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THE QUEST.

RELIGION IN CHINA.

PROF. E. H. PARKER.

IT is not easy for us who, however lax our religious practice may have become in Europe, are none the less imbued with hereditary religious instincts, to conceive of a state of human society where religious feeling, as we understand it, did not exist at all. In ancient China, as in modern China, the popular notions may have had an interest from the point of view of folk-lore, but they had no more influence upon philosophical thought than the petty ambitions of the cultivator, the chafferer, or the artisan had upon the contending dynastic interests of the oligarchy. In assuming the existence of philosophical thought, we are here speaking only of the ruling classes, whose minds alone shaped the empire's course. From the dawn of intelligible Chinese history, state-craft,—of which law, religion, morals, and social order were only regarded as branches —was the sole supporting trunk of human society, and it may be defined as the Law of God, the Law of Nature, or the Law of Heaven, as ascertained objectively by the contemplation of ever-changing life, ever-

varying movement, and as ascertained subjectively by the Vicar of God, the Mouthpiece of Nature, the Vicegerent of Heaven, *i.e.* by the Emperor or Supreme King of the World; in other words, by the elected Ruler of China, or the hereditary Ruler representing the originally elected one.

Subject, of course, to the revolutionary thoughts of the past fifteen years, this simple idea is the sole religious idea engrained in the Chinese mind, and it is quite as obstinate as our own root-conceptions upon the subject of religion; to doubt which, not to say to attack which, many or most of us consider to be shameful and blasphemous. Although a disturbing leaven is now working a change in the huge mental mass of China, many of the highest intellects are notwithstanding in serious doubt, and most of the responsible minds are at least convinced of the necessity of caution in introducing change; for it must be remembered that the Chinese principles of life, whatever their defects, have, at any rate, produced a social system which, alone amongst such, has endured practically unchanged for 2,000 or 3,000 years, and which has steadily maintained its vitality in a good quarter of the whole human race.

There is only one conception of after-life in the Chinese mind as unaffected by Buddhism, Islām, Christianity, or other foreign religion imported from time to time. That conception is of a life exactly like the present life. As the objective body remains here in the grave, the Chinese of course have been forced, like ourselves, to imagine a spiritual continuation of some sort. Whilst we have only imagined a spiritual state of bliss (or of torture), in which divine, diabolical, and human beings all alike take human form, with

perhaps the addition of wings (for the muscular working of which, however, no provision is made), the Chinese have imagined not only a spiritual state—minus the divine and diabolical forms—in human guise, but also a perfectly natural human life, unencumbered or unaided by wings, in which the loves and hates, the passions and the motives of this world are simply repeated in the next or the last. In fact there is only one life; the past, the present, and the future being merely stages of one and the same unsevered existence; very much as Shakespeare's infancy, youth, manhood, maturity, and senility are merely stages of that earthly existence which is all before our eyes. Before we ridicule or blame the Chinese for their simplicity in imagining things spiritual to be merely a *replica* of things carnal, we must ask ourselves whether we are more reasonable in imagining impossible extra limbs and a dreary, futile way of spending the time. As we and the Chinese both rank ourselves first amongst living things on earth, our imagination in both cases, accordingly, is driven by ignorance to the assumption that no forms of intelligence superior to the human can exist in that life which is not earthly; surely, then, the Chinese are to be commended, rather than blamed, for not speculating one iota beyond their earthly experience?

The most ancient Chinese philosophers, Confucius included, whilst unable to account for the mystery of life, and whilst thus perforce accepting in a loose, vague way the popular superstition or imaginative tradition of a previous life and a future life, have never taken this unknown factor too seriously. They elected to speak of the subject with decent awe when it was necessary to speak of it at all; but they preferred to give a wide berth to a subject on which there was no

human or direct information attainable. As Confucius himself said in effect: "We know little enough of ourselves as men; how are we likely, then, to obtain a better knowledge of what we once were and afterwards shall be?" The Chinese conception of human life on earth is that it begins, not at what we Europeans call birth, but at conception. Experience shews that birth, instead of following the average, may either be premature, or may be prolonged for and even beyond ten months; it is thus physically impossible to calculate the exact number of days, and therefore a safe, if rough, average is taken in calculating age. If a child is born on the last day of the year, he has, apart from some unexplained existence in a former life, certainly existed in invisible and incomplete carnal form on earth for the greater half of a year; consequently he is in his second year the day after his birth; that is, he is then *entitled* to say: "I am two years old." On the other hand, if he is born on the first day of the year, it will be nearly a whole year before he is entitled to say: "I am two years old"; and thus two individuals, born within a few minutes of each other, may differ one whole year in the computation of age; or, if born nearly a year apart, they may have exactly the same nominal age. No matter how a year be computed, it must contain a winter and a summer solstice, and the most prematurely born child must have passed two in the womb.

Having thus got a life, the next question was—and is, in spite of all imported religions—How are we to deal with this life? Dynasty after dynasty has taken over the answer to this question from its predecessor. Here, again, it may be more satisfactory to quote Confucius: "The dynasty (B.C. 1756—1122) preceding

that under which we live (B.C. 1122—255) continued the abstract principles of that before it (B.C. 2205—1766), and handed over the same principles to the dynasty now reigning." Thus the Book of Rites or Book of Abstract Principles—whatever its exact history in the form we now have it—has never been organically changed. It itself, or its commentators, may therefore be allowed to define these principles: "What the dynasties carried over from each other was (1) the three fundamental relations, and (2) the five general virtues." Or, again: "Love of kin, respect for superiors, deference to age, a proper distance between sexes; in these things the people must ever remain without change." As the most learned of living Chinese statesmen, Chang Chï-tung, pithily puts it: "The perfect sage is the highest human ideal, and thus he determines the principles of conduct after those of nature as we find it." Of course there is much of the *petitio principii* about all this, but not more than there must necessarily be about our favourite Western expression the 'final cause.'

All ancient Chinese literature, complete or incomplete, genuine or suspect, rings the changes upon the above simple ideas, or upon developments of them; and no other principles are discoverable until definite dates begin to be assigned to human events in 842 B.C. By that time the central king, or emperor, was already shorn of all but his moral or spiritual power; rival states aggrandised themselves at his expense, and at the expense of barbarians encircling the central kingdom of federated China; *de facto* power encroached upon *de jure* authority; China, in short, had its Reformation, Revolution, decay of dogma, and so on, just as 2,000 years later we had ours in Europe. The ancient 'royal road,' or simply the 'road,' was

appealed to just as before, but was tacitly modified to meet new conditions, larger areas, and denser populations. Rival schools of philosophy now grew up concurrently with rival centres of statecraft, in such wise that law, religion, morals, and social order gradually each took a separate root of their own and ceased to be mere subordinate adjuncts of the single government trunk. The recluse who founded what is often called the Taoist religion in the sixth century before Christ, simply tried to evolutionise the old royal *tao*, or 'way,' so as to include human actions and nature's laws in one homogeneous system, his object being to substitute the simple democratic life for class ambitions, and thus to pacify weltering humanity. A generation later Confucius, who was off and on both a recluse and a statesman, tried his hand upon the same familiar old material, but did his best to perpetuate class distinctions and social order based upon calculated artificial methods instead of establishing a natural democracy. The two philosophers had worked independently of each other before they met and found themselves rivals.

These two supreme instructors or advisers of Chinese mankind were only two out of many, and perhaps they are considered supreme chiefly because nearly all the others were practical statesmen or soldiers during the whole of their careers, and thus scarcely possessed the leisure to devote their entire attention to mere precept. However that may be, one and all of them failed singly and collectively to stay the disintegrating and fermenting forces of revolutionary thought; China was drenched with blood; the old feudal federation fell to pieces; and an effective centralised direct government was at last in 221 B.C.

established over an exhausted people. The new system being once established by force, had inevitably to look round for some reinforcing principle wherewith to consolidate its power and to appease men's restless minds. Taoism was undeniably in favour for at least a century, for it was owing to the iconoclastic democracy of that teaching that the new dictators had at last succeeded, after five centuries of warfare, in demolishing the royal caste federations. But, towards the beginning of our Christian era, the class conservatism of Confucius began to prove itself a more effective instrument and ally of the new centralisation. It was precisely whilst the rival claims of Taoism and Confucianism were thus adjusting themselves to the spirit of the times that Buddhism appeared upon the scene, and at once secured popularity in limited circles owing to its possessing many of the better qualities of both the other teachings; *i.e.* the simple needs, the stoicism, the democratic equality of Taoism, coupled with the gentleness, peacefulness, and benevolence of Confucianism. Besides this, the new religion — now properly so called—introduced a certain measure of female rights, the theory of rewards and punishments in the next world, the comfortable doctrine of annihilation of human passion and ambition at death, the idea of self-sacrifice by individuals for the general benefit of mankind, and many other novelties hitherto unconceived by the narrower spirit of purely administrative philosophy.

There is no real record of Buddhism having become officially known to the ruling classes of China before A.D. 65, when some courtiers interpreted an imperial dream by suggesting that the Western divinity, *Fu-t'u* (now written with pictographs then apparently pronounced

Vudu, or *Buddh*) was the 'golden man' dreamt of. The same year Buddhist books were brought wholesale from India; and ever since that time the notion of spiritual equality, self-sacrifice for humanity's sake, divine retribution, charity, prayer, control over the passions, and, in a word, religion proper, in our own European sense, has been distinctly perceived and conceived by the Chinese mind. As the Chinese had already then for 200 years or more known of the great Indo-Scythian, Ephthalite-Turk, or Kushān empire of the Oxus region, and as they seem to have had various unofficial and traditional records of certain religious features in Kushān civilisation, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the new religion may have already unconsciously or unobtrusively filtered its way into the recently conquered parts of China long before A.D. 65; in fact, the mere suggestion by a courtier that "it may have been the Western divinity Buddha" shews that men's minds had already contemplated the new situation, and that Buddha had already been talked of. Even in the case of such new ideas as steam-propulsion, electric light and force, wireless telegraphy, telephony, and torpedo-steering, there is nearly always a difficulty in tracing back the exact origins and dates. Of course it is very hard to make serious Christians believe in, or even to entertain, the possibility that the same zealous Buddhist emissaries who so profoundly modified the discredited, or at least practically unsuccessful teachings, philosophy, or ethics of China, may have also suggested analogous reforms to the Jews, as they certainly did to the Parthians; but it is impossible to deny that the ideas of a Messiah, of salvation, good works, and so on, may reasonably have suggested themselves to the Nazarenes through the efforts of

Buddhist monks. In China the older Taoism and the slightly later Confucianism (both, it will be remembered, sublimated from the common ancient natural religion) were at once profoundly affected by these peripatetic propagandists, and, besides competing with each other for Court favour, had both together to contend with the popular novelty of Buddhism. The complicated story of this competition, dynasty by dynasty, has often been fragmentarily told; but the subject has never been thoroughly worked out as a whole. So far as the government is concerned, Buddhism has usually been most demonstratively patronised by the Tartar dynasties; this is partly to be accounted for by the fact that the Tartars have oftener had more complete control of the whole Buddhistic land-route from the West, and partly owing to the picturesque externals of Buddhist ritual, appealing as they do more directly to the unsophisticated mind than do the abstract reasonings of a more artificial and class-bound social and political philosophy. Taoism has from time to time enjoyed fitful Court favour in China; but such Taoism has never been, so far as the masses have been able to grasp it, the pure abstract stoicism of antiquity, but rather the corrupted and opportunist forms adapted for opportunist purposes to meet Buddhist and Confucianist competition. Confucianism, on the other hand, has steadily gained ground, dynasty by dynasty, with the ruling classes of China, as being best calculated to secure reverence for the law, privileges for the classes, family rights for the masses, and deference by all to dynastic rights.

Shāmanism, or Tartar superstition, Mazdeanism, Manichæism, and Fire-worship have never taken deep root, nor have they ever so much as touched the greater

part of China proper; nor, again, has Judaism—always viewed as a kind of bastard Islām—had more than local and restricted vogue. The earliest Christianity in the form of Nestorianism, coming as it did by way of Persia, was not unnaturally regarded as a kind of modified Buddhism on the one hand, or was confused with the Persian religions on the other; it never gained any aggressive strength. Islām was introduced only a very few years later; and yet, alone of all the other foreign importations mentioned in this paragraph, it has taken silent, permanent root, and has survived with vigour to this day; the curious part of this fact is that it has done so uniformly in a quiet and imperceptible way, being scarcely so much as mentioned at the time when the Persian and Nestorian forms were shewing prospects of early vitality; and for 500 years after that it was never mentioned at all. Thus it may be said that, when the sea-borne Spanish and Portuguese missionaries first appeared on the China coast, 400 years ago, they had practically only to deal with corrupt Buddhism as a popular faith, and with Confucianism as the guiding principle of the governing class. Islām, the most militant of religions in the West, always lay low in China, receiving its due reward in the shape of liberal if not contemptuous toleration; it is only within the past 150 years that it has shewn signs of aggressiveness, and that aggressiveness seems to have had its origin rather in schisms within the fold than in hostility against the paganism found outside the pale of Islām.

The missionaries are full of hope, now that the leaven of new thought has worked up the mentality of the masses, that China will become more and more Christian in the sense of accepting doctrine and dogma;

but, as suggested above, the Chinese have never shewn any jealousy of foreign spirituality, so long as they have been left free to decide for themselves. The Chinese intellect is quite robust enough to take care of itself, and it is not likely that it will ever surrender itself to the dogmatic teaching of any Christian sect, Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox; it sees only too clearly that, however excellent the general effect of Christianity may have been in rendering the men of the West merciful, charitable towards human and even animal suffering, more truthful and just than the East in judiciary matters, more honest and public-spirited in financial and political matters, it has done very little, and steadily tends to do even less, towards placating race-ambitions, minimising the waste upon warlike preparations, equalising the enjoyment of the good things of life, and making men happy. In short they see that the warring nations of the West, in spite of their science, their 'faith,' and their philosophy, are in very much the same parlous state that old China was in when Lao-tsz and Confucius tried, each in his own way, to bring men back to the simple life or to the polite life respectively. They are not contented, and not happy. There is a keen demand in awakening China for all that the missionaries can do in the way of translating books of science, finance, political economy, history, *comparative* religion, the arts of war, the principles of state right and constitutional right, and so on; but the most enthusiastic missionaries will hardly pretend that any really intellectual Chinese troubles himself about miracles, holy mysteries, dogma, or doctrine pure and simple. The state of things that existed in Europe at the time of the Reformation and the Inquisition is hardly conceivable in China, where

fanaticism and religious zeal are quite foreign to the educated and the ignorant temperament alike. Such religious persecutions as have taken place have always been commanded from above, and have never burst out in the form of spiritual popular enthusiasm; they have always had a political and anti-foreign substratum, the fear being lest the peaceful course of social life and administrative government should be rendered confused and anarchical in the apparent interests of strangers enjoying the hospitality and tolerance of China. Neither Taoism nor Confucianism, which are both teachings of native growth, in no way religious, has ever been in the least persecuted, except that over-zealous individuals at Court may have occasionally been suppressed when their rivalry seemed to threaten a breach of the peace.

As things now stand, in spite of a foreign dynasty, of long-rooted financial corruption, of over half a century of opium-dissipation, of squeezed feet, of war-like incapacity, ingrained contempt (until quite recently) for scientific teaching, and other great handicaps, China is making a really brave show in the direction of political, economical, and moral independence: so far from there being in her any anti-religious fanaticism, she is beginning to shew once more a secular tolerance all round, and even to welcome missionaries for their many other virtues, gently ignoring that part of their 'spiritual' and doctrinal teaching which the Chinese cannot accept, and which they now see can do little political or social harm so long as a reasonable amount of outlet is given to it, and no irritating attempts are made to suppress liberty of opinion.

E. H. PARKER.

THE DIVINE FECUNDITY.[1]

REV. GEORGE TYRRELL.

A COLLECTIVE catastrophe such as an earthquake is often much more than a sum total of individual catastrophes. It differs in kind as well as in degree. It implies a frustration not merely of individual lives but of social life. To the former mystery—*i.e.* the frustration of individual lives before their natural exhaustion—we are accustomed; the latter is less familiar and more striking. Yet a state or city has a life of its own, a history of its own. It has its aspirations, ambitions, ideals. Though history shows us that kingdoms perish, yet for them the law of death is not an apparent necessity as it is for the individual. They live, act, plan, design, on the assumption that they will last for ever. And so of institutions, associations and other collectivities. They allow for, and are not perturbed by, the gradual elimination and replacement of their individual members. But for collective catastrophes that interrupt their history, or threaten their very existence, they do not allow. The more extensive and socially destructive such a catastrophe is, so much the more does it bring home to us the possibility of what may happen, nay, of what must happen, though it has never happened yet, namely, the extinction of the human race in the midst

[1] The summary of a paper read before The Quest Society, at Kensington Town Hall, March 25, 1909.

of its career, the frustration of its collective hopes, ideals and aspirations. Religion has probably only canonised and authenticated a spontaneous, and perhaps useful, illusion of the mind, in teaching us to believe that human history is working towards some definite and attainable goal in which its destiny will be accomplished; that, like an individual organism, its evolution has a certain inherently determined limit; that the process has to end in some kingdom of God upon earth, some socialist millennium, in which the wheels of life will spin round monotonously and without progress.

But manifestly, collective humanity is in no way inherently predetermined to any such fixed goal. As far as it seems designed for anything, it is for an eternal process of ever expanding and deepening life. Not only to man, but to every living species, Nature says: "Increase, multiply, fill the earth and subdue it"; nor is there any inward principle limiting that increase and expansion. The posterity we work for is a to-morrow that never comes. It is not some final generation that is to enter into all the labours, joys, tears, and sorrows of the past. Every future generation, even the most distant we can imagine, will have tears and sorrows of its own. Relatively, the joys and sorrows of one epoch are probably no greater than those of another. New supplies create new demands; new answers raise new questions; new attainments breed new discontents.

We progress not in pursuit of a freely chosen end, such as an earthly paradise, but in obedience to a dire law of our nature and because we must. Under pressure from behind and from around, we are constrained to live better in order to live at all; to advance

in order not to perish. Apart from such pressure we are inert and even retrograde. We kick against the goad that spurs us on to effort and conflict. Once forced into the battle, our love of conquest may become a passion with us. We then put it down to our own credit; we interpret it by our ideals. We prefer to think we are actively pursuing an end, rather than passively obeying an impulse.

Yet just because we assume that we are building up some final earthly paradise, we are perplexed by any sort of extensive social catastrophe that suggests the possibility of a racial catastrophe, such as an universal plague or earthquake or cosmic collision. Our God is in our own image and likeness. He is the embodiment and guarantee of our highest aspirations. We seem to have no higher aspiration than the final and permanent perfection of humanity. Can God be indifferent to this?

Let me say in passing that in the present context I use God and Nature indifferently; that is, I speak of God so far as he is immanent in and parallel with Nature; and not so far as he is supernatural and transcendent. Sometimes Nature sounds too inhuman for my purpose, and sometimes God sounds too human.

'Indifference,' that is the problem. Nature or God is so evidently careful, so evidently careless, about one and the same interest. Dualism offers a tempting solution for what seems to be a conflict between two independent principles, one constructive, the other destructive. But no. Construction and destruction are too plainly dependent factors of one system. Nature destroys in creating and creates in destroying. Death is but an economy of life in its higher forms, by no means necessary in the lower. The fly and the

mouse perish that the spider and the cat may live. Yet Nature is on both sides at once; she pounces with the cat and she runs with the mouse; she rejoices with the conqueror, she weeps with the conquered. Is it not the same throughout the whole world? Everywhere forces, impulses, instincts of self-assertion, self-preservation, self-expansion, whose frustration is apparently as much the intention of Nature as is their realisation.

Nor can we say that it is the lower that yields to the higher. Man is the prey of the beast, nay, of the microbe. Nor again that the lower is wholly designed for the use of the higher. No plant or animal is designed for food, but only for its own life and self-expansion. Many seem designed to prey on and infest others, but not one instinctively yields itself to be eaten. I speak under correction; but I know of no creature labelled 'food.' All Nature's designs are for conquest and consumption; she has filled the world with feeders but not with food. Food is always artificial. It is made by the destruction of something that was constructed for an end of its own. We destroy a plant or an animal to feed on its ruins. But its form and function, all that makes it what it is, is nothing to our purpose. Nature in each existing individual seems to be wholly on its side and against all the rest; while at the same time the very rivalry of types and individuals is the condition of their existence and development. Were any one type to fulfil the law of its being without check, it would overspread the whole earth in an incredibly short time, and, in destroying its rivals, would destroy the condition of its own existence. It is at once intended to prevail and intended not to prevail. Hereto-

fore man has willingly believed, and made his religion teach him, that his race is an exception to this universal law of life; that the strength and direction of its natural impulses and aspirations is a guarantee of their eventual attainment. It was thought reasonable that cows and sheep should exist not for themselves but primarily to supply him with beef and mutton. Plants existed for animals; animals for man. As for the extinct species that preceded man they were an anomaly; nay, their existence was denied. Yet there is no guarantee whatever that man in obeying the innate law of his being, in struggling upwards from bestiality to civilisation, is a favoured child of Nature; or is destined to perpetuity; or that he may not fall the prey of some new microbe or of some wild upheaval of the earth's crust. Indeed the death of the individual is not more certain than the eventual death of the race.

It is this combination of care and carelessness that constitutes the wastefulness of Nature. She is like some fickle genius who, as soon as he has proved his skill, wearies of his unfinished task and throws it aside to begin another. She delights in making but cares nothing for what she has made; infinitely clever, infinitely heartless. She takes not fifty but fifty thousand seeds in her heedless hand and flings them into space, on the chance that just one may realise some little part of that infinite potentiality with which she has endowed it; for each is not only a life in itself but is pregnant with a whole world of teeming life. We look up and see the midnight sky white with star-dust; and we recognise her wasteful hand once more. And yet in our preposterous conceit we are still confident that our own microscopic atom is a favoured

world-seed that cannot fail of eventual success. But what are the chances that its potentialities will come to anything, or that Nature will deflect her course by a hair's breadth rather than set her careless heel on our laboriously constructed ant-hill? I think none at all.

But we must perforce conceive the eternal and universal labour of Nature in the likeness of some human enterprise, with beginning, middle and end, and of which every part and moment bears on every other and builds up a final and predetermined result. For earlier thought, this order was more static and architectural; for ours, it is that of a building-process where nothing is wasted, where every movement conspires to one unifying end. And if the manifest waste and incoherence of Nature give the lie to this anthropomorphism, we then ascribe this apparent difficulty merely to the limitation of our view; we appeal from knowledge to faith. Could we see all, we think, we should see thrift and economy everywhere—"toil co-operant to an end."

But before we go abroad into the stellar universe, let us look at home and see if the history of this earth or of man bears out such an idea of progress—of an all-embracing plan to which every existence and event is subservient; let us see if we are justified in extending the categories of the part to the whole; in conceiving the whole as a vast mechanism or organism. May it not be a boundless ocean of chaotic potentialities in which myriad forms of organism appear, and, by their mere struggle for existence, fall into that hierarchic order that looks like intelligent design, but is merely a mechanical result.

Are we then justified in supposing that because

progress or development is the innate law of every individual, and in a sense of every species, it is also the law of that world which is the theatre of life; that the *whole* has been planned with a view to progress? Does not progress imply an environment; and can the whole have an environment?

Let us shut up our sacred books and look at human history as a whole, or in any of its departments, as we know it. Can we say that our present civilisation is the steady, orderly outcome of man's past history in the same way that a fully developed organism is the outcome of its first germ? Can we say that all our past has been co-operant to this end? Manifestly not. Only the barest trickle from the past mingles with its waters. The rest has sunk into the earth or evaporated into the clouds, and affects us as little as does the history of Mars or Jupiter. For all that concerns us, the history of central Africa or aboriginal America is mere waste. It might never have happened. What we owe to Assyria constitutes but an infinitesimal fraction of its civilisation. And when we point to our debts to Egypt and Greece, let us not deceive ourselves. They have not lived on in us, but have died that we might live. We have not steadily built up a structure that they began, but have gathered stones from their ruins to build up into a wholly different structure of our own. There is no more continuity of development here, than between the beast of prey and its victim.

Still more futile is it to find a quasi-organic relation between the countless species of life, extinct and extant, that have appeared on our globe; to see them all co-operant and convergent towards some grand final unification. Such order as we find is the result—the almost mechanical result—of struggle and competi-

tion. The strongest eel, says the proverb, gets to the top of the pot; the weakest gets to the bottom; and between the top and the bottom the others are hierarchically arranged according to the degree of their strength and efficiency. The history of species and genera is that of a process of division and sub-division in no way subordinated to some higher complex unity. Each goes its way independently, as if it were itself the whole world; and its relation to the rest, if not indifferent, is hostile rather than co-operative. Horses do not volunteer to work for man, nor aphides for ants. As far as present species are concerned, most of those now extinct might never have existed, so little do they enter into the present resultant. Life has put forth a thousand branches that have simply perished without trace—each a separate world that has lived and died, but not for us. They might as well have flourished in the most distant stars as far as existing flora and fauna are concerned.

And those distant stars—is there the faintest evidence in favour of Fechner's beautiful dream of an organic unity in which each has its part to play; each demands and is demanded by all the rest; in which not one is wasted or fails to contribute to the realisation of a fore-ordained end? Does not all the evidence we have explain their apparent order as the blind resultant of a competition between brute masses and brute forces? Are they not ever crashing, colliding, destroying one another, in their struggle for free play, senseless as the furious billows of an angry ocean? Let us not be blinded by our instinctive craving for unity, understanding, comprehension, which after all is only an exigency of our practical life.

As far then as our experience goes, the organic

category—the co-ordination of parts by a whole, of functions by an end—has no application in Nature except to the individual organism. It cannot even be applied to the history and development of the species; for while the organism left to itself develops, and that in one fixed way, the species left to itself is inert, if not retrograde; and when forced by external pressure to develop, may do so in any one of a thousand directions determined by the more or less accidental nature of that external pressure. It accommodates and shapes itself as a river does to its bed; and with as little foresight or design. Its future cannot be predicted from any knowledge of its present internal constitution.

Only then in the individual manifestations of life do we find anything that looks like plan or finality in Nature. These individuals are, we might say, so many condensations or nuclei in the shapeless, aimless nebula of the inorganic; each a little world apart, adjusting itself to its surroundings and to its neighbour worlds, as best it may; leaguing with its like for common advantage and adventure; depending on them for its very existence and preservation; yet not constituting with them any sort of higher natural organism, nor conspiring with them to any definite pre-established goal. Nature is not working to one end; but has just as many ends as there are living individuals. In each of them Life seeks a new self-expression. But its utterances are not connected, nor has their sum-total a separate or organic meaning.

Is the universe then, as we know it, aimless and meaningless? Rather it teems with aims and meanings, although it has no one aim or meaning. Like a great tree it pushes out its branches, however and wherever it can, seeking to realise its whole nature as far as

possible in every one of them, but aiming at no collective effect. This is its play, this is its work, this is, if you will, its end.

But a tree grows in the process; it is born, it lives, it dies. Have we any reason to think that the universe grows from anything to anything? Not the slightest. All we can find is an endless oscillation, like that of the heaving ocean; a process of making and unmaking; of condensation and dispersion; periods of progress alternating with periods of retrogression. We can see in it only the eternal theatre of those self-manifestations which are, so to say, the pulsations of the universal life. To suppose that God is working out some ultimate end by means of those self-manifestations, that they are not ends in themselves, is to reduce him to human dependency and poverty—to forget that they are but radiations from the source of life. As well look for plan and system among the blessings that the sun scatters upon our earth, cheering each heart, tuning each throat, colouring each flower, fertilising each grain, as though there were none other in the whole world.

As far then as God in Nature seems at all to care or provide, it is not for the type, but for the single life; not for the whole, but for a few of its parts.

These countless billions of separate worlds and ends; this wasteful luxuriance and fecundity; this lack of any ulterior design in whose realisation the cosmic labour is to cease; this work for work's sake so nearly akin to play—all this is perplexing to us who are driven into action only by our needs and limitations. The artist, the musician, knows something of it. We have made our God not in the image of the artist but in that of the artisan or the man of affairs. We ask:

"What is he going to make out of it all?" Perhaps nothing; perhaps the universe is only his eternal keyboard, his eternal canvas. Perhaps each melody, each picture, may have a worth in itself apart from all the rest. Lost stars, lost species, lost civilisations, lost religions—lost as far as any influence on our own is concerned—may have justified their existence, though they have led to nothing further.

Let us remember this when we think it an injustice that so many generations should have lived in bestiality, savagery and barbarism in order, as we imagine, that our civilisation might at last arise. Will not future generations look back on us with a like mistaken pity as having existed only for their sakes? Do we not feel, and rightly, that we exist primarily for our own? And did not our savage ancestors feel the same? Are we not mistaking a result for an end? We conceive progress as planned, as making for a goal, an earthly paradise, into which some far-off generation is to enter for whose sake all previous generations have suffered. And pray when? Our just indignation at such a scheme is, however, wasted if there be no such scheme, and if every generation, every individual life, have an absolute value of its own and constitute a world apart. The good of posterity is the result, not the end or motive, of our living as well and as fully as we can. We should live, not for a posterity that never comes, but for the present—always remembering that our present is a little bit of the past tied to a little bit of the future; the duration of our actual living interests; the field of our clear foresight and retrospect.

If then a collective catastrophe, interrupting the course of progress and civilisation, shocks and disappoints our expectation, it is because that expectation

was ill-grounded; because we had thought Nature pledged to the development of the social organism in the same way as she is pledged to that of the individual organism.

No doubt to view the cause of progress as God's cause, and to live and labour for an ideal society in the vague future as for the Kingdom of God, has been the source of no little inspiration and fertile inventiveness. But it has not been an unmixed blessing. The end is easily forgotten in the means. Men come to care more for universal aims and causes than for the individuals in whose behalf they are taken up; more for the Sabbath than for man; more for the temple than for him who dwells in it. There is a worship of the future not less blind and pernicious than the worship of the past; there is a devotion to progress as enslaving as the most obstinate traditionalism. Man must never be treated as a means, as a stepping-stone for his fellows. It is not by living for a remote posterity that we shall do most for it, but by living for ourselves and our children, and by making the best of the present and of that immediate future which is but part of the present.

If our problem is thus simplified, if we have only to puzzle over Nature's carelessness as to the individual, it is also in some way intensified. For there was at least a vague semblance of a solution in the idea that the individual was sacrificed to some higher and more universal end about which Nature was *not* careless; and even when her indifference to some such imaginary end—to the triumph of some chosen people or race, to the progress of all humanity or of the whole sentient world—could no longer be denied, the end was only pushed further away into the darkness of the unknown;

and in the interests of this unknown end the sacrifice of the individual was justified by faith if not by sight.

Shall we not perhaps make an hypothesis more consonant to facts as far as we see them, if we suppose God (or Nature, if you like) to be bound by a two-fold metaphysical necessity? First, by the necessity of producing and creating in all senses and directions like the wild vegetation of a tropical forest. Secondly, by the necessity according to which such individual productions interfere with and impede one another. What he produces are the individuals; the totality and its more or less mechanically determined order *result*, but are not produced or intended.

On this hypothesis he cares and cares supremely for each individual organism as though it were a world apart. He equips it for the struggle; he lives, feels, desires, devises, fights, suffers, and finally dies with it and for it. He cannot do otherwise. If in its rivals and enemies he fights against it, this again is a necessity of his nature, which in them also utters itself as fully as their limitations permit. As Schopenhauer says, he is on the side of the cat and of the mouse, of the spider and of the fly, of the oppressor and of the oppressed. He hates, but he cannot help, the conflict and agony. His will is plainly to minimise and abolish the inevitable pressure and suffering as far as possible. Here it is that his freedom is exercised—*i.e.* in dealing with the problem produced and ever reserved by his necessary fecundity. Such progress as we see, is the work of immanent wisdom and intelligence striving to make room for the swarming children of life. It is then a libel to say that he is careless of individuals; he cares for them and for nothing else; he does not

sacrifice them as means to some far-off universal and impersonal end.

What then is his interest in man's schemes and dreams of progress? Just his interest in the individuals who are to benefit by them; just his interest in that problem of life which confronts each of them, so far as in any degree they are self-conscious and self-governing—the problem of relieving the pressure and suffering resulting from the fecundity of life, and of finding room for her multitudinous children. At first it would seem to be the self-conserving instinct that leagues them together for their common and distributive, rather than for their collective, advantage. But eventually we find a diviner type of life in which sympathy becomes an instinct of the heart, a principle of the mind; in which the individual shares the divine interest in other individuals—first in its fellows, finally in all things both great and small. Thus it is that man consciously co-operates with the divine will in its care of individuals; in its task of minimising pressure and suffering; in securing the fullest possible conditions of life for all; in wrestling with the inevitable limitations of the finite—with all-conquering death and decay.

The Kingdom of God or an earthly paradise is not a sovereign end in itself, but a means to the multitudinous ends of individuals. Nor is it the product of an unbroken process of development; nor is it an end that can ever be realised. It is an impossible ideal that fixes the direction of the divine effort to minimise the inevitable pressure of an inevitable fecundity. We have here, writ large, the eternally insoluble problem of that over-population which is at once the source of progress and degradation; of happiness and of misery;

of life and of death. If one people or one species restrict its fecundity, it will only be to the profit of its rivals. Dam the stream where you will, the torrent of life rolls on just the same only to fertilise some other region.

We have thus an eternal struggle, without beginning and without end, between being and the inevitable limitations of being; between boundless fecundity and the bounds that result from it. In each particular life or branch of life the struggle is maintained as long as possible by all the devices and contrivances of an inexhaustible wisdom; but sooner or later, as in the individual, so in the race, so too in the cosmic system, the problem becomes insoluble and death conquers. Yet there is no rest or repose in the restless ocean of being. Again and again, in countless millions of forms, the broken task is taken up patiently, and the old riddle attempted anew.

If time allowed it might be interesting to dwell upon the religious and moral consequences of such a *Weltanschauung*. I can do no more than give the headings of such a chapter.

(1) The exoneration of God from the charge of willing even permissively the hurt or destruction of any individual life.

(2) His exoneration from the charge of using such hurt or destruction as a means justified by some imaginary and future end.

(3) The detachment of man from the superstitious belief in and worship of such an imaginary end; and the concentration of his care on individuals, taken distributively and not collectively.

(4) The condemnation of the Gospel of Progress

so far as it promises an eventual millennium, or anything more than an alleviation sufficient to balance the increase of individual suffering that progress brings in its wake; or rather, that is itself the compelling cause of progress.

(5) The need of fighting against evil purely for the sake of such alleviation and not in view of ultimate success; but rather of ultimate defeat—of fighting because we must and because we ought; and because if we do not go forward, we shall fall behind and be trampled under foot.

(6) The need of some transcendental other-world hope to oppose to this immediate and provisional pessimism, as the only alternative to accepting that ultimate pessimism which is professed by the largest and oldest religion or quasi-religion in the world, and that, on a wide basis of experience.

(7) The enrichment of the impoverished Christian consciousness by the restoration of that proximate pessimism to which Christ opposed his message of a transcendental hope; and which, even by itself, is more respectable than the optimism that places its hope in the triumph of progress; and far more respectable than that pseudo-Christianity which substitutes such a triumph of Progress for the transcendental Kingdom of Heaven promised by Christ.

GEORGE TYRRELL.

ON THE NATURE OF THE QUEST.[1]

G. R. S. MEAD, B.A.

In the first place I would warn you that my present adventure must be regarded as the excursion of a free-lance simply; I am not putting forward a document approved by a council, nor am I the spokesman of any settled opinion. What I have to say is advanced by way of suggestion only, as one mode of envisaging a high ideal, one manner of regarding certain means which have been proposed for winning towards it.

At this our first meeting, it seems most appropriate to consider (though of necessity briefly and in very general terms) the purpose of our association and the objects we propose to pursue. By 'purpose' I mean our hopes and aspirations, the ideal we have in mind; by 'objects' those intermediate ways and means which we propose to use for the attainment of this purpose.

The name we have chosen, 'The Quest Society,' is eloquent of our purpose; the means of furthering it are briefly summarised in our two objects, namely:

"1. To promote investigation and comparative study of religion, philosophy and science, on the basis of experience.

[1] The substance of an address delivered by the President at the Inaugural Meeting of The Quest Society, at Kensington Town Hall, London, W., on Thursday, March 11, 1909.

"2. To encourage the expression of the ideal in beautiful forms."

Further, to assure ourselves that we are setting forth on no vain undertaking, we have chosen as our motto the words of comfort uttered by one who had achieved the end of the Quest:

"Seek, and ye shall find."

As to purpose then, let us first consider the name, the distinctive title, 'Quest.' Why have we so styled our endeavour? Many other titles were proposed and considered, some of them excellent names, each in their several ways; but the lot has been cast in favour of The Quest Society, and this has been received with such general favour that we may well be content with the choice. It suggests a wealth of meaning; it is a name into which can be read both depth and dignity.

In its most pedestrian sense 'quest' connotes simply 'seeking' or 'search'; but does it not already, even for the most prosaic, call up before the mind a further sense, does it not evoke an atmosphere of romance, of poetry, of things spiritual? Has it not already, in common use, a different 'feel' from plain and simple 'search.'

A number of the titles suggested favoured the term 'research'; but as 'research' by itself was too vague in any case, and for some too ambitious or too cold, it had to be qualified. The great difficulty was to find a qualification on which all could agree. Limit of some sort there must be, no matter how we might chafe at limitation. Many epithets were suggested, only to be rejected. For instance, 'The Mystical Research Society' was favoured by some; but 'mystical' requires further definition, even for those who are genuine lovers of mysticism in its best sense, while in

modern times the name has so fallen from its high estate that it has become a veritable stumbling-block for most people.

The simple word 'quest,' however, seemed to solve all our difficulties. It could be made to include both all that is best in research and all that is most desirable in mysticism, and a host of other things as well. 'Quest' seems capable of expressing all that the spirit of 'research' suggests — and something more; indeed just that something which I venture to believe is the main purpose of every member of our Society.

With the word 'research' we rightly associate the most painstaking devotion, the most laborious and self-sacrificing study, the most brilliant achievements of the mind of man. But research is unending; there is no finality in it. The goal of the scientist, in the nature of things, can be but a temporary goal; with every fresh discovery there is a momentary, a temporary reward, but that is all; always more and yet more remains to be discovered. The scientist is like a traveller on a mountain path; every new height attained, every new discovery made, discovers in its turn but a higher summit beyond, reveals to the weary though courageous climber only how great, how infinite, is the further distance he has to cover.

Research must be scientific; every stage along the path, every step of that stage, is of utmost importance; from beginning to end of it there must be one complete chain of reasoning, one unbroken line of demonstration; should any link be found missing, any flaw be discovered, any step omitted along the route traversed, the result is invalidated, the end is not attained, and the climb must be begun anew. Even when the

temporary goal is achieved, it is but the starting-point for further research. There is no finality this way; though many virtues are developed in the searcher.

But—if I may be allowed to declare my own belief freely—in all ages and at all times, there has ever been and ever will be, while man is man, one Quest. That Quest is final and complete; when found it is the beginning and end of all things for man. It pertains to the depths and not to the surfaces of things, to life and not to death, to the eternal and not to the temporal. No matter what route of research is traversed, no matter how many steps along the innumerous paths of the ever-becoming, the final result is in no way affected; for it is something 'more,' something 'greater,' something 'other' than the product or total of any series.

This one Quest is the search or call of the soul for That alone which can completely satisfy the whole man, and make him self-initiative and self-creative. The call of the soul for its complement, its fulfilment, for all that which it seems not to be, may be figured forth by the mind as the longing of the bride for the bridegroom, or the search of the bridegroom for the bride. In folk-tale, myth, and sacred story, it has been set forth in countless modes throughout the ages. It may be found in all the great mystery-myths of the mystic union, the sacred marriage; in folk-tales it may be romantically described as the search of the gallant young prince who sets forth in the true spirit of adventure to find the beautiful princess, perchance asleep in some foreign land. It may be figured by the noble knight who fights bravely through the battles of life, whose one goal is to find the mystic treasure of life immortal and restore it to the purified temple, its own true

resting-place. It may be represented by the devout worshipper, ever kneeling at the feet of the Saviour, awaiting that supreme moment when all sins shall be washed away, and he shall rise in a new and perfect body to live for ever in the immediate Presence of his Lord. It is the transmutation of every desire and lust that leads to bondage into the pure love that seeks the liberty of union with the Divine Will alone.

There are many other forms in which this Quest can be represented in folk-tale and legend, in story and myth, in mystic rite and sacred ordinance; but whatever form may be imprinted by the mind of man upon the living idea, or whatever mode may be impressed upon the substance of his inmost nature, the goal, the end of it is one and the same. It is this: salvation, satisfaction, certitude, completeness, perfection, wholeness; relief and rest from our present state of strain and tension, freedom from the separateness of bondage, the reconciliation of all opposites in the all-embracing immediacy of self-realisation.

So while research—investigation and comparative study—is one of our chief interests, the purpose of our Society, I would believe, embraces something far deeper, far more subtle, something more spiritual in the highest and profoundest meaning of the word—a more living, more vital, more immediate quest.

This brings me to the next idea which we should, doubtless, all like to see associated with the activities of our undertaking—that of life, vitality. I sincerely hope it may be found that we are not in search of knowledge only, but that our seeking is also for deeper and intenser life. And here again the name that has been chosen can stand us in good stead, for it can be used very appropriately, as we have seen, to body forth

this idea. Our search is not only for Light but also for Life, and above all for the Good; for these three are one in the Fulness of Deity—Mind and Soul and Spirit.

The word 'research' generally calls up before the mind the scientist dealing with the mysteries of matter, trying to become master of them, to enslave more and more the latent powers of the material universe, and make them do his bidding. With the word 'quest' other ideas are mirrored in the mind; that into which we search ceases to be dead substance to be coerced by the monarch—man; it becomes living, vital. We no longer seek to enslave; we ask to be allowed to co-operate. All around us is life and intelligence to be spoken to, to be requested. The universe of those who are spiritually awakened is the vital intelligent universe of the ancients and sages; it has a soul.

In this vital quest, then, man does not seek to dominate more and more; he hardly even seeks to acquire more and more knowledge for himself. It is rather a quest which transcends his personality—transliminal as well as cisliminal. It is not simply the searching of the mind after knowledge; it is rather the yearning of the soul for more bountiful life. "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find." It is not only the mind of man daring to stand up before all the worlds of gods and men, saying: 'I will know.' It is over and above this the call of the soul, the gentle voice of the lover to the Loved, the prayer of the devout worshipper to his Lord. It is the way of knowledge and love united; as Thrice-greatest Hermes has it:

"Seek'st thou for God, thou seekest for the Beautiful. One is the Path that leadeth unto It—Devotion joined with Gnosis."

Man must first seek in order to find; and then at each finding he should call, call to the Beloved to awake. He should refuse to be satisfied with knowledge; he should go still further, and call to the Soul of Nature to array herself in her living robes of glory. For not until then will the true lover be satisfied, not until then will the soul have found its true source and power—That from which it comes and has departed, and which alone can perfect it, reform it into a wholeness, and so give it the peace which passeth all understanding, that true initiation, or consummation of the spiritual marriage, the *unio mystica*, or union of the within and the without, which illumines the mind, expands and intensifies the consciousness, and partakes of the nature of the deepest and most vital experience of self-realisation. This is the Divine bequest that has been willed to us, according to the testimony of the greatest souls among men.

The chief business of the spiritual soul, then, is how to set to work to make itself capable of receiving more and more bountifully of this its true inheritance. Can the objects of The Quest Society serve as means for the furtherance of this great purpose? They seem to me to be admirably suited to be so used.

By the first object we are encouraged to question, to dig deep down within the outer appearances of things for the hidden truth. We would promote research, investigation; we would specially commend the comparative study of religion, philosophy and science in their bearing on the nature of experience. For in such study rightly pursued we see man whose consciousness is normally towards external and changing things, working to attain to a consciousness of things internal and eternal.

By the second object we would encourage man to draw forth from himself that glorious heritage of the soul, the power to create, to express the beauty, truth and harmony that lies within.

Here we have, I believe, the two great complementary courses which must be followed by every individual soul, by every man who is struggling to free himself from the bonds of separateness, in the pursuit of That which is the One Desirable, the true purpose of the quest.

First we have the throwing of the mind outwards to things beyond, in order to widen and deepen it and increase its sympathies—the attempt to find the truth, and so to unite, in every search, with that Soul of Intelligence which indwells in everything. In this way we enlarge the mind and ever expand further and further our own field of consciousness, our capacity for awareness.

Then comes the calling forth of that complementary power of the soul—the passion of the soul to create, to express that which this extension of consciousness has awakened within its deepest nature.

First we seek and question in order to arouse in ourselves the dormant powers of the mind; we go forth with energy to do battle with the world of objects around. Next we rest, and call forth that God-given power latent in man, the power to mirror forth in beauteous forms that understanding of things which we have attempted to make our own, to possess, to master. For until this power has been aroused unto creativeness, wisdom is not truly ours. Wisdom is the creative power of Deity. We may have knowledge of many different things, we may be learned in many sciences, but true wisdom, I hold, is other; it carries with it, as

it were, an innate, immediate and spontaneous response to things without, as they appear to be 'without' to normal consciousness. True wisdom is an ever-present initiator; it is not a fixed knowledge of any or many different appearances. Wisdom is a subtle, spiritual, instant power to understand the soul of things, and also to apply this understanding ever to immediate opportunity.

From another point of view the two objects of The Quest Society might be thought of in connection with the practices of concentration and meditation—if we may be permitted to employ these terms without prejudice and in a very extended sense. Or, again, to use one of the most graphic, vital and fundamental of all figures, one that is very familiar to lovers of Indian mystic lore and symbolism,—we might think of these two objects as the out-going and returning breath of the mind; the two are complementary, indeed they must work together simultaneously for the true life of immediate understanding.

This brings me to another living idea, a matter of vital importance, expressed in the first object by the single word 'experience,' in connection with the investigation and comparative study of religion, philosophy and science.

There are many ways of considering religion, philosophy and science; they may well be regarded as a trinity in unity, where no one is before or after another, no one greater or less than another; they may also be thought of as each severally containing the others; they may, again, each be looked upon as the means of at-one-ment between the remaining two. For the moment let us regard them in one mode of the last way only.

Religion we might roughly consider as an activity of the soul, science as an activity of the mind; and then philosophy, in its deepest sense, might not inappropriately be regarded as that which alone can unite these two natural partners. Apart these twain are ever barren. Religion divorced from reason tends towards fanaticism and superstition; science, when separated from its lawful partner, the spirit of religion, tends towards scepticism, materialism, and atheism. Philosophy, in its best sense, is that which should unite them—philosophy as not only the love but also the practice of wisdom. Is it too daring to call philosophy an art? In olden days, at any rate, it was indubitably regarded as one, in so far as it was something that had to be lived and practised.

If we might, then, be allowed to use philosophy in this its deepest meaning, then in its association with religion and science, we might even go so far as to consider it the art of all arts, the craft of uniting, of joining together, of at-oning, these two great orders of human activity, religion and science—the union or marriage of the activities of the soul with the activities of the mind, the joining of the powers and activities of these two eternal partners in a practical form, and through this union the bringing to birth in the man that great consummation the life of spiritual experience, of self-realisation. And by 'spiritual experience' I do not mean abnormal happenings—these may or may not occur—but a life of rest, of poise and balance, of peaceful understanding, an inner recognition of the great truths and great powers which are hidden all around us, and which when brought within the immediate consciousness of a man, lead to his co-operating with them in the divine scheme of life, so that though he

apparently still lives in bondage as other men live, he actually is in a state of freedom which other men know not of.

Spiritual ignorance is bondage; it is the root of all bondage with which man is bound. With wisdom comes freedom, and with freedom comes greater power and intenser life. And here we are using ignorance in its deepest sense; not as the opposite of knowledge simply, but as the antithesis of that spiritual science or wisdom which is of the nature of vital Gnosis—to use one of the many names that have been given to the Quest, as the means of reaching the Divine. It is vital rather than material knowledge, spiritual rather than intellectual; and the inquiry into its nature and comparative study of the many attempts throughout the centuries that have been made to realise it, are most potent means to help us in our pursuit of the Quest.

I would now conclude these brief and fragmentary reflections on the objects of The Quest Society by dwelling for a moment on our desire to encourage the expression of the ideal in forms of beauty. Speaking with all hesitation, as a layman and one of the profane, I would venture to express my belief that the highest use and purpose of art is to reveal and express the inner soul of things. Beauty in art seems to consist in clearness of expression, or vividness of reflection, of the ideas and feelings or moods of the soul and of life. Some arts lend themselves more to the expression of the ideas of the soul, others to the expression of the passions of the soul.

Beauty and truth from this point of view are seen to be closely related. The man who speaks clearly what is in his mind is the man of truth. The man of shuffling speech, the man who does not try to reveal or

express clearly, but rather tries to conceal, is the man of untruth. If truth in this connection may be said to be the intentional and deliberate revealing of idea or inner motive, then beauty may be considered to be the unconscious or natural revealing of it. Untruth is deliberate concealment; ugliness may not be deliberate concealment, but it is confusion and the lack of capacity to reveal the truth.

The formal mind of man may be able admirably to register and record in words facts, but the artist can create forms which are expressions of vital truths,—that is to say, they are more nearly related to the soul of things; there is in them a life beat or rhythm, a further method by means of which there can be conveyed to the mind of man greater power, intenser life, and increased stimulus to understanding and experiencing. The registration of facts is a record of the appearances of things, the artistic nature is in contact with the heart, the depth, the life of things.

For beauty there must be a certain rhythm and symmetry and harmony; and when this is found, there is born a soul or atmosphere, as it were, which is a new power linking the form to that living idea which the form is trying to express.

This, I take it, is one of the reasons why we are anxious to encourage the expression of the ideal in forms of beauty; and in this connection I have been struck by a quotation from a lecture recently (March 5th) delivered at Cambridge by the well-known painter, Mr. W. Rothenstein.

"We all know," he said, "the immense stimulus we get from meeting with any profound interpretation of life, when it is expressed in terms of great beauty; we get this excitation forcibly from those writings

which are so impregnated with wisdom, understanding of the hearts of men and grandeur of vision that each civilisation claims for them a divine origin. Something of this inspiration is found in all true works of art, and this exaltation, this added sense of the value and significance of life, must, I think, form the basis of our appreciation of every form of beauty."

Art, however, is not greater than science, nor science higher than art; art and science are of equal dignity and value, they are complementary to one another. The scientist tries to stand firm on the bed-rock of knowledge; the artist bathes in the waters of life. The beginning and end of science is a fixed point; the goal of the artist is motion. What greater praise can we bestow upon a work of art than to say it is full of life and movement? The scientist tries to hold life and force still, to chain and imprison it; the artist endeavours to make that which is still become instinct with life and motion. The scientist tries to encompass life; the artist strives to infuse life.

Even from this brief reference to a high subject, which many of you are far more competent to treat than myself, I hope it is clear that our second object works together with the first as a potent means for the better realisation of the purpose we have in view.

Such, put very briefly, are a few of the ideas that have occurred to me in pondering the objects of The Quest Society. There are many other points of view, and each will naturally regard both purpose and means from his own special standpoint. Indeed the scope of our objects is so wide and far-reaching that the more one thinks over them the more amazed does one become at the vistas of possibility that open up in all directions before the mind's eye. If it were a programme of

research simply that we had in view, it would be an endless undertaking, a hopeless task; but the spirit of the Quest can transmute every search equally into a means to the same end. There are as many paths home as there are souls to tread them, and as many ways of search as there are types of mind or modes of life.

Of the multiplicity and variety of the means of search I have said nothing; it is too vast a subject to attempt in a general address such as this must be. I have, therefore, in the brief time at my disposal, dwelt rather on the more vital side of such investigation and comparative study, so as to distinguish between what I would call the spirit of the Quest and the forms of research in which that Quest may be pursued.

If the spirit of the Quest is realised every type of mind and every line of research can be utilised for a common end; and it is only by such co-operation, I believe, that results of vital value can be achieved. The ideal is so sublime that no one dreams it can at present be realised in any but a small measure; it is, however, so desirable, it holds forth such high promise, that it is well worth while to put forth every effort to work towards so fair an end with every means in our power. If we can do nothing else, an association with objects and aims such as ours should be able to do much to help in arousing interest in the deeper experiences of the soul, in the freedom of spiritual life, and in the possibility of a truly vital science; and this alone is a noble and beneficial work.

Indeed is there anything better or more legitimate that one man may do for another than to awaken such interest in him? Is there any other help so far-reaching yet so little confining, so devoid of dogmatism and

coercion? Where a man's interests are, there in truth does he live; for there is his world of experience, there, and there only, do mind and soul co-operate in one activity. If a man's interest is aroused in the possibilities of a deeper and more actual and intimate life, then the spirit of the Quest becomes alive in him, and he will start on many a self-initiated adventure to reach the goal, to work out his own salvation and self-realisation. He is started on the journey home. Such a start is a veritable initiation, the beginning of a new birth, the inbreathing of a new life and spirit.

G. R. S. MEAD.

MODERN HYPNOTISM.

T. W. MITCHELL, M.D. (EDIN.).

THE occasional occurrence of states of consciousness characterised by the manifestation of peculiar powers seems to have been observed in all times of which we have record. Familiarity with these states and with their associated phenomena has always been restricted to a relatively small number of people. The majority of men, confining their attention to the practical affairs of the world, and lacking the opportunity of encountering or the knowledge necessary for studying these unusual states, have either refused to believe in their occurrence or have denied the importance ascribed to them by those most capable of judging. In no department of scientific inquiry has progress been so slow as in that which is concerned with the investigation of abnormal states of consciousness, and in no other branch of knowledge has so much reluctance been shown in accepting the conclusions arrived at by investigators.

In ancient times as at the present day men's interest in these unusual states of consciousness seems to have turned mainly in two directions. Then as now it was claimed that during trance states supernormal knowledge may sometimes be acquired. Then as now artificially induced trance or cognate states were sometimes utilised in the treatment of disease. The modern developments of these interests are to be found in the

labour which has been devoted in recent years to certain branches of psychical research, and in the evolution of that form of psychotherapy which is known as hypnotic suggestion. At the present time the claims of investigators in regard to the acquisition of supernormal knowledge during trance states are mainly based on evidence afforded by cases of spontaneous trance, while the most noteworthy therapeutic results have been obtained in connection with the artificially induced trance state known as hypnosis.

The work of the last fifty years in these fields of research has led to a gradual clarification of our views in regard to many of the phenomena of trance states, and although the main developments of men's original interests in these states are to be found in present-day psychical research and scientific psycho-therapeutics, we may see that the increased knowledge of man's mental constitution which has been acquired in the study of these subjects is capable of fruitful application in relation to other fields of human endeavour, and may be utilised in various ways for the furtherance of individual and social well-being.

From the days of Mesmer, when the artificial induction of trance states first came to be openly studied by men of science, down to the present time, three main lines of speculation have been brought to bear on the search into their causation. Mesmer and his followers carried on the traditions of the mystical philosophers of the seventeenth century in ascribing trance phenomena to the existence of an imponderable cosmic medium which can be influenced by the will of certain favoured individuals. In the middle of the nineteenth century when Braid began his investigations of Mesmerism, it was in harmony with the scientific

and philosophic spirit of the times that a purely physical or physiological explanation of the phenomena should be forthcoming. Braid, however, was a singularly acute and conscientious observer, and in his later works there is clear evidence that he soon discovered the inadequacy of any merely physiological explanation of the hypnotic state, and that he had clearly formulated the psychological hypothesis which was at a later date put forward by Liébeault and popularised by Bernheim at Nancy.

The transition from the mystical to the physiological explanation and from the physiological to the psychological has not been one of unbroken advance. It was perhaps inevitable that a pathological explanation of hypnotic phenomena should have been put forward, but it was unfortunate in many ways that this explanation should have been championed by a man of such dominating authority as Charcot. Confining his observations to the hypnotic phenomena exhibited by a few hysterics in the Salpêtrière, Charcot was hopelessly misled as to the real nature of the hypnotic state; and so great was his authority as a neurologist that, notwithstanding the complete refutation of his teaching by the Nancy school, his opinions regarding the pathological nature of hypnosis have dominated the medical profession as a whole down to the present time. And it is a curious commentary on the importance of authority in the production of belief that, whilst almost everyone who has independently investigated this subject and done original hypnotic work is convinced of the truth of the teaching of the Nancy school, no one excepting Charcot's pupils can find any necessary connection between hypnotism and pathology.

An intelligible account of the hypnotic state can

for the present be given only in psychological terms. For although we are bound to believe that the alteration in consciousness which takes place when hypnosis is established has its correlate in an altered neural state, we can trace no physical nexus between the postulated neural change and the means employed for the induction of hypnosis. Given suggestion—the presentation of appropriate ideas under appropriate conditions — and hypnosis will ensue. Suggestion eliminated—if that be possible—no physical or physiological means of which we have any knowledge will produce hypnosis. And when the hypnotic state is established we find no constant physiological change which can be regarded as characteristic of it. All observable change from the physiological norm is the result of suggestion. No constant physiological alteration is found which is not the result of psychological appeal. The only physiological peculiarity pertaining to hypnosis is an increased potentiality in various directions, but the manifestation of this increased power is not spontaneously exhibited. It must always be called forth by suggestion.

But although we can give an intelligible account of hypnotic phenomena in psychological terms, we are still far from being able to give any adequate explanation of them. Suggestion seems to be the prime instigator of hypnotic responsiveness, but it does not explain how that responsiveness is brought about or on what conditions it depends. The capacity for such response would seem to be inherent in the constitution of the mind, and the induction of hypnosis merely an artifice that removes the inhibitions which normally prevent its manifestations. The discovery that the hypnotic state itself may be induced by suggestion compels us to

believe that suggestibility is a normal characteristic of the human mind. Yet the suggestions that are effective in bringing about hypnosis must be given under appropriate conditions, and when hypnosis is being induced for the first time they must as a rule be supplemented by certain adjuvants whose importance, at present perhaps under-estimated, was at one time thought to be paramount. The most usual adjuvants or accompaniments of suggestion in the primary induction of hypnosis are fixed gazing for a longer or shorter period and passes with or without contact; and although it is usual to deny any efficiency to these processes apart from the indirect suggestions which their use may convey, it seems more probable that rather than acting as suggestions themselves they bring about some change in consciousness which facilitates response to the direct verbal suggestions of the operator. But why ideas presented to the mind in this way should have such an extraordinary effect on bodily and mental functions is exceedingly difficult to understand.

Almost the only hypothesis which seems applicable to the whole range of hypnotic phenomena is that which postulates in the mind a region of subconscious or subliminal activity to which access can be obtained by employment of those artifices which are made use of in the induction of hypnosis. The most elaborate presentation of this hypothesis is to be found in the writings of F. W. H. Myers. But although in the particular field of research in which Myers was especially interested, his doctrine of the Subliminal may appear to be, as he himself claimed, a limiting and rationalising hypothesis, it is felt by many to be extravagant and needless in so far at least as the explanation of hypnotic phenomena is concerned.

Many observers, however, are glad to adopt some modified form of this doctrine as a working hypothesis, for they feel that any other that has as yet been put forward is inadequate to the description or explanation of all the observed phenomena. The difficulties in the way of accepting this hypothesis are great, and many of the leading psychologists of the world refuse to adopt it. They deny, moreover, the necessity for making such assumptions as its acceptance demands, and they think that the phenomena of hypnotism can be explained satisfactorily as being the outcome of normal mental processes occurring in a state of mental dissociation.

The hypothesis of mental dissociation as the basis of subconscious phenomena is at the present time the dominant doctrine amongst writers on abnormal psychology, and its adoption has led to rapid advance in clinical methods and to some modification in our ways of utilising psychotherapy in mental disorders. But fruitful as this hypothesis has been in regard to the interpretation and treatment of abnormal states, there seems to be a tendency to over-estimate the extent of the field of its legitimate application and to put it forward as sufficient explanation of facts which it in no way explains. Some observers feel that this is especially true in regard to many of the phenomena of hypnotism, and this feeling is generally strongest amongst those who have had the widest opportunities of investigating the peculiarities of hypnotic and post-hypnotic states. Those psychologists who are most confident that the principles of mental dissociation laid down by Janet in his studies of hysteria are applicable to all the phenomena of hypnotism, are prone to exaggerate the resemblance between hypnotic and hysterical states. They almost invariably describe the

hypnotic state as being characterised by a limitation of awareness and of will, and they cannot apparently get away from the old idea that a deeply hypnotised person is merely a remarkably intricate automaton. But there is in hypnosis no limitation of awareness save such as is produced by suggestion; and by suggestion the field of awareness may be extended in all directions beyond what is possible in the waking state. The limitation of the will is only a seeming limitation brought about by the acquiescence of the hypnotised person with regard to all unobjectionable suggestions; and the independence of the will in hypnosis may be readily discovered by anyone who cares to suggest to a hypnotised person something which is without any doubt opposed to that person's convictions as to what is right and proper. Such a suggestion is never accepted or acted upon. We may, indeed, by suggestion, diminish to some extent the power of volition as we may restrict the field of awareness, but we can also increase the power of the one as we can extend the field of the other. And there is no reason why we should regard the one series of phenomena any more than the other, as especially characteristic of the hypnotic state.

If the scope of consciousness in hypnosis were as restricted as it would necessarily be if the hypnotic consciousness originated in disaggregation of the normal waking consciousness, and had as content only the perceptions and memories of a split-off portion of the full personality, its dissociated status should be in no direction more manifest than in the domain of memory. But the memory in hypnosis is more extensive and precise than in the waking state, including as it does memories of the events of previous hypnoses as well as all the memories of waking life. It would seem that

the range of hypnotic memory must be regarded as evidence opposed to the hypothesis of dissociation put forward in explanation of the hypnotic state. We cannot legitimately speak of a mind being dissociated when all the associations of which it is normally capable can be effected.

Nevertheless it is the varying relations of memory-awareness in connection with the hypnotic state which afford the best evidence of something that may correctly enough be described as mental dissociation. When a deeply hypnotised person is awakened he may be found to have no recollection of anything that has transpired during hypnosis. In relation to the field of awareness manifested in hypnosis his normal waking state may be described as a state of dissociation. There is now a gap in his memory which no associative process is capable of bridging until the hypnotic state is re-induced. When he is again hypnotised, the memory-chain is once more unbroken and he can recollect the events of the previous hypnosis and also the events of the subsequent waking period. He can in hypnosis even recollect his loss of recollection in the waking state. If the hypnotic consciousness were only a split-off or dissociated portion of the normal consciousness these relations of memory-awareness would be reversed, so that the split-off portion would not know the experiences of the normal life, while the experiences of the split-off portion would be known by the normal personality when, on awakening from hypnosis, the disaggregated consciousness was once more resynthetised. It seems indeed easier to believe that the waking consciousness is a split-off portion of the total consciousness potential in man than that the hypnotic consciousness is a split-off portion of the waking consciousness.

Some writers who believe in the existence of a subconscious self distinct from the waking self although in close functional relation with it, describe hypnosis as being due to a dissociation of the one self from the other. Such a use of the term dissociation is to be deprecated because this word has already been appropriated to indicate a splitting-up or disintegration of the normal waking consciousness. According to some authorities such a disintegration of consciousness occurs normally and so gives rise to a subconscious field in every mind; according to others it occurs only in morbid states and the presence of any subconsciousness is said to be evidence of pathological dissociation.

Although there is no unanimity of opinion regarding the explanation or interpretation of hypnotic phenomena there is far less room for divergence of view as to their nature and importance. The facts are clear and indisputable. If in the quiescence and lack of initiative of the hypnotised person we seem to have evidence of a curtailment of his natural powers, we find abundant proof of unsuspected potentialities in the control of physiological functioning that may be obtained in response to experimental or therapeutic suggestion. Organs or functions which are normally apparently independent of the will may be affected in a determinate way by suggestion during hypnosis. The normal periodicity of involuntary muscle functioning may be modified. Irregularities may be corrected or experimentally produced. The secretory and vasomotor functions can often be influenced in a very remarkable manner. Secretions may be induced, augmented, diminished, or arrested, and it is asserted by some observers that local redness of the skin, blistering, and even actual bleeding have been produced

by suggestion during hypnosis. The response to such suggestions affords us a veritable revelation of an unsuspected range of psycho-neural interaction which seems to be co-extensive with the whole nervous system. The sympathetic system in particular seems to become emancipated from its customary automatism and to be guided in its workings by some form of mental activity.

Besides the manifestation of increased potentialities afforded by such modes of physiological response to psychological appeal, an extensive range of mental phenomena may also be exhibited which are of much theoretic interest and of great practical importance. The various forms of sensation and of feeling may be affected in a variety of ways. Sensory acuteness may be increased or diminished and the manifestations of normal sensory and emotional activity may be arrested or distorted. Hallucinations of the senses, anæsthesia and analgesia more or less profound, increase or decrease of appetites and desires, and changes in the emotional tone, may all be brought about by suggestion during hypnosis.

The theoretic interest of the experimental data is mainly of a technical character and appeals only to the professional psychologist, but their practical importance should be recognised and appreciated by everyone. The control of physiological functions is of prime importance in the treatment of all bodily disorders, and it may be readily understood that hypnotic suggestion is a valuable adjunct to our other therapeutic measures. But the capability of response to psychological appeal in hypnosis is not confined to physiological functions, and the influence of suggestion on character and conduct is no less remarkable than its influence on bodily

well-being. The values of life are no doubt differently estimated by different people, but probably few will deny that on the whole and in the long run a man's conduct is of more importance than his bodily welfare. And the power of suggestion to influence conduct is the feature above all others which entitles us to regard it as a branch of scientific enquiry whose importance should be recognised by all students of psychology, ethics and religion.

The influence of suggestion in increasing self-control is well seen in the results of its use in the treatment of those aberrations of conduct that are of such a character as to bring them within the sphere of the physician's work. In children we meet with certain forms of deficient control over bodily movements, such as nail-biting and other 'tricks,' in which it has been found that suggestion is a very useful method of treatment. In adults more serious forms of loss of control, such as the impulsions of the drunkard or opium-eater and even graver kinds of moral perversion, may often be successfully dealt with in the same way. But apart from the treatment of such morbid conditions there are possibilities which have not yet been generally recognised, in regard to the use of suggestion in the moral up-bringing of the people and in particular in the training of the young. For obvious reasons the successful application of suggestion by teachers and reformers cannot be made by the employment of any formal hypnosis; and it is here that the practical importance of further investigation into the operation of the laws of suggestion in the waking state will be most apparent. Up to the present there has been too much theorising and too little scientific investigation into the factors which favour or hinder

the operation of suggestion in what is somewhat loosely termed the waking state. It seems probable that a mental condition may be somehow brought about which for all practical purposes may be regarded as the ordinary waking state, but which for the purpose of making suggestion effective may be regarded as a very light stage of hypnosis. Some good work has already been done towards the elucidation of the factors on which effective suggestion in the apparently normal state depends, and many instances may be given of the use made of suggestion by great leaders of men in the spheres of politics and religion; but a more thorough investigation of the subject is necessary before we can lay down any rules as to the best way of increasing the susceptibility to suggestion which is inherent in every human being, and of utilising the power of suggestion as an adjunct to our ordinary methods of instructing the people in the principles of right conduct and of helping them to put these principles into practice.

About twenty years ago great activity was displayed in hypnotic research. Many psychologists, physicians, and jurists recorded their experiences and put forward hypotheses regarding the nature and significance of hypnotic phenomena. The assertion by responsible men in our own time that they had verified the accuracy of many of those observations of the mesmerists which we had been taught to believe were explicable only by fraud or by faulty observation, had a profound effect on the educated public and even on the less plastic minds of scientific men. But, in this country at least, the enthusiastic expectations of those days do not seem to have been realised, and people who are conversant with

the results that were then obtained, express surprise that so little apparent progress has been made in what seemed to be a most promising field of research. The neglect of hypnotism in medical practice seems especially strange to those who know its value as a therapeutic method. The number of medical men in this country who have any intelligent knowledge of the possibilities of suggestion as a curative agent is extremely small, and the number who use suggestion in their daily work is infinitesimal. Yet its therapeutic value is as well attested as anything in the whole range of medical science, and it must be only a question of time for a knowledge of this to become the common possession of the whole medical world. In the meantime the blame for this almost universal ignorance must be laid on the teachers in the medical schools. Year after year they send out into the world men qualified to practise all branches of the healing art who have not received the slightest instruction as to what value suggestion may or may not have as a therapeutic agent. The attitude of the leaders of the profession and of the medical press towards hypnotism as a branch of science, and towards the exponents of hypnotic suggestion as a therapeutic measure, is on the whole little different to-day from what it was in the days of Mesmer and of Braid; but while such an attitude may have been excusable in those pioneer days, at the present time it seems a mere impertinence.

Although the backward state of hypnotic research and practice in this country is mainly due to the ignorance of those by whom such work should have been undertaken, there is at the bottom of the long neglect of hypnotism something besides ignorance. There is something else—something based on ignorance

it is true, but quite different from mere not knowing—there is prejudice. Hypnotism and everything connected with it is viewed with great distrust by the majority of people who know little or nothing about it. So general is this feeling of distrust that it must almost certainly have its roots in some profound social instinct, and history teaches us that such instincts cannot be disregarded. There is little doubt, however, that the prejudice against hypnotism has arisen from false notions of the nature and possibilities of the hypnotic state, derived from popular fiction and the 'shows' of the professional mesmerist. The ridiculous performances of hypnotised subjects sometimes seen at music hall exhibitions, when considered as unwilled actions, are rightly looked upon as being derogatory to human dignity; and the belief that these subjects are unresisting automata whose wills are in abeyance or completely under the control of the operator, may well make any self-respecting person decide that under no circumstances would he consent to allow himself to be so much under the influence of any other human being. If the conclusions drawn from these exhibitions were justly founded, there can be little doubt that such a decision would be wise, and the conscientious advocacy of hypnotic suggestion as a therapeutic measure would be difficult indeed. But the impressions derived from such exhibitions are totally misleading to anyone who is ignorant of the real possibilities of the hypnotic state. A hypnotised person is never unconscious. He is never a mere automaton. He can never be compelled to do anything that he really objects to doing. He has an increased power over his own body, his power of judgment is not suspended, his moral sense is unimpaired. He is withdrawn to some extent within

himself, his life of relation may be somewhat restricted, but he is master of his own soul. He will do what the operator tells him to do only when he so pleases. Anything to the contrary that may appear is a result of a false belief by the subject regarding the nature and possibilities of hypnotism. If a person is firmly convinced that during hypnosis his will can be controlled by the operator, he may effectually suggest to himself the necessity for passive obedience, but if he has been taught the truth he will remain a free agent during all stages or degrees of hypnosis. He will accept no suggestion of which he does not approve. He will perform no act which he considers wrong.

Although there is a consensus of opinion on all important points amongst those who have had practical experience of the Nancy methods, and although the whole subject of hypnotism has been dealt with very fully within recent years in special text-books and journals, the general public have had very little opportunity of learning the truth as to the value of hypnotic suggestion in the treatment of disease. It may be conceded that it is in functional nervous disorders that it has achieved its most brilliant results, but we should fall into serious error if we declared it to be of no value in organic disease. Like all other modes of treatment there are limits to its usefulness, but what these limits are cannot be decided *à priori* but must be learned by experience. At present we must confess that we do not know enough to enable us to say definitely in what ailments it will be of no value whatsoever.

Putting on one side all such conditions as in the present state of knowledge may be legitimately termed incurable, we know that there are many organic diseases in which recovery more or less complete takes place

without any treatment at all. There are others in which nature seems to be assisted by the administration of remedies wisely applied; and there are probably not a few in which recovery takes place in spite of the extra work which the natural curative powers have thrown upon them owing to misapplied zeal on the part of the physician. Now the reasonableness of the employment of hypnotic suggestion as a therapeutic measure in these cases lies in the fact that by its means the natural curative powers of the body can be made more potent. Every organic disease is associated with functional disability. The endeavour to control such functional disturbance is often the only line of attack open to the physician, and it is difficult to say how far encouragement to adequate functional activity may help towards organic restitution. Now we know that suggestion during hypnosis is a most efficacious method of controlling certain bodily functions. The extent to which this is possible is perhaps still undetermined, but that it is possible to a degree which is quite unsuspected by the ordinary medical man is well known to every practical hypnotist.

Amongst teachers of therapeutics there are a few who have evidently been convinced that hypnotism may occasionally be useful in some conditions which have defied all other forms of treatment, and the limited amount of hypnotic work done in this country is mainly concerned with these seemingly hopeless cases. The hypnotic specialist's field of labour has become, as has been said, the dust-bin of medical practice. He gets consulted in cases of inveterate insomnia, of confirmed drunkenness, of nervous troubles of long-standing. All the hopeless neurasthenics are as a last resort drafted on to him. Under such circumstances it is surprising

how good a record of important results he can show. But the inevitable outcome of such a custom is to restrict in a most unfortunate way the sphere of usefulness of hypnotic suggestion. If suggestion is found to be sometimes of value in the most intractable cases of insomnia, why should it not be used in milder cases? Why try all the sedative drugs in the pharmacopœia first? Why suggestion as a last resort? This seeming application of the dictum that desperate diseases need desperate remedies, must always seem curious to anyone having practical knowledge of modern hypnotic methods.

Although in this country the study of hypnotism has been so long neglected by psychologists and therapeutists, there are some indications that this neglect is to continue no longer. The psychologists are awakening to the fact that their exposition of the workings of the mind is incomplete without some reference to the peculiarities of hypnotic and post-hypnotic states. A medical society for the study of suggestive therapeutics has been in existence for over two years and has now about ninety members. It may reasonably be hoped that as a result of its labours the whole medical profession in this country may ere long recognise the importance of suggestion as a therapeutic agent, and that the reproach of ignorance of hypnotism may no longer be made against the countrymen of James Braid.

T. W. MITCHELL.

THE POWER OF IMAGINATION.

A. H. WARD.

THE poet's eye in a fine frenzy rolling
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.

THE hypothesis of reincarnation, together with the idea of the retention in the sub-consciousness of all the experiences and attainments of past lives, throws a new light upon the problem of the creative power of the imagination; while the mystical notion of an eternal being, figured as a child born within a man at a certain stage of the great pilgrimage, and growing through many lives to the stature of a son of God, gives a reasonable basis for the comprehension of the phenomena of genius, and of the powers of sanctity. All definitions and explanations of the power of the imagination conceived from the point of view of one physical life only, are, so far as I can see, essentially inadequate. For example (I quote from Calderwood's *Vocabulary of Philosophy*): "Imagination is the faculty of representation by which the mind keeps before it an image of visible forms. This power is (1) simply reproductive; (2) creative. While a past knowledge is being recalled objects in themselves and their relations are figured to the mind." According to this view

imagination seems to be merely the visualisation of past perceptions, and their combination in fresh patterns. "In a higher form of original activity, imagination contributes to the elevation of intellectual life, in the exercise of literary and poetic gifts." Here we are told what the higher imagination does, but neither what it is nor how it works. I will not trouble my readers with more quotations, but will beg to refer them to current works on psychology, where they will find the subject discussed at length, and in "Mediterranean words that go round and round," as the author of the *New Word* puts it, and I wish them joy of their quest.

There is, however, a saying of Wordsworth which is really to the point, although I suppose he never entertained any idea so hideously unorthodox as the theory of rebirth: "Imagination, in the sense of the poet, has no reference to images that are merely a faithful copy existing in the mind, of absent external objects; but it is a word of higher import, denoting operations of the mind upon those objects, and processes of creation or composition governed by fixed laws." "To imagine in this sense," Calderwood remarks, "is to realise the ideal, to make intelligible truths descend into the forms of sensible nature, to represent the invisible by the visible, the infinite by the finite." Here, in my view, is a true definition, and the aim of the present study is to try to suggest the way in which this transcendental work is done, and the source of the power employed.

I think that under no circumstances can the imagination be said to create images, it clothes ideas in images derived from without through the perceptions, and stored in the memory. I am conscious, when I

am trying to invent anything, of moulding and modelling the airy nothing, of fitting this and that form to my idea, just as though I were actually making the object in clay with my fingers. Or I take a pencil and draw it in every conceivable way, or try over in thought any number of verbal formulæ, to find the one which describes it best. But all the forms or words I use are taken from the stores of memory, and the power of imagination consists in grasping the idea in the abstract mind which works in that sphere, and in selecting those remembered images, or immediate perceptions in the concrete mind which embody it, and illustrate its working out in experience. I conceive that an ideal is a stream of energy, a movement of a certain wave-length in a fine grade of 'mind-stuff,' and that it is comparable to the beam of a search-light in the physical ether. This, when held by the will in the mind, and directed onto the brain, causes those memory-images which are in harmony with it, and are instances of its manifestation in experience, to vibrate more strongly, and consequently to present in consciousness. In this way the mind's eye glances from heaven where the ideals abide, to earth where their concrete details are working out in place and time. For example, in Portia's great speech, the poet employs this power:

PORTIA. "Then must the Jew be merciful."

SHYLOCK. "On what compulsion must I? Tell me that."

Portia's assertion has to be justified, and Shakespeare concentrates on the ideal mercy, till its search-light ray permeates his concrete mind and brain, and there illuminates that matchless series of images illustrating the idea, which many think one of his most

beautiful creations. It is evident that these images are all drawn from his past experiences, or acquired knowledge. First the notion of compulsion has to be got rid of:

"The quality of mercy is not strained,"

he writes; and then dawns in his mind the picture of a soft warm English day, with a gentle dropping rain, and all the little green things growing up; no blustering beating storm, no pelting down-pour, but all-quiet; such is the ideal mercy:

"It droppeth like the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath."

Here the inner light by its mercy-ray arouses an image corresponding to itself, which was derived from many an observation of nature, when her tender beneficence had been marked, idly enough perhaps at the time, by the artist's eye.

Next an image more personal and concrete presents itself, of one giving and another taking, and the idea of mercy is further elaborated and enhanced:

"It is twice blessed;
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes."

It was plain to all men that mercy blessed him that took, but it needed the triple intuition of a Shakespeare to see that it also blessed him that gave; unless indeed he was but following the Master who had said that it is more blessed to give than to receive. Then the idea is glorified by an image drawn from the highest earthly state:

"'Tis mightiest in the mightiest, it becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown."

So flashed into his mind the picture of the great Queen, Gloriana herself in full state, wearing the sparkling emblem of empire, and again the ideal shines forth

more brightly. Now, to heighten the effect, he points a contrast, and introduces the sceptre with its attributes of awe and majesty:

"But mercy is above this sceptred sway,"

he sings, as he soars from the pinnacle of earth on the wings of metaphor:

"It is enthroned in the hearts of kings,
It is an attribute to God himself,"

and the words of his final intuition fall from the ideal empyrean, like the notes of a lark from a clear sky:

"And earthly power doth then show likest God's,
When mercy seasons justice."

Only when the inner light streams into the mind of a master-artist, can such a mighty act of the creative imagination be achieved, and clothed in fitting words; and all the world has wondered at the truth and beauty of it ever since.

But perhaps it is not altogether a metaphor, to say that mercy is enthroned in the heart, for 'occultists' tell us that the spiritual man is 'seated' in the region of the physical heart. Thence streams that beam of inner light which comprises every conceivable ideal, to illuminate the memory-images in the brain which is tuned to respond to its intensely rapid vibrations. It is this intensification of mental images by a ray of the ideal light, that is the secret of the power of the poetic mind to leap from image to image, all quite relevant to the subject, but which have no lower sequence of the nature of that association of ideas, by which the pedestrian thought of the ordinary man moves step by step. The images are aroused by a central power from within, and may appear in any quarter of the manifold of the poet's garnered experience. His thought moves from the idea at the centre of his thought-sphere, to

any point on its surface; the ordinary man's thought moves from one point of the surface to the next by association; hence the difference in the results, and hence the reason why nobody reads poetry and everybody reads the papers.

This power of dominating the concrete mind and brain by the cosmic insight of the spiritual man is, I think, the essential quality of genius; the inner man *is* the genius in fact, and he must be highly developed through the experience of many lives, and must also have harmonised his existing personality with himself in the present life, before he can produce the works acclaimed as those of genius. It must take many lives of devotion to any branch of art to attain this stage of development; and naturally, the accumulation of so much power along one line, would tend to the neglect of all-round growth; hence the frequent defects of men of genius in the social and political virtues. The harmony between a genius and his personality, may be compared to that of two strings tuned to the same note, but one an octave higher than the other. When the higher string is struck, its high note is reproduced on the lower string, according to the laws of harmonics; when the lower string is out of tune the higher note is not reproduced. So when the personality of a man of genius on any line is out of harmony through illness, or emotion, or fatigue, or any other cause, he says his light has gone out, that he cannot work, or that spiritual darkness has come upon him; and so St. Teresa, when her nuns were plunged in gulfs of dark despair, bade them remember that they were ill. With recovery of health and balance the harmony is re-established, the afflatus descends, the spiritual light shines again.

But if the power of imagination intensifies mental images gained through the perceptions, it will also intensify the immediate perceptions which establish those images in the organ of memory. This heightening of a range of perceptions, by the vibratory power of an idea with which they harmonise, may I think be illustrated by turning a coloured light upon a group of variegated objects, a bunch of flowers, for instance. If a red light be used, all the red blooms will stand out intensely, and the yellow and blue ones will seem dim and dull; just so an idea held in the mind of an artist intensifies those percepts which correspond to it, and blurs those which are inharmonious. This is the cause of the power of selection, which leads a painter to choose certain aspects of his subject to embody his ideal, and so produce a work of art. Let us suppose he is painting some haunt of ancient peace, on a sunny day in June. He is well, and rested, and free from care and all personal emotions, and so becomes penetrated by the ideal which his subject embodies. The inner irradiation of peace intensifies all his perceptions of the innumerable details in his subject which suggest it, and naturally he puts these in, and leaves out any jarring element, which he may hardly notice. The fall of shadows, the droop of branches, the blending of colours, the stillness of reflections, the shaded greens of lawns, the age-long growth of lichens, the weathering of venerable stone, the whole bathed in mellow sunlight,—all combine to suggest the impression; and as a result the finished work breathes out an atmosphere of peacefulness, indefinable, unspeakable, but to the trained and sympathetic eye undoubtedly there.

Take an example from the portrait painter—the

magnificent fat man Alessandro del Borro, generally attributed to Velasquez. The picture, even in re-productions, veritably exudes unctuous insolence and pride, with an element of devil-may-care jollity. Here the idea caught and held by the painter was the actual 'word,' or essential characteristic of the man himself, that which worked out in his life as his ruling passion. To have seized it must have involved singular detachment and sympathy on the painter's part, so that the distinctly disagreeable idea could be held in his mind, there to intensify all his perceptions of the traits of the sitter which corresponded to it, and to blur out any pose or pretence of goodness on the fat man's part, or the traces of any merely superficial qualities. Hence the amazing result, in which the grossness of that cantankerous soul stands revealed for all time. Or take the great portrait of the Pope Innocent X., in which all the low cunning of the peasant nature shows through, in spite of his high position and splendid dress. Small wonder that his Holiness remarked that the picture was '*troppo vero.*' There is little conventional beauty in Velasquez's work, because his sitters were not as a rule beautiful, and his motto was '*Verdad no pintura*' ('Truth not painting'). 'Painting' in this sense means, I suppose, the then current convention of stout ladies flying about in clouds, with impossible lighting, and totally inadequate drapery,—in fact the Rubens' school. But in the highest sense beauty is truth, truth beauty, and there Velasquez is a master of the beautiful, and achieves his end.

Again, take an example from the sculptor's art—the Moses of Michelangelo, instinct with the majesty and dominance of the lawgiver. No mortal man ever looked

like that, but the idea grasped by the artist, caused him so to select and intensify the traits of his models who embodied it more or less, that at last it was manifested in enduring marble.

I am inclined to believe that all the great characters in poetry and fiction are built in a similar way round one essential idea, which is elaborated by placing the man or woman in a variety of circumstances, amidst the clash of which the corresponding characteristics are developed. The imaginative power consists in being able to hold this idea at the back of the mind, all the while that the person is being described; in this way the unity of the character and its seeming reality are achieved. This power, I suggest, inheres in the spiritual sphere of the writer, it is the cosmic grip on the essential of the genius within, now more or less full grown, and perfectly conscious in his own sphere out of the physical body. While in the body, his thought is dragged down to the personal point of view, but at the moment of creation the brain is so harmonised with the real self, that the consciousness can rise into the spiritual sphere, and there grasp the idea required, and thence cause it to dominate the brain, intensify the perceptions, and arouse the corresponding memories by its potent energy. An example of this process may, I think, exist in the case of Mme. Magdaleine, whose unharmonised personality is brought under the control of her genius by means of hypnosis, so that it is enabled by expression and gesture to manifest the ideas suggested to it by music and poetry. In another incarnation her imagination will be in the power of her waking will, and her genius will be manifested in a normal way. This is actually the case in a great actress like Duse, who can so

dominate her personality by the root-idea of the character she is playing, that every tone and gesture expresses it, and she becomes the suffering broken-hearted Camille, or Adrienne, or Fédora, for the time being. It is a true impersonation, a realisation of the essential idea which the character illustrates. The spiritual power causes even the flow of real tears, so strongly does it affect the body and its functions, when the harmony between the permanent and transitory phases of the self is very perfect. I do not believe that this expression of emotion is the outcome of study, or anything that can be taught; the people of genius imagine so strongly and 'let themselves go' so fully, that their tones, movements, and gestures follow the central idea automatically, they are natural, not studied. Of course right poses, and graceful movements, have to be practised in cold blood beforehand; and then when the ideal is thrown on the screen of the flesh, it is perfectly expressed without taking any thought at the time.

So it would seem that the clear vision, the penetrating insight, the 'cosmic consciousness' of the pilgrim of eternity within, appears as the power of the imagination in the personality; and that it acts by intensifying and selecting the memory-images and perceptions, and by dominating the tones, gestures and technique of the artist. The practice of his art, whatever it is, is the real 'yoga,' or method of union and harmony with his greater self, for the man on the way of art. "Yoga," the *Bhagavad Gītā* says, "is skill in action"; and the technique of any art is supreme skill in action; by it the inner harmony is induced. The rhythmic beat of his verse is helpful, and tunes the brain of the poet, in his effort to body forth the

forms of things unknown; and by this means he can get things said which he could never express in cold prose. In a similar way, some executive artists, actors, musicians, and singers, attain the harmony within, and so cause the power of the spirit to radiate from themselves onto their audience. They are 'magnetic,' people say; and it is these who can thrill and 'hold the house,' when others of equal technical accomplishment leave it cold. But this exposure of the brain and body to the powerful energisings of the spirit is naturally a frightful strain, and is followed by much lassitude and exhaustion; hence the loafing lazy life, so deprecated by the hustling Philistine in all artists. But it is largely a matter of recuperation; for flesh and blood cannot endure the tension often or for long, until, in the course of development, the harmony becomes perfect and permanent, and unless a life of great temperance is followed. But most artists are at the prodigal-son stage, and waste their substance in riotous living in one way or another; and so they go on till the period of the 'great famine,' by which they are driven to arise, and come to themselves, and so to seek the 'way of return.'

I have dwelt so far on the artistic manifestation of the power of imagination, because the term is generally restricted to that phase of the problem. But I believe that it is essentially the same power which lies at the root of all intuitions, both of the true, and of the good. In the philosopher and man of science, the power of receiving, and holding in the mind the rays of the inner light, is sometimes called 'having a grasp of the abstract'; and the results of its activity are spoken of as laws of nature, hypotheses, and theories, by which the phenomena of the physical world are

explained. I take it that the three greatest are the law of the conservation of energy, the nebular hypothesis, and the evolution theory. The details into which these great creative ideas have worked out in experience are commensurate with the facts of nature, and they are supposed to have been arrived at by the consideration of numbers of such facts, and the subsequent abstraction of the principles which underlie them—by the famed inductive method in short. But I am inclined to believe that these profound principles were, in the first place, really intuitions of the imagination, aroused perhaps by one, or a small group of striking facts, which demanded an explanation, and that this 'flashed into the mind' of the thinker, in the true poetic way. Then more correlative facts were illuminated in his memory, gaps were seen in the demonstration, and facts sought to fill them, experiments were made, researches carried on for years and years, and verifications re-verified with consummate patience; till at last the root-principle, together with countless examples of its working-out in experience, was presented in some epoch-making book, like the *Origin of Species*, which revolutionised the thought of the world. Here the principle of evolution is the search-light of the spirit which illuminates the facts, and unifies them into a rational and convincing system of knowledge.

I believe that the mystical Way of Knowledge lies open before the thinker at the present day. The possibility of investigating the super-physical spheres, of developing the power to do this for himself, instead of merely observing the phenomena of psychics and mystics from without, is within his reach—if he will make the requisite efforts and sacrifices. By following that quest he may reach the truth of the instinctual

and intellectual regions, and even attain to the spiritual sphere where truth is one, and where the fair haven of the monist abides. There he will come to his eternal self, and identify himself with his own daimōn, the 'man' who was, and is, and will be, for whom the hour never strikes. His is the Path of Knowledge as distinguished from the Paths of Devotion and of Perfection.

This last is the way of art of which I have given some examples above. The Path of Devotion is the way of love, trodden by the saint and the philanthropist —love of the Supreme Self, as presented in the anthropomorphic symbolism of some of the great religions, or love of the Supreme Self as embodied in humanity; love of the One or of the Many. This is the profound motive for all the watching, praying and charitable effort in the world. It may, however, be well to point out here, that the saints and philanthropists have no monopoly of 'goodness'; and that in the language of the schools, the camps, the studios, and the hospitals, a 'good man' is not a pious, or even a virtuous one, but a man who knows his work and does it well. These as truly serve their day and generation, as do the devotees and humanitarians; and very fortunately it takes all sorts to make a world. But men do not choose their way; it is the deepest power of their being and draws them in spite of themselves. They may turn from it for a time, but sooner or later they will follow it to the end, since for them it is the easiest road.

So till some one shows me a better theory, I hold that the imagination is the thought-power of their immortal self, which leads men on, and supports them through the great pilgrimage. It is the Gleam,

the light within the Grail, the radiation of Ātman, the 'Three-tongued Flame of the four wicks'—these last being the physical, instinctual, intellectual, and spiritual 'bodies,' or elements of the total make-up of the Perfect Man. But there is a profound distinction drawn, I understand, between the region whence instinctive animal impulses emerge, and that whence come those manifestations of genius, which I have been trying to account for on the hypothesis of a permanent re-incarnating self, ever developing, and retaining the powers acquired in a series of earth-lives. Both classes of powers tend to manifest through rhythmic movements, but up-rushes from the instinctual sphere are comparatively simple, such as the clonic spasms of hysteria, and the rhythmic squirmings of St. Vitus's dance; while the spiritual powers, the inspirations of poets and prophets, come from otherwhere, clothing themselves in the forms of the reason as they emerge, and then so dominate the instinctual region, as to constrain it to produce rhythmic movements of the highest complexity and beauty. Hence the magical metres of a Swinburne, and the speaking poses of a Duse. To distinguish this region the term 'trans-liminal' might perhaps be suggested, as it seems to have a close connection with the transcendental sphere.

The instinctual region is the habitat of those moods which are caused by physical states, and impressions from without; and nothing shows the greatness of an artist more than his ability to dominate such moods by the power of his imagination. Only when the genius is full-grown can he sweep his mood from grave to gay, from lively to severe, in response to the ideals which he wills to express; so in the case of

Heine, the most distressing and terrible conditions of his 'living grave' were overcome, nothing could quench his spirit, and he wrote and jested to the last. The lesser man has to wait, and seize the moment when his mood is favourable to the embodiment of his idea, hence his delays and difficulties. But the only failure is to cease to strive, and by persistent effort all personal limitations can be broken through, if not in this birth, then in another. So I think.

In my view, the quest of the artist lies in striving to develope his genius, whose manifestation in the lower spheres he himself is, and to harmonise his body and brain as the organ through which that genius may manifest his creative powers. This is the æonic struggle for perfection in intellect, action, and vitality of the poetic race. So in the course of lives of effort, even the physical body will become the exact counterpart of the Augoeides, and after its own type perfectly beautiful; and thus will the single ray of the Supreme Beauty, which is the root-base of every living soul, be at last manifested on earth. In a similar way the perfect development and harmony of the instinctual sphere will manifest the Good, and the complete growth and balance of the intellect the True. Such is the triple organ of manifestation of the Perfect Man who becomes the beautiful, does the good, and knows the true. Then is he a flawless emanation of the Divine Trinity in the worlds of form; and it is in this manner that, at the long last, the infinite perfections of the Ineffable One will become manifest here below, in the persons of the perfected human race.

A. H. WARD.

WHAT IS MATTER?

WM. KINGSLAND.

NOTHING is more common or obvious in our every-day experience than the existence of Matter. So common and obvious is it, indeed, that at first sight the question 'What is Matter?' might almost appear to be a foolish one.

Few people realise what the question involves; that in truth the problem of matter is just as profound as the problem of mind and consciousness—if, indeed, it is not essentially the same.

If we could analyse matter back to its very root, if we could penetrate to the very inmost recesses of that mysterious object which no eye has ever seen, but yet upon which the whole of our wonderful and beautiful science of chemistry is built, namely the *atom*, we should perchance find that the problem of mind and the problem of matter are at root one and the same. Scientifically, the problem of matter, if completely solved, would give us the key to the whole problem of the universe, which is essentially a problem of life and consciousness, as well as of matter and force.

But if we ask the average individual What is Matter? the only reply he can give us is, that matter is—well, just matter.

This answer is not quite a foolish one, for strange to say it is only quite recently that the most learned

scientist could give any positive answer which was substantially different from this; that he could say for certain that matter—by which we now mean *physical* matter—was not something wholly *sui generis;* that it did not stand wholly by itself as a unique, and possibly 'created' thing; that it was not resolvable into something else which certainly is not *matter* in any sense in which we at present understand the term.

It is in fact only since the discovery of radium that we have been able to get behind or inside the atom; to know for certain that the physical atom of chemistry is not the ultimate particle; that it is built up of something still smaller; and that that *something* is probably not physical matter at all.

Speculations as to the atomic nature or constitution of matter date back to the very earliest times of which we have any record, and are especially associated with the name of Democritus (470 B.C.).

It was, however, only at the beginning of last century that what is known as the modern atomic theory, that upon which all modern chemistry is based, took shape and obtained definite recognition. That theory will ever be associated with the name of Dalton. The distinguishing feature of Dalton's theory was, that he assigned to every atom of any particular substance a definite *weight;* a special weight corresponding to the definite proportions in which the various elementary substances are known to combine. Thus, for example, the smallest quantity of oxygen which will enter into combination with another substance is always sixteen times heavier than the smallest quantity of hydrogen. It does not matter whether we weigh these two substances in pounds, ounces, or grains; the combining proportion will always be sixteen to one. Dalton

argued from this, that if we could isolate a single atom of oxygen, and also a single atom of hydrogen, we should find that the one is sixteen times heavier than the other.

This theory very quickly became the basis of all chemical operations; and even if there were no such things as atoms in reality it would still be true as an empirical fact, that there is a certain minimum quantity of every elementary substance which can enter into chemical combination, and it is that quantity which is called the atom.

But the mind of man cannot rest there. We must push the enquiry still further back, and ask what is the nature of the atom itself. Although Dalton's theory is perfectly true within its own limitations, there still remains a theoretical and philosophical difficulty. It arises thus.

If the atom is a perfectly definite mass of matter, and, as such, must necessarily occupy a certain amount of space, however minute that space may be, how is it that it cannot be subdivided? It is impossible to conceive of anything which has bulk or extension in space, which may not be subdivided, at all events in imagination—and if in imagination, why not in actuality? In other words, what is the nature and structure of the atom itself? Again, if the atom cannot be subdivided, but yet has mass or bulk, are we to conceive of it as a hard, rigid, impenetrable particle, as some phenomena would lead us to conclude; or are we to conceive of it as possessing elasticity, as other phenomena most certainly necessitate?

But if the atom is elastic, it must have parts which can move relatively to each other, for that is the essential of elasticity. It must in fact be compressible, and

being thus composed of parts it is not the simple indivisible thing which the term 'atom' implies.

Thence arise the questions: If the atom can actually be subdivided, how far may that subdivision be carried, and what is the nature of the various parts of which it is then presumably composed? Are we to conceive that each of these smaller parts is still matter, possessing the same characteristics and properties as the chemical atom itself; that gold, for example, is always gold, however much it might be subdivided; or are we to conceive that the atoms are built up of some rarer or more subtle element, which might possibly possess none whatever of the characteristics of physical matter?

These and similar questions have occupied the most acute minds in science and philosophy during the past century; and many and various, and mutually contradictory, have been the theories which have been put forward to cover the observed phenomena and experimental exigencies of the case. The atom has been attacked experimentally, mathematically, and metaphysically from all sides, and in every conceivable manner; yet, down to the very close of the century, it continued to present in practice a hard impassable barrier, an apparently impenetrable veil which defied all man's efforts to pierce into the arcane region beyond, and perchance to read there the solution of the 'riddle of the universe.'

Let us glance for a moment at the ultimate-particle theory, or as it is usually called, the atomo-mechanical theory, which largely prevailed down to the very close of the century which has just passed. About the year 1704, Sir Isaac Newton wrote as follows:

"It seems probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable,

movable particles, of such sizes and figures, and with such other properties, and in such proportion to space, as most to conduce to the end for which He formed them; and that these primitive particles being solids, are incomparably harder than any porous body compounded of them; even so very hard as never to wear or break to pieces; no ordinary power being able to divide what God Himself made one in the first creation."

Now this is probably not merely a clear statement of the popular conception of matter, but it is also one which held the minds of many leading scientists all through the last century, and may even be said to prevail in some minds to-day. It is a common and natural thing that in all cases where the human mind endeavours to penetrate into the unseen or arcane, the ideas and concepts which are formed should be merely an extension of ideas already received and familiar to the senses. It takes an immense amount of thought to realise fully that at the root of phenomena, at the other 'pole' of the universe as it were, things must be exactly the *opposite* of what they appear to be 'down here'; that any final definition of matter must in fact be given in terms of consciousness. We are not dealing now with metaphysics however; nevertheless we must note that while on the one hand physicists were bound to hold to their ultimate and indivisible particle theory, since any abandonment of that would lead them right into the region of metaphysics—which they abhor, for, as stated by Büchner, "to accept the infinite divisibility of matter is absurd, and amounts to doubting the very existence of matter"—on the other hand, philosophers such as Herbert Spencer could find no other logical conclusion than that of infinite divisibility.

Here may be given a quotation from a scientific work published as late as 1899, which shows clearly how little some minds had yet been emancipated from the old rigid-particle theory enunciated by Newton. In *Matter, Ether, and Motion*, by Prof. Dolbear, of Tufts College, Mass., U.S.A., we read as follows:

"There is nothing to indicate that attrition among atoms or molecules ever removes any of their material. It appears as if one might affirm in the strongest way that the atoms of matter never wear out. . . . So one may be led to the conclusion that whatever else may decay, atoms do not, but remain as types of permanency through all imaginable changes — permanent bodies in form and all physical qualities, and permanent in time, capable apparently of enduring through infinite time. Presenting no evidence of growth or decay, they are in strong contrast with such bodies of visible magnitude as our senses directly perceive . . .; there appears to be nothing stable but atoms."

But in 1899 Radium was discovered; and all such long cherished ideas—and much else besides—were blown to the winds. For the great fact represented by the discovery of radium is simply this: that we have got behind the atom. Here at last we have broken through the hitherto impenetrable barrier of the physical atom, the seemingly impregnable wall, built of those atoms which have over and over again been called 'the foundation stones of the universe.' Possibly they might more appropriately have been called the foundation stones of materialism. In the phenomenon of radium, then, we have discovered a substance in which the chemical atom is actually and spontaneously breaking itself up, disintegrating into something else.

Incidentally we find that some of the products of that disintegration are other chemical elements; that in fact we have here an actual case of the transmutation of one metal into another, that dream—or fact—of the old alchemists, so long looked upon with scorn by modern scientists. But the real interest in the phenomenon of radium does not lie so much in this fact even, as in that of other and rarer products of the disintegration of the radium atom. The main interest lies in certain small particles, called *corpuscles*, or *electrons*. These are of such a nature that it would almost appear that they should be classed as *electricity* rather than as matter. They are almost certainly some form of *motion*—a whirl, a vortex, or a knot—in that impalpable, invisible, and imponderable substance known to science as the ether.

Now ether is certainly not matter, in the ordinary sense of the term; though it may be called *substance*. It is conceived of as a perfect, homogeneous, continuous 'fluid,' filling all space; and its principal recognised function has hitherto been, to form the basis or medium for the vibrations of light, and for electrical and magnetic phenomena.

Conceive, then, of all space as filled with this *something*, of the real nature of which science has as yet not the remotest conception. Conceive of *matter* as being some kind of motion of this impalpable *something*. Conceive of electricity, light, heat, and all other forms of energy, as also being due to various forms of motion of this one cosmic substance—and you have the modern position of scientific knowledge and speculation as to the constitution of matter, and the nature of energy. Matter has in fact resolved itself into ether.

Many and various are the speculations as to the nature of ether itself, that mysterious substance which

—being conceived of as *continuous*, not atomic or structural—must be exactly opposite in all its characteristics to what we know as matter. For instance, there cannot be more of it in one part of space than another; and since all matter *is* ether, the apparent density of matter is an illusion, in so far as it is not due to the actual presence of more matter in one place than another, but only of more motion. Matter may in fact virtually be said to have resolved itself into motion; atoms being simply centres of motion in a substance or 'fluid' which, but for that motion, would be no-thing —though certainly not *nothing*, but on the contrary the very fulness of all things.

This point ought to be very clearly understood. The air we breathe, and which fills all the space around us, is invisible to us, and to our unaided senses it appears to be what the ether is defined to be, *i.e.* a homogeneous, continuous medium. If, for example, we make vortex-rings in the air—which can easily be done by tapping a small cardboard box which has a small round hole, about the size of a two-shilling piece, cut in one side—we are not able to perceive these rings. Their presence may be detected, however, by making them impinge upon a light strip of silk; and if a lighted candle be placed a short distance away, it will be snuffed out if the vortex-ring hits the flame. We may make the vortex-rings visible, however, by putting a little smoke in the box. The experiment is a very pretty and instructive one which anyone can make.

Imagine, then, that the atoms of matter—or rather the ultimate *corpuscles* into which the physical atoms may be broken up—are simply very minute vortex-rings formed in the substance of the ether. Imagine that all matter is built up of these minute vortex-rings, in

various quantities or in different combinations, forming thereby the various chemical elements—and you have the modern theory of matter, known as the continuous-fluid theory, which may now be said to have definitely taken the place of the older rigid-particle, or atomo-mechanical theory. In the words of Sir Oliver Lodge, "We cannot go back to mere impact of hard bodies after having allowed ourselves a continuous medium"; or as Sir J. J. Thomson says in his work, *Electricity and Matter*, "All mass is mass of the ether, all momentum, momentum of the ether, all kinetic energy, kinetic energy of the ether."

It must not be supposed, however, that this theory is the immediate result of the discovery of radium. It has long been foreshadowed, but only definitely proved by the phenomenon of radium. In 1867, Lord Kelvin—then Sir Wm. Thomson—published his celebrated vortex-atom theory, which is practically the same as that which we now find replacing the older theories. In 1887 Sir Wm. Crookes published a remarkable paper on 'The Genesis of the Elements,' in which he put forward the theory of a gradual evolution of the various chemical elements from one primordial world-stuff, which he called *protyle*. These theories, however, as is so often the case, were much in advance of their time when first enunciated, and were by no means commonly accepted by the more conservative or orthodox scientists. Speaking of Lord Kelvin's theory, the late Prof. Tait of Edinburgh says, in his *Recent Advances in Physical Science*, "Its very basis implies the *absolute necessity* of an intervention of Creative Power to form or to destroy one atom even of dead matter." Are we then to conclude that we have such intervention in the phenomenon of radium—in which case we must dismiss

it from our minds as a *natural* phenomenon—or is the Professor speaking here as an 'unconscious metaphysician,' or even as a theologian?

The concept of the atom as being some kind of a vortex-ring in the substance of the ether, is no doubt a very inadequate one in many respects, especially when we push all these questions a little further back, and ask what is the relation of matter, or substance, to life and consciousness. Nevertheless it has the great merit of simplicity; it enables us to form a comparatively simple mental picture of the atom, and any such picture is better than nothing. It forms a sketch as it were, a 'working hypothesis,' upon which we can build, and which, if not held too rigidly, can be modified from time to time as further knowledge is gained.

Having obtained this mental picture, then, it only remains for us to realise clearly how the *motion* of such a subtle, impalpable medium as the ether can give rise to that sensation of mass, or density, which is our common experience of ether in that modified form or mode in which we know it as physical matter. We must clearly realise that the ether cannot be compressed or densified at all. The free ether of space is apparently of so rare and subtle a nature, that it offers no impediment whatever to the motion through it of what we call solid bodies. We know, however, that there is in reality no such thing as a solid body; the densest physical substance, if magnified millions of times, would be found to be composed of atoms none of which touch each other; in fact, scientists are now telling us that if the physical atoms could be magnified to the size of the planets of our solar system, the distance between the atoms would be found to be comparable to the inter-spaces between the planets.

How then can this inconceivably rare medium ever come to possess the apparent solidity of our physical objects? The answer is: Because of its inconceivably rapid motion.

In order to realise this clearly we have only to remember what an enormous force the air may become when in motion. Even in a strong wind, the air becomes more or less *solid;* we may lean against it. In a hurricane or a tornado the force is so tremendous as to uproot trees and tear down buildings. Yet it is the same air as that which we breathe, and whose presence we do not notice when it is still. It is in reality no *denser* in the tornado; its destructive force is due simply to its motion. At Grenoble there is a jet of water issuing from a pipe under tremendous pressure. It is only a small jet, not quite an inch in diameter, yet such is the velocity of the water that it acts like a solid rod of steel. It cannot be cut through with a sword, the sword is simply splintered.

Now the velocity which we may impart to any physical substance is nothing to the enormous velocity with which the constituent particles or *corpuscles* of an atom are moving. Some of the corpuscles thrown off by the radium atom are moving with a velocity of 120,000 miles per second. The energy which is thus being continually liberated by radium is sufficient to raise its own weight of water from freezing to boiling point in one hour; yet the actual quantity of matter which is thus given off by the radium itself is so small that no change in the weight of the radium can possibly be detected, and probably would not be detected even in thousands of years.

All matter is now supposed to be thus slowly changing and disintegrating, though in most substances

the change is too slight to be detected by any physical means. But if matter is thus an evolved product—evolved through countless ages from the substance of the ether by a process of which we are as yet entirely ignorant—and if we have also evidence that some matter at all events is disintegrating, must we not take it, by all laws of analogy, that the reverse process will some day be fully completed, and all matter return to its primordial state of ether, or even possibly to some other form, mode, or 'plane' of substance beyond the ether.

The progress of the physical science of the nineteenth century may be said to be identified with the realisation of the all-importance of the ether. At the beginning of the century the ether was not even accepted as a hypothetical agent by many leading men of science. Sir David Brewster is stated by Tyndall to have said that "he could not think the Creator guilty of so clumsy a contrivance as the filling of space with ether in order to produce light." This of course is anything but a scientific objection, and Tyndall remarks thereon that "the quarrel of science with Sir David, on this point, as with many estimable persons on other points, is, that they profess to know too much about the mind of the Creator."

At the close of the century, however, we find the ether no longer a mere hypothetical agent which can *undulate* in light waves; it is the immediate source of all physical phenomena. The free ether literally *ensouls* matter; without it no single physical phenomenon could possibly take place. At the beginning of the twentieth century it is discovered that physical matter *is* ether—a mode or form of ether, due to certain forms or modes of motion.

But the ether, *quâ* ether, must be called *substance*, not matter. It sub-stands matter. Thus science discloses to us at least two distinct and definite 'planes' in the structure of the universe; and if, as seems more than likely, the ether itself proves to be structural, not continuous, then we must look beyond the ether for another plane of substance—of the real primordial substance—which perchance is not substance at all in any conceivable physical sense.

May we not hazard a guess as to what this higher or deeper 'plane' might be? May we not conjecture that even as the science of the nineteenth century culminated in the discovery of the all-embracing (physical) energy of the ether, so the science of the twentieth century will culminate in the discovery of another 'plane' beyond the etheric; a plane of substance ensouling the etheric, even as the etheric ensouls the physical? And if we must give a name to this higher form or mode of substance, what more likely than that it should turn out to be 'mind-stuff' (to use Professor Clifford's term), and mind itself (Cosmic Mind), the *fons et origo* of all phenomena.

As we get more inwards to the root of phenomena, we must necessarily find that all physical analogies fail us in our attempt to understand what is the nature of substance. They fail us even in our attempts to understand what ether is. We see plainly now how this must be, simply because physical matter has no real existence *per se*. We may explain matter in terms of the ether from which it is derived, but we cannot explain the ether in terms of matter. Likewise we may possibly be able at some future time to explain both ether and matter in terms of mind; but we cannot explain mind in terms of either of its derivatives.

The discovery of radium removes many of our philosophical difficulties about matter, which appear to have been due hitherto principally to the fact that we have treated it as a thing *per se*, as an independent reality, and not as an aspect or mode of a deeper underlying substantiality.

Atoms can no longer be regarded as the 'foundation stones of the universe.' They are no longer 'types of permanency through all imaginable changes,' to the man who can think cosmically, not in centuries but in æons. Such a one may now realise scientifically the profound insight of Shakespeare when he wrote:

"The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind."

Yet it cannot dissolve into *nothing*. At the root of all there must be One Reality, which 'stood, stands, and will stand.' Although perchance this One Reality is not substance in any material sense, yet it is certainly that which 'sub-stands' all physical phenomena, and also all life and consciousness.

WM. KINGSLAND.

THE ROMANCE OF THE HOLY GRAAL.[1]

ARTHUR EDWARD WAITE.

THE soul's motives, her pretexts also and warrants, with her glorious encouragements in all paths of search, are so much everywhere, and out of all materials does she so educe and adapt the elements required by her shaping spirit of sanctity, that there is nothing too ready to her hand, as—within the region of attainment—there is nothing too remote, for her service. Of her is all philosophy—its reveries and revelations; of her is that external knowledge embraced by the official name of science; of her is poetry—and the violet light of its vision; of her, too, is romance. The experiences of the soul on her course from the circumference to the centre are that which I understand by the mystic life, out of which comes the mystic doctrine. I propose to consider in this article whether a specific development of romantic literature embodies any rumour or expresses any phase of this life, so that it may perhaps call to be regarded as some part of our concern and a record thereof; my title indicates that it is the literature of the Holy Graal.

Now the Graal was a palladium of wonderful virtue which reposed in a secret place, and in those

[1] The summary of a paper read before The Quest Society, at Kensington Town Hall, April 29, 1909.

who sought to discover it certain qualifications were necessary. As there were stages of growth in the literature, these titles began with the idea of asking an arbitrary question, but they ended in the imputed possession of the chief gifts of sanctity on the part of the seeker. So also the palladium, from a dubious miraculous object, grew in grace and holiness, till the mystery which encompassed it and the concealment in which it abode made it too exalted for earth, and, in fine, as the world passed from evil into greater evil, as the elect were fewer and still fewer, it was withdrawn into heaven, or alternatively into an inaccessible fastness, removed from all but the chosen keepers. For the rest, it is usually described as a cup or chalice, and in this form it was a precious Christian hallow. The literature is in part concerned with the history and in part with the quest of this sacred object.

Considered as the matter of romance, the Holy Graal does not antecedently suggest any obvious mystic concern; moreover, the Graal books are books of knightly adventure, and so far as they belong—which some of them do indeed, and signally—to the ideal world, the high world on the sky of which is written the word aspiration, this aspiration and that ideality are of the domain of chivalry.

There is, however, one counsel which is desirable at this point. I know that all things testify concerning the Divine Quest to those who are following that Quest; I know that literature itself is a quest—great, holy and unending; I know that all good things belong to the mystic by the legitimacy of his dedication, and that there is no part of the gods which is not a part of him; I know that we can set the seal of our own implicits on all legends and history; and that all great things

meet in the great height. But even if we can discern in our simplicity or subtlety an encompassing atmosphere of likeness in things which otherwise are separated widely, we must find our proper justification in the eyes of the logical understanding; in literatures, we must be free from the impeachment of reading in meanings that are purely arbitrary; and in using any argument drawn from ideological similarity as a ground of comparison, apart from manifest or probable connection in history, we must be very careful not to confuse the historical issues. We must not, for example, suppose transmission through space and time when there are no external evidences. The Graal after all is, as I have said, of romance, and the Mystic Quest is the sum of all religion. Realising the necessity of these reserves, we can proceed to consider the Holy Graal as, *ex hypothesi*, the crown of perfection, as this was conceived at the period. Though destined for very few, at times it rewarded those who sought it; so also God is, and He recompenses those who seek Him with a whole heart of dedication, and who carry certain warrants which correspond to some that were required of the Graal-questers.

As regards the origin of the literature, those who are acquainted with the subject will be aware that non-Christian Celtic folk-lore is generally recognised as the first matter of the Graal-myth. It will be thought, therefore, that it began badly enough for my admitted interest, but the Graal is a myth transfigured, and its primitive stage is not now the question at issue. There was nothing in the old mystery of a certain building guild which mattered to the soul of man till that material was somehow married to symbolical Masonry, with its apparatus of mystical death and resurrection

and the secrets of the house not made with hands. We meet, however, occasionally, with the myth which must have signified from the beginning, and this characteristic is not altogether wanting in some folk-lore precursors of Graal-tradition. There was never a time and there was never a place, there was never a rite of old or a religion of the dead past in which the sense of dawning consciousness as to things of all most true, and of all highest, was not present in some degree; it was fitful sometimes, at others it was an abiding presence; of these is the cauldron which mystically restored to life, but did not restore to speech; of these is the draught of wisdom which destroyed those who drank thereof too deeply. They are not without a message to us at this day.

As an alternative to Celtic folk-lore, it has been suggested in certain quarters of research that a much earlier and a much higher origin may be found for the Graal in the East, and that its root-matter is to be sought in Oriental sacred books. We make contact in many of the views thus put forward with the high preoccupations which are ours: the communion between God and man, the imparted vision of God, the eternal life of the spirit—these are the things that we seek, and if the quest of the Holy Graal can be truly understood as the search after and attainment of such *magnalia Dei et naturæ*, we shall hold ourselves prepared at all points to seek that sacred object. In such case there is an exceedingly profound and far-reaching aspect of the romantic literature. But unhappily the allocation of Graal-symbolism to ends so high as these, and the fact that the same ends have been symbolised everywhere in the world, have led to a doctrine of transmission from age to age and from country to country for which

there is little or no evidence. Dreams of this kind are like the vocal and other identities found in words which belong to widely different languages; such pitfalls continually engulfed the old etymologists; and to myself at least the experience of past generations serves as a prolonged counsel of caution.

Many Graal antecedents have been inferred on the question of formal symbolic correspondence, but they serve little purpose except to mislead research. The consecrated cup of the Agathodaimōn in the Mysteries of Bacchus may recall, if we like, the Eucharistic celebration of Christendom, but it is not the Eucharist, nor is it the Graal cup, though this also connects, as we shall see, with the Eucharist. The chalices of bitterness and sweetness in the French Craft Rite of Masonry are no part of our subject, though Galahad thought that the Graal communion was "so sweet that it was marvellous to tell." In the Templar Grade of Masonry there are three cups: let us say, if we must, that they recall a Rite of the Gnostics, but do not infer, because this was sacramental, that the Graal, which was also sacramental, was therefore a Gnostic dream. Zoroaster is said in one of the dubious traditions to have consecrated wine, a rose, a cup and the kernel of a pomegranate, which things were used in his sacred mysteries. One commentator has testified in his reverie that the cup in question was the Shekinah; but let us, on our part, refrain from supposing that the Graal is for such reason a symbol belonging to Kabalistic Jewry; or, if we set aside the interpretation and cleave to the text of the tradition, do not let us conclude that the Graal dates from primæval Zoroastrianism. It is said that the ancients received the blood of the sacrificial victim in a cup or patera; we find allusion also to a

winged cup. The Graal went about through the realm of Logres in the days of quest, and the Graal also contained sacrificial blood, but it is not for this reason to be allocated as regards its origin to the time immemorial of Abel's offering. In Persian mythology, the goblet of Djamschid was the symbol of the happiness and abundance which the people enjoyed during the reign of this traditional King. It is on record in Holy Writ that Joseph divined in a silver cup, and the Graal sometimes gave oracles, but the Christian palladium was not Joseph's cup, nor yet that of libation mentioned, I believe, in the *Iliad*. And, in fine, to make an end of these parables, as we come nearer in time and place to the proper antecedents and environment of the Graal-literature, let it be only with caution that we remember the scalds of the North and the Breton bards, for whom poetry was likened to a cup filled with a precious liquid. Let it be only under great reservations that we mention General Vallancey, in whose *Collections*, for what they are worth, it is stated that a double-cupped patera of gold was found in Ireland with an Ogham inscription thereon. There is nothing so probable, but the *Collections* add that the written word signified Osiris, and this I am dissuaded from believing, but how much more from supposing that the Irish relic was a type of the Graal, though the Graal also was heard of in Ireland, and what I suppose to be the Ark which once contained it, is credibly or otherwise affirmed to be reposing at this moment somewhere in the depths of Tara's hill.

The general lesson is not to go otherwise than warily either to East or West that we may more fully connect the sacred vessel which is our subject with the stray relics of antiquity. The cup is not only

characteristic of every table but of innumerables rites of religion, and the cup of our present concern did not become the Graal till it was incorporated in the history of Christian relics, while to the very end it remained a reliquary transfigured. It will seem even now to be far from any goal of ours, but as, at least on the sentimental side of spirituality, it has become a mode of the moment to speak of the Quest of the Graal as of something which carries with it the implication of high intent and holy, it is worth while to see how things stand literally—what is essential to the subject, what has accreted, and whether after all we are within the ideological law in connecting this Christian legend with great mysteries of the soul.

Beginning at the beginning, let us take the antecedents in folk-lore and be content for that purpose with the pedigree in outline which has been traced by scholarship. Prior to the genesis of the Christian Graal in Northern and Middle France, there was a cloud of floating tradition, part of which had no doubt passed into writing, and it belonged to the old religion, a mixture of many elements which may be included for my purpose under the term of Druidism. It does not signify whether it is exhaustively correct, as it is a reasonably close approximation. There was above all Armorica, with its Druidic colonisation from Cornish Britain. There was finally Wales, where it may even be that we must seek the root of all. Of Ireland I must not speak, for ordinary space would fail me, but the wealth of its pre-Christian memorials will be known to some of my readers. In all these places it is believed that the first matter of the Graal existed long prior to their colonisation by Christianity. There was the bowl of eternal festival, there was the cup of supernatural

knowledge, there was the cauldron of wisdom. Of the first, except by some subtle process of reading in, we cannot say that it is much to our purpose. The material hunger and thirst, the material desire of good things, the fear of want, the rude lessons of lean years and of dreadful famine, inevitably created an ideal symbol of unfailing plenty; and though this fact may remind us of the hunger and thirst after righteousness, of the meat that does not perish, and the vineyards and the wine-press of the eternal Kingdom, it remains that the dream of food was term enough in itself for the myth which is now in our minds.

When the time came for the Graal-tradition to be declared in the realm of romance, it assumed main aspects as follows: (1) a cycle of stories which accounted for the origin of the vessel, for its nature, its power and the circumstances under which it attained a defined location; (2) a cycle of romantic adventures connected with its discovery; and (3) the epilogue of its ultimate departure. We must take each of these aspects separately, and subdivision is required in some of them. The first or historical portion is separable into three chief sections. In respect of Section A, the vessel of the Graal was that Chalice, Cup or Patera, in which Christ consecrated at the Last Supper the element of the Eucharistic wine. The Jewish Feast of the Passover included eating unleavened cakes and drinking from cups of wine. Lightfoot says that the third of these was the Cup of Blessing, and he suggests that it was this which was blessed by Christ. However this may be, there can be no doubt that when our Lord took and blessed bread it was the unleavened bread of the rite, and that when He took the cup into His hands it was the ordinary cup of the rite. The Graal is not,

therefore, a complete Eucharistic symbol, because it does not account for the element of bread which was consecrated at the same time. The tradition, however, added several other hallows, and among them there was a dish, the purpose of which is not always clear in the stories. Considering, furthermore, the genesis of the vessel in folk-lore and its subsequent allocation to the highest mystery of the Christian religion, the elements which entered into its composition were conflicting enough and brought about an amazing superincession in the mind of romance. It was thus a dish of plenty, a reliquary enshrining the most precious of all hallows, the chalice of the new and eternal testament, and a ciborium containing the living bread of Christian salvation.

I must, speak, however, of an alternative theory in section B, for which the Graal-vessel was the Paschal Dish in which the Paschal Lamb was eaten at the Last Supper; in such case it was not an Eucharistic vessel at all, but, notwithstanding, the documents belonging to the cycle from which the notion is drawn continued to connect it with the Body and Blood of Christ. This was effected after two manners; the vessel officiated from time to time at an arch-natural Mass; and in all the stories now under review its permanent and unchanging content was the Precious Blood collected by Joseph of Arimathæa, either from the sacred side while the body was still suspended from the Cross, or alternatively at the foot of the Tree when that body was being prepared for sepulture. By the intervention of the Jews, and to punish him for his supposed active part in the drama of the resurrection, Joseph was cast into prison, where he remained for forty years; but the reliquary was with him, and as he contemplated it in ecstasy he lost

all sense of time and had scarcely a notion of days elapsing when he was at last set free by Vespasian. Thereafter, under divine command, he, or his appointed legatee, brought the Vessel into Britain, where it remained either in the care of his kinsman Brons, whose life was prolonged through the centuries, or alternatively in the hands of successive keepers, till in either case came the reign of King Arthur in Britain. It was then that the Quests began.

But in respect of historical Section C, the Graal was not a vessel, Eucharistic or otherwise; it was a mysterious stone brought from heaven by angels, and for which a shrine was erected on Mont Salvatch, a hypothetical peak of the Pyrenees. Why it was brought does not especially transpire, and its history in the chief text of this cycle is really that of its keeping and its quest. It is without antecedents even in the symbolical order and there is evidence that the deficiency was felt, for at a later period a new account was grafted on the older legend, and explained that the stone was once in the crown of Lucifer. This historical section belongs to the German cycle of the Graal, and more especially to the *Parzifal* of Wolfram von Eschenbach. The poem did not entirely satisfy the mind of its age, and later writers reverted to the Eucharistic explanation.

The second aspect is that of the quests which took place for the invention of the sacred and mysterious object; but as I am dealing here and throughout with a large literature, it is obvious that I can give only a bare and unadorned outline. I shall again divide the matter of research under three heads—A and B containing the quests of Perceval—that is to say, their various and commonly exclusive versions—and C that

of Galahad. A and B are rather an artificial distinction, but it is desirable from the standpoint of scholarship to say that the share of Chrétien de Troyes in the great metrical romance called the *Conte del Graal* represents roughly the period of transition from folk-lore to Christian symbolism, and leaves everything regarding the Vessel, its nature and its history, so vague that the poet's beginning of the vast story reaches its sudden pause with little manifestation of his intention. This is enough in respect of Section A. And now generally concerning the quests of Perceval, there are five conflicting versions —that of the *Conte del Graal*, which is the only extant French metrical rendering; that of the shorter prose *Perceval;* the longer *Perceval* in prose; that which incorporates this knightly hero's mission with the higher mission of Galahad; and lastly, the epic of Wolfram, including the lost French original which the German singer reflects. I leave out of consideration for the moment the *Titurel* of Albrecht von Scharfenberg, because it belongs to the end of the XIIIth century, though I regard it, in its own way, as both interesting and important. I leave out also the considerable share in quest which is attributed to certain knights of King Arthur's Court who had a partial success only. We know that according to the romance of *Tristram*, the royal palace was almost denuded of its chivalry when the Quest was first proclaimed; but of the rank and file there is no record in the stories. Lancelot attained in part, but was only permitted to stand at the door of the sanctuary, and see from that distance what was proceeding within it at the great Mass of the Graal. In one of the texts Gawain is covered with confusion; in another he neither sees nor hears anything; in a

third he beholds more than he is capable of understanding; and there is one German poem in which he is the successful quester, but this is out of harmony with the whole spirit of the literature, although it was inclined to give him a fair share in the high enterprise, till the prose *Lancelot* and the *Quest of Galahad* intervened to efface so many of the old offices.

The keynote of the Perceval quests is the asking of a certain question, and in spite of all kinds of cautions, or alternatively because of cautions, on his first visit to the Castle of Hallows, he fails and retires in disgrace. The consequence is that he has years of exile and wandering. He returns, however, at last, and at last also inquires regarding the Graal and its service; so is he entitled not only to learn its ministry, with some part of its mystery, but in fine to be the next custodian of the Sacred Vessel. In the *Conte del Graal*, the poet who gives the conclusion says that Perceval became a priest and had the Graal with him till he died, after which it was probably removed from earth to heaven. The shorter prose *Perceval*—called usually the *Didot Perceval*—leaves its hero in the unknown sanctuary still guarding the Vessel. In the German *Parzifal* he also remains at Mont Salvatch, two of the earlier custodians abiding with him. In the later poem of *Titurel*, on account of the evil time which fell upon the world, he is concerned in its passage to the far East, where, in the realm of Presbyter Johannes, it attains a final resting place. In the *Longer Prose Perceval* he dwells with it in the Castle until all his kindred die, and he is then told to divide the sacred things among certain hermits. It does not appear definitely whether this includes the Holy Graal, but in either case a ship comes from over the sea to carry

him away, and where it takes him there the Vessel abides.

The object of all these quests is differently accounted for. The presumption, under several reserves, is that in Chrétien's portion of the *Conte del Graal* the vessel is a ciborium and contains Sacred Hosts. In the part which was written by Gautier it provides a feast of good things, and this is its office in the concluding section of Manessier. Yet for both it is also a reliquary and for one of them it was brought into Britain by Joseph of Arimathæa. A poet named Gerbert wrote an independent continuation of the great *Conte*, and perhaps brought it to a term, or at least designed to do so, and he also followed or invented some variant of the Joseph legend. The original metrical romance of Joseph is followed by the *Didot Perceval*, and the mystery which is communicated to the successful questing knight is that of certain sacramental words which cannot be written. These are words used in the consecration at the Mass, or such at least is the only conclusion that I can reach concerning them. In the *Longer Prose Perceval* everything concerning the Graal is part of the great mystery of an arch-natural Mass, in which Christ appears visibly. On the other hand, in the German *Parzifal* the only connection with Mass and Eucharist resides in the fact that the virtues of the mystic stone are renewed annually by a Host from heaven, brought down by a symbolic dove.

We come now to the third section of the Quest matter, being that contained in the romance of *Galahad*, who is here the head and crown of all the wonderful achievement, though Perceval and Bors are concerned with him therein. Here also the Graal is a reliquary—though it is termed the Paschal Dish; here also it is

the vessel of Joseph; and here in fine the great mystery of all is a Mass-mystery. The deeps and the heights thereof are communicated to the triad at the term of the Quest, and they are instructed to carry the sacred object to the East whence it came. There Galahad receives a final revelation of the deep below the deep and the height beyond the height. And in this way also the literature reaches the utmost exaltation of its term.

The question which now recurs for our determination is how far this wonderful cycle of romance can or may be held to concern us. What have we to do with the wonders of a feeding-dish, and how much must we set aside before any interpretation which we attempt will carry an appeal to our hearts? Even then, will it not be rather artificial, even arbitrary in a high degree? And is it worth while? I know that all the stones about us can be and are daily changed into supernatural bread, that after all manners *esurientes implevit bonis*, and that by all consecrated and even unconsecrated objects shall man remember in his heart the one thing needful; but with so many means of transmutation so close to our hands, why should we trouble about strange, old literature? We have seen, however, that the feeding dish is but one part of the subject into which we have briefly entered, and when the *Quest of Galahad* came to be written, this characteristic was only on the external side, acting as a drag-net to carry those whom it called from the notion of the food which is without to the spiritual nourishment which is received only within. At the beginning of the story, when there is high feasting at Camelot, because it is the time of Pentecost, the Graal enters the King's banqueting hall and those present are fed with

meats which never were on land or sea. And because of this wonder the Quest is proclaimed by Gawain, who desires to eat again after the same manner. But according to the romance of *Tristram*, he who first takes the pledge of the Quest is Galahad, who has said nothing, for he knows that the term of research is not earthly food. So when in the course of the Quest, the triad of achievement, with the mysterious Knights of Gaul, Ireland and Denmark, even the half-rejected Lancelot, arrive at Corbenic, the Graal Castle, they experience no magical supper of Cagliostro *et hoc genus omne.* The feeding dish has been voided; the reliquary is also voided; there is no word of the Precious Blood and how it was preserved, but only the most secret and intimate communion between Christ and the soul under the veils of bread and wine. All the houses of wonder and all their portents have dissolved at length and Galahad attains that which he has sought from the beginning in the plenary sense. His mortal life is closed therein; he says: *In manus tuas commendo spiritum meum*—and his soul is assumed by the angels.

The mystery and wonder of the Graal resides therefore in the manifestation of the noumenal world across or behind the phenomena of the Christian sacraments, and the removal of the sacred object notifies in symbolism the rarity of such an experience in the life of the world. Was the clerk, priest or monk who wrote the *Quest of Galahad* conscious to the full extent of what he was doing? The truest answer is perhaps that he saw enough to help us to see further. The words Holy, Holy, Holy, are so written and over-written on every leaf of the romance that I for one should be sorry to put any limit to his realisation. I should be sorry to say that in using as he did certain

gross thaumaturgic veils of transubstantiation, he did not see that they were veils and approximations only. God knows; but it is certain that he threw them aside at the term of all. His contribution remains as a message put forth from the heart of Christian doctrine and symbolism for the guidance of the children of Christendom. But as there are many schools, so it is not all mystics at this day who will confess to this kind of leading. The individual meaning must lie therefore in the individual hands of those who receive the text; assuredly the paths are many, almost as the sands of the sea, by which the external universe, with its sacraments and symbols, opens for the prepared heart to the Divine within the universe.

I have reached the utmost limits of this paper, and there is a further side of the whole subject to which I can allude only. The literature is catholic and at that it is Latin catholic, but it also incorporated certain rumours which came from very far away—remote, I mean, from all the purpose of romance. They are not vestiges of Vedic hymns or any of those possibilities which I have mentioned and set aside previously, but something almost undemonstrable respecting the life-sources of Christianity—an evaded recognition that life on the highest plane had slipped away from the external churches, and yet no line nor episode suggests that they are dead. To this side of the subject there are two manifest keys given in the books themselves, or rather in two cycles of the literature. For one of these the Mystery of the Graal was that Mystery of Secret Words mentioned heretofore—words of consecration, words used at the Mass, but words unknown in the external sanctuaries. For the second, the noumenal

Graal was placed in the hands of a priesthood which did not derive from the apostles, but by a direct title from Christ. And it is precisely the equivalent of these implicits which I have found permeating the books of the secret tradition in Christian times. It is in the strange parables of alchemy; it is in the cryptic rites of Masonry. The secret behind these keys is that of the communication of Divine Substance by an interior experience to the soul in the last stage of the condition which high theosophical Christianity, especially of the Latin type, recognises under the term ecstasy. When Galahad knelt in Sarras to receive the noumenal Eucharist, when he saw Christ face to face and the hidden things of Him, we are reading of the same experience, drawn into romance, which concerned the Hermetic Philosophers on the spiritual side, with which Rosicrucianism, under some of its guises, was and is now concerned, which—in fine—is the proper term of all the instituted mysteries, and because I believe that this end is that also which must be understood in the mind of the mystic when he testifies concerning religion on the basis of experience, I affirm in conclusion that he is on the Quest of the Graal. And this statement is apart from all confusions and all arbitrary identifications on the historical plane.

Let us therefore be content with what we have, confessing that of all the great things which have ever moved the heart and mind of man the analogies are everywhere, but the likeness is of nature and necessity and by no means signifies that they are transmitted and perpetuated like a secret doctrine through the ages. When Maître François Rabelais wrote his great book of *divertissement* for the joy of the French nation, he—being a learned man—drew ribaldry and wisdom

from many sources; but the chronicle of Gargantua is a creation after its own kind, and is not a model copied from any part of the greater or lesser world. When the extant literature of the Holy Graal came into being, practically during the brief period of fifty or sixty years, I think that there was nothing more *sui generis* in the wide world of romance. On the side of its mystery it connects, as it must connect, with other cognate mysteries, and there are many things in the East and the West which are comparable thereto in respect of the term thereof; but on the side of its invention it is of the soul at work in literature, and therein it followed and extended the precedents belonging to its proper place and time.

ARTHUR EDWARD WAITE.

THE ART OF LEARNING.

THOMAS E. SIEVE.

THE main idea to connect with learning should be the art of expression. We should learn knowledges, arts, and sciences, in order to attain to further powers of expression, for it is as essential to the life and growth of the soul to be able to express itself as it is essential to man to breathe. The soul longs to blossom forth into expression and is helped towards this by the light of knowledge, even as the flower yearns to blossom forth and express its own inherent divinity stimulated and aided by the light of day. If a person studies only in order to repeat or copy then he entirely misses the true art of learning. We should learn in order to expand our minds; and we expand our minds in order that the true soul, or man within, may have a further field for activity, a vaster scope for expression and manifestation.

We should not learn in order to become walking encyclopædias; we should learn so as to provide material for our own inherent genius (or spirit) to work upon. The encyclopædic man is often a man of little genius; the genius is often a man of less knowledge, for he devours all his little stock of knowledge and digests it, and the product is the growth and expression of his own genius; but this growth is not always knowledge, his store of facts may be few. Genius is not the power to record or remember facts; it is the art of manipu-

lating them. It is the power to attain to an original and searching point of view—a point of view from which facts are no longer only facts, but revealers of inner truths. To the genius in art, music and painting are not merely sounds and sights, they are ciphers or physical powers capable of recording the emotions of the soul; and by means of these the genius sends forth his innermost soul, by means of these the genius expresses or recreates himself. It is a putting forth of life into manifestation, the supreme act, beyond which no man can rise. He ensouls the form.

To learn and to practise are in many instances synonymous terms. It is proverbial that if you want to learn any art or science you must practise it; also that man only learns by experience, that is by practice. From this we may deduce that true learning is very intimately connected with activity; it is in fact, as I said at the beginning, the art of expression or bringing into activity. Now if we accept this idea with regard to learning—that it is the applying of our own innate genius to the outer facts and activities of life, we shall find that three things are necessary: first, faith in the inner; second, interest in the outer; third, capacity to unite the two. First, we must not only believe that there is innate genius in everybody, *ourselves included*, but we must be willing to act upon this belief. I am not meaning by genius any wonderful technical aptitude; I am meaning rather that true spiritual sense or insight, that capacity to play with any knowledge gained through any art or science and turn it to further account, make it mean more than other people do. Just as true musical genius is not so much the capacity to play more difficult music than anyone else, but the capacity to make whatever is played mean

more; and as in composition the genius is not the man who puts together successfully the most uncommon and extravagant harmonies, but the man who by some quite indefinable touch, the stroke of genius, produces the simplest phrases or harmonies and gives them new meaning, further depth. Nothing extravagant, but originality within simplicity seems to be the key-note of genius.

Now the art of learning is essentially the art of being child-like. The child has a *natural* aptitude for learning. We generally find the man who goes through life learning from every incident, whatever age he may be, has from many points of view a child-like nature. It must be remembered that by learning I do not here mean the amassing of facts of knowledge; the so-called learned man, better called the encyclopædic man, or the man of dead desiccated details, is seldom child-like to any marked degree.

Most children show a certain amount of genius, many children show a very decided amount of genius; for most children are very original in their own way and capable of making much out of very little until 'education' (that system of upbringing warranted to eradicate as speedily as possible every trace of originality and genius) crams them with so many and so varied superficial facts that the poor little genius dies an early death from suffocation. It is given no time and less opportunity to play around and transform and transmute, to add depth, richness and meaning to all these superficial structures of the intellect; it is in fact never given the chance to perform its true duty, that of *ensouling* these mental forms and changing them from dead dry facts into vital truths. That some amount of genius is essential for the production of any work of

art is more or less an accepted fact, and so in branches of art genius is less stifled; but that genius is *absolutely essential* for the formation of any true and living concept is not yet so widely accepted. People still think that you can tell a child or a man something, and if the child or man can reproduce in words the following week what you told them, that they have learned, that they have seized a living idea. Memory, however, plays a very small part in the creation of living ideas and vital truths; for if the spark of genius be really alive and awake, it is wonderful how much it can make out of the scantiest and most insignificant material; it is very independent of memory.

In children as a rule there is more genius than fact, so that their mental creations may often be not vital truths but vital fancies—but none the less important for being fancies, none the less capable of being turned to account by the competent teacher; for they are to the children vital, and this is the all-important point. We see in children a certain faith in themselves, a spontaneous belief in their own innate capacity to tackle and make something out of whatever is put before them. Children do not, as a rule, think whether they can or cannot do a thing if they are interested, they just do it; and whatever they achieve it is generally to their own complete satisfaction, for children have a marvellous capacity for adapting their ideal to the actual. They are quite philosophers enough by instinct to know that for happiness the ideal and the actual must correspond or unite; so when they tire of striving to make the actual shape itself according to the ideal with which they had set out, they, without any qualms of conscience, promptly shift their ideal till it bears a comfortable relationship to the actual.

Children are delicious creatures before they have been educated; they have so little conscience!

Now to how great an extent is it desirable for grown-ups to imitate this phase of child-life when they are struggling to acquire knowledge, and how far is it undesirable? I would not, of course, suggest that they should entirely dispense with conscience and be child-like in that way; it is a most estimable medicine or corrective only when not taken in over-doses. Still it is always better, when possible, to keep healthy without resorting to correctives. Conscience is really only something by means of which we register our movements to and from a given norm. This is thrown out as a suggested definition of conscience for the consideration of those who love to extol it as something rather more God-given than any of our other mental eccentricities.

First of all, then, the learner might be recommended to copy children to this extent: Do not stop to consider whether you can or whether you cannot do a thing, but do it. Of course if you have no head for mathematics do not take up mathematics, if you have no eye for colour do not try to be an artist; but once having decided what you intend to work at, cease to consider whether you can or whether you cannot; be child-like.

How much more quickly a man learns a foreign language, for instance, if he will just start talking it without stopping to consider whether he knows the necessary words or not. What a much better and more interesting letter a person writes if he sits down and chats to his pen and does not wait to consider what he ought to say. How thankful many a teacher would be if only his pupil would move, no matter in what

direction. Guidance is the business of the teacher, not of the pupil. But even if you are learning unaided by any teacher, the first thing to think of is a rough and ready collecting of material and some sort of activity connected with that material. It is the people who start learning very late in life who are so dreadfully cautious and always want to be right—not the children. You can learn just as much by being wrong, provided you do not remain wrong for too long a time. The first axiom then that I would suggest for the would-be learner is: Leap before you look; leap first, look afterwards! The only exception to this rule is in Ski-ing, for instance; it is as well then to look first, for if you leap first there will probably be for you no looking at all! I do not of course wish to underrate the value of scrutiny; in fact later I shall insist at great length upon the necessity for the utmost scrutiny if one wishes really to learn; I would only insist here that the scrutiny is more advantageous when it comes second, not first. Why is it that children are so much more easy to teach, as a rule, than grown-ups? It is not because they mimic more readily (the answer given by so many people), for as I have said elsewhere I do not consider mimicking learning, I do not consider example and imitation a legitimate form of teaching. It is because they just go ahead; while if you teach a grown man he first looks, then he listens, then he looks again before he moves at all, and then when you have succeeded in setting him in activity, he stops to reconsider or to ask an 'intelligent question.' Always question what you have done, not what you are going to do. So many questions get answered in action and can only be answered in the language of experience. Act first, then you will probably find all the questions

you intended asking have answered themselves, and an entirely new set of questions, far more advanced, has arisen in your mind. This advice, of course, is not intended to be given to children, or is only likely to be necessary for the very diffident child, a rare creature now-a-days. Most children act without sufficient consideration. I have in view chiefly the person of mature age who returns after years of dissipation to study the art of learning, having, in a moment of true illumination, seen it to be *the* art *par excellence*, the one great art of life, the art of bringing our own innate genius to bear upon the facts of life, a further union between the inner and outer for greater understanding, for recreation.

Let us next consider the child-like method of suiting the ideal to the actual, as soon as the actual is found to refuse stubbornly to shape itself according to the ideal; let us consider the question of shifting or movable ideals. It is a shocking suggestion, I know, and will strike horror into the breast of many a virtuous learner. I can see many objections to the plan myself, but for all that I think there is something to be learned from the idea; so let us consider it.

When a child begins to learn anything he has no standard whatsoever by which to measure himself; so he plods away quite happily, with the result that he learns quickly. Now this is not the case with grown-ups; if a man starts to study or re-study philosophy, for instance, his ideal may, very likely, be Plato; if he is taking up poetry he has ever in mind as a standard of reference Shakespeare, Goethe or Dante; if he works at music he has before him Beethoven, Wagner or Bach, Paderewski or Paganini; if art perhaps Leonardo da Vinci, and so on. I do not suggest for one moment

that the man is constantly comparing his little efforts with the result of the life-work of these geniuses (at least the comparison is wholly unconscious on his part); but the difference between the grown man and the child is this: whereas the child works all the time in great glee and with a certain amount of surety, spurred on with delight at each small accomplishment, the grown man plods away with a certain knowledge that he will never attain, in this life at any rate, to his ideal, and he frequently has fits of despair wondering whether it is all worth while. The one works with spontaneous delight, the other works nominally for the pleasure of recreation, but in reality he does it as a sort of duty to his conscience. He works for the joy that he believes it *will* bring, not for the immediate joy and excitement of each moment. The child watches himself grow; the man only sees the long pilgrimage between himself and his ideal.

A weeping warrior never wins. Worry and discontent never furthered growth; interest and delight in immediate details always help forward each step. That is one reason why the plodding man proverbially wins. He is not always and continually bothered and hampered with high ideals. He does just what is in front of him without any sort of reference to anything or anybody. I quite believe in high ideals, very high ones; but they should be kept strictly for 'best,' and only brought out into view on special and great occasions. I believe in plenty of lesser every-day ideals for common use. Grand ideals are no true stimulus to thorough work, and they are very apt to get shattered if always about. It is not really good for them or us. So at the end of a day, or week, or month, do not let us be weary because unconsciously we are regretting that

we are not yet a Goethe, a Wagner, or a Plato; it is better to cast aside all such standards and try to see what we have done, and then, with the true philosophy of a child, decide that if it is not just what we originally meant to do, it is something worthy of accomplishment, though possibly not quite on the direct route to our ideal. Did we but know the truth, we should probably find that the direct route to any ideal is always a very devious way; the way to ideals is not as the crow flies. It is necessary to watch and see to it that work is not done for any prize or for any result, not even for the prize of seeing oneself advance in learning. It is better to work simply for the love of work, for the love of doing the utmost each day. This is the way to work if we want to *grow* and not only to amass prizes or be able to register results. Knowledge can be weighed and measured; growth is so subtle and so much a thing of the soul that it can scarcely be perceived. Yet it is just this growth which brings true expansion of consciousness.

The good old-fashioned teacher thought that the world was made up of conceited and lazy people, and that the fundamental principle of teaching was to correct and snub. No doubt there are some people who need snubbing, but I think they are the exception. With most people, I think the more they are judiciously encouraged, not foolishly flattered, the better. Learners should remember to encourage themselves; courage stimulates growth. They should try to see what they have done, and not harp on what they have not yet done.

So far I have been talking about the first of the three requisites; I have been trying to stimulate learners to have faith in themselves and courage to go ahead more or less blindly; this I believe to be most

essential at the start, for with grown men and women there is often the greatest repugnance to move until they have seen exactly why and where. But if one is beginning an entirely new subject it is not always possible to know why and where; we must provide some causes and results before the teacher can point out the reason, and it is far better to have actual living causes and results than imaginary ones. It is not possible for the teacher to guide our boat until we have got it under way; the whole foundation upon which the system of steering operates is not yet in existence. Act, is the rule, then you will soon see, know and understand.

The next requisite I have spoken of is interest in and careful attention towards the outer. Let us assume that we are now alive and awake in our subject and have got somewhat under way; now is the time to look around, scrutinise everything and ask as many questions as possible. This is the state of the normal child. He plunges along merrily without bothering his head as to whys and wherefores. The difficulty is to make him think and notice how he attains his results, the difficulty is to make him see cause and effect; he learns simply by mimicking, if he is allowed to. The child has a natural, almost automatic capacity for doing things; it is when you try to make him think and really understand processes that the difficulties begin.

Learners may roughly be divided into two classes: those who always practise what they cannot do; those who invariably practise what they can do. At first glance one naturally praises the first class and laughs at the second, but in reality both methods are essential, and it is upon a judicious mixture of these two that rapidity in learning very largely depends. It is not

desirable to be always breaking fresh ground; it is very desirable to be constantly revising, provided the revision is most thorough and critical and not in any way automatic. A skilful teacher will use the utmost discretion in the use of these two opposites. If we find that we belong chiefly to the first class of learners, if we are continually thirsting for new fields to conquer, it is wiser to go back again and again, and tell ourselves that we are too superficial, that we must add depth to our present knowledge before we attempt to go further. It is wise to tell yourself when you feel you know a thing that *this* is the moment when *real* study *begins; you can only study what you know*, all before has been preliminary preparation. And by *study* I mean waiting while your own innate genius plays upon acquired knowledge or facts and ensouls them and adds depth and new meaning to them. This is something further even than clearly seeing cause and result. If you belong to the second class of student, if you are very painstaking and thorough and delight to retrace, or if you are very lazy and only do what is easy, if you can seldom bring yourself to tackle something quite new, you must be continually forcing yourself to go on and not deceive yourself with good sounding words such as 'thoroughness'; say rather laziness or want of push and pluck. In looking over your course of study look out for these two opposites and see if you have paid due attention to each. True skill in learning consists in introducing each of these methods at the most opportune moments.

I have now tried to give a few hints as to the second requisite,—namely, critical study of all that one does or all that surrounds one; but before leaving this second requisite something must be said that may

appear a little to contradict what was said about high ideals. If the reader will consider carefully, however, he will see that what is recommended for gaining the second requisite is likely to be very different from the methods suggested for acquiring the first. For these two requisites are by nature opposed. In learning to acquire push and faith in oneself, the learner is recommended to look only at what is just in front of him, to have temporary and movable ideals always at hand as definite stepping-stones. But there are certain classes of pupils to whom I would never recommend this. There are some students who are ever ready to work up for or to the latest little goal which the teacher holds in view, and with each fresh stimulus they entirely forget and set aside all that has been said before. As a rule when one has studied a subject for six months one's teacher ceases to talk about the things which he laid most stress on at the beginning, but this does not mean that the pupil is to cease to consider them; he must keep up all he has been already taught and not only work at the separate details which are put forward by the teacher each lesson.

We have now to consider the third requisite—namely, the combining of the inner and the outer, the combining of faith and push with extreme care and the exercise of the utmost critical faculty.

The arguments have so far been founded very largely upon the generally accepted fact that youth is the period, *par excellence*, for learning. And certainly the average child has far more aptitude for learning than the average man. But if you ask me to name the ideal pupil or the ideal learner I should without hesitation say not the man nor the child, but the man with a child-like nature. After teaching boys all day what a

relief and what a joy to coach a man, a creature with some amount of common sense, with a fund of learning on to which you can attach that which you have to say! In the man you get one trained in the science of cause and effect, one trained to look deeply and watch carefully exactly what he does and how he did it. One of the great principles ever to keep in mind when teaching or learning is the association of what you are studying with what you already know. When speaking of the two classes of pupils, the one who always prefers to break fresh ground and the other who always prefers to revise, I ought to have pointed out how the happy mean between these two extremes, or the point where the student should be most continuously, is with one foot firmly planted on what he has already acquired and the other foot stepping forward as boldly and as far as possible. He should work continually just at the outermost verge of his own acquired knowledge, for thus he slowly but surely extends his capacity, and pushes out the boundary or limit of his mind. In teaching men one can be fairly assured of a firm basis of knowledge of real ideas thoroughly acquired; but children are such will-o'-the wisps you never exactly know where they are or on what foundation they stand. Wonderful flashes of natural aptitude appear here or there without being founded on anything stable; so they may go out at any moment unless the teacher is able to establish them. In teaching children one often finds the rock of previously acquired knowledge on to which you are endeavouring to attach some new information, crumbles and breaks at the first little pull, and your whole line of reasoning gives way. But this is not so with men. By a man of child-like nature I mean one who still retains keen interest in everything,

who is ever awake and alive to notice all that is going on, who loves to work just for the sake of being up to something, not for desire of gain, not even the gain of amassing knowledge. By child-like I mean the reverse of *blasé*. The true genius can never be *blasé*, for genius is the portal into the eternities, into the regions of never-ending joy and bliss, of never-ending interest. In talking to a child, if you have succeeded in interesting him at all—and without the capacity to create interest none can teach—he jumps whole-heartedly to all you say. It is not so with a man; as a rule a man moves an inch of himself at a time. I fancy that is a very ridiculous and homely way of expressing two perfectly well-known methods of mind-operation; but not being versed in psychological nomenclature I cannot express myself in the accepted terms, only in terms of common experience. But if you can alight upon an idea with the whole of yourself at once it is much better than if you creep into an idea an inch at a time. The grown man seldom takes these mental leaps unless he is of a child-like nature. The child learns like this all the time; it is much quicker and just as sure provided the teacher supplies the points to leap to. Perhaps some people will think that I am extolling the child too much; there are lazy boys, I know, boys who never spring to any idea, boys who have lost all eagerness; but, if the truth must be confessed, in the vast majority of cases my sympathies are entirely with the boys. They show such wisdom in their laziness, so much more wisdom than is shown in our modern system of over-work. I only wish more boys would go out on a strike. It is quite time an eight hour bill was insisted on in schools as well as in factories.

I know a boy who broke down in health a few

months ago from over-work; I asked him on returning to school if he was working less, and his reply was, "Oh yes, I have given up working late at night because of my eyes." I asked him at what hour he stopped now, and he replied, "10.30 p.m." This is a boy of 16 at one of our public schools. This is what he calls giving up early. And he always works before breakfast too. The folly of our public schools is only equalled or surpassed by the folly of the parents. What chance has the poor little genius to survive such education! I believe, at present, girls' schools are nothing like as bad.

In this sort of education one sees an entire absence of this third requisite, namely, the union of the inner and the outer, the play of the innate genius upon the material accumulated. Modern schools take the utmost advantage of the child's natural eagerness and push, using it to involve the poor little victim deeper and deeper. The modern school always appears to me like a great sorting office; the child is thrown packet after packet which he receives, glances at, registers, stamps, and then throws into this, that, or the other pigeon-hole; the man at the sorting office acquires a marvellous agility and some little knowledge of geography; the child acquires much agility and some little knowledge concerning his own mind. At the end of his school days he has stored away packets upon packets of facts all neatly done up, stamped and registered, all put away in a certain amount of order; but he has never opened one of the packets to find the living idea inside, he has been handling all the time outer coverings; he has not even been taught that there is something inside worth getting at.

It is fairly easy to think out for one's self ways of acquiring faith and push, and it is fairly easy to think

out how to train to be more thorough, more exact, more analytical; the difficulty always appears to me to lie in the true mixing and blending of the two. It is not sufficient to practise first one, then the other, for in this way we may be simply progressing along two parallel lines, and that which should be one is still twain; there must be definite mixing and blending.

The symbol of the potter and his clay has sometimes been used to represent some of the workings of the higher mind. The Potter is the God or Ruler of the highest faculties of mind; it is he who moulds and shapes the living ideas, vessels to contain the true spirit; the clay is the material out of which he moulds them. By learning we are simply providing this material, this clay. Let us think of learning as the forming of this clay, this ultimate or fundamental mind-stuff. Here in this symbol we can trace out three requisites: We can see the water of life, what I have been speaking of as genius, push and pluck, combining with dust to form the true clay; we see how the critical mind must pulverise and reduce to dust everything around before the true genius or water of life can transform these dry facts into a living mind-substance capable of becoming a vehicle of higher intuitions. It is not sufficient to have genius; it is not sufficient to push along blindly and boldly like a rushing torrent. It is not sufficient to hammer away with our intellects at the hard facts of life; the dust and the water must combine to form the living substance of mind, and it is in the bringing about of this union that the true art of learning consists. This is the marriage of mind at whose reunion vital substance capable of being moulded into vessels of truth is born.

THOMAS E. SIEVE

ORPHEUS—THE FISHER.

I.

ROBERT EISLER, PH. D.

"ORPHEUS is in vogue." Since 1895, when Erwin Rohde wrote these ironical words in his brilliant criticism of an utterly worthless book upon the subject, this fashion does not seem to have declined. Numerous books and papers on Orphism have appeared since then, and although we find names like Albrecht Dieterich, Salomon Reinach and Otto Gruppe among the contributors to this recent literature, the problem is still very far from being solved. And yet nobody can fail to perceive that gradually one of the most fundamental problems in the history of Greek religion has arisen out of what had been before merely one of those puzzling enigmas, attractive chiefly on account of their mysterious obscurity at once to the most learned and to the most fantastic antiquarians of a bygone period.

An Orphic association, a '*thiasos*' with particular funeral rites[1] and consequently a particular eschatology,[2]

[1] According to the well-known passage of Herodotus (II. 81), they execrated woollen garments and would be buried in linen only. A recently excavated stone-slab (photographic reproduction, *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1905, p. 387) from a Greek graveyard in Cuma bears an inscription, dating from the first half of the Vth century B.C., as follows: "It is not lawful for anyone to be buried here, unless he has been initiated into the Dionysiac mysteries." This proves that the Orphics had already in this remote period reserved burial grounds, just as the Christians in later antiquity. Not even the bodies of the 'pure' or 'holy ones' (*katharoi* or *hosioi*), as they called themselves, might be defiled by the proximity of unpurified, uninitiated fellow-citizens. "I come, a pure one from among the pure," boasts the soul of an initiate, according to the inscription on one of the Orphic funeral gold tablets, published by Murray in the Appendix to Miss J. E. Harrison's *Prolegomena*. (Cambridge, 1903, p. 661 ff.) I do not know another instance of such 'eschatological' intolerance in the whole pagan world.

[2] Its main features were the doctrines of metempsychosis, considered

formerly known to us only through a rather controversial passage in Herodotus, is now palpably attested by those quaint gold tablets with Orphic inscriptions, excavated from Greek graves in Lower Italy. In the light of this fact nobody can venture to pretend any longer that the hieratic organisation of an Orphic community, as presupposed in the well-known Orphic prayer-book, is merely a literary fiction. Nor is there any reason to believe that, from the time of Herodotus and these South Italian Orphic inscriptions of the Vth, IVth, IIIrd and IInd centuries, down to the last years before our era, when the Orphic hymnology was finally brought into its present shape, there has been a single interval of time when the often-mentioned, wandering Orphic priests and priestly beggars could not find local support on their journeys from settled Orphic communities, just as did the Christian missionaries of the first centuries, when travelling from one church to another along the highways of the Roman empire. Literary as well as archæological remains—principally the latest Orphic poems dating from the IVth century of our era, and countless representations of Orpheus among his beasts on Imperial coins and on Roman mosaics, scattered all over the empire from Palestine and Africa to Great Britain—attest the continued vitality of these cults in later antiquity. Romans as well as Greeks were among the initiated, and, if we may trust Philostratus, even

as a 'circle of rebirths' and as an expiation for a mythological crime, a kind of 'original sin,' committed by the remote ancestors of humanity; of a final deliverance from this merciless 'wheel of necessity'; and—precisely as in the parallel traditions in India—of a 'double way' to the *au-delà*, one to blissful light for the initiates, one to dirt and darkness for the unclean. Empedocles and the 'Vision of Er' in Plato's *Republic* give the best idea of the classical development in Orphic eschatology, which expected a transcendental retribution for good and bad actions, quite unlike the dogma of other mysteries, where—as for example at Eleusis—"a better lot was promised for the pickpocket Pataikios, if he had been initiated, than to the great Aristides, his uninitiated rival."

in Babylonia frequent representations of Orpheus or at least of a synonymous native deity or hero—possibly, as a Christian author[1] allows us to suspect, Nebo of Mabug—prove the unparallelled popularity of these mysteries.

In addition to this, the cult—or at least the legends and influence—of the mystic hierophant was by no means confined to the Orphic communities properly so designated. From the VIth century B.C. onwards, that is to say in a period when the existence of special Orphic confraternities as such, although scarcely deniable, is not yet explicitly stated, we find that apparently independent mystery-cults, such as the imposing ceremonies at Eleusis, were already being put under his personal patronage. It is tolerably certain that the Sicilian Orpheotelests at the court of Pisistratus were officially intrusted with certain reforms at Eleusis, possibly with the addition of the so-called minor mysteries of Dionysus in Agræ[2] to the ceremonial previously adhered to. From that time at any rate the name of Orpheus is connected not only with nearly all the mystery, but also with a great many of the ordinary chthonic cults in Greece and Italy. The Lykomids at Phlya pretended that their hymns were composed by the venerable prophet; he is brought into

[1] The Sardian bishop Melito (*Corp. Apol.* IX., 426) says in one of his letters: "What shall I write to you about the god Nebo [the Babylonian Mercury; lit. = 'the prophet'] in Mabug [= 'place of emerging'] ? For all the priests in Mabug know that he is only a copy (*simulacrum*) of Orpheus, the Thracian wizard."

[2] Ernst Maass, in his *Orpheus*, p. 88 ff., was the first to assert the existence of Orphic elements in the mysteries at Agræ, but, as Rohde has shown, on altogether inconclusive arguments. Yet the place-name 'Agræ' and the tradition (Clemens Alex., *Protrept.*, p. 12, P., after Apollod., *De Diis*) that the orgies had been founded by a *hunter* named Myûs (from *myein*, the verb underlying the noun *mysteria*) point to the fact that Dionysus, the real Myûs or 'initiator,' was worshipped there under the form of 'Agreus,' the 'Great Hunter,' or 'Za-agreus' (see below, p. 186), that is to say, in his specifically Orphic *rôle*.

connection with the Samothracian and Theban mysteries of the 'Great Gods,'[1] with the Laconian cults of Korē Chthoniē, with the orgies of Hekate in Ægina,[2] with the cults of Bendis and Kybele. Finally, we cannot doubt that Christian faith took its first tentative steps into the reluctant world of Græco-Roman paganism under the benevolent patronage of Orpheus; the fact is attested not only by numerous Christian interpolations in the hieratic texts of Orphism, but also by several well-known representations of Orpheus among his beasts in early Christian cemeterial paintings and sculptured sarcophagi. Both facts, strange as this may seem, have up to the present day never been sufficiently accounted for.

In addition to this fundamental importance of Orpheus for the history of ancient cults, his name is traditionally connected not only with the origin of Greek music, poetry, writing, and even agriculture, but also with the dawn of ancient philosophy. Nearly all the current mystic cosmogony of different periods was ascribed to him, at least in a transparently pseudepigraphic way, which often left the real author's name a public secret.

The oldest mass of that literature (so-called Pelasgian inscriptions on certain time-honoured Thracian stone or wood slabs, whose existence, although attested only by Euripides and Heracleides Ponticus,

[1] The so-called 'Kabiri'; this is the Semitic name (meaning the 'Great Ones') for an enigmatical trinity of Prehellenic gods; their Greek names Axieros, Axiokersos and Axiokersa have been successfully explained by A. B. Cook (*Transact.* IIIrd Int. Congr. Hist. Rel., II. p. 194) with reference to the holy double axe (*axia*, *axinē*).

[2] Paus. 2, 30, 2; the first hymn of the Orphic prayer-book is dedicated to Hekate, and with reference to the title and thesis of the present essay I may at once call the reader's attention to the fact that Hekate was generally believed to grant an abundant catch to fishermen (Hesiod, *Theog.*, 443 f., and the scholia to these verses; *cp.* Oppian's *Halieutica*, 3, 28).

need not be questioned) is inaccessible to our researches. We have, however, among the remains of three or four other cosmogonies of minor importance, one of which is considered as Prehomeric by Gruppe and Dyroff, abundant fragments of the principal Orphic teaching, the so-called rhapsodic theogony. This great mystic poem, again and again commented on by the Neoplatonists, was considered for a long time, *e.g.* by Eduard Zeller and his school, as a *pasticcio* from a period not earlier than the first century B.C., strongly tinted with Stoic pantheism and therefore unknown to Plato, Aristotle, and so of course to Presocratic philosophers, such as, for example, Empedocles. At present, however, it is attributed by our best authorities, namely Diels, Gomperz, Kern and Gruppe, as it had been by Christian Lobeck, to the period before the Persian wars, a date which I too consider as definitely established. On the other hand, I have attempted in a recent publication to show that the current belief in an Attic origin for this quaint and most fantastic theogony with its absolutely unhellenic bisexual and polymorphous gods, as set forth by these competent authors, is rash and unfounded, at least as far as the ideas themselves—not the final literary redaction of the rhapsodies—are concerned.

Among many other arguments, the exact correspondence between the Orphic descriptions of the Time-god Chronos agēratos ('undecaying Time') and the Mithraic representations of Zrvān akarana ('endless Time'); the close relations between the Orphic Zeus 'Diskos' in his pantheistic shape, and the familiar type of Ahura Mazda in the winged disk, representing, as Herodotus expressly states, the whole circle of the sky; the strange coincidence that the god Mithras has a son

called 'Di-orphos'; and last, not least, the striking fact that the only existing Orphic idol (a representation of the mystic primeval god Phanes, born from the cosmic egg), exactly corresponding, as it does, to the rhapsodic description of that deity, has been able to deceive an authority of Cumont's unquestionable competence into mistaking it for a Mithraic image—all this, I say, sufficiently proves that the so-called rhapsodic cosmogony, or at least the cosmogonical and religious ideas underlying it, could only have been conceived in surroundings where Iranian theology of a peculiar form, well known to scholars under the name of Zrvānism—that is, a fatalistic cult of 'Eternal Destiny' conceived as 'Endless Time' and 'Boundless Space'[1] strongly influenced by the mysticism of Babylonian star-lore—could exercise a powerful fascination on the mind of Greek truth-seekers, dissatisfied with their own comparatively primitive and unsophisticated national religion. Now the only *milieu* where such a syncretism can, nay must, have evolved, is the Ionian colonies in Asia Minor, in the very period before they came under actual Persian government. 'Mēdismos,' as the later

[1] The oldest explicit testimony for the existence of this creed is a passage of Aristotle's favourite pupil Eudemos of Rhodes, quoted by the Neoplatonist Damascius (*De Princip.*, 125 *bis*, p. 322, Ruelle). Yet the absolute identity of the Zrvānistic cosmogonical system with the doctrines concerning 'Kāla,' that is the divinity 'Time,' in certain passages of the *Atharvaveda*, in the *Mahābhārata*, and in the Purāṇas (see my *Weltenmantel*, Munich, 1909, pp. 495 ff.) can only be explained with regard to the Persian dominion over the Indus valley in the VIth century B.C. This proves that *Iranian* Zrvānism goes back at least to the VIIth and VIIIth centuries B.C. An eschatology, based on metempsychosis and on an eternal circle of rebirths, is quite characteristic of this Persian cult of 'Eternity.' As it is absolutely alien to the old Vedic literature and appears in Indian mysticism exactly at the same time as the Kāla-cosmogonies, even as it reappears in the same significant connection with an Aeon-cult in the Hermetic writings in Egypt, composed in the very period when Egypt was under Persian sway (*cp.* Flinders Petrie, *Personal Religion in Egypt*, London, 1909)—while it is entirely unknown to the genuine Egyptian literature—it cannot be overlooked that in Greece also the Orphic Chronos-cult and the Orphic eschatology of metempsychosis were introduced together into the national beliefs of Hellas, which knew nothing at all either of a divinity of 'Endless Time' or of an eternal 'circle of rebirths.'

Greeks styled it, must have been a spiritual creed in Ionia long before it began to be a political movement there and in Greece. The later degeneration of Orphism, attested by Plato's contemptuous attitude towards its wandering prophets, was the result of the victorious wars of Hellas against Persia.

This theory of the origin and character of Orphic theology is in harmony with all that can be said of the peculiar Orphic rites. No sound connoisseur of Greek moods and manners could or would have believed that, any more than the mystic and fantastic doctrines which occur in the rhapsodic theogony, archaic rites of the crudest and most naïve symbolism (such as the Orphic '*sparagmos*,' the devouring of the sacred bull's living flesh and the magical reviving of the sacrificial lamb by boiling it in its mother's milk[1]—a rite already prohibited

[1] One of the most important 'symbols' of Orphism seems to have been the formula "As a kid have I fallen into the milk," recurring on most of the above-mentioned gold tablets from Orphic graves. The words had certainly an astral and cosmic significance, for, according to a well-known Pythagorean doctrine, the souls had to pass on their way down as well as on their return to the sky *through the Galaxy*. And another tradition (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II. 91; Jo. Lyd., *Ostent.*, 10), overlooked until now although its Orphic origin cannot be questioned, says, that comets, passing through the Galaxy, as if drinking of the heavenly milk, were called '*tragoi*' (goats). This leads to the conclusion, that comets or shooting stars, crossing the Milky Way, were believed to be the souls of those blessed and redeemed ones, returning to their heavenly home after escaping from the 'circle of necessity.' Such a soul, a Buddha, as the Indian would say, had become a god, one of the "few real Bacchi from among the many thyrsus-bearers." The God himself being worshipped under the form of the sacred kid and later on as the sacred goat, as Dionysus 'Eriphios' or 'Tragios,' the highest aim of his worshippers must have been to become themselves '*tragoi*' or '*eriphoi*' (*cp.* the satyrs, or rather goat-skinned acolytes, surrounding Orpheus on early vase paintings; for the equation of 'satyr' and 'eriphos' see *Corp. Inscr. Latin.*, III., 686). Only as such could they hope to pass the Galaxy and reach the blissful fields of heaven. Many analogies, treated at greater length in the late W. Robertson Smith's masterly article 'Sacrifice' in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, suggest that this mystic aim was realised symbolically by wrapping oneself in a goatskin and by devouring at the same time the sacred animal, which was believed to resuscitate in the bodies of his theophagic worshippers. The 'falling into the milk' must have been symbolised by cooking the sacrificial meat in a milk broth; for many a popular tale—notably the story of Medea dismembering and cooking first a kid and then old Pelias, or Demeter cooking and restoring the 'satyrs' to eternal youth—bears testimony to the custom of boiling the victim, intended as a reviving ceremony. More-

as heathenish by Biblical law) could have been the offspring of the most humane, most enlightened of all nations, such as we, after a due allowance for the possibly somewhat idealised pictures of the Homeric accounts, believe the earliest Greek population to have been.

On the contrary, the Cretans always claimed Orphic and all other kindred mysteries as their own invention, since they were openly performed in that country but secretly everywhere else. The validity of this classical argument is undeniable. It agrees not only with our alleged origin of Orphic theology and cosmogony in Asia Minor, but also with the universally acknowledged 'Thracian' aspects of Orpheus, and with the fact that his cult, as well as the legends concerning him, is deeply rooted only in Thracia, Macedonia, Asia Minor and the islands on its coast.

If, then, Orphic rites really belonged to the religion of the Prehellenic so-called Pelasgian, Carian or Lelegian population of Greece, Asia Minor and the Islands, to those Hethites or whatever they may have been, who adored the wild bull caught in hunting nets and sacrificed by means of the holy double-axe,[1] we can easily understand how deeply repulsive and antipathetic they must have been to the Greek conquerors, whose serene religion and mythology were as unsullied by such orgies as the original cult-system of their Roman brethren.

Just as the British Government succeeded in

over milk, being the food of the newborn, must have been considered as a life-giving and life-restoring principle *par excellence*, so that boiling in milk would be considered a doubly efficacious charm.

[1] Dionysus 'Axios Tauros,' as the god is called by the women of Elis in an old hymn (Plutarch, *Quaest. Graec.*, 36) is, according to an excellent remark of Salomon Reinach's at the last Congress for the History of Religions, not at all the 'worthy bull,' but the 'axe-bull,' the very god represented by the bull-heads with the sacred double-axe between the horns, found at Mycenæ as well as in the Minoan palace of Cnossus. The hunting of the sacred bull with enormous nets is illustrated on the famous gold cups from the graves of Vaphio, now in the National Museum at Athens.

imposing on its Indian subjects the salutary necessity of performing gentle rites such as the burning alive of widows, and other equally amiable ceremonies, in a severely guarded secrecy, and under continual dread of being surprised by 'uninitiated' enemies of such spectacles, even so may the Achæan aristocracy have forced a similar constraint upon the conquered so-called Pelasgian population. For it is hardly probable that any cult, at least in a primitive age, would assume voluntarily the humble and burdensome character of secret mysteries; on the contrary, the greatest possible pomp and publicity have always been the glory of a triumphant religion. Moreover, supposing that 'Orphism' was the religion of the vanquished Prehellenic population, we understand at once not only the syncretistic character of its doctrines and the secrecy of its orgies, but also the nearly exclusive relation of its peculiar myths to two gods of distinctly barbarian origin, such as Dionysus and Apollo, the former being universally considered as the national god of the Thracophrygian nation, the latter having been traced but lately to his cradle in Asia Minor by an authority of such rank as Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf.

The very intimate relation between these two gods —remember that Delphi, for example, remained half a year under Apollo's, the other half year under Dionysus' protection—would account also for the close connection between the so-called Orphic or Dionysiac and the so-called Pythagorean communities. This connection is firmly established through the testimony of Herodotus, as well as by all our historical evidence concerning the authors of the various Orphic poems, and ultimately by a marked affinity of rites, prescriptions and beliefs (to be still more emphasised in the further progress of

these researches), inasmuch as the mythical parallelism of Pythagoras and Apollo seems to correspond exactly to that of Orpheus and Dionysus. Just as the different historical 'Orpheuses' of Kroton and Kamarina are named after their mythical prototype, so, in all probability, the 'Pythagorases' of Samos and of Kroton —there is no evidence that both are one and the same person—as well as the famous sculptor of Rhegium, are all named after the mythical Pythagoras. This was the Virgin's son, who, five times reincarnated and once—witness, as Mannhardt perceived, his legendary golden leg—dismembered and resuscitated by a magical cooking, travelled together with the sun from his eastern birthplace to the golden evening lands of Hesperia in the West, where he died, burnt by his enemies in his own house or rather sanctuary, just as Apollo was wont to be at the end of every four-year period in the great Delphian Septerion-festival, commemorated in the well-known legend of Phlegias burning the Delphic sanctuary, or, as Hermann Usener has endeavoured to show, in the famous myth of the 'Iliou Persis' through Pyrrhos or Perseus, the mythical incendiary.

The only difference is, that while the name of the mythical Pythagoras—according to the analogous title of 'Pyl-agorai' for the messengers to the Amphictyonic assembly, once held at Pylae, it signifies "him who speaks in Pytho"—clearly confirms his identity with the Delphic god, the not less obvious connection between the personality and fate of the mythical Orpheus and the sufferings of the bull-god Dionysus—well-known even to ancient theologians[1]—seems to be most cunningly

[1] Proclus (*in Plat. Rem Publ.* 398; p. 274 f., ed. Kroll) says: "Orpheus, as the founder of the Dionysiac mysteries, is said in the myths to have suffered the same fate as the god himself; and the tearing in pieces is one of the Dionysiac rites."

and purposely hidden behind the deep mystery lingering about the yet unknown meaning of this enigmatical name.

It is generally admitted that no satisfactory etymology has been proposed for 'Orpheus' until now. We need not waste time in reconsidering the footless theories establishing a connection between Orpheus and the Indian Ṛibhus, any more than the classical pun about the 'blooming voice' ('*hōraia phōnē*') of the hero. Just as the Greek equivalent for 'Ṛibhu' would be, according to all phonetic laws, 'Lapheus,' so the German word 'Albe, Elbe,' compared with 'Orpheus' by other linguists, ought to be 'Alphos' in Greek. Still less satisfactory is Maximilian Mayer's introduction of the Harpies, under their name 'Arpa' or 'Oripsa,' into the entirely alien camp of Orphism. More recent etymologies, among them an old Semitic one, comparing a Hebrew root meaning 'obscure' and the Greek words '*orphnos*' and '*orphnaios*' for 'dark,' or 'Erebos'[1] for the cosmic night, literally grope in the deepest darkness, and are obviously very far from elucidating the character and origin of Orphism. They seem to rest merely on the vague supposition that the name could be derived from the so-called chthonic character of Orpheus, notably from his pilgrimage to the dark underworld. Yet the hero, who tried to bring back, or perhaps originally succeeded in delivering, his wife Eurydice from the terrors of Hades, just as Dionysus rescued Semele, could not easily have been identified with his great enemy, the ruler of perpetual darkness, Aïdes, the 'invisible' one.

Accordingly the evident failure of these explana-

[1] Which is itself certainly the Se itic '*ereb* ='evening,' that is 'evening-land.'

tions leaves but two possibilities: either the name is borrowed from an unknown Prehellenic language, call it Pelasgian, Carian or Lelegian as you please—and then all further research is in vain until the Hethite inscriptions of Asia Minor or Dr. Evans' 'Scripta Minoa' have been deciphered — or, following a hypothesis suggested by Paul Kretschmer for all analogous cases, we have to consider the name as a derivation from an obsolete Greek word, which at a very early date had entirely or nearly disappeared from secular language.

I think that this is obviously the case with 'Orpheus,' and simply wonder why this perfectly fitting key to the purposely locked and bolted doors of the Orphic *telestērion* has not been used before. Indeed we need no ghost resuscitated from the graves of an Orphic cemetery to tell us what may easily be found not only in Gruppe's learned and valuable article in Roscher's mythological lexicon, but even in every ordinary Greek dictionary.

We have ample evidence that the sacred fish in the sanctuaries of Apollo in Lycia—on the very spot where we are most inclined to presuppose the roots of Ionian Orphism—were called '*orphoi*.' As in many analogous cases, this word does not seem to have been from the beginning a special zoological denomination of a single species, although it is used as such by later authors. Whether the word be originally Lycian, that is to say of Hethite origin, or Semitic, or genuine Greek —there is no reason to give the preference to this or to that assumption—I feel inclined to think that its original meaning was simply 'fish' in general. Later on the use of this obsolete and perhaps foreign word must have been confined to the peculiar kind of *sacred* fish revered at the Lycian sanctuaries.

If this be admitted, the word 'orpheus' is an absolutely regular derivation from that old noun and means simply the 'fisher.' This etymology, plain and artless as it is, fits every possible requirement. First, the name, so explained, is perfectly synonymous with a well-established *epiklēsis* of Dionysus, worshipped in the city of Haliæ in Argos under the title of 'Halieus' ('Fisher'). Moreover, it corresponds perfectly to the well-known cult-name of that specific Dionysian incarnation 'Zagreus,' universally acknowledged as having been the centre of Orphic rites and beliefs. Being composed of the magnifying prefix *za*—used *e.g.* in *zatheos* (archi-divine), *zadēlos* (very clear, plain), *zatherēs* (glowing hot)—and of the familiar word '*agreus*,' the god's name can mean just as well the 'Great Fisher' as the 'Great Hunter.'

Until now, only the first meaning has been taken into account, and indeed there is no reason for denying its appropriateness. Primitive hunting with nets could be used without considerable change of methods for terrestrial as well as for aquatic animals. We need not wonder, therefore, that both in the Greek and Semitic languages (צד) identical terms were used originally for both the 'hunter' and the 'fisherman.' To avoid possible ambiguity, determinating composites had therefore to be used.

The genealogy of Orpheus affords an excellent instance: the name of his legendary father 'Oiagros' could never mean, as Ernst Maass suggested, the 'lonely hunter,' for the '*grand veneur*' or the '*wilde Jäger*' never hunts alone, *i.e.* without his heavenly host. It must, like 'Meleagros,' signify the 'sheep-hunter' (*oïs* in Greek, *ovis* in Latin = sheep) and points to the well-known rite of the '*kriobolia*,' or ram-slaying,

just as 'Leagros' means the 'lion-hunter' and refers to the '*confictio leonum*,' practised in the Kybele cults.[1] 'Taurobolos' and 'Aigobolos,' the popular epithets of Artemis and Dionysus, are the characteristic names for the merciless catcher and slaughterer of the sacred bull and the sacred goat. Now there is ample evidence that the hero or the divinity called 'Orpheus' was indeed the 'hunter' as well as the 'fisher.' The familiar scene of Orpheus playing on his lyre amidst a group of fascinated animals of every kind, so frequent in art and literature from Simonides and Æschylus onwards, is generally explained to be an idyllic panegyric on the supreme power of music. Such an interpretation, natural as it must have been to an art-loving, enthusiastic, highly cultivated nation like the classic Greeks—witness Plato's theories on the ethical influence of music—would be entirely out of place among those rough Thracian or Phrygian tribes, accustomed to devour the palpitating flesh of the living bull. No doubt these tribes also conceived music as a charm, but not in the refined spiritual sense of later times. For them the sound of the lyre as well as that of the flute was an enchantment in the most literal sense, a hunting-spell intended to allure the wild beasts into the 'great hunter's' nets.

If anybody doubts this statement, I invite a closer inspection of a very significant passage in the *Natural History* of Ælian (xii. 46), which is invaluable for our purpose, because it professes to render a 'Tyrrhenic,' that is to say again a specific Asia Minor tradition. It relates that wild boars as well as stags were magically

[1] *Cp.* Augustin, *City of God*, 24: "Do the tympana, the civic crowns, the insane agitating of your bodies, the noise of the cymbals, or *the spearing* (confictio) *of the lions* give you any hope of an eternal life?"

drawn into the hunting nets by the cunning melodies of a skilled flute-player.

We have, besides this, in Herodotus (i. 141), the very significant simile used by Cyrus in his address to an embassy of the Ionian Greeks. (Note here again the nationality of the actors in this quaint little scene.) A fisherman, said the king, watching some fishes in the sea, played on his flute, in the hope that they would come ashore. Having waited in vain, he took his net and caught them. As the victims floundered in the meshes, he said: "You need not dance now, if you were not willing to dance when I was playing the flute."

Considering all these testimonies on the use of music as a hunting-charm, we cannot doubt that Orpheus the musician is but the mystic net-hunter himself, whether he is conceived as Leagros, Taurobolos, Aigobolos, Kriobolos or Oiagros, or finally as 'Ichthyobolos,' or 'Fish-catcher,' in the proper sense of 'Orpheus.' If, then, we find in the Palatine Anthology an epitaph dedicated by the '*ichthybolōn thiasos*,' the *thiasos* of the 'fishermen,' and if we remember that the latter word is never used for a secular corporation, no doubt is possible that this brotherhood of fishermen must have been a religious community; and as far as I can see the easiest solution of the problem seems to be that '*ichthyoboloi*' here is but a synonym for 'Orphic' initiates.

Thus Orpheus-Zagreus-Halieus seems to have been originally the god of a primitive hunting tribe, catching living animals of all kinds, as his worshippers did, after alluring them with music, charms and incantations, devouring them in a raw state, as they used to do, and perhaps occasionally keeping alive an animal big with young, in order to tame its offspring.

In this way he must have developed gradually, together with his worshippers, into a less savage deity, chiefly concerned with the care of tame animals.

Orpheus, formerly the 'hunter' and 'fisher,' is transformed into Orpheus the 'herdsman,' the 'good shepherd' (Eunomos, Euphorbos), being no more a *taurobolos*, *aigobolos*, *kriobolos*, or *oiagros*, but a '*boukolos*' and '*poimēn*';[1] Orpheus, not only the cunning 'fisherman' but also the cautious warden of the sacred fish, which know his voice or the sound of his musical instrument and take their food willingly from his hand.

ROBERT EISLER.

(THIS paper, of which Part II. will follow, was read last September at Oxford before the IIIrd International Congress for the History of Religions. A few only of the notes have been added in its present form. Full references and illustrations will be given when it is published in book-form, by Mr. J. M. Watkins, together with two other essays that are to follow on 'John the Baptist' and 'The Origins of the Eucharist,' all three dealing with the rites and cult-symbols of the 'Fisher-god.'—ED.)

[1] *Boukolos* (= cowherd), was the official title of certain Orphic and Dionysiac priests. *Poimēn* (= herdsman) is a well-known *epiklēsis* of Dionysus, Apollo, Pan, Hermes and other gods.

Add to p. 130, l. 6.—We should remember that Cyrus had once been welcomed by the oracle of the 'Orpheus head' in Lesbos with the significant greeting: "Mine are also thine"; while Herodotus tells us that Onomacritus the chief priest of the Attic Orphics fled to the court of Darius together with the exiled son of Pisistratus.

THE DARK STAR.

MICHAEL WOOD.

AND the devil said unto him, All this power will I give thee and the glory of them : for that is delivered unto me.—*Luke*, iv. 6.

Who is able to abide his frost ?—*Psalm*, cxlvii. 17.

ALTHOUGH it was late in May, though the gorse was like living fire, though the birch-leaves shone vivid green like jewels, and the bog-myrtle was flushed with bronze-rose bloom in the boggy hollows where marsh-marygold glowed and forget-me-nots grew thickly, though the pine trees were covered with sticky pale-green knobs, though the 'time of the singing of birds was come' and the slumberous purr-purr of the wood-pigeons and the sinful and sardonic jokes of the jays echoed through the woods,—though all these things were, yet the land was wrapped in a 'death damp dripping autumn mist.'

Swathes of white rolling vapour filled with faint sea smells, and perfumes of peaty earth and wet leaves and moss, swept like the ghosts of dead and gone springs over the heathery spaces beyond the pines; they stole about the tree boles and became lit with shadowy hues of lavender, violet, blue-green, and rose-red. They wreathed the great grey Cornish cross in the daisied quadrangle at Brent; they covered every blade of grass with a water-veil; they anointed with the same holy-anointing the leaves and boughs of the

blossoming sweet-briar by the cloisters; they hung gleaming drops on every pine needle.

But though this autumn-baptised spring was unearthly fair to see, it was very chilly; and the playwright, a townsman and not particularly robust, grumbled at the English climate and shivered as he motored from town (as he ofttimes did) to spend a week-end at Father Standish's House of Quiet among the pines. He was glad to see a peat fire burning on the wide open hearth of the guest-room. He was alone in the big, quiet, plainly furnished room, with its wide window-seat, latticed windows, and great oak beams. He saw a crucifix on the wall which was a new gift to the House of Quiet. It was of ancient Spanish work, of painted wood, the work of a genius whose name had been blotted out by a mist other than that which was now causing the playwright to shiver. The work was wonderful, the colours mellow and subdued; the representation of the Figure had at once a terrible realism and a kind of holy reticence of expression which could only have arisen from a faith which was at once poignantly real, and profoundly awed and reverent.

"That man's faith was knowledge," said the playwright to himself, "knowledge under a veil."

It was five o'clock, and he could hear the faint chanting of vespers from the chapel. He listened in a half-dream and warmed his hands over the glowing peat. A thrush lit on the window-sill; it was a disconsolate ball of wet feathers and presumably cold; it raised its indignant beak to the place where the sky should have been visible, and shrieked at the mist, with a shrill pipe of annoyance. It so exactly expressed the playwright's frame of mind as he had motored

through the clinging damp, that he laughed aloud; and the bird flew away.

It was extraordinarily still; the mist had hushed and blurred sound, yet it seemed to be full of memories and voices. The playwright listened, until the mist blowing wraith-like through the open lattice seemed to bring with it the voices of all the people with whom he had talked in his many sojournings (brief though they always were) in the House of Quiet. The voice which had spoken with him on his last visit, only six weeks ago, he would hear no more in this world. The man was dead; but his voice was with the other voices in the mist. Tiny noises now seemed to gain in clearness; louder ones to lose their strength. The mist confused and altered values. The playwright heard the small noises of the burning peat, the snapping of twigs in the woods, the drip-drap of the drops on the pine needles, the faint toll of a distant cow-bell, the bleat of a sheep on the heather, the faint whisper of a languid irresolute wind through the cloisters, the flutter of a bird's wings in a sweet-briar bush without, and the faint fragile chant from the chapel.

He felt a sort of depression which was not usually present in the calm strength of the atmosphere of Brent. He began to wish Father Standish would come. Father Standish almost invariably did come into the guest-room at some time between vespers and compline. He came at six o'clock this evening and greeted the playwright.

"I hope this mist will clear to-morrow," he said. "If not, I am afraid you will find it dreary. I am afraid you will be alone here too; my only other guest is in very bad health, poor fellow! Indeed he is too ill to leave his room to-day; so ill I have sent for Morton

to have a look at him. You are not likely to see him to-morrow. There is no one else in the guest-house except my permanent visitor, Alison; but he has his own rooms. You know how he flies from his kind; you will not have his company."

"To tell you the truth, Father Anthony," replied the playwright, "I have been having an over-dose of my kind in town of late. Except for such time as you can spare me, I shall be glad of solitude—and the woods."

"I am afraid I shall not see as much of you as I should like. As usual, I am busy, like the majority of people in my position. But you are at home here, Noel; and the country is at its best. Ah! I think I hear Morton."

The doctor entered, greeted them both, reported on his patient, and then drew from his pocket a paper. It was *The Daily Post*, and he waved it at them flag-wise.

"Do you see this prediction of Professor Lowell's?" he said. "A dark star is to make its appearance in our solar system. It is to fight our sun—and win. It will take about fourteen years. The result will be a cold so intense that for five years before the final collision and conflagration human life will be impossible on this planet. Cheerful, isn't it?"

"Thoroughly so!" said the playwright with energy and sincerity. "The best news I've heard for years."

Whereby it may be seen that the playwright, like most people of creative mind, was not only subject to 'moods,' but had neither the good sense nor the decency to refrain from inflicting them on others. The doctor, undismayed, discussed with him the alarming prediction. But the priest was oddly silent. When

the doctor had gone, he sat gazing into the red glow of the peats. At last he said slowly:

"The dark star! The dark star!"

"It is known there are dark stars, isn't it?" said the playwright.

"Noel," replied Father Standish, "you met Barry here, did you not? Yes! I know you did."

"Yes. I did. We took to each other rather, I think. He died here, didn't he, poor chap?"

"He died here about three weeks after you met him. He was ill for twenty-four hours. Forty-eight hours before he was taken ill he dreamed of a dark star. He *seemed* to be perfectly well at the time; but as he died three days later you may say his dream was a sort of delirious night-mare caused by unsuspected but incipient mortal illness. Or you may take it that he, after a life of peculiarly bitter experience, was swiftly taught something which was true; in the only way in which anything can be really taught, by being forced to *live* it. But it has just struck me he said he should try to tell *you* the dream. I will try to tell it for him, since he is gone."

"Thank you, Father Anthony," said the playwright in rather a hushed tone. A message that a dead voice intended for his ear imposes a certain quietude upon the hearer; the playwright felt as though the voice of this dead man had suddenly crept out of the mist wherein it had echoed faintly with the other dream voices. Father Standish began.

"Barry said he dreamed this very thing of which Morton spoke, had happened. That made Morton's words rather startling to me. Barry said:

"'The star, being without light, could not be seen. But the astronomers knew its precise position; and

its effects, when I began to dream, were in full swing. We — humanity — knew our fate. We realised our doom. The effect on people's minds was extraordinary. Just think what a drastic stripping it meant! All ambitions large and small, personal or impersonal, that touched material life were *known* to be useless. All social schemes, selfish and altruistic alike, were fruitless. What was the use of Joint Stock Companies, "corners," business, Land Schemes, Tariff Reforms, Education Bills, or demands for votes, when the world would soon be an ice-bound corpse swinging through space to final cremation in a blazing solar system? Nothing mattered. All arguments of rival creeds, religious, scientific, or political, had ceased. Theories dropped dead. Speech was wiped from our lips. Experiments were done with. All those who predicted a new race with new and highly developed powers, and a new and glorified earth, were silent. The world's life and man's life were alike dying of cold. To put it familiarly, we felt that the conceit was pretty well taken out of us. We were silenced by just one quiet inexorable natural happening, which we were utterly powerless to fight. We couldn't arrest the course of the Dark Star, nor change our own course through space. People who had developed great capacity, too,—*that* did not matter. No powers of the soul which were manifested through the body mattered at all. For our bodies were one and all dying of cold. But some people said the powers of the soul were immortal and varied in development; *they* still hoped. But they were not very comfortable either; especially as the pain and discomfort increased. Some people went mad with terror. All these things, the general state of affairs, I mean, were present in my mind when I began to dream. I knew them; I had lived through

them. I remembered I had suffered very much physically; but that was nearly over. My brain was half dead, and my body weak and numbed. I was sitting all alone in a queer grey half-light on a little barren island which I knew was in the North. It was ice-bound and deadly cold.' "

The playwright shivered.

"Barry told the thing very graphically," said Father Standish. "Of course I cannot tell it as he did. He said:

"'I was alone on the island save for a little dead girl-child who lay on the grey green-white ice at my feet. I knew vaguely I had tried to keep life in her; more from a selfish wish for company, I think, than for any other reason. For what was the use of dragging out an agony to which there was only one sure end? I should have ended it for myself only I was, as you know, held by a promise I once made; and I could not find—the person—to whom I made it; perhaps he was dead.' "

"I know who that person was," said Father Standish parenthetically. "He used his name, which I suppress; and it was strange to see how the memory and the promise *held* in that strange dream-life. Well! Barry continued:

"'The child lay there stone-dead, with a queer little smile on her lips and her blue eyes half-open. Suddenly I knew that my brain was quite dead, and some finer kind of brain within it was at work. My powers of sensation and thought were thereby increased; but soon *that* brain began dying, too. That was a strange sensation. I thought: The Sun has always been the symbol and sign of God in the heavens, and—*the Sun is being conquered.* Do you realise the thoughts *that* fact brought?' "

"It seemed to me a most ghastly, an *unthinkable* idea; I wondered how Barry could tell me the dream so quietly. He went on:

"'Then I thought this Dark Star must be the sign of the Opposer of God; and I began to feel that the physical changes it caused were not all it was doing. The Dark Star had a *soul;* and that soul was beginning to deal with the world-soul; *it was beginning to deal with mine.* I thought with this poor dying brain hidden in a dead brain: This must be Lucifer, fallen from Light, quenched in Darkness. Yet it seemed strange that *he* should want to blot out the kingdoms of this world. The cold was not now an atmospheric cold at all, you understand. It was frightful—unspeakable—and it *burnt.* I began to realise you could not escape from matter; go in and in as you would, you were bound to it; there was a much wider "mortal life" than I had dreamed possible. I shrank in—in—in—before the awful cold; and it followed me inexorably and froze and burnt and stripped away each of my refuges. It went on—strip! strip! strip! and still sensation endured and a *sort* of bodily life; life in some kind of a form at any rate. I realised that this frightful flaying alive was the *office* of the cold. It burnt; but it was *cold* fire—*dark* fire! . . . My God! what agony it was! And it did another and most awful thing to you; it *showed* you your refuge before it killed it. I discovered things about myself of which I never dreamed. Sometimes I felt so ashamed of them, I was glad to have them burnt and frozen, horribly as the process hurt. Sometimes though, I hung on to them; I shrieked—silently of course, for the silence was the most terrific part of it—for mercy. But that cold never spared for your shrieks.

It worked steadily on and in. I realised the soul had senses as the body had but far keener. The Dark Star was killing these. It was a second death. The soul of the Sun seemed to have drawn them out; had expanded into fulness all you knew as yourself and much that you did not know. The Sun gave you increased power, keener perceptions, and an immense zest and joy in life such as I, personally, have never known save in that one dream. The Dark Star was reversing that process; it was killing the powers of the body and the powers of the soul.

"'I do not know at what point of this process it struck me I was being *judged*, and as it appeared to me, receiving wholesale condemnation. Nothing so far had been thought worth keeping alive. I knew the pains of death were over for the outer husk, but the soul of the Dark Star touching mine was doing for the inner what had been done for the outer. I was sure I was being utterly—and deservedly—condemned; but I thought by the time the process ended there would be nothing left for the Place of Eternal Fire. The Fire was immortal; but the poor fuel was mortal and was being burnt away. I was being judged, and . . . the words suddenly throbbed through me: "*It is not Lucifer who is the Judge of souls.*" Directly I *felt* those words (I did not hear them) other words followed them: "I am come that ye might have Life."

"'*Then* I realised, with what humility and gratitude you do not know, and I can never tell you—what was really being done to both body and soul. In this place I have learned to think of God as the Divine Whiteness; but never, till then, did I think of Him as the Holy Darkness. I had never thought of the Light Visible as the Gates of Hell which should not prevail

against His Church; Holy Gates—nevertheless Gates through which you can pass into the very Pit. The Sun is a Sacred Fire which calls created beings into mortal life; and we know what mortal life *can* be, and to what Infernos it can lead. But the Dark Star is the Gate to the Uncreated Light Invisible; He is the Door to the Bride's Court; He is the Purgation of Evil.'

"Barry stopped there. I said: 'The Darkness round the Cross?' and he nodded silently. When he went on, he said:

"'It was not my spirit, soul, and body that were being killed; it was their *mortality*. That was being burnt and frozen and *wrung* out of them. I knew a fresh meaning in the words: "In that He died, He died unto sin once; but in that He liveth, He liveth unto God." You cannot rise till you have been crucified, dead, and buried. Was it St. John of the Cross, who called the Father the Divine Hand, the Son the Divine Touch, the Holy Ghost the Divine Burn? Fire of Love in the soul of the saint; the purgatorial fire in the soul of the sinner.

"'When the Dark Fire sought me out I *knew* there was a Life inseparate from Substance; and a True Blood inseparate from True Body. That True Body and Blood was crucifying the false in me. I was being healed of mortality. It was not killing, it was unveiling; but it felt like death, and the pain was terrible. The whole "natural man" (a false shadow-man, in truth) fought it. There was a true Earth, a true Life, that lay within all the things visible to mortality; and the Dark Star's office was to burn and freeze all that was other than that Supreme Beauty and Simplicity. *Everything else was being killed;* all the dross, all the

complexities, were being destroyed by the Divine Burning.' "

" 'And it was very painful,' I said. I felt a strange sort of fear that was not fear."

" 'It was *very* painful,' he said slowly. 'Even as a mere dream it was great agony. The Dark Star feels like a cruel death. That is an earthly delusion. He is the Gate to the Marriage-Supper of the Lamb. He unveils the Wedding-Garment He wove, before the garment of shame was woven on the devil's looms.' "

"Barry was silent, and thought for a little while —we were in this room at the time—then he said:

" 'If I live to see him again, and can screw up my courage to do it, I shall *try* to tell Cardross that dream. I am much more shy than people believe. They think me particularly cool and brazen, you know!' "

"He laughed; and I said: 'Is that all your dream, Barry?'

"He looked up at me in a queer way he had; you did not know him well enough to know that look. It was just as though a—what shall I say?—a veil of childhood had suddenly fallen over his face. When he was dead, three days later, that look came back and abided on it.

"He said, with a little smile: 'I believe I dreamed my way *through* that Gate, Father Anthony.'

" 'And beyond it was—what?' I asked.

"He replied: 'You do not expect an answer to that, I know. Firstly, because you know if I tried to talk I should blaspheme. It may be, though God knows I didn't mean it, I have done that already. Secondly, because you know far better than I do, that —I can't!' "

L'Envoi.

Pow'r of the North! Thou Central Flame!
Round whom the whole creation moves;
Axle of Strength! whose power upholds
The whirling wheels that swing and flame;
We may not praise Thee, Silent One!
Thou dost sustain the mystic Plan;
The flame of Pow'r streams forth from Thee,
To guide and govern world and man.
Thou standest, symbol-wise, unmov'd
Within the darkness of the night;
Thou art the same when virgin-dawn
Doth veil Thee in her floods of light.
From Thee the Mother-Wisdom flows
To light the dimness of our thought;
She, the Revealer, who unveils
To those who seek Her as they ought—
Seek Her in trembling and in fear,
Seek Her in silence and pure love—
The Radiant Virgin, Child of Joy,
The Bride who cometh from above.
Pow'r of the Centre! Thou dost look
Upon the Silent Holy Land.
Thou shinest through the Sacred Heart
That pulseth midst the desert sand.

Michael Wood.

(Those who are interested in Barry may read his story as told by Michael Wood in *The Riddle*, recently published by Rebman, Ltd., price 1s.—Ed.)

THE HEARTH AND THE STARS.

GRACE RHYS.

I.—The White Light.

In the bevelled edge of my mirror, when there is sun in the air though not on the glass, fragments of rainbow-coloured light are to be seen. A round or oval mirror with a broad bevelled edge gives the most gorgeous colours, and the morning light seems to break up better than that of the afternoon or evening.

Such a truly appalling dazzle of brilliant colours may sometimes be caught in this way—such broken bars and bands of flaming colour, blue, purple, crimson, orange and gold—that one is thankful for the mercy that binds these many flames into one fair unbroken veil of cool white light.

Behind this veil lie hidden what seas of fire, what leaping cataracts of purple heat, what thunder of awful falling golden spray!

Are there creatures that live upon the plane of the broken light? I had rather be an inhabitant of our white land.

II.—A Rosary of a Day.

Who can tell us of what shape and size, what and how great, is that fragment of time that we call the present?

As far as human creatures are concerned, I fancy

that the duration of the present moment might fairly be measured by the heart-beat—that pulsation whose various echoes enter so persistently into our life and its expressions; into our music, which they dominate; into the war-terror of beating drum and marching feet: which are heard in the ticking of our innumerable clocks that parcel out day and night; and which so strangely often reappear in the sounds of human labour.

The telling of a rosary might represent, in the rise and stay and fall of the beads, the passing of this one moment of present time. Such a rosary of the day might help us to recollect that life is really a series of infinitesimal points of time, each one of them in its turn a real, present, vital thing. Each fresh instant of our lives is like a new birth of time. The destined moment lies hid in the future's lap. Day by day, and hour by hour, the long chain runs; nearer and nearer comes the destined moment; it leaps into life, is quick and vivid and real for a second's flash; its value is lost or won; then lo! it falls behind us, in its uses done with for ever.

Seen after this fashion the smallest moment of the present acquires new value. Foretold by the ages and destined to fairness, it will never return.

Was there not once a set of wise men who made themselves famous by discussing how many angels could stand on the point of a needle? I vow this shall be my ideal; on the needle point of the present there shall stand as many angels as can find a footing. Now, and now, and now, I shall say to myself as the irrevocable moments flit by; this, and this is the moment of life: this one, as it passes, is wide as eternity, and its harbourage spacious as all time.

What a shining chain a life so lived might be! Can I make my meaning clear and show to others what I see; a rope of flashing jewels, each one broad as the sky! Nay, and is not this the universe, and God's own scheme?

III.—Love and the Stars.

"I love you!"—that is very little between you and me. I change and you change. How can we know that the changed I and the changed you will agree? Perhaps you will want to be looking north while I am looking south.

But "You and I adore the changeless One"—that is a great matter; there is a still land where we can always meet. One crowned hour in its heavenly airs, and we can never be lost to each other again.

IV.—Love and the Hearth.

Your love for me and mine for you cross and join. At the meeting point the hearth-fire is lit, from which other lights are kindled. This fire cannot burn unless it is served. Service is the clear condition of its life. Heavenly love may burn with the cool internal fire of the gem, but these earthly loves are not made so.

Shall the hand then refuse its service and the fire die? Oh shameful hand! expiring flame!

V.—Cock-Crow.

There is an old Hebrew law which seems to me to have arisen out of a wonderfully delicate perception, an almost ethereal sense of virtue. This law commands that morning prayer shall be said as soon as the first light permits white to be distinguished from blue.

It is a very strange thing that in the twilight blue loses its colour and fades into white. I first discovered this as a child of eight years old. I remember jumping from the carriage, a prisoner released, at the end of the long day's travelling that took me every spring out of a paved street of houses and a terror of lessons, straight into Paradise. I was wearing a bright blue dress. I remember running across the gravel sweep in the dusk, almost delirious with joy at the scent of the beloved meadows, the gardens, and the flowering shrubberies. As I ran I glanced down at my dress, and behold, its bright blue had faded into a pale grey white.

When, many years later, I read about this old Hebrew ordinance, I remembered the blue dress and that heavenly twilight of my childhood; so I took the trouble to have ready a piece of blue drapery and a piece of white against the next morning's dawn. When I first got up the light was just beginning to struggle through the darkness. There lay the draperies, two heaps of dusky pallor; it was quite impossible to tell white from blue. Sitting down by the open window to watch and wait for the light, I began to comprehend the significance of the old law. The cocks began to crow with that loud shrill shout that has something exciting in it. Above, the heavens were clear and faintly spread with disappearing stars. Below, the earth lay black and still apparently asleep. But soon there was a light stir abroad in the air. All living green things were awaking from sleep; they began to move and rise up and stretch out their green living fingers to meet the day.

As the light increased, and the flush deepened in the east and in the west, there seemed to be running through the earth and sky a sense of joy, pure and fine.

It was a moment unlike any other moment of the day or night, when at last the two heaps of drapery separated themselves one from the other, the one deepening into blue, the other brightening into white.

This was the moment of the Hebrew prayer.

Within doors, blue deepened and white shone. Out of doors, the dawn wind rose and floated lightly by to meet the sun. The air was inexpressibly sweet, washed by the passage of the dews, freshened by the darkness and the silence of the night. It seemed as though nature herself desired spaces untroubled by any sound and therefore night had silenced the wings and feet of the creatures that belonged to her.

At the dawning, this air so sweet, so untroubled, is like a draught of life to the waking world. The birds feel it. Of all the recurrent miracles that delight or should delight our daily life, the dawn-song of the birds during a quarter of the year is one of the most surprising. As soon as the light is half come, they wake and begin. Refreshed by their night's sleep, and still fasting, they turn their heads up to the sky and sing all together the loudest, most joyful song of the day. The noise is fairly deafening. It is a resonant metallic sound, this of a thousand small voices chanting each one a different song. There is nothing like it in our music, nothing like it in the world. As I leaned from my window, there they were on every tree, singing spirits like tiny painted angels, their vibrating throats, choir on choir of stringed harps, sending out enchanting discords.

Many things combine to make this the most wonderful hour of the day, clarity of the air, the cold freshness of the dew, the silence of men, the pouring in of the light.

Nothing delighted me more in my childhood than the story of the mermaid's palace in the sea, with the gushing of the water in and out of the palace doors, the strange green light, and the fishes that swam in at the open window. The same strangeness and pleasure now beset me when I think of the moving tides of air about our doors, the black repose of night, the silver spears of light on their morning race towards our low heavens, the argent palaces raised above us by the sun.

These are the miracles of every day. I can promise anyone who will get up in the morning to watch the parting of white from blue, that they will gain from the enterprise some glimpse at least of the indestructible mystery that still lives in common things.

GRACE RHYS.

SIBYLLIC.

THIS then's your magic! Lady, I avow
A certain wizardry about you clings;
There is a magic in your pallid brow
And in the splendour of your violet eyes,
Which seem to say "*We* have another sight,
And gaze on incommunicable things!"
But, Lady, if they ever proved you right,
Was it not mainly to your own surprise?

This then's your magic! You will take my hand,
And poring over it read, line by line,
The will of God most accurately plann'd,
And traced to suit the blind eyes of a witch.
Or you will gaze upon the stars, and there
See Fate's infallible and potent sign;
Tell if my hidden soul be foul or fair
By which of your two thumbs begins to twitch.

This then's your magic! You will call the ghost
Of any of th' unnumber'd dead who roam
Amid the shadows of our earth. Who most
Would suit my humour? Let us raise
Shakespeare, since I'm a poet. Now you shut
Your eyes, and when your lips begin to foam,
Babble sententious platitudes—to glut
Even the folly of the fool who pays.

This then's your magic! You have many friends,
Clients, of course. A, on the stock-exchange,
Grows wealthy at your nod; your wisdom lends
B, who's a priest, hints for a homily;

While through your wizardry C got his wife!
There's not a note in the whole gamut's range
You cannot play. No! For the world is rife
With fools who love to be befool'd; that's why!

This then's your magic! You have had your say—
Shewn me your art! Now, in my turn, I'll speak,
I, who have never seen a gnome or fay
Outside the pages of a story-book!
Who never spent long hours in a damp cell
Hunting for ghosts, yet frighten'd by the squeak
Of a small mouse; who even can't foretell
To-morrow's weather save by the sky's look.

Come! Can you bear the "light of common day"
Here in the street, outside your twilight den?
Wordsworth has said that in it die away
All those bright fantasies that deck our youth
With hues not of this world. 'Tis true; I know
The Vision fades as boys grow into men;
But 'tis the fading of a dream! And lo!
Now, face to face, we see the living truth!

That's where I blame you; that by tricks and shows
(Or are you too the dupe of your own self?)
You'd gild the lily and you'd paint the rose
Of this so lovely world! (Of your own crew
Are they who paint a heaven beyond the one
That springs to birth, when, from some rocky shelf
Of Eastern cliff, mounts heavenwards the dawn's sun,
And Earth sings to the morning born anew!)

You would make all things doubly wonderful;
So rob them of the wonder they contain!
From life's bare skeleton you fain would pull
The robe of flesh; and in its stead put on
A dress of your own making. You would find
New language in the patter of the rain,
And a new meaning in the moaning wind;
Then lo! where is their ancient magic? Gone!

When next you look into a hand, see not
Only the crossing lines that, by your rule,
Spell this or that and cipher a man's lot.
See, rather, in 't a slave his will commands
To fetch him heaven or to find him hell;
Or else a master who can wield the tool
That fashions joy or sorrow—for mark well,
Man holds his fate fast in his own two hands!

When next you look into the midnight skies,
Seek not among the stars a wizard-tome
For all life's chances—foolish prophecies!
Think rather of this marvel: that as far
As eye of man can reach world upon world
Throngs infinite space, and ev'ry world the home
Of infinite life! A book, indeed, unfurl'd,
And on each page the glory of a star!

And when you'd raise the ghost of Shakespeare, take
The volume of his plays from off its shelf,
Open at random, read; there you may slake
Your thirst for wonder on each separate page!
See there the phantoms of a thousand dead
Live once again. And would you see himself,
Read through the Sonnets. Then go bow your head
Down in the dust before the master-mage!

This then's your magic! What a poor, cheap thing!
How foolish all its wisdom! Is it not?
The veriest bird that passes on the wing
Hath more of wonder; and the winds impart
Better the secret of our life. And this
Is, that of our own selves, we make our lot
Accurst or blest, that Love's first rapturous kiss
Hath more of Fate than all your wizard-art!

J. REDWOOD-ANDERSON.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

PERSONAL RELIGION IN EGYPT BEFORE CHRISTIANITY.

By W. M. Flinders Petrie, D.C.L., LL.D., F.R.S., F.B.A. London (Harper's Library of Living Thought), 1909.

THE material on which Professor Flinders Petrie bases his study of Pre-Christian Personal Religion in Egypt—that is to say of the last and highest phase of Egyptian religion, as modified by Persian and Hellenic influences—is drawn from the Hermetic writings, the sketch of the Therapeuts by Philo of Alexandria, Plutarch's treatise on Isis and Osiris, and Philostratus's life of Apollonius of Tyana; throughout (except in the case of Apollonius) the translations in *Thrice-greatest Hermes* are made use of.

The main interest in the six lectures comprised in this study is the startling hypothesis put forward by the distinguished Egyptian historian concerning the date and origin of the Trismegistic literature. There is so much of beauty and spiritual worth in the remains of the mystical and religio-philosophical literature associated with the name Thrice-greatest Hermes, that for upwards of two centuries the efforts of scholarship have almost without exception been concentrated on trying apologetically to make out its dependence on Christian influence, and that, too, in the crude form of plagiarism in the interests of dying Paganism. Of late, however, the entire independence of the Trismegistic literature from Christianity has been as strongly urged, and with greater show of reason, both in Germany and England, and attention has been drawn to the existence of a wide-spread Hellenistic theological literature, prior to and contemporary with the origins of Christianity, in a language which was practically common to all the religio-philosophical schools of the time, and was shared in also by the writers and redactors of the New Testament documents. What, then, was the date and origin of the original Trismegistic tractates? To this problem Professor Flinders Petrie chiefly devotes himself in the volume before us, and boldly enunciates an hypothesis which, if established, puts the theory of

plagiarism so ridiculously out of court, that it will be difficult for the younger generation of scholars to imagine how it could ever have been seriously entertained. His theory is that though they may show signs of a later style (presumably owing to overworking and touching up, though Professor Flinders Petrie nowhere deals with this very important side of the question), the Greek documents we possess are essentially direct translations from Egyptian originals, which are to be dated from 500 to 200 B.C. The documents dealt with are the tractates of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, and also 'The Perfect Sermon' and the long fragments of 'The Virgin of the World' treatise, which Prof. Flinders Petrie regards as the oldest document, while he reverses all prior views by regarding 'The Shepherd' treatise as the last of the series, instead of the earliest embodying the original revelation of the tradition. With the rest of the fragments preserved in the quotations of the Fathers and the Philosophers our historian does not deal.

The genesis of the tradition, it is claimed, must be traced to the direct play of Persian, or Mago-Chaldæan, influence on Egyptian religion, which began shortly after the conquest of Egypt by Cambyses in 525 B.C. This potent Persian influence gave rise to the last phase of Egyptian religion which is to be characterised as 'personal,' for it was mainly of a contemplative and mystical nature. The Chaldæo-Magian influence carried also in its train certain Indian elements—*e.g.*, asceticism and the transmigration doctrine—for India was the richest province of the Persian empire; indeed the origin of the ascetic communities not only in Egypt but also in Syria must be traced to this Indian (? Buddhist) influence.

This is the first time to our knowledge that attention has been drawn to the probability of a pre-Alexandrine phase of gnosis in Egypt due to Persian influence, and whatever may be the value of his theory of the origin of the Trismegistic tradition, Professor Flinders Petrie deserves the thanks of all historians of religion for bringing this very important hypothesis into clearer definition. We already know how strongly Persian religion, or more correctly Chaldæo-Zoroastrian ideas, influenced post-exilic Judaism; this is very evident in portions of the Psalter and especially so in pre-Christian Jewish gnosticism and in a number of schools of the early Christianised gnosis; and last, but not least, the doctrine of the Saviour that dominated the christology of the gnosis is chiefly traceable to Mazdæan tradition. We further know what enormous influence this same potent blend of Babylonian and Iranian religion exercised later on in one of its phases on the Græco-

Roman world, by the far and wide spreading of the religion of Mithra in every province of the Empire. Nor must we forget the religion of Mānī, the most important element of which was derived from the same source. Finally, the theory of Persian influence on Orphism, or we should prefer to say on the Orphic renascence from the time of Onomacritus onwards, is being put forward by Dr. Robert Eisler, and deserves the attention of all students of that most important factor in Greek religion. If then already this potent influence was energising in Egypt from 500 B.C. onwards, developing the last and highest phase of Egyptian religion, it must be admitted that we have to recognise in it a spiritualising force of the highest order, which has not yet found a historian to do it full justice and restore it to its own.

It is thus seen that if this theory holds good, the elements in the Trismegistic tractates which so many scholars have attempted to trace to Judaism and Christianity may just as well be ascribed to Chaldæo-Zoroastrian influences. We shall then have to see in Trismegisticism an original blend of Egyptian and Persian elements over-worked and philosophised by the genius of Hellas. Not only so, but if Professor Flinders Petrie's dates can stand, we have before us several Trismegistic tractates, which though they bear a close resemblance to the style of Plato's *Timaeus*, are not to be considered as plagiarisms of the great master's genius, but as independent works contemporary with and even a century prior to his day! This is one of the many startling deductions to be drawn from Professor Flinders Petrie's hypothesis, and it is therefore a matter of the first importance that his contentions should be most carefully considered and criticised.

He bases his theory on two lines of research. First, there are in some of the tractates a few vague historical references on which he concentrates his energies, and it must be confessed that, with his profound knowledge of Egyptian history, he makes out a fairly good case for referring them to the period of the Persian conquest of Egypt rather than to any later date. Indeed, the attempts that have so far been made to interpret these references in terms of the post-Christian period are all ludicrously insufficient; the references certainly fall more readily into the time-frame of Professor Flinders Petrie's hypothesis. In the second place, the learned historian of Egypt attempts to find a certain order of development in the rest of the tractates with which he deals by tracing the varying meanings of certain technical terms such as Logos and Sophia. Here the objective gives place to the subjective

method and we by no means feel convinced that his values are always correct. Moreover, his theory of development would hold good only on the supposition that the tractates were Greek originals; and this raises the whole question as to which of the tractates are translations, which paraphrases, and which Greek originals; for in high probability we have examples of all three even within the extant *Corpus Hermeticum* itself, not to speak of the fragments from other now lost Corpora or Collections from which the Fathers and Philosophers quote.

In treating this question, moreover, we shall have to reckon with the brilliant study of Thadd. Zielinski, 'Hermes und die Hermetik' in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (Bd. 8, Hft. 3, Jan., 1906, pp. 321-372; Bd. 9, Hft. 1, Mar., 1906, pp. 25-60). In it he criticises severely Reitzenstein's 'Egyptomania,' as he calls it, and sets forth a theory of the Arcadian-Cyrenaic-Alexandrian origins of the Hermetica. It is a brilliant piece of work, suggestive in many ways, nevertheless we prefer Reitzenstein's main hypothesis modified by the 'Persian' influence theory.

The value of Professor Flinders Petrie's book is not that he has dealt with details, but that he has put forward a new and far-reaching hypothesis that may be true of the originals of some of the tractates—namely, 'The Virgin of the World,' 'The Definitions of Asclepius to King Ammon,' whom Professor Flinders Petrie identifies with Nekht-nebef, Nectanebo II., 359-342 B.C., and 'The Perfect Sermon.'

The Professor of Egyptology at University College would thus apparently have us believe that the Greek element was already part and parcel of Trismegistic syncretism long prior to, as well as contemporary with, the translation-work of Manetho for Ptolemy Philadelphus in the first half of the third century B.C., and that further the originals of the tractates of the extant *Corpus* must be referred almost without exception to the collection of Egyptian documents which Manetho had before him. If this is so, it annihilates for ever the absurd but favourite theory of a *Pseudo-Sothis;* that is to say, that the letter of Manetho to Ptolemy Philadelphus quoted by George Syncellus from Manetho's now lost book *Sothis* is a forgery. In this letter Manetho promises to show his royal patron and master the originals of the Trismegistic tractates which he has translated, and if genuine, this piece of evidence completely disposes of the plagiarism from Christianity hypothesis. The only way out of this desperate strait which apology could discover has been to brand *Sothis* as a forgery; the

so-called arguments on which this reckless assertion rests I have already exposed in my Prolegomena, and am therefore quite prepared to accept the existence of Egyptian originals prior to the time of Manetho, but I have hitherto held, and am still inclined to hold, that the Greek 'philosophising' began *after* the first translations of Manetho, and that his versions, or paraphrases, belonged to a stratum of now lost documents, intermediate between the Egyptian originals and the documents we now possess.

However this may be, the extant Trismegistic tractates remain as a precious monument of that Hellenistic religio-philosophy which preceded and was contemporary with earliest Christianity; they contain some of the fundamental doctrines of mystic Christianity, such as the virgin birth, regeneration and union, and give us the inner and spiritual point of view of dogmas which in their externalisation and materialisation and in their confinement to one historical example only, are now-a-days more of a hindrance than a help to entrance into the personal mysteries of the spiritual life. Through these tractates—these sacred sermons—we are put into contact with the tradition of a community or communities of followers of the path of love and gnosis in union, of 'devotion with knowledge joined,' of self-realisation, the Path of the Good—that is to say, of men who were striving to become consciously kin with the Divine; and the study of the records of their experiences and of the manuals of their instruction is of immense interest for those who seek to understand the nature of the 'good news' which is preached by every 'Christ.'

G. R. S. M.

THE HIGH AND DEEP SEARCHING OUT OF THE THREEFOLD LIFE OF MAN THROUGH [OR ACCORDING TO] THE THREE PRINCIPLES.

By Jacob Boehme *alias* Teutonicus Philosophus. Written in the German language, 1620. Englished by J. Sparrow, Barrister of the Inner Temple, London, 1650. Reissued by C. J. B., with an Introduction by the Rev. G. W. Allen. London (Watkins), 1909.

FROM 1647 to 1661 Sparrow translated practically the whole of Böhme's works, thirty-two in number, Ellistone being responsible for two of them only. This was long before the appearance of the first complete German (Gichtel's) edition, which was printed at Amsterdam in 1682, and even before the partial edition of Beet in

1660. The select English-reading public interested in such subjects were, therefore, enabled to become acquainted with Böhme's complete works earlier than his own fellow-countrymen! With the exception of *The Aurora* and *Three Principles*, written in 1612 and 1619, the whole of Böhme's voluminous output was produced in the short space of five years, 1620-1624. The first edition of Sparrow's translations is now practically unprocurable in the second-hand market, while the incomplete second edition, in four quarto volumes, edited by George Ward, and published in 1763-1781, as a memorial of Law, and generally, but erroneously, known as "Law's edition," is scarce.

The present renascence of interest in mystical studies, of which signs are to be seen on all sides, has produced a demand for Böhme's works which cannot be satisfied by our *bouquinistes*, even when customers are prepared to pay a very high price for the rare volumes that come into the market. That Böhme is still, and must always remain, "caviare to the general" goes without saying; and the fact that his works are so eagerly sought for is a striking indication of the rising tide of interest in matters genuinely mystical as distinguished from the wild curiosity in psychic phenomenalism with which we are wellnigh overwhelmed.

Mr. C. J. Barker, a lover of Böhme, has, therefore, been emboldened to undertake the risk of reprinting (through Mr. J. M. Watkins) Sparrow's translation of one of the larger works—*The Threefold Life of Man.* This reissue is not undertaken for profit, but for love of the thing, in the hope that the response from Böhme-students may be such as to ensure the continuance of the undertaking, so that gradually the whole of Sparrow's versions may be reprinted. Such a scheme, however, is warrantable on one condition only—namely, that the translations of Sparrow are reliable. We have compared a number of passages with the German edition of 1682, and can say with confidence that the version, as far as *The Threefold Life* is concerned, is well and truly made. If the rest of Sparrow's work is as painstaking, and it has every appearance of being so, then there is no necessity for a new English version, and Mr. Barker's scheme is fully warranted.

The Barker-Watkins' edition is reproduced directly from the first edition and not from the eighteenth century reprint. The only alterations are the modernising of the spelling and the dropping of the super-abundant capitals. The italicising of Sparrow is retained, though there is no warrant for it in the German text. There is an enthusiastic introduction (pp. ix-xliv)

by the Rev. G. W. Allen, who is well-known as a competent student of Böhme, and who regards the 'Teutonic Theosopher' as the greatest of Christian Mystics, and sets forth his conviction that:

"If, of human writers, Kant is the man of philosophical first principles, Boehme is equally certainly the man of theosophical first principles. And if there appear signs (as surely is the case) that our Christian religion is not producing that national righteousness which its aim is to produce, and we suspect that we have not got our first principles right, there is no author (outside Holy Scripture) to whom it will be more profitable to go back."

At the end of the volume of 628 pages there is a very full alphabetical table of contents that may serve as an index, and an appendix giving a complete list of Böhme's works with the name of the translator of the English edition, and the date of its first publication, and also a list and summary of contents of the MSS. of Dionysius Andreas Freher, Böhme's greatest, though little-known, expositor, which are preserved in the British Museum and Dr. Williams's Library in Gordon Square. The print, paper and binding of the volume are good, and all has been carefully supervised. The reproduction of the 'Wheel of Nature' plate, facing p. 263, is excellent.

Jacob Böhme was an illuminate; he had been baptised in the Ordering and Enlivening Light, and the contents of his normal mind-sphere had through this 'dousing' in the Mind, been rearranged as well as such contents could be. Had these contents been fuller and more finely wrought, he could doubtless have expressed himself with greater lucidity and eliminated some persistent prejudices that are ever cropping up in and out of season. He had to take the Bible as he found it, as it was believed in among Protestants in those days. For, rage as he may against the spiritually blind commentators of the established order of things, whether within the domain of the 'Scarlet Woman,' as Rome had long been called by numerous mystical and liberal movements, or in the 'Academics' of those who protested against the apocalyptic Dame of Babel and all her works, he could never shake himself free from certain crude elements of Hebrew and Judæo-Christian eschatology. He is throughout possessed with the primitive Jewish 'wrath of God' dogma, and with its natural corollary the idea of hell. He is for ever going out of his way to 'get even' with the 'orthodox,' both clerical and lay, who had so vilely used both him and his illumination. All this, though very natural at the time, is at this late hour regrettable, and the modern

student of Böhme has to eliminate as much of it as he can—convinced that in spite of it the man is dealing with realities, that he had frequently been touched by the thyrsus of the God, and made drunk with the wine of the Spirit. Read without discrimination, with unquestioning enthusiasm, by the many who have no training in the study of mystic writings, Böhme would doubtless prove a very mixed blessing; fortunately this can never occur, for he is frequently so obscure that only the comparatively few, the stout-hearted and experienced, will persist in the quest, and these may be very well left to look after themselves.

For the comparative student of mysticism Böhme becomes a fascinating study. He knew apparently nothing of the many mystics and schools of mysticism and gnosis and the rest that had preceded him, except for a small smattering of alchemy derived from a book or two of Paracelsus's lent him by a friend. And yet he is evidently in contact with the inner source of that living water which has moistened the pure soul-substance of the regenerate throughout the ages, and made it green with many a paradise of trees of spiritual knowledge. The doctrine of the new birth, the secret of the Christ-nature, is the chief mystery he endeavours to reveal, while at the same time he unfolds a vast scheme of the world-process that distinguishes him from all the rest of the later Christian mystics, and links him with the earlier Gnostics, with whom he has many points in common. He has seen the world-vision and sets it forth as best he can according to the material in his mind.

It is a remarkable fact that the living symbol of which many seers obtained glimpses, 'snap-shots' as it were, is fundamentally the same. As the Initiating Presence informs Thrice-greatest Hermes after he has enjoyed the Vision of the Light: "Thou didst behold in Mind the Archetypal Form whose being is before beginning without end." It is the Eternal Order in everlasting Life. The type of the mind of the Logos is imprinted on their intelligence, and the mode of its life impressed on their substance, and they are momentarily refashioned and cosmified. But to express this, to reveal its nature, and set it forth in words, is the great difficulty; for this has to be done by means of the imperfect human mind and its contents, which is their only means of communicating with minds of a like nature.

All of this is to be seen very clearly in Böhme; but the necessary imperfectness of his exposition and the limitations of his environment must not be permitted to dull our sense of appreciation

of his true worth, or deter us from entering with him into the temple of the mysteries. It is not too much to say that if the living ideas adumbrated by Jacob Böhme could be set forth understandingly in the pulpits of Christendom to-day, there would be 'good news' and to spare for many a hungry soul now fed on the stones of lifeless dogma. But Böhme, as he stands, cannot be used in the pulpit; he must first be analysed by experienced students of mysticism, and then the living ideas which he endeavoured to express will be found to be modes of reality, capable of expression in as many ways as there are minds to reflect them and souls to respond to their life-beat.

It is because of his contact with these living ideas that Böhme has exercised such a powerful influence on so many great minds, and that philosophers of the highest distinction have recognised the profundity of his thought. Among admirers of Böhme we find in France the distinguished mystic and '*philosophe inconnu*,' Louis Claude de St. Martin, while in Germany we may mention the names of thinkers of such varied points of view as Oetinger, Friedk. Schlegel, Schelling, Hegel, Franz van Baader and Feuerbach.

Indeed Hegel dates from Böhme the beginning of the 'new philosophy,' while Feuerbach in his *Geschichte der neuen Philosophie* (1833) presents Böhme's mystical philosophy from the point of view of its metaphysical fundamental principles. Hamberger, in his *Doctrine of the German Philosopher Jacob Böhme* (1844), treats of its specifically Christian character. Of later works may be mentioned Fechner, *Jacob Böhme, his Life and Writings* (Görlitz, 1857); Peip, *Jacob Böhme, the German Philosopher* (Leipzig, 1860); Harless, *Jacob Böhme and the Alchemists* (2nd ed., 1882); Martensen, *Jacob Böhme's Theosophical Studies;* and Deussen, *Jacob Böhme, his Life and Philosophy* (Kiel, 1897). In English the translation of Martensen's book, and Dr. Alexander Whyte's *Jacob Behmen: an Appreciation*, are to be recommended.

As many lovers of Böhme cannot read German, all English-reading students of Böhme will owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. Barker for his courageous undertaking; and, therefore, in conclusion, we express the hope that the response may be such as to enable the editor not only to republish the whole of Sparrow's translations, but also to see his way to have printed the unpublished MS. commentaries of Freher. We are glad to learn that already the response has been so favourable that Mr. Barker has been able to place *The Three Principles* in the printers' hands.

THE HIDDEN CHURCH OF THE HOLY GRAAL.

Its Legends and Symbolism—Considered in their Affinity with Certain Mysteries of Initiation and Other Traces of a Secret Tradition in Christian Times. By Arthur Edward Waite. London (Rebman), 1909.

THE last seventy-five years have witnessed the development of a voluminous literature dealing with the Graal legends and allied romances. Texts have been published and translations made, though no little still remains to be done in this direction; criticism and imagination have been busy at work in discussing the origin and tracing the development of these fascinating cycles of romantic prose and poesy. On the one hand contradictory and unconvincing theories, of late years strongly dominated by 'folk-lore' prepossessions, have been proposed by most of those who have made a critical study of the texts, and on the other, wild speculations as to hidden mysteries have been put forward mostly by those whose study of the texts is patently of the slightest, or entirely non-existent. The general result is far from satisfactory, for it must be confessed that though much light has been thrown on subordinate points, and though the problems to be solved are now far more clearly defined, we are still far from understanding what the Graal really was, or from being assured of its origin and actual history. Mr. Waite, in his recent work, insists on a theory that interprets the legends and symbolism solely in terms of the spiritual mystery of the Mass, which he considers to be not only the supreme mystery of Christendom, but the arch-mystery of all mysteries. He clears the way for his interpretation by a general review of the whole literature, and has the distinction of being the first to attempt this very useful task. Such an undertaking is one of great labour, and it must be admitted that Mr. Waite has carried it out with ability. Though on the one hand he would give full scope to the strictly scientific and objective treatment of the accessible material, on the other he denies that historical criticism and purely objective and material considerations alone can give any really satisfactory solution of the problem. The real and vital element in the whole matter can be understood only by the mystic, or by one who admits the validity of the mystical element in things religious. Any interpretation which ignores this element

must fail. Indeed, though Mr. Waite hopes that he will be found to have satisfied the standard of scholarship, the main consideration by which he supports his theory, he admits, can necessarily appeal only to the mystic and the man of religious experience. In this we agree with him; of what we are not persuaded is that the Graal-mystery was solely the mystic consummation of the orthodox rite, without a tinge of heresy of any kind connected with it in any way. Orthodoxy has never been able to give birth to the quest for anything; it deals with things already found and laid down, with journeying on well-made roads. If the Graal-mystery was the natural end of the instituted and traditional rite and in the possession of the Church, there was nothing to go in search of; the Church had exact knowledge of the mystery and her children had no need to seek. The whole lesson of the legends is that there was something lost, something to be sought. Again, if the whole matter was 'orthodox' why did the Graal-literature after a century's activity suddenly cease?

The sacrifice of Divine Man for mortal man so that the earthly man may communicate with the Heavenly Man, the mystery of the Divine Body and the Divinising of the mortal, pertain to the inmost experience of regenerate mankind, irrespective of any special earthly Church, and there are those who have learned more about the nature of this mystery from 'heretical' Christianity and from non-Christian religions, than from any form of orthodoxy. That, however, a man must go forth alone to seek, and cannot be conducted on the way by a professional escort, or supplied with maps from any ecclesiastical bureau, is clearly recognised by Mr. Waite, as, for instance, in the following paragraph:

"When the natural man undertakes the Great Quest, all the high kingdoms of this world, which cannot as such have any part therein, look for the ends of everything. It is the quest for that which is real, wherein enchantments dissolve and the times of adventure are also set over. The enchantments are in the natural world, and so again are the adventures, but the unspelling quest is in the world of the soul. The witness of this doctrine has been always in the world, and therein it has been always secret. The realisation of it is the Shekinah restored to the Sanctuary; when it is overshadowed there is a Cloud on the Sanctuary. It is the story of the individual man passing into the concealment of the interior and secret life, but carrying with him his warrants and his high insignia. In a word, it is that doctrine the realisation of which is the consciousness I have called, under all reserves and for

want of a better term, the Secret Church, even the Holy Assembly—I should say rather, the cohort of just men made perfect" (p. 659).

The finding is, we thus see, a 'consciousness,' and the grades of the achievement are given by Mr. Waite as follows:

"Man in the course of his attainment is at first three—body, soul and spirit—that is, when he sets out on the Great Quest; he is two at a certain stage—when the soul has conceived Christ, for the spirit has then descended and the body is for the time being outside the Divine Alliance; but he is in fine one—that is to say, when the whole man has died in Christ—which is the term of his evolution" (p. 540).

Rejecting all theories of a definite and distinct historic origin or derivation, Mr. Waite concludes that "the Graal literature was the spiritual emotion of the Church expressed in romance" (p. 620).

Where we venture to dissent from Mr. Waite's judgment is the unsympathetic way in which he treats every form of heresy. When we remember that the Buddha was a heretic, that Jesus was a heretic, that Socrates was a heretic, and briefly that most of the greatest of mankind were heretics, we cannot agree with the sweeping declarations: "The most intelligent of all the heresies is only the truth of the Church foreshadowed or travestied" (p. 478), and "Above all the path of the mystic does not pass through the heresies" (p. 487). Heresy has frequently preserved what the Church has forgotten; in early days it stood for what the general Church had never had, or any general Church could have, in later years it had spasmodic memories of what had been long forgotten. Mr. Waite is specially down on the Vaudois, Waldenses and Albigenses, and yet he writes:

"There are strange indications of sources behind the *Gospel according to St. John*. Behind the memorials of the *Gnosis* there are also indications of a stage when there was no separation as yet of orthodox and heretical schools, but rather an union in the highest direct experience, as if mysteries were celebrated, and at a stage of these there was the presence of the Master" (p. 668).

While further on he tells us:

"I have indicated the stages of reception, or the golden links of the chain, from Christian High Grades of Masonry to the Craft Grades, from the Rosy Cross to the Spiritual Alchemists, and from those to the Graal literature. Behind all this I should look assuredly to the East, in the direction of that pure Catholic Gnosticism which lies like a pearl of great price within the glistening shell of external Christianity, which is not of Marcion

or Valentinus, of Cerinthus and all their cohorts, but is the unexpressed mystery of experience in deep wells whence issue no strife of sects" (p. 681).

This leaves us somewhat confused as to what may be Mr. Waite's precise meaning. There is a Gnosis, yet those who most emphatically made this claim are those least to be credited. Again, those associations which were in closer touch with traditions other than those of the orthodox Church have the closer affinity with the Graal legends and symbolism, and yet above all things the Graal was more directly connected with the arch-rite of the orthodox Church than with anything else.

We have thought it necessary to point out what appears to be of a somewhat contradictory nature in Mr. Waite's instructive and suggestive enquiry, not in any carping spirit, but because we think that he has unnecessarily gone out of his way to minimise the importance of a factor that is as valuable in its way as is orthodoxy in its, and that too not only for the student of the history of religions, but also for the attainment of a properly balanced mystical judgment. And it is precisely because Mr. Waite has, by the light of mystic experience, brought into clear definition so many points that have previously been left in utter obscurity, and has given their due value to so many factors in the whole puzzling investigation that have previously been either neglected or entirely misconstrued, that we could have wished he had held the balance even in all respects. Nevertheless he has written a work of great value that can be neglected by no serious student of the delightful romances and legends that have been woven round the mystery of the Holy Graal.

There are some misprints that have escaped Mr. Waite's eye, the strangest of which is '*visi sunt oculi mei salutare suum*' (p. 480); for '*viderunt oculi mei salutare tuum*,' which appears quite correctly on another page.

The volume of 714 pages contains a very useful methodised bibliography of the Holy Graal in literature and criticism, and a somewhat too short index.

We may add that one of the latest, and to our mind strangest, theories of Graal-origins is that of Mr. J. Kennedy, in a paper called 'Joseph of Arimathæa and the Eastern Origin of the Grail,' in the April number of *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*. It is as follows:

"There is one Christian legend of the East which has various remarkable affinities with the Grail, and may have suggested it.

Gregory of Tours tells us, on the authority of a certain Theodoric who had travelled to the shrines of St. Thomas in Edessa and India, that a great marvel was to be seen in India at the tomb of the Apostle. A log which was before the altar-tomb shone day and night with a supernatural light. The flame was fed by neither oil nor rushes, nor was the log consumed; it was sustained by a certain inherent and Divine virtue. Similarly luminous images of Buddha in India were known to Hiuen-tsang."

This is, in our opinion, a wilder guess than even the Buddha's begging-bowl theory, and we say so with regret, for we have great respect for Mr. Kennedy's scholarship.

Since Mr. Waite's book was published there has appeared Miss Jessie L. Weston's long expected *Legend of Sir Perceval*, in which she pleads for the most careful consideration of the initiatory element as the key to the problem, and sets forth a new theory of the origin and development of the Graal tradition, which she supports by the most careful scrutiny of the texts and the publication of the Modena MS., which preserves a very important form of the legend, supplying us with new material; she now takes her stand midway between the folk-lore and ecclesiastical schools of interpretation. A review of this important work will follow.

PARALLEL PATHS.

A Study in Biology, Ethics and Art. By T. W. Rolleston. London (Duckworth), 1908.

PHYSICS and chemistry alone are unable to explain the phenomena of nature. The facts of development and reproduction bring us face to face with an x, a factor which mocks every effort to explain it by physics and chemistry, and indeed by all mechanical theories. Mr. Rolleston's work is an attempt to establish this x, "to define its character, and to indicate the lines on which this unknown factor in evolution seems to bring into a rational unity the phenomena of the physical world and the moral and æsthetic faculties of man." His attempt is marked with much insight and with not only clearness but also charm of expression. The book is full of suggestive observations and reflections; as, for instance, when

"Man is regarded as an organic part of Nature, and his consciousness as Nature's way of mirroring herself to herself. . . The soul is not a complete and unalterable entity, but is part of

the eternal Becoming; it never can be claimed that its reflection of the world is absolutely pure and complete, yet some reality, some significance this reflection must surely have. . . . All sincere thought must tend to brighten a little the mirror of the human soul" (p. ix.).

The x factor is life, the soul of Nature, intelligent, but not intelligent in the man-mode.

"It is much easier to say what the life impulse is not than what it is. I cannot, for my own part," writes our author, "conceive it as personal or conscious, in the sense in which I feel myself a conscious person. If we ask, Has it, or has it not the quality of intelligence? we shall find both the affirmative and the negative answers equally hard to square with the facts. Our own intelligences working in a mysterious relation to a bodily organism are perhaps fundamentally incapable of forming a clear idea of the nature of the cosmic intelligence which is revealed to us in the outside world" (p. 181).

But if man's consciousness is "Nature's way of mirroring herself to herself," Nature should surely come to self-consciousness in man; and if this is so, we cannot be "fundamentally incapable of forming a clear idea of the nature of . . . cosmic intelligence." Perhaps when man extends the organ of his self-consciousness, and instead of thinking only with his brain, thinks with his whole body, then he may learn that sharing in the cosmic consciousness and cosmic intelligence is precisely the business of the fundamental nature of man.

To infallibility the life impulse is a stranger; "of a mechanised kind of vitality which ought to achieve its end with flawless exactitude, Nature knows nothing."

"Perfection is no attribute of anything that operates in Time, and so far as we regard the divine life as working in Time we must regard it as becoming, not as being, perfect. . . . The universe is what it is precisely because the Power behind its phenomena is neither blind chance on the one hand, nor rigid determination on the other—because it is vital, progressive and free. This power is certainly capable of making imperfect adaptations and of diverging into false side-tracks of development. That is a fact of much significance, but it is no argument against the evidence of such a Power—it merely reveals its character" (p. 153).

But if this is so, and it appears to be so, it must be that Nature imperfectly mirrors the Divine Beauty and Order and Perfection which she contemplates; and if man's (normal)

consciousness is "Nature's way of mirroring herself to herself," equally so must there be in man a 'super-natural' consciousness whereby the Divine mirrors itself to itself, otherwise how would it be possible for him to perceive the imperfections of Nature's working? At this Mr. Rolleston hints when he writes:

"Real knowledge, then, must consist in getting out of this prison of 'I'-hood and entering into actual union with what we observe. Could we do that, we should at once live not in our 'selves' but in the Whole. The question then is, whether it is ever possible so to escape, and how?

"We must note, however, that no one who has done this could ever tell us precisely what he has done. For the moment he begins to put his experiences into an intellectual form, the laws of the mind reassert themselves, things externalise themselves again, the 'I' reappears, the gulf yawns again between subject and object.

"And yet the instinctive language of man shows that he does regard it as possible to *lose himself* in the contemplation of something transcending his powers of ordinary intellectual apprehension. Why should he not? If a transcendent Reality exists, as it must, then the faculty of entering into conscious relation with it is one which Time would surely some day bring to birth" (p. 158).

Intellect cannot compel the Mystery to reveal itself; for it the quest must ever be unending.

"There is always a 'beyond' for the explorations of the intellect. The function of the intellect is to combine and reduce to order the experiences of the sense, thus guiding us with definite aim through the bewildering wonder of life. But let us not dream that it can ever guide us to any goal or terminus. The goal is at once infinitely distant and nearer than our breath and blood. The search for it will last as long as Time. It is of the essence of the view of the universe here put forward that the intellect can never embrace it in any closed system of thought. Turn as we may to one after another of these closed systems as each grows out of harmony with advancing knowledge and insight, the true conclusion, at least for readers who have followed these pages with assent, will be to stand cheerfully ready to renounce all systems, trusting in the last resort to no formulas, but to the play of eternal Powers on the imagination, the heart, the will" (p. 160).

This is the penultimate stage when the man listens and respond[illegible] 'Song of the Powers,' but there is a further stage

still to enter for full realisation. This is beautifully set forth by the seer of 'The Shepherd' treatise of the Trismegistic Gnosis when he writes: "Of their own selves they make surrender of themselves to Powers, and thus becoming Powers they are in God. This the good end for those who have gained Gnosis—to be made one with God."

There are many other suggestive observations and reflections in this interesting volume; at times Mr. Rolleston pens a passage of excellence, as, for instance, in the conclusion of his enquiry into the criterion and sanction of moral action, with which we may fitly conclude this notice of his instructive essay. Of this criterion and sanction he writes:

"The criterion is applied when we ask of anything done by man, 'Does it further life in the Whole?' The sanction is found in the fact that each of us is an organic part of that Whole. The richest and fullest life is evidently to be won by the most complete development of all our faculties which is allowed us by our opportunities. Ethics, therefore, exists for life, not life for ethics. This simple proposition arises inevitably from the scientific conception of the world. The greatest of fallacies is to conceive life as existing for any other object whatsoever, or to define its aim as something more or less remote from our present existence. Our 'eternal life' is not something to come—we are living it here and now. This is not a pilgrimage or a place of preparation; it leads us to no heaven, no hell, no distant judgment seat. We are before that judgment seat every hour; the heaven and the hell which it dispenses are the daily experiences through which we move; the saints and prophets of this faith are those who have felt most deeply and revealed most profoundly the great realities of existence, hidden from us not so much by the darkness of the grave as by the impalpable veils of use and wont. The grave has mystery indeed, but no terror of gloom for those who realise that the universe is but an eddy on the stream of life. By that eddy we see the stream, we feel its power and movement; and we know that the substance of which it is made is the stuff of life itself" (p. 235).

Mr. Rolleston has written a helpful contribution towards an introduction to a philosophy of spirit and a science of life. He has something to say and knows how to say it, and we hope that before long we shall have another study from him in which he will further develope some of his leading ideas.

THE ARCANE SCHOOLS.

A Review of their Origin and Antiquity; with a General History of Freemasonry, and its Relation to Theosophic, Scientific and Philosophic Mysteries. By John Yarker, P.M., P.Z., P.M.Mk., P.P., etc., etc., etc. Belfast (Tait), 1909.

SUCH a subject might well appall the stoutest-hearted and best-equipped scholar and the most skilful historical critic. Secret societies and mystery-institutions are one of the most fascinating but at the same time one of the most puzzling of historical studies. They have so well preserved their secrets that with regard to most of them we have little to go upon but the fact of their existence; where we know more it has frequently to be recovered from the polemical writings of their opponents, in which case we can never be sure of the *data;* while of mediæval and later associations of this nature even when we have the record of their high-sounding titles and inflated dignities, we have more frequent indication that these have been improperly assumed, than that they have been justly merited. With regard to the ancient mysteries, the most exaggerated and the most depreciatory opinions have been formed. The truth is they were of all kinds and grades, and it is impossible to generalise on the subject. With regard to Freemasonry, again, it is asserted by the majority of Masons in this country that as to its craft degrees it is practically a modern invention, dating from 1717; others contend that it is linked with an indefinite past and hands on in its essentials a tradition of remote antiquity.

Mr. Yarker is of the latter school; as he writes in his preface: "In the following pages I have sought to satisfy a request, often made to me, to give a short but comprehensive view of the whole fabric of the Arcane mysteries, and their affinity with the Masonic System; and I here take the opportunity of recording my protest against the sceptical tendencies of the present generation of the Moderns who are Masons, and against the efforts that are made, in season and out of season, to underrate the indubitable antiquity of the Masonic ceremonies."

Mr. Yarker is best in Parts II. and III. of his work, where he deals with Operative Masonry in Saxon England and in Norman times, and with Speculative Masonry in more recent days; here he has gathered together a mass of material, though with little method. But if we seek to discover how what we may call the

Solomonic element was first introduced into Speculative Masonry, and what was its genesis, we are left face to face with great uncertainties. Mr. Yarker certainly does something to clear up a point here and there, but the careful historical student is left for the most part without any means of controlling his statements, and even when references are given they are not unfrequently to a whole work (without citing the page), or even to a whole series of transactions. An author who writes, "my endeavour has been to print well-authenticated matter only, in order that the information supplied may be reliable," and who tells us that "every paragraph is a fact or deduction from facts," should have been scrupulous in supplying the reader with exact reference throughout. This is even more apparent in Part I., where Mr. Yarker deals with the Arcane Schools. Moreover, setting aside the question of insufficient reference, it is to be regretted that for this Part Mr. Yarker did not seek the assistance of some competent classical scholar to revise the proofs. Few Latin or Greek phrases or Hebrew words escape unscathed, proper names are frequently misspelled. It is the same for Sanskrit. Some of the errors are persistent. Ammonius Saccas is always Am. Saccus; Mithras is always Mythras; Origen's famous polemic is always *Contra Celsus* instead of *Celsum;* Firmicus Maternus is always Fermecius, and so on. With regard to his information Mr. Yarker belongs to a past generation, and relies for the most part on those who were doing the rough pioneer work on subjects which are with every year being treated by an improved method and with far greater accuracy as to externals. It is with regret that we find ourselves unable to pass a more favourable judgment on Mr. Yarker's labours, all the more so as we are in sympathy with his general standpoint. We believe that a discriminating and unprejudiced study of the fragments and indications of the higher mystery-lore of the ancients, and a critical treatment of later derivations, which for the most part are subjectively rather than objectively connected with the ancient traditions, will prove of the greatest value and interest. It is certain that the greater mystery-institutions were believed by antiquity to preserve the chief secrets of the religion and science of the nations; it is quite open for us to doubt whether the initiates and hierophants had any secrets worth knowing, but as there is no physical record, we can never be certain that our scepticism is not pure prejudice. It is quite true that many of the mystery-rites were crude and primitive, it is equally true that some of the greater rites degenerated enormously; still we have evidence

that some of the mystery-institutions were regarded by men of high intelligence, upright life and wide renown, such as Plato, Cicero, and Plutarch, as of the greatest service to mankind and worthy of the deepest respect and enthusiastic recommendation. In addition to these semi-state institutions, such as the Eleusinian, every Oriental cult that was introduced into the Græco-Roman world was either entirely private or had an esoteric or mystery side. But over and beyond all this, innumerable communities and associations vowed to the contemplative life, the members of which were all sworn to secrecy, had their own rites, and in addition their *mystæ* enjoyed individual experiences that made them partakers in revelations and put them into communication with the invisible world in manifold modes.

It has been asserted that at best the mystery-institutions could offer nothing superior to a modern Masonic ritual, and that, too, in its present formality, deprived of all spiritual and vital content. To all of which the mystic and the man of spiritual experience who has made himself acquainted with the fragments of the mystery-lore, may answer: "Let the Dead bury their dead." At the same time, when so much valuable work has been done of late years on what we may call the 'higher criticism' of the fragmentary indications of the mystery-institutions, especially in Germany, it is waste of time to reproduce the inaccurate material of the pioneers of the past in this country, such as Faber, Bryant, Taylor, Godfrey Higgins, or even of Inman and Forlong. There is great need of a work in English that would sum up the results of recent research, and at the same time show signs of something more than a purely academical acquaintance with the subject. But it goes without saying that in the first place the author must be very well equipped with a knowledge of languages and able to deal with authorities at first hand; and in the second he must be, to some extent at any rate, a knower of things that no academies can teach, and must have some contact with the realities of the soul that lay behind the most sacred rites and secret instructions of the purest forms of the arcane schools.

SCIENTIFIC IDEALISM.

By William Kingsland. London (Rebman), 1909.

MR. KINGSLAND has made a substantial contribution to the literature of serious speculation of the type which covers the great provinces of science, metaphysics and religion, without belonging

specifically to any one of them. Books of this kind are essentially modern, even in their bringing together of conceptions whose origins are lost in the obscurity of ages. The thought of the past is at root very like the thought of the present, but until recent times opportunity was lacking for that more general synthesis which endeavours to connect matters of faith and religion with the knowledge obtained directly from the physical world. Modern science descended for a time into the depths of materialism—at least in its popular manifestation, though many of its greatest exponents were men of deep religious conviction—but we have seen in recent years a still more rapid ascent, and now the idea that life and consciousness can be explained in terms of physical change is by most people discarded as an impossible conception.

The field of Mr. Kingsland's work is a vast one. Physical science is the starting-point of the author and from that he proceeds through biology and psychology to the more extended domain of philosophy or metaphysics, and finally arrives at the culminating stage of religion or the spiritual life. It is in the later chapters, on 'The Higher Science,' 'The Higher Religion,' 'The Higher and the Lower Self' and, finally, 'The Ideal Realism,' that most readers will find the material of greatest interest and value.

Throughout the book there is one dominant conception—that of an underlying unity. The chief purpose may indeed be said to be the demonstration of a real spiritual unity underlying all experience, a Universal Self which is the unchanging background against which our separated selves appear as part of its ceaseless activity, and which also, on its objective side, is the underlying Substance, the root of matter.

There are few problems in science more fascinating than that of the real nature of matter. The first impression of the world is one of infinite complexity. That is the appearance. But one of the great aims of science is to derive from this surface diversity an underlying simplicity. The value of a theory largely depends on its success in simplifying things. Sound and light, so immeasurably various in their effects upon our senses, are, physically, only two types of vibrations of air and ether. Pitch and quality of sound depend on frequency, and combinations of various frequencies, of vibrations. The colours of light depend upon analogous changes. All such phenomena are simply matter in a state of more or less rapid vibration and the difference in quality is in our consciousness and not in the external world. Heat, likewise, is matter in motion. The motion is not obvious, since it is of the minute constituent

particles and in all directions at the same time. Were all the motions to be changed into one direction the body would suddenly shoot off like a rifle bullet and we should have our heat appearing as ordinary mechanical energy. Something of the sort happens in a steam turbine when we release the steam in one direction and the hitherto turbulent heat movements unite in a swift, tearing wind, driving forward the turbine blades.

So far as we have gone it seems as though for the explanation of the phenomena nothing more is necessary than the two root conceptions of mass and motion, or rather the trinity of physical units familiar to students—mass, length (or space) and time. Mr. Kingsland in his 'Matter and Substance' discusses the later speculations which carry the unifying process further and seek the source not only of the 'forces' of nature, as they used to be termed, but also of matter itself. On these theories he points out that we have to deal with only one substance, the ether. On the electrical theory of matter the ultimate particles are electrons, and these are but centres of strain in, or entanglement of, the ether. Their mass is in the ether around them and fades off without any definite border. By the way, we are apt to leave out of account, as the author does, the poor *positive* charge (the electron is a minute charge of *negative* electricity), which seems to be much less concentrated but is of equal importance as it holds the electrons together in the atom. Till we have some better conception of the nature of positive electricity we cannot work out a very satisfactory electrical theory of matter.

Still any theory of matter is based upon ether as the foundation, whether that ether is the substance more or less directly known to us as the medium of light and electrical radiation, or the ideal substance of Lord Kelvin's vortex ring hypothesis. The latter is by far the most fundamental theory of matter yet suggested. The electrical is a structural scheme, the electrons and the positive charges being given as the building materials, having themselves mysterious properties of unknown origin. But the vortex ring theory assumes nothing but the three fundamentals—mass, space and time—mass extended in space as an all-filling fluid and therefore frictionless and incompressible. Only a miracle, from the point of view of mechanics, could give a vortex motion to such a fluid; but once given, only a miracle could break the vortex, and each vortex would behave as an elastic particle. From such vortices, regarded as the ultimate particles of matter, we can in thought build up structures from which our ordinary properties of

matter—rigidity, compressibility, capacity for vibration and so on—may be derived. Hence we can jump at once to the ultimate universal substance, the root of matter.

But further investigation makes difficulties. If we leave mechanical properties and consider electrical, we find an element which appears to be incapable of explanation in terms of mass, space and time, or any possible structure developed from them. This unknown is implicit in the expression of all electrical and magnetic properties. By means of 'dimensional equations' we can express all mechanical quantities—force, energy, momentum, torque, and so on—in terms of mass, length and time. But no electrical or magnetic quantity can be expressed in terms of these absolute units without introducing one of two other symbols—μ or K, magnetic permeability and inductive capacity, or the properties which permit of the existence of either a magnetic or an electrical field. K and μ are not independent but are connected by the interesting relation, $\frac{1}{\mu K}=v^2$, where v is the velocity of light. There is therefore only one unknown element required to explain the two properties.

All efforts, and they have been many, to explain μ or K on mechanical lines have failed. Gyroscopic phenomena provide the closest analogies, and have been used with great ingenuity, but, unfortunately, analogies are not explanations and every attempt only increases the weight of evidence in favour of some physical quantity equally fundamental with mass or inertia and hence inexplicable on any mechanical system. Thus before we can form any intelligible conception of an underlying substance constituting the root of matter we must have proceeded much farther than has yet been found possible towards an idea of the mysterious element concealed within the electrical and magnetic properties K and μ.

Mr. Kingsland does not enter into the electrical problem and offers no suggestions as to the nature of the primordial substance, but he puts forward a scheme of successive states or planes between the ultimate substance and ordinary matter. Such planes are stages of evolution, proceeding from the one root substance and returning to it. The physical atom is now known to be a system built up of many subordinate parts. These themselves appear to be structures of etheric material, and certainly the ether we know experimentally cannot be a simple elementary substance, such as Kelvin's continuous fluid. Mr. Kingsland believes that as space can be subdivided to infinity, there is room for an indefinitely

extended series of material substances, made up of particles successively smaller, a single particle or atom of the lower plane being an organisation of the finer particles of the plane beyond. Ether and matter are thus only the two lowest of the great planes of Nature, within which are other conditions, each having its appropriate life and range of consciousness.

Passing from the material side of his subject, Mr. Kingsland develops his views of organic evolution and the life and evolution of the individual, in a manner which will arrest the attention of all his readers.

It is inevitable that there should be gaps in a scheme of such a vast scope. It may be possible in pure metaphysics, or science, or religion, to pass without leaping from one step to the next, but in an effort to unite the three great lines of thought, one must expect to find some unbridged gulfs. Chief of them is no doubt that between the primeval substance, derived from a consideration of the physical world, and the universal spiritual Self regarded as the basis of all life and consciousness. The search for unity in the material world leads us to a concentration of material quality and away from the characteristics which are more immediate objects of our perception. Matter is primarily for us a conglomeration of impressions of light, colour, sound, pressure, heat, cold, and so on; but our root substance possesses none of these qualities. The conception of a root material is of value only in so far as we can give it some simple fundamental property from which the subsidiary ones may be derived, and as we proceed towards this unity of substance our 'matter' is getting deader and deader—farther and farther away from life and consciousness. Life, so far as it depends on matter—and the two are apparently inseparable—manifests itself through the manifold structure and the complexity of matter and its changes, not through its substance. In approaching unity by way of consciousness we proceed in the opposite direction.

It is only a convenient avoidance of the difficulty and not a solution, to assume that there is a Primordial Substance having two aspects—subjective and objective—one the root of consciousness and the other the root of matter. The fact is that the great difficulty in our mind is not how to establish the unity behind the external world—all sorts of considerations assist us in that, as Mr. Kingsland so ably shows—but how to conceive that unity as the real basis of the infinite diversity of things. On the simplest of all theories of matter, the vortex rings in a frictionless fluid, the origin of matter is still mysterious. We may get a fairly clear idea of the

fluid—indeed it is the most utterly simple of physical conceptions —but how about the power which makes the vortex rings, makes them in countless myriads all alike, or in groups with definite relations between them? The great mystery is not the fluid but its organised activity. On the spiritual side also, the mystery of mysteries is not the unity at the basis of life and consciousness, but the generation of the conscious individuals within it. Matter cannot be explained by a mere unity of substance, nor can life in its infinite variety by the conception of a simple, single Universal Self. The unknown reality must be something which is as much diversity as unity, containing the seed of all experience within it.

Though this ultimate problem must necessarily remain a mystery, Mr. Kingsland has written a work that is suggestive in many ways and can be read with interest throughout. The latter chapters especially will appeal to all who wish for aid in forming in their minds a reasonably consistent scheme of things, a scheme which will give room for their highest aspirations and hopes and at the same time give no cause of offence to their everyday knowledge and common sense.

A. M. G.

THE GOSPEL OF RIGHTNESS.

A Study in Pauline Philosophy. By C. E. Woods. London (Williams & Norgate), 1909.

THE main idea of Miss C. E. Woods' thoughtful study is that of the balance of opposites. This, she contends, is the basis of Pauline philosophy; though it is nowhere set forth systematically in the Letters, it is nevertheless the master-thought in the mind of the greatest of the Apostles—namely, "that the world of the inner, as of the outer life, owes its very existence to the play of opposing forces." In the concluding chapter Miss Woods writes: "Step by step we have considered the nature of and meaning of the great fundamental antitheses as they are set over against each other in the letters of Paul to the Churches. It has also been an axiomatic principle that we can only understand one side of a contrast by placing it against its direct contrary. The New Man taken alone and the Old Man taken alone are potentials only; they have concrete existence, they become facts of actual experience, only as they are brought into the arena of mutual contact. Standing apart, they are and remain abstractions. Our

attempts at defining and expanding the Pauline contraries, therefore, have presupposed their continual and eternal union in experience, for without such union we should know nothing practically of either term of an antithesis."

These points are well brought out; nevertheless we are not quite persuaded that Paul used δικαιοσύνη in the sense of 'rightness' as 'balance' between two opposites. Paul was a Jew and a Pharisee, and the terms 'Righteous' and 'righteousness' were familiar household words for all Jews. It is quite true that Paul conceived of a higher 'righteousness' than that of the Law, but it was hardly the 'rightness,' or 'balance' of opposites, for the understanding of which Miss Woods pleads so ably. The burning eloquence of a Paul is of a different order from the clear thought of a Hegel. The exegesis of Pauline terms and passages from the point of view of the doctrine of balance is exceedingly interesting, and removes a number of obscurities, but we doubt whether that was quite the point of view of the Apostle himself.

Philo removes many difficulties in the old Covenant documents by his allegorising method, but we doubt whether the writers and redactors of those documents intended what Philo found in their work; equally so, though in a different manner, with the Letters of Paul in the present case. That the doctrine of balance as the most necessary condition for the immediate inspiration of pure spirit and the direct play of wisdom is of the utmost importance is not to be denied, and from this point of view Miss Woods has written many highly suggestive passages; in other respects also she is quick to seize the spiritual meaning and what is in the nature of experience. There are comparatively few misprints, but the accenting of the Greek requires thorough revision, and the addition of an index would be an improvement.

NUTRITION AND EVOLUTION.

By Hermann Reinheimer. London (Watkins), 1909.

THE scope and aim of this work will be best indicated by the following extracts from the preface: "For years I have striven to arrive at a satisfactory elucidation of the fundamental laws governing nutrition. . . . Nutrition in the last analysis, plays as vital a component *rôle* in racial position and progress, and is as inseparably connected with justice, as morals and religion. Indeed my results show that in its silent effects, nutrition is one of the

most formidable factors in the shaping of racial and individual destinies. . . . I have set myself the task to adduce positive evidence in the support of the laws of nutrition as here formulated, to show that every deviation means a corresponding disharmony, and moreover to supply a crucial and practical test to my teachings, in the shape of a sufficiently universal Biological Analysis. A simultaneous study of Organic Architecture has convinced me that it is connected with nutrition, every whit as intimately as nutrition is with general conduct. Indeed it was only due to a combined study of physiological, psychological, and architectural laws, that I was at last able to supply the elements of an efficient diagnosis of organic development—a diagnosis at once scientifically, ethically, and æsthetically unimpeachable, as well as universal enough to embrace even the principles of constant and definite proportions ruling inorganic unions."

It will be evident from a consideration of these statements, that Mr. Reinheimer is setting out practically to explain the universe in terms of nutrition, and it is to be expected that a book of 284 pages will be somewhat insufficient; accordingly he foreshadows the appearance of further volumes, in which his views will be laid before the world. In his first chapter he gives an extensive series of quotations from the works of Dr. Gustave le Bon, setting forth his views on the evolution of matter, to the effect that matter is not indestructible, but slowly diffuses by the continuous dissociation of its component atoms. It is from the process of disintegration (dissociation) of matter, that most forces in the universe, notably electricity and solar heat, are derived. The principle of evolution applicable to living beings also applies to simple bodies; chemical species are no more invariable than are living species. Modern science, our author remarks, has not yet adopted the wider outlook afforded by le Bon's researches, but even these do not go far enough for him, since he goes on to say that when we come to so high a stage as man, le Bon's view of the cycle of life from the ether is insufficient to encompass the totality of life. Psychological and spiritual factors have to be remembered.

So far as we are able to understand him, Mr. Reinheimer begins with the theories of le Bon, because he sees no essential difference between 'dead' and 'living' matter, the latter is merely relatively less static in character than the former. Hence he holds that analogies drawn from the phenomena of the dissociation of atoms, may be properly applied to the degeneration of organic beings. Radium is an extinct body which survives only in combinations, he

quotes le Bon as surmising; and he promises to trace at a later stage of the book, the analogues of rudimentary survival in organic life. In his chapter on parasitism he proceeds to do this. As in metals radio-activity is a sign of impurity, so in organisms parasitism is the degenerative consequence of predatory habits, which mark an early stage of illegitimacy. Predatory habits imply indirect and impure feeding, and are detrimental to adaptation and endurance. Carnivorous and omnivorous animals present examples of indirect feeding with pathological results.

But this parasitism, which we gather is due to wrong diet in Mr. Reinheimer's view, is made responsible for what he calls 'retributive selection,' a disastrous result of plethora, and the cause of a whole range of abnormalities. The more exaggerated forms of this retributive selection are designated 'diabolical selection,' and are intimately connected with disease and death. This is a principle that gathers together degenerates of every type, leading them into all manner of illegitimate associations. Much as our author borrows from the works of le Bon, Darwin, Geddès and Thompson, and others, 'retributive' and 'diabolical' selection appear to be his very own. For the awful examples adduced we must refer readers to the book.

For ourselves we can only say that we have found it difficult to read and understand, as it is written in short disconnected sections, and moreover has no index; and we cannot see that the promise of the preface is in any clear way fulfilled. In our judgment the work is not quite suited to the general reader, but we can venture to recommend it to those who have a full working knowledge of scientific nomenclature, and who are interested in views which the 'scientific hierarchy' has not at present endorsed.

A. H. W.

PROGRESSIVE CREATION.

A Reconciliation of Religion with Science. By Rev. Holden E. Sampson. London (Rebman), 1909.

THIS is an extraordinary work in two volumes and some 1,000 pages. It frankly purports to be nothing less than a new revelation in which are set forth the whole scheme of the universe, the various grades of beings, the states and regions of the visible and invisible, the history of the earth, the origin of evil, the after-death states, and a thousand and one other things on which the wisest of mankind have refrained from dogmatising. If we enquire how

it is that Mr. Sampson writes with such assurance on these for the most part superhuman themes, he tells us repeatedly that it is all his own first-hand knowledge, and in particular, in a note to vol. ii. p. 133, that "one of the most momentous discoveries we made, in the course of our seeking after 'psychical' development, was in the power given to us (or rather, developed in us) of stretching our 'Soul' into the 'Infinity,' and, instead of 'spirits' making a fitful, hazardous, and often confused, manifestation of their 'presence' with us to the objective senses, we were enabled to 'presence' ourselves in any part of the 'Infinity' our desires led us. In our case we are not conscious of any severance, temporarily, of 'Soul' and 'Body.' With us, it is simply as if we are wherever we will be, we converse with the Beings wherever they may be, we see them, we hear them, we are in their surroundings, as 'objectively' to the senses awakened within us, as if we were there, and using our physical organs of sense. In this manner we have visited the Highest Heavenly Places, the lowest darkness of Hell; we have travelled the Circles of the Heavens, and the paths of the round Earth. In short, we *know* that there is a solidarity and integral unity between man in the Earth, and the God of Heaven, and all the intermediate creatures of God, and all that are below Him in creation."

We are not quite certain what all of this means, for the phrasing is somewhat confused, but how is it possible to review a book of such provenance? We quite believe that Mr. Sampson genuinely believes his own objective-subjective experiences to be what he thinks they are. We have read his two volumes with the experience of no little literature of a somewhat similar nature in our minds, and not as a cynical Philistine, and we find it full of ideas that are not unfamiliar in such books, but kaleidoscopically rearranged with often vastly different values. What we find is that the seers of this nature who most strongly affirm the inerrancy of their views, generally contradict one another on many vital points. All this is of the greatest interest psychologically, and on this account especially we are glad that Mr. Sampson has been enabled to put his experiences on record. One of the most remarkable things about the book is the fact of its publication, that a publisher has been found to finance so costly an undertaking; this shows that there is an enormously increased interest in such works. It is only necessary to add that Mr. Sampson seeks to confirm his views by his own interpretation of innumerable passages of Jewish and Christian scriptures.

MYSTICAL TRADITIONS.

By I. Cooper-Oakley. Milan (Ars Regia), 1909.

IN this volume Mrs. Cooper-Oakley continues the researches of which she gave an earnest in her *Traces of Hidden Tradition in Masonry and Mediæval Mysticism.* The 'mystical traditions' on which Mrs. Cooper-Oakley touches are Western and chiefly mediæval, and her main object is to insist that there is behind them a 'secret doctrine' and that this is essentially of the East. The chief contents of the volume deal with the 'forms and presentments' of these traditions and to this is added some information on 'secret writings and ciphers.' There are many notes and an excellent bibliography testifying to Mrs. Cooper-Oakley's industry and visits to a number of libraries on the Continent. In the interests of the general reader, however, we would point out that it is somewhat of a mistake to leave long passages in the original French or Italian. Mrs. Cooper-Oakley has gathered together a mass of interesting material and is careful to give us references; where we think she unnecessarily handicaps herself is in an over-proneness to believe that high mysticism and precious secret knowledge lay behind a number of movements that were of a purely liberalising and reformatory nature; their secrecy was forced upon them solely by the nature of the times. What we require to know is what each secret society actually taught or attempted to teach; as long as this is not known, and so far Mrs. Cooper-Oakley has said little on this side of the subject, it is wiser to maintain a more non-committal attitude with regard to the wonderful knowledge they all possessed.

THE TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.

By D. Alfred Bertholet, Professor of Theology in the University of Basle. Translated by Rev. H. J. Chaytor, M.A. London (Harper), 1909.

ON the whole this little book is disappointing. In his glance at the history of the subject Professor Bertholet naturally avoids most of the popular pitfalls, such as, for instance, that the Egyptians believed in metempsychosis and that it was taught by some Church Fathers. It must, however, be confessed that with

regard to antiquity the author has fixed his attention solely on the cruder forms of the belief, while, with the exception of references to the opinions of Bruno, Goethe, Lichtenberg, Bonnet, Lavater, Lessing, Herder, Hume, Schopenhauer, and Ibsen in more recent times, he has nothing to say of the extraordinary spread of the doctrine in the West in the last twenty-five years or of the later literature on the subject. The Professor of Theology at Basle concludes feebly as follows: "Though we are enclosed within the limits of our short earthly life, we aspire to the infinite, because an eternal flame is burning in our hearts. In letters of fire it seems to proclaim that we must in some way rise beyond the limits of ourselves. Metempsychosis is an ancient and a serious, if a feeble attempt to decipher the meaning of this fiery message."

THE MANIAC.

A Realistic Study of Madness from the Maniac's Point of View. London (Rebman), 1909.

THIS graphic first-hand record of madness is one of the most instructive and interesting psychological studies we have read for a long time; it should, however, not be recommended to the easily impressionable, least of all to the very psychic and highly imaginative. And yet it is just these latter who stand in greatest need of learning the lesson this human document has to teach; the trouble is that the medicine is too strong for them, it might quite easily do more harm than good.

THE NECROMANCERS.

By Robert Hugh Benson. London (Hutchinson), 1909.

FATHER BENSON'S last work is, like the rest of his books, a novel with a purpose. That purpose is primarily propaganda, and secondarily to warn the public against the dangers of spiritism; the theme is a case of obsession or possession induced by attending *séances*. It is evidently not a worked-up first-hand story, as seems sometimes the case with Father Benson's thrilling narratives, but a work of the creative imagination, of which the climax is reached in a desperate life and death struggle with a spiritual personality of malignant evil, of the same nature as the crisis in one or two of the graphic stories in his *Mirror of Shalott*.

NOTES.

THE EARLIEST KNOWN CHRISTIAN HYMN-BOOK.

IN the April number of *The Contemporary Review* (pp. 414-428), under the title 'An Early Christian Hymn-Book,' Dr. J. Rendel Harris announced the discovery of a document of the greatest importance and interest. Psalm-making was a busy industry in the century prior to the Christian era, and also in the early years of Christianity, as we know especially from the categorical statements of Philo Judæus in treating of the Therapeuts and allied communities. One of these hymn-collections was known as *The Psalms of Solomon*, and of these we have extant, in Greek translation, a series of eighteen pieces; we also have a fragment in Latin, quoted by Lactantius, from Psalm xix. of this hitherto lost collection. In addition there are five *Odes of Solomon*, in Coptic translation, preserved in the Gnostic work *Pistis Sophia*. From a vague historical allusion, in one of the eighteen *Psalms*, scholars have conjectured that this collection must have been composed about 70 to 40 B.C. The *Odes* in the *Pistis Sophia* contain no historic allusions. Neither *Psalms* nor *Odes* contain the slightest reference to Christianity.

Dr. Rendel Harris's most fortunate discovery contains the whole of these pieces and many others, in a collection of no less than sixty *Psalms* in Syriac translation. In a number of the new-found pieces there are allusions to the doctrines of the incarnation, crucifixion, descent into Hades and the trinity. The only historic allusion, however, is to the changing of the situation of the Temple. This presupposes its destruction. But just as with the eighteen previously-known *Psalms* the simple historical allusion tells us simply that *one* of the pieces must have been written after the death of Pompey, so here again we learn simply that another of the psalms must have been written after 70 A.D.

Dr. Rendel Harris does not think that the Christian allusions are interpolations; but as the whole collection was known as the

Psalms or *Odes of Solomon*, it seems more probable that some of them should have been interpolated and over-written than that entirely new pieces should have been added by Christian poets.

After reviewing the chief features of the evidence, the scholar whose brilliant studies in many an obscure field of research into Christian origins entitle him to a respectful hearing, gives it as his deliberate opinion that "there is nothing impossible in the belief that it is an early book containing both Jewish and Christian compositions, and belonging to the time when the Christian Church had not finally elongated from the synagogue. And, in fact, I do not think the Church is once mentioned in the whole hymn-book from cover to cover." Dr. Rendel Harris even goes so far as to say that it "might conceivably be the hymn-book of the Christians at Pella."

When so ripe a scholar and experienced a critic can put forward such an opinion it is evident that we have to deal with a document of the very first importance; for if this contention holds good, then we have to ask, What was the nature of the sacred writings used by the earliest Christians before the books of the New Testament collection became 'scripture' for them? They had, of course, the Old Covenant books, but also, in all probability, many others that were not included in either the Palestinian or Alexandrian canon. In the psalm-collection that has so fortunately come to light, we have a specimen of lofty scripture plainly emanating from the circles of the Pious and the Contemplatives and containing just such teaching as we may suppose Jesus himself to have been familiar with. As Dr. Rendel Harris writes:

"What is quite clear, apart from all questions as to the place and time of composition and the resolution of the authorship into its components, is that the psalms are marked by a closeness of touch with heavenly things and a vivid sense of communion with God, such as you will not find again in records of the Church until you come to St. Bernard, or Madame Guyon, or the Methodist revival."

As an example Dr. Rendel Harris gives a translation of Psalm xi. from the Syriac. It is pleasing to find that the whole psalm is of a mystic or even quite 'gnostic' nature, and by this we mean pertaining to those circles of Contemplatives who set before themselves as their goal the gaining of vital and spiritual, as opposed to intellectual or worldly knowledge. Note especially: "From the beginning and even to the end I acquired knowledge [? gnosis]"; and "My initiation was not without knowledge [? gnosis]." We

look forward with great interest to the publication of the detailed work on the subject which the fortunate discoverer is preparing.

THE SHEIKHS OF THE SŪFĪS.

IN the recent numbers of *Le Muséon* (Bruxelles), M. E. Blochet has been writing an interesting series of papers on Islāmic mysticism ('*Études sur l'Ésotérisme musulman*'), basing himself for the most part on unpublished Arabic and Persian MSS. Among most, if not all, of the schools of Sūfīs, as is well known, the Indian *guru* idea is carried to an excess that we cannot help considering as frequently fraught with grave danger to the spiritual aspirant. This is brought out very clearly in the following passages of M. Blochet's instructive studies (vol. x., no. 1, pp. 23 ff.).

"The novice who gives himself up to the direction of a sheikh must have no intimate relation with anyone else; he must have no other companionship but God. Should such relationship occur subsequent to his entry into the order or to the choice he has made, in full liberty, of a spiritual director, and he cannot break it off without too great pain, then he is compelled to travel in order to change the direction of his thoughts and withdraw himself by removal to a distance from so powerful an influence; he must break off this connection just as he must give up everything that goes to make the life of the world, all comfort and sensual passions. This exclusivism, barbarous though it appears and as it is in reality, is imperative in so narrow a community as that of Sūfīism; it is impossible to leave a pupil under a double influence once that all personal judgment is forbidden him and all the opinions of his director are forced upon him as so many infallible dogmas. The novice must hide no single thing from his master, and this no less of a temporal than of a spiritual nature, so that the sheikh may be able to guide him day by day, almost hour by hour. He must hide from him none of the ecstasies he has experienced, none of the graces which the One and Only One has deigned to bestow upon him; he must disclose to his spiritual director every single thing that the Divinity has taught him about his mystic state.

"Should an action or an attitude of the sheikh seem dubious to him, the novice should never allow himself to form any judgment on the matter, seeing that it runs great risk of being a rash opinion."

All this is of course equivalent to equating the sheikh with God—as indeed is the teaching. The theory is that one in a state of union can do no wrong; but who is there of mortals in a

perpetual state of union? And, again, how many stages of imperfect 'union' are there before body, soul, mind and spirit are so perfectly unified that the Divine energises immediately and spontaneously through the man? How often have false teachers of mystical sects, those who boasted themselves to be 'in gnosis,' glamoured their credulous followers and evaded the punishment of their misdeeds by asserting they were above the law and not to be judged by the ordinary canons of morality? Save in the very rare cases when the teacher is truly perfected, this system must be fraught with grave dangers for the pupil who often hands himself over, body, soul, mind and spirit, to an ignorant if not an unscrupulous guide. It is our own conviction that no really spiritual teacher would ever permit such a thing, but, like the Buddha, he would rather teach that nothing is to be accepted as true unless it satisfies the whole understanding. Spiritual instruction has for its purpose to make a man free and not to enslave.

THE TRIPLE EMBODIMENT OF THE BUDDHA.

IN the new *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark), edited by Dr. James Hastings, of which the first volume only has so far been published, there are among many other good things some instructive articles on Buddhism. Especially to be noticed is one by that deeply read Belgian scholar of the Mahāyāna, Prof. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, on 'Ādibuddha.' In it he treats of that high doctrine which sums up the buddhology of the Great Vehicle, the doctrine of the so-called 'three bodies' (*trikāya*),—'so-called,' for we certainly want some more appropriate term than 'body' as a translation of *kāya*. 'Personality' and 'activity' have both been suggested, though neither is satisfactory; person would be better than personality. These three modes of the Buddha are, as is well known, Dharma-kāya, Sambhoga-kāya and Nirmāṇa-kāya.

The Dharma-kāya is generally translated 'Body of the Law,' but Dharma here means rather Reality or Truth. It is the 'real identical nature' of every Buddha; it is the 'manner of being of that which is,' the fundamental 'element of things,' 'a real substratum free from any form which could be understood or expressed in words.' Here 'free from any form' should be understood not as abstracted from all form, but transcending all form in so far as it is creative of all, and therefore embraces all. Though impossible to translate without periphrasis, the meaning of Dharma-kāya

may perhaps be seen more clearly from the best-known of its synonyms. As Dharma-dhātu, it is the root-principle, element or substance of reality; and as such is called Tathāgata-garbha, the Womb of the Tathāgatas, or those who walk in the Way of Truth, that is the Buddhas. As a matter of fact, then, the Dharma-kāya is not a 'body' at all, in any sense in which we understand the term; it is a principle, or rather *the* principle of all things and all beings, and as such is called Bhūta-tathā-tā, which is sometimes rendered as the Such-ness (Tathā-tā) of all beings (Bhūtas). M. de la Vallée Poussin characterises this 'Suchness' as 'Thought in its quiescent state (*ālaya-vijñāna*), whence issue, by a series of illusions, all individualities and all characters.' This 'Thought' is said to transcend all egoity, or ego-consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*); but this is little to say of it, and it can hardly be characterised as 'quiescent.' It might rather be said simultaneously to transcend and be immanent in all the opposites and contraries of the world of dualism, of man-consciousness; it is the state of poise or balance in all activities rather than of quiescence.

"The 'real' body of the Buddhas (the Body of the Law not being a body at all) is the Body of Bliss (Sambhoga-kāya), a super-mundane body, marked with the thirty-two signs, etc., in which the Buddhas enjoy their full majesty, virtue, knowledge and blessedness. It is the privilege of saints to perceive this body, which belongs to the world of form, in the same way as the human Kṛishṇa (who is only a Nirmāṇa-kāya) showed his 'true' form to Arjuna [in the *Bhagavad-gītā*]. It is a marvellous sight, a symphony of light and jewels, a symphony of knowledge and sound, for it ceaselessly proclaims the voice of the True Law."

It is, in other words, the World-Body or Body of Wholeness of the Buddha as Logos. It pertains to the 'world of form' only in so far as it is all-formed, that is to say containing all forms simultaneously. What a 'symphony of light and jewels' may be we are not able to say; it is, however, evidently the Robe of Glory of the triumphant Christ, and the symbolism of jewels is used by some of the mystics to convey some idea of its glories, as for instance in the beautiful Hymn of Bardaiṣān. The Body of every Christ in his fulness is one and the same, namely the World-Body which includes all bodies, from minerals to man, from man to archangels.

But He who is Lord of all bodies can also use any body. The body a Buddha uses on earth is thus not his 'real' Body; and therefore the human Buddhas, that is to say men who have attained

to buddhahood but still use the body they had as men, are called Nirmāṇa-kāyas. This term is generally translated as the Body of Transformation, and here come in all those ideas of the illusory body of the Buddha and Christ, all those conceptions that fall under the head of 'docetism.' From the point of view of ordinary mortals, the body of a Buddha—who must be for them a historical person who has reached buddhahood—the body of a Buddha is the same apparently as the body of other men, but essentially it has been transformed. For the Buddha himself his true Body is the World-Body, and he can use any separated body at will. All such bodies when compared with the true Body are illusory, impermanent and changing.

When then M. de la Vallée Poussin says that "the Nirmāṇa-kāya, or magical body," is "like the different illusions which every magician can produce," he precipitates the whole subject from sublimity to bathos. The Buddha is one who is at-oned with the creative power of the Divine; this divine creative power is Māyā, and the Lord of it is Māyin, the Great Magician if you will; but Māyā is here Nature and all her works. This may be clearly seen from the concluding paragraph of our authority when he writes:

"The Samboga-kāya is just as illusory, on its side, as the Nirmāṇa-kāya. The latter is a transient illusion imposed upon men; the former is the cosmic illusion, which embraces the Bodhisattvas also, and is similar to the representation which the one Being makes to himself. It is the Ālayavijñāna, 'quiescent intelligence,' the great and unique substratum [? hypostasis], hidden under a glorious and eternal disguise, while ordinary creatures are the same Ālayavijñāna separated into individual consciousnesses."

Recent Studies in Magic.

The complete edition of the split Anastasi Magic Papyrus has now been brought to a successful termination by the publication of a third volume containing the indices. Under the title *The Demotic Magical Papyrus of London and Leiden*, Mr. F. Ll. Griffith (assisted by Sir Herbert Thompson) published in 1904 a transliteration and translation of the full text (for the first time) with notes, and this was followed by a reproduction of the original in a second volume. It is a scholarly piece of work, dealing with the subject from a purely philological standpoint, and completing the studies of Reuvens, Leemans, Hess, Brugsch, Maspero, Revillout and W. Max Müller. We live in a prosaic age indeed, when

magical recipes are of interest solely for the light they can throw on demotic philology; but indeed it must be confessed that the major part of the papyrus is very poor magic indeed.

Professor R. Campbell Thompson is another scholar who is evidently fascinated by magic, though somewhat after the fashion of a curator of a museum of antiquities. Already in 1900 he gave us *The Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers of Nineveh and Babylon in the British Museum*, and in 1903, and 1904, *The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia, being Babylonian and Assyrian Incantations*, while recently (1908), in the third volume of Luzac's 'Oriental Religious Series,' Professor Campbell Thompson continues his researches into the puzzling records of the cuneiform tablets with a study on *Semitic Magic: Its Origin and Development.* The Preface tells us that: "The themes put forward or maintained in this book are based on a study of that intricate demonology which has gradually developed throughout the lands of Western Asia. The earliest written records of this magic are found in the cuneiform incantation tablets from Assyria; and, aided by the various stepping stones afforded by Rabbinic traditions, and Arabic tales, we can trace its growth and decadence through three thousand years down to its survival in modern Oriental superstition. Furthermore, the parallels afforded by Aryan and Hamitic nations show how close the grooves are in which savage ideas run, and that the principles of magic are, broadly speaking, coincident in each separate nation, and yet, as far as we know, of independent invention. All these superstitions combine to throw light on many of the peculiar customs of the Old Testament, and help to explain the hidden reason *why* these customs existed." The volume is in many ways interesting and also instructive because of the material collected together, much of which is new.

The most recent study on magic which we have come across is by Mons. E. Doutté, Professor at 'L'École Supérieure des Lettres' of Algiers, who is already well known for his able studies of religions and customs in Maghreb (North Africa). It is called *La Société musulmane du Maghrib*, with the sub-title *Magie et Religion dans l'Afrique du Nord* (Alger, Jourdan, 1909). We have had time only to run over this book hastily; it is, however, of decided merit and interest, though we are not quite so enthusiastic as Prof. E. Montet of Geneva, who in the July number of *The Asiatic Quarterly Review* writes of it: "All that touches magic and religion is analysed and thoroughly examined in this masterly work—magicians, divines, magical rites, incantations, talismans,

divination, sacrifices, feasts of seasons, the carnival of Maghreb, relations of magic and religion, etc. The contents of this work of folk-lore in the North of Africa (Islām and latent paganism dominating under Mussulmān forms) is of extraordinary richness and of much interest." Prof. Montet's opinion is of value because of his own wide knowledge of N. African religion, and in this connection his article, in the July number of *The Hibbert Journal*, on 'Les Saints dans l'Islām' should be studied. It deals with the various types of 'holy men' found in Maghreb, and among other things relates many stories of the charlatanry and immorality of the loafing Marabouts.

Finally, we may note the publication of the second edition of M. Victor Henry's *La Magie dans l'Inde antique* (*Bibliothèque de Critique religieuse*, pp. 328 (Paris, Nourry, 1909).

THE INADEQUACY OF PARALLELISM.

IN *The Journal of Mental Science*, April, 1909, Dr. Drapes, in describing a case of brain tumour, writes that such cases may justly be cited in support of the contention that there is no essential distinction between the psychical and physiological functions of the cerebral centres; and that consciousness is to be regarded as the outcome, frequent but not invariable, of the functioning of the highest cerebral centres under certain conditions. But it is just this aspect of consciousness in which some very eminent authorities decline to acquiesce. The theory which seems to find most favour with British psychologists, who are, as a rule, conservative in their opinions, is the theory of parallelism, or concomitance. That an immaterial essence such as mind or consciousness should be "got out of" mere material substances seems to them inconceivable. Is it really so? The writer goes on to draw an analogy between mind, the most subtle force in nature, and electricity, or indeed any other force. Electricity is just as intangible, just as immaterial as mind, and yet we do not feel it to be a straining of language, a departure from truth, to say that electricity is produced by, or "got out of," the material elements of a galvanic cell, or from the rotation of material magnets round a core of soft iron. No one hesitates to do so. And to maintain that it is inconceivable, that what is immaterial should be procurable from material elements, seems to be absolutely at variance with what we see occurring every day around us.

The old dualistic theory of an immanent, immaterial, independent entity, "working through" the body as an operator working a

machine, is at least intelligible and coherent. So also is the more modern monistic theory, that consciousness or mind is the product of cerebral action on its highest evolutionary level. But the doctrine of parallelism, which is safe in so far as it commits itself to nothing, also teaches nothing. Although it may seem to have a positive quality about it, it is really purely negative in character. There is a certain imposing resonance in the terms 'parallelism' and 'concomitance,' but when they are examined critically they will be found to be rather of the nature of "sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal."

THE ETERNAL AS FUTURE.

IN an article on the 'Relation of Time and Eternity' (*Mind*, July, 1909), Prof. J. E. McTaggart tells us that the practical importance of the question whether the Eternal can be regarded as future appears to him to be enormous. The supreme question, from the point of view of practical importance, is whether good or evil predominates in the universe, and in what proportion. The practical importance of philosophy consists, not in the guidance it gives us in life—it gives us, he thinks, very little—but in the chance that it may answer this supreme question in a cheerful manner, and that it may provide some solution which shall be a consolation and an encouragement.

The belief in a God who is on the side of the good, has been one of the supports on which men have most often tried to base an optimistic solution of this question. But even if we accept the existence of such a God, it will not by itself afford sufficient ground for what we seek. But if we could arrive at a theory which was able to assert that, whatever the state of the universe now, it would inevitably improve, and the state of each conscious individual in it would inevitably improve, until they reached a final state of perfect goodness, or at least of very great goodness—surely this, he thinks, would be accepted as a cheerful theory. If time is unreal, Prof. McTaggart sees a possibility of such a demonstration. The reality of the Eternal can only have comfort for us if we conceive it as future, and as progressively manifested. Only in the relation of Time to Eternity does he see a chance of a happy solution, and, as philosophy stands at present, he sees it nowhere else.

This is a curious speculation; but that it is a more comforting theory than the Eternal as past or present we cannot be persuaded. The instantaneous nature of Eternity and its independence of Time seems to be a more cheerful outlook.

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THE QUEST.

THE NATURE OF CULTURE.

REV. W. F. COBB, D.D.

THIS paper is a modest attempt to point out the place of 'culture' in its relation both to 'civilisation' and to the institutional forms through which religion is expressed in our modern life. That 'culture' in its deepest sense should be offered to all; that it is absent from a great number of existing churches; and that our century will not regain 'sweetness and light' until it regains culture are truths which this essay is intended to illustrate.

One preliminary point requires emphasis. Culture is distinct from civilisation. A high degree of civilisation may co-exist with a low degree of culture, and conversely, culture of a high order may be accompanied by a comparatively insignificant development of civilisation. English life to-day in many respects can afford illustrations of high civilisation joined to rudimentary culture; witness the modern hotel, the daily press, the motor-car, municipal trams, parks and wash-houses, telephones and the best postal-system in the

world, when compared with the 'culture' offered by the music-hall, the average novel, the Royal Academy of Art and the popular preacher. Greece in the age of Pericles, on the other hand, while displaying culture of a lofty order even if limited in scope, was denied nine-tenths of the achievements which adorn modern civilisation.

By civilisation we mean the sum-total of all discoveries, inventions and appliances by which the outer life of man is enriched, his time is saved and his comfort is increased. He can convey himself and his goods from place to place with a rapidity before unknown; his thoughts can be transmitted to the antipodes in a few minutes; darkness is dispelled by touching a button; machinery has cheapened clothing and furniture; commerce carries food to the ends of the earth. Man is better fed, better clothed, better housed, provided with more amusement, given more printed matter—in short, he is more highly civilised than he has been in any previous period of history, because he is better able to compel the forces of nature to minister to his outer wants and needs.

Culture, however, stands for a different order of facts. Its primary concern is with that inner world where man escapes from the outer world of necessity, and is free to obey his own impulse to freedom. Civilisation places man at the head of the visible world; culture delivers him from subjection to it, and makes him free of the ideal world; teaches him that while he is one with nature he has also power to transcend nature, and enter into inner communion and living relationship with the Power of which nature is but the symbol or sacrament. Civilisation offers at best a more refined materialism of which the millionaire is

no unsuitable representative; culture spiritualises and frees man, and its high-priest is the artist.

The nature of culture may be best seen by considering the three functions by which it serves man's higher purposes, *viz.* science (with which philosophy is closely related), religion and art. These three functions are no arbitrary divisions made by abstract thought for the sake of convenience, any more than truth, beauty and goodness are fanciful ideals, or thought, feeling and will are psychological shadows. Each of these three triads is grounded on observed facts, and the three elements of each are co-templar divinities running back into a single entity—the Unknown, Unknowable and Unsearchable to which a St. Paul, a St. Augustine or an Immanuel Kant offers the hymn of praise. The three are the three primary colours into which the white light of heaven is split up when it passes through the phenomenal mind.

To appreciate properly the bearing of modern culture on the problems of to-day it is necessary to consider in a little detail each of these three functions of culture—science, religion and art.

SCIENCE.

Science has been defined as organised knowledge —the knowledge of the average man, deliberately tested, carefully sifted and organised systematically. Its two instruments are observation and experiment. These two by themselves, however, are not enough to enable us to organise their results into a system of thought. For this is required hypothesis; and the power of creating fruitful hypotheses is the work of

philosophic thought working in the brain of genius. The advance of science goes hand in hand with the advance of philosophy; and, on the other hand, every fresh achievement in science widens the scope of philosophic thought.

It is a commonplace when we speak of the first duty of science being that of rigorous observation and experiment. But it is not so often observed—and this is important for our present purpose—that the first fruit of close observation of external nature is an increasing knowledge of himself by man. It is not along the lines of Aristotelean logic, not by scholasticism, not by feeding on himself, that man has grown in wisdom, but by humbly and patiently cross-questioning the nature which lies around him. The thought of St. Thomas Aquinas has led nowhere. That of his great contemporary, Roger Bacon, is still on the high road of human endeavour.

This close connection between the study of external nature and knowledge of the world within may be exemplified by three names, which represent three stages in man's upward path towards culture—Magelhaes, Copernicus, Kant. The first gave the first decisive proof that the Earth is round; the second placed the Earth as but one planet of one sun among millions of other suns; and the third still further reduced man's pride by demonstrating the incapacity of his mind to know what is not empirically given. When we recollect that the sailors of Magelhaes had to be coerced to proceed along the waters of the Pacific Ocean in consequence of their fear of falling over the edge of the Earth into Hell; when we reflect on the world-view which lies fossilised in the *Divina Commedia;* when we realise that Copernicus gave the

death-blow by his *De Revolutionibus* to that Egyptian conception of Heaven and Hell which had blighted Christianity for a thousand years; and when finally we find the labours of a Roger Bacon, a Leonardo da Vinci, a Galilei, a Copernicus, a Newton, and a hundred other observers and thinkers devoted to 'natural science,' summed up and applied by Immanuel Kant to the great task of freeing man from the jungle of superstition, intellectual arrogance and ignorance, which had wrapped him round for centuries, we may the better appreciate the service rendered by science to culture. It has done more, far more, than merely open up new views of nature; it has strengthened and deepened man's self-consciousness, taught him to know himself, and pointed out the road to self-reverence, self-control, to light, life and liberty.

The close connection of science and philosophy can hardly be seen more clearly than in the successful march of the hypothesis of evolution against all competitive schemes of thought. Thrown out by a Greek thinker, the thought that all phenomena are united in one network of cause and effect was unable to come to fruition till scientific observation and experiment had provided materials for a system of synthetic philosophy. To-day a large circle of people are firmly convinced that evolution holds the magic key which not only unlocks the secrets of the present, but also opens out to thought the beginning and the ending of the universe. They infer tacitly that in such a universe God occupies no useful place, and sink back, therefore, into a philosophic pessimism which cuts at the root of moral endeavour, of faith and hope and love.

That so gloomy a result should follow so sublime

a conception comes as a useful reminder that the original sin of all philosophic thinking is forgetfulness of its limitations. Such thought deals with the abstract; and the more extensive the range of thought the more abstract the thought becomes, that is, the more remote from reality. The Real is an Individual; and it is to the individual that thought must return if it is to be fruitful, or even useful.

> "*Und wenn wir unterschieden haben*
> *Dann müssen wir lebendige Gaben*
> *Dem Abgesonderten wieder verliehen*
> *Und uns eines Folge-Lebens erfreuen.*"[1]

On that assertion of Goethe's is shattered the power of the evolution-philosophy to darken man's life with clouds which threaten but cannot break. "Speech goes downward, for it describes; Spirit upward strives where it ever dwells."

The position frankly taken up here is that nothing that has been said in criticism of Kant has in any way shaken his fundamental doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, or of the interdependence of two worlds —that "subjected to the Will," and that "subjected to a Will," *i.e.* the world which is mechanically explicable and that which is not mechanically explicable; or, to use popular language, the outer world of Nature and the inner world of Mind. It is, therefore, with Kant's contribution to culture that institutional religion has among other things to make terms.

Religion.

If the evolution-philosopher is right, then the bland assertion that religion is done with may be right

[1] "When we have analysed we must again give living forms to the abstract and so enjoy reflective life.

also. But if his philosophy is but thought abstracted from life, and becomes real only when brought back to the individual as a humble suitor for life, then religion's case may not be so desperate as it seemed. For as soon as the individual is the object of attention its value is felt as well as thought, and that felt value at once assumes the character of mystery, of spirit, of the inscrutable. But it is just here that religion has its distinctive place and critical importance. An individual thing is not known because its form has been carefully noted and its relation to other forms tracked and described; nor is it any the more known because its 'natural history' may be written and the evolution of it from earlier 'types' discussed by learned men in profound treatises. It is quite possible indeed that such knowledge may even hold us back from the only knowledge which really deserves the name, that which is born of love for the individual thing. For each individual thing is, while finite in form, infinite in its life and meaning, and is not known until that life and meaning have awakened a response in feeling equally with the response which the form has awakened in thought. The response in thought we call, when formulated, science. The response in feeling we call religion. The one deals with the body; the other with the soul; and both are necessary ingredients of culture.

This place of religion in culture may be made more clear by two illustrations, drawn from two worlds, the outer and the inner, *viz.* an oak-tree and a human being.

The scientific man on being presented to an oak-tree for the first time proceeds to study it in its mode of production, its growth, its surroundings, the form of its leaf, the formation of its fruit, the qualities of its

wood, its bark, the depth of its roots, and its phenomena in general. He next proceeds to compare it with other trees which seem like it in greater or less degree. In time he comes to accumulate so much information about the oak-tree that he is able to set out the laws of its existence and to class it—by mental processes of abstraction and generalisation—in its proper kingdom, family, group, genus and species. The oak-tree he now declares is scientifically known. Its physiology is complete.

Another man not gifted as the scientific enquirer is gifted perhaps, is also introduced to the oak-tree. He too studies it, but it is as a living thing that he finds it interesting and moving. He feels its presence rather than thinks it. To him it speaks of soul, of movement, of life. . . . He feels it to be a finite form veiling an Infinite Spirit, and from behind the veil he hears a voice which whispers to him of a Presence not to be put by, akin to his own spirit, a Being Who penetrates his being and lifts him to heights of adoration, longing and love on the one hand, and sinks him to depths of humiliation, shame and penitence on the other. He may say with the Christian Apostle that in this Somewhat he lives and moves and has his being; or with the American Emerson that everything that we know as an object is an inlet into the one Soul; or with the Hindu thinker he may confess "*Tat tvam asi*."[2] In any case he means the same thing, and he *knows* himself to be in close and intimate touch with the reality of which the oak-tree is a phenomenon, a touch so close, giving a knowledge so intimate, that scientific knowledge is shadowy and unreal by comparison. That touch, when present to

[1] "That art thou."

consciousness, is religion. The difference between the scientific view and the religious is that between a chapter of Linnæus and Goethe's poem on *Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen.*

The inner world again may afford an equally good illustration of the place of religion in culture and of its relation to science. "My mind to me a kingdom is" is a fancy which receives no respect from the psychologist, and especially the physico-psychologist, for he sees in it and its manifestations and in the inter-relation of its activities and powers, little more than objects for analysis and description. What feeling is, what will is, the modes of their action at the bidding of desire, how thought is originated, how it works, what the laws of its working are, and what its relation to feeling and will; and again the limits of our knowledge of what the 'substance of mind' may be, how mind is related to the nervous system—the connection of biology with psychology and of both with sociology—these all are fit and proper questions for the professor of mental science, and he may fairly claim that no more should be demanded of him than that he should describe as well as he can to what conclusions his observations and experiments have brought him.

Of a different character are the *dicta* of religion—not contradictory of the *dicta* of science seeing that they belong to a different plane, but yet differing from them in method and results. Religion approaches the inner man as the Holy of Holies of the universe, where the outer and the inner meet and mutually illuminate one the other—if we must use these terms 'outer' and 'inner' at all. It finds there the complement of the law of mechanical necessity under which the whole

outer world lies (including man's own body and his thoughts and feelings), and asserts it as the law of freedom, as the law of the good-will to be true to itself. This good-will is good, not because it issues in beneficent acts, or in any, or in none, nor because it is subject to an ideal spiritually discerned within, but because it *is* itself the subject's own ideal.

This ideal is not a product of heredity or environment—at least so religion holds—it cannot be manufactured, or bought, or trained, it is no product of evolution, but it is an immediate fact, carrying its own witness in its hands, appealing to nothing else beyond itself, and claiming unlimited obedience—speaking a categorical imperative, and uttering its Woe! to him who opposes or neglects its commands. It is the birth-right of each individual, the sheet-anchor by which he is held fast to that Universal Individual which makes each of us to be what he is, giving him at once his spiritual substance and his distinctive characteristics.

The consciousness of the affinity of the inmost self to the One Self is what we mean when we speak of religion; the One Self, or the Universal Individual we call God—a name expressing a thought too indefinite for thinking, but clear enough to feeling, a name which is used so glibly by most that it hides rather than reveals.

It may be well, however, before we leave this subject to state, without elaborating, two objections which may arise. In the first place, though the scientific view of a thing differs so widely from the religious that it can be discussed apart, yet the two are never more than logically separable. Science, wherever it is science, is and must be religious, for the

religious element is in reality connected with the scientific. The love of truth which inspires every scientific enquirer is transcendental and, therefore, religious, for this love of truth, this desire to know, connotes the recognition of a world of the unknown, and in the last analysis of an unknown Individual of which the commissioned exponent is religion.

In the second place the distinction between outer and inner is also logical, not real. Man is himself part of nature, and nature is in his mind, not as the object is in the mirror, but as the beloved is in the lover, by a process of spiritual transformation.

> "*Müsset im Naturbetrachten*
> *Immer eins wie alles achten;*
> *Nichts ist drinnen, nichts ist draussen;*
> *Denn was innen, das ist aussen.*
> *So ergreifet ohne Säumnis*
> *Heilig öffentlich Geheimnis.*"[1]

What is within is brought to consciousness only by what is without; and what is without must first become part of what is within before it can be known or felt. Knowledge is a product of feeling and thought, of the inner and the outer also, and both feeling and thought, the inner and the outer, are wholly in whatever is known.

Art.

What has just been said of science and religion must also be said of art. It cannot be isolated, or treated as if a work of art could exist apart from science and religion. This will appear quite clear

[1] "You must in your study of Nature always regard the Individual as the Universal; nothing is within, nothing is without; for what is within is also without. So lay hold without delay of the holy and open Secret."

when the nature of art as an integral part of culture has been stated.

But in order to do this we must, by way of clearing the ground, protest against the all too common way of speaking of art as if it were synonymous with æstheticism, of talking of things being artistic when all we mean is that their forms are pleasing, of admiring 'anecdotes in painting' because the technique is good, or the bizarre because it is clever, of talking about 'schools of art'—as if such an expression were more than a formula to save us trouble—of allowing histories of art to pass from which poetry and music have been omitted, in short of outraging art by leaving out of it its peculiar and distinguishing function—the power to create forms fitted to express its visions.

This far-reaching power of art as creative has been stated in the definition that "art is the representation in matter of an idea indirectly through the direct representation of an emotion," or more shortly by Kant: Art is the "art of the genius." The genius sees and gives form to what he sees, and we lesser men do at best but form the environment out of which springs the genius to express what we dumbly feel, to whom he turns for sympathetic understanding, for whose good it is that he expresses himself at all.

That art cannot be sundered from science and religion is a truth which Professor T. H. Green bids us remember when he warns us that "the man who seeks his entire culture in art of any kind will soon find the old antagonism between speculation and action begin to appear." But speculation, if worthy, is a due blend of science and religion, and all action also, if worthy, is art of some kind and in some degree.

If this latter statement be true, then we must

stretch the boundaries of art as far in one direction as we contract them in another. We contract them by excluding the merely beautiful in form, the decorative, the imitative. We stretch them so as to include every activity of man which springing from an ideal based on science and religion actualises itself in a material form. Michelangelo's *Day and Night*, Leonardo da Vinci's *Mona Lisa*, Titian's *Homme au Gant*, Raphael's *Madonna della Sedia*, Rubens's *Helen Fourment*, all satisfy these conditions and do it so well that they are immortal. But many other artists fail to secure immortality, not because they are not artists really, or because they are bad artists, but because their visions are not balanced by sufficient knowledge of technique, or because their technique has no heroic vision to express, or for both reasons. We may not, therefore, exclude these wholly from the roll of artists. The 'minor-poet,' the prophet, the statesman, the merchant-prince, the lover writing sonnets to his mistress's eyebrow, the shepherd of souls, the teacher of youth, even the journalist, and less infrequently the novelist, may be creating with varying success some form from which others may learn something of the vision which haunts the waking moments of the artist. There is more art than is found in the art-galleries—better art may be found often outside them. Wherever there is honest and pure thought and feeling patiently seeking after self-expression for a social end, there is to be seen and gratefully saluted an art which is doing what it can for culture. "Art," says the late Professor W. P. Ker, "is the wide world's memory of things, and any man may make his own memory a sharer in its wisdom on one condition—that he shall not hate or love anything that is revealed to him there according as it

thwarts or furthers his selfish purposes, but according to its own virtues or vices. The artistic imagination is part of the highest morality because it gets rid of the last selfishness of all—the Stoic selfishness which is proud of its superiority to external things."

The high importance of morality to art, *i.e.* of religion in the sense outlined above, may be seen from another side. Art is a department of social service; no artist can paint or sing, or form at all for himself alone. His creations are for his fellows. He creates to be understood, to be loved, in order to help. Immoral art is, therefore, a *contradictio in adjecto.* "Psychological enquiry, taken in the large sense, tells us that art is essentially the production of a social and not a personal gratification; that it can only appeal to emotions which are common to society, and which, moreover, express themselves in mass—that is, in a public and sympathetic form; and since no immoral, that is anti-social, sentiment can permanently utter itself in this concreted form, art has to avoid the immoral as one branch of the inartistic."

This remark of Professor Sully's will also help us to see the full bearing of the formula, "Art for art's sake." It does not mean that art is independent of morality—on the contrary, science and religion and, therefore, morality are presupposed in its activity—but that art must be disinterested in the sense that the artist must have no other motive but that which impels him from within to self-expression in song, or picture, or statue, or heroic deed.

One final and decisive remark may fitly close this all too scanty outline of the nature and function of art. "In poetry and art personality is everything"; and "the highest bliss of the sons of men is only

personality," says Goethe. That which the individual artist produces derives its worth from what the artist's own personality is worth. As Luther said: A man's "works make him not good or bad but he brings forth good or bad works. So we see it in all handicrafts; a good or bad house does not make a good or bad carpenter, but a good or bad carpenter makes a good or bad house. No work makes a master to be as his work is, but as the master is so is his work."

What we look for then in a work of art is not morality by itself, not science by itself, not skill in colouring, or beauty in form, not even passion by and for itself, but all these as outward and visible signs of that highest gift to the sons of men, that best revelation to them of God, a prophetic personality. It is not wholly without meaning that we speak of a Rembrandt, a Titian, a Velasquez, when we refer to a picture by one of these artists, for the value of the picture to us is measured by its ability to reveal to us the personality of the painter. By itself the picture is naught. In art Personality is everything.

W. F. Cobb.

"WHERE THERE IS NOTHING, THERE IS GOD."

MAUD JOYNT, M.A.

"THE Christian's business is not reformation but revelation, and the only labours he can put his hand to can never be accomplished in Time. He must so live that all things shall pass away. . . . We must destroy the world; we must destroy everything that has Law and Number, for where there is nothing, there is God."

"We cannot destroy the world with armies, it is inside our minds that it must be destroyed, it must be consumed in a moment inside our minds." (W. B. Yeats, *Where there is Nothing.*)

Those who have read the striking and suggestive play from which the opening words of this essay are taken, will recall the weird scene in which they occur: the crypt with its dim light, in which dawn and the flickering lamp-flame mingle; the dancing friars intoning their Latin psalm; the prostrate form of Brother Paul, lying in trance on the altar steps, then awaking to utter words, fantastic indeed, and yet shot through with strange gleams of intuition which seem like the half-remembered truths brought over from some higher and wholly supersensuous sphere. Half-crazy many readers will no doubt call him, and the play illustrates subtly enough the truth of his own saying, that men

made the laws because they thought it better to be safe than to be blessed. To be blessed—or rather to seek the blessed state—is not always compatible with safety, and till we have attained the blessed state, assuredly laws are needful for us.

I have chosen the closing words of the first passage quoted above as the title of this paper, because they suggest and seem to sum up the conclusions to which I have been led while reflecting—or trying to reflect—on the nature of Infinity as an attribute of Spirit or Deity. The terms Infinite and Eternal are in common use and are uttered glibly enough when men speak about God or the soul; and yet probably not very many of those who thus employ them attach any definite notion to the words. To most minds, it is likely, they suggest somewhat different ideas, 'infinite' being connected with space or number or degree, 'eternal' with time or succession. Thus the Deity is said to be 'infinite' in power and wisdom, because He is conceived as possessed of these attributes in a measure surpassing the comprehension of finite minds; and He is said to be 'eternal' because His existence is conceived as having unlimited duration.

In dealing with such a subject it seemed natural to turn, in the first place, to mathematical science for aid and illustration. Not, indeed, that I have the slightest pretensions to be a mathematician; but the problem seemed, by its very nature, to call for a mathematical solution. For how is one to approach the conception of that which is beyond and includes all number and all law, without first trying to understand what is meant by law and number? And of all sciences, mathematic is the one which concerns itself pre-eminently with law and number. Moreover, for that

reason, it seems to be the one in which we come to the most fixed and unalterable and self-evident revelation of truth. The mathematical formula carries with it the unassailable force of an intuition to the mind which grasps it. Once we have seen for ourselves, *e.g.* that two sides of a triangle are greater than the third, we could as soon doubt the fact of our own existence as call the proposition into question.

Hence the reverence with which philosophers of a certain type, intellects like Descartes and Spinoza and Kant, have turned to pure mathematic as a basis of absolute certainty, a rock standing unmoved amidst the shifting tides of phenomenal existence. And the perception that the laws which we find to underlie the science of numerical and geometric values are symbolic and capable of indefinitely wide application, has inspired the cryptic utterances of many seers, from Pythagoras to Novalis. "Mathematic," says the latter, "is Religion. Only through a Theophany do we attain to Mathematic. It is the highest truth. Its basis is the inward connection and sympathy of the universe. Numbers, like symbols and words, are phenomena, representations κατ' ἐξοχήν."[1] It is reassuring for those of us in whom the mathematical faculty (as commonly understood) is not highly developed, to be told in the same passage that there may be mathematicians of the first magnitude who cannot calculate, even as one may be a skilful computator without the vaguest notion of what mathematic really implies. The East, Novalis goes on to add, is the home of genuine mathematic; in Europe it has been degraded to a mere technical science.

The meaning of Novalis's aphorisms is not far to seek. Pure mathematic deals with relations in their

[1] Novalis, *Fragmente (Philosophie u. Physik).*

most abstract forms—the relations between units or aggregations of units, apart from the values which they represent; the harmonies which underlie geometric forms apart from their particular manifestations in the concrete. And inasmuch as all science and all art (each in its own sphere and its own way) are ultimately based on relations, mathematic may be regarded in a sense as the fundamental science. This is immediately apparent in music, which is built up of relations actually admitting of a numerical representation; in which, as Novalis says, mathematic appears as a revelation, a creative idealism. But it is equally true though not so self-evident, of plastic and poetic art. For these, too, claim to set before us in their true perspective and symmetrical adjustment the facts which in the course of life come to us as fleeting, disparate and incoherent; to discover and interpret for us the hidden laws and harmonies which are to be found in the world of nature and of man no less than in the world of numbers. It is true that the fundamental presentation of law is more liable to be obscured by the material in which the artist has to work, especially in the case of poetry, where we have to deal not with fixed units and standards, but with human emotions variable in their values and their manifestation. It is as when in geometry we pass from problems which seek to discover fixed points to those which determine the locus of a variable point. Yet, get only far enough from the work of art to be able to abstract attention from the details to the composition, and you will recognise that *Lear* and the *Divine Comedy* are in their ultimate analysis symbolic presentations of relations which may be conceived as admitting, in the realms of pure intellect, of a quasi-mathematical expression.

But to attain this view, we must wholly abstract the content, *i.e.* the sensuous element, in the work of art; and the same is true of mathematic when regarded as a help towards the comprehension of spiritual truths, when, for instance, we seek its aid to arrive at the conception of the Infinite or Eternal. In such speculations it becomes especially needful to heed the distinction between mathematic as an *ideal* science, concerned with abstractions only, and the mathematic of ordinary calculation; to bear in mind the saying of Novalis already quoted, that *numbers* are *phenomena.*

Ideal mathematic deals with forms and relations which are not capable of manifestation. The ideal triangle, the type from which all the truths concerning triangles may be deduced, may be conceived, but cannot be represented spatially; we can form a mental image of, or put down on paper, only one of an endless series of representations. The geometric (Euclidean) point and line have no phenomenal counterparts. Neither can we reach the conception of the Infinite by any effort of the sensuous imagination. No aggregation of units will help us here. We cannot carry any numerical series so far that it is impossible to conceive of its being carried further; there is no number so great but we can mentally add to it. We can set no bounds to imagination when we try to picture infinite space; thought travels on unchecked beyond the limits of the stellar universe and realm after realm of the Void opens before it still. Nor can we conceive of any limits to time, of any past when time was not as yet, of any future when time shall cease to be. And when we turn from the Infinite to the Infinitesimal, we cannot imagine any magnitude so small as not to allow of division. Even when it has vanished from

human perception, it may be a universe, comparatively speaking, for that infinitesimal creature which Pascal conjures up to fancy in a well-known passage of the *Pensées*. We are ever standing, as Pascal cries, between the two Infinites—"*entre les deux Infinis*."

The truth is that neither of the extremes is Infinity. There is a very real distinction which has been made by thinkers like Spinoza and Kant, between a *progressus in indefinitum* on the one hand and Infinity on the other.[1] The former belongs to the universe of manifestation and to the faculties of our mind which deal with that universe, the understanding and the sensuous imagination. Of it we can only say that its limits do not admit of being fixed; we can always conceive of their being pushed farther back. We live and think within a certain compass of it, in time and space and number, beyond which in either direction our senses and our imagination refuse to work; but we cannot deny that the progression may be extended in either direction for faculties other than ours. Nor, regarding it as a series capable, in part at least, of finite expression, can we conceive of any part of it as equal to the whole.

The notion of Infinity, on the other hand, as that of absolute Unity, belongs to the purely ideal side of mathematic, that in which the higher mental intuition comes into play, but from which all sensuous imagination, all spatial representation, all notion of values or magnitudes must be rigorously excluded. The Infinite is not that the limits of which may be for ever pushed further back; it is that which by its very nature excludes the idea of limits. Unity is not a magnitude

[1] See Kant on the Antinomies (*Kritik d. r. Vernunft*, pt. ii. bk. ii. ch. ii. § 8) and the interesting letter, dealing with Infinity, from Spinoza to Meyer, 20 April, 1663.

so small as to admit of no division; it is, like the Euclidean point, no magnitude at all and division has no meaning in reference to it.

Both these truths are expressed in the mathematical formula for Infinity:

$$\infty = \frac{1}{0}$$

Infinity is Unity divided by Nothing; in other words, Unity indivisible, or ideal Unity. Ideal, be it marked; for phenomenal unity must ever be expressed by the formula $1 = \frac{x}{x} = \frac{1}{1}$. Both Unity and Infinity, then, are purely ideal concepts, and it is meaningless to speak of a part or a whole in relation to either.

Pressing our formula a little further, we get the equations:

$$1 = \infty \times 0 = 0; \text{ and } 0 = \frac{1}{\infty}$$

A little reflection shows us that these formulas imply the ultimate identity of Infinity, of Unity and of Nothingness. And as far as the phenomenal universe goes, Unity and Infinity alike are Nothingness; they have no existence in manifestation.

Now what bearing has this truth on the spiritual world?

In the truths of the spiritual realm, I believe, as in those of the artistic, we shall find a basis of mathematical law. The spiritual life brings into manifestation, as tangible experience, ideal laws and relations; even as the concrete triangle is a manifestation of ideal relations. The true mathematician (in Novalis's sense) is he to whom the one as the other is but a symbol, a phenomenal and partial expression of something which in its absolute nature is infinite, eternal and incapable of representation.

One law which appears to underlie spiritual life

finds a striking analogy in the mathematical law of equivalents, or of transformation of energy. Progress in spiritual development may be defined as a continuous readjustment of values. Every gain on a higher plane means a corresponding loss on a lower. This truth is expressed in many ways in the Christian scriptures. As you mete, it shall be meted unto you. If you would be master, you must be content to serve. You must lose your life in order to find it. To gain the Kingdom of Heaven a man must give all that he hath.

For religion, in its profoundest sense, does not consist in acts of devotion or charity, though these may be the expression of it. Religion is based on the assumption that there is an inner world of the spirit more real and permanent than the things of the flesh; and we become religious as we become inward and learn to postpone immediate, material interests to higher ones. It is a bartering of shadows for substances, and the barter must be continuous if we would progress in the spiritual life. To speak with Paul, we attain to manhood as we learn to put away childish things.

This is a very different thing from asceticism, which is of the nature of compulsion, not spontaneous growth, and implies the realities of the gratifications which it foregoes. We are dealing here with a law of natural, inward development, not with any superimposed principle of renunciation. For though the barter may not be without pain, though it may often cost us a pang to put away the childish things that are endeared by the memory of past joys, still the pain is of that kind which is inevitably associated with growth, the unrest which comes from the stirring of new sources of life. We are all, like Faust, conscious of two souls within us, each at war with its fellow:

"*Die eine klebt mit derber Liebeslust*
Sich an die Welt mit klammernden Organen;
Die andere hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust
Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen."[1]

Faust was not thinking of what is ordinarily called sin when he spoke of the lower soul. The contrast he had in mind was rather that between the phenomenal ego and the higher or idealistic soul; between the principle which accepts material life as an end in itself and that which finds in it only a means for the expression of the idea; between the instinct which leads us to settle down to decent, perhaps blameless, comfortable lives, the creatures of our environment, absorbed in the duties, pleasures, gains and relationships which it offers, fulfilling our allotted task, perhaps, conscientiously enough, but with no notion of anything beyond, regarding that fulfilment as our equivalent to the world for the boon of existence—and that heroic spirit which impels us to over-step the limits of our duty and take upon us burdens that are not ours, to transcend and subdue and transform our environment, to fling away what seem solid gains for others that seem but visionary, to find in adventure, risk, renunciation, suffering, a fierce delight beyond any that the tranquil, painless enjoyment of material life can offer—the spirit which has in all ages informed the champions, the apostles, the saviours of mankind.

And the teaching of Christ, as of the greatest among His predecessors, seems to point out that our development is complete only when we reach the final balance of values on either side; when we have utterly

[1] The one, held fast by sensuous desire,
With clinging organs to the world would cleave;
The other spurns the dust of earth to aspire
To realms where high ancestral spirits live." (*Faust*, pt. i. sc. 2.)

exhausted the lower exchequer; when we have sundered one by one all the bonds of interest and desire which attach us to the phenomenal world, and the latter has become for us a realm of unsubstantial symbols. As Paul would say, we must die to the world that we may live with Christ. This is the true mystical significance of the Gospel-story. The Incarnation has as its inevitable sequence the Crucifixion of the phenomenal life and Resurrection to a higher. "If we have become united with the likeness of His death, we shall be also with the likeness of His resurrection"—the condition cannot be evaded. Only when we have reached absolute zero do we attain to the primal Unity and ultimate Infinity.

If we study the records which have been left by those who—perhaps only once, perhaps but for a few moments—have attained to the level of existence in the Spirit, be they Buddhists or Christians, poets or philosophers or pantheists, Paul or Plotinus, Teresa or Böhme, Dante or Wordsworth or Tennyson,[1] to mention but a few in a long list of accredited witnesses—we find that their experiences have certain features in common.

In all cases the notions of time and space and plurality are transcended; thought as well as sensation is eclipsed; the individual consciousness is merged in the consciousness of cosmic life, and the Ego becomes identified with the Non-Ego.[2] In other words, all the distinctive marks of phenomenal existence are left behind, insomuch that when the beatific vision has

[1] Cp. Dante, *Par.* canto xxxiii.; Wordsworth, *Tintern Abbey*, *Intimations of Immortality* (st. 9) and the passage "Such was the Boy. . ." in *Excursion*, bk. i.; Tauler, second sermon on the Nativity of John the Baptist; James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, lectures xvi., xvii.; Tennyson, *The Ancient Sage*.

[2] "Ego=Non-Ego, the highest principle of all science and art."—Novalis.

faded away, memory and understanding are unavailing to reproduce it in the symbols of the material world.

> ". . . *Il parlar nostro a tal vista cede,*
> *E cede la memoria a tanto oltraggio.*"[1]

One who had tasted this experience, the German mystic Johannes Tauler, wrote of it thus: "The powers of the soul [*i.e.* of the personal soul] cannot attain to this divine ground; and the great wastes to be found in this divine ground have neither image, nor form, nor condition; for they are neither here nor there. They are like unto a fathomless abyss, bottomless and floating in itself. . . . There is no past or present here; and no created light can reach unto or shine into this divine ground; for here only is the dwelling-place of God and His sanctuary. . . . This ground is so desert and bare, that no thought has ever entered there. None of all the thoughts of men have ever entered it. For it is so close, and yet so far off, and so far beyond all things, that it has neither time nor place. It is a simple and unchanging condition. A man who really and truly enters, feels as though he had been here throughout eternity and as though he were one therewith."

Such seers have believed that when the empirical self was thus blotted out the soul approached, or entered into union with God—not the definite, extra-mundane Personality of average orthodoxy, nor the indefinite Sum of all things, the God of material Pantheism; but the God who, while immanent in the phenomenal universe, yet transcends it and is not of it, whose sole definition is: I am that I am—Being unconditioned, who is Alpha and Omega, beginning and end, Nothing and yet One and All.

[1] "Our language cometh short of such a sight; and memory cometh short of such excess." *Paradiso*, xxxiii., 56, 57.

Those who find in phenomenal life present satisfaction and full outlet for hope and desire, will doubtless shrink from such a prospect as from a negation or void, and cling rather to the belief in an indefinitely prolonged personal existence or a heaven whose joys are a glorified version of those of earth. But something and nothing are, after all, relative terms; what to one are *Undinge*, chimæras of the brain—the essences and types which underlie and inspire the dreams of the artist and the philosopher—are to another the very *entia realia*, as Spinoza calls them.[1] Those who have thus transcended physical consciousness and enjoyed even a fugitive glimpse into the spiritual world, have ever spoken of the experience as a climax in their inner life, the mere recollection of which was henceforth "a master light of all their seeing." And the aspirant who has once come to feel the illusory nature of even the highest gratifications that the world can offer, the futility of so much that makes up our existence and engrosses our thought, the weight of chance desires, the well-nigh intolerable burden of the personality with its insistent claims, and who has at last set his feet in the way that leads to Freedom, in the confidence that, though in the brief compass of a human life he may make but little progress towards the goal, yet in the divine economy no step, no effort will be wasted; such a one will reply to the objector, as Faust, ere he set out on that memorable quest to find the Mothers, replied to the arch-materialist Mephistopheles:

"*In deinem Nichts hoff' ich das All zu finden!*"[2]

MAUD JOYNT.

[1] *Ethica*, v. 30.

[2] "In thy Nothing I hope to find All." *Faust*, pt. ii. act i. sc. 5.

SIMEON SOLOMAN.

CECIL FRENCH.

MODERN conditions have rendered more marked the natural barrier dividing the inner from the outer vision, and so it is only in accordance with inevitable circumstances that imaginative art should have become more and more difficult, exacting greater demands from those who must now achieve with great labour what, probably, they might have achieved far more easily in the past. We are beginning to understand that imagination is the most dangerous of all things. Indeed the fatal element hidden in the thirst for beauty is seldom very far to seek. The gift of the Gods, in Hellenic story, brings with it unvarying disaster: Semele is consumed before the revelation of her divine lover, and Danaë likewise is cast forth to wander amid unnumbered perils. In medieval times the nameless terrors, those 'dwellers on the threshold,' which so haunted the minds of magicians and alchemists, were but changing embodiments of an unchanging belief. To the same order belongs that Eastern demon Māra, in whose crown is a "jewel of such lustre that it blinds those who look at it." So, too, the martyrs of the early Christian Church were surrounded by devils and beasts rising from the sea or from the land, some "having seven heads and ten horns" or having horns like a lamb but "speaking as a dragon," and also by that mystery, 'Babylon the Great'—"the woman drunken with the blood of the

Saints." In later times the weapons have been but fashioned afresh; the war is carried on though under disguises more plastic and subtle, the powers that slay being no less terrible, if less apparent, than they were in the days of general belief in magic. It would almost seem as though some fatal law had decreed that, as the spiritual life first developes a profound and living significance, the seeker after the Eternal should lose his hold upon the world, falling madly from misfortune to misfortune, while slowly the unknown waters rise about his way. General opinion is apt to forget that the Saints were ever against the world, and that the world which cast them out but acted through a too important sense of its own righteousness. It has forgotten also that those dreamers in the creative arts who pass their lives lonely and apart, have followed, if only in a lesser degree, the quest of the ancient enquirers into divine mysteries.

That langorous melancholy which, quite recently, has swept like a flood over the more distinguished and individual forms of poetry and painting, and which, at first sight appears unreasonable and perverse, is after all not so difficult of explanation. The world which once delighted to give itself to the use of the arts and to pay homage to the artist, has turned from its former allegiance. The public mind is no longer concerned with art but with science. The methods in art most widely accepted are those which approach most nearly to the usage of the laboratory. Little wonder that the creative genius, finding itself an exile and alone in its attempt to stem the stream, has become wistful and secretive. The fastidious designer, who in Florence or Venice had merely to look out on the streets and moving waters about him, to choose from the superb appearances of

life meeting him on all sides, now finds his aspirations checked at every turn and, shrinking from the cold daylight, builds up with laborious precautions a twilight world, partly drawn from a restless, never quite happy invention, partly brought into being by the slowly accumulated lovely heritage of many a vanished age. Thus it is that we have with us an art resembling an opiate in its power of deadening the faculties of daily perception, and evoking, if but for an hour, its own artificial paradise. Imagination or vision, always opposed to ordered existence, a breaker up as it were of the bricks and mortar of common prudence, has withdrawn itself with something of disdain from the temper of an age, which has looked upon it with cold indifference or has even denied its very existence.

With this very modern development of ancient feeling, at once languid and feverish, the art of Simeon Soloman is closely concerned, but like many another dreamer his experience of the world was in sharp contrast to the delicate quality of his imaginings. It seems almost a paradox that one who, it might be said, took up daily life in both hands and wrung it dry, entering into the lurid, less reputable phases of the life of great cities, enduring, if not enjoying, all squalor and hardship, should, as far as is possible, have cast out from his art that very actuality, that strenuous life of the moment, which other men of easier and more ordered lives have sought so eagerly to bring into their pictures or their books. Whether or no this was done through deliberate purpose or came about by reason of uncontrollable natural gifts, it were all but impossible to determine. A movement may make a man just as a man may make a movement; and it would appear to be largely the example of others, coming into his life

at the right moment and in the right manner, which determined the course of Soloman's talent. The genius of Rossetti in particular set the brilliant young student on fire; and one hears of Simeon Soloman as being among the first of the younger men to approach Burne-Jones who, at that time, in the flush of his first immature splendour, was exhibiting small paintings at the Hogarth Club and at the old Water-Colour Society. So too he derived assistance from such great men as Swinburne and Walter Pater, literary leaders of a movement with which, bringing to it as he did the splendid traditions of his race together with a note wholly personal, the name of Simeon Soloman is closely associated. That Jewish ancestry of his, combining with a most unique sense of beauty and with the varied opposing elements of his generation, produced something individual and troubling, delicate and exotic, and possessed above all of a supreme fascination. In the noble words of Swinburne: "Grecian form and beauty divide the allegiance of his spirit with Hebrew shadow and majesty." It is not to be expected that a mind possessed of such subtle intuition should be able to express itself completely, and it is certain that Soloman, considered as a painter, is never completely master of himself, even in his best moments. After all it is the worker who has little to say who has the mastery over an easy, fluent means of expression; the truly profound temperament must seek its way, stumbling and uncertain, for ever hindered by the common things of the world because it has brooded long upon the things beyond the world. The perfect fusion of thought with technique can, by its very nature, only come about at rare intervals. Miracles, were they of daily occurrence, would cease to be miracles.

The colour of the rainbow is with us not frequently, and is for ever beyond the reach of our labouring hands.

Romantic!—The word can never have meant more than it means to us at the present time. Visible splendour, it would often appear, has attained its zenith in the past, and a gradual decay of loveliness must henceforth be our portion. The art of noble living—the ordered adjustment of men's passing days, rising from a sense of the dignity of the body—passed with the epoch of Pheidias and Praxiteles; even as the pomp of the body, together with the coloured glory of circumstance adventuring in strange byways, attained full consummation in the Venice of Titian. All art that would be one with the intellectual intensity of old, must needs turn from such of its recent manifestations as have drawn near the records of the market-square, seeking a way of escape in the mysterious, unbounded, little-understood life of the soul which is slowly finding its way through the labyrinth of modern knowledge. Flawless work in the arts we may no longer expect, but work of haunting charm and restless longing can move us more fiercely perhaps than could more complete achievements in a recognised colder manner. In summing up the value of a work of art, it is not so much what is not there as what is there that is of importance; there may be many drawbacks—faults easy or difficult of detection—but should the purpose be sufficiently definite and charged with beauty, the work has its motive for existence and could but ill be spared.

The paintings of Simeon Soloman belong to this order of beautiful frailty. Fired with intense feeling, they impress, except in cases of complete failure, by reason of that quality of sentiment, and despite of great and often-recurring weakness of execution. In

them arrangement of tone and line has become a vehicle purely lyrical, a mirror reflecting many moods, rejecting the definite substance of things for their essence in the same manner as have those modern Symbolist poets, whose methods have been summed up in the supreme phrase of Verlaine: "*Pas de couleur, rien que la nuance.*"

More than half a century before, Blake had shown the example of a complete surrender to inspiration; but his pictorial genius was too often absorbed in spiritual abstractions to be entirely acceptable save to the student of his elaborate philosophy. As a rule the most delightful art belongs neither to heaven nor earth; and it is here that the vision of Simeon Soloman, following on that of Rossetti and Burne-Jones, acquires its peculiar value. Those languorous, all but sexless, beings belong rightly neither to sense nor spirit; they pass upon their way lost in an unending reverie, having little concern with time and place. The earth they tread so delicately is no more than a reflection of themselves. Wandering thus, apart from the strenuous lives of men who can have no delight without labour, they know not of right or wrong, being conscious only of divinity when as beauty it is brought before them. They do not follow reason nor do they strive for lordship over the empires of the will; the mere act of existing is for them a burden and mystery greater than any may compass with word or deed. Emotion they accept as one accepts light and air, inevitably and without questioning; pleasure and pain being but varying rhythms in an eternal song. So it is that their youth is heedless of change and the coming of old age. Theirs is the disastrous beauty of the poets, passing like the song of a bird or the last gleam in a stormy sky. They

are absorbed by life as dew is dried by the morning sun, and fade with the roses of an early summer, the memory of them being:

> ". . . A lamentable tale of things
> Done long ago and ill done."

Simeon Soloman may be studied to greatest advantage in the paintings—mostly water-colours—executed between the years 1865 and 1875. Their rich sensuousness of colour and the delicacy of their sentiment produce an effect both lasting and profound. In arrangement of line they are often most alluring and their workmanship is full of jewelled passages. The water-colours are mostly handled with solid pigment, as are the water-colours of Burne-Jones, and have fine qualities of varied texture. Certain early works in oil —for example the 'Mother of Moses' and 'Hosanna'—show a mastery in the rendering of detail and character recalling the early work of Millais. This phase, however, soon gave way to the less carefully constructed, but more free and expressive methods of the painter's characteristic works. Many of the finest achievements of this time deal with the subject of Eros. 'Love in Autumn' is one of the better known; 'Amoris Sacramentum' and the extremely tender 'Love Bound and Bleeding' are of the same high standard. A singularly complete little picture is one depicting Solomon enthroned as king. It is extremely rich and glowing in treatment, and shows in a marked degree that Eastern sumptuousness touched with the Gothic severity of the North, often to be traced in certain aspects of the painter's brooding imagination. But perhaps the most striking instance of Soloman's unique blending of the spiritual with the sensuous is to be found in the two

water-colours, 'The Mystery of Faith' and 'A Greek Priest.' The first, very lovely in its pale gold colouring, represents a young man who, with rapt gaze, is in the act of elevating the Host; the other shows a priest with dark ardent countenance, surrounded by the traditional emblems of his calling, each detail of embroidered vestment and carved candlestick being worked out with loving care. One of the most typical, though by no means the most successful, of the water-colours, is that entitled 'A Prelude by Bach.' In a room vaguely reminiscent of the eighteenth century, a number of youths and maidens are listening to a player on the harpsichord. One of the listeners lies with closed eyes, his head resting upon the knees of a woman who is absorbed in the music. A taller youth, his arm encircling the fair girl beside him, looks downward lost in reverie. Standing by them, a boy is holding one of those flowering branches, of which such effective use has often been made by this designer of dreams; petals from the blossom have fallen upon the boy's hair, and not far from him is a sphere of crystal, leading the mind at once from the hangings and polished surfaces to that land of vision, of which the room and its occupants are a portion. This picture, though undoubtedly lacking in quality and firmness, sums up in a remarkable manner the mental attitude of Soloman's art.

In later days tinted chalk had become the artist's most habitual medium. In these faint swift compositions a more direct mysticism was aimed at, but their inventor had lost much of his former fire, and many of them are but repetitions of earlier achievements. A carelessness also, no doubt due to the unsettled habits which, growing with the years, had brought to poverty one who, in his youth, had been fortunate as regards

worldly success, detracts greatly from the drawings of this period. Some of them, probably done to order for a few shillings, are almost without value, but others, produced on happier occasions, rise to an astonishing grandeur. Like most visionary natures that of Simeon Soloman was one of strong contrasts. Few men have produced work so unequal in character. A weak sentimentality and meaningless distortion of shape are the characteristics of the greater number of these designs; those of the better class are inspired and tender, noble and austere. One drawing in black chalk, named 'The Old and The New Law,' representing Christ bending over the stricken Moses, is full of dignity and pathos. The design is both strong and simple; the treatment of form has a measure of that nervous energy to be found in all great draughtsmanship. Another drawing in delicate tints might be cited as an example of symbolism almost at its highest. It shows a strange tortured face with parted lips and closed eyes, the head winged and crowned with serpents. One serpent touches the throat with a caressing action. The whole is at once carved in stone and palpitating with fevered life. There is no need to look at the lettering inscribed beneath to realise that the meaning to be conveyed is that of unappeased desire. Certain of the early designs in Indian ink were repeated in chalk, and the Eros-theme still continued to be the subject of many drawings, some being of great beauty, others lamentable ghosts of an outworn day.

To consider Soloman as a master would be absurd. The flame burning in him must, even under favourable conditions, have been wavering and uncertain. He had not sufficient command over his dreams to evolve from them an art, or even a formula, that could be com-

pletely or continuously satisfying. We have but to place him beside Burne-Jones or Watts to see how far he may fall short; it is all the difference between charm combined with mastery and charm alone. Those two great artists had moulded life to their purpose; they cared for little else, and went their way without ever turning from it. Soloman, on the other hand, was of that company of inspired vagabonds who, on occasions, have done splendid things with their hands. He had that in him which made calm labour all but an impossibility; that constant restlessness which sent Monticelli wandering from lodging to lodging, and which, we are told, was the death of Watteau. He belonged to a race little known to the comfortable leisured classes and the subscribers to daily newspapers.

The outer life of Simeon Soloman can be described only as that of a modern Villon. The kingdom of the streets and what is beneath the streets in very truth claimed him for its own. Social disaster no doubt first pointed the way, but may there not have been in that life of his a certain element of choice? It is possible. Such a nature, never at rest and living so entirely in the moment, may have found in continual change and adventure the one thing in visible circumstance that it might hold as the symbol of its own swift joys and sorrows. To an idealist who is for ever unsatisfied, desiring what the world cannot give, there may be something superb in an attitude that deliberately rejects what others cling to with such eagerness, because it may not choose the highest, choosing the lowest. Compromise is usually difficult to the truly imaginative. As in the case of other dreamers—such men as Gérard de Nerval, Verlaine, and that exquisite poet Ernest Dowson—it may have been some secret command of

the soul that, in the first instance, led Soloman to those sordid places where the mask of long civilisation is utterly thrown aside. Perhaps also those mysterious visits to the slums affected by the great Turner may have had their origin in a similar cause. Is it altogether unreasonable to suppose that squalor was regarded by these men in their more lucid moments, as the hermits of the middle ages regarded the wilderness, to which they used to retire that they might be rid of the clinging illusions of the world? One who saw Simeon Soloman in his later days and is qualified to speak about him, has told how the vagrant artist appeared to enjoy his uncontrolled and perilous existence, and resisted the attempts made to render his position less precarious. I recall an anecdote related of him a few years before his death, which showed how, among conditions the most abject and disordered, he retained his pride as an artist, refuting with scorn a suggestion which had compared him with a wealthy painter whom he despised. Simeon Soloman died in August, 1905, in St. Giles' Workhouse. He had been found lying some months previously on the footpath in Great Turnstile, High Holborn. He was sixty-three years of age and had been an occasional inmate of the workhouse for some little period. Now that he is gone, some of those interested in him must wonder whether, in their coming and going through the streets, they ever passed him, a ragged figure by the edge of the pavement, or perhaps huddled on one of the public seats in park or square. Few surely could have recognised him as the creator of beautiful works.

It would be beyond the mark to affirm that, had Soloman retained the respect of the world—as it is understood officially—his art would have gained to any

very great extent. Such speculations are always idle. The rise or decline of a talent is all but beyond our control. We may scheme never so wisely, but nature will have its way in the end; the breaking up even of splendid ideals, if once inevitable, may be gainsaid by no man. Popular approval, also, has its poison, scarcely less dangerous, though more slow of action, than that engendered by continual disapproval. In England perhaps artistic popularity is a greater enemy to sincerity than it is elsewhere. How many and lamentable are the instances in which early promise has been wrecked by the desire for worldly success! It is apt to be forgotten that art is withered by the atmosphere of the drawing-room. In a measure, maybe, Soloman fulfilled his artistic destiny as completely as many another more fortunately placed. He had his zenith and decadence as is the way with all but the greatest, the very few who have advanced from triumph to triumph. "The soul is its own witness and its own refuge," and the direction of Soloman's imaginative gift at any rate was not changed by his surroundings. Among the drawings made in his last year were the 'Angel of Sleep' and an Annunciation. His mind moved among august things until the end.

CECIL FRENCH.

ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE OLD TESTAMENT.

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IN the volume of *Anthropological Essays* presented to Professor E. B. Tylor in honour of his seventy-fifth birthday (1907), there is a most interesting paper by Dr. J. G. Frazer on 'Folklore in the Old Testament,' in which he deals with such subjects as the mark of Cain, sacred oaks and terebinths, Jacob at the ford of the Jabbok, the bundle of life, the prohibition to seethe a kid in its mother's milk, the keepers of the threshold, etc. These he discusses with a wealth of illustration drawn from every available source, which makes it quite unnecessary for any future investigator to traverse the same ground again. His treatment of the matter is, it is needless to say, characterised by a very real reverence somewhat disguised by a gentle irony which cannot prevent him seeing the soul of humour in things which, to most English readers, are hedged round with a sacredness that springs from ideas inherited from a time when every word in Holy Writ was received as inspired, and 'The Bible' was set apart from every other literature and constituted a sacred enclosure which the profane foot of the scientific explorer might not touch.

Our subject in this and the following studies is both wider and more restricted than Dr. Frazer's. We are to endeavour to discover, with as much fulness as may be within a brief compass, the bearing of anthropology and the traces left by animism and totemism on the pages of the Old Testament, though we shall not develop any particular points with the abundance of detail provided by Dr. Frazer.

Until recently, as we have said, it was the habit, more particularly in England, where supporters of the 'traditional' views may still be found in certain quarters, to place 'The Bible' on a plane by itself as a volume of verbally inspired materials, and to think that only so could it be, in any true sense, a revelation. Moses was the author of the Pentateuch, the inspired narrator of the fortunes of the race, and of his own people up to the time of their entry into Canaan, the giver of the Law, the promulgator of the ritual system; David wrote the Book of Psalms; Solomon wrote Proverbs, etc.; the historical books from Joshua to Chronicles and Ezra and Nehemiah were regarded as equally valuable in all parts as a narrative of events that actually occurred, so that no distinction was drawn between the narratives of the sun and moon standing still, or the taking of Jericho in the Book of Joshua, and such events as the reformations of Hezekiah and Josiah, the Exile, or the Return; the books of the Prophets, including Daniel, were all written by the men whose names they bear.

But, it is hardly necessary for me to say, such a naïve and infantile view of the origin of the books which form the literature of the Old Testament has been rendered impossible for all students, and, indeed, for all who are willing to allow facts to speak for them-

selves—to use the method of induction to colligate observed phenomena, instead of determining beforehand by traditional methods what the facts should be and deducing therefrom what must have been God's method of revelation—by the labours of a succession of scholars, beginning with Jean Astruc in France more than a hundred years ago. Of these Germany has, perhaps, produced the larger number, whose greatest names are Graf and Wellhausen, while Holland produced Kuenen, and England Drs. Cheyne and Driver, whose names add a lustre to the scholarship of their native country.

No detailed exposition of the results attained is needful for us; they are now well known. Suffice it, that through these results, which are based on a sure foundation of inductive principles, we have learnt, as no previous generation could, to recognise that the Old Testament is a literature, and that the books of which it consists are composite productions emanating from many minds, and belonging to successive stages in Israel's progress—the Prophetic, or the stage of the early development of Jahwism from the Xth to the VIIth century B.C.; the Deuteronomic, or reformed cultus of Jeremiah and his successors under Josiah; and the Priestly, or Post-exilic development of the Church-nation and its ritual under Ezra and his successors.

To quote words written by myself now seventeen years ago: The Higher Criticism has taught us to "recognise (1) *the progressive character of revelation.* Just as no river bursts full-born from the mountain-side, but issues in a tiny rill which, as it descends, gathers to itself other rills which swell and swell its volume until it forms the majestic river rolling placidly

to the sea; so Revelation and the Old Testament, its record, ran a similar course. Beginning with the first small law-book and the records of the early traditions of the race, swollen, as it descended the hills of time, by new codes and new laws, by prophecy and psalm, and history and drama, it becomes at last the majestic 'River of God,' rolling placidly onwards, till it is merged in the ocean of God's love, as it is revealed in Jesus Christ."

It has taught us also to "recognise (2) *the composite character of the Old Testament generally and of the Hexateuch in particular.* Just as the geologist, if he would learn the history of the formation of the earth's crust, must examine and break up the rocks, and in so doing finds evidence that they were originally deposited in strata of varying depths and in a definite order of succession at different ages, though now commingled in apparently hopeless confusion until the wand of science makes them tell their tale; so is it with the Old Testament as we have it to-day. The eye of the critical student discovers the strata deposited at different periods of the nation's history, and can read the story of a uniform and consistent progress and development."

The earliest writings that have come down to us practically in the shape in which they left the hands of their authors, are the books of the prophets Amos and Hosea; and about contemporary with these was the writer who fused the Jahwistic history, known as J, with the Elohistic history, known as E, into the composite document known as J E, which runs through the Hexateuch and Book of Judges as they have come down to us, and the earliest writers of the Books of

[1] Astley, 'Date of the Samaritan Pentateuch,' *The Thinker* (1892), vol. ii., pp. 307, 8.

Samuel and Kings, which suffered afterwards drastic Deuteronomic revision.[1]

Although these writings are themselves much later than was formerly supposed, yet modern knowledge of the primitive races of mankind enables us to detect in them, as also in the still later Deuteronomic and Priestly documents, relics of far more ancient days. We now know that the ancestors of Israel must have passed through identical stages in the evolution of culture and religion that have been experienced by all the civilised races, and with them, as with us, these relics of the past survive in their literature in the guise of superstition and above all in folklore and folk-customs.

Coincidently with the critical study of the documents which make up the 'divine library' of the Old Testament—a study which has enabled the student to arrange the documents on a scientific basis, and thus to trace the development and progress of the religion of Israel along the lines which it followed from pre-animism and animism through polytheism to monolatry and monotheism—there has come into being the new, but now practically fully organised, science of anthropology. This is largely due to the labours of Prof. E. B. Tylor, whose *Primitive Culture* laid the firm foundations of a structure to which others are making additions, but which is itself a possession for ever, and by means of which anthropology passed at a single step out of the

[1] Nothing that is said here as to the results of criticism is invalidated by the able article contributed to *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1909, by Professor Eerdmans, of Leyden, entitled 'A New Development in Old Testament Criticism.' In his new-born zeal for the anthropological method, which the present writer shares, the learned professor has allowed himself to be carried too far on the backward swing of the pendulum. Nothing can shake the assured results of criticism; but anthropology, as it is the purpose of this article to demonstrate, may be of the greatest use in helping us to understand the origins of ideas enshrined in the Old Testament.

pioneering stage into that of assured results. At the same time we must not forget the work of MacLennan, who was an actual pioneer; while his successors are too numerous to mention.

Under the guidance of these masters we have learnt, from a study of the primitive races now existing on the earth, to know something of the earliest ideas of our race, and to realise that ideas which are found among the civilised peoples only in the form of folklore and, as we have been wont to call it, superstition, are really survivals of more primitive stages of culture up to the earliest, and that there must have been a time when these ideas were of the same living significance among the ancestors of those peoples as they are among the representatives of those ancestors to-day.

For one of the surest results of anthropology is this: that it has enabled us to lay down as an axiom that "man is everywhere and always the same," and that at corresponding stages of culture he will be found to possess identical religious ideas and social arrangements, and that, further, relics, or survivals, of his earliest ideas and arrangements will be found at every stage in the advancing culture of the higher races. The reason why there should be advance and progress among some races and not among others, while some have advanced a certain distance and then stopped, is to be found, as Major Lennard, following Mr. Haddon, and others have pointed out, above all in the nature of their environment, so that it may be taken as a broad but, on the whole, true generalisation that the races inhabiting the temperate zone have been progressive, and form the civilised peoples of history, while those whose lot was cast in the torrid or arctic zones were unprogressive and stationary. This holds good even when

one takes the natives of Australia, the most primitive of all existing races, into account, because there we have not only a most unpromising, though comparatively temperate environment, but the fact that these people have been isolated for untold ages from the rest of mankind.

In seeking out traces of primitive religious beliefs and social arrangements among the ancestors of the Hebrews which survived in the folklore of their descendants, as they do in our own, and have been transmitted to us in their sacred literature, we are not denying the inspiration of that literature nor the fact that, in the providence of God, it was the vehicle of that special revelation of Himself to Israel and through Israel to mankind which found its culminating point in the mission of the Christ, but we do throw fresh light on the methods of the Divine working, in showing that in this case, as in every other, God has to take men, so to say, as He finds them, and that His eternal purposes are only carried out through the slow but sure processes of evolution.[1]

It is now agreed that the earliest religious ideas of which we can find traces in the past, and of which we have evidences in the present, are comprised in what is known, following Prof. Tylor, as animism; along with which went, and goes, totemism as the basis of social arrangements.

Of man as he was when he first emerged from the brute stage we are too ignorant to be able to say anything positive, except that we know that he brought with him instincts which must be called 'religious,' and that he was gregarious, living probably in what might more properly be called a herd than a horde,

[1] See Robertson Smith, *Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, Preface.

though the horde was a very early development. Of Palæolithic man we know very little as to his religious ideas or social arrangements. His drawings show him to have been a consummate artist, and these were, without doubt, executed for a purpose, which purpose was in all probability both magical and religious. As M. Salomon Reinach says: "The study of the birth of religion is interwoven with that of the origin of art. Born simultaneously, art and religion were closely connected for long ages; their affinity is still evident enough to the thinking mind."[1] At this stage also man probably lived in family-groups, the tribe not having been yet developed.

It is when we arrive at the Neolithic stage of culture that we find animism and totemism ruling the religious and social life of man: the natives of Australia are, down to the present day, in what we may describe as the most primitive stage, though with varying degrees of complexity; in West Africa we find animism already passed into fetichism and polytheism, while totemism has been left behind; in North America we find animism, with totemism still a living force, though of a different sort from that prevalent in Australia; and it is from the survivals in folklore among the civilised races that we judge that they all passed through this stage at the beginning of their long career.

It is unnecessary to define terms in this article; but briefly stated it will suffice to say here that naturism and animism represent man's earliest outlook upon nature[2] of which traces remain, and that totemism

[1] *Art throughout the Ages*, p. 6.

[2] Using 'nature' here in its ordinarily accepted sense, as standing outside and apart from 'man'; of course we recognise, with Sir E. Ray Lankester, and all modern biologists, that, strictly speaking, man is himself a part of nature and involved in and circumscribed by the cosmic process.

represents the earliest social arrangement by means of which, through the practice of exogamy, in-breeding and marriage between close relations was avoided, through being made *tabu*.

Under the ideas hitherto embraced by animism, it is now agreed, two stages may be recognised: (1) the earliest, when man looks out upon nature and, knowing himself to be *alive*, concludes that all things that are are alive too and endowed with a personality similar to his own (this is the stage now called pre-animism or naturism); (2) arising out of this, and being in reality the philosophical explanation of this—for primitive man was at once a philosopher—that which Professor Tylor intended by animism, the doctrine of souls. Through the agency of dreams and other phenomena primitive man concludes that he is alive because of the soul, or souls, which he possesses, or which rather possess him, and therefore that all things that are are alive also because of the souls that possess them. It is when the soul becomes differentiated from the object—when, for example, we no longer speak of the 'living tree' or the 'living stone,' but of the tree-spirit or the stone-spirit, that a further advance is made in the evolution of religion, and polytheism and fetichism, with their attendant magic, begin. By this time, too, totemism is no longer a living basis of social life; it only survives in names and tribal traditions.

It is only upon the first stage, which is sometimes called, as I have said, pre-animistic, or the stage of naturism, that I will remark in this article, as an illustration of the light which the science of anthropology throws upon the Old Testament. Animism proper and totemism are reserved for future studies.

One of the most widespread ideas among primitive

races, and one that survives through all subsequent stages of culture in a more or less vital form, is that which is expressed, for want of a term in English which shall embrace its full connotation, by the Maori or Melanesian word *mana*, or the Iroquois *orenda*,[1] with which is connected the ideas belonging to another native word, now universally employed—namely, *tabu*.

"*Tabu*," as Mr. Marett says, "is the negative mode of the supernatural to which *mana* corresponds as the positive mode." In order to make the idea as clear as possible I will quote what Mr. Clodd, Mr. Marett and Mr. Hartland say in their most recent contributions to the subject, and we will then apply it, as briefly as possible, to our Old Testament study.

"The root idea in this pre-animism is that of power everywhere, power vaguely apprehended, but immanent, and as yet unclothed with personal or supernatural attributes." The idea that lies at the base of the religion of the jungle-dwellers in Chota Nāgpūr is that of power, or rather, of many powers. "Identity with this, or near correspondence in thought, underlies the Maori belief in a power or influence called *mana*, to which no personal qualities are attributed, and which can be conveyed in almost everything. With this may be compared the *orenda* of the Iroquois."[2]

"*Tabu* is not so much negative as prohibitive or even minatory; whilst *mana* is not merely positive but operative and thaumaturgic. 'Not to be lightly approached' is Codrington's translation for the corresponding word in the New Hebrides." A study of the subject shows that "there exists, deep-engrained in the rudi-

[1] There are other terms in other primitive languages which express the same idea, but these are the best, and best known.

[2] Clodd, 'Pre-animistic Stages in Religion,' *Transactions* of the Congress of Religions, Oxford, 1908.

mentary thought of the world, a conception of a specific aspect, common to all sorts of things and living beings, under which they appear as at once needing insulation, and as endowed with an energy of high, since extraordinary, potential. *Mana* is co-extensive with the supernatural, and the *mana-tabu* formula forms what Dr. Tylor calls 'a minimum definition of religion' better than does animism. Thus the ambiguity which lies sleeping in *mana* seems to persist to some extent even when religious experience is at its most self-conscious, and all religions, rudimentary and advanced, low and high, can join in saying with the Psalmist that 'power belongeth unto God.'"[1]

"Let it suffice to say that every man, surrounded by the unknown, would be oppressed by awe and wonder and the feeling of power which lay behind external phenomena. Interpreting those phenomena in terms of his own consciousness he would regard them as manifestations of personality. It would be inevitable that he would endeavour to conciliate or control these personalities. Fortunately he possessed in his own potentiality the means of accomplishing to a very large extent this object. Such inherent potentiality is called by the Algonquin tribes of North America *orenda*. In one form or another it is probably known throughout the lower culture. *Orenda* is perhaps best expressed by the English word potentiality, but it carries with it the notions of will, magic, luck, sacredness, mystery."[2]

Putting all this together, and applying it to the

[1] Marett, 'The Conception of *Mana*,' *Transactions* of the Congress of Religions, Oxford, 1908.

[2] Hartland: President's address to the Section on Religions of the Lower Culture (Congress of Religions, Oxford, 1908). Cp. the same writer's Presidential Address to the Anthropological Section of the British Association, York, 1906.

Old Testament, we can see at once the survival of the *mana-tabu* or *orenda* stage of culture in many passages which have been waiting for the light of anthropology to be cast upon them. Here, for example, we have the explanation of the 'sacredness' of Mount Sinai when Jahweh descended, and Moses went up to receive the tables of the law.[1]

"The mountain might not be touched."[2] It was *mana*, and therefore *tabu*. So, too, when the 'ark of Jahweh,' which enshrined and ensured his presence with his people, was captured by the Philistines, it caused a grievous plague among them, and, when it was placed in the temple of Dagon, the idol fell down before it.[3] Its *mana* was more potent than that of Dagon. So, again, when, on its return, the men of Bethshemesh looked into the ark of Jahweh, "the people lamented because Jahweh smote many of the people with a great slaughter";[4] and when David brought up the ark from Kirjath-Jearim, "Uzzah put forth his hand and took hold of it, because the oxen shook it, and the anger of Jahweh was kindled against Uzzah and God smote him there for his error, and he died there by the ark of God."[5] The ark was *mana* and therefore *tabu*.

In the same way the temple and all that was in it, as, in the priestly legislation, the tabernacle and all that it contained, were 'holy to Jahweh,' the priests and the Levites were holy, and indeed the whole people of Israel were a 'holy nation.'

The conceptions derived from the earliest ideas of primitive man survived to the latest stage of the nation's history and passed over to Christianity, where, among the nations converted to the faith, they met similar

[1] *Ex.* xix. 12, 13. [2] Cp. *Heb.* xii. 18, 20. [3] *I. Sam.* v. 3, 4.
[4] *I. Sam.* vi. 19. [5] *II. Sam.* vi. 6, 7.

survivals; and they survive to this day in the notions as to 'holy' places, persons and things which are found among ourselves.

A word must be said here about the ideas connected with the word חרם (KhRM), which in the sense of devoted, sacred, accursed, occurs so often in the Old Testament. It is derived from the same circle of ideas as those which belong to the *mana-tabu* formula. The people and goods of Jericho were חרם, banned, sacred to Jahweh,[1] and therefore accursed, and when Achan was found in possession of a portion of the treasure he was doomed to a fearful death. So, too, the Amalekites were חרם, devoted to Jahweh, and Saul was punished for allowing the people to run upon the spoil.[2]

The moral aspect of these and such transactions does not come before us. It lies outside the scope of primitive thought, which is rather non-moral than either moral or immoral; and although the Israelites had by then, and more particularly the writers of the stories who were of much later date, got far beyond the primitive stage, yet, so strong is superstition, that the ideas connected with it still maintain a vitality of their own, though the idea itself belongs to the far distant past. A person or thing is '*kherem*'—possessed of *mana*, says primitive man; banned, consecrated to God, says his descendant in a later stage of culture. It is enough, that person or thing is *kherem—tabu*, not to be touched, accursed; flee away as you would from death.

Let us next ask ourselves in this connection how it is that the Hebrew name for 'God' in general, as used by E and P and the later writers universally, is

[1] *Josh.* vi., vii. [2] *I. Sam.* xv.

Elohim, and why it is always used with a verb in the singular? The theological explanation is that it is a name of majesty, and the Church sees in it an adumbration of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. Be this as it may from the theological standpoint, the anthropological explanation is much simpler, and the truth of it *saute aux yeux* as soon as it is stated. In the word Elohim we are taken right back into the heart of the old pre-animistic religion. The *Encyclopædia Biblica* indeed, curiously enough, forsaking its usual *rôle* of pioneer, harks back to the most conservative view in its discussion of the word Elohim. "The usage of the language," it says, "gives no support to the supposition that we have in the plural form Elohim, as applied to the God of Israel, the remains of an early polytheism, or at least a combination with the higher spiritual beings (the 'sons of God' or 'sons of the gods' are, according to Hebrew usage, simply beings belonging to the class of Elohim). Rather must we hold to the explanation of the plural as one of majesty and rank." Now seeing that the use of a noun in the plural with a verb in the singular is confined to this solitary instance, and is absolutely unique, it cannot be said that "the usage of the language" supplies any criteria to go upon, beyond those which are supplied by the instance itself. Prof. Robertson Smith is much nearer the mark when he says: "If the oldest sanctuaries of the gods were originally haunts of a multiplicity of *jinn*, we should expect to find even in later times some trace of the idea that the holy place is not inhabited by a single god, but by a plurality of sacred denizens." Compare the localities, marked by sacred tree or stone, and by the deposition of *churinga*, where, as the Arunta tell us, remains of Alcheringa spirits lie in wait eagerly looking

out for the opportunity of new birth.[1] "I am inclined to think," Prof. Robertson Smith continues, "that this is the idea which underlies the use of the plural Elohim, and the Phœnician use of Elim, in a singular sense. Merely to refer this to primitive polytheism, as is sometimes done, does not explain how the plural form is habitually used to designate a single deity. But if the Elohim of a place originally meant all its sacred denizens, viewed collectively as an indeterminate sum of indistinguishable beings, the transition to the use of the plural in a singular sense would follow naturally. Further, the original indeterminate plurality of the Elohim appears in the conception of angels as Bnē Elohim, beings," as the *Encyclopædia Biblica* admits, "'of the Elohim kind.'" He goes on to compare the frequenting by angels of holy places such as Bethel and Mahanaim,[2] even when they have no message to deliver, and the facts that angels as sons of God form part of the old Semitic mythology, as in *Gen.* vi. 4, and that Jacob at Peniel, though wrestling with a nameless angel, *i.e.*

[1] See Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia.* The Arunta tribes in Central Australia believe that each living individual is descended from, or rather is the re-incarnation of, an ancestor who lived in the 'Alcheringa' times, *i.e.* times beyond which no tradition goes. Each of these ancestors, when dying, went either up into the skies or down into the ground. But each, ere he or she departed, deposited, in the locality where death took place, a *churinga.* In certain localities called Oknouikilla, there are swarms of Alcheringa spirits awaiting re-birth. This is what is referred to in the text. Unmarried women must be careful how they approach such localities, or they may become mothers unawares; and married women who may not wish to be mothers disguise themselves as old women, so as to avoid the ingress of the spirit-child. The *churinga* is a stone, or more generally a piece of wood, ornamented with various designs in dots and rings, similar to the cup-and-ring markings found on rock-surfaces all the world over, which marked the totem to which the deceased belonged. Consequently when a child is born among the Arunta, it is the duty of the father to search for the *churinga* of the locality (if one cannot be found it is made), and according to the markings on the *churinga* the totem of the child is decided, totally irrespective of the totem to which the father or mother belong. This system differs from that of all other primitive races, in which the totem of the child follows either that of the mother (the most primitive) or that of the father (a more advanced stage).

[2] *Gen.* xxviii. and xxxii.

a being with no distinctive individuality, is yet wrestling with Elohim.[1] In saying this Prof. Robertson Smith is entirely on the right lines, as any anthropologist will at once see; but I would go further back even than he does, and see in the Elohim a survival from a time when the class of deities or *jinns* was not yet differentiated from the living powers by which man is on all sides surrounded, *i.e.* it is a purely pre-animistic conception. The Elohim are the *strong ones*, the great powers and forces of nature, by which man is encompassed, and by virtue of which he and all things live. As I have said elsewhere: "The name Elohim, which in later times signified the one eternal God of the whole universe, and is so used in P and indeed wherever it occurs in the Old Testament,[2] carries us back to those primitive and far-away pre-Babylonian times when the ancestors of Israel were in the animistic stage of religion; for what are the Elohim but the spirits which animate all things, and by whom all things live?" And again, "the continued use of the word Elohim for God points back to the primitive animistic conception of nature which lies at the base of all later polytheistic ideas; but animism and polytheism are both negatived by the use of the verb in the singular."[3] That is to say, as Israel steadily left polytheism on one side, and left animism behind, and advanced through henotheism and monolatry to monotheism—as she purified the con-

[1] Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 445.

[2] That is, wherever it means 'God'; I am not unmindful of such passages as *Ex.* xxi. 6, and *Ps.* lxxxii. 1, 6, where it clearly means 'judges,' but even here the judges belong to a sacred locality and represent Him who sums up in Himself all judgment, *i.e.* God.

[3] Astley, *Prehistoric Archæology and the Old Testament*, pp. 160, 229. I should modify the words in this quotation now by carrying the idea of the Elohim back to the *pre*-animistic stage, and by speaking of them more generally as the invisible powers and forces of nature before they became thought of as animating spirits—and then as 'God.'

ception of Jahweh until he became her national god, and then went forward under the guidance of the prophets to conceive of Jahweh as the one absolute and eternal divine being, Jahweh himself became first '*Jahweh Elohim*,'[1] then '*Jahweh elohē Jishrael*,'[2] and finally '*Jahweh elohē col ha'arets*.'[3] The Elohim were summed up, concentrated, and finally lost in the majesty of Jahweh, whose transcendence and immanence can never be better expressed than in the French translation '*L'Eternel*.'[4]

Here we will close this article, only asking our readers whether it is not clear that 'the quest' upon which we have entered in this journal, at least in regard to primitive ideas which we find embedded in the pages of the Old Testament, may not be largely and magnificently assisted by a free and unfettered use of the light which is thrown upon the subject by the study of anthropology, the science of man ?

H. J. DUKINFIELD ASTLEY.

(This paper, and two to follow (namely, 'Animism in the Old Testament' and 'Totemism in the Old Testament'), were read in substance, as one contribution, in September, 1908, at Oxford, before the Third International Congress for the History of Religions. Advantage has been taken, by the author, of the lapse of time to incorporate some fresh material, to modify some statements, and to add some notes.—ED.)

[1] The LORD God ; lit. Jahweh of the Elohim.

[2] Jahweh God of Israel.

[3] Jahweh God of the whole earth.

[4] Cp. the illuminating discussion of the 'Elohim' in Prof. Eerdman's article, 'A New Development in Old Testament Criticism,' in *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1909, pp. 813-826.

CONCERNING THE AURA.

E. R. INNES.

I WRITE of 'things seen' and not as a philosopher or scientist; and so for the purpose of the present article I would venture to define man's aura as that air immediately surrounding him, which he is able to make vital in a particular way by the power of his presence.

If we think of every human being as a centre or focus, a point where the divine light or life is refracted or crucified, we may believe that the air immediately around is brightened or enlivened or intensified in a peculiar way due to this refraction or crucifixion. It depends upon the particular nature of the object which sets up this refraction how intense the power will be and how extensive.

In attempting to find out something about the human aura, let us first consider it in relation to the auras of animals—in what way is it the same as these, and in what ways does it differ. Animals, like men, have auras, as innumerable psychics will testify; but the nature or *timbre* of animal auras appears very different from that of men. Even plants and trees, rocks and stones have auras. I am not here referring to those peculiarly powerful auras possessed by many gems, born of age-long contact with other powerful natures; I speak of the rough and common stones of the wayside and their very primitive auras.

Now the first thing, in my experience, that the sensitive notices with regard to the auras of minerals,

plants and animals is that the life (if we may be permitted to speak of life in connection with minerals) which is energising in these surrounds, is ever going forth in an outward direction; it seems to go on and on indefinitely, and for this reason is more pure but less powerful than that life which energises in the surround of man. The limit of a plant's aura is far less defined than the limit of a man's aura. It is like the light of a candle out in the open; it becomes fainter and fainter gradually as one walks further from it, and almost imperceptibly disappears. It is almost impossible to draw a definite line of demarcation and to say that a plant's aura stops here or there.

The next thing which the sensitive observes when studying the auras of plants, is that the intensity and power of these auras do not vary very greatly. He seldom sees sudden flashes or changes of intensity in the auras of plants, such as are seen so constantly in those of men. There are certain seasons of the year when the fragrance of the aura is more pronounced and other seasons when it is less pronounced. When the sun is shining brightly this play of life, which is ever coming forth from the flower, is generally more easily perceived than when cold winds are blowing; but there is an evenness and continuity about the auras of minerals and plants which are not easily upset, and there is also the idea of this life proceeding forth without limit and in all directions.

Accordingly, the aura of nearly all plants and wild animals (about domestic animals I will speak later) is pleasing and health-giving to man. When man meets another man there is always the question of harmonising his aura to that of his companion; for human auras are specialised. This harmonising may be easily

effected or it may be done with difficulty; but in the case of plants and wild animals there is no adjusting or harmonising necessary, for their auras are not specific, they are more general or primitive.

The sensitive then, in contacting these nature-auras, experiences great refreshment. They are life-giving and soul-inspiring to his own aura; they have the effect of sweeping it clean or purifying it; they tend to de-specialise it, or urge it to return to a more simple or primitive mode of motion; and this for most men is exceedingly beneficial, restful and vitalising; for civilised man is very liable to become too specialised.

All that I have said so far applies, in my experience, to the auras of most animals. With the exception of a few highly developed domestic animals, the auras of animals are pure and not specific; they are primitive during most of their lives. There are, however, epochs in animal life when the auras change considerably, when they become far more intense and far more 'personal,' far more definite; when they display a certain amount of organisation or organic power. The time when this is most apparent is during the mating-season.

With domestic animals these times of greater specialisation of the aura occur more frequently. One may often meet a cat or a dog or a horse to whom one has to harmonise one's aura if one would avoid all friction. The aura of a dog trained to sport is very different from the aura of a dog not so trained. The aura of a horse who has been for years the pet of his master, is very different from the aura of a horse who has not received this personal and individual attention; there are continually moments of intensification and specialisation in his aura.

It becomes then very apparent to the sensitive how great is the responsibility of man in his relationship towards the animal kingdom. If he treats the animals under his care with kindness he is training their auras to expand and to vibrate in modes of affection; he is causing their auras to become vehicles of a life-giving and most refreshing power. If he treats them cruelly he is causing their auras to specialise along other lines; the auras become cramped and rigid and do not respond to the vitalising and soul-nurturing forces. In his relation towards the animal kingdom, we may well believe, man is laying the root-foundation of the auras of the coming races of animals—and of men; he is, as it were, sounding the key-note to which the great aura of the animal kingdom is learning to respond. Man is laying down the most primitive plan of organisation in the aura of the animal kingdom as a whole; for it is through contact with man far more than in any other way that the auras of individual animals become specialised.

I might here refer to the wonderful possibilities of soul-intercourse which are seen by the psychic to exist between man and animals. If a man has a pet animal he can train it to respond to him almost as he wills. If he treat it constantly with loving care, it will as constantly throw out radiations of devotion to him, and when he is weary will become for him a means of psychic refreshment. If he neglect his pet it will be for him no battery of soul-force, for he will not have specialised or organised the energy which is in its aura. If he treat it cruelly, the aura, instead of giving forth vital currents, will ever be recoiling back upon itself, drawing from him his psychic stamina.

The possibilities connected with the training of

animals were well understood in the olden days though, alas! the evil side of it was perhaps more widely known and practised than the good. What power, for instance, had the witch or the wizard without his cat? The modern practitioner of the 'occult arts' who shows any dependence upon his pet animal should be regarded with suspicion, for it can mean a most undesirable connection and dependence. Moreover, the evil may not be any less because the ignorant wizard is unconscious of the exact method of soul-sucking which he employs.

And now to come to the more special subject under consideration, namely, the human aura. The most marked difference which the psychic probably first notices is its definite line of limitation; the sensitive knows at once when he is within the limit of another man's aura and when he is outside it.

Let me say here that by aura I do not mean a man's thought-atmosphere. Perhaps it would be well to distinguish first between these two terms as I venture to employ them in this paper. By aura I mean that bright egg-shaped surround in which, to the sight of the psychic, every man lives. I do not mean anything which follows the outline of the human form, I mean that 'egg' within which the human form moves, that surround which is still egg-shaped whatever attitude the man may assume. The limit may at times be close around the human form, at other times it may extend to a considerable distance, but it is always more or less of an oval shape. What the normal extent of this surround is for each man seems to vary greatly with each individual. Some people have auras which normally do not extend for more than a foot around them, while others have the power to compel all objects

within many feet of them to vibrate in perfect harmony with their own keynote, and so they imprint their aura on things at a much greater distance. In large towns, where so many people of high civilisation are herded together, the auras of men seem to get much entangled and broken, if they attempt any great extension; but in the country, where man is freer and less likely to jostle up against other auras (for as I have already said nature-auras are primitive and not specific and can harmonise with any human aura), the human aura tends to expand and to reach its utmost limit. In such conditions people of power have been known to reach an auric limit not of feet but of many yards, though this is exceedingly rare. But the surround if uninterrupted may often extend for several feet. Perhaps this is one reason why, in all ages, those who desired to train and develop psychic capacity have been recommended to spend much time in solitude or in quiet retreats, for here the aura expands and grows and becomes active far more easily.

Now by mental atmosphere I mean something which though conditioned by space has practically no limit to its power of extension. The mental atmosphere of a man may, if conditions be favourable, reach from here to India or Australia; his aura never. If it did, he would not be man but what we may call super-man. One may suddenly become aware of being in the mental atmosphere of a friend no matter at what distance the friend may be, but this is quite a different experience from being within the natural aura of that person.

With regard to the possibility of 'projecting the aura' to a distance—a subject of great interest but with which I am not here specially concerned—the experience of the percipient is not that of coming in

contact with the projector's mental atmosphere but rather of being the recipient of a definite 'visit' as it were, and the visitation is perceived by means of a different order of sense-perceptions. One of the fundamental differences between experiences connected with auras and experiences connected with mental atmospheres seems to be that with the former there is always the idea of proximity, with the latter the idea of distance. Whether your friend be sitting in the next easy-chair or whether his aura is being projected towards you from a distance, the moment you contact this aura there is a feeling of closeness and proximity; in the latter case the first idea of the sensitive is "Why, so and so has *come* to see me." But with the second class of experiences, those which I have called coming into touch with a man's mental atmosphere, there is no idea of closeness or proximity. The experience is much more like communicating through a telephone; the idea of distance is always with you, but with it a new and immediate method of communication. Even though the agent be in the next chair or next room, if the contact with him be mental, there is no sensation of closeness. On the contrary, there is often the idea of extreme distance; your friend becomes a sort of vanishing point. But though this vista reveals extreme distance, it at the same time becomes a direct route to the man and so makes communication more real, intense and vital than talking with normal consciousness can ever be. This fundamental difference of closeness and distance, which is so very marked with psychics in these two different methods of communication, appears to me to be of great interest and suggests many ideas connected both with auras and mind, but these are somewhat outside the scope of the present paper.

To return then to the more general theme; let us consider first the idea of a definite limit or outline which appears in the auras of men but which does not appear in the auras of plants or animals, or is only slightly traced in animals' auras as they develop more and more mind, that is to say as they approach more and more nearly the human kingdom. This limit seems to be characteristic of mind. Mind seems to be a sort of magic circle which man casts around himself and which measures him off from infinity. It is as it were that which marks eternity out into rhythm.

I have compared the aura of a flower to a candle out in the open whose light gradually fades away in the distance. I would venture to compare the aura of the average man to an illuminated room—equal brilliance everywhere, beyond the fatal limit darkness. The brilliance at times appears of dazzling beauty and attractiveness, at other times appears artificial, not to say false. There may be moments when the blinds are drawn up or the doors and windows opened, and then the light shines forth further. But even then, though the limit of brightness alters, though the aura extends further, there is no idea of fading away or going forth indefinitely. The normal bright aura with which the man is surrounded throws forth a further less bright surround, a sort of shadowy reflection of itself; but this further surround has its own definite limit, and only tends to show up the outer darkness, it does not in any way blend with it. I am here endeavouring to describe what I believe to be the aura of the typical man, that is the creature, male or female, who works chiefly through his mind. When the man is thoroughly engrossed or self-absorbed all the blinds are down; when he is endeavouring to ray forth or be pleasant to other

people, he pulls up his blinds and sends forth a sort of secondary aura which is meant to blend with other people's, but it does not really do so in any fundamental way.

In this article I am trying to throw out for what they are worth a few general suggestions about different types of auras, ideas which have gradually been borne in upon me from practical observation; I am not attempting to deal with the personal idiosyncrasies of individual auras, though possibly it would have been easier to write about these.

Before leaving this stage in the evolution of the human aura, the stage where mind plays such a very important part, by creating a definite limit in order to bring about greater intensification—for even though this intensification may appear somewhat false in nature it serves a very definite purpose in the scheme of evolution—I should like to refer, briefly, to that method of communication between two souls which I have called mental or of the nature of mind. I fear from my description of the human aura I have made it appear that I believe man to be less in touch with the world around him than those creatures in which mind is less powerful and active. Now from some points of view I do most certainly believe that man while under the sway of mind is very ignorant of nature's inner calls, is possessed of little natural instinct; but lest I should appear to exaggerate the power of this limit I would point out that, though the birth of mind shuts off to a very great extent communication with the outer world by means of the auric surround, it opens up not only a new and direct method of communication with other men, but also a new route or way forth into space if I may so phrase the idea. To put

the same idea into language less expressive to the sensitive but possibly more intelligible to those who have no psychic vision; the animal communicates with the outer world almost exclusively through his senses, while man, though less keen in his sense-perceptions, has another inner means of communication.

From many points of view the aura can be thought of as the one common sensorium, the ground of all differentiated sense-centres. The animal's aura being primitive and not so specialised as man's, has not yet quite lost the power of this common mother-sense, the one common sense from and through which all our various senses are specialised. The animal's aura still goes to infinity, as it were, and retains a subtle but marvellous instinct which seems to embrace and synthesise all the sense-perceptions and add some further knowing to them. With man it is his mind which analyses all his sense-perceptions for him, and after so doing synthesises them and adds much further information; but his aura has become so specialised that it has lost much of the automatic synthesising power of instinct.

With regard to this new means of communication which man has with the outer world, how do its operations appear to the eyes of the psychic? The first appearance is that of a far stronger aura, a far greater intensification; the power of the man, his energy, instead of going forth indefinitely, is at a particular limit thrown back upon itself. With some men or at some times this energy seems to be thrown backwards and forwards as it were between the man and his auric limit until a regular network of intensity is traced within his aura. As far as my own observations warrant my drawing any inferences, I should say

that this is seen in people who are exceedingly self-centred (not necessarily selfish; by self-centred I wish to include a good as well as a bad meaning). It may tend to cramp the aura and cause selfishness, or it is sometimes seen as a condensing of the aura without any idea of cramp. The aura in some subtle way becomes more and more organised and materialised, and is definitely formed into a new sense-body. In some sort of inner way there appears to come about a return to that idea to which I have alluded before, the one sense or common sense; only this sense now appears to be much more organised. One might almost speak of it as not one great sense but infinite senses. There is developed in the aura the power automatically to create, as it were, at any moment any specialised sense which may be desirable, or perhaps it is simply the power to reproduce any sense which has ever been developed since the time when evolution began.

These seem to me the earliest and latest results of the birth of this mind-limit. First the intensification of the personality often accompanied in the beginning with selfishness, the cramping of the auric surround, and the loss of natural instinct; then the final triumph when by the doubling and redoubling back of the energy of the man, by, as it were, a wondrous play of vitality between his spiritual centre and his outer mirror-mind, there is brought about a new and definite organisation of the surround and a return to a higher form of instinct, possibly the creating of a vehicle of inspiration or intuition.

But between these two great epochs in the evolution of man's aura, there is another noticeable moment, a method of communication between man and the surrounding world—a method used by men of the present

day more than any other. I have spoken of the energy of the animal which ever goes forth through its aura infinitely; I have referred to the methods, one elementary and the other exceedingly advanced, in which this energy may play continually and exclusively within the man himself; but there is yet another method of procedure. Man soon learns that the selfish cramping of the aura, or the turning of all his energies on to himself, is most undesirable, that it only leads to misery, and so he gradually desires to go forth once more and *share* with other men. With the birth of unselfishness a new way is opened up. Mind has marked off a definite limit to the flow of the life-force outward, for man is on the return journey of the soul-life; but to the *inner* flow of the life there is no limit. In most men the play of the life-force is seen somewhat after this fashion: a gushing forth from a centre, a birth of energy in the aura; this energy is thrown back by the limit-mind and returns to its original centre to go forth infinitely in an inward direction. And man's true mental atmosphere, or what I mean by these words, is not as it were around him in space close to him as his aura is, but it is away infinitely in inner space. His mental atmosphere is not something which goes forth indefinitely from the man outwards; it is a shadowy something which is not created in our external space, but as his life energy rebounds back from his mental limit and becomes transformed into vital or living ideas, they go forth infinitely inwards towards an untraceable centre,—and it is here that we have to seek communion between mind and mind. Man does not communicate infinitely through his aura with other men as animals do, but he can communicate infinitely with other men through the vital breath, as it were, of

his mind. And so it must be understood that by mental atmosphere I do not mean any region of formal ideas—I mean a region more infinite in nature, not bound.

To sum up. The following epochs have been observed by some sensitives in the evolution of the aura from the mineral kingdom up to the human kingdom: first, in the mineral kingdom the aura is seen as a slight raying-forth of life, which does not extend to any great distance. Next, in the vegetable is observed the same raying-forth in every direction, with rather greater extension and more vitality. This further power in the aura might perhaps be spoken of as a fragrance, for such auras seem to fade away gradually and imperceptibly like scent in the atmosphere. Next, in the auras of wild animals may be noted the first beginnings of specialisation and organisation. These auras can be excited and made to show forth sudden changes. You cannot frighten the aura of a plant and cause it to contract suddenly, though it has a certain power of contraction and expansion according to whether the beneficent sun is shining or a bitter wind blowing; but sudden and marked changes may be seen in the aura of a wild animal when frightened or during the mating-season. Next in the aura of a domestic animal it is noticeable how much more frequent are these sudden impulses. There is often excitement causing contraction and expansion, and other marked differences in quality and substance. Coming then to the human kingdom, we here see first clear-cut auras, auras with greater brilliancy, greater power, but with well-defined limits of extension. This limit seems at first to bring about a certain cutting-off of the man from nature and his surroundings, a certain isolation.

Next the man learns to go forth infinitely inwards and brings to birth within himself another 'surround' which I have called his mental atmosphere, a new inner atmospheric condition, born direct from the limit-mind, and with this comes about new possibilities of communion. Isolation ceases; attraction outwards through the world of sense-perceptions ceases to hold absolute sway, for now there is for the man an inner counter-attraction. And it is between these two auric activities, the one without, the other within, that normal man is ever hovering like a bird poised in air. Then finally the union of these two modes of communion, when mind-perceptions and sense-perceptions unite in one common body, and there is born for the man a perfectly organised auric surround which combines within itself the powers of natural instinct and mental intuition, and which again becomes primitive or without definite limit; without definite epochs of passion, but with the capacity to emphasise at any moment any previous epoch in the evolution of the aura—an auric surround which can at different times show forth the powers and capacities of all other auras.

E. R. INNES.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

G. R. S. MEAD, B.A.

"I BELIEVE in . . . the resurrection of the flesh"; so runs the general creed of Christendom. In the Eastern symbol this appears as: "I look for the resurrection of the dead"; while the Western 'Quicunque' affirms: "All men shall rise again with their bodies. . . . This is the catholic faith."[1]

The intention of the first and third declarations, in the popularly called Apostles' creed and Athanasian creed respectively, is plain enough: the resurrection-body is to be the restored physical body. The Nicene symbol is less explicit; it contents itself with the hope of resurrection only, without further definition.

On the nature of the happening hoped for in this fundamental belief of the Christian faith, there has been, since the earliest times, the greatest difference of opinion. Omitting for the moment all reference to the views of the first two centuries, the best known advocate of the absolute physical identity theory is

[1] Both the Old Latin form (IVth century) and the Received form (VIIIth century) of the Apostles' creed have 'flesh' (*carnis*, *sarkós*); the Aquileian form (Rufinus, 390 A.D.) and the form of St. Nicetas (450 A.D.) have 'of *this* flesh' (*hujus carnis*). The Nicæno-Constantinopolitan symbol, in the Received form of the Eastern Church, dating from 381 A.D., has 'resurrection of the dead' (*anástasin nekrōn*); but the original Acta of the Nicene Council omit this clause altogether. The Symbolum Quicunque reads 'together with their bodies' (*cum corporibus suis*).

Tertullian. Writing in the earliest years of the third century, the great controversialist triumphantly concludes his treatise *On the Resurrection of the Flesh* with the most positive declaration possible that the flesh, that is the physical body, shall rise again in the case of every one—the very same flesh in its absolute identity and in its absolute integrity.[1]

The frankly materialistic view could hardly be stated more categorically. In subsequent controversies the more spiritual view is chiefly connected with the name of Origen; it is thus sometimes called the 'Alexandrian' view, but it can hardly be correctly limited by such a designation, for Origen based himself directly on Paul, and indirectly on many a philosopher and mystic who was not of Alexandria and its schools. Unfortunately this great thinker's treatise on the resurrection is lost; but from a Letter of Jerome to Pammachius,[2] we can recover a passage from Book IV. which is highly instructive.[3]

Origen, Jerome tells us, called the holders of the materialistic view '*simplices*,' '*philosarcas*' ('flesh-lovers'), '*innocentes et rusticos*,'—in Greek of course. This would seem almost to indicate that they could not then have been a very important body in the Christian world. Origen, however, was equally opposed to another extreme view which, he avers, would have it that the resurrection-body was to be of a purely

[1] "*Resurget igitur caro, et quidem omnis, et quidem ipsa, et quidem integra.*"—*De Carn. Res.* 59, ed. Kroyman, 1906; *Corp Scriptt. Latt.* (Acad. Vind.), vol. 47.

[2] *Ep. s. Hieron.* 38 *ad Pammach.*

[3] C. Ramers, in his *Des Origenes Lehre von der Auferstehung der Fleisches* (Trier, 1851), is hard put to it to reconcile this passage with his interpretation of isolated statements found elsewhere in Origen's works. For a sketch of the history of the subsequent controversy see 'The Resurrection-Body: A Study in the History of Doctrine,' in *The Church Quarterly Review* (April, 1909), lxviii. 138-163.

phantasmal nature—the theory of extreme 'docetism.' This, he declares, was the view of a number of the Gnostic schools, though we doubt whether it can be fairly stated quite so crudely; in some respects these Gnostics seem to have held views on this subject very similar to those of Origen himself.

What, Origen begins by asking, is the use, in the resurrection, of a body of flesh, blood, sinews, and bones, of limbs and organs for functions of the flesh, such as eating and drinking, excretion and procreation? Are we to continue to do all these things for eternity? The promise is far otherwise. Neither the matter nor the form will be the same. There is, however, a real *continuum* of individuality, a substantial ground of personal identity.

Hidden in the seed of the tree is the principle (*ratio*, *logos*) of the tree. This is the formative power (*virtus*, *dynamis*) in the seed, the spermatic principle, which is called symbolically in Greek *spinthērismos*. What the precise meaning of this last term may be is difficult to say, for the lexicons are silent. It means, literally, 'emission of sparks'; now 'light-spark' or 'light-emanation' was used by the Gnostic schools as the symbolic expression for the 'germ' of the spiritual man. Here it is used generally as the invisible principle within the visible seed, that which gives birth to the visible seeds, and seems to be conceived as a substantial something; for in it, in the case of human bodies, is said to inhere the immemorial principles of resurrection. It is compared with the innermost part or 'pith' of plants, and is called by Origen, in the case of man, the 'nursery' or 'seed-plot' (*seminarium*) of the dead; that is the ground from which they will rise.

It is the substance of many forms of bodies of

man, and not only of the body of flesh. The body of the resurrection, according to Origen, is to be of a more spiritual nature; indeed elsewhere he calls it 'divine.' "Another body, a spiritual and ætherial one, is promised us; a body that is not subject to physical touch, nor seen by physical eyes, nor burdened with weight, and which shall be metamorphosed according to the variety of regions in which it shall be. . . . In that spiritual body the whole of us will see, the whole hear, the whole serve as hands, the whole as feet." It will be a radical change of *schema*, or plan, says Origen, quoting Paul. If the stories of the risen body of Jesus being sensible to touch and eating food, are here objected, Origen replies that the Master made it appear so in order to strengthen the faith of the doubting disciples.

From this time onwards the controversy became more and more embittered. Speaking very roughly, and bearing in mind a number of exceptions on either side, the materialistic interpretation dominated the Western or Latin and the spiritualistic the Eastern or Greek Church. After hesitation Augustine adopted in its full sense the physical view; and by the time of Gregory the Great, at the end of the VIth century, this had become so firmly established that the philosophical interpretation could safely be condemned as utterly heretical. And so it continued throughout the middle ages.

Though the Reformers rejected the dogma of transubstantiation in the Eucharistic sacrament as being, in spite of the subtleties of the schoolmen, of a too material nature, they nevertheless, strangely enough, took over practically without question the naïve physical view of the nature of the resurrection-body. Thus Article IV. of the Anglican Church, in complete

accord with Tertullian, reads: "Christ did truly rise again from the dead, and took again his body, with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature."

Of more recent years, however, with the application of an improved method to biblical study and a better knowledge of the history of the evolution of dogma, the pendulum has been swinging strongly in the direction of a more spiritual and philosophical view;[1] indeed it is not too much to say that it is difficult for some of us to meet with anyone of education now-a-days who believes in a crude physical resurrection. The rationalistic denial of such materialism, based on the prejudices of an equally materialistic view of science, however, is no longer in fashion. Latterly there have been marked signs of a desire to reconsider the whole question by the light of an improved psychology which shall endeavour to take all the facts of human experience into consideration without prejudice. A truly scientific psychology of religious experience is being inaugurated; the *data* of psycho-physical and psychical phenomena are being busily collected, both from present experience and from the accounts of similar experience in the past, and these *data* are being submitted to a searching analysis; and it is very evident to all who have followed such enquiries without prejudice that the study of the varieties of such experience is a necessary preliminary to considering adequately any theory of the nature of the resurrection-body.

Moreover, the analysis of the New Testament

[1] See the interesting and instructive paper by Firmin Nicolardot, '*La Résurrection de Jésus et la Critique depuis Remarus*,' in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, tom. lix., no. 3 (Mai-Juin, 1909), pp. 318-332. R. died in 1768. His notes on the subject were first published among other fragments of his writings by Lessing, at Wolfenbüttel, in 1777.

documents touching the nature of the risen body of Jesus shows us that already in the beginning there was a strong difference of opinion. In spite of all efforts at harmonisation, there is little doubt that the general intention of the synoptic writers and the general view of the Pauline documents are at open variance. The intention of the synoptic evangelists is plainly to lay stress on the physical reality of the risen body. The retention of the stories of the empty tomb, the taking of food, etc., all indicate the anxiety to make it clear that the body that was raised was the identical body that suffered death. In the fourth gospel (xx. 14, xxi. 4), however, the stories of the difficulty of recognition and of complete non-recognition, and in the appendix to Mark (xvi. 12) of a changed form, indicate quite as clearly another view.

The belief in the resurrection of the physical body was, no doubt, the belief of the Jewish populace of the time; not only so but they held that a living physical body could ascend or be taken to heaven, for the scriptures affirmed that Enoch and Elijah had so been taken up; and still further they believed that the miracle of revival, of restoration to life of the dead, had been wrought through Elijah, Elisha and Ezekiel. Indeed we learn from the Talmuds not only that belief in such wonder-working extended to what had been done in the past, but that it was held to be a present possibility. It was one of the main articles of Pharisaic faith. Of the seven classes of Pharisees the most holy were those who were Pharisees from pure love to God.[1] For these Ḥasīdīm there was a gradual growth in holiness, or sanctity, of ten degrees, the tenth stage being the power of prophecy; but even beyond this there was the

[1] *Jer. Berachoth.* ix. 5; *cp. Sotah*, v. 5.

consummation of the spiritual powers of healing the sick and raising the dead.[1]

The early Christians of every grade, then, it is to be supposed, must have recognised that there was a similarity between the works of revival and the ascension-wonders related of the ancient prophets and those of Jesus; and yet they, apparently, held that the resurrection of the body of Jesus was absolutely unique. If we ask in what this wide difference consisted, the reply of conservative scholarship is practically that all the statements of the gospels are to be taken as equally authentic and authoritative. In the case of the revival wonders, the dead who were restored to life were restored to the identical body subject to all its previous conditions; whereas in the case of the resurrection of Jesus the body was the same yet not the same; generally speaking it was identical, but in some ways it was released from material conditions, *e.g.* it could pass through closed doors. It might here be objected that the body of Elijah was equally the same and yet not the same; indeed there is no question of identity at all, for Elijah had not died; and that his body was in some way released from material conditions is to be understood, as he is related to have been taken to heaven in a chariot of fire.

If we seek the aid of a more liberal criticism, however, we find that the frankly material elements of the resurrection-narratives are rejected as unhistoric. It may be objected by believers in the absolute historicity of the whole of the narratives that this is an *à priori*

[1] *Bab. Aboda Sara*, 20*a*. There are no less than five recensions of this *boraitha*, two in the Jer. and two in the Bab. Talmud, and one in *Midrash Rabba* This tends to prove that the tradition is ancient, and Jellinek, a high Talmudic authority, unhesitatingly declares that it is a description of Essenism.

judgment. That, however, is more or less true whatever view is taken; and the writers of the New Testament documents, with the possible exception of Paul, who reports at first hand, cannot be fairly excluded from this disability. It is, therefore, necessary to inform ourselves as to the views of the contemporaries of the earliest Christians and of the evangelists on the subject of the resurrection.

As has been already said, the belief of the populace was in all likelihood still largely of a material nature; the resurrection was to be a return to life under previous physical conditions in order to participate in the Messianic kingdom on earth. But this is not quite certain even for the mass of the people, for more spiritual views were widespread. Among the Ḥasīdīm and Essenes, among the cultured of the Pharisees (this is specially to be seen among apocalyptic writers who were strongly influenced by Persian ideas), such materialistic views had long been abandoned, and it is probable that the popular views also had undergone considerable change in the last century B.C. Referring to the general development during this period of eschatological ideas, that is of belief in the 'latter things'—the end of the world and of man—Prof. Charles, than whom we have no greater authority, tells us (*En. Bib.*, 'Eschat.') that "the hope of an eternal Messianic kingdom on the present earth is all but universally abandoned. The earth as it is, is manifestly regarded as wholly unfit for the manifestation of this kingdom." The views of the last century B.C. on the resurrection show a great development on those of the preceding century. With some the resurrection is to be entirely spiritual; with others there is to be a resurrection of the body of the righteous, only this

'body' is to be a garment of light, and those who possess it are angelic. With the first century A.D. "the transcendent view of the risen righteous becomes more generally prevalent. The resurrection involves the 'spirit' alone; or, the righteous are to rise vestured with the glory of God, or with their former body, which is forthwith to be transformed and made like that of the angels." Alexandrian writers and the Essenes not only held the more spiritual view of the resurrection, but also that, instead of awaiting the resurrection in Sheōl (Hadēs), "the entrance of the righteous spirit on a blessed immortality is to follow on death immediately."

Here then we have a variety of views, from the gross materialism of the populace to the high spiritualism of the mystics and religio-philosophers. The view the synoptic writers most strongly favour is in consonance with the belief of the people; the doctrine of the body of glory is the doctrine of Paul, and was no doubt confirmed in him by his own personal experience in his vision of the Master. We know how strongly opposed Paul was to the 'after the flesh' doctrine; he himself at any rate made no attempt to 'harmonise' himself with it. Paul's doctrine as to the resurrection-body is summarised by Prof. Charles as follows:

"This present body is psychical as an organ of the psychè or 'soul,' just as the risen or spiritual body is an organ of the 'spirit.' Thus as the psychical body is corruptible, and clothed with humiliation and weakness, the spiritual body will enjoy incorruptibility, honour and power. Hence between the bodies there is no exact continuity. The existence of the one depends on the death of the other. Nevertheless there is some essential likeness between them. The essential like-

ness proceeds from the fact that they are successive expressions of the same personality, though in different spheres. It is the same individual vital principle that organises both."

If then among cultured and mystic Hebrews there were high views of the resurrection-body, equally so among the early Christians are similar views found. Not only Paul but many other early Christian mystics held views that we can hardly doubt were based on experience, and which seem to throw light on the problem. Now it is to be noted that Tertullian (*D. R. C.* 19) is specially annoyed with those whom he opposes (*pars diversa*), because they say the resurrection is to be taken in a spiritual sense. These he stigmatises as allegorists, and contends that they would make it all a purely figurative thing. They say, he asserts, "that 'death' is really not the separation of body and soul but ignorance of God, whereby the man being dead to God lies buried in error as though in the grave; that the only resurrection worth considering is when on the coming of truth the man, reanimated and made alive again by God, casting off the death of ignorance, bursts forth from the grave of the 'old man,' for the Lord himself likened the Scribes and Pharisees to 'whitened sepulchres.' Whence it follows that they who have attained the resurrection of faith are with the Lord when they have put Him on in baptism."

Tertullian, who was himself subsequently condemned for the 'heresy' of Montanism, characterises such belief as the 'mysteries of heretics' (*arcana haeretica*); they seem, however, in their general outlines, not to have been secret teachings, but widely proclaimed; for he continues: "Indeed the majority (*plerique*) though claiming that there is a resurrection of the soul after

its departure [from the body], interpret the coming forth from the grave as escaping from the 'world,' inasmuch as the 'world' is the dwelling place of the 'dead,' that is of those who know not God, or even as the escape from the body itself, because the body also like a grave keeps the soul shut up in the death of the worldly life."

But for the spiritually experienced this was a very real happening and not an arbitrary interpretation, as Tertullian would have it; and in some schools it was associated with the first true initiation into the *arcana* of the spiritual life. If we interpret the short passage of Irenæus (I. xxiii. 5) that summarises the teachings of Menander, by the light of recent religio-historical research and by what we know generally of the nature of the main psychology of the Gnostic schools, we find that this mystic, who was strongly imbued with Chaldæo-Magian mystery-lore, and stood on the borderland between it and general Christian doctrines, taught that the chief end of the gnosis was the overcoming of the 'world' and its 'rulers.' This could be achieved only by means of the resurrection, that is to say, by being brought into immediate contact with the Saving Power through one in whom that Spirit was already active, by means of a baptism which must have been of a spiritual nature, for it was believed to bestow upon the recipient an earnest of immortality and of eternal youth, and this could not very well apply to the physical body.

The clearest form of the teaching to which Tertullian refers, however, is to be found in the composite Naassene Document quoted by Hippolytus (v. 7 ff.).[1]

[1] For the analysis of this document, see my *Thrice-greatest Hermes*, i. 142 ff.

Speaking of the primal Spiritual Man, the Pagan commentator (who is almost certainly pre-Christian) of the Greek mystery-hymn that forms the text of the whole exposition, tells us that this Immortal Man is buried in mortal man. And so we learn (§8) that in their mystery-teaching "the Phrygians call Him also Dead—when buried in the body as though in a tomb or sepulchre." On this the Christian Gnostic writer, who years afterwards commented on the Pagan and Jewish commentators who had preceded him, adds two quotations either from some lost Gnostic gospel, or—can it possibly be? —even from a lost collection of Sayings, as follows:

"This is what is said:

"'Ye are whited sepulchres, filled with the bones of the Dead,[1] for Man, the Living One, is not in you.'

"And again He says:

"'The Dead shall leap forth from their graves'[2]—that is, from their earthly bodies, regenerated, spiritual, not fleshly.

"This is the Resurrection that takes place through the Gate of the Heavens, through which all those who do not pass remain Dead."

We thus see that the Resurrection is equated with the New Birth or Birth from Above, the Spiritual Birth out of or through the pure virgin substance into the consciousness of immortality.

The Pagan commentator continues: "The same Phrygians again call this very same [Man or man], after the transformation, God [or a god.]" And on this the Christian writer notes: "For he becomes God when, rising from the Dead, through such a Gate, he shall pass into Heaven."

[1] Cp. what underlies Mt. xxiii. 27, Lk. xi. 44 and Acts xxiii. 3.

[2] Cp. what underlies Mt. xxvii. 52, 53.

The mystery of *apotheōsis* or *athanasia* was not, however, to be deferred to *post-mortem* existence, though it had to be preceded by a mystical death. It was a mystery wrought in the living body of a man. With such rites and spiritual operations the members of most of the Christian Gnostic schools seem to have been familiar; but what many of them sought to do was to introduce a unique element in the case of Jesus. Thus we are told that even one and the same school was divided in opinion as to the mystery of the spiritual resurrection in the case of Jesus. The widespread Valentinian movement was so divided. In its Western tradition (Hipp., vi. 35) Jesus was said to have had, like all men, a psychic body, that is a fleshly, mortal vehicle of the soul. The resurrection from the dead was operated by the baptism of the Spirit. The popular story of the descent of the dove signified the descent of the Spirit, which they regarded in this connection as the Logos of Supernal Wisdom; the descent of the Spirit was the resurrection or coming to life and consciousness in the mortal man of the Spiritual Man. The Eastern tradition, on the other hand, had refined the uniqueness of Jesus to the utmost; they contended that the body of Jesus already from birth was the spiritual body; now though this 'body' from one point of view was the most real of all substantial things, from the physical standpoint it was an 'appearance,' and therefore the Eastern Valentinians were regarded as extreme 'docetists.'

In brief, it may be said that all the Gnostic schools repudiated the doctrine of a fleshly resurrection, and centred their interest in a more immediate and spiritual interpretation of the mystery. When we say 'spiritual,' it is of course not to be supposed that this means a

condition of things absolutely removed from all possibility of manifestation; that is, spiritual in an absolute sense, as entirely divorced from every thing other than itself, if such a thing be possible. According to Paul the 'spiritual' body is not a body of pure spirit, which would be, philosophically speaking, an absolute contradiction in terms, but a body capable by its purity of manifesting the immediate power of the spirit. This, the 'fleshly,' psychic body, he believed, could not do. The spiritual body was a 'glory,' a body of power. In the Gnostic *Pistis Sophia* we have a magnificent description of the post-resurrectional body of glory of the Master, the vesture of light, which is practically the vehicle of all the supernal powers of the universe. In the Gnostic *Hymn of the Pearl*, the robe of glory is sealed with the names or powers of the Divine hierarchy from the King of Kings downwards.

Many of these sublime descriptions are, no doubt, largely conditioned by the feeling that the physical body is a thing of dishonour or, at any rate, of humiliation; but this cannot really be so as viewed in the greater life, and in spite of the crudity of the belief in the resurrection of the actual physical body, there seems to be at the back of it the dim intuition of a certain great truth—namely, that the *whole* man must embrace the physical as well as the psychic, the mental and the spiritual. Did the mystics then believe that there was an absolute divorcement in every sense between the physical or material vehicle and the 'spiritual body' of the resurrection? It seems already pretty evident that they did not do so. Tertullian's contention that the interpretation he opposes is merely what might be termed the 'reification' of a metaphor, or even at best an immaterial moral regeneration, as

many may regard it to-day, is not, apparently, what was believed. Most of the Gnostics, at any rate, held that in the spiritual rebirth something most real in all senses, some *substantial* as well as moral change, was wrought in them. If we read them aright, they believed that with truly spiritual 'repentance' or the 'turning-back' of the whole nature to God, that is, with effective moral regeneration, the actual body or ground of resurrection was substantially brought to birth in them. Was this, then, simply some subtle body of identical or even somewhat changed physical form, capable of manifesting more extended powers than the 'flesh'? Yes and No. It was not *a* body in any order of subtle bodies in immediate sequence with the physical body, of which so much is heard among the psychics of all ages; it was rather the source of every possibility of embodiment, the germ-ground or *seminarium* from which all such bodies could be produced.

Now some have attempted to interpret the dogma of the resurrection of the physical body according to the belief in reincarnation, and so would have the resurrection-body to be the 'again-rising of the flesh' in the form of a new physical body in a subsequent physical life. It is true that many of the Christian as well as Pagan Gnostic schools believed in transmigration, or transcorporation; they held, however, that the body of the resurrection was a body of freedom and not a body of bondage. The great change wrought at the resurrection was fundamental, it freed man from the constraints of 'fate,' from the dominion of the 'rulers.'

Fortunately we possess a mystery-ritual, or rather the ritual of a mystic rite of personal religion, that gives us clear indications of the direction in which we

should look to envisage the nature of this resurrection-body. It purports to be the innermost rite of the Mithriaca, and from it we learn that the 'perfect body' was fundamentally quintessential; it was primarily differentiated into simple subtle elements, whereas the physical body was conditioned by the gross mixed elements. It is by means of this 'perfect body' that the new birth into immortality is consummated. That this is so may be seen from the opening invocatory utterance of the ritual, which runs as follows:

"O Primal Origin of my origination; Thou Primal Substance of my substance; First Breath of breath, the breath that is in me; First Fire, God-given for the Blending of the blendings in me, First Fire of fire in me; First Water of my water, the water in me; Primal Earth-essence of the earthy essence in me; Thou Perfect Body of me! . . .

"If, verily, it may seem good to you, translate me, now held in my lower nature, unto the Generation that is free from Death; in order that, beyond the insistent Need that presses on me, I may have Vision of the Deathless Source, by virtue of the Deathless Water, by virtue of the Deathless Solid, and by virtue of the Deathless Air; in order that I may become re-born in Mind; in order that I may become initiate, and that the Holy Breath may breathe in me; in order that I may admire the Holy Fire; that I may see the Deep of the [New] Dawn, the Water that doth cause the Soul to thrill; and that the Life-bestowing Æther which surrounds all things may give me Hearing."[1]

The above are a few rough notes on a theme of intense interest and enormous importance; they might

[1] Dieterich (A.), *Eine Mithrasliturgie* (Leipzig, 1903); see my *A Mithriac Ritual* (London, 1907).

be largely added to and developed to very considerable length. Before concluding, however, it may be as well to note that in the doctrine of the 'triple embodiment' of the Buddha, which seems also to have been the doctrine of those who were more intimately acquainted with the mysteries of the Christ-nature, the Perfected Man in final self-realisation becomes as to his substance one with Nature, and therefore uses the bodies of all creatures as the 'corpuscles' of His True Body.

Finally, there may be added a paragraph from Kohler's article on the 'Resurrection' in the recently published *Jewish Encyclopædia*, that may be of a somewhat startling nature for those who are unacquainted with the state of affairs in reformed Judaism.

"In modern times the belief in resurrection [*sci.* of the body] has been greatly shaken by natural philosophy, and the question has been raised by the Reform rabbis and in rabbinical conferences whether the old liturgical formulas expressing the belief in resurrection should not be so changed as to give clear expression to the hope of the immortality of the soul instead. This was done in all the American Reform prayer-books. At the rabbinical conference held at Philadelphia it was expressly declared that the belief in the resurrection of the body has no foundation in Judaism, and that belief in the immortality of the soul should take its place in the liturgy."

May we venture to hope that Christian ecclesiastics also may be no less courageous in setting their house in order, even if they do not, as we hope they will not, go so far as the Reform rabbis. There seems to be another way out, as we have tried to indicate.

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AN EARLY JUDÆO-CHRISTIAN HYMN-BOOK.

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THE surviving catalogues of books current in the early Church, and marked with various degrees of approval, contain two works which are referred to the authorship of Solomon, outside those which are commonly ranged under his name in the Old Testament and the Apocrypha. These two works are known respectively as the Psalms and the Odes of Solomon. They are commonly grouped together, as though they were circulated in a single volume, and had something more in common than the assumed authorship of the supposed wisest of men. First of all a word or two with regard to the Psalms of Solomon. These have been known for several hundred years, and there are as many as eight Greek MSS. which contain them. Once upon a time they stood in the great Alexandrian Bible of the British Museum, whose index contains a reference to eighteen Psalms of Solomon which were formerly found within the covers of the book but have long since been eliminated or lost. When this book first came to light, there were serious attempts, on the part of those who are "insolent to maintain tradition" (as Milton puts it), to prove that they were really written by Solomon, and therefore entitled to a

canonical rank not very far removed from that of the collection which passes under the name of David.

As soon, however, as criticism was brought to bear upon these eighteen Psalms, it became evident that they not only had nothing to do with Solomon and his wisdom, but that they belonged to the half century preceding the birth of our Lord, and that they were the record of the fears and of the triumphs of the Jewish people during the first great Roman invasion under Pompey. One had only to read the history of that invasion, to be sure of the situation that provoked the songs. If Pompey was welcomed to Jerusalem by the rival factions who there contended for supremacy, and found the walls garlanded before his triumphal entry and the streets prepared for his passage, all of this finds an echo in the Psalms. When he turned his battering-ram against the Temple fortifications, and forced his way, with unheard-of audacity, into the Holy Place, and made the city run with blood, all of this goes into verse:

"With sinful pride and the force of his ram,
He beat down the mighty walls;
And Thou, O God, didst not hinder him.
Heathen peoples trod Thy altar with their shoes on!"

So the Psalmist begins one of his lamentations over the capture of Jerusalem in the year 63 before Christ. Over against this wailing we come presently to an outburst of exultation over the fall of the great dragon, and his death on the Egyptian shore, and over the unburied body that lay tossing on the waves. It is the situation recorded by the historians, when Pompey, defeated at the Battle of Pharsalia, fled to Egypt, and was stabbed in the back by one of his centurions as he was landing;

his despised body found its sepulture at the hands of a single faithful soldier, who made for him a funeral pyre out of the remains of an old fishing-boat.

So there was no doubt that a monument of Palestinian literature (perhaps written originally in Hebrew) had been recovered; and since the death of Pompey in 48 B.C. was the chief and immediate occasion for the exultation to which we have referred, the recovered document, well-known for a long time but not properly understood or interpreted, belonged to the half century before the birth of our Lord. It is not necessary to say more about this book, as any one can verify the matter for himself with a very little trouble. But since a little investigation into the early book-catalogues of the Christian Church will show that the Psalms of Solomon were very nearly of the same compass as the missing Odes of Solomon, with which they were commonly bound up, we are entitled to say that another book, of about the same length, and perhaps of similar character and belonging to nearly the same time and place, was to be looked for. And it was worth the search, for the period suggested for its production and the country suggested for its origin, are both important, whether to the historian of the Church or of the world.

But it will be said at once, that this is, after all, mere speculation: "You only know the size of the book; you do not know that it was really coeval or collocal with the Psalms of Solomon." Let us then see what we can further find out in regard to it; first by excavating fragments that may be reasonably referred to it, and second by disinterring the book itself.

The first part of the enquiry results in two

important suggestions. The missing Odes were quoted by the Christian father Lactantius at the beginning of the fourth century: he quotes one single passage, and the scribes of his work annotate that it was from the XIXth, or XXth, Ode of Solomon, and he quotes it in a Latin translation. We shall see presently that the piece quoted is in the XIXth Ode of the recovered book. The Odes were translated in Latin, then, by the beginning of the fourth century A.D. They can hardly be late inventions; antiquity is their first recovered mark.

The next important point is the discovery that a series of Odes of Solomon were quoted in a most curious Coptic book in the British Museum, known as the *Pistis Sophia*, the *Faithful Wisdom*, or *Faith Wisdom*. This book is the chief of the Gnostic books that have come down to us. It was written in the latter part of the third century, where again antiquity is on the side of the Odes to which reference is made. And those scholars who examined the embedded fragments found no difficulty in affirming that they went back at least to the second century, and probably to the beginning of the second century. That is a very respectable age, and any document belonging to that period has to be reckoned with by the students of history or of dogma. If I can succeed in putting it fifty years earlier still, the situation will be an interesting one: we want some fresh first century documents.

Now we cannot dig the borrowed matter out of the pages of the *Pistis Sophia*, and leave the rest without further remark, as we might do in the case of Lactantius. What Lactantius thought of the book matters little; we simply take him by the throat and

say: Give back what you borrowed, and then go your way. But in the case of the *Pistis Sophia* it has been suspected that the quotations were made by a Gnostic from a book which was itself Gnostic, and if that should turn out to be the case, there would be an especial meaning in the situations in which we find extracts from the Odes, and we should have to read the text, to some extent, in the light of the commentary. I must, therefore, try in a few words to explain the situation as regards the Gnosticism of the *Pistis Sophia*, and to show how it came about that Harnack believed the Odes of Solomon to be Gnostic in origin, though not so pronouncedly Gnostic as the work with which they were incorporated. A few words, then, with regard to the *Pistis Sophia*. You can read this book, at your leisure and at your pleasure, in the English translation which has been made by Mr. Mead. Harnack says it is a mad book, an exhibition of systematic lunacy—and I am afraid most people would agree with him; but he was also careful to point out that there was a genuine Christianity underlying the aberrancy and obscurity of the writer. We can get a rough idea of the book as follows:

The scene is laid on the Mount of Olives, where Jesus is sitting with His disciples, male and female.

It is the twelfth year after the Resurrection; for eleven years Jesus has been teaching His disciples the mysteries of the Kingdom of God; at the end of that time He has ascended to the place of the Prime Mystery (which is the Gnostic expression for the Supreme God); this ascension took place while they were sitting with Him on the Mount of Olives and he was suddenly transfigured before them. A Light-Power, or Glory, of the Supreme Being, descends from

the twenty-fourth or highest Mystery and surrounds Jesus with splendour. The disciples were amazed and terrified at the sight. While they gazed on Him, Jesus ascended into Heaven. After a while Jesus, out of compassion for their fears, for they thought the end of all things was at hand, descended again and appeared to the disciples. He begins to teach them further the secrets of the Kingdom. He explains to them their own miraculous births, the miraculous birth of John the Baptist and His own incarnation. He tells them the story of His ascent through the various heavens and the orders of spiritual beings, 'thrones, dominations, princedoms, virtues, powers.' They proceed to interrogate him on various points. The company consist of Peter, John, Andrew, Philip, Thomas, Matthew, James, Bartholomew and Simon the Kanaanite; Mary the Magdalene and Mary the Mother of Jesus, Martha and Salome are all mentioned. The chief place is given to the enquiring women, especially to Mary Magdalene, the lowest place to Simon Peter. Between Mary Magdalene and Peter there is something like a feud. Peter complains that the women talk too much and that the men don't get a chance; and Mary complains that "Peter hates our sex and wants to suppress us." Jesus mediates gently between them; advises Mary to make place for the brethren; but when the dispute breaks out again, Jesus definitely takes the side of the women, and Peter is suppressed. The meaning of this is that there has been a conflict over the place of women in the ministry of the Church; it is even possible that the hostility of Peter may imply the attitude of the Roman Church towards the prophesying woman of the early centuries. At all events there has been an acute situation created, which

has found its reflection in the Gnostic circles in which our book was produced.

Jesus answers a number of enquiries as to the worlds through which He has passed, and then we come to what is the kernel of the first part of the book, the account of the sorrows of Sophia, or, as she is called in the book, Pistis Sophia. Jesus relates how He found Sophia sitting below the thirteenth Æon. She was mourning over her inability to rise further. Her path was blocked by fearful forms, named Προβολαὶ Αὐθαδοῦς, or Emanations of the Self-willed. They and the rulers of the upper regions prohibit her advance and ascent. One of them had the face of a lion, half flame and half darkness. They chase poor Sophia back into Chaos. But in the midst of her affliction, she sees Jesus passing by, and to Him she addresses a series of Repentances and Hymns. Jesus relates these successively to His disciples. The method of the composition must now be carefully studied: we shall find the key in the lock.

Sophia makes her penitence, let us say, from one of the canonical Psalms. But in using this, she carefully alters every possible term in a Gnostic sense: instead of God, she says Prime Mystery or Light of Truth; instead of my adversaries, she says the Emanations of the Self-Willed; by a series of substitutions of this kind she turns the Psalm into a Gnostic Targum, in which you can only detect the original by the expressions which remain unaltered and by the general tenor of the confession. When Jesus has reported to the disciples what Sophia has said, He turns to the disciples and asks, "Who knows what Sophia said?" It is a game of guessing. Mary Magdalene or some other of the company springs

forward, begs permission to speak, and then says, "This is what thy Light-Power (the Light-Power is a substitute for the Divine Name) prophesied through David in the lxixth Psalm," or whatever the portion of Scripture may be that has been selected for disguise. Jesus gives an approbation and a blessing to the successful guesser.

For instance, when poor Sophia begins her tale of sorrow, she says:

"When I sought for light, they gave me gloom;
When I sought for power, they gave me matter.
O Light of lights, the Emanations of the Self-Willed have brought gloom over me.
Let there be traps for them and seize them; and do thou recompense them!" and so on.

Evidently this is the lxixth Psalm in disguise:

"They gave me gall for my meat
And in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink.
Let their table become a snare and a trap," etc.

The identification is, in fact, promptly made, this time by the Virgin Mary. Numbers of Psalms are quoted in this way, and guessed, each Psalm being first dressed up Gnostically, and then undressed.

In the midst of these Psalms a number of Odes of Solomon find a similar treatment, and we are able to extract them, and the important observation is at once made that the Gnostic writer must have found them in the Bible along with his canonical Psalms. If that is right it is very important, and it does not look as if Harnack could be right in calling them Gnostic. How did a Gnostic book get into the Bible? And in any case it must be a very old book to get there. We will not discuss the matter further at this point, because

we have fortunately the book itself recovered in an almost complete form; and we had better go on to the discovery of the MS. in which the Odes are contained.

The discovery of the precious book was after the following fashion. It was on January 4 of the present year (1909) that I found myself at leisure in the midst of my ordinary multifarious activities, and determined to do something to set my books and papers in order. On the shelves in one corner lay a pile of fragments of Syriac MSS., only half arranged. I determined to try to put them in order and to have them bound up in volumes. My eye fell, *inter alia*, on a heap of stained and worn paper leaves containing what seemed to be a Psalter in the Syriac language. I took it to be nothing more than a late copy of the Biblical Psalter, and ran my eye through it by way of verification. The pieces were numbered, Psalm xv., Psalm xvi., and so on. Moreover the verses were distinguished by a red-letter at the end of each stanza, the letter being the initial of the word Hallelujah. This is a common feature in manuscript Syriac Psalters. On looking at the text in a superficial manner, there was nothing at first to attract attention: "I cried unto the Lord with my voice"; that was all in good order. Then another Psalm, which looked peculiar: "Why sittest thou, O wicked man, in the congregation, and thy heart is far from the Lord?" I started at that: it was not any of the Biblical Psalms, and I thought I remembered the refrain. Hastily crossing the room, I took down the Psalms of Solomon, and found at Psalm iv. the words in question! By this time the situation was become exciting; examination showed that the whole of the eighteen Psalms of Solomon were here, with the exception of a page or two which were lost at the end of my book. Here, then, was

the first version that had yet been found of the famous eighteen Psalms. But what was the rest of the book? There was nothing to distinguish it from the recovered eighteen: the first two or three pages were gone and with them the title; but the natural suggestion arose to test whether these were the lost Odes of Solomon. Examination showed that the fragment of Lactantius was there, in the xixth Ode: and finally all the fragments which were embedded in the *Pistis Sophia* were recovered, and a complete identification made of the missing book with the recovered pages. I think you will agree that there is something romantic about this recovery and identification of the missing Odes of Solomon. The precious thing was with us here again; and one had to sit down and transcribe, and translate and 'edify by the margent' and do everything that belongs to an instructed scribe. And here the mechanical work was lightened by the satisfaction which one felt in the beauty of the ideas and the elevation of the sentiments and the spirituality of the teachings. I may be, perhaps must be, a little prejudiced in favour of my latest offspring, but I do not think I have ever recovered anything so beautiful or so winning before from the missing literature of the Early Church. Could one, for example, light on anything more full of the religious sense of Theistic belief than the following?

ODE XXVI.

"I poured out praise to the Lord, for I am His: and I will speak His holy song, for my heart is with Him. For His harp is in my hands, and the Odes of His rest shall not be silent. I will cry unto Him from my whole heart: I will praise and exalt Him with all my members. For from the east and even to the west

is His praise: and from the south and even to the north is the confession of Him: and from the top of the hills to their utmost bound is His perfection. Who can write the Psalms of the Lord, or who read them? or who can train his soul for life, that his soul may be saved, or who can rest on the Most High, so that with His mouth he may speak? Who is able to interpret the wonders of the Lord? For he who could interpret would be dissolved and would become that which is interpreted. For it suffices to know and to rest: for in rest the singers stand, like a river which has an abundant fountain, and flows to the help of them that seek it. Hallelujah."

This might have been one of the ancient songs of Zion; and as you will notice it is almost colourless as regards history or chronology. Shall we say that it is Jewish, or Christian, or Judæo-Christian (belonging, that is, to the Church that has not yet separated from the Synagogue)? We must evidently go further before we can answer such a question as that. What would you say of this one?

Ode XXX.

"Fill ye waters for yourselves from the living fountain of the Lord: for it is opened to you: and come all ye thirsty, and take the draught; and rest by the fountain of the Lord. For fair it is and pure and gives rest to the soul. Much more pleasant are its waters than honey; and the honeycomb of bees is not to be compared with it. For it flows forth from the lips of the Lord, and from the heart of the Lord is its name. And it came infinitely and invisibly: and until it was set in the midst they did not know it: blessed

are they who have drunk therefrom and have found rest thereby. Hallelujah."

Shall we say that this is a Jewish Gospel, comparable to the language of Isaiah lv. ("Ho, every one that thirsteth"), or is it a Christian Psalm expressing the new Gospel of the Kingdom? We must again go further afield to answer such a question: only noting that so far as we have gone there is no Gnosticism, any more than there is in a Methodist hymn-book.

What shall we say of this composition?

Ode XLI.

"All the Lord's children will praise Him, and will collect the truth of His faith. And His children shall be known to Him. Therefore we will sing in His love: we live in the Lord by His grace: and life we receive in His Messiah: for a great day has shined upon us: and marvellous is He who has given us of this glory. Let us, therefore, all of us unite together in the name of the Lord, and let us honour Him in His goodness, and let our faces shine in His light: and let our hearts meditate in His love by night and by day. Let us exult with the joy of the Lord. All those will be astonished that see me. For from another race am I: for the Father of truth remembered me. He who possessed me from the beginning: for His bounty begat me, and the thought of His heart: and His Word is with us in all our way; the Saviour who makes alive and does not reject our souls: the man who was humbled, and exalted by His own righteousness, the Son of the Most High who appeared in the perfection of His father; and light dawned from the Word that was beforetime in Him; the Messiah is truly one, and

He was known before the foundation of the world, that He might save souls for ever by the truth of His name: a new song arises from those who love Him. Hallelujah."

Here we are certainly on Christian ground: the Messiah is come; He has begun to gather in the Gentiles. A man of another race than the Jews makes a little apology for his presence among them: the Most High has remembered him; he has been numbered amongst those who love the Christ. We are in a Judæo-Christian Community, but at the same time removed from the antagonisms between the two sides of the early Church, which were so prevalent in the Churches of Asia Minor. And this half-apologetic attitude for being there will be found elsewhere in the Psalms, and confirms our belief that they are early products. No Gentile in a Roman or Corinthian Church which had broken away from the stricter Judaism would have expressed himself like this; and that is one reason why I refer these Odes to the first century and to the Palestinian Church (perhaps that most ancient community on the other side of the Jordan). If that should turn out to be right, it is a very important result, for we are almost destitute of Christian literature belonging to that time and area; and we shall be near the fountain head both for Christian practice and for Christian belief. The question will, however, arise whether we are right in beginning in this way with a tacit assumption that all the Psalms in question belong to one time and place. We certainly must not make any such assumption. As far as I have gone into the matter, the Odes appear to be nearly all from one hand, though I should like to reserve my judgment as to one or two of them.

But now let us turn to the question in which I

know that some of my readers are interested, the suggested Gnosticism of the new Odes. We remind ourselves of Harnack's verdict on the subject, a qualified verdict, indeed, but none the less a decided one; that the Gnostic author of the *Pistis Sophia* incorporated with his work a number of Gnostic Odes, ascribed to Solomon, the Gnosticism of the Odes being much less pronounced than that of the author who borrowed them. Harnack was reasoning from the fragments which he found embedded in the *Pistis Sophia.* And in particular he and others found in one of the quoted Odes what looked like a definite Gnostic expression. The writer spoke of a great Efflux or Emanation which had spread out over the whole world; and as Efflux or Emanation is a favourite Gnostic word to describe the relations of the various Orders of the Spiritual Universe and their action one upon the other; and since, further, the writer of the *Pistis Sophia* played with this word over and over again, tossing it in the air, as it were, and catching it, turning it this way and that way, we ought not to be surprised that the suggestion was made that, when the author talked Efflux, he was talking from his own. But you must have the whole Ode before you in order to form a judgment: here is my translation of it, made from the union of the Syriac and Coptic texts, for the justification of which I shall have to refer you to the larger critical edition that is on the way.

Ode VI.

"As the hand moves over the harp, and the strings speak, so speaks in my members the Spirit of the Lord, and I speak by His love. For He destroys what is foreign, and everything that is bitter: for thus it was from the beginning and will be to the end, that nothing

should be His adversary, and nothing should stand up against Him. The Lord has multiplied the knowledge of Himself, and is zealous that these things should be known, which by His grace have been given to us. And the praise of His name He gave us: our spirits praise His holy Spirit. For there went forth a stream and became a river great and broad; for it flooded and broke up everything and it brought [water] to the Temple: and the restrainers of the children of men were not able to restrain it, nor the arts of those whose business it is to restrain waters; for it spread over the face of the whole earth, and filled everything: and all upon the thirsty earth were given to drink of it; and thirst was relieved and quenched: for from the Most High the draught was given. Blessed then are the ministers of that draught who are entrusted with that water of His: they have assuaged the dry lips and the will that had fainted they have raised up; and souls that were near departing they have caught back from death: and limbs that had fallen they straightened and set up: they gave strength for their feebleness and light to their eyes: for everyone knew them in the Lord, and they lived by the water of life for ever. Hallelujah."

It is the latter part of this Ode that is quoted by the Gnostic writer, beginning with the statement that "there went forth an Efflux," which he, at least, interpreted in a Gnostic sense.

But let us look a little closer at the composition. What is this about the strengthening and straightening of paralysed limbs? We have heard something like this before; this is Isaiah xxxv.: "Strengthen ye the weak hands and confirm the feeble knees"; and what follows, "They received strength for their paralysis and

light for their eyes," that is explained at once by the same prophecy, "Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened." Then comparing the slightly variant renderings of the Syriac and Coptic, of which one says: "All drank of it on the thirsty land," and the other, "All drank of it who lived on the dry sand," we see that the Efflux is that which is involved in the statements that there shall be "in the thirsty land springs of water." The writer is versifying Isaiah xxxv., and is no more Gnostic than the prophet. The Psalm itself is a lovely description of the spread of the Gospel over the whole earth, and is full of the freshness and vitality and hope of the first propagation of the Faith. The Gnostic writer has read a meaning into his Efflux from his own mind which was not in the mind of the original writer. Harnack was wrong in suggesting Gnosticism, wrong also in saying that the figure of the Efflux was found in an inundation of the Nile. So far I see no Gnosticism: but I am willing, as far as relates to the rest of the book, for those who have quicker instincts than I have for such matters, to examine the matter for me. We must wait, too, to see whether Harnack will revise his first judgment after reading the text of the complete Ode.

In any case, it is a very beautiful composition; we shall all agree to that. The writer's reference to the way in which the outbreaking flood comes to the temple refers no doubt to propaganda carried on at the heart of Judaism; and the professional restrainers of floods at whom he shakes his head in pity mixed with triumph, well! we know what they are: they always must be with us, if we live. The whole Ode opens a window into the methods and conflicts of first-century Christianity.

In reading the collection of Odes carefully, you will

be struck both with the presence and with the absence of Christian features: Jesus is often referred to, but never by name; He is the Messiah or Christ, occasionally the Lord's Christ. The Gospels are never quoted definitely, but once or twice expressions are used which can be shown to be from an Apocryphal Gospel of great antiquity; so that perhaps we ought to conclude that the writer's Gospel was an early lost Gospel. The Church is, I think, never mentioned, nor the Eucharist; there is no reference to Church Orders except that in one Ode the writer calls himself a priest of the Most High and explains that his priesthood consists in thinking God's thoughts and executing God's righteousness; there is also a reference to 'blessed deacons' (or ministers) who carry the water of life. Eschatology, to our surprise, is almost entirely absent. Immortality is acquired, not innate; and there is no Judgment Day. On the other hand, certain Christian doctrines, like the Virgin Birth and the Descent into Hades, are there in an unexpected strength of statement and degree of evolution. There does not seem to be any definite reference to a Gospel miracle, unless it should be to the Walking on the Sea; nor can we certainly point to any parable that is quoted from the Teaching of Jesus. All of this is interesting and instructive and important: it is too early, as yet, to attempt to evaluate the facts from an apologetic or critical standpoint.

Returning, then, to the discovery itself; there can be no doubt that we have recovered an early Christian book of great antiquity and of exquisite beauty. In my first published statement about the matter in *The Contemporary Review* for last April, I went so far as to say that we should not reach the same level of joyful personal religion until we come to St. Bernard and

Madame Guyon and the Methodist Revival. At present I do not feel in the least like recalling this statement as over-strained or out of proportion. And I will conclude by quoting one more lovely Song of the Spirit, as follows:

ODE XXI.

"My arms I lifted up to the Most High, even to the grace of the Lord: because He had cast off my bonds from me: and my Helper had lifted me up to His Grace and to His Salvation. And I put off darkness and clothed myself with light; and my soul acquired a body free from sorrow or affliction or pains. And increasingly helpful to me was the thought of the Lord, and His fellowship in incorruption: and I was lifted up in His light; and I served before Him, and I became near to Him, praising and confessing Him. My heart ran over and was found in my mouth: and it arose upon my lips; and the exultation of the Lord increased on my face, and His praise likewise. Hallelujah."

J. RENDEL HARRIS.

(This paper was read before The Quest Society, at Kensington Town Hall, October 18th, 1909.—ED.)

ORPHEUS—THE FISHER.

II.

ROBERT EISLER, PH.D.

BOTH titles of Orpheus, 'hunter' and 'herdsman,' intimately connected as they are with animal worship in every possible form, could not but survive even in an agricultural period. We owe to Franz Cumont a splendid little paper on the half-wild cattle-herds of the goddess Anahita in Asia Minor and the rites of catching the animal destined for the sacrifice by means of the so-called taurobolion-rite,—a lifelike picture which recalls the scene of the South American pampas with their half-wild cattle under the guard of the *gauchos*, armed with the famous *lasso*, hunters and herdsmen at one and the same time.

If such a state of things persisted even in later antiquity, we may safely expect to find a god or hero called 'hunter' or 'herdsman' wherever animals in a more or less tamed condition are worshipped, or only kept for sacrificial use as sacred animals of a deity; wherever ichthyolatry also was prevalent, we shall expect to find a corresponding priest or god entitled the 'fisher,' or occasionally, where the sacred fish were kept tame in pools, the 'warden of the fish.'

The facts correspond exactly to this anticipation: in Lycia, where the sacred fishes (*orphoi*) and their representative, the divine 'Fish,' Orphos or Di-orphos, the son of Mithra and of the Sacred Stone, were revered,[1] we find the divine Fisherman Orpheus. In

[1] On Di-orphos see the Pseudo-Plutarchian treatise *De Fluv.* 23, 4. His mother, the 'Sacred Stone,' is nothing else but a well-known cult-symbol of the goddess Cybele. A god of the under-world Orphos, whose 'whip-bearer' (*mastigophoros*) is Hekate (cp. p. 127 n. 2 of this volume), may be found on a Carthaginian imprecative tablet of the Roman period, published by Richard Wünsch (*Rhein. Mus.* (1900) lv. 250).

Seriphos, where the crawfish was held to be sacred,[1] there is the mythical Dictys the 'Net-fisher,' intimately connected with the legend of Perseus.[2] On the other hand, coins of Tarsus in Cilicia, adorned with the wolves of Apollo Lykios, bear the image of Perseus coupled with an anonymous fisherman holding a fishing-rod, a fishing-basket and a fish; the same local combination of Perseus and the fisherman recurs on a work of art as early as the Hesiodean 'Shield of Herakles.' A female counterpart to this Dictys is the Cretan Artemis or Britomartis Dictynna, just as is the Trœzenian and Epidaurian Saronia[3] to her legendary consort the hunter Saron.

Even our oldest monument for Greek ichthyolatry —the famous passage about the 'holy fish' (*hieros ichthys*) in the Death of Patroclus saga (*Il.* xvi. 407f.): "As when some man seated on jutting rock from out the sea a holy fish doth take with net and cruel brass"—does not fail to make mention of this anonymous, or perhaps already hieronymous, fisherman with his sacred weapons, the 'all-catching net' (*linos panagreus*), and the 'merciless trident,'—both, as we know from a significant passage in Habakkuk (i. 14ff.),[4] the objects of a special cult in Western Asia, and probably, as I shall endeavour to prove elsewhere, in Greece also.

With the Sumerians, a fish-god Ḫanni (according

[1] Plut., *De Sera Num. Vindic.* 17. "I hear that the inhabitants of Seriphos bury dead crawfish. If a living one falls into their nets, they do not keep it, but throw it into the water again. They mourn over the dead ones and say that they are the delight of Perseus, son of Zeus."

[2] Dictys, the good king of Seriphos, catches in his fishing-net (*dikty-on*) the floating box in which are Danaē and the infant. See the article 'Dictys' in Roscher's *Lexicon*.

[3] A *sarōn* is a hunting-net according to the glossary of Hesychius. The Saronian gulf on the shores of Thessaly is named after this net-hunter Saron and Artemis Saronia.

[4] "Therefore they sacrifice unto their net, and burn incense unto their drag; because by them their portion is fat and their meal plenteous."

to Hrozny's recent and definitive explanation of the Berossian transcript 'Oannes'), together with his wife Iš-ḫanna (the 'house of the fish'), was held in great reverence, and a god Kal, with the *epiklēsis* Zag-ḫa (or 'fisher'),[1] as well as a cult-title Zag-ḫa, the 'provost' or 'warden of the fish,' is recorded in the most ancient inscriptions extant.

The Semites, who worshipped with funeral rites a fish-god Dagon[2] or Adōnis,[3] called by the Greeks 'Ichthys,' son of Derketō, had certainly also a god called 'Ṣid,' the 'fisherman,' well-known in a diminutive form as Baal-Ṣidōn, the eponymous god of the Phœnician town Ṣidon, and once worshipped (according to place-names such as Beth-ṣaida[4]) in Palestine also. Ernest Assman has but recently suggested that the enigmatical Greek name Posidon or Poseidon for the god who holds the fisher-spear and the sacred tunny-fish, is nothing but the vulgar form Bo-Ṣidon for our Ba'al-Ṣidon, like Bo-Samin for Bal-Samin. A few mystic verses of Nonnus (*Dion.* xl. 327ff.) about Tyrus show that this god also was considered as not

[1] Most probably this divinity is meant by the two representations of a god carrying two or five fishes reproduced in *Revue d'Assyriologie* (1905), p. 57, plate ii. Similar images of the divine fisher are reproduced in Milani's *Studi e Materiali*, ii. 19, figs. 133, 134, from Furtwängler's work on ancient cameos, and the *Recueil des Travaux relat. à la Philol. assyr. et égypt.*

[2] The funeral rites are remembered in the popular etymology, '*dag-on*' (*dag*=fish, '*ōn*=pain, grief, affliction), '*piscis tristitiæ*' ('fish of wailing'), given for the god Dagon of Samuel (I. v. 4) in the *Onomastica Sacra*. Budge (*The Gods of the Egyptians*, i. 303) mentions a god Rem, connecting his name with 'rem=to weep' and comparing—although with all reserve—the *fish-god* Remi, mentioned in the *Book of the Dead*, lxxxiii. 4. On a fish-cult in Egypt see Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, 18.

[3] See Aelian, *Nat. Anim.* x. 36, on a fish called 'Adōnis.' A strange tale is told of the amphibious life of this creature; it sleeps on the rocky shore after leaving the water with a leap, and returns to the water when threatened by a bird of prey. This nonsense is clearly a rationalistic travesty of the god Adonis' alternate sojourning in the over- and under-world, the latter being considered as a watery abyss by the majority of oriental cosmologies.

[4] Even to this day a local sanctuary exists at Beth-ṣaida which the Arabs call the 'shrine of Ali-es-Sajjad' ('Ali the Fisherman').

only a 'fisherman' and 'sailor,' but also a 'herdsman' of both sheep and cattle, playing the magic syrinx on the sea-shore.

In India, finally, sacred fish are kept, and Viṣhṇu is frequently worshipped in the form of a fish. The Buddhists of Nepāl also revere Avalokiteshvara under the name of Matsyendranāth, 'Lord of Fishes.'

A group of divine beings, common to Sumerian, Semitic, and Indian religion, and to the Prehellenic cults of Asia Minor, may well be expected to have left distinct traces in classical as well as in Oriental uranography. Indeed we find a whole series of constellations plainly corresponding to the alleged features of these mythological images. First of all the rite of fishing affords a satisfactory explanation for the curious fact that both the heavenly Fish are fastened by a long piece of yarn, mentioned already in cuneiform inscriptions as the *dur* or *rikiš nunu*, the 'fish yarn,' the *linon* of the Greek texts. Chinese uranography, entirely derived (according to P. Kugler's classic demonstrations) from Babylonian sources through Indian intermediaries, also delineates a hunting-net (*pi*) round the stars $\alpha\ \theta\ \gamma\ \delta\ \epsilon$ of the Bull, and another one (*tschang*) round $\upsilon\ \nu\ \phi\ \mu\ \lambda\ \kappa$ Hydræ, probably destined to catch either the Hydra herself or the neighbouring Lion. Evidently as a counterpart to this 'fish yarn,' Teukros the Babylonian mentions a group of stars called the Trident in the neighbourhood of the Fish.

Secondly, a constellation Halieus, or 'Fisherman,' is found, just where we should expect it, namely, near the Fish, as a '*paranatellon*' to the Ram in the lists of Teukros.[1]

[1] Boll, *Sphära* (Leipzig, 1904, p. 263), has been too rash in rejecting this statement as a corruption of the original text, merely because the astrological influence of this constellation is said to produce not 'fishermen' but

For different reasons which cannot be developed here at length, we are constrained to identify this Greek constellation with the well-known group of the famous 'hunter' Orion, whose principal star the Arabian 'Betelgeuze' had the Sumerian name of Kak-Sidi, which was explained by the Semites as the 'hunting' star, or, through a word-play on '*sadu*,' the 'red-glowing' star (compare the equivalent names of Sidon and Phœnix). Orion corresponds mythically to Nimrod, the 'mighty hunter before the Lord' of the Bible. Around this constellation we find—and this can hardly be a casual coincidence—all the requisites of Orphic mythology.

At the feet of the gigantic Huntsman, we see the celestial Bull, the faithful image of the bull-god Zagreus, torn in pieces by the maddened women, who immediately afterwards murdered Orpheus himself; next the Bull comes the Ram, as a celestial reflex of the sacred lamb (*eriphos*) caught in the merciless hunting-net of the 'sheep-hunter.' By the Bull we find also the celebrated 'Lyre of Orpheus' (better known as the Pleiades), the powerful musical charm of the Great Hunter. The hunting-net itself is clearly visible in Orion's right hand on the *Globus Farnese*. It is generally called *lagōbolion* (or net for catching a hare), on account of the constellation of the Little Hare under Orion's feet, but it could certainly just as well—as the general names in Chinese uranography prove—be called *kriobolion*, *taurobolion* and *ichthyobolion*, or a net for catching ram, bull or fish. The miniature of Orion in the celebrated *Codex Vossianus* puts in his hand, instead

'hunters.' This apparent discrepancy is caused only by an inadequate translation of the well-known Semitic word '*sid*,' meaning both 'fisher' and 'hunter.' The whole trouble could have been avoided, if Teukros had been clever enough to call the constellation Agreus instead of Halieus.

of the hunting-net, the well-known crosier (*pedum*) of the herdsman, so characteristic for the mythical type of the Good Shepherd, Orpheus Poimēn, in all its variations; attesting by the way the correctness of Hesychius' statement that Orion was primarily called Boōtēs, the 'guardian of the bull,' a denomination answering not only to Orion's position in the heavens, but also to the name Sibzianna, the 'faithful herdsman of the sky,' applied by the Babylonians to certain stars of the Bull-group.

The most striking fact, however, is this: Salomon Reinach has written a brilliant memoir on the fox-dress of the Thracian Orpheus, which occurs on Greek vase-paintings and is intended to identify the hero—very appropriately as we can now see—with the fox, the most cunning 'hunter' of the animal kingdom; that is to say, with the 'Thracian' fox-god Dionysos Bassareus.[1] Now in this very same Babylonian uranography a constellation called the Fox is placed immediately beside the heavenly Fish. If it is easy to understand that the sacred fox could represent the mighty hunting god, it is more difficult to see how he could possibly manage to fish, although he was certainly believed to do so by ancient zoologists. The solution, however, is given by a well-known popular tale or fable, most probably, as they all are, of Oriental origin. The fox was believed to fish with his tail, using it as a bait for the unsuspicious denizens of the water. Such an absurdity would never have been

[1] *Bassara* is a Thracian word for 'fox.' It is of high interest to note that Hesychius' gloss, "*bassaria*, foxes are thus called by the Libyans," is confirmed by the existence of a Coptic word, *baschar*, *baschor*, for 'jackal,' occurring also in Reinisch's dictionary of the Afar- and Saho-languages (cp. *Muséon*, Nouv. Série, 1904, v. p. 279f.) But Count Charencey (*l.c.*) is not justified in adducing such a fortuitous linguistic coincidence as a new proof confirming the old fable of the Egyptian origin of Orphism.

invented, if there had not been important motives for connecting the notions of the fox-god and the fisher-god himself; just as the well-known tale of the fox and the grapes is certainly based on some forgotten myth of the fox-dressed vine-god Dionysos Bassareus.

All this is easily explained. If the Zodiac really was, as we are entitled to believe, the celestial projection and effigy of an ancient calendar and sacrificial time-table, it is plausible enough that we should find, not only the settled yearly circle of animal sacrifices, beginning with the fish, followed by the ram, bull and lion, and ending with the consecration of the first ear, but also an image of the priestly functionary as the hunter, guardian and finally killer of the sacred beasts. The sacrificial functions of this *retiarius*[1] or 'net-hunter,' are not only clearly reflected on the sky, but also distinctly traceable in familiar myths.

The oldest instance is the Babylonian god Marduk (most probably to be looked for in the constellation of Orion and the Bull) who catches in his enormous net the monster Tiāmāt, represented in the heavens by the Whale or Cetus (*Kētos*), spearing her with his terrible weapon, the *kēto-phonos triaina* of the Greek fisherman, and dividing her 'like a fish' into two halves. In the very same way Yahwè fights with a great hunting-net against the monster-fish Leviāthān according to a distinctly mythical allusion in *Ezekiel*

[1] The full-armoured Roman gladiator, fighting against his naked rival armed only with a net and a trident, so familiar to English readers from Bulwer Lytton's *Last Days of Pompeii*, is certainly the survival of an old Etruscan hieratic performance. It is interesting, therefore, to recall the song, quoted by Festus (*De Signific. Verb.* p. 233, Lindemann): "When the *retiarius* fights against the *murmillo* the following song is sung:

"*Non te peto, piscem peto;* (Not thee I chase, I chase the fish;
Quid fugis me, Galle?" Why dost thou flee me, Gallus?)

Pittakos, the wise tyrant of Mitylēnē, is said (Festus, *l.c.*) to have fought with the net and the trident against Phryno. Hugo Winckler thinks that this legend originated under the influence of the different myths analysed below.

(xxxii. 2ff.). Moreover, we cannot doubt that the German myth of the god Thor, angling for the Midgard-snake from a boat, is a distant mirage of this primeval Oriental myth. Many readers of this REVIEW may have seen the celebrated second Gosford cross—or at least the *calco* in the Victoria and Albert Museum—upon one of the sides of which this scene is represented as a simile for Christ's victory over the ancient dragon. We find the same conception, expressed in a very *baroque* way, not only in the homilies of St. Gregory, Honorius Augustodunensis, Rupert Tuitiensis and others, but as late as in Herrad von Landsberg's *Hortulus Deliciarum*, where God the Father is portrayed using the genealogical tree of Jesus as a fishing-rod and the cross as a hook, in order to catch the monster Leviāthān.

Accordingly we may infer with great probability that Lucian was justified in explaining the familiar scene of Orpheus among his beasts by reference to the celestial animals of the Zodiac, and we have only to make clear how it may have come about that the figure of man and obvious symbols of the human soul, such as Psychē's well-known butterfly, are to be found among this assembly of fascinated victims of the great Fisher and Hunter of all living beings.

The problem, how Orpheus, who was from the first a fisher-god, came to be considered—as he certainly was—a 'Fisher of men' (just as Poimēn Hermes was believed to be a Poimandrēs or 'Shepherd of men') still remains to be solved.

We cannot do this, however, without glancing rapidly at the different rites performed by the human prototypes of the mythical Fisher, the priests of the fish-sanctuaries in Western Asia. The original aim

of their ceremonies was certainly to secure an abundant catch for themselves[1] or for the fishing population of the coast. For this purpose they made use first of all of magical imagery; hence the production of fish-shaped idols and of the vocal and musical incantations which underlie the traditions of Orpheus having been the first singer and musician. In addition to this they allured the denizens of the water by throwing in food at certain places, just as a modern angler would do. Divination from the movements of the sacred fish towards the bait was the natural offspring of these feeding rites; Orpheus the singing, harping or piping fisher became Orpheus the prophet. But in the end the catching of the sacred animals must always have been the main feature of this so-called worship.

No doubt the victims were sometimes left alive and kept in sacred pools, perhaps after having been finally adorned, much to their discomfort, with precious golden trinkets engraved with hieratic formulæ, which at times developed into entire poems—a custom which explains in a very simple way the strange coupling of titles for the Babylonian god Lugalkidia, called at once the "fish and the writing-table of Bel." But in most cases cooking or roasting and then sacrificial eating must have followed the capture of the holy fish.

We have now to note a peculiar feature of this latter ceremony. The priests of the ichthyomorphous deity were themselves disguised as fishes, either by wearing a fish-skin over their heads and bodies, as illustrated on the well-known Babylonian stone-slabs

[1] According to Pausan. i. 38, 1, the fish in the brooks near Eleusis belonged exclusively to the priests. In Delos the right of fishing on the coast was reserved for Apollon (*Bull. Corr. Hell.* vi. 19f.; xiv. 309f., line 36f.). In Halicarnassus the gods owned a *thynnoskopion*, and the tunny-fishing on the whole coast, etc.

in the Kuyunjik Gallery of the British Museum, or by fastening fish-tails to their backs, as may be seen on a quaint black-figured Cumean vase-painting. This must have been a hunting-charm too, at least originally. It agrees perfectly with the widespread and still prevailing custom which hunters have of wearing some of the spoils taken from their victim, in order to maintain their power over similar animals. Notwithstanding this primitive purpose, the rite must have been differently interpreted in later times. We can be almost certain that, both by eating the god, and thus bringing his substance into the interior of one's own body, and also by wrapping one's own frame in the god's former covering, the intention was to establish the closest possible connection, perhaps even the identification, of the deity and its worshippers. W. Robertson Smith has shown, in his masterly essay on 'Sacrifice' in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, that this peculiar combination of rites is the characteristic feature of the so-called totemistic theriolatry, a belief the fundamental dogma of which consists in treating the offspring of man as an ever-repeated reincarnation of the tribe's sacred animal. I need not enter here upon the controversy concerning the origin of such a creed. It will be sufficient to remind ourselves of instances such as the ant-tribe (Myrmidones) in Ægina, the snake-tribe of Parion, the cicada-tribe in Attica, the seal-tribe in Phocis, and ultimately of the Prehellenic stork-tribes of the Pelasgi. In the special case of fish-totemism the primitive burial rite of throwing the dead into the sea as a prey for the fishes, natural as it was to a sea-faring population, or at least to the inhabitants of the coast, combined with the not less natural habit of living upon the flesh of

the same fish, and last, not least, the phylogenetic coincidence that the human embryo possesses rudimentary gill-clefts in an early stage of development —a fact which could not have for long escaped the attention of the medicine-men and priests—affords a satisfactory reason for the belief that men were but reincarnated fish.

Most readers of these lines know the anthropogonical theories of old Ionian philosophy, traditionally connected with the name of Anaximander, stating that men were descendants of fish.[1] This theory has sometimes been considered as an anticipation of Darwinism, or at least of the prevalent modern belief in the origin of organic life on the borders of land and sea. But such an interpretation is devoid of all plausibility; on the contrary, the right clue for understanding it is suggested by Plutarch himself, to whom we owe the whole quotation from Anaximander. He compares the theory with the traditional opinion of the descendants "from the old (hero) Hellēn," who believed in an intimate kinship between their clan and certain fishes. This statement clearly furnishes a perfectly fitting key

[1] Plutarch, *Symp.* viii. 8, 7, p. 730 E.: "Men primordially originated in the interior of fishes and were nourished therein like sharks (*galeoi*)." The text is corrupt; the correction, ascertained by comparison with Plut., *De Soll. Anim.* 33, 982, is due to Döhner and has been accepted by Diels, *Fragm. Presocr. Philos.* p. 17, l. 29; the comparison looks to the well-known fact that sharks do not lay eggs, but procreate living young. "When they had become strong enough to help themselves they came forth and went on shore." Cp. Aëtios, v. 19, 4; Censorin. 4, 7; [Plut.] *Strom.* 2 (Theophrast.).

[2] "The descendants of the old hero Hellēn sacrifice also to the ancestral (*patrogeneiō*) Poseidon, for they believe, as the Syrians do, that man has originated in the 'moist.' Therefore they also worship the fish as a kinsman (*homogenē*) and foster-brother (*syntrophon*); this is a more reasonable philosophy than that of Anaximander, who does not say that fish and men derived their origin from a common element, but that," etc. (for the rest see previous note). The value of this learned Plutarchian comparison is still more emphasised by the fact that Anaximander's anthropogony was really connected, as we should expect it of a totemistic belief, with a tabu of the ancestral animal. See Plutarch, *l.c.*: "Anaximander, considering the fish as the common father and mother of mankind, zealously deprecated eating it."

to the whole problem. We know from a passage of Ælian,[1] that the 'holy fish' mentioned without a proper name in Homer, was elsewhere called *(h)ellops*, *(h)ellopos* or *(h)ellos* the 'silent one,'[2] or with a characteristic so-called Cretan termination[3] *hellēn*,—an appropriate enough name for the speechless gods of the ocean. Moreover we learn from Ælian that this was a dogma of certain mysteries, and he declines expressly to dwell at greater length on the subject. But if any mysteries are to be connected with the '*hieros ichthys*' we can now safely venture to identify them with Orphism, or the religion of the sacred Lycian fish, *orphoi*. Moreover I would here call to mind the fact that the aboriginal, primitive and Prehellenic cult of the sacred oak, the sacred double-axe, the dove-goddess, afterwards called Diōnē, and the 'swimming' god Naios, afterwards identified with Zeus at Dodona, was conducted by two different classes of ministers: by priestesses called 'doves'[4] (*peleiades*), and by priests who slept on the naked soil (*chamaieunai*) and never washed their feet (*aniptopodes*),[5] mentioned already in the *Iliad* under the

[1] *Nat. Anim.* viii. 28. "It is believed that what the poet [*sci.* Homer] calls the 'holy fish' is the *ellops* [=the 'mute one']. There is a tradition (*logos*) that it is a very rare fish and caught only in the Pamphylian sea, and even there seldom. If they catch one they rejoice over their good luck, and adorn themselves and their boats with wreaths, and celebrate the event with great noise and with flute-playing. Others say that it is not this fish but the *anthias* that makes the sea safe. . . But it is neither convenient nor my business to reveal the *forbidden mysteries* of nature."

[2] Mrs. Rhys Davids was kind enough to remind me, after I had read this paper at Oxford, that 'the silent ones' is also a very common epithet of fish in Buddhistic literature.

[3] Cp. for example, the Phœnician harbour Arados with the Cretan Aradēn. Both places have the same Semitic name, meaning 'place of refuge'; yet in the one case the common Greek ending —*os*, in the other the archaic Cretan termination —*ēn* has been appended.

[4] Herodot. II. 54; Sophocl., *Trach.* 170; Strabo, vii. 7, 12; Suidas *s.v.* Dodona.

[5] The same tabu, namely, sleeping on the naked soil and not washing the dusty feet, was (according to Lucian) enjoined on the pilgrims going to and returning from the sanctuary of the Syrian goddess.

name of *helloi* or *selloi*, the 'silent ones.' I now think there will be little objection if we venture to translate these hieratic names by the 'fishes,' and thus couple the sacred dove with the sacred fish,[1] for this is a combination very well known from the sanctuaries of Western Asia, and different totems for the men and for the women are regularly required by the primitive laws of exogamy.[2]

[1] The statue of the fish-goddess Atargatis was surmounted, according to Lucian's description, by a dove. The statue of the Prehellenic earth-goddess in Phigalia (Pausan. viii. 5, 8) held a fish in one hand and a dove in the other. A coin reproduced by A. B. Cook, *Class. Rev.*, 1904, p. 416, fig. 10, shows the oak-Zeus (Askraios) standing between two trees, surmounted by the sacred doves, and holding a fish in each hand. A stater from Cyzicus reproduced by Milani, *Studi e Materiali*, ii. 73, fig. 258, shows an omphalos stone with two doves and one fish. This group is particularly interesting because the name, *sūra*, of the Apollo-sanctuary in Lycia, where the sacred *orphoi*-fishes were revered, is an old word, common to all Semitic languages (Syr. *ṣerrā*, Heb. *ṣor*, Arab. *surrā*), meaning 'navel'=*omphalos* (cp. my note, *Philologus*, lxviii., p. 141, 89c). Even on Christian engraved seals (see Pitra's *Spicil. Sol.* iii., p. 577, no. 97), we find the fish, coupled with a tree, surmounted by the dove (no. 99, etc.). See also 55 and 57, where we find a vine, a dove and a fish; and also nos. 34, 35, 36, 37 and 40. It should also be remembered that 'Jonah,' the name of the prophet swallowed by the mythic fish, means 'Dove' in Hebrew.

[2] The same intimate connection as between the symbols of the dove and the fish seems to exist between the symbols of the fish and the axe. In Dodona Hellos, the presupposed '*Fish*,' the founder of the sanctuary, is said to have been a woodcutter (*dryotomos*, Pind., *fr. cit. schol. Il.* xvi. 284; Serv., Virg. *Æn.* iii. 466); his *axe* was shown there in Philostratus' time (*Imagg.* ii. 33, 1). If therefore Strabo (p. 328) calls the Helloi '*tom-ouroi*' we shall, with A. B. Cook (*Class. Rev.*, 1904, xvii. 180) connect the first part of this epithet with *temnein* ('to cut'), and take the second, instead of with Cook as a termination like that of the words *stauros*, *arura*, etc., for the noun *ouros*, 'tail.' Then the whole word would signify 'those with the *cutting tail*,' and be based on the very natural comparison between a *fishtail* and the sacred *double-axe*. (Cp. names like Germ. *Hammerhai*, *Sägefisch*, etc., for different kinds of Mediterranean sharks.) This would give a good explanation for the fact that a well-known marine-god with a fishtail is called Phorkys (=Pherekys, Berekys; cp. *parashu* and *pelekys*, 'double-axe'; see the present writer's note, *Philologus*, lxviii. 126); that Phryxos (cp. Phorkys, the leader of the Phryges in the Homeric ship-catalogue; Phrixos, the 'curled' ram, is a secondary form) is coupled with Hellē, the female 'fish'; that Prof. Newberry has recently found a Libyan god Ḫa (pronounced Gha), represented by the symbol of the sacred axe in Egyptian inscriptions (s. *Transactions IIIrd Intern. Congr. Hist. Rel.* ii., p. 184), while a word pronounced *gha* is written with the hieroglyph of a fish (Erman, *Agypt. Gramm.* 180; Hommel, *Der babyl. Ursprung der ägypt. Cultur*, p. 68, no. 26, compares the Sumeric *ḫa*, pronounced *gha*, meaning 'fish'); that the Carian axe-god Zeus Labraundos possesses a pool with holy *fish* (Ælian, *Nat. Anim.* xii. 30); that a Cretan vase-painting of the Minoan period (*Annals of the British School of Athens*, ix., 1902-3, p. 115, fig. 75) gives us a *fish* and a *double-axe*, while an Assyrian cylinder in the British Museum (no. 89,470) illustrates the sacrifice of a fish

Now it has long been admitted that the most glorious name of classic antiquity, 'Hellēnes,' as the 'Graioi' called themselves after the Deucalionic flood,[1] is derived from the cult-title of these Dodonean 'Helloi,' who are found also in the island of Eubœa. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf has established the convincing transition from *psellos* (*psellizein*=to lisp), *sellos* (Lat. *silere*), *hellos* to *ellos*, *ellops*, *ellopos*, yet wondering why in the world not a foreign population (as is the case with the synonymous denominations *barbari* and *niemiec*[2]) but the Greeks themselves should have called their own people the Hellenes or Sellenes,[3] that is, the 'silent' or 'mute' or 'muttering ones.' The solution of this puzzle is now to hand.

to a divinity, represented by the symbol of an erected axe. Even in a Christian inscription from the cemetery of S. Priscilla (Pitra, *Spic. Sol.* iii., p. 574, no. 39; Bosio, *Roma Sotteranea*, p. 506, Aringhi, ii. 259), the traditional Dodonean symbols of the dove sitting on the sacred tree, the axe and the fish are coupled in the old way, although they are certainly used here with reference to the baptismal sermon of St. John, where the axe of Yahwè (*Psalm* xxxiii. 2) is said to threaten the barren trees of the unfaithful, while the trees bearing good fruit—namely, those upon whom the dove of the Holy Spirit descends, that is to say, those reborn as 'fishes' by the baptism—will be spared.

[1] Aristotle (*Meteor.* A 14, p. 352a, 28ff., Bekker) says that before the Deucalionic deluge the Greeks called themselves Graioi, afterwards Hellenes. This statement has certainly a mythological basis, for after the flood, related in the Babylonian Gilgameš-epic, the goddess Ishtar complains that her creatures, namely men, have become 'like the brood of fish'; that is to say they are swimming about helplessly in the water. The Deucalionic flood-myth is distinctly localised at Delphi; Deucalion and the hero Hellēn are mentioned in the same (principally) Delphic genealogy. The common name of Hellenes for the different Greek clans was chiefly propagated by the Delphic amphiktyony. If then Apollo is a god imported—through Crete—from Asia Minor, the flood-story—occurring also at Dodona—and the name 'fish' for men must belong together and to the same Prehellenic civilisation, to be found all over the Balkan Peninsula, the Ægæan Islands, Egypt, Syria and Asia Minor. It is Delphic religion—remember that Dionysos Zagreus was especially worshipped at Delphi—that made the old, originally totemistic name popular all over the different branches of the newly united Greek nation.

[2] The Slavic name applied to the neighbouring German population.

[3] The Arcadians were proud of having inhabited their country long before the Greek invasion. They called themselves therefore '*pro-sellēnoi*,' the 'pre-hellenic' population. The Attic comedy made fun of this local or racial pride and made the Arcadians boast that their nation was older than the Moon ('*Arkades pro-selēnoi*.') Cp. the quotations, *s.v.* '*proselēnoi*,' in the *Thesaurus* of Stephanus. Thus the same change of initial letter is attested for Hellenes-Sellenes, as for the Helloi-Selloi at Dodona.

Those who were descended from the famous old Hellos-Hellēn believed in a totemistic kinship between themselves and the sacred Fish, and therefore called themselves the 'silent ones,' the 'fishes.' That this Prehellenic and, as we may safely say, Orphic doctrine lies at the bottom of Anaximander's theory, should not be contested on the ground that the philosopher does not call the mythic ancestral fish either *orphos* or *hellops*, but *galeos*, that is 'shark'; for, just in the same way as the god Mithra has a son called Di-orphos, so Apollo, who is so often identified with Mithra in Asia Minor, has a son called Galeos (='Shark'), the mythical ancestor of a family or congregation of priests and prophets, called the Galeōtai,[1] exactly corresponding to the Dodonean Helloi, and mentioned—of course not by chance—in Attica and Sicily, the very centres of sixth-century Orphism. But the conclusive argument is that the peculiar kind of shark which the Greeks called *galeos*, and whose flesh was believed—at least in Rhodes—to have a most powerful life-restoring energy, was surnamed by the Rhodians '*alōpēx*,' the 'fox' of the sea; from this significant coincidence we may safely infer that the fox-dress of the Thracian 'Fisher' Orpheus was probably worn also by the Sicilian Shark-priests. Most likely *orphos* and *galeos* are originally only two different names, the one Lycian, the other Greek, for the peculiar kind of shark known to modern zoologists by the name of *squales vulpes Linnæi*.

Now, if the totemistic origin of the name 'Hellēnes'

[1] Or Galeoi. The above cited Cumean vase-painting shows most probably a dance of the Galeotæ or shark-priests. A very early cult of the shark is attested by the names of the Babylonian gods Laḫmu and Laḫamu, derived according to Hommel from the West Semitic word 'luḫm,' for 'shark.' As the word LḪM signifies, according to Houtsma (*Zeitschr. f. alttest. Wiss.* xxii. 329ff.), also a 'storm' or 'whirlwind,' the Semites may have considered the shark as a marine storm-demon, just as other fish—the *remor* or *echinois* of the *Physiologus*—were believed to produce the dreaded calms.

be admitted, we should expect to find corresponding views elsewhere, especially in Western Asia. Indeed, Plutarch, in the above-quoted passage, already compares the opinion of the Syrians on this subject, with the alleged views of the so-called 'Hellēnes.' If we further, find a very old tribal name, 'Ḫani,' used as well in the low-lands of the Euphrates as in ethnically corresponding parts of Asia Minor, I do not see how we can avoid connecting this name with the Sumerian fish-gods Ḫanni or Ḫa-zal, the 'Fish' or the 'Devourer of fish,' with his wife Išḫanna or Ḫanna, and, in general, with the well-established old Sumerian word 'ḫa' for 'fish.' Accordingly the Hittite Syrians, or at least one of their principal tribes, also called themselves the 'Fishes,' evidently with reference to the fish-dress of their national totem-priesthood. If we, moreover, take into consideration the fact that writing, wisdom, and government must have originally been in the hands of this priestly brotherhood, we understand at once how the divine 'Fisher,' 'Fish-eater,' or 'Divine Fish'—they are certainly all one and the same—came to be considered (*e.g.* in the inscriptions of Sancherib[1]) as the god of the 'tablet-writers' (*dupšarru*), as the inventor of writing and all the implements of higher culture, and ultimately as the composer of the sacred hymns, incantations and revelations produced by these priestly schools. ROBERT EISLER.

(This paper, of which Part I. was published in the last number, was read in September, 1908, at Oxford, before the Third International Congress for the History of Religions. A selection only of the notes have been added in its present form. Full references and illustrations will be given when it is published in book-form by Mr. J. M. Watkins, together with two other essays that are to follow on 'John the Baptist' and 'The Origins of the Eucharist,' all three dealing with the rites and cult-symbols of the 'Fisher God.'—ED.)

[1] Ed. Meissner-Rost, p. 96, l. 19.

THE GODS AND CREATION-MYTHS

OF THE

FINNISH EPIC, KALEVALA.

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THE epic poem known as the *Kalevala*[1], of which I have recently published a complete translation into English (Dent's *Everyman's Library*, Nos. 259, 260), is an old-world poem of much importance from many points of view, and not least in its symbolism; it is, therefore, possible that some observations on the subject, with specimens, may not be uninteresting to the readers of THE QUEST. The present paper deals chiefly with the gods and creation-myths and a later one may perhaps be devoted to the magic of the Finns.

Within the last century enormous collections of traditional oral literature have been made in Finland and Esthonia, and one of the most successful collectors was a schoolmaster named Elias Lönnrot, among whose numerous works (the most important of which is a great Finnish-Swedish Dictionary, in two large octavo volumes) three volumes of folk-songs stand out prominently. These are the *Kalevala* (the Land of Kaleva, the mythical ancestor of the heroes), the *Kanteletar*, and the *Loitsurunoja*. The *Kanteletar* (or Daughter of the Harp) is a great compendium of songs and ballads, of

[1] Pronounced Kālĕvālā.

which only a few specimens have been published in English, while the *Loitsurunoja* (or Magic Songs) has been fully dealt with, in prose, by the Hon. John Abercromby in his work on *The Pre- and Proto-historic Finns* (2 vols., Nutt, 1898). The *Kalevala*, largely drawn from the same sources as the other two volumes, is an epic poem, pieced together by Lönnrot, more or less successfully, from fragments of old ballads, much as the poems of Homer are said to have been constructed by order of Pisistratus, or as Firdausi put together the *Shāh Nāmeh* from previously existing materials. The first recension was published in 1835, in 32 Runos or Cantos, and the second recast, and enlarged to 50 Runos, in 1849. It has since been regarded by the Finns as their national Epic, of which they are very proud. To conclude these rather dry but necessary introductory remarks, it is only needful to add that Longfellow's *Hiawatha* is an imitation of the *Kalevala*, apparently derived from Schiefner's German version of 1852, and that selections by John A. Porter (1873), and a translation by John Martin Crawford (2 vols., 1889, from which several later works have been derived), have been published in America. I should add that another poem, the *Kalevipoeg*, in imitation of the *Kalevala*, was compiled in Esthonia, and published from 1857 to 1861. It is, however, tediously spun out with lyrical padding, and is much inferior to the *Kalevala*. It would not be worth translating as a whole, but I have given an abstract, chiefly in prose, in my *Hero of Esthonia* (2 vols., Nimmo, 1895). Perhaps I should say that in Finnish *j* is pronounced *y*. The first syllable of a word is always long, followed by one or two short ones. The name of the great culture-hero Väinämöinen is to be pronounced Vanamœnen.

The religion of the *Kalevala* is a curious form of Shamanism and Animism overlaid with Christianity. As I have stated in the introduction to the *Hero of Esthonia*, I recognise four stages, more or less clearly defined, in Finnish and Esthonian popular religion: (1) Fetishism; (2) Nature-worship; (3) Transitional stage; (4) Mediæval Christianity.

As in so many mythologies, the primæval universe of the Finns seems to have consisted only of air and sea. Ilmatar, the Daughter of the Air, grew tired of living alone, and sank down to the sea, where she was tossed about by the tempest and fertilised by the wind.

> "Then a storm arose in fury,
> From the East a mighty tempest,
> And the sea was wildly foaming,
> And the waves dashed ever higher.
> Thus the tempest rocked the virgin,
> And the billows drove the maiden
> O'er the ocean's azure surface,
> On the crest of foaming billows,
> Till the wind that blew around her,
> And the sea woke life within her." (i. 127-136.)

In the midst of her sufferings she called on Ukko, the supreme deity, for aid; and presently a teal, looking for some place where she could build her nest on the primæval ocean, caught sight of Ilmatar's knees rising above the waves and built her nest upon them. Here she laid six golden eggs, and a seventh of iron, and brooded over them for three days, till the heat became so great that Ilmatar shook her knees, and the eggs rolled into the sea, and were broken.

> "In the ooze they were not wasted,
> Nor the fragments in the water,

But a wondrous change came o'er them,
And the fragments all grew lovely.
From the cracked egg's lower fragment,
Now the solid earth was fashioned;
From the cracked egg's upper fragment,
Rose the lofty arch of heaven.
From the yolk, the upper portion
Now became the sun's bright lustre;
From the white, the upper portion,
Rose the moon that shines so brightly;
Whatso in the egg was mottled,
Now became the stars in heaven;
Whatso in the egg was blackish,
In the air as cloudlets floated." (i. 229-244.)

Here I may say that the sun and moon are afterwards regarded as male deities.

Nine years longer, the Air-Maiden, now become the Water-Mother, floated

"Ever on the peaceful waters,
On the billows' foamy surface,
With the moving waves before her,
And the heaven serene behind her." (i. 251-254.)

Then she raised her head from the waves and began the work of creation; forming the land, the shores and the abysses of ocean, by the direction in which she turned her head or her arms and legs. At length she gave birth to Väinämöinen, the great minstrel and culture-hero, who swam to the nearest land.

Ilmatar, of course, is one aspect of the Divine Feminine Principle of Nature, the Holy Spirit. Later on in the poem we find her infernal counterpart in Loviatar, the hideous black and blind daughter of Tuoni,

or Death, who is also impregnated by the wind, and brings forth ten plagues, to destroy the people of Kalevala. Under her human aspect she may also be identified with Marjatta, the virgin who is impregnated by a cranberry, and whose history, related in the last Runo of the *Kalevala*, presents us with a most curious travesty of the Nativity, though the two stories are not derived from each other, but fused, as is obvious if we consider that the word *marja* means a cranberry, and consequently the name Marjatta cannot have been originally derived from Maria. As we have just related :

> "Thus was ancient Väinämöinen,
> He the ever-famous minstrel,
> Born of the divine Creatrix,
> Born of Ilmatar, his mother." (i. 341-344.)

> "Then did Väinämöinen rising,
> Set his feet upon the surface
> Of a sea-encircled island,
> In a region bare of forest." (ii. 1-4.)

Väinämöinen is always described as a vigorous old man, who never appears to have been young, and a patriarch and culture-hero. Chiefs of clans we meet with in the *Kalevala*, but no kings, except when the child of Marjatta is baptised King of Karelia. The word 'king' is of very rare occurrence in the *Kalevala*, and is actually of foreign derivation.

Then Väinämöinen called to his aid the slender youth, Sampsa Pellervoinen, the God of Agriculture (*pello* means a field), who sowed all kinds of plants and trees.

> "Now the trees sprang up and flourished,
> And the saplings sprouted bravely.
> With their bloom the firs were loaded,

And the pines their boughs extended.
In the dales the birch was sprouting,
In the loose earth rose the alders,
Where the ground was damp the cherries,
Juniper in stony districts,
Loaded with its lovely berries." (ii. 33-41.)

But the oak would not grow till five fair maidens rose from the water, mowed the grass, and gathered it into heaps. Then Tursas, the water-giant, set the hay on fire, and afterwards planted an acorn, which grew up into a gigantic oak-tree, which overshadowed the whole country, hiding the sun and moon, and impeding the clouds in their course. Then Väinämöinen called on his mother for aid, and a dwarf rose from the sea, who speedily grew up into a huge giant who felled the oak with three strokes of his axe.

"He who took a branch from off it,
Took prosperity unceasing;
What was broken from the summit,
Gave unending skill in magic;
He who broke a leafy branchlet,
Gathered with it love unending." (ii. 191-196.)

The fragments that fell into the sea drifted northwards, where a maiden who was washing clothes saw them, and collected them for a sorcerer's arrows.

The Great Oak-Tree is a theme about which hundreds of variants have been collected in Finland and Esthonia. The contrast between the baleful influence of the tree and the beneficent qualities of its fragments is very curious. In a similar way, later in the poem, the magic mill, the Sampo, falls into the sea, and is broken to pieces, its fragments bringing prosperity wherever they drift. Another point here to

be noticed is the curious juxtaposition of mythological and the most ordinary domestic details, which we often meet with in the *Kalevala*.

Then Väinämöinen found seven grains of barley on the sea-shore, which he carefully collected and treasured as did Robinson Crusoe in like circumstances. We find that the Finnish heroes and magicians understood the language of birds; and a titmouse advised Väinämöinen to clear the land before he planted the barley. So he felled the trees, leaving only one birch-tree for the birds to perch on, when the eagle kindled fire which burned the felled trees.

> "Then he went to sow the country,
> And to scatter seeds around him,
> And he spoke the words which follow:
> 'Now I stoop the seeds to scatter,
> As from the Creator's fingers,
> From the hand of Him Almighty,
> That the country may be fertile,
> And the corn may grow and flourish.'"
>
> (ii. 293-300.)

Then Väinämöinen called on the Earth-Mother, on the Earth herself, and on Ukko, to prosper the work; and Ukko, one of whose principal attributes is that of the Cloud-God, linked the clouds together, and sent down the sweet rain from heaven; and the corn sprang up and flourished luxuriantly.

In the usual inconsequential fashion of Creation-stories—as, for instance, in the Biblical Genesis—we now find Väinämöinen as the chief of a settled tribe (one among several of whose origin nothing is said), and entertaining his people with his songs.

"Day by day he sang unwearied,
Night by night discoursed unceasing,
Sang the songs of by-gone ages,
Hidden words of ancient wisdom,
Songs which all the children sing not,
All beyond men's comprehension,
In these ages of misfortune,
When the race is near its ending." (iii. 7-14.)

Leaving Väinämöinen for a time we will now speak of the gods of Finland. Of the celestial deities, Ukko, or Jumala, already mentioned, is the chief. He is represented as an old man, girt with a sword, and wearing blue stockings, which seem to be a symbol of strength. He is often addressed in almost Christian phraseology, and the word Jumala is retained in modern Finnish for God. Ukko is the father of the Daughters of Creation and the Cloud-Maidens, and is the patron and protector of the heroes, who continually appeal to him. He is also the healer of wounds, and the dispenser of magic ointment. When the Sun and Moon were stolen by the Witch-Queen of the North he got weary of the darkness round his throne, and looked down to the world; but as he could see nothing of them, he struck a spark with his sword to make a new sun, and gave it to one of the Cloud-Maidens to rock; but she let it fall, and it fell down through several heavens, and finally reached the earth, where it committed great havoc. The Sun and Moon are represented as male deities, with sons and daughters, and the latter occupy themselves in spinning and weaving fabrics of gold and silver, which they sometimes confer on dowerless maidens. The seven stars of the Great Bear are also apparently divine beings, but are only incidentally alluded to.

Ilmarinen, the second of the Finnish heroes,[1] was born at night upon a hill of charcoal, holding a copper hammer in one hand, and his pincers in another. (Many gods and heroes are born armed, or with weapons in their hands, in Indian, Greek, Mexican, and other mythologies.) Next day he built himself a smithy, and set to work. (ix. 107-122.)

He says of himself:

> "For 'twas I who forged the heavens,
> And the vault of air I hammered,
> Ere the air had yet beginning,
> Or a trace of aught was present." (x. 277-280.)

The vault of heaven, nevertheless, shows no trace of his hammer or pincers. However, he failed to forge himself a living bride of gold and silver, or to make a new sun and moon that would give light after the real ones had been stolen.

Of the terrestrial deities the principal ones are Tapio and Miellikki, the lord and lady of the woodlands, and their sons and daughters. When sport is good they array themselves in magnificent apparel, but if they are unpropitious to the hunter they clothe themselves in filthy rags. (xiv. 91-152.)

Ahto and Vellamo are the king and queen of the waters. Whatever sinks to them, they keep, and they are very wealthy. The gods of the woods and marshes are very numerous, and are invoked to protect the cattle. Inferior deities or nymphs protect animals, colour flowers, drive their chariots through human bodies to heal them, and perform many more offices. Among them are some evil deities, especially Lempo or Hiisi, who creates serpents, wounds heroes, and is

[1] There are four chief heroes of the *Kalevala;* the other two are not mentioned in this paper.

guilty of other malicious actions. The personified Frost is also an evil power.

The principal infernal deity is Tuoni, or Mana, whose abode, Tuonela or Manala, is a hell separated from Pohjola, the North Country, by a dangerous river. He and his wife have sons and daughters, and very few who enter their dominions return. None, however, are admitted unless they wear the livery of Tuoni, and are conducted by Tuoni himself. There sinners are tortured with red-hot stones and serpents. The daughters of Tuoni bring plagues on mankind.

The *Kalevala* concludes with a very curious half-Christian and half-Shamanistic version of the Nativity; to which I have already alluded. We have already alluded to Ilmatar, under her celestial aspect, as the Virgin of the Air, and under her infernal aspect, as the daughter of Tuoni; and now she appears under her terrestrial aspect as Marjatta, the darling of her household.

"Marjatta, the petted damsel,
Was a very little damsel,
And was always pure and holy,
And was ever very modest,
And she fed on fish the finest,
And the soft bark of the fir-tree,
But the eggs of hens ate never,
Over which the cocks were crowing,
And the flesh of ewes she ate not,
Had the ewe with ram been running." (l. 17-26.)

Nor would she go milking, or ride in a sledge drawn by a stallion or a mare; but she went to herd sheep and speculated how many years she was doomed to wander "unhooded." However, one day a cranberry invited her to eat it; and when she had swallowed it

she found herself pregnant. But her father and mother turned her out of doors in her extremity, though she proclaimed:

"I shall bear a mighty hero,
And shall bear a noble offspring;
He shall be a mighty conqueror,
Strong as even Väinämöinen." (l. 197-200.)

Then she left the house with her little maid Piltti, whom she sent to Ruotus, the headman of the village (some commentators oddly identify him with Herod), who was sitting feasting in his house in a shirt of the finest linen. Ruotus and his wife returned an insulting message to Marjatta, that she might go to the stable in the pine-wood. Thither she retired; but the snorting of the horse filled the stable with vapour, and after her little boy was born in the manger, she began to comb his hair, when he vanished from her lap. Then she sought him through the forest, and asked the moon and a star to direct her to him; but they answered that they would not tell her where her child was if they knew, for he had created them to shine in the cold and darkness, and to sleep in the day-time. But when she asked the sun he replied:

"Well indeed I know your infant,
He it was who me created
In these days of finest weather,
Golden rays to shed about me,
Silver rays to scatter round me.
Well indeed I know your infant,
Know your son, unhappy mother!
There thy little son is hidden,
There is hid thy golden apple,
In the swamps to waistband sunken,
To his arm-pits in the marsh-lands." (l. 410-420.)

Then his mother sought for someone to cross her child, and sprinkle him with water; and Virokannas, the wise man from Esthonia, came to baptise him, but first desired to know his history. None presumed to speak except Väinämöinen, who declared that as the child was the son of a cranberry he ought to be cast away in the marshes, or his head dashed against a tree. Thereupon the child, who was but a fortnight old, denounced Väinämöinen before all the people, and declared that he had committed foul offences in his youth, for which he had not been punished. He had pledged Ilmarinen to Pohjola (the North-land) to secure his own safety; and on his account the maiden Aino had drowned herself in a lake. (The charges in this passage are indefinite, but I think they undoubtedly refer to these earlier incidents of the epic.)

> "Then the old man quickly crossed him,
> Quick baptised the child with water,
> As the king of all Karelia,
> As the lord of all the mighty." (l. 475-478.)

Väinämöinen, thus disgraced and defied, could not remain in the country, so he sang his songs of magic for the last time, and provided himself with a boat of copper, and foretold how he would be missed by his people. Then he sailed away to unknown regions; but he left his harp behind him when he departed.

In Esthonian legends Väinämöinen (called Vanemuine) is represented as the God of Music, who retired from the world on account of the ribaldry with which his divine songs were received by some of his hearers.

W. F. Kirby.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF EUCKEN.

W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, M.A.

RUDOLF EUCKEN'S philosophy centres round the idea of the Spiritual Life. From the date of the publication of the *Einheit des Geisteslebens*, that is, from 1888 onwards, it has been consistently championing the supremacy of this idea. Now the meaning and value of the Spiritual has been the common theme of all the great Idealists from the days of Plato onwards; for whether we speak of Idea, Spirit, Spiritual Principle or Spiritual Life, it is with one and the same common vision or experience that we are ultimately concerned. The championship of the Spiritual is thus no mark of distinction among Idealists, but rather the sign and symbol of the fundamental affinities to which they owe their common name. But for that very reason we can perhaps best indicate the distinctive significance of any one Idealist by specifying the position which he holds in this chain of spiritual development.

Without pretending to forecast the verdict which the far future may ultimately pass upon Eucken's position as an Idealist, I would venture to predict that he will be found to stand to Kant and Hegel in a relation not unlike that in which Plotinus stands to Plato and Aristotle. Just as Plotinus sums up from a mystical point of view the long development of Greek Idealism

from Plato onwards, so does Eucken appear to me to sum up from his own neo-mystical standpoint the movement of Modern Idealism which has its roots in the critical work of Kant.

Now the limitations of the mystical philosophy of Plotinus arose precisely from the fact that it was the culminating expression of an Idealism which was at heart dualistic, and had never realised how the ideal world could regenerate the phenomenal, or how the eternal could redeem the transiency of time. Neither Plato nor Aristotle had grasped that true immanence of God in the soul and of the soul in God which gives the Spirit power to subdue the sensual to its own ends; and Plotinus, whose mysticism rests upon the idealistic premises of his great forerunners, leaves us ultimately with a God to whom the soul cannot be united without losing its own identity.

It was Christianity that first overcame this radical dualism between God and the soul by its doctrine of the descent of the divine into the human; and it is through the influence of Christianity that this doctrine of spiritual communion, this view of the intimate oneness of human and divine within the life of the Spirit, has become the germinal conviction of that neo-mysticism out of which the whole structure of Eucken's philosophy grows vitally from within outwards.

A recent reviewer of Eucken's *Life of the Spirit*[1] has characterised the author as "an idealistic mystic who should find his true refuge in Buddhism." The view that Eucken's philosophy can be truly understood only as leading up to a Buddhistic climax could hardly be sustained by anyone who was not also prepared to

[1] Translated by F. L. Pogson, published by Messrs. Williams & Norgate, 1908, as a part of their 'Crown Theological Library.'

maintain that Buddhism is the truth of Christianity. For Eucken's philosophy is essentially Christian in conception, and what is truth for Christianity is also truth for the New Idealism. But in many of his works, more particularly in his *Truth of Religion*[1] and in the recently translated work on *Christianity and the New Idealism*,[2] we find Eucken emphasising the differences between Buddhism and Christianity and referring to the latter as the Religion of Religions. Both Buddhism and Christianity agree indeed in being religions of redemption in opposition to ceremonial or legalistic religions, but Christianity differs fundamentally from Buddhism in its view as to what redemption implies. The redemption which Christianity preaches is not redemption *from* the world but redemption *of* it. Its scheme of redemption is not negative but positive. The natural man is to be redeemed from the power of evil that he may win nature back to the service of spirit. And with this activistic view of redemption goes the conviction that the world is good, for were it not fundamentally good, why should we seek to redeem it? Christianity, in a word, is an optimistic religion and its Founder "the greatest optimist whom the world has ever seen."[3] Buddha, on the contrary, was the sublimest of all pessimists. He held that desire in itself was evil, and that to be delivered from evil we must be freed from desire. But to trace the roots of evil to desire itself is to suppose that it is an evil thing to be conscious at all, for all consciousness is a conscious *striving* or desire. Evil on this view is so native

[1] *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, 2nd ed., 1905, pp. 8, 9, 394.

[2] Published by Messrs. Harper Brothers and included in their 'Library of Living Thought.' See pp. 74-76.

[3] *The Evolution of Religion*, by Edward Caird (James Maclehose & Sons, 1893), vol. ii., p. 109.

to the life of man, so profoundly original or indigenous, that the very faculty which can alone aspire to be freed from it is in its very aspiration evil. Could the Kingdom of Heaven be built to the music of such aspiration, it would be as truly based upon evil as the house that was built upon the sand. All aspiration then must die that over the tomb of our dead desires may brood the peace of the life that no longer wills to live. But of what value can this belated fruition be to us? To be of value it should be immanent in our conscious life, in the life of desire and of aspiration. It should be redemptively potent within the human clay itself, and work mightily for the transformation of this natural tenement into a spiritual temple, not eradicating the passions, but purifying and directing them. Now it is to this will to live and redeem the world that Christianity makes its supreme appeal. It proclaims a new life which is to transform and fulfil the old by giving it a spiritual value. It recognises that here and now, in the very welter of things evil, there is a soul of indwelling goodness, and assures us that if we will only distil it out, we shall find that, as we drain it, it overflows like the widow's cruse of oil. Christianity, in a word, is a religion of joy. Though it drains the cup of sorrow to the last drop, it still holds that joy is deeper than sorrow and that if we but trust in God and work for the coming of His Kingdom we may put away all other care. The issue hinges, in fact, on the answer to the question between optimism and pessimism: Is the whole scheme of things radically good or is it radically bad? If radically good, then the good may be trusted to overcome the bad; if radically bad, then our sole hope of good lies in our being rid of the whole existing order. Here we have a definite

Either-Or. Buddhism rejects this whole world of suffering as illusory and the springs thereof as evil. Christianity, on the other hand, proclaims a break, not with the constitution of things as a whole, but with a certain particular state of the world. It takes its stand at that depth of human experience where the divine is intimately present, and on this bottom rock of spiritual experience founds on earth the Kingdom of Heaven; founds it at first in parable, in the training of disciples and in loveliness of perfect deeds; then, with such gauges as these, challenges the powers of evil to their ultimate destruction. "Christianity," says Eucken, "is not freedom from illusion, but the overcoming of evil."

We conclude then that we cannot point to Buddhism as the truth of Christianity; nor are we therefore justified in claiming the New Idealism, with its confessedly Christian bias, as a forecourt of Buddhism: it is rather an integral part of the Christian temple. It is the philosophical expression of a religious conviction which is Christian in essence and not Buddhistic.

If we look at what is most mystically deep in Christian experience, what do we discern? Nothing merely subjective: no mere ecstasy of devotion, no mere levitation of the individual beyond his own selfhood into some "dazzling darkness," some "divine dark." What we see is a world in conflict, humanity's struggle for spiritual existence. Through the gloom of the conflict we can indeed discern a star of light. There is a point that is "luminous and calm," the point of personal surrender, where the divine has touched and transfigured the individual will into harmony with the purposes and aims of the Spiritual

Life. But the love that is born at this centre of mystical experience is no mere quietistic ardour; it is a love that will not let go of a world that resists and despitefully uses it, a love that has faith in the ultimate lovableness of the enemy with which it wrestles: the harmony of communion would die off into internal discords did not the love strive thus to fashion the world to its own music. It is not only where the light of the Spirit is reflected serenely back upon its own diviner depths, but rather where it is colliding with darkness, seeking to envelope and to penetrate it, that we must look for the mystical illumination in which Christianity and the New Idealism alike have their spiritual home.

The New Idealism is a *Philosophia militans*, and it owes this character to the Christian inspiration that ensouls it. Out of the sweetness of Christianity has come forth strength, out of its love for the world a dividing sword. Nothing could be more challenging and uncompromising than the message to the world which springs from the union of the human and the divine. The New Life must be the World's Life, and the new liberty a joy that sets the whole world free. It is the mission of Religious Idealism to bring this evangel home to the reason and to show that what is eternally true in Christianity is also the ultimate truth for man.

There are three main moments or phases in the development of Eucken's philosophy. The first is the *mystical* phase. Here the emphasis is laid on the absoluteness, the uniqueness, the inwardness of the Spiritual Life, and above all on its independence of the natural. In relation to the natural, to the temporal

life of sense, the spiritual stands forth in complete independence. It has its own values and standards. In the name of the Good, the Beautiful and the True it passes judgment upon the lower world of Nature and seeks to rejuvenate and transcend it. Never can the spiritual be regarded as a mere refinement of the natural in the light of natural canons, of those standards of expediency and inertia which, when not subordinated to the norms of the Spirit, are but spurious counterfeits to be mercilessly unmasked. As the inorganic is to the organic, so is the natural to the spiritual. Here as there the inertia of the lower factor must bend to the purifying activity of the higher. The independence or transcendence of the Spiritual Life is thus the first of all mystical truths. And intimately one with it is this second great truth, that the transcendent power which is so independent of the world of natural values is still immanent in that which it seeks to redeem, immanent either as a hope and sublime possibility or as an actual presence that exalts us above ourselves, lifting us into life that is more than mortal. This is the immanence-aspect of mysticism, the conviction that God meets man unmediated in the silence of his own soul. Such immediacy of union is the hearth and home of all Spiritual Life, and the consoling truth of all religion.

The second phase we may call the *humanistic*. Humanism, as Eucken interprets it, can be truly understood only from the standpoint of the Spiritual Life: it presupposes the mystical outlook, or inlook, the nature of which we have just been considering. If we wish to gauge the width and inclusiveness of Eucken's philosophy, we can do so only by reference to the depth of its spiritual foundations. This is apparent

when we turn to Eucken's treatment of History, a treatment in which the broadly human quality of the New Idealism finds its most characteristic expression. The temporal Order has a history, we find, only in virtue of its spiritual content or reference. "It is only as helping us to truth that time can have any value either for the spiritual life or for religion. But once let time be understood in this way, and it becomes of priceless value, since it is only through the movement of history that we can fully possess ourselves of that eternal element in which our very being has its root."[1] It is through this spiritual interpretation that History proper is marked off from that mere Historicity which, having no eternal present as a standing-ground, roots itself in the past *quā* past, and looks to this past to determine and explain the present. In opposition to this uninspiring conception of the function of the present and its relation to the past, Eucken maintains that it is only in the eternal present that the past has any subsistence at all, and that history is a spiritual structure which needs constant reconstruction and reinterpretation according as the spiritual standpoint changes. Old facts must be reconstituted in the light of new ideas, for it is our personal freedom which sustains the whole historical record and gives it a characteristic drift and influence over our life. "Spiritually speaking, the past is by no means a finished story. It is always open to the present to discover, to stir up, something new in it. Even the past is still in the making."[2]

From the humanistic we pass to the third and last of the three phases, the *activistic*. Just as Eucken's

[1] *Christianity and the New Idealism*, p. 50.

[2] *Christianity and the New Idealism*, p. 54.

humanism can be understood only in the light of his mysticism, so his activism can be understood only in the light of his humanism. We need the broad contrast between the fixity of the mediæval *Weltanschauung* and the restless mobility of the modern industrial world, in order to appreciate the inner meaning of that deeper activity which is to fashion and dominate the spiritual Renaissance of the XXth century. Now the mediæval Catholic view was that the Truth could only come to man through certain authorised channels, a view which found its logical last expression in the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Pope. Within the limits of this adamantine framework of authority much freedom of individual and even of corporate movement was allowed: the unforgivable sin was the deed or the idea that broke through the framework itself.

There were two trees in the garden of the mediæval prison: the tree of Liberty and the tree of Knowledge; and the law of the garden was that no prisoner must eat of the fruit of both trees. If he should eat of the tree of Liberty, and through saintship and perfect service realise the full freedom of walking with God, he must blot out from his vision the tree of Knowledge. He must never know that he is free of his prison, for he might then act as though he were and ignore the prison rules. If, on the other hand, he should eat of the tree of Knowledge and know that his imprisonment was evil and have sight of the immortal liberties beyond, he must never taste of the fruit that would make him free. He must be content to know and keep silent, and in his silence must continue to respect the rulers of the fortress. For if he spake what he knew or failed to respect what he despised, the winged word or barbed reproof might find its seditious way into men's hearts,

or by its upward movement unseal their eyes to see the unsuspected sky-light in the roof. But for all the care that was exercised by the orthodox guardians of the fold, some ideas escaped. Men came to know that the earth was neither fixed nor central; that it was but the little planet of a little star; they discovered that all things were in process of development, and that everything historical had its origins in something more impressively ancient than itself, whilst its destiny lay already wrapped in the seeds of revolt which it bore in its own structure. Thus it came to pass that the old Ptolemaic earth and with it the mediæval heaven with all its fictitious authorities and credentials, passed away from the thought and reverence of man, who was at length left free to know, and above all to know that he was free, and in the power of this knowledge could set to work to fashion a new earth and find a new heaven.

This new earth is now in the making, but its accepted philosophy was not at first, nor is it yet, alas! the New Idealism. The watchword of the New Era was Perpetual Progress through the help of Science and on the basis of Individual Freedom. But the lesson of freedom is not learnt in a day nor in a generation. The modern abuse of freedom is only too apparent, and Eucken is never weary of unmasking its pretences. In the first eager cry for knowledge and more light man lost his soul to science and to the labour to which this science was applied. In his respect for natural law he forgot the spiritual goal, and has now become entangled in the great network of industry which he has spun with such immense ingenuity and toil. There was a time when the workman owned his tools. It is now the machine that owns the man and determines the conditions of his labour. This is all very graphically

worked out by Eucken in many eloquent passages of his writings.[1] We are made to see how the impersonal intellectualism bred of over-science and the mechanical naturalism fostered by an industry that controls the power that should be keeping it in subserviency to the Spiritual Life, are threatening to leave us in an *impasse* less monstrous indeed, but no less destructive in the end both of Freedom and of Truth, than that to which humanity was brought by the dark repressions of the mediæval prison-system. It is true that the Modern World is under no illusion as to the transiency of its own solutions. One fashion follows swiftly on the heels of another but no one suggests that there is any finality about the latest discovery, institution or fad. The bogey of finality is dead, dead even in desire. Lessing's famous *dictum* is typical of the whole spirit of the modern Enlightenment. It is better to pursue the truth than to possess it, better that the truth should recede for ever as we move towards it than that we should think to hold it, fix it and leave it to tyrannise over all that come after us. But one-sided loyalties, as we know, have a way of swinging round into their opposites. A movement so disensouled, a flux so impersonal, can be made intelligible only in the light of natural law. The science of a disensouled world is necessarily a determinism, and determinism in thought spells fatalism in belief. But what could be more fixed than a universe riveted with such bolts as these? For they not only fix for ever the movements of the planets and the stars, but even the movements of character and conviction, thereby enslaving the man far more inwardly and rigorously than did the authoritative compulsions of mediæval Catholicism. The

[1] Cp. also Kästner, *Sozialpädagogik und Neuidealismus*, pp. 11 f.

Determinism of to-day is Mediævalism in its most rigorous and outrageous form. It is the principle of personal enslavement consistently carried to its paradoxical conclusions.

Now Eucken's activism is an appeal to man's soul to assert against all tyrannies, mediæval or modern, its true personal freedom, and, from the standpoint of an eternal present beyond the mere flux of time, to control History and Nature alike in the name and for the uses of the Spiritual Life. And the fundamental conviction on which this activism rests is the belief that the Spiritual *is* spiritual *only in so far as our freedom sustains it;* that it is not a mere *datum*, but a *datum* that is at the same time a problem; that it is not only a life but a world, a world which falls away into illusion when the earnestness of our will is withdrawn from it. Action is thus the final word of Eucken's philosophy. It is only through action that we pass beyond the emptiness of mere subjective feeling on the one hand, and the rigidity of hard objective fact on the other. In action, subject and object are vitally interlocked. The subject imposes its will on the object, and the object imposes its nature on the subject. The universe thus reflects the harmonious adjustment of Spirit and Matter, and the theoretical key to such a universe is Activism.

This activistic universe has the beauty proper to all spiritual workmanship. Activism is not only the philosophy of work but of joyful, disinterested, heroic work. Action, spiritually understood, is essentially creative; it draws upon all the rich possibilities of the Spiritual World and invests them with an actuality that expresses in endless variety of form the unity of the Spiritual Life. A solution that threads its way so exquisitely between the Scylla of monotony on the one

hand and the Charybdis of distraction on the other, must be possessed, as the New Idealism undoubtedly is, with a deep instinct and reverence for the Beautiful. It is only when the cult of Beauty degenerates into an Æstheticism which postpones the joy of the spirit to the pleasure of the senses, and instead of controlling and transmuting the natural passions into forms of spiritual aspiration seeks to develop and refine them in the interests of a philosophy of Taste, that Activism repudiates it as a perversion of the feelings and an insult to the will. In this respect, as in all others, Activism is the faithful champion of morality and spiritual sanity.

In conclusion—for an article must be finite however infinite its subject—I would sum up this brief *aperçu* of Rudolf Eucken's philosophy by reaffirming an old conviction which intervening years have only served to strengthen and corroborate. It is more certain to me to-day than it was a few years back, that "the depth and the inclusiveness of Eucken's philosophy, its close alliance with life and religion, the comprehensiveness of its substructure, both historical and critical, and its stimulating, personal quality, mark it out as the right rallying-point for the idealistic endeavour of the present day."

W. R. Boyce Gibson.

THE MYSTICISM OF MAURICE MAETERLINCK.

A. S. FURNELL, M.A.

MYSTICISM can scarcely be called an attribute of the French type of mind. With its passionate love of clearness, its ingrained ideology, the Gallic genius has always led the van in the cult of pure reason, and has forged for itself adown the ages a language unequalled as an instrument to express intellectual truth.

But the literary supremacy secured to French prose by the great writers of the eighteenth century did not content the ambitious youth of France. Her dramatists and poets would warble the native woodnotes of a Shakespeare, would challenge a Goethe in sonorous rhythm and depth of thought. It was an epoch-making discovery in the history of French literature when it was recognised that the muse dwells rather in the twilight of mystic groves than on the sunlit, vineclad slopes where the shadows lie sharp and clear. Then the Symbolist School arose. The features of nature were but dim shapes lit up by an ineffable Something which they symbolised. To bring French literature back to a sense of the Mystery behind phenomena, this was the task of the Symbolists—a noble effort, truly, but doomed to speedy decadence, for it ran contrary to the genius of the French language, and the genius of the French mind.

When Symbolism had run to seed, no longer revealing that truth whose expression is the end of all Art, but rather reveiling it in the most perverse imagery, a young countryman of Ruysbroeck, Teutonic in depth of mind, master of the subtle Gallic tongue, raised from the ashes of the Symbolist ideal a philosophy unique in its combination of realism and idealism, of positivism and mysticism.

It is rare to be a mystic and an artist. M. Maeterlinck is both. It is rarer still to combine scientific accuracy with poetic insight. M. Maeterlinck has done so.

He did not indeed see his philosophic ideal clear before him from the beginning. Only in the light of his later works can we perceive its dawning in the morbid atmosphere of the *Serres Chaudes*. Such insane and meaningless images as 'the mauve grass of absence,' 'the white stags of untruth,' the 'violet serpents of dreams,' cannot be called symbols. Such are not the symbols of the Mystic, those 'outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual grace' attained by Maeterlinck already in *Les Douze Chansons*. Here in the simple language of the folk-song, he finds that true Art which is artless. He speaks in parables, which have almost the primeval freshness of those once spoken by the Master Mystic upon the shores of Galilee.

Yet even in the *Douze Chansons* Maeterlinck's philosophy is scarcely formulated. It was not till he had sought to adapt to the awakening Soul of a new age that literary domain most perverse to philosophy, namely the drama, and to reform its crude and archaic psychology, that his ideas gradually clarified into anything like systematic expression. His dramas except the first, *La Princesse Maleine*, are protests against the

violence of action which characterises the stage. They are attempts to paint 'not exceptional moments of existence but existence itself,' to make speak that 'invisible principle' which surrounds like a mystic halo the most ordinary acts of life. Strange school for a mystic philosophy—the Stage! And yet the one must mirror noumena, as the other phenomena. Philosophy manipulates ideas as the drama does its puppets, and all the world's a stage where invisible forces play beneath the masks of matter.

It is in his recognition of an efficient spiritual principle that Maeterlinck is a mystic. Like that of all seers, his vision of the universe pierces the husks of things to find in the Self the One of Power; and it is not the expression of his ideas in the terms of current psychology that makes him less a mystic. In his style, too, he seeks to evoke a comprehension of the ineffable by piling up sound-images, for he holds as did the Symbolists that words have a potency beyond their mere sense. This, as Professor James points out in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, is a recognised resource of the mystic, and is as old as the *mantrāḥ* of the Vedas.

The subconscious and supraconscious Self—this is the mysterious region to which Maeterlinck lends a voice. Its approach to the surface is the Soul's Awakening, heralded by so many signs and wonders in the present day.

It is not events that are significant in Maeterlinck's dramas, it is our attitude towards events. For him it is not the Supernatural in Nature but rather the Subhuman and Superhuman in Man. An incident, nothing in itself, becomes portentous when it awakens some atavism lurking below the threshold of consciousness,

or when it stirs up that dim prescience, the groping in time of the timeless and spaceless Self of man.

Thus, the flickering lamp, the sudden hush in the song of birds, the vague gestures of waving branches, become symbols to the soul that peoples nature with its fears. And yet who shall say that nature in itself is dead and unconscious?

Though M. Maeterlinck in his prose works inclines to extend the domain of intelligence outside the human kingdom, he is far from insinuating that this intelligence is of the same order as ours or exists for us. Long is past the day indeed when the fields donned green to comfort man's eyes and the lambs carried wool that he might lie soft o' nights.

Is there to Intelligence conscious of its own ends no portal but the human brain? Maeterlinck asks this question of the bee travelling to fulfil its destiny along the redolent paths of air, of the souls that look at us through animal eyes with interest, yet strange aloofness, of the plant that struggles with the *fiat* incomprehensible that has fixed it to the soil.

As we interrogate this mystery and that of our own inmost being they grow ever greater. The instruments of scientific research augment them instead of destroying them, as a cruder science had hoped.

"One finds everywhere, beside the traces of ordinary life, the wavering traces of another life, which is unexplained." Our consciousness is but an island in the subconscious. Maeterlinck's play *The Blind* symbolises this. We are the blind groping our way under the guidance of a religion which sees dimly but is old, decrepit and dies in our midst.

From this unexplored ocean of the subconscious come the breezes that keep perennially fresh the minds

of the simple and pure in heart. From it also are

"Those obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,
Fallings from us, vanishings,
Blank misgivings of a creature
Moving about in worlds not realised,
High instincts before which our mortal nature
Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised."

From it, too, come the intuitions of primal verities which bring the woman sooner to the goal than his long reasonings do the man.

It is the light which wanes in the growing child to reappear when the stormy passions are lulled in old age—more clearly perceived, therefore, by the blind grandfather in *L'Intruse*, the Arkel of *Pelléas and Mélisande*, the Marco of *Monna Vanna*, than by the Palamideses and Guidos who represent manhood in its full flush of animality; while it reaches its consummation in the almost too etherial types of Astolaine and Joyzelle.

It is in the subconscious region that lurk those forces often personified under the name of Destiny, Fate, Chance, and there too those mysterious entities resembling perhaps what have been called Group-Souls, which guide the evolution of animal species to some end that we know not of.

And if, for all Maeterlinck's consciously evolved theories of destiny, we do not feel in his dramas its fierce clutch at our throats, as we do in those of Sophocles or Shakespeare, who never philosophised about it, we cannot deny that the Belgian artist-philosopher has brought the soul of bee and bulldog, and

the obscure intelligence of plants nearer to us than any writer of ancient or modern times.

His *Treasure of the Humble*, *Wisdom and Destiny*, *Life of the Bees*, *Buried Temple*, *Double Garden*, and his *Intelligence of Flowers*, have inimitably formulated many old teachings of mysticism in a way that appeals to the modern mind.

How few now can read Boehme or Swedenborg with pleasure? Who can read Maeterlinck without keen intellectual delight?

He brings the most abstract concepts within our mental vision by leading up to them from the observation of contemporary happenings. Anything and everything serves him as a starting point for philosophic dissertation—the death of a little dog, the gaming tables of Monte Carlo, a motor trip, the illness of Edward VII. on the eve of his coronation—these are as fruitful to him as the more poetically fertile conceptions of the Spirit of the Hive or the Perfume of Flowers. He writes, however, his most luminous pages when he addresses himself to the problems of morals, as in the essays on 'Justice' and 'Chance' in *The Buried Temple.*

With the recognition of the Subconscious, of a Master-Self which is our 'veritable I,' destiny explains itself, our moments of good luck being those in which this Over-Self controls.

It is incomprehensible, says Maeterlinck, that our ordinary selves do not know the future as they know the past, and it is more rational to suppose that our Greater Selves being beyond space and time, know, and sometimes manage to give us a hint, than that a capricious Intelligence behind the scenes plays with human counters in a game to amuse the Gods.

The sage is he who guides his stars, not by controlling circumstances, but by giving them, as they come, a significance in the economy of his consciousness. It is not in events but in us that the justice of events resides. For the sage there are no disillusions. What seem such are to him but the 'first smiles' of truth.

To bow reverently in willing acceptance of the mystery of life—this is to be wise. Thus the philosophy of Maeterlinck harks backs to Stoicism, and it seems to us significant that 'New Stoicism' is the name by which Professor Sonnenschein characterises both the 'New Theology' of the Rev. R. J. Campbell and the teachings of Sir Oliver Lodge.

Enormous as is the difference between the philosophy of Maeterlinck which is dominated by Art, and the scientific theology or theological science of these two Englishmen, may not all three be symbols, so to speak, of a Great Breath which is stirring the dry bones of Stoicism to arise and fulfil the increasing Purpose of the Age?

A. S. FURNELL.

THOUGHTS FROM THE NOTE-BOOKS OF "FIONA MACLEOD."

THERE is the vain civilisation in which new things grow old, are already old while they are yet new: it is that which is called the march of progress. And there is the fundamental civilisation in which old things imperishably grow new, moving into continual life out of everlasting youth: it is called nothing in particular, though often by the adverse term, for it is of the inward direction and so beyond the common sight, or the discernment either of scorn or indifference.

* * *

. . . I am hopeful that a new spirit is abroad. There are two flame-sworded servants of man, both of them at a discount just now—Pride and Enthusiasm. Let us not be afraid to enlist these great allies to our service.

Enthusiasm—what is it but the flame and ardour of noble ideas on fire! Pride—what is it but the aurora of the spirit! Do not let us be ashamed to be aristocratically proud. Proud of what—aristocrats in what? Proud of our great traditions, our beautiful literature, our particular racial genius: proud of all these things, with pride unconquerable and elate. Aristocrats, in the high distinction of Spiritual Beauty, in the quest of Beauty, in the passion for Beauty.

* * *

The Inner Genius—that flowing rectitude which is

our soul's atmosphere or the element wherein it is enveloped.

* * *

I do believe that the Imagination is a living Spirit, and not merely the voice and apparition of that Spirit. Bacon, I think had something, however adumbrate, of this in mind when he wrote: "Neither is the Imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested with no small authority in itself, besides the duty of the message."

* * *

"Some great compelling thought, some rapturous and passionate purpose." Yes, that is the need. But it will come only, as it has ever come, as to-day to many it comes, by a rapture and a passion that is from within, by a compelling force that is from within; and it will come, then, in its highest and rarest, not by looking into the world of speculative fantasy, but into that little infinite world of one's own heart, so frail and impotent in its mortal destiny, so uplifted beyond death by its august powers and possibilities.

* * *

Years ago, when writing went with drifting thought and not from thought rising from the depths, I wrote this: Without pain as a memory and without despair as a will o' the wisp, there would be no lyric poetry of enduring beauty.

But now I do not think this, though up to a point its truth is obvious. For Joy can be and ought to be the supreme torch of the mind, and Hope can be and ought to be the inspiration of that grave ecstasy which is Art become religious, that is . . . Art expressing an august verity, with the emotion of the life that is

mortal deepened by the passion of the soul that is immortal. Nevertheless it is true that pain is a wind that goes deep into the obscure wood, and stirs many whispers and lamentations among the hidden leaves, and sends threnodies on long waves from the swaying green shores of oak and pine and beech. "It is that which gives artists the strongest power of expression," wrote one who for himself knew the truth of what he said, the great Millet. But Despair . . . that is a quality of the mind, while pain is an elemental condition of life. It is in nature for all that lives to know pain: it is not natural for anything that lives to know despair. So while despair may have its beauty, as a desolate polar sea has, or a barren hillside where the dishevelled stony wilderness is without the green of grass or song of bird, or a marsh redeemed in the pale gold of the moon or the white mystery of starlight, it is the beauty of what is accidental and temporal, not of what is elemental and eternal. The clouds of man's hopes and dreams that drift through the human sky, and the wind of the spirit that shepherds them belong to the higher regions. And by some subtlety of association I recall with sudden pleasure those beautiful lines in *Balaustion's Adventure:*

> "Why should despair be? Since distinct above
> Man's wickedness and folly, flies the wind
> And floats the cloud."

* * *

Our thought, our consciousness, is but the scintillation of a wave: below us is a moving shadow, our brief forecast and receding way; beneath the shadow are depths sinking into depths, and then the unfathomable unknown.

Unity does not lie in the emotional life of expression which we call Art, which discerns it; it does not lie in Nature, but in the soul of man.

* * *

As Art is the vision of life seen in beauty, and Poetry the dream of life remembered in beauty, and Music the echo of life heard in beauty, so dreams and illusions are the foam and phosphorescence on the ever changing yet changeless sea of Beauty.

* * *

The psychic sense of rhythm is the fundamental factor in each and every art.

* * *

Love in Shadow has two sacred ministers, Oblivion and Faith: the one to heal, the other to renovate and upbuild.

* * *

A small cloud once said to the West Wind: "Let me drift away, because I am no good; I can give no shadow, and have no powerful wings." And the West Wind said: "Who asked you to shadow mountains? The Shepherd of the clouds will call you when he knows your hour is come. Meanwhile look down!" And the cloud (which had thought itself fit only for making Holland-fringes and rain-puddings for little cloudlets) looked: and in a green valley a cluster of daisies blessed its shadow, and a garth of grass revived in the rain. And in the eyes of the Shepherd the few daisies were as countless thousands, and the grass as many mountains: yet . . . that despairing cloud would have fain shrunk away!

Arranged by MRS. WILLIAM SHARP.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

THE MEANING OF TRUTH.

By Professor William James. London (Longmans), 1909.

IT is a well-known fact that many concepts, which dilettante mystics and philosophers regard as simple, as not standing in need of any serious examination, present grave difficulties to metaphysics. How many folk, for instance, discuss the 'operation' of the 'law' of cause and effect without the remotest appreciation of what the unsolved riddles anent causation really are; how many, who dilate fondly on the 'Absolute,' 'self,' 'thought,' 'vibrations,' 'matter,' etc., have, at best, only uncritically-used and most obscure working-concepts on their tongues. It is always the same story. The great riddles are not even noticed save by the trained thinker. And they will not be noticed even by him unless he has studied the thoughts of his predecessors and contemporaries with care. Failing adequate knowledge of the history of philosophy, no one, perhaps, is of sufficient natural acuteness to find out all these difficulties for himself. It is a great thing even to become aware of the difficulties. Their solutions, to a very great extent, will remain obscure.

The 'nature of truth' presents an instructive difficulty of this kind. The man in the street, the ordinary dabbler in philosophy, and the 'spoon-fed' mystic of modern days are not worried by it at all. Nevertheless, one of the most fiercely contested controversies that have divided competent thinkers is raging round it at this moment. There are very able writers who aver their inability to grasp Truth's nature at all. There are two prominent Absolutist hypotheses, the ordinary and improved 'correspondence' hypotheses, Bertrand Russell's startling view, and, again, the Pragmatists' doctrine (James, Dewey, Schiller, etc.), which have to be considered. And one may be sure that a struggle, in which the most acute contemporary thinkers take different sides, is worth following. A warning, by the way, seems timely at this point. Of late years it has been the fashion in certain circles to look for illumination, in respect of metaphysics, to 'the East.' An altogether exaggerated

importance has been assigned to views issuing from this quarter. I must submit that Eastern lore is much more suggestive for those interested in 'psychical research' than it is for metaphysics. Distance, as we know, lends enchantment even to historical retrospects. But the sages of the East have left behind them little or nothing of value to those confronted with the graver metaphysical issues which have loomed on us moderns since the time of Kant.

It is impracticable, of course, to discuss the various hypotheses touching Truth within the limits of this brief notice. Those who have read Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, Joachim's *Nature of Truth*, and the extensive neo-Hegelian and Pragmatist literature dealing with the subject will appreciate the reason why. As Hegel once remarked to a Frenchman who wanted his philosophy summed-up concisely: "*Ces choses ne se disent pas succinctement.*"[1] However, the Pragmatist's main contention can be stated simply enough. Thoughts are true when they "guide us to *beneficial interaction* with sensible particulars as they occur, whether they copy these in advance or not" (James). The truth of a statement, we are told, lies in its consequences and particularly in these being *satisfactory* consequences. But 'satisfactoriness'? Well, it cannot be defined precisely, seeing that it has to be measured by so many standards, some of which may not apply to any particular case. The controversy, roused by these and like utterances, waxes furious. And James's book must, perforce, be in the hands of every student who desires to be 'up-to-date.' The case for Pragmatism cannot be stated more strongly than in this effective work. Even those who resent what they call 'Trans-Atlantic Truth' will enjoy the manner in which the revolutionary truth-hypothesis is defended.

I do not propose to repeat criticisms of Pragmatism which I have made elsewhere. But I should like to say something, and that in a few words, as to the place which (as I conceive) it fills in the history of philosophy.

What is the originality to which Pragmatism can lay claim? There appears to obtain considerable misapprehension on this subject. The controversy is becoming so involved that it is of the first importance that we should be clear as to what the Pragmatists are bringing to it.

(1) Is Pragmatism to be *identified* with the truth-hypothesis which its advocates have put forward? This hypothesis, at any rate, is original. It is new, though to some of us it does not

[1] I have endeavoured to throw the salient issues of the truth-problem into relief in the course of a recent work, *The Individual and Reality* (Longmans), pp. 26-42.

appear true. It fails to allow for what is the most salient characteristic of truth—*viz.*: its being a *more or less* adequate ideal representation of reality '*as it is*.' (Truth, of course, resides not in ideas or their objects taken separately, but implies both.) Büchner's theory of the universe, that it is matter in motion, is quite *satisfactory*—for Büchner. But it does not represent reality sufficiently well in thought to be accounted 'true'—even in his regard.

(2) Is Pragmatism something more than a truth-hypothesis? James urges that it is. "It is rather a slow shifting in the philosophic perspective" (p. 121), and he tells us elsewhere that the "whole originality" of it "*is its use of the concrete way of seeing*. It begins with concreteness, and returns and ends with it" (p. 216). Now, what I have to urge is that Pragmatism, as thus described, is not new at all. On the contrary, those who, like myself, reject the Pragmatist truth-hypothesis, can adopt this "concrete way of seeing" unreservedly. And in doing so, we recall that the credit of initiating the concrete-empirical reformation in the realm of metaphysics belongs, not to the Pragmatists, but to Schopenhauer. He it was who (as against formalism and an arid Hegelian intellectualism) urged that the genuine seeker after wisdom has no option but to turn to the sensible appearances which fill our concrete life. Pragmatism, in fact, is an innovation only in respect of its truth-hypothesis; is just a phase of a long-maturing and widespread revolt which began long before the new truth-hypothesis was born or thought of.[1]

A rejection of the Pragmatist hypothesis about truth would not imply that the 'concrete way of seeing,' or radical empiricism, must be abandoned. This way of seeing seems to me, at least, the only one which gives promise of yielding rich and verifiable results. And an improved 'correspondence' theory of truth is, perhaps, one of the most desirable ideals which the radical empiricist, enjoying the new 'philosophic perspective,' is concerned to realise.

Those who have already enjoyed the charm of Prof. James's style, his inimitable art in lightening the burden of hard thinking, will find his latest defence of Pragmatism as attractive as any previous products of his pen. Even if they lay down the volume without being converted to his particular view of truth, they will derive profit from the breezy and subtle empiricism with which he seeks to drive his revolutionary hypothesis home.

E. D. F.

[1] Cp. *The Individual and Reality*, pp. 28, 29.

PSYCHICAL SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY.

A Problem of the XXth Century. By E. Katharine Bates. London (Werner Laurie), 1909.

BY her two previous books, *Seen and Unseen* and *Do the Dead Depart ?* Miss Bates has become known as a convinced but level-headed 'spiritualist,' and won for herself an attentive circle of readers. Her present volume is a general plea for the study of psychical science by the clergy in the best interests of religion; such study, she holds, would supply them with the means of stemming the present flood of popular scepticism and rationalism in things religious. Others are doing what the clergy ought to have done; the Churches have not kept pace with the development of modern psychical science. The danger is a pressing one; for, as with the rise of physical science the Churches anathematised and the laity revolted, so now with the birth of psychical science, " if it is not to be a Spiritual Evolution in the Churches, then it must certainly be a Spiritual Revolution outside of them." As Miss Bates points out, the danger is a popular one, and should be treated popularly.

THE COMING SCIENCE.

By Hereward Carrington. With an Introduction by James H. Hyslop, Ph.D., LL.D. London (Werner Laurie), 1909.

THE 'coming science' is to be based on psychical research, and Mr. Carrington in his latest work supplies us with an excellent introduction to a subject that with every day is claiming the close attention of an ever-increasing number of thoughtful people. It is a careful and judicious statement, and can be safely recommended to those who desire to become informed on matters of which no one who wishes to keep in step with the onward movement of the times can any longer afford to remain ignorant.

THE SURVIVAL OF MAN.

A Study of Unrecognised Human Faculty. By Sir Oliver Lodge, F.R.S. London (Methuen), 1909.

THE last work from the pen of Sir Oliver Lodge is a sober and convincing indication of the utility and importance of the work of

the Society for Psychical Research. Sir Oliver has not only taken a leading part in the affairs of this Society since its inception, a generation ago, but also in other fields of research has won for himself one of the most distinguished places among men of science. When, then, he gives it as his matured opinion that the time has come boldly to state that psychical research has established itself as a definite branch of scientific investigation which has already secured results of the most far-reaching nature, he should obtain at least a patient hearing even from the most sceptical. To this the work of the Society has now won an indubitable right by some twenty-eight years of vigorous work, and none but those who prefer to maintain the attitude of pure prejudice, and thus to stand self-condemned of total lack of the true scientific spirit, can any longer refuse to listen. These years of labour with their harvests of facts, the thinking out of them, and the attempts to winnow the grain from the chaff, are reviewed with lucidity and moderation in some 357 pages. The material, it is true, is not new; it is already very familiar to those who are acquainted with the voluminous *Proceedings* of the S.P.R., and therefore the chief interest of no few readers will lie not so much in the evidence as in following Sir Oliver's treatment of the material, and especially in learning what he thinks of the evidence brought forward in trying to establish the belief in personal survival on a scientific basis. To those, however, who are unfamiliar with the huge body of evidence bearing on 'unrecognised human faculty' collected by the S.P.R.—a mass huge in itself but minute when compared with less closely sifted records—the carefully selected and skilfully arranged testimony in this book should be more than sufficient to convince them that they are face to face with a series of facts of the greatest interest and importance, opening the doors wide to a new departure in human knowledge, and definitely acquiring for science a foothold in at least the borderland of that domain which had been previously hermetically sealed to official secular research, and that, too, chiefly owing to its own prejudice and stupidity.

As to the vital question of survival, Sir Oliver Lodge holds that the theory which best explains the facts of the now famous 'cross-correspondence' evidence, is that these communications are purposed, as they purport to be, by the disincarnate intelligences of Messrs. Gurney, Hodgson and Myers. It cannot of course be said that this view is officially endorsed by the Society, but it is plain that the disinclination to accept such a judgment on the facts as a sober hypothesis that deserves the fullest consideration,

is not only very considerably weakened in the Society but seems almost to have disappeared from its most intimate circles. As for himself Sir Oliver Lodge holds that this view is "fully justified," and that the following provisional judgment may now be adventured, the importance of which he emphasises by printing it in italics—namely that:

"*Intelligent co-operation between other than embodied human minds than* [*? and*] *our own . . . has become possible.*"

If we interpret Sir Oliver Lodge correctly, this means that everything points to this possibility, and that, too, in the minds of those who have rigorously tried every other hypothesis before yielding to a modified acceptance of what has been hitherto the naïve belief of modern spiritualism from its birth some sixty years ago. It has to be remembered, however, that Messrs. Gurney, Hodgson and Myers centred their whole will during life on the determination to communicate after death with their still living colleagues. If, then, with such a determination, and with such careful organisation apparently on both sides, the difficulties of proving the case are so great, what shall we say of the innumerable cases where there has not been any such determination, or any such combined effort? For ourselves we think that what has been called the 'shell-theory' has still much to be said for it as a working hypothesis, and that in many cases it is sufficient to explain many things. The 'shell,' the 'image,' 'the shadow,' of the man that was persists in the invisible; but how far is the true 'intelligence' bound up with it, and how far free? There is the problem; and some part of the Hodgson-Myers communications is very instructive on this point.

THE LEGEND OF SIR PERCEVAL.

Studies upon its Origin, Development, and Position in the Arthurian Cycle. By Jessie L. Weston. Vol. II. Grimm Library, No. 19. London (Nutt), 1909.

THE evolution of Miss Weston's mind bids fair to become not the least interesting and curious adjunct to the evolution of the Graal-cycle, of which—in England at least—she is the most distinguished and, as a textual scholar, the most discerning authority. As a study of the texts, it was difficult to speak of her first volume without passing from the language of criticism to that of simple admiration at such an instance of devotion to a research which had little but its own love of the subject to repay it. And in this kind of praise

the importance of the result attained would appear in a secondary instead of the primary light. The task is still unfinished, but she has given us on this occasion some materials for reflection which, a few rumours notwithstanding, must be called unexpected, having regard to the precedents of her earlier literary work. The specific sub-title applicable to the present volume is 'The Prose Perceval according to the Modena MS.' The text in question has been already described in the pages of this REVIEW as "a very important form of the legend." The report concerning it has been long with us, and the fact that it is here printed from a transcript made by Miss Weston will be equivalent to saying that it can be held to represent the original in the Biblioteca Estense at Modena with verbal and plenary fidelity. It is only under special circumstances that an intimate presentation of textual points can have any direct appeal to the general reader, and I have therefore no opportunity here to indicate how far, or in how important a manner, the Modena MS. differs from the sole version of the romance which we have known previously—that is to say, from the Didot Perceval. Anyone who compares them will coincide with Miss Weston's judgment that they draw from a common source, "of which D. is a bad and M. on the contrary a correct and careful copy." It is also earlier, and its variations are of great moment to scholarship. The opinion that this Shorter Prose Perceval, of which we now have two renderings, depends from a metrical romance by Robert de Borron, seems to have assumed the phase of certitude, and Miss Weston is to be felicitated on the acuteness with which she has here and there reconstructed the verse-form. The conclusion is that the poet who wrote the metrical romance of Joseph of Arimathæa and that which embodies the early history of Merlin did not, however, actually invent the Quest-section of his triple task but incorporated "an existing Grail romance with an Arthurian historical cycle." The Graal romance was also, we are told, the source of the Perlesvaux, or Longer Prose Perceval, and of the Quest of Galahad (p. 173); it was either "the original Perceval-Grail poem" or it differed only slightly therefrom (p. 221); in fine, it was a Christian poem and departed as such from the proto-poem concerning Gawain and the Graal, in the existence of which Miss Weston also believes. On these points we must await her own reconsideration in the third volume of her work, when the alternative suggestions have passed through the alembic of continental criticism.

The French text and its adjuncts fill only one-third of the

present work, and the critical apparatus in the remaining pages has a much wider horizon than would be included by the simple consideration of the text itself. It offers indeed, as the preface intimates, a "developed theory of the origin and development of the Grail legend," and it is this which justifies the opening words of my notice. Before speaking more definitely of the unexpected material for reflection, I will make a preliminary contrast which will serve my purpose; it has also the merit of dealing with a particular text. It is, I think, in her *Legend of Sir Lancelot* that Miss Weston dwells upon the unreality of the Galahad Quest, on its extreme poverty as a romance of the Graal, on the contempt it is alleged to manifest for women, and on its invention for the glorification of Lancelot as the father of the Graal-winner, as if that were its compass and its term. It is almost as if Galahad were an intrusion in the Quest, much as some other writers imply that the old legends have been contaminated by Christianity. But let us see how it stands now in this second volume of the *Legend of Sir Perceval.* That hero has no longer anything "in common with the Graal tradition" (p. 173), and in place of her previous strictures Miss Weston now speaks of "the full spiritual and mystical development" of that Galahad Quest which I have called elsewhere the head and crown of the legend. She says also that Galahad is "the last word" (p. 276) of "Graal evolution" (p. 309); that his creation took place in response to "an imperative demand, at once psychological and literary" (p. 340); and that the author of this response "wrote with full knowledge and intention" (p. 293), as I also have sought to indicate. Miss Weston is further of opinion that the devout-minded poet De Borron "knew what the story meant" (p. 331), that he was in fact an initiate, and was treating his subject from the *in*side, and not from the *out*side" (p. 279).

This reference to initiation gives me the opportunity to say that, having in her first volume suggested dimly and from afar that the Graal Castle may have been a temple of initiation, Miss Weston now appears as one who has received some unofficial instructions as to what is involved by this notion, and the result is that a new spirit has passed over her. She is still like the man who was blind, and, though she is now beginning to see, she has only a vague appreciation of several important distinctions. The occultist and mystic seem confused in her mind, and it is wonderful to read of her sudden discovery that the Graal Stone of Wolfram might not be without analogy with the Stone of Alchemy.

But the interesting point is that the Quest of the Graal has for her become the "Quest of Life" (p. 256), and that it is linked on to the esoteric teachings connected with other mysteries by the fact that "behind instructions as to the source of animal life" there is in both a realisation of "loftier and more abstract speculations on the source of the spiritual life" (p. 255). So far as she has reached at present, Miss Weston is right, but the Quest of the Graal is the Quest of the union with the source of all life in the universe. The terms and modes of progression towards that union lie behind the mystical doctrine of the Eucharist, which explains why the Graal is presented as an Eucharistic mystery. Transubstantiation takes place when the spirit of man in virtue of an ineffable intercourse with the spirit which is of God reforms the body of desire, so that it is changed and set free from that curse which has made it the body of sin. If Miss Weston will follow this indication, she should get to understand in another sense why the symbolism of vegetation, its decay and growth, formed one presentation of what lies behind the instituted mysteries, why an alternative was phallic symbolism, and on what authority I have undertaken to speak of the same thing under the sacramental veils. There is wine and there is bread; there is the vegetation which produces these as aliments to nourish life; there are otherwise the organs which perpetuate life in the external; and there is the consequent sanctity of these: all are so many lines which converge to one centre, and at that centre are the *miracula rei unius*. Some of Miss Weston's concealed informants—occult or mystic, as may be—do not seem fully qualified: *il n'y a pas de gens plus embêtants que ces gens-là.* One of them gives a better impression, but he is reported too slightly for judgment.

I feel that I must advert in conclusion to one further point of Miss Weston's criticism. I believe that the mystery of attainment symbolised by the Christian Eucharist is the *terminus ad quem* of all mystical research, and that the secret schools stand about it as the hills about Jerusalem; if so, it follows that the official Church is in a certain privation, because the outward sign has been taken for the thing signified; but it is not denuded. Miss Weston does not appreciate this point, clear as it has been made, when—denying as she does that the Secret Words pronounced at the service of the Graal were Eucharistic words, which of course is a symbolical statement—she enquires when the outward succession lapsed. The answer is—never. That succession was external and the school of experience was within. Nor were the writers of the

romances guilty of hypocrisy in exalting the official Eucharist, though they knew that it "no longer possessed a saving grace" (p. 233). They knew nothing of the sort. They knew of a rumour only, and what I have called—in my imperfection of language—the Secret Church did not make void the instituted sacraments. It has always been the destiny of the world to put up with what it has—the second best and the substitutes. But the report has remained concerning the attainment of the thing signified, and of such is some part of the Graal literature.

A. E. W.

MAN'S ORIGIN, DESTINY, AND DUTY.

By Hugh MacColl. London (Williams & Norgate), 1909.

THE arguments in this work are stated to be based upon facts admitted by nearly all scientists, and are brought forward to establish the following propositions:

(1) That as regards man and all sentient animals, the soul and the body are different entities.

(2) That the soul will survive the body and, by successive transformations, will continually develop upwards.

(3) That a psychic universe exists containing numberless ascending orders of intelligent beings above the human; though these are imperceptible to man's senses in the present stage of his development.

(4) That the whole physical and psychic universe is maintained and directed by one infinitely powerful (according to a clear and rigorous definition of the word infinite) and infinitely intelligent Being, whose will, as shown in the so-called 'laws of nature,' it is man's duty to study, and, within the limits of his faculties and knowledge, to obey.

In the consideration of his first proposition Mr. MacColl defines the soul as the entity that feels, and, in its higher developments, thinks and reasons. Physiologists, by various convincing arguments, have arrived at the conclusion that no part of the body, if we except the brain, feels, thinks, or reasons; and we have no valid reason for supposing that the brain is an exception. In other words, analogy would lead to the inference that the whole body, brain and nervous system, has in itself no more feeling, consciousness, will, thought, or initiative than a plant, phonograph, or calculating machine, or the inanimate apparatus in wireless

telegraphy. Like the last, the brain neither feels nor understands the sensations and intelligence which it transmits. He then gives reasons for the hypothesis that the soul may be external to and possibly far away from its own bodily mechanism, and connects this with the possibility of telepathy.

On the ground that far below the human there are numberless sentient beings completely ignorant of the existence of higher animals and man, Mr. MacColl infers, by induction and analogy, that man is but a link in the ascending evolutionary chain of intelligence. If direct evidence is wanting, indirect evidence is abundant all around us. The main subjects of which Mr. MacColl treats are: The Infinite, The Foundation of Ethics, Scientific Fallacies, Miracles, Evolution and Design, Man and the Lower Animals, Pseudo-Evolution, The Fallacies of Haeckel, and Morality and Religion. In dealing with the last he asks: "Can the fundamental and essential doctrines of the Christian Religion be established independently of and without any appeal to miracles? It would be an immense relief to many anxious hearts if this question could be answered in the affirmative; and the main object of these essays is to show that this is possible."

We have read the book, and also the two articles reprinted from *The Hibbert Journal* in the appendix, with great interest. It is true that the author has the short way with difficulties inseparable from the essay-form, and in some important sections gives us the impression that he has "bitten off more than he can chew" in the space at his disposal; but he makes some really valuable suggestions, quotes some interesting facts, and raises some of the questions most vital to humanity, even if he does not furnish them all with satisfactory answers. No more can be expected from a volume of essays, and we are able to recommend it to the attention of thoughtful readers.

A. H. W.

THE MEANING AND VALUE OF LIFE.

By Rudolf Eucken, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jena. Translated by Lucy Judge Gibson (Classical and Oriental Triposes, Cambridge) and W. R. Boyce Gibson, M.A. (Oxon.), Examiner in Philosophy in the University of London. London (Black), 1909.

IN 1908 Rudolf Eucken was awarded the Nobel Prize for literary work of an idealistic tendency; in the same year he published his

Sinn und Wert des Lebens, which immediately met with an enthusiastic reception, and now lies before us in the admirable translation of Mr. Boyce Gibson and his accomplished wife. As Mr. Boyce Gibson, who is the acknowledged chief exponent and interpreter of Eucken's philosophy for English readers, has already himself in our present issue given a lucid and authoritative summary of the nature of the 'New Idealism' or 'Activism,' as it has been called, it may be deemed a work of pure supererogation to try to add to it. Nevertheless, as the word 'spiritual' occurs on almost every page of Eucken's book, it may be as well to quote a few passages to emphasise the sense in which the philosopher uses this term of so many and various meanings. 'Spiritual' denotes that which looks to the needs and satisfaction of the whole man; it is essentially of a moral nature. "Spiritual values . . . sever themselves definitely from all considerations of mere pleasure and utility. They are ours, and yet more than ours. They lift us into another than the mere human world, and at the same time they are to us more inward and essential than aught else can possibly be" (pp. 88, 89). Eucken is thus continually insisting on the idea of independence in connection with the spiritual life; it is the only possible life of freedom, he holds. "As regards life's content, while we recognise an Independent Spiritual Power as the basis of reality, we no longer conceive this basis as an immoveable and unapproachable background to all our activities, but rather as a self-containing, self-developing life, a life in which we may ourselves win a share, and, so far as we do so, bring our own life on to the same level of self-initiating free activity" (p. 96). And again: "That which current conceptions treat as a Beyond that must be proved and justified by reference to the sense-world, is now the only world which exists in its own right, the only true and genuine world which neither asks nor consents to be derived from any outside source. . . . The course of historical development shows us sense immediacy constantly yielding more and more of its supremacy to a spiritual immediacy; the outward life is lived and viewed from the standpoint of the inward and not *vice versa*. The Ptolemaic centre is replaced by the Copernican" (pp. 101, 102). And yet this is not all apparently, for in so far as Eucken looks chiefly to the 'wholeness' of man, he sees that the 'opposites' must be included and transcended in self-realisation. "It is, indeed, a point of fundamental importance that life can thus take shape, and through its inclusive activity include and transcend the opposition of subject and object" (p. 93). As to the opposition of

subject and world, the Spiritual Life "envelopes this opposition, and, in the fulness of creative power, can enrich life with a content which reveals itself in and through the psychical functions of thought, feeling and will, though it can never by any possibility originate in these functions" (p. 102). It rather comes into play when these functions 'correspond' or 'match,' we should say. And yet again: "The Spiritual Life demands a complete, inclusive activity transcending the opposition between subject and world, inward feeling and outward fact. Our merely psychical life, however, is at the mercy of this opposition" (p. 109). If the term 'spiritual' occurs on nearly every page, there is also another word that occurs almost as often, as may be seen even in the few quotations we have given. It is that most unsatisfactory of all qualifications, the depreciatory vocable 'mere.' The so frequent occurrence of this question-begging epithet seems to us to indicate a weakness. Curiously enough, indeed, it sometimes occurs precisely where the strongest attack might be delivered on idealist positions by anti-idealists. And this is strange, for Eucken of course recognises over and over again the strength of the opposition; indeed he not unfrequently sets it forth with sympathy and insight.

THE FAITH AND WORKS OF CHRISTIAN SCIENCE.

By the author of 'Confessio Medici.' London (Macmillan & Co.), 1909.

WITH the faith of Christian Science Mr. Stephen Paget, the author of *Confessio Medici*, will have nothing whatever to do; as to its works, he admits that it not unfrequently cures functional disorders, but denies that it ever has, and declares that it never can, cure organic diseases. He reproaches it (by-the-by he always speaks of it as 'she') especially with keeping silence on its many failures and with the useless nature for any critical purposes of the records of its successes; and, as was to be expected from an out-and-out opponent, we have once more set forth the now familiar story of Mrs. Eddy and her book, its origin and evolution (Quimby-Wiggin), of her papacy, and the docility of her followers.

The only good of it is, we are told, that Christian Science preaches Quietism; yet the trouble of even this is that it preaches it with such boastful presumption. In so far as she does preach it, however, she supplies a want. On this her critic becomes eloquent as follows:

"More and more the churches in London are ceasing to preach Quietism, and are preaching Action: all political and social problems, all militant thought, all criticism, *quicquid agunt homines*, concern them. Now, to the heart of it all, comes the sudden advice to everybody, to leave off believing in anything but God; to sit still, and think of God; to leave all to God; practically, to be God. Slowly, the Name, like the note of a huge bell, swings down; and the heavy waves of the sound beat and fall, and pass into unquiet lives till they cease to hear those discords which they make in themselves from birth to death. Such magic is in this Name, if it be sounded alone, to the silencing of all else. Into the restless legion of the poor, that I may say nothing of the rich, I long for the advent of Quietism, into us and our Imperial London, haunted by the ghost of Imperial Rome. It is not for me to tell the churches what they ought to preach, nor do I know whether they would now venture to ask Londoners to be quiet. Only, I am sure that, for the defeat of Christian Science, they must preach Quietism. But there are two kinds of Quietism, one true, the other false. True Quietism neither philosophises, defines, argues, nor takes a side. It feels, therefore it is. Its only product is itself. It never thinks what the world has said, or is saying, or will say; it is indifferent to all evidences, works and results. False Quietism arrays herself in rhetoric, in bad logic, in phrases torn from context and pinned on anyhow, or worn upside down; introduces herself, explains her own startling occurrence, wonders that you never heard of her before, talks of her accomplishments, and of her points of view."

This, however, is not peculiar to Christian Science; in a number of analogous movements faith is being aroused among the many far and wide and in the old way—assertion piled on assertion, misunderstood resounding phrases used as magical formulæ, self-advertisement on all sides, fast shutting of the eyes to all evidence and experience that runs contrary to what the faithful desire to believe. Still there is 'faith,' and even such faith works apparent wonders. Whether, however, a subtler disease of the mind is not frequently contracted in exchange for the cure of the body by faith engendered by the affirmations and denials of Christian Science and other such movements, is a question calling for answer; those who have had long experience in such matters have little hesitation in insisting on the dangers of such methods. They admit the cure of the body, they admit the enthusiasm, they admit the power of faith, they admit the possibility of the bringing into play of the 'sub-

conscious' in many modes, but they see great danger in sacrificing the understanding to the 'sub-conscious' for the sake of temporary bodily benefit. This does not mean a glorification of the intellect, but rather a glorifying of it together with the making glorious of the rest that goes together to make the whole man.

MYTH, MAGIC AND MORALS.

A Study of Christian Origins. By Fred. Cornwallis Conybeare, M.A. London (Watts & Co.), 1909.

THROUGHOUT the centuries Christians have boasted themselves that the dogmas and ideals of their faith are derived immediately from the Life of Jesus of Nazareth, that they were realised historically and uniquely in His person. He was the living revelation of the faith; in Him was perfection made uniquely manifest in human and divine fulness. Christianity is thus made to rest first and last and midmost on a unique historic fact which brought a new element physically into the world-process; Christianity was revealed in a life, lived uniquely as an example by God Himself on earth.

This view has fully satisfied the ages of unquestioning faith, and still to-day satisfies those who are in the childhood stage of religion, that is to say, in the nursery of traditionalism. The next age of religion and first step out of the nursery is the stage of doubt, of intellectual inquiry, when the soul begins to think for itself, and asks the simple question: What evidence is there for such an overwhelming claim? For upwards of half a century the documents which for so long were unquestioningly assumed to confirm this claim have been minutely analysed in order to ascertain their historic value. The claim 'We rest our case on history' has been squarely met with the answer, 'Then it must hold good when the methods and canons of historic research are applied to it.' If these tests are applied with greater severity than is the case with any other subject of historic enquiry, the reason is that for no other event or series of events in the world's history is so much claimed.

It is, then, to the purely historical side of the question that Mr. Conybeare devotes himself rigorously, one might almost say remorselessly, in the volume before us. If history, according to the orthodox, is the final bar of appeal, then they shall have history pure and unalloyed according to the documents they have

brought into court. Mr. Conybeare's is a severely objective mind, his point of view is scarcely to be distinguished from that of pure rationalism; for mysticism or allegory, for myth or miracle, he has no sympathy, indeed for much else that generally goes to make up religion he has very little patience. But we can hardly blame him for this; the challenge throughout the centuries has been made to the historical critic, and now that he has appeared to take it up we cannot very well complain of his make-up. In his treatment of the documents Mr. Conybeare for the most part follows in the footsteps of Wellhausen, Harnack and Loisy; but throughout he deals with the material at first-hand and shows ample signs of that ripe scholarship which has characterised all his previous work.

The earliest documents of Christianity are the Letters of Paul, the genuineness of which on the whole Mr. Conybeare accepts. (This is somewhat surprising, as are also the early dates he gives to the Synoptic documents, considering how radical he is in other respects.) In these Letters, however, we find nothing of the historic Jesus; the Christ of Paul is a Christ of his own private revelations.

As to the Gospels, Mr. Conybeare at once dismisses the fourth as devoid of all historic value. "It inverts the sequence of the chief events of Jesus's ministry as narrated in them [the Synoptics], transforms his teaching beyond all recognition, turns him into the Logos or Divine Reason, and in other respects shows itself to be a religious romance embodying speculations about him, later much than Paul, but of which Paul's ecstatic thinking was the *fons et origo.* The fourth Gospel enshrines, no doubt, many noble thoughts, but is on the whole frigid, insincere, and full of exaggerations. We may safely neglect it in any attempt to get back to the earliest traditions of Jesus."

To find the fourth Gospel characterised as 'frigid' is somewhat surprising; but setting this aside, we must remember that by the 'earliest traditions' of Jesus Mr. Conybeare means the view of Jesus taken by the earliest sources of the composite documents known as the Synoptic Gospels; these earliest sources, he maintains, show forth Jesus as a Jewish teacher, sharing in the beliefs of his time, and in the practices of his ancestral religion, firmly believing in the immediately approaching end of the world and the miraculous establishment of the Messianic Kingdom of God on earth. So far was he from founding a universal religion that he never "dreamed of any but Jews sharing in the heavenly kingdom whose near approach he proclaimed. He expressly forbade

his disciples to missionise the heathen, or even the Samaritans." Least of all was he busied with founding a Church: for what need was there of a Church when the miraculous Kingdom was momentarily expected?

The solution of the Synoptic problem adopted by Mr. Conybeare in its main outlines differs little from the view that now meets with most favour. All the documents are composite. The Marcan is the oldest, and is to be dated about 70 A.D. This document demonstrably lay before the first and third evangelists, who cut it up and adapted it severally to suit their purposes. The Marcan document is not a first-hand production; it is a composite, redacted from prior sources, and those sources already literary, and not only so but most probably translations from the Aramaic. That 'Mark' lay before 'Matthew' and 'Luke' no competent critics any longer doubt; and if we admit the 70 date for 'Mark,' then 'Matthew' and 'Luke' may be given from 80-100. The use of Mark by Matthew and Luke is not the only fact in Synoptic criticism that may now be said to be 'acquired'; the first and third evangelist made free use also of another written source which probably lay before them already in two recensions—a document consisting largely of sayings and parables; this they each of them cut up, and adapted and redacted to suit their purposes and predilections. Nevertheless the major part of the original can be reconstructed with probability from their quotations, and Conybeare reproduces Harnack's reconstruction of it. It should, however, be noted that the method of this reconstruction has been called into question by some scholars, and especially by Prof. Kirsopp Lake in a recent number of *The Expositor*. This second main source is known now generally as Q. or the non-Marcan document; it was a Greek document and in all probability a translation from the Aramaic. It should be remembered that we are in a period of reaction generally in Synoptic criticism especially with regard to dates, and the theory of Ramsay that in Q. we have a document written *during* the lifetime of Jesus, just before his death, is one of the most striking signs of the extent to which this reaction has gone. The hypothesis that Mr. Conybeare seems to favour is that in the Aramaic originals underlying the sources of 'Mark' and of the Q. document we have the earliest material going back to Galilean circles, and therefore the nearest approach to the historic facts about, not the Life—for there are no materials for a Life proper—but the brief ministry of Jesus.

These were presumably documents used by the 'Brethren of

the Lord' tradition, by that circle of 'Apostles' and 'Saints' at Jerusalem with whom Paul was at such open variance, and of whom he had apparently so poor an opinion. Their point of view was limited to an essentially Jewish outlook; they were moreover characterised by the popular form of Ebionism—the ideals and expectations of the 'poor,' who looked forward to a good time on earth in terms of a crude and materialistic Chiliasm. Jesus, their prophet, was a man born as all men; he was, however, righteous according to the law beyond all others.

But if the 'Cephas' and 'James' circle at Jerusalem, of the Pauline Letters, was in possession of the plain historic facts of the life and teaching of the Rabbi Jeschu ha-Notzri, and the sources of the Synoptic writers were part and parcel of their literature, it is exceedingly difficult to understand how Paul could have had the smallest chance of withstanding the 'Pillar' apostles to the face, or of persuading communities already formed by them or their agents, that Cephas and James did not know what they were talking about. In the Canonical documents we know only what Paul says about the 'Saints' at Jerusalem; there happen, however, to be fairly abundant remains of non-canonical literature that tell us what the 'Saints' thought about Paul; and the picture that the sources of the Clementines give us, when analysed by the most recent criticism, introduces us to a mixture of so many strange elements of forgotten history and legends of a Gnostic nature that it is impossible to accept the apparently straightforward and simple solution of the origins of Christianity that seems to result from Mr. Conybeare's line of argument.

What were the communities or churches that Paul found, as well as founded, almost everywhere in his travels and to whom he preached his view of a spiritual Christ or Messiah revealed to him by his own ecstatic experiences and visions? Were they all derivatives from the Jerusalem Jesus-community, the circle that is supposed to have been in possession of the true historic facts of the life of Jesus and the custodian of his preaching? They were certainly not the orthodox synagogues, for Paul was invariably driven out of these with contumely. What were these circles who had apparently been long established when Paul first visited them, with their prophets and gifts of the spirit, with technical terms all of a 'Gnostic' nature, or at least of a common theological language that Paul shares with them? Was the only tradition of Jesus the naïve Ebionite view of the Jerusalem church, as we are asked to believe? What became of Paul during his retirement to

Arabia, after the first great spiritual experience that led to his conversion from an official persecutor of the Messianic sects to a preacher of a spiritual doctrine of Christhood begotten of immediate experience and revelation? Paul is never tired of expressing his contempt for those who preach the doctrine of a fleshly Messiah. He owes his doctrine to no man, he continually boasts, but to immediate revelation. The Jerusalem church rejects him; the other communities accept his teaching. He is perpetually urging his correspondents not to listen to the 'after the flesh' doctrine of the emissaries of the Jerusalem church that came to visit the communities with whom he is in contact. Now, if those communities had all been founded by Peter and James and the rest of the Jerusalem Saints, it stands to reason that Paul would not have had the slightest chance of getting a hearing. What were these churches? They seem most probably to have pertained for the most part to the outer circles of communities of an Essene-like and mystic nature, of pious and contemplative orders, and it is in these latter, we believe, that the secret of Christianity and its true origins remain hidden. It may even be that Paul spent his time in Arabia in one such retreat, and that this further emboldened him to withstand Cephas to the face.

However this may be, in studying the Letters of Paul, the earliest documents of Christianity which we possess, we are brought into contact with numerous religious societies apart from the orthodox synagogues of the Jews, scattered throughout the cities of the Diaspora; they were all strongly imbued with Messianic hopes of a more or less spiritual nature, and were most certainly devoted to the cultivation of the spiritual life according to their lights. That these were all Jesus-communities—that is to say, 'churches' founded by the followers solely of the popular preaching of Jesus—we have never been able to believe. The Letters of Paul, the earliest documents of Christianity, introduce us to circles of practice and belief, to an atmosphere foreign to that of the story of the 'sources' of the Synoptic compositions—that at least is evident on all hands. Did Paul create this atmosphere entirely, or did he find it already existing and pervade it with his own strenuous convictions based on his private revelations? If it already existed it follows that the view of the Jerusalem 'Pillars' concerning Messianism was but one of a number of views, that it was further, to the mind of Paul, a most materialistic view, and that he preferred to labour among those who had more spiritual ideas on the

subject. Now it was precisely among such believers that the doctrine of the Saviour as a Heavenly Being was in highest favour; it was precisely among such circles that belief in the Logos was a fundamental of their creed. Such ideas were in wide circulation among the thoughtful and educated of the time of the ministry of Jesus. It is almost impossible to believe that he himself was not familiar with them; indeed it is highly probable that before the year, or months rather, of his preaching to the people, he was a member of one of the many orders of the Pious, or Pure, or Righteous, or Poor, who had lay members scattered about everywhere in the towns and villages. These held far more spiritual views of Messianism than those of the ignorant, materialistic peasants; and it is impossible to believe that Jesus could have shared the crude expectation of the people rather than the more spiritual views of the mystics and contemplatives. Such considerations, then, do not allow us to be confident that in the 'sources' of the Synoptics which show Jesus sharing the ignorant views of the people, we have the true historical portrait of the man; they rather lead us to suppose that we have therein just the sort of misunderstanding that would naturally occur when a great spiritual teacher addresses audiences of all kinds indiscriminately. Each would interpret according to his own hopes and fears; the poor, who were expecting a social and political revolution, to be engineered by the immediate interposition of Yahweh, would interpret the utterances of the spiritually revolutionary Rabbi in their own way, and treasure up their own misunderstandings as the 'true word' of the message. But that from such records we can get to the real historic man and what he thought and hoped, much less to the 'mind of the master,' is hardly to be believed.

THE STORY OF GLASTONBURY AND THE GRAIL.

Or the Light of Avalon. A Mystery Play concerning the Introduction of Christianity to England by Joseph of Arimathea. By Melchior Macbride. London (Hunter & Longhurst), 1909.

MR. 'MACBRIDE'S' verse runs smoothly, and, though the play contains little dramatic action and its scenes are little better than settings for narrative and declamation, it will certainly act better than the indifferent 'dramatic reading' of it at the Bijou Theatre to which we listened last April would lead us to suppose. There are some fine passages and lofty ideas in it; but the whole

story is lacking in historical probability. It takes for granted the truth of the monkish Joseph of Arimathæa legend, developed in all probability from the apocryphal *Gospel of Nicodemus*, to the greater glory of Glastonbury. It would be to no purpose to recite the points on which the historical critic must perforce join issue with the author. It is enough to mention that Mr. 'Macbride' will have it that the Magi were Druids, and that he finds no difficulty in asking us to believe that Jesus in his lifetime had a coin struck, with his face on one side and a legend on the other fully declaring himself as "the Man triumphant over death."

IDEALISM AS A PRACTICAL CREED.

Being the Lectures on Philosophy and Modern Life delivered before the University of Sydney. By Henry Jones, LL.D., D.Litt., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Glasgow (MacLehose), 1909.

THESE inspiriting lectures by Professor Jones are an eloquent plea for a practical trial of Idealism, not merely in all that concerns our own individual interpretation of life, but also—and even mainly—in our social relationships and constructive work. What is here meant by Idealism, however, is no mere dry scholastic system of philosophy, although he identifies it largely with what is technically known as Objective or Absolute Idealism, and in particular with the philosophy of Hegel. It is rather the Idealism garnered of man's individual and social experience, and three of the lectures are devoted to tracing the historical process whereby "Spirit comes into possession of itself and the world, that is becomes 'Free.'" It is the Idealism which asserts that, "Spirit is more and higher than any material or natural force, and has superior rights; and further, that the natural world is itself the symbol or phenomenal manifestation of Spirit." It should be noted, however, that Prof. Jones does not use the term 'Spirit' in any theological sense, but as "the best word I know for thought and feeling and will and all the powers of man in interpenetration and indivisible unity." The work is most eloquent and suggestive, with a vein of poetry and even of devotional mysticism running through it. We regret that lack of space will not permit our quoting some of the many terse and epigrammatic sentences which are to be found on almost every page.

W. K.

STUDIES IN MYSTICAL RELIGION.

By Rufus M. Jones, M.A., D.Litt., Haverford College, U.S.A. London (Macmillan), 1909.

DR. RUFUS M. JONES should have called his interesting and instructive volume 'Studies in Christian Mysticism,' rather than 'Studies in Mystical Religion,' for he has practically nothing to say of mysticism outside Christianity (except for a short chapter on 'Roots of Mysticism in Classical Literature,' where he treats very briefly of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus), although he admits that religion of the mystical type "is not confined to Christianity, but belongs in some degree to all forms of religion, for first-hand experiences of a Divine and Higher Presence are as old as human personality." What then is the meaning that our author gives to mysticism, for it is, as he says, a word that cannot properly be used without careful definition? He defines it as that "type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence. It is religion in its most acute, intense, and living stage." That any series of studies in Christian mysticism which profess to trace its phases from the earliest days onwards, should entirely eliminate all consideration of the many forms of mystic speculation and practice represented by the Gnostic schools, is, to our mind, a serious omission, and yet Dr. Jones has nothing to say on the subject except one or two brief depreciatory sentences. And yet it is precisely the positions of the Gnostics that appear again and again in many of the later phases of Christian mysticism. For instance, what can be a clearer echo of one phase of Gnostic doctrine than the following summary of the main tenets of the Waldenses quoted from Jundt's *Histoire du Panthéisme populaire?*

"They pretend that every man is Son of God in the same manner that Christ was. Christ had God or the Holy Spirit for soul; and they say that other men also have. They believe in the incarnation, the birth, the passion, and the resurrection of Christ, but they mean by it the Spiritual conception, Spiritual birth, Spiritual resurrection of the perfect Man. For them the true passion of Jesus is the martyrdom of a holy man, and the true sacrament is the conversion of a man, for in such a conversion the body of Christ is formed."

This, however, is not quite correct; neither Gnostics nor

Waldenses contended that 'every man is Son of God in the same manner that Christ was.' This they averred of the man regenerate only.

Dr. Jones's sympathies are all on the side of what may be called a social mysticism which took its rise late in the fourteenth century. As to the immediately preceding phase represented by 'The Friends of God,' and the followers of Eckhart, it was, in our author's opinion, "weakened by its heavy load of scholastic speculation." With the Renaissance and Humanism, with the New Learning, came a fresh inner impulse. "With the new intellectual dawning there also began to spread, unconsciously and without observation, a *new mysticism*, born out of the old, but more practical and social than it; more eager to minister to the whole man, and with wider interest in the entire spiritual mission of Christianity." It is in the chapters which follow that Dr. Jones finds himself more at home, and writes with sympathy and discrimination on such themes as the Brethren of the Common Life, the Pre-Reformation in England (namely Wyclif and the Lollards), the Anabaptists on the Continent in general and especially in England, the Family of Love, the Seekers and Ranters, ending up with an interesting chapter on John Saltmarsh, Gerrard Winstanley, and William Dell, the last of whom summed up his belief in the remarkable sentence:

"In the same Kingdom of Christ all things are inward and spiritual; and the true religion of Christ in written in the soul and spirit of man by the Spirit of God; and the believer is the only book in which God Himself writes His New Testament."

No less remarkably did Winstanley declare his faith when writing:

"Friends, do not mistake the resurrection of Christ. You expect that He shall come in one single person as He did when He came to suffer and die, and thereby to answer the types of Moses' Law. Let me tell you that if you look for Him under the notion of one single man after the flesh, to be your Saviour, you shall never, never taste Salvation by Him. . . . If you expect or look for the resurrection of Jesus Christ, you must know that the spirit within the flesh is the Jesus Christ, and you must see, feel, and know from Himself His own resurrection within you, if you expect life and peace by Him. For He is the Life of the World, that is, of every particular son and daughter of the Father."

Dr. Jones tells us that he has selected these men as samples of the mystical teachers of the time. "They are of a totally

different type from the mystics who followed the negative path in a passionate search for the Divine Dark. They are primarily of the practical temper that belongs to the English character, and they introduce us to the new social spirit which is the very 'hall-mark' of the Quaker Fellowship, which will be studied in the succeeding volume."

The last sentence discloses Dr. Jones's chief purpose and main standpoint in writing the present volume; it is to serve as an introduction to a projected History of the Quaker Movement, and the point of view is mainly that of a member of the Society of Friends. We shall look forward to the publication of this volume with pleasure, and also to another on Jacob Böhme which we are promised, for Böhme's contribution to mysticism, as we are told by the writer, is too important to be crowded into an inadequate chapter. This we can well believe; it is also true of many another mystic of whom Dr. Jones has treated. Nevertheless we are glad to hear of this new study of Böhme.

Our own belief is that a still 'newer' mysticism than the 'new mysticism' of the post-Renaissance days is being born among us to-day—'newer,' however, only in the sense that true mysticism is ever young and ever fresh, for it is of the Spirit. This mysticism of to-day will be more catholic, in the widest sense of the term, than it has ever been before, for comparative religion has taught us lessons we can never forget, and made us realise that religion as a whole cannot be understood by the study of one religion only, much less by the study of one form or mode of a single religion. In this connection it is of service to read Baron F. von Hügel's recent remarkable volumes on *The Mystical Element in Religion, as studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her Friends*, and compare the standpoint of so keen a psychologist and critical historian, who is also at the same time both a mystic and submissive to the authority of the Roman Church, with the radical position of Dr. Jones—the nicety of balance and reserve imperative on the one who clings to tradition and past experience, with the impetuosity of the other, who cries out that it is the present, immediate experience alone that really counts, and writes:

"Our generation has grown weary of ancient traditions and accumulated systems. We have discovered new worlds in all directions by following the sure path of experience, and we can never again settle down with a naïve and childlike trust in the house which the past has builded. Our first question in any field is, not What do the scribes and schoolmen say? not What is the

unbroken tradition? but What are the facts? What data does experience furnish? This shifting centre from 'authority' to 'experience' runs through all the pursuits of the human spirit in the modern world, and, as would be expected, religion has been profoundly affected by it. In religion, as in other fields of inquiry, the questions of moment have come to be those that deal with life. We take slender interest in dogmatic constructions; we turn from them with impatience, and ask for the testimony of the soul, for the basis of religion in the nature of man as man. This profound tendency of the modern world has brought strongly into prominence a mystical type of religion, that is to say, a type of religion which is primarily founded in experience, and with the tendency has come a corresponding interest in the mystics of the past."

Baron von Hügel's contention is that there are three elements in religion—namely (1) the institutional or traditional, (2) the intellectual, and (3) the mystical, and that these three have to be balanced to satisfy the whole man and guard him from extravagance. Both these writers confine their studies of the mystical element in religion practically to Christianity, though Baron von Hügel deals at greater length with classical authorities than does Dr. Jones; but if we are to seek for "the testimony of the soul, for the basis of religion in the nature of man as man," then 'the new mysticism' must perforce take into consideration mysticism wherever it is found, and seek to establish its *Wesen* in the first place by the analysis of experience and in the second by the comparative method of treating all forms of such experience accessible to us.

THE FRENCH TRANSLATION OF THE ZOHAR.

Sepher Ha-Zohar (Le Livre de la Splendeur). Doctrine Ésotérique des Israélites. Traduit pour la première Fois sur le Texte chaldaïque et accompagné de Notes. Par Jean de Pauly. Œuvre posthume entièrement revue, corrigée, et complétée. Publiée par les Soins d'Émile Lafuma-Giraud. Paris (Leroux), 1906, in progress.

WE recommend most heartily to all students of the Kabalah this 'monumental' work of the late distinguished Hebraist Dr. Jean de Pauly. We have now before us four handsome volumes, large 8vo, excellently printed, of 560, 740, 494 and 321 pages respectively, —the first four of the six which will for the first time embrace a really complete translation of the Zoharic documents into any

language, ancient or modern. The French is excellent, and the way de Pauly has succeeded in making the sense clear, by inserting in italics the frequent phrases that are to be understood in the abbreviated and laconic style of the original, is extraordinary. The notes are of value, as also are the references to the books of the Law, the Prophets, the Hagiographa, and the Talmuds, and also to other Kabalistic writings.

De Pauly's translation is of the greatest service to students of comparative religion and mysticism. Indeed it is not too much to say that most of us who have studied the Kabalah from this point of view have never before had such facilities for judging of its nature for ourselves. Outside of Knorr von Rosenroth's five volumes of crabbed Latin, we have for the most part had to depend either on summaries of the text or at best on translations (and mostly imperfect translations) of selected excerpts. We speak of course of those who are unable to read the original, and very few indeed can do so with comfort who are not born Jews deeply versed in rabbinical lore. The breadth of view that de Pauly's version allows us to take is very extensive, and enables us for the first time to place many things in proportion and perspective that were previously blurred and dim impressions. We have now before us what may be called an 'esoteric' Talmud; and if we are acquainted with Talmudic writings, their nature, methods, and atmosphere, we find ourselves at once at home, and immediately understand the strangeness and perplexities of those *amateurs* of the Kabalah who have never passed through the simplest discipline of Talmudic study. It must also be frankly admitted that with the full translation before us there is much in the Zoharic documents that is insufferably dull and monotonous for all but Talmudists of the old school. The torturing of texts is a freakish amusement that humane intelligence can no longer tolerate. But together with all this we have preserved for us many a quaint tradition and folk-tale and scrap of mystery-lore for those who have the patience to disinter them; the Zohar is like an old curiosity shop heaped indiscriminately with precious things and rubbish gleaned from many lands, awaiting the inspection and classification of those learned in mystic antiquities. With this translation before us the thirteenth-century Moses de Léon forgery hypothesis can hardly any longer be considered as a satisfactory explanation of the origin of the Zoharic documents even by the most prejudiced.

The amount of labour involved in de Pauly's posthumous work is enormous, and is highly esteemed by the scholars who

have examined it. De Pauly lived only just long enough to finish his task; he died at the early age of 40, after a sad life of distress, deception and suffering, with the hope on his lips, "that the Shekinah would take his immense effort into account, and bring him to the Ancient of Days!"

We have, therefore, before us the posthumous life-work of a great scholar and lover of the Kabalah, a work to which he could not put the finishing touches; this has been left to the loving hands of others. But the main thing needed was a friend who would take the great risk of publishing so voluminous and uncommon a 'bible.' This work of love has been undertaken by Mons. Émile Lafuma, to whom all honour is due. But the burden is heavy for a single man's shoulders to bear, and we would appeal to all lovers of the Kabalah, to all students of comparative mysticism, and all patrons of such unremunerative work, to do their best to make the undertaking known, and obtain subscriptions for the completion of this courageous and useful publication. Subscribers undertake to subscribe for the whole work, in all six volumes, at the price of 120frs., payable in sums of 20frs. on the receipt of each volume. Subscription-forms may be obtained from M. Émile Lafuma, à Voiron (Isère), France.

A New Light on the Renaissance.

Displayed in Contemporary Emblems. By Harold Bayley. Illustrated with Reproductions of Numerous Emblems. London (Dent), 1909.

Mr. Harold Bayley is a sedulous student of the by-ways of middle-age literature, especially in its bearing on the obscure subject of heresies, sects and secret societies. His last work deals chiefly with the little-known subject of water-marks, in which he claims to find clear indications of the organised activities of a widespread liberalising and spiritualising movement. He finds his material mainly in the four folio volumes of Dr. C. M. Briquet's encyclopædic work, *Les Filigranes: Dictionnaire Historique des Marques du Papier dès leur Apparition vers 1282 jusqu'en 1600* (Quaritch). The "novel and subversive propositions" which Mr. Bayley believes he has tended to prove by his studies, are as follows. That:

"1. From their first appearance in 1282, until the latter half

of the eighteenth century, the curious designs inserted into paper in the form of water-marks constitute a coherent and unbroken chain of *emblems*.

"2. That these emblems are Thought-fossils or Thought-crystals, in which lie enshrined the aspirations and traditions of the numerous mystic and puritanic sects by which Europe was over-run in the Middle Ages.

"3. Hence that these paper-marks are historical documents of high importance, throwing light not only on the evolution of European thought, but upon many obscure problems of the past.

"4. Watermarks denote that paper-making was an art introduced into Europe, and fostered there by the pre-Reformation Protestant sects known in France as the Albigenses and Waldenses, and in Italy as the Cathari and Patarini.

"5. That these heresies, though nominally stamped out by the Papacy, existed secretly for many [!] centuries subsequent to their disappearance from the sight of History.

"6. The embellishments used by printers in the Middle Ages are emblems similar to those used by the paper-makers, and explicable by a similar code of interpretation.

"7. The awakening known as the Renaissance was the direct result of an influence deliberately and traditionally exercised by paper-makers, printers, cobblers, and other artisans.

"8. The nursing mother of the Renaissance and consequently of the Reformation was not, as hitherto assumed, Italy, but the Provençal district of France."

Well may Mr. Bayley call these propositions "novel and subversive"; in this he has but anticipated his critics, who almost unanimously use still stronger adjectives in their onslaught on his daring theory. As for ourselves, we would encourage Mr. Bayley to go on with his researches; he is bound to modify his preliminary generalisations as he gets into closer touch; we all do, and it would be well ever to bear in mind the Delphic *logos* "nothing too much." But this is natural and excusable in a pioneer. Objectively, Mr. Bayley does not seem to have proved his case as to the paper-making industry of the Waldenses and their fellow-martyrs of various shades of mystic belief and practice. The mystic emblems are clearly there; but whether they were deliberately adopted for a certain set purpose is, as yet, not clear. The emblems themselves are of exceeding great interest, and their interpretation pertains to the forgotten art of symbolism; but whether the interpretations that may be hazarded as probable were

the actual interpretations even of those who used such symbols and emblems with purpose, it is almost impossible to say; we know, as a rule, so little comparatively of their actual tenets. One of the most interesting XVIIth century paper-marks Mr. Bayley has unearthed is seemingly a form of the Graal-cup. Of this he gives (pp. 75, 76) six specimens, in five of which, on the body of the cup, are shown emblems of two fish and star groups of six or seven 'hosts,' apparently (in no case of five, however). It would indeed be highly instructive to prove that the primitive form of the mystic fish-eucharist was still preserved in secret tradition till the XVIIth century, and that it was part and parcel of the Graal-rites. But this example alone will show the difficulties of proving the case which confront the scholar. It is, however, a romantic quest, and deserves encouragement, provided that we still regard it as a quest and do not believe we have reached the end when we are just at the beginning. We are, therefore, glad to see that Mr. Bayley has returned to the subject in a series of papers, entitled 'The Invisible Church of Christ: its Tenets and Symbols,' in a new periodical called *The Re-Union Magazine* (Cope and Fenwick), the laudable object of which is to advance the cause of the re-union of Christendom.

THOUGHTS OF A MODERN MYSTIC.

A Selection from the writings of the late C. C. Massey. Edited by W. F. Barrett, F.R.S. London (Kegan Paul), 1909.

WE are glad to call the attention of our readers to this small volume, which we have already reviewed at greater length elsewhere. Charles Carleton Massey was a genuine mystic, and we hope that the reception of these selections from his unpublished MSS. will encourage the publishers to undertake a second volume from the remaining papers of this distinguished and over-modest thinker. Massey, as all genuine mystics, was clear in his mind as to the difference between psychic and spiritual experience; on the question of survival he writes:

"Psychical science, in my belief, has to relay the basis of religion, but I deprecate the idea of directly discussing immortality by means of it. We may—I think, do—discover survival, but that for me means only a ghostly and memorial prolongation of the earthly life (Hades or Sheol), and has no religious interest. On the contrary, I want the expansion of life, not a continuance of its

present contracted mode. There is no *true* 'spiritualism' in the disclosure of survival. We want to break the limit, not to prolong it" (p. 39).

And again:

"I distinguish between the period of post-mortem *survival* and *another* life. For the latter, I want the conditions of a new environment, of new powers of *relation*. All so-called spiritualistic communications fail to prove, for me, of themselves (though I accept them, evidentially, for what they are worth), *another* life. They signify for me only an insomnia in a larger cycle of individual existence, in which two states, activity (with *contraction*), and rest (with *expansion*), alternate" (p. 123).

As to spiritual freedom and the new birth Massey tells us:

"I conceive that when the spiritual life is really developed in a man, when he becomes a free spirit, . . . the difference will be precisely that between a fœtus and a born child—and will be so felt. . . . Regeneration—new-naturing—alone exempts from re-incarnation, the bonds of desire to the external nature being thus severed, all the tendrils being thus eradicated" (pp. 53, 54).

Here, the metaphor of transmutation would perhaps have been a happier mode of expression; but the meaning is clear enough.

The book is filled with thought-compelling observations and we can cordially recommend it to all who take a serious interest in spiritual problems.

NO REFUGE BUT IN TRUTH.

By Goldwin Smith. London (Fisher Unwin), 1909.

MR. GOLDWIN SMITH asks a large number of questions such as all religiously disposed people have at one time or another asked themselves, but he has been less fortunate than some in that he seems to have arrived at no—even temporary—answers. He dislikes many things; scepticism, evolution, spiritualism, determinism, each in turn is visited with his censure. His book is a curious jumble of dogmatic assertion and quavering interrogation. "Apart from the Bible we have no revelation of the existence of God"; "the world may abandon Christianity, but it will never advance beyond it"—these extracts are from a work which on another page asks: "Had the New Testament been divinely inspired, would not its authority have been clearly attested?"

"Theory I have none," says the author in answer to his own

questionings; but it is a little hard to see why, in that case, the book was written. Religion is the most profoundly interesting study in the world, and one in which the earnest and unprejudiced seeker is most certain to find at least a provisional creed. But, when one has toiled all night and caught nothing, it is hardly worth while writing a book to say so.

C. B. W.

REINCARNATION AND CHRISTIANITY.

By a Clergyman of the Church of England. London (Rider), 1909.

WITHOUT making any pretension to originality or profundity this little book may be recommended to those Christians who find it difficult to reconcile the overwhelming handicap of temperament and environment allotted to some people in running their earthly race with any idea of Divine justice. The author shows that the theory of pre-existence can be supported not only from the early Fathers but from the New Testament itself; and, without claiming any higher authority than the balance of probabilities, he grapples with the difficulties which an orthodox Christian might raise. It is to be regretted that the author's courage was not equal to his judgment; there is nothing in his very fair and temperate argument to which he need have been ashamed to put his name.

C. B. W.

AFTER DEATH—WHAT?

Spiritistic Phenomena and their Interpretation. By Cesare Lombroso. London (Fisher Unwin), 1909.

LOMBROSO'S work on spiritism is now before us, and it is of melancholy interest that on the very day following its publication he should have been called to answer at first hand the question to which his book has really provided no response. We doubt indeed whether investigations of the kind recorded in these interesting pages will ever answer that question with any degree of certainty. What such investigations have done is to chronicle the behaviour of entities temporarily manifesting through mediumistic agency, to determine to some extent the conditions of such manifestation, and to distinguish in a very limited degree between phenomena whose source is discarnate, and phenomena which are the result of the projection and transformation of the energy of

the medium. They have also proved for men like Professor Lombroso—formerly convinced sceptics—that man can survive the dissolution of his physical envelope, and even re-establish, under certain conditions, a broken *rapport* with friends on earth. But all this, important though it may be for the building up of a science of the Border-Land, is far indeed from presenting the real conditions of the life after death, as Lombroso himself tacitly admits by concluding the title of his book with an interrogation.

He has, however, produced a work which is certain to rank as a text-book of spiritism in general. It covers the whole ground. Beginning with an elaborate analysis of psychic phenomena taking place in connection with epileptic and hysterical subjects, he passes to a careful description of the seventeen *séances* given, at Milan in 1892, by Eusapia Paladino, to himself, Professors Aksakoff, Richet, Giorgio, Finzi, Ermacora, Brofferio, Gerosa, Schiaparelli, and Du Prel, of which the most valuable features are the records of experiments made with specially devised instruments—the manometer, dynamometer, cardiograph, and recording cylinder—by means of which the manifestations of the medium were weighed, measured, and submitted to graphic representation. This is succeeded by a valuable clinical study of Eusapia herself, whom he seeks to rehabilitate in the eyes of a suspicious public by showing her very tendency to craft to be a symptom of the hysterical temperament which is the concomitant of all remarkable mediumship. He shows, too, by innumerable experiments, that what she might have accomplished by fraud was insignificant compared with the great range of phenomena which took place under the strictest test conditions.

The chapter on phantasms and apparitions of the dead deals ably with the vexed question of identity, to which a second important chapter is also devoted. But in spite of a striking series of cases adduced from various sources in support of the Spiritualistic hypothesis, we remain to some extent less convinced than Professor Lombroso that proof of this nature is really so abundant, or so easily established. The impression left upon us by this book is that it is the work of an enthusiast eager to avail himself of every fragment of evidence that will render a newly-found truth acceptable to the requirements of science. We do not say that many of the instances given do not establish a strong probability in favour of identity, but they form by far the most rare, and therefore the most interesting, of the classes of phenomena before us. The remainder of the book is largely historical, and

treats of spiritism and mediumship among savage tribes. There is a hair-raising chapter on Haunted Houses which shows us the faith of Professor Lombroso undaunted even before marvels that savour of a Christmas Number, and the book concludes with a discussion on the Biology of the Spirits. The fifty-six photos and diagrams add largely to the value of the work.

C. E. W.

THE RELIGION OF H. G. WELLS.

And Other Essays. By the Rev. Alexander H. Craufurd, M.A. London (Fisher Unwin), 1909.

ABOUT two years ago a series of lectures was given in London by some prominent members of the Fabian Society under the general title *The Faith I Hold.* Men of such diverse tradition and temperament as the Rev. R. J. Campbell, of the City Temple, Sir Sydney Olivier, Governor-General of Jamaica, Mr. Hubert Bland, of *The Sunday Chronicle*, and Mr. H. G. Wells, then gave, to audiences already in sympathy with their political aims, a sort of personal confession of faith made from their standpoint as Socialists. Several of them, treating the question more intimately, spoke frankly of their personal religion; and Mr. Wells, among these, attempted perhaps the most definite formulation of a creed for the modern "Believer." This lecture he afterwards expanded into a volume entitled *First and Last Things*—here criticised by a Nonconformist minister of strong social sympathies and liberal theology. The friendly and tolerant spirit of these pages does credit to the personal religion of Mr. Craufurd. *First and Last Things*, though a work charged through and through with reverence and humility, contains passages which—as a leader of the National Secular Society pointed out—would have got Mr. Wells into prison for blasphemy thirty years ago. Mr. Craufurd will have done good service if he sends his readers to the original book.

E. W.

THE IMMORTALS' GREAT QUEST.

Translated from an Unpublished Manuscript in the Library of a Continental University. By James William Barlow, M.A. London (Smith, Elder), 1909.

THIS is a genial flight of the imagination. It purports to be extracts from the diary of a Dutch physician of some two hundred

years ago, who went to India and thence to Tibet, where he became acquainted with a great magician of the period. From him he learns the secret of disintegrating and reintegrating his body and transporting it from one point of the globe to another at will. Being of an adventurous disposition he determines to go further and visit Venus or Hesperos, and the major part of the narrative consists of a history of the Hesperians and their civilisation. They are a race of immortals, who, if they suffer a mortal lesion or from a derangement of the 'metronomic balance,' immediately 'evanesce' and are reintegrated at the south pole of the planet. As they never die they are great at physical science, but though immortal, in so far as they immediately are reborn full-grown or in reintegrated bodies, they are still without knowledge of God. How all this was and under what conditions the Hesperians lived we must leave the reader to learn for himself. The serious purpose of the author is to illustrate phantastically the following observation of Bishop Butler:

"That we are to live hereafter, is just as reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are now alive is; and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to argue from that scheme that there can be no future state."

"Progressive Creation."

We have been taken to task at great length by the author for the notice of this work which appeared in our last issue. Mr. Sampson will remember that several years ago we printed elsewhere a lengthy communication of his in somewhat similar circumstances. With this correspondence in mind we carefully read through *Progressive Creation* with every desire to revise our previous opinion; and it was only when we found that we could not honestly do so, that we wrote a notice as colourless as might be in the circumstances, and that, too, precisely to avoid a repetition of our former experience. We must, therefore, while regretting our failure, ask the author kindly to excuse our printing his communication; all the more so, as there is no question of fact involved but only of opinion. We cheerfully admit that our view is the opinion of one individual only; that is the case with all reviews. The work, as we have said, is interesting and instructive psychologically. Beyond that we cannot go; for the alternative on the side of approval would be to welcome it as a new and true revelation.

NOTES.

Criticism and Beauty.

The Romanes Lecture was delived in the Sheldonian Theatre at Oxford on November 24, by Mr. A. J. Balfour, his subject being 'Questionings on Criticism and Beauty.' The lecture was a memorable one, not only because of the criticism to which this distinguished thinker and man of affairs subjected current theories of æsthetics, but also from the fact that Mr. Balfour did not read a paper, but spoke with the help of a few notes only jotted down on a slip of paper. The conclusion at which so keen an observer of men and matters arrived should be of special interest to many of our readers; it emphasises the present inadequacy of philosophy and science to explain the nature of the æsthetic emotions, and looks with greater hope in the direction of mysticism for some light on the question. Mr. Balfour is reported to have concluded his address as follows:

"Did we really suffer seriously because we could give no account of the common characteristics of beautiful things, except that they aroused in us a feeling of beauty, when we could give no account of the common characteristics of things loveable except that they excited in us a feeling of love? These two great departments of human emotion and human feeling, each graded from the lowest to the highest, stood side by side, parallel, both of them recalcitrant, as he thought, at present, to any logical or philosophical treatment. If they asked him whether he was finally content with such a state of things he frankly admitted he was not. If they asked him how he proposed to escape from it, he could only say that he saw no escape at present except something which might deserve, either as a term of praise or of reproach, the description of mysticism."

Dream-Control.

The subject of the possibility of dream-control is deserving of careful study. Of late years several works have been published on

the phenomena of 'incubation' as practised in the healing-temples of antiquity, and experiments in dream-therapeutics are being made by a few medical practitioners. Those of our readers who are attentive to what ought to be a distinct branch of psychological science may be referred to an instructive article by Dr. Georges Dumas, '*Comment on gouverne les Rêves*,' in the November number of *La Revue de Paris* (pp. 344-366). The latter part is chiefly concerned with the phenomena of 'incubation'; the first half deals with some recent pyscho-therapeutic dream-experiments of an exceedingly instructive nature, and also summarises from a remarkable book by Hervey de Saint-Denis, *Les Rêves et les Moyens de les diriger* (Paris, 1867). Saint-Denis, who was a well-known figure in Parisian artistic circles fifty years ago, had so trained his attention as to be able to follow his dreams consciously and to remember them on waking. After long practice he determined to try to modify the course of his dreams solely by an effort of will; this he found he could do as readily as he could, when awake, change the direction of his steps or the subject of conversation. He then determined on a new experiment—namely, to 'evoke spectres,' that is to say to create images in the dream-pictures in which he seemed to move. This also he succeeded in doing; and for fifteen years he continued to experiment, so that he proved to himself beyond all possibility of doubt that he could change at will a disagreeable dream into a pleasant one, and so on. He thus concluded that by a sufficient training of the will we may guide our mind through the world of dream-life as well as, or even better than, we can guide our body through the happenings of the objective physical world of reality. The book is a remarkable record, and deserves to be studied, and Dr. Dumas is to be thanked for calling attention to it. After describing the dream-experiences evoked by the practice of 'incubation' in antiquity and similar phenomena in more recent days, Dr. Dumas concludes with the reflection that "those who still give direction to their dreams or attempt to do so are precisely the only people who attach a religious sense and a sort of absolute value to them. Dream-direction can be fruitful of result only if the dream appears to be truer than reality: it is an art that will not be laïcised." Of this we are by no means convinced; there are many we know of who are endeavouring to control their dreams, and no few of them for quite secular purposes.

MAĀKHERU.

THOSE who are curious as to the doctrine of the creative word and the art of incantation (known in India as *mantra-vidyā*), which underlay so much of the theory and practice of the great religions of antiquity, notably the Babylonian and Egyptian, may be referred to Mons. A. Moret's study (based chiefly on the Trismegistic literature), '*Le Verbe Créateur et Révélateur en Égypte*,' in a recent number of *La Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* (tom. lix., no. 3, Mai-Juin, 1909, pp. 279-298). In it he comments as follows on the puzzling term *maākheru* which appears so frequently in hieroglyphic texts.

"The Egyptian texts lay stress on the indissoluble union of Truth and Word in a characteristic expression, an untranslatable idiom, which has exhausted the efforts of Egyptologists. When a being, human or superhuman, by virtue of his birth, or by his own merits, or by magical processes, reaches the state of grace which we call sanctity or divinity, the Egyptians say of him that he 'realises the voice' (*réalise la voix*), that he is *mākhrōou*. This epithet characterises: the gods; the king, who is a god living on earth; deceased men who have won for themselves entrance into bliss, or who have been furnished with efficacious rites to reach that state; and, last of all, men living in a state of grace, such as priests when celebrating the office or magicians when using the formulæ. 'To realise the voice,' thus means to have at one's disposition the creative Word which bestows all power at no matter what moment and on every occasion." After giving a number of examples of its use, drawn from the texts, M. Moret remarks: "So complex an expression can be commented on but not translated." Various attempts at translation have been made, such as: 'triumphant,' 'just of voice,' 'veridical,' 'he who makes true by speaking, whose voice makes really to be,' 'creator by the voice, endowed with creative voice.' None is satisfactory; it signifies the power of creation, of making to be, but not with hands. The conclusion arrived at is that "in order to characterise the power, wisdom, and virtue of divine beings, the Egyptians have associated the ideas of both *Word* and *Reason* in a composite expression whose two terms correspond to the two senses of the equally untranslatable Greek word *Logos* employed in the Hermetic texts." We might suggest as a rendering 'he whose utterance is true'—that is, whose thought, word and act match with reality.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND SPIRITUALISM.

"THE enemy to be faced in the future is no longer the old materialism of twenty years ago, since that has been practically ousted by psychical research, but one of the elements of that which has ousted it—spiritualism itself." So we read in a vigorous article by Father Benson in the October number of *The Dublin Review*. Spiritualism, we are told, is but a novel form of the old enemy against which the Church has ever been fighting, and the faithful are solemnly warned against having any traffic with it in any form. Already many have been lost to the Church owing to the insidious teachings of the 'spirits,' and that alone, it is said, should prove the source of such communications. In brief, while Spiritualists believe that "the personalities that manifest themselves are human though disincarnate and, on the whole, benevolent and beneficent," the Roman Catholic Church teaches that "the personalities are objective indeed, and disincarnate, but inhuman, diabolical and malevolent." Spiritualism is, therefore, in no sense a matter *sub judice*, least of all a subject for unprejudiced investigation. It has all been decided long ago, and the theologian alone is the proper authority to consult. "For the Catholic, who knows that the spiritual world is an objective reality, lying very close to this world, it is, probably, in the strictest sense, the most scientific thing he can do to accept his theologian's treatment of the matter." This implies of course that theology is scientific; for the scholastic theologian, indeed, it is the 'science of sciences'; but how many Catholic theologians '*know*' of themselves the matters of which they treat so learnedly? To all of this the modern spirit replies: Scholastic theology may satisfy a certain class of minds, but we prefer to question nature for ourselves without self-imposed limitations of ancient preconceptions as to man, the world and God. It does not, however, seem to be psychical research, conducted on scientific lines, that Father Benson fears so much as spiritualism in the form of a *religious belief;* the great danger for the Roman Catholic Church lies here in the fact that the communications do not confirm its doctrines. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that most Spiritualists would be greatly benefited by a course in Catholic psychology; it is remarkably acute in its perceptions of what is the nature of spirit, and makes short work of many false values of the psychic and psycho-physical orders.

THE SYMBOLIC HAIR-TUFT OF THE BUDDHA.

ONE of the puzzles of Buddhist symbolic art is the *ushṇīsha*, which is sometimes spoken of as the "prominence on the Buddha's skull," but to which the dictionaries refer as "the hair with which a Buddha is born and which indicates his future sanctity." On this Mr. E. B. Havell, in an article, on 'The Symbolism of Indian Sculpture and Painting,' which appeared in *The Burlington Magazine* for last September, has the following interesting note:

"The word itself, literally meaning 'wool,'[1] has been a constant puzzle to Sanskrit and Pāli scholars. The explanation of it is, I believe, that the Divine Light, by means of which Gautama obtained Buddhahood, was conceived as converging towards the centre of his forehead from the 'immeasurable worlds' and entering his brain in flashes, like the lightning in an Indian sky, which is always drawn in Indian pictures in thin wavy lines, never in the zig-zag fashion of the 'forked' lightning usually represented in European art. This practice is based on accurate observation of the lightning usually seen in Indian skies, as instantaneous photography proves. Now a number of such wavy lines or light flashes, converging to a single point, would strikingly suggest a tuft of wool, every hair of which would symbolise a ray of cosmic light."

This symbolic representation of the lightning-flash in Indian art seems also to throw light on the puzzling term *prēstēr*, which occurs here and there in the Hellenistic poem known as *The Chaldæan Oracles*. Thus with reference to the Intelligible Fire, both Father and Mother in one, Light and Life, we read: "Thence the Fire-flash down-streaming dims its fair Flower of Fire, as it leaps forth into the wombs of worlds. Thence do all things begin downwards to shoot their admirable rays." The *prēstēr* was not a zig-zag flash, but a fiery stream, conceived as a fiery whirl-wind, resembling a water-spout, an emanation, efflux or flood circling downwards. In the case of the Buddha, the process is of course reversed, and the light circles upward, illuminating the path of return for all. The 'Flower of Fire' is consciously brought to birth in the purified 'man-plant'; the 'tree of life' has borne its 'perfect fruit.'

THE SERAPHIM.

CURIOUSLY enough we are able to quote from an article in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, for October, in support of the view

[1] Anything wound round the head rather, *e.g.* a turban; hence a diadem.—ED.

brought forward in the last paragraph. In endeavouring to answer the question 'What were the Seraphim?'—the Rev. Dr. Smythe Palmer writes:

"Near akin to [the Hebrew] *sārāph*, the fiery serpent, is the Assyrian *sarāpu*, the 'burning one,' a title given to the Sun-god Nergal as expressive of his burning heat. It is further to be noticed that in the Greek version of *The Book of Enoch*, *drakontes*, or serpents, stand for the Seraphim, over whom, in conjunction with the Cherubim, Gabriel, the angel of fire, presides (ch. xx. 7). Dr. Benzinger in consequence adopts the conclusion that these symbolic beings bore the actual form of the reptiles, which seems highly probable.

"It is much more likely that there lies at the root of the conception the popular mythologising idea of the lightning as a snake-like creature, dashing down from the sky, with a forked fiery tongue, and dealing death to what it strikes. . . . In all lands, and not in those only of a primitive state of civilisation, men have seen in the phenomena of lightning a resemblance to fiery serpents, and they have seen correctly. Instantaneous photography shows that this description is really far more true to nature than the sharp-angled zig-zag which has long been accepted as the conventional symbol of the flash. The word ἀπόῤῥοια, 'efflux,' which Aquila uses as a rendering of lightning in Ezekiel i. 14, accurately reproduces the stream-like flowing of the electric fluid. No less graphic is ἑλίκιας, the tortuous or twisting flash, and the line in Æschylus that speaks of the bellowing of the thunder accompanied by the gleaming forth of the 'twisters' (ἕλικες, *Prom. Vinct.* l. 1104), a word properly used of the coils and spires of the winding serpent."

Symbols and myths, however, it should be remembered, have more to do with prophets, priests and seers, than with simple popular imagination. And so a seraph is not a lightning flash, though the lightning flash may well be used to symbol forth the seraphic power; nor is the Buddha a lightning-conductor, though his image may symbolise the control of the powers of living light and fire.

Egyptian Influence on Early Christian Symbolism.

"Recent research in Egypt has brought to light the fact that not only Gnosticism but unorthodox practices of various kinds were general among the earlier Christian communities." So we are informed, or rather reminded, by Mr. P. D. Scott-Moncrieff, of the Egyptian Department of the British Museum, in an instructive

article, on 'Gnosticism and Early Christianity in Egypt,' in the October number of *The Church Quarterly Review*. With reference to the contents of the early Christian graves discovered at Akhmīm, and described by R. Forrer, in his *Die frühchristlichen Alterthümer aus den Gräberfelde von Achmim-Panopolis* (Strassburg, 1893), we are told that:

"Here as elsewhere the old Egyptian symbol of life, the *ānkh* (☥), takes very generally the place of the cross, and indeed this emblem never entirely died out but was adopted into later iconography as the *crux ansata* [the handled cross]. We have, too, the ancient Egyptian symbol of the eye still used as a protection of the Christian dead."

The eye is of course one of the symbols of Osiris, the god of resurrection. Hereon follows a note of special interest to those who are following with attention Dr. Eisler's studies on the cult of the Fisher-god.

"As was usual in primitive Christian communities, the fish as representing the letters IChThYS is very general, but the type was borrowed unchanged from the Oxyrhynchus fish worshipped in certain parts of Egypt, as may be seen from a recently found coffin in which a fish floats above the body of the deceased lying on a bier (*Annales du Service des Antiquités*, tom. ix. fasc. 1). One extraordinary fragment represents the Virgin, with Christ in the field, the latter portrayed with a child's head and a fish's body."

What are called the 'Lazarus' figures are also greatly in evidence; this reminds us of the mummy swathings and the phrase of one of the Church Fathers, the "proper garment of Osiris."

"In the old religion of Egypt it had been the custom, especially general in later times, to place with the dead numerous mummified figures of Osiris, the god of the dead and type of resurrection. A leaden figure from one of the graves at Akhmīm very clearly resembles the Romano-Alexandrian figures of Osiris and possibly is meant to represent that deity. It is more probable, however, that it is Lazarus who is intended as typifying the resurrection and as the successor of Osiris in the affection of the Egyptians. It is curious to note how the type of Lazarus as a swathed and bandaged mummy passed into later Byzantine iconography, and it is quite probable that the earlier figures may have derived their inspiration from the mummified form of Osiris in the same way as the Madonna and Child type from the ancient Isis and Horus group."

An Egyptian prototype for the gospel Lazarus resurrection story has often been suggested; and we might here perhaps be

permitted to conjecture that the mummy swathings may symbolise the cocoon and chrysalis state of the dead in the intermediate state. Now it is interesting to note that a far fuller story of the rich and poor man in Hades than is found in the gospel narrative of Dives and Lazarus is preserved in the wide-spread Egyptian folk-tales of Setme Khamuas (see Griffith's *Stories of the High Priests of Memphis*, Oxford, 1900), and curiously enough Strzygowski has recently (1904), in his *Koptische Kunst*, pointed out how a gruesome incident in this Egyptian folk-tale of the rich and poor man in Hades has passed into a peculiar form of resurrection symbolism common to Byzantine iconography, but never found in the West. "It represents the Saviour with a cross in His hand, trampling on the gates of Hell and freeing Adam and Eve from the pit. Under the feet of Christ lies a naked man, through one of whose eyes the butt-end of the cross is driven."

Has this possibly anything to do with the commandment "If thy eye offend thee"? In the Khamuas-tale, it was the "pivot of the gate of Amenti" that was fixed in the rich man's right eye, and not the butt-end of a cross, but Mr. Scott-Moncrieff suggests that the hieroglyph for a bolt or pivot very closely resembles a *tau*-cross. We may add that in one of the Talmud Jeschu-stories, Miriam is said to have had "the hinge of hell's gate fastened in her ear" (*Pal. Ḥag.* 77*d*).[1] The fates of fables are fascinating, but the ways of theological controversy make reason boggle.

Recurrent Time.

On the subject of the possibility of the sensible re-presenting of past events the Rev. F. R. Tennant, D.D., B.Sc., has some curious speculations, in the October number of *The Hibbert Journal*, that will be not unfamiliar to some of our readers. In an article on 'Historical Fact in relation to the Philosophy of Religion,' he writes:

"If the late Professor Rankine's theory be true, that the ether has bounds, and if, further, we may assume that the ether does not absorb the luminiferous waves, as they travel through it, these undulations, on reaching this boundary, will in turn be reflected back and reconcentrated into foci. [Cp. the same idea in E. R. Innes's article in our present issue.] A person suitably placed might thus yet see with his own eyes the events of a period of the remotest past. . . . On the same hypothesis, the rays thus

[1] Already in 1903 in commenting on this (see *Did Jesus Live 100 B.C.?*) we referred to the Khamuas folk-tale parallel.

brought to a focus would proceed to diverge again through space, to be reflected back from the opposite direction, and so on; so that history would not only 'repeat itself,' but go on repeating itself: the past being re-*presented* or *represented* in cycles."

Dr. Tennant assumes that this is not possible, as a matter of fact, in our world. (It is, however, we might interpose, already freely discussed as a matter of fact in the world of psychometry and voyancy, as all who are engaged in such studies are well aware.) Nevertheless he contends that:

"We can perfectly well conceive a world in which conditions prevailed that were more lenient to students of historical science: a world which might be called an automatic and auto-biographical kinematoscope. In any case it is actual fact that whenever a distant star forms the object of our 'immediate' perception, what is presented to us is its luminous state of many years ago." Now supposing further, continues Dr. Tennant, it were possible to travel through space with a velocity exceeding that of light, "we should then overtake successively the luminiferous waves that have been set up by objects on this earth in the circumambient ether; we should therefore perceive, still as 'immediately' as we ever do perceive with our eyes, first the events of yesterday, then those of the day before, and so on. We should read history backwards. The past of other things would constitute our future."

But supposing there is a power of sensible re-presentation of this order with regard to past events (and for many indeed the evidence is so convincing that hypothesis has already passed into fact), then there is no need to limit possibilities by physical considerations of the speed of moving bodies; for, as the mystic who wrote the old Māhrattī commentary on the *Bhagavad Gītā* remarked: "Without moving is the travelling on that path."

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THE QUEST.

THE FIGMENT OF RACE.

OTTO ROTHFELD, I.C.S.

SOONER or later, with an inevitable monotony of error, it appears to be the fate of all sciences to elevate the abstractions that they devise for their practice into the phantasms of reality. Perhaps until scientists confine themselves to the collection of facts, and philosophers devote time to the lessons of experiment, it may be hopeless to expect amendment. In this respect anthropology has fared no better than the other physical sciences. Indeed the peculiar scope which it affords for the bias of theology, of national pride, and of ethical prejudice has aggravated the accustomed dangers and engendered peculiar errors. More than any other science it has lent itself to the designs of faction and ministered to the passions of the wayfarer. Too often the first trenches of anthropology become the last refuge of theological hatred, and persecution finds fresh ammunition in the convoys of militant science. Let no one say that ideas break no heads and that faith moves no mountains. Better rather to say that nothing breaks bones, as indeed nothing breaks or

makes anything in this world of ours, if it be fitly regarded, but ideas alone. What is God but an idea? and yet men have been burnt and, worse, have burnt their fellowmen in His name. What is pleasure but an idea, and a very abstract one? and yet men are ruined daily and die in the gutter for its image. What is life but an abstraction and a half-truth? yet could we for a second live on without our faith in its reality? There is but one hope, one remedy: to see, as far as it lies in human minds to do, what is abstract, what more and more real and concrete; to use the former, if we like, for our immediate purpose; but on no account to transfer it to life or translate it as fact.

The most fatal of anthropological abstractions has been that of race. It has been, of all the concepts of history, the most ignorantly repeated and most misleadingly employed. It is hardly anywhere defined; and it serves at present, like natural selection in a kindred science, as the curtain drawn by professional etiquette over a blank wall. It should stand for the bow with which the performer leaves the stage; unhappily it is too often interpolated during his act in response to popular applause. For what after all is race? Often it is used as the equivalent of nation or people and, whenever it is so used, be sure that some deception, either of self or of audience, is in process of gestation. For nation and people are there already, terms sufficiently definite and distinct; and science at least has no room for synonyms. A people is a thing made up of many men, who share, at least for some official or other use, a common language and a common thought, who are roughly at one and the same stage of development, who recognise a common standard of conduct and a common ideal of life, and whose common

interests are greater and more essential than their separate and individual motives. Generally but not always (for there are exceptions easily indeed explicable) they live in a conterminous area and in easy and constant communication. A nation on the other hand is essentially a thing of political organisation. A number of people or peoples, governed by the same government, administered by the same or similar codes of law, subject to the same sovranty—this is a nation. Sometimes, but extremely seldom, the same organism is at once nation and people. More often, but still rarely, a nation covers but part of the people. Usually many peoples or fragments of peoples are embraced in one nation. France at the present moment may perhaps be said with some rough truth to be at once a nation and a people; fifty years ago Brittany, the Basque country, and Alsace-Lorraine would have given the lie to the statement. Greece and Germany are instances in which the people extends beyond the limits of the nation. Britain is one nation but comprises even in the British Isles four peoples, the English, the Welsh, the Scottish, and the Irish; and it is perhaps doubtful whether the Ulster men should not be added as a fifth. Austria and Hungary are, of course, conspicuous examples of nations, united as it happens under one troubled crown, which enclose various and widely divergent peoples. The word nationality has further been invented; but so far its chief value has been in excusing rebellion and aggression. It signifies perhaps a collection of persons who fancy themselves a people and would like to be a nation. Race then is none of those things. And what is left for it to be? Take away political organisation and all the common interests already embraced in the meaning of people, and

it becomes uncommonly like the orange-in-itself which Locke so disdainfully threw away after stripping it of colour, shape, taste and all other qualities.

But race, it is sometimes for a brief moment of argument claimed, denotes unmixed descent from a common ancestor. A valuable meaning indeed, if the word were always so used, and if then it did mean something, *some thing* in the literal sense of words. Some ingenious statistician, in one of his satiric hours, has calculated the number of ancestors we each require in a thousand and in two thousand years. It amounted, if the remembrance be correct, to some millions of ancestors in a thousand and to several quintillions in two thousand years. The amusement may be recommended to any anthropologist with a knowledge of mathematics who is ridden by the racial Old Man of the Sea. Even if the ten thousand years for which we can trace spiritual descent be neglected, the calculation for the four thousand years that the present European peoples are known on the shores of the Mediterranean and the coasts of the Baltic will undoubtedly result in a monstrous and prodigious total. Are there any rash enough to maintain that all these unnumbered quintillions of ancestors were so inbred as to descend ultimately from a single pair? Yet, if this version of racial being is to mean what it professes, this must be the inevitable conclusion. The purest of races becomes the product of the most consistent incestuous connection. The marriage of cousins becomes laudable and the prohibited degrees the *summum bonum* of anthropology. Happily, however, for the teachings of medicine and theology, no people so far has been discovered whose descent from our day to the dawn of history, or for any epoch within that period, has been unadulter-

ated. The European peoples, with which we are most intimately concerned, are seen during the historic era in a continual state of fluidity and admixture. How much Frankish blood did the *droit de seigneurage* disperse through France? Did the Moors abandon no offspring in Spain? Or did the invasions of the Huns leave no violated women and deflowered virgins? Did the Hebrews, who since Alexandria have inhabited all Mediterranean countries, who converted some tribes to Judaism and who spread Christianity everywhere with patriotic zeal, who at a later date as Jews were themselves converted to the religion of their own Messiah, forty thousand in a single year in Spain, did they all perish sterile or is not rather their blood running in every vein as their gospel in every mind? Did not slave concubines, the captives of a hundred wars and the traffic of a hundred ports, minister to their masters' passions and give their bastards to the commonwealth? Were all women, in spite of Brantome and the Queen of Navarre, invariably chaste, and were the long continence of the crusades and the abstinence of lengthy wars without the alleviation of servile embraces? Let no one think to escape the conclusion by pleading that such deeds polluted only a few lineages and affected only a few families. It becomes a mere matter of mathematical demonstration that in the course of a thousand years, with its millions of ancestors for each person, there is not one, not even the humblest peasant in his insulated hamlet, that can escape the contagion or avoid the admixture. To anyone who is prepared to consider the evidence dispassionately for the historic period, for even the period let us say from the birth of Christ to this day, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that there is not in all Europe one man, woman or

child who does not share, in some more or less average proportion, the physical blood of various peoples. It is true that within that period certain peoples and certain sections of peoples have had their physical constitution less adulterated than others. In general it is the case that, for the assumed period, the mixture of descent has been greatest among the nobility and the professional classes, least among the remoter peasantry of each people; and that it has been the most intelligent and the best developed of peoples who have been the most mixed. The English, the French, the South Germans, and the Hungarians, have during that period been the most crossed of European nations proper, and in slightly varying proportion are physically compounded of Kelt, Teuton, Iberian-Pelasgic, Slav, and Semitic, while probably all to some small extent, and the Hungarians largely, contain Ugro-Turkish constituents.

In the more exact chapters of their work, however, it may be asserted, anthropologists do not intend this meaning when they speak of race. All the more deplorable surely that they use it thus in their more popular and alluring moments. The teachings of science should be no Eleusinian mysteries; and there is no room in the statement of fact for esoteric and exoteric. If by race the anthropologist means to speak only of peoples, let him, for God's sake, say so and have done. The reader can then and will beware; he will ask for reasons; he will discover illogical conclusions; he will detect the missing links in the chain. But the pitfall is covered with the brushwood of racial pretension; in tumbles the unhappy walker and with him into the pit go goodwill, kindness and humanity.

The truth is that if the word race is to occur in a

scientific treatise and if it is to be explanatory of popular phenomena, whether in whole or in part, if with religion, art, commerce, climate and the other conditions whose influence we can trace in history, it is a real agent in the totality of national life and growth, then the meaning in which it is used must be carefully defined. It must, in spite of the temptations of popular misuse, be accurately distinguished both from 'people' and from 'nation.' It must further be demonstrated to correspond to an actual concrete thing or force. It is no function of science to revive the methods of obsolete metaphysics; and a race always latent in and identical under the varying differences of attribute, yet existent only in its attributes, is a conception as metaphysical as the substance-in-itself in which were supposed to inhere the qualities of the known object. Hegel and Bradley have left no home for the-thing-in-itself; and race, with the other forms of that mysterious abstraction, must retire to its limbo unless it can justify itself by living reality.

The difficulty has been seen, though not evaded, by some anthropologists. They have identified the meaning of race with the aspirations of craniology. The measurement of human skulls has been conducted by a fixed method or methods; and the results so collected have been dignified by that title. On this view a race is a collection of people or peoples the measurement of whose skulls is identical or at least similar. As the first simple system of measurement did not seem to produce the results which its pioneers had desired, a more complex system of additional measurement by curves and ovals and spheres was devised. But simple or complex, by way of cephalic index or of elaborate curvature, the system has failed

to give adequate support to preconceived racial theories. It is obviously open to many criticisms; but one is perhaps sufficient—the total ignorance of everyone as to the conditions affecting the shape of the skull. The theory is as a matter of fact suffocated at birth by its progenitors; their admission that adult skulls of the same sex in the same people and even in the same family are not identical in measurement but only similar is at once fatal. Everyone is aware that, where similarity begins, exact science ends. If a cephalic index of eighty-one is similar to one of eighty-two, then eighty is similar to eighty-one, and before the theorist has recovered his feet, he is at sixty. The argument by similarity is not new; it has already been exposed by Horace; and it will certainly require considerable demonstration before it is now accepted. Indeed the theory avowedly deals with averages; and an average is an abstraction, not a reality. Fifty is the average not only of forty-nine and fifty-one but also of one and ninety-nine. Hence if it is to be dealt with at all seriously, the theory must give not only averages but also explicit maxima of divergences; and must show that the maximum divergence from average in one race falls short of that of the next race. If the extremes in two races overlap, then it is obvious that the skull as a criterion and inner essence of race has proved defective and fallacious. However, when science can assert that the average skull-measurement or cephalic index of adult male Englishmen is so-and-so, it will have informed us of a quaint and not uninteresting result of statistics. When it can further state that this average cephalic index has remained the same for adult male Englishmen for a thousand years, curiosity will be raised to a higher degree. The

hearer, if he be of an inquisitive temperament, will seek to discover what conditions of climate and food, of thought and activity, have been efficient in occasioning this permanence of average. He will desire to know why it has not been affected by the constant admixture of persons whose skulls on similar *data* may have been discovered to have had a different measurement. He will begin to doubt the truth of the common statement that convolutions of the brain increase with greater mental activity and capacity, or demand that it be reconciled with the assertion that the conformation of the skull of one genus of the fauna of this island has remained unaltered for a thousand years, during which the intelligence, the sense, and the capacity of its members have considerably augmented. But even then he will not imagine that the alleged fact can account for the political and social development of the people. If he be asked to accept this inference, he will demand proof, strong and exact proof, of the relation of skull-conformation to thought; he will desire to know why dead matter like bone is the index of growth and development and the test of heredity rather than blood or muscle; or if bone be allowed, why rather the skull than the tibia or the femur. He will desire more exact information as to the closing of the sutures and the relation between size and conformation. Most of all he will point to the known effects of climate upon the other constituents of the body and to the probability that it considerably affects the configuration of the skull. If, however, the unfortunate scientist attempts to identify permanence of cranial shape with purity of descent, to make it a racial feature, as it is called, then he will be asked to explain not only why persons of varied descent living in the same environ-

ment develop the same configuration, but also the extraordinary thing that races of men ultimately descendent from the same group of apes have acquired so widely divergent skulls as well as such various minds and bodies. In fact the relation of cranial shape to character and intelligence is a subject of interest well worthy of research, and the accumulation of relevant information greatly to be desired. But the nature of that shape as little explains the development of man or the history of peoples as does an undefined 'race.' Moreover, it needs to be noted that at this moment none of the *data* which have for the purpose of this argument been assumed to be in the possession of the craniologist, are as a matter of fact forthcoming. Actually a hatter in a large way of business has a better and more unbiassed acquaintance with the facts of the subject than many a learned writer; for the total number of skulls scientifically measured amounts only to a few thousand, of which nearly all belong to our own day. When it is remembered that the population of England is alone some forty-five millions or that the Indian Dependency supports three hundred million persons, the inadequacy of such figures even for the casting of averages of the existing inhabitants is manifest. When it is further recognised that no effort has obtained any such number of instances for past generations; when it is known that no serious attempt has been made to discern by experiment the measurements resulting from the breeding of opposite types; when our confessed ignorance of the laws of cross-breeding is avowed in the use of the word atavism; and while we still have the Neo-Darwinians with us to deny heredity and disguise variation as fortuitous; it is obvious that all material for any

valuable theory even of the condition of cranial formation is at present lacking. Its nature may be concealed by the fact that the abstraction is from such sensible things as skulls, but none the less the theory is essentially and fatally metaphysical.

Attempts have also at various times been made to erect the possession of a common or kindred speech into the test of common or similar descent. The most notorious theory of this kind has been the great Indo-Germanic or Aryan myth. It was shown that the Englishman and the German, the Roman and the Greek, the Persian and the majority of Indians spoke languages of a cognate origin. The exponents of the theory, however, usually omitted the American negro from their enumeration. It was then argued that these peoples must all be of cognate descent. The admixtures already mentioned were neglected on the plausible plea that the majority is always right. But the accumulation of facts and the discoveries of ethnology have proved insuperable, and the theory has by this time been abandoned. It was very soon apparent that the majority of Indians were of wholly alien birth; and it became gradually clearer that even if the Aryan invaders were assumed to be of kin with some of the inhabitants of Europe, yet their type had been merged in or amalgamated with the previous peoples of India. It was shown by excavations that from remote periods the European peoples had been of various and divergent types. It was found that at the dawn of the historic period the dark-haired inhabitants who extended in varying admixture and, whether on the Asian, African, or European coasts, were approximately of one physical type, spoke languages of which only a portion were Aryan; while the Keltic and Teutonic tribes who

are assumed to have spoken Aryan languages from a remote period, were but a fraction of the mingled peoples who at one time or another have acquired the derived dialects. Moreover, the discovered fact of the occupation of Eastern Europe and the routes to India by tribes of Ugrian or Mongolian variety, cast doubt on the assumed purity of the blood connection between the invaders of India and any of the Aryan speaking peoples of Europe. In the meantime observation of savage tribes had afforded results comparable in accuracy to those of experiment in sciences more susceptible to abstraction. It was found that, at the earlier stages of development, peoples under the pressure of conquest, national amalgamation, or commercial necessity, exchanged their languages with an ease and rapidity almost inconceivable to men who for generations had been accustomed to written or printed literature, who had known a complex and inspiring history, and who had developed a real patriotism and a national conscience. A savage tribe, it must be remembered, does not, like a civilised person, acquire an additional language while preserving its own. In a generation it forgets and forsakes its pristine dialect.

Again, instead of the languages of the globe being classifiable under the heads of Aryan, Semitic, and Turanian, subsequent inquiry has discovered at least four hundred languages which cannot be further resolved or derived. And many of these distinct species of language are spoken by tribes that are obviously in the closest of physical relationship; while on the other hand cognate languages are often spoken by the most divergent varieties of humanity. The native inhabitants of America, for instance, though by their physical type apparently descended from a common group of

ancestors, have developed in isolation over a hundred unconnected tongues. The English spoken by the negro in America on the other hand is the most obvious example of the second process in operation. If we imagine the United States cut off from outer communication, it is probable that in a hundred years, or perhaps two, they would be populated only by a people of negro descent but with mulatto modifications, speaking a differentiated type of the English language. In their case recorded history might preserve the anthropologist with a linguistic bias from identifying their race with the Aryans. But the example shows the danger of accepting such identification, otherwise uncorroborated, in the absence of record and tradition. In the case of the Aryans there is the assurance that the invaders of India were called by this name; there is, however, no evidence to show that any of the peoples that spoke cognate languages had ever heard of this or any other common name; or that any two of them recognised and acknowledged common descent. On the contrary it is now certain that from at least the neolithic age Europe has been inhabited by peoples of mixed bodily or racial characteristics.

Again, primitive tribes are invariably particularist: they are at enmity with their nearest kindred; though they may obtain their wives from foreign septs, they have eyes only for the distinctions which divide them from their neighbours. It is only extended experience and widened knowledge that, by the contrast of differences more portentous, can elicit the identity underlying trivial modifications; particulars are coherent only in the general concept. The savage admits relationship with other tribes only under the stress of exceptional circumstances. The incursions of an external foe, or

the sudden desire for conquest under an inspired leader, may produce amalgamation; starvation, the need for protection, or a shortage of women, may result in absorption by a more powerful or a more fortunate tribe. Commonly it is broken clans and devastated peoples who seek the security of an alien name and a foreign system. The tribal wars of Scotland furnish examples, at once the best known and the most intimate. The constant accretions to the great federation of the Campbells, the adoption by the Clan Cameron of many Macdonalds, the fate of the proscribed MacGregors, are instances, incomplete only because of the previous possession of a common language and a common religion. Similarly the Hunnish, Scythian and Ionic tribes who in the sixth century after Christ overturned the dynasties of Hindustan, had in a few generations adopted the Aryan language and accepted the religion and the social system of the inhabitants.

Similarity of language is therefore in itself no proof of community of descent. Tribes separated at early stages of culture have evolved in a few generations languages distinct not only in vocabulary but even in grammatical and syntactical regulation. Peoples, since many ages civilised and refined, have adopted the language with the laws and manners of their conquerors. Community of language does indeed remain an indication of the contact, somewhere and somehow, of peoples. It may furnish the solution of a difficulty; it must at least set an historic question. But the contact may have been in many ways and from many causes; and of all possible causes the recognition of a common lineage is, though the most plausible, yet on the whole the least general and the least assured.

It may however be suspected that the convulsive

violence with which some scientists cling to race as the all-powerful agent in human development, results from a curious aversion they have from admitting the influence of thought upon matter. In their haste to repudiate superstition, they abandon reason; in their flight from the temple of faith, they hurl themselves into the abyss of nihilism. Yet it is admitted on all hands that civilisation is the fruit of thought and that the destinies of peoples are shaped by their ideals. Man is a creature of mind as well as of body; and the mind is not the less powerful. It is plain that the physical variations of mankind are both too quick and too subordinate to explain the development of ten, much less of a thousand generations; and the inter-mixture of physical types in even the smallest geographical area from the beginnings of peoples to our day is too great to permit any legitimate deduction. It may well be that a method of research, at once more scientific and humane, would trace the development of mankind from the activities of the ethnic group. In climatic pressure, in religious belief, in artistic emotion, in the invention of tools or machines, in the effects of commerce, in the struggles of warfare and the changes of conquest, consist the essential factors of 'racial' differentiation. The physical type of the individual will be found altered in response to changing environment and to altered thought; while the possession of common ideals tends to produce a general approximation to a common type.

OTTO ROTHFELD.

THE LOVE OF NATURE IN BUDDHIST POEMS.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.

"THOSE old poets," I read the other day in a little book of *badinage*,[1] always charming, often sagacious, "who lived before Wordsworth, and were supposed not to care very much about Nature, because they did not describe it very much." . . . The description is true so far as it goes. But in this age of new discoveries not only of old literatures, but even of old languages, we do well to add the reservation: "*so far as we know all about* those old poets who lived before Wordsworth."

If they and their brethren in other arts—our writer surmises—did not get the best out of Nature, the influence of open-air life and observation of Nature got the best out of them. Her "inspiration went in like sunbeams and came out like Apollo." Nature's charm and her secrets are at once a healing and a fermenting agent, which it is better perhaps to drink in and transmute, than cheapen by description. For her lover has a strong dash of the *farouche* and the anti-social in his nature, as Mr. Havelock Ellis has lately reminded us.[2] He is perhaps to this extent atavistic, a survival of more primitive culture. And feeling that to tell of his mistress might meet with little sympathy

[1] G. K. Chesterton, *Tremendous Trifles*.

[2] 'The Love of Wild Nature,' *Contemporary Review*, February, 1909.

in the children of his generation, he has not cared to wear his heart upon his sleeve for city daws to peck at, or to solicit the approval of those who might limit their likings to the well-groomed rural landscape of Vergil's Mantuan muse. It took human society, in one country and another, a fairly long time to struggle out of nomad or other primitive conditions, and to organise itself in urban life. And human societies so organising themselves, would naturally prefer to hear their poets sing about their winnings, rather than about their lapses, as would be called any yielding to the 'call of the Wild.' Those who expatiated hereon would get few listeners, let alone readers. So the poems that may have been written may also easily have perished.

Nevertheless, to return to what I was saying, before we pronounce funeral orations over perished or unwritten Nature-literature, let us be sure we are not neglecting Nature-lovers' poems that are extant, but as yet neglected by the critic.

Mr. Havelock Ellis, in the essay alluded to, glances back of course beyond both our own nineteenth century poets and our earlier Samuel Johnson, horrified at wild nature in the Highlands. He sees that the present stage of what we are pleased to call civilisation is not so unique in the history of the race, that it alone might be expected to produce a reaction from the life of cities. But his 'quest' is not exactly rich in results. And when he has quoted a sentence from St. Augustine, and a paragraph from St. Jerome's letter indited in praise of the Syrian desert of Chalcis, we are brought up against the 'Thus far shalt thou come and no farther!' of Western culture by the words: "It is highly improbable that any earlier or non-Christian

writer had ever broken out into such a eulogy of the desert as we find again and again in Jerome's delightful epistles."

They who have perversely given their lives to the study, not of those stocks of culture from which such as we now enjoy has admittedly sprung, but of more remote evolutions in human ideas,—they know this kind of remark, and doubtless benefit by it. It shows them how much they yet have to do. And besides, it is interesting to note that the type shows stages in decay, such as is betrayed by the word "improbable." The verdict is not absolutely final. Indeed I hope to show that the verdict is untrue. It is not based on all the evidence available. Much in the world's surviving literatures is of course not so accessible as that of the Christian Fathers. But there are representative agencies willing to give information, and not, all of them, growths of yesterday. The Pali Text Society, for instance, has published 63 volumes in 28 years. And its officers could, had they been consulted, have contributed matter of pertinence and interest to Mr. Ellis's inquiry.

Nor could the possibility of such a contribution coming from Buddhist literature be deemed far-fetched. It is held a plausible hypothesis that Christian monachism was derived from a pagan Egyptian monachism, which was in turn derived from India. It is on record that Asoka's missionaries travelled to Syria, Cyrene and Egypt. Four centuries later the Alexandrian Fathers had come to know of 'Boutta,' the holy man whom India worshipped. He was known, too, to Jerome two centuries later still. And before Jerome, Tertullian had contrasted the Indian recluses, lovers of the wild, with his own colleagues who 'sojourn with you in

the world.' If then Jerome, the child of this urban tradition, could write one classic on the charms of desert life, might not the scriptures of a creed, mother of monachism, and advocating that life, not as an abnormal outlet, but as part of the normal religious life, contain perchance not one epistle, but many passages in praise of seclusion in the wild? Might not the conditions of civilisation, where and when those scriptures were first compiled as oral records, have led to the utterance, in those records, and as a by-product, of what recluses found in Nature to heal and inspire?

When Buddhism had arisen and prevailed and had begun, in the third century of its organic life, to send forth foreign missions, Aryan civilisation in the cradle of that creed was about as old as is our Aryan civilisation of to-day, perhaps older, but let us say fifteen to twenty hundred years old. In some respects it was well advanced. We read, in the canonical literature, of large and populous cities, with fortifications and suburbs, with noisy streets and squares, with seven-storied houses of the great, with shops and judgment halls and prisons, with merchants and caravans coming and going, and with opportunities and a vogue for public or semi-public discussions on different subjects.[1] And temporary retirement from the proximity of cities, and even from the settlement of the Brethren itself, and withdrawal to rocky cave, or forest leaf-hut, was both practised by the founder,[2] and recommended to the follower, as the best opportunity for cultivating detachment, spiritual calm and thorough-going meditation on any given point.

[1] Cf. Rhys Davids's *Buddhist India*, *passim*.

[2] See *e.g.* *Vinaya Texts* ii. 312 ff.

Now among the books of the Pali Canon there is a collection of poems, 325 in number,[1] attributed to various members of the Order, both men and women. Many of the putative poets' names are those of the most eminent original members; most of them are not met with elsewhere in the Canon. Of the 264 ascribed to these Elder Brethren, (Thera's), about one-sixth treat of the environing nature, and its charm, either by an incidental touch, or in considerable detail. In most instances, seclusion in wild nature is made the background for higher themes. In some cases, the joy of life in the wild is blended and made co-equal with the spiritual theme. In a few poems the theme is Nature pure and simple. The solitary has usually taken up his abode in a rocky cave overlooking a stream from the hills, such as one may see still associated with Christian monachism in many places on the Continent. And he is a lover of the heights—were they not 'clean and pure,' 'lonely and free from crowds,' 'a hiding-place,' and a type of the lofty thoughts of elect minds?[2] Ever about him, making over-head symphonies,

> Its arms outstretched, the druid wood
> Waits with its benedicité;

and around him resound the call and cry, the chirp and hum of his fellow-lovers, the creatures whom he pities but slays not. And so, 'become in heart a creature of the wild' (*migabūtena cetasā*), he roams and bathes, gathers wild fruits and sweet influence, only and ever again to fall a-musing, not in desultory reverie, but in those exercises of meditative rapture whereof India and

[1] *Thera-therī-gāthā* (Stanzas ascribed to Elders of the Buddhist Order of Recluses), ed. H. Oldenberg and R. Pischel, London, Pali Text Society, 1883.

[2] *The Questions of King Milinda*, translated by Rhys Davids, ii. 353 ff. 'What are the five Alpine qualities of a Buddhist Brother?'

her near sisters have long held and yet hold the secret; until, some coign of vantage won, or, it may be, the final conquest itself, he descends once more into the plain of missionary work.

Hence his innate love of the wild is blended with and sanctified by wedded memories, also and otherwise fragrant and austere, of mists rolled back and spiritual vistas widened. And when some gift of utterance was innate no less, it would have been strange indeed had these mixed associations not found parallel expression in richer measure than may be found in the literature of Christian monachism.

But the authors of these poems show themselves more genuinely lovers of the wild than was St. Jerome. According to his well-known letter to Heliodorus, Jerome would fain have his friend's company to make cœnobitic his monachism.[1] He bids Heliodorus fear not for solitude, for it is "loneliness delighting in intercourse with God," and the Lord will be sharer in their austerities. The flowers are Christ's, —"*O desertum Christi floribus vernans!*"—and of the lonely rocks are born the stones of the city of the great King. Ardent lover, fighter, and strenuous traveller, Jerome may have welcomed a rest-cure in his desert, but his temperament was incorrigibly social and his musings urban.

But when your Bhikkhu got away alone, he loved to be genuinely alone, even in thought, as the following samples of his verses will show. He knew, with every modern lover of nature, that she absolves more swiftly the lonely sinner, and prophesies to but one heart at a time. He knew too that, in his Dhamma, every stage

"*Quanto amore et studio contenderem ut pariter in eremo moraremur conscium mutuæ caritatis pectus agnoscit!*"

of spiritual Liberty had to be won single-handed, after teachers had placed weapons and chart in his hands.

And so it comes that, in the poems of these Wordsworths of the ancient world, Nature as loved by the lonely lover, who is at the same time pursuing a Quest of sempiternal interest, is recorded and sung immortally. Like Jerome and his desert, the Bhikkhus "hitched their waggon to a star." They gave their Nature-affinities the greatest of all "supernatural allies." They attuned the pipe of old Pan to sing of the exultations and agonies of the soul at bay with the riddle of life and death, on its Quest for salvation. And thus their witness, that a conscious reaction to Nature's influences is no modern or western phenomenon only, is in our hands to-day.

In the absence as yet of any English translation[1] of the Theras' poems, I have cast a few verses from the forty-seven poems mentioned above into rough, but fairly literal verse. I take first, no voice from the jungle, but two verses of graceful Pali, instinct with the feeling for spring and its *Wanderlust*. A message is sent by the Buddha's father from Kapila-vatthu, to the Teacher at Rājagaha, inviting him to visit and instruct his kin and fellow-townsmen. The messenger, Kāḷudāyī, an old playmate of the Buddha, thereafter entered the Order, and to him, as a Thera, the metrical setting of the message he had delivered is ascribed. The opening verses are as follows:

KĀḶUDĀYĪ.

Now crimson glow the trees, dear Lord, and cast
Their swathing bloom for him who seeks for fruit.
Like crests of flame they shine, and all the air,

[1] Dr. K. E. Neumann published an eloquent metrical German version of the *Thera-therī-gātha* in 1899; *Die Lieder der Mönche und Nonnen.*

Great leader, bears the season's fragrant breath.
Their fullest foliage the trees put forth
Where'er we look, delightful to the eye,
And casting off their petals yearn for fruit.
'Tis time, O hero, that we set out hence.
Not over hot nor over cold but sweet,
O Master, now the season of the year.
O let the folk of Kosala behold thee cross
The Rohinī, thy face set toward the west.[1]

In the poem attributed to the Thera ANGULIMĀLA, once a dreaded bandit, converted by the Buddha, the scenes of his solitude while he is living in retreat are merely the setting for strong religious emotion. Thus in one of his verses he says:

Deep in the wild beneath some forest tree,
Or in the mountain cave, is't here, is't there,
I stand and let my over-chargèd heart
Transported beat. Happy I seek my rest,
Happy I rise, happy I pass the day,
Remote from evil—ah! how shall I tell
The sweet compassion of my Lord for me!

But in the little poems of two elsewhere unmentioned brethren—EKAVIHARIYA ('Lone-dweller') and BHŪTA[2] ('Elemental'—)we find the blend of nature-love and spiritual mood in true poetic harmony.

EKAVIHARIYA.

To him for whom there's nothing left—before
Or after, or elsewhere—exceeding good
It is that he do live in woods alone.
Lo! now, alone I'll get me hence and go
To lead the forest-life the Buddha praised,
In quest of happiness and still retreat.
Yea, swiftly and alone and for my good

[1] For a shorter version see Rhys Davids's *Buddhist Birth Stories*, p. 121.

[2] These names, the former certainly, the latter probably, were not family or fore names, but nicknames. There are several such names among the Sisters, explained in the Chronicle.

I'll seek the jungle that I love, the haunt
Of elephants, th' ascetic's realm of joy.
Where, in Cool Wood's[1] fair shades, cool waters lie
Within the mountain grot; there will I bathe
My limbs, and to and fro I'll roam alone.

Lone and unmated in the lovely woods,
When shall I come to rest, work wrought, heart cleansed?
Oh that I might win through, who am so fain!
I only may achieve the task; herein
None other may accomplish aught for me.
I'll bind my spirit's armour on, and so
The jungle will I enter, that I'll not
Come forth again until Nibbāna's won.
I'll seat me on the mountain-top, the while
The wind blows cool and fragrant on my brow,
And burst the baffling mists of ignorance.
Then on the flower-carpet of the wood,
Anon in the cool cavern of the cliff,
Bless'd in the bliss of Liberty I'll take
Mine ease on thee, Old Fastness o' the Crag,[2]
My heart's desire fulfilled, e'en as the moon
On fifteenth day, all deadly canker slain,
And never more Sangsāra's Round for me!

Here, too, are three of the nine *gāthā's* ascribed to

BHŪTA.

When in the lowering sky thunders the stormcloud's drum,
And all the pathways of the birds are thick with rain,
The brother sits within the hollow of the hills
Alone, rapt in thought's ecstasy. No higher bliss
Is given to men than this.

Or where, by rivers on whose bank together crowd
Full many a flower, and fragrant rushes scent the air,

[1] Sīta-vana, a classic spot in Buddhist scriptures near hill-girt Rājagaha.

[2] Giribbājā, the 'mountain-stronghold' above Rājagaha, the ruined fortifications, 4½ miles in circumference, of which are still extant, and are the most ancient stone buildings yet found in India, ancient even in Buddhist times. Rhys Davids's *Buddhist India*, p. 87.

With heart serene the brother sits upon the strand
Alone, rapt in thought's ecstasy. No higher bliss
Is given to men than this.
Or when at dead of night in lonely wood god rains,
And beasts of fang and tusk ravin and cry aloud,
The brother sits within the hollow of the hills
Alone, rapt in thought's ecstasy. No higher bliss
Is given to men than this.

One may be sceptical as to the ecstasy in these two poems being the product of religious pleasures alone.

The phrase 'god rains'—*devo vassati*—the vernacular idiom for 'it is raining,' suggests a reference to the group of pretty rain-verses among these poems. In them the sound and rhythm of the rains that brought not only wealth, but life itself to the plains below, affords many graceful refrains in Buddhist verses.[1] Here is for instance the little rondel-like poem ascribed to one SAMBŬLA-KACHĀNA Thera:

God's rain pours down, ay, and god's rain roars down,
And I alone in fearsome hollow dwell.
Yet, dwelling so in fearsome rocky dell,
To me no fear comes nigh, no creeping dread,
No quailing of my soul. For such the law
Within the blessed Norm, that dwelling so,
To me no fear comes nigh, nor creeping dread,
Nor quailing of my soul, to me, alone.

And there are several others, whose names survive solely in the apocryphal ascription to each and all of them of a common refrain of rain music, with a slightly varied spiritual melody to that accompaniment:

God rains as 'twere a melody most sweet.
Snug is my little hut, sheltered, well-roofed.
The heart of me is steadfast and at peace.
Now, an it pleaseth thee to rain, god, rain![2]

[1] Cp. *Sutta Nipāta*, 18-34, translated in Rhys Davids's *American Lectures*, 2nd ed., pp. 167 ff.

[2] *Theragāthā*, ver. 151 ff.

Now and again, the charm of the scenes around becomes sufficiently absorbing to banish awhile the problems they had gone forth into the wild to solve. Brother SAPPĀKA'S poem, for instance, might have been by the hand of a Tennyson in its sense of colour, or of a St. Francis of Assisi for its sympathy with the little creatures around:

Whene'er I see the crane, her clear pale wings
Outstretched in fear to flee the black storm-cloud,
A shelter seeking, to safe shelter borne,
Then doth the river Ajakaraṇī
Give joy to me.

Whene'er I see the crane, her plumage pale
And silver grey outstretched in fear to flee
The black storm-cloud, seeing no refuge nigh,
The refuge seeking of the rocky cave,
Then doth the river Ajakaraṇī
Give joy to me.

Who doth not love to see on either bank
Clustered rose-apple trees in fair array,
Beyond the great cave of the hermitage,
Or hear the soft croak of the frogs, their foes,
The wingèd myrmidons[1] withdrawn, proclaim:
Not from the mountain streams is't time to-day
To flit. Safe is the Ajakaraṇī.
She brings us luck. Here is it good to be!

The monachistic temperament, with its proneness to introspection, its shrinking from work in the crowd, and its 'long, long thoughts' as of a youth, find a chill welcome in the Western religious mind of to-day. But in their love of the world's loveliness, these old Aryan utterances appeal to sympathies that are quick and warm among ourselves, and to joys that many a hunter

[1] The phrase is obscure and occurs here only. The more obvious allusion is to the crane-tribe, but the Commentary alludes to snakes.

and sportsman knows, quite apart from any lust for outwitting and slaying creatures.

The trust of wild animals in the presence of the hermit is a charming myth or fact that does not appear in the Elders' poems, though it may possibly play a part in the later chronicle of the Commentary now at length being transcribed from the palm-leaf manuscripts. And the hunter, whatever he may feel, suggests less the famous picture by Dürer of St. Jerome and his friendly lion, than its recent travesty at the hands of *Punch*.[1] We should certainly not expect to find Friar Tucks among the Theras of gentle lives. Both extremes are absent, and I have noticed but one brief disclaimer of a taste for hunting, in verses ascribed to one SANKICCHA:

> I've dwelt in forest and in mountain cave,
> In rocky defile and in haunts remote,
> Infested by the creatures of the wild.
> But never mine the quest with ill-will fraught,
> Ungentle and ignoble:—'Let us hunt,
> Let's slay the creatures, let us work them ill!'

The sympathetic ear for frog-talk shown by Sankiccha's poem has no parallel in this collection. But the feeling for the beauty of the flying crane—grey against the purple bastion of the thunder-cloud—is one of many instances of the æsthetic sympathy evinced for bird-life, Nature's most exquisite product. I will try to illustrate this by a few verses from one of the longer poems ascribed to Brother TĀḶAPŬTA. The work is of considerable lyrical interest, being surcharged with emotion, and is in the form of an apostrophe to his heart or mind, after the fashion of more than one well-

[1] *Punch's Almanack* for 1910. In place of the saint, a notable hunter writes his memoirs, surrounded by *slain* beasts.

known German lyric of last century.[1] The following are clumsy reproductions of nos. 17ff. out of the fifty-five couplets of verse:

'Tis many years, O heart, that thou hast urged:
'Come now, thou'st lived house-life enough!'
See then, I've left the world. Wherefore, my heart,
Dost thou not yoke thyself to work thy weal?

Have I not, O my heart, been urged by thee:
'Up in the ancient Fastness[2] hosts of birds,
Brilliant of plumage, greet great Indra's voice
Heard in the thunder with their cries. 'Tis they
Will give thee joy whiles thou art musing there.

. . . .

'There in the jungle joyous with the calls
Of peacock and of heron, where thou'lt dwell
By panthers and by tigers fell attended,
Be not too careful for thy body's needs.' . . .
So wast thou wont, my heart, to urge on me.

. . . .

O thou wilt love the life, be't on the crest
Of caverned cliffs, where herd boar and gazelle,
Or in fair open glade, or in the depths
Of forest freshened by new rain—'tis there
Lies joy for thee to cavern-cottage gone.[3]
Fair plumed, fair crested passengers of air,
With deep blue throats and many-hued of wing,
Give greeting to the muttering thundercloud
With cries melodious, manifold; 't is they
Will give thee joy whiles thou art musing there.
And when god rains on the young four-inch grass,
And on the cloud-like crests of budding woods,

[1] Göthe's lines in *Neue Liebe, neues Leben*, if limited to the first two verses, might serve for the motto of this poem:

Herz, mein Herz, was soll das geben?
Was bedränget dich so sehr?
Welch ein fremdes neues Leben!
Ich erkenne dich nicht mehr, etc.

[2] Giribbăjă; see above, p. 424, n. 2.

[3] An attempt at the Pali alliteration: *guhā-geha-gato.*

Within the mountain's heart I'll sit as I
Were rooted, and th' hard rock will seem as soft
As couch of cotton-down. . . .

. . . .

Thou as the antelope free in her forests fair,
Hast mounted to the lovely cloud-wreathed crag.
There on the tranquil height shall joy be thine,
And death, O heart, to all perplexity.

I will quote finally from another of the longer poems, to show that these poets of the Indian woodlands and the Rājgir hills were not so wild and shy of soul that they could not come among men, and work as teachers and 'ensamples of godly life.' Solitude in the wild might claim much of their time for wise reasons, but as one of them declared:

In village, or the wild, in vale, on hill,
Where'er the man of sterling worth,[1] the saint,
His dwelling hath, delightful is that place.

Their heart might be less in the city than

. . in those forest haunts where comes no crowd
Of folk to take its pleasure; there will they
Who are set free from passion find their joy,
For they seek not for sense-satiety.

Nevertheless, as members of a 'Saviour's' church and a missionary movement, they were bound, for all their solitary campaigns for self-culture, to have the betterment of all men much at heart.

The 'Great Kassăpă,' the most distinguished in a notable family of Brahmin[2] adherents of the Buddha, is credited with a group of verses, wherein this dual life of meditation in the wild and work in the town is well shown. The ancient gospels, or Nikāyas, of the

[1] *I.e.* the Arahant, its literal meaning. *Theragāthā*, ver. 991 = *Dhammapada*, ver. 98 and 992.

[2] On Brahmin hermits see Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, i. 215-19.

Buddhist canon relate that Mahā-Kassapa became the leader of the Order immediately after the founder's death. They also contain many episodes of his life and sayings. The commentaries of a later date describe his leaving the world in company with his wife. She became a distinguished preacher, and herself indited a poem, still in her verse associating herself with him who, it was said, had even in former lives been her mate.[1] In the first half of Kassapa's poem given here in make-shift English, now he is speaking, now he is spoken of. But the traditional key to this touch of drama lies in the yet unedited Commentary.

MAHĀ-KASSAPA.

Walk not where many folk would make thee chief.
Dizzy the mind becomes, and hard to win
Is concentrated thought. And he who knows:
'Ill bodes the company of many folk!'
Will keep himself aloof from haunt of crowds.
Go not, wise man, by hearths of citizens.
Who greedy strives to taste life's feast entire,
Rejects the good that brings true happiness.
A treach'rous bog it is, this patronage
Of bows and gifts and treats from wealthy folk.
'Tis like steel splinter bedded in the flesh,
For weaker brethren hard to extricate.

Down from my mountain lodge I came for food
And in the town with leper broke my fast,
Who, as he passed a morsel of his food
To me, let fall therewith a finger-joint.
Leaning against the wall I ate my share
Nor at the time, nor after, felt disgust.
For only he who taketh as they come,
The scraps of food, medicine from excrement,
The couch 'neath the tree's shade, the patchwork robe,
Stands as a man in north, south, east, or west.

[1] *Psalms of the Sisters* (*Therī-gāthā*), Pali Text Society, 1909, pp. 47-9.

Such is great Kassapa, the Buddha's heir,
Mindful and self-possessed he mounts aloft,
Where many a one would slip, on rocky crags
With foot unfaltering, his quest fulfilled.
So mounting to some craggy coign he sits
In meditation rapt, nor clutches aught,
For far from him hath he put fear and dread.
So mounting to some craggy coign he sits
In meditation rapt, nor clutches aught,
For he 'mong those that burn is cool and still.

. . . .

Where in fair alpine glades the sweet musk rose
In fragrant garlands weaves its wildering sprays,
Where sound the trumpet-calls of elephants,
Those are the braes wherein my soul delights.
Crags with the hue of heaven's blue clouds,
Where lie embosomed many a shining tarn
Of crystal-clear cool waters, covered o'er
With myriad clustered dancing butterflies:[1]
Those are the braes wherein my soul delights.
Towering like battlements of azure cloud,
Like pinnacles on lofty castle built,
Re-echoing to the cries of jungle-folk:
Those are the braes wherein my soul delights.
Fair uplands rain-refreshed and resonant
With crested creatures' cries antiphonal,
Where venerable Rishis oft resort:
Those are the braes wherein my soul delights.
Here is enough for me who fain would dwell
In meditation rapt and solitude.
Here is enough for me who fain would seek
Well-being undisturbed in calm retreat.

. . . .

Clad with the azure bloom of flax, e'en as
The sky is flecked with clouds, and quick with crowds
Of all their varied wingèd populace,

[1] The prettier Indian word for this insect is *indagopăkā*—'guards of Indra'—but whether butterfly, beetle or firefly is meant, is not known. The last would imply a nocturnal picture.

Free from the crowds who dwell in towns below:
Those are the braes wherein my soul delights.
Crags where clear waters lie, and broad-backed rocks,
Haunted by black-faced apes and timid deer,
And the uplifted cups of water-flowers:
Those are the braes wherein my soul delights.

It may be asked to what extent this love of solitude in nature is found in the smaller collection of poems—seventy-one in number—ascribed to Sisters of the Buddhist Order?[1]

In these 'psalms' also is evinced the essential habit of frequent and regular seclusion, not taken within four walls, as a rule, but more usually in the woods or on the hills. But there is a marked absence of that intimacy with, and delight in, the wild as such, that permeates some of the foregoing selections from the Brethren's verses. That this is so, that this has ever been so till, perhaps, the last generation or two, is to me simply an inevitable result of the patriarchal *régime* for women. The nurture imposed on women has turned their vision hearthwards or heavenwards, not outwards on to the world without the house and the temple. Civilisation, wherever found, has as yet been too rudimentary in its average level of development to make practicable for the religious woman, not yet advanced in years, that cultivation of open-air seclusion needed by her every whit as much as by her brother. We find the Sisters frequently walking and meditating alone in the woods. But they are near their sisterhood settlements, or vihāras. They are frequently represented, for all their close-cut heads and patchwork

[1] Those who have not consulted Dr. Neumann's translation, may now read the writer's English version of these poems and their chronicle from the Commentary. See above, p. 430, n.

yellow swathing robes, as accosted by the dissolute. And for them the sweet influences of nature in springtime are closely associated with the allurements of sense, and with only that.

Young art thou, Sister, and faultless—what seekest thou in the holy life?
Cast off that yellow-hued raiment and come! in the blossoming woodland
Seek we our pleasure. Filled with the incense of blossoms the trees waft
Sweetness. See, the spring's at the prime, the season of happiness!
Come with me then to the flowering woodland, and seek we our pleasure.
Sweet overhead is the sough of the blossoming crests of the forest
Swayed by the wind-gods. But an thou goest alone in the jungle,
Lost in its depths, how wilt thou find aught to delight or content thee?[1]

Subhā here, and her Sisters, may have been each walking abroad in nature *alone for the first time in their lives*. They could not possibly feel that intimate sense of being *at home* that your real lover of the wild feels, when away from the homestead. Not of their girlhood could LUCY's training have been predicted:

. . . And she shall lean her ear
In many a secret place,
And beauty born of murmuring sound
Shall pass into her face.

And I doubt if Nature can ever bring her full treasures to one who never went afield after them very young.

The Sisters are on the whole more occupied with the fact of the new freedom of mobility. The Brethren could woo Nature on the stepping-stones of the free mobility that had been, more or less, their heritage from childhood. The Therīs are interested in the

[1] *Psalms of the Sisters*, p. 150.

stepping-stones. And with this new independence the hill top is more in harmony than the forest. High over Rājgir there runs the long breeze-swept *arête* of the 'Vulture-peak' range, and other adjacent heights. In some part or other of these upland crags and jungly woods most of the foregoing verses would seem to have been inspired. Here, too, the Indian woman now began to grope her way alone. And the little ancient memorials which are all that survive of such names as Chittā and Mettikā, naïve and stammering though they be beside the more fluent nature-lyrics of their brethren, have for me a deeper pathos, like the halting notes of a bird when first let out into the woodlands from a cage:

> Though I be suffering and weak, and all
> My youthful spring be gone, yet have I come,
> Leaning upon my staff, and clomb aloft
> The mountain peak. My cloak have I thrown off,
> My little bowl o'er turned: so sit I here
> Upon the rock. And o'er my spirit sweeps
> The breath of Liberty! I win, I win
> The Triple Lore! The Buddha's will is done!

So long estranged, these daughters did not so consciously recognise the presence of their ancient Mother as to speak of her, and yet—to repeat that with which I began—She was for all that 'getting the best out of them.' And they, drinking from her breast, might, adapting our own Swinburne, have said:

> My thought with eyes and wings made wide makes way
> To win the nobler Liberty 'that I desire.'

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

FRAGMENTS FROM THE MANDÆAN TRADITIONS OF JOHN THE BAPTIST.

A. L. BEATRICE HARDCASTLE, M.R.A.S.

THE so-called apocryphal traditions of John the Baptist are still waiting for translation from the Mandæan[1] dialect, the language of the Nazoræans, an ancient Gnostic sect of Chaldæan origin, who lived among the swamps of Basra (Bussorah), near the mouth of the Euphrates, and of whom some remnants are still in existence. They probably existed as a sect before their great and shining light the Baptist arose to make them famous.

The oldest existing Mandæan writings, however, date most probably only from the period of the Sāssānid Kings, that is between the years 250 and 650 A.D., during which time they seem to have been collected as fragments of traditions of far more ancient date, and edited as one work in their present form.

By some extraordinary mischance, the various MSS. in Europe of the collection of these traditions known as *Sidrā d'Jahjā* (or *Book of John*) were either inaccessible to, or passed over by, the three or four scholars who had learnt Mandæan and who might have given us some idea of the vital interest of the work.[2]

Nöldeke, the main authority on the Mandæan

[1] Māndā = Gnosis.

[2] Two short pieces were translated into German and Latin, and published in 1799, in *Beiträge zur Philosophie, etc.* (ed. C. F. Ständlin, Lübeck).

language, when writing his *Mandäische Grammatik*, in 1875, says that he was sent a copy of *The Book of John* in the greatest haste at the last moment by Euting, to whom we are indebted for a gorgeous edition of the text of the Mandæan *Book of Rites and Ceremonies*—the *Quolasta* (or *Purity*)—but who has translated nothing. Fortunately Nöldeke in his Grammar quotes several phrases and a large number of words from *The Book of John*, which enable the student to start on his studies; but a translation of the book does not at present exist, in spite of the reiterated demands for it made by Nöldeke and Brandt.

Brandt writing on the Mandæans, in 1889, was unable even to see a copy, and relied apparently on Nöldeke's notes and references; and, strange to say, the voluminous *Theological Encyclopædia* of the Abbé Migne ignores its very existence, although there are three MSS. in the Bibliothèque Nationale.

Two years ago M. Lidzbarski, an authority on Syrian dialects, published the Mandæan text only of the *Sidrā d'Jahjā*,[1] promising a translation, which has unfortunately not yet appeared.

While, therefore, we are being tantalised by the delay, I have endeavoured to gain some idea of the character of the contents, and venture to hazard a rough rendering of a few short pieces, and to offer a few tentative remarks on the book as a whole.

The Book of John consists of seventy-three disconnected fragments, some of which have not the usual invocation as heading, and do not even begin at the beginning of a sentence. One of the pieces is duplicated almost word for word in a subsequent passage of the

[1] With a critical apparatus based on the three Paris MSS., the Codex Huntington in the Bodleian at Oxford (Payne-Smith's Catalogue), and the MS. in the Brit. Museum (Cod. Orient. Add. 25, 602 A.).

book, and this leads us to suspect that the copyist had before him a collection of fragments, the relics apparently of more than one copy of some large book of sacred traditions, which had been hastily collected and bound together for safety. This bound collection of scraps was then copied again and again, with more devotion than intelligence, thus forming the various MSS. of differing dates, some as late as the XIIth and XIVth centuries, now found in European libraries. We may further reasonably conclude that if the scraps were so much worn as to be in fragments in the Sāssānid era, they must have been of considerable age, probably several centuries old, at the time they were first collected. And this is only counting the age of the writing without allowing for the first stage of all such tradition, the oral.

Nöldeke (p. xxii.) remarks on the purity of the Syriac dialect and its remarkable freedom from the influence of surrounding tongues as one of the evidences for the probable great age of the traditions. He suggests that Mandæan is probably the old form (or closely resembling that form) from which the modern vernacular Syriac of Urmi and Kurdistān is derived.

As the date is so largely a philological problem, the short scheme[1] on page 438 will shew at a glance the probable date of Mandæan in its prime and its descent from Assyrian sources.

The Mandæan characters resemble most closely the Irānian inscriptions on Pre-Sāssānid coins and also somewhat the Palmyrene alphabet. The construction of Mandæan phrases is also very close to the older Aramaic dialects.

[1] Adapted from Marti's Table in his *Grammatik der biblischaramäischen Sprache*, 1896.



The archaic nature and almost obsolete character of the language thus widen the gulf we have to bridge in our endeavours to get at the original thought of the old-world seers who wrote these treatises. What is really needed is an interpretation of the highly complex concepts present to the inner mind of these Gnostic thinkers, and not simply a translation of the phrases, word for word. The more mystical and transmundane is the subject treated of the less easy is it to translate literally any single technical term of the original. For it by no means follows that we have modern terms to represent the same ideas.

Perhaps also it is true that the more ancient the idea the more numerous are the associations and connotations of the word-symbol which has come down to us from these old traditional sources. Our modern word is without the archaic background of associations. To translate truly an ancient work it is necessary to bring through from the conceptual plane the ancient idea in all its fullness, and to change into current coin the ancient values.

The greater number of Fragments begin with the usual formula found also in the Codex Nasaræus, which is the *Great Book*, as they call it, of the Gnostic tradi-

tions treasured up by the Mandæans. It has been published by Petermann, with a lithographed facsimile of the text, under the title: *Liber Adami* (or *Book of Adam*).

The formula used as heading is:

"In the Name of the Great Life;
To the Glory of the wondrous Light."

The concluding formula is almost always:

"The Discourses of the Life are victorious,
And the man who comes hither is Victor."

But the most remarkable phrase in the book is the introductory formula heading all the fragments containing the sayings or doings of Jahjā Jōhannā (*i.e.*, of John the Baptist), namely:

"Jahjā searched in the night, Jōhannā in the evening of the night."

The Syriac word *ramish* might perhaps be translated 'watches' to make better sense, but the usual meaning is 'evening.' The most interesting word is *darush* (דרש), which means to seek out, to search, to study, to consult (an oracle), to seek supernatural counsel (according to Gesenius), or to enquire of God in the various offices of religion,[1] especially as referring to the work of a prophet.

It is true Nöldeke translates it: "preached (*predigte*) in the night"; but there is a certain improbability in this meaning, as the book tells us that John's audience consisted largely of priests and sons of priests *in Jerusalem* and Judæa, who would not be likely to attend meetings in the night.[2]

[1] Driver, *Introd. to Lit. of O.T.*, 1905, p. 536.

[2] Lorsbach for this reason suggests 'meditated' as preferable to 'taught.'

We find the identical *darush* in *Jer.* xxix. 13, "when ye shall *search* for me with all your heart and I will be found of you, saith the Lord"; in *I. Chron.* xxviii. 9, "for the Lord *searcheth* all hearts"; and in *I. Kings* xxii. 5, in the sense of seeking supernatural wisdom: "And Jehoshaphat said, *Enquire,* I pray thee, at the word of the Lord to-day," and again in the same sense in *II. Kings* xxii. 13.

We may therefore translate it: "Jahjà communed with God in the night," or "Jahjā sought counsel of the Lord in the night."

In a work so full of the transmundane phenomena of Gnosticism this opening suggests a trance, or state of vision, journeyings in the spirit, or, as we should express it now-a-days, higher states of consciousness.

The following Fragment xl. (p. 170) is probably among the older pieces in point of date. It is duplicated almost word for word in Fragment xlix. (p. 180). It may be called:

The Lamentations.

The Voice of the Life speaks, the Voice of the Great Life.

The Voice of the Life saith: Let every man take heed to himself.

Blessed is he who scorns himself, the Architect[1] in his heart shall be his portion.

Blessed are the faithful who shall rise up and see the Place of the Light.

Woe to the king who rules and in the little kingdom of himself he is not ruler.

[1] Architect of the body, *i.e.* the Creator, as in the Codex Nasaræus and Hermetic writings.

Woe to him who leads (others) on the Way and on the Path of himself he is not led (has no guidance); he who goes with him will not heed him.

Woe to the builder who builds not first for himself a building.

Woe to the thrones of the great who devastate (or corrupt) thrones and do not fill them.

Woe to the double-tongued and those who give two judgments for one.

Woe to the learned who teach (others) and do not learn (themselves).

Woe to the foolish and the mad who are shut up in their own folly.

Woe to the wise man who does not instruct others out of his wisdom.

Woe to the rulers who forsake ruling and do no good works. They shall fall into the fire which consumes, and hold in their hands glowing embers and their lips shall fan the burning.

Woe to the evil hearts and the wicked among the rulers. The dominion of the wicked shall cease and be destroyed at the end of the world and they shall not behold the Place of the Light.

Blessed are they who work righteousness. Woe! Woe, He cries, to those who work evil.

Woe to those who have (possessions) and do not prepare them for righteousness. Their sins be upon them (*lit.* are their own), and the deeds they have done shall go before them and devour them.

Blessed are they who have (goods) and prepare them for the cause of righteousness. Their reward is their own and the deeds they have done shall go before them; before them shall their deeds go and uphold them; the work of their hands shall establish them in

the Way of Truth and they shall rise up and see the Place of the Light.

The connection of the Mandæans with Pre-Sāssānid Zoroastrianism would explain their extreme love of purity, and the wearing of white garments. To this the Mandæans added frequent daily bathing in running waters and the adoration of light, and, on the spiritual side, the practice of constant praise and thanksgiving, continual aspiration, and exaltation of the soul to the eternal realms. In a word they had a rule of life for the people only found now among those in Holy Orders.

The purity inculcated is threefold—thought, word, and deed; and so we read in the first tractate of the Codex Nasaræus concerning the Great Fast of Purity:

To you my chosen I say it: Fast ye the great fast.

Fast not as fasting from the meats of this earth, but fast ye with your eyes that they look not to lust.

Fast ye with your ears that they do not listen at strange doors (*i.e.* the false religions or idolatrous sects).

Fast ye with your mouths that they do not speak malice and false things.

Fast with your hearts, that ye meditate not upon corruption nor yearn after perishable things.

Fast ye with this great fasting, and maintain ye yourselves in it, until ye have laid aside the body.[1]

Of the 'strange doors' there were said to be twelve, such as the worship of Shamash (the Sun), of Bel

[1] Cp. the Oxyrhynchus fragment: "Jesus saith, Except ye fast to the world, ye shall in no wise find the Kingdom of God."

(Jupiter), of Sin (the Moon), of Libāt (Venus), of Nireg (Mars), of Saturn, of Abatur, and of Līl. About the IVth century A.D. six huge bowls were unearthed in Babylon filled with magic formulæ containing these eight names.[1]

These and four others are the false religions over which the Shepherd grieves in Fragment xi. (p. 45).

THE SHEPHERD FRAGMENT.

In the Name of the Great Life and to the Glory of the wondrous Life!

The Æon from beyond[2] cries and says:

Come and be unto me a loving Shepherd, and guard thou for me a thousand in ten thousand.[3]

How filled the world is with evil and bestrewn with thorns and with thistles!

Come and be unto me a loving Shepherd, and guard thou a thousand in ten thousand that I bring to thee. My throne is of glory, of me, who have been down-trodden among the thorns and the thistles.
The earth and the heavens shall perish;
But my throne of glory shall not pass away.
The Sun and Moon shall perish;
But my throne of glory shall not pass away.
The Stars and their dwellings in heaven shall perish;
But my throne of glory shall not pass away.
Wind and fire and water shall perish;
But my throne of glory shall not pass away.

[1] Conder's *Syrian Stone Lore*, p. 290.

[2] Or 'without' (*draussen*, Nöl. 203) or 'out from' or 'below the Light-world.'

[3] Cp. *Pistis Sophia*. "I tell you that there will be found one in a thousand and two in ten thousand for the consummation of the mystery of the Prime Mystery."

Fruits and grapes and trees shall perish;
But my throne of glory shall not pass away.
All who work and their works shall perish;
But my throne of glory shall not pass away.
Oh, come, loving Shepherd, and guard for me a thousand in ten thousand.
I am the loving Shepherd and guard for thee a thousand in ten thousand.
When the lion comes to carry them away,
I bring to him food and I ward him off;
When the bear comes to carry them away,
I bring to him food and I ward him off;
When the thief comes to steal them away,
I bring to him food and I ward him off;
When they fall into fire and are burnt,
I bring . . . . . .

Because of the worship of the Sun there comes the bear to steal them away; they go to be a portion for bears, to be a portion for bears shall they go.

Because of the worship of the Moon there shall come thieves; they shall be a portion for thieves, in dismay shall they go and become a portion for thieves.

Because of the worship of Nireg (Mars) they shall fall into the fire which burns; their portion shall be the fire, in dismay they go to their portion in the fire.

Because of the worship of the Messiah, they shall fall into the water; their portion shall be in the Ocean of Desolation.

Because of the heathen altars which they serve their portion shall be desolation.

Because of the worship of the Spirit[1] comes the Shepherd to guard for me a thousand in ten thousand;

[1] See Bousset, p. 28. The cults of Ruhā d' Qudša (the Spirit) and of the Messiah were regarded as false religions by the Mandæans.

In his right hand the scales to weigh them, he weighs a thousand in ten thousand.

The Discourses of the Life are victorious.

And the man who comes hither is Victor!

Fragment xli. (p. 166) preserves for us an instructive catalogue of the Mandæan mysteries. With it may be compared the opening words of the Coptic Gnostic Codex Brucianus, where Jesus the Living One declares: "I have loved you and longed to give you Life," and continues: "This is the Book of the Gnoses of the Invisible God," and again: "This is the doctrine in which all Gnosis dwelleth." We may also compare with it the long list of the Gnoses of the Ineffable given in the *Pistis Sophia* (206 ff.), Jesus the Living One again speaking:

"Amen, I say unto you, this man, in the dissolution of the world, shall be King over all the orders of the Inheritance of Light, and he who shall have received the Mystery of the Ineffable that man is myself.

"That Mystery knoweth why there is Darkness and why Light.

"That Mystery knoweth why there is Darkness of darknesses and why Light of lights," etc.

Fragment of a Mystery-Hymn.

The Voice of the Gnosis of Life;
He instructs and teaches them who love Him,
He teaches the Chosen and Just
The Mysteries of this world,
The hidden Mysteries in a world of lust:
The Mystery of the Earth's Resting-Place,

The Mystery of the Anvil,[1]
The Mystery of the Light of Day,
The Mystery of the Darkness of the Night,
The Mystery of the Living Water,
The Mystery of the Sword of Fire,
The Mystery of Death and Sleep,
The Mystery of the World of Adam, and of the First Man, and of the First Day,
The Mystery of the Baptismal Word,
The Mystery of the Wand (or Staff),
The Mystery of the Myrtle of the Chosen and of the Rose,
The Mystery of the Body, and how great is the rejoicing with which the Chosen rejoice in the Myrtle,[2]
For as is the decaying of the Rose, so doth the body decay and fall off, so shall fall off the decaying body.
I am the Unknown One;[3]
The Signs are upon my Head,
Upon my Head are the Signs,
And I arise with them to the Place of Light.
The Discourses of the Life are victorious
And the man who comes hither is Victor!

This concluding formula is the great characteristic of Mandæan Gnosis—the magnificent conception of the

[1] In a passage of the Codex Nasaræus (Tractate xi., translated by Brandt in *Mand. Schriften*, p. 202) the Baptist prays to the Gnosis of Life: "Give me the revelation of the Mysteries of the King and the great Depth of Light, and of the Anvils of the Earth on which it rests, and the Anvils of the Waters whence comes the living Fire." This Mystery-Hymn may therefore refer to part of the revelation sought for by John after his Liberation.

[2] The evergreen, a symbol of immortality.

[3] *Nikra=Agnōstos*, the Unknown, or Stranger, according to Nöldeke. The first lines of *The Book of John* run: "I am the Unknown One from the World of Light, Salvation is with me and Power and Healing and the Word." Cp. Zosimus (Ω, 12): "For Nikotheos *who is not to be found*, alone doth know these things"; and Codex Brucianus (p. 12, ed. Schmidt): "Nikotheos hath spoken of Him, and seen Him. . . He saith: The Father exists exalted above all the perfect." On the unknown 'hidden Nikotheos' see Mead's note in *Thrice-Greatest Hermes* (iii. 278).

Great Life as the Life of the human race, a Life constantly with us and round us, pervading all things, whose Nature is Light and Power and Peace.

The idea of the Gnosis of Life (the Christ-principle) may be compared with the personification of the Gospel by Basilides, and the Primal Revelation or Spirit of Prophecy of another of the earliest schools of the Christianised Gnosis; it must have been abroad in the minds of the people in the earliest centuries of the Christian era. There seems no reason to doubt that the echoes of Hymns such as this, and of many like it now lost and forgotten, may have been in the atmosphere in which Jesus himself was nurtured. In any case the composers of similar hymns were his seniors and forerunners, perhaps some of them may have been even his comrades.

The Gnosis of Life is we see a Revealer of Mysteries, of the Great Mysteries of the Light. This is the Primæval Revelation (*Uroffenbarung*), or, as Brandt calls it, *Urevangelium*, the Gospel that was from the beginning, the revelation of a Light that has been shining in the world for all time. It shone, it shines and it will shine. But the great Light-Messengers come and go among men and their one joy is to lead souls to that state of purity whence their eyes shall behold the Place of Light; so that after death their souls shall be led safely over the streaming Ocean of Generation and robed in Glory and clad in Vestures of Light.

One great teacher after another enters, as it were, the Heart of this Living Light, and makes the Great Life within it speak to us in the tongue of some human speech, with the same searching wisdom and the same austere ideals.

In due order the radiant Raiment of Life was given to Adam the first prophet, to Ham, to Shem, to Simat Hajjē (the Living One), to Enoch,[1] and to Jahjā Jōhannā, and these Light-Messengers place men in the streaming rays of the Light of the Gnosis, so that they may in their turn be clad in the Light.

When the Messengers are many and the souls are strong and not "blinded by adultery and evil ways" there is, it would seem, a great focussing of the Light, a descent of the Gnosis of Life Himself; a message, the coming of which is rather that of a great movement than of a new religion, making an epoch of illuminating teaching, a shining wave of progressive thought.

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[1] Cp. Migne, *Dictionnaire des Apocryphes*, tom. ii. coll. 1102, 1150, where there is a somewhat similar Rabbinical legend of the 'coats of skin' of Adam and Eve, in the *Yaschar* or *Sepher Haiyaschar* (*The Book of the Just* (more commonly known as *The Book of the Generations of Adam* or *The Book of the History of Man*), translated into French by the Chevalier P. L. B. Drach.

IDEALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURE.

E. DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

IT is a very deep-seated, and perhaps the main, defect of modern researches into Nature that . . . they still stick obstinately to the mechanical laws, although they thus conflict with the testimony of unbiassed perception and foreclose the gate to adequate knowledge of Nature.

HEGEL, 'Doctrine of the Notion,' *Logic* (Wallace's Transl.), p. 291.

THE problem of Nature, that of the concrete outward objective world which looms with such glorious wealth of detail on sense, is not to be identified with the quite minor problem of 'Matter.' Matter (like 'Force') does not present any difficulty at all. We know all about it, for the very good reason that we have invented it. Paradoxical as the statement may appear, it is strictly accurate. 'Matter' is a creation of our conceiving; a mere way of thinking about sensible objects; a mental substitute for concrete but unmanageably complex facts. Extension and inertia are the sole attributes which are attended to in forming the concept. This latter, treated as a *working-instrument*, proves extremely *useful* to those who have to discuss Nature in an abstract mathematico-mechanical way. But it does not stand for anything which exists absolutely or in its own right. It is fortunate for us folk that it does not. Were Matter

an absolute existence, materialism or, at best, dualism (that refuge of the philosophically destitute), would furnish the most plausible theories as to the character of reality.

I note that Mr. Kingsland,[1] who approaches the subject from the side of science, urges that "nothing is more common or obvious" in our experience than the existence of Matter. Strictly speaking, however, Matter exists only as a concept; a point which even authorities on physical science have now begun to realise. Thus Mach observes frankly that "*purely mechanical phenomena do not exist* . . . are *abstractions*, made either intentionally or from necessity, for facilitating our comprehension of things"; and Whetham also takes care to warn us that, in discussing Matter, he is only inquiring into "phenomena which are associated with mass," leaving the ultimate problem suggested to metaphysics. Truth to tell, the character of Matter, even when treated only as a conception, is so unobvious, that the majority of persons are unable to tell us exactly what they mean by it. And nobody can tell us where to locate Matter in Nature. Nobody has ever *perceived* or ever will perceive Matter. Nature is not a notional existence consisting just of 'resisting-extensions' moving or at rest. If you point to natural objects, you indicate at once appearances (phenomena) which are *indefinitely richer* than the abstraction of the writer on mechanics—appearances which include not merely the so-called 'primary' qualities, but the vast multiplicity of secondary qualities (colours, sounds, etc.) as well. Nay, the only concrete Nature which you and I ever confront is one which is saturated with our emotional interests also. We can *attend*, if you

[1] 'What is Matter?'—see No. 1, pp. 76-89, of this volume.

like, chiefly to the 'primary' qualities and ignore the others—and this procedure is eminently useful for economical calculating and predicting—but the main consideration is that Nature is never *given* to perception in a mechanical form. The mechanical way of thinking is merely our *device*—a mode of regarding reality which is utterly inadequate to sensible experience and, to this extent, radically artificial and untrue.

The old view cherished by folk unversed in metaphysics (*i.e.* theory about the general nature of reality) was to the effect that mathematico-mechanical science holds up a mirror to Nature. We know now that these theories do not mirror, but just transform, our perceptions. Sensible experiences are stripped of their concreteness. They are replaced by representative fictions and the most arid conceptual substitutes. There are "substitutions of items between which ideal relations of kind, number, form, equality, etc., obtain for items between which no such relations obtain; coupled with declarations that the experienced form is false and the ideal form true, declarations which are justified by the appearance of new sensible experiences at just those times and places at which we logically infer that their ideal correlates ought to be" (James).[1] We are so accustomed to such transformation that we allow Nature to be treated just as though little save various sorts of movements happened therein. We listen gravely on being told of the "electro-magnetic radiations which *constitute* light," half believing that this useful jargon is glorious truth and the unfortunate 'light,' which we know in sentient experience, is somehow an unreal show! Thus potent are the verbal concept-substitutes to obscure the concrete sphere of

[1] *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii., p. 669.

fact. Of course 'radiations' in a medium, supposed to be *devoid of the secondary qualities*, remain radiations and are not 'light' at all. We accept this falsifying reconstruction of Nature because it works.[1] The simplifying is so convenient. But we have to guard against supposing that it represents complex Nature as it is. Mechanically formulated science is departmental in its outlook—sufficient for its uses are its ways of conceiving facts. In metaphysics, however, which seeks the *truth* about reality, mere working-notions, by help of which we are able to cipher out the future, count for little. We have to turn attention once more to the concrete experience which mechanically formulated science has left behind.

We have to get rid, then, of the Matter-world, or mythological scientists' Nature, for good. It is a conceptual scheme only—a realm of shades. Experience knows nothing of Matter save as an intellectual invention or instrument which is lodged in people's heads.

The problem, then, before Idealism[2] is not that of the abstraction 'Matter,' but that of the concrete *sensible object* as it confronts us in complex Nature, the show which is presented to workaday perception rich with anything and everything which the plain man feels in the course of his sensational life.

Consider the concrete complex appearance called 'this' Mountain. What does the idealist say about it? Well, there are many sorts of idealist. Idealism contends that all reality, including of course Nature, is

[1] I have shown elsewhere why people came originally to attribute to the 'primary qualities' that importance on which the mechanical reconstruction of Nature is based. (*The Individual and Reality*, p. 94, 'The Physicist and Chemist before the Mountain.')

[2] Of course, Idealism, like all other theories of reality, has a great many other important inquiries to prosecute besides this.

of one tissue with the content of our own experience. Sentient experience samples the stuff which the universe is made of. But, though the different idealist schools agree on this important count, they differ exceedingly in explaining how this 'experience' is constituted and what it serves to attest. The nihilist, the Berkeleyan, the disciples of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and the rest launch widely differing theories of reality on a distracted world. To describe and criticise such theories would involve a bulky history. The subject, in truth, is too enormous to admit of more than bare allusions here.

What can be done, however, is this: We can note what some of these idealists say about the Mountain, just seeking to discover *what kind of standing* they give it. The nihilist says that the Mountain and its supposed knower are alike unreal appearance—there is a series of 'states' of consciousness showing in a metaphysical void, and these 'states' come and go inexplicably, and are and mean nothing. Such a theory had its day among some of the old Buddhists. Berkeley avers that the Mountain is an 'idea' in my 'mind,' but he supposes, withal, a Divine Being from whom the 'idea,' in last resort, proceeds. Intolerable difficulties invest this view. It suffices here to describe it as psychological idealism—it makes the perceived object a possession of a fictitious subjective-entity, the abstract inward 'mind.' Kant shattered this theory when he urged that 'mind,' which is only a name for Inward Experience, pre-supposes Outward Experience—the inward and the outward resting on the same evidence, the consciousness of them. The 'empirical self,' 'mind' or personality, as we are now able to show, is the result of a growth, and is not present when the

individual life-history opens. Hume is not consistent regarding the standing to be assigned to the Mountain —he rightly rejects the entity 'Mind,' but he 'loosens' experience overmuch and verges, indeed, on nihilism at times—at others he talks like a materialist or even a Berkeleyan. His is entirely a provisional, sceptical or difficulty-raising attitude. Reid asserts against psychological idealism a real objective order, the *esse* of which is not dependent on its being known by me. The Mountain is not 'my' perception—it exists whether I happen to perceive it or not. But Reid is a crude thinker, and when he comes to discuss what the Mountain is, apart from his consciousness of it, he comes to grief. Kant urges that the Mountain, with all its sensible show, time and space determinations, etc., is just presentation—not, indeed, 'my' possession, but an aspect of the sensible *experience*, along with which my 'empirical self' arises in time.[1] Although he inclines to subjective idealism — the Mountain not existing outside the centre of experience in which he, also, abides — he posits, withal (in conflict with his own Category doctrine), the existence of sensigenous occult 'things-in-themselves,' to which the uprising of sense-data is due. Schopenhauer accepts this subjective idealism—in his own way. For him, as for Kant, the Mountain is merely presentation in conscious experience; space and time being merely forms in which sentients are aware of sense-content. Still, as I have shown elsewhere, Schopenhauer in the actual exposition of his system oscillates between subjective and objective idealism—as initiated by Schelling. This is

[1] I cannot, of course, deal with the Category complication here, but have done so, I believe, with sufficient fulness, in *The Individual and Reality*. I must confine myself here to giving bare indications as to how folk regard the general standing of the external object.

not surprising, as subjective idealism is, in truth, extremely difficult to work. Nay, the satisfactory re-thinking of experienced Nature on such lines seems impracticable.

Fichte, of course, abolishes the Kantian 'things-in-themselves.' He regards the Mountain not as an 'idea' of the individual 'mind' (the fictitious entity), but as determination of that 'I-as-universal,' or Witness-Subject, of which all individuals are the manifestation, and for which all their inner and outward experiences alike are objects. Here we have posited a 'timeless universal self,' of the type favoured by the Hindu Vedāntists, as the seat of the objective world. Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* is splendid reading. Having no space in which to examine the hypothesis of a 'timeless universal subject' (a most risky and disputable assumption), I must content myself with the remark that Fichte does not get clear of subjective idealism. *His system does not give Nature a sufficiently free swing.* Schelling's does, for here we have Nature viewed as a becoming which precedes the origin of the empirical individual in time; Nature being itself psychical in character throughout and showing this character plainly when it passes, in connection with organisms, into conscious life. His *Nature-philosophy*, conceived on the lines of objective idealism, allows for a time and space order amid which our conscious histories begin. It is important to observe that objective idealism has room for the complete assimilation of all modern inquiries into the 'inwardness' of natural happenings, great and small. I have endeavoured elsewhere to show at length in what manner the *empirical facts* (as opposed to mere working-notions and scaffolding hypotheses)

of science bearing on these happenings can be taken up.[1]

We pass to Hegel. He is no subjective idealist, of course—the Mountain is an appearance, not however only to us, but in itself. Hegel's One Reality is the *Absolute Idea* which, itself above time, includes in its logical thought-unity and harmony both Nature and the history of conscious spirit. The purpose of the universe is both eternally accomplished and yet, from our partial point of view, always accomplishing itself. Hegel's is assuredly the greatest, and indeed the only tolerable, attempt ever made to exhibit reality as a system of rational thought. You may not like the Dialectical Method, but if you must have a rational universe with the Concept as *prius*, you require also a *dynamic* of thought, and the Hegelian Dialectic furnishes the only dynamic of the kind with which philosophical history acquaints us.

I must avow my preference for the hypothesis of an Alogical Ground, having yet to discover an argument for the 'timeless' universal 'Subject,' 'Self,' or even 'Absolute Idea,' which will resist attack. But this is too large an issue to discuss now.

The Absolute Idea is interpreted by the right wing Hegelians and Neo-Hegelians as *Experience*, as God; consequently many who desire to find a 'Divine Principle' expressed in reality rally to this standard. Even F. H. Bradley, the ablest of modern absolutist idealists, finds the One Reality in Experience, complete, perfect, and finished—the time-show being 'self-contradictory' and hence, in his opinion, not ultimately real. (This Absolutism recalls the cruder, but still like, stand-

[1] *Individual and Reality*, Chap. III., Part II., 'Appearances and the External World.'

point of Shaṅkara and the Advaita Vedāntists with their universal changeless Witness-Subject and the merely 'practically real' world in time.)

On the other hand, some of the left wing Hegelians have moved in the direction of denying that Experience—a *conscious* whole or harmony of reality—is first, either from a logical or temporal point of view. The drift is to recognition of a Ground which *becomes* conscious, to wit in the multiplicity of individuals which arise out of Nature in time. This way lies idealistic atheism.

Other forms of idealistic atheism are represented by Schelling's doctrine of the 'Immemorial Being,' enounced during his later campaign against formalism, by the 'Will' of Schopenhauer, by the 'Unconscious' of von Hartmann, by the Universal Subject of Belfort Bax, and by my own theory of the Primeval Ground. The inclusion of finite superhuman powers in one of these systems would in no way remove the basic atheism. Save in Schopenhauer's case, an avowed objective idealism, in respect of the general standing assigned to Nature, is maintained throughout.

One of the great riddles which these idealists have to face is that of Time.

Idealism, of course, has a lot more to do than merely discuss Nature. And even in respect of Nature when we say that things, *both on the surface and in the inmost shrine,* are psychical in character, we have merely begun to investigate. Hegel would have told us "This goes without saying—proceed now to articulate this view of Nature more definitely." Needless almost to add that no vague 'mind-stuff' theory, such as Clifford's, will serve our turn. 'Mind-stuff,' which exists in 'pieces,' and can be 'aggregated' like so many grains

of shot, is too mechanically conceived, in fact quite too crudely British. Mind-stuff's passage from sheer discontinuity into continuity is simply the mechanico-atomic notion — 'mentalised' — once more. Nature assuredly is both continuous and discrete; is a complex to which the so-called 'axiom' of Contradiction (which I have attacked elsewhere) does not apply. A congeries of loose bits of 'mind-stuff' explains nothing.

The metaphysics of Nature requires a very ample treatment. I will suggest here only some particularly interesting inquiries to which attention ought to be directed. Of course, a lot of valuable work has been done by the German idealists and others, but the main burden of interpretation has still to be borne. Specially attractive investigations are these: (1) An adequate rethinking of the *facts* of chemistry and physics (observe 'facts' as opposed to mere working-notions and scaffolding-theory) is called for. (2) Having accepted a very 'rich' Nature, aglow with the 'secondary' qualities, stirred by a nascent sentiency perchance, we require to determine more precisely how far the *multiple* 'shadow-Natures' which we know individually, correspond to that *common* enveloping order wherein we live. (3) Admitting, as we appear forced to do, what I have called grades of 'minor centres' of psychical activity in Nature, in what entirely satisfactory way are we to conceive these to *interact?*[1] Prof. James considers, and rightly, that a most difficult and vitally important issue is presented here. (4) Are time and space, cosmically speaking, novelties? Were they evolved from antecedents in which they had no pre-existence even 'in germ'? I opine that they are novelties, and suggest how they may have arisen, but

[1] Cf. *Individual and Reality*, p. 141.

await more light.[1] (5) What is the precise relation—if any—of the conscious individual to the *already psychical* natural body allied with which he appears in time? (6) Nature on the lines of objective idealism is, of course, alive. But merely to be alive is not to possess the characteristics of 'perceiving,' 'willing,' 'ideating,' etc., which we associate with the mention of conscious individuals. We cannot suppose that Nature works towards what are called 'ends.' Still it is possible or rather probable in respect of our corner of Nature, that 'ends', which imply *conscious* superhuman activities, are being realised. The detection of the indications of such design offers scope for work of an extraordinary interest. (7) Do you hold to the belief that something akin to what Hegel called 'Reason' or the Logical obtains in Nature? or do you accept frankly, as do some, the derivation of present reality from an original 'Absolute Chance'; a Heracleitan struggle determining all that leaven of seeming 'reasonableness' in things as we now know them? Here is a parting of the ways indeed! If you cannot accept the theory of an 'Absolute Chance' and champion the primacy of something akin to cosmic 'Reason,' have a care to understand clearly *what* you are championing, and strive also to show, as well as may be, *where* it works. Assertions of a vague character anent the 'rational' constitution of things are no longer of much account in serious philosophy.

Peradventure, however, you will avoid having recourse either to 'Reason' or 'Absolute Chance' and will find it sufficient to posit a 'germinal system,' alogical but at no stage wholly chaotic, such as I have discussed elsewhere.

E. DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

[1] *Ibid.* pp. 274-76.

RELIGION IN THE FAR EAST, OR SALVATION BY FAITH: A STUDY IN JAPANESE BUDDHISM.

REV. J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, M.A., D.D.

I.

EVERY student of Buddhism is aware that the term covers a great variety of religions. No great faith, starting from a single founder, has embraced within it such singular contradictions. Without any fixed creed, it nevertheless possessed a missionary energy which carried it from the Ganges valley till it was planted all through Eastern Asia, and passed from Korea into Japan more than a generation before Augustine set up the cross at Canterbury. No central authority directed its development, or claimed any control over its sects. It imposed no dogmas; it possessed no uniform standards of belief; its sacred books varied from land to land. The common basis of Christian worship, the Bible, the Lord's prayer, the admission of the believer into the Church by baptism, the supper of remembrance and thanksgiving,—these elements of faith and rite which have secured some kind of unity and cohesion in Christendom, were lacking to the Buddhist. He might, in conformity with the teachings of Gotama, repudiate the conception of a 'self,' declare that the whole world was in perpetual flux, and reject all those ideas of permanence which

the Western mind expresses by the terms 'substance' and 'spirit'; or he might affirm the existence of an 'Absolute,' the abiding ground of all knowledge, the source of being, the goal of endeavour, and the everlasting centre of peace. In the early days the Founder was described as having passed away with that kind of departure which left not a trace behind. He might be commemorated with pious affection in pilgrimage and festival; he was represented among his disciples only by the teaching and the discipline which he had bequeathed to them. "Be your own lamps," he urged, "be your own refuge. Live with the Teaching as your lamp and refuge, seek no other."[1] A later school, however, reversed the fundamental psychologic basis, converted an empirical idealism into a transcendental, and interpreted the person of Gotama as a manifestation of the Eternal, the Self-born, the Father of all creatures, the Healer of their sicknesses and sins, calling all men into ever-blessed union with himself.

What was the common term between these two schemes? How could they find shelter under the same name? The answer must be sought in a similar view of life, and a similar impulse based upon it. All forms of Buddhism, like all the Indian philosophies which have survived from the bewildering struggle of early speculation, are founded on the doctrine of the succession of existences, the continuous sequence of birth, death, and rebirth, under the supreme law of the Deed and its issues. The principle of Karma is of universal application, and supplies the basis upon which every type of Buddhism works out its end. And that end is also universal, it is the deliverance of all beings who are entangled in this mighty web from the

[1] *Dīgha Nikāya*, xvi. 2, 26.

suffering attendant on the perpetual vicissitudes of origin, decay, and dissolution. The teaching of Gotama offered a way of escape. It rested upon the conviction that suffering sprang from ignorance and sin. Let the Teacher only lift off these veils from darkened eyes, and let in the light of truth whether on earth below or in the heavens above,—and deliverance was sure. Primitive Buddhism accordingly started as a method of rescue by an elaborate system of ethical culture; and its Founder succeeded in imparting to his followers the passionate missionary impulse which he was able himself to maintain with unexampled energy through a long life of itinerant preaching. This purpose of release from the entanglements born of evil desire expressed itself in innumerable ways. It dominated the mind of the Master as he created an Order of men and women who withdrew themselves from the contamination of the world. It took possession of the hearts of the brethren as they responded to the Teacher's call. It shaped the ideal biography of the Buddha as imaginative piety retraced his career through the ages during which he had prepared himself for his great task. It carried the disciple from land to land, over the snows of the Himālaya, through the deserts of central Asia, amid labours and dangers, hunger and nakedness and sword, "moved by the desire to convert the world." It brought into view a series of Buddhas in other spheres engaged in the ever-fresh task of winning the sinner to righteousness, by ever-fresh manifestations of the infinite compassion. And it created the beautiful figure of the Bodhisattva or Buddha-to-be, which became the new object of Buddhist aspiration. The goal of saintship was no longer the individual holiness which had satisfied the first disciples; it

required the believer to take his share in the great warfare, and enroll himself in the ranks of those who were banded together for the world's redemption. Gigantic new prospects were thus opened out. The universe expanded with boundless grandiosity both in space and time. The spheres were filled with immense hierarchies of heavenly powers. A multitude of fresh forms, emerging one knows not whence, became the objects of new devotion and the authors and givers of fresh life. Such in particular was the Bodhisattva Avalokiteçvara, 'the Lord who looked down from above,' who made the famous vow not to enter into final peace till every being in the whole range of sentient existence, from the topmost heaven through the meanest of earth's creatures to the lowest hell, was secure of deliverance. And such was Amitābha, the radiant personality of the Buddha of Boundless Light, who bore another name as Amitāyus, the Buddha of Boundless Life; for light, truth, and life can never long be dissociated in the conceptions by which our human thought seeks to express its trust in the ultimate nature of the Power encompassing and pervading the world and man.

Early in our era this gracious figure appears in Buddhist theology. His wondrous 'Prayer,'[1] and the Western Paradise to which the believer was admitted after death by faith in him, are the theme of glowing description in a Sanskrit book bearing the name of the *Sukhāvatī-vyūha*. Its author is unknown, and its date is uncertain. It plainly belongs to the general type of Buddhist doctrine presented in the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka*, the 'Lotus of the True Law,'[2] where these two figures are already connected in the Land of Bliss in the shining West. It was translated into Chinese

[1] Or otherwise, 'Vow.' [2] *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxi.

about 150 A.D., and its popularity is indicated by the fact that no less than eleven more versions can be traced in the next five hundred years.[1] A smaller work of the same kind followed, which in its turn was reproduced in Chinese in 402.[2] The two books became the chief Scriptures of a special type of Buddhism, that of the Western Paradise, which acquired immense vogue in China and Mongolia, and retains considerable popularity at the present day. Further developments took place in Japan, where it begot forms of religious experience presenting the most interesting correspondences with well-known types of Christian belief.

Seated on a hill known as the Vulture's Peak, near Rājagaha, one of the favourite resorts of Gotama, Çākya Muni relates the early history of Amitābha. Many ages before he had been a mendicant named Dharmākara, who after long prayer and meditation attained the holiness of a Buddha-to-be. He might have entered at once into the joy of Nirvāṇa. But he looked back upon the world and saw his fellow-men lying in their ignorance and sin. He thought of the long and arduous journey by which he himself had climbed; he felt it impossible to lay this burden of obligation upon all; and he made a series of vows that unless he could discover some simpler way of salvation for others he would not accept the rest and peace which he had won. The eighteenth of these vows became the foundation of the whole doctrine, and is thus translated by Max Müller.[3]

O Bhagavat, if these beings who have directed their thought

[1] Bunyio Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka* (1883), p. 10.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[3] *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xlix., p. 15.

towards the highest perfect knowledge in other worlds, and who, having heard my name, when I have obtained the Bodhi (knowledge), have meditated on me with serene thoughts,—if, at the moment of death, after having approached them, surrounded by an assembly of bhikshus, I should not stand before them, worshipped by them (that is, so that their thoughts should not be troubled)—then may I not attain the highest perfect knowledge.[1]

This vow, with the long passion following it by which supreme enlightenment and holiness were finally achieved, was destined to become the central element of a new Buddhism; and it took the place in the worship of Amitābha which the Christian Evangelical assigns to the cross of Christ. Dharmākara gave himself by a protracted series of self-denials, austerities, labours, and penances, for the deliverance of the world, and at last became thereby the Buddha Amitābha. As the Lord of Infinite Light he founded a paradise which all might enter who had faith to believe what Amitābha had done for them, and to call with lowly trust upon his name. The disciple must meditate on him with serene thought; he must again and again dwell on him with reverence; he must direct his mind towards the Bodhi; he must make the stock of good works grow, and pray for rebirth in the Land of Bliss; and then as death drew nigh Amida also would approach with an escort of saints, and full of joy the believer would be borne away in their care to the Western heaven. A gorgeous apocalypse follows. From that land all evil is banished for ever. No hapless ghosts, no savage beasts, no cruel demons, haunt its lovely scenes. No mountains bar the way to intercourse by wastes of rock

[1] A shorter form will be found quoted from a modern Japanese statement in an article by Mr. James Troup, 'A Buddhist Sect which teaches Salvation by Faith.' *Hibbert Journal*, vol. iv., p. 283. To the translations of Mr. Troup and the Rev. A. Lloyd in the *Transactions* of the Asiatic Society of Japan and elsewhere, I must at the outset express my deep indebtedness.

and snow. It is a realm of fragrant flowers and luscious fruits, of sweet-voiced birds and jewelled trees. The soft-flowing rivers are full of perfume; the airs resound with heavenly music; no sin or misfortune can enter there; sickness and distress, accident and destruction, are unknown. The very food is consumed simply by desire. The dwellers in this paradise are not grasping or eager for gain. There is no idea of 'self or others.' No one requires property, and hence there is no inequality, and strife, dispute, and oppression are unknown. Full of equanimity the saints live in the enjoyment of benevolent, serene and tender thought. By the light of wisdom and purity of knowledge they shine more brightly than the sun. They are free alike from doubt and from self-confidence. With love unlimited they resemble the all-embracing sky. By patiently bearing the good and evil deeds of all beings, they are like the enduring earth. Without clinging to personal ends they are free as the wind. Devoid of envy, they do not hanker after the happiness of others. They dwell in the presence of Infinite Light. They have arrived at the goal, and 'enjoy God for ever.'

The devotion to Amitābha became exceedingly popular. But it was still attached to the older ethical disciplines by a demand for righteous conduct as well as pious affections. The doctrine of the Deed, with its conceptions of merit and requital, still kept its powerful hold on Buddhist thought. The author of the smaller Sūtra on the same theme, however, took a further step. Faith and prayer were indeed needful; but rebirth in the Land of Bliss was not the fruit of good works in this world. No one could earn admission to the Happy Land by so much merit. The joy of communion with the heavenly Light and Life depended

on true spiritual conditions. These belonged to another plane of thought and being, where time was no more an element, but only the right disposition of the heart. A few nights, seven—six—five—four—three—two—even one, of undistracted true and lowly thought, sent forth towards Amitāyus, and the Infinite Life with his host of the delivered would deign to escort the dying sinner to the Pure Land of the West. "In the great sea of the Law of Buddha," said the famous teacher Nāgārjuna (from Southern India, about 120 A.D.), "Faith is the only means to enter."[1] The path of salvation by one's own efforts was like a toilsome journey along difficult ways by land; the way of faith in the merits of another was as an easy voyage in a fair vessel with smooth waters; by trust in the Original Vow of Amida the believer would enter at once on the road of final perseverance.[2] This faith found expression in the utterance of adoring gratitude. "Let no voice cease," said the Sūtra, "but ten times complete the thought, and repeat *Namo'mitābhāya Buddhāya*, Adoration to Amitābha Buddha."[3] This practice was enforced by the teachers of a later day. The famous Chinese scholar, Zen-do (600-650 A.D.), wrote a commentary on the Sūtra which acquired extraordinary authority. Night after night, as he pored over the text, a mysterious being like a dignified elder appeared to him, and gave him instruction. Light issued from the volumes in the temple where they were deposited. His work seemed to its author sacred as the Buddha's own utterance; and like the seer of the Apocalypse he

[1] *Short History of the Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects*, tr. Bunyiu Nanjio; Tokyo, 1886, p. 113.

[2] 'The Shoshinge,' tr. Rev. A. Lloyd, *Shin-ran and his Work* (Tokyo, 1909), p. 51. *Amida* is the Japanese form of the Indian Amitābha.

[3] *Short History*, p. 106.

forbade anyone to add or take away one word. "Chiefly remember or repeat," said he, summing up the whole, "the name of Amitābha with a whole and undivided heart."[1] Even one such act in true faith would carry the believer after death into the presence of the Infinite Light.

Not yet, however, was the hour ripe for the full development of these pregnant hints. Half a century before Zendo was born, Buddhism was carried from Korea into Japan. Missionaries and scholars, physicians, artists, craftsmen, followed in its train. The new religion attained security through the patronage of Prince Shotoku, 'the holy virtuous,' who became the first saint of Japan. The constitution of seventeen Articles by which he consolidated the state out of the rivalries of opposing clans, laid it down that the harmony of all beings was based on faith in the Three Treasures, the Buddha, the Teaching, and the Order. He himself gave lectures on the Scriptures which are said to be still preserved in beautiful Chinese writing.[2] Temples and monasteries were established; schools and asylums, hospitals and dispensaries, were attached to them. Foundations of learning and charity gathered especially round the great institutions of Mount Hiei near Kyoto, where the principles of the 'Lotus' were expounded, and faith in the manifestation of the eternal Buddha was exhibited as the root of all virtue. Buddhism was thus launched on its remarkable career. It was soon strong enough to absorb the native usages of the old Way of the Gods. It gave letters and culture, arts and morals (largely tinctured with Confucian ethics) to a nation capable of

[1] *Short History*, p. 108.

[2] Prof. Anesaki, *Religious History of Japan* (Tokyo, 1907), p. 12.

responding with alacrity to a stimulus from without. It planted deep in the Japanese mind the doctrine of the Deed, and placed the whole of life under the sovereignty of righteous Law. It created a splendid worship with ritual and litanies of prayer and praise. It spread through the teachings of the 'Lotus' a vein of religious mysticism, a belief in the spiritual communion of all beings, and a peculiar sympathy between man and nature, which profoundly influenced the art, the poetry, the romantic literature of the early Middle Ages, and prepared the way for the astonishing activity of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. While Europe was astir with the Crusades, and the introduction of Aristotelian thought was quickening her ablest minds, while Bernard and Francis and Dominic were awakening new activities in Latin Christendom, Japan also experienced a great religious revival, and the founders of four of her great Buddhist denominations lived and taught. It was at the hands of two of these, Honen and Shinran, that the doctrine of 'Salvation by Faith' received its most remarkable developments.

Honen (known also as Gen-ku), the founder of the Jodo Shu, the sect of the Pure Land, was born in 1133. He was the only son of a military chief who died of a wound inflicted by an adversary. Before his departure the officer had strength enough to enjoin his little son never to seek revenge upon this enemy; he bade him become a virtuous monk for the sake of the spiritual enlightenment both of his father and his father's foe. It was an impressive testimony to the elevation of Buddhist morality, and to the belief that between the living and the dead there might be constant relations of helpfulness. So at nine years old the boy was placed under the care of a

Buddhist monk, and in due time he proceeded to one of the great monasteries on Mt. Hiei. There at the fitting age he took the vows and received the tonsure, and devoted himself to a life of sacred study. In long periods of retreat in a hut in the Black Ravine he five times read through the 5,000 volumes of the Chinese Canon. After the eighth perusal of the Commentary of Zendo on the discourse of the Western Paradise, he was specially struck with the injunction to repeat the name of Amitābha 'with whole and undivided heart'; and in 1175 he reached the final conviction that faith in Amida was the true way of salvation. His former learning, his practices of devotion, were abandoned. He gave himself in adoring gratitude to Amida, and with tireless enthusiasm repeated the holy name as much as sixty thousand times a day. A lofty piety prevented this from degenerating into an odious form of lip-service. The foundations of his religion were the conviction of human sinfulness, and the belief in an all-merciful Deliverer. "Perfect bliss," he taught in his Catechism in Twelve Articles,[1] "Amida would not have, till he knew that all who should invoke him might be saved. This is his Primal Vow. . . Whoever calls earnestly upon his name will enter that realm of purity. There shall be no distinction, no regard to male or female, good or bad, exalted or lowly. None shall fail to have pure life after having called with complete desire on Amida. Just as a great stone, if on a ship, may complete a voyage of myriads of miles over the waters, and yet not sink, so we, though our sins are heavy as giant boulders, are borne to the other shore by Amida's Primal Vow, not sinking in the sea

[1] Anesaki, *Transactions of the Third Congress for the History of Religions*, Oxford, 1908, vol. i., p. 124.

of birth and death." His life attracted large numbers of disciples. Three emperors became his pupils, and men and women of various classes, independent of the scholasticism and technicalities of the sects, were among his hearers and correspondents. Contemporary piety quickly decorated his career. His followers told of his visions of Amida and the saints, or of Zendo, the great teacher. They pictured him preaching—like another St. Francis—to the birds and the serpents. They related how his person was transfigured, and a miraculous light filled his dwelling.[1] The orthodoxy of Hiei grew jealous of his repute, and had influence enough to procure Honen's banishment in 1207. A change of government four years later led to his recall. It was almost too late. The next year he died, praising his Deliverer with his last breath.

The movement of Honen led to the formation of the Jodo Shu, the special denomination or sect of the Pure Land. Its critics, however, observed that it did not completely carry out the principle of 'Salvation by Faith.' Its doctrines of the value of good works, of the ripening of merit, and the duty of repeating the sacred Name, all involved an element of *Ji-riki*, or 'Self-exertion.' They implied some kind of action on the believer's part. They were consequently no better than 'temporary expedients.' True devotion required the surrender of all reliance on personal endeavour. The believer must put his trust in Amida alone. The only sound principle is faith in *Ta-riki*, the 'exertion of another'; stay yourself with your whole heart on the Original Vow. This step was taken by Honen's disciple, Shinran, whose work will be described in the sequel of this article. J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

[1] The first biography was written five years after his death. A second was compiled eighty years later by imperial orders.

THE SPIRIT-BODY: AN EXCURSION INTO ALEXANDRIAN PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGY.

G. R. S. MEAD, B.A.

In this paper I propose to consider briefly, and in its inferior aspect only, the theory of the subtle body of the soul, as set forth by the philosophers of the later Platonic school, and their more immediate predecessors and followers. Many will doubtless think that such opinions deserve no consideration at all in these days of scientific enlightenment, and that they were better left to well-merited oblivion; but though it is true that the physical science of those far-off days is now entirely superseded, I venture to think that perhaps some of the notions of these old thinkers with regard to this subtle soul-vehicle, may be still not entirely without interest to those who are either specially engaged in psychical research or generally familiar with psychic and psycho-physical phenomena; for, indeed, some of the modern theories put forward to account for certain classes of such phenomena favour a somewhat similar hypothesis.

As this paper, moreover, must be kept within strict limits of space, any attempt to speculate on origins, or to try to trace the history of the evolution of the notion even on Hellenic ground, much less to treat of similar ideas in Egypt and Babylon, Persia and India,

Judaism and early Christianity, must be rigorously excluded. Let us pay unto Cæsar the things that be Cæsar's, and cheerfully sacrifice to the godlets of anthropology and primitive culture by admitting that in the beginnings the soul was apparently believed to be air, and air breath, and breath spirit, and spirit and soul one—just simply air, and pass on to those who thought far otherwise, laying it down as a fundamental dogma that the human soul was intelligible immaterial essence, and not body or a body or element of any kind.

The loftier side of the subject must also be reserved for subsequent treatment, when an attempt will be made to say something about the subtle vehicle of the soul in its purity, the celestial or luciform body, or body of light, the *augoeides* or *astroeides*, as it was called by our philosophers; here we have to deal solely with this vehicle in its obscurer or impurer state, with its inferior relationships, that is its connections with the animal soul on the one hand and with the body of flesh on the other.

A warning may first of all be given as to terms; for we must try to distinguish between living ideas and dead vocables, otherwise we shall be incontinently among the tombs with an amazing 'derangement of epitaphs' to mock us in the obscurity. The most general term used by these writers for the subtle soul-vehicle in its inferior aspect is spirit (*pneûma*) or spiritual body (*sôma pneumatikón*). But as Paul and others use these terms in a more exalted sense, it may perhaps avoid some confusion if in this article we speak of the spirituous body or spirit-body. The more attractive view, to me at least, seems to have been that, no matter what changes it might undergo, the subtle vehicle was *fundamentally* one; but this side of the

question need not be discussed in the present paper. Already in such early Christian circles as were more closely in touch with Hellenic ideas, the confusion between the higher and lower spirit, or the higher and lower aspects of the spirit, were clearly felt, and in the *Pistis Sophia*, for instance, we find a strong distinction drawn between the pure spirit and the 'counterfeit spirit,' the latter being apparently identical with the 'parasitic' or 'appended soul' of Basilides and his son Isidor. So also with the *astroeides*, the star-like or sidereal body; this must not be identified with the now popular term 'astral body,' for the latter bears a closer resemblance to the spirituous body of the Platonists than to their *augoeides*.

Again the spirit-body was often called the aëry or ethereal body; but as a distinction was usually drawn between the lower air (*aēr*) and the upper air (*aithēr*), ethereal would better describe the celestial vehicle. Occasionally it was spoken of as 'nature,' that is the 'nature' of the physical body; and after death it was known as the image (*eidōlon, imago, simulacrum*), or shade (*skia, umbra*). Sometimes it was referred to as the subtle or light vehicle of the soul, to distinguish it from the gross, dense, solid or earthy body, which was often called the 'shell,' or shell-like body or surround, in reminiscence of the famous phrase of Plato in the *Phædrus* (250c.): "We are imprisoned in the body like an oyster in its shell." Here again confusion may arise for the unwary, for the 'image' has of late been sometimes called the 'shell.'

It must, however, be always clearly understood that for our philosophers, the spirit is body and not soul; by body, however, is not meant developed and organised form, but rather 'plasm' that may be graded,

or as it were woven into various textures, but is in itself unshaped, although capable of receiving the impression of any form. The soul, on the contrary, is thought of as immaterial essence (though apparently it is held by Plotinus in some unexplained way to be capable of extension); it is classified according to its manifestations in body, but is not itself body. The most general classification is threefold: (1) vegetative, as in plants and in the solid bodies of animals and men; (2) irrational, as in the spirituous bodies of animals and men; and (3) rational, in man only. Man has thus, when incarnate, not three souls, but three grades of soul or life—namely, vegetative, irrational and rational.

Let us now turn to our documents, and first of all to the literature handed down under the honorific title Thrice-greatest Hermes. The Trismegistic tractates, though deeply tinged with Platonism, can hardly in strictness be called Later Platonic, for the larger portion of them may safely be placed far earlier than Ammonius Saccas and Plotinus, in the third century, who for so long have been considered to be the founders of the Neoplatonic movement proper; the Trismegistic tradition, however, may be said to have been one of the more immediate predecessors of the Neoplatonic 'chain.'

In this literature we find the doctrine of the spirit already well developed, and that, too, both in its spiritual and spirituous aspects; it is the latter solely, however, with which we are here concerned. From one of the earliest tractates, 'The Sermon of Isis to Horus' (15; iii. 200[1]), we learn that spirit is, as it

[1] The second references are to my *Thrice-greatest Hermes* (London, 1906).

were, of the nature of a quintessence or single element. The "mixture" of the dense body "is a union and a blend of the four elements; and from this blend and union a certain 'vapour' rises, which is enveloped by the soul, but circulates within the body."[1] It is the medium between the soul and the solid body, and so is said to partake of the nature of both. Both the spirit and the body, it is to be noted, are *in* the soul, and not the soul *in* the spirit. Elsewhere, however, in 'The Key,'[2] the soul is spoken of as being vehicled in, or on, the spirit, but as the soul is said to use the spirit not *as* its envelope but only "as though it were" its envelope, there is no real contradiction. We are further told, in the same passage, that "spirit pervading [body] by means of veins and arteries and blood, bestows upon the living creature motion." The writer, however, insists that blood is not soul or life "as some think"; blood is the vehicle of spirit,[3] and it is spirit that conditions the "living creature." Thus in 'The Perfect Sermon,' vi. 3 (ii. 318), it is said that "spirit with which they [animal bodies] all are filled, being inter-blended with the rest [presumably the four elements], doth make them live." This is based on a general principle laid down in the same treatise, xvi. 3 (ii. 336), namely that all things in the cosmos are

[1] Cp. Ex. xv. 2 (iii. 66): "And from the union [lit. breathing-together] of these four is spirit born."

[2] C. H. x. (xi.) 13, 17 (ii. 149, 152).

[3] Cp. *Vita Homeri* (p. 341): "For Homer knew that blood was the food and aliment of spirit." Diogenes Laërtius, therefore, seems to be confusing terms when (viii. 31, p. 518) he attributes to Pythagoras the opinion "that the *soul* is nourished by blood." It is true that Porphyry also says (*De Ant. Nymph.* p. 257, ed. Nauck) that "souls in generation delight in blood and moist seed," adding that "by means of blood and out of the hematic fluids is the procreation of flesh"; but delight is not nourishment. As Goethe said, "blood is a quite peculiar fluid," and it is worth noting in this connection that the bond of blood-relationship plays the chief *rôle* both in primitive ancestor-worship and also in most modern 'spirit communications.'

"made quick" by spirit, and that this spirit is as it were an "engine" or "machine," subject to the will of God—and therefore in man, to man's will. Moreover this same spirit is the common sensory. Thus in Ex. xix. 3 (ii. 81f.): "The sensible—the spirit—is that which doth discern appearances. It is distributed into the various sense-organs." A portion of it becomes "spirituous sight," or "spirit by means of which we see," and so for the rest of the senses. If this spirit, in the case of man, "is led upwards by the understanding," then it discerns sensibles, *i.e.* apparently what are called objective realities; "but if it is not, it only maketh pictures for itself," that is, is given over to phantasy or imagination (*phantasia*, or *to phantastikón*). We learn, however, from the myth of the imprisonment of the souls into fleshly bodies as a punishment, that they lose their direct vision and their sense becomes dim; they can no longer see heaven and their starry brethren in their true forms; they complain that their bodies are now "watery spheres," and their organs of vision "windows not eyes" (K. K. 21; iii. 109).

All of this may be taken to reflect the dogmas of mystical Alexandrian psychology or psycho-physiology, tinged with Egyptian and perhaps Persian, that is Chaldæo-Magian, notions. The Later Platonic school proper, however, boasted that it continued the direct tradition of Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato; but what we may call revived or Pythagorean Orphism spells already for the latest scholarship a decided 'Oriental,' that is Babylonian-Persian, influence; and this Orphism strongly influenced Plato also in his myths. Omitting early and late Orphism, however, is there anything from the middle period that may help us in our present enquiry? If the graphic vision of the after-death state,

handed on or redacted by Plutarch at the end of the first century, in his treatise *On the Delay of Divine Justice*,[1] and thought by some to underlie the general idea of Dante's *inferno* and perhaps *purgatorio*, can be held to be based on the doctrines of Orphic mystagogy, we have something to our purpose; in any case the eclectic Plutarch, though difficult to label, has been classed by some as a Platonist or even as a Neoplatonist.

Though the word 'spirit' is nowhere mentioned, the idea is there; for the deceased are said to be surrounded with a "flame-like bubble" or envelope. These surrounds are described according to their purity or impurity as follows: "Some were like the purest full-moon light, emitting one smooth, continuous and even colour. Others again were quite mottled—extraordinary sights—dappled with livid spots like adders; and others had faint scratches" (xxii., p. 564D). The discolorations and the passions that give rise to them are described, and it is explained that "it is in earth-life that the vice of the soul (being acted upon by the passions and reacting upon the [? spirit-] body) produces these discolorations; while the purifications and corrections here [*sci.* in the after-death state] have for their object the removal of these blemishes, so that the soul [the spirit, rather] may become entirely ray-like (*augoeides*) and of uniform colour" (p. 565C).

We will now turn to the opinions of the Later Platonists proper, and especially to the views of Plotinus, and of his disciple, editor and assiduous commentator, Porphyry, who are generally held to be the most sober philosophers of the school; and yet,

[1] *De Sera Numinis Vindicta;* for a translation and commentary see 'The Vision of Aridæus' in my *Echoes from the Gnosis*, vol. iii. (London, 1907).

strangely enough, neither of them was a Greek, for Plotinus was an Egyptian and Porphyry a Syrian. Though the school technically ends with Damascius (also a Syrian), the last occupant of the *kathedra*, who retired to the court of the Persian King Chosroës, when the Christian Emperor Justinian closed the Pagan schools of philosophy in 529, its influence still survived, and John Philoponus, the last of the Alexandrian philosophers, whom we shall bring into court later on, is saturated with its views. Philoponus flourished at Alexandria in the first half of the VIIth century, and is renowned for his learning and his elaborate commentaries on the works of Plato and Aristotle. In the now generally discredited story of the burning of the Alexandrian Library by Amru, the general of Omar, it is said that it was to Johannes the Laborious that the familiar question about the Korān and the contents of the world-famed library was put.[1]

Plotinus holds that all souls must be separable from bodies, with the sole exception of the universal soul from the universal body; for all bodies are in flux and perishable, except the one body of all which is eternal. What, then, in respect of souls, he asks (vi. 4, 16), is the meaning of the popular phrase 'going to Hadēs,' or 'being in Hadēs'? Let Hadēs be taken to mean the Invisible. It is not the soul that goes anywhere, for it itself is not moved, but is rather

[1] It was Dean Cudworth, in his *True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1st ed. 1678), who first in later years drew sympathetic attention to the theory of spirituous and celestial bodies according to these philosophers, and won the admiration of the learned world for his exposition. In 1733, however, J. L. Mosheim severely criticised Cudworth's estimate (see J. Harrison's translation of M.'s Latin notes, in the 1845 (London) edition of C.'s famous work, iii. 299 ff.). M. is never weary of inveighing against what he calls the "insane imaginings" of the "Junior Platonists," whom he stigmatises as "superstitious, trifling, credulous and fanatical" (p. 307, n.), chiefly because they worked what we now call primitive culture notions into their all-embracing system. But can any true philosophy of human experience omit what is so elemental and fundamental?

the cause of movement. But just as we say the soul is there, in that place where the body is, so when it is separated from the physical body, but has still attached to it the subtle image, it may be said to go to, or be in, what he calls the 'inferior place,' where the impure spirit is. Even in the case of a soul set free by philosophy from a separate body of any kind, and so abiding in purity in the intelligible state, the image still persists for a certain time in Hadēs. This is an ancient notion concerning the heroes Plotinus thinks (i. 1. 12), for Homer (*Od.* xi. 602-5) "appears to admit this doctrine in the case of Hercules, speaking of his image as being in Hadēs, while he himself is among the Gods." The image, or *eidōlon*, is intimately connected with the irrational soul, which is poetically said to be the shadow cast by the shining of the rational soul on the body (i. 1. 2); the irrational soul is also said to be the image of the rational plunged into the obscurity of sensible life (iv. 3. 27). Elsewhere (ii. 2. 2), speaking of a certain sphere-like or spherical element, Plotinus avers that whereas the movement of life is circular, as is most clearly seen in the heavenly bodies, the movement of our physical bodies is rectilinear. But there is also a circular or sphere-like body in us; it has, however, become terrestrial or obscure, and is no longer light as in the case of heavenly bodies. The nature of the movement of the spirit is probably of this kind; the spirit is the element that moves circle-wise in us. It is originally as it were an aëry or igneous body, the inner clothing or attachment of the soul before it descends into a terrestrial body (iv. 3. 9, 15).

This view of the meaning of 'going to Hadēs,' or 'being in Hadēs,' Porphyry also expounds in his *Sen-*

tentiæ.[1] Thus he tells us that in the same way as 'being on earth' is for the soul, not its moving about on earth, as physical bodies do, but having control of a body that moves about on earth, so also 'being in Hadēs' for the soul is when it has attached to it the management of an image or spirit which has its existence in space, or whose nature it is to be in a place. This image, in the case of the unpurified, is of a dark or cloudy nature. Accordingly if Hadēs is the 'underworld,' and therefore an obscure state of existence, the soul may be said to go there so long as it has such a darkened image attached to it. By 'being in Hadēs' is meant that the soul is in the state of its invisible and darkened nature (*physis*). It is owing to the propensity of the 'partial reason' of the soul towards such and such a body, owing to its habit, or its habitual relationship to a certain body on earth, that a certain form or type of phantasy is impressed upon the spirit after death, the spirit itself having no special form.[2] But what is the meaning of going 'beneath the earth,' to the subterrene or under-world?[3] Porphyry assumes that the impure spirit may be so heavy, or watery, as he calls it, that it can be said to go to the under-world; but he reiterates that the essence of the soul itself cannot be said to change place or be in a place, but only that it

[1] *Sent. ad Intelligibilia ducentes*, xxix.; p. 13 f. (ed. Mommert, Leipzig, 1907); P. is commenting on *En.* iv. 3. 9.

[2] Cp. Porph. *Comm. in Odyss.* p. 130, 31 (ed. Schrader): "For to souls, according to the poet [Homer], the images of their experiences above [? on earth] continue to appear as phantasms below as well"; *De Abstin.* p. 168, 7 (ed. Nauck): "The shapes which characterise this spirit are moulded in many forms"; *Ad Gaur.* v. 1: "Daimones make the forms of the phantasms appear on the aëry spirit, whether this spirit be their own or that of someone else." The daimones, it should be noted, may be good or bad; they are not necessarily bad like the demons of the Christians.

[3] It should be remembered that according to Orphic notions the subterrene was believed to be the state of Tartarus; the higher regions of Hadēs were supposed to extend from the earth-surface to the moon.

contracts the habits of bodies whose nature it is to change place and occupy space. For as is the disposition of the soul, so does it obtain a body conditioned in rank and properties. Just as the soul can be kept on earth only by means of the earthy shell, so can it be kept in Hadēs only by its attachment to the image or moist spirit. (According to ancient physics the downward elements are the earthy and moist, the moist being supposed to extend below the earth, and the upward the airy and fiery.) The soul has thus the humid or moist element attached to it as long as it wills to associate with, or has its attention fixed on, things in generation.

The idea that the moist principle was that which conditioned all genesis, generation, or birth-and-death, that it, so to say, constituted the ocean of animal life, the state of perpetual flux, or ever-becoming, was a general dogma of the school. Indeed, it seems to have been a leading notion of ancient mystic lore in general. Thus we find Porphyry elsewhere[1] explaining the Egyptian symbolism of the boats or barques of the 'daimones' as being intended to represent not solid bodies, but the vehicles in which they "sail on the moist"; this applied to all grades, from the soul of the sun-god to all souls that descend into genesis. And with regard to the latter Porphyry cites the *logoi* of Heraclitus: "For souls to become moist is delight or death," delight consisting in their falling into generation; and: "We live their [the souls'] death, and they live our death."[2]

[1] *De Ant. Nymph.* x.; where he cites as his authority Numenius, the Pythagoreo-Platonic philosopher and student of what we should now call comparative religion, who flourished in the middle of the IInd century.

[2] Cp. Diels (2nd ed., Berlin, 1906), fr. 77; cp. fr. 36: "For souls it is death to become water," and fr. 62: "Immortal mortals, mortal immortals, the one living the death and dying the life of the other."

Elsewhere in the same treatise[1] Porphyry tells us that, according to the Stoics, souls who love the body attract a moist spirit to them, and condense it like a cloud (for the moist being condensed in air constitutes a cloud); and that when the spirit in souls is condensed by a superabundance of the moist element, they become visible; of such are the apparitions of images of the deceased that are occasionally met with, the spirit being furthermore coloured and shaped by phantasy, that is the imagination.

The rest of the Neoplatonic philosophers held more or less the same general views on the nature of the spirit-body in its unpurified state. There was, however, a great difference of opinion as to whether or not the soul could be entirely separated from this body; some holding that it could, while others contended that it was only the impurities of it that could be cast off, as we shall see when we come to treat of what they called the luciform vehicle.

That there were many different views among the philosophical schools in general, not only on the more transcendental relationships of the soul, but also on the inferior connection between soul and body, may be seen from Philoponus (9, 35f.; 10, 4f.[2]), to whose instructive commentary on Aristotle's famous treatise *On the Soul* we may now turn. Philoponus was in an excellent position to review the whole ground; moreover he sought to reconcile Plato and Aristotle.

He contends (10, 4f.) that the true doctrine of these two great masters is (12, 15): that every soul is incorporal; that whereas the rational soul alone is

[1] *De Ant. Nymph.* xi., p. 64, ed. Nauck.

[2] The references are to *Philoponi in Aristotelis de Anima*, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin, 1897), *Comm. in Arist. Græc. Acad. Litt. Reg. Ber.* vol. xv. There is, unfortunately, no English translation.

separable from every body, and on this account is not subject to death, the irrational is separable from the physical body, but inseparable from the spirit, that is the spirituous body, which persists for a certain time after its departure from the solid body; as to the vegetative soul, it has its existence in the physical body only and perishes together with it. There is no spirit-body in plants (17, 8f.).

The irrational soul persists after death, having as its vehicle or substrate the spirituous body, which is composed of the four elements, but has in it a preponderance of air, just as the earthy body has a preponderance of earth (17, 20).[1] The spirit-body is the medium of existence in Hadēs, and also provides a basis for the phantasms of the deceased. As to the chastisements in Hadēs, they cannot really purify the soul; for the soul being self-moved must purify itself of its own free-will, and must, therefore, return to earth for this purpose. The chastisements are simply for the purpose of turning it to itself, causing it to repent, or wean itself from sympathy with the things of generation (17, 25—18, 25).

As to the inferior means of purification and the *rationale* of phantasms of the deceased, Philoponus has the following (19, 24 ff.):

"Now they say that the spirit-body also has somewhat of the vegetative life, for it also is nourished,—not however in the same way as this [solid body], but by means of vapours, not by parts [*i.e.* by separate organs], but the whole of it through the whole [as one organism], so to say, just like a sponge. And so those who are in earnest favour a lighter and drier diet, to prevent its

[1] This view seems to differ somewhat from that of the Trismegistic school (see p. 476 *supra*).

becoming dense. Moreover they say there are certain means of purification. As this [solid body] is cleansed with water, so is that [spirituous body] by purifications of vapours; for it is nourished with certain vapours and cleansed with others.[1] They say it is not provided with organs; but the whole of it, through the whole of it, is active as a sensory and lays hold of sensible objects. Wherefore also Aristotle says, in his *Metaphysics* [p. 455ᵃ, 20], that properly sense is one, and the true sensory one, by sensory meaning the spirit, in which the sense-power as a whole, through the whole [sensory], ays hold of the manifold objects of sense."

But if it have no organs, how can it be said to account for phantasms which have organs, and appear sometimes in the forms of men and sometimes in other animal forms? In the first place, when made dense with a heavy diet, it is readily "moulded into the shape of its surrounding body, just as happens with ice, which takes the shape of the vessels in which it is formed." But this does not account for its taking *different* forms. To this they say "it is probable that when the soul desires to manifest, it shapes itself [that is, the spirit-body], setting its own imagination in movement; or even that it is probable with the help of daimonic co-operation that it appears and again becomes invisible, being condensed and rarefied"—a theory that may not be without interest to modern spiritists and those familiar with the phenomena of 'materialising' séances.

It is, moreover, laid down as a general dogma that the power of sensation resides not in the physical body but in the spirit (161, 4). It is, for instance, not

[1] The same reason is given for the use of the famous Egyptian incense *kuphi* by Plutarch, *De I. et O.* lxxix. 2, where he speaks of its "fanning up [the fire] of the spirit connate with the body."

the ear, nor even the membrane or drum of the ear, that is the hearing sensory,[1] but the spirit (353, 32).

In brief, it is the spirit-body that is the unitary or common sense-organ (433, 34). This, Philoponus says, is the doctrine of both Aristotle and the Platonici.

Thus he tells us (438, 25) that according to Aristotle: "The first sensory in which is the sensing power is the spirit, the substrate of the irrational soul; for in this the sense has first of all its being. Eyes, ears and nostrils are sense-organs only, they do not come first; for the feeling soul is not in them, they are the means whereby sensible experience is referred to the spirit." And again (239, 3), according to Aristotle, "the powers of sensation are established in the spirit; for the whole, through the whole of it, both sees and hears and is active in the rest of the senses; and thus all the senses are in it, just as in plants are the vegetative powers.[2] . . . The spirit itself is not organised."

The Platonists also declare, he tells us (597, 23), that "the apprehension of sensibles does not at all take place through the [physical organs], inasmuch as both in us [*i.e.* in the case of men] the common sense, residing in a single spirit, perceives the objects of the five senses, and the irrational soul [in the case of animals] by means of a single spirit apprehends all sensibles."

And so in general Philoponus sums up the doctrine as follows (481, 19 ff.):

"The common sense, which in itself is incorporeal,

[1] Cp. 364, 15; and for the 'visual spirit,' 161, 25; 336, 17; 20, 33, 37; 337, 6, 14 ff. It should be remembered that ancient physiology was totally ignorant of the nervous system. The problem for us to-day is removed a stage; it is, however, fundamentally the same problem.

[2] Cp. 201, 31: "In the spirit, however, the psychic powers are disposed, as are the vegetative in trees, the whole of them being spread throughout the whole spirit."

functions in the body which is its ground; this ground is the spirituous body. Thus the various orders of sensible phenomena, though different from one another, occur in the spirituous body, now in one portion, now in another of it. Subsequently the power itself [*i.e.* the common sense] discriminates the sensible experiences in the spirit. And so we keep the reason free [from sense] and do not say that different forms occur in that which has no parts [*sci.* the rational soul], but [that they occur] in the greatest [body], that is the spirituous, in different portions of it."

The spirit-body being thus regarded as the true sensory, it was also thought to be the medium for what are now called thought-transference and telepathy, for "inner voices" also, both bad and good. And so, we find Psellus, in his famous treatise on the daimones, or non-human entities ([p. 94 p. 72]), suggesting that the way the lower orders of these invisibles insinuate their temptations into men's souls, is by immediately affecting the phantastic spirit: "When a man addresses another from a distance he has to speak more loudly, but if he be close, he can whisper into his ear. If, moreover, it were possible for him to come into [still] close[r] contact with the spirit of his soul, he would need no uttered speech, but all he wanted to say would reach the hearer by a soundless way. They say that this is also the way with souls on leaving the body; for they, too, communicate with one another without sound."

Not only delirium, Philoponus tells us (164), but also the frequent derangement and dulling of the understanding when a man is in possession of his normal senses, are supposed to be due to changes in this spirit, when, according to Aristotle (418^{b} 24), "the spirituous body either undergoes a certain break-

down, or by being out of symmetry, troubles and hampers the understanding."

So also with regard to memory, Philoponus explains (158, 7) that though the memory movement may be said to start from the soul, "we do not mean that the soul remembers of itself by itself; but that just as in the case of the senses we say that the movement starting from the sensible objects reaches that in which the discriminating and perceptive power [resides]—namely, the spirit—so also in the case of memory, we say that it is from the spirit in which the soul is [vehicled], that the start of the memory movement takes place."

That academic psychology will deign seriously to consider the hypothesis of the 'spirit-body' in any shape or form does not seem as yet very probable; psychical research, however, appears with every day to be more and more driven in this direction. Of course the vastly greater knowledge of physiology which we now possess must very considerably change the ancient doctrine in many respects, but the main notion in its simplest form has so well fitted in with the unsophisticated experience of mankind for so many ages, that it may still be found in some respects to bear the scrutiny of unprejudiced investigation.

G. R. S. MEAD.

THE OCEANIC ORIGIN OF LIFE.

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LIFE is worth living at the present time. Not because we enjoy an ever increasing amount of physical well-being, that would be but a poor subject for rejoicing; the privilege lies in our being at a truly interesting epoch of human history. It is true we still hear the dying echoes of the rather distressful intellectual symphony sung by the stormy soul of the XIXth century; but with the dawn of the XXth science seems to have quickened her steps, and we leap from wonder to wonder. First it was radium that opened up unlooked-for vistas on the constitution of matter. Yesterday we had the theory of the oceanic origin of man, showing in a new light the depth of life hidden beneath the sombre waves of the sea. To-day it is the conquest of the air and the hatching of the man-bird. To-morrow will doubtless be marked by a decisive step forward in the domain of the invisible, and a flood of light will suddenly shine into the dark corners of knowledge where physic touches magic and chemistry marches with alchemy.

For long the ocean-mystery has haunted the imagination. From the dawn of Greek culture we see poetry and philosophy uniting to proclaim the predominance of aquatic phenomena in the world-life. "Water is best," cried Pindar; Water is the source of all life, taught Thales of Miletus. Further we hear the

same prophetic whisper in almost all the cosmogonies of primitive peoples, where we find Earth the daughter of Ocean. More recently science has revealed to us that this is no vain myth but the real truth. The study of the strata of the earth proves that the bottom of the sea was the laboratory of the continental masses. On the tops of the highest mountains are found traces of the presence and action of sea-water. Without the unceasing toil of the sea the hard metallic surface of the earth could never have given life to a single organism. It is Ocean which gives us the key to the mighty phenomena of planetary life.

The clouds which cross the sky, the rain which lashes the air and vivifies the soil, the glaciers which polish the rocks and give birth to the torrents, the deep waters which tunnel the grottoes, the countless streams and rivers which diffuse life through valleys and plains, —whence come all these grandiose activities of the general economy but from the ceaseless transformations wrought by the vapours born from ocean's surface? Unless the oceanic currents conditioned the contrasts of climate, and the sea-mists were carried by the winds over the whole earth, the air would soon become unbreathable, and that precious life, which the Titan Oceanus, Son of Heaven, has conceived in his bosom and preserves on the earth which he has laid down layer by layer, would soon come to an end.

This startling notion that life owes its origin to the sea, or at least to the moist element, we find recorded in the most ancient religious traditions. It does not enter into our present project to search out in detail the possible agreements between the cosmogonies of sacred literature and the theories of science, nevertheless we will, in passing, glance at a few lines of

their texts, whose correspondence with the actual views of science is a sure indication of the progressive march of truth. The sacred books of India clearly express this belief, as is shown by *The Laws of Manu.* "He whom the mind alone can perceive, who eludes the senses, who is without visible form, eternal, the soul of all beings, whom none can comprehend, revealed His own glory. Having resolved in His mind to emanate all creatures from His substance, He first *produced the waters in which He placed a germ.*" Though uttered doubtless many hundreds of years before our era, these words are none the less grand and beautiful. Has modern science given a more satisfactory explanation of the genesis of life? By no means. The efforts of men of science have only succeeded in investing matter with divine but nameless properties.

The rich and profound symbolism of India shows us Viṣhṇu (the sustaining principle of the Trimūrti, or Trinity) borne on the waters, and resting on the coils of the serpent Ananta, symbolising vital force.

In giving an account of the history of creation, which no doubt was taken from more ancient traditions, *The Book of Genesis* declares: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." Passing to Greek mythology, where graceful and suggestive similes abound, Nereus, a sea-god more ancient than Poseidon, was, according to Hesiod, son of Oceanus and Thetis; and his daughters the Nereids, half women and half fish, are surely the most charming representation of the oceanic origin of man! The Greeks firmly believed in the existence of the Nereids and the Tritons. If metamorphism required a god, could we not give it Proteus, son of Neptune, with his keen and resourceful mind that could take

all forms, whom fable shows us keeping his sea-flocks in the blue-green depths? And did not Venus herself rise from the sea-foam in all her dazzling beauty, at once symbol and promise of perfected humanity?

May we not here be allowed to conjecture whether all this Greek symbolism may not be simply a mask hiding the ancient knowledge of the modern theory of the oceanic origin of life, propounded by M. René Quinton, the distinguished biologist of the Collége de France? When we turn from fable to philosophy, we see that the originator of modern ideas on oceanic life was Thales of Miletus, who lived in the VIIth century B.C., and was one of the seven Sages of Greece. This extraordinary man, who initiated the scientific thought of antiquity, conceived the idea that water, the principle of all moisture and of all that furthers the birth of life, is also the prime matter from which all emanates, and into which all is resolved. If we replace the expression primordial water by ether, or etheric matter, we see that modern science in its widest hypotheses is but an advance on the speculations of the Miletan philosopher. But to return to the ocean. A masterly book was published in 1904 by René Quinton, *L'Eau de Mer, Milieu Organique* (Paris, Masson). To prove this extraordinary thesis the author had for fifteen years exercised an ability and tenacity beyond praise, in the investigation of a huge mass of materials drawn from all branches of natural science. The whole was admirably co-ordinated and confirmed in detail, the new doctrine establishing successfully the following two points:

(1) Animal life in the cell-stage showed itself first in the sea.

(2) Throughout the zoological series, animal life has always tended to keep the cells composing each

organism in a marine environment, so that, with certain exceptions which may be neglected for the moment, and which seem to be referable only to inferior and degenerate species, every animal organism is a veritable marine aquarium, in which the constituent cells continue to live in their original aquatic condition.

Such is the thesis, and the demonstration given by the author is irrefutable. Geology and paleontology support it throughout. In the first place, it is impossible to doubt the aquatic origin of all animal forms. *All air-breathing animals have in their embryonic state a primitive branchial respiratory organ;* that is to say, that at some period of its development every vertebrate embryo possesses branchial clefts which recall the gills of fish. Further this aquatic origin is marine. Forms of life in fresh water are always secondary, and simply repeat here and there the marine forms, which are the only ones that give us the almost complete bony structure of the animal kingdom. If all fresh-water forms vanished from the zoological series, we should lose only one class and five orders; whereas the disappearance of marine forms would include six groups, eleven branches, forty classes, and one hundred and nine orders. Therefore all animal forms are derived from marine organisms. The primordial cells from which the ancestral organisms have been derived were then necessarily marine. The conclusion is that animal life in the cell-stage began in the sea. We will now follow the development of life.

In the simple state of the unicellular world life was indefinitely prolonged; each cell was relatively immortal. But the genius of evolution was there, and love was roused; then began the first psychic sensations and elementary sympathies between these primitive creatures.

Irresistible fate made life ever more complex by means of an ever-developing, evolving organism. We are watching the ascending expansion of life, an upward growth which involves death, since the forms must die that life may progress. There follows the patient amassing, in infinite detail and tireless repetition, of rudimentary experience drawn from the bosom of environment, a parallel phenomenon, though on a higher scale, to the gradual accretion of land by the prodigious labour of zoophytes, building up the continents which support humanity. Life is always ascending and ceaselessly growing. It is the first quiver of emotion which later on becomes the terrible play of the passions; it is the dawn of intelligence which grows ever keener in the conflict of life; it is that which at last in man becomes the clear vision of his self-consciousness, in possession of itself, self-confirmatory of its divine origin, and grasping with steady hand the helm of his highest destiny. Such is the priceless gift that death offers to life; such is the apparently dull jewel hidden by nature in the casket of the unicellular organisms long ago when warm waters covered the whole planet.

It is good to be alive; but this is not enough. This is not the goal of evolution; the ladder of life must ceaselessly be climbed. Need we wonder if animal life, in creating more and more complex and independent organisms, first in the ocean, then in fresh water, and then on land, has never forgotten its far distant states in the ocean waves, and has ever the tendency to keep the cells composing these organisms in a natural or reconstituted aqueous medium? In those primitive animal organisms, such as sponges, hydrozooa and scyphozooa, which have free anatomical openings to their environment, the sea itself is their vital medium

and bathes every cell. In marine invertebrates of a slightly higher order, a phenomenon of first importance takes place; the outer wall of the creature is permeable by water and salts, so that by simple osmosis the internal fluid is still the same medium as the surrounding sea. This has been established by direct chemical analysis. Serum in fact presents the same mineral composition as sea-water.

Fresh-water invertebrates show a highly significant difference, they are not permeable by water or salt; although immersed in fresh water they preserve a vital medium of a constant and high salinity, shown by chemical analysis to be the same as that of sea-water. This is a good lesson in independence for those short-sighted naturalists and philosophers who declare that living beings are slaves to their environment. Further, those invertebrates which live in air, maintain the same saline condition in their vital medium. Finally, in the highest organisms of the zoological series, those furthest from the marine ooze, namely mammals and birds, direct experiment shows the identity of the vital medium of their cells with that of sea-water.

Chemical analysis, which has the last word in this discussion, confirms the mineral identity of the vital fluid and salt-water. It decides that the salts of the blood-serum are the same as those in the sea; not only so, but these salts range themselves in the same order of importance. It was recently maintained that sea-water contains minute quantities of certain bodies not found in the organism. But recently more thorough research showed that these bodies do exist in the blood, and in approximate quantities. These new bodies found in the highest organisms are at present seventeen, of which four, *viz.* strontium, rubidium, cæsium and

gold, occur only in infinitesimal amounts. This is an important point to be considered later.

The saline composition of the blood in the higher vertebrates does not result from food. Analysis shows that basic (vegetable) foods are very poor in soda; hence this saline composition is maintained *in spite of alimentation.*

We are now far from the biologists who condemned the living cell to passivity. The truth is that all that lives freely chooses its own food. Plants absorb from the soil only the elements which suit them, and all do not use the same nutrient matter. Alimentation is not a passive action, but in some degree a free choice. Thus the dawn of free-will begins to break in the vegetable world. Much more do animals choose their foods; herbivorous creatures prefer plants which are rich in chloride of sodium, and show a well-known avidity for salt in a pure state. It is not food then which decides the composition of the organisms, as has been generally believed; it is rather this primordial composition which decides their alimentation according to a pre-existent type. Plants and animals each know what they want, and we get a glimpse here of subjective consciousness in nature. But this is not all; this law of marine habit is not isolated. Astronomy, geology, and better still the paleontological records establish beyond doubt the high temperature of the earth in primitive epochs, and the gradual cooling that has taken place in the course of ages. The study of fossil plants and animals settles this point. The temperature of the sea-water when animal life first appeared in the cell-stage was high, as compared with what it is now. Geology cannot fix precisely the temperature of the pre-Cambrian seas in which life first appeared, but

in view of the fact that in the secondary period the arctic regions enjoyed a tropical climate, a temperature of 44° or 45°C. for the pre-Cambrian ocean is quite plausible. In these warm seas cellular life became organised. The diversity of form was soon extreme. Nearly all the present groups of animals are represented in the first fossils found, that is in the Cambrian strata. Then life passed from sea to land; the first air-breathing arthropods, the primal vertebrates, the bactrachians and the reptiles appeared. The earth swarmed with life; but none of these animals were able to raise the temperature of their tissues above that of their environment. Only two classes of the animal world, mammals and birds, have this power, and they had not yet appeared. As the earth cooled what happened to these creatures? Different varieties arose, but all were equally unable to keep warmer than the air or sea. The temperature of their bodies lessened as the air and water cooled. They became proportionately weaker and less active. But mammals and birds, in spite of the lessening temperature outside, acted in a very different way. They did not cool down as the earth did, but maintained their cells at the original temperature which allows the maximum of activity. They acquired the power of creating heat and so fought against their cooling environment.

We see in this act of creating heat the distinctive mark of the higher vertebrate. Moreover the chief point to be noted is that it is always the newest organisms that keep their original warmth, and so bear witness to the primitive temperature. Thus birds, which appeared after man, have a higher temperature. Man is not the latest offshoot of the vertebrates. Physiologically a bird's organisation is superior to man's,

its anatomy is better designed for the work required of it. New organs appear, a higher temperature is kept up, its vital activity is greater.

For contemporary man the tropics are the natural environment; his life in higher latitudes is entirely artificial, he preserves it only by means of clothes to check his loss of heat, and fire by which he warms the surrounding air. What will become of him if the temperature of the globe falls still further? If history repeats itself, and the laws of analogy do not deceive us, we may expect in a remote future the appearance of a new human type, possibly superhuman, with a higher temperature, and gifted with a new sense either tactile or visual, or partaking of both, that will enable it to communicate with the as yet mysterious world of the ether.

We have seen how on the cooling globe life created heat, let us now observe how in the dark depth of the sea it has made light. In a hostile environment, if one of the essential organs is missing, life constructs the needed member. Deep-sea dredging has of late years brought to light a fauna of remarkable variety—medusæ, pennatulæ, polyps, starfish, ophiuræ, crustaceans, and fish, which generate light either localised at one spot or distributed all over them. Here is Paul Regnard's testimony on the subject. "We took," he writes, "some specimens into the laboratory, where the lights were turned out. In the deep darkness the effect was magical—one of the most wonderful sights that man can behold. From the principal lines and points of the polyps shot forth little jets of light, like sheaves of fire, which paled and glowed alternately, passing from violet to purple, from red to orange, from blue to different shades of green, sometimes to the white of

white-hot steel. The predominating colour was green, the others appeared in flashes which soon passed again into green. If I say that it was far beyond the beauty of the most beautiful fireworks, this gives but a feeble idea of the effect. . . . It was strong enough to play the part of electric light, of fireworks, or even of the sun; from one end to the other of the laboratory, a distance of nearly nineteen feet, we could see to read the smallest print."

Probably this green light is the best suited for deep water; white light penetrates water very badly, as the red and orange rays of the spectrum are soon absorbed. On the other hand, as light is not indispensable for life, since life can exist in absolute darkness, it is legitimate to believe that this phosphorescence aims at something else than simple life; it belongs to a high cellular activity. We have then a second law of constant luminosity analogous to the law of constant temperature. Let us take comfort from these phenomena, and believe that light as well as life is inextinguishable. If, as they threaten us, light is disappearing from the heavens, we ought to find it again at the bottom of the sea! Still more certainly might we find it in our own bodies; for just as we each have a portion of the ocean equal to one-third of our weight, we also hide in the depths of our nature an epitome of all the forces of the universe.

It is a notable fact that this magnificent scientific synthesis is the work of a French *savant*, who has now given body and sense to the vague tradition of sea-origins that has floated in men's minds for so many centuries. It is not the first time that the silent work of the laboratory has confirmed popular legend or religious myth. Who of us has not felt in hours of reverie, the overwhelming attraction of the ocean, and

its magic spell? How often has man vaguely felt in himself the oscillations of the miniature ocean in his veins, which bathes his tissues, and whose tiny waves beating against the cliffs and beaches of his organs obey an ancestral law of rise and fall, in the rhythm of heart and lungs. It is a distant echo of the universal *Leit-motiv* sung by the great undulations of the ocean and watched by the stars. How often, standing on deck in the early morning, have we watched the rising sun touching the liquid plain with charm and beauty, irradiating it with changing colour, while the morning air filled our lungs, and the waves murmured their caressing song along the sides of the ship. How often, conscious of our kinship with the Nereids and Tritons of fable, have we felt the emotions of the deep, and dreamed of the affinity between man and the sea. Then have we felt the pulsations of our inner life respond with the warmth of a filial tenderness towards that prodigious heaving mass extending to the horizon, gulf of death, inexhaustible source of life, ancestral cradle of humanity.

What was yet wanting to this bold theory to give it all the value it deserves? Only practical utility. For several years past hypodermic injections of sea-water have been used in therapeutics, the results in some cases being astonishing. Certainly at first there was no question of medicine. When René Quinton, the young biologist, announced, fifteen years ago, his theory of the persistence of marine conditions in all living animals, he was met with incredulous shrugs, and called a scientific romancer; he himself hardly realised that he was giving the medical world a new power capable of regenerating the vital fluid in man. Certainly treatment of disease with sea-water did not begin with

Quinton and his method; it is as old as the world. The ancients were not ignorant of the virtues of the sea. Hippocrates, Celsus and Aretæus recommended sea-voyages in cases of phthisis. Cicero was cured of his blood-spitting by repeated voyages in the Ionian seas. Sick people were sent to Egypt, Pliny tells us, much less for the warm climate than to gain health by the crossing. To-day the curative power of the sea needs no proof. The cures effected in diverse complaints, principally tuberculosis of the bones and skin, by simply living near the sea and taking sea-baths, are so evident and so specific that sanatoria have been built at great expense at many coast-resorts, both in France and other countries. Besides, many doctors use marine cures without knowing it, just as M. Jourdain spoke prose, by sending patients to Salies-de-Béarn, Salins-Moutiers, Bourbon-L'Archambault, Nauheim, Kreuznach, Wiesbaden, etc.; for all these saline waters gain their characteristics from beds of salt originally oceanic. But though the action of sea-water on the human organism was not doubted, the reason of its effect was not understood until lately.

The French genius by its brilliant generalisations has solved the problem. The descent of man from the ocean had to be proved to explain why scrofulous children are cured at Berck-sur-Mer, why sea-baths suit the anæmic and heal atonic wounds, and why the baths at Salies-de-Béarn do wonders for tuberculosis and rickets. To-day we have a method of marine healing, born from the theory of the oceanic origin of life, which tends to substitute subcutaneous injections of sea-water for all other forms of medical marine treatment, because this is at once simpler and more effectual. This is not the place for an essay on therapeutics, none the less it

is satisfactory to know that the results obtained surpass all our hopes, and that the use of this new method increases day by day. Though generalisations are to be sparingly used, it is safe to say that sea-water injected under the skin has an anti-toxic action, and that the effects are produced chiefly on the skin, kidneys and intestines. The fundamental effect is on the blood and other organic fluids. Sea-water introduced into vitiated blood renews and purifies its elements. Skin diseases are rapidly cured by the sea—all of them, not excepting the terrible lupus. There have been notable successes in severe maladies of the kidneys and intestines. In enteritis the effects are remarkable; so also in nervous diseases, especially in the neurasthenia so common to-day. In delicate children threatened with tuberculosis it effects a real transformation of the organism. But the triumph of this method is in cases of the gastro-enteritis of infants, when it acts with a rapidity and certainty quite disconcerting. In Paris, at the dispensaries where this treatment is used, I have seen mothers in tears with their white-faced babes, withered, bloodless, dying, and these same babes restored to life after a single injection of ten centicubes. You must see these things to believe them. The proportion of cures obtained is eighty per cent. If we remember that gastro-enteritis kills yearly in France 70,000 infants, it is a crown of glory for a humble biologist to have given to medicine a simple, quick and safe cure, by means of which 60,000 infant lives a year may be saved. Even if the sea-water cure failed in all other cases, this would be a sufficient reason to continue it. Moreover these happy results are obtained not from prepared drugs, but by a natural product and agent truly vital, endowed with elemental life.

When asked what he considers the active principle in marine plasma, the inventor of the cure replies at once that he thinks it lies in the minute quantities of the precious metals present. Since the discovery of the phenomena of radium, doctors and the public begin to realise the idea of the action of the infinitely small on the human organism. Lately Professor Huchard has declared, with a sincerity and courage that do him honour, that the future of medicine lies in small doses. For a century homœopaths have said this, and have been laughed to scorn. Great truths of a speculative nature are never accepted by the public at once; their diffusion is slow but sure. At present let us welcome the end of the era of man-killing drugs, and the establishment in their place of cosmic agents.

In conclusion, the importance of the sea-water theory in philosophy may be pointed out. Not only has it given science a formula for rejuvenating organic fluids, but it has reasserted the bonds that link us to the ocean, and to all nature, and above all declares the principle of the independence of life. In establishing on a secure foundation the principle of the basic and indestructible vitality in sea-water, of the invariability of all elemental life, and of its unity compared with the infinite diversity of forms, it has given to biology a new dignity and value. It was said that the sea-water theory had given a mortal blow to evolution. This is not true; what it has done is to free the doctrine from mechanism, from earthiness, to give it wings, and infuse it with a soul. It has raised the idea of life to a higher degree. Instead of the oppression with which nature seemed to weigh down living forms, it has given air and liberty to life; it has made us feel that life even in elementary forms is inseparable from intelligence.

In face of cosmic variation, in face of the tyrannical law of adaptability imposed on animal forms, it preaches the revolutionary doctrine of resistance to environment, and proclaims the rights of the living creature. What conclusion is to be drawn? We see life, one and conscious, in the course of its long and painful ascent and evolution, ever rising and developing. Does not this continual and irresistible push of life through a thousand difficulties, a thousand sufferings and a thousand deaths, towards an ever-fleeing future, postulate a unity of direction, the intention of which cannot be of a purely physical and accidental order? Do we not perceive an intelligent power at work, that knows what it does, and what it wants, and pursues a definite goal without weakness or deviation? It is inconceivable that there should be two or three or many different kinds of Intelligence; there is but one, Cosmic Intelligence; let us acknowledge it, the Divine Intelligence. Assuredly, the times we live in are interesting, but troubled and uncertain. Disquieting symptoms of disintegration begin to appear, sinister crackings are heard; still we need not fear, we may hold to all our hopes. For the great spiritual forces that direct the world-work, without our knowing anything of it, are ever day by day orienting our lives towards the greater solidarity of the human race. And if by lowering our eyes towards the ocean whence we come, we are permitted here and now to gain a feeble idea of the depths of our roots in the past, to what marvellous destinies may we not aspire, if we contemplate the flowers and fruit that await us when evolution is ended, in the prodigious fulfilment of the future.

BERNARD S. ARNULPHY.

CULTURE AND THE CHURCH.

REV. W. F. COBB, D.D.

THE first half of this essay is ended.[1] That which remains is at once more important and more difficult; more important in proportion as the marriage of principle and practice is more fruitful than the isolated cultivation of principle, and more difficult because the application of principle is bound to run counter to prejudice, to vested interests and to 'misoneism'—as Lombroso calls our instinctive and invincible aversion from what is novel. Yet the attempt must be made.

We shall find it convenient to restrict our remarks to that religion which in some form or other is the religion, and the only possible religion, for us in the Western world, not because we desire to ignore or belittle other forms of the spirit of religion, but because one example is sufficient for our purpose. *Ab uno disce omnes.* What is true of one Church in this connection is true of all.

The Church then is the name we give to the whole congregation of faithful people who under whatever form of union are banded together in the name of Jesus the Christ. The Church purports to be organised Christianity, organised, that is, to make known, to perpetuate and to multiply the effects of that Person-

[1] See 'The Nature of Culture' in our last issue.—ED.

ality which appeared in Palestine nineteen hundred years ago. In the Church, therefore, as in poetry and art, Personality is everything. "The one great sacrament and means of grace in the Christian Church is the Personality of Jesus Christ."

The question then: "What is Christianity?" runs back into a further question: "What think ye of Christ?" a question not to be answered—here at all events—by quotations from creeds, or abstract speculative philosophy, not by authority or tradition, but from the ascertained results of the best culture which has been attained among peoples who profess and call themselves Christians.

Our philosophy is transcendent and our religion is an ideal religion. Hence it is not founded on pure history. Indeed it cannot be too emphatically asserted that "*a purely historical religion is a materialistic religion.*" An ideal religion, no doubt, may take to itself a historic form, but it does not itself, therefore, become historical. For the form it may take may be unworthy, or unfit, or short-lived, and so may come to be rejected in favour of other forms. While every religion, even the most idealistic, must submit to the law which forbids formlessness, yet no one form or set of forms has any *à priori* necessity. The many pass; the One remains.

The Church and Science.

Hence it is an integral part of the liberty of a Christian man that he should be allowed to criticise freely all forms, whether of creed, or of worship, or of conduct, which obtain in his Church, so long as he is honestly seeking to uphold the ideal revealed in the

Personality of his Master. It is, conversely, the sacred duty of those in 'authority' in his Church to abstain from interfering with him in the discharge of his duty. Failure in this respect can be branded only as an inner surrender to the forces of Materialism. The ideal is hindered, not helped, by all exercise in the Church of coercive jurisdiction. As Dante said of "my lady poverty" that she had been "*privata del primo marito*" for a thousand and one hundred years and more, so may we say to-day of the Church and her ideal; and the divorce receives formal ratification whenever authority represses attempts—whether they are misguided or not is of comparatively little importance—to re-unite current practice with the personal ideal of the Christ.

"What, then, was this personal ideal?" is the question to which not only this paper, but modern life in general comes back after every attempt to state life's problem. The answer given here, and given with the deepest reverence and love, is that the Personality of Jesus was that of a supreme artist, who to the knowledge of a scientist added the deepest insight into the religion of which science just touches the hem, and expressed His culture—let us so call it—in a Life unexampled for purity, strength, simplicity and sincerity, and bequeathed His creation for the benefit of succeeding ages.

The problem then before the Church is how it can free itself from the fetters of superstition, 'misoneism' and ignorance so as to be able to conform itself to, absorb, and then reflect the culture of Jesus Christ.

His culture—all culture—we have seen is a blend of science, religion and art into one harmonious and creative whole. Under each of these heads much work

must be done by the Church before she can offer any worthy contribution to the cause of Christian culture.

Let us take, in the first place, science. The Church will do well to turn a smiling instead of a suspicious face towards science, in its broadest and most thorough-going demands. Only when it has done this has it secured to itself the right to remind the priests of science that their labours possess at best but a transitional importance; transitional, that is to say, not merely because their results are incomplete, but in a far deeper and more penetrating sense, *viz.* that even if science should have succeeded in formulating a final law, that law would then be but an airy phantom until it had been translated into knowledge of an individual —knowledge based on love of an ideal seen to be incarnated in that individual. Science is not the bond-servant of the Church, as in the days of Roger Bacon, but she is one of the hand-maids of religion, and it is Imagination which fits her for her office.

Hence if it is the nature of science to be partial and dependent, the Church can well afford to be patient of the errors of scientific men—on condition of course that she blesses with all good-will their successes. It follows from this that questions of higher criticism, of textual criticism, of *Quellen-kritik*, of historical research, of dogmatics, of the sources of creeds, of comparative theology, of mythology, of so-called Church history, of New Testament history, of the origins of Christian worship, of Christian archæology, all, as branches of science, have but a relative and at most a transitional importance. They demand and deserve a large room and considerable time for their results to work themselves out in. Their importance, indeed, does not begin until they are worked out, until, that is

to say, they are in a position to offer themselves as having a just claim to recognition as constituent elements in Christian culture.

This judgment may be easily illustrated from current controversies. A Christian might well declare it to be impossible that anybody should hold the 'doctrine of the Virgin-birth,' apart from its implicits, to be part of Christian religion, if he did not know by painful experience that it was so held. He might maintain that its proper place was in the school of scientific history, and should be kept there until its actuality was established, and that not till then should it be transferred to the Church as an ally of religion. On the other hand, to make it in any case a fact of religion is to make vain the life of Kant, and to offer a painful instance of a materialised religion. As a scientific question it calls for discussion, and, therefore, for free discussion. It has anyhow no place in the ideality of Jesus Christ.

Again, the resurrection of the body is as fit a subject for close scientific study as it is unfit for religion. Whether we shall rise again with a body; of what nature that body shall be; when it shall take place; whether bad as well as good shall rise again,—are all questions which belong to science, and science can judge only on evidence supplied empirically. To say that experience supplies no evidence, but that the decision of the subject must be left to 'faith,' is to miss wholly the meaning of Christian faith, and to invite us to put our confidence in pious guesses based on prejudice. Of course, too, the question whether we shall rise again with a physical body contains also the question whether Jesus Christ rose with a physical body. But what is here aimed at is not the expression

of any opinion one way or the other, but merely to insist that the whole question belongs to science and not to religion, and must be left to science, therefore, to settle in its own way without interference.

However large the dogmas of a Virgin-birth and a physical resurrection may loom before the eyes of many people, a question of an even more practical character is being forced upon the Church. How long, men are asking, is she going to put before men as part of the message of her Master a specific doctrine of authority, whether papal, or episcopal, or presbyterian? That each of these may have much support in history, and each have distinct practical advantages, can be easily admitted by one who yet feels the enormous harm that has been done, and is still being done, by the mistaken efforts of good men to father their theories of government on One who cared for none of these things. Every society, no doubt, must have an organisation of some sort, and an organisation implies the presence of an ultimate authority somewhere, but it is not permissible to look to religion—or to the great revealer of religion—for the institution of such an external authority, nor is the cause of the authority served by arguments which imply that religion, instead of practical convenience, is the ground on which the authority itself rests. The statesman or the historian may have much to say about the seat of authority in religion, but not the religious man as such, except when a given authority is exercising a tyranny over him.

There are, besides, two departments of scientific thought which affect the Church very closely, *viz.* the science (or the philosophy which grounds itself on the special sciences) of nature, and theology (or the science which represents the Church's own thinking about the

facts of her life). So far as the former is concerned, it may be enough to say that the only point where the Church comes into conflict with science, is to be found in the assertion of her belief that God is the "Maker of heaven and earth." But the Church does not state this belief of hers as a fact she has scientifically established but as an inference from her experience of spiritual things. As a Church she has never had any commission to construct a nature-philosophy; her mission is to bear witness to Jesus Christ, *i.e.* to One who did not come to philosophise but to create. It is true that the Jew in Babylon learned to identify Jehovah with the Maker of heaven and earth, and it is also indubitable that the Father of Jesus Christ was regarded by Him as supreme. But in both cases the inference is drawn from the facts of inner experience, and would not invalidate those facts if the inference were found to be drawn in error. On the other hand, science is debarred by her own principles from either affirming or denying anything about the making of heaven and earth. She knows nothing, and can know nothing, about the beginning of things, and any assertion, therefore, she may make about it has no more ground of reason than one made by the Church. In both cases it is an inference, an hypothesis only, resting on an analogy it may be, or constructed in obedience to man's craving for system, but never possessing more than a theoretical value, belonging to speculation rather than to action.

The position of theology is the same, if we mean by it anything more than a science which tells us what men have thought about God. If, however, we do mean more, if we use the word as Aristotle used it, to denote metaphysic, and say that theology is the science of God

in contradistinction to the science of nature, then we are bound not only to admit but to assert, not only to assert but to maintain, that such a science is impossible. "Come hither and hearken, all ye that fear God, and I will tell you what he hath done for my soul," is an invitation which promises a science. For it goes to facts of experience, and these are capable of yielding a system of thought. But directly we leave the solid ground of experience and begin to tread the airy fields of metaphysical speculation about the nature of God and the mysteries of His being, about the hypostatic union, about the great hereafter, and the 'laws' of spiritual working, we abandon religion for fancy and overstep the just boundaries of our own capacities.

The attitude, therefore, of the Church towards Science, whether the science of nature or of God, whether that science be found within her borders or without, is bound to be, on Christian principles, an attitude of large tolerance, of sympathy and of patience. On the other hand, all truly scientific men, whether in the Church or not, will do well to remind themselves continually, and to remind the Church, that all knowledge of external things is symbolical, and that language is also symbolical of thought. Hence all philosophical statements, all creeds, all dogmas, having but a symbolical worth, must be checked continually by experience, if they are not to be misused or turned even into enemies of religion.

The Church and Religion.

If, as we have just seen, the Church's attitude to Science should be one of sympathy with an ally who enjoys a certain independence by right, her attitude to Religion is of quite a different sort. Here it is her own

life that is at stake, and here, therefore, no compromises or half-measures are allowable. Religion, in the sense defined above of a feeling of kinship with That which breathes and speaks out of every phenomenon, is the distinctive legacy of Jesus the Christ to His Church. If she does not live by That and jealously protect her knowledge of It from all that may obscure, tarnish, rival or corrupt, then is her work naught and she becomes a mere cumberer of the ground. Scientific error she may well bear with, but the intrusion of a pretender on her religion is a degradation of her ideal, insupportable, calling for strenuous opposition at every turn and with all her forces. And yet history and present facts show alas! too often a deep forgetfulness of what it is which constitutes the essence of the Christian religion, and of the perplexities and strifes which are the inevitable consequence of every departure from first principles. In the light of the fact that the perpetuation of the Christ-life is the final end of the Christian Church, let us briefly note certain current conceptions of what Christ's religion is.

Intolerance. In the first place the spirit of intolerance is not only inconsistent with Christianity, it is in flat contradiction to it. Still more, intolerance of errors in the apprehension or statement of spiritual facts is a double outrage on the religion of Jesus Christ, seeing that He taught no dogmas, rebuked those who would construct them, and limited Himself to creating a certain attitude of the soul, a habit of aspiration, joy and love. Yet so far have Christian bodies mistaken Anti-Christ for Christ, so uniformly have they all used force to check intellectual originality, and so completely have they succeeded in persuading men that the Christian religion stands or falls with the maintenance

of official decrees about it, that for a millenium and a half it has been generally considered a duty to coerce heretics on earth and to leave their leaders in the Hell where Dante found them.

Yet the religion of Christ is so clearly and so strongly opposed to this rigid 'orthodoxy' that it is difficult to believe that we have not mistaken Him, until we recollect that the intolerant spirit is an intruder into His Church from the older Jewish synagogue, thrust into it by main force by the Imperial Cæsars who were the nursing-fathers of the now politically-established Church. What the Jew desired the Emperor endorsed, the Pope accepted and the Protestant inherited. We have yet to learn that spiritual things are spiritually discerned, and that the Kingdom of God is founded deep in the individual soul.

Theorising. In the second place, and closely allied to the intolerant spirit, is the inveterate custom found everywhere of confusing spiritual experiences with theories about them. For example, that Jesus was man is a fact of history; that He was God is a conclusion based on inner experience. That a man, however, knows these two truths by accepting the Constantinopolitan Creed is a pure delusion, only possible to one to whom religion is a philosophy or an institution.

That sin is the dark background of all inner striving is again a fact of experience. That this background is a legacy from Adam, to be 'explained' by a theory of the loss of original righteousness, or to be explained at all, is an idol of the theologian, who, leaving the solid ground of experience, befogs the minds of simple folk by obscuring with his theories what without him was only too clear.

God's grace is, on the other hand, a truth of inner

revelation. The Christian soldier knows that he has received and daily receives support, encouragement, inspiration in mysterious but quite recognisable modes of consciousness. If he be asked, he has no reply and no explanation to offer beyond: "One thing I know, that whereas I was blind, now I see." Theories about prevenient, convenient, congruent, sanctifying grace cannot help; mostly, they hinder the work of grace in the soul. The theory is apt to paralyse the life, and cast out the grace itself.

Even God Himself is not sacred to the theorist. In vain have fathers, saints and mystics warned him that God is in Heaven and we on earth, that our best praise of Him is our silence, and the best confession is that His greatness is beyond the reach of our thoughts. He insists that the doctrine of the Trinity is mathematically certain, and that it is, therefore, capable of elaboration into articles. He is not content to know that God is the name we give to the Inscrutable, and that the trinities of space, of time, of psychology, of spiritual experience and of history are but adumbrations of the great Reality which lies behind all phenomena. He must quit the field of experience, construct theories, clothe them as doctrines and then crown them as dogmas, else he fears that 'heretical opinions' may creep in. So is our religious sky overcast, the sun is hidden and men wander in the mists of dogma because they have been taught that the one true light shines only in the lantern of doctrinal theory.

Confusion of means and ends. Nowhere is the necessity of a return to the personality of the Christ more apparent than in the use of what are called means of grace, especially the Bible and the Sacraments. For here we have to do battle in Christ's name with a wide-

spread and deeply-loved magic—no other word will serve. If it be true that in poetry and art Personality is everything, this is also true in the Church. The Church cannot value too highly her means of grace, but they are powerless except as the expression of Personality.

The Bible, for example, has no religious value but what lies in the personalities which speak out of its pages. Whether Abraham be a sky-god, a personified tribe, or a Semite sheikh; whether David wrote sacred or secular songs; whether Moses was an Egyptian initiate, or Daniel a Babylonian astrologer—are all interesting questions no doubt, but not to the religious man as such, except so far as they help to illuminate a personality. But Abraham, the friend of God; Moses, who desired to see God's glory; David, confessing, "I have sinned," or Daniel, true to his religion, are personalities who live and speak and warn and beckon us on. Above all the New Testament is the Church's most sacred treasure, not for its value as a historical document, or for affording us the most fascinating literary problem in existence, but because there speaks through it the Personality of One who is the highest expression of the Father in heaven.

Any use of the Bible, however, which fails to bring us to the knowledge of the great personalities it portrays, may be legitimate enough where the Bible may serve other purposes—such as those of the historian, the archæologist, the philologist, or the jurist—but cannot be regarded as that for which the Church holds the Bible in trust, *viz.* for the kindling or fanning in the heart the fire of religion through the presentment of the personalities of great religious heroes.

Again, the Sacraments of the Church—whether we use the word *sacrament* in the wider or the narrower sense—are partly symbolic acts and partly social rites. Baptism is at once a symbol which speaks of purity of heart and life, and a rite which admits formally into the Christian society. Confirmation ends the first stage of tutelage, and also brings to recollection the knighthood given by Christ. Holy Communion points our desires heavenward while it at the same time bids us remember that we are all brethren. All other sacraments, how many soever they may be, serve the same double purpose. They symbolise and they socialise. But when we say this, we do but emphasise the truth that in religion, as in all branches of culture, personality is all. The sacred act which sets out symbolically a spiritual principle, does so only in order that some personality may be stimulated by it to higher things. The society which permits or enjoins it, is careful to train a minister whose duty it shall be to be its representative; the minister in his turn is a personality in which is focussed the spirit of the society; he it is, therefore, who sums up in his own personality the spirit of the many who symbolise with him, and through the given symbol all speak to the personality of the worshipper and bid him "Lift up his heart," and hold high and holy communion with the One Personality, of which all personalities are but broken manifestations, and look for joy there where his homage is ever paid.

Or if a sacrament be regarded from the social side only, the same emphasis comes to be laid on personality; with the difference, however, that it is now the personalities composing a given congregation who are the ministers of the sacrament. When "the kneeling hamlet drains the chalice of the grapes of God" it

is but asserting the reality of the love which they bear one to another—otherwise is the action naught. But love is a power peculiar to personality, and hence personality lies at the base of the social rite, and gives it its special meaning and its special degree of life and light and love. Holy Communion, for example, is a means of grace of quite extraordinary efficacy where the personalities at work are highly charged with spiritual fervour, and on the other hand sinks to a dead form where they are dormant.

In the name of divine culture, therefore, we are bound to denounce all attempts to degrade the means of grace to mere magical actions, and to insist that they are not means of grace at all except so far as through them personality acts on personality.

One further example of a false and even pernicious presentment of the religion of Christ must be given, if only because of its general acceptation. It is contained succinctly in the statement, as commonly understood, that "the Christian religion is a historical religion." If this sentence mean only that the Christian religion has manifested itself as a phenomenon and is, therefore, a proper subject for historical enquiry, then the proposition may pass as a truism which may apply equally to all religions. If it means that all religion in an individual needs to be supplemented and confirmed by the religious experiences of others, then it contains a half-truth which may be either dangerous or innocuous, according to its application. But if, on the other hand, the proposition that "the Christian religion is a historical religion" be intended to state its nature and being, then is its falsity so utter and so mischievous that it can only be designated as anti-Christian, and be met by the counter-proposition that a historical religion

of that character is a materialistic religion. It denies the demand for the changed and child-like heart, for the new-birth; it asserts that the Kingdom of God is without rather than within, that it is of this world instead of the inner world; it sends its disciples to 'evidences,' prophecy, miracle, authority, tradition and force; it chokes the fountains of living water; and takes away the key of spiritual knowledge by its pretence that theological knowledge will do equally well.

A true culture, in opposition to this, will always maintain that the home of Revelation as well as of the Moral is to be sought in the spirit of man in every clime and in every age, for that in none has God left Himself without witness. It is no doubt true that we know of the truth which others see through their presentation of it alone; and that we know the great heroes of mankind who lived in the past through their works only, and that, therefore, in a sense historical knowledge is necessary to spiritual apprehension. This is true, however, in a very limited sense. For we know great men only when we can pierce beneath the material presentment of their works to the living spirit which created the form, and to do this we require this spirit, and sympathy with their spirit. To feel their living force we must be alive ourselves. To hear their voice we must have ears that are eager to hear, a soul which feels and a will to self-surrender.

A revelation then which demands that not only shall its content be accepted inwardly, but that assent also shall be given to the mode of its historical setting, as inseparable from its content, can only tend to the materialisation of religion, and should be rejected in the name of culture by the Church. It is a matter of comparatively small importance that the royal law of

love was enunciated in Palestine. It is of quite transcendent importance that the soul should feel its divinity and yield to its power.

The same is true of the Moral. To seek this in history, in the Decalogue, in the Sermon on the Mount, in the traditions of the elders, or in self-interest, whether in the individual or in the race, is to flout its categorical imperative, to place its authority in something external to the individual and, therefore, to take away his freedom and so to empty the Moral of its characteristic power to impose a "free inner necessity." A 'historical morality' is like a 'historical religion,' a contradiction in terms. Both morality and religion are given first in the individual spirit (even though society fit him first for the gift) before they emerge on the plane of phenomena, *i.e.* of history; they are not the product of slow development but an immediate inspiration from the divine—so immediate that the subject of them is not merely right in refusing to bow to authority when it seeks to impose on him the religion and morality it has in trust, but he is bound to refuse in loyalty to himself, and also, be it added, in the interests of the authority itself. If the religion and conscience of the individual conflict with the religion or morality of the tribe, he must be true to himself and cheerfully take the consequences of such trueness. To do otherwise is to minimise the worth of personality, and to yield to the spirit which is ever at work materialising religion.

The Church and Art.

After what has been said above of the function in culture of art in general, little needs to be added as to the relation of the Church to art. But it should be

noted that the Church's attitude to art (in the specific sense of that which creates works of imagination) is similar to her relation to science. In both science and art her interest is indirect rather than direct, while in religion her interest is direct and not indirect. She should be on friendly terms with art and science alike. Unhappily, as the history of Protestantism in Germany and England shows, she has looked askance at both for three centuries, and weakened, in consequence, her influence on her own proper ground of religion.

The explanation of this fall is to be found in the dislike which Puritanism on its least discerning side has always felt for art, and literature as part of art. Hence we find a Puritan compelled to write a *Defence of Poesy* as "a discourse *pro domo* against the Puritan and Philistine variety of Protestantism," as well as against the Catholic distrust of letters. Hence Puritanism has always felt more sympathy with the prohibition of images in the Old Testament than with that Image of God revealed in Man and presented historically in the New Testament. But, on the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon race, with all its tendency to mammon-worship, has enough religion in it to feel instinctively that the divorce which Puritanism has decreed between religion and art is wrong, and should be rescinded in the interests of both, especially as it is to this unhappy divorce that is due the weakness which it finds in all Protestant Churches. Hence it is that men are seeking both their science and art in earnest, and pass by the Church on the other side, since they observe that her religion is but a feeble exotic when deprived of the support of the two forces which are essential to the healthy life of all religion.

Even when the Church does set herself in some degree to do an artist's work and express her spirit in a common form such as that of the Eucharist, she too often fails because she sets out the wrong thing, or expresses the right thing in a wrong way. It is no merely historical fact which has to be expressed, nor yet a dogma which happens to have been thrown up to the surface long ago. Neither when she desires to symbolise the divine principle of Love, in its twin manifestation of self-surrender and joy, should a medium be chosen which is foreign to the mind of the beholder. Mediæval dogma and mediæval language must both give way to their children of to-day, if art as used in Church is to speak home to the hearts of men. For it is never the function of art to set out history but to show the vision of inner beauty which floods the spirit of the artist. Love, self-surrender, joy, spiritual longing, humility, self-abasement, these are *data* of the spiritual consciousness, and it is the function of ecclesiastical art, whether this take the form of painting, music, architecture, or solemn and dramatic act, to give expression to these, and to leave dogma and history to do their proper work elsewhere.

No doubt it may be objected that if the present disuse of art is to be replaced by a generous use of it, the liberty thus gained is sure to be misused, when we consider how little knowledge of what art is is possessed by the average Church or congregation. It might be rejoined that *abusus non tollit usum*, and further that in the one branch of Church-art which has not been tabooed, *viz.* hymnody, a very low standard prevails, and yet that the license enjoyed in this department is the requisite condition for its being raised. Nothing but good could come in the long run,

though for a time many foolish things might be done, by permission being given to every congregation to use art in the expression of its spiritual life in such a way as might seem to it good. It would be necessary, however, that an informed criticism should be always at work, and that this whole congregational activity should be kept out of the hands of the lawyers.

Meanwhile we may comfort ourselves with the reflection that a greater Artist is at work, with the Church as His instrument, and is daily producing works of art in the form of pure personalities by which the life of man is kept ever fresh and strong. The saint, the sage, the knight, the hero, is, each in his way, an embodiment of the Idea of the Divine Artist, and is a thing of beauty whose contemplation inspires others to stir up the gift that is in them to go and do likewise. To the formation of a perfected humanity there is necessary a complete culture in the threefold form of science, religion and art, using civilisation as its servant, but not depending on it. The philosophy that "begins in doubt and wonder that disturb the peace of ignorance, and has for its goal the peace of knowledge"; the religion which worships that Best which is discovered in the universe within and assigns to it the care of heaven and earth; the art which expresses with premeditation in material form that which not having seen we love; these are the constituent elements of culture, and it is to these that the Church should devote her energies, to religion first, midst and last, while reverencing art and science as interwoven with it by Nature into one triple cord, which links the visible and the invisible, that which is form and that which is spirit, the mortal and immortal, man and God.

W. F. Cobb.

THE QUEST OF THE HOLY GRAIL.

JESSIE L. WESTON.

THE Quest of the Holy Grail is a subject at once of such literary importance and such arresting charm, that I find it scarcely needful to apologise to the readers of this REVIEW for again drawing their attention to questions which may seem to have been already sufficiently discussed in these pages, certain features in Mr. Waite's very sympathetic notice of my *Perceval* Studies appearing to demand comment.

To one unfamiliar with the book I feel sure that the impression gathered from the review, would be that there is much fuller agreement between the writer and myself than really exists. True, we are practically at one as to the real character of the Grail, the Source of Life, and, therefore, as to the true significance of the Quest, but our methods differ widely, and, in consequence, the value we attach to subsidiary features of the literature is proportionately different.

It seems to me that the difference may be best expressed by saying that Mr. Waite's concern is mainly with the Soul of the Literature, with the Grail itself; to him those versions in which the Mystical and Religious (more specifically Christian) view of the Talisman is more plainly set forth, are the only versions really deserving attention, and that, *per se*, their relation to other members of the '*corpus*' does not concern him.

My researches, on the contrary, are mainly directed to the Body in which that Soul is enshrined, its organism, its development, and the relation of the different parts to each other, and to the whole. Accepting, as (in common with many more scholars that Mr. Waite supposes) I frankly do, the Mystical character of the Grail, I hold it no less interesting and important when presented in its initial guise, in the form of pre-Christian Mysticism.

I must own that, considering the high claims to knowledge made by Mr. Waite, and his undoubted familiarity with Mystic literature, I find it difficult to understand why he should so persistently belittle, I might even say deny, the true pedigree and ancestry (shall we say '*haute ancesserie?*') of the Quest and its Goal. He cannot surely believe that under the Christian dispensation alone did man seek after God, and find Him? He cannot surely believe that the stupendous and ineffable Mystery of the Eucharist was expressive of some novel, and equally stupendous heightening of the Divine Power? The Source of Life has always been the same; it is the same Quest, the same Goal. The institution of the Christian Mysteries has, if I apprehend rightly, but made the path of attainment easier and more open. To my mind those texts which present the Quest in its pre-Christian aspect are in no way less charged with significance, less worthy of respect and attention, than those which present it in a form more familiar, more intimate and personal.

In my view the Grail romances are the record of a concrete and actual experience. I believe that somewhere (most probably in Wales), at some time (which we cannot now determine), the ritual with which that

Quest was surrounded, by which it was expressed, was witnessed, and shared, by one who, through lack of knowledge or purposeful preparation, failed to fulfil that test which would have entitled him to an explanation of the Mysteries in which he was a participant; that this experience, related probably by the original actor in it, was, by those who knew the true significance of the incidents, worked up into a story, and this story amplified, sometimes intelligently, sometimes unintelligently, was finally remodelled on the lines of Christian Mysticism—lines to which its original incidents and terminology were foreign—and that it has thus reached us in a form at once composite and confusing; hopelessly confusing, indeed, from the point of view adopted by the author of *The Hidden Church of the Holy Graal.*

It would seem a truism to say that no interpretation of a problem can be considered adequate which does not take into consideration, and account for, all the conditions of that problem; you must solve your puzzle in its totality, or your solution must be ruled out as, at best, only partially correct, and, very probably, altogether mistaken. To my thinking the crucial test is: How does Mr. Waite, as advocate for the exclusively and essentially Christian form of the Quest, and of the superiority of the Galahad version, deal with the characteristic incidents and terminology of the story? How does he explain the titles of Fisher King, Maimed King; the three-fold personality of the Guardian; the Waste Land, the Sword Test, the Question, the varying forms of the Grail itself? It is not too much to say that, so far from explaining these features, the writer is seriously incommoded by them, they are "but little to the purpose of the Graal"; "this disconcerting medley"; "an idle wonder which

we could wish to be taken out of the way" (*op. cit.*, pp. 82, 104, 116, 124, 125).

It is not my intention here to set forth in detail the evolution of the story, as I understand it; those interested in the subject can study it at their leisure in the chapters I have devoted to 'The Development of the Grail Tradition'; but this I may say: If I be right there is not one of these, apparently, perplexing features which has not its due, and profoundly significant, place in the story, and which is not capable of a rational and suitable explanation.

A scholar who possesses a remarkably full and exact knowledge of Mediæval Literature writes to me as follows: "Es ist doch eine grosse Conception, und zum ersten Mal eine vernünftige zusammenhangende Hypothese über den ganzen Complex von schweren Fragen, die nicht von einer vorgefassten Meinung aus die Tatsachen vergewaltigt."[1] Mr. Waite seems somewhat contemptuous of the sources whence I derived my information, but he must know, even better than I, that there are many schools, and differing methods; an incident obscure from one point of view may, if approached from another, prove to be, not only intelligible, but illuminating. I very much doubt whether all who worked on the Grail tradition were graduates of the same Academy.

But it is the knowledge of folk-lore which has placed the clue to the labyrinth in our hands. Now it is not too much to say that the author of *The Hidden Church of the Holy Graal* both dislikes, and despises, folk-lore; to him it is mere dry bones, dead, unspiritual

[1] "It is, however, a great conception, and offers, for the first time, a reasonable and connected hypothesis dealing with the entire 'complex' of difficult questions, and not wrested from the facts in aid of a preconceived meaning."

and devoid of any real significance. Yet is it not a fact that, year by year, scholars are becoming more and more aware of the direct contrary? That they are more and more realising that folk-lore, which consists largely of what we may call 'the *débris* of ritual,' has preserved, among that *débris*, certain elements of a persistent vitality, and that what the folk do to-day is often but the reflection of what their forefathers believed long ago? So far from being a dead study folk-lore is, at the present moment, an exceedingly, and increasingly, living one. (In the absence, however, of any adverse criticism of my arguments in favour of Gawain as original Grail hero, a view which Mr. Waite previously rejected with indignant scorn, I hope that the '*rapprochement*' between my reviewer and myself is mutual, that if I be laying more stress than before on the mystical aspect of the question, he is seeing ground for modifying his judgment on the folk-lore elements.)

I would protest against the idea that scholars, because they have dealt more with the traditional, or textual, aspects of the literature, have been ignorant, or neglectful, of the existence of a mystical, or occult, element in the Grail romances. I am in communication with representative scholars both in Europe and America, and I have found everywhere a profound conviction as to the general character of the Legend, and a general expression of satisfaction that I have been able to see my way to a theory which shall do justice to the more obscure elements of the literature, without exceeding the limits of the proveable. It must be remembered that those whose writings have to run the gauntlet of international criticism cannot put forward unsupported hypotheses. None of us would dare to publish a book of the extent, and importance, of *The*

Hidden Church of the Holy Graal, without providing that book with a full *apparatus* for testing our statements; foot-notes, exact reference to authorities, full bibliography, etc. Whatever the character of our views, they must be '*bien documentés*.'

Another point I would urge in excuse for our apparent lack of progress: Do outsiders, does Mr. Waite himself, realise the uncertain character of the textual evidence at our disposal? Out of the whole mass of Grail literature, in one case alone do we possess anything in the nature of a critical text; the *Parzival* of von Eschenbach is the sole and only romance of which we can be fairly certain that we possess a really full and reliable version. No other text has, as yet, been critically edited, and in the case of those which have been printed, the selection of the MS. has been determined by other factors than the excellence of the version represented. As a rule they give the worse, rather than the better form. Thus the MS. of the Potvin edition of the *Perceval* is undoubtedly the most imperfect, and most misleading, of all the Chrétien texts; the 'Didot' *Perceval* is hopelessly elliptic and confused; the very romance upon which Mr. Waite lays such stress, the *Queste*, is, whether in Dr. Furnivall's edition, or in Malory's translation, derived from a MS. very inferior to other existing versions. So far as this particular body of literature is concerned both printed editions, and translations, afford very unsafe ground for the erection of an elaborate hypothesis.

Again, scholars are in very grave doubt as to whether any one of the existing versions of the Galahad *Queste* really represents the original form of that romance. There are three distinct versions: that generally found in connection with the *Lancelot*, now

generally known as the *Vulgate* form; that incorporated with the prose *Tristan*, which, from its connection with the *Grand Saint Graal*, or *Estoire du Graal*, is known as the *Estoire Queste;* and that which, as it is now only represented in its complete form by the Portuguese and Spanish translations, is known as the *Demanda.*[1]

Neither the Portuguese nor the Spanish version is as inaccessible as Mr. Waite supposes; the former was thoroughly discussed by Dr. Sommer in *Romania*, 1907, while a reprint of the Spanish edition of 1535 was published in that same year.[2]

It is still an open question whether the shorter, and more mystical, version of the *Vulgate*, or the longer, and more chivalric, form of the *Estoire*, and *Demanda*, represents the original intention of the author. The question can only be decided upon literary grounds, and our *data* are, so far, incomplete. One thing is, however, certain, the Galahad *Queste* depends entirely upon the *Lancelot*. On this point Mr. Waite, probably unintentionally, the wish being father to the thought, misrepresents my position. I hold precisely the same view of the romance now as I did when I wrote the *Lancelot* Studies. On p. 282 of my *Perceval* I state that I have expressly excluded the Galahad romances from my Table of Grail development on account of their close relation to the *Lancelot;* on p. 300 I point out that the invention of Galahad was demanded alike in the interest of the Christian Mystic development,

[1] The first no. of Dr. Brugger's '*Enserrement Merlin*' studies, *Zeitschrift für französische Sprache*, 1905, goes fully into this question, and provides a Table of the probable development of the cycle. Mr. Waite does not appear to know these articles, which are, however, quite indispensable to students of the literature.

[2] *Nueva Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, vol. vi., Madrid, 1907. There is a copy of the original Spanish text in the Advocates' Library, Edinburgh, as well as in the British Museum.

and of *contemporary literary necessity.* We should in any case have had a Grail hero, moulded upon distinctively Christian lines. That the story took the form it did, was undoubtedly due to the necessity of connecting Lancelot, the most popular of Arthur's knights, more closely, and intimately, with the Quest of the Grail. That the original author understood what the Grail really was is obvious; it is equally obvious that he has departed widely from the original conception of the Quest. We have no longer any trace of a concrete personal experience; of an actual ritual, imperfectly understood, and reported. The terminology is retained, much to the confusion of the text; the machinery has become meaningless; there is no reason why Galahad's grandfather should bear the title of Fisher King, rather than that of King of the Strange (Foraine) Land, as he frequently does, his connection with the Talisman he should guard being of the slightest; there is no meaning in the Lance, in the Waste Land, in the Dolorous Stroke,—they are but encumbrances, as Mr. Waite in his secret soul but too well knows.

(There is no trace whatever of a genuine Welsh Galahad tradition, all the references to the hero are derived from the French. As for the connection with Cadwaldr, the form in which the Welsh writers give the name, Gwalchaved, with its obvious analogy to Gwalchmai, should be sufficient in itself to dispose of the idea.)

The Quest is here no longer a quest, for Galahad knows well where Corbenic is, and its marvels are open to him, without any test, be it of sword or question, whenever he pleases. Thus, while Galahad, in relation to the Grail itself, is a true Grail hero, yet, considered from the point of the original conception of the story,

the *Queste* is not a Grail romance in the same sense as are the romances connected with Gawain and Perceval; it is not the record of the individual experience of an individual hero, but is the gathering up of numerous and divergent themes in the interests of the *Lancelot-Arthur* complex.

As to the spiritual and ethical value to be assigned to different romances of the cycle, that is a question to be determined by personal temperament, and, probably, personal experience; argument is here of little avail. Personally, the crass materialism of the *Grand-Saint-Graal-Queste* group repels me; I frankly detest the first romance, and, with the exception of certain passages, notably those relating to Lancelot's Grail experiences, see very little to admire in the second;[1] while von Eschenbach's *Parzival* commends itself more and more to my mind as the work of a man of quite extraordinary constructive genius, and deep spiritual insight. His hero stands out in startling and salient relief as the one real, living, individual personality of Mediæval romance.

You can no more compare Galahad with Parzival than you can compare an illumination in a Mediæval Missal with a portrait by Titian or Velasquez. How is it that Mr. Waite has failed to grasp the psychological value of this truly great work, this deeply interesting study of the evolution of a soul—"*a brave man, yet slowly wise*"? The key-note of the poem is the hero's unswerving faithfulness to the light within him, which leads him step by step, from raw boyhood, to the perfection of Christian knighthood. From literal obedience to his mother's counsels he passes to an

[1] It is now generally admitted that, in their present form, the two are by the same hand.

equally loyal, and literal, adherence to Gurnemanz's knightly instruction; these outward aids failing him, he turns to an inward, and ethical, guide, to fidelity to his wife, and rises from that to the recognition of a Spiritual obligation, imposed from above. In the whole range of literature I know no more *loyal* hero, in the fullest sense of the word, than Parzival. Nor should it be forgotten that one of the main interests of the work to scholars, is the fact that it presents a curiously faithful picture of contemporary manners and customs. Certain points which arouse Mr. Waite's indignation, such as the treatment of heathen princesses by their Christian lovers, were inevitable, given the circumstances of the period; to be unbaptised was to be outside the covenant, and no contract entered into with a heathen was binding on a Christian. To-day our moral sense is keener, but let us admit also that our Faith is less ardent!

Mr. Waite's remarks (*op. cit.* Bk. VI.) on the poem show the most extraordinary confusion of thought, and lack of intimate knowledge. He calls Herzeleide Queen of Anjou; she was Queen of Waleis and Norgales; her second husband, Gamuret, was Prince of Anjou, and the heritage passed to his son, Parzival. He asks if she were "an inbred daughter of the (Grail) house?" Herzeleide was, of course, daughter of the Grail King, and the account of her marriage and departure with her first husband, who died on the homeward journey, is given. Mr. Waite asks, Why did she not bring up her son in the Grail Castle? Setting aside the fact that Parzival is the hero of a story, independent of, and quite as famous as the Grail tradition, the '*données*' of which had to be adhered to, the married maidens were never retained as inhabitants of the Grail Castle. Again, why spell

the names according to Wagner, and not according to Wolfram—Par*s*ifal for Par*z*ival, A*m*fortas for A*n*fortas —when the subject of discussion is the poem, and not the music-drama? This whole section requires drastic remodelling.

But let us accept Mr. Waite's presentation of the character of Galahad; is that of Parzival really so inferior? Remember von Eschenbach's conception of the Grail Kingdom—a centre of civilising influences, whence rulers are sent forth to bring peace and order to distracted States. If the world needs the mystics, solitaries, and saints, it also needs the Christian ruler; because we honour Antony and Benedict, shall we decry and belittle Alfred and Louis? Mr. Waite's attitude towards the poem is the more to be deprecated as he is writing for those who have little or no first-hand knowledge of the subject; his readers would certainly never suspect from his pages that the *Parzival* belongs to the order of great literature and, alike from its authorship and its intrinsic merits, ranks above all the other romances of the cycle.

(The Longer Prose *Perceval*, more correctly *Perlesvaus*, was not, as Mr. Waite thinks, an alternative to the Galahad *Queste*, but its antecedent; we have MSS. of the *Lancelot* in which direct allusions are made to Perlesvaus as the winner of the Grail, and MSS. in which these very allusions have been altered in favour of his successor, *Perlesvaus* being scratched out and *Galahad* written above. Why does Mr. Waite say (p. 698), "there *was* a German *Lanzelet*"? The *Lanzelet* exists, was edited by Hahn, and I devoted Chapter II. of my *Lancelot* Studies to a *résumé*, and discussion of its contents. Mr. Waite's knowledge of the texts is, no doubt, sufficient for his purpose, *i.e.* the discussion

of the Grail itself, from the Christian point of view, but it is only a partial knowledge, and the summaries are frequently very misleading. Another point, the title of 'Haut Prince,' here applied to Galahad, belongs in truth to *Galehault*, Lancelot's friend. It is rarely used of Galahad, and is almost certainly a borrowing from the earlier section of the *Lancelot*.)

This much seems to me certain: The Grail Literature is complex and inharmonious, but in its very complexity and lack of harmony lies much of its evidential value. To attempt to reduce it to greater simplicity, by bringing into undue prominence one group of elements, whether that group be Christian or non-Christian, is to lessen its value as a witness to the essential unity of the religious Idea, the importance always and everywhere attached to the Quest, and the identity of the Goal, whether that Idea, that Quest, and that Goal were expressed in pre-Christian or Christian terms.

JESSIE L. WESTON.

AN INNOCENT IN HADES.

E. R. INNES.

(I WAS alone in my study thinking deeply over a fatal accident which had befallen a young friend of mine some time ago, when I seemed to pass into his atmosphere, and had the following vivid record of the accident and the sequel given me. It is as I seemed to hear it, but of course I cannot vouch for its verbal accuracy.—E. R. I.).

IT was a beautiful summer's day; I was walking along a country road in the best of spirits and the best of health. I was just descending towards the little village of P——, where the hill takes a sharp curve to the left, when I heard a motor-horn sound behind me.

* * * *

I lost consciousness; I do not know for how long; but at length awoke to find myself in some amount of distress or rather anxiety. "What has happened?" I asked myself. "Wherever am I? Why can I not see?" I rubbed my eyes and tried to sit up. Even then I could see nothing; it was as if there were a misty veil before me obscuring everything. I lay back and listened. "Poor fellow! he's done for," I heard somebody say. "How did it happen?" asked another. I sat up more determined than ever to see who it was that was talking; but I could see nothing. "Who is done for?" I asked. "What has happened? Do tell

me; I cannot think where I am." My remarks were met with stony silence, and I began to think I must be dreaming. Very soon, however, I felt someone touch me; I felt myself lifted up. This awakened me to some power of vision; I now saw my own body lifted on to a stretcher and carried off. "Great Scott," I thought, "I must have met with an accident!" Again I felt tired and relapsed into a state of semi-unconsciousness.

I was next wakened by the sobbing of my mother. I jumped up to see where she was and why she was crying so piteously. I say I jumped up; but really it felt more as if I had been shot rapidly through a tube like a pellet, the activity was so instantaneous and so direct. I saw dimly my mother and my nearest relatives gathered together in great distress, and I gleaned from their conversation that I had been killed in a motor accident two days before. "How absurd," I thought, "to say I am dead; I am sure I can easily come back to life again. Why don't they try to revive me!"

I next found myself upstairs and there saw my body stretched out on a bed. It gave me a horrible shock, it looked so corpse-like; I could see my own body more distinctly than other things. Then I again lost consciousness.

When I next woke my friends were all round me. Though I could see them only dimly, I could feel them quite distinctly; I knew how many were present and could have named each of them. What woke me from my state of unconsciousness, however, was the glorious singing. I could hear as well as ever; at least I could hear the music and chanting as well as ever, but when my friends spoke I could only hear with difficulty, and not all that was said. Again I allowed myself to re-

lapse into a dreamy mood, listening only to the singing, till it wafted me far away to a delicious state of peace and quiet.

The music grew more and more faint; at last it became inaudible. . . . Suddenly my state of peace was broken in upon by light and flames. Everything around seemed to light up all at once. "What a glorious sight!" I thought. "Where am I? What is it?" Flames leapt around me; though I could feel them, they did not burn me; they seemed rather to vivify me and rouse me to further life and consciousness. The fire burnt on more and more brightly, more and more gloriously. Sweet scents filled the air. I was in a delirium of delight, . . . when suddenly the scene changed. . . . Then I knew that the cremation was over.

It was some time before I again tried to collect my thoughts; but when I did so ideas came much more clearly and a certain amount of memory returned. I remembered walking along the country road; and then what had been an entire blank, began to be filled in with a few more details.

"Well, it is quite certain now that I am dead," I thought to myself. "They have cremated my body; so I had better not trouble any more about it, but set to work to wake up properly in the next world." And yet it seemed to me that I still had a body. Only my eyes now appeared to be in the middle of it! I could not see beyond. It was a much larger body than I had on earth; indeed it was as much as ever I could do to see to the end of it; as to seeing beyond it, I did not expect this, any more than when on earth people expect to be able to see beyond the horizon.

After a time, however, I noticed that my huge

body was shrinking. "Whatever is happening?" I asked myself. "I wish I knew what to do; I don't want to die again,—unless it is the proper thing to do." I had no sooner given expression to this thought than it was answered: "You are going on a journey; so you had better begin to pack up."

"Who are you?" I asked; for I could see nobody, though I had become aware of the arrival of a friendly presence.

"I am your guardian."

"Are you really? What a comfort! I suppose you know your way about. Are you going with me on the journey?"

"Yes."

"Where am I going?"

"You are going to heaven."

"Are you quite sure I am going to heaven and not to—the other place?" I asked.

"You are going to heaven *first*," was the answer.

I thought this funny; it seemed precisely the reverse order to what one had been brought up to. But then I remembered that I was dead, and that on the other side of death everything probably would get reversed.

"What sort of a place is heaven?" I asked.

"You will soon know. Pack up and come along."

I forgot to say that my new body roughly speaking was spherical in shape, and now it was beginning to reduce itself more and more in size. I was standing on what appeared to be a cube; and someone seemed strangely enough to be taking down all the stars which were hanging in the sky—for my body was so huge and looked so full of stars, that I naturally called it the sky—and packing them away inside this cube under-

neath me. I watched the process with great interest and some amount of amusement. I tried to think if there were any passage in the Bible that might throw light on the proceeding; but as I was never much of a Bible reader I was not surprised that I could not recall any.

The lower part of my new body was like the sea, the upper part like the sky. As the stars were taken down one by one, not only did the sky seem to hang round me more and more closely, but the sea, too, drew nearer and nearer; I felt just like a small child at the seaside standing on his sand-built castle with the tide gradually surrounding it more and more closely. The stars had nearly all been taken down (there never had been either sun or moon, though there was light); and now the sea began to roar around me until I got quite scared.

"Do stop taking down those stars," I cried like a baby. "You are making the sea come right up to me; and I've only one small box left to stand upon. I shall be drowned in a minute, if you don't stop, and I don't particularly want to die again."

"You will not be drowned," came the answer. "You have to get into that cube yourself, in with all your stars. You'll be quite comfortable; and in a very short time you will be called out again. Open your cube and get in!"

"But I don't want to get into that beastly little box," I protested. "It's much too small." I had got rather puffed up with the magnitude and importance of my new body, and this seemed a poor exchange. "If you don't get in the sea will wash you in," said the voice. So after another roar from the invading tide, I got down from my cube, opened the lid, and settled

myself in. It was quite comfortable. I was still surrounded by stars, and soon fell asleep.

I was roused by someone calling out: "Are you ready to get up?" "Quite ready!" I answered, wondering for the moment where I was and who was calling. "You like swimming, do you not?" the voice said. I answered "Yes," somewhat dubiously. "You are now going to have a dip in the sea; don't be frightened." The door of my cube opened, and I came out to find myself at the very bottom of the sea. "Are you sure I shall not drown?" I asked. "You are all right," came the answer. "Swim about."

I now found that I had got a new body. It was not the body of a fish, as one might have expected, but seemed to me more worm-like or slug-like! I was rather disgusted at being only a worm; as I had begun with such a magnificent and spacious body it seemed a decided change for the worse. I swam on, however.

At first it was rather uninteresting. I swam on and on without getting the least tired; it was more like breathing, for I was not conscious of movement. But gradually what had been uninteresting became absorbingly interesting,—most delightful though rather uncanny.

I found myself amongst my people again; I could not see them, for my new worm-like body had no eyes, but I could feel them; and I felt more with them, more dear to them than ever before. All my people and friends had been brought to heaven to be with me, or else I was back on earth; I really could not say which, and did not care to try. It was just splendid; all I knew was that I was swimming about in a great sea and that I never got tired. There was something uncanny about it though, for all my friends seemed at times to

be so near me as to become me; and then I got a little muddled. This muddle-headedness went on increasing. I began to feel more and more distinctly that I was becoming all my friends, and that I was ceasing to be myself; or rather everything and everybody who used to be outside and apart from me, were now becoming *me*, and that *I* was now a sort of vanishing point outside myself,—a mere focus somewhere, I really could not say where. It felt most extraordinary, so uncanny that I got a little frightened; when I heard the same voice again:

"In heaven all things are reversed. What was outside you on earth will be inside you in heaven. What was inside you on earth will be outside you in heaven."

I pondered over this a long time; at last I replied rather indignantly: "I don't believe it ever said that in the Bible." For the utterance had been given forth in a sort of authoritative tone as if I ought to have known it, and I did not remember ever having heard that. But whether I had ever heard it or not, there was no doubt that it was fast becoming a fact. I no longer felt like one, I felt like many; I seemed to be getting scattered in all directions. It was most difficult to keep myself together; I no longer was only the worm-like thing; I began to be all the different currents in the sea, which were always passing through and through the worm, like breath through the body of man. I began to have definite and discrete sensations, and they were not all quite so delicious as the one great ocean of feeling had been.

"Now," thought I, "I am coming to hell," and I braced myself up for the worst; but I did so almost with a laugh, for I never had had much belief in all the

instruments of torture described for that region. But just at my moment of incredulity an awful stab went through me, and I yelled out with pain. "Come and pull me out," I shouted. "Help! I'm drowning." But there was no one to hear my call, for gradually the whole sea had become me; and it was rather a stormy sea at that moment. Again I called out in desperation, and the voice returned; and with its return there was peace in the place of tumult. I think I was crying—if worms can cry. I felt very miserable; but the moment the voice returned I became reassured; I felt safe once more. The presence seemed to change my hell into heaven at once.

"I cannot hold myself together," I said. "Why do I feel as though all my different parts kept running away from me? It is most terrifying. I never believed in hell before I died; but I do now. I feel quite sore already." Then I was told:

"This sea is the sea of passion through which the soul of man has to pass before it can rise higher. Earth-life and after-life are two complementary phases of one existence. The after-life which the soul earns, is the result of its activities during earth-life. During earth-life man is in a positive and active condition; during the after-life he is in a passive or receptive condition. On earth it is man's friends and his surroundings that bear the brunt of his activities; in the after-life he gathers up the results of all his activities—the results as experienced by those around him when on earth—and is brought into conscious touch with them. Each soul will have to experience exactly that which it has caused those around it to experience, for the after-state is the complement of earth-life. The great saying 'Do unto others as you would that

they should do to you' is founded upon knowledge of the truth that man and his surroundings are one; that before man can attain to union with God he must first attain to union with his immediate surroundings. And this he does in the after-state. God is everywhere and it is allowed to man during each earth-life to participate in the calling forth of the divine power latent in all. In his after-life he unites with this divine power which he has aroused. If man on earth calls forth love and harmony, righteousness and truth, then that man after death unites with this force, which is the result of his own activities; he unites with the powers of goodness and virtue. If a man has so lived as to cause those around him to be cruel or deceitful or cunning in evil, then after death he is united to these forces of evil and naked, unclothed in any earthly vesture to temper the power of these passions, he experiences the pain and anguish of going contrary to the law. He is dragged down; for unaided he cannot rise to those states of Bliss which the Lord of the World, the Most Merciful Father of Humanity, has decreed shall be the resting place of each soul between its periods of activity. Every soul attains these states of Bliss after every earth-life. The advancing soul attains to them more quickly, and with less aid; and with each further effort on the part of man to reach the goal unaided comes further power and further consciousness of the laws which control the universe. For self-reliance is the portal to self-consciousness.

"The sea in which you now find yourself, you naturally associate with the friends and loved ones whom you knew on earth; for it is indeed a sea of their emotion, the result of all those passions which you aroused in those with whom you came in contact.

At first it was pleasurable; for the balance of force for you was on the side of good; now that you have experienced a stabbing pain, you may know that during your earth-life you at some time led some one astray from the paths of virtue, that you associated yourself for a time with the powers of evil. As you live on in this sea of emotion, which you have yourself created, your present body will gradually become clothed with a soft and hair-like covering; with this growth the feelings you experience will become more and more exquisite, more and more discrete. At first the soul is plunged into this sea with a rudimentary body, the mere primitive plasm of that body which he may afterwards possess. With this body the soul experiences only the sum-total of all the forces of which he is the author. But if you would grow and learn and bring to birth in yourself further consciousness, further power to unite heaven and earth, further power to relate the one to the other, you must experience each detailed passion and emotion separately. You must in fact review your whole past life, not with mortal eyes, but with a heavenly body, riveting in that body the result of every activity of your earthly existence on to its own true source. Every emotion which you aroused in others you must win back; for you are now gradually ceasing to be your limited self, you are extending your field of feeling.

"Even as the hairs of man's head are numbered, so are the hairs which will now grow upon your body numbered; they are feelers with which to experience individually the varying thrills of emotion to which you have given birth. How could man give birth to feelings in others unless they shared together some common soul-life, some common body of experience?

It is towards this common body you now have to strive. You have called to me to release you from these turbulent waters; but this is not a desirable thing to ask. You have only to pray and at any moment my presence will be with you to instruct you, but not to release you unless you faint with weariness and cry to be set free. But to evade your responsibility thus, only weakens your capacities in the future. For it is through this conscious experiencing that the soul learns, and is born again with added wisdom. This sea is a sea of power born of your own action; if you would attain to power and progress you must become master of this ocean. Call upon me as often as you will to guide, instruct and comfort you; but call upon no one to do for you that work which is essentially your own to do. It is your privilege thus to learn if you will; but if you choose rather to wander in the paths of ignorance, it is permitted me to release you at any moment, and to pay for you that debt which you owe the world. To call upon others greater than yourself to release you may lead to temporary peace; but it does not lead to permanent wisdom and understanding. Know that you will not drown, however mighty the billows may appear; for that power which enabled you to create such passion is still with you if you seek it, and can be used for the stilling of the waters of its own creation.

"The reason for your feeling so torn in pieces, is that to most people of the present day the idea of separateness and individuality is more dear than that of unity; the feeling of independence is deemed a greater privilege than the feeling of surrender to the great sweep of life belonging to the One Whole. Man has yet to learn the true place for independence, namely, independence of idea, co-operation in action; this brings

with it the truly harmonious life. The passions of men tend more towards independence than towards unity. It is these passions which you are now experiencing. My presence is ever with you; if it withdraw for a time from any conscious contact, it is only that you may thus gain in strength and independence."

I was again left in solitude, but feeling very much strengthened and cheered. I felt that I knew now what I had to do, and surely I could find pluck enough to do it. I felt confident that I would swim that sea without ever again crying out in weakness to be released. I was young then, and little knew how turbulent those waters could be. But I am through the ocean now; and though I regret to say that I called out many times to be released, I only needed that reassuring presence to urge me to stick to the fight till the end. At times it was a struggle and a tussle; but it was soon over, and I laugh now to think what a fuss I made about it. For during much of the time I had nothing but pleasure; my pangs of woe were very intermittent, my sorrow and suffering, though sometimes acute, were never prolonged, and more often than not they were momentary. The work became ever more interesting, for I could watch myself grow even as a mother can watch sometimes in amazement the rapid growth of her child.

(The rest of my friend's adventures in Hades are in the hands of the Editor, but he thinks it probable the readers of THE QUEST have had enough of them already.)

E. R. INNES.

A CHILD'S GARDEN.

M. U. GREEN.

Rosemary for remembrance.

It was a small circular garden, set inside high box hedges, wherein a child might play unseen, or dig and plant as hidden fancy led him.

In spite of its thick hedges, the sun shone always in that garden; and in the middle of its round centre bed, toward which all the tiny box-bordered paths converged, stood a sun-dial. Round about the stone was written, 'Rede the riddle of the sun'; but the child who played in the garden never troubled his head about riddles, perhaps because he was so late in learning how to read.

He had been a delicate child, ordered to live in the open air and sunshine, without the brain-work which would turn him into a learned scholar like his father. That father sat indoors all day, in a library that smelt of ancient books, with narrow latticed windows rarely opened, and bent his rounded shoulders to his volumes, while his thin scholar's hands turned countless pages, and his dim scholar's eyes made out obscure passages in crabbed lettering. He went out only when the child went in, at bed-time, when the bats were all abroad and the trees nodded their heads in the still sky.

The man forgot to think of the child; the child had no need of the man. Each had his part in life away

from the other, the one in his library, the other in his garden.

It was a strange garden, people said, perhaps haunted. But none had seen the ghost who haunted it, or knew the shape it took; whether some grey lady roved with soundless feet among its beds of lavender, searching with ghost-eyes among its red carnations, or leaned upon the sun-dial reading the riddle of the sun; or if sorry deeds had been done in that gentle place, shut in by secret hedges—duels fought, sins wrought, evil thought, from out of whose root, twisted as the grey old lavender stems, grew evil actions.

It was years later that a man, as he stood looking over the five-foot wall of box, saw the ghost of the garden and watched its doings with uncertain eyes. It was a daylight ghost, for the gnomon of the dial told eleven o'clock on a bright June morning.

It was a child-ghost which stole in its strapped shoes, shadow-light, between the hedges up the tiny gravel paths, just wide enough to hold the little feet when he stooped to pull up a weed, or to straighten the heavy head of a carnation, drowsy with its own fragrance.

The man held his breath as he watched, for the little ghost seemed so frail, light as vapour, drifting with little pauses up the paths. If he breathed it might be frightened, this evanescent little ghost.

He saw what a wide estate seemed the garden to the child. Each bed had all the width and riches of a continent. The boy had but to turn a tousled head, and all the treasures of Cathay were spread before him through the scent of many flowers. The man's eyes grew wider open, clearer-sighted as he watched, almost as if he shared the sight that lay in the eyes of the

child. Other shadows joined the child-ghost in the garden.

A frog hopped on the path; but the man—seeing through the grave grey eyes of the ghost-child—knew that it was no frog, but a valiant prince, mischiefed by some evil-hearted fairy. He listened to the shadowy gesture-talk between the child-ghost and the frog. It seemed to him that the child grew less frail, less shadowy, as he seemed to understand it more.

"It is a special kind of herb, you know," said the frog, in an anxious croak.

"I wish I could find it for you," said the child, prepared to ransack all the treasures of his garden. "Do you know its name?"

"Ah, that I don't know," returned the frog, sitting on the path with a sudden drop, in the same way a St. Bernard dog sits down.

The little ghost considered, finger in mouth, eyebrows puckered in a thoughtful frown. "I wonder if it would be All-heal," it suggested, looking at a wedge-shaped bed filled with scented herbs. The man saw the little back as it stooped over the border to pluck the purple-headed flower and offer it to the frog, now panting with excitement.

The child stroked the back of the frog tenderly with the herb, but without effecting any transformation. "It's very disappointing," said the frog, his big eyes starting from his head.

"There are lots more herbs," said the child, stooping again.

"But they ought to be gathered in the early sun," responded the frog doubtfully. And the man wondered how it was that he could understand its speech, for he had never, to his knowledge, held communication with

a frog. "Noon sun is too late, it should be plucked soon after sun-rise."

"Why is that?" the child asked gravely.

"Haven't the flowers told you?" said the frog. "That's because you are a boy, and boys tear their heads off and leave them to die slowly. But I'll tell you. Sunrise is the magic time, the only time that you can pluck a flower and yet can leave it growing. Remember that."

The child seemed to understand, for his shadowy face grew brighter, but the man wondered what the frog meant by its speech.

"I wonder if it could be Frog-bit?" said the child.

"Sounds as if it might be," said the frog-prince. "Get me some and try it," he added in true princely fashion.

"I mayn't go down to the pond alone," said the little ghost sorrowfully.

"You offered to help me, and refuse to do a simple thing like that!" the frog said scornfully, stamping its webbed foot. "Frog-bit, Frog-bit! I've small doubt but that it is the plant to cure me."

"I mayn't go down to the pond alone," repeated the little ghost; and the man thought its small voice trembled.

"How am I to get it, then? The flower must be given me by a well-wisher, as you know, not gathered by myself."

"That is always so, isn't it?" asked the little ghost anxiously. "I wish I might; but perhaps Mabel could get it for you,—if she would understand."

"Is Mabel your princess?"

"She is, sometimes," said the little ghost in a

puzzled fashion. "But she's like you, she changes. Sometimes she pretends to be my nurse."

"Ah, it's difficult to keep one's proper shape when so much magic is abroad," returned the frog.

How it was the man never knew, but as the child spoke the quick figure of a woman came into the little garden, carrying a tray. It was a pretty and a young figure, full of activity and light of step, but its voice was not exactly the voice that a princess should own.

"Why, Master Kay," it said, "you naughty boy, you forgot to come in for your milk and biscuits!"

And the frog hopped off to repose in the shadow under the sun-dial; and when the nurse-princess had gone it did not come out again to speak to the child.

"And I never asked Mabel if she would be so kind as to get him a piece of Frog-bit," said the little ghost. "So perhaps he'll never be changed back again."

The watching man thought that the child was on the edge of tears. It was strange that he should understand it all so clearly, though he could not bring himself to speak to the little ghost, however much he sympathised with him, not even to tell him to cheer up, because the frog was probably only a frog after all, with nothing princely under his green coat. But he could not make himself realise what his reason told him was the truth. He felt that silk-clad limbs and golden baldrics were hidden under the mottled skin of the frog. The little ghost had bewitched him for the moment.

By and by the child, eating his biscuits and drinking his milk as bidden, leaned his head toward the peal of Canterbury-bells, which rang blue and white and pink tunes behind him. They rang "Turn again Whittington," just as the London bells had rung the

tune to another boy. At the same moment a big grey cat sidled into the little garden.

The man thought the ghost looked bigger and more solid, with perhaps an extra year or two added to its growth. The Canterbury-bells seemed to have rung in an added age. The child leaned on his spade, an iron one, and scraped his boots on it in laborious imitation of his father's gardener. That gardener could be heard whistling in the larger garden.

"Puss, puss!" said the little boy-ghost; and through the garden came the stately procession of the Lord Mayor's Show, with Dick Whittington in the gilded coach, always with the cat in his arms, and the cat in its turn carried a mouse, the source of all its master's and its own prosperity.

"Oh Blinky," the boy said, "Why can't you and I go up to London and be made Lord Mayor like Dick was?"

The little shadow ran along the dial of the stone, tracing its faint line. The cat mewed, perhaps in sympathy, perhaps because the little boy had touched it roughly.

"A fairy could do it for us," said the child, rubbing the grey cat's big head. "And there are lots of fairies here."

The cat assented by gentle movements close to the caressing little hand. "But I'm not sure if they do as much as they used to do," the boy went on. "What do you think? You aren't a princess by any chance, are you? It would be very interesting. Here he hugged the cat. The cat mewed, complainingly. It was not a beautiful cat and was insufficiently washed for a grey Persian.

"Speak louder," said the child.

It seemed to the man that all around the child were countless fairy figures, not one whit more ghost-like than himself, that they took the sunshine in their little hands and poured it on the dial, twisting the gnomon round to throw a shadow. Some of these fairies seemed to express themselves, to become visible, only in the scent of the flowers. They rose in little vaporous forms from the lavender bed, all dressed in silver-grey and amethyst colour. They had dark hair and serious wistful eyes. Others swung on the honey-scented roses and wore embroidered golden hearts upon their fluttering robes. Others seemed to swoop down on the garden as the swallows flew over it, or to sail in the note of the missel-thrush, or in the flutter of each tiny leaf that felt the wind.

The man felt less sympathy with the little ghost. It seemed so foolish to wish to go to London and leave this beautiful old garden and the fairies. It seemed also that the man understood the magic of that garden almost more than did the child.

An impudent sparrow flew on the grass in front of the Persian cat. The boy kept his restraining hand on the fur, the cat's nose twitched and it pricked its ears. "Steady, that isn't a mouse, you silly," said the little boy.

For the sight of the sparrow brought with it other fairies, wonderful people who drove teams of little brown-winged creatures; who entered the little box-walled garden and changed it to a temple, so that the boy felt as if he ought to kneel. The man saw within the child a new devotion to something stronger than the ancient magic of the fairies, as he watched these radiant beings move on shining feet across the grassy ways. They were stone or leaden statues in the outer

garden, but they became alive and wonderful within the hedge of box.

Sometimes it seemed to the man that he comprehended what the little ghost-boy felt for all those wonderful stone figures, how he seemed to see the small, unsteady hands copying their lines with a pointed H.B. pencil on the leaves of an old copy-book. There was a Winged Victory, wonderful as that of Samothrace, which he knew the boy adored; and the face of a laughing faun leaned out from the shadows of the ancient ilex trees, its stone dimples seemed to change into brown flesh in the flickering lights of day.

The gnomon shadow moved as the little ghost-mind moved, as the bending flowers move at mid-day, turning toward the sun.

The boy seemed bigger. He had put off his pinafores and socks. He ran through the scented garden, past the ghost-ghost of his younger selves, intent on butterflies. But sometimes, so the man imagined, if that same ghost-boy walked there in the gloaming, when the heady scents rose up from slumberous flowers, that the fairies and the great winged goddesses companioned him, whispering strange songs in his ears, showing him something of their secret beauty, the worshipful, immortal beauty which shall never know decay. At such time the boy forgot to look at the dial, or to read the riddle of the sun. Sometimes he carried a book into the garden and read deeply. As the wind fluttered the pages, the man half thought he read the words that made the young boy's pulses beat. He wondered why his own kept time with them, as if the words fell, hot as flame, on his own heart.

He could see the little goat-thighed faun lean farther out of the dark ilex trees, hand curved to ear,

face all agrin with mischief. Little goat-feet frolicked in the shelter of the trees, little reed-pipes sounded above the song of missel-thrushes, making harmony among the winds. It seemed always to be spring or early summer in that garden.

He watched the boy welcome people from the pages of his books; men and women, not quite fairies, yet, as surely, not quite human in their stature. He recognised those wonderful proud men. Athos, with his secret, walked within those garden limits locked in triple pride; Aramis carried a cypher handkerchief in his delicate hand; Porthos swaggered in his golden baldric, and d'Artagnan carried sheaves of broken swords. The flowerful garden swam in ghostly blood, the sick men fainted on the stand of the sun-dial. There was the sound of clashing swords and ringing spurs above the murmur of the summer wind. Miladi's curls shamed the sun; but neither the man nor the ghost-boy had the heart to let her suffer at the headsman's hands. She was far too beautiful. She repented her of evil and became one with the fairy queen. Just as Mab is mischievous at times, though her real name is Titania, so had Miladi wrought her ill and returned to her old innocence, cleansed of her sin. For, as the frog said, it is difficult to keep one's proper shape when magic is abroad.

The child's garden was still a wonder-garden, for now it seemed that the flowers grew as stories or as statues. Love, a charming naked Cupid, lay a-bleeding, wounded by his mother's rose-bush. Lady Venus, beautiful as Mary Mother, sucked the hurt finger with her own dear mouth and kissed it into healing. Cupid ran down the narrow paths and shot sun-arrows at his mother's birds. The ghost-boy and the grown, grey

man watched the flying figure. Lady Venus rearranged her hair in her own looking-glass, making her toilette with that simplicity which is the mark of the true goddess. She wore a face which the man seemed to know. It was not the face of that great statue which Dumont found at Melos, but it had something of the same serene nobility. The man found himself envying the boy that treasure of his garden, his inviolate goddess.

There came as well the men of the Round Table, noble, knightly men, whose very sins seemed greater than are the virtues of good men to-day. Arthur lifted his grand figure from the beds of pansies; surely he had found his healing in that sheltered Avalon. And Lancelot and Guinevere walked there unrebuked, for their love was stronger than their sin, and in that magic garden Arthur understood and so forgave. Perhaps that was a part of his healing.

The ghost-child was older now, graver and more set of face. His eyes wandered often to the riddle of the sun, watching the shadow as it crept along the dial. He had marks of clay on his clothes, and a deep line was cut between his eyebrows. The man recognised him for one of his own tribe, a sculptor. And he looked back, long and far, to the time when the little white-smocked boy drew the Winged Victory with an H.B. pencil—copied in such wavering, faint lines.

The man watched the figures blend in the child's garden, shaping themselves as colour shapes itself in light. Little ghost-boy and man with the clay on his sleeves were one and the same ghost, though the shadow had crept a little further on the dial, and the riddle of the sun had grown more difficult to read. He watched the young man clean the ancient letters of

their moss, and bend his close-shorn head to study them more closely. At the same time, it seemed to the watcher that the tangled curls of the young child leaned over the bent shoulder, urging him not to forget the sunshine while he tried to read its riddle; telling him that the world was still filled with his fairy-folk, standing, perhaps, a little further back among the shadows of the trees, but only waiting for his call to join him, just as the laughing faun hid himself for mischievous delight in being found.

So the man watched the drifting, shape-shifting ghosts and the shades of ancient memories and beautiful faint dreams. They flew into the air, harnessed like the sparrows, to some invisible car, perhaps of Venus, winged, triumphant, perhaps of mischievous Mab, who laughed at their evanishment. Perhaps they entered into heaven through the gate of ivory, and a flock of beautiful white pigeons, delicate as maiden thoughts, followed their flight.

The man watched through the long summer day, till the shadows stood in ranks in the dim background, waiting for their hour.

And a man and woman leaned over the old sun-dial where the child had played. Mouth kissed mouth under the stately moon. The scent of tall white lilies rose up in the moonlight, and the rose petals were warm to touch that summer night.

"'Rede the riddle of the sun'" the man said lingeringly. "Isn't its riddle plain to us, Princess?"

But no one read the riddle in the moonlight, because it cannot set the time along the dial. For the sun had set.

M. U. GREEN.

LIGHT.

LIGHT, by blind waves begotten,
  But born in our own eyes,
Wilt thou, too, sleep forgotten
  When this that bore thee dies;

When like a single cymbal still
  The unknown power strikes down
And no dark terrene nerve can thrill
  With colours all its own;

When man and beast and bird and bee
  No longer lend their powers
To make an emerald of the sea,
  A rainbow of the flowers?

Were all eyes sealed for ever
  Where wouldst thou make thy home?
Vainly the blind dark waves would quiver,
  The unanswered forces roam.

Dark hands might grope and blunder
  Among soft shapes of flowers,
Sweet scents might wake our wonder,
  Sweet sounds,—these, too, are ours!

Ours; for we still but gather
  Our own blind feelings here!
Flowers? Call them whispers rather,
  Caresses from—out there.

In our own ears the sighing,
  Without—the mute air-wave;
In our own hearts the flying
  Sense of the love we crave.

Whether with souls that languish
  Or lips that meet and kiss,
Howe'er we bleed in anguish,
  Whate'er we plead in bliss,

Whether the dawn be bright'ning
  Or darkness cloud the road,
We ask and ask by lightning
  In our brief signal-code.

All that we feel respond is
  The flash from nerve to brain,
And the Answerer beyond is
  Not this, but—night again.

O, dream that all inherit,
  In fields and skies unfurled!
O, pageant of the spirit
  Which we mis-call the world!

Thou, creature of our senses,
  Thou cry of smitten strings,
Ours is the lute; but whence is
  The hand of, ah, what Soul that sings?

What waif of glory lingers,
  O world, which half we make,
When, 'neath the Eternal fingers,
  We, lute-strings, break?

ALFRED NOYES.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

THE ODES AND PSALMS OF SOLOMON.

Now first published from the Syriac Version. By J. Rendel Harris, M.A., D.Litt., etc. Cambridge (The University Press), 1909.

An Early Christian Psalter. London (Nisbet), 1909.

THE first of these books contains the Syriac text, with the translation, notes, introduction and critical treatment of the material; the second has the translation of the Odes, with brief commentaries, and is intended to serve for devotional purposes. As our readers are already familiar with the main outlines of the subject from Dr. Rendel Harris's intensely interesting article which appeared in our last issue, we may plunge into the middle of things without further preliminaries. The newly recovered Odes are distinguishable at once from the already known Jewish Solomonic Psalms by (with slight exceptions) their very great beauty, and no lover of high scripture should fail to read them; indeed they deserve to be marked and learned and inwardly digested as well. In date they should be early; if for no other reasons, because the Church is nowhere referred to, but only the Kingdom. As to language, the Syriac is plainly a translation from the Greek. The lost original of the Greek Psalms was Hebrew, and a Greek translation is known to have existed in all probability as early as about the middle of the first century A.D. But what of the Odes—was their original form Greek or Hebrew or Aramaic? On this question Dr. Rendel Harris does not give us the benefit of his valuable opinion. The few Odes previously known from quotations in the Coptic translation of the lost original Greek of the *Pistis Sophia*, were plainly taken by the author of that Gnostic document from a Greek Bible. Now it is generally assumed (following Harnack) that P.S. was written in the second half of the third century; but so far we have seen no really satisfactory proof of this assumption. The matter is still, we venture to think, *sub judice*, and cannot be decided until the details of the system (exclusive of the Egyptian

elements) underlying P.S. (and the other writings in the Bruce Codex) have been very thoroughly compared with the details of the systems underlying the Mandæan and Manichæan writings, which are now attracting more and more attention. All three are derivations, fundamentally throwing back to Chaldæo-Persian traditions, and we are inclined to think that the system in the P.S. is earlier than the religion of Mānī (c. 238 A.D.). However this may be, the author of P.S. quoted the Odes in Greek, and that, too, as O.T. scripture. This is a very important point. He may of course have had a different collection of Odes before him, containing fewer than those in the Syriac version; or he may have had the same pieces, but in a form that apparently allowed him to regard them as pre-Christian; this would mean that our collection has been subjected to occasional retouching or interpolation. For if the Greek text of the newly recovered Odes as we have them in Syriac, lay before him, we should be confronted with the extraordinary fact, that the author of P.S. regarded them all without exception not as distinctively Christian but as pre-Christian Messianic psalms, that is as prophetic; for he places them on a level with the contents of the traditional Davidic psalter, and apparently has no suspicion that their form would stamp them plainly on all hands as the writings of those who had already known and worshipped Jesus. We, therefore, think it somewhat improbable that the Greek of the whole of the Syriac Odes as they stand lay before the writer or compiler of P.S. It is true this scripture-maker moved in circles whose traditions differed vastly from those of the synoptic writers; but that anyone should have ventured to write such a document as the P.S. as late as the second half of the third century seems somewhat improbable; the orthodox view had by then taken so firm a hold, and the Gnosis had been so thoroughly warred down in the West, that such a document could not have stood the slightest chance of successful circulation. It seems far more probable that P.S. belongs to the second century. Now the atmosphere of the whole of the Odes differs greatly from that of the Psalms, and they must in any case be ascribed to a school of Ode-writers of a far more spiritual and gentle nature than the writers of the distinctly Zealotic Psalms. The writer of P.S., however, knows nothing of the origin of the Odes historically, or he could not have quoted them under the name of Solomon, least of all could he have known they were Christian, when he quotes them as scripture in what purports to be a post-resurrectional gospel.

As the result of his careful analysis Dr. Rendel Harris concludes that "the majority of the Odes come from a single hand, or if we prefer it, from the same school." We think that the latter alternative is to be preferred; it is by no means an uncommon phenomenon for religious enthusiasm, engendered in the same tradition or school, to write in the same style and spirit. We cannot, however, see any very decisive reason why the whole of the Ode referring to the Virgin Birth should necessarily be put later than the rest; it may be over-written in part. There are two references to the Virgin. In 33 9-8, it is said: "There arose a Perfect Virgin who was proclaiming and calling out and saying, O ye sons of men, return ye, and ye daughters of men, live ye: and forsake the ways of that corruption and draw nigh unto me, and I will enter into you, and will bring you forth from perdition, and make you wise in the ways of truth." The Virgin is here clearly Wisdom, as may be seen by comparing the first verses of Proverbs 8. But in 19 6f. we read: ". . . opened the womb of the Virgin and she received conception and brought forth; and the Virgin became a Mother with many mercies; and she travailed and brought forth a Son, without incurring pain; and because she was not sufficiently prepared, and she had not sought a midwife (for He brought her to bear), she brought forth, as if she were a man, of her own will; and she brought him forth openly, and acquired him with great dignity, and loved him in his swaddling clothes, and guarded him kindly, and shewed him in majesty."

Here the phrases beginning "and because she was not sufficiently prepared" may very probably be an echo of some apocryphal gospel of an historicising tendency, and thus may be interpolated. "Swaddling clothes" is an 'emendation' of the editor's.

Now Philo, who is for all practical purposes pre-Christian, already teems with references to virginity and a virgin birth, especially in connection with his beloved Therapeuts and allied mystics. (See *Thrice-greatest Herm.* i. 216-224.) Dr. Rendel Harris completes the opening lacuna in the above passage with "The Spirit," but Philo would probably have written "The Father." For Philo *the* Virgin is Virtue and Wisdom, and for him there were many virgin-mothers, both men and women; they gave birth to their renewed spiritual selves. Wisdom was the Virgin-spouse of God, and Philo (*De Mut. Nom.* 24) tells us that "Wisdom, who, after the fashion of a mother, brings forth the self-taught Race, declares that God is the sower of it." (Cp. *Corp. Herm.*

18 2: "Wisdom that understands in silence; such is the matter and the womb from out which Man is born, and the True Good the seed.") The Son is the Race, the spiritual Messianic Race—an idea that may help us to understand some things in the Odes that are otherwise very puzzling and might be thought to refer to Jesus alone; and especially the frequent identification of the Odist with the Messiah. It is more probable that the original hymn-makers wrote as members of the Messianic Race than that they usurped the person of Jesus and put hymns into his mouth. The virgin-nature brings forth as a man, of her own will; for the spiritual man was regarded as male-female, as is also in the Odes the Father Himself, who in several passages is figured as having breasts and giving milk like a mother (cp. 19 3, 35 6). The Virgin Mary, again, can hardly be called "a Mother of many mercies"; but in 36 3 the Spirit is regarded as feminine, "she brought me forth before the face of the Lord." This is common mystic and gnostic use, and the Syriac *Acts of Thomas* incorporate invocations in which the Spirit is called "Perfect Mercy" and "Mother of Compassion." The virgin-birth was the new birth or spiritual birth. Cp. 28 14: "For I was not their brother, nor was my birth like theirs"; and 36 3f.: "Although a son of man, I was named Illuminate, the Son of God: while I praised among the praising ones, and great was I among the mighty ones. For according to the greatness of the Most High, so He made me: and like His own newness He renewed me; and He anointed me with His own perfection: and I became one of His neighbours." The last phrase can hardly apply to the orthodox conception of Jesus as the unique and only Son of God, but can very well apply to the sons of the Messianic Sonship. And again 17 4, 6: "I received the face and fashion of a new person. . . . I was regarded by them as a strange person"; and yet again 41 8: "For from another race am I"—that is, of the Race of the Spirit.

Ode 42 refers at length to the Descent into Hades and contains *traits* familiar to us from apocryphal works. The editor, therefore, thinks that this also should be placed later than the rest in date. But the idea is early. The 'sign of Jonah' incident is found in Q (Mt. 16 4 = Lk. 11 29), and is further given by the first synoptist (12 40) as: "For as Jonah was three days and three nights in the whale's belly [cp. Jon. 1 17], so shall the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth"; this he most probably found already in one of his sources, otherwise we have to suppose that he invented this very important saying. Now the Whale

was the Leviāthān, the under-world monster of most probably pre-Christian Jewish mysticism. The Ophites of Celsus, for instance, use the name in their famous Diagram to represent the seven-headed Hades-monster, that is the infernal world of the animal passions. The root-idea goes back to Babylonian and Persian symbolism, as may be seen by comparing the myths still preserved in these sources with the adaptations of them in Mandæan and Manichæan writings, and a number of early Christianised Gnostic systems. (See Bousset's recent work, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis.*) In the older traditions the whole creation indeed is operated by the descent of the Saving Power to rescue the imprisoned light-powers from the dominion of Chaos; on His appearing they run together to Him; it is the ingathering of the Members of the Primal Man that had been swallowed by the Demons of Darkness. Cp. in our Ode: "And those who had died ran towards me." This is a phase of the familiar running together of the *humectatio luminis*, or 'moistening of light,' that occurs in a number of Gnostic systems. There seems, therefore, no absolute necessity for regarding the idea of the Descent into Hades as a decisive mark of lateness of date.

Dr. Rendel Harris, however, seems very anxious to keep the Odes clear of any suspicion of 'Gnostic' tendencies, and by Gnostic he seems to mean solely the elaborate apocalyptic speculations, of which so much ridicule is generally made. We have still, however, a few relics of simple and beautiful Gnostic hymns used for devotional purposes, and it is almost certain that many others were adapted and taken over by the Orthodox Church; for we know that the Gnostics were prolific writers of hymns and psalms and odes, and we know how Ephraem treated the hymns of Bardaiṣan and his son Harmonius. It was not the hymns of the Gnostics, but the highly complex speculations and the involved symbolism of their cosmogonical and soteriological treatises that the Church Fathers ridiculed; and indeed it would be easy, with Bousset, to dispose of the contents of the Bruce Codex, for instance, with the convenient label *Hexentanz*, were it not, strangely enough, that just when the Witches' dance appears the maddest, we not infrequently catch glimpses of the most beautiful forms and ideas. Our Odes are certainly not of this order, but they as certainly use a mystic symbolism. Not only so, but the reiterated insistence throughout on truth, wisdom and knowledge (spiritual gnosis of course) differentiates them from the synoptic writings, and marks them out as the work of practical mystics if not of contemplatives.

(But compare 26 11, 12: "Who is able to interpret the wonders of the Lord? For he who could interpret would be dissolved and would become that which is interpreted.") The false-title itself, 'Odes of Solomon,' clearly throws back to the Wisdom-literature. The original writers may very probably have been Jews by birth; the Odes as they stand, however, are to be classed as Judæo-Christian, but of a universalistic character. There is, however, no mention of the name Jesus, and one of the most interesting points established is that there is not a single clear quotation from any of the N.T. writings to be found; Dr. Rendel Harris, however, thinks that a number of phrases "betray a Johannine atmosphere: but they do not betray a use of the Fourth Gospel"; such contradictions make the problem of origin all the more fascinating, for the writer of the Fourth Gospel can by no means be classed as a Judæo-Christian, and he treats even the synoptic accounts with the greatest freedom. *The Acts of John*, also, seem to echo the same symbolism.

If we seek for any historical allusions in the Odes, they are difficult to find. A possible historical reference is 4 1ff.: "No man, O God, changes thy holy place: and it is not possible that he should change it and put it in another place: because he has no power over it: for thy sanctuary was designed before thou didst make other places: that which is the elder shall not be altered by that which is younger than itself." The Sanctuary, for mystical Jews, was pre-existent, before the worlds; it was the eternal type. Indeed it seems to be called in the same Ode, God's 'heart' (5), His 'grace' (7), and again His 'rest' (8). It is the Shrine in the Heavenly Jerusalem, the Holy City, the Divine Body of God. Such a passage could very well be uttered by those who refrained from the temple-worship and its blood-sacrifices, as we know the Essenes did. The 'younger' would then be the sanctuary on earth, where the blood-rites were performed. The true Sanctuary was of the Spirit, and the sacrifices of the Spirit are the thanksgivings of a clean heart and the praise-offerings of a pure mind, which are repeatedly insisted on in the Odes. If this suffices, and we think it does suffice, then this Ode was written before the destruction of the Temple. Dr. Rendel Harris, however, thinks it refers to some attempt to change the place of the earthly Temple; but history knows nothing of any such suggestion at any date that would suit the composition of this Ode. There were three sanctuaries besides the Temple at Jerusalem—namely at Gerizim in Samaria, and at Assouan and Leontopolis in Egypt;

but the dates of their foundations are all too early for us. The temple of Onias at Leontopolis, however, was destroyed by the Romans in 73 A.D., and Dr. Rendel Harris thinks that the Odist, who was a Palestinian Jew and jealous of the Jerusalem Temple, may apparently have had in his mind: "See what comes of setting up another sanctuary!" But how could this have been when the Jerusalem Temple already lay in ruins? There are also frequent references to wars; but in every case these wars seem to be spiritual conflicts. As far, then, as we can see at present, there are no historical allusions to help us. In conclusion we may select one or two special points of interest.

First with regard to the Cross: "And his Members are with him; and on them do I hang" (3 2). Cp. 'The Vision of the Cross of Light' in *The Acts of John*, 100 (14), ed. Bonnet: "And as to those whom thou seest on the Cross, if they have not also one form, [it is because] every Member (or Limb) of Him who descended hath not yet been gathered together." (An alternative reading for "every Limb" is "the whole *Race*.") We may also compare the phrases, in the untitled Apocalypse of the Bruce Codex, "The outspreading of His hands is the Manifestation of the Cross," and "These are the worlds from which the Cross upsprang; out of these incorporeal Members did the Man arise," with 7 2, 3: "For the extension of my hands is His sign: and my expansion is the upright Tree [or Cross]" (repeated almost verbally in 42 2, 3).

"For there went forth a stream and became a river great and broad; for it flooded and broke up everything and brought [water] to the temple," or perhaps "poured itself over the temple." The editor has no doubt that this refers to the flood of Christianity and the temple at Jerusalem; the writer of *Pistis Sophia*, however, took the 'temple' to mean the faithful and repentant soul. Christianity can hardly be said to have brought water to the Jerusalem Temple; but if the temple was the Heavenly Sanctuary, its representative on earth was the heart of the believer. We have also to remember that Jewish propaganda proper was exceedingly active in both the first centuries B.C. and A.D.

Ode 7 is filled with the praise of spiritual knowledge and wisdom. It speaks (13) of the "fulness of the ages and the Father of them"; this can be hardly anything else but the Gnostic Plēroma of the Æons and the Father of the Universals. It also refers (17) to the "traces of the light" (cp. 10 7 "and the traces of the light were set upon their hearts"), which reminds us strongly

of the frequent references to the "Impressions of Light" in P.S.

"He became like me, in order that I might receive Him; He was reckoned like myself [lit. in likeness as myself] that I might put him on" (6, 7); this has all the appearance of being a reference to the Incarnation, but the subject of the Ode is the 'Lord Most High' (19), the 'Father of knowledge' (13), the 'Fulness of the Ages and the Father of them' (13), and not the Son. It probably developes the thought that God made man in His Image, the Spiritual Image, or the Pleroma, the Heavenly Man, the Type of every individual of the Messianic Race.

Ode 8 again is a wisdom-hymn and contains the injunction, "Keep my secret, ye who are kept by it" (11). This reminds us of a famous *agraphon* echoed by several of the Fathers, as for instance by Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 5 10): "My mystery is for me and the sons of my house." The introduction to the Priscillianist copy of 'The Hymn of Jesus' sent by Ceretius to Augustine also contained a quotation from a lost Scripture: "It is good to hide the sacrament of the King."

The Logos-doctrine is highly developed. Thus 12 3f.: "The mouth of the Lord is the true Word, and the door of His light; and the Most High hath given it to His worlds, [worlds] which are the interpreters of His beauty." Here are the Æons again. It would be possible to parallel much of this Ode from the outbursts in the untitled Apocalypse of the Bruce Codex, a Gnostic apocalypse which is generally acknowledged as of the second century. The nature of the relevant phrasing may be seen from the passage: "The Word that comes out of their [the Worlds' or Æons'] mouth, is eternal life, and the light that comes forth from their eyes is rest for them; the movement of their hands is their flight to the space out of which they are come, and their gazing on their own faces is knowledge of themselves; . . . the hearing in their ears is the perception in their heart, and the union of their limbs is the ingathering of Israel." (Cap. 11, ed. Schmidt, 1905, p. 350; see also my *Fragments*, pp. 547, 548, 556.) This is also true of the spiritually perfected who become Æons, that is attain to the Likeness or Image of the Father.

"I was a priest of the Lord, and to Him I do priestly service: and to Him I offer the sacrifice of His thought" (20 1). Cp. 7 12: "He granted me to ask from Him and receive from His sacrifice," that is the Fulness or Pleroma (13). This reminds us of the "reasonable oblations," *i.e.* the sacrifice of the thought or reason, of the

Trismegistric literature, in which could be easily found many other parallels with the ideas of our Odes. The phrase "recline on His seat" (8) reminds us of 'The Hymn of Jesus' in *The Acts of John*, 90 (3), ed. Bonnet, p. 198, "Thou hast me for a couch; rest thou upon me."

"The Dove fluttered over the head of the Messiah" (24 1). This seems to be a clear reference to the familiar Baptism-story; and the peculiar "fluttering" is very ably shown by Dr. Rendel Harris to be taken from some lost extra-canonical gospel. But compare 28 2: "The wings of the Spirit are over my heart," and again (6): "I have been set on His immortal pinions." When, however, in the same Ode 24 5, we are told, that the abysses, which are regarded as living creatures, were "sealed up," and again 31 1, "The abysses were sealed before the Lord; and darkness was diminished at His appearance," we find ourselves in the atmosphere of transformed Babylonian-Persian mythology, where the Saving Power seals up the creatures of the Darkness as He descends.

There are also interesting references to the resurrection-body of glory. "I was clothed with the covering of the Spirit, and thou didst remove from me the raiment of skin" (25 8). Cp. 21 2, 3: "I put off darkness and clothed myself with light, and my soul acquired a body free from sorrow or affliction or pain." It is to be noted that this consummation was achieved while still living. It was a common belief of the Jewish mystics of the day, as may be seen from my recent article on 'The Resurrection of the Body.' The "raiment of skin" is of course the physical body, another well-known interpretation, among the mystics, of the Genesis myth.

There are many other points of the greatest interest and importance, but it is impossible to deal with them in a review. The general impression left on us is, that we possess in the Odes of Solomon a document of the very first importance for the history of early Christianity; it can be neglected by no unprejudiced scholar, for it raises a host of questions that cry aloud for solution. The new-found document will, doubtless, be made the subject of the most searching analysis by the most distinguished scholarship of Europe and America, and the results cannot fail to be highly instructive, no matter what point of view may be taken by individual critics. But no matter how brilliant may be the studies the future may have in store for us, our chief thanks will always be due to Dr. Rendel Harris for his most fortunate discovery, for his fine translation and careful scholarship, and for the excellent

and prudent form in which he has introduced the subject. Those also who have no taste for literary and historical problems owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Rendel Harris for providing them with the translation apart.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND REALITY.

An Essay touching on the First Principles of Metaphysics. By Edward Douglas Fawcett. London (Longmans), 1909.

THE last few years have witnessed a growing revival of interest in constructive philosophical thinking. More and more numerous become the heralds of the dawn, so that the present rising generation may confidently look forward to sharing in the vivid life, the eager activity of a period wherein the nipping breath of destructive criticism, the winter of despondent, hopeless submission to the mocking taunt that Philosophy is wholly unprogressive, Metaphysic a fantastic logomachy, and Physical Science (in large capitals) the only competent expounder of the riddle of life, shall be a thing of the past. This fresh constructive epoch, we may believe, will in the main be 'spiritual' in tendency in the philosophic rather than the religious sense; and it will be largely individualistic as contrasted with absolutist in character, as well as freer from theological preconceptions, more daring in its outlook, fuller of inspiration, and possessing a new and added pregnancy of meaning as compared with any period that has preceded it, within historical times. The paralysis induced by the glamour of scientific mechanicalism, the deadness of a universe 'completely expressible' in terms of a bloodless orgy of differential equations, is passing away; even the 'stuffiness' of academic philosophising shows some signs of the stirring of the dawn-wind; so let us, who may not hope to see its full glory, at least gladly hail the first glimpse of the day. Even in the absolutist camp, Royce's two volumes on *The World and the Individual* showed a certain freshness, a wider outlook, a somewhat closer touch with vital realities than systematic philosophy had exhibited for some time. Then the work of Bergson in France, as it becomes more widely known and appreciated, is pouring a new strong wine into the present century's thinking, while Professors James in America, Schiller at Oxford, McTaggart at Cambridge, not to name others, are doing yeoman's service in the field. To those who can appreciate free and living effort at philosophical construction, the work now under notice, by Mr. E. D. Fawcett, should prove welcome and stimulating. A

much earlier work of his—*The Riddle of the Universe*—published when he was not twenty-five, showed his thorough grasp of what had been done in the field of philosophy no less than his own originality. And now we have the outcome of his maturer thought, the result of some fifteen years' reflection and seeking—not so much in the study as amid the glories of nature's Alpine fastnesses. Thus much by way of introduction; now to the book itself —an admirably printed volume of 450pp., but singularly light in the hand, as well as written in an easy, agreeable style that does not obtrude the closeness and condensation of the thought.

The essay has three Parts, of which Part I., the smallest, outlines the author's general standpoint in relation to the fundamental positions and problems involved in all serious systematic thinking. One thing, especially, the reader will here find refreshing, the clear outspoken statement of the various positions taken up by other thinkers as well as the author's own attitude. It may be that the absence of long qualifying parentheses, and the terse, often brusque form of statement, will give to some an impression of too great self-confidence. But this is not really justified, for one marked characteristic of this book is the extreme caution and reserve in stating results, and the careful discrimination between the certain, the probable and the merely possible.

In this brief introduction is much that is welcome: a clear definition of the sphere and function of metaphysic; an equally outspoken admission that metaphysic is at best partial, that it can never hope to attain a complete solution of the riddle of the universe, since being *ex hypothesi* 'rational' it is confined to a single province of man's complex nature. Then a clearing up of the relation of metaphysic to the 'super-normal' of all descriptions, its relation to religion, to illuminism and other cognate topics—all in the short 16pp. of Ch. I.; while in Ch. II. special attention is devoted to the highly important subjects of Method and of Truth, concluding with a plain statement of the starting-point adopted by the author in his enquiry. This is practically identical in substance with the now universally accepted datum of all philosophic thinkers alike, and is thus formulated here: '*Appearances, as aspects of sentient experience, appear.*' In discussing memory, however, in this connection, Mr. Fawcett disposes somewhat cavalierly of the 'Eternal Now' of the mystic.

On this topic of memory attention may be called to a point, largely no doubt psychological, but still, I think, of great metaphysical significance, the treatment of which by James, Marshall

and nearly all modern writers, seems defective: and as the author practically adopts their position, it is germane to his work. Granting that the past as actually represented in the specious present is really a new fact, not strictly the old fact over again, the point in question is the significance and interpretation of the process of *recalling* (say) a forgotten date, name or face. While sought for, this lost item is *not* present at all *as such*, till it is successfully 'recalled.' Where then does the item abide when not actually contained in the 'specious present'? In the sub-conscious of Mr. Fawcett's later theory? If so, this normal fact, in conjunction with the numerous cases of abnormal recall in hypnotism, somnambulism, etc., of facts absolutely lost from 'memory' for long years, would seem to suggest some perhaps fruitful inferences in regard to this 'sub-conscious' which might carry our author a few steps further than his caution has allowed him to advance, even in the later part of this book.

Part II. deals with the Individual and 'his' universe in six chapters comprising nearly one half of the entire volume. On a basis of criticism the whole effort is constructive, and though one is bound to confess that the actual results are perhaps less bulky than some would desire, yet they have a degree of convincing appeal which is lacking in much of such work. It is not easy to pick these out and state them in a few words; because in so doing, by divorcing them from their context, they are apt to be misunderstood. But some attempt towards this may be made.

First then we note the plain admission that the Real may, in whole or part, be also alogical as well as rational, and that appearances though *real* may *also* be 'contradictory.' Here, of course, we at once join issue with the absolutists, and the lists are opened in earnest. Then we have a lucid and interesting series of sections dealing with the 'I' or 'self' actually revealed in experience. The general lines are curiously parallel with the conclusions set forth in another work, *Consciousness*, by Henry Rutger Marshall, which made its appearance almost simultaneously with Mr. Fawcett's. But Mr. Fawcett, writing with a metaphysical purpose, very rightly lays more stress—a stress called for indeed by the facts as experienced—upon the sense of *wholeness* in and with which sentiency comes, a vitally important fact, though not warranting the belief in a 'monad' or other occult substance. But still the problem of the finite 'centre'—the concrete individual—remains unsolved, even though light has been shed upon it, and a wider purview must therefore be taken. We are thus forced

to consider two leading issues at once: the riddle of Ejects and that of Nature, which opens up a fascinating chapter, leading us to one of the main positions assumed, *viz.* that all finite 'centres' —ourselves and our 'ejects' alike—are "emphases, foci of intense activity, travelling eddies as it were, within a mother-stuff co-essential with ourselves"—that is, of the same nature *as our own personal sentiency and experience.* And thus, too, not only sub-human, but equally super-human centres are frankly admitted as more than possible existences.

But space forbids details and I can but say that all the sections of this Part possess a freshness, a novelty of outlook, which are rarely to be found in such close philosophical thinking. One may not agree with all that is said, but no one can read these pages without finding keen stimulus and an openness of outlook, which one longs to find more generally adopted. Above all no attempt is made to 'cover up' or hide difficulties, to make the reader believe that a full solution has been reached when this is not the case; and when at the conclusion of this Part the author rejects a rigid determinism, one feels that he has at least faced all the difficulties of that problem, and gives us fully his reasons for the position adopted.

We have seen that while the individual sentient 'centre' and the appearances therein are the primary and alone absolutely demonstrable Real—for the intellect—we were compelled by the character of these very experiences to *infer*, with almost irresistible cogency, both other like 'centres' or 'ejects,' and also a general continuous basis of Nature or 'Ground.' And once we admit this Ground as real, its fundamental character is also plain, for being of like nature with the appearances *within* the centre, it, too, *must* be psychical. Taken as such, the Ground is of course not conscious, but rather sub-conscious, though of the same nature as the experiences which consciousness lights. This, then, is our starting-point for the further enquiry—admittedly somewhat more speculative—which constitutes Part III., the first chapter of which discusses various competing theories as to the Ground and leads to the following formulation: "The Ground is an alogical psychical activity, not bare, but one with the content-variety which it *holds in being.*" It is not a *dead* Whole, but it and its variety *express in their self-maintenance an act.* And this conservative Activity simply upholds content *against change.* The author inclines to accept the idea of successive 'Days and Nights,' and suggests that the *spontaneous heightening* of the above self-conserving Activity

of the Ground is the fundamental change on which all other changes ensue. This is curiously reminiscent of the '*Kshoba*,' or '*Anstoss*,' which in the Indian Sāṁkya philosophy sets the world-process a-going. But aside from this question of beginnings, we have now the one and, so far as I know, the only at all satisfactory derivation of Space in the history of philosophy. It is too complex a problem to discuss in detail; the main steps are, however, these. Space is *derived*, it shows *diversity in a novel form*. The Primeval Ground being a variety-in-unity, its phases are simultaneously present; and simultaneity itself is an aspect of the fact that the Ground is not blank unity, but holds differences, and so is a primary manner of the being, or appearing of the differences. Simultaneity is thus *primary*; co-existence again is a modified simultaneity, a form into which simultaneous existence is forced. Now Space has been defined as the 'alongsidedness' of indifferent things. But the 'things' are (here) not indifferent. Phases of the Ground *conflict*, so that they can no longer exist simultaneously. They modify one another, but they are also self-conserving and decline to fuse wholly in a single result. This novel relation is expressed as externality to one another—as co-existence or space. And so we are led on to Movement, and are shown that the phrase 'continuous basis of Nature' really refers us to the development within the Ground. But the Ground being sub-conscious, is devoid of 'Ends' or 'Purpose,' though—a most important *caveat*—a 'God' may have been evolved in past evolutions, and have come *as such* to the guidance and ruling of *our* particular cosmic scheme.

This is perhaps as convenient a place as any for the mention of a topic to which the author ought to have devoted more space and expounded his position more fully. The word 'real' occurs constantly; it forms indeed one of the main topics of this work; but nowhere is its meaning—or rather the very various and divergent meanings assigned to it by different thinkers—adequately discussed. The topic is touched upon on the very first page, where 'appearances' are declared to be 'real,' and further on such 'appearances' are declared to constitute all there is of reality. On page 261, Mr. Fawcett tells us that the Ground being sub-conscious is also *less real* than us finites, and goes on to point out that even within the Centre itself there obtain degrees of 'reality,' determined by the attention. Hence one may infer that for our author 'real' = 'present in consciousness,' and hence that, to speak mathematically, 'Reality' varies *directly* as the clearness and

vividness of consciousness—quite irrespective of either persistence *in* consciousness or 'permanence' as part of the transcendent universe outside of the individual Centre.

The Chapters on the Evolution of Nature, the Evolution of Individuals and Death are of great interest. The conclusion arrived at is that the *Individual must and does persist*, as a direct and immediate deduction from the self-conserving nature of the Ground as such. Chapter V. discusses Birth and the Plurality of Lives, bringing to light many novel reflections and views of deep interest to reincarnationists, at the same time rather ruthlessly sweeping away not a few of the cherished arguments dear to most of them, and also bringing out the fact that there must be a keen 'struggle for birth' going on—a fact mostly ignored or overlooked by writers on the subject. The chapter concludes with an instructive discussion on the subject of 'Karma,' which should give 'furiously to think' to many a glib writer, though perhaps the author has not adequately taken account of the possible action of 'superhumans,' 'gods,' or whatever we choose to call them, in this connection. At any rate, it would be highly interesting to peruse a really capable and open-minded refutation of the views here advanced, by a convinced believer in the theory of a 'Law of Karma' *in the ordinarily accepted sense.*

One of the freshest chapters deals with the case of a *finite* God (or Gods). To some, of course, its outspokenness will seem 'shocking'; to others its positive conclusion in favour of the existence of a finite God (or Gods) will seem a base surrender to theology and obscurantism; but to all broad-minded students of religion the ideas set forth must appear very striking and to some schools among modern mystical thinkers eminently attractive. At the best the ideas are inspiring, at the worst, thus argumentatively buttressed, they cannot be ignored; and coupled with the further development of the subject in the concluding chapter upon the Destiny of Individuals and the Evolution of God, Mr. Fawcett's views ought to mark a step in the treatment of these subjects, and open the way to a new and broader manner of handling them.

There is so much in this volume of vital importance, so many points inviting discussion and treatment at length, so much originality of outlook, that one hopes to see its main positions adequately attacked and defended in these pages, and its stimulating thought thus made more widely known.

B. K.

JOHN DEE (1527-1608).

By Charlotte Fell Smith. London (Constable), 1909.

A YEAR ago there appeared a short account of the famous and notorious John Dee translated, by the late veteran amateur of mystical and mysterious studies, Rev. Wm. Alexr. Ayton, from the Latin of Dr. Thomas Smith, who in 1707 published a book of lives of certain learned men (*Vitæ Quorumdam Eruditissimorum et Illustrium Virorum*). We have now before us a study of 342 pages, in which Miss Fell Smith has industriously collected together a large mass of material and shaped it into a very readable account of an individual who, to use her own words, was "so conspicuous, so debatable, and so remarkably picturesque," that it is surprising no one has anticipated her, and that we have had to wait three hundred years for an adequate biography of one of the most learned men of his day, a pioneer of science and a special favourite of Queen Elizabeth. Were it not that Dee's life is documented by an unusually ample mass of material, we should say that it was a romance rather than sober history. It is the story of a man of uncommon ability and great piety, and of one who was a walking encyclopædia of all the learning of his day. But over and above this, Dee had a strong practical side to his nature; he was one of the finest mathematicians of his time and an inventor of many scientific instruments; he was also an excellent geographer and map-maker, and was fired with the idea of developing the insignificant fleet, which had already scattered to the winds the Invincible Armada, into a magnificent navy, and so making Britain a great sea-power; he was further a great collector of books and valuable MSS., and kept urging the foundation of a national library and collection of other useful means of knowledge, thus anticipating the idea of the British Museum by two hundred years. It is of course quite possible to over-estimate Dee's learning and genius; nevertheless when all discounting has been done, he remains a conspicuous figure in a period when so many of ability were laying the foundations of Britain's greatness. Had these been his only interests and endeavours, Dee would undoubtedly have long ago obtained a niche in the temple of fame of our Elizabethan worthies. But there was another side to his character, which dominated his whole life, and in which he believed he found all his inspiration. Dee was also an astrologer, an alchemist, a kabalist and a trafficker with the world of the invisibles. He has, therefore, been treated

by history as a notorious instance of self-deception, credulity and charlatanry; only quite recently has it been possible in some measure to reconsider the verdict, and, as it has been phrased, to regard him as a 'pioneer of psychical research.' What emerges with greater clearness from Miss Fell Smith's sympathetic study, in what we have learned from prior inadequate accounts. Dee himself was honest and God-fearing by nature, generous and high-minded; he was finally ruined by over-credulity in the communications he received through a 'sensitive,' Edward Kelley, who was, as so many of this nature have proved to be, a person of no character; he was a man of contradiction, irresponsibility, vanity and at times even of entire incredulity in his own visions. We possess the memoranda of a number of years of these *actiones* or *séances*, entered faithfully by Dee in his diaries. Long before he met Kelley, Dee's main devotion had been to the 'occult' arts and sciences; indeed he was already saturated with such studies. Kelley, so to speak, became the means of sight for Dee who could not see. The glamour of these dangerous paths, however, finally brought him to a miserable end, owing to his over-weening credulity in the messages from the invisibles, whom he regarded, *more cabbalistico*, as 'angels.' It was by 'skrying' in a crystal, consecrated and set forth in traditional magical fashion, that Kelley, who was certainly also in other respects an extraordinary psychic, received these communications for Dee; though Dee at times seems to have been able to hear. That which, certainly as far as Dee was concerned, began purely and with the highest intent, gradually became perverted. Nothing, however, could shake Dee's faith; even when Kelley furiously denied the authenticity of his own visions, Dee strove only the more doggedly to induce him to continue. The end of it was that Dee received a 'command' of an abominable nature from the 'spirits' concerning himself, Kelley and their two wives. After great mental agony and moral struggle Dee lost his head completely, and they yielded to the foul suggestion. This is a very crude reference to what developed very gradually and very subtly; and the record is highly instructive for students of these matters. This brought an end to Dee's intercourse with Kelley. Kelley shortly after perished miserably in a foreign prison, while Dee lived out the rest of his long life in very difficult circumstances and with perpetual disappointments. Miss Fell Smith's pages give us a detailed account of his life and of his many struggles and undertakings, and of his intercourse with the most distinguished people of the day. In this there is much to interest; it would, however,

have been of still greater interest to some readers if his present biographer had summarised and quoted from Dee's books and unpublished MSS., and so given them the means of becoming better acquainted with the doctrines and instructions which this unfortunate genius considered of such extraordinary value.

ANNA VAN SCHURMAN.

By Una Birch. London (Longmans), 1909.

IT seems desirable to say at the beginning that which can be said very seldom concerning a first work of research—as I believe this book to be: Miss Birch has fulfilled a very difficult and perhaps somewhat thankless task in a way that leaves nothing to be desired. Of her "artist, scholar and saint"—as the sub-title describes her heroine and subject—we have so far known nothing or little but the mere name in England; we have now an exhaustive biography which has left no path untried to render the account perfect. It is rich in detail, it is intimate, it is first hand, and it has a certain living quality. Whether it was worth doing—or at least at such considerable length as these two hundred pages—is another question; to be frank, I conceive that whatever shall prove of interest to the reader concerning the 'Tenth Muse' and the 'Learned Maid' is due to Miss Birch and scarcely at all to her subject. Anna van Schurman was a learned lady of her period (1607-1678): she left certain literary remains—on the education of women; a collection of Latin letters, which was popular in its day; a tract on the end of life; and her own spiritual history. A few of these survived into the eighteenth century, but they are now the matter of archives. As an artist, it is not suggested that she was other than an amateur; as a saint—well, she was an actively good woman of her place and time and lights. She appears to have reached middle age without being seriously distressed by the inadequacy of Calvinism, but she came in the end to desire the deeper experience of religion—practically leaving the official side and the formalism in the endeavour to attain it. She was introduced by her brother to Jean de Labadie, a Genevan pastor, originally a Jesuit, then a Jansenist, a Protestant—by confession of the Calvinistic type—but through all a spiritualist, in the higher sense of that term, and in fine a mystic, within his proper measure and degrees. It was in this man that Anna van Schurman found what was for her the revelation of Christ; it was he whom she followed through his ministries and

persecutions; and she lived to close his eyes. There has been much fuller opportunity previously to become acquainted with Labadie than with her who was his disciple; his books are numerous and some of them comparatively well known. I do not think that their type of mysticism can be called especially distinctive; one does not feel that the ministries which I have mentioned were especially convincing or the persecutions especially drastic; but he had seen the mystic term and he knew something of the way. From the moment that he enters the narrative of Miss Birch he overshadows the disciple completely, and although the 'learned maid' was in her youth almost a shrine for pilgrimage, though she was the friend of Descartes, it is in her connection with Labadie only that she will enter into our recollection henceforth; and Labadie, as I have intimated, is of pleasant memory rather than an important figure in Christian Mysticism.

A. E. W.

CONCERNING THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE.

By Jacob Boehme. Translated by John Sparrow. Reissued by C. J. B. With an Introduction by Dr. Paul Deussen, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Kiel. London (Watkins), 1910.

WE congratulate Mr. Barker on the rapidity with which he has brought out the second volume of his reissue of Sparrow's translation of Böhme's works. It is a handsome volume of 978 pages, excellently printed, and edited with scrupulous care and fidelity. *The Three Principles* was published by Böhme in 1619, and was the first work of his period of sustained literary activity—five years of silence enforced by narrow orthodox bitterness having been imposed upon him after the private circulation of a few handwritten copies of his earliest effort, *The Aurora*, which he wrote in 1612. Sparrow's translation was published in 1648, with the following title-page:

'The Second Book/ Concerning/ the Three Principles/ of/ the Divine Essence./ Of the Eternal, Dark, Light and Temporary World./ Shewing/ What the Soul, the Image and the Spirit of the Soul are; as also what Angels, Heaven and Paradise are./ How Adam was before the Fall, in the Fall, and after the Fall./ And/ what the Wrath of God, Sin, Death, the Devils and Hell are; How things have been, now are, and how they shall be at the Last.'

We have already, in our October issue, reviewed the first volume (*The Threefold Life*) of this excellent reprint at length, and would refer our readers to what we have there written for our estimate of this praiseworthy undertaking and of Sparrow's translations. The value of the present volume is enhanced by Professor Deussen's Introduction, which appeared originally in German in 1897, as an Address published in aid of a fund for the raising of a Memorial-monument to Böhme. The chief interest of this Introduction is that Professor Deussen, whose profound study of Indian philosophy entitles his opinion to respect, finds in Böhme's main notions very definite points of contact with the principles of the Vedānta. The nomenclature of Böhme is one of the great difficulties for beginners, and we are glad to be able to refer them to an excellent synopsis of Böhme's theosophy by the Rev. G. W. Allen, which has just appeared in the second volume of Hasting's *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. In it Mr. Allen suggests as more understandable terms for the three Principles—Homogeneity, Heterogeneity and Strain. If the favourable response with which Mr. Barker has met in publishing the first volume repeats itself in the case of the second, he proposes to combine the translations of the *Forty Questions of the Soul* and of the *Clavis* in the third volume. Mr. Barker has also in hand a detailed bibliography of Böhme's works, and to this end has been in correspondence with the principal libraries of this country, the Continent and America. We most cordially wish him every success in his undertaking.

THE MESSAGE OF PHILO JUDÆUS OF ALEXANDRIA.

By Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, A.M., Ph.D., M.D. London (Luzac), 1909.

DR. GUTHRIE describes his useful little volume as "a brief classified outline of the most important of Philo's utterances." It is a painstaking analysis, minutely referenced, of the voluminous works of a writer far too much neglected by students of Christian origins and comparative religion, and that, too, although, as Conybeare says, "this most spiritual of writers is by the admission, tacit or express, of a long line of Christian teachers, . . . the father not only of Christian exegesis, but also, to a great extent, of Christian dogmatics." Dr. Guthrie's study is worked out on the same lines as his admirable analysis of the Enneads in his *Philosophy of Plotinos*; he is, however, by no means a slavish admirer of Philo, but rather plays the part of a friendly critic, from a

modern standpoint. We regret at times that Dr. Guthrie has used Yonge's translation in the quotations, for he could, we think, have improved on it; but the main point on which we venture to differ is his view of the Therapeuts. In the first place, he still seems to be in doubt as to the authenticity of Philo's treatise *On the Contemplative Life*, and has evidently not seen Conybeare's convincing vindication of its genuineness, as against the Pseudo-Philo theory of Grätz-Nicolas-Lucius; in any case Dr. Guthrie will have it that in all probability "the Therapeut community may be considered as Philo's ideal of what the New Jerusalem would be for allegorists, and should take its place alongside of Plato's *Republic*, Plotinos's *Platonopolis*, and Augustine's *City of God*" (p. 86). Plotinos's Platonopolis, however, was to have been an actual city in realisation of Plato's ideal state, but the building plans fell through. Now what Conybeare has proved by his 'Testimonia,' in which he parallels almost every line of the *De Vita Contemplativa* with passages from the rest of Philo's works, is that even if the treatise did not exist we could reconstruct the description of the Therapeuts from the rest of the Philonean writings. The Palestinian Essenes, Philo tells us, are one form of community, the Therapeuts belong to another type, which is found scattered far and wide throughout the Græco-Roman and what we may call the Oriental world. The Essenes are historic, and the Egyptian Therapeuts appear alongside them in exactly the same way, and are described in precisely the same manner. It is true that Philo gives his own particular Mareotic community a strongly Jewish colouring, and claims for it the highest excellence and most original foundation; but equally he claims for Moses the fatherhood of philosophy. The cases are parallel; and we need not doubt the historicity of the Mareotic Therapeuts, when Therapeuts in all but the exact name are found historically in abundance in such associations, for instance, as the Trismegistic or Pœmandrist communities. We, therefore, cannot hold that these Healers or Servants or Worshippers of God, *Cultores et Cultrices Dei*, were in all probability unhistoric, the allegorised dwellers in a spiritual Utopia. The singers of the Odes of Solomon are of their kin in many ways, and they are surely not unhistorical. Now, Eusebius claimed that the Mareotic Therapeuts were the first Christian Church at Alexandria, founded traditionally by John Mark; but as the *De Vita Contemplativa* was written about 26 A.D., the Father of Church-history has left us a pretty problem that has not yet been solved: Who were these non-Christians whom the first

Christian historian could not in any way distinguish from the primitive Christians? Apart from this very important point, to which we do not think he has done justice, Dr. Guthrie has given a most useful, succinct exposition of the main ideas of Philo's religio-philosophy. It is quite true that it is in spite of his allegorical method that Philo is useful to us to-day. As a witness to the innermost spiritual ideas that obtained at the date of the most important religious crisis of the Western world, Philo indeed may be said to be simply invaluable; his attempt to evoke scriptural authority for these ideas by means of an allegorising process may be strongly objected to, but it should not be forgotten that he did not invent it; it was the common method of the time on all sides. It is legitimate, however, only when applied to mythological recitals, and surely should not be so strongly objected to by those who speak about the 'myths' of Genesis; the trouble with Philo is that he took the myths to be history.

PSALMS OF THE EARLY BUDDHISTS.

I.—Psalms of the Sisters. By Mrs. Rhys Davids, M.A. London (Frowde), 1909.

THOSE who have already in our present issue read Mrs. Rhys Davids's delightful paper on 'The Love of Nature in Buddhist Poems,' with her graceful renderings from those old-world songs preserved in the Short Group of the Sutta Collection of the Pāli Canon, will turn with lively interest to the first instalment of her most recent labours. The Songs of the Sisters, though fewer in number, and in some respects of less importance, are published first, because only this portion of the text of Dhammapāla's commentary (Vth or VIth cent. A.D.) has been so far edited and published; for the portion of the commentary dealing with the Songs of the Brethren, MSS. seem to be astonishingly scarce, and Mrs. Rhys Davids has first to collate the only two MSS. known to her before she can use the text. Though no one unacquainted with the original can have any adequate idea of the many difficulties that have had to be surmounted by the gifted translator, who renders the archaic Pāli into English for the first time with such facility and felicity, all who are acquainted with Mrs. Rhys Davids's previous work know that they can rely on her for thoroughness in introduction and notes, and for many a suggestive

parallel in Western literature gleaned from her wide reading, and in this they will not be disappointed. The Poems in general celebrate the occasion of the Sister's entering into the Order and her attainment of Enlightenment. The commentary, which sums up several lines of oral tradition, gives the story in greater detail, and is of a highly legendary nature. It is to be noted that in many of the Songs, in describing a Sister's attainment of Arahatta, that is the state of Arahantship or holiness (the fruit of which is said to be *aññā*, that is, spiritual knowledge, Lat. *agnitio*, Gk. *gnōsis*), it is said that this is preceded by the two stages of illumination which bestow the memory of past births and the celestial vision. The commentator gives us a number of such 'memories'; but, as we should expect, they bear no impression of reality, but seem rather to be artificially composed monkish exercises, conditioned by a highly developed buddhology which embraced incalculable ages of time, and that, too, even for this world. What becomes of the absolute *anattā* doctrine, the theory of the non-existence of a self, in the face of all this, is difficult to imagine. A self, whether regarded as a stream of consciousness or an eddy in a life-stream, is still a definite *continuum*. But what one is struck with most is that this *iddhi*, or power, of remembering past births, should have been considered of such a high spiritual and ethical value as to deserve to be placed eighth in the grade of ten powers peculiar to a Tathāgata, of whom it is said: "He knows thoroughly right and wrong occasions; (2) he knows thoroughly the effect of all karmaō-series; (3) the methods for accomplishing anything; (4) the elements (data) of the world; (5) the various tendencies, inclinations, of beings; (6) the capacities of beings; (7) the nature and procedure of all contemplative disciplines; (8) former lives; (9) he has the 'celestial vision'; (10) he has realised the intellectual emancipation of the Arahant" (p. 167 n.). Surely most of the preceding *iddhis* would be said to be of greater value than the memory of past births, and he who had acquired them would stand in little need of the power to evoke such re-presentations of past events! Several times again in the commentary the Master is said to have sent forth 'glory' and so revealed himself to this or that Sister. This is an interesting feature for those who are seeking after the nature of the 'resurrection body.' One of the difficulties of translation is that of technical terms; here Mrs. Rhys Davids boldly attempts a new rendering even of the key-word that sums up the whole religion of the Buddha, namely the Dhamma; for it she suggests Norm. We notice also that she

translates Aggapuggalo, a synonym of a Buddha, as a Superman (p. 58). In conclusion, we congratulate Mrs. Rhys Davids on her rendering of the Psalms of the Sisters and look forward to her version of the Psalms of the Brethren with much interest.

THE PATH OF LIGHT.

A Manual of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Rendered for the first time into English from the 'Bodhi-charyāvatāra' of Shānti-Deva. By L. D. Barnett, M.A., Litt.D. London (Murray), 1909.

SHĀNTI-DEVA lived in the seventh century, or slightly earlier, and was a follower of the School of Nāgārjuna, who systematised the older doctrines of the Greater Vehicle into one of their most effective forms in about the second century A.D. We are glad to notice that Professor Barnett thinks that "the current of mystic imagination which culminated in" the "bold theology" of the most fundamental Mahāyāna doctrines, "seems to have arisen early. Possibly it may, in a rudimentary form, have been one of the elements of primitive Buddhism." The translation is judiciously abbreviated, for the convenience of the general reader, by the omission of prolixities and of a lengthy scholastic disputation. Those who wish to consult a complete version may be referred to the excellent French translation of Prof. L. de la Vallée Poussin, who is our greatest authority on the Mahāyāna. Dr. Barnett's shortened version, however, should well content most readers; it is an admirable rendering.

However different in other respects, the spirit of what is best in Mahāyāna Buddhism is being gradually recognised to be fundamentally of the same nature as the ideal that is worshipped in Christendom; this self-renouncing love is well brought out by Shānti-deva as follows: "If the spirit of any be wroth or pleased with me, may that be ever a cause for them to win all their desires. May all who slander me, or do me hurt, or jeer at me, gain a share in Enlightenment. I would be a protector of the unprotected, a guide of wayfarers, a ship, a dyke, and a bridge for them who seek the further Shore; a lamp for those who need a lamp, a bed for those who need a bed, a slave for all beings who need a slave" (p. 45).

"Thou hast me for a bed, rest thou upon me," we read in the Hymn of Jesus in *The Acts of John*, and again: "'I am a lamp to thee who seest me"; and yet again: "I am a way to thee a

wayfarer." Elsewhere, concerning the Race of the Spirit, Shānti-deva tells us: "When he has thus taken the Thought of Enlightenment in a spirit of grace, the sage must fill his thought with gladness in order to strengthen the issue. This day my birth is fruitful, my human life is a blessing; this day have I been born in the race of the Enlightened, now am I their son. And henceforth mine is the task of them who work worthily of their race, lest any blemish fall upon this stainless stock" (p. 46). And again (if the Western reader can bear with an unfamiliar symbolism): "They that are godly of works enter the wombs of broad, sweet-smelling, cool lotus-blossoms; their lustrous forms grow, nurtured by the Conqueror's [the Buddha's] sweet melody; then they issue in comely beauty from the lotus-flowers awakened by the sunbeams of the Holy One, and are born as Sons of the Blessed in the presence of the Blessed" (pp. 77, 78). Surely we have here the same symbol as that of the mystic rose, the inner heart, the resurrection body, and of the communion of saints. Not only is love to enemies inculcated, but even honour to them: "If an enemy is therefore not honoured, how can I otherwise show patience towards him, as though he were intent, like a physician, on my welfare? It is by reason of his evil design that my patience is born; therefore he is the cause of patience, and as worthy of honour from me as the Good Law" (p. 70).

On the other hand, the doctrine of hell, though not of the eternal type that disfigures Western theology, is very conspicuous, and, of course, extreme ascetic dualism, with its unhealthy and unjust hatred of the body, is very prominent; and yet, inconsesequently enough, Shānti-deva writes: "It is better for me to hate hatred" (p. 68). That body should be excluded in a doctrine of love for all creatures is, we should imagine, as great a hindrance as love of body in the general sense is to the life of the spirit. *The Path of Light*, however, taking it all in all, is an excellent addition to that very useful series, 'The Wisdom of the East,' edited by Mr. Cranmer-Byng and Dr. Kapadia.

THE EDUCATION OF UNCLE PAUL.

By Algernon Blackwood. London (Macmillan), 1909.

THE chorus of appreciation which has greeted Mr. Algernon Blackwood's gracious and graceful story of how Uncle Paul was educated by his little nieces and nephew, and passed with them through the 'crack' into a faëry of 'verywonderfulindeed

aventures,' is well deserved. It is better than *Jimbo*, good as that was; it is better constructed and better worked out. And this is not surprising, for though *Jimbo* was published but recently, it was written years ago. Mr. Blackwood has matured his art since then, and, in *The Education of Uncle Paul*, carries us with him into a fair faëry land of innocent childhood that, in our opinion, is in conception more winning and closer to nature then Maeterlinck's *Blue-Bird*. Doubtless many of our readers have already made the acquaintance of Uncle Paul and that delightful little elf Nixie; those who have not, would be well advised to do so, and find out for themselves how Nixie could say: "What you call Death is only slipping through the crack to a great deal more memory, and a great deal more power of seeing and telling—towards the greatest Expression that ever can be known. It is, I promise you faithfully, Uncle Paul, nothing but a verywonderfulindeed Aventure, after all!"

BROWNING'S PARACELSUS.

The Text of Browning's Poem with Introduction and Notes. By Margaret L. Lee and Katharine B. Locock. London (Methuen), 1909.

Paracelsus, one of the most splendid and subtle of his poems, is a fair and fitting gate-way to the study of Browning. Miss Lee's careful and excellent commentary should be of real assistance to the student. Chapter V. (upon 'Browning's Philosophy'), in which she discusses the poet's setting-forth of the doctrine of Divine Immanence and the necessity of co-operation between body and soul, 'love' and 'knowledge,' human beings, God and Man, is well worth consideration. Much might be said upon the contrasted and complementary embodiments, Paracelsus and Aprile, occultist and mystic, as Miss Lee labels them, but here is not the place to say it. We must direct readers to the thoughtful and suggestive Introduction. We cannot omit a word of praise for Miss Locock's interesting and very capable chapter upon 'Browning's Metres.' In these days, when the study of the value of words is so neglected, when a sense of their significance is so rare, it is a pleasure to come upon an essay which recognises the cardinal importance of colour, sound and form in literary composition. The edition is provided with a useful Glossary, and its *format* is unexceptionable.

A. L.

WEDGES.

Being some Expressions of Opinion. By C. B. Wheeler. London (Gay & Hancock), 1909.

MR. WHEELER writes on a variety of topics, social, philosophical and religious. His opinions are by no means conventional; on the contrary, he has chosen the title *Wedges* in the hope that his collection of essays "may let in a little light and air to a few orthodox and conventional brains." Mr. Wheeler has a vigorous style, is possessed of a saving sense of humour, and is transparently honest. It is his directness, his scorn of shelving difficulties, that has led him to devote no less than three of his essays to the thorny problems of marriage and divorce, one of his papers being based on Milton's forgotten *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, which is curiously anticipatory of some modern views. Mr. Wheeler would be an excellent opener in a vigorous Debating Club; there would be no lack of discussion. The bond of union that has induced the essayist to bring his varied papers within one binding is, as he tells us, "the urgent questioning that runs all through them—somewhat to my regret, for most of the really nice people I know either do not ask themselves these questions, or, if they do, get different answers to what I got." Those who read *Wedges*, whatever their views of Mr. Wheeler's opinions may be, will certainly not be bored.

THE PHYSICS OF 'THE SECRET DOCTRINE.'

By William Kingsland. London (Theosoph. Pubg. Soc.), 1910.

IN this volume of 154 pages Mr. Kingsland has very ably brought into clearer definition the leading ideas on physics unmethodically scattered through the mass of the three volumes of Madame Blavatsky's *magnum opus*, *The Secret Doctrine*. Mr. Kingsland is well qualified for the task, not only because he has been a diligent student of the work, since its appearance in 1888, and that, too, under very favourable circumstances, but also because of his own special scientific training. The major part of the book deals strictly with the statements of *The Secret Doctrine*, but in Chap. VIII. Mr. Kingsland handicaps his exposition by introducing other speculative matter not found in Mme. Blavatsky's work, accompanied by an elaborate diagram headed by a picture of Babbitt's hypothetical atom.

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 'FIONA MACLEOD.'

Pharais—The Mountain Lovers. By 'Fiona Macleod' (William Sharp). London (Heinemann), 1910.

AT a certain time in the life of William Sharp a powerful influence came upon him which gave birth to a series of works of high inspiration expressed in forms of beauty. This influence he could so clearly distinguish from the sources of his more normal literary work, that he regarded it as a thing apart, a secret of his inner life to be securely guarded, for he was haunted by the fear that if it became known the mystery would pass from him. This other self of his he called 'Fiona Macleod,' and so a new name was inscribed in the roll of makers of fair poems and writers of beautiful things. Nor did this influence make Sharp alone creative, it has also inspired musicians and painters, and will, doubtless, continue to do so. We, therefore, extend a most hearty welcome to the first of the seven volumes of which the collected works will consist, and congratulate Mrs. William Sharp on having overcome the many difficulties that had to be surmounted before such an edition was possible. There can be few of our readers who are not already familiar with the work of 'Fiona Macleod,' and many, doubtless, who will desire to possess the uniform edition; for these are books that can be read again and again, they are part of permanent literature, and not to be classed with the ephemeral products of purposeless or poverty-driven pens. We have once more renewed our acquaintance with *Pharais* and *The Mountain Lovers* and found new pleasure in both.

HINDU MAGIC.

By Hereward Carrington. London (The Annals of Psychical Science), 1909.

THIS small book is well written and has some rough illustrations; we think, however, *Hindu Conjuring* would have been a better title. The writer considers the chief feats exhibited by fakirs in India.

The famous mango-trick is explained as being possible on account of the peculiar construction of the leaf, which is very tough and pliable and can be folded and compressed into a very small space. For the first part of the mysterious growth a shoot of mango is rolled up in the seed, which is about two inches long. This is gradually extracted and shown by degrees till it is all

revealed. Then a larger shoot is substituted by means of a double cloth, and the process repeated. All the other chief tricks are explained on similar lines, and the author concludes that the vast majority of feats performed by the Hindu fakirs present no evidence whatever of the supernormal, but are, on the contrary, due to skilful jugglery.

A. H. W.

Is Death the End?

By a Well-known Writer. London (Griffiths), 1909.

THIS book may be of use in arousing attention to the subject of which it treats. It is written in too discursive and unmethodical a manner to impress readers of a scientific turn of mind, and not picturesquely enough to appeal to those of an emotional habit. The most interesting thing it contains is the author's own story of a dream which impelled him to get out of bed in the middle of the night, take a walk of two miles, and arrive at a bridge just in time to save his father from drowning. We can easily understand that this experience should, in a man of open mind, have given the death-blow to his materialism, and have led him to pursue psychic research for himself. Personal evidence may convince of existence after death; the opinions of others, as set forth profusely in these pages, will hardly do so. Perhaps life after death, certainly immortality, is among those things of which it has been said, "Nothing really worth proving can ever be proved."

A. L.

The Mystery of Mysticism.

By Arthur W. Hopkinson, M.A. London (Griffiths), 1909.

THE publication of a pamphlet on the mystery of mysticism in a series of 'Essays for the Times,' says much for the advance and tolerance of modern Christian thought. It is to be regretted that the author of this little booklet, having gone so far on the road towards the mystery, should not have progressed further. The mark of the real Mystic is comprehension and comprehensiveness, and he would not, we fancy, assert that the mysticism of his particular creed was alone 'true,' and stigmatise that of every other religion as necessarily 'false.' There is much in the pamphlet that is valuable: its quotations from Rolle, Hilton and Juliana are precious, and Mr. Hopkinson will have done a good work if they induce his readers to refer to the fountain head. But his attitude

smacks too much of 'This the only genuine brand,' and the keynote of the essay is sounded in those words which describe the Christ as 'highest Bishop.'

A. L.

THE ROMANCE OF SYMBOLISM.

And its Relation to Church Ornament and Architecture. By Sydney Heath. With Numerous Illustrations. London (Griffiths), 1909.

MR. HEATH'S title leads one to expect more than he actually gives us; nevertheless his book may serve as a useful introduction for those who are ignorant of general Christian symbolism, and who are specially interested in its exemplification in old English Church architecture and ornament. Mr. Heath frankly admits the overlapping of many Christian and Pagan symbols, and refers to a number of the more obvious instances. We find, however, that almost without exception the meanings and interpretations he assigns to the symbols and emblems are of the most general and unromantic nature; and that, too, although, as he tells us, "the early writers, architects, and carvers, had a great love of mysticism, a real belief in the supernatural, and a fondness for the mysterious and unaccountable." Still there is much gathered together in these pages that it is important a learner should know in beginning such studies, and the book is well written and well suited for the general reader and *amateur*. Specialists could of course criticise points of detail, but on the whole Mr. Heath touches very lightly indeed on controversial subjects and contents himself with short summaries of a few examples. A point of interest that is new to us is brought out by the author in connection with the shamrock-symbol of the Trinity, when he writes (p. 192): "it was used in somewhat similar connection by the Arabs, for the trefoil in Arabic is called *shamratkh*, and the leaf was held sacred in Iran as symbolical of the Persian triad." No authority, however, is given for this statement; and this is to be regretted, for though in a book intended for the general reader elaborate notes are out of place, on special points an occasional one might be allowed. The book's utility would have been greatly increased, in our opinion, if Mr. Heath had added a reasoned bibliography for the help of those who desire to pursue the subject further; he has, however, printed a good index and some lists that will be of service to the tyro, though what principle has guided him in his selection of the "principal saints and their emblems" is not easy to determine.

NOTES.

THE DOMINANT ELEMENT IN CHRISTIAN ORIGINS.

THE January number of *The Hibbert Journal* contains a very remarkable article, by the Rev. K. C. Anderson, D.D., on 'The Collapse of Liberal Christianity,' which has given rise to so heated a discussion, that it is evident the finger of this courageous writer has been placed on a sore spot. Liberal Christianity claims that the dominant element, disclosed to critical research among the earliest Christian documents, is the realistic historical human figure of the Master; Dr. Anderson traverses this position, and contends that, in final analysis, we are brought face to face with a miraculous divine personality and not an historical human figure, as, indeed, Loisy has shown in opposition to Harnack. Dr. Anderson's main contention may be seen from the following extremely interesting passage:

"If the fundamental principle of Liberal Christianity were correct, that the movement began with a human individual, then we should naturally expect that traces of this would appear in the New Testament; but instead of this being the case, throughout the whole of Christian Literature, from the very first, it is Christ as a God who is the centre of the community. Community after community arose in various localities and called themselves after Him and united in honour of Him. It is difficult to understand how it could have come about that hymns were sung to Him,[1] how He could have been worshipped, how there could have been in the Christian communities a 'table of the Lord,' if the origin of the movement had been a human person. But if the movement began with a community formed after the model of the communistic clubs of the time, all of which had a 'table of the Lord,' all of which sang hymns to their patron deity, all of which worshipped this deity, then these features of the early Church become the most natural things in the world. The first idea of Christ in the Christian Church thus was not that of a human teacher, but of a

[1] Pliny the Younger in his Letter to Trajan (c. 103-105 A.D.), says that the Christians sang antiphons to Christ "as to a God."

protective deity, just as Attis was the protective deity of many of the Lydo-Phrygian associations, just as Hercules was the protective deity of the Heracleïstæ, or Serapis of those who took Serapis as their patron god. The oldest figure in the catacombs, again, was not that of a teacher of truth, but of a good shepherd, who was looked upon, not as we should expect a human founder of a religion would be looked upon, who taught certain religious doctrines and founded the religion, but as lord and protector of the dead, an entirely superhuman person, just as Hades was looked upon among the Greeks as the shepherd of the dead and kind host of the underworld. What afterwards became the Christian Church was originally a community organised around the worship of Christ. The primitive idea of Christ was not that of a human teacher, but of a Divine being, who was worshipped by this community or sect, —the vine of which the members of the community are branches; the soul of which the community is an incarnation; the head of which the individuals of the community are members."

We have ourselves often contended that the inmost secret of Christian origins is securely hidden away in the mystic communities and, therefore, naturally applaud Dr. Anderson for so boldly setting up a sign-post pointing in that direction. We, however, also hold that there must be an historical element as well, as no doubt Dr. Anderson also admits; but to recover this with any approach to reasonable certainty and to evaluate it with secure justice seems to be at present, at this late hour, almost beyond the scope of probability. Our readers will be glad to learn that our next issue will contain a paper, by Dr. Anderson, on 'The Sign of the Cross: A Study in the Origins of Christianity,' treated from a similar standpoint.

THE SAME PROBLEM AS DISCUSSED IN GERMANY.

DR. ANDERSON'S paper was a sequel to the discussion in *The Hibbert Journal*, inaugurated by the Rev. R. Roberts, of Bradford, in the January issue of 1909, by a paper, entitled 'Jesus or Christ? An Appeal for Consistency.' So many distinguished writers took part in the discussion that the *Journal* had to issue a special supplement, at the end of the year, under the title *Jesus or Christ?*—containing eighteen papers by thinkers of every shade of denomination and opinion. It cannot, however, be said that any of these distinguished writers ventured so deeply into the heart of the matter as has Dr. Anderson in his quest. Meantime in Germany the same inestimably important problem has been raised

by Dr. Drews of Karlsruhe, and discussed with almost unparalleled freedom, as we learn from the Berlin Correspondent of *the Sunday Times*, in its issue of Feb. 6:

"To-day all Germany, it may be said, is discussing a series of lectures, followed by candidly worded debates, as to the personality of Jesus.

"The lecturer, Professor Dr. Arthur Drews, is a Monist, a school of materialists widely spread throughout Germany, and his lectures are drawing large crowds to the Zoological Gardens, where they are being delivered. The papers, with an editorial audacity few English newspaper proprietors would approve, print the same heading over the reports of the lectures, 'Did Jesus live?'; and appear to agree in recognising in the question the principal one of all that most trouble religiously-minded people of to-day in Christian countries.

"The whole subject, it is right to say, is being treated both by Dr. Drews and his clerical and lay commentators in a strictly scientific spirit which keeps steadily to historical investigation, the problem set being as to the historical value of the evidence available for proving that Jesus, as known to Christian theology, ever really existed. . . . His conclusion is that Jesus, though he existed, is no man-made God, but a God-made man, and made out of a mixture of ideas which were current among the Babylonians, Persians, Jews, and Greeks of the centuries immediately preceding Christ. It is to the Apostle Paul that Dr. Drews, like Eduard von Hartmann before him, attributes the currency of Christianity, though Jesus himself was unknown to Paul, as the Apostle himself admits, and though the Christian idea existed and was developed long before the Jesus of history existed."

Surely when so many of good repute, unquestionable honesty, and lifelong training, are earnestly and reverently questioning on so vital a theme, there must eventually be some answer forthcoming, even though it may for the time be recognisable only as a profounder understanding of the nature of the problem; for it has been said: "Seek and ye shall find"!

THE CONTROL OF DREAMS.

THE note on dream-control in our last issue has been widely copied by the press, and has in one instance elicited an additional note that may be of service to some of our readers. In *The Evening*

Standard of Feb. 7, under the heading 'At the Hazard of the Bookshelf,' Mr. Walter Herries Pollock writes:

"Mention in these pages of an article in the January number of *The Quest* has recalled to my mind a very singular and fascinating little book written by an American, Colonel Higginson, himself a fascinating personality. It is called *The Monarch of Dreams*, and was published by Lee & Shepard, at Boston, Mass., in 1889. It tells, in fifty-two small pages, with remarkable vividness and power of imagination, how one Francis Ayrault set himself, as did Saint-Denis, to obtain complete control over his dreams, and at last succeeded. The tiny book, which may, of course, owe something in inception to De Quincey, is by its matter, by its treatment, and by its author's distinctive and charming style, a little masterpiece of art. One does not know that Saint-Denis suffered from his success in experiment. Francis Ayrault suffered terribly, for when there came a call to arms, which he would erst have rushed from his hermitage to obey, it found him inert, helpless, a slave to mere deliberate intoxication of the imagination as much as if he had over-stimulated that imagination by artificial aid. He had been for a brief space the monarch of his dreams, and was now, waking or sleeping, their slave."

THE LATIN RITE OF CONSECRATION.

THE consecration, or, rather, solemn dedication of Westminster Cathedral, is to take place in June next, and is looked forward to by the Roman Catholic community in England as the most important function of this nature that has ever been held in this country since the parting of the ways. The following account of the existing rite of consecrating, taken from *The Times* of Feb. 14, cannot fail to interest many of our readers. The form is practically identical with that in the Pontifical of Egbert, Archbishop of York (d. 767):

"(1) The consecrating prelate, who should be fasting on the day before, solemnly sets apart in an adjacent tent over night the relics to be used in the ceremony. These are placed on an altar with lighted candles while the choir chants matins and lauds in honour of the saints whose relics they are. (2) Twelve crosses are marked on the walls of the church with candles before them, which are lighted at the commencement of the consecration ceremony, a 'use' which, according to Rabanus Maurus, the liturgist (788-856), recalls the walls of the heavenly Jerusalem

(Rev. xxi. 14). (3) The bishop and his clergy then go in procession round the outside of the church three times, sprinkling the walls and boundaries with holy water. (4) The bishop knocks three times with his pastoral staff at the main entrance of the church while repeating (in Latin) the words:—'Lift up your gates, ye Princes, and be ye lifted up, ye everlasting doors, and the King of Glory shall come in.' After the deacon at the porch has asked, 'Quis est iste Rex gloriae?'—Who is this King of Glory?—and received for reply, 'The Lord strong and mighty, the Lord mighty in battle,' the door is opened and the bishop with his immediate assistants enters the Church, leaving the rest of the procession outside. (5) The Consecrator describes on the ash-strewn nave of the Church a cross composed of the letters of the Latin and Greek alphabets arranged saltirewise. This curious ceremony symbolises the union of the Latin and Greek Churches and the instruction in matters of faith imparted to the catechumens. (6) The consecration of the high altar and of the side altars (if any) next proceeds. The Consecrator having first dipped his thumb into a preparation of water, ashes, salt, and wine, duly blessed, marks the altar stones with five crosses, the choir meantime chanting the antiphon, 'Introibo ad altare Dei,' etc. (I will go unto the altar of God—Ps. 43). It is expected that at the consecration of the Westminster Cathedral the entire Roman Catholic hierarchy of England will assist, and to each of their lordships the suffragans will be assigned the consecration of one of the side altars. (7) The consecrating bishop next goes in procession round the interior of the church three times, during which the walls and floor are aspersed and blessed. (8) At the conclusion of the procession the aforesaid relics are borne into the church, and at this stage of the ceremony a sermon on the event of the day usually follows. (9) The doors of the church are next anointed with chrism (or holy oil), as also are the 'sepulchres' or recesses in the altar stones for the reception of the relics. The 'sepulchres' are then closed and cemented, and the plains or tables of the altars anointed and incensed. Incense is also burnt on the five crosses at the centre and angles of the stones, and the twelve crosses round the walls of the church marked with chrism. Finally, the sanctuary vessels and ornaments are consecrated to the accompaniment of the 'Circumdate Levitae,' 'Circumdate Sion,' and other appropriate chants, which bring to a conclusion a ceremony of unusual length and solemnity."

A Forgotten Civilisation.

In the American Room of the British Museum are now on view admirable specimens of the art of a pre-Inca Andean people who had arrived at a high degree of culture many centuries ago; indeed it is variously claimed that these ancient vases may be anything from 2,000 to 7,000 years old, while the 'conservative' estimate of some authorities places them at 5,000 years. Less than a year ago no less than 700 specimens of archaic ceramic vessels, mostly of high artistic merit, were discovered by Mr. T. Hewitt Myring, in the Chimcana Valley in Peru. Two hundred and fifty of these, the pick of the collection, have been secured, by the generosity of Mr. Van den Bergh, for the British Museum. The pottery was discovered in a large cemetery (there is report of 'some three miles of mounds'). Above the stratum in which these vases lay was another where were found graves of the Incas, in which human bones, woven stuffs, and even metal tools were in good condition; whereas those in the lower stratum were in such a state of decay as to make their removal impossible; even turquoise was falling into dust. The vases themselves, on the contrary, are in a beautiful state of preservation and were evidently new-made when they were buried; their perfect condition is attributed to the presence of silicates in the sand in which they were found. Some idea of the nature of the subjects represented may be gathered from the following account, in *The Daily Telegraph* of November 22, which is more 'descriptive' than the soberer summary in *The Times* of January 10; it, however, well pictures what all can now see for themselves at the Museum.

"The religion" of this people "was of the early type connected with the sun and moon, possessing no affinities with that hideous form of devil-worship found in the later Maya ruins of Central America. This Chimu people were fond of elaborate dress, and even in this one collection of their pottery there are more different kinds of hats and head-dresses than any Parisian milliner could display. They were fond of music, too, for many recognisable instruments are found, apart from the countless forms of whistles. . . . . They were as fond of children as any of the Greeks of Tanagra, and a number of toys were dug up among the more elaborate manufactures. Their houses had sloping roofs instead of the flat surfaces of the Incas and the modern Indians.

"A pronounced love of animals may also be traced in the numberless excellent representations of toads, owls, barndoor fowls, deer, and antelope. . . . Fish, crabs, and lobsters constantly appear. Cranes and storks are painted with extraordinarily lifelike fidelity and freedom. The head and beak of the condor is worked into a wonderfully effective meandering pattern. Arrangements of spirals and rosettes occur of a most curiously classical effect.

"More wonderful than all is the very high level of the sculptor's art, a level not unworthy of any age or any civilisation, reached in their best portrait-busts. Here you may see the clown grinning, with one eye shut and pliant mouth aslant. Here is the grotesque face of a man tortured by toothache, just as you may see him in many a thirteenth-century Gothic carving. There are faces swathed in turbans or shadowed by a fez almost exactly like the modern Turk or Egyptian. One marvellously-executed head is so amazingly full of life and character that it is almost impossible to realise its great antiquity. Beneath a broad brow the large, fine eyes look out with singular intelligence and strength; the high-bridged aquiline nose adds keenness to the whole expression; the mouth is firm, yet sensitive and delicately modelled; upon the face are caste-marks, and on the breast is a chieftain's badge. The head-dress shows two heads of apes.

"Some of the helmets are adorned with two or three discs, and others are surmounted by a solid semi-circle. In many instances the combination of man and beast so beloved of Egyptian and of Gothic art is unmistakably evident. One extraordinary group shows a human figure chained to a rock, with a vulture gnawing [*sic*] his intestines—the earliest representation yet discovered of the legend of Prometheus. Another grim fantasy portrays a pair of skeletons embracing."

It is somewhat beside the point to refer these wonderful vases and water-bottles, and the rest, to a somewhat shadowy Chimu civilisation; what is directly evident at first sight is that we have before us portraits, and admirable portraits, of people of a number of strikingly different races (if Mr. Rothfeld will permit us to use the word). We have no desire, at the bidding of these witnesses to a forgotten high civilisation, to start off immediately on a quest for the Lost Atlantis and the extremes of speculation; but we do say that such discoveries very completely dispose of some recent theories, which are equally extreme in the direction of niggardliness in dating the rise of Central and South American civilisation.

AN ANCIENT HIGH CIVILISATION IN BRITAIN.

AND if America can boast a high civilisation of remote antiquity, what of our own country? Will the 'woad-besmeared' Britons of our schooldays continue to hold the field; will our tattooed forebears be for ever enshrined in pious though mistaken memory? Such indeed is not the view of Mr. Charles F. Cooksey, who has been in quest of a more dignified ancestry for some thirty years. In a queer speculation on 'The Secret of Stonehenge,' in *The Nineteenth Century and After* for February, Mr. Cooksey outlines the nature of his researches and beliefs as follows:

"It was the outcome of a long period of observation in the South of England that I arrived at the conclusion of the existence of a very early civilisation, of which our English historians knew, or at least said nothing. That such a civilisation existed is evident to any person who is the least familiar with our principal museums, where may be seen arms, armour, ornaments, utensils, and implements, chaste in design and elegant in form, and in an endless variety of metal and other materials not assignable to any clearly defined historical period or people. All these things prove a comparatively high state of culture, which was not indigenous, but almost certainly introduced by some early immigrants from the scattered civilisation of the East. We read vaguely of an incursion of Belgic Gauls to Southern Britain, and they were the people whose descendants offered so stubborn a resistance to Julius Cæsar and his successors. This is all mixed up with allusions to the Britons as being little better than savages. It is stated that they lived in woods, that their bodies were tattooed with woad, and that they were entirely subject to the Druids, under whose influence the unenlightened defenders of their country bravely but ineffectually strove to protect their land and liberty. My personal observation, however, convinced me that prior to the Roman invasion there was a literature, a civilisation with settled laws, a knowledge of art, a large and well directed army, commanded by men of very superior intellectual resource, of which we in this day have little knowledge, and who for at least five hundred years maintained a not entirely unsuccessful resistance to Rome itself. I found, for instance, that the Roman city of Galleba, Calleva, or Silchester, was placed on the ruins of an earlier Celtic one, the remains of the houses of which were constructed with a knowledge

of the art of building little inferior to that of their Roman successors. . . .

"These indications, and many others far too numerous to be dealt with on this occasion, led me to investigate the region of Romance for a probable solution. I found an evidently Gallic civilisation struggling between Christianity and paganism. I read of Joseph of Arimathea and his brethren, and of one earlier missionary, perhaps St. Paul himself, associated with Caractacus on his return from pseudo-captivity in Rome about the year 60 of the Christian era. The Welsh, or rather the British records, as they should be more correctly called, contain definite statements on the subject of St. Paul's mission to Britain, but that point, interesting and capable of strong corroboration as it is, need not detain me from my present purpose. These, so far as they were available, I read, and still could find no sufficient evidence to demonstrate the chronological position of this missing civilisation. It was not until I closely studied Geoffrey of Monmouth, Malory, and others that I detected some remarkable parallels between the lives of Caractacus (otherwise Arviragus) and King Arthur, and began to see daylight through the historical gloom of the period." (See the author's brochure, *Who was King Arthur?*)

If King Arthur and the ancient British Church could be put back to 60 A.D. it would be certainly a good exchange for the 'woad-besmeared'; but before that becomes an 'acquired fact' many scientific heads will have to be broken on the green.

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF 'BUDDHIST' ATHEISM.

THE last number of *The Buddhist Review* contains an article on 'Buddhism the Religion of Love,' by Mr. Bennett, the enthusiastic convert, known as Ānanda Meltteya; in it he formulates his contradictory nihilistic faith as follows:

"Belief in the soul was denounced by Gotama as one of the three primary delusions, which must be rooted out at whatever cost. When a man dies it is not a part but the whole of him that ceases to live. With the belief in the soul vanished also, and, necessarily, the belief in immortality. When Gotama won his entrance into Nirvāṇa, that which bound him to existence was cut off. His body still remained, and while it remained he could be seen by gods and men; but after his death, that is, upon the dissolution of the body, neither gods nor men would see him any more for ever. Furthermore, while thus repudiating the existence

of the soul, and discouraging the dogma of immortality, the Buddha made no appeal to any Higher Powers, either for the sanction of his moral code, or for grace or inspiration to carry it into practice. When the end drew near, he said: 'My age is accomplished, my life is done; leaving you I depart, *having relied on myself alone.*'"

The italics are Mr. Bennett's, and he does well thus unconsciously to draw attention to the *cul de sac* in which his exposition ends. If there be no self, no eternal principle, what is the 'myself' on which the Buddha relied? Metaphysics is one thing and materialism is another; it is a pity to confound them, as does this otherwise interesting writer.

THE HALF-CASTE PROBLEM.

IN an article on 'The Social Position of the Maoris,' in *The Contemporary Review* for last November, Mabel Holmes quotes the following self-analysis by a half-caste man of thirty-five, whose father had married a Maori woman of means. He had been given the best education, finishing with Oxford and a continental tour. He writes of his own case: "The mixture of white and coloured blood is physiologically and psychologically wrong, and produces a being divided against himself, at one moment despising the black in him, at the next resenting and loathing the white. Take me as an example. My life is a *hell.* I wished to become a doctor, but my father, realising too late the fate to which his marriage had condemned his sons, would not hear of such a profession for me—he could not trust me. So with ample means, I travel for say two years, during which my white side is in evidence. I am a cultured gentleman refined in thought and in action. I return to New Zealand, drawn by that home-hunger to which every man of colour is subject. A wedding, a funeral occurs amongst my mother's people; the Maori in me is in honour bound to attend. A feast, a dance, a tangi, a war-cry,—down goes culture and the white beneath a savagedom bearing all the vices of civilisation to add to its horrors. Afterwards, satiated, debauched, I crawl back to respectability through agonies of self-contempt and remorse. No, I will be father of no children to endure such tortures as this eternal struggle between my two selves." There thus seems to be more in the idea of 'race' than Mr. Rothfeld would have us think.

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THE QUEST.

CREATIVE THOUGHT.

W. F. BARRETT, F.R.S.

EVERYONE recognises that the physical basis upon which materialism has so long rested has been undermined, if not destroyed, by recent discoveries in the very branch of science upon which that narrow school of thought had built its confident assertions. For generations it has been the accepted axiom of science that the elementary substances, of which the material world is composed, were the imperishable, immutable, eternal realities. To-day this axiom cannot be relied upon. For some of the elements, and others will follow, have already proved to be mutable, to be slowly undergoing transformation from more complex to simpler states; and the dreams of the alchemist may well revive. Even the atoms themselves are no longer, as Lucretius and his successors thought, "strong in their solid singleness," but have vanished into a congeries of electrons. Hence the crude materialistic view of the universe, with all its arrogant assumptions, instead of being a popular, has become a damaged and more or less discredited theory.

Endless evolutionary processes in the physical world, beginning no one knows how, and blindly going on, no one knows whither, cannot explain the visible universe. For behind—and the source of all tangible matter—lies the unseen, intangible, incomprehensible *Ether;* and behind—and the source of all physical energy—lies an unseen all-pervasive and incomprehensible *Force.* The progress of science is in fact steadily pushing back the boundaries of the seen, and compelling us to believe, as we were told long ago, "that what is seen hath not been made out of things which do appear,"[1] but is the offspring of an unseen universe, and an unseen, indwelling and transcendent Power.

On the other hand the visible universe is not, as theologians used to teach, a wonderful contrivance created as we now see it, and then set going by the fiat of the Almighty. Even in the controversies of the recent past, our orthodox religious teachers might have recognised that creation by *evolution* is a far more amazing fact than creation by *fabrication.* A man can make a steam engine or a motor car, but he cannot make them slowly evolve themselves out of iron ore and other natural products, nor repair themselves when they get out of order, nor reproduce themselves when they decay. But in organic Nature, from the simplest living cell to the most complex living organism, we find these three processes ever at work—a formative power, a reparative power and a reproductive power. Moreover the evolutionary processes, whilst preserving and perpetuating life, are ever pressing onward to higher types and higher faculties of life. What was once *explicitly* declared to be the Divine purpose in this

[1] *Heb.* xi. 3 (R.V.).

world, "that they may have life and may have it abundantly,"[1] is, in the physical plane, the principle which biologists tell us *implicitly* underlies all evolution. Doubtless some biologists, with Weismann, say that this principle is purely mechanical and that life is nothing more than "a chemico-physical phenomenon"; but to create and keep going a series of "living reproductive machines," with ever-widening faculties, they have to invent inscrutable factors, 'determinants' or 'dominants' contained in the germ-plasm, "by whose fluctuations in a plus or minus direction the appropriate variation is attainable."[2] Others wisely recognise their ignorance of the mysterious directive power behind evolution; some assume "the existence of original, innate capabilities of the living substance, not dependent on selection," and others frankly assert that there exist "unknown factors in evolution." But whatever be the unseen, unknown, and immanent Power behind, it presents all the characteristics of purposive guidance, having a definite aim, and therefore I prefer to call this inscrutable factor 'Thought.'

May I therefore venture to ask you to consider with me the subject of the 'Creative and directive power of Thought,' not, however, as a philosophical speculation, but as a scientific conclusion, based upon experimental evidence. There is no need to illustrate this statement as regards our own conscious thought. For the works of the savant, the musician, the architect, the painter, the preacher and the poet are monuments of this creative power. And is it not true

[1] *S. John*, x. 10.

[2] Weismann, *The Evolution Theory*, ii. 346. See a most able and lucid reply to the Darwin-Weismann theory of life by Mr. T. W. Rolleston in his admirable work *Parallel Paths*, published by Duckworth & Co., which I warmly commend to any who have not read it.

of all of us, that we project our ideas, our thoughts, into the unseen and they come back to us as realities in the seen. To a large extent we create our own world. The man who achieves, has faith in something above and beyond himself. It is faith that "subdues kingdoms, works righteousness and obtains promises." Doubt, distrust, pessimism are tokens of the lack of faith, and the result is an arid and sterile life, aimlessly criticising all things and accomplishing nothing.

But the dynamic of thought extends beyond well recognised actions. There is abundant experimental evidence that one mind can act upon another mind independently of the recognised channels of sense. This was first noticed by the early mesmerists and called by them "community of sensation"; although ridiculed by the physiologists and psychologists of the day, the fact is now undeniable. It is over forty years ago since my attention was drawn to the existence of this faculty, by some hypnotic experiments which I witnessed when staying at a country house in Ireland. The experiments were made by a friend on a subject who proved to be exceedingly sensitive to hypnosis and who subsequently was hypnotised by myself. Though sceptical at first I was convinced after carefully repeating the experiments myself that anything I felt, or tasted, or saw, was (under strict test conditions) usually perceived by the subject. Repeating the experiments in my own house, later on, the fact was confirmed. Hence it was that in 1876 I read a paper before the British Association detailing these and other facts and urging the appointment of a Committee to investigate the phenomenon of what I ventured provisionally to term 'Thought-transference,' and which to-day is now widely accepted and known as 'Telepathy.' It was

the not unnatural disinclination of the recognised scientific societies to publish the record of these early investigations of mine on 'Thought-transference,' that suggested the need of a Society for 'Psychical Research,' in the foundation of which in 1881-2 a few friends warmly co-operated. Evidence soon accumulated that not only could one mind evoke a more or less faithful image of a definite concept or percept existing in another mind without the aid of any of the recognised channels of sensation, but that certain persons could also project and create a phantasm of themselves perceived by a distant friend! That is to say, the distant agent A could not only evoke a consciousness of himself or of his thought in the percipient B, but also occasionally cause B to perceive the presence of A, though the latter was some miles away. In the experiments which my friend Mr. Beard conducted, under the strictest conditions to avoid collusion, we obtained conclusive evidence that an act of thought in the mind of A could create an apparently real external image of A in the mind of B. These facts corroborated similar occurrences well known to students of Eastern mysticism, and they furnish an obvious explanation of many—though I do not think of all—of the well-established cases of apparitions at the moment of death; the telepathic impact, by direct *psychosis*, creating the apparition of the distant person.

There is really nothing so very extraordinary or amazing about this. All that we perceive in the world around us is the projection of a series of phantasms from our own minds, created it is true by some stimulus received through one or other of the organs of sense. Take the case of vision. External objects form a minute inverted image of themselves on the

retina, as they do on a photographic plate in the camera; but we do not *look* at the retinal image, as we look at the ground glass screen in a camera. The retinal impression is transmitted to the brain, a certain tract of nerve cells is thereupon stimulated, this multitude of separate stimuli our *ego* collects into a coherent whole, and we then mentally project *outside ourselves* a phantasm of the object, apparently as big and erect as the object really is. But that appearance is the creative act of our own mind and leads us, rightly or wrongly, to think that the appearance is a real objective thing, resembling the thing in itself. It is a good working hypothesis and practically useful, but it is a mental projection for all that. The thing in itself may be, and doubtless is, wholly unlike the percept and sensory phantom we habitually create. The fact is we invariably "confound the organs of perception with the being that perceives. The eye is not that which sees, it is only the organ by which we see; the ear is not that which hears, but the organ by which we hear, and so of the rest."[1] This being so, it is not very surprising to find that a telepathic impact from a distant mind may cause the recipient to project an apparently external image of the distant person; or to find, as in the well-known cases of post-hypnotic suggestion, that a suggestion made to a subject under hypnosis, *e.g.* that he will see

[1] Reid's *Inquiry Into the Human Mind*, p. 246 (Hamilton's edition). There is a singular coincidence between this passage from Reid and the following from Swedenborg's *Divine Love and Wisdom*, § 363, published the year *before, viz.* 1763. "It is according to the appearance that the eye sees. On the contrary it is the intellect that sees by means of the eye. It is an appearance that the ear hears, but it is the intellect (*mens*) that hears by means of the ear. . . . And so of the rest." Indeed it is as true now as when Reid wrote that "no man is able to explain how we perceive external objects any more than how we are conscious of those that are internal," unless indeed we accept the theory of 'spiritual influx,' as Malebranche and Swedenborg maintained.

so-and-so at a certain time, causes the hallucination to be evoked so vividly that it has all the appearances of a real objective presence. In like manner a discarnate mind may be able telepathically to impress those living on earth so that apparitions of the dead may be evoked, or other sensory hallucinations produced. This seems to me, in our present state of knowledge, the only tenable theory of genuine cases of 'hauntings.'

These, however, are *mental* creations, and the question arises can thought produce a change in organic structure, has it a creative or reparative power over the physical organism? Of this there is abundant evidence. But before adducing some facts in support of this statement, let us ask ourselves what we mean by the word *Thought.* Obviously it embraces far more than definite ideas clothed in speech or action. All consciousness, whether in man or animals, carries with it the conception of thought. Doubtless sustained rational thought is the prerogative of man, but we cannot withhold thought and even some reasoning power from animals. Romanes has shown this to be true of domestic animals and we could all cite instances indicative of thought and reason in our domestic pets. It would be interesting to obtain evidence as to whether our thoughts or emotions can be transferred say to a favourite dog, telepathically. That they sometimes see phantasms and are in abject terror from this cause appears to be undeniable.[1] But can we excite a telepathic response in the higher animals? Will a dog answer to its name if silently called? Is there any evidence of community of emotion and sensation between master and dog, apart from sense perception?

[1] For evidence of this see *Proceedings* of the Society for Psychical Research, vol. x., pp. 326-330.

If so we might get into closer touch with the animal world and perhaps in the future this may be the case.[1]

Many naturalists have given numerous instances of what appear to be the beginnings of reason and thought in the animal creation; and even in plant-life there seem to be indications of intention and directed purpose. Moreover, what in our ignorance we call *instinct* in animals is surely evidence of *thought* that often transcends our own intelligence. The migration of birds and fishes, the homing of certain birds and animals, are familiar instances. Certain creatures and primitive men obviously possess some extraordinary sense which is not recognised as yet by science; a sense of direction or a *transcendental perceptive power* undoubtedly exists, though it may not awaken any act of consciousness. Prof. Watson, of Johns Hopkins University, has recently experimented with certain tropical sea birds—a species of tern which make their nesting place, and most northern habitat, in the Gulf of Mexico. Half a dozen of them he took from their nests, marked each with different coloured paint and their corresponding nests likewise. He then sent them by a friend, in cages in the hold of a steamer, to be liberated near New York. They were set free at the assigned spot on a given date, and five days later most of them found their way back to their nests, after traversing upwards of 1000 miles over sea and coast they had never before visited. To call this 'instinct' is merely to repeat the old lady's blessed word 'Mesopotamia.' It is certainly to us a supernormal perceptive

[1] Is this what is foreshadowed in the statement that the "earnest expectation [or the straining forward] of the creation waiteth [the word means 'with concentrated longing and expectancy'] for the manifestation [or revelation] of the sons of God" (*Rom.* viii. 10)?

power, it is Thought, impelling to action, but probably not through any reasoned or conscious process.

That a directive force can be given to the muscles, without the intervention of consciousness, physiologists know perfectly well and call it 'reflex action,' as in the acts of walking, breathing, the beating of the heart, etc. But what I wish here to demonstrate is that a *perceptive power*, which in spite of the apparent paradox, we must call *unconscious and yet intelligent thought*, does really and undeniably exist. It is difficult in the case of human beings to obtain evidence of this, owing to the intrusion of ideas or sensory impressions. In certain persons, especially those of limited education and ideas, we can and do obtain evidence of the possession of this unconscious, intelligent and transcendental perceptive power. The motion of the so-called divining or dowsing-rod is merely the outward and visible sign of this inward and singular gift. Any object hidden in an unknown place, whether underground water, mineral lodes, or buried coins, a good 'dowser' may unconsciously discern and locate, by a sudden muscular spasm, which twists his forked rod, with a vigour he cannot control nor consciously reproduce. It would take me too far from my present subject to give the abundant evidence upon which this assertion rests. It will be found in the reports on the so-called divining-rod which I have published in the *Proceedings* of the Society for Psychical Research.

The term 'Thought' must then be taken to include not only the idea and will that prompt conscious and voluntary acts, but also the subliminal stimulus that creates involuntary, unconscious and yet purposive acts. Of absolute or pure thought we know nothing whatever, nor can we form the smallest conception of

what it is.[1] All we know of thought is its *expression* within the limitations of our present existence. Behind the expression lies the wordless idea, which ever transcends the clothing of the idea in words or acts. But this we do find, *thought ever seeks to externalise itself*, and it is this manifestation we perceive. May we not therefore say that *thought is an inscrutable living directive power, seeking to express and thus to realise itself.* In our *conscious* life, *language* —and by that I mean all voluntary expression, whether of words, gestures or acts—*language is the mode in which thought externalises itself and becomes known to itself.* For we cannot separate conscious thought from some form of language; they are indissoluble, and cannot be conceived of apart. In like manner matter is a mode in which spirit expresses itself, and matter is as dependent on spirit for its existence, as language is dependent on thought. The two are to us unthinkable apart, we cannot conceive of matter without spirit, nor of spirit without the attributes of matter. The apparent contradiction and antinomy of matter and spirit disappear, when we recognise that in language and thought we have the same apparent antithesis—though we all realise there is no real antagonism here, but that language is the utterance and self-realisation of thought. And just as the great poet or artist knows that his composition is only an inadequate expression of the thought he strives to realise, so the material world is to us only a partial realisation of one aspect of the Universal Thought.

To return; let us now enquire what evidence exists

[1] Philosophers in all ages have attempted variously to define and describe thought; it is needless to cite quotations. Swedenborg truly says: "By the faculty of thought we approach still nearer to the supreme intuitions of the soul," and elsewhere: "Thought is nothing else but internal sight."

of the dynamic action of thought in creating definite physiological and structural changes in our own organism. The therapeutic value of suggestion, now so widely recognised by the medical profession, is an illustration of this. Anyone who has read the pages of the *Zoist*, or the more modern and critical work of Dr. Milne Bramwell, or the widely known and masterly treatise of Dr. Lloyd Tuckey on Suggestive Therapeutics, will find cases of the cure not only of nervous and functional disorders but cases of tissue-change, of organic processes, produced by suggestion.[1] In hypnosis the patient is more readily under the influence of suggestion, inasmuch as any conscious resistance to the idea implanted is in abeyance, and accordingly more profound and successful therapeutic effects can thus be produced than in the normal waking state. Albeit conscious assistance to the idea suggested can be aroused by expectation through, *e.g.*, conversation with a patient cured of a like disorder by hypnotic treatment, or by religious conviction as in faith healing, or at a sacred shrine such as Lourdes. Equally efficient are any religio-philosophical views, if we think them inspired, as in Christian Science. Though I gladly recognise the help and healing which this creed has afforded to many, yet it may be said of it what is new in it is not true, and what is true in it is not new. For precisely similar cures were wrought at certain Pagan shrines in ancient Rome, where votive offerings to Æsculapius were dedicated to the god for the miraculous cures that had been wrought.[2]

[1] *Treatment by Hypnotism and Suggestion*, by C. Lloyd Tuckey, M.D. (Baillière & Co., 1907, 5th ed.) See *e.g.* pp. 74, 76, 78, 389 ff.

[2] See also the excellent article on 'Mind Cure,' etc., by Dr. and Mr. F. W. H. Myers, in *Proc. S.P.R.*, vol. ix., pp. 160 ff.

History is full of the miracles of healing accomplished by suggestion. All will remember the cures by Greatrakes and by Prince Hohenlohe in Germany; of these latter, a century ago, a contemporary and eye-witness wrote: "The deaf were made to hear, the blind to see and the lame to walk, not by any medical art, but by a few short prayers and the invocation of the name of Jesus," etc. We say these miracles are due to *suggestion*, but that again is only a word to conceal our ignorance of the processes involved. They are the result of a conscious thought or suggestion in one person, liberating the sub-conscious recuperative and formative forces within the organism of the patient. That there *is* a self below the threshold of consciousness, a sub-liminal self, appears to be abundantly proved; and the sub-liminal activities are far more wonderful and more subtle than any conscious act of thought. Take for example the processes of nutrition. Can anything be more mysterious than the conversion of our food into muscle, bone and nerve? A sleepless directive and selective force appears to be ever at work within ourselves. Ask the most learned chemist with all his appliances to extract milk from a bundle of hay, he would laugh at the idea; but give the hay to the humble cow and her sub-liminal self works this miracle. *How* we know not—only that the infinitely minute molecules of hay must have been pulled to pieces and rearranged into the molecules of milk. Talk about miracles; can anything be more amazing and improbable than this, and yet we pass by this familiar fact as if the handling and building up of molecules (millions of which lie in the smallest microscopic speck) were as simple and easy a thing as the handling of bricks to build a house. Some transcendent directive and

selective power, below the level of consciousness, apparently exists within us each, and as this power is purposive and intelligent it has all the characteristics of thought. This being so, we shall not be surprised to find that profound physiological processes can be induced by this sub-liminal self—this self within ourself.

It may seem a trivial thing to adduce as an illustration of this the removal of warts by suggestion, but nothing is trivial in the arcana of the Unconscious in bodily life. Nearly fifty years ago the great physiologist Dr. W. B. Carpenter stated that "the charming away of warts by spells belongs to cases which are real facts however they may be explained." Three hundred years before this Lord Bacon mentions, in his *Natural History*, a cure thus produced upon himself. He tells us that he had from childhood a large and unsightly wart upon one of his fingers which no physician could cure. When sixteen years old he went to Paris and (I quote an abbreviation of his own words) "there grew in a month's space on both my hands at least a hundred warts. The English ambassador's lady, a woman far from superstitious, told me she could remove my warts, if I would do what she directed. Thereupon she got a piece of lard, touched the warts with it, including the large one I had from childhood, put the remainder of the lard in the sun, on a window-sill which faced south, and assured me that as the lard melted away all the warts would also disappear. At this I did greatly marvel, but it was as she said, all the warts went quite away and even that large one I had so long endured." Bacon attributed the result to the doctrine of sympathy, then the fashionable hypothesis among the learned to explain any mystery.

Dr. Hack Tuke, in his classical work the *Influence of the Mind upon the Body*, gives other illustrations of a similar kind; thus—the daughter of a surgeon whom he knew had about a dozen warts on her hands; caustic and other remedies had been tried without success for eighteen months, when a friend told her, after solemnly counting the warts, that they would all disappear the following Sunday, which actually came to pass. I might quote many instances of a similar kind attested by careful observers and physicians of eminence. Miss Mason, who was till lately the Senior Lady Inspector of Boarded-out children, a personal friend of mine, cured a little boy, terribly afflicted with warts, by a simple charm.[1]

Hence it is unquestionable that *suggestion*, taking the form of faith, or words, or charms, can sometimes do what no medical skill can accomplish. That terrible diseases, such as hydrophobia, can be both caused and cured by suggestion, has been established beyond any doubt.[2] I myself have seen rapid and startling physiological changes, impossible to produce by any conscious act, brought about by a mere suggestion made to a patient under hypnosis. Thus a red scar or a painful burn, or even, *mirabile dictu*, a figure of a definite shape, such as a cross or an initial, can be caused to appear on the body of the entranced subject solely

[1] This and other cases are fully detailed in the *Journal* of the S.P.R., vol. viii. See also Miss Feilding's excellent book on *Faith Healing* (Duckworth & Co.).

[2] See Dr. Hack Tuke, *Influence of the Mind upon the Body*, pp. 202-216. As these pages are passing through the press I have received evidence of some remarkable cures recently performed in Russia, by 'spiritual healing,' through the Rev. A. M. Niblock; even cripples it is stated were cured, as by Prince Hohenlohe and also a few years ago at Knock in Ireland. The thaumaturgy of a simple and sincere faith is only now being recognised and is not yet adequately used as a therapeutic agent by the medical profession. A new significance is now given to the words: "All things are possible to him that believeth." "Whatsoever ye pray and ask for, *believe that ye have received them*, and ye shall have them."

through suggesting the idea. By creating some local disturbance of the blood-vessels in the skin, the unconscious self has done what it would be impossible for the unassisted conscious self to perform. And so also in the well-attested cases of *stigmata*, where a close resemblance to the wounds on the body of the crucified Saviour appear on the body of the ecstatic. This is a case of unconscious *self*-suggestion, arising from the intent and adoring gaze of the ecstatic upon the bleeding figure on the crucifix. With the abeyance of the conscious self, the hidden powers emerge, whilst the trance and mimicry of the wounds are strictly parallel to the experimental cases above referred to.

Again in the lower forms of life, change of environment sometimes appears to have a suggestive effect in producing colour-changes. For the beautiful experiments of Prof. Poulton, F.R.S., have shown that some caterpillars can more than once in their lifetime change their colour to suit their surroundings. Thus, if one half of a set of certain green caterpillars have black twigs placed among the leaves on which they feed, and if the other half have some white paper spills placed among the leaves, most of the former will become black and of the latter white. The nervous stimulus which produces these different pigmentary deposits appears to be excited by the particular colour acting upon the surface of the skin. But through what wonder-working power is the change brought about? Not of course through any conscious action of the caterpillar, for the pupæ of these same caterpillars undergo a like change, changing even to a golden appearance, with a brilliant metallic lustre, when the chrysalis has been allowed to remain on gilt paper! Nothing of course occurs if the chrysalis be

dead, but when living its dormant life, the unconscious within is apparently able to respond to suggestion from without; the colour of the environment having this suggestive effect.

May not a similar cause be at work in the many cases of protective mimicry, as well as protective coloration, found in the animal kingdom? If we accept the usual biological explanation of protective mimicry, the long intermediate stages required by natural selection would render the creature not less but *more* conspicuous among its kind, and therefore expose it to greater danger of capture and less chance of survival. In fact I am convinced that biologists have too long closed their eyes to the *psychic factor in evolution*—the directive power of the unconscious within the organism. Evolutionary processes in nature are according to this view the expression of the creative power of thought, using the term in the wider sense already defined. But it is *thought immanent, operative and transcendent, within the organism.* And it is interesting here to recall the fact that one hundred and fifty years ago, Swedenborg—who was a true seer as well as a learned man of science—explicitly urged this very hypothesis of an inherent directive force in the development of the forms of life.[1] A century later E. von Hartmann, in his well-known work the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, developed much the same view, only he rejects all anthropomorphic ideas, or any form of consciousness

[1] Thus in his *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, § 275, he writes: "We must acknowledge, if we think of causes and origins, that such a directive or formative force is not without but within the chick or embryo; and that it must exist within that substance that was first in the ovum and that has life or soul within it." etc. In fine he tells us, "the Infinite is in the finite, as in receptacles." Moreover, now that telepathy may be regarded as a *vera causa*, every living cell in the organism (as Mr. Gerald Balfour has conceived) is possibly in telepathic *rapport* with every other cell, and our unitary consciousness may be the resultant of this *rapport* among the brain cells. The wide philosophical implications of telepathy have not yet been adequately discussed.

or personality in the Supreme apart from nature, whereas Swedenborg's theology is the reverse of this. Von Hartmann with great wealth of learning shows that in the phenomena of instinct and of clairvoyance (which latter he states, as did Schopenhauer, only the ignorant reject) we have additional evidence of the operation of the Unconscious in life.

Is it therefore illegitimate to assume that the Unconscious, the psychic factor in evolution, is operative in the process of development to bring about more perfect organs and higher types of life? It seems to me impossible to explain, *e.g.*, the development of the mammalian eye according to the usual method adopted by biologists. It would take me too far aside from my present purpose to trace out this argument; I can only state after a prolonged study of the subject of vision, that blind and fortuitous evolutionary forces, or endless ages of natural selection, appear a more incredible hypothesis than the assumption of unconscious thought, ever operative within the organism, as the directive force in evolution.[1]

Are we then driven to the conclusion that there is no Divine Mind outside of nature, but that Absolute Thought is only *feeling its way* as it were to self-realisation? Let us try to grapple with this difficulty. Philosophy teaches us that the phenomena of nature are only signs and symbols significant of something we cannot fully apprehend with our limited senses. We can watch and explore the wonders of nature, just as we can watch the movements of a telegraphic needle

[1] The bifocal eye of the Brazilian fish anableps is inexplicable upon a purely naturalistic theory. Mr. T. W. Rolleston, in his suggestive work *Parallel Paths*, has referred to the anableps' eye, pp. 100 ff., and shown how impossible it is for natural selection, laying hold of fortuitous variations, to explain this remarkable organ.

and learn to read the message it brings, but the moving needle does not enable us to perceive the operator at the other end who is causing it to move, nor does it even remotely resemble the operator; its signals give us, it is true, an intelligible message, but *it is intelligible only because the intelligence of the operator has been and is related to our intelligence.* In like manner the mental signs our brain and nervous mechanism give us of the material world outside are not the things, nor a resemblance to the things in themselves; the real world around us, the world of *ontology*, is absolutely inaccessible to us. But the reason why the material world is intelligible, why we can interpret the signs it gives us, is because there is an Intelligence behind the universe which has been and is related to our intelligence. In other words an Infinite Mind exists and is related to our mind. For the interpretation of nature reveals an orderly and intelligible system, and we are never put to intellectual confusion in our scientific researches, as would be the case if the universe were a chaos and not a cosmos. Hence in the universe, external to ourselves and to all finite forms of life, there exist Intelligence, Will and Purpose; and this is the conclusion reached by great thinkers in all ages.[1] Nature "is not a soulless interaction of atoms nor life a paltry misery closed in the grave."

The Creative Thought of God is thus unfolding and realising itself in the worlds and lives around us. This is the Eternal Word, the Logos, through whom the worlds were made, and in whom "we live and move

[1] In recent times we might quote to the same effect Prof. Challis, Sir John Herschel, Prof. Clerk Maxwell, Sir G. Stokes, Lord Kelvin, and other eminent physicists in our own country.

and have our being." And if this be so then, to quote Swedenborg once more, "the Deity is in each single thing, and this even to such an extent that there is in it a representation of the Eternal and the Infinite. . . From this influx arises effort, from effort force, and from force the effect."[1]

But if nature be the unfolding and indwelling of the inscrutable Creative Thought, why is there so much in nature that appears to us imperfect, objectionable and evil? As regards noxious creatures no doubt they fulfil their function in the universal arcana of life, as does every microbe, whether, from the human point of view, it be malignant or benevolent. It is our restricted vision that is chiefly at fault, and gives rise to our arrogance and conceit. Our conscious thought is but a fragment of our whole personality and only an item in the great universe of being.

Our self-consciousness is no doubt the last rung, but it is only one rung, in the ladder of evolution, and the long and toilsome ascent to it embraces infinitely more than is contained in our restricted self-conscious life. Each rung of the ladder in its turn was doubtless a state of consciousness, a region of effort and attainment; and when habitude had rendered that sphere of

[1] *Arcana Cœlestia*, § 5116. In like manner Emerson says in his essay on 'Self-Reliance': "We lie in the lap of immense intelligence, which makes us receivers of its truth and organs of its activity. When we discern justice, or truth, we do nothing of ourselves, but allow a passage to its beams. If we ask whence this comes, if we seek to pry into the soul that causes, all philosophy is at fault. Every man discriminates between the voluntary acts of his mind and his involuntary perceptions and knows that to his involuntary perceptions a perfect faith is due. . . . This is the ultimate fact which we so quickly reach on this, as on every topic, the resolution of all into the Ever-blessed One." And so also Browning:

"There is an inmost centre in us all
Where truth abides in fulness, and to *know*
Rather consists in opening out a way
Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape
Than in effecting entry for a light
Supposed to be without."

work effortless and perfect, it passed into unconscious automatic action, thus enabling the ascending conscious life to take another step upward to still higher aims. The pinnacle of self-conscious life and reason was reached in us when consciousness regarded not only the *me* within but the *not me* in the world around and recognised their distinction. And in subject and object, as in thought and language and in spirit and matter, we have a conflict and antithesis, which find their solution in a higher Unity, the manifold expression of the Universal Creative Thought.

Finally we are confronted with the mystery of good and evil, the sorrow and suffering of human life. This age-long problem has been grappled with by abler men than myself, and it is too profound and difficult a subject adequately to discuss at the close of an address. But two or three thoughts present themselves:

(i) Everything in the phenomenal world is subject to limitation, imperfect expression and apparent contradiction, but all is progressing towards some higher unity as yet unimagined by us.

(ii) Consciousness, whether of physical or moral states, is only aroused through differences, the contrast of opposites. Without relativity of sensation there would be no sense-perception. A uniform state of heat, an unchanging illumination, a monotony of sound, would not arouse the sensation of warmth, or vision, or hearing. And so a uniform state of goodness would not enable us to perceive the good. If there were no wrong to strive with there would be no active right.[1]

[1] So Swedenborg: "Quality is rendered perfect by differences which have relation to things more or less opposite. Truth receives its quality from the existence of the false, similarly good from the existence of evil."—*T.C.R.*, § 763. "There is nothing in existence without a relation to its opposite, also thence comes all perception and sensation."—*H. and H.*, § 541.

(iii) All manifestation, whether of force, or life, or goodness, involves the *overcoming* of some reluctance or resistance. The physical energies of gravitation, electricity, light, heat, etc., reveal themselves to us in the process of overcoming the inertia of matter. We know absolutely nothing of the abstract or essential nature of Force, or of any physical Energy, such as gravity, electricity, etc. We do not see electricity in a lightning flash, nor in the electric light. What we see is the overcoming of resistance in the path of some hidden power; we see the glowing of particles of air in the lightning, or of carbon in the electric lamp—a resultant jointly due to the resistance encountered and the transit of the unseen power. Reduce that resistance, as in the copper conductor, and the light and heat disappear; abolish it altogether, both in gross matter and in the ether, and electricity would be utterly unknown and undiscoverable. Inertia, impedance, resistance, call it what we will, is as essential to the manifestation of every physical force as the force itself. The most powerful locomotive ever made, the largest cruiser ever built, would be unable to move a fraction of an inch if the resistance of the rails or the water were not present. And is not this physical fact exactly similar to the moral problem that is before us? As the forces of nature reveal themselves to us, and become self-realised, through the stresses and strains they generate in some reluctant medium—so the moral and spiritual forces of the unseen reveal themselves to us, and become realised in us, by the stresses and strains they create in the reluctant or opposing medium of our inert or evil lives.

Here, as elsewhere in the natural and spiritual worlds, "the invisible things of Him since the creation

of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made."[1] With our limitations what we term evil seems therefore as real and as necessary a thing for our spiritual life as good; for in overcoming the former the Divine life becomes manifest and our higher self is, to that extent, realised. It is in the *attaining* and not in the attainment, in the *effort* and not in the rest, in the *struggle* and not in the victory, that the process of self-realisation, the deeper consciousness, the larger and higher life, which we desire and mean by immortality, truly consists.

In every aspect of our present life strength and progress come only through continued effort. But effort involves both a hidden and sustaining power and an encountered resistance. We cannot tell what may be the nature of that resistance, corresponding to evil in this life, which exists in the unseen world, but if there be any correspondence and continuity, as we all believe there is, between the seen and the unseen, analogous and perhaps more stupendous obstacles will confront the soul in its progress through the ages still to come. Only thus, in ceaseless overcoming, does the Inscrutable and Infinite Thought, the transcendent One behind the manifold, unfold and enshrine itself in higher and more abundant life, of which we see the beginning here on earth but await its fuller revelation through the unending ages in the unseen life beyond.

Summary of the Argument.

The inscrutable thing we call our conscious thought is known only in its creative utterance, or partial self-realisation, through some form of language,

[1] *Rom.* i. 20.

using this term in its widest sense; that is, its manifestation is dependent on something foreign to itself. That which we know *subjectively* as consciousness is *objectively* a conflict between will or desire and some opposing resistance or non-satisfaction.[1] There is also a sub-conscious or sub-liminal life, which reveals itself in automatic or involuntary processes and muscular movements. This sub-liminal self has powers that transcend the self-conscious life, inasmuch as it can control and direct physiological processes, and molecular forces, to a desired end. In all living things, ourselves included, we see this sub-liminal self at work and thus we find ourselves linked, by a common bond, to the whole realm of life and to the Universal Life. This sub-liminal activity can be directed and set going by verbal, telepathic or emotional suggestion coming from within or without the organism, and thus profound functional and organic changes can be brought about. Suggestion in lower organisms may also come from the environment, and may result in corresponding colour-changes in the creature; thus in part may come about protective coloration and mimicry. The psychic factor in evolutionary processes can no longer be neglected, though its importance has hitherto been strangely overlooked. That an unknown directive force, a psychic factor, is present and potent in the development of organs and species, and in the whole course of evolution, appears unquestionable. The Super-conscious Creative Thought is thus manifesting itself in

[1] E. von Hartmann, in his *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (Eng. ed.), ii. 88, has developed the same view, which however, was unknown to me when this address was delivered; he writes: "Only when the radiating will meets with a resistance by which it is checked or broken can it lead to objective manifestation of *existence*, to the subjective phenomenon of *consciousness*." So also Jacob Böhme says: "Nothing can become manifest to itself without repugnance; for it has nothing to oppose it, it is ever going out of itself, and does not return to itself."

the phenomenal world, and through evolutionary processes, which are ever tending towards higher and more abundant life. But in this manifestation—whether animate or inanimate—something, equally inscrutable to us as this Dynamic Thought itself, has to be overcome. In the process of overcoming (which involves effort and a corresponding expenditure of energy), the hidden Thought, the Logos, unfolds itself, and with a fuller manifestation as ages of attaining pass by, until consciousness and ultimately self-consciousness are reached in human personality. Then the ascent in moral and spiritual life begins, the attainment of one height setting free the self-conscious life to win another. Hence higher ideals and new difficulties to overcome must be for ever before those who would win and retain "the life which is life indeed."

> "The energy of life may be
> Kept on after the grave but not begun;
> And he who flagg'd not in the earthly strife—
> From strength to strength advancing—only he,
> His soul well knit and all his battles won,
> Mounts, and that hardly, to eternal life."

Matthew Arnold, whose words these are, was however mistaken in saying "*all* his battles won," they are in fact but just begun. Intervals of rest, hereafter as well as here, will doubtless alternate with periods of activity. The continued survival of consciousness implies *desire*, and appears to rest upon *effort*, and therefore some form of nutriment will ever be required, by the spiritual as by the natural body, to sustain its expenditure of energy.

W. F. Barrett.

ORPHEUS AND THE FISHER OF MEN IN EARLY CHRISTIAN ART.

ROBERT EISLER, PH.D.

FOR if men were not fishes, the Apostles could never have been made fishers of men. Such fish indeed are worthy of the Lord's supper, such fish can swim about in the stream of baptism, such fish are caught with the hook of faith and in the nets of holy preaching.—ST. BRUNO SIGNIENSIS, *in Matth.* iv., p. 18.

ONE of the most puzzling problems in the whole religious history of the ancient world is the presence of unmistakably Orphic symbols in the sacred art of early Christendom. Every student of Christian archæology is acquainted with a comparatively large number of catacomb-paintings, sculptured sarcophagi, gems and ivories, exhibiting the familiar Pagan type of Orpheus, with his Phrygian (or rather Persian) head-dress and the lyre, seated either among a group of the very different kinds of wild and tame animals, or in the middle of the more typically Christian flock of sheep, which elsewhere accompany the 'Good Shepherd' — a mystic figure, common to Pythagoræan and Orphic,[1] to Hermetic[2] and to early Christian symbolism, and acceptable even to the most rigid of the Judæo-Christian party on account of the beautiful Old Testament comparison of Jahvè with a shepherd.

[1] Pythagoras is said to have been 'Eu-phorbos' (= the 'Good Shepherd') in a former life. Cp. the mythical 'herdsman' Phorbas in Thessalian and Bœötian legends, or still better the mythical singer 'Eu-nomos' (= 'Good Herder') whose statue, with the prophetic cicada perched on the strings of his lyre, was seen by Pausanias at Delphi.

[2] Cp. G. R. S. Mead, *Thrice-greatest Hermes*, i. 37 ff., etc., on the figure of the Hermetic Poimandres or Shepherd of men.

There is no reason to doubt that at least the latter transition-type, ranging half-way between the ordinary Orpheus and the well-known 'Bonus Pastor' glyph, symbolises the Christ as that gentle herdsman, who "guides his flock, rarely by the staff, *mostly with the sweet sound of the syrinx*,"[1] and who could just as well be understood to play the lyre of his ancestor, the royal shepherd David, as the pastoral reed of Pan or of the shepherd-god Attis 'Syriktēs,' or the Phrygian flute of the unique piping Orpheus on one *relievo* of the Knole collection.[2] And if this is really the case, it is not improbable that the various beasts of the original Orpheus-type were meant by the Christian artists to illustrate the righteousness and peace, which are to reign even in the animal kingdom under the sway of the Messianic king, under David's offspring, under the rod out of the stem of Jesse. "The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together" (*Is.* xi. 1 and 6). Small wonder that the Orpheus-pictures could so well correspond with the prophet's idea of a golden age to come; for there is indeed a close Orphic parallel to the above-mentioned text, in Empedokles' beautiful description of the blessed time when long ago the mythic Orpheus-Pythagoras lived, who had abolished the "crime of devouring," killing and sacrificing living beings. "At that time all were tame and friends of man, | wild animals and birds as well; | for love had bound their souls" (Fr. 130, Diels).

Nevertheless it remains a strange fact, that the

[1] Gregor. Nazianz. *Orat.* II. al. I. n.9.; Basil. Seleuc. *Hom.* 26.

[2] No. 16; s. Michaelis, *Ancient Marbles in Great Britain*, p. 422, and THE QUEST, i. 138; cp. the piping Christ in the *Acts of John*, ch. 95.

artists employed by the early Christian communities should have been allowed to use the characteristic features of a Pagan divinity even in such details—*e.g.* in the head-dress—as could not have had the slightest significance in a system of Christian religious pictography, although, in spite of the strong dependence of the comparatively poor and unoriginal early Christian art from Pagan models, nothing could have been easier than to Christianise the type by suppressing such accidental features; just as—to take the nearest parallel—the 'Good Shepherd' type itself, which is obviously derived from the Pagan Hermes Kriophoros, shows in no case such attributes as, for example, the winged cap, the winged sandals, the caduceus, or even the writing-pen of the 'Logios.'

Accordingly, the only possible explanation for these entirely undisguised Orpheus-images must be found in the supposition, that their Christian owners and inspirers connected the Saviour, in some quite essential respect, with this one Pagan prophet. It is true that such a view certainly goes far beyond the intention of the only two Patristic passages which have hitherto been adduced as a justification for these enigmatical monuments; for at least the older of the two texts[1] is practically a polemic against the hero, in whose worship,

[1] Clement of Alexandria, in his *Sermon to the Gentiles*, pp. 2 ff., Potter, written some fifty years after the completion of the Orpheus-pictures in the Roman catacombs, exhorts the Greeks to leave their Pagan poets on antiquated Helikon and congregate on the Mountain of Zion, where they will find dwelling the divine Logos. This real 'Eu-nomos,' says the Church-Father, alluding at once to the mythic singer mentioned above (p. 625 n. 1) and to the Christianised Hermetic figure of the Logos as the 'Shepherd of men,' does not sing in the metre of Terpander, but in the eternal rhythm of the 'New Song' (*Ps.* clvi.). But the Thracian as well as the Theban and Methymnæan Orpheuses, call them men or more than men, are swindlers, befouling life under pretext of their musical achievements, bewitching people by some kind of sorcery, and leading them astray, to their own hurt, from their former celestial freedom to the lowest slavery of idol-worship. Not so the singer, whose song the writer praises and who indeed tames the wicked, the wildest of wild animals, be they birds (that is light-minded), or

according to the testimony of our archæological evidence, some Christian communities seem to have indulged. Of course it is hardly credible that an identification, or even a syncretistic confusion of Christ and Orpheus—let us say of the same character as the blending achieved by Hellenising Hebrews between the Thracian beer-Dionysos Sabazios (cp. Illyr. *sabaium*, Ital. *zabbajone*) and the Jewish Sabaoth or 'Lord of Hosts'—should have been admitted in any Christian, were it even in somewhat Gnosticising, circles. What can be proved from literary evidence is really nothing more than that some apologetic writers (interpreting the principle that God had not left Himself without witness in the Pagan world, according to the Stoic ideas of an all-pervading divine Logos) had claimed, among other authorities such as the Sibyl and Thrice-greatest Hermes, the mythic singer Orpheus also as a champion of a secret and esoteric monotheism, which they had discovered chiefly, although not exclusively, in such verses as Jewish or Christian interpolators had inserted into the Orphic scriptures; and that other early theologians refused to accept these suspect authorities on the very good ground that, by exaggerating the doctrine of Logos-inspiration to such an extent, an uncontrollable amount of Pagan errors would be introduced into the revealed system of the Christian faith.

Are we, then, really to believe, that nothing else but these learned theological quotations from 'Orpheus,' or these artificial comparisons between Orpheus and

creeping beasts (that is treacherous), or lions (that is violent), or pigs (which means voluptuous), etc. Eusebius, the friend of Constantine, in the fourteenth chapter of his panegyric on that emperor, simply compares the Logos, taming and redeeming mankind as if playing on an instrument, with Orpheus displaying his magical skill on the mystic lyre.

the Logos-Christ, late as they all are, can account for the inclusion of this singular essentially Pagan type—for the once occurring Erōs and Psychē group (Garucci, tav. 20) is simply Greek imagery for divine Love and the Soul—into the very limited *repertoire* of Christian *popular* symbolism? Is not the 'Shepherd of Hermas' book a proof, that at least the Christian community in Rome was quite as well acquainted with Hermetic as they could ever have been with Orphic mystery-teaching? Why then is the Pagan Hermes Kriophoros, the Egyptian Theut or Logios, with his pen or his soul-awaking staff, never figured in the catacombs? Why is the Sibyl, the favourite of the old Christian oracle-mongers—the 'Sibyllistæ' of Celsus—and therefore of mediæval and later Christian art, never found there?

If all this is taken into due consideration, will it not appear a much sounder solution of the problem in question, to say that the same spirit of missionary diplomacy, which later on induced the Church to transform—in spite of the intransigent saying about the new wine in the old skins—*e.g.* the Birthday of the Pagan Sun-god into the modern Christmas Feast, the 'Rejoicing of the Great Mother' into our 'Annunciation of Mary,'—that same spirit of wise tolerance, which travestied so many local divinities of decaying Paganism into Christian saints, was already responsible for the voluntary and conscious blending of the 'Orpheus' type with the 'Good Shepherd' glyph, as it is found in the Roman catacombs?

When Paul came to Athens he took advantage of an altar inscribed by some superstitious person to the still dreaded although long-forgotten 'unknown god' of the place, in order to persuade by a clever rhetorical

stratagem the 'pious' Athenian people, that they were already worshippers of that unknowable and 'wholly hidden' god of the Jews, whose true worship had only not yet been revealed to them by any prophet.

May we not suppose quite as well, that Peter—or, if you prefer it, the unknown apostle who spread the first seeds of the new religion in Rome—found his easiest converts among the members of those secret societies which had successfully resisted all the persecutions of the Roman Senate during the Republic, and still continued in the days of Lactantius, as they had done in those of Euripides, "to celebrate, with Orpheus for their leader, the mysteries of Dionysos,"—among those initiates of Father Liber who are so often mentioned in inscriptions of the Imperial age, and whose doctrines we know from an exact counterpart to the Orphic funeral gold-labels from South Italian graves of the IVth century, B.C., which has been found near S. Paolo fuori, and belongs to the IIIrd century of our era?

If we remember that the principal doctrines of Orphism, as they were fixed already in the Pisistratian period, offer distinct analogies with later Christian beliefs—such as the pessimistic valuation of terrestrial life, the idea of original sin, the contempt of the body as a prison or grave of the soul, an eschatology with a paradise and a hell, with purgations and a final retribution or expiation of sins, a developed ritual in which a leading part was reserved for the priests, a sacrament of the cup, a dogmatism with a certain henotheistic tinge, with a logos-doctrine and the belief in a suffering god, worshipped with theophagic communion-rites—this hypothesis will be found all the

more plausible, because it explains at once, how Jewish and Christian interpolations found their way into Orphic writings, and how the picture of Orpheus, the former patron of the first converts, came to be included in Christian funeral symbolism.

Certainly, if such a theory is to hold good throughout, we must expect to find other striking points of contact to corroborate the conclusions which have first been drawn merely from those 'Orpheus' and still more from the significant 'Orpheus-Shepherd' pictures, as we might call them. Of such similarities we may mention at once, even before we presuppose anything from the results of our recent enquiries into the name and character of the Pagan Orpheus,[1] the identity of the priestly title '*archiboukolos*' in extant Orphic inscriptions with the name of '*archipoimēn*,' or 'chief-herdsman,' given to the Christ in *I. Peter*, v. 5, and of the Orphic '*boukoloi*' in general with the 'shepherds' of early Christian communities, mentioned in *Ephes.* iv. 11, *Acts*, xx. 28, and *I. Peter*, v. 2. If any reader objects, that Christ and Christian priests as *shep*herds cannot be compared with the Orphic *bou*kolos or *cattle*herd, we would simply remind him of certain early Christian inscriptions, where the neophytes are not designated as the 'sheep' of the sacred flock, but as '*vituli lactentes*,' or 'suckling calves,' a mystic figure of speech, to which corresponds the apparently rather disrespectful saying, "the oxen signify the apostles and prophets," in Cassiodorus's explanation of the various animals in the well-known Orpheus-pictures (Migne, ii. 352), the only justification of which can be found in the existence of a Pagan title the '*bocs*,' or 'oxen,' for the initiates of a certain degree in the

[1] See pp. 124 ff. and 306 ff. of the present volume of this REVIEW.

mysteries of Dionysos—two facts, which prove at least, that no great stress has ever been laid on the difference between the Pagan cattleherd and the Christian shepherd.

But the most remarkable coincidence of an Orphic mystery-doctrine with a Christian monument is certainly offered by the sarcophagus of one 'Firmus' found at Ostia, now in the Lateran Museum at Rome. Its front shows Orpheus in his typical costume, sitting under an olive-tree, on which a bird is perched, at his feet a ram, behind him the head of a sheep; the right side is unfortunately wanting, but the left shows nothing else but the well-known symbol of the Fisher with his angling rod and the mystic fish at the end of the line; in his left hand is a vessel, wherein to keep his catch.[1] Can we avoid the conclusion, that the sculptor, or the inspirer, of this most important *relievo* was perfectly well acquainted with the main doctrine of Orphism, *sci.* with the old and genuine meaning of the name 'Orpheus' as equivalent with 'Fisher,' such as the present writer has endeavoured to explain it in two previous issues of this REVIEW? And if indeed, on this sarcophagus, the 'Orpheus' and the 'Fisher' glyph represent the exoteric and the esoteric aspects of one and the same divinity, may we then not compare the 'Fishermen,' who play such an important part in the legendary history of the Dionysian cult—the Fishermen, who ferry the god over the Euripus to Eubœa, who find and save in their nets the wooden image of Dionysos Phalēn, or the son of Dionysos, the hero Thōas, or the head and the lyre of 'Orpheus,' those Fishermen, who in Haliæ, according to an old

[1] Cp. the "gathering of the good fish into vessels" in *Matth.* xiii. 49.

oracle, yearly bathe, or rather baptise, the image of Dionysos 'Halieus,' and above all the 'Tyrrhenian' Fisherman Akoitēs, who acts as a prophet and martyr of the Bakchos religion in the 'Pentheus' metamorphosis of Ovid, and probably also in the lost *Pentheus* tragedy of Lykophron—with Peter, with the three other apostolic Fishermen of the Gospel, and with their successors, the Christian bishops, who wear as insignia of their dignity, both the crozier of the 'Shepherd' and the mystic ring of the 'Fisher,'[1] just as we had to compare the 'Shepherds' and the 'Archipoimēn' of early Christianity with the 'Archiboukolos' and the 'Boukoloi' of the Pagan Father Liber?

But let us be as cautious as possible and invite the sceptic, who feels not yet prepared to admit as much, to follow us into the so-called 'Gallery of the Flavians,' in the Domitilla-catacomb. He will find there—or with greater ease at home, on Plate vii. 1

[1] The 'fisher-ring' or '*annulus piscatorius*' of the Pope—engraved with a representation of the miraculous draught—cannot be traced further back than to a Letter of Clement IV. to his nephew Pietro Grossi, dating from the year 1265. But this means only, that the custom of sealing the so-called '*breves*' with this 'secret' (the formula runs '*sub annulo nostro secreto*') or 'mystery' ring (for the latter expression see the letter of Hincmar of Rheims, IXth cent. A.D., Migne *Patrol. Lat.*, cxxvi. 188, "the ring, the token of faith . . . out of *the divine mysteries*") did not arise before the XIIIth cent. For even now there exist two bishops' rings which go back to the Merovingian age and must be called 'fisher-rings' on account of their engravings—the one, belonging to the diocese Maguelonne, the later Montpellier, showing a fish (Deloche, *Essai hist. et archéol. sur les Anneaux*, Paris, 1900, p. 289), the other, the celebrated ring of St. Arnulph, in the treasury of Metz, exhibiting a fish caught in a net, and two others swimming alongside (*o.c.* p. 86). The latter is said by Paulus Diaconus to have been thrown into the Mosel by its owner, in order to obtain a proof of the divine grace, and to have been indeed miraculously recovered in the belly of a fish, which fishermen presented to the bishop's kitchen (cp. also the ring of St. Avit, with its two dolphins, *o.c.* p. 311). Modern bishop's rings are plain, without engraving. As it is impossible that the papal fisher-ring could have been taken over by the Popes from the Gallican bishops, we must suppose, on the contrary, that simple bishops were no longer allowed to wear the old engraving on their rings when once the Popes began to use this once common ensign of episcopal dignity as a special secret seal. That ring and staff are the essential symbols of episcopal power, is well known to everyone who has but the slightest knowledge of the mediæval controversies between the empire and the papacy concerning the investiture of the bishops.

of Monsignore Wilpert's monumental work on the Christian catacomb-paintings of Rome (Freiburg, 1903) —the oldest specimen (dating with all probability from the second half of the first century, A.D.) of the very same Christian fisher-glyph which we have met on the sarcophagus of Firmus. Besides this significant symbol the room contains only pictures of the same tree (with birds) under which the lyre-playing Orpheus of the Ostia *relievo* is seated, and which is so often connected also with the images of the 'Fish' and the 'Good Shepherd' on other monuments, secondly a representation of the usual funeral meal, and thirdly the most remarkable symbolical group of a crozier, *a lamb and a full milk-pail* (Lat. *mulctra*).

That the crozier stands for the 'Good Shepherd' is proved by the parallels, where the 'Shepherd' carries the milk-pail, or is even represented as milking himself the mystic ewe. As to the rather odd symbolism of this latter animal, the reader should remember, that in *Ruth*, iv. 11, we find mentioned, as the two mothers or 'builders of the House of Israel,' Rachel, in Hebrew the 'Ewe,' and Leah, the 'Wild Cow.' Using the terms of modern comparative sociology we should say, that the two most primitive subdivisions of the Chosen People, the 'clan of the Ewe' and the 'tribe of the Wild Cow' (*b'neh Leah*), are both named after their respective totem-animals. The *massebah* on the 'sepulchre of the Ewe' (*Gen.* xxxv. 20) must have been the oldest sanctuary of the first totem, whose members were (according to a tempting suggestion of Steuernagel) called the Jṡ Ra'el, originally Jš Raḫel,[1] or 'men of the Ewe'—like

[1] The softening of the guttural ḫ in ' in a word which contains an *r* or *l*, is quite common. As to the mispronouncing of *ṡ* for *š* by the Israelites, the Šibboleth-Šibboleth story in *Judges*, xii. 6, is the best witness. Cp. on the

Jš Gad, 'men of (the god) Gad,' in the Mesha-inscription, or, as in *Jeremiah*, xxxi. 15, and *Matth.*, ii. 18, where Rachel is said to weep for her children, *sci.* the Israelites, the '*bench Rahel*,' or 'children of the Ewe.' The rites of mystically reviving a sacrificed lamb by seething it in the milk of the ancestral 'Ewe,' prohibited in the 'Book of the Covenant,' and certainly also of partaking in common of the sacred animal's milk-boiled flesh, and of the vivifying milk-broth, are easily explained on the hypothesis of such a totem-cult in the old Ewe-clan of Israel or 'Jš Rahel,' and nothing could be more interesting for the historian of ancient religion than to see how these primitive superstitions, repressed by strict Jahvism, yet perhaps never rooted out completely from the religious consciousness of the *am ha'arez*, were immediately revived after the breaking off from the Law in the earliest Christian Church.

The elaborate system of theological after-thoughts imagined to justify and spiritualise the crude magic of this milk-communion, may be reconstructed as follows: In *The Key* of Pseudo-Melito (iii. 302, Pitra), a late yet invaluable mine of Christian allegorism, Rachel is called "the Ewe of God, which is to conceive at the end of time." This means, that the new spiritual community, the Church as the "Israel of God" (*Gal.* vi. 16), has now replaced the old totemistic unit of the clan; she is the 'Ewe of God,' being one flesh with the Christ (*Eph.* v. 31 f.), and His mystic bride. Her 'conceiving' then refers certainly to the bringing forth of newborn lambs for the 'flock' (*I. Pet.* v. 2, 3) of

whole question *Enc. Bibl.* 4003, 4092, 4463. I need not draw the reader's attention to the fact, that the figure of Jahvè as the 'shepherd' and the Jš Rahel as his 'flock' is best understood on the background of these totemistic ideas about the descent of the clan from the ancestral Ewe.

God, *sci.* 'neophytes,' symbolised as lambs, such as may be seen, *e.g.* on a well-known sarcophagus of the IVth century (Garucci, ccciii. 2), holding in their mouths the heavenly crowns (*II. Tim.* iv. 8) of baptism.

Now it is an established fact, that these apparent metaphors of the 'lambs' and the mystic 'rebirth' were taken in a very literal sense. As the Lord had said (*Matth.* xviii. 3), "Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter the Kingdom of Heaven," so deceased Christians, even grown-up people, call themselves on their epitaphs 'infants.' For, according to Tertullian (*Ad Mart.* i.), they are 'children'—and even 'sucklings' (see above, p. 631)—of the '*Domina Mater Ecclesia*,' of the 'Lady' ('*Kyria*,' cp. *II. John* i.), the 'Mother' Church. That all this was not taken as simply figurative speech, becomes clear, if we note that the earliest ritual prescribes a drink of milk and honey for the newly baptised; for, according to a wide-spread ancient and modern custom, milk-and-honey is the first food given to newborn babes. The documentary evidence for this rite has been collected most completely by Usener (*Rhein. Mus.*, 1902), while in Wilpert's reproductions of the catacomb-paintings we actually find a woman approaching the mystic milk-pail in a most reverent attitude, evidently to partake of the initiating drink of rebirth. The honey, used in this ceremony, is said in the Melitonian *Key* (iii. 40, Pitra) to represent "the sweetness of the divine Word" (cp. *Prov.* xvi. 24)—for what mystic reasons will be shown in a later quest about the origins of the Eucharist. And so also was the milk considered by the '*galaktophagoi*,' or 'milk-drinkers' (as Clement of Alexandria calls the Christians), according to the same writer, as embodying the 'Logos.'

"As the child is vivified," says *The Epistle of Barnabas*, vi. 12, "by honey and milk, so is the faithful by the Word." From *I. Pet.* ii. 2, 3, and less explicitly also from *I. Cor.* iii. 2 and *Heb.* v. 12, it appears, that by the 'milk' some kind of preliminary revelation of the Logos is to be understood, corresponding to the simpler teaching which precedes the full initiation of the grown-up (*I. Cor.* xiii. 11), that is the cup of wine, the true blood of the Logos, which could be granted only to those who had already "tasted, how wholesome the Lord is." Accordingly three subsequent cups are prescribed for the newly-baptised in the *Didaskalia of the Apostles* (pp. 111 ff., Hauler). First, a cup of water, evidently symbolising the spring, flowing forth from the moving rock, which was the pre-existent Christ, and of which the Jews partook, after having been baptised unto Moses (*I. Cor.* x. 1-4); instead of being circumcised, the neophytes had to drown their former selves (*Col.* ii. 12) in this water of life. The second is the milk-cup, symbolising, according to the canons of Hippolytus (xix., no. 15, p. 77), the mystic rebirth; if the milk is mixed with honey, we may remember, *Deut.* xxxii. 13, "the honey of the rocks" given by Jahvè to Israel in the desert. The third cup only[1] is the mixture of wine and water, which was also used in the Eucharist (cp. *Cantic.* iv. 11, v. 1).

Accordingly the 'Good Shepherd' milking the Ewe must be understood as the Christ, or his human representatives, the 'shepherds,' who bring forth from

[1] There is a *versus paræmiacus*—"tritou kratēros egeusō ("of the third cup hast thou tasted")—quoted by Apostolios (xvii. 28, t. ii., p. 692, *Paræm. Gott.*) as expressing the last and most beneficial stage of initiation "in the mysteries." Although no hint is given as to which particular mysteries are meant, the notice certainly refers to a *Pagan* cult, whose influence on the above-described Christian ritual may be safely assumed.

the treasures of the 'Ewe' Rachel, the 'Mother' Church, the milk-drink of the first initiatory teaching. The lambs approaching the milk-pail placed on the altar —as we can see them in the 'Sepulchre of Lucina' (Wilpert, plate 183c)—or the lamb reposing beside the milk-pail and under the shadow of the crozier—as we found it in the 'Gallery of the Flavians,' and as it recurs four times in the catacomb 'Ad Duas Lauros' (*ibid.*, pl. 96)—cannot but represent the first or milk-communion of the *newly-baptised* 'children' of the mystic 'Mother,' into whose womb, the '*gremium Matris Ecclesiæ*,' they have entered,[1] to be 'reborn into eternity.'

This interpretation is in perfect harmony with the fact, that the mystic milk-drink is connected with the symbolic 'Fisher,' not only in the above-mentioned paintings of the Domitilla-catacomb, but also in the beautiful hymn appended to the *Protreptikos* of the Alexandrinian Clement, where the Christ is invoked under many a mystic name, and among them also under the four figures which are of such essential importance for our present investigation: namely, the 'shepherd of the lambs,' the 'fisher of men' (*halieus meropōn*),[2] the 'source of mercy'[3]—of which they partake in the water-

[1] Cp. the stubborn doubt of the 'uninitiated' Jew Nicodemus in *John*, iii. 4: "How can a man be born when he is old? can he enter the second time into his mother's womb and be born?" To this question the adept of many an ancient mystery-cult (s. Dieterich, *Mithrasliturgie*, pp. 163 ff.) could easily have given the necessary answer. For the reader who is not familiar with these ideas I will quote only a few lines from Coleman's *Hindu Myth.* (p. 151): "For the purpose of regeneration it is directed to make an image of . . . the female power of nature, in the shape either of a woman or of a cow. In this statue the person to be regenerated is enclosed and dragged through the usual channel.

[2] Jesus as 'fisher of men' will also be found in Gregory of Nazianzus (t. i., p. 646): "Jesus, who is called the fisherman, fishes himself with the drag . . .; He bears every hardship, in order to recover from the deep the fish, which is man." Both passages may be illustrated by an old Christian gold-glass in F. X. Kraus' *Gesch. d. Christl. Kunst.*, p. 96.

[3] Cp. Jahvè as the 'spring of living water' in *Jer.* ii. 13, xvii. 13.

cup!—and the 'heavenly milk'—that is the Logos—"which flows from the sweet breasts (*apo glykerōn mastōn*) of the mystic bride,"[1] the Church. For it is quite obvious from all archæological as well as from literary evidence, that the 'Fisher' also alludes mystically to the baptismal ceremony. The whole collection of Roman catacomb-paintings contains only two other instances of this glyph beside the already-mentioned one in the 'Hypogæum Flavium,' both in the so-called 'Chapels of the Sacrament' in S. Callisto, and in both cases the meaning cannot be mistaken. On plate 27 of Father Wilpert's volume, the Fisher stands side by side with an image of Moses, smiting the rock and producing the spring of mercy, *sci.* filling the first or water cup for the neophytes. These two pictures are grouped with a third representing symbolically the Eucharistic meal, by the feeding of the seven disciples on the shore of Lake Tiberias, evidently alluding to the Eucharistic communion, which used to follow the baptism in the Early Church. Plate 27, again immediately encloses the Fisher in one and the same frame with the baptismal scene of a man pouring water on the head of another figure, standing apparently in a stream of water—whether it be the baptism of Christ himself or not—and with the pictogram of the impotent man, who carries his bed after having been healed in the '*probatica piscina*' of *Bethṣaida*—as the best manuscripts of *John*, v. 2, have it. Evidently the inspirer of this symbolic combination of the three scenes understood the 'fishpool of the sheep,' called in Hebrew Bethṣaida or 'House of Fishing,'[2] as an

[1] Cp. *Cant.* iv. 11.

[2] It may be remembered, in passing, that the 'angel' who used to descend to stir up the water of the pool amidst the five porticos of this splendid health-resort and sanctuary (in the ancient world these two

allegory for the 'fishpool' of baptism—the 'piscina,' as the baptismal font is still called in the Catholic liturgies[1]—wherein the 'lambs' are cleansed of all the infirmity and impotency of their previous sinful life.[2]

We are now sufficiently prepared to take up our original problem with increased confidence in the soundness of the hypothesis set forth at the beginning to account for the presence of the Orpheus-pictures in Christian funeral symbolism. For if we have found, on the one hand, the Fisher-glyph coupled with the image of the lyre-playing Orpheus and, on the other, the Fisher-symbol side by side with the pictogram of the lamb and the milk-pail, is it still too bold a step to take the latter group as a welcome cross-evidence for the conclusions we had to draw from the former, and to compare the lamb approaching the mystic milk, the ritual significance of which has been analysed above, with the well-known Orphic formula of the South Italian gold-labels: "As a kid have I fallen into the milk" (*supra*, p. 130), or, still better, as Salomon Reinach translates: "*As a kid have I encountered* (cp. Lat. '*incidere in*,' French '*tomber sur*') *the milk*"? Is it possible any longer to overlook the close parallelism between that other intentionally ambiguous Orphic '*symbolon*,' "Beneath the bosom" or "Into the womb of the Lady, the Queen of the Underworld, have

conceptions were always intimately connected) in 'Beth Ṣaida' was certainly none else than a transparent monotheistic disguise of the old Canaanite Lord of the 'Fishing House,' *viz.* of the 'Fisher'-god Ṣid, mentioned above, p. 308.

[1] Cp. the mediæval baptismal font of Ringstad in Denmark adorned with three fishes, forming a triangle, in Münter, *Antiqu. Abhandlungen*, plate 26. A similar yet older one is at Grotta Ferrata, near Rome.

[2] For baptism as a healing, s., *e.g.*, Faustus of Riez (Migne, *P. L.* xxx., 280 ff. § 3): "Ask yourself, who have already been regenerated in Christ, . . . if not . . . without any bodily perception . . . God healed in you what was wounded and removed what was diseased."

I sunk,"[1] and the 'regeneration' of the Christian 'neophyte,' or 'newly-conceived,' by entering into the '*gremium*' of the 'Mother' Church, whence he is 'reborn' as a 'suckling calf,'[2] nourished by the 'sweet milk from the breasts' of that mystic Bride, who is herself called, just as the Orphic Mother-goddess by her worshippers, the 'Lady' (*Domina*, *Kyria*) and even the 'Queen' (*Basilissa*), on the inscription of Abercius?

Usener has long ago propounded the theory, that the Christian rite of the honey-and-milk, water-and-wine communion at baptism cannot possibly have arisen from those two verses in *Canticles*, or from the Old Testament description of the Promised Land as a country "flowing with milk and honey"; that it cannot be derived from the religion of Jahvè, who loathes and execrates honey-offerings (*Lev.* ii. 11 f.), but must have been taken over from the cult of Dionysos, whose epiphany is regularly accompanied by the flowing-forth of honey-and-milk fountains, and by the same change of water into wine which the Lord is made to operate by the late mystic legend of the wedding in Cana. The same holds good of the symbolism connecting the lamb and the milk-pail.

[1] The Orphic initiate considers himself a "son of Earth and of the starry Sky." Consequently when buried he re-enters the womb of his Mother. Where the uneven surface of the earth is compared with the breasts of the Earth-goddess, as for example in Hesiod's expression of the *Gaia eyrysternos*, "wide-breasted Earth," *kolpos* may be taken in the more literal sense, which allows a connection with the lactation-rite.

[2] Cp. p. 631 above, the '*boes*,' or 'oxen,' of the Dionysian mysteries. The 'Lady' into whose womb the Orphic initiate enters for rebirth, is a 'horned' goddess for the Orphic, and her son Dionysos is a 'horned child.' Accordingly, where the latter is a bull-god, as in the 'Axios Tauros' hymn, the 'Mother' is thought of as a cow; where he is a kid, she is a she-goat. The recently initiated milk-suckling worshippers are, accordingly, either 'calves' or 'kids.' The substitution of the Christian 'lamb' and the 'ewe' for the kid and the she-goat is explained above, pp. 634 ff. Further, already in the Jewish prescription for the Passah (*Exod.*, xii. 5) the 'lamb' may be taken "out from the sheep or from the goats," so that the '*agnus dei*' too might be understood indifferently as a lamb or as a kid.

Although there are points of contact with old Semitic folklore just strong enough to account for the attraction which Orphism exercised upon the Hellenising Jews, it is impossible that the mystic rebirth and lactation-rites could have developed in a Jewish sect simply out of those scriptural texts which have been subsequently used to justify and to spiritualise them, if such ceremonies had not already been in existence in those Pagan cult-societies from which the whole outward organisation of the earliest Church is well known to have been borrowed.

May we not proceed now one step further, and acknowledge an immediate connection between the Dionysian, or Orphic, initiation-rites, with their main formulas, on the one hand, and the whole baptismal symbolism of the earliest Christian Church, on the other? And if this be admitted, may we not legitimately conclude that the Christian allegory of the mystic Fisher is also a survival of the Bacchic 'orgies' and equivalent to, or even identical with, the conception of 'Dionysos Halieus' or 'Orpheus,' the divine 'Fisher' of the Greek, or originally Prehellenic, mystery-cults, into whose enigmatical figure Hellenistic theology had resolved all the similar Oriental gods whose names have been enumerated in a previous paper?

Of course this last thesis will not be accepted, unless we can prove it to be in perfect harmony, not only with the already considered archæological evidence from which it has been derived, but also with the corresponding literary texts which we have still to analyse. Fortunately a survey of the latter is rendered very easy, thanks to the learned dissertation *De Pisce symbolico* (Paris, 1855) of that admirable Benedictine scholar Cardinal J. B. Pitra, whose work is by no

means superseded, or even completed, and still less improved, by the shallow and incompetent, yet often-quoted dissertation of H. Achelis, *Das Symbol des Fisches und die Fischdenkmäler der römischen Katacomben* (Marburg, 1888). We owe to Pitra an abundant collection of Patristic passages concerning our subject, out of which only three typical ones need be reproduced here for the reader's information.

There is, first, the well-known saying of Clemens Alexandrinus (*Pædag.* iii. 11) that the fishermen, in performing their daily work, should always remember the apostles and the 'infants' drawn from the water. Secondly, the not less significant words in Tertullian (*De Bapt.* c. 1), where the Church Father compares a certain Pagan woman of doubtful character with a snake, and goes on to say: "But we—the Christians—are *little fishes* (*pisciculi*) after the type (*secundum*) of our great ΙΧΘΥΣ (=Fish)[1] Jesus Christ, *born in the water*," etc. Thirdly, the most characteristic testimony of all, in a Letter (*Epist.* xx.) of Paulinus of Nola to Bishop Delphinus, by whom the writer of the missive himself had been baptised. "I shall always," says Paulinus, "remember that I have been made a [spiritual] son of the dolphin"—this alludes to the Bishop's name Delphinus, and of course also to that dolphin pierced by the trident, which is so often found in the catacombs, probably as a symbol for the passion of Christ on the cross—"so that I have become one of those *fishes*

[1] The initials of the words Iēsous Christos Theou 'Yios Sotēr—I. Chr. Son of God Saviour—give the word IChThYS, that is 'Fish.' But as Salomon Reinach has first observed, the akrostichon is certainly an afterthought, and cannot possibly be the ultimate root of the Christian fish-symbolism. It is enough to remember that both orthodox Polish Jews and the Catholic Christians of the whole world eat fish only, or at least regularly, on Fridays, that is, on the day of the planet Venus, in order to perceive, as Reinach has already done, that both Jews and Christians are deeply influenced by the rites of the Syrian goddess Atargatis, who was identified with the Morning-star, and whose son is indeed Ichthys, the sacred Fish.

which pass through the paths of the sea" (a quotation from the Vulgate of *Ps.* viii. 9). "I shall remember you not only as my father, but also as my fisher.[1] For it is you who have let down the hook towards me, to draw me out of the deep and bitter flood of the world, so that I should be soon a prey of salvation; to die to Nature, for whom I had lived, and to live in God, for whom I had been dead. If, therefore, I am thy fish," etc.

These quotations agree in every respect with the above analysed pictograms in the catacombs; they supply, moreover, the authentic interpretation of the connection established between the fisher-symbol and the baptismal rite. The old self of the convert is believed to be drowned in baptism (*Coloss.* ii. 12); from the water he is 'reborn' by 'putting on the Christ' (*Gal.* iii. 27), who is not conceived in this respect as the mystic Lamb, so that his worshippers, symbolically wrapped up in the God's theriomorphic dress, would become lambs too, but as the mystic Fish, the very figure of Christ which is so often mentioned in old Christian inscriptions, and which is generally —although beyond doubt wrongly—derived from a famous Sibylline acrostic. By 'putting on' their mystically fish-shaped divinity—just as certain Greek and Assyrian worshippers of the fish-god clothe themselves with fish-skins (*supra*, p. 315), the Christian neophytes equally believe themselves to be symbolically transformed into 'fishes' by the baptismal immersion. As 'reborn' fishes they are taken up from the water, as Paulinus says, and as we see in the catacomb-pictures, by the hook, or, as others say (cp. the motto above, p. 625), by a net. The 'hook' itself is frequently

[1] This is an approximate translation of the word-play, "*non patrem solum, sed et Petrum.*"

identified with the Christ, or the Logos, whom the neophytes swallow in the Eucharist, immediately after the immersion; and in like manner is the mystic 'net' taken as a figure of the Christ by S. Damasus (*Carm.* vi.), Ennodius (*Carm.* i. 9), and S. Orientius (Martène-Durand, *Thes. Anecd.* v. 40). The latter conception is only the more interesting, first because we possess, besides the testimonies about the above-mentioned (p. 307) Chaldæan and Orphic fetish-cult of the sacred 'net,' a precious specimen of old-Babylonian logos-mysticism in a frequently recurring text (transl. by Jastrow, *Rel. Bab. und Assyr.* ii. 49 f.; cp. i. 496 f., "Thy Word, the great net encircling heaven and earth"), where the powerful 'Word' (*Amātu*) of the Divinity is said to be "a snare prepared on the shore of the sea, *out of the meshes of which the fish cannot escape*, and *a net in which man is taken*"; and, secondly, because a late, yet not incredible, Arabian tradition (Dimešqui, in Chwolson's *Ssabier*, ii. 397) informs us, that certain priests of the Babylonian moon-sanctuary in Harran, which continued to exist until the Mongolian invasion, *wrapped themselves*, when entering the temple on a certain day, *in fishing-nets*, evidently with a similar intention as the same, or a kindred, priesthood had when they used to put on fish-skins.

All this is certainly good to know; yet we must not forget that the Patristic texts about the newly-baptised as the 'fishes,' and on the 'fishing of men' as operated through baptism, are, without exception, considerably later than the fisher-pictures of the Roman catacombs, so that they cannot tell us anything about the origin of the allegory, however elucidating they may be for its symbolic significance. Indeed all the scholars who have hitherto occupied themselves with

the monuments and with the corresponding literary evidence, have tacitly or expressedly supposed that both are to be explained by the well-known inferences of the 'fishers' and the 'fishing of men' in the Gospels themselves, namely:

First, the '*calling*' of the four apostles recorded in *Mark*, i. 16 ff., and with quite unsubstantial alterations in *Matth.* iv. 18;

Secondly, the '*miraculous draught*' narrated in *Luke*, v. 1-11, and, quite differently in the 'Petrine' appendix to *John* (xxi. 1-11);

Thirdly, the *parable of the fish-net*, in *Matth.* xiii. 47; and

Lastly, as a supplementary passage, the story of *the penny in the fish's mouth*, in *Matth.* xvii. 27.

But even this is in some respects a rather naïve way of approaching so delicate a problem, considering: first, that the alleged gospel-texts do not allude anywhere *openly* to the baptismal rite, so that we cannot admit beforehand, and without a closer analysis, that their authors used the fishing-symbol in the same *sacramental* sense as the Christians who were buried in the Roman catacombs, and the later Church Fathers, certainly did; and, second, the no less serious objection to the traditional attitude of Christian archæology towards these monuments, that the relative chronology of the different New Testament documents to a monument of such an early date as the fisher-image in the Domitilla-catacomb, which must have been executed some time during the last third of the first century, A.D.,[1] has not as yet been thoroughly investigated.

[1] The spacious and, therefore, expensive subterranean galleries in question were carried out in the first century of our era, and belonged to historic persons of the last third of this period, such as Flavia Domitilla, a niece of Vespasian and Acilius Glabrio. That the paintings in these

The difficulties which arise from this omission, are sufficiently illustrated if we remind the reader, that 'Mark,' the oldest of the so-called 'Synoptic' witnesses, is not anterior, according to some modern critics, to the year 70, A.D., and may even have been written one, two or more decades after that date; as, moreover, it is not impossible that this Gospel was really composed in Rome,[1] as so many scholars suppose, we are obviously at a loss to determine from any *external* dates, whether our literary or our monumental evidence represents the earliest tradition. This means, we cannot say beforehand whether the image of the mystic 'Fisher' in the 'Flavian' gallery is to be explained from *Mark*, i. 17 ff.; or, *vice versa*, the fisher-symbolism in *Mark*, and the Gospels depending on *Mark*, must be derived from the ritual use of the earliest Christian Church in Rome, where Orphic mystery-doctrines, such as the formula of the lamb and the milk-cup, certainly exercised a considerable influence upon the development of the baptismal sacrament.

Consequently there is beyond doubt no obstacle in the *external* chronology of our documents which could prevent us from assuming, that in Rome, or in other places where the same Pagan influence may be presupposed, the Bacchic priestly dignity of 'Fisher' (cp. *supra*, pp. 632) was taken over by the primitive Christian

catacombs cannot be later additions but, on the contrary, represent the original and contemporaneous decorative scheme, is unanimously inferred from their style, by the best expert in the stylistic development of ancient fresco-painting, Prof. Mau, and by Monsignore Joseph Wilpert, who devoted years and years of most patient and minute research to the remains of Christian funeral art (cp. the latter's above-quoted work, pp. 130 and 122). Of course such a criterion as the style of a painting allows of a certain margin, but an exaggerated scepticism in these very plain problems cannot be too carefully avoided.

[1] On Latin words, forms of expression, and Latin explanations of Greek phrases in *Mark*, see *Encycl. Bibl.* 1839 (middle). On the date of *Mark*, *ibid.* 1893.

communities, with the same facility as the corresponding Dionysian cult-office of the 'Shepherd' or 'Arch-Shepherd,' and that the celebrated saying "Come ye after me and I will make you fishers of men," in *Mark*, 1. 17, is nothing else than the ætiological *a posteriori* explanation of a title, which corresponds to the Bacchic 'Halieis,' exactly as the Hermetic 'Poimandres,' or 'Shepherd of Men,' does to the Dionysian 'Boukolos,' or 'Cattle-herd.' The parables of the fish-net (in *Matth.* xiii. 47), of the statēr in the fish's mouth (*ibid.* xvii., 27), and the allegories of the miraculous draught (in *Luke*, v. and *John*, xxi.) could then be explained, with many modern critics,[1] as later derivations from the original metaphor in *Mark*, i. 17 and *Matth.* iv. 19. However a more elaborate and thorough-going analysis of characteristic *intrinsic* features in the alleged gospel-texts than that which has been hitherto devoted to this subject by the historians of Christian origins, will prove in a definite manner, that so radical a view can *not* be successfully defended after all.

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(THE principal thesis of this paper was first stated as a conclusion of the author's lecture on 'Orpheus—the Fisher,' read in September, 1908, before the Third International Congress for the History of Religion, at Oxford, which has been published in two previous numbers of this REVIEW. These papers will be published in book-form by Mr. J. M. Watkins, together with other essays that are to follow on 'The Fishing of Men in Old and New Testament Texts,' 'The Baptism of John the Forerunner and the Initiation Rite of the Christian Church,' and 'The Origins of the Eucharist,' all of them dealing with the rites and cult-symbols of the 'Fisher-God.'—ED.)

[1] Cp., *e.g.*, *Encycl. Bibl.* 1788, on *Matth.* xiii. 47, xvii. 27; *ibid.*, 1883 § 142 and 4573 on *Luke*, vi.-11; 1786, on this passage and *John*, xxi. 1-11.

RELIGION IN THE FAR EAST, OR SALVATION BY FAITH: A STUDY IN JAPANESE BUDDHISM.

REV. J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, M.A., D.D.

II.[1]

THE Sect of the Pure Land established in Japan in the twelfth century of our era by Honen (1133-1212) was based on faith in the saving power of the Great Vow of Amida, the Buddha of Boundless Light. Honen, however, did not carry this principle to its last extremity. He did not wholly reject the idea of merit, or deny absolutely the value of good works. He might, indeed, warn the disciple against supposing that "birth (in the Buddha's realm) is attained by the efficacy of our acts or by the virtue of our minds." But the repetition of the sacred name was enforced as a duty, if the disciple desired at death the blessed vision of his Lord arriving to welcome him with his escort of saints. The logic of faith demanded that it should be not only the chief, but actually the sole, condition of salvation. The element of *Ji-riki*, or 'self-exertion,' must be entirely purged away, so that pure trust in *Ta-riki*, the 'exertion of another,' should alone remain. To this position Honen's disciple Shinran in due time advanced, and upon it he established a fresh denomination, the 'True Sect of the Pure Land' (Jodo Shin-Shu), which was

[1] For No. I. see the April issue.

destined to become the most important of the Buddhist organisations in Japan.

Born in 1173, of an aristocratic family of the first water on both father's and mother's side, Shinran had the misfortune to lose his father at four years old, and his mother at eight. From an early age he had cherished the desire to become a monk. So at nine years old he entered one of the monasteries on Mount Hiei, a vast and powerful settlement which was for centuries a hot-bed of political intrigues.

More than one teacher had already broken away from its peculiar combination of worldliness and metaphysics to proclaim a purer doctrine and a simpler devotion. Two hundred years before a prince of the blood had become an itinerant preacher, that he might win men to trust in Amida's name. In the eleventh century the turbulence of the monks broke out in civil war, and the unfortunate Emperor, unable to restrain them, lamented that he could no more control the monks of Mount Hiei than he could restrain the waters of the Kamo river or regulate the cast of the dice. Ryonen Shonin, in 1124, had a vision of Amida, who bade him clear out of Hiei as from a den of thieves, and found a sect which should have but one ceremony for all men, the invocation of Amida's name. And but a little while before Honen had actually taken the same course and gone forth to proclaim the merits of the Primal Vow. It was not surprising that Shinran should feel the spirit of unrest. Study, books, prayer, failed to give him light. At last, as he knelt before Kwannon[1] in the Hexagon Temple, the vision came to him of the Lord of saving compassion, Son of Amida himself by theological accommodation, who deigned to say, "Go

[1] The Japanese equivalent of Avalokiteçvara.

to Honen, and he will teach you." With this guidance Shinran betook himself to the 'holy hermit,' and under his influence began preaching in the Eastern provinces. He wrought the new faith into hymns, which, like those of the Wesleys, proved a powerful instrument in awakening religious emotion, and are still sung in the temples to this day. He founded himself on the Original Vow. The conception of a Being of boundless light and life involved infinite mercy and infinite wisdom; these attributes further carried saving power along with them; therefore, argued Shinran: "He can take hold of the faithful with his own light, and convey them to dwell in the Pure Land." Here are one or two stanzas from his famous poem, the 'Shoshinge,' which is said still to form a part of the daily devotions of every pious household in Shinran's denomination.

I put my trust in the great Tathāgata of boundless Light. Hail to the mystic wonderful Light.

Universally doth he send forth his endless changeless light, his light of purity, of joy, of wisdom, his light that is unbroken by obstacles, that passes human thought, that has no end in time or space.

He that is the King of flame, brighter than the brightness of sun and moon, his light illuminates worlds more numerous than the dust, and all sentient creatures enjoy it and are illuminated by it. . . .

If once there be roused in us but one thought of joy and love (in consequence of the Vow), we turn just as we are with our sins and lusts upon us towards Nirvāṇa.

Laymen and saints alike, even those who have committed the five deadly sins, will yet by faith in the power of the Tathāgata enter into the enjoyment and taste of his mercy, as surely as the water in the mountain stream at last reaches the ocean and becomes salt.[1]

While Shinran was still a promising young monk

[1] Lloyd, 'The Shoshinge,' in *Shinran and his Work*, p. 46.

at Mount Hiei, he was sent one day—so runs the tale, —on business of his monastery, to Kyoto. On his way back he was accosted to his great surprise by a young girl, who asked him to guide her to the famous shrine upon the mountain. "You are a woman," he said, "and no foot of woman may tread the holy hill." "I am a woman," replied the girl; "but I have a human heart, and my heart longs for salvation." Shinran suggested a nunnery. "Your nunneries," said she, "are like your monasteries, places where women pore over books and heap up knowledge, and think they shall be saved by what they know. I am not learned, and if I were, what good would my learning, immersed in a convent, do to my suffering sisters? I desire to be saved in order that I may save others. I want some simple faith for simple souls. While monks and nuns are poring over Sūtras of doubtful meaning in the selfish quiet of the monasteries, there are thousands of men and women in Japan perishing for lack of a few satisfying mouthfuls of saving doctrine. Take this," she said, and she held out to him a crystal burning-glass, "take this and keep it. It has the power to collect the sun's rays, and focus them upon one point, on which it shines with burning heat. Do the same for religion. Collect and focus into one point the whole system of the faith, and let that one point be made burning and bright so that it may kindle into zeal even the simplest and most ignorant soul." It was not till many years later that he discovered that he had been conversing with the noble lady Tama hi no Miya, 'Princess Burning-Crystal' as she is designated in the Shin Shu books, daughter of Kanezane, of the powerful family of the Fujiwara.[1] For one

[1] Lloyd, *Shinran and his Work*, p. 68.

day the great noble came to Honen with a remarkable proposal. "I want to find among your disciples a husband for my daughter. I wish my daughter's husband to be a monk as well as a householder, to retain his sacred character whilst yet living the life of the ordinary layman and mixing with the world. I desire him by means of a concrete example to demonstrate that the religion of salvation by faith in Amida is one which concerns the layman as well as the monk. It will be for the good of the country if we can show that the family and not the monastery is the true focus of religion."[1] The choice of Honen fell upon Shinran. For more than a year he could not bring himself to undo his vows. But at last he married the 'Princess Burning-Crystal,' as three centuries later Luther married Catherine de Bora. The breach with the old order was complete. The principle of works, of external morality, of religious rule, of judging a man by his meat or drink, his celibacy or marriage, was set aside by the higher principle of salvation by faith.

Such was the origin of the Jodo Shin Shu, the 'True Sect of the Pure Land.'[2] It is founded on the deep sense of human impotence, on the longing which besets the passionate nature to escape from the conflicts which it cannot control, and rest in the encompassing presence of a Power above itself. "If we examine our own heart," says a modern Shin Shu teacher,[3] "it is far from being pure and true, being bad and despicable, false and hypocritical. How can we cut off all our passions and reach Nirvāṇa by our own

[1] Lloyd, *ibid.*, p. 23.

[2] Now the largest, wealthiest, most learned and influential, of the Buddhist denominations in Japan.

[3] *Short History*, p. 126.

power? Therefore, knowing our own inability, we should believe simply in the vicarious power of the Original Prayer. If we do so, we are in correspondence with the wisdom of Buddha, and share his great compassion, just as the water of rivers becomes salt as soon as it enters the sea." "If we dwell in such a faith," it is added, "our practice follows spontaneously, as we feel thankful for the favour of the Buddha, remember his mercies, and repeat his name." By thus sharing in the infinite mercy of Amida the believer was brought into immediate fellowship with him. The effect of faith was realised at once. It was not postponed till death when Amida arrived with his escort of saints to carry the disciple into the Pure Land; the merits of Amida's Vow were already appropriated by faith, and union with Amida in the Pure Land was thus secured. The older teaching affirmed that even in Paradise the new arrivals must first practise good works before they could reach the higher righteousness; but according to the Shin Shu the converted became members even in this life of the 'Mass of Absolute Truth,' and at death they joined the state of enlightenment of Amitābha himself, the great peace, Nirvāṇa.

Such a doctrine was naturally exposed to criticism from various points of view. The advocates of the strenuous discipline of Buddhist tradition contemptuously called it the 'Easy Way.' That was not the experience of Shinran. Like the modern Evangelical Christian he realised the obstacles of the self-satisfied intellect and the stubborn will. "There is nothing harder," he affirmed, "for the heretic, the evil-minded, and the proud," than to lay aside their self-reliance and submit to be saved by Another.[1] The objection was

[1] Cp. the 'Shoshinge,' 41, Lloyd, *Shinran and his Work*, p. 49.

met from a very different point of view by Honen, who affirmed that the new teaching was part of the providential order designed by the Buddha himself to counteract the perverse tendencies of human decline. During the first five hundred years after the death of Çākya Muni the Buddha's word remained in full force. It was the period of the 'Upright Law.' But nothing is permanent. Everything on earth is subject to change and decay; and the doctrine, the practice, and the witness of attainment, all began to fail. There followed a second five hundred years when only an image of religion existed, a sort of phantom resembling the truth and discipline of the preceding age, but without its real substance. This in its turn faded, and the perils of the later age began. The people became insincere. Covetousness and anger increased daily. Contentions and disputes filled the years. The three trainings of morality, thought, and learning were still the correct causes of deliverance; "but if" (it was quaintly said) "the people think them as useless as last year's almanack, how can they complete their emancipation?" So Honen shut up the gate of the ancient Eight-fold Noble Path, and opened that of the Pure Land.[1] And its teaching was fourfold: first, the true doctrine contained in the *Sukhāvatī Vyūha;* secondly, the true action, the utterance of faith in Amida by the sacred invocation; thirdly, the true belief, consisting of three elements, sincerity, faith and joy; and lastly, the true witness, or salvation, the attainment of Nirvaṇā upon death.

The doctrine thus rests externally on the authority of scripture, and Shinran declared the revelation of Amida in this Sūtra to have been the chief purpose of

[1] *Short History*, p. 111.

Gotama's appearance. But it was justified internally by the experience of conversion and the awakening of a new life. The whole stress is laid on the Power of Another. Among the standards of the denomination besides the writings of Shinran himself are the Epistles of the eighth head or chief Abbot, Rennyo Shonin (Saint Rennyo) in the fifteenth century, two hundred years later. They are still read in the daily services of the temples, after hymns of Shinran have been sung. They present many parallels to Western language.

> Whatever be a man's condition, and notwithstanding that his sins may have been those of the people who commit the Ten evil deeds (violations of the original commandments prohibiting the taking of life, theft, etc.), or of the Five classes of reprobates or of revilers of the Truth,—if he has changed his heart, and repented, and profoundly believes that the Great Vow of Amida is that which affords deliverance to such vile classes of beings; if with singleness of mind he has the heart habitually relying on the Buddha, and whether sleeping or waking is constantly in the frame of mind of repeating millions of times the remembrance of the Buddha,—such an one has received the Name with faith. Buying or selling, hunting or fishing, have a profound belief in the Great Vow. Salvation being the result of the power of this faith, thanks are to be rendered for Amida's help; and as thanks for his mercy as long as our life lasts, the name of Buddha is to be called to remembrance with gratitude.[1]

This is the meaning of the constant repetition of the name. It is easy to see how it may degenerate into a mechanical formalism. But to the founder of the faith it was a privilege and not a burden. It was the symbol of joyous participation in the great process of the world's deliverance. "Think," wrote Honen to one of his correspondents, a lady of high rank, "think in

[1] Translated by Troup, in *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, vol. xvii., p. 115.

love and sympathy of any beings who have the earnest desire for the Land of Purity, and utter the Buddha's name as if they were your parents or children, though they may dwell in any place, even outside this cosmic system. Help those who are in need of material things in this world, endeavour to quicken the faith of any in whom a germ of it is seen. Deem all these services to be done to Amida."[1]

Shoreless is the sea of misery caused by birth and death,
And we for a long time were sunk beneath its waves:
But Amida, taking us into the ship of his great mercy,
By that all alone carries us across safely.
Moreover, the great mercy of Amida's prayer,
That resides in the ship of the Great Vow,
When we were tossing on the sea of birth and death,
Puts forth his pity, and takes us on board.[2]

Modern teachers are anxiously upon their guard in this matter. "Though you fail in no wise to chant and praise the name of Buddha, yet you cannot be born into the Pure Land for reward. You must without fail put forth the believing heart, and thereafter can you first attain so to be born."[3] For this salvation is not a recompense. It does not follow the repetition of the sacred Name after the fashion of the earlier Buddhist doctrines of the Deed and its fruit. The devout disciple will chant his Lord's name all day long out of adoring gratitude with a heart full of love and peace and joy. He will not do it to deserve eternal bliss. He is well aware that he has no merit of his own. His lowly homage is the natural sequel, not the

[1] Anesaki, *ibid.*, *Trans. of the Third Congress for the Hist. of Religions* vol. i., p. 127.

[2] Lloyd, *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, vol. xxii., p. 464.

[3] Troup, *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, vol. xiv., p. 10.

antecedent, of his conversion. With a changed heart he is already in what Western theology would call a 'state of grace'; and his praise rises out of humble thankfulness for such spiritual deliverance. Who was he that for his sake the Lord of mercy should have submitted himself to the long passion of toil, endeavour, and self-surrender, to rescue him from his ignorance and sin! The representative of a certain province was once asked why he carried a rosary into the deliberative assembly. "Since I was chosen as the representative of the people in this province," he answered, "I must do my best for their convenience. I must be fully just, patient, and unselfish. But as I am a man, if I should trust to my own will, I should perhaps be prejudiced, passionate and selfish. Therefore I always carry this rosary to command my evil temper; because, whenever I see this rosary, I remember the mercy of Buddha, and I return to the right."[1]

But, once more, this faith is not self-wrought. It is not the product of our volition. The arrogance of culture, the fierceness of passion, do not yield to our own exertion. The victory of faith is not achieved by any independent motion which we originate or direct. It does not lie in the Self-Power, it is the working of Another Power; it is a divine gift, not a human attainment. Were it born within us from some spontaneous motion, it would be subject to all the mutations of our own spirit. Every kind of fluctuation would beset it: we should see it rise and fall, change and decay. No stability or permanence would sustain it with unfailing strength: it would follow the fundamental law of all mundane things and finally would

[1] Lloyd, *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, vol. xxii., p. 419.

pass away and cease to be. But true faith, the faith that saves, cannot be exposed to this peril.[1] It must spring, therefore, from no human origin; it must issue from a supernatural source, and in its peace and calm present the marks of its heavenly character. The Christian theologians debated whether faith was to be reckoned as an *opus* or a *donum*, an act of man or a gift of God. The thinkers of Japan encountered the same difficulty, and found a similar solution. Faith was not acquired, it was bestowed. It is not earned by effort, or achieved by merit; it is granted out of immeasurable love. "The Buddha," we read, "confers this heart. The heart which takes refuge in his heart is not produced by oneself; it is produced by the command of Buddha; hence it is called the believing heart by the Power of Another."[2] The distinctive mark of this faith, contrasted with faith by Self-Power, is its inner assurance. Belief by one's own exertion cannot afford rest to the heart. The believer asks himself anxiously, "Shall I surely attain salvation or shall I not?" and thus (it is shrewdly remarked) "what is called faith is in reality doubt."[3] But did not Nāgārjuna say, "Where there is doubt, the flower will not open"? It is only faith by the Power of Another that brings peace to the mind. Such faith carries the believer forwards and sustains him in the various duties which rise out of the Five Relations.[4] No difficulty can turn him out of the true path: "I am

[1] "For one's own mind to excite this," say the modern teachers, "is called 'the believing mind by one's own power.' That mind is not strong; speedily it changes. It is like a picture drawn on water. But the believing mind by the power of Another,—this recedes not from its strength, it is like the diamond."—Troup, *Hibbert Journal*, vol. iv., p. 284.

[2] Troup, *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, vol. xiv., p. 11.

[3] Troup, *ibid.*, p. 12.

[4] A piece of the Confucian ethics grafted on Buddhist morality.

borne," he says, "by the power of that Prayer; I shall certainly attain salvation."[1]

Thus the first mark of the divine character of the true faith is assurance, and the experience of the Buddhist runs parallel with that of the Christian believer. This naturally leads to a doctrine equivalent to that of the 'final perseverance of the saints.' They who have received the gift by the Buddha's mercy, remain in what is called the 'company of the steadfast,' and, there abiding, they certainly attain Nirvāṇa. But in the changed meaning of this goal, as a condition of the blessed life to which the believer is conducted hereafter, the sense in which it might be realised by the believer even in this life (according to Gotama's teaching), disappeared. And the question arose whether the entry into steadfastness and the entry into Nirvāṇa should be considered as one stage of benefit, or two. "Those," said Rennyo Shonin, "who have once conceived the remembrance of the Buddha, are the company of the steadfast: this is the stage in the world of impurity. Nirvāṇa is the stage to be attained in the Pure Land."[2]

But, after all, who are the saints? Upon what principles is the 'believing heart' conferred? In Christian theology the obvious fact that some possess faith and some do not, coupled with the conviction that faith is a supernatural gift, the work of the Holy Spirit, led direct to the doctrines of election and predestination. These were simply attempts to explain from the Divine side the palpable division of the Church and the World. There were similar conceptions in Indian theology. In the early days the forest-sages had

[1] Troup, *ibid.*, p. 12, cp. *Hibbert Journal*, vol. iv., p. 285.

[2] Troup, in *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, vol. xvii., p. 115.

wrestled with like problems, and reached like answers. How was it that some enjoyed the higher insight into the unity of the self in the heart with the Universal Self, while others remained indifferent and blind? Only one reply was possible when the vision was not won but given: it was an 'act of God'; "the Self," it was said, "chooses them as his own." We need not follow now the dilemmas which arose in the later religion of *Bhakti* (devotion or love) when the Hindu theologians enquired whether salvation was due to the irresistible action of the grace of God, or depended in any way on the co-operation of man. The Japanese teachers did not wholly ignore these questions, but their solution ran on other lines. Starting from the resolve of Avalokiteçvara not to enter final peace until all sentient beings were secure of deliverance, they boldly declared the Original Vow of Amida to be of universal application. Not only did the Buddha grant the heart of faith; it was added that "he bestows it on all living beings."[1]

That is not, of course, the expression of a present fact; it represents a Divine purpose; and as the purpose of a Being of infinite mercy and wisdom cannot be frustrated, its ultimate realisation is secure. But this does not mean that the gift is granted immediately and unconditionally to each one here and now. Universal salvation is not a stroke of Divine fate suddenly terminating the age-long processes of human development by a supernatural decree. It can only operate through existing conditions, and these are due to the issues of the Deed. At this point the conception seems to run right up against the doctrine common to all forms of Buddhism, elaborated long before the days of

[1] Troup, *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, vol. xiv., p. 11.

Gotama, and stoutly defended by him against the agnostics and materialists of his time. It is embodied in the one word *Karma*. The Korean missionaries of course brought it with them to Japan, where it was planted deep in the popular consciousness, and provided an interpretation of all human vicissitudes. Cause and effect, *In-En* or *In-gwa*, rule the entire succession of our experiences. The framework of life, the visible scene in which our years are passed, comes into being in each new world-age to provide a field for working out the issues of good and evil. No one would attempt to interfere with this by entreating Amida to change the order of Nature. Just as Gotama had originally prohibited every form of magic, so the believer of the 'True Sect' will not attempt to set a machinery of prayer in operation to secure rain in time of drought, or obtain a bountiful harvest, or avert a plague. These are all conditioned by long antecedent chains of causation, with issues that cannot be evaded or changed. But this principle applied also to the diversities of mental and moral endowment. The vast and varied panorama of character had its antecedents of disposition and will, which were no less definitely related to the issue. Each man's stock of aptitudes and qualities sprang from beginnings far away in a dim and distant past; and any individual, from the topmost heaven to the lowest hell, was what he was in virtue of all the activities of thought, word, and deed, that went before. Might it not then be urged that the transcendent operation of Amida's grace involved in the human sphere the same kind of breach of the moral order which a change in the course of the weather in answer to a nation's petitions would require in the physical order? Is there not here a direct intervention of a

supernatural cause? But the advent of Amida's gift is after all relative to our power to receive it; and that depends on the whole prior history and preparation of the soul. "To understand how we are saved in our ordinary life by the power of the Great Prayer of Amida," says Rennyo Shonin, "is to know that this is the result of the growth of merit in a previous state of existence, and then that it is not by our own strength. Being bestowed by the extraneous power of the wisdom of the Buddha, we know this help to be the result of the Great Prayer. This is Karma being completed in an ordinary life-time."[1] But between Karma and grace the harmony is after all imperfect; for in this sense Amida's deliverance is not unconditioned. The soul must be prepared to know him by its own past. Salvation is not an absolute act of Divine mercy, overriding every obstacle, and conquering the will that might conceivably choose to go on sinning for ever and ever. It is contingent on the capacity of the believer to be saved. The whole prior sum of his spiritual or unspiritual life opens the door or bars the access when Amida knocks. When the sinner looks for a victory of the Divine love over his sin, up starts his *Karma* as a qualifying and possibly prohibitory antecedent. What, then, becomes of the hope of universal salvation?

It is a theoretical difficulty, but it disappears from the practical side. The foundation of the doctrine is really laid in the actual experience of moral regeneration. The postulate of all higher religion, the triumph of the good, enthrones itself on the perception that humanity is one. Shinran, we are told, "used the words, 'Brothers within the four seas.' Faith by the power of Another proceeds from Amida. Thus Amida

[1] Troup, *Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, vol. xvii., p. 113.

is father and mother; all within the four seas are brothers. The Chinese call foreigners barbarians; foreigners call China uncivilised. Both are wrong. . . . Between heaven and earth there is no one to be disassociated, no spot not to be reached."[1] Each fresh conquest over evil, therefore, strengthens the conviction that Amida's saving purpose includes the whole, and cannot be frustrated. The boundless Mercy and the infinite Wisdom and the immeasurable Life and Light may be trusted to find the right way at the right time. The resources of Heaven are inexhaustible. "Granted," says a modern Shin Shu preacher,[2] "that there are some who do not know the divine Name as yet, can we believe that he will ever forsake them, and not wait for his opportunity to give them his saving invitation? Nay, more, do we not hope that after we have reached that City of Light, our Father will give us permission to go ourselves to seek our friends to bring them home, so that ere long we may all be gathered around his knees. Therefore we wipe away our tears, and leave the world quietly and in peace; for what we see before us is the light of universal salvation."

But here, surely, in spirit at least the faiths of the East and the West 'have met together,' and Buddhism and Christianity 'have kissed each other.'

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

Troup, *Hibbert Journal*, vol. iv., p. 288.

[2] *The Praises of Amida*, sermons of the Rev. K. Tada, translated by Rev. Arthur Lloyd (Tokyo, 1907), p. 137.

THE SIGN OF THE CROSS.

A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS OF CHRISTIANITY.

REV. K. C. ANDERSON, D.D.

No story is more universal than that of the dying and re-arising Saviour-God. The story of a Divine Man, his birth, his death, his resurrection, is found in every one of the great religions of the world. The reason of this is that all these religions are derived from one source and are really phases of one continuous development. They all resemble one another, as though they ran into one another and had a common origin. And indeed they have in more senses than one —they all come from one Source, the Fountain of Supreme Wisdom. What has been claimed for one only—Divine origin—is true of all; they are ways in which the Great Teacher has been training infant humanity. Comparative physiology has taught us that there is a parallel between the life of the individual and the life of the race, the individual in his ante-natal period passing through the stages through which the race has passed. May we not extend the parallel and say, that as the individual needs guidance and gets it in his early steps and is not left to himself to struggle up to manhood, so humanity has received instruction suited to his capacity, his early steps being guided as parents guide the steps of their children—that instruction taking the form of symbols corresponding to the toys and picture-books of childhood? It

goes without saying that if infant man is to be taught at all, it must be in some such way and not by direct instruction. Some material object must be used to represent some spiritual reality, and this is the essence of the symbol, as we use a pair of scales to represent the idea of justice, or a ring to represent the idea of marriage, or shake hands as an expression of friendship.[1] Thomas Carlyle, in his *Sartor Resartus*, has given us the true idea of a symbol in the chapter under that title.

> In the symbol proper, there is ever more or less distinctly and directly some embodiment and revelation of the Infinite, the Infinite is made to blend itself with the finite, to stand visible and, as it were, attainable there. By symbols, accordingly, is man guided and commanded, made happy, made wretched. He everywhere finds himself encompassed with symbols, recognised as such or not recognised: the Universe is but one vast symbol of God: nay, if thou wilt have it, what is man himself but a symbol of God: is not all that he does symbolical—a revelation to sense of the mystic God-given force that is in him? Not a hut that he builds but is the visible record of a thought, but bears visible record of invisible things, but is in the transcendental sense symbolical as well as real.

But if this be so, the material world must have come at first from a spiritual source, otherwise it could not express spiritual realities. The Great Spirit must have expressed Itself in the material creation. The sun, the moon, the stars, the earth itself, the mountains, the sea, must be all the outbreak of an Infinite Soul. The material world thus becomes, as Carlyle teaches, a symbol or medium through which God expresses himself to man. We shall, therefore, not be surprised to find man's religion, especially his early religion, full of the objects of sense, and symbolism

[1] See Count Goblet d'Alviella's *Migration of Symbols*.

intimately associated with religion from the beginning down to our own times. As in his language, the mountain and tree became a symbol of the high and taught man the idea of exaltation, so in his religion, the altar with its victim came to serve as the emblem of friendship or self-denial. Early man could not spiritualise these qualities, but he knew how a friend was honoured by a feast; so God was to be honoured, and a table was made of stones, of unhewn stones at first, and to this came the material man to worship his material God. For long men saw God sitting at feasts, saw him on a battle-field, heard him moving in the tops of the trees, heard him walking in a garden in the cool of the day. Man is on the march from clay to Divinity. This journey from sense to Spirit is a long one, and the progress has been painfully slow; but wherever the worship has been sincere, no matter how crude, man has come into contact with reality.

It is doubtful whether man will ever outgrow the need of symbols. The modern philosopher diffuses the Divine Mind through creation, makes it thrill and throb in every part of the universe; but the philosopher is a child as was primitive man, and his picture of Deity is a child's picture still. Our idea of God must ever be a symbol, and the realities with which religion deals are all infinite, of which no exact or literal account can be given. They must be seen or assumed, never proved or demonstrated. And the poet in us must discover them and set them forth as realities by means of picture and symbol. This is what has been done in all ages; and there is, perhaps, no more important study than that of symbols and the deep-seated character of the influence they have had on the religious life of man from earliest times. They

are almost entirely of a religious character and represent human conceptions of transcendent realities that no symbol can fully express. All symbols are true in so far as they help the soul to realise its true nature; and all are false inasmuch as they fail to express the full truth.

All the religions of man are derived from nature, and represent in the first instance the changes that take place in nature. In the early days of the world, when man was a child, and hence when symbolism was much needed, the chief object placed before him as the great symbol of Deity was the sun. The most prominent object of nature is the orb of day; and the phases through which it passes, and the great changes which annually pass over the face of the earth in consequence of these phases, have given shape to the religious doctrines which men have believed, and also to the rites of their worship. A very little acquaintance with the religions of the world shows how prominent in all of them was the worship of the sun as the great representative in the material world of Divine power and life and blessing for mankind. The Sun-God, by whatever names he has been called in the different languages and mythologies of the world, has been the most universally venerated Deity. There was something more in it than superstition; and who shall say that it was not divinely directed—a step or stage in the education of infant humanity? The more we study the matter, the more shall we appreciate the wisdom and appropriateness of the choice of the sun as a symbol of Deity.

No one can be aware how much sun-worship has entered into modern religion until he gives some attention to the matter. We celebrate the twenty-fifth

day of December as the birthday of Jesus, not because we know that he was born on that day, for we know neither the year nor the month nor the day of his birth, but because that day was already a festival all over the Roman Empire in honour of the Sun-God; and the Christian Church, not being able to displace it, adopted it, giving it a new name and changing its meaning, so as to associate it with the new religion. It was not until the VIth century that the twenty-fifth day of December was generally accepted throughout Christendom as the birthday of Jesus, and there is no certain trace of it until far on into the IInd century. The historical joining of the birth of Jesus with the great solar myth of the birth of the Sun-God at the winter solstice was thus due to the fact that the twenty-fifth day of December was the birth of the Sun-God in the Egyptian, Persian, Phœnician, Grecian, Roman and Teutonic religions. Practically everywhere the twenty-fifth day of December had long been a sacred day. And the parallel does not end here. For the idea of a Virgin Mother is universal in Paganism. All the Saviour-Gods of Paganism were Virgin-born, and every detail of the supernatural birth, the story of which we have in the New Testament—the journey, the star, the Magi, the song of angels—is in striking correspondence with the myths of Paganism. The Christ whom the New Testament and Christendom call the Light of the world, has all the characteristics which mythology has given to the Sun-God. At the solstice, in winter, he is an infant born in a stable or cave. Hercules, Hermes, Cybele, Demeter, and Poseidon—all Sun-Gods, were worshipped in caves. The image of a new-born child was presented to the people just as to-day the Bambino, the swaddled

figure of the infant Saviour, surrounded by a halo and watched over by angels, is often found as an altar-piece in Roman Catholic churches, and is presented to the faithful on Christmas Eve for adoration. The Egyptian priests said that the new-born infant was found in the sacred grotto where he was born, the sanctuary of the Virgin Isis. The priests of Persia said he was found in the cave of the mystic Mithra, and our New Testament tells us that Jesus was born in a stable and laid in a manger. He was born at midnight, that is at the first moment of the first day. All this was connected with the Virgo Cœlestis, the Virgin of the zodiacal sphere, the sign under which the holy child was born; hence the Mother from whose chaste womb he came. Centuries before our era the Egyptians celebrated the birth of Horus, the Son of Isis; the Greeks celebrated the birth of Apollo, Son of Leto. The Romans had games in the circus at the winter solstice in honour of the birth of the God of Day, *Natalis Solis Invicti;* and the Persians honoured the same God under the name of Mithra, who, of all the Gods of Paganism, resembles most the Christ of the Christian Churches.

The story of the death of the Son of God is as universal as is the story of the birth. It is in connection with the death of a Divine Man that we find the most central and the most solemn doctrines of every one of the world's religions, because the death is looked upon as a sacrifice; and in every one of them, too, the dying God rises from the dead, a victor over the grave, and is the Saviour of men because his sufferings procure their salvation, his death their life. Here we are not dealing with any historical fact that happened only once in the history of the world, but with a story that has its roots not only in nature, but in human

nature as well, and which men have repeated over and over again under every sky, with endless variations indeed in the minor parts of it, but substantially the same in its great central features of death and resurrection.

An effort of imagination is needed that we may put ourselves in the place of primitive man, and look on the great changes which annually take place on the face of the earth through his eyes. These changes have powerfully impressed the minds of men in all ages; but with primitive men the growth and decay of vegetation, the birth and death of animals and men, were regarded as the birth and death of Divine beings, and especially were the changes of the seasons, from summer to winter and winter to summer again, explained by the life and death of Gods. The annual change of the seasons primitive man represented to himself as due to the union of the powers of fertility, the sad death of one at least of the Divine partners and his joyful resurrection. All over the lands which border the eastern Mediterranean, rites were solemnly celebrated in honour of these deities for centuries before our era began. Under the names of Osiris, Tammuz, Adonis, and Attis, the peoples of Egypt and Western Asia represented the yearly decay and the revival of life, and especially of vegetable life, as a God who annually died and rose again from the dead. As I have said, this general Deity had many names, but essentially one nature. By the Egyptians he was called Osiris; by the Syrians and Phœnicians he was called Adonis or Tammuz; by the Phrygians he was called Attis; but with all he was the personification of the life of nature. The story is the same in all—the birth of the Deity at the winter solstice, his

going forth to meet and conquer the evil forces of the world, the struggle for self-mastery and self-conquest, his being overcome by these evil forces, and then his triumphant resurrection, escaping the bonds of death, and his ascent to heaven, to be speedily followed by his advent to reign over a renovated world.

Very interesting is the study of these Oriental religions, and very impressive were the ceremonies by which these yearly changes were celebrated; great pomp and splendour of ritual, priests with gorgeous robes, and stately processions were common to them all. The death of the God was mourned with great lamentation; the emblems of grief and woe were on every hand. Every year this was indulged in, because every year the Deity was believed to die, passing away from the cheerful earth to the gloomy under-world. There is a reference to this annual mourning in the Book of Ezekiel (viii. 14), where the prophet tells us that when he was brought to the "door of the gate of the Lord's house which was toward the north, behold! there sat women weeping for Tammuz." We know from other sources that the death of the Deity was annually mourned with a bitter wailing, chiefly by women; images of him, dressed to resemble corpses, were carried out as to burial, and then thrown into the sea or springs. This occurred at spring, at the time of the vernal equinox, our Easter, and at that season the water of the river Adonis was tinged with a blood-red hue, due to the red earth being washed down from the mountains by the spring freshets. But to these early worshippers that was not the cause; the crimson stain was believed to be the blood of Adonis annually wounded by the wild boar on Mount Lebanon. So also was the scarlet anemone which blooms in spring

supposed to have sprung from the sacred blood. But if the mourning for the slain God was great, the rejoicing over his resurrection was correspondingly great. For three days he was bewailed as one dead; but then followed his triumphant resurrection. When night had fallen, the sorrow of the worshippers was turned to joy; suddenly a light shone in the darkness; the God had risen from the dead. The festival of resurrection was called the 'Festival of Joy,' and this term has come down into Christianity, for in the middle Ages Easter was called 'Dominica Gaudii'—the 'Lord's Day of Joy.' Part of the ceremony of resurrection was the touching of the lips of the mourner by balm or holy oil, with the words "Trust ye in the Lord, for the pains which he endured have purchased your Salvation." The words have been versified as follows:

> Trust ye saints your God restored,
> Trust ye in your risen Lord;
> For the pains which he endured,
> Our Salvation have procured—

words which could be sung in any Christian church, although they are not Christian words at all, but were first sung of the God Adonis. This is only one of these stories—that of Adonis; but we have to remember that the story is practically universal all over the world. There is Osiris in Egypt, Attis in Phrygia, Kṛishṇa in India, Ishtar in Babylonia, Mithras in Persia, Dionysos in Greece, Baldur the Beautiful, white God of Scandinavia, Samhein in the ancient Celtic faith of Ireland, Quetzacoatl in Mexico, Tien in China. In all the same features appear, the Divine Man, or Son of God, dying as a sacrifice and rising again from the dead.

It is at this point also as well as at the birth-story that Christianity is allied to the great religions of the world, for all these features are found in the story of the death of Jesus in the New Testament. What is the connection between the two? It cannot be denied, I think, that the latter is but a variant of the oft-told tale. The similarities between them are too striking to allow us to draw any other conclusion. The time of the year at which this death took place is the same in all—the vernal equinox. In the solar myth the Son of God or Divine Man is born at the moment of the winter solstice, under the sign Virgo, or the twenty-fifth of December. At the spring equinox he passes or crosses into the constellation Lamb or Ram.

This passing or crossing is the original idea of the cross, and symbolises the great sacrifice by which the universe came into being. In a mystic passage in the book of *Revelation* we have a hint of this —"The Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." All the religions of the world have taught that the universe began by an act of sacrifice. And hence the symbol or sign of the cross is as old as history itself. Indeed its origin is hidden in prehistoric times. In the form of the Greek or Maltese cross—four arms of equal length—it is worn on the breasts of Roman pontifs, and the same appeared on the breasts of Assyrian kings nine or ten centuries before the beginning of our era, as is witnessed by Assyrio-Babylonian cylinders in the British Museum. In the form of the gammadion or svastika, a cross with four feet, the symbol of life, of fire and of the thunder-bolt—Thor's Hammer—it was found by Schliemann in the ruins of prehistoric Troy. It figured on the vestments of Greek Gods and Goddesses, on the

tunic of Athene, on the breast of Apollo, on the head-band of Dionysos. It is found on a Hittite monument, on a bas-relief at Ibriz in Lyconia, where it forms a border on the dress of a king, or priest, who offers up a sacrifice to a God, as well as on tombs and altars in Gaul, Spain and Scandinavia. "With the exception of the Solar Disk and the Greek Cross," says D'Alviella, "there are few symbolical marks so widely distributed."[1] The Hindus give the name to the figure of a man standing with legs and arms extended, representing the wheel of the Sun; the mark is put on the breast and forehead of a babe at birth by Hindu parents.

In the Eleusinian Mysteries a cross was placed on the breast of each initiate. It was a common symbol among the ancient Aztecs and it was found on the rods of Roman augurs in the ruins of Herculaneum and Pompeii. The sign or mark, mentioned in *Ezekiel*, ix. 4, which was put on the foreheads of those who were to be spared because of their "sighing and crying for all the abominations that were done in the midst" of the city, was the Tau, or cross proper. It was the seal which was to be put on the foreheads of the Servants of God before the earth, the sea, and the trees were hurt (*Rev.* vii. 3). This was a very ancient and widespread symbol in Asia and America; and one of the early Fathers, Justin Martyr, says that "the sign is impressed on all nature and forms part of man himself." The conclusion is inevitable that the cross is not original with Christianity, but on the contrary is coeval with the race, and is a symbol of the very earliest religious ideas of man.

While this is undoubtedly true, the representation of a figure with the hands and feet pierced with nails

[1] *Migrations of Symbols*, p. 33.

belongs to a late period in the world's history. The use of the crucifix did not come into use in the Christian Church until the VIIth century, a hundred years later than the adoption of the twenty-fifth day of December as the birthday of Jesus. Mrs. Jamison tells us in her *History of Our Lord in Art* (vol. ii., p. 335), that the earliest symbol of Jesus was the Lamb, and beside it was placed the ancient symbol of life, the cross. Gradually the Lamb was placed on the cross, and it was not until the time above stated, under the Pontificate of Adrian I., that the crucifix, or a man fastened to a cross, was substituted. It is a most significant fact that it was so long after the beginning of Christianity that the symbol of a crucified Christ came into vogue.

The meaning of the sign of the cross was thus gradually changed, and became a symbol of suffering and death instead of life and blessing. It became associated with the supposed manner of the death of Jesus by crucifixion, which was a modification of the old savage punishment by impaling which was in use as early as 2100 B.C., according to the Laws of Ḫammurabi. A new significance was in this way given to the idea of the cross which was quite different from the ancient and original meaning. This new significance was developed after the time of Constantine, in the IVth century, who professed to have been converted to Christianity by the appearance of a flaming cross in the sky at noonday with the motto inscribed upon it 'By this conquer!' (ἐν τούτῳ νίκα). He affixed this cross to his Labarum or banner, and made it the imperial standard; he also put crosses on churches and palaces. The conversion of the Emperor was probably little more than the creation in his mind

of a superstitious belief in the symbol of the cross. It is significant that it was not this Latin cross which was found in the catacombs or burial places of the early Christians and in early churches, but the svastika or gammadion with its four ends bent as if to symbolise motion, a solar emblem. The first decided step in the direction of late pictorial representation of Jesus was that of the Good Shepherd, a buoyant, youthful figure tenderly carrying the recovered lamb upon his shoulder (catacombs of St. Agnese), and on his tunic is the gammadion twice pictured. And the cross on the breasts of Roman Popes is not the Latin cross but the Greek cross, a direct historical survival of the Assyrian cross which was worn by Assyrian kings in the IXth century B.C. and which was undoubtedly a solar symbol.[1] There are no representations of the Crucifixion until the IXth century. Gradually the old meaning of the cross as the symbol of life faded out of the mind of Christendom, and the new meaning which made it a symbol of suffering and death took its place. Perhaps it would be truer to say that the tradition of the cross as a symbol of life was never broken, as in Christianity the rude piece of wood on which Jesus was supposed to die, became transfigured into the sign of a triumphant life, though it cannot be denied that its symbolical character was slowly changed by the lapse of time.

What evidence now is there that Jesus died on a cross? When the matter is examined it will be seen that there is none at all. The meaning which the Christian Church has attached to the cross is wholly independent of its ancient significance and depends wholly on the supposed manner of the death of Jesus.

[1] Lübke's *History of Art*, i. 381.

The story of a historical Jesus did not arise until after the destruction of Jerusalem 70 A.D. Around him gathered "elements of native Semitic myth and ritual which now rose to the surface after ages of obscure persistence beneath the official and Pharisaic Jewish religion. To form the definitive myth this story combined with Hellenistic stories of similar type, itself undergoing modification in the process."[1] The first form of what afterwards became Christianity and the Christian Church was a community organised around 'Christos' conceived as a God or a Divine Man, after the manner of the numerous religio-social cults which had flooded the Roman Empire from the East. That there were clusters of Jews who were discussing what 'Christos' was, his functions, the time of his appearance, his characteristics, etc., we have evidence from the *Book of Enoch* and *The Psalms of Solomon;* and that Christianity was originally a Christos-cult seems probable, if not certain, from the newly discovered *Odes of Solomon.*

In these cults organised around the dying and rising Saviour-gods and goddesses of the East which were practically in the first century before our era began, there were, as part of the ritual, dramatic representations of the death and resurrection of the patron Deity, Adonis, Attis, Osiris, or whoever it might be. What more natural than that the death and resurrection of the Messiah, who, this new story affirmed, had already appeared and suffered as the prophets had foretold, should take a form with which the people were already familiar? This is always the way with new societies—they are formed after the model of the old; the word ἐκκλησία (*ekklēsía*) itself being

[1] Whittaker's *Origin of Christianity*, p. 26.

an "old Greek term for an assembly legally called and summoned"[1] and the officers of the church, "bishops, overseers, a name given by the Greeks to persons charged with a guiding administration." The term κυριακὸς (*kyriakòs*) that Paul used to describe the Lord's Supper, or Eucharist, was not invented by Paul, but was "a word current in the political phraseology of the East, and taken over by him into the religious vocabulary of Christianity."[2] The evidence for the fact that the stories of the Last Supper, the Passion, the Betrayal, the Trial, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection of Jesus are modelled after the dramatic representations of the mystery-plays which were a marked feature of the popular cults of the East, is found in the Gospels themselves. It is impossible to read these stories as actual history. The theory that they are the successive scenes of a mystery-play fits into the incident as a key fits into the wards of its lock. We have abundant proof that a Eucharist, or Last Supper, was a common feature in these cults from the inscriptions, papyri and ostraca discoveries of recent years.[3] Paul's description of the Last Supper of the Corinthians shows its resemblance to that of the 'Heathen.' According to the Gospel-story no one heard Jesus in Gethsemane, and hence no one could report what he said. Judas enters as one would expect him to do on the stage, and the whole proceedings of the arrest and trial of Jesus are crowded into one night when an Eastern city is wrapped in darkness and in sleep (Renan). Mr. Taylor Innes has proved, in his book on the subject, that the trial of Jesus was altogether

[1] Fisher, *Hist. of the Ref.*, p. 15.

[2] Deissmann's *New Light on the New Testament*, p. 82.

[3] Deissmann, *op. cit.* p. 83.

illegal both on the side of Hebrew and Roman Law, but the inference that it is unhistorical lies on the very surface of the story. One is compelled to agree with Mr. J. M. Robertson, when he says that: "It is the prepossessions set up by age-long belief that have prevented alike believers and unbelievers from seeing as much."[1] Crucifixion was a common feature in the cult of Cybele (Magna Mater) in Phrygia, in that of Mithras in Persia, of Adonis and Attis, and indeed in all the cults of the East. In everyone of its features the crucifixion of Jesus resembles that of his prototypes. But this pre-Christian cross, we have seen, was a symbol of the Sun-God, and a sign of life and blessing. In the older Persian form of the cult of Mithras he was represented "with his hands spread toward heaven" (J. Darmesteter). All these were originally part of a primitive sacrificial ritual that represented the annual death of vegetation and its revival in the springtime, according to the idea that dominated primitive man the world over, that to imitate the processes of nature was to aid them. From this it became part of the ritual by which the neophyte was initiated into the mysteries and obtained a higher life and blessing than that of nature.

Now we shall make a great mistake if we imagine that this myth of the death and resurrection of the Son of God, or Divine Man, which men have told to themselves and their children in every nation and age, under every sky, is a mere fancy or guess of primitive man, or that it was merely a nature story of the death and resurrection of the vegetable world. It is vastly more. "To create a myth," says Auguste Sabatier,[2]

[1] *Pagan Christs*, p. 189.

[2] Quoted by Count Goblet D'Alviella, in *Migrations of Symbols*, p. 3.

"that is to say, to catch a glimpse of a higher truth behind a palpable reality, is the most manifest sign of the greatness of the human soul, and the proof of its faculty of infinite growth." "Without doubt," adds Count Goblet D'Alviella, "the symbols that have attracted in the highest degree the veneration of the multitude have been the representative signs of gods; but what have the gods themselves ever been, except the more or less imperfect symbols of the Being transcending all definition Whom the human conscience has more and more clearly divined through and above all these gods?"

The Sun itself is a great symbol and the birth of the Sun—the triumph of the Sun over the darkness and death of winter—denotes the triumph of Light over darkness and of Life over death. Is there nothing significant in the fact that everywhere man has believed in the triumph of the God of Day and has celebrated that triumph in every religion under the sun? Was it only a physical triumph that was thus symbolised? Can we believe that man was left in moral darkness for æons without a teacher, a child without a father, "an infant crying in the night, an infant crying for the light," and that the cry had no response from the great Father-Mother heart of the universe? Is it not more rational to believe that the myths of Gods born to bring life and light, to conquer the power of evil and to inaugurate the reign of good, were pictorial forms in which great truths were given to the world? The birth of the Sun at the winter solstice which has been celebrated all over the world, celebrated the universal faith which is deep down 'in the general heart of man,' that light is stronger than darkness, that life is stronger than death, that good is stronger

than evil, and will by and by prevail over all opposing forces. How else could this faith be taught to the world than by myth and legend? And is not the truth written in the heart of man more enduring than any writing on parchment or even on rock? God is immanent in humanity and the only way He can speak to man is by speaking within him. All these voices of the past are voices of God mingled, as perforce they must be, with the crude voices of men.

Aristotle taught the world long ago that "poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history" (*φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν*). Mythology is the unconscious poetry of the human soul and conveys great spiritual truths in a way that history could not do. Ideal truth has played quite as important a part—a more important part, Aristotle says above—in the development of humanity as truth of history. According to the same wise Greek, the final cause of any process of development is the true cause; that is to say, the ultimate effect or product is the underlying cause of the development. The end explains the development, the development does not explain the end; development is but the unfolding of what is already contained. It is the ripened fruit that causes the seed to sprout, the plant to grow and put forth leaves. It is the potential oak which is in the acorn that causes the entire growth of the tree. The fully developed man of the future was present potentially in the primitive man of the past; nay, in the pre-human forms that antedated the appearance of "Anthrōpos, the being with the upturned face." Similarly the 'higher truth' of which Sabatier speaks above, behind the palpable reality of the birth and death of the year, symbolised by these tales of Gods

dying and rising again, was present in every one of such stories, and was the underlying cause of their development, what Aristotle calls the ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς (energy of soul). And what was that but the spiritual principle of life through death? What have we in these tales but the shadowing forth, in the only manner in which it could be shadowed forth, of the way in which the soul is to triumph over its lower self and rise to newness of life? What but the symbolism of the great truth which all human experience proves, that man must die to the lower self if he would live to the higher? Suppose the task were to teach the human race this great spiritual principle; how otherwise could it be done than through myth and symbol? The spiritual truth could not have been understood; it had to be brought down to the apprehension of primitive man; and in what better way could it have been done than the way it has been done? How could the great principle of Life through death be better expressed than by the New Testament stories of the death and resurrection of Jesus? The God within—our better and diviner self—must pass through the toil and suffering of earth, and by its own devotion and effort grow towards its own heights of consecration and power. Its destiny is to become consciously one with the Eternal, and to realise this destiny it must die to its lower self and rise into a better and higher self. It is this great truth that was the *enérgeia psychês* of all these stories of dying and rising Saviour-Gods, and it is the same truth that is taught the world in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

The circle—the Sun's disc—is a symbol of the unmanifested, uncreated Deity; the circle with the cross in it denotes the manifesting, creating and there-

fore sacrificing Deity. But sacrifice is scarcely the accurate term to use, for the sacrifice intended is the joyous outgoing of life. To put the emphasis on pain and suffering is to misplace it. The highest joy known to man is the joy that comes from the outpouring and willing sacrifice of life. The cross has been made the symbol of sorrow, and the life of the cross has been interpreted into terms of disappointment and tragedy. But this is against all human experience; for the more life is poured out the greater is the joy of it, and when it culminates or comes to its fulness it expresses itself in song. The highest happiness is never found in getting but in giving. The cross symbolises the manifesting God, and the highest joy is found in expression. Whatever pain or suffering is involved in such sacrifice, is of such a character that we would not exchange it for any joy that comes from simple absence of pain. The cross, therefore, symbolises the joy of God in expressing Himself in His world. The whole story of the universe is the story of the cross, the life of God displayed in suns and stars, in earth and sky, in mountain and sea; displayed also in the successive waves of development climbing ever higher and higher and culminating in the life of man who finds his highest life in Love.

K. C. ANDERSON.

THE IDEALS AND PHILOSOPHY OF INDIAN ART.

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UNDOUBTEDLY the most significant fact in modern Western art is that artists, dimly conscious of the limitations which the narrow conventions of the Italian Renaissance have long imposed upon them, have been for many years looking once more to the East for new ideas and new sources of inspiration. It is still more significant of the gulf which separates Eastern thought from Western, that in this quest British artists and art-critics have not turned at once to India as the primal source from which the main current of Eastern idealism has always flowed towards Europe, but to China and Japan, which during the greatest periods of their art-history were themselves dominated by the influence of that same mighty Indian thought-stream.

The distinguished Japanese art-critic, Mr. Okakura, author of *The Ideals of the East*, has rightly insisted that in the domain of art-philosophy all Asia is one. But if we apply Western analytical methods to the exegesis of Asiatic æsthetics, we shall never form any just or clear conception of them until we have learnt to discard all our Western prejudices, and have realised the paramount importance of Indian philosophy and

religion among the great creative forces which have moulded Asiatic art.

Personally, I think that the scientific analysis of the modern art-historian is often very misleading. What art now needs, both in the East and in the West, is not analysis, but synthesis; not a dissection of styles, methods, and principles, nor the determination of art-values by the Röntgen rays and the microscope, but a clearer understanding of the great psychic currents and intellectual ideas which have created the great art-schools of the world; and, above all, a clearer conception of the art-philosophy upon which these schools were founded. In this country especially, where philosophy is commonly held to have no practical bearing on life and policy, all our methods of art-teaching have become, since the XVIth century, almost entirely empirical and unscientific, in the true sense of the word. On the one hand, the puritanical sentiment of the Reformation has tended to divorce art from religion; and, on the other hand, our Universities have uprooted the idealism of the Middle Ages, and substituted for the art-philosophy of Christianity an academic formula of their own devising, the influence of which has joined with modern materialism in destroying all our national art-traditions. Under the tyranny of this clerical and literary domination, art has lost its power and influence in national art-education, and dwindled into a special cult for a small and exclusive sect, whose dogmas are expounded by classical professors, whose places of worship are museums, picture-galleries and exhibitions, and whose idols are the gods of Pagan Greece and Rome.

It is only in the East that art still has a philosophy, and still remains the great exponent of national faith

and race-traditions. In Indian idealism, we shall find the key to the understanding, not only of all Asiatic art, but to that of the Christian art of the Middle Ages. For the original source of this idealism, we must look much further back than the visible beginnings of Indian art as we now know them from the relics of early Buddhist worship, which date from the first two centuries before Christ. We must fully understand that the motive forces which are behind all art-creation often exist in full strength long before art finds concrete, visible expression in literature and in what we call the fine arts.

Archæologists dig in the ground and rummage among the ruined Buddhist Stūpas of Gandhāra, and when they find innumerable statues of the Græco-Roman pantheon, placed between Corinthian pilasters, they believe that here Indian art had its main root, and that Hellenic thought inspired the ideals of India. Nothing can be further from the truth. Indian art reached full expression in the Indian mind, many centuries before the Græco-Roman sculptors carved Buddhist images in the monasteries of Gandhāra. Indian art was conceived when that wonderful intuition flashed upon the Indian mind that the soul of man is eternal, and one with the Supreme Soul, the Lord and Cause of all things. It first took upon itself organic expression in the Vedas and Upaniṣhads, and though in succeeding centuries other thought-centres were formed in Persia, China and Arabia, the creative force generated from those great philosophical conceptions has not ceased to stimulate the whole art of Asia from that time to the present day.

It is probably a unique phenomenon in the evolution of the world's art, that so many centuries

elapsed between the complete expression of Indian thought in the Vedas and Upanishads, and the full maturity of the technic arts, as revealed in the sculptures of Elephanta, Ellora and Borobudur, and in the best Indian Buddhist paintings from the IVth to the VIIIth centuries, A.D., the majority of which have unfortunately perished. But when we consider the esoteric and exclusive character of early Aryan culture, we shall begin to realise that what seems to be a phenomenally slow development in the technic arts in Indian civilisation, was deliberately willed as a part of the extraordinary precautions taken by the early Aryan immigrants into India and their allies, to prevent what they believed to be their divinely-inspired knowledge from being perverted by popular superstitions. Other races as soon as they have perfected a written language, make haste to enshrine their most intimate thoughts within it. But the wisdom of the Vedas and Upanishads was always held to be too sacred to be materialised in any form, either in the written word or in the technic arts. If the intellectual aristocracy of the Aryan tribes refrained from committing their thoughts of the Divinity to writing, and strictly observed the law of Moses, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image, nor the likeness of anything that is in heaven or earth," it was certainly because they stood on a much higher spiritual plane than the races by which they were surrounded, and not from any lack of artistic culture. The proud Aryan had no missionary zeal. His religion was for the chosen people only, for his tribe and for his family, but above all for his own self, when alone in the forest, or on the hill-top, or in the privacy of an inner chamber in the house, his Soul could commune in secret with his God. The poet-priests

who composed the Vedic hymns and expressed their communings with the Nature-Spirits in such beautiful imagery, were great artists who gave to India monuments more durable than bronze; and already in this remote Vedic period, centuries before Hellenic culture began to exert its influence upon Asia, India had conceived the whole philosophy of her art. It was the Vedic poets who first proclaimed the identity of the Soul of man with the Soul of Nature, and laid claim to direct inspiration from God. Vāk, the Divine Word, they said, took possession of the Ṛiṣhis, entered into the poet's mind and made him one with the Universal Self. This idea of the artist identifying himself with Nature in all her moods is really the keynote of all Asiatic art, poetry and music. The whole theory of the sacrificial rites expounded in the Brāhmaṇas is based upon the assumed identity of the elements of the rite with the elements of the Universe. The syllables of the mantra's recited by the priests represented the seasons, the details of the sacrificial hearth represented the organs of the human body, the number of the oblations represented the months of the year, and so on. The object of the sacrifices was to bring the sacrificer into direct touch with the Nature-Spirits. The Devas came down from heaven to take part in the sacrificial feast, seating themselves upon the sacred *kusha* grass. "Formerly men saw them when they came to the feast, to-day they still are present, but invisible." On the other hand, the correct recitation of the appropriate hymns transported the soul of the sacrificer to the abode of the Gods, just as a boat might carry him over the sea.

From these ideas we can clearly understand why the religious teachers and intellectual aristocracy of

the early Aryans needed few concrete images or symbols, to help them to realise the forms of the Divinity. When they saw the Devas themselves sitting at the feast, and when men could transport themselves at will to the abode of the Shining Ones, what need had they of Gods of wood or stone? The Ṛiṣhis declared: "The vulgar look for their gods in water; men of wider knowledge in celestial bodies; the ignorant in wood, bricks and stones: but the wisest men in the Universal Self." The Vedic period, though it produced no immediate development in what we are accustomed to regard as the 'fine arts,' must nevertheless be regarded as an age of wonderful artistic richness. The transcendentalism of Vedic thought which could satisfy the intense reverence of the Aryan race for the beauty they saw in Nature with vivid mental images of the Nature-Spirits, is the opposite pole to the barbaric materialism of the present day, which is the negation of all art, and very different to the narrow view of Puritanism, which makes the sense of beauty a snare of the Evil One. Nor could the Vedic period have been entirely barren of art in material form. The elaborate rites of the Brāhmaṇas no doubt called forth the highest skill of the artificer. The carved posts which marked out the sacrificial area were the models on which the elaborately ornamental pillars and pilasters of the later Hindu period were designed. The lamps of the Fire-Spirit, Agni, and the libation vessels for the *amṛita* of the gods, the soma-juice, gave the types which are used even now in the temple-service of Nepāl, Travancore, and other parts of India where Hindu art-traditions are still alive. But the visions of the Vedic seers materialised only in the wonderful sculpture and painting of the great period of

Indian art, before the Muhammadan invasion, that is, from the IVth to the Xth centuries, A.D., when Vedic literature was first committed to writing.

The spirituality of the Vedic age was eventually smothered in the complicated ritualism of the Brāhman priesthood, and it was the teaching of Buddha which gave the next great impulse to the development of Indian art, widening the intellectual outlook, and correlating the abstract ideas and spiritual vision of the Vedic age with the principles of human conduct and the realities of daily life. But though Buddhism became the state-religion and the dominant creed at this period, the term 'early Buddhist art,' which archæologists apply to it, does not convey a correct idea of all the influences which were moulding Indian art at that time. I would prefer to call it the Eclectic, or Transition period; for it was the time when India was collecting from every quarter of Asia the different materials out of which in later times the perfect synthesis of Indian art was formulated, and through which the visions of the Vedic age materialised in the technic arts of the great Hindu epoch.

Asoka, the Constantine of India, raised the technic arts employed by Brāhmanical ritualism on to a higher intellectual plane; he made the fine arts a potent instrument in national education and in his propaganda of the Buddhist faith, not only in India but in different parts of Asia. In the Vedic age the practice of the fine arts never seems to have been a priestly vocation, and the non-Aryan tribes, who were the first to become converts to Buddhism, probably supplied Asoka with the most skilful painters and sculptors. But the members of the Buddhist Saṅgha were often skilled artists, and wherever the Buddhist missionaries went

they took with them pictures, images and symbols to assist in expounding the sacred doctrines.

In Asokan art, as we know it from the sculptures of Bharhut and Sānchi, we can recognise two distinct groups of racial elements. One represents the vigorous, if somewhat undeveloped, indigenous Indian tradition belonging chiefly to the non-Aryan tribes which, now released from the domination of the Brāhman priesthood, took a prominent part in developing a great national religious art. The other, a new importation from Western Asia, was the more polished and refined art of the Persian School, into which Hellenic influence had already made its way. But throughout the Asokan epoch a strong and deep current of Vedic influence can be felt in the entire absence of any attempt to represent what was to the Buddhist the most sacred of all conceptions—the personality of the Blessed One himself. The numerous legends of his previous existences in the form of tree, or bird, or beast, or man, his begging bowl, and the Bodhi tree under which he obtained enlightenment, and even incidents in his earthly life as Prince Siddārtha—all come within the scope of the Asokan artists' descriptive skill. But they never ventured to portray with brush or chisel the sacred person of Buddha; and it must have been a rude shock to pious Buddhists of the old school when the Græco-Bactrian sculptors of Gandhāra, employed by the Kushana King, Kaniskha, began to represent the Tathāgata as a trim smug-faced Greek Apollo, posing in the attitude of an Indian Yogī.

To regard the Gandhāran school of sculpture as furnishing the model on which the Indian Divine Ideal was founded, is to misapprehend entirely the philosophical basis of Indian art. Gandhāran sculpture is

not a starting-point, but a late incident in the Eclectic or Transition period of Indian art, which, excepting a few distinctive technical characteristics, left no permanent impression and had no influence in shaping Indian ideals.

It was about the beginning of the Christian era that the great universities of Northern India, where the many schools of philosophy were combined with schools of painting and sculpture, taking the raw materials provided by the indigenous non-Aryan technical tradition, the Persepolitan tradition, and the Græco-Roman, or Gandhāran tradition, and moulding them into one, provided Asiatic art once and for ever with a philosophical basis and created the Indian Divine Ideal in art. This new artistic development was, in fact, the flowering of the ancient Vedic impulse, the teaching of the Upaniṣhads systematised by the philosophical schools and applied to human life and work.

The opposition of Western materialism to the philosophy of the East always makes it difficult for Europeans to approach Indian art with anything like unprejudiced minds. The whole of modern European academic art-teaching has been based upon the unphilosophical theory, that beauty is a quality which is inherent in certain varieties of matter or form, a quality first apprehended in the ancient world by the Greeks, and afterwards re-discovered by the great artists of the Italian Renaissance. Just as the Greeks are said to have arrived at their ideal of human and divine beauty by a process of selection between different types of men and women, so we make art a system of discrimination, or differentiation, between what we call beautiful things and ugly things. It is the common complaint of

artists that the environment of modern civilised life is so ugly that they cannot make use of it; so art becomes an archæological cult having no hold upon popular imagination, for it is cut off from real life and work and its limits are artificially restricted to a narrow department of ideas into which the world of everyday life does not enter.

Indian thought takes a much wider, a more profound and comprehensive view of art. The Indian artist has the whole creation for his field, not only a limited section of it mapped out by academic professors. Beauty, says the Indian philosopher, is subjective, not objective; it is not inherent in Form or Matter, it belongs only to Spirit and can only be apprehended by spiritual vision. There is no beauty in a tree or flower, or in man or woman, as such. All are perfectly fitted to fulfil their part in the cosmos, yet the beauty does not lie in the fitness itself, but in the Divine idea which is impressed upon human minds more or less perfectly tuned to receive it. The more perfectly our minds are tuned to this Divine harmony, the more clearly do we perceive the beauty, and the more capable we become, as artists, of revealing it to others. Beauty belongs to the human mind. There is neither ugliness nor beauty in matter, and for a student to devote himself wholly to studying form and matter with the idea of extracting beauty therefrom, is as vain as cutting open a drum to see where the sound comes from. The true aim of the artist is not to extract beauty from Nature, but to reveal the Life within Life; the Noumenon within Phenomenon; the Reality within Unreality, and the Soul within Matter. When that is revealed Beauty reveals itself. So all Nature is beautiful for us if only we can realise the Divine Ideal within it. There is

nothing common or unclean in what God has made, but we can only make life beautiful by the power of the Spirit which is within us. Therefore it is, as the sage Shukrāchārya says, that in making the images of the Gods the artist should depend upon spiritual vision only, and not upon the visible objects perceived by human senses.

To cultivate the power of spiritual vision, the faculty of intuitive perception, which, until recently, has been regarded in the West as beyond the scope of educational methods, was therefore the main endeavour of the Indian artist in the golden age of Indian art and literature, when Buddhism was transformed by the philosophical schools from a simple code of ethics into a world-religion; when the noble Hindu epics, the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, were moulded into their present form; when the poet Kalidāsa sang at the court of King Vikrama, and when the sculptors of Elephanta and Ellora hewed out of stupendous masses of living rock their visions of the Gods throned in their Himālayan paradise. And if you would enquire what this art means to us, I would ask you to consider the art of mediæval Europe, the great Gothic cathedrals of Chartres and Rheims, and the painting of Italy from Cimabue to Fra Angelico, and see for yourselves an art proceeding from the same inspiration and founded upon the same philosophy.

Throughout Indian art, and throughout the Christian art of the Middle Ages, we find the same central idea that beauty is inherent in Spirit, not in matter. So when at last Indian artists in the early centuries of the Christian era reconciled themselves to the idea of realising in material form the actual Presence of the Gods, they rejected the Hellenic type

of a God fashioned entirely after human models, and shaped their ideal of Divine form upon the ancient artistic type of an Indian hero—the superman. This was the ideal of physical perfection in early Asiatic art, in Egypt, and in Crete; and the symbolism which it conveyed had its influence in Greek art, until the naturalism of Praxiteles and the later schools of sculptors and painters superseded the idealism on which Hellenic art was originally based.

The *Mahābhārata* tells us what this ideal of the superman was. It was the type of a mighty hunter, who in desperate conflicts with the king of beasts had become invincible and had acquired a superhuman lion-like body, with broad chest and shoulders; long massive arms; a thick neck; and a very slim or wasp-waist. One of the earliest artistic representations of this ideal is seen in the extraordinary paintings and sculptures lately unearthed by Dr. Evans in Crete. The Minoan dandies of about 3,000 B.C. are here shown as actually practising tight-lacing in the feminine fashion of modern Europe, pinching in their waists to a horrifying degree, apparently with the object of making their bodies assume this ideal lion-like form. In Egyptian sculpture and painting the same ideal type of a warrior and hunter constantly appears, though without the unpleasant deformity of Minoan art. The slim waist is also, as I have said, characteristic of the most virile period of Greek sculpture. Aristophanes alludes to a wasp-waisted man as a type of physical fitness.

Now let us see how the sculptors and painters working in the great philosophical schools of Northern India, at the beginning of the Christian era, employed this very ancient ideal form to express the quality of

the Divine nature and the power of the Spirit. By that time the original Buddhist doctrine had been profoundly affected by the Yoga-philosophy of Patañjali, and the teaching of Nāgārjuna had created the division between the Mahāyāna and Hīnāyāna doctrines. But by both schools the Buddha was no longer regarded as a human personality, but as a Divine Being, who through a cycle of many previous existences on earth, and by the power of yoga, had attained to perfect wisdom, thrown off the bondage of the flesh and won dominion over the whole universe. Yet as this yoga was not the terrible self-torture of the Hindu ascetic, but the yoga of a pure and holy life, the Master could never appear to pious Buddhist eyes with shrunken flesh, swollen veins and protuding bones—a hideous living skeleton. In that supreme hour, under the Bodhi-tree at Gayā, when the long fast was ended and as the dawn flushed in the East, all the Devas thronged together and the Buddhas from worlds innumerable; when:

"Kings at fierce war called truce; the sick men leaped
Laughing from beds of pain; the dying smiled
As though they knew that happy morn was sprung
From fountains farther than the utmost East."

Then the Great Yogī was transformed, and he appeared to mortal eyes as the Victor, the Hero, the Shining One, endowed with eternal youth and strength, filling the whole world with light.

To symbolise this spiritual re-birth, Indian artists moulded their Divine ideal upon the race-tradition of a mighty warrior with supple rounded limbs, smooth, golden-coloured skin, and a lion-like body—expressing the beauty of bodily purification, when the soul is freed from the grosser attachments of earth, and the

spiritual strength which every human soul might gain by the yoga of service, by the yoga of wisdom, or by the yoga of faith.

This was the artistic ideal which Indian sculptors and painters, inspired by Aryan philosophy, gradually evolved out of the eclectic elements of the Transition period. It was an ideal common to all schools of religious thought—Jain, Buddhist, or Brāhmanical. The Jains adapted it to their Tirthānkaras, the Buddhist to their Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and the orthodox Brāhmanical sects to the divinities of their own pantheon; for in spite of the diversity of sects there is a common spiritual basis to all Indian art and religion. Philosophers differed as to the precise relation between Purusha and Prakriti, Spirit and Matter, and religious teachers disputed over the various ways by which the Soul might gain salvation; but there were fundamentals upon which all philosophers agreed, and the end to be attained was the same to all sectarians.

Just as the great Hindu hero Krishna in the *Mahābhārata* has a dual personality, both human and divine, so this transcendental lion-like ideal always retained in Indian art a symbolism of a dual character —according as it was applied to a human being; or to a deva, a spiritual being; or to Mahādeva—God. When a human being is represented, the slim-waisted lion-like figure is the type of aristocratic birth, the mark of the Kshatriya, or warrior. In the Amarāvatī sculptures, where the transition from the Sānchi and Gandhāran ideals becomes strikingly evident, the Sākya lords, the cousins of Prince Siddārtha, all have this type of figure. The squat, full-bellied figures generally indicate menials and inferior races; though in the same artistic category the well-fed Brāhman *guru* and a

number of fanciful dwarfish demons were included. When the Divine being is intended a distinction is made by the nimbus round the head, the aureole surrounding the body, and sometimes the *ūrṇā*, the mark in the centre of the forehead signifying spiritual insight—the 'third eye.' Kings and princes were also honoured with the nimbus as a symbol of their divine origin.

I will now pass on to show how this Divine ideal, under the continued influence of the philosophical schools, became further modified and assumed other symbolical forms which to academic Europe often seem extravagant and even offensive, though in their Indian environment, even when their meaning is not fully understood, they are often profoundly impressive. The philosophic mind of India, observing the rapid working of the forces of nature in a tropical climate, could not fail to be impressed by one fact which is less patent to inhabitants of a temperate zone. The ravages caused by the shock of earthquake or rush of mighty floods in the Himālayan regions, leaving scars upon the surface of Mother Earth which in temperate latitudes would not be removed for several generations, under the stimulating heat of the tropical sun are healed in a few short years. Every hot weather in the plains of India, the scorching heat burns up the vegetation, silences the voices of Nature, and makes all the land seem a dreary desert. Yet the Indian peasant knows full well that the cracking of the sun-baked soil is but one of the fertilising processes of Nature, and that with the first downpour of the monsoon rains his fields will be bursting with exuberant, joyful life. So the destructive powers, which seem to us only malignant and fraught with

evil to mankind, appear to the Indian mind as part of the Divine Order, and belonging to the great Rhythm of things. Shiva, the Destroyer, is also the Regenerator and the Lord of Bliss. Kālī, the ruthless Ender of Time, who demands human sacrifices, is at the same time the kindly Mother of the Universe. The good and evil in Nature both belong to God; human sickness and suffering are not, as the Greeks believed, due to the envy of the gods; they only come from *avidyā*, or an imperfect apprehension of the Divine Law. So, whereas the Greek conception of the Divine Form confined beauty to an order of things which seems pleasant, comforting and normal in ordinary human existence, the Indian artist makes no distinction between good and evil, as popularly understood, and striving to show the Divine Idea in both, tells us that God's ways are not as man's ways, and that the Divine Form embraces all forms. The Divine Idea embraces both beauty and ugliness, as commonly understood, and transcends them both.

When the agnosticism of Buddha's original teaching gave place to definite conceptions of the Fatherhood of God, as expounded in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, it appeared to Hindu philosophers that neither the anthropomorphic ideal of the Greeks, nor the ideal of the Indian hero which the Buddhist and Jain artists had adopted, was adequate to symbolise the universal attributes of the Lord and Cause of all things. When Kṛishṇa, having bestowed upon Arjuna the gift of the eye divine, revealed to him his Universal Form, this is how the Hindu poet describes the resplendent awful vision, which had never before been seen by mortal man.

"God! in thy body I see all the gods,
And all the varied hosts of living things,

And sovereign Brahmā on his lotus-throne,
And all the Ṛiṣhis and the snakes divine.
I see thee with unnumbered arms and breasts
And eyes and faces infinite in form.
I see not either source or mean or end
Of Thee, the Universal Form and Lord,
Bearing thy diadem, thy club and disc.
I see thee glowing as a mass of light
In every region, hard to look upon,
Bright as the blaze of burning fire and sun,
On every side, and vast beyond all bound,
The Undivided thou, the highest point
Of human thought, and seat supreme of all.
Eternal law's undying Guardian thou;
The everlasting Cause thou seem'st to me.
I see not thy beginning, mean, or end;
Thy strength, thy arms are infinite alike,
And unto thee the sun and moon are eyes.
I see thy face that glows as sacred fire,
And with its radiance heats the universe;
For all the heavenly regions and the space
'Twixt earth and heaven are filled by Thee alone."[1]

Even Arjuna, though fortified with supernatural strength, was appalled by this tremendous apparition and begged of Kṛiṣhṇa to resume his milder, four-armed form—that which, though revealing his universal attributes and power, was not too awful for human vision.

I cannot help thinking that European art-critics are altogether unjust when they judge by the ordinary conventions and canons of European art, the efforts of Indian artists to scale the highest pinnacles of human thought, and to express the supernatural and super-

[1] Translated by John Davies (Trübner's Oriental Series), pp. 121-2.

human by forms not strictly in accordance with known physiological laws. Art does not need to be justified by the anatomist, the chemist or any other scientific specialist. Every artistic convention is justified if it is used artistically and expresses the idea which the artist wishes to convey. Indian art is perfectly intelligible to those who will read it in the light of Indian religion and philosophy; but like all other art it must be seen in its local environment and in the atmosphere of the thought which created it. Nothing can be more misleading than to judge it only by the isolated and generally inferior specimens of it which are seen in European Museums, very few of which have considered Indian sculpture and painting as worthy of study by Western artists.

India has clearly recognised the limitations of artistic expression. Art is knowledge. Art is expression. Therefore art cannot supply a symbol for the Inexpressible, the Unknowable, and Unconditioned. Though only the *Qurān* definitely placed a ban upon using any animate forms in art, the objection which underlies the prohibition did not originate with Islām. It is as old as the Vedas. The very word with which the idea of the Universal Self was expressed in Hindu philosophy was so holy that it was profanation for common lips to utter it. In a great Hindu temple in Southern India it is represented by space—an empty cell. In Indian colour symbolism it is expressed by black—the absence of colour.

The first comprehensible and expressible manifestation of the Unknowable, before Creation itself, was called the Primal Germ, conceived by philosophers as the Egg of the Universe, and afterwards symbolised by a female form, Kālī, as the Mother of all the Gods.

I believe that the first symbols ever used by the teachers of Vedic philosophy were those smooth egg-shaped stones, untouched by human art, which are placed beneath sacred trees and still worshipped throughout Northern India, though the meaning of the symbolism does not seem to be understood now except perhaps by a few intellectual Brāhmans. The stones symbolise the Primal Germ, the Egg of the Universe. The tree, with its spreading branches and foliage, is the Universe itself, a well-known symbol of the One in Many used by the worshippers of Vishṇu in the present day. The serpent, which carved in stone is often worshipped at the same place, is another well-known symbol of re-incarnation—the process by which the evolution of the soul is carried on. Thus the stone, the tree and the serpent represent the birth and evolution of the Cosmos, and the passage of the Soul to its goal in Nirvāṇa; and in this beautiful symbolism lies the root of Indian art.

All Indian symbolism has two meanings—one which appeals to the popular mind, rooted in some primitive totemistic or animistic beliefs, and the other which appeals to the mystic, founded on the high ideals of Indian philosophy.

When Hindu religious thought had arrived at the idea that the two conditions, known as Good and Evil, Life and Death, Creation and Destruction, Beauty and Ugliness, were both a part of the divinely appointed order of things, it became necessary to assume a third one, a mean or principle of rhythm to maintain the equilibrium of the universe between these pairs of opposites.

These three conditions, or *guṇas*, were recognised as attributes of the material manifestations of Īshvara,

the Supreme Lord, whose three aspects, called the Trimūrti, are represented both in Buddhist and Hindu art by the same symbolism—a male figure with three heads in one. The three persons in the Hindu Triad are Brahmā, the Creator, Viṣhṇu, the Preserver, and Shiva, the Destroyer. In later Mahāyāna Buddhism corresponding ideas to the Hindu Trimūrti were associated with the Triad—Buddha, Saṅgha, Dharma —or Mañjushṛī, Avalokiteshvara and Vajrapāṇi.

All the innumerable gods and goddesses of the Hindu and Buddhist pantheons, with their various attributes, are symbols of sub-manifestations of the three *guṇas*, and are classified accordingly in the *shilpa-shāstras* or classical works on art. The subject is, however, much too large for a single paper.

The point I wish to emphasise now is that, through all the many and varied aspects of Indian art, Buddhist, Jain, Hindu, Sīkh or Saracenic, there runs a golden thread of Vedic thought binding them together, in spite of all their ritualistic and dogmatic differences which seem to us to separate them so completely; and I think that archæologists like Professor Grünwedel and historians like Mr. Vincent Smith have entirely misapprehended the psychology of Indian art, when they have assumed that Greece gave to India the models on which her artistic creations were founded. Even now, on the Ghāts of Benares, all Indian men, women and children, forgetting for once their sectarian and racial differences, daily join together in worship of the One God, in similar rites to those which the Aryan people used at the same spot more than three thousand years ago. There we may see, if we have eyes to see, that India is one in spirit, however diverse in race and in creed.

E. B. HAVELL.

THE AUGOEIDES OR RADIANT BODY.

G. R. S. MEAD, B.A.

THOUGH the term 'Augoeides' has been popularised by Bulwer Lytton, the majority of readers of the novelist know no more about the mystical doctrine concerning it than they may have gleaned from the somewhat confused 'Soliloquy of Zanoni':

"Soul of mine, the luminous, the Augoeides, why descendest thou from thy sphere—why from the eternal, star-like and passionless serene, shrinkest thou back to the mists, the dark sarcophagus? How long, too austerely taught that companionship with the things that die brings with it but sorrow in its sweetness, hast thou dwelt contented with thy majestic solitude."[1]

To this the author, in the 1853 edition, appended a note, containing a paragraph in Greek, to which the reference and of which the translation are both erroneous. The passage is from Marcus Aurelius (xi. 12), and runs as follows:

"The sphere of the soul is radiant (*augoeidēs*)[2] when it is neither extended to any [object], nor is contracted inwards, nor is convoluted,[3] nor collapses,

[1] *Zanoni*, bk. ii., ch. 4 (1st ed., 1845). *Zanoni* was developed from a crude and floridly romantic sketch called 'Zicci,' a serial contributed to *The Monthly Chronicle*, in 1838. The 'soliloquy' is not found in 'Zicci,' ch. iv.

[2] This is a questionable reading, though it may have some probability from the concluding paragraph of the context; the latest texts however read *autoeidēs*, that is 'like itself, uniform, self-formed.' (See *D. Imp. M. Ant. Com. Libri XXII.*, rec. I. Stich (Leipzig, 1903), p. 147.

[3] Reading σπειρᾶται for σπείρηται; this gives the idea of coil, spiral or convolution, of ovoid as compared with perfect sphere.

but when it is made to shine with [that] Light whereby it sees the Truth—the [truth] of all [external] things, and the [truth] in itself."

Let us, then, see whether, with a modicum of industry, a little more light may be thrown on the subject.

In classical Greek, *augoeidēs* is an adjective meaning 'possessed of a form of *augē*,' that is of a form of splendour, brightness, brilliance, radiance; hence brilliant, shining, radiant, ray-like, luciform, glorious, etc. In modern Greek, however, *augoeidēs* is said to have a secondary derivation, and means simply 'oval,' from *aûgon*, an egg.[1] So much for the dictionaries; but what of the Augoeides as the Radiant Body, or Glorious Vehicle or Vesture of the Soul?

We have already, in the last number of this REVIEW,[2] discussed at some length the ideas of the Later Platonists, and of their immediate predecessors and successors, on the nature of the spirituous vehicle, or spirit-body, or spirit (*tò pneûma* or *tò sôma pneumatikón*), and may, therefore, proceed, without further introduction, to treat of that prime *essence* or *substance* of all bodies, and of all embodiment, to which these philosophers most commonly give the name Augoeides. The root-notion was most probably taken over into Greek philosophy from Orphism, that is to say, presumably the influence of the Old Oriental mystic doctrines of Asia Minor or Hither Asia on Hellenic thought. Now the line of descent for their 'theology' was traced by the Platonici themselves from Orpheus to Pythagoras and Plato. Let us, then, first turn to

[1] See Stephani, *Thesaurus*, 3rd ed., Hase-Dindorf, Paris, 1831-1856, and Kyriakides (A.), *Gk. Eng. Lex.*, Leukosia, Cyprus, 1892.

[2] 'The Spirit-Body: An Excursion into Alexandrian Psycho-physiology, pp. 472-488.

the earliest and latest of the School of the Academy, to the Master himself and to Damascius, and hear what they have to say about this Vehicle of Purity and Truth.

In that magnificent passage of the *Phædrus* (250c), in which he speaks of the Vision of Heavenly Beauty, Plato dwells on the philosophic memory of that state when the souls of men had not yet fallen into generation, and continues:

"There was a time when they could behold Beauty in all its brilliance, when, together with the rest of the Blessed Company—we [philosophers] in the train of Zeus, and other [ranks of souls] in the train of some other of the Gods—they both beheld the beatific spectacle and [divine] vision, and were initiated into that mystery which truly may be called the holiest of all, in which we joyed in mystic ecstasy, for then we were ourselves still in the state of wholeness and unconscious of the evils that awaited us in time to come; not only being made mystically conscious of[1] the Forms [Divine][2] (*Phásmata*)—in wholeness yet in singleness, void of all motion yet filled full of bliss—but also eye to eye beholding[3] them in radiance (*augē*) of purity, for we were [then] pure [ourselves] and not yet sunk into this 'tomb' (*sēma*), which now we bear about with us and call it 'body' (*sōma*), bound fast [to it] like oyster [to its shell]."[4]

[1] μυούμενοι—indicating the lower grade of the *myēsis*, with eyes shut or bound.

[2] *Sci.* the Ideas.

[3] ἐποπτεύοντες—signifying the higher degree of the *epopteia*, with eyes open or unveiled.

[4] Jowett's translation (i. 456) misses almost every one of the technical points—shall we say this is owing to his over-anxiety to 'modernise' Plato for literary purposes, or can it be that the famous 'knowledge' of the Master of Balliol did not include a course on the 'mysteries'?

To pass from the grandiose intuition of the Founder of the School to the last occupant of the *Kathédra* of the Academy, Damascius, who was driven from the Chair in 529 by Justinian. In his Commentary (§ 414) on the *Parmenidēs* of Plato, Damascius writes of the Augoeides as follows:

"In heaven, indeed, our radiant (*augoeidés*) [portion] is full filled with heavenly radiance (*augē*)—a glory that streams throughout its depths, and lends it a divine strength; but in lower states losing this [radiance], it is dirtied, as it were, and becomes darker and darker and more material. Heedless it grows, and sinks down towards the earth, yet in its essence is it still the same in number [*i.e.* unity]. So also with our soul itself, when it strives upwards unto Mind and God, then is its essence [*sci.* the Augoeides] full filled with gnostic Light Divine, of which it previously [*sci.* in incarnation] was not possessed, else had it always been Divine."[1]

Damascius also says elsewhere[2] that Isidōrus, who was the friend of Proclus and Marinus, and husband of Hypatia, and who occupied the *Kathédra* of the School for a brief period, had stated, on the authority of some other philosopher, whom we can no longer identify owing to the loss of the context, "that the soul has a certain radiant vehicle (*augoeidès óchēma*), as it is called,[3] starlike (*astroeidés*) and eternal; and this [vehicle] is securely shut away in this [gross] body,

[1] Ruelle (C. A.), *Damascii Successoris Dubitationes et Solutiones de Primis Principiis in Platonis Parmenidem* (Paris, 1889), ii. 270. There is a French translation by A. E. Chaignet (Paris, 1908, 3 vols.); cp. iii. 147.

[2] In his *Life of Isidorus*, which is lost. We owe the quotation to the *Lexicon* of Suidas, ed. Bernhardy (Halle, 1853), 1. 850 f.; ed. Bekker (Berlin, 1854), p. 194.

[3] As, for instance, in the *Chaldæan Oracles*' poem, "the subtle vehicle (*leptòn óchēma*) of the soul," quoted by Hierocles in his commentary on *The Golden Verses* of Pythagoras, xxvi. 67-69.

according to some within the head, [and] according to others within the right shoulder—a statement which no one else seems to have made."

It is doubtful whether the last clause is due to Damascius or to Suidas. In any case it refers solely to the queer statement about the 'right shoulder.' I have, however, heard of a certain mystic 'silver cord,'[1] or attachment, which is variously 'seen' and spoken of. This is supposed by some to start from between the shoulder-blades, and is also imagined to unroll itself as it were from a point or centre, and contract itself again into a point, when the subtle vehicle leaves and returns to the body in certain mystic experiences. The Augoeides was, however, as we see, thought more usually to be centred, as it were a light-spark, in the head—that is, its only point of contact with the physical body was imagined to be in the head—whereas the spirituous body, as we have seen in our last paper, was thought of as pervading the whole gross body and surrounding it.

We may now turn to two passages of a more detailed nature, taken from the works of Porphyry († 305 A.D.) and of Proclus († 485 A.D.). In his *Sententiæ*, speaking of the soul, Porphyry tells us that:

"When it is in a purer condition it has cognate with it the body that is nighest to the immaterial [state], *viz.* the ætherial (*aithérion*) body; but when it proceeds from reason (*lógos*) into the projection of sensible presentation (*phantasía*), it has cognate with it the sunlike (*hēlioeidés*) [body]; when further it becomes womanish and grows impassioned for form, it

[1] The reference to a 'silver cord' will indubitably remind every reader of the phrase in the magnificent, but exceedingly puzzling, concluding outburst of Koheleth (*Eccl.* xii. 6); but the treatment of the whole passage, xii. 1-8, must be postponed to another occasion, for it is a long story.

has the moonlike (*selēnoeidés*) [body] present with it; and [finally] when it falls into bodies—[which it does] whenever it gets into an amorphous state—composed of moist exhalations, complete ignorance of reality, obscuration and childishness supervene for it. . . . But when it tries to separate itself from nature, it becomes a dry radiance (*augē*), shadowless and cloudless. For moisture forms cloud in air,[1] while dryness changes vapour into dry radiance (*augē*)."[2]

With this we may compare the following passage from Proclus's Commentary on the *Timæus* of Plato:

"Man is a little world (*mikrós kósmos*); for, just like the universe (*tò pân*), he possesses both mind and reason (*noûs* and *lógos*), both a divine and mortal body; he is also divided up according to the universe. It is for this reason, you know, that some are accustomed to say that his gnostic [principle] (*tò noeròn*) corresponds with the nature of the fixed stars; his reason [corresponds] in its contemplative aspect with Saturn, and in its social aspect with Jupiter; while as to his irrational [part], the passional [nature corresponds] with Mars, the eloquent with Mercury, the appetitive with Venus, the sensitive with Sol, and the vegetative with Luna; while, further, the radiant vehicle (*augoeidès óchēma*) [corresponds] with heaven, and this mortal [frame] with the sublunary [region]."[3]

In these passages we have two different schemes; Porphyry here follows the very ancient ordering of 'Babylonian' tradition, where the Sun and Moon

[1] Cp. Porph. *De Ant. Nymp.* p. 64, 16 (Nauck): "For moisture in air being densified produces cloud."

[2] Porphyrii, *Sententiæ ad Intelligibilia Ducentes*, xxix.; p. 14 f., ed. Mommert (Leipzig, 1907).

[3] Procli *Commentarius in Platonis Timæum*, p. 384A, B, ed. Schneider (Vratislaviæ, 1847), p. 848.

follow next to the pure Light Space and precede the 'Planets,' while Proclus uses the language of the later 'Astrologists' and that, too, in a Hellenised or philosophised form.

Now the general tenor of the most recent research justifies us in ascribing the introduction of the idea of the Augoeides into Greek religio-philosophy to ancient Orphic mystagogy; and indeed, as is well known and we have said before, the Platonici themselves claimed that the sources of their 'theology' went back through Plato and Pythagoras to Orpheus himself. It is, therefore, of interest to see what Hierocles, the Neoplatonic philosopher of Alexandria who flourished in the middle of the fifth century, has to tell us of this Radiant Body, in his famous Commentary on *The Golden Verses* which contained the 'symbols' of the Pythagorean discipline. Hierocles tells us practically that the object of the whole of the purificatory degrees of this far-famed method was nothing else than the restoration of this Augoeides to its original state.

"The end of the method of the Pythagoreans was that they should become furnished with wings [to soar] to the reception of the Divine blessings, in order that, when the day of death comes, the Athletes in the Games of Philosophy [*i.e.*, of the Love of Wisdom], leaving the mortal body on earth, and stripping off its nature [*sci.* the spirituous body], may be unencumbered for the heavenly journey."[1]

And so also, commenting, in § xxvi., on verses 67-69, he tells us:

"From these verses, whoever of us is not inattentive to the Pythagorean counsels, should learn that, together with the discipline (*áskēsis*) of virtue and

[1] Ed. Needham (Cambridge, 1709), p. 227.

the recovery of truth, he shall also be diligent in the purification of his radiant (*augoeidés*) body, which the [Chaldæan] Oracles also call the subtle vehicle of the soul."[1]

And this he repeats a little later as follows:

"Just as, then, it is necessary to adorn (*kosmêsai*) the soul with wisdom (*epistēmē*) and virtue, so that it may be able to company with those who are eternally wise and virtuous, so also must we make our radiant (*augoeidés*) [body] pure and free from [gross] matter, in order that it may support communion with the ætherial bodies."[2]

From the above passages we may be permitted to deduce that the chief grades of this spiritual discipline were: purity, virtue and truth.

We may now conclude this part of our essay by some apposite quotations from Philoponus, who lived at Alexandria in the first half of the VIIth century, and who was, as we saw in our last paper, in a very favourable position to sum up the doctrines of the Platonic School. The chief passage of Philoponus on the Augoeides runs as follows:

"There is, moreover, beyond this [spirituous body] another kind of body, that is for ever attached to [the soul], of a celestial nature, and for this reason everlasting, which they call radiant (*augoeidés*) or starlike (*astroeidés*). For as [the soul] is a being of the cosmic order, it is absolutely necessary that it should have an estate or portion of the cosmos in which to keep house. And if [the soul] is in a state of perpetual motion, and it is necessary that it should be for ever in

[1] Needham, p. 214; Mullach (Paris, 1860), p. 478b.

[2] *Sci.* the stars and bodies of the Gods; Needham, p. 222, Mullach, p. 481b.

activity, it needs must be that it should ever have attached [to it] some body or other which it keeps eternally alive. For these reasons, therefore, they say it for ever keeps its radiant (*augoeidés*) [body], which is of an everlasting nature."[1]

Speaking of this heavenly 'body' from the macrocosmic standpoint, Philoponus tells us that, according to the Platonici, "the matter of celestial [bodies]" is not of the four elements, but "there is another kind of body—the fifth," element, or quintessence, and its form (*eîdos*) is spherical;[2] while, in treating of it from the microcosmic point of view, he writes: "Further it is necessary to show that the rational (*logikē*) soul has the essence [or substance, *ousía*] of every body attached to it, while the other [souls in man] have their existence in a [distinct] body; *viz.* the irrational [soul] in the spirit [or spirituous body] and the vegetative in this [gross body]" (15, 19). Finally, in commenting on Aristotle's *De. An.* ii. 7, Philophonus tells us that, according to Aristotle, "the everlasting, the sublime (*dnō*) body, partakes of transparency; and he calls it the out-flow (*chúma*) of the spheres, for all [of them] are transparent" (324, 5). It pertains to the 'crystalline.'

Though the dogma of the inseparability of the soul from its essential substance (the Augoeides) was the general belief of the School—for without the latter, as they contended,[3] the soul could not continue in activity or actuality—there was also a purely absolutist doctrine of complete separability, which Aristotle tried to saddle on the master himself, as a deduction from a

[1] *Philoponi in Aristotelis de Anima*, ed. Hayduck (Berlin, 1897), 18, 26 ff.

[2] *Ib.* 56, 3; cp. 88, 12; 138, 6; 21, 22, and also 450, 29, where it is called the 'ætherial,' and the four others the 'single bodies.'

[3] See the first quotation from P. (18, 26 f.) above.

statement in the *Timæus*. This is set forth by Philoponus as follows:

"Now in Plato's view it is better for the soul to be without body [of any kind]; for life in body is full of toil for it. He believed, moreover, that the cosmos will never be dissolved, and so the soul of the universe will be in a less fortunate state than and not on an equality with our souls, inasmuch as *they* will at some time be freed from their body; whereas the [universal soul] has to be forever inwoven with the [universal] body. At any rate Aristotle finely draws this conclusion, if really, as the *Timæus* seems to say, the essence of the [world-] soul is inwoven with the [world-] body. But [on the contrary] even as the [human] soul, when it gains the mastery over the [physical] body, has this body following it, and does not itself follow the motions of the body, so, *à fortiori*, when the celestial body [of the universe] is free from all mortal disturbance and is moved solely by the will of the [world-] soul, no disturbance results to the soul from it; and this is also the case with our own soul and its radiant (*augoeidés*) [body]" (137, 27, ff.).

The rest of this quest will be devoted to the consideration of what Synesius has to tell us about the Augoeides. Synesius (365-430? A.D.) was a Neoplatonist and for many years a correspondent of Hypatia's; indeed he sent his treatise *On Visions*, from which the following quotations are taken, to 'the philosopher' for her approval. This treatise was written about 404 A.D., before Synesius became a Christian; he subsequently, about twenty-three years after, held a bishopric, for some three years before his death. As what Synesius has to tell us is the most detailed statement on the subject known to me, I

venture to append a careful and full translation, which may be all the more acceptable as there exists no English version.[1]

7. (135D.) "If the direct apprehension (*tò autoptêsai*) of God is a felicitous experience, the comprehension [of Him] by means of [sensible] presentation (*phantasía*) pertains to a higher order of apprehension (*autopsía*). For this [power of presentation, *phantasía*] is the [one] sense of [all differentiated] senses, seeing that the spirit (*pneûma*) whereby the faculty of presentation is brought into play, is the most general sensory and the first body of the soul. It has its seat in the innermost place, and dominates the living creature, (136A.) as it were from a citadel; for round it nature has built up the whole economy of the head. Now hearing and sight are not senses, but organs of sense, servants of the common [sense], as it were door-keepers who notify their mistress of the sense-objects outside, whereby the out-turned organs of sense have their doors knocked upon; whereas she in all portions of her is simple sense; for she hears with the whole of the spirit [*sci.* the common sensory], and sees with the whole of it, and so she does for the rest of the senses. She it is who distributes the powers [of sense] among the various [sense] organs, and they each proceed from the animal [*i.e.* the spirit], and are, as it were, kinds of radii issuing from a centre and centring into it, being all one in respect of their common root, but many in their procession. Accordingly sense, when proceeding through the projected organs, is of a most

[1] Indeed the only version with which I am acquainted is the utterly valueless rendering, or rather paraphrase, of H. Druon (Paris, 1878), which consistently misses every characteristic point. My heartiest thanks are due to the good service of Dr. J. Gennadius for generous help in some specially difficult passages. The text used is I. G. Krabinger's edition of the Homilies and Fragments (Landshut, 1850), pp. 328 ff.

animal-like nature; indeed it is not sense at all before it arrives at its source; the im-mediate sense, however, is more divine and closer to the soul.

"And so let no one whose presentative spirit (*phantastikón pneûma*) is diseased, expect clear and unconfused visions. Now what its disease is, both by what things it is made blear-eyed and dense, and by what it is cleansed and purged and returns to its natural state, you must learn from the mystic philosophy, whereby also, after it has been purified by perfecting rites (*teletôn*), it becomes God-possessed; but before the presentative [body] can receive God, the incomings [of sense] flee away out of it. But he who keeps it pure, by living a life according to nature, has it ever in readiness, to be the most extended common-sensory, [even] in this life. For spirit so purified is sensible of the dispositions of the soul, and is not unsympathetic in itself [to them], as is the shell-like envelope [*sci.* the gross body]. (137 A.) For the latter has ever an antagonistic nature to the higher dispositions of the soul; whereas its primal and eternal vehicle is subtilised and ætherealised when [the soul] is made virtuous; but when it is made vicious, its vehicle becomes dense and earthy. For this spirit is precisely the borderland between unreason and reason, between body and the bodiless; it is the common frontier of both, and by its means things divine are joined with lowest things. Therefore it is difficult for its nature to be comprehended by philosophy [alone].[1]

8. (137B) For it lays under contribution what suits it, from both of the extremes, as from neighbours, and images in one single nature things that are poles

[1] *Sci.* philosophy as distinguished from 'mystic philosophy.'

apart. As to the extent of this presentative essence [or substance], nature has poured it into many divisions of being. Indeed it goes down even as low as irrational creatures, so as the better to extend itself. Moreover the whole of the genera of daimones are supplied with their substance by this mode of life [or animal]; for during the whole of their existence they are of the nature of images and take on the appearances of happenings. Whereas man [is conscious of] many things by means of [this essence] even when by itself, and of more when there is another [? a daimōn] with it. For [the orders of daimones] make thoughts always to have some mixture of sensible presentation, except perchance a man in a flash establish immaterial contact with an idea; the transcending of sensible presentation, however, is as difficult as it is blissful. For 'mind and wisdom,' says [Plato, *Phileb.* 59D], are beloved by him to whomsoever they come even in 'old age,' meaning the faculty that transcends sensible presentation. For the life surely that is pictured forth is of the imagination, or of a mind that has recourse to imagination.

9. (137D) "In any case this psychic spirit, which the blessed ones[1] call also 'spirituous soul,' becomes both a god, and a daimōn capable of assuming any form, and an image [or shade], in which last the soul works out its corrections. For not only the Oracles are in agreement about it, likening the manner of life of the soul in the after-state [of correction] to the image-happenings in dream, but also philosophy

[1] Referring most probably to the initiated of the tradition preserved in the Hellenistic poem known as *The Chaldæan Oracles;* the *scholium* of Nicephorus (N. Gregoriæ *Byzantinæ Historiæ Libri XXXVII.*, Migne, *Pat. Gr.*, tom. cxlix., col. 569) glosses it, however, as 'the sacred writers among the Egyptians.'

concludes that the first lives [on earth] are preparations for the second [in the after-state], while the higher habit of mind in souls lightens [the spirit] and wipes off the stains of the lower [habit]. (138A) And so by natural impulses it either rises on high owing to its heat and dryness—and this of course is [Plato's[1]] 'winging' of the soul; moreover we find that Heracleitus's 'wise soul, dry radiance (*augē*)'[2] comes to precisely the same thing—or, becoming dense and moist, it sinks into the depths of earth by natural tendency, lurking [there], nay thrust down into the subterrene state;[3] for this region is very suitable for moist spirits. Life in that state is miserable and penal; yet is it possible even [for such a spirit], when it has been purified by time and toil and other lives [on earth], to rise; for becoming a thing of double life, it runs a double course, and companies partly with the lower, and partly with the higher [regions]. It is this [spirit] which the first soul, when it descends, has loaned to it from the spheres, and going on board of it, as on a boat, comes into contact with the corporeal world. Thereon ensues a struggle, either to take it aloft with it, or it may be even no longer to continue with it; this, however, is a rare case. Nevertheless it may be compelled to let it go if it will not follow; for it is not lawful to be unfaithful when once the initiatory rites have been known. For it would be a [sad] disgrace for souls to return [on high] without repaying what does not belong to them,—leaving behind in the surround of the earth [instead of in the spheres] what they have borrowed on their way down. Yet even this may happen in the case of one or two as a [special] grace of initiation (*teletē*), yea of God. But the natural

[1] *Phædr.* 246D. [2] Fr. 118, Diels (Berlin, 1906). [3] Cp. *Phædo* 81C.

state [of affairs] is that when the soul is once engrafted into [the spirit], they either pull together, or one pulls over or is pulled over by the other. But in any case they are joined together until the Return [of the soul] to the state whence it came. And so when [the spirit] is weighed down by vice, it drags down together with it that soul who allows it to be so weighed down. And this is the warning that the Oracles give to the gnostic seed in us:

"'See that thou verge not down into the world of the dark rays; 'neath which is ever spread the Abyss, devoid of form, where is no light to see, wrapped in black gloom, befouling, that joys in images (*eídōla*), void of all understanding.'[1]

"For how can an infatuate life void of all understanding be a good thing for the mind? Whereas for the image [or shade] this lower region is suitable, owing to the composition of its spirit being then of a similar nature; for 'like loves like.'[2]

10. (138D) "But if, from their coupling, the two should become one, then the mind as well would be dowsed in the delight of pleasure. And, indeed, this would be the most extreme of ills—not to be conscious of the presence of evil; for this is the condition of those who no longer even try to rise—(139A) just like a hardened tumour which gives no pain, nor reminds to seek a cure. And for this reason repentance (*metánoia*)[3] is an elevating means. For he who feels impatience with the circumstances in which he finds himself, devises means of escape. Now the chief thing

[1] Using Kroll's text, p. 61; cp. the writer's *Chaldæan Oracles* (London, 1908), ii. 86.

[2] A Platonic proverb; cp. *Symp.* 195B, *Lys.* 214B, *Georg.* 510B.

[3] By this, as we see in the sequel, the philosophers meant a change of will, the conversion of the whole man (*noûs*).

in purification is the will; for then both deeds and words lend a helping hand. But when the will is absent, the whole purificatory discipline of initiation is soulless, being lopped of its chief characteristic. And on this account both in this life and in the after-life accesses [of pain] afford the greatest and best service to the orders of existence, introducing pain and purging the soul of infatuate joy. And [so] what are mistakenly called misfortunes contribute largely to breaking up the habit we have for things here. Nay the Divine Providence is revealed to those possessed of Mind by these [very happenings] which cause people who are not possessed [of Mind] to disbelieve in it; since it is not possible for the soul ever to turn its face away from matter, if it does not come into collision with any evil in things here. Wherefore we should consider the successes that people talk so much about as a trap laid for souls by the overseers of things below. And so I leave to others the pretension that there may be a draught of oblivion [for souls] on their departure [from the body]. It is rather when the soul enters into this life that an oblivion-draught is given it, the sweet and dulling drink down here. For, descending into its first life as a free worker, instead of so working, it volunteers for slavery. That is to say, it had to discharge a certain service to the nature of the world, according to the laws imposed by Destiny (*Adrásteia*); but, being bewitched by the gifts of matter, its condition resembles that of freemen who have hired themselves out by agreement for a time,—who under the spell of some [slave] wench's beauty volunteer to stop, agreeing to serve the beloved object's master. And so do we, whenever we transfer our affections from the depth of the mind to the state of bodily concerns and

external so-seeming goods—so do we seem to agree with the nature of matter, that she [matter] is fair. But she [*sci.* nature, matter's mistress] holds our agreement as a mystic secret bond, and even if we decide to be off as though freemen, she claims we are fugitives, and tries to bring us back again, and has us seized as runaways, quoting her document against [us]. Then, indeed, is it that the soul has need of all its strength—yea even of God, to help it; (140A) for it is no light business to put in a plea for the invalidation of one's own agreement, much less to obtain it by force. For then, indeed, by the decree of Fate, the avenging powers of matter are set in motion against those who take the bit in their teeth against her laws. And these, in truth, are the so-called trials, which the sacred stories (*hieroì lógoi*) say Hercules underwent, and any other hero who valiantly strives for freedom, until they succeed in raising up their spirit to a height where the hands of nature cannot reach it. But if the leap is made within her borders, [the spirit] is dragged down, and there is need of [still] more grievous struggles; for she is merciless, since the property already belongs to another. Moreover, if [the soul] abandon the Ascent in despair, she demands penalties for the attempt. . . .

11. (140B) "In general all lives are in error if [the soul] does not return along its first path. And see how vast a middle state this spirit has in which to play the part of citizen! Now if [the soul] verge downward,[1] the [sacred] utterance (*lógos*)[2] tells us, that [the spirit] is weighed down and sinks, until it light upon the 'black-rayed gloom-wrapped' land; but if [the soul] strive upward, [the spirit] also follows with it, as far as ever it has the power to do so. This

[1] Cp. Plat. *Phædr.* 247B. [2] *Sci.* the Oracle quoted above.

it can do until it comes to the furthest limit of the region opposite [*sci.* to the Abyss]. Hear what the Oracles say also on this point:

"'Thou shall not leave the dross of matter to the Abyss;
Nay, the image also hath a portion in the light-wrapped land.'[1]

"The 'light-wrapped' is the antithesis of the 'gloom-wrapped' region. With sharp eyes, moreover, we might see even something more in these words. For it is not seemly [for the soul] to restore to the spheres the nature [*sci.* the spirit] which descended thence, without any addition; but whatever of the purest strata of both fire and air it drew into the image-nature in its descent, before it was enveloped in the earthy shell—this also, it says, it restores with it to the better 'portion.' For the divine body cannot possibly be the 'dross of matter' [*sci.* the gross body]. Moreover it is reasonable that things which share in a common nature and are counted as one, should not be altogether without relation to one another, and especially things that have a neighbouring territory, as, for instance, fire follows next on the circle-body [*sci.* the spheres], and not as earth the last of existing things. And if the higher [elements] by yielding to the lower get some enjoyment out of the intercourse, and eventuate as a body of unadulterated mud,[2] as though [the former] had been assimilated by that which was permitted to dominate in the conjunction, perhaps also the lower [elements] also, if they no longer struggle against the activity of the soul, but obey the reins and become submissive— by keeping step with it, and allow-

[1] Kroll, p. 61; see the writer's *Chaldæan Oracles*, ii. 81 and 38.

[2] 'Mud' = water and earth, as opposed to air and fire above.

ing the middle nature to follow the guidance of the first without pulling in every direction—may become ætherialised and restored [on high] together with it,—if not to the whole [height], at any rate they may pass beyond the highest point of the [four lower] elements, and experience the 'light-wrapped' land. For, it says, 'it has a portion in it,' that is in some order of the circling [*sci.* body of the spheres]. As to the part that comes from the elements enough has been said, and we can believe it or disbelieve [as we choose]. But as to the corporeal essence [or substance] that comes thence [*sci.* from the spheres], it is quite impossible in nature that, when the soul returns above, [this essence] should not arise from the corpse, and rising together with [the soul], be made accordant with the spheres, that is to say, be refunded as it were into its proper nature.

12. (141c) "Accordingly these two allotments, being the 'light-wrapped' and the 'gloom-wrapped,' are the extremes, having as their portions the heights [and depths] of bliss and misery. And how many regions between, think you, [there are] in the main body (*kútos*) of the world, partly light and partly dark, in all of which the soul together with this spirit may live, changing its forms, and habits and lives? And so if [the soul] returns to its native nobility, it is a storehouse (*tameion*) of truth; for it is pure and transparent and immaculate, god and prophet, if it so will. But if it fall down, it becomes misty, and grows indefinite, and is false; for the mist-like [part] of the spirit cannot contain the activities of the orders of existence. But being between [the two extremes], it misses some and hits others. You might thus judge of the daimonic nature also in any of its grades. (142A) (For to

speak truth absolutely or all but truth is characteristic of the divine or all but divine; whereas deception in prediction is ceaseless on the part of those who grovel towards matter—[deception,] a thing of passion and of vain glory.) For it is always by means of this [daimonic nature] that the lineage [of the soul] takes on the nature both of god and of major daimōn, and leaps up into and takes possession of the land made ready for the higher nature."

What the nature of the Augoeides was, in the beliefs of the Later Platonic School, has now been made sufficiently clear, I hope, from the above quotations. There may be other equally pertinent passages with which at present I am unacquainted, but enough have been adduced, I venture to think, to bring out clearly the main conception. I have been asked why, in papers of this nature, I do not advance an up-to-date scheme, with which to control or parallel these ancient views; my answer is that I know of no scheme with which I am thoroughly satisfied. I have studied many schemes, and am quite content, in this kind of research, if I succeed in giving a just and sympathetic representation of the particular system under review.

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ANIMISM IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

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IN the article in the January number of this REVIEW we dealt in a general way with the subject of 'Anthropology and the Old Testament,' and we endeavoured to demonstrate how valuable a contribution to the intelligent comprehension of the ancient literature of Israel is afforded by bringing the resources of this—the youngest of the sciences, as it has been well called—to bear upon its study. That article treated more particularly of what we may describe as pre-animism or the stage of naturism, of which we discovered many unmistakeable traces. It is now possible for us to pursue the interesting field of investigation which is opened to us, by the endeavour to discover the traces of animism, and, in a future article, of totemism, which may be found embedded, like flies in amber, in the pages of the Old Testament.

"Animism," says Mr. Clodd, "is the seed of religion." We are not surprised, therefore, to find in the opening chapters of JE the narrative of the Speaking Serpent and the Living Tree,[1] any more than we are surprised, later on, to find the story of the Speaking Ass.[2] These stories, although themselves of late date, belong to the oldest strata in the Hexateuch, and have a flavour of the very highest antiquity;

[1] *Gen.* ii., iii. [2] *Num.* xxii.

they carry us back to a time when, to the ancestors of Israel, there was nothing miraculous in them whatever, but it was as natural for an ass or a serpent to be endowed with the gift of speech as for man himself to be so endowed.

In the days when the stories were written down[1] no doubt they were considered to be evidences of superhuman power. It was Jahweh Elohim who allowed the serpent to speak, or rather the serpent himself has become a sort of divine being or demi-god, whose powers are evidence of a malignant hatred of man, and it is Jahweh who opens the mouth of the ass, but in the earliest times it was not so. Then nothing was marvellous, but all things were possible in a world in which all things were equally alive, all equally animated with the same living principle, all equally possessed of souls.

So Homer (*Il.* xix. 404, 407) tells us of the speaking horse, although in his case, too, the stage of animism has been left far behind, and it is merely a survival.

"Him then the swift-footed horse under the yoke addressed. . . . The white-armed goddess Hera made him [the horse] speak."

So Livy tells us of the prodigy of the speaking ox, and Pliny finds it "frequently in the marvellous stories of the ancients"; but to the 'ancients' themselves it was no prodigy. So our children, still, if we may say so, in the neolithic stage of culture, treat their dolls, and indeed all things they have to do with, chairs, tables, flowers, stones and such like, as alive, and are never surprised when, in the fables of Esop or Phædrus or Lafontaine, they find animals, and even stones and trees, conversing as they do themselves; it is all a

[1] About the VIIIth cent. B.C.

matter of course, as it is in the Australian stories which have been collected by Mrs. Langloh Parker.

To illustrate the fact that in these stories—*i.e.* of the speaking serpent and ass—we are carried very far back to the ideas of primitive man, we note that in West Africa, among the tribes of the Lower Niger, although "animals were regarded as having souls as well as man, which go away in a similar manner, yet they are quite different from them. Animals are in fact a lower creation, lacking as they do the power of speech." This is evidently a later stage in the evolution of animism, arising from observation, and yet, to these natives, "all life, animal and vegetable, has within it the spiritual or living essence, varying in form and character—all, like the human, continuing their spiritual existence in the next world."[1] How near the ideas of savages approach the latest scientific thought may be seen by consulting Sir Oliver Lodge's two articles on the 'Immortality of the Soul' in recent numbers of *The Hibbert Journal.*

Still keeping for the moment to Balaam's ass, for we do not pretend to follow any order in this study, we note that not only was it gifted with speech, but it also beheld the angel whom Balaam could not see. This is entirely on the lines of primitive thought. As Prof. Tylor says: "Animals stare and startle when we see no cause, is it that they see spirits invisible to man?"[2]

The occurrence of the Living Tree or 'Tree of Life,' as it is more familiarly called, in the story of Eden,[3] takes us right back to the very heart of animism.

[1] Lennard, *The Lower Niger and its Tribes*, pp. 147, 188.

[2] *Primitive Culture*, ii. 196.

[3] The Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil is in all probability a later

Because all things are alive, it is a natural conclusion that in partaking of anything you partake of its life, its very soul, and that the properties of that life become a part of yourself. Thus the Fijian warrior ate his fallen foe that he might partake of his life, and be strengthened with his spirit, and made bold with his courage. So in the enchanted garden, where Jahweh Elohim, already differentiated and personified—a proof of the late emergence of the story as we have it—walks and talks with man, it is no wonder that there is a sacred tree *par excellence*, whose fruit gives immortality, even as in the *Zend Avesta* we read of a tree named Hom or Haoma, which imparts immortality, and is called the King of Trees. This Hom was a white tree said to grow in the midst of the mythic sea Vouru-Kasha. Everywhere, among primitive peoples to-day, we find the same stories. In Babylonian, and Persian, and Hebrew legend, either in a Paradise of the past, or, as adapted by the Christian Apostle and by Mohammed after him, in a Paradise of the future, grows the Sacred Tree, with its multiplicity of life-giving fruits, and its healing leaves, and beside it is situated the Sacred Fountain. Here we may ask in passing, is not the very same idea, derived from primitive animism, embodied in the two great Sacraments of the Christian Church, where the water of Baptism is itself the sacred cleansing fountain, and the bread and wine are the vehicles for the reception by the Faithful of the true Tree of Life, even of the Christ Himself, and are therefore, as S. Chrysostom said, "the food of immortality"?

Note again further traces of animism in the story where we are told that Jahweh Elohim walked

addition; at any rate it has not the same primitive flavour as the other, but seems the result of philosophical speculation upon the mysteries of man's environment.

in the garden in the cool of the day, and addressed the guilty pair. It was the sighing of the leaves and branches of the tree (probably the Living Tree) that seemed to them, according to the narrator, J, as the voice of Jahweh Elohim, but originally it would be the tree-spirit who was offended and whose accusing voice spoke to them in the evening breeze.

As we read the stories of the Patriarchs we notice at once that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are associated most intimately with the sacred objects of the ancient animistic religion. They are all worshippers of Jahweh —at least so J tells us, although E says the name Jahweh was not known until the Exodus, and he uses the name El Shaddai to designate the god of Abraham —but they worship him at the old sites and in the old way.

Abraham erects his altars beneath the sacred trees with which Canaan abounded, Isaac is more particularly associated with sacred wells, and Jacob with sacred stones, all part and parcel of the old animistic faith of neolithic times. When Jacob falls asleep at Bethel he uses for his pillow one of the prostrate menhirs, which, as at Arbor Low, in Derbyshire, marked a neolithic burying-place; and, on awaking in the morning, he ascribes the wondrous dream which had come to him to the influence of the god who dwelt in the stone. Lifting it from its fallen position, he set it up again, and, making it, as it were, both altar and shrine, he anointed it with oil, thus entering into communion with the indwelling spirit, and, says the narrator, as though the name were a new one, "he called the name of the place Bethel." Originally the stone itself was the *bethel*, the *baitulos*, like the bætylic altars of Crete and Mycenæ and elsewhere. It is by no means strange

that the folk-lore of Israel should have preserved such traces of animism, when we consider that according to the recently discovered Logia of Oxyrhynchus the Christ is represented as saying: "Raise the stone, and there shalt thou find me. Cleave thou the wood, and there am I"; that down to our own day the women of Brittany, when desirous of offspring, do worship before the mighty menhir, in some cases Christianised by a cross on its summit; and that the women of Cornwall and Argyleshire in similar case believe in the efficacy of passing themselves through the holed stone.

Keeping for the moment to religious ideas connected with sacred stones, we note the two tables of stone[1] supposed to bear the Commandments of Jahweh, which were laid up in the Ark of the Covenant, and thus ensured his presence with his people, so that when the Ark was taken by the Philistines Jahweh himself was, as it were, captured, and manifested his presence and his power by causing Dagon to fall from his pedestal before him. When Israel crossed the Jordan, Joshua erected twelve sacred stones as an abiding memorial; and when Israel overcame the Philistines at Mizpeh, Samuel is said to have taken a stone, and called it Eben-ezer, 'the stone of help.' "This story," says the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, "is of no historical value." That may be, but it is of psychological value, like so many similar stories, and it tells us of the survival of animistic ideas. Perhaps, however, it may have been, as Robertson Smith says, "a rude stone idol," like the aniconic idols in ancient Crete, or the rude images of the neolithic folk described by Cartailhac in France and Spain, which thus received an

[1] Compare the Kaaba or sacred stone at Mecca, and the stone which fell down from Jupiter in the temple of Diana at Ephesus (*Acts* xix. 35).

innocent explanation. Even so it is a piece of fetichism, belonging to the polytheism which is the outcome of animism.

Connected with this is the *matzebah*, or sacred stone, which, with the *ashera*, or sacred pole, representing the original sacred tree, was the accompaniment of every hill-altar or sacred shrine in old Israel, and which together were the sign and pledge of the presence of the divinity.[1] With these we may compare the two pillars, Jachin, 'He will establish,' and Boaz, 'In it is strength,' which Solomon erected in the porch of his temple at Jerusalem, in exact correspondence with the pillars in front of Phœnician temples, and with the 'Pillars of the House' in the Mycenæan cult in Crete and elsewhere. All these served not only an architectural, but an important religious purpose, as being themselves the shrine and symbol of deity and ensuring the divine presence, support and blessing to the House.

Harking back for a while, we notice that when the nobles of Israel digged a well, as described in *Numbers*, xxi. 16-18, from which Moses is said to have given the people water at the behest of Jahweh, they sang a song to it as itself a sacred fountain and quasi-divine: "Spring up, O Well; sing ye unto it!"—in the very spirit of animism.

The Burning Bush, where Moses had his vision of Jahweh, and received his call, must have been a well-known sacred tree to which he had been wont to resort. Here is represented a real theophany—Moses hears the voice of the 'Angel of Jahweh,' afterwards spoken of as Jahweh himself—but the manifestation is not in

[1] Abraham is even said to have "planted a grove," *i.e.* set up an *ashera* in Beersheba, the sacred spring where he made a covenant with Abimelech, king of Gerar.—*Gen.* xxi. 33; cp. *Deut.* xvi. 21.

human form, as usually represented at this age, and indeed many times over in the days of the patriarchs. The only special appearance is of fire, with which the bush glows but is not consumed. In the story in *Exodus* there seems to be the fusion of two widely current beliefs: that fire indicated the divine presence, and that certain trees were the permanent abode of deities. From the character of the reference in *Deuteronomy*, xxxiii. 16, it seems probable there was current a form of the story which made the bush the permanent dwelling of Jahweh ("who dwelt in the bush"), indicating the same permanency of the divine occupancy as was afterwards supposed to characterise the temple. In Exodus the fiery appearance is clearly regarded, like other theophanies, as temporary.

In the story of Hagar, when she and Ishmael, her son, were cast out by Abraham, we are told how "she departed and wandered in the wilderness of Beersheba. And the water was spent in the bottle, and she cast the child under one of the shrubs." We are not told what the 'shrub' was, but from the theophany which followed it may be concluded that it was a well-known and recognised sacred tree, probably in the neighbourhood of some shrine, and the sacred well adjoined, though the fact came as a surprise to Hagar. Of course the shrine with its divinity is, as already hinted, an evidence of later development, when through the differentiation between the object and the soul, which has now become, as it were, a *numen*, animism has passed, as in West Africa, into fetichism and polytheism. To the narrator, E, the further development had taken place, that it was the presence of Elohim (AV 'God,' as always) that was manifested, his voice that was heard.

Passing on to the times of David, we note the remarkable direction which Jahweh is said to have given on one occasion when the Philistines spread themselves in the Valley of Rephaim, and David, being at a loss what to do, consulted the oracle. This is recorded in *II. Sam.* v. 22 ff., and the Chronicler repeats the story in almost identical words, *I. Chron.* xiv. 14. The king is told to withdraw, and to come upon the Philistines over against the mulberry trees; and, it is added, "it shall be when thou shalt hear the sound of a going (or marching) in the tops of the mulberry trees then thou shalt go out to battle, for God is gone forth before thee." Here again, these mulberry trees, so definitely and specifically named, must have been well-known and recognised sacred trees associated with the old animistic religion, and, at this time, probably with a shrine adjoining, adapted to the cult of Israel's god. In the form of the sign we have the rustling of the tree-tops in the breeze utilised to represent the marching out of God against Israel's foes.

The question arises, How is it, on the principles of animism, that we find everywhere certain special trees, wells and stones accounted sacred, both among the primitive races to-day, and in the folk-lore of the civilised peoples, seeing that, originally, all things shared a common life, and all alike possessed the animating soul or souls? The answer is to be found in the growing differentiation of the object from its soul or souls, and the consequent multiplication of extra-corporeal beings which might attach themselves to any objects they chose, or pass indifferently from one object to another. This is the origin of idolatry.

The phenomena of dreams led the primitive philosopher to think of his soul as passing away from him in

sleep, and returning again when he awoke. Oftentimes he went on to assume that he possessed three or four souls, each a separate entity—*e.g.* the dream soul, the 'bush' soul, the shadow soul, and the psychic soul. What was true of himself was equally true of animal and vegetable, and even of stock and stone, of river and fountain, as well as of sun and moon and stars. Thus the whole of nature was alive with incorporeal spirits, some of them well disposed, such as the spirits of his dead ancestors, some of them evilly disposed, as the spirits of the storm and the rushing torrent or the tempestuous sea. Hence arose polytheism and fetichism with their attendant ritual and magic, and the whole army of priests, medicine-men and magicians. These latter by their arts could control the malignant spirits, who manifested their evil powers in sickness and murrains and disaster, and, by sympathetic magic, could induce the kindly offices of such spirits as were well disposed.

Now these spirits were all of them recognised as more active in certain localities than in others, and these localities would be known to the wise men or *wirreenun*[1] or priests, and thus certain spots would soon be marked off as having a special sanctity through the activity of the spirits therein. Religion and magic would soon be turned to a source of gain.

We find, for example, among the Australian natives who believe in the Alcheringa times, each living individual being a reincarnation of an Alcheringa ancestor, certain localities where the spirits are particularly active in their desire for rebirth, and these are marked by sacred tree or well or stone, which are

[1] *Wirreenun* is the native Australian word for 'magician,' and is now so well known as to be employed in all cases where the 'magician' is at the same time medicine-man, elder and sometimes also priest.

well known to the natives, and avoided by unmarried girls or women who are not desirous of offspring. In the same way every West African village has its sacred juju tree, and its fetich stone beside the shrine of the idol. And thus when Israel arrived in Canaan they found themselves in a land already abounding in sacred localities belonging to the local divinities or Baalim, the beliefs attached to which were syncretised with their own, and adapted to the cult of their own god Jahweh. So, too, when the stories of the past came to be written down, the sacred trees and wells and stones of the old neolithic times had their part therein.

We have spoken of magic. In the narrative of JE, Moses and Aaron are both masters of the science, and by their arts and the wonder-working properties of Moses' wand they are able to confound the magicians of Egypt. The devices by which Jacob was able to outwit Laban and increase his own flocks and herds at the expense of the latter, and the brazen serpent, are examples of sympathetic magic. Witchcraft, too, abounded in Israel (as it does in West Africa to-day, and as it was supposed to do in Europe in the Middle Ages, and in England and, above all, Scotland in the XVIIth century), notwithstanding the efforts of successive Codes to put it down, and the denunciations of the true prophets. We find it in one form or another from the times of the Judges to the Reformation of Josiah, and even after the Exile the second Isaiah inveighs against it, while the latest Code has to issue as stringent prohibitions as do the first and the Deuteronomic Codes. This shows how strong the belief was in witchcraft, and how even from the first establishment of the nation, the higher souls fought against its debasing tendencies on behalf of the religion of

Jahweh. Saul, the first king, was a strenuous witch-hunter, but in his extremity he himself consults the Witch of Endor, and, by her necromantic arts, which may be paralleled among all primitive races to-day, she makes him believe that he beholds Samuel as a *revenant*, and hears his solemn judgment.[1] David is himself a quasi-*wirreenun* when he charms away Saul's melancholia, which is believed to be due to an evil spirit from Jahweh, by the music of his harp, an effect of music which is alluded to more than once by Shakespeare. We may notice the same thing in India and elsewhere at the present time. A wise woman is employed by Joab to bring about the reconciliation between David and Absalom, and it is a wise woman who pronounces for the validity of the Deuteronomic Book of the Law when Josiah hesitates to accept it.[2] The drastic provisions of the Codes and the splendid satire of the second Isaiah prove beyond doubt the living potency of the old animistic belief in the influence of spirits on human affairs and the mysterious efficacy of magic and witchcraft, of divination and enchantment, down to the latest days of Israel's history. Connected with this is the trial by ordeal,[3] which, as consisting in the drinking of holy water, persisted even in the latest edition of the priestly legislation in the case of a woman suspected of infidelity to her husband. The antiquity of the ceremony is evident not only from its whole character, but because the expression 'holy water' is, as Robertson Smith points out, "unique in

[1] Might not the Witch of Endor have been a real medium, and have really entered into communication with the spirit of Samuel? The phenomena of Spiritualism (or Spiritism), and the facts ascertained by the Psychical Research Society make this a possible, if, perhaps, hardly probable, explanation of this curious story.

[2] *II. Sam.* xiv.; *II. Kings* xxii. 14.

[3] *Num.* v. 11 ff.

the language of Hebrew ritual, and must be taken as an isolated example of an obsolete expression." "Unique though the expression be, it is not difficult to assign its original meaning, and the survival of even one case of ordeal by holy water leaves no doubt as to the sense of the 'fountain of judgment' (Enmishpat) or 'water of controversy' (Meribah)."[1] It is divination at the oracle of the sacred fountain that is meant. This is entirely on the lines of primitive thought, and exists as a living belief in West Africa and elsewhere to-day.

Two subjects remain to be briefly touched upon as evidencing traces of animism in the Old Testament.

The first is that of the Scapegoat. Notwithstanding Prof. Benzinger's denial of the primitive character of the notion involved in, and the ritual connected with, Azazel, in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, my own opinion coincides with that put forward by Prof. Cheyne in the same work, which had already been advanced by Robertson Smith. "The more we study the Priestly Code," says Prof. Cheyne, "the more we are struck by the combination of firmness and laxity which its compilers display. They were firmness itself as regards the essential principles of the law, but very compliant to outside popular superstitions." I cannot do better than quote the rest of Cheyne's account. "Azazel *to the Jewish theologians* (including the authors of the scapegoat ritual) was a fallen angel, evil no doubt, yet not altogether unfriendly to man, for he was the true Tubal-Cain of *Gen.* iv., and one of the 'Sons of Elohim' of *Gen.* vi. He was said to have been bound hand and foot [like Prometheus], and placed in an opening of the desert which is in Dudāēl; rough and jagged rocks have been laid upon him. . . . There was

[1] *Religion of the Semites*, ed. 1907, pp. 179-182.

the crag down which the 'goat for Azāzel' was pushed." This account is taken from the Book of Enoch, and from the Mishna (Yōmā.) "It was this personal angel," continues Canon Cheyne, "that the author of the scapegoat ritual substituted for the crowd of *se'īrīm* (or earth-demons), to whom the people sacrificed; just as the scapegoat was the substitute for the sacrificial victims. The need must have been great indeed. In the marriage songs of the Canticles we twice find (it is probable) the strange appeal, 'I charge you, O ye daughters of Jerusalem, by the fairy-hosts and by the tree-spirits.'[1] In such a poem the name of Jahwè could not be lightly used: all the world, however, knew of the supernatural beings who haunted thickets, and sometimes inhabited trees, and, like the *jinn* to-day, were sometimes friendly to man, sometimes unfriendly." Do not play with love, says the poet, for fear of the *jinn*, who are believed to be dangerous to newly married people.

Dr. Cheyne then proceeds to discuss the ritual, which need not detain us. To the same effect write Dr. Driver (*Leviticus*, Polychrome Bible) and Robertson Smith, whose researches form the basis of all subsequent work in England. What concerns us is that in the belief in the *se'īrīm*, and in the 'fairies' and 'tree-spirits' of the passage quoted from the Canticles, we have survivals of pure animism in the folk-lore of the people.

The *se'īrīm* are nothing but degraded Elohīm, and just as the latter have become condensed, so to say, in the idea of the one monotheistic god, so the latter have become Azazel, in whom we may with Benzinger see the Satan of later theology. Thus God and Satan both

[1] *Cant.* ii. 7, iii. 5.

derive from animism when traced to their ultimate source.

The *se'īrīm* are also mentioned in *Is.* xiii. 21, xxxiv. 14, where the AV translates 'satyrs,' and in *Lev.* xvii. 7, and *II. Chron.* xi. 15, where AV translates 'devils'—all late passages. They are 'hairy demons' of goat-like appearance, reminding us of the goat-footed satyrs of Greek mythology, and in both cases they tell us how strong were the old animistic ideas in popular belief. The mediæval belief in demons, and in the necessity for guarding churchyards from their body-snatching propensities, by the efficacy of the Cross that crowned the roof of chancel or chantry chapel by day, and of the lamp placed in the 'low-side' window by night, is equally derived from animism. But to dwell further on this would lead us into the whole subject of demonology.

The last subject which we shall mention under the heading of traces of animism, is that of names. At first sight this, perhaps, appears a little far-fetched, but a moment's consideration will show that this is not so. Names, with us, are meaningless words attached for convenience to individuals for the purpose of distinguishing one from another; but with primitive man it was not so.[1] As Mr. Hill-Tout says: "*Names* are more to the primitive mind than to ours. The savage does not look upon them in the same light that we do. They are not to him mere tags or labels to distinguish one individual from another; they are part and parcel, essential attributes, of the thing itself, intimately and mystically connected with it. Consequently when he assumes the name of a thing he believes and feels himself to be closely bound to and associated with the

[1] With us they are *denotative*, with primitive man they are *connotative*.

spirit of that thing, and the spirit with him. Names are *mystery* words, potent for good or ill, and not to be lightly used or uttered. He who knows the mystery name of a thing has that thing in his power."[1]

To the same effect the late Dr. Howitt writes: "When the new name is given at initiation, the child's name becomes secret, not to be revealed to strangers or to be mentioned by friends. The reason appears to be that *a name is part of a person*, and therefore can be made use of to that person's detriment by any who wish to catch him by evil magic."[2] The italics are mine. The meaning in each case is the same, though the application is somewhat different.

Now have we not in this idea of primitive man the explanation of the fact that such a vast number of the names of individuals in the Old Testament are compounds of Jahweh or El or Baal? The original notion may have, and in all probability had, died out in historic times, but the custom was a survival from the animism of far-away ancestors. When a man was called Jerub-Baal, or Joash, or Jehoshaphat, or Jeroboam, or Eli, or Elijah, it signified his mystic union with the god whose name he bore, and the protection of Baal, the strength of El, or the mysterious potency of Jah, whose name must not be uttered, was enlisted on his side. When Jacob's name was changed to Israel after his magic wrestling with Elohim, the 'new name' was bestowed in token that he had successfully passed through what we may call practically the *intichiuma* or 'ceremony of initiation,' and henceforth he himself and all his descendants belonged in a special sense to Elohim. Israel was thenceforward the people of God.

[1] *British North America*, p. 176.

[2] *Native Tribes of South East Australia*, pp. 736, 740.

In this primitive animistic idea may also be found the explanation of the prominence given to the 'Name of Jahweh' in the religious literature of Israel. The 'Name of Jahweh' means all that is involved in the Being of Jahweh, all that Israel realises of Him in the ever-expanding fulness of His revelation of Himself to her, and thus the "'Name of Jahweh' is a strong tower into which the righteous may run and find safety." Thus Prof. Cheyne is right when, in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, he refers the expression in *Ps.* vi. 5, where *ziker* is the word used (translated, AV, remembrance, but connected with Assyrian *zikāru*, to name, mention, whence *zikru*, name), to the recital or solemn mention of God's titles to honour and gratitude in the cultus, and continues: "Now *to primitive man, the name is the expression of the personality.*" And further, "the truth of the statement that the name is (ideally at least) the manifestation of the personality" is seen in such a narrative as referred to above, "Thy name shall no more be called Jacob, but Israel shall be thy name." So to the latest period, almost, of her literary activity (*Ps.* vi. belongs to the Persian period), the purest and noblest minds in Israel give expression to their thoughts in conceptions derived from the very earliest animistic imaginings of their ancestors. To the same circle of ideas belong all those passages in the Prophets and the Psalms in which prominence is given to the 'Name of Jahweh'; it may be noted that the same animistic conceptions are to be seen in the theology of S. Paul; in the prominence given to the 'Name of Jesus' in the New Testament; in the 'new name' of Revelation, and in the expression of the highest religious ideas by ourselves.

H. J. DUKINFIELD ASTLEY.

A NOTE UPON MYSTICISM.

EVELYN UNDERHILL.

It would help us, I think, to a better understanding of that much discussed phenomenon the 'Mystic Life,' were we to regard it less as an abnormal experience—a religious or psychological freak—and more as the development of a sense, an intuition, which lies deep in every conscious Self; the intuition, that is to say, of *transcendent reality.* "Experience is one and Givenness is one, and philosophy as the understanding of Givenness by experience must be one also," says Hans Driesch,[1] here giving expression to the instinct of most modern thinkers. If this unity is ever to be attained, place must be found in it for those aspects of reality which are 'given' in the mystic consciousness, and which the mystic experience interprets to other men. This mystic experience, to which we owe that which Coventry Patmore did not hesitate to call "the science of self-evident reality," claims to be the result of a conscious and personal contact on the part of the mystic with that Cosmic Self, that All, in which the whole universe is bathed. That 'Divine Dark,' or Abyss of the Godhead, of which the great contemplatives so often speak, is seen, when we translate it into the language of another school of thought, to be

[1] *Science and Philosophy of Organism*, ii. 323.

identical with the free creative Source of things which still lurks, in defiance of the determinists, behind the phenomenal world.

Mysticism, then, considered as a method of perception, may be looked upon as the final term of a power which is probably latent in the whole race; the power of perceiving, and consciously uniting with, the transcendental world. In this sense, we may agree with Prof. James, that few people pass through life without knowing what it is to be touched by a certain mystical feeling.[1] He who falls in love with a woman and perceives—as the lover really does perceive—that the categorical term 'girl' veils a wonderful and indicible reality; he who, falling in love with nature, sees the light that never was on sea or land—a vaguely pretty phrase to those who have not seen it, but a scientific statement to the rest; he who falls in love with invisible things, or, as we say, 'undergoes conversion';—all these have truly known for an instant something of the secret of the world. At such moments, hints of a marvellous truth, of a unity whose note is ineffable peace, shine in created things, awakening in the Self a sentiment of love, adoration, and awe. Its life is enhanced, the barrier of personality is broken, man ascends to the 'apex of his spirit,' and enters for a brief period into the more extended life of the Whole.

Now this intuition of the Real shining through the veil of the senses, is present in a modified form in the arts; perhaps it were better to say, *must* be present if these arts are to justify themselves as heightened forms of experience. It is this which gives to them that peculiar vitality, that strange power of communi-

[1] See the lecture on 'Mysticism' in *Varieties of Religious Experience.*

cating a poignant emotion, half-torment and half-joy, which baffles their more rational interpreters. We know that the picture which is 'like a photograph,' the building which is at once handsome and commodious, the novel which is a perfect transcript of life, fail to satisfy us. But it is difficult to say why this should be so, unless it were because these things have neglected their true business; which was not to reproduce the illusions of ordinary men, but to catch and translate for us something of that reality which the artistic consciousness is able, in a measure, to perceive. That 'life-enhancing power' which has been recognised, by Bernhard Berensen and other critics, as the supreme quality of good painting, has its origin in this contact of the artistic mind with the archetypal world.

A recent writer, in whom poetic genius has brought about the unusual alliance of intuition with scholarship, testifies to this same truth, when he says of the ideals of early Chinese painting: "In this theory, every work of art is thought of as an incarnation of the spirit of rhythm, manifesting the living spirit of things with a clearer beauty and intenser power than the gross impediments of complex matter allow to be transmitted to our senses in the visible world around us. A picture is conceived as a *sort of apparition from a more real world of essential life.*"[1]

The mystic may say—is bound to say—with S. Bernard: "My secret to myself." His stammering and awe-struck reports can hardly be understood save by those who are already in the Way. But the artist cannot act thus. On him has been laid the duty of expressing something of that which he perceives. He

Laurence Binyon, *Painting in the Far East*, p. 9.

is the mediator between his brethren and the divine, for art is the link between appearance and reality.[1]

But we do not call everyone who has these partial and artistic intuitions of reality a mystic, any more than we call everyone a musician who has learnt to play the piano. The true mystic is the person in whom such powers are exalted to the height of genius; in whom the transcendental consciousness can dominate the normal consciousness, and who has definitely surrendered himself to the embrace of reality.

As artists stand in a peculiar relation to the phenomenal world, discovering therein truths and beauties which are hidden from other men, so this true mystic stands in a peculiar relation to the transcendental world, there experiencing the onslaught of what must remain for us unimaginable delights. His consciousness is transfigured in a particular way; he lives at different levels of experience from other people, deals with a different 'apperceiving mass'; and this of course means that he sees a different world, since the world as we know it is the product of specific aspects of reality acting upon a normal and untransfigured consciousness. He has been called a lonely soul. He might more properly be described as a lonely body; for his soul, peculiarly responsive, sends out and receives communications upon every side.

The earthly artist, because perception brings with it the longing for expression, tries to give us in colour, sound, or words, a hint of his ecstasy; his glimpse of truth. Only one who has tried, knows how small a fraction of his vision he can, under the most favourable circumstances, contrive to represent. The mystic, too,

[1] See, for matter bearing on this argument, *Hieroglyphics*, by Arthur Machen.

tries very hard to tell an unwilling world the only secret. But in his case the difficulties are enormously increased. First, there is the huge disparity between his unspeakable experience and the language which will most nearly approach it. Next, there is the great gulf fixed between his mind and the mind of the world. His audience must be bewitched as well as addressed, caught up to something of his state, before they can be made to understand. Were he a musician, it is probable that he could give his message to other musicians, in the terms of that art, far more accurately than language will ever allow him to do; for we must not forget that there is no excuse but that of convenience for the pre-eminence amongst modes of expression which we accord to words. These correspond so well to the physical plane and its adventures, that we forget that they have but the faintest of relations with transcendental things. Even the artist, before he can make use of them, is bound to re-arrange them in accordance with the laws of rhythm; obeying unconsciously the rule by which all arts "tend to approach the condition of music."

So, too, the mystic. Mysticism, the most romantic thing in the universe, from one point of view the art of arts, their source and also their end, finds naturally enough its closest correspondences in the most purely artistic of all forms of expression.

One visionary at least, Richard Rolle of Hampole, "the father of English mysticism," has made deliberate use of this parallel in that beautiful description of his spiritual experience which is one of the jewels of XIVth-century literature. To him, that condition of joyous and awakened love to which the contemplative passes when his purification is at an end, is the state

not of Illumination, but of Song. He does not 'see' reality; he 'hears' it. For him, as for S. Francis, it is a "heavenly melody."[1]

"Song I call," he says, "when in a plenteous soul the sweetness of eternal love with burning is taken, and thought into song is turned, and the mind into full sweet sound is changed."[2] He who experiences this "says not his prayers like other right-wise men," but "is taken into marvellous mirth: and, goodly sound being descended into him, as it were *with notes his prayers he sings.*"[3]

So Gertrude More: "O lett me sitt alone, silent to all the world and it to me, that I may learn the Song of Love."[4]

Rolle's own experience seems actually to have come to him in this form; the perceptions of his exalted consciousness presenting themselves to his understanding under musical conditions, as other mystics have received them in the form of pictures or words. I give in his own words the account of his passage from the first state of 'burning love' to the second state of 'songful love'—from '*calor*' to '*canor*'—when "into song of joy meditation is turned."

"In the night, before supper, as I my psalms sung, as it were the sound of readers or rather singers about me I beheld. Whilst also to pray to heaven with all desire I took heed, suddenly—in what manner I wot not—in me the sound of song I felt; and likeliest

[1] See *The Little Flowers of St. Francis of Assisi*, 'Of the Second Reflexion of the most Holy Stigmata.'

[2] Richard Rolle, *The Fire of Love* (Early English Text Society), bk. i., cap. 15. In this and subsequent quotations from Rolle I have slightly modernised the spelling, and sometimes the language, of his somewhat obscure XVth-century translator.

[3] *Op. cit.*, bk. i., cap. 23.

[4] *Spiritual Exercises*, p. 30.

heavenly melody I took, with me dwelling in mind. Forsooth my thought continually to mirth of song was changed: and as it were the same that loving I had thought, and in prayers and psalms had said, in *sound* I showed."[1]

The melody, however, has little in common with its clumsy image, earthly music. "For sweet ghostly song accords not with outward song, the which in churches and elsewhere is used. It discords much: for all that is man's voice is formed with bodily ears to be heard: but among angels' tunes it has an acceptable melody, and with marvel it is commended of them that have known it." To others it is incommunicable. "Worldly lovers soothly words or ditties of our song may know, for the words they read: but the tone and sweetness of that song they may not learn."[2]

Such symbolism as this—a symbolism of experience and action as well as of statement—seems almost essential to mystical expression. The mind must employ some device of the kind if its subliminal perceptions—wholly unrelated as they are to the phenomena with which intellect is able to deal—are ever to be grasped by the surface-consciousness. Sometimes the symbol and the perception which it represents, become fused in that surface-consciousness; and the mystic's experience then presents itself to him as 'visions' or 'voices,' which we must look upon as the garment he has himself provided to veil that Reality upon which no man may look and live. The nature of this garment will be determined largely by his temperament—as in Rolle's evident bias towards music, Boehme's Virgin Sophia, S. Catherine of Genoa's leaning towards the abstract conception of Light—and

[1] *Op. cit.*, bk. i., cap 16. [2] *Ibid.*, bk. ii., capp. 8 and 12.

also by his theological education and environment, as in the highly dogmatic visions and auditions of Suso, S. Catherine of Siena, Angela of Foligno, above all of S. Teresa, whose marvellous self-analyses provide the classic account of these attempts of the mind to translate transcendental intuitions into concepts with which it can deal.

The greatest mystics, however—Ruysbroeck, S. John of the Cross, and S. Teresa herself in her later stages—distinguish clearly between the inexpressible Reality which they perceive, and the image under which they describe it. They tell us, with Eckhart, again and again that the object of their quest "hath no image." Therefore the attempt which has been sometimes made to identify mysticism with such images—with visions, voices, and 'supernatural favours' —is clearly wrong.

The articulate mystic, as a rule, cannot do without symbol and image, inadequate to his vision though they must always be; for his experience must be expressed, if it is to be communicated; and its actuality is inexpressible except in some side-long way, some hint or parallel which will stimulate the dormant intuition of the reader and convey, as all poetic language does, something beyond its surface-sense. Hence the enormous part which is played in all mystical writings by symbolism and imagery, and also by that rhythmic and exalted language which induces in sensitive persons something of the languid ecstasy of dream. The close connection between rhythm and heightened states of consciousness is as yet little understood. Its further investigation will probably throw much light on ontological as well as psychological problems. Mystical, no less than musical and poetic,

perception, tends naturally—we know not why—to present itself in rhythmical periods; a feature which is also strongly marked in writings obtained in the automatic state. So constant is this law in some cases, that the latest biographer of S. Catherine of Genoa has adopted the presence or absence of rhythm, as a test whereby to distinguish the genuine utterances of the saint from those wrongly attributed to her by successive editors of her legend.[1]

All kinds of symbolic language come naturally to the articulate mystic, who is usually a literary artist as well; so naturally, that he sometimes forgets to explain that his utterance is but symbolic, an attempt to translate the truth of that world into the beauty of this. It is here that mysticism joins hands with poetry; had this fact been always recognised by its critics, they would have been saved from many regrettable and some ludicrous misconceptions. Symbol—the clothing which the spiritual borrows from the material plane—is a form of artistic expression. That is to say, it is not literal but suggestive; though the artist who uses it, may sometimes lose sight of this distinction. Hence the persons who imagine that the 'Spiritual Marriage' of S. Catherine or S. Teresa veils a perverted sexuality, and that the divine inebriation of the Sūfīs is the apotheosis of drunkenness, do but advertise their ignorance of the mechanism of the arts; like the lady who thought that Blake *must* be mad, because he said that he had touched the sky with his finger.

Further, the study of the mystics—the keeping company, however humbly, with their minds—brings with it as music or poetry does, but in a far greater

[1] Von Hügel *The Mystical Element in Religion*, i. 189.

degree, a strange exhilaration; as if we were brought near to some mighty source of Being, were at last on the verge of the secret which all seek. The symbols displayed, the actual words employed, when we analyse them, are not enough to account for such effect. It is rather that these messages, from the waking transcendental Self of another, stir our own deeper Selves in their sleep. It were hardly an extravagance to say, that those writings which are the outcome of the true mystical experience, may be known by this power of imparting to the reader the sense of exalted and extended life.

"All mystics," says Saint-Martin, "speak the same language, for they come from the same country." The life which nests within us comes from that country too; and it recognises the accents of home, though it cannot always understand what they would say.

Returning to our business of definition, I propose to set out, illustrate and I hope justify, four rules, which may be applied as tests to any given case which claims to take rank amongst the mystics.

(1) True mysticism is practical, not theoretical. It is something which the whole Self does; not something as to which it holds an opinion.

(2) It is a purely transcendental—*i.e.* extra-phenomenal—activity. It is not at all concerned with adding to, exploring, re-arranging, or improving anything whatever in the visible universe; but brushes aside that universe even in its most super-normal manifestations. It is uninterested in the impermanent Many, because always aiming at the changeless One.

(3) This One is for the mystic a living and personal object of love, not an object of exploration.

(4) Living union with this One—which is the

object of this adventure—is obtained neither from an intellectual realisation of its delights, nor from the most acute emotional longings. It is a definite state, or form of enhanced life, arrived at by a definite psychological process—the so-called Mystic Way—entailing the complete remaking of character, and the liberation of a new, or rather latent, form of consciousness, which imposes on the Self the condition, which is sometimes inaccurately called ecstasy, but which is better described as the 'Unitive State.'

Mysticism, then, is *the exact science of the Love of God.* Or, if you like it better (for this means exactly the same thing), it is the art of perfecting man's conscious relation with the Absolute.

"When we love any being," says Ormond,[1] "we desire either the unification of its life with our own, or our own unification with its life. *Love in its innermost motive is a unifying principle.*"

So the Persian mystic Jámí:

"All that is not One must ever
Suffer with the wound of Absence;
And whoever in Love's city
Enters, finds but room for One,
And but in One-ness Union."

The history of mysticism is the history of the demonstration of this law upon the plane of reality.

Now, how do these statements square with the practice of the great mystics, and with the various forms of activity which have been classified at one time or another as mystical? These are the questions which I shall attempt to answer in the concluding part of this paper.

EVELYN UNDERHILL.

[1] *Foundations of Knowledge*, p. 442.

HOW TO CULTIVATE INTUITION: OR THE ART OF GUESSING RIGHT.

THOMAS E. SIEVE.

THAT reason and judgment can and should be strenuously cultivated, is an accepted principle in all matters of education; but the cultivation of the intuitive faculty has I think received less attention. The art of right guessing is not one of the arts taught in our modern schools and colleges; the modern method is founded almost exclusively upon the principle of right reasoning. But some people are as naturally intuitive as others are naturally of the rational temperament. How, then, does the intuitive faculty operate? Can its operation be induced or cultivated? These are questions which have always appeared to me of keenest interest.

Take the naturally intuitive person and tackle him as to how the faculty works, what he experiences when the mind is thus operating; you will find, I think, the one thing most commonly admitted is the feeling of extreme rapidity of action, whether it be the momentary intuition which comes as a *flash* of knowledge, or the intuitive work of the artist in literature, painting or sculpture. At the time of doing any intuitive work, the brain seems to be operating at a far greater speed than the normal. If the poet stops to consider and reason out the thought which has been intuitively

imprinted on his mind, he experiences an entire change of register as it were of his mind, a slackening of speed.

There are, I believe, two mental faculties whose mode of operation within the brain depends enormously, if not exclusively, upon *pace*. These faculties are wit and intuition. Whether the man who trains his mind to work with great rapidity would necessarily develope either wit or intuition, I am not sure; but I think there is undoubtedly found in all witty or intuitive people a certain capacity for pace, not necessarily the capacity to reason from cause to result quickly, for I am not one of those who think intuition is merely this. The intuitive person, as a rule, knows very little about the sequence of cause and result, is often very slow along this line; but he has a capacity for seizing a thing *whole*, he gets at your idea quickly, provided you are not asking him to trace step by step any sequence.

In reading aloud, the intuitive person will ask to have things read to him quickly. He does not think sentence by sentence, he wants the whole paragraph *all at once;* to lose a few words matters less to him than to be unable to get that fundamental grasp upon which he seems to depend. The rational person builds up his idea and prefers to follow sentence by sentence; for him it is essential not to lose the thread.

I once asked a highly intuitive person what difference in experience there was between moments of wit and flashes of intuition, and the following answer was given me: "Wit hits you full in the face and does not mind being looked at; intuitions flash through your head diagonally and are arrested or killed by a steady examination."

I know many intuitive workers who all agree that

to examine is fatal. If you feel your brain going at a pace and ideas flowing somewhat freely, on no account think or examine them. Let them come through for what they are worth; critical examination should be reserved for when your mind has changed its register and is no longer working intuitively; wait till the *flow* is over. But this does not apply to wit.

I would associate, then, with intuition the ideas of pace and wholeness. The brain should be taught, if possible, to use this faculty for the ground-plan, or general scheme of any work; and while drawing this the artist (whatever his art) should learn to work rapidly, and never trouble his head about details or how the thing is going to work out. Details are not the business of the intuitive mind; its capacity lies more in the direction of fundamentals. While working thus, on no account look out for sequence of ideas. If the idea can be brought through the brain intuitively, it will be clean and clear; it will be whole and complete and not faulty; it will therefore *contain* proper sequential thought; but to allow your brain to run along any fixed line, hampers the real intuition.

The first thing to do in the cultivation or development of any faculty, is to direct one's attention towards it. First assure yourself that man does possess this faculty of intuition, this means of knowledge which is beyond normal thinking, knowledge which arises spontaneously in the brain without any mental exertion on his own part—knowledge in fact which rises up more clearly and more emphatically the more it is left to itself; then set to work to prepare the ground for its manifestation. I would here suggest the association of the notions of pace and purity as properties requisite for the free operation in the mind of the intuitive

faculty; and by purity I mean a certain calmness due to the mind being unattached to any specific direction, pure thought, not argumentative. Many people can get up a certain mental alacrity when excited in argument, but rapidity of brain-function is more difficult to acquire during pure thinking. Interest in argument will sharpen many a person's wits, but it is more difficult to get this same keenness in pure thinking. For this reason some people will say that their most brilliant ideas have generally flashed into their minds when excited or heated in debate; but are these intuitions? Is intuition simply this intensifying of normal mind-operations? It may be; if so, in this case the man seems to attain to illumination through the acceleration of the pace of his mind, assisted by one-pointedness rather than purity. The temperament which is normally rational, I believe, generally does get its intuitive flashes in this way, by means of pace rather than purity; but the naturally intuitive person speaks more often of a certain stillness or quietness of mind as the birth-place of his intuitions. A certain quietness, or rising out of and above normal thought on to the plane of pure meditation, is for him the precursor of any intuitional experiences. I think this is the form of preparedness to be sought and cultivated by those of the devotional temperament. Their devotion to any art or idea gives the necessary stimulus or pace, and the quietness helps towards the clear expression of the intuition.

Now most people are very scornful of their intuitions; their intuitions are not sufficiently developed to be reliable, so they take no notice of them. But either to scorn or to ignore a faculty is not the way to develope it. The better way would be that when

things happen and you can honestly say "I guessed that would be so," to make a mental note of the fact that you had an intuition. I do not of course mean any guessing that is the result of having thought over the matter and so arrived at a conclusion. An intuition, I think, is experienced more after this fashion, or this is one form of such experience:

A friend starts a topic of conversation; before he has had time to say anything, before you have had time to think, with this simple statement or idea alone in your mind, you suddenly become aware of knowing a great deal more about the matter; you may know in a flash all that he is about to say, or, better still, you may know in a flash the truth about the matter, while he is going to make a false statement.

If one only knows in advance what another is about to say, it can hardly be considered a case of intuition; thought-transference is a more likely explanation of the phenomenon. But if what flashed into your mind entirely disagrees with what your friend is about to say, and is also entirely outside your range of normally acquired information, then I should be disposed to call it an intuition. It is good practice to make a careful note of all ideas thus flashed into your mind, and study them to find out how often they are on the side of truth, and how often they are so mixed or incorrect as to be useless.

Some people may say: "But I never have these flashes." To such I would answer: "Then you should begin by working backwards." I believe the vast majority of people do often have flashes, only they have never been trained to notice them. When anything unexpected happens to you, try to recall any intuition you had concerning the event. Trace back, and do not

be satisfied till you do recall some fleeting flash which entered your mind, even if it was too weak to have left any imprint in the form of a definite idea. If it was so weak as to have conveyed no definite idea, you cannot of course discuss whether it was true or untrue. At this stage the thing to do is simply to trace back to some previous motion of the mind. You may often at first be able only to say, "Well, I believe I did have a pang" when so and so talked about this or that coming event; or, "I did feel my mind *caught up* for a moment when thinking about this. I wonder if that was an intuition trying to take root." So it is as well to continue to wonder along these lines. Wonder is the precursor of knowledge.

Now I believe that many a fit of momentary absent-mindedness is caused simply by the brain changing from its normal register to the higher register of the intuitional mind. But the average person has not studied the workings of his mind sufficiently to trouble about these little eccentricities; he has never tried to help an intuition through, or when it has come through clean and clear, has he ever troubled to imprint it on his memory-plate, and so clothe it in substance which will endure within time and space. For another characteristic of the working of the intuitional mind is that the ideas come straight through as a rule without going anywhere near man's memory. In the case of the artist we get a record of his intuitions, for the intuitions often come when he is writing or drawing or giving expression to his art. But intuitions, like some forms of dream, unless recorded at once, are very apt never to take root in the man's mind at all, and are only recalled at a later date if they happen to come true and so become realised.

Personally I distrust very noisy or aggressive intuitions. I do not find as a rule that they are so deep-seated. Such positive assertions of the mind are very apt to pertain to the region of prejudice—that subtle vice so often mistaken for the virtue intuition. I do not wish of course to confound intuitions with premonitions, or to confine intuitions simply to premonitions; but I think that to record carefully any premonitions of any description whatsoever, no matter how trivial, is all helpful in the development of the intuitional faculty.

The intuitional faculty itself is to me more the faculty of the self-taught, the capacity to see, hear or know some information upon any given subject or idea. The information may not be vast or extensive, but it should bear the characteristics of completeness and correctness. This, however, is a faculty which in its maturity few, if any, people possess.

I have suggested that it is well to get into the habit of tracing back in mind from events to any premonitions concerning them; another practice which I think helps very considerably in the training of the intuitive faculty, is the art of guessing. Make a practice of guessing every day and continually anything that turns up; guess the results of every general election, for instance, exactly what the figures in the coming majority are going to be; and do this *at once*, on the spur of the moment, without the slightest deduction or consideration; leave it to your guessing-faculty to utter the number. Don't reason—guess!

This of course is again a form of premonition. But there are other things it is possible to guess, guesses which would lead more directly to pure intuition or knowledge concerning an idea. To put the matter

crudely; get into the habit of having an opinion of your own upon every subject, whether you have any right to one or not. Guess! I should, however, not inflict these opinions upon others, until the guessing-faculty has been trained thoroughly and developed to a pitch far beyond the capacity of the normal man. It is not necessary to have studied in order to know *if*—and this is a very big *if*—you have developed your faculty of intuition. Place any subject or any idea before an intuitive person, and his mind will immediately become active upon that subject. Whether the activity is of any value or not, will depend entirely upon how well developed the person's faculty is. But these activities of the mind should be recorded by the person for his own education, though, as I say, they should not be inflicted upon others.

Take any subject which interests you—interest is essential to give the necessary pace to the mind—and then start, not thinking about it, but guessing. Keep quite quiet, hold the idea in your mind steadily, try to rise out of or beyond the plane of concrete thought, and then, when you can retain this state of quietness and alertness no longer, start guessing, and write down your guesses. After years of such practice you will be astonished how your capacity for guessing has grown. At first you may be able to guess very little, but you should force yourself to guess something. With practice you will increase the *quantity* of your guesses; with further practice and much perseverance you may be rewarded by a marked improvement in the *quality* of your guesses.

But here I would add that to guess true one must live true—a line of thought which I have worked out at greater length elsewhere. If you would never be

deceived by the conceptions given birth to by your higher passive intuitional mind; then, when working in your lower active and positive mind, you must be most careful never to deceive. For I believe that with further knowledge of mind-operations, it will be found that the one mode of mind is a sort of reflex activity of the other mode—a reflex action which the majority of people at present use very little; the normal positive mind and the intuitional mind being two complementary modes of motion within some vastly greater wholeness, the capacity of which wholeness is so immeasurably greater than our normal mind that its recesses appear to us unfathomable. It is in fact for us a store-house of information upon every subject of which we can desire further knowledge.

Accurate work in normal mental activities without self-deception, also without desire to deceive any other person in any way whatsoever, should be the final qualification for those who would enter upon that path to knowledge—right guessing. It is no use to cultivate a capacity to guess, if the guessing is going to be mere wild speculation. Cultivate the speculative initiative faculty of the mind, but with this must go in equal advancement soundness of principle and love of truth. Everything in daily life, without any personal prejudice whatsoever, must be sacrificed to truth, honesty and uprightness, for this habit of right knowing to be established; for it comes as the reward of right living to those who have in addition prepared the mental soil.

The power to guess right is I believe a faculty as yet latent in man, but one which can be developed to quite a remarkable extent by those who have the will to try.

THOMAS E. SIEVE.

LOVE AND A DAY.

I.

LOVE through the dewy morning dancing came,
  What time the shadows from the hills were laid
  Swift to the golden line, that half afraid
Wavered upon its conquest. Dawn's cool flame
Drank up the dews of night 'mid loud acclaim
  From birds, whom day's clear trumpet urgent bade
  In long full tones awake and leave their shade,
To join in hymning Love's melodious name.

He smiling, hung with shackles from the night,
  Breathed deeply of dawn's air of alchemy
That changed his dream from darkness into light,
Yet still left veiled the heart of mystery.
  Rose blushed the virgin world for his delight
Echoing effulgent heaven's harmony.

II.

Love laughed at noon-tide; all the air was blue
  Fretted with gold, the silence seemed a song
  That bore glad music on its pinions strong,
Breaking fresh chords from every motion new.
He sang to Joy, clothed all in rainbow hue,
  And called shy Beauty, who the woods among,
  Still lingered radiant where the morning throng
Of worshippers had drunk her secret dew.

Beside the woodland swayed the shining corn,
  Shot scarlet with a splendour beyond art,
Noon's pageant, yet more glorious than the morn,
Day's crown, the swift perfection of each part.
  For Love, whom Joy and Beauty now adorn,
Touches with fire the altar of the heart.

III.

Love, that had wept all day, grew still at eve,
  What time the plaintive plashing of the rain
  And leafy eddies of the wind were fain
To cease, as though the world too ceased to grieve;
Only a deeper breathing came to heave
  The parting clouds, and dash upon the plain
  Another gust of silvery drops. In vain
The myriad crystal voices strove to weave
  Of angry tears a crown that should outvie,
Outlast the stars, for when their diadem
  Sprayed living light, the wind's tempestuous sigh
Discourteous scattered every shimmering gem.
  Then slowly, from her cloud-piled throne on high,
  The radiant moon swam out across the sky.

IV.

Love, struggling in the net of chill despair,
  Spoke piteously and low. The stammered words
  Fluttered and fell, like sorely wounded birds
Into the pool of silence, and the air
Pierced by Love's breath, divided everywhere,
  And hung in tender wreaths that pitying stirred
  At his great anguish, whilst the plaint unheard
Of a slain heart rose from a soul laid bare.

On Echo's harp the woeful sounds were caught,
  And sighed forth plangent to unheeding ears
Strained for a newer voice and deaf to Love,
Who yet in hopeless hope unwearied strove.
  Alas, all efforts have availed Love naught,
Dying fast prisoned in a web of fears.

V.

Love passed, while Joy and Beauty on the shore
  Wailed wraithlike, clinging in a vain appeal
  For dear companionship, to further seal
Their mortal compact. Ah, their hearts are sore
For old days; they would spin grief's thread once more,
  And Love for ever from his Godhead steal.
  But the threads sway and snap, and the unreal
Earth must her borrowed light to heaven restore.

Love homeward goes, of all he had bereft,
  Loosing the immortal shadow from the three
So intimately interwoven, cleft
From earthly attributes eternally.
  Love through the mists has passed, and naught is left
Save ceaseless weeping of the unquiet sea.

CATHERINE M. VERSCHOYLE.

THE MODERN MYSTIC.

NOT to the blazing Throne,
Where high, and lifted up, the King of Kings
Reigneth immortal, and the Temple fills
With his great train of Saints illuminate;
Not to the blood-stained Throne on Calvary's height,
Where Christ was crowned the King of Life and Death—
The Mystic's eyes are strained; but bent to Earth,
Our near familiar Earth, with all its smiles
And tears, and thoughts of simple common things.
The open hill-top, whose sweet breezes seem
The very breath of God—incarnate Life—,
The brown and golden moorland, ragged sedge,
The vibrant swirling stream, the dark hued elms,
To him are all aglow with God himself,
And he but one with them, and one with God;
And one with those who in their squalid pain
Know but the ceaseless grinding of the wheels—
The sharp square wheels of Life—that grind to dust
Each new-born hope, and tender blossoming joy.
To him the outcast and the misformed lives
That stifle in the grave-clothes of their sin
Are but his brothers—one with him in God,
And this the only creed to which he bows:
The blessed creed of Christly Brotherhood,
The Brotherhood of ev'ry living thing.
For each one is the Dwelling-place of God,
And each a Thought of God, to some great End
Put forth in living symbol here on Earth.
And he who sees the mystic lights behind,
Honours all Words of God, and seeks through them
To reach the Vision Beatifical,
The Source, and End, and Fulness of our Life.

MURIEL G. E. HARRIS.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

WELTENMANTEL UND HIMMELSZELT.

Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Urgeschichte des antiken Weltbildes. Von Robert Eisler. München (Beck), 1910, 2 vols.

WE heartily congratulate our esteemed contributor Dr. Robert Eisler on the issuance of these important studies. They constitute a work of rare distinction, for not only are they a monument of extraordinary industry and learning, which throw light on a multitude of obscurities, but they also tend to establish theses of high value for the history of religion in general, and of prime importance in determining the nature of the immediate background of the earliest attempts at philosophising in the Western world. The manner of treating this rich and rare material is in keeping with the best scientific methods. Not only does Dr. Eisler show every sign of being intimately acquainted with the literature of the many subjects with which he deals, but he strives to anticipate the objections of the critics who will doubtless subject his structure to the most severe tests. For this reason and owing to the number of side-paths of research into which the author is for ever alluring us, we have found it somewhat difficult to keep the main theses continually in sight; though we freely admit the almost insuperable difficulty of a systematic and duly proportioned arrangement of such a wealth of material, it must be confessed that it has been at times difficult to see the forest for the trees. The two volumes contain 811 (large octavo, almost quarto) pages, and for the most part two-thirds of the page is crammed with references and detailed notes which demand a constant strain on the attention. But though at times one feels as though he were perusing the pages of a veritable *Ausfürliches Lexikon* of comparative cosmogony, mythology and anthropology, the interest is always maintained, not only in watching the mind-play and keen insight of the writer and the dexterity with which he repeatedly brings order out of chaos, but also in the fact that the whole subject is intimately interwoven with the monuments, dogmas and doings of some of the greatest mystery-institutions of

antiquity. To write a really critical review of such a work, however, would require, over and above our prior acquaintance with the subject, months of careful study and further research, and we have, unfortunately, been able to find time only to read it through once and that, too, somewhat hurriedly. We must therefore content ourselves for the moment by giving our readers a *coup d'œil* of the main theses.

The title of Dr. Eisler's *magnum opus* is determined by the closely connected symbolisms contained in the very ancient notions of the World-Robe of Deity and of the Tent or Tabernacle of the Heavens or the World-House.[1] These ancient conceptions our author tracks out through the world-literature, from Goethe's great phrase, in *Faust*, the 'Living Garment of God' (which is shown to be an echo of Critias, as quoted by Plutarch), to the earliest historically attainable stratum of the cosmological ideas of antiquity, as found in the cuneiform writings and other old-oriental sources. The chief stress, however, is laid upon their unmistakable recurrence in the earliest, still half-mythological, half-religious or mystical, literary remains of Greek philosophy, chiefly in the fragments of Pherecydes, the traditional teacher of Pythagoras, and of the earliest extant Orphic poems. Apart from the immediate gain of a sympathetic elucidation of the main features of these hitherto misunderstood fragments, the whole hotly disputed question of the origins of Greek philosophy receives a new treatment by the light of the sure progress recently made by methodical research into the nature of old-oriental culture; a treatment which seeks to find an answer more in keeping with the now known facts, by interpreting the first philosophical essays of the Western world in the light of their immediate environment, and tracing out their historical, mythological and mystical ancestry. To the elucidation of this problem, which must be considered of the very first importance for the history of the development of the human mind, Dr. Eisler devotes the major part of his researches, basing them on a very wide survey of the archæological and literary sources that are at present available, and treating this recondite and rare material from the religio-historical standpoint, and according to the method of the comparative science of religion.

[1] Cp. "(The heavens) shall perish, but thou shalt endure: Yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; As a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed" (*Ps.* cii. 26). "Who coverest thyself with light as with a garment; Who stretchest out the heaven like a curtain" (*Ps.* civ. 2). "Who stretchest out the heavens like a curtain, and spreadest them out as a tent to dwell in" (*Is.* xl. 22).

The major part of the work is thus assigned to a discussion of the early Greek cosmologies which stand as links between mythology and philosophy, and of the *dogmata* of the first Ionian philosophers, Thales, Anaximandes, Heraclitus and the rest, and of Pythagoras and his school. The outcome of these instructive studies is of a somewhat startling nature for the defenders of all prior academical views, especially the followers of Zeller, and not excepting the most recent hypotheses even of the anthropological school. The sources of Hellenic mystical cosmology are to be sought not in Greek folklore; on the contrary, they are to be traced to a quite unmistakable high cult of a supreme deity of a pantheistic and henotheistic nature ('All and One' as the logos of Heraclitus has it), the mystic concept of Endless Time and Boundless Space, with the allied notion of a world-embracing Necessity, or Inevitable Law, very distinct traces of which are to be found in all the Ionic philosophers from Pherecydes and Thales onwards. This cult of Chronos-Adrasteia, or of the Æon, of Ionian Asia Minor, is from the very beginnings of philosophy found in closest connection with the cult of the Orphic mysteries, which on their side are found to show clear signs of the remains of the pre-hellenic religion of archaic Asia Minor and of Crete. The basal fatalistic and pessimistic mood of Orphic-pythagorean doctrine—with its belief in a ceaselessly revolving Wheel of Becoming, and in an endless series of transcorporations of the World-Soul in ever new world-formations, together with the consequent dogma, essentially interwoven with it, of individual metempsychosis with its mystical, psychological and moral subsidiary doctrines—is very strikingly shown to be entirely in keeping with the root-notion of this high cult of the God of Unending Time. It is accordingly claimed, as a corollary to this demonstration, that the professors of this creed, based on the conviction that the whole course of nature was governed by the circular motion of the heaven under the supreme ordering of eternal law, were the first to formulate the indispensable and fundamental presupposition of all research into the laws of nature. Dr. Eisler thus courageously grapples with the amazing difficulties of the syncretistic religions of Asia Minor prior to the sixth century B.C., working on the data of the latest discoveries of cuneiform inscriptions and allied sources, and thus pushes back his researches into the heredity of the Æon-cult. He makes out in this way a strong presumption that, before the Persian conquest of Asia Minor, long before the Mithriac religion developed into its now known forms,

which are strongly over-worked with Babylonian elements, there existed in Hither Asia, indeed in Asia Minor itself, worshippers of Mithras, as is indicated by the recent discoveries at Boghaz-Keui, and that it was these followers of the Iranian Æon-doctrine who blended the Kybele-cult of the Magna Mater, in the form of a worship of Necessity (Baḥt), with their fundamental belief in the Divinity of Endless Time (Zrvan Akarana), the two thus forming an inseparable syzygy, reflected in the Greek names Chronos-Adrasteia. Thus the Orphic theology, which can in no way be explained as derivable from the quite insufficient and paltry elements of Hellenic folk-religion proper, is shown to agree on all main points with the monuments and traces of the Chronos-Adrasteia or Æon mysteries of Early Asia Minor. Moreover the Orphic descriptions of the mysterious symbolism of the polymorphous serpentine Divinity, called in Greek Phanēs, the Logos of their theology, though there are certain interesting differences of detail, strikingly illustrate the Mithriac images of Zrvan ; indeed, in one case, it is shown that an image of the Orphic Phanēs was boldly taken over by the Mithraists to do duty for the cult-figure of this Chronos-Æon, and further that the nearest parallel to the cosmogony of Pherecydes and the Orphic rhapsodists is to be found in a series of cosmological tableaux on a Mithriac reredos. Still further Dr. Eisler seeks to show that the main Zrvanistic doctrines were of Iranian origin, arising perhaps somewhere in Western Central Asia, long prior to the Persian expansion, and that it was the conquest of Northern India, under the Achæmenidæ, that introduced this allied Aryan cult of the Æon into Indian thought, in the Kāla (Time) cosmogonies and the Saṁsāra (Wheel of Becoming) and Punarjanman (Palingenesis and Metempsychosis) tenets, where he contends they can be no more satisfactorily derived from the elements of Vedic folk-faith than they can in the West from Greek folk-religion. Moreover, this general thesis explains in the only really satisfactory fashion the hitherto inexplicable close connection between Orphic, Pythagorean and Indian doctrines. In similar fashion Dr. Eisler would account for the origin of the Persian-Jewish blend of pre-Christian mystical and gnostic ideas as still preserved in Kabalistic tradition with its Supreme Deity of Endless Time and Space (Mākōm Ēn-sōf), and also for the Phœnician cult of Chronos or the Æon ('Olām). Still further, the same powerful influence is to be traced in the Hellenistic Egyptian Trismegistic literature, as already put forward by Prof. Flinders Petrie.

The main thesis of this remarkable work has now been

sufficiently indicated; but it also contains a number of other subordinate studies of great interest. Among these may be mentioned for those interested in the development of the German Kaiser-idea and the divine right of kings, an instructive study of the famous imperial coronation robe of Bamberg, which is shown to be in direct connection with the constellated *toga picta* of the Roman emperors, who were held to be Divi as representatives of the heavenly world-ruler. Archæologists, again, will find much to engage their attention in the interpretation of the famous description of the Shield of Achilles in Homer; and, as we have seen, Goethe-lovers will owe Dr. Eisler thanks for the most complete exegesis of the obscurest verse in *Faust* which it has yet received. Finally theologists will find in these volumes a most suggestive and carefully worked-out explanation of the puzzling story of Joseph's coat of many colours, of Peter's vision of the sail-cloth let down from heaven, of the rending of the veil of the Temple, and of the Christ-robe woven without seam throughout, and of *Psalm* xix. ("The heavens declare the glory of God") as in part based upon ancient oriental marriage-customs. Above all, those who are convinced that man is potentially a mirror or miniature of the universe and that he shall finally be clothed in glory, will take an additional pleasure in these illuminating studies, and seek to turn the key of interpretation still further in the lock of the mysteries.

Dr. Eisler has been assisted in his great labours on a number of points of detail by some of the foremost specialists, and it is not too much to say that his work is the most important contribution to the subject that has yet appeared; it opens up new ground in many directions, surveys the older material with greater accuracy, and the whole is dominated by a living idea of great fertility. The two volumes are excellently printed and turned out, with an equipment of type that should satisfy the most pedantic requirements. There are eighty-one excellent illustrations, and our only complaint is that the stitching, as is usually the case in Germany, is disgraceful; our copy is, with the most careful usage, now for the most part simply a collection of loose pages.

THE SIKH RELIGION.

Its Gurus, Sacred Writings and Authors. By Max Arthur Macauliffe. Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1909, 6 vols.

WHILE these six volumes will extend a knowledge of the Sikh religion to a much wider circle in the English-reading world than

has hitherto been the case, they may not improperly be described in their probable consequences to India (political more than religious, as will be shown later) as disquieting. The life-work of Mr. M. A. Macauliffe, late of the Indian Civil Service, contains the fullest account that has ever appeared of the founder of the Sikh religion and of the nine spiritual heads of the community who succeeded him—the ten Gurus, or Spiritual Teachers, as they are called. His account is based entirely on native information and traditional history, comparatively little known even in India, while extensive extracts from the sayings attributed to the Gurus are given in translations, made from the standpoint of their professional interpreters the Gyānīs.

These very numerous sayings, together with a fair number of those of other saints and holy personages who lived and taught in India, mostly prior to the days of Nānak the first Guru, constitute what is known as the *Grantha Sāhib*, or the Holy Book, which is not only held in great reverence by the Sikhs—that is, the followers of the Gurus—and practically worshipped in their temples, but its contents are highly valued as utterances of deep spiritual significance by every Hindu who knows anything about them. In these volumes we have practically the whole of the contents of the *Grantha Sāhib*, all excepting the repetitions. Indeed the work was originally intended to be simply a translation of the *Grantha*—the addition of the lives of the Gurus being an afterthought, as our author explains. But this addition, which now forms the main topic, the sayings being more or less interwoven with it, has proved a better scheme than a simple translation of the sayings as (and in the order) they are given in the *Grantha*. In the sixth and last volume, Mr. Macauliffe gives brief accounts of the Saints, other than the Gurus, some of whose sayings are also found in the *Grantha*.

The work contains also twenty-two illustrations—some of which are the traditional representations of the Gurus—all of them excellent. Mr. Macauliffe has also given us, at the end of the fifth volume, notations of the various Rāgas, or musical measures, to which the sayings, which are in verse, of the *Grantha* are sung. Finally, a long Preface and a longer Introduction, and an Index of thirty-three pages, make the volumes additionally valuable.

It is impossible to review, in detail, as I should like to do, a work of such magnitude and importance, in the space that is at my disposal; I shall, therefore, have to confine myself chiefly to certain general remarks.

Regarded as philosophy, the doctrines of the Sikh Gurus were identical with the pure Vedāntic teachings of the Upaniṣhads which recognised the essential identity of the innermost Reality or Self in man with the Universal Reality or Self. (Cp. iv. 6, l. 17 and 17, l. 4 and *passim;* and iii. 91, where the object of worship is spoken of as the 'Supreme Soul,' *i.e.* the Paramātman.) The Paramātman, however, which is referred to more often as Har, *i.e.* Hari, is taught not simply as an object of calm contemplation, as in the Upaniṣhads, but as an object of fervent love and adoration. In common with all other Hindu systems the doctrine of reincarnation is taught in all its fullness. The goal of all worship is found in Nirvāṇa, which is the complete blending of the Individual in the Universal or Real (i. lxv.). The means of realising this end consist in a pure and selfless life, constant meditation on the Supreme Reality, symbolised as the constant repetition of His Name, and in the cultivation of the four virtues of friendship, etc. (i. 136), taught by Patañjali and the Buddha. Like all other Hindu teachers the Sikh Gurus also taught their disciples to meditate in the heart on the Guru's image (iv. 27) —a method of spiritual culture which has always been regarded as of supreme importance in India.

This is a very brief, and necessarily exceedingly imperfect, summary of what Mr. Macauliffe developes at great length with an enthusiasm which it does one good to see. It is true that he writes, as he himself says, from the standpoint of the believing Sikh, and not as he would treat the subject if he were given a free hand. Still one can see almost in every page how full of enthusiasm he is. But this very enthusiasm, which makes him regard Sikhism (as we may, for the sake of convenience, call the teachings of the Gurus) as the best of Indian religions and "the last great religion of the world" (i. xxxiii.), leads him into conflict with such scholars as Max Müller, Deussen, Rhys Davids and Garbe. For are we not told by every one of these that the particular phase of Indian thought which he has specially studied, is the best and noblest the Indian mind has produced? Some of them have even declared their special branch to be the best and noblest phase in the thought of the world, while, according to Prof. Rhys Davids, Gautama Buddha is the noblest, best and greatest of Indians that the European knows. Whom, then, are we to believe? Does it not rather show that all of the main phases of Indian thought and religion, indeed of the thought-systems and religions of the world, are noble or ignoble according as they are looked at as ideals in

their original purity, or as actuals of a later date in their corruption and degradation? At least this is the Indian view of such things. And because of this, while our spiritual teachers of every age, from the days of the Upanishads down to the present time, have denounced degraded practices of all sects and communities, they have always taught universal tolerance, which means universal appreciation of the fundamental goodness of them all. And it is the misunderstanding of this spirit which has led Western scholars, with very few exceptions, to see little but evil in every other phase of Indian thought and religion but the one which he has been studying, and with the supreme excellence of which he is so much struck. Thus when Mr. Macauliffe finds that the Sikh Gurus have denounced the degraded practices of the contemporary Hindus, he comes to the conclusion that all Hinduism is bad. And he has not only not a good word to say for it, but shows a spirit of hostility which, I am sure, none of the Gurus, about whom he shows so much enthusiasm, would ever think worthy of one of their disciples or of even an admirer. Can Mr. Macauliffe point to a single instance where the Gurus denounce anything but the degraded practices of their contemporaries? And is not the Sikhism of to-day as full of degradations as any other spiritual movement which has travelled far in time from its source? Indeed Mr. Macauliffe is fully aware of these. It is only in the case of his favourite subject, however, that he does not take them into consideration, and deals solely with the pure teachings of the Gurus. Ought he not to exercise the same charity in regard to the thought and practices of the other sects and communities also? It may perhaps be pointed out that even the *Bhagavad Gītā*—the one holy scripture which is held in high reverence by all the sects of Hinduism, including also the Sikhs, excepting perhaps those of them who are of Mr. Macauliffe's views —denounces the Vaidik rituals as practised in their degraded and misunderstood forms. But this does not mean that the *Gītā* denounces the whole of the Vaidik teaching. As regards the lives of the Gurus themselves, Mr. Macauliffe, in his presentation of them, has had to do much 'whitewashing' of their traditional forms, as they are current even among the believing Sikhs (i. xv.). They would be repulsive, as our author himself says, in their ordinary forms. But I would not be misunderstood in this. I do not mean to say that the Gurus, great spiritual teachers as they were—and I hold them in as great reverence as any—had anything repulsive in their conduct. All I mean to say is that the popular mind degrades such accounts, by mixing up with them all kinds of

statements and stories which they think will add to the glory of the saint and sage they admire, but which in reality degrade their lives and make the accounts quite unworthy of the persons they celebrate. It is the duty of the student and scholar to sift these out, if he is to form a true appreciation as to the merits of the case, as Mr. Macauliffe himself has done, to a certain extent, in regard to the lives of the Gurus. Only it is quite wrong to compare such 'edited' accounts with the 'unedited' ones of the teachers and holy men of other sects and then denounce the latter.

This leads me to the consideration of the most vital consequence of Mr. Macauliffe's book in India—namely its political effect on the country. Mr. Macauliffe maintains throughout his work that the Gurus intended to, and did actually, start a *new* religion, not only distinct from that of the rest of the Hindus but opposed to it. The author is even wrath with young members of the Sikh community who would insist on calling themselves Hindus. This attitude is perhaps quite natural to a European scholar. It would, however, be interesting to analyse its psychology as the Hindu student understands it, and to show how this attitude is the inevitable consequence of the preconceptions of the European mind, and how these preconceptions, and therefore the conclusions, cannot be accepted by a Hindu, who though no doubt he has equally preconceptions of his own, is quite willing that these should be tried in the court of reason. But it would take me too long to do so here. I shall, therefore, leave such analysis out, and confine myself simply to statements of fact, to see how far Mr. Macauliffe's conclusion in this respect is correct. From the sketch given above of the teachings of the Gurus it will be seen, by anyone acquainted with Hindu thought, that they do not differ in any essential from earlier teachings of the Hindus. Every one of the doctrines, including even the strongest denunciation of the various forms of image-worship, the real import of which had been misunderstood by the people, as well as of caste-practices, which also had been greatly degraded, can be found in the teachings of spiritual men who lived before the Gurus. There is, therefore, really nothing distinctive in the Sikh religion, as Mr. Macauliffe calls the teachings of the Gurus, so far as its pure doctrines are concerned. Nor has the inclusion of Mahomedans in the Sikh community anything absolutely unique about it. For they were so included, not as Mahomedans as such, but as converted disciples of the Gurus. This had been done before, and even during the life-time of the first Gurus of the Sikhs, by the equally great and

spiritual teacher Chaitanya of Bengal. As a matter of fact the Sikh Gurus, who were all undoubtedly men of very superior spiritual attainments, were no more, so far as only their spiritual life and teachings are concerned, than many other great teachers that India has had the glory of producing. What distinguished them, or rather the sixth and the last of them, from the rest of such Indian teachers of devotional religion, was the martial spirit they showed. If it were not for the martial spirit which these Gurus infused into their disciples, and for the regular military life and organisation with which the tenth Guru supplied his followers, we should have heard no more of Sikhism from its European admirer, who is so full of enthusiasm about it, than we have heard from others, say, of the followers of Kabīr, who are perhaps as numerous a sect as the Sikhs. But are we to judge the spiritual worth of a system of religion by the adventitious aid of militarism which its teachers found necessary, owing to the exigencies of the times, to introduce into their method of discipline? And even if we include militarism in judging of the spiritual value of Sikhism as producing devoted and self-sacrificing soldiers, can it be said that the Sikhs as soldiers with moral discipline, and not merely as destroying agents, are so very superior, say, to the Gurkhas or Rājputs, of whose heroism and self-sacrifice we hear at least as much as of those of the Sikhs? and are not the Gurkhas and Rājputs followers of other religious teachers?

But if we leave out militarism, there is little in the way of spiritual virtues or even professions, in the lives of the Sikhs, to distinguish them from other Hindus who are followers of such teachers as, for instance, Kabīr. These are, however, facts which will perhaps have little weight with Mr. Macauliffe. For I fear he is almost as prejudiced against the religion of the Hindus in general, as Dr Trump, his predecessor in the translation of a part of the *Grantha Sāhib*, was against Sikhism. But it may be said that Mr. Macauliffe has presented the case from the standpoint of the present-day Sikhs, and cannot be held responsible for the attitude he has adopted. This argument, however, is not quite valid. For, in the first place, there is a very large section among the Sikhs who cherish no such thoughts towards pure Hinduism in general. Secondly, the Sikhs who hold such an attitude, do so because they believe they are the only community who hold the pure doctrine of 'monotheism,' while the rest of the Hindus are 'idol-worshippers'—catchwords which they have learned from the European critics of Hinduism. To begin with, it is not the fact

that their Gurus taught 'monotheism' in the European sense of the word; rather they taught essential identity of the worshipped and the worshipper (iv. 6, l. 17), which is 'monism'—a doctrine which has been taught in India from time immemorial, and is even now held by millions of her people. Moreover these Sikhs might as easily be charged with superstition as any other 'image-worshipper.' For they are as great believers in the divinity of the volumes of their sacred book, which is actually worshipped in their temples, as is any other image-worshipper in that of the image he venerates. In these circumstances it is a great pity that the author should have adopted so hostile an attitude towards Hinduism in general and given the seal of authority, which, as the greatest European student of the *Grantha Sāhib*, he undoubtedly possesses, to what I cannot but consider as a unspiritual movement for the separation of the Sikhs from the Hindus in general, of whom they have so far been regarded as a sect, and for whose sake *as Hindus* (iv. 372 ff.) Guru Teg Bahādur gave his life—a movement which tends to divide brother from brother.

Numerous other points suggest themselves to an Indian reader of these volumes. But tempting as they are I must pass them by. In regard to the translation itself it represents faithfully the traditional meaning of the *Grantha Sāhib*, as given by the professional interpreters, and is of as great or as little value from the standpoint of a scientific study of the book as are, say, the commentaries of Sāyana on the *Ṛigveda*. If it be not an impertinence on the part of an Indian reviewer to say anything as to the style of the English, I would venture to think that the translations are beautifully rendered. The only objections I have to find in regard to the literary form of the work are two. One is the most exasperating way of spelling proper names—as for instance Dilhi, Priyag, etc. Few English readers will know what they represent. Clothed in an English dress the work is meant for the whole English-reading world, and not only for readers in the Punjāb; it is, therefore, of little use to spell names in the local style of the Punjāb. And the other is that Mr. Macauliffe seldom if ever gives exact references to the original in his translations of detached passages, the chapter or section only being quoted; and as often such chapters and sections are long, it is not easy to find the extracts from them without practically going through the whole. With these few remarks which I feel obliged to make, I most heartily recommend to the readers of THE QUEST the epoch-making volumes of Mr. Macauliffe, to whom none is more thankful than

the present writer, who has under contemplation a scientific edition of the *Grantha Sāhib*, and has been working, for some time past, at arrangements necessary for such a task.

JAGADĪSH CHANDRA CHATTERJI.

Jammu, Kāshmīr.

(An article on 'The Sikh Religion' by Mr. M. A. Macauliffe will appear in the October number.—ED.)

THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.

Edited with an Introduction and Commentary by C. G. Montefiore. London (Macmillan), 1909, 2 vols.

THIS is a courageous, liberal and candid undertaking, characterised throughout by a spirit not only of remarkable tolerance but also of sympathy. Mr. Montefiore thinks that it is of great importance for Jews to "understand and appreciate aright" the life and teaching of Jesus, and the two volumes are intended chiefly for his co-religionists. Of Jewish exposition of the Gospels as a whole, he tells us, there has been little, and in this little Jewish writers have either looked for parallels or defects. This is, however, all quite natural and quite human. "No wonder that the Jews should show some injustice towards the literary origins of a religion from the adherents of which they have suffered such gross and terrible wrongs. No wonder that they should express some disdain at this supposed superior and superfine teaching of love which, so far as they are concerned, has so generally proved itself a religion of violence, cruelty and hate." But there is a more excellent way, and Mr. Montefiore has set forth upon it. After a general introduction the translation of the text as a whole is first given; this is based upon the Authorised Version but there are many emendations, and Moffat's and Weymouth's translations have been frequently consulted. Then follows the text broken up into paragraphs, with a detailed commentary based on the works of some of the most distinguished Christian scholars, German, French and English. The commentary is very ably done, and shows a remarkable grasp of the intricacies of New Testament criticism. We, however, almost regret that there is not more of Mr. Montefiore himself and less of the views of the commentators, for he is a most readable writer *de suo*. He is, however, by no means swamped by the varieties of opinion, and the special debt of gratitude that unprejudiced non-Jewish readers owe him is

when he points out, from his own more intimate knowledge of Jewish thought and more intimate experience of Jewish life, the general unfairness of Christian critics in treating of Jewish practice in contrast with Christian doctrine, and the grave injustice that has been done to a whole nation by the terrible pronouncement: "Woe unto you, Scribes, Pharisees, hypocrites!" For the great ethical utterances, however, Mr. Montefiore has the warmest admiration. Thus, in commenting on the *logos*: "If any man desire to be first, let him be last of all, and servant of all,' he writes: "It is these simple and profound sayings which seem best to reflect the historical Jesus. How can anyone fairly and honestly argue that such a sublime saying is not an ethical and religious gain over and above the great ethical and religious stores in the Old Testament? And if it could be shown that all the great sayings of Jesus were verbally and textually contained in the Talmud, it might still be justly argued that the lack of familiarity with the New Testament is a great loss to the Jews. For most Jews do not know the Talmud. . . . And in the huge bulk of the Talmud the great passages are overwhelmed and lost to view by the mass of trivial, worthless or second-class matter. Moreover, no collection of Rabbinical sayings that I am acquainted with can rival the sayings of Jesus in impressiveness, profundity and power" (i. 225). Nevertheless Mr. Montefiore remains a firmly convinced Jew; his standpoint is brought out most fully in the following exceedingly interesting passage (ii. 593):

"We know that his (Jesus's) exegesis was necessarily imperfect, that his expectations of a new world and of a speedy and final Judgment were both mistaken. We shall not believe in him the more, in any specifically 'Christian' sense, because he so believed in himself, but, on the other hand, we shall not, even if he did so believe, refuse to recognise the sublime and original elements of his teaching and its value in the history of religion, for Judaism and for ourselves. In one important sense Jesus was the founder of a new era, though not as he meant or anticipated. . . . The future will do justice *both* to the protest of the Jew *and* to the new outlook upon religion and life which Jesus introduced into the world. For, on the one hand, thought and criticism are alike tending to the recognition of the fundamental Jewish doctrine, which Jesus, like every other Jew, believed in and taught. God is One, and no man is God. What the Jews have died in thousands to protest against was not the teaching of Jesus, but the teaching of the Church—the incarnation, the Trinity, the

worship of the Virgin, the doctrine of transubstantiation, and so on. And when liberal Protestant German theologians of to-day, who are practically Unitarians, though they do not call themselves by that name, write about Rabbinism and Judaism with disdain and disapproval, they forget that what they directly deprecate and contemn, they indirectly justify and exalt. They abandon, as not originally or specifically Christian, all those doctrines against which, from the very birth of Christianity, the Jews rebelled and protested. *They have come round to us;* for surely, as regards their conception of God and His relation to the world, the orthodox Christian of every age would dub these Judaizers heretics. If *their* conceptions of Christianity conquer and prevail, great is the victory of Judaism. The name matters nothing: the reality, the doctrine, is all."

But will any one of the existing conceptions ultimately prevail as the generally admitted right view of Christianity? Is it not rather to be hoped that the present war of heart and brain which is being waged so earnestly and honestly by the best intellects in Christendom, is clearing the way for a more truly universal appreciation and a deeper realisation than ever before of the nature of the mystery that reveals itself in man's communion with God the world over? As a help towards this preparation Mr. Montefiore has written a remarkable work, and shown an example of extraordinary liberality and sympathy in dealing with the life of the founder of a religion from whose adherents his race have suffered most cruelly for many centuries. A third volume, which is to contain Additional Notes by Mr. Israel Abrahams, Reader in Talmudic and Rabbinic Literature in the University of Cambridge, is promised, and we look forward to its publication with much interest.

THE GROWTH OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

By C. Delisle Burns, M.A. Cantab. London (Sampson Low), 1909.

AN interesting and well-written book, albeit one insufficiently full and critical in view of the extent and difficulty of the ground which has to be covered. There is no insight to be had for the mere asking. In fact, common-sense solutions of the world-problem are unsatisfactory; 'common-sense,' when pronouncing its verdict on this topic, is nothing, as the author neatly observes, but '*out-of-date metaphysics*' (p. 35). Philosophy is defined as "an intellectual expression of the highest point of view obtainable, with

regard to experience as a whole." It cannot be a mere collection of opinions of the eclectic sort; a syncretism or arranging of bits of speculation drawn from miscellaneous sources. It must be the result of long study and also original thinking. It must be *systematic*, and must found on experience. And "experience means just what comes to us as we live and think and feel." The *rôle* of the philosopher is that assigned to him by the old Platonic saying—that of being "spectator of all time and all existence." The author is clearly no pragmatist, regarding truth as an end having its own inherent worth irrespective of any value which it may possess as a guide for action.

A useful chapter on 'The Renaissance and Descartes' is followed by one dealing with 'Spinoza and Leibnitz.' Next the author discusses the English empirical school and the French Enlightenment. Needless to say that it is probably impracticable for anyone to throw further light on these movements at this date; a small library might be made up of the works already written about Locke, Berkeley and Hume only. Further, the reader must not expect to find in these pages that fulness of exposition and criticism which characterises such histories as Erdmann's for instance. He will be studying an enjoyable sketch which ought to have the effect of prompting him to undertake more elaborate researches at first hand. The best chapter in the book is, perhaps, that on the 'Critical Philosophy' of Kant (pp. 104-138). A lot of information is compressed into the limited space available. But one would have welcomed a more critical attitude on Mr. Delisle Burns's part. I must record my impression that the historical significance of Kant is not presented with that force of contrast which is to be desired. The respects in which some critics consider Kant's system to constitute an advance on Hume are not adequately discussed. Kant's space and time theories—now more or less discredited—require fuller notice. The defects of the hypothesis of Categories (which are discarded by so many modern metaphysicians, idealistic and other) are overlooked. I must urge, further, that the author gives us no sufficiently full exposition of the process of transition (through Fichte, Schelling, etc.) to Hegel. Thus—to mention one phase only of that transition—there is found a great alteration of the original Kantian attitude towards Nature at the close of the development to Hegel. The stages of this transformation do not emerge with sufficient adequacy in the exposition. Again, the labours of Schelling (from whom Hegel drew so much of vital interest) might have been appreciated more fully than is

the case in Mr. Delisle Burns's book. In fine I must repeat that the novice will do well to regard this sketch of the Kantian and post-Kantian development as a preparation for more adequate researches which he ought to undertake in other quarters.

Herbart and Schopenhauer, Comte, Mill, Spencer, Lotze, and von Hartmann are dealt with very briefly. It would have been well had the author found space to consider how far those forms of Idealism which disallow an 'eternal divine consciousness' militate against the more conservative metaphysics which, in England at any rate, is usually associated with the names of Hegel and the Hegelian Right. It is impracticable to discuss Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, for instance, on the basis of a supposition that historical philosophy is simply 'growing' in such minds. A sheer invalidation of much of prior thinking is effected if we are to accept the main tenor of Schopenhauer's work as sound.

The author does not indicate the main results of the 'growth' of modern philosophy, but believes, on no clearly assigned evidence, that "we have at last reached the possibility of a Western philosophy such as will explain the whole of experience as we know it" (p. 244). He believes this to be the case, but observes withal that there are 'oppositions' even among the "generally acknowledged schools of philosophy." I opine that some of us find these 'oppositions' so acute as to render the author's optimism in respect of the forthcoming cosmopolitan philosophy a trifle sanguine. Mr. Burns refers to 'essential differences' which divide the philosophic world. "They are those of the Idealists and of the Empiricists." But surely this contrast of Idealists and Empiricists is overemphasised. *There are Idealists who are also Empiricists.* But perhaps the differences to which Mr. Burns means to refer are those which part Idealists who believe in a *rational* ground of reality from those other Idealists who limit 'rationality' to the mental processes of finite conscious beings such as arise in time. Despite his hope, the author has to note that "the present state of philosophic opinion seems to be unsettled" but regards the disagreement as healthy. "Disagreement is natural on so complex a problem as the nature of experience." Perhaps; but how about the cosmopolitan coming philosophy? I will hazard the suggestion that the next great rethinking of the problem of metaphysics will flow not from Hegelism or neo-Hegelian thought of the conservative type dear to Oxford, but from that more radical idealism which owes so much to the impulse given by Schopenhauer. The thinking of reality as the show of a 'divine principle'

is fated, perhaps, to give place to the deeper view. The 'divine,' maybe, is the end-product, rather than the source, of the real.

Mr. Burns's work forms, as I have suggested, a useful handbook rather than an adequate history. Its articulation of the philosophical movement is not complete enough for the advanced student; and at the end of my reading of it I am not at all clear as to what the author supposes philosophy to have 'grown' to. He chronicles an alleged 'growth,' but he does not show us what the half-grown figure of divine philosophy is actually like. We read something of Hegel, of Herbart, of Schopenhauer, of von Hartmann and others, but we seem to be regarding the eddies too closely to be sure as to the direction of the main stream. We even run some risk of exploring backwaters instead of keeping to the current of the said stream. Still the book has undoubted merits and may well serve, for many readers, as an introduction to more exacting and detailed research.

E. D. F.

THE OLD EGYPTIAN FAITH.

By Édouard Naville. Translated by Colin Campbell, M.A., D.D. London (Williams & Norgate), 1909.

THIS is an excellent and very complete summary of the religious beliefs of the ancient Egyptian peoples viewed from the standpoint of modern Egyptology; so full in fact that the translator's semi-apology for details omitted seems hardly necessary from the Egyptological point of view. To the mystic student, however, it is not so much the details omitted that are noticeable, as those which are admitted or which jump to the imagination from the evidence supplied by the general contradictoriness of both the subject treated of and the lectures which treat thereof. For the book is in its origin a short series of lectures, and, like M. Naville's conception of the old Egyptian faith, it contains much that is contradictory in its own statements; it is these very contradictions, however, which will, for the mystic student, to quote the language of the translator's note, "give him food for thought." Among the things omitted is any direct reference to what tradition has named the 'Mysteries of Egypt,' and this the student would expect, for in what we may call the published documents of Ancient Egypt, whether on stone or papyrus, there is but little, if anything, that can be taken as authoritative and conclusive evidence of the existence of these mysteries, and so to academic

Egyptology they can be only a sort of semi-myth founded on something that was of no great importance. Nevertheless, there are points in this little book which are of very great interest to anyone who may be seeking for evidence of these mysteries and their import; this evidence, to my thinking, is to be found in the otherwise great difficulty of reconciling the author's various statements and admissions. Take, for instance, the following. "There is, I repeat, no system at all, no strict logic at the root of this philosophy"; while a few pages later on we read: "The body or totality of the gods of Heliopolis constituted an Ennead or Company of Nine (Paut). Why the number nine? We must see here a special idea as to the nature and influence of numbers." Does not this seem to admit some system, some logic somewhere, "at the root of this philosophy"? And again, as of interest for those who have studied and delighted in the systems of the Gnosis, we find: "Gnosticism, which plays so great a part in Christian Egypt, is certainly a product of the old religious conceptions." But how did Gnosticism develop out of the old religious conceptions if there were no secret body of doctrine behind the myths and temple-ceremonial? M. Naville, however, goes on to make it still more difficult to reconcile the existence of pure spiritual conceptions apart from some such theory. To return to our contradictions; in speaking of the enormous increase in the outward expression of religious forms, ceremonies and buildings in the time of the Ptolemies, he says: "A reason for this notable change has been alleged, namely, the fact that the knowledge of everything relating to religion was being gradually lost, and therefore it became necessary to fix in stone what was still known, for the instruction of future generations. I should rather believe that the change was due to a modification in the religion itself. *It had lost its spiritual character and was now nothing but a thing of forms and ceremonies.*" The italics are mine, for, but three pages further on, we find: "The latest books which reflect the beliefs of old Egypt are those attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, and hence called the Hermetic Books," portions of which at any rate M. Naville admits, "appear to have been written by an adept in the old religion—one of those men who, to the very last, tried to maintain the beliefs and the ceremonies of the old priests, in certain remote spots like the Island of Philæ, where the Egyptian cult survived to the days of the Emperor Theodosius (379-395 A.D.)."

The question that seems almost to ask itself after reading all these contradictory statements is: Did the spiritual imaginings of

the Hermetists come from some part or portion of the old religious faith and practice which was not cut upon the monuments, which has not been handed on to us in any hieratic documents, something which stood to that popular faith and practice in somewhat the same way as the king to the people? For the great distinctions, both in life and in death, which the author has insisted on as between king and people appeal to the mystic as the setting forth of a great traditional symbol of adeptship; whence the king would stand as the perpetual sign of the initiate, and so for the existence of the mysteries, while the people would represent the outer and uninitiated world who knew not the arcana. Why otherwise should the people look forward only to a hereafter that was but an ideal of earthly and carnal life, while the king was to re-enter into the life of the gods? Again, M. Naville's translation of and explanation for the words PER ᶜM HRU strikes one as being another contradiction of the same nature. His translation is 'Coming out *from* the day,' a sentence of which the correlated idea can only be 'Going out into the night'; yet a little further study reveals the admission that this strange 'night' may best be described as 'eternal noonday.' Now seeing that ᶜM means, according to Erman (p. 127): (1) of place, existent *in, into* something, *out of* something; (2) of time, *in* the year, *on* the day, etc.; may not these words have signified for the people 'Coming out from the day,' and for the initiate 'Coming out into the day,' or, as M. Naville says, as if in contradiction to his own translation: "I love to think, however, . . . that the vast majority of the people were more ready to repeat these other words, full of hope, addressed to Ra, the great god: 'I come to thee, I follow with thee to behold thy disk every day. . . . My members are renewed at the splendour of thy beauties . . . I am come to the land of the ages, I rejoin the land of eternity.'" Is this the author's idea of going out into the night? The book is full of interesting points, and to me one of the most interesting is that Egyptologists are at last recognising that the geography of the mystical Egypt of the religious texts is quite a different affair from that of the actual country, in spite of the place-names being the same; and it is very gratifying to find Prof. Naville giving meanings to the mystical cities of mystical Egypt which are entirely consistent and, at least in one case, identical with ofttimes published ideas of my own.

M. W. B.

THE QUEST OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS.

A Critical Study of its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede. By Albert Schweitzer. Translated by W. Montgomery, B.A., B.D. With a Preface by F. C. Barkitt, M.A., D.D. London (Black), 1910.

THE search for the Jesus of History, as distinguished from the Christ either of Dogma or of Reality, is the most difficult quest of all the many puzzling problems of the origins of Christianity. Indeed it is a commonplace to say that none but specialists, or close followers of the work of specialists, can appreciate even the nature of the obstacles that have to be surmounted. Most lay-folk are either gloriously ignorant on the subject, or are content to skirt the outermost fringe of it. Not only so, but even the majority of specialists themselves are not sufficiently acquainted with the complete series of what we may call the games that have been played, or of the problems which have been practically worked out, on the critical chess-board. For long a thorough-going, unapologetic and rigidly impartial survey of the history and development of critical research on this subject has been a crying need. But at last we have it well-nigh achieved in the recent admirable work of Dr. Albert Schweitzer, Privatdozent in N.T. studies in the University of Strassburg, which now lies before us in competent English translation. In it Schweitzer reviews with judicial impartiality, deep insight, and every appearance of competent mastery of detail, the general field from the earliest posthumous work of Reimarus (published by Lessing in 1778), who was the first to attempt to form a historical conception of the life of Jesus, and is therefore as it were the 'Astruc' of scientific Gospel study, down to Wrede's *Messianic Secret in the Gospels* (1901). It is not too much to say that Schweitzer, in his *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, has written a quite invaluable work; in it he traces the origins and development of all the main points of view which have been taken up in the hope of focussing correctly the presumed historical facts and so clearly defining the problem; he further shows how these different positions, though each contributing something, have one after the other proved quite unsatisfactory, and that, too, especially by the inevitable working out of the various hypotheses to their logical conclusions. Finally Schweitzer claims to prove that the point of view which does least violence

to the basic statements of the confused and confusing narratives, is the theory which developes from a firm conviction that the 'life' in any case must be interpreted from the standpoint of the times and the immediate religious environment of Jesus, and not from the preconceptions and theological necessities of the XVIIIth, XIXth or XXth centuries; this environment was saturated through and through with Jewish eschatological ideas. The natural and unavoidable supposition is that Jesus must have shared in these eschatological expectations. This, then, is, according to Schweitzer, who reached the same conclusion as Wrede on quite independent lines, the clearest historical light in which to view the life of Jesus.

In plain words, this means that the main historical element in the so-called 'life,' more correctly the months of the preaching of Jesus, which was a continuation and development of the preaching of the Baptist, is the fact that Jesus believed absolutely that at any moment Jahweh would miraculously interfere in the world-process; that the Kingdom of Jahweh was at hand, and that, too, in the sense of a physical undoing of the non-repentant and the establishing of the elect or repentant in that Kingdom on a glorified earth, as it were a New Jerusalem let down out of heaven. In very plain words again, this means that Jesus was a Jewish religious enthusiast, who was entirely deceived in this his main expectation; that further the whole band of earliest disciples lived in the intense strain of hourly expectation of this stupendous event; that there was no thought of any thing but this supreme expectation; that, therefore, there was no intention of founding a religion to serve the world for its future needs, for the world as we know it was at once to pass away; there was no thought of marriage, no provision for social reform, no founding of a church, none of those things which the dogmatic developments and theological necessities of later centuries have sought to read back into the earliest accounts; in the earliest days all preoccupation with worldly relations was swept on one side by the overwhelming conviction of the instant coming of the final event.

Such is the latest eschatological view which is being discussed on all sides with much heart-burning; it is the view that apparently does least violence to the earliest accounts if they are to be regarded as really historical. Some of the more immediate deductions that follow from this view are as we have roughly sketched above, and a stream of similar results follow hot-footed on them. It is true that after the most downright and unapologetic chronicling of the marches and counter-marches of the hypotheses of

criticism, and the setting forth of an admirable sketch-map of the present position of the contending forces in this last eschatological battle, Schweitzer brings forward an apologetic theory of his own, as it were in some way to save the theological position, by trying to show that Jesus by consciously and deliberately forcing on his own death, as he supposes, actually precipitated the naïve Jewish eschatological view into history in a new and spiritual fashion, and thus for all time abolished it. This is clearly a subtlety of apologetics, on another plane entirely from the rest of Schweitzer's work.

If, however, we set on one side this special theory as an appendix to his labours, Schweitzer in the main body of his work makes an invaluable contribution to the 'Life of Jesus' literature. There will be few who read it with close attention and an intelligent grasp of the main moments in the dramatic evolution of the quest of the historical Jesus, who will not rise from the study with a deepened consciousness of the enormous importance and fascinating interest of the chiefest of all objective subjects of research for Christian scholars. It would seem almost as if the last game were being played out on the critical chess-board. If, however, it is found to be a critical necessity that eschatology is to be the deciding factor in the treatment of the historical Jesus, then many will doubtless feel compelled to abandon the historicity of the accounts altogether, and to look to some other element as the more probable source of what they have learned to prize so highly; the mystic secret may thus yet come to its own.

ORPHEUS.

A General History of Religions. From the French of Salomon Reinach. London (Heinemann), New York (Putnam), 1909.

WE venture to think that the main title of Salomon Reinach's recent work, now rendered into English by Miss Florence Simmonds and revised by the author, is very misleading, for there is at the outside not more than a page of the book devoted to Orpheus. The reason for the title is explained in the Preface by the author as follows: Modern criticism "recognises that Orphism has traits in common not only with Judaism and Christianity, but with other more remote creeds such as Buddhism, and even with the very primitive beliefs of existing savages. If on examination we find something of Orphism in every religion, it is because Orphism made use of elements common to them all, drawn from the depths

of human nature, and nourished by its most cherished illusions." No better patron, therefore, than Orpheus, M. Reinach thinks, could be invoked for his book; that may be true, but without the author's explanation the title is very misleading. Again, in a general history of religions, is it not out of all proportion to have given 169 pages only to the rest of the typical world-faiths, 43 to Judaism and the remaining 197 to Christianity? This lack of proportion, however, is not due to the author's treating the subject from a religious point of view; on the contrary, as he tells us in his Preface, he is deeply conscious of the moral responsibility he assumes "in giving for the first time a picture of religions in general considered as natural phenomena and nothing more," and he anticipates very severe criticism from certain quarters. M. Reinach is a great admirer of Voltaire, and though, as he tells us, he does not share Voltaire's ideas of religion, he quotes freely from him on a number of points in which he finds himself in agreement with that keen intellect. The main standpoint of the author is that "the history of humanity is that of a progressive secularisation which is by no means complete"; the hope of the future consists in perfecting this process; this view is symptomatic of the present dominant secular spirit in France. It is 'science' *v.* 'religion,' apparently, instead of their reconciliation, as a prelude to the establishment of the kingdom of heaven on earth. M. Reinach also thinks that "all that is deep and essential in religion comes from animism, of which the worship of the dead is a consequence, and from totemism, which preceded anthropomorphic religions and imbued them with its elements" (p. 20); but animism is being fast done away with; it "yields the ground to physics, chemistry, and astronomy, and takes refuge, on the confines of science, in spiritualism" (p. 23). The soul of things must go apparently; as to mysticism, "a supposed communion with God in ecstasy," it is "a chronic malady of the human heart" (p. 390). These quotations, to which many others of a similar nature could be added, sufficiently indicate the author's standpoint; his work is not a general history of religion written from within, but from outside, and that, too, frequently from a point of view which is out of sympathy with most of that which goes to make up religion. The general history of any single one of the great religions is a task that has never yet been satisfactorily performed; even in the case of Christianity, where so many attempts have been made, the general result cannot be said to have solved more problems than it has raised. It is, therefore, not to be expected that in the far vaster field of general religion a survey by a

single individual can be given that should in any way satisfy the believers in the various religions which he attempts to pass in review. Nevertheless it is good to make beginnings, and M. Reinach is among the first to undertake the pioneer work in so vast a task. There is of course much to be learned from what the author has to say on those aspects of primitive beliefs of which he has made a special study, and also on a number of critical points in which he gives evidence of wide reading; there is, however, little to be gleaned from M. Reinach of the inner nature of what, when all is said, remains the most potent power in humanity. But surely the loftiest, deepest, and innermost elements of religion should be as specially and intimately studied as the outer appearances, the mistakes, the follies, the barbarities, of the professors of religion the world over, if we are to have a really adequate history. Though, then, we must confess we are disappointed with the book as a whole, there is always something to be learned by the discriminating reader, and we are glad to praise the excellent, though incomplete, bibliographies appended to every chapter; they are invaluable to the student. The book is well and incisively written, and the translation is good.

A Vision of Love Revealed in Sleep.

By Simeon Soloman. 'The Bibelot,' 1909. Vol. xv., Nos. 1 and 2. Portland, Maine, U.S.A. (Mosher).

THE brilliant young men of the sixties who rallied round Rossetti strove, while in the first stages of discipleship, to imitate their leader in all things. That is why, perhaps, we find many of them concerned with the two arts of painting and letters. Morris, of course, in addition to his many activities, established a wide fame for himself as a poet, but one hears also of an early tale by Burne-Jones together with a paper on 'The Newcomes' published in *The Oxford and Cambridge Magazine*. Woolner, the sculptor, an original member of the P.R.B., is the author of *My Beautiful Lady* and of *Silenus*; even a painter so independent as Ford Maddox Brown made sonnets for certain of his pictures; and among the lesser lights there is James Smetham, who finally abandoned painting for the literary life. Therefore it was only in the natural course of events that Simeon Soloman, one of the most gifted of the group, should attempt to express himself by means of written words.

His one contribution to literature, *A Vision of Love Revealed in Sleep*, has been a rarity and a subject of curiosity for so many years that Mr. Mosher's reprint should be very welcome. Dated Rome, 1869, it was originally printed, accompanied by a frontispiece by the author, in 1871, and was sold by Rossetti's publisher, Mr. F. S. Ellis.

Obviously founded upon the master's early story, *Hand and Soul*, this 'vision' reflects in a most remarkable manner both the strength and weakness of its author's pictorial achievements, the weakness however predominating, be it confessed. In it one finds the same personal note, the richness of imagery, the delicate sense of beauty, together with the languor and diffuseness of Soloman's treatment of form. The literary craftsmanship is excellent throughout, each individual phrase is balanced and musical, and there are passages of rare charm and distinction, but the work as a whole lacks structure and proportion. Whereas Rossetti's story, apart from its emotional significance, is a beautiful piece of mechanism, rising inevitably to the climax that brings about its logical ending, this later, less vigorous, experiment flows at an even pace from beginning to close. In fact it would be possible to transpose whole pages with little loss to their fundamental purpose. The reader is wearied by vision after vision; symbolic figures pass as in an elaborate masque, wherein it is necessary to look closely in order to distinguish, from their respective emblems, which is death, which charity, which love, which memory.

Were the world not solid beneath our touch, we would not be able to distinguish between earth and water, water and vapour, and this holds good where art is concerned and in a degree even more marked. The more disembodied the emotion, the greater the demand made upon the artist; the workmanship has need to be hard and solid before we can enter into the ecstasy of the dreamer. But when all is said, the present work is full of beauty, containing as it does much which none other could have given us. The author clearly distinguishes between poetry and painting, as in this description: "Memory bore upon her head and breast a light rain of faded autumn leaves and blossoms, and upon her raiment small flecks of foam had already dried,"—which contains an effect that painting could not convey. On almost every page are to be found descriptive passages of much subtlety; for instance, "a delight such as one feels in looking upon the golden circles which play within the depths of a sun-lighted pool," and "a vest-

ment in colour like the heart of an opal," and again "a stole tinted like a flame seen through water," and these are but a few among many like passages. Those who care about Soloman's drawings and those who can appreciate fine craftsmanship in literature would do well to read these two small paper-covered volumes.

C. F.

EARLY CHURCH HISTORY TO A.D. 313.

By Henry Melville Gwatkin, Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Cambridge. London (Macmillan), 1909, 2 vols.

"IMPARTIALITY," Professor Gwatkin tells us, "does not consist in a refusal to form opinions, or in a futile concealment of them under a lofty affectation of treating history scientifically, but in forming them by a single-hearted effort to realise the lives of men and think their thoughts over again, and understand their whole environment." But how difficult it is to have a truly all-round sympathy, and how impossible to understand the 'whole environment' when the records are so faulty. Professor Gwatkin, it must be confessed, has the courage of his opinions, which are vigorously expressed on a host of difficult and obscure points in the singularly imperfect records of the Church in the most important and hotly debated period of its history. It is quite true that the historian's task is far loftier than that of the dry-as-dust annalist, but true impartiality can hardly be expected when the most vital consequences flow from what in last analysis must frequently be the presuppositions of the historian. In a work that will doubtless be used as a text-book for theological students, the difficulties with which they are bound to be confronted when they come to go more deeply into the subject for themselves, might with advantage have received more ample treatment. On the other hand, the method followed will make the book far more attractive to the general reader, for it aims throughout at being a narrative rather than a store-house of facts and of critical views. Professor Gwatkin sets a higher historical value on the works of the Church Fathers than is usually the case, and accepts as authentic the early martyrologies even in some of their most incredible elements. New Testament criticism disturbs him but little, and he finds no difficulty in accepting both the Fourth Gospel and the Revelations as being the authentic works of John the Disciple. As to the introduction of comparative religion into New Testament study, he will have nothing of it; it is a "fundamental error" to apply it to "revela-

tion." It will thus be seen that the latest Church History in this country will be held by traditionalists and conservatives to be quite 'sound' on these points, and a 'safe' guide for the many. For ourselves we have taken greater pleasure in the second volume, where Professor Gwatkin treats of Irenæus and Tertullian, of Clement of Alexandria and Origen; there is also a short but interesting chapter on Montanism, and an inadequate sketch of Gnosticism, which does not carry us further than the studies of Hort, Salmon and Lipsius in Smith and Wace's *Dictionary*, published some twenty-five years ago.

MESMERISM AND CHRISTIAN SCIENCE.

A Short History of Mental Healing. By Frank Podmore. London (Methuen), 1909.

OF the sixteen chapters, in this volume of 306 pages, eight are devoted to the history and development of mesmerism through the stages of hypnotism and suggestion, while two only are given to Christian Science; separate chapters deal with clairvoyance, spiritualism in France and in Germany, the coming of the prophets (mostly concerning Andrew Jackson Davis and Thomas Lake Harris), and the use of mental healing. Mr. Podmore's point of view is that all the healing and much else is to be explained entirely by suggestion. As to 'clairvoyance at close quarters,' this, "when not due to fraud, would seem to indicate extreme acuteness of [physical] vision, the result sometimes of training, sometimes apparently of hyperæsthesia in trance"; while concerning what is called elsewhere 'travelling clairvoyance,' he will have it that "the manifestations of community of sensation and of clairvoyance at a distance, so far as they appear to be genuine, furnish some support to the hypothesis of thought-transference." It is something for a man of Mr. Podmore's temperament to be forced to admit in any way that there is anything at all in psychical phenomena which is not entirely due to fraud and hallucination; it is, however, somewhat difficult to see how the present critic of the unscientific attitude of the members of the French commissions who, a century ago, rejected the whole phenomena of mesmerism root and branch, can be so very clearly distinguished in spirit from the objects of his present animadversion. 'Suggestion' has now become a 'Mesopotamian' word, and so has 'thought-transference'; they are already believed by many to explain things; they are, however, labels, not explanations. Does mind act *immediately* on gross

matter? If not, is a more subtle substance, or even as a 'fluid,' an intermediary, such a hopelessly unscientific hypothesis? What again is mind and what is will? Mr. Podmore's summing up of clairvoyance seems to us to be a simple confusion of terms; sensation is not thought; even thought-*forms* are not thought. Is the hypothesis of a subtler sensorium than that of the gross physical sense-centres, again, such a wildly unscientific hypothesis? It seems to us that such problems have to be studied as much from the inside as from the outside. Mr. Podmore looks upon them entirely from the outside; and this can hardly be considered a really scientific standpoint. Finally as to the healing; no matter how we may deprecate the wild theories and apparently irrational beliefs connected with no small part of it, we should surely endeavour our best to give a fuller, more vital, more spiritual, and more reasonable explanation, rather than seek by every means to depreciate, and to reduce everything to the depressing level of gross and grey normality. Yet Mr. Podmore quotes with approval the ironical protest of one of Mesmer's patients against this pseudo-scientific attitude, apparently without the slightest conception of how admirably it applies to his own ungraciousness. The heart of the thing is in this protest, and we cannot do better, in conclusion, than turn it from French into English.

"If it is to illusion that I owe the health which I believe I now enjoy, I humbly beg the men of science, who see so clearly, not to destroy it; let them give light to the universe, but let them leave me my error, and permit my simplicity, my weakness and my ignorance to make use of an agent *that no one can see and that does not exist, but which heals me.*"

THE RING OF POPE XYSTUS.

Together with the Prologue of Rufinus. Now first rendered into English with an historical and critical Commentary. By F. C. Conybeare, M.A. London (Williams & Norgate), 1910.

THIS collection of upwards of 600 ethical aphorisms was widely used as a manual in the early Christian churches. The main interest is that though so extensively circulated for centuries in Christian circles there is nothing characteristically Christian about them; indeed they are a collection mainly of Pythagorean and Stoic maxims with a very slight intermixture of quite general Gospel sayings. Mr. Conybeare in his excellent commentary, after review-

ing the evidence and the main features of the controversy, is inclined to accept the traditional view that they were collected in their present form by Pope Xystus (or Sixtus) I. (117-126, or 119-128 A.D.). The maxims are mostly excellent, and Mr. Conybeare is to be thanked for making them accessible in English for the first time, in a clear and graceful version; but the point that is of most importance, is that so far from the ethics of the best Pagan philosophy being thought in the first centuries inferior to Christian morals, we find the early Christians, consciously or unconsciously, taking over bodily collections of *gnomes* from the Pagan schools, just as we find that Clement of Alexandria, when desiring to set forth the whole duty of a Christian, in his *Pædagogus*, could manage no better than for the most part to transcribe the treatise of the Stoic Musonius Rufus, the master of Epictetus.

The little volume is well printed and produced with taste, and we heartily recommend it to the attention of our readers.

MAD SHEPHERDS.

And other Human Studies. By L. P. Jacks. With Frontispiece by L. Leslie Brooke. London (Williams & Norgate), 1910.

IN these gracefully written and life-like sketches the editor of *The Hibbert Journal* appears as a practised teller of tales. In the majority of the thirteen pieces there is a strong undercurrent of the psychic and mystic, but it is curbed with such sensible restraint and flows so naturally that the infelicities and above all the vulgarities with which we are to-day inundated on all sides, are avoided. Those who would spend an hour or two with Shepherd Snarley Bob, once 'medium' and 'Methody' but now hitched on to the souls of the stars, with Shepherd Toller, who in his madness reverted to the neolithic stage, with Mrs. Abel, once singer now wise wife of a sensible country parson, and with Chandrapāl, the Indian sage who had seen many cities and many men, and all of whom felt the soul of things, should hasten to procure Mr. Jacks' sketches of Deadborough and its folk; they will find the hour or two pass not only pleasantly but also in learning some things very good to know.

CORRESPONDENCE.

ON THE TERMS 'APPEARANCE' AND 'REALITY.'

TOUCHING 'B. K's' able review of my book, the following explanation may be timely. I do not, as he suggests, hold that appearances "constitute all there is of reality." By 'appearances' I mean *only such aspects of reality as well up in conscious experience.* And the universe (as is implied by the hypothesis of a subconscious Ground) is very far from being exhausted in the conscious experiences of any, or all, of the finite individuals who have arisen within it.

'Reality,' then, is wider than 'appearances'; the latter = only phases of sentient experience. Though an idealist, I cannot say, with Mr. F. H. Bradley, "sentient experience is reality." I do not believe in a static Absolute whose *experience* (complete, perfect, and above time) is the universe. The *Ground*, as I conceive it, is *not above time.* And only *in part* has it passed into sentient experience. Therefore I write expressly (p. 252) that "sentient experience includes that *variable quantity* of the real which is called appearance."

'Reality,' then, covers all phases of that changeful psychical Life, conscious, semi-conscious, or subconscious, which constitutes the universe. Hence one can speak indifferently of Metaphysics as dealing with the problem of reality or the universe. The advantage of the term 'reality' is that it suggests vaguely, what is correct, *viz.*, that the problem concerns a *psychical* whole. There exists nothing which is not psychical in character.

But 'reality' has *degrees.* The psychical Life of the Ground lies below that level of living which we call 'conscious.' *I* am more real than the Ground, seeing that I shine in my own light, whereas the Ground is subconscious or 'dark.' Consciousness is just intense life. The same activity which obtains in the Ground reappears in me as a new, more vivid and improved form of being.

When I speak of 'appearances' *within* conscious life as being 'real,' I mean (as I have explained elsewhere), that these said appearances *exist as they are felt and are felt as they exist.* There are idealists, Western and Eastern, who traverse this contention. I have discussed Mr. Bradley's view at length in my book. There is no Māyā.

Grindelwald. E. D. FAWCETT.

NOTES.

THE ATTITUDE OF LIBERAL JUDAISM TO THE FOUNDER OF CHRISTIANITY.

IN connection with our review of Mr. C. G. Montefiore's remarkable study of the synoptic gospels, and high appreciation of the teachings of Jeschu ha-Notzri or Jeshua ben Joseph, as Jesus is called among the Jews, we would quote a paragraph or two from a striking article, 'The Attitude of the Jews towards Jesus', in *The North American Review* for January, by Dr. Isidore Singer, of New York, the learned Editor of *The Jewish Encyclopædia*. After briefly describing the old state of affairs when the name of Jesus could not be favourably mentioned in the synagogue, Dr. Singer continues:

"To-day, however, it is not strange in many synagogues, especially in this country, to hear sermons preached eulogising this same Jesus; and nobody, except a few Pharisaic followers of the neo-Romantic school of Judaism, thinks in earnest of protesting against claiming—with some dogmatic reservations, of course—Jeshua ben Joseph as one of the noblest twigs of the old branch of Judah."

That this is the view of what is best in Liberal Judaism is made clear by reference to the result of a remarkable symposium, held at the suggestion of Dr. I. K. Funk, in 1899, in which 12 Jewish theologians, 7 students of religion, historians and philosophers, and 7 prominent laymen took part. The general outcome was summed up in the authoritative words of the president, Dr. K. Kohler, the leading Jewish theologian of America, that modern Judaism gladly acknowledges the moral greatness of Jesus and the prophetical insight of the Nazarene, "acclaiming Jesus as one of its greatest sons." Liberal Judaism, however, must remain loyal to the Commandment of the Covenant, and further "it denies that one single man, or one Church, however broad, holds the key to many-sided truth. It," accordingly, "waits for the time when all life's deepest mysteries will have been spelled, and to the ideals of sage and saint that of the seeker of all that is good, beautiful and true will have been

joined; when Jew and Gentile, Synagogue and Church will merge into the Church universal, into the great City of humanity, whose name is 'God is there.'"

PRÆPARATIO EVANGELICA.

IN support of the suggestion put forward, in the review of the *Odes of Solomon*, in our last issue (p. 567), namely that the spiritual 'flood' is to be referred to Jewish propaganda rather than to Christianity, we may quote, from the same article, the following paragraph:

"As early as the second century, B.C., according to the best Greek and Roman authorities, there was no island, no town in the vast Roman Empire, without its Jewish or Judeo-heathen colony, thus preparing the soil for Judaism's child, Christianity. Later on, Hillel and his school became the centre of a powerful missionary activity, and Gamaliel, the teacher of the Apostle Paul, belonged to this school. And of this great Gamaliel's son, Simon Gamaliel, who was murdered by the Jewish zealots in the beginning of the Roman-Jewish war, the following principle has been handed down by tradition: 'If a heathen presents himself to enter Israel's tents, stretch out your hands to lead him under the wings of the Godhead.' Even to-day, pious Jews all over the world, in reciting the thirteenth of the eighteen Benedictions (Shemone Esre), the central piece of the Jewish daily prayer-book, which dates back, in some of its parts, to the first century, B.C., pray for the welfare of the proselyte."

This propaganda carried in its train a host of adherents of religious *thiasi* of all sorts, Messianic, Gnostic, Mystical, Essene, and is therefore not to be thought of as the activity of the orthodox synagogue only. It was this mixed propaganda that prepared the way for Paul in the subsequent *Ausbreitung* of Christianity.

DANCING AS A PROFANE AND SACRED ART.

THE origin and significance of the art of dancing as the rhythmic expression of emotion, and its connection with primitive and highly developed forms of cult and religious ritual, are a subject of profound interest which has lately been attracting a large amount of superficial attention, owing to the daring 'innovations' of an ever increasing number of fair dancers on the public stage.

But in all this there is nothing really new; it is but a return to nature. In connection with this subject we would refer our readers to a very suggestive article by Mlle. Marcelle Azra Hincks, in a recent number of *La Revue Archéologique* (IVe Série, tom. xiv., Nov.-Déc., 1909), on 'Representations of Dancing on Early Greek Vases.' It is an attempt at a scientific examination into origins, by the comparative method, the main idea being that certain gestures and movements or dance-forms, which constantly occur as designs on early Greek vases, are used in the dances of other peoples. The enquiry is prefaced by a very necessary word of precaution: "It must be remembered that in studying the dance movements from the vases we are looking at a highly conventionalised art (for the dance in Greece undoubtedly became crystallised very soon into fixed forms and types) through the medium of another conventional art, *i.e.* vase-painting. The phenomenon differs in degree from that which takes place in the other representations of the plastic and figurative arts, for (*a*) the dance is already a formula, and (*b*) the picture is a further formula, interpreting the first." Mlle. Hincks goes on to tell us that: "Dancing is the primæval attempt to give æsthetic expression to the emotions, *i.e.* to express them rhythmically and through a definite form, and marks the first stage in the genesis of æsthetic sentiments, 'semi-physiological, semi-æsthetic play becoming art' (Ribot, *Psychol. of Emotions*, ch. x.). The chief characteristics of primitive dancing are expression and the constant use of gesture and rhythm; and the emotions most frequently expressed in the primitive dance are love and war." So, too, when we come to Hellas, "we learn from history and mythology that an important division of Greek *orchēsis* was that connected with love and the reproductive forces of nature in general. The cult of Dionysos particularly was connected with erotic emotions, and the Dionysiac dances were bound to reflect them, from their lowest manifestation to the highest degree of mysticism and spirituality."

The 'lesser mysteries' passed into the 'greater'; the former were those of generation, of physical birth and death, the latter of regeneration or spiritual birth, the 'sacred dances' of the latter are of profound significance, and deserving of careful investigation.

We note that Mlle. Hincks has just brought out a study on *The Japanese Dance* (Heinemann, 2*s*.).

TO-MORROW SHALL BE MY DANCING DAY.

I AM engaged on a quest for traces of sacred or liturgical dancing in the Early Church, in illustration of a delightfully quaint and, as far as my present knowledge goes, quite unique Christmas carol. It was included by William Sandys in his collection of *Christmas Carols, Ancient and Modern* (London, Richard Berkley, 1833), pp. 110-112. Sandys gives no account of it, beyond stating that it was still sung in the West of England, presumably more precisely in the West of Cornwall, where apparently he took it down from the lips of the peasants themselves. I am unable to trace its immediate ancestry or mediæval prototype and should be deeply obliged if any reader of THE QUEST would kindly supply me with some information; the carol is evidently a folk-echo of a mystery-hymn. As I hope to publish my study in the October number, I should be glad to receive the information as soon as possible. The carol runs as follows.—G. R. S. M.

1. To-morrow shall be my dancing day;
   I would my true love did so chance
   To see the legend of my play,
   To call my true love to my dance.

Sing, oh! my love, oh! my love, my love, my love,
This have I done for my true love.

2. Then was I born of a Virgin pure,
   Of her I took fleshly substance;
   Then was I knit to man's nature,
   To call my true love to my dance.

Sing, oh! etc.

3. In a manger laid and wrapp'd I was,
   So very poor, this was my chance,
   Betwixt an ox and a silly poor ass,
   To call my true love to my dance.

Sing, oh! etc.

4. Then afterwards baptized I was,
   The Holy Ghost on me did glance,
   My Father's voice heard from above,
   To call my true love to the dance.

Sing, oh! etc.

5. Into the desert I was led,
   Where I fasted without substance ;
The Devil bade me make stones my bread,
   To have me break my true love's dance.

Sing, oh ! etc.

6. The Jews on me they made great suit,
   And with me made great variance,
Because they lov'd darkness rather than light,
   To call my true love to the dance.

Sing, oh ! etc.

7. For thirty pence Judas me sold,
   His covetousness for to advance ;
Mark when [? whom] I kiss, the same do hold,
   The same is he shall lead the dance.

Sing, oh ! etc.

8. Before Pilate the Jews me brought,
   When Barabbas had deliverance ;
They scourg'd me and set me at nought,
   Judged me to die to lead the dance.

Sing, oh ! etc.

9. Then on the cross hanged I was,
   Where a spear to my heart did glance ;
There issued forth both water and blood,
   To call my true love to the dance.

Sing, oh ! etc.

10. Then down to Hell I took my way
   For my true love's deliverance,
And rose again on the third day
   Up to my true love and the dance.

Sing, oh ! etc.

11. Then up to Heaven I did ascend,
   Where now I dwell in sure substance
On the right hand of God, that man
   May come unto the general dance.

Sing, oh ! etc.

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N.B. TO STUDENTS OF BOEHME.

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