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THOMAS TAYLOR'S PREFACE TO PORPHYRY'S INTRODUCTION TO THE CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE

Philosophy is the knowledge of beings so far as they are beings. Philosophers therefore investigate after what manner they may possess a scientific knowledge of beings; and in consequence of perceiving that particulars are generable and corruptible, and besides this that they are infinite,* but science† is the knowledge of things perpetual and finite, they betake themselves from things partial to things universal, which are perpetual and finite. For, as Plato says, science receives its appellation from leading us to a certain *state* and boundary of things; and we obtain this through recurring to universals. Philosophers therefore recur from particular men, or the individuals of the human species, to universal man. For their object is not to know how many men there are in the world, but what is the nature of man, that he is a rational mortal animal; since he who knows this will also know all the men that the world contains, all that have been, and all that will be. Thus then from particular men

* The terms infinite and finite, as here used, refer to the numerical aspect of things, and not to their power.

Infinite here signifies the unlimited number of possible particulars; while the term finite refers to the universal principles, because they are relatively few in number.

Particulars, although more in number, are less in power than universals, which conversely are fewer in number but greater in power.

† In the Platonic writings "science" is the knowledge of real things and beings which results from dialectic reasoning. It is not concerned with particular concrete natures but with the universal causes upon which particulars depend.

they betake themselves to a certain common nature of man. Again, from particular horses they ascend to a certain common nature of horse, which comprehends all individual or particular horses, and define a horse to be a quadruped capable of neighing. For the philosopher does not wish to know particular horses, such, for instance, as what Xanthus and Balias are (the horses of Achilles mentioned by Homer), but what universal horse is. For universals possess a perpetual and invariable sameness of subsistence, and are not different at different times, like particulars. Thus the particular nature of the horse Balias is different from that of Xanthus, and the particular nature of Plato is different from that of Alcibiades. But universal man and universal horse subsist always after the same manner; and this is also the case with every other species of animal. Philosophers, therefore, perceiving that the number of these forms, though it is finite, yet cannot be ascertained by the human intellect; betook themselves to a certain common nature of animal, which comprehends all particular animals. For man, horse, and dog, so far as they are animals, have no difference, each of them being an animated, sensitive essence. He, therefore, who knows what animal is, will know all animals. Again, from the fig, the plane-tree, and the vine, they betook themselves to the universal fig, plane-tree, and vine; and in a similar manner in other plants. Again they referred these and other plants to the common genus plant, which comprehends in itself all particular or partial plants. Having, therefore, two common natures, that of animal and that of plant, they again referred animal and plant to that which is animated.* For a plant also is animated; since it is increased and nourished, and generates that which is similar to itself. Since, however, the inanimate is opposed to the animated, but the inanimate is that which does not participate of soul, such as a stone, a piece of wood, and the like, and these are many and infinite in particulars, on this account from particular stones they again betook themselves to universal stone; from particular pieces of wood to wood universal; and in a similar manner from the rest of things of this kind. From universal stone, from universal wood, and the like, they also ascended to the common genus inanimate, which contains in itself all these. Hence they obtained two common natures,

* In so far as animals and plants are animated, they participate in soul, which is the principle of animation.

the animated and the inanimate. But these again they referred to the common genus body, which possesses three dimensions; for stones, wood, man, and, in short, all such things as are bodies, have three dimensions. Again, ascending from these to natures truly incorporeal, such as the rational soul, intellect, and Deity, and the forms which they essentially contain, they surveyed that which is common in all incorporeal natures, and which has a subsistence contrary to that of bodies. For body is triply extended, and every way divisible; but that which is incorporeal is unextended and indivisible. They investigated therefore what that is which is common in both these, and they found that each is an essence. They elevated themselves therefore to the common genus essence, the name *essence** manifesting a self-subsisting thing. But we may learn the truth of what is said from the contrary. There are certain things which cannot subsist from themselves, but have their being in others, which also are called accidents; such as whiteness, blackness, sweetness, and the like. For these are not able to subsist by themselves; but whiteness is either in ceruse, or in milk, which are bodies; and the rest in a similar manner. Such things therefore as are capable of subsisting by themselves, and which do not require anything else to their subsistence, are called essences; such as men, souls, stones, and the like. And hence, as we have said, they ascended to a certain common nature, essence.

As Philoponus, however, in his extracts from Ammonius, takes no notice of the universal which has an *essential* subsistence in the soul (nor is this wonderful, considering, as Simplicius justly says of him, that the eyes of his soul were injured), it will be necessary to give the reader the following information on this most important subject. The whole of it is extracted from the manuscript, *Commentary of Proclus on the Parmenides of Plato*; and though perfectly Platonic, will nevertheless be found to accord with the doctrine of Aristotle, as will appear from our notes on his *Posterior Analytics*.

Forms, then, must not be admitted to be the progeny and blossoms of matter, as they were said to be by the Stoics; nor must it be granted that they consist from a commixture of simple elements; nor that they have the same essence with spermatic

* The usual term is substance: the names given to the several Categories vary in different translations.

reasons. For all these things evince their subsistence to be corporeal, imperfect, and divisible. Whence then on such an hypothesis is perfection derived to things imperfect? Whence union to things every way dissipated? Whence is a never-failing essence present with things perpetually generated, unless the incorporeal and all-perfect order of forms has a subsistence prior to these? Others, again of the ancients, assigned that which is common in particulars as the cause of the permanency in forms: for man generates man, and the similar is produced from the similar. They ought, however, to have directed their attention to that which gives subsistence to what is common in particulars; for true causes are exempt from their effects. That which is common, therefore, in particulars may be assimilated to one and the same seal which is impressed in many pieces of wax, and which remains the same without failing, while the pieces of wax are changed. What then is it which proximately impresses this seal in the wax? For matter is analogous to the wax, the sensible man to the type, and that which is common in particulars, and verges to things, to the seal itself. What else then can we assign as the cause of this, than nature proceeding through matter, and thus giving form to that which is sensible by her own inherent reasons? Soul, therefore, will thus be analogous to the hand which uses the ring, since soul is the leader of nature; that which ranks as a whole (i.e. the soul of the world) of the whole of nature, and that which is partial of a partial nature. But intellect will be analogous to the soul which impresses the wax through the hand and the ring; which intellect fills a sensible essence through soul and the nature of forms, and is itself the true Porus,* generative of the reasons which flow, as far as to matter. It is not necessary therefore to stop at things common in particulars, but we should investigate the causes of them. For why do men participate of this common nature, but another animal of a different common nature, except through unapparent reasons, or, in other words, productive principles? For nature is the one mother of all things; but what are the causes of definite similitudes? And why do we say that the generation is according to nature when man is from man, unless there is a producing principle of men in nature, according to which all sensible men subsist? For it is not because that which is produced is an animal, since if it were a lion that

* See the speech of Diotima in the *Banquet* of Plato.

were produced from a man, it would be a natural animal indeed, but would no longer be *according to nature*, because it would not be generated according to a proper reason, or producing cause. And hence it is necessary to recur from the things common in particulars to the one cause which proximately gives subsistence to sensibles.

After the forms or universals which subsist in nature, and are participated by sensibles, some of the followers of Aristotle directed their attention to those *νοήματα* or *conceptions* which are ingenerated in the soul by an abstraction from sensible particulars. They also contended that no forms of an higher order than these had any subsistence. A form of this kind, however, which is of posterior origin (*το υστερογενες ειδος*) and is the subject of logical predication, is entirely different from that reason or form which abides essentially in souls, and does not derive its subsistence from an abstraction from sensibles. Looking to this essential reason, we say that the soul is all forms, and is the place of forms, not in capacity only, but in that kind of energy through which we call one skilled in geometry a geometrician in energy, even when he does not geometrize, and which Aristotle accurately calls the prior form of existing in energy. The conception therefore of posterior origin, or the universal produced by an abstraction from sensibles, is very properly said to be different from the essential reason of the soul: for it is more obscure than the many in sensibles, as being posterior, and not prior to them. But the essential reason or form of the soul is more perfect, because the conception of posterior origin, or in modern language, *abstract idea**, has a less essence than the many, but the essential form more.

That it is not, however, proper to stop at conceptions of posterior origin, i.e. notions gained by an abstraction from sensible particulars, but that we should proceed to those essential reasons which are allotted a perpetual subsistence in the soul, is evident to those who are able to survey the nature of things. For whence is man able to collect into one by reasoning the perceptions of many sensibles, and to consider one and the same

* Abstract ideas or conceptions here referred to are the result of inductive reasoning and constitute man's knowledge of existing or subsisting things, which, however, have a reality independent of man's conceptions of them.

unapparent form prior to things apparent, and separated from each other? But no other animal that we are acquainted with surveys this something common, for neither does it possess a rational essence, but always employs sense, and appetite, and imagination. Whence, then, do rational souls generate these universals, and recur from the senses to that which is the object of opinion? It is because they essentially possess the gnostically productive principles of things. For as nature possesses a power productive of sensibles, by containing reasons, or productive principles, and fashions and connects sensibles, so as by the inward eye to form the external, and in a similar manner the finger, and every other particular; so he who has a common conception of these, by previously possessing the reasons of things, beholds that which each possesses in common. For he does not receive this common something from sensibles; since that which is received from sensibles is a phantasm and not the object of opinion.* It likewise remains within such as it was received from the beginning, that it may not be false, and a non-entity, but does not become more perfect and venerable, nor does it originate from anything else than the soul. Indeed, it must not be admitted that nature in generating generates by natural reasons and measures, but that soul in generating does not generate by reasons and causes which partake of the nature of the soul. But if matter possesses that which is common in the many, and this something common is essential, and more essence than individuals; for this is perpetual, but each of those is corruptible, and they derive their very being from this, since it is through form that everything partakes of essence—if this be the case, and the soul possesses only things common which are of posterior origin (*υστερογενη χωρα*), do we not make the soul more ignoble than matter? For the form which is merged in matter will be more perfect and more essence than that which resides in the soul; since the latter is of posterior origin, but the former is perpetual; and the one is after, but the other generative and connective of the many. To which we may add, that a common phantasm in the soul derives its subsistence from a survey of that which is common in particulars. Hence it tends to this: for every thing adheres to its

* Opinion is the last of the rational powers of the soul; is that which sees the *universal* in sensible particulars; and knows *that* a thing is, but not *why* it is.—T.T.

principle, and is said to be nothing else than a predicate, so that its very essence is to be predicated of the many.

Farther still, the universal in the many is less than each of the many; for by certain additions and accidents it is surpassed by every individual. But that which is of posterior origin, or universal abstracted from particulars, comprehends each of the many. Hence it is predicated of each of these; and that which is particular is contained in the whole of this universal. For this something common, or abstract idea, is not only predicated of that something common in an individual, but likewise of the whole subject. How then can it thence derive its subsistence, and be completed from that which is common in the many? For, if from the many themselves, where do we see *infinite* men, of all which we predicate the same thing? And if it derives its subsistence from that which is common in the many, whence is it that this abstract idea is more comprehensive than its cause? Hence it has a different origin, and receives from another form this power which is comprehensive of every individual; and of this form the abstract idea which subsists in opinion is the image, the inward cause being excited from things apparent. To which we may add, that all demonstration, as Aristotle has shown in his *Posterior Analytics*, is from things prior, more honourable, and more universal. How, therefore, is universal more honourable, if it is of posterior origin? For, in things of posterior origin, that which is more universal is more unessential; whence species is more essence than genus.

The rules therefore concerning the most true demonstration must be subverted, if we alone place in the soul universals of posterior origin; for these are not more excellent than, nor are the causes of, nor are naturally prior to, particulars. Hence, if these things are absurd, it is necessary that *essential* reasons should subsist in the soul prior to the universals which are produced by an abstraction from sensibles. And these reasons, or productive powers, are indeed always exerted, and are always efficacious in divine souls, and in the more excellent orders of beings; but in us they are sometimes dormant, and sometimes in energy.

But to return from this digression, the importance of which must be the apology for its length: Does therefore essence comprehend all things? By no means. For we say there are two things, ten things, and twenty things, which philosophers refer to a

certain common genus number. Again, they found that some things were great and others small, which they call continuous. Since, therefore, number and the continued communicate with each other so far as they are quantities, for each is quantity, they referred these to universal quantity. They had, therefore, two common natures comprehensive of many things, viz. *essence and quantity*. Farther still, there is something white, and many particular whitenesses; for whiteness is either in ceruse, or in snow, or in a swan. All these, therefore, they referred to that which is simply white. In a similar manner, they referred the black, the dark brown, and things of this kind, to colour. Again, there are the sweet, the bitter, the hot, the cold. All, therefore, that we have now enumerated they referred to the common genus *quality*. Farther still, there is something on the right hand and something on the left; something which is double and something which is half. All these, therefore, they referred to the common genus *relation*, which is the habitude of one thing to another. Again, something is in the lyceum, or the forum, and things of this kind, which they referred to *where*, and which is significant of place. Something also was yesterday, is to-day, will be to-morrow, was in the last year, and the like, all which they referred to *when*, which is significant of time. Again, there is something which lies, something which stands, and something which sits, which they referred to *situation*, and which signifies a certain *position* of the body. Farther still, to be clothed is something, to be armed, to wear a ring, and things of this kind, which they referred to *habit*, and which signifies the investiture of essence about essence. Again, to strike, to heat, to refrigerate, and things of this kind, they referred to *action*. And lastly, perceiving certain things which are whitened, heated, refrigerated, etc., they referred all these to *passion*, which is to be changed in quality by something else; but *action* is to operate about something. Hence they obtained these common natures, viz. *essence, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, situation, habit, action, and passion*. Everything therefore that exists is comprehended under one of these common natures, which are called categories, as being asserted of some one of the things contained under them. Concerning these ten categories Aristotle has written a treatise, in which he makes mention of the five words, *genus, species, difference, peculiarity, and accident*.

A BUDDHIST PARABLE FROM THE DHAMMAPADA

In old time, when Buddha was resting at Śrāvasti, there was an old mendicant called Pan-teh-san who, being by nature cross and dull, could not learn so much as one Gâthâ by heart. Buddha accordingly ordered 500 Rahats day by day to instruct him, but after three years he still was unable to remember even the one Gâthâ. Then all the people of the country, knowing his ignorance, began to ridicule him, on which Buddha, pitying his case, called him to his side, and gently repeated the following stanza: "He who guards his mouth, and restrains his thoughts, he who offends not with his body, the man who acts thus shall obtain deliverance." Then Pan-teh-san, moved by a sense of the Master's goodness to him, felt his heart opened, and at once repeated the stanza. Buddha then addressed him further: "You now, an old man, can repeat a stanza only, and men know this, and they will still ridicule you, therefore I will now explain the meaning of the verse to you, and do you on your part attentively listen."

Then Buddha declared the three causes connected with the body, the four connected with the mouth, and the three connected with the thoughts, by destroying which men might obtain deliverance; on which the mendicant, fully realizing the truth thus explained, obtained the condition of a Rahat.

Now, at this time there were 500 Bhikshunîs (nuns) dwelling in their Vihârâ, who sent one of their number to Buddha to request him to send them a priest to instruct them in the Law, on which Buddha desired the mendicant Pan-teh-san to go to them for the purpose. On hearing that this arrangement had been made, all the nuns began to laugh together, and agreed on the morrow, when he came, to say the Gâthâ backward, and so confuse the old man and put him to shame. Then on the morrow when he came, all the Bhikshunîs, great and small, went forth to salute him, and as they did so, they looked at one another and smiled. Then, sitting down, they offered him food: Having eaten and washed his hands, they then begged him to begin his sermon. On which the aged mendicant ascended the elevated seat, and sitting down,

began: "Sisters! my talent is small, my learning is very little. I know only one Gâthâ, but I will repeat that and explain its meaning. Do you listen with attention and understand." Then all the young nuns began to attempt to say the Gâthâ backwards; but lo! they could not open their mouths; and filled with shame, they hung down their heads in sorrow. Then Pan-teh-san, having repeated the Gâthâ, began to explain it, head by head, as Buddha had instructed him. Then all the female mendicants hearing his words, were filled with surprise and, rejoicing to hear such instruction, with one heart they received enlightenment.

PERFECTION FROM THE LÎ KÎ

Perfection is seen in its possessor's self-completion; and the path which is its embodiment, in its self-direction.

Perfection is seen in the beginning and end of all creatures and things. Without this perfection there would be no creature or thing.

Therefore the superior man considers perfection as the noblest of all attainments.

He who is perfect does not only complete himself; his perfection enables him to complete all other beings also. The completion of himself shows the complete virtue of his nature; the completion of other beings shows his wisdom. The two show his nature in good operation, and the way in which the union of the external and internal is effected.

Hence whenever he exercises it, the operation is right.

Thus it is that entire perfection is unresting; unresting, it continues long; continuing long, it reveals itself; revealing itself, it reaches far; reaching far, it becomes great and substantial; great and substantial, it becomes high and brilliant.

By being great and substantial it contains all things. By being high and brilliant, it overarches all things. By reaching far and continuing long, it completes all things. By its being so great and substantial, it makes its possessor to be one with Yin; by its height and brilliancy, it makes him one with Yang; by its reaching far and continuing long, it makes him one with the Infinite.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL IN THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES

II. THE PHAEDRUS

This dialogue takes place between Socrates and his friend Phaedrus, who has persuaded him to walk beyond the city walls into the country. They find a grassy bank and rest beneath a plane-tree beside the River Ilyssus while Phaedrus reads a speech made by a mutual acquaintance, Lysias, on the subject of love. The arguments of Lysias are refuted by Socrates in a beautiful discourse in which is set forth the distinction between rational and irrational love, and the heights to which the human soul may rise when inspired by Divine Love.*

Before unfolding this theme Socrates investigates the nature of the soul and brings forward the basic principle on which the whole discourse depends, viz. the immortality of the soul, which he demonstrates as follows:† “Every soul is immortal; for that which is always moved is immortal. But that which moves another thing and is moved by another, in consequence of having a cessation of motion, has also a cessation of life. Hence that alone which moves itself, because it does not desert itself, never ceases to be moved; but this is also the fountain and principle of motion to such other things as are moved. But principle is unbegotten, for it is necessary that everything which is generated should be generated from a principle, but that the principle itself should not be generated from any one thing. For if it were generated from a certain thing, it would not be generated from principle.

“Since, therefore, it is unbegotten, it is also necessary that it should be incorruptible. For the principle being destroyed, it could neither itself be generated from another thing, nor another thing from it, since it is necessary that all things should be generated from principle. Hence the principle of motion is that which moves itself, and this can neither be destroyed nor generated; for otherwise all heaven and all generation falling together must stop, and would never again have anything from

* See “The Human Soul in the Myths of Plato,” *Shrine of Wisdom*, Vol. IX, Nos. 32 and 35.

† Thomas Taylor’s translation.

which, being moved, they would be generated. Since it then appears that the nature which moves itself is immortal, he who asserts that this is the essence and definition of soul will have no occasion to blush. For every body to which motion externally accedes is inanimate; but that to which motion is inherent from itself is animated, as if this were the very nature of soul. If this, however, be the case, and there is nothing else which moves itself except soul, it necessarily follows that soul is unbegotten and immortal."

The demonstration contains two syllogisms, in the first of which it is shown that soul, being self-motive, must live always; while the second proves that the soul, being the principle of motion, must be unbegotten and incorruptible, and therefore immortal. Both these proofs depend upon the assumption that the soul is self-motive. Plato does not present them in strictly syllogistic order, but Thomas Taylor has arranged them in the form of sorites. The first is:

Soul is self-motive.

That which is self-motive is always moved because it never forsakes itself, nor is devoid of motive power.

But if it is always moved with an inward motion, it always lives.

Soul, therefore, is immortal.

The second is:

Soul is self-motive.

The self-motive is the principle of motion.

But principle is unbegotten.

That which is unbegotten is immortal.

Soul, therefore, is immortal.

The assumption that the soul is self-motive is examined and shown to be true by the Platonic philosopher Hermeas in his *Scholia* on the Phaedrus.*

"Let us survey," he says, "how that which is self-moved is the first of things that are moved. Aristotle takes away all corporeal motions from the soul, which we also say is most true, but Plato clearly shows that the motions of the soul are different from all corporeal motions; for he says in the tenth book

* The remaining part of the article is based upon Thomas Taylor's translation of this work, and consists mainly of extracts from it which have been re-arranged and to some extent re-expressed.

of the *Laws* that "soul conducts everything in the heavens, the earth, and the sea by its motions, the names of which are *to will, to consider, to attend providentially to other things, to consult, to form opinions rightly or falsely, together with rejoicing, grieving, daring, fearing, hating, and loving.*"

Hermeas proceeds to show the necessity for that which is self-motive by a consideration of the cause of the motion of that which is alter-motive (moved by something other than itself). If there is no self-motive principle, he says, that which is alter-motive must either be moved by another alter-motive nature, and that by another, and so on to infinity; or alter-motive natures must move one another in a circle, so that the first will again be moved by the last. But if neither of these two processes can take place there must necessarily be a self-motive principle.

It is evident, he points out, that alter-motive things cannot proceed to infinity because their essence is not infinite; nor can a science of the infinite be discovered from a study of such things (for they are always in a state of becoming, and all their successive movements have beginning and end, whereas the Infinite for ever *is* and is without beginning or end). It is equally evident that alter-motive things cannot move one another successively in a circle, for in this case the same thing would be at once the cause and the effect, which is impossible: hence, there must necessarily be a principle of motion. This principle of motion which is called soul is said by Plato to be self-motive, and by Aristotle to be immovable.* Hermeas then makes use of the conclusions of Aristotle to demonstrate in another manner the subsistence of the self-motive principle. "Nature never passes from a contrary to a contrary without a medium: for instance, between winter and summer there is at one time the medium spring, and at another time, autumn; and the like takes place in all bodies and incorporeal essences. In the present case, also, between the alter-motive and the immovable natures it is necessary that there should be a medium, the self-moved essence,

* Aristotle, viewing the principle of soul from the objective standpoint, calls it immovable relative to its effects, from which it is essentially exempt. Plato, viewing it from the standpoint of universal principles, names only the Divine ONE immovable; soul being self-moved through a divinely imparted inherent principle.—Eds. *Shrine of Wisdom*.

which has within itself the cause of its own movement: so that just as there is that which is entirely immovable, such as the One Principle of all; and as there is that which is alter-motive, such as body; so between them there will be the self-moved nature which will be nothing else than soul. We say that things moved by soul are animated, and this is the very nature of soul, itself to move itself."

The necessity for a medium between contraries is further shown by a consideration of Being, Life, and Intellect. There is a Superessential, Absolute, Infinite Cause of Being, exempt and immovable, Which is prior to Being; while in extreme contrast is the multitude of finite existences. Between these two extremes lies the medium, the principle of Being. Similar reasoning can be followed in relation to Life and Intellect.

Hermeas also points out that Plato in the *Laws* proves that the self-motive principle is the efficient, paradigmatic (formal) and final cause of all motions in time and space. "If all things should stand still," he says, "which would first be moved?" Must not this be the self-moved nature? For if that which accedes to the motive cause is moved, and all other things are alter-motive; but that which is self-motive possesses in itself a motive power, and does not merely approximate to it, but is united to it, or rather has motion essentially, it is evident that this, being first in motion, will move other things; but just as, if the sun did not rise and set, we should be dubious as to the cause of so great a light, and if it were invisible, should be still more dubious, so because the soul which is the cause of all motions is incorporeal and invisible, we are doubtful as to how corporeal processes are originally set in motion."

Hermeas goes on to explain that the soul is the paradigmatic cause of motion because its own self-motion contains the paradigms of all temporal motions. As the efficient cause of motion the soul produces eight kinds of corporeal motions: generation, corruption, increase, diminution, lation, circulation, mixture, and separation. The paradigms in soul analogous to these corporeal motions are: the ascent or new birth of the soul when it rises above the things of earth, corresponding to generation in corporeal things; the lapse from the intelligible, corresponding to corruption; the union with higher natures, leading to an increase of intellectual activity, corresponding to increase; the

turning from higher natures, with the resulting decrease of intellectual perception, corresponding to diminution; the soul's motion, as in a straight line, into the realms of generation, corresponding to lation; its periodic revolution about forms, its manifestation, and return to its origin, corresponding to circulation (which may more properly be assigned to divine souls; lation, to ours); the integration of knowledge and the unified contemplation of forms, corresponding to mixture; and a more partial intelligence and the contemplation of one form at a time, corresponding to separation. There is a ninth motion which is the soul's action in the distribution and regulation of life to bodies, and this corresponds to the life which is connascent with the soul itself, which it imparts to itself, and according to which it is moved.

It is evident that the soul is also the final cause* of motion to bodies for the following reason. The goal of all things is the good. Everything desires good, and this desire is the cause of any movement towards a proximate goal. Soul, as imparting this motion to all things, looks to the good of the universe and its own good and, to this end, gives to all things that which they need which in some manner and degree is good. Thus the purpose of soul is to lead all things progressively towards the good. Soul, therefore, is the final cause of the motion of corporeal things.

Hermeas continues his examination of the self-motive principle by proving that the soul, since it is self-moved and always moved, cannot be corrupted: for the possibility of corruption would imply that the soul's energy—that is, its self-motion—must first cease, and its subsistence afterwards; or that the subsistence must cease first, and the self-motion afterwards; or that both must cease at the same moment.

An examination of these three cases shows that in the first case if the soul's energy were corrupted its essence could not be preserved because soul, inasmuch as it *is* soul, is self-motive. Nor, in the second case, if its essence were corrupted could its energy be preserved, for its energy is the expression of its essence; if, therefore, every corruptible thing first loses its energy,

* The demonstration that the soul is the final cause of motion to bodies is missing from the original, and the proof is outlined by Thomas Taylor.

and is then corrupted, but the soul, being self-motive, cannot lose its energy, the soul must be incorruptible. In the third case the question must be asked whether, if the soul loses its essence and energy simultaneously, it will be corrupted by itself or by an external cause. It cannot corrupt itself, for it preserves and animates itself by moving itself; neither can it be corrupted by anything external to itself, as in that case the soul would be alter-motive. Moreover, it is preserved by natures more excellent than itself, while it rules over the natures inferior to itself, and is the cause of their motions. The self-motivity of the soul is exercised in its voluntary choice with regard to that which lies in its own power, and this self-movement is the life of the soul.

Hermeas next examines the second syllogism of Plato, which, he says, demonstrates that the soul, as a fountain of motion, extends itself to other things, just as Divine Natures are not only sufficient to themselves, but also are the sources of good to others. Plato states that soul is the principle and fountain of motion, and that principle is unbegotten, and Hermeas, before examining Plato's proof, in reply to a possible objection that although the Principle of Principles, the One God, is unbegotten, yet the assertion may not equally apply to all principles, inquires what is here meant by "principle," and supplies a definition: "Principle, properly so-called, is that which primarily produces the whole form": for example, the equal itself is that which primarily produces every kind of equal, and man itself is that which produces all men. Soul, therefore, being the principle of motion, will be able to produce all forms of motion and, so far as it is the principle of motion, is not generated although, as possessing essence and intellect, it is generated from Being and Intellect. The forms imparted to material things, too, are unbegotten, such as the form of the equal, of man, or of motion. Much more, therefore, must the self-motive principle, the cause of motion, be unbegotten.

A principle is like a fountain in spontaneously imparting to other things that which belongs to itself, and it also possesses another characteristic—that of ruling over all the things which subsist from it. The soul, as the cause of motion, is a principle as being co-ordinated with its productions, and is also a fountain as being exempt and subsisting in intellect.

From the previous considerations it is evident that a principle

is unbegotten in relation to all the things over which it rules. For example, the sun, as a principle of light, is not illuminated by anything else; Intellect, the principle of all that is intellectual, does not derive intellectual perception from anything else; Being, the cause of existing things, does not derive its subsistence as Being from another source; and similarly, the soul, which is the cause of life to other things, does not receive its life extrinsically, and hence is not moved by anything external.

If it is asserted that all things receive existence from the First Cause it may be shown, first, that when considering the principle of a particular series of things other prior principles should not be taken into account and, second, that the principle possesses in a different manner that which it imparts to its productions. But the First Cause, being above all principles and causes, cannot be said to be in a certain manner similar to that which proceeds from itself. Intellect is intellectual from itself, but receives its being from a principle prior to itself (Being Itself). That which is just subsists through Justice Itself which, so far as it is justice and rules over other things, originates from itself; but in so far as it possesses being or intellect, or manifests a certain God, may be said to receive its subsistence from the One Principle of Principles.

Plato's proof that principle is unbegotten is as follows: "If principle were generated it would be generated from that which is not principle, through the hypothesis that it is principle; for nothing generated is the first, but is generated from something else." In other words, principle would be generated from a certain principle, so that principle after principle to infinity would be necessary for its generation, which is impossible. Again, that which generates is different in form from that which is generated: for example, animals are generated from that which is not an animal, namely, a seed; and a house is generated from that which is not a house. Thus principle, if generated, would at one and the same time be generated from principle and from that which is not principle. Hence, everything which is primarily a certain thing, that is, every principle, is unbegotten.

Plato gives a second demonstration through reduction to impossibility: "The principle being destroyed," he says, "could neither be generated from another thing, nor another thing from it." For all things are generated from principles. Hence, "the

principle of generation being destroyed, all heaven and generation falling together must stop, and would never again have anything from which they could be generated."

Hermeas concludes: "Of the two before-mentioned syllogisms, each demonstrates that the soul is neither corrupted from itself nor by anything external to it; nevertheless the first in a greater degree demonstrates the former, and the second, the latter. Hence Plato assumes the proposition which is common to both syllogisms, that the soul is self-moved; and he does this, not merely for the sake of dialectic argument, but because self-motion, being the essence of soul, is the cause of soul not being corrupted, and of other things living and being connected by it.

"Both arguments, therefore, are demonstrative, for they are assumed from the definition of soul, and all the definitions are essential, so far as the soul is what it is. Hence they are also reciprocal or convertible.

"It is also especially requisite to admire the philosopher for employing in his reasoning that which is most peculiar to and characteristic of the soul, omitting such particulars as are common to it with other things: for the soul is *an incorporeal, self-moved essence, gnostic of beings*. Therefore, according to its other characteristics, it has something in common with many things, but this is not the case with the self-motive characteristic."

Thomas Taylor also makes an illuminating comment on the Phaedrus. "The end of man is nothing else than felicity, and this is a union with the Gods; for Plato does not place felicity in externals: but the soul is conjoined with the Gods even in the present life when, surveying the whole of sensible and celestial beauty, it acquires a reminiscence of Intelligible Beauty.

"But the reminiscence must be of that which it once beheld; for reminiscence is of something which has either been heard or seen. The soul formerly beheld this beauty when it revolved in conjunction with its proper God: it must therefore be immortal; for if not, it would neither have revolved, nor have recovered its memory.

"Hence Plato first speaks concerning the immortality of the soul, its idea, and what follows: and afterwards he discourses concerning that to which Love conducts us, namely, an Intelligible Essence and Divine Beauty, simple and unmoved."

ON FAITH AND UNBELIEF
FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON

A want of faith is called doubt, from which the numberless errors that exist in the world are produced. And so, from the absence of doubt, that is, faith, come all the excellencies that exist. Faith is the wide thoroughfare for entering on the path of Wisdom—doubt is the great enemy of Religion. Faith may be compared to a propitious wind wafting a boat down a river; doubt to the whirling eddies of the tide in which a boat, from morning till night, constantly revolves. Hence the Scripture says: "Buddha can save all sentient creatures, but he cannot rescue men who have no faith." So that the first requisite in arriving at supreme Wisdom is faith, just as irrigation of a field is necessary before seed sown therein can sink down and germinate. There are three chief reasons why men have not faith; the first is this: they say, "How is it possible that beyond this world in which we live, with its sun and moon, there can be other worlds and systems of worlds?" The second is this: they say, "When men are dead, and their bodies corrupted, how is it possible that the soul can rise to happiness, or sink to misery?" The third is this: they say, "It is impossible to believe that any man can attain to the condition of perfect enlightenment"; as much as to say that what the ear or the eye cannot apprehend ought not to be believed, but ought to be persistently denied. On the same ground men who live in the north ought not to believe that there are merchant ships traversing the southern seas; and men of Kiang-nan ought not to believe that the nomads of the north live in tents! So it is men find it difficult to believe in the Paradise of Buddha, the Happy Land, and that every good man will go there and dwell in bliss. Whereas they ought to say: "That which the eye cannot see is justly represented as a reward fit for the perfected soul."

Now our perfectly wise Teacher, possessed of every superior faculty, acquainted with all the intricacies of life, and knowing the tendencies of all creatures, directed his instructions with a view to man's complete deliverance, and the acquisition of supreme

Wisdom. And to this end he taught them to walk as he walked, according to his own words: "Himself perfectly wise, he illuminated others, and so, by wisdom and by practice, he fulfilled himself."

SEED THOUGHTS FROM THE LÎ KÎ

To be fond of learning is near to wisdom; to practise with vigour is near to benevolence; to know to be ashamed is near to fortitude. He who knows these three things, knows how to cultivate his own character. Knowing how to cultivate his own character, he knows how to govern other men. Knowing how to govern other men, he knows how to govern the kingdom with its states and families.

The sage is courteous and economical, seeking to exercise his benevolence, and sincere and humble in order to practise his sense of propriety. He does not himself set a high value on his services; he does not himself assert the honour due to his person. He is not ambitious of position, and is very moderate in his desires. He gives place willingly to men of ability and virtue. He abases himself and gives honour to others. He is careful and anxious to do what is right. His desire in all these things is to serve his ruler. If he succeeds he feels he has done right, if he does not succeed, he still feels he has done right: and prepared to accept the will of Heaven concerning himself.

The sage does not himself magnify his doings, nor himself exalt his merit, seeking to be within the truth; actions of an extraordinary character he does not aim at, but seeks to occupy himself only with what is substantial and good. He displays prominently the good qualities of others, and celebrates their merits, seeking to place himself below them in the scale of worth. Therefore, although the sage abases himself, the people respect and honour him.

THE CELESTIAL HIERARCHIES

BY DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE*

CHAPTER XIII

*The Reason why the Prophet Isaiah is said to have been Purified
by the Seraphim.†*

Let us now deal to the best of our ability with the question why the Seraph is said to have been sent to one of the prophets. For someone may feel doubt or uncertainty as to why one of the beings of the highest rank is mentioned as cleansing the prophet, instead of one of the lower ranks of Angels.

Some, indeed, say that according to the description already given of the inter-relation of all the Intelligences, the passage does not refer to one of the first of the Intelligences nearest to God, as having come to purify the hierarch, but that one of those Angels who are our guardians was called by the same name as the Seraphim because of his sacred function of purifying the prophet, for the reason that the remission of sins and the regeneration of him who was purified to obedience to God was accomplished through fire. And they say also that the passage simply says one of the Seraphim, not of those established around God, but of the purifying powers which preside over us.

But another suggested to me a solution of the problem by no means unlikely, for he said that the great Angel, whoever he may have been, who fashioned this vision for the purpose of

* For Chapters I–XII see *Shrine of Wisdom*, Vol. XV, Nos. 58, 59, and 60, and Vol. XVI, No. 61.

† The purification of Isaiah recalls the visitation of the Divine Daemon to Socrates.

“The Daemon of Socrates being allotted a cathartic peculiarity and the source of an undefiled life, . . . and uniformly presiding over the whole of purification, separates Socrates from too much converse with the ‘masses’ and a life extending towards multitude. But it led him into the depths of his soul and an energy undefiled by subordinate natures.”—Proclus, *Additional Notes on 1st Alcibiades*.

instructing the prophet in Divine matters, referred his own office of purification first to God, and after God to that first Hierarchy. And is not this statement true? For he who said this said that the Divine First Power goes forth visiting all things, and irresistibly penetrates all things, and yet is invisible to all, not only as super-essentially transcending all things, but also because It transmits Its Providential Energies in a hidden way through all things. Moreover, It is revealed to all Intellectual Natures in due proportion, and bestows the radiance of Its Light upon the most exalted Beings through whom, as leaders, It is imparted to the lower choirs in order according to their power of Divine contemplation; or to speak in more simple terms, by way of illustration (for although natural things do not truly resemble God, who transcends all, yet they are more easily seen by us) the light of the sun passes readily through the first matter, for this is more transparent, and by means of this it displays more brightly its own brilliance; but when it falls upon some denser material it is shed forth again less brightly because the material which is illuminated is not adapted for the transmission of light, and after this it is little by little diminished until it hardly passes through at all. Similarly, the heat of fire imparts itself more readily to that which is more adapted to receive it, being yielding and conductive to its likeness; but upon substances of opposite nature which are resistant to it, either no effect at all or only a slight trace of the action of the fire appears; and what is more, when fire is applied to materials of opposite nature through the use of other substances receptive to it the fire first heats the material which is easily made hot, and through it, heats proportionately the water or other substance which does not so easily become hot.

Thus, according to the same law of the material order, the Fount of all order, visible and invisible, supernaturally shows forth the glory of Its own radiance in all-blessed outpourings of first manifestation to the highest Beings, and through them those below them participate in the Divine Ray. For since these have the highest knowledge of God, and desire pre-eminently the Divine Goodness, they are thought worthy to become first workers, as far as can be attained, of the imitation of the Divine Power and Energy, and beneficently uplift those below them, as far as is in their power, to the same imitation by shedding

abundantly upon them the splendour which has come upon themselves; while these, in turn, impart their light to lower choirs. And thus, throughout the whole Hierarchy, the higher impart that which they receive to the lower, and through the Divine Providence all are granted participation in the Divine Light in the measure of their receptivity.

There is, therefore, one Source of Light for everything which is illuminated, namely, God, Who by His Nature, truly and rightly, is the Essence of Light, and Cause of Being and of vision. But it is ordained that in imitation of God each of the higher ranks of Beings is the source in turn for the one which follows it; since the Divine Rays are passed through it to the other. Therefore the Beings of all the Angelic ranks naturally consider the highest Order of the Celestial Intelligences as the Source, after God, of all holy knowledge and imitation of God, because through them the Light of the Supreme God is imparted to all and to us. On this account they refer all holy works, in imitation of God, to God as the Ultimate Cause, but to the First Divine Intelligences as the first regulators and transmitters of Divine Energies.

Therefore the first Order of the holy Angels possesses above all others the characteristic of fire, and the abundant participation of Divine Wisdom, and the possession of the highest knowledge of the Divine Illuminations, and the characteristic of Thrones which symbolizes openness to the reception of God. The lower Orders of the Celestial Beings participate also in these fiery, wise, and God-receptive powers, but in a lower degree, and as looking to those above them who, being thought worthy of the primary imitation of God, uplift them, as far as possible, into the likeness of God.

These holy characteristics in which the secondary Natures are granted participation through the first, they ascribe to those very Intelligences, after God, as Hierarchs.

He who gave this explanation used to say that the vision was shown to the prophet by one of those holy and blessed Angels who preside over us, by whose enlightening guidance he was raised to that intellectual contemplation in which he beheld the most exalted Beings (to speak in symbols) established under God, with God, and around God; and their super-princely Leader, ineffably uplifted above them all,

established in the midst of the supremely exalted Powers.

The prophet, therefore, learned from these visions that, according to every super-essential excellence, the Divine One subsists in incomparable pre-eminence, excelling all visible and invisible powers, above and exempt from all; and that He bears no likeness even to those First-subsisting Beings; and moreover that He is the Principle and Cause of all being, and the Immutable Foundation of the abiding stability of things that are, from which the most exalted Powers have both their being and their well-being. Then he was instructed that the Divine Powers of the holy Scriptures, whose sacred name means "The Fiery Ones," and of which we shall soon speak, as far as we can, led the upliftment of the fiery power towards the Divine Likeness.

When the holy prophet saw in the sacred vision of the sixfold wings the most high and absolute upliftment to the Divine in first, middle, and last Intelligences, and beheld their many feet and many faces, and perceived that their eyes and their feet were covered by their wings, and that the middle wings were in ceaseless movement, he was guided to the intelligible knowledge of that which was seen through the revelation to him of the far-reaching and far-seeing power of the most exalted Intelligences, and of their holy awe which they have in a supermundane manner in the bold and persistent and unending search into higher and deeper Mysteries, and the perfect harmony of their ceaseless activity in imitation of God, and their perpetual upward soaring to the heights.

Moreover, he also learned that divine and most glorious song of praise; for the Angel who fashioned the vision gave, as far as possible, his own holy knowledge to the prophet. He also taught him that every participation in the Divine Light and Purity, as far as this may be attained, is a purification, even to the most pure. Having its source in the Most High God, it proceeds from the most exalted Causes in a super-essential and hidden manner, traversing the whole of the Divine Intelligences, and yet it shows itself more clearly, and imparts itself more fully to the most exalted Powers around God.

But as to the secondary or last intellectual powers, or our own powers, in proportion as each is further from the Divine Likeness, so the Divine Ray enfolds Its most brilliant light within Its own ineffable and hidden Unity. Moreover, It illumi-

nates the second Orders severally through the first, and in short, It comes forth originally into manifestation from the Unmanifest through the first Powers.

The prophet was taught by the Angel who was leading him to light that the Divine purification, and all the other Divine activities shining forth through the First Beings, are imparted to all the others in the measure of the fitness of each for the Divine participations.

Wherefore he reasonably assigned to the Seraphim, after God, the characteristic of imparting purification by fire. And there is nothing unreasonable in the representation of the Seraph as purifying the prophet; for just as God Himself, the Cause of every purification, purifies all, or rather (to use a more familiar illustration), just as our hierarch, when purifying or enlightening through his priests or ministers, may himself be said to purify and illuminate, because those orders which he has consecrated refer their sacred activities to him, so also the Angel who purifies the prophet refers his own purifying power and knowledge to God as its origin, but to the Seraph as the first-working Hierarch—as though saying with angelic reverence when instructing him who was being purified: “There is an exempt Source and Essence and Creator and Cause of the purification effected in you by me, He Who brings into being the First Beings, and holds them established round Himself, and preserves their changeless stability, and guides them towards the first participations in His own Providential Energies.” (For this, so he said who taught me, shows the mission of the Seraph.) “But the hierarch and leader, after God, the first Order of the First Beings, by whom I was taught to perform the Divine purifications, is that which purifies thee through me; and through it the Cause and Creator of all purification brought forth His Providential Energies to us from the hidden depths.”

Thus he taught me, and I in turn impart it to thee. It is for thy intellectual and discriminating skill either to accept one of the two reasons given as a solution of the difficulty, and prefer that to the other as probable and reasonable and perhaps true, or to find from thyself something more akin to the real truth, or learn from another (God indeed giving the word, and Angels directing it), and then to reveal to us who love the Angels a clearer, and to me more welcome view, if such should be possible.

CHAPTER XIV

What the Traditional Number of the Angels signifies.

This also is worthy, I think, of intellectual consideration, that the scriptural tradition respecting the Angels gives their number as thousands of thousands and ten thousand times ten thousand, multiplying and repeating the very highest numbers we have, thus clearly showing that the Orders of the Celestial Beings are innumerable for us; so many are the blessed Hosts of the Supermundane Intelligences, wholly surpassing the feeble and limited range of our material numbers. And they are definitely known only by their own supermundane and celestial Intellect and the knowledge which is granted to them all-bounteously by the All-knowing Mother-Wisdom of the Most High God, which is super-essentially at once the substantiating Cause, the connecting Power, and the universal Consummation of all principles and things.

(To be concluded)

NIRVANA

If they teach Nirvana is to cease,
Say unto them they lie.

If they teach Nirvana is to live,
Say unto such they err; not knowing this,
Nor what light shines beyond their broken lamps,
Nor lifeless, timeless bliss.

Enter the Path! There spring the healing streams
Quenching all thirst! there bloom th' immortal flowers
Carpeting all the way with joy! there throng
Swiftest and sweetest hours!

Light of Asia.

SEED THOUGHTS FROM IAMBLICHUS

Every man, if he aims to do anything, should act with virtue, knowing that without virtue all possessions and every pursuit are base and infamous. For wealth can bring no honour to an unmanly or cowardly mind: the riches of such a one are for others, not for himself. Neither must beauty and strength of body when dwelling in a base and cowardly man be deemed ornamental, but disgraceful: since they make the possessor more conspicuous and show forth his ignoble disposition. Moreover, knowledge, when separated from justice and the other virtues, is not wisdom but cunning.

For if men are the voluntary causes or principles of actions and have the inherent power to choose the good and avoid the evil, the one not using this power is utterly unworthy of the advantages and privileges given him by nature. Pythagoras says this: that we choose our own destiny and career in life, and that we are our own luck and good fortune, and that we procure our own felicity. He shows that only such things should be chosen as are intrinsically beautiful and worthy.

All nature, which is as it were guided by intelligence, does nothing in vain, but does all things for the sake of some end—and, banishing the aimless, is more intent on doing all things on account of some purpose than are the arts, which are imitations of Nature. Man is constituted a composite of soul and body, the soul being better than the body; and the better by virtue of its intrinsic superiority always rules the worse, and the body exists for the sake of the soul. One element of the soul is rational, but another irrational, which latter is the inferior; so that the irrational element exists on account of the rational, and the rational for the sake of Intellect: wherefore the conclusion is inevitable that all things exist for the sake of Intellect.

JEWELS
FROM THOMAS À KEMPIS

If you do not know how to speak wisely, strive nevertheless to hold your peace with humility and modesty.

It is safer and better that a man hold his peace, who knows not how to speak duly.

Blessed is he who strictly guards his mouth that he utter not an idle or hurtful word.

He makes many quarrels cease, who is patient and holds his peace.

It is good to keep silence and carefully to weigh one's words.

Weigh your words before you speak lest you utter something foolish which may offend your hearers and you may grieve to have said because you have not observed the bounds of discretion.

Let your words therefore be few, profitable, and prudent.

In no state or order will peace and discipline abide if there be no strictness of silence, the friend of quiet, which is the good of devotion, the closing of contention, the flight of vanity.

In silence you may learn how and to whom you may speak.

By idle words the soul becomes dissipated and unstable, scarcely able to return to its interior after long mourning and tears.