dreams*. Their analogue is rather to be found in the rare and curious *illusions hypnagogiques* of oncoming sleep, or in the occasional prolongation of dream-

images into the first waking moments—the difference lying, of course, in the fact that in our cases the scene observed is one which was actually passing elsewhere at the moment.

In the next stage of visualisation the percipient sees a face or figure projected or depicted, as it were, on some convenient surface—the image being thus truly externalised, but in an unreal and unsubstantial fashion, and in a bizarre relation to the real objects among which it appears. In this respect it might be compared to the “after-image” of the sun, or of some object that has been intently scrutinised through a microscope, which we involuntarily import into our view of the surrounding scene.

We will begin with an example taken from the “Memoirs of Georgiana, Lady Chatterton,” by E. H. Dering (1878), pp. 100-102.

My mother had not been very well, but there was nothing alarming in her state. I was suffering from a bad cold, and went early to bed one night, after leaving her in the drawing-room in excellent spirits, and tolerably well. I slept unusually well, and when I awoke the moon was shining through the old casement brightly into the room. The white curtains of my bed were drawn to protect me from the draught that came through the large window, and on this curtain, as if depicted there, I saw the figure of my mother—the face deadly pale, with blood flowing on the bedclothes. For a moment I lay horror-stricken, and unable to move or cry out, till, thinking it might be a dream or a delusion, I raised myself up in bed, and touched the curtain. Still the appearance remained (although the curtain on which it was depicted moved to and fro when I touched it) as if reflected by a magic lantern. In great terror I got up, and throwing on a cloak I rushed off through some rooms and a long passage to my mother’s room. To my surprise, I saw from the further end of the passage that her door was open and a strong light coming from it across the passage. As she invariably locked her door when she went to bed, my fears were increased by the sight, and I ran on more quickly still, and entered her room. There she lay just as I had seen her on the curtain, pale as death and the sheet covered with blood, and two doctors standing by the bedside. She saw me at once and seemed delighted to see me, though too weak to speak or hold out her hand. “She has been very ill,” said the doctor, “but she would not allow you to be called, lest your cold should be made worse. But I trust all danger is over now. . . . The sight of you has decidedly done her much good.” So she had been in danger, and would not disturb me ! Oh ! how thankful I felt to the vision or fancy, or whatever it may have been.

It will be seen that the picture, though not producing the impression of a solid and independent object, was still no mere illusion, no mere momentary translation of the folds or pattern of the drapery into a human face. It was accurate and persistent enough to resist a touch which shook the curtain on which it was shown.

The next case carries us perhaps a step further still, as the image appeared with somewhat more of apparent relief—though certainly not

yet as co-ordinate in any natural fashion with the other objects in the percipient's field of vision. We received the account from Mr. Richard Searle, Barrister, Home Lodge, Herne Hill, who tells us that it was his sole experience of a hallucination.

One afternoon, a few years ago, I was sitting in my chambers in the Temple, working at some papers. My desk is between the fireplace and one of the windows, the window being two or three yards on the left side of my chair, and looking out into the Temple. Suddenly I became aware that I was looking at the bottom window-pane, which was about on a level with my eyes, and there I saw the figure of the head and face of my wife, in a reclining position, with the eyes closed and the face quite white and bloodless, as if she were dead.

I pulled myself together, and got up and looked out of the window, where I saw nothing but the houses opposite, and I came to the conclusion that I had been drowsy and had fallen asleep; and after taking a few turns about the room to rouse myself, I sat down again to my work and thought no more of the matter.

I went home at my usual time that evening, and whilst my wife and I were at dinner she told me that she had lunched with a friend who lived in Gloucester Gardens, and that she had taken with her a little child, one of her nieces, who was staying with us; but during lunch, or just after it, the child had a fall and slightly cut her face so that the blood came. After telling the story, my wife added that she was so alarmed when she saw the blood on the child's face that she had fainted. What I had seen in the window then occurred to my mind, and I asked her what time it was when this happened. She said, as far as she remembered, it must have been a few minutes after 2 o'clock. This was the time, as nearly as I could calculate, not having looked at my watch, when I saw the figure in the window-pane.

I have only to add that this is the only occasion on which I have known my wife to have had a fainting fit. She was in bad health at the time, and I did not mention to her what I had seen until a few days afterwards, when she had become stronger. I mentioned the occurrence to several of my friends at the time.

R. S.

November 2nd, 1883.

Mr. Paul Pierrard, at whose residence, 27, Gloucester Gardens, W., Mrs. Searle fainted, tells us that the cause of her doing so was the sight of an accident which befel her little niece. He also describes hearing from Mr. Searle, on the next day, that at the precise time of the fainting "a peculiar feeling overcame him, and he distinctly saw—as it were in a looking-glass—the very image of his wife leaning back in a swoon."

The last two narratives are specially noteworthy. When it first became evident to us that a number of strange heterogeneous narratives might be explained and connected by supposing them to represent the various *stages of externalisation* of a telepathic impact in the percipient's mind, we were quite ignorant of the existence of such cases as those of Lady Chatterton and Mr. Searle. Our chain of argument seemed fairly

complete without them. We should have gone on from scenes flashed before the mind to phantoms visualised "out in the room," with a sense that there was no real interruption of continuity, although the step was a long one to make on such uncertain ground. The moment, however, that these *externalised pictures* are described, it becomes plain that they supply exactly the connecting link, the want of which was vaguely felt. The picture on the window-pane or the bed-curtain comes precisely midway between the *mental image* and the *apparently solid figure*. It represents (in our language) a telepathic impression which has been externalised, but not yet completely objectified; which presents itself as something at which the percipient gazes, but which yet is not "taken for real," or localised in three dimensions among the familiar objects around him. And as compared with the two equally crude views between which we steer—that phantoms are all morbid nonsense, or that they are all "the spirits of the dead"—we think that our explanation is strongly supported by such intermediate cases as these. Our aim is to trace the connection between the most trivial phenomena of thought-transference, or confused inklings of disaster, and the full-blown "apparition" of popular belief. And, once on the track, we find group after group of transitional experiences, illustrating the degrees by which a stimulus, falling or fallen from afar upon some obscure sub-conscious region of the percipient's mind, may seem to disengage itself from his subjectivity, and to emerge into the waking world.

And now we come to the final class of cases, where the percipient sees the phantasmal figure as an apparently solid object among the familiar objects which surround him, and holding to those objects just such a relation as a figure of flesh and blood might have held. We received the following example from Mr. George Marchant, Linkfield Street, Redhill, formerly a large farmer and miller, and now an admirable specimen of shrewd and vigorous old age.

About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st of October, 1881, while I was perfectly wide awake, and looking at a lamp burning on my washhand-stand, a person, as I thought, came into the room by mistake, and stopped, looking into the looking-glass on the table. It soon occurred to me it represented Robinson Kelsey, by his dress and wearing his hair long behind. When I raised myself up in bed and called out, it instantly disappeared. The next day I mentioned to some of my friends how strange it was. So thoroughly convinced was I, that I searched the local papers that day (Saturday) and the following Tuesday, believing his death would be in one of them. On the following Wednesday a man, who formerly was my drover, came and told me Robinson Kelsey was dead. Anxious to know at what time he died, I wrote to Mr. Wood, the family undertaker at Lingfield; he learnt from the brother-in-law* of the deceased that he died at 2 a.m. He was my first cousin, and

* This brother-in-law has kindly confirmed the accuracy of the above *dat*, but has now forgotten what was the *hour* of death, not having been actually present.

was apprenticed formerly to me as a miller ; afterwards he lived with me as journeyman ; altogether, eight years. I never saw anything approaching that before. I am 72 years old, and never feel nervous ; I am not afraid of the dead or their spirits. I hand you a rough plan of the bedroom, &c.

To our inquiries as to whether Robinson Kelsey had been in his mind, and on various other points, Mr. Marchant replies :—

I had not been thinking about him, neither had I spoken to him for 20 years. In the morning after seeing the apparition, I spoke about it to a person in the house. In the evening I again spoke about it to two persons, how strange it was. It was several days after our conversation about what I had seen that I heard of his death. These people will confirm my statement, for after I heard of the death I spoke of it to the same people, that my relation died the same night as I saw the apparition. As the apparition passed between my bed and the lamp I had a full view of it ; it was unmistakable. When it stopped looking in the glass I spoke to it, then it gently sank away downwards.

We have received the following confirmation of this incident —

We are positive of hearing Mr. Marchant one day say that he saw the apparition of Robinson Kelsey during the previous night.

ANN LANGERIDGE,* Linkfield Street, Redhill.

MATILDA FULLER, Station Road, Redhill.

WILLIAM MILES, Station Road, Redhill.

Mr. Marchant has never had any other “hallucination,” and laughs at the very idea of such things. In a personal interview he entered further into detail, pointing out *in situ* the exact line that the figure took, and how it momentarily hid the lamp in passing in front of the washhand-stand. He describes Kelsey’s long and bushy back-hair as a very distinct peculiarity ; and he thinks that the figure was visible for nearly a minute.

Here, then, at last, we have the orthodox *apparition*. And we note at once that the completeness of the externalisation is not the only point in which this phantasm differs from the preceding ones. It is more durable, and it is apparently more independent. Reading the account of it, one cannot resist the question, “Should I have seen it, had I been there?” And the question cannot but lead on to another. *If* the apparition could have been seen by more than one person, what will be the effect on our theory of the transference of an impression from mind to mind? Can we conceive of this rare telepathic sympathy as affecting *two* minds at the same moment and in the same way? or are we driven

* One of us has visited Mrs. Langeridge, who is a sensible person, with very little belief in “ghosts.” She at once volunteered the remark that Mr. Marchant described his vision to her next morning.

to assume some independent agency, operating quite outside the mind of either percipient ?

Up to this point it will be observed, this fundamental problem has not presented itself. The phantasms with which we have thus far been dealing have not been such as to force on us the question whether two or more percipients would be likely to share them. But in the case of the completer or more objective phantasms, we have no longer any assurance that they are perceptible to one person only, unless we have actual evidence that other persons were present at the time and failed to perceive them.

Now, as a matter of fact, each variety of these *fully externalised* phantasms is liable (as we find from numerous instances) to be perceived by anyone who happens to be present. This phenomenon of *collective percipience*, of a sight seen or a sound heard* by several persons at once, can be shown, we think, to be not inconsistent with the substantial truth of our theory ; but the problem is a formidable one, and we cannot here do more than indicate its existence.

Meantime, the very fact that we have been able to arrange the phenomena in a graduated series must be admitted to be strongly suggestive of a common origin for them all ; and we shall endeavour to treat the solid-looking figure of Robinson Kelsey, no less than the fleeting vision "in the mind's eye" of Mr. Rawlinson, as in some way the product of the percipient's own mind, projected (so to speak) under the stimulus of an impact from the mind of the dying friend. But this explanation is something more than a natural conjecture : we have, as we stated above, a certain amount of *experimental* support even for the extreme cases where the apparition is externalised in the most complete way. We should hardly have ventured to make so positive an assertion on the ground of previously recorded cases ; as those cases are few in number, and their correctness cannot now be tested in detail. But we cannot doubt the genuineness of the case which we published in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research (Vol. I. p. 120), where a friend of our own, without having given the slightest hint of his intention, concentrated his mind for some minutes on the idea of appearing to two distant friends, in no way subject to hallucinations ; who volunteered the information, when next he visited them, that they had distinctly seen him in their room at precisely that time.† Such a

* It would be cumbersome to introduce at every turn the words necessary for extending what is said about vision to impressions of *hearing* and *touch*. The reader will have no difficulty in perceiving where the application to these further senses is possible, and is to be taken as understood.

† We cannot ignore the strength of the contemporary testimony for the occurrence of similar events in the East ; but the remoteness of the locality and other difficulties prevent us from here dwelling on them.


result is specially instructive in connection with more than one of the spontaneous cases quoted above. We noted, in passing, how Mr. Rawlinson's case differed from the more ordinary forms of experimental Thought-transference, in that the agent was not directing his attention to that which appeared to the percipient. The same remark applies to Mr. Searle's case; and in Lady Chatterton's case, though a portion of what she herself saw depicted—namely, the effusion of blood—was doubtless prominent at the moment in her mother's mind, the mother's own face and aspect can hardly have had any conscious place there. What, then, are we to conceive to have been in the agent's mind in these instances? It cannot be unreasonable to suppose (as Canon Warburton supposes in the case of his brother) that part of its content, at any rate, was a forcible idea of the percipient and of the agent's self in relation to the percipient. Lady Chatterton's mother, it is clearly implied, was thinking of her daughter, and in the other two cases we should naturally imagine a similar though more transient occupation of the agent's mind with the absent husband or friend; for it has often been noted that, in the sense of helplessness and collapse that immediately precedes fainting or death, the idea of distant scenes and persons is apt to recur in very vivid flashes. And if this be granted, the parallelism with our friend's experimental case becomes very marked. For the idea in *his* mind was of himself—not his *aspect* particularly, but his personality—in relation to the percipients; while the impression in *their* minds was of his *aspect*.

Mr. Marchant's case (which is of a common type) does, however, undoubtedly carry us beyond this analogy. We cannot pronounce it impossible that Kelsey's dying thoughts reverted strongly to his old employer; but, considering the length of time during which they had held no intercourse, we should prefer to suppose that the pre-existent and latent *rapport* between the two sufficed to effect the transference of the image, without any conscious direction of the agent's attention. We can hardly hope, however, that this hypothesis will look plausible, until the *rationale* of the projection of the image has been more fully considered. To this, then—the necessary supplement or expansion of our telepathic theory—we may at once proceed.

Let us first clearly realise the facts. Something is presented as apparently an independent piece of matter in the material world; but no piece of matter is really there, and the appearance is a phantasm. How would such an experience be most naturally described? Surely as a *hallucination* of the sense of sight—the creation of a mind which is in some abnormal state. This is precisely what we hold it to be; the abnormal state being, however, not—as in the case of morbid hallucinations—a mere pathological condition of the percipient, but a peculiar form of disturbance produced by an unusual condition in some

distant person. In virtue of their having their real cause *outside* the percipient, and so in a way conveying true information, we may describe death-wraiths and the like as *veridical* hallucinations; but as projections of the percipient's own mind, by which his senses are deluded, we hold them to be altogether on a par with morbid hallucinations. They are thus, merely a species in a larger genus; and our most hopeful course will, therefore, be to trace the natural history of the genus—to decide what a "hallucination of the senses" really involves. It is inevitable that this endeavour should carry us for a brief space into the region of physiology, but the accompanying diagram will enable the least instructed reader to master at a glance all the technical information required. We accept the commonly accepted doctrine as to the localisation of brain functions; but the general tenor of our explanation might, we think, hold good, even if that doctrine came to be modified.

Let A represent the retina of the eye which in itself has no more power of seeing than a mirror has. Let B represent the group of cells in the brain which constitutes the "visualising centre," and which is excited into activity whenever sight takes place. And let C represent the cortical or external part of the hemispheres of the brain, part of which is excited into activity whenever any of the higher psychical faculties—intelligent perception, imagination, comparison, memory, volition—are called into play. A is connected with B by the fibres of the optic nerve, and B is connected with C by other nerve-fibres. Now *any* disturbance of the cells at B which reaches a certain intensity will be accompanied by the sense of sight; and, when this disturbance is propagated onwards in the natural course from B to C, this sense will become a complete perception—an object for the mind—which can be reflected on, compared with other objects, and remembered. But the central, indispensable fact—the disturbance at B—may itself originate in at least *two* quite distinct ways. On the one hand it may originate in a nervous impulse *sent up* along the fibres from A, owing to some change which has taken place at A—whether it be a blow on the eye, which makes us see sparks, or the stimulus of external rays of light, which makes us see surrounding objects. Or, on the other hand, it may originate in a nervous impulse *sent down* along the fibres from C, owing to some change that has taken place at C; and then we shall have a hallucination—a sense of seeing, and of seeing, it may be, with great vividness and completeness, though what is seen has no existence external to the percipient's organism. This may happen either voluntarily or involuntarily. Painters have sometimes imagined a face or a scene with such force as actually to externalise it in space and see it



before their eyes. But far more often the hallucination is involuntary, as in purely morbid cases, in dreams, and in the species of apparitions with which we are dealing in this paper.

Now, so far, the matter seems plain enough. The particular cells at B, whose activity is necessary for the sense of sight, may be stimulated or exploded either by an impulse from *without*, started by light, in which case we see objects that are really there; or by an impulse from *within*, started by some spontaneous cerebral change, in which case we see objects that are not really there. But with regard to the latter case there is just one point that needs careful notice. We are supposing that the impulse which results in a hallucination is started by some change *in the cells at C*. Now what mental event does this physical change at C imply? Clearly not the *sight* of the object, for that only takes place in association with the physical change *in the cells at B*. The mental event associated with the change at C is not the *sight*, but the *idea*, of the object, as it might present itself in imagination or memory. A certain low degree of visualisation is, no doubt, involved in the very idea, and probably implies a slight downward escape of current from C to B; that is to say, the sluice-gates are never entirely closed. But the idea only becomes *completely* visualised—only becomes a *precept*, so as to suggest the real external presence of the object—when the downward impulse is of a far stronger kind, and produces as large a change at B as an upward impulse from the retina would do—the whole complex process being, however, for consciousness, a single and instantaneous event. And this being so, we are at once able to assign to the different parts of the process their respective characters. The *origin* of the hallucination is no doubt in the imagination—that is, in physical terms, at C; but it is not the imagination—or C as the physical organ of the imagination—that is to *blame* for the hallucination. There is nothing *delusive* in the mere idea or memory of a visible object; and in serving as a basis to such an idea or memory, however vivid, the cells at C are merely performing their normal functions. The *blame* attaches to the escape of a strong nervous current *in the downward direction* from C to B, in the rending of the sluice-gates (so to speak) at the point where the line drawn from B touches the semicircle. This is the abnormal event. If it did not take place, there would be no delusion, for there would be a mere idea or memory of the object. When once it has taken place, delusion is inevitable; for instantaneously a strong stimulus is communicated to the cells at B, and such a stimulus involves the sense of *seeing* the object. It may well be only the *sense*, and not the *judgment*, that is deluded; many persons who have suffered from hallucinations have perfectly well known that the figures seen by them were only phantasms. But for all that they *saw* them: to the sense of sight the figures were completely real—so

much so that the visual sensation was even referred to the external eye and the figure could be made to appear double by squinting, or by pressure on the side of one eyeball.

The physical details of the process which we have called the "rending of the sluice-gates," and the "escape of current from C to B," will perhaps never be known. Certain general conditions that favour the process are indeed recognised: hallucinations of the senses are common events in sleep, in insanity, and in the delirium of fever; and they may be produced by the immoderate use of various drugs, such as haschisch and opium. But even in these cases the broad fact is almost all that is known. Of the actual physiological process we can say no more than that in insanity it is part of the general cerebral derangement, and is due in the other cases to some change in the constitution or distribution of the blood. But there is one important class of sensory hallucinations of which even thus much cannot be said—a class of which singularly little notice has been taken by scientific writers—namely, the quite transient and casual hallucinations of sane and healthy persons. Though rare, in the sense that only a small percentage of the population have had experience of them, these occurrences are absolutely numerous. Scores of them take place in England in the course of a year. But what determines their occurrence to this or that person, at this or that moment, we are often quite unable to say. Now in this state of ignorance there certainly need be no difficulty in supposing that *one* means by which the "escape of current" from C to B may be determined is a *telepathic impulse*. Supposing the evidence for the telepathic production of hallucinations—*e.g.*, for apparitions at the time of death—to be in itself sufficient, physiology need make no difficulties about the process in the percipient's brain, for in its general outline that process is just as intelligible to us, and in its minute details just as obscure, as in any other case of hallucination. Taking a broad view of the matter, we may even say that the difficulties are *less* in the case of death-wraiths than in cases where the hallucination is purely casual, and depends on no assignable conditions at all. For we at any rate succeed in connecting the *particular rare effect*—the peculiar "escape of current," and the consequent occurrence of a hallucination to a sane and healthy person—with a *particular rare cause*—the peculiar condition of a distant friend.

This, happily, is all that need be said in the way of physical explanation. For we have now got what we wanted—a ready way of connecting apparitions with the simpler forms of Thought-transference, even where (as in Mr. Marchant's case) the connection might at first seem most difficult to establish. How, we asked above, could the idea of Kelsey be impressed on Mr. Marchant's mind with such force as to embody itself in a visible phantom, when Kelsey's mind was presumably not occupied either with Mr. Marchant or with himself in relation to

him? From a physiological point of view the difficulty vanishes, on the supposition that the primary effect on Mr. Marchant took place not at B but at C; at the part of the brain which is the great storehouse of old impressions; in the part, moreover, where an appropriate physical basis may be found not only for distinct and recognisable images, but for subconscious ideas and memories, and for the most distant and intangible associations. In the register of the brain it is seldom that a record, once made, is so utterly obliterated that, under suitable conditions, it may not be revived. And if once a relation be established between two persons, and the records of it registered in their two brains, we see no reason why the same harmony should not occasionally manifest itself between those records—even though they be long sunk below the level of conscious attention—as between the *immediate* impressions of the moment; and, this once granted, we have seen how the physiological process may lead on to the projection of the visible phantom. In psychical terms, we see no reason why subconscious ideas and memories which are in no distinct way present to consciousness, such as Kelsey's sense of his old relationship to Mr. Marchant, should not evoke similar blind movements in Mr. Marchant's mind, which, gathering strength, might lead him to body forth the vision of his old acquaintance.* On this view it would become quite intelligible that he should see the figure even before he recognised it. And in a similar way we should interpret some at least of those cases of death-wraith (of which we have a good many specimens) where the figure seems to form by a *gradual* process. We should say that there the *idea*, at first but dimly conveyed and vaguely apprehended, was working itself into definiteness (as so often occurs in processes of abstract thought), and that the character of the projection underwent a corresponding change.

But here we find ourselves fairly launched on a very wide and interesting question—namely, how far the primary idea may be modified, wrought on, or worked out, in the percipient's own mind, before it becomes embodied as a visible phantom. That mind is no mere collection

* It might seem out of the question to obtain any *experimental* support for a transference of impression apart from consciousness on the "agent's" part. Yet support of a kind has actually presented itself. We requested our friend above mentioned secretly to determine, before going to sleep at about 10.30 p.m., that his form should appear at *midnight*—that is, at a moment when he would be actually asleep—to one of the persons whom he had before succeeded in affecting, and whom he had not even seen for some time. On the 22nd of March he did so, determining not only to appear but to touch his friend's head. The result is thus described by the latter:—"On Saturday night, 22nd of March, 1884, I had a distinct impression that Mr. B. was in my room. I distinctly saw him, whilst widely awake. He came towards me and touched my head." Since this Report was written, we have received an account, from another "agent" and "percipient," of a similar successful experiment.

of separate compartments, into which new ideas will fit and then rest in a passive way ; but an organism of interacting parts, where any change or any intruding element may set in motion whole trains of images and associations. We know what small and dim suggestions will sometimes set large tracts of mental machinery to work ; and we may therefore well credit the vaguer or subconscious order of telepathic impressions with such a power. Now if a visible phantasm results, in the manner above suggested, what more natural than that these further images and associations should be embodied in it ? We may compare the process to what takes place in the one form of hallucination with which we are all familiar—in dreaming. A strong impression, whether received before sleep (as from a recent sorrow or a piece of exciting work) or during sleep (as from a knock at the door or an uncomfortable posture), will mingle itself in dreams with all sorts of scenes and ideas that the sleeping mind supplies. Now we would suggest that the mind, *even in a waking state*, may unconsciously react, as in a dream, on the crude material presented to it, may invest the nucleus of a “transferred impression” with its own atmosphere and imagery ; nay, even that the apparent externality of the phantasm—the very fact in virtue of which we call the *impression* a *hallucination*—may itself be merely a radical instance of such investiture. We should thus have a ready explanation for many degrees of distinctness and individualisation, and many diversities of character, in the sensory phantasm. Suppose the same kind of real event—say the peaceful death of an aged parent—to occur in twenty cases, and in each of them to produce a real and unique sort of disturbance in some absent person’s mind ; then, if that disturbance clothed itself in some *sensory* form—or, in our language, if it reached the point of causing a *hallucination*—such hallucination might take twenty different forms. One percipient may hear his parent’s voice ; another may imagine the touch of his hand upon his head ; a third may see him in his wonted dress and aspect ; a fourth may see him in his dying aspect ; a fifth may see him in some transfigured aspect ; and others may invest the disturbing idea with every sort of visible symbolism, derived from their minds’ habitual furniture and their wonted trains of thought.

Striking narratives of visible phantasms thus mingled with a dream element do in fact exist. In the case of sailors, for instance, the conditions of whose lives are so different from those of invalids on land, the death-wraith often seems to “suffer a sea-change,” and to reflect in fantastic wildness the perils of the deep. Such is a narrative (sent to us by Engineer Dunlop, of Bangkok, Siam) of an apparition seen “when the ship was under all plain sail off the pitch of Cape Horn,” when the seaman who had “started aloft to bend the fore-top-gallant flung his arms round the top-gallant shrouds and held on without

moving . . . till he was lowered on deck in the bight of a bowline." For as he "kept looking to the windward at the squall, suddenly in the midst of it he saw his sweetheart dressed in white flowing robes, who came flying down toward him before the wind," and who, as it afterwards proved, had died in England at that very time.

We cite this last narrative, not as itself evidentially strong, but on account of its theoretical interest as illustrating (among others more directly attested) the dream-like mode in which the telepathic impression may take shape from the scene around; and "the wet sea-boy, in an hour so rude," may transfer to "cradle of the rude imperious surge" the figure whose life is ebbing in the quiet bed at home. For we hold it legitimate to use in this purely *illustrative* manner many narratives on which we should hesitate to base our argument if they stood alone. When we review the 600 cases which (exclusive of dreams) we have already printed as material for our book on "Phantasms of the Living" alone—cases of which a large proportion come first-hand from persons known to us—we can hardly doubt that sooner or later the general fact of these distant impressions will be accepted by the majority of candid minds. Our evidence is eminently *cumulative*; but until its cumulation can be shown at full length, we must aim rather at showing its *coherence*; at indicating the way in which intermediate instances and cross analogies interlock even the most apparently isolated and grotesque of *bonâ fide* narratives of this kind.

Another group of cases in which the percipient's mind seems to modify the impression received is that where the phantasmal imagery is drawn from the appurtenances of death, or the accepted beliefs as to resurrection. Of course symbolism of this kind, which is common to the agent's mind as well as to the percipient's, affords no positive proof as to whose mind it is from which the phantom derives its shape and consistency. But the *least marvellous* explanation—the nearest to experimental analogy—will be that which assumes that it is the percipient's own activity which invests the transferred impression with its clothing of imagery. We have space for only two instances of this class. The first was given to us by Lieut.-Colonel Jones, 8, Sussex Place, N.W., who confirmed the narrative to us verbally, and showed us a letter written at the time in which his father alludes to the apparition. Colonel Jones has never experienced any other hallucination whatever; and it seems to us that this case alone would severely try the theory which explains all such phantasms as this by mere chance-coincidence.

In 1845 I was stationed with my regiment at Moulmein, in Burmah. In those days there was no direct mail, and we were dependent upon the arrival of sailing vessels for our letters, which sometimes arrived in batches, and occasionally were months without any news from home.

On the evening of the 24th of March, 1845, I was, with others, dining at a friend's house, and when sitting in the verandah after dinner, with the other guests, in the middle of a conversation on some local affairs, I all at once *distinctly* saw before me the form of an open coffin, with a favourite sister of mine, then at home, lying in it apparently dead. I naturally ceased talking, and every one looked at me with astonishment, and asked what was the matter. I mentioned, in a laughing manner, what I had seen, and it was looked upon as a joke. I walked home later with an officer very much my senior (the late Major-General George Briggs, retired, Madras Artillery, then Captain Briggs), who renewed the subject, and asked whether I had received any news as to my sister's illness. I said no, and that my last letters from home were dated some three months prior. He asked me to make a note of the circumstance, as he had before heard of such occurrences. I did so, and showed him the entry I made opposite the day of the month in an almanack. On the 17th of May following I received a letter from home announcing my sister's death as having taken place on that very day—viz., the 24th of March, 1845.

As to the coincidence of *hour*, Colonel Jones only learnt that the death occurred in the morning of the 24th. His vision was seen after an early dinner, so that, allowing for longitude, the correspondence of time was certainly near, and *may* have been exact. There had been a very close attachment between sister and brother.

The next case is from our friend, Miss Summerbell, 140, Kensington Park Road, W., who has never had any other hallucination.

I have been, for many years, on terms of close intimacy with the family of a Dutch nobleman, who reside in Holland. Early in July last I received a letter from the eldest daughter of the house saying that her father was seriously ill. From that time I received news of his condition every day. On the 27th of July, 1882, I received a postcard saying that he was slightly better. I was staying at the time at the Spa, Tunbridge Wells, and suffering much from neuralgia. On the night of the 27th I was lying, unable to sleep from pain; no doubt I dozed now and then, but I firmly believe that I was awake when what I am about to relate occurred. It was beginning to be light, and I distinctly saw every object in the room. I do not know whether it is necessary to say that in Holland, when a person of distinction dies, a *prieur d'enterrement* is employed. This man is dressed in black, with dress coat, knee breeches, and cocked hat, with bands of crape hanging from the corners. It is his office to go to all the houses where the deceased was known and announce the death. On the morning of which I speak, I saw the door of my room open and a *prieur d'enterrement* enter. He said nothing, but stood with a long paper in his hand. I remember distinctly wondering whether I had fallen asleep and was dreaming; I looked round and saw the furniture, and the window, with the dim light coming through the closed blind. I looked at my watch, it was nearly 5 o'clock. I looked towards the man, but he was gone. It was nearly six years since I had lived for any time in Holland, and I had forgotten the custom of announcing

deaths ; at least, I had not thought of it for years. But on that morning, at 3.20, my friend died.

I afterwards questioned my friend, Mme. Huydecoper, about what happened at the time of her husband's death, and I find that the first thing they did was to discuss how they should send the tidings to me. I told the friend with whom I was staying at the time what I had seen ; she spoke of it several times during the day, and reminded me of it when the news of the death arrived.

Here the telepathic impression, instead of connecting itself with some familiar image, such as a coffin, seems to have evoked slumbering memories which associated Dutch customs with Dutch friends in the percipient's mind.*

Whatever be the view taken of each separate *symbolical* case of this kind, it is to be hoped that the collection of a great number of them may throw further light on the laws of association which govern these rare events—on the path and barometry of these psychical storms. There is, perhaps, scarcely any visual phantom of a dying person from which some hint of scientific value might not be drawn, were the figure carefully scrutinised in every detail. Unfortunately, this scrutiny is much less easy in the case of veridical than in the case of morbid hallucinations. Morbid hallucinations are much more often *durable*, and much more often *repeated*. Moreover—and we commend this point

* An analogous incident was narrated more than once by the late Dr. Pusey, in a way which led his hearers to believe that the experience was his own. Our friend, the Rev. G. B. Simeon, of Gainsborough, having undertaken to ask Dr. Pusey what truth there was in the rumour that he had seen an apparition in High Street, Oxford, Dr. Pusey replied that the report was probably founded on the following fact :—

Two clergymen, A. and B., great friends, were at a distance from one another. One afternoon, A., who was in his garden, saw the figure of B. approach, and heard him say, "I have been in hell for half-an-hour, because I loved the praise of men more than the praise of God." It turned out that B. had actually died suddenly on that day, shortly before the appearance in the garden.

We were not satisfied with this evidence, as Dr. Pusey did not actually affirm that A. was himself ; and we have lately discovered what we think must be the original of the story, in an old copy of the *Imperial Magazine*. As, however, the main facts agree, and Dr. Pusey vouched for their truth, we may be allowed to refer to them for purposes of illustration. It is plain that, on our theory, the phantom's speech must be treated in the same way as the coffin and the *prieur d'enterrement*. Miss Jones was not actually lying in her coffin when she appeared to her brother in that position ; nor, happily, is it necessary to assume that B.'s words were a transcript of literal reality. Just as in the one case it was the imagery of *death* which forced itself into prominence, so, in the other case, the conception of what *follows* death may have started into dream-like vividness when the telepathic impact from the dying friend arrived, and awoke, perhaps, a slumbering judgment on him *in foro conscientia*, which affection had long kept hidden in the unacknowledged background of thought.

to those who regard veridical hallucinations as merely transient morbid affections occurring *by chance* at the moment of death—morbid hallucinations seem, in a majority of cases, to be *unrecognised* faces and figures of *strangers*, and they thus excite curiosity rather than emotion. In a large majority of our cases, on the other hand, the percipient has recognised the phantom. It is thus to the *countenance* that they have for the most part looked. The dress and surroundings are not minutely observed, or it seems a mere irreverence to dwell on them in the presence of what is so sacred and beloved. Often, too, the phantom is merely momentary, and the result is that in very many instances we have only the vague description, "I saw my father as I was used to see him," "It was my mother, as she lived." In such cases there is nothing to guide us as to the origin of the phantasmal image. It is such as the percipient might most readily have shaped for himself; but it is such, also, as the agent might most naturally have transmitted, if such images are transmitted in their entirety and, so to speak, ready-made.

There is, however, one large and important class of death-wraiths whose peculiarity it is that the dress is, as it were, an integral part of them, forming an element in the apparition so conspicuous and unexpected as to attract a full share of attention. We mean the cases where the phantom appears in the dress, or with the aspect, which the dying man actually wore at death, and of which the percipient was not previously aware. Here it undoubtedly seems as though the agent had transmitted a finished picture of himself—an *imago*, as Lucretius would say, thrown off from his whole circumference—which needed no reinforcement from the percipient's shaping imagination before it stood complete and evident in the open day.

This reproduction of actual costume or actual aspect passes through all stages of distinctness and unexpectedness. We begin with the cases where the dying person is merely seen clad in *white*, as it were the vague reflection of the night-dress in which he lies; and we go on to instances where the dress worn at death is altogether strange and unusual, or where a violent end has inflicted recognisable scars or mutilation, or where the image reiterates with phantasmal urgency some task which the living mind regretfully leaves unaccomplished, as it sinks into the stupor of the dim death-day.

The first of these cases that we shall select is one which curiously illustrates the changes effected by half a century of oral tradition in a narrative of this kind. The occurrence in question, belonging to a well-known noble family and to a tragic accident, has been often cited in society when such topics are discussed, and we obtained a written account of it from a member of the family known to us—both he and we being ignorant that a contemporary record of the matter had already

been printed in "The Journal of Thomas Raikes, Esq., from 1831 to 1847" (London, 1856), Vol. I. p. 131. We are thus, as it happens, able to compare a traditional account 53 years old with an account written down 15 months after the occurrence:—

We give first our friend's account:—

My grandfather Sir J. Y. was drowned by the upsetting of a boat in the Solent, in or about the year 1830. On the day of his death Miss M., a great friend and connection of his, was at one of the Ancient Concerts in Hanover Square Rooms. During the performance she fainted away, and when she came to declared that she had seen a corpse lying at her feet, and though the face was turned away she knew the figure to be that of my grandfather. Communication in those days was not, of course, as easy as now, and her fears were not verified till some days after the event. Such is the family story, which I heard often from my father, and had verified by my mother when last I saw her.

Here, as will be seen, there is nothing to indicate either the coincidence of *hour* or the *dress* in which the phantom was seen. Let us now turn to the contemporary account, which has the two advantages of being half a century nearer to the facts and of coming from the side of the actual percipient, Miss Manningham, whose name we are now allowed to print for the first time. In "A Portion of the Journal kept by T. Raikes, Esq., from 1831 to 1847," Vol. I. p. 131, we read:—

Wednesday, 26th December, 1832.—Captain —— recounted a curious anecdote that happened in his own family. He told it in the following words:—It is now about 15 months ago that Miss M ——, a connection of my family, went with a party of friends to a concert at the Argyll Rooms. She appeared there to be suddenly seized with indisposition, and though she persisted for some time to struggle against what seemed a violent nervous affection, it became at last so oppressive, that they were obliged to send for their carriage and conduct her home. She was for a long while unwilling to say what was the cause of her indisposition; but on being more earnestly questioned, she at length confessed that she had, immediately on arriving at the concert room, been terrified by a horrible vision which unceasingly presented itself to her sight. It seemed to her as though a naked corpse was lying on the floor at her feet; the features of the face were partly covered by a cloth mantle, but enough was apparent to convince her that the body was that of Sir J—— Y——. Every effort was made by her friends at the time to tranquillise her mind by representing the folly of allowing such delusions to prey upon her spirits, and she thus retired to bed; but on the following day the family received the tidings of Sir J—— Y—— having been drowned in Southampton River that very night by the upsetting of his boat, and the body was afterwards found entangled in a *boat-cloak*. Here is an authentic case of second sight, and of very recent date.

On a critical comparison, it will be seen that the *contemporary* or *old* account presents two small apparent discrepancies from the *tra-*

ditional or *new* account, and also (which is more surprising) contains two further circumstances of the highest interest. The discrepancies are these. The new account says that *Miss M.* did not receive the news for some days; the old account says that the *family* received it the next day. Now the journey from Southampton to London occupied only one day in 1830, and probably the *old* account is correct. *Miss M.*, however, may not have been informed for another day or two; so the *new* account may be correct also. The other discrepancy is in the name of the building where the vision was seen—the “Argyll Rooms” according to the old account, the “Hanover Square Rooms” according to the new. Now from Crickley’s “Picture of London” (1831), p. 93, we learn that “the Argyll Rooms, Regent Street, burnt down in the early part of last year, have been again restored to their former splendour. They are devoted to concerts, balls, and exhibitions, and are much frequented by persons of rank and fashion.” It also appears that the Hanover Square Rooms were open for concerts at the same time, so that either account might be correct. But as the title “Argyll Rooms” has long ceased to suggest a high-class concert hall, it is likely enough that it may have been unconsciously replaced in Lord and Lady——’s minds by the more apparently suitable appellation.

These trifling discrepancies in unimportant points are such as must needs accrue in 50 years’ tradition. But it is a much more remarkable thing to find that in this case tradition, so far from *exaggerating*, has *minimised* the cardinal points of the story. It is in the *old*, not in the *new*, account that we hear that the accident took place “that very *night*,” so that it is at any rate possible that the coincidence of *hour* was exact. Moreover—and this is the point with which we are here specially concerned—it is in the *old*, not in the *new*, account that we hear of the cloth mantle wrapped about the visionary form, the boat-cloak whose prototype was at that time entangling beneath the dark estuary the limbs of the drowning man. Note also in the old account the combination of dreamlike symbolism with reflex of actual fact. The corpse was seen as if naked, no part of the dress being visible except that one article whose significance was destined to be afterwards understood too well.

The comparison of these two narratives may serve to illustrate a generalisation which has gradually been suggested to us by many similar collocations of older and newer versions. Tradition, we find, when it deals in modern times with such accounts as these, tends primarily to *shorten* and *simplify* them. Sometimes this *simplification* may also involve *exaggeration* of the marvellous element. For instance, a coincidence of death and death-wraith, which was really not traced nearer than to the same *day*, will be sometimes repeated as if it had been proved to be also at the same *hour*. Or a figure *vaguely*

resembling a dying person will be represented as *precisely* resembling him. Often, again, this process of simplification is unimportant in its effect on the narrative; as when in the well-known Wynyard case, a man who *strikingly like* Wynyard (and whose *likeness* is the only important point) is represented as having been Wynyard's *twin brother*. But often, also (as in the case first given), this simplifying process tends to lose the very points on which we are most concerned to dwell—the undesigned indications which so often at once strengthen the evidence of the narrative and double its theoretic interest. If the narratives with which we are dealing were the offspring of chance and credulity, then the further we get them from their original sources the better, it might be thought, they would suit us. But if they are the offspring of law and fact, we shall expect—and the case is so—that the nearer to absolute accuracy, absolute contemporaneity, we can obtain them, the better will they fit in with other facts, and range themselves beneath general laws.

Our next case shall be a first-hand one, from a physician, Dr. Rowland Bowstead, of Caistor, who tells us that he has never experienced any other hallucination.

In September, 1847, I was playing at a cricket match, and took the place of long-field. A ball was driven in my direction which I ought to have caught but missed it, and it rolled towards a low hedge; I and another lad ran after it. When I got near the hedge I saw the apparition of my brother-in-law, who was much endeared to me, over the hedge, dressed in a shooting suit with a gun on his arm; he smiled and waved his hand at me. I called the attention of the other boy to it; but he did not see it, although he looked in the same direction. When I looked again the figure had vanished. I, feeling very sad at the time, went up to my uncle and told him of what I had seen; he took out his watch and noted the time, just 10 minutes to 1 o'clock. Two days after I received a letter from my father informing me of the death of my brother-in-law, which took place at 10 minutes to 1. His death was singular, for on that morning he said he was much better and thought he should be able to shoot again. Taking up his gun, he turned round to my father, asking him if he had sent for me, as he particularly wished to see me. My father replied the distance was too far and expense too great to send for me, it being over 100 miles. At this he put himself into a passion, and said he would see me in spite of them all, for he did not care for expense or distance. Suddenly a blood-vessel on his lungs burst, and he died at once. He was at the time dressed in a shooting suit and had his gun on his arm. I knew he was ill, but a letter from my father previous to the time I saw him told me he was improving and that he might get through the winter; but his disease was consumption, and he had bleeding from the lungs three months before his death.

ROWLAND BOWSTEAD, M.D.

Here the dress is a very distinct one, not associated with invalids or death-beds, and reproduced with apparent exactness. The agent's

impression of his personality seems, in fact, to have carried with it the details of his actual aspect as well as the symbolism of his imagined farewell; and nothing was left to the percipient's imagination. It will be observed that the coincidence of time is close to a minute, and was noted on the spot. It would, we think, be difficult to express in figures the enormous unlikelihood of a merely morbid hallucination, unique in the percipient's experience, and involving by accident such coincidences as these.

Our final instance shall be one which illustrates the possibility of *collective* percipience. We received it from Miss K. M. Weld, of The Lodge, Lyminster, one of the two original witnesses.*

Philip Weld was the youngest son of Mr. James Weld, of Archers Lodge, near Southampton, and a nephew of the late Cardinal Weld. (The chief seat of that ancient family is Lulworth Castle, in Dorsetshire.)

He was sent by his father, in 1842, to St. Edmund's College, near Ware, in Hertfordshire, for his education. He was a well conducted, amiable boy, and much beloved by his masters and fellow-students.

It happened that on April 16th, 1845, it was a playday (or whole holiday), and some of the boys went out on a boating expedition upon the river Ware.

On the morning of that day, Philip had been to Holy Communion at the early Mass (having just finished his retreat), and in the afternoon, accompanied by one of the masters and some of his companions, went to boat on the river, which was a sport he enjoyed much.

When one of the masters remarked that it was time to return to the college, Philip begged to have one row more; the master consented, and they rowed to the accustomed turning point.

On arriving there, in turning the boat, Philip accidentally fell out into a very deep part of the river, and, notwithstanding every effort that was made to save him, was drowned.

His corpse was brought back to the college, and the Very Rev. Dr. Cox (the president) was immensely shocked and grieved; he was very fond of Philip, but what was most dreadful to him was to have to break the sad news to the boy's parents. He scarcely knew what to do, whether to write by post or to send a messenger.

At last he made up his mind to go himself to Mr. Weld, at Southampton. He set off the same afternoon, and, passing through London, reached Southampton the next day, and drove from thence to Archers Lodge, the residence of Mr. Weld; but before entering the grounds he saw Mr. Weld at a short distance from his gate, walking towards the town.

Dr. Cox immediately stopped the carriage, alighted, and was about to address Mr. Weld, when he prevented him by saying:—

"You need not say one word, for I know that Philip is dead. Yesterday afternoon I was walking with my daughter, Katherine, and we suddenly saw him. He was standing on the path, on the opposite side of the turnpike road, between two persons, one of whom was a

* In the present issue, this case replaces one where further examination showed an apparently fundamental error in one of the dates.

youth dressed in a black robe. My daughter was the first to perceive them and exclaimed, 'Oh, papa! did you ever see anything so like Philip as that is?' 'Like him,' I answered, 'why it is him.' Strange to say, my daughter thought nothing of the circumstance, beyond that we had seen an extraordinary likeness of her brother. We walked on towards these three figures. Philip was looking, with a smiling, happy expression of countenance, at the young man in a black robe, who was shorter than himself. Suddenly they all seemed to me to have vanished; I saw nothing but a countryman, whom I had before seen *through* the three figures, which gave me the impression that they were spirits. I, however, said nothing to anyone, as I was fearful of alarming my wife. I looked out anxiously for the post the following morning. To my delight, no letter came. I forgot that letters from Ware came in the afternoon, and my fears were quieted, and I thought no more of the extraordinary circumstance until I saw you in the carriage outside my gate. Then everything returned to my mind, and I could not feel a doubt that you came to tell me of the death of my dear boy."

The reader may imagine how inexpressibly astonished Dr. Cox was at these words. He asked Mr. Weld if he had ever before seen the young man in the black robe at whom Philip was looking with such a happy smile. Mr. Weld answered that he had never before seen him, but that his countenance was so indelibly impressed on his mind that he was certain he should have known him at once anywhere.

Dr. Cox then related to the afflicted father all the circumstances of his son's death, which had taken place at the very hour in which he appeared to his father and sister; and they felt much consolation on account of the placid smile Mr. Weld had remarked on the countenance of his son, as it seemed to indicate that he had died in the grace of God and was, consequently, happy.

Mr. Weld went to the funeral of his son, and as he left the church, after the sad ceremony, looked round to see if any of the religious at all resembled the young man he had seen with Philip, but he could not trace the slightest likeness in any of them.

About four months after, he and his family paid a visit to his brother, Mr. George Weld, at Seagram Hall, in Lancashire.

One day he walked with his daughter Katherine to the neighbouring village of Chipping, and after attending a service at the church called on the priest.

It was a little time before the rev. father was at leisure to come to them, and they amused themselves meantime by examining the prints hanging on the walls on the room. Suddenly, Mr. Weld stopped before a picture which had no name, that you could see, written under it (as the frame covered the bottom), and exclaimed, "*That* is the person whom I saw with Philip; I do not know whose likeness this print is, but I am *certain* that it was *that* person whom I saw with Philip."

The priest entered the room a few moments afterwards, and was immediately questioned by Mr. Weld concerning the print.

He answered that it was a print of St. Stanislaus Kostka, and supposed to be a very good likeness of the young saint.

Mr. Weld was much moved at hearing this, for St. Stanislaus was a Jesuit, who died when quite young, and Mr. Weld's father having been a great benefactor of that Order, his family were supposed to be under the particular protection of the Jesuit saints; also, Philip had been led of late, by various circumstances, to a particular devotion to St. Stanislaus.

Moreover, St. Stanislaus is supposed to be the especial advocate of drowned men, as is mentioned in his life.

The rev. father instantly presented the picture to Mr. Weld, who, of course, received it with the greatest veneration, and kept it until his death.

His wife valued it equally, and at her death it passed into the possession of the daughter who saw the apparition at the same time he did, and it is now in her possession.

In answer to an inquiry as to whether she had ever had other hallucinations of the senses, Miss Weld replied that the above was a totally unique experience.*

We have no explanation of the third phantasmal figure; but the apparition of the second figure seems to lend itself with special facility to the telepathic hypothesis; since we can conceive that the idea of his favourite saint may have been actually present to the mind of the drowning man.

Our theory of Apparitions has, we hope, been now made sufficiently clear. It of course makes no claim to be exhaustive. Resting as it does on an experimental basis, we think that it ought to be pressed to the furthest possible point; but we are far from dogmatically asserting that *all* phantasmal indications of death are of identical nature, and that because Thought-transference explains some of them, it must needs explain all. Just as morbid phantasms may be variously produced by fever, by insanity, by opium, so also veridical phantasms may be ultimately traceable to more than one originating cause. But whatever further departures may hereafter be needful,

* The following reference to the same incident, from a physician residing at Florence, is useful as illustrating the slight inaccuracies which may creep into a narrative, without the least affecting the essential point:—

"I was mentioning this" (*i.e.*, a similar case) "to Baron F., or rather we were talking over the incidents connected with it, when he told me of a strange occurrence which happened at the school where he was, near Ware, in England, a Catholic college,—president a Dr. Cox. There was a boy there of the name of Weld, a very well-known Catholic family. This boy was accidentally drowned. The father and mother were at the time at Southampton, and on the day in question were walking on the Quay near the shipping. They suddenly saw the said boy approaching, and hurried to meet him, but immediately he appeared to fade away, so that they could see the masts of the ships, and through what had seemed to be his body. The next day, or the day following, Dr. Cox called on them, when Mr. Weld said, "I know why you are here, it is to tell me that my son is dead; I saw him yesterday, and knew then that he had departed."

we trust that the generalisations already made will continue valid. We trust that permanent acceptance will be accorded to the thesis that *some* of those hallucinations of one or more of the senses, which correspond with objective events at a distance, and which we therefore term *veridical*, are caused by a telepathic impact conveyed from the mind of an absent agent to the mind of the percipient, and rendering itself cognisable by the percipient's senses in various stages of externalisation, and with various admixtures of a dreamlike or symbolical element. We claim that this thesis possesses the *prima facie* characteristics of a true scientific generalisation. It is not contradictory of any previously established law; it has been vaguely foreshadowed by many earlier observers; it is more or less directly confirmed by two separate lines of actual experiment—those, namely, which indicate the existence of a similar reception of impressions in the *normal* and in the *hypnotic* state; and it adapts itself to facts recorded for centuries in all quarters of the globe, and forming a convergence of testimony without any possible concert or prearrangement. The theory will, we hope, be discussed, modified, and extended by many persons capable of dealing with it in all its bearings. Meantime, there is little to be learnt from the mere *à priori* negation with which it is sometimes met, and which would, without inquiry, explain all telepathic experiments by fraud, and all veridical hallucinations by mere chance-coincidence. This position of pure negation, indeed, becomes daily more difficult to maintain, as experiments are multiplied and death-wraiths recur. The force of *à priori* denunciation such as this lies mainly in its first confident expression, and in the amount of diffused prejudice which it can begin by arraying on its side. Time fights for inductive reasoners; and if (as we may fairly hope) an increasing body of informants continue to supply us with the first-hand evidence on which our induction depends, we may trust that each year will make our position stronger, and our own views more clear.

But we must find space before we close for one or two of the reflections to which the narratives cited in these papers naturally give rise—reflections which may jar, we fear, alternately on some religious and on some scientific prepossessions, but which may not be unacceptable to those who hold that these two modes of regarding the universe do but point from different sides to a higher, a reconciling unity.

In the first place, then, with all respect to those who in every age have held these death-wraiths as proof of a special Providence—intimations of the pitying indulgence of a beneficent Power—we must say that the evidence, as presented to us, does not seem to support the conclusion. Such indulgence would involve some distinct reference to the percipient's affections and emotions. But in Mr.

Marchant's case, for instance, there was no question of affection ; and the only emotions that his experience caused him were surprise and curiosity. Can we suppose that his old *employé* was expressly permitted to overstep the lot of man, merely to manifest himself on an errand so bootless, and as a phantom so undesired? No, even in this hyperphysical region, and in the very vanguard of our advance upon the Unseen, we are forced to believe that *Dieu n'agit pas par des volontés particulières*—we are forced to surmise the presence of a law which, though obscure, is immutable ; which is a factor in the fabric of things, and was not framed, nor is suspended, in the special interest of any one of us.

But, at the same time—and now we fear that a certain section of the scientific world may in their turn find our suggestions distasteful—the theory of telepathy does undoubtedly afford an unexpected support to a certain school of religious conceptions. For there are two very different theological views (often obscured by vagueness of language) as to the manner in which unseen powers exercise influence on the visible world. Some dogmatists have insisted that such influence is, in the strictest sense of the word, *miraculous* ; that it involves a *suspension* of the laws of nature, an *interference* with the established course of things ; and that, in fact, on such non-natural or miraculous-character its sanctity and value depend. Now against this creed, Telepathy, like any other correlation under law of facts previously supposed to be arbitrary exceptions to law, does but accumulate one more presumption. But there have been other theologians, from Augustine to Archbishop Trench, who have formulated the claim of theology in a wiser way. Such men maintain that an influence is in truth exercised by the invisible on the visible world ; but that it is exercised according to laws, which, though unknown to us, do in fact regulate and determine the action of higher intelligences, whose volition thus intervenes in human affairs in a fashion as strictly *conditioned* as any volitions of our own.

Now the evidence which we have been discussing certainly does not supply any direct confirmation of this view either. We have found no need to postulate the existence of any intelligences except human minds, and human minds, not in hell or heaven, but on earth as we know them. But, nevertheless, *if* other intelligent beings besides those visible to us do in fact exist—if man's own soul survives the tomb—then, no doubt, our telepathic experiments and our collected cases of apparitions, interpreted as we interpret them, do suggest analogies of influence, modes of operation, which (it is hardly too much to say) would throw a quite novel light over the long controversy between Science and Faith. It is only in some form of idealism that that controversy can find a close. And we are far too sensible of the problem

involved in the relation of our own will to the facts and forces of nature to meet any idealistic hypothesis of the relation of *other* wills to those facts and forces with a direct denial. We cannot call a hypothesis *unphilosophical*—however much *unproved*—if it introduces into the great problem no difficulty which is not already there, and is compatible—which the cruder theory of miracle is *not*—with the known facts of the universe, viewed in that connected manner which alone can give stability to thought.

But we shall do more than indicate this line of reflection. We have no wish to take wing as *chimærcæ bombinantes in vacuo*—full-blown explainers of the universe—but rather to be accepted as hewers of wood and drawers of water in a territory which inductive science has yet to clear for her own. Nay, we have preferred to submit to the inconvenience of an arbitrary restriction of our subject, rather than to risk the dangers which might attend its further extension. Of apparitions *after death* we say nothing here; we choose rather to defer all discussion of such evidence as is alleged for them (though we receive and examine it) until we have learnt everything that it may be possible to learn of those *phantasms of the living* which do not tempt us among agencies so obscure and unknown. It is true that even of these incidents *death* is the central fact. It is in this profoundest shock which human life encounters that these phantasms are normally engendered; and, where not in death itself, at least in one of those special moments, whether of strong mental excitement or of bodily collapse, which of all living experiences come nearest to the great crisis of dissolution. Following the track not only of logical sequence but of imaginative interest, our evidence has carried us from the slightest to the gravest of human things, from the curiosities of an afternoon to the crises of a lifetime, from petty experiments and seemingly aimless mysteries up to the experience which there is no refusing, and into the heart of the supreme mystery which surrounds and overshadows us whether we speculate about it or no. But in the light of advancing knowledge that mystery may appear—if no less profound than ever—at any rate less appalling. We have drawn on no creeds; we have appealed to no “supernatural agencies;” but new facts cannot leave old facts exactly where they found them; and we have at any rate discovered in *death* the great and peculiar source of phenomena which—however we interpret them—are essentially *vital*. With this reflection we may pause on the threshold—*vestibulum ante ipsum primisque in faucibus Orci*—till our eyes, which still can look into daylight, have grown accustomed to the darkening air. Not here, indeed, any more than elsewhere, shall we find the “Elysian road” which will conduct man undoubtingly to such beliefs as his heart most craves. *Centauri in foribus stabulant*. There will, we doubt not, as discovery replaces

imagination, be found much that will startle, something that will alarm or repel. But in this age, if in any, it may surely be affirmed that "Truth, after all, is the prime passion of mankind"; and the audience, the fellow-workers, to whom we look are those who in these deep matters are weary alike of unproved dogma and of uninquiring negation; who have faith enough in the methods and in the future of science to feel confident that the same humble, candid, persistent collection and colligation of facts—without disdain of the smallest things or fear of the hardest—which in one century has so changed our outlook on the world, may be rewarded hereafter by the opening of horizons wider still,—by a more indisputable insight, a more assured penetration into the "chief concerns of man."