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THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE GREEKS

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PART II *

Having premised thus much concerning the fables of the Greeks, and the design of Homer in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, I shall now proceed to the development of some of his fables, epitomizing and endeavouring to elucidate, for this purpose, what is said by Proclus in his admirable apology for the fables of the greatest of poets.

In the first place, therefore, let us direct our attention to the occult meaning of the battles of the Gods, as these may be justly ranked among the most paradoxical of the Homeric figments. Of the battles, then, which are celebrated by theological poets, we may perceive two conceptions, one of which considers the well-ordered division of the Divine Genera about those two Principles, the immediate progeny of the ONE, the exempt Cause of all things, and which, according to the opposition of these Principles, represents the Gods as acting contrary to each other. For whether it be proper to call those First Natures *Bound and Infinity* or *Monad and Indefinite Duad*, they will entirely appear to be oppositely established with respect to each other, conformably to which the Orders of the Gods are also distinguished from each other.

This being premised, Homer, to those who consider his poems with attention, will appear to speak about this mode of Divine contention when he says,

“When Saturn was by Jove All-seeing thrust
Beneath the earth.”

And in another place respecting Typhon,

* Only the chief points dealt with in this part of the article are here given.—Eds. *S.O.W.*

For Part I see *S.O.W.* No. 51.

"Earth groaned beneath them; as when angry Jove
Hurls down the forked lightning from above,
Where Typhon, prest beneath the burning load,
Still feels the fury of the avenging God."

(*Iliad* ii. 288.)

But the other conception arises from considering the contrariety and variety about the last of things, and referring an apparent discord of this kind to the powers that proximately preside over them, and thus feigning that the Gods, proceeding into a material nature and distributed about it, war with each other. For since the inferior orders are suspended from the government of the more excellent genera of Gods, and preserve the characteristics of their Leaders, though in a partial and multiplied manner, they are called by Their names. And this not only the fables of the Greeks have occultly devised—I mean that leading Gods and Their attendants should be called by the same names—but this is also delivered in the initiatory rites of other races. For they say that attendants suspended from the Gods particularly rejoice when invoked, to be called by the appellations and invested with the vehicles of their Leaders.

If, therefore, we refer Minerva, Juno, and Vulcan, when engaged in war below in the sublunary region, and likewise Latona, Diana, and the river Xanthus, to other secondary orders which are proximate to divisible and material natures, we ought not to wonder on account of the communion of names. For each series bears the appellation of its Monad or Principle. And some of these daemonical attendants are separate from the universe, others have an allotment about the heavens, others preside over the whole elements, and to others the government of individuals belongs. Opposition, therefore, in such-like genera, a division of all-various powers, mutual familiarity and difference, a divisible sympathy with the objects of their government, and other things of this kind are properly conceived as taking place about the terminations of the Divine Orders. Hence fables, in representing such powers as these discordant with and opposing each other on account of the subjects over which they providentially preside, do not appear to be very remote from the truth.

Homer particularly introduces the Gods warring with each other and dissenting about human affairs according to this conception of Divine battles, in which the Divine and intellectual

disposition of the figments adopted by the poet is worthy of the greatest admiration. For in describing the battles of those who, though they are allotted a subsistence at the extremities of the Divine progressions, yet are suspended from the Gods, and are proximate to the subjects of their government, and are allied to their Leaders, he indicates their sympathy with inferior natures, referring a divided life, battle, and opposition from things in subjection, to the powers by which they are governed. And he represents the alliance of these partial spirits with the series from which they proceed by the same names through which he celebrates the Powers that are exempt from material natures, employing numbers and figures adapted to their whole orders. For those who engage in battle are eleven in number and distributed into eleven parts. Of these, those that preside over the better co-ordination are contained in the pentad; for the odd number, the spheric* and the power of leading all secondary natures according to justice, and of extending from the middle to every number, are adapted to those who desire to govern more intellectual and perfect natures, and such as are more allied to the ONE. But those of an inferior destiny, and who are the guardians of material natures, proceed according to the hexad,† possessing, indeed, a perfective power over the subjects of their providential care through a proper number, but in consequence of this number being even and co-ordinate with a worse nature they are subordinate to the other powers. The opposition, therefore, of Neptune and Apollo signifies that these powers preside over the apparent contrariety of all sublunary wholes, and hence these Gods do not fight with each other. For parts are preserved by their containing wholes as long as they subsist. But the opposition of Juno and Diana represents the opposite division of Souls in the universe, whether rational or irrational, separate or inseparable, supernatural or natural; the former of these powers presiding over the more excellent order of Souls, but the latter bringing forth and producing into light those of an inferior condition. Again, the

* Five is not only an odd, but also a spheric number: for all its multiplications into itself terminate in five; and therefore they end where they began.—T.T.

† For six is a perfect number, being equal to the sum of all its parts which are 3, 2, and 1, the first of these being the half, the second the third, and the last the sixth part of six. And besides these, it has no other parts.—T.T.

discord of Minerva and Mars represents the division of the whole of the war in the sublunary region into Providence subsisting according to Intellect, and that which is perfected through necessity; the former power intellectually presiding over contraries, and the latter corroborating their natural powers and exciting their mutual opposition.

But the battle between Hermes and Latona indicates the all-various differences of Souls according to their gnostic and vital motions; Hermes giving perfection to their knowledge, and Latona to their lives; which two often differ from and are contrary to each other. Lastly, the battle between Vulcan and the river Xanthus adorns in a becoming manner the contrary principles of the whole corporeal system; the former assisting the powers of heat and dryness, and the latter of cold and moisture, from which the whole of generation receives its completion. Since, however, it is requisite that all contraries should end in mutual concord, Venus is present, producing friendship in the adverse parties,* but at the same time assisting those powers that belong to the worse co-ordination, because these are specially adorned when they possess symmetry and familiarity with the better order of contrary natures. And thus much concerning the Divine battles of Homer.

The next particular is the manner in which the poetry of Homer delivers multiform mutations of Immutable Natures. For that which is unitive in the Gods appears various to those by whom it is seen, Divinity neither being changed nor wishing to deceive; but nature herself giving a determination to the characteristics of the Gods according to the measures of their participants. For that which is participated, being one, is variously participated by Intellect, the rational Soul, the phantasy, and sense. For the first of these participates it impartibly, the second in an expanded manner, the third accompanied by figure, and the fourth with passivity. Hence that which is participated is uniform according to the summit of its subsistence, but multiform according to participation. It is also essentially immutable and firmly estab-

* That is to say, though Venus is not represented by Homer as actually producing friendship in the adverse Gods, yet this is occultly signified by Her being present: for She is the source of all the harmony, friendship, and analogy in the universe, and of the union of form with matter.—T.T.

lished, but at different times appears various to its participants through the imbecility of their nature. That also which is without weight appears heavy to those that are filled with it. "The miserable heart by which I am received cannot bear Me," says some one of the Gods. Whence Homer likewise, perceiving the truth of these things, says of Minerva:

"Loud crashed the beechen axle with the weight,
For strong and dreadful was the power it bore."

(*Iliad* v. 5. 838.)

Though it may be said, how can that which is without weight be the cause of weight? But such as is the participant, such necessarily must that which is participated appear. Whether, therefore, some of the Gods have appeared similar to guests, or have been seen in some other form, it is not proper to attribute the apparent mutation to Them, but we should say that the appearance is varied with the different recipients. And this is one of the ways in which Homer delivers the mutations of Immutable Natures.

In the second place, therefore, it may be said that the Gods appear to be changed when the same Divinity proceeds according to different orders, and subsists as far as to the last of things, distributing His Powers according to number, and descending into subordinate distinctions: for then again fables say that the Divinity which proceeds from on high into this form is changed into that into which It makes Its progression. Thus they say that Minerva was assimilated to Mentor, Mercury to the bird called the sea-gull, and Apollo to a hawk; indicating by this the more dæmoniacal orders into which They proceed from those of a superior rank. Hence when fables describe the manifestations of the Gods they endeavour to describe Them formless and unfigured. Thus when Minerva appears to Achilles (*Iliad* i. v. 194) and becomes visible to him alone, the whole camp being present, there Homer does not even fabulously ascribe any form and figure to the Goddess, but only says that She was present, without expressing the manner in which She was present. But when fables intend to signify dæmoniacal appearances they introduce the Gods under various forms, but such as are total, as for instance, a human form, or one common to a man or woman indefinitely. For thus again Neptune and Minerva were present with Achilles:

"Neptune and Pallas haste to his relief,
And thus in human form address the chief."

(*Iliad* xxi. 235.)

Lastly, when fables relate daemonical manifestations, then they do not think it improper to describe their mutations into individuals and partial natures, whether into particular men or into animals. For the last of those genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods are symbolized by these figures. And here you may see how particulars of this kind are devised conformably to the order of things. For that which is unitive is adapted to a Divine Nature, that which is universal to an attendant, and the rational nature to both these, and that which is partial and irrational accords with a daemonical nature, for a life of this kind is connected with the order of dæmons.

In the next place let us consider what the lamentations and laughter of the Gods occultly signify in the poetry of Homer. What, then, is the meaning of Thetis weeping and exclaiming:

"Ah, wretched me! Unfortunately brave
A son I bore."

(*Iliad* i. xviii. 54.)

For a Divine Nature is perfectly exempt from pleasure and pain. But again, it is not fit that the Demiurgus of the universe should lament and mourn, both for Hector when pursued by Achilles, and for his son Sarpedon, and exclaim respecting both, "Ah Me!" For such an imitation does not appear to be in any respect adapted to its paradigm, since it ascribes tears to things that are without tears, pain to things void of pain, and, in short, passion to things free from passion. In answer to these objections it may be replied that when the Gods are said to weep for or lament those that are most dear to Them, that mode of interpretation must be adopted which was formerly admitted by the authors of fables, who indicated by tears the Providence of the Gods about mortal, generated, and perishable natures. For this object of Providential energy naturally calling for tears, afforded a pretext to the inventors of fables; and through these they obscurely indicated Providence Itself. Hence, someone in a hymn to the Sun says,

"Phœbus, the much-enduring race of men
Thy tears excite."

And on this account, in the Mysteries also (Proclus adds) we mystically assume sacred lamentations, as symbols of the Providence pertaining to us from more excellent Natures. The greatest, likewise, and most perfect of the Mysteries (the Eleusinian Mysteries) deliver in the arcana certain sacred lamentations of Proserpine and Ceres, and of the greatest Goddess Rhea Herself.

But with respect to the laughter of the Gods, what shall we say it is, and why do They laugh in consequence of Vulcan moving and energizing?

“Vulcan ministrant when the Gods beheld,
Amidst Them laughter unextinguished rose.”

(Iliad. i. v. 599.)

Theologists say that Vulcan is the Demiurgus and maker of every visible thing (Jupiter being the Demiurgus both of invisible and visible natures), hence He is said to have constructed habitations for the Gods :

“Then to Their proper domes the Gods depart,
Formed by lame Vulcan with transcendent art.”

And this in consequence of preparing for Them mundane receptacles. He is also said to be lame in both His feet, because He is the fabricator of things that are last in the progressions of being (for such are bodies), and which are not able to proceed into another order. But since every Providential energy about a *sensible nature* in which the Gods assist the fabrication of Vulcan is said to be the *sport* of Divinity, hence Timæus also appears to me to call the Mundane Gods *junior*, as presiding over things which are perpetually in *generation or becoming to be*, and which may be considered as ludicrous ; this being the case, the authors of fables are accustomed to call this peculiarity of the Providence of the Gods energizing about the world *laughter*. And when the poet says that the Gods, being delighted with the motion of Vulcan, laughed with inextinguishable laughter, nothing else is indicated than that They are co-operating artificers ; that They jointly give perfection to the art of Vulcan, and supernally impart joy to the universe. In short, *we must define the laughter of the Gods to be Their exuberant energy in the universe, and the cause of the gladness of all mundane natures.* But as such a Providence is incomprehensible, and the communication of all good from the Gods is never-failing, we must allow that the poet very properly calls

Their laughter *unextinguished*. And here you may again see how what we have said is conformable to the nature of things. For fables do not assert that the Gods always weep, but they say that They laugh without ceasing. For tears are the symbols of Their Providence in mortal and frail concerns, and which now rise into existence, and then perish; but laughter is a sign of Their energy in wholes, and those perfect Natures in the universe which are perpetually moved with undeviating sameness. On which account, I think, when we divide Demiurgic productions into Gods and men, we attribute laughter to the generation of the Gods, but tears to the formation of men and animals; whence the poet before mentioned in his hymn to the Sun says:

“Mankind’s laborious race Thy tears excite,
But the Gods, laughing, blossomed into Light.”

But when we make a division into things celestial and sublunary, again, after the same manner, we must assign laughter to the former and tears to the latter; and when we reason concerning the generations and corruptions of sublunary natures themselves, we must refer the former to the laughter and the latter to the tears of the Gods. Hence, in the Mysteries also, those who preside over sacred institutions order both these to be celebrated at stated times. Proclus just adds that the stupid are neither able to understand things employed by theurgists in secrecy, nor fictions of this kind. For hearing of both these, when unaccompanied with knowledge, produces dire and absurd confusion in the lives of the multitude with respect to the reverence pertaining to Divinity.

PRAYERS OF THE MYSTICS

O God, my God, the Light of every mind that knows Thee, the Life of all Souls who love Thee, the Strength and Confidence of those who seek Thee, grant me Thy grace that I may firmly cleave to Thee and love Thy Name above all things. Give me a glad and joyful mind, and raise the eyes of my Soul from what is merely temporal up to Thy Wisdom which is eternal and inexhaustible.

—*St. Augustine.*

* * *

O Lord, purify, ennable, raise my intentions to Thyself; never allow me to keep them fixed on myself. Pray Thyself in me that my prayer be directed to Thy glory.

—*Père Grou.*

PHILO JUDÆAS

I. INTRODUCTION.—One of the most interesting developments of the latter part of the pre-Christian period and the early years of the Christian era was the growth in Egypt of a school of thought which infused into the Jewish religious system certain valuable elements of Greek philosophy, and thus prepared the way for the spread of Christianity in the West. The most famous exponent of this teaching was Philo.

In order to understand the conditions which made this development possible it is necessary to review the position of the Jews in Egypt. Their return from exile in Babylonia had been followed by a dispersion to the East and to the West. One section, settling in Palestine, had become extremely exclusive, adhering strictly to the letter of the sacred traditions, while the other, migrating to the various centres of Greek culture, was deeply influenced by the Greek tradition and outlook. This section became merged in the life of these cities, speaking the language and becoming familiar with the customs and ideals of Greece. In time many of their descendants were completely ignorant of Hebrew, and Greek translations of the Scriptures and Liturgy were made for general use. The better educated among the people studied philosophy, and would find little difficulty in accepting the basic principles embodied in Greek philosophy as being also the foundation of their own traditional teachings.

The largest and most influential centre of Greek culture in the time of Philo was at Alexandria, in Egypt. Here, in accordance with the privileges granted by Alexander, and continued by succeeding emperors, the Jews, who numbered about one-quarter of the whole population, shared equal rights with the other citizens, and consequently had access to the finest university and libraries of the world. They controlled the chief trades, and were prosperous and contented. A great synagogue was built in the centre of the city, and smaller ones in various quarters. These conditions were most favourable for the development of a system which interpreted the Jewish Scriptures in terms of Greek thought.

The earliest work in which this was attempted was a commentary on the Pentateuch by a Jewish Philosopher, Aristobulus. Other writers followed him, and a school of Hellenistic Judaism

arose which recognized and adopted certain laws of symbolic interpretation, and which aimed at proselytizing among non-Jewish races.

Philo was the last and greatest leader of this school. During his lifetime the Jews were severely and systematically persecuted, and soon after his death they abandoned the Hellenistic form of Judaism, which was preserved and embodied to some extent in Christianity, Philo being given a rank almost equal to that of the Fathers of the Church.

II. THE LIFE OF PHILO.—Philo was born at Alexandria between 40 and 20 B.C. According to Jerome, he was of priestly descent, and his parents were wealthy and influential. His brother Alexander, also a lover of religion and philosophy, gained the responsible position of Alabarch or chief magistrate of the Jews, and was also in close touch with imperial affairs through his wife Berenice, whom St. Paul mentions. The brothers had received a sound education in the usual Greek curriculum, and the wide scope of Philo's interests is evident from his writings which display a thorough knowledge of Hebrew tradition as well as of Greek literature and philosophy. He entered into the social activities of the city, and took part in the political life of his day with such distinction that he was elected as representative of the Jewish community on various occasions, the most notable of which was the embassy to Caligula at Rome, when, a short time after the sacking of the Jewish quarters and the massacre and torture of many of the inhabitants, a protest was made against the emperor's claim to receive from them Divine honours. But even in the midst of such occupations, Philo never lost touch with the inner life.

His writings reveal the beauty of his character, the loftiness of his ideals, his balance and discipline, and an unquenchable enthusiasm in the pursuit of the things of God. His love of philosophy is frequently expressed. In his work, *Quod Omnis Liber Probus* ii, he speaks of "That sweetest of all writers, Plato," and in *De Specialibus Legibus* III. i, describes his own pursuit of wisdom. "There was once a time when, devoting my leisure to philosophy and to the contemplation of the world and the things in it, I reaped the fruit of excellent, desirable, and blessed intellectual experiences, always living among the Divine Oracles and doctrines, on which I fed insatiably and incessantly to my great

delight, never entertaining any low or grovelling thoughts, nor ever wallowing in the pursuit of glory, or wealth, or the delights of the body, but I appeared to be raised on high and borne aloft by a certain inspiration of the Soul." He goes on to describe how he was "hurled into the vast sea of the cares of public politics, in which I was and still am tossed about." But whenever there was a respite from State affairs he could "rise aloft and float above the troubled waves, soaring, as it were, in the air. . . . I open the eyes of my Soul . . . and am irradiated with the light of Wisdom, since I am not given up for the whole of my life to darkness."*

The date of the death of Philo is unknown, but he mentions the embassy to Caligula in A.D. 40 as taking place when he was an old man.

III. His Aim and Influence.—From a consideration of the work of Philo as a whole it appears that his aim was not to expound a system of philosophy, but to demonstrate the complete adequacy of the Hebrew Scriptures, when rightly interpreted, as a guide to life. This he did by showing that they had a reasonable and philosophical foundation in first principles. The books of the Pentateuch were interpreted in an allegorical manner, careful attention being given to the meaning of names as well as to the symbolism of number.

Philo had but little permanent influence upon Jewish thought. Although in his lifetime he was regarded as an orthodox Jew, and was held in great honour by his countrymen, there are only a few conceptions to be found in the Midrashim and the Talmud which can be traced to his teachings. Soon after the introduction of Christianity into the Roman Empire, Hellenistic Judaism began to disintegrate, and the Jews, almost without exception, returned to the Palestinian form. It is supposed that the Hellenistic doctrines were regarded as unsuited to withstand the opposing influences of Christianity on the one hand, and Paganism on the other. It may also have been due in part to a reaction produced by the persecutions endured at the hands of the western races.

On the other hand the work of Philo had prepared the way for Christian missionaries who found the Hellenistic proselytes to the Jewish faith very receptive to their doctrines. The Christian leaders, who had also been deeply influenced by the ideas of

* The translation used is mainly that of C. D. Yonge.

Plato, found in the symbolical method introduced by Philo a valuable means for the interpretation of the spirit of the Old Testament, and in his universality of outlook an aid to its reconciliation with the spirit of the New Testament. Thus he formed an important link in the transmission of Greek ideas through Christianity. Origen and Clement made great use of his works, embodying in their schools his theory of education, and in their writings his symbolic method of interpretation, and he was held in great regard by other leaders of the Church.

"The Christian Church was the last great creative achievement of the classical culture. . . . Outwardly the continuity with Judaism seems to be unbroken: in reality the opposite is the fact. . . . The Church was half Greek from the first, though the original Gospel was not. . . . St. Paul was a Jew of the Dispersion, not of Palestine. . . . His later epistles are steeped in the phraseology of the Greek Mysteries. The Epistle to the Hebrews and the Fourth Gospel are unintelligible without some knowledge of Philo, whose theology was more Greek than Jewish."*

IV. HIS WORKS AND TEACHINGS.—No complete works remain, but a number of short treatises exist which in many cases formed parts of larger works. One group deals with the events related in the Book of Genesis, which are interpreted mainly in terms of states of Soul. This group may have been included under the title, *The Allegories of the Sacred Law*, and contains also the treatises, *The Sacrifices of Abel and Cain*, *The Confusion of Tongues*, *The Tilling of the Earth by Noah*, *The Migration of Abraham*, *The Giants*, *Fugitives*, *The Indestructibility of the World*, and others. In another group is a systematic exposition of the Mosaic Law, the details of which are explained in terms of the discipline of the Soul. Some of the subjects dealt with are *The Decalogue*, *Rewards Due to Priests*, *Special Laws*, *Sacrifices*, *Rewards and Punishments*, *Monarchy*. He also wrote the lives of Moses, Abraham, and Joseph, and treatises *On the Creation of the World*, *On Providence*, *On the Freedom of the Virtuous Man*, and *On the Contemplative Life*. In all there are sixty-four treatises and parts of treatises.

Throughout his works the Platonic influence is unmistakable, and although certain views held by Heraclitus and by the Stoics are introduced, they are such as are implied in the Platonic

* W. R. Inge, "Hellenism in Christianity" (*The Church in the World*.)

philosophy. Philo, however, does not always present them in their original form, but frequently adopts modifications resulting from his own reflections upon the subjects concerned. Thus he sometimes presents a particular and lower aspect of the more universal and higher truth expressed by Plato. Some of the points in which he follows Plato are:

(i) The doctrine of an Absolute God, the Cause of the Divine Ideas.

(ii) The doctrine of Archetypal Ideas, and of Divine Intelligence or *Nous*.

(iii) The subsistence not only of the Divine Unity, but also of the Divine Plurality, from Which proceed intermediary Principles through which the multiplicity of the world is produced and is connected to the One.

(iv) The Immanence of God.

(v) The conception of matter as that which is passive, unformed, potential, and essentially unchanged although receiving a variety of forms.

(vi) The descent and ascent of Souls. In this connection he adopts Plato's classification of the threefold activities of the rational, irascible, and concupiscent powers of man, all of which when wrongly used bind the Soul to transitory interests and pursuits. The remedy for this condition is given in terms of the four cardinal virtues of Plato, symbolized, according to Philo, by the four rivers of Eden, which ordinate and unify the activities of the Soul.

(vii) The two modes of approach to knowledge of God.

(a) The affirmative mode which conceives of Him as possessing all excellencies, yet surpassing them all.

(b) The negative mode, which denies of Him all attributes, since He is Unnameable, Unlimited, and Absolute.

These views can be considered under the headings, God, the Universe, and Man.

I. GOD.—Of the Transcendent God, Philo writes: "God is not as man, but neither is He as Heaven, nor as the world. . . . He is not even comprehensible by the Intellect except as to His Being, for beyond the fact of His Being we can understand nothing." (*Quod Deus Sit Immut.* iii.)

His own love of God spontaneously springs up in such passages as: "O, Mighty Lord, how shall we praise Thee, with

what lips, what tongue, what speech, what governing power of the Spirit? Can the stars, blended in single chorus, chant Thee a worthy anthem? Can the whole heaven, melted into sound, declare even a fragment of Thine Excellence? (*De Vita Mos.* xi.)

Philo refers to an aspect of God prior to the Divine Creative Unity, that of Divine Intelligence or *Nous*, Which embraces the Archetypal Idea of the Cosmos, and imparts to the Creative Intellect the Divine Paradigm of the Universe. In *De Opif Mund.* iv and x, he writes: "Since God, in virtue of His Deity, realized that a beautiful copy could not come into being apart from a beautiful pattern, and that none of the things perceived by the senses could be flawless which was not made after the image of an Archetype, or Spiritual Idea, when He purposed to create this visible world He first formed the Ideal World." And again: "The Incorporeal World, then, was already completed, having its seat in the Divine *Nous*."

Of the Divine Plurality, and the Powers posterior to the Creator, Philo writes: "Of created things, some are created by God and through Him, some not indeed by God, but yet through Him" (*Leg. Alleg.* I. xiii). He mentions elsewhere a triad proceeding from God, "In the Living and One God I understood that there were two supreme and primary Powers, Goodness and Authority, . . . and the third Power that was between these two, and had the effect of connecting them, was Intellect, for it is according to Intellect that God is both a Ruler and God" (*De Cherub.* ix). Of these Powers the three guests of Abraham are symbols, and Philo explains that "the things which are expressed by the voice are the symbols of those things which are conceived in the mind. When, therefore, the Soul is shone upon by God, as if at noonday, and when it is entirely filled with that Light which is appreciable only by Intellect, and being wholly surrounded with its brilliancy is free from all shade or darkness, it then perceives a threefold image of one subject; one image of the Living God, and others of the other two. . . . The One in the middle is the Father of the universe, Who in the sacred scriptures is called by His proper Name, I Am Who Am; and those on either side are the most ancient Powers which are always close to the Living God, one of which is called His Creative Power, and the other His Royal Power. . . . Therefore the One in the middle of the Three . . . presents to the mind a vision at one time of One

Being, and at another time of Three: of One when the Soul, being completely purified, . . . hastens onward to that Idea which is devoid of all mixture, free from all combination, and by Itself in need of nothing whatever; and of Three when not being yet perfect as to the highest virtues, it still seeks for initiation in the lesser virtues" (*De Abrahamo* xxiv).

In this symbolism Philo represents the Word or Logos of God, Which in various aspects and modes is the Cause from which the infinite Divine gifts are imparted to secondary natures, and tempered, through the mediation of lesser powers, to the limited capacity of finite beings. He therefore uses the terms "Word," "Logos" "Reason," of God in many different connections, but these are never really contradictory, since they all represent the operations of Divine Intelligence and Energy in different spheres. "The Father of the Divine Logos is God, and His Mother Wisdom, by means of Which the universe arrived at creation" (*De Fug.* xx). "The Creative Power and the Ruling Power flow out from the Logos as from a spring. . . . Moses teaches that this universe is held together by invisible Powers which the Creator has extended from the extreme foundations of the earth to the bounds of heaven, making a beautiful provision to prevent that which He has joined together from being dissolved, for the indissoluble chains which bind the universe are His Powers" (*De Migr. Abr.* xxxii).

The Immanence of God is brought out in the passage, "Can a man, then, hide himself from God? Where can he hide himself from that One Who pervades all places, Whose look reaches to the very boundaries of the world, Who fills the whole universe?" (*De Cherub.* ix).

Though obliged to use terms suggestive of human attributes, Philo makes it clear that he has no anthropomorphic conceptions of God. He points out that the attribution to God of human passions must not be taken literally. "Now some persons when they hear such expressions imagine that the Living God is here giving way to anger and passion; but God is utterly inaccessible of any passion whatsoever. Such things are spoken by the great lawgiver (Moses) . . . for the sake of admonishing those persons who could not otherwise be corrected" (*Quod Deus Sit Immut.* xi). "You will take away, therefore, O my mind, whatever is created, or mortal, or changeable, or unconsecrated, from your concep-

tions regarding the Uncreate God, Immortal, Unchangeable, Holy, the Only God, Blessed for ever" (*De Sac. Abelis et Caini.* xxx).

II. THE UNIVERSE.—Following Plato, Philo describes the creation of a twofold universe, spiritual and corporeal. "In the first place, therefore, from the model perceptible only by Intellect, the Creator made an incorporeal heaven and an invisible earth, and the form of air and empty space, the former of which He called darkness, and the latter He called the abyss. Then He created the incorporeal substance of water and air, and above all He spread light, being the seventh thing made. This again was incorporeal and modelled from the sun perceptible only by Intellect... And the invisible Divine *Nous*, perceptible only by Intellect, Moses calls the Image of God. And the image of that Image is that light perceptible only by Intellect, which is the image of the Divine *Nous*" (*De Opif. Mund.* iv-vii). And in the same treatise he says: "It is manifest that the Archetypal Seal which we call that world perceptible only by Intellect, must Itself be the Archetypal Pattern, the Idea of ideas, the *Nous* of God." Philo also takes the view of Plato with regard to the indestructibility of the universe as a whole, for he considers that there is nothing by which it could be destroyed, since the cause of its destruction must be either within or outside it, and because it is a complete unity embracing all creation, there can be nothing external to it, while on the other hand, it could not be destroyed by a part of itself unless the part could be greater and more powerful than the whole. The unity of the universe, however, integrates and moves all its parts. He also uses Plato's argument concerning time, for since time is the interval of the motion of the material universe, the world must be coeval with time, and the conclusion follows that there could never be a time when the material universe did not exist.

Again, after inquiring what is the support of the world, and where are its roots, he answers that "the Eternal Law of the Everlasting God is the strong and lasting support of the universe, . . . for the Father Who established it made it to be the indissoluble Bond of the universe," and that its roots are in the Eternal Intellect of the Father Who established the world.

III. MAN.—The chief object of Philo's writings was to point out to humanity the significance of the Hebrew Scriptures as a

means to the knowledge of God and of themselves, and to a realization of their Divine sonship. He teaches that man must seek to know his Father by uplifting the mind to Divine things, for it is in his mind that man is most like to God. "God, because of His tenderness and love for man, desiring to establish a Shrine among us, found none on earth more fitting than our Intellect" (*De Virtut.* i). "Man is the noblest of all animals by reason of the higher element, the Soul, closely akin to heaven, which is most pure in its essence, and to the Father of the universe, as having received *Nous*; of all things on earth the most faithful image and copy of the Eternal and Blessed Idea" (*De Decal.* xxv).

In his conception of the origin of mankind in the Divine Idea, Philo is again in agreement with Plato. "There is an immense difference between the man now formed (*Gen.* ii. 7), and him who had previously come into being according to the image of God (*Gen.* i. 27). For the man now formed was perceptible by sense, already participating in quality, composed of body and Soul, man or woman, mortal by nature; while he who was made after the Divine Image was, as it were, an Idea, or generic type, or Soul, apprehensible only by thought, incorporeal, neither male nor female, immortal by nature." According to this Eternal Idea were formed particular men and women. "The primeval founder of our race appears to have been most excellent in all particulars, both in Soul and body, and very far superior to all the men of subsequent ages. . . . For he in truth was really good and perfect . . . for our generation has been from men, but he was formed by God." In the treatise *De Confus. Ling.* xiv, Philo refers to man's Archetype in whom shines the Light of God, and who is an aspect of the Divine Logos connecting man to God, and imparting the Divine gifts to man. "I have also heard of the companions of Moses having spoken thus, 'Behold a man whose name is the East.' A very novel appellation indeed if you consider it as spoken of a man compounded of body and Soul, but happily chosen if regarded as applied to the incorporeal Being who in no respect differs from the Divine Image. For the Father of the universe has caused Him to spring up as the eldest Son, Whom in another passage he calls the First-born; and He Who is thus born, imitating the ways of His Father, has formed a certain species, looking to His Archetypal Pattern."

The first duty of man, according to Philo, is to seek God, and

the importance of the mind as a means of approach to Him is frequently emphasized. "Those men act worthily who have resolved to dedicate their whole youth to education, in which it is well for a man to spend both his youth and age; for as they say that vessels, even when empty, still retain the odour of whatever was originally poured into them, so also the Souls of the young are deeply impressed with the indelible nature of the conceptions which were first offered to their mind, which cannot altogether be washed away by the torrent of any ideas which flow afterwards over the mind." The consummation of intellectual development and the goal of philosophy is the mystical life of communion with the Divine. "It befits those who would company with knowledge to strive after a vision of Him Who Is. And if they cannot attain this, at least of His Image, the most sacred Logos, and next in order that most sacred of His works, this universe of ours." This is possible because "The Soul of man has been fashioned in accordance with the Archetypal Word of the Great Cause of all things. . . ." In the ascent to God man begins by knowing the visible world, and then travels beyond it. "Man has received this extraordinary gift, Intellect (*Nous*). . . . For as in the body the sight is the most important thing, and as in the universe light is the pre-eminent thing, so that part in us which ranks highest is the Intellect, which is the sight of the Soul, shining transcendently with its own rays by which the great darkness of ignorance is dissipated" (*Quod Deus Sit Immut.* x). "The human mind is . . . in some sort the god of that body which bears its image within it. . . . For it is invisible, though it sees everything itself; and it has an essence which is undiscernible, though it can discern the essences of other things. And making for itself by art and science all kinds of paths in various directions it traverses land and sea, investigating everything which is contained in either element. And again, raised up on wings, and surveying and contemplating the air, it is borne upwards to the higher firmament and to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. And so being itself involved in the revolutions of the planets and fixed stars according to the perfect laws of music, and being led on by love, which is the guide to Wisdom, it proceeds onwards till, having surmounted all essence intelligible to the external senses, it aspires to such as is perceptible only by Intellect: and perceiving in That the original models and Ideas of

those things perceptible by the external senses, which it sees here full of surpassing beauty, it becomes seized with a kind of sober intoxication like the ecstasy of the Corybantes and, yielding to inspiration, becomes filled with another desire and a more excellent longing by which it is conducted onwards to the very summit of the things perceptible only to the Intellect, till it appears to be reaching the Great King Himself. And while it is eagerly longing to behold Him pure and unmixed, rays of Divine Light are poured forth upon it like a torrent, dazzling the eyes of the Intellect with their splendour" (*De Mund. Opif.* xxiii).

Philo, in *De Confus. Ling.* iv, ascribes the cause of error and wickedness to the mastery of the rational nature by passion and appetite. "Each of these has its own peculiar evils, while they have in addition diseases in common. For the mind reaps the harvest which folly, cowardice, intemperance, and injustice sow; and passion brings forth frantic and insane strife and conflict and all the numerous evils with which it is pregnant; and appetite dominates the impetuous and fickle loves of youth which descend upon every object, animate or inanimate, which it meets. But the heaviest of all evils is the unanimous energy of all the parts of the Soul agreeing to commit sin, not one being able to act with soundness. Of this great evil the great deluge described by Moses is an image." And again, "If the Soul is driven to and fro by appetite, or if it is irresistibly attracted by pleasure, or driven from the path by fear, or contracted by grief, or tortured by desires, it then makes itself a slave, and makes him who has such a Soul the slave of ten thousand masters. But if it has resisted and subdued ignorance by prudence, intemperance by temperance, cowardice by fortitude, and covetousness by justice, it then adds to its indomitable free spirit power and authority" (*Quod Omnis Prob. Lib.* xxii).

The study of philosophy is pre-eminently valuable, for by it the mind is purified, and in such a mind the Lord of all "silently, unseen, alone, sojourns"; while "with the Souls of those who are still being cleansed, and have not yet completely washed away the stained and defiled life, angels may dwell, Divine Logoi, making them bright and pure by the doctrines of high virtue" (*De Somnis* xii). "If anyone were able to live in all his parts to God rather than to himself, . . . he would have a happy and blessed life" (*Quis Rer. Div. Haer.* xxii).

Philo tells frequently of the bliss experienced by those who behold the Divine Vision, and points to this blessed consummation as the goal of each individual Soul. In one of his works, *De Vita Contemplativa*, is described a Jewish order of men and women dedicated to God, whom he calls Therapeutæ, whose manner of life is regarded by him as a model for all to follow who wish to "see" God. But there is also a consummation for humanity as a whole, which corresponds to what may be called the return of the Golden Age, foreshadowed already by Plato, and referred to by Isaiah in the Hebrew Scriptures. "This is the only wise and truly learned race of men whose wisdom consists in carrying out the Divine commands by corresponding praiseworthy actions. This class of men lives not far from God, keeping always before its eyes the beautiful things of heaven, and being guided in all its ways by heavenly love: so that if anyone were to inquire what a great nation is, one might very properly answer that it is a nation whose most sacred prayers God hears, and to whose invocations, proceeding as they do from a pure conscience, He gladly draws near. But since there are also two classes of enemies (of such a nation), the one being men who are so deliberately out of covetousness, the other being beasts who are so as having a nature alien from ours, we will take first the beasts which are our natural enemies, for these are hostile to the whole race of mankind. . . . And no mortal can terminate this war, but only the One Uncreated God, when He selects some persons as worthy to be the saviours of their race; men who are peaceful in disposition, lovers of unity and fellowship, ever free, liberated from envy, and ready to give their private goods for the use and enjoyment of all in common.

"For long before the savage animals can become manageable, if they do so at some future time, the wild passions in the Soul must be tamed, and it is not possible to imagine a greater blessing than that: for is it not extreme folly to imagine that we can ever avoid injuries from wild beasts when we are continually rousing up the passions within us to a terrible degree of savageness? On which account we must not despair that when the passions of our minds are tamed and subdued, then the wild beasts will also become gentle, . . . among all of which the virtuous man will be sacred and unhurt, since God honours virtue, and as its due reward has given it immunity from all designs against it. Thus

the most ancient war will be ended. But the more modern war which has arisen out of the deliberate purposes of men from their covetousness will likewise easily be put an end to, it seems to me, since men will be ashamed to be more savage than even the wild beasts, after they have ceased to be injured by the beasts. . . . And even if some men are in their frenzy driven to quarrel . . . they will find that they are unable to gain the victory (over the virtuous man) for . . . God sends that assistance which is suitable for pious men—an intrepid hardihood of Soul and an irresistible strength of body—so that a hundred will flee before five, and some will flee when no one pursues except fear.” The righteous man will have an unconquerable power of dominion so as to be able to benefit all who are subject to him, for “he will have dignity, causing others to respect him; majesty, causing them to venerate him; and beneficence, causing them to have good will towards him” (*De Praem et Poen.* xiv and xv). In *De Gigantibus* xlvii Philo gives his readers an injunction to this end: “Let us keep still from wrongdoing, that the Divine Spirit of Wisdom may not easily remove and depart, but may continually abide with us, as with Moses, the wise man.” And in a fragment of unknown context, “Since God penetrates invisibly the region of the Soul, let us prepare that region in the best manner possible to us, that it may be a habitation fit for God.”

SEED THOUGHTS

See that thou waste not thy mind with vain thoughts, nor give thyself to many cares, but study this: to get and to hold steadfastness of mind, that thou fearest not the evils of the world, nor dost desire immoderately the good things thereof.

—Richard Rolle.

* * *

There is no true and constant gentleness without humility; while we are so fond of ourselves we are easily offended with others. Let us be persuaded that nothing is due to us, and then nothing will disturb us. Let us often remember our own failings, and we shall become charitable towards those of others—Fénélon.

EXTRACTS FROM THE TREATISE TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE

BY PROCLUS

Translated by THOMAS TAYLOR

PART IV *

6. Consequent to this, let us direct our attention to the sixth problem. If Providence subsists—and Providence subsisting, it is necessary there should be that which is according to desert—how does it happen that there is so great an inequality of human lives in the universe? Some tyrannizing in consequence of being depraved characters, but others being in a state of servitude though they are virtuous; and some, indeed, being prosperous in consequence of having a good condition of body, living in affluence, and the like; but others, on the contrary, being deprived of these, so that worse circumstances fall to the lot of better men. For everything of this kind appears to accuse Providence as not only here distributing equal things to things unequal, which is itself irrational, but also in things unequal distributing what is worse to the better, and what is better to the worse; though neither can it be thought that arithmetical proportion will obtain in such cases, nor the geometrical, by which a distribution of external good or evil is made according to the desert of those that receive it. In the first place, therefore, we should say that Providence distributes to everything that which is adapted to it—for this is admitted—and bestows ends which accord with habits. But this being the case, it is not at all wonderful that it should give to good men whatever may increase virtue; nor that depraved men, relinquishing the benefits with which virtue is surrounded, should earnestly endeavour to procure health of body, and should be solicitous to obtain wealth and power, about which the good are wholly free from anxiety. Hence, as those who direct all their attention to apparent good are not grieved that they are not temperate, that they are not contemplators of real being, and that their Soul is mutilated; thus, also, neither are good men afflicted because they are not rich, or because they are deprived of power; but they pursue virtue alone with the possession of which they are satisfied. For neither are

* For Parts I, II, and III see *Shrine of Wisdom*, Nos. 49 to 51.

husbandmen indignant because they do not obtain the same things as sailors, nor sailors because they do not reap, but both these, being intently occupied in their proper ends, if they obtain these from Providence are satisfied and rejoice.

We must not, therefore, say that the distributions of Providence are destitute of geometrical proportion; for they are the most harmonic of all gifts, imparting to all things good, and to each that good which it shows itself qualified to obtain, namely, either true or apparent good. For this is evident, that he who pursues virtue always obtains the object of his desire, and lives according to virtue, *but he who desires externals does not always obtain that which is conjoined to his appetition*; here, also, Providence bestowing what is adapted to habits—to the virtuous, indeed, that which is stable and sufficient to itself; but to those who pursue externals, that which is dubious and full of indigence. This, therefore, must be learnt in the first place; but this in the second place, that with worthy men a deficiency of apparent good contributes to virtue; for it accustoms them to detachment from the body, withdraws them from a solicitude about appearances, enlarges their conceptions of the magnitude of virtue, discloses to them the inanity of those things which are believed to be good by the multitude, and exhibits to those who are able to perceive true beauty that Good which is essentially venerable and admirable in the most transcendent degree. For we do not admire the pilot's art during the tranquility of the sea and air, but in tempest and storm; nor virtue in an affluence of human good, but in those things which the violent attacks of fortune cannot shake.

In the third place, if we say that the dispensations of Providence instruct those who do not use them in conformity with Providence, we shall assert that which is not very remote from the truth. For if Providence always imparted to the good riches, beauty of body, and power; but to the bad deformity, ignominy, poverty, and everything of this kind, it would indeed truly appear that virtue, comprehending all things, possesses what is honourable, and vice what is fleeting. But now, exhibiting virtue by itself alone, and vice with all its abundance, it renders the former in a greater degree admirable in a worse fortune, but shows that the latter is to be in a greater degree avoided in a better fortune, and excites those that are *well born* to the love of virtue and the avoidance of vice; the latter (i.e. the bad) blaming fortune on

account of itself, but the former (i.e. the good) truly adorning every condition: and the latter not suffering any diminution in that which is foreign to itself,* but filling it with turpitude; but the former using every circumstance that may occur as its proper ornament. Or will not justice† blame wealth, but health intemperance, and magnificence of Soul, power? *And magnanimity, indeed, adorns poverty, but a masculine mind sorrow, and a transcendency of wisdom the privation of power.* If we assert, therefore, that these things thus distributed show the foreknowledge of Providence, we shall not wander from the truth. This, likewise, must be said by us, that man is Soul, and this has been well demonstrated; but he is Soul using the body and the mortal form of life. And the two latter frequently oppose the amatory energies of the immortal Soul about that which is truly good, and require such things as may be able to prevent their attacks. Thus, for instance, affliction is requisite that the body may not by its wanton impulses draw down the Intellect which is in us from the contemplation of real Being; *but poverty, that the Soul may not through wealth be filled with an intemperate form of life; and the privation of power, that it may be void of worldly ambition.* Hence many worthy men have thought fit to live in insalubrious instead of salubrious places, punishing the evil germinations of corporeal desires, and choosing rather to carry about with them a feeble instrument, than to become *unwise* by using one that is robust. But others have abandoned the riches which they possessed, in consequence of wishing to have a Soul liberated from those passions which germinate through wealth. And many instances may be adduced of those who have acted in this way. Thus Plato dwelt in an insalubrious place in order that he might subdue the excessive impulses of the body. But Crates abandoned his wealth, at the same time exclaiming: *Crates liberates himself from the sordid burden of riches!* And other examples are recorded of the like kind.

If, therefore, Providence imparts to good men such things as they themselves choose through the love of virtue, independently of Providence, how can anyone complain of its dispensations to those that are worthy? And how is it possible that the gifts to the wicked of wealth and power and the like should not rather be called punishments than blessings? For these gifts call forth

* i.e. material advantage.

† One who knows justice.

into energy their latent evil, in order that by punishment they may be finally purified from it.* Because, however, Souls descend into generation it is requisite that they should have a certain experience of those evils in which they are here involved, by which they are excited to desire a transition from hence to that place which is beyond the reach of every ill. To those, therefore, who are good from themselves things apparently disastrous are for this purpose sent by Providence. But as it is requisite that bad men also should participate of good, they participate, indeed, of a certain image of it; and the punishments inflicted by Divine Justice lead these likewise to a flight from this terrene abode. With respect also to everything which we possess, some of these belong to us on account of the freewill of our Soul, some on account of our being passive to other things, and some solely on account of the universe. Hence, if those things over which we have dominion through our own energies (terminate badly) we must accuse ourselves. For if anyone becomes diseased or is in poverty through his own misconduct, the cause of this must be referred to him and not to Providence. For we must say that free will obtained the power which it possesses in the universe not for the destruction, but for the salvation of its possessor. And with respect to those things which we suffer from others, though we may unjustly suffer, we should consider that the law of the universe permits parts to act on each other according to their own impulse: for such are all things which conspire in union; these, indeed, *naturally* acting and suffering, but those *electively*. Retribution, however, follows both those that act well and those that act ill. That also which suffers, suffers according to its desert, and what it does is not neglected by the law (of the universe). For as it is said of beings which energize immaterially, that they produce what is contingent in an uncontingent manner, and that they do not suffer from what is contingent; thus, also, in those

* Synesius, in perfect conformity to what is here asserted by Proclus, says in his excellent treatise on *Dreams*, p. 141: "Misfortunes which are said to happen contrary to our deserts are of the greatest advantage in extirpating the affections by which we are captivated with externals; and thus the doctrine of a Providence is confirmed to the intelligent from the very circumstances which produce doubt in the ignorant. For no place would be left for the Soul to take her flight from the dominion of matter, if in the present state she lived free from the incursions of evil."—T.T.

beings that energize electively it does not appear that everything suffers from everything indiscriminately, but only that thing which has an opportune arrangement in the universe for this purpose. Nor does the self-motive agent relinquish its proper motion, though it may become the instrument of the universe; for the quality of the impulse leads that which acts to retribution; since it was not an inanimate instrument, but an instrument co-adapting itself to that which uses it. The cause, however, of those things which we suffer from the universe, whether they are better or worse, must be ascribed to our desert; and this must either be referred to the present life—as if we should require, for instance, a certain bridle, as it were (since many on account of circumstances become better); or it must be referred to a former life, since if those that suffer were not worthy from the first, purification is requisite prior to the possession of virtue; or it must be referred to a future life, Providence withdrawing us from human concerns in order that by considering virtue alone to be the perfection of our nature, we may establish the love of it in ourselves, and be persuaded that nothing else is our proper good.

Further still, if someone after the same manner should inquire why equal things are imparted by Providence to things unequal according to arithmetical equality (for this remains to be considered)—as, for instance, when whole cities perish, and one destruction ensues both of the good and bad, and a similar circumstance, as it appears, takes place with respect to those who are dissimilar in their habits—in answer to this inquiry, therefore, it may, I think, be said in the first place, that they do not suffer what is similar so far as they are dissimilar, but so far as they are similar; being willing perhaps to inhabit the same city, to enter the same ship, to engage with others in the same battles, or act in conjunction with them in anything else, and by thus acting suffer with them the same calamity. Hence so far as some of them are better and others worse, they bear the common calamity differently; the latter, indeed, impatiently, but the former mildly, though they perish. And after a separation from the present life the abode of more excellent Souls receives the former, but of depraved Souls the latter. In the second place it may be said that of such co-ordinations of those that are at the same time saved, or at the same time perish, there is an order by which they are

similarly collected together in the universe, and a common period of fate, proceeding from different principles to the same end. There is likewise a concurrence of progressions which are either preservative or destructive of all; and it is requisite that of parts, the less principal should be co-passive with the more principal parts in certain cases, while at other times some parts may suffer nothing from those things from which others suffer.

It may also be added, in answer to those who accuse Providence of distributing equality in things unequal, that they are ignorant of the different equality of Souls, which originates from many causes. Nor is it at all wonderful that they should suffer the same thing in retribution of actions which proceeded in common from common passions. But in answer to those who accuse Providence on account of the inequality which takes place in the external circumstances of the good and the bad, we ask whether laudable renown, which is alone bestowed on the good, is not to be preferred to corporeal delight, to riches, and bodily health. For all bad men are inglorious and without honour, though they may be surrounded by myriads of flatterers; since those who extolled them when living, scorn them when dead. But those who despised good men when they were alive, admire them in a transcendent degree when they are dead. If, therefore, *better men partake of the greatest of external goods* (i.e. honour), how can it any longer be said that Providence does not impart that which is according to desert, bestowing on those who desire nothing else such things as extend only to the present life, but conferring on others those benefits which are capable of being transmitted to a future and more excellent life? For the former live according to the mortal, but the latter according to the immortal part of the Soul. Hence whatever is of a more mortal nature is adapted to those who prefer that which is mortal in things within and external to them; but such as are more immortal are adapted to those who prefer that which is immortal. And thus distribution according to desert is preserved in each, through the similitude of the gifts to the life of the recipients. But if to him who possesses virtue, that which is propitious is always present, and this is imparted by the Gods Themselves; but the whole life of the depraved man is full of quietude and perturbation, of brutal delights, ferocity, and the envenomed bitterness of guilt; and if he finds no rest from these evils, which are to him inexplicable; is it not perfectly evident

that Providence proclaims the former character to be deserving of things of a more excellent nature; but that the latter, by subjugating himself to the dominion of his passions, connumerates himself with beings inferior to the nature of man?

7. Relinquishing, therefore, any further consideration of this subject, let us pass on to those questions which are continually raised respecting brutes, and let us direct our attention to the seventh problem, Providence also proceeding to irrational as well as to rational beings. What equality, therefore, is there in brutes, since some of them are well-disposed, but others not; some of them possess an ill, but others a good habit of body; and according to other suchlike differences they are separated from each other? For of these also we see that there are certain common corruptions, and it is requisite in these to contemplate the cause of the events, being persuaded that Providence extends even to the last of things. For these are the three particulars which occasion men to doubt respecting the administration of Providence, namely, the inequality in what happens to brutes, the common corruptions of these, and their devoration of each other.

We must discuss this in the first place as follows: either there is in brutes some vestige of a self-motive life which is separable from body, or there is none, every species of Soul which is in them being extinguished together with the body, and assimilated to (corporeal) qualities and to innate heat. But if there is some vestige of a self-motive life in them, and a brute can do something better and something worse from itself, as is the case with the self-motive nature, whether according to opinion, or according to truth, if this be so, then we must refer to Providence their good domestication, their devoration of each other, and their common corruption, just as we refer to Providence that which happens to men from the management of their passions, and the co-ordination which they are allotted either according to a similitude of life, or according to mundane periods, or according to both these. But if brutes are only corporeal, it is of no consequence if they suffer the same thing as a shadow all-variously transformed, and are subject to the dominion of fate.*

* The Greek text of this treatise is lost, and in the only extant Latin version of this section, the remaining part is so corrupt as to be useless.—T.T.